


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THE

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PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

EDITED BY

J. E. CREIGHTON

OF THE SAGE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

WITH THE COÖPERATION OF

JAMES SETH

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH

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
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

ON THE COMPETENCE OF THOUGHT IN THE SPHERE OF THE HIGHER LIFE.

THE quarrel of the philosopher and the artist is as old as Plato, but it has rather changed its ground since then. It was then a frank dispute over what the artist liked doing and what the philosopher thought was good for his audience. Now it has become a dispute as to whether the philosopher can ever sufficiently understand art to be able even to take its side. And it is not only art that he is supposed not to be able to understand, but all the higher emotional life.

The defect is felt to lie in the instrument he uses. Philosophy is a reasoned or thinking view of the world. Art and Religion are emotional attitudes and unreasoned. And with us philosophy has largely come to the conclusion that thought is no key wherewith to unlock the treasures of the soul, and that we had better not fumble with it. This is especially true in the sphere with which we are concerned in this paper—that of religion. "The services of thought to religion," says one able recent writer on this theme, "have been subjected to a justified distrust. Of uncertain worth, especially of uncertain recoil, are the labors of thought in behalf of any of our weightier human interests. By right instinct has religion from the beginning looked elsewhere for the brunt of support and defense—say to revelation, to faith, to feeling. A bad defense is a betrayal; and what human philosophy of religion can be better than a bad defense?"¹

Yet there *is* a religious truth, defensible or otherwise. There

¹W. E. Hocking, *The Conception of God in Human Experience*, Preface.

has always been, and in the circumstances of human life, always must be. For religious truth is a social necessity.

Man by his nature seeks union with his fellows. In order that he may unite with them, he and they must have some common belief, a mutual understanding recognizable by all as the truth, were it only the existence of a common danger or the possibility of a common advantage, or the 'fact' that they were descended from a common ancestor, or were required by a tribal God to be as brothers. The task of human beings, in the last analysis, is to agree about the arrangements of the world they are in; to map it out by thought in an intelligible way; and unitedly address themselves to it.

This construing or reading of the world, however, is characterized by all degrees of crudity. This again is in the nature of the case. The map would not serve its purpose otherwise. It could not affect the masses otherwise. And the masses have to be affected.

Were it possible for man to be content with a perfectly simple statement of the terms upon which he inhabits this globe, could people be content simply to recognize that 'in the nature of things' it is best for them to be a community and bad for them to be in disorder, and could they unite upon that, there would be an advantage. Such a version of the universe would not need to be overhauled, as enlightenment advanced. It would not go out of date. The simplest could understand the formula, and the wisest might scrutinize it. But to be content with such a bald statement is not possible. The natural man—the common, everyday man—must always specify the 'good' and the 'bad'; see what they are like. He must articulate the arrangements in virtue of which the best life *is* best. He must get them into detail, and into a detail consistent with the level at which his intelligence happens to be, or the facts won't appeal to him. And of course they must appeal to him; since it is not the select few only, but the masses of ordinary men, who have to be convinced of the goodness of the good life, if social existence is to go on. Thus the story of the universe and all the big factors in it, the God who rules it, the spirits who move in it, the traces

they leave in earth and air and sky, and all that these beings require of man—the map, as we have called it, of the world—gets to be laid out in great elaboration and full embellishment. Hence this whole inheritance of myth and legend, of rite and ceremonial, of fixed ideas and beliefs, which are handed down through all the generations of every people, which become woven through all its institutions, and become the cement of society.

This lore of another world, then, with all the impetus to self-sacrifice which comes from remembering it, and thinking upon it, and acting in view of it—a self-sacrifice continually necessary if we are to do the thousand and one hard things which social life requires that we should do—all this, is what, in most ages, constitutes religious truth. It is the inspiration to right conduct. It is a truth, therefore, without which society may go on for a while, but without which it has not the heart to go on for long.

The matter on which we wish here to concentrate concerns the question—plainly a question of the last importance—whether anything which can vindicate itself as intellectually true, is able to ‘do the work of religious truth’ among us. Is there any truth, reached as other convincing truth is reached, to which we can turn and say, “this is precisely what religion has taught, what it has intuited from afar, and has held up to us always, as the ultimate hope of the world”?

This question has very frequently been answered of late by a virtual negative. I do not wish here to attempt an exhaustive explanation of the reasons for this. I simply note the fact; and draw attention to one powerful incentive to such distrust of thought in matters connected with the higher life, namely this: that whenever thought has tried to take the side of the higher nature of man and vindicate the religious view of the world, its results have been apt to appear intolerably meagre. Those who feel this meagreness do not raise the question whether thought can establish the results it claims to establish. They merely deny that these results have anything to do with religion. I should like here to consider the fairness of this feeling. I

should like, taking all the risks of such a procedure, to state as simply as possible, and without proof or comment, what I believe thought to be able to establish regarding the universe, and then to ask whether such a message may have anything in it to substantiate its claim to be the truth of religion—in particular, whether it may have anything in it to suggest its ability to bear the social burden which we have seen religious truth has always had to bear.

And first, as regards the statement which we are venturing to make, no one needs to be told that such a statement is abstractly possible. No one needs to be told that there are those—and they not the least in the earth—who have believed that there is a solid basis of truth beneath religion's feet when she leaps forth upon her venturous flight of faith; and that with the clear eye of the intellect this truth may be seen. Moreover, they believe that it has been seen, not by themselves only, but by the greatest among their predecessors, since independent thinking upon the graver issues of man's life began. Now, however our statement of this truth may differ in expression from theirs (or our way of defending it, were we called upon for that), we believe that in all that is here to be said we shall be found in the end to be simply falling in behind these men; not propagating any new gospel, but simply indicating the result of what, so far as religion is concerned, would be allowed to be the central line of thought which has come down to us from the philosophy of the past.

Before seeking an expression for the view we wish to signalize, it will be well to look briefly at what it is not. It is not, then, any artificial attempt to renew allegiance to an authority outgrown. So much is self-evident, and need not have been stated except for the strength of the tendency at present bearing religious thought in another direction—encouraging it to imagine that it may throw itself back, even at this time of day, into an attitude which, belonging to the accidents of the past, has become once for all impossible to it. A theory of religion which is philosophical is as a matter of course free from that anachronism. Philosophy is thought; and to say that a result has been

established by thought, is to say that such result simply expresses the nature of things as that reveals itself, unhindered by either external authority or subjective prejudice. Philosophy acknowledges but one authority, the nature of things itself. To commit itself to that is not to strike a peculiar attitude. It is but to fall back upon the one authority which common sense always acknowledges when it is unshackled. It is, in fact, to discard the artificial submission (which is all that the mind once bitten by enlightenment can yield) and replace it by the natural submission characteristic of the genuine ages of faith. For in the ages of faith common sense really trusted itself to the nature of things, as that was revealed through the intelligent faculties of the soul. It had not, indeed, literally seen all the things in which it believed—Heaven and Hell, angels and demons. But it had heard of them. And through a channel whose reliability was as obvious as the rising of the sun. Essentially, it met the universe without prejudice. It accepted the facts of sense and did its best to think them out. Constituted as we are, that is the only attitude in which we can hope to be convinced. We must get back to it, if we seek a faith based on free and unforced conviction and so able to cement the social union permanently.

This autonomy of thought, if we attend to it for a moment, will help us to a way of expressing the view we wish to state. Obviously, to discard artificiality and prejudice is not to settle the question before us. 'Either God or Atoms' may still be the key to things. All that this attitude does is to prepare the mind to accept theism or materialism, as the truth may turn out to be. What the truth does turn out to be, in the way of thinking which has taken itself to be religiously reconstructive, we should express thus. This view finds that the 'nature of things' to which in all inquiry and in all life we have to commit ourselves if we are either to think truly or live well, is not simply what is given to the senses as the real world. It is that sense-given real world; *but that as seen into, interpreted, and found to consist in the real-ourselves.* It is the real-ourselves which is the ultimate reality of things.¹

¹ Contrast Matthew Arnold's "Eternal not-ourselves."

In this doctrine there is nothing cryptic. Its genesis is perfectly straightforward. First you find a man's real self to be his best self, so that the real-ourselves means ourselves at our highest. And to say that, ultimately, the real world is this is to say (a) that that which ultimately is, *is all that we are not in the direction of perfectness*; or (b) that reality ultimately is *all that we are plus our total defect from perfection*. Or if, for the sake of clearness, we retain the distinction between ourselves and the world, and bring it into our statement, then the finding is (c) that the world in its ultimate nature is *all that it would have to be in order to satisfy us, provided we were at our very best*. Or, putting it from another side still, we might say (d) that *there are two matters for investigation, namely, what the world really is, and what for us is truly worthy; and thought finds that these two converge and in the end become one*. We have nothing to do here with an account of any of the steps or stages in any particular philosopher's proof of this general position—Aristotle's, Spinoza's, Hegel's, or any other. We would simply record our conviction that to all of them, in one way or another, there is a logic in things, an interconnexion such that whatever be the part of reality with which you begin, if you but follow out its connexions with sufficient thoroughness and success, you will find it conduct you into the presence of a world-totality, which is in its nature complete and satisfying.

Having made this statement, and as a preliminary to discussing its claim to be the truth of religion, I wish to enter a warning. I trust that the statement will be taken as it is meant, not as the result of the religiously-reconstructive type of rational speculation, but as a very bald and hurried hint thereof. I give this warning for the express purpose of drawing attention to a difficulty which such warnings always create, and incidentally in order to bring what I think is the main issue clearly into view.

Look for a moment at the *caveat* just entered. Surely it is not illegitimate. I have described a point of view; represented it in terms of thought. A description of a point of view (or of anything else) may err. But so long as it remains a description, surely it will not be required to be itself the very thing it describes

on pain of otherwise being condemned as error. Such a commonplace needs no elaboration. But I state it simply for the sake of drawing attention to the need of being faithful to the principle of it, if anything but misunderstanding is to result from a discussion such as the present.

Our point, then, is this. We are attempting to describe the net result of the reconstructive thought which believes that it has seen the world, from conclusive evidence, to be actually what the religious mind thinks it is; we seek to describe that result in the shortest way possible, by saying that for this thought, *the real universe discloses itself as a real-ourselves*. It is not to the point to raise objections at once, to the effect that 'this may be the purport of a particular philosophy,' but that 'it is not religion,' and the like. Quite certainly it is not religion; and it does not profess to be. It only professes to be the truth you feel *in* religion; while religion itself is the feeling it—a very distinctly different matter. The description which thought attempts to give, then, may err. But it is not already error for being a description.

"But the description which thought attempts to give does err," will probably be the instant rejoinder, "if its description is anything like what has just been set forth." And here, clearly, we are disputing about the issue. Nor will it need any eloquence, probably, to bring the force of the objection home to most religious minds. Is it really intended, that the above 'philosophy' is what religion believes—religion, which has so seldom any acquaintance with philosophy, and which thrives so much better, as a rule, without it? If what is enclosed in the few formulæ we have suggested be at all the result of 'thinking out religion,' then surely thought in its effort to conceive the celestial city towards which religion yearns, has travelled very far indeed from the warmth and glow of that living and sustaining religious hope in the strength of which saints have lived and martyrs died.

Here, I think quite certainly, we have the issue. Thought sketches a faint outline of something which claims to be the truth of religion. And a great gap yawns between it and that which religion really rejoices in.

It is precisely on this awful gap that it seems necessary to dwell. There is, as it seems to us, something in life and in the whole calling of man which corresponds to it and calls for it. So much so, that our one need—an intellectual and a social need at once—might almost be said to be the ability to span this gap; the ability to see that the issue which thought is here said to sanction, is indeed the truth at the bottom of religion—the truth about which it is so glad, and in the strength of which it is so immeasurably strong.

Our need, I say, is to see the religious value of this intellectual truth. In saying so, I am thinking on the one hand of the literal implications of this philosophical gospel; and on the other hand of the task of life in enlightened human society.

On the one hand, what is implicated in the doctrine *that real self-hood is the thought-out truth of humanity and the world?* Let us repeat, here, that we are not concerned at present with whether this doctrine be the sum and substance of Hegel, or whether it be true to the essential position of Spinoza, or whether it were taught by Plato. We are not concerned, even, with whether it is true; but only with the question whether, if true, it can claim to endorse the religious attitude; whether if intelligently grasped and entirely believed, it could 'do the work of religious truth.' What is there in it, then, of religious encouragement? What corroboration does it give of the characteristic allegation of religion in all ages, that there is an arrangement of things upon which men can count; and upon whose reality and certainty they are free to build an all-inspiring and all-conquering hope? How much does it leave us of our faith that the destinies of the world and of men are in divine hands?

At least this much, we reply: that after looking backwards, down the long ascent up which man has had to toil towards whatever poor eminence of civilization he has reached, this view can tell us with confidence that that path must lead somewhere. For man has certainly moved; thought has been the primary and central instrument of his advance; and thought, this doctrine teaches, is the *nisus* towards real-self-hood.

Thought, we say, has been the instrument of man's advance.

We do not say so in the strength of any far-fetched sense of the word thought. We take it, rather, as it is understood in the very wide-spread view which tends to disparage thought in the sphere of the higher life.

Thought, Bergson rightly teaches (though he sometimes would fain retract), is that whereby the surface of the world appears to man prepared for his reaction upon it. Thought is the revelation of a field for practical reaction. Nay, judging by its evolutionary history, it *is* just such reaction, in a perpetual attitude of pausing to sketch its possibilities before carrying itself out. A primitive sea-creature (Herbert Spencer's example serves to illustrate the point as well as any) is guided to its prey by (say) a rudimentary sense of sight. Whenever its prey comes sailing across its field of vision, it will be stimulated to a reaction. But when changed conditions so alter its environment that something hurtful is occasionally sent across its field of vision, put up in the same shape as food, the creature, clutching at the wrong thing, gets a shock of surprise; and next time (if it is to survive) there will be a pause before it clutches, a pause between the stimulus and the reaction—an all-important pause, during which the stimulus will hover a moment, as it were, sketching the two possibilities before it, ere it translates itself into action. The rudimentary mind will see an alternative. Its little world, hitherto unitary and momentary, will have a line of division drawn through it. This is the birth of thought. What the mind deals with henceforth (and until it lapses back into instinct again) will be an affair of 'either-or,' instead of just 'so.' The stimulus, inhibiting itself before it carries itself out, dilates itself into a first, faint beginning of an articulated world.

Now, that dividing up of a world, that assembling of things the same and segregating of them from things different, that unification of similars and dividing of them from dissimilars, the mapping process which begins in the simplest distinction of good and bad, assent and dissent, yes and no, and which ends in scientific systems and the structure of civilization, that dividing, delimitating and re-grouping operation, *is thought*.

It is clear that this function has accompanied man through

every step at least of his material advance, and has heralded all his material conquests. This drawing of firm lines first changes for him the mere 'block' of sense, as which the universe first appears, into something articulate and definite. And from that very earliest triumph onwards to the end of his story, man has consistently succeeded by mapping his field. Thus does the primitive flux of successive stimuli become segregated into a world of space and a lapse of time. Thus does a group of sense-materials come to have the limiting ring drawn round it, which binds its contents together into a thing and separates it from other things. By getting such definite things symbolized in definite words is language obtained; and by keeping such words distinct do we maintain their philological integrity. And how, further, do we gain our science but by colligating things the same and noting the long, straight, dividing lines of nature which mark them off from things different? We proceed by seeking amongst things in space for those which change uniformly with the passage of time, and writing down the law of their change. By discerning these uniform changes, flowing in regular waves down the stream of time without bending or varying, does man prospect the future, master nature's ways of working and yoke her forces to his service. What is all this contrivance of mechanical invention by which man has helped himself forward so mightily but an illustration in point? What is the working of machinery but those very uniformities, showing themselves up from amongst the chaos of nature's operations, in which they are usually hidden? Steam rising from the boiling pot floats hither and thither and disappears; its movements altogether erratic, incalculable; no possible predicting what path it will follow or what cloud it will make. But all its apparently erratic movements really follow a law. Confined, it is a force of definite, calculable amount, and when applied in the proper conditions will always have the calculated effect. Having detected the uniformity of its behavior man has only to arrange the conditions, and lo, he tunnels the hills and ploughs the seas.

Our next point is that it is not different with man's spiritual advance; that it is thought, accordingly, which really has brought

man all the way he has come. And compelling as certain considerations to the contrary may appear, we are persuaded that there is nothing better at the root of them than a subtle modern sophistication.

The force of these considerations is at first sight impressive. There is indeed something in the higher emotional life which seems to make it averse to intelligence and akin rather to that spontaneous instinctive action which we have seen precedes intelligence. We may put the essence of the matter thus. Morality is 'freedom'; fine art is 'free'; and the religious attitude is one which 'sets free' the soul; while on the other hand the first thing we can say of that instinctive action—that primitive immediacy of response to stimulus through whose suspension intelligence arises—is that it goes straight to its mark; it is uninterrupted, spontaneous, and free. Intelligence, on the contrary, does not have this freedom.

Intelligence in its origin is but the shock with which the freedom of instinctive action is broken in upon. It is the 'hands off!' which arrests instinct as it is about to go wrong. It is instinct pausing to get round a difficulty instead of closing with it straight away. It is the compassing of an end through the adoption of means; the substitution of the indirect for the direct; the first faint beginning of the process of devising tools.

Such a process always means in some sense the hampering of free action by laying it under restrictions. To hit upon an instrument is to exploit a uniformity by first submitting to it. When an elephant breaks off a branch to flick the flies away, he has hit upon a thing which will address one of the uniformities of 'fly' nature, an instrument that can do what they will all respond to; and so he succeeds every time. He does not need to take his difficulties singly, now; he can sweep away a whole host at once. But it is all bought at a price. The root of the whole matter is an arrest and a consequent restriction. The elephant, presumably, goes on pleasantly browsing till he finds that such pleasant instinctive procedure means being stung. Only when thus arrested does he cast about for his instrument, feel for his uniformity, and so *get round* the difficulty.

But (for example) morality is not at all the same kind of thing. It is not a being arrested by an evil and forthwith being confined to a line of action which will avoid that evil—or conversely, a being attracted by an advantage and forthwith being confined to the line of action which will secure that advantage. Morality is not a pulling oneself up before doing something, on account of its being a sin with a penalty; and henceforth adopting every time the occasion recurs a definite restricted attitude (other than pleasantly browsing, and not so nice). Morality is free. At its best it is a doing of what the whole heart desires. And similarly with Art and similarly with the service of God. Man's economic-industrial activity is a keeping within fixed lines of action, modelled on the fixed lines which intelligence has revealed in nature, which uniformly lead him, at the cost of a certain labor, to get free of evils and come within reach of advantages. But the higher life is above the labor of the rule. It is a free and ever new manipulation and modification of the uniformities with which all nature and (at the prosaic level) all life are traversed. It is not a keeping within these, but a transcending of them, a playing upon them, a smiting of them all into music. It is not the work of intelligence but rather of an instinctive superiority to intelligence. The work of intelligence, taken altogether, seems to be a midway stage in the scale of spiritual life. Man's highest achievements and his lowest seem to be respectively above and beneath it. And in their spontaneity they approach one another.

No one can read our current literature upon the profounder interests of life without having this view or something like it meet him at every turn. Yet, we repeat, there is a sophistication at the root of it. Such a view of things makes good consolatory reading in certain states of advanced culture—after the plain lines of the moral law have become blurred, after art has begun to live upon itself, and religion has become agnostic. *But this is not how morality was built up*, or art or religion either. They had all the marks of thought—the thought which lies at the basis of practical human life—in their structure. Religion was a matter of ablutions and sacrifices, of holy days and observances,

of things clean and unclean, acts acceptable and unacceptable. Morality was a matter of clear and authoritative 'thou shalt' or 'thou shalt not.' And art was the picturing of things which were or had been, or else it was the adorning those tools which men devised, so as to make the labor of their use also a delight. That is their history. The same thought which divides things, brings the like among them together and makes them definite and recognizable, the thought with which the whole positive world is shot through is at the root of them all, and is the indispensable condition of the life of them all. Man from the first is face to face with necessity. He is from the first confronted with the thing that thought reveals, facts which are hard, lines that won't budge. There *must* be morality. He will perish otherwise. And it 'requires' this, that and the other—absolutely. Art softens these lines. And God is over all. But without the lines there would be neither Art nor God.

To come a little closer to the matter: Some acute social observers have remarked that the one sphere of contemporary civilized life in which there is no sign as yet of flagging or falling off of vital energy is that of mechanical contrivances. One reason for this is undoubtedly that the engineer is working against a necessity whose integrity his efforts will not readily undermine. Otherwise, the superfetation would come. It is a fine thing to overcome space, for instance, so long as we have to do it by discovering laws and conquering by submitting to them. There would be little in it were we all equipped with a 'Fortunatus-hat' to transport us wherever we listed. Only there is little danger, here, of such questionable luck befalling us. Nature, here, is so well aloof from man's control that there is little danger of his overcoming her so greatly that she would no longer present any obstacle, and therefore any scope to his energy. But there are things thus fatally under his control. We may not 'annihilate space' except in a metaphor. But in our domestic arts we may stain our furniture-woods to imitate one another, we may set our substances pretending to one another's functions, until we have lost all our substances and all their functions, and there is no more point in one thing than in anything else. In a precisely similar way in the moral life, while

carrying out one moral function we may coquette with another, while observing one law we may attempt every time to keep remembering all the rest, until in this futile attempt to make out of the 'spirit' of the laws a new letter, and out of the 'sum' of the ten commandments an eleventh commandment, we annihilate morality. And, once more, it is possible in the religious sphere, to take that creed which was to have been to us the inspiration to a certain life, and let it thin itself away under the assaults of the critical intellect until it is not a doctrine at all but a work of art; until it is nothing for thought but is only a piece of spiritual life; and thereby we leave the life nothing but itself to live upon, and so annihilate religion.

And here we may catch, perhaps, a glimpse of the importance of what we have called, rather misleadingly, this philosophical gospel for life in enlightened human society; the importance of seeing reason or thought as the destiny of man and the central attribute of God; the importance of retaining for its distinctions their central and constitutive place in the life of the world.

Thoroughly grasped and entirely believed, it would mean our awakening to the fact that without these distinctions of thought man perishes. It would mean our awakening to the dormant necessity for preserving the integrity of things. It would almost mean a new ethics, one prepared to be reproached with the nickname of the ethics of the letter of the law. It would mean a return to something of the greater moral sensitiveness of our forefathers, to the feeling that a lie is a lie and an oath is an oath, and that vulgarity is vulgar. All that, we say, over again; though perhaps on a new plane and with a new sanction behind it—the recognition of the fact that these things are wrong *because they wear society out*. Nor is it extravagant to say that did this spirit once seize us,—a spirit of obedience, of reverence towards all that has been law, of sensitiveness to wrongs that do not seem very wrong, we might come to find ourselves able to put *all* the things which enlightenment shall have shown us wear society out, in the same rank as the lie which we hate. Our social investigation and our psychological research, could we catch this spirit, would be rescued from that fatal dynamic of hurry which at present impels their 'results' into social,

educational, legal and business practice before they are really established, and so threatens to drive them into disrepute, a disrepute of which one would fain not see them perish before they have had time to show what is in them, for the redemption of society.

If we believe, thus, that thought is the way forward, only one thing remains necessary, if such belief is to 'do the work of religious truth' among us. That is, that it should be worth while to get forward; and that the fact that it is so, and the fact of how much it is so, *should be capable of being felt*. Now, it is impossible to prove on paper that a thing can be felt. Yet one may record one's conviction that this thing is felt already. There is already the potential sense in us, of disgust at having spoilt a whole game for the sake of showing some paltry personal prowess; of self-contempt for having purchased cheap literary effect by debasing the whole currency through coining new words or using bad language; there is the whole range of the sense in us which cannot be satisfied at merely getting on without getting on 'rightly' and carrying the rest of the world's good will with us and not merely its envy. That expanded self is already, we say, a thing we carry with us and are capable of being sensitive to. It only awaits further widening. And the work of thought (through mechanical invention) in bringing the whole world together and so leading to social insight and sympathy is already undertaking the task and connecting our little personal unremembered acts so closely with the salvation or destruction of all society, that 'we almost feel we are doing it.' Having once felt that we are doing it—that we are actually, by our words and acts succeeding or failing to keep society intact—all we need more is to realize that we are doing it unto God. We have only to feel that what we are contributing to or thwarting is a universal purpose summed up in a 'self' who is no abstract, idle, impalpable ether, but is literally all that we are and all that we are not. Then we shall have among our hands again what religion has always taught, a truth therefore which we may reasonably hope will prove itself able to sustain religion's social burden.

J. W. SCOTT.

ON CERTAIN LOGICAL PARADOXES.

IN this paper I propose to discuss certain paradoxes, for the solution of which Mr. Whitehead and Mr. Russell have devised the "theory of types" which occupies so prominent a place in the first volume of *Principia Mathematica*. For the convenience of some of my readers I shall first give a brief account of these paradoxes; next I shall endeavor to show that the reasoning upon which the theory of types is based is fundamentally unsound; and finally I shall offer an alternative solution.

I shall not consider all of the paradoxes that are treated in *Principia Mathematica*, some of which belong to advanced parts of mathematics, but only the more fundamental examples that lie within the domain of logic itself.

I.

1. The first paradox to be noted arises from the consideration of a form of words in which a proposition appears to assert its own falsity. 'This is false' (where 'this' is supposed to refer to 'This is false' itself), and 'I am lying' are examples. If one of these be regarded as a significant statement, and the question is raised whether it is false or true, neither answer can be given without contradiction. If 'This is false' is true, then, since what it asserts is that it is false, it is false; and if it is false, then, since that is exactly what it asserts, it is true.

There are also expressions which seem to denote general propositions that are applicable to themselves, but which cannot be so applied without paradox. Suppose I write between parentheses: (Two and two is five. Green is the complementary of blue. All the propositions between these parentheses are false.) If this last expression is true, then, since it lies between the parentheses, it is false; and if it is false, then, since the other propositions between the parentheses are false, all the propositions are false—which is what the last one asserts, so that it is true.

2. A paradox of a somewhat different sort arises from the circumstance that there seem to be certain classes that include themselves as members. For example, there seems to be a class of all classes, and this—since it is itself a class—must be a member of itself; and there seems to be a class of all classes that contain more than one member, and this class would seem to have more than one member and so to be included in itself. However, if it seems hard to believe that a class can be a member of itself, it is easy to grant that there are classes that are *not* members of themselves. Let us consider the class of all such classes, *i. e.*, *the class of all classes that are not members of themselves*; and let us ask whether this class is a member of itself. If it is, then it belongs to the class of classes that are not members of themselves, so it too is not a member of itself; and if it is not, then it is precisely one of the classes which it includes as members.¹

3. But the most important of the paradoxes to be considered arises from the notion of a property of a property. (Strange to say, this paradox is not explicitly mentioned in *Principia Mathematica*, although the solution that is offered applies most directly to it.) Can a property be a property of itself? It would seem, for example, that to be expressible in French is expressible in French. If this is correct, then, apparently, we may conceive of a certain property which a property may have, *viz.*, the property of being a property of itself; and by contrast we may conceive of the property of *not* being a property of itself. If, now, we ask of this last property whether it is a property of

¹ A more complex variation of this paradox arises from considering the notion of an ordered couple, the first member of which is a class of ordered couples that includes the couple in question as a member. (For example, the class of all ordered couples of similar things and the class of all ordered couples of contradictory propositions, themselves constitute an ordered couple of similar things; for they are similar in this respect at least, that if any couple belonging to either class is reversed it still belongs to the class.) By contrast let us consider the notion of an ordered couple whose first member is *not* a class of ordered couples which contains it as a member; and let the class of all such couples be called *K*. Then let us ask whether the ordered couple having *K* as its first member and (say) the center of the earth as its second member, belongs to the class of couples *K*. If it does, then its first member (*K*) does not contain it as a member. If it does not, then since its first member does not contain it as a member, it is just such a couple as belongs to *K*.

itself, we find that to answer yes is to say that it is not a property of itself, and that to answer no is to say that it is indeed a property of itself.¹

II.

I do not intend to present a complete account of the solution of these paradoxes offered in *Principia Mathematica*. That will be found in the second chapter of the introduction to that work. I wish merely to examine the arguments upon which the solution is ultimately based, or, to change the figure, the first steps of the solution.²

It is asserted that no statement of the form, '*a* has the property *a*,' can have a meaning;³ and, more generally, that no statement of the form, '*a* has the property *b*,' has a meaning if *b* presupposes *a*, i. e., if *b* cannot be defined unless *a* already has a definite meaning. We shall have to examine the proof of this assertion.

Instead of the term 'property,' which I have here used, *Principia Mathematica* uses the term 'propositional function,' or simply 'function.' Let us consider some of the statements made with regard to the nature of functions. A certain difficulty arises in interpreting these statements, due to the fact that 'propositional function' is one of the indefinables of the system, and the authors do not hold themselves to the very strictest accountability with regard to their explanations of indefinable terms. They consider that such explanations form no essential part of their system and are of only 'practical' value in initiating the reader.

"By a 'propositional function' we mean something which contains a variable *x*, and expresses a *proposition* as soon as a

¹ Again a more complex variation is connected with the notion of a relation which obtains between itself and something else; as difference is different from identity. But no new principle is involved.

² At the outset a principle is announced, relating to what the authors call a certain class of vicious circles. This principle is: "Whatever involves all of a collection must not be one of the collection" (p. 40). In the order of proof, however, this general principle belongs at a relatively late stage; and I shall altogether disregard it here.

³ This, if substantiated, directly disposes of the third paradox. The first and second are given a further elaborate treatment, into which it will not be necessary for us to enter.

value is assigned to x . That is to say, it differs from a proposition solely by the fact that it is ambiguous: it contains a variable of which the value is unassigned" (p. 41).

The following comments suggest themselves:

1. The two statements quoted cannot both be true. According to the first, when a value is assigned to the variable which a function contains, it 'expresses' a proposition; according to the other, it *becomes* a proposition. Now is a function a mere formula; or is it, not a formula, but something which formulas are used to express? It appears to me obvious that the latter alternative is intended, and I shall for the moment assume it.

2. But the variable that the function is alleged to contain appears to be a *symbol*—that is to say, a symbol to which a variety of values may be assigned. Accordingly, the meaning underlying the contradictory statements above quoted would seem to be that *when a function is expressed in propositional form, the expression contains at least one variable*. And that is true.

3. The 'natural' form of expression for a function—the form our common languages have developed—is the infinitive phrase or the abstract noun: 'to be wise' or 'wisdom.' When it is expressed in propositional form—as ' x is wise,' or ' x has wisdom'—an ambiguity seems to arise, because this same form of words is also used to denote a proposition, and can only do so ambiguously. But, as denoting a function, the expression is entirely unambiguous.¹

4. When a function is expressed in propositional form, it leaves gaps in the form that are filled up by variables. When a value is assigned to each of these variables, a proposition is denoted. This proposition, then, contains the function as one of its constituents, or factors.² The values assigned to the variables are likewise constituents of the proposition. It is convenient and proper to speak of a function of one, two, or

¹ It should be observed that the use of the propositional form to denote functions is imperative in logic; because the infinitive phrase or abstract noun does not lend itself to the expression of the complicated ways in which functions of more than one variable may be combined in a single proposition.

² This is expressly denied in *Principia Mathematica* upon grounds which we shall consider below. It is said, for example, that "the function ' \hat{x} is human' is not a constituent of the proposition 'Socrates is human'" (p. 50).

more variables. But the function itself does not contain a variable.

5. In *Principia Mathematica* reference is made to "variable propositions," which, it is said, "it is necessary practically to distinguish" from functions (p. 41). The distinction appears to me to be a real one. Of course no proposition is a variable proposition. But, as was said above, an expression may ambiguously denote one of a number of propositions; and this in fact happens when the propositional expression of a function is used ambiguously to denote one of the propositions which contain that function.

Principia Mathematica continues: "It [the propositional function] agrees with the ordinary function of mathematics in the fact of containing an unassigned variable: where it differs is in the fact that the values of the function are propositions."

If the preceding comments are correct, this is absolutely wrong. As the propositional function contains no variable, so it is not itself a variable and has no 'values.'¹ Its expression in propositional form contains one or more variables; and when values are assigned to all these variables, a value is at the same time assigned to the whole expression, considered as denoting a proposition.

"It would seem . . . that the essential characteristic of a function is *ambiguity*. . . . When we speak of ' ϕx ,' where x is not specified, we mean one value of the function, but not a definite one. We may express this by saying that ' ϕx ' *ambiguously denotes* ϕa , ϕb , ϕc , etc., where ϕa , ϕb , ϕc , etc., are the various values of ' ϕx .'"

Here the function is once more identified with its expression in propositional form. It "denotes," and denotes "ambiguously." It would have been better to say: "A propositional function stands in a one-many relation to the propositions which contain it."

If it be said that I have misinterpreted the text, and that by 'propositional function' is always meant an expression, the

¹ Later in this chapter the more acceptable expression, 'values for the function' is used instead of 'values of the function.'

facts of the matter are not altered. I shall then say that the same propositional function (the expression), which ambiguously denotes one of a number of propositions, *unambiguously denotes a property* which each of these propositions contains.

We are now ready to consider the fundamental argument upon which the 'theory of logical types' rests. It is very brief and I shall quote it entire.

"When we say that ' ϕx ' ambiguously denotes ϕa , ϕb , ϕc , etc., we mean that ' ϕx ' means one of the objects ϕa , ϕb , ϕc , etc., though not a definite one, but an undetermined one. It follows that ' ϕx ' only has a well-defined meaning (well-defined, that is to say, except in so far as it is of its essence to be ambiguous) if the objects ϕa , ϕb , ϕc , etc., are well-defined. That is to say, a function is not a well-defined function unless all its values are already well-defined. It follows from this that no function can have among its values anything which presupposes the function, for if it had, we could not regard the objects ambiguously denoted by the function as definite until the function was definite, while conversely, as we have just seen the function cannot be definite until its values are definite" (pp. 40, 41).¹

In reply I would say: An expression of the sort denoted by ' ϕx ' denotes a propositional function (*i. e.*, a property) with perfect unambiguity. It denotes a proposition ambiguously, irrespective of whether the various propositions which it might denote are all perfectly determined. In either case its meaning is well-defined if the constants that enter into it are well-defined. But in order that one of the propositions that are ambiguously denoted by the expression shall be well-defined, its peculiar terms (corresponding to the variables in the ambiguous expression) must also be well-defined.

But a remarkable comment upon the main argument remains to be considered: "It will be seen that according to the above account, the values of a function are presupposed by the function, not *vice versa*. It is sufficiently obvious, in any particular case, that the value of a function does not presuppose the function. Thus for example the proposition 'Socrates is human' can be

¹ The passage continues: "This is a particular case, but perhaps the most fundamental one, of the vicious-circle principle."

perfectly apprehended without regarding it as a value of the function ' x is human.' It is true that, conversely, a function can be apprehended without its being necessary to apprehend its values severally and individually. If this were not the case no function could be apprehended at all, since the number of values (true or false) of a function is necessarily infinite and there are necessarily possible arguments [*i. e.*, values of the variables] with which we are unacquainted. What is necessary is not that the values should be given individually and extensionally, but that the totality of the values should be given intensionally, so that, concerning any assigned object, it is at least theoretically determinate whether or not the said object is a value of the function."

Now, in the first place, it is to be observed that 'Socrates is human' cannot be understood by anyone who does not know what it is *to be human*. The statement, that to understand 'Socrates is human,' it need not be regarded as a value of the function ' x is human,' owes its plausibility to the fact that 'value,' 'function,' ' x ,' are technical expressions, which may well enough not be understood by one who understands 'Socrates is human.'

In the second place, let us see what is implied in the amplified statement, that the totality of values must be given *intensionally*. For a totality to be given intensionally means that the propositional function which determines the totality shall be known. In this case, it means that the function, 'to be a value of the expression " ϕx ,"' which I shall call $S(\phi x)$, must be known. Now suppose for the sake of argument that one might know this without knowing the function ϕx —though this seems to me a very unplausible supposition. Then in order to know the function $S(\phi x)$, the totality of its values must first be known; that is to say, known intensionally; which means that the function 'to be a value of $S(\phi x)$,' or $S[S(\phi x)]$ must be known; and so on *ad infinitum*. But this is ridiculous.

It seems to be unnecessary to carry the examination further.

III.

Let us now on our own account take up the study of the three paradoxes.

1. The first, which is, of course, the ancient 'Liar,' seems to me to be of very little significance, and I shall not dwell upon it. It turns upon the fact that the terms 'true' and 'false,' as applied to propositions may always be immediately eliminated. A proposition asserted to be true, may instead be simply asserted; and the contradictory of a proposition asserted to be false may be simply asserted. This use of 'true' and 'false' (as distinguished in particular from their application to beliefs) is in fact a mere periphrasis.

But when this operation is performed upon the phrase, 'This is true,' the term 'true' is not eliminated. For the proposition to be simply asserted is precisely that 'This is true.' The operation leaves the phrase as it was before; and no number of repetitions can alter the matter. The phrase, therefore, is meaningless.

The like may be said of the phrase 'This is false.' When the interpretation of the phrase by the elimination of 'false' is attempted, the result is, 'This (proposition above-mentioned) is true.' And when the operation is again attempted it yields only: 'This (proposition above-mentioned) is false.' This phrase also is therefore meaningless; and the question whether it is false or true, and with it the paradox of the 'Liar,' falls to the ground.¹

The case of the general proposition denying itself is obviously similar: the terms 'true' and 'false' cannot be eliminated and hence are insignificant.

It should be noted that according to *Principia Mathematica*

¹ It is noteworthy that the same result follows from one of the most novel and suggestive theories of *Principia Mathematica*, a theory which, however, I am not quite ready to accept in its entirety. "A proposition is not a simple entity, but a relation of several; hence a statement in which a proposition appears as subject will be only significant if it can be reduced to a statement about the terms which appear in the proposition. A proposition, like such phrases as 'the so-and-so,' where grammatically it appears as the subject, must be broken up into its constituents if we are to find the true subject or subjects" (p. 51). It is clear that 'This is false' cannot be thus broken up, and hence, on this principle, is nonsense.

In this connection it may be remarked that if the theory just cited is correct, the long-standing controversy over the nature of implication is decided against Mr. Russell and his followers. According to these writers, the relation of 'material implication' is such that if P and Q are any two propositions, P must imply either Q or not- Q . Generally speaking, however, neither P nor Q can be eliminated from the phrase " P implies Q ," which, accordingly, is to be regarded as nonsense.

there cannot be a proposition which affirms anything with regard to itself. On its face, this does not seem to be accurate, and I see no sufficient reason for accepting it. 'This proposition is expressed in seven words' seems to be a proposition, and a true one. 'This proposition is expressed in German' seems to be a proposition, and a false one.¹ Furthermore, according to *Principia Mathematica*, a universal proposition about propositions, or about some kind of propositions, cannot be applied to itself. Thus there is no proposition, 'All propositions are equivalent to themselves,' from which it would follow that this proposition is itself equivalent to itself. I have not been able to discover the slightest reason for accepting this theory.

2 and 3. The remaining paradoxes are of far greater interest and significance. It will be convenient for us to consider them to a certain extent together.

These paradoxes rest upon a common and very natural error with regard to the nature of the logical copula. It is assumed in the second paradox that there is a constant relation between any object and any class in which it is 'included.' This supposition has come to be universally made by logicians. A widely employed symbol for the alleged relation is Peano's ϵ . Similarly, in the third paradox it is assumed that there is a constant relation between any object and any property which it 'possesses.' To judge from my somewhat narrow reading, I should suppose that this supposition is not nearly so widely made. It is, however, closely connected with the foregoing. The relation between a property and the class of objects that it determines would seem to be constant; so that if the relation of the object to the class is constant, there would seem to be a constant relation of the object to the property. I shall use the symbol η to express this relation. Thus, as Peano would write: 'Horatius ϵ hero,' I shall write: "Horatius η heroism."

The difficulties involved in the assumption of the relation η are manifest. On the one hand it is a mere redundancy. To

¹ On the theory mentioned in the last note, the proposition is in neither case the real subject, and can be rewritten so as to bring this fact out. Thus in the two examples given, the real subject may be said to be the language employed. But at any rate they seem to be real propositions, and not mere nonsense.

have a property is nothing else than the property itself. To have heroism is simply heroism. Accordingly, if the object a has the property ϕ , *Principia Mathematica* writes the proposition by simply placing ϕ and a side by side: ϕa —not in any such fashion as $a \eta \phi$. And this seems to me to be very sensible. On the other hand, if there is a relation η between object and property, it would seem that it is an important constituent in the proposition by which the property is affirmed of the object, and ought to be distinctly held in mind. But the relation η would itself be a property (or propositional function) of two variables. If η is necessary to connect ϕ and a , must not a further relation connect η with ϕ and a , and so on without limit? I do not see how an affirmative answer can be avoided. The consequence is that no proposition can ever be distinctly conceived.

The relation η is, then, an illusion of language. What it is 'to have' a property depends upon the property.

But now the same thing seems to be equally true of the supposed relation ϵ , between an object and a class in which it is included. If ϕ is any property and ϕ' is the class which it determines, $\epsilon \phi'$ is equivalent to $\eta \phi$, and thus to ϕ itself, and hence is constant. But just as η has no fixed significance independent of ϕ , so—if I am right— ϵ has no fixed significance independent of ϕ' or, in the last resort, of ϕ . It no more denotes a relation than η does.

Let us see how this theory disposes of the logical paradoxes.

When anything stands in a relation to itself, we can express this by saying that the thing possesses a certain property, or belongs to a certain class—the class, namely, of things that have the property. Thus if Peter admires Peter, we may say that Peter has conceit, or is a conceited man; and if Paul admires Paul, we may say that Paul has conceit or is a conceited man; etc. Here a relation (*admires*), both of whose terms change from proposition to proposition, is replaced by the quasi-relation of possession of a property, or by that of membership in a class, the property or class remaining constant throughout. In symbols, $a R a$, $b R b$, $c R c$ are replaced by $a \eta \phi$, $b \eta \phi$, $c \eta \phi$, where ϕ is a property, or by $a \epsilon \phi'$, $b \epsilon \phi'$, $c \epsilon \phi'$, where ϕ' is the class determined by the property ϕ .

This holds equally well when a class stands in a relation to itself. Thus let us suppose that among the clans of a certain savage tribe the relation R is found, where $x R y$ means that the men of clan x are permitted to marry the women of clan y . Let us further suppose that in the case of certain clans, a , b , and c , the men are permitted to marry the women of the same clan. This would then be expressed by the formulas $a R a$, $b R b$, $c R c$. Here, again, we may say that these clans possess a certain property, that of endogamy (ϕ), which determines a certain class of clans (ϕ'); and thus we may write $a \eta \phi$, $b \eta \phi$, $c \eta \phi$, or $a \epsilon \phi'$, $b \epsilon \phi'$, $c \epsilon \phi'$.

So also when a property stands in a relation to itself we may regard this as the possession of a property or as membership in the class thus defined. Thus the property of being a parent may be said to be reciprocal (R) to the property of being a child; and in the same sense the property of being a brother-or-sister, and the property of being a cousin, may be said to be reciprocal to themselves ($a R a$, $b R b$). These latter properties may accordingly be said to have the property of being self-reciprocal (ϕ), or to belong to the class of self-reciprocal properties (ϕ'); which would be symbolized by $a \eta \phi$, $b \eta \phi$, or $a \epsilon \phi'$, $b \epsilon \phi'$.

It is noteworthy, however, that in the examples which have just been cited, as in numberless others that suggest themselves, the relation R is, indeed, a genuine relation: it is not one of the quasi-relations, ϵ and η . The paradoxes which we are studying arise from the assumption that the same sort of restatement is possible in the case of ϵ and η themselves.

Taking first the case of ϵ , I see no reason to question that there may be propositions of the form $a \epsilon a$. The examples above cited—'The class of all classes is a class,' 'The class of all classes having more than one member has more than one member'—seem to me to be clear and true. The question is: Can these two propositions be reduced to the form, 'The class of all classes is a ϕ' ,' 'The class of classes having more than one member is a ϕ' '? Can we replace propositions symbolized by $a \epsilon a$, $b \epsilon b$, by the forms $a \epsilon \phi'$, $b \epsilon \phi'$?

Undoubtedly there is a temptation to assume that this trans-

formation can be made. If I say: ' a is a member of itself,' ' b is a member of itself,' I seem to be attributing to a and b a common property¹ (that of being members of themselves) which marks them off as a distinct class. This, however, is an illusion. When I write $a \in a$, $b \in b$, the two expressions contain no common term, because \in has no fixed significance apart from a and b . Thus, while a given class may significantly be said to be included, or not to be included, in itself, there is no constant property of 'being included in itself,' or 'not being included in itself,' and no class of classes that include, or do not include, themselves. The paradox thus disappears.

The third paradox disappears in a precisely similar way. Even though we accept (as I do) the occurrence of true (not to say significant) propositions of the form $a \eta a$, $b \eta b$, it does not follow that these can be rewritten $a \eta \phi$, $b \eta \phi$. For η does not express a relation; and the two propositions, $a \eta a$ and $b \eta b$, have no common element. In the terminology of *Principia Mathematica*, there is no propositional function $x \eta x$.

I shall not delay over the more complicated forms of these paradoxes which are mentioned in the notes above. The solution turns upon the observation that just as there is no constant relation η , so there is no constant relation between all dual relations and their terms.

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¹ *Principia Mathematica* declares outright: "If such a supposition [viz., that some class is identical with one of its own members] had any meaning, ' $a \in a$ ' would be a significant propositional function."

INSTINCT AND SENTIMENT IN RELIGION.

THE assertion that man has a religious instinct, while by no means literally true, is not wholly false. The very general appearance of religion in all races of mankind and in most individuals of every race seems to indicate that religion is an expression of very generally felt human needs, and that it is in part at least a development of innate human impulses and not wholly a passive reaction to the physical and social environment. It will be the purpose of this paper to show that while there is no religious instinct, in the strict sense of the word, there is a religious sentiment which develops from the instincts, partly in accordance with innate characteristics, and partly in response to the social environment.

It will have to be admitted that there is no religious instinct in the sense that there are instincts of fear, repulsion, pugnacity, curiosity, self-abasement, self-assertion, tenderness, reproduction, gregariousness, acquisitiveness, constructiveness, hunger, sympathy, suggestion, play and imitation.¹ All of these are innate dispositions, characterized either by specific or more general modes of behavior, common to all members of the human species. They can all be found in the animals nearest to man, most of them are accompanied by relatively simple emotions peculiar to them, and the pathological history of many of them, at least, reveals them to be distinct functional units in the human

¹ This is Dr. William McDougall's list of the principal primary instincts, and non-specific emotional tendencies (*Introduction to Social Psychology*). Mr. A. F. Shand (*Foundations of Character*) employs the phrase 'system of the emotion' in a manner that seems to me to correspond to McDougall's use of 'instinct' while he uses 'instinct' in a different sense. My contention in this paper is that the religious impulse or attitude is not an 'instinct' or 'system of an emotion' or 'innate disposition' but that it is a 'sentiment' using the latter term in the general way that it is employed by McDougall, Shand, Stout, Westermarck, *et al.* In a general way I usually though not invariably follow McDougall on points in which these writers differ from each other; as a rule points of difference in detail between writers of this general type are unimportant for such problems as the present paper is concerned with.

mind and nervous system. On the other hand, religious emotions are extremely variable and complex, religious modes of behavior are innumerable, and there is no specific action or emotion that invariably attends religious experience and is invariably absent without it, and so could be regarded as its instinctive source or cause, or serve as a criterion or differentia of it.

Indeed, it is doubtful whether, in the case of religion, one could find any universal and hence presumably innate characteristic that would be as clearly distinguishable and definable as are certain universal characteristics of art, morality, and science. For all races have some sense of beauty, hard as it would be to reduce the diverse æsthetic judgments of savage and civilized peoples to any definite formulation. All men, too, have feelings of moral obligation, and make judgments of good and bad, although it might be impossible to designate any specific action that has always, everywhere, and by everyone been morally approved or disapproved. And all races have attempted to manipulate nature mechanically, and have distinguished purely physical from anthropopathic processes, and in this sense have had the germ of the scientific attitude,¹ often as they have blundered in applying the distinction. So in a broad sense we might say that man has innate tendencies toward art, morality and science, which every race and every individual have to a greater or less extent manifested in their conduct, variable and diverse as have been the forms which these tendencies have assumed. But if we are careful not to confuse religion with one or another of these three tendencies, it would be difficult to find a fourth universal tendency as markedly distinguishable.

It may be true that man has always had some sort of consciousness of the infinite, that he has always endeavored to come into rapport with a transcendent reality, that his morality has always been heightened by emotion, that he has always felt, however dimly, that there are other and greater forces in the universe than he, not of a purely physical nature, and that he needs their assistance. If such general claims can be sub-

¹ Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion*, pp. 3-7.

stantiated, these expressions must be understood in the broadest and most elastic sense possible, as the reader must at once recognize, if he is at all acquainted with the literatures, say, of the native religions of Australia, Melanesia, Africa, and America, and with a few of the more spiritual religious developments such as those that have taken place in Israel, Greece, India, and China. It will have to be admitted that no specific religious value with anything approaching the definiteness of denotation and connotation even of beauty, goodness, and truth has always been sought and appreciated by man. So that if we say that there is anything instinctive about religion at all, we cannot mean that there is a religious instinct in any ordinary sense of the word. Since there is no religious instinct in the sense that there are instincts of fear, anger, sex, and the others, nor even in the vaguer sense in which there may be said to be innate dispositions to goodness, beauty and truth, there has been a tendency in some quarters to deny the presence of any instinctive or innate factors in religion at all. The content of religious actions and beliefs are so clearly social products which the individual adopts as a result of his *milieu*, that the psychology of religion is thought by many to be exclusively concerned with imitation and suggestion. The startling phenomena of religion, such as conversions, ecstasies, visions, and the like, involve outpourings into consciousness of the effects of either subconscious or exclusively neural processes whose contents, so far as not wholly subjective, originally entered the individual's psycho-physical organism through the ordinary channels of sense, possibly through processes of imitation and suggestion of which at the time he was not fully aware. This method of explanation, successful as it has been in part, has come to be thought all-sufficient. The individual's mind is often regarded almost as a Lockean wax tablet on which the social environment has stamped its impressions, or as a mirror which passively reflects the religious culture of the race.

Now true as it doubtless is that almost all religions have rites and ceremonies, varying in refinement from Australian initiations to Christian revivals and confirmation services,

through which, aided by emotional excitement, the lore of the race is imparted to youth and assimilated by them, it will not do to say that this is purely an automatic and passive process upon the part of the initiate. He who feels exaltation when he has first been permitted to touch the sacred Churinga, or who has taken his refuge in the Buddha and been welcomed by the Brotherhood, or who has made a personal profession of the love of Christ in his heart and partaken of the sacred elements at the Communion, or who has passed through the counterpart of these experiences in some other religion, is not in a purely passive and automatic manner assimilating the beliefs and aspirations and emotions of his social group. Doubtless he is aware of a heavy social pressure to pass through these ceremonies, and he feels that he is sharing in the experiences of his elders in a vital way. But this is not the whole truth of the matter. His religious experience, while conditioned as to the form and details of rite and doctrine by the social environment, is none the less a development from within of his own innate impulses. A religious experience could not become a vital part of a youth's life unless already within him there were impulses and desires which the sacred mysteries satisfy. Such religious experiences as conversion and prayer are not passive receptions of the content of the social order by the growing mind of the adolescent; they are rather responses that he makes, largely of his own accord, to the religious appeal. While we may not think of the religious attitude as an innate instinct, neither should we think of it as an habit impressed on the individual's mind by external circumstances. It is quite as much a coördination and development of his innate impulses due to normal growth as it is an induced response to his social environment. In other words, the religious attitude is neither an instinct nor an artificial construct, but a sentiment.

As contrasted with instincts, "a sentiment is an organized system of emotional dispositions centered about the idea of some object. The organization of the sentiment in the developing mind is determined by the course of experience; that is to say, the sentiment is a growth in the structure of the mind that is

not natively given in the inherited constitution."¹ A sentiment therefore differs from an instinct or emotion in being a growth or development that may become highly complex; but it has its origin in the native reactions of instincts and emotions. Sentiments are by no means mere mechanical combinations of reflexes, automatically evoked by external stimuli; they are natural growths in the mind, and form the foundations of character and selfhood.

What is meant by calling the religious attitude a sentiment will perhaps be clearer if it is compared with another sentiment, that of Love. Love is not a single simple primary instinct or emotion, but, as Mr. Shand and Mr. McDougall convincingly show, it is highly complex, and includes a large number of these: on occasion joy, sorrow, hope, fear, tender emotion, curiosity, pugnacity, self-assertion and self-abasement are manifested toward or because of the beloved object. Religious sentiment likewise on occasion includes all, or nearly all, of the emotions of which man is capable. Romantic love may be a gradual growth, a youth and a maiden who have been playmates from childhood not knowing how or when their mutual affection originated may believe that they have always loved each other; or they may spontaneously awaken to a consciousness of mutual affection which dawns upon them like a revelation; or, only after long struggle and hesitation, doubts of self and the other, wavering attachment and apathy, may the time of complete mutual devotion and self-surrender be followed by the bliss of perfect love. The three types of adolescent religious experience—continuous religious growth, spontaneous awakenings and conversions—almost perfectly correspond. Love begins with certain instincts as a nucleus—tender emotion, and in the case of roman-

¹ McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 159. He goes on to say that the maternal sentiment might almost seem to be innate. Mr. Shand credits the sentiments with more innate characteristics (*Foundations of Character*, esp. pp. 35-50). The point on which I am insisting here is simply that the sentiment is unlike the instinct in being more complex, and in growing in response to the environment, while it is unlike the forms of habit usually discussed in chapters on the psychology of habit and the reflex arc concept, since it is not an half-automatic, mechanical or artificial co-ordination of reflexes in response to external stimuli, like typewriting, playing the piano, or even the infant's learning to walk.

tic love, sex. These come to be habitually felt toward the beloved, and with these as a nucleus, the other instincts and emotions are felt on occasion—fear when the beloved is in danger, anger when attacked, curiosity, elation, joy, sorrow, etc., when circumstances call them forth,—and they become organized in a system centering about thoughts of the beloved. The beloved object is always in a sense definite and specific, and may be concrete or abstract, personal or impersonal,—a child, a pet animal, a maiden, one's fatherland, truth, justice, liberty, science. The growth of the religious sentiment is similar, and involves attachment to some sort of an object, though the object may be of a great variety of types. While love is not a simple inherited instinct or emotion, but is enormously complex, and varies in different individuals in accordance with their experience and the nature of the beloved object, its character also varies in different individuals in accordance with their native tempers and other personal traits, indicating that it is a spontaneous growth from native dispositions; all of which can be said with equal truth of the religious sentiment.

In discussing the instinctive bases of religion Mr. McDougall considers the complex emotions of admiration, awe, and reverence most fundamental.¹ These involve fear, wonder directed toward the unknown as well as negative self-feeling in its presence, and the attribution of strength and pugnacity to it. Reverence also includes gratitude. Gratitude itself is "a binary compound of tender emotion and negative self-feeling." The majority of writers would probably agree with McDougall in making fear of the unknown the original incentive to religion, although a considerable minority, among whom Robertson Smith is one of the most important, have insisted that love rather than fear is the source of religion. Among contemporary savages the native races of Australia are certainly among those whom we have the most accurate reports regarding matters of religion. In their initiation ceremonies both fear and tender emotion are conspicuous, and also the gregarious instinct; while in their *intichiuma* ceremonies the food-seeking instinct appears to be the chief motive. The last

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 128-135 and Chap. XIII.

named instinct is certainly the strongest in all that remains vital in the religion of the Todas. In the case of the Baganda, whose religion has been carefully reported by Roscoe, every instinct and emotion seems to enjoy religious expression by reason of the multitudinous gods, fetiches, charms and amulets. This is equally true of the early religious beliefs and practises of India and of Greece. I should suppose it also to be true of Israel, if we remember to take the Baals as well as Jahweh into account. On the whole it would seem to be safe to conjecture that fear, tender emotion, negative self-feeling, gregariousness and the reproductive and food-seeking instincts have probably most often served as nuclei for the development of the religious sentiment, but that it is possible that other instincts may sometimes have so served, and that wherever religion has reached a high stage of development nearly all instincts and emotions have ultimately become included. How prominent one emotion will be in comparison with others, and how far emotions and instincts will appear in raw, crude forms, and how far they will be refined and sublimated, will vary with circumstances and the degree of civilization attained. In a warlike people the pugnacious instinct will be potent or dominant in their religious sentiments, while among a peace-loving nation tender emotion will be relatively stronger.

Various as are the instincts which give rise to the religious sentiment, and different as are the degrees of its relative strength, and diverse as are the complex emotions in which they are united, the objects to which a religious sentiment may be attached are yet more heterogeneous. A totem plant or animal; churinga; any sort of object that may chance to be fancied alive or to contain mana or to be associated with a spirit, from the sun to an odd looking stone; amulets, charms, fetiches; ancestral, tribal, and other spirits; abstract qualities that have become personified like Fortune; gods; some vast impersonal force thought to pervade the universe, or the universe itself:—anything other than the individual's ordinary conscious self or that of a fellow human being that is believed at the same time not to be merely physical—may serve as an object of continuous attention capable of

habitually evoking a primary instinct, and so initiating the rise of a religious sentiment.¹ This object is an agency that exercises a peculiar influence upon the individual's mind, that serves to make him conscious of increased energy, of exaltation within himself, that enables him in some manner to transcend the level of his ordinary existence.

This enhancement of his personality may manifest itself as increased fierceness in battle, keener insight in counsel, ecstasy in the dance, firmer self-control and more consistent exercise of any of the moral virtues, or in any of the finer and more spiritual rewards of prayer and consecration to God that are observable in the saints of the higher religions. The sociologist may attribute this enhancement to a sense of social enlargement due to the worshipper's feeling of identity with his social order and with the cosmos (which latter is simply, in the case of primitive man, an enlargement of his social order),² while the psychologist may explain it in terms of the influx into consciousness of sub-conscious or exclusively neural energy. It is open to the philosopher of religion, if he chooses, to suggest that man in such experiences becomes increasingly conscious and appreciative of the world of whose evolution he is the highest product upon this planet, and to think of the cosmos as becoming in him gradually more conscious of itself, and that, in a way, the worshipper may be right in believing that in religious experience he actually is becoming aware of the presence of God within his soul.

To all worshippers, except those too primitive to make such distinctions and the few philosophers with sufficient penetration to resolve them in a higher synthesis, the objects of the religious sentiments are themselves independent centers of causal agency, quite apart from the individual's own mental or neural processes. It would seem to the ordinary man that to identify them with

¹ Some of these points have been discussed more fully by the writer in a paper entitled "A Psychological Definition of Religion," *American Journal of Theology*, XVI, pp. 385-409.

² The best sociological interpretation of which the writer knows is that by Professor E. Durkheim, *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, though it emphasizes more the aspect of social constraint of the individual than the latter's social enlargement. On 'cosmos' see F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, p. 53.

the latter would be to abandon the objective efficacy of religion altogether. So man as a rule has quite naïvely attributed to agencies external to himself a peculiar sort of causal efficiency, and these agencies have in consequence become objects in space about which in his mind sentimental systems of great force and significance have developed.

An important point to notice in this connection is that the agency which is the object of a religious sentiment is ordinarily external to the value which is sought through it. Through the mediation of fetiches or gods valuable results may be obtained, because these beings have control over the matters involved and are interested in them, but the fetich or god is none the less external to the value. Zeus protects justice, but justice is not the essence of his character. Hera assists women in childbirth, and on occasion she protects virginity; but she is not primarily a personification of motherhood or virginity. St. Thomas rightly interpreted orthodox Christian tradition when he showed that goodness is something that God recognizes, and so decrees shall be followed; but that goodness is independent of His will for its existence. For theism in all its forms agency and value are external to each other. It is only at the farthest poles of religious evolution—in totemism and other extremely primitive types where they have not yet become clearly differentiated, and in philosophical pantheism where they have become united in a higher synthesis, that agency and value are not fundamentally different.

This distinction between value and agency seems to me important, in the first place, because it is a striking feature of religion, and secondly, because it aids in differentiating religion from morality and æsthetic enjoyment. Gods are guardians of morality, religious rites and ceremonies are efficacious in promoting morality, but they are agencies and not morality itself. This is a fact which we ought to recognize, quite apart from our own prejudices and preferences in the matter. However, to recognize this is not to assign a lower place to religion, but to guarantee to it an unique function and significance of its own. The obscurantists who confuse religion with morality are likely

to think that God and prayer may some time be dispensed with altogether. But to recognize that religion is different from morality, but that it is, in the case of the ethical or spiritual religions, the most sublime and effective instrument by which moral values may be conserved and enhanced, is to assure religion an unique and lofty place in human life, and to attribute to it a distinct function which no other agency could perform so well. In æsthetic enjoyment value and agency are identified; that is the reason why it is disinterested. When religion assumes æsthetic forms, as in hymns of praise and still more in mystic contemplation, the worshipper's aspirations become merged and sublimated in his God, and for the time being may be almost indistinguishable. But the æsthetic moment is only temporary in ordinary experience—it is a passing phase—and objects and desires again become sharply differentiated. Likewise the man who contemplates religious truth normally returns to an active life, mindful indeed of his heavenly vision, but mindful of it for its moral utility, *i. e.*, because it furnishes him increased impetus and inspiration in performing his duties.

In the evolution of religion three separate aspects are to be distinguished, though they constantly interact upon one another: (1) the evolution of the agencies or objects of the religious sentiments; (2) the evolution of the values which are sought through these agencies; (3) the evolution of the religious sentiment itself through the influence of the interaction between the religious agencies and values, and through the coördination and organization of the native instincts and emotions.

The evolution of religious agencies is what is usually discussed in accounts of the development of religion. From an impersonal mysterious power,¹ *mana* or the like, different religions pass through various stages of evolution, not always the same, finally reaching polytheism, henotheism, and monotheism. Contemporaneous with this is the evolution of the values which are sought through religion, which at first are almost wholly material—food, victory in war, long life, posterity, oracles, etc., and later

¹ R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*, Chap. IV; Irving King, *The Development of Religion*, Chap. VI.

become more spiritual—courage, wisdom, forgiveness of specific sins, and redemption from one's sinful nature. More germane to this paper is the evolution of the religious sentiment itself, contemporaneous with the evolution of religious agencies and values.

In the lower forms of religion there are as many religious sentiments as there are agencies. For, as has been said, the agency is the object to which are attached the initial instincts and emotions, from which the religious sentiment develops. Among the Baganda, a savage race, or among the common people in ancient Greece, a civilized nation, there must have been as many religious sentiments as there were charms, amulets, spirits, and gods employed in religious devotion. No single person would probably possess all of these sentiments, and they would vary in strength in the minds of different individuals in proportion as they were cultivated the more, and as their purposes were different. As the cruder forms of religious agency, such as fetiches, were abandoned, and as gods fused into one, the corresponding religious sentiments would also fuse into one. This would make for coherence of character in the individual, since as his gods became one the values for which they stood would likewise become harmonized and solidified. It would tend also to social unity, as the religious sentiments of all became more alike, and as the god of the nation as a whole became identical with the spirits of the family and the gods to whom the individual looked for assistance in his private needs. As Jahweh became the only God, and as men came to see their mutual identity in Brahma, common brotherliness was bound to increase, and if it never developed to its full logical conclusions either in Israel or in India, this was because men would not accept their religions whole-heartedly, and allow their religious sentiments full development and free expression in the organization of their characters.

Roughly speaking, and it is impossible to make a more specific generalization that would apply to all religions, it seems to me that in the evolution of the religious sentiment in the race three stages may be distinguished: (1) The sentiment is vague, the differentiation between values and agencies is imperfect, social

organization is not advanced, and the strictly moral values recognized by the group are not necessarily connected with their religion. The most of the Australian tribes would serve as an illustration, among whom the agency has yet received no name, although some vague notion of *mana* seems to be implied in their ceremonies. (2) The sentiment has become differentiated and individuated; in fact, it has split up into a variety of sentiments, one for each fetich, spirit, god. (3) The various agencies have become more or less completely synthesized, *aufgehoben*, into a higher and more concrete unity, monotheism. This evolution reminds one a little of the Hegelian dialectic. First, there is the bare distinction of quality, later there is the quantitative multiplicity of agents, and this in turn gives way to an higher unity in which the former differences are not so much obliterated as given a larger significance in an organic whole.

That these stages are not precisely duplicated in the development of the American child to-day need not give concern as to the correctness of this account, as we now know that precise recapitulation of the cultural experiences of the race is not to be expected. Roughly, though, the religious life of the child corresponds to the first two stages as merged together rather than as following each other in serial order; while the third stage corresponds to religious life after the adolescent transformation and enlargement has taken place. The child's notions of God are likely to be more or less animistic, disjointed, and external, and to manifest little inner experience of his own. His religious impulses are chaotic, and if he does not have a diversity of religious sentiments it is because he has been taught to believe in only one God, rather than because his attitudes toward God are consistent. During adolescence, if he experiences for himself and comes to appreciate the religious aspirations of his church or synagogue, his vague and half understood childish impulses become organized into a higher and completer unity, and his religious sentiment becomes a dominant influence in his character.

Mr. Shand¹ shows that each sentiment in the course of its organization of impulses and emotions develops a sort of morality,

¹ *Op. cit.*, Book I, Chaps. X, XI.

or a relative ethics of its own, with distinctive virtues and vices, ideals and duties. Men who love themselves to excess grow hardhearted, the pleasure lover is free from pride, but has a weaker will than the proud man, while the proverb 'All is fair in love and war,' illustrates how completely ordinary moral principles may be altered within the scope of a dominant sentiment. The partiality of a parent to the degree of positive injustice is condoned and even regarded as praiseworthy. The same law holds in the case of the religious sentiment. It is not necessary to cite instances, such as the distortion of ordinary virtues in the case of the worshippers of Moloch or Dionysius, or the singular sense of rectitude with which the Israelites massacred the Canaanites. Christianity often in its history has illustrated the same principle. The tender love for the infant Jesus and his blessed Mother and reverence for the sacred Host developed a relative ethics that condemned heretics to the rack and the stake, while Calvinism presumed to attribute its own prejudices to the Deity Himself, and to laud Him for partiality to those whom He arbitrarily chose to elect of His own free grace, without merit on their part, to be objects of His eternal love, while He equally arbitrarily chose to hate eternally the rest of mankind. Despite occasional blemishes of this sort, however, the relative ethics of the religious sentiment has on the whole played a creditable part in the development of human character. His God has been the idealization of the best traits the religious man has known; prayer has reflected to some extent these traits into himself and set before him ideals and virtues to attain that have made him more like his God. The moral ideals attributed to God have thus become enhanced in the individual's mind, and he acquires them in larger degree than otherwise would have been the case. The very bigotry, during much of their history, of the chief religions of Semitic origin—Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism—might almost be condoned because it has been the accompaniment of healthy religious sentiments. For this refusal to compromise with inferior religious faiths, or to tolerate any ideals or practices that rival the worship of the one God, has kept these faiths comparatively

pure, and permitted the development of a single monotheistic sentiment. On the other hand, Buddhism and Brahmanism, on account of their charity and tolerance for more primitive and less highly moral faiths, have suffered degeneration, since they could be cultivated in the same mind along with baser religious sentiments which have choked the full development of their own more lofty sentiments.

We may conclude that for a religious sentiment to break down within the mind mercilessly all that is hostile to itself is healthy so far as the religious sentiment is itself inclusive of all that is noblest and best, whereas it is harmful so far as the religious sentiment fails to include moral values that ought to have a place in human character. The inclusiveness of a religious sentiment in the case of a monotheistic religion will depend upon the moral comprehensiveness of its conception of God. The conception of God held by Judaism and Christianity has on the whole consistently developed, and tended to include all newly discovered moral values within a generation or two after prophet or reformer have proclaimed them. The earlier Hebrew conception of God gave way fairly soon to the loftier conceptions of Amos, Jeremiah, and the second Isaiah. The stern God of Puritanism was replaced by the more humane God of the nineteenth century, and the last is now in turn yielding to a more democratic God who loves social justice and equal opportunity even more than personal charity and private religious devotion.¹

We can both understand why religion is conservative, and also why it does progress, when we think of the religious attitude as a sentiment rather than as an instinct, or an artificial construct induced by the social order. If it were an instinct, religion would not be capable of evolution except as instincts change, which is very slowly, if at all. Man probably has acquired no new instincts since he has emerged from his animal ancestry. If the religious attitude were an artificial construct, a mere reflection of the social order, propagated by imitation and sugges-

¹ Strictly speaking, the evolution has been more Hegelian than this. The earlier idea of God in each of these cases has not so much been repudiated as corrected and conserved by being embraced in a broader, higher, and more inclusive conception.

tion, religions would change with a rapidity comparable with the fashions. Since, however, it is a sentiment which has its origin in the expression of instincts and emotions, it has roots deep in human nature, and can only change slowly as customs, morals, and institutions change. As the religious sentiment of an individual ordinarily receives its set for life during adolescence, there is small hope of altering fundamentally the religious sentiments of adults. The endeavor to modify radically the religious attitudes of an adult is sure to cause him a great deal of suffering, and is more likely to cause his religious sentiment to wither away and die than to stimulate it to fresh growth in new directions. Progress in religion usually has to come about by waiting patiently for a new generation to pass through the formative period of adolescence under the influence of an altered *milieu*. And as adults control the social order, reformers cannot alter the religious influences surrounding adolescents so much as might be desired.

However, on the whole, the conservatism of the religious sentiment is good. Even in a period of rapid transition like our own, when requisite changes are most numerous and most imperative, the moral values which need to be handed down from the previous social experience of the race, and to be attached to the instincts and emotions of the youth, and so be made a part of their religious sentiments, bulk larger than even the new increments of democracy and social justice that need to be added. I do not mean by this to minimize the imperative necessity for such reform, nor the peril of total extinction that will soon threaten our religious institutions if all true friends of religion do not speedily awaken to the emergency, but merely to point out that the situation is not yet desperate, and that religion is not to be entirely condemned on account of its conservatism. And reforms in religion will in the future be more easy to effect, once the instrumental nature of religion is understood, once it is realized that religion with all its cult, ritual, and dogma only serves to organize, enhance, and give vitality to, hence to conserve, moral values that do not need religion for their validation, but only in order to secure their more effective propagation and

more lasting hold upon the personality of individuals through their incorporation into a lasting and all embracing sentiment. Reform, and not abandonment of religion is necessary; since in no other way than through embodiment in a lasting sentiment which has its roots in the innate sources of their mental and moral nature, and embraces and coördinates their impulses by attaching them in devotion to a conception of God adequate to serve as the consummation of all their ideals and the inspirations of all their noblest efforts at self transcendence, can the values that are our heritage from the past and the new values that constitute the addition of our generation to this inheritance, be effectively and assuredly transmitted to the youth of the present time.

An objection almost certain to be advanced by many to positions like those advanced in this paper cannot be ignored, although space does not admit of an adequate discussion of it. Let us suppose our objectors saying: "Does not such a theory make the object of the religious sentiment (God in the case of monotheistic religions) merely an arbitrary fiction, convenient as a center of stimulation for the development of a valuable sentiment, but none the less a fiction? Our jurists have their legal fictions, sociologists formulate their laws in terms of a social mind or social organism, and even physicists and chemists talk of molecules and atoms and electrons, while only the more naïve and unsophisticated members of these professions fancy that these symbols have any real existence, and are anything more than convenient devices. Do you mean to imply that the God of religious faith is merely an arbitrary symbol, too? And is not such pragmatism the rankest kind of atheism?" Well! Our objectors should first observe that the scientific 'fictions' are not capricious, but are formulated as a result of the most careful study of the phenomena under investigation. Really they are not fictions at all in the sense that they are false. Though confessedly they are inadequate to the whole truth, they are the best formulations of it to which human knowledge has yet attained. Whenever they become superseded the truth that they have embodied will be carried over into new symbols,

and will be better understood and have wider meaning. And it is only by faithful employment of the best symbols that science now possesses that further advance can be made. The evolution of the agency which serves as object of the religious sentiment has been analogous. The conception of *mana* indeed involved certain elements of truth; these were better symbolized in fetichism and animism; better still by polytheism; best of all by monotheism; and as our conception of the God of monotheism continues to evolve, better because more adequate symbols of cosmic reality are constantly becoming available; and by the sincerest employment of these in theory and in practice is further advance alone possible.

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BERGSON'S DOCTRINE OF INTUITION.

STUDENTS of Bergson are not agreed upon an interpretation of his doctrine of intuition. Some have taken him to mean by intuition a merely negative process: the renunciation of thought, a pleasant, easy, and romantic return to immediacy. On the other hand, there are those who believe him to have called attention to a form of the cognitive process hitherto neglected, and to emphasize the fact that intuition demands a very considerable effort of the mind. What is significant in this opposition is that both parties can find support in the writings of Bergson. Yet both cannot be right. The existence of such divergent interpretations is a sign that Bergson's presentation is not free from difficulty. The present paper is an attempt to derive from the sometimes conflicting statements of Bergson an account of the doctrine which shall at once be self-consistent and leave undiminished its genuine novelty and value.

Bergson, as is well known, distinguishes between "two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing"—the way of analysis and the way of intuition. Let us state the contrast in his own words.

"The first implies that we move round the object; the second that we enter into it. The first depends on the point of view at which we are placed and on the symbols by which we express ourselves. The second depends neither on a point of view nor relies on any symbol. The first kind of knowledge may be said to stop at the *relative*; the second, in those cases where it is possible, to attain the *absolute*. Consider, for example, the movement of an object in space. My perception of the motion will vary with the point of view, moving or stationary, from which I observe it. My expression of it will vary with the systems of axes, or the points of reference, to which I relate it; that is, with the symbols by which I translate it. For this double reason I call such motion *relative*: in the one case as in the

other, I am placed outside the object itself. But when I speak of an *absolute* movement, I am attributing to the moving object an interior and, so to speak, states of mind; I also imply that I am in sympathy with those states, and that I insert myself in them by an effort of imagination. . . . I shall no longer grasp the movement from without, remaining where I am, but from where it is, from within, as it is in itself. I shall possess an absolute."¹

Bergson does not weary of multiplying illustrations of this contrast; it seems to be part of his deliberate method to choose the most diverse examples of it in order that we may be placed in a position from which we can grasp the common element in all these images. Thus there is the intuition of perception. Viewed from within, the movement of my arm is one simple undivided movement; viewed from without,—‘analytically,’—it is the taking up successively of an infinite number of positions.² There is the intuition of appreciation. “Consider . . . a character whose adventures are related to me in a novel. The actor may multiply the traits of his hero’s character, may make him speak and act as much as he pleases, but all this can never be equivalent to the simple and indivisible feeling which I should experience if I were able for an instant to identify myself with the person of the hero himself. Out of that indivisible feeling, as from a spring, all the words, gestures, and actions of the man would appear to me to flow naturally. . . . The character would be given to me all at once, in its entirety, and the thousand incidents which manifest it, instead of adding themselves to the idea and so enriching it, would seem to me, on the contrary, to detach themselves from it, without, however, exhausting it or impoverishing its essence.”³

There is the intuition of creative art. “Any one of us, for instance, who has attempted literary composition, knows that when the subject has been studied at length, the materials all collected, and the notes all made, something more is needed in order to set about the work of composition itself, and that

¹ *Introduction to Metaphysics*, tr. Hulme, pp. 1-3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 4.

is an often very painful effort to place ourselves directly at the heart of the subject, and to seek as deeply as possible an impulse, after which we need only let ourselves go. This impulse, once received, starts the mind on a path where it discovers all the information it had collected, and a thousand other details besides; it develops and analyzes itself into terms which could be enumerated indefinitely."¹

This account may serve to recall the main points of contrast. Let us now examine the antithesis in some detail.

(i) Analysis is the understanding of a thing through what it is not. It expresses the nature of an object in terms of other objects which we take to be already known to us. It uses universal concepts only. Therefore, by this method we can know of an object only what it has in common with other objects, never what is unique in it. Any object is more than a meeting place of a number of universals; but this *plus* which would explain the meeting of them is precisely what conceptual methods cannot capture. Intuition, on the other hand, is intellectual sympathy, acquired through no little effort, whereby we project ourselves into the object and identify ourselves with its being. It puts us in possession of some absolute,—not a point upon which universals are seen to converge, but a point from which they are seen to radiate.

(ii) It follows from this that the task of analysis is endless. A familiar example will illustrate the predicament. A physicist who is guided by the principle that every quality of a material body is to be referred to a configuration of elements, no one of which possesses that quality, is committed to an undertaking which has no end,—unless we are willing to give the name of end to the conception of a something devoid of all quality whatsoever. For the qualities of any provisional element must eventually be subject to the same process of explanation or description imposed by the guiding principle. So with conceptual analysis. It can find no finally satisfying object in which to rest. Committed to the task of resolving into predicates everything which claims to be a subject, it is precluded from

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 89, 90.

any knowledge of a subject as such. It is the victim of "an eternally unsatisfied desire to embrace the object around which it is compelled to turn."¹ Intuition severs the nerve of such efforts. It seizes the subject of these predicates. It gives a knowledge of the thing in its simple wholeness, a knowledge which, if it does not exhaust its detail, reveals at least its finished outline. The kind of illumination which accompanies it might be described thus: it is a seeing of why and how all these predicates belong together in the object.²

(iii) This suggests a third point of contrast. "From intuition one can pass to analysis, but not from analysis to intuition."³ The sense and bearings of this statement are crucial for our estimate of Bergson's doctrine. It will be necessary to examine closely the grounds for it.

Bergson has given two accounts of the matter: the first in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, from the logical standpoint; the other in *Creative Evolution*, from that of the biologist.

Logically, there are two reasons why there is no road from analysis to intuition. First, as we have just seen, analysis is bound within its own circle of general concepts and is incapable of reaching the individual. Secondly, concepts are not parts of an object, but artificial elements. No juxtaposition of concepts, then, can give us anything but an artificial reconstruction of reality. This perhaps calls for some explanation. A concept, Bergson asserts, seizes upon what is common to a number of objects; *i. e.*, it makes clear a resemblance. But, "as the resemblance is a property of the object, and as a property has every appearance of being a *part* of the object which possesses it," we infer that concepts are parts of an object.⁴ This is an erroneous inference. A concept stands for a more or less arbitrary selection of some character in an object, a selection based upon our practical needs and not upon any articulation in the object itself. Now this is the definition not of a part but of an element. Where you have a part you have the whole

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

² *E. g.*, How the self is at once unity, multiplicity, continuity, etc.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

implied in it, and consequently, given the parts, you can reconstruct the whole. An element, on the other hand, follows not the structure of the object itself but of the interests of the selecting mind. Elements, therefore, do not imply the whole and, consequently, cannot be used to reconstruct the original object. It is because concepts are elements, as thus defined, that no combination of them will restore the object in its wholeness. We are to conclude, then, that such knowledge of the whole object is to be gained only by an abandonment of the analytical method, only by doing a certain violence to our habitual ways of thinking and reaching out after an intuition.

The biological statement is more significant. The two main divergent lines of evolution, as Bergson conceives the process, are represented now by instinct and intelligence. Intelligence has been developed in man in the interests of his practical needs. He has to note the repetitions in historical experience which may serve as a basis for prediction, to detect the resemblances in things and to classify them, in order that he may generalize a type of response to their action on him. The typical instrument of intelligence has thus come to be the class-concept, which retains only what is common. The knowledge so conferred is thus marked by its range over an indefinite number of objects, and may be called a knowledge of form.

Instinct, on the other hand, while it too is cognitive, can only give a kind of knowledge limited to particular cases. Thus, "quand l'Œstre du Cheval dépose ses œufs sur les jambes ou sur les épaules de l'animal, il agit comme s'il savait que sa larve doit se développer dans l'estomac du cheval, et que le cheval, en se léchant, transportera la larve naissante dans son tube digestif."¹ There seems to be here some sympathetic rapport between the fly and the horse which enables the fly to select just this place for depositing its eggs. It is not a case of recognition; it is an immediate response, implying some understanding of this individual situation. The limitation appears in the fact that this is not a generalized knowledge. The fly has no idea of a class of things such as 'shoulder of an animal' which is here at

work; it has, presumably, not formulated a principle of action such as: Wherever I find a quadruped that licks its shoulder there I may deposit my eggs. It is limited to a specific form of action. If the dimension of intellectual knowledge be extension, that of instinctive knowledge is penetration. In the one case there is a knowledge of form; in the other of matter.

One other point in connection with instinctive knowledge must be noted: it is not consciously possessed; it exists only applied; it is a knowledge not held in reflection, but exhausted in action. This point is extremely important, for, as we shall see in a moment, it serves as the basis for the distinction between instinct and intuition.

Instinct and intelligence:—these, then, are the two termini of the evolutionary process as far as knowledge is concerned. But, though they have widely diverged, in man they are not yet wholly foot-free from each other. About the luminous center of intellect there still hovers the penumbra of instinct; detected perhaps, in those workings of consciousness which make us aware of the inadequacy of our concepts to reality, or revealing itself less uncertainly in the sympathetic imagination of the artist. In this ancient survival lies the promise of the future metaphysic. Man can perhaps take conscious possession of this instinctive knowledge, which, left to itself, will issue only in action. If he succeed he will have transformed instinct into intuition. And so Bergson can talk of intuition as "*l'instinct devenu désintéressé, conscient de lui-même, capable de réfléchir sur son objet et de l'élargir indéfiniment.*"¹

The biological account thus leaves us with the same conclusion as the logical in regard to the relation of intuition to analysis, the method of the intelligence. For the cultivation of the intuitive method involves a reversal of the direction of evolution. Man will have to retrace his steps over the path of intellect, along which nature has so long been bearing him, and set off in another direction, towards the goal of intuition.

With this as a rapid survey of the doctrine let us pass to some questions.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 192.

First, how does intuition differ from inarticulate feeling, or from a type of appreciation which is dumb? If it be true that intuition captures what is unique in an object, then by definition the content is inexpressible.¹ Bergson certainly claims cognitive value for it; but, if so, by what definable characteristic is it to be distinguished from feeling? If we can answer this question we shall have come to terms with a difficulty in Bergson's exposition which has been an offence to many of his critics.

Secondly, how is this intellectual sympathy to be distinguished from an actual identification of oneself with the object? This, again, is a problem set by Bergson's own expressions. For example, he talks of "placing oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it."² Again, in the illustration of the intuitive knowledge of the character in a novel, he refers to "the simple and indivisible feeling which I should experience if I were able for an instant to identify myself with the person of the hero himself."³ Apart from more explicit statement, is not knowing the hero equivalent to being the hero, or rather, is not the intuitive knowledge I have of him exhausted in action? If I were the hero I should not reflect, I should act. Yet from the statements in *l'Evolution Créatrice* it is evident that Bergson does not mean this. Intuitive knowledge, as contrasted with instinct, can, so to speak, be held up before the mind for contemplation. But can we lay our finger on this distinction and say further wherein it consists? Unless we can do so the case for intuition as cognitive falls to the ground.

There is, I believe, one condition on which intuition may be acquitted of the charge of being identical with either feeling or action. It is a condition nowhere explicitly formulated by Bergson, though it is implied in at least one place in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*. If, in the life of knowledge, there is an organic bond between analysis and intuition by virtue of which the one process pays into the other, then we can define the function of intuition in terms of a process complementary with analysis. If we may conceive of our temporal knowing as 'a movement'

¹ *Introduction*, p. 7.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

in which we can distinguish the two moments of intuition and analysis, then we can discern in the former the fruitfulness which Bergson attributes to it. But not otherwise.

The meaning of this claim will appear if we recall the statement already made, that intuition consists in "seeing how predicates belong together." In other words, the richness and the significance of an intuition are dependent upon the amount of analysis that has preceded it. An intuition obtained by merely abandoning the work of concept-forming and concept-weaving is an unintelligent blur into which nothing has gone and from which nothing will emerge. To take the previous example: one may read the adventures of the hero in the novel in two very different ways: young-girl-fashion, with a readiness of sympathy hardly to be distinguished from an ill-balanced sentimentality, with many a melting moment, and with a multiplicity of thrills denied to the colder critical intelligence; or one may keep alert one's powers of criticism and analysis, studying the character now from this angle, now from that, and finally fuse those judgments in a sympathetic act whereby one perceives how all the different traits of the hero are indeed expressions of one character. The first will be an intuition which has ignored or rejected the work of analysis; the second, one which has meaning because it builds upon and supplements that undertaking.

It is necessary to add that in certain places in the *Introduction* Bergson has indicated such a connection between the two processes which elsewhere he treats as not only temporally exclusive of each other, but as by nature antithetical. The most striking of these is the following. "We do not obtain an intuition from reality—that is an intellectual sympathy with the most intimate part of it—unless we have won its confidence by a long fellowship with its superficial manifestations. . . . Even in the simple and privileged case which we have used as an example, even for the direct contact of the self with the self, the final effort of distinct intuition would be impossible to anyone who had not combined and compared with each other a very large number of psychological analyses."¹ This is a clear recognition of the claim we are

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 91-92.

making; but my contention is that Bergson has not given to the principle that explicit formulation which its importance demands. There are discrepancies, as we have seen, in his account, which would not be present if he had given us a clear distinction between the two levels upon which intuitions can take place: the pre-analytical and the post-analytical. Further, we should not have had those expressions in *l'Evolution Créatrice* and elsewhere, implying that intuition was a self-sufficient method of knowing a thing, and therefore one which had nothing to gain from analysis; nor should we have statements to the effect that intuition demanded the doing of a certain violence to the intelligence. The following passage seems to me genuinely misleading if the one just quoted is to be regarded as containing Bergson's definitive view of the relation between intuition and analysis. "If there exists any means of possessing a reality absolutely instead of knowing it relatively, of placing oneself within it instead of looking at it from outside points of view, of having the intuition instead of making the analysis: in short, of seizing it without any expression, translation, or symbolic representation—metaphysics is that means. *Metaphysics then is the science which claims to dispense with symbols.*"¹ But if metaphysics be "integral experience" that is just what it should not claim to do.

Here, then, is where I find Bergson's doctrine unsatisfactory. It is clear that he has made out a case for an intuitive type of knowledge and has indicated its fruitfulness. One can agree, too, that analysis and intuition cannot be carried on simultaneously. But it is not necessary to infer, as Bergson in places infers, that this temporal alternation involves a total discontinuity. This very alternation may have its roots in an underlying bond of connection wherein each movement contributes by correction and supplementation to the life of the other. Intuition without analysis is dumb and empty; analysis without intuition is fragmentary and unfinished.

That Bergson should have laid little emphasis on this may be attributed to two causes.

First, when he is dealing with intuition for itself and not as

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

antithetical to analysis, he tends to regard it as yielding a knowledge, which, as exhaustive, renders any other type of knowledge superfluous. But for the most part he reveals its character *by contrast* with analysis. It is this method of treatment which obscures the fact that intuition, in isolation, is inarticulate, and merges into feeling or action; for, unconsciously, we conceive the contrast to exist not merely in the mind of the author but actually *in rebus*. We come to believe that intuition makes good the defects of analysis not only in thought but in the actual process of knowing itself; that they are not merely contrasted ways of knowing, but reciprocal functions. But once realize that this is a vital distinction; once try to take intuition as self-sufficient in independence of analysis, and you find that you cannot make for it the claims Bergson makes. It is all he says it is only if it completes the work of analysis.

The second reason is to be found in the different types of objects which Bergson thinks intuition and analysis respectively best fitted to know. The one introduces us to a comprehension of life, movement, change; the other deals not with what is in the making but with what is already made, with the inert, the material, the fixed. Now it is perhaps natural to infer that cognitive processes will differ as widely as do the classes of objects with which they respectively deal. At any rate I believe that Bergson has been led to magnify the chasm between intuition and analysis in part because he is conscious of the incommensurability of life and mechanism. It seems as if the way of knowing the latter could have nothing to contribute to the knowing of the former.¹ And if the processes are as disparate as their objects we may well regard them as disconnected in the life of the mind.

But at this point an obvious criticism occurs. If we can pass from intuition to analysis, and if "we do not obtain an intuition from reality unless we have won its confidence by a long fellowship," then the inference must be wrong. There must be some continuity between the two and the distinction between them must fall within knowledge itself. Further, if we can establish

¹ *Introduction*, p. 47.

a contrast between them on the basis of their different fortunes in knowing *the same kind of object*, e. g., motion, then they must both be varieties of a common way of knowing. In this case the same conclusion would follow.

To gain further light, let us ask: In what way do we know motion?

There is a certain device by which epistemological idealists have sometimes irritated their opponents. If, in realistic mood, I say to an idealist that experience is a process wherein ideas are constantly meeting not only fulfilment, but correction, surprise, defeat; and that these are not included within their meaning, I may receive the answer: Every idea looks for correction; every idea expects the unexpected; these are part of its intention. This is as though in the face of my boasted impartiality I were to be told that I was displaying only my partiality for impartiality. The principle is in both cases the same; but it is far from frivolous. It is this: there can be no such thing for a mind as a no-interest; for to name such a region of no-interest is to declare it a possible interest of the mind. Point in any direction you like:—to Herbert Spencer's Unknowable, to the ineffable One of mystic speculation, to Bergson's motion—and say: There the mind cannot go. You only confess that the mind can, if it will, find here material for contemplation. Else why should you warn me off? It is the law maketh me to sin by making me conscious of my powers; and by declaring anything as outside the scope of idea you only create a temptation for me and a contradiction for yourself. In short, the only thing that can limit idea is idea itself. Now let us apply this to Bergson. He has already told us that we can have an interest in motion, that we can distinguish it from all other happenings, that we can recognize it: in short, that we can have an idea of it. And so the real difficulty to which he calls attention is not "the difficulty of grasping motion in idea, but . . . the difficulty of putting the idea of motion into terms of the idea of rest. The incommensurables are both in the region of ideas."¹ If this be so, we may, without cancelling

¹ W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, pp. 86–87. I am particularly indebted to Professor Hocking at this point.

or minimizing the problems which Bergson has brought to notice, recognize the possibility of some continuity between the two processes and understand how they may be mutually auxiliary.

We may bring together the results of our criticism by indicating the way in which growth in knowledge exhibits intuition and analysis in interaction. Let us take as an example the knowledge of the self by the self. We have to admit that the self is never a *mere* datum; what knowledge I have of myself is largely the result of interpretation. The materials for this interpretation are supplied from many sources: experience with its surprises or confirmations teaches me to know my powers; the signs of social approval or disapproval are there for me to understand. It is important to notice the nature of the cognitive process involved in this problem of interpretation. To begin with, each datum is a predicate which claims to represent the nature of the self. The problem of self-knowledge is the task of fitting these predicates together so as to form 'a consistent picture' of the self. Many of our predicates seem incompatible with each other, and we seek a formula which will reconcile them. And now, if we let the term analysis cover all this business of predicate-forming and predicate-weaving, may we regard it as a self-sufficient way of knowing? Obviously not. For this interpretation presupposes a relatively simple knowledge of the self as a whole, a knowledge which no analysis could give. How could I be conscious of an incompatibility between predicates unless I knew in some fashion the whole of which they claim to be true? There would be no problem of interpretation unless each predicate were attached to the same subject; there could be no growth in knowledge unless the same subject of all predicates were consciously intended from beginning to end of the process. There must be possible some anticipatory knowledge of the goal of knowledge. I am learning about the self continually, and yet in some sense I know this self all the time. In other words, if analytical knowledge is to be possible, there must also be another kind of knowledge which provides a framework within which the business of predicate-connection can take place.¹ And to this we may well give the name intuition.

¹ Cf. Hocking, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-97.

But, further, not only does this knowledge of the whole or of the subject give unity to any interpretation, but as continual critic of the interpretational process it at once corrects it and keeps it to its task. For there is a danger, a danger to which as practical beings we are exposed, that a predicate may claim to exhaust the nature of the subject.¹ The corrective of this is some knowledge of the self in its simple entirety. That knowledge assures me that the self is more than any one of its predicates; but, at the same time, it sets me inquiring what this more can be; it keeps me to the specific task of finding more predicates and combining them with those I already possess. This knowledge of the whole, silently operative, keeps alive that dissatisfaction with present attainment which is the source of all advance in interpretation.

This knowledge of the whole is, however, itself subject to development. The growing complexity of the world of interpretation is not without its effect upon the subject of all these predicates; and, since what we know in intuition is 'the one of these many,' that unity is all the richer for being the one of many predicates. This is the direction in which intuition instead of supplementing analysis, is supplemented by it.

I have spoken so far as though both these processes took place simultaneously, as though they paid into one another at every step. As a fact, however, Bergson is right in insisting that in the order of time they must be employed separately. It seems to me true that, while in some sense, subject-knowledge is continually present—else it could never be recovered—yet in the work of interpretation it has a way of being lost or wearing out. From time to time, then, it is necessary to abandon all analysis and recover in an intuitive experience something of the simplicity and wholeness of that which is being interpreted. We know what it is to heap comment upon comment, to add distinction to distinction, until all unity and meaning disappear in this mass of detail. Bergson has rightly emphasized the fact that the analytical method does not contain within itself the

¹ By this I mean that every specialism—and we are all specialists—tries to drain the whole self into its channel: a man says I am *mere* scholar, scientist, artist, or whatever it may be. He takes the predicate as exhaustive of himself.

principle of its own correction. For the recovery of all that we mean by perspective and proportion we must switch the attention to the subject in its wholeness. On the other hand, this whole-knowledge is incomplete in itself. Like the mystical moment everywhere in life, it is 'a good place to reach, but a bad place to stay at.' If it seek to perpetuate itself it becomes the parent of sentimentality, of states of 'fusion,' which grow less and less articulate and are certainly not freighted with any burden of knowledge. Unless from it the mind is driven forth once more to the work of forming concepts and spinning connections between them, the insight of intuition is making a claim which cannot be upheld: it is claiming to confer an exhaustive knowledge. But, if we are right, this will come, if at all, only from some marriage of the two processes, from some just alternation between them which will measure the health of the life of knowledge.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Psychology, General and Applied. By HUGO MÜNSTERBERG. New York and London, D. Appleton & Co., 1914.—pp. xiv, 487.

The sanction for adding a new textbook to the present "bewildering variety," is, as the author explains, the inclusion of applied, of social, and of purposive psychology. This three-fold sanction determines in large measure the principal divisions of the work.

The contents of the first part (Book I) will be familiar to those who know Professor Münsterberg's earlier writings on psychology. The pages suggest, however, that biology has latterly exerted a strong influence on the author's conception of psychological problems. The tendency to an uncritical use of terms descriptive of mental process and mental function, of stimulus, and of object of perception, memory, and thought, is presumably to be referred to a compromise with the physical sciences of life. The general result of this compromise is a mild sort of teleology in which the organism is always seeking its ends,—a teleology which exalts, *e. g.*, the æsthetic functions of the eye and the ear, while it allows a "lower type of service" to the senses of smell, taste, and touch. The stress laid upon biological values leads up easily to the part on Purposive Psychology (Book II); but it scarcely sets a good example to the reader who is expected to "be loyal to the chosen one-sidedness with which we follow mental life at first only on the one [the causal], and then only on the other [the purposive] side." In some of the social chapters, where union, personal influence, submission, and achievement are discussed, the author finds it still more difficult to heed his previous "warning against a purposive interpretation in the midst of causal psychology." To substitute (in causal psychology) the weal of the body—"a biologically useful result"—for the purposes of the mind is not so much to set cause over against purpose as to set one kind of end in the place of another. If this substitution is a real confusion, it may result from a gradual change of position or of interest. To regard all conscious processes as causally determined through the body is a defensible principle; but a principle better suited,—as it seems to the present writer,—to the author's earlier descriptive and explanatory studies than to his attempt to interpret the individual and society in the presence of biological theory.

It may profitably be questioned whether the insistence on a causal psychology, which is now spoken of as an attempt to solve an "unnatural problem," is quite relevant to Münsterberg's present purposes; but it does, at all events, imply a fixed doctrine as regards standpoint and method. The same cannot be said of the inclusion of a psychology of purposes. For many years the author has insisted¹ that the category of purpose finds its proper application in life and in philosophy—not in psychology. This shift of position, which brings appreciation and 'understanding,' as well as explanation, within the science, is, to the psychologist, the most interesting part of the textbook. Precisely what a rehabilitation of purpose from philosophical and prescientific days would involve, it has not been easy to forecast. I fear that most psychologists, having succeeded in the elimination of the gross mind of common sense, would have had neither the courage nor the generosity to make scientific friends again with "life interests" or—otherwise phrased—with "the immediate reality of the inner life."

The view of the book that causal and purposive psychologies are complementary leads us to expect that the two points of view will furnish complementary bodies of scientific fact. This expectation is not realized. Purposive psychology is elaborated under the topics, immediate reality, the soul, meaning, creation, and practical and ideal relations. Although psychology of this brand is said to depend upon "a thorough study and analysis of actual facts," the reader is given instead two things: to wit, (1) the well-known distinction between reality and the "mere" constructions of science, between the continuity of purposes and the continuity of causes, between identity of soul and identity of matter, between a system of purposes and a system of mechanical changes, and (2) a discussion of the special functions of the soul in (a) the individual and (b) the social experiences.

¹ "Psychology is thus a special abstract construction . . . which has nothing to assert in regard to the interpretation and appreciation of our real freedom and duty, our real values and ideals." *Psychology and Life*, 1899, vii. "Psychology degenerates into an unphilosophical psychologism . . . if it does not understand that it works only from one side, and that the other side, the reality which is not existence, and therefore no possible object of psychology and natural science, is the primary reality." *Ibid.*, p. 33. "The objects of the scientific judgments are without value." *Eternal Values*, 1909, 23. "We can easily recognize that voluntaristic psychology has essentially to answer questions which find their natural place in the field of logic, ethics, æsthetics, philosophy of history and religion, and that the name of psychology ought to be left simply to that other group which deals in a descriptive and explanatory way with the inner experience." *Ibid.*, 17-18. Cf. *Science and Idealism*, 1906; *Psychotherapy*, 1909, and *On The Witness Stand*, etc., 1912.

Now it is obvious that the crux of the author's problem of uniting these two parallel accounts of mind in such a way as to draw therefrom an "Applied Psychology" (Book III) rests just upon his ability to give an empirical scientific account of the "special functions of the soul." It is, then, a disappointment to read that the materials for this account "seem in pitiful contrast to the claims on which we have insisted," and that "we shall confine ourselves to the statement of the problems and their bearing" because "at present it would be a vain undertaking to present even in outline the facts of purposive psychology." The main contents of purposive psychology lie hidden, that is to say, in paralipomena reserved for the future. "This science of the purposive behavior of the soul may bring together in future just as many special facts as our handbooks of causal psychology can marshal today." The whole structure of applied psychology, which is the main issue of the parallel treatment, rests, therefore,—so we must conclude,—upon hope, hope expressed in a preliminary fragment on the identity of the soul. Yet without application ("the technical use of psychology"), "causal psychology would be a scholarly attempt to solve an unnatural problem." Causal psychology points, then, to application, without which it is abortive; but application demands a science of purposes, and a scientific presentation of purposes is, at present, a "vain undertaking." Must we agree that this "important and valuable [applied] science" is for the time being upheld, on the one side, by faith in a future science of soul-acts and, on the other, by academic interference in an "unnatural problem"?¹ Even those psychologists who are more concerned with empirical descriptions of consciousness than with the sanctions for a technology would hesitate, I am sure, to believe that the case of "applied psychology" is so desperate.

But what of "applied psychology" as it is actually written out in the volume? Precisely how does it redeem the "scholarly attempt

¹ It is difficult to reconcile the epithet "unnatural" with the declaration that "the results of psychological technic must remain superficial without a solid foundation of theoretical psychology, and this must be laid without any side-thought of practical usefulness." There is at least comfort in the admission that "the greatest technical triumphs were always won through the work of scientists who did not think of the practical achievements but exclusively of theoretical truth," as well as in the statement,—evidently inspired by a different mood, if not by a different system of eternal values,—that "we ought to devote ourselves to the discovery of truth without asking how far the truth can be used to bake our daily bread." Possibly we ought not (except in the cleavages of double personality) to expect the single soul, "identical with itself," to exhibit perfect consistency in the assumption of two opposing points of view.

to solve an unnatural problem"? Again, precisely how does it make use of the prolegomena to any future psychology of purposes which can lay claim to the rank of science?

The author draws a clear distinction between the use of psychological facts in related theoretical disciplines, as in history, and the practical applications of psychology, *i. e.*, psychotechnics. It is to the latter that he chiefly devotes himself in Book III. Scrutiny of the chapters which treat of education, law, medicine, commerce, and culture makes it evident that his principal reference is to causal psychology. Facts, methods, principles, laws, and results are drawn from the ordinary psychological sources and applied to practical problems. What of 'purpose'? Purpose turns out to be the purpose of the educator ("the more immediate purposes which are common to all educational systems": "three pedagogical ends which exist for every educator"), of the jurist (the purpose of getting evidence, of extracting the truth, etc.), of the merchant, of the physician, and of "civilization." That is to say, causal psychology is applied to the pupil, the criminal, the motorman, the epileptic, the florist, and the cardplayer: purposive psychology is applied to the men who reflect upon the problems of education, medicine, law, and the rest. Just what we should not expect from a "complete psychology [which] must deal with the whole mental life" from two points of view;—a psychology which creates a plastic stereogram by the combination of two flat monocular views (p. 17). How the purpose of the educator or the judge, combined with the causally related processes of memory and association in the pupil or the criminal is to "blend into one plastic view of personality, with the true depth and fullness of real life," is not made clear. The mere scholastic who essays the unnatural problem of description would rather expect rivalry, if not a permanent strabismus. However, this may be another case of divided personality.¹

In fine, the 'purposes' of Book II appear in Book III as the problems of practice. Since these problems must,—as everyone will now admit,—be taken over by the psychologist or by someone else from practice, it would appear a simpler procedure (at least in a general textbook) clearly to formulate and then to attack them than to look for apologies and sanctions in the philosophy of the will. In the reviewer's opinion, these problems lie outside psychology just as much

¹ "So far the author in me has presented a case of double personality . . . neither knew what the other was doing," *Eternal Values*, 1909, p. vii. *Suus cuique mos!*

after they have been distilled in the alembic of the philosopher as they did before. However, he does not overlook the prefatory permission to skip; and, moreover, he willingly shares the author's hope that, at some future time, it will not "be a vain undertaking to present even in outline the facts of purposive psychology." When that time shall have come, we can tell better than now whether psychology, either in itself or in its applications, is enriched by a doctrine of the purposive soul. At present, the volume under consideration furnishes new evidence that the successful application of psychological facts and laws to the arts and the professions rests, in large measure, upon differential psychology,—a *causal* branch of the science. In making clever use of the psychology of individual differences, the author, who has a sympathetic and kindly interest in the affairs of practical life, has given us the best brief account of the applications that our language affords.

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What Is Living and What Is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel. By BENEDETTO CROCE. Translated from the original text of the third Italian edition (1912) by DOUGLAS AINSLIE. London, Macmillan and Company, 1915.—pp. xviii, 217.

As the title indicates, the aim of the present volume is two-fold. On the one hand, the author hopes to set forth what seems to him the basic truth for which Hegel contended, and which he has left as a legacy to later thinkers; while, on the other hand, he is interested in disclosing the error into which Hegel permitted himself to fall—the error which is the fountain-head of the well-known difficulties experienced by the student of Hegel. "It is not my intention," he informs us, "to offer in these pages a complete exposition of Hegel's system, nor even of his logical doctrine; but rather to concentrate all attention upon the most characteristic part of his thought, upon the new aspects of truth revealed by him, and upon the errors which he allowed to persist or in which he became entangled" (p. 8).

The most characteristic part of the Hegelian system, the part with which the author finds himself in complete agreement and which he thinks all must admit the truth of, is the doctrine of the synthesis of opposites, the doctrine which Hegel called *dialectic*—"a most simple principle, and so obvious that it deserves to be placed among those symbolized by the egg of Christopher Columbus" (p. 19). "The opposites are not illusion, neither is unity illusion. The opposites

are opposed to one another, but they are not opposed to unity. For true and concrete unity is nothing but the unity, or synthesis, of opposites. It is not immobility, it is movement. It is not fixity, but development. The philosophic concept is a concrete universal, and therefore a thinking of reality as at once united and divided. Only thus does philosophic truth correspond to poetic truth, and the pulse of thought beat with the pulse of things" (pp. 19-20). The concrete universal, "with its synthesis of opposites, expresses life and not the corpse of life; it gives the *physiology*, not the *anatomy*, of the real" (p. 21).

Having stated what he regards as the essence of the Hegelian dialectic, the author next proceeds to defend it against certain objections which have been more or less frequently raised against it, but which, he thinks, are based upon misconception of its real nature. The objection, for example, that the opposites in the triad, if *identical* as Hegel tries to prove they are, cannot give the dialectical advance is based upon a confusion between the merely negative aspect of the dialectic and its positive content (p. 25). Another objection, that the dialectic tacitly introduces an element of sense or intuition, forgets that Hegel "has destroyed that false concept of a barren and formal logic as an arbitrary abstraction, and to the true logical concept he has given a character of concreteness . . ." (p. 27). Nor does the doctrine of the synthesis of opposites destroy the principle of identity and contradiction. "So far from destroying the principle of identity, Hegel gives it new life and force, makes it what truly it ought to be and what in ordinary thought it is not. . . . If attention be paid to the words of Hegel alone, we might say that he does not believe in the principle of identity; but if we look closer, we see that what Hegel does not believe in is the *fallacious use of the principle of identity*—the use made of it by those abstract thinkers who retain unity by cancelling opposition, or retain opposition by cancelling unity; or, as he says, the principle of identity taken as a 'law of the abstract intellect'" (pp. 30-31).

This doctrine of the synthesis of opposites, which, though implicit in the development of philosophy from the beginning (chapter II), is, nevertheless, "to be considered a true and original discovery of Hegel" (p. 49), leads to a new conception of reality. "All the dualities, all the fissures, all the *hiatus*, and, so to speak, all the rents and wounds with which reality shows itself to be lacerated by the abstract intellect, are filled, closed and healed. A complete unity (*gediegene Einheit*) is realized: the coherence of the organic whole is re-estab-

lished; blood and life again circulate within it" (pp. 52-53). What is real is rational, and what is rational is real. Hegel can be called neither an optimist nor a pessimist. "Good and evil are opposed and correlative terms; and the affirmation of the one is the affirmation of the other. Hegel, who denies both, while preserving both in the dialectic synthesis, is beyond both optimism and pessimism, high up on that philosophic Olympus, where there is neither laughter nor tears; for laughter and tears have become objects for spirit, and their agitation is overcome in the serenity of thought, as in the concreteness of life" (pp. 59-60). Nor is Hegel to be considered merely a conservative spirit in the realm of politics. His conception of life "was so philosophical that conservatism, revolution, and restoration, each in turn, finds its justification in it" (p. 66). For the Hegelian philosophy all history, "the very reality of the idea," becomes sacred history; it is radically irreligious because it resolves religion into itself, and yet it is supremely religious because it seeks to satisfy in a rational manner the need for religion (pp. 69-71).

"The perpetual youth of the Hegelian philosophy, its indomitable vigour, its unexhausted fecundity lie, then, in the logical doctrine, and in the thought effectively in conformity with that doctrine. And its vigour, fecundity, and youth are increasingly apparent even in our own day, which is marked by a new efflorescence of neurotic mysticism, and of insincere religiosity, by an antihistorical barbarism engendered by positivism, and the Jacobinism which frequently ensues in these conditions. Whoever feels the dignity of man and the dignity of thought can find satisfaction in no other solution of conflicts and of dualisms than in the dialectical, the solution won by the genius of Hegel" (p. 71).

Despite the fact that the author discovers such an indisputable and basic principle in the Hegelian system, he is convinced that the system is vitiated by an equally basic error which serves as the justification for the objection commonly raised by critics of Hegel that his system is abstract, intellectualistic, and full of arbitrary assertions which are contrary to fact. The rest of the book is devoted to the disclosure of this error and the consequences which it entails.

Summarily stated, the error consists in confusing the theory of opposites with the theory of distincts. The theory of opposites we have already considered, and is illustrated by the first triad of the dialectic, namely, *being*, *non-being*, and *becoming*. Opposites taken out of relation to each other are not concepts, but only abstractions; thus, being and non-being apart from becoming are pure abstractions.

In the dialectic of opposites, therefore, the only concrete concept is the synthesis; thesis and antithesis, apart from the synthesis, are vacuous. This, however, is not true of 'distinct' concepts. These are "not in a relation of mutual indifference, but of lower and higher degree" (p. 86). The relation between distincts, therefore, is not the same as the relation between opposites. For of two distinct concepts, for example, art and philosophy, intuition and thought, and so forth, while the one may be abstract without the other, yet, in connection with the other, it is equally real and concrete. "a and b [art and philosophy] are two concepts, the second of which would be abstract without the first, but which, in connection with the first, is as real and concrete as it is" (p. 90). It is erroneous, therefore, to conceive of the connection of distincts and the connection of opposites as being one and the same; to treat the relation of degrees dialectically, in the manner of the dialectic of opposites, is not permissible. This Hegel did, and herein lies his fatal blunder. "The error is not such as can be corrected incidentally, nor is it an error of diction: it is an essential error . . . from it arises, if I am not mistaken, all that is philosophically erroneous in the system of Hegel" (pp. 98-99).

"The application of the dialectic of opposites to the relation of distincts, carried out with full logical seriousness . . . was bound to entail, as it did, a double consequence. On the one hand, what are *philosophical errors* came to acquire the dignity of partial or particular concepts, that is, of *distinct concepts*; and on the other, what are really *distinct concepts* were lowered to the level of simple attempts at truth, to incomplete and imperfect truths; that is to say, they assume the aspect of *philosophical errors*" (p. 100). The first result of this confusion is seen in the structure of the *Logic* where errors (the categories?) are treated as distinct concepts and where the attempt is made to apply to error the method proper to truth (p. 111). The second result is most clearly evident in the philosophy of history and the philosophy of nature; the absurdities that arise from this confusion in Hegel's thought are here very numerous, the crowning absurdity of them all being the application of the dialectic to individual facts and empirical concepts.

Space will not allow us to follow further the author's detailed discussion of the manifold difficulties into which Hegel finds himself plunged by his failure to differentiate between the theory of opposites and the theory of distinct concepts. But with the statement of this confusion of thought we have before us the essence of our author's criticism. With this statement our summary of the book must conclude.

With the purpose of the book the present reviewer finds himself in hearty accord. He is convinced that the system of Hegel is only partly vital, that there is much of it which must be relegated to the curiosity-shop of philosophical antiquities, and that, when this is done, the message which Hegel has for the present day will be more easily understood. He, therefore, welcomes every serious effort, such as this volume exemplifies, to separate the wheat from the chaff, the living from the dead, of the Hegelian philosophy. But he is constrained to question whether the philosopher of Naples has been able—in the enthusiastic words of the translator's introduction—"to unravel the gorgeous yet tangled skein of his [Hegel's] system, and supply to all future students the clue of Ariadne."

In the first place, Croce's interpretation of the Hegelian doctrine of the concrete universal raises doubts and perplexities in the reader's mind. He apparently makes that doctrine to all intents and purposes synonymous with the dialectic of opposites, the synthesis of abstract elements, such as is illustrated by the first triad of the *Logic*; and, what is more serious, he conceives of the 'moments' of the synthesis, that is, thesis and antithesis, as mere abstract opposites which have absolutely no significance except in their reference to the synthesis. To me, at least, this is directly contrary to Hegel's real meaning. I had all along supposed that the doctrine of the concrete universal possessed no necessary connection with the famous—or infamous—dialectic; certainly it had never occurred to me that the *concreteness* of the synthesis is to be found in the fact that it synthesizes two disparate and empty abstractions! It has long been my conviction that the dialectic, as it is illustrated in the *Logic*, has little value except in a very vague and general application: but I have also felt that the doctrine of the concrete universal is the one in which Hegel brings to fruition the spirit of the Critical Philosophy. If I am mistaken in this, all I can say is that the Hegelian doctrine of the concrete universal is by far less significant than I had come to think. If Croce's interpretation is right, then let us send the concrete universal to the lumber-room too!

The author's main contention, that Hegel confuses the doctrine of the synthesis of opposites with that of the synthesis of 'distincts,' likewise seems to me erroneous. As I read Hegel, what he really preaches is only the doctrine of distincts, the doctrine of the degrees of reality if one prefers, and not the doctrine of the synthesis of 'opposites' at all. If by 'opposites' are meant abstract and vacuous terms, which, taken by themselves, are absolutely without meaning,

then I cannot see that the doctrine of opposites is anywhere admitted by Hegel. Even in the first triad of the *Logic*—the triad which Croce constantly cites as the best example of the synthesis of opposites—thesis and antithesis are not ‘opposites’ in this sense. As Hegel views the matter, ‘being’ certainly has an element of truth in it and is, therefore, not a bare abstraction; and the same is equally true of ‘non-being.’ Of course, Hegel does say that becoming is the first concrete concept, and that being and non-being are abstract; but he also says that the whole section of the *Logic* entitled Being, of which this first triad is only a very small part, is abstract as compared with the last section, the Notion, which is concrete. The aim of the dialectic “is to study things in their own being and movement and thus to demonstrate the finitude of the partial categories of the understanding” (*Enc.*, section 81; italics mine). The truth of the matter seems to be that Hegel thought of being, non-being, becoming, and the other categories as ‘distincts,’ degrees of reality, and not as opposites—a view which becomes more and more explicit as the dialectic advance goes on. And besides this theory of the synthesis of degrees the dialectic seems to me to have no other meaning.

What confusion there is here, then, would appear to emerge from the misinterpretation which Croce places upon the Hegelian thought. And, if I am not mistaken, the critic’s misinterpretation is to be traced ultimately to his tacit assumption that the categories with which the *Logic* deals are high and lifted up, possessing no reference to perception at all (cf. pp. 26–27),—an assumption which, I am firmly convinced, is wholly without justification. But, as Kipling would say, “that is another story.”

I am glad to be able to end this review with a word of praise. The discussion is exceedingly stimulating and suggestive; time spent in reading it is time well spent. For the anti-historical spirit of the present day it is an admirable antidote. The book is beautifully printed. The reader could wish that time had been taken to add an index.

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The Idealistic Reaction Against Science. By PROFESSOR ALIOTTA. Translated by AGNES MCCASKELL. London, Macmillan & Co. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914.—pp. xiii, 483.

We are indebted to Miss Agnes McCaskill for this excellent translation of a work by Professor Aliotta of the Royal University of Padua. The book falls naturally into two parts: the former consisting

of a critical review of the opinions of others, and the latter giving, in highly condensed form, Professor Aliotta's own "outlines of a spiritualistic conception of the world." In number of words the concluding argument is but a minor part of the work, though in interest most readers will find it the more important, and will welcome the promise that, if the fates are propitious, it will receive a separate and more extended treatment in a subsequent volume. This latter portion forms, as may be surmised, an area of convergence for lines of thought developed during, or employed in, the preceding pages of critical review. The writer, like most others, reveals his own thought as he reviews that of other thinkers, and his own statement of belief gathers up and completes the revelation previously given in more scattered form.

The tendencies of modern thought are characterized, according to the writer, by a common reaction against intellectualism. This statement virtually opens the discussion, and we quickly perceive that this modern habit of refusing to assign an autonomous value to cognitive functions (this assignment being recognized by Aliotta as an adequate description of 'intellectualism') does not meet with approval. All sorts of arbitrary speculations, we are told, have entered through the door opened by anti-intellectualism; and pragmatism, with other characteristic lines of modern thought, is virtually classed with such eccentricities as theosophy, which are usually regarded as being outside the scope of profitable discussion. This and other comments prepare us to perceive that Aliotta has moved as violently towards intellectualism as modern thought has reacted from it. This imposes a limitation upon his conceptions that finds expression in his gibe that modern logic has substituted *sub specie generationis* for *sub specie æternitatis*. When he declares in his concluding argument that thought is the living model of all reality, he further betrays his blindness to the significance of the 'organism' and of the facts of 'generation', both to science and to the philosophy that can never be independent of biology or of the sciences with which it is connected through the latter.

This intellectualistic position ignores the derivative and secondary nature of the dynamic function of cognition. There is much that happens without cognition or, for that matter, without any consciousness at all. Physical and chemical forces apparently owe no part of their activity to consciousness, though thought may direct them and thus become secondarily dynamic. Vital processes and generation in general, the growth of the embryo in the womb, the life-process of

the plant, and, for the most part, of the animal, are dynamic without being conscious or cognitive. Mind, which is life attaining to conscious function, is generated, as far as appearance goes, from unconscious impulse and activity; and its primary rôle, particularly in its cognitive efforts, is that of spectator, though it be an eager spectator that takes a hand in the game. Deprived of the assistance of the unconscious dynamism, cognition is powerless. We may decide consciously and cognitively to move our arms, but our consciousness is a controlling agent only, and the movements really result from the operation of unconscious dynamism. To make cognition or thought the living model of *all* reality is to ignore the universal dynamism from which consciousness arises, or in connection with which it has its source, to perceive and control it more or less completely.

Throughout the volume, Professor Aliotta is very jealous for the absolute supremacy of consciousness. Darwinism is accused of emphasizing the utilitarian value of psychic life and of reducing forms of thought to the likeness of biological types that are in continuous process of formation by adaptation. The Unconscious of Von Hartmann really involves a higher consciousness than our own. Criticism is dealt out to Paulsen for subordinating intelligence to will, and to Nietzsche for describing knowledge as a manifestation by will towards power. Pragmatism is smitten shrewdly. Kant is treated more leniently, for, though he reduces the true to the good after the manner of the pragmatist, he avoids the latter's blatant opportunism by finding a universal norm of objective value for judgment in the law of duty. Spencer receives the ample meed of criticism that many writers still consider it necessary to bestow upon him. Dr. Johnson held that the best proof that poverty is an evil is the number of attempts made to prove that it is not. The suspicion constantly arises that the best proof of the soundness of Spencer's thinking is the numerous attempts to prove it unsound. Aliotta seeks to overwhelm him by exhibiting the direful results to which his principles have led. Like Darwinism, they prepared the way for the reaction against Intellectualism by explaining conscious life as a biological adaptation. The meaning of the history of science thus lay in needs of life and action, and this biological consciousness, through Avenarius and Mach, finally descended into the abyss of pragmatism. To be the parent of pragmatism is for Aliotta the clearest proof of philosophical turpitude.

Aliotta fails to recognize the full significance of his own criticism of mechanism, that evolution is qualitative transformation and the

fruitful genesis of individual forms. Consciousness may originate as a response to practical needs without remaining, during its total evolution, immersed in them. The *first* function of cognition is to supply information of practical utility to the organism, information that will enable it to move towards and secure its food, to escape danger and to perform its general routine of conduct. Once the cognitive habit is established in reference to practical activity it can become the basis of that wider human thought in which knowledge becomes an end in itself instead of a mere means to action. The instinct of curiosity might well develop as an assistance to conduct and then generate scientific and philosophical ardour. The animal investigates primarily to assure itself of safety, or to recognize a danger, or to discover a new source of satisfaction. In subsequent evolution the investigation centers on the knowledge obtained and is less closely bound to adaptation to environment. "Intelligence, on the other hand, could not be an instrument of action . . . did its ideas and norms not correspond in some way to objective reality." In these words, Professor Aliotta himself indicates how thought has benefitted by its development out of a consciousness devoted to practical ends, though he denies such origination. By aiming at knowledge for practical purposes, consciousness prepared the way for a further endeavour after knowledge itself, in place of exclusive preoccupation with knowledge for the sake of action. Life is a stern taskmaster, and if action is to be successfully guided by cognition that cognition must be adequately conformed to reality. The philosopher who seeks to expand the possibilities of thought is the fortunate inheritor of a consciousness that has been trained in such fundamental processes as perception by the stern discipline of ages to conform its cognitive habit to the realities around it. Limitation of scope and insight existed and exist, no doubt; for nature in her disciplinary methods accepts adequacy and does not insist on perfection, but adequacy she does demand. It is much to the good that the earlier cognitive habits of consciousness had to be rigorously adequate to the demands of life upon the organism; and the thought that, to alter Aliotta's statement, *is* "a function derived from other psychic activities which are not thought" is all the stronger for this early discipline of its progenitors. There is another side to the picture no doubt. Cognitive methods that work well for the purposes of practical activity may be misleading when consciousness applies them on the more speculative or theoretical side. The system has yet to be discovered in which advantage has not to be purchased by the acceptance of some degree of disadvantage.

The history of human thought is scarcely favorable to the view that, even with man, a reason adequate to the full grasp of all reality sprang full-born into the world like Minerva from the head of Zeus.

There is much that is sound in the critical attitude towards mechanism that pervades the book. The partial and abstract character of scientific schemes is justly insisted upon. The denial of a genetic relation between nature and consciousness which is used as a link in the final argument for the existence of an Absolute Consciousness seems, however, to involve fallacious reasoning. We travel in a circle, runs this argument, if we infer the generation of consciousness, which is cognitive activity, from nature as we conceive it, which is a product of this cognitive activity. There can be no such genetic relation because "nature is already invested with the forms of thought" through the cognitive activity of the mind which is supposed to issue from it. Since Aliotta himself recognizes that it "is undoubtedly true that nature does not exist only in the act of thought," he might reasonably be expected to distinguish between nature and our cognitive version of it. Consciousness could not arise from its own cognitive version of nature—this is all the argument amounts to. Its generation from nature apart from the latter's representation in a cognitive version remains a possibility. Otherwise we should deny that we were born of our mothers. Our knowledge of our parents is a cognitive version of them. But we issued from our mother's wombs, though this cognitive version did not, and could not, give us birth.

A genetic relation between consciousness and nature affords a more satisfactory explanation of the fact that "even before consciousness existed the world was adapted to transcription into our mathematical formulas and mental schemes," than Aliotta's contention that consciousness appears fully equipped with a scheme of categories into which the universe miraculously fits. The later comer has the task of adapting. Whether the earlier forms of consciousness can be said to be equipped with categories, which are simply highly generalized and abstract concepts, is very doubtful. In any case, the success of consciousness in its cognitive version of nature is most simply explained as the fruit of the commerce between the two—a commerce initiated and facilitated by the original genetic relation between them.

After excluding the generation of consciousness from nature, the further possibility of regarding them as the manifestations of one and the same substance, and the idealism that cuts the Gordian knot by embracing the "whole of reality in a single eternal act of thought

which is ever being renewed in the dialectical rhythm of its life," there remains the relation between human consciousness and the becoming of things, in which the former appears as the end to which the latter moves, and thought "projects its forms into things because it finds the significance of the world in itself." The Absolute Consciousness is then inferred because "an end which is not thought of by some consciousness is an epistemological absurdity," and the mind of man is the final phase in the eternal design, and nature is the phase preceding it. A passing comment on this epistemological version of the teleological argument might suggest that we know too little to assert that the mind of man is the final phase even in this world, or that it may not have been succeeded by further phases in spheres as yet inaccessible to us. Idealism is too curtly disposed of by referring to the intimate and private character of different consciousnesses that cannot penetrate one another directly. Idealism is not convicted of failure to explain "the simultaneous existence of various acts of thought" by comparing it to hysterical multiple personality. There are suggestions of polypsychism even in the normal mind. Multiple personality might be the pathological reflection in the individual human psyche of a normal polypsychism in the universal mind. In the same vein of easy assumption and dogmatism the human mind is established as the end to which the becoming of things moves—a process, it may be further remarked, that would seem to involve something very like a genetic relation. Something more rigorous in the way of proof that human consciousness is not only a mere result but the consequence of an intention is required to establish the existence of the Absolute Consciousness. The weakness of the argument does not end here. If plants can *reply* to stimuli and struggle to execute what would be called purposes in the case of conscious beings, then there may be aiming without conscious intention. If, as is quite possible, the study of animal instinct should force us to conceive the occurrence of unconsciously *directed* activity, Professor Aliotta's argument, tottering throughout, collapses like a house of cards.

The concluding effort to refute the charge of anthropomorphism against the conception of an Absolute Consciousness deserves attention, since there is much confusion on this point. Many writers argue, for example, that the postulation of a force at the back of things is as anthropomorphic as to postulate an intelligence or mind. Professor Aliotta confuses the issue in a similar way. 'Force' is, of course, a conception of the human mind, but this is not anthropomorphism. Theism is anthropomorphic because the idea of God conceives the

final cause after the manner and fashion of a man. 'Force,' on the other hand, is a conception deliberately designed to exclude, as far as possible, all likeness to human activity. There is obviously a difference between conceiving atoms as actuated by love and hate and as moved by bare mechanical propulsion. Both are human conceptions, but the first is anthropomorphic because the atoms are represented as like men, while in the second they are conceived as remotely as possible from human nature. Professor Aliotta follows the usual line of argument with its customary ignoring of the difference between *conceived in terms of human thought* and *conceived after the manner and fashion of a man*. Abstractly considered, the anthropomorphism of any conception, as far as argument is concerned, is an irrelevance, since this term is merely descriptive and has no bearing on validity. The anthropomorphism of Theism, *qua* anthropomorphism, is no objection to it. But it becomes a very valid objection indeed when evolution is conceived epigenetically. Epigenesis and anthropomorphism are sharply opposed to one another when the origin of things is in question. The latter regards man as originating in something similar to himself, the former leads to the conception of a primary condition very different from the mind that finally eventuated. This contrast has been systematically ignored throughout the particular "spiritualistic conception of the world" outlined by Professor Aliotta. He discards his own epigenetic criticism of mechanism that evolution is qualitative transformation and fruitful genesis of individual forms, and by seeking in a prior consciousness the *raison d'être* of human minds becomes blind to the direct teaching of experience that in the world of life the river flows higher than its source.

Final reference may be made to some interesting items in Aliotta's thought. There is an echo of Nietzsche's description of accident as the clashing of creative impulses in the suggestion that inert matter may result from the accidental meeting of spontaneous centers. Philosophy sees in the world a complex of real centers of spontaneous activities which, limiting one another externally, appear to be mechanical, inert and rigid, but are really, in the depth of their being, free tendency towards the ends of mind, mobile and living. This doctrine, combined with the psychological principle that consciousness is connected with blockage or arrested tendency, could easily lead one to regard consciousness as a product of evolution instead of as its prius. In the chapter on "The Theory of Models," the characteristically English habit, exemplified in Faraday, Kelvin, Maxwell and Lodge, of forming concrete representations of phenomena, is contrasted with the reduction of theory to a pure system of concepts and mathematical relations

practised by Rankine, Mach, Ostwald and Duhem. The nominalistic prejudice is traced in the ambiguous sense of 'representation' in such models. The 'model' is suited to Herz's notion that natural science has for its problem the adaptation of foresight to practice, but the concept alone furthers the real aim of science to grasp the universal and permanent. The image has the scientific office of symbolizing the concept and rendering it communicable. There is imageless thought. Physics is warned that it is sterile without the idea of force, and, in another place, mechanical causality is said to give transmission but not the origin of action. In an interesting discussion on motion, it is represented as a condition not less necessary to intelligibility than space or time, and chance is not responsible for the foundations of the temple of science being laid in mechanics. Motion is not reducible to pure quantitative relations.

There is a wealth of knowledge and power of exposition in the book. It is a pity that Professor Aliotta has not imbibed more completely the epigenetic spirit instead of insisting on the evolution principle that consciousness can only arise from consciousness. There is a failure to recognize that consciousness is a growing point of the universe, an apex on a wide base of matter, dynamism and unconscious vitality.

JOSHUA C. REYNOLDS.

GLASGOW.

La notion du nécessaire chez Aristote et chez ses prédécesseurs particulièrement chez Platon. Par J. CHEVALIER. Paris, Alcan, 1915.

—pp. ix, 304.

This book consists of an essay in two parts and three appendices. The essay deals with the concept of necessity as a factor in Greek philosophy; the appendices, though independent in form, are expanded notes on points which the text assumes as to (a) the order of the Platonic writings, (b) the relation of Aristotle to Plato, and (c) the chronology and composition of the Aristotelian writings. The essay occupies the first hundred and ninety pages; the appendices extend over another hundred, in spite of some reduction in the size of type. The book is in fact quite as much a collection of essays as a single treatise, though the first essay has theoretical interest and the remainder are historical.

Dr. Chevalier treats the subject of necessity comprehensively and thoroughly. He begins with the 'dread Goddess' of early superstition, sketches the nature-philosophy of Ionia and then follows the inevitable path through Eleatic doctrines to Socrates and Plato. Much of this material is common to all accounts of the Greek philosopher

and only serves the purpose of orientation. The author's knowledge of the literature of his subject is obviously wide and deep: he picks his way among alternatives of language and interpretation with full consciousness of what supports and what opposes his conclusions. As regards the central theme of necessity, this is found to be influenced by religion and mathematics. The first definite theory is due to Heraclitus whose idea of perpetual change rests on a basis of immutability as regards the ultimate matter and also immutability of the law of change. In other words, the Heraclitean change is perpetual exchange, not evolution. The Eleatics merely emphasized the immutability which Heraclitus had pointed out: the necessity of persistence and the necessity of change then became the dual basis of Atomism. But this atomism was vitiated by its mechanical attitude: it explained all things by motion without explaining motion, and therefore the teleological view was required to explain the very basis of atomism. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle present various phases of the answer to both atomism and scepticism. The particular achievement of Socrates was to make dialectic an instrument for the attainment of truth, by treating it as a means for disentangling the real from appearances, the Sophists having been content to treat it as primarily a play of words which left in the conclusion nothing but contradictory appearances. The position taken by Socrates "implies a new metaphysic" which, Dr. Chevalier thinks, Socrates himself did not develop but dying left the task to Plato and Aristotle. The essence of the later work is summed up as consisting in two main theses: pure unity (Eleatic) is abandoned for a plurality of Being (the Many) and effort is concentrated on establishing relations.

The specific quality of Plato's work is found to be the conception of system: the highest stage of knowledge, the sphere of dialectic, is not a mere highest universal but a wholly distinct grasp of reality through which the problems of Being and Becoming are solved. This solution, we are told, was reached by taking Being as essentially active (*δύναμις*). We must therefore regard Plato's Idea as cause rather than archetype. This brings into prominence the question of the relation between Ideas and Things, causes and effects; it culminates in the demand for a theory which shall explain the necessity of Becoming. Plato's later work is taken to be evidence that the Ideas were made active causes (rather than archetypes) by bringing them into organic relation with Non-Being. Hence reality as whole is not amenable to a purely analytic treatment, nor is Becoming either impossible or a mere emanation. This is at once the most important and the most recondite point which the author makes in his exposition

of Plato. It involves throughout a firm attitude toward Aristotle's criticisms, which we are explicitly told refer only to a *Platonisme déformée* or (in the appendix) to the weaker disciples. In common with other French interpreters of Plato, Dr. Chevalier believes that the Ideas are transcendent and immanent. He is also willing to credit Plato with all the essentials of the Aristotelian doctrines of Form and of Potentiality. The reader feels more or less directly called upon to revise his views of Platonism and may rightly ask where exactly the revision should be made. The answer seems to be that in Plato we can find the germs of a creative evolution (this book being, by the way, dedicated to M. Bergson). If Ideas are archetypes only, all Becoming is mere repetition (imitation and the like): if Ideas are wholly transcendent, there is no genuine causality; Plato's final view is that real causality lies in the end or purpose and this final causality is not the logical relation of genus and species but a dynamic (creative) activity. But the supremacy of this activity should make reality fully intelligible and therefore Platonism breaks upon the unintelligibility of the given. In addition to that Necessity which is Reason there is the necessity which resists reason, and the last phase is dualism.

We pass to Aristotle, who is presented as differing from Plato in temperament rather than in teaching, but none the less as differing profoundly. We cannot examine in detail the close and very interesting treatment to which the author subjects the Aristotelian logic. He makes the very stimulating assertion that the syllogism represents the analytic expression of necessary relations, that such relations must ultimately be reciprocal, but as the relatedness of the given is not reciprocal, the logical analysis rests always on hypothesis (the major premiss being hypothetical) and the logical necessity does not generate a real necessity. In plain language, the necessity expressed in the proposition 'All men are bipeds' is not the kind of necessity which compels any given individual to have two legs, for he may never develop them or may have lost them. By emphasizing potentiality and creating the *potential-actual* formula Aristotle hoped to solve the difficulties of change and motion. But so long as the movement is not itself necessary (as *e. g.*, when the acorn, potentially an oak, never actually matures), the logical analysis falls short of the real. Aristotle, in spite of progress in logical method, is left with his ultimate problem untouched: the truth is true but does not move, while that which moves and lives escapes from the circle of indisputable, *i. e.*, analytic truth.

These pages contain a very interesting development of the idea that we can find in Aristotle a struggle between logical and naturalistic tendencies; they shed light both directly and obliquely upon many points of Aristotelian doctrine; they provide food for reflection and show most instructively how persistent were the chief lines of thought in Greek philosophy. In the end the author sees all Greek philosophy marred by the idea of change as mere exchange: the circular movement pervades it from Heraclitus to Aristotle. The one thing lacking was the idea of a real creation, a beginning of new forms. This idea was known to the Hebrews and through it Greek philosophy was capable of amendment. By tracing the movement of Greek thought as it oscillated between the one and the many, the necessary and the contingent, the essence and the accidents, the form and the matter, Dr. Chevalier has given us a valuable introduction to the ultimate problems. We fail entirely to see how these problems are to be solved on the basis of an original free creative act. For Christian thought, says our author, God is infinite and perfect. As a principle of explanation this seems to require for its complement the Platonic notion that the divine government is sometimes relaxed. Also we cannot agree that the Greeks were wrong in preferring the finite to the infinite as an ultimate category. Unless we entirely misunderstand the author, this conclusion is an aberration for which the previous exegesis does not prepare us. To rescue Plato and Aristotle from ill-deserved accusations of being hopelessly formalistic was a crusade worth undertaking; to present them finally as marred by want of a creation-hypothesis seems little short of an anti-climax.

The appendices bring together many interesting details concerning the development of Platonic and Aristotelian criticism, going back to the early movements of the nineteenth century. The chapter on the relations of Plato and Aristotle and the way in which they have been understood by earlier and later theorists, especially Natorp and Robin, deserves to be noted as particularly instructive. A panoramic view of such a subject brings into relief the many currents of thought which have from time to time been rediscovered in Plato and made the foundations of those revolutions which Plato continually survives. There was room for another statement of this subject after and as a sequel to Lutoslawski: the second appendix of this book supplies what was wanted and may be commended along with the rest of the book as an item not to be overlooked by anyone who keeps in touch with the best books on ancient philosophy.

G. S. BRETT.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Probleme der Entwicklung des Geistes. Die Geistesformen. Von SEMI MEYER. Leipzig, Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1913.—pp. vi, 429.

Recent advances in philosophy, psychology, and biology have been such as to render less premature an attempt at a truly evolutionary account of the emergence of the human modes of apprehension and action out of the simplest forms of consciousness. We have come to understand more fully the implications of the concept 'evolution,' as well as to consider more carefully the truth involved in Goethe's dictum that "the concept of genesis is entirely denied us, so that anything observed in the act of origination is thought to have already existed"—we are becoming increasingly sceptical of the philosophical significance of the terms 'implicit' and 'potential,' at least in their earlier and uncritical uses. Biology and animal psychology, meanwhile, have arrived at numerous conclusions, of however tentative a nature, concerning the characteristics of various levels of animal minds; genetic psychology has brought to light many facts relating to the rise and development of mental capacities in the life of the individual; perfected methods of investigation and keener analysis have disclosed more fully the diversity and complexity of the functions of the human mind, and, more especially, the marked differences between these functions and those characteristic of the lower animals. Of the general results of these various lines of research the author of the present treatise would seem to possess a fairly extensive, though scarcely an exact or a detailed, knowledge. His point of view is similar in certain respects to that underlying the *L'Évolution créatrice*. No less emphatically than Bergson and with greater consistency—consider the implications of the latter's principle of 'dissociation'—does he insist that evolution must be regarded as a succession of creations. This succession, it is maintained, can in no wise be regarded as teleologically directed. The human species is neither the goal nor the terminus of the process; every form of life is complete in itself in that its nature is suitably adapted to its mode of existence just as in the case of man. Development is always complete, though never at an end. Hence, Meyer holds, it lies beyond our comprehension to understand precisely how or why genuinely new forms of life or mental capacities may come into being. He contends, however, that such novelties are the result of the interaction or of the synthesis of previously existing elements or functions. "Two are always able to accomplish, not only more than one, but also to achieve quite other things" (p. 42). It is because of this insistence on the "quite other" rather than the "more," on the qualitative as an irreducible aspect of reality, that the author is led to believe that mathematical thought cannot unlock for us the secrets of evolution. Whether the intellect necessarily geometrizes,

however, he nowhere discusses; all indications are that, as regards this point, he would disagree with his distinguished French contemporary.

For the most part, it should be stated, the present volume eschews metaphysical and epistemological issues. Its problem and method should rather be described as psychological. And yet the precise nature of the work is somewhat difficult to characterize. The author's intention would seem to be to trace empirically the various steps that lead from the most primitive consciousness conceivable (which, as he argues, can be neither a synthesis, nor feeling, nor will, but unquestionably simple sensation—probably olfactory) to the human consciousness of a world of interacting things in space and time and of purposes that may be realized in action. As a matter of fact, however, Meyer's achievement can be called genetic only in quite a different sense. Perhaps it would be misleading to say that, similarly to the *Wissenschaftslehre*, this volume singles out and discusses in turn the various presuppositions of self-consciousness. Nevertheless, it more or less mechanically adds element to element, thus building up, under the guidance of a previous analysis, the complex mental processes which introspection reveals. To consider such a method evolutionary is much less justifiable in our own day than it was at the time when Spencer published his works. A second important divergence between aim and achievement in the present work occurs in connection with its treatment of consciousness. Consciousness is continually said to be a function of life, created in response to its needs and changing with its demands and opportunities. In spite of this, however, the forms of conscious experience are not only treated structurally, but as though their nature and development were altogether independent of any relation to the physical organism or to the social environment; bit by bit, more and more complex types of consciousness are constructed without essential reference to anything beyond the field of that which is set apart as the purely mental.

While the volume will disappoint those who look for a sustained course of reasoning, it may justly be credited with some acute analysis of mental processes, with numerous valuable criticisms of current psychological theories, and with occasional hypotheses which, so far as the knowledge of the reviewer goes, are original, and would deserve mention were one to enter upon an exhaustive account designed primarily for psychological readers. In several respects the work is such as sorely to try one's patience. Most of its chapters are loosely organized; repetitions are frequent; many of the sentences are so clumsy and involved as to be quite unintelligible at first reading; there are no specific references whatsoever to the literature of the subject or to any experiments or researches on which the argument is based; the table of contents is of the most meager sort and an index is entirely lacking.

EDWARD L. SCHAUB.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY.

Is Conscience an Emotion? Three Lectures on Recent Ethical Theories. By HASTINGS RASHDALL. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914.—pp. xi, 200.

This book is of considerable philosophical importance because in it the distinguished author of *The Theory of Good and Evil*, certainly at least one of the most important works on ethical theory of our generation, has made a critical estimate of the recent psychological and anthropological interpretations of moral evolution. Dr. Rashdall has chosen for particular notice Professor Edward Westermarck's *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, and Dr. William McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology*. The former of these works he thinks is valuable "as a piece of pure anthropology," but it really adds "little to the arguments used before him by such writers as Hume in favor of the emotional theory" of the origin and nature of moral judgments. Dr. McDougall is credited with presenting "a far stronger case for the emotional view" in his theory of the instincts and emotions, and with offering the most plausible account of moral evolution from this standpoint that has yet been given.

It is to be regretted that the occasion which Dr. Rashdall has chosen to take notice of these important writers (a series of semi-popular lectures) prevents so full and technical a discussion as we might wish. An introductory lecture had to be devoted to a popular exposition of what is meant by emotional ethics, in order to introduce his auditors into the issues at stake, and the concluding lecture is largely devoted to a demonstration of the instability of a purely emotional view of ethics by an exposé of one of the worst examples of it—the rather reckless ethical remarks of William James in "The Will to Believe." The preliminary lecture and the criticism of James are obviously intended to be purely pedagogical, prompted by the occasion and circumstances. The last cannot be intended to be a serious criticism of the ethics of pragmatism for which the much more important ethical works of Dewey, to say the least, would have to be taken into account. So we may properly confine our attention to the criticism of McDougall and Westermarck.

The points in Dr. Rashdall's ethics that bring him into opposition to these writers seem principally to be these. For Dr. Rashdall, moral judgments are objective; *i. e.*, they are not of emotional origin—everything emotional is subjective—but are due to the intellectual side of our nature; most of us feel at the bottom of our minds a strong and ineradicable conviction that moral judgments are as much intellectual and universal assertions about the nature of Reality as $2 + 2 = 4$, or 'this is a good inference and that is a bad one.' There are certain self-evident moral judgments that everyone must believe if he is intelligent enough to comprehend them: *e. g.*, "the greater good ought always to be preferred to the less," and "one man's good is of equal intrinsic importance with the like good of any other" (pp. 41, f.; *cf.* pp. 75, f.). There are simple and unanalyzable categories of thought in ethics, comparable to substance, causation, space, time, etc. That children and savages are not aware of them, but think in confused, emotional terms, does not indicate

that our own moral judgments are of subjective and emotional origin, any more than a school boy's failure to do his sums correctly, or a savage's confused notions of causation render correct mathematical and scientific reasoning subjective. From the intellectual and hence objective and universal character of our moral judgments follow the postulates in regard to the moral order of the universe, God, and immortality, which Canon Rashdall maintains in somewhat Kantian fashion, and which he believes would be invalid if moral judgments were emotional or instinctive in their origin and nature.

Strongly intellectualistic as is Canon Rashdall's position, and severely as he arraigns the theory of the emotional origin of moral judgments, it is interesting to note that he does make some concessions. "The explanation why certain particular kinds of conduct first came to be approved or disapproved really is to be found in emotions of a kind which in a simpler and more primitive form are shared by the lower animals" (p. 63). Most of the savage's actual morality and of his intellectual beliefs about morality can be explained upon the emotional view (p. 70). As opposed to Mr. G. E. Moore (with whom, however, he is largely in sympathy), he insists that the moral judgment is "very closely allied with the emotional side of our nature" (p. 146), and that "emotion of one kind or another—I do not say necessarily but normally—accompanies the giving of moral judgments in actual concrete cases" (pp. 147, f.).

In defence of Dr. McDougall and Professor Westermarck, it should be observed that neither of them really questions the presence of a rational element in moral judgments. Dr. Rashdall himself quotes to this effect various statements of Professor Westermarck, which are really not so inconsistent with the anti-rationalism of his first chapter as at first seems to be the case. Dr. McDougall's interpretation of the sentiments and of the rise of the moral self, to which Dr. Rashdall merely refers, but which he does not discuss, likewise disclose the action of reason. These writers are not primarily interested in the logical and metaphysical sides of ethics, and accordingly do not lay much stress on the rational side of morality; but it is not true that they either deny or ignore it. It would be easy to supplement their accounts with a description of how rational moral conduct arises in consequence of a coördination or mediation of instincts and impulses effected through their own interaction, a rendering explicit of the logic immanent within them. Professor Dewey's sections on the mediation of impulse (*The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus*, chap. III) are worthy of study in this connection.

The real difference between these writers and Dr. Rashdall is not that they deny the presence of reason in moral judgments and that he affirms it, but that he affirms the presence of a very peculiar kind of reason, quite like that of the faculty psychologists. To be sure, Dr. Rashdall has elsewhere denied that he is under the influence of the faculty psychology, and says that when he uses the word 'faculty' he merely means a 'capacity' (*δύναμις*) (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, p. 142, n.). But the very Aristotelianism of this apology raises a suspicion which further reading of Dr. Rashdall confirms.

He constantly speaks of Reason in the manner of the century of Butler and Kant. For him, Reason is a purely cognitive faculty, external to the emotional side of our nature, that like a *deus ex machina* regulates and harmonizes impulses and emotions.

Writers on the metaphysics of ethics, as Dr. Rashdall tells us (pp. 61, ff.), can no longer afford to ignore anthropological and psychological accounts of moral origins. Would it not be best to accept these accounts at their face value, and see if they do not point in the direction of a sufficiently objective ethics, rather than oppose to them what really amounts to an eighteenth-century rationalism? Furthermore, may it not be possible to develop a satisfactory metaphysics of ethics and philosophy of religion by arguing that the logic immanent within the instincts and emotions comes to fuller self-consciousness in reflective morality? Would this not better coincide with modern conceptions of God than Dr. Rashdall's old-fashioned view of Reason, and be equally objective? And if our moral judgments be regarded as due to a higher development and synthesis of instincts and emotions, are they not a fuller and hence truer expression of Reality and of God? Mr. Bosanquet's highly suggestive conception of teleology as immanent within and arising from a mechanical world (*The Principle of Individuality and Value*, chaps. III-V) seems capable of application to this field of evolutionary morality.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

A Historical Introduction to Ethics. By THOMAS VERNER MOORE, Instructor in Psychology in the Catholic University of America. American Book Company, New York, 1915.—pp. viii, 164.

This book, as is expressly pointed out in the preface, is neither a history of ethics nor a text book on ethics as such. While it deals with the historic types of ethical theory, it deals with them by classes, paying no attention to strictly chronological order, and making no attempt at a completeness which would only confuse the reader for whom an Introduction is specially prepared. It is not a text book on ethics, partly because its method is that of a presentation and criticism of historical systems, and because it attempts to deal only with the central problems of ethics. In a space equal to about two thirds of that of Sidgwick's well-known *History of Ethics* the majority of classical systems, ancient and modern, are passed in review, classified under the rubrics: the Ethics of Conditionate Morality, and the Ethics of Absolute Morality. The presentation is followed by a criticism intended to exhibit the system of St. Thomas Aquinas as the culmination and complete truth of all that other moralists have seen and reported.

The most notable characteristic of the author's work is the desire which it exhibits to be fair to all parties, according to the principles of the master, of whom the author writes: "St. Thomas left behind him many works. In none of them is a harsh word against an adversary to be found." Unfortunately this zeal for fairness has led the author into what appears to the

reviewer an unfortunate mistake in policy, a mistake at least in the case of brief descriptions like those under consideration. He has made the book, to a very considerable extent, a collection of quotations from the authors presented. The result is, for reasons which can easily be imagined, that the readers seem to be given the letter rather than the spirit of the doctrine in almost every instance. They seldom, indeed almost never, see it in its plausibility as the creator of the system himself saw it. This seems to the reviewer true even of the presentation of the doctrine of St. Thomas. He believes that Sidgwick's account in his *History* preserves more of the spirit of this great system than does this account written by a disciple. With this defect goes what to the reviewer seems a certain limitation of vision. He cannot feel that the author is as yet sufficiently awake to the variety and complexity of the moral experience to produce an adequate presentation of the theories which attempt to reflect and interpret this experience.

FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP.

THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

Goethe. With Special Consideration of his Philosophy. By PAUL CARUS. The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago and London, 1915.—pp. xi, 357.

In a handsome volume containing one hundred and eighty five portraits and other historical illustrations, Dr. Paul Carus, Editor of the *Monist* and author of many books on many subjects, offers a "presentation of Goethe with the special purpose of bringing out those features of his life which characterize him as a thinker or, perhaps better, as a philosopher." The book is "not intended to exhaust the entire field, but to serve as an introduction to his work and to set forth in general outlines the significance of his world-conception in the literature of humanity, though there are many branches of his literary activity which have scarcely been touched upon." Dr. Carus has performed the task which he has set himself in a most creditable manner: the book gives one a sympathetic insight into the personality of "an extraordinarily normal man." No one can lay the work aside without having been impressed with the great poet's remarkable objectivity, his keen desire and his wonderful capacity for seeing things as they are, his honesty with himself, his healthy judgment, his clearness of vision, his fairmindedness, his lack of envy and his generous appreciation of the worth of other men of letters. In refusing to exaggerate the defects of Goethe's character and in emphasizing the lofty moral purpose that inspired him, our author may perhaps have idealized the picture of the man; but he is right in asserting that "even his failings had no trace of vulgarity and that his character was much purer than that of many a saint whom we know not in his sins but only in his contrition and repentance."

Students of philosophy will be particularly interested in the chapters dealing with the "Religion of Goethe," "Goethe's Philosophy," and "The Significance of Faust." Goethe did not work out a *system* of metaphysics

or ethics, but he had the metaphysical craving and was gifted with a profound philosophical insight; indeed, no philosopher felt more keenly the desire to know

was die Welt
Im Innersten zusammenhält;

and no poet attained a loftier and more ennobling world-view than did he.

Dr. Carus has produced a book which the reader desiring an introduction to the study of Goethe will find helpful and inspiring, and from which students of Goethe can gain many suggestions. It is written in a clear and pleasing style and is interesting throughout. Many poems are quoted, both in the original and in translations; nearly all of the latter, except those taken from Faust, have been made by Dr. Carus himself and are well done.

FRANK THILLY.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

The Metaphysics of Education. By ARTHUR C. FLESHMAN. Mayhew Publishing Company, Boston, 1914.—pp. 155.

The purpose of this book, as the preface declares, is "to unify the various factors in education into an organic whole." It consists of three chapters: I, The Relation of Philosophy and Education; II, The Philosophical Significance and Implications of (a) Educational Facts, and (b) Basal Concepts in Education; III, An Educational Interpretation of Metaphysics. To this is added a bibliography. If a miscellaneous assortment of philosophical opinions wrenched from their respective systems without the semblance of proof or context and made to do duty as axioms can be called metaphysics, the book is properly named. The reader is puzzled to discover the unity of principle to which the preface refers, unless it be the merely mechanical unity of the juxtaposition of the words 'philosophy' and 'education.' The author shows a certain factual familiarity with several philosophical systems, but the work is so fragmentary and uncritical, and withal, so inaccurate and slipshod, that it cannot be regarded as a contribution to the subject. Indeed, far from satisfying a definite need, it has increased the need for systematic and careful studies of the metaphysics of education. The bibliography is surely not a bibliography of the subject but rather a more or less accurate list of some books that the author had been reading. Some of the titles and authors are hardly recognizable as they appear in the bibliography. 'N. T. Harris' and 'L. F. Hobhouse' have a very strange appearance; but when one sees Henry Jones credited with a book called *Idealism as a Practical Guide* and Josiah Royce named as the author of *Spirits of Modern Philosophy* it is enough to raise some very sober questions about the freedom of the press. Even in the body of the book (p. 31) we read: "John Locke was both a philosopher and educator; he wrote an essay On the Human Understanding and Thoughts Concerning Education."

H. G. TOWNSEND.

The following books have also been received:

- What May I Hope?* By GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. New York, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1915.—pp. xvi, 310. \$1.50 net.
- The Problem of Knowledge.* By DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1915.—pp. xviii, 503.
- Inventors and Money-Makers.* By F. W. TAUSSIG. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1915.—pp. ix, 135.
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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mët.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Nto-Sc.* = *Revue Nto-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.*; *Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Wesen und Erscheinung. J. M. VERWEYEN. *Kantstudien*, xx, 2 u. 3, 276-298.

Both science and philosophy have discovered the value of a conceptual schema as an aid in raising their structures. Such a schema is afforded to philosophy by the pair of concepts: essence (*Wesen*) and appearance. (1) *In theory of knowledge and metaphysics* this means a dualism, such as that suggested by the eleatics, and maintained by Plato and theism. The latter tends to emphasize the distinction between God and the world, rather than to fall into pantheism. But the pantheistic moment is there and appears whenever the sole reality of the thing-in-itself (or of God) is emphasized. Kant never dreamed of denying the reality of the thing-in-itself. So he is interpreted by certain Neo-Kantians as a realist. But in so far as all knowledge of the thing-in-itself is seen to be joined to the conditions of the subject, we have idealism, which tends to advance to absolute idealism, to the conception of a transcendent *an-sich* known only in so far as it is recognized as logically necessary. So the intention of thought reaches out beyond the conditions to which actual thinking is attached. Even within the realm of appearance the distinction between essence and appearance recurs, as for instance in the case of color-blindness and normal vision. It is the task of science to define this phenomenal essence. (2) *In the logical sense* those characteristics are essential which make the object what it is in distinction from other objects. The intention of the distinction to a certain extent controls its application. (3) *So in scientific history* we try to get the essence out of the content of historical changes. Christianity shows many examples of argument turning on what is essential in an historical situation. We should be careful to separate event from person, office from office-bearer,—for example, to avoid confusing the immoral life of a certain pope with the idea of the papacy. (4) *In ethics* as well as in epistemology it is a primitive

tendency to take all appearance to be of equal importance, and so to fail to discover what is latent in an ethical situation. From another angle we may defend convention under our pair of concepts. Some conventions which at first result merely in agreeable appearances may eventually call into being the essence, say, of courtesy. On the other hand an event like the war, which shakes the very foundations of our customs and ethics, may result in a new differentiation between essence and appearance. (5) *In æsthetics* the concepts would seem to apply negatively. Beauty as such knows nothing of the opposition between essence and appearance, because for art the beautiful appearance is decisive. So by some theorists the æsthetic experience has been called self-deception. A question arises, as to what ground an æsthetic creation must have in the experience of its creator, and also, as to what connection exists between an artist's life and his work. Certainly there may be wide discrepancies here. It is also true that too great emphasis on æsthetic experience may make us blind to the metaphysical essence which lies behind the beautiful object, for example, the religious idea behind the structure of a cathedral. In these various provinces the terms essence and appearance have a changing content, but this should lead to an analysis of contents, and might pave the way to a philosophy of fundamental forms (*konstante grundformen*).

MARION D. CRANE.

The Self in Scientific Psychology. MARY WHITON CALKINS. Am. J. Ps., XXVI, 4, pp. 495-524.

The self is often denied in psychology on the ground that scientific introspection has not discovered it. This paper undertakes to examine and to estimate this charge. Have scientific psychologists really found no trace of a self? If so, is the failure due to inadequate methods or to the non-existence of the self? The self for psychology is indefinable; but not, on this account, elemental. Its characters are 'properties.' Like other sciences, psychology employs two methods—observation and experiment. The omnipresence of the self disqualifies it as an object of experiment. But, by means of scientific observation—systematic and controlled introspection—scientific psychology is advancing beyond the confines of sense-psychology. In such introspection the self, if it exists, should be found. Have experimentally controlled introspections discovered the self? If so, why are the 'returns' so scanty? Katzaroff finds the essential factor in recognition is the feeling of familiarity—the feeling that the sensation has been enveloped by the feeling of self; Michotte and Prüm from introspection regard voluntary choice as essentially self-activity; Ach, also, maintains the part of self in volition, and definitely asserts the experience of the self. Self-psychologists, excluding the adherents of the 'merely-inferred-self' theory, are in two groups. The first and largest group holds that we are conscious of the self in certain experiences and not in others. The conception of self-psychologists in the widest sense is, that experience always involves the consciousness of self. Why, then, if a self can be found by scientific introspection, is not the consciousness of self reported by every

skilled introspector? The self-psychologist in his answer may first take issue by pointing out that the technical writings of selfless-psychologists bristle with the terms of self-psychology. If this be explained as a convention of language, the explanation seems futile, since the convention of acknowledging a self is exactly the fact to be explained. But, assuming as a fact that a large number of trained observers fail to find the self in introspection, the self-psychologist can offer four reasons to account for the failure. (1) The ubiquity of the self tends to make me inattentive to it. (2) Systematic introspection has been chiefly concerned with sensational experiences and with thought—both relatively impersonal. (3) The directions given to introspectors rarely make specific suggestions of phases or factors of self-consciousness; and the subject, in default of such concrete suggestions, is bound to record his introspection in the terms with which he is most familiar—those of selfless-psychology. (4) The most significant reason lies in the preconceptions underlying the directions given to the introspector. If introspection is defined as enumeration of 'conscious processes' and report is limited to an enumeration of these elements, then the self is automatically excluded by instruction. It is perhaps more surprising that the self has played any rôle in technical psychology than that many psychologists have failed to record its presence.

ELLEN B. ARMSTRONG.

Die pragmatische Wahrheitslehre. DR. EDWIN WAIBEL. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XXI, 2, pp. 113-126.

The pragmatic theory of truth may be discussed under three heads: (1) Attributes and varieties of truth, (2) the criterion of truth, (3) the ontological status of truth. (1) Truth is purely human, produced in the course of experience. The activity which establishes truth is brought about, according to Pierce, by actual doubt: James, the general uncertainty of human things: Dewey, the conflict of elements in experience: Schiller, interest. Truth is both subjective and objective; subjective, as being good for the individual's purposes, objective, as the accumulated capital of the race. This distinction, it is claimed, goes back to Protagoras, and is superior to the later Platonic classification. No truths, even mathematical truths, exist before they are actually conceived and tested. Truth is a characteristic pertaining only to ideas. It is not a passive or inert attribute, but rather a characteristic process of leading, which can be tested. Testing is actual or potential, direct or indirect. (2) The criterion of truth according to Dewey is the capacity of the idea to control the situation, and according to Schiller, the capacity of the idea to further the interest at hand. Truth is in continual flux, and the oldest is liable to alteration. Truth must agree with former experience (testing backwards), and the old must agree with the new (testing forwards). That idea is most true which reconciles the new to the old with least alteration to the latter. The testing forward is most important (Günther Jacobi has misunderstood this point). The criterion is not formal, but is immanent in the testing-process itself. (3) Truth as an existence is nothing but the process

of making true, through concrete testing of the idea's leading. Satisfaction is not to be identified with truth.

D. T. HOWARD.

The Method of Psychology. A. H. JONES. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth. XII, 17, pp. 462-471.

In current discussions on the rôle that consciousness plays in psychology, it is often overlooked that consciousness may be taken in one of two different senses, the subjective, or dualistic sense, and the functional, or relational sense. Psychology has commonly been regarded as the science of consciousness in the first sense; whose existence has been assumed to be self-evident. While this traditional doctrine has accomplished a good deal, its weakness is shown in the serious differences of opinion on the part of its exponents concerning many of its simplest and most important conclusions; in the philosophical difficulty as to what kind of reality consciousness would be and where it would exist; and in its failure to distinguish between the content known and the process of knowing it. These difficulties have led to the new or relational view, that knowing is a relation between the functioning organism and certain apprehended portions of the objective world. This view simplifies the work of psychology by transferring its material to the common order of things, and by reducing introspection to a special form of ordinary knowing. It also disentangles philosophical difficulties by making the physical organism itself the knower, and by distinguishing between the act of knowing and the data known. It should be noted that this involves no change in the detailed content studied in traditional psychology. As to the recent theory of behaviorism, the main objection is that it leaves out the study of consciousness. Just as colors may be treated by esthetics as red and green, yellow and blue, and by physics as vibration of the ether, so the same material may be treated from the qualitative view of consciousness or the quantitative point of view of behavior. Which we should call psychology will depend upon usage.

YUEN R. CHAO.

La Science comme instrument vital. D. ROUSTAN. Rev. de Mét., XXII, 5, pp. 612-643.

What is the original function of thought and its relation to life? Philosophy advances two theories, (1) that our intellectual activity has its end in itself; (2) that conscious life has for its purpose "the conservation and defense of the individual." Both contain some truth, but their reconciliation is difficult. The point at issue is the value of science as truth. If the sole object of science be to assist life, it need not be true; illusion may be quite as useful to life as truth itself. If however we hesitate to separate the notions of truth and science, we may define truth with the Pragmatists, make the true idea that which works, and science remains true—true because it is an aid to life. So to make life the purpose of science, to identify science with a sort of biological perfection means to some to allow it to embrace useful error

as well as truth; to others to limit scientific research by standards of utility. Pragmatism or Positivism would seem the only possible consequences of such a theory. But the theory could hardly be maintained if it demanded the acceptance of the Positivism of Comte. Man strives to understand the world, not merely to formulate its laws; and although we must consider intelligence as primitively an instrument in the service of the instinct of conservation of life, it is plain that man derives the greatest benefits from his scientific activities when he forgets the utilitarian standards of Comte and indulges in disinterested theoretical conceptions. So we need not reduce the theory of science as an instrument of life to Positivism: no more need we connect it with a Pragmatism "where the notion of truth evaporates." True, with Nietzsche, we have the theory ending in the conception of a science which employs useful lies. He greatly emphasized the importance of errors to life. In so doing he exaggerated a partial truth. Many times in the history of science errors have been useful; but they have been half truths, useful in proportion to the truth which they contained. But in spite of his emphasis on the importance of error, Nietzsche retained the traditional conception of truth. For him utility did not make errors truth. Herein he differs from contemporary Pragmatists for whom the notion of an absolute truth is nonsense and the only admissible truth is precisely what Nietzsche termed "kind error." For W. James, Schiller and Dewey, science cannot attain the real simply because there is no real to attain. Pragmatism, however, did not arrive at this position because it adopted a biological conception of science. The first care of the Pragmatists was to find a definition of religious truth. The definitions so acquired were then grafted on to the biological theory of science, to the transformation of the latter. Pragmatism no more than Positivism is the legitimate result of such a conception of science. The true bearing of biology on the theory of knowledge is seen in the doctrine of trial and error; a doctrine which permits the mind to hold new views, formulate new conceptions, providing only it test such conceptions by the facts. Such a theory is the correct expression of a biological conception of science.

GERTRUDE Q. BAKER.

La doctrine dualiste. B. BOURDON. Rev. Ph., XL, 7, pp. 1-20.

The dualistic doctrine, recognizing two species of essentially distinct realities—physical phenomena and physiological phenomena,—is in great part untenable. The separation of phenomena into physical and psychological, and their division into internal and external as referred to the body, are both artificial devices, and are not based on intrinsic characteristics. The brain excitation corresponding to a representation differs only in degree from that corresponding to the sensation to which this representation is connected. Many so-called internal phenomena are really external. Physical phenomena, in contrast with psychological phenomena, are said to possess extension, form, localization, and the capacity for measurement. But sound and smell do not possess extension; some so-called psychological phenomena do possess

extension, and hallucinations, which are psychological phenomena, are localized. Moreover, one can refer psychological phenomena to a scale of magnitude. That different observers placed in practically identical conditions, can agree in their verification of certain phenomena, is as true of psychological as of physical phenomena. The belief that psychological phenomena are known by internal observation (introspection), and physical by external observation, arises from the error of incorrect grouping. Moreover, if the excitation of the nervous apparatus necessary for the recognition of physical and psychological phenomena both, be left out of consideration, then both internal and external observation are direct,—otherwise they are indirect. The invalidity of the dualistic doctrines of psycho-physical parallelism and of the double aspect of nature can also be shown by arguments similar to those stated above. Nature has more than two aspects. Besides, the psychologic and the physical aspects, respectively the psychologic phenomena and the nervous processes, are not always different in their nature. The arguments advanced for the dualistic thesis distinguishing between the objects, physical realities, and sensations, psychological phenomena, simply prove that, in order that there be color, eyes are necessary, etc. Again, if with certain philosophers, we consider sensations as appearances, and we know them only, what can we know of the real objects? And as indefensible as the opposition between object and sensation, is the opposition between sensation and stimulant. The way to distinguish the sensations and the corresponding objects is to call sensations certain subjective phenomena which associate themselves with the object. The division of natural phenomena and the methods of knowing them, into two groups, is superficial and artificial, and not in accord with the facts. Psychology and physics do not always separate the phenomena they deal with, but the viewpoint differs in each.

JULES G. PROCTOR.

Constitution des idées et base physiologique des processus psychiques. YVES DELAGE. Rev. Ph., LXXX, 10, pp. 289-314.

This article is a chapter from a work on dreams, to appear shortly. Its aim is to link the conception of the constitution of ideas to the results of recent studies in anatomy and physiology. Cortical neurones are the organs of thought. But the paucity of neurones in comparison with the infinite variety of ideas demands that the latter be conceived as combinations of a relatively small number of constituent elements. Ideas are of three kinds: concrete, general, and abstract; and may be decomposed into seven different sorts of elements: situations in space and time, forms, colors, sounds, odors and tastes, tactile phenomena, and names of objects. Let us suppose that there are as many of these elements as there are cortical neurones, and that an idea appears in consciousness when the neurones corresponding to its elements become active. An idea, then, is the cerebral condition created by the entrance into action of the neurones or group of neurones corresponding to the elements that constitute it. From the researches of histology we learn that neurones

are all reciprocally related by virtue of *cylindraxile* communication and communication by means of protoplasmic prolongations. The organs of communication are three: *une sorte de chevelu de radicelles, les boutons d'Auerbach, and les articulations*. By closing some exits and opening others these organs compel excitations of a neurone to follow certain permanent, privileged paths instead of diffusing equally in all directions. To show how the play of these neurones can explain the psychic processes involved in dreams: perception, recognition, memory, and the association of ideas, four assumptions are necessary: that each neurone incite all others, that it affect other acting neurones more than inactive neurones, that paths of connection are more pervious the more frequently they are traversed by intense excitations, and that in the case of memory an idea be recognized as new, as having been before presented, and as differing from its former presentation in point of time. From physiology we must borrow Lapicque's theory of a *chronaxie* peculiar to each neurone, and Waller's conception of a *mode vibratoire* also peculiar to each. To this we must add the hypothesis of a *parachronisation temporaire*, permitting the neurones corresponding to the elements of an idea to vibrate in unison for the representation of that idea. We must also add the hypothesis of *reliquats*, that all psychic process, in realizing itself, renders easier its reproduction and reflects the entire history of its former participations in representations. Finally we must introduce the hypothesis of the *localisation des reliquats* explaining memory, education, and the infinite variety and flexibility of the association of ideas. Following chapters will apply these conclusions to the phenomena of dreams.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

Private Property and Social Justice. WILLIAM K. WRIGHT. Int. J. E., XXV, 4, pp. 498-513.

Progress depends on an increase of wealth. Society should therefore be composed of individual property owners with the opportunity to practise that thrift necessary to the economical management of public enterprise. Germany and Switzerland, whose voters are property owners, conduct public business more successfully than American cities where the voters are largely without property. Such few officials, unthriftly in private life, who nevertheless manage government property successfully, are mere imitators of a virtue they do not possess. Such imitation is no secure foundation for public thrift. To secure a society whose adults are all property owners it is necessary that wages be large enough, without lowering the standard of living of the worker, to allow him a margin for investment. This implies a minimum wage scale; some judicial and legislative support of labor unions; and that debentures of large corporations be publicly inspected, guaranteed, and made accessible in small denominations. As soon as laborers acquire a taste for accumulation it will be possible to prevent all starvation, even all poverty, and to give everybody a good education. The road to social benefit does not lead through the abolition of rents, profits, and interest. The rights to public property

should be made secure and extended to secure the small investor, so that he may have the opportunity to develop his personality by becoming a property owner. Public property may be increased almost indefinitely. The poorer classes to become wealthier need not take any of the property now owned by individuals. They should create *new* property. This they may readily do under juster social conditions. Educators, too, and moral leaders should be paid larger salaries, so that with a standard of living necessary to their calling, they may, in addition, become property holders, thus making their personalities more concrete and social.

ALLEN J. THOMAS.

La psychologie de l'ontologisme. G. TRUG. Rev. Ph., Vol. XL, No. 9, pp. 240-275.

Psychology traces out the process by which men have arrived at the idea of God, and thus at the same time understands the idea, and becomes aware of the fallacies upon which it is based. Man's earliest belief in the divine was based on his need for the explanation of particular events, and upon his group life, with its *totem*. But the idea of the divine man has always drawn from his experience of himself. All speculations on God, however, from the lowest to the highest, are based on the same principle, and in the last analysis, operate with the elementary mechanism of intelligence, causality. Primitive man believes without criticism and is unaware of the inconsistencies of his thought; his emotional, moral and social life are reflected in his gods. He is not so much impressed by the "order of creation" or the "spectacle of nature" as by the necessity of finding explanations for the phases of the multifarious and confused world in which he lives. But here we find the principle of all theology, a causal term with a psychological content, a realization of content and sentiment, an ontology. We will now pass on to consider some of the reflective forms of ontology. Anselm has been interpreted too narrowly by his critics, who have confined his doctrine to the logical passage from the idea of the most perfect being to its reality, and have failed to appreciate the spiritual content of Anselm's position. Anselm spoke, not merely of a being so great that no greater could be conceived, and which therefore included 'existence' in itself, but of a being without which nothing could exist, and which existed by its own nature. Anselm's position was founded upon a living intuition of a Most Perfect, which it was impossible to doubt. "*Dieu donc, lui-même, dans cette idée vivante, expérimentale et irresistible du Parfait, s'impose en même temp qu'il se pose, et le concept ainsi compris entraîne bien l'être avec quoi il se confond*" (249). Anselm merely enclosed this vital intuition in a framework of syllogism, which reveals step by step, the faith which forms its starting point. Man, with his fragmentary knowledge, his confused emotional strivings, his longings for moral and spiritual perfection, conceives the idea of himself, perfect, complete and whole, and this vivid idea, he posits as an eternal reality; such is the inner psychology of ontology. St. Thomas has also been interpreted too narrowly and scholastically; his interpreters and

critics have overlooked the spiritual vision to which he gives a supremely rational form. Ontology is not to be defined, *i. e.*, as a pretended immediate knowledge of God as he is in himself. It is rather, a consciousness drawn from ourselves, of an ideal without us, an inference which leads from our emotions and thoughts, to a supreme spiritual unity of thought and emotion, infinitely perfect, which explains both ourselves and the world. In this sense St. Thomas was an ontologist. He held a "dynamic ontology," which saw, as the essence of God, his creative activity. Aquinas saw that existence is essentially action. We rise from the idea of human action to the idea of an infinite agent, or creator. Again we have human consciousness raised to infinity and taken as real. The system of Aquinas incarnates the wisdom of the Church in its supremely reasonable satisfaction of this emotional tendency. Since the liberation of thought from dogma, it has fallen into excesses, and absurdities unknown to serious theology. The modern man has sought knowledge of God by himself without the external authority of the Church. Rousseau was a sentimental ontologist, and found the way to God through the needs of his heart and conscience. Kant gave a philosophical form to Rousseau's attitude; he perceived that the great dogmas of ontology could never be proved by pure reason, and hence, reversing the former mode of thinking, found the basis of theology in morality, rather than *vice versa*. The attempt of the Catholic, Ollé-Laprune, to found theology on a moral basis has not been approved by the Church. Subjective ontology, advancing beyond Kant, and basing all upon feeling, gives us the real meaning of the doctrine, but in its most hazardous form. The doctrine of the immanence of God closes the author's series of ontological doctrines. Tonquedec, d'Alès, and Blondel are mentioned. In a general way, the doctrine of immanence may be defined as insisting upon the mutual interdependence of all things. "*Rien n'existe à l'état isolé, tout tient à tout, non point par des liens adventices et inseparables, mais par le fond et l'essence même*" (267). But this universal relatedness, the doctrine of immanence bases upon a fundamental unity of the world. On this view, God is not the unity outside the world which animates it; everything, and above all, every spirit, reveals him. Blondel gives a more orthodox turn to the doctrine; he denies that reason can give us the truth; and affirms that we feel a contradiction, between our human capacities and our ideals, which only supernatural religion can resolve; and only the inner necessity for action, gives us God. "*Nous avons inventorié en passant de grandes illusions et de notables richesses. Mais, de l'ontologisme, si adroit, quand on sait le prendre, de saint Anselm au dévergondage lyrique des immamentistes, quelle chute! . . .*" "*Ainsi se fait le Dieu des hommes, fruit d'une logique impuissante et d'un appétit exacerbé, et simple témoin de l'envol terrestre vers une inaccessible grandeur.*"

W. CURTIS SWABEY.

Die Krisis der modernen Erkenntnistheorie. ALBERT LEWKOWITZ. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XXI, 2, 186-196.

The position of Kant and the Neo-Kantians is identical in this, that both believe Nature to be determined through knowledge; through scientific synthesis. Neo-Kantianism in differentiation from Kant, holds that this determination occurs in the course of scientific procedure, rather than in an apriori way. Where Kant separated form from content, the Neo-Kantians recognize this separation only as a logical moment in knowledge. But knowledge is viewed in an external rather than immanent way, and the metaphysics of knowledge is set aside. In paying attention to knowledge on its external side alone, the strength of the older position is lost. The standpoint of immediacy is important. To the natural sciences personal observation and experiment are as essential as mathematics, while in biology and the historical sciences mathematical categories do not suffice. Ethics and Religion especially show that reality lies deeper than the Neo-Kantian method proposes to go. If epistemology is merely a discussion of scientific concepts as possible determinations of reality, it cannot deal adequately with these tendencies. The determination of reality by thought is impossible, if we conceive the determination as taking place through *Kultur*, rather than underlying it. The crisis of modern epistemology consists in this: that it conceives itself to be a philosophy of *Kultur*, while denying the metaphysical basis of *Kultur*. This is destructive of modern rationalism.

D. T. HOWARD.

Die Freiheit als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie und die Begründung der Moral durch dieses Prinzip. OTTO KRÖGER. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XXI, 1, pp. 92-98.

The fundamental philosophical question is, What must I do to attain the highest possible degree of freedom? Whether Idealism answers by a command to agree with the non-ego or to strive for the higher, the same fundamental practical principle is involved. From contact with other people (the first non-ego we meet) ensues the moral direction of the will. What gives it value? Utilitarianism answers, The pleasure resulting. Idealism says, Freedom and this freedom is not foreign to the will but of its very essence. The Utilitarian theory is not satisfactory as a standard of ethics. But, is a standard requisite? Not until I am conscious that a higher degree of freedom belongs to the moral will than to the immoral, does the sense of duty become more than a subjective taste. Moreover, without the consciousness that the moral will is founded in the very nature of being, there is no assurance for a continuance of morality, either in the world or in any particular individual.

ELLEN B. ARMSTRONG.

Ethics and the Struggle for Existence. J. C. FLÜGEL. Int. J. E., XXV, 4, pp. 518-539.

There are two extremes of opinion as to whether the struggle for existence is a necessary concomitant of human life. One holds that it is a natural law

of human, just as it is a natural law of infra-human existence; the other believes that man's power over nature exempts him from the necessity of such a struggle. Certain it is, however, that this struggle exists amongst us today. We are constantly verifying Malthus's doctrine that the populations increase faster than the supply of food. Two checks which Malthus termed "positive" and "preventive checks" have become measurable by modern statistics. These two checks have been shown to be complementary. The greater the birth rate, the greater will be the death rate from lack of nourishment; whereas the greater the death rate, for any cause, the greater will be the birth rate. We find evidence of wages which cannot supply adequate physical nourishment. The scarcity of other necessities as well, indicates that the struggle for existence still continues among certain classes of our population. The struggle may be eliminated in two ways: (1) by a more rapid increase in the production of necessities; (2) by a less rapid rate of reproduction. The existence of these two factors in our civilization shows a tendency to abolish this struggle. Our production of necessities has lately increased enormously, and the habit of voluntary control of reproduction—a concomitant of high civilization—will in time penetrate to our poorer classes. A vigorous campaign against the high birth rate among poorer people would greatly hasten the time when the struggle for existence among individuals will cease. The objection that mankind would fall into a condition of slothful ease, if the struggle for existence were abolished, is removed by the fact that there is a large class of our population in which no such struggle exists and among whom are found types of men as perfect as are found among those developed by hardship. We find men whose means free them from this struggle excelling in the work of supervision, organization and initiation upon which our modern methods of production so largely depend, and excelling, as well, in the arts and the professions. Natural selection is largely a dead letter in our civilization; and rational selection is rapidly being recognized as the thing to take its place. Even luxuries make for perfection. The desire for them makes for the fullest development of our natures. There still exists, however, the struggle between nations. Yet, as Norman Angell has pointed out, war has to a great extent lost its character as a genuine expression of this struggle. There are powerful forces making for its extinction. Some still consider war a moral tonic. We are gradually recognizing, however, that the same tonic may be gained with much less waste without the deterioration consequent upon war. It is possible for patriotism to be modified so as to embrace a wider field than the nation or the race. The sterner virtues are, moreover, more needed in the arts of peace to-day than in the arts of war. The struggle for existence may, therefore, be eliminated between nations as well as between individuals.

ALLEN J. THOMAS.

NOTES

We regret to announce the death of Professor Wilhelm Windelband, of the University of Heidelberg, which occurred on October 25, 1915. Professor Windelband was born at Potsdam in 1848, and was a pupil of Lotze and of Kuno Fischer. He entered upon his career as a teacher of philosophy in 1873 at the University of Leipzig, where he became a *privat docent*. Afterwards he was professor of philosophy successively at the universities of Zurich, Freiburg i Br., Strassburg, and Heidelberg, coming to the last named university in 1903 as successor to Kuno Fischer.

Two of Windelband's historical works, the *History of Philosophy*, and *History of Ancient Philosophy*, are well-known to English readers in translation, and have been used for purposes of class-room instruction in many American universities. His finest piece of historical writing, is doubtless the work in two volumes entitled *Die Geschichte d. neueren Philosophie in ihrem Zusammenhange mit d. allgem. Kultur u. der besonderen Wissenschaften*. The fifth edition of this work appeared in 1911. In connection with Windelband's historical writings the little volume on Plato which he contributed to "Frommann philosophic Classics" deserves special mention as an illustration both of his depth of historical insight and his remarkable ability to express philosophical thoughts in language of great beauty and great precision. Among his other works the following may be mentioned: *Die Lehre vom Zufall*, 1870; *Praeludien*, 2 vols, 1911; *Geschichte u. naturwissenschaft*, 1904; *Ueber Willensfreiheit*, 1904.

As a teacher Windelband exercised a great influence in Germany, and not a few American students remember with gratitude the stimulus and instruction received through the seminaries which he conducted in Strassburg and in Heidelberg.

The fifteenth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held at the University of Pennsylvania on December 28-30. The sessions were presided over by the President, Professor A. C. Armstrong.

We give below a list of articles in current philosophical magazines.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XXV, 5: *Clive Bell*, Art and War; *L. S. Woolf*, International Morality; *Bertrand Russell*, Non-Resistance. A Rejoinder to Professor Perry; *Samuel G. Smith*, The Rights of Criminals; *Charles Gray Shaw*, Culture and Dilettantism with the French; *Norman Wilde*, The Conversion of Rousseau; *Stephen H. Allen*, The Moral Responsibility for Wars; *Delisle Burns*, When Peace Breaks Out; *Roscoe Pound*, Legal Rights.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XXVI, 4: *K. M. Dallenbach*, The History and Derivation of the Word 'Function' as a Systematic Term in Psychology; *Edwin G. Boring*, The Thermal Sensitivity of the Stomach;

Mary Whiton Calkins, The Self in Scientific Psychology; *Garry C. Meyers*, Grasping, Reaching, and Handling; *Gustave A. Feingold*, The Influence of Suggestion on Imagination; *G. Stanley Hall*, Thanatophobia and Immortality.

THE MONIST, XXV, 4: *Gottlob Frege*, The Fundamental Laws of Arithmetic; *Florian Cajori*, Oughtred's Ideas and Influence on the Teaching of Mathematics; *R. Ruggles Gates*, Mutation Concepts in Relation to Organic Structure; *Walter Woodburn Hyde*, The Religious Views of Euripides as Shown in the "Bacchanals"; *Sidney Waterlow*, The Father of Monism.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, XII, 20: *John Dewey*, The Logic of Judgments of Practise; *C. Judson Herrick*, Introspection as a Biological Method; *Elsie Clews Parsons*, Gregariousness and the Impulse to Classify.

XII, 21: *George Santayana*, Philosophical Heresy; *Norbert Wiener*, Is Mathematical Certainty Absolute? *Kate Gordon*, A Study of an Imagery Test.

XII, 22: *Ralph S. Lille*, What is Purposive and Intellegent Behavior from the Physiological Point of View? *Elsie Clews Parsons*, Circumventing Darwinism.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XL, 9: *A. Leclère*, L'Obsession et l'idée prévalente; *G. Truc*, La psychologie de l'ontologisme.

XL, 10: *Yves Delage*, Constitution des idées et base physiologique des processus psychiques; *Solange-Pellat*, Le geste graphique; *A. Leclère*, L'Obsession et l'idée prévalente (2^e article).

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XL, 11: *G. Richard*, La Morale sociologique et la crise du droit international; *G. Fonsegrive*, De la nature et de la valeur des explications, I; *Th. Ribot*, L'Idéal Quétiste; *A. Leclère*, L'Obsession et l'idée prévalente (*fin*).

REVUE de METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XXII, 5: *E. Boutroux*, Allocution au congrès de philosophie mathématique; *L. Cahen*, Un fragment inédit de Condorcet; *C. Bouglé*, Remarques sur le polytélisme; *D. Rouston*, La science comme instrument vital.

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE, XV, 57-58: *Th. Flournoy*, Une Mystique Moderne.

XV, 59: *A. Descœudres*, Les tests de Binet-Simon comme mesure du développement des enfants anormaux; *P. Ceserole*, L'Irréductibilité de l'intuition des probalites et l'existence de propositions mathématiques indémontrables; *Ed. Claparede*, Expériences sur la mémoire des associations spontanées.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, 72, 3 u. 4: *Adolf Korte*, Kinematoskopische Untersuchungen

72, 5 u. 6: *Auguste Fischer*, Weitere Versuche über Wiedererkennen; *R. Hohenemser*, Über Konkordanz und Diskordanz; *R. Hennig*, Eine unerklärte optische Täuschung.

73, 1 u. 2: *L. V. Viqueira*, Lokalisation und einfaches Wiedererkennen; *K. Koffka*, Beiträge zur Psychologie der Gestalt- und Bewegungsergebnisse. III. Zur Grundlegung der Wahrnehmungspsychologie. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit V. Benussi; *H. J. u. W. A. Pannenburg*, Die Psychologie des Musikers; *A. Meinong*, Stephan Witasek zum Gedächtnis.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, 73, 3 u. 4: *H. Henning*, Der Geruch, I; *G. E. Müller*, Ein Beitrag über die Elberfelder Pferde.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR POSITIVISCHE PHILOSOPHIE, 2, 3 u. 4: *J. Petzoldt*, Die biologischen Grundlagen der Psychologie; *W. Kleinpeter*, Das Kausalproblem — ein Scheinproblem; *A. Dworetzky*, Zum Unterschied zwischen Fiktion und Hypothese, zwischen naturwissenschaftlicher und historischer Begriffsbildung; *A. Pagel*, Zur Lehre von der Rechtsnatur des Völkerrechts; *K. Bernhard*, Toleranz und Intoleranz.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE, XXXIX, 3: *Otto von der Pfordten*, Der Erkenntniswert der Mathematik. I.; *Th. Ziehen*, Kategorien und Differenzierungsfunktionen. II.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XXVIII, 4: *Dr. Kratzer*, Die Frage nach dem Seelendualismus bei Augustinus; *Luise Krieg*, Das Substanzproblem eine philosophiegeschichtliche Darstellung; *Joh. Zahlfleisch*, Die Kausalität bei Kant in neuer Beleuchtung; *Paul Stahler*, Über die Beziehungen Fichtes und seiner Schule zur Universität Charkow.

KANT-STUDIEN, XX, 2 u. 3: *Ernst Bergmann*, Fichte in Jena; *Ernst Katzer*, Kant und der Krieg; *G. Rosenthal*, Der Schönheitsbegriff bei Kant und Lessing; *Jonas Cohn*, Zur Kritik der modernen Kultur; *Friedrich Lipsius*, Vorfragen der Naturphilosophie: *Th. Elsenhaus*, Phaenomenologie, Psychologie, Erkenntnistheorie; *Johannes Verweyen*, Wesen und Erscheinung; *A. Messer*, Zur Verständigung zwischen Idealismus und Realismus; *Bruno Bauch*, Schlussbemerkung zu meiner Diskussion mit A. Messer.

REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA, I, 4: *Angel Gallardo*, El instinto de las hormigas; *Alfredo Colmo*, Los estudios filosóficos en nuestra enseñanza oficial; *Augusto Bunge*, Los fundamentos biológicos de la moral; *M. S. Victoria*, El positivismo en la educación argentina; *Julio Cruz Ghio*, Preceptos morales para los hombres nuevos; *José Ingenieros*, La personalidad intelectual de José M. Ramos Mejía.

I, 5: *Julio Mendez*, Teoría biológica de la inmunidad; *C. O. Bunge*, Notas para una teoría del instintismo; *Enrique Martínez Paz*, La filosofía en el plan de estudios del Deán Funes; *Rodolfo Senet*, Desenvolvimiento del lenguaje interior de la infancia a la edad adulta; *N. Besio Moreno*, Floretino Ameghino y la verdad científica; *Juan W. Gez*, ¿Debe nacionalizarse la enseñanza?; *Vicente D. Sierra*, Las doctrinas sociológicas de Echeverría; *José Ingenieros*, Los saintsimonianos argentinos.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, XII, 23: *Lucius Hopkins Miller*, The Religious Implicates of Bergson's Philosophy regarding Intuition and the Primacy of Spirit; *A. A. Goldenweiser*, Spirit, Mana, and the Religious Thrill.

XII, 24: *George Santayana*, German Philosophy and Politics; *George H. Sabine*, A new Monadology; *C. E. Ferree and Gertrude Rand*, A Résumé of Experiments on the Problem of Lighting in its Relation to the Eye.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, XIX, 4: *Kirsopp Lake*, The Theology of the Acts of the Apostles; *A. Edward Harvey*, Economic Self-Interest in the German Anti-Clericalism of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries;

John Richard Brown, The Character of Jesus: A Genetic Interpretation; *Ukichi Kawaguchi*, The Doctrine of Evolution and the Conception of God; *A. Marmorstein*, The Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Dead in Rabbinical Theology.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XXII, 6: *Herbert Woodrow*, Reaction to the Cessation of Stimuli and their Nervous Mechanism; *H. S. Langfeld*, A Study in Simultaneous and Alternating Finger Movements; *Walter S. Hunter*, Retinal Factors in Visual After-Movement; *J. Arthur Harris*, Experimental Data on the Errors of Judgment in the Estimation of the Number of Objects in moderately Large Samples, with Special Reference to Personal Equation; *Joseph Peterson*, Origin of Higher Orders of Combination Tones.

MIND, XXIV, 96: *W. M. Salter*, Nietzsche on the Problem of Reality; *C. D. Broad*, What do we mean by the Question: Is our Space Euclidean?; *E. E. Thomas*, Lotze's Relation to Idealism; *C. E. Hooper*, The Relation of Idea to Object-Matter as a Universal Mode of Cognition; *F. C. S. Schiller*, Realism, Pragmatism and William James; *H. S. Shelton*, The Necessity for a Universal in Reasoning; *J. E. Turner*, Mr. Strachey's Defence of Mr. Russell's Theory; *W. A. Pickard-Cambridge*, The *A Fortiori* Argument; *F. C. S. Schiller*, The Indetermination of Meanings.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

PHILOSOPHY AND COMMON SENSE.¹

I.

PHILOSOPHY and common sense have often waged an internecine warfare. Embittered feeling has moved both parties to the conflict. "There are two things which I must deprecate," writes Kant toward the close of the *Prolegomena*, "first, trifling about probability and conjecture . . . ; and, secondly, decision by the magic wand of so-called common sense." And more than seventy years earlier Berkeley had made a similar demand, half evading, half disdaining the comparison of his theory with the judgment of mankind. "Though we should grant a notion to be never so universally and steadfastly adhered to"—so he urges in the *Principles of Human Knowledge* (§ 55)—"yet this is but a weak argument of its truth. . . ." And common sense repays the debt of scorn with interest added. Philosophy is abstruse and valueless, the common man believes—is prone to believe to-day more generally and more firmly than in many other periods of the world. The philosophers form an amiable company, he concedes. For he thinks of us as enthusiasts, rather more amiable and considerably more absurd than the social reformers, to whom, in certain points of variation from the average of mankind, we show not a little of resemblance. Philosophy is abstract and hence impractical. The solution of

¹ Delivered as the presidential address before the fifteenth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, at the University of Pennsylvania, December 28, 1915.

its problems has been shown impossible by the controversies of the past. It may supply intellectual exercise for minds of a certain order. But the man of common sense finds no profit in it, nor will he waste his time in attention to its claims.

Quotations on either side of the dispute might be multiplied without end. But it would be idle to labor the proof. Let me rather bring to your notice certain features of the situation which seem remarkable in view of the length and the acerbity of the conflict. That popular opinion should misconstrue philosophy is easily understood. For it is the task of philosophy to interpret common thought in terms of ultimate symbols. That—with the exception of certain schools—philosophers should refuse to submit their reasoned conclusions to unreflective judgment, this again is one of the fixed elements of the case. Greater surprise is warranted by the discovery that each side on occasion forgets the relations—relations normal, and even necessary, in themselves—in which it stands to the other. When philosophy overlooks the fact that common experience supplies it with primary data for its own activity; when it forgets that its explanatory force with reference to experience forms a principal criterion of its value; and, on the other hand, when common sense denies the metaphysics implicit in its own convictions; that there should be no realization of the contributions which philosophy makes to common sense; above all, that men should lack the knowledge—or reject it—that common sense is a variable function—such errors are as noteworthy in themselves as they are deplorable because of the results to which they lead.

II.

In view of current doctrines these conclusions require explanation and defence. And in order to explain, as to support, we shall need to make distinctions. Kant's criticism was directed not at common sense itself, but at the school which appealed to common sense in settlement of metaphysical questions. With Berkeley it was a protest against the submission of philosophical principles to a tribunal deemed generally fallible. The two cases differ widely. The Kantian discussion moves entirely within

the philosophical field. As the Scottish philosophers had made normal human judgment the court of metaphysical appeal, Kant retorted that this procedure reduced transcendent questions to the level of the street. More particularly, he argued that common sense deals with the application of rules to concrete cases in experience, whereas metaphysics has to do with the conditions on which experience itself depends. The former is a useful instrument in face of the exigencies of daily life. But the final questions fall without its scope. To employ prudential maxims in the attack on metaphysical problems is to confuse practical sagacity with speculative insight. In its own time this debate merited general attention. Now the subject hardly requires long consideration. For the issue has passed from the circle of living questions. Historically, the work of the philosophers of common sense is ended. Kantianism remains established in the center of our modern thought. It might be doubted, indeed, whether the Koenigsberger ever did entire justice to the Scotsmen and their Teutonic followers. Nevertheless, this controversy over common sense has for the most part passed away.

Berkeley's argument suggests problems of more permanent interest. The gravamen of his objection lies in the charge of mutability and error. The reader is warned to doubt concurrent human testimony because "a vast number of prejudices and false opinions are everywhere embraced . . . by the unreflecting (which are by far the greater) part of mankind." It would have been of advantage if Berkeley had used his wonted insight to elucidate these errors further. He mentions disbelief in the antipodes and in the motion of the earth as typical examples. But mistaken views in astronomy and physics are one thing. The fundamental human judgments, though they are also subject to reflective challenge, require a different kind of evidence for their disproof. If his position precludes the philosopher from yielding to naïve opinion, he still must reckon with the spontaneous metaphysics of common experience. Or, as it was stated at the outset, a principal part of the philosopher's task consists in the explanation of this experience. And there is

always danger—as the immaterialist himself discovers—in interpreting explanation to mean explaining away.

At very least, the endeavor must be made to ascertain the several elements out of which common sense is composed. And this, whether common sense be considered in its static, or its dynamic phase. It is indispensable also to recognize the fact that common sense is dynamic, that the sum total of the opinions which men “take for granted in the common concerns of life” is not fixed, as it appears to be, but that it undergoes demonstrable change; in short, that common sense is a developing and, as we hope, a progressive thing. This view conflicts, indeed, with customary opinion, with the judgment of common sense about itself. For it is of the essence of the function to represent the body of doctrine which to any given age appears established. It sums up the beliefs which have been adopted with so much confidence and which have become so thoroughly familiar that they have entered into the common stock of thought. And since they are not recognized until they reach this level, the way is forgotten by which acceptance has been gained.

At times, moreover, these principles display remarkable vitality in face of opposition. The conclusion which has just been drawn suggests that common sense and doubt are mutually exclusive. Exclusive, it must be added, when they are contrasted in the same sense. If, on the contrary, the levels of comparison do not meet, popular belief may tolerate a surprising amount of contradiction. When a principle has been adopted into the current creed, it is often held superior to reflective criticism. New discoveries in science or new views in philosophy are counted ‘theories’—and theories the sagacious man will disregard in favor of the practical wisdom by which, in common with his fellows, he guides his life. In this way the process of development is retarded. The evolution of common sense proves neither so rapid nor so continuous as might antecedently have been expected. But in time the light breaks through. Insensibly the theories which approve themselves undermine received conventional opinion. The ‘man in the street’ overlooks the change which is in progress; the defenders of untechnical

thinking may deny that change is possible at all: in the end, the movement finds its term and the incorporation of the new principle is accomplished. It may even be that the new is substituted for the old. That which before was common sense is replaced by fresh ideas, and these are accepted with the same assurance as their predecessors, although they differ from them in point of content. At length it becomes patent that common sense has evolved a further stage.

III.

Some examples will illustrate the process of development. Consider, first, the characteristic modern doctrine of the uniformity of nature. This principle has been variously described. And under differing names it has gained widespread influence. Taught earlier as fundamental to induction, it proves on examination essential to deductive reasoning as well. Discussed as a postulate of science or as implicit in popular thinking, it leads on to the final questions of epistemology, to the presuppositions on which knowledge of every kind depends.

And yet the clearest inference suggested by the history of the principle is the fact of its development. It is evident that during the modern era, and especially within these later centuries, this principle has been definitively added to the common stock of thought. And its beginnings may be traced much farther back. Even in the ancient world, as antiquity moved toward its decline, the Stoics based their code of rational conduct on the order predetermined by the reason of the world. When mediævalism gave way to modern culture, the new science of nature abandoned the teleological for the mechanical principle of explanation. As our age advanced beyond its primary stages, the successes of science increasingly impressed the idea of law upon the modern mind. At length in these last centuries—I had almost said within the memory of men now living—the doctrine has been welded into the framework of the common creed. In this evolution, moreover, intellectual progress has been matched by victories of service. The idea of law has led to the idea of system, as law has been joined to law and subordinate conclu-

sions grouped as deductions from some single principle or ordered under its normative control. Science has been linked with science until unities of broader scope have appeared, nay, until pregnant hints are given of the unity of the whole. Meanwhile, intellectual progress has supplied the basis for important practical gains. Never before has man advanced so fast in his interpretation of nature; never has his mastery over nature been so extensive. Modern life depends upon the natural sciences as modern thought has felt their imperious domination. Thought and life together have entrenched the principle of uniformity in the spirit of the age.

A second illustration is furnished by the dualistic phase of modern thinking. This, as the historians tell us, derives from a long ancestry. Plato, by his ideal theory, impressed it on the consciousness of the European world. The Christian faith found in dualism welcome metaphysical support. Nominalism and terminism, the differentiation of the primary and the secondary qualities, helped subjectivize the world of inner experience. The mechanical interpretation of nature furthered the process of distinction. At length Descartes—true to his method of clear and distinct ideas—brought the movement to a climax, as he gave definitive formulation to the dualism of the age. To every student of history the result is evident, and the divergence which it marks from the beliefs of primitive times. For in this theory we have a second crucial instance. Here is a principle inculcated by metaphysicians and adopted as the basis of scientific inquiry, one which has entered also into the body of doctrine unhesitatingly accepted by ‘the man in the street’—this principle, indeed, has grown so familiar that we look on it as ‘natural,’ and hear it defended by capable authorities, even now that it is questioned alike by speculation and by empirical inquiry. And yet this principle has not always formed an element in common sense. The fact is demonstrably the opposite. It has attained its later rank through a long course of intellectual development.

Many thinkers to-day press the inference further. It is not alone specific beliefs—like those which Berkeley criticized—that

are considered subject to change; nor these together with principles of content, like the doctrine of uniformity and the dualistic theory. The fundamental forms of thought are also held to have originated by evolution. Space and time and substance and cause—the concepts which we term the categories and the primary judgments—these have been developed as well as the interpretations of concrete experience which they underlie. This conclusion receives support from the evolutionary movement of our time. It is favored by the prevailing tendency toward empirical explanation. It is congruous with recent formulations of psychological theory, and the philosophy which grounds all thought in practice sees in it a final illustration of its thesis. For axioms, we are told, are postulates, along with the other achievements of man's mind. First hit upon by happy chance, they have proved their worth in the intellectual toil of life as the lever and the crowbar—likewise discovered by some fortunate primitive man—have become established as instruments of physical endeavor. All thinking depends upon hypotheses and proof is verification: so the categories are shown true, rather they are 'made' true by working, like every other intellectual possession which man has securely gained.

Manifestly, the case for the evolution of integral common sense is formidable. It represents the coefficient of the spirit of the age. I must ask indulgence, therefore, if I venture to doubt whether the evidence is so coercive as partisans maintain. For though it is easy to argue, in the mass, that the primary human judgments have been reached by experimental testing, closer examination lays bare the difficulties of the position which is thus assumed. If axioms are postulates established by verification, it is pertinent to inquire concerning the factors in this important process. Are these biological merely, so that the evolution of the categories reduces to a function of organic growth? Or does the development of the forms of thought imply participation on the part of thought itself? And if reason is involved in the establishment of its own norms, by what procedure, apart from reason, does it carry on the work? Or if the fact of evolution be conceded in the sense of temporal succession,

the traditional question recurs, whether succession and derivation can be logically equated. Finally, even if intellectual evolution were definitely proven, would not the process of development presuppose the existence of an objective rational order, the venue in the cause of rationalism and empiricism being changed without essential detriment to the former's case?

But however we resolve the problem of the categories, in the remaining phases of common sense development is sure. Decision here in no wise depends upon the balance of contrasted ultimates: the facts lie open to definite historical inquiry. Although in this field also principles are accepted with conviction, the proof is complete that they arise by gradual process, that they change from age to age, that one principle may give ground before its opposite, even that the common sense of one period may include elements which at a later time seem essentially absurd. To the analysis and interpretation of these humbler forms of thinking the inquiry may now profitably turn.

IV.

The initial problem here is the problem of analysis. This has been partly solved by the historical review. Common sense may be divided into three subordinate phases. First in importance are the forms we call the categories, on which, however they are reached, all our thought depends. In the second rank belong the broad outlines of man's understanding of his world, or as they might collectively be termed, the popular metaphysics of the age. From this division two examples have been considered in our earlier argument. More loosely connected among themselves, more fluent also and less fixed, come ideas and judgments of a narrower type—ideas concerning the antipodes, as Berkeley cited them, about organic evolution or human progress or popular government or of some ethical case. Exception may be taken, it is true, to this analysis. The divisions are not exclusive, it may be urged—in particular, the line between ideas of the second and conceptions of the final class is of the vanishing kind. But the pertinence of the criticism may be conceded without abandoning the analysis; as I should also be disposed to

recognize a second limitation of its scope. For by no means all the beliefs referred to are common to mankind. Large sections of the race have not heard of certain of them; others are not universally accepted when they are understood. Again let the charge be granted. No endeavor will be made to deny the interconnection of the several elements into which, nevertheless, common sense may usefully be divided. And we shall not repeat the ancient fallacy of arguing the fiction of universal consent. On the contrary, as common sense changes with time, so its factors may vary in the extent of their acceptance. Races, nations, classes even of men differ as well as centuries in the convictions to which they yield allegiance. The one phenomenon, like the other, is implied in the fact of evolution. As students of philosophy we shall be most interested in the broader movements. But the less essential tendencies, the 'fringe' of common sense, will also need to be taken into account.

The inquiry grows more difficult as we approach the question of origins. If common sense evolves, what are the causes that explain its evolution? Are there laws of development here, which can be disentangled from the varying phenomena to describe and to elucidate the process of growth? It will lighten our task, if two phases of the causal problem are distinguished. For either the conditions may be sought which determine the admission of a principle to the rank of common sense; or the question may be raised concerning the agencies which prepare a principle to meet these tests.

The answer to the simpler query is suggested by the previous discussion. The conditions that determine which elements shall enter into the body of belief termed common sense are at once theoretical and practical, cognitive and of the active type. A principle may secure acceptance because of its explanatory service in relation to broad reaches of experience, or through its coherence with systems of knowledge antecedently established, or by conformity to any of the familiar criteria of belief. Or a conception may prove so effective in the furtherance of life that it is taken for granted in virtue of the reflex influence of practice. Or a third case is probably more frequent than either of the

former two. Thought and life, knowledge and practice are joined in the process by which a principle becomes accredited. I should like also to suggest that these factors may unite in varying proportions. It is not accurate to emphasize the significance of either one, while we tacitly or explicitly neglect its fellow. If the matter is tested by recorded cases in experience, even the side of practice may not justly be exalted. Did the Copernican astronomy gain credence because of the arts which benefited by its survey of the heavens, or as it furnished a more tenable account of the celestial movements? Descartes framed his dualism in defence of immortality, and his opposition of body and mind has often since been used for this ideal purpose. But it will scarcely be maintained that the dualism which has entered into the tissue of our modern thought has owed its favor merely to its support of the religious postulate. Or recall the principle of uniformity. No impartial student can overlook the influence of the applications of science in establishing this doctrine in the center of the modern creed. But it would be equal error to ignore the persuasive force of the intellectual victories which have been won under its guidance. Modern technical achievements show science furthering man's welfare. But scientific theory forms the intellectual distinction of the age. Both phases of the movement have contributed to its triumph. They have coöperated in the elevation of the principle to the rank of common sense.

Such examples throw light also on the deeper causal problem. The criteria of acceptance may be theoretical or practical or a fusion of the two. The productive or creative causes are those which fit a principle to pass these barrier tests. For philosophy the theoretical or intellectual aspects of the process have chief importance. And these may be arranged in different groups corresponding to the successive stages of reasoned thinking. A principle of common sense may take its rise in popular opinion or scientific discovery or speculative reflection. It may be generated by customary experience or empirical inquiry or rational construction. Or often, as you readily infer, the influence of more than one of these agencies contributes to its genesis.

Of the three, however, the second and the third most demand attention. And each is illustrated by the examples which have been considered. The power of science is shown in the belief in uniformity, the intensity of its influence in the circumstances under which this principle has gained acceptance. For the most remarkable fact about the doctrine is not that we all subscribe to it, but that it has developed and triumphed in a period of negative reflection. At the same time, it is evident that philosophy has been absent neither from the process of evolution nor from the achieved result. Witness the long discussion of the problem since Hume burned it into the consciousness of the modern world. It has been debated as a question of logical theory, it has been argued as a crux of epistemology, it has given rise to hard-fought battles in the field of ethics and the philosophy of religion. Therefore, although philosophers gladly recognize the services of science in the establishment of this principle, it would be abnegation for us to neglect the share which speculation has taken in the work.

The dualistic theory illustrates the genetic effect of philosophy on a larger scale. For if science and even popular opinion have tended to support the principle, its foremost modern defenders have been of the metaphysical type. In this way philosophical thinkers have enriched the spirit of the age. The speculative results of one generation have become the common inheritance of later times. A principle wrought out by the genius of the masters, and placed by them in the center of their systems, has passed over into the body of convictions which men hold in common, which they accept with unquestioning faith.

It will be noted, however, that the causal process is in neither of these cases pure. In the one science, in the other philosophy, has been the principal factor. In both contributory agencies have been associated with the chief generative force. A more complex balance still is found in a third modern instance, the principle of evolution when this is taken in its general sense. In the establishment of this principle Darwin and his co-workers played the leading part. It was through their labors and their success that the evolutionary theory won its place in the con-

sciousness of the age. Their subordinate ideas, moreover, have colored our conceptions of the world. Men talk freely now in terms of environment and the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest, even—and this is the final test—when they betray little comprehension of what the phrases mean. Biology has affected all departments of our thinking. Every discipline has felt its power. There is scarcely one which has not responded to the summons, which has not adapted its conclusions to the evolutionary scheme.

How then can it be just to cite evolution as an instance of the coöperation of philosophy and science in the genesis of popular thought? Because, if biology acted as the principal force, it was only one of the tendencies which in later times have favored the evolutionary interpretation of the world. As science had been moving toward the doctrine before Darwin and Wallace announced their epoch-making theory, so genetic influences had earlier been at work in literature and in speculative thought. Lessing, Herder, the Idealists, with Hegel as the culmination of the school—before this audience I need only repeat the names which suggest the part, the great and significant part, which philosophy played in the establishment of genetic views. Or consider for a moment a few of the dates in the case. By 1822–23 the Hegelian system was complete. In the winter semester of that year the master read on the philosophy of history, the last division of his philosophy to be set forth. Now in 1823 Darwin was fourteen, Spencer barely three years of age. It was eight years still to the beginning of the voyage in the *Beagle*; and more than a generation was to pass before the *Origin of Species* broke upon the notice of a startled world. But the Hegelian system was instinct with the notion of development. And the results of its influence proved no less remarkable than its precedence in time. The impetus given to political and civil history was shown in the advance of German historical inquiry. The theory of the state and of law likewise benefited by genetic ideas. The effects of the doctrine were seen in the criticism of the Christian Scriptures, in the evolutionary accounts of religion at large, in the historical interpretation of philosophy. And

Hegelianism represented only the climax of the movement. In many respects it is easy to criticize the literary and speculative tradition, to contrast it unfavorably with science and the latter's splendid success. But it demonstrably shared in the genesis of the spirit of our time. Without Darwin the evolutionary thinking of the era would have been notably different—other in method, in type, in assured result. But without Darwin, prior to Darwinism, thought at large was responsive to genetic suggestions, it had already felt the influence of the evolutionary idea.

V.

Here is a situation which philosophers will do well to consider. Common sense is not independent of philosophy, for philosophy conditions it in manifold ways. Now speculation organizes and interprets the outcome of scientific inquiry. Now it forms the sole instrument or the principal agent in the genesis of popular conviction. Anon it coöperates with science, or joins with every-day experience, in the development of a principle and its confirmation. Many forces participate in the evolution of common sense. It is essential to note that in the creative process philosophy also is involved.

And this fact merits examination. At least, it deserves more, and more careful scrutiny than it has in the past received. The suggestions which philosophy has taken over from popular thought—suggestions of problems or suggestions of doctrine—have often been studied and discussed. The origin of philosophical conceptions in scientific, or medical, or religious ideas has been investigated, in particular with reference to the thought of Ancient Greece. Less attention has hitherto been given to the activity of philosophy in the formation of popular views. And yet the contributions of philosophy to common sense possess extraordinary significance. Since they are not detailed conceptions but general views, not superficial, but fundamental principles, when they enter into the popular mind they condition the spirit of the age. The principle of uniformity, the distinction between body and mind, the evolutionary theory—the discipline which has favored or created these has affected the course of

western civilization. For it has produced or modified the ideas on which our culture rests. Through them man's notion of the world has been renewed or altered. New principles of living in the world have been created. The outlook toward the world beyond has undergone revision. Modern thought, modern industry, modern politics, modern ethics, modern society, modern religion constitute the outcome. Philosophy has placed all under obligation, and it has assumed responsibility concerning them. For it has helped to rear the foundations on which they all are builded.

The inquiry proposed will therefore serve a useful purpose, as it exhibits philosophy at work. Philosophy is never practical, the criticism runs; it produces no attested or profitable results. But the record shows that philosophy is always practical. It determines the principles of common life itself. For the conclusion which we have reached holds good of other ages besides our own. Not the modern world alone, but in their measure various stages of human culture have felt the influence of reflective thinking—thought entering into the warp and woof of culture, speculation affecting civilization, the outreachings of the master's genius in the day of his creative power founding the spirit of the generation to which he hands his conclusions down.

In fine, the study of the origins of common sense will prove more than an investigation of the past: it will lead on to constructive work. The history will yield at once a record and a challenge, reasoned explanation and a summons to activity of a similar kind. A summons also, as I am happy to believe, which the philosophers of the present day will not leave unheeded. For we have a mission to fulfill—under the conditions of our time. And the more thoroughly we realize the part our discipline takes in the genesis of opinion, the more persistently we shall attack the tasks which devolve upon us. Thinkers of the closet we may not be, although it is our duty constantly to face the questions of the mind. Live in the region of ideas we must, or forfeit our right to the philosopher's name; but we shall not forget that ideas are forces also, sources of energy and direction and power in the common life of man. Our route will lie apart,

and those who travel there will always seem a little strange to the many whose life's journey follows a different course. But the same beacon guides us all. If it is our part to watch the light, as theirs to march their swiftest on, do not we contribute to their progress? Are we not responsible in measure for it, albeit they reject our leadership? If the argument set forth to-night is true in any sense, these queries carry their own answer. And if philosophy shares in the responsibility for common sense, the philosophers of to-day will be found faithful to their trust.

VI.

These several conclusions apply once more to popular conviction in its ethical phase. So far our illustrations have been taken from the region of theory. But common sense includes an ethical side as well. Popular views of truth are paralleled by ideas of duty. Theories of the world are supplemented by rules of conduct. Common sense, indeed, may be said to culminate in practical principles; and it is about these that conviction centers with the maximum of attachment and force. The duties which are required of us or which we demand from others, the obligations of society to the individual, realized as our age, with travail, seeks a more equitable social order, the laws incumbent upon states, as the slow course of moral evolution leads toward the recognition of morality in international affairs, and, lastly, the spiritual beliefs in which the sentiment of duty finds support—such are the elements of common sense which men cherish with passionate devotion. For these they give their lives, because in them life consists. Truths may pass, explanations alter—let them go! Indifference to the principles of conduct is treason. The man who neglects established views of duty is outlawed; for he is held recreant to his most sacred trust.

To these convictions, then, our former conclusions generally apply. Ethical common sense, like theoretical opinion, undergoes change. It develops by gradual process. It owes its genesis to various causes—though the balance of influence will here swing notably to the side of action. More particularly, popular experience and scientific inquiry and philosophical reflection

all share in the formative process. And for us it is important to notice that, despite the antagonism between popular opinion and our own mode of thinking, in spite also of the unconsciousness of obligation by which common sense is marked, philosophy is often foremost in the creative work. In ethics, too, the summons to renewed activity sounds clear for the thinkers of to-day—and their response is heard. For, with reference to the duty of philosophical inquirers in face of moral problems, it may be said that already we have put our hands to the work. It was hardly mere coincidence that the meeting of this Association a year ago was principally given to the discussion of such questions. It certainly was not chance that my predecessor in this office led our thinking toward them by his noble examination of the Ethics of States.

VII.

And such service brings its reward. Or rather it includes its reward, and this of a distinctive kind. The labor and the result both lie in a domain where the philosopher is citizen—they belong in the commonwealth of mind. The progress of morality, therefore, in particular the moralization of the social order and of the nations, may be expected to confirm the mission of philosophy. The creation of ethical values will enlarge the boundaries of reason's world.

In the first place, moral evolution may be expected to confirm the philosophical type of thinking. Compare for a moment the advantages which have accrued from the progress of scientific inquiry. Notwithstanding the occasional conflicts between science and philosophy, gain has resulted on many a hand. Old doubts have disappeared, old problems have retreated into the background, even when they have failed of definitive solution, because in the realm of physical nature thought has proved its efficacy by its results. Thus the rule of reason has been consolidated and advanced. And may not similar benefits be looked for, if the principles of practice shall be developed and established? For in this process also reflective thinking bears its part. As the moral life advances through the evolution of ethical

ideas, shall we not witness a reinforcement and enrichment of the spirit from which morality proceeds? Prophecy, I am aware, is forbidden us. Least of all does it become the historian of opinion to forecast the future. But suggestions may be hazarded when they are grounded in the nature of the case. Given moral progress, then, and with it social evolution, can these pass without a reinvigoration of the human spirit, a development in particular of the spirit of reflective thought?

These questions presuppose affirmative answers because of the nature of the evolutionary process. Progressive moral reflection implies the production of new spiritual fact. The same conclusion holds, indeed, of theoretical thought as well. And in this way the evolution of common sense throughout involves production and creation. But ethical progress furnishes a conspicuous illustration of the truth. There is an expressive phrase of Rudolf Eucken's which epitomizes the principle which I have here in mind. The German Idealist dwells with predilection on what he terms the substantiality of spirit; and he contends that this substantiality is progressively achieved. Now, you will dispense me from the task of following the philosopher of Jena as he endeavors to construe supersensible reality. But within the limits of the finite order, his discussion completes our own. As spiritual evolution proceeds—development which is spiritual in either the intellectual, or the ethical sense—not only is there progress made in the discovery of fact already in existence, but new spiritual reality is brought to the birth. The movement transcends discovery and recognition. It reveals the intellectual and moral order as this has been in the past. But it also expands the intellectual and moral order—broadening its scope, applying it to new phases of individual existence, extending its control over wider and wider groupings of the social units, knitting these to one another and to the whole by fresh bonds of intangible reality, creating spiritual links among the segments of man's world.

For the order of reason and the spirit is no mystical dream. That for which I now contend cannot be accounted a metaphysical abstraction in the reprehensible meaning of the term.

Intangible the things of the spirit are—intangible, but yet most real. And they are capable of verification in entirely concrete ways. On the social side, I do not even argue for some pre-scinded collective mind. For in such a mental entity I beg to disbelieve. But the forms of the commerce between mind and mind, the principles of conduct and conduct by them controlled, the order of human society, the aspirations of faith, these things and others similar, together with the systems and the institutions to which they lead, these are the constituent factors of human nature, the essential reality of man's world. In so far as philosophy fosters these it accomplishes its mission. As they progress, it gains in scope, in consistency, in power.

Such is the philosopher's reward. As thought develops, in particular with the progress of morality and of social organization, new spiritual reality is brought forth. The more rational the world becomes, the more evident it appears that matter is not all. And the larger the share which philosophy takes in this development, the nearer she approaches to her goal. Thus the achievement forms the substance of her recompense. The study of common sense suggests a renewal of the proper activity of reflective thinking. It shows that one of the principal functions of philosophy is to contribute to the humbler type of thought. But as she does this she enlarges her own borders. The humble duty points the way to important constructive work.

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THE PARMENIDES OF PLATO.

IF there ever was a problem that justified the proverb, *quot homines tot sententiæ*, it is the meaning of the *Parmenides*. The literature on the subject is vast, and is based on views not only divergent in various degrees but often mutually contradictory. I take it that the Platonist and the student of philosophy generally will at least be grateful for a classified survey of these interpretations, however he may feel disposed towards the new interpretation which I have the temerity to add to the list already disconcertingly long.

To begin with the extremists. There are those who see in this dialogue a frank and unreserved attack on the doctrine of Ideas, and who accordingly reject the work as spurious, on the ground, mainly, that Plato himself could not possibly have treated the central thesis of his philosophy in this manner. The first of the athetizers was Socher.¹ The other extreme is represented by Fouillée,² who takes the dialogue throughout as a positive argument *for* Ideas. Fouillée's position is briefly this: In the first discussion Parmenides shows that the union of contraries in the sensible world implies a similar union of contraries in the Ideas, and that the difficulties which concern the participation of sensible things in Ideas have their solution in the participation of Ideas among themselves. Hence the second part takes up this point, and demonstrates that whatever hypothesis you start with, it always involves the primitive union of contraries, the radical union of the one and the many. Thus, whatever pair of Ideas you may consider, positive and negative, you will always find a mediating term in some third Idea, so that all Ideas, even those mutually contradictory, enter into one another and are reconciled in the supreme Unity.³

To these two extremes should be added Grote's cavalier denial

¹ *Ueber Platon's Schriften*, 1820.

² *La philosophie de Platon*.

³ Vol. I, pp. 203, 4.

of any consistent meaning at all in Plato (*Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates*). He regards the theory of Ideas supported by Socrates in this dialogue as genuinely Platonic, and at the same time regards Parmenides's attack on the theory as "most powerful" in itself and as beyond the reach of Plato's answer. The whole dialogue has no other purpose than to clear the mind of false and hasty assumptions: "It is certainly well calculated to produce the effect intended—of hampering, perplexing, and putting to shame, the affirmative rashness of a novice in philosophy."¹

Now these interpretations cannot all be right, and I think it would be easy to demonstrate that they are all wrong. As for the athetizers, it is sufficient to say that the dialogue bears on every page indubitable signs of the master's hand, and to ask who else could have written it. This intrinsic evidence is so convincing that almost all scholars now accept the work as authentic. Moreover, the objections lose their point as soon as we have found (as I think we shall find) an interpretation which gives the dialogue an important and integral place in the whole metaphysical discussion of Plato's later years. On the other hand, Fouillée quite overshoots the mark. Virtually to ignore, as he does, the validity of the arguments against Ideas is simply to read the book with closed mind. As for the second part, even Zeller, from whom he borrowed his Hegelianizing method, recognized that the nature of the antinomies here employed indicate an absolute gulf between true Being and the empirical world of time and space.²

Grote maintains his position with his usual cleverness and honesty, but I doubt if he has any followers to-day. To hold that Plato never attained a philosophical position of his own, and that the great bulk of his works contain no positive plan or conviction, is to fly in the face of common sense.

Those who take a middle ground between the extremes of Socher and Fouillée are so numerous that it would be intolerably tedious to deal with them individually. We can get the same

¹ Vol. II, p. 295.

² *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, Vol. II, i, p. 565.

result more commodiously by a rough classification of the points which, with negligible shades of difference, are variously combined in their theories. On one point they pretty well agree: they nearly all acknowledge the strength of the Parmenidean attack on the position held by Socrates in this dialogue. They differ in their methods of avoiding the disagreeable consequences of this admission. They all make Parmenides the mouthpiece of Plato in this part of the dialogue, but to some of them the "young" Socrates is vainly attempting to support an embryonic theory of Ideas which Plato had now outgrown, whereas to others Socrates is arguing for a theory of Ideas (as entities separate from the world of phenomena) which was advanced by enemies of Plato, whether frankly as their own or in Plato's name, or was erroneously supposed to be Plato's by inconsiderate pupils of the Academy. By exploding this false doctrine Plato, either directly or inferentially, is enforcing the genuine doctrine of Ideas as pure conceptions of the mind or as "the basis of potentiality," or "scientific laws," or "the methodic foundation of experience."

Now the first difficulty in these explanations is the supposition that in a question vital to his whole philosophy Plato would have chosen Socrates as the mouthpiece of the doctrine he wished to combat. The difficulty is not quite so overwhelming, I admit, if we assume that the "young" Socrates is arguing for a genuine Platonism now outgrown rather than for a pseudo-Platonism. But this assumption throws us into another insurmountable difficulty. No doubt in the course of his growth Plato changed somewhat in his attitude towards Ideas; it could hardly be otherwise. But there is nothing in his writings to indicate such a complete break as must be assumed by this explanation of the *Parmenides*, whereas, on the contrary, there are passages in his latest works (e. g., *Timæus* 28A, *Laws* 965C) which speak strongly for the essential continuity of his philosophy in this respect.

Against those who would see in Socrates the champion of pseudo-Platonism, there are two further objections. On the one hand, the conceptualist doctrine of Ideas which they regard

as genuinely Platonic is clearly embraced (132B) among the various explanations set up by Socrates and knocked down by Parmenides. On the other hand, in this very dialogue, it is shown that the rejection of Ideas as existing apart in a sphere above our own involves the rejection also of the divine government and knowledge of the world—a conclusion so abhorrent to Plato that he could not have accepted the premise. And I hold it demonstrable (though to prove the point would require a separate essay) that the whole recent movement to deprive Ideas of some sort of independent reality for the imagination and to reduce Plato to a scientific rationalist is, on the bare face of it, a perversion of the simple facts, for the conscious or unconscious purpose of confirming the tendency of present-day thought by the authority of a revered name of the past.

When they come to the second part of the dialogue these mediators take different and contradictory grounds. Some of them hold that Parmenides remains the spokesman for Plato throughout, and, having exploded the false doctrine of Ideas, now demonstrates the true doctrine. To these the same reply must be made as was made to Fouillée: this second part of the dialogue, unless violently distorted, is, like the first, negative from beginning to end, and to discover in it a positive exposition of any doctrine is a wanton reading of what is not written. Others hold that Plato first uses Parmenides as his own mouth-piece to destroy the pseudo-doctrine foisted upon him by the Eleatics, and then, in a super-refined spirit of revenge, turns the table by making Parmenides exhibit the fallacies of his own Eleatic philosophy of the One. This explanation contains, as we shall see, a half truth; but it over-reaches itself in taking Parmenides now as the exponent of Platonic truth and then as the exponent of Eleatic untruth. Plato was subtle enough, in all conscience, but he was not quite so disconcertingly double-faced as that. And, further, though a minor result of the second discussion may be to expose the untenability of the Eleatic unity in its absolute, exclusive form, the primary intention and achievement of Parmenides will turn out to be of an entirely different nature.

So much for the interpretations which run counter to common sense or to plain statements in the dialogue itself or to the whole tenor of Plato's philosophy. A few scholars have partly or wholly avoided these errors, and have left explanations which are rather inadequate than false. Among these is the author of *Griechische Denker* (3d ed.), with whom, considering his general attitude towards Greek philosophy, I find myself rather unwillingly yoked. Gomperz thinks that the *Parmenides* was written at a time when Plato's mind was in a state of fermentation. Attacks from the Megarians, or new Eleatics, had united with his own deepened reflection to disturb him with difficulties in regard to the very basis of his metaphysical theory of Ideas. He could not at this time answer these difficulties, neither could he surrender his whole philosophy. In his zeal for the truth, therefore, he brings together all the arguments against Ideas, making no discrimination between those that are answerable and those that are not. In this way he delivers himself, so to speak, and is free to pass on. He piles up all sorts of arguments against the metaphysical school from which had proceeded the sharpest attacks on the theory of Ideas (II, 437, 8). After the *Parmenides* we see two things: Plato's searching analysis of hostile doctrines brings out by way of indirect proof the inevitability of the doctrine of Ideas, and the trial through which he has passed leads him to modify his own principles (p. 440).

One thing is thus seen by Gomperz, which ought to be clear to any one who reads the dialogue with open mind: the logic against Ideas is conducted with relentless rigor, and is not directed against a particular form of the doctrine, but against all its forms, including conceptualism. (132B: "Perhaps," says Socrates, "each of these Ideas is only an act of cognition, and is nowhere present except in the mind.")¹

¹ Only in one place does Parmenides leave the position of Socrates unassailed. Socrates proposes a simile by which he thinks that possibly the indivisible integrity of the Idea may be reconciled with its presence in the multiplicity of objects which partake of its nature: "Just as day, being one and the same, is simultaneously present in many places yet is separate from itself [*i. e.*, does not lose its integrity by being among the events of time], so each Idea might be in all things yet remain one and the same." Instead of replying fairly to this argument, Parmenides shifts the com-

But another thing is clear. Plato did not for a moment admit that this logic, however rigorously conducted, rendered the doctrine of Ideas in itself untenable. As we have seen, he continued to adhere to the doctrine in his later works, and, more than that, this very dialogue contains direct statements of his adherence. The strongest of these is in the words of Parmenides himself, where, at the close of the discussion which has driven Socrates point by point to a complete nonplus, he asks what is to be done about philosophy if we surrender our belief in Ideas, or whither we shall turn our minds, or, indeed, how we shall be able to converse at all (135B).

Such a passage ought to be sufficient in itself to refute those who find in the *Parmenides* any surrender of the distinctly Platonic doctrine of Ideas, but its force and emphasis are doubled when we remember that it does not stand alone, but is a repetition of, rather a brief reference to, Plato's constant argument against the anti-idealists of the Heraclitean and Protagorean school. This point is important enough in itself and in its bearing on the place of the *Parmenides* in the whole drift of Plato's metaphysical period to warrant us in pausing a moment to consider such a passage as the close of the *Cratylus*. The bulk of this dialogue is given up to a series of linguistic puzzles which have been one of the bugbears of Platonic students. Many of the derivations suggested by Plato are so absurdly extravagant as to force the conclusion that he was ridiculing the pretensions of certain etymologists of the age; yet others, again, seem to be advanced quite soberly by him, and the reader is left with no criterion to distinguish between satire and serious exposition. This bewildering medley of fun and earnestness is not absent in other dialogues; is indeed one of the marks of the Platonic method. But whatever Plato's attitude may have been towards the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the current etymological science parison to a tent spread over a number of men; in which case not the whole tent but only a portion of it should properly be said to be over each man. Did Plato himself fail to see that by shifting the simile from time to a material piece of canvas he was leaving the real point untouched, or did he perceive the difficulty of determining the nature of time itself, whether it has any objective reality, and so shrink from a discussion which would have been out of all proportion to the scope of the dialogue?

of the day, he seems to have felt that the Heraclitean notion of the flux was natural to the unreflecting mass of men and was deeply imbedded in the elementary substance of language. Any seeker for the truth, therefore, must free his mind from the implications of common speech and train himself to look at things as they are. The fact is, says Socrates at the close of his discussion with the "young" Cratylus, that those who gave this color to language did so, not because our world is a huge perpetual flux, but because their own minds were revolving dizzily in a sort of whirl, into which they had fallen and are dragging us after them. The only escape for us is not to consider individual objects which may be good or beautiful, and the like, and which appear to us to be continually changing, but to fix our minds on Ideas, such as the good itself, the beautiful itself. For how can we even give a name to a thing which is now this and now that, always altering, and slipping away from us at the very moment we are speaking of it? There is no knowledge of such a thing; for just when you are going to know it, off it goes into something else, so that you have no chance to learn what it is or what qualities it has. There isn't any knowledge—nothing to be known and no one to know, if all things are in this state of unceasing flux. Granted the faculty of knowledge in us, then there must be something for it to know; then there must be those Ideas of goodness itself and beauty itself, and the like, which do not belong to the cosmic stream and whirl. It may be hard to decide between the truth of these Ideas and what the Heracliteans and Protagoreans and all the rest of them believe, but certainly he is a pretty poor creature who will permit the life of his soul to be determined by the mere implications of common speech, and will ignorantly assert that there is nothing sound in the universe but that the whole thing is a sort of leaky vessel continually at drip. How would he differ from a man who was suffering from a rheum, and was convinced accordingly that the whole world was in a state of rheumy fluctuation? You at least, Cratylus, are still young, and ought not to accept these current theories out of hand, but should investigate them bravely and honestly (439C ff).

Now there can be no doubt that the brief exhortation to the "young" Socrates was written in the same tone and to the same general end as that to the "young" Cratylus. The interpretation of the *Parmenides* thus depends on the solution of this crux: we have the whole doctrine of Ideas subjected to a process of destructive logic to which Plato makes no direct answer either here or anywhere else in his writings, and by the side of this we have an unwavering statement of the reality and vital importance of Ideas. Given this dilemma, the only way of escape would seem to be through holding that Ideas do not come to us by a process of metaphysical logic, but by means of some direct experience independent of such logic, and that the method of reasoning employed against them by Parmenides, while perfectly sound in itself, is all *in vacuo*, so to speak, and has no bearing upon their existence or non-existence. No other interpretation would appear to be tenable, and as a matter of fact the second, and larger, part of the dialogue is directed to exhibiting the limitations, and the usefulness within these limitations, of what I have called the process of metaphysical logic. To understand this point we must look a little more closely into the antecedents and structure of the dialogue.

Parmenides, the principal speaker of the dialogue which bears his name, was the pre-Socratic philosopher from whom more than from any other, unless it be Pythagoras, Plato's thoughts received their color. His name sounded to Plato out of antiquity with peculiar authority, and even when disagreeing from him the younger man could not forget his veneration. Against all the other philosophers, from Homer down, who had seen in the world only the play of flux and perpetual mutation, Parmenides stood forth in lonely grandeur, a man, in the Homeric phrase, "reverend and dreadful," a sage able to impress Socrates with "the noble depth of his mind" (*Theætetus* 183E). In Elea of Magna Graecia he had set up a school in direct opposition—so it seemed at least to Plato and the later men—to that of Heraclitus. In his cosmic poem he represents himself as carried by the Sun-maidens up to the Gate of Night and Day, which is opened to him by the Goddess Dikê (Right, Justice), and there

in the realm of heavenly light he is instructed in the difference between truth and deceptive opinion. The whole vision was to be taken over by Plato in the *Republic* when searching for the nature of justice, and worked up into his sublime comparison of the supreme good in the moral sphere with the light-giving sun in the physical sky. And the truth as Parmenides saw it was one aspect, incomplete and therefore partly false, of what Plato was to hold. Our opinion of the world of change and appearance is a mere deception; rather, such a world *is not*, for the reality of being is the reality of thought, or knowledge, one and indivisible, without beginning or end, without growth or decay, finite in itself and with nothing beyond it, with no color or motion or quality of perception. The universe of Parmenides was the pantheism of his predecessor Xenophanes, but as an intuitive philosopher would express it instead of a religious dreamer.

Now it was inevitable that this one-sided perception, or intuition of the unity underlying all things should have been met with ridicule on the part of those who could see nothing but the world of flux, and it became necessary for the Eleatic pupils of Parmenides to support their master by means of whatever logical instrument they could lay hands on. The shrewdest of these defenders was Zeno, who sought to discomfit the enemy by bringing confusion into their own camp. The Heracliteans had undertaken to dispose of the Eleatic unity by showing the absurdity of a theory which, by its maintenance of indivisibility, involved the denial of our common perceptions of motion and change, and which, by its demand of absolute uniformity, involved the denial of all qualities to things, thus reducing the mind to a state of complete negation. Zeno did not, indeed could not, answer these criticisms directly, but he did undertake to strengthen the Parmenidean position by setting forth the equal absurdities that followed if we rejected unity and made multiplicity the essence of all things. One of his arguments was the famous riddle of Achilles and the tortoise. Suppose Achilles, who runs ten times faster than the tortoise, tries to catch a tortoise that has a start of ten feet. By the time he has traversed

these ten feet, the tortoise will be one foot in advance. When he has traversed this foot, the tortoise will be a tenth of a foot in advance; and so on *ad infinitum*. That is to say, on the assumption that time and space are divisible this division will proceed without end, and Achilles can never overtake the tortoise; which is absurd on the face of it. Another argument of Zeno's turned on the contradictions that must arise from the ascription of qualities to things. For instance, if you say that A is like B, this will imply that A is unlike something else, so that you are driven to the paradox of holding that A is at the same time like and unlike; which, again, is absurd.

All this, of course, might be waved aside as an amusing play of logomachy, but in fact it introduced a real evil into the life of a people who were already prone by nature to lose themselves in linguistic subtleties and to prize sheer cleverness above simple veracity. Instead of throwing up the whole game the Heracliteans answered Zeno in kind, while on the other hand the Megarian school of Euclides took up the cudgels for the Eleatics and carried their logic to the extreme of fatuity. Hence arose that art of eristic which threatened for a while to reduce the whole of Greek philosophy to a vain babble of contentious words. The very essence of eristic, it will be seen, lies in the unbridled use of reason, or logic, without regard for, or in flat contradiction to, the facts of experience and intuition. Reason in itself is the faculty of combining and dividing (*συναγωγή* and *διαίρεσις*). When properly employed it restricts itself to following the perception of actual similarities and differences; it becomes eristic when it disregards these facts and attempts by its own naked force to build up a theory of the world as an abstract unity or an abstract multiplicity. By the time of Plato's maturity these successors of the sophists were expending their strength in ever vainer and more perplexing enigmas, while of the sincere aspiration after the truth it might be said, "Naked and poor thou goest, Philosophy!" The wrangle had spread until it embraced Plato's own doctrine of Ideas, which hitherto he had held rather as a matter of intuition and as an unquestioned necessity of the imagination than as a reasoned conviction, and was forcing

him in self-defence into what may be called his metaphysical period.

One of his aims at this time, perhaps his chief aim, was to expose the vanity of the new form of sophistry—for it was at bottom precisely the same spirit as that which he had opposed in his earlier dialogues, but disguised now in the sober garb of metaphysics—and in its place to establish the true dialectic, that is to say, the generalizing ascent of the reason without losing from sight, indeed, by using as its firm stepping-stones, those innate perceptions of moral and æsthetic consequences which he had hypostatized as Ideas. Already, in the *Republic* (454A), he had expressed his scorn of those who, in their inability to distinguish Ideas, gave themselves up to the pursuit of verbal oppositions, thinking they were practising dialectic, or true philosophic discourse, when in fact they were indulging in mere eristic. In his systematic exposition of this evil, the first task would be to bring into the light the lurking absurdities of the Heraclitean metaphysic of the flux; this he had done in the *Cratylus*, *Euthydemus*, and *Theætetus*, with a drastic power in comparison with which the campaign of Zeno and the other Eleatics was mere child's play. Now, in the *Parmenides*, he would employ the same weapon, only with greater respect for the persons concerned, against the Eleatics and Megarians, and at the same time would investigate the validity and scope of the whole metaphysical, eristic method.

For this purpose he took advantage of the occasion when the aged Parmenides had visited Athens with his pupil Zeno, and had there met and talked with Socrates, then a "very young man." There are, I know, difficulties in the way of accepting this meeting as historical, but Plato mentions it so often, in other dialogues besides the *Parmenides*, and in such a manner, that we are almost bound to regard it not only as an actual fact, but as one to which Socrates was fond of alluding. That, however, is unessential. Whether as a fact or fiction, we are told in the *Parmenides* that Zeno has been reading those treatises of his in which, as I have said, he undertook to support the Parmenidean unity by showing that the multiplicity assumed in its

place by the Heracliteans led to even greater paradoxes. Socrates listens attentively, grasps the point of the argument, but has a modest question to ask. I see, he says, that material phenomena are at the same time both one and many; for instance I, as I stand here, am one if I am taken as a separate integral member of this group of men, but I am many if you consider me as composed of parts, right and left, upper and lower. I can understand how your logic by laying hold of these contraries will reduce our reason to a paradoxical *impasse*. That seems easy enough if you start with material phenomena. But I should like to hear how you would apply this process to Ideas. What, exclaims Parmenides, with concealed pleasure, wishing to bring out his clever young questioner, do you believe in these Ideas as real things having an existence apart from phenomena? Whereupon follows the famous attack on the doctrine, which turns on the difficulty of comprehending how an Idea can be immanent in the many particular phenomena which bear its name without losing its integral unity, or how phenomena can participate in the Idea without foregoing their character of changing multiplicity. Socrates is completely blocked in all his efforts to explain away this difficulty—indeed neither Plato nor anyone else has ever found a positive solution of the paradox—and is ready to throw up his position as untenable; when Parmenides checks him. No, says the old warrior, you cannot do that, for without Ideas you are confronted by a still more disastrous nonplus; unless these generalizations of the mind correspond to things in some way really existent there can be no philosophy, no knowledge, no meaning at all in conversation. You yourself have declared that the logic of Zeno did not touch the simple fact of experience which presents phenomena to us as at the same time both one and many, and you need only carry the method out to its legitimate end to discover that it will leave you in possession also of your intuitive belief in the parallel existence of Ideas and phenomena. Then, after some hesitation, Parmenides is persuaded to give an illustration of this self-denying use of eristic. Now it should be observed here that this interpretation of the first part of the dialogue—in itself the only one which does not

do violence to the plain sense of the text—avoids the absurdity of supposing that Plato would have selected Socrates for the spokesman of a theory he meant to denounce. To represent Socrates, when “very young,” as not yet competent to maintain his position with the full mastery of dialectic is quite another matter, and is in perfect conformity with Plato’s own transition, not from one philosophy to another, but from what may be called his purely intuitional period to the years of metaphysical examination into his creed.¹

As for Parmenides’s eristical exhibition, which forms the second part of the dialogue, it is just one of the terrible things of philosophy; nobody need be surprised that students have found in it what they brought to it in their own minds. Heaven forbid that I should ask my reader “to swim through such and so great a sea of words.” But without a glance at the main points of the discussion we cannot assure ourselves of the general purport of this dialogue or understand the drift of the dialogues that follow.

Parmenides, then, condescends to submit his own doctrine of the One as a *corpus vile* to be tried out by this eristical method. He will first take the statement that the One is and trace the consequences, and will afterwards deal in the same way with the contrary statement that the One is not. The argument thus drags its awful length through these eight hypotheses (I alter their order as noted):

A (This stands first in the dialogue): The One is posited as absolute and indivisible. It follows from this hypothesis that the One is devoid of all qualities, incapable of being known or in any way considered or named or uttered.

B (Second in the dialogue): But by the very hypothesis that the One *is* we attribute being to it. Thus the One is presented as a duality of unity and being; this duality is subject to further

¹ Burnet’s view that in all the early dialogues, through and including the *Republic*, Plato was merely as a dramatist reproducing the philosophy of Socrates without any admixture of his own thought, and that in the *Parmenides* he marks his break with the Socratic doctrine of Ideas, must be disregarded as fantastic and incredible.

division, and the One becomes endlessly divisible and possessed of infinite qualities. But to say that it possesses every possible pair of contrary qualities is the same as to say that it has no qualities; and we are reduced to a similar *impasse*.

Now let us consider the consequences of this hypothesis for the Many (*τὰ ἄλλα*, *i. e.*, the Others, all things conceivable besides the One).

C (Fourth in the dialogue): If the Many are taken as having no participation in the One, *i. e.*, as absolute multiplicity, it follows that, like the One of A, they will have no qualities at all, and are utterly inconceivable.

D (Third in the dialogue): If the Many participate in the One, then, like the One of B, they will have all contrary qualities, which is equally repugnant to reason.

So far we have been arguing on the supposition that the One is; now let us take the contrary supposition that the One is not.

E (Sixth in the dialogue): If the One is not, regarded absolutely, we get the same total negation as in A.

F (Fifth in the dialogue): But by the very hypothesis that the One *is* not we associate being with it. To say that the One is not is a different thing from saying that the Not-One is not, and in this way altereity, the property of difference, is brought into the Not-One, and it becomes possessed, corresponding to hypothesis B, with all different qualities.

(This, it should be noted, is in metaphysical form the old thesis which Plato had wrestled with in earlier dialogues and was to discuss at length in the *Sophist*, that there is no such thing as a false statement, for the reason that it is impossible to speak what is not.)

G (Eighth in the dialogue): If we take the One as not being absolutely, it follows that the Many will have no qualities at all and there is nothing.

H (Seventh in the dialogue): If the One is not but the Many are, it follows that, by seeming to be composed of units, the Many will have all contrary qualities.

Now, there are two ways of looking at these hypotheses. According to most of the interpreters, one set (A, C, E, G) is meant to show the impossibility of positing an absolute One apart from the Many, whereas another set (B, D, F, H) demonstrates the reconciliation of the One and the Many. Thus hypothesis A leads to a total negation, whereas hypothesis B, by reconciling the One and the Many, leads to the possibility of predication and corresponds with actual experience. The whole argument, in a word, is a continuation of the assault on the doctrine of Ideas as entities of real existence apart from phenomena (*χωριστά*), and a proof that, by some theory of conceptualism or the like, they are in and of the Many.

The other way of interpreting the argument is to accept all the hypotheses as resulting equally in an *impasse*, since it is just as absurd to say that a thesis leads to the simultaneous possession of all contrary qualities as to say that it leads to the total negation of qualities. And this in my judgment, as my wording of the summaries above will have made evident, is the only interpretation the language of Plato will bear. Of course, if you care to do violence to the text, you may get any meaning out of it you choose; and that capable scholars are not above using violence can be shown from a shining example. After deducing from the second hypothesis the possibility of attributing all qualities to the One, Plato adds a corollary in which, by a subtle analysis of the time element, he shows how this is the same as saying that the One would have no qualities. Very good. But how does Burnet in his summary of the hypotheses deal with this double-edged argument? He states the conclusion of the hypothesis proper thus:

"Therefore One partakes of past, present, and future; it was, it is, it will be; it has become, is becoming, and will become. It can be the object of knowledge, judgment, and sensation; it can be named and spoken of" (*Greek Philosophy*, Part I, p. 268).

That is as close to the Greek as need be; but turn now to his statement of the conclusion of the corollary:

"It is the instantaneous which makes all changes from one opposite to another possible, and it is in the instant of change

that what changes has neither the one nor the other of its opposite qualities" (*Ibid.*).

Compare this with the Greek, which is literally as follows:

"By the same token it [the One], passing from one to many and from many to one, is neither one nor many, is neither divided nor combined. And, passing from like to unlike and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither made like nor made unlike; and, passing from small to large and to equal and to the opposites, it would be neither small nor large nor equal, neither increased nor diminished nor made equal."

Now, is it too much to say that, by transposing this statement from its negative to a positive form, Burnet has come pretty close to betraying his author? The case is still worse with a critic like Natorp, who out of an argument ending thus in complete negation draws a positive meaning such as this:

"By the instrumentality of continuity, to speak briefly, the way is prepared for a reconciliation between the absolute position (the thesis) and the relative (the antithesis). The possibility is opened for the passage of the absolute position into relativity, that is to say, for the passage of the Idea, first conceived as pure thought, the *a priori*, into experience, which signifies the realm of relativity. The first foundation is laid for the possibility of experience as methodically assured knowledge" (*Platos Ideenlehre*, p. 256).

There is not a hint of all this in Plato; it is Kant or Hegel or Natorp. The conclusions of the second hypothesis and of its corollary ought to be enough in themselves to show that no such inference can be drawn. But to clinch the fact, the whole dialogue ends sharply with this formidable summary: "Thus, it seems, whether One is or is not, both it and the Many, regarded both in themselves and in relation to each other, all in every way both are and are not, both have appearance and have not." How a scholar can have this consummation before his eyes and yet fail to see that all the eight hypotheses must be taken without distinction as reductions to the absurd, is beyond my comprehension.

Certain owlsh persons who are aware of this consequence

have worried themselves over the method by which it was obtained. It is full of fallacies and false reasoning, exclaims Apelt ("wahres Arsenal von Erschleichungen und Sophismen," *Beiträge*, p. 32), and will waive the whole thing as a piece of youthful indiscretion. Fallacies, quotha! It is indeed an arsenal of fallacies; rather, it is the fundamental fallacy of metaphysics from the beginning until now, stripped of its garb of irrelevant truths and laid bare to the gaze of any who will see. For I take it that any metaphysic which attempts to give an account of the ultimate nature of things, the *rerum natura*, by the process of pure reason will impale itself on one or the other horn of this dilemma: either it will cling honestly to the absolute One or the absolute Many, and so move about in the void, with no content of meaning; or it will surreptitiously merge the absolute One with the concrete or the absolute Many with the concrete, and so fall into a dishonest mixture, or 'reconciliation,' of contraries. This is not the place to support such a charge by detailed illustrations, but I think it would not be hard to show how perfectly the error of Spinoza's system is exposed by Plato's second hypothesis (B). Compare with the working out of that hypothesis Spinoza's effort to deduce all the contrary qualities of phenomenal existence from the absolute One, as stated in his *Ethics* (II, Praef.): "Transeo iam ad ea explicanda, quae ex Dei sive entis aeterni et infiniti essentia necessario debuerunt sequi: non quidem omnia (infinita enim infinitis modis ex ipsa debere sequi)." In like manner the scientific conception of a 'block universe,' as an absolute closed system, falls under the third hypothesis (D), or, in the Spencerian form of the Unknowable and the Knowable, under the fourth hypothesis (C). On the other side, the various forms of Pragmatism, all the systems that accept only the absolute flux, including the much-bruited metaphysic of M. Bergson, will come within the scope of one or another of the four hypotheses that assume the One as not being.

I would not insist on this modern application; but at least I do not see how the second part of the dialogue can be understood otherwise than as an endeavor to deal in such a manner with the metaphysic, or eristic, which had sprung up by the side of

true philosophy in Plato's own day. And the results obtained are of a double nature. The first four of the hypotheses discover the embarrassment into which those of the Megarian school were driven who, in fanatical opposition to Platonic Ideas and the Heraclitean flux, ran to an uncompromising idealism of the One, as the exclusive reality. I do not believe that Plato meant to direct his argument against the Parmenidean unity itself (Cf. 128A); that unity, as the Idea of the Good, was so deeply imbedded in his own teleological philosophy that it is impossible to think of him as trying to eradicate it. Rather, his aim must have been to tear away from this unity the scaffolding which had been raised about it by the later Eleatics and Megarians, and so to leave it in the form of an obscure intuition, such as it appeared to Parmenides himself, untouched by the rationalism which would petrify it into a logical negation of experience. Even so, it is notable that Plato treats this error with a certain respect; at least his exposition is conducted without any admixture of that contemptuous buffoonery which he had employed in the *Euthydemus*, when 'dusting the jackets' of the two shameless Protagoreans. He was himself a spiritual child of the ancient sage, and thought it almost an act of parricide to lay hands on "father Parmenides" (*Sophist* 241D). In this way we can understand the propriety of making Parmenides the instrument of attack on his Megarian successors.

But this freeing of the Parmenidean unity from its eristical supergrowth was by the way, so to speak; the main intention was to bring relief to Plato's own doctrine of Ideas. At the conclusion of the first part of the dialogue we found ourselves confronted by this dilemma: one by one the arguments set up to explain the relation between Ideas and phenomena had been knocked down, yet it was declared impossible to surrender Ideas. The situation was very much like that taken by Dr. Johnson (the great Socratic of the modern world) in regard to a question of equal ethical importance: "All theory is against the freedom of the will, all experience for it." By demonstrating that the eristical method led to the same absurdity (and so destroyed itself) whether we posited the One as existing or as not

existing, Parmenides would intimate to his young friend that to guard himself against a rationalism which brought out the contradictions involved in positing the existence of Ideas he should have retorted by forcing his antagonist to admit the contradictions involved in positing the non-existence of Ideas. Thus he would have made himself free to accept the reality of Ideas as a necessity of inner experience, just as he had seen that the double eristic of Zeno and the Heracliteans left him free to accept the reality of phenomena as known to perception.

This interpretation of the *Parmenides*, I submit, avoids the violences to the text to which other interpretations are bound to have recourse. It justifies the choice of speakers, and does away with the arbitrary assumption of a radical break in Plato's philosophy. It has also the advantage of finding a single purpose running through the two parts of the discussion, and of establishing an integral relation between this dialogue and the others in which Plato turned his attention from the sophistry of rhetoric to the sophistry of metaphysic.

If any further confirmation of this thesis is needed, it may be found in the natural interpretation of a much-disputed passage of the dialogue which is commonly, and rightly, I think, regarded as supplementary to the *Parmenides*. In the central part of the *Sophist*, Plato considers in turn three classes of philosophers. First, by an argument essentially the same as that employed in the *Parmenides*, he reduces the Eleatics and Megarians to confusion (242C ff). He next deals with the opposite school, not the mere Heracliteans in this case, but the gross materialists who cling to brute sensations and wage war upon the idealists of all colors, a veritable *gigantomachia* (246A). These, or their kindred at least, he had already made the subject of biting ridicule; now he is content with what is really little more than a reference to the proofs he has elsewhere given at length. They will admit that there is a soul, or life-giving principle in us; that there is a difference between the just and the unjust soul; that this difference is due to the possession and presence of justice or its contrary in the soul, and that, therefore, justice itself exists as an invisible, impalpable entity—that is to say,

as an Idea (247B). After dismissing these two opposed sects, he turns to the "friends of Ideas" (248A); and here the interpreters run amuck. Campbell, in his note, thus states the various positions held:

"Four possible suppositions remain, if we believe the dialogues to be the work of Plato. The 'friends of forms' are either (1) Megarians (since Schleiermacher this has been the most general impression); or (2) Plato himself at an earlier stage; or (3) Platonists who have imperfectly understood Plato. The fourth hypothesis combines (2) and (3)."

Now, in the name of conscience, why should not an unsophisticated reader take these friends of forms, or Ideas, to be just Plato and his true followers, without any beating about the bush? In the first place, as we have seen above, Plato, in his contention against the materialists, assumes the existence of Ideas in precisely the manner (ἐξεί και παρουσία) of his early dialogues. The *Sophist*, therefore, can scarcely contain a rejection of Ideas, or any radical change in the way of regarding them. What follows? Plato subjects these idealists to the antinomies of reason, thus (I borrow Campbell's own summary):

"Perfect Being [the realm of Ideas] cannot be in a state of mere negative repose, a sacred form without thought, or life, or soul, or motion. . . . But, on the other hand, thought is equally impossible without a principle of permanence and rest. Hence the philosopher, with whom thought is the highest being, can listen wholly neither to the advocates of rest nor of motion, but must say with the children, that 'both are best,' when he is defining the nature of Being."

We have, then, in this section of the *Sophist* an exact repetition in brief of the method of the *Parmenides*, applied now directly to the doctrine of Ideas. And note that the conclusion is in no sense of the word a 'reconciliation' of rest and motion, the One and the Many, nor is it in any sense a determination of the relationship of Ideas to phenomena, but a sheer statement that Ideas are and that in some unknown way they are connected with the realm of multiplicity and change.

The result of the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist* (the part of it

here considered) might be expressed as a laborious demonstration of two theses which Plato took over from his master and which are woven all through his philosophy. The first of these is the scepticism of Socrates, acknowledged so frankly in the *Apology* where he rests his claim to superior wisdom on the sole fact that he was aware of his ignorance, whereas other men thought they knew what they did not know. In the *Sophist* we are told that the absence of this scepticism, the state of thinking we know when we do not know, is the cause of falsehood in the mind (229C) and the source of ugliness in the soul (228D), for which the right purgation is just the process of dragging into the light the antinomies of reason and thus forcing the soul to confess its ignorance (230B).

The other Socratic thesis is what may be called his spiritual affirmation, that ringing asseveration of the *Apology*—"To do wrong or to disobey our superior, this I do know to be an evil and shameful thing!"—which in various forms sounds so often through the early dialogues. Nor is there any real hostility between this scepticism and this affirmation, but rather one is the complement of the other. It is on the very basis of scepticism that Socrates declares his resolution to suffer even death, if need be, for the sake of what he knows to be his duty. "For the fear of death," he said, "is only another form of appearing wise when we are foolish and of seeming to know what we do not know."

The destruction of eristic in the *Parmenides* and the unwavering affirmation of the reality of moral Ideas is Plato's philosophical justification of his master's life and faith.

But candor forbids us to stop here. Though this is the significant outcome of Plato's later thought, it is clear also that he never quite freed his mind of the hope of attaining to some positive dialectical proof for those Ideas whose existence could only not be disproved by the false conclusions of eristic, some rational explanation of the inherence of Ideas in phenomena which he was obliged to assume by the necessity of experience. Such a proof, if it could be found, would have succeeded in raising the third of the Socratic theses—the identification of knowledge

and virtue—into a philosophical reconciliation of the other two theses, which, as they stood, seemed to be irrational complements the one of the other. There are tentative efforts to create this positive metaphysic in the *Sophist* and the *Philebus*, but it should appear that the full working out of the plan was left for the projected dialogue on the *Philosopher* (Cf. *Sophist* 253C). The absence of that dialogue from the Platonic canon means, I conjecture, simply this, that Plato became conscious of his inability to achieve what, indeed, no philosopher has ever achieved; since it lies beyond the scope of the human intelligence.

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PRINCETON, N. J.

REASON AND FEELING IN ETHICS.

I.

THE present discussion will set out from Mr. Moore's critical analysis of the concept 'good.'¹ And I may admit at once that I find his thesis, that the content of the idea is ultimate and *sui generis*, and incapable of any definition, one which I should be inclined to adopt only as a kind of last resort after all other possibilities have failed. I do indeed understand what may be meant by an ultimate and unanalyzable quality. I agree that sense qualities are such; and when I am called upon to define the meaning of yellowness, for example, all I can say is that yellow is yellow. But for some reason this does not work so well, for me, in the case of goodness. When I try to think the proposition that good is just indefinable goodness, I confess that presently my head begins to swim. The trouble is that the conditions do not seem to be the same in the two instances. In the case of an elementary sense-content the matter is plain enough. It is a perfectly concrete and imaginable bit of stuff. So also in the case of a relationship. I know what I mean by 'difference'; it is just difference, and nothing more. But goodness, as ultimate, is not, as I understand it, held to be a relationship; it is rather analogous to a sense quality; and with Hume, I find it extremely perplexing to be called upon to allow a definite qualitative content for which there is in no sense that is intelligible to me an original impression. Certainly there is nothing that makes an impression on my sense organs; and if I am not allowed to identify the original with some concrete feeling content, I find myself very doubtful whether I am talking about anything in particular at all, and may not be only using words. If there is no other recourse, I am willing to waive this, and trust that I may come to see it more clearly in the future; but it makes me much inclined to try other alternatives first.

¹ G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, 1903.

It will be simpler if I propose a definition in particular, and then examine it in more detail with reference to the points which it aims to cover. Let us say, accordingly, that good is that which reveals a capacity, on reflection, for calling forth my approval; and that the only thing which I find common to the various objects of approval is the ability to give satisfaction, or pleasure. This is a double-jointed definition; and my point will be that the definition of goodness needs this twofold point of view if it is to correspond to what experience actually finds.

There are two senses in which you can ask about the meaning of good. The first has to do with the definite objective content of the thought, meaning by this the character of the thing which evokes the judgment. Certain things do, when I think of them, call forth my approval; that is my starting point. Such judgments are intuitive, in the sense that I cannot anticipate or force them, but have to wait to see what they turn out to be; and also in the sense that they are recognized as immediate judgments simply by looking into my own mind and finding them there. And when I set out to reflect upon and understand them, I seem to find that the reason why in all cases I call them good is that they give rise to satisfaction. It is to be noted that this is not a description of the nature of approval; it is the *reason* for approval. And for myself I can discover no other reason; nor can I conceive the possibility of my calling anything good except for this reason. In the last analysis, satisfying experience is the only sort of thing that arouses in me the judgment of approval; though it is not necessarily true that every form of satisfaction is thus approved, since there may be some counteracting cause.

It is also to be noticed that, as implied in the definition, good is a characteristic attributed to an object of thought, and not a mere feeling as an existent. An experience may *be* good, may have the quality, that is, which causes us to pronounce the judgment; but we have not sufficiently covered the case by simply 'feeling good.' When we are merely feeling pleasure, we are not in the state of mind which calls it good; that is a later experience. We must stand off and approve it, make it the object of an approving

judgment, before the word has any appropriateness; it does not seem to represent an immediate description of feeling quality, like pleasantness, but a reflective quality. Accordingly the statement, 'pleasure is good,' goes beyond the statement, 'pleasure is pleasant,' in that it adds to the quality of pleasantness recognized as the essence of the experience itself another fact, namely, that it arouses pleasant or approving thoughts. Unless I am deceiving myself, this offers a way of escape from Mr. Moore's main criticism. When I say that pleasure (or any other substitute that may be proposed) is good, I am not, in the first instance, to be understood as meaning that pleasure is a *definition* of good, but that pleasure is a *case* of good; the further meaning then will be that, over and above its pleasantness, it is the object of a judgment of approval. We have no disposition to say in turn that the *approval* is good, in the sense in which we say that pleasure is good. We do not for the moment think of the approval, or its pleasantness, at all. We do think of the original pleasantness as good, but we are able to do so only because we are in a certain attitude of mind to it which is not its own object, but only, if at all, the object of a subsequent thought; and this last is not itself a case of value judgment, but one of plain matter of fact. But now for a real definition, naturally we should turn the sentence around, and make 'good' its subject. Good then will be defined, not as some particular object of approval, or as our approval of it, but as *anything* which we approve,—the abstract character, that is, of calling forth approval. 'Is this good?', Mr. Moore says, is a different state of mind from 'Is this pleasant, or desired, or approved?' Now, of the first two terms, I have myself maintained that this is true. 'Is this good?' is a different state of mind from, 'Is this pleasant or desired?'; for it involves not only the pleasantness, or relation to desire, but also the way I judge this. So, too, in both cases, though I may hold that I should never make the judgment apart from such a quality in the object, I also grant that not in every case does the presence of the quality call forth the judgment; and this again gives point to the distinction between the two forms of question. But I cannot feel that 'approved' stands on just the same footing. When I ask what I *mean* by

calling a thing good, other than this fact of its ability to constrain my approving judgment, I am unable to discover any answer. I may desire a thing, and at the same moment refuse to call it good; but I do not see how I can *approve* a thing, and at the same moment refuse to call it good. There is indeed still a possible meaning to the question, 'Is this thing which I approve *really* good?'; but it is a different, and, I think, not a relevant one. The meaning is: On continued reflection, and further experience, shall I find it *retaining* my approval? But this only calls attention to the fact that my judgments of good no more than my judgments of truth are infallible; they may need to be corrected. But I could not correct them if I did not know in terms of my present attitude of assent what good means. The very question implies that *so long* as I approve a thing, it is for me good; and if the name ever ceases to apply, it will be because my attitude has changed.¹

¹ Here it may be worth while repeating what I said above in the text, that when I declare that goodness is the quality of exciting approval, I do *not* mean that the meaning of good can be reduced to a particular fact of approval. Mr. Moore devotes some time to showing that *what* we think, when we think a thing good, is not *that* we prefer, or approve it. With this I am entirely in accord. When I think about an object's goodness, I am thinking precisely about that goodness, and not about my thought of it. So I agree that it is false to say that we should never know a thing was good unless we *knew* that we approved it, though I doubt very much whether in that case we should ever be able to *understand* our judgment philosophically. But when Mr. Moore goes on to call it still more 'utterly false' to suppose that we cannot distinguish the fact that a thing is good from the fact that we prefer (or, as I should rather substitute, approve) it, he would appear to be obscuring a distinction of some importance. I cannot of course expect to define goodness except by glancing back at actual value judgments; and when I do this, I discover, as I think, that they did involve approval. But in defining good in terms of approval, I am not identifying it with a particular psychological feeling of approval; I am defining it through the abstract content I find in the approval situation. Distinguish this abstract intellectual content from the psychological existence of a particular judging experience, and it seems to me that we can say, indeed are bound to say, that in the former sense the general notion of good cannot be separated from the notion of approval, though it can be distinguished from a particular case of approval, about which last I intend to pass no judgment at all. I can distinguish the content of my judgment from the existence of my judgment; but I cannot distinguish the content of the judgment, when I try to understand it, from an abstract reference to approval, except in the sense that this is something which I discover by a later analysis, instead of its being present to the intellectual consciousness in the original act. But if I am compelled to leave out of a description everything that I discover through reflection, I hardly see how psychology, at any rate, can stay in business.

Consider, then, a little further, the two statements, 'Good is that which is capable of satisfying desire,' and 'Good is that which calls forth my approval'; just what is there in the second statement not present in the first, that can be supposed to affect the meaning of 'good'? While, as I hold, nothing could justify its title to the name which did not satisfy desire, it does not seem to be the case that everything which satisfies desire is good. Apparently I may condemn an act even at the moment when I recognize that I am impelled to it by desire. And yet after all, so far as I can determine, approval adds nothing to the objective content of the thought. This still seems to be capable of being put adequately in terms of desire-satisfaction. Accordingly, the only alternative I see is this, that the additional ingredient in goodness is the peculiar tang or flavor which comes from the way in which satisfaction appeals to me, not when I feel it, but when I *think* it, and which must be located therefore in that 'pleasantness of the thought' which constitutes approval. I say that this is no new objective content, for the approval-pleasure does not exist as a quality of the object. And yet I feel that if I separate it altogether from my idea of goodness, something fundamental has been lost. When I envisage the full meaning of the word 'good,' I find myself demanding that it should have this feeling effect upon me. It is not enough to recognize intellectually the fact of satisfaction; the fact must somehow appeal to me favorably, when I recognize it, if it is to have *value*. And I refuse to admit that this denies objectivity to goodness, and identifies it with bare feeling. It is not, in the first place, mere approval, but the approval of *something*; and this something has an objective content which is open to testing. The mere fact that I approve it does not show therefore that it ought to be approved. The judgment that a thing is good, presupposes that it will satisfy desire, which rests not with my approval merely, but with the nature of things; so that I can ask intelligibly whether it is after all *really* good,—will actually have, that is, the effect which I suppose when I give it my approval. More particularly, does this possibility rest upon one special pre-supposition,—the existence of a certain determinate character to

human nature. When we ask whether a given approval is justified, almost always there is in the background of our mind the reference to a standard human constitution as the basis of all possible satisfaction; believing this to exist in some form, and to act as a steadier and corrector of our judgments, we may condemn another man's approval of the moment because we have reason to think that in the long run its object will not turn out really satisfying. But more than this can be said. I think we feel also that justified approval somehow stands for a character to reality not limited to the mere correctness of our anticipation of psychological consequences in the form of pleasure; it implies a confidence that the way things appeal to human nature is fundamental and central in reality, and can be counted on, when followed cautiously, not to lead us astray. But this estimation of the significance of the feeling in the scheme of things, or any other explanation, does not do away with the feeling itself; good would not have the same meaning in our lives, if it were a mere intellectual judgment, which it has by being a judgment plus a feeling attitude toward the object of the judgment.

Possibly my position may be made clearer by comparison with another and related concept. 'True,' if I may be allowed to presuppose without justification the definition which appears to me valid, may be taken to have a certain objective meaning,—the correspondence between idea and reality. But here also there seems to be something which the definition leaves out, and that is the fact of *belief*; to try to get the full significance of the word 'true' without a reference to that experience of assent, and confidence, and a mind at rest, which primarily is a state of feeling, seems as impossible as to get the full sense of the word 'good' without reference to approval. It appears to me that the parallel is a close one; that as the objective content of true, or correspondence, is to the feeling of belief, so the objective content of good, or capacity for desire-satisfaction, is to the feeling of approval. And as approval postulates implicitly confidence in a community between reality and the way we feel about it, so belief postulates a community between reality and the way we think about it. The important difference is, that mere corre-

spondence between idea and reality does not constitute the satisfaction of a desire, and so we do not, directly and necessarily, approve of it and call it good; and I should hesitate therefore to call the true a form of the good. Truth *seeking* may be good for further reasons, or the pleasure of speculative activity may be good immediately; but trueness by itself satisfies no desire, and what we recognize as true may either be approved, or disliked, or an object of complete indifference.

Now if I have made at all clear what I mean so far, I may go on to a further problem. I have already left myself a way of distinguishing between desires which are good, and desires which, quite conceivably, may be bad. Since good requires not simply the satisfaction of desire, but also that this gratification be approved, it is not at all impossible, even though satisfaction *per se* be always good, that there may be further reasons to lead me, when I come to think about some satisfaction in particular, to disapprove it. Such a complication is involved in the claim that good is in its intention objective; it is not enough that we do approve, but there are certain things which we *ought* to approve whether we do or not. Just what are we to make of this?

Let me say first that I shall proceed on the assumption that the point of the query has changed, and that instead of asking, What is goodness?, we are now asking, What is *the* good? It is only here, so far as I see, that we come within the ethical sphere in the narrower sense. The ethical problem has to do, not merely with the recognition of the quality of goodness, but with a comparison of various claimants to the title of the good; it involves, that is, the notion not merely of 'good,' but of 'better.' A man enjoys a simple experience of pleasure, say the pleasure of taste. I do not see but that he can look back upon this, approve it, and call it good, without any reference to a better at all. It is because he can judge, not only that various things are good, but that there are different degrees of goodness, that the ethical problem arises. What is then the content of the word 'better'?

As I see it, there are three possibilities. One is, that 'better' means simply 'more of it,' and that the ethical question is therefore purely a quantitative one. Another is, that there is a

difference also of quality, and that this difference is a new intellectual content *sui generis*; this would appear to make necessary some revision of the definition of good if it is to meet ethical needs. The third is, that quality is something real, and distinguishable from quantity, but that it can be understood without adding anything essentially new to our previous results.

Now, to take the first alternative, while quantitative differences are undoubtedly highly important for us practically, I cannot see that by themselves they are competent to raise the strictly ethical question. We doubtless do as a matter of fact prefer more good to less; but I do not see, on the purely quantitative basis, why we *ought* to prefer it, or why such a preference is morally right. The most clear-sighted attempt to connect the idea of obligation with quantitative good is that of Professor Sidgwick, whose ethical theory is based on the self-evidence of certain propositions which are quantitative in their nature. But consider such a proposition as that more good is always better than less good. The statement *might* mean only this, that more good contains a larger quantity of good than less good. This is of course an identical proposition; but it is not such a purely quantitative meaning that it is supposed to have. What we really need to mean is, that more good is better in the sense that it ought always to be aimed at. But to this I should raise two difficulties. First, I am not at all sure that it is always true. Suppose I have a choice between a weaker and an intenser pleasure,—say between eating an orange which I like, and an apricot which I don't greatly care for. I am not arguing that I will take the apricot, for clearly that is not the case; I only say that I do not see that I am in the slightest degree under obligations to take the orange, though by failing to do so I am reducing by so much the content of good in the universe.¹ What the proposition ought to mean, in order to escape the charge of being a merely analytic one, is that to *choose* a greater good is better than to choose a lesser one,—that is, we ought always to do it. As I say, I do not see that this is always true; but even

¹ If it is a matter of choosing a less instead of a greater good for some one else, there may be a question whether the same thing holds; but this simply calls attention to the fact that it is not the self-evident quantitative statement which is involved.

if it were true it would not serve our purpose. For to say that it is better, is to imply just the qualitative difference which we are trying to avoid; it is not that there is more good produced, but that the man who chooses the greater quantity is qualitatively a better sort of man than the other.

The question comes down, therefore, to the meaning to be assigned to *qualitative* differences. Now the claim that quality is an intellectual content *sui generis*, affects me in much the same way as the similar claim made for good itself; I cannot seem to get concretely any real sense of its meaning. The clearest thing I seem able to say about qualitative superiority is that, even though I do not prefer it, I *ought* to; and consequently it might be maintained, with Mr. Rashdall, that better means simply 'what we ought to prefer.' But while I might admit that 'ought' represents an irreducible *feeling*, I cannot see that it represents an irreducible intellectual content. To say that the better is that in which I perceive intellectually the quality of 'oughtness' or 'rightness,' appears to me, I must confess, a purely verbal statement; it conveys to me no sense at all of what the quality may be.

Where shall we look, then, for a more positive account of what is involved in the perception of the better, or of qualitative superiority? In spite of the obloquy that has fallen on the head of Mill, it nevertheless seems to me that he is on the road to a true answer when he makes quality dependent somehow on the mere fact of the preference of experts. Consider for a moment the sentence: "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied." One can easily imagine that the life of a well-cared-for, healthy pig,—granted that his nervous system is sufficiently delicate to make his pleasures genuinely pleasant to him,—is a distinctly enviable one from the standpoint of an indiscriminating pleasure philosophy. It perhaps comes as near being one continuous round of enjoyment, unhampered by mental or spiritual cares, as it is easy to conceive. And yet I imagine it very doubtful whether the unhappiest of human beings ever genuinely desired to be the most fortunate and contented of pigs. He may unhesitatingly choose to die to escape his troubles;

but that he still would not choose death if he had the alternative of being turned into a pig, even an educated and happy pig, I imagine would be hard to disprove satisfactorily. Or take a less extreme case. Many men think, perhaps truly, that childhood was the happiest part of their lives, and they express the sentimental wish that they might once more be transported back into those more felicitous days. But if they actually had the choice, how many would be likely to avail themselves of it? Again, it might perhaps be a question whether artistic development is always accompanied by an increase in the bulk of pleasure one gets from æsthetic objects. A very crude taste may be the source of a very intense pleasure, whereas it often seems as if the growth of critical ability were apt to be marked by a diminution in the genuineness of enjoyment, and the substitution of a rather cold and passionless pleasure of the intellect. But even if he were convinced that there was thus a loss of freshness and vigor in the life of feeling, no critic would be willing to give up his hardly acquired sophistication, and regain intensity of feeling at the expense of having to go back to an uncultivated taste for what he now regards as artistic atrocities.

The ground for this seems evident. It is not that we simply want pleasure, of any and every sort, or even intense and long-continued pleasure, but we want certain *kinds* of pleasure; and what these are is largely settled for us by the requirements of our constitution. Men, most men that is, are not constituted like pigs, and therefore they cannot really wish themselves into pigs. If they really *were* pigs they might actually have a pleasanter time of it; but that implies that they already are different from what they are. In deciding whether they want a pig's happiness, on the contrary, it is assumed that the motives on which they judge are the motives of their actual present nature; in imagining themselves changed, they have to imagine in terms of what appeals to them now; and if a pig's happiness does not awake in them a responsive chord, but rather a sense of degradation and disgust, they cannot really wish themselves enjoying it. For them now, as they judge, it wouldn't really be enjoyment. In a general way they want happiness, and if they do not stop

to analyze it may seem to them that any happiness will do; but when they come to specify, as they have to do when the time for practical decision arrives, they discover that what they want is their *own kind* of happiness, not that of some other being; the happiness they really crave is the particular brand which meets their organic needs, and not abstract pleasure in general.

II.

The conclusion of the previous discussion was this: that the only reason discoverable to start from as a basis for the recognition of qualitative differences, in the sense that certain things which meet the abstract definition of good in that they are pleasurable, or objects of desire, are nevertheless considered as lower in quality, or even positively bad, is the facts of the human constitution, which determines what kinds of pleasure are really preferred. We may indeed say that pleasure as such is always and necessarily good, meaning that if we could abstract the feeling from all the circumstances of its appearance, we should find it calling forth the recognition of goodness. But practically we do not, and perhaps cannot, think of it thus abstractly. I do not think of pure feeling tone in the pig, which could never stand alone; I think of guzzling and wallowing; and in view of what I have discovered about the capacities of human enjoyment, this fills me with something of disgust, and I say that although I approve of pleasure, I do not approve of that kind of pleasure, which wouldn't really be pleasure for me as a human being. Assuming, then, that the source of the recognition of 'higher' is something in the makeup of human nature which affects our feelings of approval and disapproval, it remains to ask whether we can say anything further as to what this is.

Suppose we start with a case in particular. It would, I imagine, be pretty generally held that man's intellectual nature is higher than his sensual nature, and that if he doesn't prefer intelligent to merely sensual pleasures, at least he ought to, and it is the worse for him. How are we to justify such a judgment?

One answer might be that intelligence is a power peculiar to man, whereas the senses are what he shares with the brutes.

And it is pretty clear that such a consideration does not uncommonly influence human judgments about higher and lower. We tend to prize things in proportion as we do not share them with others, and what is less esoteric we incline in comparison to despise. But it does not seem to be at all clear that this judgment is capable of being justified on reflection. After all, it would not be difficult to make out a case for the thesis that only that which is widely shared is properly human; and the contrary judgment is in detail on so many occasions due so obviously to a narrow and snobbish spirit, that it casts doubt on the principle itself. Even if it has an element of truth, at least it needs a much exacter statement before it can be accepted.

A more defensible claim would probably be that we regard that as higher in human nature which is more inclusive. This would lend itself readily enough to the preference for intellect over sense. It seems to me very doubtful whether this last means that we judge a life devoted to thought to be higher necessarily than one of intelligence brought to bear more directly on the material of the sense world. As a personal ideal, some would prefer it, and some would not; and I am inclined to think there would be the same lack of agreement in judgments about its intrinsic merits. But if you ask about the difference between a merely sensuous or passionate, and an intelligent, pursuit of any course whatever, there would hardly be much difference of opinion; and it is at least plausible to interpret this in terms of the wider range of life which intelligence opens up, and the added possibilities of enjoyment and achievement.

That this consideration has some part to play in our judgment is clear; but whether it settles the main problem is debatable. It is, it may be noticed first, still a quantitative judgment, a matter of more or less, and so shares in any doubt that may be raised about the moral obligatoriness of the quantitatively greater. We might, and frequently do, merely prefer the more to the less, while nevertheless approving the latter so far as it goes. Furthermore, it does not seem perfectly clear how far such a form of judgment will carry us. There are situations where we seem bound to raise the question of higher and lower that cannot

easily be reduced to quantitative ones. Take the former illustration: if we set out to compare the life of sense enjoyment with the life of speculative thought in the narrower sense, which is the higher? In quantitative terms,—terms, say, of ‘fulness of life,’—the advantage is at least not so obviously now on the side of intellect; if the life of the sensualist is narrow, so also, in other directions, is that of the scholar. And I am not certain that by everybody the latter ideal would be really approved in comparison. If then, as seems to be the case in spite of the quantitative uncertainty, the commoner judgment would still be that the scholar represents the higher qualities, we might be led to look for something other than ‘fulness of life’ to account for this. But now take a different case, and compare the life of the intellect with that of simple goodness. It clearly is true, again, that *intelligent* goodness is judged better by everybody than mere good feeling and good intentions; but is the man of mere intellect, who also is selfish and unfeeling, judged higher than the simple-minded man with a good heart? I cannot feel at all sure that there would be any approach to unanimity here, or even that a given man will be entirely clear about it in his own mind. But if we talk in quantitative terms, there will not be very much doubt perhaps that the former is in some real sense the ‘bigger’ man.

Now this suggests another formula that might be advanced, perhaps an addition to, perhaps only a correction of the previous one. It might be said that ‘better’ is equivalent to a thing’s cosmic significance,—the part it plays, and the extent of its influence on the affairs of the world. This represents an actual and more or less useful form of judgment. We do rank men by their ‘bigness.’ When we are comparing men in the same general line of life, it is possible to do this with approximate accuracy. One man is a greater poet, a greater thinker, a greater general than another; he has, that is, a greater ability in a given direction, the ability being tested by results actual or possible. When it comes to comparing men in different lines, judgment is decidedly more tentative. Which was the greater man, Napoleon or Beethoven, Kant or Gladstone?—it is not obvious that the

question is a very fruitful one. But in so far as it can be answered at all, its meaning would seem to be in terms of the extent and importance of the effects of the man upon the world. It is intelligible to ask whether the results of Gladstone's work were as far-reaching and significant as those of Kant, though in view of the very complex nature of the question it is not certain that a man would show good sense in raising it.

But what I wish to maintain is, that while this is so, and while relative greatness or bigness,—the ability to do things beyond the ordinary,—in so far calls forth our admiration for its qualities, this is still not ethical admiration, and the judgment is not one of the qualitatively higher. Otherwise I should have to say that in so far the bigger or more able man is ethically the better man, which I do not think we tend to say at all. However much I admire the superior ability which brings about greater results, I do not feel that I, who have less ability, or ability in a different direction, ought to aim at these results; and when I see another man with modest talents who does his best, ethically I honor him equally with his more gifted competitor, though my intellect recognizes that he is intrinsically a smaller man.

The only positive suggestion I have to make with reference to specifically moral quality is this: that we cannot say we ought to do a certain thing, or that it is qualitatively better, or right, unless our attitude toward the alternative choice is one of actual disapproval. For the peculiarity of the judgment of 'better' in the qualitative sense, with the feeling of oughtness that accompanies it, I am able to discover no general reason except the bare fact that there is aroused in me in connection with it some feeling of repugnance. So far as I can see, this represents the difference between quantitative and qualitative judgments. If I do not feel a positive dislike to the thought of the alternative, then I simply like the other more; and while this means that I prefer it, it does not mean that I feel that I ought necessarily to prefer it. And for this repugnance I find no single cause, but rather several. Why, for example, do I feel that sensuality is lower than intellect, or that piggishness is not a human virtue? Primarily, so far as I can judge, out of an æsthetic disgust.

With a certain refinement of taste, which I find is so generally capable of being developed under proper conditions that it justifies its place in my conception of human nature, piggishness arouses an immediate feeling of dislike. If another man does not feel this, I still say that he ought to, and that I am right and he wrong. I mean, probably, at least in part, that there is that latent in him which, if only it could get a chance to develop, would lead him to feel the same way that I do. Of course in a sense this is a matter of faith, based on my knowledge of the possibilities of human culture, and my readiness to assume that all beings in the likeness of a man can be trusted to have in fundamentals much the same make-up. If on the contrary any such being really had the instincts of a pig, as is always conceivable, I should cease to say that he ought to feel differently, just as, if I am sensible, I do not blame the real pig for his preferences, but leave him to his own conscience and his Maker. But I still say that sensuality is low, because it is *my* understanding of what human nature is that determines my notion of higher and lower; and I still believe that my preference here represents essential man, and that he who has only the instinctive possibilities of an animal is a man only in outward semblance.

There is a second form of emotional revolt which may enter into my feeling judgments of qualitative difference, and that is the instinctive objection to injustice or cruelty, or what may be called moral indignation. It is this which in particular seems to me to cast doubt upon the supreme rank of intellectual eminence, or of culture, as a form of human good. In comparing this with the virtues of simple human kindliness, when each stands by itself without the other, I think I find myself in doubt about the outcome, until I begin to take notice of its obtuseness to the righting of human wrongs outside the field of what effects its special interests; and then I find myself tending to pronounce the judgment that, if I am forced to assign a relative rank to pure intellect, and the humane virtues, the latter are the higher. I recognize that here it is still less certain that everybody will pronounce the same judgment; but in case of difference, I find an explanation in the relatively weaker character of the emotion

of resentment in the man who dissents from my judgment, or his failure to take stock intellectually of the whole relevant situation. In so far as the latter is the case, I reinforce my own judgment by thinking that he also will come round to it when he enlarges his survey; in the former case I simply say, again, that my attitude is the more truly human one, and has the future on its side.

There is a third form of repugnance which I seem to be able to distinguish from both of these. It is more peculiarly an intellectual emotion, and might be called the dislike of, or contempt for, that which is petty and unworthy of human powers. That we should be able to make judgments about relative importance, is easy to understand; indeed, this is just the quantitative judgment which I was speaking of previously. What I am at present calling attention to is the possibility that this may lend itself also to a judgment of qualitative difference, by the addition, to the mere judgment of more or less, of an active feeling of dislike toward the idea of the quantitatively inferior. As a matter of fact, I think that this frequently coöperates with other repugnances, and sometimes acts alone, to produce a judgment of moral quality. It is indeed a very unsafe feeling to follow blindly, since it so readily allies itself with our natural inclination to be snobs. But the feeling of contempt for the narrow and petty is in itself surely not incapable of justification. So a part of the objection to sensualism is, doubtless, a recognition of the insignificant character of its objects of ambition, in view of all the many interesting things that might be done in the world; the result does not look big enough to justify intellectually our practical claim for its supreme importance. So of self absorption in any form; when we consider it impartially, in a cool moment, then, in addition to the indignation to which some of its effects on other people may give rise, there is also a feeling of its trivialness as an end; what is the sense of my being wrought up about my private concerns in a universe which contains so many other things that dwarf them. Here is where I should be inclined to place Professor Sidgwick's principles. The intellectual judgment that the greater is more than the less, especially

when it is applied to the superiority of the general good over what is just mine, seems to me to get its ethical significance only as it calls up the judgment of triviality; and the trivial differs from the less precisely in the emotional feeling of dislike which accompanies it. Of the feeling, one not unimportant ingredient is in a special sense intellectual,—the dislike which a reasonable being has of falling below the standard of impartiality and intellectual fairness, as he would do were he to exalt the claims of one unit over the—in the eyes of reason—equal claims of others.¹

If, therefore, I am asked to pronounce on the relative place of intellect and feeling in the ethical judgment, I should attempt to answer somewhat as follows: There is of course no ethical judgment without the exercise of the intellect; and our more complex and matured ones are shot through with intellectual elements. What I shall consider good in the concrete depends on my whole experience of life; my possibilities of appreciation, both positive and negative, represent a progressive refinement of taste which could not go on apart from more and more subtle intellectual distinctions also. Nevertheless, after I have made all these distinctions, there is something still which must not be left outside the picture; and that is the way in which the thing appeals to my feeling. Without this, the 'value' quality in the 'good' and the 'ought,' which distinguishes them from a mere judgment of fact or truth, would not be accounted for. And this emotional element goes back, apparently, not to intellect, but to our given constitution with its emotional possibilities; even the 'intellectual' elements which I have just noticed are in terms,

¹ I might add that this same condemnation of the petty may explain also why many forms which this very judgment itself takes are condemned. Why is it that the man who is over-ready to despise as petty other interests and standards than his own,—to condemn poetry, say, because it is not science, or the man of quiet tastes because he is not strenuous and eager to mix in 'big' affairs, or the student or artist because he isn't enthusiastic over uplift,—makes upon us the unsatisfactory impression that he does? For the reason, I think, that his own judgment shows narrowness and provincialism; the more our insight and our interests broaden, the more we are able to recognize the significance of things for which we may have ourselves no special bent, and the more we see how unintelligent therefore is the common disposition to think that no one understands how to live except ourselves.

not of specific intellectual truths perceived by the mind in the normal exercise of its functions, but of the emotional possibilities of our general intellectual constitution and its interests. I can quite readily conceive a being who should, intellectually, look upon an act of cruelty as I do, see what it means, and what are its consequences, and still have no repugnance to it; in that case I do not see what he could mean by calling it bad, or in saying that a life spent in cruelty is intrinsically worse than one spent in benevolence. Or, on the positive side, I can conceive a being contemplating artistic excellence, and feeling no sentiment of approval; in that case it would be meaningless to call it good. And since for all I know human beings might differ indefinitely in both their instinctive approvals and disapprovals, whereas it is less easy to conceive of them as differing in their judgments of intellectual truth when they have the same data before them, I am forced to say that the judgment of goodness is determined, in the end, not by the perception of an intellectual content or relationship, but by a certain feeling attitude toward a content, which possesses indeed many intellectual elements; and when this whole situation is reflected on, it gives me what I mean by good. Similarly of the ought: feeling seems to be necessary if we are to have that recognition of a qualitative difference which enables us to go beyond the good, and speak of the better, or the right. So far as I can at present see, the ought is reducible in the end to a sense of dislike which serves as an inhibitive force, and pulls us away from the thing to which desire may possibly be leading us,—a situation only made possible indeed by our ability as rational beings to free ourselves from the sway of momentary passion, and look at this in its wider bearings, but which yet would have no motive power were not the wider end itself backed by feeling. And it has its intellectual justification in the fact that we find it a persistent force in human nature, a sort of feeling which reflection, and further experience, tend to encourage us in; its objectivity consists in this recognition, plus the general faith which we have, also by natural endowment, that to the requirements of human nature the universe is somehow fitted.

But such a statement will fail to carry quite its right meaning,

unless we keep in mind a distinction at which I have already hinted. What this is, might be suggested by a certain peculiarity in connection with our judgment of the good. Not infrequently we have occasion to say that we approve a good while yet we do not desire it for ourselves; and if this is true, it might seem again to raise the question whether after all a quality which we approve without desire does not come nearer to an intellectual fact than an emotional. I think this may be met by noting that there are really two different kinds of judgment that we pass about the good, and that one of them is more purely intellectual than the other. Usually, I think, it is assumed that our conception of the totality of good, or of the *Summum Bonum*, is identical with our notion of the end which appeals to us as personally, our duty, or our ideal. But there are difficulties in such an assumption. Concretely, it must be evident that not every man's good, as his practical ideal and goal, can be identically the same; and if each man's different good is the *Summum Bonum*, there is no *Summum Bonum*. Or it may be asked whether I really want for myself, or regard as my duty, everything that I approve and admire as good; and it seems clear, again, that I do not.

To meet this, I may draw again on the distinction between the satisfactoriness of an experience, and the satisfactoriness of the approving judgment. Now I shall, other things being equal, naturally feel approval of that which satisfies my own desires; and if I were no more than an animal this is as far as my judgment of approval would go. But it is actually not limited to this; and the reason is, simply, that I among other things am also a rational being. And by this I mean something quite definite; I mean that I am capable of separating my intellect temporarily from the pursuit of other ends more personal to me, and of looking at things impartially, just for the sake of seeing them as they are. I can separate the idea of good, for example, from the particular things which seem good to me because I want them for myself, and, noting that satisfaction of desire is their common character, can generalize this, and talk of good, not as that which satisfies *my* desire, but as that which satisfies *desire*. Accordingly my

neighbor's satisfaction also will come under the head of the good, though what my neighbor wants may for me have no attraction whatsoever. It may perhaps be asked whether I am doing anything more here than classing this intellectually under the term good; am I really approving it also? And it is notorious that as a matter of fact mankind is not in its natural state greatly inclined to do this last. Sympathy with tastes other than one's own is rather the exception than the rule. But this is due, pretty plainly, to our provincialism and failure in impartiality; the more a man develops rationally, the more capacity he shows for putting himself in the place of others, and sympathizing with their differing modes of life. And so, since he recognizes the intrinsic goodness in satisfied desire, he will come to look with approval upon whatever satisfies desire; and he will do this primarily through a sympathetic enlargement of intellectual vision. But there will be one important limitation. Good in the large may not all of it be *his* good, but it can hardly be *inconsistent* with his good, and still call forth his approving judgment. For it is hardly rational for me to judge two things to be good which are mutually repellent. Consequently we are led to define the *Summum Bonum* as the sum of the interests and satisfactions of all sentient creatures, not in so far as they possess some one identical content, but in so far as they are *capable of living together harmoniously in the same world*. Unless there is a clash, I do not see that I am justified in condemning or despising the life interests of any being, in so far as I can assume that for him they represent the demands of his particular nature. Certainly to any one who has ever had a canine friend, the natural life even of the animal may be a constituent of the sum of good; and it seems a little snobbish to object even to the pig's happiness so long as it is a literal pig that is in question.

Now, if this is true, it would appear that there is a difference between the ideal of the individual, and the *Summum Bonum*; and this is a point which both theoretically and practically is worth considering. The *Summum Bonum*, or the greatest sum of good, does not represent the personal ideal, or what I ought individually to aim at. My duty is determined by my particular

constitution; to determine it, self-knowledge is what I need most of all. The tendency has always been to set up one single ideal, and to impose it upon everybody. The last lesson which the good man has to learn,—and it is not always that he learns it,—is that a personal ideal cannot be imposed apart from the particular wants and limitations of the individual concerned. And, on the side of *self-imposed* ideals, an enormous amount of distress and waste effort has been due to the feeling that we ought to aim at something which we may admire, apart from the question whether we are personally fitted for its attainment, or capable of taking real satisfaction in the life for which it calls. Objectively, I am bound in so far to admire the man more, and regard him as the bigger man, who is capable, we will say, of a double amount of work; but it does not follow that I ought myself to endeavor to work twice as hard. If I am a lesser man, if I only have energy enough to do half the amount with ease and satisfaction, and if to speed myself up would only make me worried and unhappy, I ought not to do this simply because I see that objectively it is more admirable. In other words, to discover my own duty I must study my own constitution and desires; and the only final test that I am succeeding is, not consistency with some concrete objective standard capable of being determined for everyone alike by reasoning it out, but my own satisfaction and assured content in the outcome. There may be individuals who find it a demand of their nature that they should aim directly at the sum total of good, and have this constantly as a motive in their minds. They are needed, probably, in order to keep one important aspect of the situation before us. But most people, it seems clear, will do better in the end to follow out their own particular interest because it is theirs, glancing only occasionally at the totality of things, and then usually to make sure that they are offering no obstruction, rather than with the view positively of enriching the general content. For not only do calculations in such vast terms quickly become unmanageable,—Mr. Moore, for example, from his own point of view, seems logical in his scepticism about the possibility of any rational conclusions in the realm of practical

ethics,—but the habit of doing things, not because they are interesting to do, but because they are needed to raise the total of good in the universe, is pretty certain to lead to priggishness and an undue sense of the importance of oneself and one's efforts; while the unwillingness to rest satisfied with cultivating one's own garden is apt also to make us too ready to interfere with other people who may want to cultivate theirs. It is at least arguable that the best way of increasing the sum of good in the world is to fix it so that nobody, not myself even, shall be able to bother seriously his neighbors, and then go off and leave each man to the task for which, as we judge from the satisfaction he takes in it, nature has designed him. I ought indeed, under penalty of being adjudged small and petty in my aims, and of growing myself dissatisfied with them, to be assured at the start that they offer some contribution to the general stock of good outside myself. A rational and objectively minded being can hardly be content with a life which does not take its significant place in the larger scheme of things. But having so justified myself, I shall commonly do better to take this largely for granted in the future, and occupy myself with the things I like to do, rather than indulge in quantitative calculations about the social importance of my efforts;¹ I shall find a sufficient field for positive and intentional contributions in particular if I make it a rule to keep my eyes open for chances to do an incidental kindness to the individuals with whom I happen to have personal dealings.

A personal ideal, then, is far more closely and immediately bound down to interest and desire than the *Summum Bonum*. On the positive and inclusive side, this last is, as I have said, primarily intellectual in its nature. The concept of totality is quantitative, and therefore a concept of reason; so also the notion of harmony is rational, and the process of determining how this harmony can be secured represents a rational problem. But

¹ To find a life which shall possess weight and significance through its contribution to the larger life of the world, and so escape self-condemnation on the ground of triviality, while at the same time, by being *my* end, and appealing to my natural likings, it gains motivation and vividness of interest, would seem to be about as far as we can go in setting forth the ideal in general terms.

even here we cannot overlook the feeling side; and this is especially evident when we come to the question of excluding that which breaks the harmony. Shut out either of the two contestants, and reason will tell you about the character of the result; but how is reason to decide which is to be excluded? No matter which you leave out, the resulting harmony would be equally intelligible. I see no answer except to say that when it does come to a conflict, each man must follow his own sense of approval; and I cannot see but that this is an ultimate fact of his nature, resting upon the assumption that the totality of good must not be incompatible with *his* ends. That good should go beyond the ends which he personally is concerned with securing, is what I have been saying. He may take an objective interest in a great many things which he is not called upon actively to further; it is just the nature of man as a rational being that he can find the world interesting even where he has no personal axe to grind. But it is not clear that he is likely to take more than a very lukewarm interest in these things except as they do *indirectly* contribute to the same sort of ends as those to which he is personally committed. and if they actually interfere with these ends, I find myself unable to imagine him approving. Accordingly, the limit to the possibility of purely impartial and rational construction would seem to be found in the necessity for every man that harmony shall not sacrifice the particular interests which he finds his own nature demanding,—interests which are set by his constitution, and which, with the feeling of satisfaction that is their only attestation, are discovered by experience rather than determined by the perception of intellectual relationships.

And this leads to a final question: What do we mean, in terms of the individual, by the rational life, or the complete life, or the unified life, or the true life,—the life of the *real* self? If we intend to ask, What is this in detail?, then I am led to say again that that is something which is the outcome of experience, and cannot be determined by any exercise of the intellect, though in this experience all sorts of judgments about the world and about ourselves are involved; and that, furthermore, there is no one

rational life, but for each man the outcome will differ, slightly or greatly, in accordance with the difference of emphasis among his impulses and natural springs of desire. But if we mean to ask how we are to determine whether the true issue has been found, then a definite reply can be given; it is by the settled character of our satisfaction with it. All we can do is to experiment; and when we have found a plan of life which actually does leave us content, in which we feel that we are truly finding ourselves, are truly living, without sense of strain, or regret, or conflict, our question is answered in the only way I see how it can possibly be answered decisively. Of course it is to be understood that this is a result for the long run, and not simply for the present moment; and also it is understood that we should be in an open-minded and receptive mood, since otherwise we shall not give the more retiring side of our nature a fair chance. Normally this will mean, supposedly, a fairly inclusive life,—inclusive, that is, of the really fundamental and persistent impulses; since otherwise there is always the danger of a disruption of our settled life from the outbreak of desires for which satisfaction has not been provided. But in special cases it is quite conceivable that a man may be so constituted that a given impulse will not suffer governance, and will refuse to keep within safe channels; and then the only satisfaction may be to hold it under, and try to starve it out. In the nature of the case there can be no general rules to guide us infallibly to the ideal end. This does not mean that reason is wholly at a loss. From a wide acquaintance with human experience we can draw up a statement of probabilities, though this can only be an average statement, and will apply unchanged only as individual men approach the average man. Or we can get closer to the goal in proportion as we have concrete knowledge of an individual nature. But since we cannot know *all* about it, prior to an experience to which we can set no terminus, such an anticipation can only be a hypothesis, subject to indefinite correction. And the correction can only come from life itself. In two ways, therefore, the power of reason is limited. Its material comes from the given facts of man's constitution, which in different

individuals clearly differ at the start, and which cannot be changed, fundamentally, by thinking about them. Of course a rational treatment of our natural dispositions may modify them largely. But that there is a limit to this, the facts of experience seem to show plainly. And, in the second place, the only test of whether we have got the right answer is not strictly an intellectual test, or an appeal to the truth of intellectual or relational judgments, but a feeling test,—the sense of satisfaction which tells us that our action really meets our personal demands. This is not a calculus of pleasures, or any sort of construction through analysis, but a unitary state of being in which the different factors of our lives may experimentally be reduced to a harmony such as no speculative activity of thought can hope, in the practical realm, to achieve.

A. K. ROGERS.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL
ASSOCIATION; THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL MEET-
ING, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA,
DECEMBER 28-30, 1915.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY.

THE fifteenth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa., on December 28, 29 and 30, 1915.

In the absence of the Secretary Professor Kemp Smith was appointed Secretary *pro tem*.

The Treasurer's report for the year ending December 31, 1915, was read and accepted, after being audited by Professors Bakewell and Bush. Report follows:

E. G. SPAULDING, SECRETARY AND TREASURER, IN ACCOUNT WITH THE AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION.

<i>Debit.</i>	
Time account, January 1, 1915.....	\$368.90
Check account, January 1, 1915.....	170.16
Dues received.....	196.00
Interest on time account to January 1, 1916.....	11.67
	<hr/> \$746.73
<i>Credit.</i>	
Chicago meeting, entertainment.....	\$ 10.40
Secretary's expenses in attending Chicago meeting....	79.42
Clerical services.....	26.28
Stamps and stamped envelopes.....	23.22
Printing.....	34.04
Travelling expenses.....	11.36
Telegrams, etc.....	6.86
Stationery.....	8.01
	<hr/> \$200.09
Total time account, January 1, 1916.....	380.57
Total check account, January 1, 1916.....	166.07
	<hr/> \$746.73
Total cash on hand.....	\$546.64

Audited and found correct:

(Signed) C. M. BAKEWELL,
W. T. BUSH.

The following officers were elected for the ensuing year: *President*, Professor A. O. Lovejoy, of Johns Hopkins University; *Vice-President*, Professor E. A. Singer, Jr., of the University of Pennsylvania; *Secretary-Treasurer*, Professor E. G. Spaulding, Princeton University; *Members of the Executive Committee*, to serve two years, Professors A. K. Rogers, of Yale University, and J. B. Pratt, of Williams College.

Upon recommendation of the Executive Committee the following new members were elected: Dr. Albert Edward Avery, of Bryn Mawr College; Dr. Ralph M. Blake, of Princeton University; Professor Edgar Sheffield Brightman, of Wesleyan University; Dr. H. T. Costello, of Columbia University; Professor Ezra B. Crooks, of Randolph-Macon Woman's College; Professor J. Forsythe Crawford, of Beloit College; Professor Carll Whitman Doxsee, of Grove City College; Dr. James H. Dunham, of Hamilton Court, Philadelphia, Pa.; Professor Louis William Flaccus, of the University of Pennsylvania; Professor Herbert P. Patterson, of Dakota Wesleyan University; Dr. Edna Ashton Shearer, of Bryn Mawr College; Dr. Ray Addison Sigsbee, of Princeton University; Dr. Henry Slonimsky, of Johns Hopkins University; Dr. Henry Bradford Smith, of the University of Pennsylvania; Professor Ernest E. Southard, of the Harvard Medical School; Dr. Ernest L. Talbert, of the University of Cincinnati; Dr. Benjamin Van Riper, of Pennsylvania State College; Dr. N. Wiener, of Harvard University. Professor G. H. Howison, of the University of California, was elected an Honorary member.

The recommendation was made by the Executive Committee, and adopted by the association, that a special committee on Academic Tenure and Freedom, to consist of Professors Dewey, Hocking and Lovejoy, be appointed, with the suggestion to next year's committee of the association, that this special committee be made permanent on a tenure of three years under constitutional form; furthermore that this committee be authorized to draw on the treasury for secretarial and travelling expenses.

The recommendation was made by the Executive Committee, and adopted by the association, that a committee be appointed to prepare a minute on the death of Professor Ormond. Professors Creighton, Johnson and Urban were appointed. Professor Royce, further, was requested to present a minute on the death of Mr. C. S. Pearce.

The arrangements for the place and date of the next meeting were referred to the Executive Committee with power.

The appreciation and thanks of the association were expressed to the University of Pennsylvania, and especially to Professors Singer and Newbold, for the generous hospitality shown to visiting members at this meeting.

The papers of Tuesday afternoon and Wednesday morning were read in honor of Professor Josiah Royce, and will be published together in the May number of the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. The following are abstracts of the other papers read at the meeting.

Respectfully submitted,

(Signed) E. G. SPAULDING,

Secretary.

An Epistemological Eirenicon. W. P. MONTAGUE.

The epistemological problem concerns the relation of the system of things, called objective in the sense that we believe in their reality, to the system of things, called subjective in the sense that they appear in consciousness. The three principal solutions of the problem may be termed, Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Dualism. All three of these solutions are incompatible with demonstrable facts and with one another, and yet they seem to exhaust the field. A way out of the resulting *impasse* can be found by splitting up each of the theories into a pair of propositions, the first members of which pairs are all true and compatible with one another, while the second members are false and incompatible with one another. By this device the epistemological problem can be eirenically solved and each of the three historically and dialectically opposed theories accepted in its revised version as a valid and exhaustive though not exclusive standpoint for viewing the knowledge relation.

Error and Unreality. W. H. SHELDON.

There are two problems in regard to error: the psychological and the metaphysical. The former has been satisfactorily treated; it traces the sources of error, the mental and physical processes that lead to it and constitute it. The latter is relatively independent of the former, and has seldom been squarely faced. It concerns the status of the illusory object. For, apparently, that object is unreal; yet an unreal thing is a *contradictio in adjecto*. It is, yet it is not. We have become so accustomed to this anomaly, however, that it excites no surprise; indeed, most thinkers believe that there is a great deal of unreality in the universe. Passing in review the several extant theories which try to solve this problem, we find only one or two which seem even to realize the paradox, and none which try to

resolve it. In these straits we propose our own solution. Illusory objects are *absolutely real*. They do not contradict the 'real' objects which they are believed to replace; for in the last analysis no *one* entity contradicts *another* entity, the only contradictions are denials; viz., 'A is B' never contradicts 'A is C,' but only 'It is not true that A is B.' The rest of the paper is occupied with the attempt to remove metaphysical prejudices against the view, with the application of the view to specific cases, and with a statement of the beneficial results to metaphysics which, the writer believes, would follow its adoption.

A Revised Causation and Its Implications. H. G. HARTMANN.

We may regard causation, historically, as an attempt to account rationally for (1) change, (2) sequence, (3) invariable sequence.

1. Analyzed, the *antecedent* of a change never consists of less than *two* objects; and, commonly, of many more than two; but *all* objects are never included in any specific change.

Further, if A, B, and C are the objects of a specific cause and E the effect, it remains to add that A, B, and C may also exist with the effect E never coming to pass. Wherein, then does the difference exist between these two manifestations of A, B, and C? My answer is brief: A, B, and C in one grouping are reciprocally 'effective' and in the other 'inert' or 'neutral.' *Why* one and the same group of objects acts thus, no one can tell; *that* they act thus is a commonplace. Causation (change), therefore, has its foundation in the inexplicable, non-sensational property of objects to interact differently or not to interact at all in their varied grouping. As a principle that is ultimate, it denotes an objective pluralism among objects. Change becomes a central problem; for to deny a reality to change, is to deny a reality to causation. The one-and-the-many problem in its bearing upon thinghood also becomes central. The outcome is an emancipation of Epistemology from the leading-strings of psychology and the 'ego-centric predicament.'

2. Causation viewed in the light of a sequence presents another distinct problem. For cause and effect 'as a sequence' is one thing and of one foundation; 'cause' as an explanation of a change (an effect) quite another. To seek for a causal 'relation,' therefore, in something *between* the effect and the cause rather than in the multiple objects of a 'cause' is a misplaced effort. It is true that a 'cause' carries us on to its effect; but an 'effect' is also a mere sign for determining the existence of a connection in the objects of a 'cause,' and as such, characterizes the connection as of this or that kind,—chemical,

psychical, or what not. Moreover, the connection is objective. On the other hand, the relation *between* an effect and a cause may be a thing purely subjective in either a Humian or a Kantian conception of the matter. But even here, it can be shown that an objective principle of control enters; namely, the principle that a given set of objects produces but one result. A given effect, therefore, cannot be randomly associated with any object or objects. Hence, where *custom* (Hume) has established one kind of linkage, this principle may itself function to correct custom. And if, upon Kantian ground, we affirm a purely thought-basis for the linkage, the range of thought's dependence upon this empirical basis would still remain an open question.

3. Where causation is characterized as 'an invariable sequence,' the foundation thereof lies in the empirical fact that different objects are not merely unique in their reciprocal behavior, but, for a further inexplicable reason, regularly recurrent in the behavior.

Hindrances to the Teaching of Philosophy. B. C. EWER.

The aims of philosophy are those of guiding human life and of synthesizing facts and principles of science in a unitary view of the universe. The effort to perform these functions by curricular teaching is beset by several hindrances: first, the usual conditions of instruction—large classes, the lecture practice, the abstract form of textbook material—conditions which have been established by custom and by the mechanical necessities of college teaching but which tend to produce perfunctory, superficial work on the part of students; second, the shadow of authority, particularly ecclesiastical authority exerted through the college administration, in restraint of freedom of thought in dealing with philosophical problems; third, an opposing philosophy, mechanistic in character, which is the uncritical presupposition or outgrowth of science, and which is imparted by scientific teachers as ultimate truth. Philosophy as a subject of curricular instruction seems to need a more definite statement of problems, the discussion of these without esoteric technicalities, and a heroic spirit in ascertaining and presenting the truth.

Conscience as Reason and as Emotion. W. K. WRIGHT.

Since the publication of Spencer's *Data of Ethics* many writers have treated of the origin and development of moral conduct and of moral ideas from the evolutionary standpoint. This attitude has tended, especially of late, to view moral evolution in terms of instincts and emotions, as in Westermarck's *Origin and Development of the*

Moral Ideas and in McDougall's *Social Psychology*. Ethical writers of a more traditional type, many of whom call themselves 'rationalists,' vigorously oppose this standpoint. A particularly trenchant attack, which may be taken as typical, and which is directed specifically against McDougall and Westermarck, is furnished by Dr. Hastings Rashdall's *Is Conscience an Emotion?* Rashdall maintains that to make moral judgments emotional in their constitution is to make them irrational and subjective, so that right and wrong become a personal matter, like liking and disliking mustard. This leads to moral skepticism. On the contrary, the consciousness of our objective duty is the most fundamental of our convictions and must be derived from the intellectual part of our nature. It is a self-evident truth, irreducible to emotions, and as intellectually certain as the multiplication table.

In answer to criticisms of this sort it can be said: (1) 'Reason' as used with reference to moral conduct and moral judgments is really as much affective and conative as it is cognitive in its constitution; it is not an exclusively discursive process. (2) McDougall and Westermarck are really showing how 'reason' in the ethical sense arises, in their accounts of how emotions and instincts become rationally organized into sentiments. This reveals their 'objectivity' much better than Rashdall's sort of 'rationalism' can do. (3) For, since the anti-evolutionary rationalist can find no *a priori* maxims that apply without qualification to every moral situation, he can afford little concrete objectivity to his maxims; whereas the evolutionist, by indicating how virtues arise from instincts and emotions and to what extent they are and are not variable, gives them definite and concrete objectivity. (4) In answer to the objection that morality cannot be reduced to something that is not morality, like emotions, it can be said that this is not attempted, but that the evolutionist believes that real light is thrown upon the nature of morality by knowledge of the conditions under which it rises and can be maintained. In favor of the sort of ethics that traces the rational evolution of morality from instincts and emotions, it is claimed that it has the double advantage over Dr. Rashdall's kind of rationalism in both affording more substantial and intelligible objectivity and rationality to the moral consciousness, and of being able to make available for ethical science the latest developments of psychology and anthropology.

The Anti-Intellectualism of Kierkegaard. D. F. SWENSON.

Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), a Danish thinker of originality and power, represents an anti-intellectualistic position notable for

precision of terminology, consistency, and the wealth and variety of concrete life-problems which it is made to illuminate. He is perhaps the first modern thinker of rank to perceive that an anti-intellectualist philosophy is not complete without essential recognition of the negative element in communication. He has worked out a logic of communication consistent with his central position, and has given it artistic expression, in various ways, in the form and style of his writings.

The elementary proposition that Reality has characteristics which a knowledge of it cannot as such assimilate, receives further amplification and definition. The following propositions are characteristic:

1. The metaphysical and ontological have no existence; they are, but when they exist, they exist within the esthetic, the ethical, or the religious. No human being exists in metaphysical categories.

2. The static character of conception permeates the whole realm of logic; there are no actual logical transitions. All real transitions take place in the realm of the actual, by means of a leap, and constitute a breach of continuity.

3. The validity of thought in relation to existence does not mean its identity with existence. The particular as such cannot be thought, nor the contingent, nor the actual.

4. A scepticism which attacks the validity of thought can be escaped only through a new point of departure, by an act of will, a leap.

5. Truth, in the sense of positive objective knowledge, is unattainable. All such knowledge (sense-knowledge, history, metaphysics) is either an approximation or a hypothesis. It is not essential, for it does not express the knowing subject's essential condition in existence. Mathematics does not deal with reality, and the relation of the logical to reality is hypothetical.

6. Truth, as essential knowledge, is ethical and ethico-religious knowledge of the self; the only reality which the knower grasps directly is his own ethical reality; all other reality he knows only in the form of possibility, essentially, in the form of an impartial balancing of alternative possibilities.

7. The transition from the ideal (the possible) to the actual, the sense for the historical, is an act of will; it is belief or faith.

8. The Truth is a subjective condition of the individual; to know the Truth (objectively) is to be in error; to be the Truth (subjectively) is to know the Truth.

9. Existence (life) is essentially striving, transition; not for an

unattainable goal, but to realize the individual's own eternal self; at this goal he may constantly arrive, but in it he cannot remain, at rest, as long as he exists.

10. To exist is to solve contradictions, not once for all, or by means of speculative thought, but through passion and pathos. The subjective thinker's passionate interest in himself is the greatest possible antithesis to the objective thinker's lofty disinterestedness; at the same time, the latter, since he nevertheless exists, exists in distraction, and is therefore comical.

LIST OF MEMBERS.

- Adler, Professor Felix, Columbia University, New York.
Aikins, Professor H. A., Western Reserve Univ., Cleveland, O.
Albee, Professor Ernest, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
Alexander, Professor H. B., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb.
Ames, Professor E. S., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
Angier, Dr. R. P., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
Armstrong, Professor A. C., Wesleyan Univ., Middletown, Conn.
Avery, Dr. Albert Edwin, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pa.
Bakewell, Professor C. M., Yale Univ., New Haven, Conn.
Baldwin, Professor J. Mark, Care N. W. Harris & Co., New York.
Balz, Professor Albert, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va.
Bawden, Professor H. Heath,
van Becelaere, Rev. E. L., Convent of the Visitation, Georgetown, Ky.
Black, Dr. G. Ashton, 621 West 113th St., New York.
Blake, Dr. Ralph M., Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.
Bode, Professor B. H., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.
Boodin, Professor J. E., Carleton College, Northfield, Minn.
Bowman, Professor A. A., Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.
Brandt, Professor Francis B., Central High School, Philadelphia, Pa.
Brett, Professor G. S., Toronto University, Toronto, Canada.
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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Second Characters, or The Language of Forms. By the Right Honourable ANTHONY, EARL OF SHAFTESBURY. Edited by BENJAMIN RAND. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1914.—pp. xxviii, 182.

It will be remembered that Dr. Rand was the first to follow up the suggestion of the late Professor Fowler, that the Shaftesbury Papers, now deposited in the Record Office at London, would repay a more careful investigation than he had been able to make in the preparation of his volume on Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, published in the popular 'English Philosophers' series. As a result there appeared in 1900 a volume entitled *The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury*, edited by Dr. Rand. A critical notice of this volume by the present writer appeared in the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. XII, No. 4 (pp. 451 ff.). While the biographical material, though not all strictly new, seemed decidedly worth publishing, the reviewer had certain doubts about the *Philosophical Regimen* (Dr. Rand's translation of the author's title, ἈΣΚΗΜΑΤΑ). Though occupying 272 closely printed pages, this disconnected chain of neo-Stoical reflections cannot by any means be regarded as a treatise or as material throwing any essential light upon Shaftesbury's philosophy. (It should be stated that the work consists of thirty-four brief chapters, on such subjects as "Natural Affection," "Good and Ill," "Reputation," "Character," etc.) It can hardly be that one of the greatest moralists of his time, greater in his influence than in his actual achievement, took very seriously these exercises in the Stoic manner,—an undertaking that would ordinarily suggest that the writer must be a very young man. Both in literary form and in content, they are essentially imitative and not to be compared with the *Characteristics*, in which, underlying the artificial style and the pedantic attempts at sprightliness,—and even when the philosopher is not at his best,—there is much more originality than is likely to be recognized by one who is not familiar with the ethical literature of that time and the following generations. To say, as the editor does: "The Greek slave, the Roman emperor, and the English nobleman must abide the three great exponents of stoical philosophy" (p. xii), is not mere exaggeration; it seems to show a fundamental misconception as to what are the permanently important features of Shaftesbury's moral philosophy.

It is difficult to avoid taking a somewhat similar attitude toward the present undertaking. Dr. Rand has performed a labor of love with the most painstaking fidelity and his editorial work seems to have been even more competent than in the case of the earlier volume; but the newly printed work,—if the four loosely connected essays printed together, for the most part carefully edited reprints of material that had appeared before, can be so called,—does not represent the philosopher at his best. In truth, the only important addition to what had already been published consists wholly of notes and memoranda and was written when the author was practically a dying man. But this is not all. Shaftesbury the philosophical moralist, at any rate when he speaks for himself and does not attempt to reproduce Epictetus or Marcus Aurelius, must always be taken seriously by those who would understand the development of modern ethical theory; Shaftesbury the 'virtuoso' is a much less imposing figure. That the Beautiful and the Good have a profound relationship, one does not need to be a Platonist to admit or contend; to establish the true nature of that relationship, in any really philosophical sense, is a very different matter. Shaftesbury's genius lay in the direction of ethical appreciation and tentative construction; on the other hand, while his ideas of art were by no means wholly conventional, they were so circumscribed by the prevailing neo-classical misconceptions and so complicated with, if not fatally vitiated by, moralistic prepossessions that one is likely to feel, after reading his æsthetic writings, that the problem of the true relation between morality and art is as far as ever from being solved.

The precise relation between the essays included in the present volume and the *Characteristics* may best be stated in the editor's own words in the Introduction. After speaking of the discovery and publication of the *Philosophical Regimen*, he says: "At that time a manuscript volume was also found among the Shaftesbury Papers, containing the plan and fourth treatise of a work intended as a complement to the 'Characteristics,' which was entitled 'Second Characters.' This volume was mostly written in 1712. It appears that owing to declining health Shaftesbury had been compelled to leave England and spend the last year and a half of his life in Italy. . . . In spite of his contest with disease, and brief as was the period that remained to him of allotted life, his last months spent in Naples were nevertheless replete with large literary activity. Not only did he then complete for the press a second edition of the 'Characteristics' but he likewise carried forward the preparation for intended publication of an entirely new work.

"The book was to consist of four treatises. These were: I, 'A Letter concerning Design'; II, 'A Notion of the Historical Draught or Tablature of The Judgment of Hercules'; III, 'An Appendix concerning the Emblem of Cebes'; and IV, 'Plastics or the Original Progress and Power of Designatory Art.' The 'Letter concerning Design' was printed for the first time in 1732, in the fifth edition of the 'Characteristics.' The 'Judgment of Hercules' was first printed in French, in the *Journal des Sçavans* for November, 1712, a fact which has heretofore strangely escaped the attention of bibliographers. An 'original translation' of this treatise appeared in English, separately, in 1713, and was also included in the second edition of the 'Characteristics' in 1714. The 'Appendix concerning the Emblem of Cebes,' so far as known, remained to be written, and the 'Tablet' itself instead is here printed in a new translation. 'Plastics,' regarded by the author as the chief treatise of the four, has never previously been published. The definite grouping of these various treatises in the form of a single work, as intended when written, is also here first made known (p. xi)." Later in the Introduction the editor shows from Shaftesbury's letters that the philosopher probably did not intend to print the "Judgment of Hercules" or the "Letter concerning Design" as part of the *Characteristics* in the later editions; and he reminds the reader that "it [*i. e.*, the "Judgment of Hercules"], with the 'Letter of Design,' has been very properly omitted by Mr. J. M. Robertson in his excellent edition of that classic work" (p. xv).

From what Mr. Robertson says of these essays in the able Introduction to his really excellent and much needed edition of the *Characteristics* (1900), it may be surmised that their exclusion was not wholly determined by considerations of congruity and symmetry. (Of course they could easily have been included in an appendix.) He says: "It is with regret that I dissent from Professor Fowler's verdict that these papers, which were incongruously included in the later editions of the *Characteristics*, show him [Shaftesbury] to have had a good taste in the arts. They rather show him, I think, to have had no breadth of taste in architecture, since he despised St. Paul's as 'Gothic,' and to have held the typically Anglican view that painting is properly not a source of delight to the sense, but a vehicle of moral instruction. His æsthetic . . . was like his ethic Platonist and *a priori*; and when Baumgarten in the next generation began to lay the bases of a truly inductive æsthetic, he had to negate the principle on which Shaftesbury most insisted. Shaftesbury was in fact false to his own rules of *expertise*, for if he had consulted the

trained tastes, those of the artists, not even in England would he have found them in accord with his. In the closing paragraph of the *Notion* he expressly insists that painting 'has nothing more wide of its real aim, or more remote from its intention, than to make a show of colors, or from their mixture to raise a separate and flattering pleasure to the sense'; and though in a footnote he adds a possibly sounder plea that 'it is always the best when the colors are most subdued,' it is evident that he did not value a picture as a composition in color, but as a fingerpost to right conduct" (pp. xliii, xlv).

When the reader finally comes to "Treatise IV," "Plastics, or The Original Progress and Power of Designatory Art," he is bound to be grievously disappointed. In the first place, this 'treatise' was never written. On examining Dr. Rand's reprint of the manuscript, one finds that from start to finish there are few completed, to say nothing of consecutive, sentences. In other words, we find here only the author's plan of the book to be written, with many hints as to the way in which the framework was to be filled in. It would be idle to criticise the meagreness of what is here presented, for of course the author did not dream that these notes, intended only for his own eye, would ever be published. Solon said: "No man can be called happy till he is dead." It is to be feared that the modern practice hardly permits even such 'happiness' to the greater dead among literary men and philosophers; only mediocrity can be called 'happy,' in the sense that it is assured of merited oblivion. But since these notes have been published, something must be said of them. They are, on the whole, fairly systematic, though no attempt seems to have been made to keep to scale in the suggested treatment. Doubtless many far more important books than this could possibly have become have been written on the basis of less orderly notes. That is the worst of the matter: these orderly notes, while often unsatisfactory enough when arguments are vaguely suggested, are at least sufficient to convince the reader that the new treatise, if completed, could not possibly have raised Shaftesbury's reputation, but would inevitably have lowered it. The author's hopelessly bad health during the last two years of his life may partly account for the disagreeable tone of contemptuous impatience at the views of others (by no means always incorrect) that one finds throughout the outline; but the plain truth is that this essay, if it had been completed according to the outline here printed, would have shown, even more unmistakably than the author's other essays on æsthetic subjects, that this was not a field in which he could be regarded as a master. His actual acquaintance

with works of art was probably much greater than that of any of his philosophical contemporaries, though this was probably due to his unusual opportunities; but his appreciations seem almost fatally vitiated by his extreme neo-classical prepossessions, which naturally keep him from really appreciating ancient art. Blind worship is not appreciation, and it never seems to have occurred to Shaftesbury that the ancient Greeks were the most modern of the moderns of their day. Add to this Shaftesbury's thoroughgoing moralistic interpretation of art, and it is easy to see that he was headed in the wrong direction. 'Art for art's sake,' when the formula is taken in the absolute sense, represents such a palpable error that, in the long run, it can hardly do serious harm either to art or morality; art as the handmaid of morality is a much more dangerous (because more insidious) ideal, quite as dangerous for morality as for art. As Professor A. C. Bradley has pointed out, art may very well be *an* end in itself without being *the* end in itself.

The doubtful thesis that sculpture is "the mother art to painting" (p. 117), common enough in Shaftesbury's day, the philosopher himself seems to have taken in the grotesque sense that nothing living was fit to be taken for a model. One of his characteristic memoranda is: "Against Academy life-painting (as inferior to study of ancient forms and culture of ideas)" (p. 126 f.). While Raphael, interpreted as the modern incarnation of the classical ideal, is always treated with the most distinguished consideration and Michael Angelo is praised in terms that seem to suggest that he was almost wholly guiltless of the modern spirit, few of the artists of the Renaissance get off so easily. A highly characteristic memorandum (so labeled) is as follows: "Bernini wicked. Therefore sit the harder on him as on Spaniolet, Carvagio, etc., throwing in a word in behalf of M. Angelo and Salvator Rosa. This elsewhere not here" (p. 152, note). As for the moderns in general, they seem to be regarded as a bad lot. "Modern masters no learning. No converse till after raised and known by their pencil, and then too late. Illiberal. Dis-ingenuous. Sharks, rakes. What ideas, when thus vulgar! . . . What sense of poetic manners, characters, personages, moral truth! . . . Yet these give the clue and lead the great, who are cheated as well as misled by these mechanic knaves" (p. 129). When moral approbation and reprobation fall into the background, censure of the tendency to emphasize color in painting is likely to become correspondingly bitter. This is merely a sample: "Strange paradox! but leading maxim, viz. 'that in tablature and painting, colors are in themselves nothing, nor

have nothing to do.' For first all the perfect and true rejected as wholly false in the workmanship. The rest dirtied, deadened, mixed, confounded, and as it were annihilated. The slave of all" (p. 149). Such was Shaftesbury's ideal,—none the better because it was not original, but part and parcel of a wholly impossible and now wholly discredited conception of the function of painting. Curiously enough Rubens, barely mentioned, is not pilloried as the great transgressor. The following speaks for itself. "Remember Rubens' Mercury with the two cardinals and queen, as an instance of the monstrous mixture of machine [*i. e.*, supernatural intervention] and history . . . Luxembourg gallery, Paris" (p. 161). (Cf. St. Gaudens' statue of General Sherman in Central Park.) One of the final memoranda runs as follows: "The philosopher and virtuoso alone capable to prove, demonstrate. But the idiot, the vulgar man can feel, recognize. The eye has sense of its own, a practice method peculiar and distinct from common reason or argumentation. . . ." Not an exact statement, of course; but, taking it as it stands, is this not the reason why a science or philosophy of æsthetics is possible? But, to conclude,—and this is really the end of the manuscript,—"But the anti-virtuosi again says—Who is he?—Who but the same one and the same man from him who said he knew not what the *καλόν* was *εἰ μὴ ἐπαινετόν*? [unless it be praised?] Hence Hobbes, Locke, etc. still the same man, same genus at the bottom.—'Beauty is nothing.'—'Virtue is nothing.'—So 'perspective nothing.'—Music nothing.'—But these are the greatest realities of things, especially the beauty and order of affections. These philosophers together with the anti-virtuosi may be called by one common name, viz. barbar. . . ." (pp. 177, 178).

After reading these pathetic last memoranda of a great man who had achieved his fame in a different (though perhaps related) field, one can hardly agree with the editor in his enthusiastic admiration of the "Plastics," which he persists in referring to always as a 'treatise.' Dr. Rand says: "The entire treatise of 'Plastics' confirms the statement which has been based upon the 'Judgment of Hercules,' that there can be applied to Shaftesbury what Lessing says of Raphael, 'that he would have been the greatest artistic genius even though unfortunately he had been born without hands'" (p. xxvi).

ERNEST ALBEE.

Nietzsche and the Ideals of Modern Germany. By HERBERT LESLIE STEWART. Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1915.—pp. xiv, 235.

This book does not pretend to be a thoroughgoing exposition and examination of Nietzsche's views; it confines itself "to those aspects of his work which may cast light upon the social policy and ideals of Germany as these have been revealed in the present war." "It is an effort to assist those who wish to correlate the moral outlook of Germany with one personal influence by which, beyond doubt, it has in part been directed." The author does not hold the prophet of Zarathustra responsible for the war; he thinks there has been a sinister aberration of thought on ethical questions, especially on the issues of international conduct in that country for the last thirty years, and he knows that Nietzsche is not the only writer who has given expression to revolutionary moral ideas. But he believes that this man "enforced with singular effectiveness just those doctrines of immoralism which Prussia has put into execution." Professor Stewart has not ignored those elements in Nietzsche's teaching which tended against racial aggressiveness and expressed contempt for German culture and German politics. He declares, however, that his points of agreement with militarism are far more significant than his points of dissent; he takes him "not as the originator of any policy, but as typical of a mood which has had fearful consequences for mankind." And he evidently believes that Nietzsche had a great deal to do with encouraging if not arousing this mood: "every one who knows Germany can testify what an idol Nietzsche is to a large and influential class"; "he is widely accepted as what he claims to be—the great ethical iconoclast who shattered forever the Christian values." Treitschke and Bernhardi, too, according to our author, exercised a great influence: the former was the historian of the Prussian government and "he has written what is received in Germany as the most discerning interpretation of his country's growth," while the latter minutely prophesied the precise grouping of the belligerents which has occurred and clearly foreshadowed Germany's tactics, three years before the war.

Professor Stewart puts his case cautiously and avoids the exaggerations into which many recent publicists have fallen in speaking of Nietzsche's share in the present European conflict. He admits that Nietzsche's message "may well have been a symptom quite as much as a cause of the militarist movement." There can be no doubt that some of the immoralist's ideas influenced some portions of the German

people; the only question is how potent this influence was, who were the persons affected by it, and what part of the teaching most appealed to them. Professor Stewart thinks this influence has been potent in a circle which is not without power in public affairs,—the middle class “which passes through the closely associated training of the University and the military corps.” I doubt this, though I would not acquit Nietzsche of having contributed to the spread of pagan ideals among his people. The most important thing to be remembered,—and Professor Stewart does not forget it,—is that Nietzsche did not originate the kind of morality or immorality which is singled out as the predominating aspect of his doctrine. Individuals and nations had behaved in the Nietzschean spirit and thinkers had justified such behavior in theory long before this maker of aphorisms and paradoxes proclaimed the gospel of the will to power in books which at first nobody read. From the standpoint of private morality some of Frederick the Great’s public acts were dastardly, and the principles determining Bismarck’s politics, if practised in his individual dealings with his fellows, would have been pronounced reprehensible. Perhaps Nietzsche’s immoralism “lent philosophical sanction to the selfishness and the unscrupulousness which had made his country successful in the past,” as Professor Stewart thinks. It is true that any one can find justification for that type of conduct in Nietzsche’s books: whatever may have been the writer’s meaning, however we may try to refine it into something great and noble, there is no doubt that his philosophy can be made to justify the selfishness and unscrupulousness of any country. Nevertheless, Frederick and Bismarck and many others like them lived and have been glorified,—inside and outside of Germany,—long before this gentle Lutheran pastor’s son thundered against Christianity and preached the superman. And *Realpolitik* is not a new thing in the world. The Germans did not originate it, even though their most admired Prussian king and their most admired Prussian statesman practised it with consummate skill. The German people learned to approve of the new politics because they succeeded and because they believed that the German states could never have been welded into an Empire by other methods than those employed by the man of “blood and iron,”—a phrase, by the way, which has done quite as much to pervert political moral standards as the catchwords “manifest destiny” and “a place in the sun.” No one who has lived in Germany needs to be told how deeply the new ideas sank into the German soul. Professor Th. Ziegler says in a book of his (*Die geistigen und sozialen Strömungen*

des 19. Jahrhunderts), after discussing the Schleswig-Holstein episode of 1864: "From these events we learned something else, something we had been able to learn only in a negative way in 1848: that in political affairs it is power that decides and not words and phrases, not agitations and revolutions. Bismarck, however, was such a man of power, action, will. In this sense, to be sure, the phrase "Might before right" was applicable to him. It is simply the truth, even though it is dangerous and may be sorely abused." Surely, there needed no Nietzsche to rise from his sickbed to preach the gospel of the will to power to influential circles in the fatherland: they had heard it long ago and had seen it put in practice with marvelous success;—and Frederick the Great already knew that pedants would not be wanting who would justify any practice of high politics on paper.

And it should be remembered also that Darwinism had a tremendous influence in Germany and that Nietzsche made this theory the basis of his new ethics, as General Bernhardt afterward made it the basis of his politics. The philosophy of selfishness and might has found in the theory of evolution a strong and useful ally, and the writers who have made use of it to "transvalue our values" are not confined to any one country. It is true, as Professor Stewart says, "the fault does not lie with Darwin; it lies with the smaller men who have caught up much of his language but little of his spirit." Still, the fact remains that the theory of evolution has been used to justify the blood-and-iron idea even in private morality, and that the principle of might has been applied in the business world and in political life, and often privately justified, by men who never read a page of Nietzsche. The remark attributed to President Roosevelt, that while Congress was debating the morality of the Panama Canal business, *he* took it, sounds suspiciously like Frederick the Great's phrase about the pedants; and the demand we frequently hear that the United States must eventually own all the territory down to the Panama Canal has the ring of the new or rather old politics. The opposition between the pagan ideal of power and the ideal of peace and good will is perhaps as old as the civilized race.

There can be no doubt on which side Nietzsche stood when he preached the superman. He cared more for the powerful individual than for the State because he regarded the State as a hindrance to the production of titanic personalities. But, in spite of his individualism and his opposition to a tutelary State, he glorified the great military conquerors; the ruthless warriors were his greatest individualists; his ideal was not civilization, which he thought to rest on

morality, but culture,—periods of history in which the great *Kraftmenschen* flourished and turned the old commonplace values on their heads. He did not believe in Germany's mission to be the teacher of all the peoples, as Fichte had taught; he had no more liking for her *Kultur* than for England's, looking upon France as the only cultivated nation of Europe; and he inclined to the notion of a European confederacy of States. But he believed in war, he glorified Napoleon, and there can be no doubt that he would have rejoiced in the coming of another such hero, whatever his nationality. He did not believe the Germans had the stuff in them or the social institutions necessary to produce that kind of man; he was not a chauvinist and he did not care who produced the superman; the superman is an end in himself and the value of a society is measured solely by its ability to give birth to such a being. He seems, however, to have had hopes of William II: "Our new Kaiser," he said in 1888, "pleases me more and more: his latest is that he has taken a very firm stand against Antisemitism and the *Kreuzzeitung*. . . . He would surely understand the will to power as a principle."

Nietzsche merely expressed in sensational form ideas that were not unknown either to theory or to practice. Little attention, however, was paid to him until 1888 when Professor Brandes of Copenhagen lectured on him; and Nietzsche never forgave his own countrymen for having passed him by. When the German professors began to study his books (after his mental breakdown), they certainly did not use him sparingly. They tried to deal justly with the valuable elements in his teaching: his impassioned opposition to hedonism, maudlin sympathy, and the dwarfing socialism that menaced the strong personalities; they praised his rigorism and his ideal of the development of the individual life, the very things which Professor Stewart with generous impartiality selects as worth while,—that is, not the new values but the true values which had always been prized by the sane thinkers of the race. But they strongly condemned his immoralism, his doctrine of the superman, his glorification of the blonde beast, his contempt for the common people, his antagonism to the modern State, and his hysterical attacks on Christianity. If any student left the University with any illusions as to the value of the Nietzschean thoughts, it was not the fault of the professors. A Nietzsche-cult did, however, gradually grow up outside of the universities, among young persons and among women, we are told. Professor Ziegler, in his book on Nietzsche, calls him the seductive ratcatcher of Hamelin of the youth, and declares that he influenced them through

his most paradoxical ideas: through his teaching of the superman in its most brutal form, and that Sudermann and Hauptmann, and even Wilbrandt and Spielhagen, had come under its spell.

These remarks are not urged in criticism of Professor Stewart's interesting and instructive book, but to emphasize some points which are often overlooked and the importance of which, I am sure, our author himself would be ready to admit. Professor Stewart is eminently fair both in his presentation of Nietzsche's views and in his estimate of them. He does not close his eyes to the valuable elements in the teaching, and his criticisms are invariably sensible and just. He cannot be accused of having cut the German immoralist's teaching to fit a desire to make out a bad case for Germany; he has simply tried to show that the *Herrenmoral* has been one of the causes of Germany's attitude in this war. Of this I am not sure; rather I am inclined to think that it would not have been different if there had been no Nietzsche.

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The Problem of Individuality. By HANS DRIESCH. New York, Macmillan & Co., 1914.—pp. vii, 84.

The four lectures which form this book epitomize Driesch's view of the biological, logical and metaphysical character of vitalism. They were delivered in England in 1913.

Biological science, Driesch says, must certainly allow the logical possibility that the unity and wholeness of an organism (its 'teleological' character) might be produced by purely mechanical processes, a mechanism being defined as "a given specific combination of specific chemical and physical agents" (p. 17). But this possibility is excluded by certain biological facts; *e. g.*, that in the blastula stage of the sea-urchin embryo a part of the embryo, cut at random, is capable of developing into a perfect adult. A random fragment of a true machine could not possibly be itself the complete machine. There certainly are "equipotential parts" in the early stage of the organism; but each develops differently in the actual ontogenesis, as may be required to realize the form of the adult. This selection of the appropriate, unity-forming development from among the several developments that were possible for a given part, can be shown not due to any simple difference of exterior local stimuli, nor to purely chemical processes inside the system. Some sort of non-mechanical "autonomy of life" is thus evidenced.

It is inconceivable, he continues, that a machine could be repeatedly

divided and subdivided, and still leave the original machine fully present in each part; but this would be required if the egg were the product of a simply mechanical process. There must be "an agent that arranges" the nuclear particles which seem to be the material conditions of inheritance. Physiology of actions also requires a vitalistic theory, for the response is made to the meaning of the situation as a whole, and is not fixed in any mechanical sense. Various biological facts thus show the existence of a non-physical-chemical, elementary agent or factor in nature. But they do not show that this agent is psychical. It may be called 'entelechy,' adopting the term Aristotle used with similar meaning. This entity "has only to do with the *arrangement* of a manifoldness" (p. 35), thus creating an organism. It is not measurable, and is therefore not a kind of energy. By excluding other hypotheses on the method of action of entelechy, one concludes that it "may suspend such kind of happening as would occur if not so suspended" (p. 38), and may then "relax its suspensory power." This is a kind of action absolutely *sui generis*, and may be non-energetic. "The principle of the conservation of energy . . . need not necessarily be violated by vitalism" (p. 36).

Driesch argues that the logic of natural science supports the vitalistic theory. The immediate content of consciousness is always chaotic, and is rationalized by the construction of a theory of nature. A necessary part of this rationalizing of experience is the postulate that the changes which occur in nature are connected "as if the logical relation of *reason* and *consequence* were realized or petrified, so to say, in them" (p. 46). But "in logic a reason can never have a consequence that is richer in content than itself" (p. 52); and a rational theory of causality must therefore introduce a new term in the antecedent to account for every apparent increase in the consequent. Some vital processes do show a peculiar kind of increase, namely an increase of complexity of arrangement of the material elements; the result is logically richer, as new concepts are required to comprehend it. "Unifying causality" is thus a biological fact, and requires the assumption of a special agent, a personal entelechy for the individual organism. A supra-personal entelechy might perhaps also be required, as the key to an understanding of "the apparent progressive complication in phylogeny," and even in human history, as well.

In his chapter on metaphysics, Driesch holds that the world of nature is a conceptual construction: it is the world of experience, a phenomenal world. A "monism of order" might be postulated for it, and a mechanistic theory might understand it as a sort of geometrical

wholeness. But a dualism seems a more workable theory of the world of nature, recognizing a factor of truly organic order, and also an essentially unordered and contingent factor, as Aristotle did in his doctrine of *eidos* and *hyle*. "There is the material world as the world of chance, but there is also the world of form or order that manifests itself in certain areas of the material world" (p. 74). One could gain a metaphysics, a knowledge of the character of an Absolute, only by inference from the character of the phenomenal world. Yet there is no basis for the assumption that all the qualities of the Absolute have correlatives in the space world; a monistic mechanistic theory of the world of nature would give no basis for a metaphysical monism. And indeed vitalistic biology finds there are "natural agents" which are non-spatial, *i. e.*, the entelechies. Certain concepts must evidently be admitted to have metaphysical validity if any metaphysics is to be possible; *e. g.*, this, such, relation, manifoldness, etc. Space and time might perhaps be taken as the sign of "a particular system of relations . . . in the Absolute"; but these relations themselves are unknown and unknowable. The metaphysical significance of the non-spatial factors, of entelechies personal supra-personal, is also obscure. Two theories remain equally tenable, and the choice is a matter of one's feeling; one may consider, as Bergson does, that the time world is the expression of an Absolute which is freely self-creating, a something 'qui se fait'; or one may consider, as Plotinus did, that the phenomenal world is the appearance of an essentially changeless Absolute.

Without attempting any comment on the strictly biological part of his argument, we may suggest some of the implications in Driesch's theory. In the first place, he does not consider vitalism a metaphysical doctrine; but his statement of it belies him. The entelechy is certainly not an experienceable object: it is no more a part of the world of nature than is the intervening and miracle-producing God of one type of theology. The real point raised by vitalism is just whether or not metaphysics should be introduced as an occasional supplement to the physical sciences.

If we suppose, first, that Driesch could show that biological facts require the inference of a non-physical agent in some parts of the world, it does not necessarily follow that he is entitled to assume a plurality of these non-physical agents. A single one might do the work for the entire world, as theologians and philosophers have often argued. A plurality of organisms is no proof of a plurality of entelechies.

If, however, Driesch prefers to assume many causes in place of one, his theory would involve more than he admits. Each living cell that exists within a complex individual, and that still manifests an apparent teleological specialization in its own development, should have an entelechy of its own. And his principle goes further still. Driesch argues that organisms exist as individuals in virtue of a peculiar type of complex order; a special arranging of their physical constituents is the process of their formation; their form of order is higher, since it is conceptually more complex, than any order required for the existence of their physical elements; and we must assume an ordering non-physical substance as both logical and temporal antecedent to such a complexly ordered individual. He emphasizes the fact that a "unifying causality" forms the individual in the case of living beings; but it seems that he does not fairly recognize that the organic is but one of the individual-constituting processes in nature. The inorganic shows also a progressive complication. A molecule exists as a certain complex unity of atoms; and we are coming to understand the atom itself as an ordered system of units. To apply Driesch's own logic of science, one should explain the formation of each higher unity by means of an antecedent entelechy. Even if the entelechy theory could be established for the organic, its principle would require us to extend the theory to the other forms of unifying order in nature. It is no answer to say that the mechanical theory does well enough in accounting for these infra-organic organizations; on the contrary, an admission of the adequacy of mechanism in this case should stand against the doctrine that mechanism could not account for the development of order of a higher form. A logic of science that would require the postulation of biological and historical entelechies would equally require chemical and physical entelechies. Driesch himself almost admits this in the passage in which he approves Aristotle's dualism of nature.

The argument employed to prove the entelechy preexistent to the organism would also prove it eternally preexistent. The entelechies have, it seems, been waiting their moment of entry, like the children's souls in the 'Blue Bird' scene. Nor does it appear a part of the vitalistic doctrine that an entelechy should ever cease to be. If each organism, past, present, and to come, has its own individual entelechy, and if we should even add entelechies for molecules and atoms, the world of the non-physical real acquires an impressively large population.

If we are to hold any entelechy-theory at all, we should either take

the whole of a World of discrete Ideas, or else some comprehensive single Form, such as an Aristotelian Reason. Driesch's form of vitalism seems an inadequate half-measure.

In his theory of rational causality Driesch has recognized one important fact about the logical relation between the temporally precedent and subsequent. It is true that the antecedent could not be completely known without knowing it as that which is to be followed by just its particular consequences. Any concept which is necessary to the comprehension of the result is then also necessary to the full comprehension of the antecedent. The logical meaning of the one must, as Driesch says, be as rich as that of the other. But he is not justified in transforming the concept into a non-material substance in the antecedent reality. Universal regularity we can postulate with good practical results for the increase of experimental science. It seems that we can even show this postulate is a necessary part of what we mean by considering our experience as objective. Yet Driesch's assumption of entelechy-causation would include the assertion that some physical processes have at least durations which could never possibly be brought under any formulation of regularity; physical science would have to assume that the organic is, in some points, essentially miraculous. But the assumption of anything physically miraculous in the world of nature is neither useful nor enlightening, however simple a solution it may at first seem for a difficulty. Driesch explicitly admits the logical possibility of the physical-chemical type of explanation of organic processes. The specific biological facts he brings against that theory might be admitted to prove (what would be granted readily enough) that there is no present chemical-mechanical explanation for many of the problems of biology; but even some of the vitalists' statements of fact have required correction by other biologists, and the chemical-physical theory seems left everywhere tenable in principle. If the two theories remain simply as competing hypotheses, then vitalism is the one to reject. We do not increase our knowledge by supposing the processes of the experienceable world are in part determined by inexperienceable entities, nor do we make our theory of objective knowledge more coherent.

Driesch's chapter on the metaphysics of vitalism would reduce to a reluctant admission that no metaphysical assertion is either verifiable or controvertable. This would dispose of the entelechy-doctrine itself, if we have rightly interpreted it. But so long as the entelechies are supposed to interfere with the regularity of some events in the material world, one must consider the vitalist supposition as at least contrary to the requirements of a theory of science.

One may make the thoroughgoing postulate that all the events of time are essentially nothing else than the development of one logical meaning, and so understand all the causation in nature as really a logical implication. One may also make the postulate that all these events are so determinate that invariable regularities are discoverable in the entire process. One may hold the first theory as a metaphysics, and the second as a theory of science, quite compatible with the metaphysics. But to do as Driesch does, to mix the two types of explanation for a process in the physical world, seems a confusion of two views that are not coordinate.

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Einleitung in die Philosophie. Von WILHELM WINDELBAND. Tübingen, Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1914.—pp. xii, 441.

There is at the present time a fairly general recognition of the exceedingly important function of such books as properly bear the caption, "Introduction to Philosophy," or as might fitly appear under some such title. Such books have multiplied in recent years, particularly in Germany, America, and France, and their writing has challenged the efforts of a considerable number of outstanding philosophical thinkers. In our own country, the initial impetus to this direction of philosophical activity is traceable in no small measure to Professor Thilly's admirable translation of Paulsen's thoughtful and altogether captivating *Einleitung in die Philosophie*. The need for works of this sort seems to have been keenly felt, first of all, in Germany, where we find them as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century. Moreover, even during the past decade, such books seem to have enjoyed a larger place in the thought life of Germany than in that of any other country. The reason for this is to be found only partly in the lack of any fixed system or organization of philosophical courses in German universities. In greater part, perhaps, it is due to the more universal interest which the German people manifest in philosophy and to the greater need which they feel for a reasoned *Weltanschauung*.

The empiristic, materialistic, and pessimistic tendencies which dominated German thought subsequently to the reaction against Hegelianism, gave way, under the rapidly growing influence of science and of practical achievement, to a positivism which found its basis in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The events of 1870, however, and the far-reaching results which they brought in their train, reacted in a

significant way upon the spiritual life-currents of the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Religion, art, and literature, all bear witness to these changes and to the emergence of new interests and demands. The powerful, though at first partly obscure and unconscious, impulse toward re-valuation and toward self-transcendence gradually engendered a very real and deeply felt sense of the need of a philosophical interpretation and basis, not merely of the methods and results of science, but of life generally. With the close of the nineteenth century, therefore, the undisputed dominance of the positivistic spirit approaches its end. More and more there come to be regnant an interest in broader, more ultimate issues, an earnest, self-conscious seeking for a general philosophy of life, and an endeavor to discover the meaning and the value of those overpowering tendencies by and in which individuals felt themselves to be borne along. A graphic portrayal of the spirit which gave birth to this deepened and enhanced interest in philosophy may be found in an address on "The Present Status and Task of Philosophy" which Windelband delivered in 1907 in the royal palace at Carlsruhe (*cf. Präludien*, fifth ed., 1915, Vol. II, pp. 1-23). The Prolegomena to the present volume again refers to these tendencies in a passage which not only throws light on the underlying motives of the *Einleitung*, but which is of absorbing interest from the standpoint of present history. I venture to quote the words in the original, for, though a translation might reproduce the vigor of expression, it could scarcely hope to embody those subtle qualities by virtue of which this passage furnishes such a remarkably vivid and accurate insight into the German spirit of the past decade: "Unser heutiges Leben ist, umstürmt, von einer Mannigfaltigkeit tief an die Wurzel des Lebens greifender Aufgaben. In unserem Volke ist etwas von dem Gefühl, über sich selber hinaus zu wachsen, eines Hinausstrebens in noch Unbestimmtes und Unbekanntes. Wir stehen in einem gärenden Kräftegewoge, das, wie alle grosze Erregungszustände der Menschheit, mit psychologischer Notwendigkeit von religiösen Motiven durchsetzt ist.—Wir haben das Bewusstsein, im Übergange zu stehen, und der Poet hat dafür die Formel von der Umwertung aller Werte gefunden. Es ist, ich möchte nicht sagen, wie zur Zeit der Romantik, sonder hoffnungsvoller: wie zur Zeit der Renaissance. Und wie damals, so waltet auch jetzt wieder das Bedürfnis nach einer Weltanschauung, in der die Kraft neuen Schaffens wurzeln soll. Dazu aber kommt die in der neueren Generation Deutschlands allmählich heraufdämmernde Erkenntnis, dass es gerade eben noch Zeit ist, uns wieder auf die geistigen Grund-

lagen unseres nationalen Daseins zu besinnen, deren Schätzung teils in dem Rausch des äusseren Erfolges, teils unter dem harten Druck der äusseren Arbeit verloren zu gehen drohte. Eine Weltanschauung also verlangt man von der Philosophie" (p. 2).

Now, not all introductions to philosophy have sought to furnish a *Weltanschauung*. Some there are which are little more than a running account, with critical comments, of certain historical systems; others consist of an abstract statement of the divisions of philosophy together with an arid presentation of certain isolated problems and of the traditional lines of their solution; still others do, indeed, embody more than the mere skeletal remains of philosophical systems, and yet they are not so much introductions to philosophy as introductions to philosophizing—they discuss a number of selected problems in such a way that, under the stimulus and guidance of the text, the reader will be led himself, so far as possible, to think through the issues involved and thus to acquire something of the spirit and of the method of philosophical inquiry. But even when we turn from volumes of the just-mentioned sorts to those that seek to minister to the need for a *Weltanschauung*, we again find important differences. The *Eingleitungen* of Fichte and Herbart, for example, are directed almost exclusively to the presentation and defence of the particular doctrines whose increased influence and more general acceptance constitute the fundamental aim of their authors. In significant contrast is the volume by Paulsen. In this case also, it is true, the author has a very definite philosophy whose validity he endeavors to bring home to the reader. Nevertheless, the various directions of philosophical thought are not only given consideration, but are analyzed with a spirit of objectivity and in the light of historical and scientific facts. Even more successful has Windelband been, both in singling out the possible alternatives of which philosophical questions permit, and in disclosing the limitations which are inherent in the very nature of the different solutions that have been proposed. Three further differentiae of the present volume should be mentioned:—(1) There is no similar work, so far as the knowledge of the reviewer goes, which so skillfully and judiciously introduces, or so successfully utilizes, the analyses and results of the history of philosophy. The same lucidity, restraint, and strict regard for a logical development of the subject-matter which characterize the volume as a whole, are in evidence also in the use which is made of historical references. In no case is this material introduced uncritically, or as a substitute for personal thinking or for a direct grapple with difficult problems. So

true is this that one may even say, not merely that the historical references greatly enhance the value of the *Einleitung*, but also that the latter gives additional illumination to the significance of various philosophical movements and a deepened appreciation of the necessity of paying regard to the historical development of thought. (2) Windelband attempts, and with remarkable success, to exhibit the genesis of philosophical problems out of ordinary reflective experience and out of scientific thought, while nevertheless disclosing the organic interconnection that exists between philosophical problems as such. Philosophy is shown to represent not a group, merely, of problems, but a system of problems. Hence our author is not content with merely indicating the divergent theories that have as a matter of fact arisen; the latter, rather, are utilized in illustrating the various logical possibilities that are shown to exist. (3) Closely connected with what has just been said is the fact that the present work includes within its scheme and its limited compass an account of practically all (except the historical) tasks of philosophy. Attention is given not merely to the problems of logic, epistemology and metaphysics, but also, with a fine sense of proportion, to those of ethics, philosophy of history and of society, æsthetics, and philosophy of religion.

Entirely in the spirit of Kant, Windelband's conception of philosophy is based on a sharp distinction between the standpoint of fact and that of validity. Regardless of their specific nature—whether epistemological, ethical, æsthetic, or religious—philosophical issues are consistently represented as relating to the justifiability of a claim. What contents of experience may legitimately lay claim to the values of truth, goodness, beauty, or holiness?—about this question there are centered all the fundamental problems of philosophy. These values are held to differ radically from those of utility or expediency, for example, in that they are independent of subjective considerations and of the mutability of conditioning factors; they are genuinely objective, universally valid. In his discussion of the basis of this validity, Windelband introduces much more of realism into his philosophy than is sometimes done by idealists. He would deny, to give a specific illustration, that a logical category represents an *a priori* principle of synthesis. Such a conception is not only fraught with the danger of confusing a merely psychological function of apperception with a logical principle, but it is entirely too subjectivistic. Principles, for Windelband, are logical categories only when they synthesize elements in the manner in which the latter, by their own nature,

belong together. That is to say, the relations which the categories establish are in no sense imposed upon, but are, on the contrary, demanded by, the content of thought. The same is true of philosophical values generally. They refer, not to anything that is abstractly 'mental,' 'subjective,' or 'psychical,' but to the character and structure of the objects of experience in their concreteness. Windelband, therefore, is led very summarily to dismiss from philosophical discussion all purely relativistic theories, as well as those that either fail or refuse to distinguish between the logical and the psychological, and those that are so fettered to the factual and the descriptive that they never even raise the questions involved in the claims of experiences to universal validity or value. Difficult as may be the issues of philosophy, they are not to be disposed of ostrich-fashion, or by conversion into psychological, sociological, or historical discussions. We may cite a single illustration. Windelband criticizes pragmatism on the ground that, while it professes to give an account of 'knowledge,' it really deals with what has long been distinguished as 'opinion' or as 'belief'; its version of instrumentalism, moreover, and its subordination of truth to practice and to life, involve, logically considered, a "grotesque confusion of ends and means," and they "put in question one of the highest attainments of culture, the purity of the will to truth" (p. 202). In this particular case, many would doubtless protest against the severity and the sweeping character of the criticisms. It is obvious that Windelband was familiar with only the cruder expressions of pragmatism and had no suspicion that these were not typical of the movement as a whole. But, in spite of occasional failures of this sort, it will scarcely be questioned that the present volume is well adapted to reveal the dignity and the seriousness of the philosophical spirit. Moreover, it sets forth in clear terms a clean-cut and an historically established view of the nature, the tasks, and the method of philosophy.

In his *Prolegomena*, the author points out that the needs which a philosophy must satisfy are both theoretical and practical. Philosophy must be both *Weltweisheit* and *Lebensweisheit*. Now, thought and life are closely interrelated. Nevertheless, they are sufficiently distinct, Windelband believes, to warrant and to demand separate treatment. Following Aristotle, therefore, he distinguishes, at the outset, two sets of problems, the theoretical (or existential) and the practical (or axiological). Part I, entitled "Theoretical Problems (Questions Relating to Knowledge)," contains, in addition to a preliminary discussion of "Reality and Appearance," three divisions:

(1) "Ontological Problems," namely, "Substance," "The Quantity of the Existent," "The Qualitative Determinations of Reality"; (2) "Genetic Problems," which include "Process," "Causality," "Mechanism and Teleology," and "Psychophysical Processes"; (3) "Noetic Problems," treated under the headings, "Truth," "The Origin of Knowledge," "The Validity of Knowledge," and "The Object of Knowledge." Approximately the same amount of space as that devoted to the theoretical problems is reserved for Part II, which appears under the caption, "Axiological Problems (Questions Relating to Value)." Again there is a preliminary discussion (dealing, in this case, with the general question of "Value") and again the material is organized into three divisions: (1) "Ethical Problems," whose sections are entitled "The Principle of Morality," "Will-Communities," and "History"; (2) "Æsthetic Problems," likewise with three sub-divisions, "The Concept of the Æsthetic," "The Beautiful," and "Art"; (3) "Religious Problems," involving a consideration of "The Holy," "The Truth of Religion," and "Existence and Value."

One cannot but admire the author's architectonic skill, as well as his success in exhibiting the logical dependence of philosophical problems upon one another. It must be admitted, however, that the two distinctions which are fundamental to the entire procedure involve serious difficulties. The sharp distinction which is made between the logical and the psychological, and between objective and subjective values, precludes the author from realizing the ideal of a philosophy which shall interpret inclusively the totality of human experience. Certain experiences—those that are merely psychological or subjective—would seem to fall entirely outside the pale of that reality, at least, with which the author, as a philosopher, could seem to be concerned; even in the case of the included experiences, moreover, one remains at a loss to understand their relation as "psychological," which all experiences are presupposed to be, to their significance as "theoretical" or "axiological." The second fundamental distinction which Windelband's procedure obliges him to make is that between existence and value. Since these phases of reality are treated in independence of one another, the final problem of the *Einleitung*—indeed, the ultimate problem of the philosophy for which this volume contends—concerns the relation which they may be said, in last analysis, to sustain to each other. Windelband's conclusion, as might be anticipated, is that "the very nature of the problem renders it insoluble" (p. 431). The author's philosophical rivals would doubtless insist that this confession is sufficient evidence, without

further argument, to demonstrate the necessity of a different analysis of experience as well as a change in the formulation of philosophical problems. Windelband, however, would contend that our experience actually involves an antinomy which comes to expression in the divergence between existence and value. Whether one may improve upon the essentially Fichtean doctrine that the will and its activity presuppose such a divergence, and that the latter is intelligible by reference to the fact that it is self-conscious striving that is of supreme worth, is a problem that cannot here be entered upon. It is obvious, however, that Windelband has at best but sublimated the difficulties that are involved in the fundamental principles of Fichteanism.

Though Windelband's volume will generously repay all who give it careful study, it will prove somewhat disappointing to those who are interested not so much in the ever-recurring phases of philosophical problems as in their ever-changing nature. The specific issues involved in present-day controversies receive but the scantiest recognition. Recent realism, for example, and the newer movements in ethics are not even hinted at; the Bergsonian philosophy is but referred to incidentally in a single sentence; pragmatism, as already noted, is discussed with exceeding brevity and superficiality. Judged solely from the point of view of its adaptability for a first course in philosophy, the most serious defect of the volume is the fact that it is somewhat lacking in those constructive results and definite solutions which a beginner seeks and which, within limits and provisionally, it is good pedagogy to make possible for him. In conclusion, it should be stated that, scholarly and extremely valuable as the book is, the author makes no effort to furnish that interpretation and new philosophical basis of German political and social life of which the passage that we have quoted from the *Prolegomena* so explicitly recognizes the need; of the two demands upon philosophy, moreover, the one for *Weltweisheit* has been much more adequately met than that for *Lebensweisheit*.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Die mechanistischen Grundgesetze des Lebens. [Von ADOLF COHEN-KYSER.
Verlag Johann Ambrosius Barth, Leipzig, 1914.—pp. viii, 373.

This book is an attempt to explain the phenomena of life in terms of mechanics as formulated by Heinrich Hertz. It consists of an introduction and nine main subdivisions, of which seven are constructive, the others being devoted to a summary and a historical review.

Biology so far has, according to the author, proved itself incapable of meeting the problems of teleology—the capacity of living beings to maintain themselves under constantly altering conditions—and of development. The difficulty originates in the fact that the solutions have been attempted in terms of physics and chemistry, i. e., in terms of atoms and molecules, resulting in a search for the smallest material units which can act as bearers of life. The assumption is that since the alternate decomposition and rebuilding of cell material is a process peculiar to living tissue, the vital substance must consist of molecular units of peculiar structure and characteristics. Hence the end is to find laws of molecular dynamics which control the progress of life phenomena. Chemical procedure assumes the qualitative likeness of all parts of the system, any subdivision of which is capable of like effect with the whole. But the investigation of vital processes has tended to show they depend on a compounding of unlike molecular units. *Stoffwechsel* occurs on the basis of relationships involved in a higher system, the complete organ itself.

The failure of the materialistic school to solve the problems presented has led to vitalism. The task of the present work is to bring proof "that it is possible, without treading the ways of vitalism, and without remaining on the foundation of materialism, to handle life phenomena in an adequate fashion and to deal in a satisfactory way with the problems which conspicuously await their solution," etc. To do this, an attempt is made to subsume life phenomena under the laws of mechanics. The former are considered to represent the changes of position of a determined material system, the vital system, which take place on the basis of constant and regular *Zusammenhänge*. In Hertzian terms, when material points are so related that "from the knowledge of a part of the components of displacement of these points, a statement concerning the remaining components is possible" a *Zusammenhang* exists between them. The character of the *Zusammenhänge* of any particular system is a matter to be determined by experience. The sum of the regular *Zusammenhänge* is the dynamic of the system. The movements executed on this basis are the dynamic renderings of the system or its function, the initiating of which is known as acceleration. The smallest vital system or dynamic unity, i. e., the smallest system that can sustain life, is the cell. Organisms are merely integrated

systems, or more complex structures, whose functioning is dependent on the activity of all the cell elements and organs. The only difference between dead and living nature lies in the complexity of the integrated units found in the two spheres. Granted that the cells and organisms are the dynamic units of the vital systems, a mere description of their processes as given in experience should lead to an understanding of these as mechanical and show the underlying laws. These processes are to be divided into (1) those connected with development and regeneration, and (2) those in which the developed system acts on external stimuli.

Of the latter we note the functioning of an organ in response to external stimuli, where the strength of the function varies directly as the stimulus, and on the disappearance of the latter, the system returns to its initial condition. Also if any function is to be repeatedly realized, the totality of the inner relations of the system, its construction, must be maintained. We get thus the concept of the construction equilibrium which seems to mean that any given organism, if it is to function, must be so constituted as to be able to respond to the external influences to which it is normally subject without fundamental alteration. Changing outside conditions are generally met within the limits of a given construction by mutual regulation of the several functions of the parts of the system, though sometimes by an alteration of the structure itself. All these cases show that the reaction to the external stimulus is in the form of the maintenance of or a return to a condition of equilibrium. The author here notes a very significant fact. The physicist has no interest in the continued equilibrium of a system in the present sense, it being a matter of indifference whether the material system with which he is dealing persists or is transformed into another. But for vital mechanics the maintenance of the system is the fundamental problem, and its task is to find the general mechanical laws on the basis of which the phenomena of equilibrium can be explained. Does not this difference raise a suspicion that vital systems are quite different from dead?

We can distinguish three stages in the whole process, an acceleration due to an external force, a retarding of this acceleration by means of the inner relations of the organism known as the *Zwang* of the organism, and the final achievement of a state of equilibrium. The *Zwang* is to be considered as a case of Newton's first law. The achievement of equilibrium falls under the principle that the inner acceleration due to the *Zwang* of the system is at any moment the least which is compatible with bringing the disturbance to zero. We finally get the law that the equilibrium of a material system with an outer force is achieved in the shortest way consistent with the given conditions, which at least as far as vital systems are concerned is an assumption.

After showing with considerable success how these concepts apply to the dynamics of the cell, in the course of which presentation the unitary character of the latter in the carrying out of the various activities, especially cell division, is emphasized, the author attempts to grapple with the problem of consciousness. He recognizes that consciousness is primarily a tool for utilizing the

results of past experience as a means of adjustment to varying conditions. Viewing consciousness as a function of the nervous system, we can consider the latter as a mechanical system, and hence state the mind in terms of physics. This is of course a *petitio principii*, as is the assertion which is made elsewhere that living systems arise by a process of integration from dead. The author then gives a typically associationalistic and atomistic account of mental phenomena, in which memory, association, conception, judgment and even inference are regarded as forms of reaction built up in the establishing of a state of equilibrium with an obtruding world. Space forbids details, but the account is, as always happens, quite unsatisfactory.

Finally we come to development, both ontological and phylological. The fundamental fact about all development is that we always end with a system similar to the one with which we started. This has led to the idea of the continuity of the germ-plasm, *i. e.*, of material continuity. Ontological development is normally looked upon as a function of substances, not of an organized system. Here Cohen-Kysper sees in it, on the other hand, a process which represents the attempt of a certain organic unity (generally the germ cell), to restore its disturbed equilibrium. A system capable of developing an organism is an *Entwicklungspotential*. Its condition at any moment of the process is a phase. The specific character of the resultant organisms is to be accounted for on the basis of the fact that the nature of all germ cells is specific. By a further law, to the effect that when a system which has reached a certain stage in its development is removed from the conditions normally existing at this stage it returns to its initial phase from whence it completes the development, we can understand the phenomena of "Fortpflanzung durch Knospen, die Erscheinung des Generationswechsels, die Stockbildung niederer Tiere," regeneration and allied phenomena. This is the "*Gesetz der Rückkehr zur Ausgangsphase*."

But how has any specific *Entwicklungspotential* come to be, *i. e.*, what is the process of evolution? Organisms themselves can only in a limited way be regarded as the carriers of the process, for they are constantly being destroyed while phylogenetic development is continuous. The bearer of the development is then the *Entwicklungspotential* of an organism and the organism only participates in so far as its changes influence the latter. Every alteration in evolution is to be regarded as a change in the *Entwicklungspotential* brought about either directly through external influences or through the reflecting back on the germ-plasm of alterations in the somatic parts of the organism itself. In the course of adjustment to the altering conditions, which is nothing but a method of restoring the disturbed equilibrium, the germ cells receive a permanent transformation, provided the change occurs often. New organs and their functions represent restored equilibrium in the presence of external stimuli. That the restoration of equilibrium should take place through integration is a specific property of the peculiar systems which are living beings.

One great point in favor of the views here advocated is to be noted—the abandonment of the attempt to understand life phenomena on the basis of the

material of which organisms are composed, and to substitute for this the study of living forms as structures or systems. Such a view may or may not lead to an explanation in terms of the ordinary concepts of physical science. But if this further consequence is not realized, still to understand the actual functions in terms of the complex structure itself seems the only method of rendering intelligible the whole field of animal behavior. Jennings seems to have come to some such conclusion. On the other hand, the attempt before us progresses but little in the direction of elucidating the vital processes. The application of certain concepts, like equilibrium, change of position, inertia, etc., in the latter is only significant provided it really renders the activities more intelligible in the sense that it gives us insight on the basis of which further definite facts may be anticipated and sought, and is not a mere transference of terms. The latter seems to be the case here. To call growth an attempt to restore equilibrium is valid enough in a sense, but it adds nothing to our concrete grasp of the details of the situation. And such hypotheses are sterile.

Many less important details could be added to our criticism. The account of mind is of course quite inadequate and hence vague. Also the apparent advocacy of the inheritance of acquired characteristics is at present quite unwarranted. And the whole work fails to show how on the basis adopted the differences between organisms which can learn and systems which can not, *i. e.*, how the results achieved by the study of animal behavior such as those of Jennings, are to be accounted for. Unwarranted assumptions are also frequent.

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The Theory of Relativity. By L. SILBERSTEIN. Macmillan and Co., London, 1914.—pp. viii, 295.

This scholarly and carefully written book is intended as an introduction to the recent development of physics known as the theory of relativity. The author presupposes on the part of the reader advanced knowledge of mathematics, such as vector analysis, and a considerable acquaintance with such branches of physics as electro-dynamics, etc. It is thus primarily a book for mathematical physicists. If the philosopher, however, is willing to descend from his architectonic heights and become a humble learner from a modest but competent and conscientious investigator, he is likely to receive much illumination concerning the meaning of such prevalent ideas as the laws of nature, time, space and causality. It is not that the author, like some other expositors of the newer theory of relativity, enters the lists in the fight against traditional ideas of physics. Dr. Silberstein is not inclined to emphasize the revolutionary character of the new ideas, but is rather concerned to show their intimate connection with the older ones. But, in spite of the fact that he is not concerned with the traditional problems of the philosophy of nature, anyone who follows his careful analysis of the ideas involved in the classical mechanics and their modification suggested by recent experimental work must realize

how vague and fanciful have been the classical philosophic data as to nature, motion, time, etc.

The first chapter is devoted to an exposition of the doctrine of relativity in the classical Newtonian mechanics. The dependence of the propositions which we know as the laws of nature, not only on our spatial system of reference, but also on the character of our time measurer, is brought out very clearly. Thus the classical physics is not concerned with absolute space or time, but gives only "sets of *simultaneous* states of motion of the various bodies, the time-keeper itself being included" (p. 6). Very instructive, also, is the way in which the principle or maxim of causality is explained in connection with the choice of clocks. The first and most general assumption of all physical investigation is "that our differential equations, representing the laws of physical and other phenomena, *should not contain the time*, the variable *t*, *explicitly*" (page 7). Or in the words of Maxwell, "the difference between one event and another does not depend on the mere difference of the times." When the laws of a physical system cannot be so expressed, every physicist will first of all try to throw the disturbance on some external agent rather than on his clock. If we find nothing in the nearest neighborhood, we look for further and deeper factors, and if we do not find real supplementary factors around us, we introduce *fictitious* supplements which may "turn out to be real afterwards, thus leading to new discoveries." Thus, a heated sphere losing its heat at a constant rate will be an example of an undisturbed system, but if the loss of heat varies at different times, we would introduce external factors, such as oxidization, etc., rather than assume that our clock varied. Though we always prefer to retain our traditional clock, it is possible to reduce our laws to the desired simplicity by reforming our clock. Thus, to get rid of one of the inequalities of the motion of the moon around the earth, astronomers have had recourse to the supposition that there is an actual slackening in the speed of the earth's rotation due to the tides. Further researches may oblige us to give up the kinetic time of astronomy for a better one, for example, electromagnetic time. "Thus, in the struggle for *completeness* of our physical universe, we shall have always to balance the mathematical theory of one of its fragments, or sides, against that of another. A great help in this struggle is to us the circumstance that, though, rigorously, all parts of what is called the universe interact with one another, yet we are not obliged to treat at once the whole universe, but can isolate from it relatively simple parts of fragments, which behave sensibly as complete systems, or are easily converted into such" (pp. 14-15).

The laws of classical mechanics of Galileo and Newton have no unique frame of reference, since if the Newtonian equations of motion are invariant relative to any system of reference, they are also invariant relative to any other framework having a uniform velocity of translation with reference to the latter. Nineteenth century physics tried to make the ether into a unique system of reference and thus replace absolute space. But all optical and electromagnetic experiments to detect "motion relative to the aether" have failed. The new theory of relativity shows that they must necessarily fail.

Chapters two to four trace the development of electromagnetic theory from Maxwell to Lorentz, showing how the dis-substantialization of the ether and the introduction of the notion of 'local time' gave rise to the investigation of Einstein as to the meaning of simultaneous events in different systems and the modern principle of relativity. The uniqueness of the latter consists in questioning the usual assumption that our clock is valid for all points of space, and that we know without further definition what we mean by simultaneous events in different places. The precise laws which enable us to pass from the time of one system to that of another moving with reference to it are known as the Lorentz transformations, and serve as the basis of the new non-Newtonian mechanics and of all that is valid in Maxwell's electro-magnetics. The remainder of the book (chapters five to ten) is devoted to working this out in detail.

MORRIS R. COHEN.

COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

A History of Philosophy. By CLEMENT C. J. WEBB. New York, Henry Holt and Company; London, Williams and Norgate, n.d.—pp. 256.

This volume is No. 96 of the Home University Library. It covers the entire history of philosophy from Thales to the nineteenth century and accords at least a mention to nearly all the men whose names appear in the ordinary texts. To deal with such a subject matter in two hundred and fifty small pages calls for an extraordinary amount of compression, so much, in fact, that it is seriously questionable whether the result can justify the labor of the attempt. Some philosophical notables come off with a very scant treatment indeed. Hobbes, for example, receives only incidental mention chiefly in connection with Descartes, and Hume, aside from references in connection with Kant, is disposed of in two pages, less than is given to Heraclitus or Anaxagoras. Considering the requirements of the case, however, it is perhaps less surprising that the condensation has been violent than that it has not been more violent than it has. Whether even that part of the public which has the least interest in the technicalities of the subject can be expected to gain much understanding from an exposition so general, is another question. Since there are already a number of excellent short histories of philosophy in English, the need for the book is scarcely apparent. If the editors of the Library felt that completeness required them to furnish a history of philosophy, it would have been wiser to devote more than one volume to the subject, as they have done in the case of English political thought.

Assuming that the task had to be attempted in one volume, the author has done it well. The style is not only clear and free from technicalities, but is surprisingly lacking in unpleasant reminders of the condensation which the author has had to practice. If this effect is sometimes gained by devoting precious space to matters not strictly within the limits of philosophy, it is at least open to argument that a book of this kind gains more than it loses by this method. The interpretations follow, as might be expected, the traditional

paths, but they are accurate in spite of generality and remarkably few important matters fail altogether of mention. The most doubtful aspect of the author's work is the liberty which he takes with the chronological order. This is due, no doubt, to the necessity of grouping the material about thinkers of first class importance, but it seems as if this end might have been secured while keeping closer to the normal order, with some gain in the clearness of the development and no loss of space. For example, the author quite rightly considers the early Greek philosophers according to their relation to Plato, and to this end he distributes the accounts of them through his exposition of the latter. The order in which they appear, however, is extraordinary: The Milesians, Heraclitus, Socrates, the Sophists, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Zeno, and Anaxagoras. The Atomists do not appear at all until after Aristotle and in connection with the Epicureans. In a later chapter a similar inversion places the Renaissance after the Reformation.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

L'intelligence sympathique. Par GUNDUMUR FINNBOGASON, docteur en philosophie. Traduit en collaboration avec l'auteur par André Courmont. Alcan, Paris, 1913.—16 mo, pp. 244.

This work, dedicated to Henri Bergson by an Icelandic disciple, contains an interesting development of the master's doctrine of intuition, applied by the author in an original manner to a specific problem. To comprehend another person intelligently as an individual one cannot merely regard him from the utilitarian point of view of one's own needs, or confine one's self to the abstract methods of science and classify him as a type. On the contrary, it is necessary to sympathize with him, and to share his feelings and emotions and modes of action, for it is these that make him an individual. The interpretation of the way in which it is possible for one to arrive at such a sympathetic understanding (*l'intelligence sympathique*) of the personality of another, gives the author his problem, and the title of his book.

The author's main contention is that this sympathetic understanding is gained through the psychological processes of imitation and suggestion. We can only understand the emotions of another by feeling them ourselves, and to do this we must consciously or unconsciously imitate his facial expression and other bodily manifestations of emotion, and so reproduce his emotions in ourselves. An emotion which we cannot thus reproduce we fail to understand. The same principle is involved in the interpretation of the individuality of persons whom we have never met,—whose acquaintance we form through their writings. We accommodate ourselves to their individuality by reproducing in ourselves their modes of feeling and action. The individual characters produced by poets and other artists, whether human beings, animals, plants, or personified inanimate objects, are created in accordance with similar principles. These laws also apply to the understanding and production of music, painting, architecture, history, biography, and all efforts to portray uniqueness

and individuality, in contrast to the scientific endeavor to secure abstract generalizations capable of repetition.

The author's thesis is strongly presented, and in the main convincing. The imitation of emotions is doubtless adequate in many instances to explain what is requisite to understand the passing mood of another, or to catch the spirit of a poem or a piece of music or a picture. And in order really to understand the individual character of another we can well believe that such imitation is always necessary; though for this, as it appears to me, something additional is also required. For the individuality of any human character is not a mere aggregate of feelings; it is a synthesis of sentiments, as McDougall and Shand have shown. Such a synthesis is always to some extent a logical, rational organization of impulses into an organic unity. To understand the character of another, a logical interpretation is necessary, and unfortunately this is impossible on the Bergsonian position, which restricts all logic to the logic of identity. A complete explanation of how we come to understand the individuality of others would require a cutting loose from Bergson, and the adoption, perhaps, of a neo-Hegelian logic, in the manner of Bosanquet. Although the author has, therefore, not told the whole story, he has, nevertheless, made a worthy contribution in his doctrine of *L'intelligence sympathique*, and he deserves consideration at the hands of students of the psychology of æsthetics and of ethics.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT.

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The following books also have been received:

- Artists and Thinkers.* By L. W. FLACCUS. New York, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1916.—pp. 200. \$1.25 net.
- The Crowd in Peace and War.* By SIR MARTIN CONWAY. New York, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1915.—pp. 332. \$1.75 net.
- A Beginner's Psychology.* By EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1915.—pp. xvi, 362. \$1.00.
- Who Is Insane?* By STEPHEN SMITH. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916.—pp. 285. \$1.25.
- Elizabethan Criticism of Poetry.* By GUY ANDREW THOMPSON. Menasha, Wis., George Banta Publishing Company, 1914.—pp. 216.
- An Introduction to Ethics.* By G. A. JOHNSTON. London, Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1915.—pp. x, 254. 3 shillings net.
- The Persian Systems of Philosophy.* By A. WORSLEY. Isleworth, A. Worsley, 1915.—pp. ii, 35. 5 shillings net.
- L'Intelligence et la Vie.* Par CLODIUS PIAT. Paris, Felix Alcan, 1915.—pp. viii, 227.
- De Bonald.* Par HENRI MOULINIÉ. Paris, Felix Alcan, 1916.—pp. v, 464.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mèt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, *I. Abtl.*: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

The Self and Mental Phenomena. ROBERT MACDOUGALL. *Psych. Rev.*, XXIII, 1, pp. 1-30.

The study of the mental life may be approached from three points of view: the practical, the scientific, and the philosophical. The first considers mind as an instrument in relation to practical ends and purposes. It views mind not as a direct object of study, but as a means to bringing about some change in the external world. The scientific view regards mind as a system in itself, without reference to its use as an instrument, or its absolute status in the universe. Taking the complex of mental phenomena, it views them in their rational order as making up a whole or system. But the mental life as given is not merely a process of events in time; it has a unity which is an immediate and indefeasible reality of our experience. This unity in its highest expression is the self. The self is the *summum genus* of the psychologist. The self is postulated in all experience. I can be aware of nothing without being aware, at the same time, of myself as knower. But the psychologist is not interested in the self as a unit of practical activity, nor as an element in the metaphysical interpretation of experience. What value then has the self as a term in the scientific study of mind? It has a specific meaning as denoting a particular phase of the mental life; the consciousness of self. This element in the neutral life is real, but not important. The self, again, may be used to denote in a material way the totality of mental phenomena with which psychology is concerned. But 'mind' is a better word in this connection, since it is free from secondary meanings. Finally, self may be used to denote the logical limit of reference postulated in the definition of the science itself. Whatever belongs to the field of study must have a unity of correlation with other mental phenomena, and a qualitative identity of content which may be characterized by saying that everything the psychologist touches must be conceived in terms

of individual subjective experience. The self thus marks the limit within which every inquiry falls.

D. T. HOWARD.

Der Schönheitsbegriff bei Kant und Lessing. G. ROSENTHAL. Kantstudien, XX, 2 u. 3, 174-186.

The author finds six points of similarity between the æsthetic theories of Kant and Lessing. (1) Kant recognizes the preëminence of dependent beauty, *i. e.*, that which perfectly fulfills a rational ideal, over free or merely formal beauty, as of flowers or landscape. Lessing speaks occasionally as if he were following Winkelman in setting up the preëminence of form, but for the most part agrees on this point with Kant. (2) For both Kant and Lessing the æsthetic ideal is an expression of the moral dignity of man. (3) Both theorists distinguish between the ugly, which can be subordinated to design, and so used in beautiful art, and the loathesome, which must be entirely eliminated, until Death itself is represented by a beautiful spirit. (4) Both Kant and Lessing give poetry the preëminence among the arts, since "the painting of ideas" which is poetry, expands the imagination beyond the limits of the merely sensible. (5) Lessing uses "Malerei" as a generic term for all the plastic arts. Kant points out the fundamental significance of painting as drawing, and its superior ability among the plastic arts to penetrate into the region of ideas. (6) Both Kant and Lessing look upon the expression of moral beauty as the high and ultimate function of the beautiful arts. Whoever believes in the moral dignity of man will naturally subordinate all other values to it. But the detailed agreement between Kant and Lessing is more than the result of this common fundamental conviction. Kant mentions Lessing and Batteau as the only completely universal art critics. Kant's use in the *Critique of Judgment* (1790) not only of the *Laocoön* but also of Lessing's other work, especially of those parts of it published (1728) in the second edition of the *Laocoön*, can be in several instances almost verbally demonstrated.

MARION D. CRANE.

Los fundamentos biológicos de la moral. AUGUSTO BUNGE. Revista de Filosofía, I, 4, pp. 69-83.

The vital imperative imposes upon us its laws, of which the moral laws are only its subjective aspects. That duty which makes the human pair toil for its progeny is the subjective aspect of what makes the pair of sparrows toil for its progeny. The vital imperative cannot be categorical in animals, for it is actualized in their automatic instincts. Its execution is satisfaction, its hindrance suffering. An instinct is infallible in the operations for which it exists but it may be blind when confronted by the unforeseen, for its phases are interrelated like the movements of a watch, and it is therefore difficult to vary them. Instinct is memory made concrete in the anatomical structure. It represents the acquisitions from the experience of the preceding generations made indispensable to the life of the species. Its acts are apprehended by the

animal as the somnambulist apprehends his acts in the state of sleep. The attempts of the individual to solve a new situation may represent the painful beginning of a new racial experience. Instinct is specific, impersonal, infallible. Conscious intelligence, on the other hand, only arranges the fund of experience of a lifetime. It is personal, fallible, and variable. Instinct is conservative; conscious intelligence lives through innovation. The individual becomes personalized in the measure in which conscience extends in, and automatically opposes itself to, the impersonal experiences of the species. The vital imperative cannot, however, be actualized in the conscious intelligence as in instinctive acts which have become perfectly adapted by natural selection. Conscience therefore cannot be implicitly virtuous. Hence the necessity of morality, which tends to formulate explicitly those laws of the vital imperative which exist objectively and actuate us. Progress is the adaptation of customs and legislation to the new laws which the vital imperative dictates. It is worth while, then, to try to investigate these laws for the purpose of adaptation and to seek the means of making all individuals capable of conforming to them. The moral individual is one skilled in the art of living his life in conformity with his own imperative. Our imperative aspiration is, however, only an episode in the universal life the significance of which we ought first to comprehend.

ALLEN J. THOMAS.

The Relation of Idea to Object-matter as a Universal Mode of Cognition. CHARLES E. HOOPER. *Mind*, No. 96, pp. 498-515.

The thinker cannot escape the psychological conditions of thought, one of which is that thought is an essentially contemplative function, which, at least at the level of philosophic thinking, consciously detaches itself from object-matter. Only through thought can any non-intellectual elements of experience be known. In the perplexity of experience, thought is both a part and a necessary factor in ensuring that future shall differ from past or present in such ways as to come within the scope of human volition. Any of the states of consciousness, when conceived as actually passing, may be termed a *process-content*: *process* refers to a peculiar relation to the past course of life; *content*, to a general relation of sameness of quality. Empirical imagination of particular forms is the fundamental stratum of thought as experience; but this gives no data to science or to philosophy, except as it causes descriptive propositions containing general ideas. *Notion* may mean a distinguished content of thought or a particular process-content of intellectual experience. A notion, then, is a *specimen* of some idea. The thoughts actually experienced are always made up of notions as such, and never of ideas as such. Language is evidently a collective product and possession. All truly typical ideas and the ideal science of which they form elements belong to the life of humanity. The purpose of an idea, for science or for philosophy, is to be *true* to some reality. All truth involves an essentially duomodal relation—that of a true symbol to reality; but this does not mean a relation of categorical agreement. Graphic

ideas play an important part in building up knowledge; but discursive ideas are more widely and more intensively symbolic. Ideas are not cognisable in themselves until they are symbolised by terms and connected in propositions; even then the relation of idea to object-matter is obscure. It is by means of ideas of all sorts that various human individuals realise their co-participation in a vast common object-matter of knowledge. Thought is a legitimate object-matter for ulterior thought, and must be analysed in any theory of knowledge. Philosophy is especially concerned with those fundamental modes of being, knowing, and relationship which are referred to by all sciences or by important groups of sciences, or which cause the divisions between the great departments of science. Modern philosophy in general recognises that knowledge of physical reality cannot be direct. The present article would suggest a somewhat new way of approaching the problem. The real question is, how ideas which are essentially contemplative and which shape themselves through predicative thought, can be a means of knowing experience which is not predicative or contemplative. Discursive contemplation must be brought into relation to actual perception. Though the first object-matter of philosophy is reality at large, this can be approached only through the processes of scientific thinking, which belongs to the second object-matter of philosophy—the human microcosm, whose outer aspect is the *Body of Humanity* and whose inner aspect is the *Mind of Humanity*.

ELLEN B. ARMSTRONG.

Mutation Concepts in Relation to Organic Structure. R. RUGGLES GATES.
The Monist, XXV, 4, pp. 531–555.

The idea of discontinuity in variation has steadily grown in importance since 1900; and we can now analyse the nature of mutation. *Ænothera lata* is a mutant from *O. Lamarckiana*. It has 15 instead of 14 chromosomes in its nuclei; this is because its germ cell, when formed, receives an additional chromosome above its normal 7. This extra chromosome appears in the fertilized egg and is passed on by cell division (mitosis) to every cell in the organism. The mutation is, therefore, a cell change propagated by mitosis, and the peculiarities of *lata* result from the fact that every nucleus contains an extra chromosome. In the same way all other mutations of *Ænothera* result from different kinds of cell change. In order to be completely inherited the variation must arise in the nucleus of some cell in the germ track of the organism, and in the new organism the change dates from the fertilized egg. Some of these nuclear changes are morphological, others are chemical. This implies that there is abundant material for divergent and multifarious evolution. It also shows that the hypothesis, based on Mendelian experimentation with hybrids, that mutation is due to the presence or absence of some factor in the germ plasm, is inadequate. The author's view implies that in the origin of any pair of Mendelian characters, we do not have a mere dropping out of some factor of the germ plasm, giving the negative or recessive type, but a modification of the positive character to produce the negative, and *vice versa*. The symbols of the

presence-absence hypothesis are of value in dealing with the inheritance of Mendelian characters, but we must modify the terminology when dealing with the *origin* of these character-differences. In reference, now, to the evolutionism of Bergson, the author is inclined to accept the criticisms of Bergson's metaphysics and epistemology offered by Bertrand Russel. Bergson is correct in his insistence upon phylogenetic divergence and occasional developments. He is also correct in his view that there is no predetermined course of evolution, if this means that the particular directions of various phylogenies are narrowly limited by conditions of the earth's surface. Bergson asks how we can explain the development of the eye in mollusks and vertebrates from purely fortuitous circumstances. But he increases the difficulty by assuming that inherited variations arise independently and simultaneously in different parts of the organism. Our view implies that the variations are all expressions of an original change in the fertilized egg. He finds difficulty in such variations being considered complementary. But one organ may influence and even produce another organ, as in the case of the tadpole's skin, which, when grafted over the developing optic vesicle, becomes a lens. Bergson asks how the small variations could have been preserved and accumulated. This question assumes that the various stages in the perfecting of an organ are in themselves of no service to the organism. The important fact that apparently new organs are often a remoulding of old organs must not be forgotten. But the changes must be correlated and must be such as to make survival and evolution possible, to be inherited at all. Some changes are advantageous, some bizarre, and some harmful. Let us now consider parallel development, as in the case of the molluscan and vertebrate eye. There are several types of eyes among the invertebrates, of which only one type is parallel to the vertebrate eye. The mollusks have frequently very many eyes, and these of different types, in the same organism. Bergson selects this complex case, and declares that science cannot explain it; the scientist points to simpler cases as affording a clue for the explanation. Thus wings have been evolved many times independently. Bergson finds a difficulty for science in the case of complex instincts, such as the instinct of the beetle *Sitaris*. But every variation implies a basis in the fertilized egg and is effective throughout the whole ontogeny. Every ontogenetic stage is modified by this initial change. This is clearly the case with structural modifications, and also applies to instincts, as these latter must have a structural foundation. No doubt it is hard to understand the transmission of complex instincts on the basis of germ-plasm, but this is no harder to conceive than the hereditary transmission of intellectual differences in man.

W. CURTIS SWABEY.

The Ethics of the Family. JAMES HAYDEN TUFTS. Int. J. E., Vol. XXVI, No. 2, pp. 223-240.

That the negative family morality of the past, with its command, 'Thou shalt not,' has failed, is proved by the present decreasing birthrate among the educated classes, the prevalence of divorce, illegitimacy and kindred evils.

A new positive family ethics must be formed, taking account, not only of the changing economic and social conditions, but of four new values: woman's freedom and development, the child, sex and motherhood, and a sound stock for national life. If the general form of family life is to remain—and it doubtless will remain—it must emphasize its positive values. The needed emphasis varies in the case of the middle and working class family. The former tend to marry too late and to have too few children; for them the social significance of the family for the community should be emphasized. The latter tend to have too many children and to fail to realize domestic, parental responsibility; for them the values of health and opportunity for mothers and children should be emphasized, and the level of intelligence raised. Will the new ethics favor a closer economic unit or a greater economic independence of the woman? Again the answer is not the same for the middle and working classes. For the former no general rules seem necessary, the answer depending on the woman's ability, taste, and the number and age of the children. For the latter, the kind of occupation necessarily pursued would hardly make work without the home desirable. Another question the new family ethics must face is that of public care versus home provision for children. The tendency is now toward public care; but children cannot dispense with parents, nor can parents afford to lose their close association with children. Present evils of family life can in time be abolished. The new family ethics may set as its ideal higher standards of fitness for marriage, of equality, fidelity, and affection in marriage, and of joy in children. It may magnify both the mission of the soul to refine the sense, and that of the sense to refine the soul. For the family will not thrive by denying either mind or body, but only by uniting both.

GERTRUDE Q. BAKER.

Psychology of Animism. CARVETH READ. Br. J. Ps., VIII, I, pp. 1-33.

Animism includes: (1) Hyperphysical Animism—attributing natural occurrences to the action of conscious spirits separable from the body; (2) Psychological Animism—attributing to both animate and inanimate things voluntary, purposive action, and a consciousness like our own inseparable from the body; and (3) Animatism—attributing to inanimate things some vague, partial form of consciousness. Animatism is a primitive, necessary, spontaneous illusion with savages; but Psychological Animism is a specialized temporary attitude or acquired way of imagining or of dealing with things. Conscious agency is attributed to non-human things only when they are injurious, dangerous, noisy, extraordinary, or when they seem to move spontaneously or are connected with totemism, magic or rites. Hyperphysical Animism probably arose from belief in human ghosts, a belief suggested perhaps by shadows, reflections, dreams, and hallucinations, and explaining sleep, fainting, epilepsy, sickness and death. Some savages confuse dreams with their waking experience or regard them as omens of good or revelations of this or another world. The appearance of the dead in dreams gives rise to the belief in their continued existence or immortality. The belief in ghosts is universal among savages and

is the first and most persistent motive in literature. Yet savages assign ghosts to non-human things only when there is a special reason for doing so, *e. g.*, when something is widely feared or loved or is connected with burial rites or is needed in the mythological explanations of the nature of the spirit-world. The original inhabitants of the invisible world were probably ghosts; but in time spirits thought never to have been incarnated take their place beside them, perhaps because their incarnation has been forgotten, or deliberately denied to enhance their dignity, or has become inconsistent with some mythical interpretation of their nature. Sometimes, however, spirits that have never been incarnate are imagined after the analogy of ghosts under the influence of language structure or for explanatory purposes in myths or in connection with totemism, nature worship or the personification of qualities and abstract ideas. Ghosts and spirits are imagined after the analogy of men, though variously by different tribes, because of their connection with the body, of their appearance in dreams, of their manipulation by sorcerers and story-tellers, and of the difficulty of imagining them otherwise than as men. Spirits marry and kill, and mix in human affairs. They have bodies composed of an invisible material 'soul-stuff,' the substance of all things in shadow-land. They live on spirits of an animatistic sort of consciousness. The conception of 'soul-stuff' develops into the metaphysical conception of 'substance' or into that of a 'world-soul.' With a belief in transmigration, or a mystical aversion to sensuality or metaphysical refinements on the distinction between matter and mind, comes the notion of a pure spirit. Some attribute a natural and others a divine origin and destiny to souls. Their dwelling place and fortunes hereafter are determined by their age, rank, nature, or manner of death. The chief motive in man's behavior towards ghosts and treatment of them is fear, which often fills his life with terror, objectless suspicion, and a sense of helplessness, and which prompts to migration, propitiatory rites, or painful and disgusting practises leading to the destruction of family, tribesmen, and self. Affection prompts to rites, lamentations, and the cherishing of relics. There is also operative the economic motive of securing the aid of spirits in attempts to attain food, trade, riches, power, or the object of revenge or love. A host of other motives play a part as Animism develops. Since edifices of thought presuppose as models edifices of matter, or in fact, the development of Animism requires (1) the rise of manual occupations educating constructive ability; (2) the development of social and political organization; (3) the means of recording advances made; (4) an educated, thinking, leisure class to introduce order and consistency into the chaos of existing ideas. The evolution of Animism takes the form of a differentiation in the character, power, and rank of spirits, and at the same time, a closer unity into families and politics analogous to those of men. At this point Animism merges into religion. Dynastic and priestly ambitions enter in, representing the interest of society in order. A sophisticated Animism is imposed upon the people by authority, suggestion, or deception, the end supposedly justifying the means. Vague beliefs are replaced by reflected tenets; fear of ghosts, by awe, attachment,

duty, or loyalty to the gods. But the rise of Positivism and democracy and the inability of the reflective mind to make the existence of evil and responsibility compatible with Theism contribute to the dissolution of Animism, and the power that comprehends all powers ceases to be an object, and becomes the immanence of all things good and evil.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

Lotze's Relation to Idealism. E. E. THOMAS. *Mind*, N. S., 96, pp. 481-497.

Lotze holds that there is an order of validity independent of the order of existence, a distinction leading him towards idealism. (1) In this phase of his thought he makes the unity of order prior to that of existence. The connections of things follow an æsthetic necessity grounded in the nature of them. The nature of things lives but is not exhausted in their existence. Validity then finds reality in eternal truth. Change, existence, and truth he conceives as bound together in an essential unity. (2) But he tends also to depart from idealism and to regard personality as the unifying medium. (a) On the one hand he maintains that the unity and meaning of existence consist in the fact that all things are parts or states of a single being. But meaning does not appear apart from consciousness. (b) So on the other hand he holds that the personality of the world as a whole involves the existence and interplay of lesser personalities. These in their activity seek to bring a unity of objective experience into their lives. This is the essence of moral activity, which takes place with reference to what is universally and objectively good. Lotze identifies this objective good with the metaphysical unity of the universe, and holds that this whole, since it is active, and pervaded by goodness, must be a person. But the activity of the whole cannot be in order to bring new experience into its life, and so must consist in the ordering anew of content already there. So Lotze tries to show its purposive activity to be a form of Becoming, a maintaining of self-identity. This activity he sometimes attributes to the individuals, sometimes to the whole as such. He wants the end to be, however, not only self-maintenance, but positive Beauty in the form of an ever-developing order. This forces him to read a causal connection into the events of history. Thus ultimate reality turns out to be not a system, but a pluralism. Lotze then assumes a Divine Being and an order of spirits cooperating for a common experience of happiness. But this presupposes a division of the universe into a material and a spiritual world, and gives a false distinction between feeling and content.

MARION D. CRANE.

Nietzsche on the Problem of Reality. W. M. SALTER. *Mind*, No. 96, pp. 441-463.

The essential logic of Nietzsche's procedure in the problem of reality may be summarised under four headings. (1) *The world is not real.* It is merely our creation in response to stimuli. We do not even know our own bodies in their real nature. The molecules and atoms of science are no more real; they are

only what we should see and handle if we had finer senses. Even in the psychological world, Nietzsche—though he does not deny its reality—finds elements which are purely imagined. (2) *We make the world real.* Life needs certain things upon which to fasten itself. "We project our conditions of maintenance, and turn them into predicates of existence." Practical need plays an important part also in determining our beliefs in general. It is this—not theory—which makes our common notions of causality, of being and becoming, etc. Even values are of our making. A great part of our belief and knowledge, then, has nothing to do with truth. (3) *Is there any reality?* His very language concerning illusion, truth, error, indicates a reality which is ultimate; again, the stimuli which produce our sensations, Nietzsche regards as *not* self-generated. We do not know the world from which they come, but we 'receive' them. But reality is not the world of science,—atoms and forces; it is not 'things-in-themselves,' out of relation; and most emphatically it is not a pure and changeless being. Nietzsche can really give no content to objective reality. What he does is to view the problem now from a new view point. (4) *Reality as power and will to power.* From our fellow-men we get the notion of realities outside of us. Again, distinguishing between true and false in the outside world is perhaps impossible, but putting up an end and trying to make things go that way is what every strong man does. Finding the will to power basal in himself, Nietzsche considers it thus also in other men. Then, may not the world in its real nature be made up of centres of power struggling with each other?—This construction Nietzsche offers purely as an hypothesis. The will to power is with him primarily an analysis or interpretation of reality. The notion of power is not merely physical, but includes the instinct of power behind *mental* operations and in the various *moralities* of men. The view may be described as Pluralistic Voluntarism. Physical motion, the forces and actions of physics and chemistry, are to be explained as the action of will upon will everywhere. The central life-instinct is not self-preservation merely, but this will to power, which means not only to dominate, but to dominate by incorporating. When the living substance takes more than it can control, it divides itself; but there is no altruism in the process. Propagation, then, is secondary and derived. Whatever does not command must obey; this is the real distinction between means and end in an organism. Degeneration and death may mean actual progress. The mass of men sacrificed to the making of a single, higher, stronger species of men would be an advance. This relation of controller and controlled in any form of organic life involves Nietzsche's order of rank, which plays so important a part in his social speculations. The whole gamut of things he interprets in terms of power and will to power.

ELLEN B. ARMSTRONG.

„Über die wahre Bestimmung der Geschichtsschreibung der Philosophie. DR. DAVID EINHORN, *Ar. f. G. Ph.*, XXII, I, pp. 34-42.

During the nineteenth century several conceptions of the history of philosophy were current, of which two especially interest us. The first of these

views the course of philosophical history as the self-developing of an over-individual whole. It is a philosophy of the history of philosophy. The second view questions what results are attained by means of history toward the understanding of the philosophers. Back of this question lies the conviction that history detracts from rather than adds to our comprehension of the philosopher. Schopenhauer's opposition to the history of philosophy is typical. We should, he believes, go directly to the philosophers, and not allow somebody else to chew our food for us. His arguments, although clever enough, are prejudiced. Now Karl Joel prophesies that the history of philosophy as a science will ultimately destroy itself, by becoming more and more lost in the minute intricacies of philology. It appears, rather, that we are approaching the beginning of a new epoch, which will require a new method in the writing of the history of philosophy. What that method will be is a further question.

D. T. HOWARD.

The Religious Implications of Bergson's Philosophy regarding Intuition and the Primacy of Spirit. L. H. MILLER. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 23, pp. 617-632.

Bergson's philosophy is a reaction against intellectualism and determinism in science and philosophy, which influences he attributes to the employment of the method of physics, mathematics, or pure logic beyond its legitimate sphere of application. His own method is that of biology and psychology; hence he emphasizes the primacy of spirit in the universe, of the free, creative activity of God and the human soul. The charges of materialism urged against Bergson are without foundation. While admitting the part played by matter in the development of consciousness, and attempting to bring mind and matter together, he holds that mind is neither derived from matter nor explainable by matter. Rather, mind and matter spring from one great spiritual source, the *elan vital* or God, a supra-consciousness, very probably a personality, a cosmic soul struggling against mechanism and matter and attempting to realize itself in a creative process of evolution, of which organic, psychical, and social systems are but results, servants, or manifestations, and of which the goal is the freedom and personality found in man. Materialism is refuted by the fact that matter, though known only in part, is known directly or is as it is perceived; hence, it cannot create consciousness; hence, the soul is an independent spiritual reality. The soul is pure memory, an indivisible continuity, an unconscious psychic state, choosing, creating, retaining all that is significant in its past, powerful over matter, and probably surviving matter as a distinct personality of a higher form of existence, for which it has been prepared by its passage through matter. If we can bring God and the soul together as independent spiritual realities, religion is assured, for religion is the feeling of not being alone in the world, the sense of a relationship between the individual and the spiritual source of life. The medium of communication and mutual giving of God and man is intuition. Intuition is a direct apprehension, an inner, mystical vision, instinct become self-conscious. It alone is the organ

of discovery, progress, and adequate knowledge of the *elan vital*. Therefore it is more fundamental than intellect, dialectic, symbolism, science, and philosophy, which, however, are absolutely necessary for practical purposes, such as collating, analysing, applying, exposing false philosophies, presenting, defending, and verifying intuition. Bergson's philosophy is not opposed to science and the intellect; it is not a return to empty emotionalism or blind animal instinct. Intuition supplements science and must spring out of and be tested by facts. It is like the experience of a man who after long study and investigation and wide and intimate knowledge of fact, puts himself at the heart of his subject by a supreme act of concentrated sympathy and imagination. Consequently, Bergson's mysticism escapes the weaknesses of the older mysticisms: their vagaries, self-centeredness, otherworldliness, obscurity and unethical or anti-ethical tendencies. It is a mysticism with a scientific filling, a subjective ecstasy tempered by objective science and historical fact. It leads to a religious, social, ethics, in which, however, the choice of the individual plays an all-important part. It is compatible with the religious and ethical doctrines of Christianity and with a theistic interpretation of life.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

Sur la Mémoire affective. LOUIS WEBER. Rev. de Mét., xxii, 6, 794-813.

Although memory is usually of events, beings, objects, images, and ideas, and not of emotion, the author thinks there is evidence of affective memory. In its typical form, the affective precedes the intellectual element, and so can be distinguished from an original emotion called up by the recollection of past events. The most interesting affective memories are not those of intense and epoch-making emotions, whose associated ideas are distinct, but of states as little representative as possible. Th. Ribot gives as an instance the faint reverberation of emotion aroused by passing a certain house,—a confused feeling-state brought to memory by a sensation or group of sensations, and afterward related to its proper intellectual setting. M. Piéron notes the power of an odor, definite and yet undefined, to do this. At the moment, the experience feels old, and foreign to actual present existence; it is fugitive and unstable. These are obviously the characteristics, not of a new state, but of a feeling remembered. States of feeling which reappear in this manner belong usually, as M. Piéron points out, to the period of puberty. He thinks such experiences practically universal, but difficult to report in psychological language. They should not, perhaps, be called emotions, for they are pure and simple 'manners of being,'—the revival of kinæsthetic sensations which formerly belonged to the 'me.' The author relates various personal experiences of kinæsthetic memory, when odors, or total environmental conditions, brought up vivid recollections of the youthful 'me,' superimposed on the 'hard,' grown-up 'me,' and made more vivid by contrast with it. These experiences are without apparent motives, but not without real causes, physical factors external and internal, which produce their effects involuntarily. The total influence of environment awakes affective recollections more surely

than any unique perception. It is evident, however, that external conditions are not sufficient by themselves to cause recollections of this sort, since they are comparatively rare. Internal conditions must also be present. The author has been in good health of mind and body whenever he has had such experiences. This is an argument against their being cases of paramnesia or false memory, which is usually coincident with fatigue. A change in the rhythm of existence, a return, for instance, to the simple living conditions of childhood and youth, would seem likely to evoke these kinæsthetic memories. Perhaps they make up part of the charm of convalescence. Changes of season are also favorable to them, especially the first breath of spring. Visceral sensations are undoubtedly important factors in these experiences. Indeed some theorists declare these sensations to be the basis of all emotion. Probably the glands with internal secretions play an obscure but significant rôle. Perhaps the tendency of old age to recollections back of the age of puberty is connected with affective states induced by the atrophy of the sexual glands. Kinæsthetic memories are not images, but states of being. The affective memory seems entirely useless, but as an example of memory it is, in highly typical instances, perfect, far exceeding in vivacity the ordinary memory of perceptions and representations. It is indeed the ephemeral resurrection of an entire being. We may suppose, however, that in a weakened form these kinæsthetic memories are constantly present to the subconscious mind, and afford a basis for our feeling of self-identity. If this be true, the intellectual memory would be secondary in importance to the affective. The immortality of the soul is indeed a cold invention of spiritualism. It is easy to understand why theologians believe in the resurrection of the body. But the ultimate solidarity between the physico-chemical life of our organisms and the psychical function of our higher nervous centres complicates the notion of psycho-physical parallelism. It can therefore be considered a legitimate postulate, but not a principle of explanation.

MARION D. CRANE.

Die Philosophie des "es ist." CHRISTOPH SCHWANKTE. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XXI, 2, pp. 197-214.

The present paper deals with the relation between consciousness and physical processes, and offers a simple solution of the problem. The natural scientist, working from the side of brain-structure, has difficulty in finding a place for consciousness, which is not capable of measurement. We approach the problem from another angle. All scientific propositions answer the questions,—what is? where is? how is? why is?—and can be cast into the form "It is. . . ." The question as to the meaning of "It is" is anterior to and independent of any scientific doctrines. "It is" means that "*man hat festgestellt*," that it is affirmed, or posited. The human consciousness is the absolute subject of all possible affirmations and existential propositions. There are three methods of affirming existential propositions, the natural scientific, the psychological, and the evaluating methods. The first works through absolute likenesses

and measurable quantities. Its ideal goal is to reduce the world to a physico-chemical system and man to a machine. The second method of affirming existential propositions, the psychological, works with what is not measurable, but it seeks psychic uniformities. Both methods can be applied to human and animal behavior. The third method, the evaluating method, affirms truth or falsity, goodness and badness, etc. This third method applies also to human conduct. There is no causal connection between the psychic and physical systems, for each is a series of existential propositions resulting from the application of its own method. Different individuals arrive at identical existential propositions, because they have the same sense-impressions and the same methods of affirmation. Sense-impressions are ultimately given facts which we must assume but cannot explain. The natural scientific method of judging leaves values out of account, but involves them, as its results themselves must be either true or false. From the point of view of the natural scientific method, man is a machine, from that of the psychological method he is a 'psyche' and from that of the evaluating method he is free. This freedom renders it impossible that the natural scientific method should ever attain its goal. The general form of moral value in human conduct is that that is good which opens the way to unlimited self-repetition and to increase of activity. Thus in the relations of the sexes that is sound which makes sound offspring possible. In industry that is a 'value' which leads to the production of higher values. In the realm of law we find that what is valuable is what is useful for the preservation and advancement of the community as a whole. In science, what is valuable or true, is what can be applied in all times and in all places, and can be carried forward. In relation to the morality of social groups, that is moral which can be done and continued by all members of the group. This general rule does not apply in art, however, where the judgment of value is immediate. Art is the free play of our possibilities. As we all have the same possibilities, the æsthetic judgment has a claim to universality. In religion we are aware of our possibilities, or spiritual powers, in themselves. God is not the creator of the world. The divine in us is the sum of our possibilities, and from this we can form an idea of God, as an 'Idea of Practical Reason.' From our possibilities there flow social relationships, and thus God is the source of love. And there are truly religious deeds, as there are works of art, which call forth our powers most deeply.

W. CURTIS SWABEY.

NOTES.

By the death of Professor Alexander Thomas Ormond on the seventeenth of last December American philosophy lost one of its distinguished representatives and teachers. Professor Ormond was born in Pennsylvania in 1847, and was graduated from Princeton University in 1877. He was for three years (1880-1883) professor of philosophy in the University of Minnesota. From 1883-1913 his philosophical activities were associated with the chair of philosophy which he occupied in Princeton. In the summer of 1913 he accepted the presidency of Grove City College. Among his writings may be mentioned *Basal Concepts in Philosophy*, 1894; *Foundations of Knowledge*, 1900; *Concepts of Philosophy*, 1906.

As a philosophical teacher, Professor Ormond was long a dominating influence in the intellectual life of Princeton. He believed that philosophy was not only a doctrine but a life; and throughout all his teaching one felt the vitality of the process by which he always sought to make his theories real expressions of living experience. Students who were in any sense serious-minded men and who had come to philosophy not merely "to talk about it but to know its power" found in him—in the frank and unclouded genuineness of his guileless personality and in his vital and profound grasp of the living issues of thought and life—an inspiring companion and guide. As James McCosh had influenced him, so he influenced them. He became "the beloved teacher and friend, who by example and precept brought his pupils to live in the presence of the great Reality."

He was "a square-set man and honest"—a man who had seen the divine vision and who, through the transparent simplicity and loveliness of his life, gave to all those associated with him in the search for truth an example which can never be forgotten.

ROGER B. C. JOHNSON.

Mr. Bertrand Russell has accepted a call to Harvard University. He will lecture next year on Logic and Ethics.

The review of Aliotta's book, *The Idealistic Reaction Against Science*, which appeared in the January number of the Review, was written by Mr. Joshua C. Gregory, and not by Joshua C. Reynolds, as printed.

We give below a list of articles in current philosophical magazines.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XXVII, 1: *Josephine Nash Curtis*, Duration and the Temporal Judgment; *Frederick Lyman Wells*, On the Psycho-Motor Mechanisms of Typewriting; *Walter B. Swift*, Some Developmental Psychology in Lower Animals and in Man and its Contribution to Certain Theories of Adult Mental Tests; *Harold E. Burrt*, Factors which Influence the Arousal of the Primary Visual Memory Image; *Lucile Dooley*, A Study in Correlation of Normal Complexes by Means of the Association Method.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL, XIV, 2: *Count Goblet D'Alviella*, On Some Moral Aspects and Issues of the Present War; *Sir Frederick Pollock*, The "Fight for Right" Movement; *J. W. Diggle*, Against Departmental Religion; *A. S. Pringle-Pattison*, Mr. Balfour's "Theism and Humanism"; *Charles A. Mercier*, Vitalism; *George T. Ladd*, The Human Mind *versus* the German Mind; *M. E. Robinson*, The Definite Failure of Christianity, and How it might be Retrieved; *William Adams Brown*, Is Christianity Practicable? *E. Armitage*, The Incompetence of the Mere Scholar to Interpret Christianity; *Charles Hargrove*, The Warlike Contest of the Gospels; *C. R. Ashbee*, Quality *versus* Quantity as the Standard of Industry and Life; *J. Y. Simpson*, Religion in Russia To-Day; *R. H. Law*, Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XXVI, 2: *James Parker Hall*, The Force of Precedents in International Law; *Amos S. Hershey*, Neutrality and International Law; *Harold Chapman Brown*, Human Nature and the State; *G. A. Johnston*, Morals and Manners; *Elsie Clews Parsons*, The Interdependence of Family Relationships; *James H. Tufts*, Ethics of the Family; *C. D. Broad*, The Prevention of War; *Homer Blosser Reed*, Ethics of Competition.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, XIII, 1: *Howard C. Warren*, A Study of Purpose.

XIII, 2: *Howard C. Warren*, A Study of Purpose, II.

THE MONIST, XXVI, 1: *Raffaello Piccoli*, Carlo Michelstaedter; *Philip E. B. Jourdain*, The Philosophy of Mr. B*tr*nd R*ss*ll; *A. H. Godbey*, The Hebrew Tithe; *Theodore Schroeder*, Intellectual Evolution and Pragmatism; *Julius J. Price*, The Jews of China; *Emanuel George Frank*, The Pilgrimage (A Poem).

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, XII, 12: General Reviews and Summaries; *J. H. Leuba*, Social Psychology; *W. H. R. Rivers*, Social Customs and Organization; *A. L. Kellogg*, Crime and Sociology; *J. H. Leuba*, Religious Psychology; *G. A. Coe*, Recent Publications on Mysticism; *J. H. Leuba*, The Task and the Method of Psychology in Theology.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XXIII, 1: *Robert MacDougall*, The Self and Mental Phenomena; *J. Arthur Harris*, On the Influence of Previous Experience on Personal Equation and Steadiness of Judgment in the Estimation of the Number of Objects in Moderately Large Samples; *Knight Dunlap*, Thought-Content and Feeling; *Percy W. Cobb*, Photometric Considerations pertaining to Visual Stimuli.

THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, VIII, 1: *Carveth Read*, Psychology of Animism; *Ernest Jones*, The Theory of Repression in its Relation to Memory; *G. H. Thomson* and *F. W. Smith*, The Recognition Vocabularies of Children; *G. H. Thomson* and *J. R. Thomson*, Outlines of a Method for the Quantitative Analysis of Writing Vocabularies; *N. Carey*, Factors in the Mental Processes of School Children. II; On the Nature of Specific Mental Factors; *George H. Miles*, The Formation of Projected Visual Images by Intermittent Retinal Stimulation. II; Apparatus, Procedure, and Results.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XXII, 6: *V. Basch*, La Philos-

ophie et la Littérature classiques de l'Allemagne et les Doctrines pangermanistes; *L. Weber*, Sur la Mémoire affective; *P. Boultroux*, La signification historique de la "Géométrie" de Descartes; *H. Höffding*, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse; *Th. Ruysen*, La Force et Le Droit.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XL, 12: *A. Lalande*, Le Pancalisme; *L. Dauriac*, La forme et la pensée musicales; *G. Fonsegrive*, De la nature et de la valeur des explications (*dernier article*).

XLI, 1: *Y. Delage*, Portée philosophique et valeur morale du rêve; *F. Paulhan*; La valeur humaine de la vérité; *H. Piéron*, L'objectivisme psychologique et la doctrine dualiste.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XXIX, 1: *W. Sauge*, Briefe von K. Rosenkranz an M. Schasler; *Arthur Goldstein*, Der Widerspruch im Wesen des Sittlichen und Sozialen; *David Einhorn*, Über die wahre Bestimmung der Geschichtsschreibung der Philosophie; *Otto Ziller*, Gustav Schilling. Sein Leben und Würdigung seiner Philosophie; *Paul Feldkeller*, Materialistische und Idealistische Kriegerphilosophie; *Joh. Zahlfleisch*, Ein Versehen Vaihingers bezüglich Schein und Erscheinung.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE, XXXIX, 4: *F. Müller-Lyer*, Soziologie des bevölkerungswesens; *Otto von der Pfordten*, Der Erkenntniswerth der Mathematik. II.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, 73, 5 u. 6: *A. Gelb*, Bibliographie der deutschen und ausländischen Literatur des Jahres 1914 über Psychologie, ihre Hilfswissenschaften u. Grenzgebiete mit Unterstützung von Prof. H. C. Warren.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA, VII, 2: *R. Ardigò*, La ragione scientifica del dovere; *G. Folchieri*, Legge e libertà; *F. Albergiani*, L'edonismo Socratico del dialogo "Il Protagora"; *F. Consentini*, L'"Université Nouvelle" di Bruxelles e la filosofia giuridico-sociale nel Belgio; *P. F. Nicoli*, L'hegelismo di Giuseppe Ferrari; *A. Gazzolo*, Verità e unità nelle teorie scientifiche; *G. N. De Conciliis*, La frode alla legge e la sentenza di Porzia.

VII, 3: *G. Zuccante*, Aristotele nella Storia della Cultura; *G. Marchesini*, La disciplina morale della potenza; *E. Troilo*, Sul concetto di Storia della Filosofia; *M. Losacco*, Proclo e i suoi Elementi di teologia; *G. Tucci*, Un filosofo apologeta cinese del sec. IX.

VII, 4: *G. Tarrozi*, L'etica induttiva e la scienza; *G. Fano*, Sui fondamenti della geometria; *G. Maggiore*, La Religione di Fichte; *M. Maresca*, Genesi e dissoluzione logica della Pedagogia scientifica; *F. Albergiani*, Il Sistema filosofico di C. Guastalla.

REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA, I, 6: *Gregorio Ardoz Alfaro*, Orientación social de los estudios universitarios; *Ernesto Quesada*, La exégesis testamentaria y la crítica filosófica; *Cristóbal M. Hicken*, Eduardo L. Holmberg y las doctrinas evolucionistas; *Maximio S. Victoria*, Las doctrinas educacionales de Augusto Comte; *Raquel Camaña*, Función social del egoísmo; *Salvador Debenedetti*, Sobre la formación de una raza argentina; *José Oliva*, Orientación de la enseñanza de la psicología; *Eduardo Acevedo*, El sentimiento de lo cómico en el carácter argentino; *Julio Barreda Lynch*, Las doctrinas morales de Augusto Bunge; *José Ingenieros*, La formación de una raza argentina.

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JOSIAH ROYCE

1914

(Aet. 58)

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

PREFATORY NOTE.

IN November, 1915, Professor Josiah Royce completed his sixtieth year. A number of men who have studied and worked with him as colleagues and students during some part of the thirty-seven years of his professional activity had for some time planned to make on this occasion some public recognition of Professor Royce's distinguished services to philosophy, both as a teacher and as a writer. The American Philosophical Association, of which Professor Royce was president in 1903, expressed through its officers a request that its members should be permitted to share in this celebration. Accordingly, at the annual meeting of the association held at the University of Pennsylvania on December 28-30, 1915, two of the sessions were devoted to papers dealing more or less directly with various phases and doctrines of Professor Royce's philosophy. Professor Royce was the guest of honor at a banquet at the Hotel Walton on December 29, at which were read letters of congratulation and appreciation from distinguished philosophical scholars of this country and of Europe. At this banquet Professor Royce gave in response to the various toasts and messages of congratulation the interesting autobiographical account of his experiences and personal convictions which is published in this number of the REVIEW.

In addition to the papers read at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, this number of the REVIEW contains papers by a number of other writers who desired to have a share in the celebration in honor of Professor Royce. The presenta-

tion to the readers of the REVIEW of the large number of valuable papers inspired by this occasion has been made possible by the support extended by a few of Professor Royce's friends.

It is interesting to note that these papers, although contributed by men who in some form acknowledge a debt of gratitude to Royce, and many of whom have been his pupils, are largely critical as well as appreciative. It is doubtless true that although we may adopt labels like 'Idealism,' 'Pragmatism,' and 'Realism,' for rough classificatory purposes, yet philosophy does not tend to develop in this country in the form of closed schools. The influence of a teacher like Professor Royce, great as it has been and is, does not lead to the literal adoption of his doctrines, but manifests itself in stimulating and promoting the spirit of inquiry and of universality through which his own philosophy has been developed. This, indeed, has everywhere been characteristic of the influence of great philosophical teachers. The spirit of true loyalty to the master has always been, *amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas*.

J. E. C.

JOSIAH ROYCE: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HIS WORK IN PHILOSOPHY.

IT is with sincere satisfaction, Mr. President and Members of the Association, that I accept the invitation, conveyed through the chairman of your Committee of Arrangements, to take part in the proceedings at this meeting in honor of Professor Josiah Royce. I am glad of this opportunity on my own personal account as well as on that of the University of California, his original alma mater, which is justly proud of him and of the notable record he has made. In the admiration felt by his native university, I of course strongly share. Parted by the breadth of the continent though we have been for these long years since 1884, we have nevertheless had many students in common. In fact, several of your prominent members, holding the chief positions in their subject at leading institutions of the country—at Yale, at Johns Hopkins, here at California, at Stanford, at Missouri, and, till recently, at Texas—had their initial training here at California and here received the stimulus that fixed them in a devotion to philosophy. In the pursuit of this they became, by my advice, as members of the Harvard graduate school, the diligent hearers of Professor Royce and his colleagues. Of his own original students, on the other hand, prominent ones, whose ability and whose profit from him their present positions before the country—at Harvard, at Columbia, at Michigan—now prove, in a degree that must give him well-founded gratification, came into the department of philosophy at California as my younger colleagues; there, by taking a constant part in the graduate seminar of advanced logic and metaphysics continuously conducted here, they became my students as well as my colleagues, and returned later to the east with an acknowledged attachment to this University which has been of profound satisfaction to its authorities and of great benefit to myself.

This important interchange in a common calling has given me an especial interest in Professor Royce's labors, and has caused

me to follow his work and his very numerous publications with an attention that I hope has corresponded to the worth of his performance.

On this extraordinary occasion of his honoring recognition by his colleagues from all parts of the country, I therefore join cordially in congratulating him on his notable career. It has indeed been of very marked achievement. Beginning in a small country village among the foothills of the Sierra, on the remote shores of our western frontier, amid surroundings none too friendly of the rugged pioneer life in a mining region, it has grown to international proportions; his words have been heard and his thoughts upon many of the most difficult human questions have been considered beyond both the great oceans. Such an extended hearing has doubtless been aided by the great spread of the English language, following on the extension of British empire and American colonization; but his native equipment and his active industry have enabled him to take advantage of this, so that still in middle life, having barely passed his sixtieth year, he has gained for the thinking of another American a serious general attention. It is a fact of which, as his countrymen, we may all well be glad; a case of the unexpected that is solid experimental reality; a thing for which we can sincerely give him recognition without flattery, and without any suspicion of compromising our self-respect.

Yet as members of a profession so serious in import as ours, in which he has proved himself such a valiant example, we should fall short, I am sure, of his own wishes if we spent this occasion in mere personal laudation. Rather, we should gather from his career and his work the real lessons which they convey for our proper business—the stimulation and leadership of thought as the guide of life. This is not a time, certainly, for rigid criticism or disputative objections; but we may well take the trouble, indeed we must not fail to take it, to ascertain what important questions he has put before us for settlement; above all, what positive contributions he has left us, upon which we must proceed in the further work which as thinkers we must do if we would go forward in the genuine spirit of his example.

What, then, has been the indisputably permanent thing in his work? What doctrine, or doctrines, has he put forward, from which we cannot wisely depart, but on the contrary must adhere to, must develop and improve, if we are to succeed in our real business? And what, on the other hand, must we be on our guard against, if against anything, lest we run into views injurious to our human calling, and mislead others into error?

For an illumining answer to these questions, I must ask you to listen to certain biographical items, not generally known, or, if known, not taken enough public account of. Without in the least detracting from his own powers and credit, it is no doubt a fact, of which Professor Royce himself has made the most loyal and public acknowledgment, particularly in his Phi Beta Kappa oration at Harvard, though repeatedly and in many other places, that he owes a considerable part of his singular success to his early recognition and hearty appreciation by his friend William James. James, in his published answer to the question, *What is the good of going to college?* has said with penetration that it is the power this gives you to know a good specimen of a man on sight; and this, his prompt discovery of our now noted colleague has pointedly illustrated. It was from James, my own greatly valued friend as well as his, that I first heard of Royce; not directly, for he did not himself speak to me on the matter, but by a message sent through one of my students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, inquiring whether I had met "Mr. Royce of California," and, in case I had not, advising me not to miss seeing him. This must have been quite soon after Royce's graduation at California, perhaps while he was on his way to his studies at Johns Hopkins—somewhere about the fall of 1876. Nothing came of this, however: I was too busy to hunt the young man up (he was then in his twentieth or twenty-first year), and I heard nothing more of him until after he had taken his doctorate at Johns Hopkins, where he had heard James (and perhaps Stanley Hall) in psychology, Peirce in logic, and George Morris, the able and accomplished translator of Ueberweg, on the history of philosophy and on Hegel, had gone to Germany and heard I know not whom, and had returned to California

to take an instructorship at his alma mater, in the department of English, where the poet Sill became his chief. Here I later heard he was not happy with some of his learned colleagues. With a genuine insight into the needed foundations for the writing of English, or indeed of any language, he discerned it was necessary to lay an underpinning of logic. For this purpose, he wrote and printed in San Francisco, in 1881, and used with his classes, his remarkable *Primer of Logical Analysis*, a work of great originality and suggestiveness, in fact one of his best productions. But many of his colleagues and some of the Regents thought this a transgression of the departmental boundaries and voted that the instructor must stick to the department lines, must teach English composition and not logic; and so on, and so on. This led Royce to be glad to give up the California position, and to come, I think in 1882, to Harvard as a substitute for James, who was to be away in Europe on his sabbatical. With a true thinker's confidence, however, he offered in addition to his regulation duties a public course of lectures on the philosophy of religion. It proved a great "take," and made his Harvard fortune; he afterwards printed the substance of the lectures in his first published work, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*. In his first years at Harvard I still got no opportunity to meet him, being absent in Europe and, later, at Michigan, and far too busy with my own work. But I heard of him one day in a way that challenged attention. The late Edward Everett Hale asked me if I had seen or heard "this striking young man from California"; when I said no, Dr. Hale went on: "Well, he seems noticeable, surely. What do you think I heard him doing in a lecture the other afternoon? Why, nothing less than showing that our human ignorance is the positive proof that there is a God—a supreme Omniscient Being!" This certainly caused me, as the slang saying is, to "sit up and listen," but I still had no opportunity to meet the young lecturer until I saw him, a singular figure, at the annual dinner of the Examiner Club, in May, 1884. Even then we got no chance to speak together, but I was so struck by his unusual appearance, that of a middle-aged British head and countenance set on a smallish youthful body,

that I could not avoid asking a neighbor at the table who he was, and was told it was Royce. It was not until the autumn of 1884, when I came to California to take up the duties of the new Mills professorship of philosophy, that at length I met our guest, who was spending his vacation there in work upon his history of California. I saw him frequently then, and found him the good character and the vivid thinker that we have all since known him to be. Yet in all our talks, I never gathered what, if anything definite, his *Weltanschauung* might be, as our German brethren call it. I kept remembering what George Morris had said to me about him, that "he could never himself learn what the young man thought on any of the questions or systems upon which he (Morris) lectured." It was not until 1885, in the fall or winter, that Royce sent me a copy of *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, from which I learned his substantial membership at that time in the school of Hegel and was in consequence greatly pleased, as I was then myself still a good Hegelian, as yet unsuspecting the profound inconsistency, which I came ere long to discover, in the doctrine of the Hegelian "center," that the real universe is an all-inclusive Spirit, a God who is a "Person of persons," in whom all particular and individual selves "live and move and have their being": a stern and uncompromising system of universal Determinism.

In 1895, a few years after our California foundation of the Philosophical Union, we began a series of Annual Addresses by the authors of the books used by the society as bases for its studies in the successive years. At our first public meeting for this purpose, Professor Royce, then ten years beyond the publication of his *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, and well established in the public notice, was naturally the chief speaker. The assemblage was so large as not only to fill the auditorium to its capacity, but to make it impossible for hundreds to find entrance; the people from San Francisco, Oakland, Alameda, and Berkeley, were greatly curious to see and hear the first graduate of their State University who had attained to a full professorship at Harvard. Professor Royce read with his well known animation and skill a paper, two hours in length, to this audience who never

took its attention off him, though the great majority of them must have been quite innocent of understanding what he said. The proceedings, including his address and notable papers on it, by his honored teacher Joseph LeConte and Dr. Sidney Mezes, their common student earlier, who had long been also mine,¹ were two years afterwards published in the volume entitled *The Conception of God*; the three papers, when thus printed in 1897, were accompanied by a series of my own comments, which I felt I must not refrain from making. I am burdening you with these long digressive details, because I wish to bring unmistakably to your attention this important but little read volume, chiefly by Professor Royce, containing besides his address his much fuller discussion of his theory of Idealistic Monism as the true account, as he then thought, of the nature of the absolutely real world; containing also his replies to his three critics. It is undoubtedly one of his most significant writings, indispensable for a clear understanding of the metaphysical theory which he then held, and continued to hold for years afterwards, and contains his clearest as well as most condensed statement of the noted argument by which he believed he was demonstrating the monistic conception of the nature and actual existence of God, and by which he certainly and conclusively refuted agnosticism. For this last reason, this book, like his other and still less known work that I have mentioned, the *Primer of Logical Analysis*, constitutes part of his enduring contributions to our field. It may well be made a landmark, and a base for our further advance in settled decisions in our subject.

The allied theory, that the defense of our capacity for absolute certainty must rest upon an idealistic metaphysics, is, as I think, Professor Royce's other contribution to philosophy to which we must adhere; I speak of it as his contribution, because, though the doctrine is not his save by hearty acceptance, I am thinking now of the subtle and unexpected argumentation by which he has supported this oldest and best expression of our historic human insight, dating from Socrates and Plato in Europe,

¹ At that time in charge of the philosophical department at the University of Texas, later its president, and now president of the College of the City of New York.

but having its earlier beginnings in the philosophies of the Orient. It is this native gift for original argumentative research that makes the genius of our colleague. His two volumes of Gifford Lectures, *The World and the Individual*, are full of this original reasoning; from this work I commend to your special attention the chapters in the first volume that establish a conclusive damnatory critique of what its advocates have chosen to call Realism. The great virtue of this critique is its vindication of Systematic Truth as the only valid director of feeling and conduct, and its implied definition of idealism as the consistent application to the control of desire and action of the universal logic that Truth as a system involves: nothing stands alone and isolated in the universe present to genuine thinking; each truth rests on other and on all. Let us keep a secure hold upon this view of what defensible idealism is, in contrast to the pseudo-idealism that means the pursuit of sentimental dreams about the so-called 'ideal,' and the utterly vague aims that go with this. Sound idealism is simply the rule of evidenced judgment, directed by the primordial Ideas, over the rest of life. How correct it is as a theory of knowledge, the act by which the individual, as thinker, displays its universality of view; and how easy the *non sequitur* by which, for instance, Hegel and his school suddenly convert this doctrine of logic, correct so far as it goes or can go, into their theory of Monism; a theory of Realism, in fact, though disguised in the misleading name of Absolute Idealism.

It is interesting to notice, in the continued writings of our colleague, that as the years have gone forward his views have apparently been changing; in the theory of knowledge, possibly more than truth will warrant. At any rate, in recent publications he has now served warning on us that he need no longer be counted as belonging to the school of Hegel; that, indeed, he never did cardinally belong there, and that, as some early reviewer has said, his doctrines are more akin to the views of Schopenhauer than to those of Hegel. We may venture to wonder at this last announcement. There has never been a trace of pessimism nor of asceticism in Royce's thinking, nor any agreement with Schopenhauer other than the prominence which, in common

with James, and in fact with nearly every other thinker in the long list of Harvard philosophizing, he gives to what he calls Will, though in a sense different in kind from Schopenhauer's and also from James's. This nominal Voluntarism I am confident we may safely discount, as inconsistent with our thinker's idealistic view, so far as this is true. It of course savors of the general Elective Theory on which the present Harvard university system is founded, and, however really it may violate the motto *Veritas* borne on Harvard's preferred seal, indicates the subtle influence that James's voluntaristic theory of the psychologic world of 'perception,' as an assemblage of particulars rendered 'real' by our selective picking out from the undifferentiated mass of 'sensation,' exercised upon his friend's thinking when this came upon the difficult question of the metaphysical reality of the world of particular selves, and the preservation of the individual person notwithstanding the all-determining fact of God as the Oversoul. It is not for us to be surprised that James himself always remained dubious over this translation of his psychological into a metaphysical doctrine, wavering to the end between a puzzled though admiring sympathy and a general pragmatic scepticism toward every view tinged, however faintly, with the color of the Absolute. To James, of course, 'absolute' whether as a comparatively humble acolyte, adjective or adverbial merely, or as elevated to the lordly substantive office and made, as the Absolute, with a capital A, to play the part of a Substitute God, was a conception under suspicion; indeed, almost under ban. The deep-seated agnosticism that lay concealed in Pragmatism prohibited the doctrine of Truth itself, in the historic meaning of an absolute certainty, and required a new meaning for the very words 'truth' and 'true,' if such a thing were in any way possible. To James the true and the real, or, rather, the true as an attempted depiction of the real, became a strictly partisan matter; as he used often to say, "A question of taste, you know." Such a voluntaristic philosophy, consistent enough with 'radical empiricism' and its really inevitable corollaries of scepticism and agnosticism, is in fact contradictory to that strong and profoundly argued idealism of *The World and*

The Individual, which has logically annulled Realism by reducing it to the unavoidable and ruinous shuttling from materialism to agnosticism, from agnosticism to materialism, ever back and forth, and forced the thinking holder of it out of its lines and into the wide-open field of Mysticism, to be driven thence, again, into the clutches of Critical Rationalism. From this one must gain rescue by the discovery of the dialectical nature of partial or partisan knowing, and by insight into the rational harmonic that carries disputative differences up into the larger embrace of interpretative conciliatory thought.

It is on this strongly reasoned basis of a logic idealistic in the sense that it replaces, by implication, the abstract scheme of the mere coherence of concepts by a conference of thought in a society of intelligences, guided, in its very initial sources, by the conciliatory Ideas (the True, the Beautiful, the Good) that provide a wider and higher region of interpretation wherein the disputes of partial thinking may seek and find reconciliation, that the sober and genuine idealistic philosophy must henceforth build. Voluntarism is consistent enough with Pragmatism, but it cannot protect itself, nor us, against sceptical Indifferentism, and cannot, in the last resort, fortify intelligence against materialism and atheism. When 'truth' gets translated into mere preference of feeling, or even into sturdy resolve, and yet remains, after all, but an uncertain conjecture, subject to revision, and sure to come to this in the lapse of time, a revision that with the lapse must recur and recur and recur *in perpetuum*, it cannot but cease at length to be worth the trouble of the guess and the testing by trial. The defect of Pragmatism is that its sole achievement is negative, is rejection. It is a factor, of course, in the dialectic of experience, the history of changing judgments in and concerning the transient world of the senses; it belongs to that logic that demands the correction of mistakes, whether private or communal. But it is not upon the level of the affirmative reason.

Very interesting and encouraging is it, that in the changes of view, whatever else they may be, that he has now publicly announced, we can notice that in the numerous volumes he has published since his lectures at Aberdeen on the Gifford Foundation,

Professor Royce has continually dwelt more and more upon the notions of Loyalty and the Community. In these indications of a concrete and social idealism, we who earlier than he have accepted the view of a primordially harmonic pluralism (if indeed he has changed in that direction), may naturally take satisfaction and hope. We desire the aid of so strong a man, who, in addition to his native gifts, has had the good fortune to come to such a fame and to so great a consequent influence. It is not true, as the old saying boasts, that 'truth is mighty and will prevail.' It will prevail if men are on the search for it and on guard for its security; but not otherwise. The burden is upon *us*, as thinkers, to find the truth that is true on the largest and most assured scale for our human nature, to seek it by that weighty and mutually interpretative intercourse of thought which the aid of the civilized community affords each of us, in return for the fealty, the duty, we owe to it and pay to it, and to our fellow-members that with us compose it.

An aspect of these changes of view, indicated rather than clearly explained, Professor Royce has recently referred to his later studies of the logician Charles Peirce, a thinker to whom James always declared himself greatly indebted, and to whom it would almost seem that Royce has now turned, after the loss of his great friend, as if to render justice to a mind not sufficiently appreciated before; or, possibly, in a reverent penitence for not having during his friend's lifetime given heed enough to James's repeated praises of Peirce.

These studies in Peirce, we are told, with a frank sincerity wholly to be praised, have resulted in a change of view, on our colleague's part, in the theory of knowledge. He now presents himself as an adherent and developer of Pierce's doctrine in this important field of philosophy. He tells us, with right caution, that he is by no means sure that in the construing and interpretation he has put on Peirce's views he would have had their author's own approval; but the new theory of knowledge, which Royce holds to be true, and of high importance, is set forth at its full in the second volume of his recent work, *The Problem of Christianity*. I may take it for granted, of course, that you are

all familiar with this new theory, and its triple logic of perception, conception, and "interpretation," as our author calls it. In this last term he appears to use the word in the sense of the clarification of issues between disputing parties, alluding to the pacificatory function of heralds between warring armies speaking different tongues, and needing to have their contesting purposes made intelligible and susceptible of mutual understanding and compromise; compromise, however, only on condition of larger advantages accruing from peace than from struggle.

It is to be hoped that the empiricism of Peirce, fully as 'radical' as that of James, may not have invaded the high and soundly supported idealism of Royce's earlier philosophical activity. At any rate, we need not permit it to weaken our own; for this 'radical empiricism' is a glaring case of incomplete and one-sided thinking, capable of refutation, and in fact refuted by Royce himself in *The World and the Individual*, and the other writings belonging to his idealistic period, if that has passed. But perhaps in this reference he has not changed.

In his Phi Beta Kappa oration our colleague has given us a list of the three names that he reckons foremost in the history of American philosophy,—Jonathan Edwards, Emerson, and James. These alone, he thinks, have commanded alike a world-wide, especially a European, attention. For my own part, I am not satisfied with a ranking based on public acceptance and fame alone. Again a current proverb proves, in the deepest sense, to be deceptive: *Securus judicat orbis terrarum* is far from true, even as an historical fact; much less, on the scale of rational worth and merit. Emerson and James were both great men of letters, great writers; yes, great thinkers, if you will; but they do not belong in the strict list of philosophers, the one a moral sage and poet, the other a richly endowed and greatly generous human character, with a style that for unaffected manly vigor has hardly been surpassed, perhaps not even equalled, and a diction so brilliant and pungent, often, as to seem to pierce and fuse the very substance and being of the objects it describes; I yield to nobody in my admiration of him as a man or as a powerful writer. Nor in a lofty estimate of Emerson, the very

foremost of our American poets, the leading writer of serious prose in his century, the most awaited, most stimulating moral influence in the world of his day, in this regard surpassing even his friend Carlyle. But both look out of place in a series with such a master of logic and technical philosophy as Edwards; that mastery in logic is a cardinal test of the true philosopher, and neither Emerson nor James possessed it. Both, on the contrary, did their best to discredit it, Emerson by taking refuge in mysticism, James by an attempt through psychology to set feeling and will into the deciding and directive place in conscious being.

It is frightful, when one stops to think what it must mean to the reality of a moral life for men, for their *duty*, for a true 'reign of God' in the soul, to hear Emerson glorifying the Oversoul: "We lie in the lap of immense intelligence," he says, "which makes us receivers of its truth and organs of its activity. When we discern justice, when we discern truth, we do nothing of ourselves, but allow a passage to its beams." (*Self-Reliance*, p. 56, quoted, too, by James in his *Human Immortality*.) There were no doubt two Emersons, as James has rightly pointed out, the plotinizing Emerson of the Oversoul and Emerson the instinctive New Englander, supremely sensitive to individual responsibility, of the *Voluntaries* and the *New England Reformers*. But neither the one nor the other had any logic wherewith to defend himself; both were satisfied with mystic insight, incommunicable, and the method of mere declaration: Say what you see, and say it adequately, and there will be no need of argument. And for James, all argument, the whole laborious round of logic, ended in insoluble dispute, in utter moveless loggerhead, the death of decision. The only way out of this was to listen to your felt wishes, choose the side you care for, put your will into its service, and strike for your cause; whether it win or lose, *you* will have won, in the sense that you will not have fallen as a malingerer or a coward. Of which we must in sober judgment say, it is certainly courage of a sort, but a courage to no purpose: *c'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre*.

We ought to think of both Emerson and James, not that they

were not at least as great as Jonathan Edwards, but that more likely they were both much greater, and that their world is right in undoubtedly supposing them so. Only, they are out of the true perspective when set in a row with Edwards; or, better perhaps, Edwards is in the wrong perspective when placed in the line with them. James, it seems to me, belongs quite justly in a list following Emerson; in a list of four English prose writers of the nineteenth century who deservedly won the greatest notice and the widest influence,—Carlyle, Emerson, Mathew Arnold, James: the last at some distance below his predecessor, just as Arnold fell discernibly below Emerson and Carlyle. The four were powerful thinking writers rather than philosophers; something probably greater than philosophers. Are not sages and poets men of larger compass than philosophers as such? Unless indeed, like Plato, philosophers should be all three at once, and so, again like Plato, become incomparable and live in all ages.

If the list of strictly philosophic thinkers in our country, rightly headed by Jonathan Edwards, who partly settled the question as to the seat of human freedom by showing incontestably where it is *not*, that it is not in the will, is now to be continued, it is little to be questioned that the place our colleague, in such quiet and natural, though indeed unavoidable, self-forgetfulness, assigned to his gifted friend James, really belongs to himself. I would insert other names in the list, on the ground of merit rather than public note—President Samuel Johnson (disciple of Berkeley and stimulator of Edwards), James Marsh, Rowland Hazard, Joseph LeConte, John Fiske, Thomas Davidson, George Morris, Carroll Everett, Elisha Mulford, and, above all, William Torrey Harris, so long our unequalled Commissioner of Education, our master scholar in Hegel, of the largest international recognition; the series has not been brief, though I confine it, of course, to those who have passed from the living. But let our colleague accept the honor that events, seconding his native powers, have conferred upon him. Let him rejoice, in common with us all, at his great good fortune. Seldom is it that genius of his especial sort meets with such general public acknowledgment: the taste nowadays is for intelligence in other

fields, more in the public sight, more accessible to the multitude; more directly advantageous, also. As Professor Royce, I may properly repeat, is still far from being old, still not past middle life, we have the hope, yes, the expectation, that he will continue to contribute, as he has hitherto done, to the stores that enrich our calling. I heartily congratulate him again upon the merited honor of the present occasion, and wish him health, continued life and powers, and yet added successes.

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VOLUNTARISM IN THE ROYCEAN PHILOSOPHY.

I AM not about to inflict upon you a belated discovery that voluntarism is an integral factor in the Roycean theory of knowledge. Were it not obvious of itself, we have the emphatic utterances of Professor Royce himself in his address to this Association twelve years ago. Following a clew in that paper, it is my purpose to present some considerations relative to the relationship of voluntarism and intellectualism¹ in the earliest phase of Mr. Royce's published philosophy, thinking that the matter has historic interest and that it involves points relevant to forming a critical judgment of his later developments. Let me begin by quoting Mr. Royce upon his own early attitude.¹ In 1881 he wrote a paper in which he "expressed a sincere desire to state the theory of truth wholly in terms of an interpretation of our judgments as present acknowledgments, since it made these judgments the embodiments of conscious attitudes that I then conceived to be essentially ethical and to be capable of no re-statement in terms of any absolute warrant whatever." And, referring to his change of views in the last respect, he says: "I am still of the opinion that judging is an activity guided by essentially ethical motives. I still hold that, for any truth seeker, the object of his belief is also the object of his will to believe. . . . I still maintain that every intelligent soul, however weak or confused, recognizes no truth except that which intelligently embodies its own present purpose."² The statement is explicit. Taken in connection with the earlier position, it arouses curiosity as to the reasons for the transition from subordination of intellect to will to the reversed position.

I first turn to the paper of 1881.³ The paper was one of the

¹ To avoid misunderstanding I would say that intellectualism is here used not in antithesis to empiricism or to sensationalism, but to denote any philosophy which treats the subject-matter of experience as primarily and fundamentally an object of cognition.

² PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. 13, p. 117.

³ *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, Vol. 15, p. 360.

addresses at the Kantian centenary. Its title is, significantly, "Kant's Relation to Modern Philosophical Progress." It makes an attempt to assess, on one hand, certain contemporary movements in the light of Kant's critical principles, and, on the other hand, to indicate the ways in which Post-Kantian thought suggests a reform in Kant himself. The first part holds that Kant's criticism still bars the way to every attempt at a philosophical ontology. The ontological monism of Mind-stuff, of Panlogism,¹ of Alogism alike stand condemned as illegitimate excursions into ontological dogmas. The reforming portion centers about the Kantian dualism of sense and reason. The difficulty left over by Kant is clearly stated: A given category, say causality, is nothing unless applied to experience. But how can it be applicable? Only in case experience furnishes instances of uniform succession. But in that case, why the category? Thought is not needed. Or if it is said that it is necessary to introduce necessity, how about necessity? If sense experience doesn't justify it, then it too is futile. If it does, thought is superfluous. Either sense already conforms to order or else it is inexorably at odds with it. Now Royce's solution is, in brief, as follows. Sensuous, irresistible presence, presence wholly unquestionable, absolutely certain, is an ultimate fact: a datum. Spatiality (as had just been claimed by Professor James) exists also as just such a simple irresistible quale. Succession as instantaneous sequence is also such a datum. What thought, as

¹ With respect to the problem of the evolution of Royce's later philosophy in its entirety, it is extremely important to note the ground for rejection of that Panlogism which was later accepted. It is connected with the fact of evolution. How can an Absolute Rational Whole change? How can it consist with progress from an earlier lower to a later higher? Or how can we think of every stage of the historical progress as itself a goal, when "the first starving family, or singed moth, or broken troth, or wasted effort, or wounded bird, is an indictment of the universal reason"? "Either evolution is a necessity . . . and the Absolute must be conceived as in bonds, or else it is irrational and the Logos must be conceived as blundering." I call this ground of rejection extremely important, for surely the key-note of all Royce's later philosophy is the formulation of a way to combine the notion of the eternal moment with genuine struggle and defeat in time. The ethical connecting link in the *Religious Aspect* is the conviction that all genuine virtue or moral good exists at the point of overcoming evil. Hence the Absolute would be lacking in moral quality unless in its eternal changelessness it included and overcame the temptations and struggles of the finite and changing.

essentially spontaneous, essentially active, does is to give the immediate momentary datum a reference beyond the present moment. However, the reference is not at first to an external cause. The primary reference is a time reference. In every cognitive act there is an assertion that the given data stand for, symbolize, recall, resemble, or otherwise relate to data that *were* real in an experience no longer existent. In short, thought primarily asserts or acknowledges the past. Then there is acknowledgement of the future: the synthesis of anticipation. Chief of all there is acknowledgment of other conscious beings than ourselves, acknowledgment of a universe of reality external to ourselves. Now "for the objects of these acts no possible theoretical evidence can be given more nearly ultimate than the one great fact that through acknowledgment and anticipation they are projected from the present moment into the past, future, and possible world of truth." And finally, "the goal of philosophy can be found only in an ethical philosophy. The ultimate justification of the act of projecting and acknowledging the world of truth constructed from sensible data" must be found in the significance—*i. e.*, in the moral worth of this activity itself. In short, the act of thought or judgment by which sense data become a knowable world of objects and a world of other minds is itself an act, an affirmation of the spontaneity of consciousness. Hence it is impossible to get behind it intellectually or give it an absolute warranty: it has to be justified in terms of its own worth as an act,—that is to say, ethically.

The student of Royce's writings will see here certain ideas which are found in all his later writings: The acceptance of empirical sense data as ultimate, things simply to be accepted as they are; the conception of them as intrinsically momentary, yet while including in themselves the fact of immediate or instantaneous sequence; the conviction that the problem of knowledge is, on the one hand, the problem of the temporal reference of these data, and, on the other, the problem of their reference to other minds, to orders of experience transcending our own; the belief that knowing is an act, an assertion, an acknowledging. Conjoined with them is the unfamiliar text that the active side,

the voluntaristic and ethical side, is ultimate, and that no theoretical justification for it can be found. In his *Religious Aspect of Philosophy* published only four years later, we find established, however, the reversed relationship: we find set forth the Roycean all-inclusive thought which eternally realizes itself in all fragmentary and partial acts of will. From henceforth acts of will are not self-justifying. The ethical is transcended in the cognitive.

I make no pretence to tell how the change came about, in the sense of ability to reconstruct Mr. Royce's mental biography. There are, however, a number of indications of the *logical* sources of the change, which are found in the *Religious Aspect*; and to them I invite your attention. In the first place, the Fichtean tone of the acknowledgement in the first essay of the reality of other experiences, other wills, than our own is evident. It is not so much a bare fact that we acknowledge them, as it is a supreme moral duty to acknowledge them. Our natural, carnal acknowledgment is not of them as Experiences like our own but rather as factors which affect our own well-being: selfishness is the radical moral evil. This *motif*, implicit in the earlier document, is explicit in the *Religious Aspect*. But recognition of this fact brings with it the recognition of the reality of clash of wills, and of the need of an organization of wills or aims. To restate the treatment, rather than to try to paraphrase it, if my own cannot be the ultimate law for other wills neither can the will of any other be the law of my will. There must be an inclusive organization which determines the aim of each alike. The same logic applies within one's own purposes; they too conflict and clash. Scepticism and pessimism are but the consciousness of this clash, in recognizing that amid plurality of aims there can be no ground for one making any one supreme, and no guaranty of abiding satisfaction. Moral certainty and moral confidence alike demand an organization of aims. Now such an organization cannot be itself an affair of will; it must be a matter of fact, a matter of reality or else of unreality, and hence something whose primary relationship is to knowledge. If it is valid, it is not because of anything in the "moral worth of the activity

itself" or it is just that worth which is put in jeopardy by the conflict, the plurality, of wills. The moral worth of the will can be established only on the basis of an organized harmony of wills as an established fact. Whether such an organization exists or not is a matter of truth, of knowledge, not of volition. For if one say that one wills that such an organization exist, the dialectic recurs. This is but an individual will; an assertion of one will among many. And why should *its* assertion of an organization of wills be any better than any other assertion of bare will?

In his *Defense of Philosophic Doubt* Mr. Balfour¹ had stated expressly that preference for one ethical end over another must itself be a purely ethical matter—that is a matter of choice undervivable from any theoretical judgment whether scientific or metaphysical. Each end founds a system of propositions all of which are logically coherent with one another. If revenge is an end-in-itself for me, then the proposition prescribing shooting a man from behind a hedge is a dependent ethical proposition belonging to that system. It is not knowledge but arbitrary choice which determines the end which fixes the dependent logical or theoretical system. It is fairly open to question whether such a conclusion does not follow from the principles set forth in Royce's earlier essay, when the clash of aims or acknowledging wills is taken into account. And, in the words of Mr. Royce, "The reader may ask: 'Is all this the loftiest idealism, or is it simply philosophic scepticism about the basis of ethics?' "

The moral will depends then upon an insight into a harmonious organization of all wills—an end in which pluralistic aims cease to be conflicting because they are taken up as elements into one inclusive aim. But does such an organization exist? This leads us to the discussion of knowledge and the criterion of truth. The conclusion is the absolutism of an all-comprehending eternal consciousness which has remained the central tenet of Mr. Royce's writings. "All reality must be present to the Unity of the Infinite Thought" (*Religious Aspect*, p. 433). "The possibility of an ontology and the supposed nature of the ideal absolute

¹ *Religious Aspect*, Preface, and pp. 128-130.

knowledge" which, true to the spirit of Kant, Mr. Royce had denied in his earlier essay,¹ is now asserted as the sole way out of ethical scepticism. The transition to Absolutism is through (a) discovery of the scepticism latent in voluntarism when that is made ultimate: (b) in the demand for a community of aims or organization of wills:² (c) the discovery that all recognition of ignorance and error, all sceptical doubt involves an appeal to a Judger or Thought which included both the original object and the original judgment about it. The analogy of such a comprehensive judger with the required moral organizations of wills which, in their separateness, clash, is obvious enough.

In being reduced to a secondary place, voluntarism is not, however, superseded. It persists, first, in the conception of the method of approach to Absolutism, and, secondly, within the conception of the Absolute itself. (1) The first step out of the world of doubt is through the World of Postulates—a conception substantially identical with the acknowledging activity of the earlier essay. The external world may be regarded as an assumption, as a postulate, which satisfies certain familiar human needs.³ Subjected to analysis this postulate turns out to be, in the rough, "an active assumption or acknowledgment of something more than the data of consciousness." The immediate data are of that fragmentary and transient nature which was earlier noted. Hence judgment must do more than reduce these present data to order; it must assert that context beyond them in which they exist and in which they have their real meaning and truth. This is, again, the corrected restatement of the Kantian problem. We are not faced with an incredible act of thought which forms sense-data as such, but with the act of thought which supplements the specific and empirical givens, in their temporal limitations, with the larger setting which gives them objectivity. This restatement at one stroke does away with the trans-empirical Ding-an-

¹ *J. S. P.*, XV, p. 371.

² The student of Royce will be interested in comparing this with the explicit doctrine of the Community in Royce's latest work. Peirce's influence is presumably effective in the earlier as well as the later writing, though it is less explicit in the *Religious Aspect*.

³ *Religious Aspect*, p. 292.

sich, putting in the place of a trans-empirical Reality, a trans-momentary one, and with the subjectivistic character of sense-data, in any sense of subjectivism which identifies them with a particular knowing self;—since sense-data are given in the most emphatic sense of given.

The sketch which Royce sets forth of the psychology of the process of the postulating activity of thought makes explicit the voluntarism implicit in the idea of the postulate. It is quite unnecessary to recall its details to you. The preface of the book makes an acknowledgement to Professor James, and the address of 1903 to which I referred at the outset expressly connects the influence of James with this voluntarism. The activity which transforms and transcends the immediate data is, psychologically, of the nature of attention; attention is essentially will, and it expresses interest.¹

A voluntaristic element, persisting all through Royce's philosophy, is seen in his treatment of a cognitive idea. An idea to be cognitive must be a part of a judgment, or itself an implicit judgment. For a judgment to be true or untrue means that it agrees or does not agree with its object—an object external to the ideas connected in the judgment. Yet the judgment must always have something which indicates what one of the many objects of the world it picks out for its own, which one it cognitively refers to. In other words, the cognitive idea is, in its objective reference, an intent. The voluntaristic implications of the cognitive idea as intent are in no way elaborated in this document as they are, for example, in *The World and The Individual*, but the root idea is present.

It is no part of this paper to follow the logic of the treatment of the possibility of error and the method which leads to the conclusion: "All reality must be present to the Unity of the Infinite Thought" (p. 433). The purpose of the paper limits me to noting, first, that we have now found the ethical desideratum—the ontological reality of an organized harmony of all aims. For being a complete *thought*, a complete knower, it must have present in it all desires and purposes, and being a *complete* or

¹ *Religious Aspect*, pp. 308–324.

perfect knower, it must also present in itself the realities in which aims find their realizations. Secondly, we note that in the formulations of this absolute knowing consciousness intellectualistic considerations predominate to a greater extent than in Mr. Royce's subsequent formulations. The Infinite Truth is conceived by predilection as Knower; it is referred to as Seer, as Spectator, as Judger. The function of infinite Thought in *knowing* our aims and *knowing* the objects in which they are fulfilled is most dwelt upon. In the treatment of the problem of evil, however, that voluntaristic aspect of the Absolute which is made so explicit in later writings appears in germ. Goodness is not mere innocence but is transcending of evil. In the divine our evil is present but is transcended in good. But such transcendence is by way of conquest. The cognitive Seer possesses also a Universal Will realized in it.¹

It is not my intention to engage in criticism of either the conclusion or the method followed in reaching it. I shall, however, indulge in a few comments which may suggest the direction which my criticism would take if occasion and time permitted. In the first place, I would point out that all solutions are relative because relevant to the problem from which they set out. In the last analysis, everything depends upon the way in which the problem is formed and formulated. With Mr. Royce the problem is fixed by the results of the Kantian philosophy, taken in its broad sense. It seems axiomatic to him that the problem of knowledge is the problem of connection of sense data which are facts of consciousness with the spontaneous constructive activity of thought or judging—itsself a fact of consciousness.² It is significant that his discussion of the possibility of error sets out with a provisional acceptance of Ueberweg's definition of judgment as "Consciousness about the objective validity of a subjective *union of ideas*" (*italics mine*).

¹ *Religious Aspect*, pp. 456-59.

² In the first published writing of Mr. Royce with which I happen to be familiar, entitled, "Schiller's Ethical Studies" in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, Vol. XV, p. 385, the peculiarity of Kant is stated as follows: "Kant's philosophy is a glorification not of self but of Consciousness. In Consciousness is all knowledge rooted, through Consciousness is all truth known," etc.

My second line of comment may be introduced by reference to the fact that I have spoken of the voluntarism of Royce, not of his pragmatism. I have done so in part because pragmatism (while it may be construed in terms of facts of consciousness, and so be identified with a psychological voluntarism) may be stated in non-psychical terms. But in greater part it is because the original statement of Royce, the one where a critical voluntarism still lords it over an ontological Absolutism, conceives will purely as Act. It is the *act* of Acknowledging which is emphasized. There is no reference to determination or measure by consequences. Now Peirce repudiated just such a position. He says, referring to Kant, that this type of position would be Practicalism, and that he adopted the word Pragmatism, still following a Kantian suggestion, to emphasize empirical consequences. The importance attached by James to consequences, last things, as a test of pragmatism, is well known.

Voluntarism rather than pragmatism is found in the Roycean notion of judgment. When intent or purpose is conceived of as the essence of judgment or cognitive idea, the intent is to know. The reference is intellectualistic; connection with the object intended is cognitive, not practical. As "attention constantly tends to make our consciousness more definite and less complex" (p. 316), so of the process of thought knowing, it is said: "The aim of the whole process is to reach as complete and united a conception of reality as is possible, a conception wherein the greatest fullness of data shall be combined with the greatest simplicity of conception" (p. 357). Construing the operation of fulfilling a supreme cognitive interest in terms of purpose and will is a very different thing from construing the cognitive interest in terms of a process of fulfilment of *other* interests, vital, social, ethical, esthetic, technological, etc.

Finally, just because consequences and the plurality of non-intellectual interests which cognition serves are ignored, the ethical voluntarism of the essay of 1881 is itself an absolutism—ethical to be sure, but absolutism. The acknowledging activity must finally be justified by "the significance—*i. e.*, the moral worth—of this activity itself." It would be hard to find

anything less congenial to the ethical side of pragmatism than a doctrine which justified moral purpose and motive by something residing in its own activity, instead of in the consequences which the activity succeeds in making out of original vital and social interests in their interaction with objects. Putting the matter somewhat more technically, the transition from the voluntarism of the early essay to the intellectual absolutism of the later book was indeed logically necessary. A will which is absolute is purely arbitrary, and its arbitrariness leads to scepticism and pessimism for the reasons pointed out by Royce. 'Will' needs a rational measure of choice, of preference, in the selection and disposition of ends. If it does not find this measure in a coordinated foresight of the consequences which depends upon acting from a given intent, it must find it in some *pre-existing* Reality, which, of course, is something to be known. In short, what the transition from the voluntarism of the earlier essay to the intellectualism of the later exhibits, is not a change from pragmatism to absolutism but a recognition of the objective absolutism latent in any ethical absolutism. I would go as far as to suggest that the ulterior issue involved in the theory of knowledge is whether regulative principles have a prospective and eventual reference, or whether they depend upon something antecedently given as an object of certitude—be it fixed ready-made goods, fixed ready-made rules, or fixed Absolute.

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NOVUM ITINERARIUM MENTIS IN DEUM.

IT seems to be the fashion nowadays in Germany, both in philosophical and in military circles, to connect the war, or at least Germany's part therein, with the teachings of the great German idealists. It is not at all strange that this should be so. Whenever any nation is at war and patriotism rises to a high pitch, there is always a marked deepening of religious sentiment,—it is as much so in France today as in Germany,—and one fondly tries to tie up one's cause to the teaching of the great spiritual leaders of the past. "Our cause is the righteous cause, and the God of battles is with us." Thus it ever was, and ever will be, no matter what one's philosophy, for the nation that does not do this will engage in war listlessly and surely perish. To be sure, outside of Germany one finds a greater hospitality toward the spiritual leaders of other nations than one's own. The Germans have come to view themselves as in some peculiar sense the chosen people. God has spoken to them as to no other race, and they are convinced that they have a special mission and duty as the representatives of the fundamental ideas of civilization.

It is not strange that the Germans should invoke the imposing figures of Kant and Fichte. But one is indeed surprised to find thinkers of our own land making these idealists responsible, not only for Germany's part in the war, but even for the whole policy of 'frightfulness,' and seriously warning us that if we would be politically saved, we must once for all turn our backs on Kant with his antiquated belief in truth, in eternal principles of right, and in a spiritual realm distinct from the realm of nature—and be baptized in the flowing stream of pragmatism. It is true that in Fichte's writings, from the first, the concepts of God and the ego have a tantalizing way of running together; and, after the battle of Jena, the resulting exalted personality was thoroughly Teutonized. It is true that Hegel was a trimmer, and that he accommodated his philosophy so as to make it find its fulfilment

in the Prussian state, and that he Hegelized Christianity to give it religious sanction. But these are the weaknesses of great men, illustrations, perhaps, of the chief weakness of a great race. This is insolent egotism, not philosophy at all. But surely chauvinism was not invented in Germany, any more than jingoism was born in France. It is a temper of mind that is independent of race, and not limited to men of any philosophical persuasion. It is just a common human failing.

If any philosophy were to be singled out as on trial in this war, it would rather seem to be a ruthless materialism, which had found expression in *Realpolitik*, and adopted an elastic pragmatic interpretation of the true and the good. But as a matter of fact, we cannot settle our philosophical differences in any such simple fashion, or decide for or against any political philosophy by pointing to Germany as the *abschreckendes Beispiel*, either of idealism, or of pragmatism, or of realism, or of any other philosophy. To attempt to do so would merely result in calling each other names.

One thing is evident. The European conflict has brought each of the nations engaged therein to a collective self-consciousness unrealized before. There are indications of a similar awakening in our own land, and it is incumbent upon us to try to discover the political philosophy, if any such there be, that underlies our efforts after democracy. Is the older absolute idealism a menace to the establishment of free institutions, and to the peace of nations? The gravamen of the charge seems to be this:—The idealist, believing in absolute truth, and in immutable principles of morality, and in a spiritual realm which is not to be comprehended under the categories of the physical order, will come sooner or later to regard himself and those of his intellectual household as the sole guardians of this truth, the only true interpreters of this moral law, and as, therefore, justified in employing any means that may seem expedient in making their view prevail. Either the idealist views himself thus as the Lord's anointed, and becomes a menace to mankind, or else he doesn't take his idealism seriously and it becomes a milk-and-watery and negligible doctrine.

There could hardly be a more complete misrepresentation of the situation. It can only be given the slightest semblance of plausibility by rehearsing the chauvinistic and egotistical utterances of a few idealists, whose chauvinism was not only not the consequence of their idealism, but was in fact in direct contradiction to it. It is, on the contrary, a matter of plain history that genuine intellectual modesty among philosophers, and a broad and tolerant humanism, and an eagerness to learn from experience, first made their appearance with the dawn of absolute idealism. These are virtues she cannot be robbed of, even if at times some over-zealous devotees have betrayed her cause.

In one of Plato's Dialogues, Socrates tells the story of his own intellectual awakening, and it is most instructive with regard to the question at issue. He learned one day that a man named Anaxagoras had written a book in which he had shown that mind was the author of all things. "Eagerly," said Socrates in effect, "I sought the book, but imagine my disappointment when I found that, although asserting mind to be the author, the writer went on to explain the facts of experience without using that concept at all. If mind be indeed the author, then everything is as it is because it is best for it so to be, and the only true wisdom would consist in seeing all things in the light of this idea of the good." He himself, however, was equally unable to attain unto this wisdom. Nevertheless, he gets from Anaxagoras an inspiration that defines a program, the program of absolute idealism, and sets a task which ages will be required to carry out. For he has a second string to his bow; he cannot, of course, take his stand with absolute wisdom; that would be indeed to affect omniscience. He must begin in all modesty just where he finds himself, with what seems most plausible and then proceed to test this view by clear, consistent, and thorough-going thinking, brought ever to the touchstone of experience. In this undertaking he finds that he can successfully eliminate error, and substitute once for all the more complete for the less complete vision. The modesty of this position is obvious. Of what value then to this idealist was the conception of an absolute reason so inaccessible to mortal mind? It inspired and justified

an absolute and self-sacrificing devotion to the pursuit of truth; gave his mission, as he viewed it, the sanction of a Divine command; justified the belief that clear, straight thinking done by any man is done for all men; that men are brought together in the search for truth and freed through its discovery, because in mind they have a truly common nature. Socrates was never dogmatic. His life is a continuous experimental test of this position, an attempt, as we might say, to blaze the trail for the *itinerarium mentis in Deum*. The function of this concept of absolute reason has been, from Socrates's day to this, analogous to that of the conservation of energy in modern physics, and it was as revolutionary and as fruitful in philosophy as the latter concept was in physics.

But there is something of the mystic in Socrates, and this vision of completed truth toward which he is striving is even now there before him, and within, as the object of his continual longing, an object as beautiful and good as it is true. Plato, or is it still Socrates, under the inspiration of this vision, tries to depict a social order in which this ideal shall be realized among men. If he makes the mistake which most reformers make of trying to make vice impossible through legislation, and of trying by means of institutions to bring about the millenium day after tomorrow, a mistake that leads him into the errors of premature socialism, he has none the less grasped certain principles that must still serve as our ideal. The only real state, the only one worthy the name, is one in which every individual may find the opportunity to do that which he is best fitted to do, and in which this service shall always be performed with an eye to the welfare of the entire community. The root of evil in states as in individuals is selfishness, the desire for self-aggrandizement, the desire to get on at the expense of someone else. These are truths of political philosophy which we must still recognize, although nowhere have they been brought to realization. And yet they remain, as all universal truths do, formal. Whether any specific reform will help to bring about the desired result we can only tell by trying. But this ideal still sets for us the end with reference to which we pass judgment upon our several experiments.

With the work of the seraphic doctor, whose title I have borrowed, I am not especially concerned. Despairing of the state of the world as he found it, Bonaventura sought salvation for the individual by the pathway of withdrawal, and this gives his work, for all its beauty, a certain unreality. But it is worth noting that, in spite of his ambitious undertaking, this idealist suffers if anything from an excess of modesty; that moreover his book is an interpretation of his own experience, an account of the spiritual gymnastics whereby he had, as he supposed, himself reached the peace that passed understanding; and that the last thing that could have occurred to him would have been to attempt to force his view on any unwilling mind.

The modern idealist, and Professor Royce is my representative modern idealist, views, and must view, his life work as nothing less than an attempt to find and describe the *itinerarium mentis in Deum*. And yet no one, at least in his rôle as idealist, ever supposes that in so doing he is giving to the world the only reliable Baedeker to the kingdom of heaven. The very magnitude of his aim insures his modesty. His philosophy itself compels him to regard every serious student as a collaborator in his undertaking, and to view the task which he has set himself as one which the ages alone can carry to completion. Nevertheless, he believes that he does possess even now a sure compass to guide him in his quest, certain fixed principles of thought and action, call them categories or imperatives if you will, which are such as are implied in the very effort to deny them, and are, therefore, the pre-conditions of all our interpretations. He believes, moreover, and for reasons that do not here concern us, that this complete vision, which is the goal of his endeavor, is no mere distant ideal but rather an ever-living force, the life and the light of the world today. He has read his Socrates through the eyes of Kant, and in the spirit of Bonaventura.

Amongst the many contributions which Professor Royce has made to philosophy, there are three or four that stand out in special relief. The earlier idealists, intoxicated by their success, and ignoring the limitations imposed by their own vision, had dealt rather cavalierly with experience. Professor Royce has

done excellent service in making it plain that idealism not only permits, but compels, respect for the facts precisely as experience reveals them; counsels docility in interpreting nature, and adopts the experimental attitude toward all specific plans and institutions. The absolute is not to be found all at once, and the philosopher, not talking to the klepsydra, as Plato would say, but having his eye on all time and all existence, can afford to be patient, and will surely be suspicious of all Utopias.

He has also succeeded in cutting under the old Cartesian dualism of mind and matter, a dualism which has haunted all modern philosophy, and is still the fertile source of many of our misunderstandings. Mind is not all here within, objects yonder without; the unity of consciousness comes into being *pari passu* with the knowledge of the unity of experience; the interpreter is at once on the object as well as on the subject side of the subject-object relation. The object that one seeks is defined and selected in the idea that reaches out after it, and is indeed simply its more complete and individual embodiment.

Again, by showing the universal presence of the practical in the theoretical, he has helped to bridge the Kantian gulf between these two realms, and to establish the thoroughgoing primacy of the practical,—a pragmatism raised to the *n*th power.

But I find a new note appearing in the *Philosophy of Loyalty*, and prominent in all his subsequent writings. Here again our idealist is simply interpreting experience; his feet are on the ground of fact. But the center of interest is now our varied human life with all its tragedies, its hopes, its failures, its joys, as it has been lived by a very human and lovable person, as good as he is wise. In these works Professor Royce has bridged the gap which, in our fondness for abstractions, we are apt to set up between individuals. He has shown that the isolated individual does not exist; that we do not take our point of departure, as it were, in the prison of the inner life, and then argue ourselves into the belief in other minds on the basis of analogy, finding the behavior of their bodies like that of our own, and inferring the presence of a corresponding consciousness. The notion of a self-contained mind coming to believe in the existence

of other minds in such a fashion is a pure abstraction. We cannot even state the argument from analogy without pre-supposing as its own terms a consciousness that takes us beyond the limits of our private personality. Our consciousness is, in truth, from the first, social, and one rounds to a separate mind only by defining his own interests and purposes within the unity of the mind of the community.

The pursuit of truth is always a social enterprise where at least three minds are involved, one mind interpreting a second to another, or to other, minds. And the real world we seek is no other than the community of interpretation which can be found by no one except the spirit of the community dwell within him. This idea of the community, and of the divine spirit as dwelling therein, is no mere abstraction, no metaphor, no topic for mystical insight. Any highly organized community is "as truly a human being as we are individually human, only a community is not what we usually call a human being; because it has no one separate and internally well-knit organism of its own; and because its mind, if you attribute to it any one mind, is, therefore, not manifested through the expressive movements of such a separate human organism." Nevertheless, its mental life possesses a psychology of its own which can be systematically studied. It is, moreover, one through the possession of a common fund of memories and experiences. "As empirical facts, communities are known to us by their deeds, by their workings, by their intelligent and coherent behavior; just as the minds of our individual neighbors are known to us through their expressions." The difference between individual human beings as we ordinarily regard them in social intercourse, and communities, is properly characterized by describing them as two grades or levels of human life.

Thus our *itinerarium mentis in Deum* has led us to a concept of God as the spirit dwelling in the beloved community, a concept which in no wise resembles that spectre which the philosophical caricaturist delights in portraying, the otiose absolute of the schools. It is a God who makes a difference in the lives of men, inspiring them to loyalty, devotion, and self-sacrifice. And

from start to finish, our idealism has been in close contact with the facts of experience. If these find their interpretation in this idealism, they are not in any sense transmuted into something else. They remain with their value fixed unalterably, each in its own place in the temporal order, although their meaning, if ever it could be completely found, would involve their exhaustive interpretation in the light of the entire historical process, and in the full contexture of human intercourse.

And if all of our interpretations of experience are guided by the practical motive, we have here found the supreme practical principle in the call to be loyal to the principle of loyalty, for except through the acceptance of this principle, neither individual nor community could be; that is, to deny it is to deny life and reality.

I submit that if this view is true, the next task for idealists should be to reverse our telescopes, and, starting from this practical imperative, show how the principles and categories, by means of which we interpret experience on its various levels, issue from it, and are related to each other with reference to it. This would be to give a genuine deduction of the categories and to establish the primacy of the practical reason.

And have we not in this idealism a philosophy which helps us to define our own political aspirations, and to make articulate the vision that underlies our efforts after democracy? Most of the high sounding phrases that roll so glibly from the tongue of the Fourth of July orator are merely more or less flamboyant expressions of an aspiration common to all civilized lands today. Every land aspires to be a land of the free, and no one has come anywhere near realizing this aspiration. In our efforts in this direction we have been particularly favored by our geographical situation, and by our unsurpassed physical resources. But most of all are we favored in the varied assortment of our ancestors. We are indeed, as a nation, directly descended from England, and her institutions, and laws, and political beliefs, have been the most potent influence in making us what we are; and the very language that we speak must make her history, her literature, and her ideals ever specially dear to our hearts. At the same

time, the collateral branches of our ancestry reach back into almost every civilization. We are thus in a position to claim the living past of them all as our own past without being bound by the dead past of any one. We are, therefore, less in bondage to the past than other nations not so favored; less hampered by the claims of use and wont.

Great as are these advantages, they are very far from insuring the success of our political experiment, and there are many signs of coming storm. We are apt to speak and act as if freedom were a negative term, as if it meant freedom *from*, instead of freedom *to*. And so there is a great deal of mutual complacency, of easy-going live and let live, and a spineless tolerance of wrong that does not directly and obviously touch us as individuals. We are an irreverent and a pleasure loving people, devoted to luxury and ease. Hence the universal desire for self-aggrandizement, the mad scramble for wealth, selfishness on a scale unparalleled in history, a selfishness that is not overcome by occasional spasms of sentimental kindliness. Hence, too, the tendency to seek reform by substituting the selfishness of the group, the class, or the majority, for that of the individual. Everyone thinks himself as good as his neighbor. There is an unwillingness to use the expert, and civil service reform makes headway with painful slowness. For "every human unit must count for one, and no one for more than one." So runs the shibboleth.

Does it not all come down to this, that the concrete ills which threaten us, spring from the fact that men have lost their belief in Truth, in eternal principles of morality, and in a spiritual order that transcends, even if it includes, the world of sense. If our democracy is to triumph we must find some way of combining service with freedom, the unity of the community with the independence of the individual. Were this consummation reached, we could then say every human unit counts for all, in counting for himself, for he only counts for himself if the spirit of the community dwell within him.

This ideal, like every worthy human ideal, calls for perfection, and, therefore, sets a task which ages alone can bring to realiza-

tion. Nevertheless, it defines our aim, and supplies the standard by which we may measure the value of the means employed, [our various experiments in righteousness, individual and social] and make sure of our progress toward its realization. It places clearly before us the vision of that state, at once ideal and real, where solidarity and liberty have joined hands, and where the familiar maxim 'One for all and all for one' is more than an empty phrase.

This is indeed not a new social philosophy, but Professor Royce has given it a novel interpretation, and has shown how completely it controls the work of theoretical reason on all its levels. The ideal state which it places before us has many of the marks of socialism, but it is a socialism that will be desirable only when it is no longer necessary. For any attempt to hasten the realization of this ideal by external means, by force, or by the mechanism of institutions, would only make sure its defeat. This is a *Kultur* which can only be spread by the sword of the spirit.

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THE TELEOLOGY OF INORGANIC NATURE.¹

THE study of adaptation, of which Lamarck is the great originator, has not yet won for itself a secure scientific foundation nor led to clear and unequivocal interpretations of nature. Although the facts which this study presents are both universal and important, biologists have neither agreed upon their place in the theory of evolution nor discovered any principle by which they may be even unified.

This failure of our modern science is not hard to understand, and may fairly be attributed, in part at least, to the lack of a systematic study of adaptability, which at bottom is a physical and chemical problem, uncomplicated by the riddle of life. For beneath all the organic structures and functions are the molecules and their activities. These it is which have been moulded by the process of evolution, and these no less have formed the environment.

I beg the reader to bear this in mind and constantly to remember one simple question: What are the physical and chemical origins of diversity among inorganic and organic things, and how shall the adaptability of matter and energy be described? He may then find his way through the difficulties which philosophical and biological thought have accumulated around a problem that in its most fundamental aspects belongs only to physical science.

The scientific examination of the properties and activities of the three elements hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen and of their compounds water and carbonic acid, as it was recently presented in *The Fitness of the Environment*,² may serve as an aid to investigate the problem of adaptability. For it is evident that diversity in nature must especially depend upon the existence and availability of suitable structural materials in the necessary

¹ The argument which is presented in the following pages has benefited at every stage of its development by Professor Royce's criticisms and by successive discussions in his Seminary of Logic. I dedicate it to him with pleasure and gratitude.

² New York, The Macmillan Co., 1913.

profusion, variety and stability; on the existence of conditions which shall preserve the structures; on wealth of forces which shall activate them. Such specifications, like those of an architect or engineer, concern the properties of matter and energy rather than the laws of nature.

The properties of the three elements meet most of these specifications. They lead to the presence of water and carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and to the meteorological cycle. This cycle regulates the temperature of the globe more perfectly than it could be regulated by any other substance. It produces an almost constant temperature in the ocean, as well as constancy of composition and of alkalinity. It mobilizes all over the earth great quantities of all the elements; it deposits them in great variety and inexhaustible profusion in the ocean; it comminutes and disperses all varieties of insoluble minerals, thereby diversifying the land; it causes water to penetrate and to remain in nearly all localities. And all of these processes are more perfect or more extensive than they could be if a large number of the different properties of water were not what they are. Thereby the greatest possible variety and quantity of structural materials are accumulated. Meanwhile the conditions which make for durability of structures are insured.

Other similar results depend upon the chemical properties of the three elements. These properties lead to an even greater variety of chemical combinations and chemical reactions, to an unequalled diversity of properties in their products, and to qualitatively and quantitatively important transformations of energy.

Out of all these substances, inorganic and organic alike, the properties of water and of other substances here in question make possible the construction of an almost infinite diversity of physico-chemical systems. And, as Willard Gibbs has shown, the world of physical science is made up of systems and nothing else. Natural systems may vary almost indefinitely in the number and variety of their phases and components, in concentrations, and in configurations. They may be so constituted as to produce the most varied forms of activity. Like their components, they may manifest the greatest variety of

properties and their forms include all the possible forms of life and of the mineral kingdom.

These and many other things depend upon the properties of hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen. They make up, I cannot doubt, the most remarkable group of causes of the teleological appearance of nature. Yet it must not be forgotten that they only coöperate in the process of evolution, and that many other causes are just as necessary to the results. Not only are the laws of nature concerned, but also the characteristics of the solar system, many special features of the earth itself, and especially the origin of life. Without this mysterious event the process of evolution must have remained in a far simpler condition. But more conspicuously than the other factors in the evolutionary process these fundamental properties of matter permit in a very strict scientific sense freedom of development. This freedom is, figuratively speaking, merely the freedom of 'trial and error.' It makes possible the occurrence of a great variety of trials and of a large proportion of successes. I need hardly say that we arrive at the conception of this kind of freedom only by neglecting the causes which determine the trials—in this case the general laws, the rotation of the earth, the distance of the sun, and many others. But this is equivalent to the remark that we are investigating one particular aspect of a complex problem, meanwhile following the invariable method of science.

The nature of the properties of the three elements which thus coöperate to bring these conditions to pass must now be examined. All properties, with the exception of a few which cannot at present be recognized as bearing upon the general characteristics of systems, are concerned. Each of these properties is almost or quite unique, either because it has a maximum or a minimum value or nearly so, among all known substances, or because it involves a unique relationship or an anomaly. No other element or group of elements possesses properties which on any account can be compared with these. All are deficient at many points, both qualitatively and quantitatively. And since the whole analysis is founded upon the characteristics of systems, and therefore upon concepts which specify nothing about the proper-

ties of the different kinds of matter, it is unnecessary to examine the possibility of the existence of other groups of properties otherwise unique.

Thus we reach the conclusion that the properties of hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen make up a unique ensemble of properties, each one of which is itself unique. This ensemble of properties is of the highest importance in the evolutionary process, for it is that which makes diversity possible; and diversity, as Spencer declares, is radically necessary to evolution. In short, there is here involved an order in the properties of the elements.

This new order is, so to speak, hidden, when one considers the properties of matter abstractly and statically. It becomes evident only when time is taken into consideration. It has a dynamical significance, and relates to evolution. It is associated with the periodic system of the elements in somewhat the same way that the functional order is related to the structural order in biology. Hence it is not independent of the other order, but may be said to lie masked within it.

This is no novel experience, that the consideration of phenomena in time should lead to new points of view. From Galileo's inclined plane and pendulum to the times of Darwin and modern physical chemistry, the progress of dynamics has steadily modified our outlook on nature. In truth, it might almost have been said *a priori* that a new order must be revealed by a study of the properties of matter in relation to evolution.

This order may be described abstractly as follows: The properties of matter are not evenly distributed among the elements, nor in such manner as can be explained by the laws of chance, nor are they altogether distributed in the manner which the periodic system describes. If the extremes be considered, all the physical and chemical properties are distributed with the very greatest unevenness, so that the extremes are concentrated upon a few elements, notably hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon. As a result of this fact there arise certain peculiarities of the cosmic process which could not otherwise occur.

The characteristics which make up this unique ensemble include the greater number of characteristics, and especially the

most important and the most conspicuous physical and chemical properties. This order has for cosmic and organic evolution extremely important results—maximum stability of physico-chemical conditions and maximum complexity in the physico-chemical make-up of the surface of our planet; further, the possibility of maximum number, variety, complexity, durability and activity of physico-chemical systems in such an environment.

The unique ensemble of properties of water, carbonic acid and the three elements constitutes among the properties of matter the fittest ensemble of characteristics for durable mechanism. No other environment, that is to say no environment other than the surface of a planet upon which water and carbonic acid are the primary constituents, could so highly favor the widest range of durability and activity in the widest range of material systems—in systems varying with respect to phases, to components, and to concentrations. This environment is indeed the *fittest*. It has a claim to the use of the superlative based upon quantitative measurement and exhaustive treatment, which is altogether lacking in the case of the fitness of the organism. For the organism, so we fondly hope, is ever becoming more fit, and the law of evolution is the survival of the fitter.

Yet it is only for mechanism in general, and not for any special form of mechanism, whether life as we know it, or a steam engine, that this environment is fittest. The ocean, for example, fits mechanism in general; and, if you will, it fits the whale and the plankton diatom, though not man or a butterfly. But, of course, as everybody has known since 1859, it is really the whale and the diatom which fit the ocean. And this leads to a biological conclusion.

Just because life must manifest itself in and through mechanism, just because, being in this world, it must inhabit a more or less durable, more or less active physico-chemical system of more or less complexity in its phases, components and concentrations, it is conditioned. The inorganic, such as it is, imposes certain conditions upon the organic. Accordingly, we may say that the special characteristics of the inorganic are the fittest for those general characteristics of the organic which the general character-

istics of the inorganic impose upon the organic. This is the one side of reciprocal biological fitness. The other side may be similarly stated: Through adaptation the special characteristics of the organic come to fit the special characteristics of a particular environment, to fit, not any planet, but a little corner of the earth.

This is a most imperfect characterization of the dynamic order in the properties of the elements, for it involves only three among more than eighty substances. More serious, perhaps, is the difficulty of reducing the statement to a methodical form. It will be well, therefore, to take it as it stands. But the ensemble of characteristics of the three elements cannot therefore be dismissed. We have to note that the connection of the properties of these elements is not to be disregarded on the ground that it is an affair of the reflective judgment, for that consideration would also lead to the rejection of the connection of properties revealed in the periodic classification of the elements. Nor can we look upon it as in any sense the work of chance.

"There is, in fact, exceedingly little ground for hope that any single explanation of these coincidences can arise from current hypotheses and laws. But if to the coincidence of the unique properties of water we add that of the chemical properties of the three elements, a problem results under which the science of today must surely break down. If these taken as a whole are ever to be understood, it will be in the future, when research has penetrated far deeper into the riddle of the properties of matter. Nevertheless an explanation cognate with known laws is conceivable, and in the light of experience it would be folly to think it impossible or even improbable."¹

Yet such an explanation, once attained, could little avail. For a further and more difficult problem remains. How does it come about that each and all of these many unique properties should be favorable to the process of evolution? Existing knowledge provides no clue to an answer of this question. For there seems to be here no possibility of any interaction like that involved in the production of dynamic equilibrium or in natural selection. And yet the connection between the properties of the three elements,

¹ *The Fitness of the Environment*, pp. 277, 278.

almost infinitely improbable as the result of chance, can be regarded, is in truth only fully intelligible even when mechanistically explained, as a preparation for the evolutionary process. This ensemble is the condition of the production of many systems from few, and any other sensibly different distribution of the properties among the elements, almost infinitely numerous though such conceivable distributions may be, would very greatly restrict the possibilities of the multiplication of systems. In other words, the possibility is negligible that conditions equally favorable to the production of diversity in the course of evolution should arise without cause. But we are ignorant of the existence of any cause except the mind which can thus produce results that are fully intelligible only in their relation to later events. Nevertheless we can on no account, unless we are to abandon that principle of probability which is the basis of every scientific induction, deny this connection between the properties of matter and the diversity of evolution. For the connection is fully obvious and the result is reached by a scientific demonstration.

This conclusion is so important that I will try to state the argument in its simplest form. The process of evolution consists in the increase of diversity of systems and their activities, in the multiplication of physical occurrences, or briefly in the production of much from little. Other things being equal, there is maximum freedom for such evolution on account of a certain unique arrangement of unique properties of matter. A change in any one of these properties would greatly diminish the freedom. The chance that this unique ensemble of properties should occur by accident is almost infinitely small. The chance that each of the unit properties of this arrangement by itself and in coöperation with the others should accidentally contribute to this freedom a maximum increment is also almost infinitely small. Therefore there is a causal connection between the properties of the elements and the freedom of evolution. But the properties of the universal elements antedate or are logically prior to those restricted aspects of evolution with which we are concerned. Hence we are obliged to regard the properties as in some intelligible sense a preparation for the process of planetary evolution.

For we cannot imagine an interaction between the properties of hydrogen, carbon and oxygen and any process of planetary evolution or any similar process by which the properties of the elements should have been modified throughout the universe. Therefore the properties of the elements must for the present be regarded as possessing a teleological character.

It will perhaps be objected to this argument that the cause of the peculiar properties of the three elements is conceivably a simple one, such as the properties of the electron. This is perfectly true but quite beside the point. For, whether simple or complex in origin, the teleological connection—the logical relation of the properties of the three elements to the characteristics of systems—is complex. This complex connection is almost infinitely improbable as a chance occurrence. But the properties of electrons do not produce logical connections of this kind any more than they produce the logical connections of the multiplication table. Only adaptation is known to produce such results.

This is the one positive scientific conclusion which I have to contribute to the teleological problem. It must not be forgotten that it concerns but a single characteristic of the teleological appearance of nature. The question of the interplay of nature's laws is left just where we found it. And the accidental advantages which our earth possesses when compared with the other planets of the solar system, or with planets as they may be abstractly conceived are not even touched upon. Yet some of the very most remarkable conditions which lead to the diversification of the products of evolution are here involved. We have, however, to bear in mind certain of the general characteristics of all planets as they tend to appear through the influence of the properties of matter. And if the analysis has not been carried to a further stage, it is because we can see the possibility of almost infinite diversity in the properties of particular planets, while the universe seems to possess but a single system of chemical elements.

The result of our analysis is therefore nothing but an example or specimen of the scientific analysis of the order of nature. In

that it is scientific it possesses two characteristics which are important to note. First it leaves the chain of mechanical determination completely unmodified. We need take no account whatever of such logical relations of things, just as we may disregard the logical relations of the periodic system, in studying any of the phenomena or groups of phenomena in nature. Secondly, like all scientific conclusions, its validity depends upon the principle of probability.¹

The scientific value of this induction of the dynamic order in the properties of the elements must depend upon its utility as a means to the comprehension of diversity and stability in the products of evolution. But there is a further philosophical aspect of the conclusion which cannot be altogether disregarded.

In arriving at the scientific conclusion we have reached a position from which one aspect of the teleological configuration of nature can be clearly perceived and closely scrutinized. It is now evident that the diversity of the world largely depends upon a specific group of characteristics of the elements.

In order to describe the course of all natural phenomena as they have actually occurred, it is, however, quite unnecessary to understand or to take account of the peculiar relations which we have discovered to exist between these properties and the characteristics of systems. But, indeed, if we are merely to describe phenomena as they occur, it is not even necessary to take account of the law of gravitation. When, however, the more interesting task of explaining, or if this term be unacceptable, of generalizing the description, is seriously taken up, the employment of laws, which depend upon our perceptions or judgments of the relations between things, becomes necessary. The development of modern science has provided us with a considerable number of such laws, of which the most conspicuous besides Newton's law are the law of the conservation of mass, the law of the conservation of energy and the law of the degradation of energy. Such laws enable us to imagine the conditions under which all phenomena may be assumed to take place, in this manner to classify events which are

¹ Cf. Newton's fourth rule of reasoning in philosophy, in which the element of probability in every induction is clearly suggested.

widely separated in time and space, and thus gradually to approach more nearly to a conception of the world in which the infinite diversity of phenomena gives place to a very large number of possible phenomena. In establishing such a classification Newton's law and certain others have been of inestimable service; not so the most general laws like those of conservation and the second law of thermodynamics. These are too general to be always of value for this purpose, in that they are conditions of all phenomena. They have therefore often been of little use in this respect, except through their influence to make scientific thought more exact and more successfully analytical.

Another function of scientific laws has been to bring about the synthesis of the several sciences. With their help these have become highly organized bodies of knowledge which sometimes present purely mathematical exhaustiveness, rigorousness, and elegance in the treatment of problems and in some instances successful prediction of unknown facts. This is the rôle for which the general laws are best fitted. A small number of them often suffice for the systematic development of large departments of science and for the deduction of many secondary principles and large numbers of facts. Newton's *Principia* is the classical example of this process, but it is now generally admitted that for this purpose the laws of thermodynamics surpass even the fundamental postulates of Newton's mathematical analysis.

In the course of such developments it has been found necessary to employ other concepts than laws. The phenomena of nature are never simple, and rarely approach near enough to simplicity to serve as crucial experiments. The case of the solar system, as recognized and employed by Newton, is the one great example of a sufficiently isolated natural experiment. But even in the laboratory the man of science must always content himself with an imperfect elimination of disturbing factors. As a result of this difficulty the purely abstract ideas of line, mass, system, and many others have found their place in scientific thought. Thus all abstract scientific thought moves in an ideal world which never corresponds exactly with reality, but which may be made to approximate to reality within any desired limits. Such are

the more important functions of the abstract principles and concepts of science which here concern us.

It has been indicated above how the concept of system may be employed in the methodical description of the general characteristics of evolution. And the one existing systematic attempt to give a full description of this process, as it appears in Spencer's *Synthetic Philosophy*, is guided by a vague and inaccurate anticipation of this idea. Moreover, we can now see that a recognition of the peculiarities of hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen is a necessary further means to the explanation of the process. For these peculiarities are a significant condition of every stage, and without them the most general characteristics of nature could never have arisen. This generalization is therefore a typical instrument of scientific thought, in that it facilitates abstract discriminations and descriptions, and helps to make possible a generalized conception of the process as a whole.

The consideration of such well-known principles of the philosophy of science would be quite out of place were it not for the teleological implications of the conclusion. The peculiarities of the elements appear to be original characteristics of the universe, or if not they at least appear to arise invariably and universally when conditions make possible the stability of the atoms. Nothing is more certain than that the properties of hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen are changeless throughout time and space. It is conceivable that the atoms may be formed and that they may decay. But while they exist they are uniform, or at least they possess perfect statistical uniformity which leads to absolute constancy of all their sensible characteristics, that is to say of all the properties with which we are concerned. And yet this original characteristic of things is the principle cause of diversity in that stage of the evolutionary process which is fully within the grasp of natural science.

But it may be objected that in the strict scientific sense this is not a relation of cause and effect at all. For we are concerned with an indefinite number of chains of causation in each of which the preceding condition is at every point the cause of the succeeding condition.

Like Newton's law, or any other principle of science, great or small, the peculiarities of the three elements are, of course, the cause of nothing. They are merely the conditions under which the phenomena reveal themselves. And the world is now what it is because it was something else just a moment ago. There can be no objection to this position. But if we are therefore required to close our inquiry at this stage, the reply must be made that we shall then be obliged to exclude all the laws of science from our philosophy.

And so we may return to the conclusion that the principal peculiarity of the universe which makes diversity of evolution possible is original and anterior to all instances of the processes which it conditions. And we may recall the fact that this peculiarity consists of a group of characteristics such that they cannot be regarded as accidental. Finally, it will be remembered that the relations of this group of properties to the characteristics of systems are also such that they cannot be thought accidental. I believe that these statements are scientific facts. If this be so, we have arrived at the solution for a special case of Aristotle's problem of "the character of the material nature whose necessary results have been made available by rational nature for a final cause."¹

Of course, objections will at once arise to the terms 'rational nature' and 'final cause.' In reply I have little to say, for I believe that Aristotle has justified his use, in his own day, of these terms. In the first place, I conceive that the term 'rational nature' of the fourth century may be translated into the modern term 'laws of nature.' For these laws are exclusively rational; they are the product of the human reason, and are not conceived by science to have objective existence in nature. This is also clearly true of the relation between the properties of the elements and the course of evolution. Secondly, as we have seen above, all phenomena are phenomena of systems. Hence the operations of a final cause, if such there be, can only occur through the evolution of systems. And therefore the greatest possible freedom for the evolution of systems involves the greatest possible freedom for the operation of a final cause.

¹ *De partibus animalium*, 663^b, 20.

The above statement may now be modified to the following effect: We possess a solution for a special case of the problem of the characteristics of the material nature whose necessary results have been made available by the laws of nature for any hypothetical final cause. Thus the whole problem of the teleological significance of our scientific conclusions reduces to the simple but infinitely difficult question whether a final cause is to be postulated.

Here we are once more confronted by the fact that no mechanical cause of the properties of the elements except an antecedent process is conceivable. And since the elements are uniform throughout space, there cannot have been, in the proper sense, any contingency about the operation of this cause. At the most, contingency can have only produced an irregular distribution of the different elements in different stars. But according to the orthodox scientific view there is no room for contingency in such discussions. Accordingly, the properties of the elements are to be regarded as fully determined and perfectly changeless in time. This we may take as a postulate. But the abstract characteristics of systems are no less fully determined and absolutely changeless in time. This is a second postulate.

Finally the *relation* between the numerous properties of hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen, severally and in coöperation, and the necessary conditions of existence of systems in respect of number, diversity and durability, as these conditions are defined by the exact analysis of Willard Gibbs, is certainly not due to chance. In other words, the statistical probability that this connection has a cause, is greater than the statistical probability which we can ever demand or usually realize in the establishment of our laws of science. It should be remembered that we are here dealing with three elements among more than eighty, and with more than twenty properties; further that it is not merely a question of the coincidence of the unique properties among the elements, but especially of the relation of these properties to systems. The uniqueness of the properties is significant only because it proves their unique fitness for systems. Finally, if it should be proved that the properties are the result of one simple

cause, the question would become: What is the probability that from a single cause this group of unique fitnesses for a subsequent process should arise? This problem is mathematically identical with the earlier one.

No mechanical cause of the properties of the elements is, however, conceivable which should be mechanically dependent upon the characteristics of systems. For no mechanical cause whatever is conceivable of those original conditions, whatever they may be, which unequivocally determine the changeless properties of the elements and the general characteristics of systems alike. We are therefore led to the hypothesis that the properties of the three elements are somehow a preparation for the evolutionary process. Indeed this is the only explanation of the connection which is at present imaginable.

Such an hypothesis will have to be judged on its merits. Admitting the scientific facts, it possesses, so far as I can see, two defects. In the first place, the term preparation is scientifically unintelligible; secondly, this hypothesis is not only novel but it is different in kind from all other scientific hypotheses. For no other scientific hypothesis involves preparations other than those which originate in the animal mind. In short, we are face to face with the problem of design. Concerning the philosophical aspects of this question I have nothing new to say. It seems to me to be clearly established in the history of thought that when the problem arises the only safety consists in taking refuge in the vaguest possible term which can be employed. That term is teleology. I shall therefore modify the above statement and say that the connection between the properties of the three elements and the evolutionary process is teleological and non-mechanical.

Here it may be pointed out that biological organization consists in a teleological and non-mechanical *relationship* between mechanical things and processes. In both cases the relationship is rational and non-mechanical, the things related mechanical and non-rational. Or, in other words, the relation is an affair of the reflective judgment, the things related of the determinant judgment. It is the failure to understand this distinction which is

at the bottom of most misunderstandings concerning teleological problems in biology. The understanding may be facilitated by noting that the periodic classification of the elements is also a rational and non-mechanical relationship.

If it still be asked whether this conclusion has any intelligible meaning, the answer must be affirmative. For the concept of organization is now in general scientific use. How then should it be thought strange to find in the inorganic world something slightly analogous to that which is clearly recognized in the organic. Indeed, no idea is older or more common than a belief or suspicion that somehow nature itself is a great imperfect organism. There is nothing to commend such a view to natural science, but it may well have a foundation in undefined realities vaguely perceived.

We thus reach the conclusion that in one of its most important aspects the teleological appearance of nature depends upon an unquestionable relationship between the original characteristics of the universe which, because it is merely a relationship and in no sense a mechanical connection, because it is unmodified by the evolutionary process and changeless in time, is to be described as teleological. The reason why it must be described as teleological is that there is no other way to describe it. It is teleological just as the periodic system is periodic. In other words, the appearance of harmonious unity in nature, which no man can escape, depends upon a genuine harmonious unity which is proved to exist among certain of the abstract characteristics of the universe. As a qualification of such abstract characteristics, contingency, the one concept opposed to harmonious unity of nature, finds no place. Thus the teleological character of nature is recognized through a connection, conceivable only as teleological, among the abstract characteristics of nature.

It must not be forgotten that there is here involved but a single instance of a teleological connection between the laws of nature. And though we can vaguely distinguish other teleological aspects of the principles of science, as in the tendency toward dynamic equilibrium, there seems to be at present no possibility of investigating the problem in a more general manner.

Yet this single result is sufficient greatly to strengthen a philosophical position at which many thoughtful men have arrived from the most varied experiences and diverse lines of thought. Charles Darwin has stated it as follows:

"Another source of conviction of the existence of God, connected with the reason, and not with the feelings, impresses me as having much more weight. This follows from the extreme difficulty, or rather impossibility, of conceiving the immense and wonderful universe, including man with his capacity of looking far backwards and far into futurity, as the result of blind chance or necessity. When thus reflecting I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a Theist. This conclusion was strong in my mind about the time, as far as I can remember, when I wrote 'The Origin of Species,' and it is since that time that it has very gradually, with many fluctuations, become weaker. But then arises the doubt, can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such general conclusions?"

"I cannot pretend to throw the least light upon such abstruse problems. The mystery of the beginnings of all things is insoluble by us; and I for one must be content to remain an Agnostic."¹

Evidently Darwin's unmethodical considerations of the problem have developed from an original theological view to a vague theism, and from that to a hesitating denial of the possibility that any intelligible explanation of the teleology of nature can be found. But from teleology itself he cannot escape. Thus his position is identical with that of Hume and a long line of other thinkers. The tormenting riddle, eternal and inexplicable, is the existence, not of the universe, but of nature.

The whole history of thought does but prove the justice of this conclusion. We may progressively lay bare the order of nature and define it with the aid of the exact sciences; thus we may recognize it for what it is and see that it is teleological. But

¹ *Life and Letters of C. Darwin*, London, 1888, Vol. I, pp. 312-313.

we shall never find the explanation of the riddle. Upon this subject clear ideas and close reasoning are no longer possible, for thought has arrived at one of its natural frontiers. Nothing more remains but to admit that the riddle surpasses us and to conclude that the contrast of mechanism with teleology is the very foundation of the order of nature, which must ever be regarded from two complementary points of view, as a vast assemblage of changing systems and as an harmonious unity of changeless laws and qualities.¹

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¹ Cf. Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, London, 1912, p. 155.

THE FOUNDATION IN ROYCE'S PHILOSOPHY FOR CHRISTIAN THEISM.¹

THEISM is a philosophy, a system of thought about the ultimate nature of reality. Christianity is a religion, the relation of person to person—in Royce's words, a "form of communion with the master of life";² Christian theism is the form of philosophy reached by the reasoning which starts from the experience of the Christian life. In this brief paper which, from the limits of time imposed, must be mainly expository, only secondarily critical, and not in any degree constructive—I wish to set forth the teachings of Professor Royce which seem to me in essential harmony with those of Christian theism. My exposition is based largely, though not entirely, upon two works of what might be called his middle period, *The Conception of God* and *The World and the Individual*; and I have a two-fold justification for this restriction. In the first place, Royce says explicitly in the preface of *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (1908) that he has no change to report in his "fundamental metaphysical theses"; and he characterizes the teachings of *The Problem of Christianity* (1914) as in "essential harmony with the bases of the philosophical idealism set forth in earlier volumes."³ My second reason for treating only incidentally the later books in which Dr. Royce concerns himself specifically with problems of religion is that these books avowedly or implicitly discuss religion in its non-theistic aspect. In *The Problem of Christianity* this limitation of the subject is avowed over and over again. Consideration of the relation between God and man is dismissed as a 'metaphysical issue'; and the discussion is restricted to 'human objects' in order 'deliberately [to] avoid theology.'⁴ Of necessity, therefore, if we seek the foundations of theism we must seek

¹ Substantially as read at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, December 28, 1915.

² *Sources of Religious Insight*, p. 220.

³ *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, p. X. Cf. Vol. II, pp. 292, 295.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, p. 374.

them in the earlier and less predominantly ethical and psychological works of Professor Royce.

In *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy* (1892) Dr. Royce explicitly labels himself as "a theist."¹ In *The Conception of God* (1895 and 1897) he characterizes his view as "distinctly theistic and not pantheistic,"² and insists that "what the faith of our fathers has genuinely meant by God is . . . identical with the inevitable outcome of a reflective philosophy."³ The argument by which this theistic position is reached is so well-known that it need be suggested in only the briefest fashion. It will be found, in greater or less elaboration, in every one of Royce's books, beginning with *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*. The realistic conception of reality external to mind is found to involve internal inconsistency⁴ and the universe is accordingly conceived as through and through ideal. This ideal world, in the second place, is shown to be rightly viewed only as a world of interrelated selves.⁵ And each of these selves, it is argued, directly knows—as well through its error as through its aspiration—the existence of a reality-greater-than-itself. This Greater Reality must, finally—in accordance with the personalistic premiss of the argument—be a Greater Self of which each lesser self is an identical part yet by which it is transcended.⁶ The specifically theistic form of this argument stresses the infinite possibility of error and thus leads inevitably to the conclusion⁷ that the transcending (yet immanent) Self is infinite, all-including. The characteristic features of this argument, as is well known, are, first, the completely empirical starting-point from facts of the scientific and the moral life, and, second, the substitution for a causal argument to the existence of God of an argument based, in Royce's phrase, on correspondence⁸

¹ P. 347.

² *The Conception of God*, second edition, p. 49.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁴ Cf. especially, *The World and the Individual*, I, Lecture III.

⁵ Cf. especially, *The World and the Individual*, II, Lectures IV. and V.

⁶ Cf. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 422 ff.; *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 380; *The Conception of God*, second edition, pp. 41 *et al.*; *The World and the Individual*, II, p. 298 f., *Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 108 f.

⁷ Cf. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, chapter XI, especially, pp. 424 ff., and *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, end of p. 425.

⁸ *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 354.

—the correspondence of individual purpose with super-individual experience. The outcome is the conception of the Universe as Absolute Self—as All-Knower to whom “is present all possible truth”;¹ as Infinite Will² realizing itself ‘in the unity of its one life.’ And this ‘Supreme Person’ is, furthermore, conceived as All-Enfolder,³ as organic unity of all the myriads of existent partial selves.

The main purpose of this paper, as already stated, is to point out the theistic conceptions inherent in the philosophical system so summarily formulated and, in particular, to emphasize the peculiarly Christian features of the teaching.

I. “God” in the words of the Westminster Catechism “is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth.” In essential conformity with this doctrine, Royce teaches that God is an infinite,⁴ or absolute,⁵ self-conscious⁶ person,⁷ an Individual,⁸ in fact “the only ultimately real individual,” to whom the whole temporal process is eternally present.⁹

There is no need to argue that the conception of God as spirit, or person, is fundamental to Christian theism but I must make good my assertion that Royce should be interpreted as using the words ‘self-conscious,’ ‘person,’ and ‘individual’ in what is *qualitatively* the sense in which they are applied to human beings. Christian theism is distinguished from many forms of ‘natural religion’ by its conception of God as essentially like-minded with us human selves. There can be no doubt that this is also Royce’s

¹ *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 424²; *The Conception of God*, pp. 12 f.; *The World and the Individual*, I, p. 426; *Ibid.*, II, pp. 299, 364; *Sources of Religious Insight*, p. 134.

² *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 452; *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 429 f., 436²; *The Conception of God*, pp. 13, 202 f., 272; *The World and the Individual*, I, pp. 459², 461; *Ibid.*, II, p. 398.

³ *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 435, 441; *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 373², 379⁴, 418²; *The World and the Individual*, I, pp. 341, 418².

⁴ *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 434 et al., 483.

⁵ *The Conception of God*, and *The World and Individual*, *passim*.

⁶ *Ibid.*, II, p. 336; *Conception of God*, p. 302.

⁷ *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 380; *The Conception of God*, p. 349; *The World and the Individual*, II, p. 418.

⁸ *Ibid.*, I., pp. 40,

⁹ *Ibid.*, II.

teaching about the Absolute. "Unless," he says, "the Absolute knows what we know when we endure and wait, . . . when we long and suffer, the Absolute in so far is less and not more than we are."¹ In truth, all that exists, including my own feeling and thought and percept, exists only by virtue of being experienced by the Absolute Self.

To prove the equivalence of the Absolute to the Christian's God it is, in the second place, necessary to show that by 'Absolute Self' Royce means a genuine person who "is . . . and knows us,"² in whose 'presence' I may stand,³ who "values and needs" my "deed";⁴ and, conversely, that he does *not* mean by 'Absolute Self' a mere aggregate of finite selves; that his self-conscious, absolute person is not an unknown Absolute 'coming to consciousness' in the totality of finite, or partial, selves. In truth, Professor Royce has fully guarded himself against this essentially pluralistic interpretation of his doctrine. "The Absolute Unity of Consciousness," he writes, "contains not merely finite types of self-consciousness but the . . . consciousness of its own being as Thinker, Experiencer, Seer, Love, Will."⁵ By this statement Dr. Royce invests the Absolute with a 'consciousness of its own' explicitly contrasted with 'finite types of consciousness.' In the following words he attributes to the Absolute *both* the human and the more-than-human experience. "I hold," he says, "that all finite consciousness *just as it is in us*—ignorance, striving, defeat . . . narrowness—is all present from the Absolute point of view but *is also* seen in unity with the solution of problems . . . the overcoming of defeats . . . the supplementing of all narrowness."⁶ By these words Royce clearly indicates that, in his view, the Absolute has an experience transcending, though not 'external to,' that of the human selves. Many other quotations might be made to substantiate my conclusion that the Absolute of Royce's system is 'a person' *in the*

¹ *The World and the Individual*, II, p. 364.

² *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 471.

³ *The World and the Individual*, II, p. 150.

⁴ *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, pp. 396-397.

⁵ *The Conception of God*, p. 301.

⁶ *The World and the Individual*, II, p. 302. Italics of second phrase mine.

sense in which the Christian's God is a person, and neither an aggregate nor an Unknown Reality. A similar conclusion must be drawn from Royce's trenchant criticism of Bradley's conception of an Absolute Experience which is not to be regarded as an Absolute Self. "The Absolute," Royce concludes "escapes from selfhood and all that selfhood implies, or even transcends selfhood, only, by remaining to the end a Self."¹

This conclusion can not, however, fairly be stated without consideration of the question whether it rightly represents the outcome of Professor Royce's most recent thinking. In his later books *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, *Sources of Religious Insight* and *The Problem of Christianity* the expression 'Absolute Self' occurs incidentally or not at all; and the experience, referred to in all these books, which transcends and completes that of the human self is variously known as the 'wider' or 'superhuman' or 'superindividual insight,'² 'the conscious and superhuman unity of life'³ or 'conspectus of the totality of life';⁴ and, finally, as the 'Beloved Community.'⁵ We may profitably neglect the vaguer and less closely analyzed terms 'superhuman insight' and 'unity of life' and confine our attention to the problem presented to us by Dr. Royce's explicit statement of "the thesis . . . that the essence of Christianity, as the Apostle Paul stated the essence, depends upon regarding the being [called] . . . the 'Beloved Community' as the true source, through loyalty, of the salvation of man"⁶ and by his further declaration that he holds "this doctrine . . . to be both empirically verifiable within the limits of our experience and metaphysically defensible as an expression of the life and spiritual significance of the whole universe." Our problem of interpretation is precisely formulated in the question: does Royce intend either to supplant or to reinterpret his earlier conception of the Absolute Self by the doctrine of the Beloved Community? An affirmative answer

¹ *The World and the Individual*, I, p. 552.

² *Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 108, 112 et al.

³ *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, p. 357, 376.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 395, Cf. pp. 369, 372.

⁵ *The Problem of Christianity*, *passim*.

⁶ *Ibid.*, I, p. 26. Cf. p. 417 and II, p. 390.

to the question would of course invalidate the conclusion, based on the study of Royce's earlier books, that his position coincides with that of the Christian theist, for every theist distinguishes between God and the church.¹ To the discussion of this problem the next following paragraphs are devoted.

Unquestionably, Royce seems by certain statements to make the universal community equivalent to the Self of his earlier books. He declares "this essentially social universe . . . to be real, and to be in fact the sole and supreme reality—the Absolute,"² and he asks: "What kind of salvation does it offer? . . . What does it call upon a reasonable man to do?" Yet, in spite of expressions like these, I believe that Royce does not actually identify the Absolute Self with the Universal Community. His meaning, as I conceive it, is more exactly stated when he says that "the divine life is *expressed* in the form of a community" and that "the whole real world is the *expression* of one divine process . . . the process of the Spirit."³ 'To be expressed by' does not mean 'to be constituted by'; and the 'divine life' and 'the spirit' are distinguished from the 'community' and from the world, though not external to them.⁴ This is the meaning, also, of the repeated assertion that the real world, conceived in Charles Peirce's fashion, as a vast system of signs, "contains the interpreter of these signs. . . . Its processes," Royce adds, "are infinite in their temporal varieties. But their interpreter, the spirit of this universal community,—never absorbing varieties nor permitting them to blend—compares, and, through a real life, interprets them all."⁵ The plain implication of these passages is that 'interpreter' and 'spirit' not only include but transcend world and church. Thus, it is at least compatible with the main trend of *The Problem of Christianity* to suppose that Royce, while primarily conceiving Christianity in its relation to the church, or beloved community, none the less distinguishes God as spirit, counsellor, or interpreter from

¹ Cf. *The Problem of Christianity*, I, p. 105.

² *Ibid.*, II, p. 296; cf. pp. 281, 390.

³ *The Problem of Christianity*, II, pp. 388, 373. Italics mine.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 359, 362, 373.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, pp. 291, 324; cf. p. 272.

the church in which he expresses himself and from the world which he interprets. (The Christian theologian will not fail to remark the virtual identity, explicitly stressed by Royce, between God conceived as spirit indwelling in the beloved community and the Holy Spirit, third Person of the Christian Trinity.¹ The conception of the Beloved Community thus illuminates one of the most dimly apprehended of Christian doctrines.)² A second confirmation of this view, that Royce distinguishes God from the community, is gained by a scrutiny of the argument by which he seeks to establish the existence of the community as 'a sort of supra-personal being'³ with 'a mind of its own.'⁴ The argument, like most of those in Royce's later books, differs *toto cælo* from the closely articulated, logically ordered reasoning of his strictly metaphysical works. It consists partly in the observation that custom, language, and religions are products of community life⁵ and partly in the significant teaching that an individual "may love his community as if it were a person."⁶ But all this proves not at all that a community is a self, or person, but merely—to quote Royce himself—that it 'behaves' and is treated 'as if' a person.

This interpretation of Royce's conception is in complete harmony with the detailed teaching of a relatively recent paper.⁷ "God," he writes, "as our philosophy ought to conceive him, is indeed a spirit and a person; but he is not a being who exists in separation from the world, simply as its external creator. He expresses himself in the world, and the world is simply his own life as he lives it out. . . . You can indeed distinguish between the world as our common sense, properly but fragmentarily, has to view it and as our sciences study it . . . and God, who is

¹ *Ibid.*, II, pp. 14 ff. It may be noted that this doctrine is in harmony with Hegel's teaching, though entirely independent of it.

² The two preceding sentences have been added to the paper as read.

³ *The Problem of Christianity*, I, p. 67.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 62; cf. II, p. 87.

⁵ *The Problem of Christianity*, I, p. 62.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 67; cf. p. 101 and II, pp. 91 ff.

⁷ "What is Vital in Christianity." Prepared for a series of addresses to the Young Men's Christian Association of Harvard University in 1909. In *William James and Other Essays*.

infinitely more than any finite system of natural facts or of human lives can express. . . . This entire world is present at once to the eternal, divine consciousness as a single whole, and this whole is what the absolute chooses as his own expression."¹ Evidently Royce teaches, to use the traditional theological phraseology, not only the immanence but the transcendence of God; he conceives God not only as "the divine being" who is "the very life of the community"² but as a spirit who views the world "from above."³

II. Royce's doctrine of the relation of man to God more obviously coincides with the teaching of Christian theism. In conformity with the profoundest Christian conceptions he holds (a) that God shares every human experience, and that the life which man shares with God is essentially good, not evil; (b) that every human being is an expression of God's individuating will; (c) that the human self has a relative freedom; that he may and actually does, act in opposition to the divine will and that his sin must be atoned for; (d) that the human self is an essentially social being.

(a) The Christian conception, based on the Master's teaching, of God as father, although not literally an innovation in religious doctrine, was so vitalized by the life and words of Jesus that it rooted itself in the hearts of men. Perhaps the most fundamental contribution of Royce to Christian thought consists precisely in the fact that he argues the inherent metaphysical necessity of this conception which Jesus revealed to his disciples and which traditional theology laboriously tries to establish by a 'cosmological' argument to God as 'first' of temporal causes or by a design-argument based on arbitrarily selected facts. To Royce, on the other hand, this doctrine is an immediate consequence of the conception of God as All-Experiencer, as Absolute Knower. For, according to his absolutistic yet personalistic philosophy, the percepts, the thoughts, the sorrows, the fidelities of every least human self are real only in so far as the Absolute Self

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 167-169.

² *The Problem of Christianity*, II, p. 75.

³ "What is Vital in Christianity," *op. cit.*, p. 168.

experiences them and "knows [them] to be whatever they are."¹

Even in its supreme conception of God as suffering, as 'touched with the feeling of our infirmities' and 'afflicted in our affliction,' the Christian doctrine that God is Father of men follows at once from the absolutist's conception of God—and from this conception only. The pluralistic theist, who teaches that God shares human experience, must meet insistent difficulties: How should God know me if I am separate from him? And how can he share my experience when he is all-wise and all-powerful and I am so palpably ignorant and so piteously ineffective? But this Roycean God is my Greater Self; I am 'identically a part' of him. I exist, and even my erroneous conception exists, only as each is a transcended object of his experience. He is indeed afflicted in my affliction, for it is real only as he experiences it.

At this point emerges another peculiarly Christian feature of Royce's theism. "God, in his being," the Westminster catechism continues, "is wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth." But Christian philosophy from its very beginning has found difficulty in justifying God and has found itself obliged to sacrifice now the belief in God's goodness, now the conviction of his power, to the flinty facts of pain, stupidity, and sin. Royce's philosophy is, as all readers of him know, an optimistic conception of a good God. It is an invincible optimism for it cherishes no illusions, and affirms instead of ignoring the 'capriciousness of life,' 'the degradation of the sinner's passive victim,' the 'brute chance' and the mechanical accidents to which the nature-world is prey.² Professor Royce does not, to be sure, claim to offer a specific explanation of specific evils. But he guides the thought of the Christian philosopher into a peaceful way, a metaphysical assurance that the world, inclusive of this my dastard sin or blinding grief, is expression of the will of an all-wise chooser who is himself suffering every grief and stung by every sin. Though "he knows [the evils] as we in our finitude can not," yet "he endures them as we do. And so, if knowing

¹ *The World and the Individual*, II, p. 346.

² *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 467-468.

them he wills these horrors for himself, must he not know wherefore?"¹

(b) The Christian doctrine of the fatherhood of God directly implies that other Christian doctrine of the uniqueness and value of the human soul. For it belongs to every parent to individualize his children. The most ordinary child in a long school procession of little replicas of himself is instantly descried and selected by the individualizing eye of watching father and mother. And Christianity, which teaches that God is a father, of necessity teaches that the human soul is a 'pearl of great price,' a 'treasure hid in a field'—a coin, a sheep which, if lost, must be sought for till it is found. Now this religious teaching, also, is metaphysically justified by the Roycean doctrine that every man is the expression of a unique purpose of the Absolute Self. To the conventional critic's protest that the human self would be lost in the Absolute 'as a river in the sea,' Royce replies that on the contrary, the rich variety, the distinctness, and the stability of the Absolute's purposes furnish the only guarantee of the individuality of the human self. . . . The identity of the partial self with the Absolute is never, in his view, a mere identity without a difference."

(c) Royce teaches, in the third place, that the partial or human self has a 'relatively free' will.² He accepts ("provisionally" however) "so much of the verdict of common sense as any man accepts when he says: That was my own voluntary deed, and was knowingly and willingly sinful." The metaphysical reconciliation of the absoluteness of the divine will and the divine experience with even this relative human freedom Royce has, in my opinion, insufficiently worked out. To be sure, he regards the freedom as merely relative: the Absolute is the triumphing, creative Will. And it is the temporal, not the more-than-temporal, finite self of which Royce says that "it was good that he should be free." Yet with all these qualifications the question persists: how can a human self be free to oppose the will of Him by whose selective attention all that exists has its being? how

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 469-70.

² *The World and the Individual*, II, p. 426; cf. p. 398.

can I, in Royce's phrase, "choose to forget"? how can I "become a conscious and deliberate traitor"?¹ The truth is that Royce seems to discuss sin psychologically and ethically rather than metaphysically. And the result is that we have in his pages a masterly psychological analysis of that violation of moral loyalty which he calls sin² and which he will not have smoothed away or ignored. Organically related to this conception of sin³ is Royce's formulation of the great doctrine of the atonement—an idea, Royce says, which "if there were no Christianity would have to be invented before the higher levels of our moral existence could be fairly understood."⁴ There is atonement, Royce proceeds, when a creative deed is made possible by a treason and when "the world, as transformed by this creative deed, is better than it would have been had that deed of treason not been done at all."⁵ Atonement, in this sense, as he rightly asserts, is a fact "as familiar and empirical as death or grief."⁶ Evidently, this teaching interprets the experience of a suffering and atoning God as truly as it describes a human consciousness, but—true to the arbitrary limits which he has set to his discussion—Royce simply 'ignores' atonement 'as between God and man.'⁷

(d) There is little time, and probably little need, to summarize Royce's description of the Church, or 'Beloved Community.' The meaning of the term 'community' is precisely stated and richly illustrated. "There are," Royce points out, "in the human world two profoundly different grades, or levels, of mental beings—namely the beings that we usually call human individuals and the beings that we call communities. . . . Of the second of these levels, a well-trained chorus, . . . or an athletic team during a contest, or a committee in deliberation . . . —all these are good examples."⁸ "And yet a community is not," Royce repeatedly

¹ *The World and the Individual*, II, p. 359; *Problem of Christianity*, I, p. 252.

² *The Problem of Christianity*, I, p. 242.

³ It is beside the purpose of this paper to stress the fact that in spite of Royce's over-emphasis of the Pauline factor of Christianity he explicitly adopts Jesus's teaching about sin rather than Paul's. Cf. *Problem of Christianity*, I, pp. 225, 227 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 271 et al.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 307 f.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

⁸ *The Problem of Christianity*, I, pp. 164–165.

states, "a mere collection of individuals."¹ It is, on the contrary "a sort of live unit that has organs";² it "grows and decays"³; it "has a mind" whose "intelligent mental products," namely, languages, customs, and religions, "follow psychological laws."⁴ "A community behaves like an entity, with a mind of its own,"⁵ it "can love" and act;⁶ and, conversely, it can be loved and served.⁷ The Beloved Community, or Church, which now becomes for Royce at once the 'human founder'⁸ of Christianity, the source of salvation, and the object of the characteristically Christian consciousness—the Beloved Community is distinguished from the ordinary community by its comprehensiveness, and by its 'uniting many selves into one': it is, in a word, the 'Universal Community.'⁸ To discuss, in any detail, the implications of this conception would far overflow the boundaries of time allotted to this paper. But a final comment must be made on the inadequacy of the doctrine of the Beloved Community if it must be regarded, as apparently its author regards it, as an account of the historic Christian Church. [The cardinal defect in Royce's conception is—psychologically stated—his undue subordination of the rôle of the leader to that of the group, or—historically stated—his underestimation of the fact that passionate loyalty to the person of Christ was the bond of unity in the early Christian church. On the other hand, Christianity truly is, as Royce insists, an inherently social religion; and loyalty to the universal community is indeed the essential moral factor of the Christian religion.]

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COMMENT BY PROFESSOR ROYCE. EXTRACTS FROM A LETTER
TO MISS CALKINS, MARCH 20, 1916.

"The account which you kindly give of the position taken in my earlier books,—that is, in all the books that precede *The*

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 62.

² *Ibid.*, p. 62.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65; cf. p. 167.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 67, 95, 101.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 417.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 212 *et al.*

Problem of Christianity,—is as accurate and scholarly as it is friendly. I am not conscious of having taken in my recent work a position inconsistent in its genuine meaning with the positions which you recognize. Therefore, precisely in so far, I have and can have only thanks for your interpretation and for your aid.

“But the two central ideas upon which my *Problem of Christianity* turns, the idea of the community, and the idea of what the historical theology of the Christian church early learned to call ‘the holy spirit’ are ideas which are as living, and growing, as they are ancient. They grew when the prophets of Israel began to formulate their doctrine of Jerusalem, which, in the beginning was a city, of somewhat questionable architecture and morals, in the hill districts of Judea; but which, in the end, became the heavenly realm of which the mystic author of the well-known mediaeval hymn wrote, and which the world is still trying to understand. These two ideas, the Community, and the Spirit, have been growing ever since. They are growing today. They certainly have assumed, in my own mind, a new vitality, and a very much deeper significance than, for me, they ever had before I wrote my *Problem of Christianity*. That book records the experience and the reflections which have been working in my mind daily more and more ever since I wrote it. These reflections constitute for me, not something inconsistent with my former position, but a distinct addition to my former position, a new attainment,—I believe a new growth. I do not believe that you change in a way involving inconsistency when you reinterpret former ideas.

“To borrow a figure from a remote field, I do not believe that Lincoln acted in a manner essentially inconsistent with his earlier political ideas when he wrote the Emancipation Proclamation and freed the slaves. To be sure, before he wrote that Proclamation, he had seen a new light. My poor little book on *The Problem of Christianity* is certainly no Emancipation Proclamation, and is certainly no document of any considerable importance. But it certainly is the product of what for me is a new light, of a new experience, of ideas which are as new to me as the original form of my idealism was new to me when I first defined it.

"As for what my present position means, let me say only this: For me, at present, a genuinely and loyally united community which lives a coherent life, is, in a perfectly literal sense, a person. Such a person, for Paul, the Church of Christ was. On the other hand, any human individual person, in a perfectly literal sense, is a community. The coherent life which includes past, present, and future, and holds them reasonably together, is the life of what I have called a Community of Interpretation, in which the present, with an endless fecundity of invention, interprets the past to the future, precisely as, in the Pauline-Johannine type of theology, Christ, or the Spirit, interprets the united individuals who constitute the human aspect of the Church to the divine being in whom these members seek, at once their fulfilment, their unity, their diversity, and the goal of their loyalty. All this is a scrap of theology, which serves as a hint of what I have been trying to formulate in this recent phase, not merely of my thinking, but of my experience. I do not know any reason why this phase of my thinking should attract any other interest than what may be due to its actual relations to a process which has been going on in human thought ever since Heraclitus remarked that the Logos is fluent, and ever since Israel began to idealize the life of a little hill town in Judea.

"I stand for the importance of this process, which has led Christianity to regard a community not merely as an aggregate but as a Person, and at the same time to enrich its ideal memory of a person until he became transformed into a Community.

"The process in question is not merely theological, and is not merely mystical, still less merely mythical. Nor is it a process invented merely by abstract metaphysicians. It is the process which Victor Hugo expressed in *Les Misérables* when he put into the mouth of Enjolras the words, 'Ma mère, c'est la république.' As I write you these words, Frenchmen are writing the meaning of these words in their blood, about Verdun. The mother which is a republic is a community which is also a person, and not merely an aggregate, and not merely by metaphor a person. Precisely so, the individual patriot who leaves his home behind and steadfastly serving presses on in ardent quest of the moment

when his life can be fulfilled by his death for his country, is all the more richly and deeply an individual that he is also a community of interpretation, whose life has its unity in its restless search for death on behalf of the great good cause,—its ever-living Logos in its fluent quest for the goal.

“Now this view is at present an essential part of my idealism. In essential meaning I suppose that it always was such an essential part. But I do not believe that I ever told my tale as fully, or with the same approach to the far-off goal of saying something some time that might prove helpful to students of idealism as in the *Problem of Christianity*.”

THE INTERPRETATION OF RELIGION IN ROYCE AND DURKHEIM.

IN the introduction to his series of Gifford lectures, Professor Royce distinguished three different conceptions of the study of natural religion. The first is based upon the results of natural science accepted uncritically. The second conception views religion as a confession of the needs and the experiences of men, as "the voice of human nature itself." Now the needs of human nature, the problems and tasks of men in society and in the work of civilization, are matters of experience and of history, of psychology and of the social sciences. One may be distrustful of metaphysics and of every enterprise of philosophical synthesis which claims to be other than a report of the facts of experience, and one may nevertheless be profoundly interested in the function of religion within experience and within society. The sociologist will approach religion from this second point of view. The third conception of the study of natural religion identifies it with a study of the most fundamental metaphysical problems. It attempts the 'contemplation of being as being.' It is the traditional approach of the technical philosopher who views the significance of religion as consisting in the truth of metaphysical doctrines concerning the real world. It is thus that *The World and the Individual* views the problems of religion.

There is something more than a decade between *The World and the Individual* and *The Problem of Christianity*. Here too the fundamental problems of the philosophy of religion are dealt with, but from a point of view decidedly different from that of the earlier work. *The Problem of Christianity* approaches the study of religion from the second rather than the third of those three conceptions mentioned just now. The ideas and doctrines of religion are here viewed as growing out of the social experience of mankind; they are needed primarily in order to express "the saving value of the right relation of any human individual to the community of which he is a member." They need "no technical

metaphysical theory to furnish a foundation for them.”¹ The intensely practical and empirical task of man in building up a worthy and stable social order generates the life of religion. To be sure, it is possible to exaggerate this contrast between *The World and the Individual* and *The Problem of Christianity*. The central metaphysical thesis of the earlier book concerns precisely the way in which all true beliefs, and the real world itself, are linked to our practical interests and are fulfilments of purpose. And in the later book, religion is viewed not only as a practical solution of a social problem, not only as a ‘doctrine of life,’ but as a ‘doctrine of the real world’ as well. And this ‘doctrine of the real world’ is essentially that of Royce’s earlier writings. Nevertheless, the shift of emphasis and point of view from *The World and the Individual* to that of *The Problem of Christianity* is significant. The sociologist would discover, on the whole, little which concerned his own problems in *The World and the Individual*; he can discover very much indeed in *The Problem of Christianity*, yet both of them are investigations of the meaning of religion.

It is Royce’s interpretation of religion in terms of our social experience which invites comparison with other interpretations of religion in similar terms. There are many of these at the present time. One such I here choose, that of Émile Durkheim. The significance of such a comparison is enhanced if we remember that Royce and Durkheim are the spokesmen for two different philosophical traditions; the bearing of idealism and positivism upon our social interests and the tasks of civilization may become apparent from a study of these two men. To select but a few of the more prominent topics here which invite comparison and discussion, to point out some notable agreements between Royce and Durkheim, and some divergencies as well, is the object of this brief note.

Royce and Durkheim agree in regarding man’s social experience as, in some sense, the source of religion, as the region in which the dominant characteristics of religion make their appearance, and finally, as presenting man with the *objects* of his religious

¹ *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, p. xx.

ideas and cult. That "the reality which religious thought expresses is society,"¹—this is the fundamental thesis of both writers. For both men, religion is a language which utters truths about the right relations between an individual and some community. No one better than Royce has given an interpretation of the traditional doctrines of Christianity in terms of the significance which the community has for the individual, in terms of what the community really is and does. No one better than Durkheim has interpreted primitive religion in terms of the overwhelming importance, in primitive life and thought, of man's social experience. This general agreement between Royce and Durkheim rests upon the thesis, which each of them has elaborately defended, of the autonomy, the reality, and the uniqueness of society. Durkheim's entire social philosophy is a commentary upon what Royce speaks of as "the problems of the two levels of human existence."² There is—so Durkheim in one place sums up the matter—"an individual being which has its foundation in the organism and the circle of whose activities is therefore strictly limited, and a social being which represents the highest reality in the intellectual and moral order that we can know by observation—I mean society. . . . In so far as he belongs to society, the individual transforms himself, both when he thinks and when he acts."³

This doctrine of "the two levels of human existence," the unique reality of the community and its importance for the life of the individual, is made use of by Royce and Durkheim in somewhat different ways, in their account of the office and the significance of religion in social experience. For Royce, the social meaning of religion lies in its ability to heal an inevitable mutilation and discord in our nature which civilization increasingly involves. This discord is a result of the very processes which alone make civilization possible. The higher products and the

¹ Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, translated by Swain, London, 1915, p. 431.

² *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, p. 203.

³ *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p. 16. Durkheim discusses the autonomy of "collective representations" and their relation to individual representations in an earlier article in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 1891, p. 273.

finer achievements of man's social life are possible only when individuals have reached a correspondingly high level of moral self-consciousness and of reflective freedom. "My moral self-consciousness is bred in me through social situations that involve—not necessarily any physical conflict with my fellows,—but, in general, some form of social conflict,—conflict such as engenders mutual criticism."¹ This is the 'moral burden of the individual,' this discord and mutilation, this conflict between his increasing self-consciousness and that tightening of social bonds which civilization brings with it. Such discord and inner conflict increase with the growth in the complexity of life and in the social structures of civilization. Social progress thus "breeds men who, even when they keep the peace, are inwardly enemies one of another."² There is a clash between the inner will, the self-assertion, the longing for freedom, and the constraints which society more and more imposes. It is this situation, depicted by Royce with such insight and such skill, which, within the tasks of man's social life and independently of all dogma, increasingly calls for salvation. The function of religion is to furnish such a salvation. It can come about only through a spiritual transformation inspired by the love for a community. This is the religion of loyalty, and this is its task in the enterprise of civilization. The truths of Christianity may all be stated in terms of this social situation, and of its healing. Such is the way in which Royce, in *The Problem of Christianity* interprets religion as the work of man's social consciousness, as the function of the 'beloved community' in the life of man.

Let us turn briefly to the way in which Durkheim too interprets religion in terms of social experience. He has set this forth at greatest length in his study of primitive religion. Now the one fundamental and permanent idea in religion is the idea of the *sacred*. "All known religious beliefs, whether simple or complex, present one common characteristic: they presuppose a classification of all the things, real and ideal, of which men think, into two classes or opposed groups, generally designated by two

¹ *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, p. 139.

² *Ibid.*, p. 143.

distinct terms which are translated well enough by the words *profane* and *sacred*. This division of the world into two domains, the one containing all that is sacred, the other all that is profane, is the distinctive trait of religious thought."¹ Durkheim's great service, I take it, to social psychology lies in giving us a natural history of this 'collective representation' of the sacred. For his main thesis is that society is the only reality which can generate this idea. It is the community, it is man's social experience which is "constantly creating sacred things out of ordinary ones."² Religion, according to Durkheim, is just this community experience together with its residue, the idea of the sacred, and the acts and beliefs which center around that idea. His formal definition of religion is this: "A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a church, all those who adhere to them."³ So much for Durkheim's central thesis in his *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. But this is primarily a thesis concerning the past, concerning the beginnings of religion in man's historical life. What of the function and the fortunes of religion within the growth of civilization,—that, which for Royce, is so much the essential thing? To answer this we need to turn to an earlier book of Durkheim, in which he studies, not primarily religion, but the process and the causes of civilization. In his *De la Division du Travail Social*,⁴ Durkheim views the growth of civilization as an increase of the division of labor. It is a process of differentiation, of increasing individualism. So much is, of course, a commonplace. But the essential and—to some extent at least—novel character of Durkheim's essay lies in his belief that the division of labor, instead of causing the bonds of social solidarity to dissoye, is itself the source of a new form of such solidarity. He calls it "organic solidarity" in contrast with the more primitive "mechanical solidarity." Mechanical solidarity

¹ *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, p. 37.

² *Ibid.*, p. 212.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁴ Paris, 1902.

is that which results from social pressure upon individuals who are in all essential respects similar, none of whom has as yet attained any distinctive and individual self-consciousness. Such mechanical solidarity is much like the early "blind instinctive affection," the "natural love of individuals for communities," arising "from the depths of our still unconscious social nature," which Royce contrasts with genuine loyalty.¹ In his *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Durkheim shows how the collective consciousness of such a primitive society, constituted by mechanical solidarity, generates the life of religion. In his earlier book, he shows how such primitive mechanical solidarity is being supplanted more and more by organic solidarity, defined by the division of labor. Does it not follow that, for Durkheim, religion must necessarily play a constantly decreasing rôle in the development of civilization? If the division of labor is itself the source of social solidarity, of a new and essentially non-religious sort, then there is no such problem of salvation becoming more and more insistent as civilization progresses, which Royce regards as solved only through a religion of loyalty. This might plausibly appear to be a fair statement of the relation between Royce's and Durkheim's interpretation of religion. Durkheim distinctly says, for instance, that the rôle of our "collective consciousness diminishes as the division of labor progresses," and accordingly that "not only does the domain of religion not increase along with that of temporal life, and in the same measure, but it is more and more decreasing . . . it is a witness that there is a constantly diminishing number of collective sentiments and beliefs sufficiently collective and sufficiently strong to take on a religious form."² Moreover, the division of labor which Durkheim views as *itself* the source of an organic solidarity, is it not identical with that limitation of our activity, that "narrowness of our span of consciousness," which is, for Royce, instead of a source of strength "one of our chief human sorrows?"³

Yet, thus to state the comparison between Royce and Durkheim is not, I believe, the last word. That distinction which for Royce

¹ *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, pp. 180, 181.

² *De la Division du Travail Social*, p. 356.

³ Royce, *The Sources of Religious Insight*, p. 262.

is so important, between natural group emotion and a moral and religious loyalty runs along parallel with Durkheim's distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity. That is to say, a level of social organization characterized by the division of labor is one in which the reality of the community is more prominent and more decisive; it is one in which the community is of necessity more of a living organic being, and less of a merely natural aggregate. In a regime in which there is a highly developed division of labor, each individual's nature will appear, if you view him merely as an individual, vastly mutilated; how much more reason there is, then, to complete him, to discover the real substance of his being, to create—or to discover—the beloved community!

It is, perhaps, because Durkheim insists upon identifying religion only with the deposits of that primitive group emotion which characterizes mechanical solidarity, that he declines to see any religious significance in the accelerating process of the division of labor within civilization. With Rousseau and with Lamennais, most 'democratic' interpretations of religion in terms of our social experience seek for religion in some primitive sympathy, some species of universal fraternity which is only a prolongation of nature, in something on the level of Hume's *impression* rather than the *idea* which man imputes to his world through his own activity. An organic solidarity, held together by the division of labor, does not come of itself. It implies activity and loyalty, creation of and devotion to the community. Herein lies Durkheim's essential agreement with these words of Royce: "For the true Church is still a sort of ideal challenge to the faithful, rather than an already finished institution,—a call upon men for a heavenly quest, rather than a present possession of humanity. 'Create me,'—this is the word that the Church, viewed as an idea, addresses to mankind."¹

And, if Durkheim declines—as he does in his earlier book—to define this task of the creation of organic solidarity, of the transformation of a natural community into a moral community, in religious terms, it must be because of the divergent metaphysics

¹ *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. I, p. 54.

which lie behind the thought of Royce and Durkheim. For positivism, the values of man's social experience remain something isolated from the total background of human experience; for idealism, there is some continuity between social experience and its environment, between the 'internal' and the 'external' meaning of our ideas. And religion not only avows that man's social experience is significant and creative within the processes of history and civilization, but that it is, in some sense, true as well. It is the spokesman for idealism, then, who can claim as religious those energies and ideas upon which the tasks of civilization must in the last analysis rely.

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THE PROBLEM OF CHRISTIANITY.

I HAVE been asked to give a criticism of the first volume of Professor Royce's *The Problem of Christianity* from the systematic point of view. I am not quite sure what this cryptic phrase means, but I suppose that what I am really asked to do is to inquire how far the conception of Christianity which Professor Royce gives us in his expository volume is adequate from the point of view of the modern theologian: whether it includes all that he would wish to put in his own definition of Christianity, and whether it combines the elements it includes in proper proportion.

Before undertaking this task I should like to make three preliminary remarks:

1. I wish to express the satisfaction which we all feel in welcoming Professor Royce to this circle for the purpose of such a discussion. Professor Royce speaks modestly of his own attainments as a theologian, but the book in question gives evidence of such long-continued and sympathetic thought on the central problems of theology that we feel that its author can be nowhere more at home than in just such a circle as this.

2. I should like to raise the question whether Professor Royce has quite accurately defined the point of view from which he approaches his subject when he contrasts his own position, on the one hand, with that of all Christian theologians, whether liberal or conservative; and on the other hand, with those students of the subject whose attitude is one of pure indifference. A man who wins from his study of Christianity—a study conducted with the philosophic detachment which characterizes the present book—the conviction that in Christianity we have thus far at least “man’s most impressive vision of salvation and his principal glimpse of the home land of the spirit,”—a man who believes that the central ideas of the Christian religion answer the deepest needs of humanity and record its highest attainments to such an extent that whatever expression they may receive in the future

"will be attended with the knowledge that in its historical origins the religion of the future will be continuous with and dependent upon the earliest Christianity, so that the whole growth and vitality of the religion of the future will depend upon its harmony with the Christian spirit,"—such a man has surely passed the dividing line which separates the Christian from his critics and won the right to a place in the company of Christian theologians.

3. I wish to express my satisfaction at the clear insight expressed by our author in the very phrasing of his question, that what we most need to-day is a philosophy of history, a philosophy which shall interpret the individual experiences through which the race from time to time has passed, and the typical convictions to which it has given expression in the light of "the lesson that the religious history of the race, viewed if possible as a connected whole, has taught man." Whether we can succeed in such an interpretation may be arguable, but of this we may be sure, that if we lose faith in the possibility of such an interpretation, we shall empty life of its highest meaning and leave to philosophy only that cataloguing and re-cataloguing of logical concepts in forms admitting of equal application in every possible world to which Bertrand Russell has in his most recent utterance tried to confine it.

With so much by way of preface let me proceed at once to the task assigned me. I shall consider in order, first, what Professor Royce attempts to do; secondly, the method which he follows, and thirdly, the conclusion to which he comes.

1. And first then of what Professor Royce attempts to do. He defines his task himself on page 20 of Volume I as a double one. It is in part one of definition; in part one of valuation. "Our problem," he writes, "involves some attempt to find out what this great religion most essentially is and means, what its most permanent and indispensable features are. Secondly, our problem is the problem of estimating these most permanent and indispensable features of Christianity in the light of what we can learn of the lesson that the religious history of the race, viewed if possible as a connected whole, has taught man." What does

it mean to be a Christian, understanding by Christianity what Christians themselves have believed it to be? That is the first problem, the problem of definition. And the second grows naturally out of it. What is the significance of this Christian faith? Does it approve itself to us to-day as tenable? Can the modern man "consistently be in creed a Christian"? This is the problem of valuation.

So stated it would seem on the face of it that we were dealing with two quite different questions. But as a matter of fact, as Professor Royce well sees, they cannot be separated. How am I going to tell what belongs to Christianity? What is its essence as distinct from its transient and passing features? Clearly only through some process of value judgment by which I discriminate between the materials which history presents to me as more or less significant and enduring. Not all that Christians have regarded as Christian belongs to Christianity, but only that part of the Christian beliefs and experiences which maintain their authority in spite of the changes of the changing years. What the permanent core of vital truth may be, each must judge for himself, and his judgment may differ from his predecessors,—will in fact differ to a greater or less degree. In his book Professor Royce makes his contribution to this trans-valuation of values, and he justifies himself in so doing because the modern man, of whom he is the spokesman, is not simply a newcomer on the stage of history, but one who sums up in himself all the previous course of development, one therefore who looks upon Christianity not as an outsider, but as one to the manor born.

It is clear that in the very definition of his enterprise our author commits himself to a definite philosophical position, an attitude toward life and especially history, which finds in universals a significance which a merely nominalistic and sceptical metaphysics denies. For Royce this is a rational universe, and history, as Lessing taught, the education of the human race. He believes that humanity, taken as a whole "has some genuine and significant spiritual unity so that its life is no mere flow and strife of opinions, but includes a growth in genuine insight"

(p. 19). I for one believe that in this Professor Royce is profoundly right, and what I shall be obliged to say by way of criticism of his treatment concerns not what he tries to do, but the way he does it.

2. My first difficulty concerns Professor Royce's method. What he proposed, as we have seen, is a definition of the essence of Christianity, the separation from the vast mass of material that our records give us, of the permanent and significant core. How does he go about this separation?

He does not tell us. That is our first embarrassment. Certain negative principles, to be sure, he follows, such for example as the rejection of the dogmatic method which bids us look for our definition of Christianity to the official records and decisions of the church. Nor is he any better satisfied with that modern substitute for the dogmatic method which would identify Christianity with the teaching of its founder as distinct from the later additions which have been made to that teaching by his disciples. In contrast to this he maintains that it was not Jesus alone, but the church which was the founder of Christianity, and that the beliefs about Jesus, which we find in the writings of his disciples, and notably of men like Paul and John, belong of right among our sources and should determine our understanding of what Christianity is.

In all this, it need not be said, the present writer heartily agrees with him. No attempt to understand Christianity which ignores the experience of Christians about Christ can be historically justified. The actual living religion that has made its triumphant march through the centuries is the religion of the living and risen Christ.

My difficulty with Professor Royce begins with his account of what Christianity means to the church. He picks out three ideas as of fundamental importance for the Christian religion: the idea of the church, or the beloved community; the idea of sin, or the moral burden of the individual; the idea of atonement, or the saving deed through which this moral burden is lifted off. In these three he believes that the genius of Christianity may be expressed and its permanent contribution to humanity defined.

I believe with all my heart that the three ideas named are of fundamental importance for the Christian religion, and I think we who are theologians *ex professo* owe to Professor Royce a debt of gratitude in having reëstablished them in the place of central importance from which some contemporary theologians have been tempted to dethrone them. But it is not easy to see why these three should have been singled out to the exclusion of others (*e. g.*, the incarnation and the deity of Christ), which hold quite as prominent a place in the New Testament, and have maintained their place through the later centuries among the most cherished and sacred convictions of Christians. Why should one be taken and the other left? Surely only because when tested by the modern man's standard of value they have been tried and found wanting. But this testing Professor Royce nowhere undertakes. They are condemned without a trial. The case against them goes by default.

3. And this leads me to consider, in the next place, Professor Royce's positive interpretation of the Christian religion. That religion, as he tells us, is in its essence a religion of loyalty. It is loyalty to the beloved community which is itself the community of the loyal. This community deserves allegiance and justifies our hope in its final supremacy, not simply because it is the company of the morally perfect, but because through its principle of loyalty it makes atonement possible. It is the community that has come into existence through a deed of salvation so original, so satisfying, so perfectly adapted to the social situation as to make the impossible possible, the unpardonable sin pardonable, and reconcile the traitor himself to his own shame as the occasion of so notable and admirable an achievement.

In all this there is much that is admirable upon which one would like to dwell. In his emphasis upon the place held by the church as the company of the loyal; in his redefinition of love in terms of loyalty; in his psychological account of the genesis of sin as due to the inherent contrast between the principle of self assertion and the claims of the social standard; in his interpretation of atonement as the supreme expression of the work of the creative artist love—in all this Professor Royce has not only

given utterance to vital truths with prophetic insight, but has, I believe, recovered aspects of the Christian experience which for the time being have fallen too much into forgetfulness. This is especially true of his treatment of original sin and of the atonement.

But the purpose of this paper, I take it, is not so much to record points of agreement—many and important as these are, or to compliment Professor Royce on the many felicitous phrases with which he has illuminated the various phases of his subjects, as to point out those aspects of his treatment which raise questions in the mind of his reviewer, in the hope that these doubts may be resolved in the discussion that follows.

And the first thing which I miss in Professor Royce's treatment of Christianity as a religion of loyalty is any adequate definition of the object which calls forth loyalty. That there must be such an object he clearly sees. That the early Christians believed that they had found it he repeatedly asserts, but in the transfer of essential Christianity from its ancient to its modern domicile one cannot help having the suspicion that in some mysterious way this important part of the Christian's household furnishings has been dropped by the way.

There are three different answers which we may give to the question, To what does the Christian owe allegiance? We may say, he owes it to Jesus Christ, the founder of the Christian community; or we may say he owes it to the church which Christ founded; or still again, to the unseen God who reveals himself in and through both as the ultimate object of loyalty. In a very real sense all three of these entered into the experience of the primitive Christians. Professor Royce makes place only for the second, or at least so fuses it with the first and the third that they cannot be distinguished from it.

In this he claims to be following the early Christian example, which identifies the spirit of Christ with the spirit of the community, and both with the spirit of God. There are, he reminds us, two distinct meanings which the word, Christ, has to the Christian. In the first place, it stands for the historic Jesus, the human individual who lived and taught and died in Palestine,

the giver of the parables, the teacher of brotherhood, the master and friend whose story the gospels record. But in the second place, it stands for the divine being who became incarnate in Jesus and who lives on as the inspiring spirit of the community he founded. Professor Royce is quite right in emphasizing the fundamental importance of the second of these aspects of the Christian belief and insisting that no definition of Christianity can be adequate which leaves it out. But the first seems to interest him little. Whether Jesus was what he claimed to be; whether there was any human individual deserving the confidence which his disciples put in him; whether the author of the Fourth Gospel was or was not right in his conviction not simply that the Word was made flesh, but that the Word was made flesh in Jesus, seems to Royce of small importance. It is not Jesus, after all, who was the founder of Christianity, but the church which saw in Jesus that Christ who was at the same time the immanent law of its own higher life. It is not Jesus then to whom the Christian is loyal, but the church, or what comes to the same thing, the spirit who is at the same time the spirit of Jesus and the spirit of the church.

But this is only to push the question one step further back. What is this church to which the Christian is to be loyal, and what is the evidence that it is worthy of devotion? To this question the early Christians gave a very definite answer. It was the empirical community of which they were members, the community that Jesus had founded to be the organ of his spirit, and the evidence that it deserved this loyalty was the fact that his spirit was actually present in its midst imparting to its members spiritual gifts and justifying their faith in their ultimate conformity to his image.

But for Professor Royce this early judgment was mistaken. There is no church anywhere to be found which deserves the name of the beloved community. There is only the idea of what such a church must be if it is to deserve our loyalty. "‘Create me,’ that is the word which the church, considered as an idea, addresses to mankind" (p. 54).

But whence is the dynamic to come which is to make this

creation possible? It was not Jesus who created the church, we are told, but the church which created Christianity, including our picture of Jesus. But now it appears that the church itself is in need of a creator. Whence is the needed help to come? Who is to create the church, or, since the idea of the church is already in existence, whence came that idea, and what is its promise for the future?

It would seem natural to us that it came from God. God is the real creator of the church, as he is the ultimate explanation of Christ; He is the unseen Spirit who is at once the ideal and the dynamic of its realization in history. Here at least would seem to be the unifying concept of which we are in search.

And indeed there are passages in *The Problem of Christianity* which seem to point in this direction. More than once we find the author identifying the spirit of Christ with the church, and both with God, (*e. g.*, pp. 202, 409). And in the final constructive volume the synthesis between the community and God is complete. The church, the beloved community, the company of the loyal is itself God, the only God apparently for which Professor Royce has room in his re-definition of Christianity.

But is this really an adequate account of what God means to the Christian? What we need in our God; what the early Christians found in theirs, is a *creator*, but the God of Professor Royce is still to be created. He exists in idea indeed, as the beloved community which calls forth the loyalty of all the loyal. But he exists in idea only, awaiting his realization in that world of the concrete and the individual we call history.

Whatever this conception of God may be, it is surely not Christian. The Christian God is the God who is realizing his will in history; first in the person of Jesus, then in the faithful who have come under the spell of his spirit. He is a God whose nature can be known, in part no doubt, but truly so far as known; through the revelation made through Jesus, the God who can be described as love, because he has wrought a great deed of atonement, and who because he is love and demands love in others, calls forth and deserves loyalty.

My criticism of Professor Royce's treatment of Christianity,

then, is twofold: first, that he unduly simplifies Christianity by identifying three conceptions which, however closely related in Christian experience, must ever remain distinct, namely, God, Christ, the church. Secondly, that he empties loyalty of its highest significance by treating it as an end in itself irrespective of the object which calls forth loyalty. (Cf. especially his treatment of the unpardonable sin). It is true that loyalty as Royce defines it is more and other than love, but it is also true—and this is a distinct tenet of Christianity—that it is because Jesus lived and inspired love, in the sense in which Royce distinguishes it from loyalty, that he deserves loyalty. Loyalty in the abstract may lead, no one can tell whither, to militant imperialism as well as to Christian self-sacrifice. That loyalty only deserves the name Christian which is inspired by the type of ethics which finds its most signal, if not its only historic manifestation, in Jesus Christ—the ethics, I mean, which assigns to the individual an independent worth and function as a son of God, with his own peculiar place and responsibilities in the divine family. It is because the church, however imperfectly, is really trying to realize that kind of ideal, and for that reason only, that it can be associated with Jesus as the object of Christian loyalty.

It would seem, then, that in spite of his promise Professor Royce does not give us any real philosophy of history, for history means progress toward an ideal, and for progress Professor Royce's treatment of Christianity leaves no room. An ideal indeed he gives us, but so abstract and empty of content that it can be fitted into almost every conceivable type of experience, and for that reason affords us no standard of judgment by which we can measure the existing conflicts which give zest and pathos to the strifes and failures of the real world. Why this should be; what relation this method of approach has to the type of philosophy of which Professor Royce is so distinguished a representative, is a question which would carry us beyond the limits of the present discussion into regions which, however interesting and fruitful, do not primarily concern us here.

But I would not end upon a note of criticism, but rather with

the renewed expression of the debt of gratitude which I personally, in common with all my colleagues, owe to Professor Royce for his stimulating and searching investigation of a subject matter with which we are so intimately concerned. In these days when so many are defining Christianity in terms of an ethics without religion, it is well to be reminded of those deeper and more metaphysical truths, without which ethics alone would lose its driving power.

In conclusion, I should like to suggest the following questions, the answers to which will tend to clear up the doubts to which I have ventured to give voice:—

1. What is the method by which we must determine what part of the beliefs of a historic religion like Christianity justify their place in universal religion?
2. What is the relation of the ideal community which is the object of loyalty to the existing institutions of society?
3. Where in the modern world can we find the leadership which justifies loyalty?
4. In what sense does Professor Royce give us a God distinct enough to be communed with and good enough to be worshipped?

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ROYCE'S INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIANITY.

STUDENTS of theology, whether historical theology or constructive, have reason to be grateful when a philosopher of the eminence of Professor Royce turns his attention to the Philosophy of Religion as his most vital field of enquiry, and to the history and significance of Christianity as the most essential problem in this field. Professor Royce himself interprets to us his title *The Problem of Christianity* when in his opening chapter on "The Problem and the Method" he declares (p. 10): "Whatever the truth of religion may be, the office, the task, the need of religion are the most important of the needs, the tasks, the offices of humanity." He describes himself on the succeeding page as "one to whom the philosophy of religion, if there is to be a philosophy of religion at all, must include in its task the office of a positive, and of a deeply sympathetic interpretation of the spirit of Christianity, and must be just to the fact that the Christian religion is, thus far at least, man's most impressive view of salvation, and his principal glimpse of the homeland of the spirit."

My friend and fellow-theologian Professor Brown has the responsibility, as I understand the matter, of determining with what success Professor Royce in his second volume, bearing the subtitle *The Real World and the Christian Ideas*, has fulfilled this task of assigning to Christianity its true place in the Philosophy of Religion. I for my part am to render as sincere a verdict as I can upon the preceding volume, which has as its subtitle *The Christian Doctrine of Life*. This volume in fact contains all that we have of that preliminary survey of the history and psychology of religion in its Christian form which must precede any competent interpretation and valuation of it.

Were I to commit the indiscretion of anticipating the verdict of Professor Brown, by giving full expression to my sympathy for the Roycean philosophy of Absolute Voluntarism, and especially for the doctrine of Loyalty as the foundation of Ethics and Religion, and were I thereafter to advance my criticism of

this exposition of the teaching of Jesus and of Paul as summarizing religious history and psychology respectively, I might place Professor Royce in the unfortunate predicament of that eminent artist-literateur who was understood to be a great artist among critics of literature, and a great literateur among critics of art. I shall not commit the indiscretion. Still I may premise that I began the reading of *The Problem of Christianity* with a deep conviction that the Philosophy of Loyalty, as it has come to be called, was both true and Christian in its most essential features, and that I concluded my reading of the present volumes not with admiration alone, but with a deep feeling of gratitude for the effort of a great constructive philosopher of our time to find his philosophy—not arbitrarily, not by doing violence to historic truth, but honestly and sincerely—in the teaching of Jesus and of Paul.

The late eminent colleague of Professor Royce, in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, has made perhaps the most distinctive American contribution to philosophy in the field of the psychology of religion, having especially in view Christianity and more especially still the psychology of Paul. Theologians surely have reason to be grateful to William James. Similarly the most eminent ecclesiastical historian of our times has sought to answer the question What is Christianity? by a survey of its history. Harnack will not be reckoned a convert to the *religionsgeschichtliche Schule* because he applies his knowledge of church history to New Testament problems, any more than James to the exponents of Paulinism because he applies his knowledge of psychology to the conversion of Paul. But both are most welcome in the field just because they bring to it the more or less specialized judgment of an expert in other fields. A Blass, a Ramsay, a Percy Gardner, a Reitzenstein, a Norden, a Cumont—New Testament philology and archaeology are not unconscious of their debt to such guests as these, and how many still greater names might be cited from the domain of philosophy, who have made Christian theology their temporary home!

Such guests have special aptitudes and special limitations. A biblical critic need not be in entire agreement with Harnack's

Beiträge nor even accept Harnack's idea of what constitutes the true essence of the religion in its historic development, to be appreciative of *Das Wesen des Christenthums*. For my own part I observe with satisfaction Professor Royce's emphatic dissent from Harnack, and his sympathy with Loisy, the exponent of French modernism, in the conviction that, "the Christian religion always has been and, historically speaking, must be, not simply a religion taught by any man to any company of disciples, but always also a religion whose sense has consisted, at least in part, in the interpretation which later generations gave to the mission and the nature of the founder."¹ One may anticipate more from the historical survey of a student of the philosophy of religion when his conception of the essence of Christianity is progressive and dynamic, than from the ecclesiastical historian when the point of view taken is merely static, like that of so-called 'nineteenth century liberalism.' The doctrine of the progressive Christian consciousness as the 'seat of authority in religion' was not an exclusive discovery of Newman, nor a monopoly of the Roman modernists. We who count ourselves modernists in a wholly suprasectarian sense may well be glad that a philosopher of the type of Professor Royce should look to 'the higher social religious experience of mankind' rather than to the experience of individual geniuses, no matter how eminent, as exhibiting 'the central idea' of religion. We should not, however, be surprised at his taking this standpoint.

Without trenching on the province of Professor Brown I may therefore express at all events my hearty sympathy with Professor Royce's statement of his problem, and with the viewpoint he proposes. His 'mode of approach,' as he terms it, has this in common with the apologists, that it postulates the supreme effectiveness of Christianity in the 'endeavors of mankind to bring to pass, or to move towards, the salvation of man,' and aims to present 'a sympathetic philosophical interpretation'

¹I, p. 29. Cf. II, p. 366, and Preface, p. xxi: "The Pauline communities first were conscious of the essence of Christianity. Consequently those are right who have held, what the 'modernists' of the Roman Church were for a time asserting . . . that the Church, rather than the person of the founder, ought to be viewed as the central idea of Christianity."

of this 'effective' religion. On the other hand it avoids the most objectionable features of an *ex parte* apologetic, inasmuch as the interpreter assumes the largest liberty to treat as obsolete almost indefinitely extensive domains of traditional Christianity.¹ Professor Royce's Christianity is that of the Pauline churches as reflected in the great historical Pauline Epistles of practically undisputed authenticity; hence he has, as he puts it, "no legends to defend from critical attacks."² Even his Paulinism is "not of the letter which killeth, but of the spirit which giveth life." The 'genuine modern man' to whom he introduces us in his closing lectures, as the one for whose benefit they are written, is one who having fully accepted Paul's doctrine in its exact historical sense is magically transported down the ages to our own time to learn, without contact with our Christianity, all modern science, history, and philosophy. To such a 'modernist' Pauline teaching must in large degree seem obsolete. The contrast between ephemeral form and perennial substance would assume to him its acutest phase. He would be equally unable to deny the real historical sense of the teaching of the first century, the historical facts of the intervening time, and the scientific truths of the twentieth century. In remaining loyal to essential Pauline Christianity, such a 'modern' would resort to no theory of allegory such as Philo's, to vindicate the infallibility of his erstwhile teacher. He would realize, however, that in the application made by Jesus and Paul of their own great religious intuitions to the beliefs and conceptions of their time they were using an unconscious symbolism, like prophets of a continuous 'social' consciousness searching what manner of time the Spirit which was in them did point unto.

It is the function of the philosophy of religion to translate this *unconscious* symbolism of the past into modern speech. Myth, legend, institution and observance, are the modes of expression instinctively seized upon by the intuitions of religious genius

¹ Preface, p. xxvi. "I must decline to follow any of the various forms of traditionally orthodox dogma or theory regarding the person of Christ. Legends, doubtful historical hypotheses, and dogmas leave us, in this field, in well-known, and, to my mind, simply hopeless perplexities."

² II, 373.

before philosophy has elaborated its dialectic. The translation must be made, but it is well to preserve the original; and before it is made the original terms must be understood not merely in context, but in perspective. Here the history and the psychology of religion must do their part. Criticism must effect its unsparing analysis of the records, and trace the development of ideas; psychology must make its own diagnosis of the psychic experiences. Only when this process is complete can the philosophy of religion give its reasoned valuation of what the past has handed down. This it is, then, which will be naturally understood in philosophic terminology by the Problem of Christianity. The words which Loescher applied to the fixation of the canon of sacred Scripture may be extended to cover theseforth-puttings of the religious instinct of the race: Christianity itself came into being, *non uno, quod dicunt, ictu ab hominibus, sed paulatim a Deo, animorum temporumque rectore.*

Criticism of Professor Royce's historical and psychological survey of the Christian consciousness is doubly disarmed, first by his modest disclaimer of ability "to decide problems of the comparative history of religion,"¹ and secondly by the frankness with which he acknowledges a quasi-apologetic aim. It is quite important to realize just what is meant by this.

Apologists of the type of Hugh Miller and of my own revered teacher of geology at Yale, James Dwight Dana, are quite a well-known type to us of the older generation. Professor Dana's class-room interpretations of the first chapter of Genesis still abide in my memory, and these and their like call forth today a kindly smile on the lips of the modern student, whether of Genesis or of geology. The apologist's idea of 'defending' Scripture was so naïvely transparent, so wonderfully innocent of historical perspective. What more sublime evidence of inspiration than that the Pentateuchal story of creation should correspond with nineteenth century geology? What loftier ambition for Moses than to be a teacher of 'modern science'? And if the fruits of Moses's scientific teaching were quite unapparent for three thousand years, until what he had

¹ P. 339.

been vainly attempting to make known was independently discovered, surely the corroboration of his wonderful knowledge was more than compensation for his wonderful inability to convey it. The kind of apologetic which can conceive no greater glory for Scripture than to teach the apologist's own views is familiar since the day Scripture acquired an authority which made Scriptural corroboration a convenience. But if the higher criticism has taught us anything it is that ideas have a history, and must be viewed in perspective. So recently as my own seminary days I believe there was not a theological school in the country that possessed a chair of Biblical Theology, the teaching of Biblical ideas in their historical development. Nowadays we think a school of theology does not deserve the name where biblical doctrines are not set forth from the historical point of view.

Needless to say Professor Royce does not treat the Bible in the fashion of Hugh Miller or Guyot. And yet it is to be recognized that his acknowledgment that he "takes his stand with the apologists, and against the hostile or the thoughtfully indifferent critics of Christianity,"¹ is borne out by the character and contents of the book. It is not the product of a dispassionate critical historian of religion, aiming only at the proportionate consideration of all factors and processes in the field of study. That work of critical analysis and research we must assume to have been performed to the extent Professor Royce's other occupations allowed before he undertook his interpretation of Jesus and Paul. Professor Royce finds a great deal in Paul which must at least be acknowledged to be not apparent on the surface. Others must pursue a similar course before they adopt his conclusions or their own. In the present work, as I have already expressed it, Professor Royce 'goes to find' the religion of loyalty in Jesus and Paul. He does not attempt to deal with all Christian doctrines. He chooses three which impress him as the most vital and essential: (1) the doctrine of the Kingdom of God, or, as he expresses it, salvation through membership in the beloved community; (2) the doctrine of moral inability, or original sin;

¹ I, II.

(3) the doctrine of the Atonement. Not a historical survey of Christianity as a whole followed by a valuation of it constitutes Professor Royce's contribution, but a 'discussion of the meaning and truth of each of these three ideas' which to his mind express its essence. Not even these three ideas are considered in their origin and mutual relation. Admittedly the second, moral inability, or the doctrine of original sin, plays no part whatever in the teaching of Jesus, and the third, the Atonement, is by most critical students of biblical theology regarded as almost or quite equally foreign to the thought of Jesus. Professor Royce thinks he can discover hints or foregleams of this in "the parables."¹ I must confess ignorance of what parables are meant—unless indeed Professor Royce includes what a leading New Testament scholar has well and nobly called 'the last and greatest of the parables,' the never-to-be-forgotten words, 'This is my body which is given for you.' Here we may indeed find a point of departure for the Atonement doctrine of the Church. But I imagine that Professor Royce himself would hardly attribute to Jesus a doctrine of the forgiveness of sins which made it dependent upon his own atoning death. I find it very difficult to imagine any student of the history of this doctrine treating Professor Royce's conception of it as reflecting in any save the remotest way the mind of the Master.

All this does not trouble Professor Royce, because he limits himself to 'the Christianity of the Pauline churches' and does not greatly care to interpret it genetically. Such study as he has given to the question of the history and mutual relation of these chosen ideas is prior to the present work. If he has followed up with Tennant and our own Professor Porter the antecedents of the Pauline doctrine of moral inability and original sin in the rabbinic theory of the *yetser ha-ra'* he says nothing about it, because it is a mere preliminary to his subject. If he has trodden in the footsteps of some of the many scholarly and critical historians of the doctrine of atonement and traced it back with Dalman, Oesterley, and even, I may add, Schechter, to its connection with the Isaian doctrine of the Suffering Ser-

¹ P. 240.

vant,—if he has examined the doctrine traceable in the Hellenistic period of Judaism of the atonement wrought by the Maccabean martyrs and compared it with that of the *Zachuth Aboth* of the rabbis, of this too he finds it needless to speak. This is because his 'problem of Christianity' is not exclusively, perhaps not primarily, a historical problem but to an appreciable degree 'apologetic'; and I think we must understand the word to mean as here employed that Professor Royce to some extent has gone to Christianity, more especially 'the Christianity of the Pauline churches,' to find his own philosophy in it. Whether the discovery is real or not will depend upon the thoroughness and impartiality of the historico-critical studies which appear only by implication. If his volume does not produce the unfavorable impression of the typical apologist who notoriously finds in the Bible just what he carries to it, this may be because of the more disinterestedly critical character of these preliminary studies. I am disposed to think it largely is. It may also be, however, to some extent because his philosophy of loyalty was Christian to begin with.

I am not finding fault with Professor Royce's book, I am defending it. It does not pretend to be a critical survey of the origin and development of the Christian faith, and we have no right to criticize it for not being what it does not pretend to be. Professor Royce wisely avails himself of Harnack's pregnant distinction between 'the gospel of Jesus' and 'the gospel about Jesus.' Then with something more than Loisy's modernism he plants himself firmly on the principle that Christianity is what it came to be, regardless, or almost regardless, of what it had been, or how the development was effected. He can make, therefore, comparatively short work of his historical survey. We have the Pauline Epistles. They reflect at certain angles the three vital ideas and their psychological reaction. What need, then, of any historical Jesus? If the purpose be merely that of finding the philosophy of loyalty somewhere in the beginnings of this most 'effective' of religions, why not leap at once *in medias res* about the sixth decade, regardless of whether the Christianity of the Pauline churches has fact or fiction as its

foundation? Why not dismiss entirely those perplexing, laborious historical problems of the relation of the Greek-Christian to the Jewish-Christian churches, of Paul to Jesus, of Christianity as a universal religion of individual redemption, to Judaism as a national religion of social well-being?

As a matter of fact this is very nearly the course which Professor Royce pursues. "This book (he tells us) has no positive thesis to maintain regarding the person of the founder of Christianity. I am not competent to settle any of the numerous historical doubts as to the founder's person, and as to the details of his life. The thesis of this book is that the essence of Christianity, as the Apostle Paul stated that essence, depends upon regarding the being which the early Christian Church believed itself to represent, and the being which I call, in this book, the "Beloved Community," as the true source through loyalty, of the salvation of man."¹ Now if the object is simply to find the philosophy of loyalty in Paulinism, then to be sure the fictitious Jesus of the mythical idealists, A. Drews, or W. B. Smith, will serve the purpose quite as well. Indeed if Van Manen or Van den Berg van Eysingha gives any trouble about the historicity of Paul, then Paul too may take the same road. Rome in the third decade of the second century will do just as well as Greece in 50-60 A.D. for the origin of the Epistles. Questions of Judaism and Hellenism and their fusion in Christianity are really academic if our 'problem of Christianity' is not an attempt to assign to this most effective of religions exactly its true position in the progress of the religious consciousness of humanity. We may deal quite lightly with that great transition from social and national religious ideals to ideals of personal redemption, the transition from Jesus to Paul, if our problem is only to find the Philosophy of Loyalty in the Pauline Epistles. If on the contrary we are studying the transition of civilization in 200 B.C. to 200 A.D. from national religions of various types to the typical religion of personal and social redemption, we have a more considerable task. It all depends on whether we are trying to connect up with the eternal Spirit of Truth whose witness is

¹ Preface, p. xxvi.

world-wide and eternal, or only with the spirit of the Pauline churches.

I have spoken thus far only of the second respect in which Professor Royce disarms our criticism. Pray do not assume that judgment is already passed if I ask that his book be judged for what it professes to be and not for what it frankly acknowledges that it is not. Surely the candid acknowledgment that the 'problem of Christianity' is not confronted here from the strictly impartial standpoint of the critical historian of religion, but more or less in the interest of a particular philosophy, may be accepted without seeming to put disparagement upon the book, or to retract the encomiums uttered at the outset. Let me remind you that I have not said that the author dispensed with that critical historical analysis and research which alone can qualify anyone to define 'the essence of Christianity' even with the limitation 'as the Apostle Paul stated that essence.' I have only said that, whatever expectations might be aroused by the title, this volume does not contain the researches in question and expressly disclaims the effort to present them. They must be presupposed. Our judgment of it from this point of view must be based on what we read between the lines rather than in the lines themselves. Does the author give evidence of a historical appreciation of Paulinism?

Here we may be perhaps a little less ready to take Professor Royce's modest disclaimers *au pied de la lettre* than in the case of his acknowledgement of a method and mode of approach which are perhaps something more, at all events something else, than purely historical. If he has not allowed us to underestimate the extent of his study of Christian origins and of the development of Christian ideas, then we can only say that in this case the largeness of mind and the critical judgment naturally developed by philosophical studies have in considerable degree supplied the place of special research.

Professor Royce, as we have seen, makes no attempt to determine the historical relation between Jesus and Paul. To the question which he assumes to be put by some "kindly critic" whether "the whole meaning of the Christian religion does not

center in the founder, in his life, and in his person," he answers: "This book has *no* hypothesis whatever to offer as to how the Christian community originated. Personally I shall never hope, in my present existence to know anything whatever about that origin, beyond the barest commonplaces. The historical evidence at hand is insufficient to tell us how the church originated. The legends do not solve the problem. I have a right to decline, and I actually decline to express an opinion as to any details about the person and life of the founder. For such an opinion the historical evidences are lacking, although it seems to me natural to suppose that the sayings and the parables which tradition attributed to the founder were the work of some single author, concerning whose life we probably possess some actually correct reports."¹ The Christianity which he considers, therefore, is simply 'the Christianity of the Pauline churches.' In view of this limitation the selection of the three supreme ideas of these churches as (1) Salvation through membership in the Beloved Community, (2) Moral Inability, (3) Atonement, is to me an evidence of great perspicacity and real historical appreciation, however strange the phraseology may sound in our ears, and however we may be on our guard against a choice dictated by other motives than the effort to attain pure historical fact. The fact is, Professor Royce's view of Christianity is—I will not say like a drawing without perspective, but—like a photograph all in one plane. As we have seen, the whole emphasis of critical study for a generation of historical interpretation has been to put these photographs under a stereoscopic lens and draw out the perspective. He disclaims acquaintance with this research and yet in fundamental points coincides with it. May I for a moment assume the task which might properly fall to my colleague in the chair of Biblical Theology, Professor Porter, and apply the stereoscopic lens to what Professor Royce sets forth as the essential ideas of Pauline Christianity?

Of the three ideas named we are probably nearest to genuine Paulinism, and at the same time furthest from all other forms of Christianity both in the generation before and the generations

¹ Preface, p. xxvi.

which followed Paul, in the doctrine of original sin or moral inability. If there is anything in the New Testament peculiarly personal to Paul, based in its origin on his individual religious experience, not derived from earlier Christians and equally incapable even through the logic, the eloquence, the authority of a Paul of being impressed on the succeeding generation, it was his doctrine of the law as the strength of sin, the doctrine which Professor Royce most philosophically develops into a psychology of the moral sense. Yes, if primitive Christianity had cared for the Data of Ethics it might very well have developed a theory from the Epistle to the Romans, and if sufficiently modernized this psychology of the moral sense might very well have come out in the philosophical form Professor Royce has given it. As a matter of historical fact, Romans was taken to be as a whole what in part it really was—merely a polemic against Mosaism. Average Christianity of Paul's time had only a doctrine of Repentance, in which 'dead works' played a part as giving rise to self-righteousness. It had no theory of the origin of conscience. The Pauline dialectic was very real to Paul, and more or less effective against the Judaizers. Of the next generation it is scarcely too much to say with a learned church historian: "Nobody understood Paul but Marcion, and he misunderstood him." There is much to be said for taking the religious experience of Paul as the basis for a psychology of religion, and I wish to acknowledge my own great indebtedness to Professor Royce for his philosophical modernization of the Pauline 'data of ethics.' I fear, however, that when it comes to ranking the doctrine of original sin among the three most vital tenets of Christianity in the Pauline period I shall have to be classed with James and his individualistic mode of approach. Historically speaking, the doctrine of Christianity in the Pauline period was simply the universal need of *Repentance*. Paul's was a 'Variety of Religious Experience.'

Of the doctrine of the Atonement as it appears in the philosophy of loyalty we may say we are more or less reminded of Paulinism, although here we are no longer on peculiarly Pauline ground, but are dealing with an idea expressly declared by Paul to be part of

the common gospel, antecedent to his own preaching, an idea completely obliterated from the Lucan writings and almost completely from Matthew and Mark. As I have intimated, something of the kind is traceable far back in the history of Judaism, though with increasing opposition in legalistic circles. Noah is an ἀντάλλαγμα ἐν καιρῷ ὀργῆς in Ecclus. 44: 17, the blood of the Maccabean martyrs in Second and Fourth Maccabees is an expiation (καθάρσιον) for the sin of Israel, their life a vicarious offering (ἀντιψυχον) for its life.¹ Paul has his own distinctive doctrine of the καταλλαγή, but fundamentally he does not depart from the more primitive view that it is accomplished by the real intercession of an actual mediator who was "raised for our justification" and who in the visible presence of God "maketh intercession for us."² Otherwise "if Christ were not raised" we should be "yet in our sins."³ Translate this semi-mythological form of atonement doctrine into a philosophy of loyalty if you will, with consideration of the irrevocableness of the past, the need of the 'traitor to loyalty' to forgive himself, and the like, all of which may be—to psychological experience—profoundly true; but do not let us lose the Apostle Paul, and those who before him preached the gospel of the Suffering Servant, entirely out of sight in the historical background. Nothing would interest me more than to go into the question of the relation of the Pauline doctrines of Original Sin and Atonement to the common Christian doctrines of Repentance and Faith and the antecedents of both in Judaism; but I must limit myself to the third idea: Salvation through the Church.

As an interpretation of Paul's doctrine of the Kingdom of God I am afraid the "thesis of the book" that "the essence of Christianity as the Apostle Paul stated that essence, depends upon regarding the being which the early Christian church believed itself, and the being which I call in this book, the Beloved Community, as the true source, through loyalty, of the salva-

¹ II Macc. 7: 37 f.; IV Macc. 6: 29.

² Rom. 8: 34; cf. Heb. 9: 11-22 and the intercession of Enoch (Eth. En. xiii-xv.) Noah, Abraham, Moses, Daniel and Job in Jewish literature (Ezek. 14: 12-21).

³ I Cor. 15: 17.

tion of man "¹ would hardly be acceptable to the Apostle Paul himself. An 'essence of Christianity' from which the person and work of the historic Christ disappear entirely would be apt to draw from Paul words somewhat like the following: "There are some that trouble you, and would pervert the gospel of Christ. . . . As we have said before, so say I now again, If any man preacheth unto you any gospel other than that which ye received, let him be anathema." Speaking strictly from the historical point of view, and never relinquishing that stalwart independence which can venture to differ even with Paul, I think we must here take the side of that "distinguished authority upon Christology" and "kindly critic" whom Professor Royce cites in his Preface, who continues to think that the historic Jesus had much to do with Paul's doctrine of the Kingdom of God.

Paul had his own characteristically enlarged and universalized doctrine of the Kingdom. He could not have been an Apostle to the Gentiles if he had not. His doctrine is not only transcendentalized after the fashion of the apocalyptic writers to include "things in heaven and things on earth and things under the earth," "angels and principalities and powers," but it has taken on a strong tincture of Stoicism, the doctrine of the cosmic organism animated by the divine Spirit, the body of Christ, whereof every redeemed soul and body is a member in particular. It is the great merit of Professor Royce's book that it gives us a philosophical valuation of this adaptation of the doctrine of the Kingdom of God under the Pauline mysticism. Nevertheless it is well to remember that there never would have been a Pauline doctrine of the Beloved Community in mystical union of life with its glorified Head, if there had not first been a Jesus obedient unto death in the preaching and service of that Kingdom. We may go further and declare that whatever Hellenized and universalized form the doctrine of the Kingdom assumes in Paul, no stretch of the historical imagination of which I, for one, am capable can ever conceive him as giving assent to a formula wherein the mystical body is everything and the Head of the body disappears from the plan of salvation altogether.

¹ Preface, p. xxvi.

Stoic pantheism may or may not be nearer the truth than Jewish monotheism. That is for the philosophers to decide. We historians of biblical ideas must take our stand upon plain historic fact. Paul, with all his tincture of Hellenistic ideas, was and remained fundamentally a Jewish theist. Idealistic monism may or may not be nearer the truth than the traditional type of Christianity which attaches special significance to the person of Jesus; but actually Paul was not an idealistic monist. He did not hold with Buddhism 'that the very form of the individual self is a necessary source of woe and of wrong,' and was far from indifferent to the character and career of the historic Jesus. On the contrary, Paul expresses his sense of salvation in terms of mystical union with a very definite historical individual. "I have been crucified with Christ, and it is no longer I that live, but Christ that liveth in me . . . the Son of God who loved me, and gave himself up for me."¹ Nor did he lose his own individuality in this mystic union with the Spirit of God in Christ. He believed that he was working out his own salvation, and working with fear and trembling too, even while confident that God was working in him even to will as well as to do. He held with the orthodox Pharisaism of his time which Josephus calls Stoic that 'All things are foreordained and yet freedom is given.'

Nevertheless there is a sense in which, as I believe, even Paul might have endorsed so radical an utterance as this of Professor Royce's, and herein I think we are all debtors to him as an interpreter of Paul's doctrine of the Kingdom. "Not through imitating nor yet through loving any mere individual human being can we be saved, but only through loyalty to the Beloved Community."² The Lord and Christ, by loving and imitating whom Paul is saved, is not a "mere individual human being." He is preëminently the eternally glorified head of the Beloved Community, and it is just because he is no longer a 'mere individual human being,' no longer 'a Christ after the flesh' that Paul can preach salvation in the name of Jesus as one manifested to

¹ Gal. 2: 20.

² Preface, p. xxv.

be the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead. We recognize that the Christ whom Paul proclaims as universal Lord, Savior, Deliverer from the impending wrath, Son and Heir of God, is a very different being from the mechanic Jesus of Nazareth. We cannot help perceiving that even the features of his earthly career, as Paul depicts them, are idealized traits, more distinctive of the Suffering Servant of Deutero-Isaiah than of the historical Jesus, and we recognize here a tremendous problem, perhaps the very greatest the historian of religion can confront: How was it possible within that brief period of Paul's own lifetime for the Jesus of history to become the Christ of dogma?

Professor R. H. Charles has shed, as I believe, more than a little light on this great question—more, I think, than he himself realizes—by the observation based on his wide studies of late Jewish and apocalyptic literature, that all the many titles applied to the Messiah, the Saint, the Just One, the Beloved, the Elect, the Son, and the like, are simply the individualized form of the titles which primarily were applied to the Beloved Community. He is their representative, and as such obtains the title in the singular, which was first applied to Israel in the plural. In other words, the messianic hope does not begin with the promise to David: "Of thy seed I will set one upon thy throne. . . . I will be to him a father and he shall be my son." It begins with the adoption of the chosen people: "Say unto Pharaoh: Israel is my son, my first born; let my son go, or I will slay thy son, thy first-born." Jesus is to Christians the Suffering Servant because it is the function of *the people of God* to suffer that it may bring redemption and the knowledge of God to all humanity. Christ became to the first believers the Suffering Servant-Son, because his career had incarnated this national ideal of Israel the missionary and martyr people. Christianity—the Christianity of the Pauline churches—therefore need not cease to be a religion of loyalty to the Beloved Community because it makes salvation dependent on the person of Christ, rather than on membership in the community as Professor Royce assumes. It does not need that detachment from the historic ideals of Judaism nor

from the individual life of the founder which Professor Royce seems to think essential, because this historic ideal of Israel and this typically loyal life of the founder are precisely what give it a tangible and real content, instead of the vague generalities of the ancient religions of personal redemption or of modern idealistic monism.

Unfortunately it is precisely at this point that Professor Royce declines even to consider the evidence, not venturing to hazard an opinion about "the origin of the Church" or "the person and life of the founder." In reality the Pauline doctrine of saving loyalty to the Beloved Community is at least as much bound up with loyalty to this glorified Head as loyalty to the Empire in his time was bound up with loyalty to the genius of Cæsar. We cannot imagine any devotion of emperor worship in ancient or modern times, any consecration of patriotism evinced in love and loyalty to the symbolic person of king or emperor, which can equal the Christian's devotion to his heavenly Lord. He who makes appeal to the Christianity of the Pauline churches as displaying at least the elements of a philosophy of loyalty should take some account, it seems to me, of this tremendous fact; for it is by no means confined to Paulinism, but everywhere the fundamental creed of the Christian is the same. He is saved if he confesses with the mouth that 'Jesus is Lord,' and believes in his heart that God hath raised him from the dead. This faith in a glorified eternal 'Lord' is in Paul's time the one distinctive badge of the Christian, the very hope and ground of his salvation. His citizenship is in heaven, because his life is hid with Christ in God.

It is not the fault, certainly not wholly the fault, of the guest in the domain of historical theology that he has not solved this problem in the history of religious ideas, which yet lies so near to his own line of argument. If we ourselves have not solved it we cannot expect the solution from one who only pays us a passing visit from the domain of philosophy. But the very intuitions of such a guest should inspire us to new research. Professor Royce's book, as I have said, takes but little account of the historical method of biblical interpretation. It can hardly

be called *religionsgeschichtlich*. It presents what it takes to be the dominant ideas of the Christianity of the Pauline churches and presents them all in one plane, practically without perspective. The author does not attempt to tell us how the Pauline idea of saving membership in the Beloved Community stands related to the teaching of Judaism and of Jesus about having part in the Kingdom of God. He does not attempt to relate the Pauline doctrine of moral inability to the earlier preaching of repentance. He does not attempt to explain the doctrine of the Suffering Servant, nor how the Atonement doctrine which he elaborates from Paul stands connected with Jesus and 'the last and greatest of the parables.' In short, he has not done our work for us. It is for us students of the history of biblical ideas, and through them of the history of religion, to solve these problems; and after the coolest, most dispassionate critical research to say whether or not the philosophy of loyalty was 'preached beforehand' in the gospel of Jesus and of Paul.

Professor Royce, as I have said, explicitly declines to attempt an answer to the question which to the historical critic of Christology must, I think, appear the greatest raised by his book: How could the Jesus of Synoptic tradition become so soon the Christ of Paul? It seems to be enough for Professor Royce to observe that he did. The people's rabbi, the prophet and healer of Nazareth, the friend of publicans and sinners, became the center and focal point for the highest human loyalty to the end of time. He was 'declared to be the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead.'

Professor Royce hesitates to deal with 'legends.' Legends? I have no more to do with legends than Professor Royce. I will dismiss them with the most radical critic that you can name. I am not asking *what* the psychological experiences were which we call the resurrection manifestations. I am asking *why* they were. Take whatever experiences you choose to posit as those which actually did lead to the confession of Christ as 'Lord.' *Why* were they? How could they produce the most 'effective' religion of the world's history, save for something in the character and career of Jesus the Nazarene? If, as we have reason

to believe, the first experience leading on to all the rest was Peter's, what was the psychology of Peter? Did it merely so happen that the Galilean fisherman and his associates, and the five hundred who soon joined them, were all ecstasies and visionaries? Or was there something in Jesus which fitted him for the part he was to play in their religious experience?

It would be presuming in me to attempt to account for all. But I think that in his philosophical definition of Christianity as the religion of loyalty, whether by research or by intuition, Professor Royce has given us the real key to the psychology of the resurrection faith. 'Loyalty' is the root-idea. Only he should not have called it the "Christianity of the Pauline churches"; for what is most distinctive in it, the doctrine of absolute devotion to the Kingdom, is the doctrine of Jesus. It is the point in which the gospel 'of' Jesus and the gospel 'about' Jesus coincide.

Is it accident only that Professor Royce in one of his rare attempts to define the gospel 'of' Jesus declares it to have been "a religion of whole-heartedness"?¹ That is the very essence of the matter. That, if I mistake not, is the key to Jesus's character and life, and the explanation of that new form of the religion of loyalty which centers upon his person. The unqualified, unreserved, absolute devotion to God his Father and the interests of God's kingdom laid down in Jesus's teaching, lived out to the uttermost in his life, made imperishable by his death, this is the essence of the religion of Jesus, and *as such* becomes 'the essence of Christianity.' This made him the incarnation of Israel's religious ideal. This made his exaltation in the faith of Peter and the rest to the rôle of eternal Lord and Christ a natural and reasonable thing, whereas without it their faith would have been hypocrisy. No visions or apparitions could have made it seem anything else to sincere and religious-minded Jews.

Take, I ask you, the last public teaching of Jesus as recorded in the earliest of the Gospels. Look upon it not as a precept for others but as the key to his own life. A scribe, a teacher of the

¹ P. 229.

law, asks him (asks him, as the reply assumes, in a genuinely sympathetic spirit): "Master, what is the great commandment of the law?" Is there a way to sum it all up? Jesus answered him with the *Shema*, the Credo of Israel, the first expression of whole-hearted loyalty learned by every Jewish boy, the last triumphant confession of every martyr to its faith: "Jehovah our God is *one* Lord, and thou shalt love Jehovah thy God with *all* thy heart, and *all* thy soul and all thy strength." This is the first commandment of the religion of loyalty. And the second is like unto it, and gives direction and content to its whole-hearted devotion: Thou shalt serve the Beloved Community. "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." We have been accustomed to regard this 'summary of the law' as a rule formulated by Jesus for the conduct of others. He would never have so employed it if it had not first constituted the principle of his own living. The *Shema* is for the Jew the supreme expression of what he calls the principle of 'the Unity,' an expression not merely of the unity of God, but also of the unity or wholeness of devotion which is God's due from man. Since God is one, no divided allegiance can be acceptable to him. In such a spirit of unreserved, whole-hearted devotion to God and his kingdom, Akiba, the great martyr of Israel in the age of its division from nascent Christianity, breathed his last breath with the *Shema* upon his lips or, as the expressive Jewish phrase has it, "taking upon himself the yoke of the kingdom (i. e., sovereignty) of God." Jesus, as we have seen, finds likewise in the *Shema* the full expression of man's ideal relation to God. In combination with the golden rule it summarizes for him religion and ethics together. His life, and even more his death, proclaimed this undivided fealty as the essence of his own inner life. He bequeathed to the church as a blood-stained token 'the yoke of the kingdom of God.' Jesus, then, and not Paul, is the true founder of the religion of loyalty. Because in his life and in his death he had been the incarnation of this principle, he could without sense of strain or incongruity be 'declared to be the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead.'

B. W. BACON.

ERROR AND UNREALITY.

THE problem of error comprises two distinct questions, viz.: (1) what is the nature of the mental process when we err and what causes lead to it, and (2) what reality, what status in metaphysics has the object of error, the illusory thing? The former may be called the psychological question, the latter the metaphysical. The psychological question has been often enough answered, and with reasonable unanimity; the metaphysical one has seldom been squarely faced. There seems to have been a feeling that when one explains how error arises he has thereby assigned the status of the erroneous object. That this is not true, a moment's consideration shows. For, no matter how the error may come about, the illusory object is equally puzzling. It is, to be sure, unreal; yet on the other hand, it cannot be unreal, because we are really aware of it. If we are ourselves real and really have a certain relation to an object it is hard to deny that that object is real. The object is effective, makes a disturbance in our minds, and exhibits unmistakable evidence of its presence there. Hence it must *be*. In short, it contains a paradox; and that is what occasions the metaphysical problem.

Now this paradox has long been admitted; and therein is the greater disgrace. For we have here no mere matter of ignorance, where we may excuse ourselves because evidence is hard to get. There lies before us a *contradictio in adjecto*, a fundamental inconsistency which should long ago have been stamped out. No unreal thing can possibly be; for reality means being. The statement that the unreal in any sense is, is a self-destructive one, a direct breach of logic. By all that is decent in metaphysics, there ought to be no such things as errors, mere appearances, or other forms partaking of non-being. As evil is a standing denial of the goodness of God, so error is a standing witness of the unreality of the real. One may think to escape the problem of evil by denying God, but no philosopher dares treat reality in that way. The problem of error he has no means of avoiding.

But until he solves this puzzle, his system breaks the most elementary rules. Let it be brilliantly set forth, full of information, even practically useful, it will be as a noble countenance besmudged.

Nor does the removal of this blemish promise much in the way of knowledge. To wash one's face before dining may be necessary, but it affords no nourishment. The solution of the problem of error is only the clearing away of a perennial stain; at the end we shall remain unprofitable servants. Still, ardently as we desire to obtain positive knowledge of the plan of the universe, we cannot in honor go forward until this menial task is finished. For our sins we are compelled to labor at it. Yet, I venture to think, we shall find in the end an advantage; if not in new doctrines, at least in casting off certain hampering traditions, and in understanding more clearly the essence of metaphysical inquiry.

The issue, we have said, has seldom been thoroughly treated. Let us then, passing in review the chief theories of error, seek to lay bare their inadequacies, as a basis for our own attempt to solve the paradox.

How can the illusory object be in any sense real? The natural common-sense answer is: 'it is not real but is mental or subjective.' And no doubt it is true that errors are subjective. But this is not sufficient to dispel the puzzle. For if we say that the mental is unreal, then we must admit that our pains are unreal, and our pleasures, our efforts, our emotions; and how can there be mental life at all? No, we cannot say without qualification that the subjective is unreal. Let us then assert that it is real as an *event* but not as a *content*. Suppose I mistakenly believe there is a tortoise on my writing-table. Then there really occurs a conscious process—my belief—and while it is a real event, the object of it, the tortoise on my table, is not something contained in that event. The tortoise on my table is not a member of the subjective world, a psychical entity. If he were so, he would be real; as real as pain or any other subjective thing. He is simply the *object* of my mental process, of my belief. But the object of a thought is not part of or in the thought as a coin is in

a purse. It is somehow related to the thought but not of the same stuff with it. It belongs to the world of non-existing beings.

Thus the common-sense view loses its *naïveté*. It no longer considers the illusory object subjective. It has seen that subjective stuff is as real as any other stuff; and that therefore if the tortoise on the table is not to be real, he must be something neither material nor mental. He must be a citizen of a third country, the realm of unreal beings. This however brings us back to our original problem. For how can anything unreal be? The 'subjective' device has thrown no light on that puzzle, and must be held to have failed.

But not so fast! We spoke of the tortoise on the table as an illusory object. But perhaps we put the matter in a wrong perspective. Perhaps it is not an object at all. It may be quite incorrect to say that error is a belief in an unreal object. Is it not rather the case, that we never believe *in* an object, but believe *that* an object *is* so-and-so? In short, errors are not false objects, but false judgments. We spoke as if an idea could be erroneous; but surely it is only a judgment that can err. There is no such object as tortoise-on-my-table, whether in the real or mental or unreal world. The error consists in the mistaken *reference* of the tortoise *to* my table. It is in my attribution of the beast to the particular environment that the mistake lies. This attribution now is an act of mine and no property of the tortoise, and in this sense the error is subjective. The tortoise is real as a mental content, and the table is real as a physical body, and the error is my act of uniting or relating the two. Thus, it would be alleged, a better analysis of error rehabilitates the common-sense view.

What then is this act of attributing a predicate to a subject? Is it just a mystery of the mind, not further reducible? Now in the case of true judgments, the predication is more than an act of a mind; it is objectively valid. What 'objectively valid' means, depends upon one's metaphysical system; it may mean that the predication corresponds to the real state of things, or that it is itself objectively real. In either case, however, it is more than a mere act; the subject and predicate are really related

as our act relates them. And in false judgments, the maker of the judgment views the subject and predicate as thus really related. To him at the time of judging the judgment is not an act: his state of mind is just as saturated with objective reference as if he were correct. When I believe that the tortoise is on my table, I think reality itself contains that predication or what corresponds to it. As far as my own experience is concerned, I apprehend an objective situation as much when I am wrong as when I am right. In the psychical realm, the mere fact that I seem to see it is enough to make me see it, to call a judgment an act only is an inadequate description. It is an act, if you insist, but an act in which reality, or what purports to be reality, becomes our object. The common-sense solution cannot then escape the difficulty by refusing to admit an illusory object. For judgment is in every case about an object: no less with errors than with truths.

With this the puzzle returns. Where shall we put the precious tortoise? He is really the object of my judgment. Or if you prefer, we can say that his being on the table is the object of the judgment: 'that he is on the table' is the object of my belief. This is the *Objektiv*, as Meinong called it, of the judgment; the content or object which, in Brentano's terms, we accept or acknowledge when we make the judgment. But it matters not whether we speak of the object, the tortoise-on-the-table, or the *Objektiv*, that-the-tortoise-is-on-the-table; in either case we have something which forms the subject-matter of the judgment. And the question is, what status in reality has this 'unreal' entity? If we call it a mental thing, then it is real; if we say it is no mental thing, we must devise some third region, some sort of home for wanderers, which is designed to receive these non-existent beings.

Nevertheless, so inveterate are the prejudices of common sense, that the former alternative will probably still be chosen. Let us, they say, give up the notion of unreality. The tortoise in question is mental, and is quite real; but he is not endowed with physical reality. The error, we may be told, does not lie in his non-existence, but in the confusion of two distinct spheres of

reality. Or, to speak generally, all illusory objects are real, but they are not the particular objects we judge them to be. In our example, there is a real tortoise on a real table, but that table is not the physical table in the space-world. The mistake would consist in the identification of the mental world with the material world. There would be, on this view, no one illusory object—tortoise-on-my-table—but two real objects—tortoise-on-table in the psychical field, and table-without-tortoise in the physical; and it is the attempt to identify these two with each other, that gives rise to error. Now in reply to these statements we have only to recall that the tortoise-on-the-table which we erroneously believe in, is *ipso facto* considered to be a material being on a material desk. The object of the erroneous judgment is not a mental tortoise, but a tortoise with material attributes and in a certain spatial position. You may distinguish as much as you please between the beast and his material predicates, but that is only one side of the matter. They are also identical. The tortoise in question is meant to be, and understood to be, a material entity. He may be as subjective as you wish, but in the subjective world he is a material being. And it is just this paradox that creates the puzzle. Put him into the subjective world and his reality will be of the sort that world gives him. But in that world, viz., in the erroneous judgment, he is given material reality. Or we may state the difficulty in another way. Make the illusory object mental if you will. Then the error consists in the identification of the mental with the physical reality. In which world is now the identity which is alleged in that identification? If in the subjective world, it is none the less real. But if it is real, then there is no error. If you answer, it is real subjectively but not materially, then you must say that the error consists in confusing the subjective identification with the material identification. We have only to reply, where does this confusion reside? If subjective, it is real—and so on indefinitely. To call the error subjective can never suffice to explain the source of its unreality. And indeed this might be seen at the outset. The notion of unreality cannot be generated out of the notion of diverse realms of reality. As well try to derive the notion of a horse from that of different races of mankind.

We saw above that the illusory objects must be put either into the psychical realm or into some metaphysical home for incurables. Such a home has been founded by those who do not favor the subjective as an ultimate category. Different benefactors of this institution have given it different names; we may instance the "unreal subsistence" of Montague, the "heimatlose Gegenstände" of Meinong, the "neutral being" of Holt. What is the nature of this region? Does it possess such a character as to show us how the unreal can yet somehow be?

The first article in the constitution of the new establishment must be "the distinction between reality and being or subsistence."¹ "The universe is not all real" says Professor Holt "but the universe all is."² Thus we are to solve the paradox by discriminating between reality and being. What then is the difference between them? For it is by no means self-evident that there is a difference. The same author says, "Is it not evident that *being real* or *being thought* or *being* anything whatsoever is both a more complex and a more special thing than merely being?"³ Now it is difficult not to think that he is here misled by the linguistic form. 'To be real' adds an adjective to the infinitive, but language is often redundant. If we argue from linguistic expression to meaning, we shall have to grant that the Aristotelian logic is not valid for the Semites, Malays, Chinese, and others who use a differently constructed sentence from that of the Greeks. But the following reason also is assigned: "As to *being real* . . . we know that there is the opposed category of *being unreal*," therefore "Being real connotes more than *being*" (p. 21). Let us grant this point; let us admit that there are multitudes of things that are unreal. But what *is* it to be unreal rather than real and how is it possible? That is our very problem. No definition is given, no light is thrown on the paradox. We are met by a *refutatio ambulando*, but the matter is not explained. The home for incurables seems to be divided against itself. Is it, indeed, anything more than a hell which

¹ E. B. Holt, *The New Realism*, p. 358.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 360.

³ *Concept of Consciousness*, p. 21.

the metaphysician constructs for the purpose of receiving the devils? But how the good God can countenance a hell, or how reality can so far contradict itself as to become unreal, we do not understand.

Professor Holt here takes the bull by the horns and declares that the paradox *need not* be solved. Errors are contradictions, yes: but contradictions may be. In fact, the world is full of them. "Whenever a moving body strikes another and is stopped or turned, the law of its motion is contradicted . . . all phenomena of *interference* are cases of contradiction. . . . At the point of interference the vibratory motions imparted to the ether or to molecules are contradictory to one another, and at that point the wave-motion ceases; and energy is said to have assumed the form of tension. All counterbalancings, as in cantilevers and Gothic vaultings, are contradictory forces in equilibrium. All collisions between bodies, all interference between energies, all processes of warming and cooling, of electrically charging and discharging, of starting and stopping, of combining and separating, are processes of which one undoes the other. And they cannot be defined by the scientist except in propositions which manifestly contradict one another. All nature is so full of these mutually negative processes that we are moved to admiration when a few forces co-operate long enough to form what we call an organism; and even then *decay* sets in forthwith. We call nature everywhere consistent, and yet we admit that life is a mystery while death is none: it is none, because the antagonism of contradictory forces is the familiar phenomenon, while co-operation of forces is relatively infrequent."¹ "Nature is a seething chaos of contradiction" (p. 276). We are not here concerned to deny this. To be sure, these words present a picture of the universe very like to that of the absolute idealist, of whom the above writer is the doughty foe; but one knows that extremes meet. And if one objects to the 'Absolute' that we do not understand how it solves the dialectical contradictions, one may equally object here that we do not understand how nature can be real while it is so self-destructive. A contradiction is a con-

¹ *Concept of Consciousness*, p. 275.

tradition, whether revealed by an idealist or a realist. We cannot be at peace until we solve it, for we cannot help wishing to solve it. It is no satisfaction to an inevitable desire, to be told we ought not to have the desire. That is but an attempt to put a good face upon the mind's defeat. Once more, then, the problem of error is not solved; it is only put aside.

But there is open a quite different way of approach. It was the illusory object that made the trouble. It is somehow real, and yet it is not. And whether we call it real or mere being without reality it is equally contradictory; unreal being is a contradiction in terms. Now let us have a change of venue. Let us drop the static point of view; let us not speak of the illusory object, as if it were a rigid entity. Remember that objects are but stages in the stream of events; adopt, in short, a dynamic or functional point of view. Error now appears to be, not a static beholding of an unreal thing, but maladjustment. "Any idea," said James, "that helps us to *deal*, whether practically or intellectually, with either the reality or its belongings, that doesn't entangle our progress in frustrations, that *fits*, in fact, and adapts our life to the reality's whole setting, . . . will hold true of that reality."¹ And by implication, an idea, or judgment, which works against our adaptation to the reality, will be erroneous. Surely there is no contradiction here, for there is no entity which is unreal. Error is failure: a real process, as real, unfortunately, as the success which constitutes truth.

What then is the nature of this process? Define the erroneous idea in functional terms, if you prefer; let it be a plan of action, or a tentative reaction upon a part of the environment. Still it is a conscious process. It differs from the incipient reaction of the coiled spring in that it entails some sort of prevision of the anticipated act. If I plan to reach out and cut off the head of the tortoise as an intruder upon my table, my intention cannot be fulfilled; but my purpose to do this is more than the tightening of my muscles and whipping the knife out of my pocket. It is the distinction of consciousness that it reaches forward into the future as well as backward into the past, and a plan of action

¹ *Pragmatism*, p. 213.

is a case of the forward-reaching. The person who entertains the plan has before his mind a deed which is not yet real, and if he is in error, never can be real. As we commonly say, he contemplates the deed. He sees it in his mind's eye. If it can be realized, there is no contradiction; if it cannot be realized, he is contemplating an impossible and therefore unreal object. It matters nothing that the object is his own act rather than an external thing; it is equally contradictory. We find that the paradox returns upon us as before, for we have only translated the whole thing into another language—the language of process and deed. But which is more unintelligible: to contemplate an impossible deed or to be aware of a non-existent thing?

We are not impugning the correctness of the functional theory. It is, we believe, in many ways the best account yet given of truth and error: it is positive, specific, and offers a verifiable criterion of each. But it does not, we submit, go deep enough to remove the inconsistency of an impossible performance, of an unreal reality.

No; there is no way of understanding errors so long as reality contradicts unreality. Well then, let us make a last stand and deny that these two are hostile. Let us say that reality admits of unreality, as light admits shadows; yes, that each interpenetrates and constitutes the other. This is the way of absolute idealism. Every finite object is to a certain extent unreal, each in its own degree. The Whole alone is real; but being the whole, it includes all the parts, and among them, our errors. "The Absolute *has* without subtraction all those qualities, and it has every arrangement which we seem to confer upon it by our mere mistake."¹ Now suppose we admit the main theses of this view. Suppose we agree that science gives only relative truth, that sense-perception is not absolute knowledge, etc. Still what we commonly call error is on a different footing from scientific knowledge or sense-perception. That the planets travel in elliptical orbits may not be absolute truth and may contain some taint of metaphysical error, but it is not at all like the proposition that planets travel in straight lines. That is a

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, 3d ed., p. 192.

scientific error. And my perception of the tortoise on my table is a perceptual error. In these cases it is not merely the partiality, the finiteness, of my knowledge that renders it false, but the positive attribution of a particular predicate to a particular subject which contradicts it. Error is not merely partial knowledge or ignorance but the appearance of something which is not even present as a part of the world. Taking a broader point of view does not lead to its inclusion, its metaphysical rescue, but to its rejection. As Mr. Bradley says, "the problem of error cannot be solved by an enlarged scheme of relations."¹ And Mr. Bosanquet makes the same point: "Now in 'factual error' there is, in addition to such abstraction, hostility, *contradiction* by its conditions, from which abstraction has been made."² Absolute idealism is thus confronted not merely by appearance, or what we may call metaphysical unreality, but by a very special sort of appearance, or factual error. We can, in a way, understand that a broader point of view will solve the contradictions of the former. To be sure, as Mr. Bradley himself urges, we cannot understand it in detail, but we can see in a general way how it is possible and necessary. But as regards factual error, which is our own present problem, we cannot see even in a general way how it can be considered real. It *must* of course be real, but it is impossible to see how it *can* be. The tortoise on my table must in some mysterious way both be and not be. We may grant that the absolutist proves that this opposition is in the Absolute necessarily solved. We may assent to his words when he says "The one-sided emphasis of error, its isolation as positive and as not dissoluble in a wider connection—this again will contribute, we know not how, to the harmony of the Absolute."³ But inasmuch as "we know not how" we are no better off than when we started. The paradox of a non-existent existence remains. Of course, if this were only a case of ignorance on our part, it would be tolerable enough, for we could hope for added knowledge. But—to repeat what we said

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 195.

² *Logic*, 2d ed., I, p. 383 footnote.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

earlier—it is a flat contradiction. It is to the metaphysician's world what sin is to the moralist's; it is something which by all the rules of the game ought not to be.

We believe, then, that the metaphysical problem of error is as yet unsolved; and that being so, it becomes our duty to attempt its solution. Why did the above answers seem to fail? Because they were confronted with two mutually destructive attributes: real and unreal. The shallower views tried to hold the combatants apart by putting them into different realms—the subjective and objective; the deeper views saw the futility of this, and allowed them to fight, but were fain to extract a degree of comfort from the spectacle. And in the end no one has made peace between them. It appears that there is only one resource remaining. One of the contestants must be slain, dissolved, analyzed away. As this cannot be the category of the real, it will have to be that of the unreal. If we could believe that there are no unreal things, the contradiction would be solved. This is indeed a heroic remedy; for it is to grant reality to everything, to the content of wildest imaginations, of the most insane delusions. Can we possibly carry through so desperate a programme? Let us see how it works out.

Our first assertion shall be, that there is nothing unreal; or better, everything is real. Everything then which is an object of thought is real. Anybody will grant that perhaps it is real in the subjective world, or in some 'subsistent' world; but we ask, how can those worlds be unreal? They cannot; nothing *can* be unreal, for that is a contradiction in terms. To be an object of thought is to be related in a certain definite manner to some mind; and if the mind is real and the relation is real it is difficult to see how the term which is related can fail to be real. A real man cannot really hang from a non-existent rope. What then is the logical consequence? Why, that every illusory object is real—for it is the object of thought when one errs. Then the tortoise on my table is after all real. But further he is real not merely in the subjective world, but in the physical world. For it is of him as being physically real that I think, when I make the error. The very gist of the error is that he is a physical tortoise

on my physical table. But it seems as if we had gone too far; for wherein is any error left? Now comes our second or counter-assertion, without which the first would be futile. The error consists, not in my belief in the tortoise, but in the denial which, in my mind, goes with that belief. I take the tortoise's presence to exclude the presence of whatever else is there—be it a book, a pencil, or just air. It is in the denial of that fact or object that the sting of error lies. Error entails denial of some fact; it is a belief in the non-existence of something. This kind of a being, a negation, and this alone, can without inconsistency be unreal; for it is not, properly speaking, an entity, but a case of non-entity. And with this, we suggest, the paradox of error is solved.

Now we should here prefer to illustrate and test our view empirically; but the chief source of opposition to it will doubtless lie—as usual in philosophy—in certain presuppositions deemed metaphysically necessary, rather than in evidence drawn from particular cases. Hence it is better to consider first some of those presuppositions.

Perhaps the initial objection will be, that the reality of the tortoise cannot be admitted, because it conflicts with that of the book, inasmuch as both are referred to the same place. Two bodies, we shall be told, cannot occupy the same space. And if we presume to deny this apparent axiom, the reply will doubtless be 'Nonsense!' But nonsense is a relative term. To the ordinary Euclidean mind it may well seem nonsense that parallel lines should meet; but we know nowadays that the famous 'parallel-axiom' is really no axiom at all. There is nothing contradictory in their meeting. And there are intelligible systems of geometry in which a straight line is not the shortest distance between two points. Indeed, the great service which modern mathematics has rendered to philosophy lies, I think, not in its ability to prove philosophic truth, but in the freeing of the human imagination from its belief that this and that so-called axiom is *a priori* necessary, and that to deny it would be self-contradiction. It is, or should be, a commonplace in philosophy today that (as Kant early discovered) the principle of

contradiction is infertile to account for any specific fact. And why is it infertile? Because no specific fact has a specific contradictory opposite. Physical incompatibility Sigwart says we find; but even this incompatibility would be better named separation. Our eyes do not see red and green together, but why might there not be such an eye? Some people, it is alleged, see red in olive-green. And why should not some one construct a geometry containing the postulate that two bodies and no more may occupy the same space? And another geometry in which three might, and so on? There are no rules forbidding it. So we are driven to say that no error compels us to deny a truth. We think it does, because we are the slaves of habitual perception; but after all, reason has thrown off many a heavier yoke. One might fairly estimate our advance from savagery by the number of possibilities we are willing to admit. The more primitive the mind is, the more is excluded. In the field of practice, Professor Baldwin has recently brought this to our notice. "Primitive man" he says, "is governed by an elaborate system of rules, rites, and mystic observances, which know no exceptions and show no mercy. We are accustomed to think of the 'natural man' as a sort of primitive 'individualist,' free from our social conventions, and roaming at his own sweet will in the broad fields of life. But the very reverse is the case. Primitive man is a slave, subject to unheard-of severities, brutalities, terrors, sanctions, persecutions, all represented by detailed rites and ceremonies that make his life a perpetual shiver of dread. . . ."¹ And a similar phenomenon seems verifiable in the sphere of beliefs; both in the race and in the individual. Primitive man is conservative, and youth is conservative. Ability to take the point of view of other people, to consider novel suggestions, unaccustomed hypotheses, is a late acquisition of civilized life; and is almost the prerogative of maturity and old age. Then history of science is a case in point. How unwilling was the mediæval mind to consider the proposals of the astronomers and physicists! The more do we pride ourselves—and justly—upon our increased toleration of all ideas. Now it is simply the logical

¹ *Genetic Theory of Reality*, p. 46.

conclusion of this increase, that we come to the position here advocated, and admit that everything is not only possible, but compossible. No statement, and no fact, contradicts any other statement or fact; provided the latter is truly other, or about another.

Do we then abolish contradiction entirely? By no means. Having once made a statement, one may not deny it; in this sense alone do contradictions ever occur. They are, truly analyzed, always of the form 'A is B' versus 'It is not true that A is B.' But the denial of 'A is B' is never forced by another judgment 'A is C.' No predicate C contradicts another predicate B. It is usual to say that only propositions can contradict each other. But this is, we suspect, not seriously meant; for it is tacitly believed to be the hostility of the predicates which *makes* the propositions conflict. Thus, 'this figure is square' is alleged to contradict 'this figure is round' only because 'square' and 'round' are supposed to be incompatible. But this incompatibility is just what we deny. The true contradictory of 'this figure is round' is not 'this figure is square' or 'triangular' etc., but 'it is not true that this figure is round.'

So extreme, we may say so violent a statement, needs however some care in the interpreting. Squareness cannot contradict roundness, *unless* you have already defined 'square' by your particular system of geometrical postulates, in such a way as to exclude 'round.' In Euclidean space, which we usually take to be the space of our perception, we do so define it; the mutual exclusion is involved in the postulates of our space. And therefore, when we are talking in terms of that space, to say 'that square is round' is, by definition, to say 'that square excludes squareness' which amounts to saying 'it is not true that that square is square'—a self-contradiction. If you agree beforehand that your terms are understood as mutually inconsistent, then of course your illusory object, the round square, is non-existent. But that is because it is not even an object of thought, but a denial of such an object. It is not a figure with two positive qualities, round and square, but a square (or a circle) which is erased as we try to picture or conceive it. Yet apart from

Euclidean geometry, who would say that a system of postulates might not be devised which would enable squares to be round, circles to be triangular, etc., etc.?

Consider also another pair of alleged opposites; one, too, which has played no mean part in the strife of philosophers—to wit, sameness and difference. Many thinkers have taken for granted that these two contradict each other. Two things, they say, cannot be the same and yet different. The famous ‘dialectic,’ in fact, turns upon this assumption. Messrs. Bradley and Bosanquet define contradiction as the identification of the diverse. Now this is dogmatism. It cannot be proved by analysis, since the situation is too simple to be analyzed; it rests upon no evidence of experience, since experience presents to us a complex of sameness-in-difference. If what is self-contradictory cannot be real, it would therefore seem that sameness-in-difference is not self-contradictory. Surely this is more natural than to declare that sameness *must* contradict difference, and therefore the world we see is infested with non-being!

Or take another, and even harder, instance. Does it not seem to be an absolute *a priori* contradiction to think of a body moving in two directions at once? And we certainly have no empirical scientific grounds for believing in such monsters. But that seeming inconsistency is due to the fact that in waking life in our space we do not see such things, and we impart that habit into the very nature of body as such. In dream-life, however, we frequently experience a doubling of identity, both in persons and things; and this is somewhat analogous. Our friend A.B. is our friend C.D. as well as himself, and we are not surprised. And dream-life is of course quite as real as waking life—only it is not usually considered to be numerically the same life.

No two qualities or properties considered in themselves contradict each other. A thing indeed cannot both *be* and *not be*; so speaks the law of contradiction. And the corollary of it is, that a proposition should not be asserted and then denied. But a thing can have any predicate X you please and then at the same time any other predicate Y you please—always provided you have not already defined X as the non-existence of Y, or conversely.

The next metaphysical *reductio ad absurdum* of our view may perhaps be this: if all things thought of are real, there is no way of distinguishing the illusory object from the non-illusory. The term 'real' is so general as to have lost meaning. Should we not have defined it before venturing to employ it in the large, loose manner above used? Now this objection is one of a kind which must always confront a wholesale view. Subjective idealism, for instance, has to furnish a criterion between the subjective and the objective, absolutism between reality and appearance, pragmatism between practical and theoretical needs, and so on. And so we must in our turn account for the distinction between the book that is on the table and the tortoise that we erroneously assert to be on it. Now what are the properties of each? When I blow across the table the book will hold down a piece of paper while the tortoise will not. The book weighs, say, two pounds, the tortoise weighs nothing. I can open the book, but I cannot open the tortoise. It is like the old example of the real and imaginary dollar. The former will buy something, the latter will not. To be sure, Kant declared that the two differ in no describable way; but surely that was because he considered them abstractly, merely by themselves, and not in the concrete situations of life. In short, the illusory objects have no consequences, the other objects have. It makes no difference whether you accept the tortoise or not; you try to act upon him and nothing can be done. You can go through the motions of dissecting him, but those motions alter nothing and are not affected by his presence or absence. Now these seem to be the facts of the case, and we are indebted to the pragmatists for having pointed them out. The illusory object, then, is real enough, but it is not effective; it is not creative, it produces nothing, and is not affected by anything. We can imagine it producing something, and then it does so; but the productiveness goes no further than our judgment pushes it. The non-illusory object, however, takes the game into its own hands, and affects the environment and the future course of events whether we go on to predicate them or not. The difference is one of fertility or coherence. Errors are the drones, facts are the workers. But the one class is just as real as the other.

Here we may be accused of philosophic partisanship. In defining the erroneous as that which does not cohere with the remainder of our world, we seem to have chosen the idealistic theory of truth. And *ipso facto* we seem to reject the (realistic) independence-theory. Now it would be a pity if our results hung upon the solution of so difficult an issue. As a matter of fact, however, the independence-theory could easily assimilate our view. However much independence there may be between the parts of our world, there is always enough system in any given case for us to test truth and error by it. There is no 'reality' so isolated that it does not belong in *some* context; and in the actual working we estimate its 'reality' or 'unreality' by comparing it with that context. An alleged hallucination we compare with the physical world; a faint odor, challenged, we attest by repeated sniffing; a sum of a column of figures we add up in reverse order; and so on. Everything that we commonly call real, whether physical, or psychical, or spiritual, or conceptual, has enough connections in its own field for us to be able to verify it by examining those connections.

But to return. There is not the least need of distinguishing reality from unreality in order to distinguish truth from error. We are here confronted, I believe, by a superstition as injurious as it is deep-rooted. Unwittingly we judge reality after the analogy of human rivalries, competition, the struggle for food. As there is not enough provender for all, we vie with one another for it; one person's satiety is another's want. So we think that there can be no reality without a correlative unreality; as if the supply were limited. Notwithstanding the fact that modern society is ever more earnestly attempting to abolish this exclusiveness, we have it too thoroughly beaten into us to be able easily to dislodge it. In social theory, lovers of peace that most of us are, we should not dare to uphold such an ideal. But in metaphysics it seems to do little harm, for metaphysics has come to have little bearing upon the rest of life; and the presence of the superstition passes unnoticed. The result for metaphysics is contradiction, just as for practical life it is pain. But, as the simple-minded Parmenides taught, Being is and non-Being is

not. There is enough of Being to supply all, without taxing some into giving up their share.

Another rather fundamental objection is this: our view would rule out an old and respectable tradition which believes in degrees of reality. For if unreal being is a contradiction in terms, there can be no slightest lessening of the fulness of being in any instance. An abstraction like a perfect circle would be as real as the sun, or the Roman empire, or God. But our view, with its all-or-nothing attitude, misses the richness and the graded quality of reality—as do all wholesale, downright views. Moreover, if unreal being were an inconsistency then so is dim light; for that is light which is not all light. But I answer, there is a distinction of kind between degrees of light and degrees of being. Whatever has non-being must first be, as the substance is prior to the accident. It makes no difference how small the degree of non-being, that non-being is still the real negation of being—which is the same as saying a real nothing. It is self-contradictory: the *fons et origo*, indeed, of self-contradiction. To be sure, some say that *nothing* is a real entity—an existing thing. It would be just as true to say it was not: for *nothing* is a self annulling thing, naturally. But neither statement gives warrant for the assertion, that positive objects are infected by nothingness in such wise as to reduce their reality. There can *be* all the nothings you wish, but they do not eat into and partially destroy the being of any particular object. Of light, now, the case is otherwise. An object which is partly dark must *be* in order to be dark; but there is no contradiction between being and darkness. It does not have to be lighted in order to be dark. But non-being has to be in order not to be. And the doctrine of degrees of reality—which is, I believe, a valuable doctrine—loses none of its worth if for reality we substitute some other term, such as perfection, or complexity, or what not.

Let us now examine a practical objection. Suppose one grants that everything he imagines or conceives is real: then see the result! As he walks in the morning to his office, there happens into his mind the idea of a bloodhound in pursuit of him. Dashing forward at top speed, he loses hat and bag, colliding with

passers-by, only to turn suddenly at a right angle because the thought of an advancing mastodon has arisen in his brain. So the poor man will proceed through his day, suffering dreadfully from an enlarged conception of reality. We may begin by describing his malady as auto-suggestion but we must end by confining him as a lunatic. A *reductio ad absurdum* of our theory, indeed. And yet I believe the victim might have escaped this fate. Admit everything to be real, yes: but remember also that some objects are fertile of consequences and others are not. Our friend need only realize that illusory objects are absolutely irrelevant objects; they contradict nothing and they produce nothing. They are the waste products, the dung of the universe. And when one tries to adjust himself to them his deeds are futile and irrelevant to the business of life. But these are terms of practice. Insanity, in short, does not mean a group of erroneous beliefs; it is not a theoretical, but a practical category. However many absurdities enter one's head, yes, however many of them he believes, so long as he is able to repress the tendency to act upon them and attends to the 'realities of life' as we call them, he is adjudged sane. And as matter of fact, it is the lot of most men who are thought mentally sound to own a goodly share of these suppressed beliefs. Who would be willing to confess all the idiotic thoughts, the shameful suggestions more than half credited, that pass through his head in a day?

We have said that everything positive is real, and we called negations alone unreal. But is not negation a genuine attribute of things? White is not red, you are not I, time is not space, etc. Without negations, reality would be featureless. And in the instance above discussed, it is absolutely essential that we recognize that the book on my table is not the tortoise and the tortoise is not the book; each retains its particularity by negation of the other. Now in one meaning of negation, it is doubtless quite real, viz., in the meaning 'other than.' This is the predicative or relational use, as in 'white is not red,' 'the book is not the tortoise,' 'you are not I.' But there is another use, whereby it is taken to mean denial of existence or of truth; as in judgments like 'there are no centaurs,' 'no men are perfect,'

'nothing is better than wisdom' or 'there is no tortoise here.' In these examples, certain things are commonly understood to be excluded from reality; but such exclusion, such non-existence, is for our view not a fact. Non-being is not; reality excludes naught from itself. We do not, then, claim that there are no true negative judgments. But every negative judgment, correctly put, is of the form 'A is other than B.' 'There is no book here,' means 'what is here is other than a book.' 'No men are perfect,' should be interpreted 'all men are other than perfect.' 'Nothing is better than wisdom,' we should restate as 'wisdom is better than anything else.' Our analysis may be illustrated by reference to the old fallacy: "nothing is better than wisdom, but dry bread is better than nothing, therefore, etc." Here the mistake consists in taking nothing to be an entity, whereas if the propositions were understood in our sense, this could not occur.

The above objections are perhaps the more prominent of those which rest upon certain metaphysical assumptions. Others indubitably there are; but some of them at least will be dealt with if we pass to the application of our theory in specific cases. Let us then proceed to this, the real test of our proffered solution.

We begin with some errors of sense. I judge a distant bush to be three feet high when it is 'really' four feet high. Here I perceive a real three-foot bush. To be three feet high is a property of that four-foot bush. The bush has, indeed, potentially an infinite number of heights besides the four-foot height. Any object, we may say, spreads like a grease-spot; by which we mean that it stands ready to take on an endless number of attributes, relations, etc. Its properties are infinitely infinite, as great in number as the point-continuum, which surpasses the denumerable infinity by the infinity of irrational fractions and transcendental numbers. It is like an area, or a finite line, in its inexhaustibility. Even common sense admits a vast wealth of predicates to any one thing; but our view goes much farther. And of all these properties, how few, relatively, are the effective ones, those which alone common sense considers real! It is like nature's lavish production of eggs in some of the lower species.

Out of a million eggs, two or three perhaps are strong enough to survive; the rest are, biologically, as if they were not. The biological law thus appears to be but one case of a wider law; a law by which reality itself puts forth, with infinite prodigality, an inexhaustible number of attributes of each object. So the bush may *be* of any height you please; but, in the case we have designated, our apprehension of all of these but the four-foot height is incompetent to enable us to deal with the thing. The apprehension which gets that particular height is the one which helps us to understand the other qualities of the bush; for that height of four feet is the quality by which the bush takes its place in the environment, the quality which coheres with the other 'real' qualities. As we noted above, in this matter of 'coherence' our view resembles idealism and pragmatism. But while these two say that reality *is* coherence or effectiveness, we make reality a wider, richer thing, which displays such a boundless creativity as we find in two of its chief categories, space and life. We include in it the abstract, the partial, the insignificant. And in fact it is difficult to see how any metaphysic can do otherwise, for the unreal, the finite, etc., *are*, and the appearance *really* appears, and the abstraction *is actually* abstracted; so that we always have to say 'the unreal really is.'

But let us take up some more errors of sense. Suppose that I see two objects where there is one. Here the duplicity is real and does not conflict with the unity. The same remarks may be made as above in regard to the effectiveness of its unity and the ineffectiveness of its duplicity. And of course we shall declare that there is no contradiction in a thing being one and at the same time two. Perhaps this may be easier admitted than some of our declarations, inasmuch as there seem to be many instances of this sort. The same person is one and two, for he is quite a different being to his friend from what he is to his enemy, etc. And the difficulty about the same body occupying two places has been already treated. The judgments made by the color-blind offer, I think, nothing in principle not yet discussed. They are either denials—'that object is not red' or substitutions 'that object which you call red is brown.' The denial

has no object, but is an attempt to remove a suggested object: the red color. Hence it offers no positive unreal content. The substitution must be admitted true, but does not contradict the vision of the normal eye, because no color precludes another color. Time-illusions are perhaps more interesting, though logically analogous to the preceding cases. The misdating of an event seems flatly inconsistent with the fact; but there is no *a priori* reason why a given event should not happen at any number of different times. The postulates which govern the nature of the time we perceive, are no more sacred than the postulates of Euclidean space. Of course, we may be told that a different date makes a different event, because the environment will affect the event. Had the death of Cæsar, *per impossibile*, happened in 500 A.D., it would have occurred in a very different manner. This we may admit; but if sameness does not contradict difference, it might also have taken place in the original Roman fashion. On our principles the reality of no one specific object interferes with that of another; therefore, no particular event at any particular date can be considered unreal. The distinction between illusion and fact must be conceived in terms of efficacy.

In certain psychological experiments the subject perceives the sensory stimulations in the reverse of their true order. Surely we cannot deny that here is a contradiction? Is not the reverse inconsistent with the original order in *any* system of postulates? And this case is typical of many. If an object in the dark is illuminated for but a fraction of a second, I may see its parts in the wrong order. Proof-readers often see the interchanged letters of a word as if correctly printed. Who among us has seen the cinematograph reversed, so that people are seen to eat and drink backwards, etc.? Professor K. Pearson suggests¹ that one who left the earth faster than light travels would see history unroll itself into the past. However mechanically impossible they are, such experiences are not inconsistent, either with themselves or with reality. After all, a reversal of order is but a change of position in one or more of the members of the series.

¹ Somewhere in the *Grammar of Science*, I believe, but cannot verify it.

The order ABC is no more adverse to the order ACB, than is the position of B in one place contradicted by its position in another; and that we have already declared to be not the case. In short, time is not irreversible. There may *be* many events that never recur, but they *could* consistently do so. The dogma of the inherent irreversibility of time is an instance of the superstition we are combating throughout this investigation—the superstition that two or more distinct things can be mutually inconsistent.

More difficult than errors of sense, are errors of thought. Thought can take tremendous liberties: its range of objects has no limit that can be designated, for such a limit is passed in thought. If now any object whatsoever is real, all objects of thought are real; and quite independently of our belief or disbelief in them. And there are some hard cases. Suppose, *e. g.*, I imagine that my view of error is erroneous. There my fancy must be true; the *Objektiv*, 'that my view is wrong,' is real. Yet I view the opposite as real. Now how can a theory be right and wrong at once? Is not this a genuine contradiction? Surely this is worse than a body being in two places at once. Yes, it is worse; for it is a flat denial. There is no positive object before me in so far as I say, 'this theory is not true.' It is, so to speak, an attempted destruction of a positive object, *viz.*, of the theory itself. The destruction is however a mere act, having no content; and as it has no content, it is not an unreal entity, but a non-entity. If on the other hand the theory were truly wrong and one should say 'it is correct,' the situation is nearly the same. For there seems a real contradiction between 'the theory is correct' and 'the theory is false,' one of the *Objektive* here must then be an unreal entity. But these are judgments of reflection, not of simple apprehension. Their *Objektive* are respectively 'the theory being true' and 'the theory being not true'; and the latter is just the flat denial of the former, and conversely. The erroneous view, in other words, is just a *denial* of the true view; it has no peculiar content of its own, but is an attempt to suppress or destroy the content of the other. When, then, I say erroneously 'my view is the true one'—provided I confine myself to this proposition and do not go into the details of 'my

view'—there is no positive unreal content before me. In neither assertion about the view itself is there a contradiction between two objects or entities.

Another case is: $3 + 1 = 5$. This is simple. We define 5 as $3 + 2$, and we define 2 as inconsistent with 1, and hence $3 + 1 = 5$ is an attempt to deny our definitions; and that is all it is. It presents no positive object—except it assume a new definition of 3, 1, and 2; but in that case there is no error.

A more serious instance is this: suppose I say 'A is greater than B and B is greater than C, therefore A is less than C.' Or again, 'A is essentially similar to B and B is after C, therefore A is before C.' Many analogous instances readily suggest themselves. Now these are chains of reasoning, and there is implication leading from the premises to a certain conclusion. The difficulty of such cases is that another and positive proposition, put in place of the conclusion, appears to contradict the premises—which are themselves positive. Here then would seem to be an occasion where there is genuine contradiction between two distinct *Objektive*—a possibility our theory had to deny. But we must ask, how does 'A is less than C' contradict 'A is greater than B and B is greater than C'? We answer, only in so far as it contradicts their consequence, 'A is greater than C.' But it is not true that it contradicts that consequence. It is *a priori* quite possible that $A > B$ and $B > A$ are true together. In fact some have defined equality by this property: $A = B$ when ' $A > B$ ' and ' $B > A$ ' together are true. In the number-system we are accustomed to use, and in the systems of quantity that we use, ' $A > B$ ' is indeed so defined that ' $A < B$ ' is not, except in the case of equality, at the same time true. But a different number-system and a different quantity-system are conceivable. Since then 'A is less than C' does not contradict 'A is greater than C,' it does not contradict the premises 'A is greater than B' and 'B is greater than C.' To be sure the question remains: how are we to distinguish the false from the true, if neither contradicts the fact? By the criterion of efficacy, fertility, coherence. Thus: 'A < C' does not follow from those premises, nor do other

properties of the system in which we are working follow from 'A < C.' The test of the truth of a supposition always is: does it cohere with, explain or follow from the rest of the system to which it belongs? On the other hand, if we make such a judgment as 'A > B and B > C, but it is not true that A > C' there we have a simple negation with no positive content. Comparable to these cases would also be the assertions 'the law of contradiction is false' 'the falsity of the law of contradiction is true' and analogous ones which may easily be devised; they have no positive object, and no unreal entity.

Certain practical instances may seem yet harder to reconcile with our view. Suppose an accused man proves an *alibi*. Are we not justified in inferring that he is not the criminal, on the ground that a man cannot be in two places at once? Surely we do not go so far, in our demolition of *a priori* incompatibles, as to deny that ground! But we do not need to do it. We can make the usual inference; though not from any axiom about two places, but solely on the basis of our own past experience. We have not seen men in two places at once, and we do not expect so to see them. The *alibi* lets the man off, because we have found the property of unique space-occupancy to be the one which fits in with the rest of our experience. It is like our belief in the morrow's rising sun. It would break no law, either of logic or of physics, did the sun not rise; it would doubtless be due to some cause. If some bodies were some day found in two places at once, we should only say that the character of our space had altered. The cases where we base our reasonings on the belief in contradiction, are cases where we expect a certain body of laws to continue. When we say 'so-and-so must be true, otherwise a contradiction!' our words should be, 'so-and-so must be true, because I do not believe the laws and general character of my environment will change.' Most of our alleged contradictions in empirical subject-matter are only cases of strong expectation against the proposed assertion.

But here we run into another practical difficulty. In cases like the above, we make a denial: 'he is not the criminal.' Our theory has urged that denials are not objectively valid, but

are mere acts of rejection. Has 'not' then no objective counterpart? Of course, when it means 'other than' it has one: as 'the grass is not green but brown.' But even when used in a denial, has it not a kind of reality? Let us consider the proposition above stated.

Here it is not enough to interpret the judgment, 'he is other than the criminal'; for he *might*—since no *a priori* axiom forbids it,—be also the criminal. The important part of the meaning is 'it is false that he is the criminal'; and this negation of criminality is objective fact. The prevention of the man's execution is the practical end and that end is attained only if the negation be objectively real. There is then apparently a real state of affairs which *contradicts* the judgment, 'he is the criminal': hence this erroneous proposition cannot have any real object but only an unreal, because contradictory one,—and our view is annulled. And this case is only one of a great class; cases where anything is correctly asserted *not* to be so-and-so. Now undoubtedly both of these statements, however contradictory they seem, represent objective reality. But there is still no logical ground for making the negation mean anything besides 'other than.' 'The man is other than the criminal' is true, and there is really nothing in this to prevent him from being also the criminal. But it alone of the two statements is the one that coheres with and affects the rest. And since men customarily take the exclusive view of these matters, then when we wish to emphasize this otherness-relation, we do it by denying the positive judgment. There is nothing about the real situation that prevents him from being the criminal. We wish him however to have the privileges of the free, and under human institutions he will not have them if the error is endorsed. So we exclude the error. But the affirmation of the truth does not truly need the exclusion of the error. We are so under the yoke of the exclusive habit that we feel that the exclusion alone guarantees the true. But fact contains no exclusions, no denials, only affirmations.

Doubtless there are further instances of error which appear to provide a *reductio ad absurdum*; but it is bad method to parade too many objections. Let us rather conclude our account by a summary statement and pass to the consequences for meta-

physics. Our theory rests upon two propositions. First, there cannot be any unreal object-matter or content; everything positive is real. An unreal being—no matter how slight the degree of unreality—is a contradiction in terms; there are none such. We should condemn nothing as 'appearance,' 'abstract,' 'non-being,' etc. This is, we believe, the first great commandment of metaphysics: Being is and everything that is at all is Being, and non-Being is not. The second support of our position is a sort of counterpart of the first, yet not, I think, deducible from it, viz., no two distinct entities contradict each other. This is perfectly general: 'entity' here means thing, property, relation, proposition,—any category or object whatsoever. The only contradiction in the universe is flat denial, viz., 'A is B' *versus* 'it is not true that A is B.' The view which we have proffered is the logical product of these two principles. If everything is in its own right real, and if its reality does not conflict with anything else's reality, then illusory objects are, metaphysically speaking, absolutely real. They differ from so-called real objects in the fact that they are not effective or fertile. And we have tried to show that though this view seems at first hardly less than insane, yet it deprives us of no principles that are of the least value. Unreality is not a category that is needed or used for either practice or theory.

But, after all, to what purpose is our theory? Has it that fertility which, according to its own account, it should have if it is true? We have proposed to substitute for the old pair 'real and unreal' the couple 'fertile and infertile'; but is this more than a change of words or the avoidance of a formal contradiction? No substantial advantage has yet appeared, no new light upon the structure of the universe or the means of ascertaining it.

We began with the gloomy prognostication that our task was a thankless one. And certainly our solution does not directly suggest any hypothesis as to the make-up of the world. But indirectly I believe it to be of no mean value, and that in two respects; as regards method, and doctrine. As to method, it promotes a certain openness of mind. If all is real, the horizon of metaphysics is vastly widened; many possibilities now straight-way dubbed nonsense and dismissed before they are examined,

will be candidly entertained. In this way the chances of some happy discovery are many times increased. We have heard much, from scientists of repute, about the blessed quality of imagination in science; but imagination in philosophy is hardly so extolled. Other good counsel in abundance is given our philosophers: 'be not abstract but concrete, be empirical, know the sciences, use the exact deductive method, take a broad point of view,' etc., etc.; but who has said to them 'never dismiss an hypothesis on account of its apparent absurdity?' Small progress would have been achieved by the physical sciences if their pioneers had been afraid to venture beyond the common-sense of their time. Philosophy itself would have made little advance, had not our predecessors speculated more freely than we dare to do. We smile in a superior way at some of their flights; but they have the merit of sacrificing themselves to show us what is wrong,—while we are held back by fear of doing the like. Our timidity is also seen in that we hesitate to occupy ourselves with specific questions like the origin of life, the nature of it, the definition of soul and spirit, the chances of personal immortality, the existence of an efficacious God, and so on—all being questions of vital interest, upon which we fear the attitude of science. And be it noted that science itself eschews any decision upon these matters. We confine ourselves to the abstractest possible questions, whose settlement could not be attacked by those who deal with the concrete: such as the dependence or independence of reality on mind, the objectivity or subjectivity of values, of qualities, and the like. Such limitation of our interest indicates a lack of philosophic vitality. Compared with the speculative vigor of Hegel, Schelling, Leibniz, Aristotle, or Plato, it even suggests decadence. We need, I affirm, to be more hospitable to ideas, more generous to welcome the new and strange, even the disreputable, to cast aside the fear of common sense's disapproval. Thus may we inject blood into the anæmic patient.

Naturally, we urge no blind acceptance. Our theory insists, by its very definition of error, that we must test all hypotheses by their fruits. Accept all, but test all. But in a critical age like this the danger is not that we do not test them: it is that we

have too little to test. Not rashness, but poverty of resource, is our trouble.

As regards doctrine our view suggests both a purgation and a more promising line of inquiry. The notion of unreality or appearance must be discarded and the search for a definition of Being abandoned; the only goal worth seeking in this direction is the nature and the principles of the things that are. The distinction of real from unreal is more than a formal contradiction; it is an incubus. It not only fixes upon us certain harassing problems, such as error, appearance, *et al.*; but also, like the advertiser of breakfast-foods, it seduces us into chewing upon something which affords neither pleasure nor nutriment. Our desire, in seeking knowledge, is to satisfy the contemplative instinct or to serve practical ends. Now the definition of Being as over against unreality is generally admitted to promote no practical aims; but it likewise fails to gratify the impulse to contemplation. There is no reason why an object's being real makes it more satisfactory to think about, than its being unreal. There is no more before the mind in case of reality; for reality is no added content or quality. There is just as much *stuff* for the mind to be exercised upon in either case. The reason why reality appears to be more satisfactory to the mind than illusion, is that it has been understood to *mean* more. It has been understood to mean, *e. g.*, a persisting universal, a fulfilled purpose, a material force, etc. Is it not obvious that it is the *character* which is hereby presented us, not the *reality*, that makes it acceptable? For a reality which had no identifiable *properties* would be no more than the old thing-in-itself, and as profitless. Let us then extirpate the notions of unreality, appearance, non-being, out of philosophy.

Of course it sounds exact and subtle to distinguish between being, reality, existence, subsistence. Yet there are false subtleties; and certainly these cannot be distinguished in any such way as has been usual. There are no degrees, no stages, no shades, in Being. The usual differentiation is based upon introducing the notion of unreality, as when it is said that being is less real than reality or subsistence than existence or existence than reality, etc. Now one may undoubtedly define these

terms as different; for instance, one might use existence to mean physical reality, subsistence to mean conceptual reality, or psychical, etc., etc. Different *regions* in the universe may be thus marked out. But one of these is as real as another. The question, whether an apparition is real, is truly the question, whether it is physical; whether, that is, it has potencies and connections which affect, or are affected by, the other things we call physical. We never genuinely raise the question, whether anything is real; but rather, whether it belongs in this or that context.

The result of taking metaphysics to be the search for ultimate reality—even apart from gratuitous troubles and profitless distinctions,—is that it becomes an abstract, indifferent sort of pursuit. Reality is, at the narrowest, a very wide genus; and a definition of it always does, and I think always must, have no bearing upon the species within that genus. Still less does it connect with the subspecies and the particulars. If reality means, say, independence, or *percipi*, or object of will, or stimulus, etc., the question so far remains untouched, how there come to be different independent objects, different percepts, various sorts of will-objects, etc. The difficulty Plato had in deriving the subspecies and the individuals from the Ideas, has been repeated without cessation, in the protracted efforts of philosophers to get from their definitions of Being an understanding of the things that have it. The metaphysical ultimate has no discernible effect upon the details, the particularities, to which it applies. Now reality is a genus and a whole (or an Individual if you wish) but it is also composed of parts and specifications; and a philosophy which seeks to know but the former of these is only a half-philosophy. That our professional thinkers today should be contented with any principle which is so abstract and fruitless, is, one cannot but fear, a sign of enfeebled interest in reality. Reality is not an abstraction, but is things, relations, universals, etc. These are reality, and all these are real. Reality, in fact, is *as such* and *qua* real, naught that is unique or investigable; so our view has taught us. Let us drop the abstract metaphysics and return to the study of the principles that govern the things that are.

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REALISTIC ASPECTS OF ROYCE'S LOGIC

THAT ultimately a realistic position is taken in philosophy, even when one attempts the opposite, and that this Realism is not limited to the acceptance alone of an existential world of physical and mental entities, has been, in the writer's opinion, exceedingly well shown by Professor Josiah Royce in an essay with the title, "The Principles of Logic," in the volume entitled, *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences: Logic*, 1913. Professor Royce would probably not accept this judgment as to the outcome of his demonstrations. However, that this judgment is correct I shall endeavor to show by quoting and discussing certain paragraphs. Professor Royce's essay will be examined in this way, both because it is a most timely and excellent presentation of recent results in the field of modern logic, and because of what seems to be its bearing on philosophical problems and their solution. The meaning of the passages quoted is not altered by their removal from their context.

The essay is divided into three sections. The last two, making up the greater part of the essay, are (p. 67) "devoted to indicating very summarily, the nature of a doctrine of which the traditional General or Formal Logic is but a part, and, in fact, a very subordinate part. To this doctrine the name 'The Science of Order' may be given. It is a science which is indeed incidentally concerned with the norms of the thinking process. But its character as a normative doctrine is wholly subordinate to other features which make it of the most fundamental importance for philosophy. It is today in a very progressive condition. It is in some notable respects new. It offers inexhaustible opportunities for future progress."

Defining Applied Logic, or Methodology, as that "special and very extended part of 'Logic as a Normative Science' which deals with the norms of thought in their application to the methods used in various special sciences," Professor Royce says: "Methodology, taken in its usual sense as a study of the norms

and methods of thought used in the various arts and sciences, is the mother of logic taken in the other sense hereafter to be expounded. For the undertakings of Methodology lead to certain special problems, such as Plato and Aristotle already began to study, and such as recent inquiry makes more and more manifold and important." "They are problems regarding, *not* the methods by which the thinker succeeds, nor yet the norms of correct thinking viewed as norms, but rather the *Forms*, the *Categories*, the *Types of Order*, which characterize any realm of objects which a thinker has actually succeeded in mastering, or can possibly succeed in mastering, by his methods."

Discussing some of the solutions of the problems of method as they have occurred in the development of philosophy, he cites (p. 71) the view of Plato, that (1) "*The realm of the Universals or 'Ideas' is essentially a System*, whose unity and order are of the first importance for the philosopher; (2) *Inference is possible because truths have momentous objective Relations*, definable precisely in so far as the process of inference is definable; (3) *The 'Order and Connection' of our rational processes*, when we follow right methods, *is a sort of copy of an order and connection which the individual thinker finds, but does not make*. One thus sets out to formulate the right method. One discovers, through this very effort, a new realm—a realm of types, of forms, of relations. All these appear to be at least as real as the facts of the physical world. And in Plato's individual opinion they are far more real than the latter."

Professor Royce then says (p. 72): "We are not in the least concerned to estimate in this discussion the correctness or even the historical significance of the Platonic Metaphysic,—a doctrine thus merely suggested. It is enough to note, however, that even if one sets aside as false or as irrelevant all the principal metaphysical conclusions of Plato, one sees that in any case the Methodology of the logician, even in this early stage of the doctrine, inevitably gives rise to the problem as to the relatively objective order and system of those objects of thought to which the methodologist appeals when he formulates his procedure. The Platonic theory of Ideas, Aristotle's later theory of

Forms, the innumerable variations of the Platonic tradition which the subsequent history of thought contains—all these may or may not be of use in formulating a sound metaphysic. But in any case this comes to light: If a logician can indeed formulate any sound method at all, in any generally valid way, he can do so only because certain objects which he considers when he thinks,—be these objects definitions, classes, types, relations, propositions, inferences, numbers, or other ‘principles,’—form a more or less orderly system, or group of systems, *whose constitution predetermines the methods that he must use when he thinks.*¹ This system, or these systems, and their constitution, are in some sense more or less objective. That is: What constitutes order, and what makes orderly method possible, is not the product of the thinker’s personal and private caprice. Nor can he ‘by taking thought’ willfully alter the most essential facts and relations upon which his methods depend. If any orderly classification of a general class of objects is possible, then, however subjective the choice of one’s principles of classification may be, there is *something* about the general nature of any such order and system of genera and of species,—something which is the same for all thinkers, and which outlasts private caprices and changing selections of objects and of modes of classification.”

And again Professor Royce says on the same point (p. 73): “Order is order. System is system. Amidst all the variations of systems and of orders, certain general types and characteristic relations can be traced. If then the methodologist attempts to conduct thinking processes in an orderly way, he inevitably depends upon finding in the objects about which he thinks those features, relations, orderly characters, upon which the very possibility of definite methods depends. Whatever one’s metaphysic may be, one must therefore recognize that there is something objective about the Order both of our thoughts and of the things concerning which we think; and one must admit that every successful Methodology depends upon grasping and following some of the traits of this orderly constitution of a realm that is certainly a realm of facts.”

¹ Italics mine.

In all these quoted statements Professor Royce seems to the writer to accept very directly and unconditionally the *objectivity*, not only of entities that are ideal and general and abstract, but also of those that are logical. Thus he opposes the dominant and traditional view that logic is 'subjective,' and is, in this sense, the 'art of thinking,' and that the 'laws of thought' are laws of a psychical process.

From the quotations given it would appear that all logic, including the traditional narrow logic of classes and of the syllogism, is objective, and is only one of the several types of order.

There follows, in Professor Royce's essay, an exposition of some of the most important features of *The New Logic*, especially as this includes 'Order-types.' In these sections such subjects as Relations and their 'Logical Properties,' Classes, Series, the Correlation of Series, Functions, and, finally, 'The Logical Genesis of the Types of Order,' are presented in considerable detail, and the following interesting statements, bearing upon specific points, are made (p. 97): "Relations are of such importance as they are for the theory of order, mainly because, in certain cases, they are subject to exact laws which permit of a wide range of deductive inference. To some of these laws attention must be at once directed. They enable us to classify relations according to various *logical properties*. *Upon such properties of relations all deductive science depends. The doctrine of the Norms of deductive reasoning is simply the doctrine of these relational properties when they are viewed as lawful characteristics of relations which can guide us in making inferences, and thus Logic as the 'Normative Science' of deductive inference is merely an incidental part of the Theory of Order.*" Thus the *implicative* relation, the progressive discovery or guidance of which is identical with, or accompanies our correct reasoning processes, is held to be objective. Reasoning, as defined in this manner, has its conditions. Did these not subsist, there might still be a 'world,' and this 'world' might be knowable, but we could not reason about it. For, says Professor Royce (p. 107): "Without objects conceived as unique individuals, we can have *no Classes*. Without classes we can, as we have seen, define *no Relations*,

without relations we can have *no Order*. *But to be reasonable is to conceive of order-systems, real or ideal. Therefore, we have an absolute logical need to conceive of individual objects as the elements of our ideal order-systems.*"

With all this, excepting only a seemingly implied dependence of the individuality of 'individuals' upon their being conceived as such, I can agree. But at this point, as in other places, Professor Royce seems to retract his earlier introductory assertions of the objectivity of the logical situation, and to color these now with an idealistic tinge. He introduces the thin edge of a wedge for his idealism even more noticeably, but quite as unnecessarily, in the statement (p. 108) that "*Apart from some classifying will, our world contains no classes.*" One may very well ask, then: *How about the class of Wills that classify? Is this, as a class of individual wills or will-acts that are related and so ordered in a certain way, itself dependent upon a classifying will? And, if not, may not other classes, and the individuals, the relations, and the order, by virtue of which they subsist as classes, be equally independent of a classifying will, although related to it?*

Professor Royce's 'proof' or demonstration that Individual, Relation, and Class are 'the Forms,' or Categories, that "characterize any realm of objects which a thinker has actually succeeded in mastering, or can possibly succeed in mastering," is contained in the Section on "The Logical Genesis of the Types of Order." His proof is the familiar one of finding that a proposition is 'presupposed by its own denial.' But in applying this test or criterion he again seems to pass from the earlier acknowledged objectivity of logical entities to a somewhat surreptitious introduction of an idealism that does away with this. Professor Royce's demonstration and the principle on which he makes it can be granted in the specific instance chosen. But one cannot allow either the limitation of the principle to this instance or the conclusions which he draws from this specific demonstration. Some of the main points of his demonstration are as follows (p. 131):

"(1) To any 'mode of action,' such as 'to sing' or 'singing' (expressed in English either by the infinitive or by the

present participle of the verb) there corresponds a mode of action, which is the contradictory of the first, for example 'not to sing' or 'not singing.' Thus, in this realm, to every x there corresponds *one*, and essentially *only one*, \bar{x} ."

"(2) Any pair of modes of action, such for instance as 'singing' and 'dancing,' have their 'logical product,' precisely as classes have a product, and their 'logical sum,' again, precisely as the classes possess a sum. Thus the 'mode of action' expressed by the phrase: 'To sing and to dance' is the logical product of the 'modes of action,' 'to sing' and 'to dance.' The mode of action expressed by the phrase, 'Either to sing or to dance,' is the logical sum of 'to sing' and 'to dance.' These logical operations of addition and multiplication depend upon triadic relations of modes of action, precisely analogous to the triadic relation of classes. So then, to any x and y , in this realm, there correspond xy and $x + y$."

"(3) Between any two modes of action a certain dyadic, transitive and not totally non-symmetrical relation may either obtain or not obtain. This relation may be expressed by the verb 'implies.' It has precisely the same rational properties as the relation < of one class or proposition to another. Thus the mode of action expressed by the phrase, 'To sing *and* to dance,' *implies* the mode of action expressed by the phrase 'to sing.' In other words 'Singing *and* dancing,' implies 'singing.'"

"(4) There is a mode of action which may be symbolized by a o . This mode of action may be expressed in language by the phrase, 'to do nothing,' or 'doing nothing.' There is another mode of action which may be symbolized by 1 . This is the mode of action expressed in language by the phrase 'to do something,' that is, to act positively in any way whatever which involves '*not doing nothing*.' The modes of action o and 1 are contradictories each of the other."

Professor Royce finds further (p. 134):

"(1) That the members, elements, or 'modes of action' which constitute this logically necessary system Σ exist in sets both finite and infinite in number, and both in 'dense' series, in 'continuous' series, and in fact in all possible serial types."

"(2) That such systems as the whole number series, the series of the rational numbers, the real numbers, etc., consequently enter into the constitution of this system. The arithmetical continuum, for instance, is a part of the system Σ ."

"(3) That this system also includes in its complexities all the types of order which appear to be required by the at present recognized geometrical theories, projective and metrical."

In conclusion, Professor Royce arrives at a position which he calls 'Absolute Pragmatism,' and which he holds "differs from that of the pragmatists now most in vogue." He says (p. 121): "There are *some* truths that are known to us *not* by virtue of the special successes which this or that hypothesis obtains in particular instances, but by virtue of the fact that *there are certain modes of activity, certain laws of the rational world, which we reinstate and verify, through the very act of attempting to presuppose that these modes of activity do not exist, or that these laws are not valid.* Thus, whoever says that there are no classes whatever in his world, inevitably classifies. Whoever asserts that for him there are no real relations, and that, in particular the logical relation between affirmation and denial does not exist, so that for him *yes* means the same as *no*,—on the one hand himself asserts and denies, and so makes the difference between *yes* and *no*, and, on the other hand, asserts the existence of a relational *sameness* even in denying the difference between *yes* and *no*."

"*In brief, whatever actions are such, whatever types of actions are such, whatever results of activity, whatever conceptual constructions are such, that the very act of getting rid of them, or of thinking them away, logically implies their presence, are known to us indeed both empirically and pragmatically; but they are also absolute. And any account which succeeds in telling what they are has absolute truth. Such truth is a 'construction' or 'creation,' for activity determines its nature. It is 'found' for we observe it when we act.*"

With the general tenor of Professor Royce's essay I am in closest sympathy, and it is only to certain restrictions and conclusions that exception must be taken. One can accept even the specific instance which the application of 'proof by denial'

furnishes, namely, that the 'modes of action' 'to assert' and 'to deny' are themselves instances which conform to and presuppose the logic of classes, of relations, of logical products, of series, etc. However, to the author of this book this is not proof for the idealistically tinged conclusion, that this logic is in some way created by 'will,' for example, by the will 'to assert' and 'to deny,' or that individuals, classes, relations, order, etc., are in some way dependent on 'will.' This idealistic tendency is exhibited in the statement, previously quoted, that 'Apart from some classifying will, our world contains no classes.'

Modes of action such as are those of willing, of affirming and denying,—and especially of *finding* that denial presupposes the very thing denied, may indeed present a specific existential case of entities that are individual, are similiar, form classes with sub-classes, have logical products, etc., and form series that are infinite, and either discontinuous, dense, or continuous. *But this does not imply that any of these generic entities as such, or that any instance of them, such as the real numbers, points, and physical objects, is created by 'will,' or dependent on it.*

The ground for this assertion is the generally recognized principle, accepted by Professor Royce himself, that if there is one 'instance,' it is always a permissible hypothesis that there are others. Perhaps, indeed, 'instance' means or implies just this possibility. It follows, that, if there is one 'instance,' namely, of acts of 'will' which form *classes, series*, etc., that the possibilities cannot be denied (1) that there are *other instances* of these generic entities, and (2) that *these generic entities themselves also are*, that is, *have being*. However, if there are these possibilities, there are also the further ones, (3) not only that these other instances of individuals, classes, series, etc., may be independent of that particular series which is identical with acts of will, but also (4) that the generic entities, class, series, etc. may be similarly independent. In fact, this independence of 'other instances' is itself identical with that of the generic entities. But in any case, even with only the *possibility* implied, that there are *other* instances of series than the will-series, it is logically prohibited to infer the dependence, either of these other

instances, or of the generic entities, *on the will-series itself*. *The opportunity for their independence is quite as good as for the opposite. Such an independence is quite compatible with a relatedness of both specific and generic entities to will, to reasoning, or to knowing, and means the objectivity both of the general logical entities, class, individual, series, etc., and of all instances of them.*

However, one can find not only that this hypothesis of the objectivity of logical entities and principles is permissible and that it is confirmed by empirical investigation, but also that Professor Royce himself really presents no obstacles to its acceptance as confirmed. For the very logical principles which this author himself elucidates and accepts, if they are applied to the specific situation under discussion, themselves demand this conclusion. This can be shown as follows:

Professor Royce makes a number of statements to the effect that 'rational will,' 'modes of action,' 'reasoning,' 'the making of conceptual constructions,' and 'the getting rid of them,' etc., each 'presuppose' or 'logically' imply that logic which is identical with classes of individuals that stand in one or another, or in many, of several relationships, and that form one of the several kinds of series, etc.

Although neither 'presuppose' nor 'imply' is defined by Professor Royce, each of these entities is, by his own logic (at least) a relation. This is the case, first, because the *distinction* is made between the act of 'rational activity' (will to reason, etc.) *and* that which this activity presupposes or logically implies, namely, individuals, classes, etc. 'Presupposer' and 'presupposed' are, then, at least *two*. But, secondly, a relation is defined (p. 96) as "a character that an object possesses as a member of a collection (a pair, a triad, etc.), and which would not belong to that object, were it not such a member." We must conclude, then, that since 'presupposer' and 'presupposed' are two, they are *related*, and that 'presuppose' and 'imply' are the relations present.

The next important question is, Can that which is presupposed or implied be related to, and yet be *independent* of the 'pre-

supposer' or 'implier'? Again Professor Royce gives us the materials for an answer. In his presentation of the several classes of relations as dyadic, triadic, symmetrical and non-symmetrical, transitive and intransitive, etc., he says (p. 99): "*Transitivity and symmetry are mutually independent relational characters.*" This independence is then exhibited by finding instances of the one character *without* the other. Thus the relation of 'greater than,' symbolized by $>$, is transitive, since, if $A > B$ and $B > C$, $A > C$; but it is totally non-symmetrical, since, if $A > B$, this precludes $B > A$. Likewise the relation 'father of' (A is 'father of' B) is also non-symmetrical, yet it is non-transitive, since, if A is father of B , and B is father of C , A is precluded from being father of C : the relation 'father of' does not 'go' from A to C . 'Ancestor of' is, however, both non-symmetrical and transitive. Thus, for example, are symmetry and transitivity demonstrated to be, in Professor Royce's own words, 'independent relational characters.' In any case by the principles previously stated, since these characters are two, that is, a pair, they are *related*: and now they are proved to be *independent*. Therefore it follows, in at least one case, that *relatedness and independence are quite consistent, and co-subsist*.

Here again it must be said, that, if there is one instance of such compatibility, there may be others, and that in no case does relatedness merely of itself imply, necessitate, or carry with it, dependence; nor independence, non-relatedness. Just such another instance, however, may be the important relation, just discussed, of 'presupposition' or 'implication.' That which is presupposed or implied, namely the logic of order, etc., may be related to and yet be *independent* of that which presupposes or implies it, namely, that very rational activity which Professor Royce emphasizes so much.

With this the case, one certainly cannot justifiably assert that (p. 169) "our world contains classes" only because there is the will to classify. One cannot in this manner logically maintain a 'synthetic union' of 'creation' and 'discovery.'

However, in order to confirm empirically this hypothesis, that independence and relatedness are quite compatible, Professor

Royce himself need only have found, if possible, another class and series of individuals which bears the same relation (that of being 'reviewed') to his own investigating mind as do his own rational modes of action. Professor Royce discovers in *these*, quite as Descartes found that either to deny or to assert consciousness is to presuppose it, *a relation that generates a series*. He finds that to review a mode of action is itself a mode of action, and implies *its* possible reviewal in another mode of action and so on, in an infinite series. Further, this series is found to be generated by an asymmetrical transitive relation, and is either discontinuous, dense, or continuous. However, each member of the series is, as Professor Royce himself admits (p. 153) "distinct," and sooner or later there is *that* member of the series which discovers, or is identical with the discovery of, the serial characters of the whole. It is shown by the subsequent study of this series, that, if any specific member drop out, especially any so-called first or last member, the series is no less serial or ordered. The series is both *related* to, and yet *independent* of any member that can thus 'drop out.' Thus that very serial character of the 'modes of action,' which Professor Royce, in order to support his Idealism, would show is created by and depends upon the 'will to act,' is implied by his own logic to be *independent of that individual act or member in which it is discovered*.

But further, that there are *other series* than the modes of action called 'reviewing,' 'noting,' etc., is also admitted, at least tacitly. For our author accepts and explains at some length the *correlation* of series and the functional relationship. Then, at least, there must be series to be correlated, say, by a one-one relation, and each series is distinct from the other. But, related, they are also in their distinctness or bare 'twoness' independent. For, if there must be at least two entities as the condition for a relation, then this relation cannot in turn generate or condition this *minimum* of diversity.

We thus reach, finally, an important conclusion of direct bearing on the problem of the character of the relationship between 'knowing process' and 'entity known,' whether this be existential or subsistential, generic or specific, concrete or

logical and formal, physical or mental. First, there are other manifolds than that of the series of rational will-acts. This is implied by the possibility of series being correlated. With this the case, there must be at least two series. But the manifold of will-acts is a series. Then there must be *other* series with which this is in correlation. Briefly, we must conclude, that other manifolds *are*, or *have being*, and second, that these other manifolds involve one, some, or all of the logical principles that does the series of rational will-acts. Third, as 'other than' and numerically distinct from *this* series, these other series are both independent of, and yet related to it, just as the series of one's own rational 'modes of action' (Professor Royce's for example) are both related to, and independent of that specific mode which is the act of discovery. Finally, there is at least the possibility that all of these ordered manifolds should be related to each other, and yet be distinct, not identical with, and independent of each other.

This four-fold conclusion presents one of the most important parts of that modern logical doctrine which is called Logical Pluralism. It is the direct opposite of that tendency which Professor Royce supports, at least towards the close of his essay, namely, Logical Monism. These two positions together center on what is perhaps the most important problem in philosophical methodology, that, namely, of the compatibility of independence and relatedness. The one answer to this problem, Logical Monism, has, whether it be true or false, conditioned logically the majority of the great orthodox philosophical systems down to the present time. It is an answer that is itself conditioned historically and psychologically in the Aristotelian tradition. The other answer, Logical Pluralism, has had its forebodings, now and then, also all through philosophical development, but its roots strike deepest into that fertile soil for logical research which is furnished by the relatively recent development of the empirical sciences, including mathematics. Only of late has this tradition and tendency come, as it were, to self-consciousness, and its logic been formulated. Professor Royce's essay forms a notable contribution to the formulation and emphasis

of the importance of this new logic or 'Science of Order,' as it may be called. Indeed this long discussion of Professor Royce's essay has been ventured because of its recognition of 'the inexhaustible opportunities for future progress,' both in philosophy and in science, through investigations in this new field. Not so much along the line of continuing to use the traditional logic, as in philosophizing in accordance with the new logic, is there the possibility of philosophical advance in the future; not so much by studying substance and causation, mere classes, and the relations of exclusion and inclusion, will real problems be solved, as by examining the various types and the properties of relations and series, the correlations of series or functions, and the nature of implication and presupposition. The one procedure is full of promise; but the other would almost seem to have exhausted its possibilities.

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NEO-REALISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROYCE.

THE object of the following brief considerations is not to pass judgment on the value of either of the two philosophies under discussion, but rather to suggest a point of view from which their agreements and differences may appear somewhat more significant than they usually appear to those who approach philosophy from the exclusively epistemologic interest.

If economy of thought be, as Mach and others have it, one of the main objects of science, then philosophic labels like Realism, and Idealism, are among the most useful instruments of thought. But to those who care for accuracy, these labels appear as snares and stones of stumbling—they are apt to hide from us the important differences which separate many of those who call themselves idealists, and the more important bonds which connect realists and idealists. Vital philosophic achievements, we all know, do not grow out of the effort to spin out the consequences of simple formulae such as those which sum up the distinction between realism and idealism, though such formulae may have a decisive influence in giving direction and form to the effort after coherency and system which is at the heart of philosophy. While philosophy, like law, must of necessity always strive after consistency, it is true as a matter of fact that it never completely attains its goal. The very effort after coherency and system is conditioned for any genuine philosophy by its starting point, the actual complex of intellectual needs growing out of the material of the philosopher's world of experience. If this be so, then the suggestion naturally arises, that the fact that both neo-realism and the philosophy of Royce endeavor to assimilate the general results of modern logical and mathematical studies, may be more significant than the attempt to condense the whole of Royce's philosophy into the dictum that the Absolute is the locus of all our meanings, or neo-realism into the doctrine that objects are independent of our knowledge. The fundamental differences between neo-realism and the philosophy of Royce

can from this point of view be traced to their respective attitudes to the problems of religion.

The systematic neglect of mathematics on the part of all great influential philosophies of the nineteenth century is obvious on the most cursory survey. Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Lotze, Mill, Hamilton, Green, Cousin, Comte,¹ Rosmini, all show how social, theologic, and psychologic interests absorbed all attention. Philosophers like Bolzano or Cournot who took the philosophic importance of mathematics seriously, were assigned to obscurity. Now in intellectual affairs, it is difficult to say which is the cause and which the effect. But there can be no doubt that the neglect of mathematics and the prevalence of nominalism and atomism, were intimately connected. This can be seen perhaps most clearly in Mill's logic in which the emphasis on particular 'facts,' 'states' of mind, leads to the complete degradation of deduction (and consequently of all exact mathematics) as a source of truth.² At any rate, whether we take the phenomenalistic idealism which comes to Mill from Hume, the so-called objective idealism of the Hegelian school of Green and Caird, or the practical idealism of the Neo-Kantians, we find them all assuming that the world which is our starting point is a brute, disconnected manifold; and while these philosophies differ in the method by which the initial atomism is overcome, they all regard the connections or relations of things as a contribution of 'the mind' to the world.

Now it would take us far afield to indicate all the difficulties resulting from the assumption that mathematical relations or entities like numbers, are mental. But it is clear that this view throws no light at all on the peculiarities of mathematical procedure which distinguishes it from physics or psychology. When a mathematician is investigating the property of a given equation or curve, it is precisely as fitting to tell him that he is looking for the product of his own creation as it would have been

¹ I include Comte because though brought up on mathematical physics, his whole philosophy was controlled by practical demands—due to the influence of St. Simon.

² The exaggerated importance attached to Mill over and above more fruitful logicians like De Morgan and Boole, would not have been possible if philosophers had paid more attention to mathematics.

to have told Leverier and Adams that in looking for Neptune they were looking for the product of their own mind. Hence, when philosophy could no longer ignore the progress of mathematics and symbolic logic, there was bound to be a reaction against the traditional idealism and a preference for the type of realism that followed in Greece close on the first discovery of mathematical method. Russell's *Principles of Mathematics* and the chapter in his *Problems of Philosophy* dealing with Plato's Doctrine of Ideas, seem to me still the most significant expression of the new yet essentially Platonic realism.¹ There have, to be sure, been other motives for neo-realism besides the mathematical one, e. g., the natural reaction against the sweeping claims of psychologism, expressed with such admirable self-control by von Meinong. But it is significant to note that the one doctrine which all the six authors of Neo-realism press in their book is the non-mental character of logical and mathematical entities. In thus emphasizing the objectivity of the relational structure of the real world, neo-realism takes itself completely out of the scope of Professor Royce's dialectical objections against realism, which will be found on close examination to be all arguments against dualistic or atomistic realism that is incompatible with the linkage of facts.

The realistic arguments as to the nature of mathematics were first advanced by Royce in the two volumes of *The World and the Individual*, several years before the appearance of Russell's *Principles of Mathematics*. The mathematician, we are told, is as much a student of given facts as is the chemist or business man. He is "as faithful a watcher as the astronomer alone with his star" (I, p. 256). The result of his observations abound in the unexpected as much as do the facts of any other field of research. To be sure Royce adds that what the mathematician watches is *in a sense* the result of his own play or activity; but this "sense" is made clear by the example of the diagram. The mathematician makes his diagram or set of postulates, but he cannot wilfully alter the consequences which alone are, after all, the specifically

¹ For further indications of this I may here refer to my paper on the *Present Situation in the Philosophy of Mathematics* (1910), and to the review of *Neo-Realism*, *Journal of Phil.*, VIII, 533 ff. and X, 197.

mathematical facts. You may call the spirit from the deep but you cannot control his actions after you have called him.¹ This purely realistic account of mathematics is developed in Professor Royce's address on "The Sciences of the Ideal" (read before the St. Louis Congress) in the monograph on the *Relation of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry*, and his essay on "Logic" in volume entitled the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. The fruitful character of deductive reasoning as a source of truth appears even in his *Sources of Religious Insight* (pp. 88ff.).

To those who view Royce's philosophy as a type of Neo-Hegelianism this attention to mathematics may appear as an introjected episode. (Royce's first introduction of mathematical considerations in the *World and the Individual* caused considerable surprise and misgiving doubts among idealists.) But those who have had the good fortune of membership in his logic seminar have learned how characteristic of his thought is the complete objectivity of all logical and mathematical considerations. The truth is that a careful survey of the whole corpus of Professor Royce's writings fully bears out his contention, in the preface to the *Problems of Christianity*, that his philosophy is not in any true sense Hegelian. Such a survey seems to me to show how profoundly Royce's philosophy has been influenced, not only by the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason,² but also by the metaphysic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. For whatever may be our objections to the Kantian metaphysics, we must not forget that Kant himself began as a mathematical physicist, that he had taught mathematics and that a primary object of his *Critique of Pure Reason* was to show the possibility of mathematics and physics as apodeictic sciences. The Kantian

¹ In his concept of a common world by means of the process of interpretation, in the second volume of the *Problem of Christianity*, Professor Royce has suggested a method which, if it can successfully be carried out, would overcome the neo-realist antithesis between finding and making propositions true. An adequate discussion of this, however, is not in order before Professor Royce gives us a fuller account of his meaning.

² This shows itself not only in the conclusion of his paper on Kant in the *Jour. of Spec. Phil.*, but also as the method of postulates in Chs. 9-10 of the *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*. In his general attitude to the importance of the 'practical' in philosophy Royce, like James, has been profoundly influenced by Lotze.

philosophy at least never identified the abstract and the unreal. At any rate it ought to be noted that the very first of Professor Royce's published writings, the *Primer of Logical Analysis*, already shows a strong interest in symbolic logic.

It is, however, precisely Professor Royce's rejection of the Kantian distinction between possible and actual experience that is at the basis of the fundamental divergence between neo-realism and the idealism of Royce. This rejection of the Kantian doctrine seems to me to grow out of the needs of natural theology which looms so large in all of Professor Royce's writings. Religious philosophies are for the most part doctrines of hope or guarantees of the efficacy of moral effort. Hence they tend to assume that the object of our striving is already in some sense actual. This leads to the rejection of all possibility from the nature of the Absolute. The Absolute of Professor Royce's philosophy, however, differs from the realistic God of Aristotle. It is not outside of mundane things but all-inclusive; and this identification of the Good with the Whole leads to the familiar difficulty as to the problem of evil. It compels us to assume that even now the world is better or richer because of the presence of vice, crime, poverty, disease and all the horrors of war. Such philosophies have always been sources of strength and comfort to many. Nor can any one rightly accuse such a philosophy of quietism who notices how few are willing to fight unless they are assured beforehand that victory is in some way certain. Neo-realism, however, does not share this strong faith, so impervious to the vicissitudes of human experience. It is not that neo-realism is hostile to the proper interpretation of religious experience. As I have tried to indicate elsewhere, its logic, with its emphasis on the organizing relations, is a better instrument for social philosophy than any nominalistic philosophy which must contain latent atomism or individualism. But neo-realism sees no evidence that any human community like church or state necessarily embodies our highest goal. The neo-realist lives in a world in which there are all sorts of possibilities of which only a small number succeed in becoming actual, and where all our gods or goods *may* meet with defeat.

NEGATION AND DIRECTION.

THE directional value of negation seems to me a not unprofitable subject for discussion at this time. This is perhaps only to say that I think I have something worth submitting on the subject, but in any case practically and logically negation is a very common attitude or motive in experience, at the present time being very much in evidence, and its value, in particular its relation to direction, is a subject of real interest. Also, whatever may be said for the substance or the manner of the discussion that follows, the subject is certainly one that may be chosen for the present occasion, when special honor to Professor Royce is intended. Any subject, however, seriously undertaken, would have Royce's approval.

Anarchy, agnosticism, irrationalism and many other cults or attitudes in negation—not all of them, socialism, for example, or liberalism or naturalism, bearing names of negative form—are surely among the signs of the time, and accordingly give more than a mere formal or abstractly logical interest to the problem of direction. Now, moreover, as at any time, there are many who from thoughtlessness or superficiality wonder how there can be any real direction in negation, their opinion being that negations can lead nowhere or at least nowhere in particular or nowhere pertinently. Not only have popular notions taken this discouraging view, but also even expert theories have often failed to recognize clearly and appreciate fully the part that negation has or may have in direction. So I would discuss the question; and my thesis is just this: Logically and practically negation can never be merely and absolutely negative, as so often assumed; on the contrary, in general it does and must lead somewhere and, what is more, in a pertinent and orderly way. Indeed there can be no real negation without direction, and even this: direction can be *significant* in the life of anything positive only through negation.

In support and explanation of this thesis I begin with certain

very simple and familiar principles. Thus, for the first of these, whenever there is definite assertion or 'position,' then is also, in tendency if not in fulfilment, generalization, and the outcome of generalization is always negation, transcendence of the positive. The idea here is manifestly Hegelian, but apart from its Hegelianism in real life propagandism, imperialism, all forms of what in general I may call monarchism or monism or even monomania, reputable or abnormal, show both how inseparable position and generalization are and how negation or opposition results inevitably from their union. With such origin, however, negation cannot escape a certain inheritance from its parents, position and generalization.

Secondly, then, among the familiar principles referred to, nothing positive may be negated or say transcended by reason of its generalization, without assertion, open or implied, of the principle, the general principle, of that for which in particular form the positive thing negated has been standing. Thus you can not honestly proclaim some one an impostor without ascribing actual significance to that which he has claimed to represent. There must be thrones, if there be pretenders; truth in things, if there be lies or liars about them. Again, to deny the letter of some creed is to assert the spirit and even anarchy is really a call for a new regime. A metaphysical nihilism, declaring there is no reality, can be only a disguised or indirect realism, being nihilistic only relatively to some passing notion of reality. So, to recur to the biological figure and to enlarge upon it a bit, although the negative may not or apparently may not inherit the formally manifest traits or characters of the positive, although really or apparently it may not inherit any of these quite intact, at least it must inherit the general principle, the basal radical life or nature of the positive; showing, if never the exact formal structure, the essential function.

Nor can negation, thirdly, he said to inherit *only* the general principle of the positive which it negates. Can any negative ever be free from the formal context, from the positive conditions, of its origin? Logically a negative, even if seemingly superlatively negative, must still always be relative or relational.

However negative, whatever else be true of it, it must at least formally be only another case of the positive. So, for example, are morality and immorality, although very distinct from each other, both cases of general morality. Opposition is possible only between things alike. Anarchy attacking organization must nevertheless adopt organization. Your very worst enemy can indeed fight with you only as he adapts himself to your nature and methods. It is only matter that may not penetrate matter. Even infinity can be only another finite. This necessary affinity of context or at least formal identity of negative and positive, this relativity of the negative, is a thing much too often forgotten or, if remembered, too little appreciated. In this, as in its many other aspects, the negative is so peculiarly elusive. So easily one has regard only to the obtrusive side of its nature. Yet how deeply and subtly the child enjoys willing *not* to touch, taste, handle or otherwise disturb or molest the forbidden jam! Just in his negative attitude and his filial cultivation of it lies, hidden perhaps but very much alive, a sweetly persisting jam context. Logically, I say, and with not less truth practically the context of any positive must persist in the negative. What were a negative term, impure or untied or apathetic, with only the prefix?

But, fourthly, and not so simply, now that the negative, born of position and generalization, has been shown to inherit both the general principle and the specific context, described above also as the manifest traits or characters, of the positive, there is some danger that the negative itself will be taken for a mere shell, an empty fiction, quite lacking in real meaning and effect; in other words, that, inheriting so much, it will seem to offer nothing really new; and this danger must be quickly removed, although the sheer absurdity of such a conclusion might be counted on to take care of it. Thanks to nothing less than that origin in the meeting of position and generalization, negation can never be idle or empty. It does inherit the general principle or function of the positive, but it retains this only as freed from the positive parental expression for some new expression. Again it does inherit the context or particular form of the

positive, but this it does not and cannot retain intact or unchanged in value. The formal context of the positive does indeed persist in the negative, or for the negative, but not as something final and intrinsic; it persists only as something having *meaning*, as something real or valid only mediately, not any longer immediately. Negation, as our story has it, shows the positive neither wholly denied nor—of course not this—merely reasserted, but *made means instead of end*, this change having in point of fact a radical character not easily exaggerated. The end to which the positive becomes only means lies of course in the comprehensive general principle or function which the negation has freed from its identification with the positive. So is there truly a great difference between real negation and 'absolute' negation so-called, the latter being as idle or abstract or formal as 'absolute.' Real negation is relative, and its rise in experience must always show the two things already pointed out: (1) the liberated principle as end or meaning, and (2) *mediation*—in the sense of change from immediate reality or value to only mediate reality or value—of the positive thing negated. 'Absolute' negation can at best give only another case, perhaps a last or limiting case, of the positive; real negation quite transcends the positive by making it not opposed, but mediate.

It seems worth while to add here that, viewing negation from any one of those three standpoints which were so closely associated above, from the contextual affinity of negative and positive, or from the necessity of opposition being in kind as well as from the negative's relativity, one must always find mediation of the positive as incident to the negation. As to either the affinity or the opposition, what two mutually opposed things have in common obviously can be only medium, a 'medium of exchange' perhaps, a common weapon or instrument, the always necessary common ground on which distinct differences meet. Just by dint of the difference, the opposition, the negation, it simply can not be immediate any longer. But the relativity of the negative is of most direct interest here. So, to return to that, not only are all real negatives relative, but also in all relativism there is negation, perhaps often disguised, however poorly, never really

hidden; and relativism, as is a commonplace at least in history if not formally in logic, has never been without its notable associate, utilitarianism. The relative, besides being the questioned if not denied, the mistrusted if not opposed, has been also the merely useful or mediate and so, I add, the forerunner of some real change.

But, fifthly, now to reach an important conclusion from what has so far been presented, negation, having such origin and such inheritance, brings difference or change of a sort which I think can best be described as *dimensional*. Real negation means, it implies and induces *dimensional difference*; this being, as I conceive it, neither difference in mere degree nor absolute difference in kind, but a true *tertium quid*.¹ The term dimensional or dimension is of course borrowed from mathematics, and borrowed by a layman in mathematics at that, but some intimation of its meaning even as used here should be evident from its source, although many may regard the term in this place as quite too metaphorical to be profitable. Also, as must be conceded, philosophy has need in general of guarding herself against too much mathematicalism, professional or lay. The meaning here, however, is the chief thing, be the term wisely borrowed or not, and in the present intention a dimensional difference or change is one which, although qualitative, although really negative of something, although in kind, is still both congruous with and dependent upon, not directly but mediately dependent upon, that from which the different thing is said to be different. Otherwise put, anything become only mediate is dimensionally inferior to that to which it is mediate, the latter being dimensionally greater. This may, then, be a bold use of the term dimension, suggesting as plainly it does that dimensional difference is intimately related to the distinction between means and end, but I think I can at least make out a plausible case.

The whole question of dimensions is of course not just one of length, breadth and thickness, nor of the rectangular relation

¹ I have discussed dimensional difference in two other articles: "The Logic of Antithesis," in *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, Vol. VIII, No. 11; and "Dualism, Parallelism and Infinitism," in *Mind*, Vol. XX, N. S., No. 78.

that these may have to each other. Like other things, dimensions are always of wider and deeper principle than any given case of them can ever adequately exemplify. Simply any given case must be relative to some particular situation. I submit, then, as already suggested, that in general in dimensional difference or change there is involved the distinction between means and end, that where you have the distinction you have dimensional difference and where you have dimensional difference you have the distinction. As to the objection, which is quite likely to be raised, that dimensions coexist, whereas in the distinction between means and end there is always an implication of movement or action, the former thus being spacial and the latter temporal, I would simply say that dimensional variation may very properly be viewed genetically and that in any given instance coexisting dimensions, like those of ordinary three-dimensioned space, may only (1) represent certain accomplished adjustments or mediations and yet also (2) just by their structurally determined region be mediative of some activity in time that realizes a new dimensional variation of the mediating region. Ordinary space's three dimensions only bound or define a region that formally or structurally is what it is relatively to such established adaptations of varying but functionally related factors as accord with the possibility of locomotion or change of place, or even with the possibility only of a certain type of locomotion or change of place. Locomotion, in other words, is so much a matter, if physical or objective, of mere mechanical routine or, if subjective, of free habit or second nature, that its sphere or region, its space, appears quite staid, seeming static in character and coexistent and eternal in all its parts component or dimensional. But this staid character, or rigidity, is relative to the freedom of the locomotion or to the perfect adjustments which the freedom shows. The space of the locomotion, itself three-dimensioned, may still be only mediate to something different, dimensionally different.

In most general terms, if one view any dimensional variation genetically and so in accordance with the distinction between means and end, the new dimension, say the $n + 1$ st dimension,

instead of being just one more statically and numerically, as if its ordinate place and character had no distinct value, as if with the advance there was no enhancement and progression of meaning, even no advance in quality, must always be a mark of something to which the lower dimensional field, that is, the n -field, has become only means or medium. Indeed is not the mediation, here suggested, to be detected in the familiar functional relation that maintains between dimensions, even when viewed quite statically or coexistentially? Any two, if functions of each other, are in the relation of means to end, so to speak, reciprocally; the dynamic character of the relation being only hidden in the poise, the established balance, of the function and being indeed only truly dynamic because of the reciprocity. A function so accurately established as to be reciprocal or reversible, like the functions of coexisting variants or dimensions, is the very basis of a freely active force. Furthermore, if an established function thus shows reciprocity in the relation between means and end and so also gives evidence of a freely active force, one needs only to look in order to see that the situation thus comprising at once a rigid system, the established region of the function, and a liberated force, the movement within the system, must be potential with something else, with something different, to which the situation itself is become only mediate. Ordinary space, the rigid sphere of free locomotion, may be mediative of activities dimensionally much more complex.

To ordinary space and locomotion I shall have occasion to refer hereafter. Here, besides pointing out that any dimensional difference or variation may be viewed genetically and under the relation of means and end, a variation in dimensions, n , $n + 1$, $n + 2$, etc., showing a progressive mediation, I would suggest also—perhaps now quite unnecessarily—that any dimensional variation must involve more than a quantitative change. In other words, a manifoldly dimensional field or region can be, or contain, no mere homogeneous mass, but must involve heterogeneity, its dimensions making only a systematic distribution of qualitatively different factors. Thus, very simply put, a four-dimensioned field varied by a fifth dimension involves a difference

that is not like in kind to the ordinary quantitative difference between four and five. In the former case there is a structural change; in the latter, only a change quite within given structural conditions. In ordinary mathematical terms, which can not wholly conceal the facts, the former involves ratios and multiplication, for a new dimension is always a multiplier, a constant factor; but the latter involves mere quanta or masses and addition. Logically the context of multiplication is very different, qualitatively different, from that of addition; as different as ratio from mass. Multiplication may be, as we used to be taught, merely a short method of addition, but this does not preclude its being a different kind of thing. A dimensional difference, then, is not a quantitative difference; or, if a quantitative difference, is its own kind of quantitative difference, unlike that of mere aggregation.

At risk of offending with much repetition, in any dimensional change, n being what you please and the $n+1$ st dimension being a multiplier of the n -dimensioned field or structure, the change reduces the n -field from an aggregate of mass-values to a system of ratio-values; and ratios, as was said, certainly do give a different context from that supplied by mere masses. Also, as showing another phase of the change, from the standpoint of the $n+1$ st dimension there is realized a peculiar superiority to the merely quantitative conditions or limitations of the n -field. Fifteen, for example, as a whole, is a distinct sort of a whole, a whole of a higher kind, when the multiplicand of some number, its multiplier, as compared with fifteen as a whole simply increased by some addition. As a multiplicand it is a functional whole, a mediated whole, an integral system of ratios or related parts become the medium of something formally different, and in this character of system there is that peculiar superiority. In the difference between length and area or between area and solidity there is to be seen the change of context and quality above referred to, for the lower region as well as the mediation of that region, length being only mediate to area, area to solidity. But of course the idea is not confined to such commonplace geometry. In any dimensional difference the lower field, becoming mediate,

changes from one kind of whole to another kind of whole, from an aggregate whole to a relational whole. Dimensional variation, to sum up, and mediation and heterogeneity go together; and, lest we forget, in each of these there is evident a negation of something or, say, evidence of what it is to negate something. Any given region, negated, mediates something different.

Furthermore, still to consider the nature of dimensions and to court still the favor or at least the patience of mathematics, there is an incident of dimensional variation, of any change from n to $n+1$ dimensions, that should have close attention; since, as seems to me, it throws important light on the meaning of negation and of the various accompaniments of negation which have been pointed out here. Thus, to begin with, the $n+1$ st dimension must always stand, of course for something formally different from the mediating lower field, the n -field, but also for something essentially possible to, or potential in, that field. Such essential in distinction from formal—or mechanical?—potentiality might be concluded from the functional relation that the new dimension must have to the mediating field; and the conclusion itself suggests an interesting, if bold, question. Can it be that dimensional variation is closely akin to the difference between mechanism and organism, the mechanical and the organic? Certainly the organic, always depending on the mediation of some mechanism, must be something essentially potential in the mechanical although at the same time itself—notice the negative—non-mechanical. But, such bold speculation aside, so much being said of the potentiality of the new dimension in the mediating field, it remains to be added that much of the present story, at least a very important chapter of it, is to be found in the infinity of an infinite series and especially in the last term which must represent a possibility of the series, but being infinite, not a formal possibility.

Infinity, however negative, is always the infinity of something—a simple circumstance not infrequently overlooked; it can no more be free from the context of some finite than any negative can be free from the context of its positive. But, furthermore, nothing infinite can ever be duly accounted for as merely the

largest or the smallest possible, for the infinity of a thing must be more than just the supreme variation in number or size, and not to see it as more is to fail to give the negative in it full significance. Also it is to belie the last term by treating it as a formal possibility. Thus a so-called infinite term, a last term or limit, of a series can not possibly be a term of the series and also last or infinite; a difficulty that is quite too old and familiar to need more than mention. Simply by its negative the infinity adds something besides maximum or minimum size to the finite. Any series of terms must obviously be more than just the terms of the series and at least a part, an important part, of the meaning of the infinite term must somehow be that by which the series is more, the very infinity even effecting a certain abstraction of the positive finite terms of the series and revealing and asserting, apart from these terms and their formal character, something essential to the series, general to all the terms, and formally different. The 'last term,' for example, of the simple series: $1, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{8} \dots$ is describable in various ways, every one of them having some regard to this peculiarity. It is hardly the half of anything, since at infinity there would be nothing left to halve, but halving itself as a principle, a function, at last free from any particular application *and so implying all possible applications*. It is, then, as implying all possible applications, not so much a term of the series as the series's unity or law that has been exemplified in every term. If you would call it zero, you must remember that it is a contextual zero. Is there any other kind of zero? Moreover, in so far as it is zero, not only is abstraction made of all the positive formal terms, but also the abstraction is no sooner accomplished than these very positive terms return to the series in a new character, all of them having the nature of the infinite term. In short, they return to the series as constituting a system rather than a series, as 'relations' rather than 'things,' ratios rather than quanta. So does the infinite term show itself like any other negative, to be born of position and generalization, to have inherited the principle or function of the positive, and to have rendered the positive only a mediating system. With regard to the mediation it remains to be said that by the change

from series to system, which logically the infinite term completes, the formal series is, so to speak, taken up—*aufgehoben?*—into a region dimensionally enhanced, mediation and dimensional variation being inseparable. Thus, again, the logical value of the last or infinite term includes a dimensional change for the field within which the finite terms have their manifest form; and the term itself, so valued, appears indeed as a true *tertium quid* between difference in degree—the term as essentially although not formally a term of the series—and difference in kind—the term as standing for something in and of the series but formally different. Possibly the same story is told at least as plainly in the following way: An infinite series, whatever its positive manifest form, must always be expressive of a functional—so different from a structural—unity; of such a unity between two formally different things, making some n -field mediate to the $n+1$ st dimension or taking an n -field up into an $n+1$ -field.

Parenthetically I venture to remark that the real logic of mathematics is commonly hidden in the very abstraction, the extremely formal character, of mathematics. In a world of purely formal relationships, the real things related are made as invisible as ghosts. Graphical representations, therefore, are bound to be of great value, since in some measure they bring to view important logical implications that otherwise would be quite hidden. It has often puzzled me, for example, that one could ever get the sum of an infinite series; for, however formally correct the calculated sum might be, there has still seemed to be something not accounted for; but, perhaps only in my layman's folly or my superangelic aggressiveness, I think that I see a simple way out of the difficulty. The sum of the series: $1, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{8}, \dots$ is, of course, 2; and, formally, one need go no farther; but, to go farther, if the series be formally in an n -field, the 2, if really 'satisfying' the infinity and what this brings to the series, must be in an $n+1$ -field; in other words, 2 as a product rather than 2 as a sum; graphically, 2 as an area rather than a length or as a solid rather than an area, depending on the value of n . To the formal mathematician such a distinction will doubtless seem too subtle or altogether empty and futile; but, whatever be its value

or lack of value in the mere technique of mathematics, it strikes me as highly important in the real logic of mathematics.

I do not know if I have succeeded in conveying my meaning. Yet what I would say is that the case of infinity affords a specially interesting illustration of the negative as involving dimensional difference or change. If any given finite, or structure, be of n dimensions, then its real in distinction from its formal or only hypothetical infinite must have $n+1$ dimensions. Infinite space, for example, is not just formally like but bigger than the biggest possible finite space; for (a) a finite space is always formally a definite and specific thing, in other words a thing of n dimensions, of given structure and originality, (b) it is made infinite only serially or gradually, that is only by some persisting function, operation or principle, the series's unity or law, such as bisection, *uniform* addition, parallelism, or any regular variation you please, and (c) as infinite, far from being the series's biggest, or smallest, possible case or term, it reveals something true of all the terms, informal or superformal to them and virtually transforming of the series as a whole, making the positive series only mediate to something formally different. A finite space, then, may not become infinite and remain formally intact. As an n -space it must remain always finite, formally unchanged; infinite, it is an $n+1$ -space; its very infinity being so rounded up or brought to earth. As an $n+1$ -space, although infinite relatively to the n -space mediating it, although positively manifesting and incarnating the infinity of that space, it is itself quite earthy for being, within its own higher region, capable of indefinite finite expressions.

Have I at last lost myself and perhaps others in the maze of mathematics? I make no apology. Also my story, although not yet finished, is approaching its last chapter and there may be relief in that. Before leaving the field of mathematics, however, or rather the field of the real logic of mathematics, there is a conclusion from much that has now been said which, although possibly somewhat aside, I can not pass without mention. Thus, in just a word or two, with every instance of mediation or dimensional variation there must go a change in the meaning or

value of what it is to be the part of a whole or, as of special interest, of what it is to have position or location. A given structure or region having n dimensions and having become a mediating system to an $n+1$ st dimension, every part or position in the new region must have a value *comprehensive of the whole of the mediating n -dimensioned structure*; every part or position must be intensive with the complete extension of the lower region and so must be said to have the freedom of that region, transcending the limitations of partiality or particular position in it. So appears in a new way that peculiar superiority which was claimed above for the new region in any case of mediation over the old, any part or position in the new being as if all parts or as if everywhere in the old; and this fact of superiority, suggestive even of the infinite for which, if I may paraphrase the words of the Psalmist, all finite places are as one place, opens up most interesting reflections on the whole problem of location or participation. In any valuation of part or place one must first know, let me say, the dimensional coefficient. To speak in the familiar symbols, an $n+1$ -here is an n -everywhere.

Now, to recapitulate, negation has been seen to be sprung from position and generalization, inheriting from its allied forebears at once the freed principle of the thing posited and the thing posited itself as a mediated whole. Negation, furthermore, having such inheritance, brought difference, but dimensional difference, which I venture to speak of now as the difference of change by mediation. Thus there is mechanical change, variation under conditions of uniformity and commensurability, in fact routine or accumulation rather than real change. There is, again, absolute change, the creationalistic change of an old time theology, change by causation *ab extra* or production *ex nihilo*; difference, then, by a complete dualism or pluralism; not real change. And there is change or difference by mediation; the change of dimensional difference, discoverable, as has now been submitted, even in the dimensional variations of space; real change; and, as may be added here, change that has real direction.

So much have we seen. But for appreciation of what has been found there is need of other than mathematical illustrations of

dimensional difference, useful as these have been; for, as should be remembered, in its rise here the idea of such difference was as general as negation. In the variation of an n -field by an $n+1$ st, dimension masses were seen to give way to ratios, component parts to relational parts; in other words certain assumed absolutes became relative; and relativism succeeding absolutism is certainly no mere mathematical phenomenon, being quite as typical of the worlds of psychology and sociology. In these worlds, too, the relative, as was indeed remarked, is also the mediate, the useful, quite as truly as in the world of mathematics. To explain a little, relativism in general, when supplanting absolutism, always means the passing of certain positive standards, or 'measures.' Once treated as final and absolute, these are become only 'relative' and with the change the pertaining whole, perhaps the organized life of some people, in which they have maintained, becomes in the course of history a mediated whole, losing at once its isolation and a certain inner discreteness or separation of its parts that has made it more social aggregate than a unity. In short the relativism shows a social system come or coming into free, open use; its various component institutes changing from things of direct interest, each with its own cherished and intrinsic value, to so many related conventions or utilities; from distinct institutes, each quick with its own human life and passion, to mere instruments generally and freely in use because become conventional and humanly dead; for relativism and utilitarianism, I say again, are of the same day and generation. It may be only a coincidence, but it seems a coincidence well worth some reflection, that among the ancient Greeks mathematics came to a consciousness of the difference between mass and ratio, leading eventually to Euclid's mingling that strange and incongruous book of proportions with the other books of his geometry, at about the same time that brought the relativistic and utilitarian dictum of Protagoras: Man is the measure of all things. The mass-unit and the definite or positive standard or measure of any kind were thus dethroned contemporaneously; all such measures being henceforth only 'relative'; there being no longer any supposed commensurability of men or things. But,

Euclid's book of proportions aside, in what I have said above of relativism and of a social system coming into use, becoming mediated, I shall seem to some to be blinding myself to an important fact. Relativism, they will insist, by discrediting traditional positive standards and institutions really brings individualism and serious social disorganization instead of 'social system in free use.' This fact or rather this notion I deny. Such a way of putting the case rests on a misunderstanding of individualism, of the disorganization so often seen and of a social system become a mediated whole or come into real use. Thus the assertive individual, always more the cosmopolitan than the provincial patriot, has at last found the various elements of the organized life around him only so many adjustable parts of a useful whole, which just in being used becomes a real unity or system, and there results, relatively to the traditional sanctity and conservative integrity of things, seeming instability and disorganization. Yet the 'disorganization' is only an incident of the use or mediation, very much as a law's loss of rigor is an incident of its application in real practice. There must ever be 'disorganization,' when mere use or only mediate interest succeeds immediate devotion, when the sacred turns secular. Deeply, however, nothing is so organizing as secularization. Moreover, the individual is at once a truer and bigger whole, a more comprehensive and a more complex unity, than the local system or order which, thanks to the possible adjustments of parts, he has been able to make only the means to his now cosmopolitan life. I might add, too, that the individual is always something of a foreigner and, thanks to his cosmopolitanism, is never without his invitation to what is foreign. But the foreign, by the very negation in it, is only an influence sure to bring to completion the relativism and utilitarianism in the life of a people. Invading foreigners, although like bulls in a china-shop, are so much freer even than the cosmopolitans at home really to use what they find, unhampered as they are by any lingering emotional associations. Just here, then, that is, in the negation which the new or foreign realizes, lies what must give special significance to the analogy, here suggested, between sociological and mathematical relativism and the

several incidents, mediation and dimensional difference, which relativism implies. Thus with the negation from the foreign there must come into life real difference, but a difference—however bold or seemingly crude it may be to describe it so—that is no more or no less radical than a dimensional variation. It is a dimensional variation under the here adopted definition; for the new life that is brought about is always dependent upon the mediation of the old regime. Such mediation, moreover, is more radical than revolution, which commonly brings only opposition and succession in kind; it is as radical as evolution; as the change from the ancient civilizations to the Christian or from the medieval regime to the modern. In history, as in logic, change by mediation is the only real change.

Further illustration of what is meant here by mediation and dimensional difference, by change through mediation, as coming from negation, is afforded by the various circumstances that always underlie a movement for democracy. This case of democracy, I may say, was the subject of a paper published recently¹ under the title: "The Duplicity of Democracy, or Democratic Equality and the Principle of Relativity." In any democratic call for equality, a call that, however seemingly abstract and general in its terms, is always in effect relative to some particular social and political context, that is, to some established type of social organization, there is to be seen, in the first place, something positive, so far as also general, becoming only mediate. In both the generalization and the mediation, moreover, one can see negation, the democratic attack upon the positive, that is, conflict of democracy with some aristocracy and its peculiar privilege; and the result of all is that special privilege turns into general opportunity, the institutes of the aristocracy becoming the *general* instruments of a democracy. Democracy, then, at least under present definitions, may be spoken of as a dimensional variation of aristocracy. Also, in like manner, constitutionalism, for which the given law is only a means to an end, is a dimensional variation of political absolutism; induction, of deduction; rationalism and mathematicalism,

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1915.

of a positive and dogmatic legalism; industrialism, of militarism; and, not to make a longer list, Protestantism or liberalism generally in religion, of a religion of authority. In all of these 'dimensional variations,' as in the case of democracy, something positive has been at once generalized and negated and so has been made mediate to something new, to something radically different.

"Is he diagramming history," I imagine some one asking at this point, "for the entertainment of mankind? Would he draw the life of one period of history in n dimensions and of the succeeding period in $n+1$? How humorously profound! So to illustrate his story is truly delightful, although possibly more delightful than true." Let a dimensional history amuse, if it must, or may. Of course the intended meaning is the important thing and the meaning is, again, that the significant changes of history are changes by mediation, the later thing, the new, being what it is only by the free mediation of the old or passing thing; only—with apologies for the worn refrain—by one time institutes becoming the instruments of human life. Can the new, if new, if different, if negative of the old, ever escape the context and mediation of the old?

But, waiving further illustration, whether from mathematics or from history, and resuming the recounting of general principles and their story, I turn at last, sixthly, to the simple conclusion, virtually stated already, that in dimensional difference, consequent upon negation, in change by mediation, lies the direction which I would claim as not less practically than logically belonging to negation, even to such negatives as were mentioned at the beginning of this paper, anarchism, atheism, agnosticism, irrationalism, and many others, including those bearing names not negative in form. In such change by mediation there is real direction; for, in the first place, it is real change, and, in the second place, the change is always, so to speak, mindful of a context. A dimensional difference might even be defined as a difference mindful of a context; and certainly significant direction must depend on such mindfulness.

Here, then, this paper might come to an end, for in essential

principles its course is run, its story told. It is, however, a poor story that awakens no afterthought; and so, to save my tale at least from the appearance of poverty, a few reflections, some with a view to meeting possible criticisms, some perhaps of a lived-happily-ever-after character, are appended.

In human experience as worked out socially, as developed in a social organization, where social classes exist under the conditions of division of labor, specialism and all sorts of isolated cults and interests, one may often have difficulty in detecting the conditions and results of negation here asserted. Like other attitudes of organized and more or less isolated groups, negation may often seem to be assumed and maintained absolutely and unqualifiedly, that is, just for its own sake, and an apparently aimless and directionless violence accordingly may quite obscure every thing else. But in the logic of human experience one needs to remember that no attitude or cult of a group, no defined class-interest, positive or negative in character, should ever be taken by itself. No such interest ever represents the experience-whole. Clear as this is, it is often overlooked. From the standpoint of wholeness, then, of the essential unity of human experience, I think that the social expression of human experience, always more disruptive and analytical than the personal or individual, can afford no real case against the idea that logically or practically negation leads somewhere, having real direction by the dimensional difference, the mediation of the positive, which it brings.

As to the idea being practical as well as logical, it has certainly had its place in psychology and biology which at least seem to deal more directly with what is actual than logic. In these fields the fact of mediation is evident in the part taken in all theories of adaptation by the distinction between the structural and the functional, the formal and the vital, the mechanical and the organic, or even, recalling Professor Dewey's valuable contribution to psychological ethics, impulse and will, will being in his phrase the 'mediation of impulse,' and impulse being the response of given structure to something external and different. Biologically or psychologically, as well as sociologically, the logic

of negation and mediation, of positive structures becoming mediate, has no lack of illustrations. Structures become mediate, as they confront alien, negative conditions; as the self, identified with them, adapts itself to a not-self or external environment.

But somebody says here that it is not the doctrine of mediation but the application of the term dimension which gives him pause. Logically and sociologically and psychologically and biologically there seems to be a case for change by mediation, but to make the phrase, 'dimensional difference,' cover all such changes is fantastic and to get behind a definition of one's own is quite too arbitrary to be accepted without some protest. So must I, the offender, return once more to the scene of my offense. Replying to the critic of my admittedly very comprehensive dimensionalism I shall get out from behind my definition and suggest: (*a*) that dimensional difference, like most if not all other things, is bound to be, as has in fact been said here already, more in principle than in its usual acceptance or application; (*b*) that psychologically even the dimensional values of ordinary space are acquired by processes of adaptation and mediation; (*c*) that ordinary space, whether regarded psychologically or mathematically, is ordinary and three-dimensional only by virtue of an abstraction, which, however warranted, needs now to be recognized as arbitrary and so misleading; and (*d*) that ordinary and three-dimensional space itself is or may be in reality, that is, when seen without constraint of any arbitrary abstraction, a space of many more than three dimensions and so of a much more complex adaptation or a much larger or fuller mediation than the abstract standpoint referred to can possibly disclose.

(*a*) The first suggestion needs no explanation.

(*b*) The second will hardly be disputed.

(*c*) The third, on its psychological side, obviously has reference to the fact that space has been for the most part and under the prevailing habit of mind regarded and explained only as a region or medium of bodily locomotion. This fact has already been a matter of some discussion here, but it may be enlarged upon. Thus the old theory of space perception by association of visual

sensations, local signs and muscular sensations was certainly relative to the notion of the self or subject, whether in its whole body or in distinct parts, like the moving legs, the gesturing arms, or the adapting eyes, as locomotive; and, so far as I can appreciate, later theories or later variations of this theory have not really freed themselves from such an isolation of the locomotive self. Relatively to the locomotive self space may be so and so; perhaps, thanks to the bilateral structure, the erect position and the free mobility, three-dimensional, possessing height and width and perspective or depth; but one must always remember the relativity and the abstract standpoint determining it. In reality locomotion is very far indeed from exhausting the nature or meaning of the self's spacial activity, even of its activity 'in space,' and the space itself in which the activity takes place can not therefore be merely, so to speak, a room to move about in, while one does, thanks to more abstraction, a lot of non-spacial things. The self's so-called non-spacial activities are quite as truly *of* space as *in* space. The higher human activities in general may have their space *in quo*, but also, in a sense that may not yet be apparent, they must have their space *ob quem*. My Latin, I think, is correct.

(d) To turn to the fourth suggestion, which is only complementary to the third, space, even ordinary space, really must be deep with the values of activities far more complex in their adaptive or mediative character than those of mere locomotion and must be accordingly differentiated with many more dimensions or terms of functional relation than the three which locomotion seems to require or which express the natural space or extension of only so much of human activity or, objectively, of mere change of place. Admittedly it is a very artificial way of showing the meaning here only to point out that, dimensions being multipliers or terms of functional relation, the space which to the conventional locomotive view seems only three-dimensional may really be reproduced or multiplied into itself indefinitely, a fourth dimension—if the structural basis of variation be rectangular—being formally but not actually identical with the first, a fifth with the second, and so on; but, however artificial

this notion, in form doubtless more mathematical than psychological, it is well to recognize and appreciate once more that the ordinary spacial world really does mediate far more than just the locomotive activities and so that the actual dimensions of this world's space can not possibly stop at three—mathematically or psychologically. True, the psychology of the fourth, fifth, sixth . . . twentieth dimension has yet to be worked out and would, if ever undertaken, be sure to meet great difficulties; but, humorously or seriously, psychology has not been in the habit of stopping at difficulties. I wonder if it may not be said that psychologically, as well as mathematically, the free and orderly motion of a body in space expresses or realizes—how shall I put what I would say?—a field or space which is dimensionally, or functionally, superior to that merely mediating space in which the motion as motion seems to take place. Does not the very freedom and order of such motion imply a functional relation, a dimension, not formally manifest in the spacial structure either of the body itself or of the merely *containing* space? The mathematician may duly account for such a complication by his device of 'powers,' one or more of the dimensions being squared or cubed, and yet fail to realize that the motion he has so described expresses more than the space it seems to be in, expressing a space *ob quem* that dimensionally transcends the space *in quo*. But the mathematician's blindness should not set the limit to the evidence. Wherever there is orderly activity within a given structural system, there is realized a space *ob quem* dimensionally superior to the space *in quo* of the activity. Think, furthermore, of the dimensional variation or complexity that must be realized when a freely moving body freely uses—or functions with—a freely moving body; as, for example, when a human being makes use of a tool or in any way expresses himself or his 'thought' through any mobile medium. The situation so presented is truly a complex one, probably far too complex for successful analysis; but the pertinent fact about it is that the activity is spacially mediated and that the space even of its mediation must lie quite within the ordinary three-dimensional space of mere locomotion.

The same abstraction which has hidden from view the deeper values of ordinary space has also hidden the meanings, the living and immanent meanings, of location and of the external world, the world sensuously perceived in space. Of location or position something has been said already. To know the value of any location one must know the dimensional coefficient. As to the perceived world, to all human activities save those of locomotion, this has been indeed an external world. Primarily only a world of motor-signs, landmarks, tactile values and such conditions of locomotion, it has had no direct and intimate part in the super-locomotive activities. Man's nature, in short, has been divided. He has been a creature of physical or sensuous activities and of non-physical or non-sensuous activities. His consciousness has depended on the distinct faculties of ordinarily spacial sense-perception and non-spacial and non-sensuous thought. It is true, of course, that in recent times these divisions have been losing character, or animus, but the illusion of them is not wholly dispelled. Yet, even as the space in which men move and act is in reality indefinitely dimensional, being unlimitedly potential with what may be called mediative power, being a space whose resources are, so to speak, only very slightly exploited by locomotion, the perceived world in space can be no mere world, as ordinarily understood, of 'external perception.' It is itself always a world of thought, and not less sensuous or spacial for being a world of thought. *The very essence of thought is mediation.* Thought and the life it accompanies and directs, instead of being non-spacial, really comprise only deeper variations, fuller mediations, of that same space, itself a realization of thought, the ordinary three-dimensional space, in which men move and perceive sensuously and 'externally.' Perhaps, if the much abused impractical, abstruse thinker, walking the streets of life, had his head less in the air, realizing that his thinking could mean only added dimensions for the space of his walking, in other words, a larger and deeper mediation of the world and the life around him, his thinking would be less abstruse and impractical and he, at the next crossing, less in danger of being run over.

An important conclusion from the foregoing view of the external world is plainly this. The distinction between external and internal can not be at any time a fixed one, single in application; it must be, on the contrary, not indeed an unreal distinction, but moving or functional; always an incident, specific as to the application and content of the terms, of every mediation. Always the mediating field is 'external,' but its meaning, that which it mediates, is internal; yet internal in a relative and at the same time somewhat special sense. Thus the 'internal' meaning is so, or is said to be so, for being different in kind from the form or structure of the medium. Meaning must always be thus different in kind and accordingly, although mediated by the given structure, can not be formally identified with this but, relatively to it, must seem hidden, mysterious, not placeable anywhere, 'internal.' So internal, however, it at the same time comprehends a greater sphere than that in which it has no determined place. In the adopted language of this article, while internal or without position relatively to the space *in quo*, the *n*-space, it has its place and part in the space *ob quem*, the *n+1*-space, any one of whose heres, as should be remembered, is an *n*-everywhere. How absurd one's language does sometimes get! But for illustration of this account of the external and the internal I would call attention to certain facts of history, which is only human experience written large. In history, in social evolution, as we have seen, it is the destiny of the institutional to become instrumental, of the immediate to turn only mediate, and, further, with this change there always arises a vigorous assertive individualism. In other words the personal members of society acquire a life to self, a life by reservation, an inner life, to which the institutional order of the time becomes only the external means or medium. Such an inner life, however, is so only relatively. The individual feeling and asserting it is also very much a man of the world, the outside world, another world, in feeling and volition being universal, cosmopolitan, natural, identifying himself even with things quite alien to the old order and retaining the old order only for its use to his new and different life. Historically the man of deep 'inner' life at

any time has himself lived and helped others to live at once in a larger 'outer' world and in a different world—different for the mediation, different by the 'dimensional variation.'

So, as to my offense of dimensionalism, far from needing to get behind my own definition of the term, dimension, which may have seemed an arbitrary definition, in my use of the term I can not have made any serious departure from anything essential to the ordinary usage.

Finally, in a very simple sum of the whole story, which has been told here, real negation does possess directional value; it brings, not change by mechanical variation nor change by causation *ab extra* or *ex nihilo*, but change by mediation; real change; change, as may now be added, that strikes in as well as out, developing inner life as well as larger and different spheres of life; change, again, that really leads somewhere, just because always mindful of a context, always using instead of just opposing what it changes and always being at once inward and outward.

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TYPES OF ORDER AND THE SYSTEM Σ .

IT is a commonplace of current theory that mathematics and exact science in general is capable of being viewed quite apart from any concrete subject matter or any system of physical facts to which it may usefully be applied. Geometry need not appeal to any intuition of spacial complexes or to a supposititious space form; it has no need to rely upon diagrams or make use of 'constructions.' Arithmetic makes no necessary reference to the sensible character of collections of marbles or of areas. Dynamics does not require the dubious assumption that the 'moving particles' of which it treats are possible of experience or verifiable physical entities. The 'points' of geometry and kinematics, the 'numbers' of arithmetic, and so on, are simply terms,— x 's, y 's, z 's, entities, anything,—and the question what concrete things may be successfully regarded as such x 's and y 's is a question of application of the science, not one which need be considered while the system itself is in process of development.

If considerations of usefulness and of application are important in determining what assumptions shall be made or what systems developed, still such pragmatic considerations are principles of selection amongst actual and possible systems, and not internal to the systems themselves.

An arithmetic, a geometry, a kinematics, is thus capable of being viewed simply as a complex of relations and operations (relations of relations) which obtain amongst entities the nature of which, apart from those properties which follow from the relations assumed, is wholly indifferent. Such a system may, in fact, admit of various interpretations and applications, more or less useful, all of which satisfy the requirement that these relations and operations be valid. As Professor Royce is accustomed to put it: a system of science is a type of order, the distinguishing characteristics of which are the kind of relations—symmetrical or unsymmetrical, transitive or intransitive, etc.,—which obtain among its terms, and the relations of these re-

lations, by means of which the terms are 'ordered' and the relations 'transformed.'¹

The growing recognition of the advantages of so viewing systems of pure science is one of the prime motives for the present interest in symbolic logic, or logistic. For logistic is the science which treats of types of order. One may reach the particular type of order which it is desired to portray—the arithmetic or geometry—by further specification of that minimum order which must obtain among entities if they are to 'belong together' in a set or system—the order of logic. This can be done in a variety of ways, which may be roughly divided into two groups. These two methods are distinguished by the fact that in the one case the 'numbers' of arithmetic or 'points' of geometry are treated as (conceptual) complexes having a definite internal structure, while in the other the 'numbers' or 'points' are the simple and indifferent terms, the x 's and y 's of the system. The former mode of procedure is best illustrated by the investigations of Russell's *Principles of Mathematics* and *Principia Mathematica* of Russell and Whitehead. The other method is exemplified by Dedekind's *Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen*, by the *Ausdehnungslehre* of Grassmann, and by the paper of Mr. A. B. Kempe, "On the Relation between the Logical Theory of Classes and the Geometrical Theory of Points."² But this second method appears in its best and clearest form in the paper of Professor Royce on "The Relation of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry."³ Each of these procedures has its advantages and its difficulties. Of late, the first method has received a disproportionate share of attention. For this reason, if for no other, I deem it important to call attention to the second method in general and to Professor Royce's paper—its notable exemplification—in particular.

Professor Royce generalizes upon certain relations previously

¹ I do not know that Professor Royce has anywhere printed just this statement, and my way of putting it may not be satisfactory to him, but Harvard students in "Philosophy 15" will remember some such formulation.

² *Proc. London Math. Soc.*, Vol. 21, p. 147. See also his earlier "Memoir on the Theory of Mathematical Form," *Phil. Trans.*, Vol. CLXXVII, p. 1, and the Note thereon, *Proc. Royal Soc.*, Vol. XLII, p. 193.

³ *Trans. Am. Math. Soc.*, Vol. 6, p. 353.

pointed out by Kempe, in the paper mentioned above,—certain relations which are fundamental both for logic and for geometry. If $ac \cdot b$ represent a triadic relation in which a and c are the 'even' members and b is the 'odd' member, $ac \cdot b$ is capable of various significant interpretations. If a , b , and c represent areas, $ac \cdot b$ may be taken to symbolize the fact that b includes whatever area is common to a and c , and is itself included in that area which comprises what is either a or c (or both). The same relation may be expressed in symbolic logic as

$$ac \prec b \prec (a + c); \text{ or; } \bar{a}b\bar{c} + a\bar{b}c = 0.$$

This relation may be so assumed that it has the essential properties of serial order. Taking it in the form just given and presuming the familiar laws of the algebra of logic, if $ac \cdot b$ and $ad \cdot c$, then also $ad \cdot b$ and $bd \cdot c$. Hereupon we may translate $ac \cdot b$ by ' b is between a and c ,' and the relation will then have the properties of the points a , b , c , d , in that order. Further, if a be regarded as an origin with reference to which precedence is determined, $ac \cdot b$ may represent ' b precedes c ,' and $ad \cdot c$ that ' c precedes d .' Since $ac \cdot b$ and $ad \cdot c$ together give $ad \cdot b$, if ' b precedes c ' and ' c precedes d ,' then ' b precedes d .' Hence this relation has the essential transitivity of serial order, with the added precision that it retains reference to the origin from which 'precedes' is determined.

Professor Royce points out to his students that the last mentioned property of this relation makes possible an interpretation of it for logical classes in which it becomes more general than the inclusion relation of ordinary syllogistic reasoning. If there should be inhabitants of Mars whose logical sense coincided with our own—so that any conclusion which we regarded as valid would seem valid to them, and *vice versa*—but whose psychology was somewhat different from ours, these Martians might prefer to remark that " b is 'between' a and c ," rather than to note that "all a is b and all b is c ." These Martians might then carry on successfully all their reasoning in terms of this triadic 'between' relation. For $ac \cdot b$ meaning $\bar{a}b\bar{c} + a\bar{b}c = 0$ is a general relation which, in the special case where a is the "null" class contained in

every class, becomes the familiar "*b* is included in *c*" or "all *b* is *c*." By virtue of the transitivity pointed out above, $oc \cdot b$ and $od \cdot c$ together give $od \cdot b$, which is the syllogism in *Barbara*, 'If all *b* is *c* and all *c* is *d*, then all *b* is *d*.' Hence these Martians would possess a mode of reasoning more comprehensive than our own and including our own as a special case.

The triadic relation of Kempe is, then, a very powerful one, and capable of representing the most fundamental relations not only in logic but in all those departments of our systematic thinking where unsymmetrical transitive (serial) relations are important.¹ In terms of these triads, Kempe states the properties of his 'base system,' from whose order the relations of logic and geometry both are to be derived. The 'base system' consists of an infinite number of homogeneous elements, each having an infinite number of equivalents. It is assumed that triads are disposed in this system according to the following laws:²

1. If we have $ab \cdot p$ and $cb \cdot q$, r exists such that we have $aq \cdot r$ and $cp \cdot r$.

2. If we have $ab \cdot p$ and $cp \cdot r$, q exists such that we have $aq \cdot r$ and $cb \cdot r$.³

3. If we have $ab \cdot c$, and $a = b$, then $c = a = b$.

4. If $a = b$, then we have $ac \cdot b$ and $bc \cdot a$, whatever entity of the system c may be.

To these, Kempe adds a fifth postulate which he calls the 'law of continuity': "No entity is absent from the system which can consistently be present." From these assumptions and various definitions in terms of the triadic relation, Kempe is able to derive the laws of the symbolic logic of classes and the most fundamental properties of geometrical sets of points.

¹ It should be pointed out that the triadic relation is not necessarily unsymmetrical: $ac \cdot b$ and $ab \cdot c$ may both be true. But in that case $b = c$, as may be verified by adding the equations for these two triads. Further, $ab \cdot b$ is always true, for any a and b . Thus the triadic relation represents serial order with the qualification that any term may be regarded as "preceding" itself or as "between" itself and any other.

² See Kempe's paper, "On the Relation between, etc.," pp. 148-149.

³ If the reader will draw the triangle abc and put in the "betweens" as indicated, the geometrical significance of these postulates will be evident. I have changed a little the order of Kempe's terms so that both 1 and 2 will be illustrated by the same triangle.

But there are certain dubious features of Kempe's procedure. As Professor Royce notes, the 'law of continuity' makes postulates 1 and 2 superfluous. And it renders entirely obscure what properties the system may have, beyond those derivable from the other postulates without this. For the negative form of the "law of continuity" makes it impossible to assume the existence of an entity without first investigating *all* the properties of *all the other* entities and collections in the system, where some of these other entities and collections exist only at the instance of the 'law of continuity' itself. Consequently the existence of any entity or set, not explicitly demanded by the other postulates, can be assumed only at the risk of later inconsistency. Also, in spite of the fact that Kempe has assumed an infinity of elements in the base set, there are certain ambiguities and difficulties about the application of his principles to infinite collections.

In Professor Royce's paper, we have no such 'blanket assumption' as the 'law of continuity,' and the relations defined may be extended without difficulty to any finite or infinite set. We have here, in place of a 'base system' and triadic relations, the 'system Σ ' and "*O*-collections."

The system Σ consists of simple and homogeneous elements. Collections of these may contain any finite or infinite number of elements; and any element may be repeated any number of times; so that x and x -repeated may be considered a collection, x , x -repeated, and y a collection, and so on. Greek letters will signify determinate collections in Σ . Collections in Σ are either *O*-collections or *E*-collections. $O(\text{---})$ signifies that (---) is an *O*-collection; $E(\text{---})$ that (---) is an *E*-collection, i. e., that it is not an *O*-collection. Assuming for the moment the principles of the algebra of logic, $O(pqrs \dots)$ signifies that $pqrs \dots + \overline{p}qrs \dots = 0$. [Both the laws of the algebra of logic and the properties of *O*-collections which render them thus expressible are, of course, derived from the postulates and not assumed in the beginning.] It will be clear that the order of terms in any *O*-collection may be varied at will.

' x is equivalent to y ' means that in every collection in which

x or y occurs the other may be substituted for it and the collection in question still remain an O -collection.

If two elements in Σ , say p and q , are such that $O(pq)$ is true, then p and q are said to be *obverses*, each of the other. Since it will follow from the postulates of the system that all the obverses of a given element are mutually equivalent, and that every element has at least one obverse, a 'unique representative' of the obverses of x may be chosen and symbolized by \bar{x} . Pairs of obverses will turn out to have the properties of negatives in logic.

Any g such that $O(\beta g)$ is true, is called a *complement* of β .

Any r such that $O(\beta q)$ and $O(qr)$ are both true is called a *resultant* of β .

The postulates of the system Σ are as follows:¹

- I. If $O(\alpha)$, then $O(\alpha\gamma)$, whatever collection γ may be.
- II. If, whatever element b_n of β be considered, $O(\delta b_n)$, and if $O(\beta)$ is also true, then $O(\delta)$.
- III. There exists at least one element in Σ .
- IV. If an element x of Σ exists, then y exists such that $x \neq y$.
- V. Whatever pair (p, q) exists such that $p \neq q$, r exists such that while both $O(rp)$ and $O(rq)$ are false, $O(pqr)$ is true.
- VI. If w exists such that $O(\theta w)$, then v also exists such that $O(\theta v)$ and such, too, that whatever element t_n of θ be considered $O(vwt_n)$.

From these assumptions the whole algebra of logic can be derived in such wise that the system Σ has the order of the totality of logical classes. To see this, we must first define the F -relation. If $O(pqrs \dots)$ to any number of terms, we may represent the same fact by $(F\bar{p}/qsr \dots)$, $(F\bar{p}r/qs \dots)$, $(r/F\bar{p}qs \dots)$, etc., where the rule for transforming the O -collection into the corresponding F -collections is that we introduce a bar, separating any one or more elements of the O -collection from the remainder, and then replace each of the elements on one (either) side of the bar by its obverse.² Since the order of terms in O -collections is indifferent, terms on the same side of the bar in any F -relation

¹ See p. 367 of the paper.

² This definition presupposes the proof of the principle that if $O(pqr \dots)$, then also $O(\bar{p}\bar{q}\bar{r} \dots)$, as well as the proofs which make possible the notation $\bar{p}\bar{q}\bar{r}$, explained above. See pages 367-371 of the paper.

are independent of the particular order in which they are written. Also, it follows immediately from the definition of the relation that $F(pq/\overline{rs})$ and $F(\overline{pq}/rs)$ are equivalent. Where the F -relation holds for three terms, it turns out to be identical with the triadic relation of Kempe, and the Kempean $ac \cdot b$ is thus a special case of the F -relation, namely $F(b/ac)$, or $F(ac/b)$, or $F(a/b\overline{c})$, or $F(\overline{a}/\overline{b}c)$, or $F(b/ca)$, etc., all of which are equivalent. We may, then, define the "illative" relation,—" b is included in c " where b and c are classes, " b implies c " where b and c are propositions, " b precedes c ," where b and c are points or terms in one-dimensional array,—as the special case of any of the above F -relation' in which a is the "zero element," or "null class," or "origin." But these F -relations are equivalent, by definition, to $O(a\overline{b}c)$ and $O(ab\overline{c})$. Hence $b -<_a c$ may be defined to mean $O(a\overline{b}c)$ and $b -< c$ to mean that $O(o\overline{b}c)$. Thus in terms of the totally symmetrical O -relation, the unsymmetrical, transitive dyadic relation which characterizes both serial order and syllogistic reasoning can be defined.

As is well known, the entire algebra of logic may be derived from a class K , the idea of negation, and the illative relation, hence also in terms of the system Σ and O -collections. The 'zero element' or 'null class' is any arbitrarily chosen member with reference to which all illative relations are supposed to be specified. Such an element o itself bears the illative relation to any other, x , since $F(ox/o)$, or $O(o\overline{o}x)$ holds for any element x . The element 1 , the "universe" of the algebra of logic, may then be defined as the negative or obverse of the o chosen. In the system Σ , o and 1 do not differ from any other pair of obverses, apart from the arbitrary choice of a reference element for illative relations. The logical product of two terms, x and y , is then definable as any P such that $F(ox/P)$, $F(oy/P)$, and $F(xy/P)$. The logical sum of x and y is definable as any S such that $F(1x/S)$, $F(1y/S)$, and $F(xy/S)$. P , so defined, will be such that $P -< x$ and $P -< y$, while any w such that $w -< x$ and $w -< y$ will be also such that $w -< P$. For S it will be true that $x -< S$ and $y -< S$, and any v such that $x -< v$ and $y -< v$ is also such that $S -< v$. S and P are, in fact, the "lower limit" and "upper

limit," with reference to the chosen zero element, of all the F -resultants of x and y , an F -resultant being any z such that $F(xy/z)$. These definitions for the product and sum of two elements may be extended immediately to any number of elements, or any collection β , if we replace x and y by "any element of β , however chosen." The usual laws of the algebra of logic, connecting sums and products, terms and their negatives, and the elements 0 and 1 may then be verified for the system Σ . This order of logical entities is contained in Σ in an infinite variety of ways, since any pair of obverses may be arbitrarily chosen for 1 and 0. F -relations and O -relations, not confined to dyads and triads, *are capable of representing this order in a generalized form.*

There is, moreover, a wealth of order in the system which the algebra of logic, even in terms of any polyadic relation, does not require. It is this difference which renders the system Σ capable of being viewed as a generalized space form.

It follows from postulate V that if $p \neq q$, then there is an element 'between' p and q . The postulate states: Whatever pair (p, q) exists such that $p \neq q$, r also exists such that while both $O(rp)$ and $O(rq)$ are false, $O(pqr)$ is true. $O(pqr)$ or $F(pq/\bar{r})$ gives, by definition of the illative relation, $r \prec_o p$ and $\bar{r} \prec_o q$ or r is "between" p and q . And \bar{r} must be distinct from p and q both, for otherwise, it follows from the definition of obverses, one of the two $O(\bar{r}p)$ and $O(\bar{r}q)$ will be true. Hence postulate V may be restated in the form: For every pair of distinct elements, there exists an element, distinct from both, between them. It is at once obvious that if the elements be "points," and $p \prec_o q$ mean that p is between o and q , postulate V requires that the order of points in Σ should be dense in every direction (with reference to every pair of points). It is further clear that if we take any pair of distinct points, o and z , and postulate t between them, we shall be required to postulate also r between o and t , v between t and z , and so on. Owing to the transitivity of the illative relation, we are thus required to postulate for every pair (o, z) an infinite number of elements in the order $o \prec_o r \prec_o t \prec_o v \prec_o z$. Such an ordered collection is continuous. We have already seen that it is dense. It remains to see that it

satisfies the requirement that every fundamental segment has a limit. Consider two selections from the collection, κ and λ , such that if k is any element of κ , every element j such that $j -<_o k$ belongs to κ , and every element l , such that for every element k of κ $l -<_o k$ is false, belongs to λ . There is, then, an element, call it S , such that, for every element k in κ , $k -<_o S$, and if l is any element such that, for every element k of κ , $k -<_o l$, then $S -<_o l$. Such an element S is the 'sum' or 'upper limit' of κ , defined above. Hence every fundamental segment has a limit. Any collection thus characterized by a transitive unsymmetrical relation and continuous order deserves to be called a 'line.' Every pair of distinct elements in Σ determines such a line.

For every pair of distinct points, o and q , there exists p such that $F(oq/p)$ and hence $O(oq\bar{p})$. By the definition of the F -relation, if $O(oq\bar{p})$, then $F(\bar{o}\bar{q}/\bar{p})$. Hence if o and q determine a line, $o \cdots p \cdots q$, there exists also a line, $\bar{o} \cdots \bar{p} \cdots \bar{q}$ or $\bar{q} \cdots \bar{p} \cdots \bar{o}$, in which appear the obverses of all the elements in $o \cdots p \cdots q$. But it also follows from $O(oq\bar{p})$ that $F(o\bar{p}/\bar{q})$, or $q -<_o \bar{p}$. Thus if $o \cdots l \cdots z$ be any line determined with reference to an "origin" o , the line containing the obverses of the elements of $o \cdots l \cdots z$ may be determined by reference to the same origin. And if two elements of $o \cdots l \cdots z$, say m and n , are such that $m -<_o n$, then $\bar{n} -<_o \bar{m}$. If we further consider the order of elements in both lines, $o \cdots l \cdots z$, and $\bar{z} \cdots \bar{l} \cdots \bar{o}$, with reference to the origin o and its obverse \bar{o} , the two lines appear as a single line which passes from o to \bar{o} through l , and from \bar{o} back to o through \bar{l} . Let m and n be any two elements of $o \cdots l \cdots z$ such that $F(on/m)$. We have $m -<_o n$. Hence $\bar{n} -<_o \bar{m}$. But if we have $F(on/m)$, then also $O(on\bar{m})$ and so $F(\bar{o}\bar{m}/n)$. Hence $n -<_m \bar{o}$. Thus any two elements, m and n , such that m is between o and n , are also such that n is between m and \bar{o} . From the transitivity of the illative relation, $m -<_o \bar{o}$. But if $m -<_o \bar{o}$, then from the above $m -<_o o$. Thus we have the continuous line, $o \cdots m \cdots n \cdots \bar{o} \cdots \bar{n} \cdots \bar{m} \cdots o$, or $\bar{o} \cdots \bar{n} \cdots \bar{m} \cdots o \cdots m \cdots n \cdots \bar{o}$, which has so far the character of the projective line with o as

origin and \bar{o} the point at infinity. And if m, n, r , occur in that order in one 'direction' from the origin, then $\bar{m}, \bar{n}, \bar{r}$, occur in that order in the 'opposite direction' from the origin.

Certain further characteristics of order in the system may be mentioned briefly. In general, lines such as those considered above may "intersect" any number of times. From the definition of obverses, $O(a\bar{a})$ and $O(c\bar{c})$ always hold. But by postulate I, if $O(a\bar{a})$, then $O(a\bar{a}\bar{p})$, and hence $F(a\bar{a}/p)$, for any element p . Similarly, if $O(c\bar{c})$, then $F(c\bar{c}/p)$. Thus collections consisting of the F -resultants of different pairs may have any number of elements in common. But in terms of such operations as were in question in the definitions of 'sums' and 'products,' sets of resultants may be determined such that they have one and only one element in common. Thus certain selected lines in the system intersect once and once only. There are any number of such sets.

In general, if any pair of elements in a set are obverses of one another, all the other elements of the set will be resultants of this pair, and their entire array will be "one-dimensional" so far as dimensionality may be attributed to such a collection. The problem of selecting sets suitable for any space form—any n -dimensional array—is the problem of selecting so that O -collections will be excluded. Such sets, containing no obverses, are the 'flat collections' of Kempe. As he pointed out, the excluded obverses will form an exactly similar set, so that 'spaces' come in pairs somewhat suggesting companion hemispheres. In terms of "flat collections," one-dimensional, two-dimensional, n -dimensional arrays, may be specified in any number of ways.

Once the order of the system Σ is generated in terms of O -relations and F -relations, the determination of such more specialized types of order is a problem of selection only. In the words of Professor Royce, "Wherever a linear series is in question, wherever an origin of coördinates is employed, wherever 'cause and effect,' 'ground and consequence,' orientation in space or direction of tendency in time are in question, the dyadic asymmetrical relations involved are essentially the same as the relation here

symbolized by $p \prec_v q$. This expression, then, is due to certain of our best established practical instincts and to some of our best fixed intellectual habits. Yet it is not the only expression for the relations involved. It is in several respects inferior to the more direct expression in terms of o -relations. . . . When, in fact, we attempt to describe the relations of the system Σ merely in terms of the antecedent-consequent relation, we not only limit ourselves to an arbitrary choice of origin, but miss the power to survey at a glance relations of more than a dyadic, or triadic character."¹

With this hasty and fragmentary survey of the system Σ , we may turn to considerations of method. It was suggested in the introduction that the procedure here exemplified differs in notable ways from the method of such studies as those of *Principia Mathematica*. In that work, we are presented at the outset with a simple, though general, order—the order of elementary propositions so related to one another that one is the negative of another, two may be such that at least one of them is true, and so on. In terms of these fundamental relations, more special types of order—various branches of mathematics—are built up by progressive complication. In some respects this is the necessary character of deductive procedures in general; in other respects it is not. In particular, this method differs from that employed by Mr. Kempe and Professor Royce in that *terms*, as well as relations, of later sections are themselves complexes of the relations at first assumed. The complication thus made necessary can hardly be appreciated by those who would regard a number, for instance, as a simple entity. To illustrate: In *Principia Mathematica*, the "cardinal number" of x is the class of referents of the relation 'similar to' where x is the relatum.² The 'class of referents' of any relation R is defined as α such that α is identical with x such that, for some y , x has the relation R to y . 'Relatum' is similarly defined. ' m is identical with n ' means that, for any predicative function φ , φm implies φn . I do not pause upon 'predicative function.' α is 'similar to'

¹ Pages 381–2 of the paper.

² I shall, perhaps, be pardoned for translating the symbolism,—provided I do not make mistakes.

β means that, for some one-to-one relation R , α is identical with the class of referents of R and β is identical with the class of relata of R . A 'one-to-one' relation is a relation S such that the class of referents of S is contained in $\mathbf{1}$ and the class of relata of S is contained in $\mathbf{1}$.¹ ' $\mathbf{1}$ ' is defined as α such that, for some x , α is identical with *the* x . '*The* x ' is my attempt to translate the untranslatable. The attempt to analyze 'is contained in' would require much more space than we can afford. But supposing the analysis complete, we discover that the 'cardinal number of x ' is ———, where ——— is the definition first given, with all the terms in it replaced by *their* definition, the terms in these replaced by *their* definition, and so on. All this complexity is internal to the *terms* of arithmetic. *And only when this process is complete* can any properties or relations of 'the cardinal number of x ' be demonstrated. An advantage of this method is that the step from one order to another 'based upon it' is always such as to make clear the connection between the two. It preserves automatically the hierarchic arrangement of various departments of exact thinking. The process of developing this hierarchy is tedious and taxes our analytic powers, but there is always the prospect of assured success if we can perform the initial analysis involved in the definitions. But the disadvantages of this complexity can hardly be overemphasized. It is forbidding to those whose interests are simply 'mathematical' or 'scientific' in the ordinary sense. Such a work as *Principia Mathematica* runs great risk of being much referred to, little read, and less understood.

In contrast with such complexity, we have, by the method of Mr. Kempe and Professor Royce, an order completely generated at the start, and such that the various special orders contained in it may be arrived at *simply by selection*. Little or no complication within the terms is required. Involved as the structure of the system Σ may seem, it is, by comparison, a marvel of simplicity and compact neatness. With this method,

¹ More accurately, "every member of the class of referents of S is contained in $\mathbf{1}$, and every member of the class of relata of S is contained in $\mathbf{1}$," because all relations are, in *Principia Mathematica*, taken in the abstract.

there seems to be no assurance in advance that any hierarchic relations of different orders will be disclosed, but we shall certainly discover, and without difficulty, whatever analogies exist between various orders. Again, this method relies much more upon devices which may be not at all obvious. It may not tax severely the analytic powers, but it is certain to tax the ingenuity.

In another important respect, advantage seems to lie with this method. One would hardly care to invent a new geometry by the hierarchic procedure, or expect to discover one by its use. We have to know where we are going or we shall not get there by this road. By contrast, Professor Royce's is the method of the path-finder. The prospect of the novel is here much greater. The system Σ may—probably does—contain new continents of order whose existence we do not even suspect. And some chance transformation may put us, suddenly and unexpectedly, in possession of such previously unexplored fields.

Which of the two methods will prove, in the end, more powerful, no one can say at present. The whole subject is too new and undeveloped. Certainly it is to be desired that the direct and exploratory method be increasingly made use of, and that the advantages of studying very general types of order, such as the system Σ , be better understood.

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INTERPRETATION AS A SELF-REPRESENTATIVE PROCESS

PROFESSOR ROYCE'S doctrine of interpretation has received as yet but little appreciation. Recent critics of the *Problem of Christianity*, which contains the first formulation of that doctrine, have either failed to understand its significance or have been unable to relate it to Professor Royce's earlier teachings. This note is intended to call attention to interpretation as a self-representative process.

What interpretation precisely means must first be made clear. In agreement with the late Charles Peirce, Professor Royce rejects the traditional dichotomy of the cognitive processes into perception and conception, and of the objects of knowledge into particulars and universals, appropriate to these processes. There are objects which can be called neither 'things' nor 'universals' and which are known by neither perception nor conception. Such objects are meanings, aptly called by Charles Peirce, 'signs,' *i. e.*, signs of meaning.¹ The term sign may be taken literally. The sign 'Keep off the grass,' for instance, is both a datum which can be perceived, and it has a general or abstract character which may be conceived, yet as a *meaningful* sign it appeals to a different mode of cognition. The sign addresses itself to one who can read and understand its meaning. One not familiar with the English language can upon seeing the sign still perceive a *thing* and conceive a *universal* quality or character belonging to it, but the *meaning* of the sign will escape him, despite adequate perception and conception. The knowledge of the sign *qua* sign, *i. e.*, *qua* meaning, is, according to Professor Royce, a knowledge *sui generis*. It is interpretation.

Interpretation not only differs from perception and conception in that its objects are meanings, but it is distinguished from them

¹ Professor Royce's definition of a sign: "A sign is an object whose being consists in the fact that the sign calls for an interpretation." *The Problem of Christianity* New York, 1913, Vol. II, p. 283.

in other respects. While perception and conception involve but two terms—the traditional subject-object relation—interpretation requires three terms. The triadic form of interpretation makes of the knowledge of meanings a social enterprise. A 'sign' must be interpreted *by* some one *to* some one. The interpreter 'mediates' between the sign calling for an interpretation and the one to whom the interpretation is addressed, who, by analogy with an addressee, may be called the 'interpretee.' The three terms may represent three different mental states within the same individual, or sign, interpreter and interpretee may be three different beings or groups of beings.¹ Interpretation is a name for a complex process constituted by a triadic non-symmetrical relation. This 'social' theory of knowledge which requires three terms of a different kind and order for the cognition of any meaning has led Professor Royce, not indeed to alter any of his earlier views concerning the 'world' and the 'individual,' but to deepen and to clarify them.

In yet another important respect interpretation differs from the two traditional cognitive processes. Both perception and conception terminate in their objects, while interpretation is interminable. When perception meets its particular and conception its universal, the knowing process has come to an end. A new particular and a new universal are required for the further operation of perception and conception. Interpretation, on the other hand, is endless, for the accomplished interpretation is itself a 'sign,' a meaning, which requires a fresh interpretative act, the result of which is in turn a new object for still further interpretation, and so on *ad infinitum*.

It is not mere endlessness, however, which constitutes the nature of interpretation. Its endlessness is one which any self-representative process exemplifies. It is the endlessness of a determinate infinite which Professor Royce has expounded in the "Supplementary Essay" to *The World and the Individual*. Professor Royce has himself not emphasized the self-representative character of interpretation. He merely hints at it when,

¹ This doctrine maintains—perhaps no other can—that the knowledge of the 'alter' is as certain or uncertain as the knowledge of one's 'self,' and *vice versa*.

for instance, he says, "By itself, the process of interpretation calls, in ideal, for an *infinite sequence* of interpretation."¹ That any interpretation when once initiated generates by virtue of its own nature an infinite series of interpretations having the relational structure of a self-representative system is implied, however, in the very meaning of the process.

The development "of an infinite multitude out of the expression of a single purpose"² which characterizes a self-representative system is precisely what the single purpose of interpreting a 'sign,' *i. e.*, knowing a meaning, exemplifies. The 'sign' which it is my purpose completely to interpret gives rise to a "recurrent operation of thought" such as, "*if once finally expressed*, would involve . . . an infinite variety of serially arranged facts corresponding to the purpose in question."³ Let it be my purpose to interpret completely the meaning of any 'sign.' The result of the triadic process of interpretation—the expression of the purpose—is a new object of knowledge, a 'sign,' calling for the same interpretative act, the result of which as a new object of knowledge, a 'sign,' requiring once more the same interpretative act, etc., etc.⁴ The self-representative character of interpretation may be expressed symbolically thus:—

Let x = any sign;

" y = " interpreter;

" z = " interpretee.⁵

Then $R(x, y, z)$ = any interpretation, *i. e.*, the triadic relation which unites the sign, the interpreter, and the interpretee into a complex.

But the triad, $R(x, y, z)$, is in turn a sign, requiring interpretation.

¹ *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. II, p. 150. The italics are mine.

² *The World and the Individual*, New York, 1912, Vol. I, p. 503.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 507.

⁴ It must here be noted that Professor Royce uses the term interpretation to indicate both the *act* of interpreting and the *result* of such act. To say that interpretation as a 'sign' calls for a fresh interpretation is to say that the *result* of an act of interpretation requires a fresh interpretative act. This result, though now a single 'sign,' is logically the compound of previous sign, interpreter, and interpretee.

⁵ It should be borne in mind that y and z may be the same individual.

The new complex will be $R[R(x, y, z)]y', z'$. This again requires a new interpretation which can be represented $R\{[R(x, y, z)]y', z'\}y'', z''$. This process goes on indefinitely. The whole series will run: $R(x, y, z)$. $R[R(x, y, z)]y', z'$. $R\{[R(x, y, z)]y', z'\}y'', z''$. $R[[R(x, y, z)]y', z']y''', z'''$¹ Each term is a triad one of whose terms is the term preceding the triad in question in the series; thus the series is self-representative. Or, the 'chain' of interpretations thus generated is a self-representative series, each of whose members is a triad, one term of which is the triad's preceding term in the series. It will be readily seen that this self-representative series fulfills all the conditions of self-representation demanded in the "Supplementary Essay" to *The World and the Individual*, Vol. I, pp. 508 ff.

The self-representative character of interpretation shows at once that Professor Royce's new epistemology is no radical departure from his previous theory. The novelty of his doctrine consists in his insistence that the knowledge of meaning is different from the knowledge of 'things' and the knowledge of 'universals.' The knowledge of meaning is a triadic process, but the triadic process as *one* purpose requires for its expression an infinite manifold. Thus, Professor Royce's earlier solution of the problems of the One and the Many, of the Infinite, of the World, and of the Individual receives from his theory of Interpretation additional confirmation.

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¹ This is mere symbolism; there is no proof, no rigid logical definition attempted.

ON THE APPLICATION OF GRAMMATICAL CATEGORIES TO THE ANALYSIS OF DELUSIONS.

ABSTRACT.

Remarks on Royce's sociological and logical influences. The general nature of Royce's logical seminary: choice of topics. As to the superposition of grammatical upon psychiatric concepts, the reason for choosing delusions. Delusions in the Danvers symptom catalogue and their place in nosological entities. The neglect of delusions by logic and psychology. James's handling of delusions probably over-sensationalistic. Probable value of the psychopathological point of view as illustrated in James's later work. Analysis of certain instances of somatic delusion. Analysis of certain instances of environmental and personal delusions. Contrasting results of the somatic and personal group analyses. Anatomical intimations that the frontal lobes are involved more especially in disorder of personality. Function of impression more likely to employ posterior-lying nerve tissue; function of expression, anterior-lying. Two groups of delusions in dementia præcox, one associated with frontal lobe anomalies or lesions, the other with parietal: the latter delusions fantastic. The pragmatic element in most delusions invites comparison with the grammatical categories of the verbs. Delbrück *vs.* Wundt *re* grammar and psychology. Non-identity of these topics. The four fundamental moods (imperative, indicative, subjunctive, optative). Subjunctive the mood of *will*, optative that of *wish*. 'Stratified' development of these moods. Their relation to human character types. Relation of grammatical moods to logical modality (necessary, impossible, contingent, possible). Importance of getting a clear conception of beliefs from the point of view of the believer. Category of the voice (active, passive, middle). Situation passive with many hallucinations, perhaps reflexive in the case of *Gedankenlautwerden*. Involvement of the first person. Importance of distinguishing the second from the third person from the patient's point of view. Gender and number of persons involved in a delusional situation. Do essentially tetradic situations occur, at least where the number of persons involved is *manifestly* four? Tense-distinctions. Probability that most moods with special names in different languages fall toward either the subjunctive (*e. g.*, potential, conditional) or the optative (*e. g.*, desiderative, precativ, jussive?). Pragmatic delusions as subjunctive 'precipitates.' Fantastic delusions as optative 'precipitates.' Summary.

I.

I AM peculiarly glad to speak here in honor of Royce. Especially in recent years I have felt, in my professional work as neuropathologist and as psychiatrist, the effects of Royce's teaching, more particularly of his graduate teaching in the logical seminary, which I have followed omitting a few years only since

1897. I well remember when my training with James and Royce was regarded as something of a disability: it was questioned whether a man with philosophical antecedents could do the work of an interne in pathology! Nowadays we have pretty well worked through that period to one of greater tolerance.

I want to illustrate in this paper a concrete effect of Royce's logical seminary through the employment of its comparative method in a certain special field of psychiatry wherein are to be applied some categories derived from a portion of the science of grammar.

But first a word as to broader effects of Royce's work. I do not speak of his metaphysics, except as it has relation to the social consciousness. My colleague, Richard Cabot, has already to-day spoken of the Royce influence upon himself. In more limited ways, I must own to identical influences, making for a greater interest in social service than is common among physicians. And indeed the sociological influences of Royce have been wide, as may be seen in the chapter "Of Society"¹ in the fourth volume of Merz's *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, 1914. Therein Merz sets forth how "no subject of philosophical or scientific interest has been more profoundly affected by it [the spirit of comprehension in opposition to that of definition, or as later termed, the 'synoptic' tendency] than the study of man in his individual and collective existence." After then speaking of new definitions of the social 'Together,' of the 'social self' as opposed to the subjective, Merz ascribes to Royce "the clearest indication of this doctrine," quoting a passage from the papers of Royce contained in early volumes, 1894-1895, of this REVIEW.² I have no specialist's command of the history of these developments, but I am sure that the history of Richard Cabot's justly famous campaign for social service could not be written without reference to Royce's work on the social consciousness. And I know personally that hardly a day passes at the Psychopathic

¹ Merz, J. T., *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, Vol. IV. Chap. X, "Of Society," p. 437. Blackwood, Edinburgh, 1904.

² Royce, J., "The External World and the Social Consciousness." *Philos. Review*, 3, 1894; and "Self Consciousness, Social Consciousness and Nature," *ibid.*, 4, 1895.

Hospital in Boston without concrete exemplification of these interests as opposed to the purely medical.¹

What I wish here to set forth is a matter of special psychiatric analysis whose scope and shape have been transformed by influences, not so much of a sociological, as of a logical nature, drawn from Royce's seminary. That seminary has dealt with a great variety of topics from a comparative point of view, although the statistical sciences have not been neglected. Such widely contrasting points of view as those of L. J. Henderson (revolving about the considerations of his book on *The Fitness of the Environment*²) and those of F. A. Woods (revolving about the considerations of his books on *The Influence of Monarchs*³ and *Is War Diminishing?*⁴) have been brought by their authors in the developmental state to the seminary.

The topics of the Seminary over a long period of years have been well-nigh as wide in range as those of, e. g., Wundt's *Logik*,⁵ but their choice has not been governed by any principle such as that of Wundt's *Logik* or by any evident principle except that of the needs of a variety of workers who have for a variety of reasons been attracted to the Seminary. Accordingly, although the principle of a book like Wundt's majestic volumes on *Logik* is probably to some extent aprioristic, or at any rate governed by still more general metaphysical principles than those which the book itself sets forth, the topics of Professor Royce's Seminary have subjected themselves to no special principle; and this despite the fact that the seminary visitors and its moderator have often been tempted into metaphysical digressions. Aside from the personality of the leader, very possibly the effects of the thought of the late Charles S. Peirce and the late Professor

¹ (Southard, E. E., editor), *Contributions from the Psychopathic Hospital* (Department of the Boston State Hospital), Boston, Mass., 1913 and 1914.

² Henderson, L. J., *The Fitness of the Environment, an Inquiry into the Biological Significance of the Properties of Matter*, Macmillan, N. Y., 1913.

³ Woods, F. A., *The Influence of Monarchs, Steps in a New Science of History*, Macmillan, N. Y., 1913.

⁴ Woods, F. A., and Baltzly, A., *Is War Diminishing? A Study of the Prevalence of War in Europe from 1450 to the Present Day*, Houghton, Mifflin, Boston, 1915.

⁵ Wundt, W., *Logik, Eine Untersuchung der Principien der Erkenntnis unter der Methoden wissenschaftlicher Forschung*, 3 aufl., Stuttgart, Enke, 1903.

William James have been most in evidence; more particularly, perhaps, the effects of Peirce's thought.

II.

My special topic may be described as a *grammar of delusions*, or more exactly as an application of a portion of the logical classifications of grammar (and more especially the grammar of verbs) to a portion of the data of psychiatry, viz., delusions (and more especially certain delusions that I call pragmatic or paraprismatic to distinguish them from fantastic or more purely ideational delusions). The connotation of the term *grammar* is therefore not that of the elementary-and-therefore-simple-and-reliable, which the term receives in, say, Newman's *Grammar of Assent* or Pearson's *Grammar of Science*.

My reason for choosing delusions as one member of the comparative system which I proposed to employ as illustrative of the method of Royce's seminary was as follows. First, there was no doubt from an inspection of the records of state hospitals for the insane that delusions or false beliefs of many sorts were among the most frequent of psychopathic phenomena. Secondly, it did not appear that the topic had been taken up seriously either by logic or by psychology.

First, to develop a little farther the frequency of delusions amongst the insane, I may refer to the data of the Danvers (Massachusetts) State Hospital symptom catalogue, unique I believe in its representativeness of routine records of comparatively high standard.¹ Despite the fact that many patients do not exhibit definite delusions of a nature permitting accurate transcription, yet in some 17,000 cases of all sorts of mental disease examined at the Danvers State Hospital, period of 1879 to 1913,² there were certainly no less than 5,000 cases in which the delusions were definite enough to permit being recorded in the case history. No doubt this experience is the pre-

¹ Southard, E. E., *The Laboratory Work of the Danvers State Hospital, Hathorne, Massachusetts*. With especial Relation to the Policy Formulated by Dr. Charles Whitney Page, Superintendent, 1888-1898, 1903-1910.

² Southard, E. E., *A Study of Normal-looking Brains in Psychopathic Subjects, with Notes on Symptomatology* (Danvers State Hospital Material) to be published.

vailing one, and no doubt more intensive histories would greatly augment the percentage of cases characterized at one time or other by delusions.

Such figures of course far transcend the numbers of true 'paranoiacs' (or even victims of paranoid forms of the dementia præcox of Kraepelin), and I should not wish to be understood to say that, in the 5000 or more Danvers cases, delusions formed the head and center of the mental diseases in question.

Yet the number of actual entities (in the medical sense of this term as a kind of collection of symptoms) in which delusions do form a central feature makes a formidable list. I may limit myself to the following actual or possible entities: paranoia, the paranoid form of dementia præcox, and the somewhat closely allied paraphrenia of Kraepelin's recent formula, the so-called acute alcoholic hallucinosis, or insanity of alcoholic origin, a number of forms of pre-senile psychoses, some forms of senile psychoses, to say nothing of various forms of syphilitic mental disease, as also manic depressive psychosis, various mild or severe psychopathic conditions not ordinarily considered to amount to frank mental disease, and even such apparently remote entities, or groups of entities, as are found under the caption of epilepsy and feeble-mindedness.

So much will suffice to show the frequency of delusions among psychopaths and the probable magnitude of the problem for the science of psychiatry. I need not here discuss the somewhat large psychiatric literature of delusions. I confess that the literature in question has struck me as a little barren or at best the threshing over of old straw by the application of categories borrowed, *e. g.*, from Herbart or Wundt to material that neither had ever concretely considered.

Secondly, to develop a little farther the logical and psychological neglect of the topic. The logic of fallacies, *e. g.*, in Alfred Sidgwick's excellent work,¹ makes not the slightest draught upon psychiatric data, not merely perhaps because the delusions of

¹ Sidgwick, A., *Fallacies, a View of Logic from the Practical Side*, The International Scientific Series, Appleton, N. Y., 1884. *Distinction and the Criticism of Beliefs*, Longmans, Green, London, 1892.

the insane are not prominently fallacious (at least some of the most serious and important of insane delusions) but because a logician would never spontaneously think of going to psychiatry for logical material.

But also and more markedly perhaps, it would be somewhat easy to show that delusions, especially of the insane, have been too largely neglected by the psychologists. Even James, in whose work may be seen remarkable influences of his psychopathological point of view, deals with delusions of the insane in a very few brief pages.¹ For example, he cites insane delusions along with alternating selves and mediumships as a type of abnormal alterations in the self, quoting Ribot upon our personality and Griesinger upon the 'doubleness' of self, of the 'struggle of the old self against new discordant forms of experience,' 'the opposition of the conscious me's,' etc. Again, James quotes from Krishaber a case of the well-known metaphysical type of delusions with feelings of unreality. In a footnote to his chapter on the perception of things, James quotes a list of certain special delusions given by Clouston, suggesting that in many cases "there are certain theories which the patients invent to account for their abnormal bodily sensations," "that in other cases they are due to hallucinations of hearing and sight." James here also defines a delusion "as a false opinion about a matter of fact which need not necessarily involve, though it often does involve, false perceptions of sensible things."

How rationalistic, nay sensationalistic, are these latter definitions just quoted from James! The point is urged that the data of reasoning are as it were poisoned at the sensory source. Theories are invented, or hallucinations supply data.

This, as it seems to me, over-rationalistic account of delusions is the more remarkable in James because the whole trend of his thinking was surely bent by his medical or psychopathological point of view. Those of us who have confidence in the psychopathological method may indeed feel that the key to a thorough-going theory of belief may be found in a study of delusions; namely, of false beliefs.

¹ James, W., *The Principles of Psychology*, Henry Holt, N. Y., 1890, Vol. II, Chap. XIX, "The Perception of 'Things,'" footnote, p. 114.

I should like to dwell on the James point of view here, because I think his progress subsequent to the *Principles of Psychology* and culminating in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*¹ shows a drawing-away from the sensationalistic point of view to a very overt voluntarism, under which, had James considered the problem of delusions, he might well have dealt with them as perversions of will rather than false conceptions or conceptions based on false perceptions, hallucinations, or strange bodily sensations.

It is difficult not to think that the logical method at the bottom of James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* is not essentially the method of psychopathology despite the careful guarding of the point of view from certain misconstructions in the initial chapter of that work, entitled "Religion and Neurology." As when James states concerning the phenomena of religious experience that "When I handle them biologically and psychologically as if they were mere curious facts of individual history, some of you may think it a degradation to so sublime a subject and may even suspect me, until my purpose gets more fully expressed, of deliberately seeking to discredit the religious side of life." James, it will be remembered, furnishes a concrete example in George Fox, pointing out that whereas the Quaker religion, which he founded, is something which it is impossible to overpraise, yet Fox's mind was unsound, and from the point of view of his nervous constitution, he was a psychopath or "detraqué of the deepest dye."

To be sure, we do not need to guard the results of an analysis of insane delusions with such cautious remarks as the above concerning the psychopathic varieties of religious experience. Yet I am inclined to believe that whether or no the point of view of psychopathology is more important than that of the classical psychology in the analysis of belief, at any rate the possible contributions of psychopathology have been singularly neglected.

Accordingly, some years ago I started some superficial and

¹ James, W., *The Varieties of Religious Experience, A Study in Human Nature*. Being the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion delivered at Edinburgh in 1901-1902. Longmans, Green, London, 1902.

orienting analyses of delusional material,¹ the results of which I wish to present briefly here, partly to show the general nature of the material.

My first systematic work dealt with somatic delusions² and the result was decidedly sensationalistic and quite aptly illustrated James's remark above quoted concerning "theories which the patients invent to account for their abnormal bodily sensations." In fact it was only when one passed from somatic to personal and environmental delusions that what I have called the sensationalistic hypotheses seemed to fail.

To quote a portion of the conclusions drawn from the work on somatic delusions, "the concept of the *crystallization of delusions around sensorial data of an abnormal sort* must be entertained for some delusions at least." More in detail, "In one group of cases (Cases I, II, III, possibly VIII) the psychic rendering of the somatic states is rather critical and temporary, and follows a process somewhat comprehensible to the normal mind. (Type: "*shot by a fellow with a seven-shooter*," in a *spot found to correspond with a patch of dry pleurisy*.)"

"In others (Cases IV, V) the psychic rendering is less natural and is more a genuine transformation of the sensorial data into ideas quite new. (Type: "*bees in the skull*" found in the case with cranial osteomalacia.)"

"In others (Cases VI, VII) the problem is raised whether severe hypochondria, with ideas concerning dead entrails and the like, may not often indicate such severe somatic disease as tuberculosis. The psychic rendering here is of a more general (apperceptive?) sort."

A somewhat generalized account of this conception was presented in more popular form by my friend Dr. Franz in the *Popular Science Monthly*.³

¹ Southard, E. E., and Mitchell, H. W., "Melancholia with Delusions of Negation: Three Cases with Autopsy," *Jour. Nervous and Mental Disease*, 1908, Vol. 35.

² Southard, E. E., and Fitzgerald, J. G., "Discussion of Psychic and Somatic Factors in a Case of Acute Delirium Dying of Septicemia," *Boston Medical & Surgical Journal*, 1910, Vol. 162.

³ Southard, E. E., "On the Somatic Sources of Somatic Delusions." *Jour. Abnormal Psychology*, December, 1912-Jan., 1913.

⁴ Franz, S. I., "Delusions," *Popular Science Monthly*, January, 1915.

A second paper on environmental (or, as I called them, following Wernicke, allopsychic) delusions¹ yielded the in one sense negative result that environmental delusions seemed to trace back in most instances to temporally or logically prior disorder of personality. I raised then the question whether delusions often spread inwards (egocentripetally) or habitually outwards (egocentrifugally), a concept later to be illuminated by the concept of the voice (active, passive, or reflexive) in which the patients habitually or characteristically moved.

I found that, to quote a later paper on delusions of personality,² "put briefly, the deluded patient is more apt to divine correctly the diseases of his body than his devilments by society." Or more in detail "these delusions having a social content pointed far more often inwards at the personality of the patient than outwards at the conditions of the world. And case after case, having apparently an almost pure display of environmental delusions, turned out to possess most obvious defects of intellect or of temperament which would forbid their owners to react properly to the most favorable of environments. Hence, we believe, it may be generally stated that the clinician is far less likely to get valuable points as to the social exteriors of his patients from the contents of their social delusions than he proved to be able to get when reasoning from somatic delusions to somatic interiors."

A word is perhaps necessary to guard against too sweeping conclusions. "In a few cases it seemed that something like a close correlation did exist between such allopsychic delusions and the conditions which had surrounded the patient—the delusory fears of insane merchants ran on commercial ruin, and certain women dealt in their delusions largely with domestic *debâcles*. But, on the whole, we could *not* say that, as the somatic delusions seemed to grow out of and somewhat fairly represent the conditions of the soma, so the environmental delusions would appear to grow out of or fairly represent the environment."

¹ Southard, E. E., and Stearns, H. W., "How Far is the Environment Responsible for Delusions?" *Jour. Abnormal Psychology*, June-July, 1913.

² Southard, E. E., "Data Concerning Delusions of Personality. With Note on the Association of Bright's Disease and Unpleasant Delusions," *Journ. Abnormal Psychology*, Oct.-Nov., 1915.

I need quote from only one more paper on the delusion question. The papers above mentioned deal chiefly with cases whose brains looked normal to the naked eye, the material having been chosen as nearest to normal. In another study I deliberately took up perhaps the most abnormal material that we possess in psychiatry, namely, subjects of general paresis,¹ a disease now regarded as a form of brain syphilis. Incidentally I found that the somatic delusions, despite the grave brain damage of paresis, tended to show somatic sources, precisely as had the normal-brain material. When it came to allopsychic (environmental) and autopsychic (personal) delusions, it appeared that these delusions were statistically associated with lesions of the frontal lobes, and that cases without frontal emphasis of lesions were not at all apt to be delusional or, for that matter, to be specially subject to grave disorder of personality.

Now it might not be at once obvious to those who have not followed the progress of brain physiology whither these frontal lobe findings would speculatively lead. I shall develop the matter merely to the point of justifying the choice of the grammar of verbs rather than that of nouns for comparative purposes (I bear in mind that I have not yet justified the choice of grammar at all for such purposes).

There has been, ever since the discovery attributed to Charles Bell of the different functions of the posterior and anterior spinal nerve roots, a growing mass of data concerning the posterior situation of the sensory arrival-platforms (a term of F. W. Mott) and the anterior situation of the motor departure-platforms. The evolutionary complications of the bulb and indeed of the whole rhombencephalon and of the isthmus cerebri did not succeed in abolishing this general tendency to the posterior situation of the sensory arrangements, despite their sidewise pushing in certain regions.

The posterior-lying cerebellum is regarded as a sensory organ despite its indirect chief function of modifying muscular activity

¹ Southard, E. E., and Tepper, A. S., "The Possible Correlation between Delusions and Cortex Lesions in General Paresis," *Jour. Abnormal Psychology*, Oct.-Nov., 1913.

in certain ways. Then the physiologists found a variety of sensory spheres more posteriorly lying in the cerebrum. Sherrington found that the fissure of Rolando had tissue behind it that must be regarded as receptive in nature and tissue forward of it that must be regarded as motor. Moreover, different parts of the precentral gyrus serving face, arm, and leg were found to lie immediately adjacent to receptive tissues for the self-same structures lying back of the Rolandic fissure in the postcentral gyrus.

Accordingly it appeared that the nerve tissues exhibit a somewhat general law to the effect that the function of impression is likely to employ posterior-lying tissues, whereas, anterior-lying tissues are likely to be related with the function of expression, and this law is likely to find expression not alone in the simple spinal cord but also in the complicated cerebral cortex.

If it were permissible to draw psychological conclusions from this law as applied to the cerebral cortex, it might be plausibly mentioned that consciousness, in so far as it is cognitive, whether those cognitions are visual, auditory, or kinæsthetic, is rather more likely to employ posterior-lying tissues than anterior-lying ones in the cortex. Campbell¹ indeed gave utterance to the suspicion that consciousness is a function of the posterior association center of Flechsig. I am personally inclined to this view.

It is clear then that to find delusions related to frontal lobe disorder, *i. e.*, to disorder of forward-lying tissues was at first surprising. Delusions or false beliefs have the ring of consciousness, of cognition, of ideas. The falsity of these ideas is somehow taken as residing in the ideas; at least that is the tendency of the analyst. Hence, if one were seeking cortical correlations for false beliefs taken as ideas essentially and intrinsically false, one would be apt to turn forthwith, not to the *frontal* lobes, but say to the parietal lobes.

Surprises in the nature of results diametrically opposed to expectation are somewhat frequent in neurology as elsewhere. I had been astonished to find, in the obscure quasi-functional but probably in some sense 'organic' disease dementia præcox, that

¹ Campbell, A. W., *Histological Studies on the Localization of Cerebral Function*, Univ. Press, Cambridge, Eng., 1905, esp. p. 206.

the symptom katatonia, a highly motor-looking symptom, tended to associate itself with posterior-lying tissues.¹ In the same disease, delusions tended to relate themselves with frontal lobe lesions. Not only were delusions found to be based as a rule on frontal disease and katatonic symptoms on parietal lobe disease, but an equally strong correlation was found between auditory hallucinations and disease of the temporal lobe. Of course the correlation between auditory hallucinations and lesions of the temporal lobes might be *à priori* expected, but the writer at least did not suspect beforehand the possibility of any relation between katatonia (a condition in which hypertensive states of the muscles occur, sometimes amounting to actual *flexibilitas cerea* and catalepsy) and disease of the parietal region. In point of fact, the strikingly cataleptic cases of my series seemed to be often associated with gross lesions of the post-central gyrus, thus giving rise to a suspicion that the condition katatonia or catalepsy is actually due to a disorder of kinæsthesia, or at all events of the tissues which are in some sense the seat of kinæsthesia. This, then, is an example of one of the perennial surprises of observation. An apparent disorder of motion seems to resolve itself into an actual disorder on the afferent side.

Equally surprising in an opposite direction was the correlation of delusion formation with disease of the frontal lobes. As elsewhere stated in this paper, a rationalistic or sensationalistic account of delusions would naturally lead us to think of brain disorder in the sensorium. In point of fact, the parts of the brain which are best entitled to the name sensorium seem to be free of gross lesions and anomaly except in a comparatively small hyperphantasia group. To quote from conclusions of a paper on Dementia Præcox, "The non-frontal group of delusion-formations the writer wishes to group provisionally under the term *hyperphantasia*, emphasizing the overimagination or perverted imagination of these cases, the frequent lack of any appropriate

¹ Southard, E. E., "A Study of the Dementia Præcox Group in the Light of Certain Cases Showing Anomalies or Scleroses in Particular Brain-Regions." On the Topographical Distribution of Cortex Lesions and Anomalies in Dementia Præcox, with some account of their Functional Significance, *Am. Jour. Insanity*, Vol. LXXI, Nos. 2 and 3.

conduct-disorder in the patients harboring such delusions, and the *à priori* likelihood that these cases should turn out to have posterior-association-center disease rather than disease of the anterior association-center. This anatomical correlation is in fact the one observed."

To sum up the argument to this point, delusions of the insane have been chosen for comparative study because of their frequency as symptoms and their centrality in many important mental diseases. Furthermore, because of their neglect by logic and by psychology. There is, however, a likelihood that psychopathological methods will aid both logic and psychology. Somatic delusions do, it is true, afford some basis for a sensationalistic theory of delusions and indirectly of belief in general. But delusions affecting personality are perhaps better regarded as will-disorders or disorders of expression. At any rate, the writer's views were governed by his anatomical results in general paresis and in dementia præcox, which seemed to show that the majority of delusions were related to frontal lobe disorder. On general grounds the frontal lobes seem to the writer to be best regarded as organs for the elaboration of motion (including attitude, conduct, and the like). Of course the existence of essentially ideational delusions, here called fantastic, must be conceded: these beliefs are as it were *prima facie* delusions and do not require individual and specific testing in experience to determine their falsity. Such delusions were found in one disease (dementia præcox) related with parietal lobe anomalies or other lesions. However, the accuracy of the anatomical observations and their future confirmation are not essential to the argument. Nor is it necessary to consider the parietal lobes as an expanded and elaborated sensorium and the frontal lobes as an expanded and elaborated motorium in following these contentions. In point of fact, the pragmatic element in many or in all delusions is perhaps obvious to inspection, and the existence of a fantastic group of delusions, not requiring much pragmatic testing, is not unlikely on general grounds.

Assuming, then, for the moment that the value of comparing the categories of grammar with those of psychiatry is conceded

and that delusions have been chosen for a test of such comparisons, it becomes obvious that the strong motor, expressive, pragmatic element in delusions immediately invites comparison with the categories of the verbs.

III.

I am so ignorant of the theory of grammar that the present section of my paper must be very brief. At the outset I must perhaps say that the value of comparing categories of two sets of scientific data would be much diminished if those data happened to have been analyzed by the same group of men or under the same dominant logical interest. Had the theory of speech-function, language, grammar, and cognate materials been elaborated by the same technique as the materials of psychiatry, then the chances are that the comparisons here intended would be of lesser value. Luckily for these purposes, unfortunately perhaps for others, it would appear that the psychology which dominates philology and comparative grammar is not especially modern, and is indeed Herbartian. On the other hand, the development of aphasia doctrines and cognate matters in psychiatry has not considered to any extent the developments of philology, comparative grammar, or even the anthropology that has grown hand and hand with linguistics.

The ideas of Delbrück¹ about grammar and the ideas of Wundt about speech have undergone insulated courses. Steinthal and Paul seem to have been Herbartians, and Delbrück seems to have followed them. After Wundt's publication of large volumes on *Sprache*,² Delbrück brought out a little book of critique,³ regarding many of the Wundtian contentions about speech as unwarrantable applications of personal and unproved psychology. Wundt replied in another small book.⁴ There was no sign of unanimity.

¹ Brugmann and Delbrück, *Vergleichende Grammatik der Indogermanischer Sprachen*, 1886-1900.

² Wundt, W., *Volkerpsychologie, Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgeschichte von Sprache, Mythos und Sitte*, I Bd., *Die Sprache*, 1900; H. 2, 2 Aufl., 1904.

³ Delbrück, *Grundfragen der Sprachforschung, mit Rücksicht auf W. Wundt's Sprachpsychologie Erörtert*, Strassburg, 1901.

⁴ Wundt, W., *Sprachgeschichte und Sprachpsychologie mit Rücksicht auf B. Delbrück's Grundfragen der Sprachforschung*, Leipzig, 1901.

For our purposes this situation is on the whole advantageous, since we can trust the categorization of grammar to have proceeded without immediate and constant overhauling in the progress of psychology. Humboldt, Jones, Bopp, Grimm, Pott, Binfry, Schleicher, Brugmann, Whitney, and Delbrück himself are names of men hardly touched by psychology or logic. In fact the *Junggrammatiker* with their suspicion of metaphors in the whole range of their science would probably look on an incursion of psychology into philology as a genuine raid. They would probably recall with heart-sinking older efforts at a universal grammar, at a 'metaphysics of language'! There might indeed be a suspicion that somehow the psychological raiders were going insidiously to introduce still more deadly poisons into the already defiled wells of grammar than the 'bow-wow' or 'pooh-pooh' theories.

The present plan is more modest. Probably the streams of logic now current in linguistics and psychology parted as long ago as Kant. The categories of neither science have had much effect upon the other. Occasional references are made by exponents of the one science to the injurious effects of a possible resort to the other. Probably a 'nerve-brain' theory of linguistics would be regarded by philologists as hardly a degree removed from dangerous metaphors derived from 'natural' sciences, of which examples are cited especially against Schleicher. Giles says,¹ *e. g.*: "Schleicher and his followers in the middle of the nineteenth century had taken a keen interest in the development of the natural sciences, and had to some extent assimilated their terminology to that employed in those sciences. It was, however, soon recognized that the laws of language and those of natural science were not really alike or akin." Thus, by appeal to higher authority, are guarded the preserves of special theory.

However, on the other hand, in discussing these considerations with psychologists and philosophers, I find signs of an opposite tendency. A friendly critic remarked that he had always supposed that psychiatry and psychology could derive much aid from linguistics, in view of the obvious fact that thought and language

¹ Giles, P., "Philology," *Encyc. Brit.*, eleventh ed., Vol. 21, p. 431.

are so largely identical in mechanism. This contention was that in studying linguistics one is studying a branch of psychology and that in studying psychology one is nowhere or almost nowhere free from speech analogues. And, in the same direction, one is aware how much of the development of brain-localization theory in psychiatry is built up on analogies to the conditions prevailing in aphasia. The psychiatrist would here recall the efforts of the Wernicke school,¹ beginning with sensory aphasia and culminating in apraxia.

As against such contentions I find numerous objections to the employment of linguistic theory in the elaboration of logical and psychological doctrine. The logicians in especial seem aggrieved at the perverted usage of sentence-structure in syllogistic theory and are constantly calling attention to the pitfalls of language in respect to logic. Charles Peirce remarks² how much the logician Sigwart seems to depend on the expression of immediate feeling as logical, and how Sigwart considers language and especially the German language as the best vehicle of logic. It will be recalled how much attention is paid to 'substantive' and 'adjective' ideas in some of James's chapters. The reaction of most readers to the idea of 'but' or of 'if' runs, I suppose, to the effect that something figurative probably lies at the bottom of the linguistic analogy.³

We are often warned both by grammarians⁴ and by psychologists not to trust overmuch to the situation depicted in Indo-European comparative grammar, *e. g.*, in the work of Berthold, Brugmann, and Delbrück. Thus the principles of the isolating Chinese, the agglutinating Turkish, the polysynthetic North American Indian languages are said to be impossible of establishment by means of terms borrowed from the Indo-European grammar.

¹ Wernicke, C., *Grundriss der Psychiatrie in klinischen Vorlesungen*, Thiéme, Leipz., 1900, 2. Auflage, 1906, "Psycho-Physiologische Einleitung," S. 1-78.

² Peirce, C. S., "Modality," *Baldwin's Dict. Philos. and Psychol.* Macmillan, N. Y., 1902, Vol. 2, p. 92.

³ James, W., *The Principles of Psychology*, Chap. IX, "The Stream of Thought," esp. pp. 243-8.

⁴ Wheeler, B. I., "Language," *Baldwin's Dict. Philos. and Psychol.* Macmillan, N. Y., 1902, Vol. 1, p. 618, esp. 621.

Upon a superficial inspection of grammar we chose to believe that something of value to the theory of delusions, at all events to their nomenclature, could be obtained by a study of the theory of verbs in grammar. If the polysynthetic languages have no verbs, it is nevertheless undeniable that action is expressed by North American Indians. If incorporated languages often insert the object in the verb, yet at any rate the Basques are able to express action. If the Semitic verb has no tenses and merely expresses relations, yet at any rate there is a concept tense, which concept could be expressed by Semitic speakers. These examples suffice to hint at the great extent of the field of comparison.

I choose to study the grammar of verbs for the purpose of getting light on delusions or beliefs involving action. Much will be to the purpose, much not. In any event the grammatical nomenclature will not have been built up by psychologists or psychiatrists. We shall not identify grammar and psychology: we shall merely hunt for identities and analogies.

There is some indication that in Indo-European grammar there are four fundamental moods, imperative, indicative, subjunctive, optative. A discussion like that in Goodwin's *Greek Moods and Tenses*¹ exhibits some of the ingenious and appealing problems of these moods. Probably the germ of my desire to approach the present considerations was got from casual reading of the discussion by Goodwin of Delbrück's contentions concerning the subjunctive as a mood of *will* and the optative as a mood of *wish*.

The simplest verb forms seem to be the imperatives, bare stems as a rule. How readily these could be derived from cries, simple vowel calling, or at any rate simple articulations, early in man's development, can be readily imagined. The early world of the savage and the babe gets on to a considerable range of power with imperatives and the kindred vocatives.

Indicatives may then develop or, if not temporally prior to

¹ Goodwin, W. W., *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb*. Revised and enlarged. Ginn, Boston, 1890. Especially Appendix, "The Relation of the Optative to the Subjunctive and other Moods," p. 371-389, with specific references to Delbrück.

the subjunctives and optatives in verb-form development (and I suppose there are not enough comparative data from different linguistic groups to permit a general answer to such questions), then in any event logically prior. The world of language is full of statements, true or false, affirmative or interrogatory.

Figuratively presented, the linguistic verb stratum of imperatives is spread over with a layer of indicatives, which the increasing tranquility of life permits and produces. Imperatives and vocatives are less necessary, less polite, less useful, since past and future facts can now be held and turned over in the mind.

Gradually there may develop at the two poles of the language structure the moods of will and wish, to use Delbrück's terms. The development *might* of course be that, as a result of the operation of the fancy, the layer of the indicatives should be overlaid by a stratum of optatives, to which a number of *false* indicative statements might have made a convenient transition. Then further the layer of wishes *might* be topped with the layer of subjunctives, *i. e.*, of hypotheses, conditions, probabilities, and the like.

As we see men and women, however, I am inclined, for the present at least, to hold to the notion that the subjunctive and optative developments (of course always as mental reactions, *not* as verb-forms necessarily) take place rather independently. To be sure, the absolute deliverances of the *Utinam! Would that!* optative type do surely resemble imperatives rather than indicatives. And the more complicated machinery of a sentence containing a subjunctive immediately suggests the regularity and finish of the indicative. Both the subjunctive and the optative, however, have a derivative appearance and suggest the necessity of indicatives as at any rate logically prior to their formation. Hence, as above stated, I prefer to see the optatives and subjunctives rising as it were as separate eminences from the plateau of indicatives, and this despite the fact that special pipes may lead from the underlying imperatives to the moods of wish.

Perhaps I should here insist that the point of such a metaphor-

ical account of a certain aspect of verb-forms is not at all to offend any modern representatives of the *Junggrammatiker*. Above all, such an account has nothing historical or glottogonic about it. The point, if well taken, is logical not historical.

The student of human character and especially the alienist is at once aware that this fourfold division of moods (imperative, indicative, subjunctive, optative) fairly well corresponds with human character groups. Especially is this true of the subjunctive-optative contrast.

Who cannot see the scientific man as a man of hypotheses and probabilities, viz. of subjunctives, and the artistic man as a man of wishes and fancies, viz., of optatives. 'If me no ifs,' impatiently cries the poet to the man of science. 'The wish is father to the thought,' sadly or crabbedly the scientific man replies.

Such reflections as these, rather than genetic linguistic considerations, suggested the comparisons of the present paper.

More or less instructive comparisons between these fundamental moods and the classical temperaments might be made: thus, choleric, imperative; phlegmatic, indicative; melancholic, subjunctive; sanguine, optative. Probably the choleric and sanguine temperaments suit the imperative and optative moods more perfectly than do the others. There remains, however, something apposite in them all. It would not be difficult to show similar analogies between these four moods and the character types of Malapert, for example.

To sum up, at this point, after stating in Section I the *raison d'être* of these comparisons, the general reasons for choosing delusions as the *comparand* were stated in Section II, at the end of which section it was stated that the grammatical *comparator* must be from the region of the verbs. Section II had called attention to the pragmatic element in the majority of delusions, throwing this element into contrast with the ideational one. Some special reasons from brain physiology and from the writer's anatomical studies were adduced in explanation of the pragmatic element in delusions. These physiological and anatomical notions were not essential to the logical argument. But the fact

that somatic delusions seemed to crystallize about sensorial data (and were consequently rather more of the nature of illusions) and the fact that there seems also to be a second group of fantastic delusions (also more of a sensory nature and as it were illusions of memory and overplay of imagination) are two facts that tend, by the relative infrequency of their appearance, to emphasize the fundamental importance of the pragmatic element in most delusions. Most delusions are not *prima facie* false beliefs, but require the test of time and experience to prove their nature. This is but another way of stating their pragmatic, or at any rate their motor and expressive, character.

In Section III, a brief sketch has been offered of the situation in grammatical science, which seems to have developed along a path separate from that of the mental sciences, such as logic, psychology, psychiatry. The categories, nomenclature, and classification of grammar have therefore a certain independence from those of the mental sciences. Delbrück and Wundt do not give exactly. The section is finished by a brief statement as to the four moods (imperative, indicative, subjunctive, optative), which Indo-European grammar has shown to be fundamental. A figure of speech recalling the strata of geology is offered wherein the earliest practical situation in the development language is depicted as a layer of imperatives, next a layer of indicatives, and thereupon the subjunctives and optatives. Possibly these latter have a certain independence of development and spring from different parts of the plateau. The optative or mood of wish may possibly derive more particularly from the imperatives.

The next section will take up in order the most striking features in the categorization of the verbs which seem to be applicable to delusions.

IV.

Dismissing discussion as to choice of delusions as an object of comparison, and assuming that the pragmatic element in delusions is strong enough to suggest comparison with the most active and motor categories of grammar, I had proceeded in Section III to point out the independent development of the mental sciences on the one hand and grammatical science on the

other and to indicate in the briefest manner the characterological interest of the grammatical moods.

In the present section, I propose to rehearse some categories of the grammar of verbs that seem to me of theoretical and even of some practical value in the analysis of delusions. It is unnecessary to insist that the impetus to such comparisons is logical rather than psychological. It is not that thought and speech, pragmatic beliefs and grammatical moods, delusions and modal over-use or perversion, have developed *pari passu*. They may have developed *pari passu*, and speech may be as central in thought as aphasia is in the Wernickean psychiatry; but, if so, the point and origin of these comparisons did not lie in that identity.

Are there not logical categories ready to hand which are superior to any that may have developed in grammar? Notable is the fact that many logicians strongly condemn the grammatical infection of logical processes and the allied situation presented by the necessity of describing many logical processes in words. But, aside from the verbalism of much logic, let us consider a moment the logical modalities in comparison with the grammatical moods (or, perhaps better, modes).

There is a certain relation between the modalities of logic¹ and the so-called modes or moods of grammar. The distinctions of *possible*, *impossible*, *contingent*, and *necessary* are of obvious value in describing a variety of situations. In describing the actual facts that correspond to beliefs and delusions, these modalities are most exact. Or, if the 'actual facts' are not to be obtained, these modalities are of the greatest service in denoting what A thinks about B's statements, *e. g.*, what the alienist thinks is the truth about his patient's delusions. These modalities are of value in objective description. It is even possible to point out the vicinity of the concept *contingent* to the concept *subjunctive*, of the concept *possible* to the concept *optative*. It could almost be said that the *necessary* is not far from *imperative*. This would leave us with the *impossible* to

¹ Peirce, C. S., "Modality," *Baldwin's Dict. Philos. and Psychol.* Macmillan, N. Y., 1902, Vol. 2, p. 92.

correspond with the *indicative*, and perhaps, with the idea of Charles Peirce concerning the range of ignorance as corresponding with that of knowledge, some argument could be made even for the vicinity of the concept *impossible* to that of the *indicative*. In any case the *impossible* is well known not to be the opposite of the *possible*.

It must be clear from the comparisons here sketched that the classical modalities, *possible*, *impossible*, *contingent*, *necessary*, are of little immediate classificatory service for delusions or even for beliefs. Neither is there enough known offhand about any situation to make sure of affixing the proper modal description to the said situation, nor can the contentions of the believer or the paranoiac be subjected to experimental tests for the same purpose.

Accordingly, though the modalities of logic may be far more accurate and more representative of species of truth than the grammatical moods, yet the grammatical moods will perhaps prove more useful in immediate descriptions of belief-situations *from the point of view of the believer*, e. g., of the deluded patient.

What we have long wanted in psychiatry is some way of getting at the psychic interiors of our patients. It is a safe injunction to hold fast from the first to the patient's point of view. The familiar Freudian distinction of manifest and latent¹ contents looks in this direction. But, omitting altogether at first any alienists' constructions as to latent contents, the examiner who adheres overtly to what is manifest in his patient's story is too apt, according to my experience, to fail to distinguish between what is true to the patient and what is true to the alienist. Let us distinguish what is *latent* in the patient from what is *manifest* in the patient. But let us distinguish between what is manifest to us *in* the patient from what is (to the best of our belief) manifest *to* the patient. Identical precautions are surely observable not only for patients but in the evaluation of all sorts of direct evidence.

One of the most valuable of the grammatical categories under which to consider a delusional situation or any belief-situation

¹ Freud, S., *Die Traumdeutung*, Deuticke, Wien, 1900.

in which the believer attributes a change in the universe is the category of the *voice*. Again it is important to distinguish the actual situation as the examiner views it from the situation as the patient or witness views it. We stick to the latter. Does the patient view himself as in the active voice, or in the passive voice, or perhaps in the middle (reflexive) voice? The question cannot often safely be asked in so simple a form. But it is as a rule singularly easy in a few questions to elicit from a deluded patient what he believes as to his own passivity or activity in the situation as he conceives it to be altered.

Perfectly simple is the felt passivity in certain victims of hallucination. The patients are here as passive as any recipients of sensation, and the whole reaction may be one of fixation or fascination *prima facie* passive. On the other hand, in cases of so-called *Gedankenlautwerden*,¹ the insistence of the hallucinatory or quasi-hallucinatory voices may be as intense but is not necessarily one of felt passivity. The patient may be best described as in the middle voice: his conscience is at work, the still small voice is no longer small or still, he himself is somehow the source of his difficulty. Further reasoning may discover additional non-personal reasons or ancient active sins that are conceived by the patient to be actually responsible for the trouble. But this further reasoning is not necessarily faulty or in any sense delusional and may even be as objective as the alienist's own analysis. Indeed the patient may reason from manifest to latent as skilfully as the alienist or may even mislead the alienist by means of constructive or over-evaluated happenings of the past, which may then be taken falsely as actual objective happenings. And such constructions or distorted facts may prove new *points d'appui* for false beliefs. But the fact that this merry logical dance may be led both by patient and by examiner is not here in question. The point I am endeavoring to make is that the voice in which the patient's situation (to our best belief as to the patient's own point of view) can best be expressed is an important category of classification. Several alienists to whom I have submitted the point are in entire agreement with me and

¹ Cramer, *Die Halluzinationen im Muskelsinn bei Geisteskranken*, Freiburg, 1889.

regard the felt or conceived activity, passivity, or reflexivity of the patient as a surprisingly comprehensive characterization for the total situations presented by many deluded patients. That is to say, though it might be thought *à priori* that a given patient would rapidly shift in his deluded state from active to passive to reflexive (and permutably), yet the facts are commonly against these rapid shiftings of the felt 'voice.' Of course the phases do not always take so long in the evolution as in Magnan's *délire à évolution systématisée*,¹ now presented by Kraepelin in slightly modified form as *paraphrenia systematica*.² I shall not here enter special psychiatric questions; but limit myself to saying that in practice a given delusional phase in a patient is commonly well enough characterizable in a word as active (*e. g.*, certain states of delusional grandeur), as passive (*e. g.*, certain states of delusional persecution), or as reflexive (*e. g.*, certain states of self-accusation). The terms are good brief accounts of what I more cumbrously designated formerly³ in such terms as 'ego-centrifugal,' 'egocentripetal,' 'spreading outwards,' 'spreading inwards,' and the like. Only the term reflexive is not so familiar and may need replacement with hyphenates of the term 'self,' or even with 'solipsistic,' 'egoistic,' though these latter terms are often too active in their denotation.

The fact that a situation may be described with correct grammar either in the active or in the passive voice need not trouble our analysis. So also can delusions. The point is not to identify grammatical voice with a type of delusional situation, but to borrow from grammatical categories a classification suitable for delusional situations.

Nor need a fact such as that in certain Indo-European developments the passive verb-form grew out of the reflexive verb-form be taken as of more than suggestive value. That fact might or might not be of telling value in such an analysis as ours.

¹ Magnan, "Leçons cliniques sur les maladies mentales faites à l'asile Sainte-Anne," *Gazette méd. de Paris*, 1877, and *Progrès médical*, 1887-1891. Also Magnan et Serieux, *Le délire chronique à évolution systématique* (Masson, Paris, no date).

² Kraepelin, *Psychiatrie, ein Lehrbuch für Studierende und Aerzte*, 8 Aufl., Bd. III, 1913.

³ Southard, E. E., "Data Concerning Delusions of Personality. With Note on the Association of Bright's Disease and Unpleasant Delusions," *Jour. Abnormal Psychology*, Oct.-Nov., 1915.

Central in our considerations of the believer's active, reflexive, or passive voice is clearly the personality of the believer. We are thus naturally led to the possible comparative or suggestive values of the grammatical person. The grammatical concept and the common sense concept of person are to some extent obviously identical. The vast majority, if not the entire group, of psychopathic delusions may be said to revolve about the first person. The concept of the first person (singular) together with that of the voice synthesize to a concept which makes a fairly complete characterization of at least the majority of delusions. Delusions of grandeur as a rule readily reduce to the active voice and the first person singular: the predicate situations are often numerous and mutable. Delusions of persecution reduce as readily to the first person in the passive voice. Reflexive is the situation of the first person in delusions of self-accusation. Much of psychiatric interest doubtless awaits a grouping of other sorts of delusions even with so slight a logical armamentarium as this.

The second person is often involved in delusions. If we adhere to a projection of the delusional universe always from the patient's point of view, it must be clear how important is a distinction of second and third person. Taken from the psychiatrist's point of view, the *dramatis personæ* may well all seem to be in the third person, except perhaps the patient with whom the psychiatrist may feel like starting a small new drama of their dual own. But, if we adhere as ever to a construction from the patient's point of view, the difference between the *you* of the patient's plight and the *he* or the *she* may be decisive. Thus in minds working more or less on normal lines, it is hard to conceive homicidal ideas directed at a *him* or a *her*. The threats must far more often lodge with a *you*. On behalf of some *you*, the patient might conceivably try to do to death a somewhat otherwise uninteresting *him* or *her*. But the majority of delusional situations are doubtless far more apt to be egocentric.

It may prove of special interest whether hallucinations of hearing come from a conceived *you* (as in a conversation or a monologue) or from a conceived *him* or *her*. There must be far greater intensity and dramatic quality about the statements of some *you* than from a third person.

It is entirely feasible to construct the situation of these other persons from the standpoint of grammatical voice. This has recently arisen in some cases that have come to my attention of *folie à deux*, in which the so-called 'active' and 'passive' persons may need separate analysis. And, in situations far less psychopathic, the psychiatrist has often to execute an about-face of this sort to get at the reactions of the grieved or angry husband or wife.

I have had to mention gender in the previous paragraphs. Krafft-Ebing and Freud have sufficiently called the world's attention to the sexual situations that occur in or make for psychopathies of various sorts. The routine collector of delusional elements must however bear in mind the necessity of establishing the sex of all the *dramatis personæ*, whether for the purpose of establishing or destroying some of the more recondite Freudian hypotheses or for the more modest purpose of banal social adjustments.

The value of the number of persons is not quite so obvious. How many persons are involved in the universe of belief or of delusion? Of course the scene may be peopled with any number of persons all acting normally even from the patient's point of view. But how many are acting abnormally either as sources of effect upon the patient, or as the objects of his action or perhaps as the instruments of his action? Are there perhaps some who may be fused and are working as a collective unit (the family, union-members, etc.) from the patient's point of view? Perhaps here is the weakest point in the routine analysis of delusional situations. The number of persons may be one, two, three, several, many, almost everybody, everybody, indeterminate, etc.; but all that can be collected concerning the number (and obviously the sex) of the persons involved, so far as the patient conceives them to be acting or suffering abnormally, will be found of the greatest value in analysis. Increase or reduction in the catalogue of intra-delusional persons may prove of value in prognosis. I should not need to insist on a special record of persons remaining extra-delusional, *i. e.*, excluded from the universe of the patient's altered world, when by all signs such persons would naturally be involved.

Most delusions of the lucid group which we can hope to analyze represent situations at least dyadic from the standpoint of the objective examiner. They are often triadic, *e. g.*, delusions of jealousy. But it must not be forgotten that a dyadic situation may conceivably be monadic from the point of view of the patient, as when he conceives that the altered attitude of a relative is not really injurious. But obviously enough there remains the suspicion that the situation, even from the patient's point of view, is effectively dyadic. Again delusions of jealousy may masquerade as dyadic.

Whether there is any important group of essentially tetradic delusional situations is worth inquiry. Among fictional situations as depicted by novelists, the tetradic situation with double shifting of courtiers is not unusual, though it may well be a more symmetrical situation than the world itself is apt to show. So far, I have not found many good instances of essentially tetradic delusional situations, *i. e.*, when the elements are persons. In numerous instances where four persons are involved, the fourth turns out merely ancillary to the third and to disappear, as it were, by the identity of indiscernibles. But this needs much concrete case analysis.

The important tense-distinctions of verb-forms recall the importance of the time element in delusions. Some of Delbrück's designations for general time relations of action are suggestive, *e. g.*, iterative, frequentative. Terminative actions, those conceived to have a beginning, an ending, or both, suggest obvious distinctions as to conceived delusional situations. Of course the stock case-history should and often does contain a sufficient account of these matters, as the term *history* insists. Still, I fear that we do not always keep separate in mind the objective anamnesis (to use a frequent medical term) and the anamnesis or catamnesis as the patient describes it and believes it to have occurred. Thus the one noxious event in the whole history may have occurred as it were aoristically at a special moment or brief period, and the rest of the history may seem to the patient an entirely natural train of consequences. In the direct or indirect psychotherapy, so apt to be employed in all

sorts of not-yet-defined delusions, quite a different technique might need to be employed for the delusional universe with an aoristic event long past than for a universe with iterative factors or with 'present perfect' characters, etc.

I arrive once more at the perhaps central topic of the moods. At the conclusion of the last section I spoke of the major distinctions as to moods, so far as the most thoroughly studied Indo-European grammar is concerned. I shall not in this paper deal intimately with the topic, as I conceive that much more case analysis should be available than I have as yet looked over.

But I wish to call attention to the vast wealth of special designations of moods which are found in the gradually increasing group of languages now being brought under scientific study. Most of these moods appear to me to fall rather readily into one or other of the subjunctive and optative groups. Thus the *conditional* certainly belongs with the subjunctives, and might perhaps be thought to offer a better general designation for the group. So too the *potential*. But *desiderative*, *precative*, *jussive*, probably belong with the optatives. As to the verb-forms and their special origin and appearance, the logician can have little to say. The point is, rather, that, if a verb-form exists to which a special name has been given, then at least some special shade of meaning has been thought to exist by the grammatical analyst. This shade of meaning probably expresses some rather concrete belief of *intra vitam* origin, not cooked up for a special purpose or at least for any psychiatric purpose.

I have more or less in hand a collection of these mood names from different grammars, of which a set probably large enough for these purposes is in existence at the Boston Public Library. The publication of the British and Foreign Bible Society¹ gives a convenient large list of languages, those in fact into which the Bible has been translated.

I hope to show, but will shortly dismiss here, the possibility that the transformation of 'subjunctive' beliefs into 'in-

¹ Darlow and Moule, *Historical Catalogue of the Printed Editions of Holy Scripture in the Library of the British and Foreign Bible Society*, Bible House, London, 1903, esp. Part IV, Indexes.

dicative' ones means paranoia of a pragmatic sort, whereas an identical transformation of 'optative' beliefs leads to delusions of the fantastic sort. 'Transformation' may be better rendered figuratively by such terms as degeneration, collapse, crystallization, condensation, degradation, etc.

V.

The object of this paper has been to illustrate the method of Royce's logical seminary at Harvard. No attempt has been made to describe the method, which is comparative rather than observational or statistical.¹ When the logician superposes the categories of Science A upon the material of Science B, or compares the categories of both, he is not at all sure of important results. If he obtains too extensive or too numerous identities by means of his comparisons, he may be compelled to decide that identity of categories means actual unity of materials. Thus, in the present instance, the reader may be the more ready to swallow the identity of certain categories in grammar and psychopathology, simply because he fundamentally believes in a larger degree of identity of speech and thought. In the event of such a nominalistic view as that, the only merit of the present essay would consist in spreading a sound method over new materials of the same sort; the method would not then be comparative in a very rich sense of the term. But, even if speech and thought are as closely allied as, *e. g.*, Max Müller thought them to be,² the fact still remains that the categories of linguistics and of psychology have not been wrought into their present form by the same group of men or under the same group of interests. If there is a partial identity of scientific materials, there is no evidence of identity of categories. The comparative method will then obtain a certain scope, even if that scope is limited to trying-out of special methods devised by linguists inexperienced in technical psychology.

I hesitate to set forth the point; but I am left with a queer impression that linguistics falls short of representing logic in

¹ Royce, J., "The Principles of Logic," *Ency. Philos., Sci.* I, Vol. I, *Logic*. Macmillan, London, 1913.

² Müller, F. Max. *The Science of Thought*, Scribner, New York, 1887.

somewhat the same way that psychopathology falls short of representing psychology. I do not so much refer to the prevalence of concepts like 'phonetic decay,' 'empty words,' 'anomalism,' etc., in linguistics, although these concepts certainly suggest human frailty quite outside the frame of classical logic. I do not wish to construct a false epigram to the effect that linguistics is a kind of pathology of logic, attractive as this epigram might be. My point is that human facts are got at more readily in linguistics and in psychopathology than in logic and in so-called normal psychology.

For example, if I try to determine the logical modality of something and to affix the proper epithet (necessary, impossible, contingent, possible), I sink into a morass of factual doubts. But, equipped with the fundamental grammatical moods (imperative, indicative, subjunctive, optative), I can dismiss my doubts by describing them under one of these mood aspects, regardless of objective reality, truth to me, truth to Mrs. Grundy, or any situation except that depicted by the statement in question. The grammatical moods deal with evidence unweighed; the logical modalities require more weighing of evidence than is as a rule humanly possible. Psychopathology also deals with evidence unweighed. Particularly is this true of that portion of psychopathology which deals with false beliefs. Granted that some beliefs are *prima facie* fantastic and to us incredible. By the patient these fantastic and incredible beliefs are believed, but the nature and history of these fantastic beliefs may well be investigated to learn whether we are not dealing with a so-called wish-fulfilment (a Freudian technical term) or with a kind of degradation of what the linguist might term an optative attitude. But the majority of false beliefs are not *prima facie* fantastic and incredible. They on the contrary require the test of experience. They represent pragmatic situations. Granting the truth of certain hypotheses, we say, these beliefs might be accepted also as truth. Our thesis is that these pragmatic delusions do not represent a conceived wish-fulfilment, if by wish is meant a fancied situation. On the other hand, these pragmatic delusions appear to hang rather upon the degradation of a subjunctive

attitude, that is, upon taking as true a certain hypothesis. But neither fantastic nor pragmatic delusions can readily be classed under the logical modalities, *e. g.*, as possible or contingent, however possible and contingent they actually seem to the patient. In any event they are or will shortly turn out to be impossible, logically speaking, and, if the patient were to ascribe any logical modality thereto, he would be likely to deal in necessities on the one hand and impossibilities on the other. Grammatically speaking, the degraded optative belief may even set into an imperative, and beliefs degraded from both the optative and the subjunctive appeal to the patient as indicative, if not yet imperative.

From our superficial study of the categories of grammar as they revolve about the verbs, we have come upon two considerations of value that are not entirely obvious, the psychopathic analogue of the grammatical 'voice,' and the question of two main types of delusion degraded respectively from 'subjunctive' and 'optative' attitudes.

I believe that the 'voice' distinction will forthwith appeal to all psychiatrists as valid within its range. The distinction seeks to express the relation between the world and the individual from the individual's point of view under two forms, (*a*) that in which the self is active and (*b*) that in which the self is passive in relation to the environment; but in the third place (*c*) the relation of the individual to himself is suggested, *viz.*, under the 'middle' or reflexive relation. Whether the reflexive relations of the self break up further into a group where the 'I' dominates the 'me' and another where the 'me' overpowers the 'I' (that is, whether the ego is sometimes active in respect to itself and sometimes passive), is a question partly of fact, but more of the nature of the self and of the whole difficult topic of self-activity.

Whether the distinction between pragmatic delusions (as it were, precipitated subjunctives) and fantastic delusions (as it were, precipitated optatives) is valid, must remain undetermined. The distinction has at least the value of suggesting a similar distinction in human character in general; both distinctions may be derived from identical psychological facts.

If in the practical handling of a patient, or indeed of anyone else in a situation hard to interpret, the observer can make out the 'voice' of the subject's situation from the subject's point of view, and can secondly determine whether the difficulty rests upon trouble with hypotheses or trouble with wishes, much is gained surely.

We saw also from our incidental study of person, number, and gender how important might become the question of monadic, dyadic, triadic, or polyadic situations involving false beliefs. The collection of groups of such situations for analysis is certainly indicated, naturally with invariable reference to the 'voice,' active or passive, of the patient or central figure. Fiction and drama could throw some light on these matters.

In the gathering of data for analysis, it is clear also that the time-relations must also be studied from the patient's point of view, to the end of determining whether the particular subjunctive precipitate has relation to some central point in the past, whether the particular optative precipitate has relation to a present or present perfect situation, or whether other 'tenses' come in question.

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LOVE AND LOYALTY.

ONE who like me has gone to Royce for wisdom now this long time and never come away empty, may yet live to know that some of his receivings are more his belongings than others. Thus if it ever happen to me that I find my hold on the Absolute slackening and the thing slipping from me, I cannot think that even in that day I shall have forgotten two words I have heard. Love and loyalty, loyalty and love: this pair I expect will still be singing its burden in my soul after other things have left off singing there. But I hope that when this day comes I shall know better than I do now whether love and loyalty are two names for the same thing, or whether they are not the same, yet brothers and friends, or whether in the end they are not rather enemies of which one can survive only if the other doesn't. Nor do I know, though I should very much like to, how Royce himself would answer these questions. Sometimes the words fall in such close juxtaposition in his writings that I wonder whether they do not express a single idea whose peculiar quality is just unselfishness. But again I bethink me that to be just unselfish is not enough for an absolutist, if for anyone; that giving up can only be justified when it is a means of acquiring, and I wonder what loyalty can have to say for itself half as convincing as the things love could point to. Until at last I find myself speculating whether if love had its perfect way with us there would be any place left for loyalty in our lives, and whether we should not look back on it then as on a virtue happily outlived.

And this may be my matter in a nutshell—is not loyalty a thing to be outlived and is not that which alone can enable us to live it down a love so perfect it calls for no sacrifices? Some such thought has long been with me, but if I am to lay my troubles before you it is time I put aside a language too rich in sentimental associations and took up the idiom I love best, that of cold and if may be mathematical definition.

Any definition of loyalty that could have meaning for me must assume the existence of something many deny to have either existence or meaning, and which I shall call in my own way the mind of a group, or a group mind. The conception of a mind belonging to a group of beings each one of which has a mind of its own, yet such that the mind of the group is no more to be known from a study of its parts than is the mentality of Peter from the psychology of Paul, is a very old conception and perhaps for that reason supposed by some to be old-fashioned and foolish. It is a mere analogy, they say, and a very thin one at that, to speak of a group of organisms as itself an organism: it is Plato, it is Cusanus, if you will, but it is not modern. Benedetto Croce even goes so far as to be polite about the matter. "The State is not an entity, but a fluid complex of various relations among individuals. It may be convenient to delimit this complex and to entify it for the sake of contrasting it with other complexes. No doubt this is so, but let us leave to the jurist the excogitation of this and the like distinctions,—fictions, but opportune fictions—being careful not to call his work absurd. It is enough for us to be sure we do not forget that a fiction is a fiction."

To Royce the group mind is far from being a fiction, though he may prefer to call it by some other name than group mind,—maybe universal mind or universal will. But if to him it seems natural, as it does to me, to recognize group minds while to Croce the entity is but a polite fiction to be pleasantly dismissed there must be some lack of definition befogging our issue. Nor can I think of any way in which old issues can better be made clear than by old images. Aristotle would not have asked when and where do new entities appear, but where and when must we take account of new forms. Now matter was informed for Aristotle when the behavior of some class of beings was recognized to be predictable in terms of purpose. Thus earth, water, air, and fire sought their proper places, one below, another above, and the others in between. But we remember how no sooner had these elements reached their proper places than transformed by the sun's heat they were no longer at home

where they found themselves, but must needs seek their new homes anew. Thus homeward bound in opposite directions they collided and became entangled, so that mixtures of the four appeared which as it proved kept their proportions for a longer or shorter while ere they lost their equilibrium and fell apart again. Among these mixtures were vegetables and animals and men, but Aristotle is very far from defining this new class, organisms, in terms of the quantities of the elements that enter into their bodily composition. No, what they have in common and all they have in common is a new purpose, that of self-preservation (and, if we are to follow Aristotle rigorously, that of type preservation). But why in this class of beings does a new form appear when there is nothing in any one of them but so much earth, so much water, and so much of the rest? Because, I take it, in order that the purpose of the group may be realized, the purpose of each constituent of that group must be defeated: when the earth in us finds its way back to earth and our fire to fire, then we are no more. Which is the fundamental difference between us and them: if we win they lose; if they win we are done for. The whole has a purpose whose realization is only possible if the purposes defining the parts are given up for it.

I suppose Croce would say that nothing better could be offered in support of a modern fiction than an ancient fable, and I confess that I can think of nothing better fitted to set forth the complex problem of how beings of one mind can combine to form groups of another mind, than Aristotle's account of the way elements in the form of mechanism combine to produce a group with that other form, life. Perhaps I can make out the connection between old and new ideas by a single example. I know of no fellow easier to get along with than your average Parisian: many a time have I sat at his board, looked in his eyes, listened to his amusing wit, and wondered how the great-grandfather of my host could have been part of the Reign of Terror. And yet I suppose the Parisian of today is not very different from the Parisian of four generations ago, when groups of these same Parisians were ranging the streets of Paris crying, "A la lanterne!"

However much it was in the character of the Pierre, Paul, Jean, and Jaques Bonhomme of those old days to steer for home, their distributive tendency was contradicted by their collective tendency. A new form, a new entity had appeared: it was the spirit of the mob. It may be pleasant to call such new entities fictions, but wouldn't it be a more dangerous fiction to suppose these new entities pleasant, and isn't the object we have defined as hard and fast a fact as any in human experience?

I must let this single illustration take the place of what might at some other time grow into a systematic account of the varieties of group minds that history and personal experience reveal to us. For my world is highly organized,—groups within groups and groups within these in a way one might have learned at the feet of Nicolaus or by gathering one's history from Gierke's *Geschichte des deutschen Rechts*. But on this occasion instead of going into all this literature and all this philosophy, let me come back to the matter of loyalty's worth. There would be no such thing as a demand for loyalty were there no call for a man to deny his wish for home, whether home be on earth or on high for him, for the sake of organizing himself into a group, which means as we have seen sacrificing his purpose for the group purpose. Now what you think of the value of this sacrifice depends altogether on the esteem in which you hold group minds. If you can find some principle on which to estimate their dignity as something worth dying for in part or altogether, then loyalty may be the last word of virtue. But if you find that at their very best there is something rather primitive, sometimes amœboid, sometimes tigerish about such minds, then you should seriously consider whether your biped soul owes anything more to this polypod entity than the entity owes to it. Merging oneself into something big may not be just the same as reaching for something high.

But I am not belittling loyalty. It is a great virtue so long as it understands itself to be making a virtue of necessity. Just so is it a great virtue to acquire equanimity in the face of death, so that not being able to invent a way of getting around the thing one may accept it for the time being without disturbing

oneself or one's friends more than the episode calls for. Still if I had some genius to spend, I should rather contribute it to the suppression of dying than to the cultivation of a cheerful manner in dying. So should I rather spend my time if it were worth while in wearing away the conditions that make loyalty necessary than in developing a spirit of loyalty. And so, or I mistake him, would Royce; for I can't get over the impression that for him too loyalty is but a half-way house on the road to something better—which something better is love.

It is with relief I find a definition of love can be effected which makes no very heavy demands upon one's sentimental experience, in fact requires no more in that way than a fair understanding of the theory of substitutions. For the peculiar quality Royce finds in the idea of love is that love individuates. This its quality is for him its virtue also and its excellence, so that the more love individuates the more is it love. We are far enough from the days when a Plato could hold the love to be higher that had detached itself from the individual and attached itself to the quality, had forgotten the beautiful being to think only of his beauty. For Royce love is not love unless it has succeeded in making its object irreplaceable.

Now I do not know whether this constitutes a complete definition of love. There is something hopeful about the suggestion that it may do so, for if no one has been able to say anything very articulate about love, neither has anyone said much that is intelligible about individuation. But certain difficulties occur to one. Is love the only thing that individuates? If there is such a thing as Platonic hate, which I suppose would be the sort of hate that hates the sin and not the sinner, why should there not be such a thing as a romantic hate whose object would be just the sinner and not his fault? Or may not a process of individuation go on, cold and impassible, untouched either by hate or love?

One day Flaubert took his disciple by the hand and led him into the secret places of art. The talent of the artist, he said, is a long patience spent in learning how to portray so that your

portrayal leaves the object it offers just as individual as the thing it found. "When you pass a grocer sitting at his door, or a concierge smoking his pipe, or a stand of cabs, show me this grocer and this concierge, their pose, their physical appearance, suggesting also by the skill of your image all their moral nature, in such wise that I do not confuse them with any other grocer or with any other concierge. And make me see with a single word in what a certain cab horse is unlike fifty others following him or going before."

Why then, beside love and hate, art too claims to be that which individuates,—and not because, if we may believe a certain philosophically minded critic, art has borrowed anything of love or hate. This disciple of Flaubert, this Maupassant, carried out his master's teachings if ever an artist did, but there is that in his way of doing it which makes one feel that Anatole France's account of him is not altogether wanting: "He is the great painter of the human grimace. He paints without hate and without love, without anger and without pity,—hard-fisted peasants, drunken sailors, lost women, obscure clerks dried up in the air of the office, and all the humble folk whose humility is without beauty and without merit. All these grotesques and all these unfortunates he shows us so distinctly that we think we see them with our own eyes and find them more real than reality itself. He is a skilful artist who knows he has done all there is to do when he has given life to things. His indifference is as indifferent as nature."

I am not so very confident that all these claimants to the right of individuating—love, hate, art—are equal claimants. As for hate, some poverty of experience may account for the fact that all I know of this romantically valued emotion is directed against persons unknown whose manner of conducting themselves on the earth beneath and in the waters under the earth shows nothing more clearly than that they have forgotten the human being and are utterly lost in loyalty. A hate of such poor quality cannot well be said to individuate, and it is certainly not any experience of my own that would lead me to suppose romantic hate as we

have imagined it to be real. Respecting the impassibility of the creative artist I am no less skeptical, and so I think is France at bottom, for of this same artist whose indifference is as indifferent as nature he says in another passage of the same appreciation that his hardened hero "is ashamed of nothing but his large native kindliness, careful to hide what is most exquisite in his soul."

No, I am not convinced that love has any rivals in the art of individuating, and if not, then to call it that which individuates is to define it completely. But whether it is a deduction from this definition or whether it is an independent element in a fuller definition of love, it must be set down as an important fact about it that love wants the will and desire of the beloved to prevail. It wants the will of another to prevail, and as the easiest and most obvious way of bringing about this result is to yield its own will, it has generally been supposed that love was less the art of individuating than the art of yielding. But this is just the mistake that has prevented love from taking its place among the more seriously meant categories of philosophy and realities of life; for this yielding disposition that might be supposed to make for peace in a republic of lovers is the very matter which introduces trouble and perplexity there. It is the very matter which has made traditional Christianity less effective than it might have been, failing where it fails not because there is anything better to be conceived than its gospel of love, but because it has supposed a good heart and convinced will was enough to bring about its kingdom.

Our two great experiments at loving—the love of man and woman and the love of one's neighbor—have been too much alike in this, that they both supposed love to be the sort of thing one could fall into and be done with. But it is clear this is not at all the way of the matter, and in our poor imaginings about the lovers' republic we have been too much guided by our imperfect experience of what our loves have been to think our way into what the love that individuates ought to be. Oh, yes, our love has yielded; its great vice has been its contentment in yielding

rather than suffer the labor and unrest of that thinking which alone could have saved its kingdom. In this dear, illogical passion for yielding we have been content with a division of the spoils: one is allowed to give this, the other that; one now, the other then, and so we have patched up our lovers' quarrel as best we could without logic. But logic, which is supposed to have nothing to do with love and has had little enough to do with the old loves of this world, has everything to do with the love that individuates. For the moment love begins to be a mutual affair neither lover has the right to usurp the privilege of giving, else what is left for the other lover to do? Without logic our lovers are doomed to stand bowing to each other before the door of promise till time grows gray.

However, besides logic there is such a thing as bad logic, which is perhaps nothing more than a well meant half-thoughtfulness in presence of puzzling experience. As a result of this half-thoughtfulness there has sometimes crept a half-reasonableness into the matter we are considering, which would begin by suggesting that the various and contradictory desires of lovers, though equally strong, cannot, save by improbable chance, be equally high and worth while; that therefore the logical thing to do would be to let the lower ideal recognize the higher and bow to it, while the higher might somehow forget its longing to give and content its poor heart with being given to.

There are many difficulties in the way of making such an account of the affair persuasive, but there are more serious troubles ahead of anyone who would try to make it meaningful. Chief of these is the hopelessness of defining high and low in the matter of purposes and ideals. Here once more Royce is quick to analyze the difficulty and remove it; for, if I read him aright, he sees no way, and no more do I, by which the value of ultimate objects of desire may be compared. It is easy to calculate the better means but how is one to know the better end? Only this may we do—we may discover that purposes which seem contradictory are not really so, and that neither need sacrifice itself to the other if thought be allowed to work its perfect work. No

doubt happiness lies in getting what we want, but this is not the same as getting what we think we want, as capturing what we go after, for our wants are none the less difficult to make out because they are our own.

This, then, is thought's infinitely difficult task in the service of love, to analyze apparent desires until it has found the real want at the core of appearance, while the postulate on which alone the advent of the kingdom becomes possible is that thought may find our real wants not contradictory. The times are not without sign that Christianity as an ethics is coming to realize how very intellectual is the task it has set itself in trying to bring the kingdom of Christ's vision to be on earth. What Christianity most needs, writes Tennant, is a philosophy.

The twenty minutes we allow ourselves for our communications have usually proved ample for a person of industry and thrift to make himself thoroughly misunderstood, and I hope I have used them to no less purpose on this than on former occasions; but among the misunderstandings I would prevent if I could is that which would sum up the matter of my paper as a defense of individualism against collectivism. Such an issue could only be meaningful for one to whom the collectivity was denied some sort of individuality which the 'individual' enjoys. But I have tried to show that I could conceive no such difference between the mind of the part and the mind of the group. The group mind may be loved with the human love that individuates as well as can the soul of a fellowman, and no doubt one may love one's country as a mistress. But the difference between the love of equals and the love of constituents is plain. The latter sort of love can last only so long as its object endures, and as long as it lasts its sacrifices are incurable; for in a world that has conquered strife there would no longer be that contradiction between the will of a group and the will of its parts which alone makes the group entity meaningful. Groups bound in mutual respect of each other and studying to preserve their parts irreplaceable have no minds; the entity born of struggle and calling for sacrifice has simply disappeared; where we had a group mind, we have

now but an aggregate of minds, 'a fluid complex of relations among individuals.' But the love of equals can push on toward the ideal without destroying the very object of its devotion; it can go on searching the core of concord in the stupid appearance of discord until love has found a way to make loyalty a lost virtue and a group mind a thing that is no more.

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JOSIAH ROYCE AS A TEACHER

IF duration of discipleship is any criterion, my eight years as a student under Professor Royce should entitle me to speak of him as a teacher. For three years as an undergraduate and five as a graduate student I enjoyed the privilege of his instruction face to face. Outside the classroom I have now been learning from him the meaning of my own thoughts for just thirty years, as I first began to read his writings in 1885.

I.

I think it was in 1886 that I first tasted the full flavor of his teaching when in a thesis on the ethical doctrines of his first book I pointed out with proud distinctness thirteen ways in which he had strayed from the path of truth and ventured to differ from me. I left Professor Royce's ethical philosophy such a hopeless wreck that I was apologetic in presenting to him an attack so full of 'frightfulness.'

Then it was that I learned of him my first memorable lesson,—how to take criticism—even the most unintelligent criticism. He seemed really delighted with my onslaught. Indeed I do not remember that he ever showed as much genuine pleasure in the reception of any of my subsequent weighty writings as he did when I fired at him this broadside of heavy metal—quite irresistible and crushing as I viewed it from the gunner's standpoint. My later and milder effusions never seemed to please him so much.

This behavior of his took me completely aback. Like other undergraduates of average pugnacity I hated and repelled criticism because it was a dangerous attack on the strongholds of entrenched truth behind which I carried on the daily business of life. That there existed on the earth a being who could tolerate—yes, actually welcome criticism, contradiction, and attack, was to me a brand new fact, one that made me blink and stagger at first, but later opened my eyes to a new and most

comfortable reality. For it gradually dawned on me that Professor Royce understood my objections, received and felt them acutely, and yet, *mirabile dictu*, was not demolished by them.

Might it not be, then, that I too could open my ears to those who had the temerity to differ from me, might receive their bit of sincere experience and use it without being upset by it? That first lesson from Professor Royce made an epoch in my life. I still believe that it contained one of the most important truths that I or any other belligerent thinker can learn. For he shocked me into perceiving that a man could really welcome a difference of opinion not merely with the sort of politeness that prize fighters display when they shake hands before the first round,—not merely with diplomatic suavity or cynical tolerance,—but as a precious gift.

I saw that Professor Royce really understood all that I meant when I attacked him, really took it in. Indeed he could restate it better than I. This had never happened to me before. When I differed in argument with Palmer, Santayana, or James, I never felt that they understood my point. They could answer me, refute me, perhaps; but they never came into my entrenched camp and fired my own guns for me with an aim better than my own.

This, then, is, I think, one of Professor Royce's chief characteristics as a teacher. He can understand, welcome, and incorporate better than any man I have known a view which attacks his own. Thus in my case at least he prepared the way for my conversion. In the course of a few months I came to see that the thirteen points of error which I discovered in Professor Royce's ethics were in fact thirteen points of misunderstanding or of fractional understanding. As soon as I followed his method and succeeded in understanding the doctrines I had been attacking I came to see that the remaining point of difference concerned chiefly the forms of wording. I still thought that some of his ethical doctrines were unwisely expressed or were weighted too heavily on one side; but his openness to see my points made it necessary, in common decency, that I should enlarge my mind

sufficiently to take in his. In the end it was conversion to me in the sense of new experience. Rewording was not enough. I had to stretch my mind to get in the new ideas. But I got the courage to attempt this ever painful process from the contagion of Royce's example. He showed me by example as well as by precept how to use one's mind,—how to be genuinely converted without giving up the substance of the belief which had made one previously resist conversion. That example has always been one of the richest fruits of his teaching to me and I believe to many others.

II.

A second and contrasting feature of his teaching comes out clearly in his seminaries—namely his searching and rigid criticism of views that betray culpable ignorance of the history of philosophy. Professor Royce assumes that by the time a student is fit for seminary work he has no right to be innocently ignorant of the history of thought. He must have some awareness of what he does not know. A man is bound to know something, he holds, of the main historic outlines of thought about the subject he deals with. The sharpest and most destructive criticism that I have ever heard from him was designed to impress it upon the advanced student that philosophy means scholarship as well as speculation. The student's well-known tendency to launch forth on the tide of his own unaided meditations, profoundly ignorant of what Aristotle, Spinoza or Kant has had to say about it—is firmly checked by Royce in the interests of good scholarship.

No other teacher of philosophy in my time has carried into his seminaries so full and living a consciousness of the historic stream of philosophic thought. No one else gave me so salutary a sense of how small a chip was sufficient to float my entire stock of ideas along that majestic current. No one else gives us such shocks of disillusionment, when we hear from him and later read up sadly in the originals how many times our own fresh thoughts have been stated and better stated before, and how completely—perhaps—our views have been refuted.

III.

It is further characteristic of him to assist in discussion the weak and wavering views of the muddleheaded or timid student and to direct his most searching questions at the trenchant and self-confident speaker. In seminaries that I attended a man would deposit before us some shapeless and incoherent views. Royce would melt them down in an instant and reissue them to the astonished student, new minted, clean and finished. Then with almost miraculous innocence and sincerity he would inquire, "Would you accept that as a fair account of your main thesis?" Would I accept it! Will a man kindly allow his Alma Mater to double his salary? Will a man be so kind as to accept the Nobel Prize? The chances are that he will.

One year we had informal meetings of the whole department of philosophy with the seminary students. I was fencing one evening with Santayana and getting the worst of it. Stroke by stroke he drove me to the wall till finally he was just about to impale me with the thrust of an unanswerable question, when swiftly Royce cut in and answered the unanswerable for me. I had an instant to breathe and gather my wits. I recognized (was it not a strange coincidence?) that Royce's parry to Santayana was the very one I was about to make, and following wisely this safe line of defence I escaped with my skin.

But this rescue was made not merely because of any desire to keep up the game. It was because he thought the truth was suffering from a poor defence. That provoked his instant aid. If on the other hand error was making a particularly showy and effective presentation through the mouth of some 'tough-minded' student, Royce's criticism took on edge and was pushed home to the very end. The wind was tempered to the shorn lamb but not to the seasoned and heavy fleeced sheep.

IV.

I regard it as one of Professor Royce's greatest achievements as a teacher that he is seldom if ever entrapped by the snares of verbalism. We all know the human tendency to become devotedly attached to certain words and to insist that the philo-

sophic heavens shall revolve around them. There is a corresponding tendency to blacklist certain phrases and to regard as anathema all that they seem to symbolize.

In formal logic Royce follows the tradition of attaching one and only one precisely defined meaning to a single word. But in the other fields of philosophy he maintains our ordinary human right to the use of synonyms. He will play the game with any implements at hand. If bat and ball are inaccessible he is never too proud to convey his soul by means of a turnip and a stick of kindling wood. He is hospitable to many sets of symbols, and able to pursue and to catch one's thought no matter how disguised in a pseudo-scientific mask or a heavy German wig.

Students often do not like this. They are often conservative and rigid about terms and when invited to play three old cat with a broomstick and a tennis ball will often turn sulky and stay out. But I am especially glad to have seen Royce teach by example that we should be flexible and at ease with many sets of terms—always provided that by profuse exemplification we keep ourselves vividly mindful of the concrete experiences which various alternative phrases can body forth. I think it is due to his wide historic study of philosophy that he is so tolerant of many usages in philosophic terminology. He knows so many pet words of this or that philosopher that he is not inclined to hitch all his affections to one pet tool.

When students ask him questions he does not discourage them by always having the answer on the tip of his tongue. He often has to think before answering,—most rare and precious trait in a teacher!—and sometimes he takes a question under advisement and hands down his decision at a later meeting. That encourages us. Questions taken so seriously as that are apt to be asked with more seriousness and pertinacity in the future.

His power to answer questions is, I think, one of his best traits as a teacher. I heard him one winter deliver a course of lectures on Child Psychology to public and private school teachers. At the end of each lecture an hour or more was taken up with the asking and answering of questions, and I heard many teachers say that they never knew questions so brilliantly and usefully

answered. For he saw all round the question and often answered what it meant as well as what it said.

V.

Once in his seminary, a student read a paper in which the ultimate reasons for his beliefs were as he said hidden *behind the veil*. One followed him step by step along his approaches to the problem of Causality, Individuality, or Time. But each time that we came close to the main issues of his belief he explained to us that *here* we approached the edges, not indeed of Spencer's Unknowable, but of a lineal descendant of that august Phantom. The student was like Spencer in knowing a great deal about the Unknowable. He told us precisely what we could find behind the veil *but for its unhappy opacity*. He bemoaned his fate like the aphasic patient who when asked, "Can you say the word horse?" answered, "O doctor, horse is one of the words that I never can get across me lips."

At last he finished. We were restless and puzzled—not knowing how to strike into the discussion. But Royce showed just the suspicion of a twinkle as he pulled himself upright by the arms of his chair and asked the reader briskly, "Now, Mr. Blank, won't you *draw aside* that veil and tell us what's behind it?"

The quality that made him say this is one of the unforgettable things about his teaching. He is always endeavoring to draw aside veils which are kept in place by the strenuous effort of him who at the very moment declares his sad inability to get through them. He regards it as characteristic of the human soul to deny the ground it stands on, to pronounce loudly its own dumbness and to explain that it cannot possibly say 'horse.' Sometimes by painstaking explanation, sometimes by whimsicality and shock, he is always endeavoring to make us more aware of what we are about when we think.

VI.

Professor Royce's chief fault as a teacher is, I think, his failure to invent a wholly new and effective way to teach philosophy, thereby superseding all the current methods, such as lectures,

seminaries, and theses. Philosophy like most college teaching is still in its pedagogic infancy. It still awaits its pedagogic prophet who will follow the *bahnbrechender* example of Dickens' immortal pedagogue Squeers. Nicholas Nickleby was shocked by the large motor element in Squeers' plan of teaching. "W-i-n-d-e-r, Winder—now go clean it."

I look to Royce or some other great teacher to abolish all the present methods of teaching philosophy in favor of some newly invented plan whereby we can say to the determinist, "D-e-t-e-r-m-i-n-i-s-m: now go *do it*." So far Professor Royce has not found time to work out the details of this method. It is the only serious fault that I can find with his teaching which I will characterize positively as I end this paper as having the maximum of scholarship with the minimum of verbal legerdemain, the maximum historic consciousness with the minimum of slavery to the past. He teaches by his example how from wounds and sore defeat to make one's battle-stay in the world of thought. He makes discussions interesting by helping the lame ducks and cooling the swelled heads. Above all he develops the student's own thought by catching him in the act of asserting what he denies, of performing what he ignores, and of possessing what he supposes himself to lack.

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ROYCE'S IDEALISM AS A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION.

IS some apology necessary for discussing philosophy in relation to education? He who thinks there is no vital connection between them has an inadequate idea of each, for philosophy should not be detached from practical interests, and a great practical interest like education should not go on its way empirically without the guidance of reflection. Philosophy provides the general theory of life which education should seek to realize. Their problems are the same, viewed theoretically by philosophy and handled practically by education. It is the bane of philosophy to regard it as something by itself, and, as Herbart showed, whether a philosophy works well in education is one test of its truth. We might recall that it was educational questions raised by the Sophists which started western speculation about man on its course. The world's greatest philosophers have been teachers, such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, Kant. He whom we honor today is a philosopher and teacher.

Education is a human interest large enough to have a philosophy. There is a philosophy of the state, of religion, of art, of truth, of morality. Education involves the use of all of these related interests in perfecting human life; then why not a philosophy of education? In fact, any philosophy worthy the name forms the background of educational practice. As Dewey says: "Education is such an important interest of life that in any case we should expect to find a philosophy of education, just as there is a philosophy of art and religion. We should expect, that is, such a treatment of the subject as would show that the nature of existence renders education an integral and indispensable function of life."¹

But the philosophers of our day have not supplied us with a general theory of education, inwrought in their philosophical

¹ Art. "Philosophy of Education" in *Cyclopedia of Education*, Vol. IV, N. Y., 1913.

thinking, as did Plato, Aristotle, and Herbart in their day. And the educators have seemed not to need it. Philosophers have viewed education as too practical a matter to engage their attention, and educators have regarded philosophy as too theoretical for them. Both philosophy and education have thereby suffered; philosophy remaining aloof from one great interest of life and education proceeding unscrutinized.

What is education? It is the endeavor society makes consciously to realize its ideals, such as health, happiness, social effectiveness, and the public weal. Narrowly, this is done through the school with the young; broadly, by all the agencies of life with young and old alike. Education needs to know its ideals, which are the ideals of the complete life in a properly ordered society, and it is a part of the business of philosophy to formulate and inter-relate those ideals.

What then is a philosophy of education? It is a program of human achievement. It is a systematic setting forth of the essential ideals of individual and social human living. It is the theory of the proper relations between the more permanent elements of the total educational situation. It is an interpretation of education in terms of the whole of experience. With those philosophers who have more than the process of social experience in mind, it may even be an interpretation of education in terms of the ultimate world-ground. So it was to Plato. So it would probably be to Royce. I say 'probably be,' because Royce has not himself given us a philosophy of education. In 1891 in two articles in the first volume of the *Educational Review* on, "Is There a Science of Education?", Royce answered in the negative; and in 1903 in his *Outlines of Psychology*, which appears in a "Teachers' Professional Library," he defined some of the problems of teaching in psychological terms. It is to be hoped that Professor Royce may similarly relate his philosophy to education. The term 'education' does not appear in the index to the two volumes of *The World and The Individual*.

There are two ways of arriving at a philosophy of education; one, from an accepted ready-made philosophy to educational theory by deduction, a rather external mode of procedure; the

other, by an analysis of the educational situation as a part of human experience to determine its essential features in relation to the goal of living. The latter method is more in keeping with our times; the psychology of education has made the same shift; but the former is perforce the only method available under the title of this paper. My task is to interpret education in terms of Royce's Idealism as Royce himself might do.

There is no occasion, I think, for summarizing Royce's system of Idealism. It is expressed particularly in *The World and the Individual*,¹ covering the problems of ontology, epistemology, and cosmology. The terms most used by Royce are Being, Knowledge, Nature, Man, and the Moral Order. The motives animating Royce's idealism seem to be the three following: (1) No radical reconstruction of the actual, as illustrated by Fichte, but the conservative interpretation of the actual in large terms of rationality by means of dialectic, as illustrated by Hegel, though Royce's interpretation of experience, will, and nature differ from Hegel's. (2) No concession to naturalistic or realistic types of philosophy, apotheosizing scientific method and conclusions, but, by supplementing the category of 'Description' with that of 'Appreciation,' the preservation of the interests of morality and religion. (This motive provokes the new realists but they have yet to launch a defensible interpretation of religion.) (3) As opposed to dualism and pluralism, the unity of the world. "The whole of experience," which Royce presents is not an aggregate of interrelated centres of finite experience but an integrated total unity, embracing time, in which finite centers have their place.

What does Royce's system of idealism, so motivated, yield in the way of a philosophy of education? The large field of theory provided by this world-view, in which education works, might be briefly stated in this wise: the subject of education, the educand, is man; he is really a citizen of an ideal world, but he doesn't realize it; his naturalistic beginnings are consistent with his ethical goal; his progress in development is a process of deepening his consciousness; he is both a self and a *socius*; his fellows

¹ Two vols., N. Y., 1900-1901.

are not only other beings like himself, but possibly animal types as well; even nature is a larger self between him and his goal; the mal-adjustments between selves which we call evil are the conditions of winning the highest good through their conquest; in this struggle with evil man has freedom through union with the whole; as a unique expression of the infinite will, he has immortality; the met-empirical nature of his knowledge, the inclusive character of his time-span, though short, his victory over evil, his essential selfhood as ethical, all betoken already the infinity of his nature; his progress is unending; his goal is the Organic Being, comprehending both the static and dynamic viewpoints, a Life of lives, a Self of selves, an Individual of individuals. Reality is a self-representative experience, sentient and rational, embodying ideas, fulfilling purposes.

One perceives the similarity of this general theory to be realized by educational practice to that of Froebel, especially in the primary place assigned the feelings and will in contrast with the descriptive rôle of ideas.

The main problems of education have a possible solution in accordance with these principles. What is the real nature of education? The realization of self-hood. What is the real aim of education? The union in acting and thinking of the finite with the infinite. What is the means of education, the curriculum? The natural and social order, the sciences describing the regularities in the activities of the Self of nature, the humanities acquainting us with the Self of man. What is the right attitude toward the body in physical education? As a part of the material world really expressive of purpose, it requires cultivation in the interest of the whole man it serves. What is moral education? It is, ultimately, bringing the will of man into harmony with his own best self, which is the absolute will for him. What is æsthetic education? It is bringing man into appreciation of the perfect, which characterizes the whole of experience as well as certain selected portions of it. What is social education? It is bringing the individual into the sense of the unity and mutuality of the different centers of experience. What is intellectual education? It is the acquaintance of man with those mechanisms

and necessities of the world which enable him to survive, to keep his engagements, and to progress. What is vocational education? It is the equipment of life with skill akin to that displayed in the activity of the world-will. What is religious education? It is the recognition that all phases of education are abstractions until they find their unity with each other in conscious relationship to the life of the All or God. The ultimate solvent is the conscious unity of all reality. There is an education of the individual and of the race; each is a process of realizing ideals and fulfilling purposes expressed in temporal succession. There is an education of the body and of the mind; each is a phase of the one process of making man. There is cultural and vocational education,—the theoretical and practical phases of one process of growth. There is an education of the school and an education of life,—two phases of the one process of living. There is an education under authority and an education under freedom, but the two are limiting terms. Each individual, being a unique embodiment of the absolute will, has priceless worth and requires complete development, which is democracy in education, limited, however, by the conception of good citizenship. Naturally we do not look to any philosophy for details of educational procedure, such as, how to correlate the work of the kindergarten and the grades, or whether we should have a junior high school.

In sum, Royce's idealism puts infinite and partly accessible meaning into educational processes. Man, as individual and society, is coöperating, now blindly, now knowingly, with the absolute purpose in bringing himself nearer the goal of his being. This process is evolutionary and without ceasing. The curriculum studied is really the activity of the selves of man and nature. The temporal, the knowing, and the moral elements of the process suggest the presence of the infinite in the finite. The ground of it all is an actualized Ideal, like the *energia* of Aristotle.

How shall we estimate Royce's idealism as a basis for a philosophy of education? There is no time for comparing its conclusions with those of naturalism, pragmatism, and realism. It is difficult to agree on a standard by which to judge its truth.

Its strong and weak points are just those of idealism itself as a philosophy. These educational interpretations to idealists are doubtless intellectually convincing as well as emotionally satisfying and morally stimulating; to others, they leave something to be desired. The educational facts themselves are not distorted by this philosophy, and their meaning is deepened and extended. An inductive study of the educational fact as part of the social situation in order to find an educational philosophy by the other method would doubtless lead some thinkers to similar conclusions. For myself, I feel the difficulty of rejecting it without implying its truth, and I do not see that this dialectic difficulty is met by voluntarily refusing to be caught by it. Royce has developed his idealistic system on the moral, religious, scientific and epistemological sides; he has not developed it particularly on the institutional, æsthetic, governmental and vocational sides. And these latter are mooted points in educational theory today. One can not be sure that on some of the questions raised above, Royce would answer as I have done.

It is also proper to ask whether education could hope to realize the idealistic philosophy. We may answer yes; for some at least, if this philosophy is itself the culmination of educational training, as Plato made it. The rank and file of teachers, in their present relative lack of training, are like the prisoners sitting chained in Plato's cave watching the shadows reflected by a fire at its opening without having ever once seen the sun of light, truth, and being. The idealistic philosophy of education may be accepted or rejected, but, if accepted, it is a mighty challenge to society to re-constitute its education more in accord with the high ends of living.

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THE HOLT-FREUDIAN ETHICS AND THE ETHICS OF ROYCE.

A STUDY OF THE BEARING OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS UPON ETHICAL THEORY.

SINCE any scheme of ethics implies a psychology, any original movement in either field will affect the other. Whether or not a psychology recognizes a soul may make comparatively little difference in views of the goal of behavior, provided some changeless law of Karma secures that moral coherence of destiny which is one of the soul's functions. But theories of the will, of consent, and especially of the ranking of various impulses and desires under some 'ruling faculty,' may mark the difference between the Stoic and the Epicurean; and in this case it seems probable that the differences in psychology were largely due to prior differences in moral conviction.

At present, psychology is more independent of ethics than ethics is of psychology. But if psychology declines to deal with the will and its components, ethics will be obliged to develop this part of psychology for itself. Such home-grown psychologies will lack fertility; they are not wrought in sufficient detachment from the business of their application.¹ In Royce's ethical thought, the psychological basis was neither taken over bodily from any contemporary doctrine (though the influence of James is marked) nor was it developed as an independent science; but on the other hand it was not developed in the first place as an element in an ethical system. When William James distinguished among philosophies those that 'run thick' and those that 'run thin,' he included the philosophy of Royce in the former class, because of the omnipresence there of data of experience, largely psychological. For Royce, and indeed for any idealistic

¹ This is one of the most serious defects of pragmatism in its bearing upon the arts of thinking and education. It is inclined to argue backward from the perceivable uses of ideas to the ideas themselves, forgetting the vital difference between utility and fertility.

view of the world, there can be no metaphysics without psychology.¹ The ethical ideas of the *Philosophy of Loyalty* thus owe their shape in large measure to views regarding the self, its purposes and its objects, which first appeared in connection with metaphysical studies; though their sources lie far behind these in an uncommonly broad observation of, and interest in, human experience for its own sake.

Royce's views stand in interesting relation to the ethical results of certain recent developments in psychology. It is the purpose of the present paper to trace this relation. Already the prominence of 'behavior' in recent psychology is governing the statement of ethical and social problems, and so, to a certain extent, their solution. McDougall's *Social Psychology* may illustrate this. And now from another quarter, the strikingly original psychological work of Sigmund Freud, who has purposely remained as far as possible naïve toward current psychological traditions, is laid under contribution. In Professor E. B. Holt's book, *The Freudian Wish*,² the interest in behavior and the analysis of Freud are brought together; and both are employed, first in the re-stating of ethical questions (which is all that new concepts, strictly speaking, can accomplish), and then in indicating certain methods of solution.

This book is much more than an application of Freud's ideas. It offers a distinctly novel interpretation of the 'wish' in terms of behavior and environment. And it so far generalizes the principles of Freud's psychology, that it amounts to a gallant rescue of that work for ethical purposes both from the one-sided emphases of its friends, and from the distortions of its critics. It is refreshingly fair and clear sighted in recognizing what is significant in this region of easy and voluminous misunderstanding. The ethical application itself is essentially Holt's work. It is true, of course, that the psycho-analyst in his therapy must constantly use assumptions about where moral health as well as mental health lies: to this extent Holt's ideas may be said to

¹ Though (as his *Outlines of Psychology* may witness) it is quite possible to treat psychology while keeping metaphysical issues in the background. See page viii of the Preface of this book.

² New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1915.

be 'involved' in Freudian practice. But it is Holt, and not Freud, who has said what these ideas are, and what they mean in terms of other ethical theories. We may thus fairly regard this as a pioneer treatise, one with a weighty thesis, and further, one whose vigor, compactness, and clarity throw into welcome relief the issues about which discussion will naturally center.

I.

One looks first for the basis of the distinction between good and bad. The psycho-analyst begins with a condition judged hygienically bad, namely the mental disorder. If this disorder is caused by a repression of wishes, then repression must be judged to be extrinsically bad. Professor Holt translates this clinical judgment into an ethical judgment: repression is morally bad. This condemnation of repression is the characteristic common element in the two value-systems. But why is repression morally bad? This judgment, I take it, does not depend, through a utilitarian first premiss, upon the fact that repression may cause mental disorder. It seems to depend rather upon the judgment that the condition of repression is one already out of normal relation to the facts of the world. The implied first premiss is that there is a natural relation to these facts, and that this natural relation is "somehow right" (p. 151).

This natural relation is one of a personal knowledge of facts, and an adjustment to them through this knowledge rather than through authority. The facts will 'drive us on to morals' if we expose our minds to them: this is the ethics of the dust, the ethics from below upward. On the other hand, if we take our relation to the facts through social authorities, with those prohibitions and tabus which prevent acquaintance and personal knowledge, we deprive ourselves of the natural reasons for moral behavior, and our good conduct, such as it is, is a result of repression, not of wisdom. This is the ethics 'from above' (p. 132), sanctioned by the prestige of the censor, and hence *not* sanctioned by the inner working of one's own experience and discrimination. "Thus (through their official bans) it comes to pass that church and state often play in the adult's experience

the rôle of shortsighted and injudicious parents. . . . It is truth and the ever-progressive discrimination of truth which alone conduce to moral conduct" (p. 130).

But if we define our ethically right attitude simply as one which is derived from a knowledge of facts and their consequences, our theory does not differ essentially from that, for example, of Herbert Spencer (especially in his treatise on *Education*). Spencer has the same high scorn of those heteronomous systems which display, perhaps not so much *distrust* of the experiential sanctions for conduct, as an *incompetence* in recognizing them, an imperfect development of causal reasoning. But Spencer would have us hold to authority in some form or other until such time as the causal consciousness is so vivid in all of us that we can surely perceive the relations between our ideals and our experiences. How far Holt would accept this reservation; how far, on the contrary, he would advise the bolder attempt which Arthur Balfour pictures,¹ is not wholly clear. He has a place for authorities that tell the truth, and are known to tell the truth (p. 114). It is rather the lying authority, which while exhorting us to suppress our wishes is at the same time busied in suppressing the facts (p. 133), that is to be condemned. The impression received from my reading is that Holt judges most human authorities to be of the latter kind, the more particularly when they allege a divine sanction (p. 130). In this respect, Holt's views are similar to those of many other modern writers.

The distinctive character of his doctrine must be found in another aspect of what I have called the 'natural relation to facts.' For there are really two sets of facts which the moral life has to consider, the facts of the world in which our wishes are to be worked out, and the facts of those wishes themselves, defined as specific responses (or dispositions to respond) of our own organisms (p. 56). Our wishes also are objectively given. And it is the business of right conduct not alone to know the facts of the environment, but so to know them that we can satisfy our wishes. To refrain from eating mushrooms because some mushrooms are poisonous is not ideal conduct; our task is

¹ *Foundations of Belief*, pp. 204-208.

to know which are edible, and (if we wish) to eat them. "Right is that conduct, attained through discrimination of the facts, which fulfils all of a man's wishes at once, suppressing none." (p. 131).

There are thus two conditions which conduct must satisfy in order to be moral. It must be autonomous, and it must fulfil my wishes. It must be free in the sense of containing within my own knowledge all the reasons for my conduct; and it must be free in the further sense of liberating that in me which craves an outlet. The condition of the repressed individual is unfree; his will is divided against itself; while he does one thing, there is a secretly rebellious fraction of himself which longs for something else, the forbidden fruit. He cherishes the delusion that some actions are 'delightful, yet sinful'; and so far, while rejecting them, he remains privately attached to them, hence in bondage, rebellious, and unmoral.

The way of moral improvement is in general such as to satisfy both these conditions at once; for it is by a process of 'discrimination' that one finds it possible to satisfy the repressed wish. For example, I have a wish for social amusement and relaxation. The world of facts provides me with companions and places of amusement. But the censor has declared that the available amusements, theaters perhaps, are bad; and I am in the position of one who faces a field of poisonous mushrooms: my wishes must be repressed. What is needed is a discrimination; if I trust my own eyes, there is 'the easily perceivable fact that the theater is partly good and partly bad'; and with this bit of wisdom comes the release of my rightful desires.

This use of the word bad as applied to theaters, etc., invites some attention; for there is no doubt that the bad theater has the power of satisfying just those wishes that were repressed. And one who freely indulges in bad theaters is not guilty of that fear of experience which marks the dominance of the censor. If we condemn this indulgence it would seem at first sight to be on some as yet unacknowledged ground. Holt himself makes an apparently extra-scientific appeal to 'conscience' (p. 120), or to "a sound prejudice against unbridled frivolity, and a normal

shrinking from . . . moral contamination" (p. 119). But the difficulty is only apparent. When we call the theater bad it is only because in satisfying wish A it in some way thwarts and represses wish B. And our moral problem is, not simply to find objects which satisfy our wishes severally; but to find among a class of objects X which satisfy a given wish A, that variety X' which thwarts no other of the entire magazine of wishes. The postulate which this type of ethical theory seems bound to make is that such objects as X' exist. The edible mushrooms and the good theaters exist, and I can reach them.

II.

If I point out the generous optimism of this postulate, it is not for the sake of disputing its general validity, nor that of the corresponding dictum, that if repressions occur in this world of ours, it is through lack of knowledge (p. 128). It is for the sake of enquiring whether all repressions are alike evil; whether some may not be both inevitable and desirable.

Is Professor Holt, perhaps, treading dangerously near that view from which Thorndike has recently so solemnly warned us,—the view that original human nature, as a bundle of wishes, is always right? This view, says Thorndike, "by being attractive to sentimentalists, absolutist philosophers, and believers in a distorted and fallacious form of the doctrine of evolution, has been of great influence on educational theories."¹ He then points out the presence in us of wishes to lie, to steal, to fight, to torture, to run away, some of which we are bound not merely to repress but to throttle, because they are appropriate only to an archaic environment. We have to 'unlearn a large portion of our natural birthright.' One may reasonably challenge these categories, denying that there is any such wish in human nature as a wish to lie, or to steal, etc. One may insist that whatever impulses we have must be given non-invidious names; the alleged wish to lie may in fact be a wish to dramatize or invent, etc. But one has still to consider the broad necessity of discipline, perhaps even of excision, in the making of the moral

¹ *Original Nature of Man*, p. 270.

person, if only because of the 'side-stepping of civilization,' or the reversal of selective methods which Huxley has pointed out.

If we are to require in our morality satisfaction of the entire man—and this seems to me a just requirement—we must invoke, I believe, another principle,—that of *vicarious satisfaction* among our wishes. This implies (1) that our various 'wishes' are not distinct entities (as the A and B of our illustration), but are related as species of a few more general wishes, perhaps ultimately of one most general wish; and (2) that the satisfaction of the more general wish is a satisfaction of the more particular wish. Instances of the operation of this principle are not far to seek. The love of fighting or of opposition is one which may be satisfied in many ways from the combat by fists to the rivalry of commercial undertakings or of political parties; William James has familiarized us with the notion of a 'moral equivalent' of the cruder pugnacity. Indeed, society may be said to be largely engaged in the work of discovering moral equivalents for our primitive wishes; and what we call a custom or an institution seems to be fairly describable as a social finding of this sort.

It is because *our wishes exist as generals*, and not as specific particulars alone, that the process called by Freud "sublimation" is possible. This process, which seems to me to be the most important conception for ethical purposes that Freud has outlined (though he has rather assumed it than developed its theory), has its most obvious illustration perhaps in the æsthetic equivalent, or social equivalent, of sexual wishes; the general wish under which these specific varieties occur may be variously described as the wish to create, or the wish for union, etc. In this form it has variously appealed to social observers, as to Miss Jane Addams, to Walter Lippman and others. But its prevalence and fundamental character have hardly been recognized. It needs to be related to the process of the transformation of instincts which McDougall has touched upon and which all forms of education make use of. And it needs to be understood in terms of a tendency of the life of our wishes to reach successively more general interpretations, and to become subsumed ultimately under one comprehensive wish,—the 'will.' With

the principle of vicarious satisfaction thus defined, it is conceivable that comparatively few of the enumerable wishes of a man should be satisfied, and yet the *man* be satisfied. The inevitable lopping-off that comes with every large decision, the successive specializations into which we are driven, the relinquishments necessary if only through lack of time, the hungers left by poverty, by social pressure, by the hundred comparative failures to one thorough success in competitive pursuits, and finally that universal human longing due to the actual absence from the world of those objects upon which many wishes might run out (the music not yet written, the justice not yet achieved, not to speak of the lacking edible crows or wholly good wars, even if there be edible mushrooms and wholly good theaters),—all of this need no more make man unhappy than make him immoral, if our psychology can show us that the 'soul,' or the 'will,' or the total wish of man, is so far a genuine entity that a checked wish need not persist as a repressed and rebellious moment of subconscious demand, but find its way upward into a purpose that *is* satisfied.

If this could be shown, and I believe that it is precisely in this direction that the development of the Freudian school is tending,¹ we should be inclined to transfer Holt's moral law of discriminative self-expression to the one wish or purpose, and let the particular wishes take the consequences. The difference between the two methods might be symbolized in some such fashion as this:

Assume as before that we have wish A which can be satisfied by X, but at the cost of repressing wish B; and we have wish B which can be satisfied by Y (or by not-X), but at the cost of repressing A. According to the method of discrimination we are to find an object X' which will satisfy A without repressing B, and presumably also an object Y' which will satisfy B without repressing A. According to the method of vicarious satisfaction we have to recognize the more general wish, M, of which A and B are special forms, and then to find the object, Z, which will satisfy M.

Under this latter method, A and B would not be satisfied in

¹ See below.

their own persons. Neither would they be repressed in the sense of being pressed back into a continued life of protest. It might be fair to say that, as at first defined, they would be *suppressed*, as a necessary first stage of being sublimated.¹ All growth must involve some such suppression of imperfectly defined wishes, until we discover what, as a major purpose of our existence, we really want. Repression must be judged bad; not however because of the local rights of the minor wish, but rather because it implies a laxity of the main current of the will, a Lot's-wife sort of irresolution, such as a brisker seizure in thought of one's chosen object might dissipate.

I am not posing as a protagonist of self-mutilation or asceticism, though I believe with William James that every man needs his own quota. I thoroughly believe in the principle of the inte-

¹ I have been using throughout the word repression for Freud's *Verdrängung*. I have had this distinction in mind in doing so. For Freud, *Verdrängung* is not the general condition of a wish which is denied outlet, but rather the condition of the wish which while outwardly checked is inwardly harbored. He recognizes the normality of what I have called suppression as a part of growth. Thus, in his Clark lectures, he speaks as follows: "The general consequence (of psychoanalytic treatment) is, that the wish is consumed during the work by the correct mental activity of those better tendencies which are opposed to it. The repression is supplanted by a condemnation, carried through with the best means at one's disposal. . . . (At the origin of the trouble) the individual for his part only repressed the useless impulse, because at that time he was himself incompletely organized and weak; in his present maturity and strength he can perhaps conquer without injury to himself that which is inimical to him." So far, Freud pictures the rather drastic procedure in which wish B actually puts wish A out of existence entirely, suppressing it, instead of repressing it; and without substitution. But, he continues, "the extirpation of the infantile wishes is not at all the ideal aim of development. The neurotic has lost by his repressions many sources of mental energy whose contingents would have been very valuable for his character-building and life activities. We know a far more purposive process of development, the so-called sublimation, by which the energy of infantile wish-excitations is not secluded, but remains capable of application, while for the particular excitations, instead of becoming useless, a higher, eventually no longer sexual goal, is set up." It is this departure from the 'sexual goal' which evidences that Freud does not contemplate the satisfaction of wish A in its nominal character. To be sublimated, it must, in this character, be suppressed. Freud goes on, however, to indicate that he does not regard sublimation as an ideal solution of the problem of wishes. It is far more desirable, he suggests in a figure, that from the point of view of mental energy A and B should be satisfied in their particular characters. So far, he subscribes to Professor Holt's method, but he does not identify it with morality. (*American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. XXI, 1910, p. 217).

gration of wishes, as Holt has stated it, as a necessary element in our moral ideal. But when it becomes the leading element, so that what I have called local rights are the first things to be considered, it seems both to misrepresent and to complicate the moral situation. The ideal of rounded development and activity is unquestionably the law of that Nature worshipped both by Greekdom and by our contemporary physicalism. But the necessity for sacrificial choice is not provided for; and it cannot be eliminated. Nor can we evade the fact that it is precisely such choice that for most men must always constitute the conscious ethical crux. It is of little value to say to the soldier called upon by his country "So discriminate as both to satisfy your patriotic wish and your wishes for family life, social amenity and physical comfort." The synthesis is indeed better than the opposition, and wise and happy is he who can find it. But until what we call adaptation is complete, the moral law must deal with disjunctive judgments.

III.

There is one phase of Holt's psychology to which this view of the ethical problem seems more akin than the Freudian view. I refer to his theory of the subconscious. It is characteristic of Holt's view of mind to seek what is usually called 'inner' in a man's dealings with his environment. He prefers not to trust the 'inside information' of introspection. Almost we might say that for Holt, the man is his purpose;¹ and his purpose is to be discerned in the remote and inclusive objects of his action, rather than in any 'thoughts' which he might be able to serve up, on demand, as an account of himself. There is something like a reciprocal relation between the supposed 'inwardness' of a thought or motive and the remoteness of the object with which it is concerned: the more inward the thought, the more outward the object. The thoughts that we call subconscious, or 'secret' are those which are not on the surface of our minds because they are relating us to our distant rather than to our immediate concerns: while I appear to others and to myself to be purchasing

¹ See Holt, p. 28.

a railway ticket, I may be subconsciously building the house to which this momentary act is accidentally related through a thousand links. To recognize in the subconscious thoughts and wishes those which reach (or try to reach) farthest outward, seems to me not only illuminating but ventilating to this conception so commonly shrouded in mystery.

It is subconsciousness in this sense, a subconscious wisdom, in fact, which relates a man to his widest horizon and constitutes his ethical and religious nature. "In moral conduct the stimulus has receded the farthest, and such conduct is behavior toward the more universal entities, toward truth, honor, virtue, and the like" (p. 146).

This view of the subconscious, however, and of the ethical principle, seems to me hardly consistent, not to say identical, either with Freud's view and practice, or with the previously noted principles of Holt. If a repressed wish or a traumatic memory is subconscious, in Freud's usage, it is not such as refers to objective facts lying *beyond* the usual conscious border; nor is it such as can be directly discerned in any actual behavior. Let us call to mind Freud's methods. He does not, indeed, rely upon direct introspection for revealing the subconscious wishes. He states his problem thus: "To find out something from the patient that the doctor did not know and the patient himself did not know." He learns to distrust hypnosis partly because not all patients can be hypnotized, and partly because its results are unreliable. He comes to the conclusion that all memories accessible to hypnotic states are accessible also to normal states; if certain memories fail to emerge it is because of a resistance, due to the hypothetical process of *Verdrängung* or repression. Hence his methods are aimed at removing the resistance and aiding the patient to recognize and confess his own wishes. To accomplish this he does, in fact, examine such behavior, and also such experiences, as may offer a clue to the lost motive: he analyzes dreams, slips of the tongue, types of imagination and association, the various subtle ways in which we all 'betray ourselves.' "In this way," he says, "I succeeded, without hypnosis, in learning from the patient all that was

necessary for a construction of the connection," etc. What I wish to point out is that Freud depends on learning the pathogenic state of wish or memory "from the patient"; his most satisfactory evidence of the rightness of his 'psycho-analysis' is that the patient recognizes its rightness, by introspection. Often-times this recognition amounts to a new item of self-consciousness on the patient's part, the naming of an unavowed or half-concealed motive. Sometimes it is like recovering the thread of a forgotten experience. Often it bears the character of a confession, and as Freud has somewhere remarked, has some of the values and dangers of the confessional. But always it is an appeal to more searching introspection. No doubt the states of consciousness thus revealed are represented in nervous structure by subtle interplay of motor settings;¹ but the point is, that Freud neither seeks nor finds them there. Freud uses behavior as an aid to introspection. And what he finds is a radically different region of subconsciousness from that which Holt describes in the passages referred to.

The most obvious difference is that the subconscious wish recovered by psycho-analysis is supposed to be driven into subconsciousness by the censor, whereas the subconscious described by Holt is as likely as not to be the censor itself or an element thereof. The former aspect of subconsciousness is artificial, a consequence of repression; the latter is natural, entirely free, constantly coöperating with conscious thought instead of antagonizing or being antagonized by it, actively relating our conscious deeds to their widest horizons.² This latter aspect of subconsciousness may fairly be identified in a special way with the man himself:—As a man thinketh in his

¹ Holt, pp. 93, 94.

² I have elsewhere described in some detail the difference in function and origin of these aspects of subconsciousness, referring to them as the coöperative and the critical subconsciousness, respectively. *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, Appendix I, pp. 527-538. The point of this distinction is well expressed in a quatrain of John B. Tabb:

'Tis not what I am fain to hide
That doth in deepest darkness dwell,
But what my tongue hath often tried,
Alas, in vain, to tell.

heart, so is he. Or in Holt's terms,—As a man's ultimate horizon of response is, so is he. But one could hardly without cynicism sweepingly identify the subconsciousness of repression with the man or with any essential part of him. Yet this is precisely what the Freudian analysis inclines to do; and it is here that Holt's psychology might act as a salutary corrective, if it were consistently applied. Let me develop this suggestion briefly.

IV.

The first appeal of the Freudian clinic, and of the Holtian ethic, is to a greater candor, and a new self-scrutiny. It demands of us confidence in a severer but friendlier truth, as a condition of moral growth. If it confronts us with something like a universal threat to the effect that "There is nothing hidden that shall not be made known"—since in spite of ourselves our expressions are a perpetual self-betrayal (Holt, p. 36ff)—it does much to make endurable the admission of the supposedly inadmissible; for it shows our individual fault as a common human failing, holding out the greeting of a general companionship in confession. The goal of such added self-knowledge and self-avowal can be nothing but truth and health, and it must be prized accordingly. Psycho-analysis, with vastly different weapons than those of Carlyle, may be still more pervasively effective than he in making us aware of the amount of sham in our lives. Dr. James J. Putnam speaks wholly in the spirit of the new self-knowledge when he refers¹ to the "hidden motives and self-deceptions which to a greater or less degree falsify the lives of every man and every group of men," or suggests "the discovery that some apparently harmless act, classifiable in ordinary parlance as a wholly justifiable form of tender emotion, is in reality a sign that (his) thoughts are tending in objectionable directions." In so far as subtle hypocrisies and double-motives are real ingredients of character, nothing can be more welcome than a usable method for detecting them.

It does not follow, however, that every thought or motive which is under suppression is such a real ingredient of character,

¹ *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, Vol. IX, April-May, 1914, pp. 37, 44.

as a great deal of the Freudian literature suggests. As a token of the error we may point out a characteristic touch in the Freudian interpretation of wit, or dream, or art, or even of moral effort, which it would be too strong to describe as cynical or blighting, and yet which distinctly verges in this direction, and from which Holt's own treatment is not wholly free (as p. 144), though he has done much to save a good clinical hypothesis from developing into a prevalent clinical suspicion. It should be clear that solely on Freudian principles¹ there is a radical difference between the repression which has preceded the self-analysis and avowal, and the moral effort of suppression or sublimation which must *follow* it if the discovered trait is to be corrected. Any moral effort whatever, no matter how free from self-deception, necessarily implies the continued presence in us of impulses which we must resist; it implies that there must be a censor with actual work to do. To this extent there will be double-mindedness; but there is all the difference in the world between a double-mindedness which is *growing toward unity*, and a double-mindedness which is being cherished and smuggled along by some one of those many devices of compromise which Holt so justly condemns. I believe that most of the actual work of the censor in our consciousness is of the former sort (or of a mixed sort, with a good deal of the former ingredient in it); and that a call to unrestricted self-revelation would tend to undo in many minds the first stages of moral achievement. I believe this the more because in many cases, and perhaps in most common cases, the most effective method of moral improvement is *not* the Freudian method of scientific self-analysis. Something is to be said for a very different method, which without accepting Bergson's opposition between analysis and intuition, might well be described in terms of their contrast. Just as a certain element in the cure of diseased viscera is, at the proper stage of things, to forget that you have any viscera; so a certain element, and naturally a much larger element, in the cure of any moral disease is to forget that your feelings have an anatomy, and attend to wholeness of will

¹ Though I confess that Janet's account of dealing with a motive we wish to overcome seems to me more in accord with ordinary experience. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, vol. IX, No. 1, pp. 28-9.

and action. It is because this method is so ancient, so well understood, and so spontaneously used, that many an honest person confronted with an equally honest Freudian analysis of his subconscious self, would be likely to draw from it quite perverse conclusions about the state of his soul. I do not undertake to state where the border of efficiency between the two methods is to be drawn. It is our destiny to become completely self-knowing; and I do not think that any one can have too much self-knowledge or self-analysis, so long as it is true self-knowledge, proportionate. But so long as the method of health by intuition of health (if I may so describe it) has any important rôle to play, it is a serious defect of any general scheme of moral hygiene not to take account of it. And the defect becomes doubly serious when, as appears to me the tendency of the Holt-Freudian scheme, the natural and unconscious use of this intuitive method—externally so similar to repression and censorship in the hypocritical sense—is confused with them. It is not true, I repeat, that every thought and motive which is under ban and can be revealed by psycho-analysis is a real ingredient of character. And with due respect to Holt's definitions, this method of interpretation is, in its actual working, *too subjective*.

But this error, I believe, is rather Freud's than Holt's; for in Holt's own principles the antidote is clearly enough stated. "The inscrutable 'thought behind' the actions of a man, which is the invisible secret of those actions, is another myth" (p. 85). Take this general principle of behaviorism together with the principle that the characteristic purposes of a man are those which reach the widest horizon; these purposes are himself, provided that they are actively engaged in integrating the rest of his purposes into their own system. Take it with the comment that the hidden thought is a myth not because it is non-existent; but because only those thoughts have significance for character which achieve expression. We shall then have, I believe, a much sounder principle of judgment. We shall be judging a man by that which he is ultimately moving toward, rather than by what, as vestige of infantile wish-definitions, still adheres to him from a past which of his own growth he is shuffling off.

V.

It remains true that the objects toward which a man is ultimately moving cannot be discovered by external observation. For in the case of just these objects, which most define the man, the 'recession of the stimulus' has proceeded to infinity; and further, the 'stimulus'—these objects themselves—has become intangible in nature. Hence we cannot identify a man's major purposes in the manner suggested by Holt, that of exhibiting the objects (though we might attempt a metaphysical definition of them); nor can we discover them by Freud's method of uncovering repressed wishes. The best instrument which has so far been devised for discovering what these major wishes are is, I believe, an ancient one,—the Platonic logic of the affections. It is the peculiar merit of the Socratic dialectic, as shaped by Plato, that it reveals precisely that part of the subconscious self (if we wish to describe in these terms that unanalyzed part of the self which Socrates, as midwife, undertook to deliver) which as censor of the individual is also the common sense, and so the common censor, of mankind.¹

The working part of the dialectic of Plato might be roughly described as a comparison of an experimental definition of a term (in connotation) with accepted cases of its denotation. If courage be defined as daring; and it is admitted that one who

¹ One of the most vigorous and inspiring aspects of Holt's book is its recognition of points of contact with Platonic psychology and ethics. The main point of this agreement is in the doctrine that only the good man is free, and only the wise can be good. Holt's method of reaching this goal of freedom, by discrimination and synthesis, differs from the dialectic of Plato, as I shall try to make clear, precisely in that part of the subconscious which it is destined to set free. It is needless to point out that the freedom which Plato had in mind was quite consistent with a somewhat ascetic, or repressive, attitude toward the body. The *Symposium* presents us with perhaps the first instance of a conscious philosophy of sublimation, by finding in universal terms an *equivalent* for the specific forms of wish. If Plato appears in any modern dress, it must be as a democratized Plato, so far as the rank of our various affections is concerned. This modern contribution to Plato's thought, the release of the human spirit from distrust of its 'lower nature,' is perfectly carried out in Holt's theory. But the question remaining unanswered is, How shall we distinguish among our wishes those which identify ourselves, and so have especial right to be regarded as major or ruling wishes? What is it which, on the whole, we want to do? In answering this question Plato's method, or a modified form of it, is still, I hold, our best recourse.

dares in an ignorant and foolhardy manner is not to be called courageous, we must change the definition of courage so as to include the element of knowledge. The judgment that the foolhardy person is not to be called courageous can be taken as more certain than the definition, only because one's power of applying a concept in recognizing or excluding is more certain than one's power to express it in terms of predicates. It must be assumed that one knows what courage is, for the purposes of these recognitions, in order that the dialectical apparatus shall have a fixed ground to operate from. Yes, one must know *what* courage is, that is, one must actually know the connotation, in order to effect these judgments of denotation. But this knowledge of the essence as an inaccessible knowledge may be called relatively subconscious; one can reach it for purposes of expression only by a succession of these dialectical efforts or experiments.

Now this process, which is applied by Plato chiefly to the task of learning what we think, is also quite spontaneously applied by all of us to the task of learning *what we want*. For all assertions of the form 'I wish X' may be regarded as essays at definition, namely the definition of a wish in terms of its objects. And all such definitions, which children and others are inclined to put forth with a high sense of dogmatic certainty, are seen in the course of experience to be, in truth, highly hypothetical. They are, in effect, hypothetical interpretations of a wish, which in its completeness remains unknown in quite the same way as the nature of justice or courage is unknown. And the general effect of experience is to lead to revisions of the assumed definition. Not all learning by experience, however, is dialectical in character; indeed the most conspicuous examples are not so, and partly perhaps for this reason this analogy, so far as I know, has not been pointed out in current discussions of the learning process.

For in the common processes of motor learning, in which pleasures and pains, or the 'original satisfiers and annoyers' of which Professor Thorndike speaks, furnish the definitive 'yeses' and 'noes' for our active experiments, the revisions that take place affect not so much our understanding of our wishes as our under-

standing of our objects. If yielding to curiosity brings the finger into the flame, or yielding to the pecking impulse leads a chicken to take up an undesirable lady-bug, definite sensible 'annoyers' are encountered whose relation to the original impulse is simply an empirical fact. The result of such an experience is likely to be simply caution in getting the rose without the thorn, or a discrimination as of the edible from the non-edible insects, without any reflection upon the nature of the impulse itself. It is not, for instance, that the chicken's hunger was misdirected; but that what it took to be the same object as one which had previously satisfied it was not in fact the same; the genus was too widely drawn. Nature might have made all flame as innocent as incense, and all lady-bugs as sweet as corn, so far as our insight yet goes; the attributes of these things have to be learned as one learns the alphabet, without inner illumination.

There is a shade more reflection involved in another type of dissatisfaction. There are some experiments which at the moment seem to turn out well, but which bring painful results at greater or lesser distance from the satisfaction. The pains which follow over-indulgence may, if one has sufficient mentality to 'integrate' them with his experience, lead to the judgment, "This, after all, is not what I want." But here again nature might have made us so that some high orgy could be pursued without resulting depression; or, if not, the question might still be raised, and is raised, whether the orgy, or some orgy like it, might not be worth the cost. So long as the satisfaction itself shines out with unclouded light, and the connected pains are externally related to it, the entire effort of revision is directed to the circumstances and not to the wish.

But there is a third type of experience, and here it is that we encounter the dialectic change, in which an achievement is followed by an ill-defined sense that one is not, after all, satisfied with *that apparent satisfaction*. The memory of that terminal joy itself is mixed with unpleasantness. There is what I should call a *mental negative after-image* of the experience. It is hardly necessary to illustrate; but a common example may be taken from almost any experience of impulsive pugnacity. I have a diso-

bedient child; and upon an accumulation of petty failures to obey I act upon the injunction of a contemporary sage, 'Never punish a child except in anger.' With the aid of this emphasis I secure compliance, and am satisfied. But quite possibly after some time my sense of triumph may fade. I defined my wish in terms of compliance, and I gained it; but what I gained was not what I wanted,—the error was in my understanding of my own wish. I may be puzzled to know in what respect I have failed; for what is now required is a new effort at analysis, a new hypothesis, an essentially inductive achievement in naming what was wrong and so revising my definition. I may emerge with the supposition that what will satisfy me is a free compliance, or one based on confidence rather than on necessity. But whatever the outcome, the process is a dialectic process. It might be called the *dialectic of the will*.

Like the Platonic dialectic of concepts, it assumes that the *judgment of denotation is more certain than the judgment of analysis of connotation*. The judgment of denotation here takes the form: This experience is, or is not, a case of what I wish. And as in the Platonic dialectic, the certainty, in turn, of this judgment of denotation depends upon the presence of a 'subconscious' knowledge of what, in connotation, I want.

The distinction between this process and the first-named process of learning from experience of pleasure and pain may appear in this, that this 'mental after-image' is more potent than pleasures or pains to determine the history of a wish. Thus, a fight may be attended with much pain and subsequent discomfort; but if the after-image is gratifying, the pain seems to have a wholly negligible effect in deterring the enthusiastic fighter. The agony of childbirth does not deter the normal mother from again entering the same cycle of experience. And on the other hand a slight shade of dissatisfaction in the after-image may nullify the effect of the keenest pleasure in inducing a repetition of the successful behavior. If pain is, in Sherrington's sense, 'prepotent' as a stimulus; the mental after-image is '*prepotent*' (or has become so in the human species) *in fixing the definitions of wishes*, and so in determining habits.

Thus we are 'driven on' by experience, if not to morality, at least to a more adequate knowledge of what we want, by a dialectic process whose motive power comes from the free, coöperative subconsciousness, not from the repressed subconsciousness.

VI.

By aid of this conception of an experiential dialectic of the will, we may now be able so far to bridge the initial difference in terminology between the ethics of Royce and the Holt-Freudian ethics as to show what their relations are. Let me attempt to resume these relations in a series of propositions.

(a) *For Royce the moral problem of the individual might be stated as a problem of finding what on the whole one wants to do,—and then doing it; the process of this discovery is analogous rather to the dialectic of the will than to the method of discrimination.*

For Royce, as for Holt, the 'soul' or self is to be defined in terms of purpose. It makes little difference in this connection whether we call the psychological materials desires, instincts, or wishes.¹ In either case, it is not by the possession of any soul-substance that I am defined a self; but it is "by this meaning of my life-plan, by this possession of an ideal."² And Royce's conception of the moral problem is so far opposed to any kind of heteronomy that the whole duty of any man is to be found in the fulfilling of his unique purpose.

¹ Compare Royce's definition of a desire (*Outlines of Psychology*, p. 366) with Holt's definition of wish (p. 56). For Royce, "A desire means a tendency to action, experienced as such, and at the same time felt as a relatively satisfactory tendency." Of the wish, Holt says that it is "a course of action which the living body executes or is prepared to execute with regard to some object or some fact of its environment." Both definitions raise the question what kind of existence a desire or wish may have when the course of action referred to is not carried out,—which is of course their characteristic mode of existence. If we may assume that "tendency to action" in the one case, and "prepared to execute" in the other, mean the same condition of incipient activity and physiological setting, the differences between the concepts seem to be simply (1) that Royce expressly recognizes the element of consciousness, and (2) that Holt expressly recognizes the environing objects with which the action, if it became actual, would deal. The definitions are certainly not inconsistent.

² *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II, p. 276. For Holt, however, the soul is a unity only when integration is accomplished: he frequently uses the plural of purpose or wish as equivalent to soul. See pp. 49, 200 f., cf. pp. 95, 118.

As to the process of accomplishing this, the original difficulty is that one does not know what one's purpose is, at least in terms of the objects with which he must deal. It is characteristic of the purpose that it is forever in search of its own completed meaning. Its life is a movement from self-ignorance to self-knowledge. This knowledge comes in dealing with the world of objects, for they *are* the completions of the meaning of the purposes, their 'external meanings,' more organically parts of the purposes themselves than are the objects of Holt's wishes parts of the wish.¹ It is through contact with objects that I learn to recognize in them (or as Plato would say, to recollect) my own meaning.

Royce does not describe the process through which a purpose finds its meaning as a dialectic process; and there are sufficient reasons for resorting to new terms. Since Hegel's time this word has borne a connotation which was foreign to Plato, that of determining in advance the course which experience must follow; and in the rejection of this prescriptive tyranny, the descriptive value of the concept, together with its experiential character, have been largely overlooked. The notion of an *a priori* deduction of the course of experience is as foreign to Royce as to Plato; the quest is experimental, and it is essentially the same quest. So far as it has a typical history, Royce describes it about as follows: Our life at any moment shows two regions or strata: there is a region in which, having found out what we want and have to do, we have adopted habits toward various objects,—these are our known and recurrent wishes; and there is a region of groping, of working by trial and error, in pursuit of the residual meaning yet ungrasped, "interpolating new terms in a series of stages that lie between the original condition of the organism and a certain ideal goal, which the individual organism never reaches."²

The findings of this experimental quest, Royce first refers to as

¹ The fact that, according to the type of idealism which Royce holds, the world of objects only exists for me as a world of the external meanings of my ideas does not, of course, imply that the objects with which any given wish has to reckon exist only as external meanings of that particular wish.

² *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II, p. 317.

'tasks' and 'deeds' and 'offices' such as mark off my contrast with my fellows. Later he is inclined to refer to them as 'causes' such as at once set me off and unite me in common undertakings with others. To discover one's cause and be loyal to it; this is the essentially ethical problem. And the recognition of the cause which identifies one as a person is so far a critical event in the history of the will that it puts a check upon the freedom of experimentation. "The choice of a special personal cause is a sort of ethical marriage to this cause."¹ Yet all such choices are made in a degree of ignorance; they are fallible, and when it becomes "unquestionably evident that the continuance of this marriage involves positive unfaithfulness to the cause of universal loyalty," it must be dissolved, and the definition revised.

The justice of bringing this process of choosing a cause by successive revisions into comparison with the dialectic above described lies in the assumption that the finding of a cause is a judgment of recognition, and so depends upon some kind of prior possession of the connotation of the cause.

It must be admitted that Royce does not expressly argue that any such prior knowledge is implied in the choosing process. Still less does he apply to it the term 'subconscious.' This term Royce for the most part avoids.² But such seems to me to be the implication of his teaching. If I know at all that I exist, it must be, according to Royce, as entertaining a distinctive purpose; and if ever I am able to judge that "This is what I seek," the 'what' of my search must already be known to me

¹ *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, p. 191.

² In *Outlines of Psychology*, the contrast between unanalyzed and analyzed mental states covers part of the ground of the contrast between the 'allied' sub-consciousness and consciousness (pp. 105-116); and my own belief is that here Royce's terminology is less likely to be misleading.

But in speaking of "that mysterious and personal aspect of conscience upon which common sense insists," he says that "Such a loyal choice as I have described . . . calls out all of one's personal and more or less unconsciously present instincts, interests, affections, one's socially formed habits, and whatever else is woven into the unity of each individual self . . . it involves all the mystery of finding out that some cause awakens us, fascinates us, reverberates through our whole being . . . (and thus) involves more than mere conscious choice. It involves that response of our entire nature conscious and unconscious, which makes loyalty so precious." *Philosophy of Loyalty*, pp. 194f.

somewhat as the meaning of justice was known at the outset to the Socratic enquirer.¹

(b) *In so far as the will in seeking its cause or causes must choose from empirically given materials, Royce's ethics is an ethics 'from below.'*

As a psychological doctrine, Royce accepts the entire dependence of the will upon previous experience for its contents, quite as James stated the case. "We can never consciously and directly will any really novel course of action. We can directly will an act only when we have before done that act, and have so experienced the nature of it."² This principle holds good not alone for choices of physical alternatives, but for moral choices as well: we cannot choose to be self-controlled unless we have first experienced what self-control means. It is through imitation that we first find ourselves taking attitudes which have moral value: and having thus become, as it were, involuntarily good, we may then deliberately pursue goodness. But the first data for all voluntary behavior are furnished by instinctive actions. These instincts, as we inherit them, are "planlessly numerous" (p. 373); their existence imposes upon us a problem of organization. Certainly it is experience which here drives us on to morals.

(c) *But neither for Holt nor for Royce can the principle of choice or selection be given with the materials for choice as a datum of experience. This principle of choice has its psychological expression as an 'instinct' of greater generality. To this extent, ethics can be neither 'from below' nor 'from above,' but from within.*

All evaluations make use of a standard of evaluation; and however the things to be chosen or estimated may be found in experience, and the standard itself come to consciousness only with the material of the problem, it is not the data which have furnished the standard.

Royce follows James in treating the psychology of choice as a matter of selective attention, an "attentive furthering of our interest in one act or desire as against another."³ Such pref-

¹ See *Philosophy of Loyalty*, pp. 169f. Also *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II, pp. 434, 445.

² *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 369.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 369; *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II, p. 354.

erential attention, which is will in the stricter sense, may be traced to the interaction between momentarily presented interests (wishes, instinctive-impulses) and a more permanent policy, a "system of ruling motives" itself the result of previous choosing and integrating. But the problem of accounting for the earlier choices which established this system is still to be met. If we refer preference to imitation, and say that the desire to imitate is itself an instinct, or a complex of instincts,¹ we must admit that neither the tendency to imitate, nor the tendency to oppose, if such general tendencies exist, prescribe what things are chosen for imitation and what for opposition. For psychology as well as for metaphysics the will must be identified with a persistent principle of preference. And while (as the critics of Wundt's theory of apperception have insisted) there is some difficulty in reconciling the notion of a conscious function engaged in influencing its own states, with the notion of a consciousness composed wholly of states, it is possibly this latter notion that has made the difficulty. We need only say that the conception of an instinct or disposition capable of regulating the action of other instincts (as in the disposition to play) will furnish a sufficient psychological scheme for such a persistent principle. Its psychological expression would be that of a most general 'instinct.'

(d) *Royce recognizes the place for such an instinct, and partially describes it.*

In considering the will as a source of originality Royce describes an instinct of highly general character, which partly fulfils the conditions for choice above described.² The special problem being to account for "the apparently spontaneous variations of our habits which appear in the course of life and which cannot be altogether explained as due to external stimulations," they are referred to a restlessness, which is quantitative and to some degree characteristic of species, and which is "something very much more general in its character than is any one of the specific instincts upon which our particular habits are formed"

¹ *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 276.

² *Ibid.*, Ch. xiii.

(p. 318). This restlessness is something other than the rehearsal of an inherited repertoire of responses, such as Thorndike has appealed to. It is "the power of the organism to persist in seeking for new adjustments whether the environment at first suggests them or not, to persist in struggling toward its wholly unknown goal, whether there is any apparent opportunity for reaching such a goal or not." This restlessness may reach the intensity of an independent passion, as in the absorption of play or of invention; it is at the basis of all our current selective attention, so far as its quantity of persistence is concerned (p. 328). And as for its organic basis, it "depends upon vital activities which are as elemental as the 'tropisms' of the organisms upon which Loeb experimented" (p. 327; see also the preface). It may be called simply a "general instinct to persist in trying."

We can hardly agree in classing with the tropisms of Loeb a tendency or set of tendencies so non-specific in direction that their goal can be called 'wholly unknown,' save indeed for the fact that it is something novel, *i. e.*, something not identical with what is already familiar. Such an impulse (a negative iso-tropism?) would be open to the criticism of McDougall upon the possibility of an organic basis for curiosity.¹ But apart from this, the 'instinct to persist in trying' cannot be identical with the principle of selection which we seek, because of this same absence of content or direction. It would appear, of itself, to imply a still deeper and positive 'tropism'; for unless we are ready to say that the restlessness in question is purely a distaste of the old because it is old, or purely a love of action for the sake of being in action, it would be naturally explained as a case of the 'negative after-image' above described, a recognition thatt he self

¹ "This instinct is excited not by any simple sense-impressions, nor yet by any specific complex of sense-impressions; for there is no one class of objects to which it is especially directed or in the presence of which it is invariably displayed. . . . In short, the condition of excitement of the impulse of curiosity seems to be in all cases the presence of a strange or unfamiliar element in whatever is partly familiar, whether the object be one of sense-perception (as exclusively in the animals and very young children), or one contemplated in thought only. In either case the element of strangeness . . . is something which exists only for the organism, . . . and is, in fact, the *meaning* of the object for the organism in so far as curiosity is awakened." (William McDougall. *Body and Mind*, pp. 266f.)

as a whole is not satisfied in any of its present objects, because the self already knows 'subconsciously' what it wants.

(e) *Further suggestions for its description are found in the work of Jung and of Putnam. The concept of a "necessary wish or desire" defined.*

Whatever may be needed to complete the psychological concept of a selective principle, it is an important step in advance to have recognized, as Royce has done, the existence of such a thing as a general instinct, and to have proposed for it an elemental organic basis. What is required is a native tendency which is determined, not by the specific disposition of this or that nervous path, but by the form of metabolism of the nervous processes everywhere. It would be such a tendency that we could say, "To be alive is to wish thus and thus." Such a desire could be regarded as a *necessary desire*.

I have already mentioned that in the school of Freud, and especially in the work of C. G. Jung, there has been a tendency to recognize genetic relations among instincts, and finally to set up the hypothesis of an Ur-instinct from which all others are derived by differentiation. This is a result of the simple consideration that 'sublimation' implies a constant which undergoes transformation; and how far back one pursues the constant depends on how far one recognizes the scope of sublimation. For Freud the notion of 'libido' represents the constant of a group of allotropic sex-tendencies and their sublimations. For Jung, 'libido' loses its sexual character altogether and becomes as nearly as possible craving in general. "From the descriptive standpoint, psychoanalysis accepts the multiplicity of instincts. From the genetic standpoint it is otherwise. It regards the multiplicity of instincts as issuing out of relative unity, the primitive libido. It recognizes that definite quantities of the primitive libido are split off, associated with the recently created functions, and finally merged with them."¹ Jung himself draws the parallel between the introduction of this generalized concept of 'libido' and R. Mayer's introduction into dynamics of the modern concept of energy. "We term libido that energy which manifests itself

¹ *Theory of Psychoanalysis*, p. 42.

by vital processes, which is subjectively perceived as aspiration, longing and striving. We see in the diversity of natural phenomena the desire, the *libido*, in the most diverse applications and forms. . . . Claparède in a conversation once remarked that we could as well use the term 'interest.'"

Dr. James J. Putnam, who has been alert from the first to the philosophical aspect of Freud's psychology, and has repeatedly called the attention of his colleagues to their importance, has especially noted (in his Presidential Address before the American Psychopathological Association, May, 1913) the wider affiliations of the concept as used by Jung:

"Let its name be altered, and its functions but slightly more expanded, and we have Bergson's *poussée vitale*, the understudy of 'self-activity.'"

If the genetic surmises of Jung are substantiated,² we shall have made progress toward recognizing the empirical basis for a 'soul,' not alone in the sense of a result of integrative processes, but as a prior condition of such processes. It would remain, Jung thinks, as purely an hypothetical entity as physical energy. "I maintain that the conception of libido with which we are working is not only not concrete or known, but is an unknown x, a conceptual image, a token, and no more real than the energy in the conceptual world of the physicist."³ Yet he declares also that 'in nature' the artificial distinction between hunger and the sex impulse does not exist; that here we find only a continuous 'instinct of life,' a will to live, which so far coincides with the Will of Schopenhauer. It would be difficult to reconcile these two contrasting views of the original impulse, were it not apparent that the entities with which psychology deals are 'found in nature' in two quite different ways, (a) as the materials of experience and (b) as the accompanying (and, if you like, subconscious) conditions of the movement of experience, especially for its selective character. The most general instinct, under whatever name, is found in nature, but in the second way;

¹ *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, August-Sept., 1913, p. 12.

² They might profitably be compared with those of G. H. Schneider.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 40.

hence it is certainly not known as a physical object may be known. But it is not merely an hypothesis.

(f) *The resulting view of ethics attaches some meaning to the concept of an ethics 'from above.'*

If we are right in concluding that on psychological grounds as well as on metaphysical grounds there is a continuity and identity in that life-policy which we call the will, soul, or self, the law of our life must be defined in terms of those objects or causes which this unitary wish can recognize as its own. What we have to seek in this world as moral agents is not primarily the satisfaction of a differentiating bundle of wishes: it is the satisfaction of the Wish.

Loyalty to the object which the Wish at any time can recognize as its own must determine the destiny of all minor wishes; though every such minor wish, other things equal, will be interpreted as a specific application of the original Wish. This will be its 'meaning'; and the ethics of particular instincts will be summarized in the principle, use them for what they mean.

When the Wish has embodied itself in a cause, however, there is a note of ruthlessness in its attitude to the outstanding wishes, which Royce has signalized in the word loyalty. It may not be amiss to point out the cognate note in a thinker of very different mould, who has likewise recognized a most general instinct, giving it the not wholly false name of the will to power. *Geist*, said Nietzsche, *ist das Leben, das selber in's Leben schneidet*.

But Nietzsche's conception of the wish, as a subjective urge for the unloading of energy, lacks just that element of permanent attachment to an external meaning which is insisted upon by both writers whom we have been comparing. And if, as Royce maintains, that external meaning is from the first the divine being, whether or not we consciously so define it, our rule of life becomes also, to this extent, an 'ethics from above.'

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HARVARD UNIVERSITY.



JOSIAH ROYCE

1876

(Act. 20)

WORDS OF PROFESSOR ROYCE AT THE WALTON
HOTEL AT PHILADELPHIA, DECEMBER 29, 1915.¹

I WAS born in 1855 in California. My native town was a mining town in the Sierra Nevada,—a place five or six years older than myself. My earliest recollections include a very frequent wonder as to what my elders meant when they said that this was a new community. I frequently looked at the vestiges left by the former diggings of miners, saw that many pine logs were rotten, and that a miner's grave was to be found in a lonely place not far from my own house. Plainly men had lived and died thereabouts. I dimly reflected that this sort of life had apparently been going on ever since men dwelt thereabouts. The logs and the grave looked old. The sunsets were beautiful. The wide prospects when one looked across the Sacramento Valley were impressive, and had long interested the people of whose love for my country I heard much. What was there then in this place that ought to be called new, or for that matter, crude? I wondered, and gradually came to feel that part of my life's business was to find out what all this wonder meant. My earliest teachers in philosophy were my mother, whose private school, held for some years in our own house, I attended, and my sisters, who were all older than myself, and one of whom taught me to read. In my home I heard the Bible very frequently read, and very greatly enjoyed my mother's reading of Bible stories, although, so far as I remember, I was very generally dissatisfied with the requirements of observance of Sundays, which stand out somewhat prominently in my memory. Our home training in these respects was not, as I now think, at all excessively strict. But without being aware of the fact, I was a

¹ After the dinner at the Walton Hotel, Professor Royce, in acknowledgment of the kindness of his friends, made a brief statement, largely autobiographical in its character. The following is a summary of this statement, and is founded upon some notes which friends present amongst the guests have kindly supplied, to aid the speaker to remind his friends of the spirit of what he tried to express.

born non-conformist. The Bible stories fascinated me. The observance of Sunday aroused from an early time a certain more or less passive resistance, which was stubborn, although seldom, I think, openly rebellious.

The earliest connected story that I independently read was the Apocalypse, from a large print New Testament, which I found on the table in our living room. The Apocalypse did not tend to teach me early to acquire very clear ideas. On the other hand, I did early receive a great deal of training in dialectics, from the sister nearest to me in age. She was three years my senior. She was very patiently persistent in showing me the truth. I was nearly as persistent in maintaining my own views. Since she was patient, I believe that we seldom quarrelled in any violent way. But on occasion, as I remember, our dear mother used, when the wrangling grew too philosophical, to set me the task of keeping still for an hour. The training was needed, but it was never wholly effective in suppressing for any great length of time the dialectical insistence.

I was not a very active boy. I had no physical skill or agility. I was timid and ineffective, but seem to have been, on the whole, prevailingly cheerful, and not extremely irritable, although I was certainly more or less given to petty mischief, in so far as my sisters did not succeed in keeping me under their kindly watch.

Since I grew during the time of the civil war, heard a good deal about it from people near me, but saw nothing of the consequences of the war through any closer inspection, I remained as vague about this matter as about most other life problems,—vague but often enthusiastic. My earliest great patriotic experience came at the end of the civil war, when the news of the assassination of Lincoln reached us. Thenceforth, as I believe, I had a country as well as a religious interest. Both of these were ineffective interests, except in so far as they were attached to the already mentioned enthusiasms, and were clarified and directed by the influence of my mother and sisters. Of boys outside the household I so far knew comparatively little, but had a considerable tendency, as I remember, to preach down to what

I supposed to be the level of these other boys,—a predisposition which did not prepare me for social success in the place in which I was destined to pass the next stage of my development, namely San Francisco.

When we went to live in San Francisco, I for the first time saw, first San Francisco Bay, and then the Ocean itself, which fascinated me, but which for a long time taught me little.

About June 1866, I began to attend a large Grammar School in San Francisco. I was one of about a thousand boys. The ways of training were new to me. My comrades very generally found me disagreeably striking in my appearance, by reason of the fact that I was redheaded, freckled, countrified, quaint, and unable to play boys' games. The boys in question gave me my first introduction to the 'majesty of the community.' The introduction was impressively disciplinary and persistent. On the whole it seemed to me 'not joyous but grievous.' In the end it probably proved to be for my good. Many years later, in a lecture contained in the first volume of my *Problem of Christianity*, I summarized what I remember of the lesson of the training which my schoolmates very frequently gave me, in what I there have to say about the meaning which lies behind the Pauline doctrine of original sin, as set forth in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.

Yet my mates were not wholly unkind, and I remember lifelong friendships which I formed in that Grammar School, and which I still can enjoy whenever I meet certain of my dear California friends.

In the year 1871, I began to attend the University of California, where I received my first degree in 1875.

The principal philosophical influences of my undergraduate years were: 1. The really very great and deep effect produced upon me by the teaching of Professor Joseph LeConte,—himself a former pupil of Agassiz, a geologist, a comparatively early defender and exponent of the Darwinian theory, and a great light in the firmament of the University of California of those days; 2. The personal influence of Edward Rowland Sill, who was my teacher in English, during the last two years of my

undergraduate life; 3. The literary influence of John Stuart Mill and of Herbert Spencer, both of whom I read during those years. There was, at that time, no regular undergraduate course at the University of California.

After graduation I studied in Germany, and later at the Johns Hopkins University, still later returning a while to the University of California from 1878 to 1882. Since 1882 I have been working at Harvard. In Germany I heard Lotze at Göttingen, and was for a while strongly under his influence. The reading of Schopenhauer was another strong influence during my life as a student in Germany. I long paid a great deal of attention to the philosophy of Kant. But during the years before 1890, I never supposed myself to be very strongly under the influence of Hegel, nor yet of Green, nor of either of the Cairds. I should confess to the charge of having been, during my German period of study, a good deal under the influence of the Romantic School, whose philosophy of poetry I read and expounded with a good deal of diligence. But I early cherished a strong interest in logic, and long desired to get a fair knowledge of mathematics.

When I review this whole process, I strongly feel that my deepest motives and problems have centered about the Idea of the Community, although this idea has only come gradually to my clear consciousness. This was what I was intensely feeling, in the days when my sisters and I looked across the Sacramento Valley, and wondered about the great world beyond our mountains. This was what I failed to understand when my mates taught me those instructive lessons in San Francisco. This was that which I tried to understand when I went to Germany. I have been impractical,—always socially ineffective as regards genuine 'team play,' ignorant of politics, an ineffective member of committees, and a poor helper of concrete social enterprises. Meanwhile I have always been, as in my childhood, a good deal of a non-conformist, and disposed to a certain rebellion. An English cousin of mine not long since told me that, according to a family tradition current in his community, a common ancestor of ours was one of the guards who stood about the scaffold of Charles the First. I can easily mention the Monarch in

modern Europe, in the guard about whose scaffold I should most cheerfully stand, if he had any scaffold. So much of the spirit that opposes the community I have and have always had in me, simply, elementally, deeply. Over against this natural ineffectiveness in serving the community, and over against this rebellion, there has always stood the interest which has taught me what I nowadays try to express by teaching that we are saved through the community.

The resulting doctrine of life and of the nature of truth and of reality which I have tried to work out, to connect with logical and metaphysical issues, and to teach to my classes, now seems to me not so much romanticism, as a fondness for defining, for articulating, and for expounding the perfectly real, concrete, and literal life of what we idealists call the 'spirit,' in a sense which is indeed Pauline, but not merely mystical, super-individual; not merely romantic, difficult to understand, but perfectly capable of exact and logical statement.

The best concrete instance of the life of a community with which I have had the privilege to become well acquainted, has been furnished to me by my own Seminary, one of whose meetings you have so kindly and graciously permitted me to attend as leader, on this to me so precious occasion.

. . . But why should you give so kind an attention to me at a moment when the deepest, the most vital, and the most practical interests of the whole community of mankind are indeed imperilled, when the spirit of mankind is overwhelmed with a cruel and undeserved sorrow, when the enemies of mankind often seem as if they were about to triumph?

Let me simply say in closing, how deeply the crisis of this moment impresses me, and how keenly I feel the bitterness of being unable to do anything for the Great Community except to thank you for your great kindness, and to hope that we and the Community shall see better times together. Certainly unless the enemies of mankind are duly rebuked by the results of this war, I, for one, do not wish to survive the crisis. Let me then venture, as I close, to quote to you certain words of the poet Swinburne. You will find them in his *Songs before Sunrise*. Let the poet

and prophet speak. He voices the spirit of that for which, in my poor way, I have always in my weakness been working.

A WATCH IN THE NIGHT.

By A. C. SWINBURNE.

Watchman, what of the night?—
Storm and thunder and rain,
Lights that waver and wane,
Leaving the watchfires unlit.
Only the balefires are bright,
And the flash of the lamps now and then
From a palace where spoilers sit,
Trampling the children of men.

Prophet, what of the night?—
I stand by the verge of the sea,
Banished, uncomforted, free,
Hearing the noise of the waves
And sudden flashes that smite
Some man's tyrannous head,
Thundering, heard among graves
That hide the hosts of his dead.

Mourners, what of the night?—
All night through without sleep
We weep, and we weep, and we weep.
Who shall give us our sons?
Beaks of raven and kite,
Mouths of wolf and of hound,
Give us them back whom the guns
Shot for you dead on the ground.

Dead men, what of the night?—
Cannon and scaffold and sword,
Horror of gibbet and cord,
Mowed us as sheaves for the grave,
Mowed us down for the right.
We do not grudge or repent.
Freely to freedom we gave
Pledges, till life should be spent.

Statesman, what of the night?—
The night will last me my time.
The gold on a crown or a crime
Looks well enough yet by the lamps.

Have we not fingers to write,
Lips to swear at a need?
Then, when danger decamps,
Bury the word with the deed.

Exile, what of the night?—
The tides and the hours run out,
The seasons of death and of doubt,
The night-watches bitter and sore.
In the quicksands leftward and right
My feet sink down under me;
But I know the scents of the shore
And the broad blown breaths of the sea.

Captives, what of the night?—
It rains outside overhead
Always, a rain that is red,
And our faces are soiled with the rain.
Here in the season's despite
Day-time and night-time are one,
Till the curse of the kings and the chain
Break, and their toils be undone.

Princes, what of the night?—
Night with pestilent breath
Feeds us, children of death,
Clothes us close with her gloom.
Rapine and famine and fright
Crouch at our feet and are fed.
Earth where we pass is a tomb,
Life where we triumph is dead.

Martyrs, what of the night?—
Nay, is it night with you yet?
We, for our part, we forget
What night was, if it were.
The loud red mouths of the fight
Are silent and shut where we are.
In our eyes the tempestuous air
Shines as the face of a star.

Europe, what of the night?—
Ask of heaven, and the sea,
And my babes on the bosom of me,
Nations of mine, but ungrown.

There is one who shall surely requite
All that endure or that err:
She can answer alone:
Ask not of me, but of her.

Liberty, what of the night?—
I feel not the red rains fall,
Hear not the tempest at all,
Nor thunder in heaven any more.
All the distance is white
With the soundless feet of the sun.
Night, with the woes that it wore,
Night is over and done.

May the light soon dawn. May the word of the poet and
prophet soon come true. This is my closing greeting to you.

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By BENJAMIN RAND.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE IN 1915.¹

THE great majority of Frenchmen were certainly deeply surprised when, in 1914, Austria rejected the almost total submission of Servia to its ultimatum, Germany declared war on France, violated Belgium, and invaded the whole northeastern part of our country. Despite the disquieting reports that travelers brought back from time to time, almost no one had believed in the possibility of war. Merchants had made their business arrangements as usual; young men and young women had already departed to pass their vacations on the other side of the Rhine. The army was not especially equipped for war. The soldiers entered the campaign attired in their parade uniforms, in *képis* and in red trousers, their tunics ornamented with gold lace and gleaming buttons. But none felt the sadness of the surprise as keenly as did the majority of the philosophers.

In the first place, they were almost all imbued with the great truth that a war between civilized nations was disastrous for the victors as well as for the vanquished. They knew of the economic solidarity of the European nations which had already been attained in the industrial and financial world, and they were acquainted with the community of interests that certain governments and their diplomatic agents had systematically knitted together in the political order. Hence they drew the natural conclusion that no people, even if urged on by a militaristic and ambitious aristocracy, would be foolish enough to unloose such a cataclysm—one whose results the people themselves would be

¹ Translated by J. G. Proctor.

the first to feel, and keenly. They believed, moreover, that from the vantage-point given them by their profession, they especially were in a position to recognize the intellectual, peaceable, and reasonable aspect of Germany. So, when they read at the end of the "manifesto of 93" the signatures of several of their most illustrious colleagues, famous idealists and ethicists, many among them immediately thought that these signatures were false, or that they had been extorted through surprise.—Finally, what the French philosophers were best acquainted with in German philosophy were the classics—especially Kant. For thirty or forty years, under the influence of Renouvier and the neo-critical school, our teaching had been filled with the spirit of the Kantian work. Neither in a professorial lecture nor in a student's exercise did we think it was possible to deal pertinently with a philosophical question without taking account of Kant's thought. Nolen said, in 1876, in the opening lecture of his course in philosophy at the University of Montpellier: "The philosophy of Kant is to-day the philosophical bond between widely different nations and national geniuses. Just as in the seventeenth century our Descartes had the honor of founding a European philosophy, so it seems to-day that a similar glory must be reserved for Kant, the father of the critical philosophy." And Pillon, in the *Critique philosophique*, unreservedly assented to this appreciation.¹ For the last few years, at least in the field of epistemological problems, the influence of Bergson and of William James have undoubtedly weakened that of Kant. But the German moral philosophy has always been, in our estimation, of the first rank; the *Critique of Practical Reason*, the *Doctrine of Right*, the *Project of Perpetual Peace*, in other words, the religion of the human being and the firm will to substitute reason for force in the councils of the nations as it has been substituted in the relations between citizens of the same state. M. Basch, in the course of a recent study, has shown how important a place the judicial, humanitarian and international ideal holds in the classical philosophy and literature of Germany.² The con-

¹ *La Critique philosophique*, March 22, 1877.

² *Revue de Métaphysique*, issue of November, 1914 (appeared in November, 1915).

quering Nietzsche seemed to us but an exception, a great and sick poet who compensated himself for his own feebleness by a dream.

All these reasons of principle and habits of thought made such an aggression quite unbelievable. On the day when the flood of arms inundated us, we felt for the most part as if a gigantic sea-wave had crossed the valley of the Seine and was about to dash upon the suburbs of Paris. Philosophical work and production ceased immediately and abruptly, partly because of material difficulties as regarded printing and publication, and partly because all intellectual forces turned aside from pure speculation. Even those who were not mobilized thought only of the cataclysm.

La Revue Philosophique, edited by M. Ribot, was the first to resume publication. It has published its postponed numbers from the end of the year 1914, and since that time it has continued its regular service, though its issues are somewhat smaller than usual.¹ *La Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* suffered more; its editor, M. Xavier Leon, assumed voluntarily, at the beginning of the war, the task of organizing and administering a large hospital for the wounded, and to this work he devotedly consecrated several months of assiduous labor. Hence he issued in 1915 only the numbers which had been postponed in 1914 and considered these two years as forming but one, as did several other scientific reviews. One of the articles contained in these last numbers is the excellent address delivered by M. Boutroux to the Congress of Mathematical Philosophy of Paris, which met several months before the war. It is sad and touching to re-read to-day the conclusions as to the value and the international duties of science—conclusions firm and true despite the crisis through which we are now passing. In the same volume, besides the purely philosophical articles of M. Bouglé on "Polytelisme" and of M. Roustan on "La Science comme instrument vital," there is a very vigorous study by M. G. Belot on "La Guerre et la Démocratie." In this article he shows the necessary opposi-

¹ The *Journal de Psychologie*, editors MM. Janet and Dumas, completed the issues of the year 1914 a short time later, and also resumed its regular publication.

tion, both in the past and for the future, between the democratic principle which is developing among all the modern nations, and the idea of an organization of peoples under the leadership of one among them. However, that is a question to which we shall return a little further on.

Similarly, the *Bulletin de la Société de Philosophie* issued in 1915 the postponed numbers of the preceding year. These contained discussions on the scholastic sources of the philosophy of Descartes, à propos of M. Gilson's work, *La doctrine cartésienne de la liberté et la théologie*; on "Instinct and Intelligence," in reference to a comparison by M. Pieron; on "Science and Politics" (MM. Guy-Grand, Levy-Bruhl and Parodi). To these should be added the seventeenth number of the *Vocabulaire philosophique* which dealt with "Qualification à Rythme."¹

Instruction in philosophy has undergone certain changes because of the war; less, perhaps, than might be expected. The instructing staff in the *lycées* and colleges, in which there were many professors under the age of forty-six (the age limit of the oldest class actually summoned to the colors), was sensibly diminished by the mobilization. For in France, as a matter of fact, no eligible young man is excused from active military service because of his university status. There is scarcely an exception to this rule—even for the literary men, scholars, or artists most useful to the intellectual life of the country. These men themselves would on no account desire to run less risk than the other citizens of their age. Many of them demanded and obtained the most dangerous posts. Of 342 students at *l'Ecole Normal Supérieure*, including those who had just graduated from the school, 293 were on the firing line; 104 of this number were killed by the enemy.² To replace the absent professors, several of the professors who had retired resumed their chairs, and certain professors of the Faculty were given

¹ *La Paix par le Droit*, edited by M. Ruysen, professor at the University of Bordeaux, has not ceased publication, although it appears a trifle irregularly. I spoke last year of this publication, which may rank as one of our philosophical reviews, because of the force and the spirit with which it treats the actual problems of war and peace.

² 86 of the dead were identified; 18 were not found. (Official Bulletin of January 1, 1916).

charge of courses in schools of secondary instruction.—Many women, former pupils of the *Ecole Normale de Sèvres*, or simply *licenciées de philosophie*, were entrusted with classes of the boys who were almost old enough to be summoned to the colors. This instruction in philosophy by women was a novelty that seemed hardly possible. Nevertheless, from what I have heard, the results were excellent. It is probable that at the conclusion of the war, the accession of women to all branches of teaching will have made a decisive advance.

Several of the professors at the University of Paris are absent, called to various services,¹ but seven professors of philosophy or of the history of philosophy are continuing their courses.² And despite the war, the auditors have again become numerous. This relative affluence is partially due to the movement of the young women towards the higher branches of instruction; a movement which began several years ago and which is rapidly progressing. But it is also due in part to the presence of quite a large number of young men, some of whom are foreigners, and others of whom have been exempted or reprieved from military service because they were not thought to be robust enough; for the medical examiners exercise great care in reference to the youngest classes of those called to the colors. All the philosophical examinations took place in 1915, as usual, with the exception of the *concours d'agrégation*,³ which was omitted because of its importance, so as not to give too great an advantage to the students who remained above those who were on the battle line.

Outside of the field of instruction, philosophical production has changed in character. The special publications chiefly

¹ Notably M. G. Dumas, doctor of medicine, professor of experimental psychology; he is in charge of a special work dealing with insane soldiers and those suffering from nervous accidents.

² These are MM. Delacroix (Psychology); Delbos (Philosophy and History of Philosophy); Durkheim (Ethics and Sociology); Lalande (Philosophy and Logic); Milhaud (History of the sciences in their connection with philosophy); Picavet (History of the Philosophy of the Middle Ages); Robin (History of Ancient Philosophy). M. Bergson, professor at the Collège de France, was replaced this year by M. Le Roy.

³ The highest competition in philosophy, usually not given, before the war, to more than seven persons a year in all France. The usual age of the candidates is from 23 to 24 years, but some among them are much older.

consist of works on the history of philosophy.¹ M. Chevalier is the author of a book on *La Notion du nécessaire chez Aristote et ses prédécesseurs*,² which has been favorably received. It is a very thorough work, consisting of three parts, and filled with sources and references. The first part deals with the idea of necessity among the pre-Socratic philosophers, Socrates, and especially Plato. The spirit in which this history is conceived vividly recalls the picture of the dialectic movement attributed to Greek thought by Renouvier in his *Manual de philosophie ancienne*.³ The second part considers the idea of necessity in Aristotle's philosophy. It ends with a severe criticism of the author of the *Metaphysic*, whose theory is judged as incomplete, artificial, without coherence and liable to lead philosophy into pantheism. What Aristotle and all the ancients lacked, says M. Chevalier, was "the ethical notion of the person as autonomous will," and especially "the notion of a creating God, of an absolute beginning, of an initial freedom."⁴ Finally, the third part, which is the longest, consists of three appendices on the chronology of the works of Plato and Aristotle, and on the resemblances between these two philosophers. The history of the attempts made to establish the chronology of the Platonic dialogues is perhaps the most interesting part of the entire work; it is a great "*leçon de choses*" on the philological method.

¹ It is hardly necessary, I think, to signalize in this review the report of M. Bergson on "La Philosophie française et ses caractères généraux," which was written especially for the international exposition held at San Francisco, and which is already well known in the United States. It appeared in French this year as the first paper of the collection entitled *La Science française* (2 vol. in 8°, 398 pp. and 405 pp., Larousse, 1915); a collection which also contains an article entitled "La Sociologie," by E. Durkheim, and one on "La Science de l'Education," by P. Lapie, etc.

² One vol. in 8°, IX, 304 pp. Alcan, 1915.

³ "Empirical school, first section; flux unity of Being (Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Diogenes Apollonius). Rationalistic school, first section: static unity of Being (Parmenides, Melissus, and Zeno the Eleatic). Empirical school, second section: duality of Being (Pythagoreans); etc." *Manuel de philosophie ancienne*, I, book III.

⁴ This still recalls Renouvier, who has pushed this thesis to the last extreme. The work of M. Chevalier presents other details of neo-critical character, e. g., the logical value it attributes to the *Fonctions du syllogisme* of M. Rodier. It is dedicated to M. Bergson, who is not a member of the neo-critical school, but who in common with them is a great opponent of the deterministic ideal.

M. Krakowski published a small work, *Les sources médiévales de la philosophie de Locke*,¹ whose title announces both more and less than the book really contains. It should have been called, to give one a more exact idea of its contents, "Les problèmes principaux de la philosophie de Locke, éclairés par des rapprochements avec des doctrines antérieures," and not only "médiévales." For example, the studies on the origin of Sensationalism, or on the distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities, go back not merely to St. Thomas, or even to Proclus, but also to Aristotle, Plato and Democritus. It seems as if this work is especially adapted to contribute to a better understanding of Locke himself.

M. Marin Stefanescu received his doctorate with a thesis entitled *Le dualism logique, essai sur l'importance de sa réalité pour le problème de la connaissance*.² He successively studies this dualism in Kant, in his immediate successors, and finally in a certain number of contemporaneous German philosophers, Benno Erdmann, Riehl, Cohen, Husserl, and Jerusalem. These studies lead to very decided personal conclusions, which recognize in the radical dualism of the intelligible and the sensible the basis itself of all reality, the essential problem of philosophy and the reason why religion exists. His complementary thesis, *Essai historique sur le dualisme et le théisme de Kant*,³ is conceived in the same spirit, and makes the whole of Kant's philosophy depend upon his religious intentions. In this, M. Stefanescu, for whom "science and prayer are but one," sees a reason for praising Kant rather than for criticising him.

M. l'abbé Piat, already known for his books on Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and by numerous publications in philosophy and criticism, has just added to this series a work entitled *Leibniz*.⁴ This is an excellent book, although it is sometimes a little neglectful of details. It uses with profit the great special studies of Leibniz, such as those of Couturat and of Baruzi, and should be very effective in giving students and the general

¹ One vol. in 8°; 215 pp., Jouve et Cie, 1915.

² One vol. in 8°, iv-199 pp. Alcan, 1915.

³ One vol. in 8°, xiv-104 pp. Alcan, 1915.

⁴ One vol. in 8°, ix, 304 pp. Alcan, 1915.

public an insight into the scientific, philosophical, political and religious activity of this extraordinary genius. A small work entitled *l'Intelligence et la vie*,¹ by the same author, is also worth reading. It consists of a collection of lectures given at the Catholic Institute of Paris,² where the author is a professor. He maintains in this latter work, against the *fidéistes*, that the restoration of religion in France necessitates the culture of the intelligence and the development of the higher studies among the ecclesiastics. Against the agnostics (Kantians or positivists), he maintains the possibility of a certain and demonstrable metaphysics. But at the same time that he thus returns to the rational intellectualism of a Bossuet, he perceives what great resistance this theory will meet with among the partisans of faith, pure and entire; and his efforts to limit the rights of reason are not less interesting than his attempts to avoid limiting religion to the domain of the 'Unknown.' It is a truly characteristic example of the orthodox Catholic philosophy, in so far as it applies itself to the defining of its own attitude by reference to 'modernism.'

But the two great publishing houses where the new works in philosophy usually appear are now mainly occupied in publishing short studies about the actual state of affairs. The publishing house of Félix Alcan is now issuing two collections of *Publications sur la guerre*, one in brochures and the other in pocket volumes. The firm of Armand Colin is publishing *Etudes et documents sur la guerre*, of which the greater number are of an historical or documentary character, similar to the celebrated brochures of Reiss or of Bédier. To these must be added the series of short treatises edited by the review *Foi et Vie*, and those published by the "Ligue des droits de l'homme." The greater part of these studies are written by well known philosophers: MM. Durkheim, Séailles, and Delbos, professors at the Sorbonne; M. Raoul Allier, professor in the Faculty of Protestant Theology; M. Andler, who is not a pro-

¹ One vol. in 12°, viii, 229 pp. Alcan, 1915.

² A liberal university preparing for the grades of the official universities, but with its instruction designed not to shake the religious faith of the students; see *l'Intelligence et la vie*, pp. 80-81 and 210-212.

fessor of philosophy, but whose profound studies on the philosophical origins of State socialism in Germany are widely known. I believe it is in these works, written with direct reference to the circumstances of the present time, that the most vital part of the philosophical reflection of this year will be found.

II.

French philosophy has at all times attached great importance to the notion of *droit*.¹ No one has more energetically opposed the identification of *right* and of force than J. J. Rousseau; and despite several enemies of the Revolution, who have affected to turn into ridicule the *Declaration des droits de l'Homme*, the notion of *right* has always been one of those which have taken strong hold on the public conscience. The two schools of the nineteenth century farthest removed, eclecticism and neo-criticism, both professed the same belief as regards *right*. Jouffroy's treatise on ethics (unfortunately incompleting), entitled *Cours de Droit naturel*, and Renouvier's *la Science de la Morale* are both entirely founded on the idea of justice. The latter pushes its confidence in *right* to the point where it holds that if it were fully realized, it would render all benevolence useless.² Nearer to our own time, Fouillée's *l'Idee moderne du droit*, is a work so well known that it is hardly necessary to recall it.

Even among the lawyers, professionally enamored with positive texts and imbued with the historical spirit, the notion of *droit naturel*, after having passed through a period of discredit, has come back into favor the last few years. The genuinely philosophical work of M. Gény on the *Sources du droit privé* and the book by M. Charmont, whose title is characteristic, *La Renaissance du droit naturel*, offer good examples of this fact.

The war is just now giving a new impetus to this doctrine.

¹ *Droit*, in French, is a very comprehensive term; it is at the same time *right*, *justice*, a *rightful claim*, *law* (and especially *natural law*), and *positive legislation*.

² August Comte, it is true, favored the notion of *Droit* but little; but that does not mean that he substituted for it either the notion of force, or that of historical destiny. The essential moral idea for him was that of duty; his criticism of the idea of *droit* and of the anarchistic tendencies for which it sometimes serves as a pretext was only designed to demonstrate more clearly the character of the moral obligation which we connect with Humanity.

We are seeing the battle for the *right*, in all the senses of the word. On one hand, we have a battle for the defense of treaty and judicial obligations against those who have violated the neutrality of Belgium after having promised to protect it; on the other, we have a war for the principle of *right* as opposed to that of force. And by *right* opposed to force are meant two things; first, from the point of view of action, the establishment among nations of judicial agreements guaranteed by the collective power of all those interested, and the increased substitution of such agreements for armed war;¹ second, from the theoretical viewpoint, the affirmation that the truth of fact is not the whole truth, and that there exists an order of truth of another nature, enunciating that which *ought to be*, even if this latter does not actually exist and perhaps never can actually exist.

The character of the French conception of *droit* has been well explained by M. Boutroux in an article on "La Nation comme personne morale,"² and by M. Séailles in a study both philosophical and historical, entitled *L'Alsace-Lorraine*.³ Both show how the words *droit* and *Recht* differ widely in meaning to-day, though they are usually translated one for the other. They may be translated in this fashion when it is a question of the works of Kant, but the meaning of the German word has changed considerably under the influence of historical theories.

"For the German conquest-theorists," says M. Séailles, "the right of nations is not the right of each nation to dispose of itself; it is the right of the strongest to absorb into its political and territorial unity all the small nations which speak its language and which belong to the same ethnic group." Fustel de Coulanges, in a letter written to Mommsen on the occasion of the former war, had already maintained the opposing view. "You invoke the principle of nationalities," he says, "but your understanding of it is different from that of the rest of Europe. Ac-

¹ See especially Ernest Denis, *La guerre*, ch. VI, in 12, Delagrave, 1915.

² In a collection of articles gathered and published by a Belgian writer, M. Eugène Baie, under the general title, *Le droit des nationalités*. One vol., in 12, 112 pp., Alcan, 1915.

³ In the War Library of the League of the Rights of Man, 1915. Brochure in 18, of 64 pages.

cording to you, the principle authorizes a powerful state to take possession of a small one by force, on the sole condition that the latter is occupied by the same race as the former. According to Europe and the proper meaning, the principle simply authorizes a small state or a nation not to obey a foreign master against her will." This principle can then give a right to a small state itself; it cannot give to another people any right on that state.¹ "Inasmuch as the dignity, the respect of which is here in question" says M. Boutroux, "is that of man as man, it is the desire of a certain number of men to live together in the country in which they were born and on which their personality is imprinted, to cultivate together the same memories and to pursue the same ends, which is at the same time both the essence and the criterion of nationality." But a new doctrine was opposed to this classical idea by the German philosophers of the nineteenth century. In this history substituted itself for morality as the principle of right, or rather history pretended to absorb morality. According to this thesis, "nationality is, to be sure, a real and respectable fact; but it is not within the power of nations themselves to affirm and to determine it. A nation's judgment concerning its own individuality is arrived at in a purely subjective manner. But the highly cultured minds admit only objective facts. According to them it is not the sentiment nor the wish of the nation which must be taken into consideration, but only the opinion of competent judges, *sachverständige*, erudites, professors of the archeology, history, philology or the psychology of nations."² But is it not evident that these are the sciences which are the most liable to interminable controversies and which can be employed the most readily to justify with complaisance the accomplished fact, whatever it may be?

"Let us not cease carrying the war into the domain of ideas

¹ G. Séailles, *L'Alsace-Lorraine*, pp. 11-12. An important collection of characteristic texts on the German concept of *right* as opposed to the classical conception may be found in Andler, *Les origines du pangermanisme* and *Le Pangermanisme sous Guillaume II* (2 vol. in 8°, Conard, ed. 1915). This work is to be completed by two other volumes by the same author: *Le pangermanisme colonial sous Guillaume II*, and *Le pangermanisme philosophique*, which are in press at present.

² E. Boutroux, "La nation comme personne morale," in *Le droit des nationalités*, p. 19.

and of doctrines," says M. Belot. "The characteristic of right is to pronounce before the effect, because it is a rule, an ideal, and not a result; because it belongs to the order of finality and not of causality. The German doctrine will be annulled by the very fact of its defeat, while even if we are vanquished, we can still know and we must still maintain that our cause is the just one."¹

The two doctrines are thus radically opposed: on the one hand there is historical right, having for its ideal the complete realization of one or several Leviathans, justified and consecrated by the degree of power to which they have already attained; and on the other, there is the truly normative right, right clearly distinct from fact, having as its subject the human moral person, his liberty and his perfection.² But it may then be claimed that the latter is not an actual fact, that it is pure metaphysics. Not at all; but it assumes that all the intelligibility and reality of life do not consist only in past facts which are admitted and which may be verified as one would verify the existence of a monument. It joins itself to that philosophy of action so ably expounded by M. Boutroux, M. Bergson, and M. Blondel. The present will, the actual and living state of affairs, together with the direction of movement which carries them towards the future, do not merely form a simple mathematical point

¹ "La guerre et la démocratie," *Revue de Métaphysique*, Sept., 1914 (June, 1915).

² To what degree is the classical philosophy of Germany in conformity with contemporaneous German theories? This is a historical question widely discussed in France at present. M. Basch, in the article previously cited, energetically denies any conformity. M. Andler is of the same opinion. At the other extreme, a publisher's notice announcing the work of M. Piat on Leibniz says that he "appears in history as the first promoter of that idea of world-leadership on which, later, Germany was totally to sacrifice herself." Undoubtedly one may add that he does not identify right and force; but his conception of possibilities, and of their battle in the divine understanding, contains the principle whence this thesis was to issue. M. Delbos, avoiding both extremes, has analysed in a purely psychological manner the general tendencies of German philosophy as compared with those of French philosophy. Up to Kant, *inclusively*, the former appears to him to have maintained in its purity the classic notion of right which was common to it with the latter. But with Fichte the 'deviation' began which was to lead to the modern theories of right as might: and the glorification of the State as divine, in the philosophy of Hegel, marks the moment when the ancient idealistic principle (in the moral sense of the phrase) was decisively abandoned. V. Delbos, "L'Esprit philosophique de l'Allemagne et la pensée française," *Foi et Vie*, Suppl. B., April 1, 1915.

where the past has come to an end. They constitute a reality *sui generis*, in which that which ought to be has as much and more importance than that which has been.¹ If this be true, the theory which upholds the *right* and values, in a word, the ideal, as against fact, is not more metaphysical than the contrary theory; perhaps it is even more concrete and more positive. "The France of to-morrow," M. Bergson has said in a recent speech, "will be what we will it to be; for the future is dependent upon us, and is that which free human wills make of it."² But that which we will do, will be neither the result of a pure caprice, nor the blooming of an unconscious and blind fatality that we carry around in ourselves. Our will is the faculty that we possess as men, of decision by the consideration of ideal values. The partisans of *Realpolitik* mistakenly believe them to be dreams, but they are already incarnate and will incarnate themselves still further in acts, in the full sense of the word.

III.

That the right is, then, a reality in its manner; that it always possesses as a genuine formula respect for the human person; that it imperiously claims a new international régime which shall crush the conquering tendencies of the best-armed States, just as the laws and the police of each country repress the brigand; on these points I believe all French philosophers of the present day to be in accord. This is true even of those who profess a certain scepticism concerning the effectiveness of the Hague Tribunal. But on this theory of right there is grafted another question. Is the voluntary limitation of dominating, violent and warlike forces a continuation or a reversal of what takes place in the rest of nature?

But, some say, "one must not calumniate nature." The celebrated sentence with which Darwin concluded his *Origin of*

¹ "In the degree that the scale of beings is valued, a principle develops which, in one sense, resembles necessity; the attraction for certain objects. It seems that the being is then necessarily led. But he is not stimulated by an object already realised: he is attracted by an object which is still not given, and which perhaps never will be." Boutroux, *La contingence des lois de la nature*. Conclusion.

² Presidential address at the meeting of M. Paul Flat: *La guerre et la littérature de demain*. Alcan, 1915.

Species has for too long a time been regarded as the expression of an absolute truth.¹ It is the basis for Nietzsche when he affirms that "the good war sanctifies everything." If nature is assumed to be sufficiently bloody, and the logical conclusions are then drawn, we must say with him and with such of his compatriots who least "close their eyes to the necessity of evolution" that the necessity of war must be recognized. "We must stick to war, to never-ending war, which will last as long as the world itself."² But the consequence is revolting to our moral conscience only because the principle is false. The progress so far achieved by civilization has resulted less from battle than from coöperation in the affairs of life. Such was the thesis of Kropotkin in his well-known book, *Mutual aid, a Factor in Evolution*. M. Deshumbert has been for a long time the propagandist of this theory in France and England.

M. de Lanessan,³ author of *La Morale Naturelle*, had vigorously opposed what he calls "the reply of facts" to theories which wish to justify violence by the beneficent use which nature is supposed to make of it. "The study of the human races," he says, "as that of the animal species, establishes in the most irrefutable manner the fact that every species of animal and every race of man derives advantage, not in crushing those who are more feeble than it is itself, but rather in associating with

¹ "Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows." *Origin of Species*, ch. XIV, paragraph 6.

² Klaus Wagner, *La guerre*, p. 257; quoted by Chas. Andler, *Le pangermanisme*, brochure in 8°, Arm. Colin, 1915.—"The fundamental thought of the Prussian spirit, says the same author in another place, summing up the doctrine of H. von Treitschke, is that war is moral, inevitable, holy. It is the only method by which those great moral personalities, the States, can extend their rights. It is a high morality to teach the citizens of a nation that their only business during their entire lives is to furnish the means of conquest to their country, with the entire sacrifice of their private interests and of their own approbation. According to this measure a nation is worth exactly what its military organization is worth. It was just that the over-refined civilization of Greece should have been crushed by the civilization of Rome. It is just that a society which over-develops its liberties at the expense of its discipline should be conquered by a disciplined nation. True morality is recognized by its victory." Ch. Andler, *Les Origines du pangermanisme*, preface, pp. xlvii.

³ Former Minister of the Navy, honorary Professor of the Natural Sciences in the Medical Faculty.

other species or races even more feeble. And so our famous Buffon established the thesis that it is not the strongest who triumph in what Darwin calls the struggle for existence, but rather those best adapted to the different climatic conditions, conditions of nourishment, etc.; in a word, to the circumstances in which the individuals have to live. But one of the most important of these conditions is the communal life, the association in which each individual brings the total of his individual qualities to the community."¹ The human species does not differ from the animal species in this respect. Reason and history alike prove it; reason, for it is evident that the man strongest both intellectually and physically, if he desire to practise the morality of a Callicles, is almost always crushed by the social coalition which he raises against himself; history, for it shows on the one hand that nations are prosperous in direct ratio to the internal peace that they realize, and on the other, that the wars of nation with nation, far from assuring the survival and supremacy of the stronger, usually end with the collapse of the victor in the midst of the apparent victory. The destruction of the weak is then not a condition of ascending evolution in the case of individuals, families, nations or races. On the contrary, everywhere in Nature it is a sympathetic association which assures life, and right is only the possession by the individual of the consciousness of the laws of conduct indispensable to the association.² This concept of right is quite frequently found among philosophical biologists. M. Edmond Perrier, Director of the Museum, expresses himself in practically the same manner: "A barbarian can maintain that force is the origin of right; all civilized men, all honorable men, know that right has been conceived of in order to hold the excess of force in bounds and to say to it, 'further you cannot go.' Force may attempt to pass further; but then it raises the entire world against itself, because the whole world is interested in seeing that right is respected, and force thus becomes weakness."³

¹ De Lanessan, *Comment l'éducation allemande a créé la barbarie germanique*, pp. 17-18. Brochure in 8°, 32 pp., Alcan, 1915.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 22-26.

³ Ed. Perrier, "L'erreur allemande," p. 36, in *La force brutale et la force morale* (Collection of articles of the *Revue hebdomadaire*); one vol. in 12, xv-188 pp. Plon-Nourrit, 1915.

But it is argued on the other hand that the actual state of affairs is very far from being as unified and as simple as this. Every one acknowledges that laws, justice, and a public force to restrain the aggressive tendency of certain individuals, are necessary to the internal organization of every state. M. de Lanessan recognizes that "all human societies are condemned *by nature* to family and class struggles, whose harshness may be tempered by laws and customs, but which are an inevitable outcome, as are the struggles between individuals, of the egoism *natural* to all men."¹ Is this then an exception, a novelty among living beings? Is it not on the contrary the most basic characteristic? Actual war, says M. Paul Flat, the re-awakening of the spirit of conquest and of pretensions to leadership, simply proves that the humanity of which we are so proud "is not final, but is merely a polish spread over a powerful primitive animality, always ready to re-appear escorted by its lowest instincts, those of hate, vengeance, rapine and destruction."² So it is not nature which originates agreement and peace, but reflection; however strongly it be pressed down by institutions, the tendency of each animal to exploit and to dominate everything remains at bottom the most stable of instincts. How could it be otherwise? The characteristic of all living substance, and, so to speak, its basic chemical law,³ is to nourish itself at the expense of society, to increase and multiply, to divide and to multiply itself in order to increase its power of absorption; and finally to be slowly altered, to become complex in the course of its continual reactions, and so to transform itself bit by bit. But it always continues at every moment the effort to maintain and to multiply the type—an effort which is life itself, or at least biological life.—And what is the moral life?—It is the exact contrary. "It is composed of society's victories over us, partial victories whose marks we bear and which we call our memories and our experience; it is these defeats of our assimilative processes that we call the higher faculties of our intelligence."⁴ In this passage M.

¹ De Lanessan, *Ibid.*, p. 19.

² Paul Flat, *Vers la victoire*, one vol. in 12, 162 pp. Alcan, 1915; pp. 57-58.

³ Le Dantec, *Théorie Nouvelle de la vie*, ch. VIII.

⁴ Id. "Vie végétative et vie intellectuelle," *Revue philosophique*, 1911, II, 256.

le Dantec only considers the restraints imposed upon us by society. How much more striking would not this opposition be if we took in consideration the voluntary renunciation of a moral individual to egoistic and biological interests?

One of two alternatives must be chosen. On the one hand, we may accept the theory long believed in, that it is the interest of the individual which is at the basis of society. But that does not explain how the individual can ever totally sacrifice himself; or at the most it explains it by referring it to an impulse, an illusion, an involuntary and unconscious effect of habit which reflection and reason can dispel. On the other hand, we may say that it is the interest of society which expresses itself in the categorical imperatives of morality. In that case, *what is that interest?* Is it also simply biological in nature, similar to that of the individual, but on a greater scale? In other words, is morality only a means by which our Society makes use of us in order to be stronger than the neighboring societies and to exercise with respect to them the same power of conquest, expansion, and absorption which characterizes the 'elementary life?' But why should we respect in the greater that which we condemn in the smaller? Furthermore, according to this hypothesis we would be mere dupes, and reason prevents us from admiring on a national scale that which we despise in personal relations.

Moreover, it is this desire for indefinite expansion, this refusal to take account of other forms of life, which appears to our conscience as a criminal enterprise, even on the part of a nation. M. Durkheim has given a very clear exposition of this in his brochure *L'Allemagne au-dessus de tout*: "A well-known German writer has said that the individual must sacrifice himself for the community. Since the State is the highest in the series of human communities, it is not bound by the Christian duty of sacrificing itself for a higher end, for nothing is found above the state in the entire course of history." "So the state has but one duty," replies Mr. Durkheim, "to get as large a place as possible in the sun, to extend its borders! The radical exclusion of all other ideals appears monstrous, and rightly so. Doubtless no one thinks of contesting the fact that the morality of the

State is far from simple, and that the state often finds itself placed between contradictory duties, either of which it cannot choose without sad conflicts. But it is an historical as well as a moral scandal simply to strip humanity of the moral values which it ought to take into account, and to consider as null all the efforts made by the Christian world during the last twenty centuries to make reality approach nearer to the ideal. . . . It is a return to the old Roman morality, to tribal morality, according to which humanity did not extend beyond the tribe or the city."¹

But is it necessary to apply to this humanity itself in its turn what the author refuted by M. Durkheim said of the State? Are the only sources of its sanctity its extent and its ultimate character in the ensemble of societies to which we belong? Is it the *interest* of humanity as a collective *living* being which is to be the key to all duties and to all the derivative rights? Shall we return to monism by this detour, and does *crescite et multiplicamini* as applied to the entire human species, contain the science of good and evil?

I do not wish to take it upon myself to give M. Durkheim's answer to this last question. It is true that on the one hand he makes an appeal against the imperialistic tendencies to the will for power, which do not allow themselves to be eternally chained.² But, on the other hand, in the passage just cited, he conceives of humanity not as a pre-existing being, but as an *ideal* which the Christian world has attempted to realize. We can also recall that he has given us a picture of modern society renouncing its divine right, and by an exchange of rôles, ceding to the human and the moral person, the sacred character which it itself withheld in an earlier epoch.³ If this be so (I am now speaking for myself), is it not the radical dualism which is true? The individual does not renounce his personal ambitions because of love for a life which is richer but fundamentally always of the same nature; it is because of his love for another life, a new life which is ob-

¹ Durkheim, *L'Allemagne au-dessus de tout*, brochure de 48 pp. in 8°, Armand Colin, 1915; p. 23.

² *Ibid.*, p. 47.

³ Durkheim, *Le Suicide*, pp. 378-382; *La détermination du fait moral*, p. 135.

tained by the partial renunciation of the first one. The truly civilized person and nation recognize in this sign that the indefinite longing for the will for power and the desire of leadership which they possess, are repressed not only by external circumstances, the resistance of natural forces, the concurrence of other beings, and the advantages procured to us in the struggle for life by coöperation. They image their true nature and their true station to themselves, and consequently they voluntarily *renounce* their original desire for expansion. They perceive themselves, by virtue of their reason, not as the center of the world, but as unities among other similar unities, with whom they have agreements of right. They compose "a kingdom of ends," to use Kant's phrase. But this judicial equality, if I may be permitted to say all that I think of it, is perhaps itself only a provisional stage. As soon as it is sufficiently realized there appears the deeper desire which is radically opposed to the biological life and which is the secret cause of this conversion—*fraternity*, the desire "to resemble each other as brothers." And at the end comes that absolute community of beings so often dreamt of in religions and in philosophies, which is the exact antithesis of that ideal of conquest and of expansion, be it individual or political, the ignoble effects of which we see exemplified to-day.

IV.

A few words remain to be said about a man who has just died, and who was personally a true philosopher, although he did not play a great rôle on the philosophical stage. I refer to François Pillon. He is best known as the second of the neo-critical school, the collaborator of Renouvier in the publication of the *Critique philosophique* and of the *Critique religieuse*, and finally as the founder of *L'Année philosophique*, which he edited for the twenty-three years from 1890 to 1913, with the assistance of Renouvier, Victor Brochard, d'Hamelin, Lionel Dauriac, and V. Delbos. M. Dauriac has said: "François Pillon was the perfect embodiment of the virtues of the sage; he was just, kind, cheerful. The worship he rendered to truth had nothing of the austere in it; he never sought it with groans, but at the same time

he never sought to make himself agreeable by force of address or clever arts. He followed with attentive regard those whose paths differed from his own . . . he did not fear contradiction, for he always anticipated it, and accordingly had prepared for it his ever-precise answers, free from ambiguity and personal feeling. In such cases he saw only the ideas, never the men. And so the respect which he inspired was almost immediately doubled by affection."¹ William James, whose connection with the French neo-critical school is well known, and who was himself one of the collaborators of the *Critique philosophique*, had as much esteem as affection for Pillon. It was to him that he dedicated his *Principles of Psychology*.²

A studious, regular, and patient worker, Pillon has left considerable work behind, but it is widely dispersed. He published in book form only one work of exposition and criticism, *La Philosophie de Charles Secrétan* (1898), and a translation of Hume's *Treatise on Human Nature*, the latter done in collaboration with Renouvier, and of which Pillon wrote the introduction. To become acquainted with his work one must read the numerous articles which he published in the course of his long career, but which have never been collected.

His reputation began with his collaboration on the *Critique philosophique*.³ This review at that time did not much resemble our modern philosophical reviews. It appeared weekly in small issues composed of very brief articles. When an article was rather lengthy, it was divided among several successive numbers, very much as are the *feuilletons* of our daily papers. The *Critique philosophique* also reviewed contemporaneous affairs, discussing the political questions of the day, the elections, and

¹ *Notice sur François Pillon*, brochure in 12, 24 pp. Larousse, 1915; pp. 21, 22.

² "To my dear friend François Pillon, as a token of affection and an acknowledgment of what I owe to the *Critique philosophique*."

³ He had previously written several articles on scientific popularization, which appeared in the *Revue l'Ecole Normale*. He was the principal writer for the section on philosophy in the great *Dictionnaire du XIX^{ème} siècle*, a large encyclopedia published under the editorship of P. Larousse. He also wrote before the establishment of the *Critique*, for a publication already entitled *L'Année Philosophique* (1868-9); this must not be confused with the other *Année Philosophique* which succeeded; Cf. *PHIL. REV.*, July, 1905, p. 433.

important cases. It was always guided by high ideals. It ascended to principles, but it also descended to details. Next to an article on abstraction would be found a polemic on the rights of the President of the Republic; next to a study on Darwinism a discussion on Internationalism. Pillon eagerly concerned himself with these questions of applied philosophy. He was profoundly republican from his earliest youth, and was always a quiet but decided enemy of the clerical party. He took an active part in the campaign for the diffusion in France of "liberal Protestantism," a campaign which was conducted by the *Critique*. Renouvier and Pillon wished to rally to this semi-philosophical church all those who, detached from Catholicism, opposed to the absolute power of the pope in religious matters, and to the ritualistic practices of the Roman church, nevertheless remained faithful to the general spirit and ideal of Christianity. He also wrote extensively on purely philosophical subjects; the list of his articles in the *Critique* (to say nothing of other journals) is a long one. He almost always wrote his articles on the publication of a new work, particularly on the issue of English works on evolution. Later, when he was the editor of *l'Année philosophique*, his writings in general were of the same character. A historical work or question would most often give him his theme, and at such a time he would express his own opinions. Occasionally his most characteristic reflections may be found in the critical reviews he contributed annually on the principal philosophical works appearing in France. He was one of those natures who invent in reacting. This manner of writing, so frequently found in literary critics—Saint Beuve was an illustrious example—is comparatively rare among philosophers. It was well suited to the character of this firm, modest, and judicial personality.

These articles in *l'Année philosophique* are still interesting because of the differences which they show between Pillon and Renouvier. Pillon himself took care to distinguish in several places between neo-criticism and Renouvierism.¹ More of an

¹ See especially "Comment s'est formée et développée la doctrine de Renouvier," *Ann. Phil.*, XXIV (1913). One vol. in 8°, Alcan, 1914; "La quatrième antinomie de Kant et l'idée de commencement absolu," *Ibid.*, XXIII (1912); "Un ouvrage récent sur la philosophie de Renouvier," *Ibid.*, XVI (1905).

intellectualist than his illustrious friend, he did not agree with him that it was possible, in philosophy, to renounce evidence in order to hold to faith. He claimed that true thought was impossible unless there was present faith in the objective and supra-personal value of reason. "There can be no philosophy without a fundamental intellectual optimism." In another article Pillon said that he rejected the opposition between the theoretical and the practical reason, and accordingly also the primacy of the latter, which constituted a species of pragmatism, or, one might say, a moral and religious utilitarianism, both for Kant and Renouvier.¹ As against these uncertain theories, it is necessary "to give metaphysical dogmatism its rights."² What kind of a metaphysic? One very similar to that of Leibniz. Pillon admits the subjectivity in a Kantian and perhaps more than Kantian sense "of space, of motion, of physical force, and of duration"; he considers the world phenomenal in everything that depends on these categories, and hence an illusory appearance. He recognizes under this appearance a world of things-in-themselves which can only be conceived of as wills and spirits.³

Moreover, while Renouvier, even in the final statement of his philosophy,⁴ voluntarily and decidedly remained outside of Christianity, and opposed to it the lay ideal of a purely philosophical religion which should have in it no revelation, priests, or church, Pillon, on the contrary, appears to have considered the Christian doctrines in the spirit of a sympathetic adherent. He was decidedly hostile to all tradition at the beginning of his career. He regarded with severity the attempts of Cousin to unite religion and philosophy, thinking them to be hypocritical. He saw in the dogma of Providence, and even in that of the personality of God as the principle and judge of salvation, a demoralizing concept which weakened the reason, made of merit an external gift, and resulted in the justification of history and the sanctification of the criminal successes of force. No one at that time was more enthusiastic than he was for 'independent

¹ *Année philosophique*, XXII (1911), p. 129.

² *Ibid.*, p. 130.

³ *Année philosophique*, XXIII (1912), pp. 112-115.

⁴ "La fin du sage." The last discourses of Ch. Renouvier, collected by L. Prat. *Revue de Met. et de Morale*, March, 1904. See particularly pp. 182-185.

morality.' In 1876, when he was attempting to make Protestants of all the liberals in France, he did not purpose to make them accept any dogma, but only an organization, an 'enrollment' in an ultra-tolerant community which would allow to each member the full liberty of interpreting the traditional formulas into philosophy. But nevertheless he already thought at that time that "while professing the independence and the immanence of morality, it is possible at the same time to recognize the need by morality of effective and stimulating religious aids."¹ As he grew older, he felt more strongly the necessity of giving a place "to the mysterious desires concerning which reason is silent, because it can not explain them in the form of clear ideas." In his last years he even wrote that philosophy "ought to admit, for the sake of morality, the existence of an infallible person and a sovereign conscience."² A minimum of metaphysical doctrines is essential to the life of religion. As opposed to Renouvier, who applied his peculiar doctrine of absolute and absolutely undetermined beginnings to the origin of all things, Pillon considered it absurd that the appearance of God and man should be regarded as an unintelligible chance. He did not admit that before the creation there was an anterior period of time formed of distinct moments and hence infinite, but he attributed an eternal reality to God, in the sense that eternity is a *nunc stans*, and not merely an indefinite flow of time.³ His personal God, creator and eternal, is accordingly very similar to the Christian God; and, moreover, the person of Christ seemed to him to be an exceptional manifestation of this divine reality. His friend M. Raoul Allier, professor in the Faculty of Protestant theology, spoke, at his funeral, on the evolution of his ideas; and he very justly remarked that during his long life Pillon had never ceased to give an example of truly liberal thought to believers and unbelievers; thought that did not fear *a priori* any affirmation or any negation, and whose will only took one decision in advance—that of hearing all; and which then unhesitatingly ranged itself on the side which appeared most conformable to truth.

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¹ *Critique philosophique*, 1877, I, 224.

² *Année philosophique*, XXIII (1912), p. 113.

³ *Ibid*, XXIV (1913), p. 125.

CONTINUA AND DISCONTINUA.

AS a first example of a continuum for perception take smooth and even shading from the very dark grey we call black into the very light grey we call white. Assume that this can be adequately presented to observation, say on a strip of paper, all black for some little distance on the one hand, all white for some little distance on the other hand, with continuous shading between. Just where, on such a strip of paper, lie the ends of the span of shading in which there is continuous change of quality of grey, it is very difficult, indeed practically impossible, to say. The exact position of the end on either hand eludes the imperfect delicacy of our powers of perception. We can however from observation say that 'here' the paper is still undoubtedly black and that 'there' it is just perceptibly lighter than black. We may therefore infer that the end of shading is somewhere between the 'here' and the 'there,' and is probably somewhere in the mid-region between the two. We must take the ends of shading, then, as only approximately assignable. Let us now snip off from our slip so much, just external to 'there,' as to leave only a central portion within which we feel sure that there is continuous change of quality in the grey from darker to lighter.

Note that we have now for perception quite definite and readily visible ends—those imposed by our cuts on either hand. Here there is discontinuity of our excised strip with that which lies beyond it. But within the span which we have thus cut out or isolated, there are no visible ends at which it is divided into parts. In this sense it is a partless whole presenting continuously and uniformly shading qualities of grey. But by saying that there are no parts within the whole I do not mean that it is impossible to distinguish, say, the first inch as different from the third inch. No doubt we can by acts of attention isolate such parts for comparison. But then we are imposing ends to the parts which we so isolate by attention. I mean, therefore, that

within the continuous whole there are no parts, given as such, prior to some process of isolation. I mean, too, that there are no such parts for perception. There may be invisible ends, and parts defined by them, which elude our powers of perception. But that is another matter.

Although there are, in the above sense, no given parts with visible ends *within* the continuous whole for perception, it is obvious that we can none the less cut out parts *from* the whole. By a part of a continuum we shall therefore mean a part isolated in some way from the whole. We must remember however that such an isolated part is, in strictness, an entity distinct from the whole. Thus we may cut out from our strip of shading a part for comparison with a whole similar to that from which it was isolated. It too has ends where the cuts were made; it too is a continuum; and it too affords to perception uniform continuity of shading—unless, as we shall presently have occasion to see, too small a part has been cut out. Leaving this on one side, we may say that any isolated part is *like* any other part, and is like the whole, or any like whole, from which it was isolated. By ‘like’ we are here to understand having observed similarity in the fact of continuous and uniform shading, though the range of such shading differs. On this understanding we may say that in the case of such a perceived continuum *the isolated parts are like each other and like the whole from which they were isolated.*

But we need not actually cut out an isolated part, say with a pair of scissors. By viewing our strip of paper through a suitable tube of small bore we can isolate just that part which is within the field of vision. At nearer distances the isolated parts are progressively smaller; at further distances they are progressively larger; by moving the tube laterally we can isolate a part anywhere along the whole length of our strip. We may however discard both scissors and tube, and we may imagine cuts to be made here, there, or elsewhere. Such an ideal but not actual cut we will call a *defining cut*, since it defines the positions at which limits of isolated parts may be imposed. And we will assume that such a defining cut may be made anywhere at right angles to the direction of continuous shading. Then, as before,

any large enough part, limited by two defining cuts, will be like the whole. There will be similarity in that each presents continuous and uniform shading from darker to lighter.

Take next a segment of a circle. For our acquaintance under careful observation it has uniform and continuous curvature. Within its span the segment is for perception an undivided whole, and has no perceivable parts with visible ends. But by actual cuts, or by the use of a tube, or by defining cuts, we may in practise, or for thought, isolate a part; any such part is like the whole or any like whole from which it is isolated, and is like any other part so isolated. Whole and parts, if the parts be large enough, have for perception likeness of continuous and uniform change of direction. The question here arises whether the fact that we can, say by two defining cuts, isolate a part anywhere, justifies us in asserting that, prior to some such isolating process, the whole is made up of parts. Are we, by our isolating procedure, *discovering* parts already pre-existing in the continuous whole? Or are we *making* such parts for purposes of interpretation? I submit that by isolating them we make them, *quâ* parts. I submit that perception is unable to discover parts until manipulation or thought imposes cuts actual or ideal.

It may perhaps be said that at any rate the distance between any two cuts is infinitely divisible. Of course when we speak of infinite divisibility we are going far beyond perception—but let that pass. It is moreover a tenable position that no given distance is divisible into lesser distances, save under a convention. Any given distance is just what it is—the spatial relatedness between two positions as terms. We may compare it with other distances. But it is not composed or made up of lesser distances. The point is however a subtle and debatable one: so let that too pass. What then exactly do we mean by saying that a line is infinitely divisible? Do we mean that, in such a line, between any two cuts, *a* and *c*, a third cut *b* may be made anywhere; similarly between *a* and *b*, between *b* and *c*, and so on? If so, it may be granted that such cuts can ideally be made. But does that show that the continuous line was already divided before the cuts were imposed? If not, what does it show? It

shows that there is in the line, prior to cutting, a continuous order of occupied positions, some one of which will be found by any defining cut. But does not this continuous order of occupied positions just bring us back to the continuum with which we started—now tacitly correlated with a continuous order of real numbers? Is any justification given for regarding the line as *ab initio* composed of parts which are themselves little lines, placed end to end? If it be said that it is composed, not of little lines but of parts which are points in a continuous order, the answer is that this continuous order implies relatedness of points, and the spatial relatedness of points in the order under consideration brings us back to a line. In any case, for perception, the appearance with which we are dealing is unquestionably that of a partless whole.

Suppose now we observe the swing of a pendulum through an arc, say from left to right. Here the space traversed—the line traced by the pendulum-bob—presents nothing new for consideration. Any cut therein defines a position; any two cuts define a spacial part which is thus isolated from the whole. But change of position involves time-relatedness. In the case of motion any cut defines not only a space-position but also a time-instant; and any two cuts define an interval in the order of time-relatedness. Can we be said to perceive such a time-interval? At any rate we perceive the motion and can proceed to interpret what we perceive as involving time-relatedness. We can observe the swinging pendulum through our tube and thus isolate a part from the swing as a whole. As the bob enters and leaves the field of vision restricted by the tube, we have the beginning and ending of the part of the swing thus isolated. No doubt the isolated part may fall entirely within the perceptual present; but within that present we are directly acquainted with relations of before and after; and this affords the perceptual basis for time-interpretation. By suitably adjusting our tube we may isolate a part of the swing anywhere for independent observation and for comparison with other parts isolated in like manner, or with the whole swing from left to right. Or, discarding the tube we can isolate a part of the swing by purely ideal cuts, each of which

defines a position in space occupied at an instant of time. Dealing thus with motion 'in space and time' (as we commonly say) it is important to note that any part isolated from a whole of motion, is itself motion; and that if the whole motion is continuous, then is any isolated part thereof a continuum. But it is not uniform in the sense in which we have used that word. The velocity changes in the course of the swing from left to right, increasing to a maximum, then diminishing to the end-point at which motion ceases. But the change of the rate of change of position seems to be none the less continuous. Not all continua therefore are uniform continua in which the isolated parts are all alike.

No doubt it will be said by philosophers of the Bergsonian school that if we deal with time by the method of cuts we are treating it spatially; by which expression I understand them to mean in correlation with the fixed order of number which is applicable also in our dealing with space. They rightly insist on the reality of change, in which alone, they urge there is true continuity. But with change they identify time—that is, what they call real time (duration) as contrasted with fictitious time as a mere schematic device of the cold intellect which freezes that which in its fluid flow is felt in the genial warmth of intuition. For intuition, I take it, there are neither terms nor relations; there is just change such as we enjoy when the life within us glows to consciousness. It is life which is both change and source of change for a philosophy in which all intellectual distinctions melt and merge. We too insist on the reality of change, the continuity or discontinuity of which is open to discussion. But for us change is only interpretable as change of relatedness of terms. Instants, as the terms for time-interpretation, may be determined by cuts through the flow of events—which for us is *not* the flow of time. Such cuts are, no doubt, an intellectual device; no doubt with a little lack of imagination they may be regarded as inevitably spatial. But in no sense do they stop the given flow of change; and in no time sense do they yield points of arrest in that flow, any more than a snap-shot photograph of a swinging pendulum arrests its motion. We contend that if

change and time be identified, then one or the other is merely a redundant synonym. Let us in that case deal with what is given either in terms of change or in synonymous terms of time, or, if we can, perhaps in the absence of terms or relations. For it is clear that no relation, other than verbal, obtains between different names for the same entity. Cuts then, for us, are methodological devices for dealing with certain real relations spatial or temporal between phases of change—relations that are wholly independent of the methodological device by the help of which they are interpreted.

Now I said, some little way back, that, when a uniform continuum is presented for observation, parts isolated therefrom are like each other and are like the whole from which they are isolated. But, in leading up to this statement, I was forced on observational grounds to introduce as a qualification “unless the isolated parts be too small.” The grounds on which this qualification must be introduced are tolerably obvious. On viewing, for example, a large segment of a circle of, say, ten-foot radius, we may assert with some confidence that the visible line has uniform curvature. Of course in such a case judgment is involved; but it is judgment on observed matter of fact presented in the field of perception. If however a very short part of the whole segment be isolated, it may be indistinguishable from a straight line. Its curvature is so slight as to be imperceptible. And since it is imperceptible, there is no ground in direct observation for asserting its presence. In its absence the small line is judged to be straight. Here therefore the small part is not judged to be like the whole from which it was isolated. But if we happen to know that we are viewing an isolated part of a large circle, we may perhaps assert that, although the small line is *apparently* straight, it is *really* very slightly curved. From the apparent curvature in the whole we infer real but not apparent curvature in the part. And very likely, from a consideration of this and other similar cases in which our powers of perception are not acute enough to form the basis of a true judgment without going beyond that which we then and there perceive, very likely we may go further and assert as a general truth that

in case of really uniform continuity any part isolated by the method of cuts, no matter how small, is really like any other part, and like the whole from which it was isolated; and that this will hold good whether the likeness in question be perceivable by us or not. Now what do we imply here by the use of the word 'real?' First, I take it we imply, in this use of the word, that there is a knowable object to which that which we speak of as perceivable more or less closely corresponds; and secondly I think we imply that the likeness, imperceivable by us, would be perceivable by a being whose powers of perception were trained to a sufficiently high pitch of delicacy. We seem also to imply, in such a case, that the knowable object as a whole is given in our perception as it really is in some particular respect, though this may not hold good of its small isolated parts, since, through lack of delicacy of perception, we are not prepared to say whether appearance closely corresponds to reality or not—that is, to that reality, for common sense and science, of which we are in quest. But suppose that what is taken to be the segment of a large circle is really, as we say, a regular polygon with very many sides, each a millimeter in length. This might well be for our perception indistinguishable from a segment of a circle. If however a photograph of a small part were examined under a microscope, our aided perception might well reveal in the part the real polygonal figure. In this case we should probably infer from the nature of the isolated part, as revealed to our aided perception, that the whole was of like nature, though our perception of the whole failed to reveal its polygonal character. As a matter of scientific procedure we sometimes infer from the whole to an isolated part, and sometimes from an isolated part to the whole. We take our departure from that in dealing with which our perception is at its best, and from this we infer reality of like nature where the conditions of observation are less favorable. But with sharpened powers of perception the knowable object would throughout its range appear as it really is in that respect which is under examination. I suggest, then, that by what is really continuous or discontinuous we should understand that which would appear to be such to a being whose delicacy of

perception was sufficiently refined. Such reality would still be appearance, but appearance to enhanced percipience as a basis for judgments. It should be noted that we here frankly start from perception, and that what we propose to speak of as real, though it may involve conceptual thought in its attainment, is still within the same perceptual mode. Stress should be laid on this restriction to the same perceptual mode. If we are dealing with discrimination based on our perception of musical pitch, enhanced delicacy would still be in the perception of musical pitch. We must not jump from audible sounds to the vibrations with which they may be correlated—even if we feel justified in supposing that to a being of indefinitely heightened acuity of perception these might be perceived in some *other* manner than by hearing. To perceive vibratory motion would involve a different mode of perception from that of being acquainted with musical pitch of audible tone. No doubt the knowable object, in the fulness of its nature, is knowable in many different ways, through different channels of perception, and by different avenues of inference. But what I have suggested as that which we commonly mean when we say that this is really so, though we fail so to perceive it, must be restricted to the mode of perception in question; otherwise it is not, I think, what we mean when, in such phrases, we speak of appearance and reality. It is on this understanding that I submit that, for a being whose acuity of perception was thus sufficiently sharpened, it would be an observable fact that this or that was continuous or discontinuous in any given case. It is scarcely necessary to say that not all cases of continuity or discontinuity can be dealt with thus. Perceiving, thinking, enjoying, and all conscious processes, as such, are wholly intractable to this method of treatment. None of these is perceivable in the sense in which the word is here used.

Let us now follow up a little further the continuity that is presented to perception. Revert to continuous and uniform shading—for example, to vary the illustration, that from red into yellow through orange. Isolate sufficiently small parts in serial order and label them with the letters of the alphabet. Viewed

through a tube at appropriate distance, to be determined experimentally, no such isolated part from *a* to *z* is distinguishable in colors from its neighbors; and each part is, throughout, of one and only one color. None the less the color of *a* is readily distinguishable from that of *m*; and *m* from *z*. The isolated part *a* is red; *m* is orange; *z* is yellow. But in accordance with what has been suggested above, it seems permissible to infer from the apparent continuity of shading in the whole that there is real shading in *a*, or any other similarly isolated part, though our powers of color-discrimination, even after careful training, are not such as to enable us to detect it.

With suitable rate of shading let *a* be indistinguishable from *b*, *b* from *c*, and *c* from *d*. In each case the isolated parts *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, are apparently self-colored. No difference of color is perceivable within any one of these isolated parts. But now enlarge the area isolated within any part by reviewing the shaded whole from a greater distance. A stage is reached at which within such a more extended part there is just perceivable difference of color. The experimental work is not easy, since the difference in question is only just perceivable; but, as far as it goes, the results of observation seem to point pretty definitely to the conclusion that, if the shading of the whole be apparently uniform and continuous, what we may speak of as the distance for just perceivable difference, is the same *anywhere* in the whole range of continuous shading; and that an indefinite number of isolated parts with just perceivable difference are not only alike in this aspect, but are also alike in that the cuts which isolate the parts are equidistant. The inference seems to be that the just-perceivable-difference-distance is a measure of the percipient's delicacy of perception; and that within the parts *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, in which there is no perceivable difference, that measure is not reached; but that there is in these parts a real difference—one, that is, which would be discriminated by a percipient whose delicacy of perception was sufficiently increased.

This inference may be supported if we approach the problem in a somewhat different way. Shading that has the appearance of being continuous and uniform from yellow through orange to

red, may be obtained on a rotating disc. On a cardboard disc is pasted red paper which covers the whole surface. Over the red paper are pasted, say, three smooth-edged leaves of yellow paper. Where the bases of these leaves meet there is unbroken yellow; just beyond their tips is unbroken red; between these limits there is a smoothly decreasing percentage of yellow. Experimental work shows that, in accordance with Weber's Law, the increments of yellow at equidistant stages from tip to base are in G. P. This, at any rate, with a factor experimentally determined, gives apparently continuous and uniform shading, from red to yellow, when the disc is rapidly rotated. Now viewed through a tube, a small enough isolated part of the rotating disc is apparently self-colored. No color difference can be detected in the area within the restricted field of vision. None the less there is a different proportion of yellow to red near one limit from that which obtains near the other limit. There really is, for measurement on the still disc, a difference which is easily determined; but there is no apparent difference when the disc is rotating. It seems then that under rotation we cannot perceive difference which measurement, under other conditions, shows to be really true. Such observations lend some support to the reference drawn in the last paragraph.

Consider now the much-discussed 'Stumpf paradox.' Let a' , b' , c' , d' , be colored wools matching the a , b , c , d , of continuous shading. Then a' is indistinguishable from b' , b' from c' , and c' from d' . But a' is distinguishable from c' , and b' from d' . It seems then that, since b' is indistinguishable from both a' and c' , it can have no status in the range of *our* perception. It has, however, *inferentially*, a status of its own, even in our perception. For though b' is indistinguishable from c' , it is distinguishable from d' . It is thus differentiated from c' . Similarly though b' is indistinguishable from a' , still a' is distinguishable from c' . Hence b' is also differentiated from a' . And if b' is thus differentiated both from a' and from c' it has inferentially a status of its own, even in our perception. On these grounds it seems that b' lies *between* a' and c' in a color order, although we cannot directly perceive its difference from a' , or its difference

from c' . And it seems to be legitimate to suppose that, to a percipient with more delicate powers of perception, b' would be directly, and not only inferentially, discriminated. For him there would be inferentially intermediate steps in the color order, between a' and b' , b' and c' , and c' and d' , not directly perceived as different from their neighbors, but such as would be discriminated by a percipient with yet more delicate powers of perception. For that percipient in turn there would be inferred intermediates, distinguishable to a higher order of perception, and so on indefinitely.

It will here be helpful to attempt some correlation with number; in which I hope that I may not fall into error. Take our colored wools; they may be correlated with integers; a' corresponds to 1, b' to 2, and so on. But if we intercalate a wool intermediate in color between a' and b' in the manner suggested in the last paragraph, there is no integer with which to correlate this intercalated wool. It may be urged that we can correlate it with the fractional number $3/2$; but this number is not an integer; it is a *rational* which belongs to a logically distinct type of number constructed by taking pairs of integers according to an accepted principle. Since however this principle of construction gives us *inter alia* rationals of the form r/I we have a homogeneous series in which r/I may be correlated with r in the series of integers. But in practice we substitute the integer, r , for its correlated rational r/I , and deal, by a recognized convention, with a heterogeneous series of integers and rationals.

Given the homogeneous series of rationals, we can correlate an intercalated rational with any intercalated member of our imaginary series of wools. But we want to go further than this. We want to correlate a number of some number type, with any defining cut in a *continuous* order. For this the type of rationals will not serve our purpose. Suppose for example we are dealing with a straight line which we assume to be really continuous, and suppose our defining cut is such as to isolate a part which bears to the whole line the relation which the side of a square bears to its diagonal. There is no rational which corresponds to the position of our defining cut. To define its position, in

correlation with number, we require a new (and again logically distinct) type of number constructed on a different principle. Such a type is that of the *real numbers*. This type includes members which may be correlated with the rationals, as the rationals include members which may be correlated with the integers; but it also includes members which cannot be so correlated; and all its members form a homogeneous series. It meets the case of the occurrence of such an *irrational* as $\sqrt{2}$.

The principle of construction does not here specially concern us. But it may be profitable for us briefly to consider the correlation of real numbers with cuts in our continua. Let a defining cut be made anywhere within the segment of a circle. What it defines is a *limit* in that which I understand to be the technical sense of the term. This limit is susceptible of correlation with a real number; and it may also be susceptible of correlation with a rational. To the left of the cut there is a continuous sub-segment S' , and to the right there is a continuous sub-segment S'' . So too in the correlated number scheme; to the left of the limit is the whole infinite collection of rationals below the limit; to the right the whole infinite collection of rationals above the limit. But the limit itself falls within neither the one nor the other; it can not be comprised in that which is either to the left or the right of itself, nor in that collection of rationals which is either below or above itself. The defining cut marks a limit which has its own quite definite position in an order. But that which is the upper limit of what goes before is also the lower limit of what comes after. Thus r/I is the upper limit of the whole collection of rationals below r/I , and the lower limit of the whole collection of rationals above r/I , but is not itself included in either collection.

A defining cut thus gives unambiguously a position in the segment of our circle which is the limit of sub-segments S' and S'' , say to left and right, as parts thus isolated from the whole uncut segment; and this position may be correlated with a real number; at any rate (as I understand) positions which cannot be so correlated have not yet given occasion for a fourth species of the genus number. Assuming that real numbers suffice to

meet all cases, and assuming that apparent continuity, say of motion, is really continuous, we may not only say that any isolated part of a uniform continuum is like any other part in like manner isolated, and is like the whole from which, as part, it is isolated, being also like any part isolated from a like whole; we may say further that it is *equivalent* to any other part or to the limited whole.

The sense in which this may be said may be illustrated through reference to a suitable modification of the old problem of Achilles and the tortoise. Assume that the representatives of Achilles, A, and the tortoise, T, are in continuous sliding motion, the rate of change of position bring in each case constant. Assume that in 10 seconds, A slides 100 yards, and that T slides 10 yards. Let T have 90 yards start before either of them slides. It is clear that when A has covered 90 yards in 9 seconds T has covered 9 yards; and that when A has progressed through the succeeding 9 yards in .9 of a second, T has moved on .9 of a yard. And it is also clear that by the method of adding progressively diminishing rational increments we can never reach the terminal limit of 100 yards for A, 10 yards for T, and 10 seconds for both A and T. We can only reach 99.9 yards for A, 9.9 yards for T in 9.9 seconds. In this pretty obvious sense A is never abreast of T under these additive conditions. But now assume, on the basis of observations in analogous cases, that A *does* get abreast of T at the limit of their several lines of progress, which is also the limit of the span of time in which the feat is accomplished. The limit of A's slide and of T's slide correspond. Make now a time-cut *anywhere* before the limit of 10 seconds. That cut will also be a defining cut marking A's position in his course and T's position in its course. These positions correspond *inter se*; they correspond to a determinate instant in the time-span; and they correspond perhaps to some member in the order of rationals. Suppose the temporal defining cut is at half-time, the positions of A and of T are half-space. There is one-to-one correspondence to a rational with which the cuts are correlated. So too there is one-to-one correlation with $\frac{4}{5}$, $\frac{9}{10}$ and so on. And if a defining cut, made anywhere, chances to miss a position which

can be correlated with a rational, it none the less defines a position which, on the assumption previously made, can be correlated with an irrational which will be named and symbolized according to our need in each case that arises. Throughout, therefore, there is one-to-one correspondence in the technical sense of this phrase. A member of some species of the genus number is ready to hand if it be needed. And where cuts common to 'this' and 'that' give one-to-one correspondence, 'this' is said to be *equivalent* to 'that.' It remains only, in this connection, to notice that we may compare an isolated part of A's course between limiting cuts, with A's whole course. In this case, too, there is one-to-one correspondence. And in this sense it may be said that the part of a continuum which is what we have called like the whole, is also equivalent to the whole—though it should not be inferred from this statement that it applies to continua only.

I have dealt, for convenience of treatment, almost exclusively with uniform continua, and have essayed to pass from the apparently continuous for perception to the really continuous, using the word 'really' in a sense that does not involve any divorce from 'apparently.' By a uniform continuum I mean one in which any part, isolated by cuts, is like any other part and like the whole from which it is derived—like, that is to say, in some definite character which is selected for investigators. Thus a straight line has continuous and uniform direction. In a segment of a circle there is continuous and uniform change of direction. In any part of a parabolic curve there is continuous and uniform change of change of direction. In any of these cases the law of the part is the law of any other part or of the whole. But a curve of indefinitely varying direction is continuous but not uniform in the sense in which I am using the word. The law of any selected part is not necessarily the law of any other part; nor is it the law of the whole.

Now what is characteristic of any perceived or perceivable continuum, whether uniform or not, is that it presents a *slide* and not a series of *steps* however minute. If the motion of a pendulum-bob be really continuous, its center slides through the

arc of a circle without pause or jump. Let us assume, for the purpose of interpreting this motion, a continuous order of positions and a continuous order of instants. Then the center slides along each of these orders. It slides, as we say, through positions in space, it also slides, as I think we ought to say, through the order of instants in time. Each position in space is occupied at an instant of time—such occupancy to be of course clearly distinguished from *rest*, which is the occupancy of *one* position in correlation with *more than one* instant. Every defining cut defines unambiguously a position in the one order, and an instant in the other order, each of which has its own unique individuality in the sense that it may be correlated with a real number which is just itself and nothing else without hint of merging or smudginess. Two cuts define two positions and two instants within the several relational orders. The relation of position to position and of instant to instant can thus be accurately stated in correlation with the relation of real number to real number. But the cuts must define and fix for our thought the unambiguously unique individuals which limit the isolated parts we thus make; only thus can they be rendered susceptible of exact treatment. Although, however, the relations in space and time are thus treated, and must be thus treated, statically, this is not a static treatment of motion. For motion is change; and to speak of a static treatment of change is a contradiction in terms. It seems then that we ought to distinguish the sliding which is the essential characteristic of all continuous change, from the continuous order or orders along which it slides—just as we distinguish the sliding boy from the slide along which he is sliding.

The objection may here be raised that, though he is moving through a certain order of positions along a plane of ice relatively fixed in space, it is absurd to say that he is also moving through a certain order of instants in time, if it be implied that this order is in any sense fixed. The absurdity, it may be urged, becomes obvious when we consider what happens when the boy comes to rest. How can we say, as was said above, that there is then a correlation of one position with more than one instant, if there be no flow of time to give a succession of instants during so many

of which he occupies, or his center of figure occupies, one position? Well, question for question. Why should he not occupy one group of positions in space and forge ahead steadily along the continuous order of time? Why should he not be stationary in space and moving onwards in time? Why should there not, in other words, be change in time-relatedness but no change in space-relatedness? I see no absurdity here, if once we realize that what we speak of as existence endures through time, and that an ideal cut only gives an instantaneous view of it as it passes on, nowise arresting its passage. What endures is, among other things, unchanging relatedness in space; but not only this; all the other modes of relatedness by which its existence is defined. Still less absurdity is there if we also realize, as science has taught us to realize, the ubiquity of change. The stationary boy is a theatre of intricately interwoven, ever changing process. At no instant does this process cease. There is no object that is not the theatre of a moving drama of world-process. Even the stability of the atom is that of balanced change. From this point of view it is, in all cases, *process*—what we speak of as the course of events—which flows along the order of time; and it flows through so many instants of time, whether the center of the boy's bodily figure occupies one position in space or is sliding along an order of positions.

We need not however restrict our attention to process of which the boy's body is the theatre; indeed it is seldom that in the course of ordinary experience we pay any attention thereto. But when once we realize that the whole world-process is sliding or stepping onwards through the continuous order of time, we see the justification for our normal mode of procedure, which is to take for reference whatever process will best serve our purpose. We may find it convenient to correlate duration of rest with so much onward stepping of the hands of our watch, or with the amount of apparent onward movement of the sun in the sky or its shadow on a dial; or, failing then, much more commonly, with the flow of conscious process of which we have enjoyment. Unreliable as this last is, for scientific purposes, it is always at hand for reference, and it remains the primary and primitive basis

of such reference. During our waking life we are continually, and perhaps continuously, passing onwards through the order of time, and with this onward passage we habitually, though not explicably, correlate the period of rest in a stationary object. What we here speak of as rest in space is analogous to that of the sleeping top in which changes occur in relation to a central position which preserves unchanged its relations to surrounding positions similarly occupied. And the period of its rest is the period of its onward passage through time as a specific order of relations. We are aware that it remains at rest through so much progress of our conscious life. But the changes within it keep pace with the changing universe, with which our conscious process, as a mode of change therein, keeps pace. So far as we know, nothing remains unchanged in relation to the order of time, though spatial centers around which these changes are grouped in the material world may either change or not change their relations to other centers in the order of space. In reference therefore to the spatial world our perceptive process slides or steps along that which we perceive; and what we call the permanence of objects is based on the continuous or discontinuous repetition of our percepts as our attention clings to them or reverts to them. Let us call this *perceptual travelling*, and remember that it is through such perceptual travelling over our objective world, following its relative movements, dwelling on its relatively quiescent phases, and moving along its relatively stationary lines, that we come to know the facts of that world, and hence to grasp its truths.

Suppose then that we are perceptually sliding along the segment of a circle wherein the uniform change of direction is really continuous. We cannot truly say that 'now,' and 'now,' and 'now,' there is change of direction in that along which we slide, if by this we mean that between these 'nows' the direction is unchanging. But that is just what we can truly say if we are perceptually travelling along the successive sides of a large enough part of a regular polygonal figure. Here, instead of continuous and uniform change of direction we have a discontinuous and rhythmic series of changes of direction. Between

certain limits, however, those defined by cuts at the several angles, we are perceptually sliding in a continuous and uniform direction along a straight line. We have then in such a case,—so far as direction is concerned—a discontinuous series of continua, certain defining cuts marking the limits of these continua. But together with discontinuity quâ direction there is the strictest continuity of occupied positions. Suppose now that having drawn very faintly in pencil a regular polygon, and having marked with little ink dots the approximate positions of the limits defined by cuts at the angles,—we then rub out our faint pencil lines, leaving only the ink dots. There are now no continuous straight lines to be actually perceived. None the less, if we are imagining or thinking of a regular polygon, an order of relatedness of the dots sufficiently guides the perceptual sliding. But if a regular polygon be not in our thought, the dots may just as well define the positions of the sharp angles of a many-rayed star, or cuts on the segment of a circle, and so on. In each case the route of imaginary travelling differs. The important thing to grasp is that our dots, or the cuts which they roughly represent, are set in some order of relatedness, which order must be defined in our thought, if the dots or cuts are to have definite significance. Now of course in our varied world there are many cases of what seem to be disorderly discontinua. But they have comparatively little interest for scientific investigation. As therefore in considering continua we dealt with uniform continua, so now, in briefly considering discontinua, we will deal with *orderly discontinua*; and by an orderly discontinuum I here mean one in which any large enough part, isolated by cuts, affords the basis for a conclusion with regard to the form of any other such part, or of the whole from which it has been isolated.

Consider further the case of the regular polygon. Isolate small enough parts by tubular observation. Such a visible part may be (*a*) a straight line, or there may be enclosed (*b*) two straight lines which meet to form an angle. It is clear then that any given small part of the orderly discontinuum is not like every other small part, nor is it like the whole from which the small parts are derived by isolation. The given part will be

like some other such parts, and will be unlike some other such parts. Again any such small part is unlike a larger part which includes, say, two angles, and so on.

Transfer attention now to a sufficiently large part. Such a part, though it may be like the whole from which it is isolated, in the same sense as is any part of a continuum, is none the less *representative* of that whole, in the sense that the law of the whole can be inferred from the adequate consideration of such a part. What is to be understood by 'sufficiently large' must depend on the conditions of the problem presented. I take it that in determining the figure of a regular polygon, the isolated part within which are comprised three straight lines and two angles is sufficiently large. From perceptually travelling along such a part, and I think no smaller part, the figure of the whole polygon, granted that it is regular and orderly, can be inferred. If the example I have chosen may be regarded as typical, we seem justified therefore in saying that an orderly discontinuum is one of which any large enough part, isolated by defining cuts, is representative of the whole, and that such a part affords a basis for a conclusion with regard to the form or law of the whole.

Now we have seen that in the case of uniform continua the isolated parts are made rather than found. We do not disarticulate parts already there; for the continuum is a partless whole. How stands it then with regular discontinua? In the polygon it may be said that the parts are straight lines each of a definite length; these parts are given as such; that our business is (1) to find them, and (2) to state the manner of their relatedness to each other. But on these terms we seem to divorce the part from the relatedness with which it must be wedded to constitute the whole. And, on these terms, from the part as such (*e. g.*, one side of a polygon) we can draw no conclusion as to the nature of the whole. It appears to me that we ought to distinguish an analysis into terms and relations from the isolation of representative parts for comparison with each other and with the whole—though such comparison of course involves terms and relations. What I venture to submit is that, in any logical discussion of whole and part, it would be better not to apply the word 'part'

in such a case as the isolated side of a polygon. It would be better to call it a member of that collection of members which, in their specific mode of relatedness, constitute a representative part of a polygon. The point here is that any representative part of an orderly discontinuum gives not only constituent members but also their mode of relatedness. By the study of such parts we may reach valid conclusions with regard to the whole from which we isolate them. That, if I mistake not, is what, in effect, we do in the course of scientific procedure. Nature's wholes are often too large for our grasp; we therefore isolate representative parts from which we may infer the form and law of the whole. We may of course also infer from a larger to a smaller representative part; but we must not so disintegrate it that it ceases to be a representative part. Thus the chemical analysis of a compound into its elements does not yield representative parts. It yields only the dissociated members of what *was* a corporate body prior to such analysis.

I have here essayed to deal only with relatively simple types of continua and discontinua. I have dealt with them as they are presented in the world that lies open to our perception, or which would, as I conceive, lie open to the perception of a being with enhanced powers. I venture to think that only by starting thus can we hope to reach conclusions which may form a basis for the consideration of more complex cases. In the very brief discussion of orderly discontinua I have perhaps said enough to show that, by the isolation of representative parts for comparison with larger wholes, data may be reached which are of value for the purposes of science. But with the powers of perception which we possess, it is, I take it, extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to decide whether what is presented in any given case is really a very fine-grained discontinuum or a true continuum. All we can do is to follow up the quest as far as we can, and to be cautious in making assumptions beyond the range of our assured grasp. No doubt in view of my method of approach I shall be charged with perverse topsy-turvydom. It may be that, as we are so confidently told, the flow of our conscious life should afford our point of departure. It may be that this re-

veals to intuition an isolated part of the continuous push of the larger life with which the world is instinct, in spite of the apparent discontinuity introduced by the intellect. The part of which each one of us is conscious in its continuous simplicity may be like the greater whole—one and indivisible. It may be that thus, and thus only, is continuity known in its primal purity. Or it may not be so. Our conscious enjoyment may, not impossibly, afford the supreme example of pseudo-simplicity. Its seeming continuity may be analogous to that of a rope woven out of myriads of discontinuous fibres. Our complex life may exemplify the furthest known remove from continuity in its native purity. Who shall say? But such problems are beyond the modest scope of such considerations as have been outlined in the foregoing pages.

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THE ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM OF KIERKEGAARD.¹

THE aim of the present paper is two-fold: to give an introductory characterization of Kierkegaard's individuality as a thinker, and to elucidate in some detail the epistemological position from which the paper takes its title. This position I have characterized as anti-intellectualism, in order to establish a point of contact with present-day currents of thought; but I warn the reader that Kierkegaard resists a facile classification, and that one cannot, without danger of misunderstanding, transfer impressions derived from a study of James or Bergson, unmodified, to the interpretation of this most profound and original thinker. The introductory section of the paper deals briefly with Kierkegaard's style and method of writing, in its relation to his philosophical ideas; with his doctrine of 'indirect communication,' as the consistent form of a reflectively conscious protest against intellectualism; and with the method and program of his constructive philosophy of values.

I.

Although the author of a literature rich in philosophical content, Kierkegaard wrote no systematic treatise on pure logic or metaphysics. It most often happens that philosophical writers who thus wear the less professional air, have their treasures of truth so submerged in feeling, or so suffused with imagination, that their position is not abstractly clear, and consequently not readily susceptible of a sharp definition. But in Kierkegaard we have a rare combination of dialectical power with an imagi-

¹ Søren Aabye Kierkegaard, a Danish thinker (1813-1855), author of an extensive esthetic, ethical, and religious literature. The latest edition of his collected works was published in Copenhagen in 1904, under the editorship of A. B. Drachmann *et al.* References in the article apply to the separate volumes of this edition. A German translation in twelve volumes has recently been published by Eugen Diederichs in Jena. Georg Brandes, *S.K.*, Leipzig, 1879, offers a critical analysis of the Kierkegaardian literature in its esthetic aspects; Höffding, *S.K. als Philosoph*, Stuttgart, 1902, deals with his philosophical position.

native and dramatic intuition, so that picturesque characterization in the concrete is to be found in his writing, side by side with exact and algebraic definition. His native dialectical powers were disciplined by a serious study of Hegel; and though emancipating himself from the tyranny of Hegel's dominant influence, he acquired through his aid the mastery of a precise and finished terminology. The absence, therefore, of any systematic treatise covering the logical and metaphysical disciplines, is due not so much to a limitation or a peculiarity in his genius, as to the nature of his philosophical position; indeed, it is the deliberate expression of a well-considered choice, the carefully planned application of a corrective against a one-sided and abstract intellectualism.¹ This feature of his thought makes his ideas extremely difficult to convey at second hand, since the task resembles the translation of poetry, where the form is inseparable from the content. One is constantly exposed to the danger of utterly failing to interpret the spirit of his philosophy, in spite of having correctly transcribed its chief salient propositions,—a danger which the reader will note is somewhat ironical in its nature.

Kierkegaard calls himself a subjective thinker. His meaning may perhaps be conveyed, in one of its aspects, by calling him also an artist-thinker. For he strove constantly to reduplicate his reflection in an artistic form, attempting to assimilate and transmute its objective content so as to make it serve the purposes of a communication in which due regard should be had both to the giver and to the receiver. This care for the subjective elements in communication demands that thought should be doubly reflective; by the first reflection it then attains to its ordinary and direct expression in the word or phrase, and by the second reflection it receives an indirect expression in style and form, as the concrete medium of human intercourse.² Such an indirect expression, inasmuch as it is the result of reflection, is artistic; and such a thinker is therefore an artist in another and higher sense than that which is implied by the possession of mere literary skill. Kierkegaard maintains the validity and

¹ *Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift*, pp. 210, 303.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 55-62.

necessity of this two-fold reflection, whenever the subject matter to be communicated concerns Reality in its most concrete aspect, as rooted in the very nature of Reality itself, and as grounded in the fundamental relation between objective thought and real existence. Reality is such that a form of communication may be chosen which contradicts the very thought that it assumes to convey, thus "transforming the supposed communication into a non-communication."

I cannot undertake to convey, within the limits of this paper, an idea of the literary resourcefulness, the reflective ingenuity, the keenness of irony and profundity of humor, the variety and multiplicity of forms and devices, that give to Kierkegaard's writings their peculiar individuality of stamp and coloring, as a consequence of the method described as 'double reflection.' One expression of the method is the absence of a volume of pure logic or metaphysics from the list of his published works; the principle by which this choice was guided I wish briefly to explain.

The problem of Reality is of course, in one sense or another, the problem of all philosophy, and it was also Kierkegaard's central problem. As a student of the philosophy of his day, he soon began to feel, like many other students in his day and our own, the inadequacy of what philosophers are accustomed to say on this all-absorbing topic. "What philosophers say under the head of Reality," he complains in one of his aphorisms, "is sometimes as illusory as a sign displayed in a window, 'Clothes pressed here.' If you enter the shop to have your clothes pressed, you are disappointed to learn that the sign is held for sale, and that clothes are not pressed on the premises."¹ Philosophers tend to forget that the categories which are usually the first to attract their attention, and to which objective thinking is apt exclusively to devote itself, namely the logical and the metaphysical, are not as such the categories of Reality. The entities of metaphysics and the forms of logic do not exist *as such*; when they exist, they exist as imbedded in the flesh and blood of the esthetic, the ethical, and the religious. Their

¹ *Enten-Eller*, I, p. 16.

reality or being is not identical with the reality of factual existence, but they constitute an abbreviation of, or a *prius* for, the above three fundamental spheres of existence. Hence it is that no man lives in categories that are purely logical or metaphysical, but exists on the contrary in categories that are esthetic, ethical or religious in their nature.¹ A philosopher thoroughly conscious of this fact should be impelled to give his intercourse and his writings the stamp of a broad and sympathetic humanism; he will certainly wish to bear in mind that a philosopher is not only *sometimes* a man, as a Greek sceptic once frankly confessed, but always and essentially a man. In the attempt to express this consciousness, Kierkegaard made his work approximate, as nearly as possible, the essential features of the living reality. Now, in the concrete, the logical both is and is not, being imbedded in life's moral substance; hence the skeleton of Kierkegaard's own logical position was likewise imbedded and hidden in a certain 'thickness,' to use a significant expression of James. It was wrapped up in a covering of humor, wit, pathos, and imagination, and interwoven with mimic and lyric expressions of doubt, despair, and faith; so that we have presented before us, instead of a mere logical web of paragraphs, a thinking personality who exists in his thought. The subjective is shown appropriating and using the objective; on this account the style has a certain breadth, an unsystematic lingering ease of conversational tone; and there is displayed a pregnant and decisive energy of acceptance or repudiation which is unusual in philosophical composition, but which brings us incomparably nearer to the breath of life.

Pascal has noted that there are few who show themselves able to speak of doubt doubtingly, or faith believingly, or modesty modestly. It is no slight tribute to the noble simplicity of William James as a thinker, that he put in practice so large a measure of what he had learned to understand, and actually taught pragmatism in a pragmatic spirit. A student of Kierkegaard is in like manner impressed by the fact that his doctrine and method and spirit are consonant, and may be called genuine-

¹ *Stadier paa Livets Vei*, p. 443.

ly pragmatic in a high and noble sense. In Kierkegaard, abstract logical thought is not merely dogmatically described as having an instrumental function, but it is actually made to perform its duty as instrumental; it is every moment held in subjection to a realistic aim. Moreover, so concrete is the conception of this realistic aim, so reflectively apprehended are the difficulties in the way of its actualization, that the problem which it sets gives rise to a philosophic theory of the art of communication respecting it. This theory seeks to define the nature and limits of the mutual dependence of individuals upon one another, in such a way as to exhibit and respect their real and ultimate independence. The theory is expressed and summarized in the category of 'indirect communication,' which is the logical outcome of the method of double reflection, and the consistent consequence of the thorough-going anti-intellectualism which Kierkegaard represents.¹

That communication on the subject of the highest and most concrete phase of Reality must necessarily be indirect, has its ground, according to Kierkegaard, in the fact that the actualization of the real is always in process, and also in that independence of the individuals which makes any essential discipleship

¹ A study of Professor Royce's *Problem of Christianity* reveals an interesting parallel between the category of 'interpretation' as developed by him, and Kierkegaard's doctrine of 'indirect communication.' These two categories play analogous and central rôles in two antithetical views of life and reality. Kierkegaard's conception of Christianity is therefore the precise opposite, at every essential point, of that offered by Professor Royce. Interpretation is direct and positive, is an expression for objective certainty, and is related, despite strenuous efforts to avoid the implication, to an essentially static view of life. Indirect communication is a negative expression for an underlying positive principle, involves the denial of objective certainty, and is related to an essentially dynamic view of life. To take one illustration of many: Royce has a doctrine of the Spirit in the Community, but does not make paramount the question of how the Community *comes to be*, since for him it simply *is*; he does not ask how the Spirit comes to constitute the Community, or to dwell in it. When this question is raised and answered, as Kierkegaard would answer it, by an insistence upon the primacy of the individual, and a recognition of the fact that the Spirit must first come to dwell in the individual in order to dwell in and constitute the Community, instead of *vice versa*; then the life of the individual is turned inward rather than outward, and is made inwardly, and therefore radically, dynamic; the relation to God becomes prior to, and fundamental to, the relation to humanity, instead of an ambiguous variant expression for the latter, or a powerless shadow of it; and the distinction between pantheism and theism receives its true significance.

a false relation; it is an expression for the ethical isolation which makes it impossible to judge of an individual justly, or with unconditional certainty, by means of any code of general rules or laws; finally, it is a consequence of the metaphysical incommensurability between the particular and the universal, language being the vehicle of the abstract and the universal, Reality being essentially concrete and particular. When communication deals with the abstract, or with such aspects of the concrete as can be apprehended through essentially valid analogies, *i. e.*, the whole realm of purely objective thinking, there is no good reason why it should not be direct and positive; but when it attempts to deal with the absolutely individual and concrete, *i. e.*, the realm of the ethico-religious inwardness, its apparent positive and direct character is illusory; such communication becomes real only on condition that its negative aspect is brought to consciousness, and embodied in the form. A lover, for example, may feel the need of telling others of his love, though he also feels that he neither desires to convey, nor is able to express, its deepest and most intimate secret. And that which is only relatively true in the case of the lover, since the lover's experience has analogies, is absolutely true for the ethico-religious individual. A concrete subjective thinker, like Socrates, has no positive result that can be truly or adequately conveyed by a formula or a sum of propositions; he has only a way, he is never finished, and he cannot therefore positively communicate himself.

A protest against intellectualism needs a category of this kind in order to free itself from the last vestige of subservience to the dominance of the principle of identity. In my opinion, Kierkegaard was the first critic of intellectualism who burned his philosophical bridges behind him, and thereby liberated himself from the trammels of the intellectualist application or misuse of logic in the world of life and reality. Certainly not the first to discover the category in question, or the first to use it, he was nevertheless the first, as far as I am aware, to give it a clear and dialectical formulation. What I have said about it here is simply for the purpose of calling attention to the concept, and does not pretend to play the part of an exposition.¹

¹ Cf. *Indøvelse i Christendom*, pp. 115-134.

James characterizes intellectualism as the claim that conceptual logic is the final authority in the world of being or fact, and as the assertion that the logic of identity is the most intimate and exhaustive definer of the nature of reality.¹ Kierkegaard meets this claim and assertion by the proposition that logic does not and cannot define reality; that it merely predisposes reality for our knowledge without itself coming into contact with its actuality.² With this proposition his anti-intellectualism begins, but it by no means ends there; and although this attitude toward logic is the primary concern of the present paper, I wish also to indicate, very summarily and only by way of introduction, the philosophical advance which he has made in the application of this initial proposition to more concrete problems.

The chief forms of positive objective knowledge—mathematics, the historical disciplines, sense perception and the natural sciences which rest upon perception, and metaphysics—are subjected to a critical estimate, in the endeavor to establish the fundamental fact that these disciplines, despite their real and obvious value (Kierkegaard is no obscurantist), when viewed as revelations of Reality, suffer from two fundamental defects of abstraction. First, they are either entirely hypothetical in their application to reality, as in the case of logic and mathematics, or they are endless approximations to the truth, as in the case of history and the natural sciences. Secondly, they are, and indeed wish to be, purely objective disciplines; as such they realize a knowledge which from the standpoint of the real knower is non-essential, since it does not express his actual and concrete position in existence. Hence they do not essentially concern him, but concern merely a fictitious objective subject-in-general, not identical with any concrete human being; in the last analysis, the degree and scope of such knowledge is a matter of indifference, and only knowledge whose relation to existence is essential, is essential knowledge. No form of positive objective knowledge, no logical system, no metaphysical result (a metaphysical system embracing reality is an illusion), can attain to a Truth in which Reality is adequately and definitively revealed.³

¹ *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 213-220.

² *Begrebet Angest*, p. 10.

³ Cf. *Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift*, passim.

If the problem of Truth and Reality is not to be given up in despair, one must seek for a solution elsewhere, and seek for it in another spirit. There is but one other sphere in which such a solution can be sought, and this is the sphere of the subjective attitude of the knower, the realm of the subjective 'how' as distinct from the objective 'what.' Such is the fruitful turn which Kierkegaard gives to an analysis of the adequacy of knowledge that is nearly as old as thought, and which, according to the temperament of the philosopher, has served variously as a starting point for scepticism, for positivism, for relativism, for mysticism, or for an abstract idealism. Kierkegaard makes it the point of departure for an elaborate and profound critique of the personality in its chief subjective modes, in order to discover a 'how' which shall adequately express and grasp the real in its human accessibility and concreteness. He offers us a delineation of the whole range of typical subjective life-attitudes, describing them in their ideal self-consistency and sharpness of distinction.¹ In this way he presents a variety of esthetic points of view, from hardened understanding to sympathetic-egoistic melancholy; esthetic and ethical despair in many forms; prudent eudemonism and wordly wisdom; executive irony, or irony as a fundamental attitude toward life; ethical self-assertion in terms of moral courage and pathos; marriage as the most concrete ethical realization of life; the struggles of conscience and remorse under exceptional and irregular conditions, for the purpose of throwing light upon the normal; humor and resignation; religion. The forms of the religious attitude are reduced ultimately to two, which Kierkegaard regards as fundamental: immanent religion and transcendent religion, the latter being distinguished from the former by the decisiveness with which it grasps; and the passionate concreteness with which it expresses, the deepest paradox of life.² This critique of the personality is evidently equivalent to a philosophy of values. But the uniqueness of Kierkegaard's contribution to such a philosophy lies in the fact that the evaluations of life which form its subject matter are by his method made to reveal themselves, and therefore in a sense

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 212-257; and the entire literature.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 484-587.

to criticize themselves, through representative personalities; they are embodied in the self-expression of a variety of authors or pseudonyms, whose ideas constitute typical and rival views of life.

The results of this dramatic and imaginative exploration of the personality are abstractly summarized, and culminate in a definition of Truth, as *Subjectivity raised to the highest intensity of which it is capable*; or, in order to make explicit its negative relation to the objective, as *the objectively uncertain, held fast in subjective inwardness with the highest possible degree of passionate appropriation*.¹ This formula also defines Faith, which is the subject's mode of apprehending the Truth, *sensu eminenti*. A more concrete and epigrammatic characterization of the Truth is embodied in the maxim: "Only the Truth which edifies, is Truth for you."² This is evidently a concrete way of acknowledging the individual himself as the test and standard of Truth, not indeed in the sense of Protagoras, but in the opposite sense of Socrates. 'Know thyself' becomes the ultimate categorical imperative. This self is not, however, a transcendental ego serving as a starting-point for metaphysical speculation, as in Fichte; it is, very simply, the concrete personality that constitutes for each one his appropriate ethical task. Realistically, the above definition of Truth involves the consequence that the only reality accessible to any existing individual is his own ethical reality. To every reality outside the individual, even his own *external* reality his highest valid relation is cognitive; but knowledge is a grasp of the possible, and not a realization of the actual; the knowledge of actualities transmutes them into possibilities, and the highest intellectual validity of knowledge is attained in an even balancing of alternate possibilities with an absolutely open mind.³

Each of the brief characterizing phrases used in the above schematic outline stands for an entire section or volume in Kierkegaard's comprehensive literature of the personality; and he has himself given the content of these treatises an abstract

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 170.

² *Enten-Eller*, II, p. 318.

³ *Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift*, p. 271.

categorical formulation, conceived with almost algebraic exactness. This is indeed a brilliant double achievement, by the recognition of which Kierkegaard's permanent fame as a thinker will be historically assured.

II.

We now pass to a more detailed consideration of Kierkegaard's estimate of logic, formally taking up the reasons which constitute his critique of intellectualism. These reasons may be summarized under four principal heads. 1. Logic cannot, from its own resources, provide for transitions from one quality to another; in the world of fact, such transitions take place by a leap. 2. Logic cannot acknowledge, within its own sphere, the contingent; but the contingent is an essential constituent of the actual. 3. Logic deals only with universals; the particular, however, is absolutely inseparable from the actual. 4. Logic deals only with essences, whose being consists in their conceivability; factual existence is not an essence, and it involves a kind of a being which cannot be logically conceived. Let us consider each of these points in turn.

A. *A logical transition from one quality to another is impossible.* The static character of the concept has often been contrasted with the dynamic character of temporal experience, sometimes with the intent of proving the concept, and sometimes temporal experience, unfit for knowledge. Of course, we may define knowledge in different ways; but in the generally accepted meaning, it would seem to be this static characteristic of the concept which makes knowledge of a changing experience possible.¹ Kierkegaard succeeds, perhaps, in obviating much superficial misunderstanding of the doctrine of the static concept, by formulating the distinction between a logical and an actual transition, and in calling attention to the fact that the change from one concept to another, whether in the revision of judgment or in the course of history, is not *logical*, but *actual*. A concept does not change itself, either into its opposite or into a mere other, but reality makes the transition from one concept to

¹ It is one of the many merits of Hüsserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* to have abundantly set forth and illustrated this point.

another by means of a *leap*. In logic, everything is and nothing comes into being—a truth which the Eleatic philosophy transferred to the realm of factual existence in consequence of a misunderstanding.¹ In a logical system of concepts, every movement is immanent, since the relations by which the system is constituted are, by the existence of the system, rendered internal relations; the whole is therefore presupposed in every part, and that which emerges from the logical development of such a system is exactly the same as that which was there at the beginning.² Movement, transition, mediation, are all transcendent concepts, and have no legitimate place in logic. To ignore this is to confuse both logic, and the historical sciences, where these concepts belong, and makes ethics impossible; for it leads to the misunderstanding that the actual, whether past or future, may be viewed as necessary. By this interpretation all real movement is taken away from history and from the individual life, and the illusory introduction of movement into logic is a very poor substitute for such an irreparable loss.

In the realm of the actual, transitions come to pass. This is the essential nature of existence; its salient characteristic is change and striving, which is the source of all its pathos. All actual transition involves a breach of continuity, a *leap*. The leap is present in manifold forms, and it is one of the most important of philosophical problems to distinguish between transitions of different orders.³ The most significant and de-

¹ *Begrebet Angest*, p. 13.

² Hence when logic rejoices in the orderly beauty of its ballet of the categories, it is pledged not to forget that this ballet is devoid of all actual motion; reason enough for its 'unearthly' character!

³ For the sake of greater clearness, I append a few examples, culled mostly from material in Kierkegaard's journal. H_2 plus O becomes water, and water becomes ice, by a leap. The change from motion to rest, or *vice versa*, is a transition which cannot be logically construed; this is the basic principle of Zeno's dialectic, and is also expressed in Newton's laws of motion, since the external force by which such change is effected is not a consequence of the law, but is premised as external to the system with which we start. It is therefore transcendent and non-rational, and its coming into existence can only be apprehended as a leap. In the same manner, every causal system presupposes an external environment as the condition of change. Every transition from the detail of an empirical induction to the ideality and universality of law, is a leap. In the actual process of thinking, we

cisive are those which take place in the ethico-religious life of the individual; this is the sphere of the essentially qualitative distinctions. But every leap possesses the logically negative character that it cannot be construed, except out of an immanence which has first included it, and the gap between two qualities can never be bridged by a demonstration; it must either be given or be achieved.

The historical actuality is thus marked by a transition to the new as a leap, whence is derived the sense of wonder. Wonder is the philosopher's receptivity for the historically new. Under a logical construction of history, wonder would be abolished; "for who could possibly wonder at a necessary construction?"¹ But such a construction of history is illusory, as everyone would easily understand if he attempted to construe the life of a single individual, say his own. Kierkegaard pithily remarks that the Hegelian interpretation of history helps us understand the past, by apprehending it as if it had never been present or future; it interprets the heroes of the past as if they had never been alive; and it seeks to aid us to an understanding of

have the leap by which we arrive at the understanding of an idea or an author. Kierkegaard finds a pardonable pleasure in noting the inconsistency of certain followers of Hegel, who have tried to invest with romantic glamour the experience by which they awoke to an understanding of his philosophy; as if a man were to boast of the miracle by which he became an adherent of the philosophy which denies all miracles. The change from scepticism to belief is a leap of fundamental importance; a radical doubt cannot work itself out into belief by an immanent development of its presuppositions, in spite of the fact, exploited by a too facile idealism, that scepticism always posits an abstract certainty in the background. Doubt consists in falsely interpreting this certainty; hence it cannot be overcome except by the assumption of a new point of departure, reached in a decision of the will. In the inner life, the radical transitions are not merely given, but must be achieved as an expression of freedom. They are therefore both non-logical and pathetic; the breach of continuity which they involve necessitates an experience surcharged with pathos. Thus the transition from esthetic Eudemonism to ethics, or from the contemplation of nature to the idea of God, or from an intellectual knowledge of the good to its ethical realization, is in each case a pathetic transition. Cf. Sören Kierkegaard's *Papirer*, V, pp. 371-375.

¹ *Philosophiske Smuler*, p. 74. Cf. Aristotle's remark that science tends to abolish wonder, by exhibiting as necessary that which at first appears to be contingent; citing the example of the geometrician who has demonstrated the incommensurability subsisting between the circumference of the circle and its diameter.

ourselves by treating us as if we were dead.¹ The futility of this kind of explanation of life, and the need of replacing it by an interpretation more human, is expressed in the following epigram from one of his journals: "The motto of all philosophy hitherto has been, *There is nothing new under the sun*; the motto of the new Danish philosophy will be, *There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy*."

B. *Logic cannot assimilate or acknowledge the contingent aspect of the actual, within its own realm of truth.* This is an immediate consequence of the fact that change transcends the sphere of logic, since change is a contingency. In a logical system all relations are necessary, precisely because in such a system no changes actually take place. Hence the logical as the necessary cannot exist, for everything that exists has come into being, i. e., has suffered the change involved in passing from potentiality to actuality (*κίνησις*). This change the necessary cannot undergo; the necessary is, and never comes to be; its being is *sub specie aeternitatis*, in the realm which is the essential medium of thought. In logic, every movement is in consequence of a logical ground, and is hence both necessary and immanent; in reality, nothing happens in consequence of a ground, but

¹ "Misled by the constant reference to a continued process in which opposites come together in a higher unity, and so again in a higher unity, etc., a parallel has been drawn between Hegel's doctrine and that of Heraclitus, that everything is in a state of flux. But this is a misunderstanding, since everything that Hegel says about process and becoming is illusory. Hence the System lacks an ethic, and hence the System knows nothing when it is asked, in real earnest, by the living generation and the living individual, to explain becoming, in order, namely, that the individual may learn how to act and live. In spite of all that is said about process, Hegel does not understand the world-process from the point of view of becoming, but understands it, by help of the illusion incident to pastness, from the point of view of finality, where all becoming is excluded. Hence it is impossible for a Hegelian to understand himself by means of his philosophy, for he can only understand that which is past and finished; but a living person is surely not yet deceased. Possibly he finds consolation in the thought that when one can understand China and Persia and six thousand years of the world's history, the understanding of a particular individual matters very little, even if that individual happens to be one's self. To me it does not seem so, and I understand it better conversely: that he who is unable to understand himself must have a somewhat peculiar understanding of China and Persia, etc." *Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift*, p. 263. Cf. also James: *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 243-244, where Kierkegaard is quoted.

everything takes place by virtue of a cause. The apparent necessity of a natural law, binding cause to effect, is no real or unconditional necessity; the appearance of necessity arises through an abstraction from the fact that the causes (the secondary causes) have themselves come into being, and by a forgetfulness of the fact that their becoming is not explained, but only presupposed, by the law; "should such forgetfulness perhaps also be necessary?" The past is indeed unchangeable but it does not share the unchangeableness of the necessary, for when the past came to be, it did not exclude the change by which it came to be; but the necessary excludes every change. The possibility of a systematic apprehension of the past, *ex post facto*, cannot alter the fact that the past is not more necessary than the future. Just as the optical illusion of seeing the square tower round is one which is induced by distance in space, so the intellectual illusion of apprehending the past as necessary is induced by distance in time.¹

C. *The incommensurability between the universal and the particular reveals the impotence of logic in its attempt to define the actual.* The logical concept is always a universal, and even the so-called concrete universal is not concrete in the same sense that the actual is concrete, for the particular *quâ* particular is essential to the actual, and repels every attempt to conceive it logically.² When abstract thought tries to conceive the particular, it transforms it into a universal. To ask what reality is in general, is one thing; to ask what it means to call this particular thing or situation a reality, by bringing the ideality of thought to bear upon its concrete particularity, is an absolutely different thing. The former question is perhaps not even legitimate; in any case the question and answer remain within the sphere of the abstract, and do not reach reality as actual. The latter question is a concrete question, and cannot be put in a logical or metaphysical system, or in any science; it can only be answered by the individual as an individual, who finds in the definiteness of time and space the particularization of his ex-

¹ Cf. *Philosophiske Smuler*, pp. 65-79.

² *Begrebet Angest*, p. 75.

perience and his thought. Abstract thought solves all the difficulties of life by abstracting from them, whence arises its complacent disinterestedness; the concrete thinker, who faces the concrete problem of reality as above specified, discovers that this problem brings his subjective interest to a climax, since it reveals a future presenting a critical and decisive alternative. For abstract thought there is no 'either-or,' no absolute disjunction; "why in the world should there be, since abstract thought abstracts from existence, where the absolute disjunction belongs?" But for the thinker who faces the future with the subjective passion inherent in voluntary action *sensu eminenti*, there exists an absolute disjunction, a valid contradictory opposition; "whoever attempts to take this away, takes existence away, and does not therefore take it away in existence."¹

On the universality of the universal rests the possibility of communication, and on its validity rests the acknowledgment of the existence of other selves. The universal is that which is common to different thinkers, or to the same thinker at different times.² But the incommensurability between the universal and the particular makes doubt and belief, truth and error, possible. When I interpret a particular sense impression as a star, I give it a place in a conceptual order; and when I interpret it as the same star which I saw yesterday or a year ago, or as a star which my neighbor means or sees, or as a star which once came into existence, whether an instant or ages ago makes no essential difference—I am in these interpretations or judgments identifying a present immediacy of sense with some

¹ *Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift*, p. 261.

² The 'ego-centric predicament' is an imperfect expression for the more fundamental 'present-moment' predicament; it is just as impossible to know one's own past, or conceive one's own future, or realize the full significance of one's own present, without assuming the validity of universals, as it is to conceive the possibility or acknowledge the reality of another person without making the same assumption. To characterize the universal as indeterminateness of meaning is confusing, since it needlessly breaks with traditional terminology, and necessitates distinguishing between two kinds of indeterminateness, one of which is *sui generis*. To call universals dead dictionary definitions, verbal forms without content, is likewise confusing, and is excusable only as a sort of vehement *argumentum ad hominem* relevant to a particular misuse of the universal, but not tending to clarify logical terminology.

conceptuality of the memory or the imagination. Scepticism is a protest of the will against every such identification, on the ground that it involves an inference transcending the immediately given, and because it is impossible to prove that such inferences may not turn out to be erroneous. Belief is a contrary movement of the will, an affirmation which recognizes that another interpretation is possible, but nevertheless risks the assertion of this interpretation as real. That alternative interpretations are always possible, is most frequently a latent consciousness; stupid and passionate people ignore it; and the immediate suggestions of sense, together with the familiarity of the habitual, not to speak of the partiality of the will, tend to lull this consciousness to sleep. On the other hand, the experience of error tends to rouse the mind from its dogmatic slumbers, thus positing the choice between belief and belief, or between belief and doubt.¹

In the inner life of the self, the contrast between the universal and the particular finds its highest significance. The self is a synthesis of the universal and the particular. The ethical individual has the task of realizing the universal man in a concrete particular embodiment, and the individual is both himself and the race. The ethical solution of this contradiction constitutes the history of the individual, by which he also participates in the history of the race, and is essentially interested in the history of every other individual. Here lie all the ethical and religious problems of the individual life.²

¹ The philosophers who confidently appeal to Experience, spelled, like the Absolute, with a capital, as the adequate immanent guarantee for the security of judgment, seem not to have learned from experience that the consequences always come last, and cannot therefore be appealed to in the moment of judgment; their utility for the shaping of future judgments never reaches the point where it abolishes the risk of error, or the incommensurability between the given and the inferred. On the other hand, the idealists seek to heal the open wound of this situation by reference to an Absolute Knower, failing to realize the power of the actual uncertainty and risk of error involved to depress the ideal certainty which the Absolute Knower possesses, to the status of an abstract possibility; other motives than those derivable from the realm of epistemology are necessary, in order to transmute this abstract conception into a concrete faith in a real actuality. But by this transference of the problem from the logical to the ethico-esthetic sphere, the content of the conception is radically altered, and we pass from the Absolute of metaphysics to the God of religion.

² *Begrebet Angest*, p. 28.

D. *The heterogeneity of the logical and the actual is revealed, finally, in the fact that logic deals only with essences or qualities.* Factual existence, which is the mark of actuality, is not an essence or a quality; and the difference between the possible and the actual is logically non-determinable, because the change from the one to the other is not a change of essence, but a change of being.¹ From this follow two important consequences: it becomes evident that demonstration or proof with reference to existence is a misunderstanding, and that to speak of degrees of reality without clearly distinguishing between ideal reality and factual existence, involves a similar misunderstanding.

It is impossible to reach existence by means of a demonstration. All demonstration operates by essences or quales, and their existence is either assumed or irrelevant. (The objective existence of the essences postulated by logic is simply their reality for thought, but is not their factual existence.) Hence I can never demonstrate the existence of a stone or a star, but only that some existing thing is a stone or a star. The testimony offered in a court of justice is not for the purpose of proving that a criminal exists, but in order to show that the accused, whose existence is given, is a criminal. It cannot be proved that God exists; every such attempt inevitably reduces itself to a development of the consequences which flow from having assumed his existence, *i. e.*, to a making explicit the logical content of the conception of God. If God does not exist, of course it is impossible to prove his existence; but if he does exist, it would be the height of folly to attempt it. The procedure has esthetically the form of an insult, as if one were to assume to demonstrate, in the presence of someone, that he exists; for existence is higher than demonstration, and requires a more adequate form of acknowledgment. The only adequate expression for the existence of God is worship, and the attempt to demonstrate it, is consciously or unconsciously to ignore his existence, *i. e.*, his presence. All reasoning is *from* existence, and no reasoning is *toward* existence.

¹ *Philosophiske Smuler*, Chap. 3, and "Mellemspil." It is this transition which, as Bergson teaches, offers a problem that no intellectual knowledge succeeds in solving; Kierkegaard insists that the problem is irrelevant to knowledge as such, and that the attempt to find a new form of knowledge that solves the problem (intuition) is illusory.

Factual existence not being a quality, is not subject to distinctions of degree. A fly, if it exists, has precisely as much existence as a God. The dialectic of existence is the dialectic of Hamlet, 'to be or not to be.' Ideally, it is not improper to speak of degrees of reality, but when we deal with reality from the ideal point of view, we do not deal with factual existence, but with ideal essence. Spinoza's proof for the existence of God is thus a profound tautology, resting on the identification of reality with perfection. It avoids the real difficulty, which is, to bring God's ideal essence into relation with factual existence.

The category which relates the ideal to the actual is the possible, and knowledge is always a system of possibilities; intellectually and esthetically, though not ethically, the possible is higher than the actual, just as Aristotle says that poetry is more philosophical than history.¹ Belief is the application of knowledge to the determination of the actual, and constitutes our point of contact with the historical as such. The historical comes into being by setting aside the antecedent alternative possibilities; in precisely analogous fashion, belief comes into existence by setting aside as invalid the alternative possibilities of knowledge. And just as the former transition is a leap which cannot be logically construed, so the latter transition, the transition from the many possibilities of knowledge to the one reality of belief, is not necessitated by knowledge, but is an act of the will.² The choice of the will in believing is the means whereby the personality constitutes, expresses, and reveals itself, on the different levels of its subjectivity. Every deeper ethico-religious conviction, as an interpretation of the universe and of life, is an expression of the inner depths of the personality, rather than a necessary consequence of knowledge. Faith is never grounded in the objective necessities of logic or of metaphysics, and its firm conviction is incommensurable with the approximations and probabilities of history or of natural science; it is forever transcendent of every positive external objectivity, and

¹ *Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift*, pp. 273-312.

² The reader will note the identity of what is here called belief, with what modern logic calls judgment, as something distinct from the ideal content of propositions.

its object exists only for the infinite subjective interest in which and through which it lives and works.¹

* * * * *

Such is, in brief outline, and largely in free paraphrase, Kierkegaard's anti-intellectualism, viewed from the standpoint of logic. The reader may wish to compare these views with current attacks upon formal logic, and with the radical evolutionism of Bergson. The attacks upon logic charge that this discipline or no-discipline, as the impetuosity of its critics leads them to stamp it, does not describe actual thinking, does not reveal the actual motives of thought, and does not explain the actual progress of knowledge. This is evidently the same contrast between the formal and the actual which Kierkegaard has attempted to illuminate and to interpret. When compared with Bergson, Kierkegaard's position shows both essential resemblances and essential differences; but the comparison raises so many problems that the present paper cannot undertake even to mention them. Current controversy is almost wholly preoccupied with the problem of knowledge, leaving the problem of action far in the background. It is here, however, that the distinction between intellectualism and its antithesis is most sharply defined, for the mere knower is not as such the concretely real subject; as knower he makes an effort, the better to realize the function of science, to abstract from his real existence. It is by such an abstraction that he seeks to become disinterested and objective, and to identify himself, as far as may be, with the objectivity that he knows. It is true that this undertaking is but an approximation, and is never completely successful; but it is folly to ignore the reality of the effort, and futile to deny that it may and does meet with a relatively adequate degree of success. On the other hand, it is surely necessary for every thinker to understand what relation his abstract thought and

¹ For Kierkegaard, faith is by no means objectless; but its object is not given positively, outside the individual, but only negatively, within the individual; there is an absolute correspondence between the nature of this object and the individual's subjective mode of apprehending it. Kierkegaard's achievement is, so to have defined this subjective mode as uniquely to determine the object to which it corresponds.

objective knowledge bear to life; if he seeks to forget life in a complete absorption in the tasks of objective thought, or assumes that the latter is the highest and noblest human pursuit, then he becomes, as Kierkegaard has shown in a style and manner worthy to be ranked as classic, personally insignificant and fundamentally a comic figure, a type of the absent-minded professor whose real life is lived in distraction, "and who even marries—in distraction." This species of abstract thinker Kierkegaard has immortalized in the figure of the 'privat-docent.' With greater objectivity than Schopenhauer, but with a point of view akin to his, he has drawn the picture of the "professor of philosophy, in the German sense, who is bound, *à tout prix*, to explain everything"; over against this picture he has set the ideal of the "thinker, in the Greek sense, whose life is an attempt artistically to realize his thought," and who does not, therefore, need "many thoughts, all valid to a certain extent," but is satisfied with "one thought, which is absolute."

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THE DOCTRINE OF THE SELF IN ST. AUGUSTINE AND IN DESCARTES.

A. THE CERTAINTY THAT I EXIST.

I. *The Teaching of Augustine.*

IN opposition to the scepticism of the New Academy, Augustine sought a sure foundation for his philosophy. "As regards the uncertainty about everything which Varro alleges to be the differentiating characteristic of the New Academy, the city of God," he says, "thoroughly detests such doubt as madness."¹ The thinkers of the New Academy, Augustine writes, base their doubt of all things on the deceptive nature of the knowledge which comes from the bodily senses.² He agrees with their estimate of knowledge from the senses, but denies that universal doubt is a necessary consequence. In fact, as we shall see, from doubt he derives certainty. Augustine declares, then, that certainty of knowledge is a possible attainment. "Regarding matters which it apprehends by the mind and reason," the city of God "has most absolute certainty, although its knowledge is limited because of the corruptible body pressing down the mind."¹ In *Contra Academicos*, which is Augustine's earliest work, he seeks to show, in opposition to the teaching of the Academy, that knowledge of truth is possible. His main contention is that the Academics could not attain to the probable unless they knew the true, because what constitutes the probable is similarity to the true.³

In all his philosophical works, Augustine argues for the exis-

¹ *City of God* (A.D. 413-426), XIX: 18. Translation by M. Dods in Vol. II of Works of St. Augustine, p. 328. This work and *On the Trinity* belong to the latest period of Augustine's thought.

² *On the Trinity* (A.D. 400-416), XV: 12. Translation by A. W. Haddan, in Works of St. Augustine, edited by M. Dods, Vol. VII, p. 402.

³ *Contra Academicos* (A.D. 386), II: 7, 8, 9, 11, 12. In *Opera Omnia*, ed. J. P. Migne, Tomus I (Patrologiae Tomus XXXII), pp. 926 ff. This work belongs to Augustine's early period.

tence of truth. The first arguments are found in *Contra Academicos*. To the declaration of the sceptics that nothing can be perceived,¹ Augustine answers that truth is perceived in all disjunctive propositions. "For I regard it as certain that there is either one world, or not one; and if not one, either a finite number, or an infinite number . . . Likewise I know that this world of ours has been ordered thus either by physical nature or by some providence; and either it has always existed and will exist always, or it has begun and will not cease; either it has no beginning in time, but will have an end; or has begun and endures, but will not endure forever. I know many statements of this kind about the physical world. For these disjunctive propositions are true, and no one can confound them by any likeness to the false."²

To the other precept of the sceptics:—"Give assent to nothing,"³ Augustine replies that our perceptions are true for us and that there is no deception where we give assent to such perceptions. "Whatever the eyes can see, they see truly. Is, then, the way in which they see the oar in the water true? It is. For I should rather charge my eyes with making a false report if the oar, dipped in the water, appeared straight when the cause of its seeming bent were present. Since, in that event, they would not see what should be seen under such existing conditions. Nevertheless I am deceived if I shall give assent, says someone. Do not give assent to more than you are persuaded appears so to you, and there can be no deception. For I do not see how the Academician can refute him who says: This seems white to me. . . ."⁴

These two arguments for the existence of truth as found in disjunctive propositions and in our assertions of our own immediate perception, are the first which Augustine employs and are of minor importance. They are not found in his later works. The second mentioned, in its emphasis on subjectivity, forms a

¹ "Nihil posse percipi." *Contra Academicos*, III: 10; *op. cit.*, p. 945.

² *Contra Academicos*, III: 10; *op. cit.*, p. 946. (Writer's translation.) Cf. III: 13, p. 949.

³ "Nulli rei debere assentiri." *Ibid.*, III: 10, p. 945.

⁴ *Contra Academicos*, III: 11; *op. cit.*, p. 947. (Writer's translation.)

transition to that main argument for the existence of the truth, which is the foundation of Augustine's philosophy. The one truth of which we are certain is the fact of our own existence. In *De Beata Vita*, which was composed at almost the same time as *Contra Academicos*, Augustine makes the first statement of this immediate certainty.

"Navigius—I do not think myself ignorant of everything.

"Augustine—Can you tell us some one of the things which you know?

"N—I can.

"A—May I trouble you to name some one? (And when he hesitated). Do you at least know that you are alive?

"N—I do.

"A—You know then that you have life, since none can live except by life?

"N—This too . . . I know."¹

In other works, Augustine makes the same assertion. In a well-known chapter of the *City of God*, he says firmly: "For we both are, and know that we are, and delight in our being, and our knowledge of it."² This assertion, it may be noted, is an example of Augustine's use of the self as an analogy of the Trinity.³ For Augustine adds: "And we indeed recognize in ourselves the image of God, that is, of the supreme Trinity, an image which, though it be not equal to God, or rather, though it be very far removed from Him,—being neither co-eternal, nor, to say all in a word, consubstantial with Him,—is yet nearer to Him in nature than any other of His works, and is destined to be yet restored, that it may bear a still closer resemblance"⁴ Further statements of the certainty of self-existence are the following: "For it is eternal to the soul to live; it is eternal to know that it lives."⁵ "These philosophers have babbled much

¹ *De Beata Vita*, 37 (A.D. 386). In *Opera Omnia*, ed. Migne, Tom. I (XXXII), p. 963. (Writer's translation.)

² *City of God*, XI: 26, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 468.

³ Cf. also, *On the Trinity*, X: 10, 11, *op. cit.*, pp. 255, 259; *Confessions*, XIII: 11 (A.D. 400). Translation by J. Pilkington, in *Works*, ed. M. Dods, Vol. XIV, pp. 360, 361. *De Libero Arbitrio*, II: 3 (A.D. 392), *Opera*, Tom. I, pp. 1243-1244.

⁴ *City of God*, XI: 26, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 468.

⁵ *On the Trinity*, XV: 15, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

against the bodily senses, but have never been able to throw doubt upon those most certain perceptions of things true, which the mind knows by itself, such as that which I have mentioned, I know that I am alive."¹ We may end, as we began, with a quotation from an early dialogue, the *Soliloquies*:—

"Reason—You who desire to know yourself, do you know that you are?

"Augustine—I do.

"R—How do you know this?

"A—I do not know.

"R—Do you feel yourself to be simple or complex?

"A—I do not know.

"R—Do you know yourself to be self-moved?

"A—I do not.

"R—Do you know that you think?

"A—I do.

"R—Is it then true that you think?

"A—It is true."²

This knowledge of our existence does not come through the senses. "But since," says Augustine, "we treat of the nature of the mind, let us remove from our consideration all knowledge which is received from without, through the senses of the body; and attend more carefully to the position which we have laid down, that all minds know and are certain concerning themselves."³ Certainty of existence comes rather from an inner sense. "For we have another and far superior sense, belonging to the inner man by which we perceive what things are just, and what unjust,—just by means of an intelligible idea, unjust by the want of it. This sense is aided in its functions neither by the eyesight, nor by the orifice of the ear, nor by the air-holes of the nostrils, nor by the palate's taste, nor by any bodily touch. By it I am assured both that I am, and that I know this; . . ."⁴

But Augustine realized that these repeated assertions of our certainty of existence would not be sufficient. The question of

¹ *Op. cit.*, XV: 12, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

² *Soliloquies*, II: 1 (A.D. 386). Translation R. E. Cleveland, pp. 51, 52.

³ *On the Trinity*, X: 10, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

⁴ *City of God*, XI: 27, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 471.

the possibility of deception would naturally arise. It is in answer to this supposed question that he announces his discovery that the possibility of being deceived implies existence. Suppose, he urges, that I am deceived in thinking that I exist. Instead of making my existence doubtful, this shows the existence of a nature capable of being deceived. The following quotations express this thought:—"But it is clear and manifest to what a degree falsity can injure the mind. For can it do more than deceive? Yet no one is deceived unless he lives. Falsity, therefore, cannot destroy the mind."¹ "To begin with that which is most evident; I ask you first, whether you exist. You, perhaps, fear that you may be deceived by this questioning, but you could not be deceived in any way, if you did not exist."² "Let a thousand kinds, then, of deceitful objects of sight be presented to him who says, I know I am alive; yet he will fear none of them, for he who is deceived is yet alive."³ "In respect of these truths, I am not at all afraid of the arguments of the Academicians, who say, What if you are deceived? For if I am deceived I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived; and if I am deceived, by this same token I am. And since I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I am? For it is certain that I am if I am deceived. Since, therefore, I, the person deceived, should be, even if I am deceived, certainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am."⁴

Thus the possibility of being deceived shows the existence of the one deceived. In the work *On the Trinity*, this argument takes another form in the teaching that the existence of doubt implies the existence of the doubter; "And one has attempted to establish this, and another to establish that. Yet who ever doubts that he himself lives, and remembers, and understands, and wills, and thinks, and knows, and judges? Seeing that even if he doubts, he lives; if he doubts, he remembers why he doubts; if he doubts, he understands that he doubts; if he doubts, he

¹ *De Immortalitate*, XI: 18 (A.D. 387). In *Opera Omnia*, ed. Migne, Tom. I (XXXII), pp. 1030, 1031. (Writer's translation.)

² *De Libero Arbitrio*, II: 3 (A.D. 392). *Opera*, Tom. I (XXXII), p. 1243. (Writer's translation.)

³ *On the Trinity*, XV: 12, *op. cit.*, p. 403.

⁴ *City of God*, XI: 26, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 468, 469.

wishes to be certain; if he doubts, he thinks; if he doubts, he knows that he does not know; if he doubts, he judges that he ought not to assent rashly. Whosoever therefore doubts about anything else, ought not to doubt of all these things; which if they were not, he would not be able to doubt of anything."¹

II. *The Teaching of Descartes.*

As Augustine had reacted against the scepticism of the Academy, and had sought for a philosophical basis which could not be questioned, so we find in the teaching of Descartes a reaction against the prevailing scepticism of his time. In opposition to it he declares that certain knowledge can be discovered. "No doubt, men of education may persuade themselves that there is but little of such certain knowledge . . . but I nevertheless announce that there are more of these [truths] than they think—truths which suffice to give a rigorous demonstration of innumerable propositions, the discussion of which they have hitherto been unable to free from the element of probability."²

In order to obtain certain knowledge, Descartes makes use of the scepticism he is combatting. He begins with doubt, but for him it is only a means to an end. "Not that indeed I imitated the sceptics, who only doubt for the sake of doubting, and pretend to be always uncertain; for, on the contrary, my design was only to provide myself with good ground for assurance."³ Progress in sifting all knowledge in order to retain what is certain, must necessarily be slow. "Like one who walks alone and in the twilight," he says, "I resolved to go so slowly, and to use so much circumspection in all things, that if my advance was but very small, at least I guarded myself well from falling."⁴

¹ *On the Trinity*, X: 10, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

² *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, II. (Probably the earliest work of Descartes. Published in 1701.) Translation of E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, Vol. I, p. 3.

³ *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason* (1637), Pt. III, edition of Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, p. 99. Cf. *Meditations on First Philosophy*, I (1641), edition of Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, p. 144; *The Search after Truth* (published 1701, date of writing unknown), edition of Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, p. 312.

⁴ *Discourse*, Pt. II, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

Descartes seeks for truth by the process of eliminating all beliefs and opinions which are in any degree doubtful. “. . . I thought,” he says “it was necessary for me . . . to reject as absolutely false everything as to which I could imagine the least ground of doubt, in order to see if afterwards there remained anything in my belief that was entirely certain.”¹ In carrying out this plan, he rejects the knowledge which the senses give us because it is often deceptive. “Thus, because our senses sometimes deceive us, I wished to suppose that nothing is just as they cause us to imagine it to be.”² He finds that knowledge from the senses is unreliable, not only in small matters, but even in differentiating waking states from sleep.³ In reasoning, also, he discovers opportunity for deception. “. . . Because there are men,” he says, “who deceive themselves in their reasoning and fall into paralogisms, even concerning the simplest matters of geometry, and judging that I was as subject to error as was any other, I rejected as false all the reasons formerly accepted by me as demonstrations.”⁴

Although these successive steps seem to lead to universal doubt and uncertainty, Descartes presses forward. “I shall nevertheless,” he says, “make an effort and follow anew the same path—*i. e.*, I shall proceed by setting aside all that in which the least doubt could be supposed to exist,—and I shall ever follow in this road until I have met with something which is certain, or at least, if I can do nothing else, until I have learned for certain that there is nothing in the world that is certain.”⁵ “I suppose, then, that all the things that I see are false; I persuade myself that nothing has ever existed of all that my fallacious memory represents to me. I consider that I possess no

¹ *Discourse*, Pt. IV, *op. cit.*, p. 101. Cf. *Rules*, II, *op. cit.*, p. 3; *Meditations* I, *op. cit.*, p. 144; *Principles of Philosophy* (1644), Part I, Props. I and II, edition of Haldane and Ross, Vol. I.

² *Discourse*, Pt. IV, *op. cit.*, p. 101. Cf. *Meditations*, I, *op. cit.*, p. 145; *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. IV.

³ *Meditations*, I, *op. cit.*, pp. 145, 146. Cf. *Discourse*, Pt. IV, *op. cit.*, p. 101; *Search*, *op. cit.*, pp. 313, 314; *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. IV.

⁴ *Discourse*, Pt. IV, *op. cit.*, p. 101. Cf. *Principles*, Pt. I, *op. cit.*, Prop. V.

⁵ *Meditations*, II, *op. cit.*, p. 149. Cf. *Search*, *op. cit.*, p. 315; *Discourse*, Pt. IV, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

senses; I imagine that body, figure, extension, movement and place are but the fictions of my mind."¹

It is in this apparently hopeless condition of doubt that Descartes discovers the truth for which he has been seeking. He cannot, indeed, obtain an absolute assurance of the existence of the external world and the human body. But "am I," he says, "so dependent on body and senses that I cannot exist without these? . . . I was persuaded that there was nothing in all the world, that there was no heaven, no earth, that there were no minds, nor any bodies: was I not then likewise persuaded that I did not exist? Not at all; of a surety I myself did exist since I persuaded myself of something.—But there is some deceiver or other—who ever employs his ingenuity in deceiving me. Then without doubt I exist also if he deceives me, and—he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I think that I am something."² Thus, Descartes insists, the possibility of being deceived implies the existence of the one deceived. In the same way the fact of our doubt necessitates our existence. "Since, then, you cannot deny that you doubt, and that it is on the other hand certain that you doubt, and so certain that you cannot even doubt of that, it is likewise true that you are, you who doubt—."³ In parallel fashion, Descartes argues our existence, also, from our ability to think. "—I noticed that whilst I thus wished to think all things false, it was absolutely essential that the 'I' who thought this should be somewhat, and remarking that this truth 'I think, therefore I am' was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I came to the conclusion that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of the Philosophy for which I was seeking."⁴

¹ *Meditations*, II, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

² *Ibid.*, p. 150.

³ *Search after Truth*, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

⁴ *Discourse*, Pt. IV, *op. cit.*, p. 101. Cf. *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. VII. Descartes has so often been criticized unjustly for the syllogism involved in his "Cogito, ergo sum," that it is worth while to reproduce in full his refutation of the charge. "But when we become aware that we are thinking beings, this is a primitive act of knowledge derived from no syllogistic reasoning. He who says, 'I think; hence I am, or exist,' does not deduce existence from thought by a syl-

III. *The Likeness and the Difference between the Two Thinkers.*

There is evidently a striking similarity between the doctrines of Augustine and of Descartes as so far stated. Each formulates the underlying principles of his philosophy as a reaction against the scepticism of his age; each finds it necessary in his search for truth to reject the knowledge which comes from the senses; and each takes as basis of his system the certainty of his own existence which each discovers by way of the doubt which he is opposing.

Parallel with this similarity of thought runs a difference in attitude toward their thinking. It may be traced through all the passages which we have considered. It is so evident and so deep seated that it indicates a fundamental difference in the natures of the two thinkers. This difference is to be found in their estimate of the relative importance of religion and philosophy. For Augustine, religion is everything and philosophy is regarded as a means of approach and as a key to the solution of the problems of religion. With Descartes, however, philosophy is of primary importance, although the opinions of the Church are by no means ignored. The latter fact is shown by his reverence for the Jesuit masters in the College of La Flèche and by his desire for their approval of his work.¹ It is manifest also in his expressions of unwillingness to run counter to the opinions of the Church,² and in his dedication of the *Meditations*.³ In spite of this reverence for the Church and her opinions, one feels that religion for Descartes is not a vital, personal force. Neither his philosophical works nor his letters show that his religion is anything more than a formal reckoning with the power of the Church.

logism, but by a simple act of mental vision, recognizes it as if it were a thing that is known *per se*. This is evident from the fact that if it were syllogistically deduced, the major premise, that everything that thinks is, or exists, would have to be known previously; but yet that has rather been learned from the experience of the individual—that unless he exists he cannot think. For our mind is so constituted by nature that general propositions are formed out of the knowledge of particulars." (*Reply to Objections*, II, 1641, edition of Haldane and Ross, Vol. II, p. 38.)

¹ See *Letter to Dinet* (1642), edition of Haldane and Ross, Vol. II, pp. 347-376.

² *Principles*, Pt. IV, Prop. CCVII.

³ *Works*, Vol. I, pp. 133-136.

We have noted that religion, to Augustine, is the chief aim and end of life, while we are unable to discover Descartes's attitude from his writings. Their relation to theology, or the organized doctrines of the Church, shows a difference and also gives an insight into the fundamental difference in their characters. The relative importance of philosophy and theology for Augustine, is shown by the fact that as his life advances, and as the dogmas of the Church settle into more and more inflexible lines, it becomes for him increasingly necessary to subordinate philosophy to theology. In many instances, the bishop feels compelled to retract earlier teachings because they seem to defend some heretical opinion which he is now combatting. Descartes does not subordinate either philosophy or theology but attempts to define their fields and so prevent any encroachment. "One must distinguish between three types of questions," he says. "Certain things are believed through faith alone. Such are the mystery of the Incarnation, the Trinity, and the like. Others, however, though they have a certain bearing on faith, can nevertheless be investigated by the natural reason. Among these are generally ranked by the orthodox theologians, the existence of God, and the distinction of mind from body. Finally, there are others which belong in no wise to the sphere of faith, but only to the sphere of human reason, *e. g.*, the question of the squaring of the circle or of making gold by the art of alchemy. And even as these men abuse the words of Holy Scripture, who, from a distorted interpretation of it presume to elicit these last questions, so do those others diminish its authority who undertake to solve the first type of question by arguments sought from philosophy alone."¹ Augustine recognizes no such distinction, but considers all theological questions as open to philosophical consideration. An example of this treatment is his method of relating the doctrine of the Trinity to that of the existence of the self.²

This fundamental difference between Augustine and Descartes may be found throughout their philosophical systems. In

¹ *Notes against a Certain Programme* (1647), edition by Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, pp. 438, 439.

² See above, p. 589.

their arguments for the existence of the self, it is evident in their attitude toward the various stages of the argument. For Augustine, doubt is an intolerable experience which is to be shortened as much as possible, and the transition to certainty is felt, as well as thought. In the system of Descartes, the search for truth is a matter of the reason, rather than of the heart. We feel that Augustine's thinking is an intensely personal experience, while Descartes seems a rather impersonal observer of the workings of his mind.

In their method also of search for the truth, we find divergences which arise from this fundamental difference in the nature of the two men. Descartes advances toward the certainty of self-existence by means of a systematic and careful method, while Augustine employs no method, but seems to be driven on by the strivings of his spirit. This difference is characteristic of their systems as a whole. Augustine worked out his philosophy as need arose, from his inner life or from some doctrine of the Church which must be defended. Descartes, on the other hand, had as his primary object, the careful building of a system of thought on a sure foundation and was not disturbed by outside considerations. As a result of this difference in method, the complete system of Descartes is found in all his principal works. The philosophy of Augustine, however, was never arranged in an orderly manner. It is found as detached fragments in numerous works which are devoted primarily to theological questions. Another cause of this difference is the fact that Descartes had leisure to think and write systematically, while Augustine composed his voluminous writings during a life of strenuous activity.

Not only in their feeling toward doubt, and in their method of seeking the truth, but also in their attitude toward the certainty of self-existence which they have established, can we trace the difference in the nature of the two men. The discovery of the certainty Augustine has been longing for is a real experience to him, and one which is touched with emotion. To use the figure which he employs in *De Beata Vita*, he is a storm-tossed ship which has at length reached a safe harbor. For Descartes, on

the other hand, the discovery of certainty is a purely rational procedure, and the satisfaction of the discoverer is that of one who has successfully demonstrated a geometrical proposition. We feel that the thinker himself stands aloof from the search for truth.

In comparing the teachings of Augustine and Descartes on the existence of the self, it is well to emphasize in conclusion, the fact that both use the self as the basis of their philosophy. This is the more remarkable in view of the difference in their estimate of the relative importance of philosophy and theology, and in the face, also, of the centuries which separate the two thinkers. In the main points of the system of Augustine, we find changes as time passed, but the teaching as to the existence of the self does not change and is found in all his important works from the earliest to the latest. These considerations indicate the power and stability of this doctrine of the existence of the self as the basis of philosophical thinking.

B. THE CONCEPTION OF THE SELF AS FREE

I. *The Teaching of Augustine.*

Most significant of the characters attributed to the self both by Augustine and by Descartes is its freedom. It is difficult to summarize Augustine's conception of the self as free, first, because he so closely connects it with his teaching concerning the doctrine of evil, second, because he presents two unharmonized views of freedom, and, finally, because, in this doctrine to a greater extent than in any other, his views change as he grows older in the service of the Church.

a. Before attempting to discuss Augustine's doctrine of freedom, it is necessary to summarize briefly his theory of the origin and nature of evil, since the two doctrines are so closely interwoven. The existence of evil had always been a problem to Augustine. In an early work he writes: "You bring up that question which tremendously exercised me, when I was quite a youth, and then drove me, exhausted, to the heretics and cast me among them. I was so shattered by this overthrow, and

buried so deep under such heaps of empty tales, that if my love of finding truth had not gained for me divine aid, I should never have emerged and breathed the first freedom of research."¹ Augustine received his greatest help in the solution of this problem from certain works of the Neo-Platonists,² which he read before his conversion. From these books came the suggestion which he uncritically adopted, that evil is not being, but a failure to reach being, and that its existence is necessary to a comprehension of the world. This idea enabled him to reconcile the existence of evil with the existence of God.

Evil cannot originate in God, because He is good, and wills the good. "Where, then, I saw that the incorruptible was to be preferred to the corruptible, there ought I to seek Thee, and there observe 'whence evil itself was,' that is, whence comes the corruption by which Thy substance can by no means be profaned. For corruption . . . in no way injures our God, . . . because He is God, and what He wills is good, and Himself is that good; but to be corrupted is not good."³ Moreover, there cannot be any entity contrary to the divine, in which evil could originate.—"To that nature which supremely is, and which created all else that exists, no nature is contrary save that which does not exist. For nonentity is the contrary of that which is. And thus there is no being contrary to God, the Supreme Being, and Author of all things whatsoever."⁴ Since, then, evil can neither originate in God nor in some entity contrary to Him, its origin must be sought in created things. But all things were created good. "... Behold God," writes Augustine, "and behold what God hath created; and God is good, yea, most mightily and incomparably better than all these; but yet He, who is good, hath created them good."⁵

We seem now to have reached a position from which the solution of the question is impossible. If evil can originate

¹ *De Libero Arbitrio*, I: 2, *op. cit.*, p. 1224. (Writer's translation.) Cf. *Confessions*, VII: 5, *op. cit.*

² *Confessions*, VII: 9; *De Beata Vita*: 4.

³ *Confessions*, VII: 4, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

⁴ *City of God*, XII: 2, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 483, 484.

⁵ *Confessions*, VII: 5, *op. cit.*, p. 146. Cf. *City of God*, XI: 21, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 461.

neither in God, nor in any other entity, and if all things were created good, how is the existence of evil possible? It was at this point that the Neo-Platonist writings gave assistance to Augustine, by suggesting that evil is not something positive, but a lack or privation of good.¹ "For evil has no positive nature; but the loss of good has received the name 'evil.'"² Since evil originates in created things and is a privation, it must be the turning away of the human will from God who is the chief good. "And I inquired," says Augustine, "what iniquity is, and ascertained it not to be a substance,³ but a perversion of the will, bent aside from Thee, O God, the Supreme Substance, towards these lower things."⁴ Since evil is a defect or privation, it cannot have an efficient cause. "Let no one," Augustine says, "look for an efficient cause of the evil will; for it is not efficient, but deficient, as the will itself is not an effecting of something, but a defect. For defection from that which supremely is, to that which has less of being, . . . this is to begin to have an evil will. Now, to seek to discover the causes of these defections, . . . is as if someone sought to see darkness, or hear silence."⁵ In other words, evil is a participation in non-being. "This do I know," he writes, "that the nature of God can never, nowhere, nowise be defective, and that natures made of nothing can. These latter, however, the more being they have, and the more good they do (for then they do something positive), the more they have efficient causes; but in so far as they are defective in being, and consequently do evil (for then what is their work but vanity?), they have deficient causes."⁶ To summarize,— "There is, then, no natural efficient cause . . . of the evil will, since itself is the origin of evil in mutable spirits, by which the good of their nature is diminished and corrupted;

¹ *Confessions*, III: 7, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

² *City of God*, XI: 9, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 447.

³ Cf. *De Vera Religione*: 39. (A.D. 390). In *Opera Omnia*, ed. Migne, Tom. III (XXXIV), p. 138.

⁴ *Confessions*, VII: 16, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

⁵ *City of God*, XII: 7, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 490. Cf. *De Libero Arbitrio*, II: 20, *op. cit.*, p. 1269.

⁶ *City of God*, XII: 8, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 491.

and the will is made evil by nothing else than defection from God,—a defection of which the cause, too, is certainly deficient.”¹

b. Augustine’s doctrine of freedom is based upon his teaching that the self is conscious of willing. Indeed our knowledge of the existence of the will rests, he believes, upon as secure a foundation as does our knowledge that we live. “. . . This raised me towards Thy light,” Augustine says, “that I knew as well that I had a will as that I had life.”² And again: “I acknowledge, it cannot be denied that we possess a will.”³ Over and over again, Augustine asserts the importance of the will. “I have nothing other than the will;” he says, “I know nothing other than that the fleeting and the falling should be spurned, the fixed and eternal sought after.”⁴ He even teaches that the will is of central importance in perception. For example, in vision there are three elements,—“the form of the body which is seen, and the image of it impressed on the sense,—and the will of the mind which applies the sense to the sensible thing, and retains the vision itself in it.”⁵ In thought, which is the combination of memory, internal vision, and will, will holds the chief place because it unites the others.⁶ Moreover, the will can separate “the bodily senses from the bodies that are to be perceived, by movement of the body, either to hinder our perceiving the thing, or that we may cease to perceive it,” and it can avert “the memory from the sense; when, through its being intent on something else, it does not suffer things present to cleave to it.”⁷ Finally, the will is in all emotions, or, to use Augustine’s phrase, in all motions of the soul. “But the character of the human will is of moment; because, if it is wrong, these motions of the soul will be wrong, but if it is right, they will be not merely blameless, but even praiseworthy. For the will is in them all; yea, none of them is anything else than will. For what are desire and joy but a volition of consent to the things

¹ *Op. cit.*, XII: 9, p. 491.

² *Confessions*, VII: 3, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

³ *De Libero Arbitrio*, I: 12, *op. cit.*, p. 1234. (Writer’s translation.)

⁴ *Soliloquies*, I: 1, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁵ *On the Trinity*, XI: 2, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

⁶ *Ibid.*, XI: 3, p. 268.

⁷ *Ibid.*, XI: 8, pp. 279, 280.

we wish? And what are fear and sadness but a volition of aversion from the things which we do not wish?"¹

In his development of the conception of the will as free, Augustine presents two irreconcilable views which he does not attempt to relate. Both are based upon the self's consciousness not merely that it wills, but that it wills freely. (1) According to the first of these conceptions, freedom is submission to the divine will. This view is formulated in the following passages: "The mind cannot be influenced against its desire to leave the higher things and choose the lower—For this reason, all useful training makes us turn our will from the flight of temporal things to the enjoyment of lasting good, by means of the rejected and restrained impulse."² "From this it follows that whoever desires to live righteously and honorably, can accomplish this with so much ease that to will is equivalent to having what one wills."³ The conception of freedom which Augustine is employing here, is based upon his teaching that man is the product of being and non-being. "I viewed," he says, "the other things below Thee, and perceived that they neither altogether are, nor altogether are not. They are, indeed, because they are from Thee; but are not, because they are not what Thou art."⁴ When the human will, which is the center of the finite nature, submits itself to being, that is, to the divine will, it is a free will: "Our freedom consists in submission to the truth."⁵ "Hence there is no real freedom except that of the saints and of those who obey the eternal law."⁶ The free will in this sense is the good, that is, the obedient will. It will later appear that Augustine found it necessary toward the end of his life, to retract some of the statements just quoted with regard to the free will, thus conceived.

(2) Augustine's second view of freedom regards it as power of choice between good and evil: "For a man, to the extent that he is a man, is something good; because he can live right-

¹ *City of God*, XIV: 6, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

² *De Libero Arbitrio*, III: 1, *op. cit.*, p. 1272. (Writer's translation.)

³ *Ibid.*, I: 13, p. 1237. (Writer's translation.)

⁴ *Confessions*, VII: 11, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

⁵ *De Libero Arbitrio*, II: 13, *op. cit.*, p. 1261. (Writer's translation.)

⁶ *Ibid.*, I: 15, p. 1238. (Writer's translation.)

eously if he so wills.”¹ “Now it was expedient that man should be at first so created, as to have it in his power both to will what was right and to will what was wrong; not without reward if he willed the former, and not without punishment if he willed the latter.”² The theological reason for asserting this sort of freedom of the will is the desire to defend the justice of God’s rewards and punishments. But this indeterministic doctrine of the power of choice, while rescuing God’s goodness, seems to encounter a difficulty of its own in the problem of reconciling man’s freedom with God’s omniscience and foreknowledge. Augustine firmly asserts that both conceptions are to be retained. “Now, against the sacrilegious and impious darings of reason, we assert both that God knows all things before they come to pass, and that we do by our free will whatsoever we know and feel to be done by us only because we will it. . . . But it does not follow that, though there is for God a certain order of all causes, there must therefore be nothing depending on the free exercise of our own wills, for our wills themselves are included in that order of causes which is certain to God, and is embraced by His foreknowledge, for human wills are also causes of human actions; and He who foreknew all the causes of things would certainly among those causes not have been ignorant of our wills.”³ Augustine implies, by these words, the evident possibility of God’s foreknowing human choices without willing them.⁴ But he does not even attempt the far more difficult task of reconciling God’s omnipotence with the existence of free and evil human wills.

c. After Augustine entered the service of the Church, the doctrine of freedom in both its forms underwent great modification as it became necessary to harmonize it with religious dogmas.

(1) Augustine’s earlier conception of the free will as the good

¹ *De Libero Arbitrio*, II: 1, *op. cit.*, p. 1241 (Writer’s translation). Retracted, see *Retractationes*, I: 9 (A.D. 427, 428). A critical review by Augustine of all his earlier works. Ed. Migne, Tom. I (XXXII).

² *Enchiridion*; 15, p. 249. (Works, *op. cit.*, Vol. IX.)

³ *City of God*, V: 9, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 192, 193.

⁴ If God’s knowledge be conceived, as in Book XI of the *Confessions*, as essentially timeless, causal efficiency is still less properly attributed to it. On this point, cf. Windelband, *History of Modern Philosophy*, tr. J. H. Tufts, p. 283.

will was definitely related, during his dispute with the Pelagians, with the doctrine of grace. The followers of Pelagius denied the doctrine of original sin¹ and declared that man could do good by his own power.² In order to oppose this view which, Augustine thinks, leaves no place for the grace of God,³ he retracts some of the earlier statements which the Pelagians are using against him, for example, the assertions that by discipline we can turn our wills from temporal to eternal things; and that he who wishes to live honorably, is able to achieve this, almost with the wish: "In these words of mine," Augustine says in the *Retractationes*, "and in others of the same kind, because the grace of God was not mentioned (for I was not then treating of it) the Pelagians think or may think that I hold their view. But they are wrong in thinking this."⁴

Augustine's doctrine of grace is best summarized in his own words. It starts out from the conviction that man cannot do good by his own power: "For men are separated from God only by sins, from which we are in this life cleansed not by our own virtue, but by the divine compassion; through His indulgence, not through our own power. For whatever virtue we call our own is itself bestowed upon us by His goodness."⁵ Furthermore, no man more than another deserves to receive the grace of God, therefore there is no injustice in the fact that it is bestowed only on some. ". . . For he who at first gave entrance to sin has been punished with all his posterity . . . so that no one is exempt from this just and due punishment, unless delivered by mercy and undeserved grace; and the human race is so apportioned that in some is displayed the efficacy of merciful grace, in the rest the efficacy of just retribution."⁶

(2) The doctrine of grace, thus stated, supplements and modifies but certainly does not contradict Augustine's conception of the free will as the good will. It is, however, incompatible with

¹ *Retractationes*, I: 9, *op. cit.*, p. 598.

² *Ibid.*, p. 595.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 596.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 596. (Writer's translation.) Augustine here refers specifically to the passage quoted above, pp. 23, 24.

⁵ *City of God*, X: 22, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 413.

⁶ *Ibid.*, XXI: 12, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 438.

his second conception of freedom as power of choice. For if man is powerless in himself to do good he is, in so far at least, without freedom in this sense of the term. Augustine therefore restricts freedom of choice to the first man, Adam.

For this limitation, Augustine assigns two reasons. The first, which he never treats as decisive, is the unlikelihood (as it seems to him) that God should create each separate individual soul. More probably, he believes, each human soul is derived by propagation from the created soul of the first man.¹ The second and more important motive for this restriction of freedom, as power of choice, is the belief to which he comes that complete freedom of choice would remove the necessity for a redeemer. In order to conform to the teaching of the Church with regard to redemption, it becomes necessary to limit complete freedom of the will to the first man, Adam. Adam's misuse of this freedom is shown in the story of the Fall:

"God, as it is written, made man upright, and consequently with a good will—The good will, then, is the work of God.—But the first evil will, which preceded all man's evil acts, was rather a kind of falling away from the work of God to its own works than any positive work. And therefore the acts resulting were evil, not having God, but the will itself, for their end."² "Our first parents fell into open disobedience because already they were secretly corrupted; for the evil act had never been done had not an evil will preceded it."³ The penalty for this sin of the first man and woman was death.⁴ Man was created for immortality or for death, but by his sin deserved the latter. "... Our first parents were so created, that, if they had not sinned, they would not have been dismissed from their bodies by any death, but would have been endowed with immortality as the reward of their obedience."⁵ This penalty of death was just because the commandment broken was not hard to obey. "Therefore,

¹ Augustine, however, never definitely adopts this view. Cf. *De Libero Arbitrio*, III: 21 and *Retractationes*, I: 1, *op. cit.*, p. 587.

² *City of God*, XIV: 11, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 22.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 26.

⁴ *Ibid.*, XIII: 3, Vol. I, p. 523. Cf. *On the Trinity*, IV: 13, *op. cit.*, p. 125. *De Libero Arbitrio*, III: 20, *op. cit.*, p. 1297.

⁵ *City of God*, XIII: 19, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 544.

because the sin was a despising of the authority of God . . . who had laid upon him neither many, nor great, nor difficult commandments,—it was just that condemnation followed, . . . and as in his pride man had sought to be his own satisfaction, God in His justice abandoned him to himself, not to live in the absolute independence he affected, but instead of the liberty he desired, to live dissatisfied with himself in a hard and miserable bondage to him to whom by sinning he had yielded himself. . . . Whoever thinks such punishment either excessive or unjust shows his inability to measure the great iniquity of sinning where sin might so easily have been avoided.”¹

Not alone the first man suffered this penalty of death, but it has been inherited by the whole human race,² which is derived from one man for the sake of unity.³ By the sin of Adam, the race has become sinful. “In the first man, therefore, there existed the whole human nature,—and what man was made, not when created, but when he sinned and was punished, this he propagated, so far as the origin of sin and death are concerned.”⁴ Because the human race is thus under the bondage of original sin, a redeemer is necessary. “Since, then, we were not fit to take hold of things eternal, and since the foulness of sins weighed us down, . . . it was needful that we should be cleansed.”⁵ By the work of redemption, the freedom of our wills is restored, in the first sense of ‘freedom’ as ‘goodness.’ “The will, therefore, is then truly free, when it is not the slave of vices and sins. Such was it given us by God; and this being lost by its own fault, can only be restored by Him who was able at first to give it. And therefore the truth says, ‘If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.’”⁶

Because Augustine’s doctrine of freedom is so much better known in this theologically perverted form than in its original

¹ *City of God*, XIV: 15, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 28, 29. Cf. *On the Trinity*, IV: 12, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

² *On the Trinity*, XIII: 16, *op. cit.*, p. 333. Cf. *De Libero Arbitrio*, III: 19, *op. cit.*, p. 1297.

³ *City of God*, XII: 27, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 520.

⁴ *Ibid.*, XIII: 3, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 523.

⁵ *On the Trinity*, IV: 18, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

⁶ *City of God*, XIV: 11, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 23.

conception, it may be well to restate, in outline, the earlier view. According to this view every self is immediately conscious of itself as willing and as possessed of the power of choice. God creates this freely willing self and foreknows (without willing) its evil choices; but the evil of these human purposes is to be regarded as a privation of being rather than as positive evil. And the human self, when it wills in conformity with God's purposes, is 'free' in a second and higher sense: it is a 'good' and obedient self.

II. *The Teaching of Descartes.*

Descartes, like Augustine, bases both the doctrine of freedom and the theory of evil on the supreme fact of the will. In the *Passions of the Soul*, he classifies the functions of the soul into actions, or the will, and passions, or perceptions.¹ Of these two, the will is more extended. "Further, the perception of the understanding only extends to the few objects which present themselves to it, and is always very limited. The will, on the other hand, may in some measure be said to be the infinite, because we perceive nothing which may be the object of some other will, even of the immensity of the will that is in God, to which our will cannot also extend."² The will is the most perfect of all our faculties, "since as a matter of fact I am conscious of will so extended as to be subject to no limits."³

a. The will plays a leading part in the origin of evil. Descartes discusses the topic under two heads,—error in conduct, and error in judgment. "But I should like you," he says, "to remember here that, in matters that may be embraced by the will, I made a very strict distinction between the practical life and the contemplation of truth."⁴ With regard to error in conduct, or in practical life, Descartes, again like Augustine, asserts, that its origin is not in God. "—He understands and wills and effects everything: that is, everything that really exists; for

¹ *Passions of the Soul* (A.D. 1650), edition of Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, Pt. I, Article XVII. Cf. *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. XXXII.

² *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. XXXV.

³ *Meditations*, IV, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

⁴ *Reply to Objection II*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

he does not will the evil of sin because that evil is nothing real."¹ Therefore, " . . . God . . . is not to be regarded as responsible for our errors, though endowed with the power to prevent them."² Sin is not something positive, but is a defect or privation.³ "Thus do I recognize that error, in so far as it is such, is not a real thing depending on God, but simply a defect."⁴ In his reply to Gassendi's Objections to the Meditations, Descartes writes: "Here you are everywhere guilty of a false assumption in taking as a positive imperfection 'the fact that we are liable to err,' since this is really (except with respect to God) the negation of a greater perfection."⁵

Finally, Descartes teaches, this evil which is a privation of good, cannot originate in God, but has its origin in the human will. "We know," he declares, "that all our errors depend on our will."⁶ Yet while evil originates in the will, there is another factor involved, that is, the understanding. Now " . . . the light of nature teaches us that the knowledge of the understanding should always precede the determination of the will."⁷ Because of this fact, evil arises when the will is used beyond the point to which our understanding extends. "Whence then come my errors? They come from the sole fact that since the will is much wider in its range and compass than the understanding, I do not restrain it within the same bounds, but extend it also to things which I do not understand: and as the will is of itself indifferent to these, it easily falls into error and sin, and chooses the evil for the good."⁷

Errors in judgment, or in the contemplation of the truth, are treated by Descartes in much the same way. As in the case of errors of conduct, so here, error is a defect and not something real. " . . . By falsity," he says, "I understand only the privation of truth."⁸ Error is not to be attributed to God, "who being

¹ *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. XXIII.

² *Ibid.*, Pt. I, Prop. XXXVIII.

³ *Ibid.*, Pt. I, Prop. XXXI. Cf. *Ibid.*, Pt. I, Prop. XXIII.

⁴ *Meditations*, IV, *op. cit.*, pp. 173, 177.

⁵ *Reply to Objection V*, *op. cit.*, p. 223. Cf. *Reply to Objection III*, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

⁶ *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. XLII.

⁷ *Meditations*, IV, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-176.

⁸ *Reply to Objection V*, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

supremely perfect, cannot be the cause of any error."¹ The source of error, then, must be in the self. Yet the will, in itself, is not the origin of error; "for it is very ample and very perfect of its kind," nor is the understanding; "for since I understand nothing but by the power which God has given me for understanding, there is no doubt that all that I understand, I understand as I ought, and it is not possible that I err in this."² Error arises, therefore, from the relation between the will and the understanding. We err when we exercise our will beyond the limit of clear understanding.

b. In the doctrine of freedom, Descartes, again like Augustine, finds ground for asserting the existence of freedom in the consciousness of the individual self that it possesses freedom. The following quotations make this evident: ". . . We are so conscious of the liberty and indifference which exists in us, that there is nothing that we comprehend more clearly and perfectly."³ "I made no assumption concerning freedom which is not a matter of universal experience; our natural light makes this most evident."⁴ "Refuse then to be free, if freedom does not please you; I at least shall rejoice in my liberty, since I experience it in myself."⁵ In the second place, however, Descartes argues that freedom of action must exist in order to justify praise and blame. ". . . It is the greatest perfection in man to be able to act by its [the will's] means, that is, freely, and by so doing we are in a peculiar way masters of our actions and thereby merit praise or blame."⁶

Both of Descartes's conceptions of freedom are as forms of 'power of choice.' They correspond to the two forms of error which he has distinguished. One kind of freedom is the power to give or withhold assent in matters of which we have not certain knowledge. This conception is related to that of error in judgment. ". . . We experience a freedom through which we may abstain from accepting as true and indisputable those things of which

¹ *Meditations*, IV, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

² *Ibid.*, IV, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

³ *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. XLI. Cf. *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. VI.

⁴ *Reply to Objection III*, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

⁵ *Reply to Objection V*, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

⁶ *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. XXXVII.

we have not certain knowledge, and thus obviate our ever being deceived."¹ ". . . It is so evident that we are possessed of a free will that can give or withhold its assent, that this may be counted as one of the first and most ordinary notions that are found innately in us."² The second kind of freedom is the power of choice between good and evil and is related to error in conduct. ". . . The faculty of will," Descartes says, "consists alone in our having the power of choosing to do a thing or choosing not to do it (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or to shun it), or rather it consists alone in the fact that in order to affirm or deny, pursue or shun those things placed before us by the understanding, we act so that we are unconscious that any outside force constrains us in doing so."³ Freedom in choosing does not imply indifference as to the choice. "For in order that I should be free it is not necessary that I should be indifferent as to the choice of one or the other of two contraries; but contrariwise the more I lean to the one—the more freely do I choose and embrace it." Indifference "is the lowest grade of liberty."⁴

Descartes has little to say with regard to the grace of God. It increases our liberty: "And undoubtedly both divine grace and natural knowledge, far from diminishing my liberty, rather increase it and strengthen it."⁵ By grace, furthermore, we have an inner illumination which shows us that revelation is from God, "and that it is clearly impossible that He should lie: a fact more certain than any natural light and often indeed more evident than it on account of the light of grace."⁶ By the grace of God, also, I have received that perfection which befits a finite being, and therefore "I have every reason to render thanks to God who owes me nothing."⁷

The problem of harmonizing God's pre-ordination and man's freedom is simply ignored by Descartes. We are certain of our

¹ *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. VI. Cf. *Meditations*, IV, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

² *Ibid.*, Pt. I, Prop. XXXIX.

³ *Meditations*, IV, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

⁴ *Ibid.*, IV, *op. cit.*, p. 175. Cf. Reply to Objection VI, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

⁵ *Ibid.*, IV, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

⁶ *Reply to Objection II*, *op. cit.*, pp. 43, 44.

⁷ *Meditations*, IV, *op. cit.*, p. 177. Cf. *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. XXXVIII.

freedom¹ and we must believe in the omnipotence of God, from which follows His power to pre-ordain all that can happen.² But the attempt to harmonize these two conceptions would involve us in great difficulties,² since "our thought is finite," and God's power of pre-ordination is infinite.³ Therefore, although we may "know that this power is in God" and are conscious of our own liberty, we have not intelligence "enough to comprehend how He leaves the free action of man indeterminate."³

III. *The Likeness and the Difference Between the Two Thinkers.*

It is difficult to compare the precise teachings of Augustine and of Descartes on the problem of freedom, for the two thinkers approached the problem from different angles. Yet there are two points of contact which we may note. In the first place, both relate the problem of evil to the doctrine of the self, through the central position given to the will and to our consciousness of ourselves as free in willing. A difference is found in the fact that Augustine conceives evil as a turning away of the will from the good, while Descartes asserts that it is the exercise of the will beyond the limit of certain knowledge. In the second place, both base their doctrine of freedom as power of choice on our consciousness of the possession of freedom. Descartes does not modify this conception, but Augustine, in his effort to reconcile this doctrine of freedom with the teachings of the Church, ends by restricting the power of choice to the first man, Adam, alone.

The fundamental difference, already stated, between Augustine, the theologian, and Descartes, the philosopher, is, in truth, nowhere more apparent than in the discussion of evil and of freedom. Descartes's unconcern in purely theological matters is shown by the very brevity of his treatment of these subjects, for the domain of freedom lies very near the field of theology

¹ *Reply to Objection III, op. cit.*, p. 75.

² *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. XL.

³ *Ibid.*, Pt. I, Prop. XLI.

which he does not care to enter. The question of pre-ordination, also, he sets aside as outside his province. Augustine makes no such distinction between the fields of theology and philosophy, and therefore attempts to solve all the problems which arise. His predominant interest in theology is shown, in the discussion of evil, by his long explanation of the origin of evil in a world which God created good. It appears again and most strikingly in the modification of his original doctrine of freedom to harmonize with the doctrines of the Church.

C. HISTORICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DOCTRINES OF AUGUSTINE AND DESCARTES.

The great similarity of Descartes to Augustine in his fundamental doctrine of the certainty that 'I exist' and the minor likenesses, in his doctrine of freedom, at once suggest the question of Descartes's knowledge of the teaching of Augustine. Our best source is the correspondence of Descartes, for in his philosophical works, mention of Augustine is found in only one place, that is, in his reply to Arnauld's Objections to the Meditations. The references to Augustine may be divided into two classes,—those referring to the doctrine of the self, and those referring to other matters. The last-named of these classes, which is the larger, will be first considered.

(1) The first of the general references to Augustine is found in a letter to Mersenne, written in 1638. "I have looked for the letter in which you cited the passage of St. Augustine, but I have not been able to find it. Moreover, I have not been able to gain access again to the works of the Saint, to see what you have written me about."¹ In 1640, Descartes writes to Father Mersenne: "That which you have written me about St. Augustine and St. Ambrose, namely that our hearts and our thoughts are not in our power In this I quite agree with them."² In 1641, Descartes writes again to Mersenne: "But, as you write me about St. Augustine, I am not able to open the eyes of my

¹ Lettre CXLIX, Tome II, Oeuvres de Descartes publiées par Charles Adam et Paul Tannery, Paris, 1897-1910, p. 435. (Writer's translation.)

² Lettre CCXX, *op. cit.*, Tome III, p. 248. (Writer's translation.)

readers or to make them give attention to the things which must be considered in order really to know the truth,"¹ and further on in the same letter, he mentions a passage from Augustine concerning the possibility of knowing God. In April, 1641, Descartes sends Mersenne a list of passages from Augustine, cited by Arnauld in his *Objections to the Meditations*, and notes the fact that Augustine and others agree in his view that God cannot deceive.² The next year finds Descartes writing to Mersenne that he cannot find a certain passage in Augustine's works concerning the fortieth psalm, and that he has also looked for the account of the Pelagian heresy of which he had been accused.³ In 1644 (?) he writes to Father Mesland that there is no preference nor priority between God's understanding and will, and quotes Augustine in support.⁴

(2) The other group of Descartes's references to Augustine comprises those which deal with the doctrine of the self. The first of these is found in a letter to Mersenne, dated 1637, in which he writes that he has not mentioned the teaching of St. Augustine in *De Civitate Dei*, XI: 26 "since he does not seem to apply it as I do."⁵ In 1640, he writes to a friend whose name is unknown to us, thanking him for calling attention to the likeness of the Cartesian argument for the existence of the self to that of St. Augustine. Descartes continues: "I have read it to-day in the Library of this city, and I have indeed found that he employs it to prove the certainty of our existence and finally to show that there is a kind of image of the Trinity in us. . . . Whereas I use it to show that this I which thinks, is an immaterial substance. These are two very different things, but I am glad to have read St. Augustine."⁶ In 1640, Descartes writes to Mersenne: "You have already called my attention to the passage in St. Augustine concerning my 'I think, therefore I am,' which, I believe, you have asked me about before now. It is in

¹ Lettre CCXXVII, *op. cit.*, Tome III, pp. 283, 284. (Writer's translation.)

² Lettre CCXXXVII, *op. cit.*, Tome III, pp. 358, 359, 360.

³ Lettre CCLXXIII, *op. cit.*, Tome III, pp. 543, 544.

⁴ Lettre CCCXLVII, *op. cit.*, Tome IV, p. 119.

⁵ Lettre LXXVI, *op. cit.*, Tome I, p. 376. (Writer's translation.)

⁶ Lettre CCIX, *op. cit.*, Tome III, pp. 247, 248. (Writer's translation.)

the eleventh book of *De Civitate Dei*, chapter 26."¹ In Arnauld's Objections to the Meditations, he notes the identity between the fundamental doctrines of Augustine and those of Descartes² and Descartes, in his reply, acknowledges the aid of Augustine's authority.³ In 1644, writing to Father Mesland, Descartes expresses satisfaction that his thoughts "agree with those of so saintly and estimable a man."⁴

The evidence from Descartes's letters thus shows clearly that he consistently declared his independence of Augustine's teaching. Three considerations may be urged in favor of his sincerity. The first of these is the fact that he welcomes the aid of Augustine's authority. The second is the unlikelihood that he invented the story of going to the city library to read Augustine. The third is the fact that Descartes was educated in a Jesuit school; and this makes it very probable that he knew nothing of Augustine's thought. This third consideration alone needs elucidation.

Descartes's school life of eight years was spent at the Jesuit College of La Flèche, newly established in the province of Maine. And the influence of the Jesuits did not end with his school days but continued throughout his life. He is, indeed, always most anxious to win the approval of the Jesuits for his work. Of course this wish to stand well with them must have been in part due to ulterior considerations of his own safety, but his references to them suggest also sincere feeling.⁵ Now the Jesuits in Descartes's time were wholly opposed to the teachings of Augustine. Their opposition was of long standing. From the time of Augustine onward, a fierce contest had been waged in the Church over the questions of grace and free will, and the teachings of Augustine were the basis of the dispute. The Church, through the declarations of the Council of Trent (1563),

¹ Lettre CCXXII, *op. cit.*, Tome III, p. 261. (Writer's translation.)

² *Objection IV*, Works, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 80.

³ *Reply to Objection IV*, Works, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 96.

⁴ Lettre CCCXLVII, *op. cit.*, Tome IV, p. 113. (Writer's translation.)

⁵ Descartes's regard for the opinion of the Jesuits is shown in the Dedication of the *Meditations*. It finds expression also in the Letter to Dinet. (Cf. Works, ed. Haldane and Ross, Vol. II, pp. 347 ff.) and in the annotations on Objection VII to the *Meditations*.

had attempted to put an end to this bitter strife, but in vain. In France, where the conflict was destined to be waged most bitterly, Augustine was unknown at the beginning of the seventeenth century.¹ A change came, however, when Jansenius and St. Cyran entered upon their effort to elevate the standard of the church by reviving the teaching of Augustine. The Jansenists thereupon became the champions of Augustine's teachings, especially with regard to freedom.² The Jesuits, on the other hand, upheld the more liberal Pelagian view. Strife between the two parties began when the writings of Jansenius were condemned. It is easy to see that because of the bitterness of the contest Descartes's education under the care of the Jesuits would not have given him a knowledge of Augustine's works. And since he never interested himself in the works of his philosophical predecessors, there is every reason to believe that he reached his certainty of the self's existence in independence of Augustine's teaching. The fact that these two thinkers, under different conditions and in independence, have made the doctrine of the existence of the self the basis of their philosophical systems, indicates the value of this doctrine as the foundation for philosophy.

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¹ On all this, cf. J. F. Nourrisson, *La Philosophie de St. Augustin*, Paris, 1866, Tome II, pp. 187 ff.

² The most famous defenders of Jansenist doctrines were the Port Royalists and, prominent among them, Arnauld and Pascal. Naturally, the Port Royalists approved Descartes's teaching as it accorded with Augustine's.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Theism and Humanism, being the Gifford Lectures delivered at the University of Glasgow, 1914. By ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR. London, New York, Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1915.—pp. xv, 274.

Mr. Balfour has been known to philosophy hitherto chiefly by his *Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, published in 1879, and his *Foundations of Belief*, published in 1895. To those familiar with these writings the argument of the present volume of Gifford Lectures will contain no surprises. The theme of the work is what the title suggests, the necessity for maintaining some form of "Theism" as opposed to "Naturalism," if those humanistic beliefs of ours, on which the dignity and worth of our life so largely rest, are to be maintained. The author regards the acquiescence in "Naturalism" as, of course, possible. He has always acknowledged the marvellous power of human beings to pursue the ordinary avocations of their lives, feeling *as if* certain convictions were true and acting as if they were true, even with the knowledge that they cannot at all be defended. But he has always differed from the view that such a state of things is desirable, or even that it can go on. At the best, it marks an unstable state of the soul, and it carries with it at least the potentiality of grave consequences.

"To me it appears certain that this clashing between beliefs and feelings must ultimately prove fatal, to one or the other. Make what allowance you please for the stupidity of mankind, take the fullest account of their really remarkable power of letting their speculative opinions follow one line of development and their practical ideals another, yet the time must come when reciprocal action will perforce bring opinions and ideals into some kind of agreement and congruity. If, then, Naturalism is to hold the field, the feelings and opinions inconsistent with naturalism must be foredoomed to suffer change; and how, when that change shall come about, it can do otherwise than eat all nobility out of our conception of conduct and all worth out of our conception of life, I am wholly unable to understand" (*Foundations of Belief*, p. 81).

Mr. Balfour's justification of the beliefs which lie at the root of our higher life, is presented in these lectures, if not with the quite super-

lative lucidity of his earlier works, still with a lucidity far in advance of most philosophical writing. And except for a certain peculiarity of his position to which we shall refer, his argument would not be hard to outline.

Its mainspring plainly lies in a powerful feeling of the limitations of human reasoning as a means of obtaining a creed; a feeling originally derived, apparently, from a sense of the complete failure in this respect of the reigning philosophy of the sixties and seventies—a feeling to which he gave pungent expression in his first philosophical work. But to say that through human reasoning you cannot obtain a creed at all, is at first view rather drastic teaching. It would seem tantamount to bidding us believe what we please, since all beliefs alike are incapable of rational justification. And critics in the past have not been slow to urge that such teaching is all that they could derive from Mr. Balfour's writings. But in a charming little "autobiographical parenthesis" with which he surprises us in the middle of this book, the author seeks now to parry the blow. "This," he says, "is not what I have ever wanted to say, nor is it what I want to say now." And he proceeds to tell us whence such a travesty of his real opinions probably arose. The source of it was an early "and no doubt emphatically expressed" but yet wholly justifiable contempt for the attitude of assurance and dogmatism taken up by one particular philosophy, which attempted incompetently to reason us into making a creed of natural science.

"I went to Cambridge in the middle sixties with a very small equipment of either philosophy or science, but a very keen desire to discover *what* I was to think of the world and *why*. For the history of speculation I cared not a jot. Dead systems seemed of no more interest to me than abandoned fashions. My business was with the ground-work of living beliefs; in particular with the ground-work of that scientific knowledge whose recent developments had so profoundly moved mankind. And surely there was nothing perverse in asking modern philosophers to provide us with a theory of modern science. I was referred to Mill; and the shock of disillusionment remains with me to the present hour. . . ."

What shocked him, apparently, about this "scientific knowledge whose recent developments had so profoundly moved mankind" was the discovery that the foundations of it, once Mill had drawn the veil from them, were entirely flimsy; that, together with the fact that Mill himself never seemed to see it. That this is so, is perhaps the main message of Mr. Balfour's first philosophical essay, that "piece of

destructive criticism," as he named it in his preface. There were *no* foundations to the whole imposing structure. Nor, for that matter, were there any to common sense either. There was no rational proof either of the 'universal causation' which science assumed; or of the existence of the external world, which common sense assumed. And the lesson he wished to extract from the situation was not that science was untrustworthy or common sense bankrupt; but that Mill had gone wrongly to work, and had gone wrong in a specific way. He had tried to *prove* our basal scientific beliefs instead of showing (a) that they cannot be proved, and (b) that in common with our basal common sense beliefs, they have other claims to our acceptance than 'proof.' And the author's central contention now—although, of course, it is one which he had already suggested in his first work and had developed more fully in his second—is that many beliefs besides those unprovable ones of common sense and science have the same claims to our acceptance as they; and that, among the latter, what he calls "Theism" has a pre-eminent place.

The author sets out to show the necessity for belief in a Divine Being. His position, however, is not exactly that of the old 'argument from design,' although he makes use of that argument. He reaches his Theism through *values*. And the important matter for his readers, is to note quite clearly the relation in which, for him, our belief in God stands to our belief in beauty, goodness and truth. The argument from design might tell us that certain things cannot have been due to mechanism or chance; and the author makes a strong point of showing that neither the highest morals nor the highest art nor the highest knowledge can have been due to the mere mechanism of natural selection; and since for him, on the other hand, it is incredible that they should have come by chance, it will be seen that he goes practically the whole way with those who argued from design to a 'great Designer' as the ultimate source of things. But the author's central argument, the one on which he mainly relies, is different from this.

Mr. Balfour holds and shows at great length, and in agreement even with such thinkers as Nietzsche or Huxley, that such things as, *e. g.*, the morality of the Sermon on the Mount cannot have come by natural selection, because such morality is of no use for the purposes of natural selection. If nothing but biological necessity is at work, then all our higher powers are accidents. They are by-products. For they have no survival value. For instance, "few are the biologists who would maintain that care and kindness, lavished on the bio-

logically unfit," is not detrimental to the biological fitness of the race. "But if so, we must agree with Nietzsche in thinking that ethical values have become 'denaturalized.'" They are products of selection which "have overpassed their primitive purpose." Made by nature for a natural object "they have developed along lines which are certainly independent of selection, perhaps in opposition to it." And although the difference between what they now are and what the primitive purposes of selection required them to be, is not so great as in the case, say, of our higher æsthetic powers, still "no evolutionary explanation will bridge the interval." In a word, "If we treat the Sermon on the Mount as a naturalistic product, it is as much an evolutionary accident as *Hamlet* or the Ninth Symphony" (pp. 118-119).

But all this, though true and perhaps of itself conclusive, is never the main point, with Mr. Balfour. The final contention is always that *if* such chance off-shoots of an irrational mechanical process be really all that these things are, *then* their value is gone.

"In what setting," he asks, "are we to place morality so that these 'denaturalized' values are to be retained? Can we be content to regard the highest loyalties, the most devoted love, the most limitless self-abnegation as the useless excesses of a world-system, which in its efforts to adapt organism to environment, has overshot its mark?

"I deem it impossible . . ." (p. 119).

The question, all through, is thus not merely "Whether that which is admittedly valuable can be plausibly attributed to chance?" but "whether that which is attributed to chance can thereafter regain its value?" And the answer to both questions is in the negative.

Of all the values which become lowered or lost the moment we accept the naturalistic account of them, those whose loss leaves us in the most serious plight are undoubtedly the intellectual. Hence much larger space is given to these than to the discussion of æsthetic and ethical values. And it is at this point that criticism will be most likely to lay hold upon Mr. Balfour's exposition. The nerve of his main contention in all his works lies here. There seem to be two sides to it. On the one hand, while we believe in the presuppositions of science and of common sense, in universal causation, say, and the existence of an external world, there is yet no 'proof' of these things, which the author has anywhere found, which he has not shown here or elsewhere to be hollow. On the other side, there stands the biological story of how our belief in these common sense matters has

arisen. And although we cannot reconstruct all the steps whereby our basal beliefs have been arrived at, in sufficient detail to see what they positively were, we can see clearly enough what they were not. They were not valid logical grounds for holding the beliefs.

The beliefs, then, which lie at the root of all rational procedure are the products of unthinking and irrational causes. What is the result which Mr. Balfour deduces from this unsettling circumstance? Not a warrant for our rejecting these beliefs *in toto* if we please. But he does derive from it the right to reject part of them—that part, namely, which, if he gave it its way, would deprive all the rest of the only claim they have upon his acceptance. He does not want to be deprived of the substantial truth of science and of common sense. And the only supposition upon which he can retain it, is the supposition which naturalism denies; the supposition that the irrational process of selection, whereby we came by these beliefs of science, was really being used by a Supreme Intelligence to guide us towards truth and not error. Thus, with Descartes, we are forced to believe in God. As he could not believe in science without believing in God first, so we, beginning at the other end, and accepting the substantial truth of science, found a belief in God upon that (pp. 247–274).

So far, we have outlined a clear and intelligible position. Intellectual, moral and æsthetic values alike require the postulate of Theism, and therefore we have a right to believe in it. Yet, amend this short sketch of the position as one will, one is pursued by the suspicion that it may not be quite true to the original. And the difficulty, while partly accounted for by the fact, simply, that one has not Mr. Balfour's own resources of fine expression, does not spring from that alone; but is also in part due to the inherent peculiarity of the position itself which we referred to—a peculiarity which has crept into many people's thinking, ever since Kant suggested that there was another way of obtaining truth than through knowledge. All Mr. Balfour's earlier work presupposes this position; though of course he did not get it from Kant; to whose somewhat cumbrous type of mind he seems always to have felt a not unintelligible aversion. But he presupposes the position, in as much as he suggests another method for our thought in matters of morality and religion than that which prevails in ordinary knowledge. It took the form, in his earlier work, of saying that while reason was competent in the one sphere it was not in the other.

Now the author's early disbelief in the possibility of reaching a creed by reasoning survives sufficiently in these lectures to make him

avoid expressions which look like 'reasons' for the standpoint which he commends; and makes him disclaim the title of a philosophy or a philosophical system for his general view. The result is, that even with the best of management, one's representation of his views is forever being betrayed into expressions which would attribute to him more of abstract logical reasoning than he probably wishes to claim. And this is the point, we think, on which criticism—at least academic criticism—is likely to fasten. In distinguishing the character of his own reasoning, he says, "Every system that deserves to be described as a constructive philosophy conceives itself not only to be rooted in reason, but to be rationalized throughout." And while philosophers "are entirely right if they think that this is what a system ought to be," they are wrong in thinking such an ideal practicable. The author, for his part, is content, instead of asking "what creed reason requires him to accept," to ask "on what terms the creed which is in fact accepted can most reasonably be held" (pp. 262-263):

Now, whenever the attempt is made to appeal to something else than reason in the interests of the higher life, there is a temptation for such as feel the impossibility of doing so to indulge in unsympathetic criticism. And it would not be difficult to urge against the distinction made in this concluding passage of Mr. Balfour's work, that it is a distinction without a difference—that the author himself appeals to reason here, almost in so many words; only that having gone so far with reason he chooses not to go farther. And we would urge that criticism. But in fairness one ought to state what one conceives 'going the whole way' with reason would mean, as contrasted with what Mr. Balfour does.

Throughout this work, then, unless we have entirely mistaken his meaning, Mr. Balfour has been asking *what else* must be true, if our 'inevitable' beliefs in this, that, and the other thing are to be valid. Now our view is that what "reason requires us to accept" is always the conditions of the possibility of *something or other*; and therefore the author has been appealing to reason all the time in asking for the terms of our continuing to hold "the creed which is in fact accepted." And 'going the whole way' would mean (a) taking as "the creed accepted," something much narrower than our belief in the value of beauty, goodness and truth, and much more 'inevitable,' and (b) standing by that absolutely inevitable minimum of a creed, and seeing whither we are led by the very impulse in virtue of which we accept it; in other words, refusing to change our method. This rigorous procedure does not at first sight promise to carry us far. Perhaps (though

we would not be dogmatic on the point) if Mr. Balfour's first book is true, it would not carry us anywhere at all. But this does not alter the case. If so, then it is back to Mr. Balfour's first work, that philosophy at the present time ought to go. For a revision of that, and a revision of much in our own recent philosophy which that work remarkably anticipates, a revision such as will show that that rigorous method really carries us further than it itself suspected, would seem to be the only kind of defence of the higher life which will permanently convince.

A change of method, on the other hand, has always been essential to Mr. Balfour. He has always struck out against the view that a creed intellectually reasoned out could be an adequate one. All we can do is, putting logic aside, to try to make our major beliefs, as it were, hang together in some sort of emotional or a-logical 'congruity.' And, commenting upon this view of the aim of philosophy, at least one eminent representative of a different school of thought remarks that the provision of such a "congruous setting" for science, morality and art, and also "for the higher religious life, in which these main tendencies of our nature attain their consummation and consecration" is the most that philosophical prolegomena to religion and ethics can accomplish.¹ Without attempting at all to estimate this widely shared attitude, it is impossible not to acknowledge that at any rate the change of method implied is a weakness; that the antithesis between the mere provision of a "congruous setting" for our beliefs and the rational justification of them, cannot be pushed far without reacting disastrously on the thinker who uses it. If deliberate capital be made of it, as in Mr. Balfour's earlier works it undoubtedly was, then the misinterpretation against which he seeks to defend himself now in the "autobiographical parenthesis," becomes well-nigh inevitable. The reader, instead of learning that the propositions at the root of the higher life are as certain as 'that I have hands and feet,' will simply learn that common sense things are not at all so certain as he had thought them; which, however salutary as a transitional stage in education, is not satisfactory as a creed. Instead of asking, then, for the conditions upon which a number of beliefs about humanly important things may become *congruous*, we must ask how the most elementary belief, that minimum of belief which is necessary to enable us even to ask for proof, is as much as *possible*. It may not seem a very broad basis for progress in constructive philosophy. But it seems the only way by which solid construction can come.

¹ Professor Pringle-Pattison in the *Hibbert Journal* for January, 1916.

But there is one thing in estimating the value of Mr. Balfour's present work which should never be forgotten. The significance of this change of method which we criticize and which Mr. Balfour has to effect in order to reach his most important constructive results, is an academic question. On the other hand, it is not merely to the academic public that this book is addressed. And among the wide audience for whom it was written and by whom it will be eagerly read, its actual constructive character is what will count. Nor, one must think, can it, with its style, its sheer human ability, and its theme, possibly fail of the richest results. This, largely because of circumstances. There is something propitious in the stormy hour of its birth. Among the more reflective of Mr. Balfour's countrymen there is, and has been for some time, a disposition which would have welcomed his mature thoughts upon first and last things, even though the thunder had not been rolling on their ears, or their baptism of fire been upon them. And now that these things are there; every morning's news, in a sense, bringing them afresh against the ultimate; they will read these humble and dignified words rather as the record of the faith of one who has faced the issues of his thinking, than as a display of dialectical skill by one who occasionally enters the lists for his recreation. And reading his treatment of these high questions to the stern music of the time, they will at least gather something of that seriousness of spirit which is one indispensable condition of an answer.

J. W. SCOTT.

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The Problem of Knowledge. By DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH.
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915.—pp. xviii, 503.

"The problem of knowledge has two main subdivisions, the problem of immediate knowledge and the problem of mediate knowledge. The former is mainly concerned with the problem of acquaintance with reality, which is the subject-matter of epistemology proper. The latter, the problem of mediate knowledge, includes the problem of truth and the problem of its proof" (p. 10). The work before us thus naturally falls into two parts, the first part occupying in its treatment some three hundred fifty pages, and the second part about one hundred thirty pages. In each part there is an historical and critical discussion followed by a constructive statement. Dualism, idealism and the new realism are passed in review in the discussions—"Critiques"—of the first part, and intellectualism and anti-intellectualism in the discussions of the second part. In the constructive

statements, the author presents and defends what he calls "critical realistic epistemological monism," according to which there is immediate knowledge of the primary qualities of reality, while upon occasion of certain sense-stimulations, "sense-qualities—particular colors, sounds, odors, tastes, and the like—are creatively produced by each psychical subject for itself, and in many cases located with more or less accuracy in or upon the very object in the environment from which the stimulation proceeded" (p. 313).

The "Critiques" represent much industry in reading and antagonistic reaction. The main theories occurring in the history of philosophy are summarized with a painstaking differentiation of the various forms, important and unimportant, in which these theories have been presented by major, minor, and minimal philosophers. This portion of the book is encyclopaedic in character. As a sample of the attention paid to individual thinkers, it is sufficient to note that under dualism are treated in succession the views of Locke, Kant, Schulze, Hamilton, Spencer, Bradley, Hodgson, Riehl, Dilthey, Jacobi, Reinhold, Fries, the Neo-Friesians, Herbart, Lotze, Ladd, Pringle-Pattison, Strong, Lovejoy, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Volkelt, Cornelius, Kuelpe, and B. Russell—all in something less than sixty pages. The analytical table of contents and the index of authors are roll-calls of epistemologists of all western nations—with the Upanishad philosophers and perhaps some others thrown in—and of practically all epistemologic periods. Some names however are omitted. One who knows something of the history of philosophy will find in this part of the work a convenient resumé of views; but if the film is run a little too fast through the cinematograph there is likely to be a suggestion of vertigo. Objection might be made to the distribution of space; but this would be the case whatever other distribution might be substituted; so we need not linger on this possible criticism. The book is not to be recommended to the layman, or even to a beginner who has not a teacher to guide him through its mazes. Even an advanced class may possibly find it too meticulously detailed in places, and too sweepingly oracular in others. The present reviewer has devoted a half-year with graduate students to a study of the first part of the volume, and finds that they are somewhat bewildered by what to them appear infinitesimal differences, hard to keep distinct. And yet the main outlines are kept fairly clear.

The author has a very systematic mind; its creative activity revels in orgies of classification. The satisfactoriness of the results will naturally be questioned by some of the living specimens carefully

pinned down and labeled. The work is frankly written from the point of view of critical realism—that is, of one kind of critical realism, for there are manifestly going to be many kinds: cf. R. W. Sellars, *Critical Realism*, Rand, McNally & Company (1916)—and the critical discussions are dominated by what the victims of the criticism will perhaps regard as uncritical prejudice. At any rate there is a sureness of touch and definiteness of rubric, which is however not dogmatic, because all the dogmaticalness is monopolized by the criticized. The present writer, who once unsuccessfully tried to classify Mr. Dewey, does not have to make a heavy draft on his imagination to anticipate Mr. Dewey's fatigued resignation under finding his theory of immediate knowledge (*sic*) classified under "I. Antecedents of the New Realism. *a . . . b . . . c*. Movements leading to the new realism. (1) Disguised psychological idealism, as transitional to physical realism." But although from Mr. Dewey's point of view this is not where he belongs, from Mr. Macintosh's point of view this is just where he does belong; so there he is sent, like the naughty child into the corner, of course not dogmatically, but nevertheless peremptorily. What else can an author do who knows from the outside just what view another holds?

But even as an external estimate of others' theories Mr. Macintosh's presentation is not always without fault. May the reviewer take the liberty of instancing just one treatment accorded to his own views? The only excuse offered for doing this is that this happens to be the one case that the reviewer can point to with dogmatic confidence that he understands the theory expounded. He is represented as having been (in 1907) "obliged to admit that not *all* qualities perceived can be regarded as numerically identical with the actual qualities." "More recently," however, in 1912, "as if he had conceded too much, McGilvary has definitely taken up the problem of illusion, hallucination, and kindred phenomena, with the object, apparently, of showing that all secondary qualities may conceivably be independent of awareness of them" (p. 239). "He once appealed, as we have seen, to the pragmatic test in this connection; to pragmatism then let him go. Why should we seek to reinstate hallucinatory elements as independently real, when they have already been rejected by common sense on practical grounds?" (p. 240). The present writer now agrees with Mr. Macintosh in this matter, and he has so agreed *for ten years*. The only difference on this point is that Mr. Macintosh holds that the writer holds a view that he denies holding or having held. A careful re-reading of what was written four years

ago has failed to reveal any justification for such a misrepresentation. The passage referred to treated of color-blindness, not of illusion and hallucination. But Mr. Macintosh's scheme requires that illusion, hallucination and color-blindness should be regarded as 'kindred phenomena'; so 'kindred phenomena' they are and must be, and any one who treats color-blindness in a certain way must logically treat illusion and hallucination in the same way. There is no dogmatism in requiring this, but there is dogmatism if the requirement is not met.

This example serves to bring out a rather striking characteristic of Mr. Macintosh's habits of thought. Things must be treated wholesale. Whatever is true of color-blindness must be true of 'kindred phenomena,' kinship to be determined—not dogmatically, but with what amounts to infallibility—according to the classification of Mr. Macintosh. In this particular case the classification is explicitly based on psychological grounds. "The conscious processes in normal perception and in hallucination are, as processes (apart from their antecedents on the one hand and their independent objects on the other, neither of which are parts of the processes in question), essentially identical in kind. If there is creativeness in the one, there is creativeness in the other; if there is none in the one, there is none in the other" (p. 266). "In view, therefore, of the practical identity, psychologically speaking, of the normally perceived and the hallucinatory sense-quality, it seems uncritical to cling to the theory of the independent existence of only *some* of the secondary qualities" (p. 240).

But it happens that when the question is raised whether there is not "practical identity, psychologically speaking," of the normally perceived secondary qualities and the normally perceived *primary* qualities, Mr. Macintosh seems to reply that there is. Both are "*immediately* known," and to question this is to quibble (p. 327). But though both are immediately known, the "secondary qualities are created" by the psychical subject, "and thereby the primary qualities are *revealed*" (p. 323). Is it fair for the new realist to retort? Mr. Macintosh once appealed, as we have seen, to the psychologic test; to psychology then let him go. Why should we seek to reinstate primary qualities as independently real, when they have already been rejected by idealism on psychological grounds? The only answer seems to be that we must treat qualities *wholesale*, suiting the convenience of our theory in the wholesale classification. Wholesale, colors are secondary; wholesale, "comparative extension in space and duration in time" are primary. Thus a certain kind of wholesale

classification takes the edge off from the knife blade of the sharp logic that was used so incisively against the new realist.

But to be thoroughly fair to the author on this matter, it is necessary to give his own answer to the question why he does *not* go to psychology after having sent the new realist there. "With reference to the idealistic question as to why human psychical creativity should not be viewed as furnishing the explanation of primary qualities, as well as secondary, it may be remarked, to begin with, that this conclusion is to be avoided, if logically possible, if we have any interest at all in objectivity of knowledge, as opposed to agnosticism with reference to the reality which stimulates our sensing activities. What it is of special importance for epistemological theory to be able to maintain is that sense-qualities are located not only in the body of the subject, but also often in external objects, so that some of the primary qualities, such as shape, relative size, location, are as directly present to the subject as are the secondary qualities themselves" (p. 325). Now the reviewer has no quarrel with any desire to obtain objectivity in knowledge, nor even with the belief that such objectivity is best secured if the theory be true that some 'actual qualities' are directly present in immediate experience. What he does object to is the cavalier treatment of qualities by classes rather than by reference to concrete situations.

Mr. Macintosh has an interesting though complicated view of truth, to which in this review no justice can be done. It is an attempted "synthesis of certain elements of intellectualism on the one hand, and pragmatism on the other. May it not perhaps turn out that we shall be able to derive the proximate genus [representation] for our definition of truth from the one side, and the differentia [satisfaction of purpose] of the species from the other?" (p. 438). "We arrive then at the following tentative definition. What is taken as truth is representation (of subject by predicate, of reality by idea) sufficient to mediate satisfactorily the purpose with which the judgment is made. But what is really true must be representation sufficient to mediate satisfactorily whatever purpose or purposes ought to be recognized in making the judgment. In other words, real truth is practical identity of idea with reality, of predicate with subject, where the practice in question is ultimately satisfactory, as well as the mental instrument which serves it" (p. 445; romanized). A "very precise, even if somewhat unwieldy, statement of [this] representational pragmatism" is given and elaborated (p. 446). But the statement is too unwieldy even for quotation, and the elaborations too complicated to permit of discussion here.

It will have been already correctly surmised that the author regards consciousness "as a unique productive or creative activity of a non-physical subject (an activity further definable in terms of its products)" (p. 316).

It is difficult to express briefly a fair estimate of the value of the book. The reviewer feels a tremendous admiration for the erudition manifested—surprisingly Teutonic in a man whose surname begins as does the author's; and he has obtained much help from a careful study of the work, especially of the expository parts of it; but the help is rather that which comes from the author's collations than from any sympathetic interpretation. Where the reader happened not to be familiar with the philosophers expounded, he could have wished to be relieved of a suspicion that perhaps they could have said more for themselves than the critic said for them—and this suspicion arose because once in a while complete justice was not done to familiar authors. The constructive portions of the book failed to convince at least one person. The author allows himself the freedom to do what he finds fault with others for doing; and unless exception be made of dogmatising and confident assertion, it is not always done better than it had been done by them. A new hat, at any rate, has been thrown into the epistemological ring, and not without complete assurance of its eventual destiny. If its owner can impart the same confidence to bystanders which he himself possesses, they will look upon the hat as the ultimate theory of knowledge. And cocksureness among us Americans does quite frequently succeed.

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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mtt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Neo-Sc.* = *Revue Neo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abt.: Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Legal Theories and Social Science. MORRIS R. COHEN. *Int. J. E.*, XXV, 4, pp. 469-497.

Our legal theories are still wearing the cast-off garments of European thought. We retain, for example, the belief of Montesquieu that the division of power is the condition of free government. Three really separate divisions of government would produce anarchy. As a matter of fact this division in our legal politics is not strict and has been overcome, to a degree, in our extra-legal politics. Our courts are to a certain extent legislative; our executives, legislative and judicial; and our legislatures, administrative. We are forever overstepping and trying to disregard this false and impossible theory of separation. The desire that the law should be uniform, certain, and free from personal bias has led to the view that "it is not within the judge's function or within his power to enlarge or improve or change the law." In reality both our common law and our legislative law is largely judge-made. Chief Justice Marshall is one of the creators of our federal constitution; and all legislation is formed and recreated by means of judicial interpretation. Legislation, like judge-made law, shows a great degree of continuity. In England much interpretation of legislative acts is executive. It was formerly said that law asserts the previously formed will of the monarch. This view has been retained, with the exception that the will of the people has replaced the will of the monarch. Judges often couple this statement with the inconsistent one that law is justice or reason. The people do not create constitutions or legislative acts. This phonograph theory of the law has bred the mistaken view that it is an already completed and closed system. The various matters that the law tries to bring under its regulation are objects of specialized endeavor, and only experts can decide them. Courts cannot, therefore, safely rely upon antiquated theories of economics dealing with

competition, freedom of contract, private property, etc. The conflict between the law and social science is principally due to the interpretation which the courts put upon the provisions of our bill of rights. History and political science have discarded the theory of natural rights. Nor can these latter be defended on the ground of justice or public interest.

ALLEN J. THOMAS.

Introspection as a Biological Method. C. JUDSON HERRICK. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 20, pp. 543-551.

Professor Woodbridge's contention that sensations are not elements of consciousness seems corroborated by neurological studies. The cortex has no means of receiving simple sense data, nor does its activity consist in relating raw sense materials. But however we may conceive of the relation between mind and body, consciousness is a very real factor in biology. The subjective experiences of individuals form an integral part of their behavior complex, and must be taken into account by the biologist by means of introspection. The objective manifestations in a human community where consciousness is a vital factor differ greatly from those in animal communities where it is not. Nor is our inability to measure the action of consciousness in terms of energy transformation a disproof of such action. Briefly, the facts show that it would be both inexpedient and unscientific for the behaviorist to eliminate introspection from his programme. Yet introspection should not be overemphasized to the neglect of the objective method; the one must supplement the other.

GERTRUDE A. BAKER.

La Signification historique de la "Géométrie" de Descartes. PIERRE BOUTROUX. Rev. de Mét., XXII, 6, 814-827.

The synthetic era in mathematics reached its climax in the triumph of the algebraic method, near the middle of the 17th century. For the orientals, algebra was a set of ingenious practical devices, to which the savants of the 16th century gave a theoretical basis. For all intuitive perceptions algebra undertook to substitute artificial compositions. So science, which the Greeks had regarded as a contemplation of ideal objects, became a creation of the human spirit, a synthetic composition, and the aim of the scientist was to constitute a powerful and efficacious method. In this spirit Descartes proposed to apply algebra to geometry, to make it into a science. He wished to break with the tradition of ancient geometry, available only for virtuosos. Fermat, several years before the publication of Descartes's *Géométrie* (1637), set forth his method of coördinates, relating algebraic method to the study of the curve. But Fermat, though he opened the way to analytic geometry, never repudiated the old geometry. With Descartes algebraic method became universalized for geometry. He defined lines and conic sections by equations instead of constructing them theoretically by points. Mathematics became a great mechanical industry. But the analytic geometry of Des-

cartes contained in germ problems destined to react on the course of mathematical progress. Every algebraic equation can be represented by a curve, but the converse is not true. The difficulty appeared in special problems, the first of which was 'the inverse problem of tangents,' where the question is one of determining the curve, the tangents being given, at a certain point. In Descartes's solution there appeared what we call to-day a transcendent function of X . But this is not an algebraic function and so the curve which represents it is not an algebraic curve in the Cartesian sense. For Descartes the problem was logically unsolvable. But Barrow (1669-70) identified it with the problem of areas or the finding of primitive functions. So the modern theory of differential equations was founded. This procedure permits a 'graphic' method applicable to differential equations which cannot be integrated. Thus Descartes's mathematical work led to an exposition of the limits as well as the success of the algebraic method. The notions which our intuitions permit us to divine are after all richer than the artificial compositions of algebra. We have called the Greek geometrician a dreamer, 'fishing with a line of pretty theorems.' But we ourselves are coming to see that the edifice of science is something not of our own making. We have outstripped the Greeks only in realizing the value to ourselves of elaborate scaffolding in order to scale its heights.

MARION D. CRANE.

La valeur humaine de la vérité. F. PAULHAN. Rev. Phil., XLI, 1, pp. 24-61.

Human action always aims at remedying some mal-adjustment. When such action is unsuccessful, man more or less consciously resorts to deceit. He creates for himself a fictitious world in which his ideals are realized or comes to believe that the real world is more nearly as he would like it to be. The rôle of truth in life is much more restricted and the part of error, illusion, and deception much more important than even Pragmatists believe. Witness the transforming power of suggestion, auto-suggestion, and the illusions of art. Witness the enterprises, discoveries and inventions inspired by deceptive beliefs as to their outcome, pursued in blind faith or ungrounded optimism, and successful only through error or for reasons unforeseen. Witness the host of dogmas, conventions, and superstitions at the basis of our common life and institutions, harbored, cherished, perpetuated, even in the face of criticism and experience. No investigation is absolutely disinterested; the facts are always construed. Even the philosopher cannot escape the influence of tradition and prejudice. Scientific truth is at best only approximate, often merely symbolic, and frequently but hypothesis or myth or formulas sought for their utility in theory and practise. No new set of concrete facts can be predicted with certainty. We have more exact knowledge than the savage, but also more illusions. A society based on clairvoyance and sincerity is inconceivable, would be intolerable, and can hardly inspire fantasy and romance. It appears impossible to justify life except by sophisms; life must be accepted or rejected, and acceptance entails errors and illusions. The only means of

avoiding error is not to think, as of mistakes, not to act. Human instincts can neither be relied upon nor their deficiency supplied by reason. The differentiation of functions in society is accompanied by a differentiation of interests, opinions, and beliefs, necessarily involving fictions, illusions, error. Nor is this but a passing state of human existence. Complete adaptation for man is impossible, since both he and his environment are in a constant state of change. This aberration at the beginning of human evolution, from which springs the eternal necessity of suffering, evil, illusion, and error, may extend to the very heart of reality. The life of man is unique in the world; it is a continual invention. He can never completely foresee or know how to conform his conduct by applying what knowledge he has; hence he must fall back on imaginative conceptions, partial schemes and insufficient ways of acting. It is obvious then that error, illusion, and deception are necessary to life and action; they prompt to activity when cold truth is powerless or not to be had. They are necessary to the discovery of truth and sometimes create reality or transform themselves into truth. They render life and social achievement less laborious and stern. They can plainly, then, be advantageous. In general they are useful when they help us to organize our knowledge or prompt to action without misguiding or bewildering us. The love of truth for its own sake is one of these useful illusions. Disinterested curiosity, which does not tend to action, but seeks truth in and for itself, takes its departure and derives its justification from our interest to know reality in order to conform our actions to it or conform it to our desires. Knowledge is a means to activity; but like other means it tends to become an end. It is an extremely important means, for it is a necessary condition of human life and one of man's highest values. It is superior to error and deceit as a guide to action, and gives to the latter whatever value they possess. In the division of labor, therefore, it has become the special function of a special class to seek truth for its own sake and regard it as of absolute, highest or exclusive worth; but to interpret this devotion to truth as anything more than an indication of a division of labor is to lose sight of the unity of social functions or the synthesis of human life. Such specialization, illusion or deception is, however, a good, a necessity, a duty, if it can be counter-balanced or the harmony re-established by some opposing or superior social force. It is the duty of all to seek truth to some extent; but different men, or the same man at different times, require different proportions of truth and error. A singular synthesis of illusion and lucid vision is necessary to human activity. Even when we seek truth above all things we must conceal it and alter it, and to love it as we ought, we are obliged to exaggerate its worth.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

Kausale und konditionale Weltanschauung. JULIAN VON ZACHARIEWICZ.
Ar. f. sys. Ph., XXI, 2, pp. 173-185.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century a large number of scientists have become interested in philosophy. Among those who have been especially

famous as scientists we may mention Haeckel, Mach, and Ostwald. Now comes Max Verworn, the famous physiologist. He proposes to do away with the word 'cause,' and substitute 'conditions.' This change, he believes, will help to clear up our thinking. The idea is interesting. We have had *Teleophobia* and *Vitalophobia* in scientific quarters, and now we have *Kausalophobia*. Verworn's argument is that there is no single factor in a causal situation which may be called the 'cause' exclusively, but a whole series of factors which constitute 'conditions.' We must retain both 'conditions and 'cause,' however. They are as subject and object, the internal and the external. The conditions exist as the ground or potentiality of the event. The cause, operating upon these from without, gives us the event. This is true both in the physical and psychical fields. The conditions of the event must be kept distinct from the cause, and both are essential to adequate interpretation of reality. Changes in scientific terminology have sometimes proved helpful, but Verworn's suggestion is not well grounded. Were he better grounded in philosophy and the history of the causal problem, his suggestion might have some weight, but he is lacking in such knowledge.

D. T. HOWARD.

La pensée symbolique du point de vue de l'introspection et dans ses rapports à l'esthétique. J. PÉRÈS. Rev. Ph., XLI, 2, pp. 164-181.

All thought has a sensory or somatic accompaniment. This forms the symbol of thought. Thus the movement of walking can accelerate the conception of ideas, and mental activity gives an animated character to the bodily movement. When we think of imagining or anticipating there is a certain bodily attitude of looking. Understanding is represented by a bodily attitude of audition. We can only think of the general form of the mental life, duration, by means of the symbol of space. Thought is impossible without representations of facts or of verbal images. Even the most abstract thought is accompanied by a feeling of a difficulty being overcome, of a certitude being built up. The symbol is not the metaphor; the metaphor identifies aspects of different facts. It is less necessary, more arbitrary, less adequate than the symbol. One could imagine a poetry without metaphor and in which the words would suggest much more than their definite signification. This symbolism already appears in the distant associations sometimes connected with delicate odours. The symbol is more fundamental than the myth or the metaphor, and is less subject to suppression by the positivistic spirit. It is the symbol in thought which explains primitive superstition, which binds together what is without connection. Our feelings lend a sense to objective representations, which become their symbol; they become the symbol as developing the theme of these feelings. This would create mythology, if not restrained by critical thought. This tendency is expressed in poetry, in which large use is made of symbolism. The 'decadents' seek to produce their effect by an abandon of thought to the play of chance associations, by passivity to impressions from without. The classical and romantic schools

preserve a character of exaltation. Here imagination is visible in the conscious choice of facts and episodes whose nature lends itself to symbolism. We tend too much to regard the creative imagination as merely the effect of the law of least effort. Symbols are collective as well as individual. The poet creates symbols; he universalizes the facts of his personal experience. The symbol appears in painting when the painting is left indeterminate, allowing the soul to float between several alternatives. The symbol is most in use when there is an opposition between science and art. Symbolism is found among those authors who, like G. D'Annunzio, give their characters abstract appellations. In this case there is built up a kind of mythology, by a process the reverse of primitive mythology, which went from the concrete to the abstract, while this goes from the abstract to the concrete. Symbolism is found in sculpture and the plastic arts. The plastic representation is rooted in the psychological life. The plastic representation of mythology raises it out of its indetermination and thus reveals its incongruence with objective reality. Thus the critical spirit in Hellenic philosophy coincided with the most perfect divine effigies. The plastic representation as a symbol has both definite reality and the indeterminateness of the things of the soul. In poetry words are used for their suggestive power independently of their precise meaning. It may be that synaesthesia is important in poetry associating colors with sounds. Every word has many sensuous associations. The symbolist poets make great use of these associations. The epithet 'decadent' applied to poetry seems to indicate that such poetry is a relaxation of the ordinary synthetic and controlling power of thought. But such poetry is really the product of great effort. There is a lyric disorder which is not pure incoherence. We must not regard thought by images, and much less symbolic thought, as an effect of inertia. Although imagination may embarrass understanding, it may also assist it. The secret of inspiration and discovery is in giving ourselves up to the free and capricious play of associations. Mythological thought ought not to be regarded as mere puerility; it sprang from human impotence in dealing with nature, not from the preponderance of the lower faculties emancipated from critical thought. We ourselves personify Destiny or Providence.

W. CURTIS SWABEY.

A Comparative Study of Spinoza and Neo-Realism as Indicated in Holt's Concept of Consciousness. M. M. LOWENTHAL. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 25, pp. 673-682.

The method of mathematics dominates the thought of both Spinoza and Holt. Influenced by the extraordinary development of the mathematico-physical sciences of his day, Spinoza conceives of all truths as mathematical and treats everything as if it were a line or a plane. Influenced by the more recent development of mathematical or symbolic logic, Holt conceives of all being as mathematical both in stuff and in form. Both Spinoza and Holt start with a completely self-dependent given, and hold that true knowledge is

intuitive or immediate or assumed. They differ, however, in their conception of the nature of this given and in their method of proceeding from it to the rest of reality. For Spinoza the given is Substance, God, or the whole; for Holt a number of simple, neutral, logical or mathematical entities. Spinoza tries to deduce from the nature of this most complex whole the properties and relations of the simpler particulars or parts. Holt attempts to deduce from the nature of his most universal simples the hierarchy of complexities composing the intricate structure of the whole. For both Spinoza and Holt mind and matter, though distinct and distinguishable, are but two manifestations, classes, manifolds or sets of relations of one and the same substance. Both try to introduce into an otherwise static universe a causal, dynamic element of change. '*Natura Naturata*' corresponds to Holt's totality of all possible 'Givens'; '*Natura Naturans*' to his totality of 'propositions.'

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

Der Widerspruch in Wesen des Sittlichen und Sozialen. ARTHUR GOLDSTEIN.
Ar. f. G. Ph., XXII, 1, pp. 19-33.

There is a fundamental contradiction between the social will and the moral will, which contemporary terminology does not sufficiently recognize when it gives us a compound like Social Ethics (*Sozialethik*). Social and Ethical are as opposite as black and white. The social will has its source in feeling, and intellect occupies a secondary place with reference to it. In morality, on the contrary, the intellect and its fixed principles direct the will. The social will is always egoistic, whether it be directed towards an individual or a universal good. The moral will is non-egoistic. This does not mean altruistic, for altruism or an expression of the social will is egoistic in character. The social will affirms the I,—the moral will the not-I. The two tendencies of will appear therefore to oppose one another. But while opposed, they are moments of each other, the poles of a single reality. The social will as based on feeling and direct assertion of value, is at once reinforced and opposed by the moral will, grounded on reflection. One therefore cannot displace the other; both should have play.

D. T. HOWARD.

Die Philosophie des Als Ob und das Kantische System gegenüber einem Erneuerer des Atheismusstreites. H. VAHINGER. Kant-Studien, XXI, 1, pp. 1-25.

Hugo Bund published in 1913 a book called *Kant als Philosoph des Katholismus*, in which he characterized the Kantian *Als-Ob* conception as 'jesuitical.' In a second book, *Die Naturwissenschaft als Stützpunkt des religiösen Glaubens. Mit Einem Wort zur Kant-Frage*, he continued his attack on the Kantian system and the *Als-Ob* philosophy. Because harm might come to certain people from what looks like a desire to renew the atheism controversy which was waged in 1799 against Fichte and Forberg, Vaihinger sees fit to notice some points in Bund's later book. The style of the book is very careless, but this might be forgiven were it not for the fundamental contradictions in which

the author involves himself, and the denunciations in which he indulges. (1) On the subject of natural science he takes a contradictory position. On the one hand he ascribes to its influence all the discords between faith and reason which he finds in our time. Further on, however, he declares that science can 'further' religious faith. (2) In the matter of religious faith, he denounces vigorously those who would attempt to substitute a pure culture religion for the naïve faith of the people and inveighs against an undogmatic religion. On the other hand he appears to agree that it is a mistake to attempt to make plausible 'the hardest ideas' of faith. (3) In treating the traditional Kant, he praises the spirit of the Kantian philosophy, declaring that even in the present war the Kantian spirit of self-sacrifice inspires the soldier on the field of battle. But he accuses Kant himself of an eclecticism both of doctrine and character amounting to lack of moral earnestness, and finds his opportunism akin to the practice of the Romish church, which from his point of view is the worst reproach he can bring. Vaihinger's book, *Die Philosophie des Als-Ob*, attempts to show, by a detailed examination of Kant's published works, in how far he used the As-if conception. Bund praises Vaihinger's work, but considers the *Als-Ob* philosophy a menace to religion. He does not understand that it emphasizes the usefulness and necessity of Religion, while making it fundamentally independent of all metaphysical speculation. The history of philosophy and theology shows indeed that great philosophies which may at first have shattered the faith of the weak have been taken finally to be the supports of Religion. Vaihinger in his book collects material in which Kant appears to call in question the ontological substantiality of the ideas and to urge that we must act *as if* their absolute existence was a matter to be indicated. Bund assumes that this interpretation of Kant is the only authentic one, and on the ground of it accuses Kant of duplicity. As a matter of fact, Kant's careful weighing of *pro* and *con* indicates his great intellectual veracity. Bund accuses D. Theol. Steinman, in his *Zeitschrift, Religion u. Geistes kultur*, of drawing a distinction between traditional dogma on the one side and a spiritual culture religion under the influence of the Kantian philosophy on the other. Bund forgets that such a distinction must always exist, not only in religion but in all other provinces of life, and that wise governments will conserve both, preventing so far as possible the assertion of stiff dogmatic formulae and the intolerance which results from them. If Bund had read the second edition of *Die Philosophie des Als-Ob*, he would not have accused Vaihinger of lack of courage and opportunism, for he would have found there an account of the external circumstances,—lack of strength and time to perfect it,—which prevented an earlier publication of the work. Vaihinger did publish in 1899 or later in various accessible forms and places brief abstracts of his research. He worked with the published writings of Kant, always available to all students. His interpretation of Kant is a personal one, not generally subscribed to by students of Kant, and can hardly therefore be called a 'revelation' as Bund would have it. Bund reproaches Vaihinger with allowing in *Kant-Studien* repre-

sentations of Kant according to the traditional view. But such a publication ought surely to be open to the views of all reputable scholars, and not simply to one interpretation, however convinced its author may be of its validity.

MARION D. CRANE.

Le Pancalisme. A. LALANDE. Rev. Ph., XL, No. 12, pp. 481-512.

In a theory called Pancalism, Mr. J. M. Baldwin attempts to show that the aesthetic is more capable of furnishing a conception of reality than either the logical or moral norms. To do this he first gives the history of the idea of reality following the genetic method pursued in *Thought and Things*. He next reviews the modern doctrines of reality, refutes them and establishes the necessity of a theory of reality both immediate and synthetic based on the idea of the Beautiful. He hopes to find in the mental functions genetically developed a manner of thinking and feeling such that, claiming nothing beyond itself, it will not, on the other hand, suppress the other functions. The aesthetic function alone can satisfy these conditions. The beautiful is an imaginative semblance, and includes the opposition between being and image; it is inseparable from the notion of person, and so contains the distinction of self and not-self; it must be something unique, and so implies the antithesis of singular and general. But all these dualisms it resolves in a harmony: "there is not a state of soul more perfectly one and indivisible than aesthetic joy." In the work of art, subject and object, impersonal objective truth and subjective personal value, theoretic and affective logic are united. Logic recognizes the existence of error; ethics of evil. Art has for its theme a world which includes both, while it ignores its own contradictory, excluding the ugly from its domain. Aesthetic intuition unites the actual and the ideal. It is above and envelopes the theoretical and practical reasons. It alone gives an adequate conception of reality. The real, in the last analysis, is "the whole of the contents of consciousness in so far as they are organized, or capable of organization under the aesthetic form." Some criticism seems necessary. First, Mr. Baldwin mentions Kant as a precursor of Pancalism; a position which he can hardly be said to deserve. Again, the postulates of the genetic method on which the theory is largely based are such as to cast doubts upon its truth. Moreover, the aesthetic norm seems to lack in many ways the ability to absorb the other norms or the forms of reality which they suppose or establish. The logical, moral and aesthetic norms appear more properly to be parallel. Fix the attention on any one and the others seemingly become its corollaries. The work of art nourishes itself upon, and absorbs into itself all the science, all the personal and social life of its age. But could science and the moral life be perfected they would fill us with such a sentiment of beauty that all works of art would appear insignificant beside them. The aesthetic norm has rights equal to the logical and moral; but it cannot be accorded the hegemony.

GERTRUDE A. BAKER.

Nietzsche's Superman. WILLIAM M. SALTER. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 16, pp. 421-438.

'Superman' is one of the strong, picturesque expressions which Nietzsche loved to use, and it covers a substantial thought. The word is formed quite naturally, and had been used by others before him. The word 'super' occurs frequently in his writings, as in 'super-German,' 'super-national,' 'super-hellenic,' etc. Nietzsche's early idealization of the superior and great was somewhat dampened during the period of his reaction from Wagner, but it comes into full sway again in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. 'Superman' is man as he might be, not another species. But the great men of history are 'all-too-human.' There has never been a 'superman.' Nietzsche's problem was, to what extent could we sacrifice the development of humanity to the end of bringing a higher type than man into existence? Whether he meant a distinctly new order of beings is a question, for his relation to Darwinism is a mooted point. It seems that he finally settled down to thinking of supermen as simply extraordinary human specimens, who if favored instead of opposed, might considerably modify the human type. In the past great men have existed, but only by accident. He proposes deliberately to establish the higher type. How is the superman to be got? The answer is vague. Nietzsche was aware of the slowness of social change, and had no short cut to Utopia. Patience and moderation must be used in developing the new type. He observes that the first disciples of a doctrine prove nothing against it. We must put our minds to the matter, and realize that the result is in our own hands. This is a first step. Then we must use purpose, selection, and experiment for centuries, if need be, in order to arrive at the desired goal. Let us start with the best we can find, and hope sooner or later to get a world-result. The initiative to such enterprise must be furnished by men who are at once thinkers and men of action. They must be complete men, of large character. They will not neglect material matters, for these are necessary to the scheme, and they will control wealth in the interests of the end they have at heart. They will understand marriage as "the will of two to create one who is more than they who create it." Accident and education may both produce great men, and both are to be made the most of. The higher type will be developed under conditions of stress and conflict. Nietzsche did not believe that physical war is a great stimulant, though it is of some value, as history shows. The war which he praises most is that between ideas and their marshaled hosts. The men of the future will largely train themselves. They will concede to themselves the right to exceptional conduct, which builds up genius, but breaks down weaker men. Nietzsche had no settled convictions as to details and method, but he hoped that in the long run the best would come to victory.

D. T. HOWARD.

NOTES.

A DISCLAIMER AND AN EXPLANATION.

In his recent book, *The Problem of Knowledge*, Assistant Professor D. C. Macintosh makes the following declaration of his critical findings: "G. T. Ladd . . . is a disciple of Lotze whose Lotzianism is tinged with influences from the modified Scottish philosophy of Noah Porter." This statement is not only a mistake from the point of view of any critic who has studied the writings of the three persons involved, but its truth is made quite impossible by the plain facts of my mental development. After desultory reading as a boy, I began the more systematic study of philosophy during my Junior and Senior years in Western Reserve College (1862-64). The required text-books at that time were Thompson's *Outlines of Thought* and Hamilton's *Metaphysics*, besides copious portions of the writings of Paley and Butler. By myself, or with Professor Carroll Cutler, I also read a good deal in the writings of Reid (*Collected Writings*, with Hamilton's Notes and Dissertations), of Stewart, and of Berkeley. Not long after, for I was two years in business between college and Andover Seminary, I worked my way carefully through Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Porter's *Human Intellect* did not appear until 1868, and it was a year later before I even laid eyes on a copy. Meantime I had finished my theological studies, during which I had deliberately and persistently paid little attention to the courses of lectures, but had studied very carefully such works, distinguished far more by psychological insight and profundity of reflective thinking than any of the more modern German writers, as Müller's *Lehre von der Sünde* and parts of Dorner's *Lehre von der Person Christi*, and Rothe's superb work on *Theologische Ethik*. But it was not until 1881, when I went to Yale to take over President Porter's work in psychology and the history of philosophy, that I made any study of the *Human Intellect*, or even read it carefully through. I continued for several years to use it as a text-book, however, for two reasons. I thought it neither politic nor fair to begin my work at Yale by changing the textbook; and the *Human Intellect* was the book which, at that time, had more of the best and most recent work in France and Germany incorporated into it, than any other book in English.

I take this occasion to say that it is not at all to the credit of the younger generation of teachers and writers on psychological subjects that they are so reluctant or so ignorant as not to recognize the great work done for American learning and reputation by Noah Porter. But I was never his disciple, even as accepting "a modified form of the Scottish philosophy." I rejected the fundamentals of the Scottish philosophy too early, and too much on my own initiative, to have become even "tinged" with it twenty and more years later.

Much the same thing is true, though in a different way, with regard to my alleged discipleship under Hermann Lotze. I never studied with Lotze. I never studied in Germany. I was never but twice in Germany,—once only to pass through from Copenhagen to London, and once from Italy to Paris. Moreover I had been studying and writing on philosophical subjects for twenty years before making the most superficial acquaintance with Lotze. This acquaintance began with the translation of his *Dictate*. As the Preface of the first of these volumes, the one on Metaphysics, expressly states, these translations had the double purpose of affording a convenient 'Scheme' for the teacher, and of increasing the popular interest in the study of philosophy as a means of culture. They served for years in successive issues both these purposes. It was later than this that the *Microcosmus* was translated (I never read it in the original); and still later when I began to use it, for the same purpose as that for which the *Outlines* had been used, but with the advanced pupils who began to come to study at Yale after the publication of the first edition of my *Physiological Psychology* in 1887. It afforded a basis for a full year's course in the discussion of philosophical problems. But then I used this only occasionally. I made the same use of Schopenhauer's *World as Will and Idea*, of von Hartmann's *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, of Hegel's *Phaenomenologie des Geistes*; and of other similar works by the greater authors in philosophy. And no one obtained his Ph.D. who had not had two full years of study of the three *Critiques* of Kant.

At the first thorough study of Lotze's *Microcosmus* I detected the two fundamental fallacies of the Lotzian philosophy as a consistent system which, as it still seems to me, prevent its hanging together, so to say. In the first place, the moment Lotze leaves the domain of the purely physical, his reconciliation of the principle of mechanism with "the Idea" becomes rhetorical only, and not in any sense of the words satisfactorily scientific or satisfactorily metaphysical; and second, his purely subjective conception of the category of Time vitiates the application, in reality, of the principle of mechanism. But it is not my purpose to criticize the Philosophy of Lotze, but only to point out that Assistant Professor Macintosh's characterization of me as a disciple of Lotze neither justifies itself from the critical point of view nor from that of an acquaintance with the facts of my mental development.

I also take this occasion to deny that I am anybody's disciple, in any strict, not to say tenable, meaning of the word. In saying this I put forth no claim to originality, much less to the slightest spark of genius. My freedom is due to the manner of my study of philosophical problems and to the facts of my mental development. I did not begin by criticizing others, or by trying to patch up some kind of a so-called system. I began, and kept on, studying particular problems, under all the light from science and history which I could discover to be thrown upon them. After eighteen consecutive years of exceedingly hard work had resulted in two large volumes on a theological subject, I turned with inexpressible relief to the studies which led to the publication of my book on physiological psychology. The student of these days can have no

conception of what this meant under my circumstances in those days. For it was not the reading of Helmholtz, or Fechner, or Weber, or Wundt, that led me to the study of this subject; it was the interest in the subject which led me to the study of these authors. And inasmuch as no dictionary was then available, not infrequently it was necessary to translate the German roots into the corresponding Greek roots, in order even to know the meaning of the terms in anatomy and physiology.

From the psychological and the historical points of view, and after reading, without the systematic bias of the 'disciple,' many books, and taking scores and finally hundreds of mature pupils with me over the ground year after year, I came to form tentative or more or less final opinions on most of the principal problems of philosophy. This is simple historical fact; and it squarely contradicts Assistant Professor Macintosh's characterization of me and my work.

But there is a wider interest involved in all this than anything purely personal can possibly be. In the same book (p. 8) I am called a 'dogmatist.' Whether this designation should be passed back to the writer whose disciple I am declared to be, I am not interested to inquire. The name 'dogmatist' has a comical sound as applied to one who for two-score years has been attacked as a rationalist, and sometimes denounced as a very dangerous and heretical rationalist. But the way in which either name is customarily employed is usually mischievous to the cause of honest and clear thinking. To divide and subdivide, and pigeon-hole, and label, after the fashion of the book from which I have quoted, gets no whither in the direction of improving the substance or the history of reflective thinking. And it is particularly to be deprecated in a "School of Religion" at a time when the graduates into the ministry are being less and less looked up to by the great body of the intelligent and the thoughtful among the people, as trusted *teachers* of the truths which they are especially commissioned to teach.

GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD.

At Princeton University Dr. H. C. Longwell has been appointed Assistant Professor and Preceptor in Philosophy, and Dr. Donald W. Fisher, Instructor in Philosophy.

Mr. Bertrand Russell of Trinity College, Cambridge, has been convicted under 'the defence of the realm act.' Under these circumstances the English Government finds it impossible to issue a passport to him to leave the country. Accordingly, his lectures at Harvard, which were to be given next spring, must be postponed until another year. Professor Royce will resume his own course on Symbolic Logic.

We give below a list of articles in current philosophical magazines.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XXVII, 2. *W. S. Foster* and *K. Roese*, The Tridimensional Theory of Feeling from the Standpoint of Typical Experiences; *Arthur J. Todd*, Primitive Notions of the Self; *George*

F. Arps, A Marked Case of Double Inversion; *Sylvia H. Bliss*, The Significance of Clothes; *Henry T. Moore*, A Method of Testing the Strength of Instincts; *E. J. G. Bradford*, Measures of Variability; *E. Stanley Abbot*, The Causal Relations between Structure and Function in Biology; *J. C. Chapman* and *W. J. Nolan*, Initial Spurt in a Simple Mental Function; *Samuel W. Fernberger*, The Effects of Practice in its Initial Stages in Lifted Weight Experiments and its Bearing upon Anthropometric Measurements; *E. M. Alspach*, Simplicity vs. Complexity of Color Hues.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL, XIV, 3: *L. P. Jacks*, An Interim Religion; *E. W. Hallifax*, The Self-Revelation of the German War-Party before the War; *Rev. Lord William Gascoyne-Cecil*, German Patriotism; The Apocalypse of War; *The Author of "Pro Christo et Ecclesia,"* Veni Creator Spiritus; *Rev. W. Temple*, The Love of God Our Hope of Immortality; *Hugh Elliot*, A Defence of Scientific Materialism; *Sir Roland K. Wilson*, "Education Has Saved the State"; *Mrs. Clement Webb*, Madame Montessori and Mr. Holmes as Educational Reformers; *G. G. Coulton*, The Plain Man's Religion in the Middle Ages; *Rev. F. W. Orde-Ward*, Prolegomena to an Essay on Miracles; *Rev. James Moffatt*, "The Empty Purse"; *Mary Wilkens Hoyt*, The Tyranny of Benefactors.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, XIII, 9: *Joseph Peterson*, Illusions of Direction Orientation; *Tenney L. Davis*, Theory as Truth: A Study of the Logical Status of Scientific Theory.

XIII, 10: *H. G. Hartman*, Science and Epistemology; *Joseph Louis Perrier*, The Permanent Contributions of the Pragmatists.

XIII, 11: *B. H. Bode*, Ernst Mach and the New Empiricism; *George Santayana*, Two Rational Moralists.

MIND, N. S. 98: *P. S. Burrell*, The Plot of Plato's Republic (IV-VI); *G. A. Johnston*, The Influence of Mathematical Conceptions on Berkeley's Philosophy; *J. C. Gregory*, Dreams as Psychical Explosions; *Henry Rutgers Marshall*, Retentiveness and Dreams; *J. E. Turner*, Discussion: The Nature and Geometry of Space.

THE MONIST, XXVI, 2: *Raffaello Piccoli*, Benedetto Croce's Esthetics; *Gottlob Frege*, The Fundamental Laws of Arithmetic: Psychological Logic; *S. Radhakrishnan*, The Vedantic Approach to Reality; *Leo C. Robertson*, The Conception of Brahma. The Philosophy of Mysticism; *Paul Carus*, The Trinity.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XXXII, 3: *Arthur S. Otis*, Some Logical Aspects of the Binet Scale, II; *Herbert S. Langfeld*, Concerning the Image; *G. V. N. Dearborn*, Movement, Cenesthesia, and the Mind; *Howard C. Warren*, Mental Association from Plato to Hume; *S. Bent Russell*, The Effects of High Resistance in Common Nerve Paths; *Christine Ladd-Franklin*, Discussion: On Color Theories and Chromatic Sensations.

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE, 60: *A. Lédère*, La Psychologie des Graffiti;

H. Delacroix, Remarques sur "Une Mystique Moderne"; *E. Molnar*, Une Nouvelle Méthode en Psychologie Religieuse; *P. Kennel*, Essai de Classification des Odeurs par la Méthode des Majorités.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

NATURE, REASON AND THE LIMITS OF STATE AUTHORITY.¹

THAT ideas are more effective and important agencies in human affairs than events however massive—that the Justice of Plato, and the Law of Nature and of Reason of the Stoics, will continue to influence men's thoughts and actions long after all Pragmatic Sanctions and Golden Bulls are dusty and forgotten—this is a conclusion willingly embraced by most philosophers, and by some historians. The reading public at large pays little heed to it, and expects to learn 'what really happens' from the daily paper. But the part of one nation in the present war has been so obviously deliberate and intentional, the organized use of all its powers so plainly part of a plan from the beginning, that for once we are all agreed that there is a theory back of it, and that in this case at least national character has more in it than habit and feeling.

What is this theory? And is it one peculiar to Germany, or one which has affected the development and policies of all modern states, so that, sharing it more or less, they also share more or less the responsibility for its bad effects, if it has any? Since August, 1914, all sorts of answers have been proposed for these questions, especially the first. They have included insipid republications of Chamberlain's "Aryan" propaganda, the theme of which goes back to certain lucubrations of Fichte and of Schopenhauer, and is a signal example of the illegitimate alliance of science and romance; the mistaken interpretation of Nietzsche's

¹ Read in part before the Western Philosophical Association, April, 1916.

call for powerful and aggressive individuals into one for a powerful and aggressive state; the translation of the works of military theorists like Clausewitz and Bernhardt, who expound the art of war, and also stiffen the professional resolution of themselves and their readers, as every good North German is likely to do whether he be a judge or a general, by an appeal to the categorical imperative; and finally, the accusation—or the praise—of German Idealism as the animating spirit of German politics.

The last suggestion is the only one which seems to me to hit upon an influence of wide and permanent importance; and I should be unwilling to accept it except in a very restricted form. That the empty bottle of Kant's categorical imperative had the new wine of German nationalism put into it, as Professor Dewey argues, is one thing; that it *must* be used in just this way, quite another. Kant himself was cosmopolitan and international in all his hopes for the Europe of the future; in this respect he retained and clarified what was best in the spirit of the eighteenth century. Fichte began in an equally cosmopolitan spirit; and when, in his patriotic resistance to Napoleon, he became the prophet of Germanism, even in his last and most extreme statement of his theory of the national state—*Die Staatslehre*, 1813—he held that the only justifiable war is that by which one people throws off the tyranny of another.¹

The phase of German Idealism which has closest relation to the actualities of modern politics is Hegel's doctrine of the Absolute State. Hegel regarded the "modern state" as the concrete objectification and realization of all human interests whatever, so far as they are capable of being raised to rational self-consciousness; and therefore he held it to be the moral absolute, against which there is no appeal, save to the dialectic of history and the judgment worked out in battle. It includes and subordinates to itself all human activities and organizations. "The State, as the realization of the substantial will, . . . is the rational in and for itself. This substantial unity is absolute unmoved end for itself, in which freedom reaches its utmost right, and has at the

¹ Cf. Basch, "L'Allemagne classique et le pangermanisme," *Revue de Métaphysique*, xxii, 6.

same time the supreme right against individuals, whose highest duty is, to be members of the state."¹ This, I believe, is the principle, not only of German nationalism, but of modern nationalism everywhere, though it is not everywhere worked out into its consequences with the same thoroughness and precision, and is at times opposed by other and divergent principles. The proof of this is chiefly contained in what follows; but in passing I wish to recall that Hegel was the close friend of the Prussian minister Altenstein, and that a whole generation of the higher officials of Prussia attended his lectures at Berlin.

Hegel's genial insight, his gift for exact and pregnant statement of all the implications of a given historical mode of human life, are nowhere seen to better advantage than in his *Philosophie des Rechts*. Find if you can a better description of the ideal German citizen than this: "The individual, a subject as to his duties, as a citizen finds in their fulfillment the protection of his person and of his property, the consideration of his individual welfare and the satisfaction of his essential nature, the self-esteem arising from his being a member of this state; and in the fulfillment of duties as services to the state the latter has its maintenance and its existence."² Read his account of the external relations of the state to other states. It might have been written in 1914, though it dates from almost exactly a century before. The state, in its individual consciousness of itself, must assert its independence of all other states; this is a necessary consequence of its essential nature. The sharpest expression of this is war; and by it, the finite and transitory character of all in the individual that distinguishes itself from the interest of the state is demonstrated. Hence follows the moral value of war as such.³ "The content of courage as a moral trait lies in the truly absolute end, the *sovereignty* of the state;—the *reality* of this end as the work of courage has the surrender of personal reality as its means. Here then we have the rigor of the sharpest oppositions: the *sacrifice* of one's self, but as the *existence* of freedom; the supremest *independence* of *self-consciousness*, whose existence at

¹ *Rechtsphilosophie*, § 258.

² *Ibid.*, § 261.

³ *Ibid.*, § 324.

the same time consists in the mechanism of an *external order* and *service*; absolute obedience and abdication of one's own opinion and desire to discuss things, therefore *absence* of one's own mind, and the most intense and inclusive *presence* of mind and determination; the most hostile and at the same time directly personal behavior towards individuals, together with a completely indifferent or even kindly feeling towards them as individuals. . . . The principle of the modern world, *thought* and the *universal*, has given this higher form to courage, that its expression seems to be more mechanical and not the deed of a particular person, but of a member of a whole. . . . Therefore it has invented *artillery*.”¹ This is the characteristic Hegelian version of modern “military grandeur and servitude.”

As for international law, since there is no moral entity above or beyond the state, such law never is, but merely ought to be. It rests on the agreement of absolutely sovereign states, and since such agreement is more or less contingent and fortuitous, so is this so-called law.² There is no judge beyond states save the *Weltgeist*, whose court is history. Hence, if states do not agree, their strife can be decided only by war. What shall be a cause of war is indefinable, “since the state can put its infinitude and its honor in any one of its particular traits, and is so much the more inclined to such irritability, as it is a strong individual disposed by long internal quiet to seek some material for its activity outside.” “Besides, since the state is a conscious entity, it cannot stop with noticing only real injury, but the idea of injury, as a danger threatened from another state, and the calculation of probabilities, guesses at plans, etc., are causes of dissension.” Its own welfare is the highest law of the state in its relations to other states; the government of a state is no general or philanthropic Providence. War abolishes international law; what is left is merely (i) the recognition of one state by another which even war implies, (ii) the fact that war is not waged against private persons, and (iii) the restraint of manners and customs common in all civilized behavior.³

¹ *Op. cit.* § 328.

² §§ 330–333.

³ §§ 334–339.

These conclusions, beside which Fichte's theory of war appears as pure pacifism, are the logical and necessary deductions from the principle of the absolute state. If they have been exemplified on a large scale in the origin and conduct of the present war, this is because some modern states live by this principle almost exclusively, and all have been influenced by it. Hegel drew these conclusions with conscientious rigor, and willingly accepted them, especially since they seemed to him another example of the universal dialectic; war is the dialectic by which states themselves are revealed as but transitory embodiments of the Idea. It was by no means for the sake of these conclusions, however, that he elaborated his doctrine of the modern state as the absolute state. Caird's fine exposition has made us familiar with the place that the problem of the state, in relation to individual freedom, took in the development of Hegel's thought as a young man; and all] the later documentation has confirmed and emphasized the importance of this question for him.¹ The problem took shape in his mind as fundamental in politics, ethics, and religion, and as the expression of the historical conflict of the Greek ideal, as he conceived it, with the Christian. The straightforward naturalism of Greek life and the Greek state versus Christian dualism and other-worldliness—æsthetic enjoyment versus the law of duty—objective custom versus subjective conscience—the concrete immediacy of the natural world in all its aspects versus the abstract reason or understanding—these are some of the shifting phases in which the question appeared to him, and on which he rang the changes in the *Phänomenologie* of 1807. He is already outlining his answer to them, so far as they are political and ethical, in the *System der Sittlichkeit* of (about) 1802; in the third section of the *Encyclopädie*, 1817, the "Philosophy of Mind," the answer is complete in outline; and the *Philosophie des Rechts*, 1821, fills out the outline. That answer, to state it briefly, is that the modern state reconciles Nature and Reason, Social Organization and Individual Freedom, as the Greek state had done; but it does this in a higher because a self-

¹ Cf. Caird, *Hegel*, chap. II; Wallace, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, introductory essay v.; G. Lasson's ed. of *Phänomenologie*, "Einleitung" I, i.

conscious way. All individual interests, from the highest to the lowest, have become aware of their own true nature, and in doing so have also become aware that they are truly satisfied and reconciled only in the state. The intelligent man may still *want* something more or different; but he knows that this is mere private desire, not rational will. As the modern state is the end in which all these ends meet, it is absolute, the organization of all other organizations, the moral finality for man.

Hegel did not reach this position simply by speculative construction; he based it on a vast historical induction, and the best way to approach it critically seems to be by a summary review of the history of reasoned principle and moral standards in relation to the actual state. In order to be brief I must be dogmatic; and for this I ask pardon in advance.

The ancient states of Greece and Rome were autochthonous, original outgrowths of nature, in a sense that no later state has been. The results of this persist throughout their entire history. To the very last, in Greece, reason never becomes free in the state as an active principle of political reorganization: theory of the state gets no place in the history of the actual state. Instead of this, the modifications in the constitution of the various city-states—passing in general, though not universally, from monarchy into aristocracy, and then into democracy—were always the result of a conflict of individual or class interests. The very terms in which Aristotle describes aristocracy and democracy make their origin in economic conflict clear. Constitution-makers like Solon try to arrest or control this conflict, with varying success; but their end is always the immediate one of stability. Meanwhile, the philosophic concept of a universal law is developed, and helps to generalize the notion of moral obligation and to make it less arbitrary; and finally the political theories of Plato and Aristotle appear. But these theories, while they are broadly humane in their implications, are purely national in their explicit form. While Plato simply confined his attention to an ideal reform of the Greek state, Aristotle recognized that the city-state of Athens required a slave-population far outnumbering the free citizens, and defended the insti-

tution. Moreover, these theories got no opportunity to react upon the state.¹ Stoicism, with its broadly humanitarian spirit, arose as the ancient Greek state passed away.

Broadly, the same statements hold true for the Roman city-state, whose history is also one of a conflict of interests. The effect of Stoicism on the theory and development of Roman law was of great importance; but it had no influence on the relations of state to state, nor did it succeed in getting the principle of freedom of conscience recognized by the state.² From first to last, the ancient state was an absolute state, which included and subordinated all other human interests and organizations. It identified religion with itself, and denied the right of free association. Organized opinion, therefore, was repressed as a political influence. This was the chief cause, perhaps, of the conflict of the Roman Empire with Christianity. It is the very spirit of the Civil Law, so deeply present that in the later Empire occupation and civic status were transformed into hereditary castes by edict. Wherever Roman law exists in an unmodified form even to-day, the same difficulties concerning freedom of association, religious and otherwise, have recurred.

The mediæval state, like the ancient, developed through a conflict of classes and interests, the general outcome of which was the growing power of the mercantile class, the 'burgesses,' in connection with that of the king. But this development was not one from original nature, as in the case of the ancient state, and the mediæval state never became an absolute state. This is because the change due to class-conflict takes place concurrently with the gradual absorption of the older civilization, and under the tutorship of an institution older than any of these states, the Church, which stands for the Christian principle of the free conscience, in spite of many inconsistencies in its officers. It is generally recognized that there are ends beyond any 'temporal' political organization, and principles superior to its laws,

¹ I know Burnet asserts the contrary of the students of Plato; but this seems to be true at best of the colonies only. He also points out Platonic influences on Roman law, through South Italy. *Thales to Plato*, pp. 302-304.

² It has often been pointed out that Grotius's use of "jus gentium" as international law was a technical mistake.

by which those laws may be judged. These principles are classed together, as a Law of Nature or Reason. So Aquinas says, for example: "There is in men a certain natural law, a participation in the eternal law, by which good and evil are discerned;" and "since in human affairs anything is called just, because it conforms to the rule of reason, and that would not be a law which were not just, therefore every human law must be derived from the natural law which is the first rule of reason."¹ Here is the Aristotelian-Stoic principle again, in a Christian setting; but this time it gets a recognition, even if a wavering one, from the state; and it is admitted to extend not only to the relations of the state to its citizens, but also to the relations of states to one another. Of this supra-national moral law the Church is the recognized guardian and defender. What this involves as to the adjustment of powers between 'Church' and 'State,' spiritual authority and civil authority, is often disputed; but the supremacy of the principle, and the propriety of the human interest in its realization being represented in a corporation extending beyond, and spiritually independent of the state, no one ever denies.

At the opening of the modern period, the two principles of actual political power and the supra-national law of nature, which had been held together, in ideal at least, in the mediæval system as a whole, were divorced and abstractly opposed to each other. Machiavelli's *Prince* gave a naturalistic account of political authority as absolute non-moral power. The real purpose of the book is revealed by its concluding chapter, the exhortation to Lorenzo the Magnificent to free Italy from the barbarians. The sovereign was to over-rule all ordinary morality for the sake of national power; reason of state was to prevail for the sake of national independence. This throws a flood of light on the vitality of Machiavellianism in modern politics. For very different reasons, Luther became the first advocate of the 'divine right of kings' and 'passive obedience.'² Grotius

¹ *Summa Theologica*, 1a 2æ, xci, 2; xcv, 2.

² For Luther's relation to 17th century absolutism, see Lord Acton, "The Protestant Theory of Persecution," in *History of Freedom and Other Essays*; also J. N. Figgis, *From Gerson to Grotius*, chap. III.

is perhaps the most prominent example, among several, of the persistence of the idea of 'Law of Nature.' He unites it with the contract-theory of the state, for which also there were numerous mediæval precedents; and uses it for two ends—to establish the independence of political institutions in respect to the Church, and to serve as a basis for international law.

How Rousseau developed the Law of Nature into the Rights of Man, and how the French Revolution put these rights into action—this is too familiar to require comment. The reaction outside of France from joy to horror, and then to systematic opposition, is also familiar. It is part of the spiritual history of many of the greatest men of the time—of Burke, Coleridge, and Wordsworth in England; of Fichte, Görres, and Hegel in Germany. Fichte, however, fell back on nationalism only as a means of defence against the conquest of Germany by Napoleon; to the end of his life, as Basch remarks, he was "a man of the *levée en masse*, a mystic Jacobin." Burke and Hegel, among others, each in his own way, attacked the Revolutionary appeal to a 'law of nature,' which had suffered much change from the mediæval conception of it based on Aristotle, and to abstract individual rights. The reaction against these led in many cases to a sort of historical positivism; yet, by an ironical paradox, many of that time and of this who dismiss the idea of natural rights in every form as an outworn superstition, continue to admire struggles for freedom, and to speak of martyrs for liberty. Those who avoid the paradox fall back on the naturalistic position of Machiavelli—as for example the famous jurist Haller, whom Hegel criticizes with the utmost severity.¹ Hegel himself firmly believed that his own theory of the state got beyond and overcame both abstractions—the abstraction of a natural right without any society to possess it in, and the abstraction of a state which is mere historic fact with no ends to realize. Thus he revived the idea of the absolute state, but included in it two institutions derived from the Middle Ages, and foreign to the ancient polities—constitutional monarchy, and representative government. For he was no mere reactionary; his theory of the

¹ *Rechtsphilosophie*, § 258.

state was not simply the apotheosis of the Prussian constitution, as hostile critics say; only, what mediæval Europe had thought could only be accomplished by Christendom, Hegel held to be the proper work of the individual state. And in this he but idealized and theorized the actual tendency of modern politics; the ideal for him is the real.

To prove this it is necessary to show that the state is a wholly self-contained organization, within which, and only within which, the legitimate satisfaction of every human interest is provided; and this is what Hegel attempts to do in his discussion of "civil society" (*die bürgerliche Gesellschaft*), which may accordingly be considered the central citadel of his philosophy of the state. In the family, he tells us, men are at one in a unity of natural feeling; in the state they are at one in a unity of enlightened conscious purpose; but civil society, which occupies the place between the family and the state, and whose organization is the dialectic which leads from one to the other, is the special sphere of private interest. Hegel describes it in terms of the nexus of economic wants, which are selfish, and divide men as much as they unite them. Yet, in order to their satisfaction, these wants must perforce fall into a system; a division of labor must take place, men must buy and sell, and so on. Even because of their natural selfishness of feeling, therefore, men must make themselves, and be made, members of society.¹ Hegel's particular analysis of all this is most acute, and the model for most of the better discussions of this subject in modern ethics.

But examining it with our particular problem in mind, we note that this sphere of civil society is supposed to represent all the interests which a man may—abstractly though not really—be conceived to have, which are distinguishable from his interests as a member of a family, or as a citizen and subject of the state. These interests are all described, however, as economic; and at the point where it is to be shown that civil society must be actualized, and can only be actualized, in the state, we find this highly significant passage: "The principle of this system of wants, the individual separateness of knowledge and of will, possesses

¹ *Op. cit.*, §§ 183, 187.

the fully developed universal, the universality of freedom, only in an abstract way, that is to say, as the right of property; but this right exists here not merely as a fact, but in its valid reality, as the protection of property through the administration of the law."¹ To put this in other terms, it means simply this: Civil society has the principle of freedom only in property; therefore its wider organization, and the actualization of its various interests, can be only through law in the strict sense; and accordingly, its interests terminate in, and are bounded by, the political state.

It hardly seems unfair to say that the terms in which Hegel has stated this question of the organization of human interests rules out any solution except or beyond the state, and thereby makes the state absolute. If all these interests are included in family interests, property interests, and political interests, then the debate is closed. Where would art and science, philosophy and religion, find their recognition in such a scheme? It is not easy to see exactly what Hegel's view of their place in organized human life is, strange as it may seem that such a difficulty should exist. In part, of course, we know that, like Aristotle, and unlike Plato, he placed them in a region beyond and separate from morality. Yet they must have points of contact with social life and organization. Where do they get their place in the all-satisfying state?

Perhaps Hegel said so little about them in relation to the State, because of his opposition to Fichte, who had said so much, and to Romanticism generally. At any rate, what he has to say is curiously scattered and incidental. In the first place, we notice that the administration of law expresses itself in two ways—in "state-police," and in the legalization and protection of corporations. It is only as a member of such corporations that the private citizen gets his true position and recognition, and their connected interests are the source and support of the constitution of the state. These corporations Hegel describes with a keen sense for the moral meaning and value of such associations, but in quite general terms, and on the analogy of the German trade

¹ *Op. cit.*, § 208.

guilds.¹ What classes of men belong here? The only answer seems to be the division of citizens, at an earlier point in the discussion, into three estates: the substantial, the formal, and the general. The farmers are the substantial estate; laborers, manufacturers, and merchants make up the formal estate, and seem to be the members of these corporations; the general estate has the care of the general interests of society as its business, and its members must therefore be relieved of the necessity of labor to meet their private needs, either by having property of their own, or by being maintained by the state. Does this general estate include what we call the professions? Hegel does not say so, but this seems to be the only place for them in his scheme.²

Later, in the course of the chapters devoted to the internal law of the state, he does have something to say about the state's relations to religion and to "Wissenschaft." It is astonishingly frank; it also contains a curious contradiction. Religion, science, philosophy, and art, it seems, have each a special formal principle, distinct from that of the state; and therefore they are not only means for it, but also ends for themselves. It is not necessary to examine the application of state law to them, as the immediate subject is the special principle of the state.³ After some forcible remarks concerning 'carping pietism and what Arnold called the "dissidence of Dissent," Hegel comes to the question whether church and science are independent of the state, so that it is only a means for them as an end. The *other* type of independence, which his previous statement seems to allow, he excludes by his formulation of the question. To make them independent in *this* way, he insists, is to degrade the state to a mere arrangement for the protection of life and property. But the true principle of the state is *thought*; it *knows* its ends, while this rational content is present to religion only as belief and feeling. In morals and politics the state must rule, against any church teaching to the contrary; abstract dogma alone is free from state control. *Wissenschaft*, on the other hand, is the

¹ *Op. cit.*, §§ 250-256.

² *Ibid.*, §§ 202-205.

³ *Ibid.*, the note on p. 209 of Lasson's edition.

natural ally of the state, "for it has the same element of form." When learning asserts "freedom of opinion" against the state, it errs, and falls into mere subjectivity. Usually the state can despise such 'opinion,' but when it insists on erecting itself into a really superior position, claims the dignity of science, and "would make the state's own institutions of learning into a church hostile to it,"—then the state must protect against this the objective truth and the fundamental principle of moral life, since it asserts in so doing the right of self-consciousness to its own insight into what should be accepted as true.¹—In a word, the Absolute State, having absorbed all the prerogatives of the mediæval Church, must be infallible as well!

My statement of the opposing view must be brief. In the first place, the idea of the State as the final possible human organization is inconsistent with Hegel's own philosophy. The logic of that philosophy would demand the transcendence of every moral interest, as an ideal principle, over its immediate objectification. And it is not enough to have it represented, beyond its objectification in the state, only in a *Weltgeist*. As it is a principle of human consciousness, as it is implicitly transcendent over any particular State, so men must strive for its recognition and embodiment in an organized social form which goes beyond the limits of the state. To leave it to a dialectic of history represented by war is to degrade it to a mere principle of nature *an sich*.

But it is more important for my purpose, since I have been using Hegel only as the most illustrious representative of state-absolutism, to notice that the theory is contrary to the facts of the moral life. Men do have interests in common goods which exceed by their nature the limits of the state, and are, potentially at least, universally human. Moreover, since interests are by their very nature experimental, none can set a limit to the course over which their pursuit will carry the race; the state is a very relative affair after all!

The interests which transcend state limits may be roughly described as (i) economic; (ii) æsthetic; (iii) scientific and philo-

¹ *Op. cit.*, § 270, pp. 207-219.

sophical; (iv) moral and religious. What can we expect from each of them in counteracting and overcoming national enmity?

(i) Economic interests obviously, of their own nature, have no national limits. Unfortunately, they are causes of division as well as of union, for states as for individuals. We cannot hope too much for the prevention of wars from 'enlightened self-interest' or from 'class-feeling.' The present war has shown us striking examples of the interests of capital pressing towards war, and furthered by war; it has also shown us how readily Socialists can become Nationalists. But it does seem as though statesmen, who are supposed to recognize facts, might begin now to recognize the internationalism of economic interests by forming trade alliances which would be inclusive rather than exclusive, productive rather than protective. Every rightminded man should oppose the policy of 'trade wars' and 'commercial reprisal' as irrational and immoral.

(ii) Developed art in its technical forms is intensely individual, and the æsthetic interest does not seem susceptible of any close incorporation, except as united with the economic or the religious. There have been some interesting suggestions lately of the possible strengthening of art by uniting it more closely with craftsmanship. At any rate, the international character of the masonic guild in mediæval times is an encouraging precedent.

(iii) Science and philosophy should keep themselves free of all chauvinism and jingoism, since these are absolutely destructive of their true ends and nature. In no country should all the institutions of learning and education be under the sole control of the state. Free association is a liberating and developing influence of vast importance in these fields, and we should be careful in the United States not to go too far in the other direction. It would be hard to name one valuable feature or activity of our public schools which was not brought into them by the influence or example of 'private' schools and 'private' associations; and the difficulties our state universities face would be extreme, if 'private' universities had not set standards which it is simply not respectable not to observe. That the scientific and philo-

sophic interests are essentially unifying needs no demonstration. Some historian might well devote a chapter to the cosmopolitan influence of scholars and learned societies in the midst of the dynastic wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—an influence in its way a mediæval survival, for the international character of the mediæval university made for peace in a warlike age.

(iv) I take for granted that the religious and moral interests are in the last analysis identified, whether co-terminous or not. The Middle Ages had an international organization, the Catholic Church, as the expression and instrument of these interests. Whether such a body can ever have the power it had then or not, the public conscience of mankind, the belief of all good men in principles of action justified by a growing realization of a common human good, must get itself expressed and represented in international institutions. This is the place of proposed international courts and other bodies of this kind. Whether their authority shall be coercive or not is at present a much debated question. It does not seem to be noticed that it is essentially the mediæval question as to whether the Church shall have coercive power over a bad government or not. Only the accidents have changed; the substance remains the same. The alternative solution to independent international courts, coercive or non-coercive, is a World-State, to which all other organizations would be subordinate. Such a state is hardly within the confines of practical discussion; and my own view is that since the moral interest does, and ought to, transcend the political organization, in order that all political organization may itself be judged, such a state is ethically objectionable. It would simply be the Absolute State *in excelsis*, with all its faults repeated on a larger scale.

To conclude with a somewhat dogmatic statement of the idea of human organization implied in this paper: The political organization, the State, should be distinguished from the looser organization, based on community of manners and customs, language, culture, and ideals, which we call the Nation. The two tend more and more to coincide, perhaps; but they are not

identical. Left to themselves, the natural tendencies of states are likely to be exclusive; while the natural relations of national cultures are those of mutual modification by free interaction and exchange. The sole direct function of the political organization, the state, is to assure the security and freedom of its citizens; other ends it may assist in securing, if public opinion approve, but they do not belong to it of its own essential nature. An important part of the true freedom of its citizens lies in the pursuit of ends not political, and essentially transcending the limits of any particular state, since they are conceived as good for men as men. In the pursuit of such ends, they organize themselves in societies not identical with the state, and which ought to be independent of it. So organizing themselves, they work out their concrete freedom, which the state should assure, but not itself attempt to make for them. Freedom cannot be made for anyone; the state is not directly a cultural organization, but a political. In entering such societies, men voluntarily subject themselves to an authority which controls them for the purposes of the society. These purposes and the consequent authorities the state should admit and guarantee, not control. They are limited within, to be sure, by the political power; but extending beyond it, they at the same time free the citizen from the tyranny either of oligarchies or of majorities, and knit state to state in a wider organization of men. On such a view the adjustment of authorities becomes at times a difficult problem; but it is far better to have such a recurrent problem than state tyranny within the state, and such a total lack of any effective organization among states that they stand to one another in the non-moral relations of physical forces. Nor need there be any fear that national unity and the valuable characteristics of national culture would be impaired by such limits of state authority. They are not the creations of the political state; and any state which interferes with them is in so far proceeding on the principles of the 'absolute' state.

We have become so accustomed of late to talking and thinking of the state as the most inclusive human society that such statements as these may seem odd and paradoxical. But I conceive

that they are simply the theoretical expression and development of what is best in English and American institutions. The principles are the principles of Burke, extended to cover the field of international relations, and taken as meaning concrete opportunities for action, not mere checks on government. The same principles which when acted upon secure the freedom of individuals within the state, carried out and embodied in institutions which extend beyond the state, will prove the best security against injustice and aggression in the relations of states to one another.

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LIBERTY AND THE SOCIAL SYSTEM.¹

THE purpose of this paper is to discuss the revision of political philosophy which has been undertaken as a part of the work of English Idealism. This revision claims to be not only a more adequate statement of social theory but also to give a sound theoretical basis for political liberalism. It originated, in fact, in an effort to restate the traditional liberalism of the revolutionary period in terms of the Hegelian philosophy, and with an eye to avoiding the factors which, even as early as the middle of the nineteenth century, had brought this earlier liberalism to decay. The special question to be considered is how far the idealist theory of the state is really liberal. For purposes of illustration I shall use Professor Bosanquet's presentation of the theory in his *Philosophical Theory of the State*.

The fatal weakness of the earlier liberalism lay in the fact that its theory created an antithesis between the liberty of the individual and his restraint by social institutions. The theory of natural rights conceived the individual as the possessor of rights by virtue of his nature as a human being and hence prior to all forms of social organization. The hypothetical state of nature which preceded such an organization was conceived as a state of ideally complete liberty, all restraints by organized force being absent. Government arose by consent or contract; as was commonly said, the individual gave up some of his natural liberty in order that he might enjoy the remainder in greater security. And hence the paradox: The individual supposedly gives up something and yet in fact he has more of it after the surrender than he had before. The dilemma is indeed quite unescapable. If liberty consists in the absence of restraint, then liberty must grow progressively less as restraints are extended and organized. And since government is quite inconceivable without restraint somewhere, and the possibility of

¹ With some omissions this paper was read before the Western Philosophical Association, in St. Louis, April 21, 1916.

restraint nearly anywhere, liberty and government must be at daggers drawn.

It is indeed true that the application of natural rights principles, at least where it was really effective, was not so bad as the theory. The practice, in fact, contradicted the theory; for the substantial result of this early liberalism was the writing into law of certain liberties which appeared to be inseparable from the maintenance of a humane standard of life. Its practice presented the paradox of securing by law rights which the theory held to be prior to and the foundation of law. The theory was, indeed, a doctrine of protest which derived its content mainly from the fact that it was supposed to connote certain concrete reforms which the liberals agreed to accept but which had little or no logical relation to the theory itself. Hence the theory worked best where liberalism faced the problem of remodeling institutions already well established, as was the case in England and the United States. Where a more thoroughgoing reconstruction was required, as in nearly every other country, the doctrinaire character of natural rights liberalism manifested itself, and the modern reconstruction came not so much through liberalism as in spite of it. Cavour in Italy was hampered scarcely more by the Austrian and Neapolitan reactionaries than by the extreme followers of Mazzini and Garibaldi. Bismarck in Germany crushed alike the constitutionalism of the liberals and the feudalism of the Junkers.

Inconsistencies in theory, however, were not the only factors which tended to discredit the older liberalism. Two powerful sentiments also worked against it, viz., the growing sense of national unity and an increasingly historical habit of thought in regard to all social problems. The natural rights position, both in origin and nature, was cosmopolitan; it depended upon the assumption of a certain inherent core of rationality which belonged to every individual by virtue merely of the fact that he was a human being. The claim to rights was made on behalf of a common humanity, and differences of time and place, of race and nationality, were conceived to be superficial and unimportant by comparison. With the turn of the century, however, the

sentiment of national patriotism and of loyalty to the national vocation quite displaced the enthusiasm for man as such. With the sentiment of nationality came also a reawakened and developed interest in history, and this brought with it much that was inimical to the natural rights view; for it is a commonplace to say that the latter was hopelessly unhistorical. The notion of the individual as a self-sufficing entity was put out of court by the evident fact that most at least of what makes up his individuality is elicited only by the action and the reaction of his environment, physical and mental, upon him. At the same time, by a parallel line of thought, the notion of society as an analogue of temporary, voluntary associations of persons was equally discredited by the fact that the community, with its institutions, its habitual preferences, its culture, is a going concern, possessing a momentum and an inertia of its own.

Thus a complete reconstruction of the theory of political liberalism was called for. A theory was needed which would bring into accord the two apparently contradictory principles of self-control by the individual and restraint of the individual by the law. It was evident on all scores that the only sane or fruitful principle of reform was liberty in accordance with and by means of law; but such a principle cannot be founded on the assumption that liberty consists in the absence of restraint. In particular, it was evident that freedom could no longer be defended on the *prima facie* ground that the individual possesses a sphere of strictly private interests not to be invaded by public forces. The inadequacy of this argument for its purpose may be illustrated by Mill's famous distinction between conduct which "affects the interests of no person besides himself," and conduct which "affects prejudicially the interests of others."¹ The difficulty which Mill finds in handling this distinction shows its fatal weakness. Mill is, in fact, quite unable to show that there is any conduct of importance which concerns only individual interests, and the utter arbitrariness of the distinction is shown by his own extraordinary applications of it. Thus he is apparently quite willing to give the public a free hand in controlling

¹ *Liberty*, Chapter IV.

the education of children, though the interest in one's education is certainly private as well as public, while the prohibition of alcoholic liquors he regards as a gross usurpation upon the liberty of private life, though he cannot even pretend that alcoholism is a merely private concern. In fact, the distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding conduct is quietly laid aside and a quite different standard for judging the proper sphere of legislation is substituted; viz.: What can such an instrument as law reasonably be expected to accomplish, without the application doing more harm than good? The latter principle, while clearly superior as a practical guide, is not really a principle of liberty at all, except on the further assumption that certain desirable traits of character are hindered, or at least not helped, by the application of law.

It is with the recognition of the inevitable failure of any such distinction as that made by Mill that the idealist theory of the State, first presented in English by F. H. Bradley and T. H. Green, comes upon the scene. What idealism championed was in general a more concrete and positive view of individuality. If the individual cannot be defined by the circumscription of his interests, by the fencing off of an area within which outsiders have no business and will not be admitted, it is clear that the definition must imply rather a distinctive position among other persons, a place and a function which others could not immediately and fully take up and occupy. For isolation and exclusion we thus substitute some sort of determinate achievement which gives a person standing and perhaps also recognition among his fellows. "It [individuality] always comes from taking hold of the world in some definite way, which, just because it is definite and affirmative, is at once a distinct assertion of the self, and a transition from the private self into the great communion of reality."¹ It must be agreed that this is in accord with the standard by which in practice individuality is judged and also with an historical estimate of the individual. He is the man of pre-eminent achievement in some significant department of human endeavor. So far from being one whose interests are

¹ *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 126.

divorced from and indifferent to the public, he is precisely the man in whom the interests of society center; for he is the man whose work could not easily, perhaps could not possibly, be duplicated.

From this point of view, then, the self-expression and self-development of the individual are inseparably connected with the performance of functions having a generally social nature. Where, then, does the individual's liberty lie? Evidently in escape from the circumstances which are most likely to hinder such performance. A new theory of liberty, therefore, founded upon the view of individuality just sketched, must find the essence of bondage in these hindrances. Since liberty implies self-expression, and since self-expression implies the performance of social functions, the failure to perform such a function will itself be bondage and the negation of individuality. Thus bondage is identified with precisely that isolation and particularity by means of which the earlier liberals had sought to define liberty. The theory dovetails easily into the distinction between the sensitive and the rational self, bondage belonging to the former and freedom to the latter. The sensitive self is private and particular; the rational self is social, objective, and free.

In Professor Bosanquet's presentation, the theory is developed around what he calls the actual will as opposed to the real will.¹ The feeling of a conflict of selves, of which one represents a higher level of moral achievement, is, of course, a common phase of moral experience. The moral struggle is envisaged as the effort of the better self against the hindrance placed in its way by the lower. Since true self-expression cannot lie in following the path of least resistance, since it requires the following of the harder but better way, liberty cannot be mere status. It lies in the achievement of a definite and affirmative individuality by taking one's place in the objective order of social action. Institutions and laws, therefore, represent the real will of the individual, that which his better self requires for its being, while the actual will is the more immediate, but also the more casual,

¹ *Op. cit.*, Chapter VI.

impulses which solicit his interest. Thus, even in the case where law and institutions exercise restraint by force upon him, the restraint is only the extreme assertion of the real will, and therefore the instrument of liberty; he is forced to be free. "It is possible for us to acquiesce, as rational beings, in a law and order which on the whole makes for the possibility of asserting our true or universal selves, at the very moment when this law and order is constraining our particular private wills in a way which we resent, or even condemn."¹

What we have here is but an application in political theory of the conception of system which is elaborated in idealist logic and metaphysics. In the consistency logic, every judgment is tested by its inclusion in a system of judgments, by its capacity to contribute to a consistent system of knowledge. In the metaphysics of absolute idealism, every experience is combined with, taken up into, the total experience of the Absolute, and thus its partiality and unreality are transcended. In precisely the same way the individual is taken up into the social system, which for ethical purposes is the manifestation of the Absolute. The individual in himself is partial, casual, one-sided; as Mr. Bradley says, a fragment torn from his context. Whatever positive ethical value he may possess arises from the place which he comes to occupy in an objective system of values. Society is conceived as a system of rights embodied in law, institutions, and generally recognized values. The self-development of the individual consists primarily in entering into and possessing the culture embodied in this system. His primary obligation is to find his place in the system; his good consists in being the instrument of the common good. The theory cannot be better summarized than in the title of Mr. Bradley's famous chapter, "My Station and its Duties." The reality of the individual is embodied in his station in the social system. If compulsion is necessary to make the individual fill his station, the compulsion is fully justified as the compulsion of the lower by the higher. The station and its duties are what the individual would will were he not infected by "indolence, ignorance, or rebellion."

¹ Bosanquet, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

It may be admitted without debate that the theory just sketched does express at least one phase both of moral and political experience. Even the routine observance of the law may stiffen a man in the maintenance of an ideal against odds, as in the case of the poverty-stricken father who may feel the compulsory school law as a deliverance from temptation. The theory serves to suggest, at least, the extreme complexity of desires and impulses and to indicate how false, both in theory and in practice, is the superficial notion of the individual as a simple, ready-made entity. It suggests what psychological analysis has since shown more concretely, that human nature is a tangled thicket of impulses and tendencies, having various degrees of importance and requiring co-ordination and organization before they can lead to any effective achievement either within or without the self. And finally it cuts the ground from under that bane of ethical discussion, the superficial distinction between egoism and altruism; for it shows how little concrete interests permit themselves to be thus dichotomized.

Nevertheless, while the theory goes definitely beyond the ready-made individual, it comes dangerously near to stopping with another ready-made entity, the social organization. It is probably true that no such result was intended, and yet there is a definite tendency to over-emphasize the ultimateness of the social order. At least, this is true of Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet, though it is certainly far less true of T. H. Green, who has been accused by Professor Bosanquet of over-caution in estimating the value of the state to its members.¹ Characteristically the emphasis of the idealists was upon the ethical necessity of *finding* a station in the objective order, as if the system were final while the individual is only casual. The argument starts from a sound principle, viz., the principle that ultimately the individual's claim to a right has to be judged in the light of the common good, but this does not really exclude the other principle, viz., that any organization of the common good has also to give scope to individual accomplishment. Thus it is quite evident as a matter of history that many claims to rights

¹ *Op. cit.*, preface, p. ix.

have been made, and ultimately justified, though for the time being they were not recognized as contributory to the common good and were, on the contrary, subversive of the institutions in which the common good was then objectified. Galileo's right to conduct and publish investigations which were destined to shatter the moral and religious structure of Roman Christianity can hardly be defended on the ground that he was finding a station in the social order that was still dominant in Italy in the early seventeenth century, though looking at the matter from a much later date we should probably agree that Galileo was contributing to the common good. The point is that the common good is something quite different before and after the appearance of a man who can open up unsuspected possibilities of accomplishment. The common good is no more ultimate than individual good; discovery may change both.

The over-emphasis just pointed out is one which is natural if not inevitable to an absolute logic, which looks with condescension upon mere differences of time and space. The ultimate justification of the individual must be in terms of the common good, when it has been made clear what the common good is. But the process of clarification is supposed to be only a process of making explicit something that was already there. The common good really demanded the individual's contribution, though the system then enthroned was in fact hostile to the effort to contribute in that way. In a word, the interpretation after the fact is read back into the fact itself. The station is regarded as there waiting to be filled, because after it is filled it becomes a station. But this way of looking at the matter quite glosses over and conceals the most intensely individual aspect of the whole situation, the struggle to *make* a station in a partly hostile system, to secure for a value the recognition which it can not be accorded so long as existing values remain unchallenged. This loyalty to a social station which does not exist, but which might and ought to exist, is an aspect of all true individuality which cannot be obscured without falsifying the concept of individuality itself. Nor is it fair to insist that "the complex of social institutions is . . . very much more complete than the explicit ideas which at

any given instant move any individual mind in volition."¹ It may be formally more complete, but it is not therefore a final test of the individual's importance, for the 'explicit ideas which move the individual mind to volition' may represent precisely the indispensable reconstruction of the social institutions themselves. The individual gets far less than justice, while the system gets far more; for the social system, like system generally in the idealist philosophy, is conceived as self-creating, self-operating, and self-developing. A characteristic sentence from Professor Bosanquet will illustrate this view: "The legislator is merely one of the organs of the social spirit itself, as it carries out its self-criticism and self-interpretation."²

It is to be noted, however, that with characteristic British caution, Professor Bosanquet is hardly willing to accept what would appear to be the practical implications of this view. Indeed, he places a rather narrow limit upon the justifiable action of a state upon its citizens, even while he denies that this has anything to do with a distinction between society and individuals in the realization of a good life.³ The good life, he argues, can be realized only in consciousness and consciousness is on one side, at least, particular and individual. But ultimately the state has no instrument of action except force, though not every action of the state is actually carried out by means of force, and force cannot insure that an action shall proceed from motives which permit it to become an element of the best life. "An action performed . . . under compulsion is not a true part of the will."⁴ The means of action which the state has at its disposal is not therefore *in pari materia* with the end which it seeks. Hence Professor Bosanquet deduces the conclusion that "what it [the state] can effect is to remove obstacles, to destroy conditions hostile to the realization of the end."⁵ The action of the state is negative rather than positive; it can only 'hinder hind-

¹ Bosanquet, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

² *Ibid.*, p. 122. The sentence is an interpretation of Rousseau; it appears, however, to have the author's approval.

³ *Ibid.*, Chap. VIII.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

rances' to the good life. What the state requires to be effective, then, is "a definite tendency to growth, or a definite reserve of capacity, which is frustrated by a known impediment, the removal of which is a small matter compared with the capacities to be set free."¹ In the end, therefore, Professor Bosanquet reaches a conclusion not entirely different from that of the older liberals, that state action, so far as compulsion operates in it, is an interference of one type of action with another and higher type of action.

It would be easier to defend the correctness of this conclusion than to show its consistency with the main principles of Professor Bosanquet's theory of the state. It is true, indeed, that he is here speaking more strictly than usual of the legal aspect of the state, but he expressly asserts that there is no more than a difference of degree between this and its other activities. Why, then, should the action of the state through law be so closely identified with the use of force? Some mitigation might be suggested even on grounds of fact. And again, if indeed the state represents the real will of the individual, why should this real will wait until the indolent and rebellious actual will originates capacities to be set free? How can the real will be restricted to action by negative means, while the positive end of that action is embodied only in individual wills which, one would suppose, are rather more likely than not to be actual rather than real? Strangely enough, the positive result appears now to have got over into the special field of the actual, while the negative means is all that is left for the real. In a word, the real shows a tenderness for the actual that is hardly consistent with its having the full courage of its convictions. The fact is that Professor Bosanquet is here assuming that the individual person is the only thing which possesses value *per se*, and this is after all the ultimate philosophical assumption in the theory of natural rights, an assumption which is fundamentally inconsistent with the principle that the individual derives his value from his station in a system.

The limitation which thus appears in the application of state

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 192.

action is one which must modify the idealist theory of the state all along the line. The theory sets out to show the correlation of society and the individual, but in truth it fails to grasp the full meaning of this very correlation. Granting that contact with institutions and established values,—the performance of the day's work,—is the greatest moralizing force on earth, the established order is not after all in every case the last word. To speak as if the individual were always ignorant, indolent, and one-sided as compared with the social system is at least as false as the individualism of isolation. It is as much the nature of society as of the individual to require reorganization, and the reorganization of the social system must proceed for the most part from the intelligent initiative of individuals. It is untrue in fact, and it is profoundly dangerous in practice, to fall into the supposition that the perfecting of institutions takes place by a sort of self-acting dialectic. One need not be a revolutionist to see that institutions, laws, and public morality may be profoundly stupid and profoundly indifferent to values which must be supported for the time being as individual ideals which are contrary to the discernible drift of the system. The system requires the disruptive force of the individual's initiative as much as the latter requires the stabilizing influence of the system.

On the side of the individual, it may be admitted to the full that any claims to value must be supported on the ground of objective achievement rather than of subjective feeling; a healthy moral activity requires a station with correlative rights and duties. But this is not sufficient. In the common estimation of men the individual who is content to fit into a niche, to become a cog in the machine, is deficient in individuality. The higher worth is conceded to the man who makes for himself and ultimately for others stations which were not only unseen but non-existent. Even though such creations of value take place on a small scale, as for the most part they must, they are nevertheless the most important aspect of individuality. They represent the individual's reaction upon the system, his own peculiar contribution to the order of things which, without that contribution, would somehow be defective. It is this power to

contribute, even in the slightest way, which distinguishes between mere faithful performance of routine and work intelligently done for a worthy cause. And in the possibility of such an individualized contribution to the store of values lies the most concrete meaning of freedom. It is not enough to serve a cause already defined; the deeper problem is to work out the significance of the cause itself, as well as to secure its success.

Since it has been pointed out that the idealist theory of the state is an application of the concept of system developed in idealist logic, it should be added that the criticism here given of the idealist state is only an application of criticisms frequently urged against idealist logic. A correct understanding of the operation of intelligence negates the idea of a system which is rational through and through, a system in which an inherent dialectic operates for the extrusion of contradiction and the completion of the system. For idealism the reason is a universally acting principle which both supports the system and creates it; the reason overlaps, perhaps one might even say usurps, the functions of all other mental operations. But no experience ever is rational through and through, because the reason must work by a concentration of attention upon specific problems. Experience grows by the addition and assimilation of details and these assimilations make up the special province of reason. When the reorganization and readjustment have been effected, the achieved system has to lapse into habit. That which was new and difficult becomes commonplace and routine, leaving the reason free to deal with other 'tensions,' as Professor Dewey calls them. Experience presents areas of organization and points of reorganization. And this view gives a clue to the relation between individuals and the social system. Substantially institutions are habits. A way of behaving, a value, is worked out as a *modus vivendi* among conflicting interests. The problem is essentially the re-adaptation of accepted standards to new ideals and new situations. The solution is to some extent the work of intelligence brought to bear upon the situation by the individuals concerned. But the solution becomes in time, if it succeeds, what Professor de Laguna aptly calls 'the accepted

type'; it becomes the recognized standard to which conduct ought to conform, the basis of the rights which the individual may reasonably expect to enjoy and of the duties which he may reasonably be expected to perform. The type passes over into the province of habit or convention from which it will emerge only as an element in a possible later reconstruction.

Now it is clear that from this point of view there is no ground for the antithesis which formerly was supposed to exist between habit and reason; they are correlated and equally indispensable aspects of the individual's behavior. Similarly, it may be added, there is, from a generalization of the same point of view, no antithesis between the liberty of the individual and his restraint by the accepted types of social behavior. There may indeed be opposition between the two on special occasions. A person may become so much the slave of an easy, habitual course of life that his intelligence suffers dry-rot and he ceases to have any initiative in the adaptation of his behavior to new situations. Similarly the accepted types of behavior may become so thoroughly conventionalized that they ossify into a system which seriously hampers the higher types of ethical deliberation and political liberty. But both these are merely instances of the destructive effects of over-functioning in a given direction. It nevertheless remains true that social types of behavior are indispensable to individual growth. It may be confidently asserted, therefore, that the main objective of the idealist theory of the state may be secured without appealing to the assumption of a social will by comparison with which the individual is only a fragment torn from his context.

At the same time the view which we have sketched has the immense advantage of opening the way for a sane and healthy individualism, which from the time when the theory of natural rights emerged in modern history has been the only effective instrument of political liberalism and which is also the only sound principle of social and moral reform. Social conditions and social evolution must be ultimately matters of individual responsibility. There is no inevitable dialectic of social progress, nor is any man his brother's keeper, unless his brother is a

defective or an incompetent. Does this mean, then, that coöperation and combination are impossible or undesirable? Not in the least. It does mean that coöperation requires joint action by parties whose interests are equally served by joining forces. It means that every party to the agreement has a right to know where his interests are going to be furthered by the project. It means that even the will to do good has to recognize the right of the recipient to something more humane than the position of a patient in the social hospital. No individual, or no class, is good enough or wise enough to be made the perpetual guardian of the interests of another individual or class. In the long run, social and political coöperation of a desirable kind will not be hindered but rather helped by an appeal to individual interests. The point is that no class of interests is individual *per se*. The individual may reasonably be interested in all sorts of causes and ends. And what sort of reflection is likely to be morally more enlightening than the question, Why am I, or why ought I to be, especially interested in just the matters which usually absorb my time and attention? Unless a cause can bear the criticism involved in answering this question, it lacks the essential element of a moral cause. It is probably true that an individualism such as this, if widely practiced, would be revolutionary, but most thorough-going applications of intelligence to human affairs are likely to be revolutionary. How many bubbles of manifest destiny, imperial ambition, and national wealth would not be pricked by a persistent request on the part of those who furnish the resources to be shown wherein they benefit by the expenditure?

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CONSCIENCE AS REASON AND AS EMOTION.¹

A NEW mode of analysis of the moral consciousness has arisen during the last half century. Beginning with Spencer's *Data of Ethics* a series of books have appeared which have treated of the origin and development of moral conduct and of moral ideas both in the race and in the individual. The writers of this type, finding it necessary to seek for the antecedents of moral conduct in simpler and more primitive mental processes, have tended, particularly of late, to derive morality from instincts and emotions. They have believed that they have been to some extent, at least, successful; and they have also thought it possible in the light of its origin and development to assert some conclusions regarding the nature of the moral consciousness as it exists today.

In opposition to this school, writers of a more traditional type maintain that the analysis of the nature of the moral consciousness as it exists to-day is independent of questions regarding its origin, that moral categories like 'good,' 'duty,' 'virtue,' and the like, are unique, and quite irreducible to feeling, emotion, instinct, or any other mental content, since these latter are subjective and irrational, whilst morality is rational and objective; and that to try to explain the moral consciousness of adult civilized man to-day by studies of children and savages is to attempt to explain the known in terms of the unknown. Such arguments are pertinent and plausible, and it is necessary for the moral evolutionists to answer them. A particularly trenchant attack upon the evolutionary school has recently been made in this country by Dr. Hastings Rashdall, the author of the *Theory of Good and Evil*, in a series of lectures delivered at Stanford University two years ago,² which have since been published and have undoubtedly made a strong impression. Dr. Rashdall

¹ Portions of this paper were read at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association at Philadelphia last December.

² *Is Conscience an Emotion?* Boston and New York, 1914.

has directed his criticism mainly against two of the latest and best known works of the evolutionary type: the *Social Psychology* of his Oxford colleague, Dr. William McDougall, and the *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* of Professor Edward Westermarck. While the present writer is largely in sympathy with the position of the latter two works, and in fact regards himself as in the main a disciple of McDougall, he feels that it is obvious that neither of these works require the services of an American apologist, even in replying to attacks made over here, and this paper will not attempt to defend their positions in detail against Dr. Rashdall. My endeavor will merely be to show how it is possible in the study of systematic ethics to agree with thinkers of Dr. Rashdall's type that conscience (*i. e.*, the moral consciousness) is rational and objective—without however accepting their precise definitions of reason and objectivity—and yet to accept and profit greatly by evolutionary analyses in the manner of McDougall and Westermarck.¹

Any evolutionary account of the genesis of morality must seek some more primitive mental elements or processes which antedate the appearance of moral conduct, and from which the derivation of the latter can be traced. This descent, in the case of McDougall and Westermarck, is attributed to certain instincts and emotions which man has in common with the higher animals nearest him in the evolutionary scale. Dr. Rashdall vehemently objects to such a view of morality on various grounds. It makes moral judgments emotional in their constitution, and what is emotional is irrational and subjective. On the contrary, he maintains that moral ideas are intellectual and rational judgments of value; they are objective, and hold for every one alike. To regard moral judgments as emotional would be to make right and wrong merely a subjective, personal matter.

¹ It should be clearly understood at the outset that this sentence expresses the thesis of this paper. I do not pretend to know how far McDougall and Westermarck personally would assent to my concessions to Dr. Rashdall and those of similar opinions. Westermarck, at any rate, I fancy, might not agree to all of them. What I wish to maintain is, that a belief in the rationality and objectivity of moral judgments need not and should not prevent the impartial student of ethics from accepting and profiting by the *Social Psychology* and the *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*; but, on the contrary, that this rationality and objectivity can be better demonstrated and interpreted in the light of these works.

"Mustard is not objectively nice or objectively nasty. It is simply nice to one man and nasty to another: and that is the whole truth about the matter. It would, in the emotional view, be simply meaningless to ask which was right and which was wrong. If morality were a mere matter of feeling or emotion, our moral judgments would be in exactly the same case. . . . The difference is merely a difference of taste."¹

The logical consequence of the theory of the emotional constitution of moral obligation is moral skepticism; and the same objections that have been advanced against the British moral sense writers and Hume apply with equal force to McDougall and Westermarck.² On the contrary, Dr. Rashdall urges that the consciousness of an objective duty is the most fundamental of our moral convictions. It must, therefore, be derived from the intellectual part of our nature. No mere emotion could give us such an idea. This idea of duty is a self-evident truth,—as much so, and as irreducible to emotions as the categories of quantity, quality, cause, and substance; and it is as intellectually certain as the multiplication table. Moreover, though in fairness to Canon Rashdall it must be said that he keeps religious considerations apart from his main argument, if the moral law is not rational and objective, the ethical arguments for God, freedom, immortality, and a moral and teleological world order fall to the ground.

Such are some of the arguments advanced by Dr. Rashdall against the derivation of moral ideas from instincts and emotions. And as these are the usual arguments urged by opponents of evolutionary ethics, let us consider whether to affirm that moral judgments have an emotional basis is to make them non-rational and subjective, and so to land us in moral skepticism; or whether, on the other hand, we may not believe that moral judgments are emotional in their basis, and *yet* hold them to be rational and objective. But before we can decide this matter, we must first consider what 'reason' as applied to ethics really is.

¹ *Is Conscience an Emotion?*, pp. 31, f.

² Presumably Dr. Rashdall means us to understand that these appalling features of emotional ethics are merely in his opinion the logical consequences of the theory. Certainly none of the writers whom he mentions was avowedly a moral skeptic, not even Hume.

When a moral decision is said to be rational, no one means by this that it is simply the result of deductions from an original proposition in the fashion in which the conclusion of a syllogism is derived from its premises. One can readily sympathize with Dr. Rashdall in his insistence that neither he nor any other rationalist ever meant to confine 'reason' to operations of this kind. Nor does it seem to me likely that any logician to-day would affirm that reasoning consists of immediate intuitions of self-evident truths *plus* such deductive processes—which was, I suppose, the opinion of some pre-Kantian rationalists like Descartes and Spinoza. To-day it would be said that even purely intellectual propositions, such as those of mathematics, do not rest ultimately upon such immediate intuitions, but rather upon the fact, that if true, it is always possible to draw further inferences from them. Our knowledge of truth does not rest upon a few self-evident propositions known intuitively or *a priori*; but rather it rests upon the possibility of tracing the relations between propositions in such a way as to disclose a coherent and systematic unity of relations,—or, to put this in a more pragmatic form, it depends upon the ultimate satisfactoriness and workability in a logical sense of propositions however tested and applied. The whole mental process by which such knowledge of truth is obtained would surely have to be included within the conception of 'reason' held by any rationalist to-day.

Now can the body of accepted moral principles be brought under the head of 'reason' even thus understood? Perhaps Dr. Rashdall believes that the more formal side of ethics is due to the operation of 'reason' in this sense. He seems to regard Sidgwick's three laws of Prudence, Rational Benevolence, and Equity as rational in some such way.¹ But even he confesses that there is nothing strictly ethical about such axioms except the barely formal notion or category of 'the good' which they involve,² and that "they are not merely comparable to the axioms of Mathematics; they are simply particular applications of those axioms." They are purely formal, and all that they can

¹ *Is Conscience an Emotion?*, pp. 41, ff.

² *Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, pp. 147, f.

do is to give us information how to distribute 'the good' quantitatively after we have ascertained what it is. So for Dr. Rashdall as well as for the rest of us, 'reason' as applied to ethics means something in addition to the characteristics I have described. For him it includes the capacity to make a judgment of value, to be able to say that this or that is good. Thus the moral judgment implies an appreciation of value, and this involves feeling; and repeatedly as he insists that the judgment of value involves something more than a *mere* feeling, he is always ready to admit that it *does* involve feeling. In fact, he says that moral values would be impossible without desires,¹ and he is not content with Kant to limit the desires or feelings or interests which morality requires to the respect which it is able to infuse into the emotions from its own majesty and dignity.² I believe that I am safe in saying, and that Dr. Rashdall and ethical rationalists generally will agree with me, that 'reason' in ethics involves not only cognition, intuition, deduction, experiment, and all other processes of inference, but also that it involves the experience of feelings and the ability to employ the perception of feelings in judgments of value.³ Dr. Rashdall's main caution in this connection seems to be, that while moral judgments involve desires and feelings and would indeed be impossible to an intelligence devoid of them, moral judgments do not use them in the form of chaotic emotions, but as "feelings which are elements in a single, interconnected, articulated ideal of human life."⁴ In fact, his whole attack on emotional ethics, both in *The Theory of Good and Evil* and in *Is Conscience an Emotion*, seems to assume: (1) that emotions of themselves are always and necessarily chaotic, disorganized, empirical, and hence subjective; and (2) that they cannot be the foundation of an objective ethics without becoming rationally organized. While dissenting from the first of these assumptions, I, for one, heartily agree with the second.⁴ And, indeed, as I shall endeavor to show, both

¹ *Theory of Good and Evil*, I, p. 153. The whole passage is interesting reading in light of his recent attack on McDougall and Westermarck.

² *Ibid.*, I, pp. 119-131; 106, footnote.

³ *Ibid.*, I, pp. 175, f.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 158.

⁴ One trouble with Dr. Rashdall's account is, that he persists in viewing Reason

McDougall and Westermarck have thrown a great deal of light upon how this rational organization of emotions takes place.¹

A very simple illustration will serve to introduce the conception of 'reason' which it seems to me really exists in moral conduct and thought, and which I believe can be found in the evolutionary moral interpretations of such writers as McDougall and Westermarck. Suppose a clerk dependent upon a small salary and with a family to support were to be reprimanded cruelly, sarcastically, and altogether unjustly by his employer. If he were to reply in kind, with a heated rejoinder, we should say that he acted upon what Dr. Rashdall would perhaps call a "chaotic emotion," natural enough under the circumstances, but unwise, irrational. But suppose, before replying to his employer's abuse, our clerk pauses for a moment, stops to reflect. The consequences of a heated rejoinder flash through his mind. He would be sure to lose his position, and employment is scarce now, and his family would suffer. So he gives his employer a soft answer, and, let us hope, averts his wrath. On this supposition we say that the clerk acts rationally. His reasoned decision has included cognition obviously; he has thought out the consequences of his action. But more than this, reasoning here means that a variety of instincts, emotions and sentiments have influenced his decision—fear in at least the refined form of prudence, sex and the parental instinct in the form of the sentiment of love, and probably others. Now, is the 'rational' action of our clerk *less* instinctive and emotional than would have been his action, had he been governed by a *single* emotion? On the contrary, is not the 'rational' action *more* instinctive and emotional than the other, just because it involves *several* in-

(always spelled by him with an initial capital letter) as a faculty or capacity, external to the emotions themselves, and belonging to the "intellectual side of our nature" and as radically opposed to the emotions as Reason and Sensibility are to each other in Kant and in some other faculty psychologists. He pathetically fails to understand the modern psychological standpoint. Cf. *Theory of Good and Evil*, I, 142, footnote; *Ethics*, pp. 30, f; *Is Conscience an Emotion*, pp. 137 f.

¹ Though they do not use the phrase "rational organization," fearing, no doubt, that it would seem to denote the faculty of drawing inferences alone, and not the wider co-ordination of all mental processes in a voluntary act—which latter is what I mean by 'reason' and 'rational organization' here.

instincts and emotions organized into one or more sentiments? And by 'reason' in such a case as this do we not mean, not pure cognition and reflection alone, but a coördination of instincts assisted by a reflective perception of the consequences of an action? 'Reason' in this instance, includes instincts as much or even more than it includes purely discursive thinking. If we use the term 'reason' to designate this process as a whole, 'reason' is quite as much conative¹ and affective in its tone as it is cognitive. We need some word to do this, and perhaps 'reason' will serve; this is certainly one of the ways in which the word is popularly used. But 'will' has perhaps more often been thus employed. If the rationalist chooses to use the term 'reason' in this broad sense, as practically synonymous with 'will,' he should remember that he is employing it to designate a far more complex mental process than 'reasoning' denotes when used with reference to the purely discursive processes of mathematics, formal logic, and even the more varied processes of the inductive sciences.

'Reason' when used with reference to conduct is therefore really equivalent to 'will' as the latter term is used by the majority of psychologists to-day. It is 'practical reason' if you please—a far more complex process than 'pure reason.' In a moral judgment it is an intellectual process which has as subject an act of will which is affirmed to be 'good' or 'bad,' approved or disapproved. And the moral judgment is itself not a purely intellectual process. When we say 'this action is good,' it does not seem to me that this is merely like saying ' $7 + 5 = 12$,' or 'this is a rainy day.' Like the latter two judgments, it is, to be sure, an assertion that claims objectivity; and if true, it is a judgment to which every rational being must assent if he understands it. But no one who did not have feelings and emotions could make such a moral judgment at all; it would have reference to fields of experience of which he could know nothing. For such an one to say 'this is good' would be as devoid of signifi-

¹ Those who do not recognize 'conation' as a phase of consciousness on a plane with 'cognition' and 'affection' may omit the term in this sentence and elsewhere in this paper, as this issue has no bearing on the problem. The writer intends in the use of these terms as well as of 'will' to follow McDougall's terminology.

cance as for a person born blind to say that scarlet is like the sound of a trumpet. Therefore, as it seems to me, a moral judgment, like a moral action, is conative and affective as well as cognitive in its constitution; it is a synthesis of all three, that is, an act of 'practical reason.' And I fancy that Dr. Rashdall would probably agree to this, although I do not recall any specific passage in his writings that certainly commits him to such a view.

If we regard moral or practical reason as thus equivalent to volition, we must credit McDougall with a full and illuminating account of its genesis.¹ The instincts and emotions, as he shows, become habitually attached to certain objects—which may be concrete, like a child or children in general, while other such objects are abstract, like justice or virtue. From the habitual attachment of instincts and emotions to given objects in this way, sentiments develop. If tender emotion becomes habitually attached to a child, a large variety of other instincts and emotions become enlisted in the support of this object of interest. Fear is manifested when the child is sick or in danger, anger when he is treated unjustly or when aspersions are cast upon him, curiosity is felt regarding all that he does, self-gratification is felt at his achievements and self-abasement at his shortcomings, and so on. Through the sentiment of love which has thus developed and which can become attached to society as its object, or fatherland, or church, or God, the individual's character may acquire all the lofty qualities of love praised by religion. Divines like Canon Rashdall, one would suppose, would welcome McDougall as an ally, because he indicates how this greatest of the Christian virtues, without which all human achievements are but as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal, may be acquired. McDougall, too, describes the genesis of the self from the impulsive behavior of the animals upward through the successive rise of emotions and ideas of the self, the self-regarding sentiment, the interaction between the self and the social order, first influenced by the moral tradition, and later, by critically formed ideals of the Self and of the Good. The writer's personal experience has

¹ *Social Psychology*, chapters V-IX.

been that students find these chapters in McDougall's brilliant book stimulating and uplifting, and that they are incited by them to a profounder and deeper reverence for all the finer aspects of character. Westermarck, too, as it seems to me, is really tracing the rationalization of the emotions in every one of the chapters in the *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, in the sense in which I am using the term 'reason.' To be sure he insists strongly upon the emotional and in this sense 'subjective' origin of moral ideas in opposition to pre-Kantian and pre-Hegelian rationalists of the extreme dogmatic type like Cudworth, Clark, Price and Reid (with whom Dr. Rashdall is unjust to himself in aligning his own position, since they make morality an exclusively intellectual affair). The chapter in which Westermarck traces the rise of the altruistic sentiment shows this rationalizing process with particular clearness.¹ And this, by the way, leads one to mention Mr. Alexander F. Shand, whose theory of the sentiments has been utilized in this connection by Westermarck, and to whom McDougall's interpretation also owes much. In his recent work² Mr. Shand shows how emotional and sentimental systems are organized, in a manner that is clearly 'rational' in the sense in which I am using the term. Particularly suggestive is the manner in which he shows how each ruling sentiment tends to build up a 'relative ethics' of its own, and the way in which the 'conscience' coordinates and objectifies them.

If, then, evolutionary accounts of the genesis of morality from instincts and emotions may be claimed to be accounts of how these become rationally organized, does this render moral judgments objective? It seems to me that it not only renders them

¹ Chap. XXXIV. Dr. Rashdall seems to imagine that when Westermarck admits the immense influence of intellectual considerations upon moral judgments, and otherwise indicates rational factors in operation, he is inconsistent with the position laid down in his opening chapters. This does not seem to be the case at all; though I am inclined to think that Westermarck would have made his position clearer at the start if he had attempted to do what this paper attempts, to show that though moral judgments, being emotional in their origin, are 'subjective' as opposed to the standpoint of the high and dry rationalists, they are really 'rational' and 'objective' if these terms are properly understood. Westermarck is too generous in allowing ultra-rationalists a monopoly of the terms 'reason' and 'objectivity.'

² *The Foundations of Character*, Book I, chaps. X-XII.

objective, but that it also reveals their objectivity in a much more satisfactory manner than can be done by the sort of rationalism advocated by Dr. Rashdall. To maintain that moral judgments are objective because one can draw from them certain abstract quasi-mathematical formulations that can never be applied and made to throw any real light upon concrete moral situations whether individual or social, is to afford morality too sorry rags of objectivity decently to cover her. And that is all that Dr. Rashdall or Mr. G. E. Moore seem to be able to achieve by means of their ultra-rationalistic standpoint.¹

On the other hand, the evolutionary view seems to me to afford a very high order of objectivity to the moral life. There is a remarkable similarity in the emotional constitution of mankind, as Westermarck has said. Following out this and other hints in the writings of McDougall and Westermarck, I have elsewhere endeavored to show that the cardinal virtues are objective in the sense that they rest upon unchangeable instinctive foundations in human nature, and that they represent the ideals which these instincts in response to the social order will always require in human beings.² To be sure, there are limits to this sort of objectivity. Moral ideas vary somewhat in different societies and ages, and among different individuals; but the similarity of instincts and social *milieu* guarantees that these variations will occur only within definite limits. The evolutionary view is ready to recognize as much objectivity and as much variability in morals as actual experience discloses.

But it may be objected that I am using 'objectivity' in a sense which no rationalist will accept. I am merely contending for a large degree of stability in moral judgments: the rationalist

¹ I am of course not questioning the great value of *The Theory of Good and Evil* as a whole, which seems to me the most suggestive work on ethical theory in English produced by a living writer, because I think that Dr. Rashdall is mistaken on this particular standpoint. I mention Mr. Moore because his *Principia Ethica* has undoubtedly influenced Dr. Rashdall and stiffened him in his position. If the reader of the *Principia* and of Mr. Moore's recent *Ethics* will ask himself how much actual content, how much applicability to concrete problems of any kind whatsoever, or insight into the nature of ethics in a positive constructive way, is gained by all of Mr. Moore's laborious straining at subtle distinctions and definitions, I think that he will agree that this statement is not too severe.

² "Ethical Objectivity in the Light of Social Psychology," *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, XXII, pp. 395-409.

maintains a great deal more than this. For him there can be no variability at all about the truth. Variability merely connotes error in judging. School boys, to use a favorite illustration of Dr. Rashdall's, may make blunders in their sums, but there can be only one correct answer. This, however, I am quite willing in a sense to admit. That it is A's duty at a given time, place, and attendant circumstances to perform a certain action is just as objective a fact as that Julius Caesar was killed upon the Ides of March. All men and gods must so regard it, if they know and speak the truth. But we cannot necessarily conclude that it would be A's duty at a different time or place, or under different circumstances, to perform the action, merely as an inference, and perhaps it would not be B's duty to perform it at any time or place or under any circumstances whatsoever. Nor can we deduce A's or B's duty in any concrete case with *absolute* certainty from any general maxims. Moral situations are too unique for this. Only a relatively large degree of probability can be claimed for any application we can make, and the degree of probability will diminish with differences of time, place, nation, moral traditions, and a large number of other circumstances. We as evolutionists can ascertain and define more clearly than any rationalist who does not make use of evolutionary analyses can do, the limits to the variability of time, place, and other circumstances effected by the unvarying elements in instincts and environmental conditions. So, for all practical purposes, we can accord to all specific moral judgments a more specific and dependable degree of objectivity than he.

Perhaps Dr. Rashdall might object that, though the history and psychology of moral evolution may not disclose absolute objectivity in moral principles, the logical implications of moral judgments indicate that such must exist, else there is no moral truth at all. This is to argue for the existence of an Absolute Ethics. And the general standpoint which Dr. Rashdall maintains would seem to imply belief in some sort of Absolute Ethics. But it is hard to see how such an ethics could be of the slightest practical value to us.¹ Our ethics must be relative to

¹ What Dr. Rashdall says of Spencer's Absolute Ethics seems to be equally true

agent and circumstances; and being thus relative it cannot be absolute. But is there an Absolute Ethics up in the heavens somewhere, or outside of time and space altogether, known to the Absolute, in which our imperfect moral judgments somehow participate, or of which they are copies or appearances? This question may give rise to interesting metaphysical speculation, but of what relevance is it to our conduct? We must deal with our fellow men on the level of appearances, and not of the Absolute.¹

This leads to the question concerning the implications of ethics for metaphysics and religion. Undoubtedly one reason for his hostility to accounts which derive moral judgments from instincts and emotions is that they appear to Canon Rashdall to be incompatible with the moral arguments for God, immortality, and other articles of religious faith advanced by Kant. If morality is a subjective, personal affair and there is no objectivity in it, Dr. Rashdall fears that no inferences can be made from it as to the nature of the universe. In reply to this I would say, in the first place, that there is a great deal of uniformity and objectivity in moral judgments on the emotional theory, and that continued uniformity and objectivity for them are assured by the permanence of the instincts and of the social order. Moreover, as Professor Hobhouse² has most successfully shown, though other of all other kinds: "Herbert Spencer's system of Moral Philosophy will be of use when we reach a social millenium, not till then. Nor do absolute Ethics throw a single ray of light upon the path by which that millenium is to be reached." *Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 385.

¹ At times Dr. Rashdall seems to say as much himself. Cf. *Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, pp. 69, 102. It is puzzling to find Dr. Rashdall criticizing the absolutism in the ethics of Spencer and Bradley so trenchantly while his own position seems to imply an ethical absolutism to which similar objections apply with equal force.

² *Morals in Evolution*. Dr. Rashdall seems to think that Hobhouse's account affords some support for his own contentions. On the contrary, the opening and closing chapters of *Morals in Evolution* seem to me to recognize the emotional and instinctive origin of moral judgments quite explicitly. To be sure, Professor Hobhouse regards moral evolution as the result of rationalization of the moral code, and not as the consequence of the appearance of new instincts in man. McDougall and Westermarck would probably agree with him in this. Hobhouse, unlike McDougall and Westermarck, does not analyze the sentimental foundation in human nature that supports this rationalization of the moral code, but there is nothing in his book to lead one to infer that he for a moment doubts its existence and importance.

moral evolutionists indicate it, there has been a fairly consistent logical development of moral notions all through ethical development from primitive conditions till now. This, it appears to me, affords ground for believing that moral judgments in the course of their evolution not only reveal a better mutual adjustment of human beings to each other, but a better adjustment to the cosmic order. Nothing can be merely accidental and subjective that has had so continuous and so reasonably consistent a development as man's instincts and emotions, together with the moral sentiments and judgments that have arisen from them. Now if the facts of the moral life, which man has come into possession of as heir of all the ages, imply that there must in some sense be a moral world order, a God, and a future life, and support other postulates that Canon Rashdall and many of the rest of us hold dear, these beliefs appear to me to have at least as much foundation upon the emotional theory as upon any other.

I wish to notice more explicitly two objections offered against the evolutionary, emotional theory of morality. The evolutionists endeavor to reduce moral conceptions like goodness and duty to something else—pleasure, or instinct, or emotion. Now, as a self-evident matter of introspection, Dr. Rashdall argues that goodness and duty are none of these: they are "distinct, irreducible categories or ultimate intellectual notions," which cannot be resolved into anything else any more than can the categories of quantity or quality, of causality or substance. Here I am willing to admit that Dr. Rashdall in a sense is undoubtedly right. Morality cannot be resolved and explained away into something that is not morality. But evolutionists like McDougall and Westermarck have at least to some extent succeeded in indicating the conditions under which such experiences as 'good' and 'duty' arise in the human consciousness, and what in a sense may be regarded as their mental constituents. Further light on this has been furnished by Spencer's account in the *Data of Ethics*, which doubtless contains some elements of truth, by the psychological analysis of Professor Dewey in *The Study of Ethics*, the functional position of which implies the evolutionary point of view, by the sociological inter-

pretations of Professor Durkheim, and by many other writers. No one has said the last word, and none of course has succeeded in reducing morality to a combination of elements that are non-moral. I doubt if any one has really intended to claim that this could be done. But is it not a good deal to know the conditions under which these moral experiences arise and can be maintained?

Analogies may make my point clearer. Life certainly is something unique, *sui generis*: it cannot be explained away or resolved into chemical elements and compounds. Consciousness, too, is unique: it is something utterly different from the coördinated reactions of neurones. Yet it is a good deal to know that life and consciousness can come into existence or remain in existence only when certain chemical compounds and neural coördinations are present. The physical and chemical conditions requisite for life, and the added physiological conditions requisite for consciousness certainly do throw some light upon their nature. This knowledge is of the most practical value, too. Life and consciousness may be preserved, conserved, and educated where without such knowledge they would be lost. I do not wish to press such analogies too far. But I believe it can reasonably be said that at least when our psychological knowledge of the origin and conditions of the moral life becomes more complete, the work of the educator, the reformer, the religious worker, the philanthropist, and the statesman will become greatly clarified and more effective. Where efforts at moral and social amelioration now are often blundering and crude they will in some measure become enlightened and scientific.¹

A second objection, on which Dr. Rashdall, however, seems to lay less stress than most critics of evolutionary ethics, is that the validity of a moral idea is quite independent of its origin.² Though this is often admitted by evolutionists, I do not believe

¹ In fairness to Dr. Rashdall it should be indicated that he makes a few concessions to the value of evolutionary accounts of morality. *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, chap. V.

² The prohibition of abortion by the ancient Christians on account of crude physiological and theological explanations of fœtal development is a stock illustration used in such arguments.

that it is true. It owes its plausibility to the common tendency to over-intellectualize moral evolution, to suppose that it has been an evolution of conceptions in cases where it has really been an evolution of feelings, sentiments, and actions. Of course if a moral idea accepted to-day really owes its origin to a crude superstition, the discovery of this fact should not lead any one to question its validity on that account. But has this ever happened? Has a sound moral idea ever originated in a superstition? Is it not more probable that where this is alleged to have been the case what really happened was that man's feelings prompted him to right action, but that he was unable to give a good intellectual explanation of his sentiments, and so attempted to justify himself by what was really superstition? His feelings were right, and they were both the real cause of his conduct and the ancestors of our feelings in the matter; the erroneous intellectual explanations were not the cause of his conduct but only an attempted justification of it, and they played no really important part in the evolution of morality. Men have often felt and practised far better than they have theorized, and moral progress is often not so much indebted to the bad theorizing as to the good feeling and action.¹

In conclusion, the issue does not seem to me to be whether ethics is subjective or objective, emotional or rational in its constitution. The moral evolutionists who trace the descent of morality from instincts and emotions do not recognize the kind of reason and ethical objectivity for which Dr. Rashdall contends, but their accounts leave room for a different kind of reason and objectivity. The question simply is, which kind we prefer. Dr. Rashdall advocates a 'Reason' that is a 'faculty' or 'capacity' distinct and external to the emotions, that somehow descends upon them and makes them rational and objective. He has no definite explanation how this 'Reason' operates on such external impulses; though he sees a similar defect in Kant he finds no way of escaping it himself. He admits that morality *is* the product of evolution; that somehow it must be

¹ Although one-sided in the opposite direction, W. G. Sumner's *Folkways* is wholesome reading for those who have an exaggerated notion of the importance in social evolution of the work of moral philosophers and theorizers in general.

descended from the instincts and emotions appears to be implied in what he says; but he rejects the explanations offered by evolutionary writers and he has no substitute to proffer himself. His general standpoint would seem to imply an Absolute Ethics; yet he admits that abstract moral principles are of little worth without experience.

On the contrary, this paper contends for another kind of reason and another kind of ethical objectivity. The ethical evolutionists find moral reason evolving from the instincts and emotions in interaction with each other and with the cognitive processes. They do not confound reason with chaotic emotions; but they find that emotions as man develops, rapidly cease to be chaotic, and that reason, first immanent within them, later becomes explicit but never becomes external to them as a 'faculty' would be. They find that the moral consciousness is always objective in the sense that it is an expression of the most permanent phases of man's mental constitution in interaction with his fellows and with the physical universe. On this view, as it appears at least to me, the permanence of the moral consciousness and the consistency of its evolution are arguments pointing to the inference that the moral consciousness must in some sense be an interpretation of the cosmos, and hence that Kantian and other moral postulates may be regarded as interpretations of the Reality of which man is a portion, and in which he has been evolving. In favor of the positions of this paper I believe that it can be asserted that they have the double advantage over such positions as Dr. Rashdall's, in both affording more substantial and intelligible objectivity and rationality to the moral consciousness, and of being able to make available for the enrichment of ethical science the latest developments in social psychology and anthropology.

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HUME'S RELATION TO MALEBRANCHE.

RARELY do we discover an empiricist and a rationalist that teach identical doctrines, particularly when the doctrines in question are almost equally fundamental in the thinking of both. This, however, is what we find in the philosophies of Malebranche and Hume. In three particulars Hume's teaching was strikingly anticipated by that of Malebranche. These thinkers have in common (a) a very similar analysis of causation; (b) a negative account of the knowability of the self; and (c) a doctrine of 'natural judgment.' In many instances, as we shall see, the correspondence on these points is so exact as to exhibit almost identical phraseology.

These doctrines as developed by Malebranche may at first sight seem to conflict with his strictly rationalistic position. But on closer examination we find that they are the natural outcome of all that is fundamental in his thinking. They are indeed among the best indications of the originality of his own highly speculative system. Ardent disciple of Descartes though he was, and hampered thereby as he might sometimes be, he approached the problems of knowledge and of metaphysics with an independent perception of the difficulties to be encountered; and his analyses of the problems have proved to be insights of permanent value.

The question immediately arises, if Malebranche thus anticipated Hume, what influence, if any, did he exert upon Hume? Three passages, readily enough accessible, abundantly prove Hume's familiarity with the essential features of Malebranche's thought.¹ In the *Enquiry*² (Sec. VII, Pt. II), and again, in the *Treatise*³ (Pt. IV, Sec. V) Hume criticizes the Occasionalist

¹ Hume's references are all apparently to the *Recherche*. There is no direct evidence of his familiarity with any other of Malebranche's writings.

² Green and Grose's edition, 1882, Vol. II, p. 62 of *Essays*. All references to Hume are to this edition unless otherwise specified.

³ Vol. I, p. 531.

doctrine that God "does everything in all things." And in the *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*¹ (Pt. II), he cites at length the significant passage in the *Recherche* in which Malebranche describes the nature of God as neither material nor spiritual, but infinite being transcending and including both. But these references of Hume's offer only a slight basis for anything like a dogmatic assertion of direct influence. In this essay I shall not, therefore, attempt to do more than to point out the exact manner in which the philosophies of Malebranche and Hume coincide in respect to the three doctrines above mentioned.

With regard to the highly interesting question how far these coincidences may be taken as evidence of Malebranche's influence on Hume, the reader will be left to form his own opinion. Aside from the question of influence, however, I believe that such a comparison of views as the present should have a very real interest for the student of the history of philosophy. For it affords a fresh illustration of the way in which important ideas arise and develop. Rarely is a single thinker adequate to the task of originating and developing to the full a profoundly significant idea. Nor is an insight of exceptional truth always sure to be confined to the 'school' in which it originated. The present instance is especially notable by reason of the sharp opposition between the fundamental standpoints of thinkers who differ so radically as Hume and Malebranche.

I. CAUSATION.

We may most conveniently start with the problem of causation. Malebranche's general position quite clearly shows that he had failed to arrive at a clear recognition of the position later maintained by Hume, viz., that before experience it is impossible to determine the possible effects of any event. Malebranche is much too good a Cartesian not to be thoroughly infected with the belief that analysis of a concept will reveal what effects may be expected to follow from the existence to which it applies. For example—the concept of matter, is, he holds, the sufficient explanation, when clearly apprehended, of all natural effects. In the

¹ McEwen's edition, p. 26.

Entretiens sur la Métaphysique he makes Theodore say: "By extension alone and the properties which everybody attributes to it, we can sufficiently explain all natural effects. That is to say, there is no effect in the material world of which we may not discover the natural cause in the idea of extension."¹ Within the space of only a few pages, however, Malebranche clearly states the truth of which Hume made such effective use. Theodore is illustrating for Ariste the utility of "clear ideas" as the indispensable prerequisite of all fruitful philosophizing, and he employs an illustration drawn from music. You agree, he says to Ariste, that we cannot conceive how the vibrations of a string can give rise to a sound; "for sound," he continues, "is not contained in the idea of matter, still less the power to act upon the soul and to cause it to perceive. From the fact that the vibrations of a string, or of the air, are followed by a particular sound, you infer that this conjunction of events is necessary in order that we may hear a sound, but do not imagine that there is any necessary connection between these things."² Here Malebranche clearly recognizes that no study of physical vibrations could, prior to experience, make it possible to foretell that a sound would result when those vibrations were taken up by the ear. This decidedly unrationalistic position Malebranche states again and again, apparently unaware of its dangerous incompatibility with his view of causality as being equivalent to rational explanation. In principle it involves Hume's whole contention that as an effect is totally distinct from its cause, it can never be found in it. There is, then, in Malebranche, a recognition, limited to be sure, and inconsistent with his general standpoint as a Cartesian, of the truth that experience rather than *a priori* reasoning is the sole basis of all conclusions regarding cause and effect.

The inefficacy of second causes is of course the real starting-point of Occasionalism. In Malebranche are to be found many arguments for the inefficacy of so-called 'efficient causes.' One prominent argument might be called the theological argu-

¹ *Troisième Entretien*, p. 56. The references throughout are to Jules Simon's edition of the works of Malebranche, except those made to the *Eclaircissements*, which are to Bouillier's edition of the *Recherche*.

² *Troisième Entretien*, p. 63.

ment. It is developed in a chapter of the *Recherche* entitled "The most dangerous error of the philosophy of the Ancients." The idea of a sovereign power, the argument runs, is the idea of a sovereign divinity, and the idea of an inferior power, no matter how it may otherwise be conceived, is still always the idea of some kind of divinity. Genuine power is always creative and is always divine. To admit the existence of 'forms,' 'faculties,' 'qualities,' 'virtues,' or 'real beings,' capable of producing certain effects by reason of their nature is to admit something divine in the bodies around us.¹ But if such causes are thus truly efficient, and must therefore be recognized as powerful and divine, they should awaken in us love and fear. That, however, would involve worship, and would commit us to a pagan polytheism. Such worship of little divinities is so flagrantly abhorrent to Christian doctrine and the word of God that no devout philosopher may admit it for a moment. We are enjoined to give glory and honor to God alone, and can therefore recognize no inferior powers in things about us.

A second important argument is more purely philosophical, and may be called a rationalistic argument. We have ideas of two sorts only, ideas of body and ideas of spirit.² If we analyze the idea of finite body we find in it no hint of necessary connection. Nor does the idea of a finite spirit include the idea of necessary connection between the will and its effects;³ on the contrary, it definitely excludes such an idea. Only between the will of God and its effects can such necessary connection be admitted, for we cannot conceive that the Omnipotent should will anything that should not take place.

But the really fundamental reason for Malebranche's doctrine of the inefficacy of natural causes is to be sought in the rigid dualism with which he starts. He accepts the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter virtually as propounded by Descartes. Descartes' sharp dualism is the logical result of his definition of mind and matter in terms of substance. "When we conceive of substance, we merely conceive an existent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist."⁴ That is to say, substance

¹ *Recherche de la Vérité*, Liv. VI, Pt. II, chap. III, vol. 2, p. 323 ff.

² *Ibid.*, VI, II, III, vol. 2, p. 326.

³ *Ibid.*, VI, II, III, vol. 2, p. 326.

⁴ *Principles*, I, 51. Open Court edition, p. 156.

is the self-existent, the independently real. Now as mind and body are both substances, it is clear that mind needs not body nor body mind in order that either should exist. The fact is that if mind and body be conceived as substances, their complete opposition is necessarily granted. Such at least was felt to be the logic of the situation by the Cartesians. There resulted, then, the serious problem of bridging the gap between the two substances. In defiance of the complete isolation of the two substances was their apparent interaction in our human nature, at once body and spirit. Descartes's attempts to relieve the difficulty were seen to be unsatisfactory even by those who carried on the Cartesian tradition. Occasionalism was the modified form of Cartesianism that sought by absolutely denying the possibility of interaction between the two substances to escape from the *impasse* in which his followers believed Descartes had left them. The denial of interaction carried with it the denial of the efficacy of natural causes generally. It is, then, in the difficulty which thus results from the dualism of substances that we find the chief ground of Malebranche's important doctrine that second causes are never efficient, and that examination of the concepts of such causes never discloses any genuine idea of power or necessary connection. But though Malebranche's acceptance of the Cartesian dualism afforded him the best of reasons for the denial of efficient causes, he was apparently led by an independent perception of the difficulties of the problem to an analysis of the idea of necessary connection that is entirely free from rationalistic presuppositions. It is at this point, perhaps, that he most strikingly anticipates Hume.

Hume's position is, as we have already observed, that we can never by an examination of the concept of an object discover therein its possible effects, and that experience alone is capable of revealing them. Malebranche anticipates this argument when he maintains that we can have no idea of force, power, or necessary connection in reference to the relation of cause and effect even between existences both of which are material.¹

¹ Malebranche recognizes clearly that the schoolmen with their philosophies of 'substantial forms,' 'accidents,' etc., merely covered up the difficulties with high-

"By the most diligent effort, I am unable to discover in myself any idea that represents the force or power which is attributed to created things."¹ We cannot discover the source of such an idea in the causal relation of objects in the physical world. "Do not imagine," he writes in the *Méditations*, "that bodies have in themselves a power of motion which they confer upon those with which they come in contact, *for you do not see it at all*."² The language of this passage is remarkably suggestive of the very words in which Hume affirms that we have no perception of necessary connection in such cases. It is Hume's characteristic challenge to 'produce the impression.' Hume's most familiar statement of the point is in similar terms; he takes, however, a concrete case: "The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the outward senses."³

Malebranche is even more explicit in his denial of necessary connection between a volition and a resulting movement. He says positively, "We can perceive no necessary connection between a volition and the movement of any body whatsoever."⁴ Malebranche thus denies as emphatically as Hume that we are conscious of internal power when we by command of our will move our limbs or thereby indirectly any external body. For how do we, for example, move our arm? asks Malebranche. In order to move the arm it is necessary that the animal spirits should pass through various nerves to the appropriate muscles, and as anatomy teaches us, the mechanism by which so simple an action is performed is exceedingly complex. But certainly few men even know that they are possessed of so complicated a means of moving a limb, to say nothing of having a consciousness of the energy that actuates it.⁵ Hume makes use of precisely

sounding terms. So also later Hume points out the futility of such really meaningless terms. Cf. *Recherche, Eclaircissement*, XV (Bouillier's edition of the *Recherche*, vol. 2, p. 438) and Hume's *Treatise*, Pt. IV, Sec. III, Green & Grose, Vol. I, p. 505.

¹ *Recherche, Ecl.* XV (Bouillier, vol. 2, p. 437).

² *Méditation V*, p. 57. Italics mine.

³ *Enquiry*, VII, I, Vol. II, p. 52 (Essays).

⁴ *Recherche*, VI, II, III, vol. 2, p. 326.

⁵ *Recherche*, VI, II, III; vol. 2, p. 328.

this argument in the *Enquiry*. "We learn from anatomy," he says, "that the immediate object of power in voluntary motion is not the member itself which is moved, but certain muscles and nerves, and animal spirits, and, perhaps, something still more minute and more unknown through which the motion is successively propagated, ere it reach the members itself whose motion is the immediate object of volition. Can there be a more certain proof that the power by which this whole operation is performed, so far from being directly and fully known by an inward sentiment or consciousness, is to the last degree mysterious and unintelligible."¹

But if we were really conscious of any such power, says Malebranche, we should realize our selves as veritable creators; for it is a mistake to suppose that the power to move objects is a trifle, while the power to create is something vastly different and far greater.² The power to move objects is only attributable to a being that can create; indeed it is rightly understood only as a perpetual creative activity—an activity by which the divine Being "preserves objects in successively different places." To suppose that we are conscious of that of which only a divinity is capable is to suppose an absurdity. Malebranche would, then, thoroughly agree with Hume's contention that all causal connections are inexplicable; that "were we empowered by a secret wish to remove mountains or control the planets in their orbits, this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary nor beyond our comprehension."³

Equally far are we from possessing any consciousness of the power by which ideas are called up voluntarily in our minds. "I deny," says Malebranche, "that my will produces in me my ideas; for I do not see how it could produce them, since my will not being able to act without knowledge, presupposes rather than creates them."⁴ Malebranche is very emphatic on this point; and he goes on to add that the mind is not able of itself to create its own desires.⁵ Similarly, Hume insists that the

¹ *Enquiry*, VII, I; Vol. II, p. 55 (Essays).

² *Méditation* IX, p. 113.

³ *Enquiry*, VII, I; Vol. II, p. 54 (Essays).

⁴ *Recherche, Eclaircissement* XV (Bouillier, vol. 2, p. 455).

⁵ *Ibid.*

power actually to produce our ideas would be the power of creation out of nothing. And "such a power is not felt nor known, nor even conceivable by the mind."¹

Hume's constructive teaching with reference to the idea of causation is that it is not a rational concept, but the result of a habit of expectation generated by frequent experience of the constant conjunction of certain objects. Of this doctrine also there are anticipatory hints in Malebranche. He, like Hume, would seem to hold that we are led to suppose the existence of real efficient power where only conjunction is observable. In the *Entretiens* he explains that ". . . men always infer that a thing is the cause of a particular effect when the two are joined together."² Just so Hume declares that we believe one object to be the cause of another, because we have observed the two to be "constantly joined together."³ Again in the *Méditations* Malebranche writes: ". . . you infer that bodies move one another because one body is never struck by another without being moved;"⁴ than which no clearer statement of Hume's position could be asked.

Although Malebranche thus remarkably anticipates the position that was later to be developed by Hume, the final place of causation in his system is by no means what the analysis just outlined would seem to indicate. All the causal efficacy that he denies to finite creatures he attributes to God. We cannot, so runs the argument, rationally suppose a necessary connection between any finite will and any movement. It is the idea of God alone that upon analysis yields us the notion of a necessary connection between a will and the movement of bodies. For it is impossible to conceive that the Omnipotent should will and that the object of his volition should not be accomplished. God is thus the *deus ex machina* that renders activity possible in a world totally devoid of second causes. The Prime Mover is a perpetual mover, an Augustinian Creator, who has delegated

¹ *Enquiry*, VII, I; Vol. II, p. 56 (Essays).

² *Entretien* III, p. 55.

³ *Enquiry*, VII, II; Vol. II, p. 62 (Essays).

⁴ Cf. also *Méditation* VI, Sec. 5, p. 51 and the *Recherche, Eclaircissement* XV, *Preuve* VI (Bouillier, vol. 2, p. 458).

none of his power to his creatures. To do that would be, Malebranche declares, abhorrent to God's purpose of enjoying solely His own perfection. We have then a universe in which "*Dieu fait tout en toutes choses.*" This is extreme Occasionalism. In his denial of all power to the human will, even to create its own desires, Malebranche was more sweeping than many of the other Occasionalists. Berkeley, for instance, who is really an Occasionalist, admitted the finite mind's power to produce memory images. Inasmuch as the only direct knowledge of any volition is our knowledge of the human will, and since we know that the human will is not possessed of creative power, a metaphysic that resorts to the hypothesis of a supreme will would seem to be but feebly based, considering that such a supreme will must needs be conceived on the analogy of the human will. It is just this criticism that Hume makes of the Occasionalist hypothesis. He protests that those philosophers for whom "everything is full of God," are carrying their arguments beyond the sphere of experience into a "fairy land" where "we have no reason to trust our common methods of argument."¹ "We are ignorant," says Hume, "of the manner in which bodies operate on each other. . . . But are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by which a mind, even the Supreme Mind, operates, either on itself or on body? Whence, I beseech you, do we acquire any idea of it? We have no sentiment or consciousness of this power in ourselves. We have no idea of the Supreme Being but what we learn from reflection on our faculties. Were our ignorance, therefore, a good reason for rejecting anything, we should be led into that principle of denying all energy in the Supreme Being, as much as in the grossest matter. We surely comprehend as little the operations of the one as of the other. Is it more difficult to conceive that motion may arise from impulse, than that it may arise from volition? All we know is our profound ignorance in both cases."²

As a matter of fact, Malebranche was himself forced to an agnosticism as profound as Hume's, if he had only realized it.

¹ *Enquiry*, VII, I; Vol. II, p. 59 (Essays).

² *Ibid.*, VII, I; Vol. II, p. 60 (Essays).

Keen as he was to perceive the emptiness of such factitious concepts as 'substantial form,' 'faculty' and the like, he remained as blind as the blindest rationalist to the hundredfold greater emptiness of that sublime abstraction, 'Infinite Being,' which is his definition of God. But more than that, he expressly denies the knowability of God. It must not be supposed, he maintains, that when we call God a spirit, we really understand him to be spiritual in the sense in which we ourselves are so. To call God a spirit is only to signify that he is not material. But no more is he spiritual, as we understand the term. He is "being without restriction, all being, being infinite and universal," and so his nature remains unsearchable.¹

II. THE KNOWABILITY OF THE SELF.

In his criticism of the Cartesian spiritualism, Hume sought to show that, so far is it from being true that knowledge of the self as a unitary spiritual being is the primary certitude, we have no knowledge of the existence or nature of the self as spiritual substance. Now, as we shall see, Malebranche, as a follower of Descartes, contends for the reality of mind as a substance whose essence is thought; but, curiously, Malebranche, no less than Hume, maintains the self to be unknowable. Of the inconsistency of the two positions, fatal as it is to the integrity of his system, Malebranche was apparently not fully aware; though he no doubt felt the difficulty. His allegiance to Descartes, and the demands of his theology forced him to teach the doctrine of spiritual substance; but his own philosophical perspicacity led him to see its difficulties; and although he of course never abrogates his main doctrine, he states very clearly some of the very considerations that led Hume to the position that we have no philosophical grounds for believing the soul to be spiritual substance. Malebranche holds with Descartes, that there are two 'created substances,' mind and matter. He follows Descartes in his method of proving the existence of these substances. Of nothing, he argues, there are no properties. Therefore wherever we are compelled to acknowledge the presence of quali-

¹ *Recherche*, III, II, 9, 4; Vol. I, p. 436.

ties or attributes we must conclude the presence of some substance in which the qualities inhere. In this way the property of extension forces us to a belief in a material substance. Similarly with mental phenomena. "Of nothing there are no properties. I think, therefore, I am. But what am I—I who think—while I am thinking? Am I a body, a spirit, a man? I do not yet know. I know only that while I think, I am something that thinks. But let us see. Can a body think? That which possesses length, breadth, depth, can it reason, desire, feel? No, undoubtedly not; for all the modes of extension consist only in the relations of distance, and it is plain that these relations are not perceptions, reasonings, pleasures, desires, sentiments, in a word, thoughts. Then this me that thinks, my very substance, is not a body, since my perceptions, which assuredly belong to me, are something quite other than relations of distance."¹ And summing up, he adds a little later: "Then my soul is not material. It is not a modification of my body. It is a thinking substance, and it has no resemblance to the extended substance of which my body is composed."²

The method by which Malebranche proves thought and extension to be respectively the essential qualities of mental and material substance are likewise the familiar methods of Descartes. We can conceive a body without any particular form, without color, without motion, but not without extension. Extension must therefore be its essential property. We can conceive of mind devoid of sensations, emotions, or any imagery whatsoever, but not devoid of thought. For a soul to cease to think would therefore be for it to cease to exist. Thought is accordingly the essential property of spiritual substance. And Malebranche likewise maintains the familiar rationalistic position that the mind always thinks.

Descartes, as is well known, not only held that we know the two substances, matter and mind, through their ideas, which we possess in perfect clarity, but maintained that of the two mind is the more perfectly known. "What then," he exclaims, "I who

¹ *Entretien* I, p. 5.

² *Ibid.*, I, p. 8.

seem to possess so distinct an apprehension of the piece of wax,—do I not know myself, both with greater truth and certitude, and also much more distinctly and clearly? For if I judge that the wax exists because I see it, it assuredly follows, much more evidently, that I myself am or exist, for the same reason: for it is possible that what I see may not in truth be wax, and that I do not even possess eyes with which to see anything. But it cannot be that when I see, or which comes to the same thing, when I think I see, I myself who think am nothing.”¹ And in the *Principles*, he contends that we can have a clear and distinct idea of thinking substance, “provided we carefully distinguish all the attributes of thought from those of extension.”² Despite, however, his emphatic insistence on this point, he was never able to show how the concept of consciousness could be made the foundation of a rational psychology. Malebranche, however, though he retained as fundamental in his system the concept of spiritual substance,³ felt the difficulties involved in the notion, and virtually withdrew from the Cartesian position.

Malebranche first qualifies his spiritualism by insisting that although we know that the soul really exists, we cannot know all the modifications of which it is capable. He resorts here, as elsewhere, to the analogy of a material object. The smallest bit of matter is capable of an infinite number of configurations. “What reason is there, then, to suppose that the soul which is so much more noble than material body, should be susceptible of no other modifications than those it has already received?”⁴ Our ignorance of these modifications is no evidence of their impossibility. Had we never perceived color, or felt pleasure or pain, we should never have known the soul to be capable of those modifications. We may then safely hold that a thing so noble as the human spirit contains capacities whose realization the providence of God reserves for the devout believer in a future and more perfect state of existence.

But Malebranche carries his analysis much further. There

¹ *Méditation* II, p. 40.

² Pt. I, Sec. LIV. Open Court edition, p. 157.

³ *Entretien* I, p. 8.

⁴ *Recherche*, III, I, I; vol. I, p. 285.

are, he holds, four modes of knowing.¹ The first is to know things in themselves. We do not know the objects of our world in this way. God is the only being that can thus be known. "He alone is able to act within the spirit itself and so discover himself to it. It is only God that we see with an insight immediate and direct." The second mode is to know things through their representative ideas, that is to say, by something other than themselves. It is thus that we know the objects of the physical world. "It is thus in God and by their ideas, that we know bodies and their properties."² The third mode is by conjecture or analogy. This is the way in which we know of the existence of minds other than our own. The fourth is "by consciousness," or inner sense; and this is the way in which we know our own souls. This is not knowledge through ideas. The world of physical objects can be known through the concept of extension. "The idea we have of extension is sufficient to enable us to know all the properties of which extension is capable, and we cannot desire to have an idea of extension more distinct and more fruitful than that with which God has endowed us." The soul, however, cannot be exhaustively, or even adequately, known through its idea; "we do not see the soul in God." We know it by inner sense and our knowledge is imperfect. "We only know of our soul what we *feel taking place within us*."³ The wording of this sentence is strongly suggestive of Hume's famous saying: "When I enter most intimately into myself I always stumble upon some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light, or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure."⁴ Now this argument from introspection is common to both Hume and Malebranche and is the really fundamental one in both. They are at one in recognizing that "inner sense" is totally unable to reveal the existence of a simple abiding spiritual substance behind the phenomena of consciousness. Perhaps the clearness and positiveness of Malebranche's position can be no better exhibited than in the following passage from the *Entretiens sur la Méta-*

¹ *Recherche*, III, II, VII, I; Vol. I, p. 335.

² *Ibid.*, III, II, VII, II; Vol. I, p. 336.

³ *Ibid.*, III, II, VII, IV; Vol. I, p. 337. *Italics mine.*

⁴ *Treatise*, Pt. IV, Sec. VI; Vol. I, p. 534.

physique.¹ "I am unable to discover the relations of the modifications which affect my soul. By entering into myself ("*en me tournant vers moi-même*") I cannot discover any of my faculties or capacities. My inner self reveals only that I am, that I think, that I desire, that I feel, that I suffer, etc.; but it does not reveal to me what I am, the nature of my feelings, of my passions, of my pain, nor the relations of all these to one another, because having no idea of my soul, not beholding its archetype in God, I am not able to discover either what it is or the modes of which it is capable."² Here, obviously, many phrases are very like the language Hume employs in the famous section of the *Treatise* concerning "Personal Identity." Whatever, if any, may have been the influence of these reasonings upon Hume, their remarkable coincidence with his own position is sufficient to warrant the present comparison of their views.

It is needless to remark that this negative criticism does not lead to any ultimate scepticism on the part of Malebranche. On the contrary, he contends that, though we know of our souls only what we learn by feeling or "inner sense," we do know enough to be assured of the soul's immortality, spirituality, and freedom. For it is not with our imperfect knowledge of the soul as with our confused knowledge of the external world. The world of external objects as revealed by the senses is not only imperfect, but actually false. The physical world is rightly and perfectly understood only in thought. Our sense-knowledge,

¹ The reader may bear in mind that we have no independent evidence that Hume was familiar with the *Entretiens* as well as the *Recherche*.

² *Entretien* III, p. 57. Both Hume and Malebranche are equally positive that reason, no less than "inner sense," is incapable of discovering the nature of the self. Their arguments, though proving the same conclusion, are not identical. Malebranche in *Eclaircissement* XI, in support of the contention that we have no clear idea of the soul, argues as follows: (a) We cannot discover from an idea of the soul what modifications the soul is capable of. (b) The Cartesians differ as to whether the secondary qualities belong to the soul or not. If we had a clear knowledge of the nature of the soul through an idea there could be no difference of opinion on [this point. (c) We cannot, moreover, compare one soul with another, or one sensation with another in any exact way, as we can compare magnitudes. (d) Finally, if we have a clear idea of the soul, how comes it that we so often confound soul and body? Two clear ideas could not be thus confused. One never mistakes a square for a circle. If we had a clear idea of the soul men would never be guilty of the error of supposing it a function of the body.

theoretically false, is of only practical utility. But though we need ideas of the physical world to correct our erroneous sense-knowledge, such is not the case with regard to our souls. Our imperfect knowledge of ourselves is not, so far as it goes, false, but is in fact sufficient to convince us that our souls are much superior to the bodies they inhabit. It is obvious that Malebranche is here too embarrassed by theological pre-suppositions to be fair to the facts. Though he takes away with the right hand the basis of a 'rational psychology,' he is fain to restore it with his left. Promising as was Malebranche's beginning, it remained for Hume and for Kant to make the criticism complete and decisive.

III. NATURAL BELIEF.

Hume, by reason of the destructive analysis which he made of the rationalistic views of causation, and of material and spiritual substance, has been regarded as the arch-sceptic of English, indeed of modern, philosophy. This popular estimate of Hume as ultimately and thoroughly sceptical has recently been challenged.¹ Hume's true position would seem to be not scepticism, but naturalism. He holds that the function of reason is purely practical. Reason comes into no conflict with itself while rightly exercised in the practical concerns of ordinary life. It is only when it seeks to justify the beliefs of practical life that it proves self-destructive. Reason succeeds in the sphere of the practical, but in the theoretical realm soon involves itself in such a scepticism as Hume's philosophy exhibits.

This teaching of Hume's is specially illustrated in his doctrine of 'natural belief.'² "Should it be asked me whether I be really one of those skeptics who hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in any thing possessed of any measures of truth and falsehood; I should reply, that this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither I nor any other person, was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determined us to judge as well

¹ Cf. "The Naturalism of Hume," by Norman Kemp Smith, *Mind*, Vol. XIV, N.S., Nos. 54-55.

² *Treatise*, Vol. I, pp. 178-9.

as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connection with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking, as long as we awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies when we turn our eyes toward them in the sunshine." Belief is thus instinctive. Indeed, Hume's account of reason is purely naturalistic. "The understanding," he says, "is but the general and more established properties of the imagination."¹ These general "properties," habits, or instincts, when theoretically developed come into conflict with one another. This is true, for instance, of those two most fundamental natural beliefs: that objects have substantial reality, and that there are no uncaused phenomena. Hume believes that the conflict of these principles has been proved by Berkeley. "When we reason from cause and effect we conclude that neither color, sound, taste, nor smell have independent reality, and when we exclude all these, nothing of all that we apprehend remains as real existence."² These natural beliefs, moreover, lead us into fruitless speculation. The instinctive belief in causal connection, for instance, becomes unlimited in its pretensions and so demands a cause of all things, an absolute cause. Inasmuch as we have no conception that could answer such a demand, reason remains unsatisfied; and we are therefore forced to the conclusion that the function of reason is purely practical. Within the sphere of common life nature determines us to judge as well as to breathe or to feel. "Philosophical decisions," accordingly, can be "nothing but the reflexions of common life, methodized and corrected."³

Such is the important place of the doctrine of 'natural judgment' in the philosophy of Hume. Malebranche also has a doctrine of instinctive or natural belief, which though it occupies a quite different place in his system, is in many ways coincident with Hume's. Malebranche recognizes natural judgment as a process involved in sense-perception. The perception of an external object is, says Malebranche, so complex as to involve

¹ *Treatise*, I, IV, VII, p. 547.

² Cf. *Ibid.*, I, IV, IV; *Enquiry*, XII, I.

³ *Enquiry*, XII, III, p. 133 (*Essays*, Vol. II).

several processes very clearly to be discriminated.¹ There is first, the *action* of the object; as, for instance, in the case of the perception of heat, the impinging of the small particles of wood upon the hand. Secondly, there is the *affection* of the sense-organ. There is, thirdly, the *affection*, the sensation or perception, of the soul, when it is aware of the heat. And, finally, there is the *judgment* which the soul makes, that that which it feels is in its hand and in the fire. This natural judgment is but a part of that which we ordinarily call a perception. It is totally involuntary and inevitable. These judgments accompany the perceptions of all our senses, whether it be sight, touch, hearing, or what not. Malebranche discusses illustrations drawn from perceptions of sight.² When we look up into the sky and see the fixed stars, argues Malebranche, we see the stars as actually up there in the sky. But, now, inasmuch as the soul can really see an object only as it is "united with itself" (in representative perception), the perception must involve an involuntary judgment which makes the soul seem to perceive the star as it actually does not. Again, there is no one in the world who does not see the moon larger near the horizon than in mid-heaven. The only reason that can be assigned for this is that, as it in that position seems to be farther from us, we judge it to be larger than it actually appears.³

Now all these natural judgments, constituting as they do part of a complex process of perception, as an element in which they are unconscious and involuntary, are always succeeded by voluntary judgments either confirmatory or corrective. When the voluntary judgments are confirmatory of the involuntary judgments they are theoretically false. For sense perception does not reveal the natural world as it really is. The function of sense-knowledge, and so of natural judgment, is to guide and preserve the bodily life—a purely practical office. The true nature of the world can be discovered only through the conscious

¹ *Recherche*, I, X, VI; vol. I, p. 90.

² *Ibid.*, I, XIV; vol. I, p. 115, ff.

³ For a detailed study of Malebranche's theory of the perception of distance and magnitude, see the article by Norman Kemp Smith in *The British Journal of Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 196 ff.

exercise of the understanding in science and philosophy. The judgments of science and of philosophy always correct the confused knowledge of sense-experience and reveal the true nature of reality.

At times Malebranche speaks of these natural judgments as instinctive or habitual. That, for instance, is the implication of the words in which on one occasion he explains how natural judgments come to be made. When one perceives an external object, such as a star (so runs the account), the soul, not being conscious of the motions that take place in the brain the nerves and the sense-organs, "is led to judge" that the cause of the sensation is in the object itself.¹ But this is not Malebranche's final interpretation of these judgments. He is inclined (doubtless on the Occasionalist principle that what is not my conscious act is not my act at all) to hold that the judgments involved in our perceptions are not really the acts of the individual perceiving soul. God, who "does everything in all things," is the real author of our conscious judgments. "It is not we that make them, but God who makes them for us. That is the reason why I call them natural judgments."² This may be compared with Hume's corresponding conclusion that "nature determines us to judge as well as to breathe and feel."³

These, then, are the theories of 'natural judgment' or 'natural belief,' held respectively by Hume and by Malebranche. Obviously they do not occupy the same place in the philosophies of the two thinkers. The doctrine in Hume's hands becomes central in his system of naturalism. On Hume's view natural

¹ *Recherche*, I, XIV; Vol. I, p. 117.

² *Dernier Eclaircissement* (Bouillier, p. 569).

³ It is worth observing that in Hume's doctrine of "the propensity to feign," of which he makes such extensive use in his explanations of our belief in an abiding substrate of things, and in the self, we have something analogous to the doctrine of natural belief. The "propensity to feign" the existence of material substances Hume treats as being a natural belief. Moreover, Hume does in fact explicitly recognize Malebranche's type of natural belief, though in a general way. "It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our own perceptions, but would exist, though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated." *Enquiry*, XII, I; Vol. II, p. 124 (Essays).

judgment is involved not merely in our sense-perceptions, but in all our thinking, practical and theoretical as well. But in two important and interesting features the theories of Hume and of Malebranche coincide. In the philosophies of both, these judgments are regarded as involuntary and inevitable. We constantly make them, and we cannot help making them. And, secondly, their function is the practical one of adjusting us to the conditions of ordinary life. When they are taken as revealing the true nature of reality, they are false, because misinterpreted.

Here again the question of influence is one that it would be folly to attempt to decide. But here likewise the historical aspect of the matter justifies the discussion.

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DISCUSSION.

DR. BOSANQUET'S DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM.

FREEDOM has ever been a watchword of idealism. Since Kant proclaimed freedom as a characteristic of the noumenal self, idealists have maintained that freedom must be conceived positively as the self-determination of the rational or universal self. In recent years, however, the question has been more and more insistently asked as to whether the development of idealism in the direction of absolutism has not entailed the sacrifice of freedom to the demand for complete rationality. Pragmatists, personalists, temporalists, and intuitionists have alike contended that freedom is impossible in any absolutistic system. Yet absolutists, apparently nothing daunted by the attacks of their adversaries, continue in their endeavor to maintain freedom without abandoning monism. The latest and one of the most thoroughgoing of these attempts is that of Dr. Bosanquet in his volumes, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*. Here, by a "plain tale," he attempts to silence the critics of absolutism, and among other matters, to show (1) that freedom is completely rational and does not imply contingency, and (2) that, far from being incompatible with monism, it is possible only in a monistic system.

The success of Dr. Bosanquet's treatment of freedom has been variously estimated. Those in sympathy with his point of view tend to regard it as a triumphant exemplification of his principles. Thus Dr. Mackenzie says: "I doubt whether there is any treatment of the subject of freedom which more happily maintains the balance between the recognition of the conditions by which man is limited, and the assertion of the infinite element in his nature by which he is enabled to transcend these limits."¹ The opponents of absolutism, on the other hand, do not find the discussion so satisfactory. They declare that Dr. Bosanquet fails to meet the real point of their objections, and they remain, therefore, as unconvinced as ever of the compatibility of real freedom with the eternal perfection involved in a rigid monism.

Now most of the objections directed against Dr. Bosanquet's treatment of freedom are based on conceptions of freedom differing from the one which he advocates. As a result, a certain amount of

¹ *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 23, p. 470.

misunderstanding and confusion has inevitably arisen. We purpose to avoid this sort of misunderstanding by setting aside, so far as possible, questions concerning the adequacy of our author's conception of freedom, and by adopting, for the sake of argument, his own definition of the term. We shall endeavor to show that, even with this concession, freedom cannot be predicated of the finite self or of the Absolute. In regard to the question of finite freedom, our argument will consist of three main contentions: (1) that finite freedom as defined by Dr. Bosanquet involves time, and hence is incompatible with the eternal completeness of the whole; (2) that Dr. Bosanquet himself does not adhere strictly to his own conception of freedom, but sometimes admits an element of contingency; (3) that the subordination of the moral standpoint to the standpoint of logic undermines the ground for the assertion of freedom. In regard to the freedom of the Absolute, we shall argue, (1) that freedom can be applied to the Absolute only by a change of definition which removes the conception from the sphere of our comprehension; and (2) that the conception of the Absolute is beset with grave difficulties due to the incompatibility of the temporal and logical view-points. If this incompatibility is genuine, two alternatives are open: If the Absolute is logically complete and hence free, it must exist apart from the temporal order; if the Absolute exists only through the finite, it is neither timeless nor complete, but temporal and changing.

Dr. Bosanquet defines freedom as "the *nisus* to the whole,"¹ as "ideality, adjustment," "the passage of a being or content beyond itself."² Or, again, he describes it as the characteristic of "a world which reshapes itself in virtue of its nature and that of its contents, and, in doing so, extends its borders, and absorbs and stamps itself upon something that before seemed alien."³ All of these definitions imply the reality both of time and of the finite. For, if time is not real, there is no meaning in expressions such as "*nisus*" or "passage" or self-transcendence, and if finiteness is mere appearance, the "passage of a content beyond itself" cannot be regarded as a genuine achievement. Is, then, the reality of time and of the finite compatible with the logical completeness of the whole as formulated by absolutism? Let us consider briefly our author's reply to this crucial question.

Dr. Bosanquet maintains that there is no incompatibility between the temporal sequence and the eternal perfection of the whole. The temporal view-point is necessitated by finiteness, and, like the latter;

¹ *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 9.

² *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 60.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

has its measure of reality by reason of its relation to the whole. To quote: "Time is real as a condition of the experience of sensitive subjects, but it is not a form which profoundly exhibits the unity of things."¹ Or, again: "We consider time as an appearance only, but as an appearance inseparable from the membership of finiteness in infinity, and therefore from the self-revelation of a reality which as a whole is timeless."² Thus for our author, the whole is timeless, not in the sense of excluding time, but rather in the sense of including and transcending it. Yet, as various critics have pointed out, it is difficult to see how such an inclusion is possible. Can past, present, and future be eternally present as elements in a complete whole? What meaning would there be then in speaking of the past as past, or the future as future? To questions such as these, Dr. Bosanquet might reply that the difficulty is due to the attempt to interpret in temporal terms what he says of the whole. He maintains no such absurdity as that present, past, and future are given now or at any other moment of time. Rather he maintains that time itself is so beset with contradictions that it inevitably forces the mind to transcend it. This, indeed, is what he means by calling time appearance. Now, although difficulties in the conception of time must be admitted even by the most radical temporalist, yet these difficulties do not justify us in neglecting one of the most fundamental aspects of our experience, or in subordinating it to the demand for logical completeness. Furthermore the insistence upon the fact that the logical completeness of the whole cannot be described in temporal terms, throws little light on the problem of how our radically temporal experience can be included in this perfect whole.

The reader of Dr. Bosanquet's volumes finds many assertions to the effect that the logical order is inclusive of the temporal. He seeks in vain, however, for any passage which actually shows how such an inclusion is possible. There are, indeed, several illustrations which are offered as hints of this relationship.³ These illustrations comprise: (a) the feelings and conditions of a great family, revealed in a series of acts, but not reducible to a mere temporal succession; (b) a musical composition, which is more than a sequence of tones, although expressed through this sequence; (c) the mind of a great scholar who apprehends the spirit of the past and thus transcends time. Significant as these illustrations are as showing the reality of a supra-temporal aspect of experience, they all fail to meet the real difficulty

¹ *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 273.

² *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 295 f.

³ Cf. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 296 ff.

involved in the inclusion of the temporal within an eternally perfect whole. In each of these analogies, the whole which is supposed to furnish the analogue for the Absolute changes with time, and is complete only as a synthesis of *past* experience. A brief examination will bear out the truth of this statement. The family feeling, "the concentration and quintessence of the spatio-temporal series," far from being eternally complete, is progressively transformed through the very process of its expression and time. The musical composition does not exist as a complete whole even in the musician's mind until after its expression in a temporal sequence. According to this illustration, then, the Absolute would be complete only at the end of a temporal series. In our author's opinion, however, time is essentially unending and so could never give us a complete whole. The way of escape lies, perhaps, in a different interpretation of the illustration. Thus Dr. Bosanquet sometimes implies that the musical composition expresses only imperfectly a state of mind or a feeling experienced by the musician. This state of mind exists in its perfection in the musician's own mind and is not dependent upon its imperfect and often fragmentary expression. But if this interpretation be seriously accepted as furnishing an analogue of the relation of time to the Absolute, the Absolute must exist complete apart from its temporal manifestation. The temporal series then is but a fragmentary representation of that which is in itself perfect and complete. But since the whole is complete without this representation, the temporal series can not be included within the perfection of the whole, nor necessitated by it. Thus the musical composition, from whatever angle it be considered, fails to show how time falls within the logical perfection of the Absolute. Dr. Bosanquet's third mentioned illustration serves his purpose no better. The scholar is freed, in truth, from many limitations of time and space. His experience and knowledge are not confined to a moment of time. Yet his knowledge has been built bit by bit upon experience that is past, and he can see only so much of the future as is grounded in the past or present. Hence his mind furnishes no hint of that eternal intellectual intuition of the Absolute which includes all time in its grasp. There is another illustration to which Dr. Bosanquet often returns. In his opinion the logical syllogism and the judgment furnish the best clue to the eternal experience of the Absolute, and here if anywhere a suggestion concerning the nature of the whole may be found. The relation of subject to predicate, or of premise to conclusion, is not temporal, although our apprehension of it may be such.¹ Thus the judgment which sustains the universe—the

¹ Cf. *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 87 f.; Vol. II, p. 5 ff.

absolute totality in which all differences are unified—is itself timeless. The significance of this judgment lies in the assertion of unity in difference, and this unity is eternally present. The fact that it is known by us only under the form of succession, is an accident due to our finiteness rather than a representation of its real nature. Although this description of the judgment suggests how the universe may be regarded as a timeless and rational whole, it does not show how time is included in this whole. Here again the logical and the temporal aspect fall apart, and we are left with the problem of the relation of our successive apprehension of difference to that eternal judgment in which all differences are aspects of a unified system.

The difficulty of reconciling the temporal and logical standpoints is indicated not only by Dr. Bosanquet's failure to show how such a reconciliation is possible, but also by the difficulties into which he continually falls through his endeavor to maintain both standpoints. As an illustration of this point let me cite the question of the relation of the Absolute to evolution. From the logical point of view, the Absolute must be regarded as prior to all change. Indeed, Dr. Bosanquet frequently gives the Absolute a priority even from the temporal point of view. To quote from his Gifford lectures: "We are then to make the attempt to show in outline how the Absolute, seen from our side as a world of appearances, keeps throwing its content into living focuses, vortices, worlds; and how these again, each transmuting towards unity its realm of externality and eliciting its values, initiate and sustain the character in which, under the special emphasis lent by the special dissociation operative at that point, the Absolute appears."¹ But while the Absolute is here given a certain priority, it should also be observed that in so far as it is elicited and maintained by the activity of finite selves, the Absolute is a late product of evolution, since, in Dr. Bosanquet's opinion, finite selves can come into existence only as a result of a long process of unconscious evolution.² We might even say that the Absolute, from this point of view, represents the goal of the effort of the finite selves rather than an eternal achievement. It may be objected that the contradiction here cited, is due to the misleading attempt to describe in temporal terms the relation of the Absolute to its expressions. Yet it is significant that Dr. Bosanquet himself does not keep clear of such an attempt. The consequent inconsistencies of his statements may well be regarded as evidence, not of the illusory nature of time, but rather of the fundamental irreconcilability of time and the eternal.

¹ *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 69.

² Cf. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 157, 218 ff.

This incompatibility of the logical and the temporal standpoints in an absolutistic system entails the relegation of freedom to the realm of appearances. If, as absolutism teaches, the whole is eternally complete, and the finite is eternally one with the infinite, then the *nisus* to the whole, the process of self-transcendence, and all finite striving are but illusory.

Let us turn now to the consideration of our second point, *i. e.*, to the contention that Dr. Bosanquet himself does not adhere strictly to his own definition of freedom. He declares time and again that freedom is completely rational, and differs *in toto* from contingency. One who carefully examines his discussions of finite freedom, however, will discover at least the implication of an element of contingency. The same fact comes out with even greater clearness in connection with Dr. Bosanquet's treatment of the problem of evil. Evil, as well as good, is said to be necessitated by its relation to the whole. In apparent contradiction to this view, however, it is also maintained that, in principle, evil, or the seizing of a false clue, is never necessary. "In principle, a fruitful thought and course is always open; for the whole of the universe is accessible by some path or other from every complex within it. In principle, again, you—the finite mind—have always a clue to a relatively fruitful thought or act, because every demand of mind pressed thoroughly home, must ultimately bring to you all that mind can be. Thus to fail of fruitful thought or choice is in the main to fail, as we all constantly fail, in sincerity and thoroughness."¹ This admission that failure is due to a lack of sincerity or of thoroughness seems to imply the possibility of action being other than it is, and thereby to open the door to contingency. Dr. Bosanquet, however, guards against this impression by assuring us in the next sentence, that "we need not here discuss whether there is sense in saying 'we could have been more sincere and unselfish or . . . more relevantly inspired than we were.'"² To this question his system can, of course, give only a negative answer. Yet if that negative answer be accepted, the significance of the statement that in principle a path is open vanishes. For how can it be said that a path is really open to the self, if that self is so circumscribed and limited that it must fail to find the path? Furthermore the view of the self as thus limited is contrary to Dr. Bosanquet's repeated assertions that the self in principle can always transcend its limitations. The only way to bring these statements into any sort of harmony, is to take refuge again in the distinction between the temporal and the logical view-

¹ *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 108.

² *Ibid.*

points. From the temporal point of view the self is at any moment limited and circumscribed, and hence fails to find the fruitful path; from the logical point of view the self is one with the infinite, and so must always find the fruitful path even through 'hardship and hazard.' However, this only brings us back to our former difficulty. If we decline to become entangled in this problem again, we must insist that the seizing of the wrong clue in a world where the good is in principle possible, is inexplicable unless contingency is admitted. But, as Dr. Bosanquet himself so constantly affirms, the admission of the least element of contingency means a gap in the logical completeness of the whole, and is therefore fatal to Absolutism.

The treatment of finite freedom is further weakened by our author's subordination of the moral to the logical view-point. This subordination is not, it is true, consistently carried through. The discussion of morality manifests the same duality between the temporal and the logical view-points. We are told, on the one hand, that the perfection of the whole is achieved through finite moral endeavor,¹ and, on the other hand, that the perfection of the whole transcends moral distinctions and is only imperfectly represented in moral striving.² The former statement does justice to the demands of the moral life; the latter is more consistent with Dr. Bosanquet's principles. In general, his tendency is to regard morality as bound up with finiteness and time, and therefore as subordinate to the logical completeness of the whole.³ If our contention concerning the incompatibility of the logical and the temporal is justified, morality, involving as it does time, must be illusory from the point of view of the Absolute. This means that the ground for the assertion of freedom is destroyed, inasmuch as the demand for freedom arises primarily in the moral realm.

Our conclusion then is that freedom as an attribute of the finite is not possible in a universe which is a coherent, changeless, and eternal whole. The only possibility of saving freedom without abandoning absolutism lies in attributing freedom, not to the finite, but to the Absolute. This brings us to the final section of our discussion, *i. e.*, to the question of the freedom of the Absolute.

Dr. Bosanquet sometimes maintains that freedom, in its full sense, can be ascribed only to the Absolute. Freedom, like truth and reality, is a matter of degree. It is the end of the effort of the finite self, rather than a characteristic of his striving, and it is attained only

¹ Cf. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 243, 371, 382.

² Cf. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 295, 309, 328.

³ Cf. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 17; *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 193-194, 200, 201, 212 f.

in so far as such a self is one with the Absolute. The definitions which we quoted above obviously have no connection with this sort of freedom, since they imply the reality of time and finiteness. What, then, is freedom as a characteristic of the Absolute? Once more we shall avail ourselves of Dr. Bosanquet's definition. Freedom is equivalent to determinateness. It implies the adequate response of each part to the demands of the whole. As contrasted with merely mechanical causation, it is "a living and concrete world of appreciation, in which the whole quality of every element is capable in principle of bearing upon and responding to the whole quality of every other."¹ In a word, freedom is equivalent to logical coherence. It cannot escape notice, however, that the conception of logical coherence has so little in common with the ordinary meaning of freedom, that it is confusing to identify the two terms. Furthermore, as Dr. Sabine has pointed out in his admirable criticism of Dr. Bosanquet's *Logic*, the idea of absolute coherence or of absolute totality eludes our grasp.² The human mind is essentially selective, and cannot conceive a system which is all-inclusive. All systems, as we know them, are bounded by certain limits set by the dominating purpose. The Absolute, however, has no limits whatsoever since there is nothing without it; furthermore, according to Dr. Bosanquet, the Absolute is not unified by purpose, since purpose implies defect and striving. Indeed, Dr. Bosanquet himself admits that absolute totality can never be reached by discursive reasoning, as judgment is compelled to describe reality in a relational form.³ Hence freedom as complete rationality or logical coherence transcends the limitations of the finite mind, and can be grasped only by recourse to mystic contemplation.

Waiving the matter relating to the intelligibility of absolute freedom, we come back to the fundamental difficulty inherent in the whole formulation of absolutism. We are face to face once more with the old problem of the relation of the temporal to the eternal. The incompatibility of the two involves the separation of the Absolute from the finite world. On the one hand, we find the eternal and unchanging experience of the Absolute, and, on the other, the finite world of struggle and striving, of change and time. On the one hand, there is complete reality and complete perfection; on the other, appearance and finiteness. Now such a separation of the Absolute and the finite, of reality and appearance, can never be admitted by the absolutist, for the principal tenet of his creed is that apart from the finite the

¹ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 342.

² Cf. *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 21, pp. 546-565.

³ Cf. *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 290.

Absolute is nothing, and that the Absolute achieves and manifests its perfection only through the transcendence of the imperfect and incomplete. But if this doctrine be strictly held, it is evident that the Absolute must stand or fall with the finite. If the finite struggles are illusory, the Absolute elicited by these struggles must be illusory also. On the other hand, if finiteness and time are real, then the Absolute must itself be temporal. Realized through the finite, it must change and grow with each change in the finite. This conception of the Absolute leaves room for finite freedom, but it banishes the rigid coherence, the complete logical stability, *i. e.* the 'freedom' of the whole. Hence it means the abandonment of absolutism.

We conclude, then, that Dr. Bosanquet's absolutism is not compatible with freedom. Finite freedom is ruled out by reason of its temporal implications and presuppositions. The freedom of the Absolute, on the contrary, is so rigidly logical in character that it can exist only in a complete and timeless whole. The difficulty here is that this whole must be isolated from the finite and temporal world. This, however, is as fatal to Dr. Bosanquet's system as the admission of contingency or of time, for the isolation of the Absolute from the finite is subversive of the main thesis of absolutism.

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The case between 'freedom and the Absolute' has been tried in so many courts with so little positive result that one is inclined to look about for a bold judge who will declare 'no cause of action.' The following criticism of Miss Bussey's charges against Dr. Bosanquet's idealism is entered as evidence in favor of such an eventual decision.

At the time of the Dublin riots in 1913 the English *Nation* published an editorial in which it compared the speeches of the labor leader Larkin with those of the typical English M.P., educated to oratory in the classical tradition at Oxford or Cambridge. The salient point of difference was this: that Larkin, taught in the rough school of the dock-yards, spoke of a situation as he found it, and spared nobody's feelings, not even for the sake of consistency. The M.P., on the other hand, had learned to speak 'logically,' and in order to do this most effectively, was apt to build up the situation in his own mind according to his traditions and those of his listeners, and to keep inside these self-imposed limits even at the cost of strict fidelity to the actual state of

affairs. Something like the latter seems to be the procedure of "the opponents of absolutism," who, having constructed an elaborate proof as to the incompatibility of real freedom with "the eternal perfection involved in a rigid monism," have been obliged at the same time to assume the particular type of monism against which such proof can be legitimately directed.

Miss Bussey makes a definite attempt to avoid gratuitous assumptions. She gives in her first paragraph a fair statement of Dr. Bosanquet's general attitude toward freedom, and adopts, "for the sake of argument," his definitions of freedom,—definitions which, as she herself observes, imply the reality both of time and the infinite. Unfortunately, however, she fails to adopt some other definitions which Dr. Bosanquet gives, especially his definitions of the Absolute, and so in the end she is forced to repudiate his conception of freedom.

Let us take up her 'contentions' in their order. In her very classification of them she crystallizes the distinction between the finite and the Absolute. As she rightly remarks in her last paragraph, this isolation of the finite from "the whole" is "fatal to Dr. Bosanquet's system," which is probably the reason why he himself is so careful to avoid it.¹ Considering finite freedom first, she declares (1) that "finite freedom as defined by Dr. Bosanquet involves time, and hence is incompatible with the eternal completeness of the whole." This contention can be met from two points of view. (a) On the one hand, it is not possible to deny the paradoxical coexistence in our world of order and change, of the nature of things and their individual passing, of eternity—or the quality of self-completeness—and time. Miss Bussey speaks of "the fundamental irreconcilability of time and the eternal" almost as if it were possible by the turn of a phrase to get rid of what Dr. Bosanquet calls "the eternal" in experience. He invokes the whole body of scientific knowledge, the world of man-created beauty and of æsthetic appreciation, and finally the expressions of human nature in persons and institutions, to prove that we continually recognize and depend, as active beings, on order and the quality of self-completeness. Self-completeness as we know it, as for instance in the immediate unity of a flower or a person, is not the completeness of a series.² Nevertheless flowers and people exist, or appear and disappear, in serial or temporal order. If we insist on taking these two aspects of reality each in abstraction from the other, in spite of the fact that we invariably meet them clinched in an inextricable unity, then we have *made* them fundamentally irreconcilable, but we

¹ Cf. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 1 ff.

² Cf. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 71.

have not disposed of "the eternal." (b) On the other hand, as indeed Miss Bussey shows by her quotations, Dr. Bosanquet is at specific pains to insist on the reality of time. When he writes of time he appears to have in mind, and to be comparing with his own doctrines, the theories of M. Bergson. In one place¹ he institutes a specific comparison of idealism with 'temporalism.' He points out the fact that both schools agree in recognizing time to be a hybrid experience, consisting of duration as well as of succession. The question, he thinks, becomes one of metaphysical interpretation and of emphasis: Temporalism treats "the experience of system and continuity in the self as merely a side of the real, which can never be shown capable of wholly defeating or including the aspect of successiveness"; idealism agrees that the finite is never "all there," but holds that "the distinctive being of the self is inversely as its dependence on externality and successiveness." The final court of decision here is our experience of selfhood, and it is to this court that Dr. Bosanquet continually appeals.

It is perhaps his chief polemical purpose to make his readers admit that "the mind's power lies in its relation to totality," but he is always ready to admit himself that "totality is never actually achieved at all, and never approached except through succession."² This admission gives full value to the significance of the future, as standing for "any experience which we do not already possess, and must therefore acquire hereafter."³ Dr. Bosanquet maintains, however, that we have no evidence from experience to prove that the future has developmental power *in itself*, or any power at all to change the fundamental nature of reality. The future is simply the promise of an opportunity to find that this nature does not change except in so far as it is expressed in change of circumstance. We shall consider further this nature of reality in connection with what Miss Bussey calls "the eternal completeness of the whole."

Proceeding with her consideration of finite freedom, Miss Bussey tells us (2) that "Dr. Bosanquet himself does not adhere strictly to his own conception of freedom, but sometimes admits an element of contingency." Here she fails to read Dr. Bosanquet in light of his avowed method and meaning. She notes that he denies the distinction between necessary and contingent truth. "Every true proposition," he says, "is so in the last resort because its contradictory is not conceivable in harmony with the whole of experience."⁴ She does not

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 338 ff.

² *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 119.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

⁴ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 51.

note, however, that he does not stop with this somewhat formal statement of a 'coherence theory of truth.' He does not disregard the differences in the significance of different experiences which have given rise to the formal distinction between necessity and contingency. He is offering, however, "a wholly different set of suggestions" in explanation of this distinction,—suggestions which Miss Bussey does not mention at all. They are based on the simple axiom of monism, that 'the world is one,' *i. e.*, there is no 'fact' or event which has not an intelligible relation to each and every other 'fact' or event, provided all the intervening connections are comprehended. For such comprehension it is necessary to look beyond and beneath the given aspect of experience. Thus "to fail in sincerity and thoroughness" is to fail to look at things "more significantly or more worthily than their first appearance suggested."¹ Furthermore, the significance and stability of experience vary directly with its inclusiveness, so that experience presents itself in 'levels,' or, to use another figure, in concentric circles more or less central or peripheral. Dr. Bosanquet continually exhorts us, both as thinkers and as actors, to put central things in the centre. All experiences, including our shallow and inadequate judgments, are knit into the structure of the one reality, and are subject to one law. But, though the world is ultimately and incontrovertibly one, what we deal with constantly in our lives are "varieties of levels of experience." We face neither dualism nor pluralism, but 'multiplicism.'²

All of this bears directly upon the question of 'the open path,' whereupon we come finally to grips with the question of freedom. Miss Bussey finds that in the 'rigid monism' of Dr. Bosanquet, action cannot 'be other than it is.' She quotes Dr. Bosanquet as saying that "we need not here discuss whether there is sense in saying ' . . . we *could* have been more sincere and unselfish or . . . more relevantly inspired than we were'," and takes this for a final, if involuntary, denial of the possibility of freedom. As a matter of fact, Dr. Bosanquet's refusal to discuss the question of 'empty Free Will' in this place³ is based simply and avowedly on the fact that he has already dealt with it elsewhere.⁴ It may be worth while to quote him somewhat at length on this point:—"What the ordinary advocate of freedom at bottom demands as 'the power to have acted otherwise,' is in the same breath to act and not to act, or acting, yet not to act. It is to re-

¹ *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 100-101.

² See *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 373.

³ *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 108.

⁴ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 342 ff.

pudiate, not to accept, responsibility, that is, the qualification of the self by its behaviour. . . . In every action, and even in the moment of acting, he is to be as if he had not acted and was not acting, uncommitted and undeveloped." Dr. Bosanquet's theory, on the other hand, "recognises a necessary act—an act which must be what it is—but not a necessary agent, because nothing but the agent determines the act, and there is no meaning in applying to him any 'must' or 'cannot help it' except in the sense that everything is what it is."¹ The act is in two respects necessary: (a) It is the inevitable outcome of what the agent has been and done up to the moment, *including* the combination of conscious intent and mustering of 'power' which brought it finally to pass; (b) and it reacts on him and on his world according to the laws of that world. But with the crowning growth of consciousness in each specific agent, which means the growth of a conscious 'unity of apperception,' goes the power of each specific character to transfigure and to conquer circumstance according to its particular nature.² With his invariable appeal to human experience, Dr. Bosanquet must needs declare that "given finite circumstance cannot stand against will and character."³ The creative impulse of the whole is there incarnate. To be "sincere and thorough" is to use the full power of intelligent will in order to grasp the full significance of every experience and to discriminate between greater and less significance in experience. If any member of the whole fails thus to use his forces, they will be gathered up elsewhere to react finally upon him.

Dr. Bosanquet believes that "*power* of thought and will" is "what people constantly mean when they speak of their *freedom*."⁴ Part of the implication of idealistic monism is this: "That vistas must be open from every circumstance and situation to a more satisfactory complex."⁵ What then is necessary is the *giving ourselves* wholly to our best inspiration, which means for Dr. Bosanquet cooperating with the whole instead of working against it. What shall be our given notion of the whole is dependent superficially upon circumstances, but fundamentally on the degree of our effort to *exercise power*, always of course as *intelligent* beings. Here, in the relation of the member to the whole as a more or less differentiated unit of thinking power, lies the touch-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 355. Incidentally it is clear that this statement leaves no room for the idea of an Absolute over and above 'the agent.'

² See *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 95-96.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 109. Italics his.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

stone of freedom for the idealist. Miss Bussey speaks of the limitations of the power of the self, 'from the temporal point of view.' Dr. Bosanquet of course admits the limitation of the self, in so far as it is a part of the whole. But the self is not comparable to a fragment in a mosaic, but rather to a member in a body, and is partaker in or exemplar of the law of the whole. Its limitation, granted once for all, is relative. "The area covered by the relativity," Dr. Bosanquet points out, "is really immense. . . . it is impossible on any definite principle to set a limit to the power of will. But it must be understood that it operates rationally and not magically, through transformation of circumstance," and that time, for its effective action, "is a condition of the first importance."¹

In estimating the power of the will, we must not only avoid preconceived notions as to its limitation in the finite self, but also as to what must be the nature of the solution at which it arrives. "The solution may not solve the problem *qua* physical. . . . The physical impossibility may be shelved by a new purpose . . . and . . . the higher solution, which transforms the will as well as the circumstances, may demand a sacrifice."² Especially the soul may recognize that it is not an absolutely separate unit, to be satisfied as such, but in very evident truth part of a larger and more significant whole. In the last analysis the soul is "a thread or fibre of the absolute life, or rather . . . a stream or tide within it of varying breadth, intensity, and separateness from the great flood within which it moves." In such 'self-recognition' we call the power of the will 'strength,' or 'courage,' and also realize most clearly how thought—'seeing things as they are'—is the necessary and unfailing accompaniment of effective will.

(3) Miss Bussey finds in Dr. Bosanquet a tendency to subordinate the moral standpoint to the standpoint of logic, a tendency which "undermines the ground for the assertion of freedom." Here again Miss Bussey does not attempt to give Dr. Bosanquet's point of view, either in regard to logic or morality. It will not do at this point to take the word 'logical' in its narrow or technical sense, and to contrast it with a more or less popular rendering of 'moral.' In the course of an elaborate study of logical process, best understood of course by reference to his analysis of the development of judgment and inference in his *Logic*, Dr. Bosanquet has arrived at a very broad and at the same time a very specific interpretation of this process. He speaks of "the inherent logic" of the living being, which is its "tendency to

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 118-119.

² *Ibid.*, p. 120.

form a system"¹ and shows us how self-transcendence is the way to the formation of such a system.² "The general form of self-sacrifice," he tells us, is "the fundamental logical structure of Reality."³ Such an interpretation of 'logic' relates it to our concrete ideas of morality.

When we turn to Dr. Bosanquet's definitions of the specifically 'moral' terms 'good' and 'evil,' we get more light on this particular point of our discussion. He differentiates 'good' from 'perfection,' which is "the harmony of all being." Good is "perfection in its character of satisfactoriness; that which is considered as the end of conations and the fruition of desires."⁴ Evil is the reverse of this, "the inclination to a satisfaction which is attended by dread or hostility against the threatening absorption in good."⁵ With these definitions in mind we are equipped to approach an understanding of what Dr. Bosanquet means by the *transcending* of moral distinctions, by the *inclusion* of morality under a larger term such as 'logic,' or even by its subordination to the whole. Dr. Bosanquet is extremely careful to avoid the sort of metaphysics which points to an inexpressible *Ding-an-sich*, or the false mysticism which ends in vagueness. He is determined to keep within the bounds of 'this world' and of our experience as normal conscious beings, even in his description of 'the Absolute.' And he thinks that he can safely point to the fairly universal experience of what it is to 'transcend morality.' "We feel," he says, "as we constantly admit, that our judgment of morality and of failure is not all there is to be said about a man. His value and his reality lie deeper than that."⁶ And again: "Our sense of wholeness is aware of something that does not precisely fit into such a *cadre* (*i. e.*, that of the specific conflict between good and evil). . . . The universe is the magnificent theatre of all the wealth of life, and good and evil are within it. This I think we are aware of when at our best."⁷ It is by means of such experiences that Dr. Bosanquet thinks we are able to understand something about 'the mystery of evil,' and in that sense to 'transcend morality.' But this does not mean that the fruits of morality are lost, or that our moral effort becomes illusory. If tension is necessary to accomplish the perfect act, how much greater

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 95.

² See *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 264 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 243. We note here a repudiation of the species of formal and rigid 'rationality' which Miss Bussey seems inclined to ascribe to Dr. Bosanquet's Absolute.

⁴ *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 194.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

⁶ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 17.

⁷ *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 311.

is the effort required to believe honestly that life is a noble enterprise, in spite of, nay even because of its tragic imperfections. The accomplished vision may be a mistaken one, but certainly it can have nothing to do with 'undermining the ground for the assertion of freedom.' Naïvely we assert our freedom because we feel our ability and power to be effective. Even from the pragmatic standpoint, nothing is more productive of moral effectiveness than a faith that the nature of the world is to be a perfect world.

We come at length to Miss Bussey's consideration of "the freedom of the Absolute." Under this heading she asserts (1) that "freedom can be applied to the Absolute only by a change of definition which removes the conception from the sphere of our comprehension." We have already noted that 'necessity' has strictly speaking no meaning as applied to the agent. The self is "operative in its own nature . . . originative according to its own law—the only law of creativeness which prevails in the universe."¹ By the same token 'freedom' applies to the agent only in its finite aspect, as part or member of the whole, and as meeting the thrusts and stresses of its environment and its own nature. The agent as creative according to its own law is obviously neither free nor determined. In so far then as it is possible to realize ourselves thus strictly as embodiments of 'law,' we are powerful, but not free, because not under the possibility of being prevented. In this sense we may say that we do 'change our definition of freedom' when we consider it as a characteristic of 'the Absolute.' Such a positive realization of power is indeed not inconceivable, but in some degree usual to our normal living, so long as we feel ourselves functioning naturally, either physically or spiritually. What Miss Bussey calls "the conception of absolute coherence," is the purely intellectual grasp of the possibility of an omniscient and therefore unimpeded will. Her declaration, however, that "the idea of absolute coherence . . . eludes our grasp" is reminiscent of Mr. Bradley's attacks on the 'discursive intellect.' It is true of course that "the human mind is selective," and so cannot grasp all the actual details of the system which is the whole. On the other hand, the human mind is set in "the form of totality" or unity, and continually on its pilgrimage rests in this form. So Dr. Bosanquet calls thought "in part intuitive, a unity asserted through diversity."² Thought knows "a standard of wholeness or self-containedness," and while "it is fully admitted that no absolutely self-contained experience is accessible to finite intel-

¹ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 354.

² *Ibid.*, p. 65.

ligences," nevertheless we are able to measure any specific degree of approximation to self-containedness by this standard.¹ Here again Dr. Bosanquet's appeal is to the normal experience. In developing his conception of the Absolute, however, he is not so much concerned with the notion of formal coherence as with another more concrete notion which now remains to be considered in the last section of this paper.

Miss Bussey saves until the end her specific attack upon what she calls "the fundamental difficulty inherent in the whole formulation of absolutism." What she named in her first paragraph a "rigid monism" appears finally in the full horror of its rigidity. She insists (2) that "if the Absolute is logically complete and hence free, it must exist apart from the temporal order; if it exists only through the finite, it is neither timeless nor complete, but temporal and changing." We have already quoted passages sufficient to prove how foreign to Dr. Bosanquet's thought is this notion of an Absolute *existing* apart from the temporal order. He is careful to distinguish between *logical* or *characteristic*, and *existential* perfection or completeness. He points out how great a blunder it is "to say that the existence of the finite world is an illusion" . . . since "it is just the finite world which does exist. Successive appearance in space and time is what existence means."² But "Reality . . . is not merely existence, though it includes the existing world, and without it would not be itself." He declares explicitly that his final assumption is of a "nature of reality."³ This nature consists in what may be called, in view of Dr. Bosanquet's definition of logic, the logical possibility of the universe, *what it is capable of becoming*.⁴ This nature is in the truest sense "the Absolute." Its formula, or law, already suggested by the quoted definitions of logic, Dr. Bosanquet states as follows: "The general formula of the Absolute . . . the transmutation and rearrangement of particular experience, and also of the contents of particular finite minds, by inclusion in a completer whole of experience." Miss Bussey says, "If as absolutism teaches, the whole is eternally complete, and the finite eternally one with the infinite, then the *nisus* to the whole, the process of self-transcendence, and all finite striving are but illusory." But the "process of self-transcendence" is the very essence of 'the Absolute.'

It is clear that process is the nerve of this 'formula,' which gives

¹ Cf. *Op. cit.*, p. 56.

² *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 15.

³ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 150, note 1.

⁴ Cf. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 98.

essential prominence to finite experience as such, and above all, for the purposes of his discussion, implies, secondarily, it is true, but nevertheless inevitably, the element of time. Surely there is nothing 'rigid' about this monism. In view of the examples which he is constantly using, and the general temper of his discussions, Dr. Bosanquet would be justified in pointing to a flower, or to an act of perfect grace and fitness, and in asking, "Are these then rigid?"

As for change in 'the Absolute,' or in the nature of reality, in a sense the nature of reality is continually subject to change, since it works itself out in ever-changing combinations of circumstances. But "as a whole," or in its fundamental responses, the nature of reality is stable, that is, it can be depended upon, in its spiritual as well as in its physical aspects, to exhibit certain fundamental tendencies of which the most outstanding in Dr. Bosanquet's view is the tendency to work towards a whole by means of self-transcendence. The proof of this doctrine, as of all of the doctrines of Dr. Bosanquet's metaphysics, lies in *experience*. Adequate refutation of his method and his conclusions must rest not merely upon the demonstration of possible inconsistencies within his own thinking, but also and finally on the evidence of experience itself.

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BEFORE attempting to meet very briefly Miss Crane's criticisms, I wish to acknowledge the justice of her emphasis on the richness and concreteness of Dr. Bosanquet's teaching, as contrasted with my abstract formulation of it. In endeavoring to define my points as sharply as possible, I undoubtedly omitted much that furnishes light on Dr. Bosanquet's position. This, however, seemed to me justifiable on the ground that his writings are so familiar to all that the background of his teaching would be ever before the reader's mind. While this abstractness may have made the difficulties which I had in mind appear unduly glaring, it did not, I believe, in any wise *create* difficulties not actually present in Dr. Bosanquet's system.

In the first place, the real point of the difficulty concerning the compatibility of temporal and finite freedom with the completeness of the absolute, is not met by Miss Crane's explanation. Of course it is true that there is order in the world as well as time; that there are such wholes as science, art, and institutions. Yet, inasmuch as these grow and change in a temporal sequence and are *never* complete, they do not show us how time can be included in a complete whole. Miss

Crane says that I speak "as if it were possible by the turn of a phrase" to get rid of what Dr. Bosanquet calls the eternal, yet, in examining Dr. Bosanquet's illustrations, I explicitly admitted the reality of a supra-temporal aspect of experience. While this supra-temporal aspect must be taken into consideration in any account of reality, it does not entitle us to go to the length of regarding the universe as an absolute logical whole. Again, the appeal to our experience of selfhood does not show how the aspect of succession can be included in a complete logical system. As Miss Crane says, Dr. Bosanquet himself maintains that the self as finite is never "all there," and that from the point of view of our finite consciousness, the future stands "for any experience which we do not already possess and must therefore acquire hereafter." Now may not the universe itself have a future in some such sense as this? Dr. Bosanquet, Miss Crane tells us, affirms that there is no proof that the future has "developmental power in itself." On the other hand, is there any proof of his assertion, that "the future is simply the promise of an opportunity to find that this nature does not change except in so far as it is expressed in change of circumstance?"

In regard to the question of contingency, Miss Crane accuses me of failing to read Dr. Bosanquet in the light of his avowed intention. Undoubtedly Dr. Bosanquet does intend to avoid contingency absolutely. To this end, he regards every *act* as absolutely necessary, maintaining, at the same time, that the *agent* is not thereby regarded as necessitated. This distinction between the necessary act and the necessary agent, to which Miss Crane rightly calls attention, should undoubtedly have been included in my discussion of the question of contingency. My omission of it was due to the fact that it did not seem to me to meet my difficulty. Whether or not the agent is said to be necessitated by anything external or anything past, the question still remains as to whether his nature at any moment is so definite and fixed that he necessarily is what he is, and so necessarily performs a given act. Now the very fact that Dr. Bosanquet emphasizes throughout the relation of the self to the larger whole, and the consequent power of the self to transcend its limitations, seems to preclude our ascribing to the self, even for a moment of time, a definite and fixed nature that condemns him to a limited view-point. As Miss Crane says, the secret of the self's power depends, for Dr. Bosanquet, on insight, on "seeing things as they are," on "putting central things in the center"; but if the self can actually attain power by this means, surely the stupid blunder and the unenlightened choice no longer appear as *necessary*, and thus the element of contingency creeps in.

I have space for only a brief word in regard to the relation of morality and logic. Here again it must be admitted that Miss Crane is justified in calling attention to my failure to make clear Dr. Bosanquet's conception of logic. The logic which he has in mind is indeed not merely that of discursive thinking, but rather that spirit of totality, whose "characteristic embodiments within finite life, are knowledge, love, and work or activity."¹ Yet it is questionable whether morality can be subordinated to logic even understood in this wide sense. The crux of the problem lies in the relation of man's struggle against evil to that totality or perfection in which evil is eternally transcended. Dr. Bosanquet, of course, maintains that only a recognition of eternal perfection can afford a ground for genuine moral struggle, and claims also that this eternal perfection is won not apart from moral struggle but through it. Yet this brings us back to the problem of the relation of time and the eternal. My point here was simply that when Dr. Bosanquet asserts the eternal perfection of the whole, he cannot really leave a place for the reality of evil and of finite endeavor. Thus he does injustice to the moral consciousness, and so undermines the ground for the assertion of freedom.

I have once more left until last what Miss Crane calls my "specific attack" on absolutism. This "specific attack," however, seemed to me but the carrying out of the problem underlying my whole paper, *i. e.*, the relation of the temporal experience of the finite self to the eternal experience of the Absolute. As Miss Crane observes, Dr. Bosanquet is careful to avoid any separation between the two. My whole problem, however, was whether it was possible for him to succeed in so doing. Here I must acknowledge Miss Crane's correction of my statement that the Absolute must exist apart from time. As it stands the statement is clearly self-contradictory, since existence implies time. Nevertheless, calling the Absolute real instead of existent, does not show how it as real can include within it the existent order of change and time. I, indeed, agree with Miss Crane's conclusion that the final test of Dr. Bosanquet's system lies not in the question of minor inconsistencies, but rather in its relation to experience. I would therefore gladly put my problem not in terms of the details of his teaching, but rather in the form of the general question, "can freedom as manifested in our temporal experience be regarded as an aspect of a complete and perfect whole?"

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¹ *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 61.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Studies in the History of Natural Theology. By CLEMENT C. J. WEBB. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915.—pp. vi, 363.

This volume contains the substance of the lectures delivered by the author on the Wilde Foundation in the University of Oxford during the academic years 1911-12 and 1912-13. There is a long Introduction elucidating the conception of natural theology, and this is followed by studies in the natural theology of Plato and of representative mediæval writers, to wit, Anselm, Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, Raymond of Sebonde and Lord Herbert of Cherbury. The inclusion of the last-named thinker, who belongs to the 17th century and serves as a connecting link between the mediæval and the modern, was suggested by Pfeiderer's *Philosophy of Religion*, which begins with Spinoza. Pfeiderer held that there was no true philosophy of religion before religion was recognized as an independent fact in Christianity and before philosophy was finally freed from the trammels of authority by Descartes, that, accordingly, it did not exist in antiquity or among the Fathers or the Schoolmen. Webb admits an element of truth in this contention, the truth, namely, that there is a difference in the problems and in the way they are approached, a difference due partly to the change from the objective to the subjective attitude, partly to the change in beliefs regarding the constitution of the physical world, the ancients, for example, believing in the divinity of the stars, a belief which, in our author's opinion, operated to prevent the development of a true monotheism in classical antiquity and infected as a *damnosa hæreditas* the speculative thought of the middle ages. But he shows that Pfeiderer's argument exaggerates the opposition and that there is no such break in the continuity of the historical movement as it assumes. His own work, therefore, supplements that of the German scholar by treating of those earlier phases of the discussion which the latter on principle sets aside. A good deal, of course, depends on what we are to understand by 'natural theology.' It may be noted incidentally that the word theology was associated with heathenism down to the time of Abelard. The now familiar distinction between natural and revealed truth seems to have been established by Thomas Aquinas. The first Christian writer to use the term 'natural theology' was Raymond of Sebonde, who in the

fifteenth century employed it as the title of a book which aimed to show that nature was a revelation containing everything essential to salvation, though leading directly to the revelation contained in the Bible and in the teachings of the Church. The book was placed on the Index in 1595. The original distinction is different. We owe it to Varro. Varro distinguishes three kinds of theology, mythical, natural (*physicon*) and civil. The first is used by poets, the last contains the doctrines and rites prescribed by the state; natural theology was the philosophical and, according to Varro, the only universal doctrine, being accommodated *ad mundum* as the others were accommodated respectively *ad theatrum* and *ad urbem*. The original antithesis, therefore, is not between 'natural' and 'revealed,' but rather between 'natural' and 'civil,' or political. Webb reverts to this conception of natural theology, but reads it in the light of the modern conception of religious experience. Pfeiderer held that ancient speculations about the gods had nothing to do with philosophy of religion, religion being fact of experience, but, as our author points out, consciousness of the divine, or what figures as such, is a part of experience and, as far as it goes, of religious experience. Natural theology, then, as he conceives it, has to do with the relation of the religious experience to ordinary sense-experience interpreted by the scientific categories. Its doctrine, therefore, must appeal to the common reason apart from any special relation to a particular community or a particular teacher. It does not follow, however, that it bears no relation to the historical conditions by which the religious experience is mediated. There is no principle which sharply divides natural theology and historical. On the contrary, as religious experience is always historically mediated, natural theology is justified in having regard to at least such historical facts and achievements as have universal significance. The bearing of this conception is illustrated, for example, by the approval given by our author to the procedure of St. Thomas in following Maimonides and parting company with Averroes in respect to those tenets of Averroism which conflicted with a recognition of a genuine religious significance in individuality.

Accepting this view of the subject, we might expect to find some such treatment of it for the ancient world as Caird has given to it in his work on the development of theology among the Greek philosophers. But instead of this, our author confines himself for that period to Plato, and to him, not as the exponent of such high speculation as was demanded of the guardians of the ideal state in the *Republic*, but as

the defender of the more general conceptions of popular religion in the tenth book of the *Laws*. Since Taylor Lewis published his once famous edition of that book under the title, *Plato against the Atheists*, a work with which our author seems not to be acquainted, this part of Plato's writing has been unduly neglected, and we are, therefore, grateful to Mr. Webb for again calling our attention to it. We are grateful, too, for a treatment of it up to the level of modern scholarship at once critical and sympathetic and related to problems of modern as well as permanent interest. Thus in discussing Plato's doctrine of an evil world-soul, he not only defends the doctrine as Plato's against Zeller's denial of its authenticity on the ground of its supposed conflict with the teaching of the *Politicus*, a conflict which he shows does not exist, but he also, rejecting Cumont's view of it as expressing the influence of an Oriental dualism, devotes several pages to the consideration of the value of a recognition of an evil soul or souls as the cause of disorder in nature. In Plato's repudiation of all cults not recognized by the State, he finds a *prima facie* argument for doubting Mr. A. E. Taylor's theory that the accusation of 'impiety' brought against Socrates was that philosopher's connection with Orphicism. In this connection he is led to a discussion of the relation of the doctrine of propitiatory sacrifice which Plato so earnestly condemns to the similar doctrine in the subsequent religion of Europe. These are good illustrations of the method followed throughout. The author does not aim to be exhaustive. He selects his thinkers, confines himself for the most part to the exposition of some one representative work in each case, and makes us feel, however remote the type of thinking may be from our own, that the problems discussed are, fundamentally, our problems too, or are at least not unrelated to them.

The selection of representative thinkers of the middle ages and the renaissance is well adapted to the author's purpose. Anselm, Abelard and Aquinas follow in the chronological order of the centuries, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth, and, together with the others, exhibit an instructive sequence of ideas. In the first two of these thinkers no sharp line is drawn between natural and revealed theology. Anselm, the most metaphysical and most religious of the Schoolmen, seeks an argument for the existence of God sufficient to convince even an unbeliever and, on this basis, would proceed to find a rational justification for all that had hitherto been taken on trust: *credo ut intelligam*. Abelard, says Mr. Webb, is more conscious of difficulties and sometimes gives the impression of a readiness to sacrifice what in

traditional theology is most intractable to such an attempt to rationalize it. This passage to rationalism, however, shows not a greater confidence in reason, but a less. Aquinas definitely decides that a certain part of the material presented by faith could not be discovered by man apart from a special divine revelation. This leads in Raymond of Sebonde to the exposition of natural theology for the first time under that name as a subject apart from revealed. We are thus prepared for the pure naturalism of Pomponazzi, for whom traditional theology lies entirely beyond the competency of reason and even conflicts with it, and whose recognition of a 'double truth' appears as a polite, but ironical, bow to authority. Finally, in Herbert of Cherbury we have the beginnings of 'deism' with its explicit concentration on natural theology to the neglect of any alleged revelation beyond that which is given in nature and the common experience. In dealing with these several thinkers Mr. Webb shows the critical tact and easy freedom that is acquired only by thorough and intimate acquaintance with the sources and a grace, fluency and elevation of diction that conserve the best Oxford traditions in this kind of philosophical exposition. The exposition itself is relieved at times by apposite anecdote, as at the beginning of the lecture on Anselm, where the story is told of the suggestion made in 1752 by the Minister of the King of Sardinia that (for a consideration) the saint's bones should be removed from Canterbury to his native Piedmont. "I have no great scruples on this Head," wrote the Archbishop to the Dean of his cathedral, "but if I had I would get rid of them all if the parting with the rotten Remains of a Rebel to his King, a slave to the Popedom and an enemy to the married Clergy (all this Anselm was) would purchase Ease and Indulgence to one living Protestant"; and he goes on to profess himself ready even to palm off on the simpletons any other old bishop under Anselm's name. The story is used to connect in an interesting way Anselm with Hume and Kant. For Archbishop Herring was one of two archbishops who wrote encouragingly to Hume amid the chorus of dispraise which followed the publication of the latter's *History of England*, and he would doubtless have been surprised to learn that, as Webb remarks, his Scottish correspondent and the despised predecessor, whose bones he was ready to barter for foreign gold, were probably the greatest metaphysicians that had arisen in Britain, and still more surprised to know that there was living at that very time in Königsberg a young aspirant to professorial honors destined to make an epoch in philosophy by an attack on the position the citadel of which was recognized as Anselm's ontological argument.

The book also contains new material, as, for example, the account from the manuscript of the dialogue between a Christian and a Philosopher written by Gilbert Crispin, one of Anselm's disciples. Some account of this dialogue had been given before in Armitage Robinson's monograph on Crispin, but that given here is fuller and it throws a flood of light on the intellectual atmosphere, the temper of philosophical and theological controversy, of the time. And even where the material is familiar, the author has the happy knack of setting it forth in new light. He is never dull; he entertains while he instructs.

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Democracy and Education. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. By JOHN DEWEY. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916.—pp. xii, 434.

Although this book appears in a text-book series, it is something more than a compilation or systematization of existing educational doctrines. In addition to the great reputation which the author possesses as a philosophical teacher and writer, he has been known for many years as one of the country's foremost thinkers on educational questions, and his books and articles on this subject have had a far-reaching influence. In the present volume, the connection of education with democracy, to which he had frequently referred in his previous writings, is emphasized and given the central place. "Since education is a social process, and there are many kinds of societies, a criterion for educational criticism and construction implies a *particular* social ideal" (p. 115). "Particularly is it true that a society which not only changes but which has the ideal of such change as will improve it, will have different standards and methods of education from one which aims simply at the perpetuation of its own customs" (p. 94). The following paragraph from the author's preface sets forth in the most succinct possible form the scope and purpose of the book:

"The following pages embody an endeavor to detect and state the ideas implied in a democratic society and to apply these ideas to the problem of the enterprise of education. The discussion includes an indication of the constructive aims and methods of public education as seen from this point of view, and a critical estimate of the theories of knowing and moral development which were formulated in earlier social conditions, but which still operate, in societies nominally democratic, to hamper the adequate realization of the democratic ideal.

As will appear from the book itself, the philosophy stated in this book connects the growth of democracy with the development of the experimental method in the sciences, evolutionary ideas in the biological sciences, and the industrial reorganization, and is concerned to point out the change in subject matter and method of education indicated by these developments."

The first division of the book (Chapters I-VI, pp. 1-93) discusses the nature of education in general terms, without reference to the form which its activities and purposes take when applied to the conditions of a democratic society. The position adopted is that which Professor Dewey has made familiar in his previous writings. Education is achieved by doing, and it is the business of those who direct education to provide such an environmental material or subject matter of education, as will both provide the instinctive activities their proper exercise and also organize them with reference to some end supplied by society. We read much in these chapters of stimuli and response; but one has always to remember that the environment which furnishes the stimuli is social as well as physical, and the experiences are educative in the true sense just in as far as the 'responses' are responses of intelligence and emotion as well as of muscular movement. "The social environment consists of all the activities of fellow beings that are bound up in the carrying on of the activities of any one of its members. . . . By doing his share in the associated activity, the individual appropriates the purpose which actuates it, becomes familiar with its methods and subject matters, acquires needed skill, and is saturated with its emotional spirit" (p. 26). This, in spite of the biological form of statement, does not seem when explained to differ materially from Plato's doctrine regarding the necessity of supplying the proper 'pasturage' for the soul. Professor Dewey would, however, probably say that it is intended to emphasize more the function of the environment in calling out and organizing the activities of the individual. Moreover, the necessity of supplying a natural environment instead of an artificial one, and thus avoiding the danger that the school shall come to occupy itself with symbols which have grown artificial and unmeaning because of their lack of connection with the concrete activities of the community, is something much more urgent in modern times than it was in the ancient world.

In the more detailed analysis and discussion of education which follows these opening chapters, a democratic society is assumed as the criterion and standard. "A democracy," as Professor Dewey says, "is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of asso-

ciated living, of conjoint communicated experience" (p. 101). "A society which makes provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic. Such a society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing disorder" (p. 115). It is of course impossible here to give anything like an adequate summary of the author's discussions and conclusions. The main guiding principles which he derives from the conception of a democratic society are the necessity of a genuine communication of experience, not only between the members of the same group, but between one group and another; and also that this communication of experience should be reciprocal, as between individual and individual, or group and group. In education this would obviously imply, amongst other things, that the aim of education cannot be imposed externally upon the pupils, by teachers or 'educational authorities,' that the pupil is at the same time a fellow-worker, and must be given an opportunity to contribute to the educative process which is going on in the group with which he is associated.

The democratic conception is in general opposed to setting up divisions and dualisms, and to the recognition of the superior or ultimate authority of one sphere or division and opposing another to it as something subordinate and 'lower.' In education these are found in such antitheses as 'social efficiency' and 'culture', 'interest and discipline,' 'method' and 'subject matter,' etc. These again are found to rest upon certain philosophical dualisms that are implied in the classical systems of philosophy, such as body and mind, the mind and the world, the individual and his relationships to others. Underlying all these assumptions, as most fundamental, there is the "isolation of mind from activity involving physical conditions, bodily organs, material appliances, and natural objects" (p. 377). It is this idea of 'mind' as something distinct from nature and society, something 'inner' or 'spiritual,' as opposed to what is natural and controls action, that Professor Dewey finds frequent occasion for criticising as obstructive to the democratic idea of education. As opposed to this assumption, his own philosophy, as he himself describes it, is based upon the following conceptions: "The biological continuity of human impulses and instincts with natural energies; the dependence of the growth of mind upon participation in conjoint activities having a common purpose; the influence of the physical

environment through the uses made of it in the social medium; the necessity of utilization of individual variations in desire and thinking for a progressively developing society; the essential unity of method and subject matter; the intrinsic continuity of ends and means; the recognition of mind as thinking which perceives and tests the meanings of behavior" (p. 377).

Text-books on any subject are apt to be dull, and those in education are frequently distinguished in this respect; but the author's mode of presenting educational issues so as to render them something more fundamental than mere pedagogy, his grasp of philosophical principles and his power of suggestive and penetrating criticism, render this volume a notable exception. It is no threshing over of old straw, but a vigorous discussion and criticism of educational ideas from a point of view whose implications have hitherto been recognized only in a partial and superficial way. The application of the author's principles leads, it would appear, to no serious innovations in one sense; that is, in his hands, at least, they are not made to support any attack upon this or that subject, or any radicalism that is completely subversive of traditional values in education. This may be illustrated by reference to his discussion of 'culture' and 'social efficiency' as aims. When these are properly interpreted there is no antagonism between them. "Ultimately social efficiency means neither more nor less than capacity to share in a give and take of experience. It covers all that makes one's own experience more worth while to others, and all that enables one to participate more richly in the worth-while experiences of others" (p. 141). "The aim of efficiency (like any educational aim) must be included within the process of experience. When it is measured by tangible external products, and not by the achieving of a distinctly valuable experience, it becomes materialistic" (p. 143). In the same way, interest and discipline are not opposed, but connected. Discipline, or the development of power, is the result of intelligently directed interests. "To organize education so that natural active tendencies shall be fully enlisted in doing something, while seeing to it that the doing requires observation, the acquisition of information, and the use of a constructive imagination, is what most needs to be done to improve social conditions" (p. 161). The same principles serve to show the invalidity of the opposition between intellectual and practical studies, between physical science and humanism. "Humanism means at bottom being imbued with an intelligent sense of human interests. . . . Knowledge *about* man, information as to his past, familiarity with his documented records

of literature, may be as technical a possession as the accumulation of physical details. Men may keep busy in a variety of ways, making money, acquiring facility in laboratory manipulation, or in amassing a store of facts about linguistic matters, or the chronology of literary productions. Unless such activity reacts to enlarge the imaginative vision of life, it is on a level with the busy work of children. . . ." On the other hand, "any study so pursued that it increases concern for the value of life, any study producing greater sensitiveness to social well-being and greater ability to promote that well-being is humane study" (pp. 336-7).

It is not necessary to accept as final Mr. Dewey's philosophical principles in order to sympathize largely with his criticism of the traditional dualisms and of the corresponding antagonisms in educational theory and practice. Pragmatism has no exclusive claim to be a philosophy of democracy, or a philosophy which is open-eyed to the results and methods of the sciences. I make this remark because writers of this school frequently convey the opposite assumption. The conclusions which I have quoted from Mr. Dewey's book, will, I think, commend themselves to readers who are unable to subscribe to the pragmatic formula as a philosophy. Nevertheless, in all such matters the emphasis and ultimate form of interpretation depend upon a philosophical view. Mr. Dewey deprecates the attempt to derive educational principles from a ready-made philosophy, and it would be quite unfair to suggest that this has been his own procedure. No one can complain that he recognizes only, 'external' facts or narrowly 'practical' values. Indeed, he frequently goes so far in insisting on ideal values as to make one feel that the old pragmatic categories such as 'stimulus' and 'response,' 'habit,' 'tension' and 'adjustment' are not longer applicable as descriptions of the situation. But in the end, whether consistently or inconsistently, these 'ideal' values are given a pragmatic interpretation. Whatever may be the position indicated by passages such as I have quoted, one finds, I think, that their force is materially modified when they are read in the total context of the chapter or section in which they occur. In the end the pragmatic theory seems to be the standard for the interpretation of the results, and the outcome of the volume as a whole rests upon the naturalistic categories of the individual and the democratic society which that theory assumes. The main question then is regarding the adequacy of the author's categories to describe a process whose significance is to improve the quality of experience. In estimating the validity of this philosophy of education, one must

not base one's judgment wholly upon the truth and suggestiveness of many of its statements, or upon the timeliness and vigor of its criticisms. One is, as I have said, likely to find oneself agreeing with so much that the book contains and admiring so greatly its sanity and breadth of view as to take its general principles for granted. But, after all, before subscribing to its conclusions unqualifiedly, one is bound to raise the question whether a naturalistic activity is capable of furnishing any principle of organization for experience or affording any basis for the reconciliation of its conflicting interests. Do we get any genuine spiritual principle so long as the mental is regarded as simply *correlative* with the physical, and not as a universal which expresses itself not only in the function of coöperating actively with what lies beyond itself, but also as the capacity of returning to itself and finding itself at home in the realm of meaning? If this conception can be maintained, as I think it can, by an examination of what is most typically human in experience, the process of education in a democratic society takes on a new meaning and suggests a different interpretation from that of the volume before us. This position, however, does not involve the return to dualism, or to an abstract view of mind as something isolated from the body, or the setting up of superior classes within the state. One can welcome the author's criticism here. But Professor Dewey himself, in his admirable analysis of the relations involved in the organized mode of life called democracy, exhibits, it seems to me, the necessity of going beyond the naturalistic view of mind, and recognizing that progress and education consist in the progressive attainment, conservation and employment of universal meanings. This is the home and medium of intelligence. One can no more construe mind exclusively in terms of activity and reorganization than in terms of appreciation and contemplation, nor are the latter to be regarded as merely means to the former. In criticizing the static view of experience, we have come to emphasize too exclusively its prospective and futuristic character, as if it were a natural activity that had value only as a means. In this way we fail to realize that intelligence also involves contemplation, or living consciously in the realm of the universal. Is it not true that for the improvement of the quality of experience the contemplative factor requires to be recognized and nourished, not as a mere guide to activity, but as something which is in itself an essential moment of mind? Intelligence exists and develops only as it progressively comes to itself, learns to understand its own procedure, to conserve and appreciate, not less than to apply, its results, to comprehend and take possession of its own kingdom. Of

course this activity is not something that can go on fruitfully without commerce with what lies beyond the individual mind, without the wisdom that comes through practical activity and the give and take of the social process. But, after all, is it not necessary to emphasize today the need of contemplation, of enriching our minds by the insight of the past? Does not the member of a democratic society still need to develop within himself a centre to which he may always return, as it were to his home? The experience of the race proves the need and value of contemplation, and it is surely a shallow view which dismisses it as a world of idle dreams. Nor can we separate it from intelligence as constituting merely an emotional or æsthetic form of experience. There is something truncated, something high and dry that is not wholly human, in the view of intelligence which is based on the reflex-arc concept. The description of intelligence exclusively in terms of 'planning,' 'reorganizing,' 'reconstituting,' 'purposive' activity' may be necessary in order to bring it under a naturalistic category, but it is surely a caricature even of the imperfect life of reason that ordinary individuals realize. None of these terms is rich enough or sufficiently inclusive to express the nature of a principle that is genuinely spiritual. And by calling intelligence, as it manifests itself in man and in society, a 'spiritual' principle, I mean that this life consists just in at once maintaining and transcending oppositions, in being all that nature is and going beyond it, in developing itself through the use of external means and yet making the 'outer' a true 'inner.' These are the facts of the thinking experience. Unless they be straitened and truncated, limited to examples of building bridges and finding one's way, etc., they overflow the pragmatic formulas.

It seems a pity to bring the old issue of Pragmatism into the discussion of such a fresh piece of work as this volume contains. But if the reviewer has not succeeded in avoiding this issue, he can plead that in this respect he has only followed the author's example. Quite apart from this subject of controversy, however, the reader cannot fail to be impressed with the author's thoroughness and sincerity of treatment. The most important and original contribution of the book seems to me to consist in the discussion of the implications of Democracy in the process of Education.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Vorgedanken zur Weltanschauung. (Niedergeschrieben im Jahre 1901.) Von W. STERN. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1915.—pp. vi, 74.

This essay was written fifteen years ago as a sort of program for the author's thinking and laid away because he hesitated to set forth an ideal to which he could, as yet, contribute little or no fulfillment. In 1906, however, he published the first volume of his *Person und Sache*, and since that date he has prepared the second volume, which is to appear shortly. The personal grounds for withholding the essay have therefore disappeared. Moreover, in the fifteen years of the new century which have elapsed, he believes that he perceives a reawakening of interest in a systematic and unified view of the world. Hence he had already determined to publish the essay when the War began in the summer of 1914. This event, which again postponed publication for a time, is destined, he believes, to be the occasion, at least in Germany, of a period of constructive philosophical thought. Hence he issues this work of his youth, practically without change, with a dedication to the German youth "die im Waffenkampf der Geistesnahrung nicht entbehren wollen und die später im Geisteskampf um die Weltanschauung ihre gestählten Kräfte üben mögen."

The essay is divided into two parts, the first describing the nature of philosophy (*Weltanschauung*), the second estimating the attitude of the present time (the turn of the century) toward it. Philosophy, like religion and metaphysics, is an explanation of the world, but it is both broader and narrower than these, broader because there are unphilosophical explanations of the world, narrower because religion includes worship and metaphysics theory of knowledge. It has an objective aspect, since the 'world' includes both objects and values, and a subjective aspect, since the individual must perceive and comprehend these. On the theoretical side philosophy is a system of concepts, on the practical side a system of values. The ultimate problem is to combine both in a unified view. Such a system must be many-sided and harmonious, productive both in thought and action, "a creative work of art, a spiritual religion, an ethical view of life, yet at the same time, as a frame for these, a thoroughgoing logical system, a critical attitude of the inquiring mind toward all accessible things and values." On its subjective side philosophy is a personal creation like a work of art, but it is not purely a work of the individual, for it seeks to be both the formula and the watch-word of an epoch's culture.

The culture which culminated in the '80's of the last century is distinguished by its lack of a philosophy in this sense. Science was dominated by the lust for unrelated facts and by excessive specialization. Philosophical systems,

like those of Spencer and Haeckel, were built upon three or four very abstract principles, none of which was original to the period itself. The 'Back to Kant' movement issued largely in philological criticism; theory of knowledge, in the hands of various types of positivists, was anti-metaphysical; and the most fruitful writers spent themselves upon the history of philosophy or upon special inquiries in aesthetics, psychology, and ethics. Religion, more perhaps than ever before in history, was regarded with indifference, and in art the ideal of 'Art for art's sake' showed a morbid isolation from realities. Unified practical ideals were almost equally lacking. Individual freedom came to mean lack of restraint with no positive ideal of self-realization. Plans for social betterment went little beyond improvement of sanitation. The amassing of capital and the increase of technical efficiency serve only to illustrate the spiritual poverty of a period that could regard them as ideals. It was a period in which ends were dominated by means; persons were the slaves of things.

The inevitable consequences were pessimism and decadence, the spiritual nausea with which the age contemplated its own deformity. But many signs indicate that this period is past. In art particularly, the freest of all intellectual activities, realism, by exhibiting the ugliness of an age without ideals, has contributed to its downfall, and realism itself seems likely to be displaced by an art with more positive ideals. In philosophy, also, one can perceive a renewed interest in classical German idealism and tentative efforts toward more systematic studies. As yet these efforts have produced compromises rather than solutions but they mark a beginning. They inspire the hope that the alternative between person and thing, between causality by the aggregation of elements and creative synthesis, is to be boldly faced.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

An Introduction to Ethics. For Training Colleges. By G. A. JOHNSTON, Lecturer in Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, and Lecturer in Ethics in the Glasgow Training College. London, Macmillan & Co., 1915. —pp. x, 254.

This book is a short, popular summary of the main points in ethics, approached first from the psychological standpoint, and later as problems in systematic ethics. Part I, entitled, "The Groundwork of Character," outlines and illustrates the psychological laws operative in the development of the moral life, discussing specifically the influence of heredity, physical and social environment, instincts, emotions, sentiments, the self, the will, and conscience. Part II, "The Realization of Character in Vocation," discusses moral criteria and standards, motives and sanctions of conduct, the places of duty and pleasure in the moral life, the virtues, and moral institutions. The material for the book has been drawn from a variety of sources. Among contemporary writers the influence of Dewey, Tufts, McDougall, Hobhouse, Westermarck, Baldwin, Rashdall, G. E. Moore, Royce, Muirhead, James,

Seth and John Watson is noticeable; while among the classical writers Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, J. S. Mill, Spencer, and Green perhaps have contributed most.

The author, however, is no mere eclectic. He has assimilated this material and presents a systematic and coherent ethics of his own. An idealistic metaphysics is implied; but this is kept in the background, and probably would not be observed by the beginner. Clarity and consistency is accordingly gained by reason of the fact that the author knows the philosophical implications of all that he says, while the beginner is not confused by subtleties for which he is unprepared. While the author states that the book is primarily designed for training colleges for teachers, and while he is careful to make clear by illustration and comment the application of ethics to teaching, and while the subject of moral education is touched upon, the work is by no means a mere pedagogical handbook, but a well written and scholarly introduction to ethics that ought to be equally valuable for college undergraduates and general readers. For a statement that is extremely elementary, the undersigned, though he does not agree with the author in every detail, believes this to be the best new text in ethics that he has seen for some years.

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An Introduction to General Psychology. By ROBERT MORRIS OGDEN. New York, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1914.—pp. xviii, 270.

Professor Ogden's plan in writing this book has been to avoid discussion of the nervous system and the structure of sense organs, and to devote a comparatively brief space to the discussion of sensation and of experimental results, in order to have more room for the treatment of topics which seem to him to possess broader significance and closer relation to other subjects than psychology. His book is further characterized by the adoption of the point of view of the Würzburg School on imageless thought. In addition to sensations, images, and affections as conscious elements, thoughts, classified as notions and relations, are recognized. Directing tendencies are not merely posited as psychological factors, but play a part in the author's philosophical position, which is interactionism. The purposive activity of mind, he maintains, acts directly upon matter. There is a Cartesian reminiscence in the following statements. "The problem of mind as interacting with a body of energy does not necessarily mean a loss or gain in this finite quantity, since we need only assume for mind a peculiar capacity to *direct* energies toward definite ends" (page 212).

No doubt there are not a few teachers of psychology whose needs will be met by a textbook written from this point of view. The reviewer must confess that she is not among their number. Although a modern textbook should indeed make some reference to the problems of imageless thought and determining tendencies, it is doubtful whether these problems are yet sufficiently worked out to be given the position which Professor Ogden's discussion accords

them. The effect of so emphasizing them is unfortunate in two ways: it makes the book hard reading for a beginner, a defect which is increased by the almost total lack of examples and illustrations; and it compels the author to close a very large number of his paragraphs with a statement to the effect that further investigation is needed before a decision can be reached on the point discussed. It would seem to the reviewer better to acquaint the beginning student in psychology with what has already been experimentally demonstrated about mental processes, and with the methods by which these results have been obtained, than, in seeking breadth of reference, to present topics so difficult and so disputed.

MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN.

VASSAR COLLEGE.

Character and Temperament. By JOSEPH JASTROW. New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1915.—pp. xviii, 596.

Professor Jastrow's book will appeal rather to the layman than to the psychologist. The latter is constantly disappointed in his hope of finding essentially new contributions to the topics discussed under the various headings. Moreover, he will miss a good deal of material that surely should have been included; such data as those collected, for example, by Ach and Meumann. The book cannot fail to make upon the psychological reader the impression of being somewhat out of date.

After an introductory chapter dealing with "The Scientific Approach," there is a discussion of the 'sensibilities,' of sources of pleasantness and unpleasantness, followed by a chapter on the emotions, one on "The Higher Stages of Social Control," attained through socialization and intellectualization; and one on temperamental differences. The familiar quartet of temperaments appears in the following guise: "(a) the *sensitive-active* type, embodying an inclination to dwell lightly upon feeling and consideration, and under slight incentive to pass promptly to vigorous action:—(b) the *SENSITIVE-active* type,—embodying an inclination to linger in the receptive, discriminating, pondering stages of preparation, coupled with a hesitant, feeble, or involved expression:—(c) the *SENSITIVE-ACTIVE* type, embodying an inclination to an energetic, presumably a limited, responsiveness, on the basis of a vigorous susceptibility to such factors of consideration and emotionalized motive as enter the mental sphere:—(d) the *sensitive-active* type, embodying an inclination toward a feeble susceptibility of impression and a weak expression." As a cross principle the author suggests that sub-types may be formed according to the relative influence of emotional promptings and intellectual insight.

A concise and clear study of the neurasthenic and hysterical tendencies is presented in the chapter on "Abnormal Tendencies of Mind." That on "The Psychology of Group Traits" dwells largely on the psychology of sex differences. The impression of a voice from the past recurs when one reads on page 383 of "the budding girl, the debutante," who in contrast to the masculine youth, "yields more largely to the restraints and shelters of convention."

One may conjecture that co-education tends to exaggerate such contrasts as this, and that Professor Jastrow is less familiar than is the teacher in a woman's college with the girl radical and knight errant.

The final chapters deal with "Character and Environment," and with "The Qualities of Men." This last is the most unsatisfactory chapter in the book, and displays in exaggerated form the faults of the author's style. It is a style which in itself presents a very interesting problem in individual psychology. The sentences are smoothly flowing and well constructed; the vocabulary is rich, and yet one may read pages at a time without grasping the thought, so oddly do the words conceal rather than carry ideas.

MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN.

VASSAR COLLEGE.

A First Book in Psychology. By MARY WHITON CALKINS. Fourth Revised Edition. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914.—pp. xxi, 428.

Professor Calkins herself says that the most important change in this fourth edition of her elementary textbook is "the use of the term 'consciousness' as synonym for 'personal attitude,' or 'the self's relatedness to its objects.' From this follows," she continues on page xii, "the conception of the sensational, affective, and relational 'elements' (the so-called 'structural elements' of consciousness) as constituents of all forms of the relatedness of self to its objects. This allows the abandonment of my earlier view (a survival, in my thinking, of 'idea-psychology') that these elements are discovered only by an analysis of consciousness which leaves the self out of account. . . . If I were writing this book *de novo* I should throughout refer to the sensational, affective, and relational elements in such a way as to emphasize the fact that they are found through analysis of consciousness conceived as relation of self to object. Thus, I should use the expressions 'seeing colors,' 'hearing tone qualities,' 'liking,' 'distinguishing,' along with, or even in place of, the parallel expressions, 'visual and auditory qualities,' 'affective element of pleasantness,' 'relational element of difference.'"

The value of the book as a textbook has evidently been proved. The reviewer's attention is therefore naturally directed to the general topic of Professor Calkins's "self-psychology," and to the modifications, above described, in her own account of it. The limits of a brief review will not allow, however, an adequate discussion of the author's general psychological position, and a few comments only can be made. I am still, so far as my personal needs as a student and teacher of psychology are concerned, unconverted to self-psychology. My main objections to it are two: first, it does not connect itself readily with physiology, and second, it is based on statements which appeal to introspection and which my own introspection does not in the least confirm. The statement that "consciousness does not occur impersonally" does not convince me with anything like the force of evidence from experience that would attend the statement "consciousness does not occur apart from a body." Nor is it self-evident to my introspection that "I am always, attentively or

inattentively, conscious of the private, personal object, myself," although much may be claimed under cover of the word 'inattentively'; nor that "there is only one of me": when I do occasionally become aware of myself I have some reason to think there are a good many of me. There is evidently something radically different between my type of introspection and that of Professor Calkins.

Nevertheless I can appreciate the fact that those parts of human experience which, like the social and moral sentiments for example, do involve the self-experience, may be simply and clearly treated in terms of self-reactions, and that psychological sociology might well be written in such terms. But it does not seem to me that even with the changes made in the fourth edition of the present book, Professor Calkins has reached consistency. Why should one ever, in a self-psychology, refer to physiological conditions? Is it, for instance, in accord with self-psychology to distinguish assimilation from fusion (pages 64-65) by the fact that the former includes a consciousness that is 'cerebrally excited'? (And by the way, it is surely too dogmatic to say (pages 138-139) of relational elements: "They have no special physical stimuli, and they are physiologically conditioned not by any end-organ excitation but by brain change only—either by the excitation of the so-called association centers, or by the excitation of transverse fibers, or in both ways.") Again, there seems no clear separation between function and content in self-psychology, as thus far expounded by Professor Calkins. One would expect that a psychology whose foundation concept is the activity of the self would construct the first floor, so to speak, out of different types of self-activity: but while the difference between perception and imagination is discussed by Professor Calkins to a considerable extent in terms of such activity differences she is very soon under the necessity of bringing in differences of content; and it is not clear to my mind just what place content has in a self-psychology. Seeing may be a different self-activity from hearing, though I am by no means clear why it should be, but is seeing blue a different self-activity from seeing red? Again, should there not be a discussion of the varying degrees in which self-consciousness is present in different experiences? What, from the self-psychologist's point of view, is the difference between the following experiences: *myself* as discriminating red from green; *myself* as *discriminating* red from green; *myself* as discriminating *red* from *green*? These are only a few of the difficulties which the exponent of self-psychology still has to clear away in the mind of a peculiarly recalcitrant reader.

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The following books also have been received:

The Human Worth of Rigorous Thinking. By CASSIUS J. KEYSER. New York, Columbia University Press, 1916.—pp. 314.

War and the Ideal of Peace. By HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL. New York, Duffield and Company, 1915.—pp. 234. \$1.25 net.

- Bergson and Religion.* By LUCIUS HOPKINS MILLER. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1916.—pp. ix, 286. \$1.50 net.
- The Philosophy of Bergson.* By GUSTAVUS WATTS CUNNINGHAM. New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1916.—pp. xii, 212. \$1.25 net.
- Man, an Adaptive Mechanism.* By GEORGE W. CRILE. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916.—pp. xvi, 387. \$2.50.
- Democracy and Education.* By JOHN DEWEY. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916.—pp. xii, 434.
- The Next Step in Democracy.* By R. W. SELLARS. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916.—pp. 275. \$1.50.
- Christianopolis.* By JOHANN VALENTIN ANDREAE. Translated by Felix Emil Held. New York, Oxford University Press, 1916.—pp. x, 287.
- Marcus Aurelius Antoninus the Emperor to Himself.* Text, and Translation by C. R. HAINES. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1916.—pp. xxxi, 414.
- Rosmini's Contributions to Ethical Philosophy.* By JOHN FAVATO BRUNO. New York, The Science Press, 1916.—pp. iii, 53. \$.75.
- Movement and Mental Imagery.* By MARGARET F. WASHBURN. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916.—pp. xv, 243. \$1.75 net.
- Paradoxical Pain.* By ROBERT MAXWELL HARBIN. Boston, Sherman, French & Company, 1916.—pp. xxi, 212. \$1.25.
- Critical Realism.* By ROY WOOD SELLARS. Chicago, Rand McNally & Company, 1916.—pp. x, 283.
- Fundamental Conceptions of Modern Mathematics.* By R. P. RICHARDSON and E. H. LANDIS. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company, 1916.—pp. xv, 198. \$1.25 net.
- Numbers, Variables and Mr. Russell's Philosophy.* By R. P. RICHARDSON and E. H. LANDIS. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company, 1915.—pp. 57.
- Essays in Experimental Logic.* By JOHN DEWEY. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1916.—pp. vii, 444. \$1.75 net.
- The Relation of Inference to Fact in Mill's Logic.* By J. FORSYTH CRAWFORD. Philosophic Studies, Number 5. Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1916.—pp. 50. \$.50 net.
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- Morphology and Anthropology.* By W. L. H. DUCKWORTH. Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1915. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons. Vol. I, pp. xiv, 304. \$3.00.
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- The Super-State and the 'Eternal Values.'* By J. MARK BALDWIN. London, Oxford University Press, 1916.—pp. 38. 1s. 6d. net.
- Religion and Science.* By JOHN THEODORE MERZ. Edinburgh, William Blackwood and Sons, 1915.—pp. x, 192. 5 shillings net.
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- Psychologie de l'Enfant.* Cinquième édition, revue et augmentée. Par ED. CLAPARÈDE. Genève, Libraire Kundig, 1916.—pp. xi, 571.
- Zur Psychologie der Vorstellungstypen.* Von RICHARD BAERWALD. Leipzig, Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1916.—pp. x, 444. Marks 14.
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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mët.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Nto-Sc.* = *Revue Nto-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.*: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

L'idéal quietiste. TH. RIBOT. *Rev. Ph.*, XL, 11, pp. 440-454.

The author proposes to study the psychology of quietism, as an abnormal or pathological state in which there is a persistent tendency toward the dissolution of the personality. All our inherent needs are summed up in the instinct of conservation, which is not an entity, but a group of tendencies. This tendency is very fundamental: why is it that some seek self-annihilation? The stages of the tendency to self-annihilation are: (1) renunciation of the world and of social and family life through the monastic life; (2) the solitary life of the hermit; (3) the condemnation of the physiological self (although this is not entirely essential to quietism); (4) the repudiation of the moral life. Quietism is not mysticism; the latter seeks a direct intuition of the eternal, the former seeks self-annihilation. Quietism is best expressed in the saying, attributed to Molinos: "*Il vaut mieux être assis, que debout, couché, que assis, endormi, que couché, mort, que endormi.*" It is denial of the will to live. It is an anomaly, a morbid pathological state. Depersonalization is very similar to quietism, and is a well-known state in which the subject lives as in a dream and in which external reality seems to have no hold on him. The causes of quietism are complex, but we may distinguish four: (1) Lack of either production or distribution of energy. But this cause is too general to explain quietism in particular. (2) A striving for the impersonal, the infinite, eternal, and absolute. Science can say nothing of the truth of the mystic's vision. There must be an intellectual element in quietism, an idea, which may be either religious or metaphysical, or even cosmological, as when astronomy makes us feel our nothingness. There must be an affective element also, which consists of a striving for motionless repose. (3) Weakness of the tendency for self-preservation. (4) Climatic and geographical conditions are significant as secondary causes. Thus the heat and blazing sun of India are contributing

factors in Hindu mysticism. Biologically, repose is a state of reparation, but the quietist exaggerates it into an ideal of life. From the purely psychological point of view, quietism is a morbid pathological state, which contradicts our fundamental tendency to self-preservation.

W. CURTIS SWABEY.

Zur Psychologie der Metaphysik. ARTHUR LIEBERT, *Kant-Studien*, XXI, 1, pp. 42-54.

In attempting a scientific understanding of metaphysics two methods are available, the critical-systematic, which the author has used in another place (*Vorträge der Kantgesellschaft*, 10), and the psychological evolutionary, which deals not with the internal order of metaphysical systems, but with the subjective motivation of the metaphysical experience. A definition of metaphysics, however, must precede a study of its concrete structure. Metaphysics may be defined very generally as the attempt to reach a thinkable concept of the Absolute, and to refer to and derive from this Absolute all appearances. The psychology of metaphysics should be conceived, not from the standpoint of natural science, but as a constructive doctrine of human soul-life in different settings. Very much work remains to be done, especially by way of investigating the personal observations of artists, mystics, and religionists on the particular circumstances in which they happened to find themselves. Metaphysics is a matter of feeling and will as well as of intellect. Its final purpose is to symbolize life. Life and metaphysics work reciprocally on each other. In order to understand the metaphysical constructions of great men we must understand their feeling about life and the world. Metaphysics taken from the side of psychology represents a single inclusive value hypothesis. The normative concepts and judgments arising from this fundamental hypothesis partake of the peculiar value content of the particular mind which creates them. Its fineness or crudity, its energy and its weakness are clearly displayed in them. But both the psychological investigation of metaphysics and the experience itself rest on an objective standard of valuation, —i. e., the concept of the Absolute, which gives to the experience its form and its law. It is an infinitely broad and characteristically indefinite experience, because of the problematical nature of the hypothesis. The innumerable longings, bright fictions and phantoms, intuitions mingled with rationally grounded insights which arise with the effort to grasp the Absolute are but witnesses to that tragic irrationality which mars our relation to the infinite and at the same time gives depth and value to the metaphysical experience.

MARION D. CRANE.

L'Intellectualisme de Malebranche. E. BOUTROUX. *Rev. de Mét.*, XXIII, 1, pp. 27-36.

The philosophy of Malebranche is thoroughly intellectualistic. Malebranche does not distinguish between essence and existence or reserve intelligibility for the former. He would not admit that any part of being remains

outside the realm of intelligence. Rather he holds that, although many things which we consider realities, such as the existence of the material world, the relation of thought and extension, the freedom of the will, moral and religious truths, cannot be reduced to mathematical certitude, they are nevertheless intelligible; for reason has different degrees, and realities that from the point of view of the mathematical understanding are undemonstrable, conform themselves perfectly to a higher intelligence. Religion itself is, according to him, the most perfect evidence of rationality for an infinitely perfect reason. In short, the mathematical is not the only intelligence; reason has other modes of thinking and understanding analogous, but superior to, that of mathematical demonstration.

GERTRUDE Q. BAKER.

L'objectivisme psychologique et la doctrine dualiste. H. PIÉRON. Rev. Phil., XLI, 1, 61-72.

The difference between physics and psychology is not that the former deals with phenomena from an objective point of view and the latter with the same phenomena from a subjective point of view. On the one hand, psychology, as the natural biological science of the behavior of living beings, has the same objective aim as physics, and attains the same degree of objectivity in its results as other branches of biology. Its method too, so far as 'experimental,' is as objective as that of any other science, and 'introspection' also, under certain conditions, yields objective results. On the other hand, since the mind, being unable to get outside of itself, knows only what takes place within itself, all known phenomena, whether of psychology or physics, are in a sense subjective. The real dualism in phenomena is not that which opposes physics and psychology, or matter and mind, but that between the subjective, in the sense of the particular, individual, concrete, complex, intimate, fugitive, unique, inexpressible real, and the objective, in the sense of the general, universal, abstractly simplified, communicable ideal, which exists *sub specie aeterni*, and can be schematized, fixed, or expressed in language, notation, equation, diagram or formula. This is the dualism of mysticism and intellectualism, or of art and science. Its basis is to be found in the memory. When the memory finds itself no longer able to retain in all their complexity and concrete detail its constantly increasing accumulations of particular, unique facts, certain general relations are abstracted, simplified, schematized, fixed in verbal or mathematical expression, and substituted for the real. This process of schematization is the beginning of science, whose purpose is the practical one of summing up the experience of the individual and the race in such a way that it can be more easily assimilated, retained, recalled, utilized, and taught to others. Because of this dualism, and because phenomena group themselves into a number of irreducible classes, there is no true unity of phenomena. Nevertheless, phenomena may be said to exhibit an unbroken continuity in that they can all be arranged in a hierarchy, ranging from the most subjective and unique to the most abstract and universal, according to the degree to which they are amenable to the scientific process of schematization or objectification.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

Phänomenologie, Psychologie, Erkenntnistheorie. THEODOR ELSENHANS. Kant-Studien, XX, 2-3, pp. 223-275.

The phenomenology presented by Edmund Husserl and others in the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, has a peculiar bearing upon contemporary psychology. Phenomenology has distinguished itself from psychology by having a special terminology of its own. There are important differences in matter, as well as form, between the two. Descriptive psychology has to do with the facts of experience as individual and related to a subject, but Phenomenology has to do with essences, in their universal character. Phenomenology is the science of essences (*Wesenswissenschaft*). Although these essences are apprehended as universals rather than particular facts, they are never-the-less apprehended directly, and formulated by a descriptive method. Phenomenology might be characterized as a descriptive science of the essences of pure experience. While the existence of these essences may be confirmed by reflection, they are given in a direct intuition (*Wesenserschauung*). This mode of intuition is distinguished from historical forms in being descriptive, and in having as its object a pure given (*reinen Gegebenheiten*). Phenomenology may be defined by comparing it with mathematics. Geometry, especially, has as its object, not the individual experience as such, but the universal element which is given in the experience. Phenomenology also disregards the merely individual, and seeks after the essences. The pure essence is there, we have only to see and report it. But while Phenomenology is descriptive, it must not be confused with descriptive psychology as usually understood. It might be identified with an improved psychology. Certainly phenomenology cannot separate itself entirely from empirical psychology, unless it is to become a Platonic metaphysics. Husserl's unfavorable comments on psychology have been upheld by psychologists of the school of Lipps, whose life work has been in the direction indicated by the phenomenological criticism. In the field of epistemology, Phenomenology also has important bearings, although it differentiates itself from theory of knowledge. Immediate intuition is said to be the source of truth, while mediated knowledge springs from and returns to intuition. There are two characteristic features in connection with this doctrine of truth: 'immediate evidence,' and 'freedom from presuppositions.' Immediate evidence suffers from the defect of being merely individual, so that judgment or assertion based upon it can be controverted upon the basis of another individual's immediate evidence. This difficulty largely vanishes, however, when we reinterpret such expressions as 'immediate evidence' in the light of the attitude of Phenomenology towards psychology. Psychology, as a philosophical working-over of a special field of fact, depends upon psychology, and is secondary to it. Husserl approaches closely to the position of Descartes, in making the solution of all doubt depend upon an immediate certainty. Biological concepts play a considerable part in the interpretation of the relation of man to the world, and these underlie the 'empirico-critical principle of coordination,'—self-and-environment. The fundamental standpoint of Phenomenology is similar to that of Kant. For

Kant there is something given to thought: the raw material of sensation. Experience as an *Urtatsache* is the point of departure for the Kantian epistemology. Similarly, Phenomenology begins with a pure given which might be called pre-scientific, or pre-epistemological. The stand-point involves a kind of realism, which might be called naïve, or better, practical realism.

D. T. HOWARD.

A Study of Purpose. HOWARD C. WARREN. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XIII, 1, pp. 5-26; 2, pp. 29-49; 3, pp. 57-73.

Despite vigorous controversy between mechanists and vitalists, an adequate account of the *nature* of purpose has not yet been given, and empirical science of to-day needs greatly a thorough analysis of this concept. Genetically, the notion of purpose arose from a definite type of human experience; it seems fitting to begin a study of purpose with an analysis of the purposive *consciousness*. Closely related is the biological problem—to account, if possible, for the phylogenetic and ontogenetic rise of anticipatory reactions, and to determine their scientific significance. Science also has to face the further problem of the trend of cosmic and terrestrial evolution.

I. *The Purposive Consciousness*.—The peculiarity of the purposive experience is that the representation of the situation *precedes* the presentation. An examination shows five factors, some of which enter into all purposive experiences, while others occur only in special cases. (1) The fundamental factor in every such experience is *forethought*—an idea of some future situation. (2) *Assent* distinguishes a purposive series from a sequence in which the idea is fortuitously fulfilled; this factor consists of kinesthetic and organic data. (3) In vivid and complex fore-thoughts, involving deliberation, a dynamic experience—the *potency-feeling*, based upon the kinesthetic sensations—accompanies the assent, but does not guarantee actual fulfilment of the purpose. (4) The *self-factor* is always present; the explicit self-factor is based upon kinesthetic data. (5) The *sense of fitness or of unfitness* involves a correspondence or disparity between forethought and realization; this is both a judgment and a feeling.

II. *Purposive Activity in Organisms*.—In biology the concept of purpose is founded upon a certain inversion of the usual temporal order of events—an inversion whose cause science has to investigate. In purposive activity, the fundamental factor, corresponding to forethought in the purposive consciousness, is preparation, or anticipation of a future situation. All the vital functions are anticipatory; the evolution of new species shows an anticipatory character. Two types of organic mechanism in animals serve especially to bring about anticipatory movements—the reflex mechanisms of the distant-receptors and the central coördinating system, both physico-chemical structures. The real crux of anticipatory activity seems to lie in the growth processes, but the explanation of these as physico-chemical processes seems sufficient. Certain structures and functions promote life; natural selection establishes modes of behavior and lines of growth which possess a life value. The second

factor, *fitness*, is a judgment made by the scientist, his ultimate criterion being the prolongation of life; the scientist judges the fulfilment of a purposive act by its correspondence with a type. We get, not two alternatives but a series of degrees in fitness. The other three factors—adventitious accompaniments of forethought—are not elements of purposive behavior and growth. These factors, however, are largely responsible for the psycho-morphic view of instinct and intelligence, characterizing earlier biology. Purpose, then, is a real phenomenon of organic activity; at present it seems explicable mechanistically.

III. *The Rôle of Purpose in Nature.*—In the *inorganic world*, it is difficult to discover a single indisputable example of anticipatory activity; though there does seem ground for extending the concept of fitness into the inorganic realm, the extension serves only to emphasize the mechanistic interpretation of purpose. When we consider the *origin* of the cosmos, we find no support for the older purposive interpretation; scientific evidence is against the assumption on which the entelechy theory rests, and without entelechy the very problem of origin vanishes. Finally, if we seek purpose in *cosmic evolution*, we find only the existence of a *trend* of some sort, to which the judgment of *harmony* is attached; though harmony may be only a broader conception of *fitness*, trend is not equivalent to anticipation: unless the meaning of purpose be greatly revised, it does not seem at present a fundamental category in the explanation of *cosmic history*.

ELLEN B. ARMSTRONG.

Le déterminisme historique et l'idéalisme social dans "l'Esprit des Lois." G. LANSON. Rev. de Mét., XXIII, 1, pp. 177-202.

Two opposed conceptions can be found in Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois*. The first is historical determinism; the second is idealism, which emphasises the influence which man can exert on the course of events. The second is found in Montesquieu's *Lettres Persanes*, in which he insists on the ideal of wisdom, taste, liberality (*honneteté*), tolerance and benevolence. Montesquieu wrote his *Esprit des Lois* to improve the condition of mankind. His aim was not merely to explain how laws are made among diverse peoples, but also what must be done if the peoples are to endure and prosper. His book raises a strong but measured protest, in the name of reason and conscience, against certain violations of human rights. His aim was to reform society by instructing those who rule as to what laws they should make and what use they should make of the old laws. The second conception, *i. e.*, of historical determinism, is also to be found in the *Esprit des Lois*. He was not moved, like Montaigne, to find in the confused mass of diverse laws and customs evidence of the infirmity of human reason; he rather sought the law which underlies these diverse facts. He is always glad to discover a logical necessity in events. He saw in every law and institution the expression of some moral or physical cause. He explains so well, that he seems to excuse. Thus he shows how gallantry, free morals, intrigue, flattery, distinction of castes, etc., are strictly bound up with the principle of monarchy. The *Esprit des Lois* was the most

extended and most penetrating attempt which had ever been made to disentangle the general causes which rule the life and revolutions of society, which make it slave or free, military or commercial, superstitious or tolerant, polygamous or monogamous, republican or monarchical. Many causes rule over men; climate, religion, laws, maxims of government, the examples of the past, custom and manners; taken together these form the general spirit. Over some nations some of these causes prevail, over others, others; the advance of civilization slowly gives the preponderance to moral causes. This general spirit of the nation (*esprit général*) leaves little to the choice or will of the individual. In the case of nations even great men can do little; neither the carelessness nor stupidity of a government will ruin a state if it ought to prosper; nor can the genius of a king or a minister save it, if it ought to perish. Does, then, the *Esprit des Lois* teach passivity in regard to the destiny of society and the exclusive moral cultivation of the private individual? No, its whole spirit is opposed to this. Montesquieu recognized no contradiction between historical determinism and social idealism. He recognized a physical necessity and a moral necessity; the laws of the first are necessary relations which never fail to be realized, those of the second are also necessary relations, but, because of man's freedom, they may fail to be realized. Positive law is the outcome of both physical necessity and moral freedom. Because man is free, he may err; but he may also increase his knowledge and become more reasonable. An institution may be physically necessary, such as slavery, and yet be repugnant to reason. How does human action exert its influence in historical determinism? The individual, according to Montesquieu, is unable to do much. But social science and law can do much. The human will expresses itself in law; such law becomes the instrument of social progress, which consists in realizing in the world of facts the ideal necessities grasped by the human spirit. New law must be attached to the past, it must be related to other laws, to the history of the people, to the conditions of their life, to their customs and their general spirit. The art of making law consists in taking advantage of necessity, and utilizing determinism to the profit of idealism. One should observe how, in the *Esprit des Lois*, Montesquieu remolds the traditional institutions and customs of France with all the improvements his reason dictates. Montesquieu was opposed to Machiavellism; he concerned himself with peoples, not with kings, with institutions, not with conquests and *coups d'état*. For him politics was the art of governing with success, not for the grandeur and glory of the Prince, but for the realization of an ideal of civilization founded on justice and humanity. Fenelon and Bossuet believed that the king could do everything. Before Montesquieu's time the attempt to rationalize society had not gone further than the declaration of the right of reason to organize society; it had not studied the means which give reason the power to enforce its right. Montesquieu illuminated this question. He was working in the spirit of Newton and Bacon. His works, however, show a certain haste and beautiful impatience in regard to the application of his thought.

W. CURTIS SWABEY.

A Statement of Epistemological Dualism. A. K. ROGERS. J. of Ph., Psy. and Sci. Meth., XIII, 7, pp. 169-181.

The content of thought, as distinct from the object and from the psychological existence of thought, is in the nature of an abstract and representative summing up of the qualities and relations of the object. The content is not to be confused with its psychological embodiment, for while psychological facts always occur in time, the content of thought, as an abstractuon, is timeless. The content of thought has been a source of confusion in philosophy, because of the tendency of philosophers to substitute the timeless and abstract content for actual reality. Even the neo-realists and pragmatists tend to fall into the error of substituting description for reality. But the content is only a part of the situation, which, when complete, includes the object and the psychological facts as well. Common-sense accepts the view that psychical experience is a fact in reality, and it regards a judgment as true or false according whether the content which is asserted of an object actually belongs to it, or not. Truth, from this view, consists in an agreement of our ideas with reality. The ordinary criticisms of dualism fail to take account of the distinctions which are actually experienced between an object and the idea of the object. A more subtle objection to common-sense dualism is that idea and reality are actually one thing, since in judgment there is no experience of separation between them. But the dualistic position results from reflection upon these situations, and in reflection a distinction is discovered between idea and object. There is no reason why philosophy should confine its attention to the primary judgment-situation. Dualism involves transcendence, and this is a mystery, apparently. A way out of the difficulty was suggested by James, who pointed out that an idea means an object which is to be reached through intervening experiences. The nature of meaning is to be found in that concrete experience of satisfied expectation in which it culminates. By knowing a thing is meant that this experience of fulfilment can be repeated. The object may be entirely transcendent, and still be meant, in the sense that if it were ever reached the feeling of expectation would be realized. *

D. T. HOWARD.

NOTES.

Dr. W. K. Wright, for the past three years instructor in philosophy at Cornell University, has been called to an assistant professorship of philosophy at Dartmouth College.

Dr. D. T. Howard, of Cornell University, has been appointed instructor of philosophy at Northwestern University.

Professor Mary Whiton Calkins, of Wellesley College, has been appointed lecturer on the Mills Foundation at the University of California, and will deliver lectures there during the first semester of the academic year 1916-17.

Professor Bernard C. Ewer has been appointed professor of philosophy at Pomona College, Calif.

We give below a list of articles in current philosophical magazines,

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XXVII, 3: *Albert Schinz*, The Renewal of French Thought on the Eve of the War; *E. G. Boring*, The Number of Observations Upon Which a Limen May Be Based; *S. S. George*, The Gesture of Affirmation Among the Arabs; *P. F. Swindle*, Positive After-Images of Long Duration; *C. E. Ferree* and *Gertrude Rand*, A Simple Daylight Photometer; *Margaret Hart Strong* and *Edward K. Strong, Jr.*, The Nature of Recognition Memory and of the Localization of Recognitions; *Lucile Dooley*, Psychoanalytic Studies of Genius; Minor Studies from the Psychological Laboratories of Cornell University; *E. B. Titchener*, A Note on the Compensation of Odors.

THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, VII, 2: *Henry J. Watt*, Stereoscopy as a Purely Visual, Bisystemic, Integrative Process; *N. Carey*, Factors in the Mental Processes of School-Children. III. Factors Concerned in the School Subjects; *A. W. Wolters*, The Process of Negation; *James Ward*, A Further Note on the Sensory Character of Black; *F. C. Bartlett*, An Experimental Study of Some Problems of Perceiving and Imaging; Proceedings of the British Psychological Society.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XXVI, 4: *Bertrand Russell*, Marriage and the Population Question; *Elsie Clews Parsons*, Feminism and Sex Ethics; *Charles Gray Shaw*, The Pessimism of Jesus; *Alfred H. Lloyd*, The Doctrinaire in Times of Crisis; *Gertrude Besse King*, The Servile Mind; *Bertram M. Laing*, The Origin of Nietzsche's Problem and Its Solution; *Morris R. Cohen*, Recent Philosophical-Legal Literature in French, German and Italian (1912-1914).

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, XIII, 13: *Harold Chapman Brown*, Structural Levels in the Scientist's World;

M. T. McClure, Perception and Thinking; *F. L. Wells*, Von Bechterew und Uebertragung.

XIII, 14: *Harold King Chadwick*, A Suggested Metaphysics to Fit a Functional Epistemology; *Elsie Clews Parsons*, Primitive Improvidence.

XIII, 15: *A. K. Rogers*, Belief and the Criterion of Truth; *Edward J. Kempf*, Did Consciousness of Self Play a Part in the Behavior of this Monkey?

MIND, N. S., 99: *J. S. Mackenzie*, Laws of Thought; *J. Laird*, Berkeley's Realism; *P. S. Burrell*, The Plot of Plato's *Republic* (VII-XIII); Discussion, *H. A. Reyburn*, The Ego-Centric Predicament.

THE MONIST, XXVI, 3: *George Sarton*, The History of Science; *Louis D. Covitt*, The Anthropology of the Jew; *James Byrnie Shaw*, Logistic and the Reduction of Mathematics to Logic; *Philip E. B. Jourdain*, Richard Dedekind.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XXIII, 4: *James R. Angell*, A Reconsideration of James's Theory of Emotion in the Light of Recent Criticisms; *Harvey Carr*, Head's Theory of Cutaneous Sensitivity; *Herman K. Haberlin*, The Theoretical Foundations of Wundt's Folk-Psychology; *Augusta F. Bronner*, Attitude as It Affects Performance of Tests.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XXIII, 2: *Maine de Biran*, Quatre nouveaux manuscrits inédits publiés par P. Tisserand; *L. Brunschvicg*, L'Arithmétique et la théorie de la connaissance; *Masson-Oursel*, La Sophistique. Étude de philosophie comparée; *Dolleans*, Un essai de Psychologie historique: William Godwin; *D. Parodi*, Guerre et Morale.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XLI, 6: *E. Goblot*, Le Principe des nationalités; *Mlle. Ioteyko*, Théorie psycho-physiologique de la droiterie (1^{er} article); *E. Récléjac*, Le fait moral et le fait social; *E. Besch*, L'imagination et l'intuition chez Gustave Flaubert—L'esthétique du roman.

XLI, 7: *F. Le Dantec*, L'Objectif et le Subjectif; *Th. Ribot*, La conscience tactile-motrice pure; *A. Bauer*, Le rôle de la force; *Mlle. Ioteyko*, Théorie psycho-physiologique de la droiterie (2^e et dernier article).

REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA, II, 3: *Narciso Garay*, Hacia la Universidad pan-americana; *Lucas Ayarragary*, El insitinto de conservación en la psicología del gaucho; *Maximio S. Victoria*, Las doctrinas pedagógicas de Comte; *José Imbelloni*, La bio-filosofía de la guerra y William Mackenzie; *Alberto Palcos*, Obras y escritos de Enrique Molina; *Armando Donoso*, Ensayo sobre Francisco Bilbao; *José Ingenieros*, La cultura filosófica en la España medioeval.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, 74, 5 u 6: *Hans Henning*, Der Geruch, II.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

JUS NATURALE REDIVIVUM.¹

TO defend a doctrine of natural rights today, requires either insensibility to the world's progress or else considerable courage in the face of it. Whether all doctrines of natural rights of man died with the French Revolution or were killed by the historical learning of the nineteenth century, everyone who enjoys the consciousness of being enlightened knows that they are, and by right ought to be, dead.² The attempt to defend a doctrine of natural rights before historians and political scientists would be treated very much like an attempt to defend the belief in witchcraft. It would be regarded as emanating only from the intellectual underworld. And yet, while in this country only old judges and hopelessly antiquated text-book writers still cling to this supposedly eighteenth century doctrine, on the Continent the doctrine of natural law has been revived by advanced jurists of diverse schools, in France, Germany, Belgium, and Italy, and stands forth unabashed and in militant attire.³

¹ Read before the Conference on Legal and Social Philosophy, Chicago University, April 10, 1914.

² Thus in an address before the American Historical Association, Dr. James Sullivan referred to popular discussion of inalienable rights as only serving to "illustrate the wide gulf which separates the scholarly world from the general public. The world of learning has long abandoned the state of nature theory." (Report of the American Historical Association for 1902, pp. 67-68.) The assumption, however, that with the fall of the 'state of nature' theory, all questions of inalienable rights are eliminated, is quite gratuitous and in no way borne out by Dr. Sullivan's own evidence.

³ One of the first to point out that the historical school of jurisprudence had not really succeeded in refuting the standpoint of natural law, was Stammler, in his *Ueber die Methode der geschichtlichen Rechtstheorie* (1889), pp. 4, 28-48. Since then

There are, of course, important differences between the new and the old brands of natural law, which show that the attack on the old natural law was not without some justification. Yet the name 'natural law' is not inappropriately applied to the new doctrines, which are, in essence, a reassertion of the old in a form more in harmony with modern thought. That this reassertion is scientifically possible I shall try to show by a critical examination of the four usual arguments against the theory of natural law, namely, the historical, the psychologic, the legal, and the metaphysical.

The first and most popular argument is the historical one. This argument assumes that the old doctrine of natural law rested on a belief in the actual existence of human beings in a state of nature prior to organized society; and as history has not shown that such a state ever existed, natural law falls to the ground. To this very simple argument the reply is that the old doctrines of natural law rested on no such foundation. Even Rousseau disclaims it in his maturer work, as is well known to those who take the unusual course of actually reading his *Contrat Social*. When Grotius, Hobbes, and their followers speak of a state of nature they do not as a rule mean to refer to a past event. The 'state of nature' is a term of logical or psychologic analysis, denoting that which would or does exist apart from civil author-

he has pressed his conception of "natural law with a changing content" in all his important works. See his *Wirtschaft und Recht* (2d ed.), pp. 165, 176, 181, 456, and *Lehre von Richtigen-Rechte*, pp. 93 ff., 196 ff., also L. v. Savigny, *Das Problem des Naturrechts*, in Schmoller's *Jahrbuch*, 1901. Similarly Del Vecchio, in the three works now translated under the title, *The Formal Basis of Law*: Rensi, *Il fondamento filosofico de diritto* (1912), Platon, *Pour le droit naturel* (1911), and Charmont, *La Renaissance du droit naturel* (1910). On the positivistic side, Ardigò-Sociologia (1886), pp. 50 ff., and *La Morale dei positivisti* (1901), I, Pt. II, ch. I. Jung, *Problem des natürlichen Rechts* (1912) and Cosentini, *La Reforme de la Legislation Civile* (1913), I, ch. II. I omit Herbert Spencer, for his arguments as to the nature of 'absolute justice' are substantially of the eighteenth century type.

Influenced even more by purely legal than by philosophical considerations, are Hennebic, *Philosophie du droit et droit naturel* (1897); Picard, *Le droit pur* (1899); and Saleilles, *Ecole historique et droit naturel*, *Revue trimestrielle du droit civil*, I (1902).

In England Pollock has been prominent in appreciating the importance of natural law doctrines; see his *Expansion of the Common Law*, lecture 4, *Continuité du droit naturel*, *Annales internationale d'histoire* (1900), sec. 2, and *Journal of the Soc. for Comparative Legislation* (Dec., 1900).

ity. It is logically, not chronologically, prior to the 'civil state.' Similarly the 'social contract' is not a past event, but a concept of a continuous social transformation.¹

There is, doubtless, a good deal of *a priori* history to be found in seventeenth and eighteenth century thought. But consider the general and now almost classical belief that human progress passes through certain necessary stages, and that by the proper handling of our scant and crude information about certain savage or primitive races, we can reconstruct the universal history of mankind. Is not this likewise *a priori* history? Yet, would it be fair to reject entirely a legal philosophy such as Kohler's for no other reason than that it assumes a necessary succession of matriarchal and patriarchal stages which, from the point of view of scientific history, are entirely mythical? The essence of the old natural law was an appeal from the actual or merely existing to an ideal of what is desirable, or ought to be, and historical considerations alone will not settle the matter.

It would be absurd, of course, to deny all value to historical study as an aid in the correction of the aberrations of the old natural law theories. Historical study has helped to break down what might be called either the absolutism or the provincialism of the old natural law, under the aegis of which people assumed their own local ideals to be valid for all times, places, and conditions. But historical study has been only one of the elements which have brought about our cosmopolitan thought. The widening of human geography by purely physical means, the increased ease of communication between different peoples, the more intimate acquaintance with oriental and other types of social life, are other and in some respects even more important elements. I dwell on this point because sober reflection will, I think, show the historicism of the nineteenth century to be in some respects more mischievous than the rationalism of the

¹ This comes out most clearly in Kant, who discusses the whole matter on purely ethical postulates. That Hobbes, also, kept free from historical assumptions is clearly brought out by Dunning, *Political Theories*, vol. 2. There are two or three passages in Locke and one, at least, in Kant,—not to mention Rousseau's immature discourse,—in which the 'state of nature' is spoken of in the past tense. But these lapses into the common way of speaking cannot be shown to have had any influence on the general ideas of Locke or Kant.

eighteenth. Indeed, in the writings of Hegel, Karl Marx, and of the German historical school of jurisprudence, the real nature of historicism as an inverted or romantic form of rationalism becomes apparent. The absolute, the system of production, and the *Volksgeist* simply take the place of ordinary human reason. They function in an entirely *a priori* rationalistic way. Instead of refuting the normative standpoint of the old natural law, these writers substitute an unconscious natural law of their own. Instead of the revolutionary dogma of the complete plasticity of social institutions, they substitute the equally absurd conservative dogma of the futility of human effort. Even the English historical school of jurisprudence has been shown by Professor Pound to be guilty of the same offence of setting up its own idealization of the prevailing system as necessarily valid for all times.¹ The great enemy in our field is not rationalism, but perfectionism, *i. e.*, the idealization of a particular state as the definitive universal goal, whether that state be the supposed condition of the Hebrews before the monarchy, the system of equity in Lord Eldon's day, the Prussian state of the time of Hegel, or the even more vicious and extravagant dogma that every actual state is the best for its time.

The second type of argument, the psychologic, is based on the assumption that all theories of natural law must be intellectualistic and individualistic. The eighteenth century was undoubtedly intellectualistic, in the sense that it attributed entirely too much to conscious experience, deliberate invention or consensual contract,² and too little to slow unconscious growth; and we can but smile at the astounding naïvete of such views as that religion is an invention of the priests. But while a shallow mechanical intellectualism did color all the speculation of the Enlightenment, there is no necessary connection between it and the theories of natural law. Certainly the jural

¹ 24, *Harvard Law Review*, 600-604.

² The classical theory of natural law embodied in the Canon Law or in the writings of St. Thomas, is entirely free from this tendency to reduce all obligations to contractual ones. Anglo-American historical jurisprudence, however, influenced by Maine's maxim "Legal progress is from status to contract," has gone far in reading fictional consent or contract into the law.

views of Grotius, Hobbes, Spinoza, or even those of Locke and Rousseau cannot be so easily condemned. Moreover, a great deal may be said for the view that would prefer the shallow intellectualism of the Enlightenment to the romantic distrust of human reason, which denies (as *e. g.*, Hegel, Karl Marx, and, in part, Savigny) that reflective thought can aid in the transformation of jural and political institutions.¹

Similar considerations hold in regard to the supposed individualism of all natural law theories. Eighteenth and even seventeenth century speculation did undoubtedly err in attributing a self-sufficiency to the abstract or isolated individual which modern psychology holds he could not have in the absence of organized society. Government and laws, we now see, are not mere external checks over affairs which might prosper without them, but necessary conditions of organized social life. There might be physical objects, but no property, industry, or family continuity without property and family law adequately enforced. But while laws and government protection create legal rights, the effectiveness of this process depends on the recognition of previously existing fundamental psychic or social interests. To the extent that these interests exist and demand protection even prior to the specific law which meets their demand, they are the raw material of natural rights. There is no property in ideas or published works before the existence of patent and copyright laws; but interests and claims do exist prior to and not as creatures of these laws which they call into being. The latter must justify themselves by the services they render to these and other interests.

The third or purely legal argument has received its definitive form in Bergbohm's *Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie*. It is not unfair to represent his attitude to natural law as parallel to that of the pious Mohammedan to learning outside that of the Koran: Natural law either repeats the rules of positive law, and is futile, or it contradicts them and is illegal and not law at all. Con-

¹ It may seem strange that a panlogist like Hegel should be such a contemner of reflective reason. But that he was so influenced by the Romantic reaction against the Enlightenment and the Revolution, his *Rechtsphilosophie* proves beyond doubt.

ditioning this is, of course, the belief in the all-sufficiency of positive law as a closed legal system to regulate all possible cases. Unfortunately, however, the distinction between positive and natural law is not as well defined as that between the Koran and all other books. If positive law means law actually enacted by some human agency devoid of supernatural omniscience, it is clear that it cannot foresee and regulate all possible contingencies. The domains of life thus not provided for in the positive law are regulated by the customary rules of what people think fair, which thus constitute a natural or non-positive law. Where such rules, though non-legal, are fairly well established, judges will be bound by them (except in cases where their own sense of fairness asserts itself). Those who believe in the closed or all-comprehensive character of the positive law have tried to save their theory from these facts by saying that the positive law is only formally, not materially, closed. But this, like the fiction that whatever the sovereign has not prohibited happens by his command, gives us very little insight into the life of the law. It certainly ought not to hide the fact that ethical views as to what is fair and just are, and always have been, streaming into the law through all the human agencies that are connected with it, judges and jurists as well as legislature and public opinion. Indeed, the body of the law could not long maintain itself if it did not conform in large measure to the prevailing sense of justice.

Reviewing Lorimer's *Institutes of Law*, Pollock says of natural law that it "either does not exist or does not concern lawyers more than any one else," and "I do not see that a jurist is bound to be a moral philosopher more than other men." But twenty years later he says:¹ "Some English writers half a century behind their time still maintain the absolute Benthamite aversion to its name (natural law). Meanwhile, our courts have to go on making a great deal of law, which is really natural law, whether they know it or not, for they must find a solution for every question that comes before them, and general considera-

¹ Pollock, *Essays in Ethics and Jurisprudence*, pp. 19, 23, and the *Expansion of the Common Law*, Ch. IV.

tions of justice and convenience must be relied on in default of positive authority."

But if the sense of justice must necessarily exercise an influence in any growing law,¹ it becomes of utmost importance to the jurist that the principles of justice or natural law should receive the careful and critical treatment which we call scientific method. Hence, the Continental jurists who are giving up the view that legal interpretation is a mechanical process of extracting from the words of a statute a peculiar and magical essence called the will of the legislator, and who recognize that jurisprudence must necessarily be growing and creative, are also beginning to recognize the need of a systematic science of justice or natural law.

As foreign ideas, however, may seem undesirable immigrants in the field of American jurisprudence, we can press the last point in the field that is peculiarly native to us, that is, our constitutional law. The bills of rights of our Federal and State Constitutions embody certain popular principles of justice, and in spite of over a century of judicature, such phrases as 'due process of law,' 'equal protection of rights,' etc., are still essentially more or less vague moral maxims,—the effort to transform them into legal principles of fixed meaning being thwarted by the imperative need of making an eighteenth century document fit the needs of twentieth century life. Hence, the problem of justice remains an inescapable one in the field of constitutional law.

¹ I dwelt on this point at the last meeting of this Conference (see the Process of Judicial Legislation, *American Law Review*, March, 1914) and it would not be proper to repeat the arguments there made. I may, however, mention two arguments that have been advanced against the position there indicated. (1) Judges, we are told, have no license to legislate at will in the interests of justice and morality. Certainly not. But neither have they authority to decide any cases that are not presented to them. When, however, cases *are* presented, they must decide; and when issues come up, as they certainly do nowadays, which require the weighing of considerations of public policy, social welfare or justice, judges must legislate. (2) It is also urged that in new cases, judges must depend on the analogy of established principles. But it is a poor lawyer who cannot meet an analogy against him with another one in his favor, and upright judges, in choosing or weighing the force of different or competing analogies, must inevitably rely on their sense of justice.

Those who would denude the phrases of our bills of rights of their moral connotation urge that it is not well for courts of law to become courts of morals. Without wishing on this occasion to discuss the advisability of a system of government whereby a very small number of non-elective judges must, on the basis of a few hours' argument, say the deciding word on grave public questions, such as railroad rates, industrial combinations, etc., and without wishing to pass judgment on the actual results of our courts' efforts to enforce the body of moral principles (some at least of which they hold to be independent or anterior to all written constitutions), we may still urge that the fear of our courts becoming censors of morals is not well taken. The objection is not well taken because it fails to distinguish between individual morals, which must take into account personal motives, and questions of right and wrong in external and enforceable relations. The moral principles of our bills of rights are entirely of the latter kind. It is for that reason that I think it advisable to keep the old distinction between the science of natural rights or justice and the science of personal morals or ethics. The principles of justice applicable and enforceable in public relations may be regarded as part of social ethics, but they form a distinct group of problems relatively as independent of the other problems as the questions of economics are of the other questions of sociology. If the work of our courts in applying maxims of natural law has proved unsatisfactory, it does not follow that principles of justice cannot or ought not be worked into the law. Legal history shows that they always have been the life of the law.¹ So far as the use of the moral maxims of our bills of rights has actually proved unsatisfactory, the causes are to be sought in the specific conditions under which our courts have done their work. Of these conditions not the least harmful is the belief that jurists need no special training in the science of justice (either because law has nothing to do with justice, or else because what constitutes justice under any given condition is something which anyone can readily determine by asking a

¹ There is no adequate direct history of the interaction between positive and natural law; but material will be found in the writings of M. Voigt in Landsberg's *Geschichte*, N. Liszt's *Deutsche Strafrecht*, and Gierke's *Genossenschaftsrecht*, vol. 4.

magical arbiter called conscience). It may well be that such phrases as due process of law, cruel and unusual punishment, republican form of government, and direct tax, are too hopelessly vague to serve as definite legal rules. But these phrases will not prevent courts giving the stamp of constitutionality to legislation the justice of which can be shown to them.

The essence of all doctrines of natural law is the appeal from positive law to justice, from the law that is to the law which ought to be;¹ and unless we are ready to assert that the concept of a law that ought to be is for some reason an inadmissible one, the roots of natural law remain untouched. Now, it is true that the issue has seldom been so sharply put, for to do so is to espouse an amount of dualism between the *is* and the *ought* which is shocking to the philosophically respectable. The respectable dread to admit the existence of real conflicts in our intellectual household; they would rather conceal them by ambiguous terms such as natural, or normal. This is most apparent in the most philistine of all philosophic schools, the Stoics, whose tremendous influence in jurisprudence has brought about much intellectual confusion. There have not, of course, been wanting intellectual radicals who, in the interests of a strident monism have clearly and conscientiously attempted to eliminate the chasm between the *ought* and the *is*, either by denying the former, or by trying to reduce it to a species of the *latter*. Thrasyarchus's definition of justice as the interests of the stronger, finds its modern form

¹ For this reason I must reject Professor Fite's attempt, in his *Individualism*, to reduce natural rights to a question of intellect-power, or intelligent self-assertion. It seems to me a subtle way of reducing questions of right to a species of might. Basing his theory on an analysis of consciousness, Professor Fite consistently arrives at the position that the unintelligent have no rights. If that were so, we would have to say that infants, before the age of self-consciousness, and the senile or demented have no rights whatsoever, and anyone who takes advantage of his superior intelligence in dealing with them is exercising his rights. In one case, at least, Professor Fite does not hesitate to follow his theory to such a conclusion. A nation, he tells us, which allows valuable public lands to pass into private hands through lack of interest and intelligence should not complain of being robbed. If Professor Fite were consistent, he would have to say, not only that the public has no right to complain of being robbed because of its ignorance, but that the robber is perfectly justified, so long as the public does not know a way of recovering it. This, indeed, would be reducing questions of right to questions of might, but it would really make the predicate *right* devoid of all meaning.

in the definition of right as the will of the sovereign, of the people, or of the dominant group. But few of these radical immoralists have had the courage of their convictions; they smuggle in some normative principle, such as harmony with the tendency of evolution, social solidarity, etc., as *the* valid ideal. Marx may have boasted that he never made use of the word justice in his writings; but his followers would dwindle into insignificance if they could not appeal against the crying injustices of the present 'system.' The most courageous of all immoralists, Hobbes and Nietzsche, have not escaped the necessity of admitting, in a more or less thinly disguised form, a moral imperative contrary to the actually established forces. Our analytical school of jurisprudence, pretending to study only the law that is, has been repeatedly shown to be permeated with an anonymous natural law.

The boldest attempt in history to do away with the antithesis between what is and what ought to be is, of course, the Hegelian philosophy, with its violent assertion of the complete identity of the real and the rational. And it is one of the instructive ironies of fate that this most monistic utterance of man should have led to the widest rift that ever separated the adherents of a philosophic school. To the orthodox or conservative right this meant the glorification or deification of the actual Prussian state. To the revolutionary left, of the type of Proudhon, it meant the denial of the right of existence to the irrational actual state. Nor need this surprise us, as the Hegelian philosophy is at least as fluid as its object, of which, indeed, it professes to be the outcome. By its own dialectic it sets up its own opposite, so that its assertion of the identity of the real and the rational gives way to the insight that, in the necessary opposition between these two we have the clue to the process or life of civilization. If the jurist objects that this is indeed fishing in muddy rather than deep waters, and that the science of law has, fortunately, nothing to do with all this, our answer is that this is precisely the muddy condition in which the legal theory of this country finds itself to-day. In the prevalent legal theory we find the conflicting assertions that the law is (and ought to be) the will of the people, and that it is (and ought to be) the expression of

immutable justice; and an unwillingness to recognize the inconsistency which this involves. Professional philosophers, it seems, are not the only ones to take refuge in a twilight zone when their eyes are not strong enough to face sun-clear distinctions. The intellectual motives which lead to this disinclination to admit a sharp distinction between what is and what ought to be, come out perhaps clearest in the noble efforts of physicians engaged in teaching sex hygiene and furthering sex morality. They are afraid to characterize certain practices as immoral. They think it is more scientific to use such terms as unnatural or abnormal, knowing full well that these practices are natural in the sense that they are due to what are called natural causes, and normal in the sense that they are, alas, quite usual and widespread.

One of the roots of this error, which is also the basis of all empiricism, is the assumption that science necessarily deals only with the actual. It would take us far afield to point out that this is based on the inadequate analysis of scientific procedure which is embodied in the Aristotelian or scholastic logic with its underlying assumption that all propositions are of the substance-attribute type. But as certain as that mathematics is a science, and enters into all the physical sciences, just so certain it is that all developed sciences deal with that which *ought* to exist if certain premises be true. The objects of two contrary hypotheses cannot both exist; yet in every branch of any developed science progress depends upon such rival hypotheses receiving equally careful scientific elaboration before either can be rejected. Indeed, every branch of science aims to assume the form of rational mechanics or geometry, in which we do not directly deal with the realm of existence, but rather with the realm of validity or the valid consequences of given hypotheses or axioms. And not only scientific progress, but all practical activities, such as those of statesmanship, depend upon reasoning of the form, 'what *would happen* if this engine were perfect or frictionless?' even though we know such perfection to be impossible. Intelligent action demands that we know what will happen if we turn to the right and what will happen if we turn to the left, though it is certain we cannot do both.

The metaphysical objection to the possibility of a theory of natural law or justice runs thus¹—"Questions of justice are relative to time, place, and the changing conditions of life. Hence there cannot be such a thing as a definite science of these matters." The widespread prevalence of this view, even in high places, shows how woefully unfamiliar is the logic of science. The objection ignores the difference between a substantive code and a science of principles, a distinction which ought to be as clear as that between the directions of the engineer to the builder and the science of mechanics. The temperature or the time of sunrise of different places undoubtedly varies, yet that does not prove the absence of a rule or formula for computing it. Similarly substantive rules such as those of property cannot be well drawn without taking into account specific agricultural or industrial conditions. But this does not deny—on the contrary, it presupposes—the existence of a general rule or method for the determination of how far any property rule justly meets the demands of its time. Doubtless, because of the great simplicity of its subject matter and the greater development of methods of measurement, physical science has attained a degree of rigor and accuracy of formulation which the social sciences have not attained, and may perhaps never attain. But since the rise in physics of what has been called the statistical view of nature, there is no ground for denying that the difference in this respect between the physical and the social sciences is simply one of degree. Moreover, there are indications that the variability of social judgments, such as those with regard to justice, has as a matter of fact been greatly exaggerated. The first impression of savage life as gathered from the reports of scientifically untrained travelers and others interested in noting striking differences, together with the intellectual intoxication produced by the frenzied acceptance of the principle of universal evolution, have combined to produce an over-emphasis on the diversities of

¹ See Lévy-Bruhl, *La Morale et la Science des Mœurs*, pp. 257, 260, 279. It is instructive to notice how Lévy-Bruhl, like others, expells the science of ethics through the front door, only to let it in again through a side door as a 'rational art.' There seems to me no reason for refusing to admit that all sciences are 'rational arts' of ordering judgments according to their relations to each other.

human culture. As soon, however, as we get over the disposition to run wild with the concept of evolution, and examine the matter somewhat soberly, the fundamental resemblances of all human races and modes of life will be seen not to have lost significance. Historians as radical and free from metaphysical preferences as Robinson find it necessary to emphasize the fundamental unity of human history, as opposed to the differences which separate us from the Greeks or Assyrians, and critical ethnologists like Boaz¹ are pointing out that the unscientific uncritical reports of untrained observers as to so-called primitive life have produced false impressions of radical moral differences, and that the actual variations of moral opinion are explicable by the variation of social conditions. In ordinary affairs and in public discussion we all do undoubtedly assume a large amount of agreement as to what constitutes justice. And while such agreement is not conclusive, it offers a sufficiently definite starting point for a critical science, which, according to the Platonic method, consists in positing ideals (or hypotheses) and criticizing or testing them in the light of ascertained social fact.

Militating against this program are the prevalent views (1) that questions of justice are all matters of opinion, and (2) that all things are in a flux but that there is no *logos* (reason or formula) to determine the fact that things are changing, and no definite measure according to which they do so. Against the first, or sophistic position, it is sufficient to point out that no one in practice disbelieves that one opinion may be better founded than another. Against the blind worship of the dogma of universal and absolute change, it ought to be sufficient to point out that change and constancy are strictly co-relative terms. The world of experience certainly does not show us anything constant except in reference to that which is changing, and no change except by reference to something constant. We may generalize change as much as we like, saying that even the most general laws of nature that we now know, such as the laws of mechanics, are slowly changing, but this change can be estab-

¹ Robinson, "The Unity of History," in International Congress of Art and Sciences (1904), Vol. II; Boaz, *The Mind of Primitive Man*.

lished and have meaning only by means or in reference to some logical constant. The belief that the world consists of all change and no constancy is no better than the belief that all vessels have insides but no outsides.

Approaching the subject from the point of view of the requirements of a scientific theory, let us ask what is the character of the principles of legal justice or natural law, and how are they to be established? The traditional answer from the Stoics down to our own day is that they are axioms whose self-evidence is revealed to us by the light of natural reason. This belief is implied in the way in which these principles are appealed to in popular discussions as to natural rights. In a Catholic manual of socialism, we have a long list of such eternal first principles, which are put in the same class with such axioms as 'The whole is greater than any part,' 'The cause must be equal to the effect,' and the like. As the model for this view is presented by the Euclidean geometry it is suggestive to apply to these self-evident axioms the criticism which modern mathematics has applied to the Euclidean system. The discovery of non-Euclidean geometry and the whole trend of modern mathematical thought has led us to discard as unreliable the self-evident character of axioms or principles. Such principles as that two magnitudes equal to the same are equal to each other, or that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, are seen to be simply definitions, while others are either hypotheses or assumptions or else rules of procedure or postulates, whose contraries may not only be just as conceivable but even preferable in certain systems of mechanics. If now we apply the same criticism to our assumed principles of natural law, such as 'All men are equal before the law,' or 'All men have the right to life,' to the product of their labor, etc., it becomes evident that it will not do to rely on their apparent self-evidence, and that the only way to defend them against those who would deny them is to show that like other scientific principles, *e. g.*, the Copernican hypothesis in astronomy, they yield a body or system of propositions which is preferable to that which can possibly be established on the basis of their denial. But the analogy of other scientific theories

suggests, at least, three other cautions to be applied to the first principles of our science—these principles must be (1) clear, (2) consistent with each other, and (3) sufficient to yield a coherent system.

1. That the need of clearness has not yet been met in our usual theories of justice may be seen by examining the principle of equality which Pollock and others tell us is essential to the idea of justice. Here, if anywhere, we seem to have an ethical concept of some precision capable of yielding consequences of some definiteness. But the moment we begin to apply it to actual problems, we get into hopeless difficulties. Does the principle of equality mean (*a*) that we should always ignore the physical, mental, and social inequalities of men and treat them as if they were equal, or does it mean (*b*) that recognizing these inequalities, the law should handicap the stronger or strengthen the weaker so that the natural inequalities might be eliminated and real equality introduced? Neither of these meanings is free from serious objections.

(*a*) The same amount of bail for rich or poor, or the same tax on all citizens, hardly seems just—in view of the fact that equal sums or even equal percentages of income represent greater burdens on the poor than on the rich. The same punishment for all found guilty of an abstractly defined offence is now recognized to be often monstrous, and we are beginning to see that justice requires individualization of punishment. The attempt to carry out the provision of our bills of rights guaranteeing to all the equal protection of laws has been held to be our safeguard against class legislation, yet the actual course of the development of our doctrine of police power has extracted from reluctant courts the admission that justice demands the recognition of actual 'natural' classes. Even if, however, we modify our principle and put it in the form that the law should impose equal or proportional burdens, we do not remove the radical indefiniteness of the principle of equality. In view of the great variety and heterogeneity of the services that society can rightly demand of different citizens, what are equal or proportional burdens? How shall we determine how much of the

service of the scientist is *rightly* equal to the services of the nurse, of the legislator or the musician?

(b) Though the conception of justice as a process of equalizing or handicapping is very popular, few can carry it consistently. A fellowship in mathematics is open in a university. Does justice require that the weaker mathematician shall get it so that thereby he may be strengthened and made the equal of the better man devoid of similar opportunity?

These and countless other questions do not, doubtless, offer insuperable objections. They may be met much in the same way in which the physicist meets the objection to the principle of gravity found in the fact that the balloon in the air, the cork in the water, etc., fly upward—the seeming exceptions are explained by a counteracting principle. Similarly the principle of equality might be assigned a definite valid meaning, and the apparent exceptions explained as due to other principles. This, however, demands the abandoning of the monistic or monarchical craving that our science of justice shall be founded on a single supreme principle.

2. Our second caution, the careful determination of whether our diverse assumed principles of justice are consistent with each other, has not always been appreciated. Thus the right to life and the right to keep what one has produced, seem equally self-evident. Yet they flatly contradict each other in the case of the invalid, or incapacitated, whose right to life can be sustained only by others having to give up what they have produced.

Contradictions like the above can doubtless be eliminated by assigning definite provinces to the different principles, so that they cannot clash, as, for instance, the theory that each is entitled to the necessities of life, and that only the surplus (if there be any) is to be distributed either according to the amounts produced or according to some other principle. Such attempts, however, cannot be completely carried out without a quantitative social science.

3. Finally, we must ask, are the principles with which we start sufficient to enable us to deduce from them what constitutes justice in any given case? This is a question that is unanswer-

able *a priori*. No one ignorant of geometry can tell by looking at its axioms whether they are or are not sufficient to develop the complex and highly elaborate system of geometric propositions. Similarly it is only in the presence of a vast body of judgments as to justice that we can tell whether our principles offer a sufficient theoretic foundation.

If the above considerations have little positive value they at least warn us against the widespread complacent reliance on self-evident principles. No science of justice can be built up by an intellectual *coup de main*; patient analysis of the multitudes of fact as well as the proper use of principles is required. No mere postulating of principles, nor unimaginative abandonment to the infinity of details, will enable us to make the necessary progress. We must control the work of philosophy with the wealth of the facts analyzed by jurisprudence, and analyze these facts in the light of the most available philosophy. An adequate science of justice or natural law, therefore, requires the co-operation of jurists and philosophers, and is the proper task of this conference on Legal and Social Philosophy.

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THE PROBLEM OF OBJECTIVITY.

IN classic British or German philosophy, probably no question has been so variously treated, or so differently ranked, as the problem of objectivity. From the time of Locke to the present, English philosophers have inquired, to the exclusion of practically every other investigation, whether we apprehend the real, and if so, how such knowledge is possible. German metaphysicians particularly since Kant seem, on the other hand, agreed that this question is not a problem of philosophy at all. It was Hegel's proud boast that he 'broke through to reality'; that, premising a ready and authentic intercourse with objects, he expended the labor of his thought wholly on the analysis of the real, and the exhibition of the principles by whose aid we comprehend it. Philosophy, so considered, is a 'criticism of categories.' Shunning the ancient ambition to leap from the possessed to a severed and foreign reality, philosophy here limits its excursions to the plane of present proprietorship; its universe is a single-story affair. Between these well-defined positions lies a third, which partakes of the nature of each. Born of Anglo-Saxon minds, reared in this country and in England, it deals with the relation of knowledge and reality, but does so by the method of the Germans, postulating free and untrammelled commerce between thought and its object. This theory I shall call monistic realism.

British philosophy has, I believe, suffered gravely from its exclusive preoccupation with the problem of objectivity. As a supremely fascinating pursuit, philosophy is more than the dull task of hunting a reality which must, in any case, be assumed; it is an effort, difficult as dignified, to see the life of man in relation, to view it through concepts as windows, as a house set in order, a neat and mighty whole. It is, however, not at variance with this end but essential to it, that philosophers return from time to time to the problem of English thought. Even if self-imposed, this difficulty is before us, and demands attention.

Let any group of philosophers shun it and there will develop a narrow and deadly sectarianism, schools of philosophy in the worst sense of the term. The question of objectivity thus appears to be what James called a "forced option"—a problem that we must handle whether we would or no.

It is to this task that the new realist sets his hand. He aims to exhibit, with detail and system equal to that of rival theories, the conclusions of the application of the German method to the British problem. It can hardly fail to strike one as surprising that a trial so natural and promising has, in the entire history of philosophy, been made but twice, first by Thomas Reid, second by the new realists. The point of Reid's sharp attack on subjectivism lay, as is well known, in his keen and spirited denial of 'ideas.' Aroused from dogmatic acceptance of the Berkeleian theory by its skeptical issue in the philosophy of Hume, this author examined the foundations of the traditional doctrine, and discovered, not a little to his surprise, "that it leans with its whole weight upon a hypothesis, which is ancient indeed, and hath been generally received by philosophers, but of which I can find no solid proof. The hypothesis I mean is, That nothing is perceived but what is in the mind which perceives it: That we do not really perceive things that are external, but only certain images and pictures of them imprinted upon the mind, . . . If this be true [he concludes] . . . I cannot from their existence, infer the existence of anything else."¹

Reid's polemic was directed, not against all conceptions of ideas, but solely against the notion that they are the exclusive objects or termini of knowledge.² His criticism is thus of fundamental importance in the history of monistic realism, and should be reviewed here.³ Good dogmatist that he was, Reid

¹ Reid's *Collected Writings*, Hamilton's edition, Vol. I, p. 96.

² "If by ideas are meant only the acts or operations of our minds in perceiving, remembering, or imagining objects, I am," he affirms, "far from calling in question the existence of those acts." *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 298. Cf. James's statement: "Whoever blots out the notion of consciousness from his list of first principles must still provide in some way for that function's being carried on." *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 4.

³ I quote from the excellent summary which constitutes the fourteenth chapter of the second of the essays on the *Intellectual Powers of Man*. *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 298-306.

holds it self-evident that knowledge is principally engaged, not with its own ideas, but with things. "When we see the sun or moon, we have no doubt that the very objects which we immediately see are very far from us, and from one another." "A second reflection . . . is—that the authors who have treated of ideas, have generally taken their existence for granted, as a thing that could not be called in question; and such arguments as they have mentioned incidentally, in order to prove it, seem too weak to support the conclusion." Only two arguments, he finds, have been advanced in support of the conception. The first, succinctly stated by Clarke, sets forth that "the soul, without being present to the images of the things perceived, could not possibly perceive them. A living substance can only there perceive where it is present."¹ Of such reasoning, Reid makes short work, showing that whatever cogency it possesses is due to the unacknowledged premise that mind is quasi-material. The second and weightier argument arises from the fact of the variability of perception and illusion. "The table . . .," Hume remarked, "seems to diminish as we remove farther from it: but the real table . . . suffers no alteration. It was, therefore, nothing but its image which was present to the mind."² To this, the true ground of all subjectivism, Reid has no adequate or convincing reply. He merely affirms, partly on the right track, that there is no reason why real objects, under different conditions of perception, should not array themselves in different garments; and further reminds us that the forms and successions of appearances are as predictable as those of real things themselves—a fact, he believes, consonant only with the hypothesis of realism.³ "Thus," he concludes, "I have considered every argument I have found advanced to prove the existence of ideas . . . in the mind; and if no better arguments can be found, I cannot help thinking

¹ Quoted by Reid, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 300.

² Quoted, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

³ "Shall we say," he inquires, "that a false hypothesis invented by the rude vulgar, has been so lucky in solving an infinite number of phenomena of nature? This, surely, would be a greater prodigy than philosophy ever exhibited; add to this, that, upon the contrary by hypothesis, . . . no account can be given of any of these appearances, nor any physical cause assigned why a visible object should, in any case, have one apparent figure and magnitude rather than another."

that the whole history of philosophy has never furnished an instance of an opinion so unanimously entertained by philosophers upon so slight grounds."

Reid's remaining criticisms have a common aim—to reduce the theory of ideas to an absurdity. "If ideas be not a mere fiction, they must be, of all objects of human knowledge, the things we have best access to know . . . ; yet there is nothing about which men differ so much." He observes further that "ideas do not make any of the operations of the mind to be better understood, although it was probably with that view that they have been first invented. . . . We are at a loss to know how we perceive distant objects; how we remember things past; how we imagine things that have no existence. . . . They are all by means of ideas reduced to one operation—to a kind of feeling, or immediate perception of things present and in contact with the percipient; and feeling is an operation so familiar that we think it needs no explication, but may serve to explain other operations. But this feeling, or immediate perception, is as difficult to comprehend as the things we pretend to explain by it." Finally, it is in consequence of this doctrine that subjectivists feel it "necessary to prove by philosophic arguments the existence of material objects. And who does not see that philosophy must make a very ridiculous figure in the eyes of sensible men, while it is employed in mustering up metaphysical arguments, to prove that there is a sun and a moon, an earth and sea? . . . However, [he concludes] as these paradoxes have, with great acuteness and ingenuity, been deduced by just reasoning from the theory of ideas, they must at last bring this advantage, that positions . . . so contrary to the decisions of all our intellectual powers, will open men's eyes, and break the force of the prejudice which has held them entangled in that theory."

There is in these statements much that is ill-considered and utterly dogmatic; but we should not, on that account, fail to observe that they set forth, for the first time in opposition to subjectivism, the outlines of a doctrine of immediate perception. It is, therefore, the more to be regretted that Reid could not sustain and develop this promising insight. Sensation, he writes,

"hath no object distinct from the act itself"; "the feeling and the thing felt are one and the same."¹ In perception, memory, and imagination, according to our author, consciousness reveals the nature of objects independent of itself; in sensation and feeling, it has no content save its own character and state. It was accordingly at the latter point that the germs of subjectivism entered Reid's system, and, after the manner of their kind, multiplied and spread, until they infected most of it. By degrees, the secondary; and then the primary qualities contracted the ailment, and became, in effect, mere states of mind. The result is an inconsequential doctrine of perception for which Reid, owing to the misdirected efforts of his expositors, is mainly known—the theory that sensations are but signs or signals which initiate in the mind a 'conception' of objects, and an irresistible belief in their existence. What, according to this interpretation, assures us of reality is no direct seizure of it, but a common sense conviction of its existence, supposed for theoretical as for practical purposes to be authoritative and final.

This summary suffices to exhibit the grave manner in which Reid's house is divided against itself. Affirming, in opposition to Berkeley and Hume, a suggestive doctrine of immediate perception, this author, determined by subjective premises, insensibly drifted back, in the constructive movement of his thought, into the very theory of ideas which he proposed to controvert. Nor was the breach thus left open satisfactorily closed by any succeeding philosopher of the Scottish school. Influenced by Hamilton, a man of prodigious learning but of little genius, these philosophers recklessly bartered their birth-right in monistic realism for an epistemological pottage of the common or representational variety. Not until the last decade, and then outside of Scotland, and without historical relation to Reid, has there been a fresh attempt to formulate the sole original feature of Scotch metaphysics. This was done by the new realists.

Like all youthful philosophies, this system is somewhat vague and ill-defined. Initiated under definite proprietorship, it

¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 229, 230, respectively.

proposed, in published articles of incorporation, to do a business wholly specific in character. The movement, however, proved an expansive one, and soon outgrew its initial program. Like a successful candidate, snugly seated in office, it now takes a new view of its platform, and no one can say precisely where it stands. In what follows, I shall restrict myself to the theory's essential logic, leaving undiscussed the views of this or that realist.

The new realism is constructed on two cardinal principles. The one most emphasized is the doctrine that mind is a relation. Though general and ambiguous in form, this dictum has in practice a definite and specific meaning: It radically reaffirms Reid's negation of ideas. It is a way of saying that the content of perception is not the perceiving process itself, but a datum that is or may be objective. This is the very essence of monistic realism. Introduce any cleft between the material known and that which exists—let the first be of one order and the second of another—and the face of things is veiled from us forever. All that an hypothesis of immediate perception need maintain—all that its formulae can possibly mean—is that the content of knowledge is neutral, and belongs exclusively neither to the world of ideas nor to that of things. It is to make intelligible this dual citizenship that the members of this school define mind as a function or relation. The content of consciousness as a substance must partake of the nature of that substance, but the datum of thought as a relation is not necessarily of this single, one-dimensional character. That which in virtue of one connection is known, may in virtue of another exist. By the simple device of substituting a dualism of relations for a dualism of worlds the new realist exhibits reality as knowable.

But these thinkers do not, like Reid, ground this doctrine of knowledge on self-evidence. It is characteristic of the logic of the school that it regards such an appeal, like the reference to introspection, as an assumption of the precise question at issue. All that bare experience reveals, all that is datum in the case, is that we apprehend determinate sounds, colors, forms, and other sensible qualities. What this complex content is—whether mind or matter, and in what sense one or the other—

is wholly a matter of interpretation. It is what a thinker, for purposes of systematic development, finds it profitable to regard it as. It appears, therefore, that philosophers who, like Berkeley and Reid, discovered this datum certainly revealed respectively as ideas or things, view it through the distorting medium of their own preconceptions. Each dresses in the garments of his sect that which naked reveals no distinguishing mark.¹ By their fruits, not by their roots,² the theories of subjectivism and realism are known.

The principal novelty of the new doctrine lies, not in its theory of knowledge, but in its interpretation of existence. Reid, apart from the negation of ideas, was a naïve or common-sense realist. Like all metaphysicians influenced solely by English tradition, he accepted without question as warranted by the senses the common notion that reality is an absolute, about which no question can be asked. In opposition to this time-honored belief, the members of the new school propose a second cardinal thesis; that reality is the product and function of thought. Objects are self-enclosed and relatively stable; but this character, so far from being original and inherent, is secondary and derived. Cut out of a larger and plastic context by thought, they are endowed with the marks of the real by the very process to which they are commonly considered antithetical.

It follows that it is only in a specific and defined sense that reality is independent of, or external to, the process by which it is perceived. It stands outside the perceiving relation in that, though constituted a reality by reflective thought, it is so formed in relation to other objects, not in reference to the activities of the subject. The moon is external to my perception

¹ This is what new realists mean when they speak of experience as constituted of 'neutral entities'—a phrase which has been interpreted by Hegelians as affirming the existence of 'unrelated reals.' The last interpretation is false. The word neutral here has the same force as in discussions of international affairs. It signifies that the subject belongs exclusively to no one party, but has much in common with each. Entities, then, are neutral in the sense, not that they stand apart from all relations, but are now in the relation of knowledge, now in the relation of existence, and again in both of them at once. See Perry's *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 310, 311, 316.

² The phrase is James's, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 20.

in that its position and motion are determined, not in terms of my apprehension, but in relation to the motion of other spheres. Objects, in brief, are independent of perception, but not of conception. The affirmation of the independence and externality of the real is thus far from a return to dualism and representative perception. To assert this is to disregard the qualifications which alone make the new doctrine significant; it is to identify it with dogmatic realism.

The fact of illusion or error is the outstanding difficulty of naïve realism. Matter is treated as an absolute, settled in its way, and so righteous that it cannot appear falsely. But it does so appear; hence arises a difficulty insoluble unless the problem be differently conceived. As a first step towards re-definition, these unclaimed appearances are sheltered in a second absolute, the mind. In this way, arises the classic English doctrine of the twin store-houses, in one or the other of which all content of experience must lie. But this radical separation produces in turn the problem how we know these severed entities. Thus it happens that the content of the store-house reality is gradually shifted to mind, and the real becomes hypothetical. The new realist proposes a further re-definition. He suggests that the conception of matter which initiated the entire movement be abandoned; that the problem be worked out on the hypothesis that reality differs from appearance, not as one order from another, but as a section of cloth which has been cut out differs from the remainder of the piece. The part excised, because more useful, is called real; the remainder, appearance. The difference between the two sections is one of value. Reality and appearance are but concepts of praise and blame: we use one or the other according as we desire to extol or disparage. With such an interpretation of reality the problem of appearance loses its meaning. The wheel has come full circle; the fact of illusion which first appeared as a difficulty, is now deprived of power to threaten or disturb.

The essential character of the new realism should now be clear. It is not, as supposed, a party to the ancient dispute between subjectivism and naïve realism. It is the critic as much of the

second as of the first of these theories, whose premises are the same. Its salient feature is the negation of the conception of substance. Some exponents of the doctrine, imperfectly grasping its logic, have, it is true, denied spiritual substance while affirming the cognate conception of matter. But so evident is it that the two absolutes stand or fall together, that this error could hardly have been committed save that the new interpretation was elaborated in opposition to subjectivism, and so made temporarily an unnatural alliance with dogmatic realism. Had the latter been orthodox and regnant, it is altogether probable that the nascent hypothesis, developing with a new emphasis, would have been called the 'new idealism.'¹ Certain it is that the designation 'realism' has here lost its historic significance. Indeed, in that subjectivism is always to some extent critical, the current doctrine stands, on the whole, closer to it than to common-sense realism. It might perhaps most fittingly be entitled the 'new empiricism.'

The method of the new realism is the same as that of teleological idealism. In the latter hypothesis, ideas and things as self-evident, and mind and matter as discrete entities, are likewise denied, and there is assumed an organic relation between knowledge and its object which implies immediacy of intercourse.¹ What is needed in the application of the old method to the new problem, is that the new realism receive helpful criticism from the historic school, conscious, as a result of age, of the logic of the procedure. That there has been so little co-operation between them is due, partly to misunderstanding, and partly to a difference not yet mentioned. The new realism, emulating mathematics and the physical sciences, has set up for itself the ideal of exact procedure based on careful definition and observance of the canons of logic. It has thus been guided to the theory of universal mechanism. Teleological idealism, on the other hand, is specifically an attempt to interpret spiritual experience, and accordingly operates with the conception of ends. But even this difference is less real than apparent. For neither the

¹ Cf. Professor Creighton's articles, "The Determination of The Real," and "The Copernican Revolution in Philosophy," *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, 1912, p. 303 ff., and 1913, p. 133 ff., respectively.

method of mechanism nor that of teleology exhausts the real. The former procedure, though suited in principle to explain inorganic processes in all times and spaces, is yet incapable of interpreting in terms of consciousness any spiritual phenomenon. Oppositely, the latter method, admirably fitted to picture the conscious activities of man, cannot from its nature be extended to any process of the physical world. The truth seems to be that we are here confronted with co-ordinate and supplementary interpretations, by either of which or both we can and must proceed as we are able. We return, therefore, to the conclusion that the new realism and teleological idealism are not incompatible. Natural allies, they should join forces, and fight together the battle of a critical and competent doctrine of known objectivity.

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THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONS.

A PERSON is at the same time the greatest mystery and the most assured fact of the universe. This is one of the paradoxes which throng us, and without which, however baffling they may be, we could scarcely get on in this World Order of ours. The object of this paper is to attempt to bring the principles which are constitutive in the facts of our universe into as clear as possible a relationship with the problems of the origin of this most wonderful of all facts, human personality.

We regard the human person or self as a fact because we evidently have here an agent,—a center of force accomplishing certain definite things in interaction with other facts in the universe. But though we regard the self as a fact, we are confronted with the difficulty of adjusting the various elements involved in the problem, particularly, the difficulty of adjusting the scientific element of the description and explanation of the facts, to the philosophical element of the interpretation and meaning of the facts. And then there is the task of adjusting the genetic to the logical elements in the problem of origins as well as in the problem of development of the person.

The difficulty with earlier theories has been the lack of the genetic point of view. Philosophers have been too exclusively logicians. Their explanations of this fact, the human person, have failed to recognize all of the facts of human experience as derived from the world in which we are. An explanation may start from an hypothesis, but that hypothesis must be based on the total situation in the world order. Now the facts, as well as the logic of our world, reveal a principle of development,—a creative act, carried out over a long series of related facts. We call this series the evolutionary process. Hence, in explaining this most mysterious fact, the person, the facts cannot be ignored any more than can the logic of it all.

As illustrations of the inadequacy of former attempts to explain the origin of the self, we need only cite the two outstanding

schools, the pantheists and the theists. One of the principal forms of pantheistic explanation of the person is the theory of emanation. According to this view the person or soul is an emanation of the World Being. The portion of being thrown off is a part of the original Being and is destined to be re-absorbed into that Being as the mist from the ocean must sooner or later "slip back into the shining sea." This form of explanation is hoary with age, and for that reason, if for no other, it commands our respect. But the reason for the inadequacy of such a view of this problem soon appears. It takes no account of the long series of related facts in the evolutionary process. Emanation is not development. The emanistic explanation does not consider the meaning of things in the light of the facts of development all about us.

The theistic type of explanation of the origin of personality regards all things as the result of the operations of a Creator who has purposively controlled and shaped them to definite ends. Many theists have recognized the principle of development in creation, but in dealing with this special problem of the origin of persons they tend to abandon the principle of development and to account for the appearance of the soul as an act of positing of the Supreme Being. When and where the Divine plan calls for it, then and there a human soul has its origin and begins its development. According to this conception the soul is not the outcome of its finite antecedents, but, by the Divine act of positing, is a new beginning in the series.

But this form of theism meets a fundamental difficulty: It must show how this act of positing is consistent with the creative methods employed by God as we observe them elsewhere. If God has made this universe and is operative in it, then in its material and spiritual aspects it must be all of a piece. In fact, the spiritual and material must, in some intimate fashion, be linked to and dependent upon each other, else He could not be in His world interacting with it. To say that God posits a human soul admits creation, it is true, but gives us no satisfaction as to the nature of the creative act by which the appearance of the soul is effected. Nor does it give us any light on

the nature of the relation between the creative activity and the created being. We should expect by a knowledge of this relation to be able to find in the creature some clue as to the essential nature of the Creator.

The law of creative activity is that every organism or being has been preceded by a definite preparation for its appearance through the operation of vital forces adapted to securing the origin of that particular organism. In accordance with this law we should expect the methods of creation employed by the Divine to consist of what we are familiar with under the term 'evolution.' Any theory of how a being such as the human person had its origin must reckon with this evident program of development. How can we say that all created things had their origin by the method of evolution except the human person which was brought into being independently of this method, and still claim that God operates in a manner consistent with His own being?

Certainly we are now in a position to see that we cannot seriously attempt any statement of this problem of the origin and development of persons without consulting the evolutionists. But in this problem of personality there are two uses which may be made of the principle of evolution. We may regard the person as a being given to us with certain mental principles which are gradually unfolding higher possibilities. This type of evolutionism is that of the logician. And then, on the other hand, these principles of development may be referred to a temporal process of building up a being out of the World elements. The latter is the genetic explanation. As a type of logical evolutionism we might refer to Bosanquet's conception of the individual in his Gifford Lectures.¹ Bergson's explanation derives its statement more explicitly from the developmental processes in the evolutionary series. We shall therefore refer more fully to Bergson's conception of the creative act, its meaning and its end.

In reviewing Bergson's position with this problem of person-

¹ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, Gifford Lectures for 1912 and 1913 respectively.

ality in mind, we should note in the first place that he uses the terms 'life' and 'consciousness' synonymously. Whatever may be our interpretation of terms, all who deal with problems such as personality, where all of the facts of life and being are involved, are obliged to use such expressions as 'consciousness' and 'conscious states'! As the writer understands Bergson's view, the essential nature of personality is life in the full meaning of the term which makes it synonymous with consciousness. This 'life' is, furthermore, the 'vital impetus.' Bergson is describing this vital impetus when he says, "Like eddies of dust raised by the wind as it passes, the living turn upon themselves, borne up by the great blast of life."¹ And this vital impetus, which is life, is the ultimate reality behind the creative act.

We are also familiar with Bergson's explanation of creation as an unwinding or releasing of the vital impetus. "The vision we have of the material world is that of a weight which falls: no image drawn from matter, properly so called, will ever give us the idea of the weight rising. All our analyses show us, in life, an effort to re-mount the incline that matter descends."² The activity which is revealed in the triumph of life over the resistance of matter is the essence of reality. The origin of this activity is referred to the 'vital impetus.' This is made to furnish the starting point where the reversal or unwinding process begins At the originating end of the series stands the 'vital impetus,' at the other end a 'consciousness' which some designate as 'personality.' As we review this process from the beginning, we find this creative energy, which is life, manifested in the increasingly proportionate importance of life energy, or consciousness, or spirit, in comparison with the matter involved. Beginning with the crude operations of nature where matter holds sway and vital energy is restricted, these proportions are gradually reversed as the creative evolution proceeds, until in man the life energy or spiritual force is much and the material is of little importance. And so the vital

¹ *Creative Evolution*, p. 128 (p. 165).

² *Ibid.*, p. 245.

impetus comes again into its own in the conscious activity of personality.

But if the 'vital impetus' is the creative factor in duration, we should be able to discern the unity, in the evolutionary series, of the essential nature of that form of being there in the 'fire mist,' with the form of being here at the other end in personality. But for Bergson this 'vital impetus' is not of the essential nature of personality. For he holds that this vital impetus "in the rôle of life is to insert some indetermination into matter. Indeterminate, *i. e.*, unforeseeable are the forms it creates in the course of its evolution."¹ But personality foresees, and moves in the realm of purposes and ends.

But when the creative element at one end of the process is postulated as not of the essential nature of the creative being at the other, then we are at a complete loss to find the meaning of the one in terms of the other. And the creature must get its meaning from the creator. Here we must insist that the order be not inverted. Otherwise any explanation of personality would be left without meaning and would suffer shipwreck. The essential nature of the World Being must yield the mystery of the essential nature of personality. In order to do this the World Being must furnish the elements sufficient to account for personality, elements which are inherently worthy of profoundest respect.

It is just here that Bergson's 'vital impetus' lacks what Bosanquet's conception of 'individuality' has to contribute,—namely, that individuality is characterized by purposes, needs, and ideals, in the attainment of which the finite individual is raised into relation with the Absolute Individual. But the means of this attainment is the creative process, or evolution. So that we might say that the two views just referred to supplement each other, and yet neither one offers a solution of the problem as to how the origin of personality is related to the evolutionary process, nor how we are to interpret the possibility of the similarity of the Divine Person and the human person, in the light of the creative process, nor what part the evolutionary

¹ *Creative Evolution*, p. 126.

process plays in the attainment of the human personality to the possibilities of the Absolute.

We have thus far arrived at the conviction that personality, this fact of much mystery, did not appear unannounced, but that great preparation was made for it. We still face the questions, however, as to what sort of a process it was which this preparation involved, and what was the relation of that process to the nature of personality and to its development. All of us are more or less familiar with the process of evolution already briefly referred to. Let us then refer to it again in connection with these urgent problems concerning the Divine method of bringing persons into being. In the development of persons, it serves to bring forth more highly complex and clearer states of consciousness corresponding to more highly and complexly organized nervous centers, as the demands of the environment become greater in number and importance. The nature of conscious states corresponds to the complexity of nervous organization because of the fact that the adaptation to environment is secured by means of the nervous system, whose function is to coördinate the various parts of the organism in its reactions to its environment. As this nervous mechanism becomes more complex the conscious states become clearer, so that the organism is able to secure more complex adjustments, leading to greater clarity of consciousness, and so forth through the cycle until we might say that the complete series of elements necessary to a being of fixed ideas had been mastered. By fixed ideas we mean the instinctive states of consciousness which *know* certain facts necessary to the existence of the organism simply because the organism moves in, and its conscious life is confined to, the reaction to these particular facts. But if we should come to an order of being which *knows* things from without, moving amongst things, and is not confined just to its reaction with them, then we would have a totally different kind of ideas, representing another kind of environment, as we shall indicate directly. This other environment is apprehended by reason of the greater refinement of the conscious states of a being whose nervous organization is complex enough to make free ideas possible.

Without raising the question as to the quality of consciousness in fixed and free ideas, let us turn to the problem of their divergence. All of the adaptation represented in fixed ideas has to do with physical things. All instinctive forms of consciousness are bound to the material interests of a physical environment. The adaptation represented by free ideas calls for a different element,—even for a different environment. This element is that which is represented in the very unfolding of the vital processes and which requires us to postulate a Self-Conscious Will in order to account for the *direction* in the organization of these processes,—that is, the spiritual.

And now, bearing in mind that this spiritual element is that which uses the principle of development known as evolution as its method, we now say that this process of gradual development proceeds toward the requisite complexity of nervous organization which shall make possible the reaction of the organism to a spiritual environment. And just as knowledge of any kind is gained through reaction to environment and the nature of that knowledge depends on the nature of the environment, so the extent of spiritual knowledge and its nature depend upon the spiritual elements in that environment to which we react. To be spiritually minded means to be willing to go to the limit of the possibilities made available by the spiritual environment. Only to such are the highest reaches of the spiritual life possible. All this should be said in the same spirit in which we would remark that skill in scientific things can only be acquired by the scientifically minded.

The criticism that this form of explanation makes the person the product of neural activity is met by keeping in mind the fact that these free ideas are spiritual affairs *accompanied* by a highly complex neural organization. In some strange way they have their root in and take their start from the nervous system, but these particular states of consciousness are free in the sense that, being no longer fixed to a kind of reaction to environment, they move freely *amongst* the elements of their environment and so become independent of time and space. In this way these states become the means of expression of a

being which is not limited by time or space, but which is self-conscious activity. And this kind of being we call a person. The creation of persons, then, is not by emanation, organized function, organic heredity, nor by an act of positing, but occurs as the culmination of a process of creation by development or evolution.

But still the question may be raised: What has been gained on this hypothesis in the way of clearer knowledge concerning the relation of the nature of the created person to the nature of ultimate reality as it is in God? Is not that ultimate reality lost in the long series? Would not the nature of human personality be nearer the nature of Divine personality in the conception of a special or outright creation? We think not. We think much has been gained in our conception of God, as He is, by our comprehension of the process by which we came into being. And these facts come to us in self-conscious activity, that is, in a knowledge of ourselves. This participation in the nature of the reality of the Divine Person through the various aspects of human personal experience is the truth that is referred to in poetic form when the Old Testament Scriptures state that we are made in God's image. The importance of the relation of the nature of human beings as creatures and of the Divine Person as Creator, inheres in the very nature of personality. Intelligence may be enough to explain the existence of a watch. But the case of personality stands in a different light. For personality can only be explained in terms of its own activity, which is self-conscious. The nature of our personality is the essence of His being. We are kind of His kind. Those ancient temporal and spatial forms still haunt us, but in this conception of personality as spiritual being, their solicitations prove futile, for we discover that we are spirit as God is.

For a way of illustrating this deep mystery in concrete form, we are accustomed to turn to electrical mechanism. In electricity we have an essence known only by what it *does*. In this respect it is like the mind, and helps us to see what we have gained in the meaning of the relation of the method and process of the creative act to the nature of personality, human and

Divine. For, after all is said of such phenomena as electricity and personality, we must be finally content with observing what they *do*. Activity is the ultimate criterion of their nature.

But now let us examine this creative act a bit more closely in order to see more clearly if possible what this strange fact of personality may be. We have already referred to evolution as the creative method of God. We might now say that this method supplies us with the mechanism by which He would more fully realize Himself in a reproduction of Himself by the creation of other persons. The organisms which comprise the total creation series include not only the transmission mechanism but the two end mechanisms of origination and delivery, in the creative processes. Some will say, however, that while they can see how God's nature may be seen in human personality, the latest outcome of the creative mechanism, they cannot see how God could be revealed in the originating end where all was 'fire-mist.' Human personality, in its thought processes, reveals spiritual forces, but not those primordial operations. We must keep in mind, however, that personality is known by what it does whether in thoughts or in fire-mist. Personality is *the totality of what it does*. Personality whether human or Divine is not a cross section of a moment's conscious existence. It is the totality of its appearances. It is organic in its nature. It is all that it has done. And if we could shake us free from the temporal and spatial limitations, we should say that personality is the totality of all its manifestations in all its existence. We could do this, too, without ignoring the individuality of finite persons in a definite relationship to the Infinite Person.

And so in whatever part of the mechanism we may find something doing, we may rest assured that God is there. But many sincere souls are prone to lose sight of God in the mechanism and would do away with the idea of God. And it is true that the evolutionary series does not look like God, any more than electrical machinery looks like electricity. Neither does a mechanism always reveal just what it is for. One may look at the transmission wire and say that there is no light there. Or one may place the ear very close to the telephone wire and say that

there is no voice. But go to the transmitter and hear the voice! That is the appropriate instrument for revealing the activity throbbing in the entire mechanism. All in between is simply a preparation and means for the reproduction of the voice. Thus one may look along the evolutionary line from the fire-mist to the apes and say that there is no personality there. There are brains to be sure, but we must go to man's brain for the thoughts of God surging through it all! That is the instrument for which all the rest has been a preparation, and which, in turn, is adapted to the revelation of the nature of God's personality, which is spirit.

How or where the originating end of the creative mechanism works we do not see clearly, for we are the transmitting end. As yet we are only learning to see a little way back through the creative mechanism. What it is at God's end of the mechanism that corresponds to our brains and by means of which He communicates His personal energy to the mechanism, we do not know. It will probably be necessary for us that we shall have comprehended the entire process before we can attain to such knowledge. From the standpoint of our finite limitations in this life, a large task is awaiting us somewhere.

Because a 'person' is a spiritual thing, we become impatient of the material, spatial and temporal. We would have God posit a human personality and have it all over with. Some of us even seem to feel that any other kind of a theory would somehow rob God of something. Or we seem to fear that we might lose sight of God in such a long, labyrinthine process. We want the event to follow closely in time upon the Almighty Fiat. All the while we overlook the notion to which we subscribe, in other connections, that with God a day is as a thousand years and a thousand years is as a day. No! No! Let us with full confidence face the long stretches of the creative plan by which preparation was made for the reproduction of Divine possibilities in us.

Within human personality, then, the Divine personality is being revealed. With all our problems and difficulties, with all our failures and possibilities, our life is God's. In Him we

live and move and have our being. Our nature is His nature. In our defeats He shares. In our victories He triumphs. As He *does so do we*.

But with all this before us, we turn again in deep perplexity to the creation series, for we would know its further purpose. Now that we have free ideas why not be content with them and let the rest be gone? This is practically the solution of the subjective idealists, who deny the reality of matter and identify thoughts and things. And why the persistence of numberless varieties of life forms? If gradual preparation was made through lower forms for the higher, until the highest was reached in human personality, then why not have just man as the result of the creative act?

Simply that the persisting stages in the complete process, and the presence of the parts of the total mechanism may, by study on the part of human personality, accomplish for it what the mechanism accomplished for God in its creation, *i. e.*, personal development. That is, as human personality by investigation retraces the creation series, it realizes its own development through self-expression, just as God realizes His development through self-expression in creation. For God's need of self-expression is evidently imperative, as reflected in the nature of the evolutionary process. And so the human person, on his end of the process, is furnished with the means of his own development in unravelling the course of his creation and finding his way back to God in the discovery of larger truth.

Personality could not develop if it had nothing to learn and took no delight in the fulness of truth. And the things to be learned, the way to truth, is in the variety of facts supplied by the creative process, which may be regarded as the method employed to bring personality into being. The very possibility of personality was the condition of its origin, and its continued presence implies development.

And, once having come into existence, there can be no development of personality without this variety of environment. For development in the person stands for the same thing that evolution represents in the complete creative act. In his develop-

ment the person realizes the long processes of evolution within himself. It is not exactly the recapitulation theory that we have in mind just here, but two related facts,—*variety* in the environment furnished by the persisting elements of the creative process, and the *preservation* of the various stages in the creative process. In the presence of these two facts, human personality becomes involved in a seemingly endless quest for all of the elements which comprise the complete creative act. As in mountain climbing, when the ascent of one peak reveals new ranges beyond, so the mastery of one realm of creation yields to developing personality a vision of new reaches to be mastered. And these adventures in search of new facts and larger truth are life for him. In meeting the problems and difficulties of adjusting himself to the truth, and of bending the creative forces to his service, the human person discovers unlimited possibilities of development.

Then, too, the principle of interaction, which is recognized as a factor in progressive evolution, and which is made possible by the survivals of the creative process, is an element which plays a definite part in the development of persons. The highest and most productive type of interaction is that which takes place between one person and another. But we should clearly recognize that the form of interaction between the higher and lower elements in the evolutionary series is just as useful. And, in fact, in this problem of finding the meaning of the relation of the nature of personality to the creative process this lower type of interaction is as essential and indispensable as the higher. For the creative process is all one act. The larger, therefore, the number of interactions, the more comprehensive is our conception of that complete act.

In all these ways, through the persistence of past forms, we as persons are able to follow back through the creative process and, in a very real way, are permitted to observe the details of the means employed to bring personality into being. In our own activity there is an organic connection established between us and all that has gone before. It is as though God were saying to us: All this you are *plus* personality.

Now, whenever we gain a better understanding of how person-

ality originated, we make a gain in the meaning of personality for us, and of the nature of its reality. For reality gives us the terms of truth, and the satisfaction which truth brings represents the apprehension or appropriation of the thoughts of God by a human person. According to this view, the appearance of any fact in the creative series is a reality. And as it is given meaning in the total order of things it is the truth. Therefore the value of the genetic approach to the problem of personality is that any new light as to the conditions and circumstances of the appearance of a factual element in personality gives a fresh clue to the nature of personality. It is true that we must take account of personality as it is now constituted. The logical study of personality is positively necessary. The investigation of problems of personality cannot dispense with it. According to the foregoing conception, however, personality has arisen in development and is itself developing. It is ever passing from one stage of existence to a more advanced one. Therefore the genetic and the logical problems are supplementary. As the genetic contribution cannot complete the statement of the problems of personality, neither can the logical statement make a beginning without the genetic approach. Each is essential to the fullest possible understanding of the nature of personality.

How much of the Divine Person we actually comprehend is not at all certain. But this we must admit, that whatever we may know of Him, we must know in the activity of our own personality. We are aware of an ability to interact with this material world we live in, through our brains and nervous systems. As we have already remarked, just what the agency is, corresponding to our brains, by which the Absolute Person interacts with the material order, is beyond us. It may be that no such agency is needed, but that for Him thought and thing are identified, and that the full truth is implicitly His own. At any rate, we are convinced that in contemplation of the whole creative act we are getting increasing light on the mystery of our existence. And as we gain a clearer view of the origin, and, thereby, the nature of our own personality, we are gaining a clearer conception of God.

ERNEST A. RAYNER.

THE NON-SENSUOUS KNOWLEDGE OF REALITY.

A STUDY IN NEO-REALIST EPISTEMOLOGY.

IDEALISM is regarded by many of its exponents as well as by many of its critics as emphasizing the subjective side of knowledge to the exclusion of the objective, as asserting "that all objects are mental" and taking no account of "those daily recurring motives that force us to distinguish after all two somehow contrasted groups of entities, the material and the ideal."¹ The ground for this one-sided interpretation of idealism is to be found in its historical antecedents. Locke, following the scientific speculations of his time, had distinguished between the primary qualities of objects as those residing permanently in the object, and the secondary qualities as those which are due to the action of the primary qualities on the senses; Berkeley had taken up the primary qualities also into the subjective realm; Hume had argued that the categories of the understanding are likewise subjective; and Kant had completed this subjectivistic process by taking up into the subject the forms of space and time which alone had remained to the object. Kant had however retained on the objective side the empty conception of the transcendent object or thing-in-itself. But inasmuch as the Cartesian distinction of thought and extension had become a distinction within the realm of consciousness itself, the division of the universe into the two absolutely distinct spheres of consciousness and the object which transcends consciousness becomes a purely fictitious one. Hegel therefore denied the existence of the unknowable object or thing-in-itself and held that the ideal is the real, that the object in consciousness is the only object. Kant had held that all that is known is mental or phenomenal, and that reality is unknown and unknowable. In denying the existence of this transcendent reality Hegel did not mean that all that is is mental or phenomenal, but simply that we can and

¹ E. B. Holt, *The Concept of Consciousness*, p. 83.

do know reality itself and are not limited in knowledge to some mental, unreal, 'ideal,' counterpart or copy thereof. The idealism which Professor Holt criticizes is the subjective idealism of Berkeley, which denies the existence of matter, and not the objective idealism of Hegelianism, which asserts the reality of the material world but holds that it is not external to mind "but only 'external' in the sense that it consists of objects outside of one another spatially or of events external to one another" temporally.¹ The Hegelian identification of reality with the world of ideas does not, therefore, mean the reduction of reality to ideas "which have neither extension, shape, size, motion, colour, sound, odour, taste nor touch";² it means that ideas of this sort are dismissed as the fictions of a dualistic epistemology and that the human mind is recognized as being, in any act of consciousness, in direct contact with reality itself.

Granted then that the object of consciousness is known directly and not through the intermediation of 'ideas,' it follows that it is the object itself and not any 'idea of the object' merely that is in the mind when an object is known. This fact supplies the basis for the American neo-realist doctrine of mind and of ideas, a strictly monistic doctrine³ which, nevertheless, seeks to achieve monism not by denying the reality whether of mind or of matter,⁴ but by analyzing the elements of experience until we find them resolving themselves into the same fundamental concepts.⁵ Now in experience there are to be found some entities called matter or physical bodies, others called soul or mind, and still others called universals, such as logical and mathematical concepts, the laws of science, propositions, qualities, ideas, feelings, emotions, and the like.⁶ But physical reality is, as recent

¹ John Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, p. 77.

² Holt, *The Concept of Consciousness*, p. 141.

³ English neo-realism, while it relegates propositions, concepts, etc., to the objective sphere, retains on the subjective side the activity of consciousness. It is thus really dualistic. But American neo-realism, as represented by Professors Perry and Holt, seeks to explain the activity of consciousness as well as its content objectively. It is therefore strictly monistic.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 75, 77, 155, etc.

developments in physics indicate, complex and decomposable into simpler terms and relations, such as stresses, tensions, vibrations, electrical charges, capacities, masses, and so forth. The minute atom, the 'microscopic tennis ball' of materialistic physics has disappeared. But the denial of 'matter' as a distinct substance is not a denial of the existence of real objects but only a denial of "the stuff that philosophy has declared these objects to be made of; . . . the hidden and unattainable bearer of colours, sounds, smells, motions, energies and masses which alone are the objects of our experience."¹ It is further to be noticed that these entities are not only the constituent elements of the physical world, without any "trace of an unanalyzed material residue," but they are also the constituent elements of our conscious experience.² "In other words, in so far as I divide them into elements, the contents of my mind exhibit no generic character. . . . It is only with respect to their groupings and interrelations that the elements of mental content exhibit any peculiarity."³ "The same elements," viz., sensible qualities and logical categories, "compose both mind and body" so that "instead of conceiving reality as divided absolutely between two impenetrable spheres, we may conceive it as a field of interpenetrating relationships, among which those described by physics and psychology are the most familiar and typical, and those described by logic the most simple and universal."⁴ The elements which compose reality, *i. e.*, the neutral entities, are neither physical nor psychical; they are called physical or psychical according to the nature of the complex in which they appear. Mars is psychical "in relation to my perceiving activity, . . . my memories, plans, feelings, etc.;" it is physical "by virtue of its volume and its distance from the sun."⁵

The peculiar merit which this explanation of mind claims is not that it has assimilated the physical to the psychical or *vice versa*, but that it has assimilated both to a neutral substance out of which it can construct both the physical and the psychical

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 115, 122, and *passim*.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 166-8.

³ R. B. Perry, *Present Philosophic Tendencies*, p. 277.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 311.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 312.

realm without presupposing on the one hand an unknowable substratum of Matter or on the other an unknowable substratum of Mind. In other words, neo-realism believes "that it will be possible to frame a deductive system . . . consisting of terms and propositions" (*i. e.*, logical entities) "as premises, and themselves not conscious, not made of conscious or 'ideal' stuff, such that all the essential features of consciousness will follow as logical consequences."¹ Given, then, a universe of neutral entities, *i. e.*, of universals, in various degrees of combination and organization, the task of neo-realist epistemology is to "derive the 'knowledge' relation without assuming it in our premises."² Not only are we not to look in the physical world for 'microscopic tennis balls,' we are also not to look in the psychical world for a 'ghost' haunting the house of the brain.³ The neural system, however, while it is not the seat of any ghostly knower, is necessary to the existence of psychical phenomena.⁴ "Elements become mental content," we are told, "when reacted to in the specific manner characteristic of the central nervous system."⁵ But while the neural system is one term in the knowledge relation, the other term is the wide, wide world as well as other minds, and these are obviously not inside my skull. And as for the supposed mutual exclusiveness of minds, this is but a myth, leading if held to pure solipsism.⁶ Mind or consciousness, then, as defined by Professor Holt, is a field of objects selected from the environment by the response-activity of the neural organism. The cross-section of the environment "defined by the specific reaction of reflex-arcs is the psychic realm:—it is the manifold of our sensations, perceptions, and ideas:—it is consciousness."⁷ Professor Perry, it is true, draws special attention to the distinction between the action and the content of consciousness, between "thinking and thought, perceiving and percept, remembering and memory"⁸; but the action here

¹ Holt, *The Concept of Consciousness*, p. 86 f.

² *Ibid.*, p. 136.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

⁵ Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 299.

⁶ Holt, *The Concept of Consciousness*, pp. 88, 150 ff.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

⁸ Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 274 f.

referred to is not that of a soul or spirit seated in the brain and choosing a course of action; it is for Professor Perry as for Professor Holt the behavior of the physical organism,¹ the reaction of the neural system to stimuli.² To be perfectly consistent, however, in his use of language Professor Perry should not call such action 'mental.' As we have seen, elements become 'mental' "when reacted to in the specific manner characteristic of the central nervous system." The content of mind, then, is to be found not within the nervous system but without.³ Now what Professor Perry means by 'mental action' is not the action of a more or less organized complex called mind; it is the action of the neural organism whereby this mental complex is constituted, and does not itself appear as content of mind. It is true that "the bodily process which in my own experience functions as mental action and does not appear as content" may nevertheless appear as the content of another mind.⁴ But it is not an activity of that other mind but is itself an object or event to which the physical organism of that other person is responding. It is thus content of consciousness, never conscious activity. Mind, then, it would seem, has no activity of its own; it is always object, never subject; a complex of known (*i. e.*, selected) entities, but never knower. The subject or knower is for neo-realism not the mind but the body.⁵

But to speak of the body as knower is as misleading as to speak of the behavior of the body as mental action. Professor Holt does indeed define the knowing process as the manner in which a cross-section is defined by response. But if this means that it is the neural organism which knows, we are back once more to the "long since discredited 'subcutaneous' mind,"⁶ and the question of pre-Kantian epistemology rises again; how it is that the knower, though limited to an individual organism, nevertheless knows objects outside of that organism. To call the body the knower is to identify knowing with the movements

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 298.

² *Ibid.*, p. 303.

³ Holt, *The Concept of Consciousness*, p. 182.

⁴ Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 298.

⁵ E. B. Holt, *The Freudian Wish and its Place in Ethics*.

⁶ Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 303.

and behavior of the neural organism and to ignore the characteristic feature of knowledge, viz., the presence in consciousness of the field of objects to which the organism is responding. But if to know means to have a certain content 'in consciousness,' the knower must be that which contains, that which is conscious of its content. Now the content of consciousness is the field of objects responded to by a neural organism and these objects are clearly a content not of that organism but of the field of objects itself. On the neo-realist definition of mind or consciousness as the cross-section selected from the environment by the response-activity of a neural organism, it would follow that the conscious entity or knower is none other than this cross-section itself, and the known is its content. In other words, a strict epistemological monism must identify mind and object, knower and known. With this interpretation of the neo-realist conception of mind objective idealism is in virtual agreement. As Professor Hoernlé constantly maintains, to identify reality and mind, as idealism does, is to claim that anything and everything that is to be found in a mind is and belongs to reality, and this is the important attitude of objective idealism. It is likewise the important attitude of neo-realism. The problem of modern epistemology is no longer to explain how it is possible to pass from a solipsistic world of ideas to knowledge of reality, but to explain how, since the content of mind is reality itself, there arise in mind errors, imperfections, and a sense of finitude. It is in their answer to this question that idealism and realism differ. For idealism tends in some sense to identify finite minds with an Absolute Mind, and thus seems to make the problem of finitude and error more difficult than it is for neo-realism which frankly regards mind as a contingent, finite feature of reality.

The problem of the finitude of knowledge, or more correctly of the sense of finitude, arises most clearly in connection with the neo-realist doctrine of ideas. The problem is this: If the content of consciousness is reality itself, how are we to account for the sense of discrepancy between knowledge and reality? For if the wider reality, in contrast with which knowledge is seen to be imperfect, is not in consciousness, that which is in consciousness cannot be compared with it, while if it is in con-

sciousness, then the discrepancy between it and knowledge disappears. Can either neo-realism or objective idealism, with their doctrine of the identity of knowledge and reality, of idea and object, solve this problem? Can either theory offer any justification for the use of the word 'idea,' since this word embodies the popular notion that knowledge and reality are not one? "Everyone except a philosopher," says Mr. Bertrand Russell,¹ "can see the difference between a post and my idea of a post." What is the difference? Can it be clearly stated?

There is this distinction recognized by neo-realism between object and idea, that objects exist independently of being known; it is only in respect of being known that objects are ideas. "It is only necessary to conceive of idea as an office or relationship, instead of as a kind of substance. It is then possible to suppose that a thing may occupy that office or relationship, and thus assume the status of idea, without being identified with it. . . . But this does not at all imply that whatever assumes the status of idea, must be idea in order to be at all, or that there are no things that are not ideas."² But while it is held that things need not be known in order to exist, *i. e.*, that there are things that are not ideas, it is likewise held that ideas are nothing but things "in respect of being known" and indeed that there is no ground "for asserting that there is any term of the bodily complex that is disqualified from entering the mental complex."³ "There are no such two things as knowledge and the object of knowledge, or thought and the thing thought of."⁴ "The logic of the situation is simply this, . . . nothing can represent a thing (in mind) but that thing itself."⁵ And this holds true of space and time as of all other objects. What we know is not symbols which are neither spatial nor temporal, but actual space and actual time themselves. Spatial ideas, for example, "have just the size and occupy just the positions of the objects that the subject is said to have experienced."⁶ But a complication im-

¹ *Principles of Mathematics*, p. 451.

² Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 124 f.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

⁴ Holt, *The Concept of Consciousness*, p. 148.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

mediately enters. "We must conclude," says Professor Holt, "that the adequate idea of a minute or of an hour is just a minute or an hour. . . . It is to be further asserted that an adequate idea of a year would be just a year long, but it need not be affirmed that a person ever has an adequate idea of a year, any more than he ever has an adequate idea of a thousand miles."¹ "Knowledge, truly, never is complete; our ideas, therefore, are never completely identical with the objects. Hence we have become wedded . . . to the phrase,—my thought is of an object—when we ought to say and mean—my thought is a portion of the object—or better still,—a portion of the object is my thought."² Thus in the same breath we are assured that object and idea are identical and yet that they are never completely identical; that spatial ideas have just the size of the objects that the subject is said to have experienced, and yet that it need not be affirmed that any one has an adequate idea of a thousand miles; and that "it is true in the exact sense that our knowledge of the pre-Christian era, like our knowledge of celestial space, is representative, that is, it is immediate knowledge as far as it goes," but "the correspondence is incomplete."³ Now it is readily to be admitted that we do not have an adequate idea of the pre-Christian era or of celestial space or even of one year; but how do we come to know that we lack this knowledge? I have an 'idea' of a thousand years, and according to the neo-realist view this means none other than that a 'thousand years' is in my consciousness. But my idea is inadequate, *i. e.*, the 'thousand years' is not all there, is only partly there. Now I know only what is in consciousness,⁴ hence I do not know the 'thousand years' but only a portion of it, the order, perhaps, of some of the events that took place during that period, and to that portion of the 'thousand years' I wrongly give the name of the whole. But if I know only a certain series of events and certain dates, what do I mean by saying that this is not the 'thousand years' which I do not know? What is the unknown

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 146 f.

² *Ibid.*, p. 149.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 87.

X with which I compare what I do know in order to pronounce my knowledge incomplete? And how can I compare that which I do know with this 'unknown' X unless I know it also? It does not save the realist position to maintain that "the order of some of the events that take place through long intervals of time" is identical with the order of those events as they are in my knowledge¹ or that the knowledge-mass of some locality is identical with those parts of that locality of which it is the knowledge,² for in that case what we should say is that the object of our knowledge is not a century but just those events in that order in which they occur in consciousness; and again is not some distant town but just those features of it which are in consciousness. I might call the one a 'century' and the other 'Paris'; but I could not know that these are not the real century and the real Paris unless I knew the reals as well as the inadequate ideas. But Professor Holt urges that "in respect to the omissions knowledge is not representative: in fact there is no knowledge,"³ so that we are supposed to know that there are omissions in our knowledge although the omitted elements are not only absent themselves but are not in any way represented. Professor Perry's explanation that "the selective action of consciousness . . . as it includes or excludes, also defines characteristic fragments, foreshortenings, and assemblages of things, that may not coincide with physical and logical lines of cleavage,"⁴ equally fails to explain our sense of the fragmentariness of our knowledge; for (1) the only person who can know that what my consciousness has selected is fragmentary is he who knows the whole at the same time;⁵ while (2), on the realistic hypothesis that relations are external and that minds and physical bodies are chance groupings of neutral entities some of which may be common to both,⁶ the fact that the complex constituted by the selective action of my consciousness differs from physical or

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

² *Ibid.*, p. 231 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁴ Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 323 f.

⁵ See Holt, *The Concept of Consciousness*, p. 260. Cf. p. 87.

⁶ Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 310 and *passim*.

logical groupings (supposing me to know both, which is *ex hypothesi* not the case), is no ground for calling it fragmentary, since there is no reason why the lines of cleavage in the two cases should be alike. It seems quite evident that on this hypothesis the only person who could be aware of the fragmentariness of knowledge, the inadequacy of ideas, the failure of any known object or entity or grouping thereof to coincide with physical or logical lines of cleavage, would be one who has within his own consciousness not only (1) the inadequate idea which is within the mind of the other and (2) the more inclusive reality, but also (3) the 'intention' of the first person, *i. e.*, his purpose to 'mean' that wider reality which is *ex hypothesi* not in his consciousness. For as Professor Royce points out,¹ there can be no question of correspondence between my idea (*i. e.*, what is in my mind) and some reality beyond my mind (in the sense of being partly unachieved), unless I purpose by my idea that wider reality; or, to use Professor Perry's language, unless I "mistake fiction" (*i. e.*, what is fashioned by the selective activity of the physical organism) "for fact"² (*i. e.*, some physical or logical grouping which the subject had intended to select). That portion of Paris which is in my knowledge-mass is an 'inadequate idea' of Paris only if I intend by it—take it to mean—the whole of Paris, which must also somehow form part of my knowledge-mass. But this 'intention' involves complications far beyond the first simple identification by neo-realism of idea with reality. Professor Holt's exposition of the fact that objects may have their location in an individual's knowledge system and at the same time their distinct location in the time and space system, and that the two systems are identical in that portion where the two coincide and there only,³ helps us not at all, for (1) it does not account for the fact that in order to contrast the two systems we must know both:—indeed Professor Holt denies knowledge of "that more comprehensive system which should include both";⁴ and (2) it fails to explain why

¹ *The World and the Individual*, I, pp. 306 ff., 319 ff.

² Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 325.

³ Holt, *The Concept of Consciousness*, pp. 233 f., 236.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 236.

that portion of the object which is in consciousness should not be content to be what it is but should 'mean' or 'refer to' a wider whole which is partly beyond consciousness.

This second problem is thus stated by Professor Hoernlé,¹ "that we are and can be conscious of objects whose nature and existence we do not regard as simply identical with the nature and existence of our own states of consciousness." Or as Professor John Watson puts it,² "The consciousness of an object as existing outside of the particular apprehension in which it is said to be revealed cannot be identified with the particular state of the individual conscious subject. . . . If the particular conscious subject can only say that at this moment there is presented to him a tree he cannot tell what may happen the next moment. Hence the consciousness that the tree is real implies that the subject has the capacity of going beyond the immediate sensation which he now experiences." This fact, to which Professor Hoernlé has given the name of the "self transcension of consciousness," is attributed by idealism to the "universalizing power of the mind"; for sensible experience, as Professor Watson tells us,³ "is not the mere apprehension of this thing as here and now, but it is implicitly the comprehension of the thing as capable of existing in any here and now." Our problem, then, is to explain how we can in any single act apprehend an object as existing apart from that act; in other words, in what sense the object is present to consciousness when, although not present to sense, it is yet known to exist. Now it is to be noted in this connection that the object, even when present to sense, is only partly sensed,—the greater part of its qualities are really present in the form of thought. I see only part of the table at which I write; and the process by which I infer to the rest of the table is the same as the process whereby I infer the existence of the papers in the drawer where I remember having put them, and of the sun by whose reflected light I see such portion of the table as lies within the range of my vision: for be it noted that the larger part of the table as well as the papers in the drawer

¹ *Mind*, 1907, p. 81.

² *The Interpretation of Religious Experience*, II, p. 60.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

and the sun in the sky are at the present moment in no wise sensibly present to me and yet they are in my consciousness.

With this statement the neo-realist will not entirely agree. For while it is to the merit of neo-realism to have urged that the object of knowledge is in any instance a real entity and not an 'ideal,' *i. e.*, unreal, copy thereof, the new realism has not entirely freed itself from the materialistic presuppositions of the older realism which refuses the name 'real' to any but the sensible elements of reality. Thus Professor Perry¹ maintains that if I speak of the sun when I do not see it, the sun itself is not in my consciousness but only the word 'sun' and the response to that word of my neural organism, whether the word be heard, seen, or only kinaesthetically imaged. This response, however, is related to the real sun in this way, that it takes the form of a motor-set in nerves and brain directed toward the sun, a preparedness to see the sun or to act in reference to it. Now it has been already granted by both idealism and realism that in 'thought about' or 'knowledge of' any object, a real entity and not an unreal counterpart thereof is in consciousness. But when the sun is not visibly present to me it does not explain my 'thought' of the sun to say that the sun is present only as a word and neural response to that word, for the actual sun must somehow be an object of thought in order that I may discriminate between the sun and the word 'sun' which stimulates in me a motor set or preparedness to see the sun. If the real sun is not present to consciousness, how do I know that it is the real sun which the word 'sun' predisposes me to see? How indeed do I know the real sun at all? What is it that I know when I know there is a real sun over and above the word and the cortical-set? In a similar way Professor Holt defines the meaning of the word 'door' as the response of the neural organism to that word, its incipient motion toward the door, and apparently fails to consider that the psychologically untrained mind, when it hears so familiar a word, is seldom aware of the word, practically never of any motor-set in nerves or brain, but is always aware of the

¹ For some of the views attributed to Professors Perry and Holt I can refer to no printed article but only to discussions in the seminar conducted at Harvard University by Professor Hoernlé during the session of 1915-16.

actual entity door, even when the eyes see and the hands touch none. The attempt of neo-realism to find some sensuous entity or psychical image in consciousness as the 'meaning' of words which refer to absent objects is open to the same objection as was raised against that type of idealist psychology which assures us that we have in such cases 'mere ideas' only and not real things in our mind. In both cases knowledge of real things is tacitly admitted in the very attempt to explain in what form those real things are known.¹ The only way to meet this problem is to admit frankly that an entity can be in consciousness really (*realiter*) and not merely as 'idea' or 'cortical-set' even when it is not present in perception; in other words we have to admit the conceptual or non-sensuous knowledge of reality. The psychological phenomena of stimulus and response, of kinaesthetic and other images, of cortical-set, and so on, have won for themselves recognition as genuine scientific facts, but they tell us only half the story of cognition, that, viz., of the neural organism. The other half of the story is to be sought in the nature of the environment itself. To seek for a psychical image or cortical-set as the meaning of any word when the object meant is not present in perception is a point of view bound up with the misleading limitation of the word 'knower' to the body, and is surely a superfluous attempt in a theory which frankly identifies consciousness with the field of objects responded to. Moreover the difficulty—if such it is—is with us even in connection with objects given in perception, for I never sense the whole of any object and yet the whole of a perceived object is admittedly in consciousness. The real problem of modern epistemology is not to find a sensual counterpart for every object present to thought, but to determine what is the extent and rôle of sensation in consciousness; not to explain how the neural organism can ever respond not only to immediate stimuli but also to the wide, wide world—including logical, *i. e.*, non-physical, entities as well as physical,—not, that is to say, to explain how the body can know; but to show what part the brain and nerves play in a mind which both neo-realism and objective idealism

¹ Compare what Prof. Hoernlé has to say on this very point in a very interesting article in *Mind* for 1907, p. 78 and *passim*.

agree in identifying with the objects of consciousness. For the logic both of the historical development of philosophic thought and also of recent speculation has compelled the abandonment of what Professor Perry calls the 'sub-cutaneous' mind.

What then is mind and what part does the neural organism play in mind? "The phenomena called mental," says Professor Holt, "are those involved in knowledge," but knowledge is defined precisely as the "manner in which a cross-section is defined by response,"¹ in other words "mind or soul in some way or other depends on the nervous system"² so that knowledge always associates itself with the response of a neural organism to its environment. Now neo-realism is by no means to be thought of as limiting mind to the brain,—far otherwise!—and yet, as we have seen, it tends to the view not only that whatever is known has its physiological counterpart in the neural organism, but further that the object known is present physiologically or as cortical-set only when it is not present to sense. We have however seen reason for refusing to limit consciousness to merely sensational elements. Whoever or whatever we are who know, it seems quite clear that we know much which is not present to sense and indeed much that can never be so presented, although it may be represented in sense by conventional symbols and by words. In other words, not only does knowledge include the 'external' world, but many entities are known that are debarred by their very nature or position from affecting the neural system. But if so we can no longer speak of the body as knower and the environment as known. We may speak of the one as subject and the other as object of the response relation in the sense that the one may be viewed as moving towards or from the other; but this does not mean that it is the body or brain which knows, which is conscious. The conscious entity is the 'brain-environment complex.' The situation in which any one may be said to know or be conscious of something is much the same as when an observer watches some other organism respond to its environment, except that in the former case the observer is the complex observing elements which constitute

¹ Holt, *The Concept of Consciousness*, p. 179.

² *Ibid.*, p. 182, 188.

itself, whereas in the latter case it is observing elements which constitute another response situation. Each neural organism thus by its very existence and response-activity constitutes an ever-shifting complex through the ever-varying relationships into which it enters with its environment, and we are to think of a logical as well as of a temporal and spatial environment. The non-sensuous knowledge of reality means the presence of elements in this complex without their being in direct contact with the neural organism, the fact that they are nevertheless known being due to the fact that it is not the neural organism which is the knower but the 'organism-environment complex.' This conception of consciousness, viz., as an added character neither of brain nor of any merely physical complex but of the complex constituted by the response of a brain to its environment, explains a number of other puzzling situations.

1. It explains why a sensational element is always present in consciousness, since on this theory a neural organism is an ever present constituent of any mind. It is however to be borne in mind that the sense of immediacy and of greater reality that goes with sensation is to be attributed not to the fact that in sensation mind is in closer contact with reality than it is in thought—for in any monistic epistemology mind is recognized as in equally immediate contact with all that is its content,—but to the fact that there is no consciousness and hence no sense of any reality at all until there is a neural organism present with its sensations.

2. This theory explains the privacy of sensations, since in any conscious complex the response activity of the neural organism is the particularizing feature. The object external to the neural organism may be present in any mind, but the response-activity of the neural organism is its own, goes to constitute that individual consciousness of which that neural organism is the center. Now the consciousness of the response of its own neural system constitutes the feelings and emotions of the individual consciousness. It is true that (1), as observed motion my neural response can be made an object of observation by others, as when another judges from the distortions of my face that I have the toothache; and that (2), those others

may infer that I feel as they do when their nerves are similarly affected, *i. e.*, my sensations may be present in other minds, though as thought not as sensation. But if in order to know that I have the toothache it were necessary for another to have my pain, as Professor Holt contends,¹ although on this point there seems to be a disagreement between him and Professor Perry,² then it would be necessary for that other person not only to have 'the' toothache but to have 'my' toothache. My private feelings may be an object of non-sensuous knowledge to another but they can never become 'his' sensations.

3. This theory explains the community of the conceptual elements in experience—and among these is to be classed the knowledge of the objectivity of any entity as contrasted with such experiences as we describe as illusory. For if on this theory the neural organism constitutes the particularizing feature in any experience, the second term in the conscious complex, *viz.*, the wide, wide world, is the common or universalizing feature. The doctrine of the mutual exclusiveness of minds is rejected by this theory (as by neo-realism) except as it applies to the mutual externality involved in the physical character of the various neural organisms.

4. This theory explains why introspection reveals only conscious states, whereas observation of behavior discovers only motion and never consciousness. For while (a) all observation, whether introspective or behavioristic, is a form of introspection in that it reveals the content of the observing consciousness, (b) the behaviorist abstracts from himself, *i. e.*, from his consciousness, and looks upon what he sees as belonging to another complex whose neural organism—and consequently its 'consciousness' also—is outside that of the observer.

5. Finally this theory explains the wholly contradictory character of experience. Since finite minds constitute a continuum of overlapping content while yet each finite mind centers around its particular neural organism, we have in every consciousness a sense of finitude coupled with a sense of being part of the infinite; a continual striving after a whole of experience while yet we are

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 109.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 292 f.

impotent to free ourselves from certain well defined limitations; the persistent reference of consciousness to the brain while yet it is known to embrace a world of objects; the conviction that reality is one, knowledge is one, God is one, while yet particularity mocks our belief.

Some such view of consciousness as this is, I believe, the logical consequence of the neo-realist theory of mind, and yet it is not incompatible with the demand which absolute idealism makes for an infinite intelligence as the condition of an intelligible world. (a) It recognizes the fact that in one sense all minds constitute but one, that it is after all one and the same universe that supplies each finite mind with its content so that the world is not broken up into a plurality of mutually exclusive selves. (b) It recognizes, in common with idealism and with neo-realism, no limit to knowledge in the nature of reality, no entity which is prevented by anything in its own nature from becoming a content of mind, for to regard mind or consciousness as a process of reality and not as an external spectator¹ is to make reality itself the source of intelligence and therefore intelligible. Finally (c) the idealist doctrine of the eternity of consciousness is compatible with the conception of consciousness as a stage in the process of reality, when this stage is regarded as natural and inevitable (and not as an artificial and accidental by-product such as realism tends to view it); for just as the potentiality of the mature plant, *i. e.*, the nature of things which in its case determines what this mature plant is to be—is wrapped up in, or more accurately is in some way indissolubly connected with, this particular seed, so too the potentiality of consciousness is to be regarded as eternally wrapped up in the nature of the universe, at a certain stage in whose history finite conscious beings appear.

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¹ The dualistic conception of mind as an observer external to the object observed is inadvertently adopted by even so monistic a thinker as Professor Holt in his attempt to show that the logical movement, say of a mathematical problem, is independent of any mental activity of the mathematician (*op. cit.*, p. 13 f.),—as if the activity of the mathematician's mind in thinking out the problem could be distinguished from the logical processes of reality.

THE RELATION OF PERSONAL TO CULTURAL IDEAS.

I. SOCIAL LOGIC *versus* SOLIPSISM.

PSYCHOLOGY has to do with group consciousness as well as with individual consciousness. Nevertheless, it is the analysis of the typical individual mind, rendered possible through retro-introspection coupled with the assumption that one's own mind may be taken as typical, which gives us our psychological data. With logic the case is different. It is true that terms, propositions, and logical inferences must appear in personal consciousness in order to be understood; but the awareness that they come originally from without and through the agency of fellow human beings (mostly, as a rule, our fellow-countrymen) is inseparable from the ability to understand and employ them. Moreover, some half of the terms in common use refer to objects and modes of being or action which are not human individuals or groups and not human attributes, mental or physical, yet which are known to be what they are known to be through the universal agreement of educated human minds. It is agreed to signify particular historical places and things by the same proper or singular names; specific and generic types (of material, individual, differentiated part, or group) by the same concrete-general names; processes, qualities, and relations, by the same abstract names. This consensus of logical usage implies at once the presence of similar ideas in different minds, and the reality of objects and modes which are not *within* any of those minds, but equally *before* all of them. Thus elementary logic is the proper corrective to metaphysical solipsism, and that makes it the proper introduction to sociology. For the standpoint of sociology is antithetical to that of solipsism. Sociology not only asserts the reality of the social group as something superadded to the reality of its individuals taken distributively; but its most particular data are relations between individuals under social conditions. Through such relations each individual acquires a

place in some social environment, as definite and indefeasible as the actual place of his body in relation to the earth's surface.

It is probably true that there never has been, whether in a lunatic asylum or elsewhere, a real live solipsist; or one who seriously equates the universe with his personal consciousness; but certain forms of idealism, not to say insanity, lay an undue stress upon ego-subjectivity, or the supposed absoluteness of personality, no matter whether personal sensations and emotions, or personal ideas and judgments, are regarded as the more important elements. It is, of course, certain that no individual can ever literally get away from his own consciousness, any more than he can, to use a homely phrase, jump out of his own skin. It is through conscious sensations of touch, which appear to be located in the skin, as well as through consciously seeing the surface of his own hands, etc., that he becomes aware of having a skin and remaining in it. But when such terms as 'have,' 'skin,' and 'remain' are presented to his consciousness, he knows that neither the terms nor their applications to the facts or things signified are his own inventions. He has learnt to apply them in his intercourse with other persons, and intercourse or books have been no less necessary to teach him the applications of any psychological terms by which he may describe his own states and modes of consciousness. Thus from the logical or contemplative standpoint it is as impossible for him to get away from socially created meanings, as it is always impossible for him to get away from personal experience.¹

The reality of objective things is partially vouched for by the intuitive redintegration of personal sensations of sight and touch, but it is still more potently vouched for by the fact that self and others can readily agree to call the same objects and types and the same objective processes, qualities, and relations by the same names. This agreement is arrived at when a given object or an instance of a given type or mode can be simultaneously observed by two or more persons thrown together at the same time in the same place, one of whom applies to the

¹ Here we must understand that personal experience covers personal thinking, though it does not cover objective things about which we think.

given object-matter its recognized name in the hearing of the others. A familiar name will, however, serve to call up similar notions in minds which do not commonly perceive the matter named, and, by the aid of synthetic and analytic treatment of contemplated object-matter, it is possible to extend this agreement to things which are too vast or too minute, too remote or too complex to be brought within direct range of the human sense-organs. It may even be extended to states and modes of consciousness which cannot be externally observed, but can be reflected upon as occurring in connection with the living and making self-organism, and, as psycho-physiology infers, in special connection with the nervous system and brain.

2. TERMS, IDEAS, AND OBJECT-MATTER.

The simplest act of logical apprehension involves the presentation of two matters to the mind—(1) some recognized term; (2) the notion, or passing idea, which is the immediate and subjective understanding of the term. Such an act of apprehension also implies a third matter, not immediately and subjectively presented, namely, (3) the object-matter,¹ or matter consciously referred to—symbolized by the term and more or less adequately represented by the notion. This may also be called the thought-object.

In psychology it is necessary to consider ideas which form elements of perceptions, sentiments, or volitions, or appear as mental images, without the symbolic aid of words. In logic, on the other hand, we are spared any investigation of ideas, except as these constitute the meanings of terms. A truly significant term *is* an idea for logical purposes. One of these purposes,

¹ I speak of the 'object-matter' or 'thought-object,' rather than of the 'object' referred to by a term or idea, since 'object,' like 'thing,' usually conveys a somewhat substantial and external significance; whereas an object-matter, or thought-object, may be anything in any degree conceivable. It may therefore be merely imagined and non-existent; while, if we grant that it has some relative mode of reality, that need not be objective (physical) but may be subjective (mental), and need not be concrete (comprising all attributes of some particular entity or type of entity) but may be abstract (consisting in some action or state, quality or relation, which belongs to numerous entities or types, each of which has other attributes as well).

however, is to detect fallacies; and fallacies are largely due to the facts that one term may have several different meanings or ideas attached to it, while two or more terms which are properly synonymous may be artificially credited with distinct meanings. There is no reason in the nature of things why a given idea should be attached to a given word or phrase. The only criterion here is one of human usage, and the thinker must begin to be a thinker by learning to understand terms in the senses recognized by fellow-thinkers who are more competent, or at least more intellectually experienced than himself. He may, however, after sufficient study of authorities, find that some generally recognized meanings are still confused or logically inadequate, and may accordingly proceed to suggest improved connotations and differentiations in the meanings of terms verbally familiar, or even to introduce new terms to express partially new ideas. The psychological justification for this is the conviction that he thereby makes his own ideas more adequate and interdependent. The logical and sociological justification is the postulate that his own ideas are sufficiently typical of those of his educated contemporaries, and that what appears to him to be an improved understanding of things by means of a better system of correlated terms will be ultimately recognized to be such by all who are competent to judge.

Should a human individual, reared in infancy as the fabled Romulus, grow to maturity on an island uninhabited by other human beings, it is of course not possible to say exactly what sort of intelligence he would develop. He would probably acquire, as the joint result of his senses, memory, and imagination, a certain ability to contemplate things and judge of their characters in relation to his own feelings, and quite possibly he might learn to make a few special articulate sounds, each in connection with some familiar or striking object or experience, which sounds would afterwards serve to call up images of the objects or experiences in question. It is, however, incredible that he should attain to anything such as the mastery of a complete language, which mastery becomes, for the socialized and civilized man, almost equivalent to understanding itself. Sur-

rounding things would no doubt appear to him as external to and independent of his own body, but their nature would be for him a mere reflex of his own extremely immature perceptions and notions. He would not be in a position to receive information, and it is sound information which is needed to convince us that the reality of things can be relatively known in the ratio in which our subjective ideas of them are progressively improved. In the absence of such information there would be no object-matter common to the individual and other individuals, and therefore contrasting with perceptions and conceptions which are at once internal to one's own consciousness and subject to amplification through learning from men and books. It is this wider range of object-matter, differentiating the universe as known to the philosophy of cultured mankind from the world as known through the individual's innate or perceptually acquired common sense, which, with its correlative range of systematic ideas, renders possible both positive science, including sociology, and actual social progress.

3. THE LOGICAL EXTENSION OF IDEAS.

Objects which are distinct from one another in space, and events which are distinct in either time or place are none the less distinct for being counterparts of one another in their natural characters. Of a pair of vases standing on a mantelshelf on either side of a clock, each vase is as distinct from the other, whose form, color, and other attributes are indistinguishable from its own, as it is distinct from the clock or mantelshelf, whose characters are obviously different. One oscillation of a clock's pendulum is as distinct from another oscillation of the same or from any oscillation of another pendulum as it is from the movement of a human hand, which may have set either pendulum swinging. Twenty new shillings of the same issue are as distinct from one another, as any one of them is distinct from a sovereign or a half-crown.

The logical extension of shillings, or—what amounts to the same thing—the denotation of the term 'shilling,' is the actual number of shillings which have been, are, or will be current.

This number must include many issues, bearing the heads of different British sovereigns and various devices and inscriptions; but all shillings approximate to one standard in shape, size, and weight, and agree in consisting of the metallic substance known as silver.

Now if we compare ideas (here taken in the strictly subjective sense) with coins, both being characteristic products of human intelligence, though ideas are also integral parts of intelligence, what we should usually call *one* idea is comparable, not to one coin, but to a set of coins of one kind or value. The instances of the idea, analogous to actual coins of a given stamp, are the notions which momentarily appear in human consciousness simultaneously with some term which calls the idea to the mind of some person. In this sense the *same* idea may occur or may have occurred to the minds of all normal persons, living and dead, while in each mind it may recur an indefinite number of times.

Thus, in respect of its logical extension or actual occurrences to human consciousness, any given idea may be distinguished as either cultural or personal, and any personal idea as either habitual or presented.

Cultural ideas are those conveyed by literature of all sorts, and are such that each presumably occurs and recurs to a multitude of human minds, many particular cultural ideas having been thus familiar to men throughout the ages of historical civilization.

Personal ideas are those which occur or recur to individual consciousness.

Habitual ideas are those which have (to use an obvious metaphor) taken root in the individual mind, and which recur to personal consciousness according as practical occasion, deliberate reflection, or some casual association may determine.

A presented idea, which may also be termed a *notion*, is one which is in actual course of passing in the mind, or, in other words, one which forms a particular 'process-content of consciousness.'

4. STANDARD CULTURAL IDEAS.

Now it is clear that all actual ideas, considered in extension, are notions, or presented ideas. There are no ideas outside consciousness and there is no actual consciousness save that which appears in some moment (or presented span) of consciousness. In such a moment, however, there may be deliberate reflection on consciousness which was actual in the past, and there is normally the recalling of ideas which are familiar through a long series of past presentations. It is instinctively felt that only a minute fraction of memorized experience can come to the surface in any moment of consciousness. Hence any habitual idea must be considered as subsuming, and as being essentially more important than, any one of its passing presentations. If it be the idea of some concrete object-matter, it will reappear in various instances as the same idea, but in many different contexts, according to what qualities or relations of the object-matter are specially in question. The assumed reality of a concrete object-matter consists largely in the fact that it has an indefinite number of qualities and relations which cannot be simultaneously predicated of it as subject, while on'y a few of them can be simultaneously imagined. Many, however, can be predicated in succession, whether in the process of writing a treatise on the given subject or in the course of contemplating it at different moments of a life-time. When we have once clearly learnt to predicate anything of a subject, that something belongs to our habitual idea of it, though not necessarily to every subsequent presented idea in which bare reference to the subject may be made.

As the habitual personal idea is thus nearer to reality than the presented personal idea, so must the cultural idea be considered nearer to reality than the personal idea. It may be the idea of some object-matter which is better known to one person in one of its aspects and to another person in another of its aspects. Different minds in human society are constantly acting upon one another through speech and writing, and thus supplementing each other's experience through transmitted information; yet the best-informed individual's knowledge falls short of the

standard which would be attained by putting all human knowledge into one detailed system, were that possible. Moreover, the bulk of ideas handed down through scientific and general literature are based on a far wider experience than is available for the individual.

Notions or passing ideas are ideal—or perfunctory—in various degrees, and, when we speak of a personal idea, we generally mean the person's habitual idea, giving him credit for what it appears as in his sincere and intelligent moments of reflection, and for its various connections with other ideas of which he is aware, though he may not think of them all simultaneously. Similarly, when we speak of a cultural idea, we should understand that idea as it is common to the best minds of an age, and thus tends to possess a standard value in intellectual history, if not in abstract science. A cultural idea may be said to become scientific, when its application to a given particular thing, person, system, or group, or to some concrete type or abstract mode of being, is understood and agreed to by all persons who have made a serious study of the subject in question. Thus, to my mind at least, the fundamental differentiation of scientific from unscientific thinking does not rest on the discovery of laws, but on the accurate description of object-matters whose causal connections may not yet have been discovered.

5. CONCRETE AND ABSTRACT IDEAS, AS RELATED TO SUBJECT AND PREDICATE RESPECTIVELY.

The only way in which ideas can be conveyed from mind to mind (or, more literally speaking, evoked in one mind through physical means employed by another) is by the use of recognized signs. These are representations, in so far as they have some intended likeness to their object-matter; symbols, in so far as they suggest the object-matter through habitual association with something which does not resemble it. Pictures are, of course, representations (of things, in their visible aspects), while terms, verbally considered, are pure symbols. Logical ideas, or the understandings of terms, combine certain abstractly representative features with the direct symbolic references of the

terms to their object-matters, and their indirect symbolic references to other terms. Terms would not be elements of logic at all if they merely served, as they generally do serve, to call up vague mental images of the object-matters named. Ideas would not be elements of logic if they consisted in such images alone. *Terms, with their involved ideas, enter into logic, because each implies, without actually stating, all the different judgments of which it habitually forms a subject or predicate.*

Now although subject and predicate are constantly changing places in the course of ratiocinative argument, they are not essentially interchangeable. There are typical subjects which cannot become predicates, and typical predicates which cannot be properly treated as subjects. On the one hand, the names of particular persons, nations, places, and historical objects cannot stand as predicates, though they may stand as parts of predicates. On the other hand, certain verbal and adjectival predicates have, in order to become subjects for formal logical purposes, to be supplied with a concrete content, as when 'growing' becomes 'growing things'; but the essential meaning of such predicates is best expressed by abstract names, like 'growth.' Such abstract names form an artificial order of subjects; but they are really predicables (in a wider sense than the technical), being the generic class-names of certain predicates which occur naturally in verbal and adjectival forms and always *belong to* something else, as growth belongs to growing organisms or any other things which grow. Thus terms, and ideas as attached to terms, fall into two great groups.

These are *concrete* ideas, or the ideas of typical subjects (entities or quasi-entities) and *abstract* ideas, or the ideas of typical predicates (states, actions, qualities, relations, aspects—all of which may be called modes). The relation between concrete and abstract ideas is one of mutual subsumption from opposite standpoints. A particular quality, say rotundity, is only one among various qualities which belong to some type of entity, say an apple; but an entity such as an apple is only one among many entities resembling itself, and apples are only one class among many other classes of natural objects which agree

in possessing rotundity. 'Having rotundity' is thus intensively included in 'apple,' while 'apples' are extensively included in 'having rotundity.'

The above are obvious examples of concrete and abstract ideas respectively, but in other cases it has seemed to many logicians impossible to draw this important distinction with clearness. This I believe to be due to the two facts: (1) that there is a certain class of grammatically abstract names which do not convey logically abstract ideas; and (2) that concrete ideas must be taken to include, not only the ideas of natural material entities, but the ideas of (a) certain natural *features*, which are neither material parts nor abstract qualities, and (b) certain conventional quasi-entities, especially those involved in mathematical and logical constructions. These categories are non-material and are frequently regarded as abstract; but they are concrete, not abstract, in what I take to be the proper sense of the terms. They are subjects which form centers of relationship to other cognate subjects; not pure modes, in which indefinitely numerous and otherwise unrelated subjects can share.

1. A few grammatically abstract names do not refer to any definite modes, but to the whole group of qualities and relations belonging to some concrete object or class. They really mean all which might be predicated of an object or class, if our knowledge of it were perfect. *Concreteness* is an abstract name which does not mean anything abstract, but refers to the totality of parts, qualities, and relations, which coinhere in some entity or quasi-entity—the totality which *is it*. *Substantiality* usually means consisting in ponderable and resisting substance, but in its logical sense it would seem to mean the concreteness, or total nature, of any particular object which does so consist. It would thus cover the totality of qualities and of relations, internal or external, which belong to such an object, and which, in the case of any complex object, are due partly to its chemical ingredients and their physical conditions, but also to its actual shape and dimensions and its internal mechanical or vital structure. *Humanity* (when it does not mean historical mankind, or, as with Comte, the bulk of historical mankind as co-operating

towards human betterment) presumably means all attributes which are common either to normal human beings or to human communities. To employ abstract terms of the above sorts is as though we should say *apple-ity*, to signify the far less abstruse, but still largely unknown, totality of predicates which belong to all apples, or *this apple-ity* to include the natural variety, shape, size, mass, markings, and life-history of a particular apple. It is, of course, much more natural to refer to *this apple*, understanding that it has various attributes of which we are aware and others into which we do not think it necessary to inquire. Thus it seems to me that an abstract term, pretending to signify the whole extension of any object or class, is really an a-logical term. It means the uniting of all the predicates properly applicable to some subject; of those which we do not at present know, and some of which we may never know, with those which we do know. This vague idea of the total nature of anything is properly concrete rather than abstract; a true abstract idea being one which dissociates some definite and either familiar or understandable quality or relation of things from the other qualities or relations of the same things.

2. Most concrete ideas refer to natural entities; these being material objects, each of which has some unity due to the association in space of its parts or members—a unity contrasting with that of a ‘universal,’ which is constituted by the relation of likeness alone. Some entities are properly regarded as individuals, while others are systems of individuals, whose members are separated but able to produce effects in common, and yet others are parts of individual bodies, differentiated though not separated from their correlative wholes.

(a) Among other ideas which I should class as concrete rather than abstract are those of natural *features* which are neither material parts nor abstract qualities. They include perforations, cavities (*e. g.*, rooms of a house), indentations and impressions of all sorts; shadows, and reflected images; also the surfaces, edges, and corners of bodies (*e. g.*, of a common brick) as approximating roughly to geometrical surfaces, lines, and points.

(b) These last categories which, together with superficial and

solid figures, form the concrete data of geometry, are a fundamental sort of quasi-entity without which exact science would be impossible. A second class of conventional quasi-entity consists in visual representations, and ranges from geometrical drawings and diagrams, through artistic pictures of all kinds, to carvings and sculptures. Of course there are material entities employed in all these cases, but such entities are not the subjects of which we think when we consider any representation as such in relation to some actual or hypothetical thing represented. Visual symbols form a third class of quasi-entities; the most important being letters, as symbols of articulate sounds, combined into written words and sentences, as symbols of spoken language; the next most important being the figures and symbols of arithmetic and algebra; while there is another class employed in musical notation, and there are special symbols which have a more or less mystical significance in folk-lore and religion. Fourthly there are numbers and magnitudes considered as the universal object-matters of the ideas expressed in arithmetical and algebraical notation, though largely *suppressed* in the mechanics of calculation. (A somewhat parallel quasi-entity is a musical composition considered as the object-matter of the auditory ideas expressed in a musical score.)

Magnitudes are in one sense more abstract (*i. e.*, more general) even than lines and areas, yet they are concrete in that each is a definite subject, having indefinitely numerous relations to other magnitudes. A fifth and supremely important class of quasi-entity consists in ideas, as understood in the present article; that is, as definitely coined for human intelligence by means of logical terms.

The foregoing five classes of conventional quasi-entities, together with what have been termed natural *features*, are none of them entities proper, and do not in any case possess the rich and unfathomed variety of properties pertaining to material things; yet it is proper to regard them as subjects rather than as predicates, since each forms a center or nucleus of qualities or relations, and is not in itself any quality or relation. For the same reason the ideas and names of these quasi-entities are concrete and not abstract.

6. THE IMPLICATIONS OF IDEAS, CULTURAL AND PERSONAL.

Any concrete idea implies a group—it may be an indefinitely numerous group—of propositions, whose predicates express different qualities and relations of one and the same subject. Partly by common observation of actual instances, and partly by common contemplation of instances or types such as all ordinary conversation involves, people who speak the same language learn to apply the same concrete-general name to all entities of a given class. At the same time they learn to imply certain properties as essentially connected with the class in question; so that anything not possessing an essential property is not a thing of the given sort. This insures that the analytic part of knowledge shall consist in necessary judgments. The necessity rests logically on the human agreement as to the meaning of names, but this agreement, in its turn, rests on the uniformity of human experience derived from the things named. There are, however, properties, not obviously connoted of a class-name, which may be found to belong to the whole of the class, whether theoretically, by deduction from judgments which are analytically certain, or practically, by the complete absence from experience of instances of the given class not having the given property.

While the joining of various predicates to a given subject, and the concurrent grouping of concrete subjects into allied species and genera, gives rise to what may be called descriptive knowledge, explanatory knowledge consists in applying an understood predicate (usually involving causal relationship) to a variety of concrete things or classes, whose community of nature, origin, or purpose thereby becomes apparent. Natural laws evidently involve abstract ideas—predicates applicable to all individual subjects of a given type, which may of course include many subsidiary types. Such predicates signify either the mode in which one class of entities is causally related to another class of entities (*e. g.*, flowering plants to the insects which are necessary to fecundate them) or that in which one quality of a class is causally related to another quality (*e. g.*, expansion of a material to the rise, and contraction to the fall, of its temperature).

Now a cultural idea, when concrete, and referring to an entity or type of entities commonly recognized, must be considered to comprise all predicates which are known by any competent observers to belong to the given subject; while, if that be a genus, it includes extensively all its species and all their individuals, and, therefore, implies to scientific imagination (though it does not logically connote) all the attributes of each of the individuals. Similarly a cultural idea, when abstract, must be considered to stand related to all subjects to which it is scientifically known that the given abstract predicate applies. It is evident that, in both cases, the corresponding personal idea may be less adequate (*i. e.*, less charged with significance) than the cultural idea. The individual may have enough knowledge to recognize a given object or type, but he may not happen to be interested in it, and may know very little of what is known about it by other people for whom it *is* interesting. A similar consideration holds good, with even more force, of abstract ideas; for the more important of these, such as tend to attain expression as laws, can be grasped only by serious study of some relevant branch of science, in which each abstract idea appears in connection with many correlated concrete ideas. Abstract scientific ideas belong to humanity collectively, not in the sense of belonging to all or nearly all human beings, but rather in the sense of belonging each to some group of devoted specialists who, by means of their literary intercourse, as well as by means of their personal observation, calculation, and reasoning, interpret and unify the experience of mankind in relation to some chosen object-matter. Philosophical thinkers themselves should properly form such a group of specialists; though their speciality consists in viewing the universe and humanity, in their more permanent aspects, as connected wholes, and hence in harmonizing the data of the various departmental sciences and arts. This philosophical function is one which, if properly fulfilled, has unique social importance; supplying, as it must, the outlines of an all-round liberal education, in which as many individuals as possible should share.

7. THE CULTIVATION AND WEEDING OUT OF IDEAS.

Unlike statements and judgments, terms and ideas are neither definitely true nor definitely false. Some ideas are products of artistic imagination, and may truthfully illustrate, though they do not really record, characters, events, and personal relations, as met with in actual human life. Other ideas are fictitious in the sense of referring to object-matters which are non-existent, and merely imagined, whether in the way of crude mythology, sophistical rhetoric, or immature science. If it be granted that an idea is neither fictional nor fictitious, but capable of forming the subject or predicate of true judgments, it may be said to be *valid*; but it is still, of course, uncertain whether any particular judgment in which it occurs is true. The general validity of a concrete idea consists in the many predicates which can be truthfully applied to the given subject, and that of an abstract idea in the many subjects to which the given predicate can be truthfully applied.

To discuss the criterion of truth would be altogether beyond the scope of the present article; but, granting that many judgments are true and others false, it is to be observed that an idea does not cease to be valid, even when we are misled into making it the subject or predicate of an erroneous judgment, provided our knowledge of the object-matter is such that the idea enters into many other judgments which are true. Thus valid ideas may persist, both in the individual mind and in the collective culture of a nation or of humanity, even though many opinions contingently connected with those ideas undergo change.

The discrimination of valid from essentially fictitious ideas involves the chief questions of theological and metaphysical controversy; yet what purports to be such discrimination is always taking place in psychological and sociological ways. In childhood or later life every personal idea must 'dawn on' the mind before it can become an habitual idea. Then, in the normal growth of knowledge, a valid idea will be strengthened and rendered more ideal, or significant, with every recurrence, especially if it be accompanied by perceptual experience with which it agrees or by a special effort to determine its true relation

to some other valid idea, or if it be frequently evoked by reading books of a veracious character which place it in a content we can understand. On the other hand, fictitious ideas, such as are due to false tradition, worthless hearsay, or crude speculation, should be weakened by the absence of corroborating experience and by the difficulty of relating them to ideas of acknowledged validity, and thus eventually expelled from the mind into which they have intruded. These desirable processes, however, do not take place in the individual mind unless it be of an alert and progressive order. The question of supreme social interest is, do they necessarily take place in the mind of collective humanity; given the conditions of the modern world, in which there is an increasingly free interchange of opinions between thinkers of all nations and an ever-growing body of scientific and social knowledge? Perhaps the answer required depends upon answering a prior question:—is there also an increasing tendency to substitute rational co-operation in thought, as well as in deed, for the rival dogmatism of philosophies, religious nationalities, political parties, and social classes?

8. IDEAS OF CAUSATION AND IDEALS.

The abstract ideas of the simpler sorts of physical qualities, states of consciousness, and relations in place and time form predicates which help to describe subjects, but not to explain their origin or any changes they undergo. Of abstract ideas which do partially explain reality there are two sorts; (1) ideas of natural causation, and (2) ideas of conscious ends and means to be consciously employed in attaining them.

Statements of natural law are not merely statements of invariable coexistence or sequence. They do partly explain *how* effects are caused. What they do not explain is the ultimate *why* of causation; but that, from the point of view of one who believes in a universal and eternal order of things which is partially and progressively knowable, is a quite illegitimate object of inquiry. The universe is not accountable to man for being what it is. His highest ambition should be to describe it with some approach to truth. The flux of things can be partially

explained only by accepting certain landmarks of order and law. These, however, are understandable in a sense which the scepticism of Hume and his modern imitators does not admit. For instance, the law of *natural selection* is understood, if we understand (a) that the supply of chemical nourishment for plants and organic nourishment for animals is strictly limited, (b) that local groups of different species are constantly competing for larger shares of the limited supply, while animals feed on plants, some animals on other animals, and parasitic micro-organisms on higher organisms of all sorts, and (c) that both individuals and groups which are ill-adapted to obtain nourishment or to escape or resist hostile attacks tend to disappear, while those which become better adapted in either respect tend to survive and multiply. Similarly, the law of *action in the line of least resistance* is in itself understandable; for instance, in the case of water rising in a common pump. When the atmosphere in the barrel and suction-pipe is withdrawn, while the atmospheric pressure on the surface of the water external to the pipe continues as before, it stands to reason that a column of water will be freed to ascend the pipe for some distance. Other laws, like the law of gravitation, may be at present unexplained uniformities of action, but science always strives to make them relatively understandable. Many suppose that gravitation itself may be ultimately explained by ethereal strain or pressure, or in some other way, which would enable us to see mentally why bodies gravitate as we see why water rises in a pump.

Let us now turn from ideas of causation to ideals, or ideas of objects which may and should be humanly pursued. The fundamental difference of a consciously sought end from a natural effect is, of course, that there is no guarantee that the end will be attained. If it is to be realized, it must be, in the first place, willed with sufficient sincerity, and, in the second place, pursued with sufficient knowledge of the means which may bring it about and the obstacles which would otherwise prevent its attainment. There may be a theoretical necessity of attainment or non-attainment according to the strength of our motives, the amount of our relevant knowledge, and the

circumstances to be encountered; but as we are never in a position exactly to anticipate the last factor or to judge impartially of the two other factors, there is meanwhile a very real practical contingency. This contingency may be further complicated by a conflict of motives, and it is in the deliberate and rational preference of one motive to another that the idea of an end, which may be either right or wrong, becomes an *ideal*, which is at least believed to be right. If we grant that some particular end is indeed worthy of pursuit, there may be different degrees of fitness in various means by which we might hope to attain it, and there is therefore a secondary order of ideals, whereby the more certain and efficient means are selected.

It is clear that the function of philosophy does not end with positive knowledge or the indicative mood; though it does, as I think, begin with the quest for positive truth. Such truth includes all true statements, derived from historical sources, of what has been thought, felt, done, and enacted, in the human community; but it does not include those judgments of value which are involved in living ideals, foreshadowing a more complete and rational ordering of life. Judgments of fact about past human valuations are a very different thing from judgments of value, whereby living contemporaries agree to adopt some wisdom from the past and to promote greater wisdom in the future. Thus true philosophy always strives for a system of ideals which shall tend to unify the endless divergent interests and aspirations of humanity, as well as for a system of causal ideas whereby reality may be relatively explained, and a fundamental system of descriptive ideas, whereby the permanent aspects and perennial contents of the universe (including those of the human community and mind) may be logically apprehended. While, in the two latter respects, men reason to *find* the truth, in the first respect they reason to *make* it. But if, as this paper suggests, men can *find* the truth only collectively, according as groups of substantially like-minded scientific students are formed, it is still more obvious that they can *make* it only collectively, according as fuller agreement is attained by minds, consciously directed to the goals of the good, the beautiful, and the efficacious.

Whatever may be the ultimate criteria of speculative and practical knowledge respectively, the proximate criterion in both cases is logico-sociological. There must be an agreement between different persons as to the proper meanings of terms, and this involves the entertaining by those persons of common cultural ideas.

CHARLES E. HOOPER.

DISCUSSION.

IN WHAT SENSE TWO PERSONS PERCEIVE THE SAME THING.

UNDER this heading there appears, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW of September, 1907, an article by Professor George Stuart Fullerton.

The question is closely related to the fundamental Philosophy (as yet undeveloped) that underlies the Theory of Probability. In this review I will not discuss the Philosophy of Probability, but I desire to call attention to some of the doctrines expressed by Professor Fullerton. And I desire to do this because the doctrines seem to be the prevailing doctrines of the day, and yet, in my opinion, they are ill adapted to a Philosophy of Probability. The prevalence of these doctrines is in my opinion the chief cause why the Philosophy of Probability is undeveloped.

The caption at the head of this article implies that two, and therefore presumably any number of people, may and in fact do perceive the same thing. And Professor Fullerton seems so to hold.

I do not think this is true in an unrestricted sense, if true in any intelligible sense at all.

If a large number of persons perceive the same thing, the thing so perceived must be independent of the peculiar mode of perception of each person. What each perceives therefore will be the 'thing in itself,' objectively, whatever that may mean.

Otherwise expressed, if a large number, or if only two persons perceive the same thing, the act of perception and the thing perceived are independent of each other;—the thing is in no sense a product of the perception;—the perception has nothing whatever to do with determining what the thing perceived is;—the thing perceived is 'the thing in itself,' whatever that may mean, and I confess I do not know what it can mean.

Is such a doctrine tenable?

Even in popular language, I can have no idea of a distinct thing unless I determine in advance certain mental limitations, express or implied;—unless, in the language of Philosophy, I determine in advance the 'mental universe of discourse' in respect to which the thing is to be determined.

For example, I suppose we will all admit that for certain purposes

and within certain restrictions, within a limited universe of discourse, John Smith is, to you and to me and to himself, a thing;—he is a man. But how long has he been a thing and how long will he be a thing and what is he? If he is a 'thing in itself,' it would seem that his existence should be independent of particular times and places and conditions. What was he one hundred years ago? What will he be one hundred years hence? He should of course be the same as now, for by hypothesis he is a 'thing in itself,' the same 'yesterday, to-day, and for ever,' and in all places and under all conditions. Certainly I do not perceive any such 'thing in itself.' And yet this is the only meaning that I can give to two persons perceiving the same thing, unrestrictedly, in unlimited universes of discourse.

If it be urged that a thing may be a 'thing in itself' and yet may change its qualities and relations in time and in place and may even change its substance and quantity, then what is there, subjectively or objectively, to determine when the thing ceases to be the same thing and becomes another thing? It is impossible for me to attach any definite meaning to a thing independently of an arbitrary mental universe of discourse, and of the determination by me of some particular case therein under a conflux of general descriptions in my mind, believed by me to apply to and to determine the objective thing.

We may express the same idea differently by saying that it is impossible to separate the thing perceived from the act of perceiving it, except temporarily in attention. In perception, I may temporarily fix attention either on the subjective mode or on the objective thing, but in fact these are simply different sides of one experience.

In order to think we must limit our universes of discourse, and the limitation of the universe is part of the determination or definition of the thing. And no person can define accurately his own universe of discourse, much less that of other people.

Consider causation for example. Causation has no meaning in an unlimited universe of discourse, for cause and effect then merge and become one and indistinguishable in the First Cause. So with regard to the category of time;—we must limit the time within which we determine things, otherwise they ultimately lose their identity and become merged in the universal cosmos. Again relation is a necessary category, and each thing is known, not absolutely in itself, but only in relations to myself and to other things. But, unless I limit my universe of discourse, relations cease to exist, for my thoughts of any one thing in an unlimited universe would require me to relate it to all things and all things to it, and all things would thus merge into one. In unlimited universes of

discourse there is no determinate thought and no independent things, and no evidence and no synthetic propositions, and no beliefs, and no probabilities, and no knowledge in any sense intelligible to my mind, for every thing is simply One, in the First Cause.

This is the starting point of the Philosophy of Probability, namely, that to some extent the thing perceived is determined by the act of perception, which is always in a limited universe of discourse.

Is the act of perception then wholly arbitrary and subject to no law? Is there any distinction between perception and empty imagination?

The distinction is this. Perceptions, beliefs, different parts of knowledge, must agree with each other, but acts of imagination need not. Thus the test of the truth of any belief is whether it agrees or not with other beliefs. Perception is simply a belief that the subjective descriptions that I attribute in thought to the objective thing do actually apply and determine the thing. And my belief is based on its consistency with all my other beliefs. Certain sensations exist in my mind. They are known to me in terms of certain qualities and relations, which may be called their descriptions. The sensations are changes in my sensibility. Every change must have a cause. I am compelled to ask myself the causes of the sensations in my mind. I can not believe that I am the First Cause. I am compelled to surmise and hypothecate an external cause. From the descriptions of my sensations, the effects, I infer the corresponding descriptions of the hypothetical external cause called by me the thing, the object. This is both internal and external perception. It is an inference from evidence. The inference must agree with all other beliefs, which other beliefs constitute the evidence. Hence it is impossible to separate perception from hypothesis and evidence and inference, for these are what constitute the perception.

My Intellect is one organic whole. This is what gives unity to all my experience. Attention divides the unity into temporary parts called things. But except for the unity under the Intellect there could be no differentiation in Attention and thus no things. The differentiations in Attention, and therefore things, are merely temporary. Through reflexion, there is always 'Return to Self.' The individual thing always becomes reabsorbed in the universal cosmos. I may in attention separate any part of my experience and call it a separate experience, but the existence and knowledge of the separate experience rest on the background of the unity in all experience. Reflexion soon merges the present individual experience into the totality of all experience and Attention wanders to some other parts.

In order therefore that a thing should be exactly the same thing to two persons they must have the same idea of the universal cosmos, and they must in Attention divide this universal cosmos in imagination in the same way, and they must fix Attention on the same part, and must assign in belief to that part the same descriptions.

Modern philosophy professes to adopt the doctrine that neither the individual thing nor the general idea is the '*primum cognitum*,' but that these are known only in relations to each other. But it seems to me that in practice modern philosophy in general is not true to this doctrine, and herein lies the difficulty in connection with our present subject.

In the doctrine of Professor Fullerton that two persons perceive the same thing, independently of the '*percepts*' in the mind of each, it seems to me there is the covert subtle unconscious assumption that the mind knows the '*thing-in-itself*' independently of the general description under which the thing is determined in thought, and therefore that the '*thing-in-itself*' is the '*primum cognitum*.' The same assumption seems to me to lie also in the doctrine that we can "*argue from particulars to particulars*," without the intervention of generalities;—and also in the doctrine of immediate direct intuition, or '*simple apprehension*' of the objective thing;—and even, though perhaps not quite so patently, in Kant's doctrine, that though the subjective side of experience is one, under the '*Unity of Apprehension*,' yet the objective side is manifold, as given in the '*Manifold of Sense*,' thus implying that the unity in the objective is not an actual real unity but merely technically artificially imposed on the objective by the subjective as a convenient fiction, for the better understanding of the objective by the subjective;—and also this same subtle unconscious supposedly repudiated doctrine, that the '*thing in itself*' is in fact the '*primum cognitum*,' seems to me to permeate nearly all modern thought, despite all professions to the contrary.

The false idea seems to be that generalities are products of thought and in no sense conditions of thought. We are supposed first to observe things, as if '*things in themselves*.' We then analyze these things and find stored in each certain qualities and properties and relations. We note that many things possess the same qualities and properties and relations. We thus classify and generalize and arrive at general laws and inductions. This is the way we are supposed to arrive at concepts and general notions. The words generality and concept by their etymology indicate this supposed process.

On this false idea, the doctrine that two people perceive the same

thing seems very simple. But when we remember that general descriptions are not only products of thought but conditions of thought and must be either prior to or at least simultaneous with all thought, it becomes at once obvious that there can be no thing independently of the subjective mode of perception and therefore that no two people can be said strictly to perceive the same thing unless they perceive it in the same subjective modes and under the same limitations, which is practically impossible.

Professor Fullerton makes the following quotation from Professor Pearson:

"No better way of realizing the different selective powers of diverse perceptive faculties can be found than a walk (of a man) with a dog. The man looks upon a broad landscape, and the signs of life and activity that he sees in the far distance may have a deep meaning to him. The dog surveys the same landscape indifferently, but his whole attention is devoted to matters in his more immediate neighborhood, of which the man is only indirectly conscious through the activity of the dog."

In claiming, against Professor Pearson, that the man and the dog here perceive the same landscape, Professor Fullerton, it seems to me, assumes that the landscape can, objectively in fact, be severed from all else in nature and made an independent 'thing in itself,' and that it is the isolated independent landscape thus severed from all else that is perceived both by the man and the dog, alike, though through different 'percepts' in the mind of each. But objectively, in fact, the landscape can not be physically severed from its surroundings, nor can I so conceive it, except by a temporary and arbitrary limitation of attention that carries no belief with it, and that thus can not be made the basis of a perception. The landscape is part of the whole of nature and can not be severed from it. When I perceive the landscape I must locate it somewhere in nature and fix its place therein. Nor can I draw the line and say what is in the landscape and what not. The dog must do the same thing if his mental action may be called a 'perception.' But his determination of where the landscape begins and where it ends will be very different from mine, and his relating of the landscape to nature in general will be very different from mine. I find it very difficult to define accurately any unqualified sense in which the dog and the man can be said to perceive strictly the same landscape.

The same difficulties apply to the doctrine that any one man perceives the same thing twice, including Mill's doctrine that the

major premise of every induction is the 'uniformity of nature.' From a purely objective standpoint, it is difficult for me to attach any definite meaning to the 'uniformity of nature.'

The value of this discussion consists, it seems to me, not so much in the solution of the particular question in dispute, but in the determinations of the meaning of perception and the meaning of things, which determinations constitute the foundation of philosophy in general and of the Philosophy of Probability in particular.

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NOTES.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

Of most philosophers it may be said that what they make of philosophy is often less obvious than what it makes of them. When the great man appears this contrast between the thinker and his work vanishes. Each through the other now gains a vicarious importance. This is eminently true of Josiah Royce. The description of him which is at once the simplest and the truest is this: a great man. And his greatness was that of the sage who is invested with the quality and the dignity of some universal wisdom. You could not separate philosophy from Royce nor Royce from philosophy; he ennobled it even as he was ennobled by it.

If one were to try to analyze this impression I think one would detect first the vast scope of his mind. By this I mean not so much his learning,—although both in his knowledge of his own field and in those of the sciences he was certainly the most learned philosopher of his day,—but rather his power of lending to every subject that he touched an undreamt of significance, of taking it out into the open, putting it in perspective and setting the free air of the mind to play round it. A notable example of this is his treatment of the Four Conceptions of Being. We knew in our own way perhaps what mysticism meant and what realism meant, yet who but Royce in our time could have so shown them moulding a universe? We have to go back to Plato to find a philosophic imagination so comprehensive. In smaller things this quality was just as noticeable. Any one who was ever a member of one of Royce's seminars will recall the shock of pleased surprise when behind the pin-point of one's question Royce built up a great wedge to be driven deep into some problem. In one's innocence one had never suspected that one was raising an issue so profoundly disturbing. Under Royce's guidance one discovered that one had been talking philosophy without knowing it. Everything that fell into that mind took on something of the vastness which it there encountered.—Strange contrast between that small awkward frame and the splendid untrammelled gestures of the mind it housed!

Yet the great range of Royce's ideas did not set him apart on some inaccessible height. It is rarely that a man so consistently succeeds in inspiring affection as Royce did. He was loved by his fellows, and the cause of it was that he loved them. His sympathy and his friendship were given to persons of the most diverse types. Lawyers and doctors, parsons and engineers, undergraduates and children and professors all found much in him because he found much in them. In his writings this gift of sympathetic interpretation of human character is very marked. We may think of his accounts of Spinoza and Kant in *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, of his essay on John

Bunyan in *Studies of Good and Evil*, or we may recall how in all his work the illustration drawn direct from human life is never far away. His gift was clearest of all perhaps in his teaching. Some years ago he was giving undergraduate courses at Yale and it was the business of the assistant to read the weekly essays, prepare a report on them and pick out those which he thought Royce ought specially to read. But Royce read many besides the selected group. Although he would reach New Haven late in the day from Cambridge he would often sit up far into the night reading these essays and writing comments on them. Sometimes his note would be only a few lines in length, but often when his attention fell on some document of religious confession or some 'instance of loyalty' he would cover an entire page. As long as behind what the student wrote there was a personal conviction Royce would spend himself in encouragement or wise criticism.

Royce's love of his human kind is, I believe, the most important single factor in the development of his philosophy. Critics of Absolute Idealism are fond of warning us against rigid monisms and closed systems. But Royce's monism was flexible to the end. As each new volume of his work appeared one found in it a modification or re-interpretation to meet the objections to his doctrine. Pluralists, pragmatists, exponents of personal idealism, the idolaters of intuition,—Royce undertook to come to terms with them all. But the main changes in the structure of his system were introduced to 'save' the individual. As Professor Dewey, and indeed Royce himself, have shown, Royce was never a thorough-going 'intellectualist,' yet, as compared with *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, *The World and the Individual* with its absolute voluntarism marks a noticeable change of emphasis. The change was largely due to the fact that personal idealists were pleading for the value and the initiative of the finite self. Later when Royce bade us make our pragmatism absolute it was because he as much as any pragmatist realized the value of human ambition and human work. Still later when the Absolute becomes almost identical with the Beloved Community it is plain that Royce was anxious to refute the charge that his doctrine cancelled the differences between finite persons. Royce loved the human individual in theory as well as in fact. As his thought advanced he came always nearer to that wayward creature. But he knew that you do not find 'the individual' by taking away his 'world.' The permanent metaphysical significance of *The Philosophy of Loyalty* lies just in the power with which it states the central truth that you do not make the individual great by making his universe small.

No memoir of Royce may omit a reference to his humor. Of him as of another great man it might be said that "his laugh was broad as ten thousand beeves at pasture." The story of him that I think I like best comes from a friend who studied under him while he was giving his lectures on Christianity at Oxford. On one occasion Royce quoted

"He would answer to 'Hi!' or to any loud cry,"

and my friend did not recognize the allusion. Whereupon, although it was the middle of the morning and lectures were in full swing, Royce haled him up to his room with the remark, "Your education is incomplete." Once there Royce recited from memory *The Hunting of the Snark* from beginning to end and sent his amazed pupil away with, "Now go and read it for yourself." Royce's humor had much in common with that of Lewis Carroll. With a solemnity belied only by the twinkle lurking in his eyes, he liked to build up some portentous narrative or fable until the whole edifice came toppling down in laughter. Who that ever heard it can forget the story of that frantic search by the man who was trying to prove by experience the universal negative "There is no horse in this room," how in his eagerness he searched even between the leaves of books only to realize at last as the result of his efforts, "What I have found is not horse." The experiences of the shepherd with the 'infinite collection' of sheep were almost as remarkable. But perhaps most memorable of all is the introduction to his address as president of the American Philosophical Association. The philosophers of absolute novelties were having a considerable vogue at that time. In gentle ridicule of them Royce undertook to relate his first experience of an absolute novelty. With profound gravity and a patient elaboration of detail he described his emotions when in his childhood a small friend offered to show him something absolutely new,—something he had never seen before and would never see again,—and then proceeded to crack and open a nut and eat the kernel! Perhaps these seem trivial things to recall now, yet it is to the wise and kindly Royce of such moments that the memories of those who knew and loved him will most often turn.

In this brief note I have deliberately avoided any biographical references. In the number of *THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW* published in his honor Royce himself has given us the account of the facts of his life and philosophical development which we should most wish to possess. As for an estimate of the quality and extent of his contribution to scholarship, that can be found in the same number of the *REVIEW*. Because at this moment I am, like most of those, I imagine, who knew him, most sensible of a personal loss, I have simply tried to record something of my impression of him as a friend and as a teacher.

I trust I may be allowed to end with a personal experience which I record only because I believe it expresses what many others have felt. On the morning when I read in the papers of Royce's death my first feeling was one of dismay and grief. And then almost instantly there followed a feeling such as I have never had about the death of any one else. It was simply a supreme confidence that all was well with him. In this all other emotions were obliterated. He had lived too close to the heart of things for death to be anything but an episode in his life. I knew of a certainty that "no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death."

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We give below a list of articles in current philosophical magazines.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, XIII, 19: *Ralph Barton Perry*, The Truth Level; *David F. Swenson*, The Logical Significance of the Paradoxes of Zeno.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XXIII, 5: *Joseph Peterson*, The Nature and Probable Origin of Binaural Beats; *J. Victor Haberman*, The Intelligence Examination and Evaluation, Part I; *C. E. Ferree* and *Gertrude Rand*, A Substitute for an Artificial Pupil; *W. F. Dearborn* and *H. S. Langfeld*, Portable Tachistoscope and Memory Apparatus; *Herbert S. Langfeld*, Portable Self-Registering Tapping-Board and Counter; *H. M. Johnson*, A Note on Ferree and Rand's Method of Photometry; *H. C. McComas*, Extravagance in the Motor Theories of Consciousness; Discussion, *Truman L. Kelley*, Further Logical Aspects of the Binet Scale.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORAL, XXIII, 3: *A. N. Whitehead*, La théorie relationniste de l'espace; *F. Colonna d'Istria*, La religion d'après Cabanis; *L. Brunschvicg*, Sur les rapports de la conscience intellectuelle et de la conscience moral; *R. Hubert*, La théorie cartésienne de l'énumération; *C. Guy-Grand*, Impartialité et neutralité.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XLI, 8: *L. Dauriac*, Contingence et Rationalisme; *L. Proal*, L'anarchisme au XVIII^e siècle (premier article); *Dr. Philippe*, Sur la forme de perception des sensations tactiles de Weber; *F. Picavet*, La philosophie de Bonald; *Ossip-Lourie*, La Calomnie.

REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA, II, 4: *Rodolfo Rivarola*, Reflexiones sobre la introspección psicológica; *Camilo Meyer*, La filosofía de las matemáticas y su evolución en el siglo XIX; *C. O. Bunge*, Las tres leyes de la actividad psíquica; *J. Laub*, Los teoremas energéticos y los límites de su validez; *Carlos de Velasco*; El pensamiento de la revolución cubana; *José Ingenieros*, La cultura filosófica en la España teocrática; *José Ingenieros*, La renovación de la cultura filosófica española.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA, VIII, 3: *P. Martinetti*, La dottrina della conoscenza e del metodo nella filosofia di B. Spinoza; *G. Rensi*, La morale dell' "attuazione dell' Io" (Seth e Wright); *E. di Carlo*, La dialettica engelsiana; *C. Pulcini*, L'ora presente e la filosofia nella scuola; *P. Nicoli*, La funzione del tirocinio nelle scuole normali.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA, VIII, 3: *Mons. Mario Sturzo*, L'eroismo: sua natura e sua funzione; *Amato Masnaro*, L'articolo nella *Somma Teologica* di S. Tommaso; *Francesco Olgiati*, Il problema della conoscenza in Josiah Royce; *Luigi Botti*, I problemi filosofici; *G. B. Biavaschi*, Intorno alle origini del potere civile.





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