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
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Plotinos

His Life, Times, and Philosophy

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
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THE
PHILOSOPHY OF PLOTINOS

by Guthrie, Kenneth Sylvan



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THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLOTINOS.

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CHAPTER I.

PLATONISM.

1. *Plato's Three Realms.*—Plato united in his system that which was valuable in the systems of philosophy which preceded his. We may therefore begin immediately with Plato in our preliminary sketch of Greek philosophy.

Plato divides existence into two great realms : that which can be felt by the senses, the "sensible" "to aisthêton," and that which can be understood, the "knowable," "to noêton." The most cursory examination of the sense-world reveals the problem of the One and the Many : for every object is one, inasmuch as it is an object, yet manifold in its qualities. Which of these is the most fundamental distinction? Earlier Greek philosophy had given various answers to this question ; but none of their conclusions satisfied Plato wholly. Being, "ousia," as such, could not, thought he, be attributed to any finite thing ; on the contrary, "becoming," "genesis," was a fitting description of the phenomenal world. He proceeded further to reduce this distinction to its Pythagorean terms, the Limited and the Unlimited. As both of these conceptions are united in that of a definite number, so the truth of both the categories of the One and the Many is their unity, their mixture, which fittingly represented the eternal process of Becoming which may be witnessed in the phenomenal world.

Unity will apply fittingly to the intelligible world, which alone has true Being, being "existing being," "reason," and "existence," "Ontôs on, Logos, Ousia."

The Manifold, on the contrary, must apply to the formless, odorless, chaotic matter, "hulê," of which the world was formed. We thus reach a third realm of existence, which, however, can only be distinguished as having existed before the creation or formation of the phenomenal world.

Plato thus recognizes three realms of existence : "that which becomes (the sense-world), that in which it becomes (matter), and that from which it is copied (the intelligible world)." God, is the Father, the reason, the "whence it grows," the "hothen phuetai," of the world ; matter is the mother and nurse, the concomitant cause, the "En hô gignetai to gignomenon," of the world ; and thus the world is the offspring of God and Matter.

But we must not fail to analyze this intelligible world, this "knowable" "to noêton." The phrase given above, "that from

which it is copied" implies that somebody copies something : that the Deity copies the Ideas or archetypes. There is then, above the intelligible world proper a still higher realm of existence, the Deity : which, in the Pythagorean terminology adduced above would be the Mind, the "Nous," the principle or "cause" "aition," of the phenomenal world.

We have thus four realms of existence : the Deity, the world of Ideas, the world of Sense, and Matter. But as the latter realm has ceased to exist since the creation of the phenomenal world as such, there remain three realms of existence, which are sometimes referred to as the Platonic Trinity : "Nous" or the Deity, the intelligible world of Ideas, and the Sense-world the "sensible," "to aisthêtikon." How loose and inaccurate such an appellation is, is clear from the fact that Plato himself did not recognize it. The Sense-world, the supposititious third member of the Trinity, is the only-begotten Son, "Huios monogenês" of the Deity, the "Eikôn tou Theou," "Zôon aïdion kai noêton," it is a "second" God, "future" before its genesis, and "created" after it ; a "blessed deity."

As the world of Ideas is a "Zôon aïdion kai noêton," an "eternal and intelligible organism," so the world of Sense is a "Zôon ennoun," an "intelligible organism," a reasonable living being, the creating principle of "Nous," Reason, having reduced the chaotic, necessary, and "alogos," irrational Matter to an image of the world of Ideas.

Thus the problem of the One and the Many was apparently solved : every object being One, in view of its similarity to the Idea according to which, as a pattern, it has been created ; and Manifold, in view of the formless matter which had been the condition of its origination.

2. *The Archetypal World of Ideas.*—In explaining what Plato meant by his World of Ideas, we must notice the fact that he accepts the identification of Being and Thought of Parmenides. As a consequence, his "intelligible world" is the world of true existence, and everything exists only inasmuch as it participates in this existence. An Idea is that which makes a horse a horse, and a tree a tree ; in short it is a general notion, an universal, a species or genus, which abides unchanged amidst all the changes of the individuals to which it applies. Hence the world of Ideas is "in the supercelestial place," "En topô huperouraniô," beyond all change, far beyond this world, separate from the objects participating in it. The Ideas are archetypes, "paradigms" "Paradeigmata," of every quality and every thing, many Ideas at times being present in one and the same thing, as "just" and "tall" in a "man." These Ideas are co-ordinate, being distinct entities, although they also rank hierarchically from the highest genus to the lowest species, as they are the existence, being, aim and end of everything subsumed under them. Yet they are passive thoughts, and are without energy ; they are only objects of contemplation, far from the world.

3. *The World of Matter*.—If the Intelligible world, the “One” is real existence, it follows that Matter, the “Many,” is nonexistence. It is therefore absurd to call Plato’s philosophical system a dualism. Matter, “Hulê,” the indeterminate, has only negative predicates; it lacks form and quality, and cannot be apprehended by the senses. It can only be space, the form of outwardness, that is, coexistence and unordered sequence. It is an empty form waiting for a content to be impressed upon it. It is nothing, an abstraction from reality; yet it is absolute necessity, and though not able to oppose the divine power, yet able to mar its works.

4. *The Universe*.—The Sense-world is the most beautiful world possible, being framed according to the most perfect of patterns, by the best cause. “He was good; and in a good being no envy in relation to anything ever resides, but being without this he wished everything to become as like himself as possible.” We saw that the Sense-world was an “intelligible organism,” “Zôon ennoun.” It is consequently able to think: and this is the characteristic of mind, and mind exists in a soul, and a soul in a body. As the younger should not rule the elder, and mind rules the body, the mind of the world was older than the body of the world. The Universe is therefore a living being, with a rational soul interpenetrating its body. It regulates and harmonizes the world; for as human bodies partake of the physical Universe, so do human souls proceed from the souls of the Universe.

The Universe thus created is formed in two circles with a common centre, in different planes; the inner circle is subdivided into seven circles moving in directions opposite to that of the outer one. Here we have the fixed stars and the seven planets with their orbits.

5. *The Rank of Ideas*.—Having explained the nature of Ideas it remains for us to describe the rank and dignity they occupy. All together they form an “intelligible world,” an “intelligible place” an “intelligible organism,” “Kosmos noêtos,” a “Topos noêtos,” a Zôon noêton.” The cause of a thing is not the condition of its existence, but its purpose; and the ultimate purpose of purposes is the ruler of all other Ideas, “basileus,” the king of heaven, “Dophia, Zeus.” Plato combined here the Mind of Anaxagoras, and the Good “Agathon,” of the Megareans and Sokratês into an “Epekeina tês Ousias,” a “somewhat beyond existence” an existence beyond all Being, the Ideas partaking of Being, “ousia.” This Being is both Mind and Good: a conscious good Being, the Idea, the absolute Unity excluding all Manifoldness, a glorious fulfilment of the Eleatic dreams. Such a conception of the Deity lifts him in a separate realm of existence, above all other Ideas soever.

That this was Plato’s conception has been much doubted. He, the Creator, has been identified with the Idea of the Good, as both are called by Plato “the best of the intelligible and eternally existing beings.” He is himself the pattern he copies in

the creation, since he is said to copy an eternal pattern. The world is therefore called a "sensible God," an "image of the intelligible," and an "image of the eternal gods." Zeller thinks the ideas cannot depend on God without affecting their self-existence ; God cannot be dependent on the ideas, for the same reason, and both cannot be co-ordinate without creating a dualism Plato knows nothing of. Consequently, God and the Idea of the Good are identical. This view of Zeller's creates more difficulties than it explains ; for it does not account for the language quoted above, and it permits us to ask, why was it the Idea of the Good and not some other Idea which took upon itself the office of a Creator ? Why do not several Ideas create separate universes ?

And besides, a Creator such as we have described is absolutely needed by Plato in his Physics. The Ideas are true existence, and Matter is non-existence ; and both are separate. How shall the rational principle infuse itself into matter to make it a rational organism, unless the God who contemplates the Idea, generates them as a poet in himself, and thus, so to speak, incarnates them ? For Plato has no principle of Emanationism to assist him, as had Aristotle.

6. *The Human Soul.*—We have seen that the Soul of the Universe began the human souls. Yet we have other accounts of their creation, which set forth that the Creator compounded human souls in the same vessel in which he had compounded the Soul of the Universe, the difference being that the elements used were less pure ; and after creating them, the Creator assigned to each Soul its appropriate star. Thus the World-Soul and each human soul are sisters, and not related to each other as mother and daughter.

Each soul is composed of three parts. The first is reason, "to logistikon," which has its seat in the head, and is the organ of knowledge. Its moderate regulation is the virtue called wisdom, the opposite of this virtue is the vice, foolishness. The second part of the soul attends to all bodily wants, and its name is the "Epithumêtikon." It is the organ of perception, and has its seat in the abdomen (the solar plexus). To this part of the soul God has added, in the liver, an organ of intuitive and presentimentative knowledge. The moderate exercise of this part of the soul is the virtue "Sôphrosunê," self-control, and its opposite habits is the vice "Akolasia," intemperance. Lastly, we have the third part of the soul, "to Thumoeidês" the courageous part of the soul, prepared by the secondary deities, presumably the World-Soul, and this is the organ of whose moderate exercise is the virtue "Andria," courage, as opposed to the vice "Deilia," cowardice. The fourth virtue, "Dikaïosunê," justice, is the right relation between the above three virtues, and when it is exercised towards God, it becomes "Hosiotês," holiness or piety, since it is man's end to resemble God, who is absolutely good. This is happiness. Virtue is the health and order and harmony of the soul, and should therefore be followed irrespec-

tive of consequences or sanctions ; for to do injustice is worse than to suffer it from another. This philosophy demands the rationality of the entire man.

Yet, in a single life on earth, injustice to souls is patent. God is just : consequently this life cannot be all. The soul exists both before and after this life; it transmigrates through all forms according to inexorable justice. If the soul of a wise man erred, his next incarnation would be in the body of a woman ; if the soul persisted in its evil ways, the next incarnation would be that of an animal. If however a soul for several incarnations chose the study of philosophy, it would soon become permanently freed from the necessity of reincarnating.

Pleasure is not necessarily good : it may indeed be evil ; moderation and health of the soul are pleasurable in themselves. Pleasure is in itself antithetically opposed to all true insight.

CHAPTER II.

ARISTOTELIANISM.

I. *Plato and Aristotle.*—In order to understand Aristotle it will be advantageous to notice his points of contact with and difference from his great Master.

Both were agreed that Matter was indeterminate, the ground of all Plurality, the concomitant cause, the feminine principle, the mother and the nurse of the world. Here they separate. With Plato, Matter is non-existence, emptiness, void, "in which" "En hô." With Aristotle Matter is incomplete, undeveloped "dunamis" or power and possibility, "Ex hou," "out of which." Matter, according to Aristotle, is much more real than according to Plato; the latter's system may be described as a monism; even though the former's may be interpreted as a dualism.

With Plato, the Ideas were transcendent above the World that participated in them. They were self-existent, objectively real. With Aristotle, all objective existence apart from immanence in the things which participated in them was denied them. They are only the essence of the species, energy, "energeia," form. These universals realise themselves in the matter, and particularize themselves into things.

Matter, or potentiality, and Form, or energy, are so closely united that Reality results from both as a third principle. This their invariable union is "perceptible substance," as the statue which results from the union of the bronze and the shape. In all reality, therefore, we may distinguish the mover and the moved, the active and the passive. Thus all reality is teleological, having an end or aim to which it moves, as the magnet moves to the steel. A teleological aim is the very reason of motion, and of every change of matter; which is real existence. We now have a principle which is a satisfactory solution to Plato's unanswered question why the Ideas were impressed in Matter; for we have here purposive activity, ranging through all the octaves of creation, the moving and the moved principles.

This conception which is original to Aristotle is that of development, with which he finally solved the ever recurring problem of the One and the Many, which Greek philosophy was haunted by, and which Plato only restated in new terms.

Reality is thus the essence of the phenomena; being, "ousia," becomes essence, the "what it might be to exist" "To ti ên einai"; and all appearance is the realisation of essence. The

mere, inert "becoming" of Plato has become the living "development" as soon as a teleological view of it is taken. This self-realization of essence in the Sense-world is called an entelechy, "Entelechia," which takes place under four principles, Matter, Form, End and Cause. The first two of these principles refer to things related to each other; and the latter to individual things.

2. *The Deity*.—When we ask for the origin of the motion of the moving principles, it is answered that this must again be a moving principle. As, however, we cannot make a regress into the infinite, we must come to some prime Mover, himself unmoved, that excludes all passivity and potentiality, and is pure activity and energy. This is without Matter, "anew hulês," purus actus, eternal in its motion, simple, continuous, without the limitation of space. Thus the source of movement is found outside of the substances moved. It cannot cause motion, because every end aimed at is an instance of this process, and the prime Mover of the world is its final end, the best, the efficient cause. All reality lies between Matter and the prime Mover after which everything strives and which everything desires. The prime Mover is One, devoid of all multiplicity: therefore immortal, pure, desiring nothing, desired of all. On this account it is the end of scientific cognition; and because eternal, and eternally desired of all, no unification between God and his world beyond eternal desire is possible. The divine Mind thinks of itself eternally: in it thinker and thought are eternally one, and at rest; if it thought of creation or of something else it would not be at rest. Human speculation or contemplation of pure thought is the most divine occupation possible to man, re-discovering God in blissful rest. Thus God is the end of human contemplation, thought of thought.

The Deity, according to Plato, was an Idea of Ideas; according to Aristotle, it was a self-contained prime Mover of all reality, transcendent above his world. And this world lay between himself and Matter, opposed to him, because excluded from him.

The name of the Deity of Aristotle is the same as that of Plato, The Good, and The Mind. Aristotle claims to take these names not from Plato but from Anaxagoras, from whose Deity Plato has also borrowed the name of his Idea of Ideas. Yet it is true that the Deity of Aristotle is nearer to that of Anaxagoras than that of Plato; for the former one was the all-including end of all the "Logoi" of things, the principle of motion in all reality.

3. *The Psychology*.—The psychology of Aristotle is radically different from that of Plato. Man is a mikrokosm; his soul unites all the faculties of other orders of living beings. Nevertheless, the human soul may be divided into two parts: that which pre-exists and survives the body, and that which dies with it. The former is called "Nous," reason, in general. It is the faculty by which man excels all living beings. The latter is subdivided into five "souls" or planes of consciousness. Each organ exists in view of some end, which is an activity: so the body ex-

ists for the soul. The two lowest "souls" man possesses in common with animals and plants: the "vegetable" and "assimilating" or "reproductive" souls. The difference between plants and animals is that the latter have a common centre or central organ, the heart; which the former do not possess. With animals, men share the "sensitive," "appetitive," and "locomotive" souls, which include memory, desire, and self-activity. The reason itself, the distinctively human faculty, may be divided into two parts: the passive and active reason; the passive "dunamis" is a "tabula rasa" and receives forms; on the other hand the active "energeia" generates forms and this active reason alone has substantial eternal existence. The active "Nous" is represented as divine, although in Aristotle's cosmology we found no place for such a direct unification of soul and God; since God, rapt up in himself transcended the Universe. In this its highest sphere we must consider Aristotle's psychology and cosmology inconsistent.

So far, then, the human soul is composed of seven subordinate souls or planes of consciousness. If however we take the lowest as only one, then man will be found to have only six constituent elements, or counting the body as one, in addition, we will have seven.

4. *The Ethics.*—As little as Aristotle's cosmology and psychology agree, so little does his system of Ethics agree with either. Plato's Ethics we saw to be intimately connected with his psychology. Aristotle is however here the true empiricist; he finds in Plato's account five virtues; he adds to them other virtues he finds in other philosophies, without much regard to his psychology. Besides, he differs from Plato in making a virtue the mean between two extremes, whereas his Master had only known of a virtue and its contradictory vice. The teleological end of action which Aristotle assumes is happiness, "eudaimonia," the mean habit of human activity. He pretends to deduce it from experience; but finally assumes it as self-evident. He divides his virtues into dianoëtic and natural; but here he forgets to define what the dianoëtic virtues are. He only points out various gradations of truth-conception, of which the "Nous," with its immediate grasp of intelligible principles reaches the highest. The good of every being is the rational development of its powers, and as man's characteristic quality is his reason, the dianoëtic will be the highest. But we have already remarked that he neglects to define these all-important virtues.

CHAPTER III.

STOICISM.

1. *Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics.*—What Aristotle was to Plato, that the Stoics were to Aristotle. Aristotle denied the transcendence of the Ideas beyond their immanence in things; the Stoics denied the transcendence of Aristotle's Deity, and recognized it as only immanent in the world, so that while Aristotle called his Theology "Dialectics," the Stoics called theirs "Physics." Yet the Stoics belong to a later age than either Plato or Aristotle, for with the latter's comprehensive glance all former constructive work was ended. It remained for the Peripatetics and Academicians, the Stoics and Epicureans, to combine what was given before. Besides, the Stoics and Epicureans were more interested in Ethics, or the practical life, than in theoretic discussions. They preferred to borrow their Dialectic almost ready-made from Aristotle, and their Physics from Herakleitos. In this interest in Ethics they considered themselves followers of Sokratês, looking on him as the pattern of the virtuous wiseman, and were the beginners of the movement in philosophy which lasted for several centuries, being characterized by this preference for Ethics over abstract reasoning.

2. *The Aristotelian Dialectic.*—Their Dialectic they borrow from Aristotle with the following changes. It is named Logic, because its treats of "Logos," reason, which is already conceived as "implicit" "Endiathetos" and "explicit" "Prophorikos." Logic then is divided into Rhetoric and Dialectic proper; its business is however only secondary to Ethics, teaching how to avoid errors. Doing away with all but the first four of Aristotle's categories, they reach a criterion of truth, "right reason," "orthos Logos" the quality of compelling assent, logical necessity. Knowledge originates from sensation, the mind being a "tabula rasa" at first. Thus, instead of Platonic Ideas or Aristotelian essence we have reflection or abstraction from these mental images or impressions. This shows us that nothing is real except corporeal matter; the best of reality is nothing but the quality of occupying space. Reality which with Aristotle was the product of four principles, Matter, Form, Efficient Cause and Final Cause, is now the product of only two principles, the active and passive ones, which are inseparable. They do not know anything of a pure "Energeia," or "Nous"; they only know of

a conscious principle "Reason" or "Logos" connected inseparably with the universe, just as the human soul or "Reason" or "Logos" is united to the human body. This cosmical force, moving, active, moulding, reasonable, is "Reason," "Logos," and is the Deity. This form-principle is called "Logos," Soul, ether, nature, Zeus, and fire—not destructive, but constructive. Being constructive this divine fire is the womb and grave of all things, containing the rational germs "spermatic reasons," "logoi spermatikoi," of all things. The human soul is of like character with the World-Soul, and the breathing-in of the cool air of the atmosphere assists its generation and preservation.

The human soul however, seems to be composed of different elements, the governing force, is "the logical powers," "to logistikon," seated in the breast, the generative function, speech and the five senses. This would make eight component parts, the crudeness of which classification is apparent at first sight.

Although the Stoics recognised only two principles, the passive "matter," "Hê apoios ousia," and the active, "The God" "Ho Theos," "in which reason exists," yet on the other hand the divine soul is represented as being composed of Hexis, phusis, psychê, "habit," "nature," "soul," and finally "Nous." In this we may trace a faint resemblance to Aristotle's psychology.

The formation of the world then took place by change of the divine fire into air and water ; which water separates into earth, water and fire. Earth and water are passive ; the finer air and fire are active. Finally at the end of a definite age, all things are resolved into the divine fire (conflagrative) after which the world will be once more created, the same things as before happening without variation into infinity, without any thing new. This of course brings into the finite spherical world absolute "destiny" "Heimarmenê," and "providence," "Pronoia". Destiny however only related to auxiliary causes so that primary causes remained in our own free will and desire, whose actions were foreseen but not predetermined by providence. As to the immortality of the soul, Stoic teachers differed.

3. *The Ethics.*—The Stoics introduced into the domain of Ethics several new conceptions. In the first place, man was considered only in relation to himself, not in relation to the State of Plato or Aristotle. To live according to nature is not to live according to the nature of others, but according to one's own nature ; the sage need only know himself. Thus the maxim to live harmoniously with reason becomes an exhortation to live harmoniously, in an absolute sense. In the second place, they introduced the conception of Duty, "officium". This does not only regulate a natural impulse, as with Aristotle, but has the power to suppress it. It suppresses all "affective states," "Pathê," fear, trouble, desire and pleasure, as leading only to morbid states, pleasure and pain and therefore worthless. "Apathy" "Apatheia" is consequently the highest human state—in contradistinction to the Epicurean freedom from pain. This state

can be attained by making dominant in one's nature those elements which do not depend on external circumstances, so that the sage is dependent on none but himself, and can be happy even in the bull of Phalaris. The sage is then equal to Zeus, except in the unimportant physical things. Pleasure may legitimately follow the activity of the sage, but should not precede it. The sage is perfectly virtuous—for if he has one virtue he will have all the rest—the usual Platonic virtues, the end of man being not contemplation but action. In this account of the four virtues the Stoics seem to have completely lost sight of the relation between them and Plato's psychology, their own psychology being at best very crude.

All men are either fools or advancing towards wisdom, which is to live according to nature, making human conduct agree with the all-controlling law of nature, or, as some prefer to put it, the Divine Will. Yet to live in associations is but the means of living for oneself, to attain the chief good; for the sage is neither husband nor citizen. The wise will live in an ideal state embracing all men as such, dividing wealth and advantages equally to all. Suicide was a legitimate means of ending suffering.

The Ethics of the Stoics were in later times formulated into maxims by Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, which agree so closely with some of the teachings of the New Testament that they have been charged with plagiarism. Such a charge is only plausible to those who are ignorant of the writings of the earlier Stoics and the natural development of doctrine. The best evidence of this is that Marcus Aurelius detested Christianity. And this may have arisen from the fact that while its ethical maxims agreed with his, yet he could not make rational to himself the Incarnation.

This sketch of Stoicism would not be complete without mention of their tendency to seek an allegorical meaning beneath the exoteric sense of the words. Demokritos, Anaxagoras, Aristotle and the Cynics, had already explained the fables of the gods as beautiful allegories, symbolizing spiritual truths. To the Stoics, however, belongs the merit of having done this systematically in relation to all Pagan divinities, recklessly violating the most evident rules of etymology. We will find this allegorical method of interpretation in Philo Judaeus, and after him in the mystics of all ages.

CHAPTER IV.

EMANATIONISM.

1. *The Date of Hermes.*—The time in which Hermês Trismegistus lived is lost in uncertainty. It is impossible to assume his identity with the traditional Hermês of Egyptian fame. Casaubon and L. Ménard suppose the writer of the *Hermetica* to have been an Alexandrian living at the end of the first, and at the beginning of the second century, who may have assumed the name of Hermês for several reasons, either that he thought his doctrines agreed with those of Hermês, or because his dialogues introduced Hermês as a speaker, just as Plato introduced Sokratês; or, finally, to gain authority and fame for his works. He must have lived after Philo Judæus, and Josephus, and have been thoroughly imbued with the writings of Plato. He must have been an early contemporary of Justin Martyr, who refers to his doctrine of the Unity of God, and one of whose writings contains a passage verbally identical with one in the *Poemandres*, the only complete extant Hermetic work. Besides, Tertullian, 136-216, A. D., mentions him, so that the writer must have lived between the time of Josephus and that of Tertullian.

That the Hermetic writings had influence over Ammonius Sakkas, 241 A. D., is rendered possible by mention of him in the works of Asklêpios, the reputed grandson of Hermês. Besides, several Hermetic fragments are addressed to an Ammon, who might be Ammonius Sakkas, if these Hermetic fragments were of the times of a disciple of Hermês living in the time of Asklêpios.

2. *Relation to Christianity.*—There is no good ground for calling Hermês a Christian. The Fathers ⁽¹⁾ quote him whenever his doctrine agrees with theirs, or could be so misunderstood as to fit their purpose. This fact however, should rather raise the opposite presumption; for they were endeavouring to support their own opinions by quotations from well-known heathen writers, as for instance Plato and Homer, who were authorities among the heathen. That Lactantius ⁽²⁾ and Cyril of Alexandria ⁽³⁾ praised him means little or nothing; for even the Christian Justin held the Logos to be only a "second God," a doctrine condemned at Nicaea.

If Hermês was familiar with the writings of Philo, he must have also become familiar with the locutions of the Septuagint, which Philo considered inspired. On this ground, therefore, if

Hermès is considered a Christian, we must do the like by Philo. The passages which are most often advanced as proofs of the Christianity of Hermès are as follows. "Thou, O Child, send an acceptable sacrifice to The God, Father of all things. But add also, O Child, through the Logos "Dia tou Logou (4)." These words are Philonic in every particular; especially the name "The God." They cannot therefore constitute acquaintance with the Christian dogma of the Trinity. Again, "Tat.—Who is the generator of the regeneration? Hermès.—The Son of the God, One Man, by the will of the God (6)." Here we see Philonism again, especially in the expression "one man," which refers to the Logos, who must be a man since the human race is in the image of the Logos. "That the "one man" cannot refer to the human body of Jesus is plain because from the following passage we see that this "one man" existed before the creation of the world, whereas the human body of Jesus only originated several thousand years after it. "But the Father of all things; the Mind, being life and light, began a Man like unto himself, whom he loved as his own child, for he was very beautiful, having the image of the Father. For The God loved his own form, and to this delivered over all his own creations (6)." "Of whom sowing, O Father?—Of the son of the God (7)." Thus the Son is the Organism of all things (8) and the Tool of God's Will (9).

It has also been asserted that the following words constitute a reference to the Holy Spirit: "But The Mind, The God, being masculine-feminine, originating life and light, begat by reason another Mind-Creator, who being God of the Fire and Spirit created seven administrators—(10)." This refers to the Logos, and as we shall see these seven administrators are not the seven names of the Spirit but the seven heavens of which the world is composed. It is therefore another name for the Logos, and nothing more.

Again, "Immediately from the downborne elements springs forth the Word of The God, to the pure creation of all Nature. and was united to the creative Mind, for it was consubstantial. (Homo-ousios) with it—(11)." We thus see that what above appeared to be referred to the third person of the Trinity is here referred to what would be the second; which is also called "the spiritual Word (12)." Besides, the word "consubstantial," "Homo-ousios" was not used by any Christian writer of repute for more than a century after this, in the days of Athanasius. Consequently, Hermès cannot have used this word in the distinctively theological meaning, whereas it agreed with his Philonism, that all things were in God, but not God in them.

But besides showing negatively that Hermès was not a Christian, we may show this positively by noticing the fact that he held to doctrines never countenanced by Christian authorities. The Deity is masculine-feminine (13), there is a metempsychosis of souls, regeneration is accomplished by silence, and divination is approved of (14).

3. *Difference from Platonism.*—Hermetic doctrine differs from Platonism in several important particulars.

In the first place, we must notice the crude anthropomorphism, by which the first and second orders of existence are likened to the human figure. Plato's conception of the Deity was too exalted to call it anything but "Epekeina tês Ousias," "that which is beyond all Being," "Over-Existence."

Plato's highest order of being was alone Mind, "Nous." Here "Nous" is predicated of the two highest orders of being, without making it clear whether there is any difference of degree between them.

Hermês limits the transmigration of souls to human bodies, and represents that God saves the souls from "this shame," of being sent into the bodies of animals. Plato in his figurative way seemed to countenance such animal transmigration.

4. *Hermetic Conceptions.*—In the Emanationism of the author of the Hermetic writings, the Universe is composed of a number of spheres of being, each the image of the other next above it ⁽¹⁵⁾. The highest sphere of being is The God ⁽¹⁶⁾, the next is the Logos, the Son of God ⁽¹⁷⁾, and beyond him, there are seven successive spheres of Being of which all things in heaven and earth are composed ⁽¹⁸⁾. Thus, there are nine spheres of being, each proceeding from the other, in the image of its begetter; Matter being the outermost ⁽¹⁹⁾. When God is considered apart from the world, the latter, including the Logos, is called the Ogdoad ⁽²⁰⁾.

Psychology is analogical to cosmology. The soul is divided into four parts ⁽²¹⁾: "But the soul of man is carried on in this way. The Mind in the reason, "Logos," the reason in the soul, the soul in the spirit, the spirit in the body." Death is only the retiring of the spirit from the physical body ⁽²²⁾.

5. *Cosmology.*—Although the Hermetic writer speaks of an Ogdoad besides God, he usually sums up all existence in three orders of being, by comprehending the seven spheres proceeding from the Logos under the title Soul. Thus we find the so-called Platonic trinity: The God, the World, and the Soul ⁽²³⁾. He says: "First The God, Second the World, third the Man; the World because of the Man, but Man because of the God—Of the entities some indeed are in bodies, some in ideas, but some energies; but body is in ideas, but idea and energy in body ⁽²⁴⁾."

The first principle, The God, is the beginning and cause of all things ⁽²⁵⁾; his name is Logos, the God, the beautiful, the good ⁽²⁶⁾. In the Universe there is nothing which is not in the God; whence neither magnitude, nor place, nor quality, nor figure is about the God. He is the Universe and the Universe is around all things.

The second principle is "God," as contrasted with "the God." He is the "first-begotten of God," and the "second God." ⁽²⁷⁾. He is also called "the Logos ⁽²⁸⁾."

The third principle is Soul, which may also be called "God,"

though in a sense lower than that in which it applied is the second principle ⁽²⁹⁾.

The Logos is the archetypal system of ideas ⁽³⁰⁾, and is the Creator, whom the first principle generates, because it is his nature to be good, and because he has a passion for good. "For just as a man cannot live apart from life, so neither can the God live without doing the good. For this is as it were Life, and as it were motion of the God, to move all things, and to vivify ⁽³¹⁾."

"While the First Principle is the Creator in respect to the Second Principle, the Second Principle is the Creator proper ⁽³²⁾."

The physical world is of course the body of the World-Soul ⁽³³⁾.

6. *Ethics*.—The human soul develops by the experiences it gathers in a series of reincarnations ⁽³⁴⁾ which are limited to human bodies by the guardianship of good spirits. "For of The God is this law, to guard a human soul from this so great disgrace ⁽³⁵⁾ " of entering the body of an animal.

Between the Soul and the Father is the Logos, or Second Principle, the mediating element, the organ of God's will ⁽³⁶⁾. This is the "prize for souls ⁽³⁷⁾." "And this is the administration of the Universe, dependent from the nature of the One and pervading it through the Mind of the One. Than which nothing is more divine and energetic, or more unitive of men to the Gods, of Gods to the men. This is the Good Daëmon. Blessed the soul which is fullest of this ; unfortunate the soul that is void of this ⁽³⁸⁾."

Man must hate the body, in order to love himself, the Soul ⁽³⁹⁾. Man is attracted to God by contemplation, as iron to the magnet ⁽⁴⁰⁾. Thus, contrariwise, impiety brings its own punishment in darkness and fire ⁽⁴¹⁾. The only evil is ignorance of the Deity ⁽⁴²⁾. And it is possible to discern him through all things by natural knowledge, since everything is his image, remotely or directly ⁽⁴³⁾.

The manner by which the soul reaches its development is the regeneration of silent contemplation, the "silent prayer" of the later mystics. "Accept rational sacrifices pure from soul and heart intent upon thee, O Unspeakable, Ineffable, Invoked by silence ⁽⁴⁴⁾." Thus intellectual wisdom lies in silence ⁽⁴⁵⁾. "Draw to thyself and it will come ; wish and it becomes. Lay to rest the senses of the body and it will be the generation of the Deity. Purify thyself from the rational avengers of the Matter ⁽⁴⁶⁾." The road to be travelled by every soul passes through the twelve signs of the Zodiac ⁽⁴⁷⁾ "of the nature indeed, but of all shaped forms."

Besides silence, the way to reach God is to wrong no man ⁽⁴⁸⁾ ; "But the worship of God is one : not to be evil ⁽⁴⁹⁾."

7. *Spiritual Destiny*.—The end of life is to become divine. "For it is possible, O Child, that the soul be deified, placed in the body of man, having beheld the beauty of thy good ⁽⁵⁰⁾." "Knowest thou not that thou hast been born The God, and Son of

the One, which also am I? ⁽⁵¹⁾” “ But the human soul, not every one but the pious, is a kind of daemonhood and divine; and such a soul, after the departure from the body, having striven the strife of this piety (but strife of piety is to have known the God, and to have wronged no man) becomes wholly Mind ⁽⁵²⁾.” Thus some men are Gods already, and their humanity is nigh to the Deity ⁽⁵³⁾.

Transmigration of souls is only the means by which such a deification can be accomplished. “ And there, in order, they mount upwards to the Father, and they deliver themselves up to the powers, and becoming powers they become The God. This is the good ending of those who attain knowledge, to be made divine ⁽⁵⁴⁾.” Again, “ Thou seest, O Child, how many bodies we must pass through, and how many choirs of daemons, and continuity and courses of the stars we must accomplish, that we may hasten to the One and Only God ⁽⁵⁵⁾.”

CHAPTER V.

AMMONIUS SAKKAS, PLOTINOS, AND THEIR RELATION TO CHRISTIANITY.

1. *Ammonius Sakkas*.—The founder of Neo-Platonism was Ammonius Sakkas, of Alexandria. According to Porphyry and Theodoret, he was the son of Christian parents of humble circumstances, and became a labourer. Soon however he changed his occupation and devoted himself to philosophy. He abandoned Christianity, as he could not approve of Christian hostility to science and speculations. Later in life, he taught philosophy with great success, teaching orally, and demanding a promise from his students to keep his doctrines secret. Among his students were the two Origenes, Herennius and Plotinos. We only know of his doctrines that he discovered the agreement of Aristotle with Plato, a remark supported by a statement of his doctrines by his disciple Plotinos, who said that he felt himself no more bound by his promise after the heathen Origen and Herennius had broken theirs.

2. *Plotinos*.—Plotinos always remained silent about his birthday and place of birth; he was almost ashamed of having a body, and would not sit for a picture. Yet it is supposed on good authority that he must have been born in 204 or 205 A. D., in Lycopolis, in Egypt. In his twenty-eighth year he became the pupil of Ammonius Sakkas and was so carried away with the greatness of his teacher that he is reported to have said "Touton Ezètoun," "this is the man for me!" From the time he first met him, he never left his side until the death of Ammonius Sakkas broke up their mutual intercourse, which had now lasted eleven years. Feeling that he had no other ties to bind him to Alexandria, he determined to go to Persia and India, to learn the wisdom of the East. To accomplish this purpose he had attached himself to the army of Gordian which was destined to a campaign in the East; but when the army broke up, he was forced to return with it to Rome, where he settled as a teacher of philosophy, holding consultations and successfully managing his school till in his sixty-sixth year he died (270 A. D.)

As a teacher his success was great, instructing poor as well as rich. The Emperor Gallienus and the Empress Salonina, among others, attended his lectures. This success was due not only to his wisdom but also to his personal influence and power. Above all, he owed much of it to his genuineness and spirituality. During the time that Porphyry lived with him he enjoyed four times the ecstasy which he had preached to others as being the height of human attainment.

According to his wish, Porphyry collected and edited his writings. These consisted of twenty-one earlier, and thirty-three later short essays on various topics. Porphyry gathered these into groups of nine, which he called *Enneads*. The order in which he placed them was the chronological order of the times when they were written, so that they are not arranged according to the subjects discussed. The style of Plotinos is marred by continual repetitions and very many obscurities of thought and diction, so that a systematic representation of his doctrines is no easy task.

As Plotinos considered himself a disciple of Ammonius Sakkas, we may for practical purposes assume that his writings represent the thought of his Master on all important points.

3. *Relation to Christianity.*—The system of Plotinos is so beautiful and so coherent that Christian writers have not been slow to ascribe all that is good in it to the early Christian training of Ammonius Sakkas. How little such a claim means can be understood when we recollect that Clement of Alexandria accused Homer and Plato of stealing their best thoughts from the Jewish prophets. Consequently such an explanation of the good elements of Neo-Platonism would not merit any answer if it were not that by such a claim (which is still made to-day) the value of non-Christian philosophy is seriously impaired, and Christianity is credited with more than it deserves.

In the first place, Ammonius Sakkas was a mere child when Christian, and left Christianity as soon as he became able to think for himself. Besides, Eusebius ⁽²⁾ distinctly states that he left Christianity on account of its hostility to science and philosophy, the very subject of dispute; and it is well known that converts become the bitterest enemies of their former beliefs. Would it be likely that Ammonius Sakkas would permit himself to be influenced by Christianity in the very thing on account of which he left it?

Not a single word or similarity of expression in the *Enneads* betrays any acquaintance with the Christian formulations, nor does Plotinos anywhere betray that his doctrines had arisen in opposition to or imitation of Christianity; he utterly ignores it. And the reason of this is plain; for the Christians usually belonged to the lowest and most unphilosophic classes, with a few exceptions; and it seems almost amusing to think that a man so deeply read in philosophy as Plotinos or Ammonius Sakkas were should borrow all their best doctrines from eminently unphilosophic sources.

Further, if we examine the state of contemporary Christian philosophy we will see that it is almost without exception a stereotyped form of Philonism adapted to the New Testament. There are no original conceptions, and no learning; Clement's quotations from Greek literature being mostly made up at second hand from cheap anthologies ⁽⁸⁾. How then could this barren source furnish the acknowledged rich results of Neo-Platonism?

Besides, none can read the Enneads without seeing that Plotinos is thoroughly at home in all Greek philosophy, devoting whole books to the refutation of Aristotle's categories and other tenets, so that we are certain he took all his philosophic material at first hand from philosophy itself.

All this, however, is only negative proof ; positive proof is also at hand. The doctrines of Plotinos do not in any case agree with the Christian doctrines, and show no derivation from them. The Christian conception of the Trinity, in its orthodox form, is that all three Persons are co-equal in rank, and all three are separate from the world, and as far from it the one as the other. The Triad of intelligible beings that may be found in Plotinos is God, the Mind, and individual Souls, each hierarchically subordinated to the other, and including the world as physical being in the latter term. Moreover, the whole system of Plotinos is founded on the thought of development of all things from God as emanations ; and anybody who has read the Pölemic of Irenaeus against what he calls the "decay" of God will not be likely to say that the system of Plotinos had any connection at all with Christian dogma, especially since Athanasius insisted so strenuously on the difference between "made" and "begotten" which does not exist in the Plotinic Cosmology.

Besides all this, we can account for almost every dogma of Plotinos in earlier Greek philosophy, as he himself acknowledges.

Nor need the moral earnestness, which is found in Plotinos and which is found in Plato or Aristotle, point to a Christian origin any more than that of the Stoics, from which without a doubt, Plotinos and Ammonius Sakkas drew their inspiration.

This brings us to the relation of Plotinos to Philo. That Plotinos had read the works of Philo, is entirely probable, although the chaotic eclecticism and syncretism of the latter must have rendered his works repulsive to any but Jews or Christians who were unacquainted with the sources from which Philo drew all that was valuable in his interpretation of the Scriptures. Yet it is very improbable that the relation between the two was more than that both of them drew their inspiration from the same source ; for it would have been a great deal easier for the philosophic and consistent Plotinos to draw his material from the original sources, Stoic and otherwise, than to go to a Jewish adaptation and a chaotic eclecticist for what could be gotten otherwise with much less trouble. And as a matter of fact, that which separates Plotinos, (his emanational explanation of the derivation of Matter from God,) from Christianity, separates him also from Philo, who never explained that relation. Besides, the language and terminology of the two differ too much to suppose any close relation between them. The Logos of Philo is with Plotinos Nous ; and with the latter we cannot find the former's important distinction between the Spoken and Unspoken Word.

4. *The Recognition of the Authority of Plato.*—We said above that we could account for all of Plotinos's great conceptions in

earlier Greek philosophy. Before, however, making this statement good, we must notice that whether we think so or not, it is certain that Plotinos either thought so, or affected to think so in every work of his now extant.

Plotinos relies upon the authority of Plato in every small detail (⁴). He refers to him as "the philosopher," or even with a mere "he says (⁶) ;" or even without any sign of quotation as in the famous paragraph on the transmigration of souls which we shall see later (⁶). If his opinion clashes with that of Plato, he will resort to what to us seems a misinterpretation in order to save Plato from censure (⁷). He considers that he is re-establishing pure Platonism, and desires to be called a Platonist; if the issue is raised, he will refuse to depart from Plato's norm.

Other philosophers are often referred to merely as "the ancients" or "the ancient and blessed philosophers" "Hoi archaioi" or "Hoi archaioi kai makarioi philosophoi (⁸). He believes that his teaching concerning the Good, the Mind, and the Soul is Platonic (⁹) ; but he finds it also in Parmenides, Herakleitos, Anaxagoras and Empêdoklês ; Anaxagoras is said to be he who through age attained accuracy. He believes (¹⁰) that some of the ancients must have known the truth ; the only question remains which of them knew it most fully. Consequently, he feels at liberty to criticise them, as he does Empêdoklês and Anaxagoras (¹¹).

Worthy of notice is the fact that he claims that the very marrow of his system is the same as that of Sokratês and Plato : "know thyself" "Gnôthi Seauton." He says : "Let us obey the command of the Deity, and learn to know ourselves (¹²). This fact might be used to prove that there existed such a thing as an esoteric Platonic doctrine in which the moral element was the prevailing one and which was handed down under oath of secrecy. Many of the Church Fathers look upon this maxim as sufficient guide to salvation and it is remarkable how it meets us everywhere under the same name of being Platonic. At any rate it is certain that the problems of Cosmology, Physics, Politics, and Sociology which were the main topics of exoteric Greek philosophy, are to Plotinos important only inasmuch as they are deductions from his doctrine of the welfare of the soul.

5. *Relation to Greek Philosophy.*—To Aristotle Plotinos is indebted partially for his conception of development and emanation ; for the transcendence of God, for his psychology, and outlines or suggestions of cosmology.

To Plato, Plotinos owes his Nous (with the Platonic name of God) his conception of the Earth-Soul, his categories, and almost all his details, as well as the transmigration and destiny of souls.

To the Stoics Plotinos is indebted for his exclusive moral interest, and possibly some touches of his conception of the Earth-Soul, though this is very uncertain indeed, in spite of the opinion of Erdmann.

To the Emanationist doctrines of writers such as the inditer of

the "Hermetica," Plotinos owes his conception of Emanation, which completed and inter-connected the various stages of the Aristotelian conception of development. To this source, perhaps, Plotinos owes his mysticism, and burning spirituality.

Thus we see how much of his system Plotinos owes to former philosophy ; and we need not scruple to admit his claim that he is not an inventor of bold originality, but a high-souled philosopher who combined into one system whatever was of value in philosophy before his time. Thus, as Neo-Platonism is the last phase of Greek philosophy, we may look upon his system as that which represents the philosophy of Greece in its noblest and most perfect proportions.

CHAPTER VI.

MIKROKOSM AND MAKROKOSM.

1. *The Contemplative Life.*—To Plotinos there is no object worthy of consideration except the Soul. All other subjects are only interesting to him in the measure that they are efficient accessories to this end. "Concerning what would it be worth to speak and think, rather than about the soul? Let us therefore obey the command of the Deity who commands us to know ourselves (¹). To this absorbing topic the first and last Ennead are devoted, and there is no Ennead between these two that does not in some manner, directly or indirectly, refer to the subject again.

In order therefore to present the philosophy of Plotinos in its true aspect, we shall be forced to deal with all other matters very summarily, reserving all of our space to the discussion of the nature and destiny of the Soul.

Most of those who have taken in hand an exposition of the views of Plotinos have devoted most of their time to his speculative considerations. The reason of this partiality may have arisen both from the fact that being professional philosophers, they have looked upon the system of Plotinos as a system of speculative philosophy; and also from the fact that Plotinos places the "contemplative" or "theoretic" life as far above the practical life as the real Hercules in Olumpos was above his shadow in Hades (²). For Plotinos the practical life is only the means to attain the theoretic life, and the latter is the aim of the former (³).

Yet we must not take this "contemplative" life in the Hegelian sense, which demands of the philosopher nothing more than acquaintance with the terms of philosophy, and a habit to think of metaphysical abstractions, which no logician would have difficulty to attain. Besides, such a contemplative life is within the reach of all, whatever their private moral life has been, and is not limited to those who have lived all vices out of themselves. The fact that the contemplative life of Plotinos is exclusively based upon a perfection of the moral life proves it is something more than mere skill in logomachy. The contemplative life is that one in which the soul attains to knowledge of God, face to face, rapt in ecstasy.

Such a contemplative life is it that Plotinos seeks.

2. *Mikrokosm.*—We have seen before that Aristotle was the originator in philosophy of the word "mikrokosm." His con-

ception was that man is a universe in miniature, just as the universe is a man enlarged. The advantage of this observation is that if we know the constitution of one of these terms, we will be able to reason to the constitution of the other. Thus in order to know the Universe, we will only have to know ourselves ; and if we seek our highest self, we will know God. If man and God be separate, how shall man ever hope for an at-one-ment with God ?

Plotinos is not inclined to use the word "mikrokosm" although he has the full Aristotelian conception of it. It may be proved that in crediting him with it we are not reading into his system that of Aristotle ; for his Aristotelian psychology, and his continual ascription of psychological terms to the World-Soul assure us that he holds the mikrokosmic theory.

We will therefore proceed to give a sketch of his psychology, in order that our investigations in cosmology and theology may become lucid.

3. *Psychology*.—Every human soul is the unity of the following seven elements :


1. "Ho Theos," The God (⁴).
2. "Nous Koinos," Universal Mind (⁵).
3. "Nous Idios," Individual Mind (⁶).
4. "Logos, Dianoia," Reason (⁷).
5. "To Aisthêtikon Meros," The psychophysical mechanism of sensation (⁸).
6. "To Phutikon Meros," Vegetable life (⁹).
7. "To Sôma," The form, body, matter (¹⁰).

In presenting this scheme of psychology we must remember that nowhere does Plotinos give us a complete exposition of it ; but it may be proved satisfactorily that he holds it, since he always speaks of these particular faculties in a consistent manner.

The first four of these psychological elements compose the "Psuchê" or soul ; the later three compose the body, the "Eidôlon Psuchês" or image of the body (¹¹). The body is furnished to us, as we shall see, by the World-Soul, called the "lunar gods" (¹²). The Soul is alone ourselves ; it is created by God. It is divided into two parts : the ideal, and rational soul (¹³). The rational soul is composed of reason and individual mind which faculties are realized in almost every soul ; the ideal soul consists of the two highest faculties that are in many souls latent, or undeveloped.

The faculty of reason constitutes the individuality of the Soul, for it has the power of identifying itself with the highest faculties or of sinking into the lower. When the soul does sink into the flesh, the higher faculties quiesce, become latent, and may in extreme cases atrophy. Of course, the latent faculties may at some later date be revived (¹⁴).

While the soul is incarnate, all the seven faculties are indissolubly bound together ; and the bond is broken only at death, when the soul abandons the body as an old dress.



In this scheme of psychology are assured both the immanence of the Soul in every part of the body, as the body is "in the Soul," and the transcendence of the higher faculties of the Soul above the body ⁽¹⁵⁾.

We must remember that for Plotinos to know a thing, and to become one with it were identical terms ⁽¹⁹⁾. Therefore we can become one with whatever we know : and as we have a God-consciousness, the life of contemplation is the highest of all possible lives for it means that we shall come to know God ⁽²⁰⁾.

As a consequence of this we epitomize the universe, when incarnate, by having organs by which we can come into communication with every one of the Seven Realms of which the world consists. Therefore man is "Panta," all ⁽¹⁶⁾ ; he is a "Kosmos noêtos," an intelligible world ⁽²¹⁾. The soul is not an aggregate, like a house, but a unity revolving around a centre into which it can draw itself inwards ⁽²²⁾. The soul ascends to its highest heights not by addition, or adding itself to God, but by immanent union with him ⁽¹⁸⁾.

Once the soul has incarnated into the body furnished by the World-Soul, it is an indissoluble unity with it, using it as a tool ⁽²²⁾, not being affected by its pains more than the workman is affected by the injuries to his tools ⁽²⁹⁾. Then the soul is like a man standing with his feet in a tub of water ⁽³⁰⁾, reaching down to the very lowest form of being, matter, and being one with or having a faculty to become one with the cosmical Nous and even The God ⁽²³⁾. For we know that the soul is kin to the Cosmical Nous and God, by faculties like them, though at times obscured by being fallen into the flesh ⁽²⁴⁾.

Plotinos does not always speak of the various faculties of the soul in detail. He usually assumes the practical distinction, soul and body. The soul is placed between God and the World, so that like an amphibian it lives now here, and then beyond ⁽²⁵⁾ being able at its will to think without and against the will of the body ⁽³²⁾. Often, again, he divides the soul into a double self : the inner or true self, that lives in the intelligible world, the "ideal" soul we saw above ⁽²⁶⁾ ; and the external self that lives in the external world, the "rational" soul just mentioned ⁽²⁷⁾.

How the incarnation into the body furnished by the Earth-Soul takes place is not quite clear : the soul is said to emit a kind of light or heat ⁽²⁸⁾ which is probably the celestial spiritual body we shall see more about later on, in the Fifth Realm. This light or heat gives form to the body supplied by the World-Soul, and becomes united to the earthly spiritual body, or perhaps even forms it.

4. *Cosmological Import of Psychology.*—In order to show forth the relation of the small universe to the large one, we must premise that each separate faculty of man, while bound by an indissoluble tie to the other faculties, exists in a universe of its own. The physical body dwells in a realm of dead matter ; the vegetable soul in a realm of organic life in which organic life is pos-

sible, and so on. Thus all human powers co-exist in the separate realms for which they are fitted so that in order to become universal we need only open ourselves to the universal (³¹). These different Realms interpenetrate each other much as the different universes of Messrs. Stewart and Tait, in their interesting book, "The Unseen Universe."

The nature of the whole process of existence lies before us in miniature. The First Realm is The God who is above all thinkable perfection and being ; the Second Realm is the Divine Mind, or Nous, which is Divine being and essence, proper. The third, including the other four, the Realm of soul, which cannot be said to have being, although it possesses existence. These universes interpenetrate each other. The Soul and the World, which is its image, are immanent in God ; and God, in his absolute being transcends all else. The Divine Mind is the image of God ; the individual mind is the image of the Divine Mind ; finally, proceeding similarly through all the lower realms in their turn, the body is the form or image of the vegetable life ; this again is the image or form of the sensual life ; this again is the image of the individual mind. Thus matter is the lowest grade of being ; beyond is that abstraction we may call the darkness of nought, which does not even exist.

While in the mind of Plotinos the immanence and transcendence of these Realms is inseparably conjoined, we will be forced, for the sake of clearness in exposition, to consider first each Realm separately, and then to consider the transcendence of God as shown forth in his image, man.

CHAPTER VII.

THE FIRST REALM, THE GOD.

1. *The One and the Many.*—In order to understand anything, it is necessary that the mind should receive through sensation and reflection ideas and representations. The more sharply defined these are, the more thoroughly understood are they ; and they will be clear in the degree that they are limited by and distinct from other ideas and representations. Ratiocination therefore necessarily implies a Manifold, which is subsumed under the Unity of the apprehending mind. Unity is therefore more fundamental than Manifoldness.

If we should apply these considerations to the Divine Being, we see that Divine thought necessarily implies a Manifold, the duality of thinker and thought, of being and activity ⁽¹⁾. As a consequence of this, the Divine activity called Divine Thought cannot be the highest plane of Divine Life. Above the realms of Divine thought must be the realm of the Divine Unity of Apperception, which is above all thought. God is then above all describable thought, above all Divine Thought, above all Divine Life, above all Divine Being ⁽²⁾.

The highest cannot be Manifoldness ; it is Unity ; for Manifoldness is after all only a Manifoldness of Unity ⁽³⁾, and everything is itself only because it thus is One ⁽⁴⁾. God is thus above all Divine Goodness, and even Divine Unity ⁽⁵⁾, and above Divine Being ⁽⁶⁾. If we say that God is Goodness, then the thought of this Divine Goodness has its subject and object ; it becomes good by partaking of the quality of goodness. And if it thus needs this quality, if it thus depends on this quality, then it cannot be independent and self-existent Goodness. The same may be said of the Divine Unity and Being. Therefore the simple must precede the compound ⁽⁷⁾, original being must be independent of derivative being : cause must be independent of effect, and Unity, of Manifoldness ⁽⁸⁾. God is above all categories of Life, Being, Thought and Activity. The God is then Over-life, Over-being, Over-thought, and Over-activity. In this last point Aristotle was left behind by Plotinos, who could not on logical grounds see his way to call God even "*actus purus*," pure energy ; God is above even this. That there is a God at all we only know by seeking a first cause of all other causes. God is thus even above the Prime Mover of Aristotle.

2. *The God Above Cognisability.*—God is therefore unknowable. He is above all description ⁽⁹⁾, he is incomprehensible and infinite ⁽¹⁰⁾.

The highest we know does not reach up to him ⁽¹¹⁾. As he is unlimited ⁽¹²⁾ he must be formless, ⁽¹³⁾ and therefore be even above beauty ⁽¹⁴⁾. He is above good and honourable qualities ⁽¹⁵⁾. Will as a psychological faculty does not exist in God ; for will is a desire of good, of which God has no need or lack, being its fulness ⁽¹⁶⁾. In God thinking and willing, that is, over-thinking and over-willing, are the same, as happens even in a form of God so much lower than he as the World-Soul ⁽¹⁷⁾. We have already seen that God is above all activity ⁽¹⁸⁾ ; therefore he is at rest while creating ⁽¹⁹⁾. Being above thought ⁽²⁰⁾ he is above self-consciousness ⁽²¹⁾. Of him, therefore, we can only tell what he is not ; no name or conception of him is adequate ⁽²²⁾.

3. *The Nomenclative Symbol for the Divinity.*—Although we cannot describe or give a name to God, we are forced to refer to him in some manner ; by some designation. Plotinos therefore follows Plato in calling God by his most characteristic quality of Goodness in moral relations, and Unity in metaphysical reflections. God is therefore called "the Good" "Tagathon" ⁽²³⁾ and "the One" "To Hen" ⁽²⁴⁾ ; he is often referred to as "the first," for the sake of brevity and technicality in the aetiological argument for his existence.

* 4. *The God is the First Cause.*—Working back from the World to God we find that he is the first cause. As such, he is activity, even is above activity, for he is often called "cause" ⁽²⁵⁾ and "the first" ⁽²⁶⁾. He is above pure activity, without any outside himself ⁽²⁷⁾. He is the origin "Archê" of all things ; although he is really above origin ⁽²⁸⁾ because the word "origin" denotes something which concerns us, not him ⁽²⁹⁾. He may be called the centre of all things, with the same limitation as above ⁽³⁰⁾.

5. *The God's Necessity to Love.*—If God is so perfect in his self-existence, what can induce him to beget anything at all ?

The great argument of Irenaeus against the development or emanation of God into his world was that this was nothing more or less than decay of the Divine Being. This objection is however founded on a gross misconception, induced perhaps by passionate antagonism. If God is perfect, he cannot decay ; if he generates worlds and souls he does it from any other cause than decay or degeneration of his Being ⁽³¹⁾.

Why could not the perfect Being remain alone, without creating or begetting other Beings? Because as every perfect Being on earth seeks to bring forth another, and the being on earth is in the image, faint indeed, of God, so the most perfect of all must beget, giving of himself without envy ⁽³²⁾. The world was not made by a chance desire ; nor was it made because of ratiocinative reasons ⁽³³⁾ : the nature of himself ⁽³⁴⁾ for it is a physical (that is, a non-argumentative) necessity of his nature to beget. As God's nature is eternal, so are the offsprings of his nature also eternal ⁽³⁵⁾.

This necessity of God's nature follows from the fact that God is love, for the nature of Being, whatever its degree, is love.

"The universal soul has an universal love ; each individual soul has its individual love ; and the love of the highest soul is God ⁽³⁶⁾." Apart from partaking of the Divine Good no things love or are loved ⁽³⁷⁾ and the soul by the very constitution of its nature loves God and is ever forced to begin over and over to love him ⁽³⁸⁾.

6. *Manner of Begetting*.—Love is a sufficient reason for all begetting ; but the question remains, How does this disinterested love beget?

This is a question the wisest have never been able to explain except by the use of illustrations drawn from the natural world. Plotinos likens God to a river which is so full that it overflows its banks ; and the water which has overflowed does the same, extending itself ever in wider circuits ⁽³⁹⁾. This figure must however be taken with caution ; for it should not indicate either a temporal becoming ⁽⁴⁰⁾, since creation always takes place from the inner or causal side ⁽⁴¹⁾ ; nor should it be understood to be an emanation such as would abstract from the power of the first cause ; the latter remains unmoved and undiminished, while the stream of being flows from him ⁽⁴²⁾.

That which proceeds from him ever remains in him ; but he is not in it as if contained by it ⁽⁴³⁾. Plotinos advances the time-honoured illustration of the sun and the ray of light that proceeds from it without diminishing its light or heat ⁽⁴⁴⁾.

These illustrations are to-day no longer intelligible, from the fact that the law of continuity demands that the sun's heat should grow less by just the amount that is subtracted from it in the form of the light of the ray, even though the sun's heat be so enormous that the loss be not apparent. Unless therefore we find some other means of explaining the continued self-existence of God, in spite of his eternal begetting, which is doubtless the case, the whole theory of Plotinos must be said to be yet unproved. Nevertheless, Plotinos would not suffer alone ; the whole philosophy of Christianity would fall together with his.

7. *Relation of Cause and World*.—The details of the process of begetting are as follows : God is the sun which enlightens the Universe ⁽⁴⁵⁾ and rules all existence with his power ⁽⁴⁶⁾. He is the centre around which everything revolves ⁽⁴⁷⁾ ; every little part is organically related to the whole, so that from knowledge of its nature, the nature of the centre may be deduced ⁽⁴⁸⁾. All creation has a natural longing for the first cause ⁽⁴⁹⁾ and turns itself towards him as a sunflower to the sun, in the degree that its nature permits it to do so ; and the excellence of the nature is judged by the power it possesses of turning to the first cause ⁽⁵⁰⁾. This is the natural instinct of self-preservation ; for inasmuch as the creature turns itself to its creator, does it turn itself to its highest good ⁽⁵¹⁾.

The process of begetting may be likened to the natural development of a plant from a seed ⁽⁵²⁾ and that which is begotten may be called the son of the begetter, the latter thus becoming the father of that which it has begotten ⁽⁵³⁾. The first-begotten is the image of the Begetter, the second-begotten of the First,

and so on (⁶⁴) Unity and Perfection decreasing simultaneously (⁶⁵). Each thing is itself inasmuch as it is a Unity, and fulfils its function and nature (⁶⁶). The Divine Mind impresses its Ideas in matter as with a seal, so that things are living expressions of a divine Idea (⁶⁷). That which is begotten is of course never of equal intensity of being with that which begot it ; at each begetting of an image the light of perfection dims off into the darkness of non-existence, Manifoldness increasing, and Unity disappearing.

In matter, things are separated by space ; but in the Divine Mind, they are only separated by form (⁶⁸). Thus the soul is wholly in every single member of the body ; therefore we may say correctly the body is in the soul (⁶⁹). Thus also God is wholly in every single part of the world, for the world, and all that is, is in him (⁷⁰). The presence of the divine is always, for lower beings, mediated through the presence of the intermediate stages of Being. Thus in the physical World there are everywhere three stages of being : God, the Nous, and the Earth-Soul.

If the centre of the Universe be God, then the First Sphere is that of Nous, enlightened by God : the Second is that soul, enlightened by the Nous ; the Third is that of body, enlightened by that of soul (⁷¹). The body turns to the soul, the soul to the Nous, and through it to God (⁷²). Thus each sphere is a different plenitude of divinity (⁷³), each depending on the next highest sphere (⁷⁴).

In this manner all the different Realms interpenetrate each other. Plotinos sought to make this conception clear by illustrating it from the natural world : The soul is everywhere in the body, as light as in air (⁷⁵) ; but the body is in the soul as air in light ; the light being rightly distinguished as the most basic principle of the two (⁷⁶). The intellect generates and governs the lower powers as splendour is in the ray, the ray in the light, the light in the sun (⁷⁷).

The question occurred to Plotinos, how does each soul get an undivided unit or quality of life from the World-Soul? This difficulty was settled by referring to the fact that many ears can hear the same voice, the sound being in each case undivided (⁷⁸). Thus, wherever we are, are the three presences, God, the Mind, and the World-Soul, which are known by the goodness, beauty, and life which we find inherent in all things on earth (⁷⁹).

What is space in the physical world, is excess of power, intensity, in all higher spheres (⁸⁰) ; in the physical world the categories of space and time represent nothing in the intelligible World, form alone differentiating beings there (⁸¹). Thus, on different planes, each faculty of man is conscious of itself in its own way, and in its own kinds of limitation, connecting man with all the octaves of the universe (⁸²). These major and minor Realms interpenetrating each other form a perfect harmony all together ; and their activity produces that harmony of the spheres which haunted all Greek philosophy, and which was the great *Te Deum* of creation (⁸³).

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SECOND REALM, GOD, COSMIC MIND.

1. *Saturn, the Cognisable Deity.*—The first Realm was called God. The second, Plotinos calls Saturn, for shortness of appellation ⁽¹⁾.

We saw, in speaking of the First Realm, that ratiocination implies a Manifold, which shall be subsumed under the Unity of apperception, besides being limited by a Unity of same logical intension as itself. This Unity of apperception, which lies behind the Manifold and Unity of ratiocination, was when applied to the universe, God. This Manifold and Unity of ratiocination itself then becomes, applied to the universe, the Divine Mind, Nous. It is therefore no more strict unity, but Unity with Manifold ⁽²⁾, thinker and thought, subject and object ⁽³⁾.

What kind of thoughts does the Divine Mind think? It contemplates itself, and thus thinks of that of which it is the image, just as the human reason thinks of the higher unity of apperception, which is conscious of more than itself. God was Over-beautiful; the Divine Mind is beautiful. God is Over-being, Over-good, Over-life, Over-thought; the Divine Mind is being, goodness, life, and thought. God is Over-activity; the Divine Mind is primary activity complete in its self ⁽⁴⁾. As eternity is only intensity of the intelligible action of the Divine Mind ⁽⁵⁾, it may be said to live in eternity, not in time ⁽⁶⁾. Thus it comprehends all things that have existed, that exist, or that shall exist.

The consequence of this determination is that the Divine Mind knows of no distinction between potentiality and actuality in thought ⁽⁷⁾, no progress from not-thinking to thinking ⁽⁸⁾, no inconcluded thinking ⁽⁹⁾, no unknown future ⁽¹⁰⁾ and no memory for the past ⁽¹¹⁾. As human powers of ratiocination cannot contemplate the actual Unity of apperception, but still can describe it and grasp it, so the Nous can never behold the actual God ⁽¹²⁾ but can describe him ⁽¹³⁾. Moreover, it cannot behold what is below it, because itself is wholly thought ⁽¹⁴⁾.

2. *Identity of Being and Thought.*—God was Over-being and the Divine Nous is full being. And as Being and Thought are identical, the system of Thoughts of the Divine Mind are reality ⁽¹⁵⁾. It is on this account that Plotinos refutes the ten Aristotelian and four Stoical Categories. These treated of the qualities of matter; but if matter is only an image of mind, then if there are any Categories at all, they must be Categories of Mind,

beginning with Thought and Being ⁽¹⁶⁾. The Divine Mind includes ideas of all things and all numbers, so that it is a true intelligible World, "Kosmos Noëtos" ⁽¹⁷⁾. The Divine Mind is to its Ideas as the science of geometry is to the propositions contained in it ⁽¹⁸⁾; it thinks of all things ⁽¹⁹⁾ and thus its universal has all forms ⁽²⁰⁾. It contains as one power all powers, as one God all lower Gods ⁽²¹⁾. It possesses life in itself and has the original archetypes of all things ⁽²²⁾. Even small things ⁽²³⁾ and human powers ⁽²⁴⁾ are represented in it. The harmony and peace of this world is blessedness ⁽²⁵⁾ inasmuch as it accounts for the beauty in all things, which is as it were the trace of its presence in any thing; and this beauty proceeds from the stillness of perfect motion.

CHAPTER IX.

THE THIRD REALM : THE SOUL.

1. *The Trinity : Over-God, Saturn and Zeus-Rhea.*—The so-called Platonic Trinity may be found, in a form much altered from the original, in the speculations of Plotinos.

It is very true that Plotinos seems to be a little uncertain about it in some places. He speaks of three successive states of being, one lower than the other,—“ Gods, daemons, and men ⁽¹⁾.” Again, he speaks as if there were four orders : the Good, the Nous, the World-Soul, and daemons, which are the human souls ⁽²⁾. Again, he speaks of souls of spheres and stars, spheres, and the space below the moon, corresponding to divine, human, and bestial men ⁽³⁾.

Yet, as a rule, he does not hesitate in enunciating a three-fold order of existence : God, the Nous, and the Soul ⁽⁴⁾.

Of course it is understood that they are hierarchically subordinated the one to the other, and in no wise like the Christian Trinity. As the second was the image of the first plane of being, so is the third the image of the second, the reason of this further begetting being the same that led to the begetting of the second—unargumentative love ⁽⁵⁾. The Soul is an Idea imaged, and is one of the circles of light which surround the inner light of God. The highest heaven is full of fire, and therefore of light of which all souls partake individually ⁽⁶⁾. So much is this the case that the world is said to have many lights, being adorned and enlightened by many souls ⁽⁷⁾ who when thinking do not speak but simply glow, when not incarnated ⁽¹⁴⁾. The sphere of the Soul is therefore still intelligible light, although its sphere is the outermost of those which may be called spheres of light; and beyond it begins illimitable darkness ⁽⁸⁾.

In the Divine Mind, there is neither time or space ; in the Soul begins time ⁽⁹⁾ and in the body beneath it begins space. Thus the Soul is said “ to bring forth time.”

The Soul is impassible ⁽¹⁰⁾ ; therefore nothing can harm her ; but she may sink into the Manifoldness of the body ⁽¹¹⁾ and be stifled in the agonies and passions of the flesh. Yet she is not bound down to her body as to intellection : she reasons through herself, and may understand through the Divine Common Mind or Nous, which to its individual reason is as form is to matter ⁽¹²⁾.

It will explain the position of the soul if we remark that the process of begetting is always a proceeding into Manifoldness

from Unity. Consequently, the Good was the Unity of apperception, Over-Unity. The Nous was Unity mingled with Manifoldness, the Unity still predominating. In the Soul however, we see Unity mingled with Manifoldness, the Manifoldness predominating so much as to have discerpted that idea from all others, so that all others are "other" to it⁽¹³⁾. Beneath the Soul, in Reason, Sense, Vitality and Matter, the Manifold encroaches more and more on the Unity, until in matter, Unity is in its last degree of degradation into Manifoldness.

2. *Co-equality of Souls.*—All souls were originally equal ; they all came from the highest heaven ⁽¹⁵⁾. They were all originally parts of the same Divine Mind ⁽¹⁶⁾, and that they are alike as to idea and nature is proved from the fact that they can understand one another, and in the intelligible world be at the same place at the same time, that is, that they can communicate ⁽¹⁷⁾ with each other.

Yet in spite of this community of origin, there is no possible doubt that there appears to reign much confusion injustice and dissimilarity in the dispensation of the world as we know it. Yet, in spite of this appearance of disorder, there reigns down below here just as absolute order as obtains in the intelligible world above ⁽¹⁸⁾. The Souls come from the same Nous and differ only in essential qualities or characteristics ⁽¹⁹⁾. Souls may differ because of these original characteristic differences ⁽²⁰⁾ then by the amount of experience gotten in former incarnations ⁽²¹⁾ the bodies given them differed, being celestial, ethereal, or of air ⁽²²⁾, or their education or discipline may have differed ⁽²³⁾ ; but through all this inequality runs the inexorable thread of Justice, which metes out happiness according to goodness, which is merit. "The good alone are happy ; on this account is it that the Gods are happy ⁽²³⁾." The difference between men and Gods is only one of development ; men are incarnated in human bodies, the Gods have spheres or worlds as bodies, and are called "Gods" in respect to man because they give to their "sister-souls" the opportunity of incarnating. Men are also divine beings ⁽²⁴⁾ and are the "sisters" and "brothers" of the souls of the Gods ⁽²⁵⁾. Besides, Plotinos states explicitly that human souls will have the same powers and will hold the same dignity as the World-Soul, especially if they will turn into themselves without spot ⁽²⁶⁾.

3. *The World-Soul.*—We must now treat of the World-Soul. Plotinos took his conception of it, not from the Stoics as some authorities have thought, but from Plato. The latter seems to have been uncertain whether the souls of men proceeded from the World-Soul, whether they had all been created by God, in the same mould, but smaller in size. Plotinos solves the difficulty by saying, that the souls of man were born of the World-Soul in respect to their bodies ; but that their impassible self, the reason and mind had been created or begotten by the same Nous, the World-Soul only offering her sister-souls opportunities for development. We would thus explain the fact that we saw above

that everywhere on earth there were three presences, God, the Nous, and the World-Soul, and that yet human souls and the World-Soul, also called Jupiter for short (²⁷), were brethren, and equal as to origin.

Plato never defined accurately whether his World-Soul was the Soul of the whole physical universe, or only of the earth. The Stoics distinctly looked to the Soul of the Universe when speaking of a World-Soul, from which all other souls were begotten. Plotinos was the first philosopher to limit this World-Soul to the earth, assuming that each star soul possessed its own soul. He says : " One single life inheres in the one sphere, and each sphere is located in one living being. Thus all creatures which are on the sphere return to the same one life, and thus all souls on one sphere are to a certain extent one (²⁸). "

We must now enquire more particularly concerning the nature of this World-Soul. The argument by which we rise to the certainty of its existence is the Stoical one : just as in our body is a soul, which keeps the body together, so every physical body is kept together by a soul in which the body is (²⁹). For bodies are in the souls, which pervade them (³⁰). The form of its body is spherical, because it is perfect; for when unincarnate, the form of the spiritual bodies of human souls are also spherical (³¹).

4. *The Transcendent Over-Soul*.—In the Third Realm, that of individual mind, as we have seen, human souls and the World-Soul are different as to individuality, and coequal as to origin (³²). Nevertheless, the intellectual powers of the World-Soul are so much more developed than ours that she is called " pure intellect (³³)," knowing things not through organs of sense but by direct intuition (³⁴). She is outside of the world-body, and bears all that is bodily within herself (³⁵). Her self-consciousness (³⁶) is so much higher than ours that she neither has nor needs any memory (³⁷). Since she has all knowledge present to her mind, which to Plotinos seems to be the characteristic of the memory of stable souls, that is, the higher faculties of the soul, which are impassible and which are not left behind at death (³⁸). Nor does the World-Soul possess reason, that is, reflection, of the Fourth Realm (³⁹), " Logizesthai," since an equal and perfect thought has as little need of ratiocination as for a search after facts which were known in the past. She has no receptivity for sensual things, having no organs of sense (⁴⁰) the sky serving her as an eye. She creates, like God, above ratiocination or conscious choice, impelled by the same divine necessity of love (⁴¹). She never enters into connection with matter, her time being spent in undisturbed meditation. There is also a lower World-Soul, belonging to the Sixth Realm, called Rhea (⁴²), which is related to the human race in its lower realms much like the soul of a tree is related to the fruits born by the tree (⁴³). It is begotten by the higher one, Zeus, as its image ; and is intimately connected with the matter of the world's body.

5. *Interrelation of Over-Soul and Souls*.—We have already seen that the World-Soul is to men a God, affording them oppor-

tunities for incarnation. That men are incarnated in the body of the World-Soul does not necessitate that the World-Soul should conflict with the higher independent faculties of human souls ; they are not as intimately connected with it as our members are part of our bodies (⁴⁴). The relation of the human soul to the World-Soul may aptly if unelegantly be compared to the relation existing between the human soul, and the soul of the maggot which feasts on an amputated leg (⁴⁵).

The World-Soul rules and guides men (⁴⁶), besides ruling her body which obeys her better than our bodies do us, since everything is well-disposed (⁴⁷). Our bodies are made for us "by a good soul," the World-Soul, our sister (⁴⁸). The World-Soul pities us in our sorrows, and during the intervals between the incarnations the human souls are protected by her, rising to the height that is appropriate to their development in goodness (⁴⁹). While incarnate human souls can attain to be as blessed and powerful as the World-Soul, averting or minimizing the blows of fortune, and becoming the World-Soul's colleague in ruling her body (⁵⁰). Thus the World-Soul and all human souls are equal, inasmuch as they are only different manners of working of the Universal Mind ; different revelations of the same life—just as one light streams in many directions (⁵¹).

CHAPTER X.

THE FOURTH REALM, REASON.

1. *Individual Mind*.—This Realm of reason is lacking in the World-Soul (¹). Although the "individual Mind" of the Third Realm is the essential characteristic of what makes a soul a soul, yet this lower faculty of reason conjoined to it is the individual faculty by which man may identify himself with his higher or lower powers. Thus the soul is represented as choosing between its two loves, its two daemons: the higher and lower (²). The "individual Mind" of the Third Realm may be looked upon as double: containing intellect and imagination. Therefore, when the reason identifies itself with the "individual Mind" it occurs that intellect and imagination appear doubly changed, as discursive and permanent reason (³). Consequently we may distinguish in every "rational" soul, as contrasted with the "ideal soul," three parts: mind (individual Nous) rational soul (reason) and irrational soul (sense vitality and matter) (⁴). Besides, the human reason is called "rational" reason, "Logos Logikon," to preclude the possibility of its ever incarnating in the body of animals (⁵).

In this realm of reason man is responsible for his destiny. When, however, man identifies his reason with his individual Nous, it is plain that the reason ceases to exist as separate faculty. This then happens in the case of World-Souls, called Gods, who have become so good that, as it were, the possibility of falling has disappeared (⁶).

This realm is the essentially human one, and is also called "Dianoia." It is the lowest part of the eternal impassible soul; but it may become so buried in the flesh as to lose its individuality, and becoming useless atrophy.

2. *Other World-Souls*.—As the World-Soul called Zeus is only the Soul of the Earth, there must be similar souls of "Gods" in the other stars. They, like Zeus, are the most perfect souls (⁷), and consequently are, as to their body, the visible Gods, the image of the invisible Gods (⁸). Like Zeus, the Earth-Soul, they contemplate the cosmic Nous steadily from far (⁹) and live quietly, peacefully, harmoniously, producing as we have seen the music of the spheres (¹⁰). Again, like Zeus, the Earth-Soul, they have neither reason, nor memory nor ratiocinative powers, for the same reason the Earth-Soul lacks them (¹¹).

CHAPTER XI.

THE FIFTH REALM, SENSE.

1. *The Senses of the Over-Soul.*—This Fifth Realm is also apparently lacking in the World-Souls, as well as to all higher souls of Gods. The Earth-Soul has no sense organs; yet in allegorical fashion Plotinos makes the sky its eyes, and the races of animals its veins (¹). The highest Earth-Soul, called Zeus, has no need to gather information through sensation.

It might at first sight seem that if these realms are lacking to the Earth-Soul, it is impossible that each lower one should be begotten in the image of the next higher one, as is the rule in the system of Plotinos. It will however be seen on reflection, that this objection overlooks the great factor of development. Since the reason becomes merged into the individual Mind during process of development, it is plain that it must have existed at some time of the Earth-Soul's career. Besides, nothing prevents that though merged into the individual Nous the reason and the sense man may still subsist in perfect order, and be able beget their image as well as when existing separately.

2. *Unity of Souls in the Fifth Realm.*—It is in this realm of sense that human souls and the Earth-Souls are for the first time organically united; for it will be remembered that the kind Earth-Soul affords her sister souls opportunities for education by incarnating in her body, furnishing to every incarnate soul her three lowest faculties of sense, vitality, and matter (²). Plotinos insists on this fact continually.

3. *Human Sense-Realm.*—This Realm of Sense furnishes to our psychical life its sensations and passions (³). Yet, it is much more than this. It is here that we meet the spiritual body of which the physical body is so perfect an image. This spiritual body is again two-fold. The higher part belongs to the impassible, eternal soul itself, the lower belongs to the order and dispensation of the Earth-Soul. They are identical in form; but they are separable at death. The earthy spiritual body lasts longer than the physical body, though both are by nature corruptible. The life which association with the rational soul has given the earthly spiritual body recedes with the departure of the Soul, as the light follows the withdrawal of a lighted candle. The separation between the earthly and celestial spiritual bodies takes place when all vitality has left the former. We may suppose that Plotinos would have explained the appearance of

ghosts shortly after the death of the person, as being appearances of the earthly spiritual body before its utter extinction.

4. *Celestial and Physical Senses.*—What have these two spiritual bodies to do with sensations? Much, every way. On the supposition of Plotinos, man has two sets of senses, corresponding to the two spiritual bodies; a celestial, and an earthly set of senses. In this fact Plotinos sees the long-sought connection between cerebral modifications and the psychical perception of them. During the time of incarnation, both spiritual bodies are closely united, each reacting on the other. Consequently, physical excitations will be opportunities of celestial vision; while at times, as in dreams, the celestial set of senses is alone active. A case in point would be that of the somnambulistic subject who relishes the ideal apple suggested to her by the operator.

It is thus that Plotinos explains the fact that the Earth-Soul has perfect knowledge of all things without any sensation or organs of sense. The Earth-Soul possesses a celestial set of senses in her spiritual body, (celestial spiritual body), the earthly spiritual body having become useless.

5. *Senses of Animals.*—We here have an opportunity of enquiring concerning the nature of animals. The earthly spiritual body of animals is present to them equally and of like nature with that of men, so that upon the quiescence of the higher human faculties, a low human soul might if degraded enough,—although this would be a most extreme case—incarnate in the body of an animal. The souls of animals and vegetables are of one nature with human souls, although infinitely less developed. Plotinos even asserts that they have a developed Reason (Fourth Realm) (4). Nothing would oppose that as in the case of bad men, so in animals the higher faculties would be present, but only in an dormant or quiescent state.

CHAPTER XII.

THE SIXTH REALM, VITALITY.

1. *The Sixth Realm.*—The Sixth Realm in the human being is the vegetable life of the body ; the vitality present in every protoplasmic cell, and which makes all the difference between a living and a dead body, when considered apart from consciousness.

2. *The Sixth Realm of the Over-Soul.* The Earth-Soul has also a Sixth Realm ; a lower soul, which we have already spoken of, and which is called Rhea, to distinguish it from the higher Earth-Soul called Zeus ⁽¹⁾. At times this lower soul, is in some of its lower phases also called Aphroditê ⁽²⁾, as the representant of the reproductive functions of all vitality. This lower Earth-Soul is the begotten image of the higher, through the two original mediators, which are probably indicated by the word "other," "allo" ⁽³⁾. The lower Earth-Soul is connected with the earth-body as human life is connected with the human body ⁽⁴⁾. This lower soul is the substrate of sensible appearance, its name is Nature ⁽⁵⁾. It cannot meditate as the highest soul can ; it is thought, but not self-conscious ; but is simple, and purposeless ⁽⁶⁾. It may be said to have sensation just as a body sleeping has sensation ; it differs therefore very much from the sensation of the body in its full psychical state ⁽⁷⁾. Her products are "the materials that dreams are made of ;" its quiet working proceeds with the certainty of instinct, without interruption of ratiocination. It begets the matter of the earth-body as its image, from the same inner necessity of love which led to the begetting of the Cosmic Nous ; only in a much lower degree ; it cannot avoid shining with its light upon that which is below it, and which does not yet exist ⁽⁸⁾. This necessity of love was from everlasting ; and as on this account the Cosmical Nous was eternal, therefore the Cosmical Nous begat all its images eternally. The consequence is that the world is eternal ⁽⁹⁾. Yet there are cycles in the history of the world, just as in that of man ; but they are not Stoic or Platonic in rigid fatalistic repetition. They only furnish the various circumstances necessary for the development of souls ⁽¹⁰⁾.

3. *The Doctrine of Sympathy.*—In certain senses Nature may be said to be imperfect ; but if we look we may see in her the impress of the perfect divine nature. She is its offspring and image. On it she depends for being. She only has existence

inasmuch as the Divine exists in her ⁽¹¹⁾. She is not built up of foreign elements, as an aggregate, as a house is built of separate bricks. She is, in her body and souls, an organic whole, an organism, whose elements are all united in the highest Earth-Soul ⁽¹²⁾. As in a human body the members are in mutual harmony, there is a unity although it be composed of sounds low and high ⁽¹⁴⁾. As in a human body, so in the human organism every member is interdependent. All things act and react on each other, by all means physical and psychical. This is the doctrine of "sympathy," which the modern doctrine of resultance of forces has re-established, and which was used by Lotze as his supposititiously original proof of causation.

4. *The Beautiful*.—There is nothing which is nearer to the heart of Plotinos than the belief that the world is beautiful ; the most beautiful world possible. Plotinos had to enforce his view against heathen Gnostics and also Christian Gnostics, whom he mentions in this polemic as being those who say that the world-creator and the world are evil ⁽¹⁵⁾. Plotinos thinks ⁽¹⁶⁾ that the world should be composed of matter if it was to be the image of God (of course he assumes that matter is the image of God) ; and within this sphere of matter which is the image of God, we could not imagine a more beautiful world than ours. It was made so beautiful in order that the higher spirits should not be forced to pollute their glance by looking out into the night of non-existence ; and especially to remind man of the goodness of God, whose image it is, and who can therefore be known by contemplating the world, his image. Again, ⁽¹⁷⁾ How can man be said to honour the invisible Gods, if he despises their visible images? How can the guidance of Providence be admitted in the direction of minor matters if it be not admitted in that of major ones? How can a man be called immortal, if you deny immortality to the beautiful stars, and that these have souls like men have?

5. *Astrology and Vaticination*.—The above explained doctrine of "sympathy" or the coherence of things, or law of resultance of forces ⁽¹⁸⁾ explains all the truth there is both in Astrology and Vaticination. Plotinos cannot see his way to accepting a crude Astrology ⁽¹⁹⁾ which supposes that the daily position of the stars influences our daily life in a supernatural way. If the Star-Souls are Gods they are good ; why then should their different position alter their influence? What have we little men done to the stars that they should wish us evil? The influence of the stars can be little more than that of their natural influence, as of the moon on the tides, the sun on the life and spirits of men ⁽²¹⁾. The deeds of men which as responsible creatures they commit are just as important, if not more so ⁽²¹⁾. Of course the life-giving influence of the sun is part of the physical influence which the soul finds in her incarnation into the body of the Earth-Soul ; for evidently the sun exerts much influence on the growth of nature, and the powers of men ⁽²⁵⁾. Thus the Realm of Sense and Vitality of man are affected by the state of the

physical influences of the sun and moon ; but the higher impassible soul escapes them, except in a reflex manner through the body ⁽²³⁾.

As to Vaticination, Plotinos does not go beyond the scientific vaticination which from consideration of a single tooth or bone can reconstruct the nature, age, and powers of a long extinct race. Therefore, granting the law of coherence or sympathy, if we are skilful enough, we can conclude from the condition of one part of the cosmical organism to the conditions of the other parts, as easily as the dancer judges of the position of the foot from that of the hand ⁽²⁴⁾. Both are consequences of the same cause; therefore they will tell of each other ⁽²⁵⁾. The heavens are a celestial writing in which the skilful can read what will happen, because all things are interdependent ⁽²⁶⁾. The entrance of souls into the world, and the general course of their actions is part of the universal order of nature ⁽²⁷⁾. A good analogy of interdependence of the phenomena of this world may be found in the fact that two eyes are not the same yet follow each other's motions, so that from the position of one, one may tell the position of the other ⁽²⁸⁾.

In connection with Astrology and Vaticination, we should speak of the state of the dead. They can still harm us, or do us good ; they can, by showing themselves, prove that souls exist after death ; finally, they can inspire the Oracles, as they see clearer than we do, not being fettered by the flesh ⁽²⁹⁾.

6. *Free-Will*.—We are now led to the question of the relation of this world-order to the free individuality of the soul. His position on the subject is almost exactly that of Kant. Virtue and the motion of the soul in the intelligible realm are free ; but the soul's deeds in the world are part of the law of continuity, psychical as well as physical ⁽³⁰⁾. Plotinos has no taste ⁽³¹⁾ for the crude predestination of fatalism, and like immoral doctrines.

The design of all the world and what should happen in it was part of the Providence of the divine Mind, not antecedent in time, but in causality, for the world is the image of the Divine Nous dwelling within it, so that it cannot be said to degenerate or go wrong ⁽³²⁾. Therefore the soul is, in respect to her three lowest faculties, which belong to the World Order, rigidly conditioned ; for this lower soul had been given it by the Earth-Soul. Yet, in its higher impassible self it is free as self-existence can make it ; and the soul will therefore be free exactly according to whether she identifies herself with her higher or lower faculties ⁽³³⁾. Man is therefore a slave of body, (when his reason has identified itself with his vitality and matter) ⁽³⁴⁾ ; a slave of fortune, (when his reason has identified itself with his sense-world) ⁽³⁵⁾. But man is free (when his reason has identified itself with his individual Nous,) turning all things to intellect ⁽³⁶⁾ ; and man is free (when his reason has identified itself with the Cosmic Nous,) when the soul lives in contemplation neglecting all else ⁽³⁷⁾. Freedom is serving one's own good, rather than serving that of another, that is, of the lower faculties contributed to

it by the Earth-Soul (³⁸). While therefore many actions depend entirely on circumstances (³⁹), the highest God is freedom, rather than even master of his nature (⁴⁰) which would introduce Plurality into his utter Unity.

7. *The Daemon*.—We have seen that there were men and daemons and Gods. This word daemon must be carefully guarded from its later evil meaning which was given it by Christianity. In the days of Homer, it was interchangeable with God, "Daimôn," and probably remained quite as high in all classical literature, with which Plotinos was so thoroughly acquainted. They are souls who are at a stage of development intermediate between men and Gods. Like the latter they are eternal (⁴¹), and can see in the intelligible realm by their spiritual celestial senses (⁴²), implying the possession of a celestial spiritual body (⁴³) hearing their prayers. They have no physical language (⁴⁴); but of course none is needed as we have seen that souls in the intelligible world communicate thoughts to each other by an increased glow of their inherent light.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE SEVENTH REALM, MATTER.

I. *Evil*.—If God is Unity, without any Manifoldness, then matter is the greatest possible Manifoldness, with just enough Unity admixed to it to make it recognizable as such. Utter Manifoldness without Unity could not exist at all ⁽¹⁾. Therefore since proximity to God is Goodness, the furthest distance from him compatible with any kind of existence is evil ⁽²⁾. On this account matter is "*Prôton Kakon*," the greatest evil possible, Evil itself. Absolute Evil, if it existed, would have no existence. It is nothing but deprivation, emptiness, absence of good ⁽³⁾. Evil can therefore only exist in something else, in Being, either in that intensity of Being called soul, or matter ⁽⁴⁾. Matter itself, for itself, is perfect. But when we look at Matter from a higher intensity of good, say Vitality or Sense, then we call it evil, because it is absence of a certain amount of good. Therefore nothing is evil in itself; a thing is only evil if you consider it from a higher stand-point ⁽⁵⁾. But as Matter is the lowest form of being, it is evil when considered from any stand-point except itself ⁽⁶⁾. Good and Evil are not therefore opposed in a contrary manner; there is no such thing as a dualism in nature. The utmost opposition of evil to good is a sub-contrary one, a logical contrary ⁽⁷⁾. Evil therefore does not exist in what exists really; only in that which declines to non-existence ⁽⁸⁾. There are as many grades of evil as there are grades of Being ⁽⁹⁾. Matter is therefore not evil because it has any evil qualities, but just because it has no qualities at all; for quality is an intelligible limitation or form; and God is pure form or rather above it. Matter is almost formless, without quality ⁽¹⁰⁾. As a consequence of this, evils are not sent by God, but are only degeneration or declinations of qualities already possessed ⁽¹¹⁾. There is nowhere unmixed evil; everywhere the good and evil are mixed ⁽¹²⁾. But the saddest side of this view of matter and evil is that if it be true, then it is hopeless to look forward to a time when evil will have disappeared from the world as at present constituted, for evil is only a low form of good ⁽¹³⁾. And it will always be necessary that there should exist different grades or forms of good; they are all necessary to the perfection of the world: as the painter who must use more than one colour or shade of colour in his picture; or the poet who would have none but heroes in his tragedy ⁽¹⁴⁾. In one single part therefore we should not require the perfection of

the whole, nor in one part should we require the characteristic that belongs to another part ⁽¹⁵⁾. Besides if there is one source of good, it is only reasonable that there should be a gradual diminution of it into annihilation, pure privation, emptiness ⁽¹⁶⁾.

The soul can never be called evil : at the utmost, it is the fourth reduction of evil, or only a declension or disposition to lower forms of being ⁽¹⁷⁾.

Matter itself is formless stuff ⁽¹⁸⁾ and without quality ⁽¹⁹⁾. It is not size, but that which size makes (space) ; it is not measure, but measure assumes it unto itself ⁽²⁰⁾. It is not bodily ; it is "Asômatos" ⁽²¹⁾. It is not Being ; it is only possibility of Being ⁽²²⁾. It is a weak image, shadow and declension of the spiritual ⁽²³⁾. It is unsatisfied yearning after Being ⁽²⁴⁾. It is the thought of nothing ⁽²⁵⁾.

2. *Uncognisability of Matter.*—So little is known of the Sixth Realm of Being, that it is only natural that its process of begetting its image, matter, should also be dark. To be sure, we have the general principle that generation takes from the intelligible side of the world, and is like the germination of a seed ; and these two principles we shall have to apply here.

The things of sense are formed by their spermatic forms, or the Ideas active in the seed. This idea Plotinos owed to the Stoics. Each act of begetting has an idea in the cosmic Nous corresponding to it, as well as a suitable number. Thus we may say that seed is an active idea, the form of the future form, and dwelling in the seed.

3. *Intelligibility of Matter.*—Since Being and Thought are identical, the lowest form of being is also the lowest form of what is intelligible. Therefore, matter is still being, and is still intelligible in its nature. This is the marrow of the contention of the Idealists, that matter is in itself intelligible. Plotinos of course never pushed the questions of epistemology far enough to be driven to this result, to which he comes by another road. He thinks that matter is intelligible, and that there must be some sort of unity between us and matter ⁽²⁶⁾, as his cosmology shows at length.

CHAPTER XIV.

REINCARNATION.

1. *Need for Reincarnation.*—Before asking ourselves why we should reincarnate, it will be worth while asking why it is at all necessary to incarnate.

The aim of life is an ethical one. The end of life is vision of God. This happiness, like all happiness, can only be gotten by meriting it; for even Gods are only happy because they have merited it. It is necessary therefore to have an opportunity of gaining merit, to let our reason decide of its own will whether it will identify itself with its lower or higher faculties. Therefore it is necessary for souls to be in the world that they may learn to seek the good stedfastly, and work off all lower attractions ⁽¹⁾. Experience is after all a better teacher than mere knowledge ⁽²⁾; and experience can only be had in a body. The reason for incarnation is on the part of the soul a desire for procreation ⁽³⁾, a lower form of divine love, evidently. "Unless she have a body, the soul will never progress, for there is another place where the soul may propagate itself naturally. And if the soul will progress, then it will build itself a place of habitation, and will therefore generate a body ⁽⁴⁾." Thus the soul collaborates with the Divine Will in working out the World-Drama ⁽⁵⁾.

The purpose of incarnation is therefore a moral one; and for a man as serious as Plotinos, this moral purpose seemed worthy of the creation of heaven and earth for this especial end ⁽⁶⁾.

2. *Justice.*—We have already seen why one single life is not long enough for this development of soul. The Divine Justice cannot be vindicated if souls have not other lives in which the present inequalities are satisfactorily accounted for.

But here is another purpose in reincarnation. Retribution ⁽⁷⁾; and the souls are led or enticed to come of their own free will into such circumstances furnished by the Earth-Soul ⁽⁸⁾ as will purify the souls by retribution ⁽⁹⁾, these circumstances becoming indissoluble parts of her as soon as she has incarnated ⁽¹⁰⁾.

In order to make this retribution clear, Plotinos quotes the famous passage of Plato ⁽¹¹⁾ which sets forth, for instance, that foolish kings will be reincarnated as eagles, quiet citizens as bees, etc. ⁽¹²⁾.

Superficial readers have seized upon this passage to prove that Plotinos taught a theory of reincarnation which made no difference between human and animal bodies. There can not, how-

ever, be the slightest doubt that Plotinos held no such theory ; and as a matter of fact, many commentators have been led into this blunder because Plotinos, in quoting this passage from Plato, does not state that it is not his own, as is his custom, when quoting Plato, who was "the philosopher."

In the first place, we have already seen that Plotinos took the trouble to say that the human reason was "rational" so that it should not be likely to desire to incarnate in the body of an animal ⁽¹³⁾. Besides, in the Cosmical Nous the Idea of a cow or dog are as natural as those of men, and therefore it would be unnatural for a human mind to enter into an animal body ⁽¹⁴⁾.

Such a scheme of haphazard interchange would interfere with strict retribution among men.

Plotinos's own scheme of reincarnation ⁽¹⁵⁾ will be found very rational : bad masters become slaves, rich people who have used their wealth badly, poor ; murderers are murdered, and rapers are raped.

During the intervals between incarnations souls (which are in this condition often confused with daemons) go to that part of the World-Soul which is appropriate to their merits and their condition, the good souls being at rest, and the evil ones suffering in the meanwhile ⁽¹⁶⁾.

The idea of a physical resurrection was most repugnant to Plotinos ; as the body is no more than the tool or prison of the soul, it would be cruel to enclose the soul in it and all its imperfections forever ⁽¹⁷⁾. After death, the soul goes whither its inclination leads it, so that true friends will meet once more ; when the soul reincarnates it reincarnates in the body most suitable for it ⁽¹⁸⁾. When the soul has left its body, it becomes that towards which it had directed its activity ⁽¹⁹⁾.

Thus it may indeed happen, that on account of utter and repeated wickedness a soul may sink into matter and die in bestial circumstances ⁽²⁰⁾ so that it will reincarnate in an animal or vegetable body ⁽²¹⁾ ; for if the soul has become bestial, it is not able to form for itself anything more than a bestial body.

The souls that need no more reincarnations on earth are placed on the stars, whence they may see the universe, and be in such circumstances as are most fitted to develop them. The purest souls turn themselves towards the Cosmical Nous, and return for ever to their intelligible home.

3. *The Three Factors.*—There are three factors in each reincarnation.

There is in all Being the yearning of love ; to communicate of itself to that which is below. For such a reason, The God begat the Nous in his own image. Likewise souls seek to beget their image, and to give of themselves or the things below them. From such a divine mission the soul returns better than she was when she incarnated ; for she has been, as Methodius says, to a certain extent a Christ. She must become individualized, and self-determined to seek the good, till there be no more possibility of falling ⁽²²⁾ although in another place Plotinos says that

even unto the highest development a soul can reach on earth, there is always for her the possibility of falling (²³). Her first desire is to care for and to enlighten the world of the senses; but if she forgets herself in this occupation, and becomes anxious for the welfare of the body and for its lusts, she is held down by it (²⁴).

In the second place, it is from her own inclination, and desire that she incarnates in any particular body (²⁵).

Yet, lastly, this very desire of hers was foreseen, foredetermined—her destiny (²⁶); in the fulness of time, with magical powers she enters the body the Earth-Soul has prepared for her; for she was not strong enough to remain in the intelligible world (²⁷).

4. *Objection from Oblivion.*—The usual objection to the theory of Reincarnation is the contention that in the present life human souls do not remember their former incarnations.

Plotinos meets this objection in the following way. The lower faculties of the soul, including Sense, Vitality, and Body—which include also the passions and the physical memory, are furnished by the Earth-Soul new to every soul which incarnates. We have already seen that at death the soul leaves behind the earthy spiritual body, with its passions and memories (²⁸). This earthly spiritual body lasts longer than the physical body, but begins to decay at death, having in itself all that was learnt on earth, with all the remembrance of the petty things of the life (²⁹). As we have seen, there is a higher memory in the eternal impassible soul which also has the records of the life: and when the incarnate soul will have developed far enough, it will come into the consciousness of all its past lives. Thus Plotinos says that in the interval between incarnations much would be forgotten, anyway, and consequently the Platonic recollection is put aside for the lower faculties of the soul (³⁰).

In order to make the point of Plotinos clear, we may make use of an illustration. A College graduate, in middle life, has probably forgotten most if not all the definite facts he learnt at College, and yet he uses that mental training which that learning gave him, to the end of his years.

5. *Objection from Suicide.*—There is still another objection to reincarnation. If reincarnation be true, then suicide is not only safe, but a very efficient means to free oneself from circumstances that have become unendurable for the time being.

On the contrary, the theory of reincarnation is the only theory that will yield an adequate argument against suicide. It is foolishness to waste opportunities of development; and it is foolish to leave the world until the soul is ready to abandon the circumstances surrounding it, and has learnt all possible lessons from them (³¹).

CHAPTER XV.

ETHICS.

As we have already pointed out, the main import of the philosophy of Plotinos is ethical, or practical. The end of his system is the highest attainment possible to man ; and that is the contemplative or theoretic life. But we have also seen how supremely important to this life is morality ⁽¹⁾.

1. *Virtue and Vice*.—All virtues are purifications, by which the soul may disentangle itself from the lusts of the flesh. These purifications cannot change the soul, since it is impassible and eternal ; but they alter its relation to the body, giving it the upper hand ⁽²⁾ and freeing it from the lusts and disturbances of the flesh ⁽³⁾. It then appears in its original purity ⁽⁴⁾, in which state its likeness to God appears patent to all ⁽⁵⁾. Purity of soul consists in the reason seeking to identify itself with the individual Nous, or Mind ⁽⁶⁾. As long as it keeps its purity, the soul finds nothing evil ; let purity be lost, and life is an evil ; for life is good only inasmuch as evil is repelled ⁽⁷⁾. The soul itself is not evil, as long as it does not descend from the good ⁽⁸⁾.

What are the impediments of the soul? Anger, cupidity, lust, pain, fear, gluttony, intemperance, avarice ⁽⁹⁾. What are the goods we must attain? Just habits, pure temperance, fortitude, modesty, calmness, divinity of mind ⁽¹⁰⁾.

What are virtues? "The energy of the soul, that which is good for her according to her nature ⁽¹¹⁾." Virtue is the most effective means of development, being more effective than even prayer ⁽¹²⁾. What beauty is to the body, that is virtue to the soul ⁽¹³⁾.

The four Platonic Cardinal Virtues are Temperance, Courage, Magnanimity, and Prudence. Those who are unpurged by virtue lie in Hades. Temperance is the fleeing of bodily lusts, sensual gratification, and pleasure—the attainment of utter purity. Courage is but the overcoming of the fear of death, that is, fear of the soul of being outside of the body. This implies indifference to all earthly advantages, or anything which cannot be taken away with the soul at the time of death. Magnanimity is the contempt of all advantages on earth. Prudence is wisdom in turning away from lower things, and turning to the things above ⁽¹⁴⁾.

It would be hard to find a more searching rule of life than this, or a discipline that leads to a higher end than this : the end of our life is not to avoid evil or copy the examples of good men, but to become God ⁽¹⁵⁾.

2. *Philosophy of Sin.*—We must now enquire concerning the nature of sin. It is the agreement of the higher with the lower faculties, instead of compelling them to obedience ⁽¹⁶⁾. The rational soul itself can never sin, but the lower soul may cease to be its image, and break loose from its control and influence ⁽¹⁷⁾. The death of the soul occurs when it is merged into the body, and thus dies along with it, when buried in the ground. This externalization of the soul is what is meant by Hades ⁽¹⁸⁾. The weakness of the body which leads to sin is laziness, whereby the soul becomes overweighted with matter in generating offspring ⁽¹⁹⁾. The natural appetites of the body are in themselves good, so long as they are not misused ⁽²⁰⁾; likewise, the world is beautiful by nature, so that souls may be recalled to God. Pain and sorrow are the first perceptions of some dissolution ⁽²¹⁾. The causes of sin are "rashness," primary "otherness," and a desire to belong to oneself ⁽²²⁾. But above all, the first cause of sin is "falling into generation ⁽²³⁾." The meaning of temperance is turning into oneself from the flesh and its lusts ⁽²⁴⁾.

Yet the definite reason for turning away from the flesh, its lusts, and the body, has not yet been assigned. The reason of it is as follows: we have seen that all actions of the body in the dispensation of the world-order have been strictly predetermined, and that liberty exists only in the intelligible world. It is plain, therefore, that if the reason identifies itself with the body, it becomes absolutely the slave of the determinism of external causality. If however it identifies itself with its "ideal" soul, or with its individual Nous, then it has identified itself with that part of itself which is free, and outside of the sphere of determinism. The lusts of the flesh lead to slavery; purity leads to freedom and self-determination. We are not to be a live body, but an embodied spirit ⁽²⁵⁾. Inside the body, the soul is preordained, along with all things; outside of it she is free. Therefore the aim of her struggles is to separate herself from the body ⁽²⁶⁾.

3. *The Path of Enlightenment.*—This part of the Soul's development is called "enlightenment ⁽²⁷⁾," for she is herself a light. This development may be divided into three ⁽²⁸⁾ or seven ⁽²⁹⁾ degrees: I. Purification by virtues; II. Prayer; III. The adorning and purification of the soul; IV. Beginning to be conscious of the intelligible world; V. Perseverance in this course; VI. Full fruition in it; becoming like God, and unable to fall back; VII. Becoming God ⁽³⁰⁾. Thus the development of every successive faculty, assisted by knowledge of the right doctrine.

Although this path of development is the same for all souls, yet as there are different kinds of souls, or souls with differing characteristics, it is plain that the course of development must be changed for each, although probably the same stages, or like stages will occur.

This Plotinos calls "the threefold return of the soul to God ⁽³¹⁾." Each soul must progress in its own manner, since the perfect life is, in each degree, to live according to nature ⁽³²⁾.

There are three kinds of Souls : the Musician, who learns by experience ; the Philosopher, who seeks knowledge, and the Lover, whose characteristic power it is to love ⁽³³⁾. Active and sensual men are exiles from their true home ; the Active return to their fatherland easier than the Sensual men, who are like beasts laden down with prey—Plotinos then says that the Musician is led upward from harmonious sounds to harmony in general, and from this to ideality whence the path to the intelligible world is plain ⁽³⁴⁾. The Lover is at first entangled in the beauty of the flesh, but rises by his utter unselfishness to the beauty of morals, and thence to science and the Nous ⁽³⁵⁾. Lastly, the Philosopher, who seeks knowledge, is so near to perfection that he only needs a guide to free him from the weakness of the body ⁽³⁶⁾.

4. *The Daemon of Conscience.*—But who shall this necessary guide be? Conscience, the Daemon. Plotinos's explanation of the phenomena of conscience is singularly clear and interesting. The Daemon is not, as might be supposed, a supernatural guide. It is only a natural phenomenon of psychology. It is not an intelligence external to ourselves ; it is only our own higher self. We have seen that man epitomizes in himself many principles. His reason, as a rule, has identified itself with some one particular principle of his nature, either his individual Nous, or his senses. The Daemon that leads him and warns him is that faculty of his which is next above the one with which his reason has identified itself. Let us suppose, for instance, that the reason of a man has identified itself with his senses, and their lusts. The next higher principle will then guide him and warn him of the consequences of his self-indulgence. In this case the Daemon would be his own individual Nous. Again, suppose his reason has identified itself with his individual Nous : the Daemon in this case will be the Cosmic Nous or Mind. Once more, if his reason should further identify itself with his Cosmic Nous, then the Daemon could be God himself.

The question arises, why could not God himself lead him in the very first instance. Plotinos is not very clear on this point ; it would seem he doubts the lower man could hear the Voice of God. Thus man chooses his own Daemon, according to the choice of principle on which he will act ⁽³⁷⁾. Thus no man is left to flounder in the dark, by God ; if man will but listen to his inner voice, which will change with his own change for better or worse ⁽³⁸⁾, he will be led into the full glory of Divinity.

The inner voice is heard by prayer ; and the value of prayer is great. Mere intellectual will and desire will certainly get an appropriate answer through the law of the coherence of things ⁽³⁹⁾ ; but true prayer is adoration, not command of the Divinity ⁽⁴⁰⁾.

We thus come to the full meaning of the maxim, know thyself ⁽⁴¹⁾. The highest self of every man is God. This divinity of every man is quiescent in him until he have developed it. To become God, we have only to know ourselves. The human

soul is not an aggregate ; it is an organic unity of which God is the highest phase. We develop by simplification of soul (⁴²). To enter into oneself, is to enter into God (⁴³). Only with the presupposition of such a psychology can the true meaning of the famous maxim appear (⁴⁴). Plotinos claimed to have received the conception from tradition that was secret (⁴⁵) ; Philo Judaeus claimed the same origin for many of his dogmas. Thus, by the purification of virtue, we rise, and are delivered from the bondage of the flesh and the world and ascend to the life of godlike men and Gods, when in beatific vision we shall see God, "Phugê monou pros monon," the flight of the Single to the Single, face to face.

5. *Ecstasy*.—Plotinos had attained to ecstasic union with the Deity four times during the years that Porphyry lived with him. Hence, he described it as an objective fact (⁴⁶) : "Often having been awakened to myself outside of the body, and having come to be outside of all other things, but within myself, I saw a marvellous light and beauty ; then there came over me an absolute certainty that my destiny was a great one ; for when I lived my highest life, and co-operated with the Deity in it, and when I arrived, in it, to its activity, then I established myself above all intellectual things."

We must now explain the process of ecstasy. Ratiocination is a mediate process which is subsumed under the Unity of apprehension. It is therefore not the highest mental activity (⁴⁷). We must proceed beyond it, and yield ourselves to the higher being (⁴⁸). We must prepare ourselves for absolute receptivity, by being disturbed by no ratiocination (⁴⁹). Thus can we be suddenly filled with the higher light that streams from Deity (⁵⁰) just as the soul emits the light to form the celestial spiritual body, and to join it to the earthly one. Now we have Deity without being able to describe it (⁵¹) because the healthiest states of the body are often unconscious ones (⁵²). Being united to that which is above thought, the soul is no more soul or self, but pure rest in God ; and it is in "ekstasis," (standing out above), "Haplôsis," (simplification), and is in a state to be compared only with intoxication or love-madness (⁵³). The intelligible light cannot be sought ; it must be awaited like the rising sun ; suddenly it appears in the soul—it is there, it has not come (⁵⁴). It fills with joy and gladness, (⁵⁵) which however cannot last long (⁵⁶). The soul abandons the Deity not out of fear, but out of natural restlessness and weakness, so that it must fall from the Divine hypostatic union (⁵⁷) as long as it is incarnate, for it has not yet completely severed the ties that bind it to earth (⁵⁸). Yet, as long as life will last, there will be an unquenchable desire to behold the Divine Light once more (⁵⁹).

Yet, we must repeat, it is not every soul that can behold God. If the eye is unclean, it cannot see. "The eye can never hope to see the sun, unless it have become fit to see it ; nor can any soul hope to see that which is Beautiful, unless it be beautiful itself. Let everyone who would behold God and the Beautiful

become godlike and beautiful himself ⁽⁶⁰⁾." The soul must return to herself, and if she does not find herself beautiful, she must polish herself as the sculptor polishes his statue.

In the act of ecstasy there are three stages : expectation of the Divine, absolute trust in it, and final self-immolation, which is above conscious thought in silence and peace. Nor can we then see God : for if we could, God would be outside of ourselves, whereas God rises into us from within ⁽⁵²⁾. Thus God is the Light which is seen, but which is lost in the very vision of it : for "Ta duo hen gignetai," both become one ⁽⁶¹⁾. Eternal felicity comes from eternal proximity to God ⁽⁶²⁾, the eternally beautiful, so that the soul loves God and is ever forced to begin again to love him ⁽⁶³⁾.

"Since God admits no Diversity into himself, he is always present; and we become present to him whenever we put away Diversity from us. He does not seek us, as though he were forced to live for us; but we seek him and live for him. Although indeed we are ever revolving around him, we do not see him continually : but as a choir of singers which turns around the supreme Master may for a short while be distracted from contemplation of the Master, and blunder in the harmony, yet when they turn to him then everything is perfect once again, thus do we always revolve around God, even when we forget about it. But when we look towards him again, then is our utmost wish crowned, and we sing to him a Divine song, ever revolving around him. ⁽⁶⁴⁾" "Every soul in its natural state loves God, desiring to be united to him, affecting the honest love of a pure virginity ⁽⁶⁵⁾." "Such is the life of Gods, of divine and blessed men, turning away from the desolate life here below, flying alone to meet God alone, face to face ⁽⁶⁶⁾."

6. *Happiness*.—Such are the delights of ecstasy. These are however not given to all. Happiness is the most that many are able to reach ; and intelligible happiness all can have, although they cannot all be free from pain. ⁽⁶⁷⁾ As the intelligible world is outside of time, so there can be no addition of pleasure by repetition of ecstasy ⁽⁶⁸⁾ ; the only possible increase is a sounding of deeper depths within ⁽⁶⁹⁾. The famous Aristotelian quibble about the happiness of life being only known when life is over and at an end is nothing but a very transparent sophism ⁽⁷⁰⁾ since happiness, after all, does not depend on deeds ⁽⁷¹⁾.

The wise man will have both joy and sorrow ⁽⁷²⁾, for nothing can be added to him or taken from him. If they are equally wise, the rich and the poor man will be equally happy ; for if external goods cannot add anything to intelligible things, how can they add aught to intelligible happiness ⁽⁷³⁾. Happiness is of the soul so that even the change of death has no power to disturb it ⁽⁷⁴⁾. Death is after all nothing more terrible than a change of dress on the stage ⁽⁷⁵⁾. It is only terrible to children, not to men ⁽⁷⁶⁾. The soul should use the body as a tool, and not be more affected by its injuries than a workman is affected by the injury to his tool ⁽⁷⁷⁾. Even in the bull of Phalaris, the wise

man is happy ⁽⁷⁸⁾. Plotinos is not always so Stoical ; he has usually more common sense, as when he says the end of virtue is to separate soul from body ; but that until that time its pains and sorrows must be borne as well as possible ⁽⁷⁹⁾. Misfortune is nothing to the good, and to the evil it is a means of education. While we have bodies, they are certain to be sick at one time or another and we must bear the inextirpable evil as well as possible. After all, the purpose of life is to give souls an opportunity to become happy, and it is our own fault and weakness if we are not. "What is the wonder if souls do not enjoy a divine life if they do not seek to become godlike ⁽⁸⁰⁾?" The wise man enjoys the highest happiness of the world, the unselfish intuitions ⁽⁸¹⁾. For the fleshly, this happiness therefore cannot exist ⁽⁸²⁾, and though the wise man may not enjoy all the different pleasures of life, he sounds its deepest depths ⁽⁸³⁾. Circumstances can only affect the external consciousness of the happy man ; so that when the soul awakens into itself it forgets its earthly nightmare of misery, and its real waking hours are continually with God ⁽⁸⁴⁾.

CHAPTER XVI.

AESTHETICS.

1. *God, the Over-Beautiful.*—Plotinos is so passionately fond of Beauty, that a review of his philosophy could not be complete, if it did not set forth his opinion on the subject.

As God is Over-Good, so is he Over-Beautiful. The Cosmic Nous is beautiful, because it is the image of God ⁽¹⁾; the World is beautiful, because it is the image of the Nous ⁽²⁾. There are therefore three most beautiful things: the Cosmic Nous, the World-Soul, and the World-Body. Men who are slaves to Venus do not understand that what seems beautiful to them is only beautiful because it is in some faint way the image of one of these three things ⁽³⁾. When we behold beautiful things, we become beautiful; when we ignore them, we are ugly ⁽⁴⁾. Anything is beautiful, therefore, only inasmuch as it is an image, however faint, of one of these three things ⁽⁵⁾. Beauty therefore lies in form ⁽⁶⁾. In as far then as any begotten image of the Cosmic Nous resembles its Idea in the Nous (its Unity) is it beautiful ⁽⁷⁾. Thus again, Unity is beautiful, the Manifold is ugliness. The Divine Nous is the "Prôtos kalon, mega kallos, noêton kalon"; and beauty is in Soul as begotten of the Nous ⁽⁸⁾. Beauty is form vanquishing matter, the Divine Idea expressing itself through matter; therefore matter is the last beautiful ⁽⁹⁾ the beauty of matter being more fully revealed in the Realm of nature ⁽¹⁰⁾.

2. *Human Beauty.*—The soul, being itself an image of the Nous, possesses in itself an innate formula or reason (since the inner self is The God, the Over-Good), by which she recognizes instinctively the beautiful. This formula is a Divine Idea ⁽¹¹⁾. Beauty is both sensual and incorporeal ⁽¹²⁾. Sensual beauty is especially that of the eye or ear. Incorporeal beauty is the beauty of virtue, or the beauty of the soul, which is the Divine Light itself.

As nobody can speak of physical beauty until he has seen it himself, so nobody should dare to judge of incorporeal beauty until he have perceived it himself by the faculties of his own mind. Corporeal beauty is outside of the man; incorporeal within; consequently, a man cannot judge of incorporeal beauty until he have returned to himself, or rather become perfect.

As our physical sight or hearing must be perfect before we can judge of the beauty of a statue or of a song, just so must we be normally beautiful ourselves before we dare give a judgement on

incorporeal beauty. We must return to ourselves, and if we find we are not beautiful, we must polish and cut until the inner statue be perfect.

The good and beautiful is that after which every soul strives : "Hou oregetai pâsa psuchê," ⁽¹³⁾. "Those who penetrate into the holy of holies must first be purified by taking off their garments, and enter naked into that which they seek ; and there they exist, and live, and understand—Whoever therefore sees this, with what a love does he burn, with what a desire does he yearn to be at one with the beloved ;" for the beauty of the vision of God is the end of all souls, whose sorrows and trials keep them from forgetting the desire for eternal bliss. "There" ⁽¹⁴⁾ "is the fatherland whence we came ; and there is our Father." To fly to God we need no fleet or ships ; "we must throw away all things, neither strive to see any more ; but having closed the eye of the body, we must assume and resurrect another vision, which all indeed possess, but which very few indeed develop."

CHAPTER XVII.

PLOTINOS AND PAGANISM.

1. *Pagan Deities*.—It has been supposed that in framing his system of philosophy, Plotinos was seeking to rehabilitate Paganism as a religion, by furnishing it with a dogmatical basis such as it had not had before. Such a conception is totally mistaken. His references to the Gods are merely illustrative, for the sake of cutting his explanations short ; and he does not act differently from Plato in the matter. Besides, if we glance over the full list of references we find many duplications of nomenclature, such as the Earth-Soul, which is sometimes called Zeus, Aphroditê, Rhea, and Hermês ; we find many totally incompatible conceptions, as for instance, that Uranus and Krônos are still ruling deities, which still give Zeus all the power he wields. and that Zeus and human souls are “sister-souls.” Then we find a total lack of order in the nomenclature, many of the most important names being left out entirely, with no possibility of finding cosmic realities to which to apply them.

2. *Monotheism*.—If the pagan names of Deities used by Plotinos indicated a dogmatical system, then the Pagan religions would have to be changed ; for the system of Plotinos is a rigid monotheism ; and his whole conception of the One only source of life and light seems incompatible with the Pagan Olympic Republic.

3. *Augustine's Debt to Plotinos*.—Proof of this may be found in the fact that Augustine of Hippo took the whole conception of monotheism in its cosmic relations as it stood in Plotinos's works into his *De Civitate Dei*, without any material alterations. Besides, when Herennius divided each of the three Plotinic orders of existence into other three, this conception was almost literally transcribed into Christian monotheism by merely altering the nomenclature, is it not certain that it could not be the basis of Pagan dogma, unless we are willing to admit that Pagan dogma and Christian dogma were at bottom the same ?

4. *The Last Light of Greece*.—Plotinos is the last great light of the Greek world. He summed up in himself almost all that was worth preserving in the labours of his predecessors, and proving that it was possible, outside of Christianity, to conceive of God as absolutely just, as absolute Love, and absolute beauty. Augustinian Christianity could not do as much. The absolute justice of God is supposed to have demanded the damnation of

the whole race he had made, unbaptised infants and all else, indiscriminately. The absolute love of God could only be vindicated by a super-natural mediation to tide over the emergency of the ruin of his creatures. And we need not scruple to say Augustine had no conception of God as the absolute Beauty.

Plotinos looked forward to the salvation of all, after salutary education ; Augustine still speaks of eternal fire and of the worm that dieth not.

The difficulty of Plotinos to explain his conception of the way in which God begets his creatures, affects Christianity equally ; and Christianity has the additional difficulty of providing an explanation for the other mode of origination called "creating."


Both Plotinos and Christianity preach lofty morality ; but the guidance of human life of Plotinos is God himself ; whereas Augustine hesitates to say as much, lest the glory of the Son be surpassed.

Christianity preaches the physical resurrection of the flesh ; Plotinos cannot away with it ; he does not look forward with any degree of comfort at being enclosed for all eternity in the limitations of the old body, even when glorified. He guards the truth implied in it by the fact that souls when reincarnating reassume flesh, without condemning them to it for all eternity.


Last of all, Plotinos explains every little injustice in the world, every sorrow, every tear ; for reincarnation furnishes a scheme of absolute justice. Christianity closes its eyes to the injustice, and inequality of this world in its sublime faith that somehow God is just ; but the Christian priest is mute before the cry for justice in this world from the sorrowful and oppressed.

Plotinos is long since dead ; his philosophy, as his own, is long dead ; but it has never died ; for it has strutted about in borrowed plumes since his day till now. Yet, the world cannot look back, it has too much in the future to crown it with success ; few will have the time or leisure to look at the page of ancient history on which we read the name of Plotinos. Yet it will be a satisfaction for us to know that even in those gloomy days, God was in his world, and revealed himself as ever through his prophets and his saints.





NOTES



NOTES.

CHAPTER IV.

Where no name is given "Poemandres" is understood.

(1) Justin Martyr, *Apol.* 1 : 21, 22 ; 2 : 6. Tertullian. *c. Val.* 15. *de Anima*, 2. 33. Cyprian, *de Idol.* Van. Euseb. *Pamph. Hist. Lib.* 5: 8. Clem. Al., *Strom.*, 1: 21; 6: 4. Firm Lact. *Div. Inst.* 1: 6, 11; 2: 9. Epit. *c. 4. Div. Inst.* 2: 11, 13, 15, 16; 4: 8, 9, 6. 5: 65. 6: 25. 7: 4, 9, 13, 18. Arnobius *Adv. Gent.* 2: 13. Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, 8: 23, 26. Cyril Al. *c. Jul.* 1: 30a, 31b, 33c; 2: 52a, 56b, 57b, 63e, 64c; 8: 274c; 5: 176b. Quoted. (2) Lact. *Div. Inst.* 4: 9. (3) Cyril Al. *c. Jul.* 33c. (4) 13: 21. (5) 13: 4. (6) 1: 12. (7) 13: 2. (8) 5: 4. (9) 9: 6. (10) 1: 9. (11) 1: 4. (12) 1: 5. (13) 1: 9; 5: 7. (14) 12: 19. (15) 1: 12, 31; 4: 11; 5: 8; 8: 25; 9: 5; 12: 16. (16) 1: 26. (17) 1: 26. (18) 1: 9-11; 3: 3; 11-7. (19) 12: 22. (20) 13: 15. (21) 10: 13. (22) 10: 13; 12: 16. (23) 1: 8; 5: 11; 8: 2, 5; 9: 8; 10: 12, 14; 11: 4. (24) Of Hermès of Thal. to Tat. Ex Stobaeus *Phys.* 699 Meinecke, 1: 190. Patritius, p. 4. (25) 10: 1-3. (26) 1: 10; 2: 16; 7: 5; 14: 9. (27) 12: 8. (28) 1: 10. (29) 12: 1. (30) 1: 8. (31) 11: 17. (32) 1: 8, 9, 13, 14; 8: 2. (33) 2: 1-4; 8: 5. (34) 2: 17; 4: 8. (35) 10: 19, 20. (36) 9: 6; 10: 23. (37) 4: 3, 6. (38) 10: 23. (39) 4: 6. (40) 4: 11. (41) 10: 20. (42) 11: 21. (43) 11: 22. (44) 1: 31. (45) 13: 2. (46) 13: 7. (47) 13: 12. (48) 10: 19. (49) 12: 23. (50) 10: 6. (51) 13: 14. (52) 10: 19. (53) 12: 1. (54) 1: 26; 10: 6. (55) 4: 8.

CHAPTER V.

Where no name is given "Ennead" is understood.

(1) Vita. Plotini. Porphyry, *c. 3.* (2) Eusebius, *H. E.* 6: 19, 7. (3) Bigg. *Christian Platonists of Alex.* p. 46. Note 2. (4) 3: 9: 2. (5) 1: 1: 12; 1: 2: 1 Beg. 1: 3: 1 Beg. 3: 91: 1 Beg. 6: 6: 17, p. 690 D. (6) 3: 4: 2. (7) 4: 4: 22. (8) 3: 7, proem 325, C. (9) 5: 1: 8. (10) 3: 7, proem 325, C. (11) 2: 4: 7. (12) 4: 3: 1. "Let us be persuaded by the commandment of the God to know ourselves" "Peithoumetha de an tō tou Theou parkel-eusmati hantous gignōskein."

CHAPTER VI.

(1) Enn. 4: 3: 1. (2) 1: 1: 12. (3) 3: 8: 4, 5 seqq. (4) 6: 9: 11; 4: 7: 12; 1: 1: 8. See in general 1: 4: 9, 16; 4: 7: 12, 1: 7: 2. (5) 4: 7: 12; 1: 1: 8. (6) 1: 1: 8; 4: 7: 12; 5: 3: 3. (7) 1: 6: 5; 3: 5: 4; 6: 7: 4. (8) 1: 4: 9. (9) 1: 4: 9, 6: 4: 15. (10) 1: 4: 9, 10; 6: 4: 15. (11) 6: 4: 15. (12) 2: 3: 12; 2: 1: 5. See 1: 4: 9; 2: 1: 5; 2: 3: 12, 13; 2: 9: 17. (13) 6: 7: 6. (14) 4: 4: 4. See 6: 7: 15; 5: 2: 1; 5: 3: 3; 6: 5: 12; 6: 7: 6; 3: 5: 4; 1: 4: 9, 10. (15) 1: 1: 12; 4: 3: 23; 6: 4: 16. (16) 6: 7: 6. (17) 6: 7: 14; 3: 2: 7; 4: 4: 36. (18) 6: 7: 30. (19) 3: 8: 5, 6. (20) 3: 8. Int. (21) 2: 1: 5, 3: 4: 3. (22) 4: 3: 20-24; 4: 7: 1; 6: 4: 16. (23) 6: 7: 5; 3: 4: 3; 4: 3: 12; 4: 7: 13; 4: 8: 8. (24) 4: 7: 12. (25) 1: 1: 9; 4: 8: 4; 6: 3: 1; 6: 4: 14. (26) 1:

1: 7; 2: 10; 5: 1: 10. (27) 1: 1: 10; 1: 4: 16; 1: 7: 4; 6: 7: 5. (28) 1: 1: 7; 1: 8: 5; 5: 7: 5; 6: 4: 15. (29) 1: 1: 3, 4. (30) 6: 9: 8. (31) 6: 5: 11. (32) 5: 1: 10.

CHAPTER VII.

(1) 3: 8: 7, 8; 5: 1: 4; 5: 3: 10; 5: 6: 2; 6: 7: 39; 6: 9: 6, 7. (2) 5: 3: 10-13; 6: 7: 37. (3) 5: 3: 12; 5: 6: 3; 6: 6: 13. (4) 6: 9: 1. (5) 3: 8: 10; 5: 3: 17. (6) 6: 2: 17. (7) 5: 4: 1. (8) 5: 3: 11; 6: 7: 17; 6: 9: 6. (9) 3: 8: 9. (10) 6: 8: 11. (11) 1: 7: 1; 1: 8: 2; 6: 8: 16 End. (12) 4: 3: 8; 6: 7: 17; 6: 9: 6. (13) 6: 7: 17, 32, 33; 6: 8: 11; 6: 9: 3. (14) 1: 6: 6, 9; 5: 8: 8. (15) 5: 5: 12. (16) 6: 8: 12; 6: 9: 6. (17) 4: 4: 9, 10. (18) 1: 7: 1; 6: 7: 17; 6: 8: 12; (19) 5: 3: 12. (20) 3: 8: 10; 3: 9: 3; 5: 3: 11, 12; 5: 6: 2. (21) 6: 7: 41; 5: 3: 13. (22) 5: 3: 13; 14; 5: 5: 6, 10; 6: 7: 32; 6: 9: 3. (23) 5: 5: 13 Beg.; 6: 2: 12, 17; 6: 7: 38 Beg. (24) 5: 5: 6; 6: 2: 9; 6: 9: 5. (25) 1: 8: 2; 3: 8: 8; 5: 5: 9; 6: 9: 6. (26) 3: 8: 9; 4: 8: 6; 5: 3: 16; 5: 4: 1; 6: 9: 5. (27) 6: 8: 12, 16, 20; 5: 4: 2. (28) 6: 8: 8. (29) 6: 9: 3 End. (30) 6: 9: 8. (31) 2: 9: 4, 8; 3: 2: 1, 2. (32) 3: 2: 2; 3: 3: 7 Beg; 5: 3: 12 Beg; 5: 4: 1; 4: 8: 6; 6: 7: 1, 3; 6: 8: 18 End. (33) 6: 7: 3. (34) 2: 9: 3. (35) 2: 1: 2; 2: 9: 3. (36) 3: 5: 4. (37) 6: 7: 22. (38) 6: 7: 31. (39) 5: 1: 6; 5: 2: 1. (40) 5: 1: 6. (41) 2: 3: 12. (42) 3: 8: 9; 5: 1: 3; 6: 5: 3 Beg; 6: 9: 5; 5: 1: 6. (43) 5: 5: 9. (44) 1: 6: 3; 3: 8: 9; 5: 1: 6; 5: 3: 12, 15. (45) 5: 5: 7; 6: 4: 9; 6: 8: 18. (46) 1: 7: 1; 6: 5: 5; 6: 8: 18. (47) 1: 7: 1; 1: 8: 2. (48) 3: 2: 3; (49) 6: 7: 16. (50) 1: 7: 1; 1: 8: 2; 5: 1: 6; 5: 5: 12; 6: 4: 8; 6: 5: 10. (51) 6: 5: 1. (52) 3: 2: 16. (53) 3: 8: 10; 5: 8: 12. (54) 1: 7: 1; 3: 3: 7; 6: 2: 11; 6: 4: 9. (55) 6: 2: 11; 6: 5: 1. (56) 5: 5: 5; 6: 2: 11; 6: 9: 1. (57) 4: 4: 13. (58) 4: 4: 16. (59) 6: 5: 6. (60) 5: 5: 9; 6: 5: 3, 4, 6; 6: 2: 3; 6: 4: 3, 2; 6: 5: 1. (61) 4: 3: 12; 5: 5: 9; 6: 5: 4. (62) 1: 7: 2. (63) 3: 2: 16. (64) 5: 1: 7. (65) 6: 4: 7. (66) 4: 3: 22; 5: 1: 3. (67) 5: 2: 2. (68) 6: 4: 13, 14. (69) 6: 4: 2, 3. (70) 6: 4: 13. (71) 6: 5: 2. (72) 5: 3: 1. (73) 2: 3: 18.

CHAPTER VIII.

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Note from Zeller, with additions.

The Father of all Gods Uranus is God; Krônos, who devours his children is the Nous who retains within itself all its active ideas. Zeus, when escaping from him, is the begetting of the Soul beyond the Nous. 5: 8: 12; 5: 1: 4, 7. The tale of Lynkeus describes the transparency of the intelligible world, 5: 8: 4. The World-Soul is called Zeus, 5: 5: 3; 6: 4: 6; 2: 3: 31; 5: 8: 10. It is also called Aphroditê, and the double soul is explained as the double Aphroditê, 3: 5: 2, 8; 6: 8: 6; 5: 8: 13. Again, Hêrê, Dêmeter and Hestia are explained by the World-Soul, as well as Zeus, 4: 4: 27. Apollo is Unity as denying Manifoldness, 5: 5: 6. Hermês is the Logos, 3: 6: 19, which can rise or sink. The sinking of the soul into the entangling flesh is shown by Narcissus, and its flight, by the myth of Ulysses fleeing Circe and Calypso, 1: 6: 8. The story of Promêtheus and Pandora explains the world adorned with gifts, 4: 3: 4. As image of the intelligible world the physical world is called the mirror of Dionysios, 4: 3: 12. Minos becoming guest of Zeus is the soul beholding Unity, 6: 9: 7.—The Lower Earth-Soul is also called Rhea, 5: 1: 7.



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