


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THE

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

EDITED BY

J. E. CREIGHTON

OF THE SAGE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

WITH THE COÖPERATION OF

JAMES SETH

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH

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
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AFFECTIONS IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE.

II. ARISTOTLE.

ARISTOTLE'S treatment of the affections, like Plato's, is conditioned throughout by other than purely psychological interests. His principal discussion of pleasure is in the tenth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where the primary aim is to define the relation of pleasure to the pursuit of the moral end; and his principal discussion of the emotions is in the second book of the *Rhetoric*, where the main object is to relate the emotional susceptibilities of an audience to the art of persuasion. In the *De Anima*, where psychological problems are handled more from the point of view of a philosophy of mind, with the emphasis on cognition, references to the phenomena of the affective life are few and incidental. Nevertheless, wherever Aristotle does treat of these phenomena, whether incidentally or in a connected discussion subordinate to an ulterior purpose, he seems to be genuinely interested in the facts. His inventory of the facts is far fuller than Plato's, his analysis more thorough. In constructing a theory there is always a certain selection of the material, a guiding idea and a mutual adaptation and molding of the two as the theory develops. But the emphasis may be now on the one factor, and now on the other. Plato's emphasis is on the ideal factor, Aristotle is more careful in the manipulation of the material. Thus in the doctrine of pleasure Aristotle's theory seems to be more molded on the facts, whereas Plato makes the im-

pression of fitting the facts to the requirements of ideas. The antithesis is not absolute; both writers deal reflectively with experience, and neither succeeds in clearly discriminating the psychological from logical and practical points of view. But Aristotle comes nearest to such discrimination of any ancient writer, and although, as has been said, "he studied psychology as a philosopher and was chiefly interested in it as it bore on philosophical problems,"¹ he nevertheless exhibits in a remarkable degree the spirit of scientific detachment in surveying and handling his material. Hence his account of the emotions, imperfect as it is, and particularly his conception of pleasure as a concomitant of the normal exercise of vital function, though that too is incomplete, are not only of importance historically, but contain large elements of permanent psychological value.

Aristotle begins the discussion of pleasure by criticizing the definition of it as a kind of motion (*κίνησις*), especially Plato's view of it as originating in a process (*γένεσις*) of the replenishment of a deficiency, and, therefore, as conditioned on a state of pain. Pleasure cannot be a motion, he argues, for motion implies rate; but while the transition to pleasure may be quick or slow, these terms are not applicable to the pleasure itself. The conception of it as a process of replenishment and as conditioned on pain was suggested, he thinks, by the pains and pleasures of nutrition, such as hunger and thirst and the satisfaction of these wants. But this conception, besides making pleasure a bodily state, is plainly inadequate to meet the case of many pleasures in which no pain of want precedes.² Plato, as we have seen, admitted and glorified these pure, painless pleasures without, however, being able to explain them in terms of his original theory. As against the view that pleasure is a motion or process, Aristotle maintains that it is something which at any moment of its actual existence is naturally complete. Duration is essential to motion, but not to pleasure; even a momentary pleasure is wholly and entirely pleasure. Like the act of vision or a mathematical point, pleasure is without beginning, middle or end.³

¹ R. D. Hicks, *Aristotle's De Anima*, p. lxxii, 1908.

² *Eth. Nic.*, X, 3, 4-7. Cf. *Magn. Mor.*, II, 7, 1204 b 5; *Eth. Eud.*, VI, 15, 1154 b 27.

³ *Eth. Nic.*, I, c., 4, 4.

This criticism is not, of course, meant to deny that pleasures exist in time, that they persist for a longer or shorter time, that within a given extent of time they may vary in intensity; nor does it necessarily deny that all pleasure rests upon and is connected with some kind of organic movement. Aristotle is not here looking at the psychical process, a movement in the flow of consciousness to be observed and described, nor is he dealing with a physiological theory of such a process. He is simply isolating a moment or element in immediate experience and enquiring into its logical definition, and his point is that, when thus isolated, the moment in question is seen to be improperly defined as a motion or transition to an end beyond itself, but is itself a fully realized mode of conscious being, whatever its conditions and however manifold its relations. The contention may seem futile and to ignore the element of truth in the opinions criticized, which, though crudely identifying a psychical content with a physical change, had at least the merit of indicating conditions of the origin and fluctuations of the experience. But the criticism had the value of exposing precisely this crudity and of bringing the discussion on to psychological ground; it showed the necessity of avoiding hasty generalizations and misleading analogies; and it formed an indispensable beginning in the construction of Aristotle's own more inclusive and penetrating theory.

Here, however, we are confronted by an apparent contradiction in Aristotle himself. In the passages cited above he denies that pleasure is a movement or process, but in a passage in the *Rhetoric* he himself describes it as "a certain motion of the soul and a sudden and sensible settling into the normal state," pain being the opposite,—a description strikingly similar to Plato's.¹ The difficulty may be met in various ways. We might explain it, for instance, by Aristotle's broad use of the term "motion" (*κίνησις*) as including any sort of change.² Aristotle, it may be said, does not deny in the *Ethics* that pleasure can be regarded as a 'motion' from any and every point of view; all that he

¹ *Rhet.*, I, 11, 1369 b 33: κίνησιν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀνθρώπων καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φέειν; Plato, *Tim.*, 64 D.

² See Bonitz, *Index arist.*, s. v.

insists on is that it is not a 'motion' in a sense that would conflict with the conception of it as a fully realized state of consciousness. Pleasure and pain certainly imply change; they are according to Aristotle elsewhere "qualitative changes of the faculty of sense," and he notes that pleasure, in man at least, cannot be continued uninterruptedly.¹ Or we may refer to Aristotle's technical conception of motion as not mere transition to an end, but as a process in which the quality of the end is immanent. On this reading of the passage pleasure would here be defined by metonymy in terms of the process of its attainment, the end and the process being 'formally' the same thing in different stages of its attainment. Frequently the latter part of the description is taken as epexegetical, the "motion of the soul" being interpreted as *consisting in* "the sudden and sensible settling into the natural state;" and this is even supposed to mark the critical difference between Aristotle's doctrine and Plato's, the "motion" with Aristotle being, it is said, not, as with Plato, a "process of origination," but an "unmediated consciousness."² All such explanations assume that we have here to do with a precisely worded scientific definition. But what if the wording was not intended to be scientifically exact? Aristotle, when careful in his language, plainly distinguishes between the changes which introduce a quality and the quality itself.³ Here the distinction is obliterated. If now we compare this passage in the *Rhetoric* with the corresponding passage in the *Timæus* of Plato, we can hardly escape the conviction that both passages express substantially the same doctrine. Dogmatically, therefore, the teaching of the *Rhetoric* would be at variance with that of the *Ethics*. But it is to be observed that the description in the *Rhetoric* is not put forth dogmatically, but in the form of an

¹ ἀλλοιώσεις τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, *Phys.*, VII, 3, 247 a 15; *Eth. Nic.*, X, 4, 9.

² "Das ἀθρόα soll hier eben die κίνησις in dem Sinne erklären, dass mit letzterer nicht wie bei Plato eine γένεσις, ein Entstehungsprocess, gemeint sei, sondern ein unvermitteltes Bewusstsein des naturgemässen Zustandes." Siebeck, *Gesch. d. Psychol.*, p. 489. But ἀθρόον is the very term used by Plato in the passage cited. Lafontaine, *Le plaisir d'après Pl. et Arist.*, p. 54, interprets: "Pleasure is *as it were* a movement of the soul, *or rather* a sudden and sensible return of the soul to its proper state." The gloss is indicated by the italics.

³ *Phys.*, VII, 3, 247 a 19.

assumption.¹ Hence we may conclude with a fair degree of probability that Aristotle did not intend that it should be taken as a formally precise definition, but that he adopted as sufficiently exact for the purpose in hand, the purpose, namely, of the rhetorician, a proposition generally understood and a conception more or less currently accepted, and especially by Platonists. In any case it is to be noted that in the discussion which follows, the emphasis falls not on the idea of pleasure as a process, or as a sudden settling, but on the normal and natural conditions in connection with which the affection arises.

Setting aside, then, the questionable definition as, except for this emphasis, relatively unimportant, we are now prepared for the further positive statement of Aristotle's doctrine of pleasure. The doctrine in the briefest and simplest terms is this: pleasure is the concomitant of the normal exercise of the faculties of a living, conscious being. The exercise or actual realization (*ἐνεργεῖν, ἐνέργεια*) of any faculty, or of the natural potentialities of life as a whole, is pleasant, and the pleasure is proportioned to the completeness of the realization. On the other hand, any impediment experienced in the process of exercising a faculty, of expressing a function, is felt as pain. Thus in order to experience pleasure, the faculty must be in good condition and the object of its activity appropriate. When the faculty is in the best condition and the object affords the fullest scope to its exercise, the pleasure relative to that faculty is the greatest possible.² In the exercise, for example, of the perceptive faculties there are certain conditions of proportion in the constituents of the object and a certain normal ratio between the object and the faculty which may not be transgressed with impunity: if it is exceeded, the result is less pleasure, or pain, or in extreme cases the destruction of the sense itself. In the exercise of thought there is a similar adaptation of the object to the faculty, but without any such limitation; for the more intellectual the

¹ *ὑποκείσθω ἡμῖν*, "let us assume that," etc. The view taken in the text was suggested by Cope, *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric* (1867), who in Ap. D to Bk. I, pp. 234 ff. treats fully of the whole subject of Aristotle's varying expressions concerning the nature of pleasure and pain.

² *Eth. Nic.*, X, 4, 7.

object, the more it stimulates the faculty, and the greater, consequently, is the pleasure.¹ No faculty, however, is capable of continuous exercise, for as the novelty wears off the activity is relaxed and the pleasure is correspondingly diminished. But the general principle applies not only to the special activities of the cognitive faculties, but to the totality of the individual's vital functions, life being described by Aristotle as a perpetually renewed exercise of faculties. Pleasure is the accompaniment of the free, unimpeded expression of the natural capacities, pain the accompaniment of conditions detrimental to such expression. This, in terms of faculty and function, is Aristotle's new rendering of the old doctrine that pleasure is according to nature and pain contrary to nature.²

Three things in this theory are particularly worthy of remark. (1) Pleasure (and by inference pain) is not a special faculty or the realized expression of such faculty. There is no special sense of pleasure the exercise of which is required by the conditions of life.³ It is an accompaniment, a complement, something superadded and attached, when the normal functions of life are being fulfilled. Aristotle puts it thus: "Pleasure completes the activity . . . as a kind of supervenient finality, like the bloom that is set on youth."⁴ As the peculiar charm which belongs to the hey-day of life is not any one or all of the powers which coöperate to create the charm, so pleasure is not identical with, but an incident of, the exercise of the faculties to which it gives

¹ *De an.*, III, 2, 426 b 3 ff.; II, 11, 424 b 28.

² *Eth. Nic.*, X, 4, 9 f.

³ *Ib.*, 5, 7.

⁴ *Ib.*, 4, 8: τελειῶ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή . . . ὡς ἐπιγινωμένον τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα. There is an apparent conflict between the assertion in this chapter that pleasure is ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ (cf. 5, 11, 1176 a 26; 5, 6, 1175 b 26), but not itself ἐνέργεια and what is said of it in VII, 12. There we read: "wherefore it is not proper to call pleasure a perceived process of origination (γένεσις), it should rather (ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον) be described as a realization of normally constituted faculty (ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐξέως), with the substitution of 'unimpeded' for 'perceived.'" The contradiction may be toned down by considering the nature of the antithesis and what is implied in the ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον. The probability, however, is that Bk. VII, which parallels the discussion of pleasure in Bk. X with various modifications in doctrine, is not Aristotle's, but is derived, along with Bks. V and VI, from the Ethics of Eudemus. See Stewart, *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics*, II, pp. 218 ff.

an added touch of perfection. The chief significance of this idea lies in its bearing on hedonism, which it is taken to refute. Psychologically it asserts the universal dependence of pleasure and pain on other functions of the organism. But it must not, on that account, be identified with any particular form of modern analytic theory, and especially not with that with which at first sight it may seem to have the closest affinity, the theory, namely, which makes these affections general 'attributes' of sensation or of other forms of 'consciousness.' Modern theory and discussion rests in the main on a conception of mental 'elements' of which the psychology of Aristotle, perhaps to its credit, knows nothing. (2) Aristotle's doctrine is an 'activity' doctrine; pleasure is a concomitant of the active exercise of the faculties. "The exercise of every sense is attended with pleasure, and so is the exercise of reason and the speculative faculty; and it is pleasantest when it is most complete."¹ The emphasis on the connection of pleasure with the realization of faculties is so strong that one is tempted to charge Aristotle with exaggeration and with failure to take account of the large class of pleasures connected with recreation and repose. And it is quite true that he does not take them sufficiently into account; he does not develop his doctrine in this direction. He does, however, notice them, telling us, for instance, that "all conditions of ease, comfort or inattention, amusements, recreations and sleep" are pleasures. And the explanation he seems to give of them is that they rest on processes which fulfil either natural or acquired tendencies and conform to the general conditions of life.² If, therefore, we are to characterize Aristotle's doctrine of pleasure as an 'activity' doctrine, it must be, apparently, in the broad sense in which 'activity' denotes any unimpeded vital process whatsoever. In the *Ethics* he emphasizes the pleasures of the cognitive processes, which afford, indeed, the readiest illustration of the thesis that pleasure is an accompaniment of function and not the function itself, and especially that it is not a mere process of restoration of a natural state previously impaired.

¹ *Eth. Nic.*, X, 4, 1174 b 20. Peters' tr.

² *Rhet.*, I, 11; cf. *Probl.*, 878 b 11: "the way to what is natural is sweet, if only it be perceived."

But he nowhere denies that a process of the latter sort is pleasant. His theory rather requires that it should be pleasant, so far, namely, as it can be regarded as an expression of the latent capacities of life and as going on without obstruction. Similarly of all other processes that can be viewed as realizing in any way any of the manifold conditions of normal life. Pleasure, he explains, completes the exercise of all the vital powers, and so completes life itself; pleasure and life seem constantly conjoined.¹ (3) Aristotle's doctrine is thus fundamentally 'biological.' But, it must be well noted, not in any narrow sense. The "soul" is, indeed, the "entelechy" of the body, but not its product; it is the formal and final "cause" of the physiological functions, not their efficiently produced "effect." Bodily processes, the "matter" of the psychical, are not the sole condition of the affections, and the intellect, although in man intimately bound up with sensible experience, is in its essential nature a thing apart. Aristotle's point of view is dynamic: life is for him a complex of functions, and the affections are related to these functions. It is wholly a secondary matter whether or not the functions of life are embodied. The incorporeal Deity, whose life is one of perfect and uninterrupted intellectual activity, experiences, according to Aristotle, the greatest and purest joy.² It is only, therefore, with this understanding that we may see in the doctrine that pleasure is a concomitant of the normal exercise of the faculties, and pain the contrary, the original of the modern view that pleasure is an index of favorable conditions and pain an index of disturbance in some or all of the vital processes of the organism. There are, it is well known, many objections to this view of which Aristotle was ignorant. The one obvious objection to his own view, the case of pathological pleasures, he does not appear to feel as an objection; they seem to him sufficiently explained by diseased conditions of the body or perverted dispositions of the mind.³

¹ *Eth. Nic.*, X, 4, 7.

² *Ib.*, X, 7, 3; *Met. A*, 7, 1072 b 14f.

³ He treats the question from the ethical point of view, assuming a normal man, ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ, as a standard. "In all matters of this kind," he says, "we assume that things are what they appear to be to the perfect man." Hence he

Aristotle, like Plato, holds that pleasures differ in kind. But while this view in Plato rests primarily on an ethical appreciation and is developed in the distinctions of pure and mixed pleasures and pleasures true and false, in Aristotle it appears as a consequence of the conception of pleasure as a concomitant and completion of the exercise of the faculties. As there are specific differences among the faculties, so, he argues, there must be corresponding differences among the pleasures arising from their exercise, for each pleasure perfects the use of its own faculty. To this abstract logical consideration others are added of a more empirical character. Thus it is observed that pleasure has a facilitating effect on the specific kind of activity it accompanies and an inhibitory effect on rival activities. If we take pleasure in any pursuit, such as music or geometry, we are much more likely to acquire proficiency in it. On the other hand, a lover of the flute, whenever he hears the sound of it, can hardly be made to attend to an argument. And in general the pleasanter activity so preoccupies the mind that attention at the time to any other subject less pleasant is difficult. Such pleasure, says Aristotle, has almost the same effect on the rival activity as its own proper pain.¹ The argument makes plain that what Aristotle means by pleasure is the various ways of being pleased, the actual sense of agreeable hearing, seeing, remembering, thinking, etc. There are various ways of being pleased, consequently various kinds of pleasure. The 'pleasure' that is common to the different experiences is an abstraction, like 'color,' and has no actual existence. The pleasure that Aristotle has in mind is that which is specifically realized in specific modes of activity, and such pleasure is manifold. The dynamic effects of which he speaks are strictly, therefore, effects of the whole pleasant experience considered functionally. This functional view of pleasure, which reappears in various places in declares base pleasures, like perverted tastes in sickness, to be not pleasures at all "except to corrupt men"; *Eth. Nic.*, X, 5, 10 f. This is his version of Plato's "false" pleasures. Aristotle, it should be added, has other principles of explanation, namely, specific and individual constitutional differences (see *Eth. Nic.*, I. c.) and habit, a "second nature."

¹ *Eth. Nic.*, X, 5, 1-5.

Aristotle, makes it difficult to maintain rigidly the doctrine that pleasure exists only *in* the realization of function and is not itself the realization of a function, as in the seventh book of the *Ethics* it is declared to be.

Pleasures differ in purity, the degree of purity being measured by corresponding differences in the functions with which they are connected. Thus, sight is purer than touch, hearing and smell than taste, intellection than any activity of sense. Consequently the pleasures of the intellect are purer than those of any sense, and the pleasures of the senses differ according to their kind. Evidently the criterion of "purity" here is not, as with Plato, freedom from admixture with pain, but freedom from "matter" (*ὕλη*)¹. Independently of this distinction Aristotle also admits mixed states of pleasure and pain, the most conspicuous illustrations of which are found in the emotions, *e. g.*, the tragic emotions of pity and fear. Considerations similar to those which derive differences in pleasure from the particular functions they attach to lead to the conception of differences of pleasure relative to the life-function of one species of sentient being as compared with another and of individual differences among members of the same species; but the facts are noted only as a background for the conception of a normal life-function for man, and to mark the ethical distinction between the pleasures proper to it and the "false" pleasures of the profligate.² Aristotle, further, accepts the current distinction between bodily pleasures and pleasures of the soul. Under the former he includes those connected with a purely human exercise of the senses, what we may call æsthetic pleasures, as well as those common to all animals and related to conservation and reproduction, such as the pleasures of eating, drinking and the sexual appetite. Under the latter he includes such pleasures as those arising from gratified ambition and the love of learning, the pleasure of successful revenge (its failure is unpleasant), of victory (since it gives us a sense of superiority), of honor and reputation in the opinion of the competent, of flattery, and the

¹ See Stewart, *op. cit.*, II, p. 435.

² *Eth. Nic.*, X, 5, 10 f.

pleasure in things similar and cognate.¹ Aristotle curiously derives self-love from this last, since, as he says, everyone occupies the relation of the similar and the cognate in a preëminent degree towards himself.²

As a psychical experience all pleasure is, of course, an "affection of the soul."³ The "part" of the soul to which it is referred is sense (*αἰσθησις*), the Greek term, be it remembered, having all the breadth and indefiniteness of our 'feeling.' The admission of pure pleasures of the speculative intellect would seem to imply an intellectual or spiritual feeling. Sometimes, however, Aristotle insists on the relation of all pleasure to bodily sensation. For pleasure, he says, is either in present action, in which case it is a direct sensible experience excited by a sensibly perceived object, or in memory or anticipation, which are dependent upon such experience. The objects of memory are pleasant not only if they were pleasant at the time, but also if they were pleasant in their consequences. Objects of anticipation are pleasant if pleasant consequences are expected from them. But whether relating to a present object or to one past or future, pleasure itself is a sensible experience, the ideal feeling differing from the actual only in degree.⁴

Besides the relations of pleasure and pain to the cognitive processes, they are also intimately connected with conation. Mere sensation, says Aristotle, is like bare thinking, or the simple uttering of words; but if it is pleasant or painful, the soul, as if affirming or denying, pursues or avoids. Being pleased or pained is thus being active in respect to good and bad in the medium of sense.⁵ Indeed, so intimate is the connection of these feelings with active tendency that they are expressly assigned,

¹ *Op. cit.*, III, 10, 2., 11, 8; *Rhet.* I, 11.

² Gomperz, *Gr. Denker*, III, p. 336, cites this as illustrating a certain *Verschrobenheit* in Aristotle which is further exemplified by his artificial deduction of the pleasure of a reputation for wisdom from the power it gives us over others, since we all like to rule. Gomperz remarks that it does not always have this effect and that Aristotle might have derived the pleasure more directly from the pleasure of superiority, of which he had previously spoken.

³ *Eth. Nic.*, I, 8, 10.

⁴ *Phys.*, VII, 3, 247 a 7f; *Rhet.*, I, 11.

⁵ *De an.*, III, 7, 431 a 8 ff.; cf. II, 3, 414 b 4. *Pol.*, I, 2, 12.

on occasion, to the sense faculty of appetite.¹ But besides sensuous conation Aristotle recognizes a conation of the rational will. In the contemplation of an intelligible object the mind is affected by a spiritual pleasure inseparable from a spiritual conation. There is a similar relation of pleasure, pain and conation through imagination. The pleasure that arises from the normal exercise of any function and the pain that arises from excess or defect in its exercise set up movements of approach or avoidance, beget tendencies of desire or aversion, the satisfaction or thwarting of which are themselves attended with pleasure or pain. Thus under the influence of these affections the manifold impulses, inclinations, desires are created, strengthened, checked, organized, developed and expressed. Every man, says Aristotle, is actively concerned with the things he chiefly loves; in these he takes pleasure; and the pleasure completes the activity and the life whose tendency it manifests.² It is this which makes the regulation of pleasure so important ethically; pleasure consolidates or suppresses tendencies, but does not of itself determine what tendencies it is desirable to further or inhibit or how the different tendencies are to be related in an ideally perfect human life. We are not concerned here with Aristotle's ethics; the point of psychological interest is that pleasures and pains are regarded as capable of voluntary control, pleasure more easily, it is held, than intense pain.³ How more precisely the control is brought about is something of a mystery. Aristotle's disposition to separate the powers of the soul into distinct faculties obscures the conception of organic relations between the different mental processes and between these and the bodily processes which underlies his view of psychology as a whole, and which it was his great merit to have introduced in his designation of the soul as the body's form and entelechy. His conception of pleasure and pain as concomitants respectively of free and

¹ *Top.*, IV, 5, 126 a 9: ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ. In the same context shame (αἰσχύνη) is connected with the thinking faculty (τὸ λογιστικόν) and fear and anger with the spirited faculty (τὸ θυμοειδές). This division of faculties—Plato's—Aristotle in his doctrine of affection usually disregards.

² *Eth. Nic.*, X, 4, 1174 b 20; I, 8, 10.

³ *Ib.*, X, 12, 1 f.

impeded vital function remains as a permanent acquisition of scientific psychology, needing, however, more concrete definition through observation of all the facts without neglect of the negative instances; much of what he says concerning the relations of pleasure and pain to other aspects of mental and bodily life also remains, though the subtlety of the connections and the continuity in the processes require a formulation free from the disturbing suggestions of distinct and separate 'faculties.'

Turning now to the subject of the emotions or passions, we find Aristotle including under the term *πάθη* a variety of affectional states, dispositions and qualities for the grouping of which together it is not easy to discover a principle. Fifteen of these are treated in some detail in the second book of the *Rhetoric*, where they are arranged mostly in pairs: anger and placability, love and hate, fear and confidence, shame and shamelessness, benevolence and churlishness, pity and resentment; the last three, envy, emulation and contempt, are also correlated, emulation being regarded as in a sort the reverse of envy, and contempt the antithesis of emulation. The list is not, and is not intended to be complete, for in other connections we find, *e. g.*, joy and longing, enthusiasm and "spirit" (*θυμός*), of which anger and resentment would be expressions, and even appetite (*ἐπιθυμία*) used to illustrate the same general kind of mental fact.¹ It is difficult to distinguish some of these "passions" from the virtues and vices which are said not to be "passions" (*πάθη*), but formed habits of the soul (*ἔξεις*). Nor does Aristotle himself appear to be wholly consistent. Thus gentleness (*πραότης, πρᾶνσις*) is treated in the *Rhetoric* as a passion, whereas in the *Ethics* it is classed with the moral virtues and discussed as such, being defined as a kind of moderation in respect to anger, with the vice of wrathfulness as its opposite. Benevolence, one would suppose, would be regarded as a virtue on any theory; yet it is entirely absent from the list of the virtues treated in the *Ethics* (II-IV) and is grouped with the passions in the *Rhetoric* (II, 7), where it is described as that which leads one to render a disin-

¹ *Eth. Nic.*, II, 4 (5), 1105 b 20 ff.; *de an.*, I, 1, 403 a 16 f.; *Pol.*, VIII, 5, 1340 a 11, *Cf. Magn. mor.*, I, 7, 8; *Eth. Eud.*, II, 2, 1220 b 10 ff.

terested service to another in the hour of need. Modesty or shame (*αἰδώς*) is discussed in the *Ethics* (IV, 9) in connection with the virtues, the reason given being that the modest person is praised as maintaining the mean between bashful shyness and shamelessness. Here shamelessness, which in the *Rhetoric* figures as a passion, appears as a sort of vice. The opposite, shame, however, is declared not to be, in the strict sense, a virtue, "since it resembles a passion (*πάθος*) rather than a formed habit of soul (*ἔξῃς*);" it is held, in fact, to be a sort of physical instinct, "a kind of fear of disgrace with effects resembling those of the fear aroused by danger: men blush when ashamed, when terrified they turn pale."¹ We are not surprised, therefore, to find that in the *Rhetoric* shame is treated along with its opposite among the passions. Resentment or virtuous indignation (*νέμεσις*) appears both as a virtue and as a passion.²

This apparent confusion is partly due to the ambiguities of language, the same term being used to designate different things, or the same thing viewed in different ways. Back of it lies a genuine attempt on Aristotle's part to distinguish these differences. "There are," he says, "three sorts of mental facts (*τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα*), passions (or affections, *πάθη*), faculties (capacities, potentialities, *δυνάμεις*), and formed habits (dispositions, characters, *ἔξεις*). By (1) 'passions' I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, hate, longing, emulation, pity, and, in general, states accompanied by pleasure and pain. (2) A 'faculty' is that in respect of which we are said to be capable of being affected in any of these ways, *e. g.*, in respect of being angered or pained or feeling pity. (3) A 'formed habit' is that in respect of which we are well or ill regulated in our 'passions,' for example, as regards anger we are ill regulated if we are either too violent or too slack, but we are well regulated, if our anger is in moderation. And so with the rest."³ According to this the passions occupy a mean between the predisposing susceptibilities and the habits which are formed by their repeated exercise.

¹ *Eth. Nic.*, IV, 9, 1 f.; *cf.* II, 7, 1108 a 21.

² *Rhet.*, II, 6; *Eth. Nic.*, IV, 7, 1108 b 1 ff.; *Rhet.*, II, 9, 1386 b 9 ff.

³ *Eth. Nic.*, II, 4 (5), 1105 b 20 ff.; *cf. Magn. mor.*, I, 7, 8. *Eth. Eud.*, II, 2, 1220 b 10 ff. Plutarch, *de virt. mor.*, 4.

Habits are also capacities of behavior, but capacities formed and fixed as features of character. They show how well or how little the passions in a man are under the control of an ideal principle and are hence subjects of the moral attributes of praise or blame, virtue or vice. It is easy to understand, therefore, how Aristotle can say that the virtues are not passions, and yet declare that the two have much in common.¹ The distinction is not always represented by the name; the same name may be applied to both. But there is one thing which characterizes every virtue that is not characteristic of the passions, and that is the element of choice. "The virtues are in a sort choices, or at least they are not independent of choice (*προαίρεσις*), "they result in part from determinations of the will, whereas we may, *e. g.*, be afraid or angry involuntarily (*απροαιρέτως*)."² Aristotle speaks of the "irrational" passions (*τὰ ἄλογα πάθη*) and frequently contrasts a life that is according to passion (*κατὰ πάθος*) with one that is conformed to reason (*κατὰ λόγον*); but he is far from suggesting the Stoic inference that the passions must be suppressed; he regards them rather as so much material to be brought under rational control.²

With all this, however, we are still far from a positive conception of "passion." It arises from a "faculty," but so in a way does every other manifestation of the psychic life. It is not a "habit," from which we conclude that it is a temporary and transient expression of its capacity; but this is true of the actual expression of every mental power. Why are not the expressions of the "habits" passions? What difference does it make to the nature of a passion to be frequently repeated so that its original potentiality becomes fixed in a disposition of the character? Well, there is a difference, especially in the case of the virtuous dispositions, as Aristotle clearly points out. The habit is not formed *merely* by repetition; it is formed in relation to the whole organization of experience, the developing knowledge of the

¹ *Eth. Nic.*, II, 4(5), 1106 a 3; X, 8, 1178 a 15. Hence remarks on the passions are naturally included in the chapters (III, 6-IV) which treat of the moral virtues. Wundt, *Phys. Psych.*, III, p. 239, finds in these chapters the beginning of a psychology of the emotions, but omits to mention the fuller treatment in *Rhet.*, II.

² *Eth. Nic.*, III, 3, 1111 a 1; cf. I, 1, 1095 a 8, VIII, 3, 1156 a 32, etc.

individual and the pressure of the social environment. It is formed in the light, used or misused, of ideals, and it is these which give to it its moral character. Hence there is a difference, for example, between the resentment or benevolence which springs up sporadically from a natural inclination and the resentment or benevolence arising from settled habits developed under the guidance of ideas. Nevertheless, if we abstract from the relations, occasions and manner of their manifestation, it can hardly be denied that the phenomena in the two cases present a psychological identity, an identity particularly manifest in the ill regulated vices as compared with the like phenomena before they acquired moral character. Aristotle himself calls enthusiasm a passion of the "ethical" part of the soul and pity and indignation passions of virtue.¹ We are ready to conclude, then, that although primary potentialities or "faculties" and formed habits of soul are distinct as regards both originality and organization, the phenomena called "passions" which are said to arise from the one may and do arise from the other also. None, possibly, ever occurs unless grounded in some constitutional tendency; but not every expression of a native tendency appears to be regarded by Aristotle as a "passion." What, then, determines the class to which he gives the name?

To this question he supplies no satisfactory answer. He defines "passions" in the passage quoted by naming a number of the things he regards as such and by a general reference to states attended with pleasure and pain. In the *Rhetoric* he defines them also, and, primarily, as states that radically affect judgment, a feature which especially commends them to the rhetorician and the student of politics.² The particular "passions" are defined very largely as species of pleasure and pain. But they differ from pleasure and pain as such in that, besides being evidently more complex, they are "motions of the soul," and not mere complements of a function.³ Some of them are defined as pains or perturbations. Many of them have a markedly

¹ *Pol.*, VIII, 5, 1340 a 11.

² *Rhet.*, II, 1, 1378 a 20 f.; *Pol.*, III, 15, 1286 a 33.

³ *κινήσεις ψυχῆς*, *Pol.*, VIII, 7, 1342 a 8; cf. 5, also *de mem.* 1, 450 b 1.

conative character; they express appetites, tendencies, strivings; they include appetite (ἐπιθυμία) and "spirit" (θυμός), into which Plato had distributed the whole of the "mortal" soul, and these impulses expand into many special passions besides.¹ Finally, they are all "materialized notions" (λόγοι ἐνυλοί), *i. e.*, mental states or processes so connected with bodily processes that they can be described as being either the one or the other, while to be fully described both aspects must be taken into account; thus,—to use Aristotle's own illustration—anger is defined "logically" as a propension to retaliation, but "physically" as an ebullition of the blood about the heart.² Along with this, however, we have a special class of "somatic passions" (σωματικά πάθη) to which the pains of want and the pleasures of replenishment are referred and which may reasonably be supposed to include the appetites of hunger, thirst and sex;³ and although the corresponding term "psychic passions" does not occur, it seems to be implied in the description of the passions in the *Rhetoric* that they are what in the discussion of pleasure Aristotle called pleasures (and pains) of the soul.⁴ But from all this we get no clear idea of a distinct class of mental phenomena such as might conceivably be derived from a careful psychological analysis. Much of what is said applies generally to all mental phenomena, *e. g.*, to sense-perception. What we find is rather a broad classification with indications of subordinate groupings in which, however, conations of various kinds, pleasure and pain, emotion, passion and sentiment are confused. The explanation of this lies deep in Aristotle's 'logical' way of thinking in approaching the problems of psychology. The soul is for him a real entity (οὐσία) with a definable essence which actively expresses itself in modes (ἐνέργειαι) which are the realization of its proper function or end (ἔργον, τέλος). Now the "passions" (πάθη) do not belong to the "essence" of the soul; they are rather ways in which it is

¹ The summary statement, "By πάθη I mean anger, appetite and the like" is in this connection not without significance. *Rhet.*, II, 12, 1388 b 33.

² *De an.*, I, 1, 10, 403 a 25-b 8.

³ *Eth. Nic.*, X, 3, 6, 1173 b 9. The term σωματικά πάθη is also used in another sense, namely, of such determinations of body as largeness, smallness, softness, roughness, etc., *de part. an.*, I, 4, 644 a 13.

⁴ See Cope, *Aristotle's Rhetoric*, note on II, 1, 8.

"affected." Hence, although Aristotle warns us that we must not neglect the "passions," since they reflect light on the essence, it evidently depends very much on our prior conception of the soul's essence what we decide to contradistinguish from it as its passions. Aristotle's conception leads him to a very wide use of the latter term, one of its uses being to designate roughly what we, also for the most part very roughly, are accustomed to call emotions. But as we have seen, and as will further appear from the definitions to be presently given, this class of "passions," often spoken of as the passions generally, is of varied nature and indeterminate extent.¹

In discussing the passions selected for special examination in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle does not pretend to give a complete scientific account of them, such as would satisfy his own conception of scientific method, much less does he approach the subject from the point of view of a modern analytical psychologist. He neglects altogether the 'physical' aspects of the passions and deals with them 'logically' by definition and description with reference to their usual objects, occasions and circumstances in a manner suited to the purposes of the rhetorician. His point of view, therefore, is that of a keen observer of human nature arranging his observations in some kind of classified order. For this sort of descriptive writing he sets the standard. Later writers, whether accepting or modifying his definitions, followed in the main his method for centuries. Certain of the passions, as, *e. g.*, anger, were treated more fully and the passions in general were more systematically classified. Classification was pre-eminently the work of the Stoics. But so thoroughly did Aristotle do his work that in writings still extant we find none which surpasses it in abundance and sharpness of detail till we come in the Middle Ages to the great treatment of the subject by Thomas Aquinas.

In what follows it must suffice to note the definitions and a

¹ On Aristotle's use of the terms *πάθος* and *πάθημα*, see Bonitz, *Ind. ar.*, s. v., *Arist. Studien*, V. Etymology has suggested the use of 'passions' in the text; the broader term would be 'affections.' The historical student of psychology will not overlook the connection of both these terms with Aristotle's conception of the soul as *ὄψα*.

few of the more important observations. *Anger* (ὀργή) is "an impulse attended with pain to avenge openly an undeserved slight openly manifested towards ourselves or our friends." The pain, however, which arises from the consciousness of frustrated desire, is only the predominant affection; there is besides an element of pleasure in the expectation of revenge. The objects of anger are individuals; the slight may be contempt, spite or insolence. Seasons, times, temperaments and periods of life condition the passion. *Gentleness* or placability (πράνσις) is "a settling or quiescence of anger," arising, *e. g.*, from lapse of time, or from the mood induced by mirth or prosperity, or from pity on seeing the object of our anger suffer greater injury than the anger itself would have inflicted. *Love* or friendliness (φιλία) consists in "wishing a person all the things you consider good, not for your sake, but for his, and readiness, so far as in you lies, to bring them about." *Hate* or enmity (ἐχθρα) is the opposite. Hate differs from anger in several respects. In anger we are moved by personal offences; we may hate a man solely for his character. Anger is concerned with individuals; hatred may be directed towards a class. Anger seeks to make the evil it inflicts manifest; to hate the exhibition of the evil is indifferent. Anger is necessarily painful, not so hate. Anger, finally, is not inconsistent with compassion; but if you hate a man, you aim at his destruction.

Fear (φόβος) is "a kind of pain or perturbation arising from the idea of impending evil hurtful to life or at least painful." Aristotle dwells particularly on the different circumstances which excite this feeling towards persons, such as their criminality, enmity, rivalry; he notes too an indirect source of it in compassion: what excites compassion when it happens or threatens to happen to others appears, generally speaking, as a thing formidable to ourselves. Aristotle makes use of this fact in his theory of tragedy. *Confidence* (θάρασος) is the opposite of fear, being a kind of hope attended with the idea of things salutary as at hand and of things formidable as either absent or remote. *Shame* (αἰσχύνη) is "a kind of pain or perturbation in reference to evils past, present or future, that are thought to tend to discredit (ἀδοξία)."

Shamelessness (ἀναισχυντία) is disregard of and indifference to such things. Shame may be excited not only by acts which we condemn ourselves, but also by those deemed disgraceful by others. Before intimates we are ashamed only of things really shameful, before strangers of things that are conventionally so. But we must hold the persons and their good opinion in some regard; we do not feel shame before those whose opinion we despise. Regard for the consequences of others' opinions is also, in Aristotle's view, a potent factor, for we feel shame, he says, in the presence of slanderers and tell-tales, satirists and comic poets. *Benevolence* (χάρις) is the feeling "which leads one to render service to another in time of need, not to repay past services or to obtain future rewards, but solely for his benefit." Past services, however, may be the occasion of its exercise, in which case it is gratitude. Its opposite is ill-will or churlishness.¹ *Pity* or compassion (ἔλεος) is "a kind of pain at the sight of great and undeserved misfortune in another, such as we deem liable to befall ourselves or any of our friends or relatives, and especially when it appears imminent." It is not felt either by the utterly miserable or by those who are enjoying supreme felicity; it requires a sense of liability to suffer and is found in those who have experienced suffering, are somewhat advanced in years, are physically weak or constitutionally timid, who have parents, wife or children living, etc., and it implies belief in the existence of human virtue. Further, its object must not be too nearly related to us, for then the feeling is akin to that which we should have in similar circumstances for ourselves, namely, fear or horror. Aristotle tells the story of a Persian general who wept at the sight of his friend's beggary, but not when he saw his own son led out to death. *Resentment* or indignation (νεμεσᾶν, νέμεσις), the correlative of pity, is pain at the sight of unmerited prosperity. This is a noble sentiment, not found in slavish, mean or unambitious natures. It is, therefore, sharply differentiated from *Envy* or malice (φθόνος), where the feeling of pain at the prosperity has no regard to the merit of its possessor, but solely to the fact that another, our equal or similar, enjoys certain advantages.

¹ χαρίσασθαι καὶ ἀχαριστέιν, 1385 b 10.

Envy is not especially limited to the poor; it is found in the ambitious and mean-minded, including persons engaged in important affairs or highly prosperous, but who think that the world is robbing them of their dues, and it is directed towards those who are near to us in time, place, age or reputation, who are our rivals, who have attained a rapid success, whose success is our reproach, etc. *Emulation* (ζήλος) is "a kind of pain at the sight of goods which we value and might acquire when possessed by another naturally resembling ourselves, not because he possesses them, but because we do not." This, like resentment, is also a noble passion, being a spur to increased activity in the pursuit of worthy ends. The antithesis of emulation is a supercilious *Contempt* (καταφρόνησις).¹

Following these definitions and observations Aristotle treats of the influence of the passions on the different periods of life, giving an admirable popular description of the common emotional characteristics of each, especially those of youth and old age; he notes, among other things, how the same emotion may spring up in different periods from different impulses, pity, for example, from generous good-nature in youth, from feebleness and a disposition to fear all manner of evils to themselves in the old.² But it must suffice to refer to this in passing. There is one other topic which must be touched on before concluding this part of our subject, Aristotle's teaching concerning the peculiar emotional effect of tragedy. What he says on this topic is tantalizing in its brevity. It is simply this, that tragedy, by exciting pity and fear, aims at a "katharsis" of such emotions,³ one of its effects being to alleviate these usually painful feelings with pleasure (κουφίζεσθαι μετ' ἡδονῆς.) Much has been written to elucidate the meaning of this teaching and the controversy is still from time to time renewed. Since the thoroughgoing investigation of the subject by Bernays this much at least may now be regarded as settled: we must not follow Lessing in referring the "katharsis" to a moral purification of the character in respect to pity and fear and emotions of a similar nature generally, but

¹ *Rhet.*, II, 2-10.

² *Ib.*, II f.

³ *Poet.*, 6: δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.

must take the term in the medical sense, and the process indicated as limited to the emotions excited at the time by the tragedy itself.¹ The rest is largely conjecture. Aristotle possibly had in mind the teaching of the Hippocratean school regarding the process which takes place in the cure of disease; this school held that disease was eliminated by the morbid matter being "concocted out," it being thereby first raised to a condition of more intense activity.² Aristotle seems to be thinking of this analogy when he speaks of the effect of orgiastic music on persons suffering from religious frenzy; he represents the music as effecting a purgation (κάθαρσις) of the morbid state and a consequent alleviation of soul; and music, he says, has a similar effect on pity and fear and other emotions.³ If he conceived the action of tragedy in a similar way, his thought would be something like this: the spectators enter the theatre with susceptibilities to certain emotions which in real life are painful and burdensome; the tragedy represented on the stage excite these emotions in a very high degree, but, if properly constructed and acted, it excites them in such a way that the painful element is purged away and the final result is pleasing and satisfying. It is not necessary to suppose that he regarded pity and fear as literally diseases; the analogy must not be pressed. And it will be generally admitted that a true tragedy does produce some such effects quite apart from the antiquated medical analogy. But it is also obvious that we have here no adequate account of the psychology of the process. Even if we allow that the tragic pathos contains as its essential ingredients pity and fear, or rather commiseration and horror, we find no explanation of the all-important difference between these feelings as æsthetically experienced and similar feelings when aroused by the dread events of real life. Aristotle may possibly have conceived the relief as brought about "by an appropriate adjustment of responsibilities and

¹ J. Bernays, *Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über die Wirkung der Tragödie*, 1858, and a number of subsequent writings; Lessing, *Hamburgische Dramaturgie*, 75-78. Bernays' interpretation does not necessarily deny an effect on the character; only it was not of this that Aristotle was thinking.

² A view also found in Plato. See Siebeck, *op. cit.*, p. 94 f., with references to Hippocrates, ed. Littré, I, p. 444; Plato, *Rep.*, X, 606. A, *Laws*, VII, 790 A.

³ *Pol.*, VIII, 7, 1342 a.

actions" exhibited in the development of the characters and the plot;¹ but this is doubtful. Probably he thought no small part of it due to the representation as such, for he elsewhere in the *Poetics* observes that we naturally take pleasure in imitation;² but this is clearly insufficient.

Turning now from the 'logical' to the 'physical' side of the emotional process, we find little on the subject in the genuine writings of Aristotle, but a good deal in the *Problemata*, which embody the Peripatetic tradition, and in the works of other adherents of the school whose opinions it will be convenient to indicate in a general way here. The special contribution made by Aristotle himself was in the development of the doctrine of the pneuma. He holds the pneuma to be the congenital source of all vital power in the organism. By its spontaneous contraction and expansion it moves the limbs of the body mechanically.³ It is the vitalizing material principle, the source of the animal heat, with its special seat in the heart, the power also by which the parts of the organism are differentiated in the embryo, and with its differences are correlated the differences of honor and dishonor in souls. It is not composed of the ordinary corporeal elements, but is of a nature akin to that of the stars.⁴ As the source of heat it is naturally bound up with the blood, and differences in the quality of the blood, according as it is warm or cold, thick or thin, and, especially, pure or impure, affect the whole mental and physical constitution.⁵ Timidity is due to a thin, watery condition of the blood; the chill of fear comes from the congelation of the water. Bloodless animals are as a rule more timid than sanguineous and show the symptoms of fear in a marked degree; they become motionless, discharge the excrements and, in some cases, change color.⁶

¹ As maintained, *e. g.*, by A. W. Benn, *Aristotle's Theory of Tragic Emotion*, *Mind*, N.S., 23, 84-90. 1914.

² 1449 b 24; 1453 b 12.

³ *De motu an.*, 10, 703 a 6 ff., reading κινῶν, not κινῆν (Bon.).

⁴ Namely, ether. *De gen. an.*, II, 3, 741 b 37, 736 b 29 ff.

⁵ *De part. an.*, II, 4, 651 a 12 ff.; *cf.* 667 a 9 ff., where Aristotle speaks of the influence of the anatomical character of the heart as affected by the vital heat on the emotional dispositions of courage and timidity.

⁶ *Ib.*, 650 b 20 ff.

The *Problemata* give a list of the symptoms of fear in man that rivals in extent that found in Darwin or any other modern writer: cold and shivering, pallor of countenance, trembling of the body, of the hands, of the lower lip, trembling and shrilling of the voice, thirst, disturbed action of the heart—the pulsations becoming rapid (πυκνή) and pricking (νυγματώδης)—the drying up of the saliva, paralysis of the tongue, abnormal secretions of bile, puckering of the skin in the body generally and, in particular, in the scrotum, loosening and discharge of the bowels and bladder, breaking of wind, contraction of the testicles and emission of semen. The prominent cause assigned to all these phenomena is a redistribution of the vital heat consequent on the withdrawal of the blood from the upper to the lower parts of the body and from the surface to the interior, the result being that the former parts are abnormally chilled, the latter abnormally heated. Thus the trembling of the voice is explained by the spasmodic action of the heart as the sustaining heat is withdrawn, causing a rapid succession of pulsations to be sent to the vocal organs instead of a single stroke. The shrilling of the voice is due to inability to set a sufficient quantity of air in motion, this loss of power being involved in the diminution of the vital heat. The thirst of fear arises from the excessive heating of the parts in the region of the stomach; the relaxation and discharge of the bowels and bladder come from a like excess of heat in the lower viscera, heat tending to liquefy as cold to solidify. A difficulty was found in the fact that different emotions have the same or similar symptoms. Thus the heart is disturbed not only in fear, but in rage. But there is a difference, it was said: in fear the heat is withdrawing downwards, hence the rapid, pricking movements; in rage, on the other hand, it is crowding in upon the heart, hence the ebullition and tumult of the passion. Again, there is trembling of the voice due to departure of heat from the heart not only in fear, but in grief or distress (ἀγωνία), but with this difference, it is said, that in fear the pitch of the voice is high, in distress low. The ingenious explanation assigned for this difference is that the heat in distress mounts upwards instead of descending as in fear, evidence for this being found in the blush

of shame, a species of distress; but when the heat ascends, it compacts the vital breath (pneuma) used in vocal utterance and that, being more slowly emitted, gives a lower pitch.¹ Another point in which fear and distress agree—and also anger—is in the matter of thirst; but it is noted that in fear, *e. g.*, in the panic of soldiers, the thirst demands abundance of liquid for its satisfaction, whereas in distress, and also in anger, all that is required is a swallow or a rinsing out of the mouth. The explanation is that in distress and anger the thirst is due to the withdrawing of the blood from the tongue and is, therefore, only a quasi-thirst and not the real thirst due to the exhaustion of the liquids in the stomach, as in the case of fear. The cardinal point to be explained, of course, was the movement and direction of the heat. Why, for example, does it withdraw downwards and inwards in fear? The answer is that the vital heat is animated, and so, like a living creature, seeks to escape from that which threatens it; but as the object of fear is outside the body, the heat naturally moves inwards.²

Aristotle must not be held responsible for these special observations and explanations, though we may fairly ascribe to him the general direction which they follow and which was followed in the school for generations. Thus in the *Problems* falsely ascribed to Alexander of Aphrodisia (c.200 B.C.) we find a number of the same and similar questions raised and essentially the same principles used to solve them. Here "nature," which, following the usage of Hippocrates, appears as the synonym of the pneuma or physical soul, plays a prominent part in the crude teleologico-biological explanations. We turn pale in fear because "nature" and the provident force of the body seek the body's safety by retreating downwards, as we, when in danger, take refuge in our houses. We color in joy because "nature," self-taught, goes out to meet the object of pleasure as we go to meet a friend or a child. We blush in shame because "nature," with a certain instinctive consciousness of evil, decently retires,

¹ It may be noted that Zeno the Stoic is reported as regarding voice as a special faculty due to the pneuma stretching from the ruling faculty of reason or intelligence to the vocal organs. Nemesius, *De nat. hom.*, p. 96; Aetius, IV, 21, 4.

² *Probl.*, XI, 31, 32; XXVII.

like a well-born maiden, to the interior and inferior part of the body, and the blood, separating and diffusing itself, invests the body like a covering veil, as the maiden covers her face with her hands. Fantastic as these speculations appear, they nevertheless contain the germs of the idea that the organic expressions of the emotions are essential parts of the phenomena to be studied and that they arise in the main instinctively and spontaneously with reference to the welfare of the organism. This idea could not be duly developed until for notions of hot and cold, dry and moist, "nature," pneuma, vital heat and the physical soul there were substituted more precise conceptions of the nervous system with its sensory, motor and vaso-motor functions, and of the whole organism as related to its environment through a process of evolution. But this is a late achievement of the present time, and we are still far from the solution of the problems of emotion. The imperfect physiology of the ancients naturally led to much futile writing; on the other hand, the interest taken in the study of the phenomena led to some not unimportant observations of fact and not infrequently to explanations which were correct in principle. The same writer who compares the blush of shame to a girl's hiding of her face with her hands notes with scientific acuteness the closing or semi-closing of the eyes in the enjoyment of voluptuous pleasure, ascribing the phenomenon to the withdrawal of energy, or as we should say attention, from external perception and its absorption in the voluptuous sensations themselves, and explains the sighs of grief, love and anger as phenomena of physical oppression and relief involving at once the condition of the lungs and of the heart.¹

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¹ The numbers in the Ps.-Alex. *Problemata* treating of the physical phenomena of the emotions are I, 11-16, 19-21, 31, 102, 105, 118; II, 26, 35.

THE PLACE OF PLEASURE IN ETHICAL THEORY.

IF we undertake to ask ourselves what is the content of that which we call good—not final and absolute good, but the thing that has the root of goodness in it so as to deserve the title under certain circumstances at least, and from some possible point of view—we are met first by the obvious fact that the things which on one occasion or another we call good are practically innumerable. Health, holidays, diamonds, fame, strawberries, virtue, courage, beauty, warmth and coolness, poetry and push pin,—the list might go on indefinitely. The only chance of answering our question therefore in a way that would satisfy the philosophic instinct, would be to discover some quality or qualities common to all the list. Is any such quality to be detected?

The reply which, in company with a great number of ethical theorists of all ages, I shall make to this, is, I confess, one which I should find it impossible to demonstrate according to the strict demands of logic. It depends wholly upon an appeal to our actual judgments of approval, and upon the claim that, when we examine these, we do find that the quality never is absent from what we recognize as good. A man might deny, if he wanted to, that the connection is a necessary one, and there would be no way that I can see to show conclusively that he might not be right about it. But he could be challenged to present a case in which the attribute was lacking; and if every case proposed could be shown to involve the attribute in question, under penalty of failing to call forth in us the reaction which we call the feeling of its goodness, the thesis would be established in the only way in which it is conceivable that it could be established. The thesis itself is, that any sort of fact approved as good will be found to be the sort that gives rise to the feeling of pleasure or satisfaction in experience. I do not mean that when we think of it we take pleasure in the *thought*, because *this* pleasure is, I believe, identifiable with the feeling of approval itself, which

constitutes 'goodness' in the abstract; I mean that in its original presence also it was a pleasurable experience. I think with pleasure of the taste of an apple, and call it good, because the taste was pleasant. I reflect upon poetry, and call it good, because, prior to reflection, poetry gives me pleasure; and if it were not a source of pleasure it would no more seem good to me than a laundry list or a tailor's bill. Virtue itself it is inconceivable that we should pronounce good were it not that the life of virtue is a life that brings satisfaction in its train. Conceive the life of virtue as purely cold, austere, bringing no slightest glow of feeling to oneself or others, directly or indirectly, and it becomes impossible to convey any meaning into our words when we call it good; let any one really make the experiment and see.

It is well to emphasize the fact that the thesis so far means just what it says, and no more. Commonly, in the history of ethical thought, hedonism *has* meant something in addition. It has meant, not simply that pleasure is the particular quality that justifies us in calling a thing good, but that pleasure is the only end of action, the sole human motive, the one thing at which we aim, and that induces us to put forth our effort. I have made no such claim as this; indeed I consider the claim to be quite inadmissible, and contrary to obvious facts. Pleasure I have only held to be necessary if we are to call a thing good, not if we are to act with reference to an end. And there are a variety of familiar facts which go to show that action does not have to wait upon the reflective recognition of goodness. For one thing—and this is decisive in itself—if it did depend upon this we should never get action started at all. If no one ate until he knew that food was pleasant, eating would soon become a lost art. Before we know that an experience is pleasant, we must have had the experience; and the first time, therefore, at any rate, something other than the expectation of pleasure must move us. The young chick pecks at a grain of corn because it cannot help itself, not because it is a devotee of pleasure. Of course after we have enjoyed an experience, the memory of the enjoyment is not without its effect upon our future action.

But even if pleasure now enters into the situation, it is certainly not to the exclusion of the mechanism of instinct which started the act off in the first place. This still has to be there and play its part; and the mere fact that we have found eating pleasant in the past does not now induce us to repeat the act apart from present hunger, any more than the thought of the pleasure that as infants we took in a rattle now sends us to the toy shop.

We must start from the fact, then, that the original source of action, or of conduct, is a complex interrelation of instinctive or impulsive tendencies which go to make up our concrete nature. And this carries with it a certain way of looking at the fact of pleasure from which ethical theory also will have to start. First, and beyond any manner of doubt, pleasure cannot be taken as the ultimate fact, but is somehow to be explained functionally,—in its relation, that is, to the active process of behavior. And, though this is slightly more doubtful, it seems also true that the relationship can in part be defined by calling pleasure the *sign* that the more ultimate end is being attained,—an indication to me that I am really on the right road to the satisfaction of my needs. Following this clue, accordingly, and committing ourselves also to the common sense belief that we as human beings are able to attain our ends more intelligently and successfully if we know wherein they consist, we are led to define the feeling of pleasure as a sign that the constitutive demands of our nature are being met, which then has a functional *value* likewise for the process of attainment, not only in the biological sense that somehow it swells the flow of energy available for the act, but also in the—for ethical purposes—more important, as well as more immediately verifiable sense, that it helps us in the conscious job of estimating reflectively the relative significance of competing ends and actions, and so puts us in the way of supplanting mere impulse with reasoned and intelligent conduct.

But to leave the matter here would be to over-simplify the situation. There is a rejoinder the hedonist might still make, even while admitting all that has just been said. I grant you, he might reply, that what we shall find pleasurable is in the end determined by our organic needs and impulses, and so that, on

a purely natural or animal basis, our deeds are ultimately traceable back to instinct as a predetermined tendency to action. But because this is usually the source and ground of behavior, it does not follow that it is bound to be the *motive*, if by this we mean an end consciously selected because it appeals to us as *good*. Man differs from the animals just because he is not bound down mechanically to impulse. Of course, he cannot break free from impulse in the sense that he can arbitrarily make a thing seem pleasurable to him for which he has no constitutional bias. But among the impulses, all of them his, which stand for possible lines of action, he can give his conscious preference to certain of them on the basis of their recognized goodness; and this 'goodness' is a *feeling*, rather than a physical or biological fact. Indeed the previous analysis admits this. So long as pleasure is interpreted in purely biological terms as an intensification—or any other qualification you please—of the organic process of directed energy, it is to be sure, by definition, no more than a subordinate aspect of an end describable wholly in objective language; but when it becomes a *conscious sign* capable of being utilized by intelligence, it takes on a different status. As intelligent and ethical beings, then, it is goodness, not biological adjustment, at which we aim. No matter what it is that causally determines the particular thing we shall call good, what we really hold before the mind in reflective choice is just its goodness; and if goodness is describable in terms of pleasure, then it is pleasure after all that constitutes conscious motive and end.

So interpreted, then, the hedonistic thesis is, not that pleasure is the only goal which we can conceive ourselves predisposed to attain,—for we have sufficiently seen that we are adapted biologically to the attainment of ends quite independent of the feeling of pleasure; but that it is the only fact which a reasonable human being can set before himself as a *desirable* end, really worth the trouble of attaining. A man might find himself pushed by unconscious forces to a goal from which he withheld his approval. Thus a perfectly sincere pessimist might, by the pure 'will to exist,' be held to a life which he reflectively condemned; as a matter of fact very few pessimists commit suicide.

And this would offer no difficulty to the hedonist provided he elected to maintain, not that pleasure is the only end of action, but that it is the only end with which we consciously identify ourselves, and which we intentionally pursue. But now it still is possible to raise again the question whether we really are justified in drawing the conclusion that pleasure constitutes the only motive for action, even as a 'rational' motive. And to settle this we first need to decide what we are to mean by the word motive.

The simplest thing would be to suppose that we refer to nothing more than the particular idea or object present to the mind before we act, in so far as this represents something that attracts us and draws us on. Now *if* we mean this, pleasure is clearly not the only possible motive. We may, to be sure, hold up before the mind some future pleasure as explicitly the object of our efforts; but it is not at all necessary that we should do this. Indeed we do it relatively seldom. For the most part I do not think of my feelings, but of the acts I am going to perform, the things I am going to get, the results I am going to accomplish. We expect a man, setting out on a business career, to take keen pleasure in the thought of building up a large enterprise, making money, acquiring power and reputation among his associates. But these are all objective facts, not feelings; and we certainly should think less highly of him if all the time his mind were filled instead with the pleasures that money will buy, or with anticipations of the pleasurable emotions of pride and complacency attending upon success. I do not at present ask why this is so. But that for the most part we are aware in healthy motivation of the objects that possess goodness (or, if one pleases, that produce pleasure), and not of the bare pleasures themselves, seems a clear fact of experience; and this would hardly have the effect it frequently does have upon our sense of ethical approval, unless the difference were something more than just a verbal one.

But the hedonist will not be content to stop with this. Granted, he will say, that an idea which stands for a motive in the mind may be of various sorts, the further question is, *Why* does it stand thus? and what is the source of the attraction or compul-

sion which it exercises? And if we attempt to answer *this* question, it will appear to him that we are brought back again from a multiplicity of motives to the one aspect of them all—pleasure—that really exerts motive power. But then what *do* we mean by a motive, if not the idea of the object we are conscious to ourselves of wanting? Accordingly we are pointed to the second definition of what a motive is, suggested by the way the hedonist puts his case,—not the thing we naturally fix upon as attractive to us, but the *reason why* this thing is chosen rather than something else. But we have already seen that this cannot intend to ask for the ultimate reason why the thing is *pleasurable*. The moment we ask this, we are directed back of feeling altogether to that basic fact of impulse, lying below the level of the conscious life, on which feeling and action alike depend. Accordingly it is left to us to mean the reason why we *approve* the thing, and set it up as an end *worth* attaining.

But when we come to consider this, it will appear, I think, that any plausibility in the new definition depends upon a failure to distinguish sufficiently between two different situations which in the hedonist's judgment are confused. The distinction is, again, that between *action*, and the intellectual process of *judging* the relative goodness of ends. Now primarily a motive is a motive for action; and in the active situation we do not, as even the hedonist will admit, ordinarily think about pleasures at all, but about things, acts, ways and means, consequences. A large share of our lives is passed simply in doing things, more or less pleasant, under circumstances where our ends are already taken for granted; and here at any rate the thoughts that motivate, or set off, the act are on their face objective terms. But this is not the situation which the hedonist really has in mind when he claims that we always aim at pleasure. If it is suggested to him that things, not pleasures, are commonly before the mind when we act, what indeed he replies is, Well, I grant that we *seem* to be thinking about objects; but the *real* motive after all is the pleasure, as we discover when we stop to think, and ask ourselves how we are to justify our judgment to reflection. In other words, pleasure appears as the motive, not when we are acting,

but when we 'stop to think.' But the act of reflection upon our ends, and of coming to a decision about their goodness, is a case quite distinguishable from the presence of motivation in the actual conduct of life. In the former case we *are* indeed thinking about pleasures; but why? It is not that they stand now as a direct motivation to action. We are not now engaged in doing, but in thinking; we are trying to solve the intellectual problem, What really is the good? And we go about this by bringing before our mind not the *motive* for action,—for as every act alike has its motive this would leave all on exactly the same plane,—but the *test* by which a good end is distinguished from those that do not evoke the judgment of approval. Now pleasure is, I have held, the test or sign of goodness; and accordingly when we are engaged in an intellectual inquiry to discover to what things goodness really attaches, we of course have to think explicitly about their pleasurable-ness, or their satisfying character, as the only means of separating true from false claimants. And this pleasure, as the thing consciously before the mind, may now in an intelligible sense be assigned as the 'reason why' the end is judged good by us. But all we mean by this is that it identifies the particular quality which the mind picks out as, as a matter of fact, eliciting approval; it neither constitutes the original motive in consciousness for doing the act, nor does it supplant the need for a more ultimate, and objectively causal, explanation of *why* it itself gives rise to 'approval.'

Meanwhile this last question is a legitimate one, which needs consideration in order to round out the present analysis. And in order to put adequately the situation now before us, it is necessary to call more explicit attention to a distinction which throughout has been implied. In talking about pleasure as a motive, it is always a future pleasure that is meant, for it is only something still to come that can furnish a motive to action. But we need to be reminded again that a future pleasure is judged *good* only as it elicits also a present 'pleasurable-ness of the thought.' And there may perhaps be a sense in which this present pleasure could be assigned as the *reason why* the future pleasure is thought good, or approved. If we are asked why

pleasure should be called good by us, it may seem natural to reply, Because the thought of it gives pleasure. But when we look at it we see that this is not a real answer. Strictly, the present 'pleasure of the thought' is not the *cause* of our approval; it *is* the sense of approval itself. What I *mean* by approval is just the fact that I think of a thing pleasurable. The cause of my approval is therefore still to seek. The act gives pleasure, we have roughly assumed, because it calls into exercise some impulse or capacity of human nature; but why should the *contemplation* of what is pleasurable give pleasure also?

To such a question there is one simple and obvious answer. If we are already attracted toward an object, in the sense that we feel the impulse to secure it as a means of satisfying some desire, the pleasure of approval would be a sign of the same attractive desire in an intellectual or reflective setting. Desire, it should be clearly noticed, and what I have called approval, are not the same thing. Desire also involves an anticipating thought of the object, and may be attended by pleasure; though it may equally be painful if the object of desire is too far out of reach. But desire is an *active* experience in which we already feel ourselves urged forward toward attainment; and we find no difficulty in distinguishing it from the reflective *judgment* of an object's goodness. But it is quite possible, and natural, to suppose that the inner glow of feeling-quality which makes the difference between a judgment of fact purely intellectual in its nature, and a genuine and first-hand sense of value, is due to the actual presence of incipient desire. Many of our so-called judgments of value are to be sure no more than secondary intellectual perceptions that things have, or have had, that quality which we have learned to recognize elsewhere as necessary to value; but the original sense of goodness or value, which gives meaning to the terms, is, I have held, that particular flavor which comes from the actual present pleasure I take in the thought of certain things. And this pleasure would be explained if we could relate it to the active demands of our nature; it seems natural to suppose that the object whose attainment would satisfy desire, or give pleasure, will also be pleasurable to the thought.

Now this would presumably be regarded as a sufficient answer if it were not that the matter is complicated somewhat by another fact. There is a peculiar kind of pleasure—the æsthetic pleasure, namely—which we find directly connected with what we may call also the contemplative attitude and divorced from the immediate facts of desire and action. It would seem an alluring theory, therefore, if we were to try to identify the feeling tone distinctive of approval with that special pleasure which belongs to the contemplative attitude as such; to reduce, in other words, the moral judgment to the æsthetic. But if the æsthetic object is capable of calling forth the judgment of approval directly, my main thesis will have to be abandoned; it will no longer be true that pleasurable is the one quality necessary to essential goodness.

Now it does appear that in that complex to which we assign the convenient name conscience, æsthetic feeling plays a not insignificant part. When we distinguish, as it is the business of morals to distinguish, between what we desire, and what is desirable, it seems difficult to disconnect altogether the desirable from that which we admire, as over against that which we actively want. The positive and attractive content of moral good would commonly be recognized as at least a semi-æsthetic object; and almost always moral theorists—of the Greek or pagan school—who emphasize this positive content, have shown a disposition to emphasize also the community of the good with beauty. And not only has the moral object an æsthetic character, but the direct source of its claim upon conduct appears to be at times its æsthetic attractiveness in the narrow and specialized sense. I may admire certain ends or qualities without any previously strong desire to achieve them; and they then may come to exert a motive power due just to their attractiveness to the contemplative mind. For a certain type of mind in which the æsthetic interest is conspicuous, it may even be that ethical ideals are principally or wholly determined by the consciously æsthetic effects of the beautiful life; such for example is the philosophy of Oscar Wilde in *De Profundis*.

But granting all this, it still is impossible to accept the reduc-

tion of the moral judgment to the æsthetic. What I have just been saying obscures a distinction that, on the side of fundamental theory, still remains to be drawn more clearly. After all, immediate æsthetic approval, as a sense of beauty or sublimity, is not identical with the judgment that its object is 'good.' Beauty is not the same as goodness; it is *a* good. We have to stand off and reflect upon it before we call it good; and we can call it good precisely because æsthetic contemplation is itself *pleasurable*. Put more generally, we need to recognize that the immediate instinctive reaction of human nature in emotional terms, though it may take the form of contemplation in the presence of the object, is not yet a judgment of goodness, or what we have been talking of as approval; æsthetic 'contemplation' is not intellectual 'reflection.' 'The 'reflection,' which gives rise to the concept of goodness is not an immediate emotional reaction, but a subsequent intellectual one. The direct emotional judgments which experience evokes are an exceedingly important part of its subject matter. Not only do they, as notably in the case of beauty, supply new values in themselves, but also they may constitute the first revelation of more active interests that are really a part of us, though we may not yet be aware of them as desire. The man who as yet has felt in himself no call to lead the heroic life may find his judgment affected by the thrill of admiration, and against his will be led to feel uneasy at the tameness of his own spirit, and so be induced to cultivate qualities for which naturally he has only a rudimentary relish. But theoretically these still remain different from, and more ultimate than, the judgment of goodness.

And this leaves as the only point at issue, for a theory which tries to reduce morality to æsthetics, whether the pleasure that we call good is limited to the pleasure of the act of æsthetic contemplation, or whether it also, and primarily, is connected with more fundamental organic impulses. And to this there hardly can be more than one answer. It seems more reasonable therefore, again, to interpret the æsthetic quality which the good indubitably possesses as a result rather than a cause. We can quite well admit that goodness has characteristics which make it

one of the objects capable of arousing æsthetic appreciation, without going on to claim that this æsthetic quality constitutes its nature as goodness; this is no more true than that the beauty of the religious life constitutes religion. Meanwhile also, as I have granted, the æsthetic experience itself is a genuine and important element *in* the good life. But it enters thus into the ethical ideal only as it ceases to be the mere enjoyment of beauty, and becomes a goal at which we actively aim—connects, that is, with desire again. The true drawing power of beauty for conduct is not as an agreeable form of contemplation,—though the hedonistic quest for æsthetic thrills would likewise be an active ideal of a sort,—but rather the desire to *create* beauty, whether in the material arts, or as the fashioning of a 'beautiful life.' It is, in other words, not æsthetic contemplation, but artistic creation, that is ethically significant; and the 'artistic' impulse is as good an impulse as any other.

I accordingly should find the source of the feeling tone which constitutes the nature of approval, and thereby the nature of goodness, in the appeal which ends make to our impulsive nature, and so to the same source as that which constitutes them an original object of desire and occasion of satisfaction. And if we ask what then is the basis of the ethical superiority of approval over mere desire, which enables it to rank desires in their order of value, in principle the answer is simple. It is just the advantage of being a reflective judgment, not bound down to the exigencies of the moment, or dependent on the temporary state of the organism. Its possibilities are the possibilities of our more impartial and reasonable nature. This presupposes only two things,—the empirical unity of the self, in the sense that we are as a matter of fact in some measure constituted in a way to make possible an organization or harmony of the springs of desire, so that a successful life consists in integrating the ends of conduct instead of leaving them a mass of conflicting impulses; and, secondly, the power which we have of *anticipating* this harmony in the ideal realm, by thinking the scattered ends of life together, and through an anticipatory judgment of what is likely to be their final and permanent appeal, getting a tool for coercing the tyranny

of their temporary and merely organic insistence. I desire some pleasure of sense; and if I could keep my mind solely on the one desire and its attendant pleasure, I should unhesitatingly pronounce it good. But this is just what the mind refuses to do. Its very nature is to spread; it can no more be confined to the simple field of present intensified desire, except as the desire is so abnormally strong as temporarily to inhibit the exercise of reason, than water will confine itself to circumscribed limits on a level surface. Straightway, to modify the desire, other considerations press upon us. Circumstances occur to the mind, desirable or otherwise, to reinforce or check the impulse; this is the realm of prudence or expediency, the realm of the purely logical 'ought.' And also certain immediate *feelings* are called up which the circumstances are fitted to excite, partly in connection with conceived consequences, in part even more promptly and instinctively; and so far as these serve to check the impulse, by casting doubt not on its feasibility, but upon its desirability, we have entered the realm of ethical quality, and the *moral* 'ought.'

Before proceeding, let me restate the situation in its larger aspects. The one fundamental fact, to begin with, is the fact of life itself, as a complex of active processes growing out of native disposition or inborn impulse. Certain conditions attending this self expression—conditions which there are reasons for describing roughly in terms of a freely moving and successful carrying out of impulse, or of an 'enhancement of life'—give rise to the new fact of pleasurable feeling tone. And at the descriptive level of animal behavior we perhaps could stop here. Behavior, however, is not all we mean by *human* life. We do not simply act upon ends; we present ends consciously to our minds, choose and reject among them, look into the future, and try to gain some large and comprehensive guidance. And we are able to do this intelligently and to good purpose, because we have a sign or indication that we are heading the right way in the fact which psychology calls pleasure or the sense of satisfaction. If the selection of our ends is no longer to be trusted to an automatic mechanism, and they are to be put under the control of intelligence instead, there must be *some* way in which intelligence

shall recognize its own. The ordinary working of the intellect, in the way of perceiving facts, events, relationships, and drawing proper inferences from them, is not enough here. If the end which the organism sets, and which constitutes living, were a simple and unambiguous one—the preservation of life, we will say, at all hazards, against the chances and accidents of the environment,—intellect indeed would not need to go beyond its familiar utilitarian and scientific exercise. All that would be called for would be a careful and impartial survey of the situation in order to discover the means appropriate to an end previously settled and defined. But as a matter of fact the case is otherwise. The end is not a single and preëstablished one, to which we are pushed from behind by unconscious forces. Our most difficult task is to decide what in any comprehensive way the end of life really is, and to settle accounts between a host of competing claimants. And for this task we need an intellectual tool different from the purely scientific intellect which deals with qualities and connections of things all on the same level of existence. We have to have a means of estimating the ends themselves. And such a tool we have in the perception of *values*. A value, I have held, is definable as anything that excites in us, in reflection, the feeling of pleasure. And nothing has this power except as it is productive in itself of pleasure; the only reason we can give to account for its attractiveness to the mind—its value nature—is that it stands in such a relation to our active nature that pleasure is its natural accompaniment.

But it does not follow that pleasure ought to be called our only motive. On the contrary, 'motive' has no clear meaning except as it stands for that which, held before the mind, attracts us in the form of desire, and by so doing leads to action; and many things beside pleasure fit this definition. They all may have pleasure capacity connected with them. But because a thing will not work without a certain quality, it does not need to be the quality alone that does the work. Coal does not warm us except as it is hot; but it is much more natural to say that we heat our houses by means of coal than by means of hotness. After all the question is not one of theory, but of fact; and the

fact is, beyond any manner of doubt, that the thought of many other things induces us to act besides the thought of future pleasure. Indeed, the more we try to whittle down the motive to the bare feeling of pleasantness, and to exclude the concrete circumstances in connection with which the pleasure occurs, the less attractive is the idea certain to become. I see, for example, a picture that I want to buy. Clearly it is the thought of the actual picture, with all its concrete beauty, that loosens my purse strings, not a mere anticipation of my pleased state of mind when it shall hang upon my walls; for unless I held the picture vividly before me I should anticipate no pleasure. So again the more we separate pleasures from the actual occasions of their appearance, the more desperate becomes the task of estimating and comparing them. All pleasures in the abstract look alike; we can tell whether we prefer one thing to another only as we bring before the mind as fully as possible the entire situation out of which the pleasure rises.

Now in the light of this, let me return to some of the objections that may be raised to making pleasure a constitutive fact in ethics. The theory I am adopting is not hedonism in the historical sense, for it does not say that we *aim* only at pleasure. There is no need of my meaning this, since 'good' I take to be the content of a secondary and reflective judgment on an act which already possesses a character of its own. This leaves it to be settled entirely without prejudice at what we do actually aim; it only says that no aim will be called reflectively a *good* aim unless it tends to result in pleasure. Neither, in the second place, do I mean to say that *every* pleasure, or object of desire, is judged good; evidently this again is not the case. Since good involves not simply the satisfaction of desire, but also that this be *approved*, it is not at all impossible, even though satisfaction *per se* be always good, that there may be special reasons to lead me, when I come to *think* about some satisfaction in particular, to disapprove it. All that I do claim—and I can appeal to nothing except its immediate self-evidence—is this, that it is impossible to find any relevancy to the term good if we try to apply it to something which turns out to have no capacity for giving rise to the feeling of satisfaction in experience.

And in this one is not, so far as I can see, committed to undesirable ethical consequences. To return to the second point, it has been a common claim of critics that the moment you connect pleasantness in the abstract with goodness, you are compelled to admit that anything that carries the hallmark of pleasure, under *any* circumstances, is bound under *all* circumstances to be accepted as good. Now there are two different propositions distinguishable here, one of which I accept, and consider sufficiently harmless, while the second I entirely deny. The first is that pleasure as such is connected in the abstract with the quality of goodness. The second—and this is what the critic apparently has in mind—is that abstract pleasure is identified with what *concretely* we call *the* good. But when I claim that pleasure by itself is essentially a good, I am claiming neither that *pleasantness* by itself is a good, nor that *every* concrete pleasure is good. Pleasantness is not a good by itself, because pleasantness cannot exist by itself; a good is concrete, and pleasantness merely an abstract quality. When therefore I say that pleasure as such is always good, I mean either (1) that pleasantness is the quality necessary to make anything good, or (2) that any concrete pleasurable experience whatsoever is regarded as a good *so long as* we look at it by itself, and other considerations do not enter in to modify our judgment. But this last possibility is always open; and it prevents us from accepting the second proposition. Anything that gives pleasure is an intrinsic good, since so far, in abstraction from other and complicating circumstances, it is felt as satisfying in itself. But this does not mean that all pleasures alike are going to be accepted by me as what *I* intend by the good. For to get *the* good, in its practical meaning, we need to introduce a further condition—the individual constitution and outlook, namely, which makes for me certain pleasures, and certain pleasures only, really pleasurable in the concrete. And this involves that in a given situation some pleasures are going to be rejected from what, just then at least, is called the good. And any *kind* of pleasure may, on occasion, be so rejected—the ‘higher’ as well as the ‘lower’; the pleasures of art, or of family affection, are sometimes, judged concretely, quite as truly bad, or wrong, as pleasures of sense.

But now there is a further point to be made in connection with the critical objection to pleasure. As the theory in question does not imply that every pleasure in the abstract must necessarily be a part of the concrete good for me, so neither does it imply that my good is measured by the greatest quantity or intensity of even my own pleasures. In other words we have to postulate—because we find it is so—a being who is enough of a unity to be capable of pleasure ‘on the whole’; and what pleasure on the whole means has to be settled by the evidence. Now it is conceivable that it *might* have been found in the choice of the most intense pleasures, or the greatest sum of pleasures; but the fact seems to be that normally it is not so found. There is a meaning, difficult to define, but open to introspective evidence, in such words as ‘total satisfaction,’ or ‘contentment,’—something which we feel involves the harmonious reaction of our natures, in a way that distinguishes it from the sum of individual pleasures we may enjoy. For a sum of pleasures cannot exist at any single moment, whereas satisfaction is itself an individual and unitary state of feeling, easily identified when actually it comes into being. ‘Satisfaction’ is a feeling state of enjoyment; but I can enjoy without in the least feeling satisfied. I can experience even a strong disgust at my pleasure at the very moment it is pleasant to me. Far from being a mere sum, contentment has apparently not a quantitative nature at all. I can say that the pleasure my dinner gives me is greater or less; the pleasure of eating is always there, but there is more of it at one time than another. But when I say that I am more or less satisfied, the meaning seems to be a different one. There is no maximum which is identified with *the* pleasure of taste; but to be ‘content’ is a perfectly definite state of consciousness, which I either have or I do not. When I say, therefore, that I am more or less content, what I mean is that I am nearer to contentment, or further from it, as the case may be.

Accordingly when I come to deliberate and choose a line of action, what goes on in me, if I can trust my own introspection, is something like this: I project myself in imagination first in one alternative situation and then the other, try to live out the

thing, get the feel of it, soak up the resultant satisfactoriness as a whole by anticipation. Incidentally this may involve setting off pleasure against pleasure, or pleasure against pain. If there are two pleasures of a known or standard value belonging to the rival situations which I feel to be approximately equal in intensity, I pair them off, and exclude them from the reckoning. But this is a definitely preliminary operation, and is recognized not as solving my problem, but as necessary in order to simplify it and make it manageable. The final decision is of a much less mechanical nature, and consists just in the attempt to realize the immediate inwardness of the situation as a whole. And how pleasurable a thing will turn out to be is at the start entirely unsettled; only in the light of the whole does the relative worth of many of the elements first become determinate. The essential business of the ethical or rational life is, then, to compare ends or courses of conduct as *wholes*. This does not exclude the special desires and their pleasurable-ness; there can be no whole without parts, and the desires *are* the parts. But in coming into relation to a larger situation the desires lose their sharply separate character. The pleasure of a good dinner becomes noticeably less alluring if I have to eat it with the thought in my head that I am to make a speech afterwards. The appeal pleasures make is modified, then, by an appraisal of the way they look to an intelligent and sensible being who sees around them, and notes their less immediate characteristics, their relationships and consequences. And whereas in comparing single desires or pleasures it is by their relative *intensity* that we decide which it is we want, intensity is a quality which does not belong to totalities; rather, here, it is the new quality of 'satisfactoriness'—a quality involving a reference not to desires singly, but in their relationships and contexts—which decides between competing goals. An intense *life* is simply a life characterized by a rush and vividness of interests, and may or may not be 'satisfying.'

And as for quantity of pleasure in any sense which distinguishes it from intensity, this is left a very minor place indeed in our judgments. As between two different pleasures, 'more' has

always the meaning 'more intense.' We can 'add' pleasures only in the unimportant sense that *a* and *b*, granting them both to be attainable pleasures, are quantitatively greater than either would be alone (which would seem to follow so long as two is greater than one). But this enables us to compare pleasures with anything like quantitative precision only in the case of groups composed of identical units. Thus I see no definite meaning to the claim that I get double the amount of pleasure out of a game of tennis that I do out of a good dinner; but I might get *more* pleasure out of both than out of either singly, and I *might* get twice as much pleasure out of two games of tennis as out of one. Within narrow limits we can therefore apply the quantitative test. Other things being equal, I shall get a determinately less amount of enjoyment from a day's vacation than a week's. But this is purely incidental in cases of real difficulty, where the choice is certain to be between ends of different kinds, and in any case its utility is precarious; if I am likely to get bored before the week is over, I need to fall back on something different from quantitative addition. In practice, the only important sense that a sum of pleasures carries is this, that I want my life to be a continuous series of satisfied moments lasting as long as possible. But this is a purely formal demand; and on what constitutes satisfaction at any given moment there is thrown almost no light at all.

There is, then, a kind of life which, in view of the sort of person I am, the nature and relative strength of my interests and capacities, my disposition to like or dislike things, the clearness and sensitiveness of my intellectual judgments, will actually come nearest to making me a satisfied man. Contentment is of course not intended here to suggest passivity, or the sort of acquiescence in present attainment which implies a refusal to exercise intelligent self-criticism. I may, supposedly I ought to, feel discontented with myself unless I am somehow actively getting ahead all the time. Nor does satisfaction mean for a human being full attainment, that leaves nothing more to strive for. It means, rather, as opposed to both of these extremes, a satisfying sense of progress. It is not inconsistent with a measure of pain and

sorrow, and the exclusion of many human delights. To have the least chance of success, it must be weighted with a sober sense of reality, and an acceptance of the actual conditions of human living. To demand more than life can possibly give is to cut off all chance of satisfaction at the outset; we must be ready, if we are not to be always open to the inroads of discontent, to see and acquiesce in inevitable limitations, to make the best of necessarily imperfect attainment, to give up without whining what does not lend itself to our more dominant and insistent interests, to prefer defeat to success that degrades us in our own eyes. What pleasures will form a part of the satisfied life depends on various things,—in particular on the real possibility of their attainment, or of their attainment without sacrificing more important objects, and on the relative strength of the impulses which render pleasures pleasurable. There is no real paradox in the statement that satisfaction is only open to the man who stands prepared to give up pleasure. It only means, again, that satisfaction as a human goal is no abstract ideal of limitless good; it presupposes a determinate human nature set to work out its destiny in determinate surroundings. That at which we aim is not an unimaginable state of the intensest possible pleasure unaccompanied by pain, but the sense that I am making the most of life that it is possible for me to make, with my particular interests and limitations, and in consideration of the means at my disposal; if one is not willing to accept these qualifications, while one may dream of happiness, one is not yet prepared to set to work intelligently to secure it. And it is a simple fact of experience that along this line there is open the possibility of a feeling of content and satisfied acquiescence, not essentially marred by the presence of what, considered solely by themselves, I should regard as evils. For if life is not just what we should prefer if it were given us to choose its conditions freely, it has compensations of its own. The satisfaction that comes from measuring oneself against hostile forces, and taking the chances that ensue, is itself one ingredient of happiness; and for a being constituted as man is, the very recognition of an unpleasant reality, the acceptance of the fact that *this is so*, helps a little to

take away the sting of its unpleasantness. No man whose eyes are open would *want* to escape unhappiness if he knew it meant deceiving himself and living in a fool's paradise; so long as the dark background of existence is a reality, and the good life remains in point of fact precarious, his sense for realities will not leave him content while ignoring this, and endeavoring to keep himself untouched by anything that is harsh and painful.

Meanwhile I note a final point which needs to be made more explicit. Even 'contentment' is not yet 'goodness'; it is pronounced good by a reflective judgment. But in the last analysis the pleasure that constitutes 'approval' in its complete and truly *moral* sense, is the pleasure attending the anticipatory realization in imagination of this same contentment or satisfaction that sets its seal upon our practical experiments in living. And it gets its authority, once more, by reason of the nature of reflection. Any *act* is limited with respect to the number of impulses to which it gives exercise; at any moment of conduct a large part of our nature is quiescent. But as reflection asserts its sway, the character of our particular practical satisfactions is itself modified. In spite of the fact that in practice only a fraction of our possibilities are, at the moment, actively engaged, in a secondary way these latent powers still exert an influence. More and more we aim not at temporary satisfaction merely, but at what is going to prove permanently satisfying as we look back on it in memory, and place it in the larger setting of our lives. And in this way, prior to action also, the claims of our many-sidedness, the claims of the long run, succeed in making themselves felt through that survey of the whole stretch of experience which results in the critical and rational feeling of approval, by which more transient experiences even of 'contentment' are themselves judged.

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THE NOTION OF A DETERMINISTIC SYSTEM.

I. *Introduction.*—The problem of Determinism, which has proved of such perennial interest in the past, has recently been raised anew by certain passages in an essay published by a well-known English philosopher. In this article, I wish to consider in some detail the view there set forth, and to show how it appears to me to fail in its application to this universe of ours.

Before coming to the main argument, a brief reference is necessary to the opinion sometimes held¹ that the future is in any case determined in the sense that 'it will be what it will be.' It may be pointed out that all such assertions reduce to the statement that all Being is determinate, *i. e.*, Pure Being is identical with nothing. It is therefore important to distinguish between the terms 'determined' and 'determinate.' To say that the future, *when it comes, will be determinate* is very different from saying that it is in fact *determined now*. The former proposition by no means implies the latter. It is impossible to pass logically from the one to the other.

Ruling out such a type of determinism (if it can be so called), we may now proceed to consider the statement of the case for determinism mentioned at the beginning of this introduction, which puts the whole matter very clearly, and which urges very forcibly the arguments in favor of a deterministic view of the universe.

II. *The Case for Determinism.*—The account just referred to of a deterministic system is due to Mr. Bertrand Russell.² Mr.

¹ It is, in fact, mentioned in the passages we are about to consider.

² In all that follows, the reference is to an essay on "The Notion of Cause," by B. Russell, which originally appeared in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* for 1912-13. It was then published in *Scientia*, Vol. 1913, N. XXIX-3. Recently it has appeared in a volume entitled *Mysticism and Logic, and other Essays*.—The references are to pp. 199 ff. of the latter, or to pp. 331 ff. of the number of *Scientia* mentioned. It should be said at once that Mr. Russell does not himself come to a definite conclusion here as to whether the universe is deterministic or not, though he inclines to the former view.

Russell's definition is as follows: "A system is said to be 'deterministic' when, given certain data, e_1, e_2, \dots, e_n , at times t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n respectively, concerning this system, if E_t is the state of the system at any time t , there is a functional relation of the form

$$E_t = f(e_1, t_1, e_2, t_2, \dots, e_n, t_n, t).$$

"The system will be deterministic throughout a given period if t , in the above formula, may be any time within that period, though outside that period the formula may be no longer true." In this definition, all unnecessary lumber, such as the notion of causation, is cleared away. As Mr. Russell points out, the common view is that inference of the future from the past is made possible by the principle of causality. But the explicit introduction of that principle, bringing, as it does, in its train all sorts of problems as to the exact nature of causality, is superfluous. Granted our functional relation, obtained by empirical observation, any further postulate as to the inner working of the system is irrelevant in deciding whether the system is deterministic or not. The very fact of the existence of the functional relation is sufficient to establish the determinism of the system. Mr. Russell calls the data e_1, e_2, \dots, e_n "determinants" of the system, remarking that it is evident that a system having one set of determinants will in general have many. In view of the fact that his account of a deterministic system is perfectly clear and unambiguous, and comprises all that is generally contained in the notion of such a system, we shall take it as a basis for criticism and discussion.

The fact that the future will be what it will be is regarded by Mr. Russell as being of considerable importance. For reasons already given we do not take this view. It is true, as Mr. Russell says, that we cannot make the future other than it will be, but this is very different from saying that the future is in fact determined now. For evidently what the future will be is in part determined by our actions, and we cannot decide as to whether the future is determined now, unless we know whether our actions between the present and any given future date form part of a deterministic system or not. It is true that those actions

themselves will be what they will be, but here again the reference is to the future. To say that any future event whatever is determined *now* by the fact that when it comes it *will be* determinate, is simply equivalent to saying that everything is something, a true enough statement, but hardly to be urged as an argument in favor of however lax a determinism. Mr. Russell does not insist on the point, recognizing that it is not what people usually mean by 'determinism,' but confines his attention for the most part to a deterministic system as defined in the quotation given above.

Two important illustrations are given by Mr. Russell as bringing out clearly the conception of a deterministic system. Both refer to the possible nature of the universe. In the first the hypothesis of psycho-physical parallelism is introduced—that is, it is assumed that to a given state of brain a given state of mind always corresponds. The highly probable assumption is also made that to a given state of a certain brain a given state of the whole material universe corresponds, since the recurrence of exactly the same brain-state is extremely unlikely. Hence, if n states of the material universe are determinants of the material universe, they would also be determinants of the *whole* universe, mental and material, as would also the corresponding n states of a given man's mind.

Evidently, if the above holds, the universe, including man, forms a deterministic system, and conversely, if the universe is determined it must be in some way which is closely represented by the above. Moreover, it should be noted that psycho-physical parallelism is not an assumption essential to the latter. For psycho-physical parallelism is rather a methodological principle than a hypothesis, and the fact of correspondence which it asserts would exist equally if there were any form of interaction between mind and brain. It is true, as Mr. Russell remarks, that the correspondence between mind and brain may not be one—one, but many—one, or one—many; but in that case the universe would still be deterministic (though its determinants might be more complex) provided the scope of the correspondence on the multiple side was determined.

The second illustration relates to the dispute between the teleological and the mechanistic views of the world. A 'mechanical' system is reasonably defined as one having a set of determinants which are purely material, such as the positions of certain pieces of matter at certain times. But if some account of the universe such as that, for example, given in the first illustration were true, all mental facts, including purposes and desires, as well as the universe of matter, would be determined by such a set of material determinants. Hence purposes, whether realized or not, could exist in a mechanical system, so that the latter might also in that case be fairly designated 'teleological.' Thus if the view taken is correct, the terms 'teleological' and 'mechanical' are not incompatible. There might be a mechanical system which was also teleological and *vice versa*.

Clearly these two illustrations are particularly valuable, for the first shows us under what form we must conceive the universe if it is actually determined as a whole, while the second indicates one important consequence which would necessarily follow in a universe of that nature.

Evidently if we form part of such a world, we cannot be content to regard ourselves as 'free' in any satisfactory sense; for given (say) the positions of certain pieces of matter at certain times, all our actions would be theoretically calculable, past, present, and future. Even now our destiny would be irrevocably fixed by the laws of mathematics. Could a sterner necessity, a more unbending taskmaster, be imagined?

Determinism possesses as its chief advocate the success of physical science. Nobody pretends that our knowledge of the material universe is all-inclusive. But science has dealt so remarkably with the limited portions in space and time at our disposal, by weeding out, in any given case, the superfluous (because negligibly effectual) accompaniments so as to temper the problem to our intellectual capacity, that we feel little difficulty in thought in extending the process, by analogy, to the performances of a Laplacian calculator who, given certain data, would derive the knowledge of all things. For a mind thus capable of grasping the infinite complexity of the deter-

minants involved, the universe would be an open book. The success of science seems to render it highly probable that the material universe is completely determined by a limited (though perhaps infinite) number of material data, and hence, granted the existence of the psycho-physical correspondence, that the mental universe is also completely determined by those data. If we are not to pass unchallenged a view of such far-reaching significance, it will be necessary to analyze fully the grounds on which it is based. Only thus can we arrive at a true estimate of the credibility to be attached to it.

III. *Analysis of Determinism.*—The first step in the analysis of determinism in the sense which has been defined, consists in the examination of the functional relation

$$E_t = f(e_1, t_1, e_2, t_2, \dots, e_n, t_n, t),$$

upon the probable existence of which the case for determinism rests. If the state of a system at any particular time is given by such a relation, what exactly is it that thereby determines the system? The determinants e_1, e_2, \dots, e_n with the corresponding times are not sufficient. From them *alone* we can derive no information about the system. Given the function, they fix its value for particular values of the variable; that is, they may be considered as necessary and sufficient determinants of the *values of the function* in particular cases. But for *the system* to be determined, not only must the data $e_1, t_1, \dots, e_n, t_n$, be given, but also the relations between them, that is, the way in which they enter into the function f . In other words, the *form* of that function must be given, and it is therefore a determinant of the system equally with the data e_1, e_2 , etc. Summing up then, we must regard e_1, e_2, \dots, e_n , together with the form of the function connecting them with one another and with the variable t , as the determinants of the system.

Let us now consider the course we should have to pursue, had we the intellectual grasp of the Laplacian calculator, in order to discover from observation whether the universe is a deterministic system or not, *i. e.*, whether there exists for it a functional relation such as $E_t = f$. At least one possible type of the necessary

determinants e_1, e_2, \dots, e_n , would probably be discoverable from empirical inspection alone, as is generally found to be the case in scientific observation. But the verification of this possibility and the number of determinants thus required, together with the form of the function into which they enter as constituents and which is the remaining determinant, would only be certainly demonstrated in that final synthesis whereby the functional relation is constructed in its completeness.

In the first place, we must not assume that the course of the material world is entirely independent of mind. *Prima facie* it is not so, and should the appearance be misleading, that fact could only be demonstrated in the course of our calculation. Consequently our first step, after a course of exhaustive experiment and observation on mind and matter and the interaction (real or apparent) between them, would be to collect all the results of that empirical procedure under a number of general laws. This number should be the minimum possible in accordance with the results so far obtained.

The next step would be the inspection of these general laws with a view to reducing their number. If our process had been carried on in a manner more or less analogous to the evolution of science, the laws would have been obtained as the result of many relatively independent lines of enquiry. A hypothesis fitting all the facts must now be sought by means of which the phenomena can be brought under a common heading, and the laws to which they conform synthesized if possible into one all-embracing formula. This is the ideal to which all science turns its endeavor in dealing with the material world. Examples of it on a comparatively small scale are common enough. For instance, the kinetic theory of matter enables us to reduce many of the facts observed in the study of Heat and Light to mere manifestations of an underlying process which is purely mechanical. The science of Heat proceeded originally as an enquiry quite independent of the science of mechanics, yet in the end it has been reduced to a common basis with the latter. The theoretical investigation we are considering would, of course, be far more complicated, for in it we are dealing not only with *all*

material phenomena, but with all mental facts as well. But in any case one important point is evident, namely, that a necessary condition of the possibility of reducing the laws we have obtained to a single formula, is that those laws should be capable of precise statement, *i. e.*, of being put into exact *quantitative* form. If this condition is fulfilled, and if we can relate all the quantities to which the different laws refer, the way is clear for the construction, by numerical calculation, of that single functional relation which shall determine the whole universe.

In the course of our calculation it might appear that we should be led to a functional relation capable of statement in different ways according to our choice of the determinants e_1, e_2, \dots, e_n . At this stage of the calculation we should have a number of data at our disposal all of which would not be found to be necessary in achieving the final result. Our decision as to which set of independent data to select would then depend on the particular form we wished our function to take in virtue of the nature of its determinants. Possibly we might be able to make the latter all material, or all mental, or partly material and partly mental. If, however, it turned out that by appropriate manipulation we could eliminate all the mental determinants and yet arrive at a single functional relation, the universe would be a deterministic system whose history, including the history of every living being in it, would be fixed by a set of purely material determinants. Given some such data as the positions of certain pieces of matter at certain times, we could predict with absolute certainty the future behavior of any man. Discredited astrologers may perhaps draw some comfort from this consideration.

It follows from the foregoing that if a system is to be deterministic in the sense we have been considering, it must be one of which quantitative notions are significant, that is, one whose state at any time is capable of being described in terms of quantities which are theoretically measurable. For example, qualities, as such, cannot enter as constituents into the functional relation which gives the state of the system, seeing that qualities cannot be exactly specified but only indicated—to be comprehended they must be experienced. Yet it may be possible to indicate

the qualities by quantitative concepts, just as, for instance, we correlate 'red' with a certain wave-length or range of wave-lengths. If this is so, the quantity may enter into the functional relation, thus 'representing,' as it were, the quality, and results deduced from the relation will be valid and capable of being re-interpreted, where necessary, in terms of qualities. If, however, it is impossible to make precise quantitative notions in any way significant of the system, the latter cannot be deterministic.

Another possibility suggests itself. There might be a system the state of which at any time is capable of description in terms of measurable quantities, and yet for which no functional relation exists. Mr. Russell makes the following statement in this connection:—"If formulæ of any degree of complexity, however great, are admitted, it would seem that any system, whose state at a given moment is a function of certain measurable quantities, *must* be a deterministic system. Let us consider in illustration a single material particle, whose coördinates at time t are x_t , y_t , z_t . Then, however the particle moves, there must be, theoretically, functions f_1, f_2, f_3 , such that

$$x_t = f_1(t), y_t = f_2(t), z_t = f_3(t)."$$

But let us take another example. Consider two material particles attracting one another with a force which is some function of the distance between them. Now suppose this function itself varies, also that the law of its variation varies, and so on. If at any stage of this regress (which may be infinite) the law of variation were known, we could construct our functional relation. This, apparently, is what Mr. Russell means when he makes the proviso that formulae of any degree of complexity, however great, should be admitted. But it is *conceivable* that we should never (even after infinite regress) come to a *law* of variation. The variation might *conceivably* be purely haphazard, or at least contain a haphazard element which renders any *precise* statement of a law impossible. Whether such a system could exist is not the question. At any rate we can imagine it to exist. Its state at any time could be exactly described in terms of

measurable quantities, such as the coördinates of the particles and their velocities and accelerations; but no functional relation could be constructed giving its state at *any* time. Such a system would be called 'non-deterministic' or, to use Mr. Russell's word, "capricious." If, however, it is not even possible to describe the state of the system in quantitative terms, because quantitative notions are not significant of it, then the words 'deterministic' and 'non-deterministic' are not significant of it either.

Let us now consider what must be the essential characteristics of a system of which quantitative notions are significant, and to which in consequence numerical calculation may be applied—calculation which will be successful, at least within limits, unless the system is wholly "capricious."

Quantity is expressed by means of number. Number is a property of classes. A given number is the common property possessed by all classes having that number of members. Now a class is a collection of objects (using the last term in its widest sense), and the latter may be considered as units. Replacing, permissibly for formal purposes, the common property defining members of a class by that class as a whole, we have as the definition of the number n , the class of all classes of n units.¹ This definition in its first intention applies only to positive integers, but the concept can be extended without great difficulty to negative, fractional, and irrational numbers.

The quantities which spring naturally to mind at once are those termed 'extensive' quantities, *i. e.*, those having a nature such that a given quantity may be regarded as the sum of smaller quantities of the same kind, which we may term 'parts' of the given quantity. It is common to divide such quantities into two types, *viz.*, those associated with a finite number of discrete objects, and those which cannot ultimately be regarded as made up of a finite number of parts. The former are used in statements such, for example, as that referring to the number of legs of a certain species of insect, or, to give another instance, in

¹ See *e. g.* Dr. Whitehead and B. Russell's *Principia Mathematica*, Vol. I. Part II.

dealing with phenomena depending on the number of molecules in a given volume of a gas. In such cases, any one of the discrete parts forms a natural unit of measurement. To the latter type belong such quantities as distances, which cannot be considered to be composed *ultimately* of a *finite* number of parts. For our purposes, however, it is not the difference between the two types which is important, but the characteristic which they have in common, namely, that any given finite quantity¹ may be regarded as the sum of a finite number of smaller *finite* parts, these parts being themselves quantities of the same nature as the given quantity.

In addition to quantities of extensive magnitude, science also has to deal with those having 'intensive' magnitude, such as density and temperature. We cannot regard a density as the sum of other densities without great ambiguity. But it is important to notice that, in any case, the measurement of such quantities is only effected by correlating them with quantities possessing extensive magnitude. Thus, if the notions of quantity and calculation are to be significant at all, we must ultimately deal in every case with extensive quantity, *i. e.*, with things which may be considered as made up of parts similar in nature to themselves.

Intensive quantities are similar in one respect to certain qualities, such as those of color, seeing that they may be specified by correlation with extensive quantities. In fact, strictly speaking, the term 'quantity' might well be restricted to the latter. For if there were any actual entities corresponding to things such as temperature and density, having what we call 'intensive' magnitude, they would be really more akin to abstract qualities or states. Probably the only reason we call them 'quantities' at all is by an illegitimate transference of idea, because we can correlate them with true quantities. The last point is made clear by the consideration of objects of a certain kind which are supposed to be intensively quantitative, namely, sense-data. For example, people commonly regard a bright yellow light as

¹ In the case of quantities of the first type, the given quantity must evidently comprise at least two of the discreta.

having in some way a greater magnitude than a dim yellow light. But the difference is purely qualitative. Certainly both lights are yellow, but the difference between bright and dim is qualitative; just as red and yellow are both colors, but the difference between them is entirely qualitative. That the differences of sense-data in respect of intensity are purely qualitative is shown by the fact that there could be no objective standard of measurement for them. To assign the number 10 (say) to a sense-datum of a certain intensity, would be arbitrary and meaningless. Fechner made an ingenious attempt to construct a system based on a "least perceptible difference" of intensity. Not only, however, would this difference vary with different people and probably also with the same person for different total situations, but it is itself qualitative. It is meaningless to talk of a difference in intensity of sense-data as being so many times the least perceptible difference. All such attempts reduce ultimately to correlation with true (*i. e.*, extensive) quantities, viz., the physical stimuli concerned. Moreover, it should be remembered that all physical concepts, whether those such as mass and energy, or those such as density and temperature, are really constructions of sense-data. Hence the possibility of applying quantitative notions to what is perceived, will depend finally on whether the object of experience may be regarded as made up of parts (sense-data) standing in certain relations, or not. To this we shall return shortly.

Quantity, then, is expressed by a number of units, one important condition being that while dealing with a fixed type of quantity the units must be homogeneous. From the above it is evident that quantity is actually significant only of things which can be considered to be made up of parts, these parts constituting the units. Evidently the number expressing a fixed quantity will depend on the scale chosen; that is, on the part selected as the unit of measurement.

The foregoing is made clear by considering its application to the world of physics. Evidently the latter is deterministic, *if the fundamental postulates of physics be granted*. In any case, quantitative notions are significant of it. Let us endeavor to work back to the ultimate reason for this.

The unitary entities constituting the universe as conceived by physical science are points, instants, and particles. Such entities as these are capable of being exhibited as logical constructions of the immediate data of sense;¹ they are not *inferences* from the latter. The physical conceptions which are psychologically primitive are those of force, duration, and distance. The notion of mass is derivative. In ordering our ideas, however, it is common to make a re-arrangement by taking the concepts of mass, time (*i. e.*, lapse of time), and length as logically prior, and making that of force derivative. On these fundamental conceptions the science of Mechanics is based, and all Physics is based on Mechanics. It is true that as physics has developed it has been found necessary to introduce two more fundamental quantities, namely, (as the most convenient choice) temperature, and either magnetic permeability or specific inductive capacity. The dimensions of the two latter in terms of mass, length, and time are not known, but the dimensions of their product are known. They are those of the inverse square of a velocity. Hence it is not improbable that the dimensions of the separate quantities may ultimately be discovered. In any case, however, no difficulty arises in practical calculation, for the two quantities mentioned enter into our equations merely as numerics, namely, as the *ratios* of their values for any substance to their values for air. Hence the question of their expressibility in terms of mass, length, and time does not arise. Temperature, permeability, and inductivity are intensive. Hence it has been proposed to replace them by entropy and electric charge, both of which have extensive magnitude.

Resuming our discussion, it should be observed that in measurements of mass we are always determining *mass-ratio*. We select any convenient standard of mass and find how many such parts would make the mass of the body we are considering. Now the relations between force and mass (or inertia) are expressed in the fundamental postulates of mechanical science, commonly known as Newton's Laws of Motion. From the second law it appears that the ratio of the masses of two bodies is inversely as

¹ See, *e. g.*, B. Russell's *Our Knowledge of the External World*, Lect. IV.

the rates of change of their velocities produced by equal forces acting on them, or, if the forces are impulsive, inversely as the sudden changes of velocity produced. The third law states that exactly equal forces (though in opposite directions) act on the bodies in the case of any interaction between them. In particular, in the case of impact between the bodies there exist equal, opposite, impulsive forces. Hence the theoretical measurement of mass-ratio (which is all that *can* be measured), depends on the observation of changes in velocity. Hence measurements of mass reduce to measurements of time and distance. Thus the significance of quantitative notions in physical science depends ultimately on the fact that we are here dealing with things which may be considered as made up of parts, namely, times and distances. The parts selected will be the units of time and distance in terms of which we measure.

We are thus led to the conclusion that physical calculation in connection with the world we perceive is rendered possible by the fact that the nature of the object of sense-experience is such that it may be considered (at least to a close approximation) as made up of parts standing in spatial and temporal relations. Hence quantitative notions are to this extent applicable to what we perceive in sense-experience, and consequently the terms 'deterministic' and 'non-deterministic' are significant of what is thus perceived.

It does not follow, of course, that sense-data form a deterministic system. As we have previously stated, the physical system is deterministic provided the fundamental postulates of physics are granted. But the physical system, based as it is on the supposition that the object of experience is made up of parts standing in certain relations, is only an approximation. In actual sense-experience the object is a presented whole, one and indivisible. The object perceived by each subject is unique; but in reflective analysis, which is discursive, we are compelled by the limitations of intellect to regard all objects of experience as having at least one common characteristic, namely, that they are made up of parts (termed sense-data) standing in spatial and temporal relations. That this conception is a close ap-

proximation to actuality is shown by the fact that under suitable circumstances we can successfully predict, by adopting it, what we shall perceive at future times, *provided we are attending appropriately at those times*. But we *are* only approximating, and the perception by which we verify our calculation only approximates to the predicted result in the same order as our original data for calculation approximate to the perceptions on which they are based.

Moreover, it must be remembered that the object of experience is qualitative. Qualities cannot be dealt with by calculation directly, though it may be possible to deal with them indirectly by correlating them with quantities. But even in this case we have no guarantee that the quality which one person correlates with a certain quantity can be considered as similar to that which another person correlates with the same quantity. The appearance which I call 'red,' for example, *may* be qualitatively quite different from that which you call 'red.' If such were the case, it would be possible at most to predict approximately one's own sense-data. One could not predict in imagination those of other people. And there is also the further point that it seems probable that even for one person each perception is qualitatively unique. This being so, any prediction of one's own sense-data would be of the roughest character.

Evidently, then, there are strong presumptions against the view that sense-data form a deterministic system. The question will not be pressed, however, for we are not here concerned to come to a definite conclusion on that particular aspect of the problem. But we may note that the material world can only be regarded as a deterministic system if it be isolated from mind. *Prima facie*, however, mind interferes with the course of matter, and it remains to decide whether that interference is determined or not. This brings us to our next point, the application of determinism to the mind.

IV. *Determinism and the Mind*.—In investigating the problem as to whether the notion of determinism is applicable to the mind, we must first of all be quite clear on the meaning of the latter

term. In other words, what types of facts are to be included under the heading 'mental'? The most satisfactory and unambiguous definition of 'mental' is "that which pertains to the subject as distinguished from the object of experience." This limits us to feeling and the various forms of subjective activity, such as thinking, willing, desiring, etc. All such modes of activity may probably be reduced to the single activity of *attention*, the differences between them consisting in the different types of objects respectively attended to. There seems, however, to be an exception in the case of volition, which appears incapable of reduction to attention alone in so far as it implies *motives*.¹

Let us approach the problem before us by referring back to the first example given by Mr. Russell as illustrating a deterministic system. We saw that it represented a world which the actual universe must resemble more or less closely if it is deterministic. In that example the probability is considered of there being a number of mental determinants of the world. "Given n states of a given man's mind," it might be possible to calculate the state of the whole universe, mental and material, at any given time, past, present, or future.² Now there are two points in the phrase "Given n states of mind" which demand criticism. In the first place, what exactly is *a* state of mind? It is evidently impossible to differentiate precisely *one* state of mind, which might accordingly be "given." State of mind, if it means anything, must mean the subject acting and feeling. But the subject is one—an individual entity. We cannot significantly suppose a section of his activity and feeling 'cut out,' so to speak, as one state of mind. His active existence is an indivisible whole. We cannot even *conceive* of sections of it. Nor can it be objected that we can at least say that some actions are before others, thus making a time-basis on which such a conception might be founded, for in all cases the temporal sign attaches not to the activity itself, but to the changes in the *object* of experience of which the activity is the ground. We only arrive at the perception of temporal relations in the object of experience through

¹ See, e. g., Dr. James Ward's article "Psychology," in the *Ency. Britt.* (Sec. 9).

² See p. 49 above.

our activity in differentiating that object; and we cannot conceive of a 'section' of that activity by attempting to correlate it with a temporal section of the object, for it is the activity of the one individual subject in whom it is evidently meaningless to try and distinguish temporal relations. We might just as well (and just as meaninglessly) attempt to conceive a *spatial* section of activity on the ground that we attend to objects situated in different places.

A second point now arises. Even if it be granted that there is something actually corresponding more or less vaguely to the notion of a state of mind, what is meant by saying that it is 'given'? Evidently it cannot be given as an immediate datum, that is, as an object of knowledge by acquaintance. For clearly one subject cannot be acquainted with the feeling and activity of another subject. Nor can he be *acquainted* with his own feeling and activity. The latter would imply that the *subject* (not as conceived, but in his actuality) was *object* of his own knowing, which is impossible. Yet we certainly have knowledge *about* activity and feeling. How does this arise? It is based on what may be called *realization*. We *realize* our own activity and feeling, for it is we who feel and are active. Such realization is not itself knowledge, for it implies no object, though the proposition asserting its existence is, of course, a piece of knowledge by description. Thus a 'state of mind' cannot be given as an immediate datum, nor can it be described with any adequacy.

Let us even grant, however, that there is some sense in which a 'state of mind' may be supposed to be given. We must then enquire as to the form in which it is given. In considering the attempts of the Laplacian calculator to discover whether the universe is deterministic or not, we saw that it would be necessary to formulate general laws referring to matter, mind, and their interaction (real or apparent), based on exhaustive observation. From these it might be possible to construct, by calculation, a functional relation of the type considered, and thus to establish the determinism of the universe. If it were found possible in the course of the calculation to eliminate mental factors, the universe would have at least one set of purely material determi-

nants. As, however, we cannot avoid introducing mental factors, at the outset it is evident that if the calculation is to be possible at all, a 'state of mind' must be capable of being given in a quantitative form. Otherwise, we are debarred at the very beginning from attempting to construct our functional relation; debarred, not by practical difficulties of computation, but by the fact that nothing can be inferred from such a relation as to things of which quantitative notions are not significant, and conversely, that if such things exist in the universe, the attempt to construct a functional relation which shall be significant of the whole universe is meaningless, for it implies calculations involving things to which calculation is not applicable at all.

Moreover, if material determinants are sufficient, we ought to be able to predict future mental facts simply by determining the material state of the universe at that time. But the material state could only be specified quantitatively, and how would it be possible to correlate it with mental facts if quantitative notions are in no way significant of the latter? We might conceivably be able to predict fairly accurately the sense-data which a given man would perceive at that time, *provided he should be attending appropriately*. But how are we to foretell whether he *will* be attending appropriately, unless attention is susceptible of calculation, that is, is quantitative in nature? It does not help us in the least to assume that to a certain state of brain, a certain 'state of mind' corresponds, unless we can state precisely the nature of the correspondence. Nor can it be urged that just as we correlate a sense-datum such as 'a patch of red' with something quantitative such as a wave-length, so may we perhaps be able to correlate mental facts with something quantitative. For the concept of a wave-length is itself merely a construction of sense-data, and ultimately depends on the fact that it is possible, at least approximately, to apply quantitative notions to the object of sense-experience by regarding it as made up of *parts* standing in spatial and temporal relations. Unless some such approximation is also possible in the case of activity and feeling, it is hopeless even to attempt to *correlate* them with objects of which quantitative notions are significant.

The crucial test, then, lies in discovering whether quantity is significant of feeling and activity or not. Let us consider feeling first. Certainly we talk as if the vaguer quantitative notions might apply to it. We speak of being more or less pleased or pained. But obviously we cannot get a certain pleasure by addition of other pleasures. A state of 'being pleased' is one indivisible thing, not a collection of parts which are themselves states of 'being pleased.' It will probably be urged that pleasure and pain are analogous to quantities having intensive magnitude. We saw, however, that the latter are not strictly quantities at all, and, in fact, the only reason we ever apply the term to them is that we can correlate them with true quantities. But the basis of this correlation is the fact that both the terms in it are reducible ultimately to sense-data, of which they are constructions, and sense-data may for most purposes be regarded as parts of the object of experience standing in spatial and temporal relations. No such correlation as that mentioned is possible in the case of feeling. For what is the necessary extensive quantity? Certainly not something physical, for there would then be no common basis such as we get in the case of two correlated quantities which are both physical. Feeling is not a sense-datum. We do not *perceive feeling*. We *feel*. Probably we only use even the vaguer quantitative terms 'more' and 'less' of pleasure and pain, which are purely qualitative, because we instinctively try to objectify them by comparing them to physical stimuli possessing intensity. Thus if we are to specify feelings quantitatively at all, it must be by correlating them with some other mental factor which is quantitative. This brings us back to the original question. For the only other mental factor is activity, and this we must now consider.

When we come to deal with the various modes of subjective activity, we find that the hopelessness of the attempt to make quantitative notions significant of mental facts is more clearly demonstrated than ever. Again we use the vaguer quantitative terms. We 'concentrate' our attention. We are 'more absorbed' in some things than in others. But here the quantitative reference is evidently to the objects to which we attend. For

example, by concentration we simply mean that we confine the portion of the object of experience termed 'the focus of attention' to very narrow limits. Hence the quantitative reference is strictly to that portion of the object, and not to the attention itself. Moreover, attention depends on interest. Clearly interests are not quantitative. They are not made up of parts which are themselves interests.

Similar considerations make it evident that what we have just said is true of all mental activity. A willing is not the sum of parts which are themselves willings. A thinking is not made up of thinkings, nor a desiring of desirings. And, in general, we may say that the notion of an act of attention as being made up of parts which are acts of attention, is quite meaningless.

Any attempted analogy of mental activity with quantities having intensive magnitude is of no help whatever. As we have seen, if there are entities actually corresponding to the concept of such 'quantities,' they must really be more like abstract qualities. But this is not the most serious objection. To insist on a previous point, the idea of a quantity only becomes applied to these concepts because we can correlate them with true or extensive quantities. On what is this correlation based? An intensive magnitude is always a function of extensive magnitudes. Density is the ratio of mass and volume; temperature, of energy and entropy; permeability, of magnetic induction and intensity. In each case the ratio is that of two extensive quantities, or of two quantities which may be simply and immediately correlated with extensive quantities. Now extensive quantities are logical functions of sense-data. Hence all quantities we thus deal with start from the same basis. From sense-data we construct extensive quantities, from extensive we construct intensive quantities. That is the principle of the correlation. It is not a correlation of two things springing from utterly independent sources. It follows from the fact that we may consider the object of experience as composed of parts standing in spatial and temporal relations.

We cannot, however, arrive at feeling and attention by constructions of sense-data, especially as the constructing process

itself involves attention. Therefore we cannot possibly correlate mental facts with any material quantities, whether the latter possess intensive or extensive magnitude. Hence, if quantity is to be significant of any mental factor which is not itself directly quantitative, it must come about by correlating it ultimately with some mental factor of which the notion of extensive quantity is significant. But we have seen that this notion is not significant of *any* mental factor. Thus it is impossible to effect the necessary correlation in any way whatever.

Evidently the foregoing is summed up in the statement that the feeling, acting subject of experience is an absolute, indivisible unit. The notion that the subject is made up of parts (themselves subjects) is without any meaning. Nor is it possible by any means to correlate his feeling and activity with something possessing magnitude. Therefore quantitative notions are utterly without significance in application to the facts of mind. Hence it is impossible to construct a functional relation of the type considered which shall take account of mental factors, and it is impossible, not because of any practical difficulties of calculation, but because the existence of a functional relation in such circumstances is contrary to the very idea of such a relation.

The subject, then, is not determined. Strictly, it is neither true nor false to say that the subject is determined. It is meaningless. But the universe comprises subjects, and so no functional relation can exist which is descriptive of the state of the universe as a whole. Therefore the universe is not a deterministic system.

V. *The Problem of Free-Will.*—The application of the results of the preceding section to the problem of free-will is more or less obvious. There are one or two points of importance, however, which deserve notice. In the first place, it is necessary to give a clear meaning to the term 'free.' Probably confusion has often arisen in past discussions on the subject by regarding this term as the opposite of 'determined.' That view is incorrect. The opposite of 'determined' is 'undetermined.' Both those terms apply to systems of which quantitative notions are significant, *i. e.*, to systems whose state at any given time can be

described in terms of quantities which are theoretically measurable. As we have seen, if, from observations on the state of such a system at certain times, it is theoretically possible to construct a functional relation giving its state at *any* time (at least, within a given interval), the system is 'deterministic,' or 'determined.' If on the other hand, the construction of such a relation cannot be performed, the system is 'undetermined.' Neither of the terms thus defined, however, is applicable to systems of which quantitative notions are not significant; and it is to these systems that the term 'free' may properly be applied. Hence, since quantity is not significant of volition, the will is free, or rather *we* are free in willing.

Clearly, though, volitions are not utterly chaotic. There is a very definite sense in which they are intelligible and coherent. But the coherence is not of a logical kind. When we say that a man's actions are intelligible, we mean that we understand them. The basis of this comprehension is not formal and abstract, but concrete. It is not the laws of logic, but the nature of the self. The self is purposive; its striving is towards betterment by entrance into a completer harmony with the active beings that surround it. Thus a man's actions are intelligible to us when we realize that they are the expression of purposes analogous to our own. In that Realm of Ends (to use Kant's expressive phrase) which constitutes the world as we know it, we find, not logical determinism, but teleological guidance.

The category of End or Purpose is subjective. It cannot be reduced to any other category, nor can the things to which it applies be subsumed in any way under the notion of quantity. Purposes, intentions, and motives are not measurable. They are not capable of description in quantitative terms, nor can they be correlated with quantities. Yet their introduction into our explanations of certain facts is inevitable. We cannot explain the coming together of the parts of a watch or of a motor-car simply in terms of the motions and configurations of the molecules composing the brain and nervous system of each person taking part in the manufacture. For such creative work is the very opposite of what is implied in the laws of molecular

physics. There we have a constant breaking down and levelling, not a building up. Any attempted explanation of a work of the kind considered by the help of purely physical categories, inevitably leaves us dissatisfied, with an irreducible minimum which cannot be thus explained. This residual factor is the *purpose* for which the watch or the motor-car is designed; and the fact that quantity is not significant of purpose emphasizes the truth of the statement that the subject, in the exercise of the power he possesses of guiding the course of phenomena, is free, in the fullest sense of that term.

It is clear, then, that the argument which contends that determinism cannot be true of the world is clinched by this fact that our purposes and interests cannot be weighed out quantitatively and numerically ear-marked for calculation of the future. *Given* the end which it is purposed to bring about, we may approximately predict the probable actions whereby the end will be realized. But how to foretell the purpose? It is hidden in the individuality of the man. Man is free—free in his thoughts and aspirations, free in his intercourse with his environment, free to make the best or the worst of what he finds therein.

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DISCUSSION.

THE FORMAL EGO.

THE formal ego, in the sense of the logical unity of consciousness, has figured much in philosophical thought since Kant, who made so much of form-elements, and it has proved a useful distinction in its place and way. But to be serviceable, it must be kept in its place, and not asked to do what it cannot perform. It is but the ego reduced to the pure form of unity. It is the subject reduced to an empty formula, not the ego of experience. Professor Pringle-Pattison has made objections to what is properly called Idealism, or the doctrine that what is known must be known in relation to consciousness or an ego. His objection is that the argument yields only "the bare form of consciousness," "the formal ego," which "is of no real account." Thus he appears here to lay all stress on content, though when he comes to treat of the finite individual, he finds "a subtle danger in the term content," and rightly says that "when the whole stress is laid on content, the content comes to be regarded as somehow detachable from the centres." I think it may serve some useful purpose if I put forward some reasons why I cannot concur in thinking that only "the formal ego," "the bare form of consciousness," is yielded in the idealistic argument based on consciousness, and also why I cannot assent to the doctrine that "the formal ego," properly interpreted, is "of no real account." By this I do not mean Kant's blank form of thought or mere *Cogito*—a knowing faculty alone—but the ego of experience viewed in its aspects of form rather than as content. Certainly such a 'formal ego' or mere necessary subject, as was involved in Kant's 'I think,' is 'of no real account'; hence in all actual experience the primitive datum of consciousness declares alike 'It is I who think' and 'I think something.' But the formal aspects of this concrete ego may be looked at, in distinction but not in separation from, its aspects of content.

It must not be forgotten that the reality of the outer world is not constituted for us save by the constitutive, creative power of mind; and it is this logical priority of mind to matter—which latter is always fused with mind—that is the essential thing in the argument. This pre-eminence of consciousness, in its creative character, over the world of external reality, is the great idealistic fact which the argument

proclaims. It is an idealistic discovery of every philosopher who, duly reflecting on his own living consciousness, finds the universe as mirrored in it to be the universe of *his* experience, and a truer and deeper one at that than was before open to him. But that does not make the world a mere experience of his: the world is still and always there for him to know. But he finds that matter or the object does not intelligibly exist apart from his mind as knowing it, and that the ego is in this knowing connection something which cannot be got rid of. His conception of reality being thus mediated through consciousness, the ultimate reality for him is mind. As to 'the formal ego' Riehl has written,—“This pure or formal consciousness which is expressed by the word ‘I,’ and which rules all our ideas, includes as it were the whole content of our experience.” This does not seem to me to state quite the whole case, but it is at least a significant advance on the other view, and does not simply say it is of no account. Surely the act of knowing is indivisible, even if the form be abstracted or distinguished for mere purposes of thought. The argument is concerned, in its important Berkeleyan aspect, with *being* as by the ego perceived (*percipi*), which is not pure, abstract, indeterminate being. It is *being* in the knowledge relation. Consciousness in the knowledge relation, not any mere Kantian logical unity of consciousness, is the concern of the argument; that is not ‘the formal ego’ or anything you can call ‘the bare form of consciousness’; it is consciousness with a specific knowledge content involved, whatever the object may be. It may be an intelligible thing to say of the argument, in Ferrier’s mode of representation, that it gives ‘the bare form of consciousness,’ but the recent discussions of the so-called ‘ego-centric predicament’ at least show that thought is uneasy, and not content to brush so lightly aside a contention like that of Ferrier, that “self is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition.” If our thought or knowledge can only be thought or knowledge of the object *with* self, the self, *with* which our knowledge is gained, must make a difference, cannot be of no real account. That I maintain, although I do not myself quite like Ferrier’s mode of speaking of the object *plus* self. I do not, however, share Professor Pringle-Pattison’s inappreciativeness of the work of Ferrier, and I think Professor James Seth’s remarks on Ferrier in his work on *English Philosophers* (pp. 332–339) much more just and satisfactory. ‘The bare form of consciousness,’ as such, seems a mere abstraction, and consciousness is always associated, in experience, with content, or something one is conscious of. When talk is made of ‘the bare form of consciousness,’

it might be objected that there is really no such thing as an *abstractum* called consciousness, but only consciousness-content. That, of course, would not keep consciousness from being of use as a general expression of the common property of all psychic acts. That is the attitude of an important thinker like Cornelius, and I mention it only because it would pretty well make of no account 'the formal ego' which has been ascribed to the theory in question. Cornelius is not alone among modern philosophers in thinking that consciousness is no kind of being, when sundered from content. His position even recalls that of Aristotle, "that in a manner the soul is all existent things."¹

The perceptive process is one in which is implied the active, constitutive power of intelligence. Our knowledge of reality, Kant insists, depends upon perception. And the object is that of which we are aware. Hence the 'mind' is never 'nothing but' a 'register,' as Professor Pringle-Pattison blames it in this theory for being, but is as far as possible from any such thing, owing to the activity of consciousness. Where the 'mind' is present, everything must take form and color from the 'mind.' For the 'mind' is never a mere form or envelop or receptacle of contents, but is ever active, ever molding the contents till these are subdued to the quality of their lord. Consciousness yields meaning, and this is not derived from the contents. 'Mind' is activity, not passive form. And the activity cannot be separated from cognition. You cannot speak of 'the bare form of consciousness' or 'the formal ego' in any sense which would imply, by strident contrast, a formal ego which can exist without a real one. You cannot abstract 'the formal ego' in such a way for in the abstracting process the self or ego is already presupposed, and it is no abstraction. Such a formal ego cannot be reached, for it does not exist in this *per se* fashion. Form loses all being for mind when severed from that which sustains it. It seems to me a misconception to suppose that such a formal ego is all the idealistic argument yields; the argument is concerned with the presence of the self or ego in the cognitive process and relation; and it proceeds on other than abstract lines, to wit, on the testimony of real and living consciousness, or, if you prefer, the study of concrete living experience. Consciousness is the form of all experience, and is held to be an underivable *prius* in respect of that which is not consciousness. All is known in consciousness, and by or through consciousness, but consciousness is not made by anything. Dr. Bosanquet compares consciousness to "an atmosphere," rather than a thing or existent, and I confess to finding

¹ *De Anima*, Bk. III, ch. 8, by R. D. Hicks, Camb. Univ. Press.

myself at times tempted to think in a similar way. But consciousness is not simply formal, passive, diaphanous, but active and meaningful. The ego cannot think itself as a form empty and void: if one could abstract the contents of consciousness, there would remain an abstract conceptual moment, not absolutely contentless, since it would exist in so far as it contraposed itself, as unity, to the multiplicity of the contents. But such an abstract or formal ego is wholly supposititious; it is a pure, but not therefore illusory, form-element, like, at most, some sort of aboriginal Fichtean ego in its solitariness; it has not the character of spatiality; nor has it any place in actual experience, where form and content are indissolubly united. Such an abstraction or severance of contents from the ego, conceived as formal, is impossible, for it is the nature of thought always to have a content, and the concrete reality called consciousness—formed of ego and content, or subject and object—vanishes the moment one of its two terms is annulled. Their synthesis as a consciousness-whole is an original or primary fact, a datum of consciousness. The act of thought is concerned with an object different from itself, in its relation to which lies its peculiar content. But when the objects of consciousness are called consciousness-content, the procedure is equivocal, since it involves all the objects of consciousness in general, and those experiences of the ego itself which are contents of it as a subject. But these two have been carefully distinguished by some psychologists, Lipps for example, while Wundt and Külpe show great inexactitude on the matter. But we are only now concerned with the fact that if we tried, on the other hand, to free the subject of form, as Professor Pringle-Pattison has supposed it free of content, and if we so got an ego of contents alone, these contents or data would have no validity for thinking intellect until they assumed the *forma mentis*. What would such mind-contents be without form, the particular constitution of the individual, to give them shape, and stamp, and character? They could not come into consciousness at all. As Hegel said,—“The real contents of our consciousness are preserved, and even for the first time put in their proper light, when they are translated into the form of thought and the notion of reason.” But the unity of subject and object in experience is not effected by the mere formal unity—a mere form of thought—whereby Kant supposed unity to be given to the manifold: it is the primary datum of consciousness which I have shown it to be: the contents are not given to a formal ego, as though it were a passive spectator. Form and content are, I hold, inextricably interwoven, and to make an abstraction of ‘the

formal ego' from the knowledge relation would be a violent cleavage of the ego which is one and indivisible. The formal ego is one thought-aspect, if you like, of the ego, and the real ego is another aspect, but to make two egos of them in any such wise that the one should deny the other would be false, both formally and absolutely. This unity of the self or ego is the underlying presupposition of all experience. But what is really to be made out of the relation of two sides of what is, in fact, always an experience-unity? The attempt to isolate—except in mere thought—'the formal ego' seems to me a failure, and such an ego is, in my view, neither founded on, nor yielded by, the argument in question.

Professor Pringle-Pattison calls the theory under consideration a "spectator" or "external" one, but the criticism fails to appreciate the fact that the essence of the theory is just the abolition of externality, as the world without becomes apprehended within. Now, it is not inconceivable that the self or ego might have been a passive "spectator" in respect of all experience-contents, but it is certain that it never is so; the already present consciousness of *what is*, makes passive spectatorship always impossible and out of the question. Campbell Fraser is therefore found saying: "So self, conscious and percipient, comes by degrees to absorb all outward things, converting an illusory outwardness into a real inwardness." The inwardness is merely that of things as known in the complex unity of the self. The self or ego may thus in its concrete reality embrace the whole world of things or objects as its content, but that is not to say that the things do not retain their own consistency, that is, are not dissolved in ideas or so-called 'mentalism.' Their objective reality is so little impugned that the self ever turns anew to deeper study of them. But it can do so only in the knowledge relation, that is, as they are related to the perceiver's mind. In such knowledge, objectivity is, and must be, the goal. For knowledge is revelation of the objectively necessary, as Kant clearly showed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

In the form of Idealism now in hand, the knowledge-process is so internal to the life-experience, that the form is too immanent, too inseparable from the material thought-content, for such a criticism as "merely external" to be at all justified. The ideas can be no other than internal, as those of the particular mind concerned. Nor will it do just to say that cognition is objective, and uncritically pay no heed to the manner in which objective reality is realized by the knowing subject. Because one may distinguish in thought the form of the

knowing experience, it would be a violent and unwarranted thing to say that the form has in the theory been abstracted and externally imposed upon the contents. For the mind to superimpose its own order in such a way would be impossible.

It must not be thought, because I have insisted on the non-experiential, purely abstract and conceptual character of 'the formal ego,' that this abstract ego is of no account whatever—a mere subjective illusion: no, the abstract is still, as Schuppe said, *Bestandtheil* or constituent part, that is, constitutive of the real. Not that it is anything of the concrete, certainly, but that it is not without efficacy in the processes of reality, even though it cannot act or be perceived. Accordingly, the abstract ego, the 'I think' is, to Kant, an essential element in every state of consciousness, though it is merely that which thinks, and a condition of the possibility of all experience. But it were vain to invoke this formal ego to "vanquish Berkeley with a grin," as we have seen. Such an ego might leave us with the unknowableness of the nature of the object, but would not be a denial of its existence.

The whole question of form is in this connection of great interest, but can only be briefly referred to here. Aristotle thought the form of sensible things could not exist for itself, apart from the real object, though it was separate in thought (*χωριστὸν λόγῳ*). But the forms were to him separable in reality in the case of certain spirits and the active intellect in man. But when Aristotle inquired into whether it is form or matter that constitutes the reality of a thing, it was his finding that the reality of the thing lay in what caused the thing to be what it is. That is the form, in Aristotle's view, not the matter. And the form is a *quale*, a *kind* of thing. The qualities for him constituted form, and left matter no longer pure unperceivable matter. What I have been saying is based upon his *Metaphysics*, but it may be remarked in the present connection that in his *De Anima* there is already a greater approximation to Ferrier's position that things exist only in relation to the perceiving mind, than many philosophers realize. Things are to Aristotle realizable only by the mind; they are actual only if endowed with form; the 'formal' aspect is of real account to him. Aquinas held that forms in the Aristotelian sense—the sense in which soul is the form of body—"are not," because 'form' without matter is mere abstraction. Bacon said,—“The form of any nature is such that, when it is assigned, the particular nature infallibly follows.” And he added that the form is of such a character, that “if it be removed, the particular nature infallibly

vanishes." It was the mistake of Kant to make too great an opposition between the form and the material of knowledge. Form is not to be conceived as external or accidental, but as interior and essential, as inward and identical, in its nature or idea. What makes of the abstract or purely formal ego a concrete reality is the sensorial content.

What I say is, that the universe came out of Mind, is, in Green's phrase, "a world already determined by thought," and, in our apprehension of it, returns into mind, a natural process, but not without knowledge-conditions. If the world, with its order and unity, were not such product of mind, it could not become content of knowledge. Of its objects, as objects of experience, I say, their *esse* is *percipi*. The relations are thus, I submit, far more internal in character than any critical use of the word 'external' could properly suggest. There is not the slightest need, therefore, in order to a real relatedness between nature and mind, to have recourse to a biological epistemology, in which intelligence figures as a quasi-biological function. It is clearly absurd for some realistic thinkers to talk of knowledge as 'ready-made,' simply because the materials have been provided for knowledge. Knowledge begins with knowing. Knowing, if that is taken as *knowledge*, is not created together with mind or intelligence in such wise that it is necessary and simultaneous with it. That only is knowledge which *we* know. The simplest perception is not merely a perception, but is *my* perception. Green held the elements of sense-perception to be mental or spiritual, not mere feeling-elements, and he held that they presuppose the work of mind. Green thought that "feelings without relation are nothing to us as thinking beings," but he did not deny the presence of the feeling-element in knowledge. It would, I think, be no satisfactory position to associate the analyzing, discriminating, comparing, and combining powers of mind, in the work of knowledge, mainly with feeling, though will and feeling factors are largely concerned. Green avoided doing so, even though he over-emphasized the thought-element in our world-knowledge. But it is the necessity of reason that we should know: knowing is an objective aim or *Zweck*; its presupposition is, that the objects of knowledge are determined for knowing. But objects there must be; knowledge always implicates reality beyond knowledge—in other words, the trans-subjective real; and the object as known or recognized forms part of the conscious content. And we have already seen that conscious states also are objects of cognition. But, however the self may exist for itself as a conscious subject, we may not think of

the self as subsisting apart from the sensible objects, in the working of experience. The objectivity of experience may be said to lie in its dependence upon objects. But that is not to say that this is the only sense or meaning of objectivity. It seems to me worthy of remembrance that the younger Fichte once wrote, in the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, that "objectivity can only be known by being recognized as originally rational, since the laws of reason which govern our mind show themselves to be exactly the same as the objective reason existing in it, *i. e.*, external objects." Thought would contradict itself, if it posited an object out of relation to thought, or as not at least a possible content of consciousness. As James said, its *esse* is *percipi*, and it and its image are "generally homogeneous." "Thought and actuality," in his view, "are made of one and the same stuff, the stuff of experience in general." There does not seem much room for talk of mere externality on such a view; and although he admits a certain dualism—that of the object and its image—he seems entitled to claim that the difference is not one of essential nature. Still, I do not think James got satisfactorily clear of the transcendent aspect in knowledge, or was even absolutely self-consistent on the subject. And although the fact of cognition could not happen but for mind coming into relation with the objects, so that, for us, their being lies in their being perceived, yet that is not to say that the whole being of the object, or all reality, is identical with our knowledge or perceptions of the object or reality. But it is to say that the elements which make up reality can have meaning only in relation to the mind, and that is the only knowledge of reality possible to us, according to the type of idealism now under consideration. Berkeley said of objects: "My meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives them; and that it is affected from without, or by some being distinct from itself." But our ideas of such objects are internal enough, since they can only be those of a knowing mind, cannot, in fact, otherwise exist than as those of a real, and no merely formal ego. That is the true and proper yield of the idealistic argument in question. It is, therefore, no fair or tenable description of what initial duality is involved in knowledge to call it that of "a stranger visitant, contemplating *ab extra* an independent universe." Not as a "stranger visitant," but as one who already discerns the world to be for him, and himself to be for the world, does the knowing subject put forth the activity of a consciousness which is certainly objective. In the most ordinary experience, the world around him is already for the ego the sphere of consciousness, and this last is not

confined to immediate knowledge *ab intra*. There is a certain potential universality, one may say, in normal mind, that awaits training and development. But it learns reflectively to extend the sphere of self-consciousness to the objective manifestations, that what remains of the externality of the object may be eliminated, and subject and object become one. The mind must understand, in psychological and epistemological ways, what it is to apprehend the object *ab intra*, and any philosophy which sets itself above the conditions of consciousness in the knowledge of reality cuts itself off from the possibility of reaching a true conception of reality.

Thus we have seen that, in the ego of experience, all we know is, that matter or content and form *are*, but neither the one nor the other by itself *is*; yet neither is unimportant; for the abstract or formal ego is essential element and condition of all experience, and is activity as the 'I think,' not passive form; while the contentual ego carries, so to speak, within its sensorial content, the objects necessary to representation and judgment, the multiplicity required for the enrichment and completion of experience. The contents of this contentual ego are not determined by the 'I,' but by something which is not dependent on our will, and cannot be identical with our ego. But these two forms or aspects of the ego, the formal and the contentual or real, are, taken separately, merely abstract moments, and it would be meaningless to ask how the subject began to have an object: they are, as we have seen, an original unity, a consciousness-whole, in all human experience.

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MR. MOORE'S REFUTATION OF IDEALISM.

I WISH to examine certain aspects of the analysis of knowledge, and more particularly of the sort of knowledge that sensation is supposed to involve, which constitutes the backbone of Mr. G. E. Moore's well known attack upon the idealistic argument.¹ And first I shall disclaim any intention of standing up for idealism. I do not myself hold idealism as a necessary epistemological tenet; and I therefore can view with equanimity the more immediate polemical conclusion from Mr. Moore's discussion. It happens however that his analysis would, if accepted, be equally hostile to a doctrine that I should like to be able to maintain. I do not suppose that in what follows I am establishing this alternative doctrine. I may be allowed to entertain the hope that when it is put clearly it will carry some conviction; but all

¹ "The Refutation of Idealism," *Mind*, N.S., No. 48, pp. 433, ff.

I really profess to be doing here is to show that it represents a *possible* analysis. Mr. Moore rests his case upon the contradictions inherent in the position which he is attacking; if I can show that there is a way of putting the matter which is self-consistent, at least any logical compulsion attaching to his argument is removed.

The particular proposition denied by Mr. Moore which I am chiefly concerned to maintain, is that in a sensation,—of blue, for example,—blueness is genuinely the 'content' of the sensation. For Mr. Moore, on the contrary, the actual state of the case is rather this:¹ The sensation is not a blue consciousness; it is a consciousness *of blue*. There are two things here involved—blueness, namely, and consciousness, united by a relationship totally different from that expressed by the word 'content.' The very essence of knowledge is awareness *of something*, the sole thing common to the vast variety of forms which, in sensation, this something may take, being just the awareness itself. Blue then is not a sensation; it is an object. If blue were not different from the sensation of blue, then I should be unable to distinguish 'awareness of blue' from 'awareness *of the awareness* of blue,' as it is evident that I can and must do,—the latter case differing in that *its* object is no longer the single entity blue, but blue plus awareness.

Now the force of Mr. Moore's contention seems to me to rest upon certain ambiguities in his terms. In order to point out what I conceive these to be, let me turn back to a somewhat more explicit account of the course of his reasoning. Mr. Moore undertakes to show that in claiming that nothing can exist except as it is experienced, the idealist is maintaining a self-contradictory proposition. Since the sensations of blue and of red agree only in being conscious sensations, consciousness, or the common factor, must be an element perfectly distinguishable from blueness and redness, as they are distinguishable from one another. If then the idealist denies that the existence of blue is conceivable apart from consciousness, he is able to do this only by identifying two things that are plainly different. His case rests upon the thesis that the existence of blue is the same thing as the existence of the sensation of blue; and if he says this, he "makes a mistake and a self-contradictory mistake, for he asserts *either* that blue is the same thing as blue together with consciousness, *or* it is the same thing as consciousness alone,"² which is equivalent to identifying a part either with the whole of which it is a part, or with the *other* part of the whole.

¹ Pp. 444 ff.

² P. 445.

Before considering this, I want again to make it clear that I am not engaged in defending any idealistic argument. I am willing to allow the possibility of its being false that blue can exist *only* as a conscious fact. It may very well be granted, for my present purpose, that just as we can have a blue dress *and* a blue sky, so we can have a blue dress *and* a blue sensation,—that blueness, in other words, may be a quality attaching to things as unlike as matter and mental states. All that I am interested in is to maintain that Mr. Moore's argument is not conclusive, and that *if* there were such a thing as a blue sensation, it might still be possible to hold in connection with it, without self-contradiction, that the proposition 'blue exists' is not *necessarily* different from 'blue and consciousness exist.'

I suppose it to follow that on only one condition could this be so. Mr. Moore assumes without argument that consciousness is an element quite on a par with blueness,—as if, like blue, it represented a quality, or characteristic, or essence, capable of forming a portion of the 'what' of some fact or entity. There is however an alternative possibility; and if, as might so far as I can see quite conceivably be the case, 'consciousness' were rather a term intended to imply or identify the existence status itself, Mr. Moore's difficulty would become a purely verbal one. All we have to do is to take seriously the distinction between the what and the that—between the character which existence has and by means of which we describe it, and the existence *of* this character. And if consciousness were thus a term by which we identify *certain cases of existents*—those, namely, of which we are capable of having direct and first-hand experience—the logical objection would disappear. When some one now tells me that (in a given instance) the existence of blue is the same thing as the existence of the sensation of blue, he is not necessarily falling into self-contradiction. If he means that the sensation of blue *is* an existence, that blue is a quality which, in order to be other than a non-entity, must be embodied as a quality *of* something, that something conceivably being the existent to which we give the name sensation, I do not see that he could be debarred from his right to mean this on logical grounds. He is not asserting either that blue is the same thing as blue together with consciousness (that a bare abstract quality, namely, is the same thing as the conscious *existence* of this quality), nor is he saying that blue is the same thing as consciousness alone (that is, that existence having a specific character is the same thing as characterless existence). What he *does* say is that the existence of blue may be the same thing as the sensation of blue, *if* by sensation we *mean* a certain

form of blue's existence. All that this seems to presuppose is, first, that existents, to exist at all, must have *some* character, and cannot consist of bare and indeterminate substance; and, second, that this character does not have to be of a single standard sort, but may have just as great variety as it actually *seems* to have. Of these two propositions I see no reason whatever for rejecting the first, while the justification of the second is involved in the very possibility of philosophizing. If, that is, what 'states of consciousness' have in common must needs be a new character, or 'element,' comparable with the qualities in which they differ, and entering along with these into the 'what' of the thing, and *may* not be the very stuff of the existence which is qualified, then the world falls apart into an infinity of totally incomparable predicates. There is no word whatever, to which any meaning attaches, that can stand for all qualities alike—being, entity, subsistent, or what not,—since any of these you are forced, equally with sensation, to turn into a separable 'element,' which thus becomes nothing that will apply to red and green and blue in common, but a new addition to the list of incommensurables.

Logically, then, this possibility should be taken into account before we surrender to Mr. Moore's dilemma. And now I should myself go further, and claim that it is not only a logical possibility, but a plausible statement of the real facts of the case. It seems to me that a 'state of consciousness' *is*, or may reasonably be held to be, an existent. It has always been regarded as such by the creators of typically British philosophy and psychology; and incidentally, if this be considered relevant, it is their position which Mr. Moore's argument sets out to refute. Sensations, images, feelings, are, in the traditional British way of thinking, precisely facts of existence, ontological entities, about whose reality, it has always been maintained, we can be far more certain than we have the right to be in connection with any other supposed existence whatsoever. There is not very much that can be said on this point, one way or the other. One either sees that it is so, or he does not; and I shall accordingly not spend time in elaborating the issue. At any rate such a point of view cannot be *logically* disproven; and it is a sufficiently influential belief to deserve at least to be taken into account among the possibilities. Meantime what I am alone concerned with is Mr. Moore's argument; and as regards that at least, it seems to me competent to point out that the reason why the interpretation is disregarded by him is not, apparently, that he has given it judicial consideration and rejected it, but that he has been betrayed into overlooking it

through an ambiguity whose presence here, unnoticed, is bound to make clear thinking impossible.

The ambiguity is that between conscious or psychical reality in the foregoing sense as an existent, an ontological fact, and consciousness as a term of *knowledge*, or epistemology. If 'conscious' is taken as meaning 'conscious *of*,' then it is perfectly true that a fact, and the knowledge of that fact, cannot be identified, and that the attempt to show that nothing can exist except as it is *known* to exist lays itself open to Mr. Moore's rebuttal. I recognize that idealists have often tried to prove just this; and as I say, I am not interested in defending any such doctrine. I *am* interested however in the proposition that blue is a content of the sensation of blue; and it is necessary therefore to emphasize that when I say this, I do *not* mean that a quality is a content of the knowledge or awareness of itself. But on the identification of the two interpretations Mr. Moore's whole argument seems to rest.

The argument is briefly this: Since, in a sensation, we must at least admit that the consciousness exists, it remains to ask whether it exists alone, or exists together with the blue.¹ Now the last alternative must follow from the 'content' notion; what indeed this says is, that the blue *exists as the content* of the sensation. Mr. Moore undertakes to establish the other alternative. And first, he asks, what do we mean by 'content'? And he finds the answer by analyzing the instance of a 'blue object'; blue is the content of a blue flower in the sense that it is among the elements that make up the 'what' of the blue flower. Now blue cannot be *the* content of the sensation, because we have already decided that this contains another element—consciousness—besides; it must therefore be a *part* of what is said to exist when we say the sensation exists. If then we "assert that it is part of the content of the sensation of blue, we assert that it has to the other parts (if any) of this whole the same relation which it has to the other parts of the blue flower; . . . we cannot mean to assert that it has to the sensation of blue any relation which it does not have to the blue flower."²

But in Mr. Moore's opinion this does not represent the real facts in the case. He allows that there *may* be such a thing as a blue awareness, though he sees no reason to suppose there is; but *if* there is, it at any rate is not what we mean by a sensation of blue. Blue is *also* related to the sensation in a different way; and this last relation is all

¹ P. 446.

² P. 447.

that entitles us to speak of a 'mental fact.'¹ As conscious, the sensation is an awareness of *blue*; and this is not the relation of thing to content, or of one part of content to another, but a unique relation which constitutes just knowledge and nothing else. The sensation is, then, a case of knowing something. "To have in your mind 'knowledge' of blue, is *not* to have in your mind a 'thing' or 'image' of which blue is the content. To be aware of the sensation of blue is *not* to be aware of a mental image—of a 'thing,' of which 'blue' and some other elements are constituent parts in the same sense in which blue and glass are constituents of a blue bead. It is to be aware of an awareness of blue,"² the 'awareness of blue' being now just as much a non-'mental' fact as the blue was before. It follows that blue is as much an object, and as little a mere content, of my experience, as the most exalted and independent real thing of which I am ever aware; and the question how we can get outside the circle of our own ideas and sensations to an independent world is answered, therefore, by pointing to the fact that whenever we have a sensation we are already outside that circle. To have a sensation is to know something which is as truly and really *not* a part of *my* experience as anything which I can ever know.³

It is clear, then, as I have said, that Mr. Moore's argument depends wholly on identifying consciousness, or the mental, with *knowledge of*. I do not, I may remark in passing, consider that he has left us with any very distinct notion of what he conceives this knowing or awareness to be. It is apparently an *actus purus*, performed (if such an act needs to be 'performed') by an entirely undefined entity or self. Now such an act, appearing out of the void with no content of its own, and yet capable of being combined as an 'element' with physical properties, is to my own rather prosaic mind pure mythology; I cannot get the slightest suggestion of its meaning. An act, to mean anything to me, has got to be put in terms of content, or agency, or both. If the agency here is the physical organism, then indeed I can see what its 'act' might be; but in this determinate sense it would be something totally distinct from what I understand by knowledge. If on the other hand the thing which acts is a soul or ego, I still remain at a loss to comprehend what the pure activity of an undescribable and empty entity can be like; while to accept 'awareness' as an ultimate and irreducible concept needing no further analysis or attachment seems to me unprofitable philosophizing. I will, then, to

¹ P. 450.

² P. 449.

³ P. 451.

repeat, grant cheerfully that the act of knowledge is something separable from the reality which we know, and that the latter can exist apart from the former, though I ask also that this act be described, its anatomy laid bare, the machinery which it uses brought to light. *But*—and this is my present point—*whatever* knowledge may be, I refuse to grant that the case we are considering is a case in any exact sense of *knowledge* at all, and therefore that the argument against 'content' holds.

To justify my meaning fully would require a more extended analysis than I care to attempt here; but since my purpose is, again, not to prove my position, but to point out a *possible* way of escape from Mr. Moore's argument, it will be enough if I can make clear the general nature of the contention. First, then, Mr. Moore is able to make out his case by disregarding another ambiguity. In discussing the distinction between blue and consciousness, in the sensation of blue, he has occasion to remark that language offers no means of referring to such facts as blue and green and sweet except by calling them sensations, it being an obvious violation of language to call them things or objects; and he thinks it hardly likely that if philosophers had clearly distinguished in the past between a sensation and what he himself calls its object, there should have been no separate name for the latter.¹ Now it seems to me rather surprising that he has failed here to notice that language *has* a perfectly familiar way of identifying the 'object' of the sensation, which does distinguish it from the 'conscious' fact. It does not, to be sure, call it an 'object'; but it has no objection to calling it a *quality* of an object. So that in his search for a distinction that philosophers have not seen, Mr. Moore blurs a distinction which the human race *has* made, universally. In speaking of blue, against our natural usage, as an *object*, he neglects to note that there is a different thing which the phrase 'object of knowledge' does naturally refer to; and consequently in the course of his discussion he uses the term object interchangeably, now of the qualities which reality is conceived as possessing, and now of the *independent existences which possess these qualities*. And it surely is not plain that this identification ought without discussion to pass muster.

My thesis then is twofold. I admit, first, that when in the proper sense we speak of an object of knowledge, we distinguish the object from the knowledge of it. But knowledge here is knowledge of an existent; object, in its primary meaning, and existence, presuppose one another. And accordingly a sensation of blue, *in so far as it*

¹ P. 446.

involves knowledge at all, is an awareness of the *quality of a blue object*. But, conversely, until there is this reference to a 'blue thing' involved, we have nothing that deserves the name of 'knowledge'; we have what rather is describable merely as a sensation *with the content blue*. I do not mean to imply that we may not intentionally separate qualities from their existence status, and consider them by themselves or in their relation to other qualities; we do this constantly when we adopt the standpoint of the logician. But to think of abstract blueness, so that we can, for example, compare it with yellowness, is a very different experience from merely *having a sensation*, in the old fashioned psychological sense; it not only implies a prior acceptance of a world of things to which blue and yellow belong as qualities,—a reference always in the background to lend to logic its flavor of objectivity; but it also involves, on the basis of this common experience of 'things,' a further effort of abstraction *from* things which is a relatively late product of development. But meanwhile, even *before* blueness is referred to things, we may have, I should say we *must* have in order to make such a reference intelligible, something describable as a blue experience, or a blue sensation. Here 'conscious,' or 'psychical,' or 'mental,' no longer means *knowledge of* an 'object,' or even *knowledge of* 'itself.' The experience in the first instance simply *is* itself. But when also we come to pay attention to it, or look back upon it,—when, that is, *we* know it,—we discover, or may discover, that the being of just this bit of psychical fact or sensation, as an existent, is describable by the quality blueness. Blue, in other words, *is* the content of the sensation, not in the sense that it is a part of the 'what' along with consciousness, (since consciousness is no longer conceived as an element belonging to the 'what'), but in the sense that it is literally the determinate form which existence takes, existence here being identifiable, by reflection, as part of a series of facts which we all recognize as making up what concretely we call our lives, or our experiencings, and so as being 'subjective' or 'mental,' not as a case of 'knowledge,' and certainly not as thereby rendered in any degree unreal, but by way of contrast with the different series that most of us believe constitute the world of physical processes.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Volume XVII.
London, Williams and Norgate, 1917.—pp. 497.

This volume contains the papers read before the Aristotelian Society during the session of 1916-1917. The fifteen numbers (including two symposia) may be roughly classified by saying that two treat of social philosophy; five have more or less to do with the new realism and mathematical logic; three treat of theory of value; three are historical papers; there is one paper representing the metaphysics of absolute idealism, and one Bergsonian paper. Pragmatism is wholly unrepresented, and scarcely mentioned.

The last-named paper is the address of the president, Dr. H. Wildon Carr, who, in "The Problem of Recognition," offers a Bergsonian theory of recognition and raises a number of interesting questions to which, however, I am unable to find his answer. The chief point is clear. Intelligent recognition, in which a person operates with a memory-image, is of the same kind as instinctive recognition, as shown by an animal which deals appropriately with an object encountered for the first time; and the latter, it seems, is the type of the kind. When, therefore, a new experience is recognized as familiar and intelligible, it is the expectancy and preparedness of the subject that makes it so rather than any recall of or comparison with past experience. In both kinds, however, the expectancy is the resultant of past experience; between past and present there is a mental continuity. But how (as in the case of the first instinctive recognition by an animal) is continuity to be established between one generation and another? Here the author has recourse to a "concept of life, not an abstraction from living process, but a pure, universal, concrete concept," involving a two-fold continuity of living body and thinking mind, which, I should say, he only barely attempts to explain.

The symposium on "Ethical Principles of Social Reconstruction," by L. P. Jacks, G. Bernard Shaw, C. Delisle Burns, and H. D. Oakeley, is rather disappointing. Principal Jacks and Mr. Shaw are inevitably good reading, but each says just what we should expect him to say. Mr. Jacks makes the question refer to post-bellum reconstruction and forecasts that all will depend upon which side wins; if neither side wins, there will be no ethical reconstruction. The choice will lie,

then, between asserting "the right to do good to others *with or without* their consent" and "the right to do good to others *only* by and with their consent"; which means that "the ethical sequel to the victory of the Allies would be a revival of *laissez faire*, of non-interference, of minding one's own business and rejoicing when other people minded theirs." I wish he were right; for myself, I cannot see that non-interference receives support from either side.

Mr. Shaw prophesies that there will be no ethical reconstruction unless the war ends in a draw. In that event he looks for a great development of supernationalism, which, however, will be paralleled and conditioned by a reconstruction of internal conditions in the nations themselves. Here "ethical reconstruction will take the form of a substitution of the ethics of communism for the ethics of commercialism, and of the ethics of democracy for the ethics of feudalism."

Mr. Burns, treating the question rather comprehensively, looks for reconstruction in any event; and according to him, reconstruction will involve both communism and voluntarism, *i. e.*, an order that will allow for and promote spontaneous individuality, but not by simple non-interference. A point made by him in his argument for a supernational organization is that the exercise of force is ethical, and wrong only when employed by the parties to the dispute. I should call this view more convenient than ethical. As an ethical principle it seems to stand only for a new absolutism.

My feeling is that Miss Oakeley's paper cuts more deeply into the ethical motives involved in the question than any of the others. Her idea is that we are probably now facing a great turning-point in history, the next great turning-point after that which closed the Middle Ages, and a new conception of value and of life. This may be described as "a new understanding of the principle of personality, which goes so much deeper than the sixteenth-century affirmation of the freedom of thought and will," and extends (in Russell's words) to the giving of full scope to the creative impulses in man. The motive of creative personality goes deeper than the antithesis of individualism and socialism (or communism). It is found underlying all the social philosophy of our time, even to the syndicalism of M. Sorel.

In "The Function of the State in Promoting the Unity of Mankind," Dr. Bernard Bosanquet replies to criticisms of his theory of the state, especially to those contained in Volume XVI of the "Proceedings," and restates his view in the form of seven definite propositions. Two points are constantly reiterated: (1) that the state is a unique unity; and (2) that it is the deepest and highest expression

of the individual. If the second be granted, I find myself wondering why it seems that so many private citizens, German, French, English, or American (most of them, I should say), conform in their dealings with one another to a moral code so much higher than that observed by their respective states. Citizens who behave no better than states are likely to be found only in prisons. As for the unique unity of the state, I can only remark that the uniqueness is admirably designed for exalting the state above the private citizen, on the one hand, and, on the other, for treating any international unity as absurd and unnatural. Let it be granted, with Dr. Bosanquet, that a real unity presupposes an actual understanding, is it not a little strange that one's understanding of one's fellow-men goes all the way to the national frontier and then suddenly stops?

Among the papers referring more or less to the new realism and the new logic, I include those of the second symposium on the question, "Are the Materials of Sense Affections of the Mind?", by G. E. Moore, W. E. Johnson, G. Dawes Hicks, J. A. Smith, and James Ward. Those who hold that philosophical discussion is nothing but a clever game will be delighted with this symposium. The discussion is led by Dr. Moore, who, it seems, is empowered by the rules or traditions of the Society to define the issue. I am not sure that he would admit that he is proposing a game. His four colleagues seem all agreed that this is what he has done. Mr. Smith hardly conceals his disgust for the "game" of "entities." In any case one must credit Mr. Moore with a clever bit of irony. By a process of interpretation which somehow reminds me of "If you had a brother, would he like cheese?" he defines the question to mean, Do sense-presentations cease to exist when no longer presented? It seems to him quite conceivable that they may cease to exist; he will be open-minded. But nothing of the kind is implied in the fact that they are presented. Will some one kindly aid him with a better reason? None of his colleagues seems much disposed to help. Their space is mostly occupied by their reasons for refusing to play his game. As Mr. Johnson points out, the question whether sensations "cease to exist" already implies that the sensation is "an entity of the nature of a continuant, like a material body or a conscious experient." To answer the question either way is then to admit the implication.

A similar game, I should say, is proposed by Professor A. N. Whitehead in "The Organization of Thought." Mr. Whitehead's purpose is to exhibit "logic" as the organizing principle of thought, which, beginning with the analysis of the immediate phenomena, shows four

ascending stages; the arithmetical, the algebraic, the stage of general-function theory, and the analytic stage. Mr. Whitehead explains that the game depends upon the initial assumption that experience consists of a multiplicity of "perceptions," *i. e.*, of terms adapted to numerical ordering. For those who can make the assumption, the game may well be an "organization of thought."

That a similar assumption underlies Russell's "axiom" of the externality of relations, is brought out clearly in the paper by Miss L. S. Stebbings on "Relation and Coherence"; in which it is shown that Russell's theory of the externality of relations and Bradley's argument for their unreality are both determined by a conception of 'things' which makes any internal (or, as the author prefers, "interpenetrative") relation inconceivable. The purpose of this paper is to establish a "concrete-unity" (unity-and-difference) theory of reality against Russell's pluralism and equally against the "ultimate reality" of Bosanquet and Joachim, which is held to be distinctionless.

And it seems to me that forgetfulness of the assumption just mentioned may be charged to C. E. M. Joad, whose paper on "Monism in the Light of Recent Philosophy" undertakes to show that "relations are real, are external, and are experienced." That relations are real, if anything is real, and experienced, if anything is experienced—some relations, at least—I can see no way of denying. But whether relations are to be accounted "external" to the things related must, I should say, depend upon your (always correlative) distinction between relations and things. If, however, relations are merely "mental," how shall we escape Mr. Joad's conclusion that, on this view, the more thought you put into your philosophy the falser it becomes?

The epistemological side of the new realism is dealt with by Professor G. Dawes Hicks in "The Basis of Critical Realism," a paper too long and too full for a brief summary, but well worth a careful reading. The chief aim of the author is to present an analysis of knowledge which shall distinguish the content of knowing from the object known: to show that to know is not to *be* that which is known. An important feature of the argument, however, is a criticism of the new realism, than which I have seen none better or more fundamental. The author calls himself a "critical" realist. The neo-realists (such at least is the implication) are uncritical realists. Marvin would call them neo-dogmatists. The critical realists, such as Adamson, Alexander, and Hobhouse, have reached their position (in the only intelligent way, it seems) through epistemological reflection. The neo-realists repudiate epistemology, yet they are constantly occupied with it.

Russell's absolute distinction between acquaintance and description comes in for a destructive criticism; and it is shown how Kant's similar distinction, separating sense and understanding, gave an unintended subjective character to the Kantian theory of knowledge. Holt's "cross-section" version of the relational theory of consciousness is shown to come perilously close to the Hegelian conception of "finite consciousness"—for, "if the circumstance of constituting an element of the cross-section affects in no way the nature of the element itself, does it not follow that an object which is conscious in a cross-section is equally conscious outside that context?" In general it is contended that only a thin partition separates neo-realism from Berkeleian idealism.

Coming to the papers on value, I mark the paper by Mr. Pickard-Cambridge, "On Our Knowledge of Value," as the most enjoyable in the book, and also as one of the most illuminating. The author writes—to the scandal of the Aristotelians, I fear—with an evident enjoyment of his subject. His paper shows style, humor, psychological insight and shrewd worldly wisdom, and withal a clear sense of logical order. Is there a criterion of value? And if so, what is it? The answer given is that there is no subjective criterion, such as desire or enjoyment; still less an objective criterion. Nor does it avail to set up an "ideal critic." "The only positive suggestion I have to offer" is that the criterion "is to be found in the understanding and judgment of every individual,—that every individual is himself and for himself that ideal spectator or critic to whose intelligence, will, and taste, true value is indissolubly related." In brief (as I understand him) the criterion of value is not desire, but desire become self-conscious and critical, and thus both objective and subjective. This presupposes the distinction, and also a relation, between apprehension and awareness, *i. e.*, between unreflective and reflective consciousness. From this also it seems to follow that the cause of error and evil is to be looked for in the sluggishness of our minds. The closing pages of the paper contain some suggestive remarks upon this thesis. It is true that the realization of values is retarded "only" by lack of reflection, yet this lack of reflection is part and parcel of human nature and to a certain extent even necessary for the preservation of the social order,—which leads to the rather cynical conclusion, otherwise phrased by the author, that all that keeps the social order stable is a certain stupidity.

Mr. F. C. Bartlett's paper on "Valuation and Existence" is one of the kind that treat value as if unrelated to persons—a grin without

a cat. Does valuation imply existence of the object valued? His answer is that "the æsthetic judgment makes no reference whatever to existence; the economic judgment may probably refer to existence indirectly, but does assert or assume a balancing of needs or of desires, or of desire and need; the moral judgment always has reference to an act or a series of acts, considered as performed or as achieved." His distinction of æsthetic, economic, and moral judgments seems to me far from convincing; and I should also say that the bearing of valuation upon existence involves more things in Heaven and earth than are dreamt of in this paper.

In "Fact and Truth" Professor C. Lloyd Morgan presents the associational and correspondence-theory of knowledge under a new figure. For the parallel series of outer and inner events he substitutes two spheres, the sphere of the knowable and the sphere of knowledge, which are in contact at a point where (I suppose) hypothesis coincides with fact. Getting at truth, it seems then, is a process of rolling the sphere of knowledge upon the sphere of the knowable so as to bring about such contact. Truth, it seems, requires self-consistency in each sphere—the knowable is necessarily self-consistent and contains no shadow of error—but also a correspondence in the structure of the two. I fear this will not be very luminous to my reader. It is hardly luminous to the reviewer. I hope that "the man of science" will grasp the point, however, since the purpose of the paper is to represent his point of view.

In "The Conception of a Cosmos" Professor J. S. Mackenzie brings together a number of considerations, such as the mutual implications of order and contingency, of persistency and change, and of good and evil, for the purpose of showing that the difficulties in the way of regarding the universe as a self-explanatory system are not insuperable.

Of the three historical papers I can say only a word each. Mr. M. Ginsberg's long paper on "The Nature of Knowledge as Conceived by Malebranche" is careful and learned, but diffuse, and it is not easy to locate the center of gravity. This, however, seems to lie in the point that, while Malebranche deepens the distinction between essence and existence, he tends to hypostasize the essences, so that now, having become particular existences themselves, they no longer account for the universality of knowledge. Dean W. R. Inge, in "Some Aspects of the Philosophy of Plotinus," which deals particularly with his doctrines of time and eternity and with his conception of self-consciousness, points out that, while there are some superficial resemblances between Plotinus and Bergson, at bottom their philos-

ophies are utterly opposed; for while Bergson exalts the individual and exults in the novel and the chaotic, Plotinus finds true being in an eternal order and unity and looks upon self-consciousness as only an imperfect knowledge of God. Mr. C. D. Broad's paper on "Hume's Theory of the Credibility of Miracles" is a careful and sympathetic analysis of Hume's argument, which leads him to say, however, that Hume's assertion that no possible evidence can justify belief in an exception to a law of nature, would make any revision of scientific laws impossible.

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Human Nature and its Remaking. By WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING.
Yale University Press, 1918.—pp. xiv, 434.

This book is based upon lectures delivered by the author in 1916 before the School of Religion of Yale University. As the title indicates, the central purpose of the book is to discover and establish certain principles at work in remaking human beings. Many readers will immediately surmise that there is kinship between the theory here set forth and the fundamental religious dogma of original sin. Indeed, the title can imply nothing else. Human nature needs to be remade nearer to the heart's desire. The author does not, however, easily assume human depravity, but rests his case upon a long and thorough attempt to answer the question: What is human nature? Life is never content to be without art. It always wills to fashion the outer world to conform to its own persistent ends. Human life adds to this general effort a specific conscious attempt to remake itself. This attempt is revealed in language, religion, law, and education. "To say that mankind is by nature bad is, in its origins, only a more sophisticated way of saying that virtue is difficult" (p. 6). The thinker cannot accept instinctive answers to the questions: What is original human nature? What should it be? How shall we make it what it should be? He must seek an objective answer in terms of human structure and history and the dialectic of experience. Law and religion agree in assigning to human beings a natural depravity but they differ in their estimate of its permanence. Law tacitly recognizes that evil is not to be overcome but religion declares that human perfection can and must be secured. In answering the question, What is desirable? the claims of liberation and discipline are stated and it is shown that the desire for liberation leads to its own sort of discipline and that defenders of pure liberation have gone from

among us. It is possible to defend the opinion that the goal of human endeavor is not contrary to human nature but beyond it, as faith may be beyond reason.

Part II proposes an answer to the first question. Whatever account of man's instinctive life is given, some recognition is demanded of the fact that the organism as a whole criticizes each instinct and imposes limits upon its function. By comparison with other animals man reveals neither a completed instinctive function nor its corresponding structure-mechanism—"he is as nearly as possible animal-in-general" (p. 47). Commenting on the extreme difficulty of fixed classification, the author expresses his preference for a division of all instinctive actions into two groups—(1) assertive and outgoing instincts; (2) negative and contractive instincts. In addition, certain general instincts will be found to take neither of the fundamental forms to the exclusion of the other. Among these may be specified curiosity, play, pugnacity and fear. Such instincts will be found to express general needs of the organism and to utilize the specific instinctive mechanism of either group as occasion seems to require. They point to some necessary interest of the organism as a whole, indeed, to a willful action involving partial and varied subordination of parts. In human beings this sum of desires may be called the self. "A self may fairly be defined as a permanent principle of selection" (p. 70). The policy of the self is its acquired interpretation of its central and necessary interest. As a label for this motive force the author prefers 'will to power' on the ground that it gives a clearer indication of the nature of the will without at the same time limiting its range, as does the phrase 'will to live' or the Freudian 'libido.'

Part III is to treat conscience as in some sort of germ deposited in man's original nature, and at the same time one of the chief instruments in his remaking. The social origin of the 'you ought' consciousness need not be discredited, but it is seen to assume a unique and simple 'I ought' in the awakening individual. "The social use of the word is thus never purely instructive; it is also, and primarily, awakening" (p. 94). Conscience does not act like an echo of the racial experience, but "seeks out its own applications, and is capable of a development like the sense of beauty; rising in some persons to the point of genius" (p. 96). "My own view is that conscience stands outside the instinctive life of man, not as something separate, but as an awareness of the success or failure of that life in maintaining its status and its growth" (p. 99). Chapters on sin and its meaning in the light of the foregoing discussion conclude the account of man's

original nature. Sin turns out to be "the refusal to interpret crude impulse in terms of the individual's most intelligent will to power" (p. 116).

The remainder of the volume is given to the discussion of the processes by which man is recast in the mold of his own total desire. Experience is the process of change. Any given portion of experience modifies subsequent action according as the 'after image' is judged by the whole will to be good or bad. Therefore, "the work of experience is the dialectic of the will" (p. 163). Pugnacity, for instance, develops through stages of destruction, revenge, punishment, *et cetera*, as it is forced to recognize that each stage partially fails to secure its real purpose.

Part V argues that social pressure upon the individual is mainly in the direction of the development indicated by the dialectic of individual experience. The author steers a middle course between Hegel and Hobbes in his treatment of the individual and the state, although he leaves no doubt in the reader's mind that he considers Hegel the lesser evil. Whoever is discontented with the social order may discover by deeper insight that the social order fundamentally conforms to the whole will of the individual. "The deformity of human nature in the state is not a myth: we can only say that it would be still more deformed apart from it, and only by its aid can it become less deformed" (p. 210).

Education is only a more conscious attempt to remake the person. It selects certain racial experiences for transmission to the young. It *selects* because it cannot assume that the young have either the materials from which to choose or the will to select if the material is supplied. Education must evoke the will by exposing the individual to the objects that call out his responses. It must dare to be partisan for the sake of giving something positive. "Against errors and interested propaganda the growing will has natural protection: it has *no protection against starvation* nor against the substitution of inferior food for good food" (p. 234).

In a chapter dealing with the rights of rebellion the author touches gingerly the claims of the individual against the group. In the last issue he concludes that the individual must be true to his vision and the group must in like manner be true to its charge by deciding whether the individual's outbreak shall be treated as a rebellion or as a common crime. The state is forced to punish and not to follow the dialectic of pugnacity to the point of forgiveness because, apparently, the state must be maintained at all hazards. It is an essential product

of racial experience fitted to stand between the accuser and the accused to prevent savage revenge and to secure a genuine restoration of the norm.

Part VI deals with the place of art and religion in the remaking of the individual. The public and the private orders desire to preserve different aspects of man. For instance the public order is interested in the economic status of man, while the private order is interested in "the self of play, of art, of bodily beauty, of manner and carriage, emotion, aspiration, religious feeling." Art which begins in play, and religion which is continuous with art seek to save the whole man. They function directly through the whole will to power. If art does not satisfy the whole will it at least prefigures its satisfaction. Religion places the whole self at the source of creative activity and thus lends to the self creative wholeness and the complete satisfaction of the will to power. Part VII discovers in Christianity, as a single example of religion, a realm for the complete exercise of the will to power. The individual soul by participation in the divine nature may secure the goal of his whole spirit and discover the scope of his power. This interprets the phrase 'will to power' and lends plausibility to the general tendency of the argument that human nature has to be remade out of its natural instincts by a power which is at once natural and beyond nature. Human nature is both a fact and a prophesy.

The foregoing summary doubtless does violence to the logical completeness of the book and certainly leaves out of account many of the most interesting details of the argument—details which are interesting largely because they present more or less original interpretations and, therefore, challenge controversy. In its main outlines I find little need of dissent. The argument proceeds after the usual manner of idealistic discussion. There is no great array of quasi-scientific data to pad the pages. Perhaps the most suggestive portion of the book is its treatment of the instincts and the interesting, if not wholly new, category of the general instinct. By all odds the author's application of his general formula of regeneration to the practical problems of reform will call out the greatest differences of opinion. Many readers will be convinced by the theoretical conclusions without being in the least convinced that they apply to the practical situations in the way he has indicated. For instance, his faith that the state must punish seems in no way connected with the logical structure of the argument. Why may the state not forgive and by that very act maintain itself? Or, the state may do neither,

but address itself to the teaching of men in the art of realizing the will to power. If there is no other way to know when a rebellion is in order than to try it, to see whether society considers it a rebellion or a common crime, we may be reasonably certain that the might of established institutions will uniformly be the right side of the conflict. The view advanced by Dewey and others that the function of the individual in society is precisely to reconstruct it is more certain to lead to progress.

In the discussion of education the same tendency to trust institutionalism rather than the present living humanity is easily discerned. Interested propaganda is considered a better educational content than a too free access to divergent evidence on the ground that the growing will has a natural protection against the former but not against the latter. It is not sheer perversity which leads to the very opposite statement, for there are certainly native traits of mental method which awake under the stimulus of conflicting evidence but are easily lulled to sleep by dogmatic instruction. This seems true, moreover, of all grades of instruction.

As a whole the book is instructive and persuasive. The final chapters which deal with art and religion are especially thoughtful. The will to power may surely find in religious devotion both negative and positive realization. Reverence will keep it from being a will to exercise power over others and zeal will direct it to the most universal expression. The style is terse and usually clear but will not furnish easy reading for those unfamiliar with the way of idealistic writers to treat abstract notions as personal agents which *do*, and *say*, and *believe*.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS

The Complete Works of Plotinus. Translated by KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE. Alpine, N. J., Comparative Literature Press, 1918.—pp., Vol. I, 282; II, 353, III, 371; IV, 380.

Up to the present time it has been customary to call Ammonius Sakkas the Father of Neo-Platonism—and that on a mere tradition; whereas there remains of Ammonius Sakkas only a few trifling fragments, ascribed to him jointly with some other writer. This statement continued to pass as truth for another reason, namely, that his disciple's works, those of Plotinus, were in such a confusion that almost anything could be read into them. For instance, they have been used by Augustine and others as a mine of practical mysticism, while the German Drews used them as supports for Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious. The difficulty of the Greek, in addition, together with the extent of the writings, conspired to keep the texts inaccessible. Of course, there were translations—that of Bouillet, but beyond price; the German, expensive, and as difficult, if not more so, than the original. Thomas Taylor had of course selected a few mystical writings, but they too were tinged with mediæval mysticism, besides being entirely unsystematic.

In order to clear up the situation, two things were necessary. The first was a translation that would make the sources, as a whole, accessible. The length and the difficulty of the undertaking had deterred the most laborious. First, as to the length, it would have proved a deterrent, except that the life-problems of a student who in his youth had attempted to throw together an outline of the philosophy of Plotinus compelled him to undergo the ordeal. As to the difficulty, his translation does not pretend to solve insoluble problems, problems which must have been present to the author; for had he analyzed his thought more clearly, he would probably have stated it unmistakably. All that the present translation pretends to do is to present in clear English the thought of the translator, as a provisional means of approaching linguistic difficulties to which centuries of research are welcome, with the advantage that doubtful passages have been interpreted in the light of parallel statements, and in harmony with the philosophical sources of the text.

But mere translation made the reigning confusion still more striking. It reminded one very much of the Pentateuch in the Bible. Criticism has there unravelled the tangle, by demonstrating that some editor mixed sources in themselves coherent, in obedience to some prearranged purpose. Was there such a purpose in the mind of Plotinus's editor, Porphyry? The latter, in his preface, explains it in detail. It was, in those days, fashionable (not even the works of Plato had entirely escaped this process) to group an author's works by subject, or length,—in this case, into six "enneads" of nine books each,

with a fine disregard of the chronology of their origin. Porphyry claimed to have made this arrangement in order to group the works by subject; but such an idea was illusory, in view of the desultory nature of Plotinus's thought in many individual essays; and the result was such a confusion that the very first essay is practically the last one written by Plotinus.

Under such circumstances, it was no wonder that readers of Plotinus found it difficult to discover consistency, inasmuch as it is the natural course of life for thinkers to grow in power, and even fail in later years, as happened to Schlegel, to Plato, and others. Indeed, Porphyry explicitly records this of Plotinus. It was therefore necessary to unravel this tangle by both doing the work of translation, and by printing the works in their chronological order. The result was as illuminating as with the Pentateuch. It was discovered that the earlier period was Numenian, or Gnostico-Platonic, the second Porphyrian, or Stoic, while in later years Plotinus returned to his earlier views. The latter indeed may not be the case, if in his later years he was merely giving out early incomplete works, to put his writings together.

It will of course be asked, How could so great a thinker as Plotinus prove so changeable in his views? The answer is interesting. Plotinus was absorbed in thinking, and left writing to his secretaries; writing must to him have been laborious, especially in later years when his eyesight was low, for neither his speech nor writing was scholarly; Porphyry mentions specific vulgarisms. He had as first secretary Amelius, the legatee of the works of Numenius, who knew them all by heart. Is it any wonder, then, that in the writings of the Amelian period a number of Numenian expressions can be demonstrated? In the second or Porphyrian period, we find the most systematic treatises, Stoic in character. When Porphyry wished to commit suicide and was persuaded as alternative to sojourn to Sicily, Plotinus was thrown back on his earlier thought; and therefore it is no wonder that he returns to Platonic opinions. Thus Plotinus's views become consistent, in each period; and therefore we will in the future, as we do with Plato, not speak of Plotinus's views, but of views of Plotinus of the first, second, or third periods.

Interesting as this rescuing of Plotinus's progress of views is, it would be no more than grave-digging, were it not for the light that it sheds on the origin of the philosophy of Christianity. In Plotinus we find a number of Nicene formulations a century before that council; and so more than ever do we realize that just as Plato summated early Greek philosophy, so Plotinus fused the thought of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, and put this Greek heritage in a shape in which it could be used practically by a young religion as explanation of many of its mysteries.

There is still another living issue in our study of Plotinus; what is the independent value of the mystic ecstasy, the authority for which has always more or less involved Plotinus? Numenius had drunk deep at the Oriental Hermetic sources, and through Amelius this doctrine must have been found convenient to explain the epileptic attacks to which we are told Plotinus was subject. But to demonstrate a physical basis for mystic experiences does not deny

the latter, nor invalidate them; but it does supply a basis for more careful criticism of these experiences.

Plotinus summates Greek thought; he is the sunset of the ancient world-conception, and the dawn of the new; and this latter can never be justly evaluated without a knowledge of its source, Plotinus.

AUTHOR.

The Relation between Thought and Action from the German and from the Classical Point of View. The Herbert Spencer Lecture Delivered at Oxford, October 20, 1917. By ÉMILE BOUTROUX. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1918. —pp. 32.

The text chosen for this discourse is the saying of Herbert Spencer's that if two opposing terms both have bases in the reality of things, then between them there must be a fundamental harmony. The author begins by saying that the *thought* and *action* of ordinary life seem at first to imply each other, but reflection soon reveals antagonisms between them. Thought is universal, independent of time, patient in solving problems; action is particular, limited in time, and compelled to be decisive. Are they, in reality, indissolubly connected or radically different? The German answer to this question—to which Kant gave direction—is the assertion of a complete dualism; thought deals with things from the mechanical point of view; the principle of action is absolute freedom. The problem of German philosophy after Kant was as to how this abstractly ideal principle of action could become realized concretely. Only, for the Germans, in material success and the control of the visible world, M. Boutroux thinks. He points out that this exaggeration by the Germans of the rights of will was in part a reaction from an opposite tendency, the tendency to define the function of the human mind as an accommodation and subordination of itself to an external reality. But, he asks, is it necessary to take either of these alternatives which oppose the mind to reality? The Greeks, believing that Thought and Being are fundamentally akin, refused to confine thought to the merely mechanical aspect of things. "Thought composes above the physical world, a moral, a social, a human, an æsthetical, a religious world, which although not reducible to material elements, is nevertheless real, and worthy of subsisting and developing." The element of the mental life through which the union of thought and action is effected—an element scoffed at by the Germans—is feeling; it is "the natural link between Action and Thought." "From the heart spring both great thoughts and great actions. Let us, then, give the heart its due."

In so far as M. Boutroux lays the blame for German mechanism and materialism at Kant's door, he is obviously a partisan interpreter of the history of philosophy. At his best and on the whole Kant pointed the way to an organic view of experience. But in his positive statement of the composition of the good life, and in his appreciation of the Greek view, M. Boutroux will seem to most readers just and wise. We need continually to be reminded by such clear statements as this that the end of life is not exclusive; that in-

temperance is always an evil. The present German tendency to minimize the value of feeling in the good life is, as the author points out, not merely an omission, but a distortion of the whole scheme and ideal.

KATHERINE E. GILBERT.

General Types of Superior Men. By OSIAS L. SCHWARZ. Boston, Richard G. Badger.—pp. 435.

The reviewer may as well say at the outset that, in the opinion of the author, he is probably not competent to appreciate, certainly not likely to acknowledge, the merits of this work, because he belongs to the class of college teachers, whom the author thinks of as generally "vain academicians and pseudo-scholars who vehemently refuse to accept the new theories and philosophical conceptions of non-professional, non-academical, self-taught, genuine thinkers, because the acceptance of such new truths would mean a loss of prestige for their self-important personalities and for the capital-supported institutions of learning" (p. 97).

It is hard to get much meaning from the title; something more is suggested by the sub-title: *A Philosophico-Psychological Study of Genius, Talent and Philistinism in their Bearings upon Human Society and its Struggle for a Better Social Order.* The work assumes that the genuinely superior man is a "socialist, anarchist or communist" (p. 377). The man of talent is often of the pseudo-superior class, which apparently includes most of those who represent themselves as interested in human betterment, except the genius. Most others, except the poor, are philistines, a word the author uses a thousand times. On the three classes of genuinely superior men, pseudo-superior men, and philistines, the author rings the changes with iteration. Indeed, he could have said what he has to say on the devotion to the truth, the power to see, the loneliness, and the high mission of the genius, if he had been content to say it once instead of many times, in a few pages. In addition to this tautology, he gives much space to repeated, general, conventional condemnation of parasites, and predatory members of society. Considering the author's general opinions, one is somewhat surprised that he often speaks of the inferiority of women; he unhesitating declares them almost inevitable philistines, and naturally inferior to men.

The whole work is general and abstract. For example, though it purports to deal with men of genius, the only genius mentioned is Max Nordau, who read the manuscript and wrote a highly commendatory, though frankly and shrewdly qualified letter, which is prefixed to the volume. Nordau remarks that the work is subjective; he might have said that the author appears very self-conscious. One feels, in fact, that the author, in allowing his work to be so confused as it is—he himself speaks of it as "mosaic-built, semi-aphoristical and therefore incoherent looking" (p. 393)—is taking privileges of the sort he grants to the genius. The aphoristical character of the book is especially apparent in the 'wild and whirling words' of the earlier part. Sometimes the author forgets his attempts to overpower his reader by 'sound and fury,' and

writes more simply and strikingly, as on pp. 134-140. The latter part of the work is much more readable than the earlier part, being on the whole more simple in language and more dependent, one feels, on the author's own experience.

In fact, he sometimes transcends his self-consciousness and rises to the expression of strong feelings, for notwithstanding his socialistic lingo, he shows that he is moved by a genuine indignation against the shams and evils of society. Of the various good things in the book, the remarks on specialization and broad knowledge, and the diagram illustrating them (p. 131), are especially worthy of mention. One may cite also, for example: "Even the morality—paradoxical though it may sound—of socialistic and of ethical movement leaders, although superior to that of other political leaders, is as a rule inferior to that of simple members" (p. 315). A passage that shows the author at his best in language, thought, feeling, and perception of the truth is one protesting against the abuses of inherited wealth consisting of natural resources (p. 266).

ALLAN H. GILBERT.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

The following books also have been received:

The Good Man and the Good. By MARY WHITON CALKINS. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918.—pp. xx, 219.

Greek Ideals; a Study of Social Life. By C. DELISLE BURNS. London, G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1917.—pp. lx, 275.

The Present Conflict of Ideals. By RALPH BARTON PERRY. New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1918.—pp. xiii, 549.

The Next Step in Religion. By ROY WOOD SELLARS. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918.—pp. 228.

The Problem of Space in Jewish Mediæval Philosophy. By ISRAEL ISAAC EFROS. Columbia University Oriental Studies, Vol. XI. New York, Columbia University Press, 1917.—pp. 125.

Christian Belief in God. By GEORG WOBBERMIN. Translated from the third German edition by DANIEL SOMMER ROBINSON. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1918.—pp. xix, 175.

The Law of Struggle. By HYMAN SEGAL. New York, Massada Publishing Company, 1918.—pp. 161.

Sri Krishna. The Soul of Humanity. By A. S. RAMAIAH. Madras, The Kanara Press, 1918.—pp. xvi, 167.

The Interference of Will-Impulses. By ABRAHAM A. ROBACK. Psychological Monographs, Vol. XXV, No. 5. Princeton, N. J., and Lancaster, Pa., Psychological Review Company, 1918.—pp. viii, 158.

La Conflagrazione. Per E. TROILO. Roma, A. F. Formiggini, 1918.—pp. 353.

Figure e Studii di Storia Della Filosofia. Per E. TROILO. Roma, "L'Universelle" Imprimerie Polyglotte, 1918.—pp. 324.

La Grâce. Essai de Psychologie religieuse. Par GONZAGUE TRUC. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1918.—pp. 136.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie, der Sinnesorgane, I. Abt. Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

The Religious Philosophy of Professor Pringle-Pattison. DR. H. RASHDALL.
Mind, N. S., XXVII, 107, pp. 261-283.

Dr. Rashdall is chiefly concerned to answer the criticism of his own position found in Professor Pringle-Pattison's new book, *The Idea of God*. This involves a consideration of the main points of Professor Pringle-Pattison's philosophy, from which he diverges. Dr. Rashdall feels himself in strong agreement with the general attitude of that philosophy; he rejoices that such an able antagonist has arisen against certain modes of 'Absolutist' thinking that appear in the writings of the late T. H. Green, Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet. His differences in point of view are summarized under four heads: (1) While Professor Pringle-Pattison has clearly grasped the central truth of Idealism (that subject and object cannot exist independently), yet he seems to over-emphasize the reality of the object and to under-emphasize the impossibility of a subject without object. (2) The main difference lies in their conceptions of the relation between 'finite centers' of consciousness and the Supreme Spirit. According to Professor Pringle-Pattison, the Supreme Spirit includes all finite spirits and is called indifferently the Absolute or God. On the other hand, for Dr. Rashdall it is meaningless to speak of one consciousness as 'included in' another. God, to him, is a 'finite' God, and God together with the 'finite centers' make up the Absolute. He asserts that Professor Pringle-Pattison, by the logic of his position, is forced to substantially the same view; for he has strongly stated the reality of finite centers, and has repudiated the attempts of other thinkers to regard the individual as a mere 'appearance' of the Absolute. He has apparently admitted God as Person or consciousness,—and he has confessed that we cannot understand how finite minds are 'included in' God's mind. Therefore he has no right to hold to this 'inclusion.' Here Professor Pringle-Pattison would seem to have fallen into the very mistake which he has so ably criticized in others; he has con-

founded the 'content' of knowledge with the 'form' of consciousness which knows this content. He falsely assumes, because the 'content' of knowledge belonging to finite centers must exist in the 'perfect experience,' that therefore the finite centers themselves must form part of the Being that has this 'perfect experience.' But at bottom he does not treat the actual consciousness of the individual as part of the consciousness of God. Along with this confusion, he has failed to attribute higher individuality to consciousness than to 'things'—a violation of his principle of degrees of reality. (3) A third difficulty is that he denies efficient causality to God. Yet the gist of his whole book is a vindication of teleology. And he recognizes God as Will; although *what* God wills does not appear. That he fails to regard God as an efficient cause implies that he here again falls back into the attitude of that Oxford 'Hegelianism' which sees God only as Thinker. (4) Should Professor Pringle-Pattison urge that the notion of God as efficient cause would involve the extremely difficult conception of a creation in time, Dr. Rashdall would suggest: first, that when causality is identified with activity (as Pringle-Pattison implies), then the element of succession in time is no longer vital; second, that the old antinomy of time should be frankly acknowledged as unsolved. The ambiguity and contradictoriness throughout *The Idea of God* result from the attempt to think of God both as a Person and as a logical universal.

MARIE T. COLLINS.

Dr. Bosanquet's Theory of Mental States, Judgment, and Reality. J. E. TURNER. Mind, N. S., XXVII, 107, pp. 304-317.

In the final chapter of his *Logic*, Dr. Bosanquet deals with the relation of mental states to judgment and to reality. He rightly maintains the essential continuity between mental states and reality, but further holds that mental states are an aspect of all known reality, and such universality of mental character the author of this article questions. While the activity of 'being conscious' is always mental, it would not seem to follow from this that the content of consciousness is always so. Yet Dr. Bosanquet appears to suggest this. But such a universal mental character would derogate the whole content of objective reality to the same level with the undeniably subjective contents of mind (such as dreams, memories, hallucinations). Further, if sense-content and ideas are symbolical, as Dr. Bosanquet holds, the real world would be cut off from direct knowledge (since the symbol and the thing symbolized are different). Even if we admit with Bosanquet that all reality has a psychical-mental character, and therefore that thought adds no element to feeling, but merely reorganizes it, a difficulty remains. For in order to know the material of thought as feeling, we must be able to distinguish content as feeling from some content apprehended as not-feeling. We cognize a content A only by distinguishing it from a content not-A; and not from a content AX, A being again a universal phase of X.

MARIE T. COLLINS.

Jules Lachelier. *La méthode de reflexion*. G. SEAILLES. Rev. Phil., XLIII, 7-8, pp. 1-18.

The only reality is thought. Though thought is conditioned by sense, yet sensible objects become intelligible only through contact with thought. Indeed, the diversity of the world has its origin in the unity of thought. Pure thought, as such, is never given to us; it appears only in its activity. To understand absolute thought, we must first examine the content of consciousness. We find there sensation, which not only gives us sensible qualities, but is accompanied by affective states, and will, which is prior to the affective states. These states of sensible consciousness are given the seal of objectivity by intellectual consciousness. Moreover, intellectual consciousness frees the world from the subjectivity of sensible consciousness, in other words, makes the world real. This does not mean that thought imposes its laws on the world in an external way, but that thought is the intelligible order which gives the object existence and truth. The examination of thought leads to the construction of a system of complementary truths. In this system, the first moment is *being* in its abstract form. At first, only logically necessary, abstract being becomes mechanically necessary through the application of extension and succession to itself. The second moment is concrete being. At this stage appear sensation and will. In applying to itself succession and two-dimensional extension, will becomes finality. The final moment of being is pure thought which is reflective. This reflection is individual in that each of us affirms his own life; it is perceptive in that it places spacial objects outside of us; and it is rational knowledge of ourselves and of the world. Its symbol is space of three dimensions. The progress from moment to moment is a dialectical process in which each succeeding moment gives to its predecessor its value and true existence. Such a system, then, exhibits thought as the true reality of our being. The system does not end in moral indifference, however, for this last moment is the true good in that it is the pure liberty of spirit.

MARJORIE S. HARRIS.

Le concept moderne de la philosophie. A. CHIAPPELLI. Rev. Phil., XLIII, 7-8, pp. 100-115.

The characteristic trait of philosophy—that of always questioning its own existence and legitimacy—is an indication, not of weakness, but of immortal vitality. Philosophy determines not only the legitimacy of its existence, but also of its aim and its method, without being limited as science is by fixed external objects. Philosophy aims to get at the meaning of the totality of things; its function is the ideal representation of reality. For this ideal or intellectual construction, the unity of mind furnishes the point of departure. Thus into philosophical thought individuality is introduced and the human element enters; the category of value plays a more important rôle in philosophy than the category of truth. On account of this human interest the doctrines of the great thinkers of the past have a permanency which is lacking in much scientific theory. In the development of thought the principles and laws of

knowledge remain constant; there is change only in its application. Thought preserves its unity of direction, but it is always in process; it is a continual effort, a perpetual increase of itself, a true creative evolution. Just this demonstration of the synthetic and creative activity of thought is the great innovation of critical philosophy since Kant. In the organization of knowledge, philosophy occupies a central position. It must do more, however, than integrate the work of science; it must respond to the most profound needs of the spirit. In its comprehension of all reality, it guarantees the eternal conservation of all spiritual values.

MARJORIE S. HARRIS.

The Conceptions of the History of Philosophy. VICTOR DELBOS. Monist, XXXVIII, 3, pp. 394-409.

It is not easy to form an exact idea of the history of philosophy, of its function in the order of human disciplines, and the way in which it must carry out this function effectively. Like all histories its task is to find out and reconstitute, and as far as possible explain, realities which have previously come to pass. Philosophy does not exist objectively; philosophies do so exist, but not philosophy. There is some difficulty in distinguishing philosophic doctrines from other forms of intellectual production. Some philosophies supply directly from the resources of the human mind an all-embracing explanation of reality, and also such an idea of the destiny of man as will enable us to determine his essential task in this world. Some philosophies are doctrinal and dogmatic, others are critical and sceptical. Cartesianism offers us a striking instance of the conflict between the historical and the philosophic mind. When Descartes philosophizes, he does not want to know if men existed before him or not; he asserts the truth, and this he discovers through the content and the concatenation of clear and distinct ideas, the meaning and scope of which are external and immutable. The following are a few modern works which have directly or indirectly contributed to the development of the history of philosophy or have claimed to do so. It is impossible to count among these works Bayle's *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (Rotterdam, 1695-1697, 2 vols.). His doctrine is calculated to confuse human reason. *The History of Philosophy* by Thomas Stanley, published in London, 1655, 2d ed., 1687, is concerned only with philosophy previous to Christianity, on the ground that "Christian theology being the receptacle of truth, there is no longer any reason why philosophy should seek it." Bruker's principal work, *Historia critica philosophiæ, a mundo incunabilis ad nostram usque ætatem deducta*, 5 vols. (Leipsic, 1742-1744), also confuses the origin of the history of philosophy with that of religious mythologies and poetry. There is more coherence and organization in Tiedmann's work: *Geist der speculativen Philosophie* (7 vols., Marburg, 1791-1797). He tries to find out if the philosopher has contributed something new, if he bases his affirmations on solid reasons, if he is able to connect his thoughts, and ensure their agreement, and what objections may be raised against him. The appearance and predomi-

nance of the Kantian philosophy tended to make Kantianism a guide in the exposition and examination of doctrines. We find this tendency in Buhle, whose works are valuable mainly for the bibliographies they contain. In the years 1798-1819 Wilhelm Gottfried Tennemann published his great history of philosophy in eleven volumes. The work has careful critical investigations into origins, clearness of exposition and a wealth of information. Its defect is that it judges doctrines too much in their relation to Kantianism. Degérando published in three volumes a comparative history of the systems of philosophy and added a critical analysis of the cause from which these systems were derived. To Hegel is due the credit for introducing a conception of the history of philosophy. He makes the sequence of the doctrines, not a succession of episodes and opinions, but rather the expression of a continuous and regular effort to reach truth through all its contradictory forms. In this sequence of doctrines we find a reasonableness which enables us largely to recognize the reason of to-day. In contrast with the Hegelian spirit, Ch. Renouvier in his *Esquisse d'une classification* has set forth a general view of the history of philosophy in the form of dilemmas. From the variety of methods used, it is evident that it is difficult to reach an exact idea of the proper formulation of a history of philosophy.

EMILY A. LANE.

Civilisation et Philosophie aux XII^e et XIII^e Siècles. MAURICE DE WULF.
Rev. de Met., XXV, 3 pp. 273-283.

This article forms an introductory lecture to a course on mediæval philosophy delivered at the University of Poitiers, and was later published in a volume entitled, *Civilisation et Philosophie au Moyen Age*. Civilization is a complex of social, political, economic and juridical factors, of moral and religious aspirations, and of artistic, scientific and philosophic conceptions. The interdependence of these factors is very noticeable in the philosophy of the Middle Ages. S. Anselm, Thomas Aquinas and William of Occam are typical sons of their centuries. To comprehend and evaluate the Middle Ages, it is peculiarly necessary to judge it from its own point of view and standards. In the twelfth century there blossoms forth the springtime of a new civilization, essentially creative and constructive. The patrimony of antiquity, the amalgamation of Celtic and Germanic races, and the influence of Christianity are the three great forces which are interfused and blended. The men of the Church become ardent propagators of their own beliefs but, at the same time, develop science and literature and lay the foundations of the great philosophic system which dominated the thought of four centuries. In the thirteenth century—the apogee of the Middle Ages—religion effects a unity, independent of nationality, of all the concepts and sentiments that govern the life and thought of the mediæval man. But despite this apparent internationalism, there appears at this moment in the world's history the first noticeable differences between the neo-latin, anglo-celtic and teutonic temperaments. And so to understand the psychology of the peoples engaged in the present

war, we must study this important period. These two centuries also form a period of French hegemony during which France is the chief factor in the formation of the feudal temperament, and especially of the philosophies of that epoch. These compact and complete philosophical systems included such divisions as a philosophy of nature, psychology, metaphysic, logic, æsthetics and ethics, and left their imprint upon every aspect of civilization. Their moral and social ideas noticeably influenced artistic, juridical and political theories and, in general, our manner of thinking and speaking.

EDGAR DE LASKI.

Western Philosophy and Theology in the Thirteenth Century. MAURICE DE WULF. Harvard Theological Review, XI, 4, pp. 409-433.

The tendency in the past has been, and still is, to look upon the scholastic philosophy of the middle ages as being wholly in the service of Catholic theology. That is a false view. Philosophy was taken out of the liberal arts in the twelfth century, and put in a class by itself, just below theology. Philosophy was not confused with dialectics, as many writers suppose; it was put above dialectics. Not only did the twelfth century take philosophy out of the liberal arts, but it also completely separated philosophy from theology. Philosophers were defined as "*humanæ videlicet sapientiæ amatores*"; while theologians were defined as "*divinæ scripturæ doctores*." Of course, there were some people who abused and looked down upon philosophy, but most people gave it an honorable place. Then in the thirteenth century came the creation of an international center for philosophy, the University of Paris, and the difference between philosophy and theology became even more distinct. Philosophy was based on reason; theology, on faith. This distinction was not only recognized by Thomas Aquinas and the other theologians, but it was universally recognized by all men. Since the Middle Ages were religious ages, however, theology was bound to affect philosophy, just as it affected art and everything else. There were three ties between philosophy and theology: (1) inasmuch as theology was *the* study, philosophy came to be considered as a preparation for theology; (2) philosophy was applied to theological doctrines to furnish additional support; and (3) the ends of philosophy and theology were the same, viz., happiness. But at the same time, philosophy remained "a synthetic study of the world by the sole data of reason"; it remained distinct from theology. These ties between philosophy and theology were usually not obstacles to the independence of philosophy. Even when philosophy was forbidden to contradict the doctrines of theology, philosophy did not become subservient thereby. Though not permitted to contradict theology, philosophy was not required to establish theology. Besides, where no theology was involved, philosophy was free to maintain whatever doctrines it desired. The philosophy of the Middle Ages, then, was not the servant of theology; it was in general independent of theology; and where the problems involved were non-theological, philosophy was as free in the Middle Ages as it is to-day.

I. CHASMAN.

L'Art et la Philosophie. VICTOR DELBOS. Rev. de Met., XXV, 3, pp. 325-336.

The relation of art to philosophy is two-fold: art is capable of expressing, in part, philosophical ideas and sentiments, while philosophical systems, on the other hand, may be works of art. The thoughts of Xenophon, Parmenides and Empedocles were expressed in poems, the form and grace of which are much to be admired. Lucretius makes Epicureanism the subject of a poem. It is also precisely because philosophy is so deeply and intimately related to human desires and needs that it is capable of artistic expression. And even when philosophy aspires to know what things are in themselves, this really expresses a human desire to exercise the reason and force it to a satisfactory end. But when thought is transformed into verse, this should not be merely a formal procedure. It is necessary that the imaginative mind should give animation, warmth and color to ideas before they really take on an artistic form. Goethe had this gift of transforming philosophical ideas and experiences of the highest and most complicated sort into poetry. In Faust there may be said to be represented all the Kantian metaphysic. The opposition and union of Faust and Mephistopheles artistically interpret that idea, so dear to German metaphysicians, that the immediate desire of perfection does not suffice, and that liberty consists essentially in meeting and overcoming obstacles. It is the idea that in human activity there is never a moment in which perfection is realized. And so philosophy becomes interfused with poetry and art when it assumes a humanitarian attitude, by which it relates itself to the needs, anxieties, torments and desires of the human soul. In turning to the question as to whether philosophy itself can be a work of art, we must affirm that all human intelligence is architectonic in point of form and attains truth by the order which it constructs and the harmony which it establishes between ideas. Is not this a proof of the great affinity between philosophy and poetry? What magnificent symphonies of ideas are those of Plato, Aristotle and Leibniz! And the harmoniousness of these systems speaks of a sort of artistic activity in the construction of great philosophic doctrines. We do not mean, however, that philosophy becomes the play of the artistic dilettante who is only desirous of expressing his own unique personality. A philosophic production resembles an artistic creation in that they both tend to raise us above the commonplace and the banalities of life and, especially, in the fact that they cannot be retouched, altered or added to. For philosophy, like art, must be an organic construction from a certain point of view, which it regards as true and in which the ideas must harmonize.

EDGAR DE LASKI.

Again, the Value Objective and the Value Judgment: Reply to Professor Perry and Dr. Fisher. WILBUR M. URBAN. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XV, 15, pp. 393-405.

From Professor Perry's and Dr. Fisher's criticism of his value theory Professor Urban concludes that, while he has much in common with Dr.

Fisher, he has but little in common with Professor Perry. Professor Urban finds that Dr. Fisher agrees with him on "the fundamental distinction between value and being"; also in the beliefs "that value may attach to objects apart from human feeling about those objects; that there is such a thing as value knowledge; that reality is a form of value and that a value connotation is inseparable from the notion; and that value implies reality." They also agree that reality is essentially a value-concept. Dr. Fisher does not agree with Professor Urban that value may be equated with the proposition that an object ought to be, but denies that objects can possess the obligation to be. To this Professor Urban replies that in passing from oughtness to obligation Dr. Fisher has changed the issue.

For Professor Perry, according to Professor Urban, value is not essential to reality itself; there is no such thing as a knowledge or apprehension of value; "there is only knowledge about things and their relations, value happening to be the name we give to a certain type of relations." For Perry, interest makes or constitutes values, but interest does not know them. Therefore, Urban asserts, Perry must deny that there is any knowledge of value. While Urban asserts that a value-judgment differs from any judgment which asserts existence hypothetically, Perry asserts that there is no difference.

I. CHASMAN

Neo-Vitalism et Sciences Physiques. R. MOURGUE. Rev. de Mét., XXV, 4, pp. 419-431.

The problem of vitalism has again come forward as an urgent question, in fact as the greatest question with which the biologist is concerned. Even those who do not admit a vital principle begin by demonstrating the insufficiency of the actual phenomena to explain themselves. Certain other writers such as Bergson, Johnstone and Driesch think that the analysis of the facts justifies the introduction of special concepts into biology,—*élan vitale*, *entelechy*. However plausible this may sound, it by no means excludes the possibility of a complete explanation in physico-chemical terms. The present established laws do not explain the phenomena of diffusion, absorption and catalysis in the protoplasm, and even in physics the explanation of classic phenomena has had to be given in contradictory terms. For example, we have admitted that the movements of particular elements may, in certain cases, be discontinuous, and that the velocities, which such particular elements assume, are only a multiple of the initially given velocity. In an inorganic process the phenomena lead to a transmutation of potential into kinetic energy and the equal distribution of this energy to all parts of the system in which the phenomena act. In organic life, on the contrary, energy is transformed from kinetic to potential and works towards the establishment and maintenance of differences of kinetic energy. And so from the point of view of energy, organic and inorganic life appear to be directly opposed. It is noticeable, also, that a living organism cannot produce its maximum energy, after a long period of inactivity, without danger to itself. Preliminary training appears to be neces-

sary for it to function as before, while in inorganic life, energetic power remains constant. Here we have admissions of some irrational elements, and it is not impossible that the progress of the biologic sciences will indicate the existence of other irrational facts of similar type. The study of reproduction and regenerations should reveal to us numerous phenomena which appear to have no analogy in the inorganic world. But it is still more interesting to note that physics itself appears to encounter inexplicable variations which seem to indicate a vitalistic or non-mechanical activity. The term vitalism has so many different associations that its use leads to many confusions and ambiguities of meaning, but it is very difficult to substitute for it any expression that would not necessitate a lengthy paraphrase. It indicates, indeed, a classification, and not a doctrine that has its own principles.

EDGAR DE LASKI.

The Empirical Correlation of Mental and Bodily Phenomena. GRACE A. DE LAGUNA. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XV, 20, pp. 533-541.

The possibility begins to appear of a reformulation of the mind-body problem as momentous as that marked by the philosophy of Descartes. Formerly it was assumed that there were two alternatives in the relation between mental and bodily phenomena: either every change in conscious experience was accompanied by a corresponding change in the chemical and physical processes of the cerebrum, or else no general, complete correlation was discoverable between psychical experience and nervous action. But these alternatives are not exhaustive. Both falsely presuppose that the only kind of correlation possible between consciousness and the functioning of the nervous system must be between psychical processes and the chemical and physical changes in the brain. But the central nervous system is not chiefly a physiological organ. Its primary function is rather the adjustment of the behavior of the individual to his environment. Further, a parallelism could only prove that the correspondence between psychical and cortical changes was a significant correspondence if it could adduce some principle of individuation and classification common to the two. And this would be to exhibit them as a single system. Evidence is offered from the fields of emotion and perception to show that the common principle individuating both mental processes and their bodily correlates is their function in behavior.

MARIE T. COLLINS.

Habit et conscience. L. DUGAS. Rev. Phil., XLIII, 7-8, pp. 116-135.

At first sight consciousness and habit seem mutually exclusive. Yet at the beginning of habit-formation consciousness is present. Thus in habits formed by the 'trial and error method' consciousness is more or less at work eliminating false and retaining right movements. We are not aware of the part consciousness plays in developing habits, because we examine only already formed habits from which consciousness has apparently disappeared, and because we confuse consciousness with reflection. Taking consciousness in its more

humble connotation, we find it present in the execution of an habitual act, for the act is perceived as easy or hard of accomplishment. In general, at the moment when habit is being formed, consciousness is present judging, conceiving laws, perfecting ways of action. Moreover, consciousness is also a concomitant of habit at the moment when it is lost. This return to consciousness is a retrogression in that it is a return to an anterior state where habit was non-existent; but it is progress in that consciousness is now more effective than in habitual action. It remains to consider how much consciousness is present in a formed habit. Habit should not be opposed to will, for habit is of the same nature as will. Indeed habit is a will which has retired in part from its work. Even at the heart of an habitual operation consciousness may intervene when an obstacle presents itself. Further, the normal will is not the entirely conscious will; for, when consciousness supervises constantly, the act, so directed, is restricted and hence is just as imperfect as a wholly mechanical act. We may say, then, that the unconsciousness of habit is merely relative, that habit is a complement of reason. The normal act is that in which reason and nature—nature here meaning instinct and will—concur. In other words, habit is the meeting-place of reason and instinct, and to assert that habit is conscious is to relate it to its origin and to reveal its end.

MARJORIE S. HARRIS.

The Hindu Yoga-System. CHARLES ROCKWELL LANMAN. Harvard Theological Review, XI, 4, pp. 355-376.

The purpose of this article is to introduce Dr. Wood's book on *The Yoga-System of Patanjali*, and to encourage research in the Hindu Yoga-system. The elements of Yoga go back indefinitely into ancient days. In its teachings emphasis is laid upon the control of the senses; asceticism is deemed superior even to heavenly happiness. Buddha was greatly influenced by the teachings of the Yoga-system, as is shown by his use of the Four Truths of the Yoga-system: concerning disease, cause of disease, health, and remedies; the five means to a higher concentration: faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, insight; the Four Exalted States: friendliness, compassion, joy, and indifference; and many other teachings of the Yoga-system. The Yoga also emphasizes magic, which it seems to have developed to an astounding degree. However, much of what is called magic, is hypnotism. This has been highly developed. In fact, while hypnotism is comparatively new to the Occident, it has been known to the Orient for over two thousand years. When in 1899 Braid described his technique for inducing hypnotism, it was found that fifteen hundred years ago there was written a book on the island of Ceylon which set forth essentially the same principles.

I. CHASMAN.

What Do We Mean by Democracy? RALPH BARTON PERRY. Int. J. E., XXVIII, 4, pp. 449-464.

Mr. Frederick Harrison says that the war of Nations is merging into the war of Class, and Class wars suppress the spirit of nationality. His account

may be exaggerated, but we cannot dispute the fact that the present war is not a mere struggle for power among rival nations, but a struggle for ascendancy among rival forms of government, economic policies, and social philosophies. The people of the United States are not fighting in order that they may live, but for a principle—democracy. The three great ideas associated with democratic tradition are: Equality, Liberty, and Popular Government. The last two define political democracy. Liberty is the principle of giving to the individual the largest possible sphere within which to carry out his own desires and judgment. Political democracy is the union of liberality and responsibility. Social democracy is defined through Equality. To what motive does Equality appeal? First, *Compassion*, an emotion felt toward individuals, and excited by the aspect which life presents at the lower end of the scale of happiness. The great task of civilization is to achieve happiness that may be generally shared. Second, *Emulation*: Men desire to overtake or surpass their fellows in the race for life. Emulation demands fair play and a 'square deal' for everyone. Third, *Fraternity*: Self respect demands the esteem of others, and resents disparagement. Fraternity acknowledges the just pride of others. Fifth, *Envy*. This feeling prompts men to retard those who excel them. It confuses and depresses all standards of excellence. These several motives which underlie the love of equality, are the motives which justify or discredit the ideal of social democracy. In so far as social democracy means a compassionate regard for all human beings as having feelings, powers and capacities of the same generic type; in so far as it means the equalizing of opportunity and a mutual respect, it rests upon sound and incontrovertible ethical grounds. We need now the courage to carry out this internal readjustment. Are we prepared to pay the cost of social democracy by surrendering personal advantages which we at present enjoy? Only so far as we have learned to live more austere, and to find our happiness in those things which are not diminished by being widely shared, may we in the time to come have the heart to be cheerful despite the realization of our ideals.

EMILY A. LANE.

NOTES

The eighteenth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held at Harvard University, December 27 and 28, 1918. The Presidential Address was delivered by Professor Mary Whiton Calkins of Wellesley College. This address, entitled "The Personalistic Conception of Nature," will appear in the March number of *THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*. Professor H. B. Alexander of the University of Nebraska was elected President of the Association for the ensuing year.

We regret to announce the death on the twenty-second of November, 1918, of Dr. W. G. Smith, lecturer in psychology at Edinburgh University. He was formerly a professor in Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts, and later lecturer in psychology at Liverpool University.

We give below a list of articles in current philosophical magazines:

MIND, XXVII, 108: *C. D. Broad*, On the Relation between Induction and Probability (I.); *W. M. Thorburn*, The Rights and Wrongs of a Person (II.); *F. C. S. Schiller*, What Formal Logic Is About; *L. J. Russell*, The Basis of Bosanquet's Logic.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XXIX, 1: *J. Dashiell Stoops*, The Larger Self; *E. Thackray*, The Enthronement of Public Right; *J. R. Kantor*, The Ethics of Internationalism and the Individual; *Victor S. Yarros*, Ethics in Modern Fiction; *Herbert L. Stewart*, Euthanasia; *Hariley Burr Alexander*, Art and the Democracy; *Joseph Roy Geiger*, Religious Worship and Social Control.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, XV, 21: *A. A. Goldenweiser*, History, Psychology and Culture: A Set of Categories for an Introduction to Social Science. Part I; *Harold Goddard*, Politics, Philosophy and Poetry.

XV, 22: *A. A. Goldenweiser*, History, Psychology and Culture: A Set of Categories for an Introduction to Social Science. Part II; *A. A. Merrill*, Free Will and Intuition.

XV, 23: *Grace A. de Laguna*, Dualism in Animal Psychology; *Henry Rutgers Marshall*, Other Men's Minds; *A. P. Weiss*, Conscious Behavior.

XV, 24: *Thomas Reed Powell*, The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law; *Harold Goddard*, The Coming Bravery—A Spencerian Dream.

XV, 25: *Maurice R. Cohen*, The Subject Matter of Formal Logic; *James Bissett Pratt*, Professor Spaulding's Non-Existent Illusions.

THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, IX, 2: *Carveth Read*, The Mind of the Wizard; *Ernest Jones*, The Theory of Symbolism; Symposium,—Why is the 'Unconscious' Unconscious?, *Maurice Nicoll*, *W. H. R. Rivers*, *Ernest Jones*.

THE HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, XI, 4: *Charles Rockwell Lanman*, The Hindu Yoga-System; *Alfred Fawkes*, The Papacy and the Modern State; *Leighton Parks*, Phillips Brooks; *Maurice de Wulf*, Western Philosophy and Theology in the Thirteenth Century.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, XXII, 4: *Henry B. Robins*, The Theological Curriculum and a Teaching Ministry; *F. A. Starratt*, The Demands of the Rural Church upon the Theological Curriculum; *A. Clinton Watson*, The Primary Problem for an Empirical Theology. III; *James Westfall Thompson*, Church and State in Mediæval Germany. IV; *George W. Richards*, The Church and the Religion of Russia.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XXIX, 4: *Anna Berliner*, The Influence of Mental Work on the Visual Memory Image; *Wesley Raymond Wells*, The Theory of Recapitulation and the Religious and Moral Discipline of Children; *Wesley Raymond Wells*, The Biological Value of Religious Belief; *Albert Schinz*, Intellectualism versus Intuitionism in French Philosophy since the War; *Cora L. Friedline*, The Discrimination of Cutaneous Patterns below the Two-Point Limen; *P. T. Young*, The Localization of Feeling; *Henry Bradford Smith*, Aristotle's Other Logic; *J. F. Dashiell*, Sixteen Origins of the Mind; Minor Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of Cornell University. Communicated by *E. B. Titchener*, *H. P. Weld*, and *E. G. Boring*. XLIII. *F. Cutolo, Jr.*, A Preliminary Study of the Psychology of Heat; *Arthur S. Phelps*, The Mental Duet.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XXV, 5: *S. Bent Russell*, Communication, Correspondence and Consciousness; *Leonard T. Troland*, The Heterochromatic Differential Threshold for Brightness: II. Theoretical; *H. B. Reed*, Associative Aids: III. Their Relation to the Theory of Thought and to Methodology in Psychology; *Rudolf Pintner*, Community of Ideas; *Carl Rahn*, Psychoanalytic Concepts and Reëducation.

XXV, 6: *Edward Chace Tolman*, Nerve Process and Cognition; *Joseph Peterson*, Experiments in Rational Learning; *Erwin A. Esper*, A Contribution to the Experimental Study of Analogy; *Herbert Sidney Langfeld*, Judgments of Facial Expression and Suggestion.

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE, XVII (No. 65): *François Naville*, Mémoires d'un médecin aphasique; *J. Languier des Bancelis*, Sur les Origines de la Notion d'Ame a propos d'une interdiction de Pythagore; *A. Claparède*, La Conscience de la Ressemblance et de la Différence chez l'enfant.

RIVISTA FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA, X, 4: *François Mentré*, La discontinuità nella vita sociale e psicologica; *Aurelio Palmieri*, L'Idealismo americano ed i suoi frutti nella guerra odierna; *Agostino Gemelli*, La dottrina delle localizzazioni cerebrali.



THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE PERSONALISTIC CONCEPTION OF NATURE.¹

I.

THE position of this address as interlude in a discussion of mechanism and vitalism² has determined its starting point. The first division of the paper will attempt accordingly to trace the metamorphosis of vitalism into personalism and to show that this psychological vitalism antagonizes no justified claim of mechanism. The later divisions of the paper will discuss the philosophical nature and the bases of a personalistic cosmology.

As the preceding discussion has made most clear, the outstanding difficulty in the settlement of the issue between mechanism and vitalism is that each term has been used in radically different senses, often fused but seldom distinguished. It follows of course that one may be mechanist or vitalist in one meaning of the term but not in another of these senses; and it follows, equally, that one may be a mechanist in one sense and a vitalist in another. The three sets of contrasted meanings are, briefly, the following: (1) Mechanism, in the first meaning of the word, describes the universe in structural terms; vitalism, taken in the corresponding sense, conceives the universe functionally, that is, in terms of relation. (2) Mechanism in the second sense is synonymous with determinism; while vitalism

¹ Read as the President's address at the eighteenth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association held at Harvard University, December 27-28, 1918.

² For the papers contributed by the leaders of this discussion, *cf.* this REVIEW, Vol. XXVII, pp. 571 ff. (Nov., 1918).

introduces the conception of an incalculable and unpredictable controlling force or entelechy. (3) Mechanism, finally, is used in the sense of materialism; and vitalism opposes to it either functionalistic vitalism in a new dress or else personalism, psychological vitalism, the doctrine of the real self.

We are especially concerned with the last pair of contrasted conceptions but it is none the less of interest to us briefly to consider the others. (1) The mechanist in the first sense of the term analyzes his phenomena into structural elements, whereas the vitalist views them primarily as organisms, or wholes, each in relation to its own parts and also to other wholes. The mechanist, for example, analyzes the living cell into chemical elements, whereas the vitalist conceives it as an organic unit and studies its function in muscular or circulatory adjustment. Mechanism and vitalism thus defined are, however, not antagonistic conceptions. Nor is the first an exclusively physical, the second a purely biological category. On the contrary, biology must use structural categories and "every principle of chemical science" must apply "to organic . . . substances"¹ since every organism is a carbon compound as well as an animal or plant. And conversely, as Professor Henderson has argued, inorganic as well as organic bodies are incompletely described unless they are described in terms of their fitness and order as well as in terms of their physical and chemical constituents.

(2) In the second sense of each term mechanism and vitalism stand in sharp and irreconcilable opposition. Mechanism, in this meaning of the word, is simply a synonym for determinism, the theory which assumes such a perfectly determinate relation between phenomena that none can vary in independence of the rest. To this conception, vitalism (in its extreme form) opposes the hypothesis of an entelechy or vital entity which, at one point or another in the succession of phenomena, "actively intervenes in the processes of organisms"² and interferes in the otherwise determined succession of events.—Here then we have a complete disjunction. Mechanism and vitalism thus conceived

¹ L. F. Henderson, *The Fitness of the Environment*, p. 192¹.

² H. S. Jennings, "Doctrines Held as Vitalism," *American Naturalist*, XLVII, 402².

are no longer supplementary conceptions but utterly incompatible points of view: On the one hand the conception of series of phenomena, determined and (so far as they are temporal) predictable. On the other hand, the conception of inscrutable, irregularly interrupting entities and only apparent predictableness and uniformity. Between the two it is evidently necessary to make choice; and unquestionably, in my view, the mechanists score. For the truth is that the experimental arguments against mechanism—Driesch's arguments, for example, from the phenomena of development and restitution—fall far short of proving that "something new and elemental must be introduced" to account for the facts.¹ The indeterministic vitalist, the entelechist as we may call him, is therefore unjustified in his refusal to play the game through. He makes the deterministic postulate of causally related phenomena in the case of physical bodies and cavalierly abandons it when he studies organisms. Science, on the other hand, must postulate a universe of law, and experimental science must postulate a rigid determinism, a future which is uniform with the past.

It is important, however, to emphasize once more the fact that this rejection of entelechistic vitalism involves no break with vitalism in the first, the functionalistic sense already justified. Such functionalistic vitalism is indeed perfectly compatible with deterministic mechanism. Protoplasm, for example, biologically regarded as sensitive or irritable, as well as protoplasm conceived as a carbon compound, may be conceived as determined; or, to take another illustration, the restitution of a cerebral function as truly as a molecular change may be regarded as completely predictable. Such an acceptance, it must be noted, of determinism in science, simply leaves open the philosophical question whether or not the world is ultimately a determined universe.

(3) Mechanism in the third sense of the term is a philosophical rather than a scientific doctrine. It defines all phenomena, psychic as well as biologic, in physical terms, and by physical it means not the molecular or atomic but the non-mental and the

¹ Cf. H. S. Jennings, "Mechanism and Vitalism," this REVIEW, Nov., 1918, XXVII, pp. 585 ff.

non-ideal. Loeb and Warren may be named as upholders of this type of mechanism, though Professor Warren states (in the paper written for our discussion) that the evidence for the theory is not demonstrative.¹ It conceives "conscious experiences" as "identical with . . . neural processes";² and unambiguously states that "all human activity, including deliberation and selective volition, is completely mechanistic";³ and that "this mechanism is physicochemical in type." Mechanism, in this final sense of the term, it should be noticed, though of course it involves both structural and deterministic mechanism, is not in turn implied by either conception. In concrete terms: one may describe phenomena in structural terms and may conceive science in the determinist's fashion, without believing that the world is ultimately non-mental in its nature.

The most effective opposition to this materialistic mechanism comes from what may well be termed psychological vitalism. The psychological vitalist stresses the fact that there exist in addition to whatever elements and unconscious organisms the world may contain, conscious beings who not only secrete and digest and react in response to environment but who also perceive and remember, desire and wish, prefer and choose. To assert that purposes and emotions and memories are phenomena of the same order as vibrations and chemical reactions is, he points out, to misstate or to ignore facts open to immediate experience. For we know by direct observation what we mean by deliberating and willing, feeling and remembering; and we know that we do not mean by deliberation and the rest what we mean by vibrations and combustions. That such physicochemical phenomena may accompany, condition, or even take the place of deliberation, emotion or memory, the psychological vitalist does not deny; he merely insists on the observed fact that consciousness is not identical with the mechanical or the chemical or the electrical phenomena. An emotion of fear, for example, may well be due to a sudden and intense excitation of a

¹ H. C. Warren, "Mechanism versus Vitalism in the Domain of Psychology," this REVIEW, Nov., 1918, XXVII, p. 608².

² *Ibid.*, p. 604.

³ *Journal of Philosophy*, August, 1918, XV, p. 464³.

man's first temporal convolutions; but "being afraid of a thunder clap" is a phenomenon distinguishable from this excitation, however dependent on them.

Psychological vitalism, in a word, charges materialistic mechanism with a theoretic prepossession which obscures the plain facts of observation and uncritically identifies interrelated but distinct facts—conscious experiences and neural processes. To quote Jennings: "At least some living things present the phenomena of 'conscious states.' There is practically complete agreement that these are not analyzable into nothing but configurations and motions. . . . If this be admitted it is clear that mechanism in its more inclusive form is not correct for the living; they are not '*nothing but*' configuration and motion."¹

This comparison of the claims of mechanism and vitalism culminates accordingly in a conception of the universe which, while it is frankly opposed both to vitalism as indeterministic doctrine of entelechies and to functional vitalism viewed as exclusively biological conception, is anti-mechanistic in the sense of being anti-materialistic. It is the psychologically vitalistic, the personalistic, conception of the universe as, in part at least, constituted by related selves. To the study of this personalistic doctrine this paper is devoted. It is however necessary, for the time being, to turn aside from the main purpose of the argument and to explore a dangerous *cul de sac* into which brilliant adventurers are tempting us. The alluring by-path against which I would warn you is that of so-called teleological vitalism, ordinarily adopted as an idealistic protest against materialistic mechanism. This view is represented in our discussion by Professor Hoernlé,² and is obviously a form of functional vitalism, with stress on the purposive type of the relations of organisms to their environment. According to the teleological vitalist, "life cannot be formulated in physico-chemical terms." On the contrary, "the phenomena of life" need to be dealt with first and foremost in their own "terms." And these prove to be 'teleological' terms—terms of 'value.' "Wherever," Mr. Hoernlé

¹ *Op. cit.*, this REVIEW, Nov., 1918, XXVII, p. 594³.

² Hoernlé, however, eschews the term vitalism and speaks of teleology.

says, "the facts challenge us to say not merely that *B* is the effect of *A*, but that *B* is the *reason why* or *that for the sake of which* *A* exists or occurs, there we have the *immanent purposiveness* of living things."¹

As they stand, these statements may not seem to contain a challenge. For, on the one hand, value and purposiveness, superficially regarded, may appear to be cases of the functional relations already admitted as categories of scientific description, —an interpretation favored by the fact that the arguments put forward for teleological vitalism are mere repetitions of the old contention that science needs functional as well as structural categories. And though, more closely considered, value and purposiveness turn out to be characters radically different from organic relations, they seem, from this more adequate point of view, to be personal categories; and accordingly, teleological vitalism seems to be a mere corollary or application of personalism. Against this last interpretation, however, the teleologists vociferously protest. "When I speak of teleological concepts," Hoernlé says, "I do not mean a design, or plan, or purpose or desire consciously entertained by any mind, be it of God, of man, of animal, or of plant."² The language of teleology must, indeed, he holds, be purged of these associations since they make it "unwelcome to scientists, and are not required by the facts."³ Teleological vitalism is, in other words, formulated in opposition as much to personalism as to materialistic mechanism. The personalist, accordingly, must turn critic of this teleological form of vitalism. And his criticism takes shape somewhat as follows: Like Philonous, he insists that terms shall be either defined or shown to be indefinable. But he seldom, if ever, finds, in the pages of the teleologists, even an attempt to state what they mean by purposiveness, value, or the relation of means to end. Illustrations he finds in plenty of purposive actions—references to the bee seeking her home, the moth laying her eggs, the animal devouring food—but he discovers no efforts to analyze and delimit purposiveness and value. Evidently the

¹ "Mechanism and Vitalism," this REVIEW, Nov., 1918, XXVII, p. 643.

² *Ibid.* p. 632¹.

³ *Ibid.* p. 642².

teleologist accepts the terms at their face value as irreducible data. Against this conception of value and purposiveness as indefinable and ultimate but non-conscious characters dominant in the organic world, personalism protests that value and purposiveness, far from being further irreducible, are in fact definable in necessarily personal terms. 'Purposive' means 'pertaining to purpose' and purpose implies 'purposing,' the experience of a 'purposer.' Were there no purposer there could be no purposing, and hence no character-pertaining-to purposing; that is, no purposiveness. Similarly, value is what is valued, that is either wished or willed by a valuer. Without such a valuing self the highly abstract conception of value—the character common to all valuings—would be absolutely meaningless.

In comment on this conception of value, teleological vitalists admit willing and wishing as one class of values, but they protest that countless purposive actions—food-getting and egg-laying, for example—have not been preceded by any conscious design. Here, the teleologist exclaims, are clear cases of unconscious purposiveness or value. But this protest naïvely ignores the on-looking scientist for whom alone the terms 'beneficial,' 'function' and 'value'—so far as they do not belong to somebody's immediate experience—have meaning. The unpurposed egg-laying has indeed value. But value for whom? The question is inevitable, for the word is a transitive verbal adjective. And if we abstract from the possible but unproved satisfaction of the reproduced living being, maintenance of structure is beneficial only from the standpoint of the scientist's interest in a regularly and progressively developing world.

The neo-teleologists, in a word, in their "anxiety not to compromise themselves" with the old-fashioned anthropomorphists, have committed what Hylas describes as "a pleasant mistake enough." As they were thinking of an unpurposed value, where no one was desiring it, they believed that they were conceiving a value as existing unpurposed, not considering that they themselves were valuing it all the time.

The personalist is, accordingly, justified in his rejection of teleological vitalism as recourse from materialism—in his protest

against abstract values, which by hypothesis nobody values, against the means and ends which are means and ends to no one, against the purposivenesses which are in no sense purposes! Teleological vitalism, he insists, reduces to psychological vitalism. There are values, there is purposiveness—but only because there are conscious beings who value, that is wish or will or enjoy, and who purpose. In a word, teleologism is merely an abstraction from the psychological, or personal, vitalism to which the argument has led us. Even those purposive actions which are unpurposed by the actors imply the existence of selves. The real world, therefore, the world of physical and chemical substances, is certainly also a world of selves.

II.¹

The conception of the world, achieved in the first division of this paper, as made up in part, at least, of conscious beings, or selves, is not yet a fully personalistic conception of nature. For a completely personalistic doctrine must maintain, not that selves exist along with other real though non-mental beings, but that the world consists wholly of persons, or selves; and that so large a part of the world is accounted impersonal simply because the selves in whom it consists are undistinguished and uncomprehended. This paper espouses the fully personalistic conception of the universe as consisting in innumerable selves, or persons, of different levels and degrees, more or less closely related to each other. To establish this conception would demand the proof first (1) that supposedly non-mental beings are really mental; second (2) that mental beings are inevitably personal; third (3) that more than one self may be known to exist. In negative terms, the thorough-going personalist, before he has a philosophic right to his cosmology, must successfully maintain first (1) idealism against both dualism and materialism; second (2) personalism against ideistic idealism; third (3) a non-solipsistic, a non-subjective, form of personalism. The limits of this paper prohibit the adequate carrying out of any part of this program, but the following may serve to suggest the main outlines of the personalistic argument.

¹ Part II was omitted from this paper as read.

1. The personalist as idealist begins by protesting against the common practice of dismissing his case before it is heard—in other words against the naïve assumption that the physical world as we know it by observation is material in the sense of being non-mental and independent of mind. The idealist, like every other metaphysician, unreservedly accepts at their face value facts of every description—facts such as redness, hotness and oscillation as well as facts such as likeness, connectedness and uniformity. He therefore begins where “common sense and science . . . begin, without any doubts concerning the reality of the world.”¹ Whoever, however, identifies the statement that the physical world is real with the assertion that it is *ipso facto* non-mental is not, the idealist insists, arguing against idealism; he is simply postulating or assuming the conclusion which the idealist insists on putting to metaphysical test.

By idealism is here meant frankly what is sometimes called mentalism, the doctrine that any reality—electron, brain, protoplasm as well as self or purpose—is mental.² Stripped of unessential features³ the argument for mentalism emphasizes the fact, never disproved nor seriously disputed, that the only unchallengeable assertions about alleged material, *i. e.*, non-mental, reality, are assertions of somebody's way of being conscious. I say' for example, that the sea is blue; you insist that it is green; my only certainty, but an impregnable certainty, is that I have the experience which I call seeing blue, not the experience which I call seeing green!

This argument, oddly enough, has never been better stated than by that peculiarly omniscient neo-realist, Bertrand Russell. In the third lecture of his *Scientific Methods of Philosophy*

¹ J. E. Creighton, “Two Types of Idealism,” this REVIEW, 1917, XVI, p. 525. Cf. pp. 533² ff.

² This conception of idealism is sharply opposed to the ‘objective idealism,’ as it is sometimes called, which consists in the “direct acceptance of things as having value or significance.” Cf. Creighton, *op. cit.*, p. 515³.

³ In the face of contemporary criticism it is important to remind the reader that no serious idealist from Berkeley downward rests his case either (1) on the primary-secondary qualities argument or (2) on the argument from illusion. The first of these, the idealist is well aware, may cut either way. (Cf. Berkeley, *Principles*, XV, and May Sinclair, *A Defense of Idealism*, p. 175².) The second he regards as decisive against many forms of realism, not as conclusive for idealism.

for example, in the effort to tell "what is known . . . without any element of hypothesis," Russell says definitely: "What we know by experience," in viewing a table, "what is really known, is a correlation of muscular and other bodily sensations with changes in visual sensations." This is, in its essence, precisely the basal position of idealism. Russell, to be sure, at once supplements his "really known" sensations by extra-mental sense-data.¹ And other neo-realists cavalierly dispose of the argument that unchallengeable statements about physical objects are all in mental terms by the remark that some unchallengeable assertions are trivial.² They do not, however, offer any proof that the idealist's unchallengeable assertion belongs with the trivial certainties. Accordingly, the idealist is still free to urge his fundamental thesis. If, he insists, the attempt to reach irrefragable certainty about alleged non-mental reality inevitably issues in mental and not in non-mental certainties, the philosopher is in honor bound first, to stop identifying the physical with the non-mental and second, to set down the alleged non-mental as, at the least, negligible for plain man and philosopher alike.

2. The personalist has next to argue for personal idealism. The idealistic conception of the world as mental does not, in the view of all philosophers, imply that it is also personal. On the contrary, a group of idealists—impersonal idealists, ideists or phenomenologists as they are called—follow Hume in conceiving the universe as through and through mental but impersonal, as consisting of a succession of mental contents or processes, psychic items or states. According to Karl Pearson and Ernst Mach, for example, well-known representatives of the school of mechanistic idealists, the world of nature with which science deals reduces to the ordered succession of ideas in the scientist's mind; and the laws of nature are the scientist's way of grouping and predicting phenomena. Pearson, for example, describes matter as a "union of immediate sense impressions with associated impressions."³

¹ His only argument, so far as I can find, for the existence of the sense datum, is based on the involuntariness of sensation. (*Op cit.*, p. 76.) The argument is indecisive since the involuntariness is stateable in personalistic terms also.

² Cf. *The New Realism*, pp. 19-20. (Macmillan Co., 1912.)

³ *The Grammar of Science*, second edition, p. 75².

The personalist has therefore to justify his rejection of idealism, this conception of the world as a great complex of succeeding mental states. The basal objection to the theory is that, thoroughly understood, it implies the very conception which it opposes. For when, accepting at its face value the idealistic theory, one asks the meaning of the statements: "This or that nature object is a complex idea"; "the course of nature is a series of ideas;" "the law of nature is an experienced routine"—one finds that there are no really, independently existing ideas, that an idea, that is, a mental experience, always is part of a self, who has the idea, who experiences. In a word, the selfless or impersonal idea, like the impersonal value, is an abstraction from the concretely real self. The world, as mental, inevitably is a world made up not of ideas, or mental processes, but of selves.

The personalist is well aware that the foregoing paragraph constitutes no argument. Indeed, in the nature of the case, no argument is possible. As ultimately real, the self cannot be proved through being bolstered up by something more real; it is simply discovered, immediately known. Yet the personalist is not without resource in face of any Hume, past or present, who protests naïvely: "When I enter into myself . . . I can never catch myself."¹ For such a protest overlooks the significant fact, stressed by Augustine and Descartes,² that self is the one reality whose existence can neither be denied nor doubted, since neither denial nor doubt are possible without a self to do the denying or the doubting. I may question or deny the existence of God or of my brother or of my breakfast without thereby implying the existence of any one of them, but as soon as I question or deny myself—*ecco*, I myself questioning or denying! The personalist has accordingly a right to assert the existence of the self which experiences and "has ideas."

3. Even with this conception of the world as personal we have

¹ *Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. I, Part IV, Section VI.

² Cf. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, II, 3, *De Trinitate*, X, 10, and XV, 12, 26; and Descartes, *Meditations*, II, *Principles of Philosophy*, I, 7. Descartes's self-doctrine is too often confused (by himself as well as by his critics) with his more mediæval conception of the soul.

not, it must next be pointed out, achieved the fully personalistic conception of the world as a society of interrelated conscious beings, or selves. For directly in the path toward such a conception looms the specter of solipsism: the conception of the world as personal, to be sure, but as narrowed to the confines of myself, the only undoubtable, immediately known self. Thus conceived, solipsistic or subjective personalism as a nature philosophy differs little from impersonal idealism, or ideism. For if only I myself can be metaphysically known to exist, then the physical universe—plants and stars and evolving forms of life—must reduce to a mere system of ideas in a single mind—my mind, the mind which (on this hypothesis) constitutes reality. Now, according to the realistic critic,¹ solipsism is the only valid form of idealistic personalism. My certainty of the self, he reminds me, is rooted in my introspective discovery that I cannot doubt my own existence; the argument against alleged extra-mental reality pivots on the fact that what I know is my experience. Obviously, the critic insists, the only certainty here is that of myself, of the solitary me, and of my individual experience. Were it necessary to accept this conclusion each of us would accordingly be shut up to the philosophic conception of the universe as a system of his own ideas exclusively.² A careful consideration of this criticism would, therefore, be the logically next step of this paper. But limits of time prevent this undertaking save in schematic outline. In brief: the personalist holds that the object of my alleged knowledge alike of other-self and of thing is *both* my own experience, or idea, and *something-beside*. The personalist justifies himself in asserting the existence of this something-beside-me on the ground that I directly experience

¹ Cf. G. E. Moore, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1905-06, VI, "The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception"; cf. also, *The New Realism*, 1912, pp. 146-147. It is not without interest to add that, some two hundred years before the rise of neo-realism, Berkeley put a closely similar argument into the mouth of Hylas. Cf. the third of the *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, the passage beginning: "Answer me Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly inert beings?" (The personalist agrees with the realist in discrediting Philonous's handling of the situation.)

² Most neo-realists, on the other hand, unjustifiably imply that to prove idealism solipsistic would *ipso facto* discredit it.

myself as a limited, hampered self—limited in my perceptual experience to just these special seeings and hearings, and limited also in my personal disappointments and in my baffled purposes. But a direct experience of being limited is, as Fichte long ago suggested, a direct (not an inferred) knowledge of something existing beyond the limit. When, therefore (to repeat the old illustration), I perceive the sea as blue, my only unchallengeable certainty *about the blueness* is indeed my own consciousness, but I have also the certainty of being limited to just this sensation of blueness; and this direct experience of being limited includes in it the knowledge of a something-besides-me. But this conclusion constitutes the first step only of the personalist's refutation of solipsism. He has still to show reason why the something-besides-me must be conceived as invariably personal. And here the pluralistic and the absolutistic personal idealist part company. Both find that I know objects in some sense beyond myself. The pluralist asserts that I could not know these objects (unless they were essentially like me, and that non-mental and impersonal objects would be unknown.¹ The absolutist, on the other hand, argues that knowledge implies identity of knower and known; that I know the Absolute by being identically a part of Him; and that I know other selves in so far as they, like me, are genuinely though partially identical with Him.² Both pluralist and absolutist, however, argue that knowledge is inexplicable unless its objects are personal.

Herewith, the second division of this paper reaches the end toward which it has hastened. It has indicated, very summarily, the outlines of the argument at the base of the conception of the universe as completely personal. No resentful hearer or reader can realize more keenly than I the indecent brevity and consequent inadequacy of this statement of the grounds of a personal-

¹ Cf. J. Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, Lecture I, pp. 10 ff., and *passim*; C. A. Richardson, "Scientific Method in Philosophy and the Foundations of Pluralism," *this REVIEW*, 1918, XXVII, pp. 233 ff., 267 ff.

² Cf. J. Royce, *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II, Lecture IV ff.; B. Varisco, *The Great Problems*, pp. 16 ff., 292 ff.; M. W. Calkins, *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 410 ff. There is need for a fuller statement of the absolutist view and a more critical discussion of its difficulties.

istic cosmology. The main concern of this paper is, however, with the consequences of the doctrine if true, not with the arguments to prove it true. I propose, therefore, boldly to ask you, whether or not you are satisfied with the metaphysical grounds for the conception, to assume, if you do not believe, that the universe is personal and not confined to the limits of a single self. The way is then open for the discussion of the nature of the personalist's world.

III.

The third division of this paper is devoted to the working out, in rough fashion, of certain details of an unsolipsistic but personalistic nature philosophy, a conception of the universe as constituted by an indefinitely great number of interrelated selves. The phrase 'great number of selves' is used without prejudice to the possibility, which preceding pages have suggested, that the many selves may turn out to be members of an all-including Absolute Self. It matters little to students of nature philosophy whether or not this absolutist doctrine is correct. For the Absolute of modern philosophy is a respecter of persons. Therefore even if the many selves are parts of the One Self they will retain both their personality and their relation with each other through the Absolute.

Fundamental to such a sketch of personalistic cosmology is a delimitation of the term self. The self, in the first place, is not the entelechist's soul: that is to say, the self need not be conceived as having inherently a decisive influence on phenomena; it has not by definition the power to intrude itself, as ultimate cause, among phenomena.¹ Self, in the second place, is not to be confused with soul, in Locke's sense of the term: that is to say, the self is no underlying substratum, no unknown substance, no "something I know not what to support ideas,"² but is a directly experienced reality. To turn from negative to positive: By

¹ This unqualified denial of the propriety of *defining* the self as an essentially potent being, a controlling influence, is not of course a dogmatic denial of the possibility of later proving the self possessed of such a power. This is in truth a question to be determined by argument. What is denied is the right to define the immediately observed, known self as a power.

² *Essay*, Bk. II, Chapter 23, 15.

self is meant a being essentially similar to that which any man means when he says 'I' or is conscious of 'myself.' The self is, strictly speaking, indefinable since there exists nothing else of its class from which to distinguish it. The self is, none the less, a complex being¹ possessed of at least the following characters: relative persistence, or identity, which need not mean immortality; change, or growth; uniqueness, that is, irreplaceableness, or individuality; and relatedness to its environment.² These characters of self, according to the fully personalistic conception, are directly experienced and not inferred. And it cannot be stated too unequivocally that the personalist in asserting that the world of organic and inorganic nature is, in concrete reality, a world of selves must use the word self with the psychological meaning gained through introspection, that he must mean by self a being essentially similar, in its nature, to himself. Otherwise cosmological personalism becomes logomachy, mere metaphorical play on words.

The conception of the world of nature as a world of genuine selves does not, however, preclude the possibility or probability that these selves differ vastly from the human selves and from each other. One empirical consideration, later to be discussed in more detail, points directly to such differences. We believe ourselves to communicate directly with other human selves—to put questions to them, to be hailed by them and to share their experience. Such communication with inorganic nature, with plants, and with many classes of animals is either lacking or, at the least, is uncertain and unsystematized. The world of nature is accordingly in great part, to use Royce's phrase, an uncommunicative world.

¹ The position: "Either consciousness is a complex entity, not fundamental but definable in terms of simpler entities . . . or else consciousness is fundamental and simple," seems to be based on an illicit conversion of the proposition: "The elemental is indefinable." This is, of course, true, but it certainly does not follow that "the indefinable is elemental." (Cf. E. B. Holt, *The Concept of Consciousness*, p. 73³.)

² On the conception of self, cf. M. W. Calkins, *A First Book in Psychology*, Chap. I and Appendix, Sec. I. (For bibliography cf. pp. 282 f.) "The Self in Scientific Psychology," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1915, XXVI, pp. 495 ff.; *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, fourth edition, pp. 407 ff.

From this preliminary statement of the basal principles of personalistic cosmology we must turn to detail and to argument. The personalist has first to show the psychological likelihood that beings exist, far less complex than we and yet significantly described as selves. That the higher vertebrate animals are conscious beings is commonly admitted. The question is whether we are to think of earthworms and beetles, of bacteria and amœbæ, of pebbles and lichens as selves. Leibniz was first among modern philosophers in the attempt to establish the possibility of the extra-human self by emphasizing in our human experience, the wide difference (1) between inattentive and inactive and attentive, active consciousness; (2) between simple and complex; (3) between sensuous and non-sensuous consciousness. It is essential to our purpose to study these conceptions and to begin by making them vivid to ourselves. Let each of my hearers, therefore, using Leibniz's own method, contrast himself in the alert, interested, competent handling of an intellectual problem with himself in the first moments of waking from a very sound sleep, utterly dazed and unaware of where he is or what he has to do, as little recognizing a past as anticipating the future. In this sleepy state he is an inattentive, sluggish, indiscriminating, inactive self; in the other case he attends, distinguishes, compares, relates, advances, controls. Between the two experiences are innumerable grades of attentiveness, weak and strong, dispersed and narrow; innumerable variations in the importance and complexity of non-sensuous, thought-factors of experience; innumerable gradations between utter passivity and complete self-initiative. The personalist appeals to this incontrovertible experience of widely different levels of our own consciousness as confirmation of the possibility of selves of many grades or types. There well may be, he insists, selves who are even more inactively and inattentively conscious than we are in the sleepest stage which we can catch by retrospection, selves who remain at this inactive level from which we have risen, though to be sure we periodically fall back into it. These would be the relatively stable selves, which constitute what we call the inorganic world, which we conceive as unconscious mainly

because there seems no hope of getting them to talk to us. And corresponding to the successively more attentive, active, discriminating levels of our own consciousness would be other types of selves—until one reached the higher vertebrates whom, implicitly or explicitly, people already treat as selves even if they do not so conceive them.

Up to this point, in our attempt, following Leibniz's clue, to attain a conception of non-human nature-selves, on the analogy of our own widely varying types of experience, we have scarcely touched upon the temporal distinction, emphasized both by Leibniz and Ward and by Royce, which may mark off one group of selves from another. In its genuinely sleepy state every self is unaware of past and future; so far as its own present consciousness goes, it is like Melchisedec "without father, without mother, having neither beginning of days nor end of life." It furnishes, therefore, the basis in human experience for Leibniz's simple self (his naked monad), *mens momentanea seu carens recordatione*,¹ the momentary, unremembering, unrecognizing self. At the lower extreme from us, according to this view, are, or may be, momentary selves, selves whose consciousness of change does not rise to the contrast of past with present and future. They are thus selves of a moment, unremembering selves. And between them and us would be, as already suggested, an ascending scale of selves roughly rated by their capacity to recall and recognize the past and to anticipate the future. Royce's characteristic contribution to the conception of selves as temporally distinguished is well known and may best be stated in his own words. It is that of the varying time-spans. He supposes, in common with all personalists, that "when [we] deal with Nature [we] deal with a vast realm of finite consciousness of which [our] own is at once a part and an example." He next points out that "our consciousness, for its special characters, is dependent upon a fact which we might call our particular Time-Span. If we are to be inwardly conscious of anything, there must occur some change"—not too fast nor too slow—"in the contents of our feel-

¹ *Theoria motus abstracti Definitiones*. Gerhardt edition, IV, p. 230. Cf. Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 255 ff.

ings. What happens within what we describe as the . . . thousandth of a second necessarily escapes us. On the other hand, what lasts longer than a very few moments no longer can form part of one conscious moment to us. But suppose that our consciousness had to a thousand millionth of a second or to a million years of time the same relation that it now has to the . . . length in seconds of a typical present moment. Then, in the one case, we might say: 'What a slow affair this dynamite explosion is.' In the other case, events, such as the wearing of the Niagara Gorge, would be to us what a single musical phrase now is, namely something instantaneously present. . . . This simple consideration," Royce at once applies, suggesting, for example, that "a material region of the inorganic world would be to us the phenomenal sign of the presence of at least one fellow-creature who took, perhaps, a billion years to complete a moment of his consciousness, so that where we saw, in the signs given us of his presence, only monotonous permanence of fact, he, in his inner life, faced momentarily significant change."¹

The special use which Royce makes of this hypothesis, in the discussion of evolution, does not here concern us. We have simply to emphasize the fact that actual experience of the varying time-span justifies the hypothesis of still greater variation and thus the conception of selves with time spans so widened or so narrowed that we may even fail to know their existence. This speculative conception enlarges that gained by direct observation of our own inattentive, inactive, unthoughtful moments—the conception of the relatively simple, sensuous, stable, unremembering self.

The immediately preceding pages have mainly tried to show that the conception of non-human selves makes no assumptions which are not verifiable on some level of human consciousness. In other words, emphasis has fallen on the essential likeness of the human to the non-human self. In the pages which follow, the stress will fall upon the different groups of non-human selves and on the methods of distinguishing them from each other. When the superhuman self, whether God or Absolute, is disre-

¹ *The World and the Individual*, II, pp. 227–228.

garded, it is found, as already suggested, that the non-human selves are most readily grouped, according as they are from our human standpoint (1) intercommunicating, or (2) communicating, or (3) uncommunicating selves—in other words, according as they either signal to us and are signalled back to, or as they signal to us without being aware of us or of our message, or, finally, as they are totally uncommunicative. It will be profitable to dwell for a moment on these distinctions and, in particular, to stress the difference between intercourse, or intercommunication and mere communication.¹ Evidently, when any self (A) is in intercourse with another (B), A must be aware (conscious) of B and of B as conscious in his turn of A. Furthermore, since by self is meant *inter alia* a changing being, that is, a being of successive experiencings, this mutual awareness carries with it an awareness by A of B's changing experiences and by B of A's changes. Complete or adequate intercourse, finally, must imply a correspondence between these successive changes in A and B. Mere *communication* of A with B may be said to occur whenever A modifies B's experiences, but full *intercommunication*, or intercourse, implies the mutual relation and the awareness of it.

From this statement of the principle of classification, we turn back to the problem of grouping the non-human selves. To begin with: everybody will agree to describe the higher vertebrates as intercommunicating selves. In this case we have strong empirical (if not metaphysical) evidence of their intercourse with each other and with ourselves. Nor is there any conclusive reason for limiting the group of intercommunicating selves to the vertebrates, to the exclusion of the higher anthropoids, for example. At the other extreme are the non-human selves which make up what we call the inorganic world. We become aware of their presence through such of our sensational experiences as we do not refer to the communicative selves, men or animals. Suppose, for example, that I have at one and the same time, a great complex of sense-experience—visual, auditory, kinæsthetic—not attributed to my own initiative. Part of this

¹ Royce seems not explicitly to recognize what I have called communication. By 'communicative' he probably means 'intercommunicative.'

experience I designate as awareness of voices, gestures, and faces; and this part I regard not merely as indication of the existence and presence of other selves but as disclosing to me their changing experience. Another part, however, of my sensational experience, the perceptual awareness, for example, of hardness and grayness or of blueness and rippliness, I describe as consciousness of pebble or of lake. But in this case I am conscious of no give-and-take of experience between pebble or lake-self and me; I find no mutually varying series of changing ideas which enables me to designate or to 'feel' just this complex of sensation, as sign of a communicating self. I cannot, in other words, regard either one of these sensation complexes as indications of a single, individual pebble-self or lake-self with the assurance with which, when I am conscious of a gesturing, talking human body, I regard it as a sign of another self. It is true that, on the strength of my personalistic philosophy, I believe that my pebble consciousness indicates the presence of personal being. I have, however, no way of knowing that the pebble is, like my own body, the 'phenomenal sign' of a *single* non-human self. It may, rather, indicate merely one part or aspect of a non-human self, or again, it may indicate a whole group of such selves. In other words, the pebble may correspond not to a human body, as experienced whole, but to one organ or fragment of a body or else to a group of bodies.

We have next to consider the status of the vast numbers of living beings, lower in the scale than the intercommunicating non-human selves, yet widely different, it seems, from the stolid inorganic world.¹ We have, apparently, no intercourse with them, yet the more we know about them the more we incline to conceive them as conscious beings. For experiments on animal behavior show that animals of every class may learn by trial and error, in other words, may adapt their reactions to their environment. Not merely insects and crustacea but infusoria—the stentor of Jennings's classical experiments,—have learned both to vary response with changing environment and even to

¹ Merely in the interest of brevity, the following paragraph omits any reference to the possible plant-selves.

alter their reactions to a fixed environment.¹ Now this acquired capacity to vary reactions to a fixed environment is the most significant indication of consciousness. By most biologists the stentor which alters its response to a harmful stimulus and the crab which learns to shorten its progress through a labyrinth are judged to be conscious animals, that is, selves. And we may go even further. Not only is an adaptively reacting animal probably conscious; it is also in a very literal sense communicating with the observer, informing him, by its forward or backward movements, let us say, of its changing experience. On the other hand, nothing suggests that the observer makes the animal aware of his own onlooking experience. The animal is, in other words, a communicating, but not an intercommunicating self; it gives but does not take. Thus experimental observation justifies the recognition of a group of communicating, non-human selves midway between the totally incommunicative and the obviously intercommunicative nature-selves.

One difficult topic suggested in the preceding pages must at least be touched on.² The distinction of the uncommunicative from the communicative selves has more than once involved a reference to the human body. These casual references have now to be amplified, and the relation between self and body to be stated in personalistic terms. (It should be emphasized at the outset that the personalist does not share at all in the spiritualistic dualist's concern to show the independence of some aspect of self—memory or emotion or will—from the body.³) For, to the personalist, brain and body are themselves mental, and "the experience of the body is the body."⁴ Looked at *en bloc* and uncritically my body may be described as follows: It is a peculiarly ubiquitous object—in the querulous words which the little

¹ "Studies on Reactions to Stimuli in Unicellular Animals," *American Journal of Physiology*, 1902, VIII, pp. 23 ff. Cf. *Behavior of the Lower Organisms*, 1906, Chapter X, especially pp. 175 f.

² The paragraphs which follow, to the end of this section, have been added to the paper as read.

³ It is curious to find Bergson, of all men, playing into the hands of these dualistic spiritualists by the teaching that memory cannot be cerebrally localized. Cf. *Matter and Memory*, Chap. II.

⁴ D. H. Parker, *The Self and Nature*, p. 86¹.

girl applied to God, it is always "tagging me around"; and it has two important aspects: (1) In the first place, it is not only, like all physical things, a public object, open to other people's observation as well as to my own, but it is a mediating, instrumental sort of object, serving to indicate my existence to other people—in Royce's words, serving as 'phenomenal sign' of me.¹ (2) My body, in the second place, according to the uncritical observer, is not merely a visible and audible and tangible object, perceived by other people along with me. Rather, it is also a source of unshared organic sensation, the awareness, for example, of stabbing pain, of palpitation, or of bodily vigor. This description of the body in terms of the every-day observer has now to be philosophically interpreted. In the terms of the impersonal idealist, plainly, my body is a persistent complex of sensations, visual and auditory and contact sensations, on the one hand, kinæsthetic and visceral sensations, on the other. The personalist goes further. He points out, first, that sensation is somebody's sensing and that accordingly 'complex of sensations' means somebody's complex sense-experiencing. In the second place, he reaffirms the plain man's distinction of public from private object, that is, he describes my visible, tangible, and audible body as complex experience shared by me with the other selves who are said to see, hear, and touch me. Finally, and once more in agreement with everyday observation, the personalist describes my body as that part of other people's shared sense experience which suggests to them the existence, the presence, of *me*, a self with individuality of its own. (And conversely, the part of my sense experience which I call "consciousness of other human bodies" suggests to me the presence of other selves.)² My body as directly experienced is, therefore, according to the

¹ It should be noted that these are only relative distinctions of the body from other physical objects. There are other persistent ways of experiencing—the consciousness of clothes and of home, for example. And there are other instrumental ideas, mediating experiences. The experience, for example, indicated by the words "using a microscope" is essential to my having that other experience designated as "seeing the capillaries of a frog's circulatory system."

² For the sake of brevity, no reference is made to the consciousness of my body as phenomenal sign of me which, in addition to my direct introspective awareness of myself, I possess.

personalist, a complex and chiefly sensuous experiencing—in part, my incommunicable experience and in part the shared experiencing of many selves which serves as the ‘sign’ of my presence.

But this description of the human body is still incomplete. It has left out of account those portions of my body which are not, and need never be, objects or parts of any one’s direct experience. For in addition to (1) my body as seen, touched and heard, and in addition also to (2) my body as ‘felt’ by me alone, in a toothache, for example, there remains (3) my body as inferred object—my body, as containing spleen and liver and cerebral ganglia, for instance. I infer the existence of some of these organs when I have watched the cook drawing a chicken and of still others when I have studied the diagrams in a physiology book or have dissected a cat.¹ By the surgeon when he operates, or by the histologist, still other organs—the adrenal glands or the white blood corpuscles—may be directly observed. Yet neither adrenal glands, nor blood corpuscles, nor brain, nor liver can be described (in the way in which my *directly experienced* body is described) as my peculiarly constant sense-experiencing, in part private but in part shared, and *serving as sign of me*. The reason, once more, why my body-as-inferred is not to be described as sign of me is clearly this: neither I, nor other people when conscious of me, are inevitably or invariably or even often aware of my caudate nucleus, blood corpuscles, adrenal glands, or even of my liver and my lungs. And yet, according to careful observation and experiment, I, the conscious self, with my experience, am closely related to this merely inferred portion of my body. In particular, that part of my experience which constitutes my directly-perceived body is closely bound, in one organic system, with the inferred portions of the body. For example, my muscular reactions (directly observed), vary with changes in the frontal Rolandic region (inferred) and my bodily vigor in anger or in rage (observed) vary with the secretions of the adrenal glands (inferred).

¹ “Few of us realize the limitations of our direct ‘private’ knowledge of the interior of our bodies. Probably the most important item of it is that knowledge of something beating under our tangible and partly visible ribs.”

How then shall the personalist conceive these inferred portions of my body? Only two ways seem to be open to him. Either he must content himself with describing them in merely ideistic, not personalistic, terms, as inferences (and in part percepts) of the scientist, forming part of an ordered description of the world of actual and possible sense impressions,¹ or (basing his speculation on the personalistic conception of body or bodily organ as sign of self) he must follow Leibniz and Ward in supposing that such parts of my body as are not signs of me must be signs of some other self or selves. To such selves I should stand in relation of 'dominant' to subordinated self or selves.² Such selves, other than I, would have direct experience of what for me are my inferred bodily organs. I should stand to them in no adequate relation of intercommunication. For though, truly enough, they might be said to affect me, for example in my unlocalized fatigue, and though I might be said to affect them when I took chloroform or strychnine, we should yet have no mutual awareness each of the other's awareness of him.³ It is this lack of complete intercourse which would debar me from knowing the number or the exact nature of such subordinate selves.

With this parenthetical and speculative consideration of the obscure self-body relation this rough outline study of the personalistic nature philosophy must end. To sum up its main points: It has taken the term self at its introspective face value, yet has distinguished three main groups or grades of non-human self: first, the intercommunicative selves, represented by the higher vertebrates; second, a group even less distinctly limited, of selves imperfectly and one-sidedly communicative; finally, the group of selves which constitute the reality of inorganic nature, selves whom we cannot disentangle from each other or delimit, selves with whom we are apparently related but of whom we are not directly aware, with whom we have not intercourse.

¹ Cf. Pearson, *op. cit.*, chapter on "The Scientific Law."

² To avoid awkwardness of phraseology, I use the plural 'selves' in the remainder of this paragraph but without intending to decide dogmatically between the two hypotheses.

³ The relation of this speculation to the various subliminal-self hypotheses must be passed over, since it would carry us too far afield.

IV

The final section of this paper attempts to state and to meet the most common of the serious criticisms urged against personalistic cosmology. Purely emotional prejudices must be disregarded since it is obviously futile to combat criticisms after the order of

"I do not like you, Dr. Fell;
The reason why I cannot tell."

Irrationality apart, people ordinarily ignore or discard personalism, as nature philosophy, because they confuse it with what it is not. And of such misinterpretations there are at least three:

1. First and foremost, personalism is confused with pre-scientific animism and our philosophers are consequently desperately eager not to 'compromise themselves' with it. But the truth is that present-day personalism differs almost as much from the ancient fashion of personifying laurel trees and rivers as it differs from the modern realist's apotheosis of mathematical and logical quantities. The modern personalist, as we have seen, turns his back on tree-selves and pebble-selves; emphasizes the differences between selves of different levels; and frankly disclaims the right to a definite conception of any selves with whom he has no communication.

2. More serious is the confusion of personalism with impersonal idealism or the identification of personalism with the solipsistic form of personalism. Such theories reduce to mere series of ideas—whether or not referred to a self makes, at this point, little difference—solar universe after solar universe and geologic epoch after geologic epoch. Against this doctrine the instinctive repulsions of scientists and nature lovers are arrayed. And though this largely affective rejection of ideism and solipsistic nature philosophy cannot be accepted as a metaphysical refutation, though the achievements of Mach and Pearson and the other phenomenologists constitute proof positive that scientific progress is compatible with the adoption of this view—none the less it must be admitted that this reduction of the nature world to the compass of a single mind, to the status of succeeding ideas is, to speak very temperately, a barren and repelling doctrine.

And, whether true or false, attractive or repelling, the conception of the world of nature as a series of phenomena simply is not identical with personalism, the conception of nature as a society of concretely real persons. Personalism can not fairly be rejected for characters which it does not have.

3. More important than either of these misinterpretations is the confusion of personalism with the conception of the universe as lawless. Personalism is condemned for its alleged break with the conception of natural law. To conceive the physical world as fundamentally made up of conscious beings, or selves, is held to menace the doctrine of uniformity, the assumption of predictability on which experimental science is based. The advance of science, it is pointed out, is bound up with the possibility of experiment; and experiment presupposes the recurrence of phenomena; and the recurrence of phenomena involves a uniform and necessary causal relation between them. Such a necessary uniformity, we are told, is what is meant by a law of nature; and scientific progress, it is justly held, has consisted and must consist in the establishment of laws of nature, verified hypotheses. The personalistic conception of nature, it is urged, substitutes for this conception of an orderly world of predictable phenomena, causally connected, what is virtually the picture of the nature-world as a mob, a crowd of irresponsible, capricious, lawless conscious beings.

The personalist meets this formidable arraignment by protesting that it is founded on an inadequate view of personalism, and on a misconception of scientific law. To start from the first of these positions: it is of capital importance to point out that personalism is not of necessity an indeterministic doctrine. It has been so described largely because it has been confused with entelechistic vitalism which conceives the soul as possessed of genuine initiative. But the self, notwithstanding the characters which it shares with the soul, differs from the soul both in origin and in nature. Thus the soul is inferred as explanation of biological phenomena, whereas the self is directly experienced. And the inferred soul, or entelechy, is conceived as "suspending physical reactions now in one direction and now in another,"

whereas the activity attributed to self is a species of consciousness, a feeling of activity. Such a feeling of power or activity is not always a consciousness of capacity for choice—it may consist, for example, in the mere expansive feeling of spontaneity, untrammelledness. And even when it does take the form of feeling of power, such a feeling may perfectly well be illusory. In other words, the active self may be a really determined self for all its feeling of power. It is true that most of our modern pluralistic personalisms—Bergson's, for example,—are indeterministic, but this is not because a self is of necessity an undetermined being. Leibniz's essentially deterministic personalism is a standing refutation of the uncritical identification of pluralistic personalism with indeterminism. And absolutist personalism offers what is perhaps the only *a priori* confirmation of determinism.

Even more important to the present purpose than the truth that not all personalism is deterministic is the consideration that personalism even of the indeterministic type does not stand irreconcilably opposed to the conception of scientific law. Scientific law is of course to be taken not in the old, traditional and mythical sense of an inexorable sort of external force, an inexplicable coercing power, but in its truly and admittedly scientific sense, as formulation of the results of "humanity's process of making a survey of the universe"—formulations which, as Jennings points out, reduce to predictions such as these: "(When) you have such and such experiences you will have such and such other experiences."¹ In a word, a scientific law is an experienced, generalized, justifiably predicted uniformity of experience. Now this conception (obviously stateable, and in fact most often stated, in personal terms) clashes with indeterministic personalism only when the uniformity is regarded as absolute, when the predicted recurrence is conceived as apodictically certain. But the temperate, experimental scientist makes no such claim. He simply postulates absolute uniformity for the purposes of experiment and description. When the union of NaCl and

¹ "Doctrines Held as Vitalism," *The American Naturalist*, 1913, XLVII, pp. 392-393.

H_2SO_4 fails to give hydrochloric acid and sodium sulphate the experimenter does not, to be sure, view this as a proof of indeterminism but rather as indication that his salt or his sulphuric acid or both are impure. But this practical postulate of complete uniformity is far from constituting an assertion of axiomatically absolute nature uniformities, of necessary predictions. Here the clear thinker, scientist or metaphysician, must take his stand with Hume. Scientific laws are generalizations from experience: in the nature of the case, finite experience cannot be universal. No human being has ever seen or can ever see every particle of matter; attraction inversely as the square root of the distance is not the only conceivable relation between particles; even the law of gravitation is therefore a generalization from the widest observation, not an intuitive and axiomatic certainty, still less an inexorable compeller of the motion of particles.

But when once this is admitted, as it is indeed admitted by most scientists, all incompatibility vanishes between experimental science with its postulate of uniformity and even indeterministic personal cosmology. For the nature world as the indeterministic personalist conceives it is no anarchic universe in which one event is as likely to occur as another, in which prediction is futile. Rather, the world of the indeterministic personalist is itself a world of laws; but these are statistical laws, laws of average behavior, uniformities of the conduct not of individuals but of classes. From their wide observation of the ages at which men die, the insurance companies—in spite of the great diversities of physical constitution—make up their tables of vital statistics, predictions of the dates of death of their clientèle. From their incomparably wider acquaintance with particles, utterly simple beings, physicists formulate the law of gravitation—still a statistical law, but an indefinitely greater, indeed a practically complete approximation toward an absolute uniformity. To quote from James Ward's illustration of the same point: Supposing that industrial statisticians "instead of trade returns from a score or two of countries had returns from one or two thousand, the inhabitants being increased a myriad fold,

and being also severally vastly more the creatures of habit than men now are, we can imagine such statistics would approximate still more closely to those of the physicist. The physicist, like the statist," Ward insists, "is always dealing with aggregates, but unlike the statist he finds the constituent individuals to be beyond his ken. The statist is aware that individual variations underlie his aggregates but they do not interest him: the physicist is ignorant of those underlying his and assumes that they do not exist."¹ Thus, for the indeterminist, in Royce's phrase, the statistical not the mechanical (in the sense of the inevitable or absolute) is the canonical form of scientific law.² But this conception of the nature-law as statement of average behavior, especially when applied as in physical science to the behavior of relatively static individuals, amply justifies the experimentalist in his scientific postulate of complete uniformity.

A final criticism must be met. Granting all that has been said—granting that personalism is unjustly identified with pre-animism, with phenomenalism and with the doctrine of the lawless universe, it remains to the end, the critic insists, a conception totally unfitted to interpret the detailed results of scientific observation and experiment. The personalist, it is with some show of reason alleged, is shut up to the unfruitful statement: "there exist non-human selves", but has no clue to the number or the limit of them; and knows far too little about their nature to translate into personal terms facts of chemical combination, for example, of radioactivity, or of electrical insulation.

The personalist, in the face of this objection will admit, in the first place, that nature philosophy, is a more speculative doctrine than social philosophy, and, in the second place, that the physical world has often to be described in terms not of selves, but of spaces and motions and weight, not to name colors and sounds.³ To take random examples: the description of Arcturus as shining

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, Lecture III., pp. 65-66.

² "The Mechanical, the Historical and the Statistical," *Science*, N. S., XXXIX, 1914, pp. 551 ff., *passim*.

³ All manufactured things, clothes and houses, and automobiles have to be described in these terms.

like two hundred suns, of the sun as containing sodium, iron and copper in the form of gleaming vapors—these scientific descriptions certainly are not and cannot be in terms of the sun's or of Arcturus's conscious experience. The personalist, to be sure, will supplement this admission by pointing out that these descriptions of Arcturus's brilliancy and of the sun's gases are descriptions of the world as it appears, or as it might appear, to observing scientists. In other words: even when or if we find it impossible to describe physical phenomena in an adequately personalistic fashion, that is, in terms of individual conscious beings each with its own unique experiencing and initiative, we are yet driven to describe these phenomena in terms of the shared experiencing of conscious, observing selves. To use Fite's phrase in our own setting: when we are no longer able to know things as they feel, we none the less know them as they look—to us human selves.¹

The personalist, however, is not content to stop here. He finds in scientific accounts of the physical world, not merely recorded observations, refined and multiplied by modern technique, of things as they look to people, and not merely laws stateable in terms of the uniform and predicted sequences of experience, direct or inferred. He finds also an irrepressible tendency to talk about corpuscles, atoms, ions as possessed of an individuality, a unique being, and, in particular, an activity and initiative of their own. "The atom," for example, is said to start with a certain "amount of kinetic energy";² radium is said to "emit energy"; bodies are held to "exert force"; "lines of force" are supposed to "repel each other."³ These conceptions, the personalist boldly asserts, are of value, have a meaning, only as bodies and substances, thus dynamically conceived, and are virtually, though vaguely, regarded as active, initiating selves.

Confirmation of this conclusion is derived from the statements of scientists and methodologists of science. Ostwald, for example, bids us study our own "voluntary activity" (*Willens-*

¹ Warner Fite: "The Human Soul and the Scientific Prepossession," *Atlantic Monthly*, December, 1918, Vol. XXII, p. 778.

² J. J. Thomson, *Electricity and Matter*, 1907, pp. 156 f.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 7 ff. Cf. W. F. Cooley, *The Principles of Science*, p. 129².

betätigung) in order to "gain an idea of the content of the concept of energy;"¹ Montague observes that "potential energy is . . . perceivable internally or by participation in it through . . . the muscular sense";² and W. F. Cooley says: "The fact seems to be that for most investigators, as well as for men in general, the straining of which we are conscious in our own organisms when in action is accounted sufficient ground for the posit of an active something within us . . . which is transferred to similar situations external to us and used as the natural cue for their interpretation. . . . That factor we call force, energy, power, at times will . . . : It is, evidently, an object of immediate experience."³ It will be remembered that this is Pearson's contention. And, phenomenalist that he is, he would banish from science the conception of force excepting in the sense of "conceptual measure of motion," precisely because he believes that force, in any other sense, "is the will of the old spiritualist separated from consciousness."⁴ But Pearson and Mach avail no more than Berkeley to hold down the scientist to the purely phenomenistic categories.

Even the supposedly static characters of physical things are conceived in terms which, to say the least, are as truly personal as impersonal. Thus inertia ("the one sole unalterable property of matter")⁵ is either defined in terms of passivity or inaction, as the property in virtue of which "matter cannot of itself change its own state,"⁶ or it is conceived as "resistance to any change of state." But passivity is a basal character of the perceiving self, and resistance is, once more, a form of activity. In a word, the physicist when he talks in explanatory and not in descriptive terms, really personifies his units. For change and persistence, passivity and activity would be meaningless terms if they did not suggest to each of us his own self-identity and growth, his receptivity and self-initiative. I am not arguing, of course,

¹ *Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie*, pp. 153 ff.

² *Essays in Honor of William James*, p. 123.

³ Cooley, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-111.

⁴ *The Grammar of Science*, second edition, pp. 305, 119.

⁵ R. K. Duncan: *The New Knowledge*, p. 179, quoted by Cooley, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

⁶ Ganot, transl. E. Atkinson, *Physics*, 13th ed., p. 10.

+ they are beings constructed after the analogy of selves—constructs which are meaningless unless conceived in personal terms. And if this is true, if at the very core of speculative science lies the concept of the conscious self, then assuredly personalism is no negligible factor of a genuine nature-philosophy.

✓ In conclusion, therefore, I venture to appeal, in behalf of personalistic cosmology, for the respectful and detailed consideration which it has seldom received. Two tendencies of modern science, as this paper tries to show, seem to favor such an up-growth of personalistic doctrine. The first of these is the prevalence, suggested in the pages immediately preceding, of ✓ dynamic theories in physics. The second is the rising opposition, evident in all the papers of this year's discussion,¹ to vitalism in the biologist's sense of the term. Biological vitalism, as mere emphasis on the categories of order and fitness, has been rejected on the ground that the biologist has no monopoly on these categories. Biological vitalism, as a capriciously indeterministic entelechy doctrine, has been condemned as a baseless hypothesis. But the elimination of biological vitalism opens the way, as the first division of this paper seeks to show, to psychological vitalism or personalism. I look hopefully, therefore, for a recognition of the claims of personalism as soon as scientists and metaphysicians can be persuaded that it involves neither animism, phenomenalism nor crass indeterminism.

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¹ Cf. this REVIEW, November, 1918, *passim*.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLERIDGE'S THOUGHT.

LESLIE STEPHEN has expressed surprise, felt probably by nearly all readers of Coleridge, at the disproportion between the amount of his "definite services to philosophy and the effect which he certainly produced upon some of the ablest of his contemporaries."¹ That a man who wrote no systematic treatise, whose thought was contained in such unpromising philosophic forms as a history of his literary life and opinions, a volume of religious aphorisms, a popular literary magazine obviously foredoomed to unpopularity and death, some lay sermons, and endless conversations, should have been one of the two most stimulating English thinkers² in the early nineteenth century, "the anchor of the intellect of England" in that unsettled period, is indeed striking.³

Not so striking and yet, perhaps, not altogether a matter of course, is the fact that so little has been done, especially from the side of philosophy, to define the exact nature of his contribution. The best detailed study is that of F. J. A. Hort in his *Cambridge Essays*, 1856, but this was before much of the necessary material was available. Mill's *Essay* is appreciative but not detailed. Benn's account in his *History of Rationalism* is very detailed but completely unappreciative. Seth's notice in his *English Philosophers*, is, in the main, just, but not adequate. Shawcross's *Introduction* to his Oxford Edition of the *Biographia Literaria* is beyond criticism, but it is concerned primarily with the esthetic theory. There would seem to be a place, therefore, for a more thorough examination of his thought than has yet been made from the point of view of philosophy.

Before such an examination can be made, however, there is need for a preliminary study of origins; for the problem of determining just what his contribution was, is, in the case of a thinker

¹ *English Util.*, II, p. 373.

² J. S. Mill, *Essays*.

³ Goldwin Smith, *Rational Religion*, p. 77.

such as Coleridge, bound up with the problem of tracing the literary influences upon his life, since it is always in the form of comment or criticism upon his reading that his thought takes what little shape it had. Always reading, and never save for amusement, as he says of himself, his philosophizing, like his interminable conversations, consists in oracular and edifying monologue on texts furnished by the latest stimulating book. To understand his opinions at any given stage of his career, therefore, one must know the text upon which his discourse is based, for it is always as critic, though constructive critic, that his contribution is made.

But at the same time that one insists upon the primacy of Coleridge the critic, one must also recognize this fact of his constructiveness, for while it is true that his discourse is always unintelligible apart from his text, it is sometimes equally true that his text becomes unintelligible as interpreted in his discourse. The system in which for the time he has become absorbed is, for him, no mere objective fact to be analyzed or reproduced, but a vital document in which he may hope to find some new form for his own self-expression. It is never impersonal curiosity that draws him on, but always a hunger for an ever greater satisfaction of his spiritual needs. His attitude is therefore appreciative and assimilative to the extent that what he finds is too often what he seeks. Whatever in his author lends itself to his uses he thankfully takes, not always with scholarly care as to the question of historic truth. He never gives himself wholly to the objects of his admiration: he will walk with them as long as he can constrain them to walk with him, but when they refuse to take his path he casts them off. It is this desire to find himself in successive systems, that has made the interpretation of his meaning difficult, and has caused him to be labelled with the name of now this one and now that, of his philosophic friends; whereas in truth he remains himself and goes his own way in spite of the variety of his intellectual affiliations. To understand him, then, is not merely to trace the history of his reading, but to appreciate his principle of selection.

The label that has most frequently been attached to him is

that of German Transcendentalism, either in the form given it by Kant, or in that represented by Schelling. The title was given him in his own day against his vigorous protest: "All the elements, the differentials of my present opinions existed for me before I had seen a word of German metaphysics, later than Wolf or Leibnitz. But what will this avail? A High German transcendentalist I must be content to remain."¹ Leslie Stephen represents him as the exponent of the same tendency, and even F. J. A. Hort, in his careful study, in spite of his appreciation of other factors, asserts that "the cardinal distinction of Coleridge's philosophy was obviously derived from Kant."² So, too, Seth,³ following Hort, seems to take back with one hand what he gives with the other, in that although he recognizes that "he was no mere purveyor of German philosophy to the English public," he yet opens his chapter on him with the statement that "the earliest, and in some ways the most influential, representative of German Transcendental Philosophy in England is the poet-philosopher, Coleridge."⁴

That in vigorously rejecting this classification, Coleridge meant to assert the originality of his thought, is only in part true, for, in spite of the carelessness which characterizes his utilization of other's words, and which has called out such not wholly undeserved criticism, his recognitions of indebtedness are many and generous, though indefinite.⁵ He lacks the scholar's interest in sources, absorbing and utilizing whatever meets his needs, but making no effort to distinguish as his own even those points in which he really does differ from his originals. He feels, with justice, that his thoughts are not borrowings, but neither does he assume them to be unique. They are for him embodiments and developments of that sound tradition in philosophy known inexactly as the Platonic. From first to last, Coleridge was a

¹ *Letters*, p. 375.

² *Cambridge Essays*, p. 319.

³ *English Philosophers*, p. 319.

⁴ H. L. Stewart in the *Harvard Theological Review*, XI, pp. 1-31, in spite of his recognition of the difference between the usages of Kant and Coleridge in respect to the term understanding, insists upon the same derivation from Kant.

⁵ Cf. for his feeling about this *Anima Poetæ*, p. 106, *Biog. Lit.*, I, pp. 105, 244, Oxford ed.

Platonist of the mystic type, for a few years intellectually entangled with associationalism, and later charmed with the technical vocabulary of German transcendentalism, but always at heart akin to those believers in the direct vision of truth who have claimed the name and authority of Plato. It is not as turning the stream of English philosophy out of its native channels that Coleridge habitually sees himself, in spite of his tributes to Kant, but as returning it to the bed in which it ran in the days of its greatness, the days of Hooker, of the "latitude men," and the Cambridge Platonists. For him, the eighteenth century, with its Locke, its Hume, its Hartley, was the aberration, to correct which and to bring men back to that deeper tradition in philosophy without which he felt Christian doctrine must fall, was the labor of his life. It was his success in reviving this older tradition, the enthusiasm with which he preached its basic principles, the keenness with which he adapted them to meet the needs of his time, that constituted his essential service. Intellectual England, hesitant after a century of naturalism and doubt, was roused to new hopes by his vigorous preaching of the right to believe and eagerly welcomed the new basis of faith in the reality of the spiritual world.

But when we try to follow the thread of Coleridge's thought to prove this thesis we find it far from easy to trace the intellectual development of a man who wrote nothing of philosophical significance until after forty. We have his poems, his correspondence, and his ubiquitous marginal notes, as well as his note books. We have also his own wandering account in the *Biographia Literaria*, published in 1817, when he was forty-five years of age, but none of these sources are of such a character as to afford clear evidence of the steps in his development and the motives leading to them. The *Biographia*, to which we naturally look as the main source, besides being unsystematic and episodic, is polemical, and its autobiographical parts evidently colored by the faculty whose nature it is its aim to define. Coleridge is careless of dates and names, and temperamentally incapable of objective reminiscence. In his letters to Thomas Poole he even misdates his own birth, and, though always ready to recognize

his spiritual ancestry, his philosophy shows itself in his rooted conviction that his fundamental ideas were not gathered from his reading, but were the expression of his own nature. "Every man is born an Aristotelian or a Platonist. I do not think it possible that any one born an Aristotelian can become a Platonist; and I am sure no born Platonist can ever change into an Aristotelian."¹ Coleridge was born a Platonist and the changes his thought underwent were for him insignificant in comparison with the native unity which underlay it. His inevitable tendency is to read the beginning in the light of the end.

Of that beginning we get his own view in his intentionally autobiographical letters to Thomas Poole, as well as in Charles Lamb's passing sketch of "the inspired charity boy." In his childhood he was solitary, emotional, dreamy, precocious, turned in upon himself—"a character" by the time he was eight. He was a voracious reader, especially of works of the imagination, through the influence of which, he writes, "my mind had been habituated to the *Vast*, and I never regarded my senses in any way as the criteria of my belief. I regulated all my creeds by my conceptions, not by my sight, even at that age. . . . I know no other way of giving the mind a love of the Great and the Whole. Those who have been led to the same truths step by step, through the constant testimony of their senses, seem to me to want a sense which I possess. They contemplate nothing but parts, and all parts are necessarily little. And the universe to them is but a mass of *little things*."²

This activity of the imagination (which he seems to feel uncharacteristic of childhood) was further exercised and developed during his school life at Christ's Hospital, where his philosophic bent was set by his reading of the Neo-Platonists. How far he read and how much he understood, we do not know, but enough to make "the casual passer through the cloisters stand still, entranced with admiration (while he weighed the disproportion between the speech and the garb of the young *Mirandula*), to hear thee unfold in thy deep and sweet intonations

¹ *Literary Remains*, p. 37.

² *Letters*, p. 16.

the mysteries of Iamblichus or Plotinus."¹ And in his own words, "At a very premature age, even before my fifteenth year, I had bewildered myself in metaphysics and in theological controversy. Nothing else pleased me. History and particular facts lost all interest in my mind. . . . Poetry itself, yea, novels and romances, became insipid to me."² In particular, he had translated by that time, the eight hymns of Synesius from Greek into English anacreontics.³

Of this metaphysical disease he was cured for the time through the poetry of William Lisle Bowles and his own love for Mary Evans. But though he speaks of it as a cure, it was rather a change of form assumed by the malady, for the same Platonic spirit is manifest throughout and contributed to his later thought. It is impossible to separate his philosophy from his poetry or specify the one as determining the other—they were born together.

A matron now, of sober mien,
Yet radiant still and with no earthly sheen,
Whom as a fairy child my childhood woo'd
Even in my dawn of youth—Philosophy;
Tho' then, unconscious of herself, pardie,
She bore no other name than Poesy.⁴

And the spirit of both and of his whole view of life is given in this adaptation of Plato's figure of the cave,

All that meets the bodily sense I deem
Symbolic, one mighty alphabet
To infant minds; and we in this low world
Placed with our backs to bright reality,
That we might learn with young untroubled ken
The substance from the shadow.⁵

At the same time, however, that he was giving this ideal interpretation to nature and finding satisfaction in the visions of the mystics, his quick intellect was finding equal pleasure in the sceptical criticism of Voltaire and perhaps of Helvetius, though his acquaintance with the latter may have belonged to a

¹ Lamb, *Christ's Hospital five and thirty years ago*.

² *Biog. Lit.*, I, p. 9.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

⁴ *Garden of Boccaccio*.

⁵ *Destiny of Nations*.

later period. His scepticism seems not to have been much more than the pride of a precocious boy in the independence and keenness of his intellect. "I had too much vanity to be altogether a Christian, too much tenderness of nature to be utterly an infidel. Fond of the dazzle of wit, fond of subtlety of argument, I could not read without some degree of pleasure the levities of Voltaire or the reasonings of Helvetius."¹ But his own passional nature was such that he could never seriously rest in a negative position and his infidelity never went further than his head. It is questionable whether there was any time in his life when he could not be called a Christian, and, if we allow his own flexible usage of the term, even an evangelical Christian.

On his removal to Cambridge, this negative movement in his life reached its furthest limit. It there took the form of the associationalism of Hartley and the Unitarianism of Priestley, perhaps even of the materialism of the latter. Just what his philosophical position was during his university years and for several years after, we have no means of knowing. He tells us that he was an enthusiastic admirer of Hartley during this period, naming his oldest child after him in 1796, and in 1794 he writes to Southey, "I am a complete necessitarian, and understand the subject almost as well as Hartley himself, but I go farther than Hartley, and believe the corporeality of thought, namely, that it is motion."² Yet in 1796, he writes in denying the preëxistence of a soul separable and playing on the body, "not that I am a materialist, but because I am a Berkleyan."³ Again, he distinguishes his religious Unitarianism from his philosophical Trinitarianism, asserting that "I was at that time (1795) and long after, though a Trinitarian (*i. e.*, *ad normam Platonis*) in philosophy, yet a zealous Unitarian in religion"⁴ in the sense of denying the divinity of Jesus and the orthodox doctrine of the atonement. The most probable interpretation of the situation is that in Hartley's doctrine Coleridge found a philosophy which gave more rational satisfaction to his doubts

¹ *Letters*, p. 69. To his brother, 1794.

² *Letters*, p. 113.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

⁴ *Biog. Lit.*, p. 114.

than did traditional theology. In particular, it was the Unitarian denial of the incarnation and vicarious atonement that appealed to his moral sense, for at that time he could see no rational meaning in the merely historic elements of the Christian creed. It was Hartley the Unitarian, rather than Hartley the Associationalist, who obtained his allegiance, his acceptance of the latter doctrine being probably only for a short time in the first flush of his enthusiasm. Indeed, it may well be that it never possessed his whole mind, but that for these few years it was held by him tentatively along with his temperamental Platonism, he himself insisting that it was this fundamental difference in his metaphysical notions from those of the Unitarians that led to his final re-conversion to orthodox Christianity.¹ Whether this retrospective view of his opinions at that time is to be accepted in the face of the assertions contained in his letters, is a question, but it may well be that these latter were only the expressions of the changing moods of the moment, though the doctrine of necessity certainly was held and taught for years. It is then, perhaps, safe to conclude that Coleridge's enthusiasm for Hartley's *Essay on Man* did not imply the rejection of Platonism, but the acceptance primarily of the Hartleyan rationalizing and critical theology, including the doctrine of necessity. It was as a practical system of Christian theology that he accepted it, rather than as a system of metaphysics; though it is impossible to deny that he may have held it tentatively as psychology and theory of knowledge for a while. So, in the 17th century, the Cambridge Platonists had felt that an atomistic natural philosophy was not merely consistent with, but even a support for a Platonic metaphysics.

Just what the steps were by which Coleridge passed beyond the influence of Hartley, we cannot be quite sure. We know that even as early as 1796 he felt the mechanical philosophy to be inadequate as a complete account of experience.² In the *Biographia Literaria*³ he speaks of a period of doubt and investigation of the foundations of religion and morals about the year 1797,

¹ *Biog. Lit.*, p. 137.

² *Ibid.*, I, p. xxx, note.

³ *Ibid.*, I, p. 132.

as the outcome of which he came to realize "that religion, as both the corner-stone and the key-stone of morality, must have a moral origin; so far at least, that the evidence of its doctrines could not, like the truths of abstract science, be wholly independent of the will. It were therefore to be expected, that its *fundamental* truth would be such as MIGHT be denied; though only by the fool, and even by the fool from the madness of the heart alone."¹ It dawned on him even before he had met the *Critique of Pure Reason* that, "If the mere intellect could make no certain discovery of a holy and intelligent first cause, it might yet supply a demonstration, that no legitimate argument could be drawn from the intellect *against* its truth."² Thus while not yet able to dismiss the mechanical philosophy based on the abstract understanding he was able to set a limit to its explanations and reserve a sphere in which its principles were not valid.

The underlying influence to which this gradual casting off of the mechanical philosophy was due was undoubtedly that of the mystics. As he puts it, "the writings of these mystics acted in no slight degree to prevent my mind from being imprisoned within the outline of any single dogmatic system. They contributed to keep alive the *heart* in the *head*; gave me an indistinct, yet stirring and working presentiment, that all the products of the mere *reflective* faculty partook of Death."³ In this passage he pays a specially glowing tribute to Boehme, and elsewhere in the *Biographia Literaria* he acknowledges his debt to the "Teutonic theosophist," the similarity of whose ideas to those of himself and Schelling he freely admits. But to Lady Beaumont he writes in 1810, "For myself, I never brought away from his works anything I did not bring to them."⁴ Both statements may well be true, for Boehme's influence upon him consisted essentially, as he says, in keeping alive his heart in his head, and confirming him in his spiritual faith until he was able to work out a system relatively expressive of it. It was the Neo-Platonic element in Boehme that appealed to him and made his mysticism

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

² *Ibid.*, p. 134.

³ *Ibid.*, I, p. 98.

⁴ *Memorials of Coleorton*, January, 1810.

the transition stage in the development to Coleridge's later and more personal philosophy. Southey implies that Boehme was coming into the ascendant about 1804, but Shawcross places the study of him and his fellows during the years 1795-1798, a much better confirmed date.¹

To this time also belongs in all probability at least the beginning of his familiarity with the great seventeenth century divines to whose Christian interpretation of Plato and Plotinus, or perhaps better, to whose Platonic interpretation of Christianity, Coleridge undoubtedly owes the fundamentals of this later thought. Coleridge the theologian is only a reincarnation of John Smith and Henry More. This indebtedness he acknowledges again and again, so that it is amazing that any one acquainted with the writings of these men should persist in looking for any other source for the most persistent and distinctive of his doctrines. The passage in the *Biographia* just quoted in which he insists upon the place of the will in religious knowledge, might have been taken from John Smith or Benjamin Whichcote, and his distinction of the reason from the understanding was almost a commonplace of the school, not formulated with the definiteness of his later thought, but the same in essence as inherited from their common master Plotinus. His more thorough study of these divines belongs to his later years and finds expression in his *Aids to Devotion*, which is only a free commentary and criticism upon passages from their writings, but as early as 1802 he writes, "I have read a great deal of German: but I do dearly, dearly, dearly love my own countrymen of old times, and those of my contemporaries who write in their spirit."² That these beloved countrymen were not Bacon, Hobbes, or Locke, needs no proof. That their doctrine was not a pure Platonism, but a Plotinism, he recognizes with regret, Henry More at least being infected by "a corrupt, mystical, theurgical, pseudo-Platonism,"³ from which only a "transcendental, æsthetic, logic, and noetic,"⁴ such as was worked out by Kant could have

¹ *Biog. Lit.*, I, p. 242.

² *Letters*, p. 373, July 13, 1802.

³ *Lit. Remains*, p. 114.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 267.

saved him. A suggestion which summarizes his own development—Platonism illuminated by Kant. This Kantian influence is the next in his life.

His life in Germany, from September, 1798, to July, 1799, though devoted almost wholly to the study of the language and literature, could not but have brought him into contact with the philosophy of the day and carried him still further back to a completely idealistic position. Yet we have no explicit evidence of this and are forced to date his real acquaintance with Kant about the year 1801. In March of that year he writes to Poole, "If I do not greatly delude myself, I have not only completely extricated the notions of time and space, but have overthrown the doctrine of association, as taught by Hartley, and with it all the irreligious metaphysics of modern infidels—especially the doctrine of necessity."¹ This sounds very much as if he were already familiar with the *Critique*, yet Leslie Stephen tells us that in some letters to Josiah Wedgwood, written only a few weeks before, containing an elaborate comparison of Locke and Descartes, "He writes as though he had as yet read no German philosophy. I know that he began a serious study of Kant at Keswick; but I fancied that he had brought back some knowledge of Kant from Germany. This letter proves the contrary. There is certainly none of the transcendentalism of the Schelling kind. One point is, that he still sticks to Hartley and to the Association doctrine, which he afterwards denounced so frequently."² Apparently, as Shawcross observes, the overthrow of the association doctrine must have been accomplished in the interval between these two letters and, Leslie Stephen to the contrary notwithstanding, possibly by the help of some knowledge of Kant.

With this year 1801, Coleridge enters upon the study of the writings which were to help him to the final expression of his thought, so far as one may speak of anything final in connection with it. "Once for all, read Kant, Fichte, etc., and then you will trace, or if you are on the hunt, track me,"³ he wrote in 1804.

¹ *Letters* (edit. by E. H. Coleridge, 1895), p. 348.

² *Ibid.*, p. 351, note, containing extract from letter by Leslie Stephen.

³ *Anima Poeta*, p. 106.

By the time we reach 1810 and the publication of the *Friend*, the trail leads us also through Schelling, Bruno, Spinoza, and Jacobi.¹ In 1808, Southey gives the succession of Coleridge's idols as Hartley, Berkeley, Spinoza, Plato, Boehme, the latter being in the ascendant in 1804. This is hard to reconcile with what we know of his development unless we are to take it as part of the list which concludes with Kant and Schelling or as referring to personalities rather than doctrines. Kant's influence may date from after 1804 and probably Schelling's greatest attraction was considerably later, about the time of the publication of the *Biographia Literaria* in 1817. He was acquainted with Spinoza at least as early as 1803 and his mysticism and doctrine of immanence had the same attraction for him that the earlier mystics had. It may be that the study of Bruno, whom he read in 1801, was the link between these latter and the *Ethica*, which in turn led on to Schelling through Kant. Certain it is that Spinoza was the object of his profound admiration, though with qualifications, as late as 1812, as is testified by that dramatic scene reported by Crabb Robinson, when Coleridge kissed the portrait of Spinoza on the title page of his works, declaring, "This book is a gospel to me.' But in less than a minute he added: 'His philosophy is nevertheless false.'"²

To Jacobi he expresses no direct indebtedness, but he was familiar with his writings and, in the second edition of the *Friend*, 1818, he accepts Jacobi's conception of reason as probably identical with his own, *i. e.*, that it is an organ of spiritual vision corresponding to the eye in the world of nature.³

To what extent Coleridge was influenced by these various sources can only be estimated in connection with the statement of his own doctrine, but there is no real ground to doubt the truth of his assertion already quoted, "All the elements, the differentials . . . of my present opinions existed for me before I had seen a word of German metaphysics, later than Wolf or Leibnitz."

When one turns from the consideration of the philosophical

¹ *Life*, p. 165, note.

² *Diary*, October 3, 1812.

³ "First Landing Place," Essay V.

influences upon his life and looks for the underlying motives which led Coleridge from stage to stage of his development, one finds a baffling scarcity of material from which to reconstruct his inner life. He was a good letter writer, but his biographers and editors seem to have conspired to publish only those letters which they deemed readable and to leave to oblivion those of merely philosophical or religious interest. In consequence, there is no spiritual portrait of the man Coleridge and it is almost impossible to unify and give life to the facts we have.

The special problem is that of the continuity between the early radical and the later evangelical; or, to take it from another angle, it is that of the relation between the philosopher and the religionist. In early manhood, Coleridge was a political radical and a rationalistic Unitarian and determinist; in later life he was a conservative and a Trinitarian of almost pietistic fervor. Intellectually, he was through and through a speculative thinker, preaching, in season and out, the necessity of adding to one's faith knowledge: religiously he was the champion of revealed religion and the orthodox creeds. So marked were the apparent contradictions of his position that both then and now he has been accused of at least pious accommodation to the prejudices of his age and a lack of intellectual honesty.¹ Whether or not his position was free from contradictions is at least a debatable question, but that he himself was sincere there can be no reasonable doubt. He was, at the worst, sentimental and self-deceived, but there is not the slightest evidence that his whole soul was not just as much in his orthodoxy as in his radicalism.

In the analysis of his temper, the fundamental element to be recognized as the basis of all his later thought is that which he later labored so hard to define under the name of the imagination. Whether we agree with his distinctions or not, it is this tendency to see in sense only the symbol of spirit, to pass beyond the appearances of nature to its reality, to construct out of the data furnished by the senses a meaning intelligible only to the spirit, in short, it is this essentially poetic spirit that is the determining factor in Coleridge's life. Even though his properly poetic

¹ Cf. Benn, *Hist. of Rationalism*.

period was but of a few years duration, yet in the critic, the philosopher and the theologian we find reappearing and dominating, the poet. As poet, his thought moves along the *via media* between sensationalism and intellectualism, rejecting the brute facts of the one and refusing to rest content with the lifeless abstractions of the other, insisting always on the primacy of the spiritual vision. In later life he refuses to admit the imagination, in any technical sense, as the organ of the highest truth, but it is none the less the dominance in him of this interpretive faculty that determines him in the acceptance of the intuitive reason as the source of our knowledge of the spiritual world.

Endowed with this temper in childhood we can see how easily Neo-Platonism could make its appeal. Not that we can give much significance to his early fascination with the doctrine, for it probably served mainly as food for his imagination, rather than as meat for his intellect. What his early religious experience was, or whether he had one at all, we do not know. Probably his earliest real experience was the Unitarianism and radicalism of his college days, deepened by the sense of the injustice suffered by his teacher and by the deprivations involved in his own dissent from the authoritative doctrine. This decade of his life might seem unrelated to his poetic temper, in spite of the fact that it was the period which included all his significant poetry, were it not that the ground of his objections to orthodoxy were not intellectual, but moral. Metaphysically, he remained a Trinitarian, but he could not accept the morality implied in the doctrine of original sin and atonement: they seemed to him inconsistent with a spiritual interpretation of life. And so he was forced over to a system which seemed, superficially at least, more in conformity with the moral reason, emphasizing as it did, in spite of its doctrine of necessity, the independence and rights of the individual.

His return from Unitarianism, which seems to have been taking place about the time when he was making the acquaintance of Kant, was due, it seems likely, not so much to the direct influence of that philosopher, as to a change and deepening of his own experience. We have no record of any specific religious

experience during those years, or any years. Some have seen in his disappointment over the loss of Mary Evans and the subsequent heart-searching sceptical crisis a short time afterwards, the source of his later change of views, but these were several years before his faith in Unitarianism was shaken, nor was the love affair serious enough, nor the scepticism religious enough, to account for the return. As he puts it, "A more thorough revolution in my philosophic principles, and a deeper insight into my own heart, were yet wanting."¹ The more thorough revolution in his philosophic principles was due to the help of Kant, but it was a condition, rather than a cause, of the change. It consisted essentially, in all likelihood, in the distinction drawn between the theoretical and the practical spheres, enabling Coleridge to see that difficulties in the intelligibility and theoretical formulation of a doctrine need not prevent the acceptance of its truth, provided it has a basis in the practical reason, or in spiritual experience, as Coleridge would prefer to put it. This at once made possible the acceptance of the difficult doctrines of Christianity, provided only that their reality be given in experience. And here comes in his "deeper insight" into his own heart, an insight gained, there can be small doubt, through the bitter experiences of his own weakness and misery, for it was during these same years of his studies in German philosophy that he reached the lowest depths of his slavery to opium. It was this realization of his own sin, yet helplessness, that made impossible for him the optimistic moralism of Unitarianism and forced him back upon the evangelical doctrines of sin and atonement.² These experiences he could not explain, but they were for him vital facts, whose ultimateness was only confirmed by the inability of the understanding to comprehend them. The orthodox formulation of them remained unacceptable to him but, as he puts it, he was able to "vault over the unhappy idol"³ and take his stand on the fact it had displaced. In his later years he seems to have worked out a more explicit philosophy of these

¹ *Biog. Lit.*, I, p. 137.

² *The Friend*, III, 312; *Hort.*, p. 338.

³ *Lit. Remains*, p. 195.

facts, but even as late as the *Aids to Reflection* they remain essentially mysteries, given, but not explicable even in symbols.

Of the reality of this evangelical religious experience and its influence upon his thought it is impossible to doubt, pervading as it does not only his published theological works, but also his correspondence. And yet as one reads and compares with the facts of his life, one is tempted at times to question, not the sincerity, but the truth of the experience. Is there not an element of the sentimental in his confessions? Are we not reminded of Rousseau and the tendency to offer the feelings for the deed? This, perhaps, is inherent in all evangelical religion, but it becomes more prominent the greater are the possible deeds for which we are asked to accept the feelings. In Coleridge's case, his religion was deep enough to enable him to sympathize with the established religion and to form a basis for an honestly held philosophy, but not deep enough to regenerate his will and build up his character. He remained to the end a disorganized genius, enthusiastic for virtue but at the mercy of his impulses and feelings: enjoying his Christian experience, but incapable of turning it into action. And not merely is there this lack of self-control, but also a, perhaps unconscious, sense of justification through confession, a making a merit of self-abasement. His biographers have rightly noted that he never laid claim to exemption from criticism on the score of his genius, but they seem not to have felt this subtler soothing of his conscience through the waiving of any such claim.

But in addition to this emotional satisfaction, his Christianity also gave him just the intellectual and imaginative satisfaction his mind needed. With true insight he writes even as early as 1798: "But though all my doubts are done away, though Christianity is my passion, it is too much my *intellectual* passion, and therefore will do me but little good in the hour of temptation and calamity."¹ And a growing intellectual passion it remained throughout life, in spite of the deeper emotional tone induced by his later experience. To interpret Christian doctrine in the light of that experience became his life work, in which his poetic,

¹ *Letters*, p. 247.

imaginative power found free scope. Literal facts had small interest for him in comparison with their symbolic meaning, and the Bible, nature and history became but so much material for the constructive power of his imagination. He seemed to revel in this emotionally satisfying process of interpretation and no facts came to seem incapable of yielding some spiritual meaning. Not that he meant to ignore facts, but a mind that could find in Isaiah the revelation of the philosophy of the French Revolution and could "challenge all the critical benches of infidelity to point out any one important truth, any one efficient, practical direction or warning, which did not preëxist, and for the most part in a sounder, more intelligible, and more comprehensive form, in the Bible,"¹ must have had the interpretative faculty developed at the expense of the receptive. The only facts for which he had an interested and critical sense were those of the inner life and in this field his analysis is illuminating. Religion as personal experience was the foundation of all his thinking and supplied him with the key to his metaphysics, but in the application of that key his imagination often runs wild until we are apt to feel as we follow him that the religious structure he has reared, or rather, sketched, has for him the personal value of imaginative play rather than the objective value of a religious interpretation of the world. As not rooted in the will, his attitude tends to be esthetic rather than religious, and his later work to be, even more than in the case of most speculative philosophers, that of a metaphysical poet rather than that of a critical theologian. Both in temper and training, therefore, he belongs, not to the German transcendental schools of his day, but to the traditional English Platonism of the seventeenth century.

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¹ *Statesman's Manual*, p. 315, Bohn Ed.

MIND, BODY, THEISM AND IMMORTALITY.

MATERIALISM, in the general sense of the origin of life and mind from a material system, is not more incompatible with Theism than is the principle of evolution. In any case Theism must conform its belief in the divine origin of the human personality to the arrival of that personality by stages. First the humblest organisms, then animals a little less humble, then animals higher in the scale, and so on through an indefinite succession till life finally ascends to man. To infer an extra and prior stage behind the humblest organism from which organic evolution started makes no appreciable extra difficulty for theistic interpretation. One sovereign added to a million makes no appreciable difference to the trouble of counting. If the creative process required so many steps between man and his first living ancestor, it could easily include a purely material ancestry for the latter. Materialism, in the simple sense that matter was the prius of mind, only adds an appendix to the scheme presented to Theism for explanation.

It is important to realize that the material origin of life and mind adds nothing appreciable to Theism's difficulties; for inspection of the cosmic span of the earth's history, so far as this inspection is possible, indicates that matter gave birth to life and, through life, to mind. The evidence points to a previous earth that could not carry living creatures. It was, to mention one point, a furnace for their destruction. Since life appeared where there was formerly only inorganic matter the evidence again indicates that, when the earth became a practicable habitat for plants and animals, the living issued from the non-living.

Professor Pringle-Pattison's assertion, in his *The Idea of God in Modern Philosophy*, that the evolution of the living from the non-living is a point of no philosophical importance, is true in so far as it implies that this materialistic appendix to the doctrine of evolution need give no extra trouble to the Theist. If God developed man from an amoeba he could {presumably produce

the amoeba from lifeless matter: if he did the one he might equally well do the other. It does seem over-emphatic to deny any philosophical importance whatever to the generation of the living from the non-living—so momentous an occurrence must have some significance. The details of divine method must bear on our interpretation of it. Professor Pringle Pattison's over-emphasis helps, however, to direct attention to the importance of avoiding certain conclusions often associated with the belief in the evolution of the living from the non-living. Materialism is usually associated with beliefs that are antitheistic because it tends to a mechanical conception of life. Materialism in the simple sense of the priority in time of matter to life and the genesis of the later from the earlier is no more incompatible with Theism than organic evolution. It can be so further construed as to make it incompatible. This is not peculiar to materialism, for Theism can be ruled out of a scheme of thought that puts mind before matter. Materialism has become a bogey term because it has usually connected itself with mechanical conceptions of life and mind. It has, for example, not merely inferred that life and mind originally proceeded from matter but has insisted that whenever they are found in action they are being constantly produced from it. We must accept the evidence to hand that life and mind originally issued from matter. It is not complete, it is true. Our knowledge and power of interpretation are both very limited, but we must go by what we have, as a man must live on his income though it be small or inadequate. Mind undoubtedly appears to have proceeded from matter, but our estimate of it must not be based upon this particular fact. Both sides of the transaction must be examined. Materialism has become a bogey word through the assumption that descent decides destiny. This is akin to the aristocratic tendency to connect a lofty genealogy with the man who becomes great. It is quite possible that we should increase our respect for matter instead of roundly declaring it to be no fit parent for mind.

The living organism and the lifeless thing appear different to the mind, as blue and red are different experiences for it. Mechanism and vitalism disagree over the significance of the difference.

As blueness and redness are two variations on a single theme of color sensation, so for the mechanist there is nothing more in the difference between the living and the non-living than a variation between two sets of purely physico-chemical processes. The vitalist believes in a difference of kind between the purely physico-chemical nature of the lifeless and the inclusion in the organism of an extra-mechanical agency. Organism = physics + chemistry = matter + energy = inorganic matter. This is the mechanist formula. The vitalist requires two formulæ: non-living = physics + chemistry, and organism = physics + chemistry + *X*. The vitalist is backed by immediate experience or the impression made on common sense, for the living organism seems to differ from the physico-chemical, from the purely inorganic, and to differ essentially by its *tactical* methods. Very humble animals appear to strive persistently after an end. A small amœba dodges and twists when a larger amœba pursues it. A beetle will run when prodded once and sham dead if prodded twice. Pursuit and escape, with considerable tactical accompaniment, form a considerable part of the routine of life. It has been remarked that intelligence is highly developed in animals that, like the fox, are both hunters and hunted. Tactics, suggestive of plastic and modifiable concurrence of activities on results, seem to distinguish the living from the mechanical and fixed of the non-living.

It is doubtful where animal tactics become conscious and mental, but consciousness does finally appear. Plant life, animal tactics, animal consciousness, the human mind: this series irresistibly suggests that the evolution of life involves a new activity within the cosmic process. This is the *X* in the vitalist formula. It ultimately declares itself most completely in mind, when it reaches its terminal development in man. In its earlier stages it can only be more vaguely described as 'life.' This conception that an extra-mechanical agency or factor or entity, more vaguely describable in its earlier phases as 'life,' more definitely recognized in the phase of animal consciousness, most completely known in its final development as the human mind, has arisen from, or out of, an original inorganic prius, seems to cover

most satisfactorily the data of experience. At some cosmic point 'life' conjoins with the material. Their first conjunction is the living thing or organism—consciousness is yet in the future. The evolution of plant and animal life proceeds from the conjunction and coöperation of the physico-chemical and 'life.' Organization proceeds along the double lines, connected and independent in their mutual coöperation, of material and vital. 'Life' becomes conscious and consciousness becomes the human mind.

According to this conception the body and the mind are two mutually interacting and interdependent entities. There is no need for the further supposition that they are *substances* in the metaphysical sense of the term. An individual mind is an entity, its associate body is also an entity—just as the driver and his engine are entities, though the actual relation between mind and body is more intimate and perplexing than the relation between the engine and its driver. The dependence of the mind on the body connects naturally with its ultimate origination from the material. The action of the body on the mind and of the mind on the body, although perplexing to conceive because of their apparent disparateness, appear intelligible in the light of this origination. The apparent disparateness may not be so great as is often supposed. Spatiality does not cut absolutely clean between the mental and the bodily. The spatial severance of material bodies involves as an essential element, coexistential separation. Minds are also coexistentially separate. The thoughts of two different minds may be contemporaneous and quite apart. Coexistential separation may be carried over into 'life' and mind as the permanent representative of the space of the material world, and maintain a connecting link between mind and body. Driesch uses the terms 'entelechy' and 'psychoid' in place of 'life' and 'conscious life'—the conceptions are similar in principle though not necessarily identical in detail.

He conceives the vital agent as non-spatial, as outside space but acting into it. The interaction between the spatial and the non-spatial is one of the standing puzzles of thought. It has

led to attempt after attempt to so conceive mind and body as to evade their recognition as separate, though not necessarily separated, entities. They are two aspects of the same thing; they correspond to two different mental attitudes; the body is a phenomenon that attends consciousness as a shadow attends the opaque body. These and other conceptions endeavor to evade the conclusion, defended in recent thought by McDougall, that body and mind are two separate entities. Space seems to cut the mind, regarded as an entity, so completely off from the body. If the space of the material world includes the two elements of extension and coexistential separation, the mind, by retaining the latter though rejecting the former, maintains its connection with the matter from which it originated.

This connection originating in the generation of mind from body, is maintained as the basis of a copartnery. This notion of a copartnery between two interacting entities seems to provide a convenient method of conceiving the relations between body and mind. The two partners depend upon one another: the body provides sense-organs for conveying impressions received by the mind as sensations; the mind interprets and decides, it guides movements through the motor apparatus supplied in the physiological mechanism. This is probably the primary office of the mind—to realize situations for the body and conduct it to food or safety. Consciousness was probably in the first instance little more than a useful appendix to the body. Possibly it began as little more than a feeling of pain or of satisfaction to whip the organism into activity or encourage it to persist in useful efforts, such as eating. Through our own action under fear or anger or love we may perhaps catch a glimpse of the first stirrings of life into consciousness—stirrings that may be compared to an emotional drive on the living being. As mind developed from its first conscious beginnings it acquired more the status of a junior partner—dealing with situations that affected itself, but in which the body had a predominant interest. This junior partnership continued well on into the human era. "The human mind," writes Professor Whitehead, "was not evolved in the bygone ages for the sake of reasoning, but merely to enable

mankind with more art to hunt between meals for fresh food supplies."

But the mind has not remained tied in servitude to bodily demands, any more than in originating from the material it merely repeated the chemical and physical characteristics of its parentage. The difficulty in accepting the cosmic evidence that life and mind proceeded from matter resides mainly in the apparently startling break with the *cosmic heredity*. Something has sprung from matter and energy that they seem incompetent to produce. It is difficult to persuade ourselves that we are no final judges of cosmic competency and accept the evidence that life proceeded like a new creation from the broad bosom of the material world. Hylozoistic theories attempt to evade this conclusion. Mendelism suggests a possible explanation of the apparent origination from matter of life and mind. Matter may contain the vital principle repressed within it as the recessive hereditary quality is repressed by the dominant. As a succession of births may sort out the recessive Mendelian factor and permit expression to it, so during the material process the vital principle may be liberated to pursue its own course, not independently of matter but developing according to its own nature. This resolution of the production of life from matter into escape from enclosure within it, may or may not make the term 'materialism' a misnomer. Neither materialism nor hylozoism can give a final decision adverse to Theism. In any case, life and mind sprang out of matter, remained connected with it, continue to depend upon it (matter in its turn depending on them) but develop in accordance with their own principles and nature. In developed man mind becomes the senior member of the co-partnery. Social intercourse, love and a whole range of emotions, beauty, truth, morality, religion become the dominating interests. Matter is now seen clearly in the position of a mother bearing a child of genius who will far surpass her in achievement.

This brief outline seems to sketch in the general relation between mind and body that most satisfactorily expresses the data of experience. The whole evolution of life is a progression from inferior grades of existence to superior. This progression appears

as an impulse originating in the creative process by which life sprang from the lifeless. The living organism, typified still in the plant, was the first result of the coöperation between the two agencies that now divide the cosmic process between them. Life, breaking by its creative nature with the causal routine of the material, moved upwards into consciousness and from animal consciousness into the human mind. It derived benefit from the physico-chemical agencies from which it sprang and with which it remained connected. Doubtless the marvellous organization of the human body was based fundamentally on constant physical and chemical factors but assisted by the creative and organizing capacity of life and consciousness. Ultimately the human mind became the supreme entity, though still coöperating with the body and remaining dependent on it, though also independent. Such a sketch simply attempts to conceive the nature of the evolutionary process presented to Theism for explanation. It does not decide against its power to give that explanation.

It is natural that mind and body should share some methods of procedure. There are various characteristic methods readily perceptible in the organism. Hydrolysis is one such method. The chemical processes in all living matter consist very largely of hydrolytic decompositions. In hydrolysis chemical molecules are divided into others by the entrance of a molecule of water. Two new molecules are formed by the fission of an old one and the addition to the divided parts of atoms from the entering molecule of water. The body converts starch into sugar by a series of hydrolytic decompositions. Hydrolysis occurs so frequently in the chemical processes of the body that it can be reasonably regarded as a standard chemical procedure adopted by the organism. Hydrolytic processes are familiar to the chemist, and they can be frequently induced or facilitated by small quantities of some substance that often remains unchanged at the end of the hydrolytic decomposition. Such substances are known as catalysts and the whole process as catalysis. The organism provides special catalysts for many of its hydrolyses in the form of complex organic compounds known as enzymes.

Enzyme action, often closely associated with hydrolysis, is another characteristic method of procedure in the organism. Hydrolysis and enzyme action are characteristic of the living thing in its physico-chemical aspect. There is another method of procedure in which both material and psychical more obviously participate.

When men prepare machinery that can be touched off into appropriate action, as when a bell is rung by pulling a switch, they use a method that is almost the very soul of the procedure of the organism. The type of process in which an action already prepared in a mechanism set to a stimulus—like a gun set to fire by a touch on the trigger—is touched off by some cause slight in comparison with the total action, exhibits a standard psychophysical method. The body is full of reflex actions. A dog's hind leg scratches his flank if it be rubbed at the right place. Snuff in the nostril produces a sneeze, the eyes wink when a body moves near them. The nervous system is largely a series of touch-off systems in which a relatively slight stimulus applied to a nerve or nerves may move a limb through the associated mechanism of bone and muscle, or cause movement of the whole body. In many reflex or virtually automatic actions, such as the playing of a pianist who is concentrating his attention on a conversation remote from his music, the psychical mingles with the mechanical. It seems clear that some bodily automatisms are set to a psychical stimulus. The pain of a pin-prick makes us jump. The wink of the eye seems to be due, in part at any rate, to the *perception* that something is approaching. If it be true that a sleep-walker does not wink when a candle is waved before his open eyes, it seems confirmed that a psychical stimulus initiates this particular reflex. Mechanical and apparently determined response is not necessarily indicative of the purely physico-chemical. Men endeavor to supply themselves with machines that will complete a whole series of processes in a perfectly automatic manner. This is a development of the practice of the organism. It is possible that when the sea-urchin points its spines to a passing shadow its reaction responds to a conscious impression. The shadow may be cast by an enemy and the sea-urchin may

have set a mechanism of defence to respond to a sign of possible danger. Instincts in their most absolute forms, as among the insects, are probably complex series of bodily mechanisms set to psychical stimuli. The hunting wasp who seizes the caterpillar, stings it at the exact spot and in the exact way to produce paralysis without death, places it in her nest and lays her eggs on it in the best position for the newly born grubs to attack their living host, can hardly be supposed to act through foresight, for she dies before her grubs are born, and has acted in a systematic, provident way without previous experience of their requirements or of the methods of paralyzing a caterpillar. Her performances can hardly be purely mechanical throughout—mechanical arrangements set to purely mechanical stimuli. Her movements will be different in detail in stinging each caterpillar that she stores for her young. Conscious appreciation of situations must be supposed to be present. Some conception of the operation of instinct can be formed by supposing that within her body certain physico-chemical mechanisms are 'set' to certain psychic stimuli. Her instinctive behavior is a series of actions resulting from such settings to the psychical stimuli constantly arising in the course of her acting. There is, there must be, some pliability in her conduct—she must adapt to the detail of contingencies. Part of this pliability may transcend explanation in terms of physico-chemical mechanisms set to psychical stimuli, part may be explicable in terms of alternative settings to possible stimuli. We can conceive an absolutely pure instinct in which a succession of purely physico-chemical or mechanical settings are touched off by successive psychical stimuli. Few, if any, instincts may be 'pure' in this absolute sense, but it seems clear that the psychical may coöperate with the physico-chemical by acting as stimulus to its mechanical setting.

The converse action also occurs in the interaction between the body and the mental. Within the mind ideas tend to associate into organized groups, comparable with the physico-chemical settings of the body. The laws of the Association of Ideas express the mental tendencies to organize such psychical settings. Odors are well known to form very fixed associations. The

smell of a particular flower, for example, may become almost permanently associated with some particular events. The smell at once rouses a definite set of memories and flashes past scenes upon the mind. The memories are 'set' to respond to the stimulus of the odor. Since the odor depends ultimately on physical or chemical action on the organs of smell, a bodily stimulus initiates a psychical reaction. In all perception there seems to be the response of a psychical 'setting' to physico-chemical stimuli. The memories of past experience are so organized that when impressions from the external object are received through the sensory apparatus the mind apprehends the object and realizes the meaning of the stimuli applied to it. The sensations received from an object stimulate a mass of memories and ideas so organized that the mind interprets them as a bird flying or as a mass of rock. Perception is marvellously plastic. This plasticity may partly transcend the conception of psychical settings to material stimuli, it may derive in part from a richness of alternative and compounded settings to very varied stimuli. The illusions of perception often reveal the existence of this 'mechanical' element within the psyche. A wanderer in the dark is filled with fear and his ideas become 'set' to flash the perception of a ghost upon his mind. A dimly seen white sheet touches off this setting into an illusory ghost.

This conception of interaction between mental and bodily in terms of stimulus-applied-to-setting may be compared with Descartes's notion that the pineal gland was the point of conjunction between mind and body. The difficulty of conceiving the interaction between such different entities was minimized by supposing it to occur only at one particularly appropriate point. The notion that the mental and the bodily act as stimuli to one another, in a similar way, minimizes the amount of interaction between them. Bergson speaks of the psychical reaction overflowing the cerebral state, connected with it as a coat is connected with the peg on which it hangs. If the cerebral motion, the terminal point of the physico-chemical stimulus, acts on the mind as the pull of a lever sets off an engine, the mental reaction does do much more than merely present a psychosis parallel

and correspondent to the neurosis. The conception of a perfect parallelism between brain processes and mind processes ultimately leads to the opinion that they cannot act upon one another. The recognition that one characteristic procedure of the psychophysical individual is the setting of a system to a stimulus provides an intelligible way of conceiving the interaction between mind and body.

This conception does not exhaust the nature of consciousness, but it suggests considerations that may bear on the destiny, the immortality, of the human psyche. The birth of mind from matter does not decide against a final theistic interpretation or make it less possible. Does the close connection between mind and body originating in this birth decide against man's immortality or make it less probable? The body certainly dies. If the connection is a permanent tie the mind seems doomed to die with it. The continual dependence of the mind on the body during physical life does not necessarily imply that it cannot continue to exist when there is no body to depend on. The child may depend very greatly on his parents during their life, he may continue to depend on their support when he is older, without being unable to live on when they are dead. He can continue to live because he is just as truly an independent existence as a dependent on them. This independency of nature grows with his years. As an infant he must be suckled or fed and cared for, as a man he *can* care for himself even though he continues to depend upon his parents. A similar growth of independency appears to occur in the mind. The effect of sensory stimuli depends more and more on the mind itself than on the material, and perhaps on the bodily agencies. The primrose by the river's brim is less than a primrose to the confused perception of the very young child, little more when he is older; it may be the suggestion of thoughts and speculations to the mature mind that can hardly be perceived to be related at all to the original perception of the flower. The mental contributions steadily and progressively overshadow the contributions conveyed through bodily stimuli. Imagination can dispense with information from the actual world more and more as the mind grows

and develops. It is not possible to attain certainty through science or philosophy regarding the ultimate or actual relation between body and mind. It may be that the mind is ever tied to its brain processes, however wide the sweep of its imagination and however relatively insignificant its actual physical impressions received from the external world may appear to be. But it is quite possible that it is not fixed firmly to the body as its indispensable base. There are suggestions in its ever-widening sweep that it can use the body as a base for achievements that can make it ultimately independent of it. There seems to be a steady shift of the center of dominance. The infant is the creature of its appetites, the conceptions of the mind grow, or grow in the normal development, into superiority and supremacy. The young child, like the humbler animals, no doubt regards the world as a place to feed and sleep in. For the mature mind the world of sense tends to disappear in a universe of beauty, truth and goodness. The mind required matter for its prius, it required the body for partnership in its process of development, but it is possible that when that partnership has played its part and been dissolved it may be free to follow its own life.

JOSHUA C. GREGORY.

BRADFORD, YORKSHIRE.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL
ASSOCIATION; THE EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING,
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, DECEMBER 27 AND 28, 1918.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY.

THE eighteenth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held at Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., on December 27 and 28, 1918.

The business meeting was called to order at 11:50 o'clock on December 27 with President Mary Whiton Calkins in the chair. The published minutes of the last meeting were approved. The Treasurer's report for the year was read and referred to auditors Fite and Woods. The report follows:

H. A. OVERSTREET, TREASURER, IN ACCOUNT WITH THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION.

Time Account.

Debit.

Time account, January 1, 1918.....	\$323.02
Interest, January 28.....	4.84
	<u>\$327.86</u>

Credit.

August 20, 1918, transferred to check account.....	\$150.00
Balance on hand.....	177.68
	<u>\$327.86</u>

Two Hundred Dollars Registered Bonds of the $4\frac{1}{4}\%$ Third Liberty
Loan, Nos. 513173, 513174 in the keeping of the Treasurer.

Check Account.

Debit.

Check account, January 1, 1918 (Spaulding, January 23)	\$192.41
Received from time account—August 20, 1918.....	150.00
Received from dues.....	180.00
Interest on Liberty bonds.....	2.98
	<u>\$525.39</u>

Credit.

January 23, Spaulding expenditures (Letter, January 23).....	\$ 57.24
February, clerical (letter, February 13).....	2.83
February, express package from Spaulding.....	3.99
March 22, printing.....	14.00
March 26, stamps and envelopes.....	9.12

April 11,	clerical	3.56
April 18,	printing.....	2.75
April 27,	stationery (large envelopes).....	2.50
May 6,	stamps.....	9.00
May 13,	clerical.....	3.75
July 1,	W. T. Marvin.....	4.66
	L. J. Henderson.....	26.10
	W. C. Warren.....	5.00
	R. F. A. Hoernlé.....	9.50
	H. S. Jennings.....	35.78
July 20,	printing.....	29.83
August 16,	Third Liberty Loan Bonds.....	200.00
	interest on deferred payments.....	1.69
September 4,	exchange.....	.50
December 16,	expenses of acting secretary.....	14.07
		<hr/>
		\$435.97
Balance on hand.....		89.42
		<hr/>
		\$525.39

The report of the Executive Committee was read and accepted. The President took occasion in behalf of the Executive Committee to apologize for overlooking the provision requiring the Executive Committee to appoint to the discussion committee two members of the Association in addition to the leader; also for the President's misstatement of the title of the Acting Secretary upon the Secretary's resumption of his duties.

The following new members were elected on recommendation of the Executive Committee: Dr. Irwin Edman, Columbia University; Dr. Kenneth S. Guthrie, All Souls Church, New York; Dr. Stephen C. Pepper, Concord, Mass.; Dr. Abraham A. Roback, Harvard University; Dr. Adolph J. Schneeweiss, Columbia University; Dean William Marshall Warren, Boston University.

Upon the recommendation of the Executive Committee, the following officers were elected for the ensuing year: *President*, H. B. Alexander; *Vice-President*, J. B. Pratt; *Secretary-Treasurer*, H. A. Overstreet; *Executive Committee Members*, E. C. Wilm, W. M. Urban.

The Executive Committee presented for the consideration of the Association three discussion topics chosen from among those submitted to the Committee by the members of the Association: *Contrasted Theories of Beauty*; *The Nature of the Community*; *Contrasted Theories of Time*. It was moved and carried to postpone the selection of the next year's topic until Saturday morning.

The Executive Committee asked the Association to express its wish concerning payment of the expenses to the December meeting of its

guests, Professors Warren and Jennings, participants in the discussion, stating that the Executive Committee stood ready to assume this expense. It was moved, seconded and carried, without dissenting vote, that the Association pay these expenses.

It was finally moved and carried that the report of the Executive Committee, with its recommendations, be adopted.

The report of the Executive Committee included the recommendation that the Constitution be amended so that Art. III, Sect. I shall read: "The officers of the Association shall be a President, Vice-President, and Secretary-Treasurer. The President and Vice-President shall be elected by the Association at each annual meeting. The Secretary-Treasurer shall be elected for a period of three years."

Professor Overstreet read the report of the Committee on Place of Meeting, which was adopted.

A motion to continue the Committee on International Coöperation was seconded and carried.

The report of the Committee on the Possibility of Securing More Representative and Inclusive Meetings of those Interested in Philosophy was read and accepted. The report follows:

Some further step in the direction of securing larger coöperation among those interested in philosophy seems desirable. The present situation with three organizations, none of them completely inclusive, seems to be largely due to accident.

Our first organization under the name of the American Psychological Association served an excellent purpose for a time, but increasing professional interests aided perhaps by the increasingly technical character of psychology led to a separate organization of the philosophers under our present name. At about the same time the Western Philosophical Association was organized. This also at the outset included both philosophy and psychology and for several years planned its programs and elected its officers on this dual basis. Without any formal action the Western Philosophical Association has, like the American Psychological Association, come to correspond to its name, and has practically dropped psychology. Finally the Southern Philosophical Association was organized. The result is that whereas the American Psychological Association, like similarly named associations in other fields, is a general all-inclusive association, there are three philosophical associations which overlap in part.

As pointed out in a report of a committee of this association two years ago, our association has never been exclusively eastern. It has western members; it has from time to time chosen officers from the west; it made a liberal grant last year to aid a journal published in a

western city. On the other hand, we recognize that the American Association at present does not fully perform the service rendered by similarly named associations in other fields.

1. It does not bring together so many as ought to come together. In its Atlantic Coast meetings relatively few are present from the West; in the one meeting thus far held in the West few attended from the East.

2. Meetings have not been arranged with a view to cover all parts of the country so as to distribute the expense of attending meetings somewhat equally over all sections. Meetings have perhaps been regulated more by offers of hospitality, by the convenience of a majority of members, and by the thought that western and southern members had their own associations.

The reasons for larger gatherings and for a more comprehensive organization of the profession are obvious. Aside from the advantages of acquaintance and of the added importance which occasion lends to the discussion of at least certain themes, there is growing recognition that in a republic a profession like ours has a duty not only to seek truth and to teach the young but also to contribute towards shaping institutions and public opinion. This is met in part by publication, but a comprehensive organization holding widely representative meetings would furnish additional opportunity and tend to call out the best thinking and most effective presentation.

The chief obstacle in the way of such meetings is no doubt the expense of travel, but men in other fields overcome this obstacle to a great degree. Philosophers ought not to be the only group unable to transcend space. The best device for meeting this difficulty seems to be not to attempt a maximum attendance every year but to plan for such a general meeting once in two or at most three years.

Any plan must presuppose a conviction that a general meeting is worth some effort and sacrifice. If the association will affirm the principle the subordinate matters of organization and method could be easily worked out. Three plans or types of plans are possible.

Plan 1.—Enlargement of the scope of the American Association. This Association might itself undertake the task. This would involve (1) enlarging its membership, *e. g.*, by including all now enrolled in other Associations and some not now enrolled in any; (2) arranging a schedule of meetings for some years in advance, to be held in the several sections of the country with the understanding that the biennial or triennial meetings should be of especial importance; (3) constructing a program for these special meetings which should give prominence in at least one session, to the public as contrasted with the more purely

technical aspects of philosophy; (4) making definite provision for publishing papers, carrying out more completely the policy of the last and of this present meeting.

Plan 2.—Stated joint meetings or congresses. The three Associations might provide by amendments to their by-laws for biennial or triennial joint meetings or congresses; the president for the first congress to be chosen by all members of the three associations through a mail nomination and ballot conducted by the secretaries of the three associations; the provisional secretary to be appointed by the president thus elected; the committee on program, time, and place of meeting to be constituted by the presidents and secretaries of the three associations; officers for subsequent meetings to be chosen as the first joint meeting might provide.

Plan 3.—Federation in a new organization. A carefully worked out plan for this is presented in the proposal of the Western Philosophical Association's Committee.

Probably either the second or the third plan would be freer from objection as neither of these would interfere with the present excellent work of the respective Associations. Your Committee agrees that some plan ought to be adopted. Owing to the necessity of conducting this work by correspondence it has not been able to hold such a conference for discussing the merits of the three plans as might have enabled it to reach an agreement upon details. It, therefore, recommends that the association express its preference for one of the three types of plans (not necessarily for any precise plan) and instruct a Committee to organize such a general meeting for 1919, or later.

Signed:

H. B. ALEXANDER,
M. W. CALKINS,
ALBERT LEFEVRE,
H. A. OVERSTREET,
J. H. TUFTS, *Chairman*.

Professor Alexander opened the discussion by reading a resolution of the Western Philosophical Association proposing the formation of a general federation of all philosophical societies in America. The name of the federation was to be "The American Philosophical Association." It was to have, besides the regular officers, a Council, consisting of these officers and the executive officers of the federated associations. The regular meetings were to be biennial; biennial dues to be five dollars, apportioned between the federal and the federated associations. The Proceedings were to be printed in the form of a volume.

It was moved and carried that the Association declare itself on the three plans proposed by Professor Tufts' committee.

Professor Fite moved that the Association declare itself in favor of Plan Two, to wit, the holding of a triennial joint meeting of the philosophical societies. Professor Hoernlé moved as an amendment that the discussion be postponed until the Saturday morning meeting. The motion was carried.

The meeting adjourned until Saturday at 11:30 a.m.

ADJOURNED MEETING, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1918.

The Association proceeded to vote upon the topics presented by the Executive Committee and chose as topic for 1919: "The Nature of the Community."

The following amendment proposed at the 1918 meeting was carried, to wit, Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution to read as follows: "There shall be an Executive Committee of nine members, three of whom shall be the officers of the Association, and six of whom shall be members at large, two members elected each year, for a period of three years."

In pursuance of the above amendment and on recommendation of the Executive Committee, the following were elected members of the Executive Committee for the three years' term: W. G. Everett, A. W. Moore.

The auditors reported that the Treasurer's report had been found correct. The report was adopted.

Professor Woods offered the following resolution, which was adopted: "The American Philosophical Association expresses its appreciation of the effort made by the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* to promote a better knowledge of American philosophy in France and desires to perpetuate and deepen the intimacy between French and American philosophers and the closer coöperation between France and the United States."

Upon the recommendation of the Executive Committee, Art. VII of the 1918 report of the Committee on Discussion was amended so that the date should read August 1, instead of July 15.

The consideration of Professor Fite's motion being resumed, Professor Drake moved as a substitute motion: "(1) That we instruct the committee of which Mr. Tufts is chairman that it is the wish of this Association to join with the Western and Southern Philosophical Associations in constituting an inclusive association, and thereupon to change the name of our existing Association, that the new inclusive

Association may bear the name 'American Philosophical Association.'

(2) That we instruct said committee to confer with a committee of the Western Association upon the problems involved in creating the inclusive association, and upon the proposal that congresses of the inclusive association shall be held, reporting the results of this conference to this Association at its next annual meeting."

Professor Overstreet moved to amend by dropping out, in the first sentence, the words: "and thereupon to change the name of our existing Association, that the new inclusive Association may bear the name 'American Philosophical Association.'" The amendment was carried.

Part (2) of Professor Drake's motion was then put and carried. The substitute motion as amended was then carried.

The meeting adjourned until Saturday afternoon at 2:15.

H. A. OVERSTREET,
Secretary.

ADJOURNED MEETING, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1918.

The adjourned meeting was called to order at 2:15 o'clock. The following resolution of Professor Kallen was read:

"*Resolved:* That it is the sense of the American Philosophical Association that the indispensable instrumentality of a just and lasting peace is a League of Free Nations democratically organized and administered and designed to serve the common interests, economic and political, of all nations. Be it further resolved that notice of this resolution be sent to the President and to the Senate of the United States."

Dr. Benjamin Rand moved that the resolution be laid on the table. Carried.

Professor Drake proposed the following amendment to the Constitution: Article I, Section 1 to read as follows: "The name of this organization shall be the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association."

Professor Talbot moved a hearty vote of thanks to the hosts of the Association. The motion was unanimously carried by a rising vote.

The meeting adjourned.

H. A. OVERSTREET,
Secretary.

The Status of Ethics. A. A. ROBACK.

The fundamental fault in the general conception of ethics is the undue emphasis laid on theory. It is scarcely recognized that ethics differs from logic and science in general in that its main signi-

ficance lies in the *carrying out* of certain principles rather than in their being set up. Hence arises the difficulty of finding a suitable clear name for ethics so as to include both the theoretical and the practical aspect. It is not a science, nor a discipline, nor an art nor merely a study. It is a *method of living* and as such it goes behind all science, since scientific endeavor constitutes only one section of life.

A method always presupposes a *problem*. The problem every rational person has before him may be stated thus: "*Given a society such as I live in, what shall be my course in life, so that I could improve the world, myself understood, since I form a part of the world.*" On the descriptive side, morality thus becomes the adjustment of a certain condition to a purpose that sees fit to effect a change. In other words, it is *the reaction of a personality* to his or her environment. To distinguish this reaction from the mere behavior of an organism, let us call it a *reformation*, accentuating thereby the volitional element. The attribute 'normative' does not attach here. It is not an adjustment of 'what is' to 'what ought to be,' but of 'what has been' to 'what is' in the intellectual and moral make-up of the reformer. The change is from the past to the present.

It is the purpose that fashions the personality; the wider the purpose in life, the greater the personality and the less scope for actual conflict with other purposes. The personality should be judged, not the particular act, except inasmuch as it is a manifestation of the agent's personality.

The concept 'good' not being exclusively ethical, does not enter into our problem. Instead we shall speak of 'right' and 'wrong.' There is no absolute criterion of rightness. Instead we have (a) *circumstantial* rightness (according to the time, place, and situation of the agent) and (b) a *pragmatic* or progressive rightness of an act as viewed by posterity. What is circumstantially right may be progressively or pragmatically wrong, but what is circumstantially wrong must always remain wrong. Thus if a man does what he is convinced he ought not to do, the act is wrong, though many advantages might have been due to this wrong. These have come about through sheer accident and an accident does not make a wrong act right. G. E. Moore's view of absolute moral evaluation is utterly untenable because only an omniscient being can know all the consequences of a given act.

How are Moral Judgments on Groups and Associations Possible?

A Neglected Chapter in Ethics. W. M. URBAN.

The object of this paper is to call attention to a group of moral judgments—on associations, social classes, peoples and states—

which, while most significant in practical morals, find no place in Ethics, because that science is individualistic in its presuppositions, defining the object of moral judgment as the act or character of an individual. At most, quasi-moral judgments on institutions are recognized, according as they are, or are not, instrumental to human ends.

Judgments of praise and blame on collective wills are, however, it is maintained, a genuine and fundamental part of the morals of common sense, the meaning of which, analysis shows, cannot be reduced to judgments on individuals or groups of individuals. The view that the conception of collective wills is either illusion, or practical fiction (like legal fictions) is opposed. The arguments for the illusory character of these judgments apply equally to judgments on individuals. Practical fictions are workable up to a point, but ultimately they break down, as no genuine moral judgment can rest on fiction. The validity and "practical reality" of collective wills is argued after the fashion of Kant in his *Rechtsphilosophie*.

It is only upon such a conception that a genuine ethics of states is possible, as is shown by the failure of all attempts to construct international morality on an individualistic basis.

How are such judgments possible? Perhaps they are not completely possible now, but may be made possible by developing adequate conceptions of the unity and personality of social wills. Burke said he did not know how to indict a whole people, but perhaps we may learn how. This is not wholly absurd. Many philosophers have conceived the individual self as an ideal rather than a *datum*. Such a conception would be *a fortiori* even more applicable to over-individual wills.

To the objection that there "is no whit of evidence" for such conceptions, the reply is that it is not evidence for validity that is lacking, but evidence for certain images and analogies in terms of which the objects have been envisaged. We must look for evidence in the right place. Elsewhere I have maintained that knowledge of other minds is essentially valuing and such valuing includes and is the source of our certainty of other minds. This is *mutatis mutandis* true of over-individual minds and collective wills. But this is another story.

Wrath and Ruth. H. B. ALEXANDER.

The great war has been fought; the hour for reflection is come. What philosopher, in 1918, can write of human nature and achievement as he would have written in the spring of 1914? Looked at from the vantage of four years' experience, the ideals of 1914 seem shot

through with the bizarre, the puerile, the presumptuous. Then, man felt himself to be 'self-made'—and was proud of it. And from this self-made man, arrogant, conceited, came man-made war; and the bubble of human self-satisfaction was pricked, and the old idols overthrown,—among them, far from the least, the philosopher's idolatry of human reason. Reason is surely not the trusted guide men had deemed it! Further, the war, with its new experiences, brought new revelations of human character. Biology had taught that conduct is keyed to a selfish hedonism; but we find whole nations fighting with an unselfish enthusiasm. Right had been esteemed an insight of commonsense; but it was about diverse conceptions of right that men warred. Wrath and ruth, these are the two great facts of human nature which the war and its aftermath have brought out, showing us mortals to be out of gear with the world.

Ministers of consolation, to be sure, talk of the 'good' that will make the war a blessing, and 'justify' its loss of life and treasure. But to whom? Will not the blood of the slain cry out? the torments of the sufferers? Is the past non-existent? 'Democracy' . . . but is a race whom reason cannot guide worthy of democracy? Are we not, after all, slaves to our passions? 'A new religion' . . . but can religion be made to order and win belief? And is it not true that pugnacity is ineradicable in human nature? Ought we to expect everlasting peace? Is the universe pacifist? 'To err is human' . . . how deep, then, is the illusion? What kind of a world created me to deceive me? is it curst at the core? Is there no hold which reason or feeling or moral sense can secure? No sanity? No place where men can fall square with the world?

Philosophy must answer. "*Tantum scientia potuit suadere malorum!*" But at least we recognize the ills as ills. What, then, of the Good? This is our sole philosophic problem. Reason, feeling, moral sense, all these are *selective* in operation. But the end of selection is to *determine*, by some nature more profoundly ours than we realize. This we must fathom, or seek to fathom, even though the task be beset with apparent futility,—which is but another mode of saying that philosophy will continue to be cultivated while experience of the world continues. Nor is the fact of the final obliteration of humankind a reason for giving over: perchance the Good, like the recognized Evil, is of the present hour; and perchance our very condemnations are our fullest measures of this two-fold world, and our ruths, our penitences, our supreme credos. Wrath and ruth, righteous wrath and ruth, are themselves philosophy.

Teleology in a System of Knowledge. JOHN WARBEKE.

Teleological interpretations of supposedly objective, empirical relationships have little scientific odor of sanctity; but recent attempts to interpret the knowledge process as instrumental, or purposive with relation to other forms of behavior, etc., claim to be scientific and also raise important questions concerning the logical implications of such a method. The current vague use of the term 'teleology' necessitates specific reference to definite connotations in their limited contexts, and four types are considered: those of James-Schiller, Bergson, Kant, and Dewey, respectively. The first involves ethical ends which, becoming objects of desire, realize good purposes by active agency, the results effected by the process (good fruit, cash value, etc.) being the criteria by which epistemological validity is measured. The second method interprets experience in terms of changes which are regarded as expressions of some form of energy, producing effects recognized and measured as valuable, but not attributable to deliberative conscious agency. The rejection of Finalism and the positing of genuine creative activity in the *élan vital* heightens rather than diminishes its teleological character by ascribing mental or quasi-mental agencies to the ends attained in the course of evolution, not only psychologically, but ontologically. Kant's *Zweckmässigkeit*, or regulative principle by virtue of which every interpretation assumes a formal purpose, is a third type omitting both ethical ends and empirical objects of desire. A fourth type looks to the knowledge process as a means to the end of a prospective functioning of all human life to its maximum. It would abandon most of the traditional problems of philosophy in the interest of a practical achieving of good and avoidance of evil, the problem of error being simply the problem of evil. The last-named doctrine is comparable in many respects with the Socratic-mediæval anthropocentric teleology, the chief point of difference being that the latter assumes good ends to be a matter of faith or of accepted empirical data, while the former erects anticipated human good into a *method* whereby to deal with all situations for the attainment of knowledge. The teleological character of this method is not altered by any atomizing of good ends, and since for Dewey the distinction between subjective and objective does not obtain for experience (which is regarded as being quite as objective as any 'natural' process) there can be no assignable limit within which the good purposes of man may be said to determine the character of our world.

Realism and Perception. JAMES B. PRATT.

Sense perception is the stronghold of realism, yet neither naïve realism, Lockian dualism, nor neo-realism has been able to give a satisfactory account of it. The first and third of these can find no place for the indubitable facts of illusion and error, while Locke was unable to explain the possibility of veridical perception. This peculiar situation is due to an incomplete analysis of the perceptive process—an incomplete analysis in which not only the realists but the majority of the psychologists share. Most writers on the psychology of perception have contented themselves with a description of the (sensational and revived) content of the percept and the way in which this is built up. A few psychologists, however, notably Stout and Ward, have pointed out as an equally important aspect of the perceptive process an outer reference to an object conceived as existing independently of the perceiver. This outer reference is both a meaning and the conscious correlate of a tendency to reaction. The child's notion of an external, dynamic world grows up hand-in-hand with his notion of himself, and his attitude toward this world is a genuine part of his perceptive process. It is a dynamic and independently existing object which one means, and toward which one tends to react in perception. The percept is thus only one aspect of perception, and its function is to act as a token of the presence of an independent object and to prompt us to reach towards it. The bearing of this view of perception upon epistemological theory is considerable. For a realism which makes the distinction suggested between content and object of perception is able to avoid both the difficulties which all three of the other forms of realism have found so insuperable. Since real things rather than 'ideas' are recognized as our objects, knowledge of reality and veridical perception again become possible; and for the same reason a place is also found for the possibility of mistake and illusion.

Principia Analytica. H. M. SHEFFER.

Deductive systems, it is well known, may be determined by means of postulate-sets in various ways. Euclidean geometry, for example, is determined by the widely different postulate-sets of Hilbert, of Veblen, and of Huntington. These distinct determinations are all 'equivalent'—any two of the postulate-sets are uniquely intertranslatable. May there not be, then, a set of 'superpostulates,' of which Hilbert's, Veblen's, Huntington's, and other postulate-sets are special cases? There is. And, as a matter of fact, the 'invariant' of these postulate-sets turns out to be of an extraordinarily simple character.

This concept of the invariant of a postulate-set for any deductive system is employed by the writer (1) in formulating the Theory of Postulational Technique, the Theory of Relativistic Physics, and the Theory of Epistemological Constructions (such as those of Russell and of Whitehead), and (2) in reconstructing the Foundations of Mathematical Logic.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New Series, Vol. XVIII.

Containing the Papers read before the Society during the thirty-ninth Session, 1917-18. London. Williams and Norgate, 1918—pp. 655.

This volume is a remarkable testimony to the vitality of philosophical interest and activity in Great Britain. Seventeen meetings of the Society were held during the year, and seventeen papers contributed, together with three symposia and three shorter communications. All of these papers are included in this volume, with the exception of those belonging to the symposium on the question, Why is the 'Unconscious' unconscious? which is published in the *British Journal of Psychology* (October, 1918). When it is remembered that the volume before us is a record of the work of the Society during the fourth year of the great war, with all its terrible trials and strain, one cannot refrain from expressing admiration for the steadfastness and courage of the group of scholars who kept alive the torch of philosophy in such unpropitious times, and when burdened with many heavy and unusual tasks. It is interesting to read that despite the enormous amount of public work which fell upon them, Mr. Balfour and Lord Haldane were able to preside at two of the meetings. Professor H. Wildon Carr was for the third successive year the president of the Society, and to him doubtless belongs a large measure of credit for the success of the session.

The papers of this volume are representative of all the more important phases of philosophy. Of the two symposia here reported, one dealt with the question, "Are Physical, Biological and Psychological Categories Irreducible?" and papers were contributed by J. S. Haldane, D'Arcy W. Thompson, P. Chalmers Mitchell, and L. T. Hobhouse. The other had as its subject, "Do Finite Individuals Possess a Substantive or an Adjectival Mode of Being?" and papers are published from B. Bosanquet, A. S. Pringle-Pattison, G. F. Stout, and Lord Haldane. There are three historical papers: "Indian Ideas of Action and their Interest for Modern Thinking," by F. W. Thomas; "The 'Modes of Spinoza' and the 'Monads of Leibniz,'" by G. Dawes Hicks; and "The Philosophy of Proclus," by A. E. Taylor. Two papers deal with political philosophy: "Realism and Politics," by

J. W. Scott; and "The Conception of a Unitary Social Order," by H. J. W. Hetherington. Four are somewhat distinctly theological in character: "The Theory of a Limited Deity," by Charles F. D'Arcy; "Omnipotence," by F. C. S. Schiller; "The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God," by Albert A. Cock; and "The Moral Argument for the Existence of God," by W. R. Mathews. Three papers may be classified as psychological: "Behaviour as a Psychological Concept," by Arthur Robinson; "On the Summation of Pleasures," by Dorothy Winch; and "Association," by Arthur Lynch. There remain the presidential address on "The Interaction of Mind and Body"; "Thought and Intuition," by Karin Stephen; "The Development of Criticism," by F. C. Bartlett; "The Conception of Reality," by G. E. Moore; "Is There a Mathematics of Intensity," by J. A. Smith; "Anthropomorphism and Truth," by J. B. Baillie; "Practical Dualism," by E. E. Constance Jones; and "Space-Time," by S. Alexander.

It is clearly impossible in a review to give even a brief summary of the content of all of these papers, even if one were at home in all these different fields. I shall call attention only to those that happen most to have interested me.

The presidential address with which Professor Carr opened the work of the session, continues, as he tells us, the consideration of the subject which formed the basis of his two previous addresses on similar occasions—the subject of the relation of mind and body. He believes that new facts have lately been established concerning the nature of the mind and the body which will contribute to a more satisfactory theory of their relation. Of these, the most important seems to be the fact, which he regards as established beyond question, that some disorders of the psycho-physical organism, are psychological in origin. This makes it impossible any longer to conceive of the mind as the concomitant of certain nervous changes in the body. "The mind has a structure of its own. It is an integration of coördinated psychical elements or processes—personal memories, tendencies, desires, wishes, and the like—which mutually repress or inhibit one another; or, as the case may be, interplay with and evoke one another. This psychical matter has an organization as complete, and a unity of living process as perfect, as the physiological matter of the body. The mind is not an intermittent consciousness lighting up with awareness certain states of the organism and dependent on particular physiological processes. It is a structure which can suffer injury, derangement or disorder, independently of the physical derangement of the

body. If, then, there be interaction between soul and body, it by no means follows that parts or constituents of the soul must interact with parts or constituents of the body; it may be that the whole soul, or the soul as an individual, interacts with the whole body as a self-controlled unity of coördinated mechanisms" (pp. 2-3).

This is the theory which Professor Carr supports by appeal to fact and argument throughout this paper. No one can doubt that it represents a great advance over the older interactionism and parallelism, which used to be set out as the sole alternatives. But one may accept this more concrete view of the relation of mind and body without connecting it with Bergsonian metaphysics, as Professor Carr does. Mind and body, he tells us, are antithetical principles representing the dichotomy of an original unity, and appearing in the mutually exclusive forms of freedom and necessity. Now if this is true, one must ask where is the basis to be found of that 'solidarity' of mind and body on which Professor Carr insists. Life in this view is a progressive dichotomy; and it is evident then that there is no basis of unity or 'solidarity' to be found in the process itself, or in its end. One must, as always in the Bergsonian metaphysics, look back to the beginning to justify the unity and connectedness of diversity.

The symposium on the relations of physical, biological, and psychological categories, contains matter of much interest. The formulation of the problem has the advantage of bringing into the foreground what is often overlooked in discussions of this central problem, that the categories of the various sciences are assumptions implicated in the particular form of the questions which they severally raise, and must be interpreted in the light of these questions. Their value in any situation depends upon the completeness of the form of answer to which they lead. It is because the requirement of intelligibility assumes new forms, and makes further demands, as one proceeds from the physical to the living and conscious, that the mechanical categories have to give way to others more adequate to the demands of the new situations. This seems to be very clearly recognized in the arguments of Dr. Haldane and Professor Hobhouse, while their opponents, as is unfortunately too common with representatives of the special sciences, seem inclined to regard mechanism as an absolute form of intelligibility, or at least as affording the only objectively verifiable form of answer to which human reason can attain. It is worth while to have the issues thus sharpened.

The title of the problem that formed the subject of the second symposium reported in this volume is taken from Professor Pringle-

Pattison's book, *The Idea of God*, where he protests against the Spinozistic use of the term substance and the description of all "provisional substances as predicates" or "adjectives" of "the one true individual Real." All the parties to the discussion however acknowledge the inadequacy of the formula, 'substantial' or 'adjectival,' to express the opposition between the two points of view here under discussion. Dr. Bosanquet and Professor Pringle-Pattison are the chief protagonists, and the point at issue may be said to be the different emphasis and interpretation which each has given to the reality of the individual in recently published Gifford Lectures. In spite of the fact that there is much that these two writers recognize in common, there are also fundamental differences in their ultimate attitude and conclusions, and these are here restated with great force and clearness. In general, Professor Pringle-Pattison emphasizes more the existential unity of the individual self with its 'given' ends and demands; while Dr. Bosanquet finds the ground of its reality in its principle of self-transcendence, which is identified only in terms of a universal content. Professor Stout, who appears on the whole to agree more nearly with Pringle-Pattison, seems to me to make an important contribution to the discussion by his criticism of some logical doctrines which are common to Mr. Bradley and Dr. Bosanquet. And Lord Haldane's admirable review of the discussion contains valuable suggestions as to the means by which the impasse between the One and the Many may be avoided. He holds that the difficulties of the system of Professor Pringle-Pattison on the one hand, and of Dr. Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley on the other—the incomprehensibility of the Absolute—to which both views seem to lead—has its source in the fact that both alike cling to 'relational' forms of knowing, and fail to make adequate use of the speculative categories of reason.

The article by Professor Baillie, entitled "Anthropomorphism and Truth," has also certain bearings on the questions at issue in the symposium just described, but it also represents a point of view which seems to me especially fresh and interesting. It is to be hoped that it will lead to further discussion, and that the author may see fit to proceed to develop his position. In defining this position in opposition to contemporary views, he says: "In our own time we find those who, laying stress on the independence of truth, treat the human mind as but a medium in which truth is intermittently realized or focused; the mind is subordinate to the truth, and shapes its conscious process in terms of an 'objective' order or system. In inevitable reaction from this position, there are those who consider that truth is not

independent of the mind, that truth is at best but subordinate to and dominated by the prior practical interests of the mind, a mere instrument for its purposes. . . . The assumption in the one case is that the individual mind is always qualified by a particular element which either is, or should be, in process of dissolution into the universality characteristic of truth; the assumption in the other case is that the particular element is in itself precious to the individual, and neither can nor should be surrendered to the claims of a universal which, however important, is always 'abstract' and incapable of doing full justice to what is particular" (pp. 186-87). Both of these points of view ignore the nature of individuality as essentially development, and also that "behind the processes of both practical action and intellectual procedure lies the more ultimate reality of the single indivisible individuality itself." It is the whole mind as a developing individuality which gives the key to the nature of experience, and it is in terms of it that truth is to be understood. "Individuality prescribes the course which thought has to take, not thought the character which individuality should possess." What is necessary, I think, is that Professor Baillie shall give some further account of what he calls "the solid integrity of the mind's life." One may readily grant that the abstracting process of the intellect is only one of its forms or functions, and yet hold that as a concrete universal its unity is in a real sense logical. And though agreeing with his contention that truth is nothing 'transcendent,' I find difficulty in accepting the 'anthropomorphic' interpretation which he has given of it.

Under the title of "Realism and Politics," Mr. J. W. Scott calls attention to a connection between "a phase of current thought and a phase of current social theory," taking Russell and Bergson as representatives of 'Realism.' "Realism is not the view that things are non-mental. It is the view which treats the question of their position in the best arrangement, the best 'place for the soul,' that the universe will make, as quite indifferent to the question of their reality. It is the view that the most indubitably real is the most nearly non-constructed." The thesis of this interesting article is that there is a connection between the realistic temper of mind in philosophy and certain contemporary social movements which take as their standard the immediate and narrow demands of the bare will, without any attempt to harmonize or coördinate them in the light of a broader human principle. The paper by Professor Hetherington on "The Conception of a Unitary Social Order" forms an excellent complement to this article, and is in itself an admirably clear statement of the classical view of the state as the expression of a 'General Will.'

I regret that no space remains to comment on the other papers contained in this volume, several of which are of great interest and importance. One cannot help being impressed both by the range of interest represented by the activities of the Aristotelian Society during the past year, and by the scholarly character of the papers which have been produced. I can only close by expressing congratulations, and wishing for the Society a long continuance of such distinguished achievement as is represented by the papers of the thirty-ninth session.

J. E. CREIGHTON.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

Creative Intelligence. Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude. By JOHN DEWEY, ADDISON W. MOORE, HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN, GEORGE H. MEAD, BOYD H. BODE, HENRY WALDGRAVE STUART, JAMES HAYDEN TUFTS, HORACE M. KALLEN. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1917.—pp. iv, 467.

This volume of essays by eight representative American Pragmatists is characterized in the preface as follows: It "presents a unity in attitude rather than a uniformity in results. . . . The reader will note that the Essays endeavor to embody the common attitude in application to specific fields of inquiry which have been historically associated with philosophy rather than as a thing by itself. Beginning with philosophy itself, subsequent contributions discuss its application to logic, to mathematics, to physical science, to psychology, to ethics, to economics, and then again to philosophy itself in conjunction with esthetics and religion. The reader will probably find that the significant points of agreement have to do with the ideas of the genuineness of the future, of intelligence as the organ for determining the quality of that future so far as it can come within human control, and of a courageously inventive individual as the bearer of 'a creatively employed mind.'"

Professor John Dewey opens the volume with an essay on "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy." The recovery will take place when philosophy substitutes for an outworn and largely false view of 'experience' one which is congenial to present conditions, and an interpretation which, instead of being forced upon the word, "experience suggests about itself" (p. 7). The contrast between the inherited account of experience and the one relevant to modern life is considered under five heads: (1) Experience is not primarily knowledge, but intercourse of a living being with his physical and social environment; (2) it is not subjective, but objective; (3) it is not a

"registration of what has taken place," but experimental and forward-looking; (4) it is not atomistic, but "pregnant with connexions"; (5) it is not opposed to thought, but constantly and by nature full of inference.

The second essay by Professor Addison W. Moore is entitled "Reformation of Logic." "The present task of logical theory," says the writer, "is the restoration of the continuity of the act and agent of knowing with other acts and agents" (p. 77). Two "ancient disabilities" of logic must be overcome: the leaving of an absolute breach between non-logical and logical acts, in which case a 'universal' or 'idea' tends to be held "as an object of contemplation and of worshipful adoration," and (2) the reading down of logical attributes into non-logical experience. The latter is the fallacy of idealistic logic and is the realization of continuity in experience at the expense of a real distinction. The conception of growth by means of which immediate experience is seen to 'become' what it is not at first, that is, reflective, sets the parts of experience in their right relations.

In the third essay, "Intelligence and Mathematics," Professor Harold Chapman Brown shows by the aid of a good deal of anthropological material that mathematics like all other sciences springs from the needs of man in adapting himself to his environment. The writer follows the "progress of self-conscious theory" down to the application of algebra to geometry by Descartes. In the discussion of the mathematical logic of Messrs. Whitehead and Russell, he insists that the use of symbols is possible in an advanced stage of abstraction only because those symbols applied in the first instance to real things. His emphasis throughout is upon the likeness in kind between mathematics and the natural sciences.

In "Scientific Method and Individual Thinker," Professor George H. Mead insists upon the 'experimental' nature of the movement of science. The ancients treated single happenings as belonging to a system, an individual, or an essence. Upon their view the 'nature' of all things was 'given,' and the task of the scientist was merely that of accurate classification. Modern science, on the other hand, takes seriously the 'fact' or isolated thing, which will not fall under any theory, and which may by its insubordination overthrow an earlier hypothesis. It also does justice to the participation of the individual thinker in the progress of science. The kingdom of science is within men, and not in some reality apart.

That psychology is properly a science of behavior is the main theme of Professor Boyd H. Bode's essay on "Consciousness and

Psychology." But the 'behavior' of psychology is of a distinctive kind, and must be marked off from the subject-matter of physiology and physics. "Control by a future that is made present is what constitutes consciousness" (p. 242), and the present conscious situation is characterized by expectancy and uncertainty. The interpretation of consciousness as functional, dynamic, objective, and experimental necessitates the abandonment of various methods and conceptions which deny these qualities to consciousness: The method of introspection is subjective and preserves an attenuated form of the 'soul' of traditional psychology; psycho-physical parallelism virtually makes the mental of no account; the notion of focus and margin, when taken in terms of static structure, is partly based on a false analogy with vision.

In the sixth article Professor Henry Waldgrave Stuart discusses "The Phases of the Economic Interest." Changes in economic needs and interests in the individual indicate a change in the personality as a whole; the new acquisitions do not satisfy preëxistent demands; neither are they utterly lacking in meaning for the old self. But the individual or society mounts to a new level of experience with the attainment of novel economic satisfaction. The writer's term for economic activity—"constructive comparison"—is intended "to suggest that the process is in the nature of adventure, not calculation, and, on the other hand, that though adventurous it is not sheer hazard uncontrolled" (p. 309). The reigning Austrian theory which makes of economics a mere matter of accounting neglects the "qualitative uniqueness and the integral character of personal budgets" (p. 317, note).

Professor James Hayden Tufts bases his interpretation of "The Moral Life and the Construction of Values and Standards" neither upon a mere study of concepts nor upon descriptive anthropology, but upon the appearance of standards within the "process of forming and reshaping ideals" (p. 357). "We must . . . take as our starting-point the conviction that moral life is a process involving physical life, social intercourse, measuring and constructive intelligence" (p. 404). These are the 'factors'; the nature of good and right are defined in relation to them. 'Good' is objective as a value, not as an essence or physical fact, and its relation to other values depends in part upon the social factor. "Right is not merely a means to the good but has an independent place in the moral consciousness," and this place is determined by reference to a moving and social standard. Emotion and intellect fuse in the formation of moral judgments. The Prag-

matic view of the moral consciousness, in contrast with Professor Fite's, is objective and dynamic.

"Value and Existence in Philosophy, Art, and Religion" is the subject of the final essay by Dr. Horace M. Kallen. 'The problem of evil' is best understood in the light of its psychological origin. The numerous fundamental instincts in man call for satisfactions which the world does not *prima facie* furnish. In the face of this disappointment and obstruction the mind seeks or creates substitutes for itself. The tragedy of the world is the necessity of accepting something different from the original object of desire. "Dreams, some of the arts, religion, and philosophy may indeed be considered as such fulfillments, worlds of luxuriant self-realization of all that part of our nature which harsh conjunctions with the environment overthrow and suppress" (p. 422). Unity, spirituality, and eternity are traits of the perfect universe which man imaginatively constructs, and freedom and immortality are compensatory values which he attributes to himself.

Such in very brief summary are the statements of the application of Pragmatic theory to various fields.

It did not seem necessary to reproduce the essays in greater detail; the "common attitude" is not only the matter of chief importance, but when it is once thoroughly grasped the applications follow almost of themselves. We have already noticed to what elements in this attitude the authors themselves wish to call attention. There is in evidence, however, a more general mark of the Pragmatic position by which it has from the first been distinguished. This is the Pragmatists' belief that they are the first to do justice to things as they are, that they alone among philosophers report the nature of the real world in its full complexity and movement. 'Facts,' 'life,' 'experience,' 'the concrete,' are their peculiar possession; philosophy has too long concerned itself with abstractions, unproved assumptions, dead and formal hypotheses and problems, and fictions of the imagination. Examples of this feeling of superior closeness to reality may be found in numerous passages throughout the book.

To Pragmatism (and biology, with which it shares the glory) is due all the credit of making effective use of the conception of the 'organic' in the interpretation of experience (p. 20). The name of Professor Dewey is connected with the discovery of the part played by emotion in the formation of judgments of right, as if the world owed this truth also to Pragmatism (p. 389). "Tangible meaning and practical importance" in the interpretation of growth and change come from

Pragmatism. Idealism, committed as it is to the 'latent' and 'implicit' cannot account for genuine development (p. 297). Pragmatism "drops the pretense of envisaging the universe," and "frankly acknowledges the realities of immediate experience" (pp. 467, 466). Speculative philosophers have been guilty of "the more than technical blunder" of substituting "the otiose insight gained by manipulation of a formula for the slow coöperative work of a humanity guided by reflective intelligence." We are to infer that the latter effective method is that of Pragmatism (p. 28). Idealists have spent all their spiritual substance (if we may believe the account of the Pragmatists) in "disingenuous apologetics," in explaining away real experience.

Because this claim of superior faithfulness in reporting reality is made by all philosophers who take themselves seriously, and who believe that they are the first to know the whole truth, it is worth while once more to examine in what sense, and by virtue of what affirmations and exclusions, the Pragmatists are closer to the facts than anyone else. For it is evident that the 'experience' that they report has a distinctive and describable nature; not all qualifications attach with equal validity to the world as it appears to the Pragmatist. Even he has predilections and assumptions.

In general, then, it is true that the Pragmatic philosophy draws its substance—the material upon which it operates—from the contemporary industrial, political, and scientific movements. This at once implies that it does not draw its significance from the life of philosophy hitherto. "This essay," says Professor Dewey, who opens the volume with a general discussion of the work of Pragmatism, "[is] an attempt to forward the emancipation of philosophy from too intimate and exclusive attachment to traditional problems." Too much emphasis has been laid on past thought, old antitheses, old problems and their solutions. What is called for is "direct preoccupation with contemporary difficulties." Philosophy must not be side-tracked from the main currents of contemporary life. But in the next breath Professor Dewey hastens to add that we must keep something of philosophical tradition. We do not want too much of it, but something of it is necessary. By what standard then do we distinguish what has value in the history of philosophy from what is an unprofitable accumulation of words? It appears that we are to retain such parts of the tradition as are useful to outsiders. Scientists and business men shall determine in large measure the content of philosophy (see p. 5). Philosophy, in a word, is a serving-woman, as in the middle ages, and is valued as an instrument, but does not properly determine its own ends (p. 14).

The Pragmatist views all things in the light of existing science and social practice.

Nobody doubts that philosophy should bring its full powers to bear on contemporary problems. But the question is whether philosophy has or has not any inner life or positive content by means of which it at once attains self-expression and also the capacity to stimulate other kinds of life and thought. An examination of the references throughout this volume to some of the outstanding traditional philosophies suggests the hypothesis that Pragmatists do not believe in the history of philosophy because they have not thoroughly appropriated it. It is evident, for example, that a philosopher is scarcely repaid for time spent with Kant who comes away from it with the conviction that "Kant recognized no functional relationship between the nature of the *Mannigfaltigkeit* of sensuous perception and the forms into which it was poured" (p. 194). Again, we are told that Kant's view of experience was no substantial advance on the sensationalism of Hume (p. 17). Hegel is allowed to be more concrete, "and yet in the Hegelian logic, the movement is always away from the perceptual experience toward the higher realm of the *Idee*. . . . Thought is . . . a great process of realization in which this world is forever transcended" (p. 196). These are, of course, the conventional and external observations to make about these philosophies. Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza fare no better in the hands of these prophets of 'contemporary movements.' The lack of historical sense assumes its most offensive form in the final essay on "Value and Existence." It is scarcely credible that any school of thinkers should entrust the treatment of religion, art, and the general significance of philosophy to one who refers to most of the serious career of philosophy—"any idealistic system from Plato to Bradley"—as somnambulism, and who draws an analogy between traditional idealism and paranoia (p. 436). The writer of this article says that "much of the underlying motive of the doctrine [of immortality] is a *sehnsucht* and nostalgia after the absent dead," and that Spinoza preserves the form if not the substance of this passion (p. 433). It is difficult to find this preserved form. Perhaps the reference is to Spinoza's use of the word "eternity." The same writer speaks of "the historic accident we call Christianity" (p. 433) and refers to the history of philosophy as an unvarying succession of attempts to *prove* the falsehood that the contents of daily life are value-forms (p. 435). In the light of the unsympathetic treatment of the history of philosophy throughout the book, Professor Dewey's remark that "It would also be a grateful task to dwell upon the precious

contributions made by the philosophic systems which as a whole are impossible," and his reference to "the fertile and ample ideas of a Spinoza, a Kant, or a Hegel" (p. 6), strike one as homage which is more verbal than real.

There is then this fatal contradiction at the very heart of the Pragmatic position. While its representatives profess to keep closer to 'experience' and the 'real world' than any previous group of thinkers, in reality they are guilty of the very abstractness against which they inveigh. Philosophy is committed, as they insist, to an examination of the world as it is, to reality in its connections, continuity, and development. But this complete view has not been hid from the patient and progressive reflection of more than two thousand years to be now suddenly revealed to contemporary science and industry. Pragmatists profess to stand over against the whole evolution of philosophical thought; and then by the standard of some test that they draw from the problems of the present time propose to select here a bit and there a bit that is true and valuable. They have not sunk themselves within the movement of philosophy and learned its progress in reasonableness; they know at once from the 'strains' and 'conflicts' of 'immediate experience' what problems are genuine and worth working at.

Connected with the abstractness of the Pragmatists' interpretation of the function and achievement of philosophy is the abstractness of their view of the human mind. Just as philosophy springs for them full-orbed out of the immediate context, without any traceable intellectual ancestry, so the human being seems to be explicable in terms of present wants and desires,¹ and to lack those larger feelings which exhibit his universal nature. For example, man is not credited with such a disinterested emotion as 'wonder,' the root in humanity of all speculative philosophy. Rather we are told that "Thinking—worse luck!—came into being as response to discomfort, to pain, to uncertainty, to problems" (p. 409). We think, apparently, because we are driven like hirelings to it, not because of a spontaneous impulse to assert our kinship with something greater beyond ourselves. Intelli-

¹ Professor Tufts says (p. 407) that "only wilful misinterpretation will suppose that the method here set forth is that of taking every want or desire as itself a final justification." However, even at the risk of being accused of "wilful misinterpretation," I must still say that I cannot discover that Pragmatism succeeds in explaining mind by anything in principle different from particular desires and impulses. The fact that it claims to operate upon these particulars with a refined type of calculation which aims, as Professor Tufts says, to reckon with all the factors in the situation, does not seem to require one to alter the above estimate of the Pragmatic theory of the constitution and significance of mind.

gence, from the Pragmatic point of view, is skill in the manipulation of concepts (p. 120). The function of reflection is to assist "in that control of the world which secures a prosperous and significant expansion of experience" (p. 25). In plain words, its function is consideration of consequences, calculation of advantage. "Experience is an affair of facilitations and checks, . . . of good fortune and defeat in . . . countless qualitative modes." (p. 16). There is only scorn for those "pietists who persist in arguing that the trouble which we do encounter in this vale of tears springs from the inwardness of our own natures" (p. 409). But there are a good many conceptions, vital to large numbers of people, for which there is no room in the Pragmatists' philosophical edifice. They speak indeed of courage—for example, in the phrase, "courageously inventive individual"—but this 'courage' always seems to be exercised in view of some advantage to be obtained either for the individual or the group, and to approximate in its significance 'interested aggression.' There is a courage which is self-effacing, and which may manifest itself either as active wrath or as patient fortitude. None of the virtues associated with the acceptance of the universe as a whole are recognized by Pragmatists: acquiescence of mind, grace, humility.

The explanation of this second abstractness in the Pragmatists' view seems to be that for him man is in the last resort nothing more than a psycho-physical organism. Self-consciously proud of the fact that their view transcends mere mechanism, they yet usually fall back upon 'connections of neurones' and 'biological adjustment' for their definite explanation of the nature of consciousness. How, Professor Bode inquires, may we distinguish consciousness from the ordinary reflex? "Conscious behavior," he tells us, "involves a certain *process* of organization which constitutes a differential. The units entering into this process are 'definitely organized systems of neural discharge'" (p. 237). "The *a priori* element in human experience," says Professor Dewey, "is activities made possible by means of established connections of neurones" (p. 19). "Man is, after all, rational only because through his nervous system he can hold his immediate responses in check and finally react as a being that has had experiences and profited by them" (Professor Brown, p. 174).

But the total nature of man can not be expressed in terms of stimulus and response. The logic of Pragmatism does not allow for more, and yet 'the concrete,' 'experience,' 'things as they are' show more than will compress into so limited a theory. There are many inconsistent hints of a larger reality in these essays: "the essential connexion of

intelligence . . . with possibilities involving a transfiguration" (p. 29); again, "From some source beyond the scope and nature of the earlier function a suggestion or an impulsion has come by which the agent has endeavored to move forward" (p. 293); again, "A spontaneous constructive interest stands more or less constantly ready in us" (p. 299); again: "its [the mind's] use in bettering life" (p. 28); again, "The only truly general, the reasonable as distinct from the merely shrewd or clever thought, is the *generous* thought" (p. 389). Reflection upon some of the conceptions here suggested—'transfiguration,' 'sources beyond,' 'spontaneity,' 'life,' 'generosity,' inevitably lead to a more comprehensive theory of the nature of philosophy and of the human mind. Taken by themselves these statements seem to indicate on the part of the writers a recognition of the higher levels of experience. But the conceptions involve a juster view of the place and work of the individual thinker and of the present age in the history of thought than Pragmatism can consistently furnish, and a more respectful attitude toward the actually existing universe which it would so lightly change for the better.

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The Processes of History. By FREDERICK J. TEGGART. New Haven, The Yale University Press, 1918.—pp. ix, 162.

This book is a sequel to the author's *Prolegomena to History* noticed in this REVIEW, Vol. XXVI, p. 228. The former volume was an examination and criticism of the rather voluminous literature dealing with the nature of history, and expressed the writer's conviction that the work of historians had been dominated by the construction of narrative rather than by a scientific formulation of fact. In the earlier book Professor Teggart promised a more constructive outline of the task of history, and the present work is the fulfillment of that promise.

The thesis of the book may be expressed in general somewhat as follows: History to-day needs some such revolution (though the analogy must not be pushed too far) as Darwin wrought in the biological sciences. Political history, the history of culture, philosophy, economics,—the humanistic studies generally,—need to be drawn together about one principle in the same fashion as organic evolution brought together paleontology, embryology, and comparative anatomy. More particularly, facts within each of these humanistic sciences need to be brought together by what might be called a dynamic explanatory principle, as natural selection brought together a

mass of previously unrelated facts about the breeding and distribution of plants and animals. Along with this tightening of logical relationship, there must be a broadening of the field to escape the provincialism of history as written for men of European culture alone. In short, the problem of history is to show "how man in all his diversity has come to be as we find him now," just as Darwin's problem may be said to have been to show how organic structure came to be diversified as it is. Like Darwin also the historian must assume innumerable series of historical events and that all things have come to be as they are by the continued operation of natural processes.

The title of Professor Teggart's book is therefore descriptive of the procedure of history as he conceives it. History is a search for 'processes' or, as the biologist more commonly calls them, the 'factors' of change. Nor is the historian's work, more than the biologist's, the mere description of factual changes. The processes sought are forces operative always and everywhere; the problem is one of comparison and generalization. The human story, wherever told, is of one piece, held together in its most general aspects by the features of the physical environment. Thus throughout the world we find political organization arising at the termini of routes of travel which are marked out by the configuration of the land or the nature of soil and climate. Moreover, the movements of men along these routes, at least in masses, are determined probably by alterations in the equilibrium between population and the means of subsistence. These factors form the permanent background of history, though they are by no means the only factors or perhaps the ones most vital to historical explanation.

The heart of the problem lies in the human factors of history, in the natural processes of human nature. The argument at this point is somewhat involved, but if I grasp it, it runs as follows: In most general terms, there are two types of human organization, that according to kinship and that according to territory. The latter is the specifically political type of organization, and since political organization arises at the termini of routes of travel, the physical and human factors are correlated at this point. The physical factors determine the lines of movement and the termini of the movements are the points of strain between different races and cultures. Migration breaks down the primitive organization by blood relationship and brings about organization by territory or ownership of soil. The concept of property may be said to be the heart of the new organization. The problem of history is to untangle the factors which appear

in the transition from one type of organization to the other. The outstanding feature of the transition is the liberation of spontaneous, individual activity, since organization by kinship means the domination of the individual by habit and tradition. The breaking up of this type of organization takes place mainly, if not altogether, as a result of the meeting and conflict of different cultures. When ceremonies can no longer be performed at the places and in the manner prescribed by custom, the individual is forced to criticize and to act on his own initiative. In its most inclusive sense, therefore, history is the study of the changes by which systems of ideas have come to be as they are, the chief factor in these changes being the conflicts between different systems of ideas.

It should be said that Professor Teggart presents these generalizations in no dogmatic vein, being quite as ready as one could wish to recognize their tentative nature; so far as their agreement with fact is concerned, he presents them only as what he takes to be the drift of the evidence. Aside from difficulties of evidence, however, there are serious difficulties of definition which he certainly does not ignore but which he perhaps does not recognize quite so clearly. To mention only one such difficulty, what are we to take, in any given case, as constituting a release of individual initiative? That the present-day European is freer than the member of a savage tribe is perhaps true, but if all the qualifications were made, it seems doubtful if much meaning would be left in the original generalization. The European is free in many ways which would have no meaning at all for the savage, and on the other hand he is bound in many ways that the savage is never conscious of. Certainly for any definite period of history it is practically impossible to decide whether individual initiative has grown or diminished on the whole. Is a man freer to-day than a century ago? In the matter of religious practice he probably is; in the management of some kinds of property he almost certainly is not. Until we have some way of measuring spontaneity as against tradition, the utility of such a formula as Professor Teggart's is rather doubtful.

Whatever its utility may be, however, one feels that it at any rate introduces a point of view somewhat different from that taken when the geographical factors are under discussion. Increase of liberty can scarcely be a factor in the same sense as diminished rain-fall. Nor does the analogy with Darwin's work seem to hold in this case. There seems to be no more reason why the processes of history should produce individual spontaneity as a rule, than why natural selection should produce differentiation of structure as a rule. The latter

point of view seems to introduce an element of valuation into the work of the historian for which Professor Teggart does not find a place and which he appears to condemn. One suspects that this is a phase of the humanistic sciences which refuses to be eliminated, a phase, moreover, which is intimately connected with Professor Teggart's liberal conception of all these sciences as being concerned with systems of ideas.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

The Life and Work of George Sylvester Morris. A Chapter in the History of American Thought in the Nineteenth Century. By R. M. WENLEY. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1917.—pp. xv, 332.

Professor Wenley has accomplished a difficult task with rare skill and success. The meaning of his sub-title is amplified in the following statement from his preface, where, speaking of Professor Morris, he says:—"His intellectual history, despite its sudden end, epitomizes that of many minds in his day, because it embodies a representative human experience peculiar to the second half of the nineteenth century, particularly in the English-speaking world." Mr. Wenley's achievement is measured by the fact that his biography actually sets forth in a living form this epitome of a great intellectual experience of the later nineteenth century. The reader is not simply told about it. The development of the generation, its intellectual transition and struggle, is depicted as it was embodied in a personality of wonderful sincerity. Sympathetic insight, delicacy of touch, fidelity of portraiture, have combined with hard work and an understanding of the spiritual questionings characteristic of the transition out of Puritan Evangelicism, to produce a work which is both a faithful biography of an unusual human soul and a contribution of signal value to the history of American thought. The task was not made easy by materials ready at hand. In Professor Morris, the traditional constraint and self-consciousness of New England Puritanism had been sublimated into a spiritual detachment from all that narrowly concerned his own ego. He had learned to consume his own smoke, to transmute his personal experiences into something of impersonal meaning, and he would have found it indelicate and impossible to dwell on the incidents of his personal history. As a consequence, it was hard to gather together even the main external facts of his life, to say nothing of the intellectual crises through which he passed. Professor Wenley's scholarly *pietas* surmounted the difficulties. The result is a book which it is to be hoped will serve as a precedent for later records of other American scholars and teachers. There are traditions which are harmful, and there is equally in American life a lack of tradition which is harmful. Studies which should unite as does Professor Wenley's book the biographical element with the significant movements of the time would supply a much needed sense of the continuous ties that bind our present to the past. Few things would so well lend richness and distinction to the intellectual life, which in spite of vigor will be meager till it is fused with a sense of the labors and achievements of the bygone generations who have worn the roads along which we may press forward to new goals.

If I have said more about the book than about its subject, Professor Morris,

it is because to write of the latter in this place would be but to summarize the book itself. George Sylvester Morris was leaving Dartmouth College just as the Civil War was breaking out. Twenty years later he assumed the Chair of Ethics and History of Philosophy in the University of Michigan. In 1889 came his untimely death. During this period, a much greater transformation came over America than it is even yet possible to realize. Mr. Morris suffered the spiritual conflicts of the transition. For himself he achieved, by means of a combination of Greek and German thought, a triumphant reconciliation of traditional religion with rational intelligence, of the older New England individualism with devoted loyalty to the purpose and meaning of objective institutions, of moral faith with the pronouncements of science. This generation finds the solution too easy; the formula of reconciliation too much a product of desire; the combination too much a mixture of incompatible factors. But Mr. Morris's personality, his spirit, was a prophecy of the possibility of a true union of substantial tradition and the free life of thought. No person ever came under his influence without attaining a greater faith in both of these things. In education he was a power among the scholars of those days who led the American College away from its provincialism into broader fields of learning, and keener methods of criticism. His old pupils and friends will rejoice that his life has found such a worthy record, that others may also come within the range of his learning and charm.

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Studies in the History of Ideas. Edited by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University. New York, Columbia University Press, 1918. Volume I.—pp. 272.

The first study in this volume, by Mr. M. T. McClure, is on "Appearance and Reality in Greek Philosophy." Mr. McClure finds in Greek Philosophy three well-defined types of interest—the *scientific*, which is uppermost in the Milesians, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus; the *mystical*, which is uppermost in the Pythagoreans and Plato; and the *humanistic*, which leads to the problem of the adjustment of nature and convention, which, blending with the mystical interest, is central in Pythagoras, Plato (both in his political philosophy and his theory of knowledge), and in Aristotle. Heraclitus stands apart, "happily free from initial presuppositions and concerned with a description of the immediate." The paper concludes with a brief pragmatic criticism of absolutistic monism and the assertion that "Reality is a choice of values." The three motives of Mr. McClure are undoubtedly operative in Greek philosophy, but I cannot admit that philosophers can be classified in terms of their disjunction. Plato and Aristotle had strong scientific interests and Empedocles, for example, was not devoid of the mystical interest. Mr. McClure's criticism of absolutism is too meager to be of any value.

Mr. Walter Veazie, on "The Meaning of *Φύσις* in Early Greek Philosophy" makes an interesting collation of passages from Greek writers in support of

the view that "*φύσις* is the inner nature or essence of things, their potency, that in them which has the *power of motion in itself*."

Mr. W. T. Bush entitles his contribution "An Impression of Greek Political Philosophy." I am afraid the reader, unacquainted with Plato and Aristotle, would get from this paper an impression so hazy as scarcely to deserve the name. After a large number of citations from Greeks and moderns, Mr. Bush concludes that "the confusion and disorganization of Greek life are not likely to be exaggerated" and that this condition was a powerful motivation in the political thought of Plato. Doubtless! But Mr. Bush does not make even a slender contribution to our knowledge and understanding of Greek political thinking. His paper is not in any proper sense a study in the history of ideas.

Mr. John J. Coos, in a very slender contribution, calls attention to the fact that Francis Bacon had good ideas as to how the history of philosophy should be written.

Mr. Dewey, in "The Motivation of Hobbes's Political Philosophy" makes out a good case for the view that Hobbes aimed at giving a rational and scientific foundation to morals and politics in order to free them from all subservience to divinity. Hobbes suffered from a false psychology, but he aimed to found an art of social control on a science of a human nature. Mr. Lord's paper "The Attempt of Hobbes to Base Ethics on Psychology" takes the same general standpoint and includes some good criticism of Hobbes's theory of the springs of human conduct. Mr. Albert G. A. Balz gives a comprehensive and clear account of "The Psychology of Ideas in Hobbes" and, incidentally, contends that "the true intellectual progenitor of Hobbes is Galileo."

Mr. Roberts B. Owen has a paper on "Truth and Error in Descartes." Descartes holds that "to be true means to grasp the content of a static and determinate reality." Truth cannot change while experience may. Agreement with experience cannot be a test of truth; therefore, true ideas must copy reality; but there is no means, except clearness and distinctness, of determining whether ideas are true or not. "In order to validate such ideas the hypothesis of God is invoked." Therefore once an idea is true it is true always. Error must be due to the interference of the will. But, if this be the case, either will and intellect are not separable and ideas may be both clear and false, or intellect and will are absolutely separate and then one cannot influence the other at all. Thus error in the intellect becomes impossible. Mr. Owen makes no attempt either to trace the historical sources or the consequences of Descartes's doctrine of truth and error. Mr. Owen would have made a more instructive contribution if he had taken up the influence of scholasticism and the new mechanical theory of the universe on Descartes. The same criticism holds good, in lesser degree, of Mr. W. F. Cooley's "Spinoza's Pantheistic Argument," although here there is some reference to the Neo-Platonic Infinite and the scholastic *Ens Realissimum*. The influence of mathematics on Spinoza's thinking is not noticed.

Mr. Woodbridge, in his paper on "Berkeley's Realism," argues against the view that Berkeley was much influenced by Locke and for the view that Berkeley's chief motive was to defend "the realism of the common man reinforced by the nominalism of the philosopher"; "by refining the naive realism of the common man, the opposition between materialists and spiritualists is reduced to an absurdity." The thesis of the paper is well documented and argued. Nevertheless, I feel that, while Mr. Woodbridge's contention is largely correct, Berkeley's strongest motive after all was to furnish a plain and simple argument for God and immortality and that he was, above everything else, a theologically-minded philosopher. In the *Principles of Human Knowledge* and elsewhere he waxes enthusiastic over the irrefragable basis of religion that his philosophy affords.

Mr. A. L. Jones has "A Note on Thomas Brown's Contribution to Esthetics," a theory which he estimates highly.

Mr. Montague's discussion of "The Antinomy and its Implications for Logical Theory" is interesting and good. His criticisms of Ultra-Rationalism and Ultra-Empiricism are excellent. I do not feel that he does full justice to the relational view, which seems to me to be capable of being so stated as to include his own "Double Aspect View." But this paper, good in itself, is not at all a contribution to the *history of ideas*. The last paper, by Mr. H. T. Costello, on "Old Problems with New Faces in Recent Logic," contains a refreshing appreciation of Aristotle as an instrumentalist in logic and a just valuation of the biological-nominalist and mechanist-realist points of view in logic. By the latter he means the view that "nature is subject to precise laws." This standpoint, as he says, does not mean that everything in the world can be accounted for in terms of mechanics, physics and chemistry. He concludes with a convincing argument against the assumption, common to B. Russell and others, that the 'logical atomism' which would reduce reality to an aggregate of terms and relations wholly external to one another is a necessary consequence of the doctrine that both physical reality and conscious being, including thought itself, have determinate structures and modes of behavior which it is the business of the mind to find and not to make out of whole cloth. Both thinking and reality which is not thinking are systematic. There are many systems in the world, one supervening upon another. To all of this I heartily subscribe. The whole paper expounds a sound standpoint, but it is only in the vaguest sense historical.

In short, this volume, taken in its entirety, is misnamed. Contributions to the history of philosophy should be of two kinds—(1) Some or all of the leading ideas of a philosopher should be expounded, with abundant reference to his writings. The sources of these ideas, whether in previous thinkers or in the author's contemporaries or his other interests, intellectual or practical, should be followed out. The curve of his historical influence might well be plotted too. (2) Another fruitful historical method, of whose use in an elementary fashion and on a large scale Windelband's *History of Philosophy* is the best example, would be to trace the development of a leading idea through

a whole period or succession of periods; for example, the idea of nature, substance, law, right, cause, end, self, etc.; and to show the historical antecedents and consequences of the idea in question. Some of the papers in the present volume, notably those of Messrs. Dewey and Woodbridge, do conform to the first method. Others, such as that of Mr. McClure, attempt, with but meager results, the second method. Some are not historical in any proper sense of the term.

J. A. LEIGHTON.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY.

The Field of Philosophy. An Outline of Lectures on Introduction to Philosophy.

By JOSEPH ALEXANDER LEIGHTON. Columbus, Ohio, R. G. Adams & Co., 1918.—pp. xii, 414.

The author believes that a student's first course in philosophy should combine the historical and systematic methods of approach. He accordingly begins with a rapid survey of the most significant stages and types of philosophical thinking, starting with the primitive world view and including the early Greek philosophy, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Democritus, Stoicism, Neo-Platonism, and Christian philosophy in ancient and medieval forms. The principal problems are thus in the first place presented in a manner that is both elementary and representative of their actual course of development in human thought. The problems which are then discussed in a more advanced way, from the modern standpoint, include that of substance (materialism, spiritualism, double aspect theory), the one and the many, evolution and teleology, and the self. An outline of the fundamental concepts of metaphysics (substance, causality, finality, individuality, space, time) and two chapters on the theory of knowledge follow. The closing three chapters treat of the various branches of philosophy in their relations to one another, the status of values, and the philosophy of history. The general standpoint of the book is idealistic. An appendix, however, gives accounts of the new realism, pragmatism, and of the philosophy of Bergson.

The principles on which the book is planned are excellent. First, the choice of topics is admirable. The topics treated are the very ones which, in the experience of the reviewer at least, undergraduates in their first course most wish to know something about. Secondly, the arrangement of material is pedagogically sound. The historical survey orients the student in the problems, and when he meets them for the second time in the latter half of the book he is ready to attack them with renewed interest and profit. Thirdly, the order of topics is rational. Each is made to lead to that which follows. The problem of knowledge is reserved until toward the last, the place where historically and pedagogically it belongs.

Mechanically, the book is in the main to be commended. Type and binding are attractive. The references at the end of each chapter are well chosen. The names of authors ought always to have been given in full (to save time fumbling over cards in library catalogues). The student should be told by

means of asterisks or in some other way, which of the references are meant for his use, and which for the use of his instructor. (E. g., the works of Hegel, Bradley, Bosanquet, Joachim, *et al.*, cited after chap. XXII cannot be read with profit by a student in his first course in philosophy.)

The author says that the book has been primarily prepared for the use of classes in his own institution. As he proceeds, however, to express the hope that it may be found of service elsewhere, it may not be ungracious to point out some of the difficulties that may be found in the way of its adoption in some places. Many teachers will find the book altogether too condensed. The author describes it correctly as a "comprehensive outline—an extended syllabus—to be filled in by the teacher in his lectures and by the pupil in his collateral readings" (p. vi). It would be impossible for the student to grasp the thought of many chapters until they had been covered in lectures; and, even then, much would not be clear until he had completed his collateral reading. The chapters are short, and so far as the student's time is concerned, he could do some collateral reading in connection with every chapter, and this is apparently the author's intention. But few college and university libraries are well enough equipped in duplicate copies of books to make such a plan of study feasible for large classes like the first course in philosophy. The book would be more largely serviceable if the author would do one of two things: (1) enlarge the book to double its present size by the addition of illustrative material, but without adding a single topic (more already are included than could possibly be covered in one elementary course); or, (2) publish a 'source book' which would consist of supplementary material to be read in connection with each chapter in the text.

On the whole, the book is a valuable contribution. Every teacher of an introductory course in philosophy will get ideas from it that will help him to plan his own course; and perhaps many, like the undersigned (who has already tried it with a class), will conclude that, notwithstanding the difficulties in making use of it, it is the most practically available book for a course in the introduction to philosophy.

WILLIAM KELLEY WRIGHT.

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE.

A Study of Beliefs and Attitudes. The Psychology of Conviction. By JOSEPH JASTROW. Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1918.—pp. xix, 387.

This is a collection of essays, most of them reprinted from periodicals, whose homogeneity lies in the fact that most of them discuss or illustrate some phase of the law that men's convictions are determined not by logical evidence but by desires, conscious or disguised, by imitation, and by other psychological forces. This thesis, which we all accept and nevertheless constantly ignore, Professor Jastrow exhibits to us from many points of view, with many felicities of phrase, and some forcible illustrations. The chapter which the present reviewer likes best, perhaps because it adds conciseness to its other merits,

is that on "The Will to Believe in the Supernatural," which begins with a delightful passage recalling the author's youthful and enforced study of "Butler's Analogy": "By the light of that benign essay I have again and again appreciated the comfort of sighting the terminus from the starting-point of a logical journey." It was Butler's work that "first revealed the commanding Supremacy of Conclusions, and the subsidiary function of premises."

In pursuance of his plan of studying the psychology of credulity by the 'case method,' the cases of Paladino, of Mrs. Eddy, of Taxil, of Caspar Hauser, or phrenology, and of Clever Hans are all discussed by Professor Jastrow; the essay dealing with Hans seems to have been written before the days of that animal's more mystifying successors Muhamed and Zarif. The last three essays have not been previously published: they treat of "The Psychology of Indulgence: Tobacco and Alcohol," of "The Feminine Mind," and of "Militarism and Pacifism," and do not relate at all immediately to the main theme of the book.

MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN.

VASSAR COLLEGE.

The following books also have been received:

Life and Finite Individuality. Two Symposia: I. By J. S. HALDANE, D'ARCY WENTWORTH THOMPSON, P. CHALMERS MITCHELL, and L. T. HOBHOUSE. II. By BERNARD BOSANQUET, A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON, G. F. STOUT, and VISCOUNT HALDANE. Edited for the Aristotelian Society with an Introduction by H. WILDON CARR. London, Williams and Norgate, 1918.—pp. 194.

Morale and Its Enemies. By WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING. New Haven, Yale University Press; London, Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1918.—pp. xv, 200.

Outlines of Social Philosophy. By J. S. MACKENZIE. London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., New York, the Macmillan Company, 1918.—pp. 280.

The New State. By M. P. FOLLETT. New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1918.—pp. vii, 377.

The Relation of John Locke to English Deism. By S. G. HEFELBOWER. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1918.—pp. viii, 188.

John Dewey's Logical Theory. By DELTON THOMAS HOWARD. Cornell Studies in Philosophy. No. 11. New York, Longman's Green and Co., 1918.—pp. iv, 135.

Education for Character. By FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP. Indianapolis, The Bobs-Merrill Company, 1917.—pp. 453.

La Psychologie de Stendhal. Par HENRI DELACROIX. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1918.—pp. 286.

Théorie Génétique de la Réalité. Le Pancalisme. Par JAMES MARK BALDWIN. Traduit par E. PHILIPPI. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1918.—pp. xiii, 332.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scholastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl. Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Why is the 'Unconscious' Unconscious? (Symposium) I, MAURICE NICOLL; II, W. H. R. RIVERS; III, ERNEST JONES. *Br. J. Ps.*, IX, 2, pp. 230-256.

I. Captain Nicoll's view is that the 'unconscious' is unconscious because the inexhaustible source of our psychic life is not yet fully adapted to reality. He follows Jung, who divides the unconscious into the *personal unconscious* (which for Freud is the unconscious) and the *collective unconscious* or racial unconscious. The contents of the collective unconscious are *primordial thought-feelings*, which are shared with all mankind. In the dream, the product of the unconscious, we find the forces of progression as well as those of regression. In the progressive evolution of life, the conscious mind gets adapted to reality through progressive transmutations of psychic energy carried on at levels beneath consciousness.

II. The aim of Rivers' contribution is to show that the unconscious is the home of instinct; and that mechanism, by which experience becomes and remains unconscious, is particularly connected with instinct. He asks two chief questions: (1) Why does experience become unconscious? His answer is that dissociation seems a process especially connected with instinctive modes of reaction. But in the higher animals and man dissociation is less complete. Here certain elements of the instinctive complex are suppressed, while others are combined with more discriminative modes of reaction. (2) Why, when experience becomes unconscious, does it persist in this dissociated state? The reply is that, through this process of dissociation, nature puts out of action instinctive reactions which interfere with mechanisms formed through a combination of instinct and intelligence.

III. Jones, following Freud, maintains that the 'unconscious' is unconscious owing to the inhibiting pressure of the affective factors known together as 'repression.' He notes that the chief feature of unconscious processes is that

the attempt to explore them is opposed by the subject. It is stated as a general law that what has a positive affective tone in the unconscious, has a negative affective tone in consciousness. This transformation of pleasure into displeasure is perhaps the most essential characteristic of repression. Freud traced the genesis of repression from two mental systems which precede the unconscious and the conscious. The primary system is dominated by the 'pleasure-pain principle'; the secondary, by the 'reality principle.' Repression arises through the conflict of these systems. Nicoll held the unconscious to be *not yet* adapted to reality. Rivers held it to be *no longer* adapted to reality. Jones holds that the unconscious is *sometimes* better adapted to reality than consciousness, and *sometimes not*.

MARIE T. COLLINS.

The Theory of Symbolism. ERNEST JONES. Br. J. Ps., IX, 2, pp. 181-229.

The thesis of this paper is that symbolism, in the strict sense, forms a distinct type of indirect representation; and that its clear differentiation throws light on the primitive levels in mental development and their relation to conscious thought. The attributes of *true* symbolism (as modified from Rank and Sachs) are: (1) representation of unconscious material; (2) constant meaning; (3) non-dependence on individual factors; (4) a phylogenetic and ontogenetic evolutionary basis; (5) linguistic connection between the symbol and the idea symbolized; (6) phylogenetic parallels between the symbolism of the individual and myths, cults and religions. The number of ideas symbolized is very limited compared to the endless number of symbols. There are less than a hundred ideas that can be symbolized. All these are found to relate to: the physical self, members of the immediate family, or to the phenomena of love, birth or death. They apparently arise as a result of regression from a higher level to a more primitive level of meaning. The 'real' or actual meaning of an idea is somehow lost temporarily, and the symbol is used to convey the meaning of a more primitive idea, to which it was once equivalent symbolically. Hence, when the meaning of the symbol is revealed, the conscious attitude is characterized by surprise, incredulity, often repugnance. The original identification at the base of every symbolism is suggestive of the fundamental tendency of primitive mind to note resemblances and not differences. Three factors are operative in this tendency: (1) mental incapacity, (2) the 'pleasure-pain principle,' (3) the 'reality principle'. Progress takes place *via* symbolic equivalents, and not *via* symbolism as held by the post-psycho-analytical school. Silberer may be criticized for confusing the process of symbolic equivalency with that of symbolism. The essential function of symbolism, in its broadest sense, is to overcome the inhibition which hinders the free expression of a feeling-idea. If the regression which this involves proceeds only a certain way—remaining conscious—the result is metaphorical, or 'functional' symbolism. If the repression proceeds to the level of the unconscious, the result is *true* symbolism.

MARIE T. COLLINS.

L'Optimisme et la Science. A. LECLÈRE. Rev. de Mét., XXV., 4, pp. 433-473.

Optimism in regard to the continual progress of civilization should not be a matter of sentiment, but can only be satisfactorily based upon scientific investigation. A philosophy of history cannot avoid a preconceived finalism and, consequently, an unjustified optimism on the basis of little known and inexact facts. To envisage the principle of evolution as dominating all other laws is to interpret history as the study of a super-organism. To every historical fact is added some fantasy of the imagination, more or less metaphysically disguised, and a cause not rigorously positive is taken as the explanation of all causes, resulting in a monstrous confusion of scientific and arbitrary points of view. Only by pointing out certain well established facts in physics, physiology, psychology and sociology, can we determine whether optimism is justified in the field of morality. It is universally recognized that the most highly organized products of evolution as, for example, those of organic chemistry, are very unstable. And since morality is ultimately reducible to the physiological processes taking place in the nervous system, we find that its functionings are the most unstable and most precarious of all. For all development of a high order in the history of mankind is of a relatively recent date, and as that which is inherent in an organism for the shortest length of time is the least assimilated by it, future development is very uncertain and the most perfect form is the least stable. In every human being not pathologically tainted there still exist the two defects of fallibility and of susceptibility to immoral influences. The effect of ontogenetic and phylogenetic instincts will prevent the individual from perfecting himself. The only hope for a better state of morality is to re-create the human organism through a more complete and comprehensive knowledge of the laws which govern it. This moral medication can only be made possible by the development of the science of social therapeutics. The further science advances, the more plausible it seems that the nervous system and a knowledge of the physical laws that govern it are the ultimate irreducibles upon which the state of morality depends. A day perhaps will come in which practical morals will be based upon a systematic enumeration of all the physiological means of acting on the mind through the body. But a perfect knowledge of the totality of the laws of matter would connote a *quasi* divine knowledge, and we can, therefore, never hope for a perfect state of society. A truly moral man, from the point of view of physiology, will be far from a genius, but will be comparatively free from defects. The individuals who are only 'moral' through pusillanimity somewhat compensate for the highly intellectual natures who prefer isolation and consequently develop nervous psychoses. The present war has somewhat accelerated moral progress by promoting internationalism and by alleviating social antipathies. Education may be said to be the greatest means for social improvement because of its power to destroy the degenerate instincts of the uncultured. The majority of the evils that affect humanity are due to unforeseen and unfavorable circumstances, for which there are, theoretically speaking, certain remedies. In all cases

the body is the chief culprit, and the task of the future will be that of ameliorating certain undesirable human instincts through social therapeutic methods. A certain optimism is justifiable, as we can hope for a greater advance in the knowledge of psycho-neural diseases and their attendant causes. Scientific ardor may hope for a completely perfect man, but as knowledge is not omniscient, we must conclude that a modified pessimism is more justifiable than an unwarranted and absolute optimism as to the future of morality.

EDGAR DE LASKI.

The Larger Self. J. DASHIELL STOOPS. Int. J. E., XXIX, 1, pp. 1-7.

The racial as well as the individual aspect of the self should be taken into account in the effort to understand the place of the self in the scheme of life. The eighteenth century emphasized only the latter aspect, and hence regarded the individual as a unique self of will and reason externally related to society. But evolution has shown that, to interpret the self adequately, we must recognize also the former aspect and must realize that, because of his fundamental brain-patterns, the individual is organically related to his fellows. Thus, only the individual who regards himself as a part of an organic whole, who recognizes that his behavior must accord with the rough outlines of the instinctive action-patterns, and who identifies himself with the racial life,—only such an individual can be an end in himself.

MARJORIE S. HARRIS.

Consciousness As Behavior. B. H. BODE. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XV, 17, pp. 449-453.

This article is an answer to certain objections brought by Dr. H. R. Marshall against the view that consciousness is to be interpreted as a form of behavior. The chief of these objections is that a study of behavior does not lead to consciousness; that the existence of consciousness is a matter of inference and not of objective observation. In reply, the author affirms that we observe by seeing things as existing in a certain context, and that the context is not a something supplied upon the basis of observation. Consequently, consciousness *can* be reached through purely objective observation.

I. CHASMAN.

Mr. Russell and Philosophical Method. B. H. BODE. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XV, 26, pp. 701-710.

The writer, who believes that philosophy is obliged "to aid in the creation and realization of human ideals, not in a realm apart, but in our everyday world of space and time and in the affairs of our common life," finds himself in disagreement with the philosophical method of Mr. Russell. In his recent book entitled *Mysticism and Logic*, Mr. Russell does not, indeed, deny the reality of time, but considers it philosophically unimportant. The reason for this view is that philosophy is not concerned with the accidental nature of things. While particular things *exist*, universals *subsist*, and philosophy should

be concerned with universals. This, however, takes philosophy out of the everyday world, and puts it in a realm apart, where it can do no one any good. Moreover, there is that separation of the world of universals and the temporal world found in Plato, and which presents the logical difficulty of some union between the two. Dr. Bode would turn philosophy from the realm of mathematical concepts to the world as it is.

I. CHASMAN.

Professor Dewey's "Essays in Experimental Logic." BERTRAND RUSSELL.
J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XVI, 1, pp. 5-26.

Mr. Russell here attempts to answer some of Professor Dewey's criticisms of him in the *Essays in Experimental Logic*. Professor Dewey has misunderstood him on several points. That is due to the fact that what Professor Dewey calls logic, he would consider a part of psychology. The ways in which we become possessed of what we call knowledge are not a part of logic but of psychology. In general, the criticism involves three points: (1) logical and psychological data; (2) instrumentalism; (3) the external world. In regard to the first, Mr. Russell deduces three propositions on the relation between the psychologically primitive data and the precise data of science. They are: (1) all that we learn through the senses is more or less vague; (2) what we learn by careful analytic attention of the scientific kind is less vague than what we learn by casual untrained attention; and (3) even the vaguest perception has *some* value for purposes of inference, but the vaguer it is the smaller becomes its value for inference. The value of this theory is threefold: (a) no perception can be so precise as to be incapable of greater precision, and no perception can be so vague as to be incapable of greater vagueness; (b) it allows *some* inferential value to even very vague data; and (c) it does not involve an Unknowable either at the beginning or at the end. These merits are not found in Professor Dewey's theory. Regarding Instrumentalism, there are four difficulties: (1) the "crude datum" of Professor Dewey lies outside of knowledge; (2) it assumes a knowledge of causal laws; (3) it ignores fundamental skepticism; and (4) it is opposed to contemplation except as a means to action, while contemplation, Russell believes, is worth while for its own sake. Finally, regarding the problem of the external world, Mr. Russell first defines his view and then answers some of Professor Dewey's criticisms on his view. Data are a certain collection of particulars and facts, and they are the total store from which, at the moment, the knowledge of the world is drawn. The external world lies outside the group of data,—where "outside" is used in the logical sense. The world of data differs from the world of common sense in three ways: (1) by extrusion of the notion of substance; (2) by including particular things only at the moment when each exists as a datum; and (3) by excluding everything of other people except their outward show.

I. CHASMAN.

Nerve Process and Cognition. EDWARD CHASE TOLMAN. *Psych. Rev.*, XXV, 6, pp. 423-442.

The thesis presented here is that the cognition of a given object or stimulus consists in an internal neurological placing, involving an activity of the association neurones. Thus, the cognition of a given color involves the discharge into an association path of the excitation caused in the visual, cortical areas by the color. First, the common light paths in the cortex are developed and then are used in developing individual color paths, which are, therefore, closely connected with each other and with the common paths. Here, then, we have the commencement of a system in which, through the activity of any one path, the object causing this activity is placed with reference to the whole system. Further, with each differentiation of color, new association paths are formed, influencing and influenced by the old paths, so that there are eventually only compromise paths. Activity in any such paths due to a color stimulus is cognition neurologically interpreted. Moreover, the cognition of other sense qualities may be similarly explained and the cognition of objects more complex than sense qualities can also be ascribed to associative placing. The correlative of this associative placing is meaning, and meaning often has for its accompaniment the 'quale' or 'raw feel' of the quality. The 'raw feel' is caused by those sensory neurones which discharge into such association neurones as condition meaning. In remembering or thinking an object, a given 'raw feel' will not arise unless the association path connected with the particular sensory center which gives rise to that 'raw feel' produces excitation in the center. The conscious perception of more complex objects, such as chair, includes not merely the meaning *chair* but also the meanings of the individual sense qualities and further the 'raw feel' of each quality. In thinking or remembering *chair*, the excitation of association paths may produce excitation in the sensory centers which ordinarily discharge into them and these will in turn produce a 'raw feel.' Again, in the case of objects, such as the idea of finance, the process of cognition is similar, except that the general meaning is connected with definite sense qualities in ways variable with the individual. Thus, cognition, which we have explained neurologically, has, as its correlate, meaning which may be accompanied by a 'raw feel.'

MARJORIE S. HARRIS.

Professor Spaulding's Non-Existent Illusions. JAMES BISSELL PRATT. *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.*, XV, 25, pp. 688-695.

Professor Spaulding insists that illusion, hallucination, and error must *not* be classed as mental. The reasons for this assertion are threefold: (1) illusions have an adequate causal explanation; (2) they consist in taking one entity to be another which it is not, or in localizing it in the wrong place or the wrong time; (3) they are not existents but mere subsistents. This leads to self-contradictions. If the bent stick as seen in water, for example, is physical and not mental, and if it be identical with the straight stick, then the same stick is both straight and not straight at the same time. If dreams be ruled

out of existence, and considered merely as subsisting, it would be necessary to rule out sensations as well; for Professor Spaulding's definition of existents as including matters mental as well as physical would apply to both. Hence, by attempting to rid the world of existents from error, hallucination, and illusion, Professor Spaulding has got into difficulties from which he is unable to extricate himself without overthrowing the very views on error which he tries to establish.

I. CHASMAN.

The Subject Matter of Formal Logic. MORRIS R. COHEN. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XV, 25, pp. 673-688.

If by logic is meant a clear, accurate, and orderly intellectual procedure, then the modern text-books on logic are highly illogical. Besides, the information they give on scientific methods is inaccurate. "Logical or formal truths are truths concerning the implication, consistency, or necessary connection between *objects* asserted in propositions and the distinctive subject-matter of logic may be said to be the relations generally expressed by *if—then necessarily*." Formal logic does *not* consider the consequences of propositions apart from their meaning, as is usually supposed. From a proposition devoid of meaning nothing could be deduced. Logic deals with the elements or operations common to all sciences. The nature of the subject matter of logic is identical with the subject matter of pure mathematics. Formal logic is simply the study of the most general portion of pure mathematics. Formal logic is identical with deduction. As for induction, that "is either disguised deduction or more or less methodical guess-work."

I. CHASMAN.

The Ethics of Internationalism and the Individual. J. R. KANTOR. Int. J. E., XXIX, 1, pp. 29-38.

Most of the discussion concerning internationalism is futile because it fails to take account of concrete facts. The way to secure moral conduct on the part of nations is to make them realize the need of promoting the common welfare, of establishing and safe-guarding certain rights for all, and of interrelating benefits and obligations. Nations may be brought to such realization through organization. To obtain a genuine social organization, plans must be shaped with the individual and not the nation as the focal point; for only as there is coöperation among individuals who are conscious of their relation to and responsibility for other individuals is there genuine society. That is, to get a social organization, individuals and not nations must be brought into self-conscious coöperation. If the social order is to be harmoniously maintained, the individuals must reflect on their rights and obligations; for a moral society is based on the conscious formulation of ideas and moral sentiments. Thus society achieves progress only through the enlightenment of individuals. Hence education is essential; for the development of self-consciousness depends on an understanding of the historical, developmental

aspect of institutions and on the appreciation of economic values. The progress in such education would, of course, assume immense proportions, but the educational campaigns in the present war have given a hint of what might be accomplished through coöperation. It has also become evident, during the war, that governmental problems are problems of the people and that the individual is the important factor in group activity. Hence, when a league of nations that is a league of peoples has been effected, we may hope for morality among states.

MARJORIE S. HARRIS.

Angelus Silesius: A Seventeenth Century Mystic. FREDERIC PALMER. Har. Theo. Rev., XI, 2, pp. 171-202.

Johann Scheffler, afterwards known as Angelus Silesius, is interesting for the completeness with which he represents the position of mysticism. He was a Lutheran by birth and education, took his doctor's degree in philosophy and medicine in 1649, then became court physician at Oels in Württemberg. Here the ecclesiastical atmosphere was uncongenial, so in 1583 he abandoned it and entered the Roman Catholic Church. Becoming a member of the Franciscan Order, he was consecrated a priest. Then it was that some of his Protestant friends circulated scurrilous songs attacking him. Thus began a controversy which lasted many years and finally ended in his resignation. In 1671 he retired to a monastery at Breslau where he spent his time editing books and communing with his soul. His hymns have kept his name alive, but later thinkers have discovered the importance of mysticism in his work. In the *Cherubinischer Wandersmann* he develops the idea that God is forever endeavoring to pour himself into us, and to give us all of himself that we are capable of receiving. The character of the soul not only determines its status, but is its status. In setting forth the means by which this union with God is to be attained Silesius emphasizes the central doctrine of mysticism—dualism. Man must empty himself of all that is characteristic of humanity; the more completely he succeeds in self-annihilation, the more completely he becomes one with God. Yet he insists that this does not abolish personality, which persists after death. He likens the presence of God in all that is His to the presence of the number one in all the other numbers. Like all mystics he holds that the knowledge of God comes through intuition. The conviction flashes upon the soul with a clearness and intensity which is its own assurance. The deepest intercourse between mind and mind is not limited by the senses, but far transcends word or sight. So the communications of the spirit are like the wind, of which "thou canst not tell whence it cometh nor whither it goeth." Angelus Silesius was a man who sought to lose himself in God.

EMILY A. LANE.

NOTES.

The *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* for January-February announces the death of Dr. Gaston Milhaud, teacher and writer on philosophical subjects. Since 1909 he has lectured at the Sorbonne on the History of Philosophy in its relation to the sciences. He was the author of a number of books, among which are: *Études sur la pensée scientifique chez les Grecs et les modernes* and *Nouvelles Études sur l'histoire de la pensée scientifique*.

On February 11 occurred the death of Dr. Paul Carus, editor of the *Open Court* and *The Monist*, and the author of numerous philosophical articles and books.

We give below a list of articles in current philosophical magazines:

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XXIX, 2: A. E. Heath, International Politics and the Concept of World Sections; H. M. Kallen, "In the Hope of the New Zion"; I. W. Howerth, The Great War and the Instinct of the Herd; Roger Sherman Loomis, A Defense of Naturalism; Thomas D. Eliot, The Creation of Souls; Maurice de Wulf, The Society of Nations in the Thirteenth Century.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, XV, 26: B. H. Bode, Mr. Russell and Philosophical Method.

XVI, 1: Bertrand Russell, Professor Dewey's "Essays in Experimental Logic."

XVI, 2: Albert G. A. Balz, The Use and Misuse of History; Margaret Floy Washburn, "Dualism in Animal Psychology"; F. C. S. Schiller, Doctrinal Functions; Henry Rutgers Marshall, Of Outer-World Objects.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XXVI, 1: J. R. Kantor, Psychology as a Science of Critical Evaluation; C. E. Ferree and Gertrude Rand, Chromatic Thresholds of Sensation from Center to Periphery of the Retina and their Bearing on Color Theory, Part I; F. A. C. Perrin, The Learning Curves of the Analogies and the Mirror Reading Tests; Clark L. Hull and Robert B. Montgomery, An Experimental Investigation of Certain Alleged Relations between Character and Handwriting; C. H. Griffiths and W. J. Baumgartner, The Correlation between Visualization and Brightness Discrimination.



THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE.

I SHALL begin by distinguishing four elements in the knowledge situation which an empirical analysis seems to reveal—distinctions which are perfectly easy to draw, and which all alike have enough apparent claim at least to stand for facts, to put the burden of proof upon the one who shall reject them. First, there is the object perceived, the real thing with its status in the world of reality independent of the knowledge relation. This various traditional theories of knowledge have persistently tended to ignore or to deny, but evidently only at the cost of a sharp break with normal human belief. Over against the object stands a second fact, which common sense also in the past has been accustomed to accept, and to think of as an independent and—in a specified sense of the term—subjective entity, belonging to the realm of psychological experience,—the ‘state of consciousness,’ or psychical state, as an existent. Here again we have a sort of fact that is nowadays not universally admitted, and it will be a part of my task to defend it, incidentally, against the current disposition to extrude it from the universe; but meanwhile I find no excuse for anyone pretending that he does not know what the phrase is meant, at least hypothetically, to stand for. It may be identified summarily as that which constituted the whole stock in trade of the traditional English introspective psychologists—the bits of psychological stuff into which it was their business to analyze the conscious life.

About the next distinction there is more excuse for misunder-

standing; but recent philosophy in particular has made some sort of a distinction here a commonplace. It is what in familiar language may be called our 'meanings,' or 'ideas.' A real possibility of confusion lies in the fact that 'meanings' have two different aspects, which it will be my main purpose in what follows to try to adjust. On the one hand, a meaning is distinctly 'our' meaning; it belongs, that is, in *some* sense to the realm of psychological experience. We talk about our 'ideas,' in the sense of the traditional psychology, as events in the stream of consciousness with a particular existential locus. But on the other hand, a meaning, from another angle, does appear to have a non-psychological objectivity. It is always on the point of breaking loose from its local embodiment in the psychical series. When we subject it to ordinary psychological introspection, it tends to elude us, leaving us simply with the 'image'; and between the image, a plain psychological existent, and the meaning, there is, however close the connection, no identity. Indeed, the meaning seems to belong rather to the object than to the image; it is the object's 'essence.' Or it may even claim a status as a timeless entity, inhabiting a logical world of its own independent of any attachments; thus we may speak of it as the 'same' meaning no matter who thinks it, and no matter to what particular object it is referred, or whether it is referred at all.

The fourth distinction is that of the 'mental act.' This is a concept confessedly obscure; but whatever the interpretation, it seems tolerably clear that there is *something* for which the expression stands, worthy of entering into a complete analysis. Without an element of 'activity,' we do not get the complete fact that experience seems to present; psychological states become a bare disjointed string of Humian bits of mind stuff, and 'meanings' an unchanging skeleton world of logical abstractions, or Platonic ideas.

There is not intended to be anything abstruse in the foregoing analysis; and if there has seemed to be, I can perhaps dispel the impression by translating it into a concretion. I recall my dinner of yesterday. Here there is first the dinner itself, an actual experience of eating which is now past and done with, and, therefore,

not now to be discovered as an actual presence. The ideal content of this past experience, however, its 'character,' or 'nature,' or 'essence,' *is* present with me now in the focus of my attentive consciousness as an idea, or meaning. Distinguishable from this, again, is the imagery which may be said somehow to 'carry' the meaning—a species of psychological fact which differs from the latter in that I am unaware of it at the moment of remembering, but which examination reveals as actually having been present,—whether as visual, gustatory, verbal, or what not, being relatively unimportant to the significance of the memory itself. And, finally, over and above all these aspects, singly or collectively, is the fact that *I am remembering*, the 'act' of memory. There may be a reasonable doubt about the interpretation of some or all of these aspects; but that each of them stands for *something* that the plain man can easily identify as a part of, or as directly involved in, the total fact that he is familiar with as memory, I do not believe can fairly be disputed.

It will be evident that the preceding analysis is not an analysis of 'pure experience,' at the moment fashionable. It is frankly an account of what our normal and more or less sophisticated reflective belief finds involved in the knowing experience, rather than a mere statement of what the experience is 'for itself.' In addition to pure experience, it includes whatever independent entities may be found actually accepted, or referred to, in such experience (though the distinction between these and the experience itself may only be discovered later), and whatever latent characters may belong to the experience which in our original interest were overlooked, though later examination may make us confident that they were really there at the time. And this, I believe, is the natural procedure, to be abandoned only for reason shown. It sounds safe and modest for the philosopher to say that he proposes to assume nothing but the pure data of experience, as against those who make use of all sorts of unprovable and transcendent objects; but in reality this is likely to be only an ingenious way of begging the question. It may for certain purposes be useful to take this as a point of departure. But to assume that, when such a task is accomplished, we have

done all that is called for, and that anything more is a corruption of the pure gospel of philosophic truth, is, so far as I can see, nothing but dogmatism. If it were so it might indeed be acceptable to a certain ideal of 'evidence'; but to start out with an *a priori* demand that things shall only be accepted when they show the peculiar kind of evidence that happens to be most agreeable to us personally, though it has been an insidious temptation from Parmenides down, has also been in its various forms successively discredited. As a matter of fact, the plausibility is all on the other side. In terms of actual *belief*, mankind has never had the slightest disposition to confine its universe to the narrow range of 'experience.' That it learns progressively to limit its beliefs to that for which some evidence can be found in connection with experienced facts, is indeed so. But empiricism in this latter sense is quite consistent with the acceptance of a vastly wider realm within which human experience finds its setting; and such a universe is far more congenial to the human spirit than the contracted and unadventurous world of positivism, and therefore has an initial advantage.

I am now in a position to state in a preliminary way what I consider to be the nature of an act of belief. And as perception is the original form of that which takes itself as knowledge, and is, besides, the storm center of the epistemological controversy, it will be desirable to take it as the case in point. Perceptual experience, then, is a process of recognizing, implicitly, a certain character or essence as belonging to an object, or to a real-existent. This existent is something that is not immediately apprehended, or that does not enter literally in its bodily presence into the flow of direct psychological experience. The real chair which I see, no more than the real dinner which I remember, is identical with anything that is at the moment an 'experienced,' as distinct from a 'known,' fact. For one thing, if in knowledge the actual object were literally enclosed within the knowing experience, it would be bound in so far to exist precisely as it is known, and error would be impossible. Consequently, as opposed to subjectivism, the 'existence' to which knowledge refers must be postulated as having a life of its own, untouched

by, and—existentially—independent of the knowledge process. On the other hand, the specific dress—the complex of qualities and relations—in which for knowledge the object is clothed, *must* somehow be immediately grasped, or intuited, or apprehended, or given. The true object of knowledge cannot therefore be understood except as we recognize it as an intimate union of two factors. In its construction we have to distinguish two separate processes or phases—the apprehension, or direct presence in experience, of the character or essence which describes it, *and* the outgoing reference which locates this as an attribute of an independent real world. The defect of neo-realism—and, I believe also, of objective idealism—is that it stops with the character apprehended, and so turns existence into logic—a complex of attributes or ‘data.’ In point of fact, what we do when we ‘see’ an apple is not merely to have a complex awareness of redness, roundness and the like, but to feel redness and roundness as *really existing* out there, as the qualities of an actual ‘thing,’ where the thinghood, or existence, is not itself reducible to apprehended characters of which we are aware in the same way that we are aware of redness. On the other hand, the neo-realists are unquestionably right in holding that these ‘characters’ are truly objective in the sense that they are not ‘sensations’ or ‘mental states.’ An apple is not a collection of sensations and images, nor do I attribute sensations to it as its qualities. At the moment of perceiving, no reference to the mental is present to my mind at all. The content which specifies or describes the particular kind of reality I am in contact with is a complex of purely abstract, logical, and therefore non-existent entities,—it is a case not of red sensations, again, but of *redness*. And yet from a different standpoint subjectivism also has a word to say for itself. For while it is so that in the description of the known object there is no question of a red sensation, it does not follow that we should have it in our power to see redness in the object were it not that actually physical processes have given rise to red sensations in our personal experience, so that we can somehow (just *how* is what I wish presently to consider) utilize such ‘mental’ facts to make the knowing process concretely possible.

The foregoing statements need of course a good deal more in the way of explication. For a powerful defence of what I am glad to believe is substantially the same doctrine, I may refer to a volume just published by Professor Strong.¹ In what I shall go on to say, however, I shall for the most part confine myself to certain points on which I am less sure of my agreement with Professor Strong's position. More specifically, I wish to consider the exact status of a 'meaning,' or, in Professor Strong's language, an essence, and what its relation is alike to the object and to the mental state.

I have said that an essence, or meaning, is not as such an existent; it is rather a *description*. We do not refer existences to the real world as its describable character. But then what does constitute its metaphysical standing? I see here only two roads to follow. On the one hand this status of 'non-existence' may represent an 'ontological' fact, in the sense of a realm of Platonic ideas. To this, with its hypostasization of logic, neo-realism seems inevitably to swing. Or else non-existence is purely a mind-made fact, and depends upon our human power of abstraction. And this last is the road which I prefer to follow.

Now so far as the explicit recognition of an essence goes, there is no particular difficulty involved. The 'character' of an object is not an existent, just because we have left existence out of account in thinking of its bare descriptive features. All we need to postulate for this is the power to lend attention to partial aspects of experience, and ignore for our selective thought the rest. If asked how we arrive at the character of an apple, for instance, assuming now the 'apple' as a part of the already accepted world of real things, we should naturally say that we note by the abstracting eye the redness of the apple, the taste, the shape, and, ignoring the fact that they are embodied in a particular existential form, we hold them before the mind in their own right just as characters. They really do, for our naïve belief, belong to the apple, exist there—that is why we can reassign them to it objectively as its very nature. But also we can think them as qualities without at the same time intending to think of any particular instance in which they really exist.

¹ *The Origin of Consciousness*, Macmillan & Co., 1918.

But while the status of the essence in relation to the object is not particularly abstruse, whether embodied in it as its quality, or as attended to in abstraction from it, its connection with the process of *perception* is less evident. For any point of view at least which accepts a distinction between psychical experience and an independent reality, the presence of the essence in the *knowledge experience* cannot be accounted for merely in terms of its existence in the *object*, without breaking down this very distinction between the real world as real, and the world as it enters into the knowing state,—without leaving out, that is, the human fact of knowing altogether. Of course, there is the alternative, again, of assuming a Platonic universal as a self-subsisting and non-existent something to which, then, an equally bare and abstract ‘act’ of awareness gets externally attached. To both sides of this thesis I have to confess myself quite unable to assign any meaning; it is my major premise—and if this is denied I ask for some straightforward and intelligible account of the matter—that anything that *is* at all either ‘exists,’ or is a quality or character *of* what exists. To explain on such a showing, accordingly, the epistemological experience, we have to ‘embody’ essences not in things merely, but in connection with the human knowledge of things also, on the ground that otherwise their presence there is ultimately unthinkable. But now they already have, if the earlier analysis is correct, such a point of attachment. *Somehow* they are ‘ideas of ours,’ which we can hold before the mind, and attribute on occasion to various ‘things’; and the mind which is doing the thinking, as a psychical continuum, also belongs to the order of existents. I have however already had occasion to admit the impossibility of simply identifying the ‘meaning’ with the ‘psychical state,’ to which alone the word ‘existence’ can be applied. What then are we to take to be the relationship between the two more or less discrepant facts?

The simplest answer seems to me to be the true one. The sensation is actually there as an existent psychical fact, though we are not aware of this at the time, and do not refer the sensation to the thing. But the sensation also, like the object, has

certain characters, or an essence; and as, in viewing an object, we can ignore the object's existence in favor of its qualities, so, when we have a sensation, it is possible that without any reference whatever to the fact *that* we have it, or its existence, our attention may automatically be held by certain special characters attaching to it, which we use then for interpreting the extra-experiential object in which on other grounds we have reason to believe. And this, I should hold, constitutes the experience of cognitive perception, and explains the ontological status of the essence in human belief. The same explanation of course equally would apply to non-sensuous knowledge, where the 'image' would take the place of the sensation.

To return, then, to a more comprehensive summary, what I conceive to be the essential facts are roughly these: The foundation of knowledge is to be found in the variously qualified psychical experiences—color sensations, sound sensations, and the like—which arise in connection with the action of the outer world on the organism under specifiable conditions. That undulations set up by a vibrating body and impinging on the sense organ, condition thus the appearance of sound sensations not identical in character with the physical changes in the nervous substance, is to be accepted solely because we find it to be so. These qualitative effects may be called as such passive, and if they stood alone would not constitute knowledge at all; they would be no more than transient pulses of psychic fact of which one could say only that they *are*. But the organism has another and more aggressive side. It is constituted by outward-going impulses, which need for their expression the material of the outer world. And this relationship of active tension in which the organism stands to a world which it finds only indirectly amenable to its own purposes, is that which translates itself into the inner life as a reference to, an acceptance of, a real extra-experiential universe of existents. It is not that we reason to, or infer, such a fact beyond experience; the belief is rather an assumption which we make by instinct, since only by taking it for granted that we are in relation to realities on which the needs of life depend, should we be able to maintain ourselves alive at all. And we do

not simply *react* to this world, but we have an intellectual or conscious recognition of its being there, as something to be taken into account.

But now if this is to be of any practical benefit to us, we must not merely recognize reality in general, but must find reality clothed with certain specific features, that our recognition may help us in adopting the action appropriate to the particular situation. We must, that is, qualify reality by distinguishable predicates. And the only material we have for this purpose is in the form of those characters which we experience ultimately through the effects that outer objects exert upon the organism. We cannot characterize existence except in experienced terms—in terms, that is, of the essences of our experienced psychical states. And if on certain occasions we are led to react, at the same time that we find ourselves experiencing a red sensation, why should we *not* automatically characterize the existent to which the reaction points by redness, and so have a mental tool for future discriminations in conduct? This again distinctly does not mean that we first recognize the psychical state as an existent. Rather what is presupposed is that, while the psychical state *is there* all along, all that comes to the surface, rises to our attentive consciousness, is one or more of its essences; for attention these are given *apart from* the fact of their psychical embodiment, which last can only be noted by a second introspective act of knowledge. Normally, and originally (for until it happens we have no case of knowledge at all), these essences are present to our awareness, or are 'given,' as descriptive of an independent object; the recognition of the object, once more, being due to the practical needs of life, which force us to take account of what we find affects us for weal or woe. An 'object,' therefore, is constituted by a group of the characters with which experience makes us familiar, *plus* the instinctive sense that there is something present of which we have to take account. The latter aspect is thus an inner transcript or interpretation of that state of muscular tension which is conditioned by our nature as active beings dependent on an environing world, while the characters are used—also instinctively—to give to this specific

form. And, finally, in our reflective moments we are able also to abstract the essence from its existence or thinghood, and direct attention to it just as an essence, or abstract character, or universal.

It is here, I may remark in passing, that I find the ground on which I should base the conclusion that true knowledge is in terms of 'correspondence.' This character of the psychical state which the mind 'intends' in its 'ideas' must really be identifiable with the character of the object to which it is referred, or else in so far our knowledge is in error; and if the essence in the two cases is identical, the things which have this essence 'correspond.' And this furnishes a reply to the objection that if by definition an object is outside experience, there is no way of getting hold of it to compare it with the mental state, and so discover its correspondence. Of course correspondence is discoverable not in the original act of knowing, which is a unitary act of reference or identification, but by a subsequent reflective thought, to which *both* the terms are in their *existence* alike external. But it is made possible because also both object and mental state *are* now present in *idea*, that is, in their essence, and so can be compared.

In terms of a single quality, at least, I think that such a conception of the relationship between essence and sensation is sufficiently simple not to need further laboring. Evidently a red sensation, as a psychical existent, is neither identified with the red object, nor attributed *to* the red object as its quality; it is *redness* we find in the existent world. But *how* could we ever have the meaning 'redness' before us unless we had somehow *experienced* redness as the quality of an actual psychical state? However, if we pass beyond this simplified situation, the matter, I recognize, is not quite so plain; there are a number of qualifications needed to cover all the facts. I shall attempt to point out the two which seem to me most important.

To introduce the first, I shall find it convenient here to make certain distinctions in the term 'meaning,' which I have used as an alternative of 'essence.' The first distinction is that between meaning in its active and in its passive sense,—between having *a*

meaning in the mind, and *having* this meaning. Here the only question is that which has to do with the descriptive nature of this *act of* holding a meaning before the mind. I have just interpreted it as attentive awareness of, or attention focused upon, a specific character existentially present as a character of the momentary psychical state.

There is, however, a second and quite distinguishable *active* sense attaching to the word 'meaning.' The meaning *which* we have may also be actively *referred to* an external object; and then we may talk, in this new sense, of 'meaning the object,' and not simply of 'having a meaning' present to our minds. Both the meaning which we have, as a particularized content, and the act of attributing this content to something as a true description of it, are equally involved in the present theory, and they must, as was said before, be united to get the complete 'object of knowledge.'

It is a third ambiguity, however, that is chiefly important for my present purpose.¹ It is illustrated when we speak of the meaning of a word. This I think is partly responsible for confusing the claim that for true knowledge, when this professes at all to be concerned with the *nature of reality*, an idea must be an adequate 'copy' of the character of the thing. There is no such correspondence where a word is concerned; it is merely that we find it useful to simplify our thinking processes by substituting for the various characters of reality arbitrary signs. And the sign system may, without correspondence, be 'true,' in the sense that we can substitute it in our calculations, and still find the result coming out correctly. And this practical or symbolic use of the mental state has a still wider extension. Alike in terms of thinking, and of conduct, the outcome may be of such paramount importance that anything that will enable us to reach our goal may serve to carry our meaning, and so in a sense constitute perfectly valid knowledge. Even apart from the use of arbitrary signs, it is evident that between the meaning, and the mental state or image, there may be almost no point

¹ A still further sense of 'meaning' very common in pragmatists' writings, is in terms of purpose, valuation, practical significance. Thus the meaning of a chair is 'sitting,' of a memory, the act it is called up to facilitate, and the like.

of similarity, and there may even be a sharp discrepancy. I see a round table as round—roundness is a part of its essence; my image meanwhile may have the essence ‘elliptical.’ So perceived distance—belonging to the object’s essence—may be represented in the analysis of the mental state by characters quite distinguishable from its real nature. And imagery is notoriously still more apt to be minus most of the characters belonging to the ‘meaning’ which we think.

In general, the explanation seems to be that the presence of meaning in the active life—of thought or of conduct—is largely a sense of definiteness in the direction in which we feel ourselves moving, the assurance that we are on the right track, and will come out at a point where some specific experience will greet us as winding up happily and successfully the active process. This might possibly account for such a thing as ‘imageless thought,’ if such a thing there be,—as the irradiation from a moving equilibrium whereby felt relationships give rise to a tingling sense of the terms which will complete them, even before these arrive in person on the scene. But it is not necessary for me to present an adequate psychology of meaning—a thing which I am far from professing myself competent to do—since for my particular purpose the question can be considerably narrowed. Whatever the symbolic functions of the mental state, falling short of correspondence, the moment we come back to the special aspect of knowledge in which alone I am now interested, and consider knowledge not as a technique for attaining practical or theoretical ends, but as an attempt at a mental reconstruction of the *true nature of things*, we find the notion of correspondence inevitably cropping up again. We can use words, when their meanings are sufficiently fixed and we are become sufficiently sure-footed, or we can use any other form of substitutory image, without stopping to realize to the imagination the concrete realities for which they stand. But when we do stop to *realize the meaning* of our words, and think not of the practical end that thought for the moment is interested in reaching, but the real character of the world with which our thinking deals, we are led to recognize that we have no proper imaginative realization of the meaning

of the word unless we are capable of translating it back, for any particular detail of our meaning, into the concrete fact of which it is the sign. And an idea is in *this* sense true, or enables us to think the nature of the object truly, only in so far as it has itself the characteristics of the thing to which it professes to refer. Suppose I am trying to think truly the character of a previous sense-experience of redness. Unless I can call up an image whose redness is equivalent to the previously experienced redness, or can get a new sensation of the same kind, to that extent I fail to have any realizing sense of its qualitative nature, in the state of mind in which I am just, as we say, 'thinking about it,' though the defective image may still serve the purpose of directing me in the sort of conduct for which its object calls. Or if I try to 'think' another man's feeling of fear, I only succeed in knowing the qualitative 'fear' essence in so far as I am able to use, directly or indirectly, in 'knowing' it, a similar concrete experience of my own, which embodies in itself the same quality I need to have before my mind if I am to attribute it to another. At the very least I must possess the assurance that I *could* get the similarly qualified experience if I tried. And the same situation holds of beliefs about the nature of a physical world. Whether or not redness really belongs as a character to things, the very intelligibility of the dispute itself is bound up with the thesis that I have had an experience characterized by the quality of redness, and that, alike when I assert and when I deny, the experience thus qualified, bodily or in a reproduction, is my ground of persuasion, the identity or lack of identity of *its* quality with the character of the real thing being the only point at issue. And I am bound to suppose that this is true of *every* character attributed to the real world, relationships as well as qualities; unless the relationship can be translated into the *relational experience* which gives the word its meaning, and unless we suppose that just the character thus represented attaches somehow to the real world itself, we have no ground for claiming that we know the nature of this world at all, though we might still perhaps be able to orientate ourselves in it.

It remains true that the *total* image through which one thinks

an object is usually, and perhaps inevitably, a long way removed descriptively from the essence of the object. But the essence of the object as a unified whole functions normally in that active process in which we are mainly concerned in reaching a goal; and here any sort of substitute or symbol may be made to do the practical work. But when we are bent rather on stopping to realize concretely within the mental life itself the true nature of the reality of which we are thinking, we are compelled to take up its various characters point by point; and in such a case we find ourselves balked unless, by reviving an image, or repeating an original experience, we can actually get in experience the quality we are wanting to assign the object as its nature. So of perceptual qualities like distance. When we begin to scrutinize, we are likely in the 'mental state' to find no element 'corresponding' to distance. But if we really attempt to realize what we mean by distance, instead of going on at once to the suggested movements—or stopping with the sense that we could go on if we liked—we shall find this out of our power except as we are able to utilize experiences which in themselves possess the qualities that give intelligibility to the term.

But now there is a second qualification of the statement that in true knowledge the essence of the object and the essence of the mental state are—potentially—identical. Both object and mental state have, *as existences*, certain qualities which either cannot be compared at all, or only in a carefully qualified sense. Thus the fleeting character of the image does not belong to the—in most cases—more permanent character of the thing. From the other side—the side of the object,—in particular, this needs to be recognized in order to evade certain plausible objections. Thus it might be asked, for example, whether a thought of the infinite is itself infinite, or whether the thought of an object independent of experience is itself thus independent. But this would be to forget the very distinction between existence and essence on which the theory rests. Of course the idea does not have *the* existence which belongs only to the object, nor is it able to *perform the acts* which the object by virtue of its reality is able to perform. We can consistently say that the thought of

activity is not itself active; the idea of running does not run. But why? Simply because running is an occurrence in the actually existing world, whereas only the essence of this world is taken up into the idea. But it does not follow that we could have an 'idea of running' without some actual experience of running in the past, which now is utilized in imagination, and its descriptive characters attended to. So if the complex character of 'infinity' implies also an aspect of actuality, we should have ground for admitting that in so far the *idea* of infinity is not infinite, though this idea might still embody the 'essence' infinity, and be impossible were it not that the essence had actually qualified experiences of my own which I can draw upon for purposes of thinking. If we were to define infinite time, for example, in the traditional way, as time which goes on without ever stopping, it would not be necessary for our thinking this that the thought also should go on without ever stopping. It is not required that the thought should *do* the things that its object does. But if I had not had experiences themselves characterized by continuance, and by stopping, and the experience of one sort of event not being the same as another, I should certainly not be able to think the possibility of a 'continuance that does not stop.' The same distinction relieves a difficulty that might be felt about simple sensational qualities. If I say that a certain 'state of mind' *is red*, this seems paradoxical only when we interpret 'being red' to mean 'that which would *appear* red to an organ of vision,' or 'that which has the *power of producing* a sensation of red in an observer.' But this last phrase would itself be meaningless if we had not had experiences characterized as such both by redness and by 'causality,' though I grant that what the nature of this causal experience is, philosophers have not been very successful in describing.

And now there is a final point which clearly ought not to be left unnoticed. In order to be able to think meaning apart from existence, existence also must stand for some definite aspect of reality, as I have throughout had occasion to argue that it does. But a theory of existence offers very considerable difficulties. And I particularly want to call attention to a logical objection.

I have held that we can and do abstract the character of a thing from the existence of this character in the concrete thing.¹ But in that case, it may be asked, is existence itself an essence, or is it not? If it is, then it is as abstract as any other essence, and existence itself would not exist; if it is not, then how can we think or mean it, since everything we are able to think must be reducible to an essence before it can get into relation with the mind and knowledge, and take on the form of an 'idea'?

I may get around to a consideration of this by beginning with a distinction. It seems—to me at least—self-evident that the fundamental stuff of 'existence' would have itself to become a part of immediate experience before we should have any chance of getting at it as such, though without this we might be able to think its abstract 'characters.' If, then, there does exist an independent world capable of being known by human beings, but not entering bodily into their inner life, it follows that we cannot possibly discover immediately, or apart from inference, the nature of its 'isness,' but can only describe this in terms of some essence which it shows. Now in this latter sense there is a familiar everyday judgment as to what it is we mean by an 'existent' thing; a thing really exists when it *has consequences*, and so has to be practically reckoned with in our conduct. Thus when Professor Sheldon in a recent article² avoids the need of a special class of 'real' existents which shall exclude errors and illusions, by appealing to the empirical fact that some reals, but only some, have effects, and so can be distinguished in practice without needing to limit the term 'real' to them alone, I should reply that, as applied to extra-experiential entities, this is precisely what I should mean by their being existentially real, as opposed to the inconsequential class of thinkables that are not real. And surely it is natural to ask oneself, Is there not some ultimate reason *why* certain objects are big with consequences, while others are totally innocuous?

¹ I should perhaps say that I see no compelling reason for supposing the existence of a thing 'substance' in which qualities inhere; at any rate, the existence status of the characters themselves, as equivalent in their combination to what we mean by a thing, is all that I assume here.

² PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. XXV, p. 335.

and how can we find language in which to express the nature of this reason, that avoids speaking of the one instance as existentially more real than the other?

As regards the reals that are not capable of forming an identical part of the inner life of a human individual by their bodily presence in it, I should maintain, then, once more, that a recognition of their 'existence' goes back primarily to a certain active attitude toward them in view of their practical relationship to human well-being, and that, apart from some later speculative hypothesis, what we mean by calling them real in a reflective judgment is interpretable as a transcription, in knowledge terms, of this practical and pre-inferential attitude. To be real is to be effective, to be what one needs to take into practical reckoning. But now it is to be noticed, again, that such an account of the 'existent' does not really tell us what existence *as such* is; it does no more than point out a character—in terms of the 'causal' relationship to specific human experiences—that will enable us to detect whether or not existents are present in our neighborhood. If we are to be able actually to catch existence on the wing, it must be on condition that it is present bodily, and not merely revealed through its effects; and that is only conceivable of a sort of existence that comes *within* experience, and is not simply 'known' indirectly through the *medium* of experience. I have maintained, and should on occasion be prepared to argue more at length, that we do actually find such an existent fact in what traditionally has been called psychical, or psychological, or conscious, or experienced being—feelings, sensations, and all the rest. Here, however, I cannot undertake to add anything further to the identification; my only present interest is in suggesting a possible way out of the particular logical difficulty which I started out by raising. Granting, then, that in the psychical fact we are directly in contact with existence, is this existence an essence as red is an essence? I do not find that it is. There is no distinguishable content, having form or quality of its own, that I seem able to hold before the mind as a meaning to indicate what the 'existence' of a mental state is, as distinct from the 'what' or character *of* existence; that is why it is so

easy for the philosopher to persuade himself that no 'isness' remains over and above the intelligible characters of reality—its logical description. The *being* of the psychical fact is not redness, or spatial extension, or tonality, or any term that I can name; nor is it all of these together. But neither do we need to hold that all these characters are reals in themselves, which have in experience no inherent connection with the psychical; red as a sensation may be, as it seems to be, just one particular form of psychical stuff. For I see no logical reason why existence may not need *some* character in order to exist, or why it may not have any number of *different* characters, all equally real. This 'existence' I have admitted that I cannot describe. I can only point to it as an immediate revelation of experience, and say, Consider a toothache, or an emotion of fear, or a sweet taste, or a living memory, and see if you are not forced to recognize, over and above any terms in which you can describe the distinctive *quale* of these experiences, the sense of the actual living presence of the qualifying adjectives, not now as an abstract description, but as the very stuff of inner experience itself, a fact of life and not of logic. And if I am still asked, How then, if this has no specific content, can you think or mean it? the best I can do in way of reply is to say, I cannot, indeed, mean it in the sense of having it as a specific meaning before my mind, comparable with red as red is comparable with blue; but I can *actively* mean it, point to it, locate it, have an anticipatory sense that I shall land in its immediacy. And I can do this because the mechanism of meaning, in this second and active sense, apart from all the differences of content that constitute 'meanings,' is *itself* also a real experience; and so the immediate sense of reality, though it never can be pictured or reduced to relationships, is always with me to irradiate with a feeling of significance my knowledge-references. And if we wish to make this explicit, we have only to stop for a moment to *give attention* to the present psychical field, to have what may intelligibly be called a direct knowledge of existence, apart from the need of ideas to mediate it. For in the act of attention through which we bring into the center of the conscious field a present fact of relatively

stable immediate experience, knowledge and being merge; we *are* what we know (attentively realize), and we know what at the moment we are. And if we can find no features of this which lend themselves to descriptive terms, and can only identify it by directing others to go and do likewise, and see what they will see, this only means that reality is deeper and thicker than logic—a conclusion which after all ought not to surprise the philosopher any more than it does the ordinary sensible man.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE STATE IN THE WRITINGS OF GABRIEL TARDE.

I. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TARDE'S WRITINGS AND SOCIOLOGICAL SYSTEM.

OF all French writers upon systematic sociology since the time of Comte probably no other author has been as influential in shaping the general body of sociological thought as Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904)¹. Tarde's contributions to sociology mainly center about the elaboration of the psychological and sociological importance of imitation, though this principle by no means embraces the whole of his system. There can be no doubt that his interest in imitation was fostered by his duties during the greater part of his life as a judge and a statistician, professions well-designed to impress upon the mind the significance of the repetition of similar circumstances and phenomena.² To be sure the idea of imitation as a socializing force was not new; a century and a half before Tarde, Hume had emphasized its action in his brilliant essay upon "National Character," in which he had defended the idea of imitation as producing those uniformities of culture attributed by Montesquieu to geographic influences. The emphasis placed upon imitation by Bagehot and Huxley is also well known. Finally, at about the

¹ The classic exposition of Tarde's sociological system is to be found in Davis's monograph, *Gabriel Tarde*, New York, 1906, which was incorporated in his later work, *Psychological Interpretations of Society*, 1909. This work is one of the best expositions of a sociological system extant. Other briefer discussions are to be found in G. Tosti's excellent article, "The Sociological Theories of Gabriel Tarde," *Pol. Sci. Quar.*, 1897, pp. 490-511; Professor Giddings's Introduction to Mrs. Parsons's translation of Tarde's *Laws of Imitation*; Bristol's *Social Adaptation*, pp. 185-192; Gault's *Introduction* and Lindsey's editorial preface to Howell's translation of Tarde's *Penal Philosophy*; and Professor Small's review of Tarde's "*Social Laws*," *Amer. Jour. Soc.*, Vol. IV, pp. 395-400. For an ingenious American adaptation of Tarde's sociological theories see Ross's *Social Psychology*, and for the most extended application of similar theories to psychology by an American writer see Baldwin's *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*.

² For a brief survey of the salient points connected with Tarde's career see Giddings's Introduction cited above.

same time that Tarde was elaborating his doctrine, similar views were being put forward by a number of writers, among them, Bordier, Espinas, Baldwin, James, and Royce.¹ But whatever Tarde may have lacked in originality he compensated for in the completeness and thoroughness of his analysis of imitation. Tarde's analysis of the social aspects and influence of imitation has not been received without criticism; Graham Wallas criticizes it sharply for its ambiguity,² and Bristol lightly remarks that "indeed his discussion of suggestion and imitation is *passé*."³ The truth seems to be that, on the one hand, Tarde rather exaggerated the influence of imitation and was not averse to straining a point to claim a certain process as the product of this socializing force, and that, on the other hand, certain of his assumptions regarding the psychology of imitation have not stood the test of refined experiments in the psychological laboratory. At the same time, there can be little doubt that his discussion of the sociological importance of imitation has been of the sort which will render further exploitation of that field extremely unprofitable.

Imitation, however, was only the central theme of Tarde's system of sociology, and it now remains to examine his system as a whole. Tarde's sociology was almost exclusively psychological, though he frankly admitted that there were other legitimate lines of approach. He finds that the social process consists fundamentally in the intermental activity of a group of associated individuals. This intermental activity takes place through the three fundamental processes of *repetition* (imitation), *opposition*, and *adaptation*; and these in turn operate upon the beliefs and desires of individuals and societies.

In other words, beliefs and desires are the raw psychological material of socialization, intermental activity is the general process through which socialization is achieved,⁴ and repetition,

¹ For the historic antecedents of Tarde's theories and the stages in the development of his system, see Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society*, Chaps. ii, vii.

² *The Great Society*, pp. 119-20.

³ *Social Adaptation*, p. 191.

⁴ *La logique sociale*, chap. i., and *Essais et mélanges sociologiques*, pp. 156, 268.

opposition, and adaptation are the special processes through which intermental activity accomplishes its work.¹

Tarde finds that these three principles of repetition, opposition, and adaptation will serve as the basis of a cosmic philosophy as well as for the foundation of a system of sociology. They are the three great factors in the development of all sciences and all phenomena.² His general thesis is two-fold: (1) in the thoughts and observations of men regarding the operation and existence of these three fundamental processes, the historic progress has been from that of the observation of the large-scale and sometimes fantastic examples of repetition, opposition, and adaptation to that of the discovery of the minute and fundamental examples which go to make up the greater; (2) in the actual world of phenomena the repetitions, oppositions, and adaptations proceed in the reverse order from the minute and fundamental to the great and extensive.³

It will be impossible in this place to do more than to summarize the main points which he makes in regard to sociology and socialization. In the field of social phenomena one may discover the same inversion of order between theory and fact in regard to *repetition* as was noticed in regard to phenomena in general. Beginning with the earlier superficial observation of picturesque social repetitions like the classical theory of the cycles of government or the triads of Vico and Hegel, the scientific sociologist has now come to regard as fundamental the repetitions of two persons in a state of association. In the same way, the reversal of observed progress to actual progress in repetition is manifested in the fact that social repetitions proceed in a geometrical ratio from the fundamental one of two persons to that of international repetition or imitation.⁴ As it is under the head

¹ Cf. *Social Laws*, *passim*. Each of these three great agencies receives its complete analysis in a separate volume. Repetition is analyzed in *Les lois de l'imitation* (1st ed. 1890, 3rd ed. 1900); opposition in *L'opposition universelle* (1897); and adaptation in *La logique sociale* (1895). These were epitomized in his *Les lois sociales* (1898), which presented an outline of his whole system of philosophy as well as of his sociology.

² *Social Laws*, translated by H. C. Warren, New York, 1899, pp. 1-10.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-23.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 24ff.

of repetition that Tarde would include the fundamental process of imitation, it might be well at this place to interpolate a brief summary of his analysis of the mode of action of this principle in social life as developed in his *Laws of Imitation*. Davis sums up his treatment of imitation in the following ingenious and illuminating manner: "I. The source of social action is in individual initiatives expressed in new ideas or procedures called *Inventions*. II. The essential social and socializing act is *Imitation*, by which Inventionse come more or less socially accepted and socially influential. III. The *origin* of an Invention is influenced by: (a) The inherent difficulty of combining mentally the ideas whose combination is the invention; (b) The grades of innate mental ability in the society; (c) The social conditions favoring mental alertness and the expression of ability. IV. The *imitation* of an invention is affected by: (a) the *general law* that imitations spread from their initial center in geometrical progression, with regard to the number of persons affected; (b) *Physical and biological* influences, including race characteristics; the general law being that 'Imitations are refracted by their media'; (c) *Social* influences: (1) *Logical*: the agreement or disagreement of the new invention with the inventions already more or less socially accepted (imitated); ('Logical causes operate whenever an individual prefers a given imitation to others because he thinks it is more useful or more true than others, that is, more in accord than they are with the aims or principles that have already found a place in his mind.'); (2) *Extra-logical*: (x) Ideas are transmitted before means; imitation goes *ab interioribus ad exteriora*; (y) Imitation proceeds from the socially superior to the socially inferior; (z) Ages of custom, in which the past has peculiar prestige, alternate with ages of fashion, in which prestige is possessed by the novel and the foreign."²

In regard to the principle of *opposition* in sociology and society, the earlier oppositions which were observed by students of society were the mythological struggles between the forces of good and

¹ *Laws of Imitation*, translated by Elsie Clews Parsons, New York, 1903, p. 141.

² Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society*, pp. 97-98.

evil. Next there came the idea of the conflicts of races and nations which was later softened by the economists into the notion of competition. Finally, however, the sociologist has reduced the matter so that he correctly understands that "the really fundamental social opposition must be sought for in the bosom of the social individual himself, whenever he hesitates between adopting or rejecting a new pattern offered to him, whether in the way of phraseology, ritual, concept, canon of art or conduct."¹ The three main types of social opposition are war, competition, and discussion, mentioned in the order of their historic predominance. Each of these forms has tended to develop on a larger scale and again verifies the thesis that the order of the progress of phenomena in fact is the reverse of the order of the observation of these facts.²

With respect to the third great principle, *adaptation*, the sociological observation of this principle was first confined to the somewhat fantastic ideas of the philosophy of history whereby the path of history was looked upon as the result of the adaptation or harmonizing of the work of one nation to that of the nation which had preceded or was to follow it, thus making the advance of historical action appear as a harmonious and teleological whole. These ideas were gradually made more scientific until now, according to Tarde, we know that "we must seek the fundamental social adaptation in the brain and individual mind of the inventor"—a harmony among the ideas in the mind of the individuals in society is essential to a harmony of the minds of the different members of a society.³ Following the usual rule, the adaptation of social phenomena proceeds from the lesser to the greater—from those in the individual mind to those adaptations between nations upon which must be based the expectation of eliminating war in the future.⁴

In summing up the interrelation of the action of these three principles of repetition, opposition, and adaptation, Tarde says:

"These three terms constitute a circular series which is capable

¹ *Social Laws*, pp. 81-84.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 111 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 169 ff.

of proceeding on and on without ceasing. It is through imitative repetition that invention, the fundamental social adaptation, spreads and is strengthened, and tends, through the encounter of one of its own imitative rays with an imitative ray emanating from some other invention, old or new, either to arouse new struggles, or to yield new and more complex inventions, which soon radiate out imitatively in turn, and so on indefinitely. . . . Thus of the three terms compared, the first and third surpass the second in height, depth, importance, and possibly also in duration. The only value of the second—opposition—is to provoke a tension of antagonistic forces fitted to arouse inventive genius.”¹

“The mutual relations of our three terms—repetition, opposition, and adaptation—are easily understood when we consider successive repetitions as operating, sometimes in favor of adaptation, which they spread and develop by their own interferences, sometimes in favor of opposition, which they arouse by interferences of another sort.”²

This indicates in a brief way the main lines of Tarde’s approach to the chief problems of sociology. His principles will be analyzed more in detail in the treatment of his political theories in which he consistently applies the analysis of the workings of repetition, opposition, and adaptation in the field of political activity.³

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 135-137.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 212-13.

³ In closing this brief introduction to Tarde’s system of thought it might be well to indicate his more important works not already mentioned. Tarde’s reputation as a criminologist, which is fully as great as his fame as a sociologist, rests, aside from his actual work as a judge, upon his *La criminalité comparée* (1886, 2nd ed., 1890); *La philosophie pénale* (1st ed., 1890, 4th ed. translated by Howell, Boston, 1912—his greatest work in this field and one of the world’s criminological classics); and *Etudes pénales et sociales* (1892). His system is applied to the interpretations of the problems of jurisprudence in *Les transformations du droit* (1893); to the problems of economics in *Psychologie économique* (2 vols., 1902); and, finally, his views on the field of political science are embodied in his *Les transformations du pouvoir* (1899). For the complete bibliography of Tarde’s works, including his main contributions to periodical literature, see Davis, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-60. This list also gives, p. 260, the main commentaries and critiques dealing with Tarde’s contributions to social science.

II. SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL THEORY.

I. *Preliminary Observations on Political Concepts, Methods and Processes.*

Tarde's treatment of the chief problems of political science is almost exclusively psychological, but this point of view is assumed in full knowledge of the limitations imposed by this method of approach and with complete acknowledgement of the validity of other supplementary methods of analyzing these same problems.¹ The main defect in the work, aside from its psychological bias, is the exceedingly ambiguous use of the word *pouvoir* which is the central theme of his analysis. At times it is used in its most general sense of physical or psychological power; in other instances it is made practically synonymous with political sovereignty; in still other cases it is given the meaning of political or governmental authority; and, finally, it is repeatedly used to designate the various departments of government—the sense in which it was used by Montesquieu in his famous doctrine of the separation of powers as the chief safeguard of political liberty. In other words, the same elasticity is to be found in Tarde's interpretation of *pouvoir* that Graham Wallas criticizes in his use of *imitation*. The attempt will be made as the analysis proceeds to make clear the meaning which Tarde assigns to *pouvoir* in each instance.

As to the relation of sociology to political science, Tarde evidently holds that sociology is the general science of society, of which political science is that subdivision which deals primarily with the subject of political authority in its various manifestations. He makes the "science du pouvoir," synonymous with "la sociologie politique."²

After a few introductory chapters on the origin, nature, and sources of political authority Tarde resolves his analysis of political problems into an organization of these questions around his well-known triad of principles outlined above—repetition, opposition, and adaptation. In fact, the main thesis of the

¹ Tarde, *Les transformations du pouvoir*, Paris, Félix Alcan, 1899, preface, pp. v-vi.

Ibid., p. 116.

introductory chapters is that the growth and transformations of political authority are chiefly accomplished through the agency of inventions spread by imitation.

The political activity of society, according to Tarde, is that portion of general social activity in which the group coöperates as a unit.¹ Or, again, in a more special sense, political activity is that part of social activity which has for its direct and immediate purpose either the political subordination or the political liberation of foreign peoples or a part of the citizens of the state in question.² The relation of political power or authority to society, according to Tarde, is what the relation of the will is to the mind.³ Power, or authority, in its most general sense is the right or privilege of being obeyed.⁴ Tarde distinguishes between political authority and the various other types of social authority, and finds that the former is characterized primarily by its being determinate and precise.⁵ He further differentiates internal from external political power. The term '*pouvoir*,' which is applied to internal political authority, has a moral significance, while the term '*puissance*' which is used to designate external political power—the exercise of political power by a state outside its own boundaries—is a term brought over from mechanics into the domain of political science and has no moral connotation whatever.⁶ The shadow of this "*puissance*" is what is commonly known now as the 'influence' of a nation—"quelque chose de moins brutal déjà mais d'immoral aussi."⁷

The state, according to Tarde, may be viewed in several ways. It may be regarded as the supreme political authority vested in

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 181.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 7. "Les vrais rapports entre la vie sociale en général et l'activité politique en particulier nous sont indiqués par là. La vie sociale consiste en courants multiples d'exemples qui se croisent, interfèrent, s'anastomosent. La vie politique consiste à diriger ces courants, soit en les contenant, soit en les activant, dans le sens de leur plus grande convergence et de leur moindre divergence." pp. 8-9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ "La langue marque ainsi le caractère de brutalité de ces êtres collectifs," *i. e.*, states viewed in their external relations. *Ibid.*, p. 168.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 168-9.

a single person or group of persons. It may be looked upon as the total force of political administration. Or, finally, in its broadest signification, it may be viewed as the nation as a whole.¹ He, thus, does not have a clear notion of the state as distinct either from the government or from the nation, though, as pointed out above, he has the correct view of the relation between the state and society.

2. *The Sources and Transformations of Political Authority (Pouvoir).*

In introducing the subject of the sources of political authority, Tarde cautions against confusing the sources and channels of this authority, though he does not always rigidly adhere to this distinction himself. The real and vital source of political authority is to be found in the universal need on the part of individuals to be directed and commanded.² This need of guidance and protection which gives rise to political authority originates in the family where "l'habitude d'être protégé et dirigé a été contractée."³ Without this preliminary discipline in the family the later formation of the state would have been impossible. Political authority in its further expansion and development was modelled on the many sided authority of the head of the primitive family.⁴ To delve more deeply into the psychological foundations of political authority it may be seen to rest upon the beliefs and desires of the society.⁵ The power of a statesman has two specific sources, the diffusion of a general confidence in his ability to fulfil his function, and the need for the fulfilment of this function, together with a wide dissemination of a sentiment of this need.⁶ While authority has the double foundation of belief and desire, one of these may predominate at any given time. If authority is primarily based upon desire it is likely to

¹ "Il s'ensuit que, à voir profondément les choses, l'Etat c'est la nation tout entière." *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 25ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 30-32.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

be tyrannical in the classical sense of that term, as well as, in reality, illegitimate. On the other hand, if it rests mainly upon public sentiment and belief it will be a much more lofty and legitimate form of political authority. This, Tarde holds, is the only real psychological basis for a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate political authority.¹

The next important problem which arises after that regarding the sources of political authority has been settled, concerns the explanation of the transformations in the forms of political authority and of the shifting of its location within the state.² Inasmuch as political authority is in reality based upon the beliefs and desires of the political community, anything which modifies these beliefs and desires will thereby effect a change in political authority. Therefore since inventions are the main agency in revolutionizing beliefs and desires, it is to inventions that one must look for the ultimate cause of the transformations of political control.³ Political transformations are, thus, but a function of the more general mutations of beliefs and desires within a society.⁴ It is not only, or even primarily, the inventions in the field of politics which produce the transformations of political authority, but rather the innovations in every field of social activity which tend to alter the beliefs and desires of the community. If primacy were to be assigned to the changes in any particular field of social activity, Tarde holds it would probably have to be awarded to those in science, industry and religion.⁵ His interpretation of industry is so wide as to include all applied science. On this point Tarde makes perhaps the most brilliant analysis in his whole work, in which he shows how the great historic transitions in government and political power have been correlated with these "inventions."⁶ Those followers

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 44-45.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 35ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 36ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 40, 54.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 40ff.

⁶ "Le premier sauvage qui a fait jaillir une étincelle de deux cailloux heurtés ne se doutait pas que la religion du foyer allait naître de là. Le premier sauvage qui, ayant capturé de jeunes agneaux ou de jeunes taureaux vivants, s'aperçut de la facilité à les apprivoiser, de l'utilité de les engraisser plutôt que de les tuer immé-

of Ranke, Freeman, Seeley, and the political historians who like to think of political influences as the causal element in social evolution would profit immensely by a perusal of these pages. Even such a discovery as the Cartesian system of co-ordinates and graphic representation, seemingly so remote from the domain of politics, has had a very considerable political influence in making possible the modern science of statistics which is indispensable in every field of modern political activity.¹ It is because political transformations are a "function" of the general social revolutions of various types that political mutations are variable, irregular, and even arbitrary beyond what is to be found in any other field of social transformation.²

diatement, ne soupçonna point qu'il inaugurerait une ère nouvelle, l'ère pastorale et un régime politique nouveau, la famille patriarcale, le clan et la tribu organisés, d'où surgirait la noblesse, l'aristocratie héréditaire. Le premier sauvage qui a imaginé, au lieu de cueillir simplement des graines et des fruits, d'ensemencer et de cultiver des grains de blé, de planter des arbres fruitiers, n'a pas deviné que, de cette simple idée, la cité allait naître, gouvernement tout nouveau, et que, du patriarcat, du chef de tribu ou de clan, le pouvoir allait passer, tout métamorphosé, aux magistrats municipaux. Et dans cette cité même, combien de déplacements et de changements d'autorité! Le premier homme ou la première femme qui a eu l'idée du métier de tisserand et de fabriquer de la toile pour la vendre au dehors, tandis qu'auparavant chaque famille produisait tous les vêtements dont elle avait besoin, par les bras de ses femmes ou de ses esclaves, celui-là a préparé pour les cités de l'avenir, telles que Florence avec ses 'arts de la laine', le microbe d'industrie ou du commerce qui, par l'accumulation et l'effranchissement du capital, a démocratisé le monde. . . . Le premier philosophe grec qui a imaginé d'expliquer les phénomènes par des causes mécaniques et physiques a frappé au cœur la vieille religion animiste et fétichiste sur laquelle reposait la vieille constitution familiale et municipale, et préparé une transformation toute positiviste et utilitaire de l'autorité." Tarde, *Les transformations du pouvoir*, pp. 188-190.

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-54. "En résumé, c'est dans l'état des croyances générales et des besoins généraux d'un pays à un moment donné qu'il faut chercher la raison d'être du pouvoir politique qui le régit. Et c'est par les changements à la fois des croyances et des desirs, changements dus à des découvertes et des inventions accumulées ou substituées, que les transformations de ce pouvoir s'expliquent. Il en résulte que celles-ci sont 'fonction' des transformations religieuses et des transformations industrielles avant tout."

² The theories of Fustel de Coulanges and Loria which attempt to account for the transformations of political authority are both inadequate, for neither takes into account both the beliefs and desires of the community. In his *Ancient City*, Coulanges bases his explanation of political institutions almost exclusively upon the prevalent ideas and beliefs of classical times, thus giving them an intellectualistic interpretation; while Loria in his *Economic Foundations of Society*, founds his explanation of the location and changes in political authority almost entirely upon

Tarde next considers the rôle of the nobility and the capitals of states in the creation and propagation of these innovations which cause the transformations in the political world. According to the law that the socially superior are imitated by the socially inferior, the nobility and the capitals are the radiant points of social imitation. It is from them that in the past, at least, the epoch-making innovations have been produced and disseminated throughout society.¹ The rise in the influence of great cities, especially of political capitals, is always accompanied by a corresponding decline in the prestige of the nobility, since the latter depend upon the principles of exclusiveness and the inheritance of privilege, and these are not well-adapted to the conditions which accompany the growth of urban centers of culture, industry, and wealth.² While cities may grow up around different locations which offer military, religious, social, or commercial advantages, in any case, the founding of a city is really the invention of one or more individuals who have the ingenuity to recognize and utilize the advantages of the particular location.³ If one goes deeper in his analysis, however, he will readily realize that no city can strictly be said to have one founder or several founders. Every individual who, previous to the foundation of the city, had produced an invention or a discovery, the utilization of which contributed to the growth and prosperity of the city might correctly be reckoned as one of its founders.⁴ Cities are made possible by the growth of imitative sympathy, which has previously taken place in the family, and has tended to break down the exclusive spirit fostered by the strict principle of kinship.⁵ A city becomes a political capital in a number of ways, the desires of society, thus presenting an economic interpretation. In so far as either of these writers fails to take into account both the beliefs and the desires of society, his theory, Tarde maintains, is inadequate. *Ibid.*, pp. 54ff.; 63ff.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 74. It is unfortunate that in his discussion of these points Tarde devotes so much space to the already well-understood subject of the origin of the nobility and cities, as well as capitals, and gives relatively little attention to the subject of their importance as centers of innovation and radiant points of imitation—something that he was much better fitted to discuss than the questions connected with their genesis.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 83ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 87ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 95ff.

but most often through the partiality and special interests of the ruling family or party.¹ In addition to political capitals there are also religious, economic, and artistic capitals. The rôle of a capital as a place of innovations and as the radiant point of social imitation is greatest when a city happens to be the capital of a nation in every one of these aspects. Again, the more centralized a nation the more influential will be the capital as the center of initiative and of the rays of social imitation.² The era of the predominance of capitals, however, is passing. Their prevalence was intermediate between that of the régime of the feudal nobility and the present and probable future preponderance of the nation or the group of nations.³ This ends that portion of Tarde's work which is concerned with general and introductory observations. The remainder of the book is devoted to a systematic analysis of political phenomena as organized about his three principles of repetition, opposition, and adaptation.⁴

3. *The Function of Repetition and Imitation in Political Processes.*

Government, according to Tarde, originates in imitation. The leader of the herd of animals gives his orders through the medium of suggestion and is imitated by the herd, their imitation becoming habit in the course of time.⁵ When words are invented the process remains much the same. The ruler can only utter intelligent commands by using forms already well-understood and he, thus, has to imitate the precedents of his ancestors. On his side the subject has to follow a given mode of action in rendering obedience in order to please his chief.⁶ Then nations are

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 106-107.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 107-108.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 108ff., particularly p. 111. "Les capitales maintenues commencent à voir leur absolutisme ébranlé, démolé chaque jour, par les progrès de la représentation nationale." *Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁴ Of course, he has devoted a large portion of the material already surveyed to a consideration of the part which invention and imitation play in political activity.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

⁶ *Ibid.*

always wont to imitate one another when there is any considerable degree of mutual communication. In any region or age there is almost invariably a certain nation or people whose prestige makes it fashionable to imitate them.¹ In the fifteenth century Italy enjoyed this preëminence; Spain in the sixteenth; France in the seventeenth; and since then England has been the most imitated nation. The absolutism that swept over Europe during the seventeenth century was an imitation of the government of Louis XIV, and the subsequent growth of parliamentary government throughout the world has been an imitation of the English system.² The people of the French Revolution were swelled with pride over the thought that they had produced a type of government which was absolutely new and original. As a matter of fact all that was really essential and valuable in their supposed innovations had been strongly suggested by the previous examples of the American Revolution and republican government, by the parliamentary government of England, and by the democracies of antiquity and the neighboring democracy of Switzerland. These precedents were assimilated with the theories of Rousseau, but the doctrines of Rousseau were only adaptations or copies of earlier ideas.³ When one makes a thorough examination of the antecedents of the French Revolution one finds that the whole situation was prepared years before the outbreak. Beginning as early as 1700, with the works of Locke and Newton, there had been a tendency on the part of the French to imitate the English ideas and practices. From 1760-1789 there was in France "*une anglomanie enragée, épidémique, dont rien ne peut nous donner aujourd'hui l'idée.*"⁴ Rousseau's doctrines of the social contract and the sovereignty of the people were taken from familiar English sources. In addition to previous ideas on the subject, he had before him the constitutions of the Swiss republics as a source of democratic

¹ "Il y a toujours eu en Europe un peuple à la mode, jouissant du privilège d'être imité, grâce au prestige du succès ou d'une civilisation jugée supérieure." *Op. cit.*, p. 119.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 119-120.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 126-128.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

ideas, and on the other hand, he had the absolutism of the French kings from which to fashion his idea of the absolute sovereignty of the people.¹ This is but one conspicuous example of how alleged originality fades away when its antecedents are closely examined. Of all types of political repetition colonization, while perhaps not the most important, is the most striking and the most wide-spread.² While there is an internal type of colonization which consists in the formation of settlements about certain points within the original boundaries of a state by reason of their economic advantages or religious sentiment, the external colonization is the more conspicuous and more important.³ In the process of colonization the national type of the mother country is reproduced *en bloc*.⁴ The colonization of antiquity differed from that of modern times in being primarily the concern of a city as contrasted with the national colonization of modern times. Between the two eras there has been the transitional stage of the great empires of Alexander, the Romans, and Charlemagne.⁵ While it is no longer possible to erect a great empire out of contiguous territory, the improvement in the means of communication and the growth of the imperialistic spirit may make it possible for nations to create great colonial empires with a perfection in the adjustment of parts quite foreign to the experience of Rome.⁶

4. *Opposition in the Realm of Political Phenomena.*

Tarde next deals with the subject of political opposition. As in the more general field of social phenomena, so in regard to political activity, opposition is a more intermittent and less fundamental principle than either repetition or adaptation.⁸ Political opposition is of two main types—external opposition,

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 128-130.

² *Ibid.*, p. 131.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 132-133.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 135-6.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 137. For an earlier discussion of repetition in political activity see Tarde's *Laws of Imitation*, pp. 287-310.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 138. One should contrast with this view that of Gumplowicz and the 'conflict' school.

taking the form of war, imperialism and diplomacy; and internal, as manifested in the strife between parties and classes. Tarde first deals with the internal political opposition. From the most primitive times social groups have been divided into parties and classes, but at no time have these divisions been potent in face of national stress, such as war, when collective and concerted action is indispensable. It is only in the intervals between such periods of national stress that party and class divisions and strife have a flourishing activity.¹ The political "process," then, has consisted in an alternation of periods of maximum prevalence of external and internal political opposition. When looked at from a broader standpoint party strife may be considered as coöperation and a division of labor in the interests of the general welfare, for when a party is in power it attempts to exceed its predecessor in its accomplished results.² It is only when party divisions coincide with those fundamental divisions in the social body which are based on distinctions of class, locality, religion, or racial sentiment that party strife threatens the integrity of the state.³

In discussing the problem of the origin of parties Tarde first clears the ground for his own theories by disposing of a number of proposed explanations which he deems inadequate.⁴ After

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 138-139.

² *Ibid.*, p. 139. Tarde might have mentioned that this coöperative division of labor between parties more usually consists in a division of the privilege of distributing political spoils.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

⁴ In the first place, he condemns the theory of Rohmer, which received the approbation of Bluntschli, to the effect that party divisions are determined by the age of the members. According to this theory, the radicals are made up of young men; the liberals of those approaching middle life; the conservatives of the middle-aged; and, finally, the aged are the supporters of absolutism and despotism. (*Ibid.*, p. 141. Cf. Coker, *Organismic Theories of the State*, pp. 49-60.) This is only one of the many errors arising from employing biological analogies to explain social phenomena. It breaks down when it attempts to explain why in the past there were long periods when there were scarcely any party divisions except the cliques in the absolutist party, or why in some periods there were as many parties as there were classes or tribes. This explanation has some value, but its application is severely limited. (*Les transformations du pouvoir*, pp. 141-142.) Loria's doctrine that party divisions are but the reflection of the struggle between capital and labor is rejected as inadequate, though having some relation to the problem. (*Ibid.*,

having rejected the more important unsatisfactory theories accounting for the origin of parties, Tarde offers his own opinions upon the subject. In the first place, every great phenomenon of history began as a question—as a disputed point at issue.¹ The chief distinction between political life and the other aspects of this eternal and universal process of interrogation is the psychological intensity of the divisions which result from the different solutions offered to the questions proposed.² The origin of parties, then, begins in the logical duel in the mind of the individual as to the best solution of some question or group of questions.³ But it is not enough that there should be a large number of per-

pp. 142-143.) Likewise he finds that his own earlier explanation of party divisions, which was offered in the *Laws of Imitation*, was also only a partial explanation. Here he had maintained that the liberal party was the party of fashion imitation and the conservative the adherent of custom imitation. While it is certain that parties always represent definite currents of imitation, their explanation is not so simple as this, because on the basis of this theory it is difficult to account for the fact that there have been times when there were two well-defined parties and at the same time an absence of one or the other of these two fundamental forms of imitation. (*Ibid.*, pp. 143-144.) Another very popular but equally incomplete theory is that which accounts for parties on the basis of the struggle between those who are in office and those who are seeking offices. (*Ibid.*, p. 144.) Tarde then examines Sir Henry Maine's theory that parties originated as a means of recreation and intellectual diversion within the nobility and have now come to embrace practically all of the voting population as a result of the spread of democracy. This doctrine is valid in maintaining that party divisions spread from the apex of society towards the bottom, but it is erroneous in so far as it represents the parties in monarchies and aristocracies as made up entirely of nobles. Some of the fiercest divisions of parties involving the entire population have been found in despotic states. (*Ibid.*, pp. 145-146.) The true explanation is not that democracy is the cause of party divisions, but that both democracy and parties are the product of the same psychological principle; the needs and interests that give rise to parties first arise in the upper classes and are then copied by the mass of the people through their universal propensity to imitate the ideas and acts of their social superiors. (*Ibid.*, pp. 146-147.)

¹ "Avant les croisades, il y a eu la question des croisades; avant le triomphe du christianisme dans l'Empire romain, il y a eu la question chrétienne. . . . L'histoire est un interrogatoire séculaire des nations par leur destinée; interrogatoire qui décide de leur sort et qui souvent les condamne." *Op. cit.*, p. 148.

² *Ibid.*, p. 149.

³ "Cette raison, la raison profonde des partis, c'est que l'homme est un animal logique, malgré ses contradictions. Il ne lui suffit pas de ne pas voir ses désirs se contrarier ou contrariés par ceux d'autrui; il lui est insupportable au même degré de se contredire sciemment ou d'être contredit. Les hommes se passionnent pour le triomphe de leurs jugements autant que pour celui de leurs volontés." *Ibid.*, pp. 151-152.

sons holding to a common solution of a public question; there must also be a diffused knowledge of this common opinion and interest. The indispensable nature of this knowledge of a common interest is manifested by the instances where a party is formed to support a cause which the people have been led by the deception of the press or popular orators into believing to be a matter of common interest, and by the opposite case where a question of a very vital common interest failed to originate a party because there had been lacking a knowledge of this common interest. Therefore, anything which will increase the facilities for communication will contribute to the growth of parties. The growth of parties, then, seems to be a function of the development of civilization in general rather than merely of the growth of democracy, as Maine had contended. The modern press has been the greatest medium for increasing the communication of ideas, and hence has been the most powerful agent in increasing the development of party divisions, strife, and organization.¹ The causes for the origin of parties are as numerous as the questions confronting the public. The reason that party divisions usually coalesce into two or three main parties is that the various ways of looking at a question are limited and that those who take a decided view of one question involving a certain principle will normally be guided by the same principle in regard to other questions.² Under normal conditions the origin of parties differs from that of clans, classes, or corporations in that the former rest upon opinion, the latter upon inheritance.³ One of the least satisfactory aspects of the settlement of public questions by party strife is that parties do not tend to become greatly interested in carefully thought-out solutions, but are more stirred up by interest in matters of personality or passion.⁴ Tarde does not believe that as civilization advances the parties based upon dynasties or personal

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 152-154.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 155-156.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

⁴ "On se passionne plus pour des personnes que pour des idées, de même que pour des idées plus que pour des calculs, et pour des mots sonores plus que pour des principes ternes et précis." *Ibid.*, p. 154.

leaders will become less important, for a Gambetta or Gladstone of recent times seems to have had as much personal influence as Pericles or the brothers Gracchi of old. Neither does he think that in the future, party divisions will be based upon a difference of interests rather than upon a difference of beliefs and ideas, since men are naturally more passionate over their beliefs than over their interests. This tendency is still further exaggerated by the growing prevalence of parliamentary government which tends to make men all the more disputatious. One thing is certain, and that is that with the growth of communication parties tend to become more plastic and more readily changed. Another change that is manifest is that with the progress of civilization the party as a crowd is replaced by the party as a public.¹ In the conflict of parties, when one is temporarily overcome, it usually reappears under another name and is recognizable by its principles and general attitude. In the end, however, the triumph of one party tends to be complete unless in the meantime, as in the case of Poland, the country is invaded and all party divisions crushed out by the conquerors.²

Under the heading of internal political opposition, Tarde also treats the subject of the division of powers which received its initial vogue from the writings of Montesquieu. He criticizes the conventional theory on this point and makes an original psychological contribution to the subject. He holds that the real source of political liberty is not to be discovered in the formal separation of governmental powers, but in the real independence in the mind of the individual between his own ideas and beliefs, on the one hand, and his desires, on the other. If a person's beliefs and opinions and the acts resulting from them were based upon his desires alone there could be no such thing as political liberty. The chief guarantee of political liberty lies in the fact that the opinions and beliefs of the individual are based

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 156-159. Tarde's detailed analysis of the relation between the "public" and the "crowd" is to be found in pp. 1-62 of his *L'Opinion et la foule* Paris, 1904. He sums this up briefly in the preface as follows: "*Le public est une foule dispersée, où l'influence des esprits les uns sur les autres est devenue une action à distance, à des distances, de plus en plus grandes.*"

² *Les transformations du pouvoir*, pp. 159-160.

upon the education which he has received and upon the customs of his social group. The individual finds it impossible to follow his desires to the contradiction and opposition of his beliefs—in other words the pangs of conscience, which are the reflection in the psychological experience of the individual of the restraint of custom over the social group, act as the check to arbitrary power and form the sole guarantee of political liberty.¹ The successful party leader who has at his back the armed force of the nation is not able to use his power in the arbitrary way in which his desires would lead him, in regard to the destruction of his enemies, “parce qu’on n’est pas toujours maître de croire ce qu’on désirerait croire, ce qu’on aurait intérêt à croire, parce que la croyance est, jusqu’à un certain point, autonome dans sa sphère et ne se laisse entamer qu’indirectement par le désir.”² If this were not the case there would be despots, compared with whom Heliogabalus and Nero would appear as liberals. The true check, then upon arbitrary power is the necessity which always exists in the mind of the most powerful ruler as well as the most humble subject, “de se mettre d’accord avec ses principes, avec ses croyances enracinées, *de ne pas se contredire*, ou de se contredire le moins possible, de ne pas tomber sous le coup, sous le couperet, se son propre jugement.” It is here that one discovers the real basis of the protection of the unarmed subject against the power of the state, and not in the infantile fetish of a parliamentary system or the fiction of a political constitution, which can be easily overturned by the caprice of a sovereign majority.³ Good examples of the truth of this assertion are common enough. When King John of England was opposed by both the nobility and the populace the combination was not able to go to the point of dethroning him, though they desired

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 160ff. “En un seul mot, c’est l’indépendance—relative—de la croyance à l’égard du désir, non l’indépendance—toute relative aussi—du pouvoir judiciaire à l’égard du pouvoir exécutif, ou du Sénat à l’égard de la Chambre des députés, qui est le vrai fondement des garanties individuelles, dans la mesure, toujours bien faible, où elles sont protégées efficacement.” *Ibid.*, p. 161. This thought is related to the Freudian doctrine of “repression” so effectively introduced into social psychology by Trotter and Graham Wallas.

² *Ibid.*, p. 162.

³ *Ibid.*

to do so, for "elles sont forcées, malgré leur désir, de croire à la légitimité de son commandement, de voir en lui l'héritier seul légitime, seul autorisé, de la couronne d'Angleterre."¹ Therefore the Magna Charta, so often hailed as the bulwark of Anglo-Saxon liberty, stands as a great historical testimony to the independence of belief and desire as the guarantee of individual liberty. Again, the same cause lies at the bottom of the principle which makes the judge render his decisions according to law and contrary to his personal desires in many cases. There was, then, some basis for Comte's desire to separate the spiritual and the secular power in the Positivist commonwealth, for this separation is closely cognate to that of the separation of belief and desire.

Tarde then discusses the various aspects of external political opposition, which he classes under the captions of war, imperialism, and diplomacy. As has already been pointed out, Tarde shows the significance of the fact that *puissance* rather than *pouvoir* is chosen as best describing the external relations of states. But even more general than force at the present time in external political relations is the operation of what is known as "national influence." In the intervals between wars there is a quiet conflict going on between nations in the field of industry, religion, art,—in fact between the totalities of different cultures. Indeed, it may be said that the real significance of battles is to be found in the prestige which comes from victory and causes the struggle between the contending cultures in the time of peace to turn in the favor of the victorious.² The field or scope of military and diplomatic activity has shown a steady increase from the days of clan feuds to the present wars of coalitions, but the most promising and satisfactory element in this development of political opposition on a large scale is that the movement has in it greater potentialities for a permanent peace in the future.³ War is especially an evil correlated with small political units,

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 163-164.

² "Combien, hélas! nos défaites de 1870 ont fait perdre de terrain à la langue française, aux idées françaises, aux mœurs françaises, aux arts français!" *Ibid.*, pp. 168-169.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 174-175.

as shown by the experience of ancient Greece and medieval Europe.¹ If the United States had been made up of as many small nations as it has states there would have been innumerable wars instead of one civil war. Empires and federal unions are the first great step towards a permanent world peace.² The less praiseworthy side of the course of national expansion and aggrandizement is that the process is a sort of political cannibalism, or a vivisection, as in the case of Poland. Again, as in the history of customs cannibalism was superseded by slavery, so in the modern colonial protectorates one may see a sort of political or collective slavery.³

In the field of the external conflict of states one finds the theory of an equilibrium between nations which corresponds to the balance of powers within a state. As a matter of fact, the idea of an external equilibrium was prior in origin to the theory of a division and balance of powers within the state. The former originated with the medieval Italian cities, while the latter was not elaborated till the time of Montesquieu. The idea of an European equilibrium arose as a policy of protection of the remainder of Europe against the dreams of a world empire held by Charles V and Phillip II.⁴ As in the state one sees two conflicting tendencies—one to set up a centralized despotism, and the other to secure liberty by a division and balance of powers, so in the external relations of states there is on the one hand a tendency towards imperialistic expansion and on the other a movement to establish an equilibrium between states. The logical result has been an alliance between the ideal of political absolutism and imperialism, and between internal liberalism and

¹ "En réalité les guerres sont la grande calamité de toutes les époques des morcellement politique." *Les Transformations du Pouvoir*, p. 175.

² "C'est la grande réponse à faire aux sociologues tels que Turgot et LePlay, qui, trop frappés des vices propres aux grands Etats, vantent outre mesure les petits peuples chasseurs ou pasteurs, ou demi-civilisés." *Ibid.* This thought has a profound bearing on the problem of the wisdom of creating a large number of small national units in Europe at the present time and upon the value or desirability of a 'League of Nations.'

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 175-176.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 176-178. Tarde was evidently unacquainted with the fact that Polybius had set forth the doctrine of 'checks and balances.'

international equilibrium. These allied dual tendencies have alternated during the course of history. Liberty and equilibrium have, naturally, characterized periods of peace, and absolutism and imperialism periods of war. Even though the periods of equilibrium have been frequently broken up by war, the progress of modern history has been marked by a continually increasing scope in the application of the idea of political equilibrium. It has progressed from that between the petty medieval Italian republics to the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian or 'Dual' Alliance of the present time (1899). Tarde, with an apparent prophetic vision, declares that a likely result of a war between these great alliances would be the establishment of "*un équilibre monodial.*" Along with the idea of international equilibrium between great states has come the conception of the neutrality of the lesser states—an ideal of great importance giving a new vitality to the growth of international law.¹

The real value of political opposition, both external and internal, is to be found in its tendency to give an impetus to the spread of civilization.² Mere battles and campaigns, as such, have no real interest for the true historian—if they did, then the Empire of Tamerlane would have a greater interest than the Roman Empire. The real contribution of imperial development to progress is that it has made possible the spread of civilization on a larger scale, particularly if the conquering nation has availed itself of the cultural contributions of the conquered. The fact that this was especially true of the Roman Empire is the reason why the Roman Empire is the most important and interesting empire that history has produced. Likewise, in regard to the struggles within a nation between parties and classes, if they take place in a non-progressive and non-inventive nation they possess little interest. If, on the other hand, they occur in an alert nation where they may contribute to the production of new inventions in the political field, these internal political conflicts are of the utmost importance in hastening political

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 179-181.

² "Elles ont pour effet, en abaissant les frontières des nations ou les murs de clôture des classes, de hâter, de favoriser l'élargissement graduel du champ social, et de préparer ainsi l'harmonie finale dans la lumière. *Ibid.*, p. 182.

evolution. It is for this reason that the strife between the Plebians and Patricians, between the Whigs and the Tories, and between the Girondists and the Mountain possesses so much more interest for the historian than the internal political struggles of China or India. Both internal and external political opposition, therefore, seem to have had a net result of being a very considerable aid to progress and the development of civilization, though this aid was quite unconscious on the part of the actors in the drama. But this conclusion should not be taken as an agreement with the school of Gumplowicz that progress is a function of conflict between nations; the main value of past war has been to make it more certain and possible that physical war is to be eliminated in the future.¹

5. *Political Adaptation.*

Tarde concludes his analysis of political processes with the discussion of his third main topic—*political adaptation*, which he makes practically identical with political transformation. Evolution and adaptation, says Tarde, are practically synonymous; thus a study of political adaptation is essentially a study of political evolution.² In his treatment of political adaptation Tarde deals with the following topics: an analysis of the psychic forces which produce transformations in the forms of political organization through the modification of the prevalent set of beliefs and desires; an examination of the nature and processes of political evolution viewed as a gradual expansion of political units and a concomitant adjustment and harmonizing of internal and external processes and policies; the growth of the great historic forms of government and a new psychic classification of governments; the future of the function of statesmen and of state-activity; a critique of the various proposed criteria of political progress; and a brief discussion of the relation of art and morality to political activity and adaptation. His analysis

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 182-185; Cf. also pp. 36, 50.

² "Adaptation ou évolution, c'est même chose au fond, ou plutôt l'évolution n'est, en tout ordre des faits, qu'une adaptation progressive. C'est donc, en définitive, la loi des transformations politiques que nous avons à chercher maintenant." *Ibid.*, p. 186. See also above, Part II, Section 2.

of political adaptation is, thus, rather a group of suggestive lines of development than a systematic presentation of the subject. Only a few of his more significant observations can be touched upon in this article.

The divergent accounts of political evolution given by Aristotle, Bodin, Vico, Comte, Spencer, and others prove the impossibility of discovering a uniform and unilateral scheme of political evolution. This can only be explained by a system which is designed to view the course of evolution as it has actually taken place, and to take into account all variations from the general rule of progress.¹ Since authority rests, as has already been pointed out, upon the beliefs and desires of the community, those who hold the authority at any time will be those judged best able at the time to satisfy those beliefs and desires. As beliefs and desires are modified, those who are in authority either have to give way or readjust their method of government.² The primary agent in changing these desires is *invention*, which is usually accidental and then spreads by imitation, thus introducing new interests over a wide area. But while it is true that changes in beliefs and desires depend upon the imitation of individual inventions, it is inaccurate to maintain that the results of the same invention will be the same in all societies, for it is one of the fundamental laws of imitation that rays of imitation are refracted by their media. In spite of these probable divergencies, there are certain general rules regarding inventions and imitations that hold good for all societies, such as that simple inventions will precede complex ones, and that those ministering to urgent needs will come before those which satisfy luxury or fancy.³ Again, the progress of invention has a false appearance—a sort of “*air rationnel*”—from the fact that many series of inventions are so dependent upon the order in which they have evolved that the series could not have been reversed or altered. The evolution of western civilization presents almost as striking a series of national contributions as is shown by

¹ *Les transformations du pouvoir*, pp. 186-187.

² *Ibid.*, p. 188.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 188-191.

the series of inventions which made possible the Industrial Revolution. When one considers the contributions made to western civilization successively by Egypt, Babylonia, Greece, Rome, and Western Europe, he can readily see that there is no such series to be found elsewhere in the evolution of mankind.¹

Inasmuch as it has already been pointed out that political evolution is a function of the independent variables of scientific, economic and religious evolution, it is foolhardy to expect that one can discover any unilateral scheme of political evolution.² About all that can be said, as a general formula, is that owing to the operation of the laws of imitation, political evolution, which begins with a chaotic mixture of contending powers, always ends in a relatively harmonious adjustment of these powers, however divergent may be the course of evolution in different states whereby this final end is attained.³ Tarde rejects the Spencerian law of the evolution of political organization as a progressive differentiation of authority and maintains that the beginnings of political organization are always marked by an extreme heterogeneity of contending powers. Tarde defines the general law of political evolution as a "passage nécessaire d'une différence à une autre différence, d'une différence extérieure et contradictoire à une différence intérieure et harmonieuse."⁴ In general, political evolution has started with divided and contested authority in small groups of primitive peoples. The next stage was one of territorial expansion and of the centralization of political authority. This intermediate period was followed by one in which political authority has tended to be distributed, but at the same time harmoniously adjusted.⁵ In political organization and activity in general there are two fundamental relations—a rivalry among different sources of authority, and a coöperation among them which allows them to work together as so many

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 191-192.

² "Demander au sociologue une formule élégante et simple des transformations du Pouvoir, un verset magique réglant d'en haut, par une sorte de cérémonial surnaturel, la procession des phénomènes du gouvernement, c'est se méprendre entièrement sur les conditions du problème à résoudre." *Ibid.*, pp. 192-193.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 195-197.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 198-199.

⁵ "Les pouvoirs divisés d'abord et hostiles, se sont centralisés pour se diviser de nouveau, mais d'accord entre eux." *Ibid.*, pp. 199-200.

parts of the same machine. The general tendency of political evolution has been towards a development of the latter relation at the expense of the former. In the field of economic activity this rivalry automatically issues in harmonious adjustment through the medium of the process of exchange, but as there is no process in political activity analogous to exchange, the adjustment is not automatic here. On this account there is a necessity for the intermediate stage of political centralization and territorial expansion to make possible the essential harmonious adjustment of powers.¹ The question at present is whether or not this territorial expansion has proceeded far enough to bring about the adjustment of states in regard to their external relations, or whether there must be a universal empire which will put an end to war as the Roman Empire brought peace in its era.² The universal tendency, however, for political rivalry to issue in the evolution of large territorial states will not admit of reduction to a law of unilateral evolution. These states often differ in language, art, religion, science, and industry, so that there is practically no resemblance save that of the simple fact of the extension of territory and of a single political control. With the centralization of authority and the extension of territory there comes a consequent division, distribution and adjustment of administrative authority. The resulting remoteness and generality of law has its advantages and disadvantages. It is an effective method of preventing favoritism and partiality in government, but it had in earlier times the disadvantage that the ruler could no longer behold directly the cruel results of his unjust laws and moderate their operation. In modern times, the development of the means of communication has largely operated to eliminate this difficulty and allows the government to be conscious of the evil effects of mal-administration.⁴

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 203-205.

² The question is "si, dans l'avenir, il y aura une paix russe ou une paix anglaise, à moins que la France redressée et retremée ne ressaisisse l'occasion de faire la paix française!" *Ibid.*, pp. 206-7. It is interesting to note that Tarde does not list the possibility of "une paix allemande." In his *Psychologie Économique*, Vol. II, p. 444, Tarde expresses his belief that future peace will come through international federation and not imperialism.

³ *Les transformations du pouvoir*, pp. 207-208.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 208-209.

Tarde attempts a psychological explanation of the common tendency of governments to change from a monarchical or aristocratic to a democratic regime. In the first place, he points out the fact that this is by no means a universal tendency. There have been many exceptions and several instances of a movement in the reverse direction. Two good examples of the latter are the recrudescence of monarchy and aristocracy in England from 1760-1850 and the recent creation of an aristocracy of wealth in America. These he explains on the basis of the fact that they came as a result of the Industrial Revolution, and of the fundamental law of inventions that their benefits are at first monopolized by a few. Again, one must always take into consideration the possibility of the appearance of a great political genius, as such a person is likely to give democracy a set-back, even though he poses as its supporter and patron.¹ But so far as the trend towards democratization is a fact, it is to be explained by the fundamental applications of the general law of imitation. First, the need of a new political régime brings a desire in the minds of the people to be governed in this way before it makes general their desire to participate in this new government. In the second place, the progress of invention and imitation is always from the unilateral to the reciprocal—from decree to contract, from dogma to free-thought, or from man-hunting to war. Every new régime, thus, is for a time monopolized by the most alert, rich, or powerful members of a society. The spread of democratic forms in society always takes place through an extension of the idea of equality from the top downward. It begins with the ideal of equality among aristocrats and the circle of equals gradually widens by imitation.² This democratizing tendency is a result of the universal habit on the part of the masses of the people to imitate their social superiors. In the field of political activity this imitation ends usually in the success of the people in securing their share in the

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 214-215. He would, no doubt, regard Jackson, Roosevelt, and Wilson as examples of this tendency.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 130-131. Many writers take the opposite view, that democracy originated in the enforced equality of the submerged classes of the feudal period and that equality has grown from the bottom upward through all social classes.

affairs of the state. This tendency of imitation, however, is absent when the superior classes are represented as so much superior to the masses as to be different in kind and thus discourage imitation, such as is the case when a ruling family or caste is declared to be of divine origin. This explains the exceptions offered by the empires of antiquity to the general rule that monarchy and aristocracy are gradually transformed into democracy.¹ But after all, Tarde believes, the classification of governments on the basis of their being theocratic, aristocratic, monarchical, or democratic is at best a superficial classification and differentiation. In reality there are but two fundamental types of government—an “idéocratie” and a “téléocratie.”² The former is based upon the sovereignty of ideas and beliefs, and is mainly manifested by doctrinaire governments. The latter is founded upon the sovereignty of desires, and is chiefly illustrated by the government of a military party or a dictator. The trend at present seems to be in favor of the growth of the ideocracy, since it is a much higher form of government.³

Tarde then proceeds to consider the pertinent problem of the likely changes in the power of the statesman and in the degree of state activity in the future. He is inclined to believe that both will increase. The growth of modern communication, bringing with it an improved mechanism of administration, has given the statesmen a much greater range of power than was formerly the case, while at the same time the increase of human interests in modern times has rendered necessary an increase of state activity to protect them.⁴ The indications, thus, are that the future will bring a greatly increased degree of state activity and a corresponding extension in the power of the great statesmen, “à côté desquelles pâliront les plus grandes figures des despotes du passé, et César, et Louis XIV, et Napoléon.” This prediction, however, need cause no alarm on account of the great difference in modern

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 214-217, 250-251.

² *Ibid.*, p. 212.

³ “Les pouvoirs fondés sur la souveraineté de l'idée, des croyances, ont le grand avantage sur les pouvoirs nés de la souveraineté du but, des désirs, qu'ils sont susceptibles d'une domination plus étendue et plus pacifiante.” *Ibid.*, p. 213.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 218-219.

times in the method of obtaining and retaining great political power as compared with that in the past. No statesman can obtain such a prominent position at present or retain it for any great length of time, unless, on the one hand, he has great ability and a very zealous devotion to the public welfare, and, on the other hand, has the general and enthusiastic support of the people. Such characteristics are as rare as the opposite extreme of malignant wickedness. Between these two extremes are to be found the mass of ordinary individuals, rather egoistic, but withal susceptible to the suggestion and leadership of the truly élite. As a few great scientists and inventors have made possible modern science and industry, so perhaps a few of these great statesmen of the future will be able to devise that grandest and most needed of all political innovations—the attainment of a permanent world peace.¹

6. *Summary of Tarde's Political Theory.*

Tarde's contributions to political theory may now be summarized. His work can hardly be correctly designated as "psychological prolegomena to the study of politics," as is the case with Graham Wallas' contributions, for Tarde's *Les Transformations du Pouvoir* is, in general, directly concerned with questions which are usually analyzed by political science. On the other hand, there is very little resemblance between his work and a systematic treatise on political science, either in procedure or in the topics considered. Perhaps the best description of the work would be "psychological miscellany relative to the explanation of certain political phenomena, particularly the origin and transformation of political authority." The treatment of those problems which it does deal with is, curiously enough, mainly historical or genetic, rather than analytical as one would expect from a sociologist of pronounced psychological tendencies. There is no detailed treatment of such fundamental topics as the nature of sovereignty and the state, or the scope of state activity. On the other hand, there is a brilliant statement and defense of the doctrine that political life and the state are products of social life and society, and that political

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 219-221.

organization and evolution are but a function of social organization and social evolution, in general. As such, it is an admirable antidote to historians like the late Professor Freeman and political scientists sharing the particular bias of Professor Henry Jones Ford.

His chief theses may be summarized as follows: Political authority rests upon the beliefs and desires of society. Society desires to be directed and commanded and believes that certain people are best able to guide and direct it, either from superior ability or from a special dispensation of Providence. These beliefs and desires have their foundations laid in animal society and are disciplined and developed in the family. By this family experience society is fitted to create and develop more extensive forms of social organization. Imitation gives a coherent and logical form to the agencies for maintaining and administering authority. The cause of the shifts in political organization and authority is to be sought in the changes in beliefs and desires which burst through the older forms designed to satisfy a more primitive type of belief and desire. People wish to be led in a different manner and believe that a new set of persons are best qualified to fulfil this function. The beliefs and desires of any given period depend upon the general conditions of social life, particularly upon the type of scientific thought, religion and industry in vogue. The agency which produces the transformations of beliefs and desires, and as a consequence the dependent systems of political authority, is invention spread by imitation. Inventions at first give rise to a nobility which monopolize the benefits of their inventions, but which also become radiant points for the imitation of their discoveries. In time, the nobility is superseded by cities, particularly capital cities, as the seat of inventions and radiant points of imitation, and these in turn tend to give way to nations as a whole, though in all cases inventions are an individual product. These transformations of authority are, thus, a function of the general social transformations of belief and desire, particularly of the changes in the field of religion and industry. This whole process of invention and imitation operates in accordance with the well-known laws of invention and imitation as developed in Tarde's *Laws of Imi-*

tation. Political phenomena may be studied according to their relation to the general scheme of evolution as organized about the principles of repetition, opposition, and adaptation. Political repetition may be observed, not only in regard to the imitation of political inventions as exhibited in the origin of states, but also in colonization. Political opposition takes the form of the struggle between parties and classes within the state, and the struggles between states, as manifested in war and diplomacy. Party strife, while it has many undesirable features and is a very clumsy method of effecting political progress, serves the purpose of creating and spreading political inventions within the state, thus bringing about the general improvement of political administration and organization. It is impossible, however, to regard liberty as the product of the struggle between powers within the state, but rather it is the result of the independence within the individual mind of belief and desire which prevents the latter from dominating the former. External political opposition, or war, imperialism and diplomacy, though accompanied by a vast amount of cruelty and misery, has for its ultimate result that political expansion and consolidation which alone can make possible permanent peace, for war is an inevitable accompaniment of small political entities. Political adaptation, which is largely identical with political evolution, is the process whereby political repetition and opposition issue in harmonious political organization and development. Since political evolution is a function of the various aspects of social evolution no single simple formula of unilateral evolution can be devised to explain it. The only formula which will apply is the very general one that the course of development is characterized by a passage from an original confused heterogeneity to a harmonious adjustment of differences in external and internal political processes and relations through the operation of psychic forces making for an equilibrium. The future is likely to witness an extension in both the scope of state activity and in the personal power of statesmen, but there is little danger in this prospect, owing to the modern development of effective popular control over those in charge of political administration.

HARRY E. BARNES.

ANALYSIS AS A METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE purpose of this paper is to examine the most recent attempt to apply the analytic method to the problems of philosophy. An attempt will be made to show that (I) the method cannot be applied for there are no means of doing it, and (II) the analytic method as applied to the problems of philosophy is involved in a circle.

I.

A consideration of the first question involves the neo-realistic theory of mind or consciousness; but it is necessary to select here, for there are about as many realistic theories of consciousness as there are writers on the subject. One of the most elaborate single treatments of the subject is to be found in Professor Holt's book, *The Concept of Consciousness*, and we shall use this for the purposes of the paper. Having determined the nature of consciousness as it is there treated, we shall ask the following questions: (a) Is consciousness such a thing, agency, or entity that it possesses the ability to perform an analytic operation, it being granted that such an operation can be performed by something? (b) If consciousness is not the agent of analysis, what is, it being granted that analysis is possible? (c) If consciousness is what Professor Holt says it is, why the detailed discussion of correspondence?

The aim of the book, as stated by the author, is to take "consciousness as a theme of discourse" and to make it "possible to frame a deductive system consisting of terms and propositions as premises, and themselves not 'conscious' nor made of 'ideal' stuff, such that the essential features of consciousness will follow as logical consequences."¹ The aim, stated otherwise, is to show how a neutral universe can contain both 'physical' and 'mental' objects. While the purpose is to derive mind from something that is not mind, the derived somewhat must contain

¹ *The Concept of Consciousness*, E. B. Holt, p. 86.

such an entity or class of entities as we familiarly know under the name 'consciousness.'

What kind of 'thing,' 'entity,' or 'class of entities' is consciousness? We find at least four characterizations of it which we present in summary form. Having shown that logical and mathematical concepts are objective, *i.e.*, that they are not *in* consciousness and do not in any way depend upon it for their being and nature, and that the secondary qualities are in the same status (which is termed 'neutral'), the way is open for the 'deduction' of consciousness—for finding among the neutral entities the knowledge relation.

Among the most simple of the entities in the 'neutral mosaic' are identity, difference, number, and the negative. Then follow in regular Comtian order the various mathematical and physical sciences, on through to biology, etc.; and about midway between the extremes from the simple to the complex, we find consciousness. That is to say, *consciousness is one of the complex entities in the 'neutral mosaic.'*

A second view of the nature of consciousness is presented in the figure of the searchlight. The searchlight illuminates a considerable expanse of the territory through which it passes. The expanse thus illuminated is analogous to expanses that are found in any manifold in which there is organic life. From this standpoint consciousness is said to be *the cross-section of the environment defined by the response of a nervous system*; or, consciousness is *the illuminated environment*.

It is evident that the apparatus of judgment, the means of carrying on an analytic process, have, from the first statement of the nature of consciousness, their loci in the world of 'neutral' entities; for consciousness is midway in the series from the simple to the complex. The means of judgment are in the light when the searchlight illuminates them by the reflection of its exploited powers, but they are there whether illuminated or not. In the same manner, it is asserted, does the nervous system select, and that which is selected is consciousness—trees, rivers, negatives, differences, quantity, to-the-right-of, and, in short, all things and relations. It is certainly difficult to understand the

process by which these entities are discovered when they are themselves the very things which carry on the analytic process. It appears that the illuminated environment performs an operation on itself without any means for doing it, for the means are parts of itself, or better still, *are* itself, and that thereupon it makes the startling discovery that this same environment is made up of terms and propositions, universals and sense data, cross-sections and contours.

It will be noticed that, up to this point, consciousness has the distinction of occupying two different loci. In the 'generation' from the simple to the complex, it is found in the middle section in somewhat the same position as was occupied by the 'spirited element' in the Platonic psychology. On the one hand, consciousness is *in* the process, *is* one of the complex entities; on the other hand, there is something on the outside which *selects*, which *responds to* the environment. If this 'something' is not consciousness, it is set over against the 'neutral mosaic' and consequently has not been accounted for in the 'deduction'; and if it is consciousness, there is no difference between the position of Professor Holt and that of the defenders of 'mind' and 'soul.' In either case there is no place for analysis, for if consciousness is outside, set over against the environment, and if negatives, differences, quantities, aboves, etc., are *in* the 'mosaic,' the mind or consciousness has not even the means of beholding the logical spectacle as it plays before it. On the other hand, if consciousness is *in* the 'mosaic' and is identified with trees, rivers, furniture, relations, terms, and qualities, then arises the senseless question as to how an object, a tree for example, can analyze itself.

Then again, in addition to the two characterizations of its nature, *thought follows after the activity of neutral entities, this being the process of deduction, the logical process par excellence.* Of course, consciousness is already one of the entities in the 'neutral mosaic,' and is also a group of objects and relations confronted with the serious problem of agreement with 'reality,' and, in addition, is somehow associated with a nervous system which responds to something outside itself; but all this does

not hinder its 'following' after the activity of propositions which unwind a universe. It would be a spectacle long to be remembered to behold the process which consists of a neutral entity which is itself active, being 'followed' in non-temporal time and non-spatial space by another entity under similar disabilities, when both neutral entities are the same thing. To behold an object eternally after itself in such a universe is a vision that rarely falls to the lot of a mortal man.

If consciousness is what the above accounts show it to be, why the detailed discussion of correspondence? We have at least two types of correspondence, namely, (a) correspondence of the content of the 'cross-section' and 'reality,' and (b) correspondence between the logical and mathematical entities or propositions and concrete real things. In the beginning of Professor Holt's discussion, he found that the logical and mathematical entities *are* reality, and that they, by their own activity, generate a universe; but later this world so generated is found to be too formal, and to be void of bone and blood. To secure content which was denied in the original, he has recourse to his doctrine of correspondence which is supposed to be 'acknowledged' by a mind or consciousness, and these realities turn out to be the very things which correspond.

We are informed that "nothing can represent a thing but the thing itself," yet we have the problem of the correspondence of the content of consciousness with 'reality.' Here we are told that the cross-section *is* consciousness, and that there is "no content of knowledge that is other than its object."¹ If this is true it is difficult to see the need of showing the relation between the 'cross-section' and 'reality.' If the self-activity of propositions generates a universe, *the* system of reality, the question of correspondence is senseless; and if it does not generate a real system it is useless and equally meaningless. The 'repetition of identicals' will not solve the problem, if the 'identicals' are not reality; and if they are reality, there is no problem of correspondence. "Our ideas are never completely identical with the objects," yet we are informed that there is "no content

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 150.

of knowledge that is other than its object." When we remember that consciousness is a cross-section of the environment defined by the response of a nervous system, and then again, that it is one of the entities in the series from the simple to the complex, generated by the activity of propositions and terms, we face, in the first case, the task of answering the meaningless question of how objects agree and disagree among themselves, and in the second case, of explaining in what way the theory of representation advanced by Professor Holt differs from that of his opponents whose theory is laughed out of court.

When it is further remembered that consciousness is something that 'follows' the activity of propositions and terms, the mystery of correspondence grows deeper, for consciousness is 'following' something which has assigned to it the task of its own genesis. Worse still is the difficulty when consciousness is something that 'acknowledges' correspondence in the two senses above stated, for this makes of consciousness a *tertium quid*, whereas before we have witnessed it as the identical things which correspond. To define consciousness as an object or as objects, and then to ask how it happens that objects agree with themselves, and at the same time to assert that knowledge is never complete when knowledge is the object, is a procedure that starts not only analysis but any other logical process under unfavorable auspices.

Such a confusion as to the nature of consciousness which is (a) one of the complex entities in the 'neutral mosaic,' (b) a cross-section of the environment defined by the response of the nervous system, (c) something that 'follows' after the activity of neutral entities, and (d) something that 'acknowledges' correspondence, renders an analytic process impossible, for we are never certain as to what we are analyzing and the means for the performance of the operation go to make up a definition of the object which in turn is both the agent and patient.

II.

Our second question concerning analysis as a method of philosophy pertains to the circle involved in the discovery of

elements or simples. To establish our objections we shall consider the three questions: (a) How are the elements or simples discovered? (b) What are they when they have been found? (c) What is (or can be) done with them?

Some realistic logicians accept the circle frankly,¹ while others commit the error in a more or less veiled form. They fail to accept it as does Couturat, who suggests that it is better to admit it in the beginning "without any idle logical vanity." An examination, however, will reveal it; and for our purposes Mr. Russell's *Scientific Method in Philosophy* will be used. The chapter, "Our Knowledge of the External World," not only affords information as to what is the real, the elemental, but is also an application of the logico-analytic method.

The process in the discovery of simples consists in the taking of data which are the common sense things of the world, such as trees, furniture, nature, and history, and performing an operation known as *internal scrutiny*. This method or process of internal scrutiny leads to elements which are known as 'hard' data and 'soft' data, the difference between them being also a datum. While certain alliances between psychology and logic render it difficult to distinguish between the two kinds of data, and while unconscious inferences enter to cloud a sharp distinction between the psychological and the logical, it is highly essential that logical 'primitives' be deduced from psychological 'primitives.' Internal scrutiny, in short, reveals (a) our common knowledge, (b) degrees of certainty, and (c) primitive and derivative knowledge. The 'hard' data are those which resist the "solvent influence of reflection," and are of two kinds, namely, the facts of sense and the laws of logic. The facts of sense are *our own sense data*, for it is not possible to admit the existence of other minds as a 'hard' datum, and it is highly essential that the world be constructed from 'hard' data only. All the 'hard' data are subjective, they are *mine*, they are Berkleyan.

This seems to be the terminus of the process of internal scrutiny or analysis, and the question arises, What can be done with the data, or as Mr. Russell states it: "Can the existence of any other than our own hard data be inferred from the existence of those

¹ *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Vol. I, p. 138.

data?" Then begins the process of building up a world from the elements which analysis has revealed, that is, from the 'hard' data. Beginning with the stock example of the philosopher, Mr. Russell says: "A table viewed from one place presents a different appearance from that which it presents from another place. This is the language of common sense but this language already assumes that there is a real table of which we see the appearances."¹ Mr. Russell rightly admits that such a statement begs the whole issue, and insists that we must state the facts in terms of what we know, namely, our sense data; and to this end he says: "What is really known is a correlation of muscular and other bodily sensations with changes in visual sensations." But since sensation is the awareness of an object, and not the object, it seems difficult to get anything from our own hard sense data, and to find objectivity Mr. Russell has recourse to a "model hypothesis" as an "aid to the imagination."² By the aid of the model we proceed as follows: Suppose each mind looks out on a world from a point of view peculiar to itself. (Of course it is understood that we do not know anything about other minds.) Then suppose that each of these perceived worlds exists precisely as it is perceived. Then the system of worlds perceived and unperceived, we call the system of "perspectives." By a correlation of similars between things in one perspective and those of another, we reach a system of points in space, that is, in "public space," which cannot be perceived, but is known as an inference.

Space is thus rendered continuous as a relation between perspectives. The momentary common sense thing can thus be defined: "Given an object in one perspective, from the system of all the objects correlated with it in all the perspectives; that system may be identified with the momentary common sense thing. Thus the aspect of a 'thing' is a member of a system of aspects which *is* the 'thing' at that moment. All the aspects of

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 77.

² It is highly significant that Mr. Russell has recourse to the "model hypothesis." It indicates the indispensability of a process which many of the realists hold in light esteem.

a thing are real, whereas the thing is a mere logical construction."¹

It is asserted, too, that the canons by which our common knowledge has been obtained are assumed, but they are applied a little more carefully. But we must note that this common knowledge, these common data such as nature, history, etc., are all called in question. They are certainly not 'real' reality, or no question concerning them or reality either would ever have arisen. Mr. Russell calls in question our common knowledge, but he assumes the canons by which it was established in order to call it in question and criticize it. Of course a beginning must be made somewhere, but our point is the legitimacy of calling in question the whole body of our common knowledge, and all the while assuming as a valid principle of criticism the very canons by which this erroneous knowledge was established. The procedure consists in showing that after we have learned a great deal about the external world we can then show, on the basis of the canons by which this knowledge was gained, that such knowledge is not real, or of the real, but belongs to the activity of propositions connected with 'soft' data.

Scrutiny, it is asserted, reveals as 'hard' data the facts of sense. These data are obtained from the world of common sense which is not the real world; if this were the real world, no problem concerning it would have arisen. Having discovered the 'hard' data by reflection on this unreal world of common sense, the problem that next arises is to construct from these 'hard' data a world. The world so constructed cannot be the common sense world, provided, that is, it is to be the *real* world, for this is the world that has already been thrown aside as non-real. If the common sense world is the real world, one which is already constructed, why destroy it and *build another out of the data which the torn down world showed by analysis that it possesses?* Is it not necessary that the reconstructed world shall be precisely the world of common sense with which the realist starts? If this is the case, his labor has been in vain; and if not, the data out of which he hopes to construct a new heaven and a new earth are not the *real* data, for they have been obtained from the non-real

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 89.

world of common sense. In the first case he has performed a lengthy bit of labor to get what he had to begin with; and in the second, to the construction of a world which not even a realist could recognize, for it has been made from unreal data or elements.

"Can the existence of any thing other than our own hard data be inferred from the existence of those data?" In view of the method employed in reaching 'hard' data, it is difficult to see how this question could be asked seriously. We have but to remember that the whole world of common sense was taken as existing to get the problem started at all. 'Hard' data were *found* by an examination of nature and history, and now to ask whether anything can be inferred to exist from the existence of those elements which were made possible only on the ground of the existence of the former world is, as Professor Bode says, "an unwarranted abuse of our good nature." After the analysis, it is asserted that all we know is our own 'hard' data; but before the analysis, common sense speaks of tables and chairs, of nature and history. And just so does the philosopher, in order to speak of 'points of view,' and in order to have material upon which to work. But the realist admits that we may speak of visual sensations, correlations, muscular sensations; and at the same time he tells us that sensations are the *awareness* of an object, and not the object. The experience of seeing a color, for example, is found by analysis to be a complex of at least two elements, namely, *the color or the sensible object and the awareness or the sensation*.¹ Thus by the realist's own account "our own hard data" imply the existence of objects.

In all of Mr. Russell's discussions he takes a permanent thing, a penny for example, to show that this same penny is a series of aspects. But this surely begs the question, as Mr. Russell himself admits in his treatment of the common sense 'table.' We have the penny to begin with, and to define it as a series of aspects is one way to treat a given object, and not the way to construct an object if none were given to generate the question or to make the discussion possible.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 76.

Consequently, the analytic method as the realist treats it cannot be applied, for there are no means for doing it, because: (a) the means are the objects or entities to be analyzed; (b) the means is a bare entity whose powers are a definition of the object; (c) the means is an empty shell which 'follows' the process of reality; (d) the means is an exploited outsider which merely 'acknowledges.' And also, the analytic method as applied to the problems of philosophy is involved in a circle, because:

(a) It takes for granted the existence and reality of the common sense world to get the problem started;

(b) It denies the *real* reality of the common sense world, but it assumes the genuineness of the canons by which the knowledge of the non-real world was built up;

(c) It leads to my own sense data from which nothing can be inferred, yet the realist asserts that sensation itself implies the existence of objects;

(d) It leads to this dilemma: Either the common sense world which was taken for granted to get the discussion started and which furnished the data from which the simple and ultimate data were derived, is the real world, and hence the analytic process is a failure, for the realist had in the beginning precisely what he was looking for, namely, reality, or the real world; or the common sense world is not the real world, in which case the data which were employed in reaching the ultimate data are not real, and hence the world constructed from these ultimate data is an unreal world;

(e) It is impossible, as the examples chosen from Mr. Russell indicate, to carry on his arguments at all without answering in the affirmative his own question: "Can the existence of any other than our own hard data be inferred from the existence of those data?"

If the above criticisms are valid, it is evident that the realist must give such an account of consciousness as will make possible the application of his method, that of analysis; and also that, in the actual analytic process, he give such an account of the nature of reality as will avoid the evident *petitio*.

H. E. CUNNINGHAM.

DISCUSSION

APPEARANCE AND REALITY, AND THE SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS.

MR. W. P. MONTAGUE'S paper on "The Antinomy and its Implications for Logical Theory"¹ contains a statement which in my opinion so pointedly affirms a general error, that I should be glad if I might draw attention to it.

My comment is confined to Section II, "The Method of Ultra-Rationalism," and within that to the assumption and statements which identify the modern doctrine of appearance and reality with a two-world theory according to which the world of sense is "discarded" (p. 227) and is "subjective" (*ibid.*); and consequently pronounce the distinction in question to be valueless for the solution of problems. I cite at length a passage which makes the meaning quite clear. After saying, rightly as I think, that Kant solves no difficulty about space by making it subjective, the writer proceeds (p. 229): "The same comfortless conclusion comes to us from Mr. Bradley. The qualities and relations revealed in our experience cannot, so he tells us, be reconciled with reason, for if a relation is to relate it must make a difference to its terms, *i. e.*, make them other than the terms which we apprehended as related. It is too bad that there is this difficulty (if it is a difficulty). But how does it help it to *deny that the world of sense is 'real' and to assign it a status of 'appearance'*?"² The twin concepts of reality and appearance may be valid and fruitful or they may not. Whether good or bad they are not in question. The answer involved in the quality-relation situation did not depend on the nature of 'reality' or the nature of 'appearance,' but simply on the nature of all qualities and relations. Are the contradictions or the tragedies of our experience mitigated by assuming or even proving *that beyond our experience there is another experience in which they do not occur*?³ The intellectual and moral evils in our world of appearance are one thing. Why then should we suddenly change the subject (unless of course it proves embarrassing) and begin talking about an absolute reality? (p. 229) . . . In every case in which we seek to cure an intellectual discord such as an antinomy, or a moral

¹ *Studies in the History of Ideas*. Columbia University Press, 1918.

² My italics.

³ My italics.

discord such as a sin or a pain by changing the metaphysical status of the experience in which it occurs from real to unreal, we are committing the fallacy of irrelevant conclusion. For it is the actual nature of the experience and not the metaphysical status of 'subjective' or 'objective' with which we should concern ourselves."

To understand the relation of Appearance and Reality is the condition *sine qua non* of genuine philosophy. It is the merit of the above passage that, stating the relation erroneously, it formulates its error precisely. It explicitly identifies the doctrine familiar to modern philosophy, and derived from Plato, with the two world theory the ghost of which Plato laid in philosophy,¹ but which continually rises from the dead to haunt the common-sense thinker.

I will briefly mention three considerations affecting the alleged identity of the distinction between Appearance and Reality with the two-world theory.

1. What the plain man is told about the philosopher's handling of experience.

2. How the plain man really handles his own experience.

3. That the philosopher really handles his experience in the same way as the plain man handles his own.

1. The plain man is told, as here, that the philosopher who speaks of appearance and reality is giving these names to sense and reason respectively, calling them in the same order subjective and objective. He is told, as here, that the point of the distinction is to get rid of the puzzles and pains attaching to the data of sense. And the way in which it gets rid of them, so he is here informed, is by substituting for the world of sense, discarded as unreal, a different experience or other world, invented by the philosopher, and called by him the real or objective or absolute world. This world is invented to escape the puzzle and pain which sensuous experience brings, and it does so simply by leaving it out and drawing attention to something else. Thus, by whatever name you call the substituted world, its effect on the situation is the same, and that is, none at all.

Now it is all-important, before going further, to make it thoroughly clear that philosophy has no quarrel with the plain man's handling of his own experience. On the contrary, it holds his method to be sound; and it is that method and no other which philosophy itself adopts and pursues.

What it does impeach and deny is this strange story, derived from hearsay and verbal confusion, which the plain man's informants

¹ See below, p. 293.

provide him with as an account of the distinction between Appearance and Reality.

I will now describe very shortly the plain man's handling of his own daily experience, and will then proceed to show that the procedure of philosophy with regard to Appearance and Reality is just the same as this, only pursued further, and over a larger field.

2. No phrases are more constantly in our mouths than those which say in one form or another, "It looks like that, but it is something different." Without them, or an equivalent meaning, no one could get on for more than half an hour of his day's work. That work, whether theory or practice—it makes no odds—consists entirely in judging the look of things, and correcting judgments of it. Especially this is the method of practice. All skilled work has a tentative side, from lighting a fire or cutting down a tree to treating an ailment. "This is what we want—no, not quite; that,—no, that; now we've got it right; "*i. e.*, you keep correcting the suggestions of the first look till you get what you can rest satisfied with. Or in pure theory: "The strike situation looks better." "I don't know, there's that awkward feature." "The real fact is, there's a complete upset of the old Unionism." Or in questions of pain: "He's had a rough time." "Yes, but he's twice the man he was," or, "X's loss is irreparable." "Well, but how much it is to have had him."

In such or such-like an atmosphere of Appearance and Reality the man of ordinary sense and courage moves. Three things about it stare us in the face.

α . There is no such contrast concerned as that supposed to exist between sense and reason.

β . 'Appearances' are recognized not by being subjective or containing an element of sense, but by being affirmed in contradiction with one another.

γ . Reality is recognized not by being 'objective' as against 'subjective,' nor by being rid of the element of sense, but by being a system of appearances from which contradiction has been eliminated. What you first thought, or what looked like the first thing to try, was wrong. You then added more perception, more thought, a further trial, and at last it came right. What it looked like at first was wrong, but it was not unreal, and it was not nothing. It led up to the rest, and continued within it or beside it; but it did not show all that had to be seen to give you the complete situation; that is, to put you in possession of the reality, the full system of the appearances, of which the first look, and each successive look and the progressive combination of them, were parts.

3. Now this same atmosphere of Appearance and Reality, which thus governs all ordinary thought and action, is that in which philosophy lives. There has been philosophy which has gone astray after the thing-in-itself. But not the philosophy of which the writer is speaking. It follows Plato, and "Plato laid the ghost of the two-world theory which had haunted Greek philosophy since the time of Parmenides—He had shown already in the Sophist that to be an image was not to be nothing. An appearance is an appearance, and is only unreal if we take it for what it is not."¹ In Plato "there is no attempt to shirk the difficulty (of the phenomena of the visible heavens) by referring the irregularity of the planetary motions to the short-comings of the sensible world, or to 'matter,' or to an evil world-soul, as popular Platonism did later. Nor is there any attempt to represent the phenomena as illusory; on the contrary, the whole object of the enquiry is to 'save' them. The appearances remain exactly what they were, only now we know what they mean. The gulf between the intelligible and the sensible has so far been bridged; the visible motions of the heavenly bodies have been referred to an intelligible system, or, in other words, they have been seen in the light of the Good."²

The only difference between the philosopher's handling of experience and that which we have described as the plain man's is that the former α , draws from a wider field, β , uses the principle of progression consciously, γ , makes some use of analogy in meeting the principle's demands. Of course these are not total differences. We all do these things in common life, and common sense and experience justify us. If the plain man, and the popular philosopher too, would carry into philosophy their practical and daily method and directness, and dismiss hearsay and tradition about technical antitheses, they would apprehend much more truth.

Thus we see that it is a contradiction in terms to say that replacing appearance by reality solves no problem. To restate appearances as the reality is what solving a problem means. It is replacing contradictory looks of things not by a different experience in another world, but by the same looks adjusted into harmony by reconstruction in combination with more of the same kind. The world of reality is the world of appearances, and there is no other. The difference is in the completeness with which it is apprehended.

The misconception which I began by referring to offers to treat the real or absolute of philosophy as a thing-in-itself, *i. e.*, as some-

¹ Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, Part I, p. 349.

² *Ibid.*

thing inaccessible to human experience. "'Transcendental' is for the sophisticated philosopher the equivalent of 'supernatural' for the plain man."¹ The three distinctions just mentioned explain why this is not so, even if the absolute is something beyond what a human being can completely feel.

1. *The Wider Field*.—No one would be mad enough to say that we may not interpret what we individually experience by help of the experience of others and of greater minds. To attempt such a prohibition would arrest interpretation altogether. But if we may correct and amplify the meaning of life by what we can learn of Shakespeare or Newton or St. Francis, the transcendence of our given personal experience is admitted, and how far we go is only a question of how far in fact our expanded experience takes us.²

2. *The Conscious Principle*.—You cannot send away a logical principle when and where you please like a cab. If you can go on inferring, you must. And naturally, if you are attending to the process, it will take you farther than if you leave it to take care of itself, under pressure of practice only. Thus you get contradictions and solutions which have not suggested themselves to the plain man.

3. *Analogy*.—All expansion of our experience is in some degree a matter of analogy and construction. We have seen that we cannot possibly restrict ourselves to what is given to us 'personally,' and if logical conditions indicate an experience of a certain type, it is quite in accordance with our everyday quiet procedure to fill it in by help of analogy.

In the case of terms and relations indeed this extension is not necessary. We have already plain given experience for transcending them—the experience of any concrete felt whole. And we have no experience of them *per se*, that is, apart from such a fuller concrete being. So that their artificial nature is simply and definitely given. But even the absolute itself, in so far as it is conceived to be something more than a human individual could experience, is perfectly continuous with the appearances familiar to us and is an expansion of them just on the same sort of terms as is every enlargement of my private life and continuity of it with that of others. In my judgment to master the open secret of this continuity is the indispensable propædæutic to serious philosophy. Platonic scholarship has now done its part, and the aid being withdrawn which obsolete prejudices received

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 230.

² To hold, for instance, that pain is incurably the last word of pain is to go flat in the face of experience. Hocking, *The Meaning of God*, p. 218.

from misinterpretations of Plato, it is now time that they should be purged out of the philosophical world.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

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THE CONFLICTS OF REASON AND SENSE.

A REJOINDER TO DR. BOSANQUET.

THE article by Dr. Bosanquet which appears in this issue of *THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW* contains a criticism of two beliefs which I explained and defended in my paper on "The Antinomy and its Implications for Logical Theory."¹

That one of Dr. Bosanquet's criticisms which I wish to take up first is directed against what he considers to be my general error in admitting the existence (except in philosophies of a Thing-in-itself) of what I called "major antinomies," *i. e.*, apparent conflicts between the presentations of Sense and the theories constructed by Reason to explain those presentations. The other criticism is directed against what he considers my more specific error in charging the idealism of Mr. Bradley and his followers with a tendency to solve the alleged antinomies of the world of appearance by having recourse to an Absolute whose internal harmonies are irrelevant to the puzzles and sorrows of earth.

I. As regards the first-named criticism, Dr. Bosanquet writes: "There is no such contrast concerned as that supposed to exist between sense and reason. 'Appearances' are recognized not by being subjective or containing an element of sense, but by being affirmed in contradiction with one another. Reality is recognized not by being 'objective' as against 'subjective,' nor by being rid of the element of sense, but by being a system of appearances from which contradiction has been eliminated."

I should like to preface my comment on these statements by an expression of cordial agreement with three general positions which Dr. Bosanquet takes in his paper: (1) With the philosophies which have gone astray through postulating an unknowable 'Thing-in-itself' we need have no concern. (2) The procedure of all sound philosophy is and ought to be the same as that of the plain man in handling the problems of experience. (3) The reality which the philosopher seeks is and ought to be a system in which appearances are not supplanted or forgotten, but re-arranged or reviewed in accordance with their true meaning.

¹ *Studies in the History of Ideas*. Columbia University Press, 1918, pp. 223-248

Despite the truth of these assertions, I must deny Dr. Bosanquet's claim that antinomic conflicts between reason and sense are non-existent; for it is a fact that not only in the procedure of philosophers, but in that of scientists and plain men, there do arise occasions in which the more mediated systems of reason are at variance with the less mediated systems of sensory experience from which the former originated. When the plain man awakes from a dream, in which a certain fantastic situation has been immediately experienced, he proceeds by the use of reason to review the dream-experience in the light of his broader waking experience, with the result that the things of which he dreamed are found to contradict the system constructed by reason, and hence despite their vividness, they are condemned to a status of mere appearance. The condemnation in this case is just and we can agree that no wrong has been done the dream. It has merely been re-valued and its true meaning assigned it in the light of rational analysis. Again, an Othello, by a conscientious and deeply painful process of reasoning, may construct a system of 'reality' in the light of which the behavior of his Desdemona is re-valued and assigned a sinister significance quite opposite to that which it seemed to have in the world of mere sensory appearances unmediated by the dialectic of Iago. Othello believes himself to have awakened from a dream of trusting love to a reality that is sternly and terribly at variance with appearances. In this case, however, unlike the preceding case of awaking from an ordinary dream, it is the rational construction that is at fault. Or consider the scientist who by an impressive process of technical reasoning will revalue the appearance to our senses of a rainbow, and put in its place a reality consisting of a complicated system of particles of negative electricity which are themselves lacking in the color and continuity of their effect, or correlate, in consciousness. Or, again, consider those other scientists who in the pursuance of a rationalistic ideal of explaining the apparent movements of the heavenly bodies, covered the sky with crystalline spherical shells and with cycloidal and epicycloidal motions until the 'reality' thus constructed became top-heavy and was supplanted by the Copernican scheme which did less violence to that world of appearance from which the rival 'realities' had originated. And, as Dr. Bosanquet says, it is with the philosopher as with the scientist and plain man. Reason, not considered as an empty abstract faculty, but as a concrete activity of comparison and analysis offers those more general and far-reaching re-valuations of the world of sense which we call philosophy. Hobbes, Leibniz, Berkeley,

and Hegel all present to us grandiose systems of reasoned 'reality' which are often as much in contrast to the world of appearance from which they originate as they are to one another.

Now whether we are concerned with the rationalizations of philosophers, of scientists, or of plain men, we shall frequently find cases in which the reasoned re-interpretation of the world of appearance becomes so different from the world of appearance itself that hesitations and misgivings will arise. Either because the 'reality' is actually in contradiction to the 'appearance,' which it 'explains,' or because it is fantastically irrelevant to it, the question will arise as to whether something is not wrong. (1) Has not the reasoning, perchance, been faulty, and might it not if revised give a result confirmable by observation? (2) Is not the appearance so undeniably vivid and real that the whole business of logic and the activity of reason itself should be discredited, if it clashes with the irrefutable facts of sense? (3) Should not the appearance of things in our relatively immediate experience be recognized as unreal or false if reasoned analysis yields a system which contradicts the deliverance of experience? (4) Does not the seeming impossibility of reconciling sense and reason indicate the unknowable nature of reality? The situation which generates such questions is presented by a *major antinomy*—in which there is a *conflict between the two major criteria of truth*, namely, sense and reason. These criteria are as a rule mutually corroborative; but common sense, science, and philosophy, offer many examples (some few of which I have cited) in which rational deductions are at variance with observed facts. And it is with reference to such exceptional cases that plain men, and philosophers too, divide according to their temperaments into four groups, corresponding to the four questions just listed. The affirmative answer to question (1) is the moderate or compromise position, one form of which I defended as my own in my paper on "The Antinomy"; while the affirmative answers to questions (2), (3) and (4) were labelled respectively ultra-empiricism, ultra-rationalism, and agnosticism.

In view of the numerous instances, not only in the long series of philosophies from Zeno to Bradley, but in science and ordinary thinking as well, in which these antinomic conflicts of sense and reason are found, I cannot feel that Dr. Bosanquet has established his claim that they do not exist. I still feel that not only are these conflicts between logical criteria perfectly genuine and real, but also that they offer unusually significant opportunities for studying the several types of philosophic temperament and of philosophic method.

II. As stated in the introduction to the present paper, the other criticism which Dr. Bosanquet makes of my article on "The Antinomy" is addressed to my classing the philosophy of Mr. Bradley as an instance of 'ultra-rationalism' and to my accusation that Mr. Bradley solves the puzzles which he believes that he has discovered in the realm of immediate experience and commonsense categories by having recourse to an Absolute Reality that is at variance with the world of appearance and largely irrelevant to its defects. In this connection Dr. Bosanquet says of my article, that "It explicitly identifies the doctrine, [Absolute Idealism] familiar to modern philosophy, and derived from Plato, with the two-world theory, the ghost of which Plato laid in philosophy, but which continually rises from the dead to haunt the commonsense thinker." And then, after setting forth the principle that sound philosophy aims to interpret and revalue the world of appearance rather than to construct a second and alien world, Dr. Bosanquet goes on to give his reasons for holding that modern idealism strictly conforms to this procedure and that the idealistic Absolute, in which terms and relations are revalued as the mere aspects of an organic unity, is not separate or transcendent, but something immanent in the world of appearance and expressive of its true meaning.

Now I had supposed that it was a commonplace that every philosopher of every school *means* to use the method defended by Dr. Bosanquet. And I certainly did not accuse the modern idealists of a wilful violation of that method or of a deliberate attempt to make a two-world theory. My charge was that despite their *attempts* to construct a reality which should be a rationalization of the world of appearance they had *actually* constructed a 'reality' which was irrelevant to the very experience which it purported to interpret. No philosopher that I have heard of,—not even the two-world theorists whom Plato destroyed—has said: "Go to, now; I will make a 'reality' which is alien to the world of experience and which, while internally perfect, will throw no light upon the world in which I live." The tragedy is not that philosophers have ever tried to do this, but that they have often done it. Swedenborg and Mrs. Eddy, no less than Leibniz, Berkeley and Mr. Bradley, have felt certain that the Realities which they had constructed by reason were but the true interpretations and necessary revaluations of the world of appearance. Yet all of these interpreters of the *given* have had critics who without misunderstanding their aims and without impugning their good faith have nevertheless insisted that the super-

naturals and transcendentals which their reasonings produced were not valid implications of the data and not relevant to its problems.

I must maintain then, that I am not guilty of Dr. Bosanquet's charge that I share the wide-spread error of the commonsense thinker in misunderstanding the supposedly non-transcendent character of modern idealism. My guilt, if guilt it be, is deeper, in that after a study of the arguments for the Absolute, and after understanding, at least their intent, I still remain unconvinced of their validity. In short, the real point at issue is whether the Absolute is a valid and immanent implicate of appearance as its defenders believe; or whether on the contrary, it is the transcendent and irrelevant product of mistaken analysis.

Irrespective of the soundness of the current opposition to idealism, I think that Dr. Bosanquet is mistaken if he believes that it comes mainly from popular philosophy. Popular philosophers now as always, when not crudely naturalistic are inclined not only toward the supernatural, but toward any form of transcendentalism that promises a universe in which their hopes and their values are fulfilled. So although the arguments in behalf of the Absolute are too technical for the amateur in philosophy to follow, yet the conclusion to which those arguments lead would appeal strongly to him. As a matter of fact the opposition to the doctrine of idealism has come hardly at all from the popular philosophers but rather from the realists and pragmatists. These two groups while radically opposed to one another are equally opposed to the Absolute. They have analyzed the idealistic proofs and found them wanting.

III. Inasmuch as Dr. Bosanquet has stated so clearly the experiential warrant for his belief in the Absolute, I should like in conclusion to present an outline of the realist view of the idealist's procedure.

1. To the idealist, the inclusion of all objects in experience of some sort seems to follow (a) from the evident impossibility of knowing an object apart from its relation to a knower; (b) from the relativity of sense perception and the consequent dependence of the appearance of things upon the condition and position of the knower.

To the realist, the fact that we can directly cognize an object only when it is in the cognitive relation to us, seems an unimportant truism which in no way debars us from believing that the cognized objects can, if their behavior warrants it, be inferred to pass in and out of a field of experience without change in their nature or existence. While with regard to the relativity of perception, the realist believes

that the facts are compatible with the theory that cognition is merely selective, rather than creative or alterative, of its objects; and that it is because objects possess in their own right a variety of aspects that the same object will reveal different sides of its nature to different observers or, in different relations, to the same observer.

2. To the idealist, the impossibility of explaining objects in terms of their dependence upon our empirical and finite experience is as certain as the necessity of including them in experience of some sort. It follows therefore that there is a universal or absolute experience, continuous with our experiences and presupposed by them as the immanent and perfect whole of which they are the fragmentary aspects or foci.

To the realist, also, it seems impossible to explain objects in terms of their relation to finite selves, but not believing in the necessity of including objects in some experience, he finds it simpler to conceive them as existing in their own right, independently of their presence in, or their absence from, any field of consciousness. He thus regards the postulate of an absolute consciousness as unnecessary and unwarranted.

3. To the idealist, not only the cognitive relation of knowing self to known object but all relations between selves and between objects are regarded as self-evidently 'internal.' This internality of relations means that all things are inseparable from the relations in which they stand; that each is modified by its relations to others; and, therefore, that all things presuppose and are constituted by one complete and perfect Whole apart from which no thing can enjoy either meaning or existence. And without the knowledge of this Whole no thing could be known for what it really is. This organic unity of reality as a whole is the Absolute in whose eternal and perfected system of experience the terms and relations of our world of appearance, as well as such attributes as space and time, are transfigured and fused together in a union, the closeness, though not the richness of which, is most nearly approached in our experience by the state of immediate feeling.

To the realist, relations in general and especially the cognitive relation appear to be 'external' rather than 'internal'—which means that the nature and existence of an object are not determined by or dependent upon the relations in which it stands to other existing objects. Consequently such attempts as that of Mr. Bradley to exhibit the commonsense categories of *term* and *relation*, *thing* and *attribute*, *time* and *space*, *good* and *evil*, as riddled with an inconsistency

and an endless regress necessitating our rejection of them as true and real, does not seem valid. The ascription of inconsistency to these forms of common experience, rests mainly on the argument that terms are so dependent upon their relations that there is nothing left of them to be related, and hence nothing left of relations. And it is largely on the basis of this ingenious but, as it seems to the realist, fallacious dialectic (supplemented, as it is, by the theory that judgment creates rather than discovers the relation of subject and predicate,) that terms and relations and with them, the whole world of experience is condemned to the status of appearance. And the corollary of this unwarranted theory of appearance is of course an equally unwarranted theory of an Absolute in whose all-harmonious being the puzzles and tragedies of the ordinary world are finally solved. In short, the world of experience is, for the realist, capable both physically and logically of existing in its own right, and in the form under which it appears. And whatever God or Absolute there may be, is not to be discovered by the easy way of epistemological dialectic but rather by inductive inference from the behavior of things.

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PHILOSOPHICAL IDEALISM AND CURRENT PRACTICE.

IN his reply to Professor Montague, Dr. Bosanquet says that if popular philosophers would carry into philosophy their practical and daily method and directness, they would apprehend much more truth. That practical method consists entirely, he says, in judging the look of things and correcting judgments of it. The phrases which imply the method are constantly in our mouths. "Without them, or an equivalent meaning, no one could get on for half an hour of his day's work."

In assertions like this Dr. Bosanquet seems to me to honor our practical and daily procedure too much, and to supply the explanation for some of the misunderstanding of his philosophical point of view. The reason why there is not more "sense and courage" in philosophy is precisely because there is a considerable lack of it in daily life. Many popular philosophers do not see the connection between cutting down trees, lighting fires, treating ailments and the ideal world of Plato, because such tasks are often performed about them without the thoroughness and resolution which would furnish a basis for understanding Plato. Dr. Bosanquet has characteristically taken the plain man at his best, and while in part he has reported, in part

he has idealized. There is, indeed, in his remarks description of our procedure, but there is also material for a criticism of the habits of this generation. It is because of the discrepancy between what he asserts with excessive praise to be the quality of practice everywhere and all the time, and the actual unaspiring quality of much of it, that his philosophical interpretation of experience sometimes falls on deaf ears.

The method of the day's work, as he describes it, is essentially one of self-criticism. The typical expression of it is: "This is what we want—no, not quite; that—no, that; now we've got it right!" Dr. Bosanquet believes that we are always comparing our work with an ideal and that we labor and alter until we approach the ideal. The atmosphere of ordinary life involves for him a spirit of thoroughness and patience, and in some degree a passion for perfection. It is true, of course, that these virtues are never entirely lacking in any community, and it is easy to find exceptional cases which manifest them to a high degree. There are, for example, the men and women animated by the traditional spirit of Christianity who have taken literally the injunction: "Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father which is in Heaven is perfect;" and who never relax their self-criticism in the light of this high standard as long as they live. Everyone has marvelled at the patience and high-mindedness of such people in the face of pain and death.¹ Nevertheless it seems to me that at present thoroughness and patience are rather the virtues we need than the virtues we have.

The spirit opposed to the spirit of self-criticism is the spirit of complacency. By complacency I mean intellectual inertia accompanied by a sense of approval. It is important to understand the precise quality of this complacency, for it is easy to miss its true significance. A man may be complacent and yet not be openly conceited or make any professions of knowledge or virtue; he may even be fond of asserting his own ignorance and mediocre moral state. But he asserts these things without pain, perhaps even good-naturedly. Ignorance and mediocrity are not hateful to him; they are not thorns in his spirit which prick him on to a life-long endeavor to be rid of them. And the complacent man, who, half-pleased with himself, points to his own humility, is likely to draw down to his own level

¹ Cf. the description of Ailie in *Rab and his Friends*; "eyes such as one sees only once or twice in a lifetime, full of suffering, full also of the overcoming of it; . . . and her mouth firm, patient, and contented, which few mouths ever are. . . . I never saw a more beautiful countenance or one more subdued to settled quiet."

all the rest of mankind. He is not enthusiastic, generous, or admiring. He is likely to pride himself on his ability to 'see through' people—and that usually means to see through to their weaknesses and vices; but he combines with this scepticism a practical amiability. Men, after all, are good fellows, and that is enough for the business of this world. Complacency, then, is not necessarily conceit; it is too negative for that; it is a lack of any great faith in or respect for the human kind. In the second place, complacency does not necessarily imply complete inactivity. There may be a great show of work where very little is accomplished; and so a complacent person may be connected with many enterprises. A bustle and stir, a poking about to learn the 'causes' of things, and an assumption of fastidiousness may all coexist with what is at bottom sheer laziness. The final test of complacency is the failure to revise standards of conduct and thought. It must not be confused with dullness—the tendency to lie in bed or sit in an arm-chair; it may be very lively in the service of 'good causes' or 'modern movements.' But while the complacent person may write and talk and act, his point of view is always uncritical; it is got from any chance source—the current newspaper or magazine, the popular orator, an immediate feeling or desire. The spirit of criticism pushes reflection far; it examines the assumptions and general ideas upon which the business in hand rests, but the spirit of complacency sets to work with no doubts and without preliminary investigation. Ultimately criticism is the spirit of life, and complacency of death.

At the present moment, we are on the whole rather more complacent than self-critical. At first sight this may seem to be a false interpretation of this generation. There is surely much asking of questions, restlessness, and rejection of old distinctions. But it is not in the main a movement toward 'the Good' in Dr. Bosanquet's sense. It is not self-criticism of a serious or vital character. While Dr. Bosanquet is attributing to us some measure of divine discontent, an unceasing effort for improvement, a stout courage to follow the argument wherever it leads, we are actually showing to a regrettable extent a willingness to rest in mere first impression or subjective opinion and an indifference to our jobs. For example, a discussion is often cut short by some such dictum as this: "I don't believe anybody knows anything about it. Nothing that we read or hear can be trusted, so there is really no use in arguing;" or "That's the way it appears to you; it seems different to me, and there we are!" The churches are saying; "There is no sense in bothering about theology.

Distinctions based on it are pretty artificial." The assumption underlying the elective system in colleges is that what subject a person studies doesn't really matter. Anything is education. Phrases like the following are often applied to practical endeavor: "It doesn't pay to work indefinitely at a thing;" "That is all that can be expected;" "What difference does it make?" "Everyone to his own taste." We tolerate slovenly performance in the making of houses and garments because they serve the immediate occasion. The eye is on some particular need close at hand; too little of a disinterested love of work well done animates present practice.

It is exactly when minds do not feel the stirring of the spirit of self-criticism and are complacent and tolerant that they look for 'another world' in the vicious sense—the sense in which, as Dr. Bosanquet tells us, we must not take Plato. The indolent man looks for some magic to supply him with perfect conditions of an easy life.¹ Along with the lack of correction of self and of will goes a plaintive request for a new heaven and a new earth quite disconnected from this. Working-men and clerks who will not put effort into their daily work will ask boldly for an improvement of their lot from the outside. Students hope to get truth by the easy road of some 'stimulus' or 'method' instead of by the hard way of study and investigation. Pious churchmen forget the necessarily arduous character of the religious life as expressed in the old hymn: "Must I be carried to the skies, On flowery beds of easy, While others fought to win the prize?" We seem sometimes to think that the virtue of temperance may be cheaply had by legislation, that health may be secured by the study of hygiene, and that human welfare may be increased by the simple expedient of increasing wages. We need to learn the wholesome lesson that all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare. When we have learned this lesson, we shall, both as philosophers and as plain men, of a surety "apprehend much more truth."

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¹ See the interpretation of Syndicalism in "Realism and Politics" by J. W. Scott, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. XVIII. Syndicalists, he says, are people who "lie back on the running flood, spread their sails to the winds of God, and await the splendid catastrophe" (p. 237).

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason.' By NORMAN KEMP SMITH. London, Macmillan and Co., 1918.—pp. lxi, 615.

"Kemp Smith," a colleague remarked to me after inspecting this book, "Kemp Smith seems to have put America on the map in History of Philosophy." Allowing for the slang, this is precisely what Professor Smith has done. No competent reader will doubt for a moment that he has here before him a work of first-rate scholarship, a contribution to the historical study of philosophy which not only takes front rank among commentaries on Kant written in the English language, but which, alike for thoroughness of detail, soundness of judgment, and originality of interpretation, may well be placed side by side with the best work of Vaihinger, Adickes, and other German scholars.

At the end of his Preface (p. ix) Kemp Smith himself suggests that some readers will use his *Commentary* rather for its systematic discussion of Kant's teaching, others rather as an accompaniment to their study of the text. A reviewer cannot do better than try to estimate Kemp Smith's achievement in both these respects. The sorting out has been made easy for him by the fact that the headings of all sections of systematic discussion are printed in italics. Besides, there is a systematic *Introduction* of some sixty pages, dealing with Kant's method of composing the *Critique*, with his relation to Hume and Leibniz, and with a number of general problems. A still fuller discussion of Kant's relation to his predecessors is to be found in *Appendix B* (pp. 583-606).

The most important characteristic of Kemp Smith as an interpreter of Kant's text is his emancipation from the Hegelian bias of Green, Caird, and Watson. Like almost all other commentators (with the exception of Adickes and Henry Sidgwick) he acknowledges that the *Critique*, especially when its two editions are compared, presents no single, harmonious, self-consistent doctrine, but rather a struggle of incompatible tendencies. Like almost all the others he realizes that the interpreter's chief difficulty is to decide which of these tendencies to acclaim as the genuinely 'critical' and 'transcendental' one, as Kant's novel and epoch-making contribution to philosophy. The whole reading of the *Critique* turns on this choice.

As against Schopenhauer, Kemp Smith holds that the second edition marks an advance, not a retrogression. In other words, he identifies Kant's distinctively critical thought with the 'phenomenalist' rather than with the 'subjectivist' tendency. As against most other critics, on the other hand, he holds that the 'subjective deduction' of the categories in the first edition is essential to Kant's argument, and that the elimination of it, in the second edition, was a mistake. As against all commentators who treat Kant merely as the forerunner of Hegel, he insists—rightly, as I think,—that this line of interpretation misses or distorts what is most characteristic in Kant's point of view and results. In general, he presents Kant as struggling to free himself, with varying success, on the one hand from the dogmatic rationalism of Leibniz, and, on the other, from the 'subjectivism' which, by limiting knowledge in the first instance to 'ideas in the mind,' makes the knowledge of physical objects, or, in other words, the empirical distinction between material things and minds, or selves, at best highly problematical. The conflict between Kant's 'phenomenalism,' for which the outer world and the inner world are alike 'appearances,' *i. e.*, objects of scientific study on the basis of experience, and the 'subjectivism' which shuts up the mind within the circle of its own ideas, conceived merely as mental states or occurrences, dominates according to Kemp Smith the *Analytic*. The *Dialectic* derives a corresponding dramatic interest from the fluctuating fortunes of the 'idealist' and the 'sceptical' views of the function of reason. "On the Idealist interpretation Reason is a metaphysical faculty, revealing to us the phenomenal character of experience, and outlining possibilities such as may perhaps be established on moral grounds. From the sceptical standpoint, on the other hand, Reason gives expression to what may be only our subjective preference for unity and system in the ordering of experience. According to the one, the criteria of truth and reality are bound up with the Ideas; according to the other, sense-experience is the standard by which the validity even of the Ideas must ultimately be judged" (p. 560).

Following Vaihinger, Kemp Smith maintains that the correct analysis of the text, and of the development of Kant's thought, requires the recognition that the *Critique* is composed of many strata of MS. written at different times over a period of more than ten years, and that the order of the sections, as they now stand in the text, is not the order of composition or the order of the development of Kant's thought. Large sections of the *Dialectic*, especially the argument about the antinomies, can be shown to be of early origin

and only 'semi-critical' in purport. Some of the central passages in the *Analytic*, on the other hand, are just as evidently of late composition, and one or two even appear to have been inserted only on the very eve of publication. Hence, occasionally, analysis must take a passage to pieces by sentences, in order to disentangle the original draft from additions made to harmonize it with other portions of the text. This explains the 'crazy-quilt' effect which Kant's exposition at times produces. This also gives unrivalled opportunity for what Kemp Smith happily calls "detective genius in the field of scholarship" (p. 202).

As regards the details of the analysis, every student of Kant is sure to have his own special list of knotty points and to turn first to the sections in which Kemp Smith deals with these. No reviewer can here hope to hit off every taste, and I shall, therefore, content myself with noting, more or less at random, some of the many excellent things which have impressed me, personally, most. In the opening pages, the explanatory comments on Kant's technical terms, and, where necessary, on key-phrases or -sentences in the text, are excellent. I am tempted to instance the discussion of the various senses of "possibility" (pp. 50-52); the distinction between "immanent" and "transcendent" metaphysics, as applied, *e. g.*, on p. 66, to the elucidation of what Kant means by *a priori* judgments in "pure natural science"; the long note on "appearance" and "form of appearance" (pp. 83-98). Nor ought the correct interpretation (which, with the exception of Watson, all other commentators have missed) of Kant's 'Copernican Revolution' to be forgotten (pp. 22-25). Kemp Smith is right in charging the prevailing misunderstanding to "our neglect of the scientific classics." A reference to Copernicus's *De Revolutionibus* clears up the puzzle at once. However, in singling out S. Alexander by quotation as a typical offender, Kemp Smith ought at least to have pointed out that Alexander has since admitted his mistake in print, having, in fact, been converted by Kemp Smith's own explanation, a few years ago, of the correct interpretation in a note in *Mind*.

On pp. 40, 41, the argument should be noted that Kant's doctrine of pure *a priori* intuition, as supplying the basis of mathematical science, is a survival from a *pre-critical* period in Kant's thought (being found in writings of the years 1764, 1769, and 1770), and that, in part through Schopenhauer's praise of it, its importance in the *Critique* has been overrated, and its incompatibility with the genuinely 'critical' sections of the *Analytic* overlooked. The long section

(pp. 202-331) on the *Deduction* contains, both from the historical and from the systematic points of view, the very kernel of Kemp Smith's interpretation of Kant. Here he has done some brilliant 'detective' work on his own account. He supports Vaihinger's analysis of the present text of the *Deduction* into four distinct strata, by recognizing the concept of the "transcendental object" as *pre-critical*, and as characteristic exclusively of the earliest stratum in the *Deduction* and of early passages in the *Dialectic* and elsewhere. It is closely connected with the 'subjectivist' tendency in Kant's thought which Kemp Smith interprets as being in process of slow transformation into the genuinely critical "phenomenalism." I quote from the summary of his argument. The doctrine of the transcendental object, he writes, "contains no trace of the teaching of the objective deduction of the first and second editions or of the teaching of the refutation of idealism in the second edition. It closely resembles Mill's doctrine of the permanent possibilities of sensation, and is almost equally subjectivist in character. As already noted, it also lies open to the further objection that it involves an illegitimate application of the categories to things in themselves. As Kant started from the naïve and natural assumption that reference of representations to objects must be their reference to things in themselves, he also took over the current Cartesian view that it is by an inference in terms of the category of causality that we advance from a representation to its cause. The thing in itself is regarded as the sole true substance and as the real cause of everything which happens in the natural world. Appearances, being representations merely, are wholly transitory and completely inefficacious. Not only, therefore, are the categories regarded as valid of things in themselves, they are also declared to have no possible application to phenomena. Sense appearances do not, on this view, constitute the mechanical world of the natural sciences; they have a purely subjective, more or less epiphenomenal, existence in the mind of each separate observer" (pp. 217-218).

A contention of this sort can, of course, be thoroughly tested out only by a searching re-consideration of the relevant passages in all their bearings. But Kemp Smith has undoubtedly made out a very strong *prima facie* case for his view, and I shall be surprised if his argument does not gain universal acceptance. It may be worth while to set down the four strata in the *Deduction* by way of showing, in a striking example, how much this close textual analysis, supported by references to the *Reflexionen* and *Losse Blätter*, can do to disentangle

the confusions of the argument as it stands. The first stage is that of the transcendental object without coöperation of the categories; the second is that of the categories, without coöperation of the productive imagination; the third is that of the productive imagination without the threefold transcendental synthesis; the fourth is that of this latter synthesis. As I have already pointed out, Kemp Smith, in opposition to many other commentators, attaches great importance to the doctrine of the threefold synthesis ('subjective deduction') which is necessary, in his view, to Kant's argument because our experiences form a temporal series the subjective changes in which have to be distinguished from the objective changes in phenomena, apprehension of which they none the less mediate (pp. 234-245). A typically excellent piece of scholarship is to be found in the analysis and comparison of the *seven* different statements of Kant's refutation of idealism, found in the two editions of the *Critique* and in the *Prolegomena* (pp. 298 ff.). Here is the place, too, for bearing witness to the uniformly illuminating discussions of Kant's relations to his predecessors, especially Leibniz, Hume, Berkeley, including the vexing question which of the writings of the English thinkers might have been read by Kant in translations, and which he actually did read. It would appear that he owed much of his knowledge of both Hume and Berkeley to Beattie.

But it is time to turn to the systematic discussions, for, as Kemp Smith himself would agree, the ultimate value of all historical study, and especially of all textual detective work, must lie in the training it affords to the student for a fuller grasp of the problem on its merits. The "General" section of the Introduction gives a brief statement of what Kemp Smith holds to be the systematic outcome of Kant's critical philosophy, when interpreted in terms of present-day theory, and we shall not be far wrong in guessing that this statement, at the same time, represents Kemp Smith's own philosophical position. Here is one of the key-passages: "Kant teaches that experience in all its embodiments and in each of its momentary states can be analyzed into an endlessly variable material and a fixed set of relational elements. And as no one of the relational factors can be absent without at once nullifying all the others, they together constitute what must be regarded as the determining form and structure of every mental process that is cognitive in character. Awareness, that is to say, is identical with the act of judgment, and therefore involves everything that a judgment, in its distinction from any mere association of ideas, demands for its possibility" (pp. xxxiv-v). Having

myself held for many years that the theory of judgment of idealistic logicians, like Bradley and Bosanquet, can be traced straight back to Kant, and that their logic is the direct descendant of Kant's 'transcendental logic' (except that it is indebted to Hegel, on the one hand, and to psychology, on the other, for an evolutionary point of view in the study of judgment-forms), I find myself, naturally, in complete agreement with an interpretation of Kant which recognizes the central position of judgment. Hence I agree also that Kant rather than Hegel is the founder of the Coherence Theory of truth (pp. xxxvii and p. 36). I am not quite so ready to agree, however, that the description of knowledge (*aliter* "consciousness," "judgment") as "awareness of meaning" (*e. g.*, pp. xxxiv and xli) is preferable to Kant's own phrase, "consciousness of *objects*" (*i. e.*, judgment affirming an object to be real).

A very interesting point, in support of which Kemp Smith advances much plausible argument, is that Kant's transcendental method is, at bottom, nothing but the hypothetical method of the natural sciences (p. xxxviii). This means that actual experience, *i. e.*, judgments affirming a real world perceptible by the senses, is Kant's datum, and that the factors or "conditions" of its "possibility" are postulated in order to explain the actual result, and are verified by their success in doing so. Now, if I have not misunderstood Kemp Smith completely, he holds that Kant's theory involves two sets of presuppositions or postulates, one logical, the other metaphysical. This view seems to me both original and important, and I will try to state it more fully. As regards the logical presuppositions, they concern especially the *a priori* factor, the importance of which in judgments Kant, as a rationalist, stoutly maintains. In fact, in his treatment of the *a priori* he proves himself a distinctly novel kind of rationalist. He denies Leibniz's view that the *a priori* can be logically demonstrated as a necessity of thought: *a priori* principles are not self-evident and 'analytic.' He denies equally Hume's view that they are instinctive beliefs guided in their application by associations of ideas. His own view is that their validity can be justified only by showing them to be indispensable presuppositions of the judgments in which the "empirical reality" of the objects of physical science and psychology is affirmed. In respect of the metaphysical presuppositions, Kemp Smith construes a sharp antithesis between Kant and Hegel. For Hegel, "consciousness knows itself in its ultimate nature" (p. xlv). For Kant, self-consciousness is merely "the *representation* of that which is the condition of all unity" (p. 328). Again, "Kant's critical

philosophy does not profess to prove that it is self-consciousness, or apperception, or a transcendental ego, or anything describable in kindred terms which ultimately renders experience possible. The most that we can legitimately postulate, as nominally conditioning experience, are 'syntheses' (themselves, in their generative character, not definable) in accordance with the categories. For only upon the completion of such syntheses do consciousness of self and consciousness of objects come to exist" (p. 261). Thus the fact of experience, in its cognitive character, throws no light on the question whether the self is a spiritual, immortal personality. The generative conditions of self-consciousness (by which, we must remember, we are to mean judgments about the self and affirming its reality) "may, for all that we can prove to the contrary, be of a non-conscious and non-personal nature" (p. 262). Indeed the noumenal factors or activities generative of consciousness are not presented to it, fall in this sense outside it, and can be determined only by inferential reasoning (pp. 263, 264). They remain shrouded in obscurity. No doubt, Kant never abandoned his personal belief, which he shared with Leibniz, in the reality of the spiritual self, and tries to vindicate its legitimacy by an analysis of the moral consciousness. But he always maintains "a pluralistic distinction between the intellectual and moral categories" (p. xlv), and therewith between 'appearance' and 'reality,' whereas Hegel tries to establish a 'monism' in which nature ranks as a lower category finding its 'truth' in man's spiritual life. That this represents closely the position actually reached by Kant, especially its sceptical strain, must, I think, be conceded. But I cannot feel as sure as Kemp Smith apparently does, that on the merits of the issue the advantage lies with Kant rather than with Hegel. However, a review is not the place for arguing so difficult a point. In any case, Kemp Smith has given us a reading of the place and function of self-consciousness in Kant's theory of knowledge which is not only highly novel and challenging, but which also, if established, would go far to remove the difficulties that, on the usual interpretations, beset the "transcendental unity of apperception," especially in its relation to particular minds.

Of the many corollaries of this view, I will draw the attention of Kant-students to only one which is of great interest in itself, and closely connected with the distinction between 'subjectivism' and 'phenomenalism.' Sensations, so Kemp Smith believes Kant to teach, have a twofold origin, noumenal and mechanical. In the latter respect they are the effects of physical stimuli operating on sense-

organs and brain. In the former respect, they are due "to the affection by things in themselves of those factors in the noumenal conditions of the self which correspond to 'sensibility'" (p. 276). As mechanically caused, sensations are on the same plane as other appearances. As noumenally caused, they supply the material, or 'given manifold,' of those syntheses through which alone appearances come to be apprehended. Here is a typical passage summarizing the contrast: "From the subjectivist's point of view the synthetic activities consist of the various cognitive processes of the individual mind, and the given manifold consists of the sensations aroused by material bodies acting upon the special senses. From the objective or phenomenalist standpoint the synthetic processes are of noumenal character, and the given manifold is similarly viewed as being due to noumenal agencies acting, not upon the sense-organs, which as appearances are themselves noumenally conditioned, but upon what may be called the 'outer sense'" (p. 275). What Kemp Smith is most concerned to maintain is apparently two things. One is the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, which he praises Kant for substituting for the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter (p. 280). At the same time, he maintains that things in themselves, or the noumenal conditions of consciousness, remain in a very genuine sense unknowable, and may not even be mental at all (p. 277). The second point is that, on this view, consciousness of objects and consciousness of self are cöordinate on the same phenomenal level. Or, to put it otherwise, physical things and the minds which psychology studies are alike appearances, known in the same direct way. "Material existences are known with the same immediacy as the subjective states" (p. 281). Material and mental phenomena thus form together a single objective order of causally interconnected existences, in a single cosmic time and a single cosmic space. "Subjective states do not run parallel with the objective system of natural existences, nor are they additional to it. For they do not constitute our consciousness of nature; they are themselves part of the natural order which consciousness reveals" (p. 279). In fact, it is only as elements in this natural order that mental states can have assigned to them the privacy which distinguishes them from the public character of material things. In short, as Bradley would say, minds and bodies are both "ideal constructions" within the ideal construction of "nature." And, of course, a mind which is the product of such a construction cannot be the mind, if we are to call it a mind at all, which does the constructing. Something like this

appears to be what Kemp Smith is ascribing to Kant. Mind or consciousness as appearance is the product of a synthesis, and cannot be identical with the consciousness, if consciousness it is, which does the synthesizing. But what precisely is the nature of that which does the synthesizing, "constitutes a problem, the complete data of which are not at our disposal" (p. 280).

Seeing that Kemp Smith leaves the matter there, it is, I think, a pity that he has not allowed his interest in the systematic problem to carry him on into a discussion of some of the modern realist thinkers, who not only have been wrestling with many of these problems, but who have in several instances developed their views through direct and explicit criticism of Kant's arguments. The complete absence of any reference to H. A. Prichard's *Kant's Theory of Knowledge* is especially noteworthy in this connection. Kemp Smith, it is easy to guess, does not think much of this, or any other, neo-realist, but I, for one, regret that he has not, in the context of his systematic discussions, taken the opportunity to deal with some of the neo-realist criticisms of Kant's theory of knowledge.

I am tempted to conclude with a general reflection. With a few notable exceptions American students of philosophy are more keenly interested in the systematic than in the historical approach to their subject. They tend to be more at home in the latest novelty by a contemporary writer than in the great master-pieces of the classical periods. Under the spell of 'research' and 'progress,' they attach more importance to attacking new problems, or offering new solutions for old problems, than to seeking to learn by sympathetic study what thinkers of the past have to teach us on problems which are ever fresh because they are always with us. The spirit of a pioneering people, exploring and conquering a 'New World', reappears in the intellectual outlook of American philosophers. Their strength and their weakness is that of American civilization generally—enterprise and boldness without much historical background; a forward-looking, forward-straining attitude, unhampered, but also unhelped and unilluminated, by the sense of a rich past. In such an intellectual environment men who, like Kemp Smith, give the best of their very high abilities to the history of philosophy, fulfill a singularly important function. Their learning helps to keep us all in living contact with the great thinkers of the past. Princeton is fortunate among American universities in having this contact with Plato through Paul Elmer More, and with Kant through Norman Kemp Smith.

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The Origin of Consciousness. By CHARLES AUGUSTUS STRONG.
London, Macmillan & Co., 1918.—pp. viii, 330.

The present volume by Professor Strong is a fulfillment of his promise, made in his earlier work, *Why the Mind Has a Body*, to answer certain difficulties concerning consciousness which formed a hindrance in the minds of many to the acceptance of panpsychism. It is, then, a thorough study of the exact nature of consciousness, controlled by the purpose to show that psychical mind-stuff is the substance of the physical world and that cognition, feeling and will can be explained as functions of the organized psyche.

It is seldom, in these days, that we find an example of such persistent concentration upon a theory. In reading the book I was constantly impressed with the feeling that philosophy was here measurably approaching the method of science. Exact distinctions are drawn, and careful analyses are made; and the whole process of advance is cumulative and empirical. Whether the reader agrees with the various steps or not, he cannot but regard the framework as, itself, a contribution. Specific problems are raised and specific answers given. There is no tendency to dwell in vague generalities, no suggestion of mere impressionism. He is so assured of the truth of his position that he welcomes objections. The book is obviously the product of prolonged and intense reflection upon all the aspects of the mind-body problem.

It has evidently been Professor Strong's experience—as it has been my own—that this problem requires an interpretation of the empirical facts in the light of a definite theory of knowledge. What peculiarly interests me is that his theory of knowledge approximates to my own. It is a form of critical realism. And it has always been my persuasion that the metaphysics of a thinker would be the expression of scientific facts as these are coördinated and illumined by a definite theory of knowledge. Am I forced to accept panpsychism? That has been the question uppermost in my mind while assimilating this suggestive volume.

The book divides into four parts. The first part is introductory; the second concerns itself with the problem of cognition; the third with the unity of mind; and the fourth with mental plurality and diversity. The major portion of the book is devoted to epistemology, and only in the last third is panpsychism defended in detail.

In the preliminary chapter, the author points out the difference between his present position and that held by him in his earlier work. "Thus, in my former book, I had two series or planes of objects, one behind the other, one given to the mind and the other existing outside

it, and my doctrine may be described as having been idealism with representation. I now see that if the outside objects are that to which we adjust our relations—if perception is a function existing primarily for the sake of action, and providing information about external things in order that we may act suitably with regard to them—the external things and they alone are entitled to be called ‘objects,’ the objects of perception; and not the less so because we do not perceive them in all cases exactly as they are.”¹ In short, he now holds that the physical thing is alone the object of both perception and intellection, and that knowledge is *direct*. To use his former terminology, things-in-themselves are knowable. Of course, this means that he has relinquished Kantianism completely.

The reader will probably find some difficulty in getting a clear idea of the terminology Professor Strong employs. Let me therefore give the gist of his notion of the mechanism of cognition and attach his terms to the factors.

We perceive things, but we do not always perceive things as they are. Perceptual error is possible. And it is possible because cognition is not an intuition but an exhibition of things by means of a datum. Naïve realism maintains that the physical thing itself is given, while idealism holds that only mental contents are given. This new form of realism asserts that only essences are given, while the physical thing is known in terms of the essence imputed to it by the percipient’s motor reaction to the stimulus coming from it. The mere givenness of an essence is not knowledge—to suppose so is the mistake of idealism, on the one hand, and of neo-realism, on the other. The object is *affirmed* and known in terms of the imputed datum. Representative realism makes the mistake of supposing that the essence is the first object of cognition and that the physical object is inferred and known later upon the basis of this first act of cognition. We must proclaim that the physical thing is the first and only object of cognition; and that it is affirmed instinctively and is not inferred in some mysterious way.

It may be well to give my own reaction to this teaching. That the physical object is affirmed rather than *intuited* has been one of my contentions. It was for this reason that I designated my position non-apprehensional realism. Knowledge of the physical world is not either a direct intuition or a copy of the physical realm. It is knowledge in terms of a datum aroused in the mind and referred to the object. *We are aware of the datum and know the object.* And

¹ Page 7.

this brings me to a point upon which I am inclined to criticize Professor Strong. He does not seem to me to distinguish clearly enough between perceptual knowledge and critical knowledge. In fact, so desirous is he of stressing the directness of knowledge that he tends to drop into something closely resembling naïve realism. The essence imputed to the object affirmed is, he asserts again and again, the essence of the object, the essence embodied in the object. I must confess that I am not certain what he means by these expressions. He should have explained them more fully.

It is with some hesitation that I indicate another point of difference between his epistemology and my own. His book is clearly the production of a psychologist trained in introspection. But it appears to me that Professor Strong does not do justice to the recent stress in psychology upon meanings and imageless thought. Let me explain.

Consciousness is used by him in the epistemological sense of givenness, that is, awareness. It is his contention that givenness is not given, that there is no diaphanous consciousness which terminates upon the essence and is given with it. It is clear that he is attacking Moore's teaching. With this attack I, for one, heartily agree. Consciousness is not mingled with the essence given. When I perceive this book before me, the essence, 'a brown oblong book,' is given; but there is not another element, called consciousness, given. From this conclusion, he passes to the assertion that the given-essence or datum in terms of which we perceive the object is a purely logical entity. And it is in this connection that he introduces his vehicular theory. Psychical states are the vehicles of essences. An essence is a universal. It is not in space and time. Particularity comes from the practical attitude of affirmation. "It may be asked how two psychic states so different as a sensation and the corresponding mental image can be the vehicle for givenness of the same essence. For it cannot be doubted that the essences given when I see an object and when I imagine the same object are the same. The answer depends on realizing, first, that the essence is a mere intent, not a sensible fact, and, secondly, that it is brought before the mind not by the psychic state alone but also by the practical attitude. . . . What makes essences the same is, after all, our reacting to the objects as the same."¹

Now is not Professor Strong developing in his own way something of what Woodworth means by imageless thought and what Pillsbury means by types? But these gentlemen are psychologists and would

¹ Page 179.

not for a moment proclaim their thoughts and types logical entities. As against the old sensationalism, the vehicular theory seems to me a distinct advance, but I am very skeptical of this carrying of logical entities by psychical states. In fact, I find it difficult to understand the conception of logic. There is something of the same mystery here as in Bradley's notion of meanings as detaching themselves from images. Let me quote Woodworth's Presidential Address: "I call it (my theory), for lack of a better name, the mental reaction theory, or perhaps the perceptual reaction theory. Its basic idea is that a percept is an inner reaction to sensation. I call it a mental reaction to distinguish it from the motor reaction which several psychologists have put forward as being important in attention, perception, association and the like; for it appears to me that these suggestions, while on the right track in insisting that *reaction* is dynamically important, have mistaken the locus of the reaction, and so are unable to account for the conscious content that appears in these mental activities."¹ If something of this sort were adopted, the content of perception could be regarded as psychical and not as a logical entity.

Cognition is, then, a function of the organism, especially of the psyche. It is not an intuition, and can be explained in an evolutionary way. Let me stress my agreement with the writer on this point. I hope his clear analysis will call attention to the possibility of a realism which does justice to the motives which break down naïve realism.

It is obvious that this gnostic realism presses new problems upon the panpsychist. The majority of panpsychists have been phenomenologists and so were able to interpret things-in-themselves by *analogy* with the psychical which remained the sole stuff experienced. But a gnostic physical realist must prove a harmony between the psychical and the physical as known. Otherwise, he cannot make the identification that panpsychism requires. Let us see how our author faces this task.

In the preliminary chapter where he is recording his shift in outlook, he suggests that it may be necessary to "lessen somewhat our conception of the adequacy of introspection and to conclude that, if it does not mis-present, it to some extent fails completely to present, the psychic reality." Thus there is a marked swing toward a one-substance theory. He refuses to accept materialism because a psychic character clearly appears in the object of introspection.

A realistic interpretation of introspection supplements the realistic

¹ *Psychological Review*, Vol. XXII, p. 22.

theory of external perception. Here, again, we meet the vehicular theory. We know introspectively by primary memory, which furnishes the psychical basis for the essence which exhibits the past psychical state. Since the vehicle is *like* the object, the cognition is probably very adequate. "The principle underlying this proof of the adequacy of introspection is that, the more nearly the vehicle is like the object, the more fitted it will be to produce a given-essence rendering the object truly."¹

The feeling or psychic state is independent of our cognition of it, of its being felt. Consciousness is not a part of its nature. Its being does not involve awareness on our part. In this connection, I would suggest that, perhaps, the author does not lay sufficient stress upon the subject side of cognition, upon experiencing. There is somewhat too much stress upon the knowledge-attitude. One gets the impression that the present is experientially the darkest moment.

In cognition, what is discriminated in an essence depends upon our powers of discrimination. "What we perceive introspectively may be only an 'extract' from the total object, a summary view of it, like that which we have of a crowd when we are some distance away."² This point is important, for it is upon it that Professor Strong depends for his faith that psychic states are comparable to the brain. "Do feelings not only consist of parts that are introspectively discoverable, but of parts smaller still that are undiscoverable, and so on indefinitely? Is feeling really as composite as matter?"³ The argument leads to the position that simple qualities, even, are not ultimate. And I think that we enter here upon the weakness of panpsychism. The physical analogy is at work. There must be a one-to-one correspondence between matter as known and feeling.

I have lingered over the main argument of the book, but my selection must not convey the impression that there are not many other features of significance. Thus he takes up the question of the unity of mind under such headings as:—Memory and Personal Identity, The Perception of Change, Mental Synthesis, The Momentary Psychic State. In these chapters the argument is very adroitly directed against any unitary soul. The analyses are radical and in my opinion essentially sound.

A very readable epilogue is appended, entitled Fate and Free Will. Empirical freedom is distinguished from speculative freedom. Only

¹ Page 232.

² Page 232.

³ Page 308.

empirical freedom is essential to morality. We have here a protest against the 'block' universe.

The Origin of Consciousness shows the influence of William James to whom it is dedicated. Yet the originality of Professor Strong is everywhere present. It has helped me to clarify my thoughts on many points and forced me to defend my own prepossessions. It can safely be recommended to the philosophical public as one of the most stimulating books of recent years. It is a warning that both neo-realist and idealist must be prepared to meet a new antagonist in the coming years.

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The Good Man and the Good. An Introduction to Ethics. BY MARY WHITON CALKINS. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918.—pp. xx, 219.

In this introduction to ethics, Miss Calkins proposes to present ethics not "as a science of abstractions—of duty, goodness, virtue, or values—but as the science of the dutiful, the good, the virtuous man and his object. Thus concretely conceived, ethics is an inevitable outlet of psychology and an essential source of sociological science" (p vii.). She analyzes the various descriptive interpretations of the good man, "the good," the virtuous man, the socially virtuous man, to resolve their contradictions in a conception of the good man as one who identifies the good with the community, a community that is inclusive of himself as of all selves,—the universal community. It is in this conclusion that the argument culminates, and at each step it is enforced by insistence on the superficiality of other conflict breeding interpretations.

The conflicts considered are the age old ethical conflicts; they are set forth and criticized with the simplicity appropriate to an introductory treatment. One hopes that even the elementary student, wondering that such stubborn issues yield so readily to treatment, will submit the treatment to the careful scrutiny the author would desire.

The consciousness of obligation is revealed as a paradoxical complex, uniting as it does a sense of compulsion and of freedom in a consciousness of self-compulsion. Since a man as he grows in goodness may have less and less sense of inner compulsion so that the sense of obligation is but transitory, and is, moreover, at no moment, the whole moral experience, moral experience is never merely a consciousness of duty; it is a consciousness of duty with some object. Though

the object varies among different people the moral experience has two invariable characteristics. It involves not merely doing but willing to do, and what is to be willed is the good. A distinction must be made between bodily activity and will though the latter is normally followed by the former—"a man is constituted a good man by the character of his will, or self-activity, and not in virtue either of the bodily activity which normally accompanies will or of the external result of the bodily reaction" (p. 23). In so far as the point insisted on is that effect on environment should not in itself bring credit or discredit, there can be little objection; but it seems to be suggested that the will, effectual or not, is sufficient warrant of the morality of an action. It is perhaps not fair to say that Miss Calkins implies that good intentions are in themselves moral, but certainly the brief treatment here is a refusal to grapple with the problem,—a refusal we cannot willingly accept.

A significant characteristic of the will is that it is individualizing; in willing a man knows the volition "as one which only he can achieve, the duty as one which no other can do" (p. 24). When he acts unreflectively in conformity with group customs and laws he is not acting morally, for he is not actuated by an awareness of himself as a unique individual. The interesting consequence of this is that behavior the opposite of which would be bad is not necessarily good; you are not a good man because you of course do not steal.

The good which is the object of will has now to be considered. What is 'the good' as distinguished from things that are merely good? It has been finally defined by Aristotle as "that which is willed for its own sake." 'The good' is the supreme object of will, and, moreover, whether happiness or wisdom or benevolence, it is personal. But despite fair agreement as to its general nature, the specific objects of the good will may be pleasure for one man, individual perfection for another, social harmony for a third. If a man genuinely chooses any of these as supreme and self-sufficient, the measure of his morality is the measure of his devotion. Such an estimate of men, permitting as it does to each his own moral standard, does not, however, involve a subjective ethics, for while we may and do count men as good or bad according as they serve their own moral ends, we still pass a judgment on their ends that is independent of our estimate of the men;—and pass in our discussion from moral psychology to ethics: "for moral psychology, amplified by the critical estimate of concepts of the good, widens out into the normative science of ethics" (p. 39). Surely then the permission just given to estimate

men as good or bad independently of the ends they serve has been, aside from other considerations, premature, for in psychology these distinctions have no place.

There follows a critical account of various conceptions of the good. Both egoism and altruism—devotion to self, devotion to others, as the proper moral object—are challenged as arbitrary limitations of the object of moral loyalty. Can any object of moral loyalty escape some such challenge? None but the universal community, the community which includes along with all other selves the self that wills. But perhaps the defect of this object lies in the very lack of a convenient narrowness; perhaps the object is too vast to be psychologically a possible object of will. Moreover loyalty to it may be incompatible with proper loyalty to one's own individuality. But loyalty to a group is a common human experience, and always such group loyalties tend to overflow into wider embracing groups in such a manner that there seems no reason to limit the possibility of loyalty to any group short of the universe of selves "of which all groups of men and all individuals are vitally related members" (p. 60). To the objection that loyalty to the great unity may be at the expense of individuality, of inherent value, the answer is that such a criticism rests on the conception of individuality not as uniqueness, but as separateness. An individual's relations to his fellows are "not external excrescences but integral parts of him" (p. 64), so that "choosing one's own good in disregard of the good of the community discloses itself as an inherently inconsistent policy" (p. 64); and, conversely, to deprive and deny oneself when large ends of the universe are not at stake is to lower one's value to the community.

What we have now to determine is what the great community finds supremely valuable. Are we to strive for its happiness, its knowledge, or its power? Does the hedonist or the non-hedonist rightly describe the good? The author criticizes the good proposed by each in somewhat the same spirit in which she attacked objects of loyalty lesser than the all-inclusive community,—as an arbitrary limitation of the good which is needlessly exclusive if it omits any experience "which people wish or will for themselves."

In turning now to her examination of the virtuous man the author admits that there is some cause for the suspicion that theoretical ethical conclusions are of little help in moral decisions. They may, however, determine one's general direction; and, moreover, the charge should not be pressed against the conclusions so far reached in the present work, for we have yet to scrutinize the "specific habitual

volitions by means of which men seek to achieve the good,"—*i. e.*, the virtues. We have yet to undertake the "science of applied ethics." The virtues are defined as "habits of will furthering the good by control of instinctive tendencies" in the interest of the universe of selves. Moral control neither merely denies nor merely accepts any instinctive tendency; it is neither asceticism nor naturalism. Seldom either inciting or suppressing any tendency, it modifies to preserve all that is not tyrannous or destructive to other tendencies. "The material of our vices is, in other words, precisely that of our virtues—our instinctive feelings, impulses, reactions—but these are uncontrolled by moral habits of willing" (p. 90). Indeed, tendencies that would seem commendable in themselves, often achieve virtue only by combining with tendencies of ill repute. "So, courage involves the control of instincts which, unmodified, would become rashness, on the one hand, cowardice on the other" (p. 90).

The following chapters explain from this point of view all the important, well recognized virtues. They are the conspicuous habits which secure for the universal community fullness of life, which the instinctive tendencies enrich or impoverish as thus transmuted by control, or allowed, neglected, to run an independent, destructive course. Thought reviews the gain and loss involved in each claim of the various instinctive tendencies, and determines means to be employed; the role of thought is thus acknowledged, but the treatment here is too summary to reveal its significance.

It might be felt that at points in the course of the discussion moralizing gets in the way of exposition of ethical theory, but this is always a delicate problem for the writer on ethics; descriptions of the virtues and the vices pass only too readily into sermons. The illustrations are occasionally somewhat flat,—the obvious historical or the conspicuous contemporary figure or episode; such references are our ready aids in the classroom but are somehow distasteful in print. It is in the classroom that the work will be especially valuable. The beginning student—the general reader as well—will be instructed, and stimulated to further thought and inquiry. Though an argument in behalf of a particular theory, it is still as the author intends an introduction to the study of ethics, for the debatable questions, though treated as solved, are clearly and fairly presented, and the tone though that of assured conviction is not dogmatic.

EDNA ASTON SHEARER.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS

Social Process. By CHARLES HORTON COOLEY. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918.—pp. vi, 430.

This is a text-book of sociology for college students. The slow advance of that subject as well as of its elder sister, political economy, to recognition even in conservative circles as a proper theme of argumentative discussion and of university courses is mirrored in the treatment each has received in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. In the first three editions both subjects were ignored, but in the fourth (1810) is a long article on Political Economy, and in the eleventh, a century later (1911), there is for the first time a long article on Sociology. The transition occurred in the ninth edition (1887) when Ingram's elaborate and much discussed article on Political Economy ended with the position that "Economics must be constantly regarded as forming only one department of the larger science of sociology." In the latest edition, Kidd claims even more for the science which he champions. He concludes: "It is not the human mind which is consciously constructing the social process in evolution; it is the social process which is constructing the human mind in evolution. This is the ultimate fact which raises sociology to its true position as the master science."

From this position Professor Cooley, I judge, would dissent to the extent of denying that we are dealing here with the social process as a cause and the human mind as its effect, and affirming that we have rather to do with a case of action and reaction between the two wherein the dependence of each on the other is becoming steadily more intricate and intimate.

Each of these two sciences, economics and sociology, still reveals characteristics of the type of thought prevalent at the time of its origin. In the eighteenth century and the first part of the nineteenth, the usual method of scientific investigation was to isolate certain fields so far as possible and study them in their separateness. As astronomy was the science of gravitation, or chemistry the science of atomic weights, so political economy at first was the science of wealth or exchange, or of the economic man. Sociology, too, in its early days tried to establish its title to recognition among the sciences by maintaining that it was the science of superorganic evolution, or of imitation, or of the consciousness of kind. At this stage analysis, to get the facts, followed by a synthetic reconstruction, to get the system, was the prevailing method of study. But during the latter part of the nineteenth century scientists gradually learned that this method was defective, because analysis has no attainable limits on reaching which the synthesis may begin. Hence this method is being supplemented and in some fields almost supplanted by the tendency to look at things in their wholeness, mentally reconstructing the system with the help of a comprehending imagination. This tendency appeared in the younger

science of sociology much earlier than in economics; it is especially marked in recent sociology and few writers exemplify it better than Professor Cooley.

The present work, envisaging the social process as one whole, culminates in its view of progress. Progress, the author says (p. 405), cannot be defined, and in the statement he breaks with that analytic dissecting treatment of much current economics and the other social sciences which devotes pages to meticulous and pedantic discussions of definition. Progress, he adds (p. 406), "is essentially a moral category," and in that statement he tends to break down or at least to overstep the boundary line between sociology and ethics. Elsewhere (*Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 26: p. 373) in discussing recent economic writings he reënforces this position by saying: "A social science which is not also in its central principles an ethical science is unfaithful to its deepest responsibility, that of functioning in aid of general progress." So, too, "the supreme aim of social science," we are told (p. 403), "is to perceive the drama of life," and with this the distinction between art and science is shaken if not destroyed. In various passages, and notably in the closing chapter on "Art and Social Idealism," we are told that the idealization of society or the state as "the march of God in the world" is in line with the needs of human nature, and thus sociology points toward, if it does not culminate in, religion. In all these respects Professor Cooley is perhaps the ablest and most persuasive American exponent of what Merz has called the synoptic as distinguished from the atomistic view of society, life and the universe.

This reaction against what Cooley in another passage calls the pre-Darwinian spirit of much current economics is healthy and greatly needed. Yet, perhaps, at times it is carried too far. Thus, when he explains why sociologists center their attention not upon the digging out of primary facts but upon the interpretation of these facts by affirming: "We have within easy reach facts which, if fully digested and correlated, would probably be ample to illuminate the whole subject" (p. 397), I cannot but question this challenge to the enormous amount of effort now being devoted to the determination of social facts. If it be said that such workers are inspired by practical rather than theoretical aims, I would answer that nevertheless the facts they are bringing to light must be fitted into and are likely in future to modify, as in the past they have modified, the social theories which embody them. One gets occasionally from Professor Cooley's books a slight feeling that he exaggerates the importance of pure theory and believes that he like Hegel can "think out the universe" with little help from experience.

Yet after all the antithesis between fact and theory is superficial and forced. We must keep in mind the pregnant saying of Goethe, "*Alles factische is schon Theorie.*" And I should not end this appreciation with a note of dissent, but rather with an expression of my heavy debt both to the thinking and to the spirit of the writer.

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The New State: Group Organization the Solution of Popular Government. By M. P. FOLLETT. New York and London, Longmans, Green and Company, 1918.—Pp. vii, 373.

The aim of this book is not to construct a new state, but only to make some general suggestions concerning it. The discussion is divided into three main parts: the first inquires concerning the fundamental principles upon which the new state is to be based, the second seeks to discover the extent to which these principles are expressed in present political forms, and the third considers how these principles may most advantageously be expressed. The inquiries of the first part of the book are of most interest to the readers of this REVIEW, and so the present notice will be limited to this consideration of first principles.

The author's basic thesis is that the group process is the source from which the new state must spring. This process "contains the secret of collective life, it is the key to democracy . . . it is our chief hope for the political, the social, the international life of the future" (p. 23). This process is, therefore, of ultimate significance in the author's mind, and the description and application of it may be said to be her chief aim. Precisely what it means may be gathered from the following considerations. Both the abstract 'individual' and the over-individual 'society' are illusions; they have no real existence. "There is only the group and the group unit . . . the social individual" (p. 21). The group process is the process by which the group is created out of the group unit. The group is neither crowd, nor mob, nor herd (Chapter XII); it rather consists of individuals "associating under the law of interpenetration as opposed to the law of the crowd . . . suggestion and imitation" (p. 23). Therefore the group process "is an acting and reacting, a single and identical process which brings out differences and integrates them into a unity. The complex reciprocal action, the intricate interweavings of the members of the group, is the social process" (p. 33); it is "the harmonizing of differences through interpenetration" (p. 35). It is the process through which the group idea is created, since through it the clash of ideas results in the production of the common, the universal, point of view (chapters II, III). It is the process, also, which gives birth to collective feeling: sympathy, true sympathy, is not altruism, nor benevolence, nor pity; it is a group product and, like the universal idea, an expression of an integrated whole (chapter IV). The group process, finally, is the process through which a collective will is created; by means of it, and by means of it alone, there exists "the will to will the common will" (Chapter V).

In short, this group process is the dynamic of social evolution. This it is which gives rise to genuine individuality. For individuality "consists neither of the separateness of one man from the other nor of the differences of one man from the other"; it consists, rather, in "the capacity for union" and "is a matter of each finding his own activity in the whole" (pp. 62, 63, 67). And all of this amounts simply to saying in other terms that the group process is the creator of genuine society. For society is precisely the whole in which

the individual finds his place when he discovers his individuality; the self and others are only two sides or aspects of the same reality; the relation between the individual and society, thus, is dynamic and not static, spiritual and not spatial (pp. 65 ff.). Society is neither a collection of units nor an organism; it is precisely that whole which lives in each of its members and of which each of its members is potentially the whole (chapter X). Progress, likewise, comes through the group process (chapter XIII). "Progress is not determined by economic conditions, by physical conditions, nor by biological factors only, but more especially by our capacity for genuine coöperation" (p. 93). Individuality, society, social progress—all are expressions of the group process, they get their content from it; it is the mainspring of the present, the hope of the future. It points the direction of the World State: "The world will be re-generated by the people who . . . heroically seek, by whatever hardship, by whatever toil, the methods by which people *can* agree" (p. 359). It is the divine within the human: "Man and God are correlates of that mighty movement which is Humanity self-creating. . . . We, by sharing in the life-process which binds all together in an active, working unity are all the time sharing in the making of the Universe. . . . This is the True Democracy" (pp. 103-104).

There is much in this discussion which is interesting and suggestive. If I am not mistaken, the author has touched upon a vital point in the group process. Certainly it is true that, unless people can agree, not by renouncing differences but despite differences and through them, unless it is possible for individuals to make themselves part of an integrated whole of which each can feel himself to be in some sense a real part, then the future of our social evolution would seem to hold little hope for progress. This book does well to call our attention to this basic fact. It does well, also, to suggest that agreement through differences is perhaps after all the fundamental characteristic of conscious life. This is not proved by the present discussion; the author can hardly be said to have dug to the roots of the problem. But the thesis is one which, to the mind of the reviewer, is in line with the current tendency of philosophical thought.

The book is interestingly written, and some of the analyses are penetrating. The author's suggestions concerning the methods for the conscious application of the group process to political and social problems are quite suggestive; to what extent they are practical is a question which cannot here be discussed. On the whole, the book interests the reader from the beginning, stimulates thought always, and not infrequently compels agreement.

G. WATTS CUNNINGHAM.

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The Interference of Will-Impulses. By ABRAHAM A. ROBACK. Princeton, N. J., Psychological Monographs, Whole No. III, 1918.—pp. viii, 158.

Psychologists have found it no easy task to bring the higher and more subtle mental processes under experimental investigation, and, while there has been an increasing interest of late years in such inquiry, the work so far done must

be considered tentative and preliminary. Dr. Roback's monograph on "The Interference of Will Impulses" is an experimental contribution toward the investigation of that most perplexing of psychical processes, volition. In view of the present state of our scientific approach toward the study of will, Dr. Roback's attempt must, of course, be evaluated with respect to its possibilities for further employment and development in the analysis of volitional impulses.

"The Psychological impulse," says the author, "should include all tendencies to action which are accompanied by consciousness and should form the unit of volition, whether that tendency be more like an impulsion and thus fought against by the individual, or whether it follows a process of careful deliberation" (p. 6). The volitional situation is defined in terms of conflict between these impulse units. "In the most general terms, an impulse is an idea that obtained its promotion at the expense of its congeners, *i. e.*, it could only become an impulse after and because all the other elements in consciousness have been inhibited" (p. 4). Inhibition, therefore, Dr. Roback thinks, is a factor of foremost psychological importance in the volitional situation, and the study of the willing process must be made with special attention to the manner in which conflicting impulses inhibit one another.

In order to bring the warfare of impulses under observation, Dr. Roback designed a modified reaction experiment of a kind calculated to produce inhibitions and conflicts, recorded and analyzed his results most carefully, and called for introspective reports from his subjects. The experiments were conducted in the Harvard laboratories during the years 1913-14 and 1914-15, some 31 subjects in all taking part in the investigation at various times.

The results are summed up in several chapters, detailing the "Objective Results," "Specific Results," "Introspective Results," and "Individual Differences." A chapter on "Applications" is added for good measure. The objective results are in no wise startling. "The outstanding feature of the results," says the author, "both in the simple movement and the graphic experiments is the *universal tendency to move along the lines of least resistance*" (p. 37). This tendency is called the "primary or dominant determining tendency." Employing this tendency as a principle of explanation, Dr. Roback says: "there are scarcely any phenomena which could not be brought in line with, if not actually explained by, the course of least exertion" (p. 39).

It is not possible, in brief space, to give any account of the "Specific Results," which are intelligible only in the light of a detailed examination of the experiment. The "Introspective Results" are a disappointment. This might be expected, in view of the fact that no detailed instructions were given to subjects in advance of the experiments (p. 30). They did not know what to fix attention upon. Consequently the introspective reports published in the monograph are vague, heterogeneous, and aimed at nothing in particular. The questions asked by Dr. Roback after the event may have had a system and an aim, but the evidence shows confusion of mind and failure of observation on the part of his subjects. What might have been, in the reviewer's

opinion, the most important part of the experiment, was rendered useless by this neglect of instructions. The chapter on "Individual Differences" shows no striking results. Some of the subjects were slow, some fast; some became confused but persisted, some omitted reactions; some "equalized," some "undulated." Various personal peculiarities were noted. Although the tabulated results may some day be valuable in the study of individual differences, they reveal no general principles of differentiation as they stand. The chapter on "Applications" may be passed over in silence. Concerning it the reviewer can only express the opinion that a sense of humor is quite as desirable, in some connections, as the logical faculty itself.

It may be said of Dr. Roback's experiment that it was a faithfully executed piece of work, which deserves close study by anybody interested in the subject under investigation. Turning now, however, to the general plan and design of the experiment, and its possibilities in the field of volition, the reviewer feels impelled to make a few remarks of a 'metaphysical' character. Any student who is reasonably familiar with modern discussions of the will must recognize that Dr. Roback's treatment of volition is mechanistic throughout. In view of the contributions of functionalism toward a teleological interpretation of conscious behavior, the mechanical standpoint ought not to be adopted without some explanation and defence. The particular error which is most conspicuous in this experiment lies in Dr. Roback's implicit assumption that the two reactions to stimuli which he is examining are separate and discrete, each a little volitional 'unit' unto itself. Speaking of the very type of reaction experiment here employed, Professor Bode says: "If the subject is to respond with the right hand to one stimulus and with the left hand to the other, both hands are in a state of activity before the stimulus appears. . . . The various successive movements, then, which make up our temporary reflex achieve their relationship to one another from the fact that they are started simultaneously, and this peculiarity constitutes a distinctive feature" ("Consciousness and Psychology," in *Creative Intelligence*, p. 233). That is to say, both movements are willed in advance of stimulation, and willed, not separately, but as elements in a total coördination of nervous tendencies. Dr. Roback has left out of account the two most important facts about voluntary action: on the mental side, its purposive character, and, on the physiological side, the prearranged organization of nervous tendencies which it effects. It is only by overlooking all that is characteristic of will that Dr. Roback is able to remain at the mechanical standpoint which views volition as a conflict between impulses of varying energy.

It is the reviewer's opinion that Dr. Roback's experiment was just what it appears to be to the reader at first sight—a reaction experiment. Nothing more.

D. T. HOWARD.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY.

Le subconscient normal: nouvelles recherches expérimentales. Par EDOUARD ABRAMOWSKI. Paris, Alcan, 1914.—pp. 442.

The director of the psychological laboratory at Warsaw here brings together the results of a number of researches on recognition and recall under various conditions of distraction, on the galvanometric phenomena attending the recall of emotionally toned experiences, and on telepathy: all these contribute towards the establishment of what he holds to be a new theory of memory and the subconscious. The theory is not, as will be seen, fundamentally new; the author's hypothesis as to the physiological basis of the subconscious seems to involve great difficulties, but the experiments have certain results of considerable interest, and M. Abramowski's hypotheses on certain minor points appeal to the reviewer as highly probable.

The author's general theory is as follows: In every perception we may distinguish between the image, which is the intellectualized portion, having been attended to and linked with various associations; and the impression, which is non-intellectual, merely a sentiment, and belongs to the subconscious. The image itself, when it passes out of attention, sinks to the level of impression: the author calls the impression which has never been image (for example, the part of a picture that passed unnoticed when the picture was examined) the subconscious of the first order, while the impression which was once image (the parts of the picture which were originally attended to but cannot now be recalled) he terms the unconscious of the second order. These impressions, in any case, make themselves influential as sentiments, generic sentiments; it is by their means that we recognize and reject wrong candidates for recognition (compare James's 'active gap' in thinking); the influence of past experience thus reduced to vague sentiments is what constitutes the appeal of art; the whole mass of our past experience thus effective in sentiment constitutes the feeling of our individuality; with truly French devotion to the memory of Lamarck, our Polish author does not hesitate to say that these submerged memories can be inherited and form the consciousness of race. Barring this last suggestion, there is in these hypotheses much that appeals to me; that the phenomena of imageless thought are simply obscure and unanalyzed ideas (what Bühler terms the 'condensation theory') has long seemed to me the most plausible account at least of what I have elsewhere called the 'non-nameable' imageless processes.

But M. Abramowski maintains that these generic sentiments, these impressions of the sub-conscious, have a continued existence as mental entities: his conception of this existence is wholly Herbartian, although he nowhere refers to Herbart. He seems to think that this view has never been presented before. His theory as to the physiological basis of such a continuously existing subconscious mass of sentiments is indeed new, and as I said above, singularly unconvincing, if I understand it correctly. Since the subconscious impressions (the whole past of the individual, not to say of the race) are always existing as affective phenomena, their physiological basis must be in organic processes; in modifications of the organic condition to correspond with their peculiar

nature. Now it is one thing to maintain that when these generic sentiments and feelings become conscious, certain modifications of organic processes are involved; that at all times there exists the possibility of producing at any given moment the appropriate organic modification when a given sentiment or imageless thought or impression is exerting an influence; and quite another thing to hold that since the sentiments are always existing in the subconscious, their organic disturbances are constantly present. One wonders, simply, how any of the ordinary physiological processes of digestion, secretion, and so forth could go on in the midst of this continuous chaos.

Many of the detailed results of the experimental series are highly interesting, and throw a good deal of light on the processes by which recognition and recall are modified. The experiments on telepathy, however, were performed in the conviction that telepathy is a genuine phenomenon. It is curious that investigators who set out in the absence of such a conviction never seem to succeed in demonstrations which appear so absurdly simple when the atmosphere is favorable.

This notice does not do justice to a book which is full of ingenious method, acute introspection, and clear presentation.

MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN.

VASSAR COLLEGE.

L'Église. A. S. SERTILLANGES. Librairie Victor Lecoffre, Paris, 1917.—2 vols., pp. viii, 318 + 358.

There is no reason why a systematic account of the Christian Church should not be of philosophical interest, for the affiliations between philosophy and theology are close and intricate, and philosophers have always regarded religion as being at least within their field of criticism. It is accordingly something of a disappointment, especially after the promises afforded by the table of contents of these two volumes, to find so little of real interest, not only to the philosopher but even to the ecclesiastical specialist. An attempt is made to provide the Church with a *milieu* by giving a preliminary treatment, first of religion and then of Christianity, and here one naturally looks to find some reference to the problems that have been filling men's minds for the last twenty-five years. Such an expectation, however, is far from being fulfilled. Religion is spoken of as social, to be sure, but the phrase is taken from the intellectual world of Rousseau, and Comte and Renan are the writer's philosophical contemporaries. Moreover the whole treatment is superficial. Stated brutally, the argument is as follows: religion is the child of desire, and Christianity makes the largest promises. Christianity is distinguished from other forms of religion by a supernatural element not present in them, but no attempt is made to coördinate this new element with what precedes; it remains a *deus ex machina*, unjustified save by its results. With regard to the Church itself, which of course is the real subject of the book, the treatment presents no special grounds for criticism, but is neither new nor particularly interesting.

G. N. DOLSON.

Idées Directrices de la Morale Chrétienne. Par CLODIUS PIAT. Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1917.—pp. xii, 220.

As its title page indicates, the contents of this book is made up of *Conferences* given at the *Institute catholique* at Paris in 1916, and its origin no doubt accounts for its somewhat elementary character. As one would expect from its author, it is written in an easy and agreeable style and is interesting; but I do not think that much more can be said for it than that. Perhaps the subject matter precludes originality of treatment; but, as in so many books written upon kindred subjects, references to philosophical difficulties and to philosophical problems rarely go chronologically beyond Comte. Anything later is either unknown or ignored. Perhaps in the present case this omission may be due to some mysterious pedagogical purpose, but it certainly detracts from the value of the book. One is surprised, too, at the position given to Pascal. No one would care to deny that Pascal is one of the great thinkers and writers of France, but here he seems almost to occupy the authoritative position once given to Aristotle, and an *ipse dixit* goes far to settle several disputed questions.

Not much need be said about the general contents of the book. A good many of its statements might be criticized; but it probably serves its purpose well, and that, if not the only test of a book, is nevertheless to be kept in mind in any endeavor to estimate its value. One passage, however, can hardly be ignored. Certain of the religious wars of history are justified on the ground that the teachings of the New Testament refer only to the duties owed by one individual to another and not to the relations between states or between a monarch and his subjects. This has become so familiar in the recent pages of German writers that one regrets to see it appear on the French side of the Rhine.

G. N. DOLSON.

L'Avenir de la Philosophie Bergsonienne. Par ERNEST SEILLIÈRE. Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1917.—pp. 51.

This monograph is a comprehensive outline of the philosophy of Bergson. Although numerous excellent surveys of this same work have been made, the author believes that, inasmuch as the war has renewed all ethical questions by changing our perspectives, it is worth while to reëxamine Bergson's philosophy, in common with other great speculative systems of its kind. Under three captions—the sphere of utility, the sphere of liberty, and some moral suggestions—the author examines the outstanding features of Bergson's work, and after explaining their nature he points out the possibility of their application to the problems of the reconstructive period.

For Bergson the necessity of useful action explains the genesis and present character of the intelligence, which depends on conscious perception for the selection of a possible route to a desired goal in the exterior world. While there is a certain illusion in the manner in which our minds determine objects outside of us, still this trait has the advantage of permitting us to give names to things and to make them serve our social life. Science in its last analysis,

from primitive geometry to the most advanced field of research, has as its aim the same end as perception, namely, the increase of our influence on things, and is nothing more than a prolongation of conscious perception whose function is to light the way to conduct.

Bergson's thesis is an inquiry into the nature of Reality, which has been hidden from us to a large degree by the usual methods of perception and science governed by the necessities of vital action. As the rationalists claim that we can know only the Relative and not the Absolute, the author of *L'Evolution créatrice* proposes to reform their system and then to apply the corrected plan to the study of the Self. As there is great danger of seeing the inner world through the same mechanistic prism through which we have been accustomed to behold the outer world, we should eliminate from our process the utilitarian stamp characteristic of our perception of the world about us. By thus abandoning ancient routines in speculative philosophy, by separating the practical from the theoretical, by employing his so-called intuitive investigation, Bergson is found to have cleared up many metaphysical problems.

Our critic next considers the Bergsonian notion of moral liberty by examining first the character of the basic psychic life of the Self revealed by an ultra-intellectual intuition, next the conditions of a free act, and then a sketch of Bergson's esthetics. It is not within the scope of this review to take up these various points concisely discussed and fairly treated in this compact study. Suffice it to say that Seillière brings out the striking difference between the intellectualized Self of rationalistic philosophy and the ultra-intellectual Self of the intuitive philosophy of the brilliant French master. The latter reveals how the painter, the poet, the musician, and the novelist, each in his turn, puts us into a more intimate relation with Reality by somehow penetrating our conventionalized personality, and touches the profound depths of our nature. After warning us not to confound the intuitive theory of Bergson with the instinct idea of the Romanticists, Seillière informs us that will power enlightened by experience will form one of the bases of Bergson's ethics. Furthermore, the latter will give prominence to laughter as a valuable weapon of public opinion, to common sense as the enemy of traditional routine and air castles, to a fine intuitive instinct as the instrument of progress, justice, and reason. To conclude with the words of our author: "It (the Philosophy of Bergson) will therefore assuredly hold an eminent place in the general effort that France will have to furnish tomorrow to rapidly build anew the national substance at the end of the terrible crisis which has revealed it to be so largely susceptible of renovation, so rich in deep vitality and in exalting possibilities."

FREDERIC D. CHEYDLEUR.

WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY.

The following books also have been received:

The Neo-Platonists. A study in the History of Hellenism. By THOMAS WHITTAKER. Second Edition with a Supplement on the Commentaries of Proclus. Cambridge at the University Press, 1918.—pp. xv, 318.

The Philosophy of Plotinus. The Gifford Lectures at St. Andrews, 1917-1918. By WILLIAM RALPH INGE. In two volumes. Longmans, Green and Co., London and New York.—pp. xvi, 270 + xii, 253.

Greek Political Theory. Plato and His Predecessors. By ERNEST BARKER. London, Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1918.—pp. xiii, 403.

Social Purpose. A Contribution to a Philosophy of Civic Society. By H. J. W. HETHERINGTON and J. H. MUIRHEAD. London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., New York, The Macmillan Co., 1918.—pp. 317.

Social Process. By CHARLES HORTON COOLEY. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918.—pp. vi, 430.

Cultural Reality. By FLORIAN ZNANIECKI. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1919.—pp. xv, 359.

The Adventure of Life. By ROBERT W. MACKENNA. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1919.—pp. xix, 233.

The Elementary Nervous System. By G. H. PARKER. Philadelphia and London, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1919.—pp. 229.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mèt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scholastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, I. Abtl. *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

The Idea of God; A Reply to some Criticisms. A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON.
Mind, N. S., XXVIII, 109, pp. 1-18.

This article is a reply to objections of Dr. Rashdall and others to certain of the author's positions in his *Idea of God*. The first criticism to be dealt with is that concerning the author's position on the 'duel' between Idealism and Realism. Dr. Rashdall thinks that the author insists too much on the independence of the object, and hence does not give evidence of being a 'complete and thoroughgoing' Idealist. Dr. Rashdall, on the contrary, apparently considers matter to be analyzable into forms of conscious experience, and thus identifies Idealism with Berkeleyan Mentalism. But it is epistemologically unsound to make the knower's knowledge of an object identical with the reality of that object, for knowledge and experience imply that, to be known, or experienced, an object must have reality beyond the subjective process of knowing, or experiencing of it. This is apparent in the individual case because of the flux of finite experience. Hence the mentalist assumes a cosmic consciousness that creates the objects of our experience by a fiat of will. The object's reality then exists in this fundamental cause, and reality, accordingly, is acknowledged as extra-mental—a weak position and one contrary to the basic principle of Mentalism. Moreover, the Realist's position is untenable, for he also posits an aggregate of unrelated existences, though these existences are, for him, things, rather than minds. But relatedness is essential to experience; the world and man are organic to each other, and things do not exist apart from their function in the organic whole.

The second point to be dealt with concerns the relation of finite consciousnesses to the supreme Spirit. First, in this connection, the author has been criticized for his failure to distinguish between God and the Absolute. But he uses these terms indifferently rather than as equivalents. If rightly under-

stood, these terms should not cause confusion. The Absolute is the "self-contained and internally organized whole," whereas God is the "self-communicating life." And the act of creation is not a magical act, but is the progressive self-realization of the divine in finite spirits. The finite selves, however, have real 'otherness.' Hence they are not merely channels for the thoughts and acts of the divine self-consciousness. Nor, on the other hand, is the supreme Spirit merely a sum of finite spirits. The ethical independence of the finite individual is essential to moral life and yet there can be no ethical progress without the inspiration of the divine Spirit. A full comprehension of the relation of the divine self-consciousness to the finite selves is, however, not possible to finite experience. But the relation does involve, as has been said, a real 'otherness,' a 'formal distinctness.' The experience of each is an individual experience and the experience of God, as self-consciousness, is also unique; it is not an aggregate of finite experiences. But God is not merely, or primarily, another self-consciousness; God is the fruition of infinite values: Truth, Beauty, Goodness, and Love. We must not represent God in anthropomorphic terms and thus lose sight of his transcendence. Finally, we cannot think of God as efficient cause, for we can apply that category only within the physical world. The divine does not act on the human spirit as one physical force on another; it inwardly illumines the finite self.

MARJORIE S. HARRIS.

On Certain Criticisms of Pluralism. C. A. RICHARDSON. *Mind*, N. S., XXVIII, 109, pp. 54-65.

The writer regards a spiritualistic pluralism, such as that maintained by Dr. James Ward, as the most satisfactory hypothesis for the basis of a philosophical system. He undertakes to answer certain criticisms of this hypothesis: (1) Dr. Bosanquet has said that the environment of subjects of experience cannot be other subjects, for 'inward centres' cannot form circumferences for each other. But for pluralism the object of experience does not consist of other subjects (as Dr. Bosanquet implies) but of the *appearance* of these subjects to a subject. (2) Dr. Bosanquet does not give a true account of consciousness. He has no right to say that organic regulation is independent of consciousness, for regulation appears always associated with mind. It is contradictory to speak of consciousness as the 'meaning' or 'focus' of externality. The meaning of an object must be *for* a conscious subject. Externality is no less externality because it is concentrated in a focus. (3) Professor Pringle-Pattison has criticized the pluralistic conception of the evolution of natural law. But laws and individuals cannot be taken as separately existent entities in nature. A natural law can only signify certain modes of behavior of individuals; and is therefore capable of change. (4) Professor Pringle-Pattison has also objected to the 'bare' monad, unassociated with a body. This brings us close to the limits of the pluralistic hypothesis. For while the 'bare' monad involves no inherent contradiction, it implies the problem of the interaction of monads; and we seek for a concrete ground of this interaction.

MARIE T. COLLINS.

Neo-Realism and Religion. R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ. Har. Theo. Rev., XI, 2, pp. 145-170.

The only type of Neo-Realism directly interested in religion and which attempts to offer a definite 'philosophy of life,' is the *moral realism* of R. B. Perry. According to him, religion is "a plan of action," "man's hope or despair of salvation"; it springs from the need for "a final adaptation," for "a coming to terms with God." Science is the embodiment of disinterested curiosity. Religion is the embodiment of the practical motive, a desire for a plan of action which will secure the maximum of good fortune from the environment as a whole. Thence it follows that "as popular or applied science is related to pure science, so religion is related to pure philosophy." Now religion is no exception to the rule that man conquers and molds his life into good through forgetting his fears and renouncing his hopes, until he shall have disciplined himself to see coldly and steadily. Perry says "belief is the spirit of hope and confidence which sustains him in energetic living." "The good is to be won by the race, and for the race, it lies in the future and can result only from prolonged and collective endeavor, and the power to achieve it lies in the progressive knowledge and control of nature." Science supplies the detailed knowledge of cause and effect, and philosophy investigates whether it is favorable to the realization of human desires. Religion turns philosophy's verdict into belief and thus supplies the dynamic element. Such is the theoretical content of religion as Perry offers it in his *Moral Economy*. His treatment would be inadequate for those who regard mystical experience as the intensest and purest form of religion. The issue so far has been whether religion as a matter of experience is identical with "moral enthusiasm," especially when this enthusiasm tends to control and modify environment so that it becomes a better place for men to live in. Abstractly put, the problem is, is the value of evil purely negative, as of something to be once for all eliminated, or is it so closely interwoven with the whole tissue of life that it is not only ineradicable, but positively valuable as a condition without which other values cannot be had? Most people accept evil and the struggle against evil as permanent features of the universe, and accept life in this universe on these terms as supremely worth while. They accept it not with a gesture of despair or condemnation but, like James, confidently and even joyously, content to play a man's part, and fulfil a man's destiny under the conditions of finite existence. As the spirit of daily living this is religion. As reflective theory it is philosophy. Though usually called 'idealism' it is really the only philosophy which is realistic to the bitter end.

EMILY A. LANE.

Bergson and Absolute Idealism (I). S. RADHAKRISHNAN. Mind, N. S., XXVIII, 109, pp. 41-53.

Anti-absolutism and anti-intellectualism are the chief marks of Bergson's philosophy. But Bergson's philosophy is more absolutistic than is generally supposed. If we interpret it logically and as free of inconsistencies, it becomes

identical with a concrete absolutism. Bergson, like absolute idealism, holds that reality is a whole and that it is spiritual. Life and matter are really two different tendencies in the one real; the one a creative tendency, the other a non-creative. Becoming, the union of being and non-being, is alone real. Here Bergson and absolute idealism agree. The *élan vital* and the force that opposes it in Bergson correspond to the self and the not-self of the absolutists. Life and matter are forever opposed, although they are only relative differences within the whole. Their unending strife is the pulse-beat of the universe. This is Hegel; this is Bergson; only for Bergson, the strife seems to be the ultimate end of things. Bergson is not logical when he suggests that the two tendencies of the universe are only accidentally related, that spirit or pure duration existed first alone and only later came to arrest.

MARIE T. COLLINS.

Emerson's Transcendentalism. RÉGIS MICHAUD. Am. J. Psych., XXX, 1, pp. 73-82.

If transcendentalism consists primarily in the recognition of an autonomous religious faculty, in transferring authority from outside, inside, in rebuilding religion on the basis of ethics, Emerson may be properly called a transcendentalist. As the foundation of religion, Emerson posits the moral sense which for him is supreme. Religious beliefs, however, are referred to the test of the inner sense of individual experience which no criticism, historical, nor critical, can affect. In the doctrine of religious autonomy and spiritual independence consists the significance of his plea for self-reliance. Emerson shunned the narrow limits of sects, not because he was too little, but rather too much, of a transcendentalist. He wants not only the church, but society, politics, art and literature to be reconstructed and renewed, through the medium of our best and most personal intuition. In its purely metaphysical sense, Emerson's philosophy affirms that intellect is primary, matter secondary; that the end of all knowledge is to reduce the world to mind. Everything real is perceived, after all inquiry, to be only another aspect of the spirit. The world is a divine creation projected into the unconscious. Indeed, through all his writings he assumes this idealistic attitude which is the very essence of his transcendentalism. Emerson was well aware, however, of a certain dualism between mind and matter which made him turn to Lamarck, Cuvier and Goethe as the real successors of Platonic spiritualism. His conception of evolution was that of an inherent spiritual necessity of the mind forcing itself ever higher and higher. Emerson's rationalism nevertheless was thoroughly permeated with sentiment, and his philosophy, in its last analysis, centers and ends in his mystical doctrine of the Oversoul.

EDGAR DE LASKI.

The Use and Misuse of History. A. G. A. BALZ. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XVI, 2, pp. 29-41.

The history of philosophy, like all history, needs to be continually reinterpreted in order that it may take account of the latest discoveries, and also to

give it an additional degree of freshness. One cause for the dissatisfaction with the usual manner of treating the history of philosophy is the practice of historians of turning the history into a method for establishing their own systems, or for showing how their own system necessarily follows from those of the past. This is converting what is meant to represent an impartial exposition into an argument for one's own views. It is perhaps justifiable to stretch certain facts for the sake of being more interesting or illuminating. But most historians have stretched their facts too much. On the other hand, there is the danger of making the history of philosophy a mere dry compendium, bereft of all life whatever. An historian is likely to stick to the past only, and so be outstripped and get out of harmony with the thought of the present. As a result, the philosopher gets into a situation where he does not understand the world, nor the world him. The historian should remember that the principles of interpretation must be developed from the historical materials, not history from an assumed principle. Historians should show why philosophical problems which have no interest for us were important in former ages, and why they have ceased to be important. A history of philosophy "should help free philosophical thought from over-respect for the past, to provoke a more forward-looking manner of thinking, and make history an aid and not an obstacle in the pursuit of wisdom."

ISRAEL CHASMAN.

The Society of Nations in the Thirteenth Century. MAURICE DE WULF. Int. J. of E., XXIX, 2, pp. 210-229.

The thirteenth century was the consummation of mediaeval life. A new spirit pervaded the policy of kings; material prosperity increased; the dignity of the individual, and the spirit of fair play between adversaries arose as the basis for relations between laymen. Christian dogma and ethics permeated the whole human fabric, no activity was exempt. In the whole of art there was the same spirit of universality and the same attempt to realize the ideal of order. Nor was the literary production of the century lacking in great endeavors. Most important of all, the philosophers and theologians drew up vast classifications of human knowledge, wherein every kind of thinking found its place. Philosophy and theology held the place of authority and international prestige, thus preparing for a movement towards cosmopolitanism. The great centers of speculative studies—Paris and Oxford—accepted the same program and taught the same science. There was one system of education for princes, lords and clerks; one code of morals, one church, and one sacred and learned language—the Latin—for the whole West. The Crusaders had taught the Barons to know each other. Commerce had established contacts between men of several countries, and predisposed men to a thinking which was no longer local. A stability close to perfection was attained, and it lasted from the middle of the thirteenth century till the middle of the fourteenth. It was under these conditions that the philosophers and theologians attempted a wider organization, which included a universal society of human beings.

In this *humana universitas* God created all things. Man, spirit united with matter, dwells in a corporeal space, the earth, waiting until the future when he shall realize the destiny which the redemption of Christ has assured him. Just as the earth is the center of the universe, so man is the king of the earth. Every one admitted that in a human society there must be two kinds of rules, a temporal and a spiritual. The spiritual hierarchy was presided over by the Pope, who represents Christ on earth, and the temporal domain was governed by kings. The true agents of international action were the Popes. The thirteenth century had not yet heard the warnings of the great dislocations which were to come, and so the Catholic faith preserved its internationalism. This association did not constitute a society of nations in the modern meaning of the term; for a nation presupposes a strongly organized state, and European nations of this type did not as yet exist. From this very fact they had more traits in common than the nation of today. The state existed for the welfare of individuals. Now this prosperity and this development imply the right of the individual to a whole series of inalienable rights which belong to every human being. As these unifying conceptions vanished, the European states became more stable and their national spirit more divergent. So this *universitas humana* failed to realize itself and can now be made possible only when the organized states are represented on a basis of equality.

EMILY A. LANE.

Mental Process. HUGH A. REYBURN. *Mind*, N. S., XXVIII, 109, pp. 19-40.

Professor Alexander's conception of mental processes is considered under three heads: mind as a fact in space, enjoyment and contemplation, and subject and object. First, as to spatial mind: it has, according to Professor Alexander, voluminousness, extension; and it apprehends this spatial character without the aid of sensation. As evidence of the 'spread out' character of mind, Professor Alexander gives his experience of feeling a localized movement of consciousness accompanying a change in the tenor of thought. Even in sensations of touch, he thinks there may be experienced, besides the tactual sensations, a change in the movement of consciousness. But this feeling of localized movement, in the touch experience, is attributable to sensations caused by the adjustment of the organism to the receiving of sensations. Moreover, it is always possible to account for the experience of localized movement by referring it to the back-ground of organic and kinæsthetic sensations. Thus, facts fail to support Professor Alexander's hypothesis. Further, his theory of spatial mind is related to his view that the object causes consciousness; but the facts ascertained in this connection show that the causal relation of an object to a brain state or a mental act is never direct. The second aspect of this conception of mental processes is the hypothesis that mental processes are enjoyable, whereas objects are contemplated. But Professor Alexander succeeds in making no distinction between enjoyment and contemplation, taken abstractly, for such distinctions as he does make refer merely to differences in what is apprehended. Furthermore, if, in trying to distinguish

between enjoyment and contemplation, we refer to the apprehended object in each case—to the mind aware of itself and to the object of which it is aware—we still find no real distinction between these two forms of awareness. This becomes more evident when we note that space, as a characteristic of mind, is enjoyed and, as a characteristic of the object, is contemplated. Similarly time and 'mine' are enjoyed as well as contemplated. Moreover, enjoyment and contemplation have common basic ways of operating. In the third place, the fundamental feature of the theory under consideration is the distinction between subject and object. As to Professor Alexander's conception of the nature and extent of this distinction, he holds that it is a distinction between two facts of diverse qualities, facts that exist separately, and that this distinction was made even in primitive times. Yet reflection shows that this is contrary to fact, that the distinction has been derived in the course of experience, that one part of primitive experience did not look upon the rest as 'presented' to it. At first, experience was conative and only later an organized self—as a factor of the whole—was developed. Again, the view that subject and object are existentially distinct and have diverse qualities seems to cut objective reference away from mental states. With the designation of a mental fact as merely 'moving awareness,' mind becomes very attenuated and we seem able to get no hint of what mind really is. Finally, in making mind only one factor in experience and a factor whose nature we cannot determine, a very ghostly sort of mind is obtained; whereas mind is really concrete and is a proper subject for observation from first to last.

MARJORIE S. HARRIS.

Psychology As a Science of Critical Evaluation. J. R. KANTOR. Psych. Rev., XXVI, 1, pp. 1-16.

The purpose of this paper is to define the function of critical evaluation in psychology, and to point out its results, if correctly used. The function of evaluation in scientific activity is itself a type of experience. The facts of science are evaluations of phenomena which develop as the phenomena are brought under the control of the individual. In the first stage the objects, forces, and conditions of the world mean no more than attitudes, or psychophysical adjustments on our part. The simplest meaning of a candle flame is the act of withdrawing the hand. But as knowledge advances, the happenings grow more remote from their symbolization. The concept of force, for example, is far removed from actual motion. There is, however, a continuity between the occurrence and the scientific description.

But in psychology the facts are of a different type. Conscious behavior is much closer to the individual than are physical phenomena. The study of conscious behavior is very different from that of physical phenomena. Conscious behavior cannot be described in terms of physical symbols or ideas. It is because of a faulty conception as to what constitutes scientific description, and because of the assumption that psychology should accept as valid the type of analysis used in chemistry, that psychology has failed in the past to

study critically its phenomena and to describe them in adequate scientific terms. The behaviorist makes the mistake of the structural psychologist. While he attacks the mechanics of mental states, he substitutes just as vicious a formalism in terms of stimulus and response. He reduces the behavior of conscious beings to reflexes and motor habits. To have progress in psychology two conditions must be corrected. First, psychology must abandon describing its facts in terms of abstruse, logical abstractions. Its descriptions should be made in terms of what actually does occur. Secondly, it must cease to trespass upon the premises of related sciences. The function of psychology is to describe actual facts. And a fact is defined as "the critical determination of existential conditions, and an evaluation of some phase of genuine experience."

ISRAEL CHASMAN.

Dualism in Animal Psychology. M. F. WASHBURN. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XVI, 2, pp. 41-44.

In criticizing the author, Dr. Grace de Laguna rejected both the dualism of *The Animal Mind* and the "mechanistic behaviorism" which that dualism opposes. The question is, what is her own position? Her argument against the view that there exists in animals and in man an inner aspect of behavior, is briefly this: all experimental investigation of alleged subjective states of mind involves the standardizing of objective conditions, and "the phenomena thus investigated [become] in effect functions of the factors constituting the standard conditions of the experiment." This argument is unconvincing, for the dualist would admit that subjective phenomena are functions of objective conditions. The difference lies in the interpretation of the results. Also, the author is unable to see the strength of Dr. de Laguna's arguments against the dualist's conception of anger. It remains for Dr. de Laguna to set forth her own type of behaviorism.

ISRAEL CHASMAN.

A Defense of Naturalism. ROGER SHERMAN LOOMIS. Int. J. E., XXIX, 2, pp. 188-201.

The subject of art is nature; and the purpose of the artist is to show nature as it is, not omitting the stupid, the hideous, and the shameful. But certain naturalistic literature has encountered execration. Why? Because naturalism, according to the critics, is bestialism; makes man out to be a beast, and denies that he is a demigod. By way of defense, the naturalist maintains that all men are beasts to some extent, that man has no qualities different from those which he has in common with other animals, and that he is not a demigod if by that term be meant anything supernatural. Three concepts the naturalist, therefore, rejects, namely: those of providence, absolute morality, and free will. For naturalistic ethics is hedonistic, the greatest happiness of the greatest number being the rule of conduct. And naturalistic writers have done good service to morality by telling the truth about labor and sex, though it is true that they have done more to destroy evil conventions than to build new moral and social laws.

ERNEST BRIDGES.

An Experimental Study of 'Feelings of Relation.' JOSEPHINE M. GLEASON.
Am. J. Psych., XXX, 1, pp. 1-26.

The problem of this investigation was to discover whether there are in the experience of the average individual either elements or patterns of consciousness which may be peculiarly distinguished as feelings of relation. The results of the experiment were unequivocal. The experimental situation in which stimuli and instructions were especially designed with the intention of inducing in the observer a full realization and pregnant awareness of the relation, seldom had this effect. The observers could not, in the majority of cases, follow the instructions to react to the awareness of relation, because no awareness came; they made relational responses and they stated the relational meanings which were associated with the perception of the stimuli. In other instances the feeling of familiarity, knowing the logical universe, the imagery of the full bodily response to the stimuli, the relaxation and pleasantness of the *Aufgabe* awareness, and finally an organic depicting of the particular relational meaning, were all called awarenesses of relation. The other experience, which was so named, resembled in its greatest form any awareness or durative consciousness the course of which was predetermined. In all of the experiments with nine observers, a relational element was not once observed. The existential processes were usual imagery, the kinæsthesis attending bodily movement, and organic pressures and warmth. No pattern of the contents of consciousness which may be designated as a relational complex was found corresponding to the relational behavior or the relational meaning, or even to the full awareness of relation. In this respect one may not speak of the relational consciousness in the sense in which one speaks of the generalizing, or the cognitive or the emotional consciousness.

EDGAR DE LASKI.

NOTES.

Professor Wilbur M. Urban of Trinity College, Hartford, is a philosophical lecturer at Harvard University during this semester and is conducting a seminary on the theory of value.

Professor Edgar S. Brightman of Wesleyan University has been appointed to the chair of philosophy in the graduate school of Boston University.

Charles W. Hendel Jr., Ph.D. (Princeton), has been appointed Instructor in Philosophy at Williams College.

We give below a list of articles in current philosophical magazines:

MIND, XXVIII, 109: *A. S. Pringle-Pattison*, The Idea of God: A Reply to some Criticisms; *Hugh A. Reyburn*, Mental Process; *S. Radhakrishnan*, Bergson and Absolute Idealism (1); *C. A. Richardson*, On Certain Criticisms of Pluralism.

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, XII, 2: *J. Loewenberg*, Multiplicity and the Social Order; *William Adams Brown*, The Seminary of Tomorrow; *Francis J. McConnell*, The Causes of Pre-Millenarianism; *F. J. Foakes-Jackson*, The Kingdom of God in Acts, and the "City of God"; Some Old Unpublished Letters, Edited by *Preserved Smith*.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XXX, 1: *Josephine M. Gleason*, An Experimental Study of Feelings of Relation; *Harlow Gale*, The Psychology of Native Sons; *C. E. Ferree* and *Gertrude Rand*, The Speed of Adjustment of the Eye for Clear Seeing at Different Distances; *E. B. Titchener*, An Anomalous Case of Simple Reaction; *Theodore Schroeder*, Authorship of the Book of Mormon; *Regis Michaud*, Emerson's Transcendentalism; *Edmund S. Conklin*, Superstitious Belief and Practice among College Students; *June E. Downey*, The Psychology of Figures of Speech.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, XVI, 3: *James Gutmann*, Imagination as a Factor toward Truth; *Q. L. Shepherd*, Pragmatism and the Irrelevant; *Charles A. Ellwood*, Comment on Dr. Goldenweiser's "History, Psychology and Culture."

XVI, 4: *James Gutmann*, Political Thought in Reconstruction: Discussion by *V. R. Savic*, *W. T. Bush*, *Harold Goddard*, *James H. Tufts*, *Harley B. Alexander* and *H. A. Overstreet*, An Opportunity; *Albert P. Brogan*, The Fundamental Value Universal.

XVI, 5: *Albert Schinz*, New and Dominating Tendencies in French Philosophy since the Beginning of the War.

XVI, 6: *Warner Fite*, Felix Adler's Philosophy of Life; *Frederick John Teggart*, The Approach to the Study of Man; *Knight Dunlap*, "Scientific

Prepossession" and Antiscientific Animus; *A. A. Merrill*, Prediction and Spontaneity.

XVI, 7: *G. A. Tawney*, Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept; *H. S. Jennings*, Experimental Determinism and Human Conduct; *J. E. Turner*, Dr. Dawes Hicks on Reality and Its Appearances.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XLIV, 1-2: *P. Janet*, Les fatigues sociales et l'antipathie; *R. Lenoir*, Claud Bernard et l'esprit expérimental; *A. Leclère*, L'ère de l'ingénieur pénal.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XXVI, 1: *B. Croce*, Critique de moi-même; *D. Parodi*, Ernest Renan et la philosophie contemporaine; *M. Dorolle*, Liberté et pensée, *L. Selme*, L'entropie, extension conservative.

RIVISTA DE FILOSOFIA, X, 4, 5: *G. A. Cesareo*, La coscienza storica; *S. De Chiara*, Bernardino Telesio; *B. Giuliano*, Dommatismo e idealismo estetico (sulla 'Poetica' di Aristotele).

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA, XI, 5, 6: *P. Aurelio Palmieri*, La crisi della filosofia occidentale secondo Vladimiro Solovev; *Guido Mattiussi*, L'atto di fede; *Federico Kiesow*, Il processo di Socrate; *Luigi Di Rosa*, L'idealismo contemporaneo: da Emanuele Kant a Giovanni Gentile.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF EDUCATION.¹

AS we look forward to the work of educational reconstruction that must follow the establishment of peace we may congratulate ourselves that evolutionary science has furnished educational theory with solid foundation stones of biological fact. Not yet have we exhausted the implications of that elementary yet profound truth that consciousness has arisen and developed as an instrument of organic adjustment and adaptation. And if under the spell of this revealing truth thinkers of the present generation have been tempted to an illegitimate use of the categories of biology in explanation of the processes of social life and development, as the following argument tends to show, that does not in the least detract from the importance and value of the scientific fact in question.

In particular we have gained from evolutionary science a new understanding of the processes of perception. To this subject I wish to direct attention at the start because I believe that an examination of the content of perception in its earlier and simpler phases affords us a clue to distinctive features of the social consciousness which are often overlooked. That perceptions are originally anticipations of action is a fact upon which all at present agree. Arising when habitual responses prove inadequate, they prefigure motor adjustments that promise to result in experiences which in the past have been found satisfactory. The conflict between the actual motor adjustments of the living individual and the incipient responses to new stimuli produces a tension which is consciously reflected

¹ Read as the Presidential Address before the Western Philosophical Association, April, 1919.

in certain perceptual qualities projected into an object possessed of a definite location with reference to the agent. The perceived object is therefore the projected fulfillment of responses elicited by stimuli, in its location mapping out the movements required for approach and appropriation, in its qualities anticipating the satisfaction it is capable of yielding when appropriated. The tension out of which the perception arises is relieved by the initiation of the pre-figured movements which in their turn bring the actual motor adjustments of the organism into harmony with the ideal possibilities of its situation. The result is that the movements at the command of the organism become such as to sustain and to reinforce, rather than to impede or exclude, the experience of those qualities which past experience has proved to be desirable.

The subservience of perception to demands of motor readjustment appears upon examination to be so detailed and complete that one is tempted in the interests of simplicity to reduce all qualitative differences that enter into it to terms of varying motor response.¹ Explanations of this sort, which reduce differences of conscious quality to terms of organic behavior, are at present being offered and claim the merit of replacing subjective differences, that are known only to the introspection of the individual, with a detail of objective change experimentally verifiable. Each perceptual quality is said to be, without exception, an anticipation of results of motor responses while these are still incipient: not only is this true of tactual qualities; it also holds of colors and sounds, and even of differences of aesthetic and intellectual value. Undoubtedly this explanation covers a large body of fact, but it fails of completeness; because the selectiveness which even behaviorists admit to be an essential feature of perception depends altogether upon the existence and accentuation of qualitative differences within the perceiving consciousness.² It is indeed true that if

¹ I have in mind here the recent writings of Professor Bode which contain a particularly able exposition of behaviorism interpreted in the light of pragmatist principles. Cf. Bode, "Nature of the Psychical," *Jour. of Phil.*, XIV, No. 11, pp. 290-291. *Creative Intelligence*, 1917, pp. 240 f.

² Professor Bode's theory seems to me to fail at this point and to be open to the criticisms that follow.

the organism is to be released in its responses from the rigidity of mechanical repetition it must be able to anticipate the results of incipient and alternative modes of action before they become overt. But this is necessary because it affords the conditions for selecting that one among the conflicting incipient responses which promises most effectually to meet the needs of the situation. And selection is actually made, never among varied motor sequences and systems, but always among qualities different in content or character. The images which in ordinary perception supplement the original sensations serve to distinguish or classify it as furnishing this or that characteristic satisfaction. Through the selections which it makes among the qualitatively different satisfactions offered by the environment, the organism asserts and develops individuality.

Thus it appears that the qualitative diversity of the content of perception is not explained away or rendered unimportant by recently acquired knowledge of the original subservience of perceptive processes to the demands of action. Instead we see plainly that perception could discharge its function of facilitating adjustment only through the increase and accentuation of differences that may correctly be called subjective or internal. Among the endlessly differing complexes of sense qualities a noteworthy difference exists—a difference to which I wish to give prominence because of the part it plays in the development of the social consciousness. The core of most, perhaps of all perceptions before intelligence by the aid of symbols accomplishes its work of reconstruction, is constituted by those qualities which reflect the satisfaction of the principal organic appetites. Now in addition to these central qualities, which along with associated kinæsthetic sensations and imagery reflect primary organic satisfactions, are three sensory complexes to which I wish to give special consideration. I will first enumerate them and then indicate by what common attributes they differ from the perceptual experiences first mentioned. The sensory complexes in question are: first, those of color and sound in association with kinæsthetic sensations aroused by adjustment of the apparatus of seeing and hearing;

second, those of vocal sound and speech associated with sensations of movement in the vocal apparatus; and, third, those aroused by effort to grasp, manipulate and fashion in close association with visual sensations picturing the active member, which in the case of the apes and men is of course the forearm and hand. These three perceptual complexes differ in two important ways from the organic satisfactions imagined or perceived, to which value primarily attaches. They are, in the first place, more directly within the control of the living individual, since the movements required to arouse or confirm them are always at his command and usually do not depend upon the possession of an external object; secondly, they have when aroused a place in the world common to the percipient and the other members of his species. They are thus peculiarly well-fitted to serve as commonly employed signs or symbols of experiences and satisfactions which are confined to the inner and private experience of individuals. This is most evident in the case of colors, shapes, and many sounds (and frequently of odors). Stimulation of the distance receptors evokes an initial interpretation in terms of visual or auditory quality; such initial interpretation is tested by instant adjustments of sensory apparatus which serve to prove the existence of qualities of color and form and sound that signify, in advance of more extensive movements, the bearing of the object upon the welfare of the organism. The possibility of producing a wide and increasing variety of sounds by the movements of vocalization leads to the formation of a second sensory complex of an indicative or symbolic character. Vocal and, in the course of development, verbal sensations or images are of an auditory motor character and serve as signs of objects either by identifying them in the experience of the individual or by securing confirmation through a like sound produced by another individual. The third of the sensory complexes enumerated consists of visual and kinæsthetic sensations which are aroused by the movements of touching, pushing, and finally of grasping and manipulating objects. These movements are originally of an experimental character. They show themselves in the different attitudes or postures habitually

taken toward various objects, which attitudes and postures come in time to signalize somewhat as gestures the presence of their objects. Such movements, along with the sensory complex they produce, do not of course attain great importance until the exact posture permits the evolution of arm and hand. The point to be noted in the case of these three complexes is that all three serve originally as signs or indices of expected organic satisfactions and that all have for purposes of verification their own action systems.

While the power of selective emphasis or attention which reveals itself in perception marks the rise of individuality in the life-series, it is true that the processes of perception in animals are explainable in the main along strictly biological lines. This power of self-determination or conation, as one may wish to call it, is the conscious reflection of the instinct or impulse to survive, and, although it does choose between satisfactions qualitatively different, it seeks in all those choices the objects that favor the continuance of the natural life process. Since all values are thus modes of survival-value, it seems not unreasonable to explain all differences of meaning in terms of organic response and adjustment. Thus not merely the taste but the shape and color and odor of an article of food seem in truth to mean the nutritive processes which the food sets up and the continued vital activities to which it leads. The organism shows power of self-determination or character of individuality only in the choice of means by which it realizes its predetermined end.

The human individual is impelled by physical heredity to seek much the same organic satisfactions as the animals. But human conduct differs radically from animal action because man's intelligence enables him to make a new use of these three sensory complexes, formed as we have seen in the animal consciousness, but transmitted by processes of social heredity to the human individual in the form of language, technical invention and art. Man utilizes these three types of imagery, which with the animal remain signs of organic satisfaction, to symbolize and communicate experiences after they have been reorganized by, and

thus made expressive of, the unity of his own rational will. The functioning of the same power of self-conscious intelligence in all normal human individuals, which brings or strives to bring all experiences into relation with its own synthetic unity, imposing as it does the same rules or conditions of intelligibility upon the consciousness of all, makes all men capable of sharing the same experiences. Now in order that experiences thus become intelligible to individuals should be made the common possession of humanity, and thus the matter of truly social intercourse, they must be communicable, and this requires adequate media of communication. Such media to be effective must be capable of symbolizing the intelligent meaning of experience both in the consciousness of the individual who originally comprehends them and in the outer world where they are open to the perception of others. Precisely this is accomplished by the three types of imagery in question: they furnish symbols which are always ready for employment by the consciousness of the individual because depending upon motor adjustments at his command, and which also possess physical existence in the world of common perception, where they are open to the interpretation of those who have intelligence to understand them and may be preserved as permanent embodiments of rational meaning in the possession of human society. Thus I believe language and literature, technical inventions and art should be understood—as the embodiment for purposes of social transmission of experiences of a human individual so reorganized by the rational will he possesses in common with all others that they are rendered generally intelligible and hence valuable for all. Rational discourse presents experiences in such generally valid relationships as to make them experienceable by all individuals; it is a medium for the interchange of objective experiences. Technical invention or skill exhibits the ability of intelligence to control natural forces in the interest of purposes which because rational have universal value for others as well as the agent; the use of the same methods and appliances makes men aware of the coöperation of others, and thus of receiving from the team-play of industry an enlargement of their own sense of personal power. Objects

of beauty, natural and artistic, serve to symbolize and transmit experiences which, although inarticulate, are profound in their emotional effects and, although subjective in a sense, have general significance because they grow out of common features in the human situation. Now, since these three activities are all of them means and media of intersubjective intercourse, they are evidently supremely important for social life and development. Indeed it is my contention that the development of the distinctively social life demands that natural existence itself be made subservient to the enlargement and extension of these personal satisfactions which spring from the use of language, the employment of technical skill and the appreciation of beauty.

I wish further to show that any plan of education which has in mind the development of social intelligence must aim primarily to increase the power of these capacities of verbal expression, technical invention and æsthetic appreciation, to expand and enrich the personal consciousness of man and, above all, to avoid treating the activities in question as instruments of biological adjustment. Since my conclusions in regard to education derive what force they possess from the fact, as I take it, that neither language nor invention nor art can be explained except as expressions of the one universalizing reason at work in the minds of men, may we consider a little further each of these departments of human culture?

The chief purpose of language as used by man is not to express the emotions of individuals or to point out the particular objects an individual may perceive. Such denomination by individuals of subjective states and objective incidents doubtless had survival value in making concerted action possible. But in civilized human life words are primarily symbols of qualitatively distinct experiences, open to the consciousness of men universally, and of the permanent relations which these generally distinguishable experiences or elements of experiences sustain. This development of language in human association presupposes both a power of subjective analysis and recombination continuing with self-consistency through individual experiences, and also the ability of individual minds to share a system of universally

verifiable and therefore valid meanings. To the use of language is largely due, it must be acknowledged, the remarkable development of intelligence in man; yet the use of language by men would have been altogether impossible if they had not all been participants in one rational order. It is a fact that through the aid of speech the human individual, without it confined to the more or less haphazard world of his own perceptions and imaginings, comes into conscious possession of an orderly system of significant objects realizable under uniform conditions and offering socially authenticated ranges of possible satisfaction. But it is equally true that he can enter and engage in this world of rational discourse only if the principles by which it is constituted answer to demands of his own consciousness, only if his own will demands of its world uniformity of action, consistency of character, and continuity of growth. The fact that man, developing as man, comes more and more to think and act in this social world of reasoned discourse rather than in that of his private perceptions and fancies, proves that the principles on which it is based are essential to the human mind itself. The requirements of uniformity and consistency are all of them based upon the unity of the human self and give expression to the demand of the human will for an extension of this unity. The so-called laws of thought, of the common reason that unites us and makes verbal communication in the true sense possible, pertain to and are explainable only in terms of the internal organization of the self. The attempt to explain the permanent significance and social acceptance of the system of meanings by referring them to a uniformity of response due to individual habit or race instinct is predestined to failure. For, in the first place, the responses in question which have become habitual depended originally upon selective attention, and this activity presupposes the very distinctions in meaning which are reducible, it is claimed, to differences in instinctive response. And, secondly, mutual understanding among individuals is made possible, not by the inheritance of similar speech-tendencies, but by constant verbal communication; and this produces general agreement only because the individuals who communicate are subject to the same logical requirements of self-consistency.

The world of rational discourse is an ideal world in the sense that its objects are not objects as originally perceived, but rather perceptual experiences reorganized and thus made to reflect the unity of rational will working in the social consciousness of man. This ideal order of objects affirmed to be real or realizable by human intelligence is the concrete universal of which the idealist speaks, often without being understood.¹ It is in truth the real world if the social intelligence of man has not entirely missed its aim. But to say this is by no means to assert the existence of an intellectual realm, a world of pure ideas divorced from actuality and remote from the concerns of practical life. On the contrary, ideas even when they are rational constructions continue to be, in a certain sense, *ends*,—that is, they point to action. *Qua* ideas, they are possibilities of realization; the source of the opposition between idea and actuality is the tension between end and existence which arises in the course of voluntary action. But all ideas do not aim at overt action, at least not at such movement as seeks to modify or transform the physical environment. For thought, although originally a function of conduct, acquires in the course of human development a certain independence as a field within which voluntary activity, with its distinction between end and realization, takes place. In the development of this purely intellectual interest, language plays an important part; indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that it is the speech mechanism which makes possible the coöperative pursuit and realization by mankind of the ideal of truth. Truth as an end aims at the expansion of the system of ideal meanings to include all objects possible of realization. Ideas are constructed, hypotheses formulated, with the intent of adding to the sum of knowledge. The truth of these ideas may be tested directly by action which essays to realize them—most effectively, of course, by action under experimental control. But, more frequently, we verify the theories we adopt by ascertaining their consistency with the socially accepted body of knowledge. This is made possible by the speech mechanism, a motor system largely within our control, which we operate with a near approach to freedom.

¹ Professor J. E. Creighton has given us an exposition of this type of idealism notable for its lucidity and completeness. PHIL. REV., Vol. XXVI, p. 514.

We put our supposition in words and communicate it to another, if it is by word of mouth, adjusting our auditory apparatus to the expected reply. In many, perhaps more, cases we hold conversation with ourselves, so stating our chosen idea that its agreement (or disagreement) with the system of propositions whose meaning has been verified by our own experience or that of the race shall be made apparent. It is noteworthy that the procedure here is in every essential that of voluntary action. An idea, usually symbolized by a verbal image, is selected for realization; it is acted upon by a series of motor adjustments; it is verified if the result of action is to establish and illuminate the meaning of the idea by giving it part and place in the system of accepted meanings; it is not realized but rather disproved if the resultant movements introduce conflict into the field of discourse and thus signalize the inconsistency of the proposed theory with the body of verified fact.

An understanding of the importance of the fact just alluded to, that all ideas are verified by actions, even those which aim at no alteration of environmental conditions but only at an enlargement of the system of knowledge, and are consequently accompanied by no overt or visible movement, leads sometimes to the further conclusion that logical consistency, which we accept as a criterion of truth in our thinking, is reducible to a harmony of motor responses, and logical contradiction to a conflict of movements.¹ This is so serious an error that it is worth while to see just how it arises. An idea is verified in the field of thought by giving it statement in words and thus ascertaining its conformity with that body of discourse which gives verbal expression to the system of verified knowledge. This conformity is determined by the application of conventional grammatical rules whose observance has become unconscious through habit. Such a rule is that two contradictory predicates cannot be applied to the same subject. Now this familiar procedure of systematic thought is fully explained, in the opinion of certain writers, as an instance of the universal pragmatic verification of an idea by

¹ Professor Margaret Floy Washburn furnishes us with a good example of this: cf. the (apparently) orthodox pragmatist interpretation of logical contradiction in her *Movement and Mental Imagery*, pp. 130 ff., 179 ff., 219 ff.

movements which proceed unimpeded by, and in harmony with, other motor adjustments, already established because favoring the well-being of the organism; or its exposure as false through the initiation of movements which conflict with, and block, other responses necessary to adjustment and survival. But such an explanation, when applied to thinking, mistakes symbol for thing symbolized, shadow for substance. The verbal formulas employed are signs which indicate whether is fulfilled or not that demand for consistency which is rooted in the unity of rational will, whose fulfillment or non-fulfillment is the object of direct logical insight.

It is true, we may freely admit, that when two qualities are ascribed to an object which arouse or anticipate conflicting movement this is often, perhaps generally, a sign of their contradictoriness. But it is not in this that their contradictoriness primarily or properly consists. That is rooted in the fact that a conscious subject which preserves its own identity in its choices cannot will at once to realize and not to realize the same quality; for to affirm along with any quality a second whose realization is known to interfere with or prevent the realization of the first is *ipso facto* to negate the realization of the first. No doubt—to illustrate—the qualities honest and dishonest anticipate different and conflicting courses of conduct. Yet it is a trifle absurd to find the explanation of their contradictoriness in the conflict between the motor responses of predicating the two different adjectives of one subject-term, or, in overt action, of opening my purse and taking out a five dollar note a man has asked me to lend him and of closing my purse and buttoning my coat. No, the two qualities are contradictory. I cannot in self-consistency choose to follow the two different and mutually exclusive courses of action at the same time and with reference to the same subject or person. Nor is this tantamount to asserting that, in the case of thinking at least, the 'motor discharge' is accidental and superfluous; that would be to fall into an error opposite to that we have been criticizing. Language plays an indispensable part in our thought which is always and essentially social, inasmuch as by verbal expression and by that alone can

the experiences of individuals be made permanent and communicable possessions of mankind, and thus a cumulative social effect be given to the insights of successive generations of human individuals.

The construction of a socially accepted system of knowledge by the aid of the speech mechanism is an impressive instance of how within the continuity of biological process new powers appear whose activity is not completely explainable in terms of the biological categories of stimulus, response, and adjustment; for while the relation between selected idea and motor discharge conforms in outward order to the biological pattern, it is a virtual reversal of this because thought is not really (as the order of events might seem to indicate) instrumental to motor response or resulting adjustment. Instead, the movements elicited turn out to be themselves instrumental to the building up of a system of ideas or ideal objects which express to the individual what is significant in the experience of his fellow-men. Within the consciousness of individuals is created or re-created the world of universal social life and achievement, in which all objects that have proven generally realizable directly or indirectly, all events that are capable under prescribed conditions of being re-experienced, are interwoven by relations, mechanical and teleological, into something approaching unity. The humanly significant result achieved by the habits of speech, spoken and written, that we have been considering, is not organic adjustment but intellectual insight, spiritual vision. The noble function that language may discharge is eloquently set forth in a recent presidential address by Professor Gilbert Murray. *Grammata*, letters, the poetry and philosophy that come down to us from our fathers enshrine their living thought and feeling. The scholar's special duty is to interpret the *grammata* and so to re-live and to enable others to re-live the chosen moments of human life wherever they are recorded.

"The *traditio*, the handing down of the intellectual acquisitions of the human race from one generation to another, the constant selection of thoughts and discoveries and feelings and events so precious that they must be made into books, and then

of books so precious that they must be copied and recopied and not allowed to die—the *traditio* is itself a wonderful and august process, full no doubt of abysmal gaps and faults, like all things human, but full also of strange half-baffled and yet not wholly baffled, splendor, which marks all the characteristic works by man.”¹

Civilized man receives by social inheritance besides language all the mechanical appliances and technical devices that have been invented or discovered to augment his powers of action in the fields of industry, commerce, government, household management. Each of these tools and instruments, machines and methods, requires for its use a certain practice and skill. Civilized man learns in his youth to employ many of them effectively with the result that ideas of these instrumentalities, in close association with the motor adjustments they elicit, are an important constituent of his consciousness. Now such mechanical devices seem at first thought merely to extend man's power of action in the physical world and thus to make it possible for him to live more safely and comfortably. Such increase of our mechanical efficiency, while very useful, has, it may appear, no personal or social value: its end is admittedly physical adjustment, to be rated, at very highest, in terms of survival value. Such has been the prevailing view. Professor Murray, who eulogizes letters because they embody and preserve the significant and precious in human experience, sees no value in modern technical art beyond temporary utility. But my belief is that mechanical industry to a great extent is, and to a much greater extent may be made, the source of experiences of coöperation and team-play which contribute to the enrichment of social life an element that nothing else can supply.²

The first tools were of course objects of nature, but chosen because of a dim perception of the requirements of this or that human purpose. Their shaping and improvement were due to an

¹ *Century*, June, 1918, p. 171.

² Professor Judd in his article on "Evolution and Consciousness" brings out in a striking way the significance of tools and appliances as objective embodiments of ideas which recreate the environment within the individual. *Psych. Rev.*, Vol. 17, p. 77.

increasingly clear consciousness of the ideal requirements of such instrumentalities and a comparison of different objects with these standards in mind. The distinguishing between shape and material and an investigation of the different possibilities in each case enabled men to standardize the processes of manufacture in accordance with the dictates of the ideal pattern. The finished tool or appliance is consequently the result of an analysis of the different natural forces and agencies that promise to contribute to the realization of a human purpose and their recombination in such manner as to serve most efficiently this end. These instrumentalities embody methods of procedure universally effective, because depending upon a selection from among the conditions of action of those factors essential to the realization of an intelligible human purpose; they represent the reorganization of natural forces by the power of creative intelligence at work in human society. Hence the individual in all stages of development who learns to use the tools, weapons, and appliances of his people receives from their employment a greatly augmented sense of power coming not merely from the increased control gained over natural forces, but also from the coöperative alliance with his fellows in the prosecution of identical purposes.

The fact that I wish to emphasize is that the whole machinery of industrial activity and social intercourse which is handed down from one human generation to the next, just because it represents the conquest of nature by an intelligence in which we all share, may be productive of experiences of comradeship in effort, of associated enterprise, which have highest ethical significance. The perfecting of tools and appliances in any department of industry means the establishment of a uniform procedure, a regular technique. This in its turn favors concerted action on the part of individuals: many forms of labor become communal. Wundt tells how the use of the hoe has been in many primitive tribes the source of a cult of community-labor. Hoe-culture carried on by many individuals in adjacent fields at the same season of the year and with the common purpose of securing the harvest is quickened by the thrill of comradeship: a certain rhythm and tempo are observed along with accompanying

expressive movements which symbolize and accentuate the coöperative unity of all. Plough-culture, the same writer points out, individualizes labor: each man must guide his own plough. But it must not be forgotten that plough-culture makes possible the division of arable land into separate holdings or farms whose cultivation becomes the common interest and coöperative employment of the family, often enlarged to include two or even three generations. And although such agricultural proprietorship has been handicapped by isolation, within its limits it remains, in the unity of interest and endeavor which it engenders, the most effective basis of coöperation that society has produced: the world contains no more impressive symbol of coöperative endeavor than the farm homestead. That division of labor which restricted farming to the farmer also limited the activity of other men to specialized trades and occupations. But here too, while the new association was less wide and varied, it was in many cases more thoroughgoing and continuous. The master workman, journey-men and apprentices were, or might be, associated in an intimate and inspiring way by the labor of the workshop. Indeed such a workshop illustrates in a striking fashion the possibilities of comradeship in industry; within it a number of workers associated by a common aim and technique have each one as much opportunity for individual expression through creative work as his skill and experience may warrant.

Civilized man of today is often represented as a slave of the machinery he has himself invented and set up. But if modern man is in danger of having his soul crushed out by machinery, the fault is his own and not that of the mechanical devices his intelligence has created. That extension of social and political organization which by the end of the last century made the world one community was brought about by mechanical facilities of communication, transportation and production. If this enormous enlargement of man's powers of action has worked social injury, it has been because of attempts of individuals to utilize it for private profit instead of finding in it a means to more extended and effective intercourse with fellow-men. Much of the machinery of social life now inherited by each successive generation is

adapted to the use of all and, in civilized countries, all receive more or less training in its use. I have in mind not merely the 'modern marvels' which have been sufficiently celebrated, such as telegraph and telephone, steam and electric transportation, automobile and aëroplane. I am thinking of such familiar instruments of commerce as coinage and bills of exchange, of devices to expedite the processes of government like the secret ballot, and of all those appliances and instrumentalities which have been introduced into our homes to add to the convenience and comfort of life. All these technical devices are social products, conquests over matter by that faculty in man whose scope is universal; the most of them directly encourage human intercourse and facilitate human coöperation.

They should then be used with sense of their social significance. This requires some exercise of imagination, some power of intelligent correlation, and, it must be admitted, these capacities are often-times deficient and undertrained. Many individuals acquire a manual dexterity in working the machinery of social interplay and employ now this, now that, instrumentality for private gain with no appreciation of the network of social activities into which they are drawn. It should consequently be made a prime concern of popular education so to enlarge the intellectual horizons of future citizens that they can follow in imagination the far-reaching social ramifications of their everyday activities. Our schools should give information concerning the growth, organization and interdependence of the great industries that feed and clothe and house us, that put us in communication or transport us bodily, without regard to barriers of earth or sea or sky.¹ We are told that a regiment comes to realize its own unity by marching together. If men could be made conscious of working together, they would awake to a fresh realization of the social solidarity of mankind.

When we turn from the essential activities of daily life in which we all participate to the special trades and industries, the social benefit from the introduction of machinery is not so clear. In

¹ Professor Judd has recently emphasized the duty of the schools to bring home to new generations as they arise the social interplay of industry and interdependence of the economic activities of men. *School and Society*, August 3, 1918.

some few trades the workshop still survives where a number of craftsmen work together with improved tools, each contributing his skill to the finished product and consequently feeling a sense of proprietorship in the total enterprise. But the factory has for the most part taken the place of the workshop, and in the factory, as we know, the opportunity of the individual worker to make any contribution through his own skill is reduced to a minimum. And when the individual can find no expression of himself in his work, there is no reason to expect that this activity of his will identify him in a unity of coöperative endeavor with others employed in the same industry (dynamic interdependence seems in this case to have been transferred from the workers to the machines whose servants the men have become). This result promises to be accentuated to the extreme limit by scientific management: even under the factory system as previously operated the possibility remained for the workers to show individual skill in the management of their machines, but now all their movements are to be standardized and prescribed. How can a human being take personal interest, or find social satisfaction in the repetition of identical and monotonous movements? An answer to this question is at least suggested if we consider another aspect of scientifically directed industry. The elaboration of machinery and consequent organization of industry has made possible the association of human activities on a scale never dreamed of before, and has made these associated human activities productive to a degree unparalleled in human history and scarcely credible even now. If those who participate in such vast enterprises could come to feel their own acts, stereotyped and insignificant though they be in themselves, as necessary to, and symbolic of, the whole, they might acquire some realizing sense of the wonderful interplay of forces proceeding under intelligent direction and obtain some satisfaction from the marvellous results being produced. To bring this about two conditions must be fulfilled. In the first place, the workers must themselves be enlightened both in regard to the technical processes and labor organization of their industry on the one hand and concerning the service it renders to society on the other.

And, secondly, they must be associated in some degree, even though it be slight, in the direction of their enterprise. Each worker must be encouraged to feel that he counts somehow as a human individual in the conduct of the industry, for only if he is given this much opportunity for self-expression will he derive from his work any of that satisfaction of effective comradeship which constitutes its social and ethical value. As a recent writer has reminded us, work which has ceased to be individually creative may become socially creative.¹ To make it such the association of industrial workers must come to resemble in some degree that of team-mates in athletic sports, a willing coöperation in which each receives from his fellowship with the others and his contribution to the final result of their common effort some of the joy of team-play, one of the spiritual fruits of social life.

My thesis that types of imagery whose original significance is to be understood in terms of survival come in the course of social evolution to mean personal experiences in which men participate as members of an intelligent community, needs no extended defense in the case of those visual and auditory complexes which arouse the feeling of beauty. The senses of sight and hearing, as we know, give warning of the presence or approach of objects to the organism: shapes and colors and sounds are signs which elicit motor responses having survival value and anticipate the satisfactions which accompany the preservation or heightening of vitality. But from early prehistoric times man has found a satisfaction in pictures and engravings, in songs and dances, which cannot be explained in terms of organic response and must be referred to the intrinsic significance which these art-products had for his dawning intelligence. The cave-man of Europe at the close of the glacial period was decorating the walls of his grotto with carefully wrought designs and patiently shaping figures from bone and ivory. The products of primitive artistry, pictures and ornaments, of ritual movement and melody, were probably employed as magical or religious means of protection; but magical potency was ascribed to them doubtless because of the mysterious power they exercised over those who produced

¹ Marot, *The Creative Impulse in Industry*, pp. 137 ff.

or perceived them. They were appreciated by primitive man as objects of natural or created beauty are appreciated by us today because, through the emotions they arouse, they signify more or less definitely those fundamental experiences of personal aspiration and achievement, or of personal disappointment and haunting regret which are the common lot of mankind as possessed of rational wills which strive, under conditions of earth, for self-expression. There is reason, indeed, for holding that in æsthetic enjoyment we realize meanings that in thought we project as possible and in actions we strive to give existence to. Beautiful objects have this power because they free the imagination and stir the feelings as things do which are brought by choice and effort into identification with our personal wills. Art then gives rational significance to material or sensible objects, not the meaning which verbal images acquire when they come to suggest other images in the fixed relations that constitute the objective world, but the power which diverse sense-qualities possess, when combined in various orders and relations, of expressing the reaction of the human self to the existing nature of things which, because it is the reaction of a subject that maintains identity in spite of changing conditions, has potential universality. To this potential universality of æsthetic enjoyment is due its communicability. Through his painting or his poem the artist transfers his own emotional or imaginative response to life and the world to his fellows, and, considering the efficacy of the method, it is no wonder that art outstripped both language and industrial invention as an expression of the universality of human experience. The accumulated art-products which each human generation receives from those preceding are witness to that which they themselves have fostered, the fellow-feeling, the personal sympathy, the rational concord, of humanity. But it should never be forgotten that this, the social function of art, is incapable of explanation if we fail to recognize either on the one hand the diversity of sense-qualities as they appear to the consciousness of the individual or, on the other hand, as underlying the identity of the rational self.

Our conclusions thus far, which will I believe be borne out

by any intelligent study of the facts unbiased either by scientific prepossession or by metaphysical dogma, have a direct bearing upon education. They furnish us with true and appropriate conceptions for the interpretation of the educational process in human society and, at the same time, supply a corrective for grave misunderstandings of this process that have resulted from an over-hasty application of the principles of biological evolution to the field of social progress.

In the first place, we are never dealing in the educative process with living individuals merely; we are dealing always with social selves. It is a great mistake to think that we are founding our educational theory upon scientific facts by beginning with a study of man as a living organism in a physical environment. Man is never that, and so to begin is to substitute fiction for fact. Man is from the first a social self: his consciousness has the form of sociality which means universality. What does such a statement mean? Metaphysical theory? By no means. Rather, the simple and (when not misunderstood) undeniable fact that man *qua* man is able to correlate the contents of his consciousness in ways which express his own self-identity. With man as with the animal the result of instinctive response continued and modified by its own experienced outcome is to supplement sensory complexes with images and thus to build up sense-perceptions. But the human consciousness is never a mere procession of such perceptions with associated images. Passing perceptions such as yield an identical quality of satisfaction are correlated within the unity of class or kind; bodily movements or external events which lead to one result are correlated, as causes or conditions with this, their effect; the variety of qualities, the range of different satisfactions which objects present when realized, are organized within a unity of character or meaning. The constitutive principle of man's conscious life is thus that of identity in difference, the identity of rational will finding expression through a variety of different objects. But the human individual besides possessing by nature a universalizing intelligence receives by social inheritance an elaborate system of symbols for representing experiences as correlated in expression of rational self-

hood. He is taught to call objects by their class-names, to handle tools which embody and express the causal efficiency of natural forces and agencies, to sing songs and recite poems and enjoy pictures that stir the deeper emotions felt by all men in the face of a common lot and a common destiny. Whether the reason of mankind could ever have constructed such a universally valid system of distinctions and relationships as we have been describing if these symbols had not been employed and elaborated is a question we do not ask. Their existence and currency means that the human individual as a member of society is forced to exercise his intelligence sufficiently to interpret his experience in terms of distinctions and relationships that are valid for mankind universally. And not merely do language and technical appliances and art bring home to the individual the common human significance of his experience; the results of his own activities in intercourse with nature and his fellows enrich the meaning of these symbols and thereby add to their social value. Thus whether he will or not, man's conscious life (particularly of course that of civilized man) is set within the universal experience of humanity organized in accordance with the dictates of a common reason. Hence even although the individual fail altogether to realize the larger possibilities of his social inheritance and seek only to gratify his instinctive appetites, nevertheless he must formulate to himself his purposes in terms universally intelligible, he will in action avail himself of methods and devices that bespeak the common interest of mankind in controlling natural conditions, he may embellish his own satisfactions by the use of art forms that touch deeper chords of human feeling. This then is the meaning of the statement that man's conscious life has the form of universality.

Since man is never an animal and must develop as a rational self if he is to develop as a man, we can commit no more fatal blunder than to hold in the name of science that education which is largely concerned with transmitting to younger generations the science and literature, the art and technique accumulated by the race, aims primarily at an improved adjustment of the human individual to his natural environment. This conception

of education is in its effect particularly mischievous because based upon a perversion of the true relationship between the physical and the social. Since man's development is measured by his ability to participate in a social life organized on universally valid principles of reason, *i.e.*, a community of persons, the proper business of education is to assist the human individual in making his natural existence instrumental to the establishment of truly social or personal relationships. A second educational principle may therefore be laid down following the first: that education should make men able to translate their private imaginings, acts, and feelings into terms universally intelligible and therefore personally communicable. The work of education is thus to convert existence into terms of personality, to make living individuals capable of rational intercourse. In the accomplishment of this task, the largest use must be made of language and literature, of art and of the established manners, methods and machinery of industrial and social life. The human individual must first of all be rendered intelligently articulate; he must be taught to express himself adequately in the forms of oral and written speech. He is thus introduced into the world of rational discourse; his own ideas are made communicable to others and others' experiences communicable to him. A mastery of language opens to the individual the portals of a larger life that admits no limits of space or time: literature and history and science reveal to him what is significant in the experience of humanity extended by the powers of rational inference and prediction beyond the period and environments of man's history as an organic species on this planet. Again and secondly, the individual must be made in his action genuinely coöperative; he must be taught to employ the instruments and inventions, the method and practices of industry and intercourse and government with a sense of their social significance. It is not enough to make the individual skillful in utilizing the devices and appliances that make modern industry so productive, modern organization so efficient; he will acquire a certain familiarity with the machinery of business and politics without the help of education. But he must be taught the social use and value of this marvellous machinery for organizing human effort, and be prepared to derive from its em-

ployment a vivid and continuing realization of the interdependence of all human activities and a sense of personal proprietorship in the tools and technique that make this concerted activity successful.¹ Under these conditions and these alone will the work of the average man cease to be mere wage-slavery and become a willing partnership in human industrial enterprise. Third and finally, the educative process is left incomplete if feeling and fancy are not universalized and thus made expressions of personality. In many respects feelings, determined as they are by the satisfaction given to instinctive cravings and physical appetites, remain the most exclusively individual of all mental states. They can be effectively universalized, given rational and therefore communicable meaning, only through training in æsthetic appreciation; for by the awakening of this capacity, as we know, sense-objects which otherwise would arouse only the instinctive desire for selfish appropriation yield disinterested pleasure in contemplation. Experience in the enjoyment of beauty in art and in nature should therefore play a larger part in education than heretofore, and society must take active measures to open to the enjoyment of all its members the most beautiful in painting and music, in sculpture and architecture, in garden and landscape. The ideals of self-conscious personality have suffered somewhat in the estimation of students of social evolution from the formal and schematic way in which they have been presented; in particular has the universality which has been ascribed by idealists to the ideals of personality, truth, goodness and beauty, seemed abstract and empty when contrasted with the particular and definite aims that men actually do pursue. But when universality is interpreted as sociality, that true sociality which is founded upon the common reason that places men in intelligent communication with one another, and these universal ideals of knowledge and fellowship and beauty, are understood to find realization each through its own "action system," that is, through speech and manual dexterity and sensory adjustment,

¹ Even Mr. Mallock, who believes that the mass of mankind are born to toil with their hands rather than their brains, thinks that this common herd should receive some knowledge of economic fact and some training of the imagination, if for no other reason than to make them more contented with their lot and more capable of enjoying leisure hours. *The Limits of Pure Democracy*, 108, 316 ff.

the ideal of personal development must be admitted to give expression to all that is humanly valuable in our human situation.

The educative process is not completed by the introduction of the human individual into the great community of rational intercourse and endeavor. It should evoke and strengthen whatever powers reside in the individual of enlarging the scope of this rational order either intensively by multiplying the personal contacts among members of individuals or extensively by increasing the number of individuals and thus the variety of personal points of view. Now this end is served by all genuinely constructive or creative work whether in pure science, or art, or mechanical invention, or social adjustment. In the field of thought the discovery of new truth acts primarily to increase the subject-matter of intelligent interchange among persons already in communication. But such a discovery by the general interest it arouses may tend to quicken dormant intelligences or through its practical use in the control of physical or vital forces may be instrumental in raising many individuals to the level of intelligent intercommunication. Work in social and political reform such as aims to improve popular education or to secure a wider recognition of individual rights has the direct effect of increasing the membership of the great community, but at the same time, although indirectly, it adds to the material of discourse by bringing to the general cognizance fresh and interesting points of view newly become articulate. Inventions and constructions of a mechanical order, extending the control which intelligence has gained over the forces of the natural environment and calling for an ever more extensive organization of human energies, both multiply points of coöperative and therefore socially fruitful contact among individual men and tend to draw an ever greater number within the net of associative industry. It is therefore a third principle fundamental to education that individuals should be stimulated and encouraged to do creative work in science or industry or art. Each should assume that he as an individual has his original contribution to human culture to make in one of these fields. There will be abortive effort and misspent energy and keen disappointment, to be sure, but this will not be too great a price to pay for ac-

completing what our educational system largely fails to perform, that is, developing the individualities of the rising generation. No greater social service can be rendered by education than this; the individual can scarcely contribute anything more valuable to society than himself; for the range and richness of social intercourse is directly proportionate to the uniqueness and originality of the individuals composing it.

The gravest responsibility laid upon philosophy in this critical time of social reconstruction is to see that men give a true meaning to the admittedly social purpose of education. Philosophy must make it convincingly clear that the social life for which all agree that our youth should be educated is that of a community of free persons associated by rational communication, coöperative industry and emotional concord. Furthermore, philosophy must protest against all educational methods and tendencies which while they profess the interest of society really hinder or oppose the ideal extension of human life along lines of rational community. It must protest against the doctrine of social efficiency in education when this means that the agencies of social culture, literature, science and art, mechanical invention and political organization, are to be made use of for material gain or rational aggrandizement. It must protest against the tendency in the professed interest of standards of culture and refinement to restrict education to those who by close association for generations within the limits of social caste or intellectual class have cultivated a mutual understanding, a habit of courtesy and personal accommodation, a community of taste that is very thoroughgoing and satisfactory to those privileged to enjoy it. No less strongly must it protest finally against the opposite tendency now threatening human society, to attempt by a few violent and sweeping measures of industrial reorganization and political reform to fit men for a world-wide comradeship of free and willing workers, —while by these very measures it destroys such underlying sources of personal inspiration and spiritual vision as national loyalty, family honor and individual ambition which have contributed to human life some of its most exalted and illuminating experiences.

H. W. WRIGHT.

THE LOGIC OF COSMOLOGY.

I. THE CONTRIBUTION OF FAITH.

I AM unprepared to make the first move toward proposing a logic of cosmology until I recognize that I have no evidence whatever for the existence of auditors.

Let us recall the two foundation principles of logic. As to terms: Words must have meanings. As to propositions: A choice is imperative between affirming and denying anything. Let us recall also the nature of evidence. Evidence for a proposition is any other proposition which if believed makes it difficult or impossible to avoid believing the first. Propositions which we meet forthwith in the psychological attitude we call belief are termed *self-evident* propositions; for example, the axiom—Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other.

An auditor interposes:—The evidence for the existence of auditors should be patent to the logician. It is an argument from analogy. From bodies nearly or remotely resembling his, he can argue to souls nearly or remotely resembling his.

So to speak is to mistake the cause of a belief for its reason. The cause of my belief in the existence of others, is the fact that a certain mass of experience I call my body has a dominant influence upon the whole of it; whence the sight of another body resembling mine becomes motive power for the assumption of another totality of experience like mine. This is a sequence of psychological effect upon psychological cause, but it is not an argument. The premiss and the conclusion are totally disparate. The premiss moves within my universe; the conclusion postulates another.

Nor has the premiss any better basis in reason than the conclusion. I have no more evidence for my own existence than for the existence of other people. *Something exists*. This single proposition is the bedrock of cosmology.

I leave this bedrock only by a leap in logic. The first mental movement toward a cosmology is not a step but a jump. The

All of things, at first a flux of elements simply coming into existence and passing out of existence, becomes, when I differentiate between myself and a world about me, a flux of elements which do not simply come into existence and pass out of existence, but which in many cases may somehow have existed before existing, and remain in existence after ceasing to exist. No evidence can engender or destroy such a belief. Evidence has two forms, inductive and deductive. Induction consists in saying that since things have happened so and so wise, they will happen likewise. Deduction consists in repeating in a new way what has once been said. Neither tells me anything about things that never can happen; and it is such things that I believe in when I affirm the existence of a world about me.

Incorrect, says an objector. My belief in a world about me is only a belief in things that can never happen *to me*. In this objection *petitio principii*, the bosom friend of all the argumentative, shows its unwelcome face. The *me* here assumed is exactly the point to be proved.

In fact, to affirm the duality of self and world is an act of faith and not of reason. When to the *Something exists* I add *Something else exists*, I am proceeding by my own unaided force. Each of the two assertions stands on its own bottom. The apparent consequence is a pure *non-sequitur*; a completely a-logical movement of thought. Evidence has no part in it, but only self-evidence, so far as it is evident at all.

Here I emerge upon the Cartesian viewpoint, the historical foundation of modern European philosophy: *Cogito, ergo sum*. The famous sentence is not an inference but an identical proposition. Descartes assumed the duality of I and not-I in his *Cogito*, and gave it a rhetorical echo in his *Ergo Sum*;—doubtless fully conscious what he did.

The assumption of a duality of I and not-I, of self and an external world, is an astounding liberty to take with thought. The simplest illustration makes the matter plain. When I wink a whole mass of the something that exists goes out of existence and exists again. By what right can I suppose that meanwhile what is non-existent nevertheless exists? The discovery,

if discovery it be, is nothing less than the discovery of a *We*, namely, an *I* and a *Thou*.

It is possible to hold, at least in words, that this is going too far, and that the not-*I* is not a *Thou*, not a soul like that implied in its discovery. Yet, in thought, what ground is there for this opinion? Standing on the bedrock *Something exists*, when the complex of sensation I call the sun disappears below the horizon it ceases to exist. If leaping in logic from this standpoint I claim that the sun still exists, unless in one statement I simply deny the other, which logic forbids, there is some difference between the denial and the affirmation. What is asserted being identical with what is denied, a difference of assertor and denier alone remains. Logic compels the assumption of a perceiving *Thou* for whom the sun persists when it is gone for me. My apprehension of an external world, soulless as the atoms may be which compose it, is the discovery of that *Thou*.

But the discovery does not reveal the *I* and *Thou* side by side. The *Thou* does not appear simply other than the *I*. It does not take up the contents of the *I* when the *I* leaves them, and leave them when the *I* takes them up. The *Thou* I believe in shares in my world. Here I emerge upon a viewpoint akin to that of the Upanishads, and capable of expression by their dictum *Whatever exists, that art Thou*.

I take a second leap in logic more amazing than the first when I people the world with other *I*'s. By this secondary belief, I affirm that *Something exists*—namely, another *I*—which is apart from me, while still, in harmony with the dictum of the Upanishads, not apart from the *Thou*. Otherwise expressed, something exists which is other than the original something while bearing the same relation that this bedrock something does to the *something else* affirmed in the primary leap away from it. Here I emerge upon the Leibnizian viewpoint; *the Monads have no windows*; but I have combined with it the Brahmanical belief that they have an identical foundation.

The cosmology thus reached may be stated as follows: *Something exists; Something else exists; Something exists which is else to the first and not else to the last*. With these affirmations I

finally emerge upon the dizzy logical summit which forms the cosmology of civilization: that is, the conception of a world peopled by indefinitely numerous and mutually exclusive I's.

It is conceivable that I should refuse to execute any of these acts of belief either primary or secondary. I may deny the reality of the dualism of I and Thou, holding my view of things to the ultimate cosmological bedrock *Something exists*. According to this view, the order of the All is interrupted whenever what is commonly called I turns its back, as in falling asleep. The stars might grow into whirling globes under the conditions that I should name *travelling toward* them; but in default of these conditions the only real existence of the stars is that of pinpoints in a nightly blue. Rather than a Cosmos, this conception may be termed a *protero-cosmos*.

Or I may balk at the second and multifarious leap in logic. I may decline to believe in the existence of other I's. The people I meet may all be automata to me. There may be nothing behind their faces and their acts. Some of us can remember when we thought so. William James once told me he could recall the time when he first came to realize that other people had souls like his own. The realization is dim enough in almost all of us still. The philosopher who refuses it altogether is called a *Solipsist*. He exists, but he alone. But if alone, why he at all? Although a truncated creed, his is a creed all the same. Logically his choice to be hung for a cosmological lamb rather than sheep is no more respectable than the opposite choice of the common man.

Passing the solipsist by, and taking the second logical leap, I find therein a sense of the term Thou in which the dictum of the Upanishads—*That art Thou*—no longer holds. That—when I mean thereby my thought or my feeling—art *not* Thou—when I mean thereby my friend's thought or his feeling. I do not think his thoughts or feel his feelings; nor he mine. Each of us according to the familiar comparison is an island of being, absolutely inaccessible from every other. Yet most of us believe in the real existence of all the other inaccessible.

2. THE CONTRIBUTION OF REASON.

All that the present exposition has hitherto accomplished has been to develop the logical nature of the Cosmology of Civilization, the conception of souls in a world. In so doing we have traced its growth from the germinal tenet *Something exists* by successive acts of pure belief, first to a Thou, then to other I's. What remains of our exposition will no further tax faith, but instead appeal to reason. Our task will be a rational development of the cosmology of civilization. The demonstration is—*quod sciam*—personal to me. The part of wisdom in such a case is to expect that its clear presentation may recall to some reader the philosopher in East or West who has before advanced it. Meantime let it be examined on its merits.

I have spoken of a *Something that exists*; a *Something else that exists*; and of *Somethings else to the first and not else to the second*; otherwise expressed, of mutually exclusive I's all bearing the same relation to a Thou. It will be a convenience to designate these parties to the received cosmology by the initial of the word *Something*, using the Greek capital Σ for the something to which all the others bear the same relation and the Greek small σ for these others. The Greek initials are chosen, notwithstanding the barbarity of the choice, because more easily distinguishable than the Roman *S* and *s*. The letter *S* has the advantage of being the initial at once of the word *Something* and the words *Self* and *Soul* and *Spirit*, which are the customary terms for these primordial elements of the world as usually believed in.

The words by which the relation between the Σ and any σ are customarily expressed are such words as *beneath* or *within* or *including*. None of these words does more than adumbrate the relation. It is unique and can be unequivocally indicated only by pointing at it. Let us express this unique relation which the Thou bears to each I by the letter r ; and the converse of this relation, namely, the relation which each I bears to the Thou by cr . Let us further represent the case in which anything is in both of two relations to anything else by writing both the letters denoting the relations. Let us further represent any relation other than a given one by writing the letter for the given relation with a bar over it.

A relation may or may not be its own converse. The relation *cousin* is an example of a symmetrical relation. If *A* is cousin to *B*, then *B* is cousin to *A*. The relation *agent* is an example of an a-symmetrical relation. If *A* is agent of *B*, then *B* is principal to *A*.

Again, a relation may or may not be reciprocable: that is, it may or may not be possible for the relate to bear toward the correlate both the direct and the converse relation. The relation *lover of* whose converse is *beloved by*, is an example of a reciprocable relation. If *A* is lover of *B*, *A* may still at the same time be beloved by *B*. The relation *right*, whose converse is *left*, is an example of a non-reciprocable relation. One's right hand cannot at the same time be one's left hand.

The relative terms beneath, within, or including, by which the unique relation *r* is sought to be expressed, name relations at once a-symmetrical and reciprocable. They are a-symmetrical; for the relation of foundation and superstructure from the standpoint of the foundation is beneath, from the standpoint of the superstructure is above; the relation of today and this year from the standpoint of the day is within; from the standpoint of the year is without; the relation of circle and circumference from the standpoint of the circle is included by, from the standpoint of the circumference is inclusive of. They are also reciprocable; a fish is both above and below the water it swims through, a man both without and within the air he breathes, a body both inclusive of and included in the space it occupies.

So designating the σ relation, we may represent the belief by which we affirm I's and a Thou—ourselves and a world containing us—by the expression

$$\Sigma \ r \ \overline{cr} \ \sigma.$$

It is at once evident that if we guide ourselves by the two foundation principles of logic this expression represents but one of four possibilities. Besides bearing to σ the relation *r* only, Σ may bear to σ the relation *cr* only, which is different, or both *r* and *cr*, which is possible, or neither *r* nor *cr*. The remaining three possibilities expressed in the same notation are the following:

$$\Sigma cr \bar{r} \sigma$$

$$\Sigma r cr \sigma$$

$$\Sigma \bar{r} \bar{cr} \sigma$$

Of the four cases, the three which contain a positive element exhaust the possible forms in which the Σ -relation may present itself, the fourth being its total denial. A complete logical theory of that relation is thus a cosmology embodying three modes of being, of which one only is affirmed in the cosmology of civilization, or the conception of selves in a world.

The other two possible modes of being are—*quod sciam*—new-comers in philosophical theory. But conceptions approximating to them are far from strangers to the faith of men. In all ages and among all peoples it has been held that a world existed other than that we believe ourselves now to occupy in common, and that beings existed intermediary between the two. The novelty, if novelty it be, of the present exposition lies in its demonstration that a world, conceived as the cosmology of civilization conceives it, logically implies these two other possibilities: one its opposite, the other their intermediate. The fully rational form and fashion of a universe such as most of us believe in is that of a tripartite whole, in which what we call *nature* is completed by what may be called an *ob-nature* and what may be called an *ambi-nature*.

The obnatural world of this demonstration is not a *super-natural*, the theater of a sublimated natural life. An inversion is neither an etherialization nor any other kind of heightening. Nor is the ob-natural world an abode in or beyond the stars. A change in the mode of our being is not a matter of displacement in space. Nor is the obnatural world the scene of an absorption of the I into the Thou. An exchange of rôles does not release the actors but retains them.

Nevertheless, the tripartite cosmology draws in passionless logic outlines common to convictions expressed in all these ways. A change in the mode of our being, though not an affair of other space, is an affair of other time; and the obnatural world may really represent a lost Paradise or a future life. The conception

fits beneath the verses in which Shakespeare alludes to the cosmology of the West:

*So part we sadly in this troublous world
To meet with joy in sweet Jerusalem.*

It fits also beneath the pilgrims' prayer to Kwannon in which Okakura has pictured the cosmology of the East:

*At thy peaceful shore a port we seek.
Guide our frail bark through the storm of life.*

The third conception, that of an ambi-natural state, is one which supposes a historical human being to have dwelt at the same time in the other world. It is not given in the shadowy angels and archangels of Christian faith; perhaps not in the Avatars (descents of deity) and Bodhisattvas (ascents toward deity) of the East; but it may reasonably be thought a part of Dante's vision of divinity, wherein a second of three circles of light

*Within itself and of the selfsame color
Appeared to me with our own image painted,*

Upon these visions it is not the office of this discussion to enter. We have sought only to develop the pattern which a total conception of the universe of selves in a world must take in reason. Our theme has been the logic of cosmology, but neither its ethic nor its æsthetic.

Let us examine the logic again. Its conclusion establishes a triple possibility: first, a state in which a universal soul exists *beneath*, as we say, each individual soul; second, a state in which each individual soul exists *beneath* a universal soul; and third, a state combining these correlative conceptions. Its argument is this: to deny this triple possibility is to deny the cosmology of civilization; that is, a world and we within it. No sooner do we fully grasp the relation of the two than the tripartite cosmology opens from it like a flower from its stem, attended by its negative as a flower casts a shadow.

In this argument the first constituent is a belief self-evident if evident at all; namely, a belief in soul. Infidelity to this belief is possible; but we have seen reason to doubt whether a thorough-going disbelief in soul can be said to leave a cosmos;

and we have called the conception a *protero-cosmos*. We may it is true disbelieve that the not-I implied in the conception of I is also soul; but for this idea we could find no logical warrant.

The second constituent in our argument, the affirmation that other souls exist, is likewise self-evident if evident at all. Infidelity is possible here too. But this is an inconsequent heresy, an arbitrary refusal to take more than one logical leap; and it has appeared to us the dictate of good sense to accept instead of solipsism the cosmology of civilization by which the world is peopled with a plurality of mutually exclusive I's.

The third and final constituent in our argument consists in applying to the relation of I and Thou, judged as a-symmetrical and reciprocable, the fundamental principles of logic which command us to give words meanings and to choose between affirmation and denial. The result of this application is the tripartite cosmology. To reject the principles from which it finally unfolds is to reject logic; and let us remember that the alternative to logic is not illogical discourse but none at all: in a word, silence.

The logic of cosmology may be expressed in one sentence. Either there is no such thing as soul, in which case, since gravitation stops when I've gone by, the All of things is not a Cosmos; or there is nothing else than Soul; in which case the All of things is at once a Cosmos, and potentially tripartite.

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THE DESCRIPTIVE METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY.

THE pragmatic theory of knowledge rests, finally, upon the doctrine of "immediate experience," which indicates "the necessity of employing in philosophy the direct descriptive method that has now made its way in all the natural sciences, with such modifications, of course, as the subject itself entails." Again: "The inferential factor must *exist*, or must occur, and . . . all existence is direct and vital, so that philosophy can pass upon its nature . . . only by first ascertaining what it exists or occurs *as*."¹

In the note from which these quotations are taken, Dewey expressly repudiates the older empirical doctrine of immediate experience. He does not mean by the 'immediate' any particular kind of given existence—such as sensation—which is ontologically prior to thought, "any aboriginal kind of stuff out of which things are evolved." Nor is the descriptive method advocated by Dewey to be confused with the older inductive conception of scientific method as a process of discovering the connections which obtain between the particulars of experience. With sensations as such, or with experience as a collocation of feelings, instrumentalism has nothing to do. Nevertheless, as will be seen, experience is regarded as a 'given' from the standpoint of judgment, something assumed to be final for philosophical reflection. The precise nature of this assumption should be brought to light.

In this connection it may be remembered that the great word in pragmatism is 'action.' C.S. Pierce shot straight at the mark when he said: "This doctrine [pragmatism] appears to assume that the end of man is action—a stoical maxim which, to the present writer at the age of sixty, does not recommend itself so forcibly as it did at thirty."² We ought to expect, then, to find that the 'immediate experience' of instrumentalism is a theater of action—a stage on which man realizes his chief end

¹ Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, etc., p. 240.

² Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, article on "Pragmatism."

as a doer. Dewey's definition of experience confirms this expectation. 'Experience,' he says, "is primarily what is undergone in connection with activities whose import lies in their objective consequences—their bearing upon future experiences."¹ One ought to charge a *hysteron proteron* against him at once.² But it is frequently urged that this form of argument is unavoidable in a philosophical system which is organic rather than structural, and, within measure, this must be admitted.

This, then, is 'immediate experience.' The world viewed as a theater of action wherein an organism seeks to maintain and develop itself, is what is given to thought, and from this, 'immediate' philosophy must take its departure. Would it be of any use to argue that experience so conceived is a highly sophisticated affair, a late product of thought, rather than that with which reflection really begins? To raise the question is to invite the old answer that philosophy must begin somewhere—why not with what is most certain and dependable? It is useless to retort that experience so understood is certain and dependable because it has been established and tested by judgment in a thousand and one crises. And yet, there is a world of good sense in certain of Bradley's comments about the world of practical action. "What," he asks, "is the world which I am accustomed to call 'my real world'?" It is (we must reply) the universe of those things which are continuous in space with my body, and in time with the states and actions of that body. . . . Now if I make an ideal construction of this nature in space and time, I can arrange (more or less) in one ordered scheme both myself and other animates, together with the physical world. This arrangement is practical since I can act on it, and since I must

¹ *Creative Intelligence*, p. 20.

² A. W. Moore says: "If, here, the metaphysical logician should ask: 'Are you not in this assumption of a world of reflective and unreflective conduct and affection, and of a world of beings in interaction, begging a whole system of metaphysics?' the reply is that if it is a metaphysics bad for logic, it will keep turning up in the course of logical theory as a constant source of trouble. On the other hand, if logic encounters grave difficulties when it attempts to get on without it, its assumption, for the purposes of logic, has all the justification possible" (*Creative Intelligence*, p. 79). This *ignoratio elenchi* will hardly suffice to explain away the *petitio*.

act on it if I am to continue what I call my 'real' life." But, he asks, is this the only possible world? "My 'real' world depends, as we saw, on my body, but then that leads to a further question, What is really my body? . . . The whole center and foundation of what I call my 'real' scheme is the body which to me is mine at this here and this now. Such a result may be unwelcome, but, however unwelcome, it seems unavoidable. Why I should then assign to my 'real' scheme an exclusive or even a superior reality, seems far from evident."¹

This somewhat extreme (but nevertheless justifiable) statement ought at least to suggest the truth that experience has a distinctly human side. Curiously enough the pragmatists have insisted strongly that experience is many things to many men; they have made a distinct effort to 'humanize' the world. Why, then, this prejudice in favor of a biological action-world? Ought we not to ask, for whom does such a world exist, and under what conditions? It is doubtful whether this question has ever been considered seriously by the pragmatists, in spite of their recognition of the relativity of experience to human purposes and designs. For did they take it seriously they would be led at once into metaphysics, a good enough reason, according to their view, for evading the issue. It seems an unavoidable conclusion that experience as defined by Dewey is meant to be taken as ultimate for philosophy, a proposal which, in view of the teachings of the history of philosophy, is as startling as it is audacious.

And it must be remembered that it is through an appeal to this 'immediate' world that Dewey proves the instrumentalism of thought, with all the anti-intellectualism thereunto appertaining. "It should be possible to discern and describe a knowing as one identifies any object, concern, or event."²

"Or, put more positively, knowing is one mode of experiencing, and the primary philosophic demand (from the standpoint of immediatism) is to find out *what* sort of an experience knowing is—or, concretely how things are experienced when they are ex-

¹ "On My Real World," *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 460 f.

² *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, etc., p. 77.

perienced as known things."¹ Remembering now that Dewey's 'immediate' is a 'world of action, interaction, adjustment, response, adaptation, and remembering also that to 'describe' is to tell what happens in experience-so-defined, how could his so very empirical seeming experiment result in any other conclusion than that which does result? If thought *must* be an activity that occurs in an adjustment-world, how can it be anything but a form of adjustment?

It does make a difference, then, how experience is defined, and on this account Dewey's *hysteron proteron* ought to be seriously considered. But this problem of how experience ought to be defined, in view of the all-too-human character of our reflections upon it, is precisely the problem of metaphysics. But no pragmatist can be induced to enter that field. In such an emergency, it would seem best to confine attention for a while to thought as a concrete process in reality. Granting the pragmatist his starting-point, let us ask whether he makes good use of it, and, more particularly, whether his assumptions justify themselves in practice. Thought, we must suppose, is some kind of a process in experience. What kind of a process is it?

In controversy pragmatists have directed criticism especially against two conceptions of thought, one of which has seemed to them too narrow, and the other too wide. Thought as a self-enclosed activity confined to a world of subjective impressions is the *bête noire* of the instrumentalists. The copy-theory has been vigorously assailed wherever it has dared to show its head. The classical instance of the pragmatic assault upon the 'copy' theory of reality is, of course, Professor Dewey's criticism of Lotze, as contained in the *Studies in Logical Theory* (1903). Nobody (unless he be a professed dualist) would be apt to deny the validity of this criticism. Nor can the pragmatists very well urge that the overthrow of the Lotzeans leaves themselves in undisputed possession of the field.

The wider conception of thought has been dubbed by its opponents 'structuralism.' Kant, it will be remembered, having on hand Hume's intractable 'manifold of sensation,' tried to trans-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 229.

form it into a rational experience by subsuming it under the forms of space and time, and the twelve categories of the understanding. A world so constituted would be a system of sensations held in order by 'thought.' The pragmatists have made merry over the deficiencies of this 'constitutive,' or 'transcendental,' or 'cosmic' thought. Valuable as such a criticism might have been at one time, it seems to be little called for in this day and generation. And from these observations it would seem to follow that pragmatic criticism has missed the mark, if it was intended as a polemic against rival contemporary theories of knowledge.

But it ought to be frankly conceded that modern idealism (to say nothing of neo-realism) is rather elusive. It offers an indefinite target placed in a field of low visibility. Idealism is not (as has so often been supposed) a single, coherent, methodically constructed system that can be assigned a definite place in a chart of philosophical theory. It is, on the contrary, 'speculative philosophy,' and as such is made up of a mass of independent hypotheses, suggestions, experiments, tentative proposals about the nature of things. Probably everybody would admit that Bosanquet's *Logic* (choosing at random) cannot very well be refuted by a single blow directed at its center, because its center is everywhere and nowhere. How much more difficult, then, to sum up all idealism in a single formula and blast it with one charge. But perhaps we ought to confine our attention more strictly to the subject of knowledge, since it is the nub of all criticism. And in this connection it will not be amiss to indicate that the charge of system-making, if it is to be made at all, ought to be directed against the pragmatists. For do they not boast openly that their account of thought is definite, concrete, thoroughly understandable and therefore practically useful? And is not their *real* criticism of the idealistic account of thought just this, that it is vague, speculative, too unstable and uncertain to be serviceable as a guide to the conduct of life? I have tried to show elsewhere that Dewey (who started out as an idealist) was led into functionalism through his desire to give a thoroughly concrete and definite account of the 'synthetic activity' of

thought as a process in experience.¹ This demand for definiteness, simplicity, and concreteness is characteristic of all pragmatists, and stands out as the most powerful 'determining tendency' in their mental make-up.

Concerning this activity called thought, then, it would seem appropriate to ask whether we ought to expect, considering the present extent of our ignorance, anything like an exact and explicit account of its nature and laws, and again, whether the pragmatic account of thought is as definite as it appears to be, and (being found definite) whether it is tenable in the light of all the facts of experience. Considering the first matter we have no guide but general presumption. It would be easy enough to raise a dispute over the efficacy of our scientific methods, and the assurance with which their results may be accepted, and the degree of positiveness that the status of our knowledge warrants. Our first question must needs, then, pass unanswered. It may be permissible to express, however, a conviction that, in spite of all our science and experiment, the human mind remains, in a sense, a mystery. If this conviction is supported by an even partly adequate appreciation of the complexity of the mental life, and some little insight into the nature and limitations of our methods of interpreting it, it may at least justify itself by serving to encourage an attitude of healthy scepticism. And this, combined with a normal sense of humor, would seem to be a desideratum in the present mental crisis of civilization. "This is a gift that I have, simple, simple; a foolish extravagant spirit, full of forms, figures, shapes, objects, ideas, apprehensions, motions, revolutions. These are begot in the ventricle of memory, nourished in the womb of pia mater, and delivered upon the mellowing of the occasion." *Holofernes* has, at least, some appreciation of the complexity of mental phenomena, and that, surely, is a gift.

The second question, however, cannot be set aside. Is the functional theory of knowledge as definite and precise as its exponents suppose it to be? Now, to be sure, such a question might seem to hint at some occult insight into the pragmatic

¹ *John Dewey's Logical Theory*, Cornell Studies in Philosophy, No. 11.

mind. But do we not read, in Dewey's essay, "A Recovery of Philosophy" (in *Creative Intelligence*), that pragmatism is to free us forever from the time-worn problems of traditional philosophy, wipe the slate clean, and make philosophy a device for dealing with the practical affairs of life? Nonsense to say that pragmatism is merely a method! It would be quite absurd to treat it as anything else than a solution. A definite solution, that reformulates the whole problem of knowledge, and puts logic on firm ground. It must surely mean something very definite and precise.

But before we consider the conclusions of pragmatism it might not be amiss to consider the 'direct descriptive method' by which they are attained. "Pragmatism," we are told, "is content to take its stand with science; for science finds all such events [knowing among others] to be subject-matter of description and inquiry—just like stars and fossils, mosquitoes and malaria, circulation and vision."¹ Since Dewey nowhere (so far as I am aware) enlarges upon this matter of description, we are to take it, presumably, that his general meaning is quite obvious. Philosophy is to give up its idle trifling with concepts, and *describe*.² Description, however, at least scientific description, is *not* a simple matter. It is a highly complicated and technical procedure, requiring long training and special equipment. Consider, for instance, the business of describing the stars. It would take our pragmatist ten years to learn to describe as the astronomer describes, and the things he would need most would be, not telescopes or charts of the heavens, but concepts, abstract ideas, 'floating adjectives,' to be applied on occasion. It would be quite fallacious, in fact, to assert that the sciences describe, if it be meant thereby to imply that all follow an established procedure. What constitutes description in astronomy would be sheer gibberish in biology. And the question therefore presents itself, what kind of description does the pragmatist actually employ in dealing with reality?

It must be admitted that Dewey's works are filled with con-

¹ *Creative Intelligence*, p. 55.

² See *Ibid.*, p. 63.

crete references and illustrations. Pragmatic writings, generally, have an empirical appearance. But surely, however description may be defined, it cannot be identified with illustration. Description is universally regarded as a process which precedes and leads up to hypothesis and conceptual explanation, whereas illustration merely serves to make clear the import of principles already established. The scientist is, of course, a 'describer' (although the word must be used cautiously), but it cannot be said that the principles with which he works are proved by applying them here and there at random to see whether they fit. On the contrary, his categories are proved in the very process of being brought to light and recognition. They are bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh of the facts to which they apply. But Dewey proves that thought is a form of behavior that 'comes after something and for the sake of something' by demonstrating how perfectly his categories of adjustment and response work in a few selected instances. We are confronted here with the question of what empiricism means, or ought to mean. Have the pragmatists studied the facts of the mental life assiduously and carefully, at first hand, and on their own account? Are the categories which they employ principles which have developed out of the facts in the course of the effort to interpret them? They look, at any rate, suspiciously like certain categories of the same name that have gained a standing in the biological sciences. It cannot be argued, of course, that it is in all cases illegitimate to employ in one field of knowledge the concepts that have developed in another, but Kant was justified in dubbing their uncritical employment 'dogmatism.' At least, they cannot be illustrated into legitimacy. And since the pragmatist is much given to illustration, but not at all devoted to anything that can be recognized as 'description,' it must be concluded that, at least in its present form, Dewey's method of 'direct description' is as vague as possible.

When we inquire, however, concerning the concreteness of Dewey's completed theory of knowledge, we are on different ground. Is not this, it will be asked, a matter of opinion? How can it be settled except by a vote? Consider the testimony

for a moment. It must be agreed that a considerable number of philosophical students have found Dewey's results delightfully understandable, a great relief from the vagueness of idealism. The functional theory of knowledge, in fact, serves as the basis for a whole program of reform in education and sociology. On the other hand one is reminded that most idealists, and a considerable number of realists, both on their own word and that of Dewey, have incessantly misunderstood the instrumental theory of knowledge. It would be a hopeless task, therefore, to seek a consensus of opinion.

But, coming to closer terms with the question, we may agree that the intelligibility of any theory depends upon its capacity to illuminate the facts to which it is applied. And in advance of all speculation, it must be admitted that there is small likelihood of such explanatory value in case the theory has been formulated without reference to any important group of facts that might have a bearing on the problem under investigation. This reflection brings us, finally, to the crux of the whole matter. For it will be urged here that Dewey, having left out of reckoning the data furnished by logic, is in no position to give a completely adequate account of the nature of thought as a process. This argument, to be sure, is something of a *tu quoque*, but the situation makes it inevitable.

When psychology left the philosophical fold, and established itself as a separate science, it left behind it logic, ethics, æsthetics, and the other disciplines that deal with human nature. In this fashion it limited its pretensions to be the exclusive science of mind, and confined itself to a particular field and a particular task. In Dewey's hands, however, psychology repudiates its original contract, and either swallows up the special philosophical disciplines within itself, or denies their right to exist—perhaps a little of both. But the fact is that our knowledge of mental phenomena is obtained through several sources, of which logic is not the least. In logic problems are wrestled with, facts considered, victories won and mistakes made without let or hindrance from any other science. Aside from the obvious inapplicability of the functional categories to the immediate subject-matter

of logic, it must be considered that the pragmatists have never tried, or pretended to try (so far as I know), to apply them to logical problems. Nor have they written independently (except controversially) on the subject. Now surely this circumstance is not without significance. It seems a fair inference that pragmatists have no interest in logic, and it is certain that they make little or no use of the results of logic in estimating the nature of the knowledge process. It is well enough to appeal to biology and sociology,—as the pragmatists do,—but in constructing logical theory why leave logic out of account?

These comments may be confirmed by reference to one of the latest (presumably representative) pragmatic pronouncements on the subject, Professor A. W. Moore's essay, "Reformation of Logic," in *Creative Intelligence*. It is perhaps needless to say that Professor Moore's 'reform' does not touch logic internally, except for some generalizations concerning the nature of hypothesis. He has very little to say about judgment and inference, and raises no problems about negation, quantity, modality, or the nature of propositions. On the contrary, his essay is an attempt to maintain that "the present task of logical theory is the restoration of the continuity of the act and agent of knowing with other acts and agents."¹ It is, in other words, an attempt to 'naturalize,' the act of knowing. Logic is reformed by tearing down the old barriers which constituted it a separate science, and making it biology, sociology, politics, eugenics—not to mention psychology, chemistry, physics, and the other branches of knowledge—all at one and the same time. Professor Moore's argument, of course, means that logic, in its traditional form, has no right to exist.

"We do not mainly want to ask," says Bradley, "How does judgment stand to other psychical states, and in ultimate reality what must be said of it? Our desire is to take it, so far as we can, as a given mental function; to discover the general character which it bears, and further to fix the more special sense in which we are to use it."² Bradley is always careful to distinguish

¹ *Creative Intelligence*, p. 77.

² *The Principles of Logic*, p. 2.

between metaphysical and logical problems. It is clearly his opinion that logic is a special science, having its own field and its own unique problems, and this seems to be the common view of the older logicians. It is true, then, as Professor Moore maintains, that the nature of thought as a process is not fully set forth by the logicians.¹ Such a complete account can only be supplied by metaphysics which, reckoning upon the information supplied by all the special sciences, is in a position to ascertain the place and function of thought within the whole of experience.

The pragmatic contention, in virtue of which traditional logic is set aside, is that the test of truth is extra-logical—that is, dependent upon non-logical activities. Two things should be kept in mind here: (1) The notion that thought is an occasional activity results from the application of the 'direct descriptive method,' and is peculiar to functionalism. And in this connection it ought to be remembered that logic has something to say about the validity of methods, and hence about the validity of the 'direct descriptive method.' (2) Even if it be admitted that truth can only be discussed by taking into consideration the place of thought in reality at large, a proposition which might be admitted with certain qualifications, there still remains the important question whether the pragmatic conception of the ultimate nature of thought is adequate.

It will be seen that the argument approaches a *cul de sac*, from which there is no release except through a direct consideration of the value of logic as it has existed hitherto, a subject much too large for a brief paper. Briefly, however, there would seem to be no *a priori* reason why the knowledge process cannot be studied directly, as it appears from the standpoint of the knower. The undertaking is surely natural enough. Nor does it imply, as is so often suggested, the subjectivity of thought. It does not follow that, because the knowledge process can be studied without reference to biology and the social sciences, the process is itself isolated and without a place in the real order of things. And, at least in idealistic hands, logic reveals by its

¹ See *Creative Intelligence*, p. 71.

own movement the universality and objective necessity of truth. Nor, again, is logic as a special science abstract in the sense that it deals with thought apart from the world. On the contrary, the results of logical inquiry demonstrate clearly that truth and meaning are incomprehensible apart from concrete reference and application. For if thought is a real process, as must be assumed, it is in and of the world, and a considerable effort at abstraction would be required to separate it from its objects. What is to prevent, then, a direct study of the knowledge process? Why must it be approached indirectly, through biology and sociology?

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THE FUNCTION OF INTUITION IN DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE.

THE purpose of the following paper is to deal with an aspect of the thought of Descartes to which the traditional treatment of his work by historians of philosophy has given quite inadequate consideration. It is usually supposed that his central interest was the building up of the well known metaphysical system. But for several reasons this does not seem to have been the case. In the first place, the doctrine of the nature and function of God, which is the basis of that system, arose at a relatively late stage of his intellectual development. In his earliest work, the *Regulae*, we find no more than traces of it. Secondly, this doctrine has little connection with the field of positive science in which he made his most important contribution to human knowledge, and we might well suppose that a man whose main preoccupations were scientific, and indeed who came upon general problems in the course of his scientific work, would be more interested in a philosophy of science than in a constructive metaphysic. And thirdly, while it will not be possible to take the matter up in any detail or very systematically, enough will be said to show that his treatment of the fundamentals of his metaphysical scheme exhibits such marked and radical contradictions that while it would perhaps be hardly fair to say that it was a mere sop to the Cerberus of the Church, it is very difficult to believe that Descartes took it as seriously as later comment would have us think.

While the Cartesian system as ordinarily understood, ostensibly takes its rise from the notion of intuition, or *lumen naturale*, as he prefers to call it in his later work, in the sense that we might call it a metaphysic of intuition, it will be maintained that this is in effect a *tour de force*, and that the true meaning and valid development of the theory of intuition is to be sought elsewhere. It is evident from his numerous autobiographical references, that Descartes was a working scientist who was interested in problems

of method, and it is along this line that we must look for his genuine approach to the questions of philosophy. Further, the doctrine of intuition was the vital nerve of his conception of an adequate scientific method, and if we understand it, we shall understand his general position. But that doctrine inevitably brought him into touch with the problems proper to epistemology, and thus we shall find that our exposition naturally falls into two main divisions. First we must see in what sense Descartes regarded intuitive knowledge as the proper and valid organ of science, and take up the doctrine of intuition from the purely methodological point of view. But second we shall see that this theory of method brings into unavoidable prominence the philosophic problem of objectivity or externality, and this will bring us face to face with the Cartesian epistemology.

I. INTUITION AND METHODOLOGY.

The purpose of the *Regulae*, as Boyce Gibson points out,¹ is to work out the general questions of method which find their application in the *Geometria*, which is closely connected with it. And in the opening passages of the former work we find that Descartes' primary concern is to arrive at what he calls "*scientia*," which he defines as certain and evident knowledge. This search for certain and evident knowledge arose from a twofold discontent with science as he found it. On the one hand, he complained that it was cumbrous, in that it arrived at its results, which were often correct enough, by chance rather than by analysis; and on the other hand, it failed to establish the validity of its results by building up from a basis whose validity was assured. Now the method, which he says is "necessary for investigating the truth of things"² is designed to obviate these difficulties, in that it builds up a logically coherent system and bases it upon an assured foundation. This notion of certainty is of the greatest importance in the thought of Descartes. Indeed it is more important than the notion of truth. In the *Regulae* we find that the identity of truth and certainty is assumed. Later he tries to demonstrate their

¹ *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 1896.

² Descartes, *Works*, Adam and Tannery, Vol. X, p. 371.

identity by means of his metaphysical notion of a good, and therefore trustworthy God, who is the giver of clear and distinct ideas. But in the fifth Meditation, speaking of this demonstration, he says: ". . . and although I had not demonstrated this, the nature of my mind is such that I could not prevent myself from holding them (*i.e.*, clear and distinct ideas) to be true, so long as I clearly and distinctly conceive them." Thus at the outset we encounter the antinomy between the Cartesian methodology and the Cartesian metaphysic, for this amounts to an almost explicit admission that the philosophy of science has no need of the metaphysico-theological constructions which are designed to show the necessary truth of certain and evident knowledge.

The quest for certainty is carried on, and the requirements of certain knowledge are brought to light, by means of his familiar method of doubt. In the *Regulae* this appears as nothing more than the tentative and critical hesitancy of the scientist in accepting results and drawing conclusions. Thus he finds various practical difficulties in a number of sciences and pseudo-sciences, and comes to the conclusion that only in arithmetic and geometry do we find the certainty which is the mark of genuine *scientia*. Later this method of doubt develops into something much more sophisticated and metaphysical, which Huxley has called a "scepticism before knowledge," and he refuses to accept even arithmetic and geometry as necessarily true, partly on the ground that mistakes have occurred even here, but mainly because an omnipotent God might deceive us even where there seems to be most certainty.¹ Thus we find once more that he rejects in metaphysics what he accepts in methodology. Now science will regard geometry and arithmetic as certain because they deal with a special type of objects, simple essences, which, as he puts it, involve nothing that experience has rendered uncertain. That is to say, we have here genuine *scientia*, genuine intuition, free from all confusing elements. For Descartes, mathematics is something more than an illustration of the working of intuition. It is the characteristic field of undiluted intuitive knowledge, and

¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 6.

thus the mathematical method will be the ideal method of all research, and the *Mathesis Universalis* will be the final philosophy.

He describes intuition as follows: "By intuition I understand not the shifting testimony of the senses, or the misleading judgment of the ill regulated imagination; but a concept (conceptum) of an untroubled and well directed intelligence (mentis purae et attentae), which is so facile and distinct that absolutely no doubt is left about that which we understand."¹ There are two interpretations of this notion which seem to give an incorrect idea of its intent, and which we now take up. One regards intuition as being what a later school has called "Common Sense" or "Reason," the other identifies it with the conceptual as distinct from the perceptual side of experience. Both lead to an erroneous view of Descartes' theory of method, and in criticizing them we shall hope to reach a true comprehension of his aim and thought.

(a) Many considerations show that intuition is not to be identified with "Common Sense" or "Reason." First, Descartes tends to describe intuition rather by means of images than in a systematic manner. Thus we may infer that for him the notion was not very clear cut or sharply defined, while this certainly is the case with "Common Sense." While this does not of course preclude our finding something in common between the two notions, it emphatically does show that to assert their identity is to read much into Descartes. Again, in the third Rule, he tells us that he uses the term intuition, not in its technical scholastic sense, but in its derived sense of looking into something. He goes on to point out that there are more things open to intuitive knowledge than might at first be imagined. For we can directly know that we exist, that we think, that a triangle is bounded by three straight lines, and many other such facts. It is this insistence upon the direct perception of elementary facts which constitutes the main methodological innovation of Descartes, and which conditions his whole point of view. And all this strongly suggests that by intuition he has in mind something far less systematic and sophisticated than "Common Sense" or

¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. X, p. 368.

"Reason." This conclusion is confirmed when we find him speaking of intuition and deduction as the only valid methods of discovering truth, and condemning all other modes of procedure as being open to error. For intuition is now seen to be one among many ways in which it is possible to deal with facts, though it is the best of all of them, and hence it cannot be regarded as a special faculty for discovering truth. Thus we may conclude that when Descartes speaks of intuition, he is dealing with the actual practice and procedure of the expert investigator. The expert will develop and possess a power of immediately perceiving the essential factors of a complex situation. And no doubt Descartes found this to be the case in his own mathematical studies.

The interpretation of intuition as being in essence what a later school called 'Common Sense' is suggested by much that we find in the later writings of Descartes. All the methodological ideas with which he begins undergo a radical transformation as soon as the metaphysical interest becomes prominent, and among these the notion of intuition suffers a change. Even between the notion of the *lumen naturale* given by God, and the notion of 'Common Sense' there are obvious differences. But in any case it is absolutely necessary to interpret the later writings of Descartes in their historical and logical setting. And to do this is to see that it is gratuitous to ascribe to him a rudimentary belief in 'Common Sense,' which he called intuition. It is noteworthy that he uses the term intuition very little except in the *Regulae*. Elsewhere he deals with the same topic by means of a set of concepts and terms which are more or less misleading. And when we find him resolving his scepticism before knowledge by means of the activity of a good God, who illumines the mind by the light of reason, we have something that is superimposed upon the essentially methodological, and so non-metaphysical notion of intuition. And once more we are reminded of the practical meaning of the Cartesian philosophy, whose purpose seems to have been the description of the procedure of the ideal expert.

(b) It has been suggested by many commentators, among whom we may mention Boutroux (*L'Imagination et les Mathématiques*

selon Descartes) and Heimsoerth (*Descartes Methode der klaren und deutlichen Erkenntnis*), that intuition must be confined to what Descartes himself would speak of as *mens pura*, or what we may call the conceptual or rational side of experience. This is a point of very great importance for our understanding of the doctrine of intuition, and much that will be said later will center round it. For the moment we may make two observations, first that the passages which seem definitely to commit Descartes to this limitation are very far from being conclusive on the matter, and second that this limitation would seem to stultify the essential purpose of the method.

(i) Let us take his famous illustration of the wax, which occurs in the *Meditations*. Here he points out that when we perceive a sweetness or an odor or a color, we do not have knowledge of the wax itself. For he says the wax does not consist of these perceptual properties, but rather it is a body which is made apparent under various modes. And he concludes that it is necessary that we perceive the nature of the wax by means of the mind alone.¹ This would seem at first sight to mean that for Descartes intuition must be confined to reason or *mens pura*. But it is to be carefully observed that what he denies is that knowledge of the various properties is knowledge of the wax. He did not and could not deny that knowledge of them was knowledge, and thus that perceptual knowledge might also be intuitive. In fact in the twelfth Rule we have a passage which issues in a precisely contrary assertion, for there we are told that in perception and sense we have the understanding at work under certain conditions. Thus sense knowledge is genuine knowledge, but knowledge obtained under certain conditions, and determined by the action of a physical mechanism.

(ii) The limitation of intuition to reason would in effect stultify the entire method. We have seen that the *Regulae* is to be regarded as a sort of methodological introduction to the *Geometria*. And the main notion of the latter work is the introduction and elaboration of the use of coördinates. In epistemological terms then, we may say that the *Geometria* is concerned with the prob-

¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. VII, pp. 30-31.

lem of how to use perceptual knowledge in order to deal with general and abstract problems. And this would seem necessarily to involve the admission that it is possible to arrive at some sort of genuine knowledge in perception. For these reasons then it would seem that the attempt to limit intuition to the rational or conceptual side of experience is mistaken. It is merely the name for the type of knowledge or procedure which marks the work of the expert, and it cuts across the distinction of perceptual and conceptual knowledge.

A further misunderstanding of the doctrine of intuition is involved in the question as to whether Descartes ought not to have sought for deductive rather than intuitive certainty in dealing with mathematics. But while Descartes is very far from ignoring the importance of deduction, he deals with it in terms of intuition, which he regards as the more fundamental notion. He would insist that the mathematician must proceed by means of intuition if he is to arrive at valid results. By this he must not be understood to mean that mathematical intuition consists first and foremost in the ability to envisage a complex problem at a single glance. It would be wrong to suppose that he has in mind what Schopenhauer speaks of when he tells us that for him *The World as Will and as Idea* was a unified, though enormously complex judgment, or what Bosanquet means when he says that the distinction between inference and judgment is merely the number of elements involved. For Descartes the distinction between intuition and deduction is precisely that between a static and a dynamic element of experience. Deduction is a serial intuition, and is based wholly upon the power of the expert to make clear and distinct every step of his procedure. Intuition, we are told on the one hand, is easy, and on the other, it is the main secret of procedure (*principium artis secretum*). That is to say, the expert is one who is able to analyze a problem in such a way as to arrive immediately at its simple elements, which are then quite obvious, though without his guidance they might always remain obscure. Expertness, in mathematics as elsewhere, is essentially a matter of arriving at the constituents of a problem. And the power by which we make a synthesis of these

clearly defined elements is *deductio* or *inductio*, which latter might well be translated inference. It is notable that in practice this consists in what Descartes calls enumeration, that is to say, the running over one by one of the relevant elements, and that its certainty arises from memory. Once more, then, we see that the true meaning of intuition is always a description of the manner in which the expert will deal with a problem in breaking it up into its constituents, each one of which becomes so clear cut as to make possible a final and convincing synthesis.

Such being in general the nature of intuition, let us now raise another question, and ask what is the characteristic object of intuitive knowledge. We find that intuition will always be directed to what Descartes calls simple natures or simple essences. These are objects which are clear and distinct, that is to say, ultimate in the sense that they cannot be further divided by the distinction or reason. And here we find important confirmation for our claim that we must admit the legitimacy of perceptual intuition. For we find simple natures classified as being corporeal, spiritual, or both.¹ This is the same as the distinction between things and truths, which is made explicitly in his later work. And it is evident that he must admit that corporeal natures call for perceptual knowledge, so that we have intuition in the sphere of perception.

Descartes' treatment of simplicity exhibits a certain inconsistency which is symptomatic of a far reaching weakness in his methodology, and which is of interest here in that it throws light upon the general bearing of his notion of intuition. First and foremost he treats simplicity from what we might call the epistemological point of view, in that he defines a simple nature as the object of a particular type of knowledge, namely intuition. But in addition to this he deals with it from the point of view of logic, regarding a simple nature as being essentially an entity which possesses logical priority. That is to say, in the solution of any problem there will be some entities which will come first, as being inferentially prior, or indefinable. And we are told that other elements are determined as regards their degree of sim-

¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. X, p. 399.

plicity or absoluteness by the number of steps which esparate them from the original postulates of the system in question. He defines the absolute (*absolutum*) as "whatever contains in itself the pure and simple nature which is in question." And correspondingly we are told that the relative (*respectivum*) is such that it must be referred to the absolute, and deduced from it by an inferential series.¹ This is a quite notably close approach to the modern point of view of postulate theory. But Descartes failed in this essential regard, that he did not cut loose sufficiently from the particular mode of dealing with a problem which appealed to him, and did not generalize his own practice enough. Systematically, this failure manifests itself in the absence of any sharp distinction between the two quite disparate notions of simplicity, and in a confusion of the logical absolutes with the unavoidable data of experience; whereas the logical absolute is a matter of arbitrary choice, so long as it gives good results and satisfactory solutions, and may be very far removed from anything that it is possible to know by any sort of immediate intuition. It is necessary to see that intuitive and logical simplicity are distinct notions, though there may be a certain relation between them in many cases. Practically, this failure manifests itself in the assumption which Descartes tacitly makes, that the only fruitful way of dealing with a problem is that which he himself finds successful, whereas a problem will in a sense have as many solutions as transformations.

In connection with this study of the nature of the objects of intuition, we may remark in addition that the simple natures will always be universals. They are arrived at by means of the distinction of reason. We are aware of them at the point where it becomes impossible, by the distinction of reason, to divide the object of knowledge any further. And this process of abstraction is one of generalization. "It is impossible to make any abstraction save from something that is less general."² And this would certainly seem to involve the admission that the results of this process must be universals, a conclusion which

¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. X, p. 381.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. X, p. 458.

is confirmed when we consider the various lists of simple natures which we find in the *Regulae*, and elsewhere. Thus he admits in effect that when our mental content is free from confusions, it must consist of universals. Indeed he gives it as his opinion that while from the naïve point of view each individual thing with all its properties is a simple, the scientist must regard it as a complex of universals. This is brought out in his example of the magnet, where he tells us that in order to deal with the phenomena of magnetism on a scientific basis, we must grasp the various simple natures whose compounding goes to make up what we call a magnet. This is practically the view of scientific method which is advocated by the modern logico-analytic school of philosophy, and it is to this that the Cartesian doctrine of intuition leads.

II. INTUITION AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD.

It is clear that a methodological discussion which moves along the lines which we have indicated must quickly culminate in a raising of the epistemological problem proper. As soon as we begin to be concerned with the object of intuitive knowledge, the question as to the reality and externality of the world with which intuition brings us into contact becomes pressing. Especially is this the case when we are dealing with a perceptual intuition which consists in clear and distinct knowledge of things. And it is this question which we must now consider. There are, however, two points on the borderline between methodology and epistemology, which must be taken up in order more clearly to define the issue before us, before passing on to the problem of externality itself. First we must consider the relation of perceptual intuition to knowledge in general, as it is seen in the analysis of experience, and second we must take the structure of perceptual intuition itself.

(a) In the comment on the fourteenth Rule we find a most interesting analysis of experience designed to show that imagination, by which is meant perceptual intuition as we find it employed typically in geometry, must be a useful, if not an indispensable agent in the solution of general problems. Descartes begins

with a reference to his doctrine of recollection, saying that the learning of a new fact is not unlike calling to mind something previously known, but since forgotten. In general, progress in knowledge will consist in making explicit what was previously implicit. In detail this process must be carried on by means of comparison, which is the rationale of all thought. Thus, when we have a syllogism in *Barbara*, we compare a *quæsitum* with a *datum*, with respect to a middle term. So it is that all science must proceed by means of comparison, and a large part of its task will be to prepare the way by an elimination of the "relations and ratios" which complicate our "common nature" (the middle term), so that comparison may go on, and uniformity (*æqualitas*) be established between the *quæsitum* and the *datum*. But this uniformity can only be established by means of the concepts of greater and less. So we must be able to express our problems in terms of continuous magnitude in general; and since nothing can be affirmed of magnitude in general which is not true of magnitude in particular, we must reduce the matter to terms of particular magnitudes, for the sake of facility and certainty. And this analysis of experience issues in a demonstration of the importance of imagination, when Descartes tells us that he hopes to gain a great advantage by reducing questions concerning magnitude in general to terms of that sort of magnitude which is most easily represented in imagination. The conclusion then is that experience is by nature such that imagination or perceptual intuition can be used effectively in dealing with general problems.

(b) Such being the relation of perceptual intuition to scientific knowledge in general, the next question is that of the structure of perceptual intuition itself. This we find discussed in a passage in the twelfth Rule, where Descartes is considering the distinction between perceptual and conceptual knowledge. He explicitly warns us not to regard the scheme which he there proposes as an attempt at serious scientific accuracy, but only as a sort of illustration or working hypothesis, designed to make matters clearer. The account begins by explaining that the stimulus from the sense organ passes through the nervous system to the

sensorium commune and the *phantasia*, which themselves are parts of the neural structure. In its passage it modifies the whole system to some extent. And in this notion of perception as essentially conditioned by a physical mechanism we have the logical basis of conscious automatism. It is evident that Descartes comes near to holding all perceptual knowledge as being merely the adaptation of a physical organism. But he insists that the mind, which is the organ of knowledge, is not to be thought of as situated at the end of a chain of special sense, common sense, imagination and memory, but says rather that it is parallel with the entire physical process. So while perceptual knowledge is physical as regards its conditions, a fact which marks it off from conceptual knowledge, it is nevertheless genuine knowledge in that here we have the mind functioning, though under the conditions imposed by the constitution of the organism. It is important to be clear on these two points, that perceptual knowledge is knowledge properly so called, and that it is essentially conditioned by a physical organism.

It is this psycho-physical account of the nature of perceptual knowledge, and its distinction from conceptual knowledge that brings us to the heart of Descartes' treatment of the problem of externality. For it is in terms of this discussion that he decides what sort of object is typical of and necessary for perceptual intuition. We already know that this object will be a simple nature, because it is to be the object of an intuition, and also we know that it will be a corporeal nature. But now we are in a position to go a step further in its characterization. In the same passage from the twelfth Rule Descartes goes on to say that the external sense perceives by means of passivity, and by passivity he has in mind a very definite physical notion. The wax is passive with reference to the seal. And this is no mere metaphor, but an actual account of the way in which the external sense functions. "We must hold that the external form of the sentient body is really modified by the object in the same way as a change is produced in the superficies of the wax by the seal." And this, he says, is not the case with touch alone, where it seems most evident, but also with all the ex-

ternal senses. Thus Descartes arrives at the conclusion that the physical conditions of perception are such as to make it necessary that the typical object of all perceptual intuition shall be figure. And the significance of the schematic connection of special sense, common sense, imagination and memory is to show that figure is, as he puts it "carried off" from the organ of external sense to various parts of the neural mechanism, thus making figure essential to all sense knowledge. We may remark that while Descartes regarded figure as essential to perceptual knowledge, it is not correct to say that he regarded it as essential to mathematics. The passage which we have just been considering is written with the object of showing that if geometers employ figure in their work, they are using something that is exceedingly congruous with perceptual knowledge, and thus likely to help them. But he was well aware that it is quite possible for mathematics to proceed without figures, and, as has been pointed out, the aim of analytic geometry is not so much to extend the use of intuitive aids, as to limit and make it more discriminating.

The precise point of view from which Descartes, as a philosopher of science, will be led to deal with the problem of the external world is now evident. He must raise the question as to the objective reality of figure. But as soon as this point comes up, we are aware of a most serious ambiguity in his use of the term *figura*. For sometimes it would seem to refer to what he specifically calls *nuda figura*, which may be taken to mean geometrical figure, and sometimes it refers rather to the superficies of bodies. Thus our question is divided into two parts, and we consider first the objectivity of geometrical figures, and second the objectivity of superficieses.

The question as to the objectivity of *nudae figurae* is not one that is very important for this discussion; and could well be passed over, had not J. S. Mill asserted that for Descartes they were independently existing entities.¹ But this certainly needs qualification. In the *Discourse*, in the sixth *Meditation*, and in the *Replies to Second Objections*, we find him insisting that only

¹ *Logic*, bk. V, ch. 3, sec. iii.

the idea of an infinite being can guarantee existence, while the idea of a finite being can give us only possible existence. Thus logic does not demand that we regard geometrical figures as real entities on the ground that they can be conceived. And the fact that sense knowledge is in some way involved in their use is very far from deciding the case. In the first place, it is imagination which gives us geometrical figures, and the object of imagination may presumably be non-existent. In the second place, even when some figure is actually drawn, Descartes never tells us whether he regards this as the figure, the triangle or whatever it may be, itself, or an approximation only, or some sort of perceptual representation. While we may agree that sense-knowledge certainly does come into play, the precise sense in which it is used, and its precise relation to the figure as an abstract relational scheme is left quite unconsidered. And in the third place, as we shall see in a moment, sense knowledge in no way guarantees the real existence of its object.

The question as to the objectivity of superficies is much more interesting, for here we are led directly to Descartes' positive view of the external world. When dealing with superficies he finds himself in a dilemma. On the one hand, he expressly denies the reality of superficies. It is neither part of a body nor merely the common limit between one body and another. Thus it is not real but modal. But, on the other hand, the demands of physics, and indeed the demands of all experience are such as to demand a plurality of bodies. To break down the heterogeneity of the universe would be to close the door to all science and to all mental life of any kind. But it would seem that the denial of the reality of superficies must issue in precisely this effacement of all difference. For it is usual to distinguish between bodies in contact in terms of their superficies. This antinomy Descartes resolves by introducing another criterion of individuality, a dynamical criterion. We find this worked out in a most interesting and significant manner in that part of the *Principia* in which he deals with the fundamentals of physics. He defines an individual thing as "all that which is transferred together." Thus transference, or motion, is the principle of differentiation

in the physical universe, and his whole account of motion is thoroughly relativistic. In it we find the fundamental physical principle, for the world is conceived as a complex which is differentiated by the mutual motions of its components, and it is by this means that he obtains heterogeneity in the external world, which goes by the name of *extensio*.¹ If we take this discussion in connection with the comment on the fourteenth Rule we see clearly his point of view in this whole connection. For there we are told that extension actually means the possession of a definite locus, so that the external extended world is essentially a complex of matter which is differentiated and in fact made a world of possible experience by virtue of motion. And it is this world to which we are introduced when the external sense comes into contact with it.

So the narrow question of the reality of superficies at once opens out into the question of the reality of the entire complex which constitutes the datum of sense knowledge, and which we call the external world. In what sense, if any, will Descartes regard this complex as real or objective? It may appear that the answer is not far to seek, and that all we have to do is to refer to his well known scheme of thinking substance, extended substance, and uncreated substance. But there are reasons for supposing that this naïve realism did not represent his true position. We have already seen that many doubts may in general be cast upon his metaphysics. And more specifically we find that he was keenly aware of the difficulties of just such a theory of perception as he advanced, the theory which is usually taken as his characteristic and central position. Moreover, his view of intuition as the organ of science called for a very different solution of the problem of externality. We have seen that his notion of perceptual intuition arose in connection with his dualism. Of that dualism we have the first specific trace in the passage in the twelfth Rule to which reference has already been made. There he writes as follows: "For a knowledge of things, two factors are to be considered, we who have the knowledge, and the things themselves which are known." And he

¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, pp. 53 ff.

goes on to say that while he would like to give a full account of the first of these factors, and explain what mind is, what body is, and how it is informed by the mind, this is not possible, and he must be content with the schematic outline which we have already noticed. Thus the dualism begins as a dualism of mind and brain rather than of mind and matter, a psycho-physical rather than an epistemological dualism. And from the functional point of view it appears as a dualism of two kinds of knowledge, perceptual and conceptual. It is only when other motives come in later that the true epistemological or metaphysical dualism makes its appearance, and that we find discussion being carried on in terms of knowledge and its object. Thus what is perhaps the most cogent reason for regarding Descartes as finally and unequivocally pledged to a naïve realism is dissipated.

It is of course very easy to attribute to Descartes quite an uncritical belief in the independent reality of the world of perceptual intuition. And we can find in his writings many admissions to this effect. But in the first place, what may be spoken of as his true view, true at least in being consistent with the requirements of his methodology, was never worked out very explicitly and is to be found in suggestions rather than in extended exposition. And secondly his literary method was such that, in using the terminology of ordinary life rather than a technical instrument, he should often suggest theories which he did not hold. And the fact that we find him continually throwing doubt upon the reality of physical objects, and refusing to accept this as a necessary assumption, though admitting that it was a natural one, goes to show that he was by no means so naïve in his approach to the problem of externality as various damaging admissions would suggest. In speaking of his method of doubt he writes, “. . . We doubt in the first place whether any of the objects of sense or imagination exist. . . .”¹ And this cannot be dismissed as a piece of metaphysical supererogation, for the reasons he gives are the eminently cogent and sane ones of the uncertainty of our senses and the possibility of

¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. VIII, pp. 5-6.

hallucinations. And in the *Meditations* we find this critical doubt directed against precisely that naïve common sense dualism which is supposed to be the characteristic Cartesian theory of the external world. In the sixth Meditation he points out that the copy theory of knowledge is nothing more than tentative at the best. On the assumption that material things exist, he says, the difference between conception and perception might be that in the former the mind is directed to things within it, while in the latter it is directed to things without it. But clearly this turns upon the assumption of external existence. And Descartes insists that perception, or perceptual intuition, furnishes no ground for such an assumption. Even though certain considerations would seem to support it, it can only be accepted with the greatest caution. For always we are liable to the deception of our senses, and always the phenomena of dreams and hallucinations present a difficulty. And even if we are to allow the external existence of the objects of which we have perceptual knowledge, this would not carry with it a copy theory of knowledge, and the relation between the object and the percept would still remain a problem. In the third Meditation he makes three points against the apparently natural hypothesis that our adventitious ideas are copies of independently existing entities. First we must distinguish between the spontaneous inclination which makes some beliefs seem plausible, and the natural light which gives valid certitude. It is to the former rather than to the latter that our belief in independent existence and the copy theory is to be attributed. We may note in passing that this distinction between assurance and certitude presents a formidable difficulty for his theory of knowledge. Second, the fact that our adventitious ideas are to a great extent beyond our volitional control is no proof that their cause is external to ourselves. For it is quite possible that their arbitrary nature arises from our own constitution which cannot be altered at will. Third, even if we admit that these ideas arise from some external and independent cause, this is no proof that they are copies of that cause. On the contrary, we find the greatest divergence between different presentations of the same object, as when a

tower looks at one time round, and at another square, at one time large, and at another small. Thus to sum up we may say that Descartes, in spite of inconsistent remarks, was well aware that the assumption of independently existing entities and a copy theory of knowledge constituted a problem rather than a solution, and that it is impossible to attribute to him a naïve belief in the external reality of the world of perception.

Finally we may point out that even if we allow the introduction of a God whose goodness guarantees the validity of perceptual intuition, what Descartes might actually have claimed to establish by this questionable piece of metaphysics would be only the reliability of sense knowledge. But for him reliability does not mean objectivity or truth. He explains the notion in the sixth Meditation. "For I see that in this as in other similar things, I have been in the habit of perverting the order of nature, because those perceptions of sense having been placed within me by nature solely for the purpose of signifying to my mind what things are beneficial or hurtful to the composite whole of which it forms a part, and being up to that point sufficiently clear and distinct, I yet avail myself of them as if they were absolute rules by which I might immediately determine the essence of the bodies which are outside me, as to which in fact they can teach me nothing but what is most obscure and confused." Thus reliability receives a behavioristic interpretation, and is seen to have little or nothing to do with objective reference.

Thus we see that Descartes' general approach to the problem of externality, as conditioned by his methodology, would tend strongly in the direction of subjectivism of some kind. This might be expected from his view of the nature of intuition and of the requirements of science. For he lays far more emphasis on certitude than on truth. Indeed he goes so far as to tell us that if an idea is clear and distinct we cannot help regarding it as valid or true. But while we can say with some assurance that the theory usually ascribed to him was not one which he could take very seriously, it is true that he had no other consistently and explicitly worked out. All that we have is in the form of suggestions. Perhaps the nearest approach to a constructive

solution which we can find would be to take his notion of the data of intuition as being universals in connection with his view of extension as essentially a relational complex of spatial type. This would at least suggest a theory of externality to be worked out along the lines of treating a real object as a complex of perceptual qualities with a determinate spatio-temporal locus, and it would exhibit the connection between Descartes, himself a mathematical philosopher, and the modern logico-analytic tendency.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

The New Rationalism. The Development of a Constructive Realism upon the Basis of Modern Logic and Science, and through the Criticism of Opposed Philosophical Systems. By EDWARD GLEASON SPAULDING. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1918.—pp. xviii, 532.

However great may be the toll which time exacts of creeds as well as doctrines, man's interest in formulating them is deep-seated and abiding. As Socrates so long ago observed, it is an essential human trait to attempt to fathom the meaning of one's existence and to discover the nature of the world—both physical and social—with which man must hold commerce and with which his fortunes are so intimately interwoven. These attempts may take the form of emotional or mystical contemplation, of rigid deduction from accepted truths, or of generalization and interpretation of observed facts; they may issue in myth, poetry, declaration of faith, or reasoned statement. But some adoption of principle, some direction by ends and values consciously entertained, some comprehension of the meaning of the world and of life is universal to human conduct. It is in this sense, and in this alone, that every man may be said to have a philosophy.

Philosophies, moreover, are significant and time-defying in precisely the degree in which they enrich and purify the springs of personal and social life, deepen and clarify man's insights into the meaning of his world, and extend the boundaries of his comprehension and his sympathies. These are the sources of philosophy's vitality and prestige. Yet the 'professional' philosopher not infrequently fails to take this fact into account. In the interests of 'philosophic' advance, he inclines to the adoption of an esoteric technique and terminology and then proceeds to ostracize the non-conformist from the school of philosophers—a fate which brings suffering to the outcasts only because they have all that reverence for philosophy which human society generally, with the occasional exception of the 'professional' philosopher, has always had and will ever maintain.

Our present age, with its release from ancient moorings, its restlessness, discontent, pervading cynicism, and explosiveness, needs nothing more than a sound and convincing interpretation and doctrine of

life, as an essential constituent of, and an indispensable guide to, a genuine and rational human existence. Such a philosophy, however, must grow out of the historical development; it must spring from the currents of life itself.

In his present volume, Professor Spaulding manifests himself as a professional philosopher, and unquestionably as one of high rank. He is in part animated, as he states in his preface, by the desire to combat the tragically erroneous philosophy which actuated the recent attack on civilization. This philosophy and ethics, he—not being an orthodox pragmatist—describes, not as absolute idealism, but as naturalism. Unfortunately, however, he does not proceed to inquire into the precise character of the particular attitudes and doctrines involved or into their setting. Instead of dealing directly with them in the concrete, he, having designated them ‘naturalistic,’ undertakes a logical and abstract analysis of naturalism. And the naturalism which he analyzes is not one that “exists” in actual life or even in theories as actually developed by philosophers in the course of history; it is one which, in the purity and nakedness examined, merely “subsists”—it is the doctrine which logically is naturalism. The results, however cogent and however important, cannot in the nature of things do much in the way of clarifying or bettering the conditions of contemporary life. Indeed, only a rationalistic bias can conceal the fact that it is through appeals to emotion, interest and purpose that conduct is directed, rather than through the dispassioned presentation of a logical argument. Professor Spaulding is persistent and unflinching in his assaults on relativism and humanism, whether in the field of morals or of truth. He staunchly and consistently argues that there are eternal and unchanging verities, principles and ideals which man must discover, acknowledge and adopt as guides to action if all is to be well with him. Yet the discussions of ethics and social life are quite subordinate, and the speech lacks the gripping qualities of eloquence. This, together with the fact that the treatment abstracts from the historical development and setting of issues and relates to logically formulated theories, rather than to concrete philosophies as actually entertained prevents the author from doing all that can be done toward revealing the truth of human life and toward transforming this truth into the fabric of institutions.

But it is not so much with attack as with “philosophical refutation” and, be it said to his large credit, with philosophical construction that Professor Spaulding is concerned. His inquiry is an evaluation of doctrines regarded merely as expressions of what purports to be truth

and therefore in abstraction from their historical development, their cultural setting, their meaning to those who formulated them, or their relation to the remaining doctrines of the same philosopher or philosophical system; further, it is an effort to determine whether there is not a set of principles logically presupposed by all philosophical systems; and, having come to an affirmative conclusion in this matter, the author attempts to develop this set of principles into a philosophical system by the use of the new logic of relations and of the methods and results of modern science. Such a program requires not merely wide learning but also splendid intellectual courage, and these qualities will be cheerfully conceded to the author even by those who may receive an occasional shock because of inaccuracies and errors in matters that fall within the history of philosophy.¹

All philosophies other than the new rationalism are traced by the author to a common source, namely, the Aristotelian logic. This logic, however, is said to be dominated by the "thing-concept" and

¹ To give a number of illustrations: On p. 10 Fichte is said to have assumed a "substance-like, underlying entity." On p. 59 it is declared that pantheism, as well as deism and theism, holds to the "fact both of purpose and a Purposer" and teaches that "this Purposer is external to that to which purpose is given." (Spinoza is cited in illustration.) Höfding is interpreted (p. 61) as maintaining that there is a "power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness." The note on p. 108 mentions Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Fichte, and Hegel as teaching that logical principles and categories are "subjective or psychical entities that are attributes of and that inhere in the knowing mind" and that are "read into" the realm of known things "by the causal influence of the knowing on that which is (to be) known." Of Kant it is said (p. 217, n.) that he regards the knowing self as "a substratum-like entity in which both *a priori* concepts (categories) and empirical experiences (sensations and ideas) inhere"; and that he believes the "original" self "can be known in its real and genuine character" (p. 220). Bergson is mentioned as a positivist (p. 247) as well as as a pragmatist (p. 307, n.). Pratt is included among the pragmatists (pp. 284, n. and 307, n.), as also is Baldwin (p. 307, n.). It is said (p. 308) that for Spinoza physical entities and all other entities are "in some way psychical or mental in nature, especially as identical with the mental 'contents' of some Absolute Mind, Self, or Spirit." The note on p. 312 includes Fichte, as well as Beck and Schulze, as implying that at least some things, or things-in-themselves, "act causally on a thing-like ego to produce sensations;" the note on p. 322, referring to a doctrine of Fichte's, states that its demonstration is to be found "all through his *Wissenschaftslehre*, Werke, Vols. I and II. It is repeated in many forms and ways, and one reference is as good as another." Recent studies have made it compellingly clear that there are very marked differences in the Fichtean philosophy even during the so-called first period, to say nothing of the philosophy succeeding 1800. Eucken's philosophy is said to be a "Universal Vitalism of Romanticism" due "to the influence of the concept of biological evolution and of the science of biology" (p. 342). James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* is placed under the "general works on mysticism" (p. 407, n.).

therefore to issue in systems whose structure is determined by the notions: of substance, as a substratum in which qualities inhere; of causality, as the action of thing upon thing; of classes, as the grouping of things on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity; of the additive relation, by virtue of which wholes have only those characteristics possessed by the constituent parts. The systems based on these implications of the Aristotelian logic are fundamentally two: (1) causation philosophies (represented by phenomenalism, subjective idealism, positivism, naturalism and pragmatism), and (2) substance philosophies (represented by objective or absolute idealism, panlogism and ethical idealism, voluntarism, and vitalistic and romantic idealism). The most fundamental difference between these two sets of philosophical systems is found in the fact that, while both uphold the doctrine of internal relations, the one, emphasizing the universality of the causal relation and of interaction, holds to "the mutual modification" theory of relations, while the other, under the influence of the concept of substance, holds to the "underlying—or transcendent—reality" theory.

It is not likely that the objective idealist of today would recognize the lineaments of his philosophy as these are sketched by Professor Spaulding, and the subjective idealist would be surprised to learn that he was understood as believing that "knowing *makes* or *creates* its objects *completely*" (p. 237.) But, having concluded that all philosophies but his own are based on the logic of the "thing-concept" and that their central feature must therefore be the concept either of substance, in the common-sense meaning of the term, or of causality, in the dynamic sense, the author seems to pay little regard to what is actually maintained, contenting himself with an elaboration of the principles which would logically be associated with these concepts regarded in abstraction from all else. The result is a treatment which is not merely highly abstract but, in spite of great acuteness, somewhat barren and unconvincing. The essential and the common difficulty in the causation philosophies is found in the fact that they affirm themselves to be true and, in addition, affirm certain things to be matters of fact, while yet teaching that to be in the knowing relation is *ipso facto* to have undergone alteration. The systems, therefore, are self-refuting inasmuch as they assert that the act of cognition affects the content and yet, by presenting themselves as true, they presuppose that the known object, though related to the act of knowing, is nevertheless independent of it and unaltered by it. The substance philosophies are described as monistic systems maintaining that

reality is ultimately an "Absolute One," and that this principle of unity, which is necessary in order to relate the manifold, is "at a different level, either transcendent to or underlying" the manifold. These philosophies are then likewise characterized as self-contradictory, on the ground that, according to their doctrine of relations, a unity would be required to relate the postulated unity to the manifold, a further unity to relate this unity, and so on *ad infinitum*. If, that is to say, there is to be a series or system, it must be because the relation itself, though external to the terms, is presupposed, in the last analysis, as adequate for the purpose, though this is precisely what substance philosophies are most concerned to deny in their teachings.

All philosophical systems are thus shown to imply that there are some items of knowledge, and thus some instances, in which the thing as known is precisely the same as it is outside the knowledge relation; that relatedness does not imply dependence; and that, while there is an ego-centric situation, there is no ego-centric predicament, inasmuch as it is both possible and legitimate to employ analysis *in situ*, to examine the nature of objects without reference to the fact that they are objects of or for a subject. These truths, represented as presupposed by all philosophical systems, are then taken as the basis of the new rationalism.

In its structure and development, this philosophy is based on the modern logic of relations as opposed to the logic of substance—on the logic dealing with symmetrical, asymmetrical, transitive and intransitive relations, with types of order, series, and variables, which latter are related, not causally, but functionally. The cardinal doctrines are: Knowing and consciousness are related externally to, are independent of, other entities. (Hence, realism.) In spite of the ubiquity of the ego, therefore, the knowing situation may be examined by analysis *in situ*. While there are situations in which the older methods of analysis fail or lead to antinomies, analysis is not thereby proven invalid, as Bergson, for example, argues, for there are newer methods of analysis, as found more particularly in modern mathematics, and these have demonstrated their adequacy. (Hence, the "new" rationalism.) Knowing and known object may be qualitatively different, each being precisely what it is found as, whatever the variety either of entities or of the relationships that obtain between them. (Hence, ontological pluralism.) Illusions may be objective—and the author interprets them as such. (Hence, pan-objectivism.) Objects may be genuinely known; they may be unknown (though not unknowable), may become known, or may cease to be known. (Hence, absolutism.)

With not a little skill, and with great suggestiveness, Professor Spaulding develops the system of general principles involved in these propositions and thus comes to grips with the questions of ontology, cosmology, epistemology and psychology, and, somewhat sketchily and with doubtful success, with certain fundamental questions of value, teleology, and theology. Ontological status is given not merely to existents (defined as physical or mental entities which occupy a particular space or time, or both, and have in addition "that full quota of characteristics, or be that full quota, which the sciences of physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and the like, find it empirically to have" (p. 491)), but also to subsistents—entities discovered by reason, though also by dreaming and by the waking imagination. This is a vast realm, including such diverse entities as relations, classes as such, numbers, space, time, logical principles, series, infinity, continuity, terms and qualities; also some entities contrary to existent fact, such as *perpetuum mobile*; "false" hypothetical entities, such as phlogiston; imagined entities, such as centaurs and satyrs; illusory and hallucinatory objects, such as the 'snakes' of tremens; and, in addition to the foregoing, ideals of all sorts—justice, mercy, etc., in distinction from the existents, just and merciful acts. An attic is indeed a convenient place to which to consign whatever cannot otherwise be readily disposed of, but, in connection with Spaulding's realm of subsistents, questions such as the following arise: (1) How reconcile this changeless order with the facts of evolution and of time? (2) How relate it to the order of existents—justice, for example, to just acts? (3) Is it really intelligible to speak of subsistents as possessing "agency," "efficiency"? (Spaulding cites the case of men "actuated by ideals that have never yet received concrete existential form." But are not the ideals, when and in so far as they are efficient or actuating, mental *existents*, and not subsistents?) (4) With existents and subsistents so diverse in character, what meaning can be attached to the doctrine that "God is the totality of values both existent and subsistent, and of those agencies and efficiencies with which these values are identical" (p. 517)? (Further queries: According to this view, what is the relation of God to man? And how can one say: "Accordingly, if God is personality, He is also more than personality," etc. (p. 517)?)

To the reviewer one of the most characteristic and significant features of Spaulding's new rationalism is its empiricism. The ontological pluralism has already been mentioned. Further empiristic tendencies are: (1) The admission that, while truth is found and not

created, a most successful way both of finding and of testing it is through experimentation and the processes of trial and error; (2) the rejection of the doctrine of internal relations; (3) the denial of the universality of implication; (4) the acceptance of the doctrine that "the mere 'givenness' of the co-presence of several characteristics establishes their consistency" (p. 490); (5) dependence upon experience and upon the empirical methods of science in determining what is existent; (6) the view that logic is an empirical science and that the various types of relations, classes, series and functions which form its concern are obtained through a process of induction. Empiricism of a very fundamental sort, moreover, issues from Spaulding's adoption of the three following principles: (a) "parts form wholes which manifest, or are, one or more qualities that are different from those of the parts"; (b) "new qualities are a law unto themselves"; (c) "one and the same entity can stand in several relations, and these relations are not constitutive of one another." It follows from these principles that the higher levels of realities and of organization can neither be reduced to or deduced from the lower; they can be understood only if observed and studied as found. In connection with Spaulding's clear insistence upon evolution as creative, however, one wonders at some of his criticisms of Bergson, particularly since he himself regards the process as alogical and describes it as undeniably efficient in that it "produces," "causes," and "brings about" (p. 516).

The New Rationalism provides much stimulus for discussion but it does so because it is replete with thought and with suggestiveness. It may confidently be called a substantial contribution to contemporary philosophy. Unfortunately, it contains many typographical errors; the references to books and to authors discussed are frequently so general as to be of little value; and the bibliographies, though useful, require careful revision.

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Some Suggestions in Ethics. BY BERNARD BOSANQUET. London, Macmillan and Co.; New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918.—pp. viii, 248.

This book is intended for "ordinarily thoughtful persons who are interested in reflecting upon morality." Though no friend to casuistry, Dr. Bosanquet considers that moral theory may dispel some perplexities by showing the assumptions upon which they are based to be untrue. Starting from the phrase 'living for others,' the first part of the book passes to an examination of the self and others, the nature

of the individual and of value, and the relation of goodness to value. The general point of view will be familiar to readers of the author's Gifford Lectures. In the second part these conceptions are applied to special difficulties and hindrances of the good, such as the relation of evil to perfection, the growing repugnance to punishment, and stupidity. The book avoids controversy, although the author often treads over hidden fires, and it is impossible not to admire the skill with which Dr. Bosanquet's dialectic seizes and uses permanent and significant elements, not only in Plato and Hegel, but also in writers with whom he is in less perfect sympathy. Dr. Bosanquet has always held firmly to the great humanist tradition, and a younger generation of philosophers, sometimes too absorbed in the technicalities of their craft, may well envy the insight with which he brings experience of life and literature¹ to bear on philosophical problems.

It may be objected—indeed it has been objected—that this book is casuistry with a difference, since it does attempt to set principles in relation to particular cases. But the point does not penetrate to the core of the author's position. Dr. Bosanquet, I take it, means by casuistry the *art* of applying general rules to particular cases, an art that reveals its mechanical nature in proportion as it achieves complete codification. On his view the function of philosophy is to understand its subject-matter, not to dictate. Much of the book applies a solvent criticism to the general conceptions which the ordinary man uses in judging or guiding action. In the first chapter, for example, the phrase 'living for others' leads to the master-conceptions of individuality and value, which are too formal in character to afford specific guidance. Or again the discussion on punishment attempts to disentangle its function from a mass of notions which have lately encrusted it "like some marine Glaucus": these notions are, it is contended, taken uncritically from current medical or biological theory, or influenced by false humanitarianism, or by imperfect analogies from the education of children. Is the result merely the substitution of good principles for imperfect rules, of good casuistry for bad? We may distinguish between the play of the judgment upon the actual structure of values which men have achieved and what Croce conveniently calls the *gusto pratico*, when the individual faces and must act in a unique situation, unique because his act is spontaneous and creative. It is the claim of any principle or rule to take command of the act that Dr. Bosanquet repels, because no principle "can tell you its own proportion of truth compared with others, nor when it is

¹ The 'author wanted' on p. 167 is Adam Lindsay Gordon.

right to attend to it, and when it would be better to think of things otherwise." This I take to be the position implied in Aristotle's doctrine that the *φρόνιμος* himself is the judge by reason of his achieved character, and it is one side of Socrates' figure of the mid-wife.

Dr. Bosanquet's main contention is that while values are impersonal, the individual feels and judges them. "They are imperatives or notes of perfection to which the persons as facts are subordinate." It is from this point that the various lines of discussion in the book radiate. I may touch on one or two to indicate his mode of treatment.

If on one side Dr. Bosanquet refuses to allow the past in the form of tradition or precept or creed to bind the present, on the other he regards any theory that progress is the end, or that immortality is a recompense for suffering or sacrifice, as showing a lack of faith and insight. Such views nullify the meaning of self-sacrifice—the note of the book is *Stirb'und werde*—and place before the finite individual a false ideal of perfection. The bearing of this view may be considered in the light of two examples.

It is asked what is the value of the many who "have lived faithfully a hidden life and rest in unvisited tombs." The error to be avoided here lies in considering them as means or instruments or in judging them as if they fell short of high achievement. The values that they have contributed and do contribute to the common stock give a color and character to the life of the whole. To touch one line of argument: our civilization has taken its form from men organized in families, in guilds like the builders of cathedrals, and in communities, all with a positive life and spirit of their own. "In all this medium of unity, which, though unreflective, is not subliminal, we have an undeniable human value of a direct and universal type, in which there cannot be a human creature who is not a partaker in some mode or degree." We may combine with this an instance from the most suggestive chapter on stupidity, in which the author quotes a friend as objecting to the description of Christ as perhaps a rather clumsy carpenter. Such clumsiness implies a lack of respect for the work and the material; but the crafts stamp those who practise them with an insight and veracity which lies at the base of social structure. The point is that the humble values, which are apt to be overlooked, "grow at every point into the general vitality which surrounds" them.

Dr. Bosanquet utters a plain challenge to those who consider that the school to which he belongs slur over the problem of evil. He cites almost with exultation that passage of Hegel which suggests

that evil is an illusion which prevails in all finite spirits, and lays bare what appears to him to be its relation to the old antithesis of Justification by Faith and Works. Evil is to be taken in the context of the finite individual's life, "made out of the same stuff as good; the stuff of life, its passions and values." Again the point is that we cannot deal with it by thrusting it out of relation to its context, and imagining a future conquest of an alien system by progress. "Evil is evil; once more, you have not to palter with this truth; but, all the same, it can be overcome; not at a distance, but now and here; and the secret of overcoming it is to feel that it is overcome, and to treat it practically as a conquered thing. Such is the faith of science in its battle with appearances; it does not suppose some to be intelligible, and some not. If it did, it could not work. And such must in effect be the faith of the good man, if he is in any place or time to overcome the world. He must not suppose that here and there he may light upon an absolute evil which is in principle a separate thing, unresolvable and insuperable" (p. 104). Here the author appeals from moralism, a "thing of theory," to that hope which men call salvation or liberation, the heart of great religions. Nothing was more curious or lamentable in the late war than the readiness of some teachers of religion to stake their belief in the goodness of things upon the Allied victory, as if our defeat would prove evil to be invincible. Whatever practical utility such an attitude may have, it carries religion back to Mount Carmel. It is against such faithless demands for the liquidation of evil that Dr. Bosanquet sets his account of 'liberation' as giving men the power to transform the immediate evil into good. "It is not an accident that 'morality' in a certain sense has been the *bête noire* of religion; not, for example, that Scott has put in the mouth of a woman of almost perfect saintliness such words as these: 'Mony a hungry, starving creature, when he sits down on a Sunday forenoon to get something that might warm him to the great work, has a dry clatter o' morality driven about his lugs.'" The strength of this view seems to lie in its refusal to make drafts on the future for rectification or compensation. It is not, I think, a valid objection to urge that the real difficulty is the fact that evil has a *spirit* of its own, hostile to the good. For if the principle of liberation has any power, must it not at least mean that such a spirit, however deformed, can be changed? We must in this discussion bear in mind the fuller argument in *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, which subordinates the judgment of good to the judgment of perfection.

In concluding these notes on a most suggestive book, one would

like to ask gratefully for a fuller discussion on the definability of the good, some hints on Croce's theory that theoretical error is practical (p. 108), and some further guidance on the theory of education at a time when we are in danger of being made efficient by discarding many things of value.

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Teoria e storia della Storiografia. By BENEDETTO CROCE. Bari, Gius. Laterza & Figli, 1917.—pp. vi, 293.

This is the fourth and concluding part of the author's series entitled *Filosofia come Scienza della Spirito*, and the only part which has not been translated into English (the translation of Part Three has not yet appeared). We may hope that this part will soon be made accessible to English readers, for it is valuable in itself, and important among the writings of Signor Croce. Indeed, Dr. H. Wildon Carr, in *The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce*, declares that in Croce's conception of history we come on the "central idea and fundamental principle" of his philosophy, and in his Preface Croce says: "The problem of historical comprehension is that to which are directed all my researches into the modes of the mind, as to their distinction and unity, as to their truly concrete life, which is development and history, and as to historical thought, which is the self-consciousness of this life. In a certain sense, then, to take up again, at a time when the circle of my labors on the philosophy of mind was completed, the subject of the writing of history, and to deal with it more fully than before, was the most natural conclusion that I could give to the entire work." The present book is an amplification of what had already been said in the *Logic*, and most of its contents had already appeared separately in Italian reviews in 1912-13. As a result, there is more repetition than would appear in a work written as a unit, and the parts are not always in the order easiest for the reader to grasp. Yet the general impression made by the whole is clear and deep.

The first part of the work deals with *The Theory of the Writing of History*. Here we read that "history [properly so called] is living history, chronicle is dead history" (p. 10). That is, history is real only when it is "contemporary," or a genuine product of the thought of the man who writes it. A book which is essentially only a collection of "sources" is not worthy of the name of a history, nor is "poetical history," which is a product of feeling and not of thought (pp. 19-22). "Universal history" cannot be treated, but the universal can be known through history; "history is thought, and, as such, thought

of the universal, of the universal in its concreteness, and therefore always particularly determined" (p. 49; see also p. 131, etc.). The "philosophy of history" is an abstraction, and destructive of true history, for, as Croce reiterates, philosophy and history are identical. "All the controversies . . . which philosophers, methodologists in history, and sociologists think their particular provinces . . . lead for us to simple historically motivated problems of philosophy, connected with all the others which philosophy treats" (p. 71). The problems of history are those of the life of man, and hence those of philosophy. Croce is a firm believer in unity, and hence insists that no part of the past can be adequately dealt with apart from the whole, and that distinctions can be made only for practical purposes. August Boeckh has told us that a man who studies any age should wholly reconstruct it, knowing not merely its political history, or its literature, or its philosophy, but all that can be known about it. Croce would agree, with the caution that "what man needs is to reproduce the past in imagination and rethink it while remaining in the present, not to uproot himself from the present to fall back into the dead past" (p. 254). But if he who concerns himself with the activity of the human mind in the past must do so in the light of an understanding of all its manifestations, this understanding cannot be an abstract metaphysics, for Croce is sure that there cannot be any universality except through the concrete and individual. Hence he declares that "a great advance in philosophic culture would tend to this effect: all who study human things, jurists, economists, moralists, philologists, all those who study historical matters, would become conscious and disciplined philosophers; and the philosopher in general, the *purus philosophus*, would no longer find a place among the learned professions." At least students of philosophy should not confine themselves to works on abstract metaphysics—as has been done as a result of the false belief in a "fundamental and unique problem" peculiar to philosophy. "The foundation of philosophy as history is all history, and to circumscribe his foundation to the history of philosophy alone, and of 'general' or 'metaphysical' philosophy, is possible only when there is an unconscious adhesion to the old idea of a philosophy not methodological but metaphysical" (pp. 145-146). Philosophy is, then, the methodology of the study of human affairs as they are, and does not offer an esoteric revelation. "To philosophy conceived as methodology ought to correspond a history of philosophy . . . which would consider as philosophy not merely what pertains to the problem of immanence and transcendence, of world and other

world, but all which has had the power to increase our patrimony of directive conceptions and our understanding of true history, and to form the reality of thought in which we live" (p. 148).

In the second part of the work, *An Outline of the History of Historical Writing*, Croce sketches the subject from classical times to the present, keeping always in mind his theory of the continual progress of the world. Partly, it may be, as a result of it, he gives higher praise to the historical works of the Middle Ages than we have generally been accustomed to hear, saying that just as "only the less cultivated and more fanatical among priests and Catholics in general" "defame Voltaire and the eighteenth century as the work of the devil," "only the vulgar democrats, similar to the others in anachronism" slander the Middle Ages (p. 250).

The work abounds with passages that attract attention, as the assertion that the belief of the Germans that they were the chosen people resulted from an abstract "philosophy of history" (p. 261), or the suggestion that the philosophy of value places "in opposition to the conceptions of science the conception of value as a protection for the mind, . . . 'like a philosophical *cave canem*'" (p. 285). The volume is vigorously written, is evidently the work of a learned and thoughtful man, zealous for the truth, and can furnish help, or at least food for thought, to most students of human affairs.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

The Relation of John Locke to English Deism. By S. G. HEFELBOWER. University of Chicago Press, 1918.—pp. viii, 188.

To determine the existence and extent of the influence of one thinker upon another is a difficult task. In some cases, where doctrines peculiar to one man reappear in the work of a successor and where we have some direct evidence of relationship, the connections can be established with reasonable certainty. But the more we study the history of philosophy the more we find that such cases are exceptional. To help us in demonstrating a relationship we have, as a rule, two classes of evidence to help us: external, consisting of agreements and differences in method or idea; internal, consisting of definite admissions of indebtedness or hostility. But agreements and differences can give us, at best, only presumptive evidence of a real connection: they may be accidental, or due to some undiscovered source, or symptomatic of a cause upon which both thinkers are dependent. The internal evidence is ambiguous, because, since we do not know how the ideas of one man 'influence' another, B may confidently assert that he is a disciple of A when he is, as a fact, nothing of the kind, or, on the other hand, he may really have been influenced by A without knowing and consequently without stating it. In face of these difficulties the historian of philosophy, if he be circumspect, usually contents himself with giving us as it were the natural history of ideas and touches lightly on the human agencies of transmission. The result is that the account becomes vague where the actual influence of particular philosophers is in question.

It is a vagueness of this kind about the relation of Locke to English Deism that Professor Hefelbower undertakes to dispel in this study. He is not content with traditional estimates, such as that Locke is the "progenitor" of the Deists; that they are "the descendants of Locke"; that "from his theory of religion came Deism"; that Locke "has an honorable place in the history of Deism." He is in search of something more definite. His own thesis is that Locke and Deism "are co-ordinate parts of one and the same general movement." They "appear as different manifestations of the same spirit of the age, which was seen also in all other writers of the liberal party. . . . The resemblances between Locke and Deism are not those of parent and child, but rather those of fellow-members of the same family. They are related, and closely related, but their relation is not causal, nor do they mark different stages of the same movement."

In arguing in support of this conclusion Professor Hefelbower handles the problem of method with conspicuous success,—in fact the whole book may be taken as a study in the consistent use of an instrument of historical research. First, he catalogues the main points of agreement and of difference between

Locke and the Deists in regard to their use of the concepts of reason and nature and upon religious and theological problems. Secondly, he estimates the significance of these agreements and differences in the light of the ideas current among all liberal thinkers of the period. His conclusion is that what Locke is generally supposed to have contributed to the development of Deism might just as well have come from these other sources. The ideas were in the air; Locke had no monopoly of them. Where the characteristic doctrines of Deism are concerned it is their difference from, not their resemblance to, those of Locke that most clearly emerges. Third, he tests this result by a consideration of the internal evidence. "The internal evidence shows that Locke's influence on the deistic movement, when it was at its height, was small, that it was greatest in Toland and either negligible or without significance in the writings of Wollaston, Tindal, and Morgan, who wrote the most important and most characteristic deistic books. As the movement advanced, it seemed to get farther away from Locke, and either ignored him or assumed a critical attitude toward him, more especially toward his religious views."

This work has a twofold value for the historian of philosophy. First, a general value. It is a brief but an exceedingly detailed study. In a region where there is a great temptation to make hasty generalizations the author has held himself down to patient and arduous research among the discoverable facts. His work seems to me to bear the same relation to the ideal history of philosophy as the work of philologists bears to the ideal criticism of literature. Professor Hefelbower has done some of the hard digging for foundations without which stately buildings will not endure. The particular value of his study lies, first, in the sharpness with which he has defined the distinguishing marks of Deism, second, in the way in which he has brought out the conspicuous differences, hitherto little emphasized, between Locke and the Deists.

As far as a reviewer who has no special knowledge of the period may judge, the work has been competently done. It is thorough, the argument is presented with admirable clearness, and the author shows a nice sense of proportion in the balance he maintains between a justice to detail and a feeling for perspective.

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John Dewey's Logical Theory. By DELTON THOMAS HOWARD. New York, Longmans, Green, & Co., 1918.—pp. v, 135.

This doctor's thesis from the Sage School of Philosophy, published as No. 11 in the "Cornell Studies in Philosophy," is a timely work of interest and importance. The subject itself deserves careful treatment, and the treatment it receives is scholarly and on the whole judicial. Mr. Howard presents, largely in Dewey's own words, the views held by the latter at various successive stages of their development, going back to the first published articles in 1886. The progressive changes of the author studied are brought out clearly.

Dewey started, as almost every philosophical thinker beginning his work in the last decades of the preceding century in America did start, from what

is generally known as the neo-Hegelian position. From this position he worked his way, slowly and cautiously, to his present well-known immediatism and instrumentalism. As Mr. Howard points out in his preface, an historical treatment of Professor Dewey's logical theories is especially appropriate, "since functionalism glories in the genetic method. . . . At any rate, the historical method employed in the following study may escape censure by reason of its simple character, for it is little more than a critical review of Professor Dewey's writings in their historical order, with no discussion of influences and connections, and with little insistence upon rigid lines of development. It is proposed to 'follow the lead of the subject-matter' as far as possible; to discover what topics interested Professor Dewey, how he dealt with them, and what conclusions he arrived at." The volume thus presented forms a record of a very active facing of difficult problems, and a very temperamentally consistent series of solutions. The brief notice I can give here of the work makes it impossible to follow this development.

One thing of great interest to me, as brought out by Mr. Howard, is that Dewey's instrumentalism was first worked out for moral theory and then later extended to logical theory (pp. 33-46). This is what I had long suspected, knowing Dewey's earlier ethical writings; but I had never taken the pains to substantiate the impression. Mr. Howard's presentation makes it possible to hold, what he himself does not hold, that in instrumentalism we have a correct moral theory unwarrantably extended to fit all the facts of logic. Incidentally, it is worthy of remark, if this view be correct, that the unchecked tendency to universalize is dominant even in pragmatic thought.

In the critical passages of the thesis, I do not think that Mr. Howard is always especially happy. For instance when he says: "Dewey's interpretation of Green's ideal self is far from satisfactory, largely because of its lack of insight and appreciation. . . . His acquaintanceship with Green seems to have been formal from the beginning, never intimate" (p. 46). There seems to be an underestimate of Dewey's understanding of Green, and a failure to appreciate the motive which led Dewey to give up Green as his master in moral theory.

The brevity of Howard's criticisms of Dewey, all based on the idealistic position, makes it difficult sometimes to understand the point he wishes to make. The reader has often to refresh his memory of Bosanquet's *Logic* before he can see what the critic is driving at, and not always can he do this then. In way of criticism either too much or too little is often said.

Even the correctness of the statement of Dewey's own position is not always free from question. For instance, when in dealing with "Later Developments" Howard tells us that Dewey "does not distinguish, as carefully as he might, between knowledge as inference, and knowledge as perceptual awareness" (p. 107), he is likely to mislead or else to provoke the retort that Dewey is not understood; for Dewey for many years has distinguished between knowledge as instrument (inference?) and perception as *neither* knowledge *nor* awareness.

But no work in philosophy can completely satisfy a man who does not

occupy the position from which it is written. The real question is whether the work undertaken is well done and worth doing; the answer in the present case is a decided "Yes."

EVANDER BRADLEY MCGILVARY.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

The Next Step in Religion. An Essay toward the Coming Renaissance. By ROY WOOD SELLARS. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1918.—pp. vii, 228.

The time is ripe, the author believes, for a great step forward in the evolution of religion. As the title suggests, the book is a statement of the author's conviction as to what this next step will be. He says: "What I write here is in its way a confession of faith. The values and loyalties which I shall proclaim as true, redemptive and invigorating are those which my own life and critical reflection have selected. In them I see the possibility of high spiritual attainment" (p. 3). The "values and loyalties" referred to include "humanitarianism," "constructive reform," "social democracy," and the like. Individuals must be afforded opportunity for education, contact with beautiful things, and the stimulus of association with great causes. With such values as these in mind, 'religion' is defined as "loyalty to the values of life," the "spiritual" as "man at his best, man loving, daring, creating, fighting loyally and courageously for causes dear to him," and 'salvation' as "the loyal union of a man with those values of life which have come within his ken" (pp. 7-9).

Religion must be purged of every trace of 'supernaturalism.' This term includes, not only the miracles and plenary inspiration in which our fathers believed, and the conceptions of an ethical God and personal immortality held by religious liberals to-day, but apparently all beliefs in an idealistic or teleological world order in which values are conserved in any other manner than through human agency. If it be asked, whether it is justifiable to retain the word 'religion' when its ancient setting has been so completely discarded, the author calls attention to the fact that we commonly speak of a man having made a religion of some interest into which he has thrown himself wholeheartedly, as when we say a socialist has made a religion of socialism, a social reformer of his work of constructive philanthropy, and an artist of his art. Such a man is "filled with the spirit of consuming loyalty to what he values. . . . I think that this spirit and attitude is coming to be called religious, no manner to what objects it attaches itself. . . . Morality is too cold a word in the ears of most men. Besides, moral values are only a part of the immense throng of appreciations to which man responds. There is need of a comprehensive term, able to take in all those interests and activities which give life its variety and glory. Is there a better term than religion?" (p. 221).

As this book is a "confession of faith," and not a systematic philosophical argument, specialists will understand that the author's numerous assertions upon the outcome of research and controversy in the fields of anthropology, natural science, Biblical criticism, comparative religion, psychology and the new realism in their bearings upon religion are merely intended to be his own

personal feelings and convictions. In stating a mere "confession of faith" a man need cite no authorities other than his own writings. However, as the book is popular in its aim and scope, and will probably chiefly fall into the hands of those whose acquaintance with the literature of these fields is slight, the author really ought to have informed his readers that there exist scientific and philosophical students, as learned as he, who have come to radically different conclusions upon almost everything that he says, as well as others who are more or less in agreement with him.

WILLIAM KELLEY WRIGHT.

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE.

Liberty and Democracy and Other Essays in War-time. By HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER. Boston, Marshall Jones Company, 1918.—pp. x, 229.

The essays collected under this somewhat general title are republished from a number of periodicals and vary considerably in length, interest, and importance. The manner varies but all are inspired by the author's reflection upon the problems raised by the War and his convictions regarding the issues at stake in it. The book has, therefore, a sufficient unity.

No merit of novelty can be claimed for the author's interpretation of the issue of the War; in fact, he makes no such claim. The struggle, as he sees it, was between justice and force, between an order of law founded on rational, self-controlled freedom on the one hand, and an order of hierarchical subordination on the other. But if not novel, the author's views are presented interestingly and in a manner to provoke thought. For he conceives the situation not as a rudimentary struggle between good and evil but rather as the occasion for a clarification, by severe thinking, of the ethical principles upon which political liberty has been supposed to rest. The book is a call to the American public to analyze its ideals and to understand more deeply the political goods which a lazy-minded democracy supposes that it has mastered and realized. As an incentive to popular philosophical thought of this kind, the book has real merit. It is a good interpretation of what the War meant to many Americans who sought to understand the more speculative issues.

With the close of the War a perhaps inevitable reaction has come. Liberty and democracy seem rather vague in the welter of concrete interests and issues. Perhaps one has become a little sceptical and disillusioned; perhaps one is only tired. But the mood of conviction gives place to the mood of criticism. One wonders how much of what we thought we were fighting for was effective ideal and how much was propaganda and camouflage for more sinister designs. In this mood it is hard to do justice to Professor Alexander's book. But the mood of faith will return and then the perennial interest in these ideals will revive. In any case, the book should remain an interesting account of what a considerable number of Americans considered to be the ultimate issues of the great struggle.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

The following books also have been received:

- Moral Values and the Idea of God.* The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of Aberdeen in 1914 and 1915. By W. R. SORLEY. Cambridge: at the University Press; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1919.—pp. xix, 534.
- Rousseau and Romanticism.* By IRVING BABBITT. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1919.—pp. xxiii, 426.
- Knowledge, Life and Reality.* An Essay in Systematic Philosophy. By GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1918.—pp. 549.
- The Soul in Suffering.* A Practical Application of Spiritual Truths. By ROBERT S. CARROLL, M.D. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1919.—pp. 241.
- The Beginnings of Science.* By EDWARD J. MENGE. Boston, Richard G. Badger, 1919.—pp. 256.
- Backgrounds for Social Workers.* By EDWARD J. MENGE. Boston, Richard G. Badger, 1919.—pp. 214.
- A Survey of Symbolic Logic.* By C. I. LEWIS. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1918.—pp. vi, 406.
- Philosophical Currents of the Present Day.* By LUDWIG STEIN. Translated by SHISHIRKUMAR MAITRA. Vol. I. Published by the University of Calcutta, 1918.—pp. xvi, 234.
- Progress of Education in India, 1912-1917.* By H. SHARP. Seventh Quinquennial Review. Vol. I. Calcutta, Superintendent Government Printing, India, 1918.—pp. ii, 215.
- La Philosophie Contemporaine en France.* Essai de Classification des Doctrines. Par D. PARODI. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1919.—pp. vi, 502.
- L'Idée de Finalité.* Finalité Générale et Finalité Individuelle. Par A. DE GRAMONT-LESPARRE. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1916.—pp. 159.
- De L'Inconscient au Conscient.* Par GUSTAVE GELEY. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1919.—pp. xiii, 346.
- Le Ceneri di Lovanio e la Filosofia di Tamerlano.* Per MICHEL-ANGELO BILLIA. Milano, Libreria Editrice Milanese, 1916.—pp. 85.
- Lo Spirito Evangelico di Roberto Ardigò.* Per GIOVANNI MARCHESINI. Bologna, Nicola Zanichelli.—pp. 123.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mtt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl. Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

La Psychologie, ses divers objets et ses méthodes. ANDRÉ LALANDE. *Rev. Ph.*, XLIV, 3, 4, pp. 177-221.

The independent status which seemed assured to psychology during the period between 1881-1903 has been threatened by two great influences: (1) analysis has revealed the importance of intuition and immediate feelings. Bergson identifies human and even comparative psychology with metaphysics, and James, though at first a partisan of a strictly 'scientific' psychology, in 1907, greatly modified this earlier point of view; (2) by the influence of sociology, especially the works and teaching of Durkheim, who declares that social life depends upon psychical processes that are inseparable from judgments of value or philosophic problems in general. But what we really call psychology consists of several types of research, distinct both in aim and method. (1) Psychology, undertaken as a study of physiological behaviorism, regards the conduct of all living creatures as explained by an immense number of definite, delicate and varied reflexes which are displaced, associated, facilitated or inhibited during the course of 'experience.' From this standpoint, the modification of these reflexes is regarded as the sole problem of psychology, the method being capable of a varied and extended application in the field of education and in all sorts of acquired associations. (2) Another type of psychology deals with consciousness, its desires, pains and fatigues. It also examines the conscious idea of the presence of others—of their feelings and intentions which play an important rôle in mental life and attitude. Furthermore, it should examine questions of fact in the consideration of moral value. (3) Still another type of psychology would consist in the investigation of the elements of experience in their relation to a subject or thinking person, and in certain cases to thought in general. The distinction between the actual psychological process, such as pain, and the idea which the process

provokes in consciousness, reflective psychology, involves this third type of research, and necessitates an analysis of the general conditions of consciousness. Thinking implies certain forms of affirmation, negation, identity, difference, time, space, order, number and necessity of which the relations and precise significance must be determined. This type of psychology does not apply to things but to the act by which things are thought. (4) Finally, an ontological or metaphysical psychology would concern itself with a general view of the relations of man and nature. For since no one knows where metaphysics begins and positive science ends, to proscribe metaphysics would be arresting an investigation which may prove both interesting and fruitful psychologically.

As regards psychological methods, we find first of all, that though the introspective method involves many difficulties, it is quite legitimate. It consists in determining the nature of psychical processes through the description which the subject gives under controlled conditions, instead of merely attending to the physical response or reaction that he manifests. Thus in comparing two weights, we do not care to determine the exact quantitative relation of the comparison so much as the attitude of mind under which the observer made the comparison. Binet declares that introspection has revealed an indefinite number of states of consciousness: consciousness of relations, intellectual feelings, mental attitudes, tendencies, etc. By way of introduction to pathological and psycho-analytic methods, the author declares that mental pathology for fifteen years has been the principal factor involved in the progress of psychology. It is the point of view which has determined the distinct stages of psychological life and the rôle played by images, ideas, emotions, and tendencies in the constitution of the personality. Above all, in establishing certain distinct types of insanity, it has greatly contributed to the comprehending and bringing together of many facts of normal general psychology. Dr. Freud, while still employing the psycho-analytic method of questioning in pathological cases, has renounced hypnosis as a means of procedure and confines himself to asking questions habitually attitudinized by the patients; by observing the remarks, intonations, attitudes and involuntary gestures which the patient assumes in replying to questions while in a natural and unaffected frame of mind; by an analysis of dreams which Freud considers to be the true revealers of intense desires, habitually repressed as undesirable or revolting. But this method of interrogation and observation, oriented by a search for repressed 'complexes,' is very much exposed to the dangers of suggestion. The cures which it effects are often explicable by far simpler psychological phenomena than those generally named by Freud. An attempt at interpretation, however, is a step which has great value in the endeavor to discover the real significance of images and in the establishment of a general system of normal and pathological psychology. Another guiding principle for scientific analysis is the observation of the development and normal evolution of the human mind whose various stages appear to be homogeneously grouped or related: by observing the phenomenal progress of the infant; by examining the succes-

sive transformations of consciousness historically; or finally, by analyzing the actual peoples found in different degrees of civilization, assuming that the most simple type of savagery represents the oldest and most primitive form of racial psychology. These genetic methods propose to explain mental functions by their genesis rather than by describing the actual relations present at any particular moment. This method has certainly given rise to very novel as well as suggestive concepts, but the greatest precautions are necessary if we wish to escape illusions. It generally involves the assumption of a simple and uniform primitive state of mind common to all races. But the facts do not give any support to this hypothesis, and appear to modify it in many respects. What we almost always meet with in the oldest forms of a religion or language is a multiplicity of forms which progress or evolve either by elimination or assimilation. Another illusion is that the present mental state of a non-civilized people can furnish us *a priori* with an irrefragable representation of its past mental attitude. It is also very dangerous in genetic psychology to reconstitute a series of hypothetical stages whose order is not directly known and furnished by chronological determinations. Reality when properly observed almost never presents this regular series. The celebrated formula that ontogenesis is a reproduction of phylogenesis cannot be admitted; the action of heredity and environment entirely changes the conditions of the phenomena. The psycho-physical method, involving the concepts of an absolute and differential limen of sensation, proportional to the stimulus, consists in varying the stimulus to discover the difference limen for any given series of sensations. The four principal methods employed are the method of just noticeable differences, the method of gradation, the method of true and false cases and the method of mean errors. The results obtained are criticized because the numerical units so furnished cannot be interpolated by a simple formula and also on the ground that sensation does not satisfy the general conditions of measurable magnitudes. It is also noticeable that nothing guarantees the equality of just noticeable differences of sensation, for that is to confound a numerical series with a series of increasing values of a given variable.

EDGAR DE LASKI.

Claude Bernard et l'esprit expérimental. R. LENOIR. Rev. Ph., XLIV, 1-2, pp. 72-101.

Claude Bernard freed physiology from metaphysics and vitalism. By his discoveries and by the invention of a new technique he helped forward the method of experimentation, and showed that without the experimental spirit experiment is nothing. His conception of science sprang from an historical, psychological method analogous to the positive method of Comte. He raised empiricism to experimental rationalism by showing that experience only acquires its full sense when logic is introduced into the study of facts to establish the relations between them. The formal conditions which assure the validity of phenomena are furnished by reason. The assumption of the

uniformity of natural law is such a rational presupposition, for upon it all prediction and action upon phenomena depend. Science rests on the principle of determinism. Bernard thought that besides the facts of experience and reason, there is a directive, creative idea, which he called sentiment or intuition. This is the essence of the scientific spirit. It is unlike other intuitions in that here imagination and belief are separated. The intuition of the scientist is a state of doubt, of suspended judgment; it involves faith in science and distrust of self. Bernard means nothing mysterious by this intuition; he has simply described the psychological attitude of scientific thought. Also when he describes himself as a vitalist, Bernard does not mean the old vitalism or neo-vitalism. He does not conceive vital action to be something in its essence which escapes science. A vital mechanism is only a mechanism of a *particular sort*. In uniting physiological elements, properties appear which were not appreciable in the separate elements. We call vital those properties of the organism not yet reduced to physico-chemical terms. Though the 'vital synthesis' has not yet been solved by science, it will be some day. The mechanism of the organism must be studied in the living, and not by a procedure which destroys the phenomenon before explaining it. Bernard freed biology from metaphysical theorizing by narrowing it to the study of the physico-chemical conditions of life. He made clear the sense in which science can admit the uniqueness of vital phenomena without falling into a vitalism that relinquishes the principle of determinism. He recognized the autonomy of the anatomical elements to be an essential postulate of physiology. The solution of the problems of vital phenomena is to be looked for in the anatomical element and in the living cell. The present epoch seems absorbed in the individual, the particular. Bernard has apparently asserted in vain that experience deprived of its intellectual elements is nothing but empiricism.

MARIE T. COLLINS.

Causality, Induction, and Probability. P. E. B. JOURDAIN. *Mind*, N. S., XXVIII, 110, pp. 162-180.

Mach has shown that the concept of cause can be replaced by the mathematical concept of function, that the law of causality is an *a priori* postulate of science. In a previous work Jourdain has tried to show that causality is a problem of extrapolation which depends on the nature of the functions assumed, and has no reference to the notion of probability. In his *Principles of Mathematics*, Russell has supported the view that the foundations of physics are concerned with the determination of the nature of certain functions so as to make possible the validity of the law of causality. In his later works, however, he emphasizes the "inductive principle" as a foundation for the law of causality, implying that Jourdain does not go to the root of the matter. But the law of causality is an *a priori* principle which is more fundamental than induction and mere probability. The notion of causality appears in the notion of probability, and therefore cannot be defined in terms of probability. There may not be any principle of causality, but if such does exist

it must be *a priori*. It is impossible to determine a law from a finite number of observations.

ISRAEL CHASMAN.

The Syllogism and Other Logical Forms. H. S. SHELTON. *Mind*, N. S., XXVIII, 110, pp. 180-203.

The aim of this essay is to offer "a methodological description of the process of formal reasoning as applied to material reality." Deduction involves three processes. First, there is the abstracting from reality the concepts of the aspect with which we are dealing. A deduction is valid only with regard to the concept used. Secondly, there is the reasoning with regard to these concepts by means of some universal rule. We make a deduction only because, consciously or unconsciously, we consider some principle to be absolutely or universally true. Thirdly, the conclusion is referred back to reality. The conclusion is materially true only after having been referred back and empirically verified. The syllogism should be accepted as the standard mode of formal logic. Only that which is formally stated can have any place in logic, and all arguments *can* be expressed syllogistically. Some subsidiary forms are developed from the syllogism. All deductive reasoning is and must be formal. Formal deductive logic should be disentangled from the psychological and metaphysical discussions with which it has been associated.

ISRAEL CHASMAN.

Logic As the Science of the Pure Concept. G. A. TAWNEY, *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.*, XVI, 7, pp. 169-180.

The article offers a critical exposition of Croce's *Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept*. In this work the pure concept and perception, philosophy and history are identified. The *Ding an sich* and the transcendental ego are rejected. The following equation is introduced: Philosophy = thought = history = perception of reality. Every philosophy must be at basis idealism. But Croce is not an idealist in the Platonic sense. His reality is that of perception. No hypothesis can be philosophical that is not thinkable as an idea. Philosophy is the doctrine of the categories. So far as the truths of science, industry, commerce, and morality are concerned, his doctrine is pragmatic. The task of the empirical sciences is classification, and that is dominated by practical motives. The law of thought proceeds on the principle of identity and contradiction: A is A and A is not-B. His theory of knowledge reduces itself to the following: "There are two pure theoretic forms, the intuition and the concept, the second of which is subdivided into judgment of definition and individual judgment, and there are two modes of practical elaboration of knowledge, or of formation of pseudo-concepts, the empirical concept and the abstract concept, from which are derived the two subforms of judgment of classification and judgment of enumeration." Error, he believes, is the substitution of the practical act of the spirit for a theoretical act, the uttering of sounds to which there corresponds no thought. It might be successful

and rational, but cannot be morally good. Error is an improper combination of ideas.

ISRAEL CHASMAN.

Critique de Moi-Même. BENEDETTO CROCE. Rev. de Mét., XXVI, 1, pp. 1-40.

It is not Croce's purpose in this small essay to write confessions or recollections or memoirs. This is a critique of himself, wherein he sets forth briefly the story of his studies and contributions to human learning.

As a child, he had a great love for all sorts of tales. His greatest enjoyment lay in the reading of books; and in this he was helped by his mother. At nine he entered a Catholic college. The moral and religious education there was free from superstition and fanaticism. So far he knew nothing about politics. Soon after, he came to dislike all party politics, rhetoric, and oratory. His chief interest was in literature and history. He suffered greatly from waves of desire for the ascetic and deeply religious life. But this did not hinder his studies. In his classes he was always among the first. During the last years at this college the director gave some lectures on the philosophy of religion. As a result of these lectures young Croce was thrown into a religious crisis, and came out freed from religious beliefs. About the same time his reading bore fruit. He was inspired to write some critical essays, which appeared in a literary journal in 1882. He later revised these and published them in pamphlet form under the title, *The First Step*.

Then came the earthquake of Casamicciola, which robbed him of his parents and only sister. He was himself hurt under the ruins. When he recovered from the bruises, he went, together with his brother, into the home of Silvio Spaventa, who became their guardian. This led him into political surroundings. Being totally ignorant of politics, his life became exceedingly miserable. His delicate constitution grew even more frail. These were his most sorrowful years. Nor did his study of law at the University make his existence any happier. He left without even taking the examinations, having all this while preferred poring over books in the libraries to attending to his texts. He became interested in the moral philosophy of Antonio Labriola, and many of the ideas of that book he later incorporated in his *Philosophy of the Practical*. His studies in Labriola were followed by a period of pessimism. He wrote much, and published his pamphlet entitled *Juvenilia*.

It was in 1886 that he returned to Naples. Here he was much happier. He determined to devote his life to scholarly research. He began to see the philosophical aspect of things. He read the German philosophers, but could not understand them, and was discouraged. For six years he turned all of his attention to study, and it was during these years that he wrote most of his essays later published in his *Neapolitan Revolution of 1799*. He also wrote *Playhouses of Naples from the Renaissance to the End of the Eighteenth Century*, some of the essays comprising *The Literature of the Eighteenth Century*, and other essays which formed a series of *Historical Curiosities*. He also began the publication of a *Neapolitan Literary Library*, and, with some friends, the

Napoli Nobilissima. The value of these works toward his own growth was twofold. First, his childish dreams of literature and research were satisfied, and he was forced into strong mental and physical discipline. But the chief value of these works was a negative one. Just when he was hailed by critics as a creator of *la bonne littérature italienne*, he became averse to this *bonne littérature*. The publication of these works made him feel as if he had closed a period of his life. Henceforth he wanted to be concerned only with the deeper, more serious aspects of life. But what were the deeper aspects of life? He was not sure. At any rate he determined to make a study of the sentiments and spiritual life of the Italian people from the Renaissance to the present day. This necessitated a knowledge of the peoples which influenced Italy. It was not long before he was making researches into the nature of history and science. He became interested in the problem of art. After long meditation he wrote his *History Embraced under the General Concept of Art*. This completed, he returned to his historical studies proper. He plunged into and mastered political economy. This bore fruit in a volume of essays: *Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx*. Then he turned to art, on which he had long desired to write. He had published the *Fundamental Theses of an Esthetic As a Science of Expression and General Linguistics*. These labors on art culminated in the *Esthetic*, which appeared in 1902. But the *Esthetic* raised numerous other problems to which he now devoted his attention.

In 1900 he had come in close relationship with Gentile. With the aid of the latter Croce founded in 1903 *La Critica*, a magazine devoted to a review of history, literature, and philosophy. This marks the period of his maturity in thought,—the union of the theoretical with the practical. He believes that it is in directing and contributing to *La Critica* that he rendered the greatest service to Italian culture. At the same time Croce did not neglect his studies. Beside publishing collections of Italian works, he succeeded in publishing in 1905 his first sketch of the *Logic*. In 1906, he published *What Is Living and What Is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel*; in 1907, the *Philosophy of Right As Economic*; in 1908, the *Philosophy of the Practical*; in 1909, the *Logic* under a developed form; in 1910, the *Problems of Esthetics*; in 1911, a monograph on *Vice*; in 1912, the *Theory of Historiography*; in 1913, the *Breviary of Esthetics*. Beside these, he completed *The Italian Historiography from the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century Until To-day*, and numerous smaller monographs.

The last twelve years have been the most fruitful. He solved his difficulties, and achieved internal serenity. It is the period when he learned most and created most. From *De Sanctis* he learned that art is not a work of reflection or logic, or a product of skill; but that in its spontaneity and purity, it is a form of the imagination. In his early years his philosophy came to take on a sort of Platonic-Scholastic Herbartianism. That served as a protection against the Naturalism and Materialism which dominated the days of his youth, and rendered him immune from the sensualism which was coming into style under the leadership of D'Annunzio. But he was not influenced by

D'Annunzio. Nor was he influenced by the Hegelian, Spaventa. While Spaventa was interested almost wholly in the theological-philosophical problems of the relation between Being and Knowing, transcendence and immanence, Croce was moved to philosophy by his interest in the problems of art, the moral life, of right, and later, the historical method. Spaventa could not have influenced him because their minds are of totally different types. D'Annunzio could not have influenced him because he is a contemporary of Croce.

Age has brought with it maturity of thought and calmness of spirit. The perplexing problems and dissatisfied solutions of his earlier life have ended in satisfactory solutions, a faith in himself and in the ability of man in attaining truth. The reception which his works have received all over the world have brought him contentment and peace.

ISRAEL CHASMAN.

Esthétique et Memoire. EUGENE D'EICHTHAL. Rev. Ph., XLIV, 2, 3, pp. 222-250.

The source of beauty is in our sensation of physical well-being, while the memory which, like all organic functions, must exercise, rest, conserve and develop itself, transforms these sensations of well-being into rudimentary æsthetic appreciation. The affirmation of the existence of rhythms and various symmetrical forms is itself the proof of the functioning of the memory in æsthetic. The waves of the sea, the march or gallop of certain animals and the beating of the wings of certain birds furnish examples of natural rhythms. The memory which recalls the multifarious organic forms of æsthetic expression is the faculty of relating the impressions of our sense organs to past impressions. It also plays an associational rôle by attaching to the sensorial perception all sorts of ideas and images. The memory is thus the consummation in time and space of a unity of elements which concur by means of the relations involved to give us a completely satisfying impression of the *ensemble* present to sense-perception. This consummation gives birth to a feeling of satisfaction which constitutes an æsthetic realization. Beauty presupposes certitude attested by the memory and is thus understood by the finest artists and critics. A thing is beautiful because of its characteristic of perfection, and so little by little moral considerations are related to the appreciation of beauty. For beauty seems incomplete when not associated with majesty or gravity or perhaps with a certain passion or moral disquietude. The appreciation of a work of beauty is not possible without a preliminary training of the memory which reunites and solidifies the elements and organizes them into a unity. Observations indicate that the memory does not exercise itself with the same rapidity, the same application or the same specialization in all mankind. There are singular inequalities in the power of æsthetic appreciation in various individuals. Some do not appear to know how to use their eyes and ears in constructing or discovering a source of harmony or beauty. Others appear to have this faculty of æsthetic memory

innately developed, and also creating in others the taste for art which they themselves have felt. The current of sympathy between creative work in art and its public appreciation is very often a great source of pleasure for both, depending on the one hand on the love of admiration and fame, and on the pleasure of the æsthetic feeling on the other. Memory, which is one of the principal causes for the permanency of the rules that regulate art, is fundamentally necessary to an appreciation of an æsthetic object.

EDGAR DE LASKI.

Ernest Renan et la Philosophie Contemporaine. D. PARODI. Rev. de Mét., XXVI, 1, pp. 41-66.

Renan's superb literary talent has been injurious to his importance as a philosopher. In his views he seems to stand between Comte and Bergson. In *The Future of Science* he speaks as a positivist. His faith in science is immeasurable. This faith he never lost. In 1890 he wrote: "I was therefore right at the beginning of my intellectual career in believing firmly in science and in taking it for the goal of my life. If I were to begin over I would do the same thing again." But he attributes to science a religious function. Science has a religious value because its conception of life is serious. The spirit of atheism is a frivolous one. Science is the true modern religion. Renan really introduces the romantic German philosophy into French science. His standpoint is distinctly historical. In *The Origin of Language* he holds that languages do not come from a common root, as had been supposed, and the further back one goes the more diversity one finds. Like Comte, he too has three laws of progress. Syncretism, or the first view of things, is comprehensive, but obscure and inexact. This is followed by analysis, or the state of precise distinctions and discussions. But as yet we have no unity. That is produced by synthesis, which unites the power of the intuition with scientific clearness. The first state is religious; the intermediate state is irreligious but scientific; while the last state is both religious and scientific. Truth is continuous progress. The results of the moral sciences reduce themselves to history. Our time is historical, not metaphysical. All sciences are at bottom only diverse forms of history. Nothing is static in nature; everything is in perpetual development. The very laws of nature apply only to the actual state of things. The universe has an ideal goal, which is that reason should rule. The term God is used in two senses; as the category of the ideal; and as synonymous with the whole of existence. The divine is revealed in us not only through religion and science, but also by art and morality. The end of humanity is intellectual and moral perfection.

ISRAEL CHASMAN.

A Sketch of the Philosophy of Religion, with Illustrations of Critical Monism. DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH. Mind, N. S., XXVIII, 110, pp. 129-162.

Neither idealistic monism, rationalistic monism, nor epistemological dualism can stand the test of experience. What is needed is a critical monism, *i. e.*, a philosophy which seeks to be monistic while at the same time it remains

critical and takes account of experienced fact. This may be applied to religion. The final test of religion is its intellectual value. Here God, as a dependable Power discovered through a religious attitude, is of direct acquaintance to the religious man. Truth is attained when the predicate is practically identical with the subject matter about which the judgment is made. The empirical results of empirical science should be synthesized, and theology included. Thus metaphysics and theology become necessary to each other. The method of critical monism is to be applied to the problems of matter and mind, law and freedom, evolution and creation, mechanism and purpose, nature and the supernatural, the one and the many, and good and evil.

ISRAEL CHASMAN.

"Scientific Prepossession" and Antiscientific Animus. KNIGHT DUNLAP. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XVI, 6, pp. 156-160.

The feature which Professor Fite finds most objectionable in psychology is its demand for scientific proof, as against conjecture, popular report, and anecdote. All the apostles of the Easy Way protest that it is silly to insist on scientific demonstration of the phenomena, which they declare they have observed by merely "keeping the eyes of the mind open." Scientific method does not accept a mere statement of what is believed to have happened; it demands an arrangement of the conditions under which it happened, and also requires a statement of conditions under which it may be repeated. The practical accomplishments of psychologists through scientific methods in the various branches of the army and navy, will be found in their reports. Psychology deals with the mind, and with the physical and psychological phenomena which are closely connected with the mind. So psychological research finds its work not so much in extending the field of human knowledge, as in bringing order out of chaos within its field. Psychology will always be dull to those who have not the 'scientific prepossession,'—the prepossession that no labor is too hard if it lends to the ascertainment of truth.

EMILY A. LANE.

Prediction and Spontaneity. A. A. MERRILL. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XVI, 6, pp. 161-162.

The two functions of the intellect are 'to describe' and 'to reason.' The difference between the two is that the former relates to that which we have experienced, while the latter means to go from that which we have experienced to that which we have not experienced. We describe the past and predict the future. Since prediction involves the passing of time, this passing of time must not introduce any cause not known at the time of prediction; otherwise the effect cannot be predicted because all the causes are not known. A spontaneous act is an act, all of the causes of which do not come into existence until the very instant of the act. Clearly such an act cannot be predicted. To predict one must know all the causes. And if we did this we could not predict the act, we could only describe it, because it would then belong to the past. Prediction is most accurate in the sciences of logic, mathematics,

astronomy and physics; and is least accurate in biology, political economy, sociology and history. In the latter sciences, which deal with the living, spontaneity is bound to enter and spoil predictions, because the time between a prediction and the phenomenon predicted cannot be ignored without destroying the accuracy of the prediction.

EMILY A. LANE.

La "Pédagogie" de Rousseau. É. DURKHEIM. Rev. de Mét., XXVI, 2, pp. 153-180.

The educator, Rousseau says, must take nature as a guide. The reasons are that the child is man in the state of nature and that nature furnishes a norm that is not arbitrary but may be observed and studied. Thus if pedagogy adopts such a standard, it becomes less subjective. Although Rousseau believes that a child is intrinsically good, he does not on that account adopt a *laissez faire* pedagogical doctrine. Indeed, no one has felt more keenly than he the necessity for education, nor has anyone had a more exalted opinion of what might be accomplished by it in transforming the nature of the child and putting him in harmony with his environment. To bring about this adjustment the educator should seek to establish equilibrium between the child's desires and his capabilities. Education must, therefore, become a science and a study of the nature of the child. This psychological emphasis of Rousseau's pedagogy is an important innovation. Nature teaches us two main things concerning education: the fundamental needs of the child can be satisfied only by being allowed to develop freely; yet man is a civil being and, as such, must feel the yoke of necessity. The feeling of restraint should be imposed, not by education, but by physical things. Commands cannot properly give this feeling of necessity, for they represent the demand that a certain act be performed, not because of its necessity, but because it has been commanded. The child will accept a restraint that results from the physical nature of things. He should not be punished but should feel the physical consequences of his acts. It follows from all this that a child should live in an environment of things. The master should impose his will on the child through the manipulation of things, but this manipulation must be according to law. A direct relation between master and pupil is, however, sometimes inevitable, but even then the manifestation of the master's will should have the character of a manifestation of nature. This educational doctrine has been characterized by Rousseau as negative because it excludes man and society. It limits the nature of the child by things only during the first twelve years, which is the most important period in life; the young child can best be influenced through physical objects, for they will arouse his imagination and serve as instruments of culture. Yet the child cannot avoid contact with man and hence there must be some ethical instruction. This should be given through the medium of the forces which play on life and not through precept. The child should be taught his rights and duties by being instructed at first concerning what is originally implied in the right of property. Then he can be led to respect the rights of others and thus will come to respect the social bond.

MARJORIE S. HARRIS.

NOTES.

Professor A. S. Pringle-Pattison has resigned the chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, which he has held since 1891. Before that he had been professor for four years at St. Andrews and for four years at University College, Cardiff.

Professor Norman Kemp Smith of Princeton University has been elected to the chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh in succession to Professor A. S. Pringle-Pattison.

Dr. James Drever, Lecturer in Education in the University of Edinburgh, has been appointed to the Combe Lectureship in Psychology, left vacant by the death of Dr. W. J. Smith.

Dr. W. Curtis Swabey has been appointed Instructor in Philosophy at The Rice Institute, Houston, Texas.

Dr. Marie T. Collins has been appointed Instructor in Philosophy at Wells College.

Dr. Ethel Gordon Muir of Wilson College has been appointed Professor of Philosophy in Lake Erie College.

We give below a list of articles in current magazines:

MIND, XXVIII, 110: *D. C. Macintosh*, A Sketch of the Philosophy of Religion, with Illustrations of Critical Monism; *P. E. B. Jourdain*, Causality, Induction, and Probability; *H. S. Shelton*, The Syllogism and other Logical Forms.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XXX, 2: In Memoriam. John Wallace Baird; *Gilbert J. Rich*, A Study of Tonal Attributes; *P. F. Swindle*, Some Forms of Natural Training to which Certain Birds are Subjected; *P. F. Swindle*, Analysis of Nesting Activities; *P. F. Swindle*, The Peristaltic-Like Nature of Organic Responses; *G. Stanley Hall*, Some Relations Between the War and Psychology; *Frank Angell*, Duration, Energy, and Extent of Reaction Movements.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS: XVI, 8: *James M. Leuba*, The Yoga System of Mental Concentration and Religious Mysticism; *John Warbeke*, A Medieval Aspect of Pragmatism; *William M. Salter*, Mr. Marshall on Outer-World Objects.

XVI, 9: *Alfred H. Lloyd*, Luther and Machiavelli: Kant and Frederick; *J. R. Kantor*, Human Personality and Its Pathology.

XVI, 10: *Hartley B. Alexander*, Wrath and Ruth; *Wesley Raymond Wells*, The Biological Foundations of Belief; *Elsie Clews Parsons*, Teshlativa at Zuni.

XVI, 11; *H. T. Costello*, The Value of False Philosophies; *S. A. Elkus*, Purpose as a Conscious Concept; *Grace A. de Laguna*, "Dualism and Animal Psychology:" A Rejoinder.

XVI, 12; *J. H. Randall, Jr.*, Instrumentalism and Myth; *Wilson D. Wallis*, The Objectivity of Pleasure; *W. H. Sheldon*, Dr. Goldenweiser and Historical Indeterminism.

PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XXVI, 2: *Robert M. Yerkes*, Report of the Psychology Committee of the National Research Council; *C. E. Ferree* and *Gertrude Rand*, Chromatic Thresholds of Sensation from Center to Periphery of the Retina and their Bearing on Color Theory. Part II.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XXIX, 3: *C. Delisle Burns*, De Ecclesia; *Alfred H. Lloyd*, When Gods are Born; *John M. Mecklin*, The International Conscience; *M. W. Robieson*, The Theory of Morals on a Class Basis; *Wilbur M. Urban*, How are Moral Judgments on Groups and Associations Possible?; *Richard Roberts*, The Problems of Conscience; *Durant Drake*, Will the League of Nations Work?; *E. C. Moore*, Educational Reconstruction; *Margaret Jourdain*, The Victorian Spirit.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, XXIII, 2: *George Cross*, Federation of the Christian Churches in America—An Interpretation; *J. Warshawer*, Jesus as a Teacher: Toward an Interpretation; *Herbert L. Stewart*, Lord Morley's Relation to History, to Theology, and to the Churches; *Charles C. Torrey*, Fact and Fancy in Theories Concerning Acts (Concluded); *A Wakefield Slaten*, The Qualitative Use of ΝΟΜΟΣ in the Pauline Epistles.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XXVI, 2: *É. Durkheim*, La "Pédagogie" de Rousseau; *G. Davy*, Émile Durkheim: I. L'Homme; *F. Michaud*, La Dégradation de l'Énergie et le Principe de Carnot.

XXVI, 3: *G. Milhaud*, La Question de la sincérité de Descartes; *A. Reymond*, Sur une définition possible des Ordinaux transfinis; *É. Bourguet*, Sur la Composition du "Phèdre"; *R. Lenoir*, La Doctrine de Ravaisson et la Pensée moderne.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XLIV, 3 and 4: *A. Lalande*, La psychologie, ses divers objets et ses méthodes; *E. D'Eichthal*, Esthétique et Mémoire. Du rôle de la mémoire dans la perception du Beau réalisé par l'Art; *G. Bohn*, La dynamique cérébrale; *P. Dupont*, L'x objectif conscient.

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE, XVII, (No. 66): *H. Reverdin*, Petite note sur un très petit magicien; *E. Reymond*, Le relâchement musculaire; *Ch. Werner*, XIII^e réunion des Philosophes de la Suisse romande (La loi de relativité).



THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE, 1918.¹

I.

THE days last summer were the saddest we had seen since 1914. The bombardment of Paris by long-range cannon began near the end of March and continued from that time on sometimes by day and sometimes by night; air-raids multiplied; women and children, among the working classes as well as among the rich, sought refuge *en masse* in the central or western part of France. In June the advance of the Germans became so threatening that hardly any remained in Paris except those detained by their positions or necessary work. Fortunately the moral support and material aid of the American army began to make itself felt. The invaders were arrested, then turned back. Victory was with the Allies. But the harm had been done. "It is chaos," writes a traveller who, shortly after the armistice, crossed the place which had been formerly occupied by a large and bustling village. "It might well be the 'dry land' of Genesis at the moment when it issued out of nothing,—not a human being nor a living creature anywhere. The only things left are the primitive elements, earth, water, the wind heavy with mist and rain whistling across the desolate plains. As far as eye can see, on the slopes of the ridge and in the flat immensity, there are only shell-holes filled with yellow water,—terrible wells, foul at the bottom, and so numerous as to touch each other and unite oftentimes in shapeless seas . . . Of the

¹ Translated from the French by Dr. Katherine E. Gilbert.

trees that used to flourish here only a few still raise to heaven their barkless trunks and twigless branches."

In such a state of affairs, French philosophy also has passed a narrow and painful existence. The very look of most of our books is distressing. Printed on poor, grayish paper, brittle and thin, which would have scarcely served in former times for the daily papers, with the composition badly inked, and often defective on account of the inexperience of the workmen and the insufficient number of proof-readers,

Invalidique patrum referunt jejunia nati.

However, among the books of the year one stands out both because of its importance and because of the exceptional care given to the printing: the *Traité de Logique*¹ of M. Goblot. But the author informs us in the preface—and we could have guessed it—that it really dates from before the war. For four years M. Goblot, professor at the University of Lyons and deputy-mayor of that city, had had duties far too pressing for him to concern himself with a book. Lyons is indeed far from the scene of battle, but the general distress strained to the uttermost the administrative strength of all France. In particular, Lyons was a great center for hospital-work, manufacturing, and the furnishing of food. The town-council did not enjoy many leisure moments!

The most conspicuous characteristic of M. Goblot's book is that it is the work of an isolated individual, not of a school or even of a group whose members act as a kind of scientific check on each other. This accounts for its virtues and its defects. It is personal, and full of life and action; even when the author uses ideas which were not original with him, it is plain that he has rethought them, made them his own, and blended them with his own so thoroughly that he has forgotten their origin. The same thing happened to Descartes. The disadvantage is that the book is extremely uneven: first, because M. Goblot considers on the whole only those questions which interest him, and condenses into a few pages or even suppresses entirely what does not interest him. His book is less a *Treatise* than a series of 'essays'

¹ 1 vol., 8vo, Armand Colin, publisher.

on important points in logic. In the second place, what he does discuss he often treats summarily, with some little disdain for exactness and rigor in detail. One is sometimes reminded of those sketches by great painters in which important parts are scarcely drawn in, or in which features, considered singly, are frequently false, but which are, nevertheless, in their general 'movement' full of propriety and interest. In illustration one may cite his suggestive, although incomplete, analysis of the different kinds of quantity in propositions, the extension given to hypothetical propositions, the theory of deduction in so far as it may be distinguished from the theory of the syllogism.¹ For the past twenty years M. Goblot has set himself this problem: Granted that demonstration, as used by mathematicians, cannot be reduced to the syllogism, what *is* the operation which constitutes its essence? After dealing at close quarters and in great detail with Poincaré's celebrated theory which puts the nerve of the operation in "reasoning by recurrence," he himself proposes the following solution: Mathematical reasoning and all reasoning processes of the same type are essentially *constructive*, that is, they proceed by putting together distinct intellectual elements, the combining process being analogous to, although not identical with, that used in a physical manipulation. They derive their fruitfulness from this element of active construction and their quality of rigor from following definite rules. We *verify* the results by a mental act,—quite as the mechanician verifies the result of a certain mechanical adjustment,—with this difference, that in reasoning we take note of a logical result instead of an empirical event. The syllogism enters in only in order to apply to each separate operation general rules based upon admitted principles and propositions previously demonstrated.

Because of the part assigned to action, M. Goblot's theory might seem at times to approach Pragmatism. But this is a false impression; his intellectualism remains untouched, thanks to the distinction, noted above, between free choice of *operations* and the rigorous necessity which, within each of them, connects

¹ I beg to be allowed to refer for a more detailed discussion of this point to the article which appeared in the *Revue Philosophique* for January under the title: "*La Logique de M. Goblot.*"

principles with applications. His last chapter is a study of the scientific and rational spirit, written precisely in the temper of classical philosophy. In spite of a few concessions (chiefly of form) to the theories which include in science an element of 'arbitrariness' or 'convenience,' he vigorously criticizes contemporary irrationalism and anti-intellectualism. "If our knowledge," he says, "must be supplemented by our beliefs, the logician must see to it that the distinction is maintained in nature and value between the belief logically possible—even practically necessary—and science, which has logical necessity; and that the rights of science should not be sacrificed to the pretensions of belief so that the character of an assertion is attributed to a statement that lacks proof and is really an hypothesis . . . (p. 383). Since science is too limited for the purposes of action, it has to be eked out with something; but let us not paint this supplementary piece with the colors of science, and persuade ourselves that it is really a part of truth—truth differently acquired and supported, but none the less truth. . . . The belief which calms, reassures, or consoles, the belief which preserves, frees, or fortifies, may be described as *good*, but that does not make it *true*. . . . Let us have no fraud about it. Reason must disavow what it has not engendered" (p. 391).

II.

The enemy with whom M. Goblot here engages is not an imaginary one. Some works appeared this year which represent very well the opposite manner of thinking.

One is a little volume by M. Gonzague Truc, entitled *La Grâce, essai de psychologie religieuse*.¹ One could have wished for more extended and trustworthy references to theological literature and a more intimate acquaintance with contemporary psychology. It is, however, of especial interest for its implied or even explicit judgments of value. Whether God does or does not act upon men (and for his part, M. Truc frankly confesses his own scepticism) it still remains true that religious souls have felt, proved, lived, the experience of grace, and the opposite

¹ 1 vol., 12mo, published by Alcan.

experiences, lukewarmness, *acedia*, barrenness; here is, then, a reality to be analyzed. And what does one find upon analysis? A double state, kinæsthetic and psychological, the power of which, if we may believe the author, thoroughly establishes the primacy of feeling over intelligence. "We wish because we choose, and we choose because we love. The mere pretension of directing one's wishes independently of emotion, and of being governed by rational principles alone, simply reveals the greater sentimentalism, or to speak exactly, the greater pride. As for these principles, we cultivate them with a deliberate and jealous care, we feel injured if they are injured, and if, out of respect for them, we pretend to scorn the promptings of the heart, it is only to luxuriate the more in our own self-esteem. And it turns out that the pretended freedom from sentiment has all the qualities of the narrowest and most intolerant of sentiments" (pp. 61, 62).

"From whatever point of view one regards the life of inner experience, one discovers the necessity for this feeling of acquiescence that Christians call grace. . . . It produces harmony and peace within us. It is the addition which consecrates—one might even say—indemnifies effort. . . . In ethics it is the affective state which delights in the good; in its whole compass it is the inner predisposition toward the many and varied goods of life. . . . Finally it becomes a deep and harmonious attitude, the natural spring of all our acts, and the true health of the soul. It is then that we pass from the transient enjoyment of the emotion to its most enduring fruits, that our acts cease to be external and almost foreign to us, that we become identical with our intellectual 'form,' in short, that we become 'ourselves' in the sense of Nietzsche and Ibsen" (pp. 64, 65).

Whether the philosophies of Nietzsche and Ibsen have this moral value is a point that might be discussed. But it is surprising to find the author adding in the same passage: "It is one of the characteristics of our time to search out emotion wherever it may be found, to substitute for it the cold and abstract games of pure thought" (p. 62). Professions of an intellectual and rationalistic faith (such as M. Goblot's) are rare in the collection

of contemporary philosophical publications. Perhaps M. Truc had in mind while writing those lines the critics of romanticism,—such as M. René Berthelot, Ernest Seillière, René Lote, and also (the context would suggest) the sociologists who have sought a rational justification of morality in a positive theory of society. But beside these advocates of science and intelligence¹ what a flood of philosophical or semi-philosophical publications turned in the opposite direction! Is not the passionate and confused worship of life, such as was celebrated by Guyau in his beautiful prose-poem, *La Morale sans obligation ni sanction*, still the creed of many minds? *To live one's life, to be oneself*, have become the commonplaces of the great mass of half-cultivated minds. And on the other side, rationalism and science have not been less vigorously attacked in the name of religious faith. Fonsegrive, in his *Evolution des idées dans la France contemporaine*², with its sub-title of *De Taine à Péguy*, portrays the whole evolution of French thought from 1880 to 1914 as the renunciation of the 'scientisme' of Renan, Taine, Berthelot, and a return to the Christian faith. No, surely it is not by an excess of intellectualism that most of our present-day writers err.

M. Segond has just published a book on *La guerre mondiale et la vie spirituelle*.³ One of the clearest chapters is entitled: "*La position rationaliste du problème.*" The aim of the chapter is to explain that reason can make no substantial contribution to this important subject,—neither the egoistic and partial reason of the practical man, nor the disinterested reason of the philosopher who looks at all things from the point of view of eternity. "For the impersonality of intellectualism," he says, "must be substituted the mystic universality of sentiment." M. Segond is a philosopher by profession; he teaches philosophy in one of the Lycées in Paris. But quite in contrast with the

¹ There are still further reservations to make. In M. René Lote's last book which is just out (*Les Intellectuels dans la Société française*, 12mo, published by Alcan) there is indeed a keen criticism of sentiment and imagination and a fine eulogy of reason, provided that by 'reason' be understood the *raison classique*, thoroughly impregnated with traditionalism; but there is also a great deal of defiance toward logic and "intellectualistic utopias."

² 1 vol., 12mo, published by Bloud and Gay.

³ 1 vol., 12mo, *Bibl. de phil. contemporaine*, published by Alcan.

professional mathematicians who have become philosophers, as Poincaré, Milhaud, LeRoy, he is by nature a mystic and artist. An artist—that is, his language is very individual, and glories in confounding ordinary logical distinctions. The mixture of highly abstract and emotional terms; the taste for rare usages and paradoxical groupings of words; the abundance of unexpected or puzzling epithets; the constant use of the preposition ‘à’ to suggest relations without defining them; the flowing music and harmony of his phrases; all combine to give the reader an impression of a very modern melody with subtle dissonances, which might at the same time be a half-transparent dialectic. And it must be confessed that this anti-intellectualism of form is not without charm. But M. Segond is also—and perhaps peculiarly—a mystic, and formerly wrote a curious book on *La Prière*. He feels the war with a prophet’s soul; underneath the physical appearance he seeks to commune with “the eternal and creative movement of spiritual life” (p. 113) which seems to him to be at work in hidden ways in the earthly conflict. Of M. Bergson’s doctrines he has retained especially the idea of “*l’élan vital*” which expresses itself at once in instinct and thought. But while the famous author of *L’Évolution Créatrice* carefully distinguishes the two forms of primordial will, and emphasizes their divergence at least as much as their common origin, M. Segond insists particularly upon their continuity. He explains the catastrophes in the midst of which we are living by a kind of immanent force, not a providence, yet something spiritual, and before all things, to his mind, a unity. For him, a soldier’s heroism is only a small impulse in the total ‘thrust’ that moves the nation; the effort of the United States or of France is only one aspect of the general movement which draws humanity on, and this movement in its turn is only an exalted form of the total life “universal and indivisible,” whose essential character is always to be creating afresh at any price (pp. 9, 11). “If all the potential exuberance of the spirit of the world should become manifest in the visible acts of the insane tragedy, the disorder thus exhibited would be in reality the organic and abounding power of the total action, and like the energizing cause of our essential development” (p. 121).

With such premises one would suppose that M. Segond would regard Pangermanism with indulgence; for is it not also a product of this universal ferment that tends toward power and renewal? But this would be a mistaken inference. Since he thinks of the vital exuberance as at once single in essence, and free, indeterminate, and full of the unforeseen in its manifestations, he is at the same time a monist and a pluralist—or at least he demands for himself the philosophical advantages of both. He repels, as opposed to action, the attempt to stand "*au-dessus de la mêlée.*" It is in deepening his own feeling of hatred for the barbarians, in delivering himself over to it entirely, that he thinks he sees the universal significance of war. Moreover, it is from this very hatred that he expects to see issue some day "*l'amitié universelle*" triply incarnated in an international Catholic Church, a judicial Society of Nations, and a general Confederation of Labor. Thus must come to its fruition "the spiritual energy of our victorious war." *Spiritual energy* is the first and last phrase in the book. By 'spirituality' does the author mean anything more than life? It is the higher life, he says in conclusion. But if life, as he is constantly saying, is nothing more than perpetual renewal, infinite ambition, inexhaustible "disquietude," in what consists the measure of *superiority*? "We must incarnate the spirit which carries us on toward the inspired formulas of our heart" (p. 166).

The same defiance of ideas, the same confidence in feeling, appears in *Les Leçons morales de la Guerre*¹ by M. Paul Gaultier. "The intellectualism which has too long reigned in philosophy," he writes at the end of his book, "and which erred in attributing influence to pure ideas alone, has been battered in by the facts. In view of the successive explosions of feeling which have brought all peoples one after the other into the war, even the most convinced rationalists have been forced to confess that reason does not guide the world." In a series of brilliant chapters he tries to bring out the rôle of purely affective states in each of the belligerent nations; the insane pride, the mystical religion of imperialism in German aggression (for from the point

¹ 1 vol., 12mo, published by Flammarion.

of view of her own interests, Germany would have done better to have simply continued the economic conquest of the world, without trying to hurry it by a struggle of this kind); with the Belgians, the feeling of independence, the rebellion against the Germans' claim to recognize no law but force; in France the feeling of the country's danger, mingled with the old love of war and of an intense life; with the English, love of honor, respect for treaties, scorn for treachery; with the Servians, heroic obstinacy; with the Italians, the 'irredentist' sentiment; the ardent desire to increase the moral and material greatness of their country; finally, dominating everything else, American idealism, —the 'crusade' of the United States for right and justice.

All this is true. But must we conclude with M. Gaultier that ideas are nothing and feeling is everything? What would American idealism be without ideas? To what would the feeling of 'right' be attached in Belgium, England, France, if it had not for its 'matter' (as the philosophers say) the *idea* of right in general, and the *idea* of the particular rights which were violated by invasion? He denounces as a chief cause of the war the pan-german mysticism, the absurd and sentimental belief in a divine mission of hegemony. He may be right; but when he adds that mysticism was also the cause of the resistance to German aggression, is he not forgetting that for defense against actual invasion, or against a menace almost as imminent as invasion, a clear notion of danger and a reasonable courage are sufficient? Is it 'mysticism,' as M. Gaultier asserts, to engage in a "war for the defense of civilization"? Of course no one would deny "that ideas have no force without the coöperation of sentiments"; but the example of Germany proves that the inverse is no less true: that sentiment without ideas, or in the service of false ideas, can produce nothing but disorder and catastrophes.

III.

I have spoken first of works which draw from the war arguments against the intellect. But the events of the present time nourish philosophical reflections of a quite different type, and also reflections that are purely psychological.

Dr. Georges Dumas, professor of experimental psychology at the Sorbonne, and during the last few years physician to a hospital for nervous and mental diseases in the army, has summed up his observations in a volume entitled *Troubles mentaux et troubles nerveux de guerre*.¹ For some time works on this subject have been appearing, several of them voluminous collections of clinical observations. Professor Dumas's book, on the contrary, is brief, and aims to state clearly certain general ideas intelligible to laymen. After recalling and disposing of the classical mental ailments that existed before the war, and to which the war simply gave a content which might have been found elsewhere, he emphasizes the importance of *mental confusion* as constituting the most general form of war neuroses. He shows how various nervous affections, such as loss of speech or hearing, roaring in the ears, spasms, trouble with the gait or posture, paralysis or anesthesia, become grafted on to this confusion.

How are these troubles to be interpreted? Some arise directly from organic causes; but the others? They have been explained by the permanent or chronic character of an emotion. Dr. Dumas is not satisfied with this explanation; an emotion is, by its very nature, a passing thing which would not give rise to definite and lasting symptoms. More can be said in favor of auto-suggestion; treatment by contrary suggestions often succeeds, especially if it is combined with unpleasant therapeutic measures, such as the use of electricity, that force the subject more or less consciously to desire a cure. The efficacy of these suggestions, direct and indirect, demonstrates the mental character of the phenomena in question. But whence comes this extreme suggestibility bequeathed to the soldiers by fatigue, emotion, or the nervous shock of bombardment or bursting shells? From two things: on the one hand, from a general nutritional disturbance transformed by intoxication, and manifesting itself on the psychical side as mental confusion. When this mental confusion is slight, it is a favorable soil for auto-suggestion; if very strong, it produces only depression, stupor, numbness. But in its light form it causes a motor disturbance that suggests

¹ 1 vol., 12mo, published by Alcan.

the impossibility of motion. A pain or reaction, local or even trivial, is then sufficient to bring into play the second factor—the subject's belief that he can no longer speak, or straighten up his head or shoulders. The psychological mechanism is a familiar one; it was what provoked Solomon's remark, "There is a lion in the way!" Moreover, these exaggerated inhibitions are not explained simply as weakness or vice; they are the spontaneous self-defense of the organism, an unconscious and perhaps awkward means of economizing the vital forces which would run risk of exhaustion in a premature or ill-timed effort.

A final chapter, which is particularly interesting because it touches both psychology and ethics, has to do with imposters. What a problem they raise! In dealing with them Professor Dumas sometimes employed the 'strong manner,' threatening them with court-martial, subjecting them to painful treatments; sometimes the 'gentle manner,' that is, by an appeal to their better feeling he sought to win from them the confession of their deception,—a more efficacious method, but inconvenient in that it disarms the doctor: for once made confessor, he says, he can no longer punish the men nor hand them over to justice. To these methods, both of which aim at conviction, he prefers a third which is also recommended by his eminent colleague Babinski: not to try to determine the degree of sincerity of the man who calls himself sick—there is a complete scale from absolute sham to simple exaggeration—but to make the alleged symptoms disappear as rapidly as possible without inquiring into their reality. Doubtless the doctor who pretends to believe the patient, seems naïve, he acutely remarks in conclusion, but what difference does it make if the desired result is achieved? "On the other hand, if the patient is allowed to see that he is suspected of sham, from that day it is a battle to the finish,—a battle, moreover, in which his reputation is at stake, and the issue, therefore, much more doubtful and always more distant. Sometimes after the cure is accomplished, I have thrown off pretense and spoken with energy and precision; but usually I let the impostor continue to think that he has deceived me, and that he has not fallen in my opinion. It is a great help in keeping honest to fancy that one has never lost one's credit."

M. de Lanessan treats a moral question of a more far-reaching character in a pamphlet attractively entitled: *La Civilisation et l'organisation, leur influence sur la guerre*.¹ After passing in review the opinions of philosophers, almost all of whom condemn war, he defends the paradoxical thesis that neither with animals nor prehistoric men is there real struggle; war arises with the appearance of hereditary chiefs and ruling families. It is power which creates the appetite for more power and the unwholesome desire for domination and unlimited conquest. On this interpretation organization is the source of militarism, while its inverse, civilization, consists on the contrary in "a development of private and public morality to the point where each member of the social body respects spontaneously—quite without coercion—the life, goods, and liberty of all the others." There is much truth in this antithesis. But how can we admit that struggle is an accident in nature? Undoubtedly *organized* warfare is a function of the progress of mankind in technical knowledge. But does that mean that science and industry have engendered war? They do nothing but give it its external form. The effort toward universal expansion is the most general characteristic of living beings and the 'union for existence' made famous by Kropotkin, is merely a successful incident in the struggle for existence.² Despotic governments, aristocratic castes, established creeds favor war; that is certain. But whence come the castes themselves? Do they not frequently, if not always, arise from struggle and conquest?

M. de Lanessan indignantly attacks his eminent colleague, M. Gaston Bonnier, for speaking of war among the bees and for saying that "nature is savage." It seems to him that such an opinion would logically issue in "excusing the crime of the German Empire in provoking the present terrible war." How would this be an excuse? M. de Lanessan seems to think that all that is natural is good, and he is not alone in so thinking. But nothing

¹ Large 8vo, published by Alcan, 62 pages.

² In his lecture *La guerre au point de vue biologique*, M. Et. Rabaud has considered this question much more fully, and in a judicial manner stated the arguments for and against. (*Conferences de l'Association française pour l'avancement des sciences*, 1918, published by Masson and Co., pp. 80 to 95.)

is less evident; and to admit it is to remain in the philosophy of the eighteenth century. While agreeing with M. Gaston Bonnier that "nature is savage," we can also agree with M. de Lanessan that the ethical rôle of man is to go in the opposite direction from this ferocity and from the kind of organization which promotes it. Here, as elsewhere, conscience and right are not of less value because they are the antithesis of life, as of differentiation. Is not organization the most characteristic feature of life, even of merely biological life? We have here then neither an excuse nor an extenuation of the wrong done—except for those who interpolate a false minor premise between the major premise and the conclusion.

Right here may be mentioned one who comes very close to M. Gaston Bonnier, and who ends by denouncing organized and scientific barbarity as forcefully as could be desired.

In form *Hélène enchaînée*¹ is a poem in dialogue. It contains enough beautiful verse to give it a place in any literary review. But fundamentally it is a philosophical work by the same token as the book which inspired it,—the Second Faust. It is, so to speak, an epilogue or, more exactly, a fantastic fragment to be put with the *Paralipomena*. The last incarnation of Goethe's hero at the end of the 'Second Faust' is the man of magnificent ambition who is devoured with the passion of *pleonexia*. Seconded by Mephistopheles he sways and stimulates the working-people, through whom he hopes to build a new world, but who, in reality, dig his grave. He is not simply an organizer, he is a conqueror. Urged on by his infernal acolyte who preaches to him unlimited expansion, universal "colonization," he seeks to extend his dominion over all the neighboring territories. He decides to drive out Philemon and Baucis, whose little possession has the misfortune to adjoin his. He orders them banished, whether they are willing or not, to a beautiful distant estate. But the gentle and pious old couple cling to their corner of the earth, and shut themselves up in the inmost recesses of their cottage. Without a moment's hesitation the soldiers break in the door, murder

¹ 1 vol., 12mo, *Librairie Plon*. Madame M. Combes is the daughter of M. Gaston Bonnier. I may add that he entirely approves the philosophy of war which stands out in *Hélène Enchaînée*.

the old man and woman, set fire to the cottage, the overshadowing lindens, and the neighboring chapel. And Faust, looking at the fire from a distance, consoles himself, after a first moment of regret, by thinking that from his palace "the view will in the future extend to infinity."

Does not this read like the history of Belgium? It is this same Faust, drunk with pride, deluded by the desire for power, who reappears in *Hélène enchaînée*. Hélène represents civilization and beauty as conceived by the Greek genius and those who inherited that tradition. It is

l'éclat humain et doux de la chaste Raison.

Faust hopes to seduce her by the display of his intellectual, social, and military power. He boasts to her of his gigantic ambition, the varied resources he has accumulated in order to become universal master and which he pretends that he will use to build up under his dominion a more perfect world. Hélène, who gradually comes to understand him better, wishes to leave this palace which seems to her nothing but a brigands' retreat. Too late! War is declared. Faust informs her that she is held as a prisoner. Then with his gift of magic and magnetism he confers on her the gift of vision through time and space. But the clairvoyant captive perceives, not what he hoped—the apotheosis of his victorious force—but the tragedy which is about to plunge him and his people by an inevitable dialectic into the abyss. The law of his destruction is personified by the Greek Moira (a trifle modernized), the divine Nemesis who will not permit human pretensions to scorn moral laws:

L'équilibre du monde est une conscience,
Faust!

In vain one seeks to make a compact with evil for the profit of good, to proceed by violence toward happiness and universal peace, to realize the reign of justice by a gigantic hegemony. These unsound methods are condemned to sure defeat. Durkheim wrote truly in 1915 in the prophetic conclusion of his pamphlet: *L'Allemagne au-dessus de tout*: "There is a universal conscience and a world-wide opinion from the dominion of which one can no more withdraw than from the dominion of physical

laws. For they are forces, which if struck, strike back at those who offend. There are, indeed, severe nervous disorders in the course of which the sick person's powers are excessively stimulated; his capacity for work and production is increased; he does things of which he would be incapable under normal conditions. He has no sense of his limitations. But this extreme excitement is never more than a passing thing. It exhausts by its exaggeration, and nature is not slow to take revenge. . . . When the will refuses to recognize the limits and measure set for every man, inevitably it will allow itself to be carried to exhausting excesses, and some day it will strike against superior forces which will shatter it."

Is it not curious thus to see positive sociology joining with the mystic tradition which is as old as history?

IV.

Studies in the history of philosophy have suffered less from the war than philosophy proper. Why, it is difficult to say. Perhaps because they divert us more from the pressure of anxiety. To philosophize is to think with the total content of the mind; thus at the present time it means, almost inevitably, to recur to the griefs, difficulties and agonies of the present hour. He who fixes his mind on a classical work, on the contrary, gradually lets himself be drawn out of the sad circle of the present. He recovers something of the serenity of the time before the war. He anticipates the future when, if it is given us to see order and normal conditions reestablished, we shall be able to tie again the thread of tradition.

I should have spoken first of numerous articles by G. Milhaud on scientific problems in the philosophy of Descartes,—chapters from a book he was finishing on *Descartes savant*. But unfortunately death suddenly overtook him just as he was finishing his work. I will recur later to the career and work of this excellent man.

Durkheim, who is gone too,¹ had written during his last years a very profound study of J. J. Rousseau, which has just appeared

¹ See the *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW* for 1918, pp. 465 to 468.

in the *Revue de métaphysique*. His main concern is to show the unity of the work of the author of *Émile* and the *Contrat Social* through all the diversity of subject-matter.

M. Léon Robin, who is, I suppose, at the present time our best historian of ancient philosophy, has brought out a substantial study on *La signification et la place de la physique dans la philosophie de Platon*.¹ He compares Plato's spirit to that of Malebranche, who is the most capable, he says, of all the philosophers familiar to us, of making us understand Platonism. Malebranche received the deepest impression from the thought of St. Augustine, and from the Greek tradition with which Augustine was saturated.—It is a common—almost a consecrated—practice in our French examinations for the licentiate, to train our students to search out in this way likenesses and differences in ancient and modern philosophical doctrines that bear on the same subject. We only understand well that which we can translate into another language. And are not comparisons of this sort a vigorous stimulus to 'rethink' what is enduring or permanent in these doctrines?

M. Delacroix has published an interesting and scholarly work on the *Psychologie de Stendhal*.² Wretchedly misunderstood during his lifetime, Stendhal had a generation of admirers about 1848 in the group of graduates of the École Normale among whom Taine, About, Sarcey, Eugène Yung, Prévost-Paradol were the best known representatives. Later he was a little neglected, but recovered favor about 1890 when several of his published works were issued. He does not please everyone, and some of our best known critics have written very sharp things about him. But those who have once tasted him see his defects, indeed, but yet always keep an attachment—one might almost say, a weakness—for him. His mind is so original (in spite of his plagiarisms), and at bottom so sincere and so true, even when he hides behind the most deceiving masques. He is a singular writer, the only one of his kind, with a quite special quality, sometimes too con-

¹ *Revue philosophique*, October-December, 1918; 1 vol., 8vo, *Collection historique des grands philosophes*, published by Alcan.

² 1 vol., 8vo, published by Alcan.

densed or too subtle, often irritating with his *egotism* or fancies; but he never uses words for their own sake, and thought and feeling are always with him real, actual, living. How few deserve that commendation! The *Psychologie de Stendhal* is neither a defence nor an accusation. M. Delacroix has tried to make him intelligible by connecting him with his sources. The first part of the book examines Stendhal's connections with the school of the ideologists (Helvétius, Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy). The second is devoted to his theory of love. The last deals with Stendhal's ideas and impressions of art, and is the best part of the book. The author, who is himself a discriminating lover of art, particularly of music, has sympathetically understood and expounded Stendhal's ideas on this subject and his psychology of æsthetic feelings.

In a very fresh little book called *Chez les prophètes socialistes*,¹ M. Bouglé has given us fragments of a study, with which he has been engaged for a long time, on the history of economic and social doctrines. The men of whom he speaks date from the last century; but the questions he discusses in connection with them are most timely,—the relations of the working-class and the 'intellectuals' in the school of Saint Simon; Saint Simonian feminism; the attempt by Karl Marx and Arnold Ruge to form a French-German scientific alliance in 1844; and finally the relations of Marxism and sociology. It contains one very keen and intelligent criticism of historical materialism: through failure to apply its own principles and to regard social phenomena objectively, that is, as positive facts, Karl Marx has substituted for the realistic study of moral and religious facts an *a priori* interpretation which juggles with them instead of explaining them, and deliberately transforms them into an illusion.

M. Moustoxidi, a Greek, has obtained his doctorate from the University of Paris by a curious thesis on *Les systèmes esthétiques en France*,² examined exclusively with reference to their "scientific" character. He means by that qualification all studies on art which have only a theoretical aim, which are

¹ 1 vol., 12mo, published by Alcan.

² 1 vol., 8vo, published by Jouve & Cie.

neither critical, nor polemical, nor the manifesto of a school, which have no object but to state the facts of esthetics and find formulas by which to classify and explain them. Thus he regards the preface of Victor Hugo's *Cromwell* as typical of "doctrinal esthetics," and drops it; on the other hand, Jouffroy's *Cours d'Esthétique* is the pattern of "esthetic system" which he wishes to study. The difficulty in such a classification is at once apparent. How many works there are between these two extremes! And between 1700 where the book begins and 1900 where it closes what an enormous distance to traverse! In default of a thorough study, M. Moustoxidi's book is at least an interesting disquisition on the progress of scientific esthetics in France; it gives many names and quotations, and may suggest some special studies which will gradually complete it. The author himself expects to work energetically toward this end.

Without leaving the province of philosophy Madame Metzger's book, *La genèse de la science des cristaux*,¹ may be given mention. Although belonging particularly to the history of the physical sciences, it is full of references and reflections useful for students of the functions of human thought. In spite of certain defects of form, which are quite external, it is an instructive and solid piece of work, and contains new and well-chosen matter. By showing the threefold origin of crystallography in the study of minerals, living beings, and physical phenomena (the book is divided into parts on the basis of these distinctions), the author furnishes a remarkable illustration of the polygenetic character of most sciences. This character has usually passed unnoticed on account of the prejudices connected with evolution. By showing the alternate play of patient examination of sources, investigation of the given, and on the other hand, of invention and intelligent interpretation of facts, she supplies some typical and unpublished examples of a well-known law, but a law which had not given precise statement to the relative value of the different parts of an investigation. Finally, Madame Metzger's book makes a precious contribution to the fundamental problem of epistemology, that of the needs and claims of

¹ 1 vol., small 8vo, published by Alcan.

logical thought,—by asking what constitutes the decisive turn, the triumphal moment when one may say: "At this point science enters." I do not mean that her answers to these questions are complete; certainly the author's views might be discussed or made more precise at certain points. But this improvement would often be accomplished by reliance on this very book,—its value is then untouched.

V

This year also there have been two great losses among the striking figures in French philosophy: Jules Lachelier and Gaston Milhaud.

Born in 1832, admitted at the École Normale in 1851, Jules Lachelier was the oldest of our masters. He attained great eminence from a little book of rare conciseness and originality on *Le Fondement de l'induction* (its main idea goes back to Kant's *Critique of Judgment*), a Latin thesis on the syllogism, an article on "*Psychologie et Métaphysique*," and a few essays gathered into a slender volume under the title of *Études sur le syllogisme*.¹ Purity of language, propriety of expression, and formal clearness are as conspicuous in his work as the force of his thought. His teaching exercised so profound an influence at the École Normale, where he was professor for some years, that long after his departure the new students recopied his lectures, and transmitted them from class to class. His knowledge of all classical philosophy—still more, of classical literature—was marvellously wide and sure. Yet, strangely enough, this wonderful teacher did not like to teach. Even to say this is not enough; in reality teaching was for him suffering and perplexity. He was never satisfied either with what he was going to say, or with what he had said. No one ever felt more strongly than he the infinite complexity of problems, the impossibility of keeping to 'positive facts,' to detailed observation, and meanwhile the almost insurmountable difficulty of arriving at a stable system without deliberately closing the eyes to lacunæ and inconsistencies—a thing

¹ As a matter of fact the title applies to only two of the articles. Besides these the volume contains a critical discussion of *l'Observation de Platner*, regarding a man blind from his birth, and a note on the *Philebus*.

which his scrupulous passion for truth would never tolerate. Later the same feeling made him forbid the publication of any sketches or notes after his death.

Although he had done great service by teaching, it was a relief to his conscience to leave it and enter upon administrative work. In his position as Inspector of the Academy at Paris, subsequently as Inspector-general of Public Instruction for classes in philosophy, then for a long time as President of the Jury on Fellowships,¹ he could continue to exert a considerable though indirect influence. "As regards M. Lachelier," wrote the Editor of the *Revue de Métaphysique* at the time of his death, "all Frenchmen who have lived the philosophical life in the last half century owe him a debt of gratitude and respectful remembrance."

He leaned in his views toward a critical idealism which interprets the soul not as substance—an invisible being in a visible body—but as the condition of knowledge and action. It was for him a reality quite different from the objects of representation. It transcends nature and causal determination, and is therefore free,—not free through breaking the chain of facts by the introduction of indeterminate phenomena, but free in belonging to another kingdom from that of facts and laws. Teleology is superimposed upon mechanism without infringing on the rights of mechanism and without withdrawing anything in nature from the conditions of understanding and logic. Similarly, upon philosophical thought a still higher stage is superimposed,—that of religious faith. Faith is added to, without demanding any sacrifice from reason. Faith and reason cannot conflict, except in appearance, because their problems are different. Thus at the same time Lachelier might be seen professing the Catholic faith most confidently and yet, when he spoke or wrote as a philosopher, not recoiling before the most daring speculation. "His brain had water-tight compartments," said Bersot. His mind was thoroughly saturated with the notion of hierarchy and eclecticism, not in the sense of Cousin, whom he disliked, but in the sense of Leibniz.

¹ The 'fellowship' is the highest professional examination in philosophy in France. See *The Philosophical Review*, July, 1907, pp. 365-368.

But he never expressed his great ideas except in the most cautious form. He attended regularly the sessions of the *Société de philosophie*, but scarcely ever spoke except when appealed to. He then gave his opinion on the subject under discussion discretely, and with so much penetration, justice, and nicety that no one could have been heard with more respect or profit. He had a gift which at first seems paradoxical of defining and enlarging questions at the same time. He brought to the task of revising the *Vocabulaire philosophique* the marked characteristics of clearness, depth, learning, and reliability. Freed from the care of arranging a lesson or an article, free to write only a few words or to fill several pages according to the inspiration of the moment, he loved this task which furnished food for reflection without curtailing liberty. He wished to see the completion of it; and he would have had his desire, if the war had not hindered this modest enterprise as it did so many other things. Of what may one speak in France at the present time that war has not injured, if not, indeed, ruined?

Born in 1858, Gaston Milhaud was a much younger man than Lachelier, and not so revered a figure in French philosophy. But he captivated all who met him by the charm of his personality, the keenness of his mind, and the delicacy of his feelings. He was at first a student of mathematics. He entered the scientific department of the École Normale in 1878, graduated in 1881 and was professor of mathematics for more than fifteen years. Reflection upon the subject he taught and on neighboring sciences such as mathematical physics,—and, from another direction, conversations with M. Pierre Janet, his colleague for a number of years at the Lycée at Havre—led him to philosophy. By 1893 he had published his *Leçons sur les origines de la science grecque*, a résumé of a free course given at the University of Montpellier. His *Essai sur les conditions et les limites de la certitude logique*, *Le Rationnel*, *Études sur la pensée scientifique chez les Grecs et les modernes* (to mention only his best known works) brought him so rapidly into honorable notice that in 1909 there was created for him in the Sorbonne a chair of "History of Philosophy in its relation to the Sciences." He continued in-

struction in this subject to the great profit of his students until his death. When he died he was on the point of publishing a book on *Descartes savant*. With solid learning in two subjects, mathematics and philosophy, he was one of the few men capable of treating such a delicate historical problem. Various chapters of the work which have already appeared in the scientific or philosophical journals show plainly enough how valuable and original it is.

William James classed him among the Pragmatists, or at least among the thinkers favorable to Pragmatism,—Mach, Pearson, Poincaré, Duhem, etc. He did not accept this label willingly. To be sure, the fundamental character of his thought was the negation of classical idealism, the conviction that there is no such thing as pure theoretical knowledge in the sense of Descartes or Kant. He contributed vigorously to the contemporary movement in criticism of the sciences which has humbled the pretensions of mathematics to absolute truth. He was one of the first to hold that only the formulæ referring to arbitrary conventions are absolute. He drew the inference that reflective voluntary decisions rank high in the development of thought as in action. He asserted the rights of freedom everywhere, and feared anything which stiffened the life of the spirit. But his reaction against 'pure logic' and the partisans of the *a priori* did not exclude a profound faith in reason, both in the theoretical and practical fields. If not a rationalist in the sense of the great defenders of 'universal intelligibility,' he was passionately rationalistic in a sense opposed to philosophical romanticism, the apology for sentiment, implicit faith, all the doctrines of knowledge through the heart, characteristic examples of which I gave above. He refused to assign to reason what he considered a fabricated genealogy, but he insisted strongly on the right of reason to rule conduct and individual beliefs. He knew that truth is difficult to attain—more difficult still to define—but he did not doubt that all matters which concern us are accessible to our intelligence and he would never admit that anything could be preferred to rational truth. Like Poincaré he began with the most radical formulas in order to shake his con-

temporaries out of their mental sluggishness or dogmatic routine; like him again, he ended by defending the value of science against the many who at the present time stop at the first look, and fancy that they can make a theory out of purely negative doctrines such as indeterminism and anti-intellectualism. Possibly there is a lesson in this double evolution.

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PLATONIC PLURALISM IN ESTHETICS.

ALTHOUGH in the course of the contentious years which intervene for most of us between birth and the final acquiescence we dispute about many matters, the main burden of our disputations turns out, if one probes to the heart of them, to concern the settlement of a single disagreement. Whether we argue about things visible or invisible, about what happened or what never in the nature of reality *could* happen, about brute fact or the dearest creatures of our fancies and desires, we are primarily and ultimately interested in whether, in their inmost essence, things are like or unlike, whether they are predominantly one or predominantly many. William James tells us that between philosophers the significant quarrel is precisely this quarrel as to the singleness or plurality of the universe, as to whether the differences we encounter are subordinate to a fundamental similarity, or the reverse. Every man, he tells us, in so far as he is a philosopher, will, by virtue of temperamental and other peculiarities, enroll himself under one banner or the other in the great conflict.

Now, all of us, happily, are in some humble sense of the word philosophers, and since temperaments are things we come into the world with, and customarily carry with us throughout our days, our initial philosophic allegiance, at least to the degree that it is temperamentally determined, may very well persist in each one of us to the end. But though, in our character of philosophers, we may thus be consistently monistic or consistently pluralistic regarding the cosmos and all contained therein, in our more frequent character of experiencing human beings, all of us alike are probably smitten alternately with a sense, now of the paucity, now of the plenty, of individualizing traits in whatever may for the moment be our concern. It is the question as to whether people are more dissimilar than alike, or more alike than dissimilar that we shall jointly here consider, and we may

safely set out with the generalization that human beings are *not* the same, but astonishingly, inexhaustibly, different. It is a generalization we have severally so often made before that there will be little desire to dispute it. Indeed, it may seem a trite aphorism to take as a watchword upon a philosophic expedition, but in the course of the following reflections it may prove fruitful beyond expectation and even somewhat disconcerting, by reason of the conclusions it may force upon us.

Our point of departure is something Flaubert once said about art. Flaubert believed, and he agonized to put his belief into practice, that for every idea, every inward vision of the beautiful, there is but one name, one perfect epithet, the task of the artist being the quest of this unique word—a quest oftenest involving weary search and in the end defeated, though occasionally, with the rare wind blowing straight from Mt. Olympus, rewarded by success. The theory, in these days of pragmatism and common sense, and with absolutes of most sorts rather out of fashion, may very well strike many as a quaint piece of academic superstition. Assured on all sides that there is in nowise The Truth, but many truths, never The Good, but many goods, how may the seeker of the true and the good in the way of speech venture to drag forth from its fast moldering retreat a doctrine that there are never and in nowise many ways but One Way to embody in language any given inspiration? How, much less, will he dare to push still further the vicious creed of uniques and the absolute by enlarging upon the suggestion thrown out by Flaubert, and contend that for every musical fancy there is but one cluster of notes, for every dream of a visible beauty, one tone, one tint, one contour? This would indeed be a doctrine which only at his peril the enthusiast, encompassed by a ring of pragmatic doubters, might believe. In vain would he cite felicities of cadence and harmony and form in the greatest masterpieces of the greatest masters. Never could the sheerest bit of enraptured expression, the most poignant passage of song or story serve him for proving to his opponent that there is at least occasionally in artistic creation to be found a maximum, a veritable finality.

Not that the doubter would refuse to admit the reality of

degrees of success. He might quite readily commend a fragment of melody from Schubert or Mozart as beyond most others satisfying. He might look upon the face of a brooding, wide-eyed madonna of Botticelli, or search the strangely lighted spaces and sombre shadows of the world that Rembrandt envisaged and pronounce them alike beautiful in more than ordinary degree. What he would in every instance be averse to admitting is that any sequence of tones, howsoever haunting, any form or rhythm, howsoever ineffable, could be truly, or even significantly, denominated the one and only adequate embodiment of the particular transport and need which possessed the artist, and which wrung from him his cry or his gesture. More than this. Our sceptic would reiterate that not only has there never been already a Most Perfect utterance, but that even the possibility of such an utterance is preposterous.

Now the champion of Flaubert's dictum is, if he be properly aware of the perils of over-facile superlatives, none too eager to stake the validity of his views upon specific samples of not further perfectible expression. He knows the slow clarifications of thought—like the gradual transforming of the landscape by the coming of the day—that keep pace with successive discoveries of the continuously more felicitous turn of words, the more and more pregnant phrase. He recalls the mistaken satisfactions, the premature elations, that, like forsaken camping grounds, besprinkle his own past pilgrimage toward self-articulation, and he is reluctant to jeopardize the general theory by citing cases of what after all may be less than perfect,—the seeker for perfection, growing weary or too easily content, having stopped just short of the goal. And yet, for the finality of at least a few instances of flawless phrasing, he is more than ready to do combat. And if any fragment of dream or reverie comes to his thought as a possible candidate for the ultimate laurel, then surely he will pause an instant before the song of magic which begins:

"O what can ail thee, knight-at-arms,
Alone and palely loitering?
The sedge is wither'd from the lake,
And no birds sing."

and which ends:

"And I awoke and found me here
On the cold hill's side.

"And this is why I sojourn here
Alone and palely loitering,
Though the sedge is wither'd from the lake,
And no birds sing."

Again he well may adduce that portrait in prose of "the presence that thus rose so strangely beside the waters," of whom it is told that she possesses a "beauty wrought out from within upon the flesh, the deposit, little cell by cell, of strange thoughts and fantastic reveries and exquisite passions," and whose epitaph is that "She is older than the rocks among which she sits; like the vampire, she has been dead many times, and learned the secrets of the grave; and has been a diver in deep seas, and keeps their fallen day about her; and trafficked for strange webs with Eastern merchants: and, as Leda, was the mother of Helen of Troy, and, as Saint Anne, the mother of Mary; and all this has been to her but as the sound of lyres and flutes, and lives only in the delicacy with which it has moulded the changing lineaments, and tinged the eyelids and the hands."

Out of the stored treasure of man's bygone speech we can at need recapture passages of greater import, of finer flavor, of fuller iridescence, and of these some are more distinguished still for a quality of marvellous adaptation to what they incarnate. Certain of them seem to impart the very essence of the artist's vision—its exact gradation of mood, its precise color and tone, its very rhythm and cadence. Let me declare my viewpoint fully and say: such modes of speech possess the mark, not of an approximation to expression, but of expression accomplished.

And yet, admittedly, tastes differ. What appears superlative to one is merely mediocre to a second, and he in turn puts forward as well-nigh faultless what to a third seems semi-articulate. Complete agreement among even a small number as to the total adequacy, beyond chance of betterment, of any single utterance might conceivably be chimaerical. What then of the theory—thrown out as a comment by Flaubert to describe his own literary procedure, but before us now as a principle to be examined on

its own merit—the theory that there is some one sequence of words which alone fully enunciates any meaning? Is it a true generalization of fact, involving a special metaphysics of esthetics? Or is it no more than the expression of any artist's dream of sometime accomplishing the perfect crystallization of his imaginative creation?

Obviously the case for the theory cannot be made to depend upon its advocate's success in establishing the finality of any particular utterance. It must be shown to possess merit on its own account, to have its foundation in facts of reason or emotion or the character of art or nature. But first of all it must be able to meet certain specific criticisms urged by the critic.

What, first of all, the disbeliever in the absolute in the way of speech brings forward as a quite unimpeachable objection is that, there being no conceivable way of comparing another's intuition with his manner of voicing it, we are committed to the defence of a highly academic and groundless assumption when we suggest that some manner of voicing can be the *most* adequate. The objection, he would continue, is quite or nearly as great in the case of one's own self-expression. Whom could one trust to make a reliable comparison of his internal picturing and the concrete painting of it, of the inward wordless song and its verbal articulation? The bare notion of such a comparison of internal and external, of subjective and objective, is as fantastic as the notion, incidental to the correspondence theory of truth, of measuring against one another a clear and distinct idea and the reality of which it is supposed to be a copy. Unhappily there is, in this latter case, no means of transition from the subjective state to the nature of the outward fact as it is in its unsubjectivized essence. Just so in the case at issue. Accurate measurements, each against each, of a thought and its statement, is clearly and unavoidably impossible of accomplishment.

The criticism may, it seems to me, be met on its own ground. Let us grant that neither in the matter of verbal expression nor in that of the entertaining of what one calls true ideas can there be comparison of subjective and objective by any process of superimposition, or otherwise. What follows? Our critic will

triumphantly reply: why, as regards the correspondence theory of truth, precisely common-sense pragmatic scepticism. Many ideas, many truths. Not *A Truth* or *The Truth* mysteriously receiving a perfect duplication, but various ideas variously validated by their varying degrees of utility. Why not imitate this wholesome example, and give up presumptuous hypotheses of a One rendering of any given intuition, differing from all other possible renderings in its total adequacy? Well, again admitting the impossibility of any sort of comparison between thought and its expression, what, on analogy with the procedure in similar difficulties, ought to follow? The rejection, by some, of the ordinary correspondence theory of truth is only one case among many. What of the innumerable other instances of a universal assumption of correspondences and identities where empirical demonstration and comparison is even less feasible than here? Who ever achieved a comparison between his experience of red and the experience of red of any other human being, to warrant his confidence in the identity of the two experiences? What intersubjective exchange ever took place to guarantee the common belief that what one calls the sound of middle C corresponds in character with what features as middle C in the consciousness of any other individual? Has there anywhere been devised or even barely imagined a method of empirically justifying the practically universal faith in the unimpaired persistence throughout its unexperienced intervals, of any experienceable thing whatsoever? Our deeply-rooted assumptions of similarity and coincidence demonstrably far exceed our power to validate them.

Now appeal to the fact of one insufficiently grounded belief is surely no proper defence for another. But when many important, useful, and unshakable beliefs are alike at least as regards indemonstrability, it is well, if one of them is to be therefore put in question, to be fully aware of what others are by the same token threatened: and, if some of them are allowed to pass unchallenged, to be able to see what others merit similar treatment. Yet even to establish thus a bare right to suppose a possibility of perfect correspondence between a poet's inner vision and his utterance, is not necessarily to possess arguments against a more

particular and searching criticism that may be raised. Let us see what such criticism amounts to.

It may be argued that if indeed but one verbal sequence will properly shadow forth any given sequence of ideas, then perfecting of style by the greatest literary masters will mean, not increasing individuality, but closer and closer approximation to a common norm of expression. In other words, not the more, but the less proficient will manifest idiosyncracies in the utterance of the same intuition. A group of experienced poets, each desiring to render into language a sudden imaginative sense of the unutterable transiency of what is fair, would as a consequence of their perfected power produce, not so many totally unique rhapsodies and laments, but a set of identical phrases, all alike shorn of the particularity of temper and emotion distinguishing their authors.

Such consequences, we hasten to grant, would truly be appalling. If search for absolute expression does indeed involve departure from the unique and a common convergence upon one shared manner of speech, then at all costs let us give it up as a literary ideal. If absoluteness and individuality are incompatible, let us cease our praise of the absolute. But does the paradox pointed out by our critic genuinely exist? is his difficulty a real one? or into the formulation of what he calls the logical consequence of our supposition has he introduced a fallacy? I believe the latter, and in support of my belief I want to appeal to the consequences of a generalization we rather blithely and inconsiderately assented to at the beginning; namely, that human beings are not fundamentally similar, but profoundly and inexhaustibly different. This formula, we agreed, has been employed by all of us many times, and with diverse connotations according to circumstance. It has been variously inspired in particular connections by recurrent realizations of the idiosyncratic character of all specimens of mankind. Thus, differently interpreted, it may have stood as an expression of the many facts of men's individual actions—that they laugh, weep, work, play, each in a characteristic manner. What then of the inner conscious side of these various performances—their corresponding mental and

emotional attitudes and contents? This, obviously, is the more vital and significant application of the generalization. May we declare that different people's moods and dreams and reveries, their fitful desires and broken imaginings, their solutions and questions and understandings, their broodings and delights and regrets, are all ultimately dissimilar? The importance of the query for our contention about ideas and their expression begins perhaps to become evident. If no two individuals ever entertain precisely the same thought or fabricate identical fancies, there will be no peril of their possible selection of identical phraseology for the crystallization of those diverse thoughts and fancies. How far, for our present purpose, are we justified in deciding for irreducible uniqueness as regards the conscious contents of men's minds?

Consider the antecedents of such content. Two men stand together gazing over the darkening ocean, each wrapped in his private reflections. Upon each the same wind of evening blows, for each the ancient stars emerge one by one. It is one ocean, one sky, one earth, one common end of day and commencement of one night. But the ancestral lineage of the two men is different, their entire course of experience, different. Memories and beliefs, attractions and antipathies in their complicated intermingling are not shared between them but are diverse. The two men feel the beauty of the hour shaping itself into an impression that craves utterance. By what miracle of coincidence could the inner visions that would thus give birth to a lyric or an elegy turn out to be identical? Even without resort to the view that the course of one's thoughts is fully determined by one's past and the past of one's forbears, how could we believe that the vagaries of genuine creation on the part of two differently constituted and differently equipped individuals could bring forth identical products? The theory of absolute determinism leaves no room for a coincidence of feelings and ideas in two persons with pasts that differ; but the only alternative to determinism plays equally into our hands. If our present thinking and imagining is only in part controlled by our past—a not specifiable residue being the product of entirely spontaneous

creation—then, unless the spontaneous and indeterminate parts of human minds are exactly what manifest completest uniformity and convergence, the reflections and dreams of people will have no choice but to differ. It is no esoteric doctrine, then, but a matter of common acceptance that what a man is, instinctively, emotionally, intellectually, causes him to see and feel and think somewhat that differs in its essence from anything seen or felt or thought under precisely the same circumstances by anybody else.

But though apprehensions of reality are thus diversified, it is after all the *same* universe that each one paints and sculptures and apostrophizes and sings. The idiosyncracies are in the matter of the approach only. Sometimes conceived in the mood of midday, sometimes in that of twilight or dark night, now gay or rapturous, now very cruel or sombre, it is in every case the *real* cosmos that is envisaged and that constitutes the ultimate common term in the discourse of all. The monistic correlate of our radical pluralism is then the conception of the universe as a confluence of diversified points of view—an incalculably rich congeries of individual aspects. That it is not many, but one, needs, for popular belief at least, no argument. Platonic monadism outruns common sense not in its assumption of a single world, but in its especial emphasis upon the multiplicity of that world's possible perspectives. Everyday actions and judgments are all based upon an unquestioning assumption that various people's various views ultimately refer to a shared world. What for our present purpose is interesting and highly important to recognize is that this same assumption is not merely compatible with our pluralism, but its necessary presupposition. For different people's versions of their universe to be assuredly diverse, there must be assurance that they are versions of the *same* universe, and not each of a different one. If two individuals inhabiting two distinct worlds thought and felt and interpreted diversely by virtue of their individuality, *what* they respectively thought and felt could very possibly coincide, since the subjective differences between them might be exactly neutralized by the objective differences in what they reacted to. If pluralism as

regards subjective universes is correct, then monism for their objective correlate is strictly necessary. And let it not be thought that we are indulging here in vicious circularity of reasoning. It is not the case that we tried first to establish a plurality of viewpoints—with the tacit assumption that they were viewpoints of the same universe—and thereupon proceeded to state as a corollary what was originally taken as an axiom. We did indeed tacitly assume, what few if any would regard as open to question, that it is the same universe which all of us severally envisage. Reference to that sameness of universe may be taken then not as an illegitimate attempt to demonstrate the indemonstrable, but as making explicit what was merely implicit in our earlier argument.

One further significance of the cosmos being singular rather than multiple we must pause to notice. If each contemplated a private universe, communication by each of his private vision would for other men be interesting, certainly, but far less essential than now. Their own comprehensions would not thereby be supplemented and enriched, nor their world revealed to them in some hitherto unperceived aspect. Under such circumstances the artist would still play the rôle in society of a person capable in more than ordinary degree of initiating others into his own particular way of thinking and seeing and feeling. But in proportion to the dissimilarities between his world and that of any disciple, the beauties he imparted would lack relevance to that other's world.

As it is, the artist's function is as essential as the scientist's, though different. Whereas mathematicians and physicists are the discoverers and communicators of what underlies every possible version of the universe, and is common to all men's views of it, the painter, the poet, and their kin, discovers each what is open to him alone to discover: communicates what except for him would be incommunicable. The situation is analogous to the case of the simultaneous experience of the sun by a number of observers. Each of them could take the measurements of that shared sun, and determine its distance: those are its public properties. But though every sense-image of a blazing disk is

the image of one common source of heat and light, it is the result of a perfectly distinct set of ether waves. Only the recipient of each such individual cluster of vibratory impacts would be in a position to describe from immediate knowledge his particular view of the one sun. Except for an infinitesimal discrepancy in spatial reference the perspectives received by various observers would be practically indistinguishable, but though thus qualitatively identical, the radiations from the sun's surface are as numerically distinct as if they issued from different sources altogether. In the case of the radiations from the total universe of its myriad of perspectives upon the diversified consciousness of the multitudes of sentient beings it comprehends, the distinctness, as we have already noted, is not merely numerical, but qualitative, in a diversity exceeding comprehension.

If, then, these unique points of view are communicated by those gifted with power to transcribe their visions, the aspect of the universe thus communicated ceases to be private and peculiar to its first recipient. It supplements and qualifies other versions of the world, and as thus assimilated to them it becomes communicable by him who receives it as part of what he in turn apprehends and strives to crystallize in speech. The interactions and reverberations from mind to mind, through art in its greater or lesser degrees, are thus infinite and everlasting: those kaleidoscopic and instantaneous impressions contain potentiality of reincarnation and recombination without limit. Echoed and re-echoed as long as the race shall last, they are destined to acquire ever increasing amplitude and completeness.

That the work of the artist can ever be one of invention in the usual sense of the word is frankly denied in this realistic interpretation of artistic creation. Pre-philosophic man says, art is created and truth discovered. The pragmatist contends that truth as well as art is a genuine product of man's initiative. For the realist, the pre-philosophic man's notion of discovery applies to truth and to art as well. In his opinion, artistic expression, though subjectively a genuine creation, as, subjectively, is also the finding of laws and systems, is, objectively, a mere finding of what was eternally there. Of such realism there are

two somewhat disconcerting corollaries. The first of these is to the effect that the universe is a thing of such appalling complexity and catholicity that it harbors without disruption or even conflict the seemingly contradictory, that it is inclusive of not only the rich and adequate perspectives of things, but also of those that are foolish and one-sided and incomplete. This is a true corollary, but it need not induce scorn, rather, wonder and admiration. The other corollary concerns the unrecorded fleeting perceptions of beauty and all the wealth of aspects for possible comprehension which never enter into any consciousness whatever. These, too, must be granted to have an objective ground in the nature of reality, and to be called at least potential works of art. For if with the passing of the fortunate moment its particular perception remains inarticulate, the reality of the felicitous rendering of it—that one perfect rendering which we were considering at the start—will be in nowise jeopardized. The tragedy is not for it, but for him who might have captured and crystallized his vision forever in some exquisite form, some magic phrase. From henceforth it will simply persist as part of the undiscovered and,—unless souls can be duplicated or past moments return,—the forever undiscoverable.

Upon spirits, whose brief duration is rounded by a sleep, there falls then an obligation, which is also felt as a pressing need, to gather in the utmost possible of the surpassing richness by which they are encompassed, and to discover the incarnation which has awaited it from the foundation of the world. This call upon artists to arrest the particular and transient is thus more imperative, paradoxical as it may seem, than is the call for like vigilance on the part of the scientist whose concern is with the universal and recurrent. For those elements are open to any man to appreciate and record, and if one, slackening in his zeal, gathers less truth than with more strenuous efforts he might have done, others press on behind to do it in his stead. Though a great mathematician be rarer than a mediocre poet, the matter he deals with is unchanging and imperishable and can afford to await its discoverer. Ages may elapse before that discoverer appear but he is surely forthcoming, and the process of explana-

tion, meantime, is merely delayed, not defeated. But for the finding of the momentary and vanishing there can be no such waiting. Vouchsafed but once, it must be seized in their swift flight through time by those for whom—unless their watchfulness is unceasing,—the rarest of their opportunities will vanish away like dreams beyond recall.

If slothfulness in the pursuit of what constitutes the substance of art is then deplorable, all of us who plead guilty to that sin must share in the condemnation. For just to the extent that we are percipient and articulate we have as an unescapable vocation a share in the task of those deliberately committed to the making of the beautiful. Humanity may profit but little by our labor,—though profit it must, somehow, since even the most partial and imperfect glimpse of what is vouchsafed but once possesses a value actually infinite, by reason of its irreplaceability. It is we ourselves who cannot but gain. The ego, stunted and warped and insufficient, is assured of expansion with every attempt to see clearly, and profoundly, and to respond emotionally to ampler horizons. Learning the secrets of language, devoutly pursuing to its goal the search for the one right rendering of any intuition, contributes immeasurably to that development. For imagination needs both matter to feed upon and wherewithal to crystallize its imaginings. It blossoms and expands with each effort after articulation. In such wise is gained new impetus and power for the quest and the achieving of ever higher absolutes.

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ON NIETZSCHE'S DOCTRINE OF THE WILL TO POWER.

THE conception of the Will to Power was of rather slow development in Nietzsche's mind, as is evidenced by a chronological study of his works. But there can presumably be no question that in his later writings he regarded this doctrine as basic to his philosophy of life. In it he at last finds the justification for his individualistic theory of ethics and his condemnation of the traditional moral values. The aim of the present paper is to inquire to what extent the doctrine can logically support the individualism which Nietzsche builds upon it.

The most general statement of the meaning of this doctrine is that life consists in out-going impulses—structural processes, instincts, desires and interests—which necessarily express themselves in some form of activity. Let us agree to refer to these vital tendencies as 'abilities.' Then our statement of the meaning of the doctrine would be that life consists in abilities; that the living individual, the bearer of life, is a centre or focus of abilities, and hence a dynamic being; and that the life process is a tendency to maintenance, persistence and self-development.¹

It would seem that such a general characterization of life is not inappropriate. Wherever you find life, there you find activity and self-expression; and, furthermore, you find abilities which bear within themselves the impulsion to self-assertion. In the amoeba, for example, life is power in this sense of the term, and must of necessity manifest itself as power: the amoeba which fails to assert itself is an amoeba which soon ceases to live, because the very nature of the amoeba as a *living individual* lies within its impulsion to exist—which in the last analysis is seen to be equivalent to the impulsion to self-assertion; for here the will to exist is the will to action and development. And the same is true of each and every form of life wherever in the organic scale one chooses to look for an example. Life in its essence is initia-

¹ Cf. W. H. Wright, *What Nietzsche Taught*, p. 302.

tive, the tendency to persistence and development—the will to power.¹

But it is fairly obvious that such a general statement of the matter has only touched the surface of the problem. When once we dig a little deeper into the facts of life, we are soon confronted with a complexity and reciprocity which the above general description has wholly failed to take into account. Life does not express itself in each of the different foci of its manifestation as *one ability*, but rather as a *complex of abilities*, a multiplicity of vital tendencies. In the individual living form, the bearer of life, the life-process is a bundle of powers reciprocally affecting each other.² And this complexity makes the adequate description of life not so easy as otherwise it might conceivably be. The interfunctioning of these several abilities is itself an important, indeed, an essential characteristic of life and cannot, without serious mutilation and distortion of the facts, be left out of the analysis. So the question arises: What are we to understand to be the relation among these various abilities or powers of the living individual when that individual expresses within itself, through its conduct, the essential nature of its life? In other words: In what terms may 'fullness' of life be measured? And the answer to this question is a basal element within the general problem.

To this question there are at least two radically different answers. One of these answers interprets the relation among the abilities in purely quantitative terms, while the other conceives the relation qualitatively. From the first point of view, 'fullness' of life is wholly a matter of intensity and multiplicity of abilities—the living individual whose abilities are the most numerous and the most strongly developed manifesting life in the greatest

¹ There is considerable justification for Nietzsche's contention that Schopenhauer's doctrine of the Will to Live fails to do justice to this fundamental aspect of life. At least, this is so to the extent that Schopenhauer can be interpreted to mean that life is primarily a tendency to 'self-preservation.' Nietzsche is nearer the truth when he urges, "A living thing seeks above all to *discharge* its strength: 'self-preservation' is only one of the results thereof . . ." (*The Will to Power*, trans. by Ludovici, Vol. II, p. 128).

² Of course, I am speaking here of the living individual as the organic complex which can in some intelligible sense be regarded as a centre of interests, a focus of tendencies—a living individual in the common-sense notion of the term.

degree.¹ The monkey, then, is higher than the protoplasm on the scale of life, because the monkey manifests in its conduct the greater number of abilities severally existing in greater intensity; and man is higher than the monkey (if, from this point of view, he can be said to be higher) for the same reason. Here the emphasis is chiefly on the *quantitative* aspect—the number and vigor—of the abilities in which life finds its outlet. From the second point of view, however, not merely the multiplicity and intensity of these abilities must be taken into the reckoning when one wishes to measure the expression of life and weigh its value, but their *organization and correlation* as well. On the basis of this view, 'fullness' of life is estimated primarily in terms of the harmonious interfunctioning of the several abilities within the individual centre of life and the resultant adaptation of the individual to its environment. The monkey is higher than the amoeba, or man higher than the monkey, primarily because the natural abilities are more harmoniously and consistently interrelated in the experience of the higher individual than they are in that of the lower.

Both of the above views have been attributed to Nietzsche by students of his philosophy, and it is a nice question of exegesis as to which of the two views is nearer his real thought. But I have here no intention to argue this question. At present I am much more interested in the justification and implications of these views. The problem, however, must be still further limited if it is to be brought within the compass of this paper, and so I am going to neglect the first view and arbitrarily to assume that Nietzsche holds the second. If we but grant Nietzsche this concession, so some of his disciples insist, it will be seen that his philosophy of life is essentially sound and must in principle be accepted. On the contrary, so I am forced to conclude, in spite of the fact that Nietzsche calls our attention to some basic truths of life which we are prone to overlook, if he

¹ In each case, presumably, the limitations placed upon the individual by the species or type—what Schopenhauer would perhaps call the 'Platonic Idea'—would have to be taken into consideration when comparing individuals of the same species. But these very limitations would be all-important factors in the comparison of types and would, consistently, have to be evaluated quantitatively.

accepts the view that organization is an essential element within the *living* of life he admits that which ultimately involves him in self-contradiction and forces him to surrender the vantage-ground from which he launches his vitriolic and uncompromising attacks in his war with the age.

It is Nietzsche's conviction that life as will to power necessarily expresses itself through struggle and violence, and that consequently individualism, individualism in the sense of self-centered conduct, egoism, is the highest manifestation of it. "To refrain mutually from injury, from violence, from exploitation, and put one's will on a par with that of others: this may result in a certain rough sense in good conduct among individuals. . . . As soon, however, as one wished to take this principle more generally, and if possible even as the *fundamental principle of society*, it would immediately disclose what it really is—namely, a will to the *denial* of life, a principle of dissolution and decay. Here one must think profoundly to the very basis and resist all sentimental weakness: life is *essentially* appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusions of its own forms, incorporation, and, at the very least and mildest, exploitation. . . . On no point, however, is the ordinary consciousness of Europeans more unwilling to be corrected than on this matter: people now rave everywhere, under the guise of science, about coming conditions of society in which the 'exploiting character' is to be absent:—that sounds to my ears as if they promised to invent a mode of life which should refrain from all organic functions. 'Exploitation' does not belong to a depraved, or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the *nature* of living beings as a primary organic function; it is a consequence of the intrinsic Will to Power, which is precisely the Will to Life."¹

I do not doubt that there is an important truth in Nietzsche's contention that struggle is essential to life. Indeed, if life is a process of which organization in any intelligible meaning of the term is predicable, struggle must necessarily be an aspect of it. Organization means precisely the interfunctioning of elements or

¹ *Beyond Good and Evil*, section 259.

agencies; it means the subservience of the several constituent parts to the needs of the whole. And this involves conflict and struggle. Indeed, it seems pretty safe to say that, if life is a process of organization, then *ipso facto* life is a struggle. Illustrations of the truth of this assertion are not difficult to discover.

Take life, first, as it expresses itself in isolated living beings. It makes no difference whether the individual chosen is an amœba or a man, its life inevitably involves internal conflict, and for the reason that its life is the expression of a greater or less degree of organization. If there were no organization in the life of the amœba, for example, then there would be no conflict among its several instincts; for, in that case, no one of its instincts could possibly affect the others or itself as an individual. But, in such a case, there would also be no *living* individual; its conduct would in no sense differ from the conduct of the stone. Its nature, however, as an individual characterized by that something we call life is such that its several instincts so interfunction that some are curbed and others strengthened: the very organization which makes the individual a living thing necessitates within its experience a persistent conflict among instincts, which conflict is its life. The same fact is evidenced on a much larger scale and therefore much more clearly in the life of the human animal. No hedonistic theory of ethics, not even the Cyrenaic, has ever rested wholly satisfied with the suggestion that life in man finds its complete expression in the indiscriminate gratification of impulses and desires; and for the very obvious reason that such a life would defeat its own end, namely, living. Human life, even in that meager sense in which it consists in the pursuit of pleasure as the goal, in the mere satisfaction of desires, cannot afford to be without foresight; some desires must be done to death for the sake of others, some pleasures must be foregone for the larger end. Here once again the organization apart from which life is impossible necessitates a conflict within the soul. And what is the development of knowledge, if it is not a conflict among what, for want of a better term, I shall designate states of consciousness? No sane mind, probably no mind, can at any moment be wholly cosmopolitan in its entertainment of conscious

states: attention means precisely the preference of some conscious states above others. And this preference is a matter of conflict, of struggle; here lies the secret of the effort of attention. In its higher and more complex forms knowledge is still more obviously a battle; the old idea never dies of its own accord, nor does the new spring full-panoplied into being. There is no procreation of ideas; there is only creation, and this involves much travail of soul. Now all of this struggle inherent in the development of knowledge is made necessary by the fact that the mind is in some sense organic—at least in the sense that it is some sort of system of elements. Because it is such, it demands that some ideas give way to others, that some be left to perish by the wayside while others are elevated to the throne of truth. If we had no preferences, logical, esthetic, moral or other, then there would be no such conflict among our mental states. But there would also, and by the same token, be no sanity, no knowledge and experience such as normal human beings possess, no mind such as we know—then we could at best be but blundering idiots. So, in the sphere of individual mind, as of the body, life as organization means conflict and struggle.

Precisely the same is true of the expression of life in human society, in so far as life as will to power can in any intelligible sense be said to express itself in human society—in so far, that is to say, as society may legitimately be said to be organic. I shall not enter here upon the vexed question as to what extent and precisely in what sense society may be called organic, or whether in the last analysis it is only a collective name for a congeries of isolated individuals. The point of interest just here is the contention that society, to the extent that it is characterized by organization, in so far as a real unity is predicable of it as a form of the will to power, necessarily involves some sort of conflict among its constituent members, whether those social units be known as states as at present understood, or as nations or community centres, or whether ultimately they be known by some other name. The conflicts within the social whole which hitherto have characterized social evolution one may very reasonably take to be indicative of this basic fact; and much

may be said in support of the view that we are just now standing on the eve of a new era in our social life in which we are to experience a still more violent 'blazing-up of the old conflagration'—a still more vigorous conflict of divergent social agencies. Certainly, there is every reason to hold that, if society may in any precise sense be called organic, then the social life lives through conflict.¹

Considerations such as these would seem necessarily to lead us to the admission that there is a great deal of truth in Nietzsche's insistence that life as will to power must express itself through conflict. It is obvious that this conclusion lays a great deal of emphasis upon the significance of the individual, implying as it does that the reality of the individual cannot consistently be denied; for it is precisely within the individual that the locus of the conflict is found, and apart from which the life-process is a pure abstraction. And on this point, likewise, one must grant that Nietzsche's emphasis points to a basic truth. Nietzsche's pluralism—so at least I am willing to agree—is a healthier philosophy of life than is the pantheism of Schopenhauer or even of Bergson.

But there is another aspect of his doctrine, the implications of which Nietzsche entirely overlooks when he goes on to construct his gospel of the Superman and to urge that life is wholly ego-centric in its individualized assertion of itself. In innumerable passages, particularly in his later works, he seems to have stuck at the thought that life is nothing more than explosive self-assertion on the part of the individual, that the will to power is identical with the will to over-power, that the conflict essential to life is synonymous with *exploitation and subjugation of the alien*,—in a word, that abstract individualism is the logical out-

¹ I wish to guard against a possible misunderstanding here. It is not a part of my thought to contend that conflict in the sense of war is essential to social evolution. My only thought is that social evolution necessarily emerges out of a conflict of forces, is, precisely, such a conflict, and that this fact can be accounted for through the organization characteristic of the life-process as it expresses itself in social evolution. Of this conflict war is undoubtedly a type, but only a type and a very primitive one at that. In the higher reaches of the struggle the conflicting forces may become more and more subtle: it is no mere figure of speech to speak of a conflict of ideals.

come of the life-process. But this gospel forgets that organization involves coherence as well as conflict, that the former is an aspect of life as will to power which is as basic as is the latter. And, unless I am greatly mistaken, this oversight caused Nietzsche to stumble into many by-paths of nonsense. This other aspect of the problem we must clearly discern if we would read the facts aright.

If it is true, as I do not question it is, that progressive organization of abilities is one of the basic characteristics of life, and that life as such a progressive organization *ipso facto* expresses itself through struggle and conflict, it is equally true that this progressive organization is synonymous with an ever-increasing harmony among the agencies in whose activity it exists—a harmony, or correlation, ever-increasing both in scope and penetration. This might, indeed, be deduced from the very conception of organization itself. Since organization is precisely systematization, it would necessarily seem to follow that, if organization is once for all to be regarded as an essential characteristic of the life-process, then the expression of life must consist in the manifestation of coherence among the different vital tendencies. Organization is just coördination, interpenetration. Of course, it is comparatively easy to juggle with a word in such a way as to read out of it almost any implication one may desire to establish, and one more often than not reads out of it what one previously has read into it. But it still seems legitimate to urge that, if this term is really predicable of the thing we call life, then life must be qualified by the basal elements implied in the term; and among these elements is coherence.

But the facts support the hypothesis here suggested. Much of what we have just been saying above shows this to be true. From the lower to the higher forms of living beings there is discoverable a more and more marked harmony within the life of the individual form; and the same fact is disclosed by a survey of the divergent forms of the social life. Throughout all phases of its evolution, in all the foci through which it expresses itself, life correlates the various types of its activity so as to make them converge upon the welfare of the unit as such. In some real

sense these different vital processes must be regarded as harmonious elements of the organic whole; they cannot be adequately comprehended otherwise. The vital processes within the living being, the reaction of the individual organism upon its environment, the interpenetration of individuals within the social unit—these are manifestations of that coherence which is an essential aspect of the organization characteristic of life; and they would not be what they are apart from their function within the whole. It is true, as Professor Hobhouse has shown particularly in the fourth and fifth chapters of his *Development and Purpose*, that this coherence among 'abilities' is effected in devious ways. Sometimes, as he points out, it is the result simply of the 'hereditary structure' of the organic whole, while at other times it is the result of instinct; and, in the higher forms, the correlation emerges from individual and social experience and can be explained only in terms of it. But the all-important fact is that correlation is there at all the levels and that it is an ineradicable fact of the life-process.¹ One is inclined to add that it is a fact which even a superficial consideration of the evolution of life reveals.

Life, then, is a two-faced process, involving conflict and harmony as two sides of the same reality. On the one hand, life is not an eternal conflict of non-correlated forces where victory always lies on the side of the strongest; nor, on the other hand, is its issue a fool's paradise of perpetual rest and blank passivity. It is rather force, power, continuously realizing some sort of meaningful end interpreted in respect of the expanding circle of an organic whole. And the coherence, the correlation, is as fundamental as is the conflict of forces. To neglect the correlation among the vital abilities—whether the process be viewed from the standpoint of the inner nature of the living individual or of the reaction of the individual to its physical and social environ-

¹ As I follow the discussion of Professor Hobhouse, he means by correlation what I have in mind above when I make use of the term coherence. For him, correlation "is a term applied to the parts of a whole when they are so arranged that their joint operation yields a result tending to the maintenance of the whole or of some function, character, or activity of the whole" (p. 42). This, in principle, is what I mean when I speak of coherence among vital 'abilities.'

ment (the two points of view are separable only pragmatically)—is to overlook one basic characteristic of the process, apart from which only a distorted comprehension of the true nature of life can be obtained.

Now it is precisely this oversight and the distorted view of life it entails which lies at the bottom of Nietzsche's abstract individualism preached in his gospel of the Superman and his consequent dissatisfaction with the present values of civilization. His contention that 'exploitation' is an 'organic function'; his condemnation of the 'morality of pity' and his insistence that the true morality must once again set all conduct under the 'egoistic categories'; his conviction that the attempt to bring the 'pretensions of morality' into 'relationship with mankind' is wholly 'childish and irrational'; his assertion that Christianity is nothing but a 'practical sympathy with all the botched and weak,' a subterranean conspiracy 'against health . . . *against Life itself*'; his sharp separation between the 'spirit of the herd' and that of the leaders of the herd; his demand for a 'fundamentally different valuation' for the two orders of humanity; his vision of that other ideal which 'runs on before us, a strange tempting ideal . . . the ideal of a spirit . . . to whom the loftiest conception which the people have reasonably made their measure of value would already imply danger, ruin, abasement'—what is all of this but the result of a misapprehension of the true implications of the will to power, a misapprehension whose source may ultimately be traced to a failure to read aright the significance of the fact that life as will to power necessarily involves coherence and correlation? For such statements as these assume that the fullest expression of life is found in the abstract individual, and that any morality which would estimate the value of the individual from the standpoint of his social relations rather than of his isolated grandeur is a morality that sins against life itself. But this assumption contradicts Nietzsche's contention that life is will to power. For this doctrine, if the correlation of elements implied by it be taken into account, supports neither the view that life, at its lower levels, is 'appropriation,' 'exploitation' and 'injury'; nor the assertion that, at the higher levels,

the fullest and completest manifestation of life is in the 'solitary' type. On the contrary, if this doctrine be accepted in good faith and the argument be followed to its conclusion, it will be seen to imply coöperation rather than antagonism, socialized rather than ego-centric individuality.

Space forbids an exhaustive consideration of the argument here suggested: a general outline of it must suffice. It is a fact of biological evolution that correlation is essential to life, that apart from it life simply could not *live*. So it happens that the life-process is characterized by, and progressively emphasizes, those very features that Nietzsche most vigorously condemns. Early in the evolution of life sympathetic activity plays an indispensable rôle, and as life develops into its higher forms this sympathy becomes more far-reaching and more penetrating in its expression. At first an instinct, and predicable perhaps only of the species, it gradually becomes more and more individualized until, in the case of human life, individuality itself is measured largely in terms of it—measured, that is, by nature and not merely by accidental and artificial (priestly or other) standards. Thus it happens that in human society the highest form of individuality is created through social relations, through the interpenetration of individual with individual; society, therefore, is a real expression of life and not a mere congeries of isolated and accidentally associated individuals. The non-social individual is as blank an abstraction as is the non-individualized society: neither can legitimately claim to be a form of life. Now, if this be true, then the individualism which Nietzsche preaches defeats the end of life, and the condemnation he heaps upon the values of the age is a blow at the very values which, in principle at least, he ought without reservation to champion. For the true type of individualism seeks, and must find, real individuality, not in the isolated and solitary Superman, but in ordinary individuals whose lives have touched the profundity of that 'humanity' Nietzsche berates; and for the production of this sort of individuality the standards of present orthodox morality are better fitted than are the standards set up by Nietzsche in his 'immoralistic' scheme. For reasons such as these,

then, I am compelled to believe that, in principle, the Christian ideal of the 'brotherhood of man', as the goal of moral endeavor and the standard in terms of which moral valuations are to be judged, is more nearly consistent with the doctrine of the Will to Power—in the only interpretation of that doctrine that can stand in the light of facts—than is the ideal which Nietzsche sets over against it—"the ideal of a humanly superhuman welfare and benevolence, which may often enough appear *inhuman*."

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MANICHÆAN TENDENCIES IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE religion of Manichæism arose in Persia in 241 A.D.

The founder Mani was reputed a mathematician and geographer, a musical artist and painter. He was the son of a Persian nobleman whose Babylonian faith had become tinctured with Christian teachings. Mani (or Manichæus) proclaimed himself the prophet of a new gospel and preached it as far east as China and west of Persia among the lands where Christianity was growing. Attracting many followers, he was opposed by the orthodox sect in Ecbatana, crucified and flayed in the year 276. A century after his death, his faith had gained a strong footing in Persia, Mesopotamia, Transoxonia and as far west as Rome.¹

"Two beings made the beginning of the world, one Light and the other Darkness. Each is separate from the other. . . . Out of the dark region arose Satan, not that he was in himself from the beginning eternal, although the substances in his elements were without beginning. These substances united . . . and went forth as Satan. . . . He spread confusion to right and left."² Thereupon God created man, equipped him with the "five elements of light" and sent him to do battle with Satan. Defeated by the latter, man was robbed of some of his light elements and infected with Hell substances. He was rescued by God and carried to Heaven. But the fundamental character of the world had now been set: good and evil had intermingled.

To recover the light stolen by Satan, God made the earth to set free the precious substance, and the sun and the moon to receive it. Satan countered by creating Adam, storing in him

¹ F. C. Baur (*Das manichäische Religions-system*, Tübingen, 1831) traces the religion back to Zoroastrianism and Buddhism (p. 458). Harnack says there were no important borrowings from the latter (*History of Doctrine*, Vol. III, p. 332).

² From the *Fihrist*, of Mohamed ibn Ishak. Flügel, *Mani, seine Lehre und Schriften*, p. 86.

for safekeeping as much light as he could, and also creating Eve, whose portion of the light was exceedingly tiny. The drama of existence became a struggle between the two kingdoms for the recovery of the light. Man's essential task was to set free every possible particle. These portions of light were caught up by great buckets in the wheel of the Zodiac and poured, those which had mingled with cold demons, into the moon, those with hot, into the sun. Here they were once more to be purified and ascend to the Kingdom of Light. This process consummated, a fire was to burn up all earth; the hosts of Darkness were to sink forever into the pit; and the purified souls that had risen to Heaven were to rejoice at the restoring of the original glory, the complete and perfect separation of the two kingdoms.

The morality enjoined was ascetic. The chief obstacle to the separating of light from darkness was lust. There were two orders of worshippers, the *electi* or celibate saints, and the *auditores* or laity. The *electi* performed the usual priestly offices. They were to abstain from meat, as this was the product of generation, a taint from which Mani's biology absolved the vegetable world. It was an act of merit for a layman to provide a priest with fruits of the earth, as the eating of these by the latter set free the portions of light. As in the Catholic church, there was a doctrine of indulgences: a fund was constituted of the virtues of the elect, out of which salvation might be drawn for the weaker.

The appeal of this system to the more thoughtful, and the extent to which in time it was mingled with Christian teachings, may be gathered from the words of Faustus, an adherent learned enough to be engaged by Augustine in the historic debate: "We believe in one God. It is true we believe in two principles, but one we call God, and the other ὁ ἄλλος . . . or the Devil. If you think that this means two gods, you may as well think that health and sickness are two kinds of health. . . ."¹ "We worship one deity under the threefold appellation of the Almighty God, the Father, and his son Christ and the Holy Spirit. While these are one, we believe that the Father properly dwells in

¹ Augustine: *Contra Faustum Manich.*, Bk. 21, Ch. 1.

the highest or principal light which Paul (I Tim. VI, 16) calls 'light inaccessible' and the Son in the second or visible light."¹

The origins of Manichæism, its descent from older Persian faiths, its affiliations with Buddhism, its debt (despite an avowed hostility) to the Bible, are the business of the historian of religion. This paper deals with the Manichæan teaching on good and evil, and more particularly with its dualism. If therefore we designate as Manichæan, (1) the belief that there are two distinct principles, good and evil, in active conflict, (2) the assumption that the good principle is limited in power, (3) the prominence given to the struggle against evil in human life as related to the cosmic conflict, we shall find in the history of philosophy many forms of the Manichæan tendency from the earliest days to this. Not all dualism, to be sure, is Manichæan. Descartes, for example, though he distinguished between *substantia cogitans* and *substantia extensa*, did not explain the cosmos as consisting originally of these two and then disturbed by their conflict. We shall speak of dualism as Manichæan when it conforms in whole or in part to the threefold description mentioned.

Mani's idea of a cosmic conflict between relatively equipotent principles was not original. In his own country, the early Sumerian nature-worship (afterwards adopted by the Akkadians), had taught men to believe in a warfare between the sun-god Marduk and Tiamat, good spirits and bad. The Persian invasion brought Zoroastrianism, whose followers, when Mani's religion arose, opposed it bitterly. Perhaps they hated it the more cordially because it so resembled their own. The similarities were indeed striking; but between their own militant, optimistic, world-overcoming faith and the pessimistic, world-shunning faith of Mani, there were differences which the soldierly Zoroastrians would not allow to be slighted. It was they who had the new prophet executed.² Another sect which flourished

¹ Bk. 20, Ch. 2.

² *Manichæism.*

Zoroastrianism.

Dualism absolute and eternal.

Devil a fallen creature of God's and inferior in power.

Creation due to conflict of two kingdoms.

World made by God, pure and perfect.

in Mani's day (he himself had been a member) was that of the Mandæans (or Nasoreans, Sabians, Christians of St. John), related to Babylonian and Persian dualists and to the Christian Gnostics. They believed in a conflict between the soul's "kingdom of the first life" and the material creations of the "kingdom of the second life."¹

In Greece, there were many traces of the thinking which Mani's dualism incorporated and emphasized. He acknowledged no debt to Greek speculation; but we know that he borrowed from the New Testament; and he was close enough to at least one by-product of Hellenistic thought, namely Gnosticism, to make its resemblances to his own religion more than accidental. A mathematician whose country had once been part of the Greek empire must have been well acquainted with Hellenic philosophic traditions.

Among the earliest of these to emphasize stress ethical dualism was the cult of Orphism which flourished in Athens in the sixth century. It explained the good and evil in man as the result of a conflict between Dionysian and Titanic elements. Man contained both; and a severely ascetic morality was prescribed to drive the Titanic substance out. Part of the Orphic teaching was taken over by some of the Pythagoreans, who enforced the distinction between the perfect stellar world and an imperfect earth, relating the soul or good principle to the former, and the body or evil to the latter. Hence the ascetic ethics. The chief tendency in Pythagoreanism, however, was monistic.²

So was Plato's teaching monistic. Yet here, too, successors found ample encouragement for an ethical dualism akin to

Material things evil except to the extent	Earth, fire, water, pure and sacred.
that they contain light.	

Earth was to be destroyed.

Earth was to be renovated.

Procreation, wealth, eating of animal
food discouraged.

Encouraged.

¹ W. Brandt: *Die mandäische Religion. Mandäische Schriften.* Göttingen.

² There is a hint of dualism in Empedocles' account of the four primal elements as moved by Harmony and Discord (*Frag.* 35). But except for calling forth Aristotle's criticism (*Met.* II, c. 4) that neither can be a first principle, this teaching had little effect upon the main currents of Greek thought.

Mani's, though less drastic. Plato declared in the *Timæus* that the world had been created after the type of the eternal patterns; but the creative power was limited: it did not create the sense-world but found this given, and stamped the divine pattern upon it only "as far as this could be accomplished" (§ 30). "Mind persuaded necessity to bring the greater part of created things to perfection. . . . Thus was the universe created. But to tell truly how this happened, one must include the other influence of the variable cause" (§ 48). "From God, the constructor, the world received all that is good in it, but from a previous state came elements of evil and unrighteousness" (*Politicus*, § 73).¹ Hence the ethical dualism described so frequently (*v. Phædo*, 66; *Phædrus*, 54) as a thwarting of soul by body.²

Plato's successors emphasize this dualism and the limitation upon the creative power.³ Philo makes God architect not creator. *ὕλη* exists from eternity and God sets it in order "in proportion to its receptive power."⁴ In Plutarch we get the usual insistence of the Neo-Pythagorean and the Neo-Platonist upon ethical dualism as the dualism of spirit and flesh in man, and of *νοῦς* and *ἕλη* in the cosmos. We get also a remarkably emphatic insistence upon the non-omnipotence of God. Plutarch's wrath had been aroused by the Stoic theodicy; and he picked out Chrysippus for an attack in which he absolved God from acquiescence in the world's evil but saved the benevolence by sacrificing the omnipotence. The Stoics, he said, call God humane, "yet they

¹ See also *Theætetus* (176) and *Leges* (896) (906). On this head Anaxagoras had declared: "All things were together and *νοῦς* separated them and put them together." Aristotle too made creation the action of the Prime Mover upon given matter (*Met.* XI, Ch. 3, 6).

² This referring of evil to an ultimate intractability in *ἕλη*, explains in part why Plato, although he taught free will (*Rep.*, 379, 380), never insisted as vigorously as the Bible upon the absolute responsibility of the sinner. A creator himself thwarted by the original recalcitrance in matter would be more indulgent to human frailty. Zeus could not say: "Be ye perfect even as I am perfect."

Moreover, Plato's was an æsthetic nature. As artist, he could appreciate how matter is unable to embody the perfect ideal. Note that Mani, whose god was thus limited, was a painter.

³ See *Commentary on Timæus* by Posidonius.

⁴ *De Mundi Opificio*, §6.

attribute to him savage and barbarous deeds. . . . If it be God who brings wars to pass, he is also the cause of our vices, provoking and perverting mankind as he does. . . . Chrysippus asks 'whether some things may not be neglected, just as in great houses some grains of corn fall unnoticed, although the estate as a whole is managed well.' And he adds that there is a large admixture of necessity in things. I pass over the recklessness of likening to the unnoticed fall of grains of corn such misfortunes of good and noble men as the execution of Socrates and Pythagoras. . . . Is it not to blame God to say that evil spirits had been appointed to such offices? In that case God would be like a king who handed over his provinces to evil and stupid satraps. Finally, if there be a large admixture of necessity in things, God is not all-powerful. . . .

"I would gladly learn from Chrysippus of what use vice is in the universe. . . . Does it benefit our beauty or our strength? . . . And is it not terrible that although what is useful to the farmer . . . leads to its proper end, yet what is created by God for virtue destroys and corrupts virtue? . . . If, as Chrysippus says, 'Not the smallest part exists otherwise than as Zeus wills,' then more ruinous is this utterance. For it is ten thousand times more decent that the members of Zeus, deranged by his impotence, should do many absurd things contrary to his nature and will, than that there should be no wantonness and no wickedness of which he was not the cause."¹

In Plotinus, whose philosophy afforded Augustine a resting-place on his way from Manichæism to Christianity, we meet again Plato's limitation of the creative power, the world being a mixture of *νοῦς* and *ἀνάγκη*.² Though less ascetic than others of his age, he too like Mani casts a slur upon physical generation.³

¹ *De Stoicorum Repugnantiiis*, §§ 32-36. The principle opposing God Plutarch regards not as matter but as a third entity. It is significant of the Manichæan tendency in Plato's dualism that Plutarch cites Plato as authority for this belief. See *De Animæ Procreat. in Timæo*, 6, 1014, 1015. Also *De Iside et Osiride*, 46, 58, where he refers again to Plato's "malignant world-soul."

² *Enneads*, III, 2, §4. From Plato, Plotinus also gets the argument which Augustine was to use in his own fashion (v. p. 499) that evil is not-being. *Enneads*, I, 8, §3.

³ *Enneads*, I, 8 §4; VI, 9.

The speculations most akin to Mani's were found in Gnosticism, the mixture of Greek philosophy and Jewish and Syrian religion flourishing in the first and second centuries A.D. in Babylonia, Persia, Phrygia, Egypt. Like Manichæism, its teachings resembled Christianity so closely that fathers of the church felt called upon to combat it. Marcion was an avowed follower of Paul. Although differing among themselves in many points, the Gnostics agreed in asserting the independence and eternity of matter, the difference between the creator of the world and the Supreme God, the origin of the present world from a fall of man or from an undertaking hostile to God, the doctrine that evil is inherent in matter and is therefore a physical potency.¹ Creation is the mingling of two primordial kingdoms.² In some accounts, it is the work of a single Demiurge; according to others, of several fallen divinities. Valentinus relates the creation to the emanation doctrine of the Neo-Platonists, creation being a lapse from perfection.³

Ethical dualism thus plays an important rôle in the Gnostic system. There is in man a good principle derived from the light elements which Sophia (for all her presumption in forgetting that only the Perfect and Uncreated could make a perfect world) could not help transmitting from the Pleroma. The bad is equally primal. All earthly things, according to Tertullian's account, belong to the lower god of creation, all '*invisibilia*' to the good god.⁴ Neo-Platonism appears in making the realm of darkness the realm of metaphysical evil, that is, of the 'non-being,' essential to the perfection of Being. The 'void' is essential to the glory of the 'full' or Pleroma. All the sects required an ascetic discipline. Redemption was a progressive purging of the soul from earthly hindrances in order that it

¹ Harnack, *History of Doctrine*, Vol. I, pp. 247 ff.

² "*Materia subjacens* gave the stuff out of which the Old Testament God created the world." Tertullian (Library Ante-Nicene Christianity), I, 15.

³ Hippolytus (Library Ante-Nicene Christianity), VII, 21 ff. See Hastings, *Cyclopedia Relig. and Ethics*, Articles "Valentinus," etc.; Harnack, *History of Doctrine*, I, pp. 227 ff.

⁴ Tertullian, *op. cit.*, I, 16.

might ascend from star to star into the Pleroma. As this was possible only to the few, two classes of men were sharply contrasted, the spiritual or πνευματικοί and the earthly, ἰλικοί. The kinship of good and bad with physical principles, as in Manichæism, led to superstitious practices by which the soul might ascend.¹

We come next to the relation of Manichæism to the thought of one of the ablest thinkers in the Roman Catholic Church. Augustine, whose teachings influenced Aquinas, Anselm, Luther, Descartes, had been a follower of Mani; and his refutation of this earlier belief constitutes one of the three great controversies in which his main thoughts were developed. Reacting against the idea that God's power could be at all limited, he reached a conception of absoluteness which left its mark upon all later theology. He was led (with modifications resulting from the Pelagian controversy) to the view of free-will which is quoted in every debate on the subject. As we shall see, the spirit which found satisfaction in Mani's account of the war between good and evil expressed itself, even in the new faith, in the same acute sense of a profound ethical dualism; and it still persists in the church whose doctrines and polity he helped so largely to shape.

The keynote of his thinking is his keen consciousness of the tug of evil. Whence did evil come and why? These questions, he said in his *Confessions*, "greatly harassed me when rather young, and cast me headlong among the heretics." But before he became a Christian, he had become a Neo-Platonist. The bridge was easy. Plato's teaching, "that there were two worlds, one spiritual wherein truth itself dwelt, the other tangible to sense,"² was affiliated with Manichæan dualism and with the Christian dualism of heaven and earth.

From the Neo-Platonists, he got the argument, "evil is not-

¹ Note the connection between Gnosticism and the tenets of the Essenes and the Jewish Cabalists of the Middle Ages. The Essenes were probably influenced both by Persian beliefs and by Neo-Pythagoreanism (*Essenes* in *Encyclopedia Biblica*, and Hastings, *op. cit.*).

² *Contra Academicos*, I, 3, 17.

being," which he used against the Manichæans. The conception goes back to Plato's thought that existences are real to the extent that they participate in the eternal ideas.¹ Augustine argued that the supreme good, original, eternal, unchangeable, can be asserted only of God.² But as evil destroys its own existence, it cannot be substantial, essential, existential. God is not the author of evil, since the cause of all being cannot at the same time be the cause of not-being, that is, of tendency to non-existence (Ch. 2). Evil therefore is not a substance but a disagreement hostile to substance (Ch. 8).

To Augustine such a conception could not remain merely speculative. In his *De Civitate Dei*, he gave it a notable practical application. This remarkable book, called forth largely by the destruction of Rome, enforced the point that the great calamity should be regarded as further evidence that the real home for men was Heaven. All earthly cities were *civitates diaboli*. Rome had been founded by a fratricide, and the first of all city-builders was Cain. Conceived in wickedness, all earthly cities were to be destroyed, a thoroughly concrete application of the practical import in the tendency, inherent in evil, to 'non-existence.'³

Augustine insists also that there is no absolute evil: some things, e.g., heat and cold, are good in moderation and bad in excess; poisons and antidotes are interchangeable when used properly.⁴ Instead of good and evil, Manichæans ought logically to require four principles, a good and a bad in themselves, a good and a

¹ E. g., *Sophist*, 237-259. Aristotle, following a lead of Plato's, spoke of the first principle as perfect and of the "tendency to decay or corruption" in things evil (*Met.*, VIII, Ch. 9). The argument appears frequently in Neo-Platonism. Plotinus defined evil as "some form of not-being" (*Enneads*, I, 8, §3). Origen calls evil *τὸ οὐκ εἶναι* (*Johan.*, II, 7, 65). Pantheists are attracted by this conception. See Spinoza's insistence upon degrees of reality, and Emerson's characterization of evil as "merely privative not absolute" (*Div. Coll. Address*).

² *De Moribus Manichæorum*, Ch. 1. In *De Civ. Dei*, "the opposite of God is not Being in any of its forms, but non-being, and evil which is its product" (XII, 2). The Neo-Platonist argument appears in the statement that "the beauty of the world is shaped by the opposition of contraries" (*De Civ. Dei*, XI, 18).

³ *De Civ. Dei*, XIV, XV, 1-5.

⁴ *Contra Faustum*, Ch. 11-14.

bad in relation.¹ Whence therefore evil? It was not substance; it did not come from God. It was the result of man's misuse of free-will. This familiar argument, developed and modified in the controversy with Pelagius, need not be discussed here. The point to note is that the problem of evil which had first led Augustine to Manichæism brought him to the exceedingly important Christian doctrine of a God so absolute that in the dispensing of grace he could not be bound even by the merits of Adam's children.

But though the dualism was thus overcome in theory, in practice it remained an exceedingly vivid affair. Nowhere has the war between good and evil as a cosmic struggle been more sharply urged than by Augustine and his church. Heaven is set over, once and for all, against the world. Between the two there is no compromise, only war. The Church which Augustine helped to build is more than a school of philosophy or a charity society: it is *ecclesia militans*, an army headed by God and his archangels, and under them a band of highly-trained priests organized with Roman efficiency to conduct the war. Well might Augustine reflect that if life was to be envisaged *sub specie certaminis*, he had lost little by giving up the dualism of Mani.

Except among the Paulicians and the Cathari or Albigenses, Manichæism is in little evidence during the Middle Ages.² The absoluteness of the deity was unquestioned; and it was reinforced by the Roman passion for unity. Among the Cathari (so-called because of their rites of purification) the Manichæan heresy flourished vigorously for a time despite the attempts at suppression from Rome. It had been introduced into the west by missionaries from Bulgaria in the eleventh century.³ It opposed spirit and body. All matter was vile. Withdrawal

¹ Augustine was perhaps familiar with the difficulty raised in Plato's *Parmenides* where Socrates is asked if there is not an eternal pattern for each sort of existence, even for mud, hair, filth, etc. Compare Moore's *Principia* (pp. 208-225) on "mixed evils and mixed goods."

² It was known to the Mohammedans. The chief first hand source is the text contained in the *Fihrist* or *Catalogue*, compiled by Mohammed ibn Ishak circa 1000. It is translated in Flügel, *Mani, seine Lehre und Schriften*.

³ Hastings, *Cycl. Relig. and Eth.*, I, p. 278. Lea, however, questions this origin (*Inquisition*, I, p. 90).

from the world was advocated. Men were divided into two classes on the basis of their capacity to live the life of the spirit. "This hybrid doctrine spread so rapidly and resisted so stubbornly the sternest efforts at suppression, that at one time it may fairly be said to have threatened the permanent existence of Christianity itself. The explanation may perhaps be found in the fascination which the dualistic theory . . . offers to those who regard the existence of evil as incompatible with the supremacy of an all-wise and beneficent God."¹

With the modern age, speculation becomes freer. Hence though we nowhere meet Manichæism as a religious practice, we find thinkers in abundance who either look upon the creative power as limited, or regard good and evil as aboriginally antithetic. When we speak of limitations upon the creative power, we have reference of course to forces beyond the control of the deity, and offering resistance to the deity's good. That God could not will anything contrary to reason ("the limitation of logic," according to Thomas Aquinas), or that imperfection is necessarily bound up with finite existence (*e.g.*, the body cannot consist wholly of the eye, "the metaphysical evil" of Descartes and Leibniz), is a different matter from the Manichæan opposition which Huxley finds the cosmic process offering to the ethical. Or to say with Cudworth, Clark, Wollaston that there is an eternal and immutable morality, "a moral fitness in actions prior to all will which determines the Divine Conduct," is to put upon the deity a limitation quite different from that which Mill finds in the architect whose product can be called the work of benevolence only by disavowing the omnipotence. The conception of limitation being thus defined, the Manichæan tendency is met in widely different modern philosophies.

The relation to Platonism appears in the *Aurora* of Jacob Boehme (1610). To him the struggle in man was part of the cosmic struggle. Everywhere he saw antithesis. This fundamental fact must be due to something essentially dualistic in the one prime cause. His preface declares that "two qualities existed in Nature from the beginning." Hence arose two king-

¹ H. Lea, *Hist. Inquisition in Middle Ages*, Vol. I, p. 89.

doms, a heavenly and a hellish (§ 84). "The bad quality hath wrestled with the good ever since the beginning" (§ 18). The creative principle is dual. "In God's own nature is eternal contrast." "The Devil is in God but shut up in the divine night."¹ The world as we now know it began when Lucifer attempted to become greater than God.² The explanation lies in the fact that pure unity with nothing to oppose it has no occasion to exercise will.³ This metaphysical evil is frequently adduced in the theodicies.⁴ Boehme was more daring in making the deity a dual being and in putting forward (albeit as poetry) his own creation-myths in explanation.

Something of Boehme's thought reappeared in Schelling's *Treatise on Human Freedom*. In his *Philosophy of Nature*, Schelling had explained the sense-world as reason pushing its way up to self-consciousness. But then he began to ask why the Absolute projected itself into the sense-order when the step involved a farewell to perfection. It was no answer to say (in *Philosophy and Religion*) that the Ideas (bridges between the Absolute and the world) shared the Absolute's freedom: it was not wholly rational for an absolute freedom to will to become finite. Hence, in the *Treatise on Human Freedom*, he asked whether this lapse might not be due to some imperfection in the Absolute. The result was Schelling's dualistic conception. Along with ideal reason, there existed in the Absolute a dark, blind Abyss of unreason, sheer unconscious will. The world was the product of both forces.⁵ History is the tale of the resultant conflict in the life of the race.

Edward von Hartmann posited a similar dualism in the creative principle.⁶ But whereas Schelling fixed attention upon the evolution of ideal reason, Hartmann fixed upon the urgency

¹ *Concerning the Election of Grace*, chap. IV, § 134.

² *Aurora*, Ch. 13, 14, 18.

³ Boehme's kinship with Schopenhauer is evident in his *Threefold Life of Man*: "All things stand in the will, and in the will they are conducted" (p. 56).

⁴ Cf. e. g., Leibniz's thesis in the *Theodiceë* that a world of none but perfect beings would be self-contradictory.

⁵ *Treatise on Human Freedom*, I, Ch. 7.

⁶ He acknowledged the debt to Boehme and Schelling, *Phil. of Unconscious*, Vol. II, p. 91.

of unconscious will. Even reason itself, he says (with many modern psychologists) was called into being by the basically irrational element in consciousness. The world is the product of both forces. Both are found in God.¹ Hartmann called himself a monist. God is the All-One. "The will and reason . . . in the Absolute contradict each other as little as the redness and the perfume in a rose."² The illustration is unconvincing. Even if, like Schopenhauer, Hartmann had made the world the product of will alone, a dualism more or less Manichæan would have been implied in the fact that the will is never satisfied and that it has no meaning apart from the meeting with resistance. He is as pessimistic as Schopenhauer in holding that the essential dissatisfaction in will causes a preponderance of pain. But it is hard to see why pain should predominate if the Unconscious were not thwarted by a force beyond its control.³

Among the skeptics the Manichæan tendency received friendly recognition. Pierre Bayle was far more cordial than was good for his reputation. In his Dictionary article *Manichæans*, he says that their heresy might be refuted by reasons *a priori* [*i. e.*, a self-subsistent, necessary and Eternal Being must be One], but that the experience of evils and contraries in the world seems to require the Persian interpretation. The only answer is given by revelation. Illogical as it is to suppose that evil can come from a perfectly good and holy principle, it is nevertheless the fact.⁴ These statements brought down upon Bayle the accusation of skepticism. Accordingly, in the closing volume of the Dictionary (Explanation II), he refuted the Manichæan heresy by showing that the order of the universe requires a single maker, and that Manichæism really requires three principles, a good, an evil, and a third, passive and capable of receiving either of the other two. In the light of Bayle's objections to Spinoza's view of the universe as a single individual substance, we can understand why this disavowal was regarded as disingenuous.

¹ Pt. C, Ch. 8.

² Vol. 3, p. 191.

³ Schiller of Oxford characterizes Hartmann's view as an admission that "the absolute created the world, or entered upon the world-process, in a fit of insanity" (*Riddle of the Sphinx*, p. 324, note).

⁴ In his articles, 'Paulicians,' 'Marcionites' Bayle says the same of Gnostic dualism.

Voltaire regarded matter as eternally existent, not created by God but shaped "like clay under the potter's wheel."¹ Evil is therefore due to the fact that God, though benevolent, is confronted by insuperable limitations. Voltaire's replies to Leibnizian optimism in *Candide* are familiar.

David Hume professed a belief in a single author of Nature; yet he left the door wide open to the belief that this deity was not perfect. "The order of the universe proves an omnipotent mind;"² but like Bayle, Hume repeated often that the "best foundations for such a belief lie . . . in faith and revelation."³ "To reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions with prescience, or to defend absolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the author of sin, has been found hitherto to exceed the power of philosophy."⁴ "You have no ground to ascribe to [the Deity] any qualities but what you see he has actually . . . displayed in his productions Hence all the fruitless industry to account for the ill appearances of nature and save the honour of the gods, whilst we must acknowledge the reality of that evil and disorder with which the world so much abounds."⁵

In the *Dialogues of Natural Religion*, he says that the sin and sorrow of the world suggest "a blind nature impregnated by a great vivifying principle and pouring forth from her lap without discernment or parental care her maimed and abortive children" (XI, p. 518). The design argument may just as well point to a finite God or to many Gods (V, p. 461). Perhaps there were two Gods in conflict; but Nature's uniformities require a unity as their probable origin.⁶ Nevertheless that this deity may not have been all-powerful, we gather from the words which Hume puts without refutation into the mouth of Cleanthes in the

¹ *Dictionary*, article 'Matter', sec. II.

² *Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. I, Pt. III, Sec. 14.

³ *Inq. Concerning Princ. Human Understanding*, Pt. II, Sec. 12.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sec. 8.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Sec. 11. Also *Dialogues of Natural Religion* (Pt. II), pp. 433 ff; (Pt. IV), p. 461.

⁶ *Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. I, Pt. III, Sec. 14. Cf. also Lotze, *Phil. of Religion*, §71. See also *Inq. concerning Prin. of Morals*, Sec. V, Pt. II. Hume rejects the idea of an evil god on the ground that there is no sheer evil in man.

closing dialogue: "Supposing the Author of Nature to be finitely perfect, though far exceeding mankind, a satisfactory account may then be given of natural and moral evil. . . . Benevolence regulated by wisdom and limited by necessity may produce such a world as the present."¹

Immanuel Kant's thinking was essentially dualistic; and his attempts to reconcile the empirical and the noumenal orders by means of an omnipotent Creator scarcely did the man justice. In his thought good is given cosmic significance by the fact that the good will is the only absolute good in the universe,² and that the good or rational act is characterized by universality and necessity.³ There is in man a "radical evil," a propensity to invert the relation which ought to exist between the two orders.⁴ Into the origin of this evil we must not inquire.⁵ We must take its existence for granted as we must the existence of the two worlds. The origin of things reason may not probe.

We need not repeat Kant's refutation of the ontological, cosmological, physico-theological proofs for the existence of a perfect creator. There is some hope in the argument from design; but "the utmost that could be established by such a proof would be an architect . . . always . . . hampered by the quality of the material . . . not a creator."⁶

The only reason for believing in an all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good God is to accept the demands of the "practical reason" and to recognize that only such a creator can guarantee that the universe will pay its due tribute to the superior, noumenal order by rewarding the exercise of virtue with eternal happiness. The argument is weak; and its weakness shows why the appeal of Manichæism has been so persistent. So powerful a thinker as Kant was able to establish the case for belief in a single perfect deity only by this very inadequate reasoning—that is, asserting

¹ Part XI, p. 507.

² *Met. of Morals*, p. 1.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 66.

⁴ *Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason*, Pt. I.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 351.

⁶ *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 627 *et ante*. See also *Critique of Judgment*, pp. 367 ff., where he says the design argument points just as logically to a Demon as to a good god, to many as to one.

the absolute supremacy of the good will, defining duty as action in accord with the pure dictates of such a will, he shifted his ground and introduced a different and misleading conception by declaring that virtue was to be rewarded with happiness. His only way of bridging the two orders was his unwarranted introduction of the paymaster Creator.

John Stuart Mill avows Manichæism with great frankness. In his *Three Essays on Religion* he pleads for the idea of a limited deity as the "only theory . . . wholly clear both of intellectual contradiction and of moral obliquity."¹ The very argument of design militates against the omnipotence idea, since design implies "the necessity for contrivance, the need of employing means,—a consequence of the limitation of power."² Even so thoroughgoing an absolutist as F. H. Bradley argues in something of this fashion for a distinction between the Absolute and God: "The Absolute can have no unsatisfied desire."³

Like other agnostics, Comte envisaged the ethical task of man as part of a world-conflict between nature and the ideal. Nature, which man must "order" so that he may progress, is an external limiting fatality.⁴ To Huxley, "social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step."⁵ Nature is simply non-moral. "If Ormuzd has not had his way, neither has Ahriman" (p. 202). The "cosmic process" is the struggle for existence; the opposing or "ethical process" is reduced to the benevolent dispositions which "tend to the suppression of the qualities best fitted for success in the [cosmic] struggle" (p. 31). For an agnostic, Huxley declared himself perhaps too positively upon the "cosmic" process. But a better answer to his view is needed than the reply of post-Darwinian religious philosophers that good is just as "natural" to the cosmos as evil. The answer still leaves a dualism to be explained or transcended.

In passing, we may note Samuel Butler's *God the Known and the*

¹ *Three Essays on Religion*, p. 116.

² P. 176.

³ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 156. Cf. Fichte's statement: "In the concept of personality is involved that of limits." *Vocation of Man*, p. 159.

⁴ *General View of Positivism*, pp. 17 ff.

⁵ "Romanes Address" in *Evolution and Ethics*, p. 53. Cf. Schopenhauer's insistence upon essential strife in nature, *World as Will and Idea*, I, §27.

Unknown,¹ in which, somewhat like Giordano Bruno whom he quotes (p. 28), the author makes the deity a single person comprising the whole of animate existence as distinct from inanimate (p. 55). The main interest of the book lies in the exposition of the difficulties in the way of conceiving God as both absolute and personal. God therefore is limited; and "in return for the limitations . . . we render it possible for men to believe in Him and love Him not with their lips only but with their hearts and lives" (p. 72).

Professor Howison finds in evolution the warrant for belief in a God who must combat an evil for whose origin he is in no wise responsible. God works to eradicate this aboriginal evil by raising the souls of men as near to his own level as possible. He is not even the creator of these souls; for *The Limits of Evolution* outlines a system of Idealistic Pluralism in which all the souls are uncreated and equally free. In this eternal republic God is *primus inter pares*, related to the other souls, not as *causa efficiens*, but as *causa finalis*. Pluralistic as Howison's system is, it comes close to Manichæism: "The whole of evil . . . falls into the causation that belongs to the minds other than God's" (p. 402). "Every soul . . . carries in its being an aspect of negation to its divine nature. . . . [There is] an irrepressible conflict between the free reason, moving in response to its Ideal and this actual, antagonising Check" (p. 364). The implication of dualism in this irrepressible hindrance to the divine power from an evil Check uncreated by that power, should be quite plain.

F. C. S. Schiller explicitly makes his immanent deity a finite, "growing" divinity who encounters the opposition of an evil co-existent from the beginning with the good.² "An infinite God can have neither personality nor consciousness; for they both depend on limitation. Wisdom or intelligence is an essentially finite quality, shown in the adaptation of means to ends."³

¹ Yale Univ. Press, 1917. First pub. 1879. In *Unconscious Memory* (Chap. 5), he retracts the distinction between organic and inorganic.

² *Riddle of the Sphinx*, pp. 353, 416.

³ P. 307. Cf. Mill, p. 506, *ante*. Pragmatists constantly remind us that thinking is a function of the encountering of obstacles.

Dr. McTaggart is an Idealist for whom the Absolute is simply the sum of individual minds. God's goodness is saved by making him non-omnipotent,¹ a view which the author holds more acceptable "than the belief that the destinies of the universe are at the mercy of a being who with the resources of omnipotence at his disposal, decided to make a universe no better than this" (p. 219). Chapters 6, 7, repeat and amplify the arguments of Mill.

Dr. Rashdall is another Idealist who cannot identify God with the Absolute. For purposes of morality it is better to think of God's power as limited.² Human duty can best coöperate with a Will of perfect goodness but finite power. "The limitation must not be conceived . . . as imposed by the existence of some other 'being' . . . [but] as part of the ultimate nature of things. All that really exists must have some limits. . . . Space and time are unlimited just because they are not real" (p. 237). Does this not covertly assume the dualism which it professes to avoid? Is the thwarting "ultimate nature of things" an empty abstraction? To call the limitations of God "eternal necessities which are part of his own eternal nature" (p. 242), does not overcome the dualism but shifts its origin. It simply assumes with Boehme and Schelling a dualism within the Godhead, a perfect will and its co-existent hindrance.

Professor Ward's Pluralism, though different from Dr. Rashdall's, makes similar admissions and exposes itself to like objection. "The problem of evil is greatly simplified [by admitting] what is inaccurately styled 'the doctrine of a finite God.'"³ Our pluralistic experience leads us for origin and ultimate end to the One; but if the One were absolute, there would be no need for human co-workers (p. 439). The limitation does not consist in the thwarting influence of a principle of evil: "There is no principle of evil. There is moral order; but evil is only disorder. . . . The struggle with evil is not a struggle for supremacy; . . . it is an advance against hindrances, which exist only as hindrances, not as beings having ends of

¹ *Some Dogmas of Religion*, chap. 8.

² *Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, pp. 240, 288, 290.

³ *Realm of Ends*, p. 438.

their own" (p. 376). The limitation is eternally self-imposed: "An omnipotent being that could not limit itself would hardly deserve the name of God, would in fact be only a directionless energy of unlimited amount" (pp. 243, 244).

Is anything important gained, however, by either of these positions? Whether the hindrance be actively malevolent or quite inert, the thwarting which it offers remains nevertheless a fact. And, in the second place, the self-limitation imposed by the deity explains little. If his energy must be not "directionless" but purposive, does this answer the final question: Why was it necessary to direct the evolutionary process in one direction rather than another?

Bergson's answer simply takes for granted the existence of the refractory element of the *élan vital*. To Professor James such a reply not only simplifies the problem of evil but imparts greater justification to men's struggle against badness. "The only way of escape from . . . the mystery of the fall, of 'evil,' etc. . . . is to . . . assume that the superhuman consciousness . . . has itself an external environment and consequently is finite."¹ His reference to the Absolute as a mere name for our right to take a moral holiday has often been quoted.² Hence the pragmatic conclusion with its implied ethical dualism: "Not why evil should exist at all but how we can lessen the actual amount of it, is the sole question we need consider" (p. 124). Dr. Dewey disposes of the problem in the same way.³

We can see therefore why Manichæism, whether avowed or implied, appears so often in one form or another in the history of philosophy. It permits the ethical character of the deity to be saved as it cannot be when God is counted all-powerful. Even such a view as Royce's, that the Absolute suffers with his creatures, would still fail to explain why omnipotence could find no other way to its "perfect selfhood" than through the sin and sorrow (albeit shared) of mortals. We have seen how this difficulty led Howison to give up the idea of God as efficient

¹ *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 309 ff.

² Bradley had raised the same objection. See *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 442, 443.

³ *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, pp. 69 ff.

cause. For the same reason, A. Seth Pringle-Pattison in his Gifford Lectures is obliged to give the term 'omnipotent' a very decided wrench: "The divine omnipotence consists in the all-compelling power of goodness and love to enlighten the grossest darkness and to melt the hardest heart. . . . The ultimate conception of God is not that of a preëxistent Creator . . . but that of the eternal Redeemer of the world."¹ But if God is no more to be counted Creator, surely we may well ask not only by what right the old name is retained for a quite new conception, but also whether it would not be better to assert openly that the "darkness and the hard heart" here taken for granted should be recognized as thus given and unexplained.

All attempts at explanation of evil are bound to fail. Dr. Adler's view, in his *Ethical Philosophy of Life*, that effort should go not into explaining evil but into utilizing the ethical perceptions which attend the combatting of it, suggests, we venture to think, the more satisfactory handling of this ancient problem.

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¹ *Idea of God in Recent Philosophy*, p. 411.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Idealism and the Modern Age. By GEORGE PLIMPTON ADAMS. New Haven, Yale University Press; London, Oxford University Press. 1919.—pp. lx, 253.

This book undertakes a survey and an analysis, partly historical in character, of the systems of ideas which have been mainly responsible for the present form of modern life, with its fundamental problems and conflicts. In general, it is a vindication of idealism against naturalism and instrumentalism, and the author's practical interest in the questions which he has discussed, though not made prominent, appears both from his preface and from occasional remarks throughout the text. "When the time comes to decide what the world order of the future is to be," he asks at the close of the first chapter, "shall we go back to those structures and habits of thought which rest upon the maintenance and the balance of interests, or shall we go forward to a world in which our interests are worth conserving, not because they happen to be our interests, but because they participate in an objective and sharable good? We know now as never before what the modern world means. Shall we go back to naturalism and conflict, or forward to idealism and coöperation?" (p. 12).

There are ten chapters with the following titles: I, "The Modern Problem"; II, "Democracy and the Modern Economic Order"; III, "The Religious Tradition"; IV, "Platonism and Christianity"; V, "The Isolation of Mind and of Self"; VI, "The Mind's Participation in Reality"; VII, "Idealism and the Autonomy of Values"; VIII, "Knowledge and Behavior, Body and Mind"; IX, "The Self and the Community"; X, "The Interpretation of Religion".

Idealism, as the author defines it, "may be viewed as the theoretical framework for a certain attitude and temper in which the mind looks forward to ideal yet objective, significant structures in which human experience may participate. Such an idea system may be set over against that idea system in which the mind is the spokesman of and the instrument for some vital interest which exists as a fact of nature, and which is bent upon its maintenance, its expansion, and the exploitation and control of all which the world may offer" (p. 13). The practical attitude and ideas which are denoted by idealism are his-

torically bound up with some of the deeper characteristics of religion. Instrumentalism or naturalism, which is throughout set in sharp contrast with idealism, is said to be allied with democracy, the modern industrial and economic interests, and science. Finally, this contrast is taken to apply, in general terms at least, to ancient and medieval thought on the one hand, and to the modern system of ideas on the other. "Neither to Greek philosophy nor to Christianity did it appear that the vocation of man consisted in the rational and scientific control over life and over nature's energies in order to satisfy human desires. For Aristotle and St. Thomas, speaking respectively for the ancient and the medieval worlds, man's essential vocation was contemplation, the possession, in thought or in feeling, of those eternal and absolute perfections and forms which are both the ultimately real and the ultimately valuable" (p. 8). On the other hand, "the naturalism and subjectivism of modern thought have expressed in the language of theory those formative and practical forces which have fashioned the characteristic institutions and habits of life in modern, west-European and American culture. . . . The mind looks backward to needs, interests, and desires rather than forward to 'The Idea of the Good.' Ideas are servants of the will to live; science and knowledge exist in order to yield power, to be useful instruments in the satisfaction of human wants" (p. 141).

These are the generalizations which form the framework and plan of this essay, and which the author illustrates and supports throughout the various chapters. In general, he does not fail to make the necessary reservations and exceptions in his consideration of details, and his discussions are marked by sound scholarship and philosophical insight. He recognizes also the necessity of making a place for the interests and ideas of instrumentalism which characterize the modern age within the system of idealism which he defends. This is of course the most difficult part of his task, and we shall later have to raise the question as to how successfully this has been accomplished.

It is not possible within the limits of this review to give a summary of the different chapters of Professor Adams's book. There is a good deal of repetition, but the main points are presented with great clearness and the treatment is full of instruction and suggestiveness. One of its chief merits consists in the connection of philosophical ideas with broader issues of theory and practice in other fields of thought. I have found the discussion of English Empiricism particularly enlightening; and his statement that "in Hume's philosophy is embedded practically the whole of instrumentalism and of modern

biological naturalism" (p. 230), seems to be fully justified. The account of how in the modern period ideas become isolated from objects and withdraw into the inner subjective sphere of the individual consciousness is also well worked out. As a consequence of this separation of ideas from objects, as Professor Adams shows, the epistemological problem assumes a central place in modern philosophy, and also ideas come to be regarded more and more as 'instrumental' in character. One cannot fail to obtain new light on the significance of the movement of philosophical ideas in their relation to the broader issues of thought from Professor Adams's admirable survey of this field.

At the same time, I think that the sharp antithesis that he sets up between Platonism and Christianity on the one hand, and modern philosophy on the other, has led him to misinterpret or neglect what is after all perhaps the most important tradition of modern thought. The modern age cannot be understood apart from the systems of thought which have found in the principle of Reason the standard of value and of reality. The significance of the philosophy of Descartes and of Spinoza is surely obscured when they are exhibited as the fore-runners of subjectivism. And it is more strange still to find that a book on idealism and the modern age has almost no reference either to German philosophy or to the English idealists of the nineteenth century and of the present day. We are told, indeed, that "Kant is . . . preëminently the philosopher of the modern age" (p. 162), and in one or two passages his view is contrasted with that of Plato, and there are a few incidental references to Green and to Bradley. Royce's views are naturally often quoted, as well as those of Webb, Simmel, Scheler, and other writers who oppose instrumentalism. Nevertheless, one cannot avoid the feeling that the author is too ready to hand the modern age over to the enemy, and that he has not kept sufficiently in mind the 'great allies' of Idealism who have not bowed the knee to Instrumentalism.

A similar objection might perhaps be raised regarding the assumption that Democracy and Science are necessarily connected with Instrumentalism. And, finally, one comes to question whether any of the sharp contrasts that the author has drawn are really serviceable in helping us to understand the historical and logical relationships of the modern age. Is there any such a sharp antithesis of idea and of attitude as that indicated between ancient and medieval thought on the one side and that of the modern period? No one can doubt that there are differences, but is it not an oversimplification and a

neglect of facts to sum them up under the headings of contemplation and instrumentalism and naturalism? I do not see how either Platonism or Christianity can be regarded as 'quiescent' and without any program of practical reform. Because the representatives of these systems of ideas did not devote themselves to our methods of reform, or did not perceive all the practical consequences of their principles, one should not, I think, conclude that they were quite content to accept the world as it is. And, again, it may be questioned whether actual facts and historical motives are not rather obscured than elucidated when 'Democracy' and 'Science' are definitely ranged on the side of naturalism. The moving forces of modern Democracy are various and complex, but they continue to be nourished and supported by the ideal of a common reason and of universal brotherhood. In the same way, modern Science is something more than instrumental in its motives and purposes, and is still sustained and fertilized by the waters that flow from the deep springs of contemplation. If this were not true, if the breach between the forces which have formed the modern point of view and Idealism were as complete as Professor Adams's survey represents it to be, the case of the latter doctrine would indeed be hopeless, and it would be idle to talk of any reconciliation. Professor Adams has too easily granted to Pragmatism its claim to be the representative of Science and Democracy and everything that is modern. It is true that he makes a reservation on behalf of religion, but even religion, he acknowledges, has been "weathered down" and rendered "problematic" by the dominating forces of modern life. There is a real difficulty here. Idealism can be defended only if the ideal is to be found in the actually existing order. I believe that it is possible to demonstrate the ideality of the natural through a survey of the movements of the modern period,—and one might find much in Professor Adams's chapters to confirm this view. But he himself, as I think, has made it almost impossible to find any logical reconciliation between the modern age and Idealism just because he has begun by handing the former over to the world, the flesh, and the devil.

It is in Religion, as has already been intimated, that the author finds a basis for the reconciliation of naturalism and idealism. Here he lets the antithesis between the two sets of motives fall away, and points out that in religious experience they function together. In this last chapter, then, he himself has recognized in some measure the artificial character of the earlier framework. "What I urge is, in substance then, that religion concentrates in a single

attitude and experience those two motives which have seemed to so many to be utterly incompatible with one another, the motives of possession and activity, contemplation and control, idealism and democracy, the idea systems of Platonism and Christianity, and the moving ideals of the modern age. And I have wished to urge that, in principle, these two attitudes are not necessarily antagonistic, but that they mutually imply and reinforce each other when we take them at their fullest and their best" (p. 239). No one will doubt that it is along these lines that idealism must be maintained and defended. I am not quite sure, however, that Professor Adams has succeeded in showing that the natural and the ideal "imply and reinforce each other." It is not enough to point out that as a matter of fact they do so in Religion, if this term is used to denote some special and isolated realm of experience. The appeal to Religion is warranted only if this attitude can be shown to be implicit in all experience and to be nothing but the most complete expression of what all experience implies. In spite of passages like the one just quoted, I cannot help finding in the book an attempt to defend an idealism of the dualistic type. I cannot now fully justify this statement: but I would refer to the adoption of Bergson's view of the relation of the brain as an instrument of action and the life of the mind as pure memory or knowledge (p. 171), and also to the arguments in support of the autonomy of values, as a realm having its justification and authority in itself. It seems to me that there is a truer and more courageous type of idealism which does not proceed by antitheses, but assumes as its guiding principle the identity of the real and the rational.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, which may to some extent be due to my failure to understand the author, the book is full of suggestion and value. It seems to me a genuine contribution to our understanding of our own age and of the forces which have produced it.

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Strife of Systems and Productive Duality. An Essay in Philosophy.

By WILMON HENRY SHELDON. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1918.—pp. 528 and index.

This closely knit volume of over five hundred pages is undoubtedly a distinct achievement. Whether its merit may not lie in some quarter other than where the author supposes it to lie, or where he would most wish it to lie, is another matter. The volume offers an admirably sympathetic and—certainly for the most part—accurate cross section of the deposit of the entire philosophic tradition. If the

author's own solution of the radical philosophical problem is not satisfactory, if his philosophy does not provide an actual map of the world and yield a body of doctrine which may guide human conduct—which is what he aims to do—at any rate his study does furnish a very tolerable map of the world of philosophical issues and solutions.

There is here no slightest yielding of the old unabashed metaphysical boldness. Philosophy undertakes actually to explain the entire content of the world. It seeks a formula which shall be utterly comprehensive, fertile, inclusive of all more partial insights, and productive of the concrete and individual detail of things. It requires courage thus to envisage the task of philosophy. And Professor Sheldon brings to this high task catholicity of interest, power of analysis, and an historical imagination sufficient to make the book worth while, even though our final judgment must be that his own solution is formal and barren.

The plan of the work runs somewhat as follows: There is a radical philosophic disease which brings it about that, in philosophy, there is no cumulative, funded truth. The problem is to discover the poison which has made for exclusiveness, disagreement and mutual contradictions. The author will seek a solution through an examination of the chief recurrent types of philosophical systems, trying to discover the source of the difficulty, and then to remove it.

There are thus passed in review the major systems of philosophy. They fall into two main groups, "partisan" types, and "synthetic" types. A partisan type results from the attempt to draw a complete map of the entire world from the point of view of a single angle or concept: "Subject, object, individual, universal, static, dynamic, mind, matter, biological adjustment, pure theory, will, reason, feeling." The synthetic type results from a conscious attempt to harmonize the conflicting partial types, and "to heal the philosophic disease by the device of breadth or all-inclusiveness" (p. 317). There are three such synthetic types: the Hegelian or logical, the Leibnizian or æsthetic, and the Thomistic-Aristotelian, or practical type.

But, so the argument runs, each of these historic types, partial or synthetic, falls a prey to essentially the same radical disease. There is for each system a "critical point." It is not that a system is true up to its critical point, and false beyond that point. It is true *throughout*. But beyond its critical point it is unprofitable and infertile. Thus, for Subjectivism there is the mental and the objective. Now it is perfectly true that anything objective *can*, if you will, be defined in mental terms, but mental categories alone can never account either

for the existence or for the detail of that which is objective. "The objective side of reality is the critical point of subjectivism" (p. 66). Likewise the individual is the critical point of all Platonisms. "Everything about an individual can be defined in terms of universals; . . . The paint of universality can be daubed over everything—as was the case with subjectivity too" (p. 235). But no universal will ever account for an individual. And so for each of the historic types of philosophy.

Through generalizing this situation we may reach a diagnosis of the disease. The strife here in question turns out to be, at bottom, the conflict between the externality and the internality of relations, between sameness and difference. Each system starts with some one category which it supposes to be self-contained and ultimate (externality), and then sets out to interpret all else in terms of that category (internality). It is "as if each category said to its counterpart, I am ultimate and you are not, for you are only a relation in me" (p. 417). The author's solution lies in holding that sameness and difference do not exclude each other. They are *other*, but not opposite. And it is their very duality which is productive of all novelty and of all reality. Here is the author's own account of his formula in its most rudimentary and abstract shape: "Suppose the simplest possible dyad: any two things which possess both sameness and difference. Call them *A* and *B*. Then *B*, being the same as *A*, must have the relation to *B* which *A* has, to wit, difference. *B* is therefore different from *B*. (This does not destroy the identity of *B*, as sameness and difference are not mutually destructive.) This second *B* should be called by a new name, to distinguish it from the first, viz., *C*. Now *C*, being the same with *B*, must be, as *B* is, different from itself—hence is implied a new entity *D*. This series is indefinitely long" (p. 509).

This is the formula of "productive duality" which is to unlock the secrets of the universe. It is to succeed where all previous synthetic philosophies have failed, *i.e.*, in showing how "one fact or event, one part of the universe, leads on to another." "It has shown—even though to a very limited extent thus far—a fertility which no other principle yet named has been able to claim" (p. 498). The author's concrete applications of his principle—from the iceberg floating on the sea to the problems of society and morality—are interesting and acute. Yet, notwithstanding many pertinent analogies and careful analyses, the impression of barren formality, of a too optimistic confidence in the fertility of a comprehensive formula, of a desire to see everything as but the unrolling of a single and ultimate process,

such an impression will not depart from the reader's mind. Such an interest and such a temper hardly conduce now to a valid understanding of the problems of our present social structure. To be sure, this present volume is concerned mainly with the elucidation of the formula, not with its concrete applications. It may be that the further exploration of the practical insight afforded by the concept of productive duality, which the author promises, will do much to mitigate this impression of dialectic futility and abstractness.

This partially negative judgment should not, however, be the last word. It is a very substantial and much needed achievement to have given the careful exposition of Natorp's, Münsterberg's, and Baldwin's systems, to have given a fine portrayal and interpretation of the Thomistic synthesis, to have subjected "Great Objectivism" to a remarkably clear and acute analysis and criticism, and everywhere, to see into the motives, the difficulties, and the deeper points of contact between the major types of philosophic thinking. This value remains whatever be the worth of the author's own ingenious system and solution.

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The Origin and Evolution of Life. By HENRY FAIRFIELD OSBORN. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917.—pp. xxi, 322.

This book furnishes a remarkable survey of evolution from the precellular stage of the bacteria and their forerunners to the higher mammals. It is as remarkable for its contribution to scientific hypothesis as for its mastery of data. It shows the distance, in both respects, that biological science has traveled since Darwin. It begins with the chemical analysis of life and describes the inorganic preparation for life in our solar system and on our planet. On the latter point the author is in substantial agreement with Professor Lawrence J. Henderson. Against a background of "perhaps a hundred million years" the author arranges the available material, particularly the paleontological evidence to which he is a distinguished contributor, into a wonderful story which gives the reader the impression of a great epic, more fascinating to us today than the mythology of *Paradise Lost*. It gives us indeed an appreciation of the poetry of science, at the same time that it shows that "imagination itself is strictly limited to recombinations of ideas which have come through observation," and that any theory to be of value must rest upon "experiment, observation and research, guided by imagination and checked by verification." Throughout, the author manifests a candor

and open-mindedness which might well make him a model to our too sectarian philosophers of today. It is of course impossible in this review to notice more than a few theoretical considerations of especial importance for a philosophy of evolution.

The author adopts the physicochemical theory of the origin of life without being a materialist. "Without being either a *mechanist* or a *materialist*, one may hold the opinion that life is a continuation of the evolutionary process rather than an exception to the rest of the cosmos, because both mechanism and materialism are words borrowed from other sources which do not in the least convey the impression which the activities of the cosmos make upon us. This impression is that of limitless and ordered energy" (p. 3). The evolution of life is creative evolution. "As compared with stellar evolution, *living matter does not follow the old evolutionary order*, but represents a new assemblage of energies and new types of action, reaction, and interaction—to use the terms of thermodynamics—between the chemical elements which may be as old as the cosmos itself, unless they prove to represent an evolution from still simpler elements. . . . The evolutionary process now takes an entirely new and different direction, . . . essentially constructive. . . . It is a continuous creation or creative evolution" (pp. 4 and 5). The author does not regard it impossible that some new element may be discovered in life compounds. But it is "more probable that unknown principles of action, reaction, and interaction between living forms await such discovery." This is "adumbrated in the as yet partially explored activities of chemical messengers" (p. 6).

He does not regard the difference between the lowliest organisms and inorganic compounds so vast but what we may discover the bridge—"namely, whether it is solely physicochemical in its energies, or whether it includes a *plus* energy or element which may have distinguished life from the beginning" (p. 281). But in any case he holds that there is "positive disproof of an internal perfecting principle or entelechy which would impel animals to evolve in a given direction regardless of the direct, reversed, or alternating directions taken by the organism in seeking its life environment or physical environment" (pp. 277, 278). "The conclusive evidence against an *élan vital* or internal perfecting tendency, however, is that these characters do not spring autonomously at any one time; they may lie dormant or rudimentary for great periods of time. . . . They require something to call them forth, to make them *active*, so to speak" (p. 279). This arousing of a latent new character may be effected through chemical

messengers "by stimulating the transformation of energy at a specific point."

The author rejects emphatically the doctrine of chance which since Darwin has been fashionable with writers on evolution. "I have long maintained that this opinion is a biological dogma . . . which has gained credence through constant reiteration, for I do not know that it has ever been demonstrated through the actual observation of any evolutionary series" (p. 8). The question of law *versus* chance in the evolution of life is no longer a matter of opinion but of direct observation. "So far as law is concerned, we observe that the evolution of life forms is like that of the stars: their origin and evolution as revealed through paleontology go to prove that Aristotle was essentially right when he said that 'Nature produces those things which, being continually moved by a certain principle contained in themselves, arrive at a certain end'" (p. 9). But this end is no "supernatural or teleological interposition through an externally creative power," but a law immanent in the process itself.

Professor Osborn proposes as the fundamental law of life its determination through four energy complexes. "In each organism the phenomena of life represent the action, reaction and interaction of four complexes of physicochemical energy, namely, those of (1) the inorganic environment, (2) the developing organism (protoplasm and body-chromatin), (3) the germ or heredity-chromatin, (4) the life environment. Upon the resultant actions, reactions and interactions of potential and kinetic energy in each organism, selection is constantly operating wherever there is competition with the corresponding actions, reactions and interactions of other organisms" (p. 21). The Darwinian principle of natural selection is thus given a subordinate, though a real place. Since the beginning of life there has been competition of organisms with other organisms as well as the survival selection of the inorganic environment. But "selection is not a form of energy nor a part of the energy complex; it is an arbiter between different complexes and forms of energy; it antedates the origin of life as remarked by Henderson" (p. 20). To quote but one illustration of the inadequacy of Natural Selection as an explanatory principle: "The general fact that the slow-breeding elephants evolved very much more rapidly than the frequently breeding rodents, such as the mice and rats (*Muridæ*), is one of the many evidences that the rate of evolution may not be governed by the frequency of natural selection and elimination" (p. 271). Neither the origin nor the development of life-forms can be accounted for by this principle.

Special stress is laid throughout the book on the directing agency of the germ or heredity-chromatin: "It would appear, according to this interpretation, that the continuity of life since it first appeared in Archeozoic times is the continuity of the physicochemical energies of the chromatin; the development of individual life is an unfolding of the energies taken within the body under the directing agency of the chromatin; and the evolution of life is essentially the evolution of chromatin energies" (pp. 96, 97). The chromatin content of the nucleus is contrasted with the protoplasm and body-chromatin. "The chromatin content of such a nucleus is measured in the bulk of the chromosome rods of which it is composed" (p. 97). The marvels of the chromatin are dwelt upon: "The chromatin as the potential energy of form and function is at once the most conservative and the most progressive center of physicochemical evolution; it records the body forms of past adaptations, it meets the emergencies of the present through the adaptability to new conditions which it imparts to the organism in its distribution throughout every living cell, it is continually giving rise to new characters and functions. Taking the whole history of vertebrate life from the beginning, we observe that every prolonged old adaptive phase in a similar habitat becomes impressed in the hereditary characters of the chromatin. Throughout the development of new adaptive phases the chromatin always retains more or less potentiality of repeating the embryonic, immature and more rarely some of the mature structures of older adaptive phases in the older environment. This is the law of ancestral repetition" (p. 152). But the author admits that "the idea that the germ is an energy complex is an as yet unproved hypothesis, it has not been demonstrated" (p. 19). While it is supposed to be the presiding genius of all phases of development, we are ignorant as to how it accomplishes this. "We are equally ignorant as to how the chromatin responds to the actions, reactions and interactions of the body cells of the life environment, and of the physical environment, so as to call forth a new adaptive character, unless it be through some infinitely complex system of chemical messengers and other catalytic agencies" (p. 98). Surely a large bill of ignorance; and in the light of evidence it is questionable whether the author's emphasis on the chromatin and its sharp separation from protoplasm is justified. But he is in distinguished company.

As to the controversy between the Lamarckians and the pure Darwinians, the author takes a middle ground. The Lamarckians hold "*that the causes of the genesis of new form and new function are*

to be sought in the body cells" (p. 143). According to this "explanation a change of environment, of habit, and of function should always be antecedent to changes of form in succeeding generations." This would mean an increasing similarity in adults of antecedent generations which is not always the case. The pure Darwinian (Weismann and deVries) explanation, on the other hand, is "*that genesis of new form and function is to be sought in the germ cells or chromatin. . . .*" According to this explanation, body cell changes do not exert any corresponding specific influence on the germ cells" (p. 144). The predispositions that arise in the chromatin are conceived as lawless or experimental, fortuitous or chance variations upon which natural selection acts. But the Darwinian view is contradicted by paleontological evidence both in the Invertebrata and the Vertebrata where we "observe that continuity and law in chromatin evolution prevail over the evidence either of fortuity or sudden leaps or mutations, that in the genesis of many characters there is a slow and prolonged rectigradation or direct evolution of the chromatin toward adaptive ends" (p. 146). Neither theory meets entirely the facts presented by adaptive characters. These present three phases: "*First, the origin of character form and character function; second, the more or less rapid acceleration or retardation of character form and function; third the coördination and coöperation of character form and function. . . .*" It is certain that our search for causes must proceed along the lines of determining which actions, reactions and interactions invariably precede and which invariably follow those of the body cells (Lamarckian view) or those of the chromatin (Darwin-Weismann view)" (p. 145). The author is of the opinion that the causes of germ evolution "are internal-external rather than purely internal—in other words, that some kind of relation exists between the actions, reactions and interactions of the germ, of the organism, and of the environment" (p. 283). As there is a centrifugal action whereby certain cells of the reproductive glands affect, in an important way, all the body cells including the brain centers of intelligence, so it is likely that there is "a centripetal action whereby chemical messengers from any part of the body specifically affect the heredity germ and thus the new generation to which it will give rise."

Professor Osborn does not seem inclined to extend this theory to mental processes though he accords them an important rôle. "These profound and extremely ancient powers of animal life exert indirectly a *creative influence* on animal form, whether we adopt the Lamarckian or Darwinian explanation of the origin of animal life, or find elements

of truth in both explanations. The reason is that choice, discrimination, attention, desire for food, and other psychic powers are constantly acting on individual development and directing its course. Such action in turn controls the habits and migrations of animals, which influence the laws of *adaptive radiation* and of selection. In this indirect way these psychic powers are creative of new form and new function" (p. 114). But if it is true that "the body is an organic whole, and the so-called organs of internal secretion are not unique, but the bones, muscles, skin, brain, and every part of the body are furnishing internal secretions necessary to the development and proper functioning of all the other organs of the body" (pp. 289, 290), then it is not clear why the 'psychic powers' may not express themselves through the characteristic brain secretions and affect the germ cells centripetally as they are admittedly affected centrifugally by the secretions of the reproductive glands.

If the causes of evolution are obscure, the phenomenological sequences are becoming increasingly clear. "What we have gained during the past century is positive knowledge of the chief modes of evolution, we know almost the entire history of the transformation of many different kinds of mammals. These modes are distinguished from unknown *causes* as expressed in the following laws: first, the *law of continuity*; *natura non fecit saltum*; there is prevailing continuity in the change of form and proportion in evolution as in growth" (p. 251). Jennings has shown the graduated change in the protozoa. Perrin Smith, in the case of the cephalopod molluscs and the Triassic ammonites, "observes that the evolution of form continues uninterruptedly, even when there is no evidence whatever of environmental change. Conversely, environmental change does not necessarily induce evolution—for example during the Age of Mammals, although the mammals developed an infinite variety of widely different forms, the reptiles show very little change" (p. 137). This graduated character of change in the evolution of life was clearly expressed in the mutations of Waagen who discovered a complete fossil series of ammonites in 1869 and formulated Waagen's law: "It is that certain new characters arise definitely and continuously and, as Osborn has shown, adaptively" (p. 139). While the author recognizes discontinuous or saltatory mutations of the kind emphasized by de Vries, these amount to only a fifth or less for mammalian evolution. "Such mutations are attributable to sudden alternations of molecular and atomic constitution in the heredity-chromatin, or to the altered form of energy supplied to the chromatin during development" (p. 107).

The second law is "the *law of rectigradation*, under which many important new characters appear definitely and take an adaptive direction from the start" (p. 251). Thus we "observe in the characters springing from the heredity-chromatin a *predetermination* of another kind, namely, the origin through causes we do not understand of a tendency toward the independent appearance or birth at different periods of geologic time of *similar new and useful characters*," not in the ancestral body forms (pp. 251, 252). The discovery of this fact, with which the author's name is especially associated, is the strongest argument for law in evolution as opposed to blind chance.

The third law is "the *law of acceleration and retardation*, witnessed both in racial and individual development, whereby each character has its own velocity, or rate of development, which displays itself both in the time of its origin, in its rate of evolution and its rate of individual development" (p. 252). The last law underlies the profound changes of proportion as illustrated in mammals, as for example the long neck of the giraffe and the short neck of the elephant. Few new characters are observed to originate in mammals. The changes are due for the most part to loss of characters and changes in proportion. Indeed, as the author points out, "the chief quest of evolutionists today in every field of observation is the mode and cause of the origin and subsequent history of single characters" (p. 146). These he regards as determiners in the chromatin existing as an individual, potential and causal. An 'intruder' into either of the four energy complexes may produce a new or abnormal visible character type. The individuality of characters, their separate rate of movement and their coördination furnish today the bulk of descriptive explanation of life forms and functions. Their evolution exemplifies the law of compensation (p. 158). The special development of one character means the sacrifice of others as in the case of the extra toes of the horse. The sacrificed parts are never regained, and in this sense the chromatin evolution is irreversible. Reversal of adaptation must be regarded as "the reversal of function rather than of structure" (p. 198). Character evolution also exemplifies the laws of convergence and divergence (with radiation). "Widely separated descendants of similar ancestors may evolve in a closely but not entirely similar manner. The resemblances are due to the independent gain of similar new characters and loss of old characters. The differences are chiefly due to the unequal velocity of characters: in some lines certain characters appear or disappear more rapidly than in others" (p. 271).

But what accounts for these character changes? "The only vista

which we enjoy at present of a possible future explanation of the causes of character origin, character velocity, and character coöperation, is through chemical catalysis, namely through the hypothesis that all *actions* and *reactions* of form and motion liberate specific catalytic messengers, such as ferments, enzymes, hormones, chalcones and other as yet undiscovered chemical messengers, which produce specific and coöperating *interactions* in every character complex of the organism and corresponding predispositions in the physicochemical energies of the germ; in other words, that the chemical accelerators, balancers and retarders of body cell development also affect the germ" (p. 150). It is in the field of interaction that somehow the efficient cause of character development must be found. The author distinguishes interaction from action and reaction. Interaction refers "to what is going on between material parts which are connected with each other by other parts, and cannot be analyzed at all by the two great dynamic principles alone without a knowledge of the structure which connects the interacting parts" (p. 15). We have been concerned mostly in the past with the interacting functions of nerve impulses. But latterly we are learning that "an interacting enzyme, hormone, or other chemical messenger circulating in the blood, may profoundly modify the growth of a great organism" (p. 15). The central theory which the author develops in his speculation on the origin and development of life, "is that every physicochemical action and reaction concerned in the transformation, conservation and dissipation of energy, produces also either as a direct result or as a by-product a *physicochemical agent of interaction which permeates and affects the organism as a whole or affects only some special part*. Through such interaction the organism is made a unit and acts as one because the activities of its parts are correlated" (pp. 15, 16).¹ In the complex economy of plants, in the absence of a nervous system, chemical messengers furnish the sole means of interaction. But they are no less important in animal economy, as is adumbrated in the effects on growth and proportion of such ductless glands as the pituitary body and the thyroid and parathyroid glands.

The author gives but scant attention to the experimental work on 'unit characters' since Mendel. We are told that "an accurate examination shows the untrustworthiness of any such simple or naïve view as that of unit characters" (p. 290). He refers approvingly to Mathews, in connection with the bearing upon heredity of the internal secretions or chemical messengers in the body. "The internal secretions of the body appear to Mathews to constitute strong evidence

against the existence of such things as inheritance by means of structural units in the germ which represent definite characters of the body. We see in the internal secretions, he observes, that *every character in the body involves a large number of factors (i.e., determiners)*. The shape and size of the body, the coarseness of the hair, the persistence of the milk-teeth, a tendency toward fatness—all these may easily depend on the pituitary body, on the thyroid, and on the reproductive organs, and these—in their turn—are but the expression of other influences played upon them by their surroundings and their own constitution" (p. 290). The apparent results of the theory of 'unit characters' are due to the fact that the experiments have been performed on comparatively simple forms of life such as the pea where we lack the perspective furnished by vertebrate paleontology. The relation between heredity predispositions and body characters is more complex, at any rate, than such a theory would indicate. "A very large number of characters spring, not from the visible ancestral body forms, but from invisible predispositions and tendencies in the ancestral heredity chromatin. For example, all the radiating descendants of a group of hornless mammals may at different periods of geologic time give rise to similar horny outgrowths upon the forehead" (p. 242).

At best, however, a theory of evolution (including that expounded by the author) based upon individual characters with their individual rate of movement, is strained to the breaking point, convenient though it may be for descriptive purposes. The author adopts the obscure concepts of physical science, such as 'latent' and 'potential,' to make intelligible the supposed dormant existence of such characters, sometimes for geologic ages. But he himself is keenly alive to the danger of transposing concepts from the mechanical realm to that of organic origins and evolution. It would seem as though the key to creative evolution in the lower stages of life might rather be found in the manifestations of life in the higher stages of evolution. Just because life is, as the author so well shows, a unique type of creative synthesis, the fundamental laws of life, once it exists, must be stated in terms of life itself. What seems clear is that life is a process of creative synthesis, determined in part by internal and in part by external conditions. It has a logic of its own in which both the cumulative set of the heredity basis (whatever it is) and the external situation (including the somatic, physical and life environments) figure as factors. On the basis of this logic there is unconscious experimentation toward adaptive ends in which nature manifests creative genius in the lower stages of life (and infra-life) as truly as on the higher

conscious stages. Such creativeness is greatly facilitated and becomes more meaningful with the capacity for abstract thought and the inter-subjective medium of speech, but the essential laws of creativeness are rooted in the organic (and cosmic) process, and to its unconscious logic and experimentation we are in the last analysis subject for our further biological development or elimination. A further study of instinct, which is admittedly both organic and intelligent, with its experimentation toward adaptive ends and the crystallization of the results into organic structure, may furnish a bridge between general organic creativeness and its specialized form in human intelligence.

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The Philosophy of Plotinus. The Gifford Lectures at St. Andrews, 1917-1918. By WILLIAM RALPH INGE. New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1918.—Vol. I, pp. 270; II, pp. 252.

That Dr. Inge is Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral guarantees that he is the heir of the best traditions of English scholarship; and to this we may add that his qualities of mind and heart endear him to us as a genuine idealist, a dreamer of the good, the true and the beautiful. He is at his best in the chapter on the third century's literary (pp. 33-35) and religious (pp. 35-70) conditions. The chapter on the Soul is charming. The "Spiritual World as a Kingdom of Values" is inspiring, intoxicating, elevating, modern, and prophetic. He sets forth the soul's three paths to God (II, 104): that of Perfection (p. 125), of Beauty (p. 122), and of Dialectic (p. 105) in the following brilliant words: "We have seen that Goodness, Truth and Beauty are the attributes of Spirit and the Spiritual World. They are the three objects of the soul's quest. They may be represented as the three converging pathways which lead up to the hill of the Lord; and they furnish three proofs. The spiritual world *must* be,—this is the conclusion of the dialectic, which convinces that the idea of plurality implies that of unity, that of imperfection, a perfect. It *ought* to be,—this is the claim of the ethical sense. It *is*,—this is the discovery of direct experience or intuition, made by the soul yearning in love for its heavenly home."

Some of the best sections of the book are on æsthetics, in which Dean Inge notices the theories of Croce, of energy-values; and on religion, in which he studies prayer, the genius, and the "vision of God." But in his study of Plotinus's ethics he is very weak, omitting the study of happiness, the ecstasy, and the virtues. Mr. G. R. S.

Mead, of London, has already emphasized his omission of the mystical aspects of Plotinus.

Thus much in appreciation. But readers of the *Philosophical Review* will ask themselves, how far does the work promote the progress of thought? The title, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, leads us to expect a study, a criticism, a guide to Plotinus. And this is just what the book is not. The author himself, at the beginning and end of his work (I, p. 10; II, p. 219) insists that he has approached his subject not as a student or critic, but as a disciple. He acknowledges (II, p. 219) that he may have sometimes read his own convictions into his author; that his "Spiritual World as a Kingdom of Values" is not explicit in Plotinus; that his treatment of the categories is inadequate. He does not scruple to suggest the abandonment of all the categories in favor of the good, the true, and the beautiful, although Plotinus faces this question point-blank, and rejects it (II, p. 75). He acknowledges that Plotinus (II, p. 115) "would have to accept" his own formulation, that "the God of practical religion is the universal soul; the God of devout and thankful contemplation is the Great Spirit; the God of our inspired moments, the Absolute." Although in a note (II, p. 82) he acknowledges that Plotinus calls the Absolute, God, he says "that those modern critics who habitually speak of the Neoplatonic Absolute as 'God,' only mislead their readers." Because the "spiritual body" stands in the way of his using the word 'spirit' for 'mind,' he twice contemptuously (I, p. 220; II, p. 38) brushes it aside as of "no philosophical value," "it does not stand for anything important," in spite of 2 Cor. v. 2; 1 Cor. xv. 44; 2 Cor. iv. 16, etc. In his contemptuous rejection of whatever does not please him, he is even very unfair to Plotinus. He accuses him of saving himself (II, p. 174); "his country he could not save." And yet, in I. 116, he calls Plotinus's attempt to found a Platonopolis "a foolish episode." He does not hesitate to dub "a popular error" the usual view that Neoplatonism is "a philosophy of ecstasy." He calls one of his chief divisions, "the Absolute," a Hegelian term, which as a noun is practically imported into Plotinus. He changes the word 'mind' (which has good authority in 1 Pet. iv. 1; Phil. ii. 5; 1 Cor. ii. 16) to 'spirit.' To do this, he has to throw out the 'spiritual body'; and while the word, 'spiritual world' has a glamor, it fails to represent the intellectual aspect of pure reason, importing an ethical element not primarily found in the Greek thought. 'Contemplation' becomes "spiritual vision," beautiful, but inaccurate (I, p. 161); and then (II, p. 82) it authorizes us to speak of 'the Great Spirit' (with a capital S,

of course), which because of its North American Indian associations, leads to Dean Inge's doctrine that "the Great Spirit is the God of Neoplatonism." Evidently the book is *not* "the Philosophy of Plotinus;" it would be more accurately called, "The Message of the Traditional Plotinus for our Modern Days;" or, "Plotinus's Value for Modern Religion"; or, "Plotinic Values for Modern Thought."

Under such a title, no further criticism would be passed on the book; but under the title he has chosen, he stands convicted of a lack of sense of historical values, and of a failure to understand his author.

First, a lack of recognition of historical values. It was possible to him to say (I, p. 28): "It would no doubt be possible to discuss the philosophy of Plotinus as a thing independent of the date and locality in which it appeared,"—which, of all philosophical writers, is least true of Plotinus, in whom can be distinguished three different periods. Again, he (II, pp. 39, 104) goes back to Plotinus from modern days, using Bradley "as a valuable guide to understanding Plotinus." On the contrary, Plotinus can be understood only by coming down to him from Plato, through Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, Philo, and Numenius. By Bradley, Plotinus can only be interpreted, illustrated, utilized. Proof of this unhistoric sense is the fact that in the chapter on Immortality (with the exception of Origen, who really does not count in the chain of succession), and those on the Soul, and on Nature, his introduction begins from the dawn of philosophy down to Plato; but between Plato and Plotinus is an entire blank. Are we answered by reference to the chapter on "Forerunners"? This chapter is entirely traditional, containing nothing new, if not many very interesting "*realien*," which however do not help the student, even if they do attract the amateur. The author is entirely traditional in his reverence for Ammonius Saccas, in spite of his having left practically nothing. His discussion of Plotinus's attitude to the Stoics lacks both precise enumeration of the many other Stoic terms employed (phantasy, I, p. 230; the feeding of the stars, ii. 1. 8; the seal, iv. 6. 1; suffering, vi. 1. 17; the four modes, vi. 1. 29; hexis, vi. 1. 6-8; seminal reasons, vi. 7. 7; predominant principle, iii. 3. 2; nature, v. 9. 6; etc.) and his later opposition to Stoicism (Guthrie's note 1 on i. 7). As to Platonism, in spite of Plato's later evil-world-soul, he derides, as a popular fallacy (II, p. 39) the notion that Platonism was a dualism; as to Numenius, he credits Plotinus, "more than any other thinker," "with a definite doctrine of spiritual existence," whereas Plotinus was only following Numenius's work on Immortality (Fragm. pp. 44-57). Plotinus is also given credit for the doctrine of inexhaust-

ible giving (I, p. 195) which was Numenius's distinctive solution of the world-puzzle (Fragm. 29). Also the derivation of Apollo, (II, p. 193, n. 3). When he accuses Numenius (I, p. 213) of teaching that the souls are only parts into which the world-soul is divided, he ignores that Numenius (Guthrie, pp. 122, 123) taught that the world-soul is the Pilot of the world, Providence of the other souls, the world harmony, and that the world-soul itself progresses by the discipline of watching over the others. Of course such misstatements about Numenius were excusable before Guthrie's work was known, but not after.

The Plotinus which Dean Inge professes is not the real, but the traditional one. Although Dr. More of Princeton had already emphasized the self-contradictions of Plotinus, to Dean Inge (II, p. 148) "Plotinus is the last writer in whom we should expect to find such an inconsistency." Nevertheless, in spite of this traditional faith, Dean Inge is in four instances compelled to notice inconsistencies. The most definite (II, p. 75) is that in vi. 2. 17 Plotinus excludes *mind* from the categories, but includes it in v. 1. 4. The explanation is interesting, vindicating Guthrie's views of Plotinus's development. The latter case is in the 10th essay, of the first Numenian period, when mind is still hovering over the world (Numenius, 10); whereas the first case is the 43rd Essay, of the later Stoic period, when monism has integrated mind into the material world.

Again, in his treatment of the material categories, Dean Inge limits himself to one long quotation, and the statement that the matter is "obscure" (i. 194). But the fact is that ii. 6 is of the early Numenian period, in which Plotinus is simply studying Numenius's name for the divinity, "Being and Essence," while in vi. 1-3 he studies the subject systematically; rejecting the ten Aristotelian, and the four Stoic; holding to the five Platonic, and as would be natural in a later period, purposely mentioning the earlier "Being and Essence" as unsatisfactory, superimposing above it a unity (vi. 2. 2, 3; 43-895). Then, while holding to Plato, Plotinus interprets him by Aristotle, and the Stoic "hexis" (VI, p. 28; pp. 44-983). This short outline is quite comprehensible.

Another case of "inconsistency" (II, p. 33) is reincarnation. Both iii. 4. 6-15, and iv. 8. 5-6, are of the Numenian period, and the passage supposed to conflict with this, III, p. 4. 2, on reincarnation into animals, is practically a quotation of Numenius's quotation from Plato (Fragm. 57).

The fourth noticed contradiction is one which Chaignet had pointed

out (I, p. 145). Dean Inge evades it by a figurative interpretation of the latter passage. Here again the monistic view, opposing a spatial chaos into which the higher principle descends with its forms, is of the Stoic period, vi. 8. 11, 39th essay: while i. 8. 14, where the soul could not have come if the matter had not been there already, a dualistic view, is in the 51st essay, in the fourth, or Platonic period. With the developmental view of Plotinus's opinions, we do not need any Procrustean methods.

There are still five other cases in which the author's presentation of Plotinus's views is confused, and where it can be cleared up by the developmental method: matter, nature, the world-soul immortality, and the place of ideas in the intelligible world. The treatment of matter will be found in Guthrie, 1296-1299.

As to nature, in the First Numenian period, it is a non-corporeal (2. p. 78) generative power of seeds (5. pp. 110, 114), helped by arts in development, and is begotten by the universal soul (VI, p. 130; II, p. 194). In the second period Porphyry's questions led to definitions: matter is the "other" nature (26. 384); nature is the lowest faculty of the world-soul, above the elements (28. 458, 459); nature acts on matter by potency, having as father the formal reasons, and as mother the universal reason (30. 553-542); nature is perfectible (33. 607). In the third, or Stoic period, just as the Stoics taught the identity of matter and spirit, so here (38. 705) nature and cause coincide in the intelligible. In the last or Platonic period, we are back in a dualism, and the soul is directed by natural law (52. 1173).

As to the world-soul, in the first or Numenian period (10. 175) the world-soul alone is born of intelligence, and she in turn creates ours, and is the ground of our divinity. In the second or Transition-period, Plotinus still studies the difference between the world-soul and ours (28. 463, 506; 33. 612). In the third or monistic Stoic period, both the world soul and ours are born of the Intelligence (43. 929); while in the third or Platonic one, the world-soul is the deity of the third rank, and she again is alone the first realization of Intelligence, from which all other things proceed (51. 1144),—with the Numenian touch that she contains the harmony.

Immortality was so near to Plotinus's heart, that it was the second topic about which he wrote. Here he was at pains to prove the immortality of the soul, explicitly taking issue with the Stoics (2.81), claiming that after you have stripped off all adventitious trappings, there remains an immortal germ. But in his third or Stoic period, (ii. 1, 40. 817-820) he is concerned, just as a Stoic, who identified

soul with matter, to prove the immortality of the heavens, and that it does not extend to the sublunar sphere, and all sublunary parts of our nature. In the last period (47. 1048), souls again after death are reunited immortally with the world-soul.¹

The chapter on "the Spiritual World" is, in other language, the Berkeleyan argument for the reality of the mind. Dean Inge, in a masterly manner, expounds the necessity for the intelligible entities being within the intelligible sphere. He is conscious that it leads to a monism, and a spiritual one, too, which he counts as the heart of Neoplatonism (II, p. 39). But he did not grasp its significance, as indeed was impossible to any one to whom there was only one phase or period of Plotinus. He has indeed a glimmering of the state of affairs, for he reminds us that this crucial problem was the cause of the quarrel between the Numenian or Platonic Amelius, and the Stoic Porphyry. But he does not go on to notice that then the earlier period must have been a dualistic one, a Platonic one, and the latter, a monistic one, which was Stoicism. This argument was the moment of change in Plotinus. We can see how the Stoic monism was the only possible result of this Berkeleyan dialectic relegating all reality to the mental intellection. Then also we can accept at full value the dualistic expressions of the First or Numenian periods, the bath-tub simile of the soul in two realms (vi. 9. 8; 9-163), the description of the upward path at a marriage of the soul (vi. 99), the Procession of the universe (p. 11), and Matter (p. 12), and Dialectics as a means of raising the soul (p. 20).

The philosophic student will appreciate the treatment of "the Absolute as the One," "The One as Beyond Existence," "the One as Infinite," "the One as First Cause and Final Cause;"—but he will not be able to refrain from asking himself whether Dean Inge realized that it did not at all agree with the Berkeleyan logic of the former chapter which located all reality in mind. Most of Plotinus's splendid yearning for the "Beyond Essence" comes from his first Numenian or Dualistic period, in which there was room for aspiration. There is none in a metaphysical monism, which ends in despair, and indeed drove Porphyry to try to commit suicide.

In significant contrast to all these instances of confusion, not specifically recognized by the author, but which we have been at pains to disentangle, we may notice his treatments of Extension,

¹ The references in the last three paragraphs are to the Plotinic books by order, and to the paging in my translation. This is done for the convenience in noting the order.

Time, Space, Change and Causality, all of which are satisfactory, because based on texts of a single period.

Dean Inge had at his disposal the traditional quotations from Plotinus made by Simon, Vacherot, Chaignet, Steinhart, Kirchner, Richter, Zeller, Drews, Eucken, Windelband, and Whittaker. In addition, he studied the Greek text laboriously; but it was in vain; the Porphyrian chaos was too confusing. Had he consulted the concordance to Plotinus now accessible to every student he would have supplemented his views of the obligatoriness of the triadic schematism (I, p. 192) and the Aristotelian seven-foldness of psychology implicit in vi. 4. 5. He would have found the parable of the three faces, as basis of the trinity, which he needed on I, p. 122, see vi. 5. 7. The "eternal generation" of iv. 8. 4, vi. 7. 3, and iv. 8. 20 would have proved his point in II. pp. 236, 247. A plain translation is the *sine qua non* of all sane studies of an author. His words in I, p. 17 imply he did not take the trouble to consult the manuscript of Mr. McKenna, and it is certain he failed to respond to the announcement of Guthrie's chronological translation. All this criticism would have been saved by a more accurate title.

For in the concluding reflections, Dean Inge proposes Neoplatonism as a philosophy of life which does not oppose science, and supports Christianity, and on which the religion of sacrifice can be engrafted. This will enable intelligent people to remain Christians, he says. But of course the truth is that the Alexandrians developed their theological metaphysics from Neoplatonism. The book should be put into the hands of all students of philosophy, not as a text-book, but as a lure to the love of philosophy.

KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mët.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, *I. Abtl. Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

La philosophie française en Amérique (II.—Le positivisme). W. RILEY. *Rev. Ph.*, XLIV, 5 and 6, pp. 369-423.

Though positivism is a forgotten chapter in the intellectual history of America, yet Comte rendered valuable help to American philosophy at a time of need. For realists, transcendentalists, and materialists were all aggressive in their claims, and Comte's system showed the limits of each. Positivism, however, met two opposing forces,—a tendency and a confusion: first, the tendency to look upon a genetic view of ideas as heresy, eternal truths being considered fixed, and, second, the confusion of positivism with materialism. This confusion was perpetuated by theological reviews which represented Comte's universe as nothing but an immense machine. Comte had, in general, three classes of critics: theologians, metaphysicians, and proletarians. In the first class was Professor Shields, who was the first to publish a rival synthesis in which he attempted to complete and perfect Comte's classification. Shields' attack on Comte's proof of the law of intellectual development is nothing but an argument *ad hominem*. He should have criticized Comte by showing that, to establish the law, it was necessary to show that the three periods have existed successively in the history of humanity, and that this cannot be demonstrated. Shields reversed Comte's method and resolved positivism into metaphysics and even into theology. He thus reduced positivism to a verbal quibble. A second critic was James McCosh, who treated positivism superficially and declared Comte narrow, one-sided, and dogmatic. Professor Mahan called the new philosophy an ally of scepticism and materialism, for scepticism, he thought, is manifested in ignoring research for the ultimate cause, and materialism, in showing a preference for material phenomena and the determination of their laws. From what has been said concerning these theological critics, it is evident that they were wholly incapable of appreciating

the real contribution of positivism to science—its contribution as a genetic study of intellectual development. The first representative of the metaphysical group—Professor Bowen—was a critic of about the same stamp. He declared positivism to be the work of a half-witted French professor of mathematics, and tried to show that everything that had been considered valuable and new in the system might be traced directly to earlier philosophers. In John Fiske, we find a different type of critic. His work on cosmism began in a systematic vein but developed into a polemic. For eleven years Fiske called himself a positivist, but later became more favorable to Spencer's system. He then showed that the two systems accorded in their recognition that all knowledge is relative, that the evolution of philosophy is a process of de-anthropomorphization, that philosophy consists in the organization of scientific doctrine and method, that the critical attitude is not destructive but constructive, not iconoclastic but conservative, not negative but positive. He criticized Comte's conception of philosophy as too anthropocentric, his deification of humanity as absurd, his law of the three stages as the description of a state of spirit which never existed and never could exist, his phrenology—which Comte substituted for psychology—as ridiculous, and his utopia as a return to a spiritual despotism where public opinion would have to submit to the authority of a clergy of philosophers, and where scientific research would be limited to practical applications. In contrast with the hypercritical Fiske, Bascom seems nearly converted to positivism. Yet he pointed out that, in breaking with the past, in regarding it as the product of errors without remedy, positivism has little reason for hoping to obtain success in the present. In taking this attitude, positivism is opposing real development. In the same strain, William Ellery Channing asked how Comte has a right to think that the human race has been deceived up to his time. But though the metaphysicians were rather hypercritical, Lester Ward was more sympathetic. He pointed out that Comte's supreme merit is his insistence on the ultimate unity of all natural processes, a principle which no one before Comte had made the basis of a system of philosophy, yet he admitted that Comte was too rigorous in his coherent monism. But Comte had few adherents. His partisans were chiefly among the poor emigrants and humble folk living in New York. The *précieux foyer* of Philadelphia, of which Comte speaks, reduces to one client, Horace Wallace, who thought that the time was not far distant when Christianity would support itself on the positive philosophy and draw from that philosophy its dialectic. Hence he disapproved of Comte's atheism. In New York, Henry Edger was the Comtian propagandist. For converts, he had to go to men of anarchistic tendencies, and hence it is not surprising that he obtained only a mediocre success. The best manual published by any of the societies formed among the converts recommended that the positivistic clergy be composed of captains of industry, because of the lack of philosophers, scientists, and artists suitable for such office. Pragmatists are like positivists in considering the needs of humanity as the ultimate end of knowledge and in not being concerned with ultimate principles; but the former are guilty of a

dogmatism of act, whereas the latter are guilty of a dogmatism of idea. James differed in two important respects from Comte: he was opposed to the theory of the immutability of natural law, and he gave emotion an important place. It is apparent that positivism did not obtain the unreserved adherence of any of the leaders of American thought. The chances of a popular revival of positivism are few. Yet Comte, as the inspirer of the feeling of continuity, is important.

MARJORIE S. HARRIS.

Filosofia e Storia. EMILIO CHIOCCETTI. R. d. F. Neo-Sc., XI, 2, pp. 138-152.

The author gives a sketch of Benedetto Croce's recent work, *Teoria e Storia della Storiografia* and expresses his approval of much of it. He then gives some of his own beliefs. The past is a preparation for the present, and is intelligible only in the light of the present. The problems of human life are solved by thought, which arrives at completeness in and through life; in other words, philosophy is the comprehension of human life. Man's thought is fully revealed in history. But the philosophy of nature develops side by side with the philosophy of man. The laws of human reason are not diverse from the laws of the divine reason and the laws which direct the course of nature. Hence, a man who knows himself knows all. Any one who has attained to the organic conception of reality cannot but subscribe to the following: (a) Spatial experience is but one thing in a vaster field of experience. The reality of the physical world consists only in its being something distinct in the field of complex experience. The hypothesis that the external world is outside the process, and is the cause of the process through which we construe our experience, is unjustified. Physical bodies and facts are abstractions, if not considered in relation to the experience in which they are real. Man is the condition of the intelligibility (and hence of the existence) of nature. Man and nature are correlative. Man is essentially connected with the universe, and his problems are involved with those of the cosmos. (b) "The internal being of everything finite depends on that which is beyond it" (Bradley). The supreme reality of things is found in their ideal character, that is, in their unity which manifests itself in differences. Multiplicity does not exist apart from unity. He who comprehends the One comprehends all. To know myself, I must know myself as the man of history, the man of nature, and the man of God.

Problems which are no longer living for history are also dead for philosophy. We must examine contemporary thought to see what problems real to history are. Croce believes that the problems of the immortality of the soul and of a personal God are not part of contemporary thought. The author's conclusion, as the result of his observations, is quite different. The problem has new forms, but is not dead. As Miguel de Unamuno says, anxiety about immortality is immortal, and if when the body dies man's consciousness becomes unconsciousness, then the human race is but a procession of phantasms. Croce says that men are the servants of Reality, and that the end of Reality

is the perpetual, progressive enrichment of spirituality. The author shows the consequences of this belief, namely, that we are the ephemeral manifestations of the one Spirit, which is history, because in us the universe acquires self-consciousness, and that the Eternal is able in us—transitory and particular beings—to realize itself, and save itself from being an abstraction. So we are the condition *sine qua non* of concrete existence, of the universal, and yet we are as individuals absorbed or annihilated. The author will not discuss whether with this doctrine it is possible to speak of progress, when there is a denial of the fundamental value—that of personality,—and of the condition of all value: a personal God who guides history to an end that is his and ours, and so gives history significance by referring it to the goal toward which human reality always strives—felicity and personal beatitude in perfection. He wishes only to ask if the idealistic-pantheistic conception of reality is in the thought of the present time possessed of much more life than is theism; if the problem of immortality is no longer of interest; and if the doctrine of the destruction of the individual is stronger than its opposite in a time in which the value of the individual is magnified to exaggeration. Philosophy is history, and history is philosophy, a progressive solution of human problems, only if man is studied in relation to the causal and final reasons of his becoming.

ALLAN H. GILBERT.

La nature et le mouvement d'après Aristote. O. HAMELIN. Rev. Ph., XLIV, 5 and 6, pp. 353-368.

This article sets forth the purely physical part of Aristotle's theory of movement, and its cause—nature. In general, nature is an internal principle of movement and repose. The implication that repose needs a principle indicates that repose participates, in a sense, in movement; that it is the state of immobility of what can be moved; that it is posterior to movement. Again, as the principle of movement for the thing in which it resides, nature is an internal, or immanent, principle. Hence a natural object is distinguished from an artificial one, in that the latter, unlike the former, does not possess spontaneity. Thus medicine does not possess the principle of its action. Furthermore, nature is an immediate and an essential attribute of its subject, and as such has two aspects: form and matter. As matter, nature is that which persists through change. It is not merely in mobility, but is an aspect of mobility; for there is no movement without mobility. Hence, for nature to be the necessary and sufficient cause of movement, there must be mobility in it. In other words, it must be matter. Nature is also form. But form, taken in itself, is not nature, because it is then not immanent. Thus nature is something between form and matter. So much for the cause of motion. As to the phenomena themselves, or, at least, their common basis—change, Aristotle's first task was to show that and how change is possible. The most essential thing in change, according to Aristotle, is not the two limits but the interval of progress between the two limits. Change is a passage between two extremes; a becoming other but not a giving place to something else.

Change implies a unity, a link between the two limits. Change is, before all else, a continuous progress. Now change is a genetic term which applies to change proper, and to the different kinds of movement, of which there are three—movements of quality, quantity, and place. Hence Aristotle's theory of movement is of a pronounced dynamic and vitalistic character.

MARJORIE S. HARRIS.

Philosophy and Democracy. JOHN DEWEY. The University of California Chronicle, XXI, 1, pp. 39-54.

In general there are two erroneous assumptions in regard to the nature of philosophy. "One is that philosophy ranks as a science, that its business is with a certain body of fixed and finished facts and principles." The second is that "philosophy somehow knows reality more ultimately than do the other sciences." A true appreciation of the place of philosophy comes with the realization that philosophy is not knowledge, but desire, effort at action—a love of wisdom. It is a conviction about moral values, not a colorless reading of reality. It expresses "differences of interest and purpose characteristic of great civilizations, great social epochs, differences of religious and social desire and belief." But there is nothing arbitrary in this expression of wish and feeling. The best science and knowledge of the day give form to philosophy, so that it is not a passion, but a reasonable persuasion. What is the relation between philosophy, thus interpreted, and democracy, defining democracy in terms of the classic formula: liberty, equality, fraternity? The 'liberty' befitting a philosophy of democracy is not the same as rationality or acquiescence in the laws of the universe; it must imply real uncertainty and contingency. 'Equality' means that there is something unique and irreplaceable about every existence, and is opposed to the conception of species, grades, or degrees of reality. 'Fraternity' means association and interaction without limit.

KATHERINE GILBERT.

La spiritualisation des tendances. FR. PAULHAN. Rev. Ph., XLIV, 5 and 6, pp. 424-454.

Spiritualization is the modification of a tendency by the influence of the whole personality and the penetration of the personality by this tendency; that is, the given tendency and the personality modify each other. The innate tendency inevitably comes in contact with other elements of the personality and is transformed in the process of being adapted. Spiritualization is, then, a law of the mental life and all mental elements tend to be spiritualized, to be related to other elements in the mind, and even to be integrated in the mind itself. There are two types of individuals which represent the extremes of spiritualization. An individual of the one type has a divided mind. His different tendencies are never harmonized. He lives a routine life, dividing his time between his occupation and his pleasures. An individual of the other type puts himself entirely into whatever he does: into each desire,

thought, or act. There is nothing isolated in his mental life. Of qualities which tend to promote spiritualization the following should be noted: taste for reflection, power of inhibition, slowness to act, taste for analysis, synthesis and comparison, and independence and originality of spirit. Whatever tends toward automatism works against spiritualization. Spiritualization helps to bring about the organization of the mental life and promotes a more intimate union of the various mental elements. But if it does not take sufficient account of external realities, it is defective. Thus, the romanticists have sacrificed logic and good sense in the interests of a 'spiritual' life. The organic functions still have their place in the best human life. It is true that all passions and inclinations can be ennobled or regulated, but each man should resign himself to being, in certain respects, a brute, refined, but not wholly detached from animality. It is evident, then, that we are giving spiritualization a different connotation from that which it usually has. It does not necessarily mean a purification, an idealization of the tendencies; a suppression and impoverishment of them in certain ways. It means, rather, an enrichment of them. For example, to spiritualize the need for nutrition is to associate with this organic need a great number of tendencies and sentiments; to coördinate with it ideas of health and æsthetic impressions, and other elements of the psychical life. In a sense, however, it is an idealization of tendencies, for it consists in the elevating of the inferior, in the humanizing of animal propensities. But it includes also a perversion of tendencies, for when æsthetic or literary tendencies, for example, are combined with sentiments which adapt man to the real world, the tendencies lose their purity. Finally, spiritualization can reform the mental life itself; that is, it effects the general coördination of organic, psychical, and social tendencies, and of acts which are its manifestation. A truly spiritualized mind is that which enters into the least of its acts, as it were. Opposed to it is the diffused mind, such as is exhibited by the scientist who leaves his religious beliefs at the door of his laboratory. Reality, however, shows no completely spiritualized mind, but merely types which manifest, in diverse amounts, contrast and conflict.

MARJORIE S. HARRIS.

Remarques sur la psychologie collective. J. SAGERET. *Rev. Ph.*, XLIV, 5 and 6, pp. 455-474.

A war presupposes two hostile groups, each a kind of collective personality; for without collective action there can be only a chaos of individual actions. But 'collective personality' seems a contradiction in terms, for what is collective is the antithesis of what is personal. Yet further consideration shows that the living organism has two parts: an individual and a social; and also that the collective personality of a beehive, for example, would be, as it were, the social bee greatly augmented. This dualism which exists in all forms of life is exhibited most strikingly in man. As to the social side of man, his bodily life, and still more, his mental life are dependent on his human environment, which reacts on him chiefly through language. Human thought

exists only in the measure in which it can be communicated. Only when one can formulate a thought does one really know what it is. Since without language we cannot think, and since man is man only through thought, the mind of the individual is conditioned by all humanity. But this does not mean that man is the least individualized of beings; for with the development of thought, consciousness develops, and the highest degree of consciousness is reflection. In reflection, the individual separates himself from the world. Thus progress accentuates at once the social and the individualistic aspects of man. As there are collective personalities, so there is a collective psychology which relates to individuals in their relations with each other. It studies the results of the collective efforts of individuals' motive forces. Under the sway of the collective soul, we do what is contrary to our reason, desires, sentiments. In the great war, the *poilu* had a duty which he did not well comprehend, yet he performed it when he would have preferred to return home. Thus the individual subdued his personal instincts in favor of those put in him by humanity. Hence the victory was one of spirit over matter.

MARJORIE S. HARRIS.

Les fatigues sociales et l'antipathie. PIERRE JANET. Rev. Ph., XLIV, 1-2, pp. 1-71.

The isolation of patients has great value in therapeutics. Nervous patients, for instance, may otherwise have the most harmful influence on persons in their environment. M. Janet reviews cases which have come under his observation, and finds that neuropaths produce an atmosphere of fatigue and depression, thereby lowering the psychological tension of persons about them. They have certain well-defined traits which account for this. They show an extreme negativity of character; beside disliking all work or effort, they appear incapable of any deep affection and lacking in will-power. Their inertia makes them resist all demands or obligations laid upon them. Often this is accompanied by a mania for domination and interference in other people's affairs. The impulse for domination usually takes the form of a mania to be loved or to exact attention and services from others. The neurotic generally centers this attitude upon members of his family, who become his veritable victims. Again there is the impulse to aggression, which appears in obsessions for teasing and tormenting those the patient pretends to love. Along with this go manias for making 'scenes,' and for recriminations and jealousy. In their extreme form these campaigns of disparagement may become deliriums of hate and persecution. The patients' negativity and indecision render them incapable of doing anything useful. Other members of the family must assume responsibility for their actions, at the same time exposing themselves to continual reproaches and protests. In dealing with neurotics, one has to count on the instability of their feelings. They are neither capable of loving nor of recognizing when they are loved. Their mood is gloomy and discontented. By perpetual criticism, they keep the household weary and fatigued. The mania for dictation leads them to interfere with the smallest acts of those

about them. The manias for love are especially difficult to endure, as they call for the repeated semblance of emotion and endless services. It becomes necessary to dissimulate in dealing with the neurotic, while the conduct of the neurotic, on the other hand, always suggests that *he* is acting a lie. Since the phenomenon of antipathy arises in connection with persons who keep us on too great a strain, who wear us out, and neuropaths are in the highest degree *wearing* individuals, ordinary persons whose psychological tension is unstable come to have actual crises of psycholepsis in associating with neuropaths. Neuropaths may also cause physiological disturbances in the persons about them, such as changes of circulation, of muscular force and especially of digestion. Because neuropaths are almost never alone, but appear surrounded by persons tainted with the same depression of psychological tension, one is led to speak of the 'neuropathic group.' Some such groups can be explained through common heredity, but others cannot. There are instances of a normal person and a neuropath living together, in which the normal person became tainted with psychasthenia after some years of cohabitation. A great number of the cases of depression found in the environment of neurotic patients is the result of social fatigue. This influence upon the social environment must be taken into account in the treatment of neuropaths.

MARIE T. COLLINS.

Émile Durkheim: I. L' Homme. G. DAVY. Rev. de Mét., XXVI, 2, pp. 181-198.

The death of Émile Durkheim was an irreparable loss to science and his university, for his personality was rich and his talents fully developed. His aim in life was to teach a doctrine, to have disciples, and to play a rôle in the social reconstruction of France. His difficulties in carrying out his purpose soon convinced him that neither pleasure nor good fortune are necessary; but that there must be courage in meeting affliction. He found that the Normal School, which he entered only after two unsuccessful attempts, was not the school of his dreams; it was not sufficiently receptive to the scientific spirit, yet he loved it deeply. He soon gave evidence of exceptional powers as an orator. While at the school, he was greatly influenced by Renouvier and Comte; thus his vocation as a sociologist was determined. As to his social life at the school, he had few but firm friends, because he had a horror of the levity and banter prevailing in the conversations of the students. He did not, however, eschew the society of his comrades, for none loved better than he political and philosophical discussion. He left the school with a passion for truth, a disdain for notoriety, and without acquaintance with ambition. After being a professor at different *Lycées* for five years, he accepted a professorship at the University of Bordeaux, where a course in social science was created for him. In 1906 he became a professor at the University of Paris. Through the earlier years of his career, he allowed nothing to interfere with the publication of his works; but, when war broke out, he placed his exceptional powers at the service of his country. He gave himself to all forms of

intellectual propaganda, especially that which would help sustain the morale of the nation. Pamphlets which he wrote on the war bespoke the serene objectivity of the scientist, and thus furnished a sharp contrast to the prejudiced affirmations of the Germans. In spite of varied activities throughout his life, he never neglected his professional duties. Above all, he was the true founder of French sociology. He was the genius of *L'Année sociologique*, which he founded and published in collaboration with a select group of workers to whom he was a spiritual father. In his analyses for *L'Année* of works of historians and jurists, as well as in original articles, he explicated and expanded his own views on the nature and development of society. The aim of sociology is, he held, to know man and to direct his conduct. Man, both as an individual and a social being, can be explained only by reference to the medium in which and by which his nature is developed. Thus society explains the individual more than the individual explains society. Sociology must affirm the existence of society as a reality which can be observed and explained, but only by the methods of sociology. Moreover, as a sociologist, Durkheim was passionately attached to securing the essential virtues of order and discipline which alone are capable of assuring stability and of promoting efficacious action on the part of the individual.

MARJORIE S. HARRIS.

The Approach to the Study of Man. FREDERICK JOHN TEGGART. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XVI, 6, pp. 151-156.

If we are successful in promoting the highest interests of humanity, we must apply ourselves to the scientific study of man. In no one of the universities can the subject be taken up as a whole, but in each it must embrace the support of the separate departments, each one of which represents an integral and essential aspect of the inquiry. The 'study of man' can be accomplished only when the presentation of a set of ideas makes it possible to the men working in different fields to see how their individual efforts may be contributory to a great and highly desired end. Dr. Goldenweiser offers a mode of approach, an introduction to social science. His point of view is that in any given event there are clearly present both deterministic and accidental factors. Leaving out the deterministic, history becomes a something without rhyme or reason; leave out the accidental, and grave injustice is done to reality, for law and order is then claimed as a fact. The author here takes certain particulars related in chronological sequence and reflects upon them. As a result of this he finds the accidental features preponderate. But the deterministic factors can only be arrived at through scientific investigation. This approach made by Dr. Goldenweiser ends in the expression of a variety of opinions, but fails to open the door to scientific investigation; and the conclusions reached may at any moment be rendered invalid by new research. Every science asserts that we know things in characteristic ways, and these may be discovered by scientific analysis. With the contrast of methods it will appear that the whole question of 'accident and determinism' in history is an outgrowth of the concentration

of attention upon events, and disappears as an essential matter for consideration when the scientific attitude has been adopted. What we need is an approach to the study of man which will orient the aims of the different 'subjects' and show how all our efforts may be made contributory to a common end. To solve this, the method of science must be adopted.

EMILY A. LANE.

The Objectivity of Pleasure. WILSON D. WALLIS. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XVI, 12, pp. 324-327.

The most obvious standard for pleasure would seem to be a personal one, because a personal standard is always accessible. Yet soon the individual finds he must refer his own feeling to something beyond. In the history of hedonism there have been attempts to discriminate among pleasures, and to instruct others as to the greatest pleasure. The theological hedonists pointed out that posthumous pleasure was to be preferred above all others. The utilitarians showed that the pleasure of all was the ideal, and to be preferred to the pleasure of the individual. In recent speculation there is much said about pleasure as the ideal, but there can be no definition of it as long as pleasure is viewed as a unique and irreducible experience. We must be able to define pleasures so as to make the concept usable. If an experience fits in with a larger experience, when all things are considered, then true pleasure comes in the doing of a thing for its own sake.

EMILY A. LANE.

New and Dominating Tendencies in French Philosophy Since the Beginning of the War. ALBERT SCHINZ. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XVI, 5, pp. 113-127.

A change of attitude toward fundamental problems has recently found expression in French thought. Papalism, which means Neo-Catholicism in so far as it represents a political rather than a theological creed, had been started before the war to stop political disorders resulting from the strifes of republican political parties. After two years of war, Ch. Maurras, one of the most forceful writers of France, again awakened this religious disposition. He contended that the world must return to the idea of a catholicity of humanity in social organization as well as in philosophical thought. There must be some concrete medium of communion between human families. The people must see that the lofty universality which did exist, was destroyed by the Reformation. Protestant subjectivism has ended in the monstrous attempt of one individual to subject all others to himself. Maurras endeavors to expose what he calls the old time antinomy of Lutheran Germany and of Latin Catholicism. He believes in the intelligent arrangement of the world, and in all the nations working harmoniously under one rule, this rule to be represented by a moral power like that of the Pope. But he does not believe that all nations are mentally equal and have an equal right in international affairs. Maurras goes so far as to ascribe the sinking of the Lusitania to Protestantism.

Giving up intellectual and mental development for mere material progress, the Reformation was bound to bring horrors to pass. To counteract the result of that fatal material progress, an improvement and a higher training in the education of human souls would have been necessary. *Le Sacrifice*, by Henri Massis, shows the same tendency; it is very alert and stimulating, but does not convince because it opposes dogma to reason. Vallery-Radot's *Reveil de l'Esprit* (1917) is worth knowing. He also takes the Catholic view of the war. Matter (material progress) has turned on us and crushes us; this is the secret of the war. Our generation does not want matter subordinated to mind; it has found again the truth of the Incarnation. *Economic Democratism*, the second constructive theory, aims to shift the center of gravity in our modern conception of the State, discarding the traditional principles of statesmanship and organizing societies on a purely economic basis. The economic theory of the state goes back to Auguste Comte (1836). Etienne Rey, in *La Renaissance de l'Orgueil Français* (1912), says that the France of the future must no longer waste her time in strifes between royalists, republicans, Bonapartists, and socialists, but must bring about a strong industrial and economic organization. The problem of socialism is serious, but has been a most useful instrument of the new economic and industrial ideal. Without it democracy would have remained in the narrow bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe, the republic of wealthy industrials and land owners. Sargaret, in *La Guerre et le Progrès*, discusses the principles involved in the great conflict. He can see no connection between war and the human race; for war picks out its victors at random and by doing this prevents a rational economic organization of the planet by human kind. In a general way he follows up the argument of Rousseau in the 18th century. Pierre Hamp says France must be rich, and must begin at once to work. Pierre de Lanux develops the same idea, and maintains that the great problem for France is to substitute, as America did, machinery for men. The most vigorous books on the subject are by Lysis, *Vers la Démocratie Nouvelle*, and *Pour Renaitre*. In the first he says that France must do what Germany did, but not as Germany did. Politicians must go, and business men must take their place. Both employers and employees must unite to govern the state. The second volume appeals to practical thinking on "the German progress and the French decline for forty years."

EMILY A. LANE.

NOTES.

We give below a list of articles in current magazines:

MIND, XXVIII, 111: *James Ward*, Sense-Knowledge (I); *S. Radhakrishnan*, Bergson and Absolute Idealism (II); *H. A. Prichard*, Professor John Cook Wilson; *Dorothy Wrinch*, On the Nature of Judgment.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, XVI, 13: *George A. Barrow*, A Defect in the Argument for Realism; *James L. Mursell*, The Critical Philosophy and the Theory of Types.

XVI, 14: *W. H. Sheldon*, The Defect of Current Democracy; *Henry Bradford Smith*, On the Extension of the Common Logic; *Wilson D. Wallis*, What is Real Pleasure?

XVI, 15: *Sarah Unna*, Bertrand Russell—Then and Now; *W. Curtis Swabey*, Mr. Bradley's Negative Dialectic and Realism.

XVI, 16: *A. C. Armstrong*, Philosophy and Political Theory; *J. E. Turner*, Dr. Strong's Panpsychic Theory of Consciousness and Perception; *Durant Drake*, Panpsychism Again.

XVI, 17: *J. R. Kantor*, Instrumental Transformism and the Unrealities of Realism.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XXIX, 4: *Boyd H. Bode*, Justice Holmes on Natural Law and the Moral Ideal; *Victor S. Yarros*, Socialism and Individualism in Evolution; *M. L. Eastwood*, The Implication of Good; *H. M. Kallen*, "In the Hope of the New Zion"; *E. S. P. Haynes*, A League of Nations; *A. K. Rogers*, Principles of Moral Legislation; *Henry C. Corrance*, The Church and Divorce.

PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XXVI, 3: *John B. Watson*, A Schematic Outline of the Emotions; *Howard C. Warren*, A Classification of Reflexes, Instincts, and Emotional Phenomena; *H. N. Gardiner*, Affective Psychology in Ancient Writers after Aristotle; *Henry Nelson Wieman*, The Nature of Mentality.

XXVI, 4: *H. Heath Bawden*, The Evolution of Behavior; *Rulledge T. Wiltbank*, The Principles of Serial and Complete Response as Applied to Learning; *Harvey Carr and Helen Koch*, The Influence of Extraneous Controls in the Learning Process; *E. R. Wembridge and Priscilla Gabel*, Multiple Choice Experiments Applied to School Children; *Buford Johnson*, Practice Effects in a Target Test—A Comparative Study of Groups Varying in Intelligence; *Herbert A. Toops*, Plotting Equations of Three Variables in Mental Measurements.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XXX, 3: *H. S. Liddell*, Eye-Movement During Fluctuation of Attention; *Henry Jones Mulford*, What is "The Unconscious?"; *Theodore Schroeder*, The Psychologic Aspect of Free-Association; *A. A. Roback*, The Freudian Doctrine of Lapses and its Failings; *W. T. Shepherd*, On Sound Discrimination in Dogs; *Vincent*, Confessions of an Agoraphobic Victim.

THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, IX, Parts 3 and 4: *John Laird*, The Psychological Interpretation of Sense-Data; *Carveth Read*, The Unconscious; *Victoria Hazlitt*, The Acquisition of Motor Habits; *Godfrey H. Thomson*, The Proof or Disproof of the Existence of General Ability; *J. C. Maxwell Garnett*, General Ability, Cleverness and Purpose.

THE HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, XII, 3: *George Hodges*, The Validity of Non-Episcopal Ordination; *Ephraim Emerton*, The First European Congress; *James Bissett Pratt*, Some Psychological Aspects of the Belief in Immortality; *William Hallock Johnson*, Is the Design Argument Dead?; *Edward Farwell Hayward*, The Reconstruction of Religion.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, XXIII, 3: *Ernest Thomas*, Church Union in Canada; *Douglas Clyde Macintosh*, Troeltsch's Theory of Religious Knowledge; *J. M. Powis Smith*, The Conservatism of Early Prophecy; *Fred-eric Palmer*, A Comparison of the Synoptic, Pauline, and Johannine Conceptions of Jesus; *A. S. Woodburne*, The Relation of Religion to Instinct; *William Muss-Arnolt*, Puritan Efforts and Struggles, 1550-1603. I.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XLIV, 5 and 6: *O. Hamelin*, La nature et le mouvement d'après Aristote; *W. Riley*, La philosophie française en Amérique (suite); *Fr. Paulhan*, La spiritualisation des tendances; *J. Sageret*, Remarques sur la psychologie collective.

XLIV, 7 and 8: *E. Rabaud*, Le domaine et la méthode de la biologie générale; *G. Marcel*, W. E. Hocking et la dialectique de l'instinct; *G. Rodrigues*, L'art et l'absolu; *J. Philippe*, Contribution à la psychologie de nos mouvements; *H. Piéron*, De la détermination et de l'interprétation de la loi de l'ouïe et des lois psychologiques en général.

RIVISTA DE FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA, XI, 2: *Francesco Olgiati*, Astrazione e concretezza; *Antonio Masini*, Il brivido cosmico; *Adolfo Levi*, Il concetto del tempo nei suoi rapporti coi problemi del divenire e dell'essere nella filosofia greca sino a Platone; *Emilio Chiocchetti*, Filosofia e storia.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE NATURE OF THE COMMUNITY.

A DEFENSE OF PHILOSOPHIC ORTHODOXY.

MAN is always interested in the community because he lives in it. He is interested in its nature because he usually wishes to change it, to mould that which he considers 'a sorry scheme of things' 'nearer to the heart's desire.' He is especially interested in it at the present time because, say what we may, life within the community and relations between communities have become strangely difficult and unsatisfactory. The community as we have known it is rapidly becoming unrecognizable. The state is no longer the state as we have understood it, but tends to dissolve into labor unions, conventions, boards of conciliation and conferences. As in all such times of practical change and reconstruction, theoretical questions have again become uppermost.

What is this thing, society or community? What is its matter and its form? Is it something made or does it grow? or is it partly a growth and partly a construction? What are the limits of its modifiability? Is it a collection, an organism, or a person? Which is more ultimate, individual, society, or group? What of the *communitas communitatis* or state? What is its relation to other communities or groups? Is it omni-competent and omnipotent, or is it but one among equally sovereign groups? Such are some of the specific questions now being asked with new and greater insistency. But underneath them all is a deeper and more fundamental question which may perhaps be

stated in the following form: Does the community, for instance the state and the ordered institutions of historical man, but give utterance and protection to the natural interests and rights of individuals and groups, or does it have ends of its own and in fulfilling these ends, by its own intrinsic life, add to the wealth of interests and values of individuals?

The problem of the nature of the community is thus far from simple. All these questions and many more, are interwoven in the recent literature of our topic. They are obviously closely connected with one another, yet no less obviously a discussion of each of them on its own merits requires an expertness in so many fields of knowledge and practice that no single science can hope to deal with them adequately. It is to the sympathetic coöperation of the specialists in sociology, jurisprudence, and political science, who have so generously given us their services, that we look for light on most of these problems. Yet, as doubtless our guests would be the first to admit, not only are inspiration and assistance to be got from the philosophers of the past, but the central question about which all our discussions will in the end revolve, is still such that we can not wholly dispense with the philosophers of the present. The task of the philosopher is greatly simplified by the fact that these central questions reduce themselves in the last analysis to one. The over-individual and monistic conception of community and state represents, on the one hand, such a constant stream of human thought and feeling that it has acquired the name of traditional and orthodox. It represents, on the other hand, a tendency which has been well-nigh inescapable for so large a body of philosophical thought that it has been called the metaphysical theory *par excellence*. The discussion of this theory is inevitable and the thesis which I shall attempt to support may best be described as a defense of a modified form of the orthodox view. It is my conviction that most of the progressive and even radical developments in social and political thought—with some of which I am myself in sympathy—call not so much for its abandonment as for its reinterpretation.

The philosopher's task is essentially interpretation and we

may best approach that task by asking ourselves what is implied by these various questions which our general topic includes. Limits of space will permit merely a statement of our position, not its debate. "What we desire to know," says a recent writer in political theory, "is not what has the legal or ideal right to prevail, but what does in actual fact prevail." For some purposes of political science this is perhaps true; for more human, and therefore more philosophical ends, it certainly is not. Not only does each of these specific questions have significance only with reference to our interest in maintaining or modifying the social order, but any formula in terms of which these questions are answered—therefore any social or political theory, is necessarily a scheme of social values and by its very nature a standard of appreciation and evaluation. We have long since learned to distinguish between such formulas as descriptions of historical fact and as expressions of the meaning of any recognized social order. It is with the latter that the philosopher is mainly concerned, and it is as the best résumé of communal meanings that the traditional idealistic formulas seem to me worthy of defense.

II.

In present-day discussions the over-individual conception is more generally accepted than the monistic. It is quite common to hear, even in the more radical social and political philosophies, that both individual and state, as commonly envisaged, are not truths but fictions, and that the unit of social thought is to be found in the group, to which quite frequently an over-individual reality is granted. We shall accordingly take up the two problems separately, our first task being a critical consideration of the formulas, organic or hyperorganic, in terms of which the over-individual character of communities is described.

Clearly, the reality of the over-individual character of communities is a compulsion we find it very difficult to resist. When we take any group of people leading a common life, to whom some kindred purpose may be ascribed, we seem to evolve from it a thing or a personality that is beyond the personalities of the constituent parts. The sources of this compulsion lie partly in

feeling and tradition, partly in certain logical necessities of ethical and legal thought which require subjects of obligation and responsibility, but even more fundamentally in certain analogical or supralogical necessities generated by community life itself.

The prevailing doctrine—at least until quite recently—regarding the nature of this over-individual reality is, in most general terms, the organic conception, which has been interpreted, now in a purely biological again in a more psychological sense. Communities, it is held, must be looked upon approximately as organisms, and as such they are subject to the law of historical development. That this teaching has won such widespread consideration is due to several circumstances—the growth of the biological and historical categories and the possibility which such a conception offers of including social reality in a triumphant scientific monism. But what weighs far more than this, I think, is the fact that the ‘organic formula’ resumes as does no other, certain results of community experience, and therefore certain social meanings and values. From this point of view it is a formula upon which both liberals and conservatives have been able to agree, as against extremes of radicalism. “Evolution not revolution” is the conclusion of the practical syllogism which the conservative constructs with the organic formula as the major premise. On the other hand, as Hobhouse, who accepts the organic formula, says, the putting of the category of life above that of mechanism is for the liberal “the very heart of liberalism,” the understanding namely, that progress is not a matter of mechanical contrivance, but of the liberation of living spiritual energy.

Criticism of this over-individual conception—especially of the organic formula—has been markedly revived in recent discussion. Neglecting the radical animus which underlies much of the opposition to these conceptions, the criticisms may be described as of two types, and from two points of view, that of fact and that of value. The first line of criticism is largely directed against the analogical formulas, biological or psychological, in which this over-individual and organic conception

is expressed. Space will not permit us to enter into the details of these criticisms. In essence they consist in denying the possibility of such hypothetical entities. "Even to say," says one writer, "that it is possible to suppose individual minds integrated into an over-individual mind, is to put the matter too strongly. There is no such super-organism even among the most complete biological collections. It would contradict all known anatomical and physiological laws. Nor is it clear that any such unity is possible in terms of self-consciousness, in view of the peculiar individuality which is attached to the data of introspection."

Now I think we must admit the justice of this criticism up to a certain point. It is obvious that, as James Ward says, if an organism must be literally either an animal or a vegetable, then society is certainly not an organism. We may go further and say that if an over-individual mind must have literally the same type of self-consciousness that characterizes the individual mind and personality, then society is not an over-individual mind. Yet it is by no means clear that such objections are insuperable. Thinkers differing as widely as Mr. Wells and Professor Wundt, for instance, think that the immediate oneness of self-consciousness is too unessential a characteristic to counterbalance the fundamental agreement of the analogy on other points. But aside from this, it seems fair to say that such criticisms misapprehend completely the basis of the analogies and the significance of the formulas. The amusing extremes to which some writers, such as Bluntschli for instance, push their organic and psychological conceptions of society and state, can scarcely blind the judicious thinker to the importance of their conclusions as attempts to express the meaning of the social order. All social and political theories are primarily schemes of social values and it is from this point of view that their truth is ultimately to be tested.

It is, therefore, from the standpoint of 'value' that the more recent as well as the more significant criticisms are made. "Such a metaphysical entity as the over-individual state or the living being set on high above individuals," says one writer, "is a

rational monstrosity. To call it superhuman is quite in the Germanic vogue, but to men reared in the humanitarian school, there is nothing complimentary in the epithet. The *Übermensch* can never be less than unlovely and ogreish." More definitely it is charged, as by MacIver, that it is not only impossible to give meaning and concreteness to such a value, but "the postulation of it deprives of reality the values that we actually know." It makes illusion of the personal values.

With regard to the first point Mr. MacIver and his congeners are certainly wrong. Far from its being impossible to give meaning and concreteness to such a value, it is in fact, as I have pointed out elsewhere,¹ something that we are constantly doing. It is true that if by meaning and concreteness we are to understand some grotesque picture of this "rational monstrosity," we are indeed dealing with fictions which are both theoretically indefensible and practically delusive. If, on the other hand, we understand by such meaning, "the attribution to communities and nations of such degree and form of personality as can evoke in us interests and emotions which personality alone can win," not only is it something that we *are* constantly doing, but something which we *must* do if a large part of our moral and legal judgments are to be valid. Nor is it at all clear that we have here to deal with a voracious ogre, who devours personal values. We should first have to know just wherein personal values consist. Perhaps nowhere is clear thinking more in order—nowhere is the purely instrumental conception of the social order and the state so far from the real truth as at this point. Some of the personal values at least arise precisely from the postulation of objective over-individual structures and participation in their life. It is an axiom of any satisfactory theory of knowledge that if knowledge is to be genuine, the object must in some sense be independent of the subject. Is it not strange that it should be so little understood that this same postulate is equally the condition of genuine appreciation of values?²

¹ In a paper, "How are Moral Judgments on Groups and Associations Possible? A Neglected Chapter in Ethics," *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1919.

² I confess my inability to appreciate the fear of the term over-individual, and

There are, indeed, as Nietzsche says, some things we must learn not to say about reality, and if the organic formula in either its biological or psychological sense is to be taken literally, Nietzsche's saying is eminently applicable to social reality. But it must be remembered that all social and political theories, as schemes of values, inevitably contain an element of practical dogma. As dogmas they are perhaps more significant in that they tell us what reality is not, rather than what it ultimately is. From this point of view, the organic formula in its psychological form, with its significant assertions of what the social order *is not*, is the most adequate résumé of our experiences with human communities. This is the abiding value of the Hegelian formula of "self-conscious ethical substance,"¹ for it expresses, however inadequately, a truth of which no serious student of social reality can long remain in doubt, namely that no formula of sheer realism, still less of bald instrumentalism, can exhibit the true nature of the social order. The community, the social order, is not just my idea, but it is certainly not merely a collection of independent entities, either physical or mental. A community, a state, an authority whose reality is not in some sense constituted by mind, is not in other words a chapter in the history of mind, is no real community and no real state.

III.

The step is easy, says Mr. Laski, from the talk of the state to the talk of the community, but it is illegitimate. This may or may not be true, but at least the step from talk of the community to talk of the state is not only easy, but also inevitable. I think it is also legitimate.

We can not avoid the temptation to make our state a unity equally my inability to understand that anything is gained by substituting inter-individual for over-individual. Where the difference is not merely verbal, any gain in the direction of emphasis on process is lost in the direction of loss of precisely those values dependent upon the assumption of transcendence. And so far as 'mysticism' is concerned, the one conception is as mystical as the other.

¹ From this point of view it is immaterial whether we call community ethical process or ethical substance, though for some purposes emphasis on process may have its advantage.

because, as Gierke says, it is out of the personal character of the community that the demand for the unity of the state arises, "a unity which, like that of the individual, is to be as simple as possible, one in which the parts are completely contained, and worthful only for the whole, a unity which ultimately leads to communism." Monism is accordingly but a more abstract term for communism. It lies in communal logic, if I may be permitted the term, to pass from the *communitas* to the *communitas communitatum*.

Neither this inner compulsion, nor the external dominance of this traditional conception of the state is minimized by its opponents. Those who oppose it recognize quite frankly that it is independent of the political distinctions of autocracy and democracy, that on this point the erstwhile socialist Combes is no less insistent than a Treitschke. Whether now this tendency be viewed as communal instinct, or as something more ontological—part of a general *nisus* towards totality, the fact remains that it seems to witness to one of those ultimates of which philosophers are fond—ultimates which seem to be proved by their very denial.

At times in the history of every state there comes a point where the maintenance of its unity and supremacy seems to some men worthless as an end compared with the achievement of some good deemed greater than order and peace. But as careful analysis will always disclose, such moments are by no means a denial of the supremacy of the state and of the general will which it ideally represents, or of the belief that its larger purposes have superior worth. They are rather an insistence upon its supremacy and constitute a denial of validity to governmental acts on the ground that they do not represent the common will and do not achieve its ends in adequate fashion. It is by no means accidental that the formula, "Republic one and indivisible," was born in the throes of the French Revolution¹ and that, as Carlyle says, it was "the

¹ It has been pointed out that the monistic theory of the state was born in an age of crisis and that each period of its revivification has synchronized with some momentous event which has signalized a change in the distribution of political power. Far from being an argument against its validity, this is rather the strongest proof of its inevitability. In national as well as individual life, is it not in the

newest birth of Nature's vast organic deep, which men name Orcus, Chaos, primeval night, and which knows one law, that of self-preservation. Tigresse Nationale, meddle not with a whisker of her."

Yet this inherent character, like the more general character of over-individuality, is seriously questioned by the more radical thought of the day. Here again, the 'traditional' theory is criticised from the two points of view, that of fact and that of value.

Stated in summary fashion, the first line of criticism amounts to the statement that the abstract and traditional doctrines of authority and sovereignty can be made to square with the facts only by an elaborate sophistry, that these theories contain as much fiction as fact. We must admit, I think, a large part of the criticism from this point of view. We must admit, to specify some of the points of this criticism, that while the state is said to be sovereign, in practice its will is often operated by only a portion of its members, and to this portion sovereignty is often denied; that while the state is held to be bound only by its own consent, yet in recent history groups other than itself have compelled its adoption of policies to which it was opposed; that while sovereignty is said to be indivisible, yet as a matter of fact, its broad partition on every hand is obvious. Who would be concerned to deny these facts and others like them? Yet, in social and political theory, have we not long since learned to distinguish between theories as descriptions of historical fact and as expressions of the meaning of any recognized social order, and have we not also learned that social order is primarily a question of meaning? Our question is accordingly not so much whether the dogma of absolute sovereignty has a fictional element in it, as whether there is any meaning or value in that fiction.

It is at this point that the criticism of the monistic state from supreme moments of crisis, rather than in the normal and prosaic decades, that the higher values as well as the deeper necessities are displayed? For the philosopher at least no formula regarding the nature of the community can be adequate which does not include in it this *nisus* towards totality, towards the *communitas communitatum*, as part of its ultimate nature.

the standpoint of value appears. From this point of view, moreover, the problem is pushed back from the legal conception of the omnipotent state to the more ethical concept of the omni-competent state. Here again, as we shall see, it is not so much a question whether any existent government is actually omni-competent, as how far the assumption or postulate of omni-competence is implied in any organization of our social meanings and values.

Much of the criticism of this theory rests, I can not help thinking, upon a misapprehension of what the theory implies. If, as some charge, it rests upon the assumption that the activities of man in relation to government exhaust his nature, and upon the capacity of the state to generate and direct all the interests of men as individuals and groups, it is certainly false. But, so far as I know, all that is claimed by the extremest theories is that the function of the state is promotive as well as protective, and this implies the existence of interests already recognized. Nor does it seem to imply the denial of interests transcending those of the state, as Hegel himself was often careful to point out.¹ That which the theory does seem to imply is that all individuals and groups have certain relations in which the state alone is competent, just what these relations are being determined by the aim of the state. In other words the *omni* applies, not to the interests and values of society, but rather to the individuals and groups within it. Omni-competence means not ultimate authority in all things, but final authority in some things which concern all the elements in the community. In modern phraseology, the state is concerned with the "ethical minimum," or in Plato's terms with the "minimum community."

Thus understood, however—and it seems to me to be all that we can justly ascribe to the theory—the dogma of the omni-competence of the state, far from implying the absorption of individual and group interests, really constitutes their only guarantee. There is no reason why the retention of the principle

¹ Hegel is quite explicit on this point, saying in one connection that "nothing ought to be so sacred in the eyes of government as to leave alone and to protect without regard to utilities, the free action of the citizens in such matters as do not affect its fundamental aim: for this freedom is itself sacred."

should not go hand in hand with the exercise of sovereignty as little as possible, why for instance the state should not prohibit the members of a religious body from killing each other for the glory of God but should allow them, if they so desire, to roll on the ground in agony for that purpose. Here much misunderstanding arises from the confusion of two issues. Extension of state control is not so much a question of increasing or diminishing as of reorganizing restraints. There is no difficulty in understanding why the extension of state control on the one side should not go hand in hand with determined resistance to encroachments on the other. Practically what is called increase of state control is often of the nature of decrease in the total amount of restraint. The object of state coercion is to a large degree to override coercion by individuals and by associations of individuals within the state, and such a function, so far as I can see, is consistent only with the assumption of the competence of the state to decide between the conflicting interests. In the end, as Hobhouse says, the external order belongs to the community, and the right of protest to the individual.

But the attack goes deeper. The state is frankly charged with ethical incompetence in the sense of actual performance. And its very ethical character and purpose are also challenged, that namely upon which alone the postulate of its competence rests. If it has an ethical purpose, in practice, we are told, the realization of that purpose is so inadequate as to render at best dubious the value of the hypothesis. It is, moreover, sheer delusion to think that the state is necessarily any more in harmony with the ends of society than a church, a trade-union or a Freemasons' lodge. The assumption of the ethical superiority of the state to other forms of human association is due either to an illegitimate comparison of their different immediate purposes or to a false identification of state with society.

Here evidently the ultimate issue is definitely joined. The practical issues are far-reaching, but also the issue as to the nature and meaning of political formulas and the ground for their validity. Much of this criticism has its roots in a temporary impatience with the complexities of society and the difficul-

ties of administration. Much of it is due to a temporary panic which has led some men to call the state the "root of madness." But much of it also arises from a genuine desire to make theory square with the facts—in other words, to find in theory some validation for the apparent dissolution of the state into voluntary groups and associations which seems to many the significant social phenomenon of the time. Even in the latter case, which alone merits our consideration, there seems to be serious misapprehension.

I will not delay to rehearse in detail the arguments by which an English Burke,¹ no less than a German Hegel, seeks to maintain their theory. For neither of them, however, did ethical competence mean ethical infallibility. That which alone both of them were concerned to maintain is that, because in actual fact the state does transcend, both in length of life and in inclusiveness of interests, the lives and interests of its individual members, therefore it is *de facto* other than a voluntary association and *de jure* ethically competent. If in that reasoning there was sometimes a tendency illegitimately to identify the state with the community as a whole, it seems to me not so serious an error as to identify the nation with a form of government, an assumption which underlies much of this criticism. Nor do the decline of old-fashioned individualism and the growth in importance of voluntary associations seem to me essentially to alter the situation. There is in fact *every reason* "to think that the state is more in harmony with the ends of society than a church or a trade-union." The ends of the former are the ethical *minimum* but it is the indispensable minimum. With this no voluntary association is by its nature primarily concerned. If a government is recreant to its trust, that does not disprove the ethical character of the state and its superiority, but constitutes rather a challenge to reaffirm that superiority and to inquire anew into the genuine aims of the state. Certainly there is no occasion to deny the ethical character of the state itself. To do so is to despise and ignore the entire wealth of experience

¹ *Reflexions on the Revolution in France*. Select Works edited by Payne, Clarendon Press, Vol. II, pp. 113, 114.

of which that formula is the expression—to revert either to the conception of the state as a non-moral mechanism or to that conception of abstract morality with its inevitable individualism of conscience which it is the great achievement of modern idealism to have overcome. Which of these is practically the more unfortunate I am at a loss to say, but that either is theoretically not progress but retrogression I can not for a moment be in doubt.

IV.

A recent writer praises the common sense of Lowell which always led him to stop short of the ultimate. He attacks the fallacy—the favorite fallacy of the sciolist, he calls it, of reducing all questions to their ultimate metaphysical terms. There will not be lacking those, who will see in the foregoing a glaring illustration of this fallacy. Be that as it may, the problem set us by the *Association* is one that calls for ultimates, and in so far as this question of the nature of the community is concerned, as we have abundantly seen, ‘common sense’ and the metaphysical theory *par excellence* are not in contradiction. It is precisely in common sense, understood as *sensus communis*, that these finalities are most in evidence.¹

The practical bearing of this is obvious. The problem here is the limits of the modifiability of the social order through reason and its schemes. Such limits we are accustomed to find in what Sigurd Ibsen calls “might conditions,” *e.g.*, “human nature,” economic law, social passions and forces. Beneath these, however is that deeper “cunning of reason” using these forces and passions for her ends. It is this that shapes our ends, communal

¹ It is true that the term common sense is equivocal, that in its secondary meaning of immediate practicality it might easily be usurped by those who see in ordered institutions of society, including the state, merely the instruments for the utterance and protection of individual and group interests. It is true also that the appeal to common sense is not necessarily impressive to those who, seeing no reason why any logically constructed constitution should not “be made to march,” conceive social action and statecraft on the analogy of engineering. Yet to those who are not blind to the fact that political philosophy, whatever else it is, is but a chapter in the general philosophy of mind, it will not be considered wisdom to minimize those finalities which belong to the unconscious thought of the race.

and social, rough-hew them though we may. Considerable latitude is doubtless to be allowed for this rough-hewing, whether by individuals or by social groups. Or, to change the figure, *a priori* reluctancies and fears are no more in place in dealing with social growths than with biological. There is no reason why we should have an *a priori* horror of soviets, functional representation, or of any other novelty, any more than of artificial fertilizing of the land or eugenics. But such conservatism as is embodied in the orthodox theory is not of this sort, for it has its roots in the deepest experiences and thoughts of the race.

The bearing on theory is even more important. It is indeed an error, as Professor Dewey insists, "to regard the individual and the social as something fixed and ultimate instead of as something developing and therefore as objects continuously to be worked out." That all the historical theories have suffered more or less from this error is doubtless true. We must, as the political thinkers of the present are fond of insisting, distrust abstract formulas and "make our theories grow out of and coördinate with the life of men in society as it is actually lived." True, but among the facts which our theories are to fit,—part of the very life which is actually lived, are precisely these values which we have emphasized. A mystical element in the over-individual monistic theory can not be denied. But, here as elsewhere, I agree with Bosanquet, "despite the strongest predilection for rational simplicity and after the most resolute efforts to follow out a realistic empiricism, I have never in the long run found it possible to construe the world without an element that might be called mystical." As we trench upon the mystical when we attempt to picture the divine immanence, so also when we attempt to envisage the over-individual or inter-individual community.¹ Even in the 'soul of the state' there is a mystery, as Shakespeare says, a mystery, however, that lies so close to common sense that the veil is rent asunder whenever, as in all the great crises

¹ Thus when it is said, as by Miss M. P. Follett, that society is neither a collection of units nor an organism; it is precisely that whole which lives in each of its members and of which each of its members is potentially the whole, wherein is that more easily construable without an element of mysticism than the more traditional conception of over-individual soul or mind?

of communal life, the transcendence and unity of that soul is acclaimed. Until these traditional values are put out of their place, until more realistic conceptions take on an emotional and religious coloring, the classic formulas will have not only the "advantage of ideality," as Professor Dewey admits, but also the characteristics of essential reality.

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THE PLURALISTIC STATE.

EVERY student of politics must begin his researches with humble obeisance to the work of Aristotle; and therein, I take it, he makes confession of the inspiration and assistance he has had from the effort of philosophers. Indeed, if one took only the last century of intellectual history, names like Hegel, Green, and Bosanquet must induce in him a certain sense of humility. For the direction of his analysis has been given its perspective by their thought. The end his effort must achieve has been by no other thinkers so clearly or so wisely defined.

Yet the philosophic interpretation of politics has suffered from one serious weakness. It is rather with *staatslehre* than with *politik* that it has concerned itself. Ideals and forms have provided the main substance of its debates. So that even if, as with Hegel and Green, it has had the battles of the market-place most clearly in mind, it has somehow, at least ultimately, withdrawn itself from the arena of hard facts to those remoter heights where what a good Platonist has called¹ the 'pure instance' of the state may be dissected. Nor has it seen political philosophy sufficiently outside the area of its own problems. Aristotle apart, its weakness has lain exactly in those minutiae of psychology which, collectively, are all-important to the student of administration. Philosophy seems, in politics at least, to take too little thought for the categories of space and time.

The legal attitude has been impaired by a somewhat similar limitation. The lawyer, perhaps of necessity, has concerned himself not with right but with rights, and his consequent preoccupation with the problem of origins, the place of ultimate reference, has made him, at least to the interested outsider, unduly eager to confound the legally ancient with the politically justifiable. One might even make out a case for the assertion that the lawyer is the head and centre of our modern trouble; for the monistic

¹ Barker, *Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to Today*, p. 68 f.

theory of the state goes back, in its scientific statement, to Jean Bodin. The latter became the spiritual parent of Hobbes, and thence, through Bentham, the ancestor of Austin. On Austin I will make no comment here; though a reference to an ingenious equation of Maitland's may perhaps be pardoned.¹

It is with the lawyers that the problem of the modern state originates as an actual theory; for the lawyer's formulæ have been rather amplified than denied by the philosophers. Upon the historic events which surround their effort I would say one word, since it is germane to the argument I have presently to make. We must ceaselessly remember that the monistic theory of the state was born in an age of crisis and that each period of its revivification has synchronised with some momentous event which has signalled a change in the distribution of political power. Bodin, as is well known, was of that party which, in an age of religious warfare, asserted, lest it perish in an alien battle, the supremacy of the state.² Hobbes sought the means of order in a period when King and Parliament battled for the balance of power. Bentham published his *Fragment* on the eve of the Declaration of Independence; and Adam Smith, in the same year, was outlining the programme of another and profounder revolution. Hegel's philosophy was the outcome of a vision of German multiplicity destroyed by the unity of France. Austin's book was conceived when the middle classes of France and England had, in their various ways, achieved the conquest of a state hitherto but partly open to their ambition.

It seems of peculiar significance that each assertion of the monistic theory should have this background. I cannot stay here to disentangle the motives through which men so different in character should have embraced a theory as similar in substance. The result, with all of them, is to assert the supremacy of the state over all other institutions. Its primary organs have the first claim upon the allegiance of men; and Hobbes's insistence³ that corporations other than the state are but the mani-

¹ Cf. *The Life of F. W. Maitland*, by H. A. L. Fisher, p. 117.

² The background of his book has recently been exhaustively outlined by Roger Chauviré in his *Jean Bodin* (Paris, 1916), esp. pp. 312 f.

³ *Leviathan*, Chap. XLIV.

festations of disease is perhaps the best example of its ruthless logic. Hobbes and Hegel apart, the men I have noted were lawyers; and they were seeking a means whereby the source of power may have some adequate justification. Bentham, of course, at no point beatified the state; though zeal for it is not wanting in the earlier thinkers or in Hegel. What, I would urge, the lawyers did was to provide a foundation for the moral superstructure of the philosophers. It was by the latter that the monistic state was elevated from the plane of logic to the plane of ethics. Its rights then became matter of right. Its sovereignty became spiritualised into moral preëminence.

The transition is simple enough. The state is today the one compulsory form of association;¹ and for more than two thousand years we have been taught that its purpose is the perfect life. It thus seems to acquire a flavor of generality which is absent from all other institutions. It becomes instinct with an universal interest to which, as it appears, no other association may without inaccuracy lay claim. Its sovereignty thus seems to represent the protection of the universal aspect of men—what Rousseau called the common good—against the intrusion of more private aspects at the hands of which it might otherwise suffer humiliation. The state is an absorptive animal; and there are few more amazing tracts of history than that which records its triumphs over the challenge of competing groups. There seems, at least today, no certain method of escape from its demands. Its conscience is supreme over any private conception of good the individual may hold. It sets the terms upon which the lives of trade-unions may be lived. It dictates their doctrine to churches; and, in England at least, it was a state tribunal which, as Lord Westbury said, dismissed hell with costs.² The area of its enterprise has consistently grown until today there is no field of human activity over which, in some degree, its pervading influence may not be detected.

But it is at this point pertinent to inquire what exact meaning

¹ I say today; for it is important to remember that, for the Western World, this was true of the Church until the Reformation.

² A. W. Benn, *History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, Vol. II, p. 133.

is to be attached to an institution so vital as this. With one definition only I shall trouble you. "A state," writes Mr. Zimmern,¹ "can be defined, in legal language, as a territory over which there is a government claiming unlimited authority." The definition, indeed, is not quite correct; for no government in the United States could claim, though it might usurp, unlimited power. But it is a foible of the lawyers to insist upon the absence of legal limit to the authority of the state; and it is, I think, ultimately clear that the monistic theory is bound up with some such assumption. But it is exactly here that our main difficulty begins to emerge. The state, as Mr. Zimmern here points out, must act through organs; and, in the analysis of its significance, it is upon government that we must concentrate our main attention.²

Legally, no one can deny that there exists in every state some organ whose authority is unlimited. But that legality is no more than a fiction of logic. No man has stated more clearly than Professor Dicey³ the sovereign character of the King in Parliament; no man has been also so quick to point out the practical limits to this supremacy. And if logic is thus out of accord with the facts of life the obvious question to be asked is why unlimited authority may be claimed. The answer, I take it, is reducible to the belief that government expresses the largest aspect of man and is thus entitled to institutional expression of the area covered by its interests. A history, of course, lies back of that attitude, the main part of which would be concerned with the early struggle of the modern state to be born. Nor do I think the logical character of the doctrine has all the sanction claimed for it. It is only with the decline of theories of natural law that Parliament becomes the complete master of its destinies. And the internal limits which the jurist is driven to admit prove, on examination, to be the main problem for consideration.

There are many different angles from which this claim to unlimited authority may be proved inadequate. That government is the most important of institutions few, except theocrats,

¹ *Nationality and Government*, p. 56.

² Cf. my *Authority in the Modern State*, pp. 26 ff.

³ Cf. *The Law of the Constitution* (8th ed.), pp. 37 ff.

could be found to deny; but that its importance warrants the monistic assumption herein implied raises far wider questions. The test, I would urge, is not an *a priori* statement of claim. Nothing has led us farther on the wrong path than the simple teleological terms in which Aristotle stated his conclusions. For when we say that political institutions aim at the good life, we need to know not only the meaning of good, but also those who are to achieve it, and the methods by which it is to be attained. What, in fact, we have to do is to study the way in which this monistic theory has worked; for our judgment upon it must depend upon its consequences to the mass of men and women. I would not trouble you unduly with history. But it is worth while to bear in mind that this worship of state-unity is almost entirely the offspring of the Reformation and therein, most largely, an adaptation of the practice of the medieval church. The fear of variety was not, in its early days, an altogether unnatural thing. Challenged from within and from without, uniformity seemed the key to self-preservation.¹ But when the internal history of the state is examined, its supposed unity of purpose and of effort sinks, with acquaintance, into nothingness. What in fact confronts us is a complex of interests; and between not few of them ultimate reconciliation is impossible. We cannot, for example, harmonise the modern secular state with a Roman Church based upon the principles of the Encyclical of 1864; nor can we find the basis of enduring collaboration between trade-unions aiming at the control of industry through the destruction of capitalistic organization and the upholders of capitalism. Historically, we always find that any system of government is dominated by those who at the time wield economic power; and what they mean by 'good' is, for the most part, the preservation of their own interests. Perhaps I put it too crudely; refined analysis would, maybe, suggest that they are limited by the circle of the ideas to which their interests would at the first instance give rise. The history of England in the period of the Industrial Revolution is perhaps the most striking

¹ Cf. Professor McIlwain's introduction to his edition of the *Political Works of James I.*, and my comment thereon, *Pol. Sci. Quarterly*, Vol. 34, p. 290.

example of this truth. To suggest, for instance, that the government of the younger Pitt was, in its agricultural policy, actuated by some conception of public welfare which was equal as between squire and laborer, is, in the light of the evidence so superbly discussed by Mr. and Mrs. Hammond, utterly impossible.¹ There is nowhere and at no time assurance of that consistent generality of motive in the practice of government which theory would suppose it to possess.

We cannot, that is to say, at any point, take for granted the motives of governmental policy, with the natural implication that we must erect safeguards against their abuse. These, I venture to think, the monistic theory of the state at no point, in actual practice, supplies. For its insistence on unlimited authority in the governmental organ makes over to it the immense power that comes from the possession of legality. What, in the stress of conflict, this comes to mean is the attribution of inherent rightness to acts of government. These are somehow taken, and that with but feeble regard to their actual substance, to be acts of the community. Something that, for want of a better term, we call the communal conscience, is supposed to want certain things. We rarely inquire either how it comes to want them or to need them. We simply know that the government enforces the demand so made and that the individual or group is expected to give way before them. Yet it may well happen, as we have sufficiently seen in our experience, that the individual or the group may be right. And it is difficult to see how a policy which thus penalizes all dissent, at least in active form, from government, can claim affinity with freedom. For freedom, as Mr. Graham Wallas has finely said,² implies the chance of continuous initiative. But the ultimate implication of the monistic state in a society so complex as our own is the transference of that freedom from ordinary men to their rulers.

I cannot here dwell upon the more technical results of this doctrine, more particularly on the absence of liability for the

¹ See their brilliant volume, *The Village Laborer* (1911).

² Cf. his article in the *New Statesman*, Sept. 25, 1915. I owe my knowledge of this winning definition to Mr. A. E. Zimmern's *Nationality and Government*, p. 57.

faults of government that it has involved.¹ But it is in some such background as this that the pluralistic theory of the state takes its origin. It agrees with Mr. Zimmern that a state is a territorial society divided into government and subjects, but it differs, as you will observe, from his definition in that it makes no assumptions as to the authority a government should possess. And the reason for this fact is simply that it is consistently experimentalist in temper. It realizes that the state has a history and it is unwilling to assume that we have today given to it any permanence of form. There is an admirable remark of Tocqueville's on this point which we too little bear in mind.² And if it be deemed necessary to dignify this outlook by antiquity we can, I think, produce great names as its sponsors. At least it could be shown that the germs of our protest are in men like Nicholas of Cusa, like Althusius, Locke, and Royer-Collard.

It thus seems that we have a twofold problem. The monistic state is an hierarchical structure in which power is, for ultimate purposes, collected at a single centre. The advocates of pluralism are convinced that this is both administratively incomplete and ethically inadequate. You will observe that I have made no reference here to the lawyer's problem. Nor do I deem it necessary; for when we are dealing, as the lawyer deals, with sources of ultimate reference, the questions are no more difficult, perhaps I should also add, no easier, than those arising under the conflict of jurisdictions in a federal state.

It is with other questions that we are concerned. Let us note, in the first place, the tendency in the modern state for men to become the mere subjects of administration. It is perhaps as yet too early to insist, reversing a famous generalisation of Sir Henry Maine, that the movement of our society is from contract to status; but there is at least one sense in which that remark is significant. Amid much vague enthusiasm for the thing itself, every observer must note a decline in freedom. What we most greatly need is to beware lest we lose that sense of spontaneity which enabled Aristotle to define citizenship as the capacity

¹ Cf. my paper on the Responsibility of the State in England. 32 *Harv. L. Rev.*, p. 447.

² *Souvenirs*, p. 102.

to rule not less than to be ruled in turn.¹ We believe that this can best be achieved in a state of which the structure is not hierarchical but coördinate, in which, that is to say, sovereignty is partitioned upon some basis of function. For the division of power makes men more apt to responsibility than its accumulation. A man, or even a legislature that is overburdened with a multiplicity of business, will not merely neglect that which he ought to do; he will, in actual experience, surrender his powers into the hands of forceful interests which know the way to compel his attention. He will treat the unseen as non-existent and the inarticulate as contented. The result may, indeed, be revolution; but experience suggests that it is more likely to be the parent of a despotism.

Nor is this all. Such a system must needs result in a futile attempt to apply equal and uniform methods to varied and unequal things. Every administrator has told us of the effort to arrive at an intellectual routine; and where the problems of government are as manifold as at present that leads to an assumption of similarity which is rarely borne out by the facts. The person who wishes to govern America must know that he cannot assume identity of conditions in North and South, East and West. He must, that is to say, assume that his first duty is not to assert a greatest common measure of equality but to prove it. That will, I suggest, lead most critical observers to perceive that the unit with which we are trying to deal is too large for effective administration. The curiosities, say of the experiment in North Dakota, are largely due to this attempt on the part of predominating interests to neglect vital differences of outlook. Such differences, moreover, require a sovereignty of their own to express the needs they imply. Nor must we neglect the important fact that in an area like the United States the individual will too often get lost in its very vastness. He gets a sense of impotence as a political factor of which the result is a failure properly to estimate the worth of citizenship. I cannot stay to analyse the result of that mistaken estimate. I can only say here that I am convinced that it is the nurse of social corruption.

¹ *Politics*, Bk. III, C. I, 1275a.

Administratively, therefore, we need decentralisation; or, if you like, we need to revivify the conception of federalism which is the great contribution of America to political science. But we must not think of federalism today merely in the old spatial terms. It applies not less to functions than to territories. It applies not less to the government of the cotton industry, or of the civil service, than it does to the government of Kansas and Rhode Island. Indeed, the greatest lesson the student of government has to learn is the need for him to understand the significance for politics of industrial structure and, above all, the structure of the trade-union movement.¹ The main factor in political organization that we have to recover is the factor of consent, and here trade-union federalism has much to teach us. It has found, whether the unit be a territorial one like the average local, or an industrial like that envisaged by the shop-steward movement in England, units sufficiently small to make the individual feel significant in them. What, moreover, this development of industrial organization has done is to separate the processes of production and consumption in such fashion as to destroy, for practical purposes, the unique sovereignty of a territorial parliament. It is a nice question for the upholders of the monistic theory to debate as to where the effective sovereignty of America lay in the controversy over the Adamson law; or to consider what is meant by the vision of that consultative industrial body which recent English experience seems likely, in the not distant future, to bring into being.²

The facts, I suggest, are driving us towards an effort at the partition of power. The evidence for that conclusion you can find on all sides. The civil services of England and France are pressing for such a reorganization.³ It is towards such a conclusion that what we call too vaguely the labor movement has directed its main energies.⁴ We are in the midst of a new move-

¹ A book that would do for the English-speaking world what M. Paul-Boncour did twenty years ago for France in his *Fédéralisme Économique* would be of great service.

² See the *Report of the Provisional Joint Committee of the Industrial Conference*. London, 1919.

³ See my *Authority in the Modern State*, Chap. V.

⁴ Cf. Cole, *Self-Government in Industry*, passim., esp. Chap. III.

ment for the conquest of self-government. It finds its main impulse in the attempt to disperse the sovereign power because it is realised that where administrative organization is made responsive to the actual associations of men, there is a greater chance not merely of efficiency but of freedom also. That is why, in France, there has been for some time a vigorous renewal of that earlier effort of the sixties in which the great Odillon-Barrot did his noblest work;¹ and it does not seem unlikely that some reconstruction of the ancient provinces will at last compensate for the dangerous absorptiveness of Paris. The British House of Commons has debated federalism as the remedy for its manifold ills;² and the unused potentialities of German decentralisation may lead to the results so long expected now that the deadening pressure of Prussian domination has been withdrawn. We are learning, as John Stuart Mill pointed out in an admirable passage,³ that "all the facilities which a government enjoys of access to information, all the means which it possesses of remunerating, and therefore of commanding, the best available talent in the market, are not an equivalent for the one great disadvantage of an inferior interest in the result." For we now know that the consequent of that inferior interest is the consistent degradation of freedom.⁴

I have spoken of the desire for genuine responsibility and the direction in which it may be found for administrative purposes. To this aspect the ethical side of political pluralism stands in the closest relation. Fundamentally, it is a denial that a law can be explained merely as a command of the sovereign for the simple reason that it denies, ultimately, the sovereignty of anything save right conduct. The philosophers since, particularly, the time of T. H. Green, have told us insistently that the state is based upon will; though they have too little examined the problem of what will is most likely to receive obedience. With history behind us, we are compelled to conclude that no such will

¹ Odillon-Barrot, *De la centralization*.

² *Parliamentary Debates*, June 4th and 5th, 1919.

³ *Principles of Political Economy* (2d ed.), Vol. II, p. 181.

⁴ On all this, cf. my *Problem of Administrative Areas* (Smith College Studies, Vol. IV, No. I).

can by definition be a good will; and the individual must therefore, whether by himself or in concert with others, pass judgment upon its validity by examining its substance. That, it is clear enough, makes an end of the sovereignty of the state in its classical conception. It puts the state's acts—practically, as I have pointed out, the acts of its primary organ, government—on a moral parity with the acts of any other association. It gives to the judgments of the State exactly the power they inherently possess by virtue of their moral content, and no other. If the English state should wish, as in 1776, to refuse colonial freedom; if Prussia should choose to embark upon a Kulturkampf; if any state, to take the decisive instance, should choose to embark upon war; in each case there is no *a priori* rightness about its policy. You and I are part of the leverage by which that policy is ultimately enacted. It therefore becomes a moral duty on our part to examine the foundations of state-action. The last sin in politics is unthinking acquiescence in important decisions.

I have elsewhere dealt with the criticism that this view results in anarchy.¹ What it is more profitable here to examine is its results in our scheme of political organization. It is, in the first place, clear that there are no demands upon our allegiance except the demands of what we deem right conduct. Clearly, in such an aspect, we need the means of ensuring that we shall know right when we see it. Here, I would urge, the problem of rights becomes significant. For the duties of citizenship cannot be fulfilled, save under certain conditions; and it is necessary to ensure the attainment of those conditions against the encroachments of authority. I cannot here attempt any sort of detail; but it is obvious enough that freedom of speech,² a living wage, an adequate education, a proper amount of leisure, the power to combine for social effort, are all of them integral to citizenship. They are natural rights in the sense that without them the purpose of the state cannot be fulfilled. They are natural also in the sense that they do not depend upon the state for their validity. They are inherent in the eminent worth of

¹ *Authority in the Modern State*, pp. 93-4.

² Cf. the brilliant article of my colleague, Professor Z. Chafee, Jr., in 32 *Harv. L. Rev.*, 932 f.

human personality. Where they are denied, the state clearly destroys whatever claims it has upon the loyalty of men.

Rights such as these are necessary to freedom because without them man is lost in a world almost beyond the reach of his understanding. We have put them outside the power of the state to traverse; and this again must mean a limit upon its sovereignty. If you ask what guarantee exists against their destruction in a state where power is distributed, the answer, I think, is that only in such a state have the masses of men the opportunity to understand what is meant by their denial. It is surely, for example, significant that the movement for the revival of what we broadly term natural law should derive its main strength from organized trade-unionism. It is hardly less important that among those who have perceived the real significance of the attitude of labor in the Taff Vale and Osborne cases should have been a high churchman most deeply concerned with the restoration of the church.¹ That is what coördinate organization will above all imply, and its main value is the fact that what, otherwise, must strike us most in the modern state is the inert receptiveness of the multitude. Every student of politics knows well enough what this means. Most would, on analysis, admit that its dissipation is mainly dependent upon an understanding of social mechanisms now largely hidden from the multitude. The only hopeful way of breaking down this inertia is by the multiplication of centres of authority. When a man is trained to service in a trade-union, he cannot avoid seeing how that activity is related to the world outside. When he gets on a school-committee, the general problems of education begin to unfold themselves before him. Paradoxically, indeed, we may say that a consistent decentralisation is the only effective cure for an undue localism. That is because institutions with genuine power become ethical ideas and thus organs of genuine citizenship. But if the Local Government Board, or the Prefect, sit outside, the result is a balked disposition of which the results are psychologically well known. A man may obtain some compensation for his prac-

¹ J. Neville Figgis, *Churches in the Modern State*. The recent death of Dr. Figgis is an irreparable blow to English scholarship.

tical exclusion from the inwardness of politics by devotion to golf. But I doubt whether the compensation is what is technically termed sublimation, and it almost always results in social loss.

Here, indeed, is where the main superiority of the pluralistic state is manifest. For the more profoundly we analyse the psychological characteristics of its opposite, the less adequate does it seem relative to the basic impulses of men. And this, after all, is the primary need to satisfy. It was easy enough for Aristotle to make a fundamental division between masters and men and adapt his technique to the demands of the former; but it was a state less ample than a moderate-sized city that he had in mind. It was simple for Hobbes to assume the inherent badness of men and the consequent need of making government strong, lest their evil nature bring it to ruin; yet even he must have seen, what our own generation has emphasized, that the strength of governments consists only in the ideas of which they dispose. It was even simple for Bentham to insist on the ruling motive of self-interest; but he wrote before it had become clear that altruism was an instinct implied in the existence of the herd. We know at least that the data are more complex. Our main business has become the adaptation of our institutions to a variety of impulses with the knowledge that we must at all costs prevent their inversion. In the absence of such transmutation what must mainly impress us is the wastage upon which our present system is builded. The executioner, as Maistre said, is the corner-stone of our society. But it is because we refuse to release the creative energies of men.

After all, our political systems must be judged not merely by the ends they serve, but also by the way in which they serve those ends. The modern state provides a path whereby a younger Pitt may control the destinies of a people; it even gives men of leisure a field of passionate interest to cultivate. But the humbler man is less fortunate in the avenues we afford; and if we have record of notable achievement after difficult struggle, we are too impressed by the achievement to take due note of the anguish upon which it is too often founded. This, it may be remarked,

is the touchstone by which the major portion of our institutions will be tested in the future; and I do not think we can be unduly certain that they will stand the test. The modern state, at bottom, is too much an historic category not to change its nature with the advent of new needs.

Those new needs, it may be added, are upon us, and the future of our civilization most largely depends upon the temper in which we confront them. Those who take refuge in the irrefutable logic of the sovereign state may sometimes take thought that for many centuries of medieval history the very notion of sovereignty was unknown. I would not seek unduly to magnify those far-off times; but it is worth while to remember that no thoughts were dearer to the heart of medieval thinkers than ideals of right and justice. Shrunken and narrow, it may be, their fulfillment often was; but that was not because they did not know how to dream. Our finely articulated structure is being tested by men who do not know what labor and thought have gone into its building. It is a cruder test they will apply. Yet it is only by seeking to understand their desires that we shall be able worthily to meet it.

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COMMUNITY IS A PROCESS.

COMMUNITY is a process. The importance of this as the fundamental principle of sociology it is impossible to overestimate. Physical science based on the study of function is today a study of process. The Freudian psychology, based on the study of the 'wish,' is preëminently a study of process and points towards new definitions of personality, purpose, will, freedom. If we study community as a process, we reach these new definitions.

For community is a *creative* process. It is creative because it is a process of integrating. The Freudian psychology, as interpreted and expanded by Holt,¹ gives us a clear exposition of the process of integrating in the individual. It shows us that personality is produced through the integrating of 'wishes,' that is, courses of action which the organism sets itself to carry out. The essence of the Freudian psychology is that two courses of action are not mutually exclusive, that one does not 'suppress' the other. It shows plainly that to integrate is not to absorb, melt, fuse, or to reconcile in the so-called Hegelian sense. The creative power of the individual appears not when one 'wish' dominates others, but when all 'wishes' unite in a working whole.

We see this same process in studying the group. It is the essential life process. The most familiar example of integrating as the social process is when two or three people meet to decide on some course of action, and separate with a purpose, a will, which was not possessed by anyone when he came to the meeting but is the result of the interweaving of all. In this true social process there takes place neither absorption nor compromise. Many of the political pluralists believe that we cannot have unity without absorption. Naturally averse to absorption, they therefore abandon the idea of unity and hit upon compromise and balance as the law of association. But whoever thinks

¹ I am indebted to Professor Holt's very valuable book, *The Freudian Wish*, for the references in this paper to the Freudian psychology.

compromise and balance the secret of coöperation fails, insofar, to understand the social process, as he has failed to gather the fruits of recent psychological research. Our study of both individual and group psychology shows us the evolving individual. But when you advocate compromise, it means that you still see the individual as a *ding-an-sich*. If the self with its purpose and its will is even for the moment a finished product, then of course the only way to get a common will is through compromise. But the truth is that the self is always in flux weaving itself out of its relations.

Moreover, the Freudian psychology shows us that compromise is a form of suppression. And as the Freudians show us that a 'suppressed' impulse will be our undoing later, so we see again and again that what has been 'suppressed' in the compromises of politics or of labor disputes crops up anew to bring more disastrous results. I should like to apply the Freudian definition of the sane man to social groups. After having shown us that dissociation of the neural complex means dissociation of personality, it defines the sane man as one in whom personality is not split, as one who has no thwarted wishes, 'suppressions,' incorporated in him. Likewise the sane industrial group would be one in which there was no 'suppression,' in which neither workman nor employer had compromised. The sane nation would be one not based on log-rolling. The sane League of Nations would be one in which no nation had made 'sacrifice' of sovereignty, but where each gains by the fullest joining of sovereignty. Suppression, the evil of the Freudian psychology, is the evil of our present constitution of society—politically, industrially and internationally.

What then is the law of community? From biology, from psychology, from our observation of social groups, we see that community is that intermingling which evokes creative power. What is created? Personality, purpose, will, loyalty. In order to understand this we must study actual groups. For instance, it is often discussed whether community may be a person. A recent book on ethics gives the arguments for and against. There is only one way to find out. My idea of ethics is to

lock three people into a room and listen at the keyhole. If that group can evolve a common will, then that group is a 'real' person. Let us stop talking about personality in ethics and sovereignty in political science and begin to study the group. Wherever you have a genuine common will, you have a 'real' person; and wherever you have a common will and 'real' personality, you have power, authority, sovereignty.

As the process of community creates personality and will, freedom appears. According to Holt the individual is free as far as he integrates impulses, 'wishes.' His activity will be constantly frustrated by that part of him which is 'dissociated.' An individual misses of freedom by exactly as much as he misses of unity.

The same process must take place with a group of two, say of two people who live together. They have to stand before the world with joint decisions. The process of making these decisions by the interpenetrating of thought, desire, etc., transfers the centre of consciousness from the single I to the group I. The resulting decision is that of the two-self. It is the same with a three-self, a several-self, perhaps a village-self. Our conception of liberty depends upon where we put the centre of consciousness.

Freedom, however, is supposed by many to be the last stronghold in the individual which has not yielded to contacts, that impregnable stronghold which *will* not yield to contacts. These people are in grave danger of some day entering their Holy of Holies and finding it empty. I must each moment find my freedom anew by making a whole whose dictates, because they are integratings to which I am contributing, represent my individuality at that moment. The law of modern psychology is, in a word, achieving. We are achieving our soul, our freedom.

When we see community as process, at that moment we recognize that freedom and law must appear together. I integrate opposing tendencies in my own nature and the result is freedom, power, law. To express the personality I am creating, to live the authority I am creating, is to be free. From biology, social psychology, all along the line, we learn one lesson: that

man is rising into consciousness of self as freedom in the forms of law. Law is the entelechy of freedom. The forms of government, of industry, must express this psychological truth.

I have said that community creates, that it creates personality, power, freedom. It also creates purpose, continuously creates purpose. No more fatally disastrous conception has ever dominated us than the conception of static ends.

The Freudian psychology shows us purpose as part of the process. Through the integrating of motor reflexes and objective stimuli we get specific response or behavior, which is purpose. The object of reference in the environment is not the end of behavior, but a constituent of behavior. In the same way we see that when in the social group we have the integrating of thought and overt action, purpose is a constituent of the process. As in the Freudian psychology the purpose about to be carried out is already embodied in the motor attitude of the neuromuscular apparatus, so in the social process the purpose is a part of the integrating activity; it is not something outside, a prefigured object of contemplation toward which we are moving. Nothing will so transform economics and politics, law and ethics, as this conception of purpose, for it carries with it a complete revaluation of the notion of means and ends. Many who are making reconstruction plans are thinking of static ends. But you can never catch a purpose. Put salt on the tail of the European purpose today in 1919—if you can! Ends and means truly and literally make each other. A system built around a purpose is dead before it is born.¹

¹ The correspondence between Holt's Freudianism and the activity of social groups we see daily. Holt synthesizes idealism and realism by showing us one and only one evolving process which at different stages we call matter or mind. By showing us scientifically that the integrating whole is always more than the sum of all the parts, he clearly indicates that the appearing of the new is a moment in evolution. This corresponds perfectly to what we find in our study of groups. The genuine social will, or community, is always a moment in the process of integrating. The recognition that the joint action of reflex arcs is not mere reflex action, the recognition of the law of *organized* response, and that behavior is not a function of the immediate stimulus, is as important for sociology as for biology. What Holt names "receding stimuli" is a term particularly felicitous for group psychology. Holt calls himself a pluralist—is this pluralism? Holt calls himself a realist—he expresses the *truth* of idealism in dynamic concepts and scientific language.

The conception of community as process affects materially our idea of loyalty and choice. When we are told to choose our loyalties, as the idealist would have us choose the universal community and the political realist¹ the 'nearest' group, the same error is being made: the individual is put outside the process. According to many of the pluralists there is an individual who stands outside and looks at his groups and there is something peculiarly sacred about this individual.² This individual is a myth. The fallacy of pluralism is not its pluralism, but that it is based on a non-existent individual. But Royce, who was not a pluralist (!) would have had us 'choose' a cause to be loyal to. Life is knit more closely than that. It is the complexity of life which both monists and pluralists seem not to reckon with just here. For a man to decide between his trade-union and the state is an impossibility, because by the time the decision comes to him it is already too late: I am part of the trade-union purpose; also the I that decides is a trade-union-I, in part. When the pluralist says that the individual is to choose between his group and his state, he has reduced the social process to a mechanical simplicity nowhere to be found in actual life. I am quite sure, for instance, that I should be capable in some instances of voting with my trade-union to-day in a trade-union meeting and with the state to-morrow in an election, even when the two votes might be opposed. Now what is the reason for this, if you are willing to assume that it is not moral depravity on my part? Are our groups wrong, is the relation of group to state wrong, is the relation of individual to group and of individual to state not yet synthesized, and if so what forms of government or what forms of association would tend to synthesize them? These questions cannot be answered without further study of the group.

To conclude this point of choice. Our loyalty is neither to

¹ I say the political realist meaning the realist in his applications to politics, because the realists in their interpretation of recent biological research do not make this mistake: they show that the reaction is the picking out of a part of that which sets up the reaction. This makes the process of selection decidedly more complex than the political realists seem to realize. They forget that the self which they say chooses the stimuli is being made by reaction to these stimuli.

² This is the same as the outside God of the Old Testament.

imaginary wholes nor to chosen wholes, but is an integral part of that activity which is at the same time creating me. Moreover, choice implies that one course is 'right' and one 'wrong.' Freud has taken us beyond that simple rule of morals, that unproductive ethics, by teaching us integration.

We see the same mistake of putting the individual outside the process when it is said, by a pluralist: "The greatest contribution that a citizen can make to the state is certainly this, that he should allow his mind freely to exercise itself on its problems." But it seems to me that the greatest contribution a citizen can make to the state is to learn creative thinking, that is, to learn how to join his thought with that of others so that the issue shall be productive. If each of us exhausts his responsibility by bringing his own little piece of pretty colored glass, that would make a mere kaleidoscope of community.

The individualist says, Be true to thyself. The profounder philosophers have always said, Know thyself, which carries the whole process a step further back: what is the self, what integrations have I made? I am willing to say that the individual *is* the final judge, but who is the individual? My individuality is where my centre of consciousness is. From that centre of consciousness, wherever it may be, our judgments will always issue, but the wider its circumference the truer will our judgments be. This is as important for ethics as for political science. When modern instinct psychology tells us of the need of self-expression, the *group* psychologist at once asks, "What is the self I am to express?"

A man expands as his will expands. A man's individuality stops where his power of collective willing stops. If he cannot will beyond his trade-union then we must write upon his tombstone, "This was a trade-union man." If he cannot will beyond his church, then he is a church man. The soul of the process is always the individual, but the individual forever escapes the form. The individual always escapes, but it is no wayward self who goes from this group to that and slips from all bonds to sit apart and judge us. But also he is no methodical magistrate bent on 'order,' 'organization,' 'method,' 'hierarchy,

who rises from a lower group to a higher and then to a higher and finally to a 'highest.' Life is not a pyramid. The individual always escapes. Yes, but because his sustenance is relation and he seeks forever new relations in the ceaseless interplay of the One and the Many by which both are constantly making each other.

The study of community as process does away with hierarchy, for it makes us dwell in the qualitative rather than in the quantitative. Much of the pluralist objection to the state is because of the words often applied to it by the monists: it is 'superior,' it is 'supreme,' it is 'over and above.' What we need is to discard this quantitative way of thinking and speaking.

Unifying activity is changing its quality every moment. *La durée* does not abandon itself, but rolls itself into the new *durée* endlessly, the qualities interpenetrating so that at every moment the whole is new. Thus unifying activity is changing its quality all the time by bringing other qualities into itself. We must develop the language which will express continuous *qualitative* change. Those who speak of hierarchy deal with the quantitative rather than the qualitative: they jump from the making to the thing that is made; they measure quantitatively the results of the unifying principle. But what on the other hand are the groups of the pluralists? They are the mere creatures of the unifying and they are helpless. When we understand the principle of unifying taught by the latest psychology and the oldest philosophy, we shall no longer fear the state or deify the state. The state, as state, is not "the supreme object of my allegiance." The supreme object of my allegiance is never a thing, a 'made.' It is the very Process itself to which I give my loyalty and every activity of my life.

We see this error of hierarchy in ethics as well as in political philosophy. We hear there also much of conflicting loyalties, and while the pluralist is satisfied to let them fight or balance, others tell us, surely an equally repugnant idea, that we are to abandon the narrower for the wider loyalty, that we are to sacrifice the lesser for the larger duty. But the man who left his family to go to the Great War did not 'abandon' his allegiance to his

family; he gathered himself and his family into the fullness of the answer he made to the new demand. The most ardent supporters of the League of Nations do not intend to abandon their nation when a difference arises between it and the League; they hope to find the true integration.

It is partly, I realize, a matter of emphasis. A noble passage in a recent book shows us Martin Luther standing on the Scala Santa facing away from the Roman church. I am sufficiently Bergsonian to see Martin Luther with all the richness and strength of the Roman Catholic church so incorporated into his being that he is capable of faith in Self-salvation. It was impossible for that *durée* to be lost, it rolled up and rolled up and created. The absolute impossibility of Martin Luther turning away from the Roman Catholic church is to me one of the splendid truths of life.

To sum up this point of hierarchy. There is no above and below. We cannot schematize men as space objects. The study of community as process will bring us, I believe, not to the over-individual mind, but to the inter-individual mind, an entirely different conception.

If the study of community as process might perhaps lead the monists to abandon the notion of hierarchy, it might give the pluralists another conception of unity. The pluralists are always speaking of the 'reduction to unity.' With many of the pluralists unity is synonymous with uniformity, identity, stagnation. This would be true of a static unity but never of the dynamic unity I am trying to indicate. The urge to unity is not a reduction, a simplification, it is the urge to embrace more and more, it is a reaching out, a seeking, it is the furthest possible conception of pluralism, it is pluralism spiritually not materially conceived. Not the 'reduction' to unity but the expansion towards unity is the social process. That is, the expanding process and the unifying process are the same. The same events have created a Czecho-Slav state and the League of Nations: they are not cause and effect, they are not mere concomitants, they are activities absolutely bound together as one process in the movement of world history. This is enormously significant.

Our alternative is not between Royce's finished Absolute and James's strung-alongness. We create the beyond and beyond and so to be sure produce strung-alongness which, however, exists only as part of the unifying process.

The pluralist loves the apple best when it rots. Then he sees the seeds all scattering and he says, "This is Life, this is Truth." But many men see beyond the rotting apple, the scattering seeds, the fresh upspringings, the cross-fertilizations, to the new whole being created. If, on the other hand, some of the monists have tried to petrify the 'finished' fruit (as in the conception of the absolute state), life has never allowed them to do so.

To put the conception of *unifying* in the place of *unity* might help to bring monists and pluralists nearer together. Spontaneous unifying is the reality for humanity. But is not spontaneous unifying what the pluralists are already urging in their advocacy of groups? And is not spontaneous unifying the heart of a true monism? The activity of the pluralists' entities, the activity which is their only being, should be harmonious adjustment to one another—which is monism a-making.

The practical importance of an understanding of the nature of community can only be indicated, but its influence on our attitude towards present political and industrial problems is very great. We come to see that the vital matter is not methods of representation, as the menders and patchers fondly hope, nor even the division of power, as many of the pluralists tend to think, but *modes of association*. When the political pluralists propose a more decentralized form of government, I am entirely in sympathy with them; but what they propose will surely fail unless we are considering at the same time the modes of association through which we are to act within these different pluralities. The political pluralists are very much concerned with the question whether we need one authority or many. I think our hardest job is not to change the seat of power but to get hold of some actual power. And when we are told that the trade-union should be directly represented in the state, we must remember that we have at present little reason to think that a man will be more

able to contribute his will to the trade-union will than he has been able to contribute it to the national or civic will. Whoever has watched for the last few years the struggle of the younger men to break the Gompers machine will not think that party politics vary greatly in labor organizations and political organizations. It is only through an understanding of the nature of community that we shall see clearly the fallacies involved in the 'consent of the governed': a preëxisting purpose (very insidious today in both industry and politics), a collective will as the will of the like-minded, and the denial of *participation*. One is sometimes a little struck by the Rip van Winklism of the pluralists: consent and balance, believed in a hundred or two years ago, we have now outgrown.

That labor problems should be studied in the light of our conception of community as process is of the utmost importance. We hear much at present of the application of instinct psychology to industry, but this I am sure is full of pitfalls unless we join to it a study of group psychology. Again, if the industrial manager is to get the fruits of scientific management, he must understand the intricate workings of a group. If he is to have good reasons for his opinion as to whether a shop-committee should be composed of workmen alone or of workmen and management, he must study group psychology. It is impossible to work out sound schemes of compulsory compensation or compulsory insurance without understanding the group relations and group responsibility upon which these are based. And so on and so on. The study of community as process is absolutely necessary for the sound development of industry. And if we should have industrial democracy—but democracy is just this, productive interrelatings.

It seems to me that jurisprudence has gone ahead of ethics or political science or economics in an understanding of community, as for instance in the notion of reciprocal relation. It is significant that the fact that the master has a relation to servant as well as servant to master has now general recognition. Moreover, the philosophical jurists see that it is the same process which produces the corporate personality and the social individual who

is fast becoming the unit of law. Our progressive judges seek always the law of the situation, which means in the language of this paper the discovery and formulation of modes of unifying. Upon this point turns all progress for jurisprudence.¹ Less bound by the crowd illusion than the rest of us, and therefore better understanding community as process, jurists are showing us law as endlessly self-creating. I hope they will soon show us explicitly some of the errors involved in a teleological jurisprudence. It would be interesting to examine the decisions of judges to see how often in the case before them they accept a fossil purpose developed in bygone times, and how often, on the other hand, they see the purpose a-growing within the very situation.²

A criticism of pragmatism involved in the conception of community as process may be barely mentioned. The essence of pragmatism, as commonly understood, is testing. But whenever you 'test' you assume a static idea. With a living idea, however, truth may be created. If, for example, you try the pragmatic test and take 'coincident interest,' as between employer and employed, out to find its cash value, you will find it has very little. But coincident interest can be *created* through the process of interrelating: as, for instance, the employer often finds, after his patience has been exhausted in the joint committee, that the further education of the worker is as much to his own interest as to that of the worker. And so on. We are told by a realist that according to pragmatism truth is "a harmony between thought and things." Is it not more 'realistic' to say that thought and things interpenetrate and that this is the creating activity? Rationalists 'verify' within the realm

¹ The importance of this for the development of "group-law" as advocated by the upholders of administrative syndicalism, I have not space to go into, but there are problems here to be worked at jointly by jurists and political scientists.

² Many revaluations are involved in the conception of community as process. The functional theory of causation must be applied to every department of thought. Natural rights take on a new meaning. And the distinction between subjective and objective loses its significance, as it has with the realists through their interpretations of the results of recent biological research where they see the objective, as an integral part of the process of integration, becoming thereby the subjective, and the subjective becoming objective. The importance of this for jurisprudence and political science must be developed at some later time.

of reason. Pragmatists 'test' in the concrete world. The step beyond is to learn to *create* in both.¹

To conclude: I wish to urge in this paper actual group association—the *practice* of community. I am thus in close sympathy with the pluralists because I too believe in the 'nearest' group; but while most of the pluralists believe in the 'nearest' group because they think the personal element gets thinner and thinner the further away you get from it, I believe in it just because I do *not* think this, because I think it is the path to a fuller and richer personality. This idea of the pluralists is I believe infinitely prejudicial to our national life. For the practical harm such a conception can accomplish, witness many of the lectures last winter on the League of Nations. I know of a talk based on this idea given to an audience of working men with the consequence that that particular audience was left with very little interest in the League of Nations. The lecturer with this mistaken sociology and mistaken ethics was trying to urge his audience to rise above personal interests to impersonal considerations. We shouldn't, we don't, we can't. The larger interest must be made personal before it can be made real. That audience ought to have been told, and shown, how a League of Nations would change their own lives in every particular.

We build the real state, the vital and the moral state, by reinforcing actual power with actual power. No state can, forever, *assume* power. The present state has tried to do so and the pluralists have been the irrepressible child to cry out, "The King has on no clothes." But if the pluralists have seen the King, as in the fairy story, clad by the weavers who worked at empty looms, shivering in nakedness while all acclaimed the beauty of the robes of state, many of us do not intend to accept this situation, but believe in the possibility of ourselves weaving, from out our own daily experience, the garments of a genuine state.

Idealism and realism meet in the actual. Some of us care only for the workshop of life, the place where things are *made*. James

¹ I am speaking of course in a general way, not forgetting those pragmatists who do not hold the somewhat crude idea of testing.

says that critical philosophy is sterile in practical results. As far as this is true it is because critical philosophy remains in the concepts it evolves, instead of grasping the activity which produced them and setting it at concrete tasks. We must grip life and control its processes. Conscious achieving is leaping into view as the possibility of all. We are capable of creating a collective will, and at the same time developing an individual spontaneity and freedom hardly conceived of yet, lost as we have been in the herd dream, the imitation lie, and that most fatal of fallacies—the fallacy of ends.

This is the reality for man: the unifying of differings. But the pluralists balk at the unifying. They refuse to sweat and suffer to make a whole. They refuse the supreme effort of life—and the supreme reward. Yet the pluralists lead our thought today because they begin with the nearest group, with the actual. If they will add to this insight the understanding that the job of their actual groups is to carry on that activity by which alone these groups themselves have come into existence—they will have recognized community as process.

M. P. FOLLETT.

THE COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC GROUPS.

THE community must get a living, and in one sense we may say that its economic aspect is as old as its family organization, and older than the political organization in its form of state and nation. None the less, state and nation were the first to take advantage in conspicuous degree of the great principle of coöperation and organization. It is only within the past hundred years that economic groups, whether in the manufacturing or financial or purchasing or industrial field, have gained such power as to come into frequent conflict with the political organization and to force upon the world problems of adjustment comparable to the great controversies between church and state of the Middle Ages, or to wars between different political states. To-day we realize that the control over our lives—what we shall eat, what we shall wear, how we shall occupy ourselves—is far more economic than either political or religious. Our social classes, which have so much to do with our standards of morals and our satisfactions in life, are more economic than military or political, and although an army is still the most impressive manifestation of power, we are made to realize at times that those who control prices or who can shut off the supplies of food and fuel from great cities are really arbiters of our fate.

Two recent examples of political and economic forces in collision will serve to illustrate certain present tendencies and show the background of present problems.

In February, 1917, a writer described the passage of the Adamson Bill as follows: "The elected representatives of 400,000 railroad workers passed an eight-hour law and then went to the President and Congress and demanded that they ratify that law. Congress did not wish to pass the Adamson Bill. . . . 'If you don't,' replied the presidents of the railroad brotherhoods, 'we will tie up the country so tight next Monday morning, that the American people will rend you limb from limb on next election

day.' So the Senate endorsed a bill which had originally been passed by referendum vote of the industrially enfranchised citizenship on the railroads."

The writer then generalizes:

"The American nation is rushing out of political government into industrial government. Congress is losing function after function. Its job is pretty nearly done. Its place is being taken by the industrial experts of the various commissions. We now have national commissions for railroads, for interstate corporations control, for shipping and for the tariff. Add a half dozen national commissions for six more big industries and the Congressmen at Washington will sit around and draw their salaries for sucking their thumbs. The old state lines and district lines are fading. The industries are the new states of our nation."

On the other hand, in the same year of 1917, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, *Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. vs. Mitchell*, and *Eagle Glass and Manufacturing Co. vs. Rowe*, enjoined the officers of the United Mine Workers of America from attempting to unionize a mine without the consent of the plaintiff. The mine owners had required the employees to sign a card agreeing not to belong to the Union while in the employ of the company. The injunction prohibits in substance, according to a careful analysis by Professor Cook, of the Yale Law School: "(1) inducing plaintiff's employees to break their contracts of service; (2) inducing by any means plaintiff's employees to leave, even though by their contracts of employment they are privileged to leave at any time; (3) persuading persons 'who might become employees' of the plaintiff not to do so by representing to them that they are 'likely to suffer some loss or trouble' if they do because of the non-union character of the plaintiff's mine." On the face of it, this would tend to estop any attempts at unionizing any employees of a non-union firm or any persons who might become employees, although it may be confessed that this last clause would be very difficult of enforcement on account of its very indefinite application.

Here, then, on the one hand, it is affirmed that political power

is waning and the real power passing into the hands of an industrial organization; on the other hand, the courts are interfering with the activities of labor unions in a more drastic manner than ever before.

Another illustration of the crossing of political and economic forces may be found in our recent graded income tax. Undertaken primarily as a war-time necessity, it has within it the possibilities of profound social and economic changes. It is already compelling a great estate in Chicago to dispose of its real estate holdings, which under it yield a net income of only one and one-half per cent.

Or again, political democracy as advocated and represented by President Wilson, it is alleged, represents an outgrown condition. The real contest is between an imperialism which backs economic expansion with political power and a soviet democracy which subordinates political lines to economic class interest, and practically abolishes the older political order.

Such conflicts as these, nominally between political and economic forces, are at bottom, of course, contests between different groups. They reflect class-consciousness. They express in varying degree the interests and demands for power, wealth, prestige, liberty, justice, which in part give rise to our institutions and in part are evoked by these institutions. A group like that of the English aristocracy, formed originally on a military basis, perpetuating itself as a governing and land-owning group, and reënforced still further by the dignity and social status of an established church and its universities, makes an almost impregnable organization. Nominally surpassed in financial power by a middle class, it really maintains its dominance essentially unimpaired, since its social prestige enables it to take over from time to time sufficient wealth and ability to renew its strength without in any way giving up its class-consciousness. Only a labor group which does not aspire to be adopted into the gentry seems likely to put up a real opposition. The older contest between tory and liberal is now apparently breaking down just because the class distinction between gentry and middle class is not fixed deeply enough.

Whether now the labor group which represents so different a type will work through Parliament or through direct action seems rather a matter of strategy. Whether it seeks to lower the price of commodities by political measures of tariffs, nationalization of coal mines and transportation, or by economic measures such as coöperative stores, whether it seeks to redistribute wealth by graded taxation or by forced levies in the form of strikes—this is less significant for the philosophy of society than the ends that are sought and the evolution of character that is taking place.

In America conditions have given a different framework. The colonists were largely outside the established church. The influence of the frontier and of the small farm tended to efface the social distinctions of the older sort which came across the ocean. Only in certain large plantations in the South and commercial cities on the coast were there tendencies making toward class distinction. Interests and ambitions were at first of corresponding character. Security against want was gained by the ownership of a farm. When practically everyone owned a farm, a man was relatively independent of economic control by others. Little money was used. Wants and satisfactions were alike few and simple. The chief danger to one's economic welfare, aside from the uncertainty of crops, was the taxing power of the government. Property was thought of chiefly as a right needing protection by the government from violence and needing protection from the government by constitutional guaranties. In the consciousness of the American people as a whole during the early years of the republic, 'liberty' was the word that stood foremost and highest, and liberty meant chiefly the civil and religious liberty won against Crown and Bishop. Property was for the many a means of security against want, not a provision for luxuries, to say nothing of being a power over the lives of others. There was no labor group. Perhaps the nearest approach to class division was that into debtors and creditors, which was disclosed by a Shays Rebellion, and the discussion of the Constitution.

A change came with the development of the cotton industry.

One form of property—namely, property in slaves—changed its status from that of a relatively domestic and private affair to that of a commercial and political power. But direct action was even then not unknown. The necessity of cotton for English factories was counted upon to decide the contest between South and North.

After the Civil War, wealth gained through manufacturing assumed the position of power previously held by the cotton group. It dictated tariffs and was in a position to change the *mores* of a great part of the population of the country. Sumner, in his *Folkways*, says: "Amongst ourselves now, in politics, finance, and industry, we see the man-who-can-do-things elevated to a social hero whose success overrides all other considerations." The enormous power gained through modern methods of production and organization naturally called out jealousies and antagonisms. The shippers and small merchants and farmers sought to check monopoly and regulate prices, and government responded with the Sherman Act and the doctrine of property affected by public interest. The Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act continue this line of control. The labor groups, however, have preferred for the most part to pursue their own way through organization and collective bargaining rather than through politics. Heretofore the objective has been chiefly a larger share in the productive income of industry. A minority has urged political action, but thus far unsuccessfully. At present an increased share in power as well as in profits is demanded by the labor group. The first step is recognition of the union. The next stage is usually a demand for some control over actual conditions in the shops. The third step, which only the more radical are at present disposed to take, is that of participation in the management, and implied in this, in greater or less degree, is the abolition of the wage system. As a radical writer puts it: "the policy of the leaders of the labor movement has been to abolish poverty as the means for abolishing slavery. Now it is seen that this is to proceed wrong end first. The way to the abolition of poverty lies through the abolition of slavery." Stated less dramatically, this would

mean: labor cannot succeed in getting what it wants except by the control of industry. For now the day of 'property for power'—to use Hobhouse's phrase—as contrasted with property for use or property for security, has come.

The emergence of these great economic forces and the enormous increase in quantity and variety of goods produced have doubtless operated to shift the attention of men from such older political objectives as liberty to more economic objectives, such as comforts and luxuries. Justice means not so much equality before the law as a fair share in distribution. This does not necessarily mean materialism. No people ever spent so lavishly for education. And in the great crisis just past, we were ready to sacrifice possessions and life. But it does mean that in the ordinary course of the day's work, both economic ends and economic powers play relatively a greater rôle in the community life; political and, one may add, religious ends and power, relatively less.

How far is this shift likely to go, and what are the relative merits and demerits of the political power and method and ideals as compared with the economic power and method and ideals? The political organization, starting with military force, characterized at first by sharp class divisions, dominance, and autocracy, has tended in the direction of equality of rights; that is, the recognition of the worth of every human individual. It has worked out a protection of the individual against arbitrary use of power. It has devised methods of securing responsibility from the immediate agents of rule and of giving to all people a considerable degree of responsibility by the use of the power that they wield. Economic power has succeeded in maintaining the incentive of competition and rivalry in a less bloody form than that of wars. It has on the whole stimulated activity more successfully and carried out a great measure of that coöperation which Professor Jenks regards as "the cardinal fact in the history of civilization." But on the other hand, at present economic power is in the hands of a very small minority. According to King's estimates, the richest two per cent of the people own considerably more property than all the rest of the popula-

tion, alike in Prussia, France, the United Kingdom, and Wisconsin, which may be regarded as typical for the United States. The public can, to a certain degree, resist by direct action the taxes levied by economic power; that is, it can refuse to buy when prices are raised too high. But this is a remedy that cuts both ways when the necessities of life are concerned. Or again, if we look at the economic power exercised by the organized labor groups, which is immediately directed against employers but really involves the great group of consumers,—the great strike in the anthracite coal industry which gave four millions of increased wages to the miners, levied about thirteen millions upon consumers in the increased cost of coal—it may fairly be said that although political legislation, when decided ultimately not by reason but by majority vote, is based on force, economic 'legislation' is even more definitely based upon force and in this case upon minority rather than majority rule. And further, whereas political legislation is theoretically at least for the public interest, economic action is professedly for special groups and without regard to whether this group is already richer or poorer, better or worse paid than other groups; the decisive consideration is: Which groups have greater bargaining power?

What are the lines of development which on the one hand seem most probable and on the other promise most for the welfare of the community, for its progress and its ideals?

1. Society might proceed by extending its political organization, either negatively in the way of restricting economic inequality and violence growing out of it, or positively in the way of taking over economic functions, as in state socialism. The objections which have been raised against this in the past have more often taken the form of criticism upon the unintelligent, unprogressive character of political organization. It is weak in invention and in selection. An objection which is now coming to be urged more is that a political organization does not recognize the rights of many specific groups or classes. It is claimed that state socialism is conceived rather in the interest of consumers than of producers. In the laboring class itself, there is violent opposition to what is called 'state-ism,' as against socialism. The

logic of representative government is against the recognition of specific groups. Does it not in this go too far toward uniformitarianism? May not the functional group have a larger part to play in our community life than it has played hitherto? And is not the remedy against objectionable class-consciousness to be found not in ignoring such groups but in recognizing them and defining their position? Certain it is that a representative government which works out in such form as to give us not only judicial but legislative bodies that are composed almost exclusively of lawyers suggests the need of some sort of readjustment.

2. The opposite method, which is confessedly a class solution, is that of syndicalism, which abandons the general community for the economic group as the important organization. Such an organization undoubtedly will look after the welfare of its own class, but makes little if any provision for adjustment between classes except on the basis of economic power. And this is really to abandon justice as an ideal. It would doubtless cultivate responsibility within the group but is weak in developing responsibility to the public as a whole.

3. A third method, which would aim to secure certain of the advantages of both the political and the economic process, is that of giving to economic groups considerable functions as committees for certain purposes and holding them responsible for their results within their field. There can be no question, for example, that for working out certain economic problems of relations between capital and labor, neither Congress nor the courts are fitted by training or by the system of ideas within which they habitually move. I have been brought into contact with certain labor groups who have for eight years maintained an agreement with their employers which includes provisions for negotiation; *i.e.*, new legislation, for settlement of particular cases, and for the formulation of principles of adjustment to meet changing conditions. I have been impressed with their distrust of the legal and even of the judicial attitude. They claim that the all-important thing is to foster in all concerned a constructive attitude which shall face new problems and

difficulties with a view to keep the agreement vital. Strong organizations which can control their members, and on the other hand a spirit of appeal to reason rather than to force, are the most hopeful means of avoiding clashes and securing that harmony which is necessary for the community.

The political ideal of liberty which Bertrand Russell would set foremost is no doubt an imperishable ideal, but it is not the only value. One may question even whether it is the chief value. Coöperation, responsibility, justice, are all of them values which the community must secure. The new powers, the complex interests, the enlarged satisfactions, which the economic process has introduced, need to be adjusted to the older conceptions of responsibility, justice, and democracy. And conversely, the older conceptions of liberty and equality need to be enlarged by the constructive attitude of the inventor, by the flexibility fostered by economic processes, and by the differences in interests and values which occupational and economic groupings bring about. And thus adjusted, they will continue, we may hope, to give new range to human personality and to the life in common.

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DISCUSSION.

THE NEW RATIONALISM AND OBJECTIVE IDEALISM.

IN *The New Rationalism* Professor Spaulding presents a serious, systematic and impressive formulation of 'neo-realism' as he conceives it, a pluralistic conception of the universe as a totality of 'externally' related entities, of which very many are non-mental. This conception of the universe is reached by way of a critical examination and elimination of the chief anti-realistic systems. Spaulding contends, indeed, that all philosophical systems, saving only neo-realism, must be rejected as inherently self-contradictory. "Phenomenalism," conceived after the Kantian fashion, contradicts itself since, on the one hand, it explicitly teaches that ultimate reality is unknowable while, on the other hand, it implicitly assumes that "the facts about knowing can be known as they really are."¹ Pragmatism claims truth as "relative and shifting" but none the less presupposes "that this claim is itself an absolute and permanent and not a relative . . . truth."² Naturalism which sets out to acknowledge empirically discovered facts wholly ignores "cognitive emotional and volitional processes." Positivism, on the other hand (and by this term Spaulding means Humian idealism), so far from ignoring mental reality, holds that only impressions and ideas exist.³ But positivism contradicts itself in that it can not define these impressions and ideas except in terms of the selves and physical objects whose existence it denies.⁴

There remain non-Humian, or 'personal' idealism (to which Spaulding always refers as 'subjective' idealism) and numerical monism or Absolutism.⁵ Both doctrines must successfully be eliminated if the argument for pluralistic realism is to be valid. Both are combined in the system called by Spaulding 'objective idealism,' the doctrine that the universe consists in One Being, mental or spiritual in nature. To the refutation of this doctrine the greater number of Spaulding's

¹ *The New Rationalism*, p. 227. (Page-references not otherwise designated are to this book, but Spaulding's self-defeating italics are, for the most part, not reproduced.)

² P. 75. Cf. pp. 297, 299, 398 f.

³ Cf. p. 243³ *et al.*

⁴ P. 244².

⁵ Cf. note on page 602, below.

critical pages are devoted. The purpose of this paper is to summarize and to comment on this attempted refutation. Non-Humian idealism holds that the world is through and through mental, but teaches (in opposition to positivism) that mental entities are ultimately personal—that the universe is made up of egos, knowers, or selves and their 'mental processes' or experiences. Spaulding objects to both parts of the doctrine. (1) Against the idealistic position that objects are mental he urges that known objects are independent of being known. To establish this position he recognizes that the realist must meet the egocentric predicament, the fact that "the only world which we can 'get at' [is] one that is related to our knowing or to our experiencing."¹ The realistic solution of the predicament seems to him simple. To be sure, the ego or knowing cannot be "experimentally" removed from any situation; but by analysis *in situ* (Spaulding's term for abstracting attention) knowing may be ideally eliminated.² It can be shown moreover that the knowing thus ideally eliminable makes no difference to the world that we know.³ For the idealist, like every philosopher, "presupposes" that his solution of the problem of knowing is "not causally dependent upon being known either by himself or by any one else."⁴ In other words, idealism is presupposed to be the 'genuine' state of affairs and as such "independent not only of the specific knowing and experiencing process in the knowing individuals who maintain it, but also of . . . knowing in other individuals."⁵ And in thus presupposing an object (namely the theory of idealism) which is true independently of being known by any one in particular, idealism is virtually adopting the absolutistic theory of truth—in other words it is unwittingly admitting the realistic contention that some objects at least are independent of knowledge and accordingly non-mental.

(2) Intertwined with this, his emphasized argument against what he calls subjective idealism, is Spaulding's criticism of the non-Humian idealist's conception of the self or knower. Such a knower or self, he holds, would have to be identical with the Aristotelian "substance-like, unitary ego," conceived "after the analogy of a physical thing with only the difference that the substratum here is regarded as spiritual instead of as material."⁶ Now a thing-like substance, what-

¹ P. 81¹. Cf. pp. 219 ff., 322¹.

² P. 210² *et al.*

³ P. 211²⁻³. Cf. p. 315.

⁴ P. 212¹.

⁵ P. 84⁴. Cf. pp. 211 ff., 313 ff., 367 ff.

⁶ P. 33¹. Cf. pp. 243¹, 326³.

ever else it is, is causally related to other entities—in other words, it alters or modifies them. An ego, therefore, if it exists, must modify the objects related to it. But the specific relation of an ego to objects can be no other than its consciousness or knowledge of them; and the realist has argued that objects are independent of—unmodified by—being known. Obviously, therefore, the realist concludes, if knowledge does not modify its objects there can be no modifying or causal ego.

It will be convenient to comment on these arguments in reverse order and to protest at once that the argument just stated is based on an arbitrary misconception of the knower, or self. For though the self, or I, has indeed too often been confused with a 'thing-like causal entity' (the soul), this misconception is quite unwarrantably foisted on the idealist. This statement must be stressed. For by self is meant simply the conscious being, whatever one's conception of the nature of consciousness; and such a self, the idealist insists—the self as a complex, unique, persistent and yet changing conscious being—is either discovered or presupposed by every philosophic system not excepting realism.¹ This contention is, in truth, well borne out by Spaulding's own procedure. He sets forth, to be sure, a theory of consciousness as 'linear series' or 'dimension' of conscious processes—a conception, it may be noted, which is in essence indistinguishable from the positivism which he has so effectively criticized.² But he states the theory with hesitation³ and offers no argument save a bare analogy: sensational and other sorts of conscious elements, he argues, might conceivably be related to each other as are the members of a series, without thereby losing their characteristic mental quality.⁴ But in the face of this doctrine of the nature of consciousness Spaulding throughout assumes the existence of the concrete self—the 'I' or

¹ It is irrelevant to our present purpose either to discuss non-causal idealistic theories of knowledge or to point out that idealists sometimes conceive the self as 'causal' with a meaning quite foreign to that which Spaulding usually gives to the term but closely similar to that of his 'non-causal efficiencies' (pp. 442 ff.). Schaub has already suggested (*This Review*, 1919, p. 415) that by this doctrine Spaulding seems to yield all that the causal theory of consciousness has ever claimed.

² Cf. pp. 243 ff.

³ Cf. p. 471, toward the end: "It would not be surprising if consciousness were included in this class of dimensional entities." It must be admitted, however, that familiarity with the hypothesis seems to breed certainty for before long (p. 478) we meet with the unqualified assertion that "any specific consciousness is a qualitatively distinct dimension in the universe."

⁴ Cf. pp. 484 ff. For Spaulding's criticism of argument from analogy cf. pp. 152 ff.

the 'you'—not only by numberless more or less incidental allusions¹ but in passages whose meaning turns upon the assumption of such a self. Thus, he says explicitly that "there are processes of self-perception;"² he asserts that "in acts of will we discover a push . . . against our better nature or against our appetites;"³ and, even more significantly, he founds his argument against positivism on the distinction, quite impossible on a dimensional theory of consciousness, between the 'I' and the 'you.'⁴

This criticism, however, of Spaulding's argument against the conceivableness of the ego, still leaves on our hands his more formidable argument against idealism. For to Spaulding, whatever might prove to be the nature of knower or of knowledge (of self or of consciousness), the known object still would exist, independent of both, by virtue of the realistic solution of the egocentric predicament. This solution it will be remembered first seeks to eliminate the ego by an analysis *in situ* and then argues that the user of the egocentric predicament contradicts himself by presupposing a true state of affairs. In comment on this argument, it should be observed that the analysis *in situ* is not only rather naïvely claimed as peculiar to "the new logic" and kindred disciplines⁵ but is also mainly irrelevant to the reasoning. For one may 'ideally eliminate' almost any obstinately existing object or quality by an effort of abstracting attention, without thereby annihilating it. One may be said, for example, to eliminate the color of a fabric when one is examining its texture, but the fabric keeps on being green or blue as well as smooth or rough. And similarly, though one may ideally eliminate the self when discussing the thing; yet the thing may none the less keep on being an object analyzed (perhaps even constituted) by a self or selves. The only significant part, therefore, of the realistic solution of the egocentric predicament is the assertion that subjective idealism, in asseverating its own truth, presupposes a distinction between true and false and therefore a more-than-subjective reality. But it is at once evident that this argument is effective not at all against idealism in general, but against subjectivism (in the sense of relativity). From the fact that the known object is "independent of the specific knowing process" does not follow the

¹ Cf., for example, the following passages among many others: pp. 72⁴, 100¹, 113², 124³, 207³, 238¹, 295¹, 318³, 393, 404³.

² P. 98².

³ P. 336¹.

⁴ Cf. p. 245³ f. "I, if I am a positivist," Spaulding says, "offer the doctrine to you."

⁵ Cf. pp. 158², 367¹ *et al.*

conclusion that it is on that account non-mental. For, as Spaulding admits,¹ numerically monistic idealism, the doctrine of the Absolute Self, unites idealism with an absolutistic doctrine of truth, since it defines truth in terms of the Absolute's consciousness. Unless then Spaulding succeeds in his arguments—presently to be discussed—against objective, or monistic idealism, his realistic solution of the egocentric predicament, though it effectively combats relativism, does not prevail against idealism.

We are thus led at last to the consideration of Spaulding's criticism of numerically monistic idealism, that is of Absolutism in the ontological sense of the term.² For, as the preceding paragraphs have shown, the very core of his argument for realism is his solution of the egocentric predicament; and this solution consists simply in the demonstration that subjective idealism really presupposes absolute truth, becoming thus a self-contradictory system. But the objective idealist claims that absolute truth is conceivable in terms of his theory and it is therefore imperative for Spaulding, not only as pluralist but as realist, to disprove this numerically monistic doctrine. As he conceives it, objective idealism is the doctrine that an Absolute Unity, spiritual or mental in nature, "underlies" the many entities empirically known to exist and "mediates" their relationship.³ Spaulding finds three main objections to this doctrine; of which the most important is the first: (1) There is, he insists, palpable self contradiction in the conception of an underlying unity as mediating the relations of the many individuals which are its parts. "Such a unity," he says, "is really never reached, since, as mediating the relation between the terms which lie above it, it is *related* to those terms and therefore presupposes *still another* mediating unity and so on in an infinite series."⁴ (2) The second criticism is a corollary of the first. If once it be admitted that a unitary being can not, without self-contradiction, be conceived as 'including' its parts it

¹ Cf. p. 351³.

² Spaulding makes use of the term 'The Absolute' in this ontological sense but uses 'absolutism' epistemologically to designate the non-relativistic conception of truth.

³ Pp. 317 ff. esp. 322⁴ ff.

⁴ P. 198¹. Cf. p. 180², where Spaulding insists that the underlying unitary reality (which he designates by the symbol, *U*) "as the mediator of the original relation . . . is related not only to *a*, *b* [its terms] and *R* [the relation between them] but also to the complex *aRb*, so that again, by the original assumption, there is required still another *U* to mediate *this* relation and so on, in an infinite regress. . . . Therefore *U* is only a member of a series and not such an all-including and all-mediating *U*" as is sought." Cf. also p. 185³.

follows, as Spaulding holds, that such an entity, if it exists, must be "absolutely simple, since, if it is not, it consists of parts, and thus repeats the very problem, as regards the relation of these parts, which it is supposed to solve."¹ But obviously an elementally simple being is no Absolute *One*. Finally (3) Spaulding reiterates, there is no observed instance of a unitary being. "Strictly empirical procedure," he says, "discloses not a single instance of a one 'something' . . . that mediates the relation between two or more terms."²

These objections may once more best be considered in reverse order. (1) In opposition to the realist, the objective idealist insists—or may insist—that empirical procedure does disclose an instance of a "one something that mediates relations" or more accurately stated, of a "one something that relates."³ This is the self (or I, or ego) of every one of us, the realist included, a unitary being which (to say the least) relates its own experiences. This relating self, the idealist continues, is as truly a directly observed, an empirically discovered fact as any one of the physical facts "such as tables and books, batteries and bombs" which, according to Spaulding "the physical sciences" and "common sense accept."⁴ In other words, as directly as observation discloses, for example, the existence of falling bodies,⁵ it discloses also the existence of classifying, remembering, and purposing selves, that is to say of beings who unify distinct experiences (and objects) and who unify present with past. (2) The closer study of this unitary being, the self, provides also one answer to Spaulding's second objection. He contends that a being which mediates relations must be elementally simple. But the idealist points to the empirically discovered self as instance of a relating yet complex entity, 'ideally' analyzable indeed, yet incapable of reduction to elements. Within the self it is thus possible to distinguish many aspects, attitudes, processes; but this analysis *in situ*, this *distinctio rationis*, this attentive absorption in one or other aspect of the self does not, as already argued,⁶ imply the separate existence of any one

¹ P. 198¹.

² P. 181². As possible instance of such a 'something,' Spaulding suggests the concept. (Cf. p. 188³.) His refutation of this possibility is so closely bound up with his treatment, here irrelevant, of the 'objective concept' that it can not expediently be considered.

³ Cf. the next paragraph for comment on the use of the term 'relates' in place of Spaulding's phrase: "mediates relations."

⁴ P. 445⁴.

⁵ P. 491⁵.

⁶ Cf. page 601, above. On the conception of being, or entity, which is unitary without being simple cf. L. W. Stern, *Person und Sache*, pp. 78, 163¹ et al.

of them. Up to this point the objective idealist, in his reply to the realist, has been insisting on an ignored fact—the self. There is no instance, the realist has asserted, of a unitary being; the idealist points to the self. Every complex being must reduce to elements, the realist has argued; the idealist confutes this argued conclusion by the observed instance of an irreducible complex, the self. But these are, after all, supplementary considerations which do not affect the fundamental argument of Spaulding in opposition to numerical monism: (3) The Absolute, he has argued, would of necessity underlie its members and mediate their relation. But no being, complex or simple, can underlie its parts and mediate their relation since such mediation presupposes an infinite series of relations between mediating and mediated terms. This statement, over and over again repeated,¹ constitutes, it must once more be insisted, the central position of *The New Rationalism*. The argument is fundamental, as has now so often been pointed out, not only to the pluralistic but to the realistic part of the system since the realistic solution of the egocentric predicament is contingent on the disproof of objective idealism. In a word the whole argument of *The New Rationalism* pivots at precisely this crucially significant point. It is accordingly startling to discover that Spaulding's specific argument is not directed at all against objective, or monistic, idealism but against an extraordinary travesty of the theory. He conceives objective idealism as the doctrine of a One, or "extra-entity that mediates the relations between other entities;"² and he has no difficulty in showing that such an 'extra-entity,' so far from being absolute, itself turns out to be a member of an infinite series. But this conclusion is the inevitable outcome of an obvious *petitio principii*. The supposedly 'underlying one,' whose self-contradiction is so triumphantly shown up, has never really been conceived as either absolute or as underlying. For when anything is thought as an extra-entity it is not thought as absolute or all-including; and when anything is conceived as mediating relations, then the relations are thought of as existing outside it. In a word, Spaulding makes his point against objective idealism only by stating the doctrine so that it presupposes the existence of many entities externally related. The truly monistic conception, on the other hand, is that of a being which, so far from mediating the relations of entities outside itself relates, or unifies, its own members. And if it be objected that this is an arbitrarily conceived, a fictitious conception, the monistic personalist points once more to the empirically observed self, the unifier not only

¹ Cf. pp. 180 ff., 187 ff., 332 ff.

² P. 185^a.

of its manifold experiences, of its past and its present but of the physical and social world which it systematizes and orders.

It may profitably be noted, in conclusion, that the objective idealist finds in Spaulding's illuminating doctrine of "the whole which has characteristics qualitatively different from the characteristics of the parts"¹ a conception readily adapted to the description of the self, whether partial or absolute. According to the personalist, *relating* is, in truth, a specific characteristic of those fundamentally real 'wholes,' or complex entities, known as selves, or egos. *Relations*, on the other hand, are cases of relating (relatings) when regarded, for practical or methodological purposes, *as if* independent of the self or selves whom they characterize.² Thus conceived, as readily as if they were 'external,' relations may in truth become subject matter of the 'new logic.'

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REJOINDER.

THE editor having given me the opportunity of examining Miss Calkins's manuscript, I offer the following comments and questions. In my reply I shall refer by number to Miss Calkins's successive paragraphs.

I. I do not say (*The New Rationalism*, p. 244) that "positivism contradicts itself in that it can not define impressions and ideas except in terms of the selves and physical objects whose existence it denies." The contradiction consists, rather, in denying, and yet in using, universals.

II. The justification of my recognizing only two major types of idealism, namely, subjective and objective, and of my placing Miss Calkins's peculiar type under the second of these, is to be found in her own statement, *Persistent Problems*, (pp. 418-90), that "Ultimate reality is an absolute . . . the universe is self." If there is a third type that is coördinate with these two, and not either a species or a composite of the two, I shall be pleased to have such a type defined.

2. I do not deny, as Miss Calkins seemingly would have me, personalities, but I do deny that all mental entities are personal. Personality—for me—is a specific organization of mental entities. I should say that there is empirical evidence of the presence of mental processes and the absence of personality (*a*) in many lower organisms,

¹ Pp. 447 ff., 501 ff.

² Cf. L. W. Stern, *Person und Sache*, pp. 147 f., 167 f., 346 ff. Cf. also Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre*, Bd. I., p. 80, as paraphrased by Schweitzer, *Journal of Philosophy*, 1916, 13, p. 331.

and (b) in hypnotized human beings. I would ask Miss Calkins, then, for the evidence or the proof that all mental processes are *ipso facto* personal.

3. Miss Calkins recognizes, tacitly at least, that her idealism is based on what she regards as the insolubility of the egocentric predicament. For she maintains that the self, either finite or absolute, or both, can not, as relater, be eliminated in any way from a related universe. I, however, maintain that this predicament (so-called) can be solved by an "analysis *in situ*," and by "virtual elimination." Miss Calkins's reply to this, both here and in paragraph 5, is that "analysis *in situ*" is merely "abstracting attention."

That there is such a thing as "abstracting attention" I do not deny, but that there is much more in the method of "virtual elimination" and "analysis *in situ*" than "abstracting attention" can be shown by an examination of any number of instances of scientific investigation. As an example of these methods, in addition to the many examples given in *The New Rationalism*, I may cite the work of the chemist who is making "determinations by weight." In such determinations the chemist can not experimentally eliminate the chemical composition of the substances he is examining, *i.e.*, he must leave the composition *in situ* with the mass from the beginning to the end of the reaction. Yet he finds, as a matter not of "abstracting attention" but of the logical structure of the processes with which he is dealing, that the mass (or masses) is logically independent of the changing chemical composition. This fact is formulated in "The Principle of the Conservation of Mass." The result is, that the chemical composition, though always present, is "virtually eliminated." It accordingly becomes possible on this basis to unify the various phenomena of *e.g.*, gases, and to bring under a single point of view the varying phenomena of temperature, pressure, volume and dissociation.

Such a method is, now, radically different from "abstracting attention," with which Miss Calkins very erroneously identifies it, and a good part of exact scientific results are obtained by its use. Accordingly the philosopher who has not learned to use this method is not in a position to say whether certain philosophical problems are soluble or not. Indeed, in this connection I should like to ask Miss Calkins, where in *traditional* philosophy and logic she can find, as she insinuates she can, the methods of "virtual elimination" and "analysis *in situ*," the discovery of functional relations, as scientifically defined, and the like. As an example of Miss Calkins's lack of

conversance with this field I may cite her own note to the effect that a "functional relation" subsists between "simples," and that "simples" must be functionally related.

III. I am glad to have Miss Calkins acknowledge that "the idealist may well believe, quite as firmly as the realist believes, that knowledge is non-causal, and that the knower does not or need not cause (alter, modify, or create,) the object of his knowledge," but I would ask her to render this acknowledgment consistent with her later statement (Paragraph VII) that "the idealist insists" that there is a "one something that relates," namely, "the self." For if this does not mean that the relations are caused, or at least created, by the knower or the self, then I ask, What does it mean?

2. I grant that knowing and consciousness and also a knower of some kind are presupposed by realism as well as by every other philosophical system that is a *known* system. Yet to say this is to assert only a tautology. But to insist that this proposition means or implies that the system which is known—*i.e.*, the system of related entities—be these propositions or something else—is dependent, as regards either terms or relations, or both, upon being known, or upon a self, is to assume idealism, and not to prove it. And no proof of such a position stands unimpeachable until the methods of "analysis *in situ*" and of "virtual elimination" have been used in order to ascertain whether or not the relations and terms, one or both, are dependent or not upon knowing or a knower.

But I am quite willing to grant, with Miss Calkins, that there are selves, knowers, and that there is knowing and consciousness. But the questions then remain: What is the nature of the knower, the self? and, What is consciousness?

To consider the former question, I find that Miss Calkins identifies, in her article, the "knower" with the "self," and then in various paragraphs defines the self as "a being" that is (1) "complex," (2) "unique," (3) "persistent," (4) "changing," (5) "conscious," (6) "unitary" (7) "classifying, remembering and purposing, *i.e.*, unifying," (8) "relating," (9) "ideally analyzable, yet incapable of reduction to elements," and, (10) unifying of "its own members." Perhaps I have left out some of the characteristics that Miss Calkins finds, but the above list is sufficient to show that the self must be admitted by her to be at least "complex." Such a list is also sufficient to arouse perhaps a feeling of dismay. For until one can find, in idealistic literature or elsewhere, fairly precise definitions of these several characteristics, one can only feel that, through mere logomachy, the

way is open to make the self do or be almost anything that one may wish.

However, with Miss Calkins's list before me, I should like to ask her to answer the following questions:

1. If the self is "complex" and also "unitary," then to what type of unitary complex does it belong? I have specified several of the types in *The New Rationalism*, Ch. XXVII, but if I have omitted some types, then
2. What are such types, and
3. To which ones of the completed list does the self belong?
4. Are there, however, unities that are not unitary complexes, and, if there are, what are they?
5. If there are such unities, what differentiates them, and to which type or types does the self belong?
6. If, however, the self is unique in that it belongs to no type either of unitary complex or of unity, then, What are the differentia of this uniqueness? If the uniqueness is said to consist in the fact that the self is a unity constituted by, or arising through, its unifying of "its own members," then
7. Is the self (a) one or more of the relations between "its own members," or (b) is it "its own members" as unified or related (Miss Calkins identifies the two) by itself, or, (c), is it something other than, and numerically distinct from, a self as defined in (a) or (b)? If the reply to this last question be affirmative, then is this self which is something other than the self as defined in (a) and (b), itself complex? And, if it is, then, since the parts of this complex self are in turn *related*, is, or is not, still another self implied to give this preceding self its peculiar complex character—the result being an infinite series of selves with no final member? Or, if the answer to the question be that this "other, relating self" is not complex, but simple, so that it does not in turn need another self to relate its parts, then does not this result stand in contradiction with Miss Calkins's statement that the self is "complex"?
8. However, if the self is complex, as Miss Calkins insists, may it not have at least constituents, if not "elements," and may not these constituents in turn have constituents? If this is asserted, then,
9. What are these constituents, and in turn the constituents of these constituents and so on? Or if there are certain constituents that in turn have no constituents, then,

10. Are not such constituents "elements," so that the self is, after all, "reducible to elements"?
11. If the self does "relate" or "unify its own members," then to which of the many well-known types of relations do the relations thus established belong? And to which of the several types of "being one's own" that are recognized, in, e.g., law, economics, ethics and psychology, does the special instance of the "self's own members" belong, or
12. If this special instance is asserted to be unique in the sense that *everything* is the "self's own members," then is not idealism merely asserted and not proved? Or if the position is capable of proof, then,
13. Just what are the basic premises, and the successive steps, syllogistic and otherwise, that constitute the proof?
14. If the self, whatever else it may be, is "a being that relates or unifies its own members" (Paragraph VII), then is, or is not, "being its own member" a relation between the self and the members? If it is not, *what is it?* And if it is, does the self (one term in the relation) establish this particular relation or not? If it does not, then to what is such a relation due? Or must it be admitted that there is at least one relation that is not the product of the self? And if there is one such relation, may there not be others? Or if, in order to escape these difficulties in which the assumption of a *complex self that relates* is involved, it be maintained that a relating self is not complex, but simple, then does such a self stand in any relation to the parts that it relates, and if it does, to what self is this specific relation due?
15. Just what is it, on a dimensional theory of consciousness, that makes impossible the distinction between the "I" and the "you"? (Cf. Miss Calkins's fourth paragraph.)

V. Where in *The New Rationalism* do I state that "from the fact that the known object is independent of the specific knowing process," it follows that "on that account" the object is "non-mental"? What I do say is, that the object *may* be non-mental.

VI. I do not, contrary to what Miss Calkins asserts, deny that there are observable instances of unitary beings, since, for me, almost everything is unitary in the sense that it is an organized whole. But I do deny, as Miss Calkins states, that, "strictly empirical procedure" discloses . . . a single instance of an absolutely numerically simple being, unless this be a relation, that relates terms.

Miss Calkins can not consistently cite (Paragraph VII) the self, ego, or knower as such a being, since by her own definition the self is complex.

If, however, the position be taken, as Miss Calkins takes it, that the self does not "mediate" relations, but relates, then the self is either the relation or the relater—the second possibility being Miss Calkins's position. But since this relater is also by her own definition complex, the problem arises, whether or not the self "generates" those relations that are involved in its own complexity, as well as relates "its own members" to itself and to one another. And if it is held to perform any or all of these remarkable functions, then it is fair to ask for a description of such a remarkable process, or whatever else one may prefer to call it, in language that is free from equivocation and the inaccuracies of figures of speech.

VII. Even if one grant, then, as one may, that empirical procedure discloses the self as a unitary yet also complex being, this admission does not preclude the possibility of ascertaining in due time the precise character of such complexity. And even if it be also admitted that such a self relates, this does not demand, as we have seen above, the further admission that all relatedness is due to such a self, since the self's own relatedness is not so due, but is just *given*, as logically prior to other relatedness. Accordingly it may well be that no relatedness is due to such a self,—in fact that the self does not even relate its "own experiences," but that these just *are* related . . . by relations. Indeed the self as a complex may be just these experiences as related in various specific ways, and so may itself be their "product" rather than conversely. In fact, to join issue with Miss Calkins as sharply as possible on this point, I would ask her to name a single relation between "experiences" that is not already present before a self relates, and that is, therefore, clearly the "product" of a relating self. The two examples which she does give, namely, those of a self that unifies "distinct experiences" and unifies "present with past" are not satisfactory. For, on the one hand, the question remains as to just how "distinct experiences" are unified, *i.e.*, related, over and above what they are as "distinct," *i.e.*, as also either similar or dissimilar, earlier and later, and the like; and, on the other hand, it would seem that "past and present" are already related in a specific way, namely, asymmetrically—as past and present—quite independently of any further relations that might come from a relating self.

2. When the realist so carefully examines the egocentric predicament, to find a solution for it, if possible, even though this solution

be that the self can be "virtually eliminated" and therefore ignored, how can Miss Calkins justly claim that the self *has been ignored*?

3. The latter part of paragraph VII reveals several extraordinary misunderstandings and question-begging statements. As an example of this we have the characterisation of my criticism of the underlying-reality theory of relations as "the central position" of *The New Rationalism*. I must reply that the latter has no "central position," but consists in the destructive criticism of opposed systems, in the search for fundamental presuppositions, and in the demonstration that such presuppositions form a system that is not self-refuting.

4. Miss Calkins's characterisation of my formulation of objective idealism as "an extraordinary travesty" is quite unjustified, since I find that formulation to be given in essence by a number of objective idealists (including Miss Calkins) from whom I quote. Thus Miss Calkins in her own *Persistent Problems* writes of a "unique Individual that is the "relater of its parts," and Taylor (*Elements of Metaphysics*) writes of a "single," a "one perfectly determinate principle" of which the "world" is a "manifestation." The core of the position as thus defined is, that the universe as a system of terms in relation implies a relater.

In accordance with this definition it is, therefore, in rebuttal, quite indifferent whether the "parts" or the "manifestations" and the relations between them, are regarded as "outside" or "inside" the "relater," but it is not a matter of indifference that "parts" and "relater" are distinguished as such, thus presupposing that the two are "distinct" at least to this extent. Since, now, this distinctness is recognized by the idealist himself, it is a matter of further indifference whether the relater be described as "underlying" or as "transcending." All that needs to be insisted upon is that if "relater" and "related" are *distinct* as such, each is to that extent an "extra-entity" as regards the other. This leaves the further question quite open whether the relations between the parts themselves as well as between the parts and the relater are "internal" or "external," Miss Calkins's statement to the contrary notwithstanding. But it does not leave open, but, rather, directly contradicts Miss Calkins's statement that an "extra-entity" can not be "thought as absolute." For if Miss Calkins herself can distinguish the Absolute from its parts, thus presupposing that each is an "extra-entity" as regards the other, then it follows that the Absolute is an "extra-entity."

I must accordingly deny Miss Calkins's imputation that I endeavor to refute objective idealism by making the misinterpretation that the

"relater" and the "related" are "externally related," as I must insist, also, that my refutation is quite independent of the use of such terms as "outside," "extra," "mediate," and the like. For whether terms are related internally or externally, it is the fact that they are related that furnishes the idealist with his problem.

The only solution, now, that Miss Calkins can find for this problem is the position (or hypothesis?) that *relatedness of any kind presupposes a relater, and that this relater can be only a self*, either finite or absolute, and that a self is a complex entity.

I would therefore wish only to point out that this hypothesis does not solve. For if "the truly monistic conception is that of a being which, so far from mediating the relations of entities outside itself, relates or unifies its own members" then, seemingly, either this being's own members are "its own" independently of its own relating activity, or they are "its own" only because, by hypothesis, they are "put" *in this relation* by a relater. But this means that for every relater there must be *another relater* whose specific function it is to relate the preceding relater to its members so that these members are "its own." Thus it is that the fundamental idealistic hypothesis that relations demand a relater, logically generates an infinite progression, *i.e.*, a series which, though it have a first, has no final member. The result is that no ultimate, no Absolute, is ever arrived at. This criticism of objective idealism I not only maintained in *The New Rationalism*, but I now find no reason for modifying, as a result of Miss Calkins's discussion.

In the other case, however, namely, that of a being whose "own members" are allowed to be "its own" independently of *its own* or any other relating activity, it is quite clear that there is the presupposition that at least *some* relations are logically prior to a complex relater's relating activity. In other words it is presupposed that some relations do not demand a relater, but just *are*.

Far more important, therefore, than the view that relations demand a relater, is the principle that a relation, whatever its kind, itself relates and unifies. This principle does not mean or demand in the least that one is to ignore or deny the self, or the fact of knowledge, or the existence of unitary complexes, and the like. But it does mean that investigation in a specific direction is stimulated, *i.e.*, that search is made for specifically different types of relations and of organized wholes with the result that philosophy is placed in line with precise and exact methods of research rather than made a matter of personal reaction and of figurative description.

DR. STRONG AND QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCES.

IF one is not a philosopher by profession, one's capacity to be attracted and stimulated by a philosophical work is obviously in a very special degree proportional to the attempt of that work to answer the problems towards which one's own habits of thought naturally lead. Dr. Strong's book *The Origin of Consciousness*, is particularly attractive to the psychologist of what I may call the moderately motor type: one who, like myself, while accepting the authority of introspection, inclines to the belief that the organism's movements furnish the most satisfactory explanatory principle in psychology. Dr. Strong, like the psychologist in question, grants the authority of introspection, and posits the 'essence' of objects and mental states, that which is known, as something distinct from their existence. At the same time, also like the psychologist in question, he has the habit of thinking in terms of physical science. The reality back of essences is clearly for him the atomistic, evolutionary reality which physical science gives us, the hypothesis of which has made possible its wonderful success in predicting changes in the phenomenal world. Moreover the influence of motor theories is throughout shown, for example in his doctrine that the essence of an experience regarded as a physical object differs from the essence of the same experience regarded as a mental state by virtue of the different motor attitudes which we assume in the two cases.

From this starting-point, Dr. Strong finally reaches a monistic universe, made up of atoms, which are however psychic atoms. They are atoms, because physical science gives us atoms as the ultimate reality: they must be psychic atoms because if the original stuff were not psychic the psychic never could have appeared in the process of evolution. And if introspection tells us that the essence of sensations is not atomistic, then introspection's false testimony must be excused on the ground that discrimination in introspection as in sense-perception is a process which has developed only along practically useful lines. Introspection "may err by defect—by failing to reveal to us the plurality and complication which our feelings really possess, or revealing it only in the form of a vague general impression" (page 312).

A discussion of Dr. Strong's psychology is beyond my present purpose, which is simply to record a few meditations on the question as to whether one can ever, once having made the dualistic admissions above mentioned, reach a monism, panpsychic or otherwise. It is not sufficient, surely, to say that those characteristics wherein the

world of mental states differs from the atomistic world of physical science are all due to the distorted character of the 'essence' furnished by introspection. This distortion is itself a part of the universe, and must be capable of complete reduction to the stuff out of which the universe is made, if the monistic interpretation is to succeed. It is not enough to say that since introspection distorts, then for all we know mental states may be made up of psychic atoms. Suppose that we start out with the conceptions of physical science, whose validity Dr. Strong seems completely to accept. In the beginning there were electrons; these entered into patterns, some relatively permanent, some more temporary; living matter appeared as an elaborate pattern; its interaction with other patterns constitutes behavior. Now conceive electrons to have been from the beginning psychic. At just what point in the world process, and why, did the mental state 'essences' begin to falsify? Or were they illusory from the beginning? Can the nature of their falsifications be derived from the nature of the process as a whole? If so, the way is clear for monism: if not, dualism remains.

The problem is really of course that of deriving the world as known to consciousness from the world as constructed by physical science: the same old problem. At least two important differences appear between them, to be resolved if mental states are to be reduced to mind-stuff atoms. First, the world of the physical scientist is a world of discontinuity, of discreteness; the world as known to introspection is a world of continuity. In the 'real' world of physical science things are groupings of discontinuous particles, and these particles or points of stress in ether have no extension, no spatial continuity whatever.

A second essential difference is the substitution of qualitative variety for qualitative identity. In the world of physical science the notion of ultimate qualitative differences between the atoms of different substances has long ago been questioned and practically abandoned. The periodic law is perhaps the greatest triumph in the history of science: never have predictions been more brilliantly verified than on the supposition that the ultimate particles of which all matter is composed are always the same in their nature. All differences are differences in the patterns according to which these identical units are grouped. There is in the physical world no qualitative variety whatever; only variety in spatial and temporal arrangement. On the other hand the world of mental states is a world of irreducible qualitative differences. It may be illusion, but there they are: reds, greens,

low tones, high tones, odors; a color refusing to reveal itself to direct experience as made up of odors or even of other colors; no ultimate identity between them anywhere. The world of mental states is full of qualities: the world of physical science is all quantity and spatial arrangement. Now how, to speak crudely, did a world of qualitatively identical atoms, even psychic atoms, ever come to have the illusion that it was a world of qualitatively unlike sensations?

It seems to me that the conditions which physical science asserts to have governed the evolution of the universe *can easily account for the illusion of continuity and simplicity where the reality is atomistic, but not for the illusion of qualitative differences where the realities are qualitatively identical*. Now Dr. Strong's solution of the problem of quality considers it solely as the problem of illusory simplicity where the reality is atomistic. He says (pages 312-3): "The external facts which these qualities serve to reveal, and which are the causes of our sensations, are quantitative and not qualitative in their nature. The surfaces of objects that reflect coloured light, the vibrations of objects that give rise to sound, as well as the light rays and sound waves they send forth, are describable solely in quantitative terms. The events in the sense-organs and the nerve fibres, and even in the minute processes in the cortex, are also so describable. At some point then there must be a transformation of the quantitative into the qualitative. . . . Why may it not be due simply to our inability to resolve the feeling into its parts? If feelings sometimes break up into parts—as they do whenever we analyze them—why may not the feelings always consist of parts? And why may not the special number and arrangement of the parts be the explanation of their apparent differences in quality?"

This clearly assumes that if we can account for complexity's appearing simple we shall have accounted for qualitative uniformity's appearing qualitatively varied. Now it is, I think, a fairly easy matter to see how what is really made up of parts comes to appear simple. In fact, it is probably just a matter of the *size* of the reacting organism. The motor psychology which Dr. Strong accepts endeavors to derive the characteristics of mental states from the movements made in response to stimuli. Suppose that an organism were capable of perceiving a mass of matter as made up of the discontinuous particles which physical science tells us really constitute it. Such a perception would involve the ability to make separate reactive movements to each of the electrons composing the body. Evidently only an organism infinitely smaller than any living creature known to our

methods of observation would be capable of reacting with discrete and separate movements to the discrete and separate electrons. It is far from impossible that organisms no larger than a single molecule of protoplasm do exist, since we have no reason to suppose that the limits of our microscopes determine the limits of the size of living beings, but even these would be large compared to an electron. And the comparatively clumsy organisms with which we are familiar necessarily make continuity and simplicity out of the discontinuous and complex. You can get simplicity out of complexity if you fill up the gaps, spatial or temporal, between the parts of the complex. Thus a spatial pattern of electrons or atoms would be apprehended as a continuous extent by an organism whose reacting movements overlapped the intervals between the particles, and a temporal series of ether or air impulses would become a continuous sensation if the movement initiated by one impulse were still in progress when the next impulse arrived. Given sufficient discrepancy in size between the discontinuous stimuli and the reacting organism, and you get simplicity out of complexity by a perfectly comprehensible process.

But how can one get qualitative out of purely quantitative changes? How can one get red and blue from a mere difference in the length of the space and time interval between two precisely similar ether stresses? Suppose we take into account the photochemical processes in the retina: these too, as Dr. Strong says, are simply the movements of atoms into new spatial patterns, and the atoms themselves are patterns, somewhat more permanent, of electrons. Is there really any way in which, from the nature of the organism's reactive movements, we can derive quality from quantity, as by referring to the difference in size between atom and organism we could derive simplicity from complexity?

No: a movement is never qualitative. Simplicity and complexity are motor terms. In fact, of course, all the ideas which the physical scientist uses in constructing the real universe are kinæsthetic: we get the notion of an interplay of moving particles and stresses from our own movements. And we find it a simple matter to derive, from a universe so constructed, our own experience, but only so far as our experience is kinæsthetic. Discontinuity or complexity is in terms of motor experience simply moving and stopping, moving again and stopping. Simplicity or continuity is moving without stopping: merely omit the stops and you have it. But quality is not kinæsthetic at all. In the kinæsthetic universe of stresses and velocities purely qualitative differences do not, and never will, fit. Our own movements give us no experience of qualitative differences.

The nearest that we can come, and it is not very near, to any derivation of quality from the non-qualitative is to ask how else, except under the guise of qualitative differences, an organism could represent to itself the essence of those molecular patterns whose true differences, those of spatial arrangement, it is unable because of the size and clumsiness of its movements, to perceive. A molecule of sugar and a molecule of fat differ in the pattern, in three dimensions, and the number of their atoms. It is impossible by means of any reacting mechanism we possess, to respond to these patterns and numbers as such. Yet it is important, we may suppose, that the organism should distinguish them: if not as patterns, then how else but by transforming them into qualities? Yes; but on the atomic conception of the universe, there is no such resource at its disposal: qualitative differences are something quite foreign. *They cannot be fitted into a universe of atoms, even a universe of mind-stuff atoms.*

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Moral Values and the Idea of God. The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Aberdeen in 1914 and 1915. By W. R. SORLEY. Cambridge, at the University Press; New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1919.—pp. xix, 554.

"The purpose of the present work is to enquire into the bearing of ethical ideas upon the view of reality as a whole which we are justified in forming. The argument begins with a discussion of values and ends with the idea of God. In this way it reverses the traditional order of procedure which seeks first for an interpretation of reality, founded upon scientific generalisations or upon the conceptions involved in knowledge, and then goes on to draw out the ethical consequences of the view that has been reached" (p. 1). Lotze's dictum, that 'the true beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics,' may be interpreted to mean: "If we take experience as a whole, and do not arbitrarily restrict ourselves to that portion of it with which the physical and natural sciences have to do, then our interpretation of it must have ethical data as its basis and ethical laws in its structure" (p. 7). This indicates the general point of view from which the enquiry proceeds. The issue of the argument is what the author calls an 'ethical theism,' "which finds the moral purpose of the world to be the purpose of a Supreme Mind and which regards finite minds as attaining unity with this Supreme Mind not by absorption of their individuality but by the perfecting of their character in coöperating with the divine purpose" (pp. 473-474).

The main points in the argument may be summarized as follows. The distinction between knowledge of the universal and knowledge of the individual offers a convenient basis upon which to differentiate between science, in the ordinary meaning of the term, and philosophy. For the interest of science is primarily, if not exclusively, in general laws and formulæ, "its ideal is a science like mathematical physics" (p. 505); whereas the ultimate interest of philosophy is, despite the abstract arguments which it employs, in the individual. Proceeding from this distinction and fixing attention upon the individual, we distinguish two fundamental aspects—"in respect of one of which we describe its properties, and trace the connexion of its parts with one another and of the object as a whole with other objects; while, in re-

spect of the other aspect, we appreciate the value of the individual, and say that it has a certain worth" (p. 507). These two aspects are that of causes and that of values respectively. Of values there are various kinds, the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic being fundamental for the present argument. Intrinsic values belong only to persons—at least this is so of intrinsic moral values. These intrinsic values are objective and consequently are as truly a part of reality as are the qualities and causal relations which we ascribe to things and persons. Limiting the argument to moral values and taking into consideration the fact that they "belong to persons in as truly objective a sense as any other characteristic belongs to them" (p. 508), we are compelled to posit a standard or ideal of goodness as the implied ground or condition of the realisation of moral values in the conscious life of individuals; for "the attainment of value is recognized as a value only because of its conformity with this standard or law of value, or because of its approximation to this ideal of value" (pp. 508-509). Thus we are led to the conception of a moral order which in some sense has objective reality. So we have two orders within reality; namely, the natural order or the realm of causation, and the moral order or the realm of ends. "The chief problem, therefore, for any synoptic or philosophical view of reality is the attainment of a point of view from which we can regard these two aspects as aspects of a whole" (p. 510). Using this problem as a test for the validity of the different philosophical theories, the problem being a crucial problem, the argument makes it evident that on investigation neither naturalism nor pluralism nor monism can stand. Naturalism falls because it runs directly in the face of facts by denying the objectivity of moral—as well as other—values. Pluralism must be ruled out of court because it is "compelled to acknowledge an order of law and an order of values . . . inexplicable in a universe where finite monads or selves alone are real" (p. 511). And all forms of monism—absolutism or pantheism—must be given up "for the express reason that they give no tenable explanation of the existing incongruity between the natural order and the moral order" (p. 511). What, then, is the true explanation of the relation actually existing between these two orders? The discrepancy between them which experience discloses is found on analysis to be of a two-fold nature. In the first place, persons in whom moral values have to be realized make such slow and devious progress in their realisation; and, in the second place, the causal order of the world displays a decided indifference to the demands and ideals of the moral order. How, now, can these difficulties be explained?

The fact of evil and imperfection in human experience demands the postulate of individual freedom: moral values can be realized by free beings only, freedom is necessary for goodness, but freedom makes evil possible as well as the good. The second difficulty, the indifference of the natural to the moral order, "can be explained only by the interpretation of the world as a purposive system" (p. 513); "the events of the world as a causal system are not inconsistent with the view that this same world is a moral order" (p. 350), provided the world as moral be interpreted to mean that the world as moral is purposive, that objective ideals of goodness are discovered by finite minds and by a free act of will gradually organised in individual characters. "With the recognition of this mode of harmonising the order of nature with the moral order, it is not any longer possible to regard both orders or either as merely unconscious law. The order of nature intends a result which is not found at any particular stage in the process of existence. It requires an idea of the process as a whole and of the moral order to which nature is being made subservient. It means therefore intelligence and the will to good as well as the ultimate source of power. In this way, the recognition of the moral order, and of its relation to nature and man, involves the acknowledgment of the Supreme Mind or God as the ground of all reality" (pp. 513-514). This Supreme Mind, however, is not absolute, being limited by the wills of free finite agents; his purpose is attained by and through the coöperation of the finite centers of free activity. This theory satisfactorily explains, in principle at least, the unity of reality without destroying its multiplicity: it is neither pluralism nor monism, but ethical theism.

So far I have tried to let the author speak for himself and get his argument before us. I am well aware that this sketchy outline of the argument does poor justice to its richness of detail and suggestiveness. But the outline follows as closely as possible the summary statement of the discussion given by the author in his last lecture. So it may at least be taken as presenting the high points of the argument, as well as the logical consecutiveness of the several steps in it.

On many points in the discussion I find myself in hearty agreement. But three questions on fundamental points framed themselves as I followed the discussion, and they remain with me at the end. The first concerns the treatment which pluralism receives at the author's hands, the doubt lingering whether it has legitimately been ruled out of court as a possible world-view. The second question concerns the more constructive part of the argument and converges upon the proof

which the author offers for the existence of a personal deity. While the third centers about the ancient and troublous problem of the relation between God and the finite individual, the author seeming to contradict himself in his conception of that relation.

Granting, as I think we must, that the author has proved his contention that the moral order is a part of reality in as true and as intelligible a sense as is the so-called natural order, then certainly the problem of the relation between these two orders becomes a pressing one whose solution must be sought for by any thoroughgoing system of philosophy. Now the author insists, and attempts to prove, that pluralism does not offer a satisfactory solution of the problem. In this I am in general agreement. My quarrel is simply that the only form of pluralism which the author seriously considers is defined in such a way that it is *by definition* incompetent even to face the difficulty. For pluralism is made synonymous with that theory which "envisages the world as consisting of a vast number of spiritual units, which have been variously called monads, subjects, souls, or selves" (p. 362); and this is the only type of pluralism attacked, all other forms being thrown into the discard at the beginning of the discussion. Not a word, however, is said of that form of pluralism, usually called dualism, which solves the difficulty by the simple method of denying that there is any to solve. I personally hold no brief for dualism in its traditional form; but it is a perfectly intelligible theory, and has played a rather important rôle in connection with the problem under consideration. My only wish is that the author had given thought to its claims. His failure to do so is of considerable importance in respect of the continuity of his argument, since he approaches his own solution of the difficulty by eliminating other theories from consideration.

The second difficulty is perhaps more serious, since it touches the conclusion towards which the author's entire argument is directed. God exists, so the argument runs, as the Mind for which the moral ideal is already an accomplishment; the existence of God, in Dr. Rashdall's phrase, "is the logical presupposition of an 'objective' or absolute Morality" (p. 351). Or, in the author's own words: "A particular instance of goodness can exist only in the character of an individual person or group of persons; an idea of goodness such as we have is found only in minds such as ours. But the ideal of goodness does not exist in finite minds or in their material environment. What then is its status in the system of reality? The question is answered [only?] if we regard the moral order as the order of a Supreme

Mind and the ideal of goodness as belonging to this Mind" (p. 355). I find it difficult to make the leap here suggested, though I think I can see that the chasm is not so abysmal as is that of the traditional Ontological argument. But what precisely is the difference—relevant to the problem—between the 'idea' and the 'ideal' of goodness, and why the latter cannot exist in finite minds but finds lodgment only in a Supreme Mind, are matters which it is difficult for me to grasp. Furthermore, if, as the author seems to admit, it may logically be argued that the laws of the natural order exist in phenomena and do not, in consequence, have any bearing upon the existence of God (p. 353), why may not the principle, or principles, of the moral order be in the same status? But I am inclined to suspect that my darkness here is due to failure to understand the author's conception of the nature of the moral ideal, and his view of the implications of the moral judgment as regards existence (pp. 82 ff.).

In order satisfactorily to explain the presence of evil in the world, the author contends that human freedom must be postulated; otherwise, ethical idealism falls to the ground (p. 469). This human freedom, if it is to be a real freedom and not an illusion such as monism (pantheism) admits of, must be regarded as "a limitation of the divine activity" (p. 469). But it immediately turns out that this 'limitation' is more apparent than real. "If we remember that the Infinite Mind is not limited to a finite span of the time-process, we must allow that, notwithstanding the free causation of finite minds, the actions which we call future are yet eternally present to his knowledge. . . . And if God foresaw, can we suppose that he would call into being spirits who would frustrate his purpose?" (p. 472). I am at a loss to understand why this conception of the Infinite Mind does not flatly contradict the assumption of finite freedom. If God's experience is not limited to a finite span of the time-process—an assumption, by the way, which the author's discussion does not prove,—then it would seem that we are in the clutches of that dreaded monism which the author, rightly as it seems to me, rejects because it fails to account for precisely those facts which he introduces the postulate of finite freedom to explain. If the whole time-process is present to the Infinite Mind, then it is idle to insist that I, or any other finite creature who has a real future, am free to determine what shall be done to-morrow whether good or ill; to-morrow is already a fact, an event, in the Infinite experience. And there is no salvation in calling this sort of thing foreknowledge; for in a timeless experience, to be foreknown is to be fore-experienced. Unless I am greatly mistaken, then, the

author's final conception of the idea of God turns his ethical theism into that type of monism which he so effectively criticises in his fifteenth lecture.

Many other points in this exceedingly interesting and stimulating book call for consideration, but space forbids. I cannot refrain from stating, however, that the distinction drawn by the author between the universal and the individual at times tends to become rather sharp; and I am not sure but that some at least of the difficulties I find in his argument arise from the fact that these are more radically sundered than I have hitherto supposed justifiable. The distinction drawn between synthesis and synopsis in knowledge (pp. 251 ff.) is also interesting and raises questions of far-reaching significance, but they cannot be debated here.

This review has emphasized the main points in the contemplation of which the reviewer seems to find himself in disagreement with the author. On many, perhaps most, points, however, there is agreement. Certainly there is no question but that the author has amply justified his basic thesis that moral values, all values, are genuinely real parts of the world, and that they have an important bearing upon the final view of reality which philosophy adopts. He has made it abundantly clear that there is more to the world than the existents of space, and that any theory which neglects to take account of the values of life is incomplete. The argument is an important contribution to contemporary thought, and is suggestive both in its point of view and in its development.

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Syndicalism and Philosophical Realism. A Study in the Correlation of Contemporary Social Tendencies. By J. W. SCOTT. London, A. & C. Black, Ltd., 1919.—pp. 215.

The relation of the social tendencies of the philosophers of a given period to the logical and metaphysical theories set forth in their philosophy is always a subject of interest. As treated by the author of the book before us, the general interest of the subject is heightened because the period under consideration is our own; the tendency analyzed is Syndicalism, which, be it promise or menace, is the most important phenomenon on the political horizon; and, finally, the two philosophers with whom the author is chiefly concerned—Bergson and Russell—are not only leaders, but leaders of opposing movements, who, nevertheless, for some obscure reason appear to have approached a common goal in their social philosophy. It is Mr. Scott's aim to

convince his readers that the syndicalistic implications of the two philosophies are the logical and natural result of a certain metaphysical doctrine which is to be found in each of them; and to this doctrine Mr. Scott gives the name "Realism." The book begins with four chapters in which Syndicalism and "Realism" are expounded in such a way as to show their correlation; the remaining seven chapters are devoted to the concrete exposition of the two theories in relation to the philosophies of Bergson, Russell and Meinong.

After a brief account of the way in which the older and more segregated trades-unionism of England, France and America has developed and broadened, the author proceeds to his definition of Syndicalism as "a spontaneous popular feeling for larger combination and bigger scale striking, breaking through the limits of craft within which it had been too readily assumed trades-unionism must confine itself" (p. 13). Having depicted syndicalism from the standpoint of its relation to trades-unionism, the author in his second chapter depicts it in its relation to the development of the socialist movement from its 'Utopian' or pre-Marxian stage down to the present day. The epitome of the history of socialism contained in this chapter appears to the reviewer to be deserving of criticism in the following respect: It makes much of the differences of the earlier socialistic schemes from one another and from the socialism of Marx, but barely mentions the definitive ideal which they possess in common and which marks them off from all other schemes of human betterment: the ideal, namely, of doing away with the system of private ownership of the means of production which enables a small class of owners to control the lives of a large class of workers and to subsist parasitically upon their labor. Socialism would substitute for this system of capitalism a system under which the sources of wealth are to be owned collectively to the end that each worker shall have the product of his labor, and liberty and equality of opportunity be universal. The syndicalists differ from other socialists in holding that the industries should be owned and operated by the workers as such, organized in their respective unions or guilds, rather than by the totality of consumers, organized politically in the State. They differ also in discarding the political method of achieving the collectivist goal, and in advocating 'direct action' or economic pressure exerted in the revolutionary strike. These two peculiarities of the syndicalists are certainly important, and Mr. Scott uses them as the basis for his charge that the movement is essentially negative and destructive in character. But it is manifestly unfair and misleading for the author to omit

from consideration the positive and constructive ideal of collective ownership of capital which syndicalists in common with all other socialists are striving to attain. And it is almost equally unfair to characterize the method or tactic of 'direct action' as a mere negation of the political method. Direct action or economic pressure, is quite as positive in character as the political method of settlement by ballot. Each method negates the other; and it is rather naïve to assume that there is something intrinsically positive about the parliamentary lobby and something intrinsically negative about the revolutionary or political strike. Our author fails to realize that the syndicalists, while they urge the class-war, do not urge it as an ultimate ideal but because they believe that it is the war that will end war. They hold that the victory of the working class, expressed in a temporary dictatorship of the proletariat, is the only hope of abolishing all classes and establishing a thorough-going democracy, industrial as well as political. And, finally, syndicalism claims that to change society from a primarily political organization of consumers into a primarily economic organization of producers will not result in a negation of order, but rather in the substitution of a free social order based on the rational needs of all for the present enforced order based on the self-interest of the capitalist class.

The objections that can be urged against this program of syndicalism or industrial socialism, are numerous enough. And it seems to me a pity that Mr. Scott does not mention them. He prefers instead, as we have stated, to pass over the positive and constructive ideals to which the threatening growth of the movement is due, and to sum up his chapter or follows: "It [syndicalism] is the failure of construction and science and statesmanship as a socialistic means. It is the failure of the socialistic idea to prove its fitness for political power. It is the very voice of socialism at the confessional, confessing its inability to do what it set out to do, namely, run a state" (p. 31). Such an utterance is itself a confession of the failure of conservatism to see in a new idea anything except the bare negation of the old and the customary.

To leave the matter here would however be unfair to Mr. Scott; for in his third chapter he appeals to the Bergsonian spirit, as expressed in the work of Sorel, in support of his charge that syndicalism is essentially negative. Now whether or not there is any *causal* relation between Bergson's anti-intellectualistic stressing of the value of action and the syndicalists' abandonment of intellectualistic formulations of the future society, it is undoubtedly true, as Mr. Scott

claims, that there is an essential similarity between them. To the syndicalist it appears that the worker's business in the industrial war of the classes is to fight rather than talk. Hence, in contrast to the Fabian, he appeals to the workers to win their freedom by action and not to weaken their fighting spirit by disputations as to the peace-terms which may follow the victory.

Despite this resemblance between Bergsonism and syndicalism, the anti-intellectualistic spirit of the latter is not so new a phenomenon as might on first sight appear. Whenever men feel themselves slaves, they are apt to be careless of the obligation of proving to their masters that they will make good use of the liberty for which they struggle. The successive classes which have won the right to vote did not deem it necessary to plan out in advance just what they would do with the ballot when attained. In the recent struggle of the women to gain the vote there were only a few suffragists, and those not the most important, who took upon themselves the gratuitous burden of proving that good results of a definite kind would follow from their political emancipation. Political aristocrats have always insisted that the vote was a privilege to be granted only when the ruling oligarchy was convinced that specific good results would ensue. Political democrats, on the other hand, have regarded the vote as a right rather than a privilege, and as a thing to be demanded and seized rather than a boon to be argued and pleaded for. And so now, when the supporters of capitalism, backed up by nervous and conscientious Fabians, ask of the syndicalist that he justify in advance the use which he will make of his goal when he attains it, we may expect him to retort angrily that such a burden of proof is not for him to assume. He wants control of the tools on which his living depends; what he will do with that control when he gets it is his own business. Now of course if one feels that the workers' demand for control of the mines and machinery which condition their labor is a matter not of justice but of dubious expediency, then indeed the syndicalist attitude will seem wilfully anti-rational and negative. But if, on the other hand, one regards the claim to industrial freedom and equality of opportunity through guild ownership as being as much a right as the claim to vote, why, then, the refusal to submit a program and justify it in advance will appear no more unreasonable in the case of the syndicalist than in the case of the suffragist. Whether sound and beneficent or unsound and dangerous, there is no question in the mind of the reviewer that the syndicalists' dislike of a constructive program and their impatience with parliamentary methods rests

not upon the very new philosophy of Bergson but upon the very old philosophy of natural human rights—applied today to the attainment of industrial democracy exactly as it was applied yesterday to the attainment of political democracy.

And as the movements for political and industrial democracy possess in common a certain measure of justification, so also do they share in a certain weakness and menace to society. The danger of political democracy is that the right of majority decisions in matters of general policy may be misused to oppress minorities in matters which concern private life and conduct; that the heresies and variations on which progress depends be suppressed; and all be forced to conform to the norms of the herd. The analogous danger of syndicalism is that the unions of workers in the vitally necessary industries, when once they attain the status of guild owners, may use their economic power not merely to secure their own rights and liberties but to suppress the rights and liberties of those other members of society who, because employed in less vital industries, would be at the mercy of the unions controlling food and transportation. This is the danger which lies at the heart of the syndicalists' attempt to replace political and parliamentary control by the majority of consumers with a system of industrial control by guilds of producers; in which the power of a group would be measured, not by its ability to convince the majority, but rather by its ability to coerce the majority by withholding the necessities of life. The struggle to win the whole loaf of industrial democracy through direct action may result in a loss of that very substantial half loaf which we now enjoy under a political democracy in which government by majorities takes the place of government by minorities and society determines its policies by ballots rather than bullets. This danger of syndicalism and Bolshevism is real and terrible. How far it may be met by a compromise such as guild-socialism in which the political power of consumers is retained along with the new power accorded to industrial organizations it is too early to say. It is in any event a great pity that Mr. Scott, instead of facing this danger and discussing it, should talk along in an artificial and doctrinaire manner about the purely negative and destructive character of the syndicalist movement. If syndicalism is to be feared and opposed, it is not because of its negative but because of its positive and constructive program for substituting the economic force of minorities of producers for the political force of a majority of consumers.

Mr. Scott follows out in the metaphysical parts of his book the plan that he has used in the earlier, political, sections. As syndicalism is

treated as the negation of constructive and rational programs of social reform so, too, 'realism' as found in Bergson, Meinong and Russell is treated as the negation and abandonment of the faith in a universe in which the principles of reason and the ideals of conscience are embodied. Thus, the correlation between the political and metaphysical tendencies of the day is shown to be rooted in their common negation of idealistic rationalism.

Now there are two criticisms which may be made of this second part of Mr. Scott's book. First, it may be criticized for using the term 'realism' to denominate a doctrine which, whether good or bad, is not realism at all. The second, and more important line of criticism is not concerned with the author's nomenclature but with the deductions drawn from his premises.

Mr. Scott defines realism as an attempt to conceive the world in terms of the immediate and unrelated data of sense. Things are just what they are given as. "Hume is a realist or something quite as bad. And Hume, apparently, is nothing but Berkeley made consistent" (p. 55). "Now this taking of the real to be what it is given as is the doctrine which we propose to call realism" (p. 67). "The reducing of qualities to ideas is, in its origin, a process of making them all distinct and separable" (margin p. 61). "And this atomism is the realism we are seeking" (margin p. 67).

Now, as distinguished from this phenomenalism or positivism or nominalism, modern realism is the attempt to rid academic philosophy of a certain body of sophisticated confusion which has placed it in a needless opposition to common-sense and to science. This body of morbid doctrine grew like a fungus from the time of Locke through Berkeley and Hume, and then in a new and intensified form through Kant and his followers. It is the doctrine—firmly opposed by the realists—that the act of knowing constitutes, creates, or modifies the things known, with the result that the entire world, in so far as it is knowable, is in dissolubly bound up with the reality of a mind, or minds. This epistemological idealism, especially in its more radical or German forms, is tangled up in the minds of those who hold it with the ancient and still unrefuted hypothesis that the cosmos is at heart akin to human spirit and a conserver of human values. That epistemological idealism, or subjectivism, is logically quite independent of ontological idealism, or theism, is apparently not recognized by Mr. Scott. Unless I mistake the tenor of his argument, he would hold that whoever opposes the Kantian epistemology, according to which the interrelatedness of the physical world is the

work of mind, ought in consistency to oppose also the hypothesis that the world is directed by a purposive or spiritual power. Now it so happens that the realism of today is neutral on the question of whether nature is mechanistic or teleological, or both, or neither. Secondly, realism is neutral on the question of whether universals are objectively real as such or whether the nominalists and positivists are correct in construing all alleged universals of reason as functional derivatives of the particulars of sense.¹ Thirdly, the realism of today is neutral on the question of whether the anti-intellectualism of Bergson is correct in maintaining that intuition rather than scientific reason is needed to yield insight into the heart of things. The central thesis of modern realism is the doctrine that knowing, whether perceptual or conceptual, is selective rather than constitutive of the world which it reveals. Holding to this thesis the realists deny Berkeley's argument that because physical objects and their qualities are discovered as ideas or objects related in consciousness, therefore they together with their relations cannot exist independently of consciousness. And they deny equally Kant's argument that the *a priori* and necessary character of the fundamental forms of relation such as space, time, and the categories, is proof that those relations are the work of mind and incapable of obtaining between things in their own right. So far from believing, as Mr. Scott assumes, in a world of unrelated sensory data, the realist maintains that relations are objectively real and in no sense the work of the mind that discovers them, whether that mind be conceived as empirical or transcendental, finite or absolute.

That Mr. Scott ignores the whole procedure of the new realism in its attempt to emancipate philosophy from the subjectivism of Berkeley and Kant is a little disappointing in view of the title of his work. But after all it is less damaging to his general argument than might be supposed; because all that is needed is for the reader to swallow his amazement at the author's terminology, and to keep in mind that the word realism in Mr. Scott's language means any one of three things: (1) phenomenalism in epistemology, (2) naturalism or anti-theism in cosmology, and (3) intuitionism or anti-intellectualism in methodology. Thus Bergson can qualify as a 'realist' by reason of his defence

¹ As a matter of fact, the new realism has been Platonic rather than nominalistic, maintaining the objective subsistence of universals independent of mind no less strenuously than the objective existence of material bodies. The qualification of neutrality on the status of Universals is only inserted in deference to Mr. Russell's recent drift toward phenomenalism.

of intuition as superior to the intellectualism of science, although in his conception of nature as controlled by the spiritual force of the *élan vital* Mr. Scott finds a praiseworthy lack of 'realism.' Mr. Russell, on the other hand, can qualify as 'realist' both by reason of the tendency increasingly shown in his later work toward a phenomenalist particularism almost as extreme as that of Mach and Pearson, and also an account of his opposition to a spiritualistic conception of the material world. Truly Mr. Scott's 'realism' makes strange bed-fellows! One almost wonders that the author did not go on to show a further affinity between Bergson and Russell on the ground that Bergson's aggressive anti-Germanism and Russell's equally aggressive anti-militarism were both cases of the general spirit of negation characteristic alike of syndicalism and of 'realism.'

Despite the anomalies of this book, it contains much excellent matter. The account of Hume's development of Berkeley's ideas is a fine clear piece of work. The same may be said of the brief discussion of Meinong and of parts of the discussion of Russell's increasing interest in reconstructing the categories of physical science in terms of sense-data and their relations. In this latter connection, however, one could wish that the author had made a more serious attempt to explain the puzzling and disconcerting change in Mr. Russell's views from the Platonic realism of his earlier work to the almost complete nominalism of his recent writings.

The temper of Mr. Scott's book is always fair and generous; and at the end there is an interesting hint as to the policy which, as a constructive conservative and idealist, he would advocate in place of the correlated negations of syndicalism and realism. Mr. Russell has attacked the present marriage laws of England on the ground that when both parties to a marriage agree in finding that their union was a mistake and its continuance intolerable, and act accordingly, they are unable to secure a divorce. Mr. Scott suggests that the true remedy for such a situation lies not in changing the law so that each of the aggrieved parties may have a chance to rectify the mistake, but rather in convincing the couple that their misfortune is irremediable and that serenity can be attained by recognizing it as such and ceasing to struggle. This principle of making the best of any bad business rather than of rebelling against it is capable of far-reaching applications; and we may follow Mr. Scott in assuming it to be the cardinal principle of conservatism as a philosophy. For if people were once convinced of its efficacy, it could be used as an anodyne for all social ills and as an almost universal substitute for that Promethean spirit

of rebellion against the injustice of things as they are which may be taken as the cardinal principle of the philosophy of radicalism.

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Outlines of Social Philosophy. By J. S. MACKENZIE. London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.; New York, The Macmillan Company.—pp. 280.

This volume grew out of lectures delivered at the London School of Economics and Political Science in the session 1916-17. The author tells us that it may be regarded as taking the place of his *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, published in 1895 and now for a long time out of print. The general views presented, we are told, are based largely on the teaching of such writers as T. H. Green and Dr. Bosanquet; of the two, Green is the one with whom Professor Mackenzie appears on the whole to be in closer agreement.

A just appreciation of Professor Mackenzie's work depends largely on a clear understanding of its purpose and scope. It is precisely what the title indicates—*Outlines of Social Philosophy*. The reader who approaches the book without appreciation of its necessary limitations may be disappointed at the absence of detailed discussion of problems growing out of the war or elaborate schemes of social reconstruction. What Professor Mackenzie undertakes is chiefly a delimitation of certain spheres of thought, the definition of fundamental concepts, and the balancing of opposing theories and ideals. In the main, therefore, he deals with the universal and permanent. It is fortunate that the preparation of such *Outlines*—a difficult task—should have fallen to one so well qualified. What, in less able hands, would have been a mere skeleton, takes on life and color from the author's wide learning, critical acumen and genuine humanism.

A book of this kind, treating very briefly a wide range of important topics, does not lend itself to summaries, but compels a somewhat arbitrary selection of points for presentation and comment.

In the Introduction attention is called to the vague and encyclopædic sphere of Sociology, which takes "all knowledge about human life for its province," and which therefore can not be "adequately dealt with by a single person or in a single book." Social philosophy is described as differing from the special branches of sociology "in the way in which philosophy in general is distinguished from the particular sciences." It has to do chiefly with "values, ends, ideals."

Book I is devoted to The Foundations of Social Order. If the actual forms of Association that appear in the historical life of com-

munities may be described as "conventional," it is insisted that these conventions are strictly natural to men, as natural as for birds to build "particular forms of nests." The basis of social unity is found in the conception of a Common Good, which Green did so much to make clear and significant. Professor Mackenzie finds this a safer and more fruitful conception than that of a Common Will. The unity that can be ascribed, ideally at least, to human society is a spiritual unity. This can be realized only by spiritual beings, *i.e.*, beings "more or less clearly conscious of themselves as persons pursuing some good, and conscious of those with whom they are associated as other persons pursuing the same or a similar good." Thus we reach the ideal of a "spiritual whole, containing within itself lesser wholes, some of which may also be called spiritual, others organic, and others mainly mechanical, but all in some degree coöperating, in a well-ordered society, for the general good" (pp. 58-59).

Book II, on National Order, contains chapters on The Family, Educational Institutions, Industrial Institutions, The State, Justice, and Social Ideals.

Many would have welcomed at this time a fuller discussion of the problem of wealth and poverty, but the question of the basis of property rights would fall, in the author's view, to the science of ethics. He well points out, however, that strife between nations and also between individuals is almost always strife for material possessions. Although there may be rivalry with regard to higher goods, the strife that arises in such cases is chiefly due to "differences of valuation rather than to difficulties about possession. When people quarrel, for instance, about religion, it is usually because each wants to confer his religion upon the other, rather than to appropriate that which the other holds" (p. 119).

Book III, on World Order, seems to me to be especially fruitful, and to show the author at his best. It deals with International Relations, The Place of Religion, and The Place of Culture, closing with a chapter on General Results.

Professor Mackenzie urges that the basis of progress in international relations, as also of any League of Nations that may serve this end, must be the recognition of a common good among the nations. "It may fairly be maintained," he says, "that peace and freedom are two closely related goods that are common to all nations alike; and all might very well combine to defend them. To do this is not in reality to sacrifice sovereignty, but rather to secure the necessary conditions upon which alone the essentials of sovereignty can be maintained"

(p. 207). The discussion of international relations would have gained in completeness had there been space for consideration of the obligation of the more advanced to the more backward nations. Is not this obligation akin to that of adults to further in every way the welfare and highest development of children? And would not the recognition and faithful discharge of the obligation prove a distinct good to the more powerful and highly civilized nations themselves? It is doubtful if much progress in world relations can be realized until a sense of moral obligation takes the place of the desire to exploit for selfish ends the less advanced peoples.

The meaning of religion is found in "the spirit of devotion to the perfection of human life." Morality, it is admitted, involves the "pursuit" of the good, but the distinction between morality and religion lies in the fact that for religion the good is thought of "as, in some sense, eternally realized, or involved in the nature of things." If the former of these alternative statements be taken as offering the essential element of religion and its mark of distinction from morality, the sense in which the good is "eternally realized" and the extent to which it is so realized, would require, I think, very careful definition. The second statement seems to me less ambiguous and more easily defensible. For religion, doubtless, is "involved in the nature of things." This view does not make religion dependent upon a particular metaphysical theory, but makes it implicit in every such theory. Is not the fundamental point of difference between religion and morality found in the fact that the religious view always involves the relation of values to reality as a whole, whereas morality is concerned with the estimation and production of the various goods of human life?

Readers will find here an excellent discussion of the principles of religious education. Urging that the attempt to impose particular creeds upon immature minds is open to serious objections, and yet recognizing that religion is too important to be neglected in education, Professor Mackenzie points out that there are at least two aspects of religion that can be made fruitful and inspiring in the training of the young. One of these is the part played by religious ideas and practices in history and literature. Without an understanding of these there can be no appreciation of the deeper life of different peoples. Beyond this historical survey, something of the religious spirit may be imparted—something not dependent on particular creeds and theories of the universe; so that whether the young "accept or reject the doctrines of their elders, they may always be able to fall back upon those

eternal values, to realize that truth is intrinsically preferable to falsehood, beauty to deformity and good to evil" (p. 216).

Culture is defined as "education in its larger sense—the sense in which it is the end of life, rather than the preparation for life." In contrast to culture, pedantry is a "Knowledge of particular things that have value" without appreciation of "proportion and relations." One would like to quote some of the excellent remarks on science, art, literature, and philosophy, each of which is briefly treated from the standpoint of its place in culture. I must, however, content myself with a single passage, appropriate to the times, from the concluding chapter. "It is only by conscious choice and effort that we can hope either to produce or to preserve what is best. But unless we are incurably foolish, we can hardly fail to profit both from the errors, the follies, and the crimes of the past, and also from its great achievements. Fortified by these considerations, we may still venture to believe, in spite of all the dangers that beset us, that it will be possible, in the not very remote future, to build up a finer and more stable order of society, against which the 'Gates of Hell' shall not prevail. What is specially clear, I think, is that that better order must not be supposed to be the peculiar privilege of any one people. It must be, in the fullest sense, a common good. . . . The time is past when it would be fitting for any people to think of 'Deutschland uber Alles,' or of Britanina ruling the waves, or of fair France as the sole mistress of civilization, or of Rome or Athens or Mecca or any other sacred seat, as the exclusive object of devotion. The earth is our country, and all its inhabitants are our fellow-citizens; and it is only the recognition of this that entitles us to look for any lasting security" (p. 257).

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Locke's Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations. By JAMES GIBSON, Cambridge, University Press, 1917.—Pp. xiv, 338.

Professor Gibson's book is an acute, thorough and entirely convincing presentation of the thesis that the commonly accepted interpretation of Locke is a mistaken one, and that the English tradition of empiricism has isolated only one aspect of his teaching, and that a side issue relatively. Those of us who were brought up to suppose that Locke's main interest lay in proving that all our knowledge comes from sensation, must often have been puzzled to account for the fact that so substantial a thinker is apparently so very little troubled by inconsistencies which stare one in the face. It is surprising how a

change of emphasis in the statement of the problem before him everywhere helps to relieve these inconsistencies. Indeed it goes a long way toward rehabilitating Locke, toward whom the historian has for some time been inclined to adopt an indulgent and patronizing tone, and makes it necessary entirely to revise the criticism which regards him merely as a rather confused precursor of Berkeley and Hume.

The point of the change lies in the recognition that Locke's intellectualism, instead of being an irrelevant excrescence upon his fundamental empiricism, in fact represents his chief concern. His aim is not psychological and genetic, but logical; he writes, not to show that all our ideas come from sensation, or even from experience, but to explain how it is possible that we should have knowledge which is *certain*, and yet not merely analytic and trivial—a kind of knowledge in which he thoroughly believes, and to validate which seems to him essential not only in the interests of philosophy, but of morality and religion as well. The consequences of this change of emphasis begin to appear at once. Thus Professor Gibson shows conclusively—and in so doing lets in a flood of light upon the earlier part of the Essay—that even in the polemic against innate ideas Locke is setting out not to show how ideas originated, but to refute a certain prevalent conception of logical method for which his own thesis is to be substituted. For academic scholasticism, which still held sway largely in the English universities, *certain*ty comes from the syllogistic deduction from fundamental principles which are themselves to be taken on trust. As against this, Locke proposes to establish his own doctrine that it comes from a direct perception of relationships between the contents of our abstract and general ideas, and he lays the foundation for this by proving that no such things exist as the innate *principles* which the scholastic doctrine presupposes. Instead therefore of being an easy victory over Descartes (with reference to whom Locke's argument is largely irrelevant), it is a pertinent analysis, and refutation, of the various logical possibilities of a widely accepted contemporary belief of at least some apparent plausibility. In passing I may call attention to the valuable and illuminating character of Professor Gibson's historical work in linking up Locke's speculations with those current philosophical opinions of his day which lie more or less outside the main lines of philosophical history; indeed all the historical chapters, which close the volume, are excellent.

It is unnecessary to follow in detail Professor Gibson's account of the course of Locke's argument, particularly as the book has already for some time been in the hands of the philosophical public; but a few

words may be added in the way of estimating the rehabilitated Locke. Professor Gibson, though himself apparently an adherent of the idealistic tradition which has been most severe upon Locke in the past, is particularly generous in his estimates, and allows him a significance which in some respects does not fall short even of that of Kant. His principal strictures are, perhaps, these: First, while Locke intends primarily to use the term 'idea' not of a psychological but of a logical fact, he does not sufficiently realize the ambiguities to which it lends itself, and has no well-digested account to give of the relation between the logical and the psychological aspects of the idea. (Neither, I may add, does it seem to me that Professor Gibson's own comments help us out very much here; the description of the mental side as just an 'act' or operation, though it has been a favorite device from the time of Reid's attack on ideas down to the present day, is an evasion of the most serious difficulties, which has yet to be analyzed in a way to make it intelligible without recourse to something after all in the nature of a 'mental state.') Again, Locke's classifications are in general too tentative not to be at times confusing and misleading; inconsistencies develop in the attempt to fit new and original insights into pigeonholes determined largely by traditional ideas, and Locke, whose interest in classification as such is not very keen, allows the inconsistencies to go uncorrected and often unnoticed. Finally, Professor Gibson ascribes Locke's most serious shortcomings to his uncritical acceptance of two more or less connected metaphysical presuppositions—the scholastic category of substance, and the 'composition' theory—that the ultimate constituents of our knowledge, namely, are simple units each complete in itself,—along with the artificial and arbitrary character assigned to 'universals' that flows from this. As he never is led to revise these fundamental conceptions in the light of his own discoveries, his explicit theory cannot escape the charge of obscurity and self-contradiction.

I should myself be inclined to go even further in some ways than Professor Gibson in my estimate of the present-day value of Locke, and partly for the reason that I do not place his main deficiency quite where Professor Gibson does. He is probably justified in his criticisms of Locke from the standpoint of logical method: but I am not sure that this is not to wander a little from Locke's own special problem. I question whether, even if he were to accept the corrections, Locke would have found the new relational logic of much added assistance in his quest for certitude, though it may furnish a more adequate account of the basis of our hypothetical procedure in explaining the

world. Locke seems to me to be substantially correct in locating certainty in the intuitive perception of relationships between the content of our ideas. But the more this is recognized, the more clear does it become that we get certitude at the expense of that 'real' knowledge which Locke also desiderates—that we are dealing, that is, with relational systems disconnected from the world of actual existents. Locke's attempts to effect the transition are hardly successful. It is true that when our ideas are simply definitions which we form by our own free activity, there is no need to justify a correspondence with reality to which they do not pretend, though that is hardly an excuse for calling such knowledge 'real'; rather, we avoid here any problem by giving up all claim to 'reality' as Locke is trying to justify it. It is only as applicable to existents that ideas have anything beyond a bare logical, or, perhaps, an æsthetic value; and even the logical value is in Locke's instances apt to be purely analytic. But just what right we have to apply ideas to reality, in a sense at any rate that goes beyond the mere momentary presence of perceptual qualities, is exactly the problem that Locke does not meet; for surely it is no solution to say, with Locke, that the mere *possibility* of their existing guarantees the knowledge real. Relations that are discovered between the ideas of qualities that are assumed to belong to the real world we may have the right to take as 'real' relationships, and so, provided they are 'possible' in the sense of not being self-contradictory, as holding of realities if these realities exist. But this is no guarantee that they *do* exist; and anyhow in assuming a connection with reality in the first place we have rather begged the question. So an hypothesis known to be possible in terms of physical science, we are justified in using *as* an hypothesis. But the possibility of an hypothesis gives only the *possibility* of its being real, not the actuality; and the more therefore we attribute 'reality' to knowledge the more we are sacrificing the certainty which alone makes it knowledge.

There are only two ways I see of getting round this difficulty. One is by giving up 'real' knowledge in Locke's sense, and contenting ourselves with the explication of logical relationships; the other is by making our definition of knowledge more catholic, so that it will include as well justified 'belief' in what transcends mere 'logical' experience. Professor Gibson would, I take it, regard it as a merit that Locke did not adopt this latter course; I regard it as a merit that he refused to take the former, and in spite of the requirements of his definition did believe in real knowledge that to all intents and purposes is satisfactory, though it is not reducible to a perception of

relations between ideas. That there is a real world to which knowledge points other than the relational system of ideas, Locke's common sense never allowed him to forget, as more sophisticated philosophers have often forgotten it. To my mind it is greatly in Locke's favor that he sees that scientific method is not the whole of philosophy, or terms and propositions the whole of reality. But while he never questions this common-sense variety of realism, he cannot be said to have contributed very much to an analysis of 'real' knowledge. Obsessed as he is by the conviction that nothing deserves to be called knowledge which stops short of certainty, he does not fully realize to what extent that which is humanly significant in the intellectual life is not by his definition knowledge at all, but only belief. Accordingly his program is from the start a mistaken one—to find logical certainty for those spiritual interests which, as he tells us, were in a sense the starting point of his philosophical activities. In both ethics and religion his ideal of a demonstrative science has definitely broken down; indeed he hardly himself does more than go through the motions of creating a demonstrative ethics. That these spiritual interests may attain to *practical* certainty is indeed possible; but practical certainty is only what Locke would call belief. And when logical certainty is clearly separated from practical certainty, it becomes evident how far it is from leaving us with enough knowledge to keep house with. So with physical knowledge; it is practical certainty alone that we can get here, as Locke himself, though he continues to call it knowledge, confesses. If Locke had taken more seriously suggestions that he himself has made about the nature of that confidence which sensitive knowledge involves, it might have thrown a different light upon the place which he assigns to relational intuition in human affairs.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Rousseau and Romanticism. By IRVING BABBITT. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1919.—pp. xxiii, 426.

In this book Professor Babbitt discusses a general human tendency, and not any individual as such, or any sharply-defined school of thinkers. By 'Romanticism' he means the emotional aspect of "the attempt to erect on naturalistic foundations a complete philosophy of life" (p. x). He attaches the movement to Rousseau because Rousseau represents the movement more adequately than anyone else. After an introductory chapter on the terms 'classic' and 'romantic,' there are eight chapters devoted to various phases of Romanticism: II, Romantic Genius; III, Romantic Imagination; IV, Romantic Morality (The Ideal); V, Romantic Morality (The Real); VI, Romantic Love; VII, Romantic Irony; VIII, Romanticism and Nature; IX, Romantic Melancholy. Chapter X is called "The Present Outlook." There is an appendix on "Chinese Primitivism," a movement which is "perhaps the closest approach in the past to the movement of which Rousseau is the most important single figure" (p. 395). The twenty pages of "very unsystematic bibliographical notes" will, the author hopes, "help to add to the number, now unfortunately very small, of those who have earned the right to have an opinion about romanticism as an international movement" (p. 399).

In substance and intent, this work is an essay in defence of humanism; but the method employed sets it sharply off from many statements sympathetic to the classic tradition. Professor Babbitt, far from turning back toward an ancient attitude, aspires to be more modern than the moderns. His objection to the naturalists, both scientific and romantic, is not that they have left the way of the fathers, but that they have not carried their own critical and empirical method through. He complains that, in being positive according to the natural law alone, they have left their work half-done, and so have vitiated their whole performance. The 'law for man' needs to be investigated in the same scientific spirit as natural phenomena. What is needed is a *complete* positivism. In this book the author professes to make a contribution to the empirical study of human nature. His procedure is somewhat as follows: Granted the romantic attitude toward life, how does it work? To answer this question he examines the life and writings of a great many individual romanticists, and draws the following conclusion: "No movement has perhaps been so prolific of melancholy as emotional romanticism. To follow it from Rousseau down to the present day is to run through the whole gamut of gloom" (p. 307). In a word, romanticism is condemned by its fruits in experience. Similarly a classical attitude stands approved, not primarily by its ancient honored name, but by its present merits. The only ultimate justification for

commending the 'human' life, restraint of the imagination, constant reference of action to a 'center,' is simply "that it is more delectable, that it is found practically to make for happiness" (p. 393). "Progress on the path [of virtue]," he quotes approvingly from Buddha, "may be known by its fruits, . . . by an increase in peace, poise, centrality" (p. 150).

The position that Professor Babbitt takes, as the result of his 'experimental' method applied to human nature, needs some elaboration. It is not at first evident what he means by 'reference to a center' and an attitude of 'imaginative wholeness.' The opposite notion—that of eccentricity or particularity—is much easier to lay hold of. But through various terms which, if not synonymous with 'centrality,' yet convey at least some important aspect of the conception—'proportionateness,' 'measure,' 'control,'—and through illuminating phrases and analyses, the meaning of the position gradually appears. In the first place, centrality of attitude implies maturity; it appeals from a moment or mood to "the future and sum of time." "The very mark of genuinely classical work . . . is that it yields its full meaning only to the mature" (p. 391). The maturity here exalted is not that of old age, but of a disciplined and seasoned judgment, and literature and history, rightly used, may furnish that discipline. We are reminded of Goethe's saying that the masses of universal history should be opposed to the aberrations of the hour. In the second place, a central attitude is inclusive and systematic. Conventional antitheses such as those between ethics and art, originality and tradition, spontaneity and discipline, nature and convention, are never taken absolutely in the type of idealism here represented. There is room for all good things, but they are properly 'placed' or 'centered.' Even romanticism itself is not excluded from Professor Babbitt's doctrine of the good life: "My quarrel is only with the aesthete who assumes an apocalyptic pose and gives forth as a profound philosophy what is at best only a holiday or week-end view of existence" (p. 289). And elsewhere he distinguishes his view from asceticism thus: "Apollo cannot always be bending the bow. . . . But it is only with reference to some ethical center that we may determine what art is soundly recreative" (p. 209). A central attitude is, then, at once hospitable and orderly. Naturalism is abstract and defective because it tends to sacrifice design to the vivid and immediate impression.

If the philosophy of life set forth in *Rousseau and Romanticism* falls short, it is at the point where Professor Babbitt himself admits perplexity, and suggests the need of supplementation. In the "Introduction" he says: "The question remains whether the more crying need just now is for positive and critical humanism or for positive and critical religion" (p. xx). In the concluding chapter he recurs to this question and says: "The preference I have expressed for a positive and critical humanism I wish to be regarded as very tentative. . . . The honest thinker, whatever his own preference, must begin by admitting that though religion can get along without humanism, humanism cannot get along without religion" (pp. 379, 380). The reason why humanism leads on to religion is, I believe, that the better-proportioned one's view of

life becomes, the more one sees that it is "an humble thing to be a man," and that the ideal of understanding is to see all things *sub specie æternitatis*.

KATHERINE GILBERT.

Essai sur l'évolution des doctrines de M. Georges Sorel. Thèse présentée devant la Faculté des Lettres pour le Doctorat de l'Université de Grenoble par FREDERIC D. CHEYDLEUR. Grenoble, 1914.—pp. 174.

This is a monograph presented to the faculty of letters in the University of Grenoble as a thesis for their doctorate. The author devotes himself chiefly to an exposition of Sorel's social and philosophical views in the light of their development. He brings to light, roughly speaking, a traditionalistic period of Sorel's development, a second period in which Marxian features are prominent, subsequently the evolution of a definitive theory of political economy, and finally a return towards traditionalism. Throughout, the writer emphasises the strength of Sorel's ethical interest. The most constant further feature characterizing the successive phases of his mental evolution is a certain pessimism, manifesting itself in *e.g.*, an aversion to all utopian schemes for social welfare, a disbelief in so-called democratic institutions, anti-intellectualism. This bent, however, was with Sorel always a spur to action; and is therefore, in the writer's view, hardly to be called pessimism in the ordinary sense of the term. His mind was of the type which, while it saw the evil in the world, was not prevented thereby from combating it with its whole strength. There was an energism alongside the pessimism which gave an optimistic cast to it.

Throughout the treatment there is ample evidence of wide acquaintance both with Sorel's writings and with writers akin to him. Yet curiously enough, as one passes with appreciation over these careful and scholarly and entirely competent pages, the thought which rises uppermost is the rather sad one that the fate of canonisation should have overtaken the late M. Sorel so soon. To the keen follower, and equally to the keen critic of his teaching, the interest manifested in this book is quite a strange one. The burning questions to Sorel are, no one of them, the burning questions here. Not the question, what is the hope for France? is the central question of this book, nor what is the future of socialism? It is simply, what was Sorel? The focus is the man, not the causes. Sorel has passed into history. What is interesting is his style, his sources, his opinions, his development. In a word, he is canonised.

One wonders, was it time for this? Wasn't it rather soon? Perhaps not; but if not, then there is a sadness about it, a sadness in the thought of Sorel as a literary figure, a sadness akin to Ruskin's mood when he found people deaf to all he wanted them to do, and yet loud in their praises of his style. With infallible instinct he saw that his right effectiveness was over, the moment people began to take a literary interest in him. Sorel was finely conscious of the same fact. His anti-intellectualism was precisely his sense of it. And it was so fine that one cannot but wonder how, towards the end, he viewed the prospect, inevitable to a man like him, of being made the subject of biography.

ical and literary studies, and of seeing his great causes treated as things interesting simply because he was interested in them. Canonisation flatters vanity, and Sorel was not without his vanities; but we are certain it must have taken his whole stock to reconcile him to the prospect of enthronement.

Still, these reflections apply only to the writer's choice of a task, not to his accomplishment of it. As far as that is concerned we anticipate little disposition on the part of readers to be adversely critical. We have the merits one looks for in work of the kind. An intrinsically interesting piece of mental development has been interestingly studied and unfolded; and that with all the clearness of thought, the precision of phrase, the delicate reiterations and the attention to matters of style and finish, which we associate with French expository work. The space given to the various aspects of the subject show an agreeable balance and proportion and the aspects themselves are intelligently selected. The bibliography of Sorel's manifold and scattered writings is given with a care and completeness which will save future students a great amount of research. The author betrays also a good share of that very real merit, an ambition to have his hero quite unique, an aversion to having him pigeonholed or labelled as simple pessimist or simple optimist, as socialist or syndicalist, or in any way forced into any of the current categories which are the temptation of expository writers. The interest which Sorel's works have aroused will create a niche for the book to fill; and his importance will reflect an importance upon it.

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De l'inconscient au conscient. Par GUSTAVE GELEY. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1919.—pp. xiii, 346.

This is a work boldly conceived and boldly carried out. In his effort to comprehend in one vast synthesis all evolution, the author becomes convinced that the methods of the standard biology and psychology are fundamentally wrong. Proceeding from the simple to the more complex, they strain and distort the facts of life and consciousness so as to make them fit into a frame suitable for dealing with facts of more elementary existence. Neither on the Darwinian nor on the Lamarckian basis are we able to account for the origin of species and of instincts, or in general to show how the complex arises from the simple, the higher from the lower. As little able is modern physiology, which treats the individual as an assembly of heterogeneous cell-structures, to explain its self-maintenance and self-reparation, its embryonic and post-embryonic metamorphoses, or insect-histolysis. A study of materialization-phenomena, involving some two years' experimenting with the medium Eva, has served to persuade the author that the biologic organism is a primordial unique substance conditioned by a centralizing essential dynamism. The self, likewise, is not to be regarded as a mere synthesis of conscious states produced by the functioning of nerve-centers. A mass of clinical evidence militates against this view of the standard psycho-physiology, and the whole problem of the subconscious demands treatment from a radically different standpoint.

So Dr. Geley insists that the living being is conditioned by a *dynamo-psychisme essentiel*: it constitutes the essence of the self and cannot be referred to mere cerebral functioning.

The evolutionism of dogmatic theism, monism, and Bergson's creative evolution are criticized, especially Bergson's neglect of the subconscious and his sharp distinction between animal instinct and human intelligence. In a discussion of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, Dr. Geley shows himself a duly reverent Schopenhauerian, but undertakes to overcome the metaphysical basis of his master's pessimism by substituting his own *dynamo-psychisme essentiel* for Schopenhauer's Will and von Hartmann's Unconscious, and especially by correcting their distinction between the unconscious and the conscious.

We come now to the more avowedly constructive portion of the book (pp. 209-338), containing Dr. Geley's evolutionistic philosophy of the universe. Evolution, in his view, is the advance from the unconscious to the conscious, through the agency of the *dynamo-psychisme essentiel*. Between the unconscious and the conscious there is no gulf; the two interpenetrate throughout and condition each other in the individual. The unconscious is progressively becoming conscious; ultimately the unconscious will become all conscious; each individual consciousness will become all-consciousness. The summit of evolution can thus be imagined as a sort of conscious Nirvana (p. 250).

Schopenhauer-wise, Dr. Geley advocates palingenesis, but his own outlook is optimistic, involving the ultimate realization of the sovereign consciousness, sovereign justice and sovereign good. The utter indifference of Nature to the individual's death is simply Nature's way of declaring that the disappearance of the individual consciousness is only an apparent disappearance, that death is an episode, not a final chapter. Immanent justice is at work in the universe; if the balancing of justice is not evident in the present life-span of each individual, we may be assured that in a sufficiently long series of existences it will become mathematically perfect. As to evil, it is the inevitable accompaniment of the awakening of consciousness; the complete attainment of consciousness by the universe will record the extinction of evil.

This, in running summary, is the substance of the book before us. It is Schopenhauerism made optimistic through the abolition of the barrier between the unconscious and the conscious; it is Schopenhauerism brought up to date and made scientific by being grounded upon the firm rock of evidence supplied by mediums and other 'supernormal' agents. Very occasionally (as, for instance, on pp. 275ff.) Dr. Geley faces the objections of those who doubt the genuine or the informing character of the medium's data. Usually he proceeds unquestioningly and treats the recital of mediumistic sittings and materialization-phenomena as if he were dealing with the account of unimpeachable scientific procedure. He cites Hodgson's conversion, after twelve years of study, from scepticism to faith, but does not refer to William James's confession that, after twenty-five years experience with psychical research and researchers, he found himself no further than he was at the beginning.

The intentions of the author are scientific, but his enthusiasm for the 'super-normal' runs away with him. He refers (pp. 72f.) to the Paris experiments with Eusapia Paladino (*sic*) as *exemple indéniable et irréfutable*, irrespective of the numerous detections of Palladino's fraud. He cites the 'unanimity' of scientists as affirming the authenticity of the calculations of the Elberfeld horses (p. 193). Writing of this sort throws doubt on the author's capacity to estimate or to report valid evidence. It likewise makes his constant 'scientific' castigation of the standard science of the day more interesting than instructive. The shaky character of his 'scientific' substructure disturbs the stability of his philosophical edifice.

Dr. Geley's method of referring to his sources as inadequate, and his proof-reading needs attention.

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The following books also have been received:

- The Justification of the Good.* By VLADIMIR SOLOVYOV. Translated by NATHALIE A. DUDDINGTON. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918.—pp. xxxiii, 475.
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- The Life of Matter.* By ARTHUR TURNBULL. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, London, Williams and Norgate, 1919.—pp. 313.
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- Études sur la Signification et la Place de la Physique dans la Philosophie de Platon.* LÉON ROBIN. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1919.—pp. 96.
- La Sélection Humaine.* Par CHARLES RICHTER. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1919.—pp. iii, 259.
- Essai sur l'Évolution du Règne Animal et la Formation de la Société.* Par MAURICE BEDOT. Paris, Félix Alcan; Genève, Georg & Cie., 1918.—pp. 176.
- L'Émulation et Son Rôle dans l'Éducation.* Par FRÉDÉRIC QUEYRAT. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1919.—pp. xii, 159.
- Les Maladies de l'Esprit et Les Asthénies.* Par DR. ALBERT DESCHAMPS. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1919.—pp. xxvii, 740.
- Intuition et amitié.* Par J. SEGOND. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1919.—pp. 278.

NOTES.

Dr. William McDougall, of Oxford, has been appointed Professor of Psychology at Harvard University as successor to the late Professor Hugo Münsterberg.

Professor Lévy-Bruhl, editor of the *Revue Philosophique*, and Professor of Philosophy in the University of Paris, will deliver a course of lectures during the first term of the present year, as exchange professor, at Harvard University.

The nineteenth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association will be held at Cornell University on December 30-31. Members are requested to send to the Secretary at an early date the titles of papers offered for the program of the meeting.

Circulars recently received from Germany announce the publication since the beginning of the year 1919 of a new philosophical organ entitled *Annalen der Philosophie*. This new journal will be published by Felix Meiner in Leipzig under the editorship of Hans Vaihinger and Raymund Schmidt, and will be specially devoted to the "Probleme der Als-Ob-Betrachtung." The prospectus of the new undertaking emphasizes the need of closer coöperation between the special sciences and philosophy and sets before itself the object of promoting this coöperation.

We give below a list of articles in current philosophical journals:

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XXX, 1: *David Snedden*, Some New Problems in Education for Citizenship; *J. D. Stoops*, The Inner Life as a Suppressed Ideal of Conduct; *Alan Dorward*, Some Deductions from the Doctrine of Consequences in Ethics; *Robert Shafer*, Henry Adams; *E. A. Ross*, Lumping *versus* Individualism; *J. W. Scott*, Democracy and the Logic of Goodness; *J. H. Tufts*, War-Time Gains for the American Family.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY, XVI, 18: *C. E. Ayres*, Thomas Hobbes and the Apologetic Philosophy; *Roberts B. Owen*, Teleogy and Pragmatism: A Note; *Ethel Sabin*, Pragmatic Teleology.

XVI, 19: *A. H. Lloyd*, The Function of Philosophy in Reconstruction; *F. R. Bischofsky*, The Concepts of Class, System, and Logical System; *H. B. Smith*, Note on the Relation of Subalternation.

XVI, 20: *H. C. Brown*, The Definition of Logic; *A. Thalheimer*, Purpose; *F. C. S. Schiller*, Methodological Teleology.


XVI, 21: *L. L. Thurstone*, The Anticipatory Aspect of Consciousness; *H. T. Costello*, Relations between Relations; *H. T. Moore*, A Reply to "The Defect of Current Democracy"; *H. B. Alexander*, The New State.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XLIV, 9 and 19: *Ch. Dunan*, L'un, le multiple et leurs rapports; *A. Leclere*, Habitudes et troubles mentaux; *C. Lalo*, L'art et la religion; *J. Segond*, L'imagination pure et la pensée scientifique.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XXVI, 5; *V. Delbos*, Les facteurs kantians de la philosophie allemande du commencement du XIXe siècle; *L. Rougier*, Les erreurs systématiques de l'intuition; *L. Blanchet*, L'attitude religieuse des Jésuites et les sources du pari de Pascal. *W. Winter*, Les Principes de l'Analyse mathématique par Pierre Boutroux; *M. Leroy*, Citoyen ou Producteur?

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE: *J. L. des Bancels*, Instinct, Emotion et Sentiment; *H. Flournoy*, (1) Symbolismes en psychopathologie, (2) Quelques remarques sur le symbolisme dans l'hystérie; *C. E. Guye*, Reflexions sur la classification et la unification des sciences.





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