
UNIVERSITATIS · CALIFORNIENSIS
FIAT LVX
MDCCCLXVIII
EX LIBRIS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL STATUS OF VALUES

by

J. F. DASHIELL

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
under the Faculty of Philosophy,
Columbia University

New York

1913

THE PHILOSOPHICAL STATUS OF VALUES

by

J. F. DASHIELL

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
under the Faculty of Philosophy,
Columbia University

New York

1913

PREFACE

Explanation or apology is hardly needed for any study in values at the present moment. Though beginning this research at a time apparently unmarked by any special interest in the general subject, at least in the eastern states, the author is now gratified to see "values" entering into the center of attention of the philosophical public.

For his first introduction to the attractiveness of the value-philosophy, the writer is indebted to certain lectures by Professor George A. Coe, of Union Theological Seminary. He gladly acknowledges his indebtedness to Professors Frederick J. E. Woodbridge and Wendell T. Bush, both of Columbia University, who through stimulating class lectures and private consultations have done much to define his general philosophical attitude. Above all, he appreciates the help of Professor John Dewey, of Columbia, whose constant advice and inspiration have been fundamental throughout the work. Thanks are due to the author's wife, and to his sister, Miss E. A. Dashiell, for important assistance in preparation of manuscript and proof.

J. F. D.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

PART ONE.

PART TWO.

PART ONE

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

One of the greatest antitheses in the whole history of philosophy is one which is fundamental to a dilemma strikingly brought out in Fichte's "Vocation of Man". The thorough-going scientific and rationalistic treatment of human life as a part of the cosmos, as one link in the chain of absolute necessity and causality, living a life totally amenable even to mathematical treatment, is indeed satisfying to one's intellect; but how our personality, our inner heart life, does cry out for a radically different viewpoint, one which gives a truer picture of life as we actively and intimately, *live* it! The antithesis, I say, permeates the whole story of man's mental development. The Platonic message which holds the essence of things to be their meanings, their future and higher significances, as over against a Democritean theory of the world as describable primarily in terms of physical constitution; the analytic description of man's mental life in terms of motion by a Hobbes, as over against a Humian recognition of philosophy as after all secondary to the daily life of human beings—as *human;* the Kantian antithesis of pure and practical reason; and even the broad distinction between ancient and modern science as holding, the former to a qualitative diversity of existence in the interest of ideals, the latter to a homogeneity in the interest of manipulation:—these are but examples of the opposition of motives permeating the history of thought from the early Greeks to to-day. It is the opposition of head and heart.

Modern thought may be characterized as developing these two interests and points of view in striking forms. On the one hand is the scientific interest, from Galileo, Hobbes, and Descartes, on down to our specialized and highly technical sciences of the present. On the other hand, a romantic tendency seems irrepressible, and we have throughout waves of idealism of this, that,

and the other kind. In this perspective the philosophic situation of the present takes on partial meaning. The scientific advance of the last decades has formed a happy and important picture; while the philosophic thought that has been supposedly directed to a realization, a justification, and a systematic treatment of man's more intimate affective and volitional life, has slowly settled into hardened rationalistic systems that know not life and revel in logistic realms of thought which offer in the final outcome little more than husks to the hungry.

It seems to be the inevitable bias of any philosophical writer of today who happens to be retailing a particular brand of philosophy, to assert that all the signs of the times point in that particular direction. Your realist or pragmatist or naturalist or even your idealist finds the tendencies of the present in his favorite direction. I shall not say, therefore, that in all philosophic fields the problem of values is going to be given increased attention, and that the theory of values is fundamental to all other considerations. I shall not say that the social sciences also are coming to consider the nature of value as fundamental. But it is undeniable that many thinkers are indeed paying a little attention to the subject. We see a growing distrust of a merely "descriptive" treatment of the world and an increasing attention to its "appreciative" aspects. After every scientific description some elements slop over and are incommunicable. The world as seen from the standpoint of a physics or of an astronomy seems to be lacking certain touches of *meaning*, of *significance*, which it has for the experiencing human being. True, description has its *raison d'etre* in appreciation—its origin as well as its end—but it does not fully cover it and cannot act as substitute for it. The world of human life and experience has been in only a very slight proportion reducible to intellectualistic and to scientific terms; and things—primarily objects of appreciative attention—are to be given the status first of *values*, and secondly of impersonal science. "The world does not present itself first of all to us as a mass of objective facts, with little or no relation to ourselves and the things we may be striving to do. It is rather as a world of values and interests that it is first apprehended." [1]

1. I. King, "The Development of Religion", New York, 1910, p. 44.

As a natural result of this recent (though ancient) tendency to return to man's own intimate experience, we have what promises to be a philosophy of value: a study of this broader appreciative aspect of things with a view to just appraisement and reconstruction and even to the development of a technique. The more or less unconscious aim seems to be to overcome in a measure the dualism between scientific description and human appreciation, partly at least by making the former of service to the latter, in describing and systematizing the various phases of our active and emotional life.

Contributions are coming from many quarters. Economics has, since the days of Bentham, been absorbed in the working out of a technique of economic value-movements. Ethical contributions, both direct and indirect, are numerous, less in the development of laws and technique than in the development of general theory. Anthropological interpretations are shedding added light on values by showing them in more naive situations, especially shown in the treatment of religion. Studies of the esthetic attitudes are giving us new insights not only into esthetic worths but also into worths in general. The instrumental conception of logic really assumes a value basis. Finally, even epistemological schools of different tenets are becoming interested in the position of value in the knowledge situation. But these manifold notices of value cry out first of all, I think, for some determination of the philosophical status of value. Every treatment shows inevitably the presupposition of some sort of a philosophical conception of value in general, and it is obvious that until such conceptions are compared and criticized, the discussions of value to-day remain to some degree inarticulate and the uses of the value conception indeterminate. This study is offered as an attempt in this direction, with the hope that it may at least be of interest in suggesting one way of going at the task, whether or not its positive results are all accepted.

I shall hastily touch on the treatment of value in general as we find it more or less explicitly brought out in several most typical schools of thought. I shall notice in Part One:
the German Psychological School;
the Idealistic treatment of Münsterberg;

the Neo-Realistic doctrine of values; and
the Pragmatic doctrine of values.

From these brief reviews we may in Part Two reap something in the way of suggestions toward a general theory of value. Chapter Six will be given to a sketchy outline of the philosophical basis (considered most typical of to-day) from which the work proceeds and in the light of which values are interpreted. The remaining chapters will outline the philosophical theory of value here conceived, and briefly touch on a few of the many implications of the position taken, as well as suggest what answers are to be given to a few of the questions now being asked about value.

CHAPTER TWO

The German Psychology of Values

A start for the study of value in general has been made by what I shall arbitrarily call the German Psychological School. By and large, their treatment is not psychological in a functional or biological sense, but rather is restricted almost wholly to conscious terms.

The movement was characteristically initiated by A. Meinong [1] and C. v. Ehrenfels, [2] and developed with the aid of other Germans such as J. C. Kreibig, [3] J. Cohn, [4] H. Schwartz, [5] O. Kraus, [6] G. Simmel, [7] W. Liel, [8] Dürr, [9] and has found disciples in America, especially Professor W. M. Urban. [10] The aim of this school is to develop the principles and laws of value-phenomena in general—which with them amounts to the development of

1. "Psychologisch—Ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie", Graz, 1894; "Ueber Werthaltung u. Wert", Archiv. f. syst. Phil., v. 1, 1895; "Für die Psychologie u. gegen den Psychologismus in der allgemeinen Werttheorie", Logos, Bd. III, p. 1, 1912.
2. "Werttheorie und Ethik", Vierteljahrsch. f. wiss. Phil., 1893 ff; "Von der Wertdefinition zum Motivationsgesetze", Archiv. f. syst. Phil., v. 2, 1896; "System der Werttheorie", 2 vs, Leipzig, 1897.
3. "Psychologische Grundlegung eines Systems der Werttheorie," Wien, 1902.
4. "Beiträge zur Lehre von der Wertungen", Zeitschr. f. Phil., 1897.
5. "Psychologie des Willens", Leipzig, 1900.
6. "Zur Theorie des Wertes", Halle, 1902.
7. "Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft", 2 vs, Berlin, 1892–3; "Chapter on the Philosophy of Value", Am. Jour. Sociol., v. 5.
8. "Gegen eine voluntarische Begründing der Werttheorie" in "Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie u. Psychologie", Leipzig, 1904.
9. "Zur Frage der Wertbestimmung", Archiv. f. d. gesammte Psych., 1905.
10. "Valuation: Its Nature and Laws", London and New York, 1909; art. "worth" in "Dict. of Phil. and Psych."; "Recent Tendencies in Psych. Theory of Values", Psych. Bulletin, v. IV, no. 3.

a definite theory of the nature of the mental attitude of valuation and in consequence the discovery of the laws governing the growth and changes in the species of this general mental attitude. I shall refer only to the three or four most important and characteristic authors.

The first problem to be attacked is that of the "*worth-fundamental.*" What phase of mental life is it that is fundamental and necessary for every act of valuation? Now this presupposes a division of mental life into elements and a selection of the essential one concerned here. (Meinong, for instance, divides mind into idea, judgment, feeling, and desire.)

According to Meinong everyone will agree that experiences of value are invariably accompanied by some aspect of *feeling* life. But are all feelings value-feelings? Obviously not, and to feeling we must add the *judgment of existence* as part of the worth-moment. Not a mere pleasantness or unpleasantness, but a pleasantness or unpleasantness referred to a definitely judged object, makes up a value. An opposing view is that of Ehrenfels, who says: "Value is a relation between an object and a subject, in which the subject *desires* the object..... The strength of the value is proportional to the strength of the desire." Kreibig accepts feeling as the fundamental of the worth-moment, but he restates Meinong's theory of existence-judgment, calling it not the presupposition, but the intellectual correlate, of value-feeling. Urban reconciles these different positions: "We are compelled to include both the concepts of feeling and conation in our psychological equivalents for the worth-moment." In fact, "it is impossible at any point to make an absolute distinction between feeling and will. They constitute rather a continuous series of meanings in which these two aspects can be distinguished only relatively".

Although the German psychology of value seems to pay most attention to strictly conscious phenomena, there is, nevertheless, a recognition of dispositional elements: the coloring of a present state by a background of pre-formed attitudes and habitual dispositions. Thus a continuity of values is secured, the earlier going to help form the basis of the later, and mental life accordingly given a continuous meaning.

The combinations and substitutions among the values, going on within this general continuity, form a fascinating study—but we must pass over this, with the bare mention of the fact that such general phenomena of value-transfer give rise to differentiations of values themselves. Most familiar is that between "intrinsic" and "instrumental" values. The former are those objects which we value primarily for their own sake, while the latter are valued by virtue of their practical connection with other (valued) objects. It is implied in the very conception of instrumental values that at least some values possess a referential element, pointing beyond to something else. They are not sufficient in and of themselves but their character is in some degree determined by a reference beyond themselves. But this hint is not followed out in this particular direction.

Now the "dispositional" element spoken of above, taken in connection with the "value-movements", with "intrinsic and instrumental worths", and with the "referential" character, leads to an assembling and a rounding-out of these conceptions in that of "purposive consistency". The value-movements are specific changes within the general tendency of the conscious individual to set up and maintain values, integrating and organizing them out of their struggle for existence, into a more and more unified self.

An important though obvious character found in all worths is that of a duality of quality, analogous to the duality of quality of feeling-tones. Thus we have positive and negative values, or "Werte" and "Unwerte". Now, this polarity is more than a simple division of worths on the right hand and on the left: it is a "Wertscala"; and analogous to the hypothetical ranging of simple presentations on the hedonic scale of pleasantness-unpleasantness, we have here a ranging of values on a worth-scale.

It may be noted in passing that the German School do not limit their treatment of value to its individual aspects. There are values developed by the social life of man, and exercising influence on social wholes as well as on individuals. However, it is values of and for the individual that are first examined; social values are then built out of them.

A very fundamental question involved in problems of absent

objects of worth as well as in that of value-errors, is the question of the objectivity or subjectivity of value. Meinong is somewhat confusing here, but he really unites with Ehrenfels, Kreibig, etc., in denying objective value as a property of outer things. We ascribe value to things only as we desire them, etc. It is merely subjective. Now "subjective" may mean the object of strictly inner or "introspective" observation of so-called states of consciousness. This use is writ large over their works. "Subjective" may also mean relative (in part or in whole) to the individual's own existence (not necessarily to his awareness). This use also is evident throughout—as in the description of values in terms of individual feeling or desire. This individual feeling or desire is in fact not merely *selective* of values but *constitutive* of them.

A problem which is related in some of its phases to the question of subjectivity or objectivity of worths is that of the "*absolute*" character of value. We hear mention of absolute values in many places. The German School deny absoluteness to value. Urban, however, grants that *practical* absolutes may be found in moments of complete absorption and identification of personality of the subject in esthetic or mystical contemplation, etc.; for here all other values are absent. But a single permanent absoluteness for one value is impossible—all values we know are subject to mutation.

CHAPTER THREE

Muensterberg's Theory of Value

In "Eternal Values",[1] written by Professor Hugo Münsterberg as an edition in English of his "Philosophie der Werte",[2] we find a decidedly different attack on the problem of values.

Our author surveys the work of science and its findings. Physics treats of things as *just things,* psychology treats of psychic contents as *just contents,* and the scientific method is to examine only such facts in their bare fact-status, not as elements in systems of significances and meaning. Truly the work of natural science is magnificent; but can we rest here? And in the true Fichtean spirit, Professor Münsterberg rises up against such constructions as final views of life, asserting the importance, the necessity, of values. Instead of being "imbedded helplessly into a blind accidental game", we must claim a greater birthright. The duty of philosophy, then, becomes that of seeking by clear conceptions, and conscious purposive labor, to show what it means to *have* values—to show that they are absolute and eternal. Münsterberg's purpose is accordingly to show that values are eternal, that it all rests in one great absolute value.

What does the very fact of values imply? It implies always some intentions, purposes, attitudes, some desires and aversions of our active life. But these are all manifestations of will; it is in the fulfillment of our will that our truest satisfaction is found. The secret of our life, then, is to be found in our will; and the fundamental absolute valuation is to be found in the essence of will, namely, the assertion of identity among changing experiences. "If life were nothing but a momentary flash, if no instant referred beyond itself, if no content remained beyond the flying experience, life would have no meaning and we should have

1. Boston and New York, 1909.
2. Leipzig, 1908.

nothing which we might call a world." Values are in a sense created, are not hidden somewhere ready-made, waiting to be discovered. They are created, are experienced in the very act of striving—striving to realize purposes and intents.

In the striving of the will for self-realization a certain character is to be marked. "We will the right and the good and the just, and in this will lies a reference to a good which in this act itself remains entirely independent of any conscious relation to our welfare." In moral action we feel a categorical imperative which has the character of absoluteness. Values, then, come to us in our daily strivings not as relative characters but as possessing in themselves a unique absoluteness. The good thing is good, not because this or that person or law or custom says so, but simply because it *is* good. "The values stand above the individual."

And yet we must not be confused. Values stand above the individual, not in the sense of constituting a realm or a being existing external to us and transcending us, but in the sense of giving the fundamental determination to our will. They are the inward ideals working impersonally in us. This is what our author calls the "Over-self". It is that Will that is fundamental to all existence, to all values, to all experience. It is not the mere sum-total of all individual selves, but is rather the fundamental essence of them all. The over-self is the true metaphysical absoluteness, and in it is founded the absoluteness of values.

What, then, is the phenomenal world? We as separate individual selves are but limited standpoints of the over-self, limited manifestations of its striving. And with us arises the whole manifoldness of the outer world—space and time relations and material content. But this resolution of the over-self is not temporal, for it is more fundamental than time. The over-self is the *essence* of all experiences and of all worlds.

Nature accordingly is not a dead nature. It "is willing to become material and tool of the evaluating will. In the progress of economy nature climbs from step to step through richer and richer forms of serviceableness. In its beauty and in its development nature shows its will; in its causal lawfulness nature guarantees its loyalty."

And now, having reached this insight and having found the absolute basis for his values, Münsterberg shows the enthusiasm of Fichte: "Banished is the anxiety that the over-reality is meaningless, and that our world of experience with all its truth and beauty and goodness may be a useless purposeless upbuilding."

CHAPTER FOUR

The Neo-Realistic Theory of Values

As a consistent school of philosophical thinking now coming into prominence, the new realism demands attention. Unlike certain other schools, this one is not based fundamentally on a theory of values, and in consequence we find only one American representative who considers them, Professor R. B. Perry. [1]

Not all contents of consciousness, according to this author, are independent of consciousness. There are certain cases of subjectivity—using "subjectivity" in the sense of being dependent upon the part played by the organism in the whole organism-environment situation. He enumerates seven cases of subjectivity, and includes among them values. The fundamental basis for a value is a desire on the part of the subject: without this attitude of the organism toward the object the latter can never attain worth: to be a value is to be desired. Again, when an object becomes a value it has entered into new relations with other things co-present, remembered, etc.; and as these new relationships are supplied by an interested consciousness, the object *as value* is subjective. But Professor Perry seems always to have in mind desire only as conscious desire. Though not quite consistent with his broader position concerning values and organic life, yet the point is definitely expressed.

A distinction is pointed out: "If *a* is good, in that I need, like, or aspire to it; *that fact* can be neither made nor unmade by any judgment or opinion concerning it." In other words, though the value itself is subjective, it is independent of opinion about it: it is a fact, and so far objective.

Inorganic nature has no values. With the advent of life on the globe, interests enter the world. Nature then shows values

1. Essay in "The New Realism", New York, 1912, sections VI & VII; "Present Philosophical Tendencies", New York, 1912, chap. XIV; "The Moral Economy", New York, 1909, chap. I.

in proportion as objects further or hinder these interests or desires. Goodness consists in the satisfaction of desire; and when various interests conflict in seeking satisfaction, moral values arise as the most satisfying of these competing elements. Moral values are organizations of interests.

An essentially opposing view to Professor Perry's is defended by the English realist, Mr. Bertrand Russell.[1] Goodness is as objective as redness, according to this author, and our reluctance in seeing this is due to two facts: (a) goodness is not presentable to sense, and (b) there is less agreement among people as to what are good things. Nevertheless we do strive for goods in a definite objective sense. To identify the good with the desired is insufficient, for do we not have desires for evil things? Thus the goodness that is sought in ethics is impersonal and should exist for its own sake. Even in a conflict of desires, is it not the ethical aim to search out *the* good, and thus to correct those that are erroneous? "*Good* and *bad* are qualities which belong to objects independently of our opinions, just as much as *round* and *square* do." Furthermore, "Presumably there are many goods of which we human beings have absolutely no knowledge, because they do not come within the very restricted range of our thoughts and feelings."

It is obvious that the latter-day realism has yet to extend its labors to cover the problem of values more thoroughly; with the standpoint and methods of this school now fairly organized, other consistent constructive attempts may be fairly expected.

Let me suggest what appears to me a significant point for a thoroughly consistent realism.

The disposition to make values or worths dependent upon the valuating subject is a manifestation of the same tendency that led the thinkers of old to believe in a chasm between the so-called primary and secondary qualities. Such a distinction is

1. "Philosophical Essays," London, 1910, chap. I, "Elements of Ethics".

now discredited and referred to an antiquated physics. I shall use the terms "primary and secondary qualities", however, because both taken together represent in everyone's mind a fairly definite set of qualities, and because I want to develop the similarity between their status and that of the "tertiary qualities" or values.

I see no more reason for claiming subjectivity for tertiary qualities than for secondary qualities or even primary. One argument runs like this: an object that is beautiful to you is ugly to me, or again, an act that seems wrong to me on Sunday seems justifiable enough on Monday. The very relativity of these worths proves them to be only functions of my own dispositions and habits. But the same argument holds against primary and secondary qualities. The tree green to you is blue to me who am more distant; it is also large to you and small to me. If relativity destroys the objectivity of values, it does the same for colors, sizes, sounds, shapes, etc.

Another argument runs: values are never experienced except as we have certain desires, interests, emotions, feelings. Waffles are found to be a positive value (in an immediate sense) only when the human body is in a state near hunger: when the stomach calls for no more food, these waffles are found to be of negative worth. This style of argument is familiar from Professor Perry's position. If a person had no interests he would have no values. But this argument sounds as fallacious as the "physiological argument" for subjectivism. Because sensations are the *ratio cognoscendi* of the external world, we may not conclude that they are its *ratio essendi*. Similarly, because desires, feelings, conations, are the means of *experiencing* values, we may not conclude that they are their *creators*.

A third form of argument is the familiar one of errors. Of course, this is applicable to other qualities beside values.

Furthermore, just as the nervous system must reach certain degrees of development in order to be able to lay hold on reds and sours and roughs, may we not say the nervous system must reach certain degrees of development in order to lay hold on dismals and beautifuls and bads?

It would seem, then, that the case of the independence of

values stands or falls with the independence of primary and secondary qualities. If we begin by shaving off the values from the objects, I do not see that we can stop at colors and sounds, nor even at thicknesses and weights.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Pragmatic Doctrine of Values

The school of present-day thought to which values are perhaps more fundamental than to any other, is pragmatism. In the important literature of pragmatism I find several short treatments of "values" specifically. These treatments appear at first sight very different; it will remain for us to see whether they are contradictory or are different approaches to one fundamental conception.

First, in Professor John Dewey's works, the "Studies in Logical Theory" and "The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy".[1] In the former work, after showing the vicious distinction that cold logic of the formal type forces between thinking and other values in experience, the author makes a plea for a *true* logic, as a study of conflicting values in life: scientific, esthetic, religious, etc. Such a "logic of experience" will be directed immediately to the *evaluation* of our thinking tools, our working conceptions, and will seek to test their adequacy for the given life-situations. It will seek for adjustment and equilibrium between the various phases of daily life by making them not haphazard adjustments to be tested merely by the law of survival, but intelligent, economical adjustments. The philosophical task will be to evaluate the work of the various sciences and departments of thought with reference to their social effect.

In his volume of essays, "The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy," etc., Professor Dewey speaks of values as *found* in the *world*. Experience demonstrates "that knowable energies are daily generating about us precious values." "The facts of the case just stare you in the eyes: Goods *are*, a multitude of them—but, unfortunately, evils also *are*; and all grades, pretty much, of

1. Chicago, 1909, chaps. I–IV: New York, 1910.

both." "No account of the universe in terms *merely* of the redistribution of matter in motion is complete, no matter how true as far as it goes, for it ignores the cardinal fact that the character of matter in motion and of its redistribution is such as cumulatively to achieve ends—to effect the world of values we know." "Things are surcharged valuations." Thus it is insisted that since we *do experience* values— and everyone of course does—it is useless and silly to attempt to adduce proof of their existence and of their supremacy.

Again, the conception of worth is used by the same writer in his statement of the thought-situation. As things are present to us in our problematic situation they are freighted with meanings. It is just this factor of meanings and references which constitutes the elements as values. It is *because* they have meanings that the things have any value for us, any motivating power over us. Otherwise they would awaken no attention, would not even contribute themselves to the situation at all, in fact, there would *be* no situation. Thus primarily the value of objects consists in their referential character. But again: the original presentation of the problematic situation is in emotional terms; the more or less intellectual handling of it is guided largely by the selective nature of emotion and feeling; and the outcome, good or bad, is attested in its goodness or badness by its emotional character. Thus, values are such not only by virtue of their referential character, but also by virtue of their emotional vividness. Furthermore, after the experimental testing of the claims to truth, of the suggestions of solution, the values are divided into those of positive and those of negative worth.

Mr. F. C. S. Schiller puts forth much the same ideas pretty plainly in his "Studies in Humanism." [1] "Whatever arouses an interest or forwards an end is judged to be (so far) 'good'; whatever baffles or thwarts is judged to be 'bad'. If, therefore, the consequences of an assertion turn out to be in this way 'good', it is valuable for our purposes and, provisionally at least, establishes itself as 'true'.....Thus the predicates 'true' and

1. London, 1907.

'false' are nothing in the end but indications of logical value, and *as values* akin to and comparable with the values predicated in ethical and esthetical judgments, which present similar problems of the validation of claims." "Neither the question of *Fact*,.....nor the question of *Knowledge* can be raised without raising also the question of *Value*. Our 'Facts' when analyzed turn out to be 'Values', and the conception of 'Values', therefore, becomes more ultimate than that of 'Fact'. Our valuations thus pervade our whole experience." Here there is a tendency to merge values of different traditional kinds. The point of similarity is that they are all *purposive*, all involved in organic adjustment to environment, and all have reference to the process of testing-out. There is, then, a certain organic connection between them—making them specific kinds of an underlying generic value-in-general. This, of course, does not preclude their further *distinction into* these specific kinds, and they are not to be identified and confounded.

"In theory, at least, the 'goods', and therefore the 'truths' of all the sciences are unified and validated by their relation to the Supreme Good. In practice no doubt this ideal is far from being realized, and there arise at various points conflicts between the various sorts of values or goods, which doubtless will continue until a perfect harmony of all our purposes, scientific, moral, esthetic and emotional has been achieved." "It is no exaggeration, therefore, to contend, with Plato, that in a way the Good, meaning thereby the conception of a final systematization of our purposes, is the supreme controlling power in our whole experience, and that in abstraction from it neither the True nor the Real can exist." Thus we come upon a doctrine simliar in many ways to the "purposive consistency" of Urban and the German Psychologists. Pragmatism, then, becomes a logic for mediating between the previous and funded valuations and the coercions of the values given in present experiences.

And there is a further corollary. Life and mind are purposive, and the purposes actuating are concrete and pluralistic. Yet they are not always highly definite. Definite purposes are always of gradual growth. "They arise by selection; they crystallize out from a magma of general interestedness and vaguely pur-

posive actions, as we realize our true vocation in life.....Thus we become more and more clearly conscious of our 'ends', and more and more definite in referring our 'goods' to them."

Professor William James touches on values briefly in his article, "The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience".[1] It is the popular notion that affectional experiences are purely inner facts. But this statement is based on the same error as the conception of a consciousness-stuff. In point of fact, "subjectivity and objectivity are affairs not of what an experience is aboriginally made of, but of its classification." The preciousness of the diamond is found to be a quality of the gem or is found to be a feeling in our mind, according to the direction of our thought at the time.

"We soon learn to separate the ways in which things appeal to our interests and emotions from the ways in which they act on one another." *If* we are talking in terms of the latter, then we discriminate against the former, and as it were, push them off the map of the real world. But when living in terms of the relations of things to *us*, the values are experienced as immediate and all-convincing. They are, then, mental or non-mental, according as we take them in one or the other natural context.

A corollary from this whole point of view is that the appreciative aspects of things are genuinely *found*. "We discover beauty just as we discover the physical properties of things."

A systematic presentation of value from the pragmatic point of view is given in H. W. Stuart's "Valuation as a Logical Process."[2] Value-judgments, this author contends, are just as objective as factual judgments, and are constructive of an order of reality just as is theoretical science. For, first of all, what is the source of "objectivity"? It lies in the motor functions of the subject. Those things which present themselves as stimuli to provoke and to guide activity, which stand over against us, as it were, as determinants of behavior—these things are "objective". And now, if things stimulate and guide us not only in the capacity of mere existences but also in the capacity of meanings, surely by our criterion the latter aspects are as truly objective

1. Now chap. V. in "Essays in Radical Empiricism", New York, 1912
2. Chap. X. in Dewey's "Studies in Logical Theory."

as the former. They are even *more* so, for after all, it is in their capacity as significances and leadings that things enter into our living experience.

If, now, judgments of value are even more primarily objective than judgments of fact, the corollary would follow that the latter judgments are probably developed in the interests of the former. Such, indeed, appears to be the case. "Our judgments of sense-perception and science are, as such, capable of satisfactory interpretation only as being incidental to the attainment and progressive reconstruction of judgments of value." As *bare* facts, they are meaningless. They have meaning only as they are abstractions from the concrete richnesses of life, "to define the situation in terms of the means necessary for the execution of the end that is gradually taking form". "Thus the realms of fact and value are both real, but that of value is logically prior and so the 'more real'.....Reality in the logical sense is that which furthers the development of the self. The purpose that falls short of its promise in this regard is unreal.....in the logical sense that it is no longer valued."

We have been speaking thus far of valuation as a *process*. What now is the consciousness of value—considered as a moment or cross-section from the stream of living experience? It is "a sense of the 'importance' to oneself of a commodity or defined moral purpose". The commodity or the moral purpose has been approved in previous experiences and in judgments, and is now the bearer of concrete meaning compacted into itself. This sense of importance is now a motor attitude of the subject, which becomes a factor in the new present situation.

We have been noticing the rather fragmentary treatment of value by different pragmatist authors: let us see if we cannot find a fundamental agreement.

For the immediate experience values appear as objective as do physical existents. They are even more immediately *noticed*, for with their emotional and referential characters, they are the propelling and guiding factors in the movement of thinking. Values simply *are*. The world is not really seen to be a physical world pure and simple but a world of goods and bads and uglies and fearfuls. It is a world which grips us emotionally and forces

us into favorable and unfavorable attitudes. These various values, meanwhile, enter into competition; and through successive reconciliations we find them growing in definiteness and articulation as our purposes gain in coherency. Since these concrete purposes are more or less organically inter-related, value may be taken as a generic term, the kinds of values (ethical, economic, etc.) being its species. Finally, values are the supreme embodiment of purpose. Without values purpose is meaningless; without purpose values are impossible.

PART TWO

CHAPTER SIX

Two New Philosophical Movements

Revolts against the constraints of consistency with past philosophic thought are strikingly evident in the last two decades. These have taken various degrees and directions. Of these I will mention two that I consider most striking and most influential: one is the conception of pure experience, the second is the emphasis on the reality of change.

The Doctrine of Pure Experience

A new point of departure and a new method for philosophical procedure is found in the work of many contemporary writers who take explicitly or implicitly a standpoint of pure experience, or better, *mere* experience. The works of Richard Avenarius, [1] have been made familiar to English readers in their main contentions by the monograph by Professor W. T. Bush on "Avenarius and the Standpoint of Pure Experience." [2] Professor Bush has done further work on this line. [3] Pure experience is also convincingly set forth by Professor Dewey [4] and Professor James. [5] Less explicitly we find the same attitude in general lines adopted by Professor George Santayana. [6] The sympathies of Professor F. J. E. Woodbridge with this point of view I have felt more in his spoken words than in print. The general tendency needs no introduction to the philosophical public, but it may not be amiss to re-emphasize certain particular points.

1. "Die Kritik der reinen Erfahrung," Leipzig, 1888; "Der Menschliche Weltbegriff," Leipzig, 1891.
2. New York, 1905.
3. Articles in Jour. of Phil. Psy., and S. M.: v. VI, pp. 175, 393; v. VIII, pp. 169, 438.
4. "Infl. of Darwin"; "Studies in Log. Th."
5. "Pragmatism"; "Essays in Radical Empiricism"; etc.
6. "Life of Reason", New York, 1906, v. I.

To philosophize from the basis of pure experience amounts to a resolution to stand by the actual facts of a daily, living human life. This means that preconceptions must be ruled out as far as possible, that consistency with past notions shall not prejudice the naive observation of the facts. Attention is directed not to what we *must* do, what *ought* to happen, what has *got* to be the result, but to what we *do* do, what *does* happen, what actually *is* the result. Experience is the philosophy we live, whatever we may preach.

Again, the standpoint of experience opposes all that claims a transcendental quality. To talk of existents we must talk of things as experienced or experienceable, never of any of them as always and ever beyond the direct immediate contact of the human being. True, mathematics and other dialectical studies have their value, but this value does not refer to existents but to convenient ideas for dealing with existents. Professor Bush argues that God, the soul, the universe, have never been the objects of real present experience but have been built up from certain animistic survivals. They are never experienceable; so let us clarify our atmosphere and vision by dispelling such mists. It does not follow, however, that all philosophers of pure experience take quite this stand. In the same spirit he would do away with (transcendental) metaphysics, leaving philosophy on the basis of natural science and human life. But metaphysics is retained by others (e. g., Professors Woodbridge and James) in a different sense: as the study of existence and experience in its most general aspects, a thing which no science properly does.

Or again, the position of pure experience may be defined as an immediate empiricism of a radical temper. *Any* fact of experience, so it be such, is entitled to some consideration in our seeking philosophical adjustment. Things are experienced as red and blue just as much as heavy and solid, ugly and magnificent as much as red and blue. The mystic's vision and the dreamer's romance are original data just as truly as the broker's stocks and the zoologist's protozoa. Anything, then, that may be the object of experience must be taken as *original* data. The purposes of investigation or the contingencies of use may require a selection of certain kinds of experiences and a discrimination against certain other kinds.

The method of this brand of thinking in its appreciation of the original, naive, unprejudiced status of the world's elements is well shown in the critical work of Professor Woodbridge. There is constantly evidenced an impatience with the method of dealing with facts which first subjectifies those facts and then is hard put to it to explain their original objective character. If we find this or that thing in our dealing with the world, let us construe them *in* that world and learn their exact status and characters by empirical discovery, rather than imprison them in the mind.

I have said that this method is an immediate empiricism of a radical temper. It is, then, not limited to a recognition of facts observed in a coldly intellectual spirit, but includes all facts of life, however emotional and affectional. These things are all original data.

A most interesting product of the pure experience point of view is pluralism. Against the older fashion of starting one's philosophy with a conception of the totality and unity of the world, this point of view urges that we look to see whether the world as we know it *is* a single unity. " 'The world is One'.... just so far as we experience it to be concatenated, One by as many definite conjunctions as appear. But then also *not* One by just so many *disjunctions* as we find.....It is neither a universe pure and simple nor a multiverse pure and simple." Even time and space as absolute and unified concepts find their real basis in scientific and philosophical thinking, while "the great majority of the human race never use these notions, but live in plural times and spaces interpenetrant and *durcheinander*." [1]

One pitfall for the student, especially him who has drunk deep of various forms of idealism, is the tendency to read a solipsistic strain into the doctrine of experience. He feels that we argue each from his own private experience and that the conception of other minds, even of outward nature, are reached by some process of projection or leap beyond this privacy. But this really subverts the whole position. Subjectivism itself, the dis-

1. James, "Pragmatism", pp. 148, 177-8.

tinctions between my experience and others' experience and outward nature, is this not already a product of sophisticated thinking? Original data, naive data, are not presented in such pigeonholed forms. The corollary follows that experience is quite really a social affair, and our objects of daily experience are social products based upon current beliefs and traditions—upon the *Erkenntnissmenge* in which the individual finds himself. Even the distinction between you and me is a practical one limited to the purpose in hand. I feel that this false subjectivistic interpretation of the experience notion is to be diagnosed as fundamentally a false notion of mind and thought. "Experience", "mind", "thinking", all such words refer not to a consciousness stream or a mind-stuff or even just a *consciousness,* but to overt situations that certain natures get into. When one is conscious of, or thinking about, the statue before him, the statue is itself *actually included* in this thinking relation. It is seen from this that the statue may be simultaneously involved in other conscious attitudes on the part of other subjects, that these simultaneous attitudes may modify and reflect each other, consequently that the statue is properly speaking the object of a broader attention than that of one individual. In general terms, the private experience of a single person is seen to be an abstraction from the experience of Humanity.

The Reality of Change

The static interpretation of the world as a whole which for examination may be cut up into sections spatial and temporal, which is susceptible to thorough treatment by the Mediaeval formal logic of genera and species, which is not so much a world of process and development as a world of mechanical displacements and which is *sub specie aeternitatis* rather than *sub specie generationis*—this static interpretation received its jolt in the decided rise of the evolutionary doctrines.

The phenomena of change, accordingly, are now being taken

as of supreme importance. The pragmatists find this a fundamental point in their teachings, explicitly brought out by Professors Dewey,[1] James,[2] and J. E. Boodin.[3] It is one of those characters that Professor Woodbridge finds so truly real of existence. As "temporalism", it is held in one form by Professor A. O. Lovejoy.[4] It is, of course, fundamental to the whole Bergsonian philosophy. Minor manifestations are to be found in many other thinkers, and the whole influence of the new stimulus is incalculable.

There are perhaps two different starting-points for the general theory. Sometimes the argument is from the efficiency experienced in our own intimate activity; sometimes it is from the observation of genesis and process in the world of nature; but as far as I know, the arguments from these different bases converge rather than diverge, and the whole general theory of dynamism stands on two legs.

We are not to suppose, of course, that the thinkers of the preceding centuries failed to recognize change at all. But they considered it unimportant. Their interests were, as said above, primarily scientific, and for the purposes of tabulation and breaking up of material into shape to be easily manipulated, the conception of time as absolutely homogeneous was essential. Laws of physics are made as laws good not for to-day only, but for all time. The change quality is abstracted; the static inert remainder can then more easily be classified and handled. And yet this is not putting it exactly. A certain conception of change was indeed retained but it was a change taking place in a homogeneous time, a change after the manner of mechanical displacements merely, a change without creation and without definite directions or tendencies—a change emasculated, as it were.

1. Title essay in "Infl. of Darwin", etc.; also certain class lectures I have had the privilege of attending.
2. "Pluralistic Universe," New York, 1909, lecture VI and Appendices B and C.
3. "Concept of Time," Jour. P. P. and S. M., v. II, p. 365; "Time and Reality", Psych. Rev. Monograph Supp., v. VI, no. 3.
4. "Problem of Time in Recent French Philosophy," Phil. Rev., v. XXI, nos. 1, 3, 5; "Place of the Time Problem in Contemporary Philosophy," Jour. P. P. and S. M., v. VII, p. 683.

But all this reading of the world in static and mathematical terms, seems to leave out important elements. It simply is not the world we live in. For is not yesterday a past which we now use as material for helping to make our to-morrow a better to-morrow? If the future were to be the past over again, if the efficacy of strivings extended no further than to a turning of the kaleidoscope, our attempts to lay hold of causal connections between things would be in vain, and the life of aspirations, hopes, and strivings would be a mockery. This would be a flux—nothing but a flux. To our living purposes, however, this flux has certain principles and meanings, and we are all unconsciously disciples of Heraclitus in seeking after this reality within the appearance of chaos. We are Aristotelians, too, in a measure, for we recognize that this change is not necessarily the manifestation of a single general impulsion, but that generation means specific generation. Certain particular antecedents give rise only to certain particular consequents; and how much unity of impulsion there may be is a matter for empirical discovery.

To obviate a possible misconstruction, a remark may be inserted here. [1] If we find these ordered changes in the world with their purposive and creative characters, why not *leave* them in the world? By what valid constraint are we actuated when we try to put the purposiveness, the creativeness into the mind of the beholder? Why say that these characters are *read into* nature rather than *found* in nature? It is as sensible to say that a teleological world awakens human aspirations as to say that human aspirations create a teleological world.

That this whole dynamic conception in contemporary thought is valuable for purposes both critical and constructive, no one will question. One striking example is the changed attitude toward epistemology. The problem of knowledge is not now looked on as a problem of the relation of a static mental content with a static parallel, Reality; it is rather the problem of the fruitfulness and efficiency of this, that, and the other thinking-activity.

1. Following a suggestion of Professor Woodbridge's.

Certain Other Tendencies.

The last paragraph has opened a way to what might have been called a third principal tendency in contemporary thought: *voluntarism* and the doctrine of thought as primarily functional and purposive. I prefer, however, to regard this as more or less implied and involved in the two tendencies mentioned. It may be fairly asked if psychological voluntarism has not in fact been father to both those movements—even if the other parent has been a decided revolution in conceptions of nature.

Thought, now is to be given this new dynamic interpretation. The old hard and fast division of mental life into faculties (from which indeed the common present-day psychology has not fully broken away), and the theory of mind as a self-enclosed set of conscious states, are to be rejected in favor of the conception of mental activity as the behavior of an organism that has a living to earn and a business to perform in the world: the facilitation of efficient modes of adjustment. The functional character is typically shown in the case of awareness. Consciousness emerges in a situation of stress, and the examination of the situation yields clues to new possibilities of adaptation. [1] Or again, "Our perceptions give us the plan of our eventual action on things..... simply mark what we can attain and modify in them." [2]

Neo-realism is a definite school of contemporary philosophy. Its relations to the two above movements are interesting. There are, I suppose, three most apparent aims in the new realism. (1) Its origin is due largely to a dissatisfaction with subjectivistic epistemology, and its most explicit aim is to prove that the existence of material objects, logical terms, errors, secondary qualities, etc., etc., are independent of their being known by anyone. (2) This emphasis upon things as independent has led to an insistence upon the methods and findings of the natural sciences. (3) Along with this goes a defence of formal logic and analysis, as applying not to forms of thought but to forms of extra-mental existence.

1. Professor Dewey.
2. Professor Bergson, "Creative Evolution", trans. by Dr. Arthur Mitchell, New York, 1911, p. 188.

In the first two aims, in the attempt to get back to the facts of daily life, we see the standpoint of experience operative. In the third, however, we are likely to find an insufficient appreciation of the dynamic character of existence and life. Neo-realism has its mind so concentrated upon refuting subjectivism that it is caught speaking largely in the same static concepts of mental facts and outer facts. Moreover, we are likely to find here the restraint of the empirical temper rather weakened in the face of formal logical demands.

CHAPTER SEVEN

An Outline Theory of Value

In the study of the various contemporary treatments of value outlined in Part One, I felt myself growing into a fairly definite attitude. Each theory has had its influences, as well as the more general tendencies in contemporary thought outlined in Chapter Six, but these influences are so numerous and complex that I must perforce leave the references to the reader. The aim is to outline an attitude which appeals to its possessor as sufficiently single and unified.

Before we become philosophers we are plain people living man's common life in the every-day world. What are the general characters of this life and world?

Our life is cast in a world that surrounds us and that concerns us deeply. It is not all agreeable and not all disagreeable, but that it is in parts now one, now the other, is the first lesson of life. Be we never so young and indiscriminating or never so dreamy and inactive, we are always forced into attitudes, positive or negative, by our experiences, favorable or unfavorable. Things strike us in the face, as it were, by the very coerciveness of their meaning. Nothing is more false than to say that we find the attributes of goodness or badness, of prettiness or ugliness, added to the things: they simply *are* the things. It is not that we experience an object as having also the quality of loveliness, but rather that we know it *as* a loveliness in this particular *form*. It is seen *first* as a *value, then* scrutinized for its detailed make-up and for whatever handles we may grasp.

Generalizing, in the real experience of humanity—and I know not what else to start from—the categories of value actually are found to be more primary than those categories developed by further description of the thing. The persons we know, the dog we pat, the chairs and houses and sidewalks, are the results of a gradual precipitation out of the solution of a general mean-

ingfulness. However much the first experiences lack definiteness, they never lack the qualities of meaningfulness; and the babe experiences uncomfortableness, or better, just something wrong, long before he is conscious of what is the trouble in definite particulars. But this is not a story of children only. Adults are conscious of, and react to, situations primarily in their value aspect. How often we have a sense of deep satisfaction or its opposite before we realize what the situation is!

Take the savage and his animistic tendencies. I have long felt dissatisfied with the traditional interpretation that tells of the hunter projecting into the good or bad object something of a duplicate of his own soul or mind. From the phenomena of our own life it would seem much more that the savage, in so far as he treats the mysterious thing as alive and full of purposes, fails just so far to discriminate further the particulars of the object given. He has failed to carry further the analysis and characterization of the thing. Whatever it may come to be in addition, the significant thing about anthropomorphism and animism is not the introjective imputation of a soul, but the uncriticized appreciation of the dynamic goodness or badness of the object. As hinted, we see this in our own experience. If I become angry with a tie that will not slide in the collar, it is not because I impute an additional agency to the tie thwarting my purposes, but because in my impulsion I have failed to utilize the fruits of past analysis. If, then, animism be an error by the primitive man, it is an error of insufficient subtraction, not one of superfluous addition.

Advance from animism does not mean a total reading out from the object of *all* the good-bad character originally found there and a substitution of a dead absolute purposelessness: the object is still good or bad, but this goodness or badness comes to be seen in a more refined light. In place of a capricious and uncalculated foe or friend is substituted a hindrance of just so much limited troublesomeness or a help of just so much limited assistance. Animism, in other words, has suffered by reason of a mechanical and static rather than a living and dynamic interpretation.

This excursus now lends weight to a wider thesis. As stated above, *our "objects" are the results of a gradual precipitation out*

of the solution of general meaningfulness. It is not a denial of meaningfulness, but a defining of it. Taking "category" in a living rather than a pigeon-hole sense, we may say that *value is a category fundamental to all others.*

The meaningfulness of the world we live in implies another of its characters. Hindrance and help are words of no meaning except as referring to an effect upon some action or tendency in some more or less definite direction; and that we find values in our world testifies to some action in some direction in ourselves. It is only as active, dynamic beings that we can experience worths. But the world, too, must be active. The dynamism of the savage and of the child may need analysis and extended refinement, but it is nevertheless an indication of the *dynamic character exhibited in all immediate situations.* Those phases of experience that become most vividly valuated are the more active elements which force us into decided attitudes. We are not passive spectators of a finished cosmos, but finding ourselves in a world of change and flux we can know nothing else to do but struggle to keep above the surface.

In this struggle, now, a significant thing is that we encounter all kinds of values, some of them helpful to us if we but learn just *how* helpful and just how to lay hold of them for our use, some of them hindering and treacherous. Growth in wisdom will amount to growth in power of discrimination and of discovery as to what is helpful and what is not—what is more truly the positive value and what the negative. And this is not a small nor an easy matter. Things may come in guises of usefulness that need re-interpretation and refusal, while many objects and forces hitherto unappreciated or even disliked and feared need to be given a sharper analysis and a consequent appreciation.

Then comes in a significant step. The increase in sharpness of analysis, in acuteness and carefulness of definition, leads not only to a truer appraisal of what is given, but to a new kind of valuation, which finds the elements of the experience capable of yielding meanings indirectly by being handled for *mediate* purposes. Instead of being regarded only in light of their usefulness now, they gain importance by reason of their possible utilization in the seeking of remoter things. When mankind has thus

analyzed deeper than the aspect of things as valuable or not right here and now, then mind has begun to realize itself, and the human being has begun in a measure to escape from his environment or better, to remake it. Henceforth, *human purposes and aspirations become dynamic elements in the making of reality.*

This implies several things. First of all, if man is to be able to lay hold on the world of nature and manipulate it in the interests of remoter aims, it is obvious that nature must be just that kind of a thing as can be so laid hold on. To think that one can use purely static materials for dynamic ends is as erroneous as to think that one can distinguish and discriminate in a homogeneity. In point of fact, man does employ processes and causalities to work for him, setting a given process in action now that the fruit may be yielded to him in the future. Here, then, he recognizes a certain *definiteness* in the activity. The world of change is a flux, to be sure; yet it is not an aimless flux, but one which manifests lines of change that allow of increasingly precise definition. Had the flux no such comparative regularities, man's control would be impossible. There is some meaning, then, attaching to an ancient exhortation that the surface of this changing flux is mere appearance, reality is to be sought within it. This does not imply, of course, the monistic view of existence, for the processes and hence the "realities" we read in them are encountered here and there and now and then. The degrees of unity in these processes are to be revealed only empirically.

Much the same is true for the other phase of the whole situation—the psychological side. We strive for values either found immediately in the world of experience or projected into the remote for a mediated control. But our strivings are for now this value and now that, and the change from one value to another is frequently an actual transition between distinctly experienced things. *Our aims and purposes*, accordingly, *are concrete and pluralistic.* This is not saying that they are at odds and hopelessly antagonistic. We are, of course, torn frequently by opposing impulses—sometimes to a tragic extent—and many of our everyday attitudes toward things are just such cases of balance and indecision; yet the line of development in all life and in man's own conscious life explicity, is the gradual coördination of pur-

poses. That the human being comes to act more and more consistently in one general direction is a manifestation of the growing coördination and gradual reconciliation of values. A *hierarchy* of values comes thus to be built up—not a static and geometrically arranged hierarchy, not a Platonic hierarchy, but a system of fairly definite *relations* between our different aims in *actual operation*. These relations remain constantly subject to greater or smaller variation and change consequent upon changes of present situation and of previous personal development; yet it seems undeniable that through an individual's life certain consistencies of preference may be noted.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Values and Science

Undoubtedly the greatest antagonist to a philosophy that conceives the world as really a world of values and interests is the pseudo-scientist. A thinker is all too likely to fall a prey to his method, and those who in their scientific zeal forget the true nature and true aim of the scientific procedure, I call pseudo-scientists.

The nature of science is implied in the foregoing pages. The emergence of concrete objects from the magma of general meaningfulness is accomplished, as has been said, by the increase of definition and analysis. No longer content to react to moments of vague pleasantness and unpleasantness, we seek to know the *what* characters of these moments. The investigation may not be a very conscious one always, but there is a constant growing demarcation and limitation of the source of the pleasantness or unpleasantness. Important differences between animal and human behavior have been traced to this difference in degrees of discrimination of actual sources. The dog or cat reacts to the situation in which the value is experienced but he is unable to distinguish the essential from the unessential factors. Man, on the other hand, comes more and more to perceive the relevant elements and to react to them only. He learns just how to locate the source of the value. But he learns also its characteristics and especially just how it may be approached or shunned most conveniently and economically, just what particular handle may be best seized, just what certain path will lead to the heart of the matter. But it is a gradual development, and man is slow not only in the location of his values, but also—and especially—in the just estimation of their strength. Having found the agent in a given element of the situation, there remains the further problem of determining its energies. It must not be left a capricious, indeterminate agent, but must be analyzed into an object

or a force of just so much power. (The stimulus to this investigation of the value is, of course, a more or less felt difficulty in dealing with it; or more broadly, the stimulus to the examination of the situation is a hindrance somewhere.)

But now in this more careful and exact analysis of the value, our immediate reactions must be arrested, held in suspense, while the object is kept as long as possible in the field of direct vision. Only in undisturbed observation can we secure an adequate idea of the make-up and the modes and amounts of activity of the agent. And this is the scientific interest—the interest that abstracts from the more immediate characters of the object in order to learn what is "behind". To learn what is behind will mean to learn the aspects that while less evident are more controlling. *Science arises as a process of definition and analysis of the value with a view to ultimate manipulation.* As such, science is seen to be a certain phase of the natural history of man. The life of man, some say, is a story of progressive control and utilization of values. But we may look at it from a different angle and say that *the life of man is a story of progressive discovery and definition of values.*

It is the common contention of the pseudo-scientist referred to that the objects of science are studied absolutely *per se*. But it is evident that unless the data are interesting, or in other words, unless the investigator is interested in the data even just *"per se"*, there would be no investigation. An object with no significances —even after immediate significances are abstracted from—can not even be an object. Thus science in its analysis of values does not abstract all the value aspect: it merely limits it conveniently.

It is not to be maintained that scientific work is entirely and throughout busied with values in the primary sense and with direct motives of manipulation. An esthetic interest in system may enter (as in mathematics or astronomy), as well as complex interests indirectly connected with the more practical life (as in scientific philanthropy, personal rivalry, etc).

The insistence upon the ultimately purposive and interested motive of science leads to the more general truth that a field of thought is characterized not only by its concrete subject-matter

but by the attitude of the thinker. Such an observation is useful in the attempt to distinguish between "science" and "philosophy". In our manners of speech and thought, we recognize a certain difference between the two, but the precise demarcation is an old question still at times raised. Perhaps these definitions are now usually given for philosophy: (1) as a science of sciences; (2) as a study of the totality of existence rather than particular existences; (3) as appreciation as over against scientific description. Now it would seem that each definition gets hold of a half-truth.

Science has been defined as the analysis of values in the interest of manipulation. But this analysis is directed toward particular concrete things of one or another given kind. Physics, geology, astronomy, each is busy with certain general kinds of elements which are marked by certain uniformities within the whole tangle of experience. Attention is consciously not given to the relations of these objects to the human being and his particular problems. This is "mere description." But when we come to have a more consciously appreciative attitude and construe experiences in the light of more direct relation to our welfare, we seem to become philosophical. Any radical separation of appreciation and description must, however, be viewed with suspicion, for already it is evident from the standpoint of these pages that they are only relative terms depending upon differences of emphasis.

We may, indeed, seriously question the advisability of seeking a hard and fast delimitation between science and philosophy. Such borders would be hard to point out between the various sciences themselves, for their respective ranges have been determined by innumerable exigencies and incidental factors. If the difference be, then, one of degree, philosophy may be said to be the more appreciative attitude, inasmuch as the particulars of experience are reinterpreted in their broadest possible meanings and in their general bearings on human individual and social life. This, of course, includes something of the second definition given above: philosophy is the study of totality in the sense of the more general relations of particulars. (This does not imply, it must be remembered, an *a priori* starting point of a Uni-verse.) Finally, to be the science of sciences, philosophy need only be the appre-

ciative attitude that studies the fruitfulness and ultimate value of the particular sciences.

It is sometimes said that philosophy deals with values while science deals with "facts"; or again, that a particular philosophy is colored according as it deals with one or the other; or still again, that the problem of philosophy is to seek the ground of reconciliation and of unity between values and facts. But all these conceptions imply a hard disjunction against which a protest should be urged. They imply, or even assert sometimes, that we have two worlds to deal with, whether in science or in philosophy or in the two together: the world of facts and the world of values are utterly disparate. But from the preceding pages it should be reasonably clear that such a distinction is arbitrary and relative to human needs and purposes, and a problem of how to get them together again is a problem created rather than found.

A discussion of the nature of science is always likely to demand in addition some notice of the concept time. In fact, perhaps the most important contemporary attack on the scientific method is a certain claim that it falsifies true qualitative duration and sets up an abstracted, lifeless, quantitative time series that grossly misrepresents the world we live in. [1] Whether we subscribe to this indictment or not, it is significant as pointing to the essential intimacy of the two conceptions of scientific procedure and the matter of the temporal relation. The next chapter will examine into the status of values in so far as it pertains to the problem of time and change.

1. **Bergson.**

CHAPTER NINE

Values and The Temporal Relation

It is in the immediately experienced value situations that temporal relations are seen to have their primary meaning.

Reference has been made to the dynamic character exhibited in all immediate situations. The objects of attention claim our notice by virtue of their very liveliness and their objectivity may be said to be due to their exercising some influence and control over our activity. Our values, then, are not primarily stationary and highly definite objects, but mobile agencies whose courses of action yet to follow are very indeterminate. They are *unstable, shifting,* and this very instability coupled with the *indeterminateness of their later behavior* is what is always of supreme importance for us. Were an element of the environment to assure us of its eternal immutability, were it to be lacking in all ability to be other than exactly just what it is, it would be consequently ignored, for what of harm thereby need be feared, or what of good could be hoped? (The most common teachings of psychology emphasize the necessity of a dynamic character to anything that is to be an object at all.) Thus, our values are such for us fundamentally because of their indeterminate status not only in the present moment but also in further experiences.

We may state this in another way. Terms such as "dynamic", "unstable", "mobile", are strictly speaking, never applicable to a thing in only an instantaneous present cross-section but involve references to subsequent conditions. The elements of living appreciation are elements that are unstable in the sense of having *prospective implications* as well as *retrospective* references. Take the snapshot photograph. The position of the athlete high in the air two inches above a horizontal bar means nothing in itself; it is understood and appreciated only as referring to the past and to the future career of the subject. Myron's

Discobolus, beautiful as it is in exhibiting a poise, exhibits it as a momentary poise, and takes meaning only as related to and involving the subsequent movements in the discus throwing. When we appreciate the whole dynamic process suggested in this petrified cross-section (wonderfully chosen), we begin to understand the statue. We are concerned with values here and now because they show some hint of future advantage or disadvantage, and our hope is to lay hold of the more fruitful of these implications.

It is here we get our sense of time. If the worths of experience were absolutely stable and permanent, there would be no appreciation of a temporal order at all; in fact, the word would be quite meaningless. But since our experiences *do* change continually and since a forward pointing implication is found essential, the world takes on a direction. Or perhaps it were better to say *directions;* for our values and aims being largely pluralistic and exhibiting only degrees of coöperation, the movements of existence may be said to be in an indefinite number of directions. The instabilities of the various now-givens imply various things-to-come, various futures. The movements of existence are also in an indefinite number of rates. The dynamism is not the parallel activity of teams of horses, but of innumerable forces acting at different rates of speed. From the point of view of one process, other activities may be fast or slow.

In the making use of present processes to mediate a purpose, we must perforce await the action of the process. If we could make these processes accomplish their desired results *instanter,* science would be largely usurped by magic. Thus we feel a certain objective restraint upon us in awaiting the fruits of our manipulations, and our futures have a definite objective meaning as over against our present.

Now, practical life involves adjustments of an indefinite number of discrete sides of experience, and as our values in their activities are decidedly pluralistic both in kind and in rate, we are forced at last to the conception of a *one-dimensional, serial time* as an *artificial standard* with reference to which fragmentary and occasional "times" are coördinated.

Another artificial treatment of time and process in the inter-

ests of practical life is the fixation of the indefinite activity of given values by symbols and static concepts. Scientific thinking in its definition of values here and now is really reading their courses of history in approximate terms. In fact, the description of a present-moment or past-moment content just *per se* is of utterly no use: no consequences could possibly flow from it. However much we recognize the fact, it is the subsequent behavior of the thing that concerns us, and our scientific endeavors are in the direction of plotting future forces from present and past uniformities. But now the intelligent reader of science is aware of the all-importance of the law of probability. Whether there is true creativeness at work somehow or whether human knowledge is incompetent to grasp absolutely all the factors involved, does not interest us here (and perhaps is a meaningless question to the radical philosopher on the experience basis). What I would emphasize here is that these forces are only *approximately* mapped out, the *values are described in only general* aspects, and the habit of treating them as highly definite and fixed elements—even uniformly active elements—is very dangerous.

One of the most striking paradoxes in human thinking is the *idealization of permanence*. "Eternal", "immutable", "everlasting", are words which in their very enunciation tend to put one in something of an awe-stricken attitude. They are in common employment by religions; they are some of the catch-words given a semi-magical meaning by certain inventors of obscurely outlined creeds and philosophical doctrines; they are more or less explicitly the qualities that absolutistic philosophical systems seek to find in their solutions of the world-riddle. But compare this with the experience of practical life, in which the elements of richest meaning are precisely those of most dynamic urgency, and the paradox is obvious.

This paradox may be due partially to one's falling a prey to his technique. In the analysis and manipulation of worths (it is already said) the method followed is the definition of them in fairly constant and static terms. The aim is to arrest the flux, as it were, sufficiently to obtain purchases on it. But the motive to arrest is easily carried too far and permanence is given an unwarranted hypostatization.

Attention should be called, also, to the human tendency to petrify transitive and attributive characters into substantive entities. The adjective, "conscious", has changed to the substantial status of "a consciousness"; "thought", originally only a form of the verb "thinking", is now given too often the "thought-stuff" meaning; "experience" is in danger of being taken as a content rather than a mode; even "mind" I believe must now have succeeded to an estate unwarranted by its lowly beginnings as "mental" activity, "mental" life.

The idealization of the permanent has, however, a deeper root. The contrast of this idealization as compared with the dynamism of actual life may be traced back into the immediate experience of a concrete striving. Our effort and striving is dynamic, yet what we aim at is in some sense static. I say, "in some sense". The man with a gun wants his game to be stationary in some sense. Yet it is to be stationary *only* in a sense, for no sportsman derives pleasure from shooting hogs. *The static character is,* then, *a relative one, an expression for the aspect of the process at the moment of seizure.* In the anecdote of the dog that "cut across" to head off a rabbit from his hole, the static element is the particular point for which the dog is making, but this point has value and meaning only as possessing certain relations of a dynamic character. Thus in moment-to-moment experience we find plenty of the static as over against our active endeavor, but in reflective experience this is found to be static in only a relative sense. Yet since we are ever and always striving beings, the idealization of the goods of life tends usually to a petrifaction of them.

CHAPTER TEN

Relativity of Values

Perhaps the most common character we hear associated with values is their relativity. Speak very long on the beauty of a picture, or on the sublimity of a moral ideal, or with Mark Twain pronounce the movement and the roar of the Atlantic's waves "a success," and you will hear the answer: Yes, but values are relative! Obviously the assertion is true, but the connection of the speech is suspicious and certain (conscious) implications are dangerous. The expression, "it all depends", carries with it something of this depreciatory attitude toward whatever is openly and obviously relative.

It is an old truth, but one easily forgotten, that *relativity does not imply unreality nor non-existence.* It does not prejudice the ultimate validity of the experience in question. This should be (but is not) a familiar truth from the natural sciences and daily life. For optics the stick-in-the-pool must be bent, or else, as someone has said, the stick that is not bent when in the pool is a suspicious thing. To the astronomer it is a matter of course that the light of an extinct star should reach me long after it has ceased to be observed by an inhabitant on a planet half the distance away. The student in zoölogy does not marvel philosophically that the same snake should be repulsive on the ground but attractive when he has it in his hands and under a knife. The realization that the bull in the pasture is not frightful to the tree near us does not slacken our own progress toward the fence. Whether the relativity be in terms of space or time or thought-connections or even of our organic constitution, it does not prejudice the reality of the experience.

In our common discourse, then, a given subject may take on different qualities as it is found in different connections, but it remains throughout substantially the same subject of discourse, the same *that*. Perhaps it may even be said that as scientific

thinking aims at more complete definition of a given value, ultimately in terms of its most probable futures, it actually goes to work on the task by comparing and construing that value's relativities. To apply new conditions and seek to know the consequent new relativities is, after all, the heart of experiment.

We must repeat: relativity as prejudicing the reality of the subject-matter is manifestly a confusion of thinking. But an even greater confusion is often hidden under a name given to *certain kinds of relativity that are emphasized on particular occasions*. In defining the values discovered, some of their aspects may be found wholly foreign to the purpose of this particular enterprise, or will prove treacherous in their implications. A physics of the seventeenth century will render color, sound, taste, and so forth, as secondary, or "merely mental" qualities, because no place is made for such characters on the atomistic premises, and they are left relative to the perceiver. Similarly, your man interested in "things as things" may recognize both the "primary" and "secondary" qualities but deny reality to the "tertiary", calling values "only relative".

The inference usually to be read from the ordinary text-book of psychology is that because this or that perceived thing is relative to the organic process involved in its perception, the thing's locus must be not in the world at large but "in the mind". How the thing may appear with, e. g., spatial relations in the mind, becomes a much discussed problem.

Such treatments of experience lead to a notion of the *"subjective"* as a dump-heap (however it may be conceived) for these relativities. The well-known subsequent history is the introduction of a split between "subjective" and "objective", and even a discarding of the latter category. But an all-important point to be borne in mind is this: in the initial stage *not all relativities* have been hailed into the subjective limbo—only those foreign to, or objectionable to, our present enterprise. In the condemnation of relativity it is usually a *particular* kind that is in mind—not a recognition of the relativities involved in all existence. This is the underlying fallacy of those who urge "relativity" against the reality of values.

The recognition of relativity as an indictment against the reality of all our immediate experience is hardly germane to the limited topic of values, and we may pass it over with the remarks that (1) such a philosophical attitude is akin to the idealization of the permanent, [1] and that (2) its fallacious implications are due largely to preconceptions in favor of "substance" in a most rigid sense.

"Subjectivity" has been used in, say, four fairly distinct ways. (1) The given is wholly a state of consciousness; (2) its existence is dependent on, or is modified by, consciousness; (3) its existence is dependent on, or is modified by, the human organism; (4) its presentation is misleading.

The first and second uses are the most common in traditional philosophy. Is the day really gloomy, or is the gloominess an element in consciousness added to the perception of the day? But perhaps the whole question is an illegitimate one. As soon as we forsake the standpoint of consciousness as a static reflector of a parallel panorama in favor of a conception of mind as the body active, and consciousness as a particular relation into which objects get with reference to each other and to this active body, then the question as to how much is real existence outside and how much is "just consciousness", appears artificial.

The third use of the alternatives "subjective-objective" may or may not be legitimate. If "subjective" be applied to the values in experience which man has built up of his own accord as real contributions to the making of reality (books, good roads, the aeroplane), such a category is full of significance. But if "subjective" refers to an essential part played by the organism in the experiencing of the value, then its full significance is rightly understood only as an abstraction from the total situation. The requirements of a technique of values, e. g., may require a distinction between an object as in relation to ourselves and an object as in relation to other things. A thorough-going reading of the object in only the former selected aspects will yield a subjective account of it—an account in terms of visual and tactual sensations, feeling qualities, existential judgments, motor disposi-

1. *Supra*, chap. Nine.

tions, and so forth. This is, be it remembered, only an artificial abstraction from the total complex experience.

The fourth use of "subjectivity" is historically fundamental to the other three, and has really been touched on above. Values are sorted according to the positive-negative quality, the help-hindrance criterion, in relation to our present purpose and undertaking. To summarize: in the business of life—the discovery, analysis, and utilization of values—*subjectivity and objectivity arises as a functional distinction, a distinction of worth.* The other uses of the terms find their root here.

Our conception arrived at concerning the legitimate use of the notion of relativity, especially as applied to values, will be of some service, I am sure, in understanding and appreciating the results of an analysis of another problem so important for the philosophy of value. This will occupy the next chapter.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

The Social Nature of Values

The full importance of the social element in value is yet, I think, to be appreciated. That life of man with fellow-man is a most important factor in the development of all his mental equipment is to-day a truism, and that it plays an enormous role in the discovery and appropriation of worths, can hardly be over-emphasized. The fundamental problem is whether the social factors developing values are merely additional, complicating, and supplementary, to the individual factors, or are also the necessary original conditions of the latter. In spite of a widespread tendency to favor the former alternative, a consideration of the question tends to discredit that position.

First, take the starting-point of those who hold to the more individualistic theories: work from the individual outward. There are, I should say, at least five respects in which the values of the individual's experience are part of, or dependent on, social forces.

(1) In his native equipment of abilities for appreciating and discriminating worths, the individual is, of course, indebted to his ancestors and social progenitors.

(2) Very obvious, but important, is the individual debt to the same agencies for his very life.

(3) A person's present values have been previously defined with the all-important help of his fellows, be they teachers, parents, playmates, or social inferiors. Our opinions of impersonal and personal objects as well as of ourselves are colored immeasurably by the people we know directly in our own lives.

(4) There are moments when individuals take part in a demonstration of a social attitude and valuation, as at a crisis in an important athletic event.

(5) The individual identifies himself with now one set of

things, now another, and his sense of self may comprise any sized sphere from the innermost part of his head only, to the boundaries of his social whole. The distinction between individual and society is here indeterminate.

Now to speak of appreciation from the single individual's viewpoint alone and to try to work out either a philosophy or a technique of values thus involves a dangerous abstraction from, if not an actual neglect of, an immense amount of social interactions really entering into the whole process.

A significant corroborative fact is to be seen in a certain contention of recent anthropology. For the primitive savage, so for as we konw, his consciousness of the world was strictly a social consciousness. Any particular amount of originality of behavior or thinking was usually attended with direst consequences. Routine, custom, tradition, had their greatest weight. In a world where the dynamic manifestation of power by the elements of environment were something unmeasured and horribly uncertain, any departure from the most customary behavior toward these things must have been viewed with something of terror and as much of resentment toward the individual. In such an iron-clad system of social coercions and restraints, the sense of individuality had small opportunity for development, and the system of unquestionable social values left little room for individual appreciations. But with gradual development of the race, when the forces of life and existence grew more definite in their proportions, traditional valuations must have loosened up gradually, allowing the individual member of the tribe a measure of freedom in his attitudes and a measure of independence in his handling and manipulation of things. With this increase of freedom came, of course, a sense of power, a feeling of the appropriativeness of objects, and it is in just this sense or feeling that the ego is really grounded. The viewpoint of the individual experience thus leads to a conviction of great indeterminateness in the demarcation of values of the self from values of society in general.

Turn now to the opposite point of attack. In Chapter Six I have indicated that the philosophy of experience is a philosophy not of a single person's experience but of Humanity's in general.

As hinted there, the principal stumbling block to an understanding of this point is really the persistency of the conception of minds as stuffs in separate hermetically sealed vessels and, hence, eternally refusing to mix. Once we recognize that to think, to feel, to appreciate, is a function of the dynamic relations of organism and objective situation, we see that the same things may be objects of many experiences at once, and that a single experience or attitude is not necessarily private and exclusive. Its "uniqueness" may be due only to the relativity of position of this particular organism.

Experience, then, is public, is the world of Humanity. Human values are public, built up and maintained by a complex multiple of interacting forces. These forces may be resolved into successive stages of complexity, even down to that of protoplasmic cells; in practical thinking, however, they are most commonly analyzed into convenient stages where separate human organisms and their immediate relations may be taken roughly as the units. These units may be taken on this view as participating in the enterprise of Humanity, and their individual values may be so many partial attempts at locating the values of society. But, of course, there are numerous different stages of complexity in which these persons serve as units, depending upon the degree of inclusiveness and exclusiveness implied in the idea of "individual person."

The treatment of these larger values of public experience is an important part of sociology, anthropology, and comparative ethics. We are to trace the development of a people by analyzing the mode of life at given stages, by finding the crucial points in its career, by comparing the different conceptions of natural environment, by observing changes in religious and political observances—in a word, by the analysis of the values of the people.

And this gives us perspective to understand the conceptions of science and philosophy given in Chapter Eight. Philosophy must ever be testing the living significance of this, that, and the other idea or problem. If it be artificial, for instance, a problem having its basis in traditional speculation rather than in present needs, it is to be neglected and forgotten. Human energy must be redirected constantly into fruitful channels. Scientific in-

vestigation is only the more intensive study of these values.

Summarizing: values are not to be studied only in their relations to discrete individuals, *for they owe their status largely to the public attitudes of social wholes, to currents and forces working at large in the community.* The attitudes and forces may be focussed in the valuations of particular individuals, yet the bare fact of focussing does not exhaust their total reality.

Values have been found to be facts not simply of individual biography but of racial history. A suspicion is aroused: why stop here? Perhaps these phenomena may be found characteristic not merely of human personal life but of wider existence.

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Metaphysical Status of Values

In Chapter Six I have distinguished between metaphysics as a study of the extra-experiential or transcendent, and metaphysics as a study of the most general types and aspects actually discovered in existence. I shall confine my attention here only to the latter use, leaving the relation of the former to the philosophy of values to be touched on under the head of religious values.

On earlier pages sympathy has been indicated with the philosophy of the present day which makes much of the dynamic and changing character of the world. The world is in flux and change, but this flux is an indefinite multiplicity of particular processes. These processes, also, have their own more or less determinable directions of development. It is not merely an unguided clash of atoms but a complexity of growth and progressive changes showing something of a general tendency and direction.

Now this advance of a given process in a definite direction is accomplished not by a rolling of dice, as it were, a chance assemblage, but by such an interaction between parts as secures some unities and coördinations. One part becomes the support for another, becomes useful to it, and by such interchange of uses, the parts gain footholds on each other and combine in complex dynamic relations. A new character is then present. Besides the mere numerical elements in spatial and temporal continuums, are to be found relations of use and worth. Grass is not simply another object in addition to the sheep, but is an entity in the relation of serviceableness to it. Vegetables make use of minerals, vegetables of vegetables, animals of vegetables, animals of animals, men of all the others, and men of each other. To describe reality in terms of a physical point of view as a complex of units or as a complex of forces is far from exhausting the matter. It is a denial of the fact that such units and such forces work themselves up into great systems of meanings, wherein one be-

comes advantageous or disadvantageous to another and hence an object of worth. We can, of course, (and often to great profit) study our subject-matter from a limited point of view, picking out such phases as are relevant. For the purposes of geology man is an elevated and late type of earthly animals; to the physiological chemist he is a complex combination of anabolic and katabolic processes; to the social economist he is a producing and consuming agent; to the religious propagandist he is a soul to be saved. And so to the metaphysician steeped in Democritus' or Galileo's physics, the world is a world of units and motions and displacements. (It would be absurd to challenge the beneficial effect of such teachings, especially as they point the way to more adequate ways of grasping nature—but always this good effect is for certain limited, definite purposes.) But the thinker with a livelier sense for realities and a broader conception of metaphysics, will feel the lack of such one-sided interpretations. The world is made up not only of static-seeming particles but also of significant functional relations between them. Why then not recognize these other phases at their face value? Surely, *value should be recognized as a valid concept of metaphysics.*

Another point must be noted. In order to discover, analyze, and appropriate the worth aspects of experience, we are forced to the use of more or less static concepts. To be socially communicable as well as individually clinched, the descriptive work must be cast in formal, static, unmistakeable terms that lose little by handling and by age. Mathematics is a classic example of this. Now my point is that we are too prone to think that when we have such a system of symbols for our values, we have lost the values. This is the fallacy at the root of the popular condemnation of "materialism"—which is really a developing technique for the treatment of actual values. It is the fallacy in the opposition to such enterprises as the analysis of the religious life, the analysis of the moral life, etc.: the presupposition is that when you have analyzed religion there is no religion left. Based as this fallacy partly is in the truth that the attitude of definition is an arrested stage and not a direct appreciation of the values, it still ignores the fact that to analyze a thing you must first have the thing.

In a sense, the spiritual view of life is thus defended. The world of experience no longer has mere motion and matter as its denominators; and the meaningful aspects of our immediate, daily, active knowledge of the world are retained also in our colder moments of intellectual criticism.

As a matter of fact, we find relations as operative as terms. When I welcome an incoming train, it is not a reaction to the train merely as train, but to the train-bearing-loved-ones. When you put down your work at five p. m. to rise and open the door, it is not the door that is in mind and is effective so much as the door-that-leads-home-to-possible-beefsteak. Even the caged animal's excitement at the approach of the keeper is due not to the keeper's status as a human being or even as a keeper merely, but to his relation to some kind of food—however undefined the value here remains.

A negative side of this defence of the metaphysical validity of values is a protest against the treatment of them as strictly psychological phenomena, a method which is to be found widespread, not at all confined to the German School. Values are usually spoken of as functions of the purposive nature of the organism and as developments of active processes. But the organic attitudes by themselves can never be values. Let me repeat that it is for special purposes only that we may abstract one side of the situation and discuss it in its own terms. As seen on other pages this position loses nothing by charges of relativity, by the "physiological argument", etc.

The world is, then, full of spiritual relationships, and is fairly alive with richest meanings and implications; and no philosophy can pretend to completeness that makes no room for the discovery and utilization of values.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Some Other Problems Involved

Numerous other questions springing from a philosophical theory of value suggest themselves. The German Psychological School, for instance, touched on many significant questions in a more or less thorough manner. It is, however, aside from this undertaking to develop the analysis and solution of such problems, and a bare notice of some of the most important must suffice.

Both the Germans and Mr. Schiller make use of a distinction between *value-in-general as genus, and ethical, esthetical, and such values as species.* Perhaps a unity of value is felt because of the unity of the subject's life; but this is of course a result of progressive unification of discrete purposes and strivings. At any rate, it seems as if the discovery of a fundamental unity of value as a genus is part and parcel of a subjective analysis of experience—in the sense of an abstraction from the totality of experience for the sake of biographical description. If a fundamental unity there be in all the worths of experience, it awaits discovery yet by empirical investigation. [1]

It may be that a historical and genetic study of the growth in differentiation of values will yield a classification of worths differing from the classical one of logical, ethical, esthetic, religious, and economic. Certain it is that the actual historic values are so bewilderingly complex, and the passing of a value from, say, an economic to an ethical category, is so subtle, that even if these species be retained, they must be allowed a decided fluidity.

The interrelations of values—be they species or not—should be a rich field for empirical study beyond the results already obtained, value substitutions, oppositions, movements, etc., being a fascinating line of topics.

1. Cf. "hierarchy of values" at end of Chapter Seven.

An evident corollary from the chapter on the "Metaphysical Status of Values", is that the utilization of worths is not in fact limited to human life. This has been hardly recognized by contemporary writers—a failure due probably to the biographical prejudice in most theories. That *animals,* e. g., *do use values* is unquestionable. We may see evidences in:

(1) the selective character of the behavior of the organism toward the environment;

(2) the polarity obvious here, i. e., favorable-unfavorable attitudes;

(3) the referential or implicative character seen in the attitude of the organism to a given object.

An adequate conception of the sense in which animals use values is to be determined, of course, by further investigation—aside from our purpose here.

We hear much of *"absolute values".* In the sense of being transcendent of the experienced world, they are noticed below in the paragraph on religious values. In the sense opposed to relativity, they are noticed above in Chapter Ten. In the sense of not being subject to the familiar law of diminishing value, Professor Urban fails to find any. It may be that the only legitimate use of the term is for the "practical absolutes" of Professor Urban, extended to cover not only objects in esthetical and mystical states but also objects in any absorbing valuation.

In the matter of *religious values* it should be borne in mind that the metaphysical validity of values does not carry with it the postulate of a single purpose that foresees the future and guides all the activities of the present thereto. A certain immanent purposiveness does indeed appear, but we are in danger of illicit verbal suggestion when we make too much of this.

Are there not enough values in *this* world to give life its richest desired significance? Two facts favor an affirmative answer. The actual cases of theoretic description of a next world amounts to a heightened appreciation of terrestrial values. Again, historical cases are frequent enough when moral appeals based on sense of honor, hope of posterity, patriotism, etc., etc., were equal in strength to other-world appeals. If we

will but realize that all about us constantly countless values are in process of creation and destruction, and that our sense of discovery and of utilization of them is not a mere sham, surely life then will be worth living.

Let me add that I do not identify "religious" and "transcenddental" values, and my criticism is directed against the former only when used distinctly in the sense of the latter.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Conclusion

The empirical standpoint and method outlined in Chapter Six have been followed as faithfully as possible in the subsequent chapters, and in each case the aim has been kept in mind not to go beyond what has been found. Since certain different phases of the value-problem have been somewhat isolated and studied in this manner, the work as a whole may not show an extraordinary unity or coherence of result. A word in summary then will not be amiss.

It seems as if the determination of the philosophical status of anything inevitably starts from some limited type of philosophy. If the standpoint of these chapters (outlined in Chapter Six) seems more arbitrary than is necessary, this arbitrariness should be the less objectionable since it is a choice of what appears as the most recent and therefore the most applicable fundamental tendencies in philosophical thinking.

The *main problem* has been to determine in a preliminary way the *philosophical status of value.* Starting from the general philosophical standpoint referred to in the preceding paragraph, it has been found: that the world we live in is intensely *dynamic* and fruitfully (and fruitlessly) *prospective;* that by the very fact of the case, values *immediately are* for us and form therefore a *fundamental category;* that *scientific* thought arises in the natural human enterprise of *discovering, defining,* and *analyzing* values, in the interests of living; that this enterprise is primarily *social* and values are individual only by abstraction.

The bearing of the whole essay is certainly in the direction of a justification of the treatment of values as original, found elements of the world as much as is anything whatsoever. This implies, as has been claimed, the spiritual view of life and of reality. The value conception may fairly claim to be at least a

partial solution for the "dilemma in philosophy" (to borrow a phraseology without all its connotations). The place given to science should be remembered. But especially should we note the double fact that, the rationalistic or "tough-minded" thinker has been prone (for various reasons) to abstract values from the world of direct experience as far as possible, while the romantic or "tender-minded" thinker has felt driven then to seek them in some different kind of realm. Surely the realization that richest values are to be had right here and now, only awaiting discovery and definition (and *adequate* appreciation), is something of a gospel for an age of doubt.

And this is important, not only for the pseudo-scientific who would reduce absolutely all to mechanical shiftings of atomistic particles and chemical transformations along ironclad lines, and not only for the anti-scientific of whatever motive and whatever faith who declare this a misinterpretation of the facts, but also for some contemporary theorists in the field of values specifically. As suggested in Chapter One, the whole field has been opened up largely through a motive to return to the immediate and intimate and humane. And results have certainly been gained. Yet it is the suspicion of the writer that such contemporary treatments have often shown too much of an ax to grind. Frequently it seems as if we want to vindicate not only man's heart-life of hopes and strivings but his heart-life plus this or that set of doctrines coupled traditionally therewith. There have been many riders on the bill we have tried to pass. Or if not just that, we have o'ershot the mark. Having justified our heart-life we have proceeded further to erect an intellectual scaffolding supposedly essential, in truth unessential, to the validation of the former. The great use made of the concept of values in theological (not necessarily religious) circles has not infrequently led into this error, and the more strictly philosophical treatment by Münsterberg is typical of the same point. The outspoken dissatisfaction with pseudo-scientific philosophy, the seeking of satisfaction in a voluntaristic conception, the reading of nature as not dead but alive and serviceable: with this fine insight we cannot quarrel. But to go on to an hypostatization and apotheosis of the (approximate) unity in this voluntarism, calling it the

over-self in a half mystical, half theological vein: this seems an unnecessary exaggeration of the insight, and one is tempted to ask in what sense is satisfaction secured beyond a mere use of words. The whole position suffers in consequence and becomes more pretty than convincing.

The contemporary treatments of value have been tending largely in another important direction. The lead of the German School has had a large following, and there is a very pronounced tendency to "psychologize" the phenomena of values. The human subject is, of course, implicated in many worth-situations, and, taking the cue from the procedure of general psychology for the last few decades, the value theorists have sought description of their subject-matter almost wholly within the field of mental states and mental dispositions. And this line of work has been pursued to a great length. The problem of the "worth-fundamental", a question as to whether valuation is essentially feeling or desire or both, presupposes, as has been said earlier, a division of mental life into irreducible elements. It overlooks the qualitative uniqueness and absoluteness of a given moment, and the fact that a given act of valuation is a function of the whole organic nature at that moment. This is not to be wondered at. The general psychology of the times has gone in this very direction. It has been an integrative psychology, atomistic in its manners of thinking, and retaining more of the faculty-notion than has been recognized or acknowledged. A given phenomenon of mental life has been treated as an integration, as a product of a cup of this, a teaspoonful of that, and a pinch of the other psychic element, instead of being taken as a unit interpretable from several points of view.

This atomizing tendency has been part and parcel, I feel, of a more general one hinted at above. We may say that values have been too much "psychologized", that they have been and are claimed as the exclusive property of psychology. If value has been often defined as a relation between the subject and the object,[1] it yet remains a fact that the subsequent treatment has usually concentrated on the subjective side alone. If we wish to

1. E. g., Ehrenfels, "Syst. d. Werttheorie," p. 65.

know what values are, what are their nature and laws, we are to turn to the conscious human individual; by analysis of his conscious and dispositional make-up at the moment of valuation we find their true nature. There may be a certain virtue in this—aside from the atomizing fault just pointed out—but its vice consists in its negative side. The obvious implication is that this is *all* there is to the matter. It has been said above [1] that for certain purposes (in the case of the German School, the purposes of developing a technique) the subjective aspect may be abstracted from the whole worth-situation. But it was added that we should remember this as an abstraction; and this is the point of my attack. It is, in fact, a double abstraction: an abstraction of the personal element from the whole experienced situation, and an abstraction of the individual element from the actual and effective social milieu.

Surely, attention need hardly be called to the fact that a questioning of the philosophical presuppositions of this German Psychological School does not amount to a denial of the fruitfulness of the technique developed thereupon. Valuable results, especially in the ethical field, have been gained beyond doubt. The plea here is for a more satisfactory philosophical basis, and, if necessary, a restatement of the technique in more fitting terms.

As a key to the subjectivistic and individualistic position of this whole school of thought, an historical fact is of interest. The school has plainly taken over its task and its presuppositions largely from the Austrian economic theory of value. Now this economic treatment has already been indicted on at least two counts: (a) it has overlooked the great complexity of mental life by seeking to trace the essential characters of value to merely those desires and thoughts immediately concerned in producing and consuming; (b) it has neglected the wider forces in the environment physical and personal by seeking to limit the study to aspects of an individual mind. [2]

Now as a positive rather than negative criticism of this whole subjectivistic or psychologizing or biographical description

1. *Supra*, p. 54;
2. B. M. Anderson, "Social Value", New York, 1911.

of value, the preceding pages have outlined a wider conception and have indicated that empirical investigation of what values are will reveal roots running far deeper than the individual human person's private consciousness. The resulting position has been sketched briefly in Chapter Twelve.

Looking back over the wider denotation and connotation of the term "value" developed in this paper, it may be said that what has really been maintained is the reality of *"quality"*. The results of the empirical treatment of experience all point to the immediate and actual reality of the qualitative aspect of existence as over against the merely quantitative, and the secondary and derived character of the latter.

This is very plainly to be found in the chapter on the nature of scientific thinking. If one says that values are not superadditions to the original bareness of the given, in the same breath he maintains that qualities are not superadditions. They simply *are there,* and any conception of the objects of experience as naked of them must be looked on as an abstraction in the interest of some specific enterprise.

If it is preferred to use the term "quality" to cover the wider conceptions of this paper, the essential result is unaltered. For it is obvious that "value" as it is commonly used in the narrow biographical sense, is only a phase, a limited aspect, of "quality". The boundary lines become fluid and "value" cannot be claimed at bottom as the property exclusively of psychology.

And there is a significant reflection upon the conception of "quality". If the broader use of "value" coincides with "quality", the latter is given a character new to traditional conceptions. An active emphasis replaces the static. Existences are characterized qualitatively not by certain amounts of redness, hardness, etc., that inhere eternally in them or may be thought of as clapped on to them, but by fairly definite modes of manifestation of their actual or potential dynamism. It is not because of any inert and dead aspects but because of vital characters that concern the interactions with other existences that differences are discovered and distinguishing marks found. A red cloth isn't just simply *red*: among a thousand other functions, the red is active in drawing on the angry animal in the barnyard. This

dynamic character of quality is exhibited well in odors: I can hardly imagine one that fails to throw me into some kind of "set", whether it be a subdued tendency to appropriate or a gesture of repulsion or a release of muscles in tension or what not. Let this not be set down as a fallacious reading into the object of a character strictly intra-peripheral. Take any quality of any thing whatever and seek whether it has not at some time exerted its own influence, contributed its own share to the active processes of the locality.

VITA

John Frederick Dashiell was born at Southport, Indiana, April 30, 1888. He received his elementary education in the Indiana public schools. He attended the academic department of Moores Hill College, 1902-1905, and the collegiate department, 1905-1909, receiving the degrees of Bachelor of Science in 1908 and Bachelor of Literature in 1909. He has attended Columbia University, 1909-1913, and received the degree of Master of Arts (in psychology) in 1910. He has held the following positions: instructor in English and History, Moores Hill College, 1908-1909; scholar in psychology, Columbia University, 1909-1910; assistant in philosophy, Columbia, 1910-1913.