

A. J. BALFOUR
1906.

201

L121

104935, v.1

The University of Chicago
Library

201

L121

104935, v.1

BOOK 201 L121 v.1 c.1
1 ADD # PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION



3 9153 00064888 3

Date Due



Pub at 8
act of 1864

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

A CRITICAL AND SPECULATIVE TREATISE OF MAN'S
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT
IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN SCIENCE
AND REFLECTIVE THINKING

BY

GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD, LL.D.

FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN YALE UNIVERSITY

VOLUME I

LONDON
LONGMANS, GREEN & CO.

1906

201
172
711

Copyright, 1905, by Charles Scribner's Sons, for the
United States of America

Printed by the Trow Directory, Printing and Bookbinding Company
New York, U. S. A.

“In this diversity of true opinions, let Truth herself produce Concord; our God have mercy upon us that we may use law lawfully; the end of the commandment, pure charity.”

AUGUSTINE.

“*Dieu veuille bénir cette nouvelle orientation au cœur des hommes qui pensent.*”

GATRY.

P R E F A C E

The nature of this work and its relation to the other treatises by the same author make desirable a somewhat more detailed and personal explanation of its sources, growth, and purpose than would otherwise seem appropriate. It is now nearly forty years since the study of man's religious experience and religious development became for him an absorbing interest. Meantime, the investigation has been as diligently pursued as circumstances permitted, from various points of view. Biblical religion, as considered from the critical and theological standpoint, received at first his chief attention; and this, with the intent to discover how much of essential truth there was in it, when regarded from those more advanced positions of race-culture, to the attainment of which the religion itself has made so important contributions.

In 1879 a somewhat abrupt change in professional requirements compelled the concentration of all his energies upon questions which the new psychological science of Europe was at that time pressing upon the attention of students of man's mental life and mental development. For a number of years, his time was almost completely given to psychological studies, by a method then quite new in America,—namely, the physiological and experimental. But even then the possible bearing of the phenomena, which were under examination, upon the religious life of man was never lost out of sight. And when the broader and more fruitful fields of psychology and philosophy were entered by paths already made somewhat clearer, it became a daily business and delightful duty to examine afresh all the greater problems of the spiritual life and development of humanity.

Among such problems, three are of supreme importance in preparation for the special study of the philosophy of religion : they are the nature of the Self ; the nature, validity, and limits of Knowledge ; and the general theory of Reality which a critical and speculative examination of the so-called categories seems to justify and even absolutely to require. The author's researches on these subjects have been confided in, and either expressly or implicitly referred to, at almost every step in the following treatise. To bear this in mind will much diminish, or quite obviate, a certain appearance of overconfidence, and even of dogmatism, in places, which any investigation of this character should carefully avoid. Not everything can be said at the same time. And in the examination of so varied and complex a network of difficult problems as must be undertaken by the philosophy of religion, some fixed points of view must be mapped out beforehand ; and certain positions regarded as, at least for the present purposes, firmly established. And this, as bearing on the following treatise, is what was attempted by previous treatises on the "Philosophy of Mind," the "Philosophy of Knowledge," "A Theory of Reality," and the "Philosophy of Conduct."

No amount of preparation, however, which neglects the study of comparative religion and of religion as an historical development, will suffice for any writer on the philosophy of religion. But the field of the religious history of humanity is so vast, and so many of its major outlines—not to speak of its less important discoveries and delimitations—are so obscure and doubtful, that a hundred lifetimes would scarcely suffice to survey it all. In apology for the weaknesses which scholars of the subject from these points of view may discover in this attempt, I can only say : All the while, this side of the investigation has been kept in view ; the data for its cultivation have been eagerly seized and prudently hoarded ; and during the last several years my attention has been directed largely to learning from others, who are specialists in the history of

religions or in their comparative study, the facts and truths they have to impart.

On passing from a statement of the way the material has been collected to a description of the method of its handling, I am more inclined to call attention to its somewhat special character. On the one hand, it is not the method of an abstract speculation as to what religion ought to be, and as to how its greater conceptions of God, the World, man's Self, and of the relations between the Infinite and the finite, ought to be framed; nor on the other hand, does it remain satisfied with a description of the phenomena that leaves unattempted the critical estimate of the truths for which they stand, as well as a positive philosophical doctrine of that Ultimate Reality whose being and nature the phenomena reveal. Our method does not begin with an historical survey of previous opinions in the same field—of Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schleiermacher and other authorities; nor does it proceed upon the assumption that psychology and anthropology, whether pursued by the statistical or other method, can solve the problems proposed by the spiritual life of humanity. It does not, however, neglect either the historical, the psychological, or the speculative method. It endeavors to include them all. It aims, first of all, to ascertain the facts; and this in order that it may build itself solidly upon a basis of actual human experience. To these facts, when ascertained, it applies reflective and speculative thought, in full confidence of the conviction that human knowledge and rational belief are progressively attainable in this way; and only in this way,—in religion as in other kinds of human experience. In a word, the method of the philosophy of religion, like that of the pursuit of all philosophical problems, must be speculative upon a basis of experience. *Truth results from the application of reflective thinking to experienced facts.*

What has been already said amounts to an explanation of the reasons for the division into the Parts which follows. The first

Volume deals chiefly with the collection and exhibition of the data furnished by religious experience. It attempts a general survey of the "phenomenology" of religion, as regarded from the historical and psychological points of view. A mere reference to the titles of the three different Parts into which this Volume is divided will make this more clear. It need only to be added in this connection that, in treating of the religious being of man, I have laid especial emphasis upon those larger, social reactions of the human Self which relate the spiritual life and development to all the other important forms of race-culture. In this way only can the immense social value which religion necessarily has, be made sufficiently apparent.

In the second Volume the leading conceptions and tenets of religion, especially as they have come to their highest development in the greater world-religions, and above all in Christianity, have received the sympathetic but searching criticism which they deserve at the hands of modern science and philosophy. Here, of course, the one absorbingly interesting and important question becomes, to discover, if possible, the truth which they embody respecting the real Being of the World, and respecting man's relations to this Being, and man's destiny.

A further word of explanation is desirable, to set forth the relation in which the treatment given to Christianity stands to that given to religion in general. A preliminary statement cannot, perhaps, be better expressed than by saying that this religion is treated in essentially the same way as are all the other religions. This is, however, but to say that its data, as given in the particular experiences which it represents, are collected, surveyed critically, and tested for the truth that is in them by application of such criteria as are applied to man's spiritual life and development in general. For we are not undertaking a work in *Dogmatik*, or in theology, Christian or otherwise; but a quite free and scientific treatise of the total religious life and religious development of humanity. The Christian faith is, indeed, our faith. But for this reason are

we all the more sympathetic toward the good and true in all other religions ; and none the less faithful to our ideas of what is really good and true, wherever found, in our critical examination and testing of our own religion.

For a more express definition of the attitude taken in this *comparative* work, reference may be made to the chapter on the "Standard of Religious Values ;" the justification of the attitude can, of course, be established only when it is seen how the result aimed at is secured.

Only an equally long and patient examination of the subject can prepare the most critical reader to appreciate the deficiencies of this work as keenly as does the author himself. However many of them might have been avoided by some more competent writer, there can be no doubt that a great number of similar defects are unavoidably connected with the very nature of its study. The data which form the basis for truths of fact in the field of religion are most conflicting and difficult surely to ascertain ; and the truths of reflection upon the significance and value of the facts quite overtax, at many points, the energies of thought and imagination that can belong to any individual mind. Since this branch of philosophy deals largely with the supreme ideals of humanity, and since these ideals are themselves in a course of development, final solutions for the problems they offer are scarcely to be expected ; and conclusive words are difficult to speak. I therefore desire that these volumes should be considered as expressing at the most an effort to contribute to the better understanding and higher appreciation of the ultimate meaning and supreme value of the religious experience and religious development of man.

Great pains have been taken to avoid errors of detail, and to select only such data of facts as appear to be fairly well established. Errors have, however, undoubtedly crept in ;—partly, on account of the author's limitations, but largely also because the different authorities consulted have by no means been always in agreement as to the facts, and even less in

accord as to their interpretation. It is some small comfort in this connection to refer to the expressions of the scholar, Edward Meyer, in the introductory chapter to his *Geschichte des Alterthums* (I, pp. xvii. ff.). Here this writer truthfully says that the understanding of important ancient inscriptions is often so doubtful as "to drive to despair anyone aiming to write a scientific work dealing with data of foreign, and especially oriental history." But the reports of residents and travellers among present day savage and uncivilized tribes respecting their religious ideas and practices are no less doubtful and conflicting than are the inscriptions of ancient Egypt or Babylonia. All this doubt and conflict, however, does not destroy, or greatly impair, the validity of the principal conclusions which are based upon the data. For so completely and pervasively does the spiritual unity of the race show itself in all the facts and expressions of its religious life, that where one illustration is found to be misinterpreted or displaced, a dozen others might be substituted to furnish data for similar conclusions respecting the more ultimate truths.

In the spelling of proper names also I have ventured quite freely to follow the suggestion of the scholar quoted above. In all matters of transliteration the practical results to be obtained must outweigh any benefits supposed to be connected with scientific consistency. I have therefore definitely abandoned any attempt to spell foreign and ancient names according to any one rule. For, in the first place, no such rule can be established; and, in the second place, to follow any rule would render a very considerable proportion of the words unrecognizable by even the more cultured of my readers. The same names will, however, ordinarily be found, it is hoped, spelled in the same way throughout; except in those cases where courtesy to the authors from whom they are quoted seems to make it necessary to conform to a different spelling.

In the study of the experience, the conceptions, the practices, and the ideals, of religion, "the spirit" of the inquiry is of

peculiar, and even of dominating importance. On this point it is enough to say that I have everywhere quite honestly endeavored to keep not only the fair, but also the sympathetic, irenic, and conciliatory, attitude of mind.

To mention the several hundreds of authorities from whose books I have derived some fact, or some suggestion, or some more definite thought, would be manifestly impossible. It is hoped that the references, either in the text or in the footnotes (the latter of which, however, I have tried to limit as much as convenient), will serve the due purposes of a more definite acknowledgment of my obligations.

I send this work out with the hope that it may serve to some others somewhat of the same purpose which its preparation has served to its author. Religion is the great "Psychic Uplift" of the Race. The spiritual unity and spiritual progress of humanity represent all that has most lasting and supreme value.

GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD.

NEW HAVEN, SEPTEMBER, 1905.

CONTENTS OF VOLUME I

INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER I

PROBLEM AND METHOD

PAGE

The Assumptions involved — The Aim of Philosophy — Resources at Disposal — Possibility of a Science — The Sciences auxiliary — Method of the Study — The Temper required — Relation to other Branches of Philosophy — Importance of the Conception of Development	3
---	---

CHAPTER II

DIFFICULTIES AND BENEFITS

Mistakes and Misconceptions of Fact — Uncertainty of Archæological Researches — Difficulties of an intrinsic Nature — The Need of Rational Treatment — Office of Scepticism — Value of the Study — Guidance of the Ideal	29
--	----

CHAPTER III

THE STANDARD OF RELIGIOUS VALUES

Attitude never purely Scientific — Significance of Value-Judgments — The Psychological Test — The Scale of Values — The Tests of History — Degrees of Satisfaction furnished — The Capacity for Self-Reform — Absoluteness of Religion — The Ideals of Rationality — The Ultimate Test of Values	51
--	----

PART I

RELIGION: AN HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF RELIGION

The Problem complicated — The lowest Terms admissible — Nature of Unreflecting Spiritism — and its various Forms — Its Universal	
--	--

	PAGE
Distribution — The special Case of Buddhism — Development of this <i>minimum</i> Content — Higher and highest Forms of the Conception — As Attitude toward a Universal Principle	85
CHAPTER V	
UNIVERSALITY OF RELIGION	
Two Meanings of the Word, "Universal" — Difficulties of the Investigation — Testimony of Anthropologists — and of Students of Comparative Religion — Spiritual Unity of the Race — The so-called "Universal Religions"	120
CHAPTER VI	
THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION	
The Problem now proposed — An Historical Answer impossible — Religion distinctively Human — Origin not in irreligious Practices — Nor in any one Lower Form of Religion — Nor in Magic or Mythology — Ancestor-worship not alone original — The Answer of Psychology — Naturalness of Religion — So-called "Feeling for the Infinite"	133
CHAPTER VII	
DIFFERENTIATION OF RELIGIONS	
Differentiation distinguished from Development — Classification of Religions — Influences at Work — Amalgamation and Syncretism — Complexity of the Forms — The Higher Kinds of Unification — Speculative Syncretism — The Growth of Polytheism — Greek, Roman, and Teutonic Pantheons — Personal Religions — Buddhism, Zoroastrianism and Islam	158
CHAPTER VIII	
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION	
Nature of Development — Principal and lesser Examples — The Case of Judaism — The Conception of Yahweh — Relations of Christianity to Judaism — Newness of Christianity — The Forces of Development — Nature of "Race-Culture" — Effect of Race Temperament — Religious Consciousness of Savages — The Determining Conceptions — Religions of Salvation	203
CHAPTER IX	
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION [CONTINUED]	
The Order of Development — Not an Affair of fixed Laws — So-called Normal Stages — Progress toward Unity — The Growth of a Spirit-	

ual Monism — Law of Social Selection — Law of Parsimony —
 Law of Social and Political Harmony — Law of Self-Harmony —
 Law of the Conflict of Extremes — Obligation of the Ideal . . . 236

PART II

MAN: A RELIGIOUS BEING

CHAPTER X

THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS

Man in his Entirety — Factors involved — So-called "Subliminal Self"
 — The Affections in Ancestor-Worship — The Religious Feeling —
 Further Analysis of Religious Experience — The Humanity of Religion 261

CHAPTER XI

IMPULSIVE AND EMOTIONAL SOURCES OF RELIGION

The Biological Point of View — Rise of Conscious Need — The Heart
 as the Organ of Religion — Lower Forms of Emotion — Influence
 of Social Feelings — Ethical Love of God — Intellectual Curiosity 278

CHAPTER XII

MAN AS RATIONAL AND FREE

The Object of Religious Faith — Conception of Reason — The Belief
 in Reality — Nature of Cognitive Experience — "Ontological
 Consciousness" — Work of Imagination — Office of Intellect —
 and of Reflective Thought 302

CHAPTER XIII

MAN AS RATIONAL AND FREE [CONTINUED]

The Higher Forms of Sentiment — Moral Feelings — Aesthetic Sentiments —
 The Feeling for the Sublime — Implicate of Moral Freedom — Importance of the Value-Judgments — Experience of Spiritual Powerlessness — Relations of finite will to Absolute Will . . . 324

CHAPTER XIV

MAN "MADE IN THE DIVINE IMAGE"

Belief in "Creator Gods" — Reversal of Doctrine of Biological Evolution — Anthropomorphizing — Metaphysics of Religion justifiable

	PAGE
— Influence of an improved Conception of Divine Being — The Conception of Personality — Ontological Foundations of Religious Belief — Spiritual Conception of the Being of the World . . .	346

CHAPTER XV

THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Different Kinds of Its Influence — The Stimulus of Nature — The Awakening of Religious Feeling — The Apprehension of Unity — The Forms of Nature-Worship — Theistic View of the Cosmos . .	372
--	-----

CHAPTER XVI

INDUSTRY, POLITICS, AND RELIGION

The Complex Reactions — Religion and Agriculture — Influence upon Industrial Development — Relations of Politics and Religion — The Growth of Democratic Institutions — Development of the Ro- man Empire — Influence of Confucianism — Influence of the Priest- hood — The Theocracy — Influence of Christianity	390
---	-----

CHAPTER XVII

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, AND RELIGION

Differences between Science and Religion — Methods of the Two — In- fluence of Faith, in both — The Basis in Experience — Satisfactions of Science and Religion — Summary of Relations — The Reconcile- ment — Philosophy and Religion — Early Attitude of Christianity — Underlying Metaphysical Doctrines	411
---	-----

CHAPTER XVIII

ART AND RELIGION

Psychical Factors in Common — Creative Imagination — The Ideal of Pantheism — Æsthetical and Religious Feeling — Enthusiasm for the Beautiful — The Ideal of Perfect Life — Historical Relations — Development of Antagonisms — Early Attitude of the Christian Church — The Fundamental Harmony	435
--	-----

CHAPTER XIX

MORALITY AND RELIGION

The Indissoluble Connection — Conflicting Views Examined — The Theory of Identity — Influences of Religion on Morals — Numerous Corollaries — Consciousness of Sin — God as Ethical Spirit — In- fluence of Christianity on Morals — and of the Christian Church — The Conception of <i>Mere</i> Morality	454
---	-----

PART III

RELIGION: A LIFE

CHAPTER XX

FAITH AND DOGMA

The Conditions of the Religious Life — Rationality of Faith — Relations of Faith and Dogma — Conception of Faith — Its Relation to the Object of Religion — As Confidence in Reality — Sources of the Christian Doctrine — Essentials of the Christian Faith — Necessity for Dogma — Failures of Dogma — Development of the Creeds of Christendom — “Esoteric” and “Exoteric” Faith 485

CHAPTER XXI

THE CULT OF RELIGION

Principal Kinds of Religious Cult — Superstitious Forms of Worship — Classifying of Cults — The Nature of Sacrifice — The “Priestly Code” — Prayer as a Form of Cult — The Cult of Christianity — Specific Expressions of Religious Experience 512

CHAPTER XXII

THE WAY OF SALVATION

So-called “Practical Religion” — The Desire to be Saved — The Path of the Brāhmanas — and of Buddhism — The Way of Islam — Jesus’ Doctrine of Salvation — The Direct Method of Christianity — The Opposition to the World — Common Elements in the Theory of How to be Saved — Christianity as the Religion of Salvation . . . 540

CHAPTER XXIII

THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY

The Social Interests of Religion — Formation of the Community — Earlier Forms of Religious Association — Influence of Local and Tribal Gods — Founders of Churches — The Religious Festival — The Buddhistic Order — The Church of Islam — Israel as Religious Community — The Divine Kingdom — The Church of Christ — The Development of the Social Christian Community — Theories of the Church Universal 564

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXIV

THE INDIVIDUALITY OF RELIGION

	PAGE
The Variety of Religious Experiences — The Characteristic of Individuality — The Constant Recurrence of Sects — Individuality essential to Progress — and the Expression of a Higher Unity	594

CHAPTER XXV

THE PROBLEM RESTATED

Review of the Phenomena — Different Conceptions of the Being of the World — and of the Object of Religious Experience — The Problems now proposed to Philosophical Reflection	607
---	-----

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

INTRODUCTORY

“And hath made of one blood all nations of men . . . that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him, though He be not far from every one of us.”

PAUL.

“The essence of all divine knowledge is that which opens the spiritual eyes of the ignorant, and destroys doubts and confusion.”

BRAHMA BAIHARTA PURANA.

“For when I found Truth, then found I my God, the Truth Itself. . . . And now will I stand, and become solid in Thee, in my mould, the Truth.”

AUGUSTINE.

“There is not anything I know, which hath done more mischief to Religion, than the disparaging of Reason.”

GLANVILL.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER I

PROBLEM AND METHOD

The mere proposal to treat the phenomena of man's religious life and development from the philosophical point of view involves two assumptions, both of which, however, would seem entitled to command our confidence without preliminary discussion. The first of these is the assumption that such phenomena exist; and that they may be collected, classified, and studied in a manner to secure from them the material for a further elaboration by critical and reflective thinking. It is assumed, in the second place, that the method of critical and reflective thinking, which is the method of philosophy, is applicable to this material. In a word, religion exists as a fact, and we may philosophize about it.

If, however, the claim be extended so as to include the possibility of establishing a philosophy of religion,—meaning by this a rational and defensible system of conceptions and principles that have been based upon scientifically verifiable facts,—the assumptions involved in the claim are by no means so evident. On the contrary, there are not a few among those who accept the truths of this particular form of religious faith, who would agree with the dictum which a modern historian¹

¹ See the passage used as a motto to Vol. I of Harnack's *History of Dogma* [English Translation].

quotes with approval from Goethe: "The Christian religion has nothing to do with philosophy." But our primary assumption is that philosophy *has* something to do—and something which is exceedingly important and at least theoretically valuable—not only with the Christian but with every other actual or possible form of religion. We recognize at once, then, the obligation to explain with some detail in what meaning of the words "philosophy of religion," they have been chosen as a title for the investigation before us; and how we are proposing to conduct this investigation. The explorer must orient himself by fixing his points of view for the consideration of the general domain which religion presents to philosophy, before undertaking the more thorough exploration of any of the numerous subordinate portions of the domain. It should be understood, however, that at present any statement of the problem or of its method is only preliminary. The clearer comprehension and fuller justification of our conception of the problem, and of the correct method of any attempt at its solution, must be left until the investigation is completed.

The work we are about to undertake is constructive and systematic; as, indeed, all the work of philosophy attempts to become. With regard to the facts which it aims to build into its structure, philosophy assumes that they have enough of abiding and general, if not of absolutely unchanging and strictly universal character, to entitle them to its method of treatment. For philosophy is interested in what belongs to man as man, and not in what is more peculiarly individual or seemingly accidental. Exceptions interest science; the unifying of principles and of ideals is the goal of philosophy. It is, therefore, because religion is an abiding and universal, as well as a practically influential and even an essential, part of man's complex life and development that its phenomena demand philosophical treatment.

That the facts of man's religious experience certainly possess the characteristics which entitle them to become an im-

portant branch of philosophical discipline is here assumed in a preliminary way; the fuller evidence in justification of the assumption will be presented in subsequent chapters upon the nature, origin, and development of religion, upon the sources and phases of man's religious consciousness, and upon the part which religion plays in the other complex political, social, and spiritual developments of humanity.

But the attempt to construct a philosophy of religion, in the stricter meaning of these words, also involves a certain more or less definite conception of philosophy itself and of the philosophical method. And here the extremes of conceding too much and of claiming too much are both to be avoided. On the one hand, no one acquainted with the nature of man's religious life and development could reasonably expect to secure, whether by processes mainly of deductive thinking or of inductive discovery, a logically harmonious and interconnected—not to say, a rigidly demonstrable—set of conceptions and principles, after the fashion of Spinoza's philosophical classic (*Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata*), or of Newton's *Principia*. Even less does our assumption amount to a claim that any one mind, or any one age, can evolve *the* philosophy of religion as a finished product. But then, the very conception of philosophy forbids this claim for any of its various fields of inquiry, or for any of the fruits yielded by any of these fields. Systematic philosophy must always remain no more, and yet no less, than an attempt to frame a unity of rational assumptions and opinions concerning the ultimate problems of nature and of the life of man.

On the other hand, the fault-finding and despairing attitude of mind toward the proposal of philosophy to deal with the problems of religion is even more unjustifiable. Religion, like every other form of man's complex experience, yields some sweet and mature fruits into the lap of the cultivator who is capable of gathering them with a bold, judicious, patient, and aspiring hand. "Let the philosopher," says Professor Acquoy,

in a way to depreciate the application of the philosophical method to religion, "study this question, *if he pleases.*" We do please to study the religious life and development of man by the help of reflective and critical thinking; and in this way we hope to accomplish for these phenomena something of that at which philosophy always aims.

The philosophic method as applied to religion aims (1) to discover what is permanent and universal; (2) to elucidate and defend what has at least a relative rational certitude; and (3), as far as possible, to harmonize the conclusions from the religious experiences of man with conclusions derived from his other experiences, in a systematic and uniting way.

The distinction between the philosophy of religion as our purpose is to cultivate it, and a philosophy of religion which claims to furnish a demonstrated and systematically arranged knowledge of the Absolute, might be further illustrated by referring to the aims and methods of Neo-Platonism.¹ For although there are more modern illustrations of this distinction, there is perhaps no other which sets the distinction itself in a clearer light. Like that ancient ambition the ambitious thinker of to-day may with entire propriety affirm: Our "final interest is the religious." But the highest object which modern philosophic inquiry seeks is not the same as that sought by Neo-Platonism. It is not some vision or cognition of the "super-rational"; nor is it a complete and finished "philosophy of revelation." The expectation to establish an absolute religion by the aid of a philosophy of the Absolute, may after centuries of instructive experience, fitly be suffered to lapse and die. On the contrary, our philosophy of religion proposes to retain a final interest in the religious, but to apply all the rational powers to the ascertainment of those truths of life and reality for which man's religious nature, in its most profound and comprehensive

¹ See Harnack, *History of Dogma*, I, p. 336f; and Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, III, 2.

forms of activity, stands accountable, both as creator and as sponsor.

A similar conception of the philosophy of religion has been expressed with substantial correctness and admirable brevity by Pünjer¹ in the following sentence: "The phrase philosophy of religion, like the analogous expressions (*Naturphilosophie*, *Rechtsphilosophie*, *Geschichtsphilosophie*, u. a.) designates the application of philosophy to a definite object,—viz., Religion." In other words, it aims at the "philosophical cognition of religion." This conception, however, raises at once the further questions: How are we to conceive of the philosophical as distinguished from other forms of knowing any particular object; and, also, How are we to understand the nature of the particular object called religion?

The character of our inquiry may be made still more obvious by contrasting the aim of the philosophical with the aim of the so-called comparative study of religion; and with the science of religions. "Comparative religion," as it is sometimes called, is a purely historical study. It began when the similarities and differences between the religions of different peoples and ages first stimulated intellectual curiosity and created the desire to make them all the subject of comparative research. Its spirit of historical science, and the large and ever growing wealth of material which now characterize its best endeavors, belong to recent years. But the beginnings of such a study were made centuries ago. In this connection it is worth noting that Akbar, the Great Mogul who reigned in Northern India (1556–1605) is credited with having invited to his court Muhammadans, Jews, Brāhmins, Zoroastrians, and Christians. He is said to have employed philologues in the work of translating all the sacred books of other peoples to which he could obtain access; and as well, experienced readers who read to him daily from foreign literatures. It was doubtless due largely to the exclusive spirit of Christianity that, in Europe, until the eight-

¹ Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie, p. 1.

eenth century, there was little or no study of other religions ; and until the nineteenth century, scarcely any study of any religion from the comparative point of view. It is to Herder that the honor must be awarded of founding in modern times a school for the historical and comparative study of religion.¹

Notwithstanding the charge of excessive *apriorism* which may be brought against the work of Hegel, he is the true successor of Herder. For Hegel saw the real problem ; and he discussed it in the belief that reflective thinking upon the basis of the facts of an historical evolution is the only proper and hopeful way for attempting its solution.

No philosophy of religion can longer hope to claim the attention of well-informed minds which does not avail itself of all the resources now put at its disposal by the historical and comparative study of religions. For it is just this study which furnishes to reflection the problems with which it must attempt to deal. These problems are suggested and offered by historical facts :—and not by isolated, disconnected, and unimportant facts, but by great groups of interrelated and essential facts which lie along lines of the historical evolution of humanity. There should be little need, therefore, to exhort the would-be philosopher, first of all to learn with due diligence and modesty from the students of the religious history of humanity precisely what it is about which he is expecting to philosophize.

On the other hand, it cannot be admitted that the historical and comparative study of the world's religions is, of itself, sufficient to constitute a philosophy of religion ; nor does such study satisfy fully the demands either of man's intellectual

¹ It is a defect in Professor Jastrow's account (*The Study of Religion—Its History and Character*: chap. I) that he makes no mention of India; and we cannot accord to Spinoza the place which he assigns to him in the development of the study of religion. The proposal of Lessing, "to see in all positive religions the course taken by the human intellect in its unfolding," emphasizes the psychological and philosophical rather than the historical method of study.

curiosity or of his practical and spiritual life. But one of the most important results of this increase of knowledge about the religious history of humanity has been to awaken and stimulate the call for a renewed attempt to treat religion by the philosophical method. The first effect of the travel and resulting discoveries of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was to interest students in the religious beliefs and cult of the different peoples with which this travel brought Europeans into contact. But the second effect was, of course, to raise such questions as follow: Why so many and different religions? Why religion, as a permanent and universal affair, at all? And, finally: How is it possible to account for that unity in variety which the different religions show; and to harmonize the assumptions, conceptions, principles, ideals, and practical aims of this development of humanity with its other leading developments? Thus the discoveries of comparative religion have only heightened and intensified our interest in the treatment of its ultimate problems. And no mere heaping up of facts, or refinement of statement as to what the facts are, can avail to answer any such inquiries as those which the discoveries themselves raise. The human mind is so constituted that it demands to know what the facts of man's religious history signify for our view of the ultimate realities which condition his existence and his evolution; and for the highest ideals and supreme values of his life.

And, indeed, the historical study of religion has of itself something important to teach upon this very point. For it clearly shows that the endeavor to give certainty and logical consistency to man's religious beliefs and practices constitutes one of the oldest and most persistent of human endeavors. In some important way it is true that the philosophy of religion is a very ancient and influential factor not only in man's religious development, but also in the development of his entire complex life. The philosophical and speculative study of religion existed and exerted a profound influence long before its

historical and comparative study. In India, nearly or quite two thousand years before Akbar, regular tournaments for the discussion of the problems of religion were held at the various courts; and all the possible schools of religious philosophy—such as Materialism, Pantheism, Theism, Dualism, etc.—had their claims presented and advocated. There is even no little ground for the contention of a recent historian of philosophy,¹ that the doctrines of the various religions of the world must not only enter much more largely than they have hitherto done into the account of the development of philosophy; but also that these doctrines, essentially considered and when “stripped of their mythological clothing,” are philosophy itself.²

The study of religion from the historical and comparative point of view, and its study from the philosophical point of view, cannot be considered as antagonistic or even independent. Comparative religion shapes and hands over to the philosophy of religion the problems which it discerns but cannot solve. Further discussion of this relation belongs, however, to questions of method.

If it be proposed to employ this title as it applies to the sciences which can avail themselves largely of the mathematical and experimental methods—the so-called “exact sciences”—then it is not proper to speak of the *science* of religion. Fixed laws, reversible sequences, definite and demonstrable formulas, have not yet been found, nor can we ever hope to find them, in the religious life and development of humanity.³ The failure at this point, if failure it is to be considered, is not due to faulty methods of exploration or to incapacity in the explorers. The phenomena of man’s religious

¹ Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, I, p. viii.

² In this connection it is pertinent to notice that almost all the modern interest in the study of the history and philosophy of man’s religious experience has been due to the beginning and increasing acquaintance of Europe with the religions of India.

³ Comp. Rhys Davids, *Origin and Growth of Religion*, [Hibbert Lectures, 1881], p. 10.

life and development are far too complex, subtle, and swiftly changeable, to admit of this kind of scientific handling and scientific construction. Indeed, the very attempt to use such a method shows an inadequate and untrained appreciation of the nature of the religious experience itself. But there is a more liberal and scarcely less appropriate meaning of the word "science" which renders it in some measure applicable to the phenomena of religious beliefs, sentiments, and cult. Wherever there are facts which may be observed critically, classified and compared with care, and their more or less regular groupings and sequences discovered, together with the explanations of these relations, there the beginnings at least of a science are to be found. It would be unfair to deny that a "science of religion" is possible in this looser but valid meaning of the term; or even that some worthy approaches have already been made toward the establishment of such a science. Indeed, the comparative and historical study of the different religions of the world lays the sure foundations for a science of religion. And although it would be an obvious exaggeration to claim that a system of laws regulating unvaryingly the manifestations and developments of man's religious consciousness has been discovered, certain conclusions of a *quasi*-scientific character as to the origin and interrelation of these manifestations and developments may be made apparent.

When, however, we have once for all admitted the propriety of speaking of a "science of religion," the question still remains unanswered as to what kind of a science this may be; and, as well, the question as to the character of the method applicable to this science. On this point there would seem to be no reasonable doubt. The science of religion is a psychological, or to use the term of Tiele,¹ "a mental science." "There is no question here about natural laws" (that is, in the restricted meaning of the word as applying to physical nature, or to the science of things). It follows also that when we

¹ Elements of the Science of Religion, I, pp. 216 and 245.

are speaking of the development of religion we are, as the same authority declares, using an "elliptical term," and are really studying the "development of the religious man." The science of religion is, then, an historical science, as well as a psychological science, because it is concerned with the evolution in history of the life of self-conscious and rational beings.

But whatever there may be of knowledge or of reasonable conjecture that is worthy to be called a beginning science of religion, there can be no reasonable dispute as to the relations in which this body of scientific truth stands to the philosophy of religion. The science of religion, like the history of religions, prepares the phenomena in the form of problems for philosophy to consider. Here, as everywhere else, philosophy is dependent upon science; but science is deficient, inconclusive, unsatisfying, without philosophy.¹ In the investigation before us, every legitimate claim to furnish a scientific basis for constructing a philosophy of religion must be welcomed and carefully considered. But the critical freedom of the genuine philosophical spirit needs to be preserved, not only when, but even especially when, phenomena like those of man's religious life and development are the subjects for consideration.

There are at least two of the particular sciences which stand in the closest connection with the proposal to study religion from the philosophical point of view. These are psychology and anthropology. The study of religion is always essentially psychological. Even the preliminary survey of an historical and comparative character cannot be successfully accomplished without use of the psychological method. For the phenomena

¹ M. Burnouf (*La Science des Religions*, p. 2) seems to us quite completely to transpose the relations between the philosophy of religion and the so-called science of religions. With M. Burnouf, science seems to stand for a body of ascertained principles; philosophy for the unverifiable theorizing of the individual thinker. But in no case is this a satisfactory conception of the relations existing between science and philosophy; least of all, in the case of man's religious experience.

of religion are psychical phenomena. All its objective manifestations reveal their real significance only when interpreted in terms of the life of the human soul; and all the conceptions, beliefs, and practices, of every form of religion known to the history of the human race, are products of this life. Neither history nor any other science, neither revelation nor speculation, neither human nor divine authority, can take religion out of the psychological sphere. The psychology of the religious consciousness is, therefore, an indispensable propædeutic to the philosophy of religion. And the older speculative attempts at this branch of philosophy have not erred more seriously through their neglect of historical and comparative study than through their ignorance of psychology. But psychology can no more take the place of philosophy than can comparative religion.

Anthropology has, of late, interested itself in no small degree in the study of the religious aspect of human development. Indeed, from its very nature, because it combines the advantages of the historical and the psychological methods, this science would seem, of all others, adapted to become the most close kindred and valuable handmaid of the philosophy of religion. In the past, however, anthropology has scarcely fulfilled its mission in this respect, in a worthy and commendable way. For its comparative failure there are probably these three reasons chiefly to be assigned. Anthropology has only of late, and as yet somewhat grudgingly, acknowledged its dependence upon psychology for its own successful pursuit. In the effort to make itself an objective and exact science it has forgotten that man cannot be studied, either as respects his nature, his achievements, or his developments, in the purely objective way of the physical sciences. But anthropology is essentially a psychological science, for man is a thinking, feeling, willing soul; and in all human history the subjective lies back of, and gives life, interest, and value to the objective.

In the second place, the natural and proper interest of anthropological science in the study of origins has too often led

its devotees into speculations which, although put forth as established by scientific method in the form of general principles and fixed laws, are far enough indeed from meriting any such claim to acceptance. The more our acquaintance with the actual facts increases, the farther do we appear to be from a really scientific knowledge of the absolute beginnings of racial developments. Strictly speaking little or nothing is known about *primitive* man. Especially in respect of the first things of his religious consciousness, the safest motto for philosophy would seem to be a confession of ignorance for the present, if not a relinquishment of hope for the future [*ignoramus*, if not also *ignorabimus*]. However, there is a peculiar temptation to speculate about the beginnings of religion; because, while the accumulation of facts concerning the existing lower orders of religious belief and cult is so great, the information needed to account for their origin and arrangement into a scheme of consistent development is so meagre, as to lead to an almost hopeless confusion of opinions. Yet more important, perhaps, in its disturbing influence, is the tendency, so common among anthropologists, largely or quite completely to neglect those higher forms of religious experience—the great world-religions and especially, among them, Christianity—which embody most completely the permanent principles, suggest most vividly the supreme ideals, and satisfy most thoroughly the essential needs of man's religious consciousness. In no branch of evolution can the highest and choicest products of the life of nature, or the life of man, be neglected without a sacrifice of scientific completeness and scientific certainty. If the structure and development of the egg must be known in order to know the bird, the bird must be known in order to appreciate the structure and understand the final purpose of the development of the egg. If we need the generic history in order to understand the higher attainments of the genus, we need the best specimens of the most highly developed species in order to comprehend the teleology of the genus. Especially true is

this in the case of man's moral and religious evolution. For in morals and religion the dominance of value-judgments and the influence of ideals are so powerful that any neglect of the higher forms of development impairs the value and limits the trustworthiness of conclusions respecting the lower and more nearly primitive forms.

Connected with this consideration is another and third: neither the science nor the philosophy of religion can be successfully cultivated without approaching the phenomena in a certain sympathetic and appreciative temper of mind. Religion is essentially an inner experience: it *manifests* itself in varied forms which may be made the object of observation, record and reflective study. But interpretation is of the first importance here; and satisfactory interpretation is not possible without experience. He who has never felt the mystery of nature and of human life, he who has never desired and sought to know and commune with the Divine Being, he who has never acknowledged his need of improved relations toward the all-comprehending Life of the World,—he is ill-fitted indeed to comprehend the religious nature and development of his fellowmen. In truth, a certain attitude of mind, which is especially credited with the titles "objective" and "scientific"—however appropriate to other forms of research—when it approaches the phenomena of religion is not really scientific and utterly fails of reaching its object.

At the same time, no student of the philosophy of religion can neglect the data furnished to his hand by modern researches in the field of anthropology without the failure to possess himself of some of the most valuable means for accomplishing successfully his task. For the essential and permanent relations between anthropology and the philosophy of religion are such that the latter imperatively needs the data discovered by the former; while the former is quite unable to give the final and most valuable treatment to these data without the help of the latter.

The claim of philosophy to a field peculiarly its own, has, of

late, been somewhat further complicated by the attempt to relegate the whole subject of religion to so-called sociology,¹ or even to biology. It is indeed true, as this rival claim asserts, that one of the conceptions which serve to bring about a unity among all the different religions is that of a social bond (*lien de société*) between man and superior powers more or less like himself. Human sociability extends even to the heavens themselves, and everywhere throughout the imagined, invisible world. The tie which unites the gods among themselves, or the gods and men, or men to the One God, is necessarily conceived of after the analogy of human society. But this truth, important as it is, by no means sums up all the legitimate and valuable conclusions of a reflective treatment of the phenomena of man's religious life and development. Nor is it of such a nature as to warrant the surrender of all investigations into the field occupied by these phenomena to the loosely connected and extremely complex group of studies denominated "sociology." Moreover, the sketch of the development of the beliefs and practices of religion which a purely sociological theory devises does not—as will subsequently appear—by any means agree in all respects with the order of development which the historical and comparative study of religions shows to have been the fact. The unit element of sociological development, the individual man, is by no means deemed a mystery by himself in the earlier stages of his development. What man chiefly knows, or thinks he knows, and what he therefore least of all envelopes in mystery, is his own Selfhood. The things and forces of physical nature, the heavenly bodies, the trees, plants, and animals, especially those of the least man-like sort, are the rather esteemed mysterious. These are the first objects of religious belief and worship; not because they are so well known, but because they are so unknown, so doubtful as to their sociological character; and because man is therefore so doubtful about the propriety, or even

¹ See especially the work of M. Guyau, *L'Irréligion de L'Avenir*, with its sub-title, *Étude Sociologique*.

the possibility, of establishing any social bond between them and himself.

The relations of the philosophy of religion to the various attempts at scientific treatment of the same or kindred phenomena must, then, be maintained with self-respect for each and with reciprocal respect among all. Each of these sciences—comparative history, psychology, anthropology, sociology—has its appropriate sphere. They all contribute the wealth of their accumulations to the foundations of fact and law upon which reflective thinking must build its systematic view of the world, if it is to command the respect of the particular sciences, or even to cherish a reasonable self-respect. But not one of these sciences, nor all of them combined, can usurp the place or perform the service of critical and constructive philosophy. And in this conclusion we may justify ourselves by an appeal to history, as its witness is summarized in the following pregnant sentences from Merz:¹ “We find ourselves at the end of a long and critical period unable to say that any one of the three realms of thought, (namely—scientific, philosophical, religious) has gained an undisputed victory over the others. Science is more than ever that kind of thought which gives knowledge and certainty. Religion is still the generally recognized abode for those convictions which refer to our deepest personal interests. And more than ever do we feel the need of a reconciliation of both in some theory of life which is neither purely scientific, nor purely individualistic; and this means that philosophy is as much needed as ever.”

Much has already been implied with regard to the Method which philosophy must employ in its attempt to deal with the problems offered to it by the religious life and religious development of man. Some more precise statement is, however, necessary concerning the way in which it is proposed to conduct the present examination.

The method of the philosophy of religion follows from the

¹ A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century, I, p. 73.

complex nature of the subject of religion,—that is, from the nature of man. For men in general are religious; they have beliefs, sentiments, and practices, of the religious sort. Or, the rather we may say, that the human being is essentially religious. But man is also a reflective and rational being. It is of his nature to philosophize. He has that form of experience which is called religion; and he wishes to understand the ultimate significance, the value with reference to his cognitions of Reality and of his practical adjustments toward Reality, of this form of his experience. Hence the philosophy of religion: it is as inevitable at a certain stage of human development as any other work of human reason possibly can be.

In religion, as in all other fields of philosophical inquiry, the means employed must be adapted, first of all, to ascertain the facts of human experience as presented in a form to require treatment by the method of philosophy; and then to subject this material to critical analysis, rational interpretation, and comparison with other allied forms of experience, with a view to a speculative synthesis. Now in the field of religion it is certain beliefs, sentiments, and forms of conduct, in which these facts consist; these beliefs, sentiments, and practices are the substance of religion. The treatment of these facts by the philosophical method results in the philosophy of religion.

More specifically defined the question of method includes the way of getting at the facts of man's religious life and religious development. That is to say, the method is a combination of the historical and comparative with the psychological method. Man's religious life is a life of the race in history; and his religious development is a historical process. Thus anthropology and comparative religion, by the use of the historical method, furnish organs both of standing and of motion to the philosophy of religion. Without these studies, philosophy floats aimlessly in mid-air; or, if it moves in any well-defined direction, it fails to carry the conviction that its voyaging

is toward the land of truth and reality. Without these studies, philosophy can neither discover and occupy any sure positions, nor move along lines of thinking which follow the lines along which, in actuality, has moved the religious life of humanity. Without them, also, the speculative synthesis at which philosophy aims, and its effort at a reconciling and uniting view of the ultimate problems of nature and of human life, fails to command the confidence of those who seek for truth by the method of reflective thinking rather than secure the empty satisfaction of speculation for its own sake.

But the historical and comparative method, and more especially the method of anthropology, require to be assisted and supplemented by the psychological method. By themselves—if, indeed, they could really be pursued strictly *by themselves*—comparative religion and anthropology can throw little or no light upon some of the problems offered by man's religious experience. This, for example, is preëminently true of the problem of the origin of religion. As will be shown in detail in Part II of this work, the necessity for the constant use of the psychological method arises from the very nature of religion, which springs ever fresh and self-renewing and full of life and vigor from the soul of man. For to man, religion, with its beliefs, sentiments, and practices, is as natural and necessary, and as rational, too, as are any of the other highly complex reactions of his spirit upon his environment and upon the totality of his other experiences.

The benefits of free and intelligent use of the historical and psychological methods are not confined simply to certifying the student of the philosophy of religion with respect to certain groups or broad areas of fact. History, psychology, and anthropology, have fundamental truths to tell concerning man's nature and the laws of his being and development, which the philosophy of religion imperatively needs to know. The value of these truths cannot be better emphasized, so far as is necessary in the present connection, than by citing some of the con-

clusions reached by the anthropologist Waitz.¹ It is the *spiritual unity of the race*, whether we consider its historical evolution in time, or its present distribution over the earth, with all the existing grades of race-culture, which impressed this distinguished student of the phenomena. "This," says he, "is established in the most indubitable fashion if we keep in sight the accounts which the different travelers have given of the spiritual peculiarities of the most cultureless peoples. Everywhere essentially the same type of spiritual life meets us." Of the most civilized Europeans and of the wild, so-called "primitive" man (the *Natur-mensch*), including the most ape-like negroes, the word of the poet is true :²

" Die schlechteste Gesellschaft lässt dich fühlen
Dass du ein Mensch mit Menschen bist."

But while all races of men are thus positively united by unbroken and unbreakable bonds of spiritual kinship, they are negatively differentiated from the lower animals, and so positively and closely united with one another in the following among other ways: (1) Superior perfectibility; (2) superior means of expressing the inner life,—especially speech; (3) superiority of social nature and of capacity for social organization; and (4) the possession of the religious element, which is "nowhere wanting where the remaining characteristics of humanity show themselves; and if it often does appear only in distorted form, its influence upon the life of the peoples is on the whole everywhere demonstrable, and this influence in all cases where we have accurate knowledge is a very significant one."³ But to take a special case: M. Réville⁴ is, by use of the histori-

¹ See especially *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, I, ii, cap. 1, on "The Specific Characters of Man," pp. 315 ff.

² "The worst companionship makes you feel that you are a man among men."

³ Waitz, *Ibid.*, p. 322.

⁴ *The Native Religions of Mexico and Peru*. [Hibbert Lectures, 1884] p. 7 f.

cal and psychological method for the examination of the native religions of Mexico and Peru, entirely satisfied that he finds there "the same fundamental principles, the same laws of evolution and transformation, the same internal logic;" in a word "a fundamental identity of spiritual being" with ourselves.¹ "All mythology and all history of beliefs," says another writer on this subject, "must finally turn to psychology for their satisfactory elucidation."²

The reliance, then, which true philosophy in all its branches places upon the conclusions of the particular sciences, must in the case of the philosophy of religion be bestowed chiefly upon the sciences of psychology, anthropology, and comparative history. These sciences must be allowed the perfect freedom in the use of their respective methods to which they have long ago proved themselves entitled. In their own appropriate domain, philosophy is neither their master, their arbiter, nor their judge. But in some real and important way they are all the servants of philosophy; and by the use of their method they furnish to the critical, reflective, and systematic method of philosophy those generalizations and laws, and more permanent and universally active causes, of whose significance, value, and unitary relations with the other particular sciences, philosophy takes cognizance. For philosophy, in general, aims to harmonize and unify all human experience. And the philosophy of religion, in particular, aims to harmonize and unify the phenomena of man's religious life and development—his religious experience

¹ On this point we might further quote K. Bruchmann, who says (*Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie*, XI, p. 124): "It is easy to prove that the striking similarity in primitive religious ideas and actions does not come from an interchange of tradition but rather has its roots in the *essentially similar mental construction of man* (italics ours), and in the primitive tendencies of the human individual." And as another writer has truly said: "Before this unity of the human spirit, in its perpetually similar features, the individual, national, or even racial differences sink into insignificance." (J. J. Honegger, *Allgemeine Culturgeschichte*, I, p. 332.)

² Granger, *The Worship of the Romans*, p. vii.

—with the other principal forms of his experience. The scientific method as employed by psychology, anthropology, and comparative history, therefore, prepares for philosophy the facts of human religious experience in the form of a body of science, in the looser and yet legitimate meaning of the title.

The other half of the method of the philosophy of religion concerns its way of dealing with the facts when once they have been ascertained, classified, explained, and arranged under the conception of development, by the use of the mixed psychological and historical method. This method of philosophizing is confessedly difficult even to describe and perhaps impossible to reduce to strictly scientific form. It implies, first of all, the possession of a certain spirit which it is proper to call the philosophic spirit, or temper of mind. Everywhere, but especially in dealing with ethical and religious truths, this spirit is critical but not coldly sceptical; it has hospitality and breadth but is not indifferent; it is reverent but free, cautious but implicitly confident of the supreme value and gracious influences of the truth. Thus the philosophic spirit, as applied to reflection upon the problems of religion, is closely akin to, if not identical with, the ethico-religious spirit itself. And perhaps it would not be out of the way to claim that, just as in the case of aesthetical and ethical subjects, so also in the case of religion, the sympathetic and appreciative spirit is an essential factor in the method of inquiry.

But the possession of the philosophic temper must be supplemented by training in the use of the philosophical method. Indeed, the disciplined temper can scarcely—although it be given by heaven in different degrees to different men—be gained or retained without actual practice of the method. In religion, as elsewhere, the philosophical method consists in the application of reflective thinking, with its searching critical analysis, and its cautious but free and bold speculative synthesis, to the material already prepared for it by the appropriate particular sciences. The goal at which it aims, but which it never expects

to reach until the tasks of thought are finished for the race, is a harmonious and unitary system of rational principles including all the ultimate problems of nature and of human life.

The philosophy of religion must enter upon its task of examining the phenomena of man's religious life and experience with certain presuppositions derived from the other branches of philosophical discipline. To criticise these assumptions in detail, and to establish them in the modified form in which philosophical criticism leaves them, would be quite impossible in any introductory treatment of religion. The student of its philosophy is entitled to these assumptions; and, indeed, the performance of his task by the use of the philosophical method is quite impossible without them. But he is not entitled to them in the particular field of the philosophy of religion unless he has justified this title by work done in the other closely allied fields of philosophy.

The assumptions which enter, in an exceedingly important and all-pervasive way, into the use of the philosophical method upon the problems of religion, may be divided into three classes. These are (1) the epistemological assumptions: (2) the assumptions with regard to the origin, nature, and validity of human judgments of value; and (3) a certain metaphysical assumption or rather theoretical and practical attitude of mind, toward the Being of the World, or Ultimate Reality.

The epistemological assumptions of any investigator into the philosophy of the religious life and development of humanity, concern the nature and limits of religious knowledge, the extent and validity of the grounds on which religious faith or belief reposes, and the origin and trustworthiness of those standards of truths of fact and of conception which influence so powerfully the religious experience. Can man attain a cognition of, or a rational faith in, God? What are the proofs for this cognition, or the evidences and supports of such a faith? How shall we regulate our confidence in the accuracy of human testimony, when dealing with alleged facts of such a nature as

are many of those in which the religious experience seems so largely to consist? How shall we justify to others, if not also to ourselves, those conceptions of the non-sensuous realities and the unrealized, and not infrequently unrealizable ideals, in which the religious experience so abundantly rejoices and of which it is so productive? Now it will be found that the answer which the inquirer inclines to give to these and to all similar problems is always profoundly influenced by the epistemological assumptions which he carries over from his own crude or elaborate system of general philosophy into the philosophy of religion.

The positions in debate between Agnosticism and Gnosticism, or Dogmatism and Criticism, are undoubtedly of the greatest importance for the philosophy of religion. But after having considered them in a preparatory way, it is an essential factor in the use of the philosophical method that the investigation of man's actual religious experience should proceed with that calm and confident, but limited reliance upon human reason which culture in this method both recommends and justifies.¹

The importance of the judgments of value in the domain of religious experience—its beliefs, sentiments, and ideals—is so overmastering that some special treatment of the theme would seem to be a necessary part of any introduction, however brief, to the philosophy of religion. For these beliefs, sentiments, and ideals, are themselves largely founded upon and expressive of such judgments. No fact of a religious character can be regarded as a *mere* fact. No conception can be framed and be deemed important by the religious consciousness, that has not more than a merely logical import and worth. There are

¹ For our own theory of knowledge we can only refer to those works in which the subject has been discussed; and where this theory comes into use for the determination of such problems in the Philosophy of Religion as the foregoing questions propose, it must be left to justify itself as best it can: Namely, in chief, the "Philosophy of Knowledge" (throughout); "Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory," chaps. XX-XXII; and "A Theory of Reality," chaps. XV-XX.

no religious ideals that may be regarded with a purely speculative interest. In religion everything—facts, conceptions, ideals—is shot through and through with the logic of feeling, is deeply dyed (often enough literally “blood-red”) with convictions, is held with a grasp, or rejected with a movement of soul, which is more profoundly seated, more intensely emotional, and more sternly practical than anything of a simply intellectual character can well be. So, then, the tests of religious truths are never merely logical, or strictly scientific; they are, the rather, always and properly also dependent upon certain more complex and profounder satisfactions than are those which can be afforded by the acceptance of truths that depend chiefly upon logical consistency or scientific exactness. It would, therefore, be a great and serious mistake to begin either by absolving religion from all obligations to rationality, or by discrediting it altogether as quite incapable of submitting itself to any scientific testing, and thus of reconciling itself with the conditions and conclusions of scientific progress.

The spiritual unity of man, and the necessity which is laid alike upon science, philosophy, art, and religion, to provide satisfactions for this one and indivisible unity is a postulate proved by psychology, anthropology, the philosophy of mind, and the historical development of humanity; it will be constantly adhered to, and made prominent, throughout the entire following investigations. But the peculiar province and special importance of man’s conceptions, judgments, and ideals of value, appears in the ethical, æsthetical, and religious life of humanity,—preëminently, however, in the religious life, as in some sort comprehending the ethical and æsthetical factors of human experience. Hence there arises the necessity of a discussion of the standard of religious values.

That the world is a unity, that human experience as representative of the life of Nature and the life of Man must somehow be made to hang together and may fitly—Nay! must properly—be considered in the light of some One Principle, an

Ideal-Real, is an assumption which all the progress of man's scientific discoveries and philosophical speculation goes to confirm. To be sure, this Unity remains an Ideal. There are not only many diversities, but also not a few apparent oppositions and self-contradictions existing within the complex totality of human experience. Each individual man has his share of them. The growth of science and philosophy in the race has not yet by any means succeeded in expelling them, or in solving the theoretical problems and practical puzzles which they press constantly upon the mind. Neither science nor philosophy seems to draw near the final, and much longed-for, and long-time dreamed-of, realization of its ideal of perfect Being and perfect Knowledge. Within the realm of ethics, which is the realm of conduct, neither the progress of political and social science, nor the readjustments and refinements of law, nor the most strenuous summons to reform, nor all the threats and promises and hopes and inspirations of religion, have solved the fundamental problems or removed the patent contradictions between what is, in the doings of mankind, and that which ought to be. But that, after all, the Unity which is humanity's Ideal is also essentially and eternally Real, remains the no less confident postulate of triumphant science and of "divine philosophy." The contradictions and oppositions are expected, somehow and sometime, to show themselves to be either apparent, or temporary, and in harmony with the essential and eternal Principles of the Universe. Philosophy, while it may not by any means deny facts, or in any case force the evidence, may legitimately accept this confidence as, at least its working postulate.

Moreover, the light which science and philosophy have thrown upon all the more ultimate problems by accepting in some worthy form the conception of Development can by no means be refused for our guidance in philosophizing over the problems of religion. In this philosophical meaning of the word, then, we are bound to have a *monistic* theory of human

experience and of the world of reality as progressively made known within this experience. There can be little doubt that such philosophical Monism is inclined and entitled to look with especial favor upon monistic religions; and among monistic religions, upon that one which best accords with the highest developments of that "spirituality" which psychological, anthropological, and historical science shows us to be the endowment or the acquisition of the most advanced of the human race.

To summarize the views respecting the general problem and method of the philosophy of religion which will guide our investigations throughout their course, we may say in a word, that the philosophy of religion aims to give to the facts and laws of man's religious life and development that critical and reflective treatment which will discover, elucidate, and defend the fundamental Conceptions and universal Truths of Religion, and to unite them with other conceptions and truths in a harmonious and unitary theory of the World and of Man's total experience. Like all philosophy, this branch should graft itself upon truth of fact. In order to ascertain the facts, it must employ the descriptive and historical method, must consult the results of the comparative and evolutionary study of the religious life of mankind. But this method it uses in constant connection with the psychological, which is the scientific investigation of the religious experience as it expresses itself in manifold objective forms. For the evaluation, interpretation, and rational estimate of what the scientific method discovers to be true, and for the synthetic construction of this truth, together with other truths, into a general system, the method of philosophy must be employed.

In a word, it is our purpose *reflectively to examine the conceptions and ideals of the religious life of humanity, in the light of their own origin, nature, and history, and of modern science and modern thought, in order to test and to refine them.* And we have been mindful of the declaration of Leibnitz, that he

studied science and history in order that he might speak with authority in philosophy and religion.

This conception of the correct method and real purpose of the philosophy of religion prevents us from making our point of departure the discussion of the opinions of other writers on the same subject. One cannot be unmindful of the inestimable services which Kant, Schleiermacher, and Hegel, as well as many another worthy name in ancient and in modern times, and in India as well as in Europe, have rendered to the reflective study of man's religious life and development. Nor can one approach a similar task with any confidence of a measure of success without some earnest effort to know and critically to estimate other views than one's own. It becomes all explorers to be especially mindful of the truth that no workman in so vast and difficult a field can succeed in any degree without using the implements furnished to his hand by previous workmen in the same field; or even stand at all in his own chosen place unsupported by the invisible hands of many predecessors. But however one may be helped and instructed by the failures and the successes of writers in the past, the real *basis* for the structure of a philosophy of religion at the present time cannot be found, and should not be sought for, in the domain of speculation, as such,—however instructive and true. The real basis is rather to be found in *the religious experience of the race*. Here, as elsewhere, if we are seeking foundations for philosophizing to good purpose,—Yes! here preëminently, on account of the very nature of religion, the experience of the race must furnish the ground of standing for the reflective thought and critical conclusions of the individual mind.

CHAPTER II

DIFFICULTIES AND BENEFITS

The difficulties which lie across the pathway of the student of the phenomena of man's religious life and development, with a view to construct a philosophy of religion, are indeed many and great. For this study encounters all the obstacles belonging to the investigations of comparative religion, and of the history and psychology of religion, together with added difficulties arising from the attempt to apply the critical and constructive method of philosophy to the data furnished by these sciences. This branch of philosophical discipline, since, like all philosophical inquiry, it seeks to arrive at universal principles and to throw light upon ultimate problems, cannot begin by examining any one religion as though it were *the* religion, exclusively or *par excellence*; nor can it end by examining all the positive religions descriptively, without making the attempt to integrate the results and to combine them harmoniously with the results of other branches of philosophical discipline, in some systematic view of the world and of human life. No wonder that so comprehensive and lofty an enterprise should encounter manifold obstacles at every step of its way!

The difficulty of ascertaining the facts concerning the religious experience of humanity is in part due to the comparatively recent character of the inquiry. These facts could not be known, so far as they are to be gathered from existing conditions or records, until modern discoveries and inventions had

made relatively easy foreign travel and residence, and so the comparative study of foreign affairs. Even Herodotus knew and remarked upon the truth that the earlier reports of travellers in foreign countries are in general untrustworthy. During the sixteenth, seventeenth, and early eighteenth centuries, the world in its newly discovered largeness was becoming rapidly known. But the facts regarding the more obvious truths of man's religious nature and history, as they came to the notice of the earlier explorers were generally misunderstood and largely misreported.

The mistakes and misconceptions which were the inevitable result of the newness and casual nature of the acquaintance with foreign religions thus obtained, were multiplied and made more difficult of detection by the almost complete lack of linguistic knowledge and skill on the part of these early explorers. How shall anyone know and interpret accurately the religious experiences of a tribe or nation whose language is foreign? The linguistic evidence adduced by the etymological methods, and in accordance with the etymological theories, of this earlier period, more often led the inquirers into vagaries of belief than it proved a safe guide to trustworthy conclusions as to the real nature of even the most patent facts. Different religions were *derived (sic)* from one another, and their most subtle and hidden faiths were interpreted and explained, by the easy-going but unsafe method of discovering fanciful etymological connections between the words for their divinities, or for the complex and variable conceptions in which their faiths were embodied. Through lack of psychological insight, and of that broader and more genial comprehension of the workings of the mind of savage and primitive men which modern anthropology, when pursued by the mixed psychological and historical method, possesses, the real truth was in this way seldom attained. For the *real* meaning of any name for a divinity, and the *real* nature of the religious conception or faith embodied or symbolized by any word, implies the whole mental

history and mental attitude of the people employing this name or this word. It cannot be claimed that, at the present time, those peculiar difficulties of ascertaining the facts of man's religious experience which the development of linguistic knowledge and skill alone can overcome, are not numerous and great. But, while the linguistic difficulties are increasing with the increase of the data needing examination, they are being gradually overcome by the increasing ability of scholars to avail themselves of these data. The discovery of the key to the hieroglyphics and the acquired ability to read the cuneiform inscriptions, which have accompanied the successful exploration of the buried remains of the Nile Valley and of the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates, are instances of great significance in this connection. The scientific knowledge of Sanscrit, which is a recent acquisition of western scholarship, stands in the relation of both cause and effect to the increased interest in, and knowledge of, the religions of India and of the Aryan peoples generally. To a less extent, the linguistic evidence concerning the Hebrew religion in its earlier stages, and concerning the popular beliefs and practices prevailing among the Palestinian and Syrian branches of the Semitic religions, is becoming enlarged and more trustworthy. But it is, perhaps, in the study of the dialects of rude and savage peoples that the greatest difficulties in the way of giving a trustworthy interpretation to their religious consciousness remain to be overcome. In this line of investigation scarcely any progress has hitherto been made; and little entirely trustworthy information is to be obtained. Yet anthropology—especially modern anthropology, with its claim to be a science placed upon secure inductive foundations—without any serious attempt to interpret, both scientifically and sympathetically, the language in which these peoples express their religious beliefs and sentiments, has too often built up a theory, not only as to the origin and development of religion among such rude and savage peoples, but also as to the nature, significance, and value of

religion in general. Perhaps the chief difficulties still waiting to be overcome, in order to understand and appreciate the facts with reference to the lower forms of man's religious development,—or, the rather, *to get at the real facts of the soul-life in which religion essentially consists*—are of the linguistic order. But the kind of scholarship and skill needed to overcome these difficulties is not merely grammatical and etymological; it is distinctly and chiefly psychological.

The more objective antiquarian researches, which are supposed to throw much light upon the origin, nature, and development of religion have their own peculiar temptations and special difficulties. No small part of the work done in these lines of research owes the burden of these difficulties largely to its recent character. The present extended interest in the antiquities of man, and in every form and product of race-culture, cannot fail, of course, to exercise an increasing influence upon the collection and interpretation of the facts of man's religious life and religious development. For, as will later on be made clearer, his religious experience and all other forms of race-culture, cannot be considered as independent, one of another. And we have already made it sufficiently clear, that any study of the philosophy of religion is in duty bound to welcome all the assured data which can be delivered to it by the explorers in the general field of anthropology. On the other hand, it is certain that very little of a trustworthy sort, has as yet been discovered by this method.

While, then, one may reasonably excuse archæological researches for the meagre contribution which they have hitherto made to the store of trustworthy data for a philosophy of religion, on account of the newness of these researches, one must be wary of the impulse to yield a too ready assent to their claims. "From the ancient grave-mounds," said J. Grimm,¹ "no intelligible voices, but only confused sounds, reach our ears." And though this declaration was made some years ago

¹ *Geschichte der Deutschen Sprache*, I, p. 797.

(in 1848), and its more immediate application was within a restricted field, we shall not be far out of the way if we extend its statement down to the present time, and out over the entire domain of objective, antiquarian researches. The testimony of the monuments of the neolithic age is meagre and uncertain. It goes to show, although not in a perfectly certain or very clear way, a prevalent belief in a future life; but little else, of either a negative or a positive character, with reference to man's religious beliefs and practices in this age, can be confidently inferred. The monuments of a later age, where dolls, ornaments, utensils, etc., are found buried, show an improvement in this belief—an advanced notion of a less gloomy and vague, and a more happy and distinctly human life after death; but they, too, so far as they are prehistoric, have little other trustworthy information to afford. It is possible, however, that more time being given, more of usable data may be acquired by antiquarian research. Although this hope is somewhat chastened by the consideration that fragmentary as are the records of the religious life in ancient Egypt (and we might also add, in Babylonia and Assyria), "the stock of original and trustworthy materials" actually in existence illustrative of this religion, is "more extensive than the corresponding materials extant for the religions of Palestine, Greece, or Rome."¹

Closely connected with this class of difficulties are those which arise from the prejudices of the explorers on the ground, whether skilled or unskilled; as well as of the scholars who, perhaps remaining at home themselves, aim to give scientific form to the data furnished by these explorers. Such prejudices may be either negative and opposed to accepting conclusions which have the consent of the current "orthodoxy," or positive and *a priori* assumptions in favor of alleged facts supposed to be favorable to this "orthodoxy." Both classes of prejudices are doubtless accentuated by the comparative newness of the investigations into the field of the world's religions

¹ See Renouf, Religion of Ancient Egypt (Hibbert Lectures, 1879), p. 26f.

by the scientific and philosophical method. As these investigations progress and the truths of fact become, in consequence, more apparent, all such influences prejudicial to scientific investigation and to calm and rational reflection, are destined to diminish, if not to pass away. It cannot be hoped, however, even were it desirable, that men should become indifferent to the answers which the facts justify in the case of a subject of so great ethical and practical importance.

In spite, then, of the recent earnest and successful efforts of scores of learned and competent inquirers, it is not strange that large fields of facts upon which the scientific and philosophical study of religion would gladly build, have not yet been rendered accessible; and that other fields, which are relatively easy of access, have as yet been only very superficially occupied and imperfectly explored. This statement is illustrated, as perhaps by no other one work, by the voluminous treatise of J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*. On the one hand, we find here the valid assumption greatly elaborated, that the primitive Aryan is not yet extinct; that "the popular superstitions and customs of the peasantry of Europe"—a hitherto not carefully explored field—afford one of "the fullest and most trustworthy sources of evidence which we possess as to the primitive religion of the Aryans."¹ On the other hand, there is no more conspicuous modern instance of the difficulty of ascertaining the exact facts of man's religious experience as well as of basing true views, not to say temporarily tenable hypotheses upon them, than the work of Frazer himself. Starting out to explain a single comparatively insignificant and obscure religious rite—the priest of Aricia—the author is led on to convert his hypothetical explanation into a theory which would account for all religion as arising out of magic. But

¹ Frazer himself affirms that these superstitions and customs are "by far the fullest and most trustworthy," etc. But we may well hesitate to take this distinction away from the oldest hymns of the Vedas. G. B., I, p. viif.

there are sufficient well-defined grounds, extending over almost all the religions of mankind, for declaring the theory which derives religion from magic quite untenable.¹

To those difficulties which are largely temporary, and which patient scientific investigation may hope in time largely to overcome, there are certain others which must be added that are due to the intrinsic nature of the facts themselves. The discovery, verification, classification, and interpretation of *these* facts—the facts of man's religious life and religious development—will never be freed from certain great difficulties peculiar to them. Such difficulties may be said to be “intrinsic,” because they belong to the characteristic nature of the phenomena to be investigated. Those who have endeavored, whether among uncivilized and savage peoples or among those civilized and highly cultured, to ascertain the exact facts respecting the popular religious experience know well what almost insuperable obstacles stand in the way of the inquiry. On the part of those who are being investigated there are always various influences which tend strongly to effect a concealment, or only partial disclosure of the facts. Of these influences some arise from that estimate which gives a sacred character or special value to all the phenomena of religion. Savages, even more, if possible, than men of refined culture, are shy about disclosing their religious beliefs and sentiments. The possession of the knowledge supposed to be embodied in the belief is something which has a peculiar worth in their sight. Even where the individual does not himself belong to the class who, like the magicians, priests, and oracles, of the religion, have a more or less tangible property interest in this kind of knowledge, it is a valuable asset, so to say, of the tribe, the clan, the religious community. To belong to those initiated into the secrets of the religious cult is also a matter of pride; such secrets are not to be revealed to others without reason,—least of all, just because

¹ This seems to be acknowledged in the Preface to the second edition, p. xvii.

these others have a scientific curiosity to know what the secrets are. On the other hand, the refined spirit feels an unwillingness to detail its spiritual experiences, on account of a sort of intrinsic spiritual worth which seems to belong to them. And, in general, among all classes of people, the most fluent and easily obtainable recitals of the alleged facts of religious belief and feeling are, as a rule, most untrustworthy as data for a scientific conclusion. Moreover, there are in many cases various fears—such as the fear of being outcasted or of saying something displeasing to the gods or to one's fellows (more especially, perhaps, to the religious authorities)—which greatly increase the difficulties of this sort. And, besides, the temptation to an only half-conscious hypocrisy is by no means confined to those who stand lowest in the scale of mental and moral development.¹

More especially, the phenomena of man's religious life and development, when regarded from the subjective and psychological point of view,—and, in the last analysis, one must always come to this point of view—are in themselves extremely difficult of ascertainment and description. This is due to the subtlety, complexity, and variety, of the conscious processes in which religion consists, and especially to the large amount of unanalyzed and unanalyzable feeling which enters into these processes. Even the most clear-sighted introspection of the intelligent and trained self-consciousness can never divest them of a certain air of mystery. The facts themselves are as the wind to the observer who knows nothing of modern meteorology: it “bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth.” An investigation which does not recognize and, in its conclusions

¹ This statement is strictly true of by far the greater part of confessional statistics of religious experiences, collected and handled in the name, and by the method, of so-called “modern psychology.” Many of these investigations have not even the scientific value of the spontaneous utterances of the “experience” meeting, or of the devil dances or exorcising ceremonies of Ceylon, etc.

take account of, these psychological characteristics of men's religious experience, does not discover the fundamental facts of religion. In some worthy sort and within limits, these are not abnormal phenomena, or indications of the essentially diseased character of the life of religion; on the contrary, they are the natural and normal characteristics of religion itself. But the normal characteristics are such as undoubtedly to enhance the difficulty of a precise determination of the particular facts upon which the psychology of man's religious consciousness must rely.

Many of these various difficulties may be illustrated as they exist in combination amongst the peoples of the lower stages of religious development, by the beliefs and practices of *tabu*; and amongst those of a higher degree of culture, by the doctrine of infallibility, whether this quality attaches itself to certain sacred writings, or to the priestly class, or to the organized religious community. If by *tabu* we understand "a system of restrictions on man's arbitrary use of natural things, enforced by the dread of supernatural penalties,"¹ we find instances of this practice among all so-called primitive peoples. But the mental attitude toward religion which this universal practice implies is more comprehensive and profound, and therefore more suggestive of the truth with which we are now dealing, than is the practice itself. Religion is, essentially considered, an experience which implies emotions, impulses, and cognate beliefs and forms of conduct, that do not admit of easy or obvious explanation when summoned to give full account of themselves before the bar of the ratiocinative faculties. If the particular *tabu* in question forbids the indulgence of the desire for physical possession of some thing, or for inquiring into some alleged truth, because of its holiness, its very nature is such that it does not know, or will not reveal, even if anyone claims to know, the rational grounds on which the command, "Thou shalt not, etc.," reposes. The justification of the belief that it is better to

¹ See W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*, p. 152f.

obey the prohibition than to disobey it is a secret. As soon as scientific curiosity is allowed to satisfy itself in the attempt to answer its inquiries, the peculiar character of the tabu is gone, and its peculiar power is also departed. While in existence, this feeling operates to protect the sanctuary, and the fetish or idol which either temporarily or more permanently affords a dwelling-place for the god, from closer inspection and critical scrutiny. Even if the fetish or idol is seen and handled in most familiar fashion, there is still something quite mysterious and concealed about the power which it can exercise, something not wholly calculable about the manner of the exercise of this power. And the same concealed and mysterious character is attributed everywhere by the religious consciousness to those incantations and magic formulas, those rites and ceremonies, in which the religious cult consists. The popular religions of India, and the religious beliefs, sentiments, and practices, of countless millions of the race outside of India, are to-day saturated and dominated by this confidence in the action of supernatural penalties to enforce prohibitions, or to reward compliances,—in a wholly unaccountable way. Now all this is material of the science and philosophy of man's religious life and development; and the difficulties of handling such material are intrinsic and unavoidable.

Another form of similar difficulties due to the intrinsic nature of the phenomena of man's religious life and development is connected with the claim to infallibility. Indeed, this claim not infrequently takes the form of an implied tabu: "Thou shalt not draw near to inquire curiously, or to examine critically this dogma or current opinion of religion;" but "Why not?" "Because the thing is sacred, or its opposite is unclean and polluting." This is essentially the same prohibition as that enforced by dread of supernatural penalties in the form peculiar to tabu. Now neither science nor philosophy can readily tolerate a denial of the right to investigate. Indeed, it belongs to the spirit and method of both to contemplate

with dissatisfaction every such form of restriction. And if the claim to infallibility implies the denial of the duty and the right of the human mind to investigate the facts of its own religious experience by the use of the scientific and philosophical method, it is involved in hopeless contradiction with the divinely given and inspired nature of the mind itself. For God made man "in his own image," and so fitted to seek after, find, and come into spiritual union with Himself—this is the great truth which the religious consciousness of the race has to teach; therefore man is in duty bound to strive to know his own religious Self.

It is quite too customary to assume that a scientific and philosophical examination of the phenomena of religion serves to explain away this class of difficulties, or that the rational development of the race wholly changes that aspect of man's religious experience which gives rise to these difficulties. But neither form of this assumption is true. The beliefs, sentiments, and practices of the most cultured and rational of man's religious developments continue to be largely of this same hidden, mysterious, and not wholly analyzable or explicable quality. In a certain justifiable meaning of the words we may say: It is of the essential nature of religion to be "*supernatural*." Surely the stirrings of consciousness by way of conviction, reverence, worship, and service, with which the most cultured and reasonable Theism greets the One and Perfect Ethical Spirit whom it calls God, are not less complex, profound, or difficult of scientific analysis and philosophical criticism than are the beliefs, feelings, and practices of the worshipper of a fetish, a sacred stone or animal, or of a deified ancestor. The most completely rationalized system of modern theology neither feels itself compelled, nor finds itself able, to submit to precisely the same rules of testing, or to admit precisely the same freedom of speculating, as belongs to the physical sciences or to the schools of philosophy when uninfluenced by ethical and religious considerations. Indeed, the *modus oper-*

andi of revelation, inspiration, religious conversion, prayer and its answer, and the spiritual edification of the devout believer, by divine influence, is quite as much an essentially concealed and mysterious affair in the sight of the advocate of any school of Christian theology, as is the operation of the supernatural power which enforces with its penalties, or with its rewards, the tabus, incantations, and magical formulas of the lowest species of religion.

In calling attention to those difficulties which are intrinsic and belong to the very nature of religion, we are far from wishing to depreciate the value of that rational treatment of the phenomena which the scientific and philosophical method commends and enforces. Indeed, as to the final question of method, and of the value of the results to be obtained by the right method, we wish at once and definitely to place ourselves upon rationalistic grounds. Only in doing this it must not be forgotten that the truly scientific method never overlooks the modifications of its use and of its conclusions which arise from the very character of the material to which it is applied. Religion is not irrational, nor are its experiential data irrational and therefore abnormal and diseased. In due time an abundance of evidence will be adduced in contradiction of such a view. But religion, like all the other most complex, subtle, and profound, developments of man's soul-life, in unceasing reaction upon his physical and social environment, and swayed and moved by powerful influences which come from the unconscious, the invisible, and the unknown realms that encompass this life, is not rationally treated, unless these, its essential and natural characteristics are constantly recognized and respected. Moreover, "reason" itself is not to be understood in the narrow and restricted way in which the word is too often employed both by the defenders and by the opponents of the effort to render religion rational.

Only here again it is neither rational, nor in accord with the spirit and method of science, to neglect the influence on our

judgments which is properly derived from the intrinsic nature of religion. For—to take the most extreme case—religion is naturally and essentially, in some sort, involved in a claim of infallibility. Strictly speaking, indeed, the infallible—the judgment that is absolute and never to be questioned or revised—is not for human reason to pronounce. Reasonable, and happy in his reasonableness, is he who once for all acknowledges this truth, and abandons his search for what it is hopeless to try to attain. But who knows all this better than the expert student of the method and the results of human science and human philosophy? Is not science itself a continual process of correcting errors, of modifying generalizations to include newly observed exceptions, and so of constant approximation toward the ideal of absolute truth? And what better or more trustworthy is the best reasoned system of philosophy than a fairly harmonious (or not too obviously and distinctly self-contradictory) body of opinions upon those problems of nature and man which will never receive their final and infallible solution? A certain satisfaction, which comes in the form of personal convictions and which presents itself with an authority difficult to trace historically, or to justify on wholly scientific grounds, belongs, however, to the essential characteristics of religious experience. To communicate this satisfaction, and thus to justify these convictions, is not possible without the awakening of an experience which is largely similar. When the experience comes, or if it has been had in the past, the felt satisfaction and the confirmed convictions render the justifying proof in a measure less necessary. For like everything else which man knows, the sources of its evidence lie implicate in experience.

In religion it is possible, then, by the use of the methods of historical and psychological science to discover and, in a measure to explain, the satisfactions and convictions which belong to all forms and degrees of man's religious experience; and also to evaluate the different satisfactions and the conflicting con-

victions. But even this task is made peculiarly difficult, partly because the facts are essentially obscure and mysterious, and partly because the influence of the investigator's own judgments of value is so preponderating. Thus the very claims to a supernatural origin and ground, and to infallibility, which the different religions make in so conflicting a way, on the one hand, greatly increase the difficulties of the inquiry; but on the other hand, the recognition and the testing of these claims is an essential part of the task of the philosophy of religion, since the claims themselves are essential factors in the phenomena of religious experience.

Enough, and perhaps more than enough, has already been said to signalize the difficulties which beset the path of him who aspires to a so-called "science of religion."¹ But after the material has been gathered and subjected to the preliminary scientific treatment which it, at one and the same time, so imperatively needs and yet makes so exceedingly difficult, there are other obstacles to be met which concern more especially the use of the reflective and philosophical method in the discussion of this material. Even the genial and irenic spirit which should characterize and guide the pursuit of this branch of philosophy has its own peculiar difficulties.

If we may consider as one of the earliest, the attempt of Plutarch "to form a consistent body of doctrine" out of the

¹ For these and other reasons we cannot accept the confidence expressed in such statements as the following from Réville and Burnouf. Says the former (*The Native Religions of Mexico and Peru*, edition of 1884, New York, p. 3*f.*): "The law of continuity is no less rigorously applicable to the successive evolutions of the human mind than to the animal and vegetable transformations of the physical world." And Burnouf goes so far as to declare (*La Science des Religions*, p. 8): "Tel est le fond solide sur lequel repose la science des religions. Comme on le voit, elle ne le cède point en valeur aux autres sciences d'observation; elle occupe, par sa méthode, une place marquée près de l'histoire et de la linguistique, touchant d'un autre côté à la philosophie." On the whole subject see Lecture VI of Max Müller's *Anthropological Religion*, with the title: "The Untrustworthiness of the Materials for the Study of Religion."

“heterogeneous and chaotic materials of the popular faith of his day, and of its past,” we find in his trials and failures an illustration of this class of difficulties. To this writer in antiquity the inconsistencies and contradictions with one another, as well as the internal inconsistencies and self-contradictions of the different religions with which he was acquainted, were only too obvious. And even if one sought only for the truly “ancient and hereditary faith,” one found the philosophers, the poets, and the legislators (the latter prescribing and enforcing certain rites and ceremonies connected with the welfare of the state) by no means in agreement with one another.¹ How, then, shall harmony be attained and unity sought? and, What principle of judgment, what final criterion shall attempt to put an end to this strife? The principle which Plutarch adopts is that Reason must be the final Judge; or, to use his own metaphor, Philosophy must be our Mystagogue to theology, and must be accepted as essentially and unalterably true.

But how shall we understand the nature of reason itself, and how justify its claims to the place of supreme judge and final arbiter? This is the question which the modern inquirers into religion by the critical and reflective method find it supremely difficult to answer. With Plutarch “reason” means, what it means with the average culture of to-day, nothing more definite, profound, or trustworthy, than “the general taste and good sense of the educated man.” Now *Reason*, as the modern demands oblige us to understand the term, means something more and higher than this. What this something more is, and what is the authority which reason possesses in matters of religious as well as other forms of experience, constitutes the

¹ Compare the examples which may be gathered from the treatise, *De Placitis Philosophorum*, especially, lib. i, 879–881 and following,—a work, however, which cannot be quoted as giving Plutarch’s views. See Oakesmith, *The Religion of Plutarch*, p. 62f.; from which admirable work the quotations are taken.

most profound, difficult, and complex problem of modern philosophy. In any examination of the necessary method of studying the data of man's religious life and development, with a view to arrive at a rational system of principles, the difficulty must be met and, as far as possible, overcome. The more approved view of the sources and guarantees of religious belief, and of the legitimate values of the religious feeling, will make it clear that the nature and limitations of reason in arriving at a philosophy of religion are both more comprehensive and more restricted than was provided for in Plutarch's use of rational methods.

On the one hand, the epistemological branch of philosophical discipline must cope with all the problems over which dogmatic agnosticism, or an invincible scepticism, stands in opposition to the confidence that any philosophy of religion at all is possible. Here the "general taste and good sense of the educated man" is by no means sufficient, or even particularly well fitted, to bring about a happy issue. Culture and rational views of the nature and limits of knowledge are not always found together. But, on the other hand, the popular beliefs, sentiments, and practices, as these are gathered from all quarters of the world and from all ages and stages of the evolution of the race religiously, both evince the authority of reason and assist us in enforcing its legitimate claims. The voice of reason, as it arises from the profound and multitudinous depths of human experience, although its dicta are usually much confused and hard to interpret, when consulted, criticized, and reverently but freely treated by the mind trained in analytic and constructive philosophy, is more likely to bear to the soul a message of truth, than are the conventional utterances of a class that is too often separated from the larger life of humanity by a self-conceited claim to a superior culture. Pity and sympathy with the experiences of the race, therefore, have claims upon reason; they are themselves rational exercises of the human mind. And religious faith, however concealed and perverted

by mythological ideas and superstitious practices, is a persistent and essential "moment" in the life and development of mankind. Nor can the legitimate practical outcome of an attempt to treat religion philosophically be the displacement of existing religions by irreligion, or by scepticism, or by indifference and neglect, to the unsettling of political and social foundations; for the ultimate purpose of the attempt—difficult of execution as it will prove to be—is the better and more rational appreciation of the worth and essential truthfulness of man's religious experience.

A recent writer on this subject,¹ after raising the question of the possibility of perfect impartiality and of the avoidance of all polemics, concludes that the pretence of neutrality in the discussion of the greater problems of religion is usually either not well founded and borne out by the facts, or else is hypocritical. Both the traditional and the naturalistic schools are habitually guilty, he thinks, in this respect. There is, however, what this writer calls a "true impartiality." "It consists in not making more use of polemics than is necessary, and in making this use honorably; it consists in not being dogmatic except where we have knowledge;—without falling into fanaticism and without withdrawing ourselves from the true scientific method." The same author also contends that in meeting these inherent difficulties any writer is entitled to certain *a priori* principles, in the use of which he has a confidence that is, at least, partially established on grounds which lie outside of the field of religious phenomena.

It should be the investigator's purpose, then, to meet the inherent difficulties as they occur, in the spirit of a true impartiality. This guarantees, on the one hand, a profound respect for the truths witnessed to by the common human consciousness; and, on the other hand, a fixed intention never to depart from the use of scientific methods in the form in which

¹ Abbé de Broglie, *Problèmes et Conclusions de L'Histoire des Religions*, p. xiiif.

they apply to this class of inquiries. But if any success is to be met in overcoming these difficulties as they increase in number and magnitude across his pathway, he must also make free use of certain conclusions respecting the subject in whose experience religion essentially consists. Of these conclusions the most important are the following: (1) The conception of the Self, as not merely a psychical mechanism, absolutely dependent upon the antecedent or the concomitant forms of the functioning of the nervous system, and therefore strictly determined in its activities by the place it occupies in its physical and social environment; (2) a confidence in man's rational powers to attain a valid, though constantly more comprehensive and accurate cognition of Reality; (3) a confidence in the authority, value, and objective validity of the ethical and æsthetical Ideals of humanity; and thus (4) a rational conviction of the possibility, as man's experience heightens and broadens, of attaining a more and more harmonious and satisfying apprehension of the Object of religious belief and worship. In a word, the Being of the World may be conceived of, on grounds of experience and with the authority of reason, so as to satisfy the religious needs of the human Self. From this it follows that the obligation to take a certain attitude toward this Object, which rests upon the human Self, may be justified by reason as having its ground in experience.

So far as these principles are preliminary to work in the field of the philosophy of religion we borrow them as assumptions from investigations previously made (see note p. 24). So far as they must all—and especially the last (4)—find their completer justification in the success which they meet when specifically applied to the phenomena of religion, they remain to be explained and tested in connection with the various problems which await consideration.

It would seem as though the Value of a study of the religious life and development of humanity would be too obvious to be called in question, and too great to be overlooked. The

truth of history, however, compels the admission that such has not been the case. The reasons why the faulty estimate of this branch of philosophy has been so often made, are found partly in the nature of the subject, and partly in the preparation of writers in this field; but, even more largely, the reasons are found in wrong views as to what philosophy may legitimately attempt and more or less successfully perform. But to the inquirer with insight into the nature of both religion and philosophy there can be no doubt as to the preëminent importance and value of the effort to effect a rational combination of the interests represented by both.

For, indeed, the impulses which give rise to religion and those which result in philosophy, as well as the needs to which the two minister satisfaction, and also the thoughts, conceptions, and ideals which both cherish, have common roots deep down within the soul of man. Without the metaphysical instinct, and the conclusions and postulated truths at which the mind of man arrives by impulsion from this instinct, there could be no form of religion whatever. A non-metaphysical religious being is an absurdity, a contradiction in terms. It is in the needs and activities of man's "ontological consciousness" that both religion and philosophy so largely have their rise. And no development of religion could take place without the critical and analytic, as well as the speculative and constructive work of philosophy. Without it, the lower forms of religion could never have risen to the monotheistic stage; nor could monotheism itself ever have attained the higher stages of its own belief. Religion never has dealt and does not now deal, *solely* with "practical interests," in the narrower meaning of these words. Religion has never been, and is not now, *merely* concerned with securing the direct ethical and social well-being of man. It is now, and always has been, an ontological explanation of important human experiences, a theory—if you will—as to the origin and happenings of physical events and of the being and mental life of man.

It must also be remembered that religion, in its relation to the sources, sanctions, and ideals of ethics, proposes a metaphysical solution for every important ethical problem. The ancient Jews are not unjustly accused of having been dull and slow in speculative philosophy. But the postulate of One ever-living God, the Ground and Guarantor of righteousness, is, however it came to ancient Judaism, a triumph of the ontological and speculative over the merely empirical consciousness. And Christian theology cannot well dispense with the genial judgment of Clement of Alexandria:¹ "Perhaps philosophy was given to the Greeks directly and primarily, till the Lord should call the Greeks." Philosophy is indeed as necessary in religion as everywhere else; its imperative mission is to (1) harmonize the actual facts with the persistent ideals of humanity, and (2) to unite the subjective and historical aspects and truths of human experience with the objective and universal.

This opinion of the value of the attempt, in general, at a philosophy of religion may be further enhanced by considering how much of stimulus to intellectual curiosity the phenomena of religion furnish; and how much of gravity, dignity, and practical importance belongs to the questions with which religion deals. To treat these questions otherwise than with grave, dignified, and prolonged reflection, with a view to bring our answers into harmony with all our other most important and persistent experiences, is to treat them unworthily. Baron Bunsen considered religion to be one of the two poles about which in its primitive condition human life revolves. To understand the development of man religiously is necessary in order to understand man at all. And only by this study can one gain the higher, nobler, and more influential appreciation of the solidarity of the race, or prepare oneself to enter with full, intelligent sympathy into the experience of the race. Such a study will, for example, secure an attitude at once apprecia-

¹ Stromatum, I, v and xiii.

tive and scientific toward that lowest form of the religious experience of man which appears in the vagaries, superstitions, and absurdities of an "unreflecting spiritism." It will certainly prevent any investigator of this, or of any other stage in man's religious development, from concluding rashly as to the truth conveyed,—“The great intellectual movement of the last two centuries has simply thrown it aside as worthless”;¹ or from following, for example, such mistakes as those of the Greek comedians and the devout Christian Fathers regarding the zoölatry of the Egyptians.

The explorer in the fields of comparative religion and of the psychology of the religious consciousness frequently meets with all sorts of inconsistent and contrary beliefs existing not only side by side in the social and religious community, but even within the same individual experience. For men's religious beliefs are seldom arranged in form to satisfy the demands of logic; and the student must constantly remember the almost unlimited capacity of the human mind for entertaining these beliefs, with little or no appreciation of their real nature. The slow and as yet most imperfect development of rationality in man is an astonishing fact. Even to-day the most pious people in the most advanced civilization, so-called, have not infrequently the minimum amount of well-ordered judgment on matters of fact and truth in science and philosophy; and men notable in scientific and philosophical circles are by no means always distinguished for piety and good sense in religious affairs. Still more difficult of compliance is the exhortation always to bear in mind the intense, confused, and wearisome, but not unfruitful or hopeless struggle by which humanity has reached those ethical, æsthetical, and social conceptions and sentiments, which are so essentially connected with the higher development of religion.

But by perseverance, with devout spirit and philosophic temper, under the guidance of the right psychological and

¹ See Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, I, p. 156 (1st Am. ed.).

epistemological conceptions and postulates, the student of the philosophy of religion may hope to discover those truest, æsthetically noblest, and morally most purifying and helpful conceptions and principles, whose germs lie, indeed, in much which to the uninstructed mind seems most erroneous, unworthy, and debasing. For the guidance from that Ideal toward which the evolution of the race is moving, and which is, essentially considered, a Self-manifestation of Spiritual Reality, makes clear much which would otherwise be left quite in the dark.

For such a study as the philosophy of religion proposes, in spite of all its inherent difficulties, the present age would seem to make upon all thoughtful minds some peculiarly urgent demand. Is not this age well described in the following words? "To a generation which had thought itself able to find repose in positivism in philosophy, utilitarianism in morals, and naturalism in matters of art and poetry, there is succeeding a generation which is tormented more than ever by the mystery of things, which is attracted by the ideal, and which dreams of social fraternity, of self-renunciation, and of devotion to the weak, the miserable, the oppressed, even to the limits set by the heroism of Christian love."¹ Of this study above all, then, we may say that it affords the only hope of effecting a rational reconciliation of the scientific and philosophic spirit of the modern age with its moral and religious ideals.

¹ Sabatier, *Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion*, p. v.

CHAPTER III

THE STANDARD OF RELIGIOUS VALUES

It is an instructive fact that men generally find it difficult or impossible to take toward the subject of religion an attitude of indifference or of unemotional and purely scientific inquiry. On the contrary, religious beliefs and ceremonies are customarily regarded with feelings of approbation or disapprobation, which tend to become of a somewhat intense ethical or æsthetical character. The religious experience is, indeed, often somewhat hyperæsthetical. Even the most consistent agnostic of to-day is almost sure to regard all positive religion either scornfully or sadly—thus showing the same tendency to an emotional attitude toward the subject which characterizes the religious devotee. This attitude, however, is not so much due to the intellectual weaknesses of humanity, or to the unscientific insincerity of the average attempt at an unprejudiced search for “pure” truth in religion—“the truth for its own sake”; it is rather due to the very nature of religion itself and of the claims which the religious experience always makes upon the mind and heart of man. For religion is essentially an affair, in large measure, of ethical and æsthetical emotions. On this account, and more especially because of the relations in which its beliefs and cult are supposed to stand toward both the lower and the higher interests of human life and human destiny, it necessarily claims to have value, to be a thing of worth.

Now since this claim to have value arises from the essential nature of religion in general, and since in fact there are many and varied sorts of religions, comparisons of value are inevi-

table in the study of the religious life and development of man. The different, greater positive religions all are wont to insist—each one—that they have as their peculiar possession, either the only true and valuable, or the only absolutely true and supremely valuable, content of truth and way of life for their disciples. Even in the case of the lower forms of religion, the same judgment of a preferential value is constantly asserting itself. To the fetish worshipper his particular fetish—evanescent, debased, and absurd, as it may seem to others, when regarded as the temporary abode of deity—has, for the time being and the purpose in mind, a peculiar worth. To the totem worshipper, it is the totem of his tribe, or family, or his individual totem, that has worth above all others. And of course, the individual ancestor, chief, or hero, who is deified and worshipped, is endowed for that very purpose with special powers and honors. In the ancient Egyptian religion, each locality had *its own* divinity; the claims for reverence and bounteous offerings of the local and chthonic gods were based upon the peculiar protection and care given to the locality. In the earlier developments of the Babylonian religion, it is the god of the principal city, or of the great conqueror, who has gained prestige and honor above others. With Nebuchadnezzar I, it is Marduk who stands above all other gods; and Rā with Rameses II. While the “first word” of Yahweh (Ex. xx. 3) to the people with whom he proposes to make a covenant is: “Thou shalt have no other gods beyond—meaning besides me” (in the LXX, *πλὴν ἐμοῦ*). The very essence of the Roman religion provides that each householder shall have, if he will honor and foster them in a special way, gods that are his very own. The greater world-religions—Islam, Buddhism, and Christianity—are to-day, each one as earnestly as ever, claiming to offer the safest and surest way of salvation, the most certain and rational content of truth, the supremest satisfaction to the needs of the human soul.

The moment, then, any inquiry into the religious life and

development of man begins to make comparisons, it is forced into the use of some standard of values. The conception of religion and of the task before the student of the philosophy of religion will, indeed, prevent him from prematurely dividing the different religions into the false and the true; or from arbitrarily ranking them one above another in the order merely of their sequence in time or of their relative position in the favor of certain social classes and political divisions. But to regard with indifference the standards of intellectual sanity and reasonableness, when, for example, comparing the worship of the "godlings of disease" and the "godlings of the village" in India with the worship of the God of Theism in Europe; or to neglect the standards of physical and moral purity, when comparing the phallic worship of ancient Syria and of Old Japan with the worship of the righteous Yahweh or of the God whom Jesus proclaimed as the Father and Redeemer from sin—this would be as unscientific as it is unavailing. Religious beliefs and doctrines, like all other beliefs and doctrines, must be tested by some sort of standard; they must, at least provisionally, be regarded as more or less credible and practicable, more or less rational and true. Religious sentiments and emotions, like all other sentiments and emotions, have varying degrees of acceptableness, which depend upon their conformity to the eudæmonistic, æsthetic, and moral ideals of man; they must, therefore, have their worth tested in submission to the standard set by these ideals. Preëminently true is it that religious conduct, like all other conduct, is a moral concernment; and even the bare conception of morality implies some attempt at an authoritative estimate of values by application of an ideal standard.

We must, then, discover in certain fundamental value-judgments our authority for setting up standards by which to estimate the comparative worth of different religious beliefs, sentiments, and practices. And the different claims of the different religions to appreciation and allegiance must be made to

depend upon the way in which they conform to these standards. From the philosophic point of view this method of procedure is especially indispensable. Without it, no theory of development, with its different stages of religious progress, is possible. By the candid and patient use of this method one becomes capable of cheerfully complying with the edict, No. 12, of King Asoka: "There ought to be reverence for one's own faith, and no reviling of that of others." Whenever any religion—as, for example, at the present time Christianity in the most notable way—urges its claim to universality and finality, the investigator is thus prepared to resist the temptation inconsiderately either to accept or to reject the claim; but if he accord his assent and obedience, this attitude is of greater practical value, because the better founded in the entire rational nature of man.

Those value-judgments which, being common to all men, must set the standard for the comparative and critical study of religions, have reference to four aspects of human experience. These are truth, beauty, morality, and happiness. Truth has value; beauty has value; moral goodness, or conformity to the ideal of conduct, has value; and the happiness, which is somehow subjectively connected with truth, beauty, and goodness, has value. These valuables are interrelated and interdependent; but no one of them can be so resolved into any other, as to identify the two or destroy the peculiar worth of either. It follows, then, that we necessarily test religions in general as well as any particular religion, by their *rationality*; meaning by this, their conformity to human experience of fact and law and to the higher and more enduring æsthetical sentiments and moral convictions. Nor can we omit from this standard of rationality, the support rendered by religion to upright living on the part of the individual and to the improvement of society; in fine, the amount of the satisfaction afforded to all the more persistent and worthy needs of human nature. The fact that the particular value-judgments pronounced by men

upon all these aspects of human experience are themselves subject to development, and are variable in their nature, and that the ideals whose authority the judgments respect, are themselves in a process of growth and change, while, as has already been explained, it enhances the difficulty of the task, does not absolve us from the necessity, or diminish the benefits, of a persistent attempt to apply these judgments to the phenomena of religion. Religious ideals, like all other ideals, seem to possess an unconditional worth for man's rational well-being and progress; but the particular judgments made under them, and the more precise determinations of their character, are in a never-ceasing process of development.

On combining such considerations as these with the considerations already presented concerning the nature and method of the philosophy of religion, we are led to speak of three classes of tests, or standards of value, which may be applied to this subject. They are the psychological, the historical, and the more peculiarly speculative and ideal.

By the psychological test, with its application of value-judgments to the phenomena of man's religious life and religious progress, we mean the degree of perfection with which any particular religion expresses the different functions, and satisfies the different needs, of man's religious being. A detailed psychological examination will be necessary to determine more precisely just what these functions and needs are. It may be affirmed in this connection, however, that religion is an affair which involves and calls forth, in its own somewhat peculiar way, the total psychical life of man. Since, then, religion is a belief which aims to grow into a certified knowledge, that knows its own foundations, and as well, its own limits, the intellectual activities must be aroused, expressed, and as far as possible progressively satisfied, in order that any particular form of belief may most successfully bear the test of this class of value-judgments. It is, indeed, possible to regard the demand of Emerson as an unattainable ideal: "The religion which is to

guide and fulfil the present and coming ages, whatever else it is, must be intellectual. The scientific mind must have a faith which is science." It is pertinent to criticise as extreme the position of Hegel who, in his confidence in the power of human reason to reproduce the process of the eternal and absolute Reason, seemed to regard his own *Logik* as the veritable history of God's Spiritual Evolution, and the writing of this *Logik* as a sufficiently acceptable act of worship. Doubtless it is also true, as Eucken¹ has well said, that "the truth of religion will be established in a different way from that of scientific cognition." But, on the other hand, the mind of man is so constituted—and if we accept the tenet of religion which affirms the making of man "in the divine image," it is by God himself so constituted—that one standard of the worth of all religious beliefs must be their seeming truthfulness, their conformity in some sort to the rational demands of the human intellect. Monstrous credulities and incredible beliefs have, indeed, always existed and do still exist in religion. But the progress of man's intellectual development, with the estimate of worth which it places upon the rational conformity of religious beliefs to the truths confirmed by the sum-total of human experience, steadily operates in their disfavor. Even the false tests which were applied by the early orthodoxy of Christianity are being displaced by the spreading of a justifiable respect for the legitimate demands that belief should be related to evidence, and that the needs of the intellect in the function of assent should not wholly be left out of the account. That religion can flout at science, and disregard the call for any universally appreciable proof, is not a tenet that can give support to religion in the more mature stages of its claim to satisfy the whole soul of man.² Indeed, what one writer has called the "extravagance of Christianity" in this re-

¹ *Der Wahrheitsgewalt der Religion*, p. 394f.

² The extremer form of this denial of right to the intellect in its inquiry into religious beliefs was advocated by Tertullian: *De Carne Christi*, 5. *Et mortuus est Dei filius; prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est. Et sepultus*

gard can no longer be charged against it in the same way. Neither can the view which Cicero assigns to Cotta,¹ who believes in the national religion as a Roman while doubting or denying it as a philosopher, maintain itself with the more intelligent classes under the changed conditions of modern political life. Even that theory of "Two-fold Truth" which, as says Owen,² was accepted "without hesitation by all the foremost teachers in Italy during the sixteenth century," cannot long survive in an age of earnest and honest religious illumination.

On the other hand, just as the entire soul of man is not exhausted in the form of intellectual functions, nor is his complete means of arriving at or expressing the truths of his experience limited to the logical processes, so the standards by which his estimate of the value of the satisfactions afforded by religion are not wholly of the intellectual order. Man requires of religion something more and other than to be, for him, one of the exact or empirical sciences. That these sciences themselves, as well as every other form of human knowledge, whether popular or systematically arranged, are not matters in which the determination of the judgment is a *merely* intellectual affair, is an epistemological proposition which should be destined to become a commonplace. Feelings, choices directed toward ethical and practical ends, and ideals of an æsthetical and spiritual character, influence the methods and the conclusions of every form of human scientific endeavor. But especially in religion do the emotional and practical factors, and the inspiration and guidance of distant or unrealizable ideals, constitute the important and even essential factors. Belief in the invisible, the superhuman, the spiritual, with all the sentiments and practices which this belief occasions or from which it results, is of the very essence of religion.

resurrexit; certum est, quia impossibile est. Of a much milder form is the saying of Augustine: *Ut crederetur quod non demonstrabatur.*

¹ De Natura Deorum, iii.

² Sceptics of the Italian Renaissance (2d ed.), p. 186.

Arranged according to the scale of values thus set up, those who like the natives of Northern India worship with gross fears the Bhûts,¹ or malignant spirits emanating from men who have died a violent death, or like the populace of Ceylon strive by magic to overcome, and by bloody sacrifices to propitiate, an endless variety of harmful deities, must stand far below those who have attained to that reverence for the Divine Being which is the beginning of wisdom, or that perfected love of God which banishes all fear. But comparative religion shows clearly that even those lowest in the scale of race-culture possess also the social feeling of desire for communion on terms of good fellowship with their gods. The worship of the intoxicating personified *Soma*, the picture of Indra drinking its sweet juice, and the cult in which gods and men get drunk together, exhibit this element of social feeling in the earlier forms of the Aryan religion. The identification of the yellow *soma*-plant with the yellow moon, and the sacred hymns addressing the divinity in terms which, to the sober intellect seem absurd (whether applied to plant or luminary) are feats of the same extravagant mythologizing fancy, which when it becomes a chastened imagination is essential to all religious faith and religious cult. These same feelings, and all other religious feelings, together with this activity of the image-making faculty, are found wherever man, the subject of religion, is found. The satisfactions which religion affords to them must, therefore, be taken into the account whenever any attempt is made to understand the phenomena of this side of human life from the psychological point of view. But to the character of these feelings, and to the form which the activity of the imagination takes in the pictorial representation of the object of religious faith, the appropriate value-judgment must be rigorously applied. Its application points out that some fears are more selfish and base than others; but some kind of fear of the Invisible is in-

¹ See W. Crooke, *The Popular Religion and Folk-Lore of Northern India*, I, p. 234f.

separable from the realization of the highest rationality in man. In this way we discover that the æsthetic feeling of awe with which the human soul greets the mysterious immensity of nature's forces and spaces, and the sentiment of admiration which belongs to the appreciation of the worth of her laws, are closely akin to the religious emotions. Indeed, when directed toward the Object of religious faith, these feelings *are* religious emotions. And when we are searching for correct answers to the value-judgments, these religious emotions can claim a certain authority and right to satisfaction, that bears some just proportion to the place which they occupy in the scale of æsthetic appreciation.

The history of man's religious progress shows how dependent this progress has been for its choicest and most beneficent factors upon his growth in the intelligence, purity, and strength of the moral consciousness, or "conscience" in the most comprehensive meaning of this term. To the unawakened or gross moral feeling and limited imagination of the savage or uncivilized man, those gods are best and most to be cultivated, which, however bad their own moral character may be and however reprehensible morally the methods of their government, may be expected to affect most favorably the immediate physical interests of their worshippers. It is doubtful, indeed, whether the charge of actually, in and of its own influence, debasing and corrupting the public morals can, so often as is customary, be made with truth against the tenets and beliefs of religion. But, however this may be, there is no doubt about the close relationship which always has existed, and which essentially exists, between morals and religion. From this it follows that those judgments of worth which belong to the very nature of man's ethical development are of necessity transferred to his religious life and religious development. A religion whose conception of the Divine Being, and of his relations to the universe and especially to the race of men, is not satisfying to the most cultivated moral consciousness cannot maintain in the

face of moral enlightenment, its claims to allegiance, whether of head, heart, or life. For with the individual, or with the people, that is best entitled to judge the worth of the claims of religion, there is no other standard of judgment more nearly absolute and supreme than the one erected and maintained by the moral consciousness. The God who will satisfy this demand of the human soul must be a righteous God; he must, indeed, be conceived of as a perfect ethical Spirit. To refuse this satisfaction is to create a schism between the demands of the moral consciousness and those of the religious consciousness; the schism must somehow be healed before a completely satisfied soul can be realized.

It is just in this connection, however, that another form of the application of the psychological test to religion comes before our notice. It is a simple matter of historical fact that what theologians call the "consciousness of sin" has somehow been awakened, and has more and more pervaded and possessed the human race, in connection with its religious development. This form of religious experience undertakes, so to say, to join ontologically and indissolubly the moral and the religious attitudes of man toward his environment and toward his destiny. As the conceptions formed of the gods, or of the One God, rise in the scale of ethical grandeur, strenuousness, and purity, the consciousness of non-conformity and of separateness deepens and greatens in the human soul. In tracing the development of religion, and in fixing the important and essential relations between morality and religion, we shall have frequent occasion to see the truth of this statement. What imperative demands for satisfaction are created by the rising and intensifying consciousness of wrongdoing and wrong character as an offence against, and a cause of separation from, the perfect ethical Spirit of God! Thus a new class of needs and demands for satisfaction affords a new standard, by whose judgment of value the different forms of religion may be afforded some valid test. This test is accomplished when it is shown how far, and

how truthfully, any particular religion proves in experience its adaptation and its power to heal this schism. The plan of any religion for satisfying the longings for moral purification and redemption, and for effectuating that purpose which is finest in all the more highly developed religions,—namely, the accomplishment of a satisfying union between man and his God—is its so-called “Way of Salvation.”

Without dwelling more in detail upon the nature of these psychological tests, and of the different value-judgments which arise when a comparative view of different religions is proposed, we may affirm again the necessity of their use. If it be true, as one writer¹ has asserted, that the science of religion does not “aim to set up any other standard than past experience by which to measure the claims” of any particular religion (although we do not see how any “science” can originate from data to the arrangement of which no tests of sanity or truthfulness are applied), the same assertion can never be accepted, even in a preliminary and introductory view, by the philosophy of religion. *Philosophy deals with value-judgments*; and one class of its tests for the worth of religion in general, and of each particular religion, must always be found in the value of the satisfactions afforded to the human soul. When transformed into the language of the religious experience, this is equivalent to saying that every religion may properly be tested by the character of the salvation which it offers to man, and by its efficiency in procuring for man the entrance upon, and successful pursuit of, the true and highest “way of salvation.”

But even this more definitively psychological method of testing the values of the religious experience of humanity cannot be considered as a merely individual affair. It is true that the religious experience is always so preëminently subjective and individual as to make every individual’s judgment of its worth largely dependent upon what it has proved itself *worth to him*. And any form of religion that, taken in the large, admits of a

¹ Brinton, *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, p. 3.

sort of unity under which great numbers of individuals are willing to be classified, and also admits of such specific differentiation as to fit itself in some special way to every individual soul among these great numbers, is thereby better adapted to fulfill the functions of religion in general. On the other hand every religion is also a social affair, and religion in general is an affair of humanity. All the greater religions are historical religions; and this very fact, which is a factor essential to their very nature and to their conquest of considerable portions of the human race, makes them subject to historical tests. This is to affirm that appropriate value-judgments apply to religion in general, and to each particular religion, which may serve to establish its place as a historical development. We may properly demand to know of each claimant to our attention and our confidence: What are you worth as an historical development, as one essential "moment" in the complex evolution of the life of humanity?

This method of applying a standard of values to the phenomena of man's religious life and religious development will chiefly concern these three particulars: (1) The value of the historical data on which reliance must be placed for our knowledge of the facts and doctrines that determine the essential content of religious faith, and the main features of its difference from other religions; (2) the value which is evinced by the power of the religion to win adherence, to sustain itself amidst changes in its physical and social environment, and to command the "witness" to its worth for different races and eras of history; and (3) the value which shows itself in the capacity for self-reform and in the ability to keep pace with, and materially to contribute toward, the improved culture and social condition of the race.

That the greater religions of the world present themselves, as having their origins and guarantees in certain facts of history, and as showing a certain power to undergo an historical development amidst more or less important changes in their

physical and social environment, is a truth which needs no special research to establish. Mythical and legendary elements, extravagant or mistaken proffers of evidence to warrant confidence in their tenets, and unverifiable claims to credence and to authority, belong to the origin of all these religions. These more primitive factors, as well as various accretions of like character, continue to be found connected with the historical development of them all. Notwithstanding this, however, the so-called "world-religions" evince their marked superiority over both the so-called "natural" religions and also those more purely speculative constructions of religious beliefs and practices which rest upon no historical basis. In a word, *historicalness* is a characteristic of religion which brings every claimant to our credence and our allegiance before the standard of a new set of value-judgments.

To illustrate this quality, with the value attaching to it, we may instance, among the ancient religions, Judaism; and above all other religions, Christianity. Of the historical records of the former—especially, of course, the records concerning its origins and earlier developments—all that has been said above is in a measure true. The historical writings of the Old Testament are not entirely free from those imperfections and even graver faults of an historical character which are shown by all the accounts given of the origins and early development of the other ancient religions. But the relative paucity of these things is truly remarkable. The religion whose history the sacred writings of Judaism aim to tell, came forth from its Semitic sources bearing in its members the marks of low conceptions of Deity and of the Divine relations to the world and to mankind; its adherents had their degrading superstitions and barbarous customs and institutions. But the Hebrew prophets, from whose divinely illumined religious consciousness, in an historical and progressive way, a lofty spiritual vision of the divine righteousness and the divine kingdom in grace and truth was given to the world, stand in ancient history as a

quite matchless series of religious teachers and reformers. What they were, and what they did for the religious development and illumination of mankind, and what is the essential content of the religion they, receiving in succession the results of one another's work, founded for all times, may be subjected to historical tests and known by the use of the historical method. Nor can it be doubted that this historical character of Judaism is entitled largely to enhance our estimate of the value of Judaism as a religion.

It is Christianity, however, which is preëminently the world's historical religion. No doubt there remains, and probably always will remain, much obscurity hanging over many important problems connected with its beginning and earliest history. And perhaps debate will never end regarding the genuineness and authenticity of some of its more important records. Notwithstanding this, however, the picture of its founder—what manner of life he led, what he taught as true about God and the way of salvation, what was the effect of his teaching, manner of life and death, and of the belief in his resurrection—all this is clearly and definitively enough to be ascertained by the historical method. Nor is there any fatal lack of trustworthy historical evidence as to what the early Christian Church considered the essential content of the religious truth in which consisted God's revelation of himself in Jesus Christ. In proof of the truthfulness of this picture we have the Epistles of Paul, which were written within not more than thirty years of the death of Jesus, the Gospel of St. Mark, and the so-called "Matthew Logia"; even after the most searching criticism of sources has done its destructive work. And all the other New-Testament writings, as well as the remains of the writings of the Apologists, besides other collateral evidence, are accessible to the student who would know in an historical way what the best-informed of its earlier adherents considered the Christian religion essentially to be. It is not necessary to approach the early records of Christianity from the apologetical

point of view, but only in the spirit of the fair and well-equipped investigator of history, to recognize its superiority when tested by the standard of "historicalness."

To the modern investigator it follows as an indubitable conclusion that the historical evaluation of any religion must always be made in strict compliance with the historical method. That is to say, the method of applying this standard of values to religion is itself the result of experience in ascertaining the truths of history. Any religion which claims an historical origin and an historical development must submit to this method of its testing. As to the character and application of the method, neither religion nor the philosophy of religion is competent to decide. Facts (or, the rather, alleged facts) of occurrence in the past cannot be tested, as facts, by the religious consciousness as such; but the value that these facts—alleged or actual—may have for the religious life is a matter about which the religious consciousness is entitled to speak. And no student of man's religious experience from the comparative and psychological point of view will be prepared to deny the presence and the value for the religious life, of much which is unhistorical and quite incapable of being made matter of indubitable fact in history. But what claims to be history must stand the tests of historical examination. And these, as has already been said, are not primarily subject to the ideas and feelings which are so influential for the construction of a philosophy of religion.

Yet even here philosophy, in the interest of fairness to religion, may interpose objections to certain uses of the historical method for setting up a standard of religious values. There is not a little very doubtful *a priori* history, just as there is undoubtedly much disputable *a priori* philosophy. This *a-priorism* in the use of the historical method shows itself in many of the current attempts to estimate the worth of the different religions, or of religion in general. To enter upon the examination of all alleged facts with the predetermination, or

even with the predisposition to exclude such as seem ultra-mysterious, or claim to belong to the class called supernatural or miraculous, is too often made a demand for the proper use of the historical method. But to regard history itself as a *quasi*-physical science, and man's historical development as strictly conditioned by natural laws, is, in our judgment, to begin by violating the fundamental requisites of a successful historical examination. Surely the historian knows no more than the philosopher (and if the philosopher is faithful and skillful in the pursuit of his discipline, the historian knows less than he), in an *a priori* fashion about what can and what cannot take place in fact; neither should he claim antecedently to limit the whole circuit of the mysterious and invisible powers which environ man and which are operative in influencing his life and determining his destiny. And it is *such* powers in which religion believes.

While, then, alleged facts of religion must be submitted to historical testing as *facts*, and their value as entering into the essential content of the religion will in a measure depend upon the way in which they bear this test, it must always be remembered in making application of this standard of value that we are dealing with facts of *religion*. The belief itself, and the feelings and the cult connected with the belief, are matters-of-fact of the religious consciousness of man. This consciousness in general is a persistent and, on the whole, a profound and trustworthy witness to an order of facts, not only subjective but objectively grounded, of a peculiar character and of a value which is in some respects their own. The historical credibility of these alleged facts is always open to investigation by the historical method. The religion which establishes, in a large and fundamental way, its own historical character, is thus rendered a superior claimant for the credence and the allegiance of mankind. But in every case, and especially in the case of those religions whose ethical and æsthetical ideals and influences especially commend them, it must be remembered that

even the historical factors of this form of man's experience partake of the mysterious, hidden, and largely inexplicable characteristics of the experience itself. In a word, the history of religion is the history of the manifestations of a spiritual experience.

Although the truths of religion are in so large measure to be tested by the satisfactions which they afford to the human soul, it cannot, of course, be maintained that the particular form of religion is necessarily best which wins most followers to itself. It is little to the credit of the worship of Gûga, the Snake-king, for example, that he has thirty-five thousand worshippers in the Punjâb and one hundred and twenty-three thousand in the north-western provinces;¹ or that both Hindû and Muhammadan Fakirs receive offerings made to him. At the same time, that practical testing which takes the historical form of eliciting and answering to the experiences of large numbers of the human race is not without a certain value as evidence of the essential truthfulness of any religion. In applying any such test three considerations should, however, be kept in mind. In religion, as everywhere else, the principle of imitation and of unquestioning acceptance of the traditional views and practices is most powerful with the multitudes of men. If all religions were to be tested by the superstitions, moral imperfections, and irrational beliefs and practices of the intellectually lower classes of their adherents, they would all alike deserve to be condemned. Christianity to-day among the Copts, Islam among the peasants of parts of Syria, Buddhism in the remoter portions of Ceylon, and Hindûism in the foothills of the Himalayas, all show evidences of degradation, in some respects, essentially alike. But all these religions, in the form assumed by the beliefs and lives of the most sincere, thoughtful, and pure spirits who adopt them, have certain excellencies in common. Of them all that is true which Pro-

¹ See W. Crooke, *The Popular Religion and Folk-lore of Northern India*, I, p. 212f.

fessor Jastrow¹ declares to have been true of the religion of Babylonia and Assyria: "It is in the hymns and prayers, rather than in the cosmology and eschatology, that the spiritual aspirations of the priests (and to a limited extent of the masses) manifest themselves." It is, then, only by applying this historical test to the moral and religious experience of "the men of God," as well as of the multitude, while taking into account the limitations which the intellectual and social conditions of the time place upon the multitude, that a fair estimate of the value of any religion can be formed.

When, however, as in the case preëminently of Christianity, and to a far less extent of Buddhism and of Islam, the early adherence of the multitudes is gained because the new religion ministers in a fresh and vigorous way to the religious needs of men; and when, especially, this ministry effects the acceptance of improved spiritual beliefs and ideals, and the purifying and elevating of the spiritual life of the community; then the crowd of witnesses, by its very numbers, gains the right to present their value-judgments as valid evidence in the behalf of their religious beliefs and cult. The argument from the "common consent" is, therefore, perhaps not substantially different when applied to religion from the same argument when applied to other matters of general experience. For whatever else it may or may not be, religion is always an experience. And when historically determined, critically considered, and construed according to rational principles, the judgments of worth passed by multitudes of men are of no small importance to him who is in search of the ultimate standard of religious values. But especially do those religions rightly claim precedence, when viewed and measured by tests of an historical sort, which have shown themselves capable of spreading over wide areas, during long periods of time, and of securing the acceptance and devoted allegiance of many and diverse races. Such are the greater world-religions of Buddhism, Christianity, and Is-

¹ Religion of Babylonia and Assyria, p. 693.

lam. By their conquest of so vast multitudes they prove—with varying degrees of assurance and yet without diminishing the necessity for a quite different kind of evidence in order to make the proof complete—the validity of their claim to be universal religions, or religions for all men and for man as man.

Thus the history of religions that bear transplanting becomes a wellspring of evidences which may be drawn upon to show their substantial value.

But—at least according to our latest scientific and historical advices—the world of men is in a process of development which is a progress, through better and higher stages of its life, toward the realization of an ideal good. Religion, too, is one of these forms of the development of humanity. But religion is only one of the several important factors in the spiritual culture of the race; it is, therefore, only one of several important forms of the spiritual development of the race. Now to the surveyor who takes the historical point of view and, after orienting them, applies his lines of measurement from this point of view to the religious movement of the life of the race, it is quite plain that no religion which ceases to grow can conform to any satisfactory standard of values. The more special relations which exist between religion and race-culture will occupy our attention in several other connections. But even in this preliminary discussion, so much of assumption is justified: Every religion will most certainly be tested by its ability to keep pace with the improved culture and social condition of the race. Moreover, in testing this ability, the capacity for self-reform is a most important factor. All abiding religions find themselves constantly called upon to improve their conceptions, to purify their beliefs, to refine and elevate the sentiments with which they regard the objects of their belief, and to make their cult, and the whole manner of life which expresses the content of the religion in a practical way, better adapted to meet the approbation of the ethically, æsthetically, and spiritually improved tastes of the best among their contemporaries.

The history of Christianity has been one long series of struggles at self-improvement. Its life has been shown as a power of self-purification from accretions of erroneous doctrine and of corrupting or unworthy practices. It is true, as has been said, that "the image of Christ remains the sole basis for all moral culture, and in the measure in which it succeeds in making its light penetrate is the moral culture of the nations increased or diminished."¹ Doubtless, also, as Crozier² has declared, we must distinguish "between the parts played in the complex result by the spirit of Christ on the one hand, and by the Doctrines and Institutions of the Church on the other." But Christianity as a religious development in history has shown a remarkable power of reform. It has perpetually needed reform. Its need of adaptation to the demands of a changed race-culture and of new social conditions was never before greater than now. But if Christianity shows in the future the same essential worth, as judged by the standard of historical adaptability to development, which must be credited to it in the past, it will remain the most essentially "universal," the truest *world-religion*, of them all. This it may do without ceasing to be the religion of the humble and uncultured classes; for, as Augustine long ago said of it: "Christianity is a river in which a lamb may wade, while an elephant must swim."

In a word, the capacity for self-reform and self-development by a sort of spiritual metabolism, when shown in the way of fact through long periods of time, and over large sections of the earth, while coping with various races under changing physical and social conditions, is the supreme historical test to which any religion can be subjected. It is the test of life and of experience, administered in a large, historical way. The emphasis laid upon the four different valuables of truth, beauty, moral goodness, and happiness, varies from age to age. But just now

¹ Quoted by Harnack (What is Christianity, p. 133) from a modern historian.

² History of Intellectual Development, I, p. 249.

the social benefits which any religion can confer are becoming, as it were, the supreme practical test. Only the final conquest of the theoretical consent, as well as of the practical allegiance of the race, can furnish the ultimate and conclusive test of the historical order.¹

The very use of the words which imply the possibility of an "ultimate and conclusive," or so-called "absolute" test, are fitted to remind us that the value-judgments to which the religious beliefs, sentiments, and cult, of man subject themselves, must have to do with something more than the psychological satisfactions of the individual or their own self-perpetuation and extension in history. Strictly speaking, and if by "absolute" we mean what is so finished as to be incapable of improvement and so demonstrable as to be unassailable by doubt, there is no *absolute* religion, either in existence or in store, for man. Indeed, the possession of these hypothetical characteristics, if it could be gained by any particular type of religious experience, would unfit its possessor to be the true and helpful servant and friend of mankind. It was a mistake, which cannot easily be committed again in the same way, when the orthodoxy of the Catholic Church of the third century based its tests upon three conceptions, each one of which is not only disputable but also lacking in clearness and even largely untrue. These were (1) the claim that exactness of definition and minuteness of analysis are everywhere necessary as grounds for a reasonable faith; (2) the belief in a "majority of a meeting," the theory "that God never speaks to man except through the voice of the majority" (a conception that comes from politics rather than from either religion or philosophy); and (3) the assumption that "the definitions of primary beliefs as made by the majority are not only true but final."²

¹ In this connection the remark of Von Hartmann (*Religionsphilosophie*, p. xvii) is worthy of note, that the modern critique and polemic against religion, and especially against Christianity, is constantly becoming milder.

² See Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church* (Hibbert Lectures, 1888), p. 330f.

On the other hand, a certain claim to absoluteness of authority as respects its presentation of truth and its appeal for allegiance of the heart and life belongs, as an essential factor, to all the great world-religions; and to none of them in so comprehensive and uncompromising fashion as to Christianity. This claim is of such a nature as to demand another sort of testing which aims to go beyond the merely subjective and historical, and to reach some higher and more nearly supreme and conclusive standard of religious values. We may say, then, that the third class of value-judgments test religion in general, and each particular form of religion, by the standard of conformity to the higher ideals of humanity. This is, indeed, not a standard of worth which can be separated wholly from the considerations belonging more especially to the two classes of judgments already discussed. For the ideals of humanity are the products of the human mind; and they are themselves subjects of historical development and so of historical study and proof. They are psychological and historical facts, outputs of the spirit of man in its progress in history; but they are facts of a unique order, to which nothing in the world of time and sense completely corresponds, and whose origin, evolution, and validity within the realm of Reality, cannot be wholly accounted for by the purely psychological and historical methods. Neither are these ideals wholly manageable as phenomena belonging strictly within the field of any of the particular sciences. There is truth in the declaration of the Abbé de Broglie: "The visible world does not contain within itself either the origin, or the end, or the law, or the ideal of human life." But the beliefs, sentiments, and doings of religion have reference in a special way to the invisible and spiritual world in which man seeks to find that answer to his questionings and needs which the visible world does not contain. In this invisible and spiritual world his thought and imagination projects the realities which are the correlates of these ideals; these are the beings, influences, and transactions, which *ought to be* in order to justify the

fact that the man feels himself powerfully possessed by these ideals.

There can be, then, no more ultimate and no higher test of the value of the beliefs, sentiments, and practices of any religion than its conformity to the ideals of humanity. The characteristic of this class of tests has already been summed up in the single word *rationality*. It is the rationality of any religion which will finally determine its place in the scale of religious values. But the conception covered by this term must be interpreted in no narrow and restricted way. That it does not neglect, much less exclude, but the rather comprehends and includes in its highest potency, the psychological and historical evaluation, has already been made sufficiently clear. The ideals of reason do not contradict or thwart the satisfactions of the soul; the rather are they the objectifying of that which gives to the soul its highest, most permanent, and most valuable satisfactions. Neither are these ideals strangers to the struggles, the wanderings, and the upward climbing of man in the actual, historical process of his evolution; the rather are they always present as potent forces, inspiring, directing, and defining the goal and the worth of this process. But especially is all this true of that one of all the developments of humanity which has its springs, its aims, its principles, its realization, in the world invisible and spiritual. And this is religion. We, therefore, return now to our earlier point of view.

That Ideal of Rationality which constitutes the more ultimate test of the value of religion includes its essential truthfulness. The religion which has the highest worth must satisfy man's craving to realize his intellectual ideal; and this intellectual ideal includes a cognitive commerce with Reality. But in order that the ideal of truthfulness may be complied with it is necessary that the conceptions and beliefs respecting the nature of this reality, and respecting the character of the actual relation to it of the physical universe and of the life of men, should be perpetually readjusted to all the growing knowledge

and reasonable faith of the race. None of the particular sciences can usurp the place, or perform the functions of religion, in respect even of these more purely intellectual satisfactions. Neither can they all combined succeed in dispensing with the light thrown upon the Ultimate Reality by the religious experience of man. Philosophy, too, even in its study of religion, must remember that by the interpretation and criticism of religious beliefs, sentiments, and practices, it gains no right and no fitness to substitute itself for religion. On the other hand, religion has always proved itself, and is in its essential nature, quite unfit to attempt the rôle, in the drama played upon the stage of human history, which has been assigned to either science or philosophy. Man, a scientific, philosophical, and religious being, by the attempt to use in some increasingly effective and harmonious way the powers which belong to these three related spheres of his activity, seeks the realization of his ideal of the certain and absolute Truth. Every religion has, then, an inalienable right to the peculiarly religious point of view from which to regard the conceptions and beliefs in which its content of truth consists. But any religion which fails or refuses to adjust itself to that knowledge of the real world which the scientific and philosophical progress of the race authenticates, furnishes in this way its own refutation of its claim to truthfulness. For truth is indeed many-sided; and all human knowledge is fragmentary and essentially relative. Doubtless, too, that Ultimate Reality which science knows as a Unity of Force and Law, which philosophy presents in synthetic form as the Absolute One, and which religion believes in, worships, and serves as God, is resourceful and manifold enough to satisfy all human ideals. But the very nature of truth is such as to exclude the incompatible and self-contradictory. And although our concepts of what is incompatible and self-contradictory are constantly undergoing change, the essential characteristics of the rational activity which rejects from its conception of Reality what, at least for the time being, seems

impossible to harmonize, do not change. These rational characteristics give the law to those value-judgments which determine the worth of any religion according to the measure of its conformity to the Ideal of Truthfulness.

In a different manner, and with a different degree of steadfastness and self-understanding, does the standard of conformity to the æsthetical ideal get itself applied to the beliefs, sentiments, and cult of religion. This ideal itself is of psychological origin, and is a growth in history; but it is also a revelation from the realm of the invisible and spiritual. From our modern and more refined point of view, nothing can be uglier than many of the conceptions and pictorial representations of the gods, or than the kind of worship and service which their devotees conceive to be demanded of them in order to please their divinities. The conceptions and cult of the greater world-religions, not even by any means excepting Christianity, have often enough been at variance with any ideal of beauty tolerable to a cultivated taste. The relations between religion and art will claim attention in other connections. It is enough at present to call attention to the following two considerations: On the one hand, any theory of the beautiful or estimate of the arts which leaves out of account the dreadful side of nature and of human experience, the austere and awful aspects of Reality, and the superior æsthetical as well as ethical value of the mental images and the conceptions which represent the sublimity and majesty of God, is itself condemned for its untruthfulness and inadequacy at the very start. But on the other hand, the development of man's religious as well as his æsthetical consciousness has led more and more to the refusal to conceive of the Ultimate Reality as essentially ugly: it has more and more removed from the conception of Deity those factors which excite, in the case of the lower religions, the emotions of gross fear and even of disgust. When to these considerations we add the insight into the actual beliefs and feelings of the religious man, which a psychological and historical

study of the phenomena imparts, we can the better understand how the standard of conformity to the Ideal of Beauty may be applied to religion.

So important is the moral value of any religion as a test of its general worthiness that the appropriateness of this ideal needs only to be mentioned in order to be acknowledged. Of all standards of value, that of conformity to the moral ideal is the most close-fitting, practically important, and conclusive. Religion and morality are not, indeed, identical. The way of salvation provided by religion never coincides wholly with the customary rules of conduct as existing and enforced among the members of the non-religious community, or in society as regarded from the non-religious point of view. Indeed, if by morality we mean simply conduct as related to the intercourse of men, then we may say that the primary point of view from which religion regards conduct differs from that of morality. The peculiarity of religious morality, however, is that it claims an invisible, spiritual, and superhuman authority for the rules which govern conduct and enforce the sanctions of right living.

Now morality is the special sphere of that which *ought to be* in character and *ought to be done* by way of voluntary action. This is to say that morality judges the worth of conduct by its conformity to certain ideals of a personal sort. The actual deeds of men and the laws of conduct which religion refers to a superhuman authority, the developing moral consciousness of the race approves or disapproves by this class of value-judgments; and thus religion in general, and the particular forms of religion, each one, are subjected to the standard of conformity to a Moral Ideal.

There are two respects in which the conformity of every religion to the ideal of morality admits of testing by a combination of the psychological and the historical methods. The first of these consists in the moral purity and thoroughness of its conception of Divine Being and of the ethico-spiritual relations which are maintained between this Being and the ethical life and

ethical development of man. The other consists in the breadth and strenuousness of the moral influence exerted by the religion over its followers, and through them, over the surrounding society. These two modes of the conformity of religion to the moral ideal are by no means precisely the same; they do not always, in the ethical history of the same religion, keep pace together. For example, as a modern writer has said:¹ "The Hindū system of Moral Science is a part and parcel of the general metaphysical system of the Hindūs. The first principles of the Hindū metaphysics are the following: From the Absolute, Unconditioned and Perfect Supreme Being proceeded the related, conditioned and imperfect universe. He manifests Himself as related and conditioned, in forming, and for the sake of, the related and conditioned universe and thus becomes the Personal God of love and power." From this metaphysical system, which is a doctrine of the "Unconditioned and Perfect Supreme Being," the thinkers of India have deduced a lofty and attractive system of rules for the conduct of the practical life. But the multitudes of India have always remained, and still remain, held fast by a relatively low and, in many respects, repulsive morality, which is the survival of the superstitious and degrading beliefs of those nature-religions in which Brāhmanism found them, and from which it has never been able to raise them. With these multitudes religion itself, instead of being a comprehensive and effective moral influence, is almost entirely a matter of rites and ceremonies.

With these characteristics of Hindūism, as respects its conformity to the ethical ideal, we may contrast Judaism on the one hand and Christianity on the other. The moral austerity and intensity which Judaism gained from its conception of Yahweh as the righteous One is beyond question a fact in the history of religions. But this conception itself was lacking in certain elements which are present in the conception of Hindūism; and the character of the morals encouraged and pro-

¹ Kishori Lal Sarkar, *The Hindū System of Moral Science*, p. 1.

duced by the conception among the Jews themselves was somewhat one-sided and devoid of breadth and geniality. These relatively suppressed or wanting factors in the ideal of God as perfect ethical Spirit, in the ethical impulses and ideas, and in the supports to conduct which come from such an ideal, were supplied by the conception of the Divine Being which Jesus revealed. And the marked immediate improvement of the moral life of individual believers, the increased satisfaction of the ethical nature, and the leavening moral influence over surrounding social conditions, which early Christianity showed, are matters of its history too well known to need more than a passing mention here.

But the Christian religion, like every other religion, is constantly called upon, in an ever new and more impressive way, to show its theoretical and practical conformity to the rising and expanding moral ideals of humanity. God as conceived of by Athanasius, or Augustine, or Calvin, cannot be regarded as an unchangeable and final pattern of a Divine Being who shall always command with authority these ideals. This present age is demanding of Christianity, as never before, the practical proof of its claims to universality and absoluteness by challenging its power to effect the moral transformation of society. Indeed, this issue raises the great apologetic problem of this, as of every other age. For there is something about the moral ideals of humanity which refuses to yield to any claim of presenting essentially true views of the Being and Final Purpose of the World, or to any demand for the exercise of authority, which is not satisfactory to them. Whatever other manifestations of the Divine Being in human souls and human history may fail, it must still be said of these ideals :

“ They ne'er shall sink to slumber in oblivion ;
A power of God is there untouched by time.”

The universal belief of man as religious is that superhuman and invisible beings have power over his well-being and ill-

being. The gods can work both human weal and human woe. Thus man as sentient is moved to religious emotions, and to such religious deeds as prayer and worship. He will, if he can happily find the way, escape that evil which the powers of the unseen world can inflict; he will secure the good which they are able to bestow. But in the lower stages of his religious evolution his conceptions of what will conduce to his happiness are, of course, as low and narrow as are the forms of happiness of which he is capable. Thus every religion appeals to the desire to escape evil and to the complementary desire to secure good; but the nature of its appeal necessarily depends upon the conceptions of good and evil which awaken and elicit these desires. As the ethical and æsthetical, as well as the intellectual, development of the race goes on, the conceptions are modified; the character of the satisfactions which the soul seeks, and the coming of which it anticipates and welcomes with peace and joy, is also changed. This amounts to saying that the Ideal of the Good which religion must confer, in order to conform to the higher and purer standards, is itself subject to development. "In the Punjâb hills," says W. Crooke,¹ "every householder keeps an image of Nâga or harmless snake, as contrasted with the Sanq, which is venomous. This snake is put in charge of the householder's homestead, and is responsible that no cobra or other dangerous serpent shall enter it." Now it is not simply a lack of belief in the defensive power of Nâga that keeps the more rational religious man from the resort to this and other similar means of securing happiness. Nor is it because he does not regard Providence as having aught to do with the manners of harmless and venomous snakes. On the contrary, while taking other measures to defend himself against the cobra, he commits all his ways to the Lord. But this he does, looking to his religious beliefs and their expression in the conduct of his affairs to afford him another and higher kind of happiness which comes from a life in com-

¹ *Ibid.* II, p. 144.

munion with God, and consists in the peace and joy which only this communion can bestow. At least such is the claim in which Brāhman and Buddhist would unite with the Christian.

The ideal of a happiness that is found to go with the realization in experience of those satisfactions which religion alone can afford, is not wholly an individual affair. Judaism had its picture of an ideal religious community; and the early Christians appropriated to themselves as the true Israel and the genuine children of Abraham, the promises of God to this community. Hindūism and Buddhism have their Nirvāna; and Islam holds out an attractive promise of Paradise. This ideal Good of union with God and with others in a blessed society sets up a standard, by theoretical and practical conformity to which the different religions may in a manner be judged.

It is, then, the conformity of religion to the highest ideals of Truth, Beauty, Righteousness, and Blessedness, which affords the most ultimate and final standard by which to estimate religious values. But this standard is not something wholly separable from the more definitely psychological and historical tests of religion. On the contrary, it is the supreme form of the psychological and the historical tests; because these tests exist in combination and raised to their highest potency. And using the words in an admittedly loose but, as we believe, defensible meaning, it may be said that *Rationality is the ultimate test of the Values of Religion.*

In estimating the value of religion in general, and of each religion in particular, from that point of view which the philosophy of religion occupies, and in endeavoring by its method to solve the various questions which the problem of religious value raises, we shall need constantly to apply the complex threefold standard of Humanity, Historicalness, and Ideality. By conformity to the first standard religion is enabled to satisfy all the demands made upon it by the needy and desirous soul of the individual believer, whatever his place may be in the

scale of race-culture. By conformity to the standard of historicalness, any religion shows its qualities of universality, or rather universal adaptability; so that its concrete manifestations may respond to all the necessary racial and temporal modifications. This makes progressiveness possible. For like all spiritual developments, and all permanent and effective movements of the life of man, the truest and best of religions can never be given in a single fact or epoch of its history; nor can it be regarded as having reached a statical and perfectly finished condition. Indeed, the more the claim to an absolute value and to universal acceptance is put forth by any religion, the greater its need of perpetual progress toward a completer rationality and a more perfect standard of ethical and spiritual life.¹

And, finally, by conformity to the standard of ideality religion secures the qualities of truthfulness, in the highest sense of the word, of comprehensiveness, and of the blessedness of a participation in the spiritual life of God. This ideal of truthfulness in the correspondence of man's thought to the Ultimate Reality, when presented from the religious point of view, unites and harmonizes the scientific conception of the World as a unity of forces and laws, and the philosophical conception of Absolute Will and Mind, with the religious conception of perfect Ethical Spirit, revealing itself to and redeeming mankind. Such an Ideal of religion is also comprehensive enough to include, appreciatively and sympathetically, all the other eudæmonistic, ethical, and æsthetic ideals of man;—to comprehend, without attempting to dominate or control, the attempts of science to discover the laws of man's economical and social development, or the ideals and principles of art. But

¹ This consideration is expressed in somewhat extreme form by Eucken in the following language: "So bildet das Christenthum mit dem Gaben seines Wirkens und Seins die Religion der Religionen. Aber zugleich enthält es weit mehr Probleme, gerät es in mehr Kampf nach aussen und in mehr Zwist bei sich selbst, hat es eine irrationalere Art als übrige Religionen."

especially must religion be tested by the way in which it meets the demand for the presence of God in humanity—thus revealing itself and affecting humanity so as to bring the race to a oneness with, and spiritual likeness to God.¹

The application of so complex and indefinite a standard of religious values can, of course, be no easy affair. And the different religions which are brought before it will yield different results according to the particular method and special points of its application. As, for example, Schultz says of Judaism:² “The Old Testament in its national particularism and its character of externality stands below Buddhism and Islam, and in its lack of ‘other-worldliness’ below the Egyptian priestly religion.” But the mere attempt to apply such a standard may well guard the student against the mistakes of an austere and unsympathetic criticism on the one hand, and, on the other hand, against the yet more fatal mistake of an easy-going syncretism. Besides this, an insight into the history of man’s religious development and into the depths and recesses of his religious experience, will cause the investigator to withhold the proposal to mark out, like von Hartmann and others, “the religion of the future,” and to refrain from predicting with confidence, as did M. Guyau, the “Irreligion” which is to take the place of all existing positive forms of religion, including Christianity. Christianity itself, and other claimants to the titles of universality and absoluteness, while having their claims fairly considered, will also have the opportunity to learn in what relation their present condition stands when compared with the realization, in its highest form, of that Supreme Good which religion should minister to the race. For the light which we are enabled to throw upon these very claims comes itself, as a self-revelation of God, in the religious life and religious development of humanity; but above all other religions, in Christianity.

¹ As said Athanasius: *θεός ἐνανθρώπησεν ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοθώμεν.*

² Grundriss der Christlichen Apologetik, p. 169.



PART I

RELIGION : AN HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

“God is no respecter of persons; but in every nation he that feareth Him, and worketh righteousness is acceptable to Him.”

PETER.

“However men approach Me, even so I accept them, for the path men take from every side is Mine.”

BHAGAVADGĪTĀ.

“If, then, amid the many opinions about the gods and the generation of the universe, we are not able to give notions that are exact and consistent with one another, do not wonder at that.”

PLATO.

*“Correct the portrait by the living face,
Man's God by God's God in the mind of man.”*

BROWNING.

PART I

RELIGION: AN HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF RELIGION

It is the first task of the philosophy of religion, after it has attained a clear conception of its purpose, has defined its method, and established its standard of value-judgments, to collect the material to which a critical and constructive reflection is to be applied. This material is religion—the subject-matter of the inquiry of this branch of philosophical discipline. Its collection and preparation for the uses of philosophy requires, as has already been shown, the aid of the historical and psychological method. In this way only is it possible to understand religion as an historical development and as a product of the many-sided being of the subject of religion—the soul of man. A brief study of those peculiar institutions in which the religious life expresses itself will then complete the work of laying the foundations in a system of inductive conclusions. Further reflection will try to unite and harmonize these conclusions with the results of systematic philosophy in its efforts to throw light upon the ultimate problems of nature and the life of man.

But what is religion? and, By what marks are we to recognize the experience connoted by this term? Some brief and yet more precise determination of the sphere of historical and psychological research within which the investigation of the phenomena proceeds is surely needed at this point. For on the one hand, there is the risk of framing too loose and indefi-

nite a conception for the term "religion," and so perhaps of identifying its sphere with the entire group of ethical and æsthetic beliefs, emotions, and ideas; or with the content of thought and opinion belonging to philosophy itself. While, on the other hand, a danger awaits the inquiry, from confining the examination to certain favored examples or types of religion, or from prematurely dividing religions into the lower and the higher; or into the wholly true and wholly false. This last form of restricting the subject may amount in the end to something quite different from distinguishing between truth and half-truth, or between truth and falsehood, in any particular religion. It may discourage the attempt to trace the development of the religious consciousness of humanity from lower to higher stages in the rationality of its conceptions and the purity of its sentiments. And surely the use of the psychological and historical method will not permit, except in a modified way, the acceptance of Eucken's declaration¹ that "he who concerns himself about religion's content of truth need not inquire into its darksome beginnings nor trace its tedious climbing upward, but may at once transport himself to its height. Since here the problem of its truth first attains a full clearness, and here first gains a compelling power."

The problem of the Nature of Religion is complicated with questions as to its origin, universality, and development. And over all these questions different authorities are found to disagree in their views in a manner which shows the interdependence of them all. The plain requirement would seem then to be, at first, to define religion in those lowest terms in which it is actually found everywhere prevalent in human history, and then, as far as possible, trace its development upward from these lowest terms. Thus by inquiring into its "darksome beginnings," and by tracing its "tedious upward-climbing," the observer is fitted to place himself on the height from which its essential content of truth is seen in the fullest "clearness"

¹ See his *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, p. 1.

and with the most "compelling power." In all this work one may confidently assume the truth of science as embodied in the conception of a *rational and spiritual unity of the race which has been attained by an historical development*. And he who does not understand this truth with regard to all religions, does not clearly and thoroughly know the truth regarding any religion.

No help in discovering the essential nature of religion is to be derived from the terms employed to connote the diverse and conflicting phenomena of this order as they are discoverable in the actual life and historical development of mankind. The people with whom the word "religion" (*religio*) originated—namely, the Romans—were among the least religious of all ancient or modern peoples. There is no agreement on the part of philologists as to the original meaning of this word. Among the Hindūs, Hebrews, Greeks, Celts, or Germans, there is no synonym or equivalent term. The early Christians had no word for religion, and no such word occurs in the New Testament writings. When it comes into Christian usage in the third century, according to Sabatier,¹ it receives without doubt "a sort of baptism and seems to clothe itself with a meaning more conformable to the spirit of the Gospel." Lactantius, in accordance with this idea, defines religion as "the bond which unites man to God." But so mystical and spiritual a significance for the term is quite foreign to the conceptions of the ancient writers of Rome, who regarded the matter in an external way, as "a tradition of rites and an institution of a social nature transmitted by their ancestors."

When the inquiry turns upon man's religious life and development as it appears in the history of different peoples and of diverse portions of the human race, the complexity of the phenomena is so great, the differences in the points of view taken by different investigators are so influential, and the significance and origins of the more primitive forms of religion so obscure, that any generally acceptable definition of religion is

¹ Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion, p. 7.

exceedingly difficult to find. The diligent researches of modern students of comparative religion have, however, established satisfactorily these two helpful truths: (1) While religions are many and varied, religion in some form and stage of evolution is universal with man; and (2) While religions are many and varied, religion, in some true and significant meaning of the word, is one. Now, if to these conclusions as based on historical investigation there is added a psychological study of those activities and forms of mental functioning in which religion consists, it is possible to arrive at a conception which will comply with both the historical and the psychological tests. Religion appears in history, then, as always a certain belief, with correlated feelings and impulses to conduct;—all three of these classes of psychical factors being united and yet variously emphasized and developed in different stages and conditions of race-culture, and even in different individuals.

But what sort of belief is that in which religion essentially consists? and, What are the more important kinds of emotion and sentiment, and the more obvious dependent modes of behavior, which are essentially connected with the belief? The attempt to answer these inquiries, and thus to define religion in a more comprehensive and positive way, leads to the search for that “historical or matter-of-fact *minimum*” (I will venture to call it) which everywhere appears as essential to the religious aspect of man’s multiform life. It is true that by taking religion at its lowest terms, so to say, we shall by no means fully comprehend its profound significance and supreme value for the total life of man. But we shall, on the other hand, comply with the demand to conform our conception of religion to the facts of history as interpreted by the method of psychology.

The question, What is left of belief, feeling, and conduct, to constitute the essential factors of all religion, when abstraction has been made of those beliefs, sentiments and emotions, rites and ceremonies, which are peculiar to this or that religion?

is, therefore, a question which meets us on the very threshold of an inquiry by the appropriate method. In answering this question it is necessary first of all, to reduce the formula for religion, as a universal aspect of man's life and development, to its lowest terms, so that this formula may serve more efficiently in the attempt to solve the problems which are presented by all the particular cases that arise in history. In other words, we seek the germinal ideas, feelings, and actions, which constitute the more primitive, universal, and essential content of religion. Only in this way can the subject be studied genetically.

Taken at its lowest terms and considered as universal with man, religion is the belief in invisible, superhuman powers (or a Power) which are (is) conceived of after the analogy of the human spirit; on which (whom) man regards himself as dependent for his well-being, and to which (whom) he is, at least in some sense responsible for his conduct; together with the feelings and practices which naturally follow from such a belief. Thus the lowest form of religion is most properly denominated a "vague and unreflecting Spiritism."

Thus defined the essential characteristic of religious belief, as it springs everywhere and at all times from the soul of man, is the belief in "Other-Soul" that is also "Over-Soul." From this belief, and as inseparably connected with it, various feelings arise which for their peculiar characteristics and differentiation depend upon the character attributed to those invisible, superhuman, and spiritual powers, which are "posited," as it were by the belief itself. And in an equally natural and inevitable way, certain practices having reference to these powers and to man's adjustment of his active relations toward them, form a part of religion.

It will be seen, then, that religion considered content-wise is an attitude of the human Self toward other and superior Soul-life, which it is desirable or necessary to apprehend and to conciliate, because this Other can affect man's welfare in

manifold important ways. Religion is thus essentially "animistic"; if only the term be employed in a sufficiently indefinite and comprehensive fashion.¹ What is the precise nature of the spirits (or *animæ*) which are thus brought by religion into relation to the life of man, is a question to which the earlier forms of belief give most vague, uncertain, and even fantastic answers. For man has as yet attained little or no scientific and reflective knowledge of his own Self-hood; and the stirrings of his fancy, emotional impulses, and unintelligible, obscure, longings, are not at all clear as respects their significance and worth to himself. A child of nature, he views all nature as moved and influenced by soul-life, similar and yet superior to his own. His conception of his own spirit is not a fixed and well-defined affair, either as to its characteristics, or localization, or relations to the body, or to other human spirits, or to the "Other-and-Over Souls" with which his imagination peoples his world. But inasmuch as he is sensitive to whatever affects his happiness or misery, and has the rude but potent social and ethical emotions which so largely enter into his constitution as human, he desires to adjust himself to the invisible and spiritual world which is, he believes, the most important part of his environment.

It is this vague and unreflecting, but vivid and potent belief in soul-life, which must give the clue to the understanding of the phenomena of religion in its lower and more nearly primitive stages. For the modern man, with his cultured views of a theistic or pantheistic or atheistic sort, it is not easy or even

¹ As Professor Jastrow says of the Babylonian religion: In the oldest form known to us it may best be described "as a mixture of local and native cults. Starting with that phase of religious beliefs known as *Animism* which has been ascertained to be practically universal in primitive society," etc. *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, p. 48f. "If we call them (*i. e.*, the lowest Nature-Religions) animistic," says Professor Tiele (*Elements of the Science of Religion, First Series*, p. 68), "it is not because we regard Animism as a religion, but solely because religion, like the whole life of primitive man, is dominated by Animism."

possible, without the stimulus and guide of historical and psychological studies, to comprehend sympathetically the religion of this vague and unreflecting spiritism. But the same workings of the human mind account for its peculiar beliefs as those which explain, for example, the belief of the Jacoons that the tiger which meets them in the path is the metamorphosis of their human enemy; of the Bushmen that their wives can change themselves into lions; and of the peasants of modern Europe that witches have the power to avail themselves of the great variety of embodiments and transformations given to them by folk-lore and the fairy tale. All this is the very substance of the popular religions of India, and of other countries even down to the present day.

Something important, however, must be added to this vague but vivid spiritualizing tendency in order to account for the origin and define the nature of even these lowest forms of religious belief. For spiritual powers thus construed and constituted are not necessarily species or examples of the superhuman, much less of the supernatural,—of the “*Other-Self*” which is also an “*Over-Self*.” The experiences of man with many forces which he cannot control by ordinary social means, or locate in the person of any member of human society, and the feelings of fear, dependence, mystery, admiration, awe, and desire for friendly communion, awakened by these experiences, must also be taken into the account. These experiences contribute to the belief in the superhuman and supernatural character of other spirits than the human. And inasmuch as these experiences are both of evil and of good, and since man’s conduct, while seeming to contribute certain factors to the events, does not seem largely to control or to produce them; what more natural and even inevitable than that the invisible superhuman spirits should themselves be classified into the evil and the good? Thus an indefinite number of such powers, more or less closely allied or opposed to one another, appears to the primitive man necessary in order

to account for his total experience with himself, with other men, and with the forces and events of his physical environment.

The difficulties of adjusting to the facts of history this conception of religion—as being, when taken at its lowest terms, a vague unreflecting Spiritism of the character just described—arise from two kinds of religious developments. To the one class belong such so-called religions as Shamanism, Fetishism, Totemism, Theriolatry and the other lower forms of nature-worship; and especially such Magic as is frequently confounded with a certain definite species of religion. To the other class belongs, in a special way, Buddhism, which, after being taught by its founder as “no religion,” speedily became and has thus far remained the accepted religion of millions of mankind of different countries and races. The difficulty has been greatly magnified by the persistent attempts made, chiefly by anthropologists but also by students of comparative religion, to discover the origin of all religion in some particular one of these lower forms; and thus to overlook the undoubted truth of history that they all, at a certain stage of man’s religious development, coëxist and are confounded, as different manifestations of essentially one characteristic religious belief. For, Shamanism, Fetishism, Totemism, Theriolatry and the other lower forms of nature-worship, as well as Magic so far as it is at all religious in character, are not *different* religions. They are only different manifestations of the one religion which, in its lower stages, we have defined as a “vague and unreflecting Spiritism.”

The truth of the statement just made may be illustrated and enforced by a brief examination of the phenomena from the historical and psychological points of view. In conducting this examination, however, the following truths should be kept constantly in mind. The term “Spiritism” is not employed in this connection to denote a definite species of religious beliefs and practices, such as is assumed by some writers on anthropology; and which they are accustomed to call “natural” and

to place in the scale of development either contemporaneous with, or just anterior to, that kindred form of religion which they designate Animism. In our meaning of the word there is no such definite species of religion as Spiritism. On the contrary, the facts of history show that every form of so-called primitive religion is pervaded by the same vague and unreflecting "spiritizing" tendency. Earth, air, fire, water, and woods, all natural objects, however insignificant and ill-fitted for such uses they may seem to the cultivated thought and imagination, and all animal as well as human bodies, readily lend themselves to this tendency. There are both localized spirits and free spirits; and the locality of the particular spirit may be easily and frequently changed, or it may be regarded as more permanently fixed. The relations also in which man stands to these spirits are various and changeable; and thus the spirits themselves become the objects of many mysterious or more well-defined fears. Or they are looked upon with admiration, veneration, desire for friendship and for community of interests. Moreover, the vague and uncertain feeling of a sort of unity amidst this diversity, which is destined in the progress of race-culture to become a conviction based upon all the most assured tenets of science and philosophy, displays itself here and there, even at this lower stage of man's religious development. The invisible, superhuman, and spiritual powers have some bonds, either of concord or of strife, which bind them together; at least, they are not wholly indifferent to each other; there is a sort of hierarchy of power and a division of labor and responsibility, whether for good or for evil, among them.

Understanding the term, "vague and unreflecting spiritism," in this way, we find that the various forms of the more primitive religious beliefs and practices, which are usually regarded as more or less distinct religions, do, in fact, everywhere coëxist; they run into each other, and even persist side by side with the higher forms of belief and the purer cults, all the way upward to the stage of monotheistic religion. That is quite univer-

sally true of all the cases where the reflections of the thoughtful few have mingled with the ruder beliefs of the multitude, which Wiedemann¹ says of ancient Egypt in characterizing its religion as a "motley mixture of childishly crude fetichism and deep philosophic thought, of superstition and true religious worship, of polytheism, henotheism, and pantheism." The same authority declares that "it is open to us to speak of the religious ideas of the Egyptians, but not of an Egyptian religion."² According to the exceedingly elaborate and careful work of J. J. M. De Groot on *The Religious System of China*, the most ancient form of belief might identify souls with the powers of nature and the constituent parts of the Cosmos, or with animals, plants, and lifeless objects. Tàoism was originally, "a compendium of customs and practices framed upon ideas concerning the human soul" (I, p. xiii *f*). These souls could however, readily be elevated to the rank of gods and goddesses. "The human soul is in China the original form of all beings of a higher order."³ And Sir Monier Williams⁴ says of India, where the philosophy of religion has been carried to a high pitch of refinement, and every school of philosophy has had its gifted representatives: "It is certain that every form of Fetishism and Totemism, of stone-worship, tree-worship, and animal-worship, as well as every variety of polytheistic and pantheistic superstition, have sprung up spontaneously and flourished vigorously on Indian soil." And again: "It is difficult for any believer in Hindüism to draw a line of demarcation between gods, man, and animals." This *jumble*, or "motley mixture," of ill-defined conceptions and vague, shifting beliefs, is the psychologically natural characteristic of the unformed religious experience, as it is of all the other earlier developments of the human mind.

¹ *The Ancient Egyptian Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul*, p. 1.

² *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, p. 3*f*.

³ De Groot, *Ibid.* I, p. 1.

⁴ *Brähmanism and Hindüism*, p. 314*f*.

Of the lower forms of religious belief Shamanism most obviously corresponds to that conception of the essential nature of religion, when reduced to its *minimum* content, which has been defined above. This religion is widely spread among the Turkish peoples and among those communities where the influence of these peoples has been at all dominant. According to its view of the world there are a number of shells, or layers (*Schichten*) separated from each other, of which the seventeen upper ones form the heaven, or kingdom of light, and the seven or nine lower ones the underworld, or kingdom of darkness. All the good spirits, genii and divinities, that create, protect, and maintain the weak children of men belong to the upper strata of light:—for light is man's friend; and in the lower live the bad spirits that harm men and seek to destroy them.¹ The lord of all the beings of the under-world is Erlik Kan, who has a black beard and a countenance gray but streaked with blood. Why should not man fear him? And although theoretically the powers of light are stronger than the powers of darkness, the priests who are the mediators between the spirits and the people, and who are supposed to possess the knowledge of the way to propitiate and manage generally these spirits, emphasize the lower elements of dread and confidence in magic. Yet, amidst these lower elements, which are of so much profit to the science and acquired qualifications for "shamanizing," there exist the elements also of something higher and nobler. Even in Shamanism we may catch the spirit of an impulse toward, and a faith in, something better. This spirit and faith express themselves in the cry of the worshipper:

"Hear my weeping, my prayer,
Mother Sun, who dwelleth here,
Listen to my weeping, my prayer."

And it is of special interest in this connection to notice that the ancient Shamanistic ceremonies survive among the people

¹ Aus Sibirien, Lose Blätter aus meinem Tagebuche, by Dr. Wilhelm Radloff, II, p. 5f.

long after they have embraced a monotheistic faith in the form of Muhammadanism.¹ The very constitution of Shamanism justifies, indeed, the declaration of M. Castrén, as quoted with approbation by Roskoff, when he inquires: "Who will not willingly concede that the whole of Shamanism contains a protest against the blind power of the natural forces over the spirit of man?"

It is peculiarly unfitting to speak of Fetishism as a definite species of religion; and even more so to regard it as the original form of religion. Fetishism is not even a separate stage of religious belief; it is only a special application of the beliefs of a general vague and relatively unreflecting spiritism. The fetish is the savage's *mascot*; it is the thing which is to bring good luck, because, as being the temporary abode of some spirit, its propitiation is at least theoretically possible by the worshipper whose fetish, for the time being, it continues to be. Whoever possesses the object in which the spiritual power is lodged, becomes possessed of the spirit who has the power. The appropriation of the thing secures some measure of control over the spirit temporarily located within it.² Whenever an idol is regarded as the lodging place of the invisible spirit of some deity, that idol becomes a fetish; and any natural object, or simplest structure put together by the worshipper himself, may be regarded from the same point of view. Thus in India the image of Durga does not become the proper object of worship (the real Durga) *until* the goddess has been invited to come and take up her abode in the rude and insignificant structure of bamboo, rope and clay.³ Indeed, the story told by Waitz⁴ gives us the essence of the conception which enters into all fetish-worship and all belief in fetishes as an

¹ Radloff, *Ibid.* II, p. 63.

² Compare D'Alviella, *Origin and Growth of the Conception of God* (Hibbert Lectures, 1891), p. 108.

³ See Max Müller, *Anthropological Religion*, p. 158f.

⁴ *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, II, p. 188.

affair of religion. A South-African negro who was told that the tree could not eat the food he was offering to it replied: "Oh! tree not fetish. Fetish spirit; not seen. Live in tree." The spirit that "lives in" the fetish is the true object of religious belief and worship. Understood in this way, we find the belief and the cult corresponding, in its essential features, to the lowest and most loathsome forms of Fetishism, maintaining themselves among the more superstitious adherents of the higher forms of religion. Even Christianity has never freed itself from what is essentially fetish-worship. For generations in the Roman Catholic communities of Southern Europe the common people have been ready to treat the images of the saints as the savages of Australia and Polynesia treat their fetishes, when they fail to respond to their prayers for help. At this stage, the religious consciousness is as ready to make a fetish out of a cross, or a doll representing the Virgin, as out of the compass of a ship, a cunningly shaped stone, or a bit of wood, the horn of an animal, or a Nüremberg clock in the form of a bear.¹

Among the various phases of this vague and unreflecting spiritism there is none more obscure and puzzling, and none more seemingly foreign to the thought and imagination of the man of modern culture, than that known as Totemism. The religious belief designated by this word (a corruption of an Indian word meaning "my set") implies an intimate and important, but invisible and spiritual relation between some group of non-human objects and some human individual, or group of human beings. There are, therefore, totems of the clan, or tribe, where all the members consider themselves as specially connected with some animal upon which they look

¹ But the term "fetish" is itself liable to abuse; even Tiele goes so far as to call the *shān wei*, or wooden tablets employed by the Chinese as the "seat of the spirit" in their ancestor worship, by this name (See Legge, *The Religions of China*, p. 20f). Indeed, while they are being worshipped, these tablets have some of the most important characteristics of the fetish, and of the idol as well.

with reverence; and there are family totems and individual totems as well. But even less than the other chief forms of Spiritism can this form of religious belief and cult be regarded as either a separate species of religion, or as a special manifestation of the religious consciousness that is universal with man. To make it the origin of all the lower and cruder forms of religious belief is absurd. Totemism is, indeed, in several important respects, closely allied with the worship of animals and of natural objects generally; it may, therefore, be regarded as one of the forms of so-called animism which is most prominent among certain savage and primitive peoples. But perhaps more unverifiable hypotheses have been advanced in connection with the subject of Totemism than in connection with any of the other allied forms of religious belief. For example, the claims that totem-poles were the origin of idols, that ceremonies connected with the burial and revival of the life of nature are totemistic, and that the sacrifice of the totem is the most primitive form of sacrifice, are all unproved and quite obviously mistaken. That a totem must marry outside of his totem, that the totem-worshipper must or must not eat his totem, are not necessarily and they probably are not actually, an integral part of the cult of this religious belief.¹ Nor has the existence of Totemism, in the stricter meaning of this word, been proved to have any considerable hold upon the Semitic peoples, including the Babylonians, or upon the peoples of that land of multiform species of Spiritism, the continent of India. "We have found no trace," says De Groot,² "in China of animals being worshipped in their capacity of tribal progenitors, so that we entertain serious doubts whether any so-called Totemism exists in East-Asia as a religious phenomenon." It is probable that even among the Redskins Totemism is an affair of relatively late elaboration. And where

¹ As put forth by McLennon, W. Robertson Smith, Jevons, Frazer, and others.

² The Religious System of China, IV, p. 271.

it seems most nearly primitive, its religious significance is less prominent than its economic significance. The Uganda tribe are said to explain their objection to killing their totem on hygienic grounds. On the other hand, in many more cases the animal or vegetable venerated is the food that supports the tribe. It would appear that among the native Australians the theory and practice of totem, and all the wild mythology connected with it, has little or no religious significance.¹ In a word, Totemism, wherever it exists as a religious belief and cult, is obviously only one among many synchronous forms of belief and cult which all conform to the conceptions belonging to a certain stage of man's religious development.

Theriolatry, or the worship of animals, is perhaps, psychologically considered, the most obviously natural, tenacious, justifiable and universal of the lower forms of religion. Modern science has conspired with that conception of the dignity and value of the human Self which Greek philosophy and the Christian religion combined to give to the ancient world, and has thus placed man at the head of the animal kingdom. In whatever physical qualities other animals may surpass him, they are all, nevertheless, now regarded as belonging to "lower" classes. But the superior strength, swiftness, cunning or instinctive certainty, and seeming independence of many of the lower animals, coupled with the unintelligible character of their cries and other means of communication, and especially, perhaps, their disregard of the terrors of darkness (for man's superiority of imagination and intellect increases both his well-founded and his superstitious fears) are sufficient reasons to savage and primitive man for regarding them as partaking of the Divine Being in some more intimate way than himself. In this kind of animism or spiritizing on which Theriolatry is founded, myth, fable, and religious belief, create and foster a strange medley indeed. But primitive man is ignorant of the

¹ Comp. Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, chap. IV.

nature of the life of the animals as understood from the psychological point of view. Yet he must construe this life after the analogy of his own. This leads him readily to believe that the bodies of the animals are controlled by psychical principles like those of which he is himself conscious, but which are even more incomprehensible and mysterious than is, to himself, his own self-conscious soul. Hence his experience with the animals leads him to a further belief, and a cult, that have the essential characters of religion, when the conception of religion is reduced to its lowest terms. Theriolatry is, then, a kind of vague and unreflecting spiritism.

Among the animals which have been made the objects of religious belief and worship there are two classes that are especially prominent. They are the birds and the serpents. The reasons for this prominence seem to be chiefly two: the universal distribution of these classes, and their peculiar characteristics. Thus, among the Eskimos, birds are esteemed, above all other things, to have the faculty of soul. The Algonkins say that birds make the winds and spread the clouds; and why not? since they come like the winds from all quarters and seem to be intimately connected with the spreading of the clouds. The Navajos place a white swan at each point of the compass; and the natives of the Northwest coast "explain the thunder as the sound of the cloud-bird flapping his wings, and the lightning as the fire that flashes from his tracks."¹ The worship of the serpent, that mysterious and dreadful manifestation of the power of life and death, is too ancient to allow of tracing its historical beginnings, and too universal to need much of local and specific illustration. By the Redskins generally the rattlesnake has been venerated from time immemorial; it is with some of them the embodied spirit of the wise and worshipful ancestor; and the man who has learned safely to juggle with this poisonous reptile is worthy of being regarded as a sort of medium of religious influences. So with the cobra in

¹ Brinton, *The Myths of the New World*, p. 125.

India. "Who is a manito?" asks the mystic chant of the Algonkians: "He who walketh with a serpent, walking on the ground, he is a manito," is the reply. The supernatural explanation of the lightning given by this tribe is that it is a serpent which the great Manito is vomiting forth?¹ When magnified by an unrestricted imagination, and helped on by the myth-making tendency, Ophiology creates most wonderful structures of belief and incites to amazing forms of religious worship. In India, Nāga is a wonderful dragon-like serpent, a most powerful divine spirit. There is in the sky the snake who devours the rain-clouds and whom the god Indra must be invoked to destroy. At the time when the Buddhist traveller Fah Hian visited India, a "white-eared dragon" was worshipped at Sankisa who "caused fertilizing and seasonable showers of rain to fall within their country, and preserved it from plagues and calamity."² In the Travancore district to-day there are more than fifteen thousand shrines dedicated exclusively to the propitiatory worship of snakes. And everywhere in that district when a snake is seen approaching, the people say "The god is coming," and with reverence rather than fear, "make way for the divinity."

It is not the lower animals alone, but plants and trees, and even stones and various inanimate objects, that may become the lodging places of invisible, superhuman spirits, and so objects of propitiatory and other forms of worship. For they, too, are easily regarded as either the temporary or the more permanent embodiments or abodes of spiritual powers on which man feels himself dependent for his weal and woe, and which take some lively interest in the way that they are treated by man. That trees should seem alive and spiritual, and should be worshipped with either love or fear, does not appear strange from the psychological point of view; but it is by a process which one writer

¹ Brinton, *Ibid.*, p. 131f.

² W. Crooke, *The Popular Religion and Folk-lore of Northern India*, II, p. 129.

(D'Alviella) has characterized as "in virtue of highly complex and indirect deductions," that stones and other inanimate objects should be credited with life and movement. Various reasons may readily be given why some kinds of trees should be deemed especially sacred and divine; in certain cases the original reason may be lost from sight or merged in some more recent conclusion of the imaginative and emotional logic of the religious experience. The palm has been worshipped in Arabia and Syria for centuries on account of its beneficent and motherly nurture of man; and among the Romans in Italy, the fig tree. In India the Asoka has long been regarded as divinely beautiful; the tulsi plant has been worshipped for its medicinal qualities; but above all the Soma, or moon-plant, whose yellow juice has such mysterious intoxicating power, and which is therefore regarded as not only most acceptable for an offering to the gods, but as a veritable god itself! And stones that have, as meteorites, fallen from heaven, or that have a strange and mysterious appearance, or that have chanced to get connected with some important event so as to seem to be part of its cause, or that have somehow been specially favored by conjunction with some god or demon, may themselves be believed in and worshipped as divine. The flint, which can emit sparks that are themselves tokens of an indwelling divine life, needs no other proof of its divine nature for the mind of the savage man. Such a stone it was, say the Nahnas, which fell from heaven to earth, and out of the fragments of which arose the demigods, the progenitors of men. In ancient Arabia, and even down to the present day, all such natural objects have readily been conceived of as the temporary, or more permanent abodes of supernatural beings called *djinn*s.¹

¹ The writer of an article entitled "Forty Years Ago" (*i. e.*, in India) tells how, when he left his native village for the city, the friendly old women who accompanied him to the station, thought the puffings and pantings of the locomotive to be signs of exhaustion, and cried *ji re, ji re* ("may you live on, may your life be spared"); while one, when the machine came to a standstill, threw it a bunch of flowers and a glass of milk, with prayers

Indeed, this universal animism or spiritizing stops at no obstacle, however insuperable it may appear to the scientific thinking and sober imagining of another type of mental life. It is from this fact of its unrestrained and uninformed character that Magic in religion derives its powerful influence. For of magic, too, we must say that it is no specific form of religious belief; nor is it, as Professor Frazer has attempted to make out in his elaborate treatise, *The Golden Bough*,¹ a stage of progress regularly antecedent to religion. Indeed, magic is not necessarily religious at all; for the powers which it is attempted to control by the instrumentality of magic are not necessarily worshipped or propitiated as superhuman, spiritual powers. "Rainmakers" are, the rather, an economical factor in many of the African villages. Just as in the Isle of Man and in the Shetlands there exist to-day old women who drive a trade in "selling winds to sea-men"; and in ancient times the Greeks and Romans sought to obtain rain by magic *when they had failed* to get the same boon by use of the religious instrumentalities of prayers and processions. For magic consists in the possession and use of secret and mysterious means of obtaining good or avoiding evil; it, therefore, becomes religious only when the sources of good and evil are, in each particular case, regarded as lodged in some one of those invisible superhuman powers in which religion believes and which it worships.

It would then be more appropriate to say that prayer *is* a religion, or sacrifice *is* a religion, than to say the same thing of magic. In all instances of that form of religious belief which we are now considering, the practice of magic is an almost necessary, as it is certainly a logical, consequence of the belief itself. Thus, among the Redskins, the Africans, and the

and invocations to *Injin-Mae*, begging her to be a good mother to this motherless boy, and to carry him safely over sea and mountain (See East and West, July, 1903, p. 817).

¹ See especially I, p. 75f.

Australians, we find magic and religion existing together, but not identified, from the earliest times. And in China to-day we have in Tâoism a most impressive example of the degrading side of Spiritism; for it is the incessant and depressing dread of invisible, superhuman spirits which gives to the Tâoist priests, or "yellow tops," their power over the people. Nor is this power, in its origin and character essentially different from that which the peasant women in certain parts of France attribute to their Christian priests, and believe them to exercise over the elements by certain mystical prayers. In this respect, as Roskoff well says:¹ "There is no essential difference between the Siberian Shaman and the North-American medicine-man, the South-American Paye, the South-African Mganga, the Australian sorcerer and him on the Islands of the South Seas";—and we might add, the Tâoist and Christian priest, when the latter lends himself to a belief in magic.

Attention has already been called to the universal character of that religious belief which takes the manifold particular forms of a vague and unreflecting Spiritism among primitive and savage peoples; and which survives everywhere down to the present day among the intellectually and ethically lower orders of civilized peoples. Even among the ancient Greeks, both in the earliest times and also in later times, especially in the rural districts, all the different manifestations of this kind of Spiritism are either to be reasonably suspected or are actually discoverable. The stones which had come down from heaven as meteors were worshipped, often in the places which they had made sacred by their falling. Traces of stone fetishes also appear; and, as well, of the worship of trees, plants, and animals—not excepting the insects, of which one, the cicada, was regarded as sacred to Helios. "Even the bees, which deposited their store in the clefts of the earth or, according to the idea of the ancient Greeks and Orientals, in corpses, ap-

¹ Das Religionswesen der Rohesten Naturvölker, p. 134.

pear to have been considered as souls of the dead ;³” and thus, as possible objects of worship. In the imagination of Greeks the wind-gods naturally took the form of steeds or of birds. Remains of this universal animism are also to be found, although with a relative paucity, in the Babylonian religion as made known to us by the monuments.¹ In the magical formulas, in the legends, and epics, “a great number of spirits” are introduced to which rather indefinite and shifty functions are ascribed. A general class of protective demons, or genii, is also mentioned ; and in certain places, demons who inhabit the fields and serve to occupy and guard the ground and the soil. A special class of demons is also referred to, who disturb the quiet of the dead and need to be propitiated on that account. The cases of ancient Egypt and of modern India need not be referred to again in this connection. And, indeed, further evidence is scarcely required to justify that conception of the nature of religious belief, when reduced to its lowest but most universally prevalent terms, which we are defending. In all subsequent consideration of the problems offered by the origin and development of religion this evidence will be steadily accumulating.

These seemingly wild and unrestrained orgies of the imagination which ascribes the good and the evil of human life to the direct action of invisible and superhuman spirits and demons, which peoples with them the earth, sky, air, water, and woods, which assigns to them their temporary or more permanent lodging place in stones, trees, and animal bodies, and which thus works upon all the emotions of human nature to produce toward these spirits and demons a certain religious attitude of mind and life, are not without their rational and morally worthy aspect. For it must be borne in mind, that natural existence *as such*, or things considered as *mere* things, have never

¹ See Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*, München, 1897, I, p. 801.

² Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 180ff. and 457.

been the objects of man's religious faith and worship. Apparently, the lowest Fetishism does not identify its god with the thing-like representation—the object of the senses in itself considered, with the invisible object of religious faith. An unwarranted disrespect to the intelligence of the most degraded savages is done when they are virtually accused of incapacity for making those distinctions which are necessary for even the lowest form of religion. To be guilty of this disrespect is not only to contradict the evidences of history and of psychological analysis; but we may say with Max Müller¹ that it is to be “irrational.”

The other form of religion which at first seems to escape from all attempts to define its nature in accordance with the common religious experience of mankind, is Buddhism. It must be admitted that in several important respects Buddhism furnishes to the student of comparative religion from the philosophical point of view some of his most exacting and interesting problems. So far, however, as the particular problem is concerned, which consists in the attempt to apprehend the essential, constitutive, and most primitive elements of any form of religion, the following remarks are applicable to the special difficulties offered by Buddhism.

And, first, let it be accepted as trustworthy tradition that Sākya-Muni, the founder of Buddhism, did not attempt a new religion; and that he was agnostic, or even positively atheistic in his own belief, and in his teachings with respect to the gods of Brāhmanism and of the popular faith. Nevertheless, his teaching most definitely aimed at producing a religious attitude of belief, feeling, and conduct toward the Being of the World—both physical objects and human life. This attitude was essentially identical with that already assumed and defended as constituting the very essence of religion as knowledge and as the way of salvation, by certain Brāhmanical thinkers themselves. The Buddhistic agnosticism with regard to

¹ Anthropological Religion p. 73.

the validity of the Brāhmanical conception of Atman, the World-Soul, and the Buddhistic denial of the substantial character of the human soul, does not by any means wholly destroy the religious character and significance of the teaching of the Buddha. Moreover, the Buddhistic conceptions of the Universe as a kind of all-pervading and eternal system of moral retribution, or Karma, and of each individual soul as having a "moral kernel" as its own karma, are, it seems to us, quite as definitely religious as were the Brāhmanical conceptions which they were intended to displace. And, finally, as to so-called "original Buddhism;" if it was not in any essential respect a form of religion, then it does not concern our theory of the nature of religion to fit itself to the particular beliefs and cult which originated in the teachings of its founder.

But, secondly: Whatever was true of the Buddhistic doctrine and life, so far as its tenets and institutions had their source in the person and work of Sākya-Muni, there can be no doubt that Buddhism almost at once became regarded as a religion; and that as a form of religious faith and practice it has spread among the peoples of the Orient. Indeed, it is an almost satirical criticism of irreligion that Buddha himself was speedily believed in and worshipped as a god.

In the third place: Buddhism as it exists in diversified form in various lands is obviously one of the world's greater religions. In the minds of the reflective classes among its millions of adherents, and in its philosophical schools (especially in Japan), it shares the more essential characteristics of that Brāhmanism from which it sprang in India, so many centuries ago. Its schools, like those of its ancestor among religions, comprise the adherents of divergent doctrines of the Divine Being which extend all the way from the most crass materialistic Pantheism to a spiritual Theism which is only with difficulty distinguishable in many of its most essential features from the theistic belief of Chistianity. Indeed, by making the necessary changes in two words only we may apply what Sir

Monier Williams says of Brāhmanism to Buddhism as well : “ It may even be true that while accepting Hindūism (Buddhism) he may be at the same time a believer in Buddhism (Hindūism), in Mohammedanism, in Judaism, in Christianity ; or he may call himself a Theist, a Deist, a Polytheist, a Theosophist, or even an agnostic.” But the doctrine of the Being of the World, which binds together these so diverse views will still be found to result from an activity of the human spirit essentially similar to that which, at the lower stages of race-culture and outside of the influences of schools of religious philosophy, we have characterized as a “ vague and unreflecting spiritism.”

From this religious point of view the Universe itself is conceived of as a Spiritual Entity. The Being of the World is akin and yet vastly superior to that being which man in his best actual state feels himself to be, but for more of which he unceasingly longs. It is therefore worshipful, and the worthy object of human devotion and striving. While, however, the Buddhism of the schools, and of those affected by the tenets aimed at by reflective thinking, believes in and worships this Being of the World—divine because spiritually conceived—the religion of the multitudes nominally connected with the Buddhistic faith continues to exhibit that medley of beliefs and practices which has already been described as quite universally belonging to the lower stages of man’s religious development. Indeed, wherever it has gone, Buddhism has readily absorbed or amalgamated with the various earlier religions it has met ; in China with Tāoism, in Japan with Shintō, in Ceylon with devil-worship. Thus, in fact, whatever contention may be made in favor of its earlier *non*-religious character, Buddhism is now, and has been for centuries, one of the most characteristic and widespreading of the world’s missionary religions.

Further study of that species of pantheistical conception respecting the Object of religious belief and worship to which

Buddhism most essentially belongs will reveal certain prominent features of its likeness to the lower forms of Spiritism. Vague it certainly is; but unreflecting it certainly is not. Its vagueness is no doubt oftentimes due to the thoroughness of its reflection; it is thus a sort of protest against the attempts of Theism more definitively to comprehend the Being of the World in terms of a personal, ethical Spirit. Its feeling of the mystery, the sacredness, and the majesty of the Universe, thus spiritually conceived, is without doubt profoundly religious. The character of its reasoning, and of the expression given to its conclusions, is especially captivating to the mind of the Orient; but it is not devoid of charm and potency of influence upon many thoughtful minds among the Western nations. It is essentially in accordance with the Buddhistic conception of the nature of religion that Carlyle answers the inquiry, "What is it to be religious as any human being should be?" in the following way: "But the thing a man does practically believe (and this is often enough *without* asserting it to himself, much less to others); the thing a man does practically lay to heart, and know for certain concerning his vital relations to the mysterious Universe, and his duty and destiny there, that is in all cases the primary thing for him, and creatively determines all the rest. That is his religion."¹

The logical fallacies and unscientific character of this form of the pantheistical conception of religion, as well as its failure to meet man's practical needs, will appear in the discussion of other problems. It is enough at present to have noticed how completely the religion, which on first examination seems to escape from the terms of all definitions,—to be a sort of non-

¹ On Heroes, Hero Worship, etc., in the lecture on the Hero as Divinity. So, too, with Tolstoi we find an essentially Buddhistic conception of religion expressed as follows: "Religion is the relation which man acknowledges toward the Universe about him, or to its source and first cause; and a reasoning man must perforce be in some sort of perceptive relationship to it." (See Ethical Record, February, 1901).

religious religion—really corresponds with the experience to meet which our definition is framed ; Buddhism, too, is a belief in the Being of the World as essentially constituting an invisible and superhuman spiritual environment, to which man must adjust himself in head, heart, and life. The Soul of the World evokes the outreaching toward itself of the soul of man.

It is not possible for philosophy, however, to remain satisfied with a conception of religion which gathers up and expresses only the *minimum* content of its essential truth and supreme worth for the practical life. All religions imply indeed, at least as much of belief as we have found in Fetishism, Totemism, Shamanism, Theriolatry and the whole list of the lower forms of nature-worship. Even that complex system of philosophic tenets and motley crowd of superstitious beliefs and practices which at its beginning was no new religion, has felt itself compelled to accept so large a content of religious faith, But while anthropology, with its superior interest in origins, may properly regard even the lowest forms of religious belief and practice as sufficient to reveal the essence of religion, philosophy, which deals with ends and ideals, cannot be satisfied in the same way. For philosophy, only the higher forms of religious faith afford the true criterion by which to judge what is the essential and permanent content of religion. The end and ideal toward which the lower forms point forward contains the truth which, by its backward shining, illumines all that lies behind and below. In defining this end, and constructing this ideal, philosophy must indeed be guided by the historical and psychological method. The actual development of the religious beliefs and practices of the race, when estimated by the application of the standard of religious values, directs our speculative and harmonizing reflections toward an ideal end. A study of man's developed religious being and of his historical religious development, is therefore indispensable to answer the problem of philosophy. This problem concerns the nature which religion will have when it reaches its own final purpose ;

when, that is to say, it shall have set into actuality that which is now an unrealized ideal.¹

There coëxists, even in the case of the lowest forms of religion, a very dim, or a somewhat more definite impression of the unity in origin and character of all living things. And since, in the imagination of the savage and primitive man, all things may seem alive, the impression is that of a unity of primeval and universal life. From this life all things that show the signs of life emerge, as forms or expressions of that which is, in its essence, a sort of united whole. "To them," says Otfried Müller of the Etruscans, "divinity seemed a world of Life, blossoming forth from an impenetrable depth into definite forms and individual expressions." Especially persuasive and influential among the ancient Egyptians was this impression of something common in origin and essential characteristics belonging to every form and manifestation of life. Their worship of animals was neither due to a carefully thought out pantheism; nor was it altogether like the fetishism of the negroes. It was not simply a survival of prehistoric religion, nor a degradation of a preëxisting monotheistic belief. It was rather a development of their prevalent and habitual view of the nature of life. This view led them to make no essential distinctions between gods and men, to deify their dead under conditions of living quite similar to those obtaining in this life; and to regard the incarnations and reïncarnations of both gods and deified men in animal bodies as something entirely natural and everywhere to be presupposed. The spirits of gods and men needed, of course, some form of manifestation; but neither gods nor men were tied to any one form of manifestation. Indeed, plants as well as animals, men as well as

¹ Religion in its essence, says Pflëiderer, "is least of all to be recognized in its historical beginnings; it reveals itself only through its actualization in the course of its historical development, and most distinctly in the highest culminating point in that development, in Christianity." *Philosophy and Development of Religion* (Gifford Lectures, 1894,) I, p. 30.

gods, were all subject to the process of transmigration; and what particular animal was a specially favorite incarnation of any particular god, was a matter determined oftentimes by very unessential considerations. It is not necessary to refer to any of the innumerable proofs of the existence of this vague conception of the unity of all life, which pervades the popular religions of India and Japan to-day. Even some of the barbarian hordes of Kamschatka hold that beyond, and in, all things visible is an invisible but ultimate Power. And, indeed, this crude form of unifying is the earliest result in religion of any exercise of man's reflective powers upon his experience with that Universe which constitutes his spiritual as well as merely physical environment.

The various influences which operate to give logical character, nobility, purity, and practical efficiency, to this process of unifying the invisible, superhuman, spiritual powers, a belief in which constitutes the essential content of religion, will be considered in relation to the development of religion. It belongs, however, to a preliminary conception of the very nature of religion as philosophy aims to determine this problem, to lay emphasis upon the following three factors: (1) The growth of the race, or of any particular portion of the race, in that knowledge of the Unity of the World which the culture of science and philosophy imparts, inevitably affects in a profound way the nature of man's religious belief. (2) That unfolding, enriching, and heightening of his own self-conscious life, which comes to man through his varied experiences, results in a more true, profound and comprehensive knowledge, and a more intelligent and appreciative estimate of the value, of the Self. Of necessity, this greatly improved idea, and corresponding ideal, of Self-hood has an immeasurably great influence upon man's conception of the Object of his religious faith and upon both his involuntary and voluntary attitudes toward this Object. (3) His ethical and social progress, and the accompanying changes in his motives, accepted principles

of conduct, and ethical and social ideals, make it impossible for him to maintain the same stage of belief, feeling, and conduct, which has been characterized as that of a vague and unreflecting Spiritism.

Under manifold influences, of which the three groups just enumerated are the most important, the essential content of man's religious belief unfolds itself before us in his religious history. This history is the history of the evolution of the religious man, —the rise in truth, purity, and beneficence, of the attitude of man's spirit toward his spiritual environment. And as we watch this rise we see the vague and relatively low and even degrading belief in an innumerable and motley crowd of invisible and superhuman powers, which themselves too often wholly lack any characteristic of man's highest ethical, æsthetical, and spiritual ideals, replaced by the belief in the One Divine Being, conceived of in conformity with these ideals. In union with the belief, there develops an experience of those feelings of dependence, reverence, trust, and devotion, and of those forms of service, which are essentially dependent upon the belief. In this way the conclusion establishes itself, that *religion when conceived of in conformity to its own ideals, is the belief in the Being of the World as perfect Ethical Spirit; with the entire emotional and practical life brought into harmony with this belief.*

It is some such conception as this which has led theologians who have been duly sensitive to the demands made by ideal standards upon any religion, to speak of Christianity as "*the religion of religions,*" "*the absolute religion.*" Theoretically, such a phrase implies that this form of religious belief is *the* truth to which the Reality of the World's Being corresponds; and, practically, it lays an obligation upon religion to effect an actual and fully satisfying union, or "at-one-ment" of man with God.

Before leaving for the present the further proof of our conception of the nature of religion, both when taken at its lowest

terms and also when considered in relation to its essential ideal, the following conclusions from the definition are in place. They will be found indispensable in the search for answers to other problems which come before philosophy when it concerns itself with the religious life and religious development of humanity. One truth particularly to be insisted upon is this: Religion is a form of human experience which involves, of necessity, all the activities of the human soul. The whole man enters into the individual's religion; and even into what any individual may choose to regard mistakenly as his *ir*religion. The whole of humanity is intimately concerned in the religious life of humanity. For here, as everywhere in the important development and expressions of his subconscious conditions and conscious strivings, man is a psychical unity—however we may choose to classify and diversify his so-called powers. Anthropology has already been appealed to as affording the statement that the spiritual unity of the race must be assumed to be a precondition for any understanding of human affairs. In religion there is always a certain amount of belief, or knowledge, a predominatingly intellectual attitude toward its Object. But emotions and sentiments of a somewhat characteristic type are reasonably and indeed necessarily connected with this belief. These emotions and sentiments are essentially similar in all religions. And the conduct of the believer, as expressive of his intellectual and emotional attitudes, is always determined by these beliefs, emotions, and sentiments. In a word, all of humanity enters into religion.

But religion in its higher forms is itself a certain attitude of mind, feeling, and will, toward a Universal Principle. For the religious experience this Principle must represent an incalculably great, if not a supreme and all-inclusive worth; it must gather to itself and stand in thought, imagination, sentiment, and conduct, for what has most of value, and is therefore most worthy of possession by the human soul and of propagation among mankind. This Principle, therefore, since it is an Ideal

of such supremely worthy character, must be progressively revealed in human experience. And, finally, in the interests of man's earnest desire, and incessant demand and effort, to know the truth of Reality, this Principle must be conceived of as an Ideal-Real, a Principle of the Being of the World as well as an Object of religious belief and worship. Religion as subjective, a matter of experience, becomes, therefore, essentially and necessarily also a theory as to the Ultimate Reality.

Conceptions of the nature of religion which neglect any of these essential factors, whether of intellect, feeling, or will, are so far forth defective theoretically; and the forms of religious experience which are patterned after any of these defective conceptions lack something of the ethical and spiritual efficiency and value which belongs to a full-orbed religious life. Moreover, what is true of the experience of the individual is also true of the experience of large portions of the human race and of particular periods or epochs in its history.

The proof of the first of these statements might be furnished, in part, by citing the definitions of religion given by various writers on its history or its philosophy.¹ "By religion," says D'Alviella,² "I mean the conception man forms of his relations with the superhuman and mysterious powers on which he believes himself to depend." According to Kant, "religion (subjectively considered) is the cognition of all our duties as divine commands."³ And Martineau⁴ defines it as a belief in an ever-living God, *i. e.*, "a Supreme Mind and Will, directing the universe and holding moral relations with human life." But, neither a conception of relations, nor a cognition of duties, nor a belief in a Divine Mind and Will, exhaustively

¹ For a criticism of several unwarrantable identifications of the whole of religion with some one of its aspects, see M. Guyau, *L'Irreligion de L'Avenir*, p. xif.

² *Ibid*, p. 47.

³ *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* (ed. of 1794), iv, 1 [opening sentence].

⁴ *A Study of Religion*, I, p. 15.

defines the content of religion; nor does either of these definitions satisfactorily correspond to the facts of man's religious history. The same criticism obtains with respect to those conceptions of the nature of religion which are now so current, and which would reduce it wholly to the realm of either instinctive or rational emotions. Neither of the several forms in which the gifted and quickening religious teacher, Schleiermacher,¹ expressed his view that feeling is the essential content of religion, is either historically or psychologically defensible; and the same thing must be said of the form in which M. Sabatier² has recently revived the view of Schleiermacher. To say with the former that the essence of piety is to feel ourselves as "absolutely dependent upon God," or, what is the same thing, as in relation with God—"one with the Eternal;" or with the latter, that "the feeling of our subordination furnishes the (sole) experiential and indestructible basis for the idea of God," is to exalt a part of the truth to the position of the whole. Even more guarded must our assent be to conceptions which find the essential content of religion in "a craving for an ideal object." (J. S. Mill); or in "a feeling of reverence for what is above, around, and beneath us" (Goethe); or in a vague "cosmic emotion" (Dühring), or "an habitual and permanent feeling of admiration." All these feelings, and still others, may indeed be enlisted by, and may serve as excitants and guides to, the beliefs and practices of religion. But neither one of them, nor all of them together, can be considered as exhausting the essential content of religion.

That religion psychologically considered, like all other human conscious developments, has in some sort its seat in the voluntary powers; that from the ethical point of view, it neces-

¹ "Die Frömmigkeit welche die Basis aller Kirchlichen Gemeinschaften ausmacht, ist rein für sich betrachtet weder ein Wissen noch ein Thun, sondern eine Bestimmtheit des Gefühls oder des unmittelbaren Selbstbewusstseins: Christliche Glaubenslehre, I, § 3. Compare the various utterances in the *Reden über die Religion*.

² *Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion*, p. 19f.

sarily shows itself in the form of control over conduct; and that the objective manifestations of religion in its cult and institutions cannot properly be disregarded in forming our conception of the nature of religion;—all these, and other correlated evidences to the prominence of will in the religious life and development of man must be freely acknowledged and fairly estimated. But they can serve neither to exclude nor to submerge the acknowledgment and proper estimate of the intellectual and emotional factors in religion. “Being good,” if it be “for God’s sake,” is indeed a title to an advanced place in the scale of religious values. And King Asoka, who found the root or living spring of all religion in forbearance, or charity, and who credited all religions with the four cardinal points of excellence,—viz., control of the passions, purity of mind, gratitude, and loyalty,—was by no means wholly out of the way. But unintelligent and unemotional willing cannot form the essential content of anything that has worth. And Schopenhauer’s conception of religion as the popular and allegorical metaphysics of the World as Will, in spite of the essential truth which it contains, is a one-sided and indeed, in some respects, a virtually non-religious conception.

In closing this discussion of the nature of religion it is instructive to notice how those definitions which take at once the higher philosophical, rather than the psychological or the historical point of view, have always a pantheistical coloring, which is at least spread over their surface even if it do not penetrate them through and through. And this is, indeed, necessary, unless we are to define religion in such way as to exclude from the conception a large proportion of the results of reflection upon the phenomena of man’s religious life and development. Thus we hear Fichte¹ declaring that “religion is the immediate consciousness of the true world, producing itself in our freedom;” or that it is “an intuition of the World

¹ See the whole subject discussed in the treatise *Versuch eines Kritik aller Offenbarung*.

which is born of moral freedom and of love of the Good, the One, the True, and which bears blessedness in itself." And Hegel¹ affirms that religion is "the knowledge possessed by the finite mind of its nature as Absolute Mind." Edward Caird,² in acknowledged dependence upon Hegel, finds the essential factor in all religion to be a "consciousness of the Infinite." Pfeiderer³ regards the kernel common to all religions as being that "reference of man's life to the World-governing Power, which seeks to grow into a living union with it;" and a recent writer⁴ has advanced the view that religion, essentially considered, is a conscious relation to Universal Being, or "a relation of the human spirit to Absolute Being"—the *differentiæ* of the particular religions being either subjective (feeling, thought, and will) or objective according to the way in which the conception of this Being is formed.

Now it is undoubtedly true, as Deussen⁵ maintains, that what originally inspired the doctrines and beliefs of the various religions must have been some very real and immediate matter of experience, something of an ontological consciousness which seemed to have a valid and, indeed, irresistible claim to represent a universal reality (*ein sehr Reales, innerlich Erlebtes und Geschautes*). In all the forms of religion of which Buddhism has already been considered to be the type, we find a certain attitude of mind, feeling, and life toward the Universe or the Being of the World conceived of as somehow a spiritually significant Totality, which is worthy to be called "religious." This attitude has the essential psychological characteristics of religion; and its belief as respects the nature of the Being of the World is an essentially religious belief. But since it is the result of a process of reflection which has passed beyond the

¹ This summarizes his conclusions in the *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, I, A, III, 37f.

² *The Evolution of Religion* [Gifford Lectures, 1890], I, chaps. I-IV.

³ *The Philosophy of Religion* (second edition), III, 27.

⁴ A. Dorner, *Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie*, p. 51f.

⁵ *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, I, p, viii.

stage attained by the lower forms of religion, such as bear the characters of an unreflecting Spiritism, and has not as yet reached that higher stage in which the Universe is conceived of, from the point of view of religion, as perfect Ethical Spirit, this pantheistical conception of religion is not well fitted to serve the purposes of either a preliminary or a final and exhaustive description of the essential nature of the religious life and development of humanity. Something richer and more comprehensive than is provided for by any one of these conceptions, to the exclusion of the others, must be understood by the term, RELIGION.

CHAPTER V

UNIVERSALITY OF RELIGION

In discussing the nature of religion, both as it shows itself vaguely and confusedly in the lower forms of man's religious experience, and also as it attains a clearer revelation of its essential content in the higher forms of this experience, it has already been assumed that religion is universal with the race. And, indeed, there is not the same necessity now as that which formerly existed for defending the historical truthfulness of this assumption. If the conception of the nature of religion be adjusted properly to the truth of history, the fact of the universality of religion may be firmly established upon an historical basis. Such universality has reference to the entire race, not only as it now exists in all the different varieties and stages of race-culture, but also as far back in the past as the main characteristics of the life of humanity can be scientifically investigated. Any denial of religion as applied to sávrage or so-called primitive tribes, whose beliefs and practices can in any way be submitted to a critical and historical testing, must be of a negative and purely hypothetical character. This statement applies even to prehistoric man. As far as the evidence goes, human beings appear always to have been, what a psychological and anthropological study proves them now to be,—namely, religious, as well as speaking, ethical, and social beings.

To affirm the "universality" of religion in this meaning of the word is not, however, the same thing as to declare that individuals cannot anywhere be found who exhibit no signs of

religious belief and feeling, and who take no part in the rites and ceremonies of religion, or in other practical activities of a religious character. There is every reason to believe, indeed, that not a few of such seeming exceptions to the rule for the race are really profoundly religious, although not in the conventional way. Others of them may still require to be awakened to a fuller consciousness of the real meaning of their own inner life. If there are complete exceptions to the common religious nature of humanity, they may safely be regarded as abnormalities which do not affect the conclusions of the psychology and philosophy of the religious consciousness.

Are all men religious? Is man, *as man*, everywhere and at all times, a religious being? It would seem that we are warranted in answering both these questions, which are connected but not identical, with a somewhat confident affirmative. How does it happen, then, that so many travellers of recent or more remote times, and even resident missionaries, have reported the discovery of tribes or larger portions of the human race who were devoid of all religion? And how could writers¹ of note on anthropological topics be so deceived as to base important theories of man's historical development in general, and of the origin and development of religions in particular, upon these untrustworthy reports? While not excusing both those who have brought, and those who have accepted these reports, from a certain amount of carelessness and even, at times, of unworthy bias, we shall understand better the nature of man's religious experience if we briefly consider, in addition to what

¹ Perhaps Sir John Lubbock (*Prehistoric Times, and Origin of Civilization*, Appendix I, written against Bishop Whateley) is the most competent and fair-minded defender of the position that religion is by no means the universal possession of the human race. But Büchner, Pouchet, O. Schmidt, and Moritz Wagner, have maintained the same view. For a direct refutation of this view see, among other writers, Quatrefages (*The Human Species*, chap. XXXV); Flint (*Antitheistic Theories*, pp. 259ff and the Appendix); and especially Roskoff (*Das Religionswesen der Rohesten Naturvölker*, pp. 36ff.)

has already been said, (pp. 30ff.) the special difficulties which accompany the ascertainment of this class of facts.

Among the causes of the failure to discover and interpret the religions of savage and primitive peoples is the difference in language. It has been argued, for example, that the absence of an abstract name for a supreme Deity, or for divine beings in general, is sufficient evidence of the absence of all religious belief. What, by parity of reasoning, however, should one conclude as to the facts of experience on being told that some of the Australian tribes have no general name for tree, or fish, or bird; and others (as the Abiponer) no abstract term for man or body? How then could one expect to find among these tribes a word for so highly abstract a conception as that of Divine Being in general? Yet many of these more nearly primitive tribes do have rather developed conceptions of "creator gods," of chiefs among the invisible and superhuman spirits, or perhaps of a Great Spirit; they have also ideas of how the Divine Being made the beginnings of the world, although these ideas may seem to us very naïve and crude.

The natural shyness and deceit, and the indisposition to think, which constitute an important class of difficulties hard to overcome by the searcher after an inductive basis for his views on the nature, origin, and development of religion, quite generally operate to produce wrong impressions as to the real beliefs and sentiments of the savage. Among the Bushmen, Tahitians, and others, for example, it is always as difficult to get an accurate picture of their mental life as it is to take a photograph of their features; often it is much more difficult.¹ Moreover, when telling stories or myths of a semi-religious character, as well as when worshipping an idol or a fetish, these peoples are oftentimes perfectly well aware that they are myth-

¹ As an example of the shyness which savages show before Europeans, Roskoff refers to the trials of Dr. Oskar Lenz in his efforts to get physical measurements of the Abongos, a tribe of hunters and dwarfs on the Agowe. *Das Religionswesen der Rohesten Naturvölker*, p. 4f.

ologizing and speaking in exaggerated or mythological terms. And considering the unwillingness and inability to undertake the task of even trying to understand and to express one's religious experience clearly, which exists among the multitudes in the higher stages of race-culture, there is little cause to wonder that the same indisposition and weakness should prevent the savage from knowing the truth so as to reveal it readily to the inquiring stranger. To this cause of mistake must always be added the effect of the mysterious nature and hidden, indirect character of all human religious experience.

But, finally, the untrustworthiness of the evidence on which reliance has been placed for the existence of tribes who have no gods and no religion, has been in most cases made only too undoubted by subsequent more thorough and competent investigation. A curious instance of this may be taken from the writings of Don Felix de Azara who, in his book (*Voyage dans l'Amérique méridionale*,) says that the first Spaniards who became acquainted with the American Indians regarded them as not human, but as something between animals and men, and therefore as quite incapable of the capacity or the talent for understanding and practicing their religion. Indeed it required a bull of Pope Paul III (June 2d, 1537) to settle the dispute whether the Redskins were really human or not. Yet this same writer describes the religious beliefs and practices of the many American tribes, to whom, by identifying Christianity with religion in general, he denies all religious capacity. It is scarcely too much to say that, at present, all the witnesses on whom Lubbock relied have been shown to have been misled either by haste, incompetence, or prejudice. For example, Gerland has shown that the same traveller on whom Sir John relies to prove that the Brazilian Indians are without religion, himself reveals the facts that they reverence the moon and certain stars, believe in a principle of evil which is invisible, and try to propitiate it; and that they honor animals which they suppose to be messengers from the dead. Relying on the testi-

mony of a certain Dr. Hooker, the same authority instanced the Lepchas as without religion. But it is now known that the Lepchas are mostly Buddhists and have priests who are educated in Thibet; they are even described as not only a "morally affectionate" but also a "religiously susceptible" people. The Samoans, too, who used to be described as "godless," just as the early Christians were called "godless" by the Romans, are rather highly developed religiously.

Upon the fact of the existence of religion everywhere that our acquaintance with the race gives us the opportunity of having a well-founded opinion, both anthropology and comparative religion may now be said to be agreed. "Obliged in my course of instruction to review all human races," says Quatrefages,¹ "I have sought atheism in the lowest as well as the highest. I have nowhere met with it except in individuals or in more or less limited schools, etc." The same authority goes on to show that among those lowest races to which have been denied all religious ideas, there are traces of higher forms of belief which have existed side by side with the lowest superstitions,—a fact to which reference has already been made (p.88f). Thus among the Guinea negroes we find Fetishism and some conception of a Supreme Being; among the Northern European peoples, Shamanism and a relatively elevated idea of God; among the Redskins, witchcraft and magic together with a belief in a "Great Spirit"; and among the Tahitians, the most degrading superstitions and the conception of an "almost pure Divine Spirit." The negroes of Australia, too, know a spirit of the waters; the Polynesians recognize "a heavenly lord," and the negroes of Borneo a "creator of the earth." Substantially the same view as that of Quatrefages is shared by such anthropologists as Tylor, Waitz, Gerland, Peschel, and others.

Nor are we disappointed on turning to students of comparative religion from the historical point of view. "Hitherto no

¹ The Human Species, p. 482.

primitive people has been discovered devoid of all trace of religion" (Roskoff); "A people destitute of any religious notions has never been discovered" (Réville); "The statement that there are nations or tribes which possess no religion, rests either on inaccurate observation or on a confusion of ideas" (Tiele);—such are some of the many declarations which might be quoted in favor of the universality of religious beliefs and practices for historic man.

From the psychological point of view the universality of religion follows as a matter of course. In a word, man is so constituted that he cannot help being religious; and to his religious development all his most natural activities and receptivities, all the impressions made upon him by his environment and the reactions of his rational and spiritual nature upon this environment, are committed. This truth Réville¹ has stated in the following terms: "Religion, such as we define it, is inherent in the human mind and *natural*"; and Sabatier² has proclaimed the same truth in more dramatic fashion by declaring: "Religion is then immortal."

The evidence with regard to the religious beliefs of prehistoric man is, indeed, meagre and unsatisfactory, as it is with regard to the exact character of all his psychological reactions. The uncertainties and fallacies which quite inevitably attach themselves to the kind of antiquarian research that aims to derive a satisfactory view of man's inner life solely from remains of an external character,—fragmentary and doubtful of interpretation as these remains usually are,—have already been sufficiently remarked. But if prehistoric man closely resembled the most nearly primitive (so-called) man of to-day, the expressions of his religious beliefs and sentiments would not for

¹ History of Religions, p. 32.

² Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion, p. 22. He goes on to affirm: "Loin de se fermer et de tarir avec le temps, la source d'où elle jaillit au fond de l'âme, s'élargit et se creuse plus profonde et plus riche sous la double action de la réflexion philosophique et des expériences douloureuses de la vie."

the most part take a form that could afford an indubitable testimony to their character. Yet traces of the religion of prehistoric man, scarcely to be mistaken, convince us that, "as early as the mammoth age man practiced funeral rites, believed in a future life, and possessed fetishes and perhaps even idols."¹ It is difficult to say what further evidences of an objective antiquarian sort could be expected with respect to a subject like this. And in interpreting these and all similar expressions of the mind of savage and primitive man, it must always be remembered how much of the profoundest significance and most effective influence he attaches to things which seem trivial and childish, or even quite unintelligible to us.

It is not enough, however, to satisfy the facts, or to justify the conceptions and conclusions which we wish to place upon a basis of these facts, merely to observe that all men everywhere, and in all times, have some religious belief and form of religious cult. The ideas and major truths of religion are *universal* in a profounder and more significant meaning of the word than this. These great religious ideas and truths lie everywhere dormant, or rather vital but undeveloped, in the lower strata of human religious life. Moreover, they unfold themselves under like favoring circumstances and opportunity, into higher forms which tend to approach a more ideal and yet free, unitary being for this life. The germs of the highest and

¹ D'Alviella, *Origin and Growth of the Conception of God*, p. 15; and compare the conclusions respecting palæolithic man of Hoernes, *Die Urgeschichte des Menschen*, pp. 93ff. On the contrary, the haste with which the conclusion has been drawn from the existence of human bones, to some extent, in certain of the kitchen-middens of Europe, that prehistoric man did not believe in the immortality of the soul, and indeed had no religion, is sadly characteristic of not a little of the anthropological speculation of recent times. Happily, however, the foremost authorities in this young "science" are becoming more skillful in the use of the appropriate scientific method, and more cautious in their inductions. Says Hoernes: The denial that "the diluvial inhabitants of Europe" had religious regulations is "no better founded than that according to which articulate speech was said to be wanting to European men at the beginning of the quaternary age."

best, although in protoplasmic condition, exist in the lowest and most degraded forms of the religious consciousness. Superstitious creeds, rituals that obligate to prostitution and to other crimes, worship that is cruel immolation, and views of the divine beings that make them disgusting to the refined moral sense, all have in them, or connected with them, seeds of eternal Truth and unceasing psychical Value. Even enough of this there is to justify the contention of Augustine¹ when he affirms: "The very thing which is now announced as the Christian religion existed among the ancients, nor hath it been wanting from the beginning of the human race until Christ should come in the flesh; from which time, indeed, the true religion, which already existed, began to be called Christian."

Such facts afford the explanation of the experience of missionaries like David Livingstone, who declared that "there is no need of beginning to tell the most degraded of the people of South Africa of the existence of God or of a future life, both these facts being universally admitted." J. Leighton Wilson makes a similar statement as to the natives of West Africa. And Professor Jastrow² concludes from an historical survey of the entire field, that "the essence of true religion is to be met with in the earliest manifestations of the spiritual side of man's nature." A striking illustration of this truth is furnished by a study of the religions of Mexico and Peru, where a native and spontaneous development took place which included, in a strangely contradictory medley, the highest as well as the lowest elements of both an intellectual and a moral order. In these indigenous religions are found united the various manifestations of a vague and unreflecting Spiritism with numerous other traits belonging to the most "celebrated religions of our own ancient world"; and no external influences or historical communications can be proved in order to account for this agreement of man's religious experience in both the

¹ *Retractationes*, I, 13.

² *A Study of Religion*, p. 132.

Western and the Eastern worlds.¹ At the time of their conquest by the Spaniards these people had already "the underlying religious conceptions of the most widely severed peoples, all mingled together."

Additional evidence to the universality of religion in this most important significance of the word, will appear when the causes, laws, and results of the development of religion are studied more in detail. Thus the religious unity and spiritual oneness of the race will become firmly established. All men have religion, because all men—the human race—are religious. More particularly, that interesting phenomenon to which the title of "amalgamation" applies will be found to enforce and illustrate the universality of religion. In the case of the tribal religions, each tribe thinks it entirely natural that other tribes should have other gods. Some religion, all human beings must have; but why should it not be different for different tribes? And why should not the local divinities be most powerful, each one in his own locality? As a matter of course, then, if one goes to a new locality, one accepts the local gods, and either transfers one's allegiance to them, or amalgamates them with one's own divinities. Out of such a conception of Yahweh among the lower orders of the people did the monotheism of Israel come; and the greater gods of the Egyptian and Babylonian religions arose in the same way.

It is pertinent in this connection to refer again to a problem which has already been considered from another point of view. There are some of the greater religions that claim to present the truths and duties of the religious life in such manner as to satisfy all the demands of the religious nature in the purest, highest, and most ideal forms of its development. They think themselves, although they are more or less characteristically definite and positive forms of religion, entitled to be called "world-religions," or "universal religions." It appears that this conception of "the universal in religion" is quite different

¹ See Réville, *The Native Religions of Mexico and Peru*, pp. 179ff.

from, and even contradictory to, the conception of religion which universally prevails amongst the peoples of the lowest race-culture. For they, while considering it entirely natural that all men should have some religion, expect, as a matter of course, that different groups of men will have different religions. Of these claimants for the title of universality—somehow, in the future to be attained—the most strenuous have been Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, and preëminently Christianity. And all four of these religions have in some good measure justified the claim by actually conquering for themselves the allegiance of large portions of mankind.

The qualifications of any religion for an actually achieved universality are scarcely the same as those which commend the same religion on account of its conformity to the standard of religious ideals. In religion, as in all the other developments of man, growth in universality and the possession of an ideal excellence are by no means identical. On the other hand, in the sphere of religion, as elsewhere, the fittest will survive; but in the sphere of religion, more preëminently than elsewhere, what conforms to the ideal standards of value, comprises and constitutes a “fitness to survive.”

This somewhat *a priori* way of strengthening our confidence in the power of the Ideal over the religious development of the race is further confirmed by an appeal to history. For the history shows that those religions which have proved particularly gifted in the way of conforming to and serving the purposes of the world's progress, have all possessed in a superior degree the following characteristics: (1) They have been historical religions, rather than vague, speculative beliefs, or unorganized and purposeless communions of believers. They have rested upon an alleged basis of facts, and upon the teachings and examples of historical personages. They have had their own roots deep down in history, and have planted themselves in other races to which they have spread, in an historical way. In a word, they have themselves undergone the tests of an

historical development. But (2) they have also all been subjective and personal religions—to a peculiar degree dependent for their “relative universality” upon the individual believer’s attitude of faith toward the Divine Being. Thus they have borne better than other religions the psychological test of affording satisfaction to the human soul in a more nearly universal way. From this it follows that they have also been preëminently ethical religions, in the comprehensive meaning of the word ethical. They have influenced conduct and determined character; and this they have done in such degree that the entire social life of the races which have accepted them has been thereby profoundly modified. They have also been positive religions; that is they have had a definite content of faith and established forms and laws of organization. And, finally, (3) the religions which have hitherto proved themselves most capable of growth towards universality have all claimed for themselves a certain sanction and authority as religions of revelation, the chief purpose of which has been the proclamation and the establishment of a divinely appointed “way of salvation.” In some sort, indeed, all religion is, by virtue of its very nature, a species of divine self-revelation. But the greater world-religions are preëminently those which claim the sanction of revelation and which offer to men a revealed way of reconciliation and union with the Divine Being.

These essential qualities of universality are to-day displayed in the highest degree by the three religions, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity; but preëminently by Christianity, which has always made in an especially emphatic and, in some respects, unique way, the claim to be the universal and absolute religion. It is the task of Christian apologetics, and not of the philosophy of religion, to examine this claim and to defend it against attacks. But the following remarks are applicable to all claimants to the title of universality, for they state the necessary conditions of universality, in the meaning here given to that word. The claim to universality—that is, to be the abso-

lutely true and permanently satisfying religion for all mankind —is a claim which every generation, and every individual, may rightly examine and properly challenge and put to the test. No age, no school of theologians, no church organization, no philosophical thinker, can answer the inquiries which this claim arouses, so that they shall never need to be examined anew. Let it be granted that in some valid meaning of the words, Christianity as a religion, like its founder, is “the same, yesterday, and to-day, and forever” (see Heb. xiii, 8). But in order to be convinced of the universality and absoluteness of Christianity one must be informed as to what is the content of truth and the experience covered by this particular religion. One must also know what is the nature of this “sameness,” or identity; and whether such “sameness” is compatible with life, development, and the progressive realization of an ideal. On this last point, all our experience with the conditions of becoming universal compel the belief that it is the power to throw off what the growing knowledge of man shows to be untrue with respect to the Object of faith, what his increasing refinement of æsthetical feeling shows to be inconsistent with the sublimity of Divine Being, and what the purified moral consciousness shows to be opposed to the conception of perfect Ethical Spirit, that constitutes the chief claim to the possession of the qualities needed by any religion for perpetuity and wide-spreading dominion. There cannot be continued life without constant metabolism.

Positively stated, this same claim involves the ability to apprehend, reconcile with itself, and incorporate into its doctrine and life, the growing knowledge of truth, increasing refinement of feeling, and purified morality. The universal religion must, indeed, leave to science, philosophy, art, and, in a measure, also to ethics and to man’s social and political life, a free and independent development. That is to say, universality in religion confers no right to control by its dogmas scientific discovery and the conclusions of science; nor can it assume the position

of a heavenly descended liege lord over its vassal philosophy. Nor can religion absorb again so completely as in the Middle Ages in Europe the devotion and the products of man's artistic endeavor. Even less can its organizations again assert a direct control over the functions of government and the procedure of society. But, as of old, in the thought and life of its best and most inspiring teachers and examples, religion must, in its theoretical positions and practical developments, regard all truth as God's truth, all beauty as the manifestation of the All-beautiful, and all good conduct as obedience to Him who is perfect Righteousness. It is just this magnanimity and hospitality toward all that is good which, in the future, must more and more take the place of the (not unnecessary) initial exclusiveness and intensity of "the universal religion," if it is to furnish the complete and accomplished satisfaction of the religious needs of mankind. In a word, it is the finding of the living God, and the perfect union of human life with him, which is the goal of man's religious progress; therefore, that religion which can actually bring this Ideal into Reality for the race is entitled to be called the universal and absolute religion.¹

¹ Thus Harnack says of Christianity: "As a Gospel it has only *one* aim—the finding of the living God, the finding of Him by every individual as *his* God, and as the source of strength, and joy, and peace. How this aim is progressively realized through the centuries—whether with the coefficients of Hebraism or Hellenism, of the shunning of the world or of civilization, of Gnosticism or Agnosticism, of ecclesiastical institution or of perfectly free union, or by whatever kinds of bark the core may be protected, the sap allowed to rise—is a matter that is of secondary moment, that is exposed to change, that belongs to the centuries, that comes with them and with them perishes." [What is Christianity? p. 205.] To this thought we have had, and we shall have, occasion to make repeated reference in various connections—especially in the chapters on the Standard of Religious Values, and on the Future of Religion.

CHAPTER VI

THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION

The truth of what has already been said respecting the interdependence of the problems that deal directly with the conception of religion is at once apparent when we come to consider the question of Origin. Whence comes religion? or, what is by no means precisely the same thing: How did religion first arise in the historical development of the race? Both of these forms of stating the problem of origins are capable of treatment, by either the historical or the psychological method; and they both lead up to the same ontological problem, for the treatment of which only the philosophical method is available. We may, on the one hand, endeavor by researches in the history of man's religious development to ascertain what was actually the beginning form of religion, out of which as growths all the other forms of religion may be regarded to have arisen: or, on the other hand we may ask ourselves, from what springs in human nature it is that religion continually arises; and how far these sources are modified by the temperament of different races or by the general mental evolution of mankind. Plainly, the first of these inquiries must seek the data for its answer in history, and must submit itself to the test of historical credibility. It belongs to psychology when pursued in the more comprehensive and comparative way, to undertake and, if possible, to answer the latter form of the inquiry.

Inasmuch, however, as man is not wholly his own maker, but is always to be regarded as very largely a product of heredity and of physical and social environment operating under

the laws of the development of the race, it follows that the so-called "science" of religion in the pursuit of its inquiry into origins, inevitably leads the mind toward the problems of metaphysics. The religions of humanity originate from that same Being of the World in which all things and all souls have their origin. Man, as a religious being, and in his religious development, is a child of the Universe. His being springs from the All-Being, his development is a "moment"—although to him of incalculable significance and value—in the evolution of the system of the World. What sort of a One must be the producer of such a child? This ultimate problem of the origin of religion only philosophy can essay to answer.

Every inquiry into the origin of religion, from whatever point of view it may be started and carried forward, is quite certain at the present time to find itself early confronted with the conception of a so-called "primitive man." We have ourselves already frequently spoken of this primitive man, from the point of view of his religious endowment and religious experience. The term will undoubtedly recur with a frequency which may seem to breed undue familiarity, in our subsequent discussion of the problems of the philosophy of religion. It should be at once decided, however, in the interests of clearness and of safety, that the historical and the psychological investigation of the origin of man's religious beliefs, sentiments, and practices, cannot be made dependent upon conclusions of antiquarian or anthropological researches respecting the nature and condition of so-called *primitive man*. For, in very truth, little or nothing is known about the psychological nature, or even about the most primary conditions determining the psychological reactions of the human being when first it began to become human. Agnosticism, almost or quite complete and invincible, would seem to be the only truly scientific attitude of mind in view of this anthropological problem. Savage men may be studied as they actually exist over widely distributed areas of the world's surface, and with many interesting varieties of

the original type, although with a certain significant unity of mental habits and external conditions common to the type. Indeed, human beings of the lowest known type exist to-day—as, for example, in India—side by side with the products of the highest and most refined modern civilization. But one must not be imposed upon by an off-hand transference of the characteristics of savages or uncivilized tribes as now existing to the case of primitive man. To quote from the highest authority in anthropology,¹ the “primitive man” is a “pure fiction, however convenient a fiction he may be.”

Indeed, in many instances, it is quite in accordance with the facts to say that savage men, as we actually know them, are very far off from, and even at the opposite end of the scale as respects certain characteristics, from the mythical primitive man. For example, savages are extremely closely bound by the habits of their ancestors. They are also environed by a world of unseen, powerful agencies that have been created by the imagination of preceding generations and handed down as a binding tradition to succeeding generations. This world is a world made for them in a rigid way, and one which they have neither the inclination, nor the intelligence (shrewdly intelligent as they often are), nor the wish, to change. But primitive man must have been, like the modern scientific man, much freer to make his world for himself, to indulge in new creations of his thought and imagination, in order to alter that environment in the midst of which his self-development was set. Of course, if one regards primitive man as emerging, somehow, by slow degrees or by occasional leaps, from the enthralling habits of an animal consciousness, one may minimize the difference between savage man and primitive man. But this is precisely what, so far as the beginnings of religion are concerned, one is not justified in doing. For in studying man's religious development, more emphatically than in the study of any other form of his development, one should guard

¹ Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, I, p. 340.

against the fallacy of involving in one's hypothesis the ready-made existence of the very elements to be accounted for by the process of evolution.

It is, of course, always possible, and easy, to get out of your conception, or your formula, by evolution, as much as you have either designedly or inadvertently put into it by involution. The only proper ground upon which to base a theory of the origin of religion is, however, the historical or the psychological ground. And so far as a survey of this ground permits a decided opinion, the declaration made some years ago by Max Müller still remains true: "We know now that savage and primitive are very far indeed from meaning the same thing."¹ For example, it was formerly supposed that the native Australians might be taken as types of the so-called primitive man. But such books as Curr's *Australian race*, and the anthropological researches of Waitz and Gerland, and of Spencer and Gillen,² and others, have disproved this view.

When, however, we reach out the hand and seize the clue of the historical thread, we are not led into the presence of human beings that are either religious by primitive revelation or working hard at its formation by dint of their own observations and reflections, as a new and untried product; the rather do we at once come face to face with beings who are already for an indefinite time religious. That is to say, religion appears in its earliest historical forms as an endowment or possession rather than as an evolution or a new achievement. But it also appears to be already differentiated; it is there, on hand, in diversified forms. In no case does the tradition, much less the historically trustworthy record, reach back to the time when religion was not in existence, but first began to be.

Our impressions as to the form in which religion arose in history must, then, still remain hypothetical; they can never attain the status of anything better than a plausible theory. As

¹ *Anthropological Religion* [Gifford Lectures, 1891] p. 150.

² *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*.

Pfleiderer has well said :¹ "That theory therefore will come nearest to a solution of the problem of the beginnings of religion which possesses the highest degree of psychological probability, and which, at the same time, explains in the most natural way the various facts of primitive history." "*Primitive history*," however, is as much a mythical term, when used with any strictness of significance, as is the term "*primitive man*."

If, however, the inquiry into the origin of man's religious life be limited to the available sources in history, and if the word primitive be understood only in a relative way as expressing that lowest and so most nearly primary type of religious experience which historical investigations reveal as actually existing, it may be said that, within the limits of history, the more nearly original or primitive religion is that already described as a vague and relatively unreflecting Spiritism. This spiritism is man as religious in the more naïve and primary and relatively undeveloped fashion. How he came to be in this condition his history cannot answer. The only available and tenable answer to such an inquiry is the psychological, leading up to the philosophical answer. Traces of something higher and better than the general average of his spiritual beliefs, sentiments, and practices, even at this stage, are found involved in this kind of Spiritism. For it is not poetry alone that may feel itself entitled to avow :

" In even savage bosoms
There are longings, yearnings, strivings,
For the good they comprehend not."

It is this fact which has led some writers to the affirmation that primitive man has an "original God-consciousness" ("*ein ursprüngliches Gottesbewusstsein*," C. I. Nitzsch). But neither the theory that this relatively primitive religion is the degenerate child of a purer and higher original divine revelation,—however much of devolution some of its factors may, in certain cases, plainly show,—nor the theory that it is itself an evolution

¹ The Philosophy of Religion, III, p. 2.

out of a purely animal or non-religious consciousness, has any sufficient standing on historical grounds. In one word, and definitely, we cannot discover the historical origin of religion. It is already with man at the beginnings of his history.

These considerations must be constantly borne in mind when criticising the proposal to derive religion from some one trait, or combination of traits, belonging to a purely animal and non-human consciousness. Thus the inquiry into the origin of religion becomes submerged in the general problem of the evolution of all that is most distinctively human in man out of what is non-human, or is possessed by him in common with certain species of the lower animals.

In his interesting discussion of the "Awakening of the Religious Consciousness" von Hartmann¹ raises the question: "Have the (lower) animals religion?" This question he answers negatively; and he accounts for the answer by pointing out the powerlessness of the animals to frame for themselves an "Object" for strictly religious relations. It is a lack of capacity for observation (*Beobachtungsfähigkeit*) rather than the nature of their mental constitution on the side of feeling (*Gemüthsbeschaffenheit*) which prevents them from being religious. They are not capable of the apperceptive and reflective observation, which even the lowest type of human beings (the *Naturmensch*) possess, but are quite satisfied with the supply of their practical needs. Now we shall ultimately be convinced that religion in man's mental and social structure is by no means like a mansard roof which has been later added at the top of a six-storied building of an earlier date of architecture. On the contrary, the whole circuit and the supreme height of the differences between him and the lower animals, both in degree and kind, and involving all his psychological processes, are concerned in his religious experience; they all, therefore, combine to separate him at this point more widely from the highest of the lower animals than at any other point

¹ Religionsphilosophie, I, p. 3f.

where the two—man and they—may seem to approach. And von Hartmann himself, after a somewhat dramatic excursus, is brought around to the admission of a complex spiritual nature which man, even in the most nearly so-called primitive examples, certainly possesses, but which the higher of the other animals apparently do not possess.

The grounds for this position await a detailed examination. It will then appear that the lower animals are not religious; but that this lack is neither due to the divine withholding of some special revelation of truth or inspiration of feeling, nor to their deficiency in some one faculty or capacity. The lack of religion in the lower animals measures, better than any other available standard, the total difference in respect of all the faculties common to men and to them. It also signifies a total deficiency, in respect of certain other characteristic susceptibilities and activities, even the beginning of which it is difficult or impossible to trace in the lower animals. The other animals *are not*, in fact, religious by nature; but the nature of man *is* to be religious. Yet, "the scent of the blossom is not in the bulb."

It is of course entirely proper, and in a way stimulating (however, at times, it may be restrictive and misleading) for biology and anthropology to work away at the enormous and increasing difficulties which accompany all attempts to derive, psychologically and socially and ethically, the origin of human nature from the developments of non-human and brute nature. Let it then be supposed that the theory is complete; and that we now have a finished and trustworthy picture of the way in which, by leaps or by slow increments, the spirit that is in man has emerged from the soul of some known or conjectured species of animals. We should indeed then have an objective history of the origin of religions. But the necessity for the psychological interpretation of that history, and for its metaphysical explanation, would not be diminished in the least. This history would not be self-explanatory; it would still need

that it should itself be considered, both as the expression of man's spiritual nature and also as a progressive revelation of the Object of religious belief and worship. God in human history is no other One than God in man's soul ; and He is God as the Ground and Life of the Universe of Being. At the present time, however, we are absolutely without clear light from biology or anthropology as to the origin of man's religious consciousness from a non-religious and merely animal consciousness ; and fidelity to history itself compels us to return from following these sciences to what we actually find in the trustworthy records.

The theory of writers who, like Gruppe, find the origin of religion wholly in human customs and habits of an irrational and almost animal-instinctive sort, is also untenable. This theory holds that ceremonials and rites, originally non-religious—such as marriage customs, funeral ceremonies, fastings, tabu, penances, solemnities connected with the kindling of fire, the drawing of water, etc.,—became subsequently explained and defended by the introduction of distinctively religious ideas. Now it is undoubtedly true that many practices, such as those enumerated above, may in the course of history change from a non-religious to a religious character, as well as in the reverse direction. It has already been said that some magic among savages, and even among the more ignorant multitude of civilized people, is non-religious, and some is of a religious significance ; while in certain cases the border-lines between the two are shifty and obscure. The same thing is true of tabu, and of marriage and funeral rites,—the latter even in races of a high degree of race-culture. But the kindling of fire, and the drawing of water, and the planting and felling of trees, and other similar performances, are more likely to pass from a religious to a non-religious and purely utilitarian estimate as to their significance and value. The spark struck from the flint, which in the mind of the savage would awaken the belief in the presence of a divinity, for the English soldier of a few years

ago served only as a convenient way of firing his match-lock musket. In Northern India today the cutting of trees has a religious significance. For example, "the Sâl and bamboos at Barmedo are never cut, as they are sacred to the local Devi.¹ The real meaning of all this, however, is quite averse to the theory which derives religion from non-religious ceremonials and rites. The fact, in most of these cases, is either that the rites themselves were originally derived from religious ideas; or else that, having some utilitarian or social origin, they have become incidentally connected with religious ideas, as all forms of social expression are ever ready to become. For as W. Robertson Smith says² of the religion of the Semites: "A man was born into a fixed relation to certain gods as surely as he was born into relation to his fellow man. . . . There was no separation between the spheres of religious and ordinary life." Indeed, it is probably far oftener true that social customs and ethical rules which were of a religious origin lapse into the class of the non-religious than that customs and habits of an originally non-religious character become religious by virtue of their secondary connection with religious ideas. Besides all this, the very thing to be accounted for is the origin of these religious ideas themselves; for it is in them, and in the sentiments and practices which they awaken and encourage, that the essence of religion consists. An explanation of the origins of religion from what is non-religious is a most extraordinary reversal of the sequence of facts! And on finding ourselves forced to abandon such a theory we are brought around again to the historical position; from it our observation finds religion everywhere existing, where man exists, since religion inseparably belongs to his natural reactions upon his physical and social environment.

The time has surely gone by when any form of the theory

¹ W. Crooke, *The Popular Religion and Folk-Lore of Northern India*, II, p. 91.

² *The Religion of the Semites*, p. 30.

which once made religion originate in priest-craft and deception as did the English writers, Toland and Collins, and the French successors of these writers (not Voltaire, however), can command the attention of the well-informed and reflective student of the problem.¹ The influence of Kant, who sought to show that religion is a practical and spiritual certainty of conviction arising out of the moral law, with its categorical imperative, effected the beginning of the final overthrow of all similar attempts. Nor does any possible theory of invention or of convention deserve a better fate. Fortunately enough for the sanity of all concerned, no one is likely to revive such a theory in any form.

More promising as an answer to the historical problem is the proposal to discover and establish some one form of religious belief and practice as the original and only form; and then to show how all other forms of religion might have been derived from it. I say "*might* have been"; for so complex are the phenomena and so unfavorable the testimonies of history, when taken in the candid and comprehensive manner which is alone fitting to the subject, that any simple solution of this problem of origins does not easily fit itself to them all.

It would seem, in the first place, impracticable to regard any one form of those religions which, because they possess important common characteristics we have grouped together under the name of a "vague and unreflecting Spiritism" (Animism in its broadest and most loose signification), as the origin of all the other allied forms. For they cannot be considered as separate religions. They have, the rather, been found almost if not quite everywhere in human history, existing side by side and persisting in spirit and essence, if not in their precise formations, together through all the higher and higher developments of the religious life of humanity. Neither Fetishism, nor Totemism, nor Shamanism, nor Theriolatry, nor the other lower forms of nature-worship, can be regarded as the earliest form

¹ See Jastrow, *The Study of Religion*, p. 15*j*.

of religion ; no one of these so-called religions can be the original from which all the other religions have been derived. This negative statement might well enough be left to stand as incontrovertible, even when taken for a corollary derived from the very nature of religion itself. The precise earliest form of religion if it were historically discoverable, might well enough have been different for different portions of the human race. For the primitive man does not appear to have been without the power of differentiation in view of different environments and on the basis of different race temperaments. Even if we were sure of the strictest genetic unity of man, or if the doctrine of one original divine revelation could be historically or otherwise established, this would not place on scientific grounds the claim of any one form of religion to be that precise form from which all others were derived. It has been frequently pointed out that the fatal mistake which vitiates all the researches of writers like Comte, Spencer, Lippert, Gruppe and others, is "their not seeing, or not being willing to see, that religion has had many sources, and that any attempt to trace all phases of religion back to one source must lead to forced and unnatural theories."

The attempts of such writers have actually turned out in this way. In proof of this statement, we may cite, as sufficient, two or three conspicuous examples. In his "Introduction to the History of Religion," chapters IX and X, Professor Jevons attempts to reduce all forms of primitive religion to Totemism. But by this attempt he is led into misconceptions with regard to the nature of the totem, the uses of the totem, and the origin and significance of totem-worship ; while, if these misconceptions could themselves be overlooked, we should still be forced to say that his account of the origin of other forms of religion out of Totemism is wholly inadequate and almost everywhere unsatisfactory. Contrary to Jevons' contention that "of all food the totem is most tabu," in certain cases the totem animal or plant is regarded as most sacred and to be

venerated or worshipped, *because* it is the principal means of sustenance for the clan or the tribe. Neither does this writer succeed in his effort to show that Totemism has been a prime factor in the domestication of animals. The temperament of the animal and its usefulness under the circumstances are the rather the principal factors in determining its domestication. And, finally, as has been shown already (p. 98) in the case of some peoples—as, for example, in India—the traces of any Totemism whatever, in the stricter meaning of the word, are few and rather uncertain; although the worship of animals and of plants and trees, as of everything else, flourishes in superabundant variety.

Scarcely more successful is the attempt—to refer again to the argument of Professor Frazer in “The Golden Bough,”—to find the origin of all religion in magic, or rather, in man’s disappointment and despair over the failure of magic.¹ Indeed, Frazer prejudices his entire argument by adopting a definition of religion which is rather designed to favor the argument than to correspond to the facts of history. Religion, with this author, is “a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and human life.”² It is to be expected, then, that when the means provided by magic fail to propitiate or control these powers, other means, such as prayer and sacrifice and priestly offices, will be resorted to by a disappointed but intelligent race. Now, in the first place, this conception of religion is much too narrow; while the conception of magic with which religion is compared is considerably too broad. Moreover, the false assumption that there exist tribes which, although they have magic, have not developed far enough to have religion, vitiates the argument from the point of historical fact. The assumption is not true of all the cases which Frazer adduces,

¹ For a detailed examination and refutation of this theory, see Mr. Andrew Lang’s *Magic and Religion*.

² *The Golden Bough*, I, p. 63.

even if one were to accept his faulty conception of religion. For example, the Arunta tribe, which is adduced as a typical instance of a tribe without religion, and yet much given over to magic, is described by Spencer and Gillen as having the "most complete and adequate" system of savage metaphysics; and some of the tribe at least believe in the existence of a "Great Spirit." So, too, is the testimony of Mr. Howitt¹ conclusive as to the character of the inmost secret of another Australian tribe, the Kuanai, of a seemingly like low type, into which he succeeded only with great difficulty in securing an initiation. Their mysterious secret was the belief in Mungan-gaur, the Great Father of the tribe ("the beneficent father, and the kindly though severe headsman"), who was once on earth and now lives in the sky. In similar manner the Diesi in Central Australia strive to gain the influence of the Mura Mura, the "rain-givers," the good spirits, *both* by magic and by prayer. But there is little need to repeat again what has already been said to show (see p. 103) that religion and magic are not correlative terms in any such fashion as that one can be derived from the other. Even the lowest form of religion, the base superstition of devil-worship, persists in conjunction with the higher forms, in India, China, and Ceylon, till to-day; while magic, on the other hand, clings to the higher religions or, becoming divorced from religion, remains in the form of non-religious superstitions.

In much the same way is it found impossible to derive religion from mythology, or all religious belief from the influence of preceding myths. There is more or less of myth, indeed, in all the earlier forms of religion; it exists, although in a relatively sparing way, in the earlier sacred records of Judaism, the writings of the Old Testament. But there are many non-religious, as well as religious myths, just as there is non-religious as well as religious magic, in all forms of society at

¹ Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, XIV, 1885, p. 321f.

certain stages of race-culture. In this respect there is a great similarity existing among all peoples,—no matter how widely separated in territory or racial peculiarities. For myth-making is natural to man, and the development of the myth is an important factor in all his spiritual progress. Thus the most beautiful myths of India and of Greece bear traces of absurd and brutal legends similar to those found among the savages of Africa and Polynesia.

Mythology is not, indeed, the source of religion; but both religion and mythology spring, although to a limited extent only, from the same activities of feeling and imagination. Mythology, as an explanation of either its origin or its development, cannot be applied to the most mythological of the so-called "heathen religions"; "inasmuch as," to borrow the words of De la Saussaye,¹ "neither cult nor religious institutions and observances, though connected with mythology, properly form a part of the concept myth."² It will appear later how much both of religious myth and of more rational belief grows out of the natural idealizing tendency of man. Hence arise perpetually the pictures of both the earthly and the heavenly Paradise. If we inquire whence the former came, with its mythical streams and trees, and its wise but tempting serpent, the reply must be that it came from the soul of man; it was a germ of his desire and hope as well as a childlike explanation of his experience. God himself, as at first the Ideal of power and majesty, and afterwards of justice, truth, and spiritual perfection, is the construct of the quenchless desire and growing aptitude for the realization of the Ideal. But the conception of God is not mythical; although this conception may have grown in human imagination by nourishment from myths.

¹ *The Religion of the Teutons*, p. 2.

² In agreement with this view Wundt declares (*Ethics*, I, p. 57): "What we shall not be able to do, despite the assurance of many anthropologists and mythologists, is to trace the development of the idea of religion from the myth."

It is scarcely necessary to discuss in detail any of the various modifications of the "soul-theory" of the origin of religion; such as, for example, derive it from the fear of ghosts, or from ancestor-worship. That man's discovery—if its beginning can even be spoken of as a discovery—of something "not merely human, then superhuman, then divine and immortal," in himself, must have exercised a most powerful influence upon his religious beliefs, there can be no reasonable doubt. But history does not show us man at the time when he was just making, or had just made, so startling and influential a discovery. Hand in hand, the conception of the depth and value of his own spirit and the conception of the majesty and perfection of the Other's Spirit, go climbing the steep steps of history together. Thus savage man has no difficulty in finding the evidence for a belief in souls, or spirits, which are analogous to his own self-conscious life, everywhere present in his environment. Although he feels in some dim and inchoate fashion the unity of this environment, he has not enough of scientific and philosophical development to construct the conception of a World-Soul, or World-Spirit, and even less, the worshipful Idea of the Universe itself as a spiritual Totality. But his total known or imagined environment—his little world of experience—is peopled with souls. He himself is the fortunate or luckless possessor of two, or three, or even five souls. The maximum number of souls which any savage is known to have allotted to himself, is said to be no fewer than thirty-two souls. And these souls are so independent of their particular form of visible embodiment, that they readily pass from one form of embodiment to another. Indeed, this sort of a "soul-theory" is the kernel of that religious belief which we have already found so early in history, so widely distributed, and so persistent.

It is quite a different matter, however, when we are asked to accept Lippert's definition of religion, as a belief in the souls of the departed coming to dwell in anything that is tangible, or visible, in heaven or in earth; or when we are tempted

to pin our faith to Herbert Spencer's version of the derivation of all forms of religion from ancestor-worship, or from the worship of ghosts. Grave doubts are at once thrown upon any such form of the "soul-theory" by the discovery that so many of the earlier names of the gods in all the different religions refer to *natural* phenomena; and that the various forms of nature-worship run back to such an extreme antiquity.

For similar reasons the worship of ancestors cannot be regarded as the original form of religion, or even as the earliest prevalent form of religious worship. The widespread deification of ancestors and of the departed worthy, instead of accounting for the genesis of religion, itself needs to be accounted for by religion already existing. To ask the question in the words of Max Müller:¹ "How could he (the savage) call it (the extra-ordinary) divine, unless he had already elaborated the concept of divinity or divinities?" In China, where ancestor-worship has been most elaborated and most influential over all economical and social affairs, we find it always coexisting with other forms of worship. Ancestor-worship and nature-worship are everywhere two of the most fertile growths of the early religious life of humanity. But no case is known or is even conceivable, where the gods are, as it were, constructed solely out of this kind of material. Preferred ancestors, or especially noteworthy ones among the dead, are admitted to the circle of existing divinities—deified, that is to say. But the gods preëxist. In no case does ancestor-worship, then, appear as the original form of religion. In the earliest times in China "the worship of Heaven and Earth stands at the head of the Pantheon"; although it is "inseparably bound up with the worship of numerous other beings and things";² but there were also the tutelary gods, and perhaps the conception of Heaven was entertained as Supreme Lord, in a semi-personified

¹ Anthropological Religion, p. 127.

² See Blodget, article on the "Chinese Worship of Heaven and Earth," Journal of the American Oriental Society, XX, pp. 58-69.

way. Moreover, the deification of ancestors is quite generally mixed up with the mythical derivation of men from animals or gods as their divine progenitors. So the two conceptions of ancestor and divinity merge in one whenever that low form of religion called Totemism is raised to a higher dignity. The same fusion has taken place between ancestor-worship and the higher forms of nature-worship. Thus the Sun becomes the worshipful ancestor, either of the royal blood, as in Japan, or of all the conquering race, as in Mexico, where all called themselves "children of the Sun;" or it may be of the favored classes, as in Ancient Egypt with its god Rā. In Peru, too, the Incas were "the children of the Sun," and to obey the Incas was to obey the Supreme God. To-day in India and other lands the souls of the dead, and even of the living, are being deified in such manner as to afford all observers with a lively picture of how this process comes about. The lately deceased "holy man of Benares" is now made a god *in perpetuo*; and his successor is already squatted in the abandoned seat getting himself raised, in the estimation of himself and of the people, to the ranks of the innumerable host of deified souls of the dead. The same process, with an even greater ignorance and loathsomeness than can be shown by any of the lowest savage tribes is going on continually in India; where invisible superhuman spirits of the most fearsome character are constantly manufactured out of the basest and most criminal of dead men.

The search of anthropology to find the origin of all religions in some one of the particular forms of the manifestation of man's religious experience, seems compelled to terminate here. The so-called higher religions, for one who places his confidence in the strictest application of the theory of development to man's religious life, can scarcely satisfy the claims made upon the "primitive" and the "original" in religion. And the highest forms of all—Judaism, Hindūism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity—admit of being traced to

their origins, and of having their historical evolution studied in detail. The sources of all religion cannot then, of course, be found in them. It would therefore seem that, so long as the inquiry after the origin of religion takes the historical form, it does not admit of any satisfactory answer. The facts, in brief, are these: In his historically earliest, as well as in his lowest savage condition, man appears with religion already made. His religion is, however, of no one definite sort; nor is it of such a character that its sole origin can be referred to any one of those kinds into which it may be subdivided. If, then, our inquiry mean either, What was the one form of religion that was primitive and from which all other forms were derived? or, How and when did religion arise out of the non-religious? or, When and how did man first begin to be religious? the only answer is: We do not know. History is forever silent in answer to this question. Indeed, we may apply the words which an authority uses respecting the result in the case of one of the most ancient peoples to the result of the inquiry after an original religion for the race. "It is open to us to speak of the religious ideas of the Egyptians, but not of an Egyptian religion."¹

When, however, the inquiry into the origin of religion is pursued by the psychological method, the problem and its solution are by no means precisely the same. Pressed back to its utmost limits in time the psychological inquiry becomes, indeed, merged in the historical. To the question as to when and how man became possessed of those faculties of thought and imagination, those impulses of feeling, and needs demanding a practical satisfaction, in which the psychological sources of religion lie, only a negative answer can be returned. We do not know when or how man began to be a religious being. When we find him first, we find him already religious;—this is the answer which can scarcely be too often or too emphatically given to what is now entitled to be called an un-

¹ Wiedemann, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, p. 3f.

answerable and even an idle inquiry.¹ But if by an inquiry into the origin of religion be meant the examination of those psychical reactions and activities, which are the perennial sources of religion; then a relatively full and satisfactory answer to this inquiry may be found. It is this problem, indeed, which will be considered in detail in the Second Part of this book. From the changed point of view the problem of the origin of religion resolves itself into the question: How did man come to think of the Divine; how did he come to believe in and worship God?² The problem is, then, as De la Saussaye and many others have seen, really philosophical and psychological, and runs as follows: "What causes or powers in mankind give rise to religion?" And the general answer must undoubtedly be that given by Zeller:³ "What humanity possesses of religious truth and religious life it must win for itself; what of error and superstition has accrued thereto, man has himself produced. If now neither the one nor the other is a chance product, then the former like the latter is his own work; and just because it is so, religion, like any human work, could only climb upward gradually, out of crude and imperfect beginnings to a nobler and more pure form."

The doctrine of the naturalness of religion (or of religion as arising, in all its forms of differentiation and development, out of the nature of man) is by no means necessarily opposed to the conception of religion as a divine revelation,—that is, as having the Divine Being himself as its exhaustless source. The critical examination of the conception of revelation and its reconciliation with the facts of history is a subject for subsequent study. In this immediate connection, however, we must briefly examine the claims of a view which opposes all the pre-

¹ Les savants doivent renoncer à l'espoir d'atteindre historiquement à l'origine des dogmes et des cultes: Burnouf, *La Science de la Religion*, p. 30.

² Compare Pfleiderer, *Philosophy of Religion*, III, p. 21.

³ Ueber Ursprung und Wesen der Religion, *Vorträge und Abhandlungen* II, p. 8.

vailing forms of the anthropological doctrine respecting the origins of religion. In its most absolute form, this claim maintains that all religion originated in a primitive divine revelation; and that the so-called primitive forms which anthropology recognizes are really degenerations of the purer and higher, yet earliest stages of religious experience.

Now it is true that *devolution*, as well as evolution, appears in certain marked cases in the religious history of humanity, as it does in every other aspect of human history. This is certainly true of the religions of India and China; it is probably true of the religions of ancient Egypt, Babylonia, and Assyria; it is even true of the history of Judaism and of Christianity. The Coptic Church, for example, is a degenerate; and if it appeared before us as the sole remaining representative of original Christianity we should have no hesitation in ranking the Christian religion, in every important respect, far below either Judaism or Islam. On the other hand, traces of something higher and better than a wholly vague and unreflecting Spiritism gleam through this religion as it existed among ancient peoples and exists to-day among the lowest savages. Waitz and Gerland, and other observers, find such traces among the native Australians; they are also found among the negroes of Africa, the Andaman Islanders, the North American Redskins, and the inhabitants of the South Sea Islands. Such instances of devolution, and such traces of something higher in the more primitive religions, are not enough, however, *to place on grounds of historical proof* the contention that the origins of the lowest are to be found in the higher or the highest. Devolution accompanies all man's evolution. Among the ancestors of the savages, as among the descendants of each generation, there are some who are more thoughtful than others; religion everywhere rises, or falls, very largely in dependence upon the number and excellence of the men whose religious beliefs and sentiments reach a height considerably (and in certain cases almost transcendently) above the beliefs and sentiments of the

multitude. Moreover, there are often sufficient reasons why the higher and better beliefs and sentiments remain relatively uninfluential and in the background. These reasons will be made clearer as the development of religion is more carefully studied. But the theory of a primitive revelation can no more establish itself on historical grounds than can any of the anthropological theories already rejected. Such a revelation from the very nature of the case, could not be historically established. We are, therefore, again forced to the conclusion that the historical study of religion must start with what it finds, and continue along the lines of fact which the history establishes.¹

For these and other reasons the theory of such writers as Max Müller, who endeavors to make the origin of religion more acceptable on rational grounds by attributing it to man's primary endowment with a "sense" or a "perception" of "the Infinite," can never be rendered scientifically defensible. This view, too, is intrinsically incapable of proof by historical evidence; it is also not a satisfactory analysis of the religious experience, whether of the most primitive or of the most highly developed type. It is not necessary to follow Müller in the effort to reconcile his various deliverances on this subject, and to show how man rose from the sensuous belief of naturalism, through "henotheism" and polytheism to that form of religion which is called "the perception of the Infinite under such man-

¹ Neither does history seem fully to justify Mr. Lang's hypothesis which, as stated in a form acceptable to him, reads as follows: "The belief in a Supreme Being came, in some way only to be guessed at, first in the order of evolution, and was subsequently obscured and overlaid by belief in ghosts and in a pantheon of later divinities." *Magic and Religion*, p. 224; quoted from Mr. Hartland's Presidential Address (see *Folklore*, March, 1901, p. 21). That, however, there is a sort of savage Deism existing side by side with Fetishism, Magic, and the grossest superstitions, is the opinion of Waitz and other anthropologists (*Anthropologie*, II, p. 167). Even this fact does not warrant us in holding with Max Müller that "the history of most religions might be called a slow corruption of their purity" and that fetishism is "the very last stage in the downward course of religion." (*Origin and Growth of Religion*, p. 63; and *Natural Religion*, p. 158.)

ifestations as are able to influence the moral character.”¹ And now “*the Infinite*” is defined as being “all that transcends our senses and our reason.” But religion always, and from the very first, transcends the sense; and it never can, not even at the last, transcend human reason. Nor is the manner of accomplishing such a transcendent miracle (and Müller does not believe in miracles) made any more credible by uttering the magical word, “henotheism.” In brief, the origin of all religions cannot be described satisfactorily in any so direct and simple fashion as by ascribing it to an original “sense,” or “feeling,” or “perception,” of the Infinite.

The following truths, however, are suggested by all theories of a primitive perception of the Infinite; and the same truths are amply confirmed by the process of historical induction, when this process is conducted with that sympathetic insight which a profound knowledge of human psychology imparts. And, first, that which is recognized by religious belief as really existent, and by religious sentiment as having value for human interests, is never in any case regarded as a merely physical thing. It is *the Spirit in the object*, in which the worshipper believes, and which he fears, or venerates and adores. As says D’Alviella: ² “From the very first, worship must have been addressed, not to the material object conceived as such, but to the personality supposed to be embodied in it.”

To the word “personality” in connection with the object of the lowest forms of religion, reasonable objection may doubtless be found. In their most naïve and nearly primitive condition, what Sayce says of the Chaldeans is true of men in

¹ See *Physical Religion* [Gifford Lectures for 1890], p. 296, and compare the view of Happel (*Die religiöse Anlage der Menschheit*) who finds the origin of religion in those discerned and imagined relations between man and that “Other,” which man endows with a spirit like his own.

² *Origin and Growth of the Conception of God*, p. 97f; see also the following quotation (on p. 99) from Waitz: “The negroes make a distinction between the spirit and the material object in which it resides, although they combine the two and make a single whole of them.”

general: "To them, the spiritual, the *Zi*, was that which manifested life, and the test of the manifestation of life was movement." This test, however, although it is the most obvious and easy to apply, is not by any means the only test for the savage mind. Whatever, even in its statical conditions and relations, seems to him extraordinary and mysterious, that readily lends itself to his imagination, which fills it at once with a divine spiritual life. However vague and inchoate the distinction between the two—and in the case not only of savage man, but also of the multitudes of civilized races, the distinction is still vague and inchoate—it is the spiritual and not the material to which the spirit of man bows down.

This worship of that which manifests any signs of a super-human spiritual presence is the underlying thought of all idol-worship. The idol may take the form of the spiritual being which is deemed divine and worshipful—as among the Arabs, a man, a woman, a horse, an eagle, or even an acacia-tree; or it may assume a shape only symbolical of the being or powers worshipped; and this may be either simple, as the *lingam* in India, or the phallus and the *kteis* in Old Japan; or it may be exceedingly complex, like many of the Hindū or Buddhistic idols in both these lands. But, "it is not to be supposed," says Renouf,¹ "that so intelligent a people as the Egyptians were ignorant of the absurdity of propitiating the wooden or stone images of their ancestors or of themselves. It is the *living* image (the *εἰδωλον*, the genius, the spiritual double) which is said to be worshipped and which was said to reside in the wood or stone." In one Egyptian text,² Ptah, whom the Greeks identified with Hephæstus as the inventor of the arts, claims that he can make the gods through his agency, enter into and dwell in their images of wood and stone. Thus it happens that, in spite of what Jevons and others hold, the origin of the idol is vastly more widespread than the existence of the totem

¹ The Religion of Ancient Egypt, p. 156.

² That given by Sharpe, Egyptian Inscriptions, I, p. 30.

pole or *ashera*; and the needs to which the idol ministers, and out of its prospective ministration to which the idol originates, are much more profound than totemism can explain.

The way that idol-worship spreads in various lands is also a testimony to the same truth. It is, for example, only comparatively lately (with the advent of Buddhism, about A. D. 65) that idol-worship became prevalent in China. Since then gods and their idols—the spirits to be worshipped and the effigies of these spirits—have multiplied with fearful rapidity. Besides the principal state gods—such as the “Father of Medicine,” the god of War (Kwan Yü), and the god of Literature (Wän-ch’ang)—the cities and smaller towns generally swarm with tutelary deities, that are made such by act of government, and whose idols are worshipped by millions of worshippers at thousands of temples and shrines. According to competent testimony, however, this is universally true: “My personal inquiries amongst almost every variety of heathen worshippers, including the most degraded types in India, in China, and also the devil-worshippers in Ceylon, have never yet secured from any of them the admission which would justify me in thinking that the red-bedaubed stone or tree, or any image in front of which they worshipped, was supposed to contain *in esse* the god to which that worship was addressed.”¹

In some important way, then, it is true that even the most ignorant and degraded nature-worship or idol-worship indicates the belief that the Divine Being is Spirit; and that as spirit it must be worshipped in order that the mental and spiritual attitude of the worshipper may correspond to the Reality. As Pindar sang long ago: “One is the race of men and one of gods, and from one mother we both draw our breath.”

But, secondly, the conception of spirit as divine is exceedingly vague and indefinite with primitive and savage man. Its very vagueness renders possible its many forms, and fosters the worship of divine beings in dependence upon an indefinite va-

¹ Howard, *Trans-Siberian Savages*, p. 202.

riety of manifestations and symbols. Yet it is always *Spirit*,—somehow manifest and symbolically or virtually rendered present to sense, feeling, and imagination, which is the object of belief and worship in all forms of religion.

And, thirdly,—as has already been said—a vague and indefinite, but both theoretically and practically influential feeling of the unity of all these manifestations is early to be detected, if not universally indicated, by the content of man's religious life. And this fact, when taken in conjunction with the two preceding groups of facts, constitutes the truth which is inadequately expressed—or, perhaps, it would be better to say, is *over-expressed*—in speaking of the human sense, or feeling, or perception, of the Infinite as the source of every form of religion.

In one word,—a statement in general terms of what will subsequently be shown in detail,—it is man's constitutional and inevitable necessity of regarding all other objects after the analogy of the Self, and of explaining all his experiences as due to causes which prevail in his most immediate experiences with this same Self, in which religion has its origin. But of the time when, and the manner how, this first began to be, his history reveals no records.

CHAPTER VII

DIFFERENTIATION OF RELIGIONS

Our examination of the various theories concerning the origin of religious experience has led to the conclusion that this problem cannot be solved on historical grounds. History knows no first form of religion, and no other non-religious form of human spiritual life out of which the religious could have arisen. But the case is by no means the same when we inquire into the origin of certain particular forms of religion; or into the historical nature and laws of the development of religion in general. The greatest and highest of these forms, at present existing, have had their origins in the more or less clear light of history; and in the case of most of the others we have the privilege of observing the more significant changes which accompany their continuance as historical influences over the life of man. In other words, the way that man's religious experience has been modified since the earlier records of its existence may be made the subject of historical investigation. And, indeed, if this were not so, there could be no such thing as a science, much less a philosophy of religion.

But at the very entrance upon the historical study of the unfolding of man's religious life in history an important distinction must be made. Changes of a certain character are inevitable in the manifestations—whether as beliefs, sentiments and emotions, or cult—of the religious consciousness; and this, however remote from the centers or major streams of the movement of humanity in history these manifestations may continue to be. Reference has already been made to this truth as illus-

trated in the psychologically similar but historically independent forms assumed by religious experience in Mexico, Central America, and Peru. Differentiation takes place everywhere in the historical products of man's religious consciousness. Indeed, some differentiation is essential to the very continuance of the life of any religion; and for the uplift and real progress of that life—the *development* of religion in the stricter meaning of the word—certain lines of differentiation which end in the formation of higher unities must be followed. Thus it comes about that all the great world-religions resemble each other in this: they split up into sects, which, as a rule, divide along similar lines of cleavage and over similar intellectual or practical problems. Buddhism, for example, originated as a reform of Hindūism; it differentiated itself more or less sharply from its principal source in the earlier religion and from other antecedent or contemporaneous reforms (Jainism, e. g.); it divided into a great variety of subordinate forms; it amalgamated with itself the elements which it found preëxistent in the lands where it spread, or which were subsequently introduced in these lands; and it is to-day striving for an improved unification of its sects with one another, and even with the other world-religions with which it is in closest contact. Something notable of the same sort was true of early Christianity in its relation to Judaism and to certain elements of the religions of the Græco-Roman world; while its process of internal development through breaking up into sects and new formations of a higher spiritual or social sort is too obvious to need detailed illustration.

Such differentiation does not, however, of itself secure a true development;—if by this latter word it is meant to indicate any progressive realization of that standard which is set for the measurement of religious values. If the changes which take place inevitably, in at least some of the details of religious belief, sentiment, and cult, are to constitute a genuine “betterment” of the religious experience, these three things must

be secured: (1) the purification of religion by excluding the elements of superstition and mental degradation, which are the customary survivals from lower forms of religious belief and practice; (2) the adjustment of the claims of both morals and religion to the control of conduct in the interests of an improved moral standard; and (3) the improved rationality of the conception of God and of his relation to the world, which results from the application of reflective thinking and spiritual insight to the religious experience. In a word there must be progress in spirituality.

Now while we cannot draw a fixed line through the large numbers of religions that have existed in human history, and definitely place on one side of this line those which have not made any genuine progress, and on the other those that have, we cannot fail to notice immense differences in this regard. Let it be granted, for example, that Christianity had its sources largely in Judaism; that Judaism was a certain outgrowth of previously existing Semitic religions; and that all these Semitic religions show signs of having at one time been in, or near, the stage of a vague and unreflecting Spiritism. Yet just as certainly, and even with more assurance, can the glorious course of this religion's history in the direction of the highest spiritual ideals of the race be established. Of Buddhism and of Islam, too, it must be said that they—in however inferior way—have shown in the past a certain power of self-improvement, of development as a progress toward higher standards, which the so-called nature-religions, including that of our Teutonic ancestors, do not seem to possess. It is to be noted in passing, that, in all three of these cases, it was the influence of "men of revelation," of remarkable personalities, which gave the chief impulse to their genuine development.

In the case of some religions, then, which have had a wide and permanent control of considerable portions of the human race, it can scarcely be maintained that the conception of evolution applies in any strict way to the phenomena. Even the

principle of continuity has rather a loose application to such cases. Where the differentiation and unification do seem to conform to a fixed type, and to be explicable on historical grounds, and where the principle of historical continuity is more strictly and more obviously observed, even there it by no means always follows that real progress toward higher ideals can be distinctly traced. In other most important cases, a line of genuine development is obvious. Thus the appearance of the whole field of the history of religions warrants the mild conclusion of De la Saussaye,¹ at the very least: "We do not mean to underrate the great importance of the mechanical treatment, and the value of the theory of evolution, in the science of religion also, but we do not believe that this theory will be sufficient for a proper appreciation of the religious life of mankind."

In spite of these rather negative and deprecatory conclusions, we are proposing to distinguish between certain inferior forms of differentiation and unification and the more genuine developments of religion; and to trace the causes and analyze the products of man's religious experience, while having in mind the difficulties of carrying out the distinction.

The task of tracing the development of religion in general or of the particular religions, would be greatly facilitated if some strict and trustworthy classification of religions could be adopted. If all the religions had mounted upward, at least a few steps, by one pair of stairs, the picture of their ascent might resemble an instantaneous photograph. But the case with them is not at all so. Neither does there appear to be any one satisfactory principle of classification, or even of arrangement, which will apply to all cases. As one recent writer² on the subject has somewhat naïvely remarked: "The work of comprehending all the religions of the world under certain definite

¹ Manual of the Science of Religion, p. 13.

² Preiss, Religionsgeschichte, p. 16f, summarizing his conclusion as to the evolutionary theory of religion.

groups is no sinecure" (*nicht leicht*). In our judgment, all the attempts which have been made in this direction have some one or more valid objections against them. The division proposed by Tiele and others, into natural and ethical religions affords one of the simplest means of classification;—but only apparently, for in the broad and yet entirely justifiable meaning of the words, all the greater religions, if not all religions, are *both* natural *and* ethical. Even the immoral myths and, from the modern point of view, ethically degraded conceptions of the nature-gods of the lowest type, are expressions of ethical relations; they have been powerful influences in moulding the conduct and moral development of men. The worship of the *lingam* in India to-day and the worship of Ishtar in the ancient world, together with prostitution in honor of the divinity or as an act of submission to the priest, are signs of the intensely ethical nature of their religions. For in neither case is the attitude of the worshipper toward the object of worship merely that of the unethical following of a natural impulse, or an unnatural expression of an ethical concept determining personal relations. But if we change one of the two terms of this principle of classification and distinguish between the lower forms of so-called "natural" religion and "revealed" religion, we are at once reminded of the important truth that all religions, no matter how natural they may seem to be (as being a spontaneous and unreflective type of nature-worship) claim also to be revelations; and that religion is essentially a divine self-revelation.

Indeed, after a careful criticism of no fewer than twenty-two different classifications of religion as given by Raoul de la Grasserie,¹ one may perhaps feel quite justified in re-

¹ For which see Jastrow, *Study of Religion*, p. 95*f*. The criticism of previous attempts is then followed by a new attempt at classification which takes for its principle of division the complex results of the different advancing stages of general civilization. But this is rather to apply the standard of religious values to the different religions than to establish a

sisting any lingering temptation to add to this number a new and "original" classification. It is better at once to admit that any approach to a scientific classification of the various religions of humanity is impracticable; and, indeed, it is not necessary for a treatment, as satisfactory as is in the nature of the case possible, of the differentiation and unification of religions and of man's religious development. There can, at least, be no doubt as to the truth of Sabatier's declaration that "the systems of classification which have been proposed have been rejected one after the other as either arbitrary or too narrow."

Two remarks, however, which are verifiable as deductions from the failure to establish a strictly classified system of religions are of no small value in attempting a survey of the religious development of humanity. And, first: In the study of both classification and development we are frequently reminded that modern terms do not precisely fit the varied and uncertain phenomena. The state of beliefs, the condition of the feelings, and the impulses of will, which constitute the very essential content of the religious experience are largely undifferentiated, or not clearly to be differentiated, whether by the persons whose experience they are or by some external observer of the expressions of this experience.

But, second, it is only when we come to the highest and purest kinds of religion, and especially to Christianity regarded as the highest and purest example of these kinds, that there is preliminary classification of them on an objective and historical basis. Orelli (*Religionsgeschichte*, p. 13*f*) reviews briefly these four principles of division: (1) inner value; (2) conception of God; (3) form taken by the rites and ceremonial observances; (4) historical connection. Neither of these four is found satisfactory. Orelli holds that the mixed philological and ethnographic is the only correct method of division. This leads him to distinguish, I: *Naturbefangene=heidnische Religionen*; and II: *Naturfreie Religionen*, with a number of perplexing subdivisions. In all this it appears that we cannot divide into "families" of religions; since even the Semitic and Indo-European groups do not give us a principle of division that is always adequate; while the earliest form of religion does not lend itself to any form of grouping.

discoverable in the beliefs, sentiments, and cult, of the few, a satisfactory and definite embodiment as it were, of a religious Ideal. In some true and important meaning of the words, then, it may be said that every kind of religion belongs to all kinds. Strict classification becomes impossible. The worship of the Peruvians under the Incas was the purest form of Sun-worship; but it did not exclude fetish-worship and many of the lower forms of animal worship. Moreover, some of the more thoughtful among the sun-worshippers, so personified the natural Object, and in such way regarded the personal characteristics of the invisible Spirit thus embodied, as closely to approach the monotheistic attitude. But Shintō, which in its most important features has a close relation to the religion of the Incas, formerly embraced phallic worship. Hindūism and Buddhism have always included polytheism and idolatry and even no small admixture of devil-worship. For centuries after the conversion of the Teutons to Christianity their conception of God and Christ, and of the meaning and value of the religious life, were in many respects heathenish. To-day what is essentially idolatry and fetish-worship lingers in some lands as an integral part of the Christian religion of the multitudes. Of it, and of every religion, under certain circumstances that is true which Dr. Martin says¹ of the three religions in one, of China: "They are not as the natives thoughtlessly assume, identical in significance and differing only in their mode of expression, . . . to a certain extent they are supplementary." Confucianism has control over the practical and social life; Tāoism appeals to the sense of mystery, and captivates the imagination; and Buddhism offers comfort in sorrow and hope in the life to come. Thus the worship of Kwannon in Japan and of the Virgin in Southern Europe serves essentially the same purpose of bringing the pitiful side of the Divine Being near to the imagination and heart of men. For religion everywhere has its roots deep down in human nature and feeds on all the

¹ The Lore of Cathay, p. 193.

soil of experience in which these roots are planted. It is differentiated into a variety of specific forms according to the character of this soil and the character of the climatic and other external influences. But however inevitable this specific variation, all the species have in common certain generic characters.

The most obvious classes of influences which determine the specific differences of the lower and more undeveloped forms of religion are (1) the physical environment, and (2) those temperamental or psychical differences of the different races which must be accepted as original because we find them already existing at the earliest period of our information. In a word, human nature, a spiritual unity existing with racial differences amidst different environments, constitutes the underlying principle of differentiation. A tiger god, for example, cannot exist where there are no tigers; nor can the palm claim worship where it is not known as a significant form of plant life. The reasons which cause the selection of the totem are in the main to be found in the physical environment. Where the phenomena of storms are impressive and important in connection with the interests of human life, or the heavenly bodies are conspicuously grand, mysterious, and powerful, there the storm gods and the worship of Sun and Moon find their natural domicile.

In a larger way, the religion of nomadic clans passes from the worship of the clan-god to the worship of some tutelary or local divinity, when the wanderers have settled themselves in a particular locality. Thus Arabia is a land of barren and volcanic mountains, silent, desert, almost devoid of life, where the sun is all-powerful by day and the stars are bright and bewitching by night. Roamed over by the Bedawi, what wonder that this environment begot in them an intensity that almost amounted to a ferocity in faith; and when joined to the influence of clan-brotherhoods, it produced the fierce exclusiveness of the religions which originated in that peninsula? Then, on amalgamation with that vague and unreflecting Spiritism which prevailed

here as elsewhere, we have a mixture to be described in the following terms: "The primitive Semitic community was thought by them to be made up of gods, men, and animals, all of which were akin to one another. All nature was peopled with spirits, but the god of the people was the chief spirit of the locality where that people dwelt. The gods were confined each to his own tribe or clan, and in their activities were limited to certain localities. . . . In this chthonic period they were especially associated with springs, wells, and trees, and were regarded as the proprietors of naturally watered land. The bond between them and their worshippers was thought to be one of physical kinship, and was believed to be renewed by sacrifice"¹ How very different from all this the mixture of religions established, only so short a distance away, in ancient Egypt, with an essentially different physical environment upon which a characteristically different racial temperament had been reacting through countless centuries of human history! How different still the mixture elaborated in India, where the reflective and philosophic temperament of this branch of the Indo-Aryans developed religious conceptions quite beyond the range of the intellectual horizon of any of the Semitic peoples.

Even such differentiation as has not yet become a clearly distinguished development in the direction of conformity to any standard of religious values, involves a sort of unification. This unification may take place in one of two somewhat different ways. These we will call amalgamation² and syncretism. By the former is to be understood such a loose unifying of religious beliefs and practices as may be brought about either

¹ Barton, *A Sketch of Semitic Origins*, pp. 30f, 81f, in reliance on the researches of W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*.

² The word "amalgamation" is obviously not in all respects well adapted to describe the rather *heterogeneous* instead of homogeneous mixture of religious opinions and rites which results in the lower forms of differentiation and unification. I have chosen it, however, for lack of a better word to express my meaning.

by placing the objects of faith and worship in juxtaposition, or by identifying them, but without consciously applying any standard of value-judgments by which a reconciliation of seeming contradictions is effected, or the better is chosen and the inferior rejected. By a process of amalgamation, for example, we may say that Shintō, Confucianism, and Buddhism, have become established side by side as the religion of the Japanese; and Buddhism itself in Japan, even as early as the ninth century B. C., was a compound of polytheism and pantheism, a pantheon of gods, sprites, and devils, with a dash or a strong seasoning of lofty and mystical philosophy. In this way the compound was made adaptable to all tastes from highest to lowest, and as considered from every point of view. In somewhat the same way an amalgam of Brāhmanism, with its speculative schools—prevailingly pantheistic—and the Hindūism of the multitudes, with its medley of animal-worship and devil-worship, etc., may be said to constitute the religion of India to-day. In Thibet, too, Buddhism and Roman Catholicism have to a considerable extent amalgamated;—the beliefs of the former adopting the rites and ceremonies of the latter. And modern Babism is a mixture of Muhammadanism, Christianity, and Buddhism, selected without any attempt to apply a consistent principle of evaluation to the elements put together in the compound. Again, so-called Christian Science is forming in the United States to-day an almost equally grotesque mixture of crude pantheism, misunderstood psychological or philosophical truths and truly Christian beliefs and conceptions.

When, however, the identification of a local divinity with some aspect or power of nature takes place, the character of the loose unity brought about in the prevalent religious tenets and cult is of a somewhat different order. The two no longer stand together side by side; they are considered as being essentially one. Thus the “lord of Girsu”—one of the four sections into which the ancient city of Lagash was divided—

became identified with Thammuz the personification of agricultural activity.¹ Again, the supremacy of Babylon under Hammurabi (about 2300 B. C.) resulted in the supremacy of the patron god of this city, Marduk; and he became identified with another powerful patron god, En-lil or Bel of Nippur.² In certain stages of religious differentiation the process consists largely in deciding what sprites or demons shall be identified with the gods; or what sacred plants and animals shall be especially regarded as the embodiments of particular divine beings. The En-lil mentioned above was at one time a chief demon. Numerous instances of both these forms of amalgamation may be taken from the religion of ancient Egypt.

Now, when these already complex forms of differentiation and unification, which must be ascribed chiefly to the effect of the environment upon race temperament, are further complicated by the mixing of races, either in the same geographical divisions of the earth's surface or in changed localities, we have as a result the actually existing religions of the human race, in past time and down to the present day. Ethnographic divisions, therefore, do not correspond to geographical divisions; and neither of these two is identical with the linguistic divisions. Changes of the social and political order combine with causes of the geographical and ethnographical order to produce the resulting varieties and the new unities. In most cases no claim to originality of a perfectly pure kind can be established. Probably, other peoples, as far back as the bronze age, traded with the Finns. The Greek religions were affected by the Semitic as early as 600 B. C. The problem of the earliest relation between the Semites and the Sumero-Acadians is an unsolved problem. The relative influences upon prehistoric Judaism of the religions of Babylonia, Arabia, and Egypt, are not clearly made out. Nor is there agreement as to which one of these three localities was the original

¹ See Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, p. 58.

² Jastrow, *Ibid.*, p. 116f.

seat of the Semitic religions. The Hindūs in India have borrowed from the Dravidians some of their religious conceptions—for example, their ideas of a mother god (so Hopkins); but where the Dravidians themselves originated, and whether they are to be allied with the Mongolians of Assam or the Australians, we do not know. Many religions, formerly supposed to be indigenous and very old, are now known to be comparatively modern and largely derived. This is true of the Scandinavians, whose sagas are only a few centuries old and reflect Christian ideas. Among the Redskins of North America, too, both the oldest and the more recent, both the obviously borrowed and the probably most indigenous, religious myths and traditions are almost inextricably mixed. And, in addition to all these factors, in the case of the higher and more progressive forms of religion, appear the powerful influences derived from the teaching and lives of great religious reformers or founders; and the subtle but pervasive forces of schools of philosophy and ethics, and of drifts and tendencies in the popular feeling and thinking.

Such, then, is the picture of the actual differentiations and the resulting unities which appear in the early religious history of mankind. A “cross-section” of this history, if it cuts through the whole race in all the localities of its distribution, presents a similar picture. But under influences, and according to laws, which we shall try to trace in subsequent chapters, some of these religions have risen higher and higher toward that type of religion which appears progressively to approach the religious ideal.

This description of the manner in which the differentiation and unification of the religions of the world takes place in the lower stages of their existence, and perhaps without much which can constitute a distinctive claim to a genuine improvement, may be illustrated in an impressive way by a study of the different forms of ancestor-worship and of nature-worship. So widely spread, if not strictly universal, has been the worship

of ancestors that, as we have already seen, some authorities would trace to it the origin of all forms of religion. While every such attempt must result in failure, the modifications of this form of religion under differing conditions of its physical and social environment, and in accordance with the variations of race temperament, are numerous and significant. Totemism, where it is religious at all, is a species of ancestor-worship. Certain tribes of the Redskins in North America have been worshippers of the rattle-snake, because these animals are the "wise ones," their venerable and revered ancestors. In Egypt the worship of the dead by their descendants sprang largely from the love of life and was inextricably interwoven with the worship of animals, gods, and living men. But in Babylonia ancestor-worship seems to have sprung from fear rather than from reverence, love, or desire for continued communion; for, in general, the dead were not believed to be favorably disposed toward the living. In this respect dead men resembled the demons.¹ But the old Prussians used to invite, standing in the door of the house, the souls of the deceased to a meal which had been prepared for them.² And then, at the end of this feast in good-fellowship, the priest swept out of the house with a broom the divine participants, saying: "Dear Souls! Ye have eaten and drunk. Go forth! Go forth!" From time immemorial the Dravidian tribes of India have heard the voice of their deceased ancestors, exhorting them: "Worship us! Give us

¹ See Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, p. 581f.

² On the fear of the dead and the "recall of the soul," see Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, I, pp. 247ff. Among the Teutons the key to this ancestor-worship is perhaps nowhere else better given than in the account (Rimbart's *Life of Anskar*, chap. XXVI) of how King Ericus became one of the gods. In a large assembly it had been announced that the tutelary divinities were offended at the neglect shown them on account of the spread of Christianity. "If you wish," they were reported as saying, "to have a larger number of gods, and are not content with us alone, we herewith unanimately admit to our guild your former king, Ericus, so that he may be one of the company of the gods." See De la Saussaye, *The Religion of the Teutons*, p. 302.

food and drink!"¹ The Hindū worship of ancestors is traceable to the earliest times; and while in some directions it has become a degraded superstition, closely akin to devil-worship, in others it has developed into an elaborate system of funeral rites and Srāddha ceremonies proper. In Equatorial Africa, "the son who succeeds the deceased in power immolates an ox on the grave." According to the Vishnu-purāna, "A householder should worship the Pitris at the marriage of a son or daughter, on entering a new dwelling, on naming a child, on performing tonsure, on seeing the face of a son."²

It is, however, in Japan and above all in China, that the worship of ancestors has reached its most elaborate form and has maintained itself substantially unchanged for centuries, although amalgamated with other preëxistent or contemporary forms of religion. In China ancestor-worship is prehistoric. The earliest recorded instance of it, according to Dr. Martin,³ dates back to 2300 B. C. As late as 1889 the reigning emperor and the dowager empress made a solemn pilgrimage to the tombs of their ancestors, to worship them there. To this day the "President of the Board of Rites" bears the title, "Arranger of the Ancestral Temple." The worship of ancestors is the only kind of religion fostered by the state among the Chinese; and every Chinese household has its small shrine in which are deposited the memorial tablets of its ancestors. "Aside from its social and economic relations, this form of worship exerts a religious and moral influence beyond any other system of doctrines hitherto known to the Chinese Empire."⁴ It constitutes the warp into which has been woven the woof of the Confucian political and social ethics,—the whole constituting a unique pattern from which neither warp nor woof could be withdrawn

¹ W. Crooke, *The Popular Religion and Folk-lore of Northern India*, I, p. 177f.

² Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*, pp. 274-312.

³ *Lore of Cathay*, p. 264. See also Blodget, *Ancestral Worship in the Shū King*; and Legge, *The Religions of China*, p. 69f.

⁴ Martin, *Ibid.*, p. 274.

without destroying it. But with ancestor-worship has remained mixed the popular polytheism and idolatry, and many of the lowest and most degrading superstitions anywhere to be found. Indeed, nearly all the gods whom the people regard as having a close relation to their daily material interests—the living “godlings” of the multitude—have originated with Tàoism, as an inferential degradation of their materialistic views. Yet the whole is suffused, or at least penetrated in spots, with the deliverances of a profounder and loftier ethico-religious consciousness. This is a reverence for Lao T’ien Yeh, or “Old Father Heaven,” who watches over men and rewards them for their deeds. He is first among the five objects of worship (the others being, earth, the prince, parents, and teachers).

In Japan, also, the worship of ancestors is prehistoric and probably antedates the earliest known influences from China; nor does its character and importance appear to have been greatly modified by either Confucianism, or Buddhism, or Western civilization.¹ Here as in China, the principal motives seem to have been reverence and affection, rather than dread of the evil doings of the dead, as in ancient Babylonia. As a Chinese philosopher, Shiu-Ki, summarizes the subject: “The object of worship is nothing else than performing all that is dictated by a feeling of true love and respect.” In the earlier times in Japan, each clan had its clan-god who was “the eponym of that particular community.” A monthly sacrifice on the day corresponding to the day of the ancestor’s death is an ancient form of worship. According to a recent writer² on this subject, the present civil code is profoundly modified by this form of religious belief and cult; and the existence of household shrines for family ancestral worship is only less nearly universal in this country than in China. In the matter of ancestor-wor-

¹ See Griffis, *The Religions of Japan*, p. 80*f*, and the work of Professor Kumé from which he quotes.

² Says Dr. Martin (*Ibid.*, p. 168): “The writings and the institutions of the Chinese are not, like those of the Hindüs and the Hebrews, pervaded

ship the imported Confucian ethics and the practices of Buddhism are at one with the indigenous religion. Shintō, or *Kami-no-Michi*—"the way of the gods," was, as its bible (*Kojiki*) shows, a mixture of cosmogonic myths, crude theology, and certain outlines of history. Under the influence of a divine command, the Yamato men came from the "High Plain of Heaven" to conquer the land. The Sun was both their ancestress and their goddess; and their chief, or Mikado, was the vicegerent of the heavenly gods. His line of descendants, and his fellow conquerors and ministers, and even the conquered chieftains who submitted to their sway, became in later generations worshipped as gods. Traces of an earlier and higher form of the worship of Heaven (as in China, although not with the same historical distinctness) are said to exist in Japan.¹

The modifications undergone by ancestor-worship in China and Japan illustrate the manner in which a similar process of differentiation and formation of new unities goes on in the higher forms of animal-worship. A certain loose species of unification takes place when any class of natural objects is worshipped or thought worthy of divine honors on account of its *quasi*-personal relation to men. Thus the Mexicans invoke

with the idea of God; it is nevertheless expressed in their ancient books with so much clearness as to make us wonder and lament that it has left so faint an impression on the national mind." But the more cautious view of the Rev. Arthur H. Smith (*Chinese Characteristics*, p. 292) seems more nearly to represent the truth of the case. This writer admits the wide currency and remote antiquity among the Chinese of a belief in a Divine Being that hints at its personality, but to which, so far as we know, no temple was erected, of which no image was made, and to which no worship distinct from the worship of heaven and earth as natural objects was paid. The word "Heaven" is, indeed, often used in the Chinese classics so as to convey the idea of Personality and righteous Will. But it is also used in a manner which suggests very little of either; and when we read in the commentary that "Heaven is a Principle," we feel that "the vagueness of the term is at a maximum."

¹See the work on Ancestor-Worship and Japanese Law, by Nobushige Hozumi, p. 1/.

the tree as "Tota," or "Our Father." The early Romans personified the clear sky as Jupiter and Juno, the nourishing earth as Tellus, the germination and growth of grain as Ceres; and they made Ops a presiding deity over the harvest, and Pales over the flocks. As was the case in the native religion of Japan, so very widely have the heavenly bodies been worshipped as the ancestors of men; but they are also the supreme and most impressive objects of natural worship. Among the Redskins of North America, the Polynesians and the Africans, as well as conspicuously in early Aryan, Semitic, and Egyptian religious beliefs, the deification of the Sun is found. And he who has seen sun-rise upon the Himalayas from Prospect Hill, Darjeeling, no longer wonders at this form of nature-worship. The Moon—with her softer light, and weirder, more mysterious, but for this reason apparently more potent influences—has been in certain places even more important as a deity. The Brazilian tribe, Ipurinas, for example, address the moon as their divine ancestor, "Our Father"; and the eastern Eskimos say that their divine ancestors came from the moon to the earth. Planets and stars, and the elements of the more obvious sort—such as Earth, Air, Water, and Fire—readily lend themselves to be made the *quasi*-personified superior objects of worship.

Among the elements that are readily regarded as godlike, the Fire, which is so mysterious and so much alive itself, so powerful as a giver and destroyer of life, is conspicuous. The Romans kept the sacred fire perpetually burning, kindled every morning and covered every evening by the master of the house; and with its existence the fate of the family was thought to be bound up. Prayer eighty-four of the Orphic hymns runs: "Render us always prosperous, always happy, O Fire: Thou who art eternal, beautiful, and young." And in the *Alcestis* of Euripides, when she is about to give her life to her husband, she invokes the sacred fire: "O Divinity, mistress of the house, for the last time I fall before thee and address thee in

my prayers. . . . Watch over my children who will have no mother." In the religion of the Parsis also it is the worship of fire which remains as a factor of nature-worship united with the religious teachings of Zoroastrianism. In Guatemala and elsewhere Fire was early adored as the primeval and greatest divinity. In the Rig Veda the gods speak through the crackling of the twigs set ablaze; and Agni, or Fire personified, is one of the chief gods. The deification of the Winds, and the raising to a place among the principal divinities of those which blow from certain quarters, is easy for the savage and half-civilized imagination: for do not the winds resemble spirits in the way they come and go; and are they not indeed lords over the clouds, the rain, and the fate of man by land and sea? The Earth, however, is obviously the all-embracing source of life; from whose womb all beings proceed, and on whose nourishing bosom all depend for sustenance and growth. What wonder, then, that She is made a great goddess and adored by the Aztecs as "Beloved Mother," and by the Peruvians as the divine Mama Cocha?

As in the development of the individual no fixed line can be drawn between that unification of experience which is mainly impulsive, unintelligent, and enforced from without, and the unification in which intelligence and choice having certain recognized ends in view play an important part, so in the development of the religious life of the race. Therefore what we have chosen to call "amalgamation" and what is ordinarily understood by "syncretism" cannot be sharply distinguished. It is plain, however, that when man begins to construct his conceptions of Divine Being into some kind of a unity, and to make the attempt to bring order out of the confusion of ideas, the pattern of his own social and political organizations affords the best example of a way. The result of the attempt must be some form of differentiation tending to a higher form of unity. Now, instead of yielding himself so completely to the confusing impressions of a seemingly unorganized spiritual environment,

where caprice rules and the only supremacy is that of the momentary triumph of trickery or of power, his improved value-judgments have a voice in deciding how the differences shall be reconciled and the unification brought about. Thus the invisible superhuman spirits, in which man believes and which he regards with all the natural variety of his affectional nature, themselves approach one another for purposes of a social or political union. In doing this they, in a measure at least, reconcile their own differences; the gods form a sort of social compact against the attacks of rival or unfriendly groups of similar spirits. It is man who thus recognizes the truth of what he himself effects. He himself and the Divine Being, in all its different manifestations, *are* essentially some sort of a social unity. Among the Semites, the greater natural forces and objects were in this way made one with the sovereign gods; a "King of kings" and "Lord of lords" because the Ruler of nature, and of men and of gods. But in Greece and especially in the Roman Empire the process of syncretism which resulted in the prevalent types of religion was of a quite different sort.

The study of the higher forms of the unification of religious conceptions and practices becomes, therefore, to a large extent dependent upon the history of the social progress of mankind. Now no other form of human social union is on the whole so important in the differentiation and unification of the religions of man as is the family. Where the relation of the father to the family is unstable and lacking in dignity, the gods can be conceived of only in a low and imperfect way. Kinship through the father, the patriarchal family life, the abandonment of the chief place by the women of the clan, are necessary in order to the worship of male in preference to female divinities. With this transference of religious allegiance there is likely to follow the cessation of prostitution and free love as an indulgence or duty connected with religion.¹ In all religions therefore, we expect

¹ Barton, *A Sketch of Semitic Origins*, pp. 82ff, claims that the early

to find duads and triads of gods, which represent the father and the mother, either with or without a child; and when the Fatherhood of the Divine Being becomes established, the conception itself is changed from the more imperial and despotic forms to the more domestic and social. The influence of the syncretism effected in this way upon the whole subsequent development of any particular religion is made especially prominent in Judaism; but, above all, in Christianity, not only as having its sources in Judaism, but also, and chiefly, as emphasizing the teaching of its Founder concerning the character of this fatherly relation between God and man. But under the influence of the same conception, ancestor-worship and the higher forms of nature-worship became differentiated from other religions and internally unified.

In the case of the religions of Greece the changes which went on in respect of the conception of Soul and soul-life proved an important principle for differencing these religions from others and for giving them a unity of their own. On comparing the religious development of the Greeks with that of Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity, or Islam, its lack of unity in any organized way is noticeable: "Like the heathen peoples of the Orient the Greeks knew neither a special religious community nor a unified religious tradition of a fundamental type."¹ But the religion of the Greeks was intensely and intelligently anthropomorphic, in the narrower meaning of the word. The Greek pantheon was made up of beings constructed after the pattern of human ideals of strength, beauty, and intelligence, associated in the well-known ways of human society. The gods were

Semitic deities were chiefly female, and that even Judaism, with the purer worship of Yahweh, arose out of this form of religion. But this claim is very doubtful; and the predominatingly *male* character of all the Babylonian divinities is traceable as far back as 2500 B. C. (Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 116ff.) Indeed, the tendency finally resulted in recognizing only *one* goddess, or "great-mother," representing the principle of generation.

¹ See Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie and Religionsgeschichte*, I, p. 1.

Selves. And when, after the earlier Ionian culture of the Greeks had declined and the Hellenic culture was beginning, "the old simplicity of earlier Greek religion revived," this characteristic of thorough-going humanity was modified in the form of its expression but was not essentially changed. The new interest in soul-worship, as it showed itself in various offerings to the dead, in hero-worship, in the worship of the household gods and the gods of the clan, and in institutions like the prytaneum table as a feast with the gods of the state,¹ was not precisely of the same order as that shown by similar observances among the Egyptians or the Romans. The Greeks connected soul-worship with larger and higher views of the dignity and immortality of the human Self.

Thus from the confusion of a vague and unreflecting Spiritism the more definite varieties of ancestor-worship and nature-worship, in their more elaborate forms, arise and are themselves amalgamated with each other and with various other forms of religious beliefs and cult. But by that more intelligent and purposeful rearrangement of different and contending religious beliefs and rites which we have called Syncretism, new forms of religion, with a higher character for unity, originate in the religious history of mankind.

With respect to religion as well as to other forms of man's evolution, variability is to be assumed as the fundamental principle; unification and stability are the facts which, when they are facts, demand special recognition and some more definite attempt to account for their origin and continuance. We find, for example, among the Romans an impressive multiplication of the gods in the case of the *Di Indigetes*, or "minor and departmental deities." This results in Sator, or a spirit of sowing, Occator, or a spirit of harrowing, Sterculinius, of manuring, Cardea, of hinges, Limentinus, of the threshold, Locutius, of talking, Cunina, of the cradle, etc. But the irrationality and almost insane tendency which is implied in such

¹ Compare Wheeler, *Dionysos and Immortality*, p. 28f.

a minute differentiation is checked and turned in the other direction by the process of syncretism.

The process of Syncretism may take several forms, among which the more prominent are (1) identification, whether founded in reality or artificial and mythological; (2) social subordination or some other form of creating social unities; (3) speculative synthesis or such as results in pantheistical conceptions, from whose point of view all the gods are regarded as manifestations or incarnations of One and the same Divine Being. Of these three forms the first two are present and operative in the amalgamation of the different factors derived from different sources; and the difference as respects these forms, between amalgamation and syncretism is one of degree. But the third form of synthesis is more distinctly reflective and deliberate; it elevates into a theory the vague feelings of a spiritual unity which characterize man's earlier attitude of belief and worship toward the Object of religion.

Instances of all these three forms of syncretism are abundant. In the "Book of the Dead" (chap. XVII, lines 42f) it is said that "Osiris came to Mendes; there he met the soul of Rā; they embraced and became as one soul in two souls." The principle of syncretism is applied in its extreme form where the Divine One is made perpetually to create "his own members which are the gods"; or where some god announces: "I am the maker of the heaven and the earth. . . . It is I that have given to all the gods the soul that is within them. . . . I am Chapera in the morning, Rā at noon, Tmu in the evening."¹ This form of unification to which, when fully accomplished, Max Müller gave the name of "henotheism" is the rather to be recognized as something existing, almost or quite everywhere present, but with every variety of degrees of intelligence and completeness. In the avatars of Hinduism we have another form of reflective syncretism. And nowhere else per-

¹ See D'Alviella, *Origin and Growth of the Conception of God*, p. 213f; and compare Renouf, *The Religion of Ancient Egypt*, p. 226f.

haps—certainly not, in so early times—has the reflective spirit of man so powerfully operated to produce a controlling unification of the conceptions of religion, without coming to a clearly defined Monotheism, as in India.

The earliest examples of a speculative syncretism are to be found in the Hindū schools of religious philosophy. Of the six orthodox systems of Brāhmanism it may be said that each one emphasizes, and so theoretically unifies, some one important group of the truths of this religion : (1) Mimamsa-system, the theory of offerings and the interpretation of the sacred Vedic writings ; (2) the Vedānta system, the theory of the world as *Māyā*, the soul as eternal, and its goal the union with Brahm ; (3) Sankhya, the way of salvation as the release of the soul from its bondage to matter by the overcoming of desire ; (4) 'Yoga, the art or right practice for effecting this union with Divine Being ; and (5) and (6) Nyaya and Vaisesika, the metaphysics of the material world and of the soul. Thus by processes of reflective thinking, after the fashion of schools of philosophy, religion was centuries ago differentiated and formed into unities of a speculative order. This fact is evidence toward a conclusion which may also be placed on psychological grounds,—namely, that one of the most important and constant factors in man's religious development is the answer which any particular religion gives to his metaphysical needs. No religion is possible without the assumption of a supersensible Reality for its Object ; and the religions of the world are differentiated and unified in accordance with the particular answer which each one of them makes to these needs. Nor does this principle of differentiation apply to the schools of religious philosophy alone ; it applies also to the crudest metaphysics of the most savage mind.

All the great world-religions present many illustrations— are illustrations themselves, indeed, in their varied growths,— of all the principles and forms of differentiation and unification already discussed. The processes of amalgamation and syncre-

tism may, then, be said to belong to the very essence of the religious life and development of humanity. In the light of this truth we shall now consider the different particular religions.

According to Erman,¹ the one certain conclusion with regard to the ancient religious condition in the Nile Valley is that Egypt originally had no single religion common to its entire territory. At a very ancient period a belief in Rā, the Sun-god, who journeys in a boat over the heavens, or lives in Heaven, was universal. But everywhere he who needed supernatural aid resorted for it to the divinities of his own district or city;—as, for example, Ptah in Memphis, Atum in Heliopolis, Osiris in Abydos, Amon in Thebes, etc. These gods of the locality manifested themselves most frequently in some animal form; Ptah in the form of the bull Apis, Amon in the ram, Sbok in the crocodile. “The god of a nome was held to be the ruler of the gods within it, Creator of the world, Giver of all good things; and it mattered little to his adherents that another deity played a precisely similar part in some adjacent nome where their own god was relegated to a subordinate place.”² Some of these gods might be enemies of others; and thus quarrels between the different nomes might arise. But a certain unification of religion necessarily took place as a result of a growing geographical and political unity. Migrating families took their gods with them from district to district; and as any particular district or city gained in importance, its principal divinity gained correspondingly. Thus the worship of Osiris, originally the god of Abydos, early absorbed the devotion and even the personal existence formerly belonging to other gods. “The consequence of this process was that with the advance of civilization religion assumed constantly more and more simple forms.”³ It was the principle of identification,

¹ *Ägypten und Ägyptisches Leben in Altertum*, chap. XII, Die Religion, p. 351.

² Wiedemann, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, p. 11.

³ Erman, *Ibid.*, p. 353f.

however, which gained the ascendancy for Râ, with whom almost all the other gods could be associated in subordination. Some few, like Sbok, the water-god whose form was a crocodile, did not, however, easily lend themselves to any process of assimilation. Thus what Erman has aptly called a “divine *mixtum compositum*”—Amon-Râ-Harmachis-Atum—came to be denominated the “one only and truly living god.”¹ This process of amalgamation seems to have been helped by the reforming king, Amenhôtep IV, and dogmatically propagated from house to house by sacred hymns. In these hymns the Sun-god is addressed as the truly alone God, the creator of all things and the Lord of time. But the popular reactions against such high doctrine left the lower forms of religion still in possession of the minds and lives of the multitudes. To the popular gods the popular heart remained faithful throughout.

Yet in the religion of ancient Egypt there appear, not infrequently in very ancient times, flashes of light, or glimmerings that seem to lead the soul out of the darkness; but then subside and leave it to wander back again. Evidences of genuine and heartfelt piety, with purer conceptions of the divine nature and of man’s right relations to the Divine, are also not wanting. “Pray for thyself with a heartfelt of love, whose words remain concealed, that He may grant thee thy needs, may hear thy words, and may accept thy offering.” Yet this is the conception of God held by the exalted, by the devout monarch or the instructed priest; while as yet to the state and the priesthood the multitude of individual souls are—to borrow an expressive phrase—“only the fifth wheel of the wagon.”²

That motley grouping of religious beliefs and ceremonies, with its more than Egyptian darkness and complexity, which has prevailed in India for centuries, is held together by a “three-fold cord” which is not easily to be sundered. The first thread in this cord, which binds the reflective intelligence

¹ In the phraseology of the hymns to the Sun; *Ibid.*, p. 354f.

² So Erman, *Ibid.*, p. 370.

of the more thoughtful classes (and in India a certain thoughtful reflectiveness extends to a surprising depth of material and social degradation), is a pantheistic conception of the Being of the World. This Pantheism is mystical, poetical, and mythological, rather than scientific or philosophical, in the modern meaning of the latter term. Its best expression results in the two most important tenets of the Brāhmanism of the Upanishads; and these tenets are, (1) the existence of a World-soul as the great Object of religious belief and worship; and (2) the doctrine of salvation by a cultivated knowledge of, and a union with, this World-soul. But the theoretical strand of the three-fold cord would never hold together such varied differentiations, were it not for the other two strands with which it is combined. These are, first, a belief in the indispensable value for salvation of the prescribed rites, ceremonies, and sacrifices, with which men must try to avoid the anger and gain the favor of the gods, and by which alone "merit" is to be obtained; and, secondly, the irresistible tension and apparently unbreakable strength—without a complete overthrow of Hindūism—of the prevalent system of caste. Such are the forms of unification peculiar to the differentiations grouped under the religions of India. Of these differentiations themselves enough for the present has already been said.

Nowhere else in the ancient world does the free creative spirit of a gifted race show itself so plainly in the construction of religious conceptions and beliefs as among the Greek-speaking peoples. That their earliest historical development of the religious consciousness was free from fetish-worship, ancestor-worship, and worship of natural objects of both a lower and a higher grade, is not a credible *a priori* assumption. Moreover, as we have already seen, there are traces of the passage of the Greeks—here, as elsewhere, the multitudes of the people—through the stage marked by a vague and unreflecting Spiritism. Indeed, here as elsewhere, these multitudes remained throughout to no small extent in this lower stage of development. But

the paucity of either literary or archæological traces of the deification of stones, trees, animals, and other natural objects, as compared with other contemporaneous nations, is the remarkable thing in the religious history of this gifted people.¹ Shall we say that Homer and Hesiod—if not the Greeks of the age of these poets—were ashamed of the lower forms of worship prevailing in their time?

The characteristic Greek religion was a polytheism of a distinctly and definitively anthropomorphic type. The Greek gods *are* men;—not “superhuman,” because conceived of as more like the mysterious, incomprehensible, and dreaded spiritual energies of Nature, but because they are more strong, heroic, swift and brave, more beautiful and exalted in life, than are mundane men. Thus they are differentiated as men of a superior type of character are differentiated from the multitude or common herd. The divine beings were, therefore, frankly endowed with the qualities of human beings in a superlative degree; thus they appeared naturally, and oftentimes with extreme naïveté, as wanting in character for purity and peaceableness. From a certain point of view the gods of Greece fell far below the Buddhistic conception of the Divine Being of the Universe and the Zoroastrian idea of Ahura Mazda. The fine and true thing, however, about the Greek religion, and the thing which gave to all its conceptions the free spirit of unification which they possess, is this: The Divine Being is preëminently a rational and social affair. It is the actuality of a free community composed of fair and strong personalities. Even taken thus, the conception lacked that which Judaism

¹ In ancient Greece, as in Babylonia, the sacrifices offered to the dead ancestors on their graves were designed to appease and propitiate their spirits rather than to show honor and affection toward them. In the earliest history also, we find that “Greek religion was a thing of the *polis*, the city built of the amalgamated tribes and clans. With the *polis* it stood, and with the fall of the *polis* as a unit of government it fell. Its gods were chief citizens of the *polis*, honorary members of the associated guilds.” Wheeler, *Dionysos and Immortality*, p. 65.

possessed in so high a degree,—namely, the conviction that righteousness in Reality is of incomparable value and is an essential and eternal *moment*, or central and controlling factor of all that is truly Divine.

A distinctly obvious but arrested movement to perfect the Greek conception of the gods by conforming it to the ideal of a perfect ethical Spirit, was made by the Greek tragedians and moralists. In this movement Æschylus is especially prominent with his plea for the conviction that Zeus is the patron, protector, and pattern of righteousness. To this movement by tragedians and moralists was added the more powerful and effective influences of the Greek philosophic mind. A succession of reflective spirits, unmatched in all the history of the ancient world, strove by philosophic reflection to remove the anthropomorphic defects from the conception of God, and to exalt Him as Infinite and Absolute above all human limitations and imperfections. Parallel with this movement, and as an essential corollary from its premises, was the growth of the conception of the human soul as divine in nature and destiny, and of the incomparable worth of its rational life. These achievements of the Greek religious spirit, while they never served to bring about a unity of corresponding beliefs and practices among the Greeks themselves, entered into the most important and abiding possession of the religious development of humanity through this influence upon Christianity.

The sober, practical, business-like temperament of the Romans, and their unequalled gift at domestic and political organization, gave a marked unity of character to all the various changes of religion among them during their entire history. With the Romans to the very end, religion was a matter of citizenship rather than of philosophy, poetry, private ethics, or of the satisfaction of the individual's religious needs. Thus Rome was always most tolerant of other and foreign gods, whenever their worship did not appear to interfere with or to threaten the safety and prosperity of the state. But the na-

tional religion was indifferent to those spiritual satisfactions and personal needs of the individual to which Christianity made so forceful and effective an appeal. The control of religious emotion and of all exhibitions of religious enthusiasm as dangerous to the stability of the state, was characteristic of Rome.¹

The Romans, therefore, furnish a most instructive lesson in the methods of syncretism in religion. From the earliest moments of reflection two classes of gods are to be distinguished, the *di indigetes* and the *di novensides*. On the basis of various kinds of evidence, but especially that derived from the oldest stone calendars of the festival tables, Wissowa² derives a list of thirty-three of these oldest of the gods. Among the more prominent of these throughout Roman history are Juppiter, Mars, Neptune, Saturn, Ceres, Janus, Lares, Quirinus, *et alt.* Even in these earliest times a certain unification had already taken place by the pairing of the gods:—*e. g.*, Janus and Vesta, Jovis and Jovino, Faunus and Fauna, Liber and Libera, Mars and Nerio, Neptunus and Salacia, etc. The same tendency to unification shows itself in the form of a grouping of the gods into divine families (*famuli divi*). Another form of unification was a somewhat definite ranking of the gods, which assigned to Juppiter (whose priests were among the *flamines majores* from the oldest times downward), Mars (always the war-god), and Quirinus.

In all these conceptions, there is manifest a relative deficiency of imagination and mythological energy; on the other hand, there is an abundant demonstration of the very prosaic and practical nature of the early Roman people. But we can scarcely

¹ See Oakesmith, *The Religion of Plutarch*; and the quotation from Boissier, p. 9 (note).

² *Religion und Cultus der Römer* [volume V. 4 in Müller's *Handbuch*], p. 18f; and on the distinctions of *divi indigetes* and *divi novensides*, compare Liv. VIII, 9.6; Diodorus, XXXVII, 17; and Tertullian, *ad Nat.* II. 9, who makes a distinction between the *di publici* and the *di adventici*: See Wissowa *Ibid.*, pp. 90ff.

say, as Wissowa does,¹ that there is a complete absence of all personifying of natural forces and natural phenomena; for to Juppiter, as the "all-comprehending heaven-god," there is assigned the definite work of sending rain and sunshine. Nor can it be held that ethical ideas are wholly wanting to this ancient and rude pantheon; for, although ethical ideals are not personified in any of the gods, Juppiter shows to men from the heavens his pleasure or displeasure at their conduct; and Tellus, the "divine incorporation of a cultivated field," receives the seed and yields or withholds the fruit.

A similar process of differentiation according to a practical specialization of functions allotted to different divinities is extended among the lesser gods. The house with its door is kept by the divine being, Janus; the hearth is consecrated by the presence of Vesta; the boundary stone between the field is guarded by Terminus. The wood (*Faunus*), meadow (*Pales*), fountain (*Fons*), stream (*Voltumnus*), and the stages of agriculture—sowing (*Saturnus*), growth (*Ceres*), harvest (*Ops*), flowering (*Flora*), and fruiting (*Pomona*),—as well as the stages of human life from birth to death (*Mater matuta* and *Larenta*) are placed under the guardianship of appropriate gods. Even these divisions of divine activity were further multiplied by giving to each province a deity of its own, yet leaving to each house-door its own Janus, to each bit of ground its own Lares, to every hearth its own Vesta. The sense of the divine importance of the citizen house-holder, the family, the tribe, the state, is everywhere dominant; the sense of the universal, all-pervading life of nature in which each individual has his life is almost lost.

According to Wissowa, the next important step in the differentiation and unification of the religion of the Romans took place when the old trinity of divinities was displaced by a new trinity, consisting of Juppiter, Juno, and Minerva, to whom a temple was built upon a height commanding

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

the capital city. Henceforth these Capitoline gods became the "great gods" of the Roman state. They were all, indeed, Italian gods; and their union into a trinity was brought about by Etruscan influences and originally established in Etruria after the pattern of the corresponding Greek triad (*Zeús, Ἥρα* and *Αθηνα*).¹ Among the other important elements incorporated into the ancient religion and cult of the Romans was the worship of Diana, from the neighboring and racially allied city of Aricia.² Early also (probably in the first decade of the Republic) the Heracles-cult, of Greek origin, was introduced into the Roman state-religion. From about 537 B. C. onward, the Hellenizing of this religion went forward; and it was this process, far more than any growth in philosophic reflection, which finally undermined and overthrew it. In the later process of disintegration philosophy, no doubt, bore a somewhat important part. But the indifferentism and scepticism of the Republic killed religion in ancient Rome; and as Augustine³ affirms, the gods perished "not by hostile incursion but by neglect of the citizens."

Another form of unification, although to a relatively limited extent, operated among the Romans, as elsewhere, in the changes of religious beliefs and cult. This was the multiplication and grouping of divinities by the personifying and deification of abstract conceptions. To this process the conceptions of Jupiter and Juno as supreme male and female heavenly divinities readily lent themselves. Hence we have Jupiter-

¹ Wissowa, *Ibid.*, p. 36.

² It is largely upon the basis of this worship that Professor Frazer in his "The Golden Bough" builds up his elaborate theory of the origin and nature of religion. But it is at least doubtful whether even this slender basis for so large a structure is in any important respect tenable in the form in which he presents it. Apparently, it was as the guardian goddess of a league comprising several cities, of which Aricia was chief, that Diana became so widely adopted: and not because of occult peculiarities in her worship. See Wissowa, *Ibid.*, p. 199f.

³ De civitate dei, VI, 2.

Fulgur, Tonans, and Victor; and Juno Lucina, Moneta, Regina, Sospes; and Venus, Felix, Victrix, Genetrix, etc. In a different manner Fidius is conceived of as originally one with Jupiter, regarded as the guardian of *fides*, the public faith. So Pudicitia, Quies, and Clementia, are divine personifications of human qualities. In spite of the seeming determination of the Romans to make every god mind his own business and attend somewhat strictly to his own work, traces of what Max Müller has called "Henotheism" are not wholly wanting among them. Thus, in some of the litanies, Janus is addressed as "good creator" and "god of gods" (*creator bonus* and *deus deum*).

The last phase of the Roman religion followed the conceptions and shared the fate of the later Roman Empire. The emperors, who set themselves up as at the same time gods and religious reformers could save neither the state nor the national religion. The reforms which Julius Cæsar had in mind and which Augustus undertook, resulted in only a superficial and temporary appearance of checking the process which was hastened by the coming of foreign Egyptian and Oriental cults, not only into the private religious practices of the people, but also into the Roman state-religion. The worship of Mithras and of Isis made a profound impression upon a people who had out-grown and out-worn those ancient faiths which had given stability and dominion to the Republic through so many centuries. As the priests and believers in the mysterious Egyptian cult, in white linen garments and with shorn heads, and playing exciting and strange music, moved through the streets in procession, and bore aloft the symbols of the dog-headed Anubis and the sacred Isis cow; what wonder that the multitudes and the more intelligent but mystically inclined minds, were captivated and drawn away to the new faiths!

Like the God of Christianity, these new gods from Egypt and Syria refused to amalgamate on terms of equality with the gods of the ancient Roman state-religion. They claimed to be,

each one, the true and all-comprehending Divinity ; and their worship demanded a belief in, and a respect for, the Universal Life, which was something more than was comprehended in the prosaic and practical beliefs and cult of the ancient Romans. The ancestral and state gods must give way to what represented, in however indefinite and unsatisfying manner, the universal needs and religious functions of humanity. When these were presented in the higher spiritual form which belongs to the content of the Christian religion, a differentiation that was an almost complete transformation, took place in the religious life of the Roman Empire. And as Wissowa has well said :¹ Julian with his Neo-Platonism was no more a "restorer of the Roman religion" than Constantine was. But the idea of the state as a divinely connected and interrelated family, with the same hearth and the same family gods, contains a germ of truth not destined to perish. And Roman religion has profoundly influenced in this way the organization and perpetuation of the Christian religious community,—thus contributing factors of development to the religious history of mankind which are of no mean order.

In connection with the enforced conversion to piety of the Saxons something becomes known about the nature of their early religion through the list of superstitious and idolatrous practices recorded in such documents as the *indiculus superstitionum* and the *homilia de sacrilegiis*. We thus discover that at one time the religion of the Teutons probably corresponded to that of the other forms of a vague and unreflecting Spiritism, in its worship of trees and springs, its magic and divination, its offerings to the dead ; and in other elemental forms of religious belief and cult. A pantheon of nature-gods is also in existence.² Wôdan or the wind-god, is one of the three deities which, with Donar and Saxnot, and other unnamed gods, the converts to Christianity were required to abjure. But Wôdan is also the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 84f.

² See De la Saussaye, *The Religion of the Teutons*, pp. 221ff.

god of agriculture and poetry, and the progenitor of many families. He is the leader of the "furious host" which, when the storm is raging, rushes through the night and sometimes presages fertility to come, but usually calamity or war. He is also god of the dead to whom, with Odhin, human sacrifices were offered by some of the tribes, and whose abode was Walhalla, the paradise of the heroes that had fallen in battle. As an Eddic song runs:

"Its roof with spears is laid,
Its halls with shields is decked,
With corselets are its benches strewed."

There is also Donar, Thuner, Thor—the Thunder-god—who controls the thunder and lightning, the rain-storms and clear weather; and Tiu, the Sky-god, who is also a god of war; for so fond of fighting were the ancient Teutons that one god of this description did not satisfy their needs. But the nature-gods of the "great-god" variety did not exclude or suppress the worship of the gods who were progenitors of the tribes and leaders of them in war.

Still further variations in the Teutonic pantheon were induced by the fact that the distinction between the "active pantheon," and the divinities who were purely poetical and mythological conceptions was hardly ever a fixed and constant distinction.¹ The trinities of gods, like Thor, Odhin, and Freyr (Upsala), or Odhin, Hoenir, Loki (Edda), were probably formed according to the well-known way of unification by coupling together those gods which had become the chief divinities of different tribes. But this entire characteristic process of differentiation and unification, as well as the resulting religious beliefs, accords perfectly with the temperamental peculiarities of the Teutons in response to their physical environment. These fierce and warlike tribes, with a certain "virtuosity" of domestic and tribal characters, believed in and

¹ See De la Saussaye, *Ibid.*, p. 284; and comp. Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, p. 188.

worshipped divinities like themselves. Their worship was in the gloomy but sacred forests which were the abodes of the gods ;—the places where were kept the effigies that were carried forth to battle (the effigies, as in Egypt, sometimes representing the gods in animal form), and the theatres where all the most mysterious and weird and awful spiritual forces, variously embodied, were at play. In these forests were the bloody sacrifices of their prisoners of war ; and when they were “ converted ” to Christianity, the same kind of ethico-religious consciousness suffused the type of Christianity which the Teutonic tribes adopted. And to this day, the descendants of these tribes, while greatly modified and elevated by the beliefs and sentiments of the Christian religion, are still in need of further conversion from the temper and practices of their ancient faiths.

In spite of these repulsive qualities, however, there was a certain supreme excellence belonging to the religion of the Teutons, upon which the graft of Christianity has so flourished as to bring forth its best fruits. An ethical standard of fidelity and affectionate allegiance was applied to the gods ; and they themselves, although divine or even in spite of their divinity, were held for judgment under this human standard. Not Fate, nor a shadowy and abstract World-Soul, nor a material and wholly impersonal aggregate of existences and forces, but a self-enforcing ethical Law, embodied in Personality, has become the supreme factor of the prevailing religion of the descendants of the Teutons at the present time.

Besides the kinds of religion which result from such processes of differentiation and unification as have already been chiefly considered, there are other kinds in which the controlling principle of change is the contribution of some one or more great religious teachers, and reformers, or religious geniuses. These religions are more distinctively personal ; they are growths due largely to the reflections of individuals rather than to the products of the general religious experience. Of course in all of these

cases even, the foundations of the structure are laid in historical antecedents, and in the resulting religious beliefs, sentiments, and cult. The warp *has been* constructed; the weaver introduces, according to a new pattern formed by his thought and imagination, the woof. Chief among such religions are Confucianism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Reserving for consideration as belonging to a unique religious development the cases of Judaism and Christianity, we may close our sketch of the way in which the differentiation and unification of the world's religions has gone on by a brief presentation of the remaining four. This presentation may properly be the briefer, because it is these "personal" religions which, in the largest measure and highest degree, exhibit the marks of a genuine development; their particular religious tenets will, therefore, continually control the discussion of all the remaining problems for the constructive part of the investigation. The lower forms of religion may largely be, from this point onward, left out of the account.

Confucianism certainly is clearly entitled to be called one of the world's greater religions; whether it is possible or not to convict its founder of an atheistic agnosticism, or to prove him a believer in the more popular gods, or in that form of "henotheism" or pantheism of which traces are abundant in the older classics.¹ The religious *motif* in Confucianism, considered as a political and social system of teachings, is the worship of Heaven as the One ruling and all-embracing Power. This supreme Deity, under the symbols of T'ien (or "yî, the symbol of unity, placed over tâ, the symbol for great"), or Tî (signifying sovereignty or lordship), or Shang Tî (the same symbol with the addition of the title "supreme") was worshipped in China for thousands of years before the birth of Confucius (B. C. 551). By the learned and intelligent Chinese the other objects of religious worship—whether the so-called *shih*, or

¹ For the two views, see Legge, *The Religions of China*, Lectures I and II, with their notes.

spirits of heavenly bodies, or the so-called *kwei* or spirits of departed men (*manes*)—were regarded as subordinate to this Supreme Heavenly Lord. Even as late as the Ming dynasty (1368–1642, A. D.) the *shih* appear in Chinese writings as superintending the clouds and rain, and as raising and sending abroad the wind. There is also good evidence to show that when, later, the imperial sacrifices were divided between Heaven and Earth and were performed upon separate altars, it was still understood that both sacrifices were in the service of the One Supreme Lord, Shang Ti. This vague, indefinite and *quasi*-pantheistical personification of Heaven as the supreme Divine Being, the Ruler of nature and of men, was the historical religious core of Confucianism. Thus, according to Legge,¹ Confucius regarded the active and inactive elements as combining to bring about natural events only under the directing influence of that unfathomable spiritual operation which was rightly worshipped as the Lord and Master of all. Nor were the relations of Heaven to man of a purely physical character alone. According to tradition we have the picture of the great reformer saying in the day of his trouble: “Alas! there is none that knows me;” and immediately adding: “But there is Heaven;—*It* knows me!”²

It must not be forgotten, however, that the Confucianism which, as one of the three “amalgamated” religions of China, has sufficed for the political stability and social institutions of this mighty empire through centuries of time, is by no means the simple Confucianism of its founder. He was himself also a transmitter of the wisdom of the sages of centuries before his own day. The Confucianism of later times in both China and

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 41f.

² There is an interesting analogy between this and the outcry of many a believing Christian soul, and even of the great modern apostle of Agnosticism, in his moral justification of himself by an appeal to the “Unknown Cause,” whose agency he is: Herbert Spencer, *First Principles* (1st. ed.), p. 123.

Japan presents the ethics of Confucius, with its *motif* of Heaven as Supreme Lord, suffused with mystical elements of nature-worship and with the speculations of Buddhism. This syncretic Confucianism is neither agnostic nor atheistic, but the rather pantheistic—a sort of universal Spiritism. Kî=Spirit is in the earth, the air, the trees, the flowers, in charming poetry, and comes to consciousness in man. Tî, in fact, becomes Rî=Reason, or Law. Rî is not separate from Kî; for, then, it were an empty and abstract thing. It is joined to Kî, and may be called, by its nature, one decreed and changeless Norm. It is the principle of Kî, the very center, the reason why Kî is Kî. Thus we have a conception, reflectively obtained, of a certain spiritual Unity which is Reason, identical with Law, but vaguely and inconsistently conceived in *quasi*-personal terms, as the nearest approach which Confucianism has been able to make toward a rational Monotheism. In all its forms, however, in China, Confucianism has remained an official religion,—“a combination of such rites and ceremonies as are mentioned in the ancient classics,” “an artificial religion standing apart from that professed by the bulk of the nation.”¹

That wonderful religious movement which arose within the Hindūism of India through the effect of the teachings of Buddha, and which has counted among its adherents more millions of the human race than any other religion has as yet succeeded in attaching to itself, exemplifies in a notable way those principles of syncretism in religion which we are examining. In its beginning, Buddhism was one of several nearly contemporaneous attempts at the reform of Hindūism; of these attempts the other most important is Jainism. But unlike Jainism, which has remained in India as a relatively insignificant modification of the ancestral religion, Buddhism, although crushed in the land of its birth,—mainly by political influences and by the recurrent supremacy of the caste system,—has absorbed into itself various forms of religious beliefs

¹ J. J. M. De Groot, *The Religious System of China*, I, p. XV.

and cult originally belonging to other races and times. This surprising result is undoubtedly due chiefly to the fitness of Buddhism to meet the religious needs of the peoples among which it has spread, and to the powerfully attractive character of the spiritual ideals for which Buddha's "way of salvation" and his teachings and example as to the true life bear witness.

Buddhism was at first and still is so firmly rooted in Hindūism that the identity of the two religions, in respect of their characteristic way of looking at the world and at human life, cannot be denied. When we are told, for example,¹ that the three fundamental characteristics of original Buddhism are (1) the transitory and illusory character of things, (2) the misery of existence and the way of escape through the extinction of desire, and (3) the lack of egohood in the elements of existence, we recognize in the first two the tenets of the earlier religion. Only the third marks the chief doctrinal departure of Buddhism from the metaphysical assumptions of Brāhmanism. When in the story of Sumedha the reflection is made :

"What misery to be born again!
And have the flesh dissolve at death!"

and when we read the traditions respecting the prognostications that accompanied the conception of Buddha, his temptation, preparation for his office of Messiahship, the "joy to the world" presaged and fulfilled by his life, and the details of his daily habits, we feel ourselves to be all the while in a distinctly Hindū religious atmosphere. Nothing is more impressive than the marked differences between all these narratives and the corresponding narratives respecting the life of the founder of Christianity. That Buddhism has its roots in the doctrines of dualism and pessimism as taught by the Sankhya philosophy, whatever may be said about its relation to other doctrines of this system, there would seem to be no manner of doubt.

¹ See Buddhism in Translations, Introduction, p. xiv.

This persistent weariness of life, accentuated for the multitudes by the doctrine of caste,¹ Buddhism aimed to relieve in a theoretical way by sweeping aside the two essential metaphysical tenets of the Upanishads—(1) the existence of a World-soul, and (2) the doctrine of the salvation of the human soul only, or chiefly, by a cultivated union with the World-soul—and in a practical way by leading men into a life of pity, kindness, and self-denial. Thus as Rhys Davids has said:² Buddha “proclaimed a salvation which each man could gain for himself, and by himself, in this world, during this life, without any the least reference to God, or to gods, either great or small.” But, as has already been shown (p. 106*f*) the God here passed by without reference is the metaphysical World-Soul of Brāhmanism; and the gods disregarded in following the way of salvation are no better than the Hindū pantheon of Buddha’s time. It was the practical way of salvation which it offered to men, and the path of which it cleared by denying the truth of the Brāhmanical metaphysics, and by disputing the validity of the caste system, which won the hearts of men to the teaching of Buddhism. Its elementary morality is, indeed, essentially the same as that recognized by the best Hindū ethics of its day. But this elementary morality was introductory to the higher morality of the “Noble Path.” It ended with this truth,—so nearly akin to the central Christian truth,—respecting the spirit of him who has become “enlightened” and one with *the* (great) Buddha: “Thus the whole wide world, above, below, around, and everywhere, does He continue to pervade with heart of Love, far-reaching, grown great and beyond measure.”

The various developments of Buddhism in the lands to which it has gone have been influenced as a matter of course, by the geographical, ethnographic, and race-cultural conditions which it has met. Thus a variety of differentiations has arisen,

¹ See Rhys Davids, *Indian Buddhism* (Hibbert Lectures, 1881), p. 22.

² *Ibid.*, p. 29.

but a certain unity has pervaded them all,—a unity born of the spirit of Buddha, which was itself, however, historically determined by the most fixed characteristics of that Hindūism from which the later religion sprang.

The personal religious beliefs and ideals of the founder seem to have entered into the early form of the religion known as Zoroastrianism in a more pronounced and powerful way than was the case with either Confucianism or Buddhism. Zoroaster's life, so far as we know it, tells the story of the sources peculiar to his religion. As a seeker for the light, and a teacher of truth, he deserves to rank beside Buddha, Confucius, and Socrates.¹ The misery which he, like his Indian colleague, found in the world, Zoroaster believed to be caused by a personal evil spirit. This spirit, however, might be fought with courage and hope, if fought strenuously and unflinchingly; because of the faith in another and stronger divine personal principle of light and truth. The stories of the miracles preceding Zoroaster's begetting and birth, of his temptation and preparation for his ministry of healing and reform, of his overcoming the demons who, by powerful magical means, sought to thwart and harass him, all have the customary Oriental coloring. He discovers his religion by a series of seven visions extending through the first ten years of its origin. The period of his trial and disappointment draws to a close with the conversion of Kavi Vishtāspa, the "Constantine of Zoroastrianism." Then follows the conversion of others high in court circles and the spread of the religion over Iran. Even Greek conversions are fabled; and the great prophet displays his power to overcome demons, to bring rain, and to counteract the attacks of wolves and of noxious diseases.

The characteristics of Zoroastrianism are reforming, prophetic, and redemptive.² While sharing certain peculiarities with the religion of the Vedas, the religion of the Avesta early

¹ So, Professor Jackson, *Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran*, p. 1.

² Compare Jackson. *Ibid.*, (*passim*).

(and probably from the very beginning of the teaching of Zarathustra—1000 B. C. [?]) differed in its ethical and spiritual conception of the Divine Being from any of the developments of Hindüism. According to Darmstetter, the plainly recognizable elements of the doctrine are (1) dualism; (2) the limited duration of the world; (3) the resurrection; (4) the worship of the pure elements of the World's Being; and (5) the ethics of labor and struggle and conflict to overcome evil. The significance given to the personal, both in the conception of Ahura-Mazda, and of man as his responsible creature, when contrasted with Hindüism and even with Buddhism, is the most important characteristic of Zoroastrianism. Morality—a purity of thought, word, and deed—flows from religion; the pure life is characterized by devotion and fidelity in conflict toward the spiritual principle of Truth and Purity, conceived of in a personal way.

Geographical and ethnographic conditions prevented the spread of the religion of Zoroaster as the religion of Buddha spread far and wide. It did not become a world-religion in the spatial meaning of that term. But so far as the scanty records of the past permit us to know it in its original form it was, among the world's greater religions, by no means the least worthy of our respect and consent to its important conceptions and lofty ideals. And its few remaining modern adherents, the Parsis of India, are to-day displaying not a few of the characteristics so worthily exhibited by the founder of their religion.

It was at one time more customary than now to regard Islam simply as a degenerate form of Judaism and Christianity, with a large admixture of superstition and fanaticism; and to account for its early and phenomenally rapid triumphs, its persistency, and its remarkable power to tame and improve religiously wild and savage tribes (especially of Africa), by its unscrupulous use of violence and its seductive appeals to the future rewards of a sensuous Paradise. But no serious study

of the history and doctrines of this religious development can justify such a view. The unification which Islam attempted to accomplish and with more or less success did accomplish, was indeed not like that of Buddhism; its essential nature did not favor its amalgamation with the existing forms of idolatry, the worship of nature and of ancestors, or of tribal gods, etc. Islam aimed, the rather, at breaking down all these beliefs by the proclamation of one only true Divine Being, and by the enforced call of *submission* to Him and to the faith in Him, as proclaimed by his prophet, Muhammad. It is true to this day, however, that the lower forms of religious belief and worship—the vague and unreflecting spiritism which we have found, at some stage of religious development, to be everywhere prevalent—prevail in Muhammadan lands. But the failure to elevate the people above such faiths and practices can scarcely be attributed to the moral weaknesses and doctrinal deficiencies inherent in Islam; unless one is also prepared to deal in the same unreasonable way with the Christian religion as represented by the type which Islam found in the lands it conquered, and which maintains itself till the present in considerable portions of Asia and of Europe. Indeed, an acquaintance with the so-called Christianity which Islam has superseded or suppressed, as well as with the type of Hinduism which it encountered in Northern India, is calculated to enhance one's estimate of the spiritual elevation and power of Islam's conception of the Divine Being and of its teachings as to his relations to the world of men. On the other hand, geographical and ethnographic limitations and difficulties must be allowed to account for not a few of its weaknesses and deficiencies.

The vital kernel of truth from which the growth of the religion founded by Muhammad sprang forth, was the attribution to Allah of eternity and aloneness,—thus doing for the conception of Deity among the surrounding Arabian tribes what Judaism had done centuries before for them by the conception of Yahweh. Allah, like Yahweh was elevated not only to the place of

superiority as the god of the clan or tribe, and so jealous of all rivals on his own ground, as it were; but he was separated from all other claimants to the title of being, in the highest sense, divine at all.¹ If Al-Uzza was identified with Allah by Muhammad, it was not as though the two great Gods were put upon an equality, or even in the same category of god-head. The meaning was this: Al-Uzza, whom the prophet had been taught to worship in his childhood, *was* really Allah; was, "after all, one with the God of his larger thought and prophetic ministry."² Essentially this has always been the theoretical position of Islam; and in this respect, its proclamation is not essentially different from that of the Apostle who announced: "Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you."

The insistent and shrill monotone of Islam is this: "The Lord thy God is an alone God; he is not begotten; he has not begotten; he has none like unto himself." All representation of the Divine Being, or worship of Him in any visible or tangible form, is abhorrent to the spirit of Islam. As to man, it is his duty and destiny to surrender to the absolutely sovereign will of this alone God, to believe in angels as his messengers, in Muhammad as his prophet, and in the day of judgment. The believer should further give himself to prayer, righteousness, and benevolence. Thus the doctrine of Allah and his prophet, Muhammad claims to be the true and ancient Abrahamic religion, of which Judaism and Christianity are corrupt forms. By its elevation of God as the absolute and unquestioned authority, Islam expects to break down the pride of man. It says to the supreme human ruler (as to the Sultan at every Selamluk): "Great as thou thinkest thyself to be, there is one far greater than thou." It levels human beings so that all believers, being on the same level before God, possess equally

¹ See Barton, *A Sketch of Semitic Origins*, chap. VII.

² Barton, *Ibid.*, p. 133.

whatever is possible of wealth, glory, and power among men ; and an equal share in Paradise.

That this corollary of Islam has had the practical result of treating all the ethical failures of the "true believer" with special indulgence and leniency is beyond doubt. But Islam shares the mistake of the "double morality" with all other religions, in their actual and practical outcome. God is indeed spoken of as forgiving and merciful ; but offences against his majesty he will not pardon. In no other religion is the equality of all human beings before the Alone Divine Being made more unequivocal than in Islam. Every Moslem, from whatever tribe or people sprung, and in no matter how low condition born, is equal with every other, on the ground of his religion. This leveling of men before God, and its intense practical purpose, carried out with fervor of zeal and unquestioning faith but without moral scrupulousness or tenderness of charity, has made the reform started by Muhammad one of the greater world-religions. But purity of heart, benevolence to all mankind as alike objects of the divine compassionate Love, and faith as a purifying and idealizing inward principle, are largely foreign to the beliefs, practices, and essential spirit of Islam.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION

In considering any theory of development as applied to the religions of mankind—the forces at work, the order of procedure, and the laws exemplified—it is necessary constantly to bear in mind the limitations which belong to all investigations of similar character. The phenomena of man's religious beliefs and cult have been seen to be exceedingly complex and subtly variable; and the differentiations resulting from the processes of amalgamation and syncretism have been found difficult to classify and to explain. It has become apparent that no theory can point out any one simple form of religion from which all others have been evolved; nor can any theory derive from the essentially non-religious the necessary factors of the religious life and development of mankind. All theories of development start with the fundamental psychological assumption of a religious nature in man. Furthermore, it is impossible to appreciate, or to evaluate, the religions of mankind in terms of any merely mechanical evolution. Finally: to maintain that the principle of continuity and the conception of evolution apply to the case of religion is by no means equivalent to maintaining that man has everywhere made progress toward the religious Ideal.

It is not, on the one hand, demonstrably true, from the fact that the early history of humanity almost universally shows the prevalence of a certain low stage of religious experience—differentiated indeed in respect of certain particulars and yet always possessing marked characteristics in common—that

this stage was not itself a degradation from a higher condition. The first picture of the religious life of man shows him standing on a low rung of the ladder; when and wherever he begins to climb. There are, indeed, here and there traces of his having at sometime stood upon a higher rung. It is abstractly possible that in a remote prehistoric era he fell from heaven, or from one of the top-most rounds, with a sort of headlong fall. But, on the other hand, the view of an ancient childlike monotheism as the earliest religious condition of the human race is a most improbable view. At any rate, a theory of the development of religion must begin by taking man where history finds him;—namely, upon that same lowest rung of the ladder leading heavenward.

The one example which is above all others best fitted to exhibit the forces, the order, and the laws, of the development of religion is Christianity, as it sprung from the roots in Judaism; and, still lower down, from the religion of the Semites, out of which Judaism itself came. A study of man's religious evolution has, indeed, most meagre results unless the history of the origins and growth of this religion is made a matter of chief account.

Judaism belongs to that important group of religions which are called Semitic, and of which the religions of Babylonia and Assyria are the other principal examples; while the religions of Arabia, Canaan, and Syria, are the lesser examples.¹ In their earliest forms they all show that kind of Spiritism which may make an object of religious worship out of anything that it endows with the characteristics of life.² The more distinctive features of this animistic tendency among the predecessors of Judaism were undoubtedly due to the tribal

¹ For the general characteristics of the Semitic religions, comp. W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites* (edition 1901), and the authorities cited there.

² Compare what has already been said (p. 141*f.*), of primitive Semitic religions.

peculiarities and the physical and social environment of this particular branch of the Semitic peoples. Plain traces of the stage of "pre-Mosaic" religious beliefs and practices are by no means wanting in the earlier writings of the Old Testament. Whether, for example, we can say that the elements of the tale of Genesis iii, which represent "God, man, and the serpent, as forming one social circle" must have taken shape in "a primitive totemistic society in which animals were really believed to possess such powers," is indeed a doubtful matter; but that the tale "reflects the conditions of primitive Semitic rather than of distinctively Hebrew thought" is beyond all doubt. Again, we cannot think the claim to be established, that female rather than male divinities were the principal objects of worship by the tribes out of which Judaism sprang. But that a spiritual conception of the Fatherhood of God was prevalent among these tribes is quite contrary to all the evidence. Indeed, the lower moral and religious conceptions of the Divine Being derived from this Semitic stock linger on into the later stages of Judaism;—as the complaints and labors at purifying and elevating the popular idea of God made by the religious teachers of the time abundantly show. What an enormous amount of spiritual energy was necessary in order to bring out of such a soil the flower of Christian purity of soul and life! Surely no whiter lotus ever had its roots in deeper or blacker mud!

There are many points about the beginnings of Mosaism which will probably never be made clear. The origin of Yahweh, as the God with whom the tribes felt themselves to be in covenant is obscure. The imagery with which the limitless and incomprehensible divine power and majesty are described is fitted to impress a people acquainted with the natural phenomena of the Arabian peninsula. Whether Yahweh was, or was not, originally a Kenite god, he is first known as the very center of a new development, in covenant with the collected tribes; they are to be his people, and he is to be their

God. As to the conception of his Divine Being there was, perhaps, a growth from the position in which Yahweh is regarded, first, as one among several or many tribal gods ; then as the chief of them all ; and finally, as the alone and only true God. From this point onward, the significant fact in the development is a process of purification and elevation which goes on respecting the reputed character of Yahweh himself.

It can scarcely be said then, that "what is unique in the development of the religion of Israel is that it passed without a break from the worship of nature to the worship of Jehovah, going through the intermediate stage of polytheism."¹ Nor is the popular notion which makes the Hebrews the originators of monotheism correct. The distinctive contribution of the Hebrews to religion is not the belief in one God, but "the investing of that God with ethical attributes."² Not quite this even : it was the kind and intensity of Yahweh's ethical being which distinguished Judaism from other religions. This was such as to tend "to make religion consistently coëxistent with life itself." For from this time on, the two "moments" of religious belief which characterized and dominated the unfolding of the religious ideal of Judaism were (1) God, conceived of as the righteous and Holy One, and placed in immediate moral relations with the human soul ; and (2) the belief that the life of man, individual or national, is fraught with weal or woe, according as it does or does not, obediently adjust itself, in righteousness, to these fundamental relations.

The deepening and expansion, as well as the practical enforcement of the conception of God as the Alone Righteous One, and the belief in the dependence of man's welfare upon obedience to Him in righteousness, was the work through several centuries of a succession of religious reformers who are absolutely without any parallel in ancient history. These men were the Hebrew Prophets. Taken collectively, they consti-

¹ So Prof. Watson, *Idealism and Christianity*, p. 45f.

² Jastrow, *Study of Religion*, p. 77f.

tute a most remarkable religious development. Each one of them has his personal peculiarities which are utilized rather than suppressed or overlaid by the inspiration which he receives from the Divine Spirit. Each one is, in a peculiarly close-fitting manner, a prophetic teacher of his own time. He speaks, as called of Yahweh to that office, in the name of Yahweh, revealing the will of Yahweh in righteousness, and summoning the people, on peril of that loss and ruin which must follow the breach of the covenant, to be obedient to their God. In the successive discharge of their prophetic function, this remarkable series of religious teachers develops a new and higher conception of the Divine Being whom the people are to serve and worship, and of the spiritual relations in which his followers stand to Him.

“The miracle of the history of Israel,” says a recent writer,¹ “is Prophetism. In this is to be found the incomparable force by which the religious evolution we may trace in its annals was effected.” Judaism thus became a religion of prophetic revelation. In its highest form this “genuine prophetic religion of Israel unites the optimism of the Persians with the profound idealism of the Buddhists, the magnanimity of a religion of humanity with the inspired warmth of a national *cultus*.” But especially within the more strictly Judaistic circles the religion of Judaism never succeeded in divesting itself of its two most important deficiencies. These were its exclusiveness and its lack of “inwardness.” Amongst the Jews of the Dispersion to a larger degree, and in a less degree among the Jews of Palestine, there was, in the case of some individuals and even throughout considerable circles, a softening of this spirit of exclusiveness, a deepening and broadening of the conception of that spirituality which is pleasing in the sight of God. There were some who believed and lived as though what Yahweh really required of Jews and of all mankind was “to do justice, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with God.” Inter-

¹ Schultz, Grundriss der Christlichen Apologetik, p. 135.

course with the Greeks, and reflection upon the inmost spiritual truths of their own religion, had not only loosened the hold of the distinctively Jewish faith upon the Hebrew people; but it had also in a measure improved upon that faith, even after the cessation of the succession of Old-Testament prophets. There were those who, like Hillel, taught as having authority, and not as the scribes with their endless debate over the traditions of the elders. Of this teacher, for example, it has been, not untruthfully, declared: "He was the founder and originator, not of the universality of the faith, but of *how to make the faith universal*."¹ His purpose was to love mankind and so "allure them to the study of the Law." So did Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai see arising over the ruins of the present temple a new spiritual temple, whose altar was the homes of the poor, and whose offerings were love, charity, mercy, and justice, "the sweet incense which pleases the Lord." The gospel of this Rabbi to the stricken people was: "Love ye one another, and ye shall find mercy and forgiveness." And so Ben Dosa taught that "he who finds grace with man's conscience will find grace with the Most High; but he whose deeds are reprobated by just men will also be reprobated by the Most High."²

In spite, however, of these later developments under the influence of external and internal religious forces, Judaism remained at the Christian era in a condition quite unfitted for further spiritual growth, and for social and political conquest over the minds and hearts of men. The separation of the Jews from the rest of humanity by a wall of autocratic self-righteousness set an insuperable barrier in the way of its further free development. Their religious conceptions had indeed prepared a soil in which the germs of a new religious movement could be planted, and from which a new religion could spring and enter upon a growth that has continued with increasing vigor down to the present time, and that is unique in the history of man's

¹ Adolf Danziger, *Jewish Forerunners of Christianity*, p. 14.

² Danziger, *Ibid.*, p. 77.

religious development. To express the same truth in the words of another: "Judaism was the retort, in which different elements were gathered together. Then followed through a creative miracle the new formation of the Gospel."¹

Christianity had its sources in the following conceptions of prophetic Judaism: (1) The conception of God as the Alone and righteous One; (2) the conception of religion as a covenant for righteous living with God; and (3) the conception of a Divine Kingdom composed of all who, by faith in God and the practice of righteous living in obedience to Him, are fitted to be its members. To these conceptions had been added a certain attitude of tenderness, in imitation of the softening conception of the Divine character, toward the faithful and afflicted people of God.² For the Dawn of the Gospel was to be seen in the evening sky of Prophetic Judaism. Certain factors of Christianity, however, were from the first destined to replace Judaism and are in a measure even antagonistic to its tenets. "If" says Bousset,³ "we ask after the foundation of the Jewish religious community, there can be no doubt, that there is only one answer: that foundation is the *Law*. On this point there is in Judaism itself only one voice. It is well-nigh superfluous to bring forward witnesses here." Next to the Law in the estimate of Judaism at the time of Christ stood the cult. But Jesus from the first emphasizes the freedom of the man who feels himself to be an accepted child of God. Such an one is not a keeper of the law as bound by the law; he is a lover of God and of men, and therefore gladly obedient to the principle of the higher righteousness.⁴ If then the "Sermon

¹ See the closing sentences of Bousset's *Die Religion des Judentums im Neutestamentlichen Zeitalter*,—an elaborate work on the entire subject.

² See such passages as Is. xl: xlii: lxvi: Ps. ciii.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁴ In connection with its influence on Art, Bosanquet remarks upon "the sense of possession or proprietorship which replaces for the Christian the Judaic sense of inaccessibility or remoteness in the Creator." *History of Aesthetics*, p. 128.

on the Mount" gives us a faithful program of the earliest ideas of Jesus concerning the nature of true religion, we find in those ideas a pretty complete revolt against the current religious conceptions of his country and his age. A personal consciousness of the Divine love and favor—a truly inward religion—has been substituted for the keeping of the Law, even as that law is interpreted in the most truly inward manner of the Old-Testament prophetic revelation. Moreover, the cult is relatively depreciated, while not openly opposed or rejected. It is no longer in Jerusalem, or in any other mountain, that the worship of God has a peculiar value; God is essentially Spirit, and they who worship Him must do so in the spirit and in truth. The theanthropic has triumphed over the theocratic point of view.¹

But what imparted a certain newness of a quite different sort to Christianity was its relation of dependence upon the unique personality of Jesus, and upon the new relations to God which the early followers believed to have been established by him. It is this, more than anything else which can justify the otherwise extreme statement of Harnack,² that the connection of the religion of Jesus with Judaism is only "a loose one;" and that "most of the threads leading from it into contemporary history became of no importance at all." More true to the facts is what the same authority says in his *History of Dogma* (I, p. 41): "The Gospel presents itself as an Apocalyptic message in the soil of the Old Testament, and as the fulfillment of the Law and the Prophets: and yet is a new thing, the creation of a universal religion on the basis of that of the Old Testament." This centrality and conspicuousness of the personal elements in early Christianity was itself a matter of growth in the consciousness of Jesus himself and in the impressions and doctrines regarding him as held by the Apostles and the early Christian community. In his first announcements

¹ So Tiele, *Elements of the Science of Religion*, First Series, p. 208f.

² *What is Christianity?* p. 17.

of his mission and attitude toward his own life-work, the founder of this new religion more unqualifiedly puts himself in the historical attitude toward Israel and toward the revelation of its sacred writings. He proclaims himself the fulfilment of the Law and of Prophecy. He is to bring bread from God's hand to the "children." He has come to the lost sheep of the household of Israel. His first work connects itself with the movement of his forerunner John the Baptist; it is a call to repent and believe the glad-tidings, for the time is fulfilled and the Kingdom of God is at hand. Then Jesus begins to call men to himself as the Messiah and "Son of God,"—the especially chosen messenger of Jehovah. More and more he distinguishes himself from Moses and all the Prophets, as Master and Lord, and his Gospel from the Law and the Prophetic Writings as the higher righteousness and as the way of salvation, now for the first time announced. And, finally he comes to regard his death as a necessity, as sacrificial, and as destined to accrue to the benefit of all in somehow opening to all this "way of salvation."

It is quite too large a task for our present purpose to attempt even a meagre sketch of how the Pauline and Johannine Christology grew into the shape which it takes in those writings of the New Testament that bear the names of these teachers of Christianity. Undoubtedly, "the appearance of Paul is the most important fact in the history of the Apostolic age."¹ But to subordinate Jesus to Paul as the true founder of the new religion, in its differentiation from Judaism, is a gross misrepresentation of facts and a reversal of the true order of explanation. Of the Fourth Gospel, whatever be the decision of critical study respecting its origin and genuineness, the verdict of Christianity itself substantiates some such statement as the following: "Here we have portrayed a Christ who clothes the indescribable with words, and proclaims as his own self-testimony what his disciples have experienced in him, a

¹ So Harnack, *History of Dogma*, I, p. 92.

speaking, acting, Pauline Christ, walking on earth, far more human than the Christ of Paul and yet far more Divine, an abundance of allusions to the historical Jesus, and at the same time a most sovereign treatment of the history.”¹

But immediately upon its entrance into the Græco-Roman world, this new religion gathered to itself, and so incorporated into its structure as to constitute of it an essential part, certain truths of Greek reflective thinking, and certain institutional factors largely dependent upon the historical development of Rome. Without taking the former into the account we can neither recognize nor explain the beliefs, sentiments, and practices, of the Christian Church Catholic of the third and fourth centuries after Christ. And without taking also the latter into the account we cannot understand the Christian developments of the early and later Mediæval Ages and of modern times. To hope or expect that the Christian religion will ever again become *simply* what it was when Jesus and the Apostles left it to the world is, in our judgment, to hope the undesirable and to expect the impossible. Indeed, it is just this power of not only a self-perpetuating but also a self-unfolding life—ever vigorous and eternally new—which constitutes one of the peculiar claims of Christianity to a unique place in the religious developments of humanity.

Of those influences which worked from the second century onward, to bring about a great change in the moral and religious convictions of mankind, none was probably more decisive and pervasive in the world of that time than Greek philosophy.² This philosophic factor was two-fold, or, in many cases, a sort of combination of two factors—Stoic and Platonic. In Possidonius, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, we find the knowledge of God, the virtue of resignation to the divine

¹ Harnack, *Ibid.*, I, p. 97.

² See the account given by Harnack, *History of Dogma*, I, pp. 122ff, and comp. Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church*. (Hibbert Lectures, 1888.)

will, and the expression of trust in God, taught in a manner "hardly capable of improvement in details." In Neo-Platonism the dualistic conception of the World and the Divine Being, a distrust of the powers of human understanding, the desirableness of ascetic emancipation from sensuality, the need of authority, and the belief in divine revelation, developed in a way which only partially accorded with Christian conceptions, and which produced prominent and seductive heresies in the early Christian Church. But both the Stoic and the Platonic philosophies tended to strengthen the Christian monotheistic conception, the idea of a gracious Providence, the Christian doctrine of universal brotherly love, and the Christian estimate of the virtues of forgiveness, patience, and humility before God.

To describe fully the development of the Christian religion from the formation of the Church Catholic onward is to write the religious history of Europe and of considerable other portions of the globe. This history has by no means been one of steady progress, or altogether creditable to the Christian name; nor has it been wholly inspiring and reassuring as to the future of man's religious welfare. Both the Greek and the Roman Churches early began in no small measure to vitiate and degrade the ethical spirit and life of Christianity:—the one by identifying its own peculiar orthodoxy with the only true Christian religion and with the type of morality acceptable to God; and the other by identifying attachment to an ecclesiastical organization and to its sacrificial functions, and obedience to its clergy, with being truly good and Christian according to the standard of spiritual living erected by Jesus. The earlier and the more recent Protestantism, too, has been and still is, liable to accusation of similar erroneous views and practices. It is thus constantly giving encouragement to attempts at an irreligious morality, on the one hand, and on the other to forms of religion that are unavailing and pernicious substitutes for a truly Christian morality.¹ Still the life of Christianity, instead

¹ Compare the remarks of A. Dorner, *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 358*f.*

of being forfeited and spent by such irregularities of belief and life among its followers, seems ever vigorous enough to adjust itself to all the new discoveries of science, the new views of philosophy, the new political organizations and social conditions, the new moral maxims and moral environment.

What this essential Christianity is, whether as stated in the form of conceptions or of a pattern of life, it is not our purpose further, at present, to inquire. The study before us now is one of development. That Christianity represents, on the whole, the most complex, vital, and instructive example of the growth of those beliefs and sentiments and of that form of living, which may be unified more or less strictly under the terms of one religion, history does not leave us in doubt. It, therefore, best prepares us, when taken into connection with the other forms of the differentiation and unification of religion, for gathering together the principle factors in a so-called theory of development as applied to the phenomena of the religious experience of humanity.

Any attempt at framing a theory of the development of religion upon a basis of the facts of history must consider these three topics : (1) The Forces which operate to secure development; (2) the Order in which the development takes place in accordance with the principle of continuity; and (3) the possibility of discovering Laws, or fixed principles, which are actually in control of every such development.

In considering the developing Forces of the world's religious growths it will be necessary to call attention to what has already been illustrated by a study of those processes of differentiation and unification to which all religions are subject to a greater or less degree. This will be done, however, as much as possible without unnecessary repetition.

The philosophical principle which must guide every attempt at a theory of the development of religion has already been found to be implicated in all the history of religious phenomena. Man's constitution and environment are such that no impor-

tant form of his historical evolution can possibly remain uninfluenced by all the other important forms. Not only is the individual man a psychological unity, but the spiritual unity of the race is such as to secure for all men a sort of solidarity in religious experience,—its nature, tendencies, and achievements. Moreover, the world in which the race lives, with all its geographical and climatic differences, is one world. It is the one human race in the one world, in which must be found the account for the history of the religious development of humanity. *All the phenomena illustrate and exhibit these two unifying forces: (1) the psychological unity in function of the individual soul; and (2) the spiritual unity of the race in its development under varied physical and social conditions.*

If now, however, we try to summarize all these internal and external forces in a single phrase, we may use the somewhat loose and very complex but expressive terms,—civilization, or better still, “race-culture.” It may then be said that the religious development of the race, or of any particular smaller or larger portion of the race, depends upon its advance in race-culture; or what is rather vaguely called civilization.

What, however, is to be understood by *culture* in such a connection as this? To quote for purposes of examination the definition of a recent writer on the philosophy of religion: Civilization, or culture, is “man’s relation to the world so far as this is determined by his own rational activity.”¹ This definition, as is usually the case with definitions, itself requires explanation;—and that, in these important particulars. First: By the “world” in this connection must be meant, not simply or chiefly, the earth considered in its physical aspects; although, of course, the subjugation of the earth and the use of its resources for improving the life of humanity, form an important part of the basis for every development of the religious life. We have already called attention (pp. 89ff.) to those child-like and more unreflecting reactions upon the purely physical envi-

¹ Orelli, Religionsgeschichte, p. 7.

ronment which characterize all the lower forms of religion. But in the advancing history of the race, the character of the social relations which are themselves built upon a basis of this physical conquest becomes more important still in determining the intrinsic excellence of the so-called civilization or race-culture thus attained. The distinctions of classes, the employment of different groups of human beings in different forms of industrial, political, and social functions, and the interaction of these different forms of functioning ;—all this goes to determine the complex product which we call race-culture. And, finally, the more specific definition of the sciences and the arts, the growth of reflective thinking, or philosophy in the broadest meaning of that term, and the moral and spiritual refinement and elevation in which religion itself bears so important a part, not only crown, but penetrate and characterize the complex result.

It appears, then, secondly, that if an inquiry be raised as to what is meant by “rational activity,” the answer must include all that is implied in the superior intelligence, and in the æsthetic, ethical, and religious nature of man. From which it follows, thirdly, that the completed product of man’s “rational activity” as applied to all his relations to “the world” is a complex development. It is, the rather, a resultant or sum-total of all developments. The relations of religion and race-culture are, therefore, reciprocal. On the one hand, the character of any religious development is inevitably determined by its envioning civilization ; but, on the other hand, the prevailing religions (or religion) are powerful factors in determining the envioning civilization. Culture may become for a time irreligious or even impious, although highly developed from the scientific and æsthetical points of view ; it may temporarily scorn and defeat the essential purposes and higher ends of religion. For it will not do to claim that religion always by any means keeps exact pace with civilization, either in the race at large, or in any considerable portion of the race.¹ Or religion

¹ Comp. Herbert Spencer, *Sociology*, I, p. 317f.

may become narrow and bigoted, and so restrictive of the advance of civilization, and even corrupting. The hostile attitude toward civilization may be taken by any form of religion; it was taken by Buddhism at its origin; it has been taken by Islam as a rule (although some important features of race-culture were developed in Arabia and in northern India under Muhammadan rulers); it has not infrequently been assumed by various Christian sects. Nor was this attitude, however we may justify it, wanting in early Christianity as against the civilization of the Græco-Roman world.

In the nature of that mighty underlying force which resides in the spiritual unity of the race must be found the causes for the failure of culture when, apart from religion, it attempts (as it has so frequently done and is doing at the present day) to satisfy all the needs of man; and so to furnish a substitute for his religious beliefs, feelings, and practical activities. So often as culture without religion for its partner has undertaken the contract to build the structure of an improved humanity it has shown signs of bankruptcy. Indeed, we find the saying of Eucken¹ to be true of the best efforts of an irreligious civilization: "Of old, it has not been the optimists but the pessimists that can boast of the better knowledge of human nature." The philosophers whose thinking has set forth the loftiest, most attractive, and most practically inspiring of moral and religious ideals, and who have at the same time most penetrated the depths of human nature (the great thinkers of India, and Plato, Augustine and Kant; no less than Buddha, Confucius, Zoroaster, Jesus, and Paul), have most emphasized the schism between man's achievements and his spiritual ideals—the great gulf between what ought to be and what has been and is, in the civilizations of the world.

There is, then, no completeness of development, either for the individual or for the race, without religious development. But no completeness of religious development can be realized

¹ *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, p. 72.

unless the other interrelated developments of humanity are also carried forward. On the one hand, a complex and luxurious civilization may be distinctly unfavorable to all highly ethical and spiritual forms of religion; it may even permit or encourage both gross religious superstitions or irreligion and atheism. For it is the ethical and reflective (or philosophical) factors of race-culture which react most powerfully to advance the genuine development of religion. And a certain *simplicity* of thought, heart, and life, is consonant with the best religious spirit. But, on the other hand, the development of religion may be dwarfed and arrested by setting its course against those rising tides of science, art, philosophy, and political and social betterment, which are the inflow from a Divine Source into the channels of human history. And, doubtless, that may be said in general which Professor Jastrow¹ says of a particular case: "The development of this religion follows closely the course of civilization and of history in the territory under consideration."

Among the forces which operate to determine the results that are grouped together under the vague and inclusive term "race-culture," the following four deserve special mention: (1) The physical environment; (2) the psychical characteristics which, although they are always somewhat indefinite and of unknown origin, difference the various races; (3) the language, with its dramatic and mythological capacities and achievements, and its growth in respect of power to set forth and support advanced ways of thinking and the abstract conceptions which embody the results of such thinking; and (4) the modifying influences of each particular stage of culture in the midst of which the religious development is planted and has its growth.

The first group of these forces,—namely, that which issues from the physical environment,—in the simpler forms of their action, has already been sufficiently illustrated. The more complex forms of the action of the same forces are so compli-

¹ Religion of Babylonia and Assyria, p. 46.

cated with the entire condition of civilization prevailing at any time among any people, that they cannot be profitably considered apart. As reciprocal and interrelated reactions of the rational activity of man, they will receive attention in separate chapters in Part II.

In further illustration of the lasting influence, through centuries of history and various stages of race-culture, which comes from the rather indefinable but powerful psychical peculiarities of each race, attention may be called to such facts of history as the following. The religion of the Semitic peoples for example, has a certain characteristic type which is everywhere prevalent in all its different developments. All these developments, in their turn, show plainly that the later and more cultivated forms of the Semitic religions, rest upon beliefs and practices of a sort quite similar to those found to-day in Africa, Australia, Polynesia, and North America. Down to the latest times of their history, the Arabians, Syrians, and Arameans do not feel the inconsistency between these more primitive beliefs, with their cult, and the higher developments approaching monotheistic tenets which they in considerable measure have achieved.

Such tribal and local differentiations of the type characteristic of the race produced varying conceptions of Deity among the different Semitic peoples, all of which, however, show a marked resemblance to one another. Everywhere among them there developed, upon the basis of the earlier and ruder forms of nature-worship, the conception of the Divine Being as a monarch after the pattern of an earthly ruler—remote, awful, majestic, and unapproachable without fear and self-abasement. In Babylonia especially, under the influence of its conquering monarchs, supreme gods were raised to the throne of universal dominion; and a pantheon was constituted which included personifications of the powers of nature and the attribution to them of social relations. A certain wildness and moral weakness, especially as regards sexual relations, marks all these

forms of religion. Only among the Hebrews, and here only because of the work of inspired men of revelation, does the king-like character of the Supreme God attain the excellence of righteous and spiritual Personality. In Babylonia, the conception of Marduk as held by the monarch (Nebuchadnezzar) whose patron god he was, approaches but by no means equals the prophetic conception of Yahweh, the God of Israel. It is the distinctive thing, at this point of departure, about Judaism, that, after fighting all forms of nature-worship and of the worship of other gods than Yahweh, under the leadership of the prophets, it threw off the more degraded elements in the conception of the Divine Being, and emerged into the purer and higher forms of religious experience. As we have already seen, the tribal god became for Israel the One and Alone God of the whole earth, loving righteousness and hating iniquity.

With both Babylon and Israel, however, as with the Semitic religions generally, the great God is preëminently "a Lord of Hosts." Hence fanaticism and the tendency to fight with other people who have other gods, in order to establish the supremacy of *their* god, is characteristic of the ancient Semitic religions, as it is of Muhammadanism to-day. All through the history of the Jews may be traced the powerful unifying influence of the feeling which affirms "thy people, my people," because of "thy God, my God." With this goes the desire, characteristic of Semitic religion, to give one's god the ascendancy over the others: Baal and Yahweh must fight to the death for supreme control. No form of syncretism will settle this contest between the claimants for the throne and for the leadership of the hosts of the faithful. In all this the Semitic temperament, so to say, is clearly distinguishable.

In Egypt, on a basis of popular totemism, local gods and nature-worship, through the influence of the monarchical feeling of power combined with priestly reflection, there was built up a pantheistic form of religion for the thoughtful few; but this form leaves the local gods and the worship of animals

unchanged in the confidence, affection, and cult of the common people. Lofty monotheistic expressions came indeed to be used in ancient Egypt. God is thought of as One, with many names and infinite modes of embodiment and expression. Prayer is offered in the name of the one God. But the conception of his personal relations to this world and to human life remains vague and relatively ineffectual even among the most pious and thoughtful of the worshippers.

Upon a similar basis of unreflective spiritism a quite different development of religious life took place among the various Indo-European peoples. The piety, as well as the social customs connected with the religious development of the multitude, is among these peoples much more tender, contemplative, and affectionate, than among the Semitic peoples. The gods come nearer to the daily interests and doings of men. Marriage, birth and death, and the honoring of the dead parent and husband, are religious ceremonies. The gods migrate, and suffer, and rejoice, and fight *with* man ; but man is not so eager to fight *for* his gods. The divine beings, even when they remain natural powers, are more human than are the gods of the Semitic peoples. The poetic, myth-making habit and the contemplative and philosophic temperament of the race are largely accountable for this. But these mental reactions are also due to the physical environment into which the races wandered and, as well, to the social environment which they constructed for themselves out of the same characteristic racial constitution.

It has already been seen (p. 180) how the special type of this temperament which was carried into India by the conquering Aryan race, under the climatic and social conditions which it both met and helped to construct there, upon a similar basis of nature-worship, ancestor-worship, and a great variety of local divinities, developed a peculiar kind of pantheistic conceptions. Natural objects and natural events are personified and treated in a shadowy way by the myth-making imagination.

The world of men and of the popular gods, as well as the objects and events of nature, is subsumed under the idea of a World-Soul as the all-embracing Reality. As the freshness and vigor of the invading and conquering tribes abated, the temperamental and *quasi*-ethical characteristics of the religion underwent an important change. This is manifest enough on comparing the Vedic writings with the Upanishads. According to the doctrine of the later writings, all creatures exist in God alone. "I am spirit; thou art spirit; all things are spirit;"—thus saith the god Indra. The individuality of all existences, including men, is illusion; there is only one Reality. "In the Lotus-bloom of the heart, sits Brāhma-Ātma"—the one Self. "The world is the unfolding of this One Self." "The world is the developed (or unfolded) Brāhma; and Brāhma is the undeveloped (not yet unfolded) world." Meantime the assumptions of the priestly caste grow apace. The Brāhman himself becomes a god; he is even through prayer and incantations, the controller of the heavenly gods. And the popular superstitions are neither modified nor abated.

How different all this is from those religious conceptions and cults which the Greeks, Romans, and Teutons—branches of the Indo-European stock—developed under a different physical and social environment, scarcely needs further illustration than it has already had. Yet everywhere the difference between the Semitic and the Indo-Aryan racial peculiarities seems to remain a silent but powerful factor in the evolution of both.

So much more different from those which characterize the Semitic and Indo-European civilizations, are the developments of religion amongst the races that inhabit the Far East, especially China and Japan, that, although we recognize a similar basis for them all, it overtaxes all our resources to account for this difference. The temperamental and environmental forces must, however, remain constantly prominent in every attempt to explain the religious development of the Far East.

For additional illustrations of the operation of the remaining

two groups of the forces that chiefly coöperate in the form of a so-called "race-culture" to affect the conditions of religious development,—namely, language as the embodiment of the activities of imagination and thought, and as the support of so-called "abstract" conceptions, and that peculiar complex of conditions which involves the science, art, political opinions and institutions, and the entire social *status* of each particular "stage of culture" (see p. 215*f.*),—we must again anticipate conclusions which will be more fully established in subsequent chapters. In connection, however, with the development of reflective thinking and the embodiment of its results in language, we are introduced to another class of most important and effective forces which operate for the development of the religious life of humanity. This consists in the inspirations, convictions, and thoughts of the few. In studying those differentiations of religion that have resulted in the production of the highest forms of religious experience, the power of great personalities is invariably made most obvious. Indeed, it is the few—the thinkers and prophets, who have had special insight into the truth about the Divine Being and about his dealings with men—that have chiefly succeeded in leading upward the religious life of the multitude. It is to the "good few," the small number of "men of revelation," that mankind chiefly owes its religious progress.

This it is, we believe, which accounts for that mixture of higher and lower beliefs which is so widely prevalent, rather than any universal degeneracy of the race from an original condition in which a pure monotheism prevailed by immediate divine revelation.¹ In all religions, ancient and modern, savage and civilized, it is customary to find this mixture of higher and lower from the intellectual point of view, and of the purer and more impure from the ethical point of view. The remark

¹ Even in the modified form in which it is advocated by Mr. Andrew Lang; for a brief criticism of whose views compare an article by Professor Toy, on "Creator Gods," vol. XXIII of the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*.

applies particularly to the conceptions of the Divine Being and of man's relations to this Being. A few have wrought out and expressed the higher and purer; the multitude, although the beliefs of the few remain as a sort of tradition among them, cling to and govern their practice by the lower and more impure conceptions. It is this which accounts for the facts that warrant the following statements concerning the religion of ancient Egypt. "It is incontestably true," says Renouf,¹ "that the sublimer portions of the Egyptian religion are not the comparatively late result of a process of development, of elimination from the grosser. The sublimer portions are demonstrably ancient; and the last stage of the Egyptian religion . . . was by far the grossest and most corrupt." And, as says M. Rougé:² "More than 5000 years since, in the valley of the Nile, the hymn began to the Unity of God and the immortality of the soul, and we find Egypt in the last stages arrived at the most unbridled polytheism." Further information has compelled us to modify these views; but the more recent and thorough investigation leaves existing side by side for many centuries the higher and the lower conceptions, the semi-monotheistic beliefs of the few and the superstitions and degraded practices of the prehistoric spiritism and idolatry among the multitudes of the people. The same thing we have seen to be true in ancient Babylonia, China, and in India; it is also true among the Australians, Hottentots, Bushmen, and North American Redskins of to-day. In Muhammadan and even Christian lands, all through the history of these two religions, as in the origin of both, it has been the spiritual energy of a relatively few inspired and thoughtful men,—true prophets of God,—that has kept the religious beliefs and practices of the people from degenerating, and has constituted the main exciting and guiding force to higher stages of progress.

¹ Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by the Religion of Ancient Egypt (Hibbert Lectures for 1879), p. 95.

² *Annales de la Philosophie Chrétienne*, XX, p. 327/.

In some respects the most interesting application of the truth respecting the influence of individual thinkers is found in the explanation which it affords of the existence among the lowest savages of a seemingly prehistoric belief in "creator gods," and in gods that have a higher than the average degree of morality of the humane sort. There can, indeed, be no doubt that anthropology, until very recent years, has not only underestimated the general intelligence of savage tribes but has overlooked the evidences of individual influences of an intellectually and morally superior character. The discovery of such evidences led an authority like Waitz to admit:¹ "By a deeper insight . . . we reach the surprising conclusion that several of the negro races—on whom we cannot as yet prove, and can hardly conjecture, the influence of a more civilized people—in the embodying of their religious conceptions are further advanced than almost all other savages; so far that, even if we do not call them monotheistic, we may still think of them as standing upon the boundary of monotheism." The Bushman's god Cagn, for example, is regarded as the maker of all things. Among the Zulus the confused and debased tradition with regard to the being and rank of Unkulunkula, who is said originally to have created things but who is now held not to make it worth while for man to worship him, seems to point in a similar direction. The old-time prophets and sages of the tribe thought out this conception of a creator god: but the stage of ethical culture would not sustain the conception in intimate daily relations with the people.

Certain Australian tribes, which in respect of the arts and sciences are to be classed among the lowest of the savages, inculcate in connection with their mysteries a relatively high conception of the moral character of the Divine Being whom they worship as supreme. Their view as to Darumulun and

¹ See, especially, the discussion of the "specific characters of man," and "the natural condition of man," *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, I, pp. 307-394.

the other high gods, has thus been summed up by Mr. Andrew Lang;¹ "An all-knowing being observes and rewards the conduct of men; he is named with reverence, if named at all; his abode is the heavens; he is the Maker and Lord of things; his lessons 'soften the heart.'" For those initiated into the mysterious rites, such precepts as these are enforced by one of the high gods: (1) To obey the old; (2) to share all with their friends; (3) to live peaceably with their friends; (4) not to interfere with girls or married women; and (5) to respect the food restrictions—a moral code that compares favorably with that of Leviticus.² In all this there is certainly some warrant for Mr. Lang's remark that "the Black Man of shivering communistic savages is nearer the morality of our Lord than the Jehovah of Judges."³ Among the Andaman Islanders, whose god Pūluga is like fire, invisible, immortal, and maker of all things except the powers of evil, the moral and personal conception has reached a considerable development. Pūluga is made angry by wrongdoing; —i. e., by falsehood, theft, murder, adultery, the bad carving of meat, etc.⁴ The god Ndengei among the Fijians has been, not altogether inaptly, called "an impersonation of the abstract idea of eternal existence."⁵ How could Mr. Im Thurn deceive the anthropologists into holding that the Indians of Guiana "know no god," when they believe in the "Ancient One in Sky-land," "Our Maker," "Our Father," "Our Great Father"? So among the Redskins have the Pawnees believed from time immemorial in Ti-ra-wá, whom they address as "our father in all places;" the Blackfoots, too, consider the Old Man, Nà-pi, as creator and as in some sort primal and immortal.

¹ See his "The Making of Religion," Chapters IX–XIII, and the other authorities cited there.

² A. W. Howitt, in *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, XIV, p. 316f.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

⁴ E. H. Man, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, XII, 156f, 172f.

⁵ Williams and Calvert, *Fiji and the Fijians*, p. 170f.

It does not appear, however, that these facts and all others similar are entitled to alter our views respecting the *order* of the development of religion, so far as history and a reasonable theory based upon historical data can deal with the subject. The prehistoric inspirations and reflections of the few, and their influence upon the traditional beliefs and practices of the multitude, furnish a quite sufficient account of these phenomena. For certainly it may be said of these few, what the Eskimo said to the missionary: "Thou must not imagine that no Greenlander thinks about these things. . . . Certainly there must be some Being who made all these things. . . . He must be very good, too." (Comp. Rom. i, 19.)¹ On the contrary, the failure in so many cases of all these forceful influences from the men of revelation and of insight enhances our estimate of those relatively rare instances where a truly great reformation, followed by an historical development and uplift, has been accomplished in this way. Most astonishing instances of this failure abound in India to-day—that land where reflection upon the problems of religion has reached its highest stage of development. For example, the Santāls, who are an aboriginal or non-Aryan tribe in northern India are for the most part devil-worshippers; and yet, apparently long previous to any chance of their learning the story of Genesis, they believed, and they still insist that their first parents were created

¹ A curious instance of reflection ending in negative conclusions may be cited from the translation of the Latin of the Jesuit Father, Blas Valera, who reports the Inca, Tupac Yupanqui, as reasoning thus: "They say that the Sun lives and that he does everything. But when anyone does anything, he is near to the thing he does; whereas many things take place when the Sun is absent. It therefore cannot be he who does everything. And, again, if he were a living being, would he not be wearied by his perpetual journeyings? If he were alive, he would experience fatigue, as we do; and if he were free, he would visit other parts of the heavens which he never traverses. Indeed, he seems like a thing held to its task, that always measures the same course; or like an arrow, that flies where it is shot, and not where it wills itself." See Reville, *The Native Religions of Mexico and Peru*, p. 135f.

by the living God, that they at first worshipped and obeyed him but were seduced by an evil spirit who made them drunk with an intoxicating liquor got from the fruit of a certain tree.

It must also be borne in mind that the notions of creator-gods and gods of relatively high moral character are probably indications of arrested developments in one direction only. Ordinarily these gods are lacking in social and active relations with the human beings who think themselves to have been descended from them. And no religion, which lacks these social and active factors, can develop as an historical process in reciprocal relations with the changes of race-culture. As Professor Toy¹ has pointed out with respect to the one item of religious cult: "Sacrifice has its mercenary non-moral side, and doubtless represents a religious conception inferior in certain regards to simple reverence for a just and loving deity. But it has its roots in human nature, and is an advance on a system in which the gods have nothing to do with human life."

In all the great religions, with their characteristic development, God has something very important to do with human life. Such religions take hold of human life because they include the belief in a living God, who is a social and purifying Force, demanding and effecting the control of the thoughts, feelings, and deeds of man. All such religions are first wrought out, as it were, in the experience of a few human souls. The Individual, who has himself felt the Power of the Divine Presence in his own life, awakening, transforming, and energizing, its convictions, sentiments, and voluntary expressions, becomes himself a true divine power for the arousing and development of the life of others. This marvellous force of the inspirations and reflections of the few comes to its highest expression in the ancient world in prophetic Judaism. Upon this soil of prophetic Judaism, the world's great Personal Force in religion, as a vital consciousness of bringing and of being the Truth of God among men, was introduced with the teachings, life, and

¹ Article already referred to, on page 223.

death of Jesus. By this personal influence upon the selected few of his own day, and through them upon a widening circle of believers, and by the perpetuation of the characteristic religious experience which this influence has engendered, the Christian religion has largely secured its right to be regarded as the highest type of a religious development. But its development has always been, not only dependent upon its reciprocal relations to the stages in race-culture which it has encountered here and there, but also upon its securing the adherence and devotion of a certain number of the most thoughtful and morally pure souls, who have contributed to it the spiritual forces which they have found coming to them by means of their communion with God after the type of their Master's example.¹

It is scarcely necessary to add that those influences of a more expressly individual character which result in the development of religion reach their supreme value in the case of the great religious reformers and "the founders" of great religions. That there have been geniuses in religion, no one acquainted with the history or psychology of the subject can deny. The great religious geniuses can, least of all, be fairly explained as the children of their own age. It is not in the spirit of denial of historical truth, it is, the rather, in deference to historical fact, that we cannot concur in the opinion of Jastrow:² "It is

¹ It is this truth which has led Sabatier to say in general of religion: "Elle se présenté partout comme la création individuelle, comme l'œuvre morale et libre de quelques âmes élues, en qui l'ancienne tradition, par une crise profonde, s'épuré et s'élargit. Tel a été le rôle de Confucius en Chine, du Bouddha dans l'Inde, de Socrate en Grèce, des prophètes en Israël, de Mahomet en Arabie" [Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion, p. 116].

² The Study of Religion, p. 90. This author goes on to say: "All religions are a natural growth, and persons like Buddha, Zoroaster, and even Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed, merely mark certain important epochs in the evolution of religion, etc." It will be seen that the view of the so-called "evolution of religion" which we are expounding is opposed in several important ways to so radical a view as this, of its "natural" character, and of its epochs being "merely marked" by the founders of its epoch-making forms.

purely from conventional usage that we speak of the founders of religion." On the contrary, there is always about a religious genius, as there is about religion itself, something of the super-historical and even of the super-human. This will appear more clearly when the content and validity of the religious conceptions of revelation and inspiration have been discussed. But if we now insist upon taking the purely naturalistic position towards these men, we shall have to say that neither their parentage nor their religious environment wholly accounts for them. On the contrary, *Nature*, as a term for the deepest spiritual Being of the World, has contributed in them something that the principle of historical continuity will not quite reach or wholly explain. But using the term *supernatural*, in a meaning at the same time satisfactory to reason and to the religious experience, we may say, that the perfect Ethical Spirit, in whom monotheistic religion believes and whom it worships as God, has contributed something new of his own spirit to these sons of his own. And this is but to say—returning to the point of view taken by a theory of historical development—that the enormous influence of the greatest religious teachers and reformers is a personal spiritual influence, and is, therefore, significant of the presence among men of the Infinite and Absolute Spirit. Especially, though not exclusively, this must be said of the spiritual forces which have contributed to the development of the religious life of humanity, as they have flowed from the person of the founder of Christianity.

Indeed, the entire uplift of the race, which we call civilization, is in respect of all its factors and forces, largely dependent upon the influence of a relatively small number of individuals who are themselves, more or less measurably but not wholly, the products of their historical antecedents and their physical, political, and social environment. Science and philosophy, art and literature, industrial and political and moral improvements—all the concurrent factors of advancing race-culture—are subject to the same considerations, whenever the attempt is

made to estimate the forces that enter into their development. They are all, like religion, interacting forms of human spiritual development. Especially is this true of the forces that make for the moral reform of any age or people; whether these forces chiefly express themselves in protest and action against the existing state of the public morality, or attempt to supply the needed energy for a positive betterment of the ethical condition of the multitude. For it is these ethical forces of reform and amendment which have, both as respects their origin in the soul of man and also as respects the end they strive to secure, the most intimate kinship with the forces that are active in producing the higher developments of the religious life of humanity. Great ideas are energetic forces in man's religious development. And these great ideas largely spring from the experience and reflection of a few individuals.

To this thought constant reference will have to be made in all subsequent attempts to study the psychology of the religious consciousness, and to adjust its conceptions to the conclusions of reflective thinking as gathered into philosophical form from other sources than the religious experience. But the truth that "ideas are forces" may be illustrated here by reference to the following three particulars. And first: The development of the ideals of the unity and fatherhood of God has wrought with powerful intensity to change all the minor beliefs, feelings, and dependent practices of religion. What kind of a unity is God? and What kind of relation under the title of Father shall be ascribed to God? The more precise shaping of the answers to these questions, as dependent upon the reflection of individuals and upon the changes of social relations, largely determines the development of every religion. In Judaism, for example, we can trace the unfolding of the idea which, accompanied by an increasing stability to the patriarchal life, converted the pluralistic term Elohim into El or Allah, the Strong God; then into Yahweh, the living God and guardian of the covenant; and, finally, into the Heavenly Father,

the inspirer of filial fidelity and affection, the Object of true piety. Thus, too, in the development of Islam, it is impossible to overestimate the force of the idea which the Koran expresses in such declarations as these :

“ He is God alone,
 God the Eternal,
 He begetteth not, and is not begotten;
 And there is none like unto Him.”

Secondly, the ideal of Soul is one of those ideas that are forces in the development of religion. It is only when each individual man is somehow conceived of as *a* soul, with values and interests of his own, that a certain advance in religious beliefs and cult is assured. The crude conception of human soul-life which makes it possible to assume an indefinite number of souls for each individual, and to believe in all manner of transmissions and exchanges of souls between natural objects, and men, and gods, cannot produce the higher stages of religious experience. But when each human soul is conceived of as at least a potential Self, then the vivifying and purifying effect of the developed conception extends to every form of religious belief and sentiment. The gods become, not merely invisible, superhuman spirits, but true persons; the relations between men and gods are made more definitively personal; and an anthropomorphic religion succeeds to the place left vacant by a vague and unreflecting spiritism. The entire character of religion is thus profoundly changed. Religion is now a social affair; and to be religious is to stand in proper personal relations toward personal divinities. And as the development of the environing political and social life, and the reflections of jurists, moralists, and philosophers combine to enrich and to heighten the conception of Self-hood, religion—whether considered as belief, feeling, or cult—profits greatly thereby. It was the exalted, though crude and barbarous conception of personality held by the Teutons that gave to the Christian religion so much power over their minds. It is the

lack of a clear and elevated idea of personal existence and personal values which chiefly prevents Hinduism from making any real progress to-day. The dynamic idea of Self-hood is a mighty force in the development of religion.

Another and third idea which proves to be an almost incomparable force in the development of religion arises out of man's moral nature in the form of the so-called "consciousness of sin," and its resulting feeling of the need of some kind of "holiness" in order to be acceptable to the Divine Being. The claim that all religions, without exception, take for granted something abnormal in man's relation to the invisible, spiritual powers which he believes to be so largely in control of his destiny, can scarcely be established on historical ground. In devil-worship, and in all forms of that worship which springs from a vague and unreflecting Spiritism, the existence of caprice and of a certain malignity amongst the divine beings is taken as a matter of course. But this view of the nature of the superhuman spirits or the gods is not calculated, of itself, to develop the conscious need of even a superficial and ceremonial holiness on the part of the worshipper. It is, the rather, the producer of religious magic, of incantations, and the study of tricks and mysteries, and of the practice of Shamanism, in order to "get the better," so to say, of the divine powers. The worshipper who wishes to propitiate (that is, please and win over to his side) the Inari, or the power represented by a fetish, or Neptune when about to make a journey by sea, or the "god of luck," if on the point of engaging in some mercantile enterprise, is not in any sense of the words conscious of sin before his god. The Chinese casting lots before the idol in the Joss temple does not in this way consciously reflect ill upon his own moral character or dealings in past time. The uncertainties of life, and the frequency of ill-luck in these matters which the gods control, are believed to be due to jealousy, envy, or the spirit of revenge, on the part of the gods themselves rather than to any wrongdoing of a moral sort on the part of the worshipper.

But so closely connected together are morality and religion in all their developments that the moral standard as applied to man's conduct with his fellows cannot rise without raising his estimate of the morality that must be attributed to those superhuman spirits with which man has to deal. Very early, therefore, and in a widely extended fashion, even the magical incantations and formulas which are thought to propitiate the gods come to reveal a dawning consciousness of guilt in the ethical meaning of this term. Man is beginning to feel that in respect of those personal relations which fall under the moral conceptions of right and wrong and to which the feelings of moral obligation and approbation attach themselves, his standing before the gods is far from being what it should be; neither is it such as, for his own best well-being, it would be well to have it become. According to Jastrow,¹ "It is in this doctrine of guilt, as revealed through the magical texts, that we must seek both for the starting-point of the development of an ethical system (so far as such system existed among the Babylonians) and also for the limitations of this system." As the standard of moral values, when applied both to god and to man, is purified and elevated, the consciousness of inferiority to this standard, the sense of a schism between what is and what ought to be in human conduct and character, becomes intensified.

The religions which endeavor to meet the feelings of need thus developed are "religions of salvation"; they proceed to offer to man a satisfaction which he can derive from no other source. The worshipper now knows more clearly, and now feels more intensely and sadly, that his spirit is not in spiritual harmony with itself or with the Spirit which belongs to the Being of the World. And when, through the forceful influences of race-culture, including the development of religion itself, this Being of the World is conceived of as One perfect and ethical Spirit, the consciousness of sin, the sense of need,

¹ The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria, p. 693.

the longing for acceptance and communion with God, takes its place as one of the mightiest ideal forces for effecting an improvement in the religious life of humanity.

The influence upon the general development of any religion, or upon the development of any people from the religious point of view, which is exerted by the conception of the moral law as a Divine command, is necessarily very great. This influence reached its highest expression in ancient Judaism, where reverence for the "Law of Jehovah," and obedience to it as the necessary condition of religious welfare and even of the religious life, was the very center and core of the entire system of beliefs and cults. But the same influence is also manifest in all the religions which have showed themselves capable of any true development. Zoroastrianism and Confucianism possessed it in a high degree; it was by no means wanting to the milder and more pitiful religion of Buddha. He who would become a true follower and attain Nirvāna must adopt for his rule of life that Dharma, or Path, which Brāhmanism had personified and given a seat among the other gods, but which Buddhism regards as a natural adjustment to the Will of the Universe spiritually conceived. And the very essence of the way of salvation which Islam demands is submission to the Will of God which is the absolute Right,—the Law personified. Above all these, and above all other systems of legalism, Christianity rises supreme, with its exhortation: "Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father in Heaven is perfect;" and with its offer to provide the knowledge of the way, and the power of life to walk in the way, which leads to the attainment of the end of all religion. It is, in part, for this reason that the Christian religion appeals most powerfully to the consciousness of sin, and to the sense of need, while, at the same time proposing the removal of this consciousness and the satisfaction of this need, by bringing about a spiritual union of perfected humanity with the perfect Ethical Spirit of God.

CHAPTER IX

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION [CONTINUED]

The attempt to arrange in any fixed order of succession all the various differentiations of man's religious beliefs and cults has always ended in failure. The reasons for this ill success should by this time have become sufficiently obvious. For it has been shown: (1) that the origins of religion are lost in an immeasurable and unknown antiquity, although it can be affirmed with confidence that no scheme for deriving all the earlier known forms from any one primitive, or prehistoric, form satisfies the historical facts; (2) that, within the limits of historical inquiry and of reasonable conjecture based upon such inquiry, different races and different periods seem to have followed different paths of development; and (3) that in the case of races which have been long existent and have attained the higher stages of civilization, signs of degradation appear, while in the case of those races which are most savage and apparently nearest to the so-called primitive man, there are oftentimes not wanting evidences of ancient religious views and practices of a higher than the current order. In a word, no one law regulating alike the order of all the changes which take place in the religions of the world can be discovered or placed upon a basis of historical fact.

With respect to the cases of genuine progress in religion the data are by no means so confusing and apparently hopeless. There is, indeed, truth in the declaration of Sabatier: ¹ "The idea of religious progress is a grand and luminous idea, but it

¹ *Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion*, p. 109.

is not possible to apply it within all the details of history. Progress, incontestable as it is for the whole, when one takes the point of departure and then the point of arrival, is not made either along a single line or along a line that is continuous." The same thing, however, might be said of all human progress. In the particular case of religion, the very nature of the unceasing reactions which take place between it and the other developments of civilization or race-culture, and the dependence which religious progress always has upon the prophetic office of a few great individuals, prevents this progress from being "along a single line." Moreover, the gaps, reactionary movements, and long periods of quiescence or even of degradation, followed by periods of reform and by the upward growth of a new spring-time of life, prevent our tracing the course of even the most progressive of religions along "a line that is continuous." The stream may widen and deepen, as it approaches the sea. But there are stagnant side-pools along its course, and barren wastes through which it slowly drags its way. Even the Christian religion, which presents the best example of a vigorous and effective development, has become degenerate in not a few places where it has been planted, and has left some peoples, after centuries, scarcely better off religiously than when it began its existence among them.

One further thought must accompany every attempt to arrange the Order of the Development (as a genuine progress) of the religious experience of humanity. In general it is true enough that "all attempts to arrange human progress in stages, whether empirically derived as by Comte, or rationally as by Hegel, have split upon the rock; they are inadequate to the subtlety and complexity of nature." This "subtlety and complexity of nature" is, indeed, the baffling thing about all human attempts to find either in the inorganic or in the organic world, either in the individual man or in society, a fixed and unchanging order of development. "This subtlety and complexity of nature" is just now giving peculiar trouble to

chemists and physicists, in their attempts to reduce to order the phenomena with which they have to deal. It is this which has compelled the adoption and rejection of several score of theories—all, even when taken together, quite inadequate to explain the phenomena—which biological evolution has already propounded. It is this, *a priori*, which makes it quite impossible to distinguish in the religious progress of humanity anything corresponding to the stone-age, bronze-age, iron-age, etc., of the students of sociology. Even the primary data for fixing the order of changes in several of the most important forms of early religious development are insufficient or quite wanting. In the Semitic religions, for example, philology is summoned to show conclusively that Babylon was the original home of the Semites; history to show that their home was Arabia; and ethnography and comparative physiology, that it was North Africa.

Where, however, there is the most real and continuous development of religion, there is found one principle overruling all the changes, which permits of their arrangement in a series that may fitly be designated the *normal order* for such development. The arrangement of the single beads may differ; but it is the tenacity and unbroken character of the thread on which they are strung, that keeps them in order. This thread is man's belief—to which his entire constitution compels him—that his experience, whether of the external or the internal order, must have a spiritual origin and explanation. This irresistible belief leads the human mind to project into the phenomena of nature the principles of which it is immediately aware as controlling and explaining its own self-conscious life. The character of this process of *personification* (in the larger significance of this word) is what determines the order of man's religious progress. Its law, as expressed poetically, reads to him the effective exhortation :

“Correct the portrait by the living face
Man's God by God's God in the mind of man.”

This principle both explains and justifies what of truth there is in the statement that the students of comparative religion are pretty generally agreed upon the following two points: (1) "that the religious development of mankind proceeds in accordance with definite laws; (2) "that this development is on the whole an upward movement from crude ideas and primitive forms of worship to a philosophic conception of the Universe, accompanied by a ceremonial correspondingly elaborated and refined."¹

With these modifications which have already been sufficiently insisted upon, it may be claimed that, in all the cases where a genuine progress to religious conceptions and to the life of religion can be clearly traced, the order of development corresponds to three great stages. These have been defined by Rhys Davids, although not with perfect accuracy, as animism, polytheism, and a more or less pantheistic monotheism. More accurately described, these three stages are, first, that vague and unreflecting Spiritism which has not yet attained to a developed conception of personality, and of personal relations; second, the more social and *quasi*-political conception of Divine Being, and the more distinctively ethical and social ideas and practices, with respect to the relations of man to this Being; and, third, the unitary conception of God, which, in dependence upon the developments of race-culture especially along the lines of interest marked out by the moral consciousness and by reflective thinking upon the problems of existence and of destiny, approaches more and more the Ideal of a Personal Absolute who is also perfect Ethical Spirit. In a word, the three great steps, or stages, in the religious progress of humanity are spiritism, anthropomorphic polytheism, and ethical monotheism.

In every religion whose historical origins or earliest characteristics can be at all clearly traced, there is found at its base, so to say, a vague and unreflecting Spiritism, the nature of which has already been sufficiently described. This is precisely

¹ See Jastrow, *The Study of Religion*, p. 63.

what we should expect to find in this field, judging from what we do find as a result of anthropological explorations into other and kindred fields of the evolution of the race. The scanty prehistoric remains which have a bearing upon the problem confirm our expectation. So far as they show anything, they show the so-called primitive man existing in this first of the three stages of religious beliefs and practices. A writer¹ on this subject refers to the prehistoric human beings whose remains have been discovered in the Cave of Spy as exhibiting, from the point of view of anatomy, "such an ape-like character that they have supplied a new link in the descending scale from man to animals." And yet—*mirabile dictu*—"through thousands and thousands of years," we are assured that traces of religious beliefs can be found among these cave-dwellers; and that these "traces" indicate the existence of a kind of religious spiritism essentially like that which is widely extant at the present day. What, for example, would be the conclusions of anthropology regarding the social condition and religious beliefs of the "Kapila Bania" caste of Bombay, if some centuries hence a mixture of burned bones and cracked skulls (the former of those non-Brāhmanical members who need the purification of fire, and the latter of the Brāhmins themselves, whose already pure souls need only to be allowed to escape) were to remain as the only *indiciae* of their place in man's religious development?

And, indeed, what could be expected from primitive or savage man, and what can now be expected from the most ignorant and unenlightened, by way of solving the problems of religious experience? Consider the helpless and pitiable condition of such minds as compared with the condition of the child of an enlightened Christian parentage. In respect to *religious* beliefs and sentiments, it is only in a very restricted way that the statement of such anthropologists as Haeckel can be accepted:² "The culture-development of every child is only a repetition

¹ D'Alviella, *Origin and Growth of the Conception of God*, p. 15f.

² See his *Anthropogenie*, pp. 706ff.

in brief of that long process through which the human reason, during the course of many thousands of years, has step by step educated itself out of the natural confinement with which it began." This would be truer if "every child" did, what no child does,—namely, educate itself. But before the race, or the tribe, or some prophet or philosopher, has made suggestions of the better answer, what shall be the response to savage or primitive man when he raises the inevitable inquiry: "Who made the world, and me; and what shall I do to "square myself" ¹ with this being? What wonder that a long and weary road leads to the answer which tells of an omnipotent, omniscient, holy and yet loving Heavenly Father, as a belief springing from the religious experience of a few; that it is a yet longer way to the reconciliation of this answer with all the most firmly established conceptions of science and philosophy!

There is truth, then, in the conclusion of Preiss,² that primitive man must have busied himself with the question which children still ask,—namely, the as yet not fully comprehended question after a creator and preserver of all things. What was the first answer he gave himself may be reasonably conjectured from the surprising similarity of the answers given by different tribes and peoples who still remain in this lowest grade of culture. For, in spite of the important differentiations brought about by different race-temperaments in their mental and social reactions upon different physical environments, the spiritual unity of the race is the controlling factor in fixing the order of development common to all.

The true conclusion, therefore, flows of necessity from the attitude of both primitive or savage and unenlightened civilized man, which, in its lowest terms, Waitz³ has well described as follows: "The religion of primitive man (the "*Naturmensch*")

¹ This phrase, as expressive of the effort of man to stand right with the invisible powers, is borrowed from Professor Hopkins.

² Religionsgeschichte, p. 14f.

³ Anthropologie der Naturvölker, I, p. 362f.

is an absolutely rude and systemless polytheism, without poetry and even without mythology; or rather a misty belief in spirits and ghosts, without inner connection, by which all liberty in the consideration of natural objects is abolished and the human heart is perpetually being thrown by its extremely wide-spreading superstitions out of one state of unrest into another." It is this unrest, which serves as the spur to more refined and clearer knowledge of those conditions of his own spiritual existence and welfare to which man finds himself subjected. This entire conclusion, however, expresses only the partial truth.

In a somewhat improved form, as compared with the condition which Waitz describes, substantially the same religious beliefs and practices are prevalent among peoples of a higher than the lowest stage of general culture. "Glancing," says Dr. Griffis,¹ "at *some* phases of the actual unwritten religions of Japan we name Shamanism, Mythical Zoölogy, Fetichism, Phallicism, and Tree and Serpent worship. . . . In the creed of Shamanism there may or there may not be a belief in or a conception of a single all-powerful Creator above and beyond all. . . . Earth, air, water, all things, teem with beings that are malevolent and constantly active." Of the earliest religious condition of those Indo-Aryans among whom the Vedic writings originated, Professor Hopkins declares:² "In the Veda there is a nature-religion and an ancestor-religion. . . . Sun-myths, though denied by some *in toto*, appear plainly in the Vedic hymns. Dead heroes may be gods, but gods too, are natural phenomena, and, again, they are abstractions. He that denies any one of these sources of godhead is ignorant of India." But Japan and India, while in the stage of their religious differentiation at which this description is true, have already passed to a notable degree from the condition of unreflecting spiritism into the beliefs and practices of a more definitively anthropomorphic polytheism.

From the confused and mixed condition of belief and senti-

¹ The Religions of Japan, p. 15.

² Religions of India, p. 174.

ment toward the objects of religious regard and worship the transition to the next of the three great stages is inevitable, if any progress in religion is to be made. The forces which urge on this progress are mainly those of social and political development. They have already—and the work they accomplish—been sufficiently described. Man's consciousness of Self-hood has now developed. He knows himself as a *person* and not merely as a *spirit*, in the vaguer and lower meaning of the word. The principle of his own life is now recognized as having a higher kind of unity, and so as capable of standing in a higher kind of relations to other units of the same kind. The invisible, superhuman spirits, have—at least, to a considerable extent—retired before the man-like but superhuman gods. “When,” says D’Alviella,¹ “as human thought advances, men reach a juster conception of the personality of things, they find a growing difficulty in making celestial or earthly objects take the part of *quasi*-human persons.” The truth would be much better expressed by saying that when man, through growth in political and social experience, reaches a juster conception of the personality of his own and of other selves, he finds a growing difficulty in making beings which are not also self-like in a superior degree take the part which gives satisfaction to his own social religious needs. It is plainly his development as one among many in a society which contributes to, and compels, the advance in his beliefs, sentiments, and practices, as respects the invisible superhuman powers. They, too, must be king-like, strong, wise, just, and worthy of respect, of admiration and of worship, in order to command his allegiance, or even to excite belief in their divine existence, at this stage of his own development as a Self among selves.²

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

² M. Vernes, in his *Histoire des Religions* goes so far as to insist that religions should be classified upon the political, social, and geographical characteristics of their history. But such a plan of classification introduces confusion into the subject.

The culmination of this form of development which regards the gods as manlike but superhuman persons, existing in political and social relations with one another and with men, was reached among the Greeks. The gods they worshipped had attained the highest excellence which can belong to the stage of anthropomorphic polytheism.

But the same social and political influences, helped on by philosophical reflection, operate to produce the next higher stage in the order of religious progress. This brings to a unity the different conceptions of Divine Being in some one Personality who is supreme over all; and He, from being the supreme one among other gods, rises to the place of the One Only God. It is, however, the advance of men's conceptions regarding the unity of the complex world of selves and things by way of scientific discovery and philosophical speculations, which supplements and assists the process of unifying by social and political influences. Now as the widening and deepening of acquaintance with the phenomena of nature, and with the social and political life of men, enhances the estimate of the largeness and mystery of Reality, and as the demand for unification increases in somewhat like proportion, the number of great gods diminishes and the old-time feeling of familiarity with the Divine Being diminishes also. The One Alone God becomes, as preëminently among the Jews, in one fashion, and among the Chinese, in yet another fashion, elevated in power, majesty, and mystery, above the reach of men. Yahweh must "bow the heavens" to come down; and Shang Ti, the Supreme and Heavenly Lord, is fitly worshipped only once a year by the emperor himself.

If to this mixed physical and social separation there is added the feeling of an ethical separation which results from the growing consciousness of a contrast with the purity and elevation of the Divine Ideal of personality, a twofold schism is created between man and his God. Even kings and priests now do not readily feel close to God. That the gods are, so to

say, "weeded out" by such a political and social progress combined with philosophic reflection, results happily in the improvement of those gods that survive. For unless the monotheistic conceptions are interpreted in an *ethical* sense, and are made the incitement and guide to *ethical* improvement, monotheism has little superiority, either religiously or philosophically, over polytheism. Or, at least, the advantage which it does have is speculative and affords satisfaction to man's intellectual quest after a unitary conception of nature and of human life, while failing to satisfy his ethico-religious needs. And here, in part, is where the weakness and unsatisfactory character of Pantheism will be seen to manifest itself. But the search never ceases for a higher and yet more comprehensive Source of all good and all reality. "Who," asks the Zend-Avesta, "was from the beginning the Father of the pure world? Who has made a path for the sun and the stars? Who makes the moon to increase and decrease?" And with such questions as these go the yet more pressing inquiries: "How shall a man stand right with this Father of the pure world?" "What is the way by which to reach Him?" and, since He seems somehow to have become alienated from man, and to require of man conditions for an at-one-ment; "What is the Way of Salvation, the way back to the All-Father?"

The highest stage in the order of man's religious development appears to be reached when the Being of the World, the immanent Ground of the cosmic process, is also believed in, worshipped, and served as perfect Ethical Spirit. Thus the view is made rational that this cosmic process has at its heart, and all through its ongoing, the ethical and spiritual interests of personal beings for its goal. To believe that this is so, is the highest form of religious faith. To experience it in the inmost life of the individual is to be most truly religious. It is apparent, then, that the prophetic office must supplement the forces of a social and political character, and the generalizations of advancing science and of philosophy, in order to

bring about a state of religious conviction that shall appropriate and realize the conception of God as perfect Ethical Spirit. Insight into this truth, and the power to interpret all human experience in the light of this truth, implies a somewhat special work of divine revelation and inspiration in the souls of selected individuals. This is the reason why all the great monotheistic religions are prophetic; they tell to the world of men, and indeed project upon the world, a faith in the Unity of Spirit which is the Source of the ideal religious life, the realized Ideal of all that system of things and souls that are alive. These men have had wrought out in their own experience the confident belief in the intimate presence and boundless power of God as a Spirit, who must be worshipped and served in the spirit and in the truth.

Such a spiritual Monism has been characteristic of every religion which has nearly approached, or quite completely reached, this last and highest stage in the order of man's religious development. But its more precise form has varied in the different religions which may be classed together—though, in some respects, inaptly—in this respect. Confucianism believed in an ethical order as proceeding from, and enforced by, High Heaven personified (however imperfectly) as a Spiritual Power. Zoroastrianism planted itself upon the burning conviction that the Source of light and purity, who demands the allegiance of every man and his most strenuous efforts in the conflict with evil, resided in Ahura-Mazda, the Supreme One and Only God. Brāhmanism, although in an incurably confused way and with a lack of ethical energy characteristic of the culture of the race, finds its principles of morality, as well as of science and of art, in the Unity of Ātman, the World-Soul; and to this vague pantheistic conception it is to-day, in its more progressive circles, attributing the creation of “the related and conditioned universe” as a manifestation of the Principle when it has “become the Personal God of love and power.”¹ Buddhism has made

¹ See *The Hindū System of Moral Science*, by Kishori Lal Sarkar, p. 17.

use of its principle of Karma as a supreme ethical and spiritual Power in control of the universe, including the events of nature and an endless succession of the lives of men. But Judaism rose by the uplifting influence of "Moses and the Prophets" to the conception of God as the righteous and holy Alone One. To this conception early Christianity added factors which emphasized the tender and forgiving side of the Divine Being, his Fatherhood and Redeeming Love; and it afterward incorporated the conception of God as infinite and perfect Reason, which had been growing up through the centuries from roots planted in Greek soil. The possibility of combining all the truths of these various forms of a spiritual Monism in a conception of God as perfect Ethical Spirit that shall accord with the conclusions of science and philosophy regarding the Ultimate Reality which is the Ground of all human experience, is the central problem of the philosophy of religion. Whether any existing religion has accomplished this, or can accomplish it, is a question which always awaits a historical and critical examination.

This survey of the almost endless differentiations and new unities of the religious history of mankind tempts the investigator to announce the discovery of so-called Laws of religious Development. How, indeed,—it is asked,—can the forces of a physical environment and of a changing race-culture operate so as to produce progress in a somewhat definite order, unless these forces are subject to discoverable laws? But in asking, and in attempting to answer, such a question as this, there is danger of deceiving ourselves by the use of powerful, subtle, and measurably appropriate, but after all misleading, terms. The word "Law" is such a term (especially when it is spelled with a capital letter as its initial). *Laws*, in the meaning in which the word applies to physical events, do not belong within the domain of man's spiritual history. In this domain, such a term can only mean to indicate those more general forms of reaction, with which men respond in their social relations and

intercourse to certain forms of stimuli. But all such reactions are, of necessity, increasingly complex as the environment, both physical and social, becomes more complicated, and as the multitude of souls taking part in them increases in number or grows in sensitiveness and in the subtle and manifold character of their culture. Besides all this, every unit of force in the complicated resultant is to a greater or less degree a Self-determining Will. Moreover, as our study of the phenomena has already made sufficiently obvious, the influence of a certain few individuals in the religious development of humanity is as obviously enormous as it is necessarily incalculable.

In a modified and more modest use of the term, however, it is proper to speak of the *laws* that seem to control the religious development of man in history. These are the actual modes of procedure by which humanity appears to have raised itself to higher and higher stages of religious belief, sentiment, and worship. Excluding what is more particular and seems to have reference only to minor forms of differentiation, there are certain general rules of the religious behavior of the race in its climbing upward toward its religious Ideal. Of these the following six suggest themselves as being most important, and as most obviously to be derived from our previous study of the phenomena.

A mode of procedure that prevails in the process of "amalgamation" which all living and growing religions undergo, may be called, not unfitly, *the law of social selection*. The members of the same family, or tribe, or larger community, cannot readily remain together in the lower stages of religious development and of race-culture, or even in the higher stages, without developing preferences for the same gods and the same forms of worship. Whatever may be the particular character of the social aggregate, it tends most powerfully to enforce a consensus of opinion and of practice in religion. Those who dwell in caves or tents together surely need to be agreed in their religious belief and cult. The liberality of faith and

worship which belongs to the most highly civilized communities and even families in modern times—where it is not, as so frequently it is, in reality indifference to all religion—is unknown and intolerable in the earlier stages of social development. In ancient Babylonia the gods of the capital city of the district, in ancient Egypt the gods of the nomes, in ancient Rome the gods of the domestic hearth, of the domain, of the state, and so on, have, as a matter of course, the most decided preference in their favor, in the eyes of all the members of these social groups. But as this principle of selection extends from family to tribe, from tribe to people made up of several adjoining tribes or of conquering and conquered tribes, and then from particular peoples to great empires and larger portions of the race, its sphere of influence is extended and its potency is increased. The God of Israel, the God of Islam, and the Christian's God—these have been phrases that were no empty sounds. The rather have they been the embodiment of common conceptions and sentiments which, under the law of social selection, have fused together and mightily uplifted the religious experiences of multitudes of men.

In connection with this law of social selection another principle is found operative which has its roots in the intellectual constitution of the human mind. It is this fact which makes the same law so forceful for the advance of science as well as of religion. Indeed, the law may be said to be fundamental in the economics of human nature. We will call it *the law of parsimony*. It is under its influence that men are led, finally, to believe in no more independent spirits, or different gods, or disconnected forms of the divine manifestation, than seem necessary to account for their experience. The infinite complexity and disconnected character of those doings of nature which the human mind finds itself, at first, compelled to assign to the presence and power of invisible spiritual agencies is accountable for the lowest forms of its religious beliefs and cult. We have seen (pp. 177 *ff.*) to what an absurd extent the exuber-

ance of the Greek poetical and myth-making spirit, and the Roman love of order and obedience extending to the minutest details, led these civilized peoples in the direction of multiplying their gods. But all the more keenly on this account did the reflective thinking of the one, and the organizing capacity of the other, compel them both to discover some more economical system of religious beliefs. What, indeed, is the use of so many gods—or, at any rate, of so many *quasi*-independent gods—in order to do the business of the world? Science and the social instinct conspire to prevent this needless waste of energy. Indeed, the very conception of law itself in the world of physical objects and physical events is an outcome, in part, of this tendency to favor the explanations that have the advantages of parcimony. In ancient Babylon we find a reduction of the number of gods, and a corresponding advance in the conception of the nature of the Divine Being, resulting from the obedience of the human mind to this law. In Rome the landed estates could not grow, without abolishing the existence of numbers of divinities that had formerly presided over the boundaries and hearths and crops of the smaller landowners. The Greeks reduced the number of their independent deities by confederating them after the analogy of the confederated Hellenic states.

Doubtless, the operation of this law of parcimony is a powerful influence in favor of monotheism to-day even among the most highly civilized communities. Probably the answer which multitudes in these communities would have to give to the question, Why do you believe in one, and only one, God? would express simply a somewhat vague feeling of preference for the fewest number of divine beings possible, rather than a clear consciousness of the grounds on which monotheism rests. The very fact that there is rivalry among the gods, whether of the same religion or of different religions, is in itself a source of irritation and of unrest to the average human mind. And essentially the same thing is true of all the beliefs that go with

any particular religion. The reason why such a jumble of inconsistent and contradictory conceptions as are found in all the earlier religions, and in the religions of India, China, Japan, and even of Western Christian lands to-day, can rule human minds at all is to be found in the fact that the inconsistencies and contradictions are not made clear in the consciousness of their adherents. Whenever the difficulty of holding two or more forms of belief together is made obvious, then the law of parcimony compels the rejection of all but one, or the incorporation of factors from them all into some new and seemingly harmonious form of belief.

Closely allied to both of these laws, and, indeed, having the appearance of a combination of the two, stands a third, which we will call *the law of social and political harmony*. If many invisible, superhuman powers are to be believed in, or if a multitude of gods must be continued in existence, then there must be some principle introduced that shall harmonize the totality. Otherwise, there is hopeless and endless confusion. And, indeed, in the lowest stage of religious belief this is precisely what we have to notice. To man's thought in that stage of his development, the world itself is no cosmic order; it is, the rather, a fearful and unintelligible battlefield for capricious and conflicting spiritual powers. But so far as he reduces his environment to some kind of order, and especially so far as he reduces himself to an advanced kind of political and social order, his pantheon shares in the benefits of this progress toward harmony. That it should do so is absolutely essential to man's religious development. Some gods, like some men, must be subordinate to other gods; all other gods, like all men, must be obedient to a supreme God or to some spiritual Power or Principle, in order that harmony may prevail. The world of man's environment is, indeed, a battlefield where a ceaseless and seemingly unrelenting struggle for existence is perpetually going on. And, quite contrary to the prevalent opinion, modern science is far enough from proving, on the basis of known facts, the exist-

ence of any universal force, or law, out of which perfect harmony may be, either theoretically or practically, educed. But both in his science and in his religion, it is æsthetical and ethical considerations which chiefly lead man to indulge himself in the idea of a Cosmos—a beautiful and orderly Whole. In his religious development he greatly improves himself, as well as all his religious beliefs, sentiments, and practices, when he constructs a social system that harmonizes the different divine energies and manifestations. And men will always continue to call God the “King Eternal,” the “Lord of lords,” the “Ruler,” “Law-giver,” and “Judge,” of all mankind. Alas! that they should still have so much occasion to invoke Him to defend *their* armies and navies in wars bred and nourished of avarice and greed of power; because, forsooth! He is the “Lord of Hosts” to-day after the pattern of Yahweh among the Hebrews of old. The God of all nations and kingdoms, at peace with one another and under his loving sway, is indeed a conception worthy to harmonize the strifes of man.

The fourth of the laws which are most obviously followed in man’s religious development may be called *the law of Self-harmony*. The psychology of the religious experience abundantly shows how deeply and manifoldly rooted in human nature religion is; how much an affair of the total human Self; and how inextricably interwoven with every form of self-satisfaction and self-development is the development of religion. Man is constitutionally bound to seek continually, and until he find it, such a religious belief and such a life of religion as shall bring satisfaction to his manifold cravings and needs. These cravings and needs are themselves the subject of ceaseless change; they may become the subjects of development. That is to say, they may become more refined and enlightened, more rational, and morally worthy of satisfaction. But the very nature of religious development is such—and this grows out of the very nature of religion—that it begets an increasing consciousness of schism and disharmony within, and of separation from the

spiritual Being believed in and worshipped as God. On the one hand, then, man constructs the Object of his religious faith and adoration in a manner to correspond with his higher and nobler Ideals,—he idealizes the Divine Being; and on the other hand, he feels more intensely those deficiencies and needs which he looks to religion to supply and to fulfill. Thus he endeavors to bring self-harmony into his life by discovering and following the way to conform his own selfhood to his growing ideal of the Absolute Self. The better man must have a better god; the better God must make better the man who believes in, worships, and serves Him.

In the experience of all religions that undergo any considerable development this law of self-harmony by adjustment of the human Self to its improved conceptions of the Perfect and Absolute Self, can be discerned in more or less effective operation. Even in China the somewhat scanty improvements upon Confucianism which Buddhism has brought about are examples under this principle. Shang Ti, or the abstract Heavenly Lord, and the original Buddhistic Nirvāna, were both too remote and subtle to satisfy the religious needs of that phlegmatic and practical people. The doctrine of Kuan Yin, the goddess of Mercy, who voluntarily renounced the bliss of Nirvāna and remained in conscious existence that she might continue to be a gracious listener to the prayers of needy man, was a great advance upon the previous religious beliefs of China.¹ When brought there in the first century of the Christian era it gave a decided uplift to the religion of the people. God was, so to say, popularized and made near to the hearts of men; the way of salvation and the hope of a future beyond death were opened to the multitude; and the divinities of the popular worship had a more helpful moral character bestowed upon them. Thus the religion of China became possessed of a Deity that answered more perfectly the religious needs of the inhabitants, and also tended to make them adjust themselves

¹ Compare Dr. Martin, *Lore of Cathay*, p. 186.

to the superhuman Selfhood in which they believed and to which they gave allegiance and adoration.

But by far the most marvellous exhibition of the working of this law of development by self-harmony was that afforded by the early Christianity in its conquest of the Græco-Roman world. By its powerful influence the many and varied peoples composing this world were unified as never before, in the era extending from the beginning of the second to the end of the fourth century A. D. The feeling of need and of disharmony was then rife and intense as never before in the history of that part of the world. Probably the only other period in the ancient world that could properly be compared with this era was that at which Buddhism was introduced into India. Through the decay of the old national and political cults, and the accompanying process of syncretism in which the various religions of the peoples surrounding the Mediterranean Sea took part, there was formed a disposition favorable to an ethical monotheism, both in the minds of the cultured classes and among the multitudes of the common people. But the feeling of disharmony, the consciousness of sin and of alienation from God, could be met and satisfied only by some form of monotheism which promised to be a religion of salvation. Christianity aroused and emphasized those ideas of repentance, expiation, and healing for the soul, which emerge in Oriental religions. To the feelings of deficiency, powerlessness, and need, which these ideas accompany and support, the new religion of Jesus appealed in a most forceful and effective way. For this reason, too, the worship of Mithras, which had also its redeemer, mediator, hierarchy, sacrifice, baptism, and sacred meal, became the principal rival of Christianity in the third century.¹

In addition to those needs which arose from the feeling of disharmony and alienation from God, the new religion appealed to the admiration for heroism and to the desire for the satisfactions of self-sacrifice which are such important factors in the

¹ See Harnack, *History of Dogma*, I, pp. 116 and 118 (note).

religious development of humanity. Self-seeking, even when it succeeds in gaining what it seeks, does not harmonize the Self. And here the philosophy of Schopenhauer is profoundly true. To have one's private needs satisfied is only to arouse the deeper needs which demand satisfaction by way of self-surrender and self-sacrifice; or else it is to beget satiety and weariness within the soul. As says Dr. Carus:¹ "The great strength of Christianity lies in the lesson of Golgotha, which means salvation lies not alone in the attainment of the truth, but in struggling for it, in living for it, in suffering for it, and in dying for it." The meeting by religion of this kind of craving also serves to bring about that fuller harmony of the human Self which, as the essential truth of the Christian religion assured men, lies deep in the heart of the self-sacrificing Absolute Self.

The law of the development of religion through the conflict of extremes scarcely needs more than a passing mention in order to make clear its application to the phenomena of man's religious history. Compromises and readjustments which result in advanced positions are significant facts in all human progress. When two civilizations with their different religions, or two great religions within one civilization, or two or more sects in one religion, come into rivalry and conflict, it is difficult or impossible for either one to escape all modifying influence from the other. If these modifications are improvements, of either one or of both of the conflicting religions, then the law of which we are now speaking is fulfilled to a greater or less extent.

The method of making progress by incorporating into new unities the results derived from the attempt to reconcile conflicting extremes has been followed in all forms of human development. It is one of the most influential, and on the whole fortunate, of those causes which prevent civilization from being given over to any one line of either theoretical or practical

¹ Buddhism and its Christian Critics, p. 8.

endeavor. It prevents the curve of the evolution of civilization under the dynamic uplift of any one of its factors, from shooting up into the air so far as to leave behind all the other controlling factors.¹ Thus in philosophy, Neo-Platonism strove to furnish a Unity of Reason as Dynamic that should reconcile the extreme statical Idealism of Plato with the energetic Pluralism of Aristotle. This same Neo-Platonic philosophy forced the later Judaism and the early Christianity to modify its conception of God by incorporating into it certain elements of a rational and mystical order, by carrying of which to an extreme this philosophy itself had been rendered incapable of commanding the religious thought of the Christianized world. The conflicts over Christological speculations which characterized the first three centuries of the Christian Era, and which resulted in the orthodox doctrine of the Church Catholic, illustrate this same truth. And it is further illustrated by the changes in this orthodox doctrine which are being at present introduced to save it from those extremes of scientific or philosophical agnosticism and of historical criticism which are quite incompatible with maintaining any semblance of the essential truth of Christianity.

The same law admits of illustration from the modifications which have gone on for centuries in the Hindū pantheism in its conflicts with the sharp and narrow monotheism of the Muhammadan invaders of India; or from the way in which the characteristic extremes of religious belief and practice belonging to the Teutons were adjusted to the characteristically different extremes of that form of Christian faith and life which undertook the subjugation of the heathen world. In

¹ As says Crozier, History of Intellectual Development on the Lines of Modern Evolution, III, p. 9: "For this curve of the evolution of Civilization is the product and outcome, it is to be observed, not of any one or more or even all of these factors when taken *separately*, but of the interplay of them all *when united and combined as parts of a great single organic movement.*"

the dogma and in the cult of every great religion there is always strife between the "old faith" and the "new faith," the "old lights" and the "new lights," the conservative or orthodox and the radical or, for the time being, heretical innovators of the ancient ways and of the accepted dogmatic standards. In Christian lands, even down to the present time, this conflict has not infrequently raged with use of fire and sword. But the value of constant criticism, even from the most extreme opposed points of view, in lifting the doctrines and the life of the Christian religion to a higher plane of evolution can scarcely be overestimated; nor can it be dispensed with, after the use of these "carnal weapons" has been forever abandoned.

There is something, however, in the evolution of man's religious life, as thought, feeling, and action, which all our experiential and historical formulas do not quite avail to explain. A sixth law, or principle, over all controlling this evolution, appears to need recognition. It shall be called *the law*, or principle, *of the obligation imposed upon man by a supernatural Ideal*.¹ For this law appears in the form of a command, the significance of which is not at all apprehended in the lower stages of the religious evolution of humanity; and which is not by any means fully recognized even in the highest stages which humanity has as yet achieved. Indeed, *the entire evolution of the race may be considered, from the point of view of the philosophy of religion when surveying the history of this evolution, as arising out of obligations to the Ideal*. And this Ideal which religion in its highest form of thought, feeling, and service, strives to realize, includes the ideals of truth, beauty, and goodness. Thus religion itself, when most profoundly comprehended, is seen to be of the nature of that command which Jesus uttered to his disciples: "Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father in Heaven is perfect." The voice in which all religious doctrine and prophecy is expressed, and to which the

¹ Comp. A. Dorner, Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie, p. 406f.

soul of man responds by entering upon the "way of salvation," is the exhortation: "Thou shalt so think, act, and be, as to bring into the reality of human life a harmony with the Personal Ideal of perfect truth, beauty, and goodness."

In the religious history of man, on the side of truth this law of the obligation of the supernatural Ideal has led the race to the progressively higher stages of the monotheistic conception of God, as at the same time the Ground of the World, the Ultimate Reality, and the realized Ideal of perfect Ethical Spirit. That a process of evolution has been, and still is, both actual and necessary, there can be no doubt. Even in the lowest stages of man's religious experience, the products of reflection and of phantasy, whether as implicated in fetish-worship, nature-worship, or ancestor-worship, and whether expressed in the form of religious mythology, or of the representation of the Divine by plastic or pictorial art, contain the germs of this great truth. So on the side of religious feeling, the movement from what is more egoistic and sensuous to what is more altruistic, ethical, and spiritually refined, accords with the same conclusion. As thought moves from confusion to clearness, from lack of fixedness to intelligent conviction, from the irrational to the more rational, sentiment takes on forms which bring it, as it were, *sub specie æternitatis*. And the culture of self-determination, or that direction of the will along the path which seems to lead toward the realization of this supernatural Ideal, whose illuring presence is felt as an imperative obligation, more and more places this process of spiritual evolution under man's control.

That some belief of this sort is a reasonable deduction from the facts of man's religious history and development, we hold to be true. But the fuller evidence of its truth must be gained by considering the phenomena from another point of view.

PART II

MAN: A RELIGIOUS BEING

“And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created He him.”

GENESIS.

“There was the true light, even the light which lighteth every man, coming into the world.”

JOHN.

“For there is yet a little light in man; let them walk, let them walk, that the darkness overtake them not.”

AUGUSTINE.

“Intellect relies on Reason, Faith on Authority; opinion defends itself by probability alone. These two comprehend the sure truth; but faith, in closed and involuted, intelligence, in exposed and manifest, form.”

BERNARD.

PART II

MAN : A RELIGIOUS BEING

CHAPTER X

THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS

“The history of religions is the history of religious man”; and the historical development of religion is to be understood as the unfolding, in one of its most important aspects, of the spiritual life of humanity. It is in the form of some such principles as these that the conclusions from our previous study of the phenomena of man’s religious evolution introduce us to the more detailed consideration of man’s religious being as the source and lawgiver of the evolutionary process. The necessity for referring to psychological causes in explanation of the facts as they appear in history, has hitherto chiefly been apparent in these two directions: (1) In dealing with problems concerning the nature and origin of religion it has always been manifest that the solution of these problems must be discovered in certain forms of human psychical reactions; in a word, it is the soul of man which is the maker of man’s religions. (2) In treating of the differentiation and development of religions reference was constantly made to the dependence of these processes of change upon the various types and successive stages of “race-culture.” But the vague and complex term here employed, in order to afford a real explanation of the evolu-

tion of religion, must itself be resolved into interrelated groups of characteristic reactions of the human soul upon its physical and social environment. In a word, so far as this so-called "race-culture" is itself a matter of development, its different varieties and stages must be regarded as modifications wrought in the physical surroundings and social organizations of man by his own psychical activities.

The importance of a more definitively subjective and psychological study of the religious life and development of humanity, in order to lay a sure and broad basis for the philosophy of religion, thus becomes evident as the conclusion of our objective and historical study. Man as the "maker of religion" now comes before us; religion as an experience must be examined with the employment of such resources as modern psychology, considered both as an individual and as a social or racial affair, places at our disposal. The inquiry, therefore, involves not only those forms of psychical functioning upon which the religious life of every individual is more immediately dependent, but also those forms where the dependence is more mediate and indirect. The latter emphasize the dependent relations of religion, considered as a psychical product, to the other—*e. g.*, the industrial, political, scientific, artistic, and ethical—products of man's Psychical Life.

A preliminary analysis of man's religious consciousness can only prepare the way, and classify the material, for a subsequent detailed consideration of the different active factors which enter into his total religious experience. But even a preliminary analysis must be guided by one assumption which the detailed consideration will amply confirm. This assumption may be stated in the following terms: Religion has its psychological sources in every important form of the functioning of the human soul. *It is man in his entirety, who is the maker of religion.* Every factor of his complex being enters into his religious life and religious development. The unconscious or—to use a much abused term of modern psychology—the "sub-

liminal " influences are present and potent factors. The lower impulsive and emotional stirrings solicit or impel him to be religious. His social instincts or more intelligent social desires and aims cooperate in the same result. The uplift to that condition of rational faith which corresponds to the ideal adjustment of the human self to the Divine Self is effected largely through the awakening and employment of the higher, æsthetical and ethical sentiments. Human intelligence—beginning with that instinctive intellectual curiosity which leads man to try to explain things to himself, and himself to his own Self, in naïve and childlike fashion, and ending with the most lofty speculative flights of the trained reflective reason—is committed to the cause of religious development. Without his metaphysical nature, his ontological consciousness, man would neither be scientific nor religious; much less would science and religion find subjects for controversy or for friendly discussion. And the voluntary and practical adjustments of himself to that Other and Absolute Self, in whose Being he comes to believe his own being to be somehow comprehended, is the "heart of the heart" of man's religious life. That the finite will should be brought into harmony with the Infinite Will, and man's activities rightly attuned to the Active Being of the World in which he lives, is even more definitely the aim of religion than it is the aim of science; and this appears true whenever both religion and science come to understand their truest and highest mission.

Feeling, and every form of feeling; intellect, and every aspect and phase of intellection; will, and every species of the voluntary and deliberately chosen course of conduct;—all these enter, as integral and reciprocally related "moments," into the religious experience. For religion *in man* is nothing less than *man himself* considered in his total being with respect to its manifold relations toward one of the most complex and comprehensive ends of all life and of all development.

This unqualified manner of asserting the comprehensive character of the religious factors in the psychical being of man,

receives confirmation from all the attempts which have been made to reduce these factors to one, two, or three selected forms of mental reactions. Such attempts have inevitably resulted in failure, so far as their positive contentions are concerned. But they have, when taken together, shown what a rich endowment in the religious domain belongs to the soul of man. For the attempts not only correct the exclusiveness of one another; they also supplement one another in such a way as to show that each one of them has truth, but by no means all the truth, on its side.

Even the lowest forms of religious experience cannot be considered from the psychological point of view without making evident the truth of the variety of psychical factors which they comprehend and of which they give evidence. Here again attention must be called to how much religion means in fact, with all it includes, to savage or primitive man. It is very largely his science, his philosophy, the satisfaction of his feelings and sentiments, and the constant and comprehensive guide of his practical life. As to the latter form of the functions performed by religion, one example may suffice for all. "When," says one observer of the behavior of the wild tribes of Borneo,¹ "they lay out their fields, gather in the harvest, go out hunting, fishing, or take the field for an expedition, when they go out before and after the contracting of a marriage before starting on a commercial journey, or any other undertaking of importance, they always consult the gods, offer them sacrifices, and celebrate certain feasts, often losing the best opportunity for the business itself."

The same important truth is emphasized by the study of magic and by the very attempt to derive religion from the practice of magic. For when magic is non-religious, and thus is a sort of rival to religion, it appeals to a variety of psychical interests and activities. Its very rivalry of religion, or its prac-

¹ Roth, *The Natives of Sarawak*, II, Appendix, p. clxxii; from Schwaner's *Ethnographical Notes*.

tice in the form of religious magic, depends upon its supposed ministry to man's instinctive or more studied science and art of self-preservation. The reason that the animals do not practice magic may be said to be almost as deeply seated in the differences between their conscious life and man's, as are the reasons why they have no religion even in the form of a vague and unreflecting spiritism. Could we accept Professor Frazer's inadequate account of the principles which underlie all magic, we should find in it, on further analysis, much more than its author seems clearly to recognize. These principles Frazer reduces to two:¹ like produces like; and things once in contact continue, after separation, to act as though they continued in contact. But who does not see that the working of these principles, even in the narrow sphere of magic, involves nearly all the peculiar intellectual privileges of man? Besides this, the principles do not account satisfactorily either for the barbarous rites connected with certain initiations to manhood among savage tribes, or for the widespread practice of *tabu*. Even the impressions made upon the feeling for the mysterious and incomprehensible by the magical use of frenzied gestures, unmeaning words, nauseous compounds, etc., are indicative of the presence in germinal form of affectional modes of functioning which difference man from all the other animals.

Moreover, in estimating the sources of religion, as well as in understanding the characteristics of its earlier developments, the extreme impressibility or emotionalism of the savage or primitive man must continually be borne in mind. States of frenzy, or of physical decline, and even of sudden death, are easily produced by playing upon his imagination. According to Castrén, a sudden blow on the outside of the tent of the Samoyeds will sometimes throw the occupants into convulsions. The magician among savages has often no great difficulty in enhancing his own reputation by striking with death—really through terror—the opponent who questions his magical

¹ The Golden Bough, I, p. 9f.

powers. This extreme excitability of the emotions which civilized man also possesses, but keeps relatively under control, has led some anthropologists to liken the savage to the emotionally insane rather than to the intellectually childish. And, on the other hand, a nearer acquaintance with not a few savages shows the average level of native intelligence and of impulse to morality, as they understand morality, not appreciably lower than that of the multitudes of civilized races. In their simplest and most nearly primitive form, therefore, the psychological sources of religion are found to be much more multi-form and profound than are discovered even by the comprehensive analysis of such writers as Tylor.¹

The presence of the influence from factors that only rarely or never rise above the threshold of consciousness, and the important relation which these factors sustain to the characteristic phases and stages of conscious experience in religion, may be said to be a universal and inseparable factor of religious belief. It underlies the religious doctrines of revelation and inspiration. That some of these phenomena not only defy analysis but belong to the abnormal and even to the unpsychological (or *a*-psychological) need not be disputed. But when the sole, or even the chiefly important sources of the conscious life of religion are assigned to the obscure and misty regions of the "sub-liminal Self," and the inevitable added impression is made that religion itself is something psychologically abnormal or wholly mysterious, the errors involved cost more heavily than can be paid for by the truth gained. The child is poured out with the muddy water of the bath. Doubtless phenomena occur which seem to warrant the statement of M. Richet:² "There exists in certain persons at certain moments, a faculty of acquiring knowledge which has no *rapport* with our normal faculties of that kind." A certain power of "opening the gates of distance" may be conceded to

¹ See his *Primitive Culture* (first Am. ed.), I, pp. 428ff.

² *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*, V, p. 167.

the clairvoyant doctor among the Zulus; the real efficiency of many heathen incantations and Christian relics may be admitted, and some psychological explanation—whether by suggestion, or telepathic influence, or what not—may be proposed; and yet the failure to take cognizance of the sources of the normal, natural, and inevitable religious experience of man, be almost as complete as before.¹ The class of so-called occult phenomena undoubtedly ministers to—even if we are forbidden to speak of it as causing—the belief in invisible and mysterious existences; and this belief is an essential “moment” in religious belief of all grades and kinds. But the pretence, or implied conclusion, that the principal psychological account of the nature and origin of religion can be furnished in this way results in the degradation of religion by removing it pretty effectually from the sphere of rationality. The power of vague and awe-inspiring terms (such as the “Absolute,” the “Unconscious” the “Unknown,” etc.,) upon the consciousness of the highly cultured forms no better psychological basis for a philosophy of religion than does the power of Magic or Shamanism over the consciousness of savage or primitive peoples.

Equally signal is the failure of those psychological theories which claim to find the only source of religion, as a universal and necessary development of human nature, in some one form of feeling to the exclusion or neglect of all the others. That form of affective experience to which attention has of tenest been directed in this way is the feeling of fear. Now it is true that this emotion is a powerful stimulus to religion; and its efficiency is felt all along the line of religious evolution, from the lowest and most superstitious terrors with which the savage imagination clothes the world of invisible spirits to the holy awe and reverence with which the religious and philosophical mind approaches the supreme mysteries of the Divine Being. On the other hand, in even the lower and more su-

¹ It is difficult to excuse Mr. Andrew Lang wholly from this kind of failure. For example, see *The Making of Religion*, pp. 77ff.

perstitious forms of religious belief other emotions are efficient and equally controlling factors. "When," says one authority, "the Spanish missionaries questioned the Indians as to the origin of their gods, the usual reply was that they had come from heaven or the air to dwell among them and do them good." Strange as it may seem, the worship of the cobra among the natives of India, and of the rattlesnake among the Redskins of North America, is only very partially motivated by fear of these dangerous animals. While ancestor-worship, instead of having its main roots in the superstitious dread of ghosts, is the rather rooted in respect and in the altruistic affections. The saying attributed to Confucius tells the truth about this matter: "The services of love and reverence to parents when alive, and those of grief and sorrow for them when dead;—these completely discharge the fundamental duty of living men." Or yet more emphatically from the ethico-religious point of view: "Of all the activities of man there is none greater than filial piety; and in filial piety there is nothing greater than the reverential awe of one's father. In the reverential awe shown to one's father, there is nothing greater than making him the correlate of Heaven." In all those places where ancestor-worship has developed in such manner as to show all its psychological characteristics, when there is a family reunion on a grand scale, the living and the dead meet to eat and drink together; the living reverence or worship the dead; the dead are expected to bless the living with whom they thus associate. As the quaint old Chinese ballad from the seventh century B. C. sings:—

"And see! they place the goblet full,
 In figure fashioned as a bull;
 The dishes of bamboo and wood,
 Sliced meat, roast pig, and pottage good;
 And the large stand."

When admiration is added to affection and dutiful reverence, the departed great may be worshipped, as according to the

“Laws of Sacrifice,” in the same spirit as that in which men worship “Sun, Moon, and the constellations of the Zodiac.”

Even Schleiermacher’s conception of religious feeling is neither satisfactory as including all the affectional and sentimental factors of religion, nor as excluding the interrelated intellectual and rational factors. Indeed, in whatever form we understand it, the feeling toward the *Welt-geist* is an elaborate emotional complex, dependent of necessity upon, and by no means to be separated from, the functioning of man’s rational and speculative powers. The vaguest possible conception of a *Welt-geist* is an elaborate product of reason. And such a conception as Schleiermacher wished to appeal to, in order to win to religion the cultured Germans of his own day, was a highly elaborate product of the speculative reason of that time. Nor was the case much improved, when in the *Glaubenslehre* we are told that this religious feeling toward the World-Spirit may best be essentially and exclusively defined by calling it the feeling of absolute dependence.

None of the more modern substitutes for Schleiermacher’s feeling of absolute dependence is any more successful in explaining the psychological origin of religion as wholly, or even chiefly, seated in the affective consciousness. They are all vitiated by that defective and mischievous Kantian schism amongst the so-called faculties of the human soul, which places intellect and feeling at opposite poles, and sharply contrasts or opposes knowledge and faith. The modern genetic view of psychical life refuses to recognize such separations as possible in the development of the human soul. Degrees and variations in the proportion of the different factors do, indeed, exist. But these are all subject to such compensatory reactions as continually secure the unity of the psychical life; and this is as true in religion as it is elsewhere in the other ampler developments of humanity. He who knows psychology can no longer talk about “removing knowledge in order to make room for faith.”

The modern, Neo-Kantian over-emphasis of faith as chiefly

feeling, in the current psychological theories of religion, receives its correction by way of checking its extremes and supplementing its deficiencies, through such considerations as the following: In the first place, certain of the religious feelings, and these the most important for giving an account of the higher developments of man's religious life, cannot even be conceived of as existing in the experience of irrational beings. Such are the ethical feelings of obligation and of the desire for moral purity and moral perfection, the æsthetical feelings awakened by the very attempt to conceive of the Infinite, or the Absolute, and the emotions caused by contemplating the mysteries of Nature, or by the effort to comprehend the ground of all our experience in terms of some sort of a Unity. How true this is appears from the procedure of a recent writer¹ who attempts to give the primacy to feeling; for at once this writer is compelled to characterize the higher religious sentiments as immediately dependent upon "the consciousness of the unity of the Universe," "the consciousness of the infinite presence," and "the knowledge of details through which the unity, the infinite presence is manifested." But these forms of consciousness arise only as the result of advanced reflective feeling; such terms are not properly descriptive of those vaguer feelings which correspond to the undeveloped conceptions of the lower forms of religion. In the interests of consistency this writer is led on to make a quite unwarrantable separation between man's "natural" confidence in the uniformity of law and those intellectual equipments and acquirements which make possible his scientific and intellectual progress.

It further militates against the unqualified statement that the religious feeling, like the æsthetic feeling or the ethical feeling, is "in advance of the intellectual recognition which is logically its basis," when we consider that the former, even more than the other two allied forms of feeling, is largely a

¹ The late Professor C. C. Everett, in a suggestive little book entitled *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*.

complex of fear, hope, desire, sociability, veneration, longing, etc., as directed toward the invisible, the mysterious, the incomprehensible. We cannot, indeed, speak of the incomprehensible as a definite product of the human intellect. But, on the other hand, it is one of the chief distinctions of the human intellect that it seeks to reach and traverse far larger fields than those which ever dawn, even obscurely, upon the horizon of animal mentality. And it is man's recognition of the limits, and his longing to pass beyond them, with the result that he constantly either better comprehends these limits or else pushes them farther away, which constitutes no unimportant part of his religious experience. Moreover, without the distinct advances in the conception of God, and of his relations to the world and to human life and destiny, which are the results of the severest and loftiest work of man's imagination and reflective thinking, the religious feelings of humanity remain at a relatively low, sordid, and ineffective stage of development.

On the other hand, as says Professor Watson,¹ it is a fundamental mistake to assume that reason is "absolutely exclusive of *feeling*." To be rational is not to be a purely intellectual machine, "a cold logic engine" grinding out or transforming what Mr. Bradley has called "bloodless categories." Through the æsthetic feelings the categories of the True, the Real, and the Beautiful come into rational relations with the belief in God; and this effectuates the life that accords with that belief. The same thing is true respecting the rational relations of ethical feeling:—

"Let knowledge grow from more to more,
But more of reverence in us dwell."

The very conception of a philosophy of religion implies the recognition of certain rights which are inherent in two classes

¹ Christianity and Idealism, p. 251.

of factors,—namely the intellectual or more definitely rational in the stricter meaning of that term, and the emotional and sentimental. Religion is, in fact, an interrelated complex of belief, feeling, and practice. The factors of feeling cannot be reasoned away, or disposed of as unimportant, or fitly treated with flippancy or contempt. But reason, too, has its rights,—meaning now by reason the judicious and cultivated exercise of all man's faculties for the ascertainment of truth of fact and of law: Religion can no more than any other form of human experience escape from the summons to submit to a critical evaluation of alleged facts and truths by the light of human reason. No obligation rests, or can rest upon the human mind which is more fundamental than that of making diligent use of the power of discovering, testing, and proclaiming what appears to be true. On the other hand, there is no more mischievous religious heresy than that involved in the attitude of the Puritan William Law¹ when replying to the charge that he was a declared "enemy of the use of reason in religion:" "I own I have not only taught this but have again and again proved the absolute necessity of it." But the subtler denials of the rights of reason in this realm, such as that of Sabatier,² although fortunately fewer than they formerly were, are scarcely less incompatible with the interests of man's genuine religious progress. This writer would find the birthplace of religion wholly in the feeling of distress. In emphasizing the powerlessness of religion to provide any theoretic solution of the contradictions which so afflict the moral life of humanity, he identifies faith, "in the world of the spirit" with "the instinct of preservation in the physical world."

Finally, the psychological analysis of the religious experience shows us how all the forms and presuppositions of man's reasoning powers are normally committed to the life of religion. The intellectual curiosity, or questioning nature of the

¹ Address to the Clergy, p. 52; and compare pp. 66, 100.

² *Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion*, p. 19.

human child and of the childlike man, serves as an ever-living source and support to his religious development. As the senses are stormed by the environment and intelligence is awakened and excited, it reacts by storming its environment with questions and by bringing its own awakened and excited forces to bear upon the conquest of this environment. The parity between the boy who endows with his own life the stick he rides as his horse, or the girl who makes alive the puppet she plays with as an infant, and the "natural man" who bestows a soul upon everything of interest to him—sun, moon, stars, air, fire, and water, not less than trees, animals, and men—has already been made obvious. Thus religion and science arise out of essentially the same intellectual reactions.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the childlike mind of the so-called primitive man is incapable of making those same distinctions which, later on in the intellectual development of humanity, introduce the perplexing and hotly debated problems of the natural and the supernatural. Man has his total experience to explain; but the religious experience—not more and yet not less than any other form of experience—carries along with it no adequate explanation of itself. With man, however, when the critical powers are as yet in a low state of development, the distinction between the natural and the supernatural raises few barriers against the excursions of his imagination into the field of invisible realities. Nor does the distinction greatly alter the character of his fixed beliefs regarding the nature of these realities. For he is conscious of no strife between the two principles of explanation—that which forms the beginnings of his science and that which ministers to his religious beliefs; although he freely makes use of both. The spirits which he worships as divine, invisible though they be, afford to him no more illusory or unreal causes of what he experiences than do the visible and tangible implements of the chase and of war, or the utensils which he uses for domestic and agricultural purposes.

With all normal use of man's reasoning powers there goes in religion as truly as in science, the fundamental and unassailable presuppositions of the ontological consciousness. As a recent writer has well said: ¹ "A metaphysic of a conscious or unconscious kind always goes side by side with religion." And, "the clearer the form assumed by the religious consciousness, the more the religious idea of God passes over into a conscious metaphysical cognition of God." For religion is always, and essentially, either a naïve or a more or less elaborate theory of reality. It affords the human mind one way, and indeed man's only way, of interpreting into terms of objective reality the invisible causes and laws of his own experience. The savage follows this way in dealing with his dreams; when as yet, he has not learned to make the very difficult psychological distinctions between dreams and waking hallucinations, or between the latter and ordinary sensible perceptions. But the most highly civilized thinker follows the same way when, after making all the distinctions which the scientific growth of the race has put at his disposal, he after all constructs Reality—whether in terms of scientific formulas, or philosophic ideas, or religious beliefs—as a system of self-like existences.²

It will also appear that the combined work of intellect and imagination in the construction of those Ideals which are the exciting and the responsive correlates of the æsthetical and ethical sentiments are chiefly important, both as sources and as stimuli of man's religious life and religious development. Here again no unseemly narrowness of theory satisfies all the facts of the case. When, for example, Höffding³ defines religion as "a faith in the conservation of worth," he has seized upon one aspect of the comprehensive truth, although with an excessive and almost fanciful use of abstractions, and has made

¹ Dr. A. Dorner, *Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie*, p. 51.

² For the fact and the rational justification of the fact, see the author's *Philosophy of Knowledge, and A Theory of Reality*.

³ *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 95f.

a part do the work of the whole. This becomes obvious as soon as the effort is made to harmonize his description of the different species of worth, among which the particular worth of religion must find a place. One of these groups is represented as connected with the principle of "self-assertion" (*Selbstbehauptung*); another connects itself with the ethical, æsthetic, and intellectual feelings. The third group of values upon which religion is built arises from the necessity of working into human existence, and maintaining there, the first two groups. Hence religious feeling is described as a sort of "cosmic life-feeling," a feeling that is determined "by the relation of worth to actuality." But a careful analysis of this alleged primary and comprehensive source of religion in the feeling for a special kind of worth only illustrates once more the failure of all attempts to unify the psychological sources of religion by a process of exclusion. For this peculiar feeling of Höffding is only an abstract complex which, in experience, involves all the rational nature and all the intellectual, æsthetic, and ethical sentiments of the human being.¹

Similar criticism would be found to apply to all such attempts as that of Max Müller,² to regard religion, subjectively considered, as a special sort of mental faculty which, "independent of, nay in spite of sense and reason, enables man to apprehend the Infinite under different names and under varying disguises." The inability of all such theories to explain the facts of history has already (p. 115f.) been commented upon; and their inadequacy from the psychological point of view will fur-

¹ It is, moreover, a great mistake to limit this capacity for idealization to the higher degrees of race-culture and to modern times. On the contrary, it belongs to men of all degrees of civilization and in all times of man's historical evolution.

² *Origin and Growth of Religion* (Hibbert Lectures for 1878), pp. 21 and 42. It should be noted in fairness, however, that in the Gifford Lectures of 1888, on *Natural Religion*, Max Müller attempted to remedy the deficiency which he himself confessed,—namely, of not laying sufficient emphasis on the practical side of religion.

ther appear when we come to see how man actually does arrive at a belief in God as Infinite and Absolute.

When, then, the question is asked, "Why is man religious?" the only satisfactory answer is the as yet vague but comprehensive answer: "Because, however he became so, he *is* man." Such a reply as this may, at least, deliver us from the errors of such conflicting assertions as those of von Hartmann and M. Guyau. The former holds that an anti-social fear of devils and malignant gods, such as savages show toward foreigners who attack them with firearms, together with dissatisfaction with the world, or a pessimistic impulse, are the principal sources of religion. But the latter emphasizes the existence of social impulses, in the form of a latent social bond (*lien de la société*) as the essential factor in all religion.

It does not follow, however, from the view which insists upon the wholeness of human nature as universally committed to man's religious development, that the different factors are always combined in the same proportions or in the same way. On the contrary, religion, subjectively considered, is essentially an almost indefinite variable, dependent upon the variations in the psychical life of individuals and of the race. For example, while the religious feelings are in a way common to all human beings, their proportionate relation to one another and to the factors of thought and will are different in different individuals, in different portions of the race, and in different stages of racial development. More particularly, it may be possible to gather statistics to show the truth of what has already been generally believed,—namely, that "feeling plays a larger part in the religious life of females, while males are controlled more by intellection and volition."¹

¹ So Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 65; see also pp. 68ff. There is certainly, however, a defect if not a fallacy in the author's conclusion that the principal factor in religious conversion is the sexual changes which accompany the period of adolescence. A curve which drops off suddenly from 12 to 14, only to rise even more suddenly from 14 to 15, and then to

The more important thought, however, always remains the same; religion is consonant with human nature, *as such*. It springs ever fresh and undying, with its enormous self-propagating energy, from the soul of man. Of all the developments of the varied life of the race, there is none more thoroughly and characteristically human. In this respect, it is the twin sister of morality. Both religion and morality are, therefore, essentially democratic,—of the people, for the people, and by the people. Yet both advance, sometimes hand in hand, and sometimes separated by an unfortunately long remove, to higher and purer stages of rationality and refinement. And in this advance, they constantly draw their inspiration and their guidance from the spirit of humanity. But religion expressly binds this spirit with the Infinite Spirit whom, in the highest stages of its own development, it worships and serves as the One Only and true God.

The detailed exposition and defence of this psychological view of religion, of this doctrine of man's religious development, subjectively considered, follows in the next four chapters.

fall most rapidly of all from 15 to 17 (the latter age being below the age of 11), certainly does not correspond to any physiological curve for the same ages. The alleged induction would seem, then, to have no scientific value.

CHAPTER XI

IMPULSIVE AND EMOTIONAL SOURCES OF RELIGION

In presenting and criticizing the arguments for man's belief in a Divine Being it has not been customary to attach great importance to those instinctive impulses and emotional stirrings which are classified by psychology, as belonging to the "lower" or more animal side of human life. By "arguments," indeed, it is natural to understand only those considerations which can be appreciated as reasons, made the premises of chains of ratiocination, and established on grounds that admit of being argued with other minds. In these uses of the words a very important distinction must be made between "reasons" and "causes." For, in religion, as everywhere in human life—and, perhaps, preëminently in religion—the most potent causes and real influences, especially in the lower stages of development, are recognized as reasons only to a limited extent or not at all. Savage or primitive man, and indeed man everywhere, does not know why he believes in invisible spirits, in the gods, or in One Alone God. The causes that actually operate to bring about this belief—while not to so large an extent as is sometimes maintained, unconscious or subconscious—are of an impulsive, instinctive, and obscure emotional character. Man believes, but knows not why he believes; and, indeed, he is little interested at first in investigating the grounds of his belief. He feels; but he neither knows nor cares whence the feeling comes or whether it is rational and, in its directions, true to the desired end. He acts; but the justification in reason and reality, or the profounder significance and larger final purpose, of his action are hidden from his own

view. In truth, he does not look to see if significance and final purpose are there.

But in forming a psychological theory of the religious experience, with its justification of the analysis already made, the impulsive and emotional sources of religion are most important for rendering a complete account. They are, in fact, the primary and more fixed, unchanging, and universal *causes* of religion, subjectively considered. Without their efficient activity, man would never begin to be religious; although they alone neither account for the fulness of his religious life, nor measure the extent and prospect of its rational development. They stand, in a way, both chronologically and logically, first in any study of the psychical grounds for the religious development of humanity.

The custom of regarding the phenomena of man's religious experiences from the *quasi*-biological and economical points of view has of late led, not improperly, to placing emphasis on the instinct of self-preservation as a source of the religious life. This class of impulses undoubtedly influences powerfully those manifestations which prevail among savages and the more egoistic portion of so-called civilized communities. "So long," says Roskoff,¹ "as the means of satisfying his sensuous needs are at hand for the savage, he feels himself to be in harmony with himself and his environment; and it belongs to the essentials of his condition, to think further neither of the world nor of himself." It should be understood, however, that a variety of yet more fundamental impulses is customarily grouped under this term; in fact, the so-called "instinct" or "impulse" to self-preservation is almost as complex an affair as is "the will to live" in the philosophy of Schopenhauer. Both terms express a group of subtle and powerful psychical influences which induce and impel all men toward the beliefs and practices of religion. It is this wholly or half blind impulse which leads the animal into trying various ways to de-

¹ Das Religionswesen der rohesten Naturvölker, p. 128.

fend itself against whatever seems to attack its interests or to threaten its life. But man, alone among the animals, possesses the development of imagination and intellect necessary to create the idea of certain invisible and spiritual powers which he cannot easily locate, and of which he finds himself at first unable to calculate either the force or the method. Hence as we have already seen (p. 144*f.*) magic and religion—both religious magic and non-religious magic—spring to a considerable extent from similar impulses.

As the conscious needs of man, both individual and social, become multiplied, and as his conception of the essential nature and higher values of the true life becomes elevated and purified, the characteristics of this complex impulse are also modified. In the development of religion among the Romans, for example, there are instructive instances of how the newer feelings of need operated in a productive way for the multiplication of the popular gods and for the elaboration of the popular cult. A special illustration of this is found in the introduction among the Roman people of the *di novensides* of Greek origin. Thus Apollo (originally from Cumæ?) took the first rank as a god of healing because of his supposed efficacy in coping with some severe attack of the plague.¹ Demeter-Ceres, also, became adopted at Rome because of her services in famine relief; and Mercury, the Greek god of trade, who had for more than two centuries cared for the commerce of Southern and Hellenic Italy, became domiciled at the imperial city, when it began to recognize its need of some special divinity to preside over its growing commerce. And do not Christian nations to-day regard God as the special protector of those armies and navies which they have created in the immoral effort to satisfy and defend their “will to live” in commercial and imperial supremacy!

¹ See Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, p. 239. For *Apollo medicus*, see Liv. IV, 25 [*adis Apollini pro valetudine populi vota est*]; XL, 51; also called *salutaris* and *medicinalis*.

When, however, this impulse to self-preservation becomes more enlightened and morally purified, it still operates powerfully in the behalf of the religions of salvation. It makes men ready to heed the call of these religions for a voluntary sacrifice of the lower and less valuable life in the interest of saving the higher and more valuable life. It is out of this antithesis of the two selves, and the need of saving one at the expense of the other, that the religious doctrine of conversion and salvation by divine grace arises. Man feels the impulse, as he sees the necessity, of the "will to live" the true life, and to save the real Self. For as Professor Royce has finely said: ¹ "What corrupts and enchains men is not their innermost self-hood, but the power of an external world of temptation. To assert the true Self is to be saved." In a word, as the need of protecting the interest of life grows, so grows the impulse to protect these interests by help of the invisible spirits, the helpful and powerful gods, the One Divine Redeemer of man. The cry of the worshipper of nature in the lower forms, and of the believers in devils and witches is: "May the fire-god, the strong one, break this charm;" ² or "Fire-god, mighty and lofty one of the gods . . . overpower them (the evil spirits), so that I be not destroyed." But risen to yet higher levels of intellectual and moral development he prays:

"Do thou, O Soma, on all sides
Protect us, King, from him that sins,
No harm touch friend of such as thou."³

And, finally, believing the word of the Lord—"He that findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it;" or, yet more passionately expressed: "He that loveth his life shall lose it; and he that hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal"—"the will to live" be-

¹ The World and the Individual, * * p. 248.

² So runs an incantation addressed to Nusku. See Jastrow, Religion of Babylonia and Assyria, p. 286.

³ Hopkins, Religions of India, p. 122.

comes the intelligent purpose to carry into effect the supreme practical maxim of religion. This maxim resides in the call to a voluntary and loving surrender of the finite and imperfect self to the Self that is Absolute and perfect Ethical Spirit.

Closely connected with the impulse to self-preservation and, indeed, from the psychological point of view, an integral component of this impulse when at work, is man's restlessness and dissatisfaction with the present conditions of his living. This spur of unrest which the philosophy of economics recognizes as so essential and powerful a stimulus to industrial and commercial progress, and which is the emotional aspect of that intellectual curiosity that gives strength to scientific development, is also thrust into the religious side of human life. The hunger which gives the impulse to economic and artistic betterment has its counterpart in religion. It is this "sense of unrest, the ceaseless longing for something else, which is the general source of all desires and wishes," and "also the source of all endeavor and of all progress," in which writers like Brinton,¹ Roskoff, and others, find the most primary and powerful impulse to religion. The former of these writers quotes von Humboldt² as having anticipated his position in the following declaration: "All religion rests on a need of the soul; we hope, we dread, because we wish." In this connection attention is called to the same thought in the myth, in the Valkyria, which tells how the "Wish-maidens" carried the decrees of Odhlin to earth. Legge finds the origin of the superstitions of Tâoism in the fact that "the accredited worship of ancestors, with that of the departed great added to it, was not enough to satisfy the cravings of men's minds."³ And, indeed, the varied manifestations of the mind and heart of man in industrial, commercial, political, and artistic, as well as

¹ See *The Religious Sentiment*, p. 53.

² *Gesammelte Werke*, VII, p. 62, in his "Ideen zu einem Versuch die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen."

³ *The Religions of China*, p. 176.

religious enterprises arise out of this unceasing restlessness, this perpetual dissatisfaction.

Now it is one of the peculiar merits of the pessimistic philosophy of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, that it recognizes the fact of the impossibility of satisfying human craving by any sensuous or intellectual pleasures, or by any statical condition of religious and spiritual life. Reasonable or unreasonable, the more man has, the more he wants. Indeed, we may the more truly say that the very essence of his reason, on the side of its emotional springs and guiding impulses, is to be ever craving and seeking for itself other and higher satisfactions than those yet attained. Thus there is truth—although only partial truth—in the contention of von Hartmann¹ that a sort of pessimistic impulse, a fundamental but largely blind dissatisfaction with the world, leads men to Christianity, as it does to religion in general. According to the tradition, Moses gave to the Israelites when their longings were excited for the remembered fruits of the Nile valley, “bread from heaven to eat.” But all the higher forms of religion—and Christianity most emphatically of them all—teach that man “does not live by bread alone.” Indeed, to emphasize this truth, and to arouse and guide and satisfy cravings for another kind of food is the special function of religion with man. But the religious cravings, as aroused by the higher forms of religion, are no more capable of a lasting satisfaction once for all than are any others among the more fundamental cravings of man’s soul. Hence the religious doctrine of satisfaction reaches its supreme form in one direction with the Buddhistic tenet that salvation consists in the extinction of all desire, in the complete and eternal cessation of the spirit of unrest and dissatisfaction. Man thus realizes the end of religion by quenching the life in which religion has its source. But Christianity holds out the offer of an ever-renewed and ever-increasing satisfaction of man’s higher

¹ See his remarks upon the *Selbstzersetzung des Christenthums*, *Religionsphilosophie*, I, p. 87.

spiritual longings through a life of communion and service in that social development which it promises to realize and which it calls the "Kingdom of God."

"The heart," said Novalis, "is the organ of religion." The truth of this statement is partially illustrated in the influence exerted upon man's religious experience, as respects both its origin and its development, by certain of the lower and more egoistic forces of emotion. And, indeed, this influence has already been recognized in treating of the impulse to self-preservation as this impulse operates in the religious consciousness. Fear is the most prominent among such forces of emotion. It is fear which excites and directs toward some known or imagined object the impulse to self-preservation. "Fear first made the gods," said Petronius,—thus uttering a statement which is, for savage or primitive man, largely, but by no means wholly true. If we divide the innumerable kinds and occasions of fear which are inescapable in man's life, although somewhat inaccurately, into two classes,—namely, those which are instinctive and automatic and those which are more intelligent and rational,—both classes of fears will be found to furnish powerful stimuli to man's religious consciousness. It is, however, doubtful whether certain traces of his superiority of imagination and reasoning faculties do not enter into the constitution of all his most degrading and superstitious fears. Even the human fear of the dark, although it cannot be considered an independent source of religious beliefs, can scarcely be accounted for as an emotional uprising wholly separable from that activity of the mind which peoples the darkness with invisible existences, on whose good will his welfare is imagined to be dependent. Children, whose imagination has not been excited in some *quasi*-abnormal way, do not exhibit the slightest fear of the dark in itself considered. But ghosts, and sprites, and unfamiliar shapes, reside to the savage and childish imagination in that impenetrable environment. Its very character is suggestive of such inhabitants, because it emphasizes what

one writer has called the "negation of our familiar world," "the negation of the natural." It, therefore, awakens and nourishes the sense of the non-natural and the supernatural. "To savage man whatever is unknown is uncanny, and whatever is uncanny is feared." Thus it is fear which has created multitudes of devils and evil gods; and which has constructed the elaborate system of twenty-one hells among the Hindūs. It is the same emotion in a higher and more ethical form, which gives rise to the doctrine of Karma among the Buddhists, and to the Brāhmanic and Buddhistic doctrine of reincarnation; and which accounts for the conception of Satan or the Devil in various religions.

The impulse from fear may lead the one who experiences it in any one of several different directions. By fear men are impelled either to escape from the god or to overcome the fear excited toward some particular god by getting another and stronger god on their side; or to avoid the results by propitiating the god and so changing his evil will into a good will; or else, in the more spiritual religions, by such a union of spirit and life with God that perfect confidence and reverent love shall cast out all fear. But even in the lower forms of religion, a sort of social feeling which is a mixture of drawings of affection and of desire for good-fellowship, mingles with the fear or veneration in the worship of the god by his faithful followers. No known religion is *mere* devil-worship, motivated solely by fear. The Hindū in ancient times prayed: "Harm us not, O great storm-god; god of storm and rain." The hymn to the rain-cloud personified, or to Pluvius, sings:¹

"He smites the trees, and smites the evil demons, too;
While every creature fears before his mighty blow,
E'en he that hath not sinned, from this strong god retreats,
When smites Parjanya, thundering, those that evil do."

But a mixture of admiration, and even of affection, blends with the fear, when the Maruts, or storm-gods, are addressed thus:

¹ See Hopkins, *Ibid.*, p. 102.

“Your fury fair is, your hearts are wrothful;” “Your names of strong ones endeared I invoke.” How fear moves to prayer and reconciliation this passage from the Gilgamesh Epic beautifully shows:¹

“I came to a glen at night,
Lions I saw and was afraid.
I raised my head and prayed to Sin.
To the leader (?) of the gods my prayer came.
[He heard my prayer (?)], and was gracious to me.”

“The fear of Yahweh is the beginning of wisdom;” but the end of fear in the development of religion is to bring about that reverent and affectionate confidence in the Divine Good-Will and that consciousness of union with this Good-Will which displaces the lower stimuli furnished by so primitive and powerful an emotion.

It was a wise saying of Spinoza: “There is no hope without fear, as there is no fear without hope;” “For he who is in fear has some doubt whether what he fears will take place, and consequently hopes that it will not.” If the invisible and superhuman powers, being displeased or ill-disposed toward man, are much to be feared and need to be placated in order to remove the cause of fear, then these same powers, being kindly and well-disposed, may become the natural object of man’s hopes and desires for good. The desire of good in every form, and the hope of obtaining good through the mediation of the divine beings, are always powerful stimuli of the religious consciousness. From the very first the beliefs and the cult of religion attach themselves to the forces that control the sunshine and the clouds, the destructive wind-storm and the winds that bring the beneficent rainfall, the sending and removal of disease, the success or failure of agricultural, pastoral, and commercial adventures, the happiness or misery of domestic and other social relations, the attainment or loss of the objects of all manner of human ambitions and desires.

¹ Jastrow, Religion of Babylonia and Assyria, p. 488.

In connection with this group of emotional impulses, too, there are several ways which imagination and intelligence suggest for dealing, so to say, with the Divine Power, toward which the hopes and desires of good go forth. The worshipping believer may attempt to get the god upon his side; and he may make this attempt either in the form of a propitiation through sacrifices and offerings, or by the inducement of heartfelt prayers and promises of allegiance and service. He may, however, try by incantations and the consulting of oracles or other media of divine revelation, and by prayers for light, to find out what is the will of the god, in order that he may place himself upon the divine side. Or he may rise to the higher level of desire and hope, and may confidently follow his God-given ideals of the true and highest Good,—desiring, and hoping, and trusting, the divine Good-Will to bring out all for the best. Thus that deeply religious monarch, Nebuchadnezzar, not only prayed to the goddess Nin-Karrak :—“ Long life, abundance of strength, health, and joy, grant me as a gift;”—and to Shamash: “ Mercy towards me be thy command; through thy righteous order, may I have abundance of strength;” but addressed the great god Marduk :—

“ According to thy mercy, O lord, which thou bestowest upon all,
Cause me to love thy supreme rule.
Implant the fear of thy divinity in my heart,
Grant to me whatever may seem good before thee,
Since it is thou that dost control my life.”

Indeed, that is everywhere true in the incitement and development of the religious consciousness which Jastrow declares to be true of the religion of Babylonia: ¹ “ The fear of evil, and the desire of good, when the right stage of ethical development is reached, unite to produce the wish to purify one’s self from some sin, or conduct regarded as offensive to the gods.” Of all religions Christianity most stimulates the de-

¹ *Ibid.*, Chap. XVII.

sire and hope of that supreme good which is the realization of one's true self-hood in union of good-will with the Source of all Good. Thus *self-seeking* in all its forms becomes a stimulus to religion;—in the lower and more egoistical forms, to the lower and more degraded forms of religion; in the higher form of a seeking for the higher good, the realization of the truer Self, it arouses the most exalted and spiritual sentiments and self-sacrificing services of religion.

When, however, the superhuman or superior majesty and power of the gods, or of the One God, is believed in and felt, the emotional characteristics of the religious experience take their coloring from the more distinctively ethical feelings of dependence, humility, and resignation. In the earlier and cruder forms of the religious life these feelings are scarcely separable from the complex that is mainly composed of the impulse to self-preservation and of impulsive fears. Amongst the more aggressive and hardy races self-reliance, rather than reliance on the divine power, is the more prominent feeling. But man finds that, in many directions, his "will to live" is met and repulsed and thwarted by another and stronger Will. The more contemplative races, in the softer and more enervating climates and amidst the more seductive or over-powering physical environments, discover this important truth earliest. But as man everywhere receives the chastening of life and discovers his inability to have his own will, and to work his own way, he traces the causes of this experience to the invisible, spiritual powers; thus the feeling of dependence on these powers becomes more deep-seated and full of content. The development of political institutions in the form of monarchies, the disappointment of national ambitions under crushing defeat, the casting-down of the weak under the heel of the strong oppressor; all such experiences, both for the individual and for the multitude, move men to the feelings of self-abasement and humility. The prayers of the greatest rulers of antiquity, such men as Nebuchadnezzar and Rameses

II, are most marked by these feelings. The same thing is true of the more mighty among the invaders who founded the Muhammadan empire in India. Similar feelings are fostered and attached to religion by the mysterious and impressive nature of religious cults and of temple architecture, by the control of the priestly ruling classes (as, for example, by the Brāhmans in India); and even among savage peoples, by the practice of tabu and by other similar practices.

Genuine humility in the form of the Christian virtue, however, arises only in connection with respect for the ethical supremacy of the Divine Will over human conduct and human affairs. And resignation, which has its origin in the feeling that it is useless to resist a god, for what he wills is sure to follow, in its highest form signifies an attitude of the whole being of man toward the Divine Being, rather than any simple emotional spring of religion. In this form, then, it is one of the ripest fruits of true piety.

The impulses which arise in the altruistic and social feelings are as obviously present and effective in the religious, as they are in all other characteristic forms of the life and development of man. Kindliness begets kindly feeling, between gods and men as truly as among men themselves. The desire for, and pleasure in, the divine companionship is a necessary affectional accompaniment of a belief in divine beings who have bestowed benefits upon man or who may be thought of as naturally disposed to do so. These more distinctively altruistic feelings are strengthened by being associated with others which are of a more egoistic kind. To be on good terms with the powerful and great is a privilege and a distinction which operates to warm the heart toward those who grant to their inferiors this privilege and this distinction. A certain pride at being honored with such exalted companionship is a subtle accessory feeling which operates in the behalf of the *bonhomie* and satisfaction afforded by friendly relations with the Divine Being.

This group of social feelings is called forth, of course, in a

special way by ancestor-worship and by the worship of domestic and tribal gods. The divine ones who were the mythical progenitors of men, and those actual progenitors of men who, after death, have been raised to the rank of the divine ones, naturally become the objects of affection as well as of veneration. So, too, the gods that, although invisible, sit with man by the family hearth and are its guardians, or eat with him at the family table, or watch the boundaries of his land and protect his crops, become "dear" to him. Indeed, there is every good reason why the superhuman powers whose welfare is so closely bound up with the social prosperity and happiness of the family, the tribe, or the nation, should have a place of peculiar honor in the affections, as well as in the beliefs, of their worshippers.

The impulses to religion which arise from the social feelings toward the gods, are both expressed, and incited and fostered, by different forms of supposed intercourse with the gods. Prominent among these is the communal feast. Religious feasting, or eating which has a religious significance, is almost universal among the lower forms of religious cult. The food and drink—in Japan to-day, the rice and the cup of *sake*—set apart for the beloved dead continue to serve as a bond of companionship and endearment between them and the living; and if the dead are regarded as having become objects of worship, then such offerings furnish both the expression and the incitement for feelings of affection between the human and the divine. The more important popular religious feast is not, usually, simply an occasion for making propitiatory sacrifices to the gods, but also a means of social fellowship. In India, in the time of the Vedas, on the opportunity of such a religious festival, gods and men got drunk together.

It would be a false and unworthy view, however, not to look beyond the grossly sensual motive for the significance of the impulses to companionship which are exhibited in the religious feast, or in the preparation and offering of food, whether private or public, to the friendly and beloved gods. It is in these social

feelings that Pfeleiderer¹ finds the most potent emotional factors in Aryan religion. And the Vedic hymns certainly express them in no doubtful manner. Aurora, or the Dawn personified as a goddess, is called "dear Aurora," for "good is she, munificent, and kindly;" and she is addressed by the worshipper in such affectionate terms as, "O near, and dear one!" So in the celebrated hymn to Varuna² the faithful soul addresses the divinity as follows:—

"Far go my thoughts (to him), as go
The eager cows that meadows seek,
Desiring him, the wide-eyed god.
Together let us talk again,
Since now the offering sweet I bring,
By thee beloved, and like a priest
Thou eat'st, etc."

But similar feelings of affection, although emphasized and expressed with a mixture of emotions of a more appropriate and distinctively ethical kind, must be assumed in order to account for the oracle received by the monarch of Assyria:

"Fear not, Essarhaddon,
I, the lord, to thee do I speak,
The beams of thy heart I strengthen as thy mother."

This group of social feelings which act as impulses to even the lowest forms of religion cannot be appreciated unless the observer has imagination enough to take the point of view which is actually taken by the believers themselves. Objects which are fearsome and even loathsome to us, and which seem therefore debarred from all access by way of friendly and social feeling, are by no means regarded by their worshippers in the same way. The dreaded cobra in India, the hateful rattlesnake among certain tribes of Redskins in North America, the hideous idol among the Mexicans, and the ragged and dirty puppet among the Christians of Southern Europe, may

¹ The Philosophy of Religion, III, p. 24f.

² See Hopkins, Religions of India, p. 63.

easily become the objects of affection by being made the seats and manifestations of that side of the Divine Being which awakens affection. The "dear divine snake," the "majestic and beloved bull," and other similar conceptions, are difficult indeed for the modern and civilized mind to bring into the sphere of the religious consciousness. But there are multitudes of men and women in India to-day who love their cow more tenderly and truly than their neighbor;—not so much because the animal furnishes them with food, as because it is for them the embodied divine goodness and the helper and sustainer of human life.

This feeling of *bonhomie* and the desire for the pleasure which its satisfaction affords, regarded as impulses to religion, are much earlier and more wide-spreading than is any emotion resembling an ethical love of God. It is, however, the experience of the kindness of the gods, especially when, through the consciousness of sin and of the need of forgiveness and divine assistance, it rises to the level of an experience of the Supreme Divine goodness and grace, which develops into an ethical love. On the contrary it is *not*, as several recent writers have endeavored to show,¹ the sexual emotion of love which either becomes a source of religion or which develops into a truly religious love. The close connection of sexual conceptions with the mysteries of faith in a great number of religions, and indeed in all religions at a certain stage of their development, and the relation of sexual and semi-religious emotions as recip-

¹ For example, Brinton in "The Religious Sentiment," where it is maintained (p. 61) that "all religions have assumed the guise in turn of self-love, sex-love, love of country and love of humanity"; and Starbuck in "The Psychology of Religion," where it is regarded as a safe conclusion from an inductive study that "in a certain sense the religious life is an irradiation of the reproductive instinct" (p. 401); and even that the sexual life "seems to have originally given the psychic impulse which called out the latent possibilities of the development" of religion, although it did not furnish the "raw material out of which religion was constructed" (p. 402). See also the article of Dr. J. M. Fothergill, *Journal of Mental Science*, Oct., 1874, p. 198, and the work of Geddes and Thomson, on *The Evolution of Sex*.

rocal stimuli of certain mental attitudes toward certain of the deities cannot, indeed, be denied. It may also be said, of course, in a general way, that without the sexual emotions and relations no social life could arise or be sustained among human beings under existing conditions. From this it follows that, without its relations to the social life and social development of humanity, religion could not have arisen and developed in human history. But to say these things is to say both something less and something more than is necessary to establish a claim for the sexual emotions to be an independent source of religion; or even to establish a parity of kind and a partnership in activity between these emotions and the more definitively religious feelings.

What we have to notice as regards the connection of the ethical love of God with the sexual emotions may be briefly told in the following way. There is at the root of this ethical love, as has already been explained, a kindly feeling toward the well-disposed and friendly invisible, superhuman powers. This feeling, in order to become the equivalent of that personal affection and satisfaction in friendly companionship which maintains itself between friendly human beings, requires that the gods shall already have been somewhat definitely anthropomorphized. Being themselves conceived of as men and women of a superior power, wisdom, or beauty, they are—and this is a matter of course—also conceived of as standing in *quasi*-human relations to one another and to human beings. Gods and goddesses naturally, therefore, fall in love with each other and are married and have offspring, as do men and women. And not only gods and goddesses with one another, but gods and goddesses with men and women, fall in love, and marry, and have offspring. “The sons of Elohim saw the daughters of men that they were fair: and they took them wives of all which they chose . . . and also after that, when the sons of Elohim came in unto the daughters of men, and they bore children to them, the same became mighty men which were of old, the men

of renown" (Gen. vi, 2, 4). Thus the divine beings become connected with human beings in an amorous and erotic way.

Another line of thinking and imagination brings about another form of the connection between the sexual emotions and the feelings which man entertains toward the beings he regards and worships as divine. We have already seen (pp. 101ff.) how instinctively and necessarily the savage or primitive man regards everything which shows signs of life as possibly belonging to the realm of the invisible and spiritual powers. What wonder, then, that the worship of the force of reproduction is so very common in all stages and forms of nature-worship? This force may be personified and worshipped as Mother Earth, or as Spring, or as the spirit of productive power. It may be pictorially represented and worshipped as the *lingam*, or some other phallic effigy, or as the *kteis*. As this force of productivity becomes more definitely personified, the principle of sexual love, as it is supposed to exist between the sexes of the gods, and does exist among men, and seems to exist throughout nature in an infinitely extended way, is deified and worshipped as a god.

In such ways as these eroticism and religious devotion naturally become connected together as cause and effect. Each stimulates the other, whenever the object is regarded from the sexual point of view. But the development of this kind of love of the gods is a degradation of religious feeling; it is never an experience leading to a higher ethical and social relation between human beings and the Divine Being. Such has been the steadily downward progression of the connection in India. In the Bhagavadgîtâ Krishna demands of his followers faith and a non-sensuous love. But the hymns to Krishna in the Middle Ages are mystical and amorous in the terms of human passion. The Tantra ritual abominations were not introduced into Hindûism until about the time of the Christian era. The most brutal rites and obscene excesses in the Semitic and Dravidian religions were connected with the earliest wor-

ship of mother goddesses. It was not as a development of such rites, but in connection with their only partial but stern suppression by Judaism, that the ethical love of God became an impulse to a religion of a higher spiritual order. In Greece the Orphic mysteries were at first taught as pure and holy; it was afterwards, under the degrading influences of the erotic passion, that they became seasons of debauch. Shiwaiism in India to-day, which, in respect to some of its factors is morally entitled to be the prevalent form of Hindūism, is kept in a relative position of moral degradation through its inability to enforce the distinction between the sexual emotion and an ethical attitude of affection and trust toward the Divine Being.

To Judaism, alone among the religions of the ancient world, belongs the incomparable merit of beginning and carrying onward such a conception of God as to make possible the attitude toward Him of an ethical and spiritual love. But this conception Judaism by no means brought to its latest and more perfect stages. The God of prophetic Judaism was the omnipotent and holy Alone God, whose Will is one with the idea of righteousness among men. The relations of the pious among his people are those of faith in his covenanted mercy; and they are conditioned upon obedience to his righteous law. But if the covenant has been broken, the breach may be healed by repentance and by a return to righteousness. Thus the consciousness of sin graciously forgiven, and the confidence in restored relations of harmony brought about by the divine goodness, become reasons for man's response with an ethical love towards God. Among the later prophets of the Old Testament the more tender factors in the conception of the Divine Being, and those which normally lead the heart into the attitude of a pure affection, are more emphasized. "When Israel was a child, then I loved him and called my son out of Egypt." (Hosea xi, 1.) "Doubtless," says "the great unknown"—"doubtless thou art our Father, O Yahweh: thou art our Father, our Redeemer." But some of the Rabbis of about the

Christian era had learned to pray the prayer of R. Zadok: "Lord of the world, Thou Father in Heaven."

It is Christianity, however, with its doctrine of the Divine Fatherhood, and of the redeeming Divine Love, as exhibited in the life, death, and work of Jesus, which, above all other religions of the world, stimulates the love of God as an ethico-religious affection. This development is, indeed, very far removed from the germinal form of a responsive kindly feeling to the well-disposed divine powers, or a desire to please them by sharing with them the food and drink with which they have blessed mankind. It is, however, a development in direct line from this germinal form, brought about by the ethical factors connected with the consciousness of sin and of the need of forgiveness and help. On the other hand, its connection with the sexual feelings, although altogether natural and indeed inevitable, is not such as to warrant regarding those feelings as, in themselves, impulses to religion. Much less does the connection warrant the psychologist in identifying this entire group of social impulses to religion with the sexual feelings. In the history of man's religious development the erotic emotions, even in their most mystical and disguised form, have tended rather in the direction of degradation than of elevation.

In saying this, however, it is not meant that the domestic and social affections which are dependent upon the relations of the sexes are of little efficiency or small value in the development of religion. As the marital relations become conceived of in a more ethical way, and the domestic relations and sentiments become more refined, the influence of these social changes makes itself powerfully felt in the domain of religion. But these more comprehensive interrelations existing between the social feelings which furnish the impulses to religion and the other more important social feelings, suggest problems that must be reserved for future inquiry.

The higher kinds of ethical love, together with the most distinctly ethical forms of the feelings of dependence, humility,

and resignation, involve the conclusion of a certain attitude of will on man's part toward the Divine Will. This attitude reaches its worthiest and most satisfying expression in filial piety, or faith,—meaning by this an affectionate confidence in God regarded as the omnipotent, omniscient, and ideally perfect Good-Will. Such faith, it is obvious, involves the culture and the expression of all the mental faculties; but chiefly of those which are of the more pronounced affective and voluntary character. The germs of this essentially religious attitude of man's will to the Divine Being are found within the lower stages of his religious development and in all the cruder and grosser forms of religious feeling and practice. They constitute the religious impulses to self-sacrifice. In not a few cases they bear bitter fruits, but the end they serve is the supreme final purpose of religion. The surrender of the body in the form of prostitution to the priest or to the god, the prostration of one's self or the throwing of one's offspring before the car in the religious procession, the thousands of skulls that indicated the sacrifices demanded by Uitzilopochtli (the Aztec god whose emissary was the "divine humming-bird"), the cuttings with sharp stones or knives, and all the self-inflicted tortures of religious asceticism, are seldom or never wholly selfish. They are man's blind ways of trying to obtain satisfaction for the religious impulse to self-surrender. This unlimited capacity for devotion, which excites our admiration for the heroism it engenders where some earthly sovereign or friend, or some cause of truth and justice calls it forth, must also be reckoned among the important emotional sources and stimuli of the religious consciousness. It is because man is capable of rendering intelligent and voluntary such acts of self-surrender, that he is religious at all. For he thus becomes conscious of a Self that is not irrevocably bound to follow its own selfish strivings and desires, but is free to give itself up to the supremely wise and good Absolute Self. This consciousness is necessary in order to give birth both to morals and to true religion. In it

the higher ethical religions find one of their most effective springs of thought and conduct. In the form which it takes in some religions—notably in Buddhism, but preëminently in Christianity—it becomes the supreme expression of man's total right attitude toward the Object of religious faith. Fear alone can never produce this miracle of self-sacrifice, not even in the form of heathenish and cruel sacrificial rites ; just as the fear of Yahweh alone could never have led Abraham to bind Isaac on the altar, or raise the knife against his beloved son.

These higher, more complex, and more comprehensively ethical forms of the religious emotions, however, plainly depend upon a considerable development of human nature considered as rational and free. They are not precisely of the same character as the more simple and primary emotional stimuli with which our analysis of these sources of religion began.

There would seem to be no doubt that intellectual curiosity must be recognized as one of the most elementary and original springs of the religious experience. Von Hartmann¹ discovers the awakening of the religious consciousness in man (where on account of their inferior intelligence, it cannot awaken in brutes) to be due to the “disinterested observation of the heavenly phenomena and of their relations to earthly conditions. But “disinterested” observation of the relations of the heavenly to the earthly is impossible for the human mind. And it turns out that, in the opinion of von Hartmann himself, this purely æsthetical or intellectual impulse includes not only the imagination and the feeling of the mysterious and the sublime, but also influences from vague fears, hopes, and longings, that have important issues in the practical life. It is well, however, to notice that, as something over and above the emotional impulses already enumerated as sources, or stimuli of religion, a purer form of intellectual curiosity must be recognized in order to complete the list. For intellectual curiosity, as such, is a most

¹ Religionsphilosophie, I, p. 11.

powerful incentive to religion ; it is, indeed, a primitive source and prime mover of the religious consciousness. "The mighty impulse to spy out a cause or an originator for every phenomenon and event" drives man to the belief in invisible superhuman powers ; and, finally, to the belief in one omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and all-wise God. Something is to be said, indeed, for those writers who oppose to the derivation of religion from feeling alone, the counter statement that intellectual curiosity, with its accompaniment of naïve and instinctive metaphysic, is the very core and spring of man's personality, so far as his religious life is concerned.¹ In the extreme form in which this position is sometimes stated,—for example, by Peschel, who claims that "in all stages of civilization, among all races of mankind, religious emotions are always aroused by the same inward impulse, the necessity for discerning a cause or author for every phenomenon or event,"—the character and amount of the use of the so-called causal principle made by savage or primitive man is not correctly estimated. Much less true is it that "all religious emotions proceed only from the desire for acquaintance with the Creator, and the worship of a deity is extinguished the instant that it ceases to satisfy the requirement of causality."

On the other hand, without the influence of intellectual curiosity and the spontaneous and naïve positing of realities to act as causes in accounting for the changes in the phenomena experienced, not even the low form of religion known as a vague and unreflecting Spiritism could ever have arisen. Two considerations should be borne in mind in order to a better understanding of this more primitive form of religion. And, first, the human mind, in this stage of its development, is to itself a mysterious being living in the midst of a mysterious environment. By this sense of mystery the feeling of wonder, which answers to it, and the emotions of fear, are aroused and made

¹ See Preiss, *Religionsgeschichte*, p. 15*f*; and Peschel, *Völkerkunde*, pp. 255*ff*.

effective in the interests of the religious consciousness. As has been pointed out by Mr. Keary: ¹ The earlier and ruder mysteries of religion, which are almost universal, had "their root in instinctive expressions of emotion, not in any particular story nor in any traditional worship." Primitive man had a relatively much more extensive and powerful need of "mysteries" than it is easy for modern scientific civilization to appreciate. But emotional excitements which connect themselves everywhere, even to-day, with what seems to be wholly or largely inexplicable are not so unlike those of primitive and savage man as to make modern psychology unable to appreciate and to understand them. Witness the feelings with which the current speculations as to telepathy and clairvoyance, and no less as to the newly discovered radio-active properties of certain forms of matter, are greeted by the popular mind.

In the second place, it must be remembered that savage and primitive man has little or no conception of Nature, as an orderly system of interacting causes under the principles of continuity and uniformity. These two considerations cooperate to explain how intellectual curiosity becomes so powerful a spring of the definitively *religious* consciousness in the early stages of its development. The mind of the savage is as truly, and perhaps also as eagerly, curious to know the how, and the why, of internal and external events as is the mind of the trained scientific observer. But when his child is taken ill with some to him mysterious disease, what can he better do than send for the sorcerer or devil-priest, who knows the charm or incantation that will satisfy the demands of the mysterious and invisible power which has caused the illness? And when he needs sunshine or rain, the way to obtain them surely lies beyond his own immediate power. But the divine winds and clouds and the god-like heavenly beings know their own reasons why they grant or withhold these important gifts. The reasons are, therefore, pressing why man should desire to know.

¹ Outlines of Primitive Belief among the Indo-European Races, p. 221.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the intellectual curiosity of even the savage or primitive man is limited to those events which he has reason most to hope for, or to dread. A belief in creator gods, and the mixture of cosmogonic myths and theories with religious beliefs and stories of the doings of the invisible powers or the supernal deities, are found very low down, if not universally existent, in the religions of mankind. The relatively "disinterested observation"—to use von Hartmann's somewhat inappropriate term—of natural phenomena, under the influence of an intellectual curiosity which is more closely allied with the aesthetical feelings of admiration for the awful and the sublime, is by no means wholly wanting even in the lowest stages of man's religious evolution. But to this influence and the allied causes which determine the development of the religious life, we shall return in other connections.

All these impulsive and emotional sources of religion, when considered as coöperative, and even when supplemented by any number of similar sources, will not suffice to account for the *nature* of the object posited by religious belief; nor, indeed, do they tell us *why* any such object is, *in fact*, posited by the mind of man. Impulses and emotional disturbances do not, of themselves, furnish the ideas of the religious experience; much less do they create the ideals of the higher forms of this experience. Such stimuli can only incite and prompt imagination and thought to do this work. In a word, it is reason that must construct the Object of religious faith; and this work of construction must be based upon, and supported constantly by, the faith of reason in its power to reach Reality. We turn, therefore, to the study of the religious consciousness of man as rational and free,—as the experience of a true Self.

CHAPTER XII

MAN AS RATIONAL AND FREE

The instinctive impulse to self-preservation, the impulsive emotions of fear, hope, desire for happiness, and even certain feelings of craving for social intercourse and for the satisfactions of intellectual curiosity, are experienced by man in common with the lower animals. The latter also display instances of an impulsive self-sacrifice in the interest of their young or of the preservation and defence of the species. But these impulsive and emotional sources of man's religious life and development do not in the case of the lower animals take the same direction or proceed to the same lengths as with human beings. They fail to act as stimuli for the production of religious beliefs or a religious cult.

The fundamental and permanent difference between man and the lower animals, in respect of religion, however, has relation to the *Object*; the conception which becomes the goal and determines the course of man's religious experience cannot, so to say, "get itself constructed" in the consciousness of the lower animals. The general reason for this failure—a fact which defines the fixed limitations between their non-religious nature and the normally and universally religious nature of man—is the lack of those rational activities which are necessary in order to make objective the grounds of the religious impulses and emotions. Only a *human* intellect and imagination could frame the conception of real but invisible *superhuman* spirits; only a human conscience could locate the moral quality of conduct in relations of obligation and approbation (or

their opposites) to these spirits; only human æsthetical and ethical sentiments and ideals, keeping pace with the growth of intellect and imagination, could develop that ideal of a perfect "Ethical Spirit" which is the culminating product of man's religious progress. In a word, only a Self, such as the human being is, but the lower animal is not, could achieve the religious attitude toward an infinite and absolute Other Self. This attitude, when made rational, is the crowning achievement of humanity under the Divine Self-revelation.

The conceptions covered by such words as "reason," "rational," and "rationality," are undoubtedly somewhat vague and complex. This is true not only of these conceptions as they exist in the popular mind and are employed in the customary usages of speech; it is also true of the conceptions corresponding to these words as they are formed by philosophical thinkers. The charge of vagueness and complexity may be illustrated at length by reference to the terminology of Kant, the great critic of reason in all of its several principal forms, and to the several theories of reason wrought out in his critical system. For this philosopher, in his general treatment of this faculty as the source of the *a priori* factors and principles of cognition (*Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*) introduces three main divisions;—namely, into the rational elements of Æsthetic, of Logic, and of Dialectic. But under the third of these divisions, Kant treats of reason in a special and indefensible use of the term; the Dialectic deals with "pure reason as the seat of Transcendental Illusion." Another, and quite different form of rational faculty, which gives the law to conduct and which rests not upon scientific cognitions but upon postulates of faith, is then proposed in a treatise on the *a priori* factors, or metaphysics of ethics (*Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft*). Nor is this enough, in the opinion of Kant, thoroughly to exhaust the resources of human rationality. For although the third of his critical treatises is called a "Critique of Judgment" (*Kritik der Urtheilskraft*), it really analyzes and discusses another important and complex

group of man's rational activities. Thus we are presented with three more or less distinctive but complex forms of mental life called "reason," three reasons, indeed;—one giving birth and legitimacy to the knowledge of the sciences, one justifying the faiths of morality and of religion as dependent upon the moral law, one expounding the artistic and purposive construction of the world as leading to the conclusion that it is indeed a Reality grounded in planful Absolute Reason. In the Kantian Critique, taken as a whole, these three sometimes, indeed, appear as a perfect unity; but oftener they seem to be antagonistic and contradictory, one of another.

This schismatic and divisive view of human reason, as authorized by the brilliant analysis and persistent dialectic of Kant, has become the source of many errors in the philosophy of religion. It early begot a sort of antithesis between intellect and reason, which passed over into English thinking through the writings of Coleridge and others. This author in his "Aids to Reflection"¹ defines intellect or understanding as "the faculty judging according to sense," and declares that, "on the contrary, Reason is the power of universal and necessary convictions, the source and substance of truths above sense, and having their evidence in themselves."² In this way also, faith has come to be placed in antithesis to knowledge, religion claiming the former and science the latter to be rational; with the result that the two can never meet on any common standing-ground of reason without antagonizing each other. Feeling, too, has been divorced from cognition; belief has passed into a sphere where it neither touches argument nor is touched by argument; and man, instead of being excited and urged to become truly rational through and through, has

¹ Complete Works [New York, ed. 1868], I, p. 241.

² In this connection the sharp and, on the whole, well-founded criticism of Kant by Schopenhauer may be recalled; as well as the latter's sarcastic reference to Jacobi as one accustomed to regard as *a priori* everything he had learned before he was twelve years old.

either to abandon his scientific convictions in the interests of the religious, or his religious convictions in the interests of the scientific; or else he must endeavor to hold the two apart from each other without disturbing the unity of consciousness.

In view of these and other considerations, it is important to remind ourselves at this point of the following truths. And, first, the conception of man's "rationality" is comprehensive and varied, not to say vague and uncertain, in large measure because its content is so profound, manifold, and in some respects mysterious. Man has never yet succeeded in fully understanding his own rational nature. Savage or primitive man is not as yet aware that he is even potentially rational. But savage or primitive man *is* more by far than he *knows about* himself. Religion regards man from the point of view of his essential mysteriousness. It emphasizes the god-likeness of man, just as, on the other hand, it recognizes the humanity and super-humanity of the Divine. All that rationality will include, when man attains more of the divine likeness, he cannot satisfactorily represent by his past experiences. The present experiences of the most highly rational human minds do not reveal all the depths of the Being, in itself, of the One in whom man lives, and moves, and has his being. Moreover, the very nature of religious development is such as to make it dependent upon man's more profound and comprehensive knowledge of himself, and of his own rationality as including all that is highest and best of himself.

But, in the second place, if analysis should succeed in disclosing all the secrets of man's rational life, in the stricter meaning of the word "rational," we should not in this way be put into possession of the entire account of his religious experience. For the *non-rational*—which is by no means the same thing as the *contrary to reason*—has its part to play in shaping this experience. What is rational must, indeed, always be capable of interpretation in terms of self-conscious and cognitive experience. But there is also very much in the higher forms of

religious experience which defies or baffles the effort to interpret it in this way. It does not admit of a perfect mental representation in the terms of man's rational life. This remark applies to the beliefs, the sentiments, and the practices of religion. In all these spheres of religious experience we come at last upon certain unanalyzable and inexplicable facts. Why do I believe in the Reality of that which corresponds to my highest ideals;—believe, indeed, that this Reality surpasses them all? Why do I feel moved with the spirit of æsthetical admiration and ethical approval at the Idea which is rendered objective by my intellect and my imagination? And why, believing and feeling thus, do I also believe and feel that it is a reasonable and fit thing for me reverently to worship and devotedly to serve this Ideal-Real? In the last analysis the mind can only fall back, for the answer to such questions as these, upon what itself lies back of all the conscious processes of imagination and ratiocination. It is such a truth as this that Coleridge meant to express in his conception of Reason as "a power of convictions," and "a source and substance of truths." But the truth of experience is perverted when this rationality of man is thrown into contradiction with the forms of functioning which he employs in the construction of scientific conceptions and practical ideals.

In the third place, the well known psychological principles, which have already been stated in a general way, should constantly shape the conception of man's rationality as concerned in the origin and development of his religious life. This conception does not exclude feeling; the rather does it directly recognize certain feelings as essentially connected with the genesis and unfolding of religion as a rational affair. These are properly so-called *rational feelings* and *sentiments*; and this, not simply in the sense that they are reasonable, but with the added meaning that such feelings are essential factors in the cognitive, self-conscious, and self-determining activities of man, in his struggle to attain the ideal ends of existence. On the other hand, no adequate conception of man's rationality enables

us to resolve all the sources of religion into the higher forms of feeling. For the analysis shows how these forms emerge and develop in dependence upon the activities of a cognitive, self-conscious, and self-determining Self. Still less does the psychology of the rational functions favor the deadliest of all heresies,—the opposition of reason and religion.

Everywhere the principle of the dynamic unity of the soul in its various forms of functioning must be maintained. The action and reaction of the lower impulses and of the rational functions take place within the unity of experience. Fear, hope, desire for social communion, and the sense of various needs, excite and direct the intellect and the imagination; and these faculties in turn create and modify the object of the various religious impulses and emotions. The higher ethical and æsthetical sentiments respond to those ideals which they have themselves induced the figurate and discursive faculties to create. Thus the united progress of the mental life converts superstitious fear into reverence for the Universal Presence, hopes of a sensuous order into the expectation of blessedness, desire for an earthly good, or a Paradise where feasting with the gods is man's chief delight, into yearnings and strivings after a spiritual union and harmony with the perfect Divine Spirit. Finally, all those activities in which man's rationality consists, as well as those upon which it is conditioned, are subject to development in the individual and in the race. Rationality, in a word, is no ready-made affair, imparted at a particular point of time; it is, the rather, both an achievement of man and a gift of God, accomplished and received in a temporal process under the principles of continuity and sufficient reason.

If, now, we inquire more particularly into the content of man's rationality, as we shall use the word, it appears to involve such capacities, or forms of functioning, as constitute him a cognitive, self-conscious, and self-determining Will. In addition, on the side of feeling, certain ethical and æsthetical sentiments require recognition. Man is thus destined to be

religious because he is indeed a rational Self. He can respond by way of feeling to the beautiful, the good, and the true. He can know reality, and be aware of himself—that he is, and what he is—as a person. He can form judgments of value which do not arise out of wholly sensuous and selfish appreciations of the satisfaction which visible objects afford to his desires. He has freedom of choice with reference to these judgments of value. He is religious, in a word, because he is rational and free.

The one characteristic postulate or presupposition which enters into all the work of human reason in the sphere of religious experience is that of the *reality* of the Object. This postulate is nothing else than the expression of man's "ontological consciousness." We all want, as Matthew Arnold said, "to know what Being is;" and in religion the reality of the object—that it is and something about what it is—is always presupposed. One of the distinctions between mere mythology and religious myth appears at this point. When merely mythologizing, the narrator has a consciousness that he is constructing by a play of phantasy what has no necessary correlate in the real world. But the religious myth, taken seriously, is a story of the transactions that are thought to have actually taken place among the invisible but real spiritual powers and divine beings in which man believes. The distinction is thus exceedingly important, although it may be vague and liable to vanish; and although inquiry and scepticism are always finding their way to the heart of the religious myth with purposes of destruction or modification in mind. For it is characteristic of all the beliefs of religion that the postulate of the reality of the object of belief goes along with them. It is only when this childlike phantasy, prompted by the affective impulses already described, has given such shape to the object that man may enter into practical and social relations with it, that religion has dawned, in its vaguest and humblest form, in human consciousness. In this birth of religious consciousness, metaphysics comes into contact with religion, or rather becomes an

integral element of religion; but the contact is only—so Siebeck expressed the truth—as it were “back to back.” When then, a recent writer¹ affirms that no metaphysics of the Divine Being, the *reality* of God, arises from the religious consciousness, but only “faith’s conviction of the significance of God for our own personal standing in the world,” he is justified only if we suppose him to refer to a conscious and scientific metaphysics as applied to the explication and defence of some particular conception of the Divine Being. For religious faith always and necessarily posits the reality of its object. Religion positively cannot, either in its genesis or in its evolution, be separated from man’s “ontological consciousness,” whether working naïvely and in the most primitive ways, or working with the conscious aim to establish a scientifically defensible and systematic conception of the Ultimate Reality.

It belongs to psychology and to the theory of knowledge to trace the genesis, and to examine critically into the value, of this so-called ontological consciousness. But, as it applies to the experiences and conceptions of religion, such metaphysics is not essentially different from that involved in our other experiences and conceptions of what is esteemed real. This truth will appear in its extreme importance when the so-called arguments for the Being of God are critically examined. As Kant pointed out, the *nervus probandi* of them all is the so-called ontological argument. But this is better said by calling attention to the truths, (1) that all beliefs and cognitions depend upon their connection with the central system by some such “nerve of proof”; and (2) that every argument for the Being of God, as every argument (*sic*) for any kind of reality, presupposes as a part of its very essence and life, the same kind of connection. In other words, *what is so connected with our experience of reality as that it is essential to explain this experience satisfactorily, is itself believed to be real.* The “ontological argument,” falsely so called and entirely misconceived by

¹ Schultz, Grundriss der Christlichen Apologetik, p. 25.

a sceptical theory of knowledge like that of Kant and his modern followers, is not only the *nervus probandi* of the theological argument ; it is the *nervus vivendi*, the *neude vitale*, of all man's beliefs and knowledges, touching the world of real beings and actual events.

With the savage or primitive man, as with the child or the multitude of modern civilization, every vivid and persistent experience, especially if it connects itself in a vital way with the emotions and practical interests, is at once taken for granted as guaranteeing a more or less faithful mental representation of real beings and actual transactions. Cognitive experience, from the very nature of its constitution, cannot be for the experiencing subject, a merely suggestive and self-limited affair. It is essentially a knowledge of real beings and actual events, which I know and in which I have a share, because they and I reciprocally influence each other ; but which I do not create, and which are not by any possibility to be regarded as wholly dependent, for their existence and their occurrence, upon my being conscious of them.¹ In all such experiences, imagination and intellect both play their parts in the construction of the object known ; and this construction never is, and never by any possibility can be, a *mere* composition of sense-impressions passively received. Any remnants of such a view of knowledge, of whatever sort, as neglects this work of active mind, the Kantian criticism may well enough be held to have put forever *hors de combat*. It is as a picturing and thinking Self, an active imagination and intellect functioning in the unity of consciousness, that man knows anything whatever,—that, or what, things are ; that, or what, he himself is.

The way, therefore, in which the human mind arrives at its belief in invisible superhuman spirits, in the divine beings called the gods, in the worshipful Unity of the Being of the

¹ For the details of this epistemological doctrine, see the author's *Philosophy of Knowledge*.

World spiritually conceived, or in the infinite and perfect Ethical Spirit who is the God of monotheistic religion, is not essentially different. This metaphysics, which is only the functioning of the mind as "ontological consciousness," is indeed more naïve and instinctive, and so more uncritical and untrustworthy, with the savage than with the trained scientific and philosophic modern inquirer. But both savage and philosopher alike have, in the last resort, a common faith in reason; and they have also many common beliefs as to what Reality is, and as to the relations in which the mental life of man stands to this Reality. It is this universal faith in reason which, after all, underlies all so-called religious faith; it is these common beliefs that unite human beings in the way of an essentially true progress of the beliefs of the religious life.

With the savage or civilized man, with the child and the philosopher, it is the experience itself which includes all the data for knowledge or for rational belief; as well as also, of course, the data for false opinion, mistake, and superstition. But it is this experience which makes constant and increasing demands upon the very faculties which construct it, that they shall *explain* it as well. Human experience must undertake to understand itself. This undertaking involves something more than the naïve and instinctive way of assuming that everything goes on in reality precisely as it seems to go on in consciousness. Even the lowest type of the human mind has passed beyond so absolutely uncritical an assumption. As we have already seen, the savage or primitive man makes distinctions between the human and the superhuman, the natural and the supernatural, the work of his own phantasy for his own recreation and the real beings which he believes himself to know, as existent and not to be created by his phantasy. But his distinctions are uncertain, shifty, and not well-grounded in a large experience critically interpreted. This is, however, scarcely truer of his religious experience than of the other forms of his conscious life. Existences and transactions *in reality*, he must

have in order to account for his experience to himself. Indeed, this experience is always *of* reality.

If, however, we examine the grounds on which these more naïve and earlier distinctions are based, we shall find that, in general, the divine beings are invoked to explain those experiences which cannot readily be explained as due to the existence and behavior of visible and tangible objects of sense. Thus the world of realities, known or believed in, is increased by the addition of active beings and causal agencies which are not strictly limited to the objects of sense. The self-like life of sensuous reality will not wholly account for the richness of human experience. Something more and beyond is needed and is, indeed, found implicate in it. The intellect judges this to be true: the imagination constructs the kind of reality needed to meet the demand.

This procedure of the ontological consciousness is perfectly natural; instead of being irrational, it is of the very essence of reason itself. It is precisely similar to the procedure of science in every form of its vast productivity and wonderful development, down to the present time. The invisible, super-human spirits are as necessary to the savage, in order to explain his experience, as the invisible atoms, or "radio-active" molecules, are necessary to explain the experience of the modern chemist and physicist. Who shall say with an entire confidence, as yet, that the one assumption is not as rational as the other? The one certain truth upon which we are now insisting, however, is this: both classes of beliefs, knowledges, or assumptions, —call them what you will,—grow out of the spontaneous and inescapable necessities of human ontological consciousness. Without admitting this, no knowledge, or belief, or even theory, with reference to other existences and other events than those which happen in the "here-and-now" consciousness of the individual subject, is even abstractly possible.

The same process of purification and rectifying of the earlier products of imagination and thought, under the control of the

spontaneity of ontological consciousness, takes place in religion as in all other forms of human development. That reality is, and that it is knowable, man always believes; but what is real, and what may be believed or affirmed as known about reality, is dependent upon the growth of human experience and upon the activities of imagination and thought in the explanation and interpretation of experience. Thus the naïve and instinctive metaphysics of the savage slowly unfolds into the critical and reasoned metaphysics of civilized man, to the benefit of the religious, as well as of the scientific and social development of humanity. The complicated reactions which are thus involved, between science, philosophy, and the growth of social institutions, on the one hand, and man's religious life and development, on the other hand, furnish important topics for further consideration. The treatment of man's developing ontological consciousness as a source of his belief and knowledge with reference to the Object of religion, is, indeed, the central problem of every attempt at a philosophy of religion. From the present point of view, however, the following remarks must suffice.

Religious belief, for its form and development, and indeed for its very existence, can never be rendered independent of metaphysics. All religious experience implies an irresistible conviction of a commerce with Reality; it cannot arise without either a naïve and instinctive, or a disciplined and systematic exercise of the ontological consciousness. The cultivation of the so-called "ontological consciousness" has, therefore, an important influence on the religious evolution of humanity. In fact, the rational culture of any race, or epoch, has invariably been marked by schools of religious philosophy and of theology; and these schools have profoundly influenced the religions of the time;—first of all, through the thoughtful few of the existing generation, and then through the large multitude of the less thoughtful and of the succeeding generations. In India, every important school of metaphysical philosophy was early

represented; and every school has left its traces on the religious beliefs and practices of the people of India down to the present time. Everywhere, though not to the same extent, the influence of the great metaphysical thinkers of the race has continued over the religious beliefs, sentiments, and practices of the succeeding ages, in a most powerful way. The metaphysical speculations of the Eleatics and the Sceptics influenced the religions of the Greek world; Plato and Aristotle powerfully moulded the religious experience of the Middle Ages.

In vain are men exhorted to be satisfied with saying the same prayers and singing the same sacred songs; they continue to divide and subdivide their religions on ontological grounds. The importance of subtle and minute metaphysical distinctions is, indeed, often overestimated; the failure to recognize what is common to all, and to exercise charity with respect to minor differences, has doubtless resulted in much loss to the religious life as an essentially spiritual and practical affair. But the history of religious development confirms what the psychology of the religious consciousness enables us the better to understand;—namely, that the Object of religious belief and worship must ever be regarded as something about whose real Being man must unceasingly strive to know. A proposed belief in *mere phenomena* as divine, has about it characteristics so disturbing that even its temporary holding tends to provoke the laughter with which our mind greets the discovery that the ghost which has awakened its fears is only, after all, existent in our eye. It is never, then, any particular system of metaphysics which is the most dangerous opponent of religious faith. It is, the rather, the denial of all possible trustworthiness to man's ontological consciousness. The fundamental error, the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος*, of dogmatic or sceptical agnosticism, is the assumption that the so-called categories, or constitutional forms of human cognition, are inescapable limitations, if not the fruitful sources of illusion, for all attempts at knowledge. Thus the grand result of the cosmic processes which terminate

in man is a being whose crowning glory is to be the discoverer, critic, and self-convicted but not self-satisfied dupe, of his own rationality. In a word, the claim to be rational stands self-condemned, as inherently self-contradictory and irrational.

This belief in reality, which extends to the religious forms of belief, and which has its genesis in the experience of a self-active will opposed by, and in commerce with, other wills, cannot give form to the Object of religion as a really existent Other Self. It is the activity of man's imagination and intellect which accomplishes this. It is by the combination of these so-called faculties of the mind that the objects of religious belief and worship are definitely shaped.

In speaking of the function of Imagination in religion it is intended to include both the lighter and more illogical play of fancy and the more serious and logical work of imagination, strictly so-called. These two merge into one another; and again they emerge, one from the other. From the psychological point of view,¹ and in their relations to the activities by which the objects of religion are presented to the mind, the various forms of the creative imagining faculty are all substantially alike. The creations of imagination differ from those of recognitive memory, in that (1) the former are "freed" from those connections of place and time which characterize the latter; and (2) this "freeing of the ideas" from the limitations set by previous experience makes possible an indefinite variety of objects, for the reality of which grounds in experience may be found, but of which no immediate experience is possible. Thus what we do experience is explained by existences, not themselves to be immediately experienced, but calculated to satisfy our intellectual, emotional, and practical interests. The imagined reality, without itself being experienced, explains the real experience.

Without this work of creative imagination, science as well

¹ See the author's *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*, chap. XVIII.

as art and religion could neither exist nor make progress. In science, as well as in religion, imagination "bodies forth the shape of things unknown." In art, in the interests both of science and of religion, the same faculty shapes the pictorial and concrete presentation of ideas and ideals that are not objects of immediate experience.

In religion, the imagination shows itself in many ways. It creates causal explanations by referring items of experience to invisible superhuman powers, to the gods, or to the One Alone God. It personifies natural objects, attributing souls to things that manifest the signs of life and thus peopling sky and earth and air with divine existencies. It made the oldest known god of the Aryans, and of the Chinese, and the god of the Dravidians, the Semites, the Redskins, and the Tierra-del-Fuegians, out of the sky. It personifies the abstract qualities of things. It deified supernatural and magical vigor or power as Brahmā in India, and the idea of protection and guardianship in the gods of Rome. It not only calls into existence elves and goblins, which are not unmeaning products of pure fancy but are created in the interests of explaining the phenomena; but it also seizes upon the abstraction of a spirit, that shall be the chief as respects its abstract qualities, and thus causes to appear "the great Manitou," or Spirit, of the Redskins. It created a more and more admirable conception of Zeus among the Greeks and of Yahweh in ancient Israel. The "creator gods," and more especially the "greatest gods," of every nation are, as a matter of course, deified abstractions, by which the imagination represents the explanatory principles found necessary by a growing experience of reality, as regarded from the point of view of the religious consciousness. This is preëminently true of the more definitively philosophic conceptions of the Divine Being, whether as illustrated by the philosophic gods of Hindū and Buddhist Pantheism; or by the Platonic Idea of The Good; or by Aristotle's Prime Source of order, coherence, and movement; or by the Supreme Being, "The Infinite," "The

Absolute," of Deism, or the Trinity of the more elaborate of the Christian creeds. All these philosophic conceptions are as purely dependent upon imagination, with its persistent accompaniment of ontological belief, as are the crudest constructs of the mind of savage or primitive man. The difference between the child and the man of science or the philosopher is not at all a difference in the fundamental character of the faculties employed. It is, the rather, a difference of training and stages of development. Plato regards the gods of mythology as creatures of imagination (*Timaëus*, 40 D); and Aristotle thinks that most of the state religion is myth which is due to anthropomorphic representations and is justified by political considerations. But neither Plato, nor Aristotle, nor any modern thinker, can have either science, or philosophy, or religion, without trusting to the power of human imagination to give form to the realities immediately known or implicated in his cognitive experience.

In the popular religions of his own time even the critical mind of Aristotle recognized that the greatest truth of all was taught by a belief in Deity and in the divine nature of the heavens and the stars. But he committed a worse than the popular mistake when he excluded this Deity from the domain of experience on the ground that his presence there would be an unworthy interference; and when he further refused to accept the Socratic belief in Providence and in future retribution. Modern science and philosophy have been restoring the doctrine of the immanence of God in the world of physical events, and in the soul of man,—the doctrine, indeed, of the Divine Being, as the Ground of all experience,—with a comprehensiveness and profundity of evidence undreamed of in the days of the great Greek thinker. But in all this work of restoration the aid of the imagination has constantly to be invoked.

In all spheres of its activity the human imagination, in order that its work may "ring true" and that the world it constructs

may reasonably be regarded as consisting of real beings in actual relations, must constantly be tested by the experience of the race as regarded from the scientific point of view. The distinction between poetry and science, or myth and science, or religious myth and religious truth, is not, indeed, the same as the distinction between the work of pure fancy and the work of pure intellect. "*Purity*" of this order ceased to characterize any product of human faculty, when the "faculty psychology" ceased to be regarded as truly depicting the genius and development of the human mind. Nor is the distinction one altogether of truthfulness or of cognitive value. Poetry and myth both have their place in the development of the intellectual as well as of the artistic life of man. The Fairy Tales and Folk Lore of all peoples, "Alice in Wonder-Land" and "Midsummer Night's Dream," as well as Dante's "Inferno" and Milton's "Paradise Lost," have a truthfulness of their own. In the last analysis the difference between the two classes of products—those in which the creative imagination seems more prominent and those for which the scientific working of intellect can be claimed—is a shifting difference. The final testing depends upon the way in which the mental construct, for the formation of which both creative imagination and active intellect must combine, fits into the totality of human experience. The ever enlarging but never finished picture of the real world must have more and more of consistency. Gods and men, as well as mere things—or rather, seemingly "mere" things, for in this popular meaning of the word, there are no *mere* things—must behave themselves in harmony with one another. But this standard of consistency is itself not fixed by the human mind at the beginning, or at any time in its development, in a perfectly unalterable way. What always has been, or must be, the essential form of the World-System, science can no more confidently tell in the name of intellect, than imagination can frame once for all the perfect and unchanging, the finished picture of God.

In religion, as in all other forms of man's ongoing Life, in order progressively to reach that truth about Reality which the mind craves, there must be a continual process of selection. This process separates between those products of imagination which the advancing knowledge of general facts and laws requires or permits, and those other products of imagination which such knowledge either forbids, or refuses to indicate, as appertaining to real beings and to actual events. Such a "purification of concepts" goes constantly forward; it is indispensable for the advancement of man's practical welfare and scientific attainments. It may be reverently called a sort of divine midwifery for the delivery of ideas. The mediæval outfit with which the imagination furnished the sciences of that time—its phlogiston, and all similar entities—has passed away. But he would be a bolder prophet in physical science, than was in religion any one of the Hebrew seers, who should predict just what part the entities named "atom," and "ether," and "ions," etc., will be playing on the stage of the scientific imagination a thousand years from now. It is altogether likely that the highest flights of the religious imagination have a far more assured future before them than those of the scientific imagination at the present time.

Religion, however, stands in special need of this process of separation and purification for the work which it calls upon the creative imagination to perform; and the chief reasons for this need are the following two. Its primary beliefs are essentially of the *in-visible*, the *non-sensible*, the somehow *super-human*, the Self that is *other* than myself. Moreover, the practical and emotional interests to which the work of the religious imagination is committed are so immediate and pressing as the more easily to override the considerations upon which the scientific development of man lays such peculiar emphasis. Superstitious beliefs, born of unworthy and irrational fears and hopes and desires, have never been confined to religion. But, in religion, on account of its very nature, they have been most potent

and difficult to modify or to remove. Hence the necessity, but also the embarrassment and the delicacy, of the task of improving the work of imagination in the construction of an Object of religious belief which shall worthily fit in with the system of human experience, rationally regarded and, as far as possible, scientifically explained.

The religious development of mankind is dependent upon the harmonious activity of imagination and intellect in providing an Object, which shall both accord with scientific development, and shall also keep pace with the improvement of the ethical and æsthetical feelings, and with the growing practical and social needs of the race. This truth follows, as of necessity, from what has thus far been discovered respecting the genesis and development of religion. But its further explanation and proof requires the consideration of the important part which the Intellect takes in man's religious life and evolution.

In religion, as in all other forms of the complex development of the human soul, reflective thinking does not take the initiative, as it were. Without active intellect, of course, no religious beliefs, however crude and primitive, could ever be formed. And the superiority of the intellect of man over the similar complex of activities in the mental life of the lower animals is as truly shown in the beginnings and early stages of religion as of science or of philosophy. But so-called primitive man must first of all adjust himself to the more immediately pressing and practical interests of his daily life. This he cannot do without understanding something of the nature and relations, to himself and to one another, of the things which constitute his daily environment. Out of the attempt at such understanding both science and religion spring as from a common root. For some of the behavior of things seems intelligible as due directly to the visible and tangible relations in which the senses of man place them to one another and to himself. But much of this behavior is too mysterious to be explained in this obvious way. Even the power of wind and fire, the influence of intoxicating

drugs, or the weird appearance and deadly attacks of certain of the animals, require to be explained by reference to invisible and intangible spirits whose ways of control are unknown to man.

An essential part of the thought-factor in man's religious life and development, consists in the application to the Object, of the psychological laws which control the explanation of all classes of experience. It scarcely need be said again that these laws always apply in the religious domain, in close and inseparable union with the beliefs of ontological consciousness. Experience must be explained—whether religious or otherwise—in accordance with the conceptions and laws of efficient cause and of final purpose. For man knows himself as a will, self-determining in his purpose to realize ends; and he has no other way of constituting the being, or explaining the behavior, of the world of non-selflike existences, except that offered by the analogy of this knowledge of himself. In this sense of the word, "anthropomorphizing" is as necessary for science as for religion. The anthropomorphic way is the only way of knowledge; and instead of being an irrational way, it is the very essence of rationality itself. For reason's world is a world of interdependent and interacting self-like beings. Efficient causes, behaving according to ideas of order and consistency in the realization of ends, explain the world anthropomorphically, whether they are located in big things, or little atoms, in "mere" things, or in men, or in gods. All beings, that can really help to explain experience, are necessarily thought of, if thought of at all, under the rubrics furnished by these psychological laws.

When the naïve constructions of unreflective spiritism, the spiritualized natural objects, the creator gods, and the mythical cosmologies of the savage, fail to explain man's developing experience so as to produce harmony among the demands of science, of ethical and æsthetic sentiments, and of social and practical needs, the laws of his intellectual life undergo no essential change. The gods retreat from their time-honored

spheres of causal influence. Their agency is now either limited to certain constantly recurring classes of facts, which still, in spite of their frequency, remain otherwise inexplicable; or to the rare and extraordinary occurrences, where the need of divine interference appears more pressing, or the evidence for it more convincing. The distinction between the natural and the supernatural hardens. And, under the influence of reflective thinking operating in two new separate directions, the Divine Being of the abstract World is forced to sit apart from the varied and infinite beings of the real world of man's daily life. A stern and bitter conflict arises between the so-called scientific and the so-called religious use of the one and indivisible psychological law of efficient causation. Science becomes irreligious, and religion becomes unscientific; until philosophy successfully attempts to effect a new union of the two in an improved conception of God and of his relations to the whole world as known in the totality of human experience.

The law of final purpose, or the teleological principle, is always appealed to and actively employed in the genesis and development of religious beliefs, sentiments, and practices. The invisible superhuman spirits, which inhabit or sojourn in natural objects, the deified ancestors, and the more definitely anthropomorphic gods of polytheism, are necessarily conceived of as being governed in their action by some known or unknown purpose. The Personified Karma of Buddhism, and the World-Soul of Brāhmanism, as well as the Yahweh of Judaism or the Father and Redeemer of Christianity, are believed in and worshipped as powers that work efficiently to the attainment of some end. They are not only, "Wills to live" but they also have the will to set into actuality some idea which man can more or less doubtfully conjecture, if not distinctly apprehend. Powers that are wholly blind could not awaken and direct any of the impulsive or emotional springs of man's religious life; they could not be worshipped, because either feared, or desired, or longed for as serviceable companions.

The only conception of the Divine Being which Theism can accept, or even entertain, must have as its central factor a Will that energizes over the whole domain of the things and selves known to human experience, with a view to accomplish there some series of purposes, or some large and all-inclusive purpose.

It is thus, then, that the mind of man—acting as a creative imagination and as an intellect that seeks, under the psychological laws which all attempts to extend the sphere of human knowledge obey, to understand the grounds of its own experience—constructs the Object of religious belief and worship. But the uplift of higher forms of feeling than those which have already been examined must be recognized, before it is possible to account for the important religious truth that this Object finally attains the shape of an ethical and æsthetical Ideal. For it is these higher forms of feeling under whose impulse and guidance man comes to believe in and to worship One perfect Ethical Spirit as the Alone God.

CHAPTER XIII

MAN AS RATIONAL AND FREE [CONTINUED]

The more comprehensive and general relations which maintain themselves in the development of civilization, or race-culture, between morality and art, on the one hand, and religion on the other, will receive later the treatment which they require. This fact permits a much briefer reference, in the present connection, than would otherwise be suitable to the important part in the religious being of man which is borne by the ethical and æsthetical feelings and ideals.

If the words are understood with a broad and sympathetic meaning, it will be true to say that morality and religion are from the beginning, and always, closely and even inextricably related. The more primary and universal forms of the influence of ethical feeling upon the religious life and development are chiefly of two kinds; the negative and the positive. Of the negating aspect of ethical feeling in religion, one of the earliest and most widely extended forms of manifestation is *tabu*. Not all *tabu* has, indeed, a definitely moral significance. Here, as elsewhere in the more uncomprehended workings of human nature, the "must-not" which is a "better-not," because you are likely to get hurt, is closely allied with the "ought-not," because it is wrong and forbidden, although no one knows the reason why. Among the negative manifestations of the relatively primitive moral feelings is also the duty of "expropriation."¹ What has been given for divine purposes, it is not

¹ To use the term suggested by M. de la Grasserie, *De la Psychologie des Religions*, p. 72*f.*

justifiable to use for any other purposes. It is *Corban* (see Mk. vii, 11). It must be burned, or thrown away, or left for the gods to convey off; or if it is to be enjoyed at all, this enjoyment should be only for the priests or others connected with the divine service. Now it is this sense of being held off by an invisible power, whose negative commands cannot fully be explained, whose reasons for issuing them and whose means of enforcing them are something mysterious and occult, which constitutes one of the principal psychological sources of both morality and religion. I must not do this, or that; now one thing, and then another thing, which I desire to possess and to enjoy, is forbidden to me under a vague threat of penalties that emanate from an invisible source. It is, therefore, to the unseen spiritual powers, or to the angry and jealous gods, or to the One Holy and Righteous Deity, that I must look for the account of such an ethico-religious experience. How man behaves himself, man believes to be a matter of divine concern. And thus, in manifold negative ways the ethical feelings of humanity are directed toward the Divine Being in all the forms which belong to the moral constitution of human society.

On the more positive side, religion commits to the gods the ethical feelings of obligation in the various forms of gift, prayer, sacrament, rites, and religious austerities. In their more vague and primitive form, these feelings convert such ways of behavior toward the divine beings into religious duties. They are made "owing" to the gods. For the gods are pleased with gifts, honored by the petitions of the worshipper, dignified by rites and sacraments, and are made to seem the worthier of regard by the self-inflicted fastings and scourgings of their devotees. Such moral, or half-moral feelings, in all the lower forms of religious experience, are, of course, powerfully reinforced by those impulsive and emotional springs of religion which have already been examined. But fear, hope, and desire for good, will never wholly account for the dealings of human beings with divine beings, even in the lowest forms of

“unreflective spiritism.” There is always something more in man’s religious faith and worship. And an important part of this something more has its unfailing source in the definitively ethical feelings. The sense of obligation, of moral approbation, and the feeling of merit sought and gained, mingle with the other emotional impulses. Thus these higher feelings, in manifold positive ways, require for their satisfaction that the imagination and the intellect should construct the Object of religious belief and worship after a pattern derived from man’s moral constitution.

When the Divine Being is conceived of as a sort of moral Unity, whether in the impersonal form of the Hindū Ātman or World-Soul, or in the yet more impersonal and vague form of the early Buddhist conception of Karma, or, finally, as God, the Absolute Ethical Spirit, perfectly just, good, and holy; then *all* immorality—and not some species of conduct only—tends to become viewed as disobedience to the divine will. The height of the ethico-religious consciousness is reached when wrong doing in general is regarded as a breach of the right relations between man and God; and when right doing is regarded as the acceptable service of God, with fidelity and ethical love as its supreme motive. Thus there comes about such a fusion of the springs of morality and religion that the whole life of conduct flows forth, strong, pure, and spontaneous, as from one divinely inexhaustible Source. With religion God is now conceived of, and thought about, as essentially perfect Ethical Spirit. Man has, by gift of God—no matter how, or through how many ages and stages of evolution—become possessed of a moral and spiritual nature; and he is thus made capable of entering into spiritual relations with God. The world becomes regarded as a theatre for the manifestation of the divine purposes toward God’s spiritual creation.

Of all the known or conceivable relations in which human beings do stand, or can stand toward the Divine Being, these ethico-religious relations have for the religious experience a

supreme interest and value. Science may properly consider man as the product of cosmic forces. But the religious point of view regards him from higher ground. It affirms that the world affords man the supreme good only as it stimulates and assists him—largely by opposing and paining him—to attain a more perfect likeness to the absolute perfection of the Ethical Spirit whom he believes in and worships as God.

Thus from the religious point of view a truth follows to which it will be found necessary to refer again and again. The hedonistic and utilitarian point of view, from which to consider the practical value and truthfulness of the ethico-religious judgments respecting the world and God, and respecting man's relations to both, is inconsistent and untenable. As Pascal well said: "The non-satisfaction with the world is the last bond which binds the non-pious man to God." Or we may extract the same truth from the exhortation which the faith of Islam has wrought into the structure of one of its most beautiful places of worship: "This world is a bridge; pass thou over it, but build not thou upon it."

The susceptibility of man for æsthetical impressions is considered by Von Hartmann¹ to be one of the most primary and powerful sources of the religious experience. This conclusion he justifies by referring to the way in which the "disinterested observation" of the heavens has operated in the genesis and development of religious belief. But we have already pointed out (p. 298) that the word "disinterested" is not at all appropriate in this connection. To say this, however, is not to deny that even in the lower forms of nature-worship æsthetical feeling is a stimulus of great influence and value; and in all the more advanced conceptions of the Divine Being of the World this feeling is a most important guide, as well as incitement, to the activities of thought and imagination.

Von Hartmann agrees with Kant, as indeed all careful psychological analysis must, in holding that it is the so-called "feel-

¹ Religionsphilosophie, I, p. 12f.

ing of the sublime " which is the most important among the æsthetic sentiments as a source and explanation of religious experience. This feeling itself is, as are all the more advanced forms of the æsthetic feelings, complex and by no means easily self-intelligible. Sense of mystery, awe, admiration, and—if the expression may be pardoned—a "pleasurably-painful" sense of helplessness or dependence, blend in this form of æsthetic sentiment. When the feeling becomes emotional, on account of its intensity, the study of its physiological basis explains to the psychologist, in part, its genesis and character. But only in part. The uplifted eyes, the deeper breathing, the expansiveness of the vaso-motor organism, the thoracic and visceral stirrings, etc., undoubtedly color strongly the emotional state. But the intellectual appreciation and communion of soul with the object must, by no means, be left out of the account. It is that Other than I, so much superior to me,—so much grander in space-occupying or controlling force, so much more admirable, mysterious, and awe-inspiring, than I know myself to be—to which my soul responds with a milder or a more passionate expression of its own kindred nature.

These qualities, and indeed all the discernible qualities, in the sentiments awakened by the sublime render it quite as much a definitely and distinctly religious as an æsthetic form of feeling. So true is this, that no being can be considered as psychologically capable of the higher forms of religious experience, who is wholly deprived of this æsthetic sentiment. On the other hand, no Being is worthy to be worshipped, or indeed can get itself worshipped, as Divine, which does not, to some extent and in some form, evoke this sentiment. And this feeling of sublimity stimulates and guides the activity of imagination and intellect in the construction of an Object which shall satisfy itself. All these truths are either expressly stated or tacitly implied in that treatise of Kant's in which he most completely casts off the bonds which the Critique of Pure Reason had woven about the cognitive faculties of man, and in which

he comes nearest to seeing how self-contradictory his own effort to "remove knowledge in order to make room for faith" had now become. This work is, of course, the "Critique of Judgment." "We call that sublime," says Kant, "which is absolutely great."¹ "The sublime is that, the mere ability to think which, shows a faculty of the mind surpassing any standard of sense." "Nature," he further declares,² "is therefore sublime in those of its phenomena, whose intuition brings with it the idea of its infinity." And the philosopher then goes on to show how religion is distinguished from superstition in that, while the latter excites "fear and apprehension of an all-powerful Being," religion "which consists in a good life," and "a consciousness of an upright disposition pleasing to God," awakens the Idea of "the sublimity of this Being." This is because the soul recognizes in itself a sublimity of disposition conformable to the Divine Will.

The other forms of æsthetical feeling, such as respond to the apprehension of other species of the beautiful—for example, the orderly, the free and luxurious, the graceful, the delicately finished—may all be awakened and cultivated in the interests of religion. But none of them is so distinctively fitted to minister to its more rational beliefs and finer feelings, as is the æsthetical sentiment or emotion of the sublime. Perhaps, however, an exception should be made in the behalf of those feelings with which man greets whatever seems to bear the marks of orderly behavior and free control of one's Self and of other forces. But order and freedom themselves, when they reach the height and breadth of their greatest extent, excite the ethico-religious feeling of sublimity. The power of the conception of God to excite this feeling depends, indeed, upon his omnipotence and his omnipresence. Everywhere He is, and everywhere He has all power, when conceived of in a fashion to satisfy best man's appreciation of both (to borrow Kant's

¹ Translation of J. H. Bernard, Part I, Div. 1, § 25.

² *Ibid.*, § 26.

distinction) “the mathematical” and “the dynamical” sublime. But if everywhere the Divine Being is also the Source of a universal order, if his Free Will is the Ground of all harmony and law, then the conception we are warranted in framing of Him is more rationally and morally sublime. And it is thus that the higher forms of monotheism invite us to conceive of God.

Æsthetical feeling, in its appreciation of the value of what awakens and stimulates it, admits of an indefinite expansion and growth. Or, to speak more accurately, the ideas which arouse and justify this feeling in its higher forms admit of such unlimited development. For, to recur to the language of Kant, we are dealing here with a faculty of mind (the rather, a complex of rational activities) “which surpasses every standard of sense.” Thus its very nature fits it in several ways to serve as an important factor in the religious development of the soul. For, in the first place, the real object which corresponds to the æsthetical sentiment is *not* the object of sense. It is the non-sensuous construct of imagination and thought; it is the Idea which the mind has created in order to account for its own experience, and by positing which, as a thing of value and significance in the world of Reality, it secures satisfaction to the demands of the æsthetical feelings. But this is the way that the invisible Divine Being is made ideally great, and admirable, and good; is then believed in as real, because his Reality is needed in order to satisfy the soul’s entire experience.

But, secondly, the value of what is mysterious and not wholly comprehensible is forcefully appealed to by this form of feeling which is at one and the same time æsthetical and religious. Wholly to comprehend the sublime Object of religious belief would compel the mind to cease having towards it the feeling for the sublime. Thus, throughout the religious development of humanity there is something unsatisfying, something that speaks plainly of a much more beyond, in every conception of the gods or of Deity; just as every concrete exhibition of the

æsthetical Ideal, whether in nature, or in art, or in the heroic and splendid deeds of men, leaves the æsthetical emotion unsatisfied and ready to make new and more exacting demands upon imagination and thought.

And, finally, that conception of God which affords the completest satisfaction for the æsthetical consciousness is, other things being equal, most likely to establish itself as rational and trustworthy, when the critical attitude of philosophy is assumed toward the competing ideas of the Divine Being. But two sets of considerations are involved, of necessity, in the qualifying clause; they are both indispensable to the attempts of reason at harmonizing the life of religious reflection, if the "other things" are to be made "equal." These are, first, the considerations derived from the scientific and philosophical view of the Being of the World,—of the actual events in the world, and of the relations of man to the Ultimate Reality. The second class of considerations concerns the satisfaction of the demands of the moral life. All these three lines of investigation,—the scientific, the ethical, and the æsthetical—so to say, point toward their respective Ideals. The physical and chemical sciences, striving to discover and explain the phenomena of internal and external experience, reach forward toward the conception of the one Being of the World, the so-called Absolute and Infinite World-Ground, as a self-contained system of efficient forces operating under general laws. But the more definitely ethical and æsthetical factors in man's conscious life and development require for their satisfaction another sort of Ideal. Their goal is reached, or approached, only if they may successfully demand of imagination and thought that the reality of an ideally sublime and morally perfect Spirit shall be grounded in the facts of an actual and trustworthy experience. Their Ideal is the conception of an Infinite and Absolute Personal Life.

In a word, it is characteristic of all religions that the Object of faith is constituted by the combined activities of imagina-

tion and intellect in such form as to satisfy more or less perfectly certain existing demands of the ethical and æsthetical feelings. This Object, therefore, partakes of the nature of an ideal, rather than wholly of the nature of some particular actuality that has been, or may be, definitely presented or represented in consciousness. It belongs to the invisible, the intangible, the non-sensuous; although it must *manifest* itself in forms that are visible, tangible, and observable by the senses. For its rise in consciousness, this Object is, indeed, dependent upon the activity, with a certain degree of coöperation and harmony, of all the faculties of the human soul. But this is equivalent to saying that it is man as a rational being who makes for himself the Divine Being in whose reality, and in the actuality of whose relations to himself, he, as a matter of course, believes.

It follows, then, from this psychological analysis, that the conception of God is chiefly dependent upon the stimulus and guidance given to the imagination and thought by the higher æsthetical and ethical feelings. And what history shows is in confirmation of the conclusion reached by psychological analysis. For as the intellect of man is informed and the imagination both chastened and stimulated by experience, and as the ethical and æsthetical sentiments themselves share the purification and refinement which they at the same time seek, the characteristic traits of the Divine Image are greatly changed. All this, however, is not to be understood as discrediting the validity for reality if these rational activities, or—much less even—their value in the practical life of the race. For although religion, like every other form of man's being and doing, is subject to development, it is none the less an important and absolutely essential part of his total experience. Its beliefs are valid for reality because they are necessary to account for this experience. The proof of this last statement, however, the psychology of religion cannot furnish. It can only again point back to the nature of what has been called the "ontological consciousness," and to the way in which this conscious-

ness furnishes the *nervus probandi* of all proof, and the *nervus essendi* of all cognitive experience.

The beliefs, sentiments, and practices of the religious life, and the facts and laws of its development, imply that man is a self-determining Will. If man were merely passive under the fears, hopes, desires, and higher ethical and æsthetical sentiments, which are the stimuli of the religious experience, he could not be truly religious. For religion is essentially a demand upon the will. It is a call to make a voluntary adjustment of the human self toward that Other Self which is the Object, belief in whom arouses certain involuntary affectional and intellectual attitudes. Or, to state the same truth in a more intimately true way: The actual establishment of religion in human life whether as belief, feeling, or cult, requires the activity of a *moral agent*.

Even in the lower forms of religious experience, where feeling is more nearly blind and where the object toward which the feeling impels is most obscure and scarcely defined at all, an appeal is made to which the requisite response consists in the form of some self-prompted and self-controlled activity. But when religion assumes the form of the purest ethical Monism, and the Divine Being stands revealed as the omnipotent and omniscient, perfectly Good One, the essential initiative and the controlling factor of the life of religion becomes a voluntary choice and pursuit of an Ideal. In calling attention to these facts we are not defining religion as it ought to be; we are describing religion as it actually is.

Any discussion—or, indeed, barest mention—of the dependence of the religious experience upon the conception of man as a self-determining Self, carries us at once over upon debatable grounds. For the problem of moral freedom does not concern the student of the philosophy of religion alone. It is, rather, a problem with which psychology, ethics, and every form of economic and social science must also reckon. There are certain aspects of this problem, however, with which the

reflective study of man's religious life and development is especially concerned. Religion, subjectively considered, covers all the relations in which the will of man must be, or properly may be, conceived of as standing to the Divine Will. Or rather: on the one hand, stands the finite and limited, and yet in some legitimate meaning of the words, "morally free" human Self; on the other hand, as it were, is the omnipotent, omniscient, Infinite and Absolute Self; and religion proposes to the former a choice of attitudes toward the latter. Hence it comes about that the philosophy of religion has, for its very own, the difficult problem of harmonizing the apparent internal contradictions, and explaining the significance and value, of voluntary relations between finite beings and the Divine Being. This problem may, indeed, turn out to be incapable of a completely satisfactory solution. But whether it be solvable, wholly or in part, or not at all, the results of the psychological analysis of man's religious nature are not essentially affected. Indeed, it is these results which must be assumed in all discussions of the more ultimate and transcendent theological problems. In a word, the conception of man's moral freedom which the philosophy of religion must accept, and to which its speculation must remain faithful, is the conception approved by the investigations of psychology, ethics, and general philosophy.

The tenable conception of moral freedom, as this conception is based upon a reflective examination of human experience, involves the following factors.¹ First: In attributing moral freedom to man, we do not, as it were, locate the attribute definitively and exclusively in some one so-called faculty of *Will*. Indeed, by the term "will" psychology understands

¹ For a detailed discussion the following works of the author may be referred to; from the psychological point of view: "Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, chaps. V, XI, XXI, XXVI; "Philosophy of Mind," chaps. IV, VII, VIII, XII; from the epistemological point of view: "Philosophy of Knowledge," chaps. X, XIV; from the metaphysical point of view: "A Theory of Reality," chaps. III, VII, X, XIII, XIX; and from the ethical point of view: "Philosophy of Conduct," chap. VIII.

the entire active aspect of man's mental life, as it culminates in the more or less deliberate and conscious choice of two or more alternative deeds or courses of conduct. When intellect is spoken of as the faculty which discriminates, compares, analyzes, and forms judgments and conceptions, it is *active* intellect which is implied. The passive reciprocity of impressions from without, even when aided by the recurrence of associated ideas, cannot account for any truly intellectual function. But "active intellect" is one of the forms of man's functioning as a self-determining will. For intellect cannot be active, as man's intellect is known to be, without the voluntary attention which is involved in all these conscious intellectual processes. Imagination, too, is active, creative, and so another form of the functioning of man as a self-determining will. In the very structure of the Object of religious faith we have found this form of man's freedom to be involved. For it is peculiarly true in religion, as well as also true in science and in art, that the imagination *acts* in the form of conscious selection and synthesis of the materials furnished to it by past experience. Nor is any one of the forms of religious feeling—especially of the higher and more distinctively ethical and æsthetical forms—a passive and wholly inactive reaction to external stimuli. The religious feelings of the finer sort, depending as they do upon judgments of value, are always, so to say, suffused with a will that either accepts and cherishes, or else refuses and subdues them. It is preëminently in the construction of his religious, as of all his other Ideals, that man shows himself to be a self-determining Self, a morally free Will. Were he not active in thinking, imagining, feeling, he would not be free; but then neither would he be religious.

It is, however, in the adjusting of himself, by a more or less deliberate choice, to the Object of religious belief that man's freedom makes the culminating exhibition of itself. It is in the conscious and deliberate choice of the attitude toward Reality that the self-determining will manifests its essential

character. This is as true in respect of all forms of conduct, and of all relations to every kind of beings, as it is of that form of conduct and of those relations to the Divine Being, in which the essence of the religious life consists. To choose whether, or not, to worship and to serve this Being is the highest exercise of human freedom in the domain of religion.

But, second, moral freedom is not a ready-made attribute of man ; it is not a gift at birth, or an absolute and unconditioned endowment. It is the rather an acquisition or an achievement, which admits of a great variety of degrees, and which requires a process of development, both in the individual and also in the race. When we speak of men being created free and equally free—whether from the political or the ethical or the religious point of view—we are speaking loosely and in a manner not to correspond with the facts of experience. The plasticity of the infant, the relative mouldableness of the savage, are not indications of their superior or inherent God-given freedom of will. For want of a better term to explain what we know, and at the same time to cover our ignorance, we may speak of the “potentiality” of freedom as belonging to the human being from the beginning onward of his conscious life. But it is only when the reactions to the various forms of stimuli become voluntarily responsive to ideal ends in accordance with, or in opposition to, value-judgments, that a real moral freedom begins. The end represented in idea, the feeling appreciative of the value of the end and taking the form which adjudges value to it, and the voluntary adjustment of the Self toward the end,—all this is necessary in order that such freedom as religion requires shall be attained. But the power to represent the end, to appreciate it in the light of appropriate value-judgments, and to make the voluntary adjustment, are all matters of attainment in a process of self-development.

To say this much, however, is not to pass over into the opposite error of a determinism which is inconsistent with any free, religious, as well as free, scientific, moral, or social de-

velopment. Ideas, the power to represent which has to be attained by a process of mental growth, are not, for that reason, any less valid in reality. Value-judgments which the mind learns to make do not thereby have their worth, and their applicability to actual beings, diminished or destroyed. Choices, and the power to deliberate and to choose, which express, in the degree of their rationality and their freedom, the struggle upward through lower stages of a feebler will, are not less really free and worthy of moral approval and reward. The real character of moral freedom is not changed because such freedom is acquired by degrees, or lost by degrees, in a course of development.

From the foregoing considerations it follows, in the third place, that the freedom which is necessary to give validity and significance to the religious experience, is a matter of indefinite variations of degree which, in the individual and in the race, depend upon differences in the physical and social environment, upon the stages of race-culture, and upon that peculiar mixture of characteristics which constitutes the individual man. All men are by no means alike free; nor is any one man under all circumstances, alike free in his religious life and development. The savage or primitive man is impelled and bound by his superstitious fears and selfish desires, and by the type of his religious conceptions, as the civilized man, who has had experience of the value of the higher religious ideals, is neither impelled nor bound. In religion, as in other forms of development, the growth of experience sets the ideas "free" from the limitations of sense; while the control of the intellect secures the subordination of these ideas to the principles of order and continuity, as these principles are progressively apprehended and realized by its activities. But what especially, in each case, determines the degree of freedom is the attitude of the Self toward its own value-judgments. At this point we are again reminded of the truth that the highest expression of man's freedom, from the religious as from

the ethical point of view, is the power he attains, as a self-determining Self, to choose courses of conduct upon a basis of judgments of worth.

The importance of the relation which the development of human freedom in the religious sphere sustains to the "value-judgments," can scarcely be overestimated. On the one hand, in the formation of these value-judgments man exercises his volition by deciding what shall have value, as judged to be of superior or supreme worth. For the judgment itself is not by any means a passive affair; it is, the rather, itself a mental activity involving self-determining will—a voluntary commitment of the Self to a mental attitude of preference. But, on the other hand, the character of the value-judgment, thus preferred, itself reacts to assist or to deter the development of a higher condition of freedom. Choices, often repeated, of the more spiritual values which are presented in the religious consciousness, set the will free from the influence of other lower competing impressions and solicitations. In the lower stages of man's religious life we find this competition between different kinds of the good;—between the sensuous valuables to which the will is compelled by appetite, passion, and desire, and the spiritual values which religion, in its higher stages of the activity of intellect and imagination, presents as rivals to the sensuous. And the man is called to choose between the two. This choice it is which seems to religion as a choice between the flesh and the spirit, or between the world and God, or between human favor and the Divine Approval; or, finally, between a widening moral separation from the Source of all spiritual Life and its voluntary acceptance as the indwelling and welcome Source of the soul's true and highest life.

In this way, fourth, the exercise of moral freedom in the life of religion emphasizes the self-determining attitude of the human being toward the Divine Being. And the kind of freedom which religion demands is the ability of the human will to respond to the Divine Will. Where the Divine Being

is conceived of as a motley and conflicting host of invisible superhuman powers, there is, of course, no freedom to worship God as perfect Ethical Spirit and to serve Him with fidelity and ethical love. Where the conception of the Object of religious belief is thus split up, as it were, and involves so heterogeneous and contending elements, the allegiance of head, and heart, and life, cannot freely go forth toward this object. The possibility of the highest kind of "freedom" in religion depends, then, upon the possibility of attaining the most unifying and harmonizing idea of this Object. But this possibility itself can only be realized in the form of a choice. Only that form of religion, therefore, whose conception of God is that of an Ideal which satisfies the religious needs, and which calls forth and fixes upon Itself the choices of the human soul, can fully develop the potentiality of freedom which lies hidden in the soul's depths. There is profound moral philosophy in the promise of Jesus to those who are his disciples indeed: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." (John viii, 31.)

There are other phases of religious experience which stand in still more remote relations to its psychological theory, but which are undoubtedly genuine facts of consciousness and which are suggestive of conclusions that are of great importance for the philosophy of religion. Among these is man's experience of his own spiritual powerlessness. From the religious point of view humanity finds itself unable, without the assistance which religion attributes to a divine Source, satisfactorily to perform the duties of religion or to realize its ideals. In this phase of experience we find in part, the genesis and support of the widespread belief in the illumining and uplifting work, within the human spirit, of the invisible spiritual agencies which are universally regarded as divine. The consultation of oracles, diviners, priests, and other means of receiving ideas and messages from the divine beings are tokens of this belief in the lower stages of religious development. The doc-

trines of inspiration, revelation, and spiritual redemption—all as having their sources in God—are the theistic and Christian form of the same belief. Man cannot, as he ought—in his relations to the Divine Being, as well as in his relations to human beings. It is this conscious spiritual powerlessness which makes men seek the “way of salvation;” and it is the promise to meet the need awakened by this consciousness which gives power to the “religions of salvation.”

When analyzed, such an experience of spiritual powerlessness appears to be by no means altogether an affair of the will. It is in part also an intellectual powerlessness, an inability of imagination and thought to discover what manner of Being God is. It is dullness and degradation of feeling as well. But it becomes preëminently a moral powerlessness, whenever the mind is met by the conception of a perfectly just, good, and holy Ethical Spirit, to whom man is responsible for his conduct, and upon his relations to whom man's spiritual weal and woe depend; thus there is truth in the declaration of Eucken:¹ “Severe and unjust as the saying may be—‘The virtues of the ancients are shining vices (*virtutes veterum splendida vitia*)’—it is not psychologically incomprehensible.”

This experience of spiritual powerlessness is accompanied by, or results in, another class of phenomena which are of importance in the psychological study of the religious life and development. These constitute the conflict between nature and spirit, as this conflict takes on its most interior character, and thus becomes a powerful influence in the genesis and evolution of the religious experience of humanity. The importance of manifold forms of struggle for the evolution of all kinds and stages of existence surely has not been neglected by modern science and modern philosophy. Religion, however, has to feel the potent working of a conflict which is more interior than that between external nature and man as a totality, or between the body and the mind of man. This conflict emerges in con-

¹ Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, p. 79.

sciousness when the obligations of the world of Ideals meet with the tendencies and forces which determine the world of present actual existence. The feeling of the incongruity between the two worlds, in both of which man seems bound to live, to discharge his many functions and to fulfil his destiny, together with the consciousness of his powerlessness to realize these Ideals under the existing conditions of Reality, occasions a painful state of longing and of spiritual unrest. This condition becomes an incitement and a challenge to free the soul by an act of will and thus to establish the desired internal harmony. But, as we have already seen, the way for accomplishing this desirable result is that voluntary abandonment of the human self, which religion proposes, to the Other and Divine Self.

In a crude and blind but truly genuine way of its first beginning, we may discover this movement of the human will toward God much lower down in the stages of religious race-culture than is usually supposed. Even savage men show traces of the desire to be at peace with the invisible spirits, for other than merely temporal and selfish ends. The consciousness of disharmony, and the desire to adjust themselves to the demands of their ideal world, are not wholly wanting to them. "Other-worldliness" is, in a measure, attractive and influential with them. By choice, they would, if only they could find the way, be freer than they are. With some religions—as, notably, with philosophic Brāhmanism and with Buddhism—this feeling of conflict and the induced longing for harmony furnishes a central conception and a potent *motif* of the religious life. The end of religion is thus conceived of as the freeing of the soul; and he who persistently and faithfully chooses this end, at the last attains it. He reaches the blessed union with Ātman, Nirvāna through enlightenment. When, however, the ideal of religion, as set before the individual, is the moral perfection of finite personality after the pattern, and by the help, of the perfect Ethical Spirit, then the nature of the conflict is profoundly modified, and the conception of the end sought is

radically changed. A self-surrender, which is the realization of the true Self, and a faith which is an attitude of rational and affectionate trust between Selves, defines the essence of religion; the perfection of these personal relations becomes the supreme goal of the religious life.

Thus we can neither on the one hand, agree with those disciples of Schleiermacher who would define religion as the feeling of absolute dependence, but with the addition of a "sense of freedom," nor, on the other hand, with Professor C. C. Everett,¹ who declares that the "sense of freedom is a resultant of religion," and then at once adds: "To include it among the fundamental elements of religion is a mistake." We must, the rather, say that the voluntary attitude of man as a self-determining will to the Absolute Divine Will is *the* most "fundamental element" of religion; but that such measure and manner of this moral freedom as psychology, ethics, and philosophy establish in fact, is a quite sufficient basis upon which to place securely the validating of the phenomena of the religious life of humanity.² Upon this point, in accordance with the religious view, no wisdom goes beyond that of the poet: "Our wills are ours to make them thine." For it is, in fact, the choice of the Object of religion in a spirit of faith and self-surrender, which carries with it all else that is most essential to its supreme realization as an experience.

Equally opposed to this sane and defensible view of the relation in which the freedom of man stands to the genesis and development of his religious experience are two extreme views. One of them exaggerates the independence and creative activity of the finite will. This may be done in such manner as to constitute what, from the point of view of the religious con-

¹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 78f.

² As summing up conclusions derived from a much narrower field of investigation, Starbuck affirms: "No matter whether or not the will has been definitely exercised, and regardless of the direction in which it has been exercised, it is an important step toward spiritual regeneration that the personal will be given up." *Psychology of Religion*, p. 99.

sciousness, justifies the charge of blasphemy. In its most audacious form it puts forth the conclusion that the individual Ego is at once Creator and creation:—

“Before me was no world—’tis my creation :
 ’Twas I who raised the sun from out the sea,
 The moon began her changeful course with me.”

From this exaggerated view may follow the practical conclusion that all religion is baneful, and that man needs no divine forgiveness and help; he is to all his real needs quite sufficient, and *culture* of the body and mind is “the all-sufficing surrogate of Divine worship.” Nay! “all religious ideals and systems—none more than the Christian” are “childish illusion utterly incompatible with right reason and rational ethics;” they are, indeed, “based on hideous immorality.”¹ But no answer to such ravings as these is needed, except the silent and scornful pointing of the finger to the facts of man’s religious history and of his present and essential religious constitution.

The other extreme view so relates the finite will to the Absolute Will, the human being to the Divine Being, that the former realizes the good of religion by being merged and lost in the latter. Man is then no longer a rational and free Self, when he attains the supreme end of religion; man is swallowed up in God. Such a view as this is characteristic of all reflective religions when they have committed themselves to a certain conception of the Object of religious faith. We have already seen what shape this view takes in the religious philosophy of Brāhmanism and Buddhism. But essentially the same view has appeared and reappeared in Christian philosophy from its beginning down to the present time.² The Gnostic doctrine of emanation naturally gave rise to a correlated doctrine among

¹ Quoted from an article by R. Lewins, M. D., *The Monist*, January, 1894, p. 208f. Even the quotation is justifiable only as an example of what may be when reason and religion part company.

² On the resemblances between the Christian and the Buddhistic doctrine of the soul, see Eucken’s citations in the *Monist* for 1898, pp. 275ff.

Christian thinkers of Gnostic tendencies, which found the "way of salvation" by a return to God ending in the absorption of the human soul *in* the Being, *from* which it originally came forth. This Gnostic doctrine was, therefore, scarcely distinguishable from the Brāhmanic doctrine of Ātman. But such an ending to the rational and free self-hood of man, by attaining the goal of religion, was not the tenet of heretical Gnosticism alone. The mystical tendency in Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and even in the earlier and more devotional writings of Augustine,¹ leads these writers to expressions which seem to imply such a surrender, by will, of the Ego-hood of man that he realizes the goal of religious aspiration by being lost or absorbed in the Infinite God. In the Middle Ages Scotus Erigena² and others indulged in even more extreme views. Many passages expressive of the same opinion might be quoted from Master Eckhart and the other Christian Mystics of later times.³ Eckhart not only affirms, "Wherever I am, there is God"—a declaration which, understood in a certain way, any pious soul might make; but he also declares that man's perfection is to enter into the Ground which is groundless; and of those who are born of the spirit he says, that their Ego "dies away in the miracle of Godhood, for in the oneness with God it possesses no discrimination. The personal loses its name in oneness."

Reference has already been made to the new problem which arises, and which the philosophy of religion must attempt to solve, or at least to understand, when the psychology of the religious experience discovers that the essence of religion, in its truest and highest form, consists in the voluntary attitude of a rational and free but finite Self to an Infinite and Absolute

¹ In his *De Vera Religione*, Augustine speaks of the man *qui cohaeret Deo* as attaining in this way the intrinsic good of religion.

² Thus Scotus goes so far as to declare that finally in God, *omnia quieta erunt, et unum individuum atque immutabile manebunt*.

³ See Pfeiffer, *Deutsche Mystiker*, II, p. 617f.

Self. The problem is, indeed, a dilemma. But like other problems of similar nature, where thesis and antithesis seem opposed, if not mutually exclusive and contradictory, the student of philosophy will be wise who always starts from, and frequently returns to, the facts of experience. But in its larger aspects the whole subject must come before us again as (in Parts IV and V) we consider the Being of God, and His relations to the World, especially as Moral Ruler and Redeemer; and, finally, the nature of Revelation and Inspiration, and the religious doctrines of immortality and of salvation.

CHAPTER XIV

MAN "MADE IN THE DIVINE IMAGE"

That man has made the gods to be in his own (man's) image, is a statement amply justified by both the historical and the psychological study of the phenomena of religion. In the history of religions we find the various products of this creative process, differing in the details of their character and in the forms of their combination, in dependence upon the physical and social environment. But the psychology of the religious experience shows us how man is, so to say, impelled and compelled to this process by the forces, that lie latent ("subliminal") or are consciously exercised, of his own soul.

The distinctively religious tenet reverses this statement. It affirms that God is the maker of man in his own (God's) image. On the one hand, then, we have an empirical science proving that the causes of the human-likeness and yet super-humanity of the Divine Being are to be found in man's nature. But, on the other hand, the beliefs of religion regard the cause of man's physical and spiritual qualities as referable to a Spirit that is invisible and divine. This belief may exist as a naïve presupposition, in the forms of totem-worship, ancestor-worship, or nature-worship. It may coexist with such lower forms of religion, as a belief in "creator gods" by whose generative or formative energy man and all other beings were originally produced. Or it may take the higher and more consciously rational positions of religious belief, and elaborate a doctrine of the relations of man to God as to his Creator and Preserver, or even as to his Father and Redeemer. Again, the religious

cult may regard this process of man's making by the invisible, divine hand, after the pattern of the Maker's Self, as almost if not quite instantaneous. Then man stands forth in the Universe, quite complete, and all of a sudden, himself a mythical being in some mythical Paradise or Garden of Eden. Or manhood itself may be regarded as the product of countless æons of an evolutionary process; but if this evolution is to be considered from the point of view, and subjected to the theory of reality, which the religious consciousness insists upon assuming, then the process is a divine procedure, and its product a divine creation. Man's evolution, for religion, is but God's way of making man in the divine image. The psychological truth involved in the assumption of an essential likeness between the two—a certain Oneness which accounts for the duality; this is an assumption upon which is based the very existence of religion at all. Its beliefs, sentiments, and practices, all depend upon the validity of the principle assumed:—namely, that man is both like God and inferior to and dependent upon God; and that God is somehow like man, and yet super-human and standing in the relations of a superior to man. When the writer of Genesis i, 26^f represents Elohim as saying, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness," and then asserts: "So Elohim created man in his own image, in the image of Elohim created He him;" he is putting this universal postulate of religion into a naïvely figurative form.

The attempt to estimate the scientific and philosophical value of the postulate, or impression, of the religious consciousness that man is a dependent creation of the Divine Being, yet, bearing a fundamental likeness to his Creator, is beset with many difficulties. So true is this that the fact of the assumption has been made one of the strongest proofs against its own validity. *Because* the conception of an Infinite and Absolute Self is the ideal construct of the human intellect and imagination, after the type of the human Self, *therefore* it is argued there can be no Real Being which is the correlate of this sub-

jective Ideal. In emphasizing this objection to the significance and validity of the activities of the religious consciousness it is customary to indulge in exaggerations of two different and even opposed directions. On the one hand, anthropology points out how irrational and impossible of realization, as well as ethically low and harmful, are the ideas which savage and primitive men form of their spirits and their gods; and, indeed, how much that must be regarded as survivals of savage superstition and immorality remains to the popular conceptions of God even in the most enlightened Christian lands. On the other hand, philosophy so refines and sublimates the conception of the Divine Being of the World, as Absolute and Infinite, that even philosophers themselves grow eager to admit the total incomprehensibility and wholly indefinite nature of their own conception. The gods of the heathen and the God of the Christian populace are, therefore, judged unfit to be believed in as real; and the Personal Absolute of philosophy, by being rendered a fit Object of belief, is actually shown to be incomprehensible and unreal.¹ Such is the critical and negating process with which science and philosophy have treated this psychological assumption of human religious experience, from the time when the ancient Greek sceptics ridiculed the popular divinities of that day, down to Mr. Matthew Arnold's biting sarcasm touching the conception of the Christian God, held by certain English Bishops of his own day.

That God has really made man in his own image is, of course, a belief for which no direct historical or psychological proof can possibly be given. In this respect this belief is quite different from the statement that man has made, and continues to make, God in man's image. The latter statement, properly understood, fitly summarizes our survey of the facts of religion by the historical and psychological method. The speculative objections to accepting the truth of the belief which underlies

¹ For the extreme negative conclusion along this line of argument, see Feuerbach's *Das Wesen der Religion*.

these facts require a critical examination and a speculative answer. But inasmuch as this underlying belief is itself a psychological affair, and indeed an affair which involves all the roots of that complex ontological consciousness to which reference has so frequently been made, it is desirable to examine it yet further, before taking leave of it, from the more definitely psychological point of view.

Man has made, and perpetually keeps on making, God in his own (man's) image. By the constructive work of his imagination and intellect he evolves an Ideal which he believes in as having place in the World of Reality. At its best, this work is done in such manner as to satisfy not only his lower needs and naïve intellectual curiosity, but also his higher ethical and æsthetical sentiments, and his scientific and philosophical requirements. In man's highest religious developments, God becomes for him the Personal Absolute who is perfect Ethical Spirit, the Ideal-Real, on whom man's being and life depend, and to whom his rational and free Self takes the attitude of a complete self-surrender and an utterly faithful allegiance and service. This is fact, capable of demonstration by the method of history and psychology.

The fact that man always and everywhere makes to himself God in his own image, and yet superior to himself, is a fact which itself demands explanation. This fact can only be explained on the admission of the following truths. Something permanent and universal in the constitution of man, as it reacts on its physical and social environment, gives the stimulus and the guidance to this constructive activity, this creative energy. In a word, man needs the satisfactions of the beliefs, sentiments, and cult, of religion. And, further, man needs a God so like himself as to stimulate and warrant the effort to enter into certain relations to the Divine; but, also, a God so superior to himself as to stimulate and command the effort on man's part to develop a fitness for these relations. Thus the Divine Being which the human mind constructs and believes

in, as Real Being, must be expressive of man's improved intellectual, moral, and social conditions; and it must also be suited to the purpose of contributing to the improvement of these conditions. From this point of view, the religious experience becomes a perpetual readjustment of man, as a real and idealizing being, to the Ideal which he constructs and places in his world of Reality. Were this not so, the religious development of humanity would entirely fall out of hopeful and helpful connection with all its other developments.

Now we can no more reasonably, in the name of science or philosophy, quarrel with the fact or the method of humanity's religious development than with any other of the forms of the complex progress of the race. Indeed—as has already appeared and as will soon appear more abundantly—the religious development is inseparably and necessarily locked in with all man's other developments. So far as there are data for a study of this form of human progress, religion appears to have been characterized by essentially the same experiences as those which characterize the other forms of human progress. Man's religious history, like his scientific, political, social, and æsthetical history, shows periods of lapse and retrogradation as well as of advance. There have been in this history, and there still are, various stages of development coëxisting side by side. The superior species of the religious life are mingled with, and influenced by, an environment of inferior or decaying species. Yet, on the whole, we may assert the fact of a marvelous religious development of the race. Especially under the powerful uplifting influences of Christianity, there appear reasons for the hope of a further religious progress of mankind.

The truth, therefore, is clearly established that religion, in all its historical procedure and in its progress in history, carries along with it a certain confidence in its own right to construct an improved metaphysics, or theory of Reality, which shall explain those experiences in which its essential nature consists. This brings us again face to face with the fact that the religious

experience is necessarily ontological. It regards the objects of its knowledge and belief as real existences and actual events. It cannot consider them as *mere* products of the imagining and reasoning activity of the human mind.

This general truth which the psychological analysis of the religious consciousness discovers regarding the method of its procedure, may be divided into two equally important factors. Both of these factors are found, equally important and always actively present, in all the exercises of man's cognitive faculty, and in all the growth of his cognitions. Of these, the first calls attention again to the truth that the human mind inevitably regards the constructs of its own imagination and intellect as significant and trustworthy representations of the beings and events of the objective and real (the so-called "extra-mentally" real) World, whenever such constructs seem necessary for a satisfactory explanation of experience. In general, the mind of man finds the grounds of its own conscious life in the Being of the World. Call this Being of the World the "World-Ground" or "Nature," call it the "Unknowable," call it "God," the process, psychologically considered, is essentially the same.

Scepticism of the philosophical kind carries to the extremest lengths its doubts as to the validity of this procedure. But these doubts themselves must somehow find their ground in this same Being of the World as it expresses its larger Nature in man's nature. And the very proposal to argue the doubts, to discuss the possibility of a valid knowledge of the Ultimate Reality with the most dogmatic Rationalism, when made by the most extreme, agnostic Scepticism, is still a proposal to appeal to some common source for a rational explanation of experience. Now all this is as true in science and philosophy, as it is in religion. And all this is as warrantable in religion as it is in science or philosophy. An ontological faith, or a reasoned metaphysical system, which will lend support to one kind of search for the truth, will lend support to all. A naïve or elaborate phenomenalism which applies to one, applies to

all. If that part of human experience which is called "science" is justified in making use of metaphysics in any form, in order to render itself self-intelligible, then that part of human experience which is religion is also justified in the same procedure. The "plain man's" consciousness is, from the point of view of its essential trustworthiness, as worthy of respect when it creates an invisible spiritual Power to explain some of its psychoses, as it is when it creates various equally invisible and impersonal forces or entities, to explain other of its psychoses. And at the further end of this ontological procedure, we may say that the philosophy of religion is not less worthy of respect and confidence than is any other branch of metaphysical philosophy.

The other important factor in the method of procedure adopted universally by the religious consciousness is to be described as its "anthropomorphizing" character. In the attempt to make divisions of a fixed kind among the different religions of the world, it is customary to distinguish one class as peculiarly anthropomorphic. Indeed, a certain stage of religious progress is supposed to have been reached, when men cease to regard the divine beings as vaguely differentiated and only temporarily localized "spirits" and come to consider them as gods, made more precisely after the pattern of men. Then it is, we are told, that the more primitive form of the religious belief in invisible spiritual powers rises to the grade of polytheism. Now whatever truth there may be in the distinctions involved in such a principle of division, these distinctions themselves do not in the least impair the principle for which we are contending. All religious belief is necessarily and essentially anthropomorphic. The scattered and ill-defined deities of an unreflective spiritism, and the personal God of monotheism, are as truly made by a process of anthropomorphizing, as are the manlike gods of polytheism. When man himself is not as yet known to himself as a self-conscious, rational, and free Self, he, nevertheless, conceives of the spirits which he dreads and worships, after the type set by the knowledge of his own un-

developed and vaguely self-conscious spirit. He constructs these invisible spirits like the spirit which he finds in himself, and which he projects into the bodies of his fellow men, as the necessary prerequisite of understanding their practical relation to himself, and of having any manner of social intercourse with them, as with those of his own kind. The spirits which he projects into the heavenly bodies, and into the earthly bodies of soil, and air, and wood, and water, and into the shapes of his dead ancestors as they appear to him in dreams, and into the animals which are so important a part of his environment, are all after the analogy of his own self-known and self-determining spirit. The divine ones are like human spirits, so far as their maker, man, as yet, knows or imagines what spirits really are or may be. But the invisible spirits, or gods, are also superhuman: for their presence is not always recognizable by the senses; their ways of behavior are mysterious; their powers do not seem to be limited as are the powers of his fellow men; and there is always an increasing amount of man's total experience which cannot be explained as resulting from the agency of a limited and purely human sort.

Those conceptions of the Divine Being which stand at the other end of the rising scale of religious culture are no less truly anthropomorphic than are the vague and fluctuating ideas of unreflective spiritism. But now it is another and more rational and well-informed man who is the maker of the conceptions. His God, too, is imagined and thought after the pattern of his own self-conscious, rational, and morally and æsthetically improved and aspiring Self. But the Ideal of Personality has fed upon the food which has nourished the reality of the finite person; and this Ideal has grown much faster even than has the reality, in the form in which it has become known by its own immediate experience with itself. Thus the Infinite and Absolute, the ethically perfect, and æsthetically sublime Self, is much more superhuman, even as compared with the improved personal being of man, than

were the invisible spirits of the savage as compared with his own savage spirit. But the God of the most advanced Christian Theism is—to speak most reverently—as truly an Object of human knowledge or faith, only when knowledge or faith result from this anthropomorphizing process, as are the spirits of spiritism or the gods of polytheism.

Furthermore, the abstract conceptions of the Divine Being which philosophic Pantheism has to propose are as thoroughly tainted—if taint it be—with this same anthropomorphism as are the mythical spirits of primitive man. This would-be impersonal, or super-personal, Divine Being is Itself a construct of factors derived from the experience of the finite person with what it is to be a person,—but with some of the most important, because ethical and spiritual, characteristics of personality left out of the accounting. The Ātman of Brāhmanism can be conceived of and worshipped as the World-Soul only by a process of personifying; and this process involves the combined working of the human imagination and intellect upon a basis of human experience. The Karma of Buddhism is equally the result of an activity which projects the factors known as operative in man's personal life into the Being of the World, into the cosmic processes. It, too, is anthropomorphic.

And, indeed, in the larger but perfectly true and justifiable meaning of the word, all science is itself but a process of anthropomorphizing. Science knows the world, and explains the world, as a system of interacting and *self-like* existences. All the categories which it employs are, as truly as are the categories under which religion knows the world, forms of this anthropomorphic process.¹ The Being of the World, as science knows it, is after the human pattern. For, how otherwise can man know, or imagine, or think this Being of the World than after the pattern of man's knowing, imagining, and thinking?

That the metaphysics of religion, and the metaphysics of

¹ For the detailed proof of this statement, see the author's *A Theory of Reality*.

physics, have their roots in the same psychological principles and processes, and that the two stand or fall together when summoned before the bar of the critical judgment is both the assumption and the conclusion of the Kantian critical philosophy. From the critical point of view, the physical sciences have no advantage over religion when they and it compete in the effort to present a valid picture of the Ultimate Reality. Both these sciences and religion have undergone, in the past, and are destined to undergo in the future, a course of development. Both offer, from different points of view, their different and often antagonistic explanations of the total content of human experience. The scientific explanation, in spite of its repeated protests against the charge of being uncritically metaphysical, and its repeated assertion of its own intention to confine its conclusions to the observed relations of phenomena, can never clear its own conscious procedure from the inevitable ontological beliefs, from the underlying ontological postulates. Science, in very truth, never really regards its statements, whether of fact or of law, as only subjectively valid. Let criticism call the attention of its devotees to the undoubted fact that it, too, like religion, is making the Being of the World after the image of man, as often as criticism will; still science goes on its way cheerfully trusting the human intellect and human imagination for the stupendous task of truthfully presenting the image of that which is more than image, which is the objectively Real. It is as true of science, as it is of religion, that the object of its cognition or belief is a man-made image, like unto its maker. But this mere image is not what science thinks itself to be discoursing about. Its subject of discourse is Nature; it is the larger Nature, "made in the image" of human nature, and yet always with the assumption that this former is the creator of the latter. Man makes Nature and spells It with a capital! in order to return the compliment of Nature's having first made man. Surely, from the standpoint of psychology, there is not so much difference after all between

this and the procedure of religion, when the latter converts the historical fact that man has made God in man's image into the ontological belief that God has made man in the Divine image.

But here again we are met by the important fact of a development. The history and psychology of religion show us how man makes progress, through experience, in his ability to construct the nobler and worthier conception of God, as he himself grows more toward the better realization of this conception in himself. As Nature, by the process of evolution, makes human nature more able to understand and appreciate her own Self, so this human nature constructs the more intelligent and appreciative conception of the larger Nature of which it is a product and a part. Thus physical science reasons in a circle; and the widening circle of correspondence between the Macrocosmus and the microcosmus moves on. The procedure of the reflective religious consciousness is closely allied to that of physical science. From its point of view the correlate of the development of the power of man to conceive of God is the doctrine of the progressive self-revelation of God. Or, to state the case in a more intimately personal way: Man's ability more worthily to represent the Infinite and Absolute Self is due to the reality of the fact, that this Absolute Self is making man more like his own Self.

Thus the persuasion of all religions is that, whenever and however man began, he was (so to say, in a germinal way) made in the image of God. He was so constituted that he was capable of coming into relations with the invisible and super-human spirits, on the basis of a likeness between himself and them. He could believe, could feel, could worship, as a religious being. With the inability of any hypothetical ancestor of man to have religious beliefs, and feelings, and to undertake the practices of religion, the religious history of humanity has nothing to do. It assumes, and it finds, this ability to be religious as far back as it can carry its researches into the past. But just as man had to struggle, and still has to struggle, to

assert his dominion over Nature by developing his own intelligence and freedom from her constraints, so man has to rise by effort into more and more of his destined likeness to God. And man's power to triumph over Nature is itself the gift of Nature; thus physical science would insist on considering the relations between the two. So that consciousness of spiritual powerlessness, with its sequent dissatisfaction and struggle, when it results in renewed inspiration, insight, and moral correspondence to the Divine Ideal, which the psychology of religious experience observes, is its own witness to the belief that the religious progress of the individual, and of the race, takes place by the gift and power of God. Thus experience creates the impression that the real cause of man's religious progress is to be found in the truth of the belief that God is making man more and more into the likeness of the Divine.

Out of the same experience which gives rise to the psychological explanation of how it is that man makes God in the image of human ideals, do we derive the conviction that God himself is the Reality which explains this very idealizing activity, with all the outcome of emotional and practical results which the activity conveys. This is to admit the truth of psychological science,—namely, that the ontological factors in this kind of human experience are no more strange or untrustworthy than in any other kind of human experience. That religion, when subjected to analysis as a series of psychoses in the individual and in the race, seems to be a certain experience of the real Being of the World,—that It is, and what It is,—is as true as that so-called science seems to be such another experience. As to the varying degrees of assurance of the "That," and the varying notions possible as to the "What," both science and religion must stand the tests that are appropriate to the different species of alleged truths which they have to proclaim. So far as the two experiences, when examined from the psychological point of view, are themselves concerned, the Nature which is posited as an extra-mental Reality by physical

science is as little immediate as the God who is posited as the Ground of all Reality by religion.

The most essential and significant factor in the religious progress of humanity is the improved conception of the Divine Being; and, consequently, the improved relations in which human beings may stand, and do stand, to this Divine Being. It is a fact of man's religious history, which the psychology of the religious experience can illumine and explain, that as man has gained in knowledge of the nature of the world, of his own Self-hood, and of the significance and value of human life, he has constructed his mental image of God after a more rational, morally pure, and artistically admirable pattern. As he himself has grown in justice, goodness, and appreciation of all ethical and æsthetical values, the God that should bring to him the requisite satisfactions has been conceived of as more perfect in these same ethical and æsthetical qualities.

It is a further fact that this rising of the conception of God, as the immanent Life of the World, and as the perfect Ethical Spirit, whose Will it is that man should, in his finite spirit, be like the Divine, has most powerfully influenced the different sides of man's evolution in history. The truth of this general proposition will be made yet clearer than it appears at present by the more detailed inquiry of the next following chapters. But it may be regarded as already proved, in fact, by the study of the conditions under which the differentiation of all religions and the genuine development of some religions have taken place.

Now if the scientific and philosophical explanation of the other forms and aspects of development grounds itself at once in the real Being of the World, why should the religious development be denied all right to rely upon the use of the same ontological postulate? That the religious consciousness, in its most naïve and most instructed form alike, does make use of this postulate has been seen to be a matter of universal experience. The discovery that their world is a development has not

destroyed the confidence of the sciences in their ability to give a true picture of this world. Why should the discovery that religion is a development impair the confidence of religion in its conception of the real Being of the World?

But if science and religion stand on terms of essential equality, with respect to their right to use the ontological postulate, when viewed from the psychological point of view, the case is not the same when their procedure is viewed from the standpoint of the ethical and practical interests involved. Religion cannot afford to overlook scepticism and agnosticism as to the validity of this procedure in the same way as that which occasions no great inconvenience to the physical sciences. This is true of both the main factors which characterize the method of this procedure. Let the conclusions of positivism or of phenomenalism, in any of its several forms, be accepted, and these sciences can go calmly and scarcely less successfully on their way. Indeed, they may receive a positive temporary benefit by being delivered from all dispute over the validity of their metaphysical tenets, in any particular one of the varying forms which the ontological postulate may assure. If the realities with which science deals are only "phenomenal realities," and if the objectivity of their objects is only such as is imparted by the active intellect itself, still the observed and inferred relations between the phenomena have a security and a value of their own. But phenomenalism in any form has always seemed abhorrent to religion. In the extreme form which it takes in the Hindū doctrine of *Māyā*,—all, whether things or selves, is illusory,—it must somehow be coupled with stupendous ontological doctrines and beliefs, if it is to give any satisfaction to the religious consciousness. And, in general, if man is fully convinced that his idea of the Divine Being is only the shadow of his own fear or desire, he must either adore himself who can cast such a shadow, or he must cease to adore at all. The Object of a truly religious belief and worship must find a place somewhere in the believer's and worshipper's scheme of Reality.

The special significance for the religious experience of the second factor in its metaphysical activity is no less obvious. Indeed, it is this factor which constitutes the very essence of religion as an experience, in an altogether peculiar way. The anthropomorphizing procedure of the physical sciences is for the most part unconscious and shamefaced. It is better done, if done this way. An analysis of the interior structure of things, so to say, does indeed show that they have, even as they are known, or imagined, or thought of, by these sciences, a limited and partial but truly "self-like" existence. Things are known, if known at all, as imperfect and, as it were, unfinished selves. What more than this they are, can never be known by man; for man knows them anthropomorphically. But it is by no means necessary or desirable that the scientific knowledge of things should be kept constantly aware of the significance and more or less doubtful value of this its mode of procedure. The relations toward things into which the physical sciences for the most part introduce us are not of an obviously and emphatically self-like character. When, for example, the savage cuts down the tree, and burns its wood, merely to warm himself in that way, or to assist in building his wigwam, he treats the tree as a thing, and the fire as a merely physical event. But when he worships tree or fire, he treats them no longer as mere things but as other selves, with whom he desires to enter into veritable personal relations. So the modern man, when investigating the culture, structure, and development of plant-life, or the chemistry of combustion, is treating wood and fire as so-called physical things. But when he refers them, in a devout and worshipful way, to the Source of all life, and to the Giver of every good and perfect gift, he regards them as manifestations of Personal Being and as the media of personal relations. He can, therefore, no longer be indifferent to the sceptical inquiry whether any truth of Reality can be conveyed in such a purely anthropomorphic way.

The two aspects of this one procedure, therefore, seem inseparably bound together in the religious experience. Religion cannot exist without the confidence of man that the Object which he constructs by activity of his own imagination and intellect, to the satisfaction of certain rational needs, has its correlate in Reality. The Object must be for him no figment of imagination, no mere construct of the active intellect. In order, the rather, that the religious purpose may be served, and its end secured, this Object must itself be regarded as having a sort of creative priority to, and supremacy over, the constructive work of the mind. Man makes God in man's image; because God has made man in the divine image. Man, as he becomes more fully man, more of a rational and free personality, more worthily and truly conceives of God; but this is because God is himself making man more and more like God. Thus, if expressed from the points of view which discern its two-faced bearing and significance, does the method of procedure adopted in the development of the religious experience of humanity, appear to psychological analysis. Its further criticism, and correction or defense, belongs to the philosophy of religion. The complex phenomenon, as considered in the light of psychology, is certainly significant enough to merit such criticism; we believe it, when critically explained, to be capable of defense.

From the analysis of the psychological nature and products of man's religious experience, the following corollaries appear to be deducible. And, first, strictly speaking, an *impersonal* religion—whether the term "impersonal" be applied to the subject of religion, or to its Object, or to the relations between the two—involves a contradiction in the conception. Religion is essentially a relation between persons. Only as man has developed, or is somehow in the possession of, those characteristic forms of reaction which constitute the essentials of personal being, and which express those relations of intellect, feeling, and will, that can maintain themselves only between

personal beings, can he be religious. The Object toward which these forms of reaction are directed must also be conceived of in personal terms,—must be anthropomorphically conceived. Whatever impersonal name be given to this Object, and however severe and thorough may be the effort to exclude from it all implications of personal character, the name, correctly understood, always reveals the unsuccessful character of the effort. The factors prominent in the anthropomorphic process may change; the meaning of the process may be concealed; the result may appear quite foreign to the character of its maker, the mind of man; but the real truth remains the same. And when the vague feelings which arise in the attempt to comprehend the incomprehensible, or to represent adequately in the pictorial imagination the ineffably sublime, or concretely to present under conditions of time and sense the perfections of an Infinite and Absolute Ethical Spirit, are the predominant factors in the relation of the finite consciousness to the Being who calls forth man's faith and worship, even then the essential fact is not changed. For these very intellectual, ethical, and æsthetical emotions, with their stirrings and never satisfied longings, are most noteworthy features of the religious and personal being of man.

From these characteristics of the religious experience it follows in the second place, that the development of the conception of Personality, or Self-hood, must be the most important and influential of the subjective factors in the history of the religious life of humanity. And the history itself proves the truth of this conclusion from the results of psychological analysis. Indeed, the various stages in the evolution of the religious experience of humanity are marked by characteristic changes, which are either advances or retrograde movements in this conception. This general truth, however, should not be interpreted in such manner as to attach inseparably the validity and practical value of the religious experience to any particular conception which advances the claim to be the finished meta-

physical product of any philosophical school. Brāhmanism, for example, regarded the so-called "Soul" as an indestructible and wholly mysterious entity which might somehow be considered as really existent even when absorbed in Infinite Being, and after having suffered the loss of all its conscious powers; but Buddhism thought to resolve it into a series of sensations and mental images that possess no bond except the illusory consciousness of the Ego which somehow cherishes the belief in a common ground. The Divine Being of Brāhmanism was accordingly, an impersonal World-Soul; and the Divine Being of Buddhism was the Law of moral sequences, really personified under the title of Karma. Views essentially similar to both of these, regarding the nature of Self-hood, have maintained themselves to the present time; but the modern view of a scientific psychology is not favorable to either of the two.

What, therefore, it is essential to our present purpose to emphasize anew is this: The psychological source of all the various forms of the religious idea is to be found in man's capacity and tendency to objectify his own Self-hood in such manner as to satisfy his deeper, most permanent, and most pressing, intellectual, æsthetical, and social needs. The intellectual needs are those which impel him to know and to correlate the causes of things. The æsthetical needs find satisfaction when he contemplates the admirable, the awful, the mysterious, the transcendently beautiful, the sublime. The ethical and practical needs require him to adjust his conduct to the interests represented by his physical and social environment, through self-control, and in a manner to realize his ideal of what a Self ought to do and to be.

Now we cannot set up arbitrary limitations to this personifying process. Nor can we fail to recognize its necessity and validity in the religious, as well as in all the forms of the development of mankind. The attribution of self-like qualities to all particular beings and—in the interests of an ideal unity—to the Being of World, belongs to the essential nature of

knowledge and of the growth of knowledge. But as to what particular self-like attributions he is warranted in making in particular cases, man learns by experience. The savage is much divided in his interests and in his tendencies upon this point. But civilized and cultured man is also much in ignorance here. No little clear thought and deep feeling are manifested by the phrases with which the former describes his idea of the man-like and yet super-human Spiritual Being in whom he believes. "The Old Man above" (certain California tribes), "He who lives in the Sky" (the Creek Indians), "He Above All, Lord of the Sky" (the Aztecs);—these and similar expressions do not, indeed, mark the attainment of a definite conception of One Personal God, but they exhibit the working of the human mind on the way to this conception.¹ All similar conceptions are instances of the same intellectual necessity for an explanation of the World which shall speak to the finite Self as coming from a superior and Divine Self. It was this which drove one of the Incas to the conclusion that the heavens, earth, and man, must be "the work of the all-powerful, unknown God, the Creator of the Universe." To him this anthropomorphic reasoner erected a temple nine stories high and dedicated it to the "Unknown God, the Cause of Causes."²

Inasmuch, however, as this explanation of his experience with himself and with things, and the satisfaction of the spiritual needs which it affords, are never complete,—and indeed its completion grows relatively more distant as man advances in race-culture—the inexpressible and mysterious nature of the Object of religious belief and worship is never diminished but is rather increased. With savage and primitive man the super-humanity, or superiority, of the divine beings, may easily be of a very limited character. "The being deified," says D'Alviella,³ "may have the advantage over his worshipper only in

¹ Compare Brinton, *The Religion of Primitive Peoples*, chap. II.

² See Prescott, *Conquest of Mexico*, I, p. 192*f.*

³ *Origin and Growth of the Conception of God*, p. 63.

some one important faculty, or may escape his comprehension under some one aspect only." Yet the inexpressible and mysterious nature of the invisible and superhuman beings is mutually acknowledged and even emphasized by every form of religion from lowest to highest. Nowhere in antiquity, perhaps, do we find this more palpably expressed than in that strange mixture of beliefs and cults which the remains of ancient Egypt enable us so vividly and yet so imperfectly to reconstruct. Here are remnants of totem-worship and animal-worship;—indeed, of nature-worship from the most degraded to those most exalted forms, where it closely approaches the formulas of a developed pantheism or monotheism. Here also is a most elaborate idol-worship, consisting of paying divine honors to dolls of not more than a foot or two in length. What more could be done to bring the divine beings down to the limitations of the comprehensible and even within the bounds of the contemptible, by man? Yet so carefully were these idols guarded from profane eyes that, according to Erman,¹ no trustworthy detailed description of the most sacred of them is left among the records of Egypt. Nor can the mystery about religion be charged to the account of an insincere attempt on the part of the more intelligent to maintain intact, by a species of impressive concealment, their control over the vulgar multitude. To kings and priests of this remote antiquity, as well as to the common people, the Egyptian conceptions of the Divine Being seem equally vague and mysterious.

And now we are met by the strange and paradoxical conclusion respecting the psychology of the religious experience, that the increase of knowledge, or of rational faith, respecting the characteristics which it is proper to ascribe to the Divine Being does not abolish, but rather heightens, the impression of its ultimately inexpressible and mysterious nature. This "familiarity"—if we may venture so to call it—is not of the

¹ Aegypten und Aegyptisches Leben im Altertum, p. 373.

kind that "breeds contempt." Under whatever figures of speech the conception of this Being is presented to the human mind, it does not lose those marks which compel the recognition of its superhuman excellence, its superiority to all that man can imagine or think. But this is to say that, somehow, the selfhood of man shows the power of developing an ever purer, higher, and more comprehensive, Ideal of Personal Being, without approaching the limit where it shall become either satisfied, or discouraged, by the completeness of its own work. Is it so strange, not to say irrational, then, that the religious consciousness regards this very power of unlimited development as the trustworthy manifestation of the Reality which corresponds to this Ideal?

Considerations which are derivable from this procedure of the religious consciousness may be converted into so-called proofs for the Being of God, and for the reality of the other great conceptions and principles of religion. But all these considerations, in order to arrive at the dignity of valid "proofs," must be subjected to the critical and comparative method of reflective thinking. In other words, religion needs the further assistance of philosophy if these phenomena of the religious experience are to be made into a system of cognitions or rational beliefs. Reason, as informed and guided by other than the religious experiences, must be invoked to aid in determining how far the psychological truth that the image of God is made by man, has for its correlate the ontological truth, that this image is the divine self-revelation in the mind of man. Thus it will appear whether philosophy may not unite with poetry in saying:—

" Mind seeks to see,
Touch, understand, by mind inside of me,
The outside mind—whose quickening I attain
To recognize." ¹

The survey of the religious experience, especially from the

¹ Browning in Bernard de Mandeville.

point of view of its metaphysical procedure, shows us in part why it seems more appropriate to employ the word "faith" than the word "knowledge," to designate the attitude of man's mind toward his own conception of God. No valid reason can, indeed, be found in the Kantian distinction between knowledge and faith, or in the Kantian theory of knowledge with its phenomenalistic and sceptical outcome. The faculties employed in forming the conceptions of religion are the same as those which science or the ordinary practical knowledge of things employs; nor is the fundamental nature of the mind's metaphysics different, or less essentially trustworthy, in the two cases. In the Kantian meaning of these words, faith and knowledge mingle in both science and religion; and the activities of imagination and intellect, under the constitutional modes of the mind's functioning (the so-called "categories") are not essentially unlike in the two. But the genesis and growth of these activities is different in science and in religion; the character of the Ideal which is objectified is not the same; and, consequently, the total mental attitude in which the believer in the objectivity of his own Idea stands to it, as Object, has a markedly different character.

In man's knowledge of things the activity of imagination and intellect starts from a basis of sensuous experience; the imagery under which the presentations of things are reproduced in consciousness is after the pattern of this sensuous experience. The more remotely inferred qualities and changing relations of things are mentally representable in the same way. As long as any "Thing" is *mere* thing, what it is to me, remains what it is seen, heard, and felt to be through sensation-complexes of skin, muscles, joints, etc. But the *spirit* that is in the visible thing, is itself invisible and non-sensuous; and the idea of this spirit is constructed in terms of the self-conscious Ego who believes another Ego to be *in* the thing which it knows through the senses. The "Thing" is known as a visible and tangible non-self; but its "Spirit," if it has

one, is believed in as another invisible and intangible Self. In the same way one man may say to another, I *believe* that you are angry, because I *know* that your countenance is flushed, or you are shaking your fist, or clenching your teeth; I *believe* that you are sorry or in pain, because I know that tears are coming from your eyes, or sobbings from your chest, or grimaces are on your face. All nature-worship thus rests on the interpretation of sensuous experiences with things in terms of the consciousness of self. The imagination attributes to things which are visible and tangible, the inner explanatory life which is not visible or tangible, but is known to the self by self-consciousness. Thus all so-called argument from nature to God, or from external natural changes (physical events, *natura naturata*) to an inner Reason, or principle of being and life (Nature as Primal Cause, *natura naturans*) is an interpretation of things, as known through sense-perception, by referring their behavior to the belief in conscious indwelling spiritual powers.

We do not need again to refer to the fact that all the physical sciences, in their interpretations and explanations of the behavior of things, are obliged to resort to many invisible and intangible entities, powers, and processes of a *quasi*-spiritual character. This is that realm of so-called science, in which belief in the constructs of human imagination and intellect, rather than knowledge of fact and law, is most abundant. Thus it would be equally appropriate to say that all chemico-physical theories, or systems of evolution devised in the interests of accounting for the observed behavior of organic beings, are matters of rational belief rather than of knowledge. At any rate, he who accepts these theories cannot be accused by the believer in God of a lack of faith; and the latter cannot well be despised by the former because of a groundless faith. Both science and religion, from their different points of view, are trying to comprehend the Being of the World as manifested in human experience.

But, in the second place, the Object of religion, on account

of its characteristics as an Ideal, is more fitly spoken of as an object of rational faith than as an object of knowledge. Indeed, in the narrower meaning of this word, "knowledge" seems less appropriate to describe our mental apprehensions, or comprehensions, of any of our ideals. In the construction of even the simpler and lower forms of the ethical, æsthetical, or social and political,—as well as the religious,—conceptions of what ought to be, the mind passes beyond the limits of that which is actual, as known by immediate experience. The ideal is, the rather, suggested or indicated by experience. Its implicates may be concealed or more plainly involved in experience. But its realization is not, as yet, present there. All this is pre-eminently and peculiarly true of the ideals of religion. In the lower forms of religious development, their close connection with mythology, folk-lore, magic, and poetical cosmogonies, shows the truth of this statement. In all these forms the idealizing tendency of the mind is displaying its constructive work. They all deal with ideas of that which, although the need of it is felt for the explanation and satisfaction of experience, is not itself completely given in any of the experienced realities. But in the higher and the highest forms of religion, the Ideal takes up into itself all the most significant factors of all the ideals. God is conceived of as the ethical, æsthetical, and social Ideal One; He is the One and Alone Ideal-Real, the summing-up of all human ideals in Reality. Such a conception, on account of its own intrinsic nature, is an object for rational faith rather than for knowledge, in the narrower meaning of the latter word.

The same opinion may be reached by recalling how the value-judgments come to arrive at conclusions respecting the nature of the objects about which they are pronounced. These judgments all proclaim the conformity, or non-conformity, of some concrete real object, or actual individual act or person, to an ideal standard which represents what ought to be. This concrete reality has its value for the human soul in dependence upon its conformity to the standard applied. The judgment

affirms with conviction that this is really so. But the value-judgment cannot affirm—does not carry with itself the affirmation—that this standard of the ideal is realized anywhere. It ought to be; and the soul of man has somehow an exhaustible and sustained faith that it is so. This faith may be made reasonable by a justification of the grounds on which it reposes, either by an analytic study of its own genesis and content, or by an examination of the part which it plays in the interpretation and explanation of the totality of experience. Thus the naïve belief becomes a rational faith. But the very nature of the Object, regarded as an Ideal constructed in confidence upon a chain of reasoning whose links are judgments of value, makes the term “rational faith” more appropriate than “scientific knowledge” to describe the entire process.

And, finally, the whole mental attitude of the human soul toward the Object of religion is such as to emphasize the emotional and practical sides of the religious experience. If the Being of the World is denied personality, and so not regarded as the equivalent either of the God of Theism, or the complex of spiritual powers worshipped by an “unreflective spiritism,” and yet is contemplated as a beautiful and mysterious Totality, called the Cosmos or Nature, even then the mental attitude is more distinctly religious than scientific. It is the attitude of faith and feeling and will, rather than the attitude of clear knowledge or reasoned theory. It is the attitude of the mountain-top, or sea-shore, or star-light night, rather than the attitude of the laboratory or the workshop. But when this Being of the World—whether on logically valid or invalid grounds, it does not now concern us to inquire—is conceived of as infinite and perfect Ethical Spirit, the soul’s Father and Redeemer, and the all-wise and good Creator of the Universe, then adoration, ethical love, and submission of will, are the dominant factors in the mental attitude awakened. But this is the attitude of filial piety, or faith in a Person, rather than of scientific or reasoned cognition of a system of forces and laws.

It must not be thought, however, that in this way the negative conclusions of the Kantian criticism have after all been adopted ; or that we have simply returned by another path to the well-known ground of phenomenalism in religion. For, on the one hand, the beliefs of religion, like the cognitions of science, have their roots in experience ; and, on the other hand, the cognitions of science so-called, like the beliefs of religion, are many of them far more appropriately designated as belonging to the region of faith than of knowledge. Finally, all the cognitions and beliefs of both science and religion are matters of growth, in dependence upon an unceasing effort the better to interpret and to explain the sum-total of human experience. In this effort, the psychology of both has words of caution, as well as of encouragement and commendation, to utter.

CHAPTER XV

THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

In studying the differentiation of religions everywhere, and the more marked cases of religious progress attained by certain portions of the human race, it was necessary to refer to influences from the environment as constituting an important explanation of the phenomena. But the environment is always partly physical and partly social; and the social environment itself is largely a construction due to the complex reactions called forth by the stimuli of the physical surroundings. The complex result of all these reactions, objectively regarded, we called "race-culture;" and, on trying to separate from its other elements those which more definitively bear the marks of man's religious nature, plain indications of the truth were found, that his religious development in history is intimately related to all his other developments. In this manner, the peculiar forms of differentiation and of development which the religious life of humanity displays may, in large measure, be accounted for historically.

In the study, by the psychological method, of those activities of the human soul in which religion, for the individual, inevitably arises as an essential part of his experience with himself and with the world, we have now been led to consider the same phenomena from a changed point of view. The beliefs, feelings, and doings—the total attitude—in which religion, subjectively considered, consists, are themselves reactions dependently connected with other reactions, in its unity, of the same human being. Thus the different main factors or aspects, of that

totality which bears the name of race-culture, are all subjectively bound together, because they are interrelated activities of the one human nature. Thus, too, the forces and influences which shape religion regarded as an historical development, when these same forces and influences are looked at from the psychological point of view, may be regarded as interrelated reactions of man's spiritual life and spiritual development. Expanding the horizon covered from this psychological point of view, it will now appear how man's industry and politics, his science and philosophy, his art and his morality, act and are acted upon by his religious beliefs, sentiments, and cult.

Before beginning this wider survey from the standpoint of psychology, it is desirable again to remind ourselves how exceedingly complex are the influences that shape the religious experience in its dependence upon its total environment. The stimuli which come more immediately and directly from the physical surroundings, although varied and subtle, are relatively simple and easy to estimate. The same, or similar influences from nature arouse and determine the course of man's industrial, political, scientific, artistic, and ethical, as well as religious development. In all these directions, too, the influences to be traced more directly and immediately to so-called nature are *relatively* simple and calculable. But when all these different main forms, or aspects, of race-culture are considered in their reciprocal relations, in their action and interaction, the problem becomes immensely complicated. To determine the measure of the forces, and to plot the curve along which humanity moves in obedience to the laws of these forces, surpasses all the powers of human calculation. "For this curve of the evolution of Civilization is," as a recent writer¹ on the subject has well said, "the product and outcome, not of any one or more or even all of these factors when taken *separately*, but of the interplay of them all *when united and combined as parts of a single great organic movement*; examples of which we may see in abundance

¹ Crozier, History of Intellectual Development, III, p. 9.

in the way, for instance, in which the political and social conditions of the Barbarian Invaders of the Roman Empire reacted on the Theology of the Church, this on the political power of the Papacy, that again on the political fortunes of every State in Europe, and all on private and public morality. Or again, in the way in which the politics of the Church reacted on its doctrines, these again on the Reformation, that on political liberty, and all, as before, on morality. Or, yet again, in the way in which new born Physical Science affected Theology, that in turn Politics, and that again Morality, and so on."

The following brief survey, from the psychological point of view, of the varied and complex interactions between the religious experience and the other forms of man's conscious life, cannot hope to attain the dignity of a scientific induction. Indeed, it will make no attempt at such an unattainable ideal. It will be enough, if it shall seem to furnish a vivid and life-like picture of that varied activity of the soul of man, in its unity, in which activity the religious experience bears so important a part. And beginning with what is most simple and indisputable, let us cast another glance at the part which the physical environment plays in the excitement and unfolding of this experience. What has already been said upon this matter (see pp. 165 *ff.*) will enable us to dispense with detailed illustration.

The influences of natural beings, forces, and events, to awaken and guide the religious consciousness are both direct and immediate, and also mediate and indirect. For his observation and reflection in view of physical phenomena, on the one hand, stirs man to wonder and to worship, and, on the other hand, it conditions his industry and his politics, determines much in the character of his scientific and philosophical efforts, stimulates his art, and influences profoundly his morality. Physical nature does not *make* human industry, politics, science—much less, art, philosophy, and morality. Man makes these; they are the constructions of his active Self-hood, the

varied forms of his "will-to-live" and to develop. But they are all made by man in dependence upon what is furnished to him from that Being of the World which constitutes his physical environment. They are the reactions of human nature upon a basis reared by the larger Nature of which man is a part.

Now man's religion, like his industry, politics, science, art, and morality, is not made for man, or in man, by his physical environment. But it, like them, is made by man with a certain dependence upon this environment; and all this direct and immediate dependence upon external nature, in which so many varied reactions of man's mental life and development have their share, is immensely complicated by an indefinite variety of indirect and mediate forms of dependence. Industry influences religion, and religion influences industry; the same thing is true of man's political and scientific developments. His culture in art, and his growth in morality, are dependently related—with a dependence which is reciprocal—to his religious life. And thus by many twisted and complex ties man's religious experience is bound in with the on-going life of what we are pleased to call the Nature of the World.

But the converse of this truth is also true. For the variations in human industry, politics, science, morality, and even, although to a less degree, art and religion, effect changes in physical nature. Through all these forms of his activity, which enters into the complex product of civilization, man exercises a moulding influence upon his own physical environment. In its effect upon the universe at large, this influence is very strictly limited; it may not, indeed, be appreciable by the most delicate instruments for its detection. But so far as the secondary results are concerned, in the building up by human efforts upon an improved physical basis, of the structure of civilization, these changes in nature itself are most important and widely influential. Industry, politics, and science,—all human reactions upon natural stimuli,—compel and solicit

nature to assume new forms which are much more favorable to the growth of civilization itself.

Religion, in its lower forms, is less directly interested and influential in the reshaping and improvement of man's physical environment than are industry, politics, and scientific progress. In its higher developments religion is less dependent than are they, upon the character of the physical environment. No unimportant part of its aim is to raise man above dependence upon nature for the realization of his own highest well-being, for the attainment of those ends esteemed *good* by his allied value-judgments. Nevertheless, religion always, in all its developments, is bound in with these other interests. And what its history shows to be true in an objective way, its psychology shows must be true on account of the unity of human nature, in all man's various interrelated reactions upon his total environment.

What we have, then, as the problem afforded by all the relations, both direct and indirect, both immediate and mediated by industry, politics, science, morality, and art, between man's religion and man's physical environment, is an exceedingly complex development. From the point of view of religion itself this development appears as the fitting expression of the entire life of humanity, environed by the rich, varied, and changeful life of Nature. And not only, or chiefly, this. The rather does the environment itself appear as the physical and social setting in which an immanent Divine Life awakens and fosters the religious life and growth of man. If the motley group of an indefinite number of spirits, with which the religious beliefs of primitive man have peopled the physical environment, in order that he may thus the better understand and perchance control its behavior, is now banished forever from its ancient seat; this is only, as the steadfast conviction of the religious experience assures itself, to the final end that man may recognize, adore, and obey the One Divine Spirit now made known to him through the unifying of the world's in-

finitely varied existences and phenomena. Man answers the stimulus, and improves the opportunity, which the physical environment furnishes, with the varied and interrelated activities of his living soul. In and through these reactions he moulds into preferred forms of contact with himself this same physical environment. He develops industry, politics, science, philosophy, art, morality, and religion—all interrelated forms of development, among which religion is by no means least potent or least entitled to esteem.

Among the more direct and immediate influences which man's religious life and development receives from his physical environment, two principal classes may be distinguished. Of these, the first consists of those influences which this environment exerts by way of stimulating the mental reactions, chiefly emotional, in which religion so largely has its subjective source, or its genesis when viewed from the psychological point of view. To these may be added the more specific influences of physical nature in shaping the conceptions of men as to the nature of the Divine Being and of his relations to mankind.

It is the doubtful and mixed character of Nature's procedure with man—now kindly, and awakening gratitude and hope, now severe and destructive, and so arousing fears and desires to escape from threatening evil—which renders Her so powerful a generatrix of the fundamental religious emotions. The young human animal, like the young among many other species of animals, when stirred to fear by the threat of danger from its environment, instinctively skurries to its parent for protection. The adult man, like the adult of other animals, seeks shelter in nature from nature's own forces of wind, and lightning, and sunshine. But man, unlike any other animal (and this is chiefly due to his superiority of imagination and intellect), when he is threatened with dangers that are occult, or that he cannot readily understand how to control, seeks refuge by placing himself, if possible, on the side of the invisible spirits, or the gods, or by the side of the One Alone om-

nipotent God. Were this fear wholly blind, it could not, of course, act as a source of religion. But it is not wholly blind, although the object to which it designs to point, and the way which it directs the soul to follow, are much overshadowed by the obscurity of ignorance and doubt. With these fears the influence of the same physical environment blends many hopes and expectations of good. Out of the clouds come the refreshing showers and the destructive storms; indeed, the same downpour of rain brings the good of the harvest and the blighting of the crops. Thus nature treats her human children through all the various displays of her manifold powers; and when the imagination and intellect of man spiritualize these powers, or personify Nature as a totality, the fears and hopes, and the desire to secure the good and to avoid the evil, become those emotional reactions upon men's physical environment in which the genesis of religion is to be found.

But the unsatisfying character of man's physical environment awakens religious feelings of another kind. Among these are the sense of need and the feeling of dependence,—two important emotional sources of the religious life. In the lower stages of civilization the entire multitude of humanity, and even in the higher stages of race-culture, vast multitudes of men, constantly suffer need of the most imperative physical kind. If Nature is ordinarily kind, human needs are meagerly or more bountifully supplied; but if she is churlish or inordinately sparing in her gifts, the question how to solicit or compel the opening of the divine hand becomes a question of life or death (*So weckt Gott durch die Welt den religiösen Trieb*). Man's continually recurring and increasing physical necessities, which always tend to exceed the assured results of his own industry and skill, can be met—so he thinks and imagines—only by assistance from an invisible, spiritual source. The divine beings who control the physical environment must help, and they must somehow be got upon the helpful side, or man, if not doomed to perish, can certainly never have his desires sat-

isfactorily met. For when these physical needs are not only reasonably satisfied, but are so stuffed to satiety as to create a loathing for the goods they have craved, fortunately for the religious life, other needs demand and find a satisfaction that seems to proceed from the same physical environment.

It has already been made clear that even savage and primitive man, if he is to be regarded as already subject of a truly religious experience, does not regard his natural surroundings wholly from these lower and more selfish points of view. In this matter we cannot accord with the opinion of a certain writer on Christian apologetics who has ventured to affirm¹: "God can call forth religion, like every spiritual form of life, only by means of some definite species of effect which the world has upon us. For our spiritual life receives its impressions in no other way than by the medium of the animal life. And this happens, neither through the beauty of the world, nor through its conformity to law." Even the influences of the physical environment which awaken the psychical reactions of wonder, awe, and the sense of mystery, are not to be placed on the same level with its incitement of the more selfish forms of fear, hope, and desire. This wonderful and mysterious Nature in which man feels himself dependently to be placed is worthy, on its own account, of being regarded otherwise than simply through the medium of what it can give to man, or can withhold from him. *It* appears wonderful, awful, mysterious, and so worthy to be believed in and worshipped as Divine. The wonder which is "the dearest child of faith" (*Das Wunder ist des Glaubens's liebstes Kind*) is itself the parent of the dearest and yet most respectful faith.

In order to satisfy this sense of need and dependence upon his physical environment, in accordance with the feelings of wonder, awe, and mystery, which are awakened by its ways of

¹ See D. Hermann Schultz, *Grundriss der Christlichen Apologetik*, p. 20f.

procedure, man at first tries the method of magical incantations and charms. In a somewhat higher stage of religious development, he resorts to superstitious rites and ceremonies, or to bloody sacrifices. Then, when there has dawned upon him the conception of Nature as some sort of an orderly Totality, which has wise if inscrutable ends before it, and which is moving towards those ends and carrying along his individual interests and individual life, he tries higher and purer methods of adjusting himself to his environment. His attitude toward the Being of the World—now regarded as a sort of invisible and spiritual Unity which manifests itself in the various particular beings, forces, and processes, of his own physical environment—becomes more distinctly æsthetical and ethical. He adjusts himself to this Being, by states of belief, feeling, and will, in the more definitely religious forms of contemplation, adoration, submission, and obedience.

In close connection with such reactions upon the manifestations of its wonderful and mysterious nature which the World-Being makes through physical phenomena, are the incitements offered by the same phenomena to the more definitely æsthetical and *quasi*-ethical sentiments of religion. For the mind which, as yet, does not know Nature under any conception of its essential unity, however fanciful and unscientific, the unlimited power and glorious majesty of some of the natural phenomena are still exceedingly impressive. But the reactions with which man greets his physical environment when he recognizes in it the signs of a sublime and, as it were, ethical orderliness, approach a much higher character. Nowhere else in the religions of the world do the æsthetical and virtually moral reactions appear in more pronounced, and even in ecstatic, form than in the rationalistic or emotional Pantheism of the post-Vedic period of Brāhmanism. “*OM*, adoration be to Thee, Thou art the God of the gods, the God of the world. . . . Thou art the Lord of strength and of speech, and the Lord of the terrestrial world and of the heavens, the Lord of the woods, and of the showers

of rain," etc.¹ Indeed, among the Hindūs the more emotional phases of these reactions excited by the contemplation of the Divine Being of physical nature, not infrequently assume an expression similar to that of the lover toward his mistress. "Ye trees with bending boughs! Did our beloved Lord receive your greeting with His loving look while wandering here, sporting with the fairest of his nature, followed by swarms of bees (that would hum on your buds as on the Toolsi leaves)."

Nor is Theism by any means wanting in numerous evidences that in the souls who believe in One Alone and truly Personal God, similar sentiments and emotions are called out by contemplation of the manifestations of Himself which he is thought to make in physical phenomena. On the one hand, we have the severer and more rationalistic, even though highly figurative and poetical utterances of the Hebrew Psalmists. Yahweh is there seen to make the processes of nature his ready servants, for the execution of his decrees of justice and of mercy. When He appears in his majesty, the mountains skip, the sea flees back, the earth trembles. Or, again, the beauties of the physical surroundings of man are worn by Yahweh as his garment. Nowhere in all literature does the æsthetical and ethical character of the Divine Being as manifested in man's physical surroundings find a more complete and worshipful reception by the religious consciousness than in the case of the writer of the one hundred and fifth and one hundred and seventh Psalms. While, on the other hand, the mystical interpretation of the Song of Solomon, and abundant passages in the writings of the Christian mystics of the Middle Ages, are exact parallels to the most emotional forms of the Brāhmanical experience. They who are inclined to minimize the influences of physical Nature in awakening and guiding toward a worthy Object the religious feelings should remember how the philosopher Kant put the starry heavens above, and the moral law

¹ Vishnu Smṛiti, chap. 98. For other similar expressions, see the work of Kishori Lal Sarkar, on *The Hindū System of Religious Science and Art*.

within, as it were on a par in their power to stir the soul to the feeling of the sublime. And the feeling of the sublime was with this thinker, the one most unmistakably ethical and religious of the æsthetical emotions.

We have already had abundant reason to notice the important and even decisive influence which man's physical environment has everywhere had in moulding his conceptions of the nature of the Divine Being, and of the relations in which man stands to this Being. This class of influences, too, is both direct and indirect. In largest measure, in the case of the higher religious developments, it is the industrial, political, scientific, philosophical, artistic, and ethical forces in the complex of race-culture which determine what ideas of God shall be held, and what the ideals of the religious life shall be. The reactions called forth by these forces in the religious activities of imagination and thought, as they elaborate the ideas and ideals of this peculiar kind, require consideration in separate chapters. But a more direct influence from the physical environment upon the conceptions of religion requires, again, a brief notice from the psychological point of view. This direct influence is especially noteworthy at the two ends, as it were, of man's religious development. At the one end stands the naïve and unreasoned assumption that every important event in nature, and every significant natural being, must be regarded as, in some separate way, divine. There is truth in this assumption when the idea of "separateness" has received its due correction from the growth of experience with the real nature of the world. And as we saw, through earlier discussions, (p. 111*f.*) a certain inchoate and vague feeling of unity pervades this conception of separate spiritual and divine powers. But where the more scientific and philosophical conception of the world's Unity has achieved its place of control, there again physical nature comes to be regarded with new interest and increased respect and reverence as the revealer of the Nature of God. And now, if the reflection attains its highest possible

point of precision and dignity, the value-judgment respecting the individual being and individual phenomenon is not sunk in the vague feeling of the worthy majesty and power of the Ideal Unity. The conception of the concealed, but genuine and priceless value of the *Individual*—whether human, animal, or so-called “purely” physical—becomes the rational and efficient corrective of the pantheistic tendency. But, on the other hand, the scientific and philosophical conception of a Unity in which all natures of the particular species, and all individual natures, have their Ground, becomes the equally rational and efficient corrective of materialistic and naturalistic tendencies.

When such facts of experience are subjected to the tests of philosophical criticism, and are thus made to assume their proper place in a system of religious philosophy, it will be seen whether the conceptions of Nature and God are identical or antagonistic; and if neither identical nor antagonistic, whether the relations of each to the other, and the peculiar field covered by each exclusive of the other, can be more clearly determined. That man does react with definitely religious conceptions and feelings in the presence of his physical environment is a psychological necessity, and an historical fact, about which there can be no manner of doubt. That these reactions sometimes, under favorable circumstances, rise high into the regions of his best æsthetic and even ethical sentiments; that they give birth to his profoundest and most rational beliefs and produce and nourish various forms of religious cult;—about this, too, there can be as little doubt. It must also be admitted that these soarings of imagination and reflective thinking are all accompanied by those ontological convictions which give to the experience the characteristics of a commerce with Reality.

The direct influences of the physical environment upon man's religious ideas are most forceful and obvious in the case of the lower and vaguer forms of nature-worship. These religions may be represented as caught and held fast¹ in certain limited and

¹ The term “Naturbefangene Religionen” is used for this class of religious

largely erroneous conceptions of the Divine Being and of His relations to the world of things and of men. The conceptions themselves are irrational, not because they recognize in all natural beings and physical phenomena an invisible and super-human spiritual presence, but because they consider these beings and events in their isolation, or by separate groups; and because they judge the Divine Being of the World by the more immediate and grossly material relations in which these beings and events stand to their individual and selfish interests. Such religions, therefore, do not adequately recognize the inner Unity of Nature,—whether regarded as a unity of force, or a unity of order under law, or a unity of a more æsthetical and ethico-political or social kind. But the same conceptions are also faulty and degrading from the ethical point of view. They encourage and support those lower and more purely selfish fears, hopes, desires, and other impulsive and emotional factors of the religious life, above which the soul of man must somehow rise, if a genuine religious development is to be secured. The survival of these ideas, as they exist side by side with those elevating influences upon the religious experience which proceed from the more rational and altruistic reflective attitude toward Nature, enables us, in certain cases, to study a contrast between the two, in a vivid and picturesque example. Thus in India to-day, and through several centuries of its religious development, we find very exalted ideas and sentiments toward Nature, regarded as a manifestation of the Divine, coëxisting with the most intellectually silly and morally revolting forms of nature-worship. And in China we have the confusing spectacle of the multitudes of the people practically under the dominion of the superstitions and immoralities of Taoism, and at the same time according a vague recognition to the supreme majesty and moral worth of Heaven as Lord, because personified in such manner as to call out the beliefs in the elaborate classification, already referred to (p. 163, *note*) by Orelli, in his *Religionsgeschichte*, p. 16.

highest activities of thought, feeling, and will, in allegiance to its Divine control.

Further illustrations of the influence which the physical environment has upon the ideas of men respecting the nature and behavior of the objects of religious belief and worship, in the cases of Totemism, Fetishism, and the lower forms of nature-worship, are not necessary at this point. In the case of the Japanese Shintō and, perhaps better still, of the Mongolian-Tartar religions, it may be seen how the different forces, beings, and events, which constitute this environment continue to shape the idea of the Divine Being into a form somewhat more acceptable to reason and conducive to an improved morality. In these cases the confusion and jumble of ideas which the lower forms of religion present has somewhat abated; the attitude of man's soul toward the Object of faith and worship is less characterized by purely selfish fears and hopes. For example, some of the Mongolian tribes, besides the particular forms of belief and cult that go with Animism and Shamanism generally, honor a heavenly God called *Tengere Kaira Kan*.¹ The vague general belief in an enveloping atmosphere of spirits that are to be dreaded and propitiated is, indeed, the more influential upon their practice. Sun, moon, stars, thunder and lightning, as secondary gods, are more to be regarded; but this is not because they are more worthy, but because these powers affect more intimately the interests of their worshippers. The nobler and better the god, the less is he an object of selfish fears and hopes. This naïve way of reasoning is illustrated by the legend of the Khonds, which says that the good god of light created for himself a wife, and also all the other gods. He is supreme; but his wife demands sacrifices, because, if not pleased, she will do harm. The wild tribes of India, and the Hindūs generally, worshipped the sun as first; the Semites, however, were rather inclined to elevate the moon to the high-

¹ See W. Radloff, *Aus Siberien*, vol. II, chap. VI, *Das Schamanenthum und sein Kultus*.

est place. Some of the Hottentots have regarded the Dawn personified as their supreme god. The Finns, while they regard Jamala (or Heaven) as the supreme god, find in practice this conception too abstract. The more common name for the divinity they worship is, therefore, *Ukko*, "the Thunderer," who is a frightful old man, but the patriarch among the gods. Thus all these peoples still cling to the ideas of Divine Being which characterize the lower forms of nature-worship.

How strong, however, the personifying tendency is, may be seen illustrated in these and all other cases where either Nature at large, or some one supremely impressive aspect of the physical environment, has concentrated upon itself the religious energies of the human soul. With the Aztecs and Incas of Mexico and Central America, although they also worshipped the God of the Wind (*Quetzalcoatl*) and the Lord of Fire (*Xiuhcutli*), the worship of the Sun as god was pre-ëminent. He was a *quasi*, if not quite personal Being; the Mexicans, indeed, called themselves the "children of the Sun." Some of their more thoughtful observers were even rising above this conception of a supreme god, in the Sun personified. According to a story which has the marks of authenticity, one of the Incas could say: "I tell you there must be a greater and more mighty Lord above our father, the Sun, who orders him to take the course he follows day by day"—an argument which has all the characteristics of an attempt at a so-called "natural theology." As we have already been reminded, the oldest historically recognizable conception of the Divine Being among the Chinese is called Ti=Lord, or Shang Ti=Highest Lord, or T'ien=Heaven. This vaguely personified portion of man's physical environment is conceived of as a quite super-earthly Spirit, who sees, hears, and does everything. He comprehends all men with similar love, rewards the good and punishes the wicked.

The common assumption that the more definite process of

anthropomorphizing the gods necessarily results in an improved conception and practice is by no means universally or necessarily true. Anthropomorphizing belongs to all religions; in them all the divine beings are conceived of after the pattern of man. And the progress of any particular religion is not so much determined by the definiteness with which the gods are made personal, as by the kind of persons which the gods are made to be. Thus Hindüism was degraded rather than elevated by conceiving of Varuna, the Sky, in a more definitely anthropomorphic way. It was a fall from rationality and purity, when Yama in the later myths became a bad boy, and Agni was married into a Southern family and became notorious for his love affairs. And the later worship of the emperors among the Romans, even as measured by the simpler conceptions of the earlier religious beliefs, was a distinct decline both in intellectual sanity and in purifying influence over the conduct of domestic, social, and personal affairs.

But, on the other hand, as man's growing knowledge enables and compels him to regard his total physical environment as an orderly and unitary system, rational and purposeful throughout,—a true Cosmos,—his religious beliefs, sentiments, and practical attitudes toward the indwelling spiritual Life of this environment become both more rationally well-founded and more ethically uplifting. This is, in a large measure true, whether the Monism take the more vague and indeterminate form of personification known as Pantheism, or the more clear and definite form of a belief in an immanent Personal Absolute, by making whom his Father and Redeemer, man's religious needs are more fully satisfied.

It is Christian Theism which, far more than any other of the world's religions, admits of an expanding conception of Nature as an orderly system of forces and laws, but in a way to continue the personal satisfactions with regard to the inner spiritual content of Nature, in its relations to the individual and to the race. This way of looking on the soul's physical environ-

ment from the point of view which satisfies the religious experience is conspicuous in the person of its founder Jesus. With him there is nothing in this environment to arouse either superstitious fears or selfish desires and hopes. Its flowers and grasses, although they spring up, live a brief time, and then pass away, are emblems of God's love of beauty and care for his minutest creations. The smallest of the birds is enveloped by the divine, providential tenderness, even though it is doomed to fall to the ground. He himself, the Son of the Father in a peculiar meaning and bound by unusual ties of fidelity and affection, will not distrust that Providence, though even birds and foxes seem better provided for than he. The signs of the Divine Power and Majesty which his Hebrew ancestors had seen so plainly displayed in the phenomena of nature are, with him, not abrogated or disregarded, but softened and purified from every admixture of unworthy human passion. When the tower of Siloam falls, by gravity but also by the will of God, they who are caught beneath its ruins are not to be judged as sinners above other men. For this same God is ever sending rain and sunshine, in the fulfilment of his eternal purposes of loving righteousness for the universe, upon both the good and the bad among mankind.

This attitude of the pious soul toward his physical environment is essentially religious, and satisfactory to the needs of the religious nature. That it is scientific and philosophical as well, we hold to be true. But the proof cannot be placed upon psychological grounds.

It is matter of history, however, that a progressive harmonizing of the conceptions of the Christian religion with those of science and philosophy, regarding the inner nature and rational interpretation of man's experience with his physical environment, has slowly taken place. This is especially true of the history of religion, and of science and philosophy, during the later centuries among the Western nations. But it was also true of Mediæval Christianity. For—to quote the words of an-

other¹—“the essential lesson which it strove to teach was a profound sense of the supernatural, of a spiritual world enclosing this sensible world, as our earth is surrounded by its atmosphere, and of the little span of our life bounded by the two eternities. This sense of mystery and of spiritual dominion found its nourishment in the thoughts which through centuries of gloomy forest life had grown familiar to the Teutonic mind, and which we know had left a deep impression on Teutonic belief. And although the creed of heathen Germany was in itself sensuous and material and concerned only in questioning the aspects of external nature, yet it had in it the germs of that immaterial perception of the Infinite which so characterizes Mediaeval Catholicism.”

Of one thing the student of the psychology of the religious experience may rest assured. The influences of external Nature in awakening both the impulsive and emotional factors, and the higher æsthetical and *quasi*-ethical sentiments of religion, and, as well, in shaping the conceptions which the mind frames of the Object of religious belief and worship, and of man's relations to this Object, will never die, so long as man is man. The mind will, of an inner necessity, continue to find its way to God through observations and reflections directed toward the beings, forces, and events of its physical environment. The Personal Spirit will be known and imagined by means of the manifestation. And whether the result be good or bad, rational or irrational, morally helpful or morally depressing, man may determine. But from the determining influence of enviring Nature, his religious life cannot escape; and it ought not to wish to escape.

¹C. F. Keary, *Outlines of Primitive Belief among the Indo-European Races*, p. 504*f*.

CHAPTER XVI

INDUSTRY, POLITICS AND RELIGION

The more complex reactions of man upon his physical environment, with which the development of his religious beliefs, sentiments, and cult, comes into relations of reciprocal dependence, may be roughly classified under the following four heads. These are (1) an improved physical and social condition due to the elaboration of the material goods furnished by nature, and to the political organization which controls the production and distribution of these goods; (2) an improved condition of man's intellectual satisfactions which the growth of the sciences and the development of philosophy secures; (3) the improved condition of his artistic feeling and of the æsthetical satisfactions which the development of art affords; and (4) the improved condition of his moral consciousness, and of his conduct, in which his more definitively ethical progress consists. In treating of these four classes of reactions, as viewed from the psychological and historical points of view, in the succeeding chapters, the essential unity of the human mind, and the spiritual unity of the race, in spite of all the diverse characteristics and stages of race-culture, must never be lost out of sight.

The relations sustained to the physical environment, through his industrial development, by man's religious experience in all its varied forms of manifestation, are among the most simple and direct. The religious legends and myths with which all peoples tend to fill in the great gap between the time of their origin from the divine spirits of nature, or from the gods, and such beginnings of tradition or recorded history as

they may possess, are evidence of this truth. In general, ancient and partly civilized peoples, and even savage tribes, tend to consider their earliest industries as originated by divine command and under divine control. What modern economical science regards as an indispensable condition of all industrial development, and as a priceless source of material and social benefits, savage and primitive man, if he regards it at all reflectively, may consider as a divinely imposed burden or curse. Thus Genesis represents Yahweh Elohim as condemning the first man to eat bread, until death, "in the sweat of his countenance," and to till a soil that is afflicted with thorns and thistles as a punishment for man's disobedience. But even from this point of view, industry becomes a divine command; and the reward of industry—whether given or withheld—is kept strictly under the divine control. Work is, therefore, although imposed in a disciplinary and even retributive way, sure to be regarded as a kind of sacrament or sacred contract between the gods and men. And, indeed, this view is substantially that taken by some of the lower forms of heathenism.

In order to understand the psychological principles which connect so intimately the industrial and the religious developments of man, it is necessary to refer to such facts and truths as follow. Savage and primitive man, and indeed, undisciplined man generally (the so-called "natural" man, the *Natur-Mensch*) is a lazy animal. As long as he can live, so to say, "from hand to mouth," the activities necessary to his industrial and political development are not called forth; and such slight or spasmodic exertions as are required to obtain the supply for his daily wants, appear to him to have little religious significance. If he can subsist easily on the fruits or animals ready to his hand, he is not likely to connect the divine beings with his daily food-supply, as either the producers or givers of these good things. When, however, he has to fight for food in the midst of a grudging and unkind natural environment he soon feels the need of divine assistance—a need born of fear,

and hope, and of the sense of dependence and helplessness. Thus men who live by hunting have their special kinds of gods; and fishermen, in general, have their special kinds of prayer.

The most important transition in the industrial development of the race consists in the passage of the tribe which lives by hunting or fishing, or upon the spontaneously produced fruits of the soil, to Agriculture; and so to a life that is regularly settled in one locality, and the sustenance of which is dependent upon regular and orderly labor. This transition is also a cardinal matter in the religious development of mankind, so far as this development is connected with that of industry. The legends and myths of numerous ancient religions derive the culture of the earth, in one way or another, from the gods. Sometimes it is a divine being who has taught man how to get from the ground what she does not spontaneously yield; in general, the obligation to this kind of life is reposed upon an implied or explicit divine order; and uniformly, the Divine Being deserves to be regarded in the way of placating by offerings and prayers, or by grateful acknowledgment and generous sharing in the fruits of labor. In Egypt it was Osiris who showed men how to water and till the fields; and no other god in the whole Egyptian pantheon was more great and good and worthy of divine honor than he. He was the child of the earth-god Seb and the heaven-goddess, Nut; but "He is greater than his father, and more powerful than his mother." "The priests and poets of the eighteenth and nineteenth dynasties," says Renouf¹, "already identified Osiris with the highest of all Powers." To this god the hymn at Dendera sings²: "Hail to thee, Osiris, lord of eternity! When thou art in heaven, thou appearest as the sun, and thou renewest thy form as the moon." For the Hellenes, Demeter performed the same services as Osiris for the Egyptians. Among the Romans the cult of Tellus, or Mother Earth, was the oldest known

¹ The Religion of Ancient Egypt [Hibbert Lectures, 1879], p. 114.

² See Mariette, Dendera, IV, 44a.

form of worship.¹ The Lares were, as we have seen (p. 187), the guardian gods of the cultivated fields, worshipped in small chapels erected at the crossing of the ways (*compita*); so that the domain they guarded might lie conspicuous before their eyes. And when they were moved into Rome to preside over its cantons (*pagi*), they served to unite the political, as well as the industrial, interests of the citizens, with the religious interests. Amidst a quite different physical and social environment the ancient Peruvians said that the sun-god sent two of his children, Manko Kapak and Mama Ogllo, to teach agriculture to man.²

In India at the present day the religious ideas and sentiments of the people are so dominant over the attainment and use of the food-supply as to have the most important bearing on the industrial and political development of the country. The restriction, or the forbidding altogether by religious sentiment, of the use of animal food, the horror, as at unspeakable sacrilege, at the suggestion of using for food the flesh of the sacred cow, the caste rules and usages with respect to what may be eaten, and how,—all these religious customs are among the principal forces in control of the industrial development of the country. In China, on the other hand, the Emperor, as the only one worthy to represent the nation in the worship of Shang-Ti, himself conducts the course of the furrow made by the plough, at the opening of the season of agriculture.

In the same connection may be noted the view of many peoples that the pursuit of agriculture is especially favored by the gods. According to the Zarathustrian Iranians, agriculture was the only kind of occupation pleasing to Ahura-Mazda. A similar view prevailed among the early Romans. The dignity which this pursuit has maintained in many places, as compared with mercantile pursuits or handicrafts, is largely, if not wholly, of religious origin. The divine preference for

¹ See Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, p. 159f.

² Compare Orelli, *Religionsgeschichte*, p. 9f.

the life of the agriculturist, in the two-fold service of a tiller of the soil and a keeper of flocks, seems taught, at least by inference, in Genesis. In the early chapters (iv-vi) of this book, we meet with the attempt, which all ancient civilized peoples have made, to introduce all manner of legends and conjectural accounts between the creation and the first great traditional event (usually a destructive flood, or other natural catastrophe).¹ In the opinion of its author it is the descendants of Cain from whom come the Nomads, or "wandering dwellers in tents," and such as became "hammerers of all kinds of cutting things in brass and iron," or inventors of the harp and pipe,—the most primitive of the stringed and wind instruments. These are the Turanian and Mongolian peoples of Middle and Higher Asia, whom Yahweh has not chosen to be his people as he has the Sethites. And although the choice of Yahweh cannot be said to have depended on an original difference in occupations, it is connected with the fact that Cain, wishing to escape from the curse of hard labor, and from the results of his disobedience to the Divine commands, of the unsatisfactory character of his offering to Yahweh, of his violence, and of his pride, went off and began to build a city.

A study of all the forms of nature-worship, both lower and higher, shows how, in the pantheon of peoples who have risen in the industrial and social scale, the gods most likely themselves to be diligently cultivated are such as are supposed to stand in the most intimate relations to the industrial and political life of the people. We have seen that, in some cases, the totem is worshipped because it is an important part of the food-supply; but in other cases it is regarded as *tabu*, or harmful, because too sacred to be eaten. Sun, sky, storm-clouds, and rain-clouds, the waters of river or lake, and especially the chthonic gods, or earth-gods, are earlier worshipped; and later the divinities which are supposed to preside over the various enterprises of handicraft and trade. An interesting instance of this

¹ Compare Dillmann, *Die Genesis*, Commentary on chapters iv-vi.

is the introduction of the cult of Minerva into Rome. This goddess is foreign to the older list of deities ; she could have had no place in the earlier and more distinctly agricultural period of the development of the Roman people. She found her way to Rome as the third member of the Capitoline triad, which was of Græco-Etruscan origin ;¹ the name is of course Italian, but the origin of the cult apparently carries us back to Falerii (So Wissowa). She was needed and worshipped in Rome only when she could become the patroness of handiwork and artisanship ; and the introduction of new forms of these industries into the city from the more Southern parts of Italy probably corresponded in time with her introduction, and accounted for her recognition as one of the great gods of the Roman state.

The intimate relation between religious conceptions, rites, and institutions and certain particular forms of industrial development can be distinctly traced in various civilizations. Among the minor and yet important forms of such influence the following deserve especial mention ; illustrations of the truth might be gathered from widely distributed portions of the historical domain of religion. The celebration, as religious festivities, of the various processes and stages of agriculture—the ploughing of the fields, the sowing of the seed, the harvest-home, the gathering of the vintage—imparts courage and cheerfulness to this form of human industry. And, indeed, if the psychical stimulus of the fears, hopes, and desires, which go out toward the Divine Being in connection with that labor which secures the fruits of *his* Earth as a reward, had been withdrawn from man's agricultural development, it is not easy to see what course this development would have followed in the past.

Again, we must not neglect the influence of religion in establishing and fostering institutions and orders devoted to different forms of handicraft and trade. Whatever may be true

¹ So Wissowa, *Ibid.*, p. 203.

of the repressive and degrading effect of caste upon these pursuits in India to-day, it cannot be denied that the connection of the caste system with its ancient industrial developments of this order has been fruitful of not a few admirable results. It was Buddhist monks and priests who introduced from China and Korea into Japan those civilizing arts and forms of artisanship for which the latter country is so justly celebrated to-day. There is a truthful story told by a kakemono in one of the little temples of Shiba, which represents a Buddhist priest forging one of those swords of Old Japan,—perhaps, a better blade than Damascus ever produced,—and stopping between every stroke he gave upon the metal, in order to pray to his god that he might produce a perfect piece of work.

Another form of influence exerted by religion over the industrial development of different peoples consists in the control of property—especially in land—by the priests, monks, and various religious institutions and orders. In certain stages of this development such control has undoubtedly been a great hindrance to progress and to the increased prosperity of the common people. But, on the other hand, there are not a few areas of the earth's surface where once, under distinctly religious institutions and control, agriculture and handicrafts flourished abundantly, but where now there is barrenness and the cessation of the artisan's labors—misfortunes which are distinctly traceable to other than religious sources. More definitely still, we quite uniformly find at a certain period in industrial development a conversion taking place, of the temples and other sacred places, into financial and trade emporiums. "In the course of time," says Jastrow,¹ of the Babylonians, "all the great temples in the large centres became large financial establishments." The coining and distribution of money, the places of exchange and the centers of trade and finance, have in all ancient civilizations been more or less intimately related to the religious life of the people. And in the Orient to-day, the temple and

¹ Religion of Babylonia and Assyria, p. 650*f.*

the bazaar are so tied together as almost, in many instances, to amount to an amalgamation. In Jerusalem of the time of Jesus the priests had made the house of Jehovah a "den of thieves."

On the contrary, religion may, by inspiring and fostering a contempt for wealth, and either an unintelligent or a more reasonable and conscientious depreciation of the value of the results of industrial pursuits, discourage or greatly restrict the industrial development of any community. Such an effect has actually been produced by the numerous ascetic and pietistic sects which have arisen in the various religions of mankind;—as, for example, by the Chinese Tâoists, the Indian Yogis, the Jewish Essenes and the Christian Anchores, the Therapeutæ, etc. In the time of Jeremiah (xxxv, 1–11), the sect of the Rechabites contended on religious grounds, for the perpetuation of a low condition of industrial development. This sect wished to preserve the purity of the worship of Yahweh, according to their ideal, by dwelling in tents, forbidding even agriculture, and abstaining from wine. In the case of other sects, however, which have designed to keep themselves free from the temptations of excessive luxury, in accordance with rules prescribed by their religious tenets,—as, for example, the Quakers and Moravians,—a high degree of well-regulated industry, along comparatively narrow lines, has been attained.

The nomad or shepherd idea of religion cannot, however, long maintain itself against the advances of industrial civilization. But the complex character of the reactions occasioned by the blendings and oppositions of the religious *motifs*, and of those which give rise and force to industrial development, is manifest at every stage of race-culture. Perhaps this complexity is nowhere better illustrated than in the history of Islam. The temperament of the Bedawin Arab, in its response to the solitude, waste, and gloom, of his physical environment, and face to face with awful natural forces, produces a sense of wild, unlimited freedom, mingled with a feeling of

dependence on destiny, and a rude contempt for what we call civilization. But when Islam conquered and settled in Northern India, without essentially changing its fundamental tenets as to the character of God and of man's relations to Him, it became so essentially modified in its attitude toward industrial achievements and toward the arts of architecture and sculpture, as to produce results which have excited the admiration of the world.

The ethical culmination of the influence of religion upon the industrial development of man is attained when participating in, or abstaining from, the different forms of this development is regarded as an important part of the Divine service. Then labor, of whatever character, is regarded as devoted to Divine uses, and as subject to control by the righteous judgment of the Divine Will. Then the life of labor, and all the handling, achieving, and distributing, of the material resources which are placed at the disposal of man are carried on under the control of the laborer's conceptions as to what conduces to the greater glory of God and to the increased well-being of men. Modern economics in general takes little account of these powerful religious motives, and of the end which they suggest and enforce as the final purpose of industrial development. "Little thinking if we work our souls as nobly as our iron" (Mrs. Browning). But it remains to be seen, whether industry, frugality, honesty, and good-will, can be secured for our modern industries without relying still upon the hitherto potent assistance of the religious motives. Can a "purely" industrial age achieve even a lasting industrial prosperity? We do not believe that it can; both the history of religions, and the psychology of the religious experience, confirm our negative answer.

The relations between Politics and Religion are so numerous, subtle, profound, and powerful, that it is entirely impossible to consider, historically or psychologically, either of these forms of human development without constant reference to the

other. The connection is not superficial ; it is pragmatic and reciprocally determining. On the one hand, it is impossible to tell, or even to conceive what the political development of humanity would have been, if man had not all the while been as truly a religious as a social being. On the other hand, it is equally impossible to account for the facts, forces, and laws, of man's religious development without constant reference to political conditions and influences.

The very construction of primitive society is essentially religious. For the relations of marriage and family, whatever the differentiation of these relations, are bound up with the prevalent religious beliefs. On this theorem totemism and ancestor-worship are based ; and such early practices as the blood-covenant are instances of it. Of this embryonic and mixed condition, Professor Tito Vignoli says :¹ "There is no society, however rude and primitive, in which all these relations, both to the individual and to society at large, are not apparent ; and these are based on superstitions and mythical beliefs." What is so largely true of the more primitive forms of the political status of men is scarcely less true of the more highly civilized forms. The ordering of the state, in its varied social relations, is connected with the existing religious beliefs and with the cult of religion. The prevalent conceptions of the constitution of the rule of the gods, and the actual political constitution under which the people live, are everywhere interdependent. "The earliest form of government in the Euphrates valley," says Professor Jastrow, "is theocratic, and we can still discover some of the steps in the process that led to the differentiation of the priest from the secular ruler." And, again, the same author affirms : "Even the legal formulas as embodied in the so-called contract tables, have a religious tinge."²

The changes which went on in the early religion of the

¹ *Myth and Science*, p. 41.

² On this subject, see *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, chap. XV.

Greeks illustrate the truth of the inseparable connection between the political and the religious development. If the earlier divinities were naturalistic, and the relations existing between them were such as were supposed to maintain themselves between natural forces (for example, Zeus=the god of the heavens and the storm; Apollo=the sun-god and the storm-god; Hermes=the god of the spring and the rain; Demeter=the earth as productive; and Athene=the lightning springing from the cloud), then, when the same gods became more definitely anthropomorphized, the relations between them became of the more definitely political and social order. The politics of the gods were, of course, such as had secured preference among men. But this conception of a political constitution of the Divine Being, in its turn, reacted powerfully upon the existing political institutions themselves. The religious conceptions imparted elements of stability to the political organizations. The latter appeared to be commended, because they were patterned after a heavenly model. As the petty monarchies fell before the aristocratic houses the prevalent religion became—to quote the words of Professor W. Robertson Smith¹—“a divine aristocracy of many gods, only modified by a weak reminiscence of the old kingship in the not very effective sovereignty of Zeus.” The ruling classes were empowered to rule, both by their descent from the gods, and also by virtue of the example set them, and the authority imparted to them, by the gods.

Among the later Greeks the growth of democratic institutions was connected with changed conceptions of the divine rule, and of the relations of the people to this rule. In the Greek communities of this period, it was the religious associations called *thiasi* which, while only citizens of the state were admitted to the cult of the national gods, opened themselves to all—to foreigners, to women, to freedmen, and to slaves—on terms of equality. Thus they, on the basis of religious needs

¹ The Religion of the Semites, p. 73f.

common to humanity, without distinction of birth, sex, or political and social conditions, were the first truly democratic associations in the political development of the Greek states.

The same truth is enforced by tracing the reciprocal relations of the political and the religious developments of Hindūism in India. Thus the religion of the Vedic writings is a naïve form of nature-worship. The older gods, however, which continue to maintain their place in the later pantheon and cult, were originally the more impressive and strong powers exhibited by the daily phenomena of nature. But when, in the existing political organizations, the priest became more important (being sometimes the religious head of two clans, and often at the same time prime minister and on an equality with the king in actual power), a view of Divinity arose which expressed itself before the people as follows: "There are two kinds of gods; for the gods are gods, and priests that are learned in the Veda and teach it are human gods."¹ Still later, the Brāhmanical theories of creation and the reigning pantheistic philosophy answer to the theory and practice of the caste system. Thus the entire social organization and the moral code became moulded in accordance with philosophical and religious beliefs respecting the relations of men to Brahmā, the creative World-All. Against this organization the present foreign government of India is almost powerless to effect important changes. Only a change in the underlying philosophical and religious beliefs can effect the desirable political changes. As Crozier truly affirms:² "The hierarchy of caste inequality which based itself upon the doctrine that the different castes were sprung from the head, the limbs, the body, and the foot of Brahmā, would only be overthrown by a religion which denies the Hindū doctrine of the gods and its entity doctrine of the human soul."

We have already seen (p. 185*f.*) how the unity of the Roman state—that which really conserved it through the centuries,

¹ See Hopkins, *Religions of India*, p. 179.

² *History of Intellectual Development*, I, p. 252.

and until the forces of disunion and decay overcame the diminishing strength and influence of this conservative force—depended largely upon the religious convictions and beliefs of the common people. As the family was bound into a sort of inseparable and undying unity by the sacred and divine fire perpetuated upon the hearth, and by the worship of common domestic gods, so was it with the state when, in the person of its proper officer, it sacrificed and did reverence to the protecting and patron gods of the whole people. So, too, was the belief in the “divine genius” a religious conception of powerful influence upon the political life and development of the Romans. Every man had his *genius* who was born with him, and who was inseparable from him during his entire life; and who would die with him.¹ The *genius* of the master of the house was worshipped with the family *penates* and *lar*; he had also his place in the nuptial bed. The snake was sacred to him, and the presence of the family snake symbolized the arrival of the genius. This conception eventually became extended to all kinds of associations,—communities, cities, provinces, corporations, and even to the legions in the army, to the colonies, to the theatres, and to the schools. But especially important was the conception of the *Genius Populi Romani*, a public *genius*, or *genius* of the city of Rome. This divinity was honored by the whole people, as the genius of the master of the house was honored by each particular household. No other influence, in the days of its power, was more effective than that wrought by this religious belief and cult to unify the otherwise discordant and diverse elements of the Roman state.

A later instructive example of the related interactions of the religious and the political developments of the Roman Empire is to be found in the deification of imperial power by placing the dead emperor and a portion of his relatives among the deities worshipped by the state. Especially noteworthy was the act by which Caesar, as *Divus Julius*, was enrolled

¹ Compare Wissowa, *Ibid.*, p. 155f.

(42 B. C.) among the gods of the Roman Commonwealth. An artificial and superficial relation, quite unsuitable to the other developments of the time, was thus temporarily created between religion and politics. Such a relation could not fail to affect both parties to it in a harmful and degrading way. From this time on, to be divine assumed a new technical meaning which was by no means the equivalent of the ancient and, on the whole, politically helpful conception of *deus*; "divinity" became the designation of any member of the imperial families who had, in any way, succeeded in being raised to this rank. And it was a healthful reaction when the regulations governing the honors to be paid by the state to this new class of divine beings became more and more carefully prescribed.

More particular illustrations of the way in which religion and politics influence the developments, each of the other, can be easily found by tracing the genesis and history of almost any of the customs and laws that prevail among particular peoples through long periods of time. In China, for tens of centuries, the Confucian religion, which has regulated its almost unchanging political code and political régime, has itself been identical with the recognized science and practice of politics. Indeed, everywhere a great proportion, both of the common laws and of the statutes recorded in the law-books of each age, is of definitely religious origin and significance. The claims of a recent writer¹ with respect to the extent of the influence of ancestor-worship on even the revised Civil Code of Japan may be thought to be in some respects exaggerated; but most of the facts to which this writer appeals are undoubted. "That the foundation of our government was the worship of ancestors," says Professor Hozumi, "is shown by the word 'Matsurigoto,' or government, which means 'affairs of worship.'" Thus the business of the government may be said to begin every year with matters relating to worship. And again: "'Sai-sei-Iteli'—or the 'unity of worship and govern-

¹ N. Hozumi, *Ancestor-Worship and Japanese Law*, Tokio, 1901.

ment,' is an expression which was very commonly used by old writers on politics and government."

In particular, the recognition and regulation of marriage by the law was chiefly in the interests of the religion of ancestor-worship. But the effect of religion upon the social and political development of humanity through the regulation of marriage is by no means confined to ancestor-worship, or to any one land. Even in the rudest tribes a certain acknowledgment of the religious significance of the sexual relations puts a wholesome check upon brutish lust. And it is not too much to say that, on the whole and in spite of many considerations which point to a contrary conclusion, religion has thus exalted woman. This it has done not only through the regulation of the marriage relation but by recognizing in various ways her superior prophetic susceptibility. For it must be remembered that the temperament which in modern scientific conceptions and language, would be regarded as an unfortunate tendency to all kinds of abnormal nervous excitements, such as hypnosis, trance, epilepsy, etc., is considered by the uninformed and crude experience of uncultured man to be a peculiarly fit organ for divine influences. Priestesses, prophetesses, "wise women," female diviners and raisers of departed spirits, and spiritualistic "mediums," have had no small influence, partly good and partly bad, upon man's political and social development. Among the Siamese to-day, the gods are thought to speak through the mouths of chosen women. Among the Redskins women have, in similar ways, an exalted position of influence. It is questionable whether, even in Hindū and Muhammadan circles in India at present, the position of women is not on the whole ameliorated through the influence of religion. At any rate this influence is most powerful in regulating, for good or for evil, those relations of the sexes upon which the very constitution and growth of political and social institutions so largely depend.

In close connection with this subject stands the influence of

the priesthood on political and social development. Even in the lowest and most superstitious forms of religion, and where the ministers of religion are most ignorant and most mercenary, much can be said to establish the claim that on the whole, their influence has been exerted in the interests of political stability and social improvement. It is true, on the contrary, that the priests in India, and the women who are there, as elsewhere and everywhere, most subject to priestly influence, are to-day the principal opponents of religious change and of social and economical advancement. Among the ruder tribes, also, it is the Shamans, the medicine-men, and the priests, who are the chief opponents of Christian enlightenment. Notwithstanding this, there is no small amount of truth in the argument of Castrén who, in the Introduction to his *Finnische Mythologie*, contends that even Shamanism has had a marked beneficial effect upon the human mind in freeing it from the "shackles of blind natural forces," and in recognizing man's dependence for his weal and woe upon a purposive, objective Will. This recognition, as we have already seen, is an essential factor in all religion.

Such minor matters—of which there are many—as the influence of the "ordeal" upon the development of criminal legislation and of practice in dealing with criminals, ought not to be overlooked. The theory of the ordeal is, of course, that the gods protect the innocent; and its practice has been, on the whole, favorable to the delay of revenge and to the mitigating of violence. In the same general direction, the influence of religion has been exerted by establishing and guarding the rite of sanctuary. Thus the cruelty and havoc of "blood-revenge" have been held in check and lessened. In this connection it is sufficient to mention the "cities of refuge" in ancient Israel, or the "white towns" of the Cherokee Indians.

We cannot agree, then, with the conclusion of Waitz,¹ who states the case in an exaggerated manner when he affirms that

¹ Anthropologie der Naturvölker, I, p. 459.

the religions of primitive peoples have worked powerfully to impede every step in their political and social advance. The work has indeed been powerful; but it has by no means always been directed against advance.

Another somewhat different line of investigation would show how, in all the ancient civilizations, the gods were supposed to take a leading part in the founding of cities and states, in the establishment of their laws and institutions, and in the appointment of their priestly and secular rulers. In other connections, the great influence exercised by the priesthood, and by the definite social organizations of the religious community, over political development has already commanded our attention.

In a word, and returning to the psychological point of view, the religious experience seems from its essential nature adapted and designed to respond to those claims which give to the political organization its rights, and which assign their duties to the individual members of this organization. On the other hand, this same religious experience can become the most powerful possible influence for the rectification, moulding, and even for the overthrow, of the existing political organization. No more impressive example of this tremendous psychical power of religious faith is to be found anywhere than in the history of Islam. At once the degrading nature-worship which prevailed among the Arabs before Muhammad's proclamation of the doctrine of "One God terrible and sublime as Fate," had to give way in order that the improved customs and laws of the succeeding Muhammadan dynasties might be introduced. It was this same religious doctrine, with its "heart-stirring watchword" of *Islam*, or submission to Allah Akbar, the Alone omnipotent God, which, after having subdued the half-civilized and heathenish tribes of Arabia and surrounding territories, overthrew the still more remote political organizations of Hindüism and of a degenerate Christianity, and substituted its reign of power, in the name of Allah, in their stead.

Confessedly, the Christian religion has been the most powerful of all influences in moulding the political development of the Western peoples and nations during the last eighteen centuries. In a modified way, the same thing may be said of their industrial development. But the essential method of Christianity is the *indirect* method. Its direct and primary influence is always exerted, when exerted legitimately,—that is, according to the spirit and practice of its Founder,—upon the individual soul; and then upon the social community when organized as a fraternity of such souls. In this respect, as in most others, it departs sharply from the essential spirit and method of that Judaism in which it had so many of its historical sources. For the entire political development of independent Judaism had its customs and statutes framed and enforced upon a theocratic basis. Its earliest code was attributed to Yahweh, who either banded it down on tables of stone at Sinai, or dictated it to the inspired law-giver Moses, as occasion demanded. The greater part of this code is now known to have been enacted by *priestly* legislation; and even the kings made laws, if they made them so as to be mandatory upon the consciences of the pious, as the anointed of Yahweh. Up to the time of Jesus, even in the opinion of the more liberal of the Jewish teachers, it was first of all the Law, the keeping of which entitled the believer to be considered a faithful subject of the theocratic community,—at one and the same time, religious and political. “If,” says Bousset,¹ “we ask after the foundation of the Jewish religious community, there can be no doubt that there is only one answer: That foundation is *the Law*. On this point there is in Judaism only one voice. It is well-nigh superfluous to bring forward witnesses here.” Next to the Law, and yet below it, stood the cult.

In opposition to this theocratic exclusiveness of Judaism, Jesus would have men feel themselves, as he felt himself to be,

¹ Die Religion des Judentums im Neutestamentlichen Zeitalter, p. 87.

free and accepted children of God, conceived of as their Heavenly Father. They are, therefore, no longer keepers of the law because bound by the law of Moses ; but gladly obedient to the principles of the higher righteousness, because lovers of God and of men. This "sense of possession or proprietorship, which replaces for the Christian the Judaic sense of inaccessibility or remoteness in the Creator,"¹ was destined to work great changes in the political and social structure. For the doctrines and the enjoined practice of early Christianity were such as not to lead it to attach itself, with any particularity of preference to the existing grades and conditions of men, industrially and politically, but to deal with them all as individuals in such manner as ultimately to effect the greatest improvement in their industrial, social, and political condition. It is true that, under the false impression created by the belief in a speedy Second Coming of Christ, and on account of a certain narrowness of knowledge and vision which belonged to early Christianity, many of the first believers in its doctrines were either indifferent or opposed to social and political progress. It is indeed true that the ecclesiastical organization of Christianity has during all the history of the Christian Church too often placed itself in antagonism toward such progress. But it is also true that this same progress in the Western World, and increasingly over the whole earth, depends, more than upon any other one event, upon the proclamation by Jesus of the religious truth that the individual man must stand before God, and before his own moral and religious consciousness as the revelation of God, in independence of ecclesiastical and political authority. And whatever abuses of this truth have proceeded from Christian sources, properly so-called, are a small price to pay for the indefinitely greater advantages which this religion has even indirectly wrought through its direct influences upon the character of individual men. Moreover, we may repeat in this connection what it

¹ Quoted from Bosanquet, *History of Aesthetic*, p. 128.

would require a survey of all modern history to prove and illustrate, that social democracy in the better and nobler meaning of the phrase, and all that its growth signifies for the race of mankind, is the product of Christianity more than of any other one cause,—perhaps, quite as much as of all the other causes combined.

But whatever weight of influence may be assigned to any one particular religion in its relations with its industrial and political environment, and whatever judgment may be passed respecting the amount of influence which Christianity has exercised over the industrial and political progress of the Western World, the general contention remains sufficiently clear and well-sustained. What a study of religion as an historical development showed us to be true, is confirmed by a survey of the same phenomena from the psychological point of view. The history has yet to show the first example of a relatively stable government over a people without any religious faith. And the psychology of the religious experience shows how intimately interwoven hitherto have been the reactions which have taken place toward the Object of religious faith and worship, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, toward men as bound together in industrial and political organizations.

Nor can we fail to add that, in our judgment, the motives of religion must continue to influence men in all their attempts at the settlement of the complicated and difficult problems connected, just now, with the industrial and political conditions of the time. The desire of the laborer to share justly in the fruits of labor is praiseworthy, and is to be encouraged from the religious and Christian point of view. But from the same point of view, violence, greed, and injustice, are to be condemned and punished, whatever be the industrial and social, or political, status of the wrongdoer. For the God of the Christian religion is perfect Ethical Spirit, and, Himself a Person, no respecter of persons who are not conformable to His Ideal. Under modern conditions, moreover, since the most pressing

practical industrial problems concern the *ethics of distribution*, moral and religious considerations, rather than purely physical, must have a superior influence in the settlement of these problems. And Christianity, while comprising in its conception of that greatest good, which it calls the "Kingdom of God," all lesser forms of real good, does not warrant the belief that industrial supremacy, however gained, is certainly favorable either to the highest civilization or to the highest religious welfare of man. Finally, there is nothing which modern industry is coming so imperatively to demand as the freeing of the individual's soul from unceasing and burdensome toil that is given to merely material resources, in order to provide room for a satisfying realization of the truer and higher ideals of life. These ideals religion holds before the mind; and this freedom of soul it attempts, and successfully attempts, to impart.

And as to the political and social relations of men within the individual states and nations, and of these states and nations with one another, the spirit and maxims of an enlightened regard for religious truths were never more needed than at the present time. Among religious men, Christianity is not primarily concerned with, or distinctly with preference committed to, any particular form of political organization. A righteous monarchy is, in its sight, more pleasing than an unrighteous republic. For the direct aim of the religion of Christ is to make society a kingdom of heaven by making its members true sons of the Divine Lord and King. And it ever teaches, not the supremacy of any race *over* the others as the distant goal of its endeavor, but the dwelling of all races together in a spirit of unity, because they are all loyal subjects of One King, and obedient children of One Father, who has designed them to realize their spiritual unity with one another and with Himself.

CHAPTER XVII

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Religion and Science, in the modern use of these terms, and in the practice which corresponds to the usage, differ greatly in their aims and their methods, as well as in the satisfactions which they afford to, and the benefits they confer upon, mankind. From the psychological point of view, however, they have their genesis and development controlled by certain similar or identical impulses and activities of the human mind. They can, therefore, neither be identified nor always kept from a contradiction of conclusions and a conflict of vital interests; but, on the other hand, neither of the two developments can be regarded as independent of the other; much less can either of them be allowed wholly to overcome or to absorb the other. And what the psychology of the religious experience shows to be true from its point of view, the history of the religious development of humanity illustrates and confirms.

The aims and ideals of science and religion are, indeed, very different; and yet they are not wholly unlike. Indeed, it may be said that at least the possibility exists, of considering the two as tending toward the same goal, and as striving after the realization of a single comprehensive and sublime Ideal. But the primary Aim of science is to understand the world,—its facts and laws, and the course of its development. Science exists, because the mind of man observes and reflects upon the phenomena of the physical universe, of his own conscious life, and of the history of both. The end which he has in view is

to know what the physical and psychical existences in fact are ; how they are related to one another by their similarities and differences ; how they act and react upon one another in space and follow each other in time ; and what are the sources and causes of their reciprocal influences and related developments. But the final aim of religion is so to adjust finite selves to the Absolute Self—man to God—as to attain for humanity a condition of blessed communion, a voluntary, moral and spiritual union with the Divine.

What two equally comprehensive aims (we may ask at first thought) are more diverse or more likely to lead humanity into ever-widening, divergent paths ? Or are not the aims and ideals of science and religion indeed, as many are inclined to hold, essentially incompatible and even hostile ?

It is safe, however, to pause before committing one's self to so dangerous a schism in the soul of the individual man, and in the culture of the race. Science is, indeed, primarily interested in the facts, in *what is* rather than *what ought*, or may possibly be imagined, to be. But even in the physical universe the facts are facts of order, indicating the presence of invisible and intangible co-operating forces ; they are also facts of wonderful and intricate constructions, dissolutions, and reconstructions of beings by processes that require for their explanation the conception of an increasingly subtle and planful system of adaptations. On turning its attention toward man, science is obliged to recognize a new class and a characteristically different ordering of facts. Judgments of worth in morals and art are facts. The ethical and æsthetical development of man, in his progressively complicated reaction upon a physical environment which he is himself moulding in accordance with ethical and æsthetical sentiments and ideas, is a fact. Religion itself is a stupendous fact. That man believes, feels, prays, conducts his life *as though* the product of his religious imaginings and reflective thinking were a Reality, is a fact. That he has been profoundly influenced in his scientific de-

velopment by religion is also matter of indisputable historical truth which requires an explanation.

On the other hand, religion is obliged to discover and regard in its own interests, the very facts with which science is called to deal. How shall man so know the nature of the Spiritual Presence he so vaguely feels, or dimly suspects, as to be able to make the practical adjustments which his religious consciousness desires and needs? How shall the cultured and reflective mind so conceive of God as worthily to believe in, worship, and serve Him? Nay! How shall the atheist or the dogmatic agnostic deny or doubt the Being of a God, without knowing what he is doubting or denying? To all such inquiries there is only one and essentially the same answer possible: man must somehow find God implicated in the *facts* of his own experience. Indeed, it is the effort to construct this general fact into the form of a rational and defensible system, by the use of scientific methods, which religion itself makes in its attempt to defend itself against the attacks of science, or else—which is better—to come to some terms of a common understanding, satisfactory to both. Science and religion must, then, both be free to consider the same phenomena from their respective points of view, and in pursuit of the ideal ends to which they are especially committed. But, unless the soul of man is to be divided against itself, and even unless the Universe is to be left two-faced and incapable of ministering the satisfactions which her own more advanced children crave, science and religion must strive for terms of honorable truce and rational agreement.

At first sight, the Methods of science and religion seem even more diverse and antagonistic than are the aims of the two. If by "science" is meant only the classification of definite groups of facts, their treatment by experimental and statistical tests, and the expression of their uniform relations in some mathematical term, then religion can make little use of the "scientific method." Its beliefs cannot be examined or estab-

lished, its sentiments cannot have their value tested, or its practices be justified or reprobated by use of such means. But the psychological sciences generally, and the biological sciences in large part, can make very little progress by strict adherence to so narrowly confined a scientific method. Especially in those studies of man where his value-judgments, his ethical, æsthetical, and religious feelings, and his more or less transcendent ideals, play so important a part, such a method seems almost wholly out of place. It is certainly very unproductive of the desired results. It does not discover, or illumine, or explain the facts of experience.

To admit thus much, however, is by no means equivalent to admitting a complete difference, much less an antagonism, between science and religion, with respect to the methods which they think it right to employ. It does, on the other hand, make it desirable to bear in mind these two truths: (1) that religion itself is not a science, but a form of life, and thus more akin to art and to the realm of conduct than to science; and (2) that, if we admit the possibility of the science of religion (see pp. 10 *ff.*), such a science belongs rather to the psychological and historical than to the scientific studies in this narrower meaning of the word. In the more generous, profoundly true, and comprehensive conception of method, science and religion are at one; as, indeed, the end at which both are aiming is not essentially different, much less antagonistic. This end is a harmonious system of conceptions and beliefs which shall interpret satisfactorily the totality of human experience; and the method of approaching so exalted and distant a conclusion of human endeavor is the disciplined use of all the rational powers, in subjection to the conditions and laws of man's evolution in history.

There are, however, two respects in which grave misapprehensions of the nature of both science and religion are current; and these misapprehensions are productive of misconceptions concerning the more active relations of the two, and of mis-

chievous practice in conducting such relations. Of these the first has already (pp. 366*ff.*) been indicated and treated with some detail. There is, indeed, a certain propriety in differencing the characteristic attitudes of the human mind toward Science and Religion as Knowledge and Faith, respectively; but these very attitudes of mind are, when subjected to psychological analysis, found to be essentially interdependent, because involving identical factors, rather than mutually exclusive. And both knowledge and faith are involved in the methods of both science and religion. The latter says, it is true: "Believe, have faith, and you will be religiously right; you shall be saved." The former reiterates the exhortations: "Observe, test, experiment, prove, until you know and know just what you know; and only thus can you be scientifically right." Only thus, we might add (and even scarcely thus, as our present experience is rapidly showing) can science escape the perdition to which each age condemns many of the conclusions of the preceding age, as "the triumphal march" of scientific discoveries continues in human history. But to observe, to test, to prove—albeit by methods that accord with its characteristic qualities as a universal and essential form of human experience—the beliefs, conceptions, and conclusions of the religious consciousness, is an exhortation which the student of the science and philosophy of religion must certainly heed. And there is no form of the chemico-physical, biological, or psychological sciences, that has not its peculiar beliefs and methods; and these constantly demand that critical revision which is always indispensable to any kind of scientific progress.¹

With respect to the faith which is common and fundamental to both science and religion we may affirm that, in their naïve and normal epistemology and metaphysics, they are bound together with a tie that can never be loosened or broken; for

¹ For the detailed exposition of this statement the reader is referred to the author's *Philosophy of Knowledge*.

this tie is perpetually woven anew by the native and essential activities of the human mind. Science and religion have both an indestructible confidence, which is begotten by the ever-living generative activity of reason itself, in the power of the human mind somehow to reach Reality. Neither ever really believes, or can possibly believe,—whatever extremes of phenomenalism or agnosticism either may profess to adopt,—that its work is done with the constructing of purely imaginary representations or shadow-pictures of the real Being of the World ; or that its results have only the value of logically consistent and æsthetically pleasing systems of conceptions, or abstract mathematical formulas setting forth the relations of *mere* phenomena. And if science and religion fall into contention,—the more confidently, the more bitterly and scornfully they contend,—each believes that *it*, at least, has some sort of grasp upon the truth respecting the real nature and actual relation of the objects over which the contention is waged. Both science and religion assume that Reality, as somehow implicated in human experience, may be known,—that It is, and What it is. Neither can be consistently agnostic and still maintain the strife. For all argument, as well as all inquiry and research, whether in the interests of so-called science or of so-called religion, necessarily assumes a common ground of reason, the common property both of man and of the Being of the World.

One of the most curious of the phenomena observable in the complicated mental life of the present age is the agreement of certain theologians, whose views and methods are most unscientific, and of certain “scientists” whose religious conceptions and opinions are most meagre, if not completely negative, in the epistemological proposition that both science and religion should renounce all ontological pretensions. Hence the practical proposal that each shall refrain from coming upon the domain of the other, in deference to their common belief in, and awe toward, the Unknowable ! But if there were no

practical interests to interfere with such a truce, the unity and integrity of human reason makes its maintenance quite impossible. Science and religion,—springing, as they so largely do, from common sources in the spiritual unity of the race,—can never be reconciled on the basis of a confession of dogmatic and uncritical agnosticism. Science and religion will continue to assert, each its own rights, and the validity of its own point of view, and the truthfulness of its own conclusions, and to contend with each other, until both come to understand how their faiths and their cognitions converge upon the same One Ultimate Reality, seen in dim and fragmentary fashion by both, but by both seen truly, from different points of view.

Another important consideration which serves to harmonize the methods and the conclusions of science and religion is this:—the latter, as well as the former, rests upon experimental data. Both may, therefore, rightly provide and urge the method of experimental investigation, the testing by trial of the different claims to learn the truth. Religion, as an indubitable experience, constantly brings to man's attention a new order of facts, which do not lie wholly within the spheres covered by his sensuous life, his scientific generalizations, or even his ethical and æsthetical sentiments. Among them are the phenomena of religious conversion, of the so-called "intuition of God" and its alleged mystical apprehension of a non-sensuous Reality; there are, besides, certain unique judgments of religious values, the conception of the religious ideal with its supreme worth,—and, indeed, the whole experience of so-called religious faith. In estimating the value of these experiences with regard to the light they throw upon the Being of the World, and of man's relations to this Being, science is, in its own interests, as clearly bound to candor, patience, charity, and sympathy, as is religion, in its turn, when seeking the help of science in the interpretation and better understanding of these same experiences. "Surely," says the late Professor

J. P. Cooke,¹ "science is no more responsible for the excesses of theorists than is religion for the crimes of bigots." And the same author goes on to assert that the internal evidences (or considerations based directly upon experience) of religion are similar to the credentials of physical science.²

The Satisfactions of science and religion certainly differ profoundly; but they are not mutually exclusive, much less in necessary opposition to each other. Undoubtedly, the satisfactions of science are chiefly intellectual and practical by way of promoting the physical comfort and advance of mankind; while the satisfactions of religion are largely sentimental (in the higher meaning of this word), and practical in promoting those comforts and improvements of man's condition which are customarily spoken of as belonging to his spiritual nature.

Here again, however, no hard-and-fast line can be drawn between the two. Religion, as well as science, has been found

¹ Religion and Chemistry, p. 295.

² *Ibid.*, p. 324. This view is certainly much saner than that of Brinton, for example, who makes the extravagant statement: "There can be no question of the irreconcilable conflict between the two (namely, science and religion). They arise in totally different tracts of the human mind; Science from the conscious, Religion from the sub- or unconscious intelligence." (Religions of Primitive Peoples, 231f.) It would be difficult to unite more psychological misconceptions and errors within the limits of so few and brief sentences; but the view advocated by the same writer in Chapters II and III of his work on "The Religious Sentiment" is much nearer the truth. In this connection it is, perhaps, worth while to refer to the two views—the earlier and the later—of another writer (Romanes) who approached this subject from the scientific point of view. In his "Candid Examination of Theism," Romanes makes the interesting but hopeless endeavor to establish what he calls a "metaphysical teleology," that shall lie quite out of the range of those antagonisms from physical science which contest the current teleologies. But in his posthumous work (Thoughts on Religion, p. 40) he concludes: "Science, then, is essentially a department of thought having exclusive reference to the Proximate. . . . Religion, on the other hand, is a department of thought having no less exclusive reference to the Ultimate." From this the conclusion is drawn that "science and religion really have no point of logical contact."

to have its sources in intellectual curiosity; its objects, like those posited or discovered by science, are products of the same imaginative and thinking faculties; its conclusions must somehow be brought into harmony with other rational developments; and its most fundamental principle, or supreme postulate, is a certain theory of Reality. Thus at the moment when man's religious consciousness assumes the attitude of reflection—and especially of sceptical and critical reflection—toward its own beliefs, feelings, and deeds of will, the demand becomes imperative that some satisfaction shall be furnished to his intellectual powers. On the other hand, the opinion that science is independent of, or is only slightly influenced by, the points of view, postulates, axioms, and ideals, that have their origin and support in æsthetical and *quasi*-ethical feelings, is plainly erroneous. The most purely physical of the particular sciences are constantly giving the preference to conceptions and presuppositions which have a quite inadequate foundation in indisputable facts; that is deemed the more likely to be true which is commended by the preferential sentiments of the human mind for what seems to it fair, orderly, sublime, or in accordance with its love and admiration for system and unity. In truth, all the most fruitful conceptions and principles of the first rank, to which modern science clings with such persistency, partake largely of these more purely æsthetical and sentimental characteristics.¹

The Benefits to mankind of science and of religion are partly identical, partly supplementary of one another, and partly, for a time at least, apparently opposed. How the two have sometimes coöperated, and sometimes conflicted, in promoting the industrial and political development of the race, has already been briefly discussed. That the larger interests, both of the race and of the individual, demand the perpetuation of both forms of development,—the scientific and the religious,

¹ See Chapter XVII in the Philosophy of Knowledge, on "The Ethical and Aesthetical 'Momenta' of Knowledge."

—no one who knows human nature worthily or can read aright the plainest truths of history, is permitted to call in question. Better far that both should continue in a state of perpetual remonstrance against each other's encroachments, and even of increasing strife over the same territory, than that either should succeed in suppressing or extinguishing the other. This, indeed, is one of those rare cases where eternal warfare is better than the complete triumph of either combatant.

For illustration of the relations in which these two developments stand to each other, when considered as interdependent reactions of the human spirit upon its physical and social environment, history furnishes abundant material. These relations are, indeed, constantly changing with the changing content of both science and religion, with the altered spirit of the age, and with the changing interests, both theoretical and practical, of both forms of development. In the adjustment of their differences, neither science nor religion is wont to keep wholly free from serious defects, mistaken positions, and false assertions. Neither can clear itself of the charge of too frequent resort to illegitimate methods of attack and defence, and of the display of a spirit which is neither truly scientific nor purely religious.

The most customary relations of science and religion may be summarized under three heads: (1) The earlier and more naïve conditions in which religion is the patron and the promoter of the beginnings of certain forms of science; (2) the relations of antagonism, in which religion and science find their positions irreconcilable and even hostile, and their practical interests divergent or incompatible; (3) the relations of readjustment and progressive reconciliation, during which one or the other of the two (and customarily, both) makes compromises; and thus a higher unity of opinion and of practical effort is, at least temporarily, brought about.

These historical relations are only the expression of the unchanging psychological relations.

The earliest history of both developments discloses religion as the patron and promoter of those rude beginnings of science which actually exist. This is particularly true of such ancient civilizations as those of Egypt, China, Babylonia; but it is also true of the more modern developments in India, "Old Japan," and Mediæval Europe. Nowhere else, perhaps, can this be better illustrated than in the case of the religion of Babylonia and Assyria. "The chief motive in the development of astronomy in the Euphrates Valley," says Jastrow,¹ "was the belief that the movements of the heavenly bodies portended something that was important for men to know." Knowledge on this subject it was thought could be discovered from the gods through the seer or priest. Of medicine also, the same authority says:² "There is indeed no branch of human knowledge which so persistently retains its connection with religious beliefs among all peoples of antiquity as the one which to-day is regarded as resting upon a materialistic basis." But the study of the planets and stars as omens by the Babylonians resulted in their zodiacal system and in considerable knowledge as to the science of meteorology. Therapeutics and surgery, as dependent upon anatomy, were largely the outcome of the dissections made by the augurs and of the semi-religious interest in the construction and habits of the lower animals. Among the Romans the foundations, not only of political science, but also of the writing of history and of the divisions of time, were all of a religious character. The state-records were nothing less than the tables on which the Pontifex Maximus announced all the "divine services," or transactions in honor of the gods, which occurred during the course of the year.

In periods of antagonism and strife between science and religion, the faults and mistakes—as has already been said—almost without exception, belong to both parties. Religion is naturally and of necessity conservative; and during the greater

¹ Religion of Babylonia and Assyria, p. 356f.

² *Ibid.*, p. 246.

portion of the past history of the race, it rather than science has been in control of the governments of the nations, and of the hearts and practical allegiance of the people. Owing to this essentially conservative character of religion, especially where it has developed an elaborate creed involving fixed opinions on problems of science and philosophy, and a close-fitting moral code and ritual which are made the necessary conditions of moral esteem and of social privileges, scepticism becomes for science and philosophy the necessary means of their development; revolt becomes the only practical expedient. Religion may always plead the excuse of the incomparable worth and far-reaching extent of the interests which it is obligated to guard. But science may rightly claim that, so long as it observes its own limitations and remains faithful to its legitimate work, it is the possessor within its own realm of a more exact knowledge than religion can secure; and also of the power and the obligation to convey certain blessings to mankind which religion is powerless to bestow. And without doubt Lotze was in the right when he said:¹ "Theological learning on the one side, and irreligious natural science on the other, should not assert that they have exact knowledge about so very much which they neither do know nor can know."

But neither in the individual nor in the race can these two forms of human life and human development remain in a permanent condition of antagonism. Such a condition is psychologically unsatisfactory and untenable. The man of science has no less his need of religious beliefs, sentiments, and practical adjustments toward the Object of religion; the religious man, who will also be rational, has need to know the facts and laws which science is constantly discovering. These facts and laws define for him more clearly the nature of this Object, and of himself in relation to this Object. The scientific man and the religious man is one and the same human being—seeking that blend of faith and knowledge which shall appropriately

¹ Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion, p. 154.

clothe the world of his experience. And when the Spirit of the Time becomes divided against itself,—religion against science and science against religion,—the Spirit of Humanity, to which all times belong, cannot be permanently satisfied with such a condition of division and strife. The *Zeitgeist* must effect some kind of interior reconciliation, in concession to the spiritual unity of mankind.

Such reconciliation cannot, however, take place by way of the proposal to relegate science and religion to distinct departments of human life and human endeavor; nor by excluding the service of either wholly from the interests represented by the other. When such a proposal is disguised under the form of a radical distinction between theology, or the metaphysics of religion, and religion as feeling and life, it is no less unavailing. For as our psychological analysis has sufficiently shown, there is really no such experience as religion without theology (or God-doctrine); and all religious experience, from its lowest to its highest grade, involves either a naïve or a reasoned metaphysics,—in brief, some theory of Reality and of man's relations to Reality.

Nor can the required reconciliation take place by either science or religion surrendering those essential points of view, and those fundamental truths, which are necessary to the continued existence and progressive life of the two. Neither party to this strife can be reasonably expected to end it by committing suicide, after the Chinese fashion, at the threshold of its adversary. Scarcely more reasonable or hopeful is the effort indefinitely to postpone the strife by becoming wholly indifferent to the interests represented by both parties to it.

A psychologically satisfactory reconciliation may take place between science and religion by the common discovery that they have misunderstood each other's positions, in such manner that there has really been no valid ground for their antagonisms. Reconciliation by reciprocal apologies would then seem to be a reasonable end of the strife. Or, again, either science

or religion may discover and admit its error, accept the truth of the other, and begin anew the task of coöperating in the discovery and proof of the *one truth*, in the acceptance of which both can unite. Such a form of reconciliation by the surrender of one party to the strife has been as common in this, as in every kind of warfare. But best of all is the result of the conflict between science and religion when both, taking pains to discover and reject their own erroneous and irrelevant conceptions and conclusions, unite upon some higher and more comprehensive truth which both can accept. Reconciliation, at least for a time, then takes place by way of a voluntary and reasonable compromise.

No more instructive and graphic picture of the essential meaning and value of this "unceasing battle of opinion" is possible than that afforded by the conflict of science and religion over the modern theory of evolution. The scientific exposition of the enormous collection of data now made has not yet succeeded in establishing any one of the scores of particular theories which have been put forth during the last half-century; and it now seems certain that contributing elements from them all will have to be combined with new inductions and deductions, in order to frame a half-adequate conception of Nature's complicated processes in carrying onward the life of the World. So mysterious and complex is the Ultimate Reality. Meantime, science has profoundly and beneficially influenced the religious conceptions of the Divine Being, and of His relations to the world; and it has also given to religion new and improved conceptions of man's origin and destiny. But it ought also to be apparent that it is the religious view of the world which, to a large extent, is compelling science to recognize the presence in Nature of a unitary ordering and guiding Force, and the necessity of conceiving this Force as Will and Mind. It is also the religious experience which is emphasizing, even in scientific circles, the value, for his historical uplifting above the level of the lower animals, of man's

conscious ideals, and of his striving, under Divine inspiration and guidance, to realize them.

Recurring to a point of view already familiar, we may the more clearly see that the ideal and ethically correct relations of science and religion are those of a Unity of the Spirit, which seeks the one truth by whatever ways to be attained, and which makes practical use of this truth for the benefit of mankind. In the possession and use of this spirit, science and religion, however different they may choose to be in their aims, methods, satisfactions, and darling interests, are at one. Both believe in the unity of the final truth; both feel the obligation to be animated with a purpose, which from the ethical and æsthetical points of view, is essentially the same. And as they appear before the final court of adjudication, where Reason sits as the Supreme Judge (the Logos "that enlighteneth every man coming into the world"), both take the same solemn oath:—Namely, "to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,"—God, the Source of all Truth, being their helper.

In the pursuit of truth and happiness, in accordance with this spiritual unity of man, science and religion must continue to serve, in different ways, a common service. With respect to the prevailing conception of the Being of the World that which Eucken¹ declares to be true in one case is true in all cases: "The prevalent religion is intimately interwoven with the ancient mental picture of Nature." The modern developments of science have, without doubt, profoundly influenced the religious conceptions of God, of man's origin and destiny, and of God's relations to the world. But the current view that this influence has been destructive of the possibility of framing any scientifically tenable conceptions of "the Supernatural," of Revelation, Miracle, etc., and of the Immanence and Transcendency of a Personal God, is, in our judgment mistaken.

¹ Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, p. 23

Nor can we think that the physical and natural sciences have been retarded or injured by the difficulties which religion has persistently and even passionately thrown in their way, whenever they have tried to satisfy the mind of man with a merely scientific description of the nature and ordering of the processes which it is their business to investigate. The theoretical demand that these processes should be referred by reflective thinking to some such common ground as shall satisfy the rational beliefs, the æsthetical, ethical, and religious feelings, and the needs of the practical life to which the religious interests correspond, is no injustice to science. On the contrary, religion perpetually forces upon science, in the interests of the most important value-judgments, a certain rational caution and reserve before those profound and tremendous problems that have to do with the ultimate causes of man's existence and the final goal of his endeavor. And when the student of science feels coming over him, the spirit of reverence before the mystery of Nature, and the mystery of human life and human destiny, he, too, is the subject of a religious experience. It is the call from the depths of his spirit to "square himself" with the Infinite Spirit, whose being and nature cannot be discovered or estimated by mathematical and mechanical appliances, or expressed in terms of exact, scientific formulas. Thus the sincere and truly devout student of science may do God's service to his fellow men. And when accused of impiety or neglect of religion by a bigoted ecclesiasticism he may reply with the words of the prelate Karl Gerlock:—

"I rue no path on which my spirit entered
 In science's service solemnly and deep.

 Who seeks aright alone aright is finding;
 I rue it not, I rue it not."

But the history of man's religious development shows us a yet more interior form of this psychological truth. For knowledge, or science, *in* religion grows in essentially the same

manner as knowledge and science in all other kinds of human development. The earlier stages are those in which the germs of knowledge are given in obscure and unintelligible forms of feeling, in the half-blind play of phantasy and imagination, and in the doing of deeds whose motives are not recognized and whose import is by no means clearly conceived. This is the stage in the evolution of religious knowledge where mythology plays so important and controlling a part. In every form of development, however, humanity is obliged to pass slowly through, or linger long in, this stage. Here race-temperament, and its reactions upon the various forms of stimuli afforded by the changes in the environment, are the chief conditioning factors which demand consideration. The practical Romans never developed any science of their gods, or of man's relations toward the gods. The Chinese have never, except in the single and relatively unimportant instance of Kong Tse, gone beyond a purely practical and unsentimental interest in the phenomena of their own religious experiences. Quite otherwise has been the case with Hindūism and Buddhism. Brāhmanism was not satisfied with that mythological and practical view of the gods, and of the right religious life, which is taught in the Vedas. The speculative tendencies which developed the theory of the Upanishads, and of the Vedantic and other schools of Hindū religious philosophy, can only be explained by accepting as something unaccountable, but given (*data*), the temperament of a gifted race.

Above all other peoples of antiquity, however, it was among the Greeks that the use of the highest rational powers of man prevailed in the service of an attempt to understand the sources, value, and significance, of man's religious experience. With them, as everywhere, the stage of phantasy and feeling, and the activity of mythologizing, preceded the attempts at knowledge and science. But with them, early and vigorously, conceptual thinking and philosophic reflection attempted the engaging but difficult task of reducing to rational forms the

experiences of men with the gods and with the divine life in the soul. Enough has already been said to show how science grew up *in* the religious consciousness of this most gifted race, in connection with the developments of the artistic, philosophical, and varied, free but contentious political life of the Greek states.

Judaism, and even early Christianity, until it was fortunately challenged, quickened, and stimulated by Greek thought, was satisfied with the almost exclusive culture of the practical side of the religious life. Especially in the New-Testament writings ascribed to the names of the Apostles Paul and John, however, the theoretical interests and the demands for a scientific and comprehensive grasp upon the essential content and universal bearings of Christian truth, made themselves powerfully felt. For this science of the religious experience, as it had begun to unfold itself in the Christian community, certain important elements had already formed themselves among the writers of later Judaism. Of these Philo, in particular, had felt the intellectually quickening pulses of the Greek development of rational and reflective thought.

Christianity, although it at first, as has just been said, offered only a practical solution of the great problems of religion, by way of an invitation to accept the word of Jesus, share his faith in God and consciousness of sonship, and follow him in his manner of life, could not, on account of its very essence, escape the necessity of submitting itself to rational inquiry. For, in very truth, the simple demands of a practical sort, which this religion makes, involve the most stupendous conceivable—however concealed—system of metaphysical beliefs and assumptions. Stated in their most naïve form, they amount to declaring a knowledge, with an unshakable and not to be disputed conviction, that the Being of the World, on which all natural phenomena are dependent as its manifestations, is, indeed, a perfect, gracious, and loving Personal Spirit who, through his Divine Son, the man Jesus, is known to be

the Father and Redeemer of all mankind. To attribute to Christianity anything less than this, as a theory of Reality, is totally to disregard its most important theoretical claims and practical demands. The content of truth, thus naïvely summarized, in the claims of so-called primitive Christianity, was given its first scientific form by the Christology of Paul and the Logos-doctrine of the Gospel of John.

Now the difficulties met by the Pauline Christology and the Johannine Logos-doctrine, from the beginning of their promulgation until now, are not to be conceived of as a strife between faith and knowledge in the domain of religion, but, the rather, as the progressive rendering of the fuller content of Christian experience, as faith and life, into a more scientific and rational form. In Christianity, therefore, as in all other religions, the same two truths must always be kept in view: (1) The transition from the imaginative, practical, and historical, to the scientific and rational form is a progressive affair,—a development, for the individual and for the race; and yet (2) through all this process of development, the effort of scientific endeavor is to recognize what, that is universal and eternal, characterizes the process. In all this, it must also be remembered that religious knowledge is never merely theoretical, or exclusively an affair of intellect, but always also a matter of feeling and of will.

These reflections introduce to us the consideration of the relations existing, in the spiritual unity of man, between philosophy and religion. For the conception of science *in* religion has already virtually passed over into the sphere of the philosophy of religion. But here the present task may be treated very lightly; for, indeed, the entire examination upon which we are engaged deals with this very theme.

Among the Romans Cicero made an effort to save his countrymen from moral degradation and disorder by introducing them to Greek philosophy. In fact, from the time when the moral and social decay of the Roman Empire set in apace,

until the time when Christianity, with its control over the practical life and its stimulus to reflection and to philosophical discussion under the rubric of theology, came to dominate the ancient world, philosophy took largely the purifying and consoling work of religion upon itself. During the several centuries just before and after the Christian era, it was chiefly the study of philosophy which turned men of thought and culture from lives of vice to lives of virtue. According to Seneca :¹ “ To follow a better life, than the common herd ;” “ to abjure luxurious living ;” “ to hold by a sane and healthy form of life ;” “ to seek and strive earnestly after Virtue—that is Philosophy.” Its law is that of true religion : “ So live with men as though God saw ; so speak with God as though men heard.” As says a modern writer :² “ At this epoch philosophy was a kind of religion which imposed on its adepts at least the exterior of virtue.” To quote again from Seneca (Epis., lib. II. 4) : “ Philosophy forms and fashions the mind, disposes the life, rules the actions, demonstrates what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, sits at the helm and guides one through the channels of life’s fluctuating stream.” Even the Epicurean definition affirmed that “ Philosophy is an active principle which aims at securing Happiness by Reason and Discussion.”

Among the writers of this entire period there is, perhaps, no other who so blended philosophy, both theoretical and practical, with religion, as did Plutarch.³ In the interests of the thoughtful minds of his own day he used well such opportunities as he had to discourse⁴ upon that theme which Goethe has called “ most essential and paramount,”—namely, “ the eternal conflict between Atheism and Superstition,”—in a way to prepare the mind for a rational reconciliation in a true religion.

¹ Epist., lib. I, 5; 8; 10.

² Martha, *Les Moralistes sous l'Empire Romain*, p. 240f.

³ Compare Oakesmith, *The Religion of Plutarch*, *passim*; and especially, chap. IX.

⁴ In his *De Superstitione*.

The problem before the reflective thinking of the ancient world, whether in the form of the theosophy of Judaism or the philosophy of Greek origin, was how *worthily* to conceive of God and of his relations to man. The thinkers of the age saw that the Absoluteness of his power, wisdom, and presence, and the identification of It with an Ideal and Perfect Goodness, must be retained, substantially as the truth had been discovered by the most profound and aspiring of the thinkers of antiquity. But this Absoluteness of a half-personal Reason must also be presented in such relations to finite personality as to meet the demands and serve the purposes of the practical and emotional religious life. Then, as ever, philosophy presented the doctrine of the transcendence of the Divine Being in a way powerfully to stimulate, and greatly to enrich, the ethical ideals and the æsthetical sentiments of the thoughtful. But to bring this Divine Being near to men, to make Him, as it were, immanent in nature, in human events, and in the souls of the multitude of men, there was imperative need of a new and higher form of religious experience. This need Christianity met, as it had never been met before, and has never otherwise been met since, in the history of man's religious development. God as the Father of all men, as minute and tender Providence, as pitying Redeemer, and as ever-present Spiritual Comforter,—such is the conception of the Divine Being which Jesus brought to the ancient world.

But Christianity itself could not at its origin escape, and neither now nor ever can escape, the necessity of attempting to make its conception of God acceptable to the reflective thinking of mankind. Indeed, its very existence as a claimant to be the universal, and in some vague sense of the word, the "absolute" religion, involves the necessity of its commerce with philosophy. The earliest of a perpetual series of similar attempts was made by the Christian Apologists. They were Greek thinkers. Their reflections resulted, as a matter of course, in the acceptance of a certain doctrine of the Divine

transcendency by the thinkers of the Christian Church; but they also begat the attempt to reconcile this doctrine with the testimony of the Christian experience, which brought God "in Christ" near to man, and indeed made Him immanent in the soul of every believer. A secondary and subordinate result was a certain adjustment of the belief in the creative activity of God and in his providential care and forgiving love, and of the cult of the Church, to the views adopted by the effort to reconcile the transcendence with the immanence of God.

Two principal metaphysical doctrines were evolved through this process of elaborating the content of the religious experience of Christianity, into the forms of dogma, under the influence of philosophy. These were the doctrine of Revelation and the doctrine of Jesus as the Son of God. The philosophy of the transcendence of Divine Being made necessary a more philosophical view of the nature and extent of revelation in general; and this had important effects upon the Christian doctrine of revelation in particular. On the one hand, it made more difficult the doctrine of Jesus as the supreme and absolute revealer of God; on the other hand, it brought about modifications and extensions of this very doctrine. For these modifications the Greek philosophy of the first three Christian centuries prepared the way. The thinkers of that time profoundly felt the difficulties of this greatest of all theological problems. As a writer¹ on this subject affirms: "A transcendent God was in himself incommunicable the more the conception of His transcendence was developed, the stronger was the necessity for conceiving of the existence of intermediate links." The non-Christian theology had thought to solve this problem in three principal ways. The one was "a survival of the primitive panpsychism" (so Hatch); it taught the belief in demons, or intermediate spirits, inferior to God but superior to man. Another form of solution hypostasized abstract conceptions; such

¹ Hatch: *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church* [Hibbert Lectures, 1888], p. 245f.

as the *Ideai*, or Forms of Platonism, and the *Logoi*, or Reasons of Stoicism. A third way created Distinctions within the Unitary and Transcendent Essence of the Divine Being.

Under this last head there originated a metaphysical doctrine which designed to reconcile the transcendence and the immanence of God, and which became of the utmost importance for its effect upon the philosophy of religion as held by the early Christian Church. This doctrine hypostasized the Logos, the Divine Reason, or Divine Wisdom. It reached its most influential and culminating form in Philo, who, if it is true that only "in a peculiar sense" is he to be called a "philosopher" when dealing with the Jewish conceptions as developed in the Old Testament and in the later Rabbinical writers, drew for his thoughts upon the two principal sources of his age,—namely, the Stoical and the Neo-Platonic. Both the principal views,—(1) that the Logos is evolved from God, and (2) that the Logos was created by God,—are found metaphorically expressed in Philo.¹

But none of these solutions of the great problem of reconciliation was satisfactory to the thinkers of the Christian Church. As to how the transcendent God could become the Creator of the universe and the Savior of mankind, and as to what could be his relations to his Son in the time previous to the existence of Jesus in the flesh, the whole ancient Church was in a ferment for several centuries. "The tentative answers were innumerable." How the desire to preserve the unity of

¹ On the one hand, the Logos is spoken of as the "image" (*εἰκὼν*) or shadow (*σκία*), or reflexion, or outflow as from a Spring, of God. See De Sacrif. Abel et Cain, 18; De decem orac. 11; De mundi opif. 6; De somn, 1, 41; Quod det. pot. ins. 23. But, on the other hand, the Logos is the Son, the first begotten, of God. De agric. 12; De confus. ling. 28; is called *γεννηθεὶς*, *ibid.* 14. Sometimes Wisdom (De profug. 20) and sometimes Knowledge (de ebriet. 8) is spoken of as the Mother of the Logos. On the entire subject see Hatch, *Ibid.*, Lectures VII-IX; Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*; Harnack, *History of Dogma*, I, pp. 109ff.; and the monographs of Siegfried, Schürer, Dähne, and others.

the Divine essence, and at the same time maintain the Christian doctrine of the sonship of Jesus, led to the theory of the eternal generation of the Logos, whose nature came to be God-like, not by partaking, but by essence (*οὐσία*), it belongs to the history of Christian dogma to exhibit in detail. But all this history, as well as the entire history of the reflective thinking of man upon the problems offered by his religious experience, emphasizes and illustrates the psychological truth that the sources of philosophy are largely identical with those out of which religion develops in its kindred effort to frame a Theory of Reality that shall satisfy the heart and will, as well as the intellect of mankind.

CHAPTER XVIII

ART AND RELIGION

Art differs from science in its relation to man's religious life and development in several important respects, of which the following two are, psychologically considered, the most influential. First: The so-called faculties, or forms of the soul's functioning which Art and Religion call into activity, and to which their objects make an appeal, are more nearly identical than are those concerned, in common, with the development of science and religion. And, second, the ideals which art and religion both aim to set forth are to a large extent similar in origin and character, or even identical. In a word, the artistic activities, the æsthetical aspirations, appreciations, and ideals of human nature are very closely akin to those of the religious life. On the other hand, to identify throughout the artistic and the religious nature and development of man, whether from the psychological or the historical point of view, (or even, for that matter, from the ideal point of view), would misrepresent the facts and vitiate our conclusions. Nor can the same preference be given to art, as compared with science, in its friendly and helpful relations to religion, if our value-judgments are directed toward the highest of the aims, the most fundamental of the faiths, and the most sublime of the conceptions and ideals, of certain of the particular sciences. Art, religion, *and* science, have much in common in the upper realms of human experience.

Among the forms of psychic functioning which both art

and religion call forth in a peculiar way, and upon which the construction of their Object depends for its excellence, the imagination is preëminent. Properly speaking, there is no form of human knowledge, or growth of knowledge, possible without the activity of both the reproductive and the creative imagination. And no other form of knowledge makes demands severer, and even more impossible of compliance, upon this faculty for its operations within the realm of the non-sensuous and invisible real world, than do the modern chemico-physical sciences. But art and religion begin by requiring the imagination to cut itself loose from the ties that bind it to the merely sensuous fact. Both at once, even in the lowest stages of their development, appeal directly to the process which psychology recognizes as the "freeing of the ideas" from their matter-of-fact attachments, and which it calls the truly "creative" imagination. Neither art nor religion is satisfied with that cool, unidealizing use of the perceptive faculties, with which science aims to make a start. The exhortation of the mind which wishes to approach the object in a scientific way, runs as follows: "Look and accurately observe the mere matter-of-fact; record many similar, but carefully observed facts; exercise care not to allow the fancy to insert any data which really are not there; and, then, if the warrant seems sufficient, generalize and even speculate as to the uniform sequences, conditions, and laws of the observed facts." But both art and religion, by a leap of the imagination over all boundaries of the merely sensuous, assure the one who would have a vision of their Object: "If you do not see with the eye of the spirit, something that is not visible from the merely matter-of-fact point of view, then you cannot see that which has value from our point of view." The facts appreciable by the senses can only stir the awakened soul to bring forth the *real object* from its own hidden depths.

This office of the creative imagination is necessary for even the lowest and beginning forms of art. For art does not begin

until imitation is transcended. This is true of the basket-weaving of the Redskins, the *kava*-bowl of the Samoans, the pottery of the ancient Mexicans, the native music of the Japanese and Chinese ; as well as of the beginnings of architecture, poetry, and dramatic representation among the Greeks. The same thing is true of the objects of faith and worship created by the religions grouped together under the term of a vague and unreflective spiritism. The spirit or god that is *in* the fetish, the totem, the sacred rock or tree, the storm- or rain-cloud, the sun or moon or planet, is not there, in fact, to be observed by the senses. When so questioned as to be forced to take the "scientific" point of view, the primitive man knows as truly as does the modern agnostic, what the fetish, the totem, the tree, or the rock, is actually—as a Thing and not a Spirit. It is the creative imagination which puts the invisible beauty and divinity into, or behind, the visible object ; the tangible object is the revealer and interpreter of a spiritual existence. It is true of the savage as Plotinus declared it to be true of Phidias : He "did not create his Zeus after any perceived pattern, but made him such as he would be, if Zeus deigned to appear to mortal eyes."

What is so obvious with respect to the earlier and lower stages of art and religion, is even more obvious with respect to the higher and later stages of both. It was a true note which Apollonius struck, when, in contending for the Greek representations of the gods as men, because they were more faithful to reality than the Egyptian representations, he gave as a reason that imagination is a more cunning and trustworthy artist than mere imitation. The constructs of man's creative faculty, whether stimulated by the desire to realize in some concrete form his æsthetical ideal, or by the effort to gather into some similar conception all the elements of his experience which seem worthy of a place in his religious Ideal, are far enough removed from any matter-of-fact and sensuously apprehensible realities. This is true of the most realistic but

genuine art, if it is really art, as well as of the most highly impressionist; it is true of the most common-sense, if intelligent efforts at a conception of God, as well as of the most mathematical or the most mystical. For example, the colossal statue of Buddha at Kamakura, with all its suggestive impressiveness as to the depths of personality, is a joint product of the æsthetical and the religious imagination. So is the Taj Mahal, with its religious meaning as a tomb and its quotations from the Koran, inwrought in semi-precious stones, something more than a supreme triumph of the art of architecture; it is a unity of art and of religion in their natural copartnership. The same thought is suggested by the finest sacred music,—by the masses of Palestrina, the Messiah of Handel, and the Requiem of Mozart;—and, indeed, by all the best music of every class. In general, it is not necessary to confine our thought strictly to those products of art which have most definitely originated in, or have most largely embodied, religious beliefs and sentiments.

The severe and exalted work which is required of the creative imagination in its effort to shape the beliefs and conceptions of the higher developments of man's religious experience has been almost uniformly underestimated. It is an epoch-making demand which is made upon the human mind, when it is required to free its images from the fetish, the idol, the natural object, and all concrete representations or embodiments and to construct the Ideal of a Divine Being, not confined to locality or even by the sum-total of visible existences.

The Ideal of Divine Being in the form which Pantheism gives to it, or the belief that the Universe *is* God, cannot belong to the religion of savages; if for no other reason, because savages have not sufficient culture of the creative imagination. In India, where alone in ancient times a philosophical Monism is found, the preceding and the still coexisting religion among the multitudes is *panpsychism* rather than *pantheism*. Only in the later part of the Rig-Veda is there a nearer approach to a

real pantheism. But the Vedic hymns in general show that the Hindū was an "enthusiastic phrasifyer;" and they were written in a period of strong tendencies to syncretism. For the "great, one spirituality of the gods" was beginning to be recognized. And when, by a combination of æsthetical and religious impulses, the conception of Brāhma=All-Energy was framed, the beginnings of a philosophical pantheism were completely made. For the whole collection of known or conceivable beings cannot, of themselves, be treated as God. It is not a loose aggregate of matter-of-fact things which represents that construct of the æsthetical and religious imagination which pantheism makes the Object of faith and worship. It is Nature, conceived of as a spiritual Unity (and so worthy to be spelled with a capital!), that alone seems adequate to satisfy the scientific, the æsthetical, and the religious consciousness. It is the internal, spiritual oneness of the world—the imagined One Being of innumerable and diverse particular beings—which captivates the imagination, as its own supremely valuable handiwork. But in the proper connection we shall see that the theistic conception of God as the eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, Absolute Self, known to man as a self-revealing, perfect Ethical Spirit, is a construct of imagination which transcends all others in its blending of ethical and æsthetical satisfactions.

There are also important forms of Feeling in which both art and religion take their rise, and which make a similar, or an identical appeal to the æsthetical and to the religious consciousness. Among these may be mentioned, first, the feeling of mystery. If nature and human life were all scientifically comprehensible; if nothing awoke or sustained any of those emotions with which the mind always faces the incomprehensible; then the higher flights and nobler achievements of both art and religion could not come into existence. This feeling of mystery is illustrated, especially, by the religious art of Egypt and of India; it was due to the prevalent view of nature, at once æsthetical

and religious, and of the vaguely pantheistical type. The same thing appears in the mystical and idealistic poetry of all languages.

The feeling of appreciation, or worth, which comes from the satisfactions afforded by the artistic presentation of religious conceptions and doctrines, connects art and religion indissolubly together in the responsive soul of man. Thus every tender and true piece of art-work, whether wrought by the hand of nature or of man, becomes doubly appreciated; it is something beautiful and also something presumably of religious significance and worth.

But some of man's emotions and sentiments, usually denominated "æsthetical," are almost or quite as properly to be called definitively religious. This, as we have already seen (p. 328f.) was, in Kant's opinion, distinctly true of the sentiment of the sublime. And if we add a third species to his division and speak, not only of the mathematically and dynamically, but also of the morally sublime, we can see how all these modifications of this æsthetical feeling have a direct application to the supreme Object of religious faith. The spatially limitless or omnipresent Being of God, his inconceivably great and even infinite Power and Majesty, and his absolute and flawless Moral Perfection, awaken, beyond all other constructions of the imagination, the feeling for the sublime. With the æsthetico-religious sentiments thus awakened there arise simultaneously, and almost of necessity, the worshipful feelings of religion,—the feelings, that is, of dependence, veneration, and awe. In similar manner, when æsthetical feeling is stirred by the unusual manifestation of the heroic virtues, the sublime in human nature, the religious feeling simultaneously recognizes something more than human in man, a true spark from the Divine. Hence comes the fact that, in the history of religion, the æsthetical admiration and the deification of both man and nature are everywhere closely allied. This truth was known to the writer of the work which bears the name of

Longinus,¹ as he declared: "When a writer uses any other resource, he shows himself to be a man; but the Sublime lifts him near to the great spirit of the Deity."

Even more important is it to notice that in some of the mental attitudes toward the Beautiful, however objectified, there is a close resemblance to certain of the mind's attitudes toward the Object of religious faith. For this reason a peculiar *immediacy* of apprehension and appreciation, called by the various names of "insight," "intuition," or "ecstatic vision," has almost uniformly been claimed both for the artist and for the religious devotee. Inspiration and revelation—or the "seeing," and "having a vision of" realities that lie above and beyond the sensuous representation—are expressions fitly familiar both in art and in religion. As Bosanquet,² speaking of Plotinus, says: "In the directness with which it is perceived, beauty has an analogy to mystical intuition which often makes it find favor with those who think methodic science too circuitous for an available avenue to truth." The content of the essential fact thus recognized is, we believe, the affinity or kinship with its own life which the soul of man recognizes in the beautiful object. To express the truth as Plotinus himself did: "A beautiful material thing is produced by participation in reason issuing from the Divine."

Doubtless, much opportunity for fanaticism, false claims, failure to reach the true Object of religious faith, and even encouragement to immoral and irreligious ideas and conduct, lies in waiting at the door of every attempt, even partially, to identify the psychological sources and the ultimate ideals of art and religion. But the facts of experience cannot be altered, and they need not be either curtailed or repressed.

Enthusiasm for the Beautiful, both in art and in religion, is not the same thing by any means as fanaticism; nor are those claims to know realities, which can only very imperfectly an-

¹ See Havell's Longinus, chap. XXXVI, p. 69.

² History of Aesthetic, p. 112.

swer the demands for proof, necessarily all and altogether false claims. For ratiocination is not the only path to truth; nor are logical formulas the only means for certifying truth to the individual human soul. The race, too, in every form of its historical evolution, comes to assured cognitions of Reality by other methods than those of purely scientific experiment or strictly logical deduction. A complete analysis of human mental life, such as modern individual and racial psychology is furnishing, reveals to us the sources and the partial explanation of these aspects of man's experience. At both ends of the scale of his mental functioning there stand forms of apprehending Reality which cannot be resolved into purely intellectual processes. At the one end, there is perception by the senses, with its seeming immediacy and certainty of conviction concerning the reality alike of the Self and the non-Self. At the other end, there is that appreciative seizure of the ideals that have a value and a place in the most real experiences, which itself seems to scorn the need of a dialectical process for producing the most intense and well-assured convictions.

If art were merely an imitation of Reality,—as Plato held, and as Kant came near to holding, but as Hegel distinctly, and of principle denied,—then the relations of art and religion could not be shown to have the same profound significance or incalculable worth. But Plato's own dialogues confute him on this point. And there is one great *quasi*-religious truth, which even the extreme subjective idealism of Kant was forced, not only to confess, but even to emphasize. The view which reconciles his so-called "antinomy of the judgments of taste" is this: "The transcendental rational concept of the Supersensible, which lies at the basis of all sensible intuition,"¹ and which cannot be definitely circumscribed by theory or adequately exhibited to sense,—this it is, in which we must find the key to the connection between religion and art. A philosophy of æsthetics reveals the secret truth respecting this

¹ Kritik der Urteilkraft, Part I, Div. II, § 57.

“Supersensible.” *Its concept is the Ideal of a transcendently perfect Personal Life.* But this is precisely the same as the concept which defines the Ideal Object of religious faith and worship. This incomparable truth, to which we shall refer later, Kant could not, in accordance with the sceptical outcome of his theory of knowledge and with his delusive distinction between knowledge and faith, either elucidate or even wholly accept. But his question: “How are synthetic judgments of taste possible?” is really very closely allied to a question concerning the value-judgments of the religious experience. How can a man judge an object to be beautiful in such manner that he feels, as it were, the rational universality of the obligation, and yet be unable to discover the grounds of this obligation, either in the structure of the object as it appears to the senses, or in the natural laws which connect it with other objects?

To the question just raised, there is only one satisfactory answer. The so-called judgment of taste is somehow a silent witness to the kinship of the human spirit with a boundless Spiritual Life, whose Reality is felt with a sympathetic joy, but is not capable of mathematical demonstration or of scientific discovery and testing. Some appreciation of this underlying truth compelled Plato, even when calling poetry “a lie” in its representation of the gods, to speak of it as a “noble lie.” And a recent writer,¹ in prefacing his argument that religion will in the future, as such, totally pass away, has felt justified in affirming: “It is, then, in the self-same idea of life and of its diverse individual and social manifestations that we seek for the Unity of æsthetics, of morality, and religion.” Or, as Schiller in his “Philosophical Letters” affirms: “The Divinity is already very near to that man who has succeeded in collecting all beauty, all greatness, all excellence, in both the small and great of Nature, and in evolving from this manifoldness the great Unity.”

Returning to the more purely psychological point of view,

¹ M. Guyau, *L'Irréligion de L'Avenir*, p. x.

we affirm that the so-called "intuitions" of art and religion, considered as complex attitudes of the human mind toward its object, have these most important and significant characteristics in common: (1) This mental attitude is largely one of the will (he that *wills* to know, shall know, was the profoundly true promise of the founder of Christianity); (2) this mental attitude involves appreciations of value that, when reached, are not mainly dependent for their validity upon the testimony of the senses or upon the conclusions of a logical chain of reasoning; (3) nevertheless, it operates to produce the conviction of a reality and universal worth as belonging, somehow, to the mind's ideal; and (4) it seems itself to be a sort of envisagement of the object, which makes the conviction reasonable for the individual, if not for others also.

From what has already been said it is obvious that there is a similarity, if not an identity, between the Ideal of art and the Ideal of religion. Each involves the creative work of the imagination directed toward the satisfaction of certain of the soul's needs, aspirations, and loftier sentiments. In the case of art, we are called upon to recognize a longing for the "good of beauty;" and the so-called æsthetical feelings appear as stimuli to the imagination, to construct some worthy concrete embodiment of the æsthetical ideal. In the case of religion, it is the aspiration after the good of the divine favor, and of right and satisfactory relations with the Divine, together with the other so-called religious feelings, which excites the imagination to attempt some worthy embodiment, in symbolic or conceptual form, of the religious ideal. Both these ideals are in a process of development; they are changing, rising, becoming more or less alluring and influential, but always only imperfectly apprehensible, in the history of the individual and of the race. In these respects, too, they are profoundly alike in their most important characters.

For, as has already been indicated, the Ideal of a perfect Life is the one underlying and overspreading conception in

which both art and religion find their characteristic ideals. Only as the representation, the concrete embodiment, of some form or aspect of such a life, does the product of art present to the contemplating mind an object which arouses genuine æsthetic feeling. Only as some aspect or manifestation of an immanent or a transcendent Divine Life can any external object or subjective experience attract and attach to itself the religious beliefs and sentiments of the human soul. That which does not *live*, however interesting it may seem to be for the physical sciences, is naught for art or for religion. Death, whether considered as the cessation or the absolute negation of life, can be made the subject of æsthetic representation only through the appeal which it makes to our consciousness of life. And the thought of death, and of that which has been this side, or will be the other side, of death can stir and influence the religious consciousness only by somehow getting itself into relation with the same consciousness of life. Art presents its Ideal in some of its infinitely varied aspects, for human representation, apprehension, realization; religion represents its Ideal, in other aspects. But the meeting-point of both Ideals is a Unity which shall satisfy perfectly both the æsthetic and the religious nature of man.

One further truth of a psychological character connects art and religion closely together in the experience of the individual and in the history of the race. Both developments always, and of necessity, deal largely in picturate and symbolic ways of presenting their ideals.¹ What each concrete representation, whether found in nature or made by man, has to show, is only the merest glimpse of the perfect and unitary Whole. What religion and art say, at any particular moment or through any single agent, is a word here, a phrase there;

¹ On this point Bosanquet considers that the first great step toward a philosophical aesthetic is taken when it is clearly seen that art is not imitative but symbolic. This he makes to be the truth which Plotinus evoked from Plato's view. See *History of Aesthetic*, p. 114.

at best, it is a single sentence or a fragmentary discourse. This concession, so to say, must, however, be accompanied by the affirmative claim that *the* truth of reality is given, and is given both most appreciatively and effectively in the form of symbols and figures of speech. As the thought is enunciated in somewhat mystical form, in a Dialogue of Scotus Erigena,¹ who maintains that there is nothing among visible and corporeal objects which does not signify something incorporeal and ideal. When, for example, we represent God as the "maker" of heaven and earth, as the "Lord of lords," and "King of kings," as our "Father in Heaven," and the "Comforter" of our souls, we are putting important and precious truths of experience with a living Reality into the form of symbols and figures of speech. It is for the further reflective thinking of mankind ever to strive after a clearer and fuller conceptional understanding of the meaning of its own terms; in order, however, that this understanding may, in turn, be perpetually rendered into a fuller and richer communion of man's life with the perfect Ideal Life of God.

These psychological relations between the two forms of mental reactions exhibited in the religious and the æsthetical aspects of human experience admit of innumerable illustrations from the history both of art and of religion. The historical relations of the two developments have almost uniformly been those of mutual helpfulness. Thus science and art appear to be in a somewhat sharply marked contrast as respects their traditional and habitual attitudes toward the religious development of man. The reasons for this contrast are themselves mainly psychological. Both science and religion have dogmas to proclaim; and the former is always liable to be called to the duty of chastening and correcting the religious life on the exposed side of its dogmas. But this is a duty, to reciprocate which religion is compelled by its very essential nature and by the part which it feels obligated to assume in the conduct of

¹ De Divisione Mundi, § 3.

human life. Art, however, ministers to religion on the open and grateful side of feeling.

The entire history of man's æsthetical and religious development illustrates the mutual helpfulness of art and religion. On the one side, art furnishes to religion the symbolic representation of its beliefs, and thus provides an effective means for teaching and confirming these beliefs in the way of pictorial presentment. It also stimulates powerfully the aspirations, and affords satisfaction to the sentiments, of the religious consciousness. Here again, the ancient religions of Egypt, Babylon, and Greece afford a variety of striking illustrations. The art of Egypt, by means of the remains which have already been described, sets forth vividly and abundantly the nature of its religion. This religion was a "vast and complicated system of beliefs and institutions resulting from their view of man's relations to the unseen world." The universal mystery of life furnished the *motif*, and the strong and triumphant love of life the impulse, which controlled the ministrations of art to the religion of this ancient people. But with the Babylonians the case was very different. Monotonous hugeness was the physical characteristic of their temples,—a characteristic which from the builder's point of view was necessarily connected with the character of the material (namely, burnt clay) of which these immense structures were composed. In the mythical age their aim was expressed by the critics of their religion as the impious and heaven-defying proposal: "Come, let us build a city and a town that shall reach up to heaven." But from the more intelligent and sympathetic point of view this architecture may be regarded as intimately associated, in a reciprocal way, with the genuine and helpful expression and the development of the religious life of the people. "The religious architecture of Babylon and Assyria," says Jastrow,¹ "is of interest chiefly as an expression of the religious earnest-

¹ Religion of Babylonia and Assyria, p. 612.

ness of rulers and people, and only in a minor degree as a manifestation of artistic instincts." Yet these instincts showed themselves in these countries, in the decorative art as applied especially to the building of temples. For the importation of metals and the work in them, especially in bronze, for which the Babylonian architects became so famous, as well as the decorative use of semi-precious stones, was largely due to the desire to make the sacred structures brilliant and magnificent in a manner worthy of the gods. The anthropomorphizing among the beauty-loving Greeks was of a character largely to control the development of both art and religion, and to make them mutually helpful in a variety of ways. In Greece the history of religious beliefs and sentiments of the political and social order, and the history of artistic development, constitute an essential unity. The ideals of religion and the ideals of art were set before the mind of the people, as a combined effect, in the forms of representation employed by architecture, sculpture, and the drama.

And what is so obviously true of the more prominent forms of artistic development is also true, only less obviously, of many lower forms and minor expressions of the same development. The manufacture of the idol or totem, of the shrine or small dwelling-place of the god, the celebration of the religious festival by games and dramatic representations, all illustrate the intimate relation between art and religion. Especially is this true of the excitement of the religious feelings by music of the lower order, as among savages generally, and among the Chinese of to-day. Even the principles of flower-arrangement, as they prevail among the Japanese to-day, are largely of a religious order. And, to return to the more exalted forms of artistic expression, we find religion furnishing to art many of its most inspiring ideas, with their purifying and uplifting influence. The amount of this influence which has been exercised by such pictorial representations as, for example, those of Amida Buddha in Japan, and of the Virgin and Holy Child in

Catholic Europe, is, in spite of all the counter and degrading influences of the same art, quite incalculable.

It is not necessary in this connection to dwell upon the effect, upon art, of the patronage of religion. Among the ancient Greeks this effect was particularly great in the stimulus given by the state and the public to architecture and sculpture; and by Catholicism in Europe, especially from the Fifteenth Century onward, to architecture and painting.

Religion and Art have not, however, always developed in this satisfactory relation of mutual helpfulness and good-will. Sometimes, on the contrary, each has been accused—and by no means unjustly—of influencing the other to its harm and degradation. But these relations of antagonism are rarely immediate and direct. They are usually brought about by one or more of the following three mediating influences: (1) Ethical, when art becomes allied with, or devoted to, what religion regards as immoral and divinely forbidden; (2) economic and social, when art becomes the companion and servant, or even the inspirer of luxury and effeminacy, and is therefore antagonized by the religious spirit of self-abnegation or of asceticism; and (3) where art becomes chiefly expressive of religious beliefs and conceptions that are outlived, or even regarded as false, by the more intelligent class of believers.

Both classes of relations,—namely, the mutually helpful and the antagonistic,—as illustrative of the more profound psychological connections of the two forms of life and progress, have accompanied the history of the Christian Church from its beginning until now. While, on the one hand, the Christian community, during its early centuries seemed to be devoid of æsthetical sentiment and positively hostile to art, it was really, as Bosanquet says,¹ introducing to the world's productive activities a "completely new force and freedom in, so to speak, taking possession of the universe with all its strength and majesty, as something that shares, in its degree, man's relation to

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

the Creator." This "force and freedom" began early to show itself in various ways. There sprang up a new symbolic art, designed to emphasize the significance of the life and redemptive work of Jesus. There arose also a new kind of music, which was simple, joyous, and free, and which became the forerunner of the wonderful developments of this art in modern times. Especially marked, however, was an æsthetical appreciation and delight in nature, which far surpasses anything that can be found in Greek or Roman literature. This may be directly traced to that feeling of new relations towards the Creative Energy, whose offspring is the world of nature that environs his nearer and dearer child, the "son of man," which Jesus introduced into the life of the ancient civilization. "It is not to be denied," says the author just quoted,¹ "that the Founder of Christianity looked out upon the external world with free and friendly eyes, or that the ultimate tendency of this religion is to make men feel that the world and he himself are parallel expressions of one and the same Divinity." Even that austere and ascetic tendency toward the sensuous and luxurious in art which the cross of Christ fostered, and which the persecutions, sufferings, and hardships of the early Christian Church intensified, was the prerequisite for the sublimely expressive work of the later painters and poets. No form of art—but, especially, music, painting, and poetry—can reach its highest development otherwise than through a profound and intelligent appreciation of the incomparable worth of suffering, and of the supreme artistic power of tragedy, in the world of nature and of human history.

There were sufficient reasons, not only in the sensuous spirit and morally degrading character of the art of the time, but also in the great and sudden rush into the Christian Church of uncultured and barbarous peoples, which made the organized forces and prevalent spirit of early Christianity repressive and unproductive, if not positively hostile to art. This attitude

¹ Bosanquet, *Ibid.*, p. 129f.

continued to be prevalent for several centuries preceding the beginnings of the Renaissance. But even in its most iconoclastic attitude toward the art of the pagan world there was a difference of opinion within the Christian Church. When, for example, the Bishop of Marseilles (in the sixth century) ordered the removal and destruction of all sacred images in his diocese, Gregory the Great laid down the important distinction between worshipping a picture and learning from a picture what it is fit to worship,—thus appreciating the value and mission of symbolic art in relation to religion. But the position finally adopted by the Church that “pictures cannot be copies of an essence which is inaccessible to sensuous perception, and therefore they are not to be worshipped,” is as surely well fitted to serve the truer and higher interests of art as of religion. For thus the principle is proclaimed that art and religion have a common task before them; and this task is to lift the soul of men to an appreciation of the value of the Super-sensible and yet Real-Ideal and to a more perfect communion with it.

It must be remembered, however, that Saint Sophia was built in 530 A. D.; and “St. Sophia once built, the earth began to blossom with beautiful buildings, and the thousand years that lie between the date of St. Sophia and the date of St. Peter’s at Rome may well be called the building age of the world.”¹ Adding a few decades more, and we have to say that this was the great constructive age of the world in music and painting as well; and that all these arts were inspired and encouraged by the Christian religion and, in turn, themselves rendered most valuable service in artistic representation of its beliefs, sentiments, and ideals.

Indeed, both the psychology of the religious experience and the history of religious development warrant the conclusion that the essential good which art and religion represent in com-

¹ See Mr. Wm. Morris’ Lectures on Art, as quoted with approval by Bosanquet, *History of Æsthetic*, p. 124*f.*

mon, requires art to beautify and glorify the conceptions and cult of religion, and obligates religion, with its sentiments and ideals, to inspire, purify, and elevate art. But mere display, excessive ornateness, and above all the ministry to the mental attitudes and forms of conduct that are sensuous and immoral, are as distasteful to the highest æsthetical, as they are to the purest religious feeling. And, on the other hand, sensuous excesses, bigotry, fanaticism, and selfish strife in religion, are as immoral and as far removed from the religious ideal as they are foreign and repulsive to genuine æsthetical feeling. Thus, when both art and religion begin clearly to recognize and faithfully to follow their purest and highest ideals, they are prepared to unite in the service of that "more significant beauty" which has its source and its inspiration from the conception of an ideally Perfect Personal Life—indwelling in, uplifting, and redeeming all things and all souls.

We cannot agree, then, with the view¹ which finds a fundamental inconsequence, not to say incompatibility, between art and religion, on the ground that religion, even in its cult, seeks truth, while art, when most genuine, does not attempt to represent reality. For there are, as we have shown, indissoluble mental and emotional bonds which tie together these two forms of the expression of what is in man's nature and what is taught by his historical evolution. Both art and religion seek to present the truth respecting the Ultimate Reality. There are certain of the greatest truths, which are parts of the One Great Truth, that are set forth in the artistic view of the world and of its individual objects in a form best adapted to be grasped by the human mind. In every concrete reality, or relation of concrete realities, there may be hidden a thought which is best and most effectively presented by the symbolism of art. The Greek view which affirmed the identity of the two conceptions of the beautiful and the morally good is far nearer the truth than is that view which would place art and religion in a fundamentally

¹ Comp. A. Dorner, *Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie*, p. 389f.

antagonistic attitude. On the other hand, however, we may properly object, in the interests of both art and religion, to any off-hand identification, either theoretical or practical, of these two important human interests and their corresponding developments.

In modern times, the tendency in Christian lands, and indeed everywhere that modern life has penetrated, is more and more to divorce art from the beliefs and cult of religion. This tendency has even affected the structure of the building used for worship and the character of the music which is regarded as worshipful. It is also thought to have had much to do with freeing art from restrictions and trammels that prevent its highest development according to its own appropriate ideals, and in accordance with its own intrinsic character. "Art for art's sake," instead of art as the minister of the spiritual interests of humanity, has become the accepted motto. In many respects, this tendency is to be welcomed, in the best interests of both art and religion. The superstitious and false impressions which have been fostered by the use of images, pictures, paraphernalia, and mythical and poetical compositions, taking the form of religious formulas and creeds, are thus made less effective; and their removal makes room for that larger administration of the beautiful by cultivating the power to apprehend and to appreciate the universal presence and work of the All-beautiful One. The cultivation of this power is a most important factor in developing the fullest life of the religious consciousness. But the securing of this supreme result requires a reunion of the two influences upon a higher plane of interaction and mutual helpfulness.

CHAPTER XIX

MORALITY AND RELIGION

The psychology of the religious experience shows how indissolubly and profoundly connected are the two developments of morality and religion, in the very nature of man. This connection is, indeed, even more deeply seated, complex, and indestructible than are the interrelations existing between science and religion, or between art and religion. The reason for this fact becomes at once apparent when we consider that morality and religion meet, of necessity, in the sphere of conduct; and if the word "conduct" be used in its widest and yet altogether legitimate significance, it covers all the voluntary and conscious life of man as directed toward the realization of whatever kind of ends. Morality has to do with conduct, in general; and religion is always, even when taken at its lowest terms, and in its worst conditions of ignorance and degradation, a form of conduct. It follows, therefore, that the relations between the two forms of human life and human development must have their sources, and the laws which govern them, in man's entire nature, *as fitted for conduct*.

Besides the more direct relations there exist others which are more indirect: for industry, science, politics, and art, are all species of conduct. Religion, as influencing all of these developments, is thus brought into the greatest variety of more mediate and less obvious connections with morality, considered as the general science and art of conduct.

It is as misled by the perplexing history of the ethico-religious development of humanity, rather than as reasoning

upon a basis of careful psychological study, that two extreme, distinctly opposed, but equally erroneous views have arisen respecting the relations of morality and religion. One of these views regards the two forms of progress as essentially different in character and origin, as unnecessarily confused by being made interdependent in history, and as destined in the future to be freed from this condition of unnatural interdependence. The other view regards morality and religion as psychologically, and ideally, if not historically, identical. The former view sets up mistaken or impossible distinctions; the latter confuses the distinctions which really exist, in its effort, too directly to reach a unity of a higher order than either of the two.

The statement of writers like Waitz, that moral ideas seem originally to have had no connection with religious views has been justly criticized by pointing out that it rests upon a confusion of conceptions.¹ The argument is, indeed, invariably a paralogism. It confuses the conception of a moral law, or a rule binding upon conduct in general, and the conception of some particular content of such a law which "we modern folk" regard as obligatory. If, then, its proper content be given to our conception of morality, and it be made to cover all opinions, precepts, sentiments, and practices, that have to do with "the ought" and "the ought not" of conduct, no complete separation is any longer possible between the beginnings of morality and the beginnings of religion. The historical fact is that "even in its rudest forms religion was a moral force," and that certain demands authoritatively made upon the conduct of man are inseparable from religion.²

Students of the particular religions from the comparative point of view, whenever they affirm a complete separation in origin or development between morality and religion, are soon compelled in candor to admit that they have been guilty of

¹ Compare Orelli, *Religionsgeschichte*, p. 4/.

² W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*, p. 53.

this same confusion of concepts. Thus Jastrow¹ at first declares that, "in the earlier forms of religion there is no direct bond between belief and right living." But here everything depends upon the interpretation given to the terms "direct bond" and "right living." No one, indeed, can contend that religion has always directly contributed to the obligatory character of a living that is "right," according to our improved and essentially Christian ideals of conduct. Moreover, what this author emphasizes as the creation of divine commands and religious duties, by a process of adopting or absorbing established customs, on the authority of religious teachers or religious bodies, is, in fact, usually an influence of the exactly reverse order. The view which has, the rather, the warrant of fact is that of Wundt,² who maintains that most of the customs and current opinions which give laws and regulate practice according to an accepted moral code, have their origin in what were formerly believed to be divine commands and religious duties. Both religion and morality are, fundamentally considered, agreed that "the ultimate and eternal aims of morality are infinitely superior to its narrow exemplifications in the realm of sense; and even on the ethical theory, these ultimate aims are given to consciousness only in the form of religious ideas."³ And Jastrow himself subsequently declares:⁴ "Religion invariably has a practical aspect." But the "practical aspect" of religion and of all human life, is the aspect of morality.

In like manner D'Alviella,⁵ in his effort to explain why "the authors of the myths have ascribed acts to their deities which they themselves would regard as blameworthy or degrading," goes to the quite unwarrantable extreme of declaring: "The

¹ The Study of Religion, p. 108.

² In his Work on Ethics, throughout.

³ Wundt, *Ibid.*, I, p. 52.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

⁵ The Origin and Growth of the Conception of God, p. 177.

only possible explanation is, that at first morals had no influence whatever on the conception formed of the gods. Ethics and religion were absolutely independent of each other." This authority, too, is thus guilty of the same paralogism. For the final purpose of his entire argument is to show that, if we consider the evolution of religion as a real divine self-revelation, then the influence of this evolution upon the race is in every way most potent. Of the subsequent course of man's progress it is expressly declared: "Thus Religion and Morals react one upon the other, the idea of duty purifying the conception of deity; and the latter, in its turn, fortifying the feeling of obligation, while fructifying it with love."¹ Another writer,² after claiming the necessity for admitting that the "fusion" of the moral and the religious life is not primitive, proceeds to show how important elements of morality were expressed and emphasized even in the bloody rites of the Aztec religion. In his apologetic enthusiasm he declares not only that it "taught to consider a decent and virtuous life as required by the gods," but also that "the horrors it (religion) has caused cannot weigh against the final and over-mastering good which it produces."

But complete fusion of the moral and the religious, in a harmonious unity of living reality, has not yet been accomplished by any religion, even for its most sincere believers and devoted disciples. And all arguments with regard to the factors of an unknown quantity—the so-called "primitive religion"—quite too obviously fail to recognize what grotesquely contradictory conceptions and discordant practices can be united by the cement of man's religious needs, when his intellectual and social conditions are at the lowest; or even when these conditions have reached a relatively high grade of development. In the Mexican religion, for example, the god of war, in the buildings surrounding whose temple the Spaniards could count 136,000 symmetrically piled skulls, bore the name

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 184f., 203f.

² Réville, *The Native Religions of Mexico and Peru*, p. 87.

of "humming-bird" (*Uitzilopochtli*); and in close neighborhood there were halls where the poor and sick were gratuitously attended by his priests!

Other reasons will subsequently appear, which may properly incline the mind of the investigator to form a more generous and genial conception than is current, of religion; and a nobler and purer than the common conception of what is properly styled morality. Such improved conceptions are indispensable, if one is to understand the profoundest and most permanent relations of morality and religion.¹ These relations are such as to forbid theology to depreciate *mere* morality; and, equally, to discourage the sneer at *mere* religion on the part of the student of moral development. For genuine morality, in the lowest and most germinal conditions of man's ethical development, is never "mere" keeping of a law for the law's sake, nor a "mere" pursuit of happiness for happiness' sake. There is always in it some trace of the feelings of obligation and devotion to a personal Ideal. And when this ideal is perfected, and the acknowledgment of the obligation is completed in a supremely devoted life, then morality is ready to reveal its essence as a supreme Good. Then, too, it comes to a full consciousness of its own supreme significance and place among the things of worth in the universe; and then it cannot longer avoid recognizing its kinship to religion as well. At this point we may refer again to our refusal to classify religions as ethical and non-ethical; while, at the same time, affirming that the ethical test affords the supremely satisfactory means for estimating the excellence of different religions.

On the other hand, the psychological identity of morality and religion cannot be affirmed; nor do the two always make progress side by side, and with even step, in the history of the individual or of the race. Under the past and present conditions of human living differences between the two have always

¹ See this subject treated from the reversed point of view in the author's *Philosophy of Conduct*, chaps. XXIV-XXVI.

existed, both theoretical and practical; such differences will doubtless continue to exist until the beliefs, sentiments, and practical maxims of humanity have found their one harmonizing and all-inclusive Ideal in a perfect spiritual union with God. Of these differences the two most important and influential concern, on the one hand, the sanctions and, on the other hand, the ideals of human conduct. With morality considered as separate from religion, whether theoretically or practically, the sanctions and ideals of conduct are treated as though they had a purely natural, or humanly social, origin and character. They are regarded as of man's own devising; they originate in considerations of convenience or of propriety that are social in their genesis. They are man-made,—purely psychological growths as it were. Or, from the most materialistic point of view, the only sanctions of human conduct may be found in an inevitable response on man's part to the imperious and all-comprehending demands of his physical environment. According to this view, nature plays on the psychophysical mechanism in such a way as to evolve moral laws, with their attached sanctions and their forward reference to certain ideals. But religion, on the contrary, considers that some, at least, of the forms of conduct which can claim its peculiar sanctions, and which are patterned after its special ideals, have a superhuman, and even a supernatural or divine origin. They have also a reference beyond the sphere of what is empirical and temporal.

It is admitted even by those who hold the most extreme views as to the intrinsic separability of morality and religion, that, in fact, the two have, during most of the period covered by the authentic history of man's evolution, been closely interrelated in several different ways. For example, certain forms of virtuous feeling and action, such as reverence, loyalty, filial piety, etc., have in the past usually been evoked by presenting religious motives. And these virtues are essentially the same, whether called out and exercised towards the

gods or towards the elders and superiors among men. Moreover, any regard for either the psychology or the history of religion teaches us how influential over the whole sphere of morality are the conceptions which men hold as to the nature of Divine Being and as to the relations of men to this Being. The gods occupy, of necessity, a position in the thoughts and practices of men which enables them greatly to modify the morals of their devoted believers. They are models of conduct, good or bad, among men. More especially, certain virtues become embodied in certain deities; and these same deities become the inspirers and promoters of the same virtues. A process which Wundt expressively calls "intussusception" is constantly taking place between morality and religion. For all reflective thinking normally tends to bind morals and religion more closely together in a unity of life. And there is nothing more true and impressive about the study of the entire subject than the observation how, as the Divine Being becomes more clearly apprehended in terms of Ethical Spirit, the changed conception exercises a powerful influence over the moral ideas and practices of those whose religious ideas have first been improved ethically. The typical old-world example of this influence is found, of course, in Judaism. The prophetic conception of Yahweh as the patron and protector of righteousness, and a judge of eyes "too pure to behold iniquity," loving and rewarding right doing and hating and punishing all wrong doing, was an ethico-religious factor of the first degree of potency. But the age in Greece, when, largely under the influence of Æschylus, Zeus was set before the people as the god who rewarded the righteous and punished the wrong-doer, affords an example, only less impressive.

The view that morality and religion are psychologically united so that they can never exist apart, and yet are not to be identified, is illustrated and enforced by everything which we know about man's historical development. It has already (p. 455f.) been shown that the contention of certain anthropologists and

students of comparative religion, to the effect that religion at first had no connection with morality results from a too restricted and misleading use of the conceptions involved. The rather is it true, as Mr. Andrew Lang¹ has said of Professor Huxley's claim that, in the stage of Australian savagism "theology is wholly independent of ethics," the separatist view has been entirely overthrown. For example, according to the testimony of Fitzroy, the Fuegians—lower savages than which in their religious ideas are nowhere to be found—believe that the evil spirit torments men in this world, if they do wrong, by storms, hail, snow, etc." "A great black man is supposed to be always wandering about the woods, who is certain of knowing every word and every action; who cannot be escaped, and who influences the weather according to man's conduct."² This superhuman being, or "magnified, non-natural Man," who makes for righteousness, establishes among these savages a very vital connection between morality and religion, although he is supposed to punish "shooting little duck" as well as killing men. Nor does it readily appear how the moral influence of this superhuman being is inferior to that of *Mai Kali*, who converts her devotees into professional "stranglers," in her honor, or even to that of the Deity who demands the burning of witches and heretics. Indeed, in all these cases the power of the ethico-religious *motif*, with its peculiar form of sanction and of ideal, is equally apparent and almost equally appalling.

Sir Monier Williams has said³ of the Hindūs that they are "among all the races of mankind the greatest slaves to the bondage of immemorial tradition—not so much in its bearing on religious beliefs, or even on moral conduct, as on social usages, caste practices, and domestic ceremonial observances." But the truth is that these "social usages," "caste practices,"

¹ The Making of Religion, p. 176f.

² Cruise of the Beagle, II, p. 180f.

³ Brāhmanism and Hindūism (4th ed.), p. vii.

and "domestic ceremonial observances," in which the Hindū popular religion so largely consists, are themselves the embodiment of the moral and religious beliefs, sentiments, and cult of the same people. This entire ethico-religious system (*sic*) is an ill-assorted mixture of elements that are survivals from the superstitions and practices of uncivilized aboriginal tribes, of crude deductions from the vague pantheistic tenets of the philosophy which succeeded to the nature-worship of the Vedas, and of moral precepts of Brāhmanism that, theoretically considered, are of an advanced ethical character but that are too ignorantly or weakly held to leaven the entire mass. The specific virtues of the Brāhman are, indeed, a goodly array. They include quiescence, self-control, devotion, purity, patience, rectitude, secular and sacred understanding, the recognition of spiritual existence, and the inborn disposition to serve Brahma."¹ But it is not in the Hindū religion alone that ethico-religious principles of royal ancestry and truly regal qualities fail of control through their alliance with low-born and ignorant companions.

The powerful, and on the whole beneficial influence of religion over morality in ancient Egypt cannot be doubted by any one acquainted with the records. Here, to be sure, as in Babylonia and Assyria, the morals of the entire people cannot be measured by us except through comparison with the standard of the monarch's morality. But the same love of life, and the accompanying inability to conceive of its continuance otherwise than under the conditions of its concrete embodiment in a shifting variety of forms, which were so essential factors in the religious beliefs and practices of this country, were equally potent in its ethical opinions and its standards of right and wrong conduct. What must one do to *live* (as one would *wish to live*) in the hereafter? This is the question to which morality and religion gave to this ancient people one and the same answer. Thus it came about that the moral

¹ See *The Hindoos as They Are*, by S. C. Bose, p. 183.

standards of the religion of ancient Egypt were of an exceptionally lofty character. They were, indeed, far above those actually exacted by the laws or by existing customs. They partook of the ideals which religious belief attributed to the invisible world. For the gods will require more of men in the hereafter than the kings of earth, or their peoples, require here. So true is this that M. Chabas declares, "none of the Christian virtues is forgotten" in the recognized Egyptian code of morality. And, according to M. Renouf, the translators of the Bible found the native vocabulary "amply sufficient for the most delicate notions of Christian ethics." In fact the Christian of to-day would be esteemed most true to the moral code of his religion who could use the words put into the mouths of their ancient dead as they appear before the Judge of the other world. In that "most ancient book of the world," the *Maxims of Ptah-hotep*,¹ they who would live well are bidden: "Seek the most perfect way, that thy conduct may be above reproach. Justice is great, invariable, and assured; it has not been disturbed since the age of Osiris." "God will take away the bread of him who enriches himself by inspiring fear. . . . Let thy love pass into the heart of those that love thee: cause those about thee to be loving and obedient . . . thou art become the steward of the good things of God." "Not a little child did I injure;" "Not a herdsman did I ill-treat;" "I was the protector of the humble;" "I have not altered a story in the telling of it;" "Doing that which is Right and hating that which is Wrong, I was bread to the hungry, water to the thirsty, clothes to the naked, a refuge to him that was in want; that which I did to him, the great God hath done to me;"—it is by taking in their sincerity such moral precepts as are involved in these and countless kindred declarations that we may fairly estimate the ethical tendencies of the religious beliefs in the best thought of ancient Egypt.

There is little doubt that the worship of Heaven as Supreme

¹ As translated by P. Virey, Records of the Past, New Series, vol. III.

Lord, and the connected thought that all the social and political life of the people is under the eye and the control of this Heavenly Power, with its *quasi*-personal and ethical attributes, has done much to induce and maintain an improved standard of morality in China during the last three thousand five hundred years, and more, of its history. In proof of this statement may be adduced the lofty moral character of the religious classics of China. The inseparable and inviolable connection between morality and religion is asserted in the first sentence of the "Doctrine of the Man":¹ "What Heaven has conferred is called the nature; an accordance with this nature is called the path of duty; the regulation of this path is called instruction." "No people," says Dr. Meadows, "whether of ancient or modern times, has possessed a sacred literature so completely exempt as the Chinese from licentious descriptions, and from any offensive expression. There is not a single sentence in the whole of the Sacred Books and their Annotations that may not be read aloud in any family circle in England. Again, in every other non-Christian country idolatry has been associated with human sacrifices and with the deification of vice, accompanied by licentious rites and orgies. Not a sign of all this exists in China." On the other hand, however, the same prehistoric religious superstitions, and the same degrading ethical tendencies, which are found everywhere else, manifest themselves throughout all this history down to the present time. "It is a common saying among the Chinese," says Mr. Arthur Smith,² "that the more temples a village has, the poorer it is, and also the worse its morals." On the other hand, the same writer³ has heard of one village which had no temple at all, but which had acquired the nickname of "My Family Thief Village." But these two views of the interaction of the ethical and the religious developments are neither

¹ See Legge, *The Religions of China*, p. 139.

² *Chinese Characteristics*, p. 288.

³ See *Village Life in China*, p. 139.

contradictory of each other, nor contrary to the thesis which maintains the essential character of the psychological and historical connections between morality and religion. On the contrary, they confirm this very thesis.

The same thing is indeed true of that people of whom, in ancient times, it is most difficult to bring the religious beliefs and cult into any harmony of nature, or equality of movement, with their ethical development. This difficulty is due chiefly to the lively and unrestrained activity of the intellect and imagination of the leaders of the people, and, indeed, of the multitude itself, in the interests of æsthetical and philosophical ideals, without due regard to the truths of religion or the practical interests of morality. Yet in Greece, as elsewhere, the earlier morality and the more primitive religious beliefs and sentiments were so closely interwoven as scarcely to seem, or really to be, separable. In the time of Æschylus and the later dramatists, moreover, the improved moral conception of the gods—especially of Zeus, as the patron and protector of righteousness—became a most powerful influence over the moral development of the people, as well as over their conception of the moral order of the world. And when religion decayed, and morality, divorcing itself for the time from religion, allied itself more intimately with the æsthetical ideas and art-products of the time, the fairest results of their associated efforts did not satisfy the cravings of the people for a perfect pattern of an improved ethico-religious life.

Even in estimating correctly the influence of religion over morals among the Greeks during the period of their apparent temporary divorce, it is necessary to recur to distinctions which have already been emphasized in several other connections. Mythology and religion were, indeed, always most intimately associated among this people so gifted with imagination and with fine æsthetical feeling. But among them—perhaps, more especially among them than among any other civilized race—the distinction between religious and non-religious mythology

was recognized and important. Moreover, where the mythological theme had to do with the greater gods, with the divine beings who served in an important way as the models and inspirers of men, the æsthetical *motifs* most frequently caused both the ethical and the religious considerations to be sunk quite out of sight. The conceptions of the gods which the mythology of literature and art adopted and cultivated were doubtless, as Plato held, unworthy and practically mischievous from the ethical point of view. But, probably, their real effect upon the religious beliefs and upon the conduct of the people was not essentially different from that produced to-day in a nominally Christian community by the habitual seeing of plays and reading of novels that treat leniently, or even admiringly, the gratification of pride, love of luxury, or illicit lust. It is altogether probable that the ancient Greeks made much the same distinction between Zeus, the Guardian of Justice, and Zeus, the adulterer and intriguer, which Mediæval Catholicism applied to the pope as a man and the same pope as head of the Church. On the other hand, many of the mythological and dramatic pictures of the morality that was set by the standard of the gods are elevating and inspiring models for men to imitate. In Greece, too, the standards of morality theoretically established, if not practically in sway, rose to higher grades in close reciprocal dependence upon the theology of the time with its improved conceptions of the moral ideals set by the divine ones. Especially did Apollo, himself much improved in moral character, become a pattern of morality for man. He also attained the moral dignity of a mediator between God and man; for the Greeks were now coming to be more definitely afflicted with the sense of sin and the consciousness of an obvious failure to rise to the demands of the divine standard. The nature of the Delphic oracle, of the Amphyctionic Council, and of the Eleusinian mysteries, testifies to this improved relation between morals and religion.

Religion, morality, and philosophy, were never more intel-

ligerly and solidly coupled together than in the sincere, but only limited and largely ineffective effort which was made in the Augustan Age to lift up and improve the whole life of the Roman Empire.¹ The writings of Seneca, Dion, Aurelius, Epictetus, and others of this period, are "crowded with sermons," from the thoughtful ethico-religious point of view, on the importance of making one's life correspond to the teachings of one's philosophy.

"For like hell-mouth I loath

Who holds not in his words and thoughts one undistinguished truth."²

The whole teaching of that wonderful moralist, Epictetus, enforces the belief that "God is the Father of mankind," and that "from the doctrine of our relationship to God we are to deduce its consequences" in the rules and practice of right living.

Numerous corollaries, or subordinate considerations, with respect to the relations which exist in general, between morality and religion might be amply illustrated by the history of these two developments. How the ethical import and obligation of an indefinite variety of ceremonial observances and caste- and clan-privileges arises in the beliefs and cult of religion has already been sufficiently illustrated by repeated references to the typical case of India. Enough also has been said to show how nature-worship, with its accompaniment of phallic worship, and with the emphasis which it puts upon the mystery of physical generation and upon the part which the Divine Being takes in the origin of life, exercises a profound influence to determine the particular character of the prevalent morals. Indeed, the most degrading effect upon the current morality which arises from religious sources is connected with this kind of religion. This is especially true, for example, of the Semitic Ishtar cult,

¹ See Oakesmith, *The Religion of Plutarch*, p. 57f.

² *Iliad*, Chapman's Translation, IX, 312, 313; and compare Seneca, *De Vita Beata*, cap. 18.

of the nature-worship of Shintō in "Old Japan," and of the Hindū worship of Krishna. Nor is there need again to pass in review the regulative influence of ancestor-worship, whether for ethical improvement or the opposite, over the constitution and conduct of the family, the clan, and the nation. Each of these forms of religion has its specific connected type of morality, and they all illustrate the psychological principle of the dependence of types of morality upon typical forms of religious belief and sentiment.

Among the many most curious and yet specific relations between the morality and the religion of primitive and half-civilized peoples are the wager of battle, and the other ordeals which were originally "a device for regulating under conditions of comparative fairness the primitive law of force." These grew out of what one writer¹ has called the tendency of the human mind "to throw its doubts on God." And whether the means employed consist of an appeal to a fetish or to the justice of an omnipotent Deity, the "conception of the intervention of a Divine Power," in order to see that a just judgment is secured, is common to them all. In this respect Biblical religion, even in its most primitive Old-Testament form, is exceedingly mild and humane as compared with the customs of contemporaneous peoples. The decision of Yahweh was for the most part rendered through the casting of lots or, more rarely, through divining by the use of Urim and Thummim (see, however, Lev. xxiv, 11-16). On the other hand, the strength of this connection between the religious view of God's will as the source of right doing and the human and social relations which may properly be enforced as essentials of the moral code, is illustrated in a horrible manner by the "systematized torture" so often administered with unparalleled "cold-blooded ferocity," in the name of the religion whose fundamental law is love.

Other definite and concrete relations between the code of morals and the dominant religious faith grow out of the be-

¹ Henry Chas. Lea, in a work on Superstition and Force, p. 249f.

lief in the existence after death, and the connected belief in the gods, or in One Righteous God, as the distributors of rewards and punishments in the hereafter. Although the idea of the invisible divine beings as the guardians of law and justice does not necessarily have reference to the future after death, still, where a belief in this future as an ethical judgment is already formed, the connections between morality and religion are powerfully reinforced. Marriage and burial customs, the begetting and care of offspring, and even the minute forms of the care of the body, whether living or dead, become in this way obligatory from both the ethical and the religious points of view. In this way, also, the fundamental feelings of fear, hope, and desire of good, are greatly intensified in their control over the conduct of men in the present life. The hope of attaining the Hindū or Buddhistic Nirvāna, the Muhammadan Paradise, or the Christian heaven, and the fear of future retribution in the endless round of Karma, or in Hell, although they may be powerless to create the spirit of devotion toward a truly ethical ideal, are motives second to no others in regulating the practical affairs of the race. And in estimating the real moral value of these emotions it is always necessary to consider what would be the moral effect of rendering them entirely inoperative, or of greatly weakening their influence. The message of the Prophet of Allah, for example, runs: "O ye who believe, . . . fear God, perchance ye may be prosperous; fear the fire prepared for the unbelievers and obey God and his Apostle, perchance ye may get mercy."¹ And although the reward of this obedience to Allah is further described as "pardon from the Lord, and gardens beneath which rivers flow, dwelling therein for aye, for pleasant is the hire of those who act like this," the vigorous proclamation of the reward undoubtedly helped to raise the low moral, as well as religious ideas and practices of the Arab tribes to whom it was originally made. But the higher and more developed religious

¹ Koran, Sura iii.

conceptions of Christian Theism inspire and enforce the demands of the inner motive of fidelity to the moral ideal, in spite of all distractions and contradictions of the environment, with a steadfast hope in the life eternal.

The religious point of view, when occupied by a mind which has undergone a considerable degree of culture in respect of both its ethical and its religious conceptions and ideals, regards all wrongdoing as done against the Divine Will. In a word, immorality comes to be considered as sin. In the earlier stages of man's ethico-religious development, little or no distinction is made between breaches of the customary rules of conduct as prescribed by the social organization, omissions and deficiencies in ritualistic observances or failures to propitiate and honor the gods, and the transgression of fundamental principles of righteousness considered either as embodied in impersonal and unaccountably mysterious laws, or as originating in some invisible and ethically superior Personal Will. But when the conception of the Divine Being as perfect Ethical Spirit becomes relatively clear, such distinctions become more and more important. It very gradually—or, in the case of specially inspired men of insight into moral and religious truth, it more suddenly becomes apparent that what God requires of man is a moral likeness to Himself. The consciousness of wrongdoing is thus converted into the consciousness of alienation from the Divine purity of personal righteousness. The important effects of this change are numerous both in the religious, and also in the more definitely ethical sphere. Incantation, magic, and all other means of "propitiating" Deity—in the lower meaning of this phrase—give place to "prayer" in the higher meaning of this word. In penitence the worshipper seeks the renewal of friendly and affectionate relations with his God. Salvation becomes an ethical affair; and religion becomes a way of salvation. The goal of salvation is thus an ideal moral relation between the human personality and the Divine Being; and the grand office of the religious development of

the individual and of the race appears as the attainment of the end of salvation in its most perfect ideal form.

In this career of humanity, in which the awakened consciousness of Sin and the effort to find favor with the Source of Blessedness in Righteousness are so important factors, the earlier steps are necessarily crude and faltering. The important first thing is that man's impulses to get and to hold whatever he wants, by any means whatsoever, should be checked, and then chastened and directed aright. Thus the distinction between the right way and the wrong way to conduct one's self is cut and rubbed into the crude and tough material of human nature. It is here that the personal influence of priests, prophets, seers, and religious teachers generally, shows itself—in spite of innumerable failures and defections from the higher moral standard on their part—to be invaluable for the ethical progress of humanity. And it is as true to-day as it ever was that, as said Novalis, "the ideal of morality has no more dangerous rival than the ideal of physical strength, of the most vigorous life. Through it man is transformed into a reasoning beast, whose brutal cleverness has a fascination for weak minds."

The way in which the ethical evolution of man is influenced by the development of the religious conception of sin has, in ancient times, no more forceful illustration than that afforded by the religion of Babylonia. "Starting," says Jastrow,¹ "from the primitive conception that misfortunes were a manifestation of divine anger, the Babylonians never abandoned the belief that transgressions could be atoned for only by appeasing the anger of the Deity. But within this limitation, an ethical spirit was developed among the Babylonians that surprises us by its loftiness and comparative purity." So true is this that there are penitential hymns and prayers of the monarchs of this ancient pagan civilization that might fitly fall from the lips of any Christian sinner of the modern era.

¹ Religion of Babylonia and Assyria, p. 312. How the same authority sums up the entire subject has already been quoted on p. 287.

“ O Lord, do not cast aside thy servant,
Overflowing with tears, take him by the hand.”

It is not, however, by any of these religions that a complete fusion is accomplished between the fundamental principles and higher motives of morality and religious conceptions, sentiments, and cult. This fusion is found in its highest form of expression in Christianity—the distinctively ethico-religious religion. It is found also, although in an inferior way, in the highest developments of Buddhism. We have already seen (p. 106*f.*) how the latter began as a moral reform, based, however, on certain philosophic and *quasi*-theological tenets respecting the Being of the World and the nature and destiny of man,—rather than as a new religion. But for this very reason, among others, when Buddhism was accepted and understood as a religion, it was accepted and understood as a way of salvation, a “Path” by conducting one’s self along which it was possible to escape the consequences of wrongdoing. This “Path” led through a Universe conceived of as moral to the core. And only by persistent rightdoing, by following in the way of an *ethical* salvation, could the consequences of wrongdoing be finally overcome. Indeed, the whole Buddhistic doctrine of Sentient Existence and of Karma, and of the way to get off the “Wheel of Existence,” depends upon the identification of morality and religion. Nor must this identification be understood as a merely formal affair. The ten conditions, or virtues,¹—namely, (1) Almsgiving, (2) Keeping the Precepts, (3) Renunciation, (4) Wisdom, (5) Courage, (6) Patience, (7) Truth, (8) Resolution or Steadfastness, (9) Good-Will, (10) Equipoise—are the first steps in the Path; but they are only preliminary, as it were, to the higher morality. This higher morality is attained when the Self is completely sunk in the Being of the World, when the personal good is swallowed up in the Supreme Good;—the nature of which is so

¹ See the Story of Sumedha, Buddhism in Translations, by Warren, vol. 3 of the Harvard Oriental Series, p. 23*f.*

vaguely and imperfectly conceived by this pantheistic Nihilism that bears the name of Sākya-Muni, who became "The Buddha." Yet it is in the best developments of Buddhism that the ethico-religious conceptions of Pantheism, when untouched by the influences of a Christian Theism, have found their noblest and most helpful expression. In its historical development, and as a matter of fact, however, this form of religion has always shown the same ethical weaknesses and defects which characterize every similar form of pantheistic belief and cult. For Oriental Pantheism logically and necessarily shows an almost universal and complete indifference to certain forms of social morality which the Occidental, theistic, and humanistic developments esteem to be of the first-rate importance.

Theism, in all the various forms of its development which have reached an elevated conception of God as omnipresent and omniscient Ethical Spirit, exercises an elevating influence upon the ethical conceptions and practices of those who are faithful to its essential truths. In the history of the world's religions this influence has reached its culminating form, as hitherto displayed in Christianity. In estimating the ethical force of Christian Theism, however, we must remember the facts which characterize that point of the world's history at which this religion began the transformation of the existing Pagan civilization. For the correct estimate involves the recognition of those ethico-religious conceptions and principles which Christianity took over, as it were, from Jewish and Greek sources; and, as well, of the manner in which these conceptions and principles were modified and made more effective by the addition of the peculiar *motifs*, and the improved and higher life, which the new religion imparted to them.

The thought that the One righteous God is the Source, Patron, and Spirit, of all morally right conduct among men had come to its highest expression, before Christianity, in prophetic Judaism. Morality and religion had thus been united in an interior and secure way by having their roots intertwined

in the soil of one and the same principle. But a new danger had not only threatened, but had already prevented, the moral progress of the adherents of this religious faith, through the unexpansive and restrictive character of their religious creed. What sort of a Spirit is he whose righteous Will is man's only pure and safe law of conduct? To this question the God of Judaism did not furnish a completely satisfactory answer. His moral personality as conceived of by the ripest Judaism of the time, could not furnish the pattern and inspiration of moral perfection for man. Christianity adhered to that conception of prophetic Judaism which made an essential unity of morality and religion but it changed the nature of God and of man's relation to God, and thus raised the type of morality required by faith to a level quite impossible of attainment by the writers of the Old Testament. True morality thus became the service of God by men as his sons, and of one's fellow men as brothers (see Matt. xxv, 40-45; 1 John iv, 20). The true offering acceptable to God is the giving of one's self (Rom. xii, 1). The essential thing in both morals and religion is God-likeness;—the perfection of human being after the pattern of the ethically perfect Divine Spirit, the likeness of the sons to the One Father of all (Matt. v, 48). The higher righteousness is the keeping of the Divine Law of love to God the Father, and to men as his children and our brethren.

This conception of righteousness in its relation to religious faith was not wholly unknown to the writers on morals, or to the good men of the age, even outside of Judaism and of Christianity. In the best Greek ethics of the day, "there was the growth of a higher religious morality, which believed that God was pleased by moral action rather than by sacrifice. There was the growth of a belief that life requires amendment."¹ According to the writer just quoted, it is the maxim, "Follow God," which belongs to a plane upon which Epictetus and

¹ So Hatch, *Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church* [Hibbert Lectures, 1888,] p. 141.

Thomas à Kempis meet.¹ So, too, the later Judaism, especially among the Diaspora, and in contrast with its pagan surroundings, had developed the conception of a higher righteousness than the keeping of the Mosaic law and the service of Yahweh according to the legal notion of his requirements and character.² To a heathen who wished to know the quintessence of the Law Hillel responded: "What thou would'st not should happen to thee, that do thou not to any other." And Akiba, like Jesus, summarized the Law in the utterance: "Love thy neighbor as thyself."³

But the source of the peculiarly powerful influence which the Christian religion has exercised over the moral development of the Western world is found in the fact that its morality sprang as a living principle forth from the personal spirit of Christ; and that the summons to follow this personal leader, when accepted, awakened within the human soul the power of a new life. To this fact is chiefly due its superior success in elevating and purifying the moral code and the practices of the social communities over which it has gained even a partial and defective control. As compared with the best ethico-religious life of Judaism, early Christianity showed a more positive and forceful character. It supplied the defects of the prevalent negative sort, owing to a lack of heroic, and forth-putting, and confidently hopeful energy.⁴ It had what Bousset calls an abundance of "*élan*." As respects the best Stoic ethics of the time,

¹ Hatch, *Ibid.*, p. 170.

² Compare Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums im Neutestamentlichen Zeitalter*; and as to the conception of later Judaism regarding the divine requirements, see such passages in the Old-Testament Apocrypha, as Tob. i, 3, 17; xii, 8: the confession and prayer in Baruch; and many others. So also the teachings of Hillel, Gamaliel, Ben Zakkai, and other Rabbis.

³ On the excellencies and the deficiencies of the best Pharisaism of Christ's time, see Bousset, *Ibid.*, p. 116f.

⁴ Compare *The Teaching of the Apostles*, and *The Apostolic Constitutions*,—writings which furnish the most primitive moral code of Christianity outside of the New Testament.

Christianity showed more essential points of agreement than of difference. Epictetus, the supremely lofty teacher and practicer of this ethics, although referring all human conduct to God, emphasized the Divine Reason rather than the Divine Holy Will, as its Source. In describing the content of morality, this great moralist laid less emphasis than did the Founder of Christianity upon being meek, gentle, pitiful, and long-suffering. And these gentler virtues were sadly needed by the Christian people of the early centuries. But, after all, it was not the excellencies of its ethical code which chiefly gave to Christianity its ethical force and successes in the improvement of human conduct. It was, the rather, the experience of redemption by faith in the Love of God as manifested in Christ, and the power of the new life which came with this faith.

In estimating the subsequent historical relations between the Christian religion and the ethical development of so-called Christian nations, it is always necessary, as Crozier¹ has said, (to quote again the same declaration in another connection) "to distinguish with something like precision between the parts played in the complex result by the Spirit of Christ on the one hand, and by the Doctrines and Institutions of the Church on the other." From the former point of view, Christianity can scarcely be said to have any peculiar code of morals; —if by this be meant a system of definite rules of conduct which are designed for universal applicability, as respects both time and locality. On the other hand, whenever the Church has exercised too strictly its functions as an "ethico-pædagogical power," it has had much of baleful, as well as of salutary influence over the development of ethics. For the Christian Church, in the exercise of such functions, even to the extent which is indispensable to its own discipline and purity, is constantly liable to these three distressing and injurious mistakes: (1) the mistake of fostering the hypocrisy of the "double code"; (2) the mistake of including within its membership

¹ History of Intellectual Development, I, p. 249.

many who have not the Spirit of Christ ; and (3) the mistake of excluding from its membership, on the basis of creeds or of temporary ethical regulations, many who have this Spirit. Both the Greek and the Roman Churches vitiated and degraded the ethical life and spirit of Christianity, as has already (p. 213*f.*) been pointed out. Later Protestantism has been, and still is, guilty of similar erroneous views and practices. It has thus given encouragement to an irreligious morality, on the one hand, and on the other, to forms of religion that are unavailing and even pernicious substitutes for a truly Christian morality.

In spite of all difficulties and mistakes, however, the Christian morality has maintained in good degree its own somewhat peculiar type, and its incomparable force as a purifier and renovator of the social life. On the one hand, it is essentially and unalterably opposed to every form of a merely hedonistic or utilitarian ethics ; on the other hand, it is not committed, in an unchangeable manner, to any definitely ascetic or exclusive way of conducting the moral life. It is true that Jesus himself makes use of the appeal to the desire of reward as a motive for right conduct : " Great are your wages in heaven," he assures his faithful followers (Matt. v. 12 ; Luke vi. 23 ; and comp. Heb. xi. 6). It is also true that his first call summoned his followers to relinquish everything and, taking up the symbol of punishment and torture, to follow him as their ideal into the darkness and bitterness of an ignominious death. It is true besides, that one of the most conspicuous differences, externally considered, between the moral code of the Egyptians, the Brāhmins, and the Greeks (both at Athens and at Sparta, criminal proceedings might be taken against those who did not marry), and the moral code of early Christianity was the high estimate placed by the latter upon virginity and celibacy. For these and other severely ascetic elements of this ethico-religious code appeal may be made to the teachings of the master who commanded that the right eye should be plucked out, and the right hand cut off, rather than that either of these members

should be allowed to occasion a moral fall (Matt. v. 29 *f.*); who bade the rich young man dispose of all his wealth before he took upon himself the responsibilities of discipleship (Matt. xix. 16–26); and who even proclaimed a passionate renunciation of every dearest natural tie, when such tie became an obstacle at the threshold of the life which he enjoined upon every follower (Luke xiv. 26 *f.*). Moreover, the entire New Testament abounds in warnings and denunciations for those who are the victims of the “deceitfulness of riches,” or who value highly the good things of the present life in comparison with the riches of the Divine grace and of the Heavenly Kingdom.

On the whole, however, the asceticism of Jesus amounts, as Harnack as said,¹ to his putting us on our guard against the three enemies,—mammon, care, and selfishness; and to his exacting of every man, who would find the way of salvation through him, a certain unlimited devotion of purpose and life to the imperative interests of an ethical and religious Ideal. But this is, in another form, the “categorical imperative,” the unconditional surrender to the supreme God, which all those who have thought profoundly and logically upon ethical principles, have seen to be the amazingly audacious but perfectly unavoidable condition of any truly moral life.

In this connection the practical danger arises of attempting to derive a detailed and unchangeable moral code from the concrete teachings of the biblical writers, or even of Jesus himself. This danger is chiefly incurred, and the corresponding mistake committed, by two classes of persons who stand in quite different, and even opposed, relations to Christianity. The first of these positions is held by those purists who would like to reduce the modern ethical practice, as enjoined by religion, to the standard set by a literal and detailed acceptance of the rules of early Christian living. The second position is taken by those who wish to show that Christian morality is impracticable and cannot be applied to the existing social conditions, whether as

¹ What is Christianity? p. 91*f.*

between individuals or between nations. Still more reprehensible is the position of a third class who, under cover of an opinion coinciding with that of the second class, still profess adherence to the Christian code, while violating the entire Spirit of Christ, in the possession of which consists the essential principle of this code itself.

Observations such as the foregoing emphasize anew the permanence of the psychological principles in which morality and religion are indissolubly united, while at the same time also revealing the increased difficulty of maintaining the appearance of this indissoluble union, under the increasing complications of modern civil and social life. This difficulty has combined with other considerations to encourage many subtle, learned, and logical attempts of the modern age to separate, both theoretically and practically, between the sphere of morality and the sphere of religion. These attempts have ended in the proposal that morality, having become divorced from her monkish spouse, shall contract a second, more rational and satisfactory union with science. Thus religion is to be left out of all account in the control of the moral life; and its reward for surrendering such control is to be a deliverance, for itself, from all obligations to reconcile its faith with the facts and laws of history and sociology. Indeed our age has, as Sabatier¹ truly remarks, brought to the front with an enthusiasm which merits being called a "grand passion," the double cult of the scientific method and the moral ideal. But far from uniting the two, it has pushed both to a point where they seem to contradict and to exclude each other. The question of the age has thus been made imperative: How shall our conceptions and ideals of the supreme Good from the ethical point of view be brought into harmony with the facts and laws which science discloses with regard to the real Being of the World? This question is asked by thousands of serious souls who are divided between the feeling of ardent desire to realize the moral ideal and an ap-

¹ Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion; Preface.

preciation of the extreme difficulty of a reconciliation for both the two realms. Only an improved and expanded notion of religion, and an improvement and expansion of the life which accords with this notion, can effect such a harmony as is desired.

Twin corollaries follow from this conception of the psychological sources in which both morality and religion share. Morality cannot dispense with religion. *Mere* morality cuts itself off from its deepest and richest soil. When the life of conduct frees itself from all religious beliefs and sentiments—if such a thing be possible—it loses a certain spirit of vigor-enthusiasm, and hope, which are necessary to its most effective work, and even to its continued existence at any high level of purity and progress. It is customary to concede this to be true of the vulgar crowd. But it is not infrequently claimed that the more enlightened few may very well attain and maintain a high grade of morality without the stimulus and support of religious faith and religious feeling. This claim, however it may be justified by rare individual instances, almost uniformly overlooks three classes of facts. And, first, a considerable portion of the few who obtain a notable development of morality without experience of the religious motive, really lack a certain symmetry and charm which are imparted by the higher forms of religious faith, and by the virtues which are normally and customarily the expressions of this faith. Second, the best of these “good few” are in reality dependent upon beliefs and sentiments which are virtually religious, for the warmth and nourishment of their moral ideals, and for their steadfastness in the pursuit of these ideals. Doubtless, what De la Saussaye says of the Teutons is in large measure true of men generally:—namely, that in spite of the fact that all religious truth is lost in mystery, “men know what to do; their duty lies before them clear and simple, and the moral order is not subverted.” But the beneficial effect of Christianity upon the morals of the Teutons is one of the most obvious facts of their development in history.

Nor is the ultimate mystery in which religion is lost any more deeply mysterious than that in which faith in the moral ideal leaves the reflective mind. Indeed, a confidence in the ideal excellence and value of the Being of the World, that outstrips all our actual experience, is necessary, if man is to be consistently and logically either moral or religious. Call it Karma, as the Buddhist does, or beneficent Nature, after the fashion of the non-religious man of science, or Moral Law and Order in the name of a metaphysical ethics, this Being of the World that makes for righteousness in human history, is somehow judged or felt to be adorable and worthy of supreme devotion. But, in the third place, the so-called "upper" classes cannot permanently remain separated from those deemed "lower," by any such difference as comes between the religious and the irreligious man. For no other form of human development has more serious consequences in respect of its social solidarity than the ethico-religious development.

On the other hand when the religious development of any people falls behind their ethical progress, especially as such progress expresses itself in the changing forms of social morality, religion itself suffers decay and is hastening toward a richly deserved doom. Any form of religious beliefs, sentiments, or cult, that does not stimulate and actually promote advancing stages of the moral life, itself needs to be reformed. How true this is, there can be no more impressive example than that afforded by the present condition of Hindūism in India. But the same thing is true of Confucianism in China, and of Buddhism in Japan. Nor does Christianity offer any exception to the law. Unless it can continue in the future to impart to the so-called Christian nations the ethical and spiritual forces necessary for the better moral conduct of life, under the new and more complicated conditions of living which now prevail, this religion, too, will be weighed in that balance which Heaven itself keeps always suspended; and being weighed, it will be found wanting.

PART III

RELIGION: A LIFE

“The Lord Jehovah hath given me the tongue of them that are taught, that I may know how to sustain with words him that is weary; he wakeneth morning by morning, he wakeneth mine ear to hear as they that are taught.” ISAIAH.

“Ye therefore shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect.” JESUS.

“Give thyself to God, keep thyself continually for God; and let to-morrow be like to-day.” MAXIMS OF ANI.

“Do all works and at all times under His shelter, and then by His grace you will be saved.” BHAGAVADGĪTĀ

*“Till this truth thou knowest;
‘Die to live again—’
Stranger-like thou goest
In a world of pain.”*

GOETHE.

PART III

RELIGION : A LIFE

CHAPTER XX

FAITH AND DOGMA

Religion, as an experience of the individual and of society, is a certain form of life; but the satisfactoriness of this statement depends upon the depth and breadth which is given to the conception of "life." The essential nature of the religious experience has been seen to involve the intellectual, emotional, and practical aspects of human nature; and, therefore, the fullness of the life of religion cannot be realized where any one of these important aspects is wanting or relatively weak. An investigation of the various forms of expression which this important development assumes cannot fail—it would seem obvious—to throw additional light upon the nature and compass of the problems which the philosophy of religion undertakes to elucidate. Or, to adopt at once the language which is suggested by the practical injunctions expressive of the higher forms of the religious experience of humanity, we now have to inquire as to what, according to the tenets of religion, is "The Way of Salvation,"—the way, namely, to attain that ideal good to which religion attaches such value, and which it promises to those who will follow its injunctions. For all the higher religions point out a "Path" or course of living, which is prescribed for their faithful adherents.

The Path of the Religious Life, or the Way of Salvation,

concerns the practical answers which religion proposes to the three celebrated questions of the Kantian philosophy :¹

- “ 1. What can I know ?
2. What should I do ?
3. What may I hope ? ”

In a word : “ How shall I adjust my entire life so as to attain the ends of this life, as defined from the point of view of religion ? ” To this inquiry the various greater religions of the world give an answer which, with all the perplexing differences of detail, has certain important factors in a sort of substantial agreement. For the inquirer is assured by them all : (1) that he must accept certain dogmas or articles of faith (must, that is, assume a mental attitude of consent toward certain alleged truths) ; (2) that he must, in accordance with these tenets, maintain a receptive, worshipful, and affectionate attitude toward the Object of this faith ; (3) that he must actually conform his life to the rules enjoined by the same faith ; and (4) that the practice of religion involves certain forms of association with others of the same faith, or perhaps, with all mankind. Having believed, worshipped, and otherwise acted, according to the injunctions of religion, man may hope for salvation.

The summary answer which the inquirer after the entrance to the way of salvation customarily receives is an exhortation to have faith, according to the form of faith prescribed by each particular religion. Such so-called “ faith ” may vary, even in the case of the same system of religious beliefs, all the way from a pretty purely willful acceptance of an elaborate creed to an intellectually vague or almost void feeling-experience of satisfaction in unreasoned opinion. At the one extreme stands religious dogma, when rendered abstract and aloof from concrete personal relations ; at the other extreme is found an emotional stirring, or a quiescence of emotion, such as seems adapted to personal relations where no inquiry has yet been raised touch-

¹ Critique of Pure Reason; The Canon of Pure Reason, sec. II.

ing the grounds of a reciprocal confidence. All the way between the two extremes, different admixtures of the more purely intellectual and the more purely affective elements characterize the various degrees and forms of the "faith" which religion considers so essential to the realization of its supreme end.

In considering the relations of faith and dogma within the sphere of religion we are, first of all, met by the view which places these two mental attitudes in sharp antithesis or even in avowed antagonism. To do this is, however, to forget the most cardinal facts with which the historical and psychological study of man's religious life and development has already made us so familiar. But the same reactions which follow all extreme views, either as to the identity of experiences which are different, or as to the complete separation of experiences which are in many respects essentially the same, are destined to be the evil consequence of extreme views upon this subject. No warrant for such a misappropriation of either of the two words—"faith" and "dogma"—can be found either in their etymological significance or in the history of their use. For faith, quite as much as dogma, properly stands for a tenet, or opinion, received on authority (*fides* and *fidere*, quite as much as *δοκέω*); and if the word "dogmatic" has come to have in certain quarters a repulsive meaning on account of its associations, the words "believing" and "full of faith" have, in other quarters, become the synonyms of an unquestioning credulity. Indeed, the reflective attitude toward the phenomena of religion derives as little evidence for the truth of Reality from a logically arranged system of propositions, that do not fit the totality of religious experience, as from an attitude of blind clinging to cherished opinions that appeal to feeling and that are shattered or destroyed as soon as they submit themselves to rational investigation.

Much of the more intelligent misuse of the same terms, for polemical or critical purposes, grows out of the unfortunate

and mistaken antithesis which Kant himself instituted between faith and knowledge.¹ According to the Kantian theory, knowledge cannot be arrived at, in the sphere of morals and religion: knowledge has to do only with the connection of phenomena, under the *a priori* or formal principles of space and time, and the constitutional forms of the functioning of the understanding (the so-called "categories"). But in the field of religion, the critical philosophy found in so-called "faith" a substitute which was more than an equivalent for the lack of the possibility of knowledge. God, freedom, and immortality, were after all reintroduced in a form to serve as virtual cognitions, under the guise of postulates guaranteed by all that certainty of rational conviction which attaches itself to the most fundamental experiences of man's nature as fitted for conduct.

An examination of the current antithetic uses of the terms, faith and dogma, shows that both may be employed to represent essentially the same erroneous tendencies of the human mind in its attitudes toward the various kinds of truth. Dogma and faith, in their right uses and in their abuses, do not refer to religion alone. Either of these attitudes, when wrongly taken, may be characterized as the disposition toward Reality of an ill-balanced mind; or, in one word, as *irrationality*. Here the truth must be recalled anew, that reason in religion is not a purely intellectual affair, but properly includes the activity of those sentiments, and the influence of those practical considerations, and more ethical and æsthetical ideals, which enter so largely into all man's value-judgments. When, then, the dogmatist fails to avail himself of the evidence offered by these sentiments, practical considerations, and æsthetical and ethical ideals, he is guilty of essential "irrationality," no matter how skillfully marshalled his ratiocinations, or logically compacted his conclusions, may seem to be. But the man of *mere* faith,

¹ For a criticism of this theory of cognition see the author's *Philosophy of Knowledge*.

who suffers his feelings or value-judgments to stand in the way of all consistent effort to think out their content, to discover the grounds on which they repose, and to estimate the worth which they have as representative of Reality, is equally irrational.

On the other hand, a rational religious faith without dogma is as impossible as is science without dogma ;—that is, some authoritative formulation is indispensable for that which is to be believed as true and defensible tenet. Some proposition of what *seems to be true* must at least be framed, to which the belief may attach itself. Nor can dogmas in religion exist, or be accepted and defended, without an essential dependence upon actual facts of faith as existent in the experience of religious believers. Remove the facts of faith (and this, quite irrespective of the manner in which those facts originate or the theoretical justification which may be attempted for them), and the very substance of religion is destroyed. For religion is, essentially considered, a fact of faith in what is inaccessible to the senses, and the real being of which cannot be reached by a process of reasoning from sensuous data alone. All the way from the vague and unreasoned belief in a motley multitude of invisible spiritual powers to the most clear and rational acceptance of God as perfect and infinite Ethical Spirit, the central and regnant fact of religion is just this fact of faith.

In the religious experience, however, the word Faith is better adapted than either of the words, dogma, knowledge, or belief, to express well the total mental attitude toward the Object. For faith, while it is in some respects less than knowledge, is in other respects more than belief. That this is not because the intellect has no important part to take in man's conscious relations toward God has already been made sufficiently clear. But the prominence of the æsthetical, ethical, and more definitely religious feelings, and the influence of the practical considerations which elicit and approbate the characteristic attitude of religious experience, become yet more obvious when religion is regarded as a form of life. Thus for the individual the reli-

gious question is more appropriately put, when it is asked: "Are you a believer in, a worshipper of, and a servant and son of God?" rather than, "What do you think *about* God, or *about* his relations to the world of things and men?" Belief in religion, whether it takes the form of unquestioned acceptance of certain tenets by the multitude, or of elaborate dogma by the theological expert, so far as it concerns the invisible realities of religion, seldom or never attains the same realistic and logical character which belongs to man's practical or scientific knowledge. In its intellectual qualifications faith is, therefore, more akin to belief than to cognition.

It will be found, however, that all the great world-religions develop their systems of dogma and their faith as the inner life of religion, in a sort of reciprocal, though imperfect, state of dependence. And the more intellectually advanced and spiritually improved any particular religion becomes, the more intricate and sensitive this reciprocal dependence tends to become. Even in the lower forms of religion a certain attitude of mind toward the invisible divine beings, whether conceived of vaguely as spirits or in more anthropomorphic form as man-like gods, may fitly be described as a blend of faith and dogma suggestive of the nature and importance of the corresponding attitude in the higher religions. If, then, we accept the saying of W. Robertson Smith,¹ "The antique religions had for the most part no creed; they consisted entirely of institutions and practices," it must be added: As held by the multitudes, they had an immense amount of credulity, or crude beliefs, which originated in an endless variety of ways and were propagated largely in the form of myth. And when the same authority proceeds to declare: "Belief in a certain series of myths was neither obligatory as a part of true religion, nor was it supposed that, by believing, a man acquired religious merit and conciliated the favour of the gods;" the entire relation of faith and dogma in the religious development of humanity is

¹ *The Religion of the Semites*, p. 16f.

misconceived and underestimated. On the contrary, from both the historical and the psychological points of view it is apparent how mythology and dogma in religion spring, to a considerable extent, from the same root. And faith is the essential thing about all religion.

The theory of the divine character and the mysterious functions of the gods, as taught and elaborated by myth, and that attitude of mind which accepts the teaching as authoritative, and which governs practice accordingly, are everywhere an essential and obligatory part of the religious experience, in its earlier stages of evolution. To explain experience, and to create a practical interest while explaining, furnish the *motifs* for the myth-making tendency in religion. The desire to explain is also the ground of the dogmatic procedure. But the character of the explanation and of the interest to which an appeal is made, is changed as soon as dogma, or doctrine, supplants the myth. In religion this process of change is not essentially different from that which goes on in every other important form of human development. The earlier explanations of non-religious experience, of man's dealings with his environment, when undertaken from the mechanical, the political, or the social point of view, suffer similar changes, as mythology unfolds the beginnings of the particular sciences, with their doctrines, or dogmas, under the different aspects of Reality. Indeed, the entire distinction between religions that have, and those that have not, a creed, and even the distinction between the dogmas and beliefs of religion and the dogmas and beliefs of the particular sciences, is a distinction of degrees. This distinction cannot be made absolute without doing violence to some of the plainest facts of man's intellectual evolution.

The inevitableness of all this is illustrated in a very special way by the relations of dogma and life in the earlier teachings of Buddhism.¹ According to these teachings, the religious

¹ See Buddhism in Translations, § 13. "Questions which Tend not to Edification," pp. 117ff.

life does not depend on the doctrine that the world is eternal, or that it is finite; that the saint does, or does not, exist after death. But, nevertheless, the Buddha could not found a religion without proclaiming dogmas of his own: The world, whether eternal or finite, is certainly mere form and illusory; whether the saint does or does not exist after death, without doubt, there is no Ego; and the master knows "the nature of form, and how form arises, and how form perishes." The logical end of hearing the Great Teacher's wonderful words, therefore, is to *believe* and to declare: "I betake myself to Gotama for refuge, to the Doctrine, and to the Congregation of the priests." In fact, in Japan, where the development of philosophic sects within the limits of Buddhism has been most varied, the hair-splitting of dogmatic strife has been most minute and unprofitable; and, at the same time, to compensate for this obscuration of the form of life taught by him who obtained perfection by practice of the right way, a doctrine of salvation by faith has been developed which, in its essential features, comes nearest to agreement with that of Protestant theology. "In the sea of the law of Buddha," declares this tenet of Japanese Buddhism, "faith is the only means to enter."

It is, therefore, not without sufficient reason to be found in the nature of the religious experience that the conception of Faith is expanded so as to cover all the essential content of religion considered as the subjective condition on which the true character of the religious life depends. Thus considered, this conception includes all the factors of that voluntary attitude toward religious truth, and toward the religious life, which affords the fullest satisfaction to, and which effects the most perfect harmony in, the religious experience. In faith, thus conceived of and exercised, these three benefits of this experience may best be secured: (1) The beliefs of religion, or the things held true with conviction, may be made reasonable, in the sense of being intellectually acceptable; (2) the sentiments and higher feelings of the religious order may have

their fullest play, in harmony with the intellectual activities, —neither dominating and subverting them, nor being made slavishly subject to them; and (3) the practical life of religion may be effectually stimulated and supported by the religious beliefs and sentiments. This ideal attitude of the soul of man toward the Object of religion may be called *a rational faith*. This is reason's attitude of the finite Self toward the Absolute and Infinite Self, of the spirit of humanity toward the perfect Ethical Spirit of God.

In the case of those religions whose conception of the Object of religious faith answers in the most important respects to the Idea of a Personal Absolute, or an infinite and perfect Ethical Spirit, this mental attitude of "rational faith" is not primarily directed toward an abstract truth, but toward a personal Life. Religion, indeed, in order to be properly rationalized, requires the elaboration of dogmas, or reasoned propositions taught with authority, about God. But religion as a life, requires something more than this; it requires that the human Self should put itself into an attitude of trust toward the Infinite Self, should come into personal and voluntary relations of communion and union with God. And this is what all the great world-religions consider to be that reasonable attitude of faith which makes open the "Path," or "Way of Salvation."

Thus "the general expression for subjective religion"¹ is *Faith*, and this expression is not arbitrary; neither is it the equivalent of mere belief; much less is it to be confused with credulity. A more careful analysis shows that this complex attitude toward the Object of religion includes a considerable number of the elements taken from the different activities or so-called faculties, of the human soul. In making this analysis we may refer again to the psychology of religious experience (see p. 305*f.*). Religious faith includes the activity of the ontological consciousness, either in the form of that naïve, instinc-

¹ Compare A. Dorner, *Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie*, p. 252.

tive metaphysics, which is necessary to all apprehension of the real and actual; or in the form of a more intelligent and comprehensive grasp upon the truth of Reality. But it also includes the stirrings of sentiment and the work of fancy and imagination. Religious faith may, therefore, either assume the predominatingly social form, and thus involve the more or less complete sinking of individual thought and opinion in an attitude which is receptive of the deliverances of the common religious experience, or of the teachings of some favorite authority; or it may take the form of a separatist and mystical belief, which finds the way to God and to an apprehension of the truth, through the intuition or feeling of the individual soul. Best and noblest of all is a distinctively ethical faith,—a confidence that is firm, high, and controlling, in the sure foundations and final triumph of the ideals of righteousness, because these ideals have their Ground and Guaranty in the ethical perfection of God.

It appears, then, that the higher form of a genuine religious faith begins as an openness of the mind or receptive attitude, toward the Object of religion. The man of faith, believes not only *that the gods are*; but he believes *in the gods*, as beings who can either help or harm him, and with whom it is desirable to be on satisfactory terms of intercourse. In the lower stages of man's development, credulity as to the real nature of the objects of which he has experience is not characteristic of his religious belief alone. The credulity of the savage or primitive man is not exclusive. Its principal cause is to be found in the crudeness of his conceptions as to the nature of proof and of evidence; and in the unskillful and vacillating use of the means for distinguishing between truth and falsehood, and between truths and half-truths. The earliest stage of progress is the beginning of an important difference, which may develop with a radical antagonism,—not so much between faith and reason, as between credulity and rational faith. As an improved conception of the Divine Being is attained, the place, character,

and evidential value, of the attitude of faith toward this Being, undergo corresponding changes. When, finally, God is conceived of, with conviction, as Himself perfect Ethical Spirit, the Father and Redeemer of mankind, then the morally and spiritually perfect filial attitude becomes equivalent to the total subjective condition of salvation. This filial attitude is rational Faith. It is the attitude of the penitent, trusting, loving, and devoted son. It is reasonable,—on the postulate that the conception of the Object toward which the attitude is assumed, corresponds to the Truth of Reality.

It is at this point that the demand for dogma, or a reasoned doctrine of the real nature of the Object of religion and of the proper relations of man to this Object becomes imperative, if the completer rationality of religious faith is to be secured and maintained. This demand, however, does not suggest, nor when properly met does it issue in, a severance of the essential relations between faith and dogma. For the conception of faith, in the highest forms of its actual manifestation and considered as the “general expression for subjective religion,”—that is, for religion as a life,—itself affords the only proper basis for religious dogma. The content of this mental attitude as it responds to the presentation of its Object, affords to him who experiences it a guaranty of the reality of that Object. But the nature of this guaranty, and the value of it, vary with the kind and degree of faith, and with the rational, the æsthetic, and the ethical character of the conception entertained by the faith. And for this reason, the grounds of faith, the content of faith, and the nature and relations in terms of which faith conceives of God, are all constantly subject to renewed examination and inquiry. For the philosophical attitude toward religious faith which despises or underestimates its evidential value for the truths of religion, and that dogmatic attitude which refuses to examine and to readjust the traditional estimate of this value, are alike unreasonable.

In order to understand the evidential value of religious

faith, and the nature of the guaranty of the truth of its own content which this faith itself affords, the following considerations are needful. The peculiar province of religious faith is in the region of judgments of worth. Here, in no unimportant way, faith may become a species of self-knowledge. I *know* how I stand related to my ideals, and what is the worth which these ideals have for me. So far forth, objections, refutations, scientific agnosticism, have little or no power to influence the mind. Schiller expressed this truth in a poetical and universal, but essentially true way, when he declared: "Man is robbed of all worth, when he no longer believes in the three words" (namely, God, freedom and immortality). And a recent writer,¹ has impressively declared: "Religious faith is a postulate of the practical reason;" "Man *must* believe, in order to maintain his worth as man—a worth which no noble-spirited man ought to renounce." In this respect religious faith does not differ essentially from that confidence in the Reality of whatever corresponds to the best human Ideals, which characterizes the faiths of philosophy, art, and morals. Religious faith is one of several forms of man's eternal confidence in the belief that the Being of the World is actually constructed as man finds himself obligated ideally to construe it. In respect of this truth Professor Royce has finely said:² "Applied philosophy is like practical religion. It illumines life, but it gives no power to use the arts of the medicine-man. . . . Religious faith involves no direct access to the special counsels of God; but it inspires the believer with assurance that all things work together for good, and endows him with readiness to serve in his station the God who is All in all. Such religion is not then, the power to work miracles, but it is the wisdom to find in all things, however obscure, or fragmentary, the expression, however mysterious, of the Divine Love."

This faith of religion, with its confidence in the Reality of

¹ Schultz, Grundriss der Christlichen Apologetik, p. 22f.

² The World and the Individual, ** p. 6f.

the Ideal which it has made its Object, is most closely allied to the attitude of mind which is essential to all true morality. Without a belief in the moral ideal which reaches beyond the limits of time and sense, and which transgresses the bounds of a scientific induction upon a basis of observed facts, genuine morality is impossible. But man, even in the lowest conditions of moral degradation, has cherished the germs of this belief. Writers on ethics have exalted this attitude into a reasoned theory of the world and of human life. "Even Nietzsche's ethics with its anti-Christian tendency is unintelligible without faith." Indeed, the only intelligible basis of morality is a certain confidence, that is not wholly born of fact and that does not accord with all facts, in the reality of an invisible world of freedom and of ideal good. No trials of religious faith can possibly exceed those which constantly come to the man who steadfastly *wills to believe* in the supreme worth of personal Good-Will, in the final triumph of righteousness, and in the preferential values of the unselfish and self-sacrificing life. Indeed, it is just on this point that so-called religious faith is itself most sorely tried. For nothing is harder for it, when trying to interpret experience from the matter-of-fact point of view, and with a cold and lowering tone of feeling toward the moral ideal, than to have and to hold the faith in the perfect goodness of God. We may even say that the highest generalizations of science with regard to the physical Universe require the largest possible faith in the actuality of human ideals. The universal "reign of law" is almost, if not quite, as much a matter of faith, as is the universal Sovereignty of God. Particularly true is it that modern physical science has "pinned its faith" to ideal conceptions of a "universal order," of an "unseen Unity," of a Cosmos, or beautiful and orderly totality, which can never be more than very imperfectly and fragmentarily presented in terms of sense.

In some good and reasonable sort, then, the faith of the pious man has an evidential value with respect to its own pe-

cular content ; and where the religious experience of the race, in its manifold developments, is seen persistently to assert and to cherish a certain ideal construction of the Object of faith, to which the experience itself continually more and more closely conforms, the evidential value of the races' faith in God is by no means of small account. In this way the position which Hoffding¹ holds to be true for the individual—namely, that the existence of his faith in what has value is a valid ground for maintaining the existence of the value—may be extended beyond the sphere of the individual, and placed upon the solid ground of the spiritual unity of mankind. Thus the experience of faith in the reality of the religious Ideal carries with it, by authority of the history and psychology of this experience, a certain evidence for the Reality of its ideal. In truth, we may ask with respect to all the ideals of science, art, religion, similar questions : In what way can these ideals come into existence and go through the course of development which they actually do pursue, unless they have their Ground in Reality ? And, conversely, how could the Reality of the Ideals give to human minds the evidence of its existence otherwise than by persistently imparting faith, and a rising rationality of faith, in these very Ideals ? This, indeed, involves a sort of reasoning in a circle ; but the circle is of the nature of that around which moves all the advancing life of the race. Experience becomes more intelligible as it grows by understanding itself the better ; but the improvement in this self-understanding can be secured only when placed upon the basis of a continuous, actual growth of experience.

There are other attitudes of feeling toward God and life that are closely connected with that impulse to have faith which comes from the desire for harmony among the closely conflicting powers of the human soul. Thus originates the religious longing for rest and peace—a form of desire that can only be

¹ For a summary of his view, see his *Religionsphilosophie*, pp. 104*f.*

rationally satisfied by faith in God.¹ It is true that the genuine appreciation, and even the ability to understand the value of the promise of peace and rest through faith in the character and work of the Divine Being are almost lacking at present in the Occidental world. In the Orient, however, this feeling lingers, chiefly as a lack of interest in life or as a form of submission to fate. But such is the nature of the human soul, and of the religious experience, that the powerful *motif* to religious faith which this longing inspires will become operative again; and, then, the realization of the longed-for spiritual blessedness will add its confirmation to the evidence involved in the very nature of the experience of faith. Such is the necessary sequence of the reflection of "Bishop Blougram's Apology:"

" All we have gained then by our unbelief,
Is a life of doubt diversified by faith,
For one of faith diversified by doubt :
We called the chess-board white,—we call it black."

The claim that the full assurance of faith may be gained by contemplation, or by reflective thinking, on the ground of a common basis for the divine and the human reason, implies truth of the noblest and most important kind. But it is only partial truth. For faith is of man's entire soul. And when the interests which give a contemplative or speculative form to the attempt at securing a stricter certainty for faith are overemphasized, the ethical and active interests are likely to be relatively depressed. This deficiency marks much of the Brāhmanistic and Buddhistic experience, as well as no small amount of so-called Christian faith. In the former case the certainty attained is of a negative sort; it consists chiefly in an assured conviction with respect to the vanity of the world and of human life,—the comparative or absolute worthlessness of the good which can be realized without the religious experience. The monkish and mystical faith of Christianity dis-

¹ On this subject, see the remarks of Höfding, *Ibid.*, p. 108.

plays similar characteristics. In order, however, to afford a more complete and well-grounded assurance, there must be an experience which realizes the supreme positive good of that Divine Being whose righteous Will controls the world of things and the course of human lives. This assurance can be gained only by the indwelling of God as perfect Ethical Spirit;— by the Divine spiritual presence perfecting in time the kindred spirit of the man of faith. This voluntary acceptance of, and persistent devotion to, the supreme worth of man's communion and union with God begets and conserves the certainty of faith. Such faith, in its perfection, is the at-one-ment of the subject with the Object of religion, of man with God. Not contemplation and speculation alone, or either of these with feeling, but both of them united with the surrender of will, are necessary to this highest experience attainable by that mental attitude which is the essence of subjective religion.

While there are common elements in which all the greater religions share, it is Christianity which presents, at the same time, the most elaborate doctrine of saving faith, the most persistent and intelligent attempts to render into dogmatic form the content of this faith, and also the most unique and effective instances of lives actually consecrated and improved by the practice of faith.

The sources of the Christian doctrine of faith are, in the main these three: (1) The trust in God, for help and redemption, which was a predominately practical affair in Judaism; (2) the Greek feeling of the value of rendering this trust self-consistent and intelligible, and the tendency to examine and treat reflectively the grounds of faith which arose from this feeling; and, especially, (3) the quite unique experience of the influence of the teachings and spirit of Jesus upon the attitude in which the human soul finds itself when exercising his loving trust in the Divine forgiving and redeeming Love.

The faith of that prophetic Judaism from which the Christian religion so largely sprang was a trust in the personal character

of Yahweh, in his veracity, righteousness, and merciful plans toward his chosen people Israel. For the individual believer it was only as a member of the nation that his trust in God attained its highest significance and value; but when the character of Israel's God was recognized as not only righteous but pitiful and kind, faith included for the pious Israelites not only fear and trust, but also love. Thus the writer of Hebrews xi can regard all the faithful of the Old Testament as members of the community made acceptable to God by faith, and in this way enabled to triumph over affliction, temptation, and trial. In Greek philosophy, however, faith stood for the higher forms of intellectual conviction. With reference to God, it was a rational belief rather than a practical trust. The influence of the Greek conception of faith upon the Jewish conception can be traced in the later writings of the thoughtful Jews themselves—especially of the Diaspora.¹ It culminates in the conception of Philo, whom Bousset² has called "the first great psychologist of religious faith," and who, according to Hatch,³ "blends the sense in which it is found in the Old Testament with that which is found in Greek philosophy."

In its most primitive form, Christian faith is faith in Jesus as the Christ. But from the very nature of religion as a life, this conception can only be the medium and forerunner of a larger conception. The historical person is a "vehicle" (a "door," a "way," etc.,) for faith in God as He is revealed in the person and work of Christ. In Christianity, as in every great religion, God is the Object of faith; belief, or trust, in Christ is mediatorial, as it were; it is designed to bring the soul of the believer into new relations of loving trust toward the Divine Being. And it is faith in God which Jesus himself makes the

¹ Compare Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums im Neutestamentlichen Zeitalter*, pp. 175ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 176.

³ *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church* [Fibbert Lectures, 1888], p. 311.

indispensable condition of receiving both the physical and the spiritual benefits of his Gospel. In the next stage, this faith in the Messiahship and Messianic offices of Jesus becomes faith in Christ as the glorified personality, abiding in mystical but real and effective relations with the community of his believers. The assurance of this more developed faith was placed by the early Christian teachers in two sources; the testimony of the Old-Testament Scriptures, and the presence and work of the Holy Spirit within the heart of man. This twofold attempt to establish the certainty of Christian faith in sources lying outside of its own essential experience, and of the content of truth given directly in this experience, led to no small injury to the character and integrity of the faith. On the one hand, a false exegesis produced many untenable and erroneous views, from which historical Christianity has not yet entirely freed itself, with respect to the foundations of faith. On the other hand, the diversity of views as to what were the precise contents of faith guaranteed by the so-called "witness of the spirit," soon led either to the individualistic view which regarded each believer's *own* spirit as a sufficient witness to his *own* beliefs; or else, the rather, to the attempt to fix once for all the truths of the Christian religion in the name of ecclesiastical authority, and on the basis of the view that the spiritual guaranty of religious truth lay with the organized and officered body of believers.

But these and all other erroneous views and practical mistakes with regard to the nature, content, and guaranty, of faith in the Christian religion do not serve to alter the judgment which assigns to it a unique position and value. For in its essence it corresponds most accurately to that rational and ethically ideal attitude of man toward God, when God is conceived of—reasonably, voluntarily, and "passionately"—as the Reality who sums up and embodies, and brings into living and effective relations with the human soul, all its most important and noblest, intellectual, æsthetical, and ethical Ideals.

And such a doctrine of man's attitude in faith toward God was not only taught, but the example of it was given in history, by the Founder of the Christian religion.

This survey of the nature of religious faith, and of the relations of faith and dogma, prepares us for a more intelligent appreciation of the nature of Dogma in religion, and of its place and value in the development of the religious life. Dogmas in religion always imply three elements, with some sort of an attempt at their combination;—namely, (1) a source in the experience of faith, (2) the employment of reflection and discussion, and (3) proclamation with some kind of authority understood to be attached. That religious truth, and that legislation for the control of the religious life, come somehow from a divine source is a tenet common to all religions. The beliefs of the faithful are always, from the point of view of the faithful, peculiarly sacred; not only on account of the relations which they sustain to the life of faith and to the rewards of faith, but also on account of their supposed origin in the Object of faith, dynamically conceived of, as it were. But reflection and discussion are as inevitable in religious experience as in every other form of human experience; and this necessity grows out of the scientific and philosophical instincts and needs of human nature, as well as out of the more special needs of being defended, proclaimed, and understood, which condition the introduction and propagation of any particular form of religion. Differences of view follow, of necessity, from reflection and discussion. The social character and laws of the religious life of man are such that distinctions of orthodoxy and heresy are certain to arise. Essentially the same distinction characterizes every form of human intellectual development, every phase and step of man's progress in all the particular sciences.

To dogmatize over the content of the experience of faith, and even to attempt a systematic and harmonious exhibition and defence of this content, is, therefore, an unavoidable task

for every religion which would take the path of progress ; much more, for any religion that aspires to become " universal " by making a conquest of all mankind. This is essentially the same as every effort at science, or at replacing the vague and insecure beliefs, in any realm of experience, with verifiable and systematized knowledge. But the failures and mischief of religious dogma arise chiefly through misconceptions of its own nature and proper place in religion, conceived of and appropriated as a form of life. Such misconceptions may attach themselves to any one of the three elements necessary to the constitution of all dogmas, which have been mentioned above.

A misconception of the relation in which dogma stands to the content of the experience of the religious life of faith may take any one of several erroneous forms. It may be thought that the entire content of faith in its most general form is capable of being thrown into dogmatic expression ; but this is by no means true. There are always depths of mystery, causes and motives that cannot be rendered into reasons, in that attitude toward the Being of the World which is engendered by man's undying confidence in its ideal excellence and supreme value. Moreover, the so-called faith of any pious individual, or religious community, or of any era in the religious development of humanity, is not the " hold-all," or the " end-all," of the experience of faith. And dogma, therefore, needs the modesty of science in order to say : " So far as we have experience, and can understand this experience, the statement of its meaning and grounds seems to be thus and so." But, once again, these " grounds " themselves, as laid in the experience of religious faith, consist largely in certain convictions which do not respond wholly to facts of a character that admits of scientific testing. Hence the content of faith frequently seems either to go beyond a justifiable dogmatic statement, in the assurance of its own truth which it displays ; or else it seems in certain cases to fall short of supporting dogmas which have

been based upon unusual or rare experiences with the content of faith. For the concrete individuality of religion as a life, combined with the infinite variability of its experiences which suit the individual soul, puts an impossible task upon certain attempts at generalizing from the phenomena.

The failure to observe those conditions of right reflection and successful discussion, without compliance with which no discovery or proof of truth can exist, furnishes another explanation for many errors committed in the name of religion. In no religious community—least of all, it would sometimes seem, in the Christian Church—have the attempts to develop in dogmatic form the content of religious faith observed the laws of evidence, the limits of probability and possibility, and the differences between what is a valid basis for practice and the ideal of a completed and demonstrable system of cognitions. Reflection may convert the experience of religious faith into the form of a system of conceptions and ideas that have more or less of consistent and harmonious relations to one another, and to our knowledge as otherwise derived. But such an abstract system can never, on account merely of its logical form acquire a kind of evidence for itself which does not belong to the nature of the very facts to which reflective treatment has been given. God cannot be *proved* to exist, otherwise than as his existence is implicated in the very experience of faith in God. Men do not argue and demonstrate truths about God, in order that they may come to believe in God; the rather do they derive their evidence for the probable or certain truths about God, because they actually have the experience of faith in God. Thus also, with regard to all their conceptions of the nature of the Divine Being, and of the relations of man to this Being, the work of reflection is to interpret the content of faith. Dogma does not establish religious truth by adding the weight of logic to life; it only puts into apprehensible and systematic form the truths which are extant in the experience of the life. But this work of dogma cannot be properly done by

reflection and discussion, unless the rules of the processes employed are properly observed. And here it is that logic, and scientific exactness, and searching inquiry for light and for reasons, have their place. Faith may be converted into a kind of esoteric so-called "wisdom," with only scanty deference to these rules; but it cannot be converted into science, or dogma to be taught with authority, in the same way.¹

Closely connected with this failure on the part of religious dogma to recognize its own place and value is the result which comes from the confusion of a relative authority with an absolute and final infallibility. All religious dogmas are historical growths; the very conception of dogma implies a progress in thinking, a development from the relatively unreflective stage of the experience of faith to the reasoned exposition and defence of the content of that faith. But when, by the claim to finality and its accompanying denial of the right to think again, and to enlarge or modify the previous conclusions of reflection, the authority which attaches itself to any rational attempt at understanding the nature, grounds, and tenets of the experience of faith, is transformed into the semblance of a finished and faultless system of propositions about the truths of religion; then the life of religion—if alive and growing it will

¹ In that exceedingly curious book called *Pistis Sophia*, Mary Magdalene is made to address Jesus as follows: "O Master, if the gnosis of all these things is in that mystery, who is the man in this world who shall be able to understand that mystery and all its gnoses, and the fashion of all the words which thou hast spoken concerning it?" To this inquiry Jesus responds: "Whosoever shall renounce the whole world and all therein, and shall submit himself to the divinity, to him that mystery shall be far more easy than all the mysteries of the kingdom of light." [Edition published 1896 by the London "Theosophical Publishing Society," p. 216f.] In this mystical and pompous fashion, as "a power of sensing the light," of "knowing the one and only Ineffable," does this Gnostic writing pervert—and yet with a certain truth, proclaim—the promises of understanding and knowledge which Jesus himself made to pious and faithful souls. His followers were to "see God," because pure in heart; to "know of the doctrine," because willing to do his will; to receive by the prayer of faith whatever they should ask for, etc.

continue to be—must burst the shell of dogma, and in practical ways demonstrate anew how much more religion as experience really is than it is possible to express in conceptions that admit of strict definition and logical arrangement. Yet as surely as man must think, not only to live but also the better to comprehend his own life and the Life of the Absolute, so surely will the building of dogma anew follow the experience of the newer and larger life. The authority of religious dogma is real; but it is, like every form of authority, subject to development. It is never the equivalent of a finality, or an unquestionable infallibility.

In the case of no other religious development are these truths with regard to the nature and value of dogma illustrated so perfectly as in the history of the Christian Church. Its dogmas originated as the inevitable consequence of the Greek philosophic spirit in its reflective approaches to the content of faith in God as the Father and Redeemer of the world through Christ. As to the benefits of its dogmatizing in the earlier centuries we are told:¹ “By comprehending in itself and giving excellent expression to the religious conceptions contained in Greek philosophy and the Gospel, together with its Old-Testament basis; by meeting the search for a revelation as well as the desire for a universal knowledge; by subordinating itself to the aim of the Christian religion to bring a Divine life to humanity as well as to the aim of philosophy to know the world: it (*i. e.*, Christian dogma) became the instrument by which the Church conquered the ancient world and educated the modern nations.” On the other hand, the same influence has done in the past, and continues to do, almost incalculable harm to the spread and the practice of the Christian religion as a life of faith and love, by forgetting its own nature and obligations, and by misusing its opportunities and privileges.

The development of religious dogma cannot take place in total independence of the scientific, political, social, and espe-

¹ Harnack, *History of Dogma*, I, p. 17.

cially of the ethical and philosophical developments which environ it. This conclusion follows, as a matter of course, from the principles of man's religious being as they have already been established in the entire Second Part of this inductive examination. But it does not follow from this conclusion that dogma must be subservient to, or wholly dependent upon, these other developments. With regard to this matter the paradoxical statement is true, that dogma in religion is at the same time an independent and a dependent development. The experience of religious faith is as solid, fundamental, permanent, and ontologically valid, as any other form of human experience. It really is; and its reality must be reckoned with as a factor of the utmost importance, and of the most satisfactory conclusiveness, in framing any doctrine of the real Being and ideal Significance of the world of things and of men. The content of this experience of faith is, therefore, as much entitled to have its voice heard when it proclaims its opinions, its reasoned tenets, and its more deeply-lying convictions, as are the physical and political sciences, or the schools of morals and philosophy. Religious dogmas may, then, with the utmost propriety and consistent firmness continue to maintain their right to interpret with confidence the data furnished by religion as a form of life into a system of reasoned judgments regarding the Ultimate Reality, and the actual and potential relations sustained by man to this Reality. The ontological system of religious beliefs rests upon an indisputable ground of universal and abiding experience. But no aspect or phase of human experience can be regarded, or understood, as quite independent of any other. On the contrary, they are all bound into a unity by the essential spiritual unity of man, and by his development as a race.

Indefinitely numerous instances might be given of the influence exercised upon the development of Christian dogma by the positive sciences, by the political and social environment, and especially by the current views on ethics and phil-

osophy. At the beginning, both Stoicism and Neo-Platonism coöperated with the experience of faith to strengthen the Christian monotheistic conception, the Christian idea of a gracious and loving Providence, the Christian doctrine of universal brotherly love, and the Christian estimate of the virtues of forgiveness, patience, and humility before God. But when the majority of the Gnostics undertook, by Greek speculative thinking, to transform the Christian content of faith into a theosophy, into a revealed philosophy and history of religion, the Church cast out the attempt as a heresy. It was, indeed, a radical departure from the legitimate dogmatic development of Christian experience. At the present day, these same Christian conceptions and doctrines which the ancient Stoic and Neo-Platonic philosophy fortified, are being either assailed or severely tested by the reigning tenets and conclusions of the physical sciences. The only result which can be expected to afford satisfaction both to the Christian faith and to the observations and experiments of science, is such a modification or readjustment of the conceptions and doctrines as shall bring them into harmony with both classes of experience. Thus the essential spirituality of the Christian religion, and its quiet and joyful confidence in the all-embracing love of God, and in the divine sonship of man, will avail in the future, as it has availed in the past, to give a new and higher kind of impulse to a new and higher kind of science, of political and social life, and of art.

What has just been predicted with regard to the relations of modern science toward the continuance and the development of Christian dogma, will be true of the relations between this dogma and modern philosophy. The critical movement which began so powerfully, in 1781, with the appearance of the immortal work of Kant, and which was continued with the revision of this work by the constructive philosophy of Hegel and his successors, will never result either in a permanent antagonism between, or in a permanent and peaceful separation

of, Christian dogma and philosophical speculation. Its final result must be an improved condition of harmony and re-adjustment. For if we cannot quite accept the opinion of Emerson: "There is a statement of religion possible which makes all scepticism absurd;" or entirely agree with Hegel, that "religion is a matter of thought;" we can at least refuse to take the absurd position of Jacobi, with its implied doctrine of an irrational faith, and of the irrationality of religious dogma: "By my faith I am a Christian, by my reason I am a heathen."

One thought more: In estimating the nature of religious faith, its value as evidential, and its relations to the development of dogma, it must be remembered that faith itself as an experience, is necessarily subject to modifications according to the temperament, culture, and mental habits of the individual, and the occupations, environment, and stage of civilization, of the race. As a recent writer has said:¹ "The faith of the agriculturist is more conservative than that of the dweller in the city; the faith of the thinker is more cautious than that of the artist; the faith of the jurist inclines more to respect the fixed ordering of doctrine and morals than does the faith of the philosopher." Such facts, while they add greatly to the difficulties which surround all attempts at constructing and enforcing the dogmas of religion, are most significant and valuable when the active and practical interests of the religious life are concerned. It is this capacity for variability which, in large measure, accounts for the wonderful pertinacity of religious faiths, even when the dogmatic expression of them has become most unseasonable and even self-contradictory. So powerful is the effect of the assumed guaranty of salvation given to the man who clings to the faith "in spite of evidence." But this phrase—"in spite of evidence"—can scarcely represent accurately a sincere attitude of mind. The rather is it true that the evidence is misinterpreted with respect to the

¹ A. Dorner, Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie, p. 261.

exact truth which it is calculated to establish even in the mind of the person who has the experience of faith. In this way the distinctions of "esoteric" and "exoteric" faith arise; the mischiefs of the current *Symbolofideismus* grow up; and faith decays while dogma continues to dominate; or faith retreats within itself and maintains toward dogma an attitude either of fearsome distrust or of contemptuous silence. Various unsuccessful devices are tried to obviate the effect upon religious doctrine and practice, of the natural and inevitable, or the more or less artificial, divisions of men in respect of their ability to comprehend and interpret religious experience. In Northern Buddhism, for example, the "Ku-Sha teaching" divides all human beings into three classes which are, intellectually considered, higher, middle, and lower.¹ For these classes the systems of religious teaching are necessarily of as many different kinds. Certain Rabbis of Jesus' time despised the very people to which his experience of faith was offered, because they had no knowledge of the Law.

But that faith which is a loving trust in God as perfect Ethical Spirit, and which begets a wise ordering of the life in harmony with this trust, carries within itself, as an experience, a sufficing evidence of its own practical value and of its valuable place in the rational convictions of mankind. To investigate, expound and logically justify, the conception of Divine Being which answers to this faith is the principal task of both religious dogma and the philosophy of religion. The successful or unsuccessful performance of this task will not, however, change either the nature of faith, or the nature of dogma; neither will it alter the permanent character of the relations between the two. For all this is set into a living reality by the nature of man and by the conditions of his religious development.

¹ See Griffis, *The Religions of Japan*, p. 232f.

CHAPTER XXI

THE CULT OF RELIGION

Everywhere among mankind, and in all stages of man's religious development, the life of faith in the invisible divine beings or in the Alone God tends constantly to express itself in certain formal and regulated ways. These ways may be grouped together under the general term of "the cult of religion." The two principal forms of religious cult, which are universal with the race and which grow directly out of the essential nature of the inner religious life as an attitude of faith, are Sacrifice and Prayer. Each of these two expresses more or less completely, by its changing character, the particular content and phases of subjective religion; and each undergoes a development which is mainly dependent upon the development of the intellectual and ethical factors that have entered into the conception of the Divine Being. When man conceives of God as perfect Ethical Spirit—omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and immanent in the world and in human life—the attitude of faith changes; and the expression of this attitude, the cult of religion, changes also. Hence arise differentiations in the character of the sacrifice and prayer, which are the normal and, as it were, logical forms of Divine service; but in the greater religions these differentiations tend toward a higher spiritual unity for the life of religion.

Quite contrary to the opinion prevalent in some minds, the cult of religion is of great importance in the development of religious experience, as well as of the conceptions and doctrines of religion. And why should this not be so? For the inward

attitude and the outward form, the subjective experience and the expression of the experience, are, in religion, as in every other phase of human life and human development, intimately related and even interdependent. The importance of the cult of religion may be seen, whether attention be directed to its purpose, to its motives, or to its influence upon the individual and upon society. In the case of prayer especially, the place which it is supposed to sustain in the moral world-order furnishes problems of no small difficulty or significance. In general and in a preliminary way, however, it should be noted that, just as dogma and faith are the expression, mainly, of the intellectual aspect of the life of religion, but without neglect of the aspect of feeling, so sacrifice and prayer are mainly the expression of the aspect of feeling, without neglect of that of the intellect. It is the emotions and sentiments, which a naïve or a reasoned faith in God awakens, that impel the soul to find their expression in some form of a cult.

The more definite object, or purpose, of the cult of religion is well expressed by De la Saussaye:¹ it is "to maintain the (proper and desirable) relationship between man and God, and to reinstate it when it has become clouded." We may say of the friendly attitude between the human Self and that Other One, conceived of as super-human Self, what we say on the basis of our experience with friendships between men; in order to thrive, it must be cultivated; it must have care bestowed upon it, must, in a word, be a *cult*. When the divine beings, which it is proposed to cultivate, are conceived of as mercenary and of doubtful or capricious character, sacrifices, incantations, magical formulas, and prescribed ceremonials, are supposed to bribe or even compel them to be friendly. But when the conception of this Being is of a higher order, the idea of a sacrifice, or way of approach to the Divine favor, changes correspondingly; the sacrifice becomes an act of devotion and affection, through a gift. In the highest form of all, the giving of the

¹ Manual of the Science of Religion, p. 142.

Self in a life of devoted service becomes the all-inclusive cult, the painstaking but cheerful and loving expression of the attitude of faith in the soul of man toward the Divine Father and Redeemer.

The importance of the cult of religion in the development of the religious life of humanity may be still further seen from a consideration of the motives which lead to its practice. The spontaneity and purity of these motives measure the moral worth of any particular form of this cult. According to Jesus, men may worship God acceptably, anywhere or anyhow, if their worship is only "in the spirit and in truth." And as to sacrifice, it is the selfhood of the worshipper which the Absolute and ethically perfect Self desires, —to be rendered with the loving trust of the "cheerful giver." The permanent and ineradicable motives to worship are, therefore, the feelings of dependence and the desire of communion; but these motives are seldom or never unmixed with a number of other feelings such as normally and necessarily awaken the impulses to devotion. This Darwin saw when he was led to say:¹ "The feeling of religious devotion is a highly complex one, consisting of love, complete submission to an exalted and mysterious superior, a strong sense of dependence, reverence, fear, gratitude, hope for the future, and perhaps other elements."

The lower forms of the cult of religion, like the lower forms of belief which give rise to the cult, express more emphatically the superstitious fears, the selfish hopes, and even the most degraded and immoral desires of the worshipper. Thus the ancient Greeks and Romans called on their gods to aid them in the gratification of lust or avarice; the Thugs in India petition their divinities for success in their service of murder; the prostitute in Japan prays before the phallic effigy; and the Chinese merchant casts lots and offers bribes before the idol, in order to secure the divine influence in favor of his proposed

¹ As quoted by Max Müller, *Natural Religion* [Gifford Lectures for 1888], p. 69 (note).

business ventures. Nor have Christian nations yet wholly freed themselves from similar superstitions and morally low motives to prayer, especially in the rivalries of trade and amidst the conflicts of war. On the other hand, the better motives are rarely, or never, wholly wanting in even the lowest forms of religious worship. As these better motives, and the improved beliefs out of which the motives grow, prevail more and more in the consciousness of the individual and of the community, the worship which expresses them rises in the moral and intellectual scale. But all the way through, from lowest to highest, the important need of expression to the inner life remains the same. As the magical view, and the estimate of the magical value, of the cult progressively diminishes, the moral and spiritual importance of the expression of religious feeling is increased rather than diminished.

In the third place, the importance of the religious cult is also seen by the great influence which it exerts, as a matter of fact, not only upon the religious, but also upon the political and social life of the individual and of the community. This truth could be illustrated and demonstrated, in a notable manner, by a detailed study of the reflex effects of the different national cults upon the environment of government and society in which they have grown up. Of the *Li-ceremonial* in China, for example, M. Callery declares,¹ "Ceremony epitomizes the entire Chinese mind . . . in a word, to that people ceremonial is man as a moral, political, and religious being, in his multiplied relations with family, country, society, morality, and religion." And, says the author of the *Middle Kingdom*, "ceremony is a meagre rendering for the Chinese idea of *Li*, for it includes not only the external conduct, but involves the right principles from which all true etiquette and politeness spring." It has already been made sufficiently clear how almost incalculably great are the political and social influences which have arisen from

¹ As quoted in *The Middle Kingdom*, I, p. 644*f.*; compare Arthur Smith, *Chinese Characteristics*, p. 171.

ancestor-worship in China and Japan, from the ceremonials of Buddhism in both those countries, in Ceylon and in Thibet; and from the cult of Hindūism in India. If further evidence were needed, and it were desired to extend the proofs down to the present time, a study of the influences, whether for good or for evil, of the state churches of Russia, Germany, and England, would, we are confident, only enforce further the present contention. Even in America, where state and religion are said to be "divorced," the immense political and social influence of the so-called "religious services" cannot be doubted.

The attempt to establish fixed classes of the cult of religion, like most similar attempts at classifying the phenomena of man's religious life, are not altogether successful. Nor is the success of the attempt, in itself considered, of any great importance. Rauwenhoff, Pfeiderer, and in part Tiele, find all worship to be possessed of two characteristics: (1) Man approaches God, and (2) God approaches man. This amounts, however, to the important but rather commonplace observation that worship is, of course, designed as a means of communion between man and the Divine Being. More particularly, the two principal forms of religious cult are sacrifice and prayer. The former is of a more purely symbolical and more temporary character; the latter expresses the essential elements of man's communion with God, in their eternal and unchanging form. Thus we may say of it: "The most general, the most constant, and therefore the most important element in worship is Prayer."¹ "Nor do we know," continues Tiele, "of any religion, however undeveloped, in which prayer does not occur." The reason for this supremacy of prayer could not be more rationally or beautifully expressed than in the declaration of the Mandan in North America with reference to the First Man, the Progenitor of the race, the sun-god: "Thoughts are the surest means of reaching him."²

¹ Tiele, *Elements of the Science of Religion*, Second Series, p. 133.

² See Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, III, p. 206.

Another suggestion for a division in idea of the cult of religion may be expressed in the words of Jevons: "In every cult there are two tendencies or impulses, the mystic and the practical, the need of the blessings which the supernatural power can bestow, and the desire for communion with the author of those blessings." Among the forms of cult arising from the practical impulse, for example, we may note, the *Votum* of the Romans, which was a sacred and binding promise as to what the petitioner would do in case the god granted his petition; the *Evocation*, or solemn enjoining of the gods for assistance on the eve of a decisive or important battle; and the *Devotion*,—a pledge, made during the battle, that, in case the god granted victory, one's own or some other life should be surrendered. All these forms of cult are also to be found among the Hebrews and other ancient peoples.

In trying to discover a principle of classification for the different forms of the cult of religion, which shall recognize and appreciate their relative moral worth, the same difficulty is in a measure encountered, as that which characterized the attempt to classify the higher and lower religions. That is to say, the lowest conceptions and practices are found coexisting with some of the higher; and the higher and the highest are seen emerging from the lower as growths out of the very nature, under improved conditions, of the parent stock. In spite of this difficulty, however, the practice of incantation, the use of magical formulas, and of other means for getting control of the gods, may properly be said to represent the lowest stages of man's impulse to worship, and to commune with the invisible spiritual powers on which he believes himself to be dependent for his weal or woe.

In the earlier and grosser forms of religious worship, incantations and exorcising performances correspond to the belief in demons and evil spirits, as the better kinds of prayer and of votive offerings correspond to the belief in deified ancestors or ancestral gods. But, on the principle which commends econ-

omy and disapproves of a waste of valuable influence, incantations are the rather addressed to such gods as may be rendered favorable to the petitioner and, if they answer his summons, may be expected to deliver him from the power of the evil spirits. Even Christians are taught by the Lord to pray: "Deliver us from the evil (one?)." Thus one of the earliest and most significant forms of prayer is connected with—or, the rather, is an essential part of—the incantation. With the incantation generally the wish is close at hand, and is often expressed, to be freed from ceremonial or moral impurities, so as to assist one's self, as it were, in exorcising the evil spirit or in lifting the other burdens inflicted by witchcraft. The religion of ancient Babylonia and Assyria affords numerous interesting and instructive examples of how incantation, propitiation by sacrifice and other means, and prayer in the higher form of penitential hymns, may go together.¹ Thus the incantation may go on to recite various evil deeds of the worshipper, in punishment of which the bewitchment or other trouble is supposed to have been divinely sent. Such confession leads naturally to the prayer for purification. The sufferer inquires of his own consciousness and of the superior divine knowledge: "Have I sinned against a god?" and, in case this is so, for such and such a consideration: "Do thou purify me." As Jastrow has said:² "The incantations naturally shade off into prayers; frequently they are prayers pure and simple." We cannot, however, agree with this same authority when he declares that this change "does not carry with it the implication of changed or higher religious conceptions."

The lower conception of worship, its nature and value, is expressed in a manner yet more deplorable from the ethical point of view, by the following syllogism which has gained almost universal currency among the people of India:—

¹ See Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 328ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 293.

“The whole world is under the power of the gods,
 The gods are under the power of the *mantras*,
 The *mantras* are under the power of the Brāhman;
 Brāhman is therefore our God.”¹

In accordance with this belief almost the entire cult of the multitudes of Hindūism is under the degrading influence of religious fears. Snake-worship, especially the worship of the dreaded cobra, is well-nigh universal. In connection with serpent-worship, the worship of trees is practiced; and the worship of rivers is connected with the propitiation of the water-snakes, demons, and goblins, with which they are infested. Only positive orders, enforced by the presence of European authorities, will induce the Maghs of Bengal to cut down trees upon the hill-tops, which they imagine to be infested with demons.² Some kind of Brāhmanical charm or propitiatory offering, indeed, according to the beliefs of the popular religion, is necessary in order to get any good thing from the divine beings.

The form of Sacrifice, when taken by the cult of religion, is in its origin and lower stages characterized by much of superstition, cruelty, and selfishness; just as, indeed, in the same age and stage of race-culture, the whole of the social and political life of man is characterized by the same degrading qualities. But here, too, are numerous germs and even some flowers of a higher and sweeter form of life. The simplest idea of sacrifice is that of a gift; and this is made upon a principle, whose motive is desire for improved intercourse, and whose law is that of a fair reciprocation of favors. [*Do ut des : πειθεῖν δῶρα καὶ θεός.*] Thus Indra is thought to need the soma-sacrifice, in order to be strengthened in his battle against the demons; but it will be profitable for his worshippers to

¹ Dr. John Wilson, as quoted with approval by Shib Chunder Bose, *The Hindoos as They Are*, p. 184.

² See W. Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folk-Lore in Northern India*, II, p. 87.

have Indra win in that battle. Yahweh, to take another example, becomes changed in his temper toward the believers by the pleasant smell of the food-sacrifices. Such intercourse with the gods is not wholly selfish. The researches of Robertson Smith and others have shown that the oldest Semitic view of sacrifice was that of a meal shared by the worshipper with the deity to be honored or propitiated. In the ancient Shintō ritual of Japan "the Tribute thread and sanctified Liquor and Food" are "abundantly piled up like a range of hills" and "presented as of usage by the people of the deity's houses" to the Sun-goddess; this is done, in order that she may "deign to bless" the "Mikado's Life as a long Life," and "his Age as a luxuriant Age."¹

Another element, however, is very ancient and widely spread, if not universal, in this form of the cult of religion. This element is marked by the prevalence of some token or kind of self-immolation to deity. "The Redskin offers his sweat; the Black offers his saliva or his teeth; the more practical Greek, a lock of his hair, or even all of it. The Peruvian pulled out a hair from his eye-brow and blew it toward the idol."² In carrying out to its extreme this conception of obtaining favor from the god by sacrifice, we find traces everywhere of the very old practice of bloody offerings, even of human victims, as a mode of propitiation. Reference has already been made to the horrid excesses of the religion of the Mexicans and Peruvians at the time when they were invaded by the Spaniards. But our wonder and disgust may not improperly be turned back against the Christian nations when we remember how incomparably more lives have been sacrificed in their religious wars, or even for the baser motives of avarice and lust for empire.

But even the most cruel sacrifices do not seem, by any means,

¹ Quoted from the "Kojiki" or "Book of Ancient Traditions;" and compare Griffis, *The Religions of Japan*, p. 48.

² See Réville, *The Native Religions of Mexico and Peru*, p. 182.

to have been wholly motivated by selfish and superstitious fears and desires. Even in them the religious ideal, and the longing for acceptance by Deity and for union with Him, finds a notable, though morally shocking expression. The existence of altars and sacred pillars, of upright stones, sticks, or poles (the *ashera* among the Semites) universally bears witness to the influence in prehistoric times of this conception of the value of sacrifice. On the altar, with its flat or nearly flat top, the animal to be offered to the gods could be laid and then slaughtered; or the offerings of fruit or other food, and of flowers, could be exposed. On the pillar, or pole, the blood of the victim could be poured or sprinkled; or the prayer of the suppliant could be posted or tied. But the sacrificial meal, in which the victim is slain and eaten by gods and by men in company, has already been declared (p. 290*f.*) to be a primitive form of the religious cult.¹ From this point of view, anything which is given up for "God's sake" may make an acceptable sacrifice. Hence we have soma-sacrifices, beer-sacrifices, sacrifices of fruit, of grain, of animals, of human beings, either hostile captives or beloved kinsfolk, and the immolation of self.

It appears, then, that the motives and significance of this form of the cult of religion may be threefold or even fourfold. Sacrifices may be designed to placate or to beg for special favors; they may be hopefully employed in the effort to get into

¹ The contention of Jevons (see Introduction to the History of Religion, p. 144*f.*) and others that the origin of bloody sacrifices is to be found in totemism cannot stand the test of historical examination. Even the cruder forms of worship—such as the tying of rags and strips of paper upon sacred bushes and trees, or the driving of nails and pegs into sacred posts and trees, the casting of food and of stones into sacred waterfalls, and similar performances—seem to express a desire to get into closer contact with Divinity. In the small enclosure of a deserted shrine at Nikko, Japan, there were lying thick upon the ground, some years ago, little tablets of wood on which were inscribed prayers of women, soon to be confined, for safe delivery. By throwing them into the temple area and leaving them there, a more stable communion with the delivering god seemed to be established and continued. Compare Hartland, *The Legend of Perseus*, II, p. 200.

better fellowship with the invisible spirits ; or they may be piacular or expiatory, where sin is supposed to be removed by the offering.¹ Since the conception of the divine holiness and, therefore, of wrongdoing as sin committed against the Divine Being is relatively late, the piacular or expiatory conception of sacrifice is also a relatively late development. Plainly it is the conviction that God is a personal ethical Spirit, which is needed to raise the idea of sacrifice to its highest potency and purest form. Since petition is implied in the simplest and most primitive forms of sacrifice, and indeed the practice of prayer is almost uniformly and, as it were of necessity, its accompaniment, sacrifice invariably *implies* the personality of some one to whom it is offered. Even Buddhism, which primarily rejected all conceptions of personality in the gods, and which refused to say "Thou" in prayer, offers gifts of flowers, etc., and has abundant "prayer-wheels" and "prayer-flags," and ceaselessly repeated formulas of petition.

It is not strange, then, that the fusion of the honorific and the piacular forms of sacrifice, of covenant-sacrifice and sacramental sacrifice, takes place early and is nearly or quite universal. Thus among the Romans the earliest offerings consisted of such things as the offerers had,—the first fruits of the harvest, the first-cut stalk of grain, the first cluster of grapes, etc. In the household-worship this offering was customarily made by inviting the family gods to take part in the meal ; and the house-master or steward laid upon the dish (*patella*) of the god the portion belonging to him. Such an offering might be made with a view to secure the good offices and needed assistance of the gods ; but it might also be, and it customarily was, an expression of friendly companionship or family good-will. The same thing was true in the earlier times of the offerings of the state to the gods. Like everything else, the offerings of the Romans grew in luxuriousness as the

¹ That is, we discover elements corresponding to such specific terms as *oblatio*, *consecratio*, *sacrificium*, *devotio*, etc.

wealth and pomp of the state and of private life increased. This was especially true of the time of the emperors. But when the consciousness of guilt and wrongdoing also grew, and as the conception of the divine beings to whom the offering was made became more distinctly ethical, the desire to obtain forgiveness and to secure a restoration of divine favor through the sacrifice became more obvious and more insistent. A similar course was followed by the conception of this form of the cult of religion among the Greeks, whose earlier religious life was especially free from the restraints of dogma and ecclesiasticism, but also free—alas! from the restraints of moral law and moral example. In this manner the continued favor of the gods (*pax et venia deum*) could be secured by sacrifice; for the sacrifice was, as says Wissowa,¹ the “Lustration” which had the double purpose of purifying the object from all conscious or unconscious spot, and securing the state from all threatening dangers, on the ground of a newly assured divine mercy. While the lustration was, then, a sort of prayer and was thus closely allied to a distinctly piacular offering, the latter added something of a more definitely moral character to the conception. Hence the special piacular offering was required, in order to restore right relations with the gods, when some offence had been committed against the *jus sacrum*, which demanded punishment by them as all offences against the *jus civile* demanded punishment among men. But here another distinction of a truly ethical sort was made. The man who had violated the sacred law of the gods through ignorance, or stress of circumstances, might recover his standing with them. But he who willfully and designedly offended placed himself outside of the *jus divinum*, became *impius*, and forfeited the chance of reconciliation.²

A yet higher view of the significance and value of sacrifice

¹ Religion und Kultus der Römer, p. 327, and compare Livy. XXXIX, 10, 5; so also Cicero: thus we have *lustratio exercitus*, *lustratio classis*, etc.

² Compare Arnobius, *Adversus Gentes*, IV, 31.

was attained by the ancient world, outside of Christianity, in connection with the conceptions and practices of the religious mysteries. This improvement was due to an increased valuation of personal purity, an increased feeling of the need of divine assistance, and an increased appreciation of the desirableness of reconciliation with a Deity whose separation from the consciousness of man was due to man's impurity and sin. Of such we read in Plutarch the conviction: "It is not the wine nor the meat that refreshes us in these feasts, but good hope and faith that God is present with us, that He accepts our service and is well pleased with it."

"Thrice happy they who while they dwell on earth
Have gazed upon these holy mysteries;
For theirs alone is life beyond the grave,
Where others find but woe and misery."

Among the Semitic peoples no full account of their system of sacrifices is extant until we come to the detailed ritual laws of the "Priestly Code" of the second temple at Jerusalem.¹ The references in the texts hitherto deciphered are too meagre and incidental to enable us to say what were the ideas and practices, in this regard, of the Babylonian-Assyrian religion. In Babylonia, the two kinds of sacrifice, animals and vegetables (oxen, sheep, goats, lambs, fish, birds, even gazelles, and dates, date wine, butter, cream, honey, garlic, corn, herbs, oil, spices, and incense), were both employed in this form of religious cult.² Judging from the analogy of the Hebrew cult, the blood of the victim may have been regarded as especially belonging to the gods; and it may, therefore, have been poured upon the ground or on the altar as an offering. No special sanctity seems to have been attached to the blood; and the piacular character of bloody sacrifices, if it appeared at all in the Semitic religion of the Euphrates valley, certainly was

¹ See W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*, p. 215.

² Compare Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, p. 661.

not emphasized. No trace of human sacrifice anywhere occurs. The sacrifice of animals represented homage to the god; it was a means of placating him and of coming into his presence with increased favor. Sacrifices also served as omens for determining the will of the gods. They were most abundant at the dedication ceremonies of temples and palaces; on these occasions, the sacrifices were accompanied by appropriate prayers. According to W. Robertson Smith,¹ the leading idea in the animal sacrifices of the Arabian ritual is that the god and his worshippers unite in an act of communion by partaking together of the flesh and blood of the victim. The blood, "the subtle vehicle of the life of the sacrifice," belongs to the god, and is poured out as a drink-offering to him (comp. Ps. xvi, 4).

The notions and practices of Judaism respecting this form of the cult of religion had all the principal phases, and ran through all the essential stages of development, which can be traced in the other religions. In the earlier Hebrew conceptions Yahweh, as well as other divinities, is regarded as worshipped properly, and in a way to please Him, only if the worship be at some place which he has appointed, and with an offering that is satisfactory to his sensuous or æsthetical needs. Under special trees, on chosen hill-tops, at particular altars and pillars,—such as the tree of Mamre, under which Yahweh sat when he was Abraham's guest (Gen. xviii, 4),—or the tree of Sichen where the same Patriarch built an altar (Gen. xii, 6*f.*), the "high places" at Bethel and Dan, the numerous altars and pillars bearing different names that signify different modifications of his character (Gen. xxxiii, 20; xxii, 14, etc.)—Yahweh must be communed with and pleased with sacrifices. The selection of Jerusalem as a place, to which an unsuccessful effort was made to confine his worship, had an historical origin, but was made obligatory by a divine command.

Simplicity was characteristic of the places and the manner

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 226*f.*

of the ancient Hebraic sacrificial cult.¹ Its principal conception was that of a "service" demanded by, and profitable to render to, the God of Israel. As "the Lord," he requires a sort of standing tribute of cattle, firstlings of the flock, and tithes of the harvest. Corn and oil and wine are his due. One must not venture to approach Yahweh with empty hands (Ex. iii, 18 ; v. 3). Extraordinary gifts, that are vowed in emergencies, are particularly obligatory. Much of the later Levitical law is an organized system of tribute to the temple "service" and to the priestly representatives of the God of the nation. But this conception easily and necessarily passes over into the conception of sacrifice as a means of communication with the Divine Being. And this, in turn, into the conception which regards this form of cult as a means of restoring the relations which have been disturbed by the departure, somehow, from the law of Yahweh. In this connection, as is usual everywhere in the development of religious cult, the use of prayer is made to reinforce, as it were, or more clearly express, the full intent of the sacrifice. A solemn public calling upon the name of God, and a public celebration of the sacrificial approach, both as a means of communication and as an expiatory necessity, were indispensable safeguards of the prosperity and even of the life of the people. For with Israel originally "the offering was always an offering of the race or tribe, and the festival sacrifice even later signified a fraternizing of the servants of the same God."²

As to the character of the sacrifice in the earlier worship of Judaism, it was not necessarily a blood-offering. On the contrary, the chief vegetable constituents of the daily food of the worshipper, which were meal, wine, and oil, had a prominent place in the sacrificial feast. But the "jealousy of Yahweh"

¹ On this, and other points relating to the cult of Israel, see Smend, *Lehrbuch der Alttestamentlichen Religionsgeschichte* (2te Aufl.), pp. 127-161 and 311-332.

² Smend, *Ibid.*, p. 141.

and his delight in costly sacrifices was such as later to make his worship particularly distinguished among the Jews of all contemporaneous peoples, by bloody sacrifices. Moreover, the bloody offering was a "more pregnant expression of communion," as well as a more powerful means of restoring man to the divine favor. The answer to the question whether the offering of human victims, as a substitutionary or expiatory sacrifice, ever prevailed amongst this branch of the Semites is not altogether clear. According to Smend, the evidence is rather against, than in favor of, an affirmative answer.

The meaning of this enormous, ceaseless outpouring of blood in the sacrifices of the cult of later Judaism, in the worship of the second temple, as well as the exact historical relation in which this worship stood to the earlier sacrifices of animals among the Hebrews, has been a matter of much discussion. But that the conceptions which grew up with regard to the character of Yahweh and his principles of dealing with his chosen people furnished the determining factors, there can be no doubt. The "consuming holiness" of God compelled the theory and practice of piacular sacrifices and "sin-offerings" among this people as nowhere else. And when the "remnant" of the nation came back from the Exile, they were impressed with the conviction that on them and their fathers had been visited the sins of their remoter ancestors in neglecting the service of God, and were filled with the fear that the repetition of the same sins of neglect on their part would result in another similar experience for them and their descendants. This conviction and this fear enforced the need of a punctilious and complete performance of the sacrificial service which became truly distressing and even morally degrading. The "holiness" of the community must be maintained at whatever cost in the presence of the "consuming holiness" of God. Hence the "Priestly Code" was not satisfied with reinstating the simpler forms of sacrifice, and other cult, which had hitherto answered to the growing consciousness of sin, or with conforming the life

to the principles of inner righteousness, as these principles had come to the front in the prophetic side of Judaism ; this code, the rather, elaborated the details of all manner of lustrations and purification ceremonies, of expiatory and substitutionary sacrifices, of ritual uncleannesses, of threats of excommunication and of death at the hands of Yahweh for transgression of the priestly ordinances. Thus the sacrificial service became an intolerable burden and a cloud upon the consciences of the people.

What beneficial effect all this had in deepening the sense of sin and of the need of divine help, in consolidating the religious community, and in preparing the ground for the sowing of Christian truths ; what were its evil consequences in cultivating false notions of righteousness, artificial ideas of salvation through keeping of a law that was mainly ritualistic and burdensome to excess, and in promoting a haughty exclusiveness and excessive estimate of the necessity and value of the priestly function ;—it belongs to the history of later Judaism to investigate. But in Judaism itself there were always to be found a few who had asked and answered the question respecting the value of sacrifices in the manner of the prophet Micah (vi, 7 *f.*) : “ Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil ? Shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul ? He hath showed thee, O man, what is good ; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God ? ”

What is needed to elevate the conception of sacrifice is the sense of that obligation to moral purity which grows out of the nature of the Divine Being and of man's relation to this Being. Thus all sacrifice becomes what man *ought*, on moral and spiritual grounds, to render to God ; what is *due* to God as the outcome of the subjective attitude of faith. In a germinal way this feeling is found in very remote antiquity,—as we have already seen,—and in the lower forms of the practice of the re-

ligious cult. The feeling of the need of some kind of purification in order to approach God with propriety lifts the principle of both sacrifice and prayer out of the stage of pure self-interest of the lower kind. Thus the priest, on approaching the god at Abydos, declared: "I come before thee, thou Great One, after I have purified myself . . . I am a prophet, and come to thee in order to do what should be done; but I do not come in order to do what should not be done."¹ Among the Romans, from the earliest times, it was considered necessary that flowing water from natural sources (*aqua jugis, vivum flumen*) should be used for purification before making an offering to the gods.² Moreover, as soon as man's conception of Deity ceases chiefly to provoke fear, but on the contrary awakens affection and admiration, the character of the worship by sacrifice changes. Even in ancient Egypt there was doubtless much of these better feelings, when the images of the greater gods, Amon and Isis, or of the deified dead, were clothed with clean garments and adorned with ornaments, and even themselves purified by filling the sacred dwelling-places with sweet odors.

The relation of Christianity to the Old-Testament doctrine of this form of the religious cult may be said to be twofold. On the one hand, the teachings of Jesus require his followers to break with the practices and conceptions of the "Priestly Code" with regard to the nature and value of sacrifices. *In themselves considered*, sacrifices do not really effect any of the three functions which the ancient Judaism, in common with so large a proportion of the religions of the world, had been accustomed to attribute to them. They do not propitiate God or tend to secure favors from him; they are not especially valuable means of entering into communion with Him; and they have no effect in removing the taint and curse of wrongdoing. But on

¹ Translation of Erman, *Ägypten und Ägyptisches Leben im Altertum*, p. 371.

² See Livy, I, 45; Ovid, *Fasti*, IV, 778.

the other hand, Christ himself was from the first held by the Christian Church to have somehow fulfilled all the Old-Testament demands for sacrificial offerings of animal and vegetable products; and the content of faith which was proclaimed by the religion he founded, and the life which was patterned after his life, were considered to have taken henceforth the place formerly occupied by these offerings. For this faith included in itself—indeed, essentially was, a loving trust in the forgiving and redeeming Love of God; and this life was a complete, but rational and devoted sacrifice of the Self to God, for other's sake; just as his life had been the divinely ordered and acceptable sacrifice for all men's sake. Thus in this Christian conception and practice the idea of sacrifice culminates in the rational, free, and affectionate surrender ("offering") of man to God. The cult becomes a commitment of the life (as said Calvin: "*Cor meum, velut mactatum, Domino sacrificium offero.*")

It is in Prayer, however, that we find the one most important, permanent, and essential form of the cult of religion. That prayer is the natural and the inevitable accompaniment of all the other forms of worship has already been made apparent. But in its most comprehensive signification it may be said to comprehend all the feeling-full expression, directed toward the Object of religion, of the inner attitude of faith. In its ideal form, it is the outcome of the filial attitude toward God.

In its lower forms the conception and practice of prayer are, like the reciting of charms and magical incantations, largely characterized by superstitious prejudices and selfish fears. It does not appear, however, as Renan and others have tried to show, that prayer originated as a magic rite by which the gods or the invisible superhuman spirits were exorcised or made otherwise subject to the will of the worshipper. The history of religious development nowhere discovers the existence of prayer as purely a form of magic; the rather is it true,

that loving reverence for known and good gods combines with fear of unknown or evil gods to incite and strengthen the impulse to pray. Moreover, the more or less unselfish forms of prayer appear coexistent with the more degraded forms; and in the most civilized of Christian nations to-day, no small amount of degraded and selfish ideas of the value and influence of prayer is incorporated into the established forms of this cult. In connection with the superstitious use of prayer there is found a certain recognition of the *quasi*-magical power of words as a means of communication and of obtaining favors from superiors. "Probably," say Brinton,¹ "in all primitive faiths the word is regarded as a magical power in itself." Thus we hear the men of Christ's time asking: "What is this word, by the authority and might of which this man casts out devils?" The "*word*" addressed to the gods is prayer; and prayer may be said to be "the life of the faith of savage tribes, and it is so recognized by themselves."²

The propitiatory view of prayer is, indeed, current in all forms of religious faith; but prayer, in this view of it even, is by no means necessarily directed toward mischievous and wicked gods. In the ritual of the *Kojiki*³ (the *Norito*) the question is raised: "What god shall we send first to divinely sweep away, sweep away and subdue the gods who are turbulent in the country of fresh spikes." "If I were you and you were I," says a Vedic poet to the deity, "I should certainly give you what you wish." The whole lower theory of worship is scarcely anywhere better expressed than in an ancient inscription of Babylonia, giving divine orders and warnings to men after their creation by the god Marduk:—

"Fear of God begets mercy,
Sacrifice prolongs life,
And prayer dissolves sin."

¹ The Religion of Primitive Peoples, p. 89.

² Brinton, *Ibid.*, 103.

³ Compare Griffis, The Religions of Japan, p. 56.

So in the Maxims of Ani we read: "Pray humbly with a loving heart all the words of which are uttered in secret. God will protect thee in thine affairs; He will listen to thy words; will accept thy offerings."¹ And the saying of Mencius² runs: "Though a man were wicked, yet if he adjusted his thoughts, fasted, and bathed, he might sacrifice to God."

But such maxims and injunctions respecting the conditions of acceptable worship are very far indeed from being wholly lacking in ethical quality. Even less so, the prayer of the Navahoes: "O Lord on high, whose youth is immortal, ruler above, . . . preserve my body in beauty, *make all things beautiful*, let all be completed in beauty."³ And what of its kind can be finer than this prayer of the Khonds, a Dravidian tribe of Northern India: "O Lord, we know not what is good for us. Thou knowest what it is. For it we pray."

It is, however, in the expression of gratitude and thanksgiving for the Divine Goodness, and in confession of sin and petition for forgiveness and restoration to the Divine Favor, that all the more developed forms of expressing the attitude of faith toward God reach a higher ethical position. Prayers, scarcely excelled for beauty and spirituality by anything but the choicest products of Christian faith, are extant in all the greater religions of antiquity. From a papyrus in the British Museum may be read the petition of a pious soul in ancient Egypt: "O my God and Lord, thou hast made me and formed me; give me an eye to see and an ear to hear thy glories." And on another papyrus (now in the museum at Bulak) is extant the acclamation: "Hail to thee, Amon Rā, Lord of the thrones of the earth. . . . Deliverer of the timid man from the violent, judging the poor, the poor and the oppressed. Lord of wisdom whose precepts are wise. . . . Lord of mercy most loving, at whose coming men live. . . . Hail to thee, say all creatures:

¹ See Renouf, *The Religion of Ancient Egypt*, p. 105.

² IV, ii, ch. 23; and compare Legge, *The Religions of China*, p. 70.

³ So given by Dr. W. Matthews, *The Mountain Chant of the Navahoes*.

Salutation to thee from every land." And the greatest of all Egyptian monarchs, Rameses II, when in sore distress, cried out: "Who, then, art thou, O my father Amon! Doth a father forget his son? Surely a wretched lot awaiteth him who opposes thy will; but blessed is he who knoweth thee, for thy deeds proceed from a heart full of love."¹ Also in ancient China, when precious stones and silks were offered to Shang Ti, this prayer was prescribed: "Thou hast vouchsafed, O Ti, to hear us, for thou regardest us as our Father. I, Thy child, dull and unenlightened, am unable to show forth my feelings. I thank thee that thou hast accepted the intimation." At the second drink-offering, it was said: "Men and creatures are emparadised, O Ti, in thy love. All living things are indebted to thy goodness It is Thou alone, O Lord, who art the true parent of all things."²

Although in general the prayers of the ancient religions of India do not reach the same degree of ethical elevation, there are some of the Vedic hymns which, in a measure, approach the higher standard. Thus one of them, after having affirmed that the "god Savitar deserveth now a song from us," petitions this deity as follows:

"Whatever thoughtless thing against the race of gods
We do in foolishness and human insolence,
Do thou from that, O Savitar, mid gods and men
Make us here sinless."

But the more profound ethical consciousness, and the growing conception of the Divine Being as Center and Source of righteousness, find expression in the penitential hymns of ancient Babylon, in a truly remarkable way. In addition to those already quoted or referred to, it is sufficient to cite the following prayer, addressed by Nebuchadnezzar to the god Marduk:³

¹ See Renouf, *Ibid.*, Lecture VI.

² Legge, *Ibid.*, p. 46f.

³ Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, p. 296.

“According to thy mercy, O Lord, which thou bestowest upon all,
Cause me to love thy supreme rule,
Implant the fear of thy divinity in my heart,
Grant to me whatsoever may seem good before thee,
Since it is thou that dost control my life.”

Both in the early practice and in the established cult of Judaism as defined by the Priestly Code, prayer was distinctly subordinated to sacrifice. The beginning of this form of religious cult was the invitation, or solemn call, upon the name of God, that he should notice the offering and enter into renewed and improved relations with the worshipper on account of it. Among the Arabs, according to Smend,¹ after the slaughter of the victim is completed, the congregation stand for a considerable time, quiet and silent, around the altar, waiting for God to accept the sacrifice. Thus the promise of Yahweh to his people was (Ex. xx, 24): “In all places where I record my name I will come unto thee and I will bless thee.” But when God chooses some place, not only for coming to the people but for dwelling among them, then this divine dwelling-place becomes preëminently a place or “house of prayer.” The only prescribed form of prayer for perpetual use which is given in the Old Testament (Deut. xxvi, 5-15) is an acknowledgment of Yahweh’s goodness to his people, accompanied by a petition that this goodness shall be continued to them in the future. But the conceptions which legal Judaism held concerning the individual and his personal relations to God were not, on the whole, such as to encourage private devotions. Even in the recorded prayers of those who, like (in a special and typical manner) Jeremiah, so identified their personal cause with that of God and his people as to pray with fullness of faith respecting their personal relations, there is not the same tenderness and passionateness of feeling as that which characterizes the best examples of the Egyptian and Babylonian religions.

The prophetic element as distinguished from the priestly,

¹ Lehrbuch der Alttestamentlichen Religionsgeschichte, p. 140.

however, continually put the "offering" more and more into the background, and made the "service of God" in prayer more and more important as an expression of genuine and enduring faith in his righteousness and goodness. Its spirit was that expressed in Psalm lxii, 7*f.*: "In God is my salvation and my glory: the rock of my strength and my refuge, is in God. Trust in him at all times; ye people, pour out your heart before him: God is a refuge for us." Of this side of the cult of Judaism, as it came to its highest expression, we may, indeed, say: "In their prayers the Jewish religious community exercised a communion with their God, the historical truth of which is evident from this fact, that their prayer-book, the Psalter, has been taken over without additions by the Christian Church. It was manifoldly a prayer in the Spirit."¹

Enough has already been said to show how the cult of religion changes and develops in dependence upon the beliefs, sentiments, and social practices, which themselves correspond to the conception of God and of his relations to man,—especially as respects the "way of salvation." For this cult is essentially the expression of these beliefs and feelings, in a feeling-full and usually also in a social way. For the same reason, among all the forms of cult it is prayer which represents the true, ideal spirit, and which contains the essential worth, of all divine worship. Prayer *is* the expression of the attitude of faith; and faith is belief, suffused and warmed with feeling, and equipped for action. As, then, the conception of God rises in the religious consciousness of man, and attains the altitude of an ideal, perfect Ethical Spirit, into communion with whom the finite spirit may enter, for the satisfaction of all its religious needs and for the realization of all its own moral and spiritual ideals, the spirit and practice of prayer more and more absorbs and satisfies the demands for expression of the human soul in its religious experience. The conception of the Divine Being as a perfect Ethical Spirit is

¹ Quoted from Smend, *Ibid.*, p. 412.

antagonistic, not only to all practices of magic, incantation, and mere formalities, but also to the thought that the divine favor can be bought or secured by any form of piacular offering or propitiatory sacrifice.

For these reasons, in the cult of the Christian religion all other forms are sunk in that attitude of faith in God which naturally and necessarily expresses itself in the life of prayer. Even in the Old-Testament times the practical piety of the thoughtful had revolted against the confidence in prayer itself as a formal and set means of obtaining favors from God, if only it were accompanied by gifts, vows, and much speaking (Ecc. v, 1-7). With this revolt Jesus himself shows his sympathy by counseling his disciples—and even using a withering sarcasm in the counsel—against lengthy and ostentatious praying. But the form which is called after his name, the “Lord’s Prayer,” is the universal type of all true prayer; it thus embodies the essential features of the ideal religious cult. For it expresses the attitude of filial piety as a perfect confidence in God, the Heavenly Father; as sympathy and love toward all men who are children of this Father; and as the disposition to govern one’s own life according to the Divine Will, in a constant loving trust that this Will for us is best for us. This prayer is a perfect expression of the end of religion, attained in the spiritual communion of the finite Self with the Infinite Self; it sets forth in few and simple words the voluntary relations in which the realized content of faith places the human life to the Life of God.

In order that the higher forms of worship may be developed, it is necessary that the cult of religion should be freed from its early and universal restrictions of two different kinds. These are the restrictions as to places, and as to media, of the communication of man with God. How the places of worship in the earlier cult of the different religions were either determined by the presence of the object worshipped,—a sacred stone, tree, spring, or stream,—or else by the convenience or æsthetical

influence of the place itself, has already been made sufficiently obvious. The gods of the land cannot, from the very nature of the case, be worshipped apart from the land to which they belong. But the gods who represent universal human interests can come to have their shrines and places of worship, wherever there are men to appreciate these interests. This is true, for example, of the goddess of love, of her who presides over childbirth, of the god of war, and of the greater nature gods. Among some peoples, for example among the ancient Egyptians, a god is scarcely thinkable without his house. And the oldest temples of Egypt appear to have been built upon ground made holy by the existence of yet earlier and more primitive structures. The typical Egyptian temple could never encourage, however, a free, democratic, and spontaneous divine worship. The pillared court and hypostyle were the places where offerings were brought and religious ceremonies celebrated; but the divinity dwelt in the small dark chapel behind these spaces, where only he could enter who had purified himself fourfold. It was in the more ancient kingdom, when religion had not yet crowded so much into the foreground of the life of the people as in the later epochs, that the duties of the priests were "incomparably more" a common and popular good than they afterwards were. "At no period, of the Egyptian religion" says Erman,¹ "were the people admitted to the temples as worshippers. All the temples we know of were royal offerings made to the divinity of the locality, and none but the priestly personages attached to the temple itself had free access to its precincts."

The priests constitute the second restriction upon worship from which the cult of religion must free itself in order to realize its ideal. In the more primitive forms of religion these media between the gods and men are themselves supposed to be possessed of supernatural powers. In the Marquesas Islands, for example, the priests are thought to rule over the

¹ *Ägypten und Ägyptisches Leben im Altertum*, pp. 378f. and 392.

elements, to produce or prevent the harvests, to inflict disease and death on those who offend them. "The Mexican kings, in their priestly capacity, took an oath to make the sun to shine, the clouds to give rain, the rivers to flow, and the earth to bring forth fruits in abundance."¹ The high-priest of Heliopolis was styled, "he who beholds the secret of heaven," and "the master of the secrets of heaven." The Shaman in Siberia, the Lama in Thibet, the Brāhman in India, are similarly regarded to-day.

Judaism was unable wholly to free its conception of worship, and the spirit controlling its practice, from either of these two restrictions. But the teachings of Jesus are a definite and final release from them both. God, the omnipresent Spirit may be worshipped anywhere, with an acceptableness equal in his sight, if only the worship be one of spirit and truth. And every worshipper may go directly to God, with the prayer of faith; nor may any man intervene as an indispensable, or even as a particularly favored medium, between any other and his God. At the same time the power and helpful influence of associations and favorable circumstances cannot be neglected by any form of religious cult; neither can the social benefit and spiritual assistance which the better and stronger may always render to the less developed and weaker be neglected. For disregard of the one and neglect of the other would both do violence to those very psychological characteristics which give rise to the necessity, and secure the benefits, of any religious cult at all.

As concerns all the specific expressions of the religious experience,—sacrifice, sacraments, prophecy, and prayer,—they all tend more and more to become absorbed, as it were, in a life that is cognitively (in thought and contemplation), aesthetically, and ethically, both a communion with God and a service of God. Religion, as the scale rises of the conscious ex-

¹ On this whole subject of the "responsibility" of kings and priests for natural phenomena, see Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, I, p. 157f.

perience in which, subjectively regarded, it consists, becomes an ever fuller and richer life of thought, feeling, and action, having reference to that Object which is its Source, its Example, and its End. God in man is thus bringing about an increased knowledge of himself, an improved type of conduct patterned after his Will, and a fuller participation in the joy of that spiritual perfection which is the inspiration of art. Thus the religious life becomes constantly a less one-sided and restricted affair; it advances toward a fuller share in that completeness of the spiritual Life which is the promised indwelling of God with humanity. The religious point of view at its supreme height, therefore, views all things *sub specie æternitatis*; yet not with selfish indifference or Stoical repression, but with the divine patience, calmness, and confidence in the final triumph of the highest Good.¹

¹ "So in der Ewigkeit des göttlichen Lebens zu stehen, von diesem Mittelpunkt aus das Leben zu betrachten und aus ihm heraus zu handeln, das ist die Grösse und die Erhabenheit der Religion." A. Dorner, *Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie*, p. 406.

CHAPTER XXII

THE WAY OF SALVATION

The demands upon life which religion makes are by no means completely satisfied by assuming and maintaining the attitude of faith toward the Object of religion, and by expressing this attitude in the more specific or prescribed forms of religious worship. That attitude of filial piety toward God which includes receptivity of the truth, penitence and loving trust toward the forgiving and purifying Divine Love, surrender of the Self in the spirit of obedience and of desire to do the Divine Will, is, indeed, the very essence of religion, subjectively regarded. And the expression of this filial piety toward the Object, or God Himself, is a life of self-sacrifice and prayer. Something, however, always remains to be done,—something more than worship; although something which is always to be regarded, from the point of view of religion, as an act of divine service. There must be a conduct of life which grows out of and corresponds to the attitude of filial piety; this “practical religion,” as it is sometimes called, in order to be stamped with the characteristics of a truly religious service, must be a doing of good “for God’s sake.”

The beginnings of the conception of religion as constituting an obligation to conduct are found even in the lower forms of religion. Thus understood, right conduct is morality, because it has reference to one’s fellow-men; but it is also “practical religion” because it is motived by the attitude of faith toward God. Even the gods of nature-worship and ancestor-worship require of their followers some measure of a certain way of

behaving themselves in the affairs of the present life. It was this fact which led us to define religion, even when taken at its lowest terms, as a belief in invisible spiritual beings "to which man is in some sort responsible for his conduct." And when further considering the relations of morality and religion it was found that in the broadest conception of the two developments, while they cannot be wholly identified, they can never be wholly divorced.

In fact, all the religions which introduce the idea of salvation in a manner at all prominent and influential present some attempt at a doctrine of the "way of salvation." In general, they make repentance for past wrongdoing, and doing better in the future, conditions of salvation; religion thus presents the character of a Path, or Practice, by which the end of salvation must be attained. In the moral teaching of that low form of religion in China, called Tâoism, there are more than two hundred traits of character that the religiously good man will abstain from and condemn. He "must not sing and dance on the last day of the moon or of the year; must not shout or get into a passion on the first day of the moon or in the morning; must not weep, spit, or be guilty of other indecency toward the North," etc.¹ Unspeakable torments are provided for those who do not walk in the right way. On the other hand, in the "Divine Panorama," a book of Tâoist doctrine said to be published by the mercy of Yü-Ti, the ruler of the infernal regions is made to say: "Any wicked soul that repents and induces one or two others to do likewise, shall be allowed to set this off against the punishment which should be inflicted." Similar strange medleys of commandments, addressed in the name of the Divine Will to the will of men, characterize the "practical religion" of all the lower forms of man's religious development.

That discipline of religion which is directed chiefly toward the will, as faith appeals to the intellect for the acceptance of

¹ See Legge, *The Religion of China*, p. 186.

its content, and worship expresses the movements of feeling, lays hold upon somewhat widely different motives in the case of the different religions which teach a way of salvation. Of such motives the following three classes are most important for distinguishing the different kinds of religion and the different stages of development in religious doctrine on this point. Men may desire "to be saved," either, first, by securing for themselves an escape from the evils of their present and future lives; or, second, by securing for themselves the ideal of purity and righteousness, and the consequent divine favor in which the realization of salvation consists; or, finally, by surrendering themselves unreservedly to labor for the promotion of the Kingdom of God, for the securing of the salvation of others. In fact, as in theory, however, these motives and the appeals to them, cannot be kept wholly separate. For to try to escape from all the evils of life is not the way to secure the highest good even in the present life; the ideal of purity and righteousness cannot be realized in separation from society; and the social good which religion seeks cannot be attained otherwise than through the diligent culture of the individual Self in the path of pure and righteous living. All the greater religions which make the teaching of the way of salvation an essential part of their doctrine, and which require the walking in this way as a condition of the promised reward, find themselves obliged to take account of all these three classes of motives. But they do not by any means all make an equal, or an equally powerful and successful, appeal to all three; and they are all, in respect of the power and the success of the appeal which they do make, subject to the principle of development.

The religions of ancient Egypt and ancient Greece differed greatly from Hindūism and Brāhmanism, in that the former regarded life as good in itself, and as only needing to be continued under improved physical and social conditions, in order to afford the way of salvation; but the latter regarded life as incurably evil. The way of salvation, therefore, could be trod-

den only by him who had attained the wisdom of this conviction, and the knowledge of how to escape from this evil. The ancient Egyptian who had abstained scrupulously from those courses in life which bad men follow, and who had been positively kind and charitable and otherwise good, could appear before the judge of the dead and confidently claim the happy fate of the man who had been saved. He had walked in the path of the just; and thus walking, he had, of course, reached the end of salvation. It was all a comparatively simple affair. And yet in Egypt, as the estimate of the height and difficulty of the path was enhanced, the confidence of having followed it successfully was lowered; the need of Divine forgiveness and redemption began then to make itself felt. It was in connection with the later religious developments that the Greek doctrine of "the path" also became more clearly defined. "The Dionysiac 'way of salvation' is the way of liberation and cleansing. The soul is in essence divine. Because of its sin it is shut off in the world of body and matter. The body is a prison." And now the means of salvation provided by the mysteries, was "the *expulsive power of the new insight*, we might name it, or better, the *uplifting power of the new insight*."¹

The doctrine of salvation held by Vedic Hindūism agreed in its most important elements with that of other peoples in a similar grade of race-culture. There are good and bad men, in respect of their conduct in this life; and this difference in conduct here makes a difference in the fate of the soul hereafter. The skillful and brave hunter and warrior, the man who is *good* after the pattern of the tribal ethics, passes by the guardian dog, crosses a stream, and enters paradise. But the cowardly, lying, and bad man is doomed to regions of darkness.² According to Rhys Davids³ "the Brāhmanas still teach that the souls of men enter upon one new life—good or bad

¹ See B. J. Wheeler, *Dionysos and Immortality*, p. 42f.

² Hopkins, *The Religions of India*, p. 163f.

³ *Indian Buddhism* [Hibbert Lectures, 1881], p. 81.

according to their conduct here—in the other worlds.” But in the period of the Upanishads, either fitfully or suddenly, the theory of the transmigration of souls appears. The consequences of walking in the right or the wrong way are, therefore, not to be realized in any “*one* new life” but in a series of reincarnations, the nature of which is determined by the “deeds done” in the preceding lives. Such is the power of these deeds when evil,—and, What man is without sin?—that there is no escape from the force which they set in motion. “Thus is the soul tossed about from life to life, from billow to billow in the great ocean of transmigration.” Salvation is, therefore, the escape somehow from the endless sequence of evil-doing and its consequence of evil-suffering. But by what path, or way, shall so priceless a boon be secured? For the people at large the answer of Hindūism to this question has always been, and still remains, dreary and discouraging enough. A certain degree of *merit* may be obtained, which can in some measure diminish the amount of difference between the credit and debit columns of the existence of the individual soul, by paying one’s debts to the gods, to the seers, to the Manes, and to men. “To the gods he owes sacrifices; to the seers, study of the Vedas; to the Manes, offspring; to men, hospitality,” truthfulness, and other civic virtues.¹ But only the priest can perform the sacrifice acceptably, and sacrifice is costly; only the Brāhman can interpret the Vedas truthfully, and there is no agreement about their meaning among the scholars; only the gods can grant offspring, and to make salvation depend upon the successful exercise of the reproductive function has been one of the chief curses of India; while the lack of many of the most essential virtues in intercourse with their fellow men has always been conspicuous in the case of the popular Hindūism.

On the other hand, according to the doctrine of the instructed, only those few tread the path of salvation who by end-

¹ Compare Hopkins, *Ibid.*, p. 202f.

less use of study, meditation, prayer, and ascetic discipline, attain the esoteric knowledge of the Brāhman. Thus the Upanishads and the Bhagavadgītā, agree in teaching that all merely ritual performances are useless; that sacrifices performed with a selfish motive cannot profit the soul; and that there is no hope of salvation except "by the individual Self recognizing the true and universal Self, and finding rest there, where rest alone can be found."¹ According to the Gītā, the "path to final emancipation" is not for those whose minds are drawn away with "flowery talk" about the sacred writings, or who are "enamored of Vedic words"; it is, the rather, for those who stand "firm and steady in contemplation," who follow the path of this form of devotion, and thus come to dwell in God.² The "fruits of actions" cannot save the soul; but knowledge attained through the practice of devoted contemplation brings about that perfect union with the Divine Being which is salvation. "Through knowing Him who is more subtile than subtle, who is creator of everything, who has many forms, who embraces everything, the Blessed Lord—one attains to peace without end."³ This is the doctrine which a modern writer⁴ sums up in the following words: "If the human will is concentrated upon this supremely loving, supremely beautiful and supremely intelligent Will—the all-loving, the all-powerful God—and constantly reflects upon Him, it gradually gets into the way of being transformed into higher and higher forms."

It is a singular comment upon the certainty of the conclusion as to the essentials of the perfect ethico-religious life, and, as well upon the inconsistency of the different courses of reflec-

¹ The Bhagavadgītā, etc., Translated by Kāshināth Trimbak Tslang, in the "Sacred Books of the East" Series, Introduction, p. 16f.

² Chapters II, 42f.; IX, 1f. and 18f.

³ From the Upanishad, Çvet. 4. 14-15, translation of Prof. Hopkins, *Ibid.*, 239f.

⁴ Kishori Lal Sarkar, *The Hindū System of Moral Science*, p. 148.

tion and argument by which this certainty is reached, that **two** religions whose fundamental tenets seem at first sight to be so different, and even contradictory, as those of Buddhism and Christianity, should agree in so many important respects with regard to that form of conduct which religion commands and to which it promises its highest rewards. Christianity builds its doctrine of salvation upon the consciousness which its Founder had in perfection, that God is perfect Ethical Spirit, whose essence is Love. This consciousness, it holds, is mediated by faith in Christ, who is for man the supreme manifestation of the Divine Love and the perfect example of that attitude of faith, or loving trust, in which all the sons of God should stand to their Heavenly Father. But Buddhism was originally agnostic with regard to the gods, and, indeed, with regard to all conceptions whatever of Divine Being; it denied the Brāhmanical doctrines both of the reality of the World-Soul and of the soul of man. It denied also, as a necessary consequence of this agnosticism, the doctrine of salvation by way of sacrifice, asceticism, or philosophical or mystical knowledge of God. It agrees with Christianity, however, in proclaiming that the path which leads to salvation for the individual is a life of purity, pity, and self-sacrificing love for mankind.

The conception of life as conscious existence, from which the Buddhistic doctrine of salvation took its point of view, was thoroughly pessimistic. Conscious existence, being always maintained by gratifying the "thirst" of desire, "the will to live," is essentially evil; the only possible salvation is the escape from this evil; it is, therefore, primarily considered, a negative affair, a cessation of the evil by ceasing from the thirst of desire and all its forms of gratification. Men are bound to the "Wheel of Existence:" "And it is to be understood that this Wheel of Existence constantly and continuously rolls onward, without known beginning, without a personal cause or passive recipient and empty with a twelve-fold emptiness."¹

¹ See Buddhism in Translations, p. 173.

The one indestructible principle of existence in an unsubstantial and illusory universe, the substance of the Wheel to which the unsubstantial being of man is bound, is Karma. Nowhere else is the truth of Schiller's couplet :—

“This is the very curse of evil deed
That of new evil it becomes the seed,”

more fatefully set forth than in Gautama's doctrine of “Fruitful and Barren Karma.” A man's deeds are seeds; “and wherever his personality may be, there these seeds ripen.”

The entrance upon the Way of Salvation is, according to the tenets of early Buddhism, no easy affair. Truly, “strait is the gate and narrow is the way.” In treating of the moral code of Buddhism we have already (p. 472*f.*) enumerated those conditions which are equal in number to the four cardinal points of the compass, plus the four intermediate points, and the zenith and the nadir.¹ But the nature of practical religion is better described in the summary of the “Book of the Great Decease,” which exhorts all true disciples “to live in the practice, both in public and private, of those virtues which, when unbroken, intact, unspotted, and unblemished, make men free, and which are untarnished by the belief in the efficacy of any outward acts of ritual or ceremony, by the hope of any kind of future life.”² Or better still, there are four conditions that must be grasped in order to tread successfully “this weary path of individuality;” and they are, “the noble conduct of life, the noble earnestness in meditation, the noble kind of wisdom, and the noble salvation of freedom.”³ Nor can the following of this path be made a matter of external appearances, a kind of will-worship only. For:—

¹ As given in the “Story of Sumedha,” translated from the Introduction to the Jātaka; *Ibid.*, pp. 5-31.

² Rhys Davids, *Ibid.*, p. 29.

³ Rhys Davids, *Ibid.*, p. 99. Compare also § 57, “The Way of Purity,” Buddhism in Translations, pp. 285*ff.*

“ To cleanse and purify the thoughts,
'Tis this the holy Buddhas teach.”

But the positive factors of “good-will without measure toward all human beings and even toward all that has life,” a universal pity and love, are the essentials of compassing the “Excellent Way;” and its end is the condition of *Arahatship*. This salvation is not for the Brāhman alone, but for every man who will walk in “the way.” Just as “the flame kindled by an outcast by means of two pieces of wood belonging to a dog’s drinking vessel or a pigsty, will light a sacred fire as shining and beaming and bright, and as good for sacrificial purposes, as a flame kindled by a Brāhman or a Khattiya by means of sweet-smelling sandal-wood.”

That there is much in the Buddhistic doctrine of the way of salvation which teaches the same universal and eternal truths that belong to the proclamations of the Gospel, cannot be doubted by any fair-minded student of the two religions. Nor should our estimate of the value of the agreement be greatly disturbed by the extremity of the figures of speech in which the Oriental expresses his philosophical, ethical, and religious doctrines. For example,¹ when Buddha, in his future existence as the “Wise Hare,” is made to affirm the extent of his self-denial by saying :

“ There came a beggar, asked for food ;
Myself I gave that he might eat.
In alms there’s none can equal me ;
In alms have I perfection reached ;”

or in the Samkhopāla Birth-Story, by declaring :

“ They pierced me through with pointed stakes,
They hacked me with their hunting-knives,
Yet gainst these Bhojans raged I not,
But kept the precepts perfectly ;”—

¹See § 3, The Characteristics of a Future Buddha, Buddhism in Translations, p. 35.

the extravagance of the rhetoric must not be allowed wholly to obliterate the sublimity of the thought. On the other hand, the conception of salvation by gaining merit through giving of alms and keeping of precepts is undoubtedly mingled even with the nobler Buddhistic conceptions of the true "Path." Finally, while it cannot be denied that in Christianity also from its very beginning down to the present moment, these same lower views have mingled with the higher, the moral superiority of the way of salvation which it commends, has been placed by experience and by history beyond all doubt. That the principal reasons for the relative failure of Buddhism as practical religion are to be found in the deficiency of *religious* motives, there is also no doubt.

Another class of religions proclaims the way of salvation, the rather, to consist in obedience to certain legal enactments which are attributed to a divine source. While the idea of conducting the life in agreement with the will of the Divine Being is found in all the religions which tell men how to be saved, the more strictly legalistic conception is especially prominent in some of these religions. In the ancient Chinese worship of Shang Ti, and its dependent tenets as to the course of human duty in the "five relationships" of society, there is manifest that tenacious and powerful conception of salvation by adherence to divinely instituted and unchangeable laws which the entire civilization of China has exhibited through decades of centuries. Practical religion consists in the recognition of Heaven, the Object of religious worship, as the Governor and Law-giver to man. The welfare, or the salvation, of man depends upon the keeping of this Law. The prayer of the first emperor of the present dynasty, on taking possession in a formal way of his throne, was addressed to "Imperial Heaven and Sovereign Earth."¹ The edicts which the people, in order to secure their safety, are duly to obey, come from the earthly sovereign only as he is the "Son of Heaven."

¹ See the whole prayer in Edkin's *Religion in China*, p. 18f.

Thus, also, according to the purer form of the Confucian doctrine, the worship of ancestors is a duty which derives its saving worth from the relation which it sustains to the will of Shang Ti, or semi-personified Heaven. It is the will of the Supreme Ruler, the law of Heaven, that the people should show filial piety toward the emperor and toward their ancestors. In the Shih-King the praises of Wû who heads the actual sovereigns of his line, are recited; he himself ardently desired "to obey the will of Heaven," and "gave to all the law of filial duty," which he especially illustrated by his own example. Thus it is guaranteed that Heaven's blessing will descend and helpers, "strong friends and fast," will never fail.

The earlier Muhammadanism enforced in the most extreme manner the legalistic attitude of the human will to the Divine Will. Whatever God commanded, that must be believed in, accepted, and unconditionally obeyed. The law of Allah as proclaimed by his prophet marked out the only path to Paradise. Purity of heart and of life, outside of the faith of Islam and its practice of "submission," could not avail to escape the wrath of God. All were surely to be damned who did not "follow the usage of the Prophet of God," who did not "tread the Path" which he had pointed out as the divinely decreed and only way of salvation. But this unquestioning and uncompromising acceptance of another's will could not command the adherence of all who came to be called Muslim. On the one hand, there was heard in the faith of Islam what has been called¹ "the oversong of all Muslim thought, the faith to which the Semite ever returns in the end,"—namely, that the one reality is God, and that there is no other path to that which is good but the turning of the soul in fear and reverence toward Him. On the other hand, sects arose which either proclaimed salvation in faith alone,—a doctrine "which was Pauline in its sweep,"—or salvation by plunging "the heart com-

¹ See Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*, p. 126.

pletely in the thought of God " and thus attaining, at the end, a "complete passing away in God." Thus did the path of salvation as orientated by the Sufis lie parallel to, or coincide with, that which Brāhmanism had marked out for the weary soul, centuries before Muhammad was born.

The predominatingly legal character of the way of salvation which Judaism proclaimed has appeared in all our characterizations of its doctrine, from whatever point of view that doctrine has been regarded. The Law of Yahweh was the peculiar possession and pride of Israel; in its keeping there was great reward; to obey it was the joy of the faithful; but to neglect and depart from this law was certain to bring the Divine wrath and punishment upon the individual and upon the nation. Law rather than life, legality rather than purity of heart and good-will and service toward mankind, as marking out the Path by which man might attain the end of his being, the supreme realization of the needs of his religious nature, was the regnant conception of Judaism during all the centuries of its pre-Christian history.

Faith and worship were therefore rendered to God as the lawgiver and righteous ruler of the nation, which was under covenant relations with Him that involved mutual obligations. God was to protect and save his people, on condition that his people served Him by keeping his law. At the same time another and higher conception of the way of salvation was unfolding itself in the heart of Israel. And just as this conception transformed the idea and the practice of both faith and worship,—the subjective life of religion and the formal expression toward God, of that life,—so did it also transform the idea and the practice of the "good few" in Judaism, with respect to their conduct of the social life. By these few the way which the individual must follow, in order to secure the end of salvation, was conceived of as an inner righteousness; and its expression was in a life of pity, mercy, and good will.

With Christianity, as with all other religions that lay emphasis upon the teaching and practice of the way of salvation, the solution of the problem of evil is to be found only in the actual following of this way. How shall the evil of sin and misery be overcome? How shall man be saved? The answer of Jesus to this question is the doctrine of an immediate return of the suffering and wandering child, in the spirit of filial piety, to the Heavenly Father; then follows the conduct of all the life in the loving service of this Father, among and in behalf of his sons. This doctrine of salvation for the individual is more clearly taught in the Parable of the Prodigal Son than in any other of the discourses of Jesus. But we have his declaration that he, the Son of Man, is come to seek and to save that which is lost, and his vision of Satan falling like lightning from heaven, as men hear and heed his message of salvation. Beyond the simple assumption that man's wandering is voluntary, and that a change of will, or heart, on his part is the beginning of the cure, the teachings of Jesus contain little of philosophy or of logical discourse respecting his way of salvation. The practical life of his followers is, indeed, to be moulded after the principles which are given in their greatest fullness of detail in the Sermon on the Mount. But the Path followed by the Master himself, as in the case of him who became the Buddha, furnishes a concrete example which is to be an inspiration for all men to the end of time.

The more definite conceptions of the Way of Salvation which the Christian religion, in its historical career, has developed from the beginning down to the present time, are so various in their details that they may justly be said to include every good, as well as every objectionable and mischievous feature, which has been incorporated into the tenets of all the other religions of salvation so-called. Subscribing to a particular creed, or claiming an assurance of detailed knowledge about God, worshipping in a certain way or following some prescribed form of cult, adherence to some particular form of ecclesiastical

association or organization of the religious community, and, even, almost every conceivable type of the detailed management of the religious life, have, at some time or place in the history of the Christian Church, been incorporated into the doctrine of "the Path" that lies between man and God. But these markers of the way have been, for the most part, obstacles around which the traveller must pass, or over which he must climb. The un-Christian extreme to which even the acute reflective thinker may be led in this matter is illustrated by the declaration of the Church-father, Augustine: "A man can have everything outside the Church, only not salvation; and though he thinks he is living a good life, yet for the one crime of schism from the Church he will not have part in life, but the wrath of God abides on the schismatic."

Notwithstanding this confusing and mischievous uncertainty about its doctrine of salvation, a certain form of practical religion, a faith which expresses itself not only toward God in worship, but toward both God and man in the striving to be good and to do good, may be said to be preëminently Christian. Four characteristics, of which it has the superior share among all the world's religions of salvation, mark the path of salvation which Christianity provides for the human race. These characteristics determine this religion as, in a peculiar manner, an historic and at the same time spiritual and comprehensive redemption. The first of the four may be called its progressive character. In the parables of Jesus the kingdom which he came to found, and whose existence was, therefore, to be an immediate realization of his idea of the true way to be saved, was, none the less, presented as a growth in future history. The revelation of the way, and the realization of that which was revealed, were to come as an historical process; but the process was itself a fuller ministration, by the Divine Spirit, of all truth and purity to those who would walk in his Way.

The second characteristic of the redemption offered by Christianity is its ethical and spiritual nature. That kingdom

of God, the coming of which will cure the evils of the world, is an inner affair, a matter of the spirit. It is *not* of this world (John xviii, 36): it *is* within men, a condition of their own mentality, of their true faith and steadfast purpose. One need not change one's place or occupation, one's social status, or civil and political relations; one need only change one's self, from devotion to the things of the world and the flesh to devotion to the things of the spirit and of heaven, in order to enter upon and abide in "the Way."

In the third place, it is characteristic of the Christian doctrine of salvation that it makes use of the direct method. It affirms that those who have the spirit which it supplies, and the restored communion with God which this spirit effectuates, have already secured the supreme good. For the rest they are to trust God and wait upon him in patience, humility, and the confidence of filial love. To bribe men to receive the supreme good by displaying an artificial and condescending interest in the lesser and dependent good was not the method of early Christianity. Jesus did not heal the sick *in order to* make them disciples. It is in this regard that the Christianity of today chiefly differs from the religion of Jesus as respects its method of doing good, its way of exhibiting the practical benefits which it has to bestow. There is reason to suspect, however, that the need of the indirect method is largely of its own creation—the inevitable result of the departure of the Christian Church from the way of salvation proclaimed by Jesus; and, also, that the real efficiency and benefit of this use of the indirect method is largely overrated. When the professed followers of the Path marked out by the Founder of the Christian religion plainly do not themselves rate the being in that path as their supreme and only essential good, they, naturally enough, cannot persuade others to estimate its value more highly. As to the essential characteristic of the religion called Christian, however, there can be no doubt upon this point: "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these

things shall be added unto you ; ” “ For your Heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of these things.”

In the possession of these three characteristics, however, it is doubtful how far Christianity can claim superiority to all other of the world's religions of salvation ;—especially, for example, to Judaism and Buddhism, unlike it as these two are in certain important respects. But in the possession of the fourth and most important characteristic of its way of salvation, Christianity is, far beyond all other religions, preëminent. This is the characteristic of vitality. For the individual and for the race, this religion was, and is, the power of a new life. Its measureless, new vital energy is a permeating, reconstructive, and upbuilding force in the individual and in society. “ The second characteristic feature of the primitive community, ” says Harnack,¹ “ is that every individual in it, even the very slaves, possesses a living experience of God.” From the very beginning this vitality has never been inseparably attached to belief in the traditional words or deeds of Jesus ; or to a punctilious imitation of his form of life : or even to a *slavish* submission to his thoughts or will. It can, perhaps, only be described in the mystical manner of a reference to the coming and indwelling of his Spirit. But “ where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty ”—free and full life (see 2 Cor. iii. 17). Moreover, this vital energy has entered into history and remained there in, as it were, tangible and effective form. The social consciousness of the Christian community was from the first quite well assured of the experience in which this truth is rooted. And yet with all its mystical energy and pervasiveness, on the whole the newness of life which is the chief characteristic of the Christian way of salvation is ordinarily a very sober practical affair. Tendencies to fanatical excesses, to dreamy and lazy idealism, to useless efforts to put to the test any new social fad, have on the whole been checked and repressed, rather than stimulated, by the vitality of the Christian spirit when mani-

¹ What is Christianity? p. 177.

festing itself in the daily walk and conversation of the faithful.

In the social life of the Græco-Roman World the original proclamation, and the growing acceptance and practice, of the Christian way of salvation evinced the vitality of its doctrine in several important and effective ways. The assurance of an eternal and blessed existence for the soul in union with God and with his redeemed ones, of the immortal life brought to light and made an object of hope, by its comforting and purifying influence, transformed the manner of living of those who attained this assurance. This confident hope, and the experience in which it grew up and flourished, wrought everywhere a change in the moral impulses and practices of the men of the ancient world. Wherever the Christian religion went, it overcame the "note of despair" which the poets of the age were sounding. In spite of their poverty, lowliness of condition and estate, and frequent and bitter persecutions, the intense vitality of the followers of the Christian Way, and the aspiration, hope, joy, and love, which characterized their habitual daily conduct toward one another and toward all men, were the noteworthy features of the new religion.

Another outcome of the Christian view as to the Path which leads to the true goal of the religious life—a victory achieved by its vital energy, in respect of which it surpasses Buddhism—was a negative attitude toward "the World," as represented by its greed, its cares, its pleasures, and even its self-constituted authorities. That disciple who had much experience of the prevalent condition of society in the first century of the Christian era writes to the Christians at the capitol city: "Be not conformed to this world;" and of himself he declares: "The world is crucified unto me." "Love not the world or the things of the world," is the summing-up of that negative attitude which constitutes so important a part of the way of salvation followed and prescribed by Jesus himself. And toward those priests and Pharisees who "held the nation in

bondage and murdered its soul," Jesus showed "a really emancipating and refreshing disrespect."¹ Toward the constituted authorities of the state, tribute is due and obedience also,—but only within the limits of the obligations of the soul to God, the highest source of the final authority.

In all the greater religions of salvation a doctrine of "the Path" may be more or less distinctly traced, which, while it insists on purification of the Self and on the active cultivation of all the virtues in loving obedience to the Divine Will, also suggests the broader outlook and the more comprehensive end. The motives for following the way of salvation do, indeed, appeal to the desire to escape the evils of the present and of the future life, and to the yet worthier aspiration to secure for one's Self the ideal of purity and inner righteousness which it is the will of God that all his children should possess. Practical religion consists in the following of this way,—that is, in the actual doing of the deeds, the living of the daily life, which is "The Way." But in all this doing, and through all this living, man is, as he is in all his doing and living, a social being. Brāhmanism and Buddhism teach that the regulation of conduct in the interest of others, so as to have them enjoy the opportunity of finding and following the true path, is an important part of the obligation of every one who wishes himself to be saved. Buddhism, especially, has habitually laid emphasis upon the social virtues of pity, active relief of suffering, and the practical expressions of its inner life of good-will toward all life. It was originally a Gospel, or message of a way to be saved, which those who had themselves adopted it, were in duty bound to proclaim to others. But that all men should follow in detail "the Path" of him who became the Buddha, to the supreme satisfaction of the demands made by its doctrine of salvation, is impracticable. The dissolution and extinction of society would result from such an attempt, if it could be made successful. Yet more true is it that the

¹ So Harnack, *What is Christianity?* p. 112.

way of salvation proposed by Brāhmanism is possible for a class only, and not for all men.

In Judaism the doctrine of salvation was preëminently social and national;—social, that is, so far as the entire nation of Israel were concerned. Yahweh, at first the national god, and jealous of all rivals of his supremacy among his own people, became elevated in the conception of Judaism to the place of the Alone God; his rule was thus extended to all peoples, and He was to be the Redeemer of all, through this, the peculiarly favored portion of the race. In this holy and redeemed community the individual was to realize the supreme good of salvation. In a word, prophetic Judaism taught that the establishment of a Kingdom of God over all men was the high and comprehensive attainment of the divine purposes of redemption; and to contribute to this realization of the divine purposes is to be in the way to share in the supreme religious Good. No grander conception can possibly be formed of that goal towards which the divine plans, as viewed in the interests of the religious experience, run forward than the conception embodied in the phrase, “The Kingdom of God.”

This phrase Christianity found, took over from Judaism, and filled with new life and new meaning. And evidently, its very primary significance is such, that the phrase itself admits of an indefinite, vast development of content. It was into the community of spiritual interests, which have an unconditional and eternal value, as represented by the kingdom of God, that Jesus invited all men to respond to his call. To enter into the kingdom, and to merge one’s interests in its interests, to sink the temporal and individual good in the lasting and universal Good, which its final triumph secures,—this is peculiarly the Christian way of salvation. In this social community the standard of personal worth is “self-sacrificing labor for others”; Jesus himself willingly loses his own life in the promotion of the common good. He was mocked because it could truthfully be said of him that, while he announced himself as the Savior of

others, he *could not* save himself. And those who followed him in this way save their own lives by losing them in obedience to this universal condition of discipleship. The universality of the Christian idea of the Divine Kingdom has its complementary or reverse side in the truth of the individuality of the religious experience of the members of this kingdom, and of the specific variability of the functions of these members. "Each member has its own function, every Christian has his own gifts or gift, for the well-being of the whole body, and in discharging this function, in exercising these gifts, he finds his true place in the body."¹ Thus the Christian way of salvation can neither be followed by the man who is devoted to "the things of the world," or who finds his supreme good in them; nor can the end be gained by the man who flees the world out of a selfish desire to save his own soul through the method of retirement and asceticism. At the same time it cannot be denied that the ascetic element is largely present in the doctrine of Jesus and his early disciples with regard to the Path which leads to union of his soul with God. And, indeed, there is nothing which the seeker of salvation more earnestly desires than the peace of soul to which he feels himself entitled. Nor can it be affirmed, on the other hand, that the actual withdrawal, whether for longer or shorter times, from the environment of the religious life as dependent upon the existing conditions of society, is never the exercise of a duty, much less the enjoyment of a justifiable privilege. In general, concerning the doctrine of "the Path," as it is proclaimed by all the world's greater religions of salvation—and especially, by Buddhism, Judaism, and Christianity—these remarks seem to hold true:—

1. None of the greater religions, as judged by their best developments and by the spirit and the expressions of their most trustworthy interpreters, has ever held that the "Way of Salvation" requires merely the holding of certain dogmas or

¹ Quoted from the Essay of Rev. A. J. Carlyle, *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 249.

the practicing of certain forms of cult. Neither has any of them ever proclaimed salvation by "faith alone;" if by this condition be meant merely the addition to the formal and intellectual belief, of a self-assurance as to the individual believer's relations with the Object of belief. As we have already seen (p. 492*f.*) with them all, but preëminently with the Christian religion, the faith that saves,—or that, the rather, by being itself the essential subjective form of religion, is the necessary precondition of salvation,—is an attitude of loving trust, of filial piety, toward the Divine Being. But even this faith, if it were possible for it, not only to exist, but to subsist, *alone*,—even this faith alone is by no means the complete description of the Path that leads men to the supreme goal of the religious life. In order to attain this goal, a life must be led which has a character becoming the end pursued.

2. While the particular characteristics of the true way to be saved are differently defined and described by the different religious doctrines, there are features upon which all these doctrines are agreed. Indeed, the differences are rather differences of emphasis and of omission than of either open, or virtual though concealed antagonism. In this respect the doctrine of the right religious life resembles the doctrine of the virtuous life,—as the latter is framed in accordance with the most developed and enlightened social standards. A preliminary and yet important group of requirements for him who would walk in the acceptable path of "practical religion" is always of a negative character. The man whom the gods would save must abstain from continuance in the habits of action which the gods disapprove. But especially must he who, in the spirit of filial piety, is trusting for salvation to a loving and yet righteous God, who has conceived of the Supreme Being as perfect Ethical Spirit and who wills to be in spirit like Him who is the Object of his faith, abstain from willing that which is opposed to the Holy Will, and from doing that which is unfilial and displeasing to the Father of his faith. This simple logic

is invulnerable from the point of view of religion. If God is trusted to save, then God must be obeyed as the condition of salvation. In this conclusion all the greater religions of salvation are agreed; and the negative injunctions, the forbidings issued, and the abstinences enforced, however they may differ in details, are essentially of the same order and significance in this respect.

3. The very title—"religion of salvation"—involves, however, the immanent or the outspoken sense of the need of divine forgiveness, reconciliation, and help. It is because of the development of this feeling of sore need that such religions have arisen in history to answer to the need. Or, in more definitively theological terms, it is the consciousness of sin and of moral weakness, that has given origin to the teaching and the practice of the way of salvation. How shall man find and follow the Path that shall lead him to the true end of his being, as this greatly to be desired good appears from the religious point of view? Vague or more definite fears, lower and higher aspirations after good, more or less clear estimates of the value of purity and of moral perfection, impulses or intelligent longings after social communion, all conspire to make the answer to this inquiry a matter of the greatest concernment to man. But the very beginning of the practical solution of so grave a problem requires that the need, in which the problem originates, should itself be felt. To be sorry that the Divine Being is offended, that the relations between Him and man are so unsatisfactory, and to seek an improved adjustment of those relations, are, therefore, necessary steps in the Path that leads back to God. Hence repentance, confession, petition for the divine favor—and not once, but so often as the same need is felt—become conditions required in the doctrine of the Way as it is taught by all the religions of salvation.

4. Purity of thought and sincerity of purpose—an intensive and inner righteousness which is inconsistent with pretence

and hypocrisy, or any manner of attempt to deceive the Divine Being—are also necessary for him who, with the spirit of filial piety, would walk in the way of salvation. That merely outward purifications will not, of themselves, avail to satisfy the demands of the guardian of the Path, is the universal conviction of all those religions which aim to teach men how they must be saved. Ceremonial purifying is given a symbolical and didactic value by them all; and by them all, also, the mistake has frequently been made of giving the impression, or even of promulgating the teaching, that *merit* thus gained may somehow be made a substitute for inward purity. But the truth of them all has not been so conceived by those whose reflections upon their own experience and upon their observation of others, have instituted and commended the most reasonable doctrine of the Way of Salvation.

5. And, finally, all the religions of salvation have taught that certain positive virtues, expressive of the spirit of filial piety under the actual social conditions of the present life, constitute an important and indispensable part of the conditions of assurance that the religious life of the individual is being conducted along the way of salvation. These virtues may be summarized as those which spring naturally from the spirit of filial piety itself. This spirit, as already understood, is a certain attitude toward the Object of religious belief and worship. It is faith as inclusive of all that is essential to subjective religion. But the attitude *cannot*—such is its essential nature—remain subjective. Broadly defined, this filial piety must become the fraternal spirit toward men. It must show itself in compassion and pity toward the suffering, in kindness and helpfulness toward the needy, in justness and good-will toward all. And such, sad and frequent as the failures to keep the Path have been on the part of the multitude not only, but also of the teachers of all the greater religions of the world,—such is, indeed, their doctrine of this Path. Preëminently true is it, however, of the Christian religion that its doctrine

of God as essentially Love, and its injunction to all the faithful that they should ever seek to be "perfect even as their Father in Heaven is perfect," commits it faithfully, cheerfully, and yet unalterably to the way of social salvation through following its Founder in brotherly love.

It is this conclusion which fitly introduces the presentation of religion as a social life, or as an affair of the religious community.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY

The nature of religion, subjectively considered, and of the form of its expression in the religious life, is such that the social interests of man become immediately and intricately involved in its development. It is in the regard for these social interests that we must find the origin of the religious community. This truth has been simply but well stated by Sabatier, who says:¹ "In the same religion, the most diverse spirits, finding themselves affected in the same manner, become related to one another and form a real family united by bonds more strict and more strong than those of blood." And the same author emphasizes the benefits which are felt by the individual in this way, with the following psychologically true explanation: "The soul which was hesitating and feeble in isolation, feels itself strengthened, as if it had found the confirmation of its personal faith in the faith of others." Indeed, the whole social nature of man—and this nature is, of course, an essential unity of the one spirit with his so-called religious nature—is committed in several important respects to the social organization of religious experience. Thus Tiele² defines the very idea of the church in these words: "Religion is a social phenomenon;" and he adds: "All the more or less independent organizations which embrace a number of kindred communities, and in general, in the abstract, the whole domain

¹ *Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion*, p. 104.

² *Elements of the Science of Religion*, Second Series, p. 158.

of religion so far as it manifests itself substantially in society "—may be called the church.

Religious communities and associations of a great variety of kinds are therefore as certain to arise, and to be spread far and wide, as are human associations of any other important kind. It is, the rather, a legitimate deduction from the psychology of the religious experience, and from the psychological genesis and development of the religious life, that the social expressions of religion in an organized way should be peculiarly numerous and persistent. And this we find to be the actual fact of history. For next to the family and the tribe, and, indeed, coördinate with these most primitive forms of social communion, stands that of the souls which are united by some common form of religious belief and worship.

The formation and regulation of the religious community proceed as a spontaneous and yet logical process from the religious belief itself; and in turn this belief is strengthened, propagated, and made more efficient, through the social organization to which it has given rise. As soon as man regards his conduct as being, in any manner or measure, regulated in obedience to the gods, or to the divine law, he must also discover in the divine commands a reason for transcending the limits of his individuality. This reason may take the direction either of a prohibition or of a positive ordinance commanding him, with a "thus-saith-the-Lord," to do some particular thing. Other reasons than this assumed or implied divine command, he may not be able to discover; and in this case, a part of the basis of the social organization may, at least for a time, partake of the nature of a *tabu*. In this way all true believers are, for some mysterious reason, although in the name of an invisible power, forbidden to gratify their desires for some particular form of good.

In more highly developed religious communities the prohibitions which the associated members have accepted as the divinely enjoined duty of all may take the form of a determined

resistance to the constituted civil authorities or to other forms of external control. No impulse of a social character is more unmanageable than this impulse to union with others, whose cult and moral code are derived from a common religious faith, in the refusal to submit to restrictions from the outside. When it is God who has revealed to any man, and to others of the same religious communion, what must, or must not be done, the command may be contrary to the mandate of the king, or of the governor, or to the law of the land; but all these human authorities, with whatever force they may arm themselves, find the divine command to the divinely constituted society a most difficult thing to overcome.

Happily, however, the civil and the religious organizations—the community that takes its law from some of its own members, dwelling visibly in the midst of itself, and the community which claims to derive its requirements from an invisible and divine source—are, as a rule, in substantial accord. Indeed, in the more primitive forms of society the heads of the two forms of organization are either identical or closely allied. In the more diversified and free developments of Church and State, the failure to arrive at some basis of agreement in the distribution of authority cannot be complete or long continued without a disastrous result. Hence the heads of families or tribes are commonly also priests of the same families and tribes; and kings and emperors rule, so long as they rule righteously, in the name and by the authority of God.

The earliest form of the religious community with which history makes us acquainted is the family, worshipping together the same gods under the headship of the father of the house; or the clan, or tribe, keeping the festival meal, or doing some other honor in common to their tribal gods. The primitive organization of the religious community is thus bound together by the necessity of coöperating in religious services, for their mutual advantage, and under the belief that this advantage can best be secured by the patronage of the gods. In a word, the divine

favor must be secured for the social organization by some act that has significance for all the members, and that is somehow, either directly or vicariously, participated in by them all.

It is important in this connection to recognize how exceedingly penetrating, as it were, and comprehensive is the recognition of the social character of religion which is made by savage and primitive peoples. With them, almost anything may be made a matter of important religious service, in the well-doing and success of which the entire community have an interest, and in some sort, a share. Thus even the kindling of a fire (a relatively laborious and significantly mysterious operation for primitive man), the building of a boat or of a dwelling, are religious social affairs. But especially is this true with them, of the planting and gathering of crops, the going to war with hostile tribes, and the honoring of their totem, or of the heroes of the tribe. The divine beings who preside over the earth, the clouds, the rain, and the sunshine, have the weal and the woe of all the people in their charge; and all the people, either communistically or through their proper representatives, must therefore pay these divine beings the honor and tribute to which they are entitled. Moreover, it is likely that the ears of the gods will be opened, and their hearts moved, by petitions which represent the community of those faithful to them. And what absurdity could possibly be greater than for one tribe to go to war with another tribe, whose gods were certainly hostile, when as yet that had been left undone, which could be done, to have the full power of their own gods on their own side? Thus reasons the primitive or savage man. This simple logic is quite invulnerable from the point of view of those in whose minds the movement of thought, whether in clearer or more obscure consciousness of itself, actually takes place. Nor is it essentially different from the logic which remains wrought into the social religious life of the different communities founded by all the greater world-religions, including Christianity itself.

But it is especially the worship of the local chief god, when some one of the many existing divinities attains such an eminence, which tends to effectuate a social religious consolidation. This form of development of the religious community took place in a most instructive manner in the case of the religion of ancient Egypt. The same thing is also to be noted, as occurring in a scarcely less notable way, in the religion of ancient Babylonia. When some gifted and powerful monarch, like Rameses II in Egypt, or Nebuchadnezzar in Babylon, became especially devoted to the service of a particular divinity, and thus made this divinity in a peculiar manner *his* god, the imperial influence operated most powerfully to extend the bounds and strengthen the bonds of a national church. In general the members of a family readily and naturally accept the traditional divinities of the head of the house, who himself receives them as handed down in honor from his ancestors; and the members of the same tribe are, as a matter of course, the obedient servants and defenders of the interests of the gods of the tribe. But under a monarchy, especially in the form in which it existed in ancient Egypt and Babylonia, if the king, to whose wisdom all must bow and whose will none may resist, espouses some new but, in his judgment better divinity, as the one to be held in chief honor; then the people can only hasten to consent and to conform. And, indeed, with the multitude there is usually little difference found between the old and the new; only in their hearts and homes, and in their more hidden beliefs and secret cult, the old malignant spirits are still to be feared and propitiated, and the dear old gods are still to be loved and obeyed. Even to this day, for example, among the converts to Christianity in lands where this religion exists as foreign and recently planted, the members of its religious community constantly tend to resort to the fearsome cults of the old religions, when evil is to be warded off, or to the affectionate worship of the ancestral good divinities, when special favors are to be gained. So

powerful in both directions—as conservative of the old and as favoring the rapid growth of the new—is the social side of the religious life! It is, indeed, largely the social influence which gives to the religious life, at the same time, a continuity of historical development and also a capacity for the formation of new growths within the environment in which the older growths are losing vigor and are destined soon to pass away.

In still other cases,—and these comprise all the greatest religious organizations which most merit attention at the present time as having had the genesis and development characteristic of a “Church,”—it is some great religious genius like Moses, or Buddha, or Muhammad, who becomes the founder of a community that carries forward, as an organized social body, the religious ideas committed to their care. In this way the religious society comes to stand, not for the private or special interests of any family, or tribe, or larger political organization, but for a spiritual association, a community of ideas. The men of like “*faith*,” irrespective of preceding domestic, tribal, or even political and social connections, are banded together in the worship of the same God; and this is because God is conceived of as Being, and as related to men, in essentially like fashion, by them all. Such a conception of a “Church” is, indeed, as yet an ideal affair; it has never been at all fully actualized. But the nearest approaches made to it, both in conception and in fact, belong to the three great world-religions, Buddhism, Muhammadanism, and Christianity. It is in large measure, although by no means wholly, for this reason that these religions are said to belong to the class worthy to be called “universal.” The success which such religions have had in overcoming the prejudices and other separating impulses of different temperaments, political and social conditions, and even racial peculiarities, is one of the most important and amazing of social phenomena. It is testimony alike to a certain intrinsic value, sociologically, which is possessed by all

these religions; and also to the immense importance of the social characteristics possessed by every great religious development. And, speaking from the more purely sociological point of view, it is not wholly without warrant to claim, that the power of any religion to overcome those differences which keep the different nations and different races in a perpetual condition of jealousy, misunderstanding of one another, and of strife, is the supreme practical test of its probable "universality."

A great variety of social phenomena testify to the important influence which has been exercised upon the various forms of social life by the organization of religious communities. This kind of a bond has *value* as effective, either for or against all other forms of the social bond. Where it is either secretly or openly opposed to any other one of the more powerful social influences, among any people, a satisfactory condition of peace is impossible. In their turn the various forces of domestic, tribal, and larger political interests, may strengthen or inspire the impulse of men to unite socially, upon a basis of common religious beliefs, feelings, and cult. In other cases, these interests set themselves in opposition to such a religious union. In the early history of Rome, for example, the reciprocal influence of the worship of the lares and penates, and the civil and political development was a noteworthy phenomenon. Similar results customarily follow from the influence of belief in some particular divinity who is supposed to take the tribe, or the state, under his special protection. The interests of the worship of this divinity become, in the thought of all, essentially identified with those of all the people; and defection from him is held to be a crime against the entire community. In Judaism, to depart from the worship of Yahweh and take part in the service of other gods, was treason against the Commonwealth.

One of the less foreboding and fateful ways of injuring the public good, among the different peoples generally, is the

failure to take part in the common religious festival. For it is at this time that the common worship—honorific, commensural, sacrificial, and propitiatory—is especially to be celebrated; and both the god and the people rightfully require that each member of the community, who is permitted and with whom it is possible, shall be present to perform his share of the duty, and to receive his share of the blessing. It is said¹ that of the eleven national holidays, or “Great Festival Days,” celebrated annually in Japan, all but two—the “Banquet of the New Year,” and the Emperor’s Birthday—relate to ancestor-worship. “In all Semitic life, religious and social, the *hag*, or religious festival, has always played an important part.”² Among the Hebrews there were three such festivals: The Passover, near the vernal equinox; The Feast of Weeks, at the end of Harvest; and The Feast of Ingathering, or Tabernacles, at the time of the grape harvest in the seventh month. Among the Greeks, worship was preëminently of a social origin and character. The sacrifices were community feasts; the games were in honor of, and entertaining to, the gods as well as to the surrounding thousands of spectators.

To be sure, the opportunity of the religious festival is most favorable for securing other interests than the religious as well; and this is, in the minds of most people, not wholly incompatible,—perhaps not even inconsistent with the social religious interests. Exchange of views and of commodities is an appropriate accompaniment of the religious festival (just as the Bengali proverb equivalent to the English “killing two birds with one stone,” runs “going to see the religious procession and selling one’s cabbages”!). Nor is the stimulus of avarice the only temptation which accompanies these more exciting forms of expressing the social religious impulse. Sexual excitement and gratification have been pretty regularly and universally the accompaniments of the religious festival of

¹ So N. Hozumi, *Ancestor-worship and Japanese Law*, p. 17.

² See Barton, *A Sketch of Semitic Origins*, p. 108.

whatever character. In not a few instances the sacrifice of virtue has been, and still is, an almost integral portion of the worship itself. Nor is it necessary that the common worship should take the degraded form of phallicism in order to result in the degradation of the average ethical purity of the worshippers. It is only necessary that the social religious excitement should fall upon personalities of a low grade or weak character of ethical discipline. All of which is as true to-day as it ever was ; it is as essentially psychological in the case of the purest religions as in the case of the less pure. While the early forms of *commensural* worship helped to relieve the worshipper from that painful and terrifying view of his gods which forbids any friendly communication with them and with other men in their worship, social excitement has always proved the more apt to have a disturbing influence upon the morals of the religious community. This influence was felt in the Christian Church as soon as the common meal in recognition of the truths of their religion began to have its solemn significance overlaid with the social manifestation. Such is the unchanging nature of man that "sociability," when going to extremes of excited manifestation, works against the purity and power of the religious motives and religious conceptions.

Every form of the religious community, however originated or founded, takes its place in history under substantially the same conditions as those which determine the existence and continuance of all the other forms of social organization. It must become a subject of development. This provides that it shall have a certain solidarity or tenacity for its own peculiar form of association ; that it shall exercise some kind of efficient control over its members ; and yet, that it shall be adaptable and capable of variations in the effort to adjust itself to changes in its own environment. All these conditions of a characteristic social development apply in a special way to those religions which make a claim to the character of "universality." Such religions must have a large degree of *hu-*

manity about them, in order to furnish the vital energy necessary to organize into one body a great variety of heterogeneous or even conflicting elements; and at the same time, to admit of the variations due to the specific elements incorporated, and to the changes in the external conditions of growth. A sort of "elastic unity" must belong to those religious beliefs, sentiments, and cult, which are to effect the establishment of a Church Universal. From this general condition of the successful and widespreading development of any particular form of the religious community the paradoxical statement may be derived that a great Church must be a unity of many sects. For the development of sects is as necessary a condition of the large and permanent growth of the religious community as is the strength and tenacity of the bond which, after all, holds the divided parts together after the pattern of some essential unity.

These conditions of the development of social religious life may be illustrated, although only in a very partial manner, by comparing two cases of arrested developments,—one taken from ancient forms of religious community life that have now, long since, ceased to exist; and the other from existing forms that are, indeed, of ancient origin, but that have now, for some time, ceased to grow. In the Babylonian religion, after it reached the stage when the consciousness of sin began to appear more clearly and strongly, and the desire for reconciliation with Deity began to be expressed in penitential hymns, three persons were always concerned in every social religious transaction. These three were, the god, the penitent, and the priest. This threefold association constituted the early religious community of Babylonia in its more strictly ecclesiastical form.¹ The priest interceded between the god and the worshipper. But in Babylonia, as elsewhere at the same stage of religious development, the office of priest was largely that of exorcist and soothsayer. He was called *shangû*, or "the one over the sacrifices"; and

¹ See Jastrow, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, p. 315.

the sacrifices themselves were largely connected with the practices of soothsaying, necromancy, the exorcising of demons, etc. Now while some of the priests and monarchs of Babylonia (notably Nebuchadnezzar, see p. 287) arrived at exalted notions of Deity, and of his relations to men, neither the priests nor the monarchs seem to have been considered heads and representatives of the religious society, of the whole people as the people of one faith in One God, after the pattern of the kings and priests of Israel. This germ of a church, in the ancient time, in the valley of the Euphrates, had never, therefore, any of the necessary characteristics of a permanent religious social development.

The growth of the religious community represented by Hindūism in India is of a quite different order from this. Almost every conceivable form of religious belief, even of that highly reflective character which is necessary for the formation of schools of philosophy, has existed and still exists, with the Hindū Church.¹ Atheism and Monotheism, Materialism and Spiritualism, Dualism and Monism, Polytheism, Agnosticism, Theosophy, are all beliefs which are not only tolerable but actual, and freely held within this religious communion. It is not impossible to remain within its borders and yet advocate the specific views, and hold the specific beliefs, of religions so antagonistic to Hindūism as are Muhammadanism, Judaism, and Christianity. Sects are innumerable; and new ones are constantly arising. Of strict organization there is little or none; and as great a variety of moral precepts and practices, and of cult, as of beliefs, is a characteristic of this religion. The Hindū religious community has been changing and—in a way, we may say—developing, through several decades of centuries. But the one bond which holds the otherwise heterogeneous mixture together is the theory and practice of caste; and whatever may be said of the formation of systems of caste in other countries than India, a unity which is so loose

¹ Compare Sir Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*, p. viiif.

and inorganic as respects belief and cult, and so rigid in the enforcement of its characteristic social organization, furnishes a striking example of another species of arrested development. A Church, resembling in its structure the religious community of Hindūism, can make no progress in modern times toward a larger approach to universality.

Quite different in spirit and character is the religious community which Gautama founded. The foundations of this community were laid in the valley of the Ganges in the sixth century before Christ; it was composed of those followers of the founder who "gave up the world" in order to carry out his ideas of the right "Way." Like innumerable other similar orders the members of this religious association lived on alms, adopted a distinctive style of clothing, and sought to make converts. The first and strongest psychological bond for such unity as they attained, was the common religious craving for peace.¹ In the Khandhakas the convert who would be received into the order, when asked what his heart longs for, answers:

" That state of Peace I saw, wherein the roots
Of new existences are all destroyed . . .
.
The state from lust of future life set free."

There are probably few souls in the Western world of to-day whose motive for entering the religious social life is the longing for peace, even to the extent of the extinction of all desire and so of all existence fed by this desire. But to the multitudes of India in Buddha's time, as to the multitudes of Palestine in the time of Christ, the promise of peace made a most powerful appeal. These multitudes were, indeed, "weary and heavy-laden;" and they were not looking to either chemistry, or physics, or sociology, or trade-unionism, or new and more luxurious ways of gratifying lust, for the satisfaction of this desire.

¹ So Rhys Davids, *Indian Buddhism* [Hibbert Lectures, 1881], p. 156f.

And, as Rhys Davids has expressed the thought:¹ " Frederick William Robertson's words will help us to understand this position, when he says, without a thought of Buddhism: 'The deepest want of man is not a desire for happiness, but a craving for peace. The real strength and majesty of the soul of man is calmness, the manifestation of strength, the peace of God ruling, the word of Christ saying to the inward Spirit, Peace and there is a great calm.' "

The character of the early development which was undergone by this body of wandering and ascetic beggars is minutely described in numerous extant writings. For, unlike Jesus, the Buddha himself instituted an Order, or Church, during his own lifetime, and supplied it with numerous regulations which were to prevail after his death.² In the "Book of the Great Decease," the seven conditions of the welfare of this Society, as they appeared to the Great Teacher himself, are recited: they are, briefly expressed, the following: (1) Meeting in full and frequent assemblies; (2) concord in framing and executing the duties of the Order; (3) fidelity, both negative and positive, to its established rules; (4) honor, esteem, reverence, and support, for its elders; (5) abstinence from ambition and the spirit of rivalry; (6) delight in the life of solitude; (7) such self-training that good and holy men will resort to them and be eager to enjoy their membership. In the *Mahā-Vagga* (ii, 1) (or "Great Division," a Pali work) "The Blessed One" is made to prescribe that at the assemblies of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and eighth day of the half-month, the priest shall recite the Doctrine, and make a confession of all those precepts that have been laid down by him. And this was to be for them a "fast-day duty." If any one had sinned he was to reveal the fact. Silence was equivalent to a claim of innocence. But a

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 161f.

² On the character and rules of this order, see chapter V of *Buddhism in Translations*; and the Lecture on Gautama's Order in Rhys Davids, *Ibid.*, pp. 153-187.

conscious falsehood was a deadly sin. "Therefore, if a priest remember having committed a sin, and desire again to be pure, let him reveal the sin he committed, and when it has been revealed, it shall be well for him." In another writing (Samyutta-Nikāya) it is taught that the "mendicant ideal," or "priest who is worthy to go a-begging," must be instructed in doctrine and free from all envy and avarice,—never "wearying his welcome" nor "impudent to his benefactors." The Culla-Vagga (or "Little Division") tells in the most dramatic fashion, how it was only after the most importunate and repeated requests of Gautama, that women were allowed to become priestesses, or to "retire from household life to the houseless one;" and this was finally permitted only under the strictest discipline,—the "Master" comparing the restrictions to building a dyke for a "large pond."

Buddha's "Apocalypse"¹ describes his expectation that schisms, defections, and a "gradual declension of the holy religion," ending in a disappearance of the method (Buddha's "Way of Salvation"), would follow upon his death. "My disciples being unable to realize the trances, the insights, the Paths, and the Fruits, will keep only the four purities of conduct. Then, as time goes on, they will keep only the commandments forbidding the four deadly sins. . . . But when the last priest shall break the precepts, or shall die, the method will have disappeared." As long, however, as there were a thousand priests, to keep even the commandments forbidding the four deadly sins, "the method" would not have wholly disappeared. To the question as to who should "see" the Supreme Buddha after the long-deferred destruction of the *Kappa* (or World-Cycle), when "learning," "symbols," and "relics," shall all have been destroyed, the "Great Teacher" replies in the following way: "All beings who give gifts, keep the precepts, keep fast days, fulfil their religious duties, found shrines,

¹ As found in the Anāgata-Vamsa ("History of Future Events"), a brief account of which is given in Buddhism in Translations, p. 481f.

plant sacred fig-trees, parks and groves, make bridges, clear the highways, take their stand in the precepts, and dig wells, shall see him. Those who, in their longing for a Blessed One, shall make a gift even if only of a handful of flowers, or of a single lamp, or of a mouthful of food, shall see him," etc.

The Buddhistic Church has undergone in history a course of development in dependence upon the intellectual, political, and social environment of the different peoples among which it has been planted. In this course it has shown,—as was, indeed, inevitable—both its original and inherent weaknesses and also its characteristic elements of continuance and power to minister to social religious needs. On the one hand, it has freely absorbed and held, without the moral vigor necessary to purify itself, the degraded religious beliefs and ethical life of the multitudes of its converts. In Ceylon, and China, and elsewhere, to-day, it is only a thin varnish over devil-worship and the lower forms of nature-worship; in those places it scarcely possesses any power at all to illumine and purify the moral condition of the people. In Thibet, it has incorporated certain corruptions of Christian cult which add to the bizarre and almost grotesque character of its worship. In Japan, especially, it has developed a great multitude of warring sects, whose hair-splitting and unintelligible distinctions and discussions have been of slight benefit of any sort to the increase of rational faith in religious truth; while they have been positively harmful as respects the neglect of the body of the people in religious instruction. This religious community has been afflicted, and has afflicted others, with robber monks and murderous rulers of men, in the name of its holy faith. In all these respects, however, it is not to be forgotten that, throughout all the centuries of its history and in large portions of Christendom, the Church called by the name of Christ has exhibited in a scarcely less marked and offensive way, every one of these same weaknesses and defects. And of both of these great religious communions it must be admitted, as, indeed, it

must be admitted of every form of human social organization, that it is the character of the individuals associated, and of their social environment, quite as much as the character of the social bonds which unite them, that determines the character and the destiny of the association itself.

On the other hand, the Buddhistic Church has always had the thousand sincere and holy followers of its Founder, which he regarded as necessary to conserve the essentials of its doctrine, discipline, and life. And everywhere that this religious social organization has planted itself, it has conferred upon the people at large certain distinct and valuable benefits of an ethical and religious character. It has comforted in their sad and wearying life-journey millions of human souls; it has brought them peace and the increased spirit of pity, kindness, and good-will toward others. Even its vagaries and excessive tendencies to show a practical regard for every form of sentient life are worthy of respect, especially among those Christian nations where killing is a sport, and war is made the ruthless weapon of avarice and then consecrated in the name of the Prince of Peace!

The most friendly and appreciative criticism of the development of the Church which Buddha founded cannot, however, fail to observe these two characteristics which chiefly render it quite inferior as a form of organized social life, to the principal developments of the Christian Church. First, its loose and nerveless syncretism, its lack of a certain spirit of exclusiveness, prevents it from having the moral and spiritual vigor which throws out the effete and injurious elements of superstition and moral corruption that are constantly pressing their way into any large and growing religious community. As long as the race makes progress in its ethical views and in its public and private morals, no religion which aims at universality by taking in, and holding together all kinds of beliefs and practices, can attain a true and lasting success. And, second, Buddhism is lacking in the vital energy which triumphs over

the obstacles that the conditions of existence oppose to the realization of the supreme ethico-religious good, when understood as a positive fullness of life. The reward which its doctrine holds out to the faithful is escape from the evil of conscious existence by cessation of the desire in which such existence has its spring. Its goal of salvation is negative; its way to the goal is the withdrawal of the mind from the over-estimate of the value of conscious life. This doctrine of salvation—as we have already seen—follows, of necessity, from its doctrine of the nature of the soul, and of the Being of the World in its relations to the welfare of the soul. But it is increased fullness of life coming as the result of struggle and triumph,—a conscious and spiritual struggle after, and a triumphant securing of, a supreme conscious and spiritual good,—which is psychologically powerful and effective as a motive for the religious social unity and progress of mankind. Men unite most heartily to fight for a common cause; to contend in an associated way for a common good. Now it is at this point that the very nature of the way of salvation, and of the end of salvation, determines the effectiveness of the religious social community for its contest with, and the triumph over, the obstacles that beset the way. In this respect the Muslim Church has shown itself in history vastly superior to the Buddhistic, while quite inferior in other important respects.

The energy displayed by Islam in the social unifying of a great variety of elements, and in the characteristic growth of the Muslim religious community, is among the most remarkable and noteworthy phenomena of man's religious history. It follows from the essential character of the religion of Muhammad that it shall be a political and social power. "In Muslim countries," says one writer,¹ "Church and State are one indissolubly, and until the very essence of Islam passes away, that unity cannot be relaxed." This sort of social bond, and of a

¹ Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*, p. 4.

religious community united by the bond, was the work of Muhammad himself. During his life he had ruled over a small but compacted and aggressive community, not only as their teacher in the true faith, revealed through him directly and indisputably from God, but also as their jurist, the founder of their constitution, and their leader in battle. He had been for this beginning of a Church not only the prophet of God in his own right but "the absolute monarch." The wild, fierce, and fanatical Arabs out of which the early religious community of Islam was composed, differed almost as much as human beings can differ from those poor in spirit and poor in this world's goods, whom Christ and Buddha invited and secured to be their followers. It followed, therefore, as a matter of course, that when, upon the death of The Prophet in A. D. 632, the leader to succeed him in these offices must be chosen, family and tribal jealousies and feuds at once arose; and divisions into fiercely warring sects almost immediately began. These characteristics of the religious political community which the Prophet of Islam founded have marked its career from the beginning until now.

All this, however, does not sufficiently account for the enormous aggressive energy, the compelling force, which the Muslim Church has displayed through so many centuries. In addition to those causes which lie in the combination of religious and political motives, as appealed to with almost resistless power by Islam, the character of those religious beliefs and practices must be taken into account which, in their political and social environment, have been overcome and absorbed by its peculiar forms of faith and life. The earlier religions which, to all superficial appearances, gave way before the religion of Muhammad, were for the most part of two kinds. They were either essentially pagan beliefs, or lifeless and relatively unethical forms of Christianity. As to the earlier pagan beliefs, they really remain until the present time amongst the multitudes of the "faithful" in Muslim countries. As in those countries where

Buddhism has become dominant, nature-worship and devil-worship still have control of the thoughts and practices of the people, so it is in the countries where Islam has become dominant. And, in general, where Muhammadanism succeeded in supplanting Christianity, it must be confessed that the change, if it did not effect a genuine improvement, was at least no real degradation. On the other hand, a religion which laid so strong a grasp upon the theory and practice of jurisprudence and government, which held courts, passed and executed laws, rewarded and punished with material good and evil, in the name of God and with an authority that admitted of no question, was well suited to the notions, customs, and conditions, both political and social, of the peoples among which the faith of Islam spread.

Over and through all—both the successes and the failures, the great excellences and the yet greater deficiencies and even crimes of the Muslim Church—must be recognized the positive power to unite men socially which belongs, in an essential and inseparable manner, to Islam's conception of the Divine Being. This power manifests itself unmistakably in the traditions of the Prophet, and in the creeds to which his faithful followers must subscribe in order to follow the way of salvation which this faith opens before them. In one of these traditions, for example, the reply is made to the question, "O, Apostle of God, what is Islam?" "That thou shouldest bear witness that there is no god save God and that I am the Apostle of God; that thou shouldest perform the prayers and bring the poor-rate and fast in the month of Ramadan and pilgrimage to the House if the way is possible for thee."¹ In the creed by Al-Ash' Ari, after summing up the doctrine thus, "that we believe in God, His Angels, His Books, His Apostles, in all that has come from God, and what trustworthy men have reported from the Apostles of God," it is added: "We believe that God will not leave

¹ See Macdonald, *Ibid.*, Appendix I, for this and the following quotations from the Muslim creeds.

in Hell any of those who confess this Unity and hold fast to the Faith, and that there is no Hell for him whom the Prophet has by his virtues appointed to Paradise." In the Creed by Al-Ghazzali,—intended to be committed to memory by children,—to the First Word of witnessing, which concerns the Being and Attributes of God, the "Second Word" is added which affirms "that the apostolate belongs to the apostle, and that God sent the unlettered Qurayshite prophet, Muhammad, with his apostolate to the totality of Arabs and foreigners and Jinn and men." This creed ends with the declaration: "He who confesses all this, relying upon it, is of the People of the Truth, and the Company of the Sunna, etc."

The entire history of the spread of the Muslim Church illustrates in a marked way the effectiveness of the social bond which is provided by a community of religious faith and a common cult especially when enforced by threats of punishment and promises of reward. In this case, however, as in all other cases where a close alliance is secured by the very influence of the conception of the Object of religious faith upon the political and social organization as such, certain elements of weakness as well as of strength are necessarily introduced into the religious community itself. The actions and reactions of the various social factors which take place both upon and within the religious community, rather than chiefly the purity and excellence of the moral and social influences logically derived from the religious beliefs and sentiments, determine the fate of such a Church. Islam from its very nature, is destined always to stand or to fall, in dependence upon its political connections. Individual members of the Muhammadan Church there have always been, both among its political leaders and rulers and also among its theologians and ascetics, whose thoughts and lives have reached a high moral and religious standard. But as a *social* institution Islam is, of an inner necessity, what it always has been as an historical development,—namely, not like the Buddhistic or the Christian Church, an order whose religion

unites the members in bonds of good-will toward one another and toward all mankind, but a fighting body of fanatical devotees, into whose hands has been put by their Founder the "sword of the wrath of the Lord" to punish unbelievers, and the keys of Paradise for the reward of all who will submit and believe. This kind of a Church has, indeed, often enough been constituted in the name of Christianity, and even—though less frequently—in the name of Buddhism; but the social influences of neither Buddhism nor Christianity are legitimately chargeable with the conception of such a community.

Even a superficial survey of the religious beliefs of Judaism serves to discover how essential to them, and to their continuance in historical development, is the realization of the social idea in some institutional way. Israel is God's people, the community which he has chosen and which is joined to him, and among themselves, on the foundations of a covenant or solemn social contract. As long as the civil and political unity signified by "Israel" corresponded fairly well with the actual worshippers of Israel's God in the place and manner appointed by his Law, the conception of the Church held by Judaism did not need to be changed. But in the later days of its history the centrifugal forces needed to be overcome by the central forces attached to a somewhat new and larger conception of the nature and meaning of the religious community. It was then that, according to Bousset,¹ the one tendency which in a measure counteracted the disuniting and chaotic conditions of Judaism during the Maccabean era was the "churchifying of piety" (*Verkirchlichung der Frömmigkeit*.) Under similar circumstances this strengthening of the organized expression of the social religious life is characteristic of all the great world-religions. For example, among the Persians² this form of the social consciousness of religion first appears in a manner quite analogous to that assumed by Judaism. The significance of

¹ Die Religion des Judentums im Neutestamentlichen Zeitalter, p. 54f.

² See E. Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums, III, i, 167-171.

the formation taken by the Jewish Church in New-Testament times is, however, preëminently great on account of the relations which it came to sustain to the genesis and the development of the social Christian community, the Christian Church. Three features are especially noted in this connection by Bousset. These are: (1) the religion begins to separate itself from the national life of the people and the idea gains currency that the Church may live, although the nation perishes; (2) in spite of this separation, it is by no means a doctrine of pure religious individualism which arises, but new forms of expressing a common religious experience are discovered which are not connected with the continuance of the national life; and (3) religion in this new expression begins to transcend the limits of the nation.

The spread and universal triumph of that Divine Kingdom which Jesus proclaimed the purpose of founding, was not, by his teachings or his acts, inseparably bound up with any form of ecclesiastical or political association. Nor is the conception of the Kingdom of God as Christianity has formed and proclaims it, identified throughout with that of the Christian Church; it is not even synonymous with Christianity conceived of as the universal religion. In the view of Jesus the Divine Kingdom stood in opposition to the "kingdom of this world," as coming, in its fullness, in the future; and yet this social union is presented in his preaching as already present with men. The conditions of entrance into it are a complete change of mind, self-surrender, and a loving trust in God's grace. "The standard for members of this kingdom is self-sacrificing labor for others, not any technical mode of worship or legal preciseness." His summons into this kingdom points out the way of personal attachment to him as the promised Messiah. It is, of course, a social affair; and the very titles which Jesus claims for himself—such as "king," "lord," "son of man," etc.—are significant of relations to a body of disciples united in a common faith and common life. And "parables like those of the draw-net or

the wheat and tares—both of which, like the term *ἐκκλησία*, (“Church”) occur only in the Gospel of St. Matthew—imply a society existing not in a pure ideal state, but under the confusion and difficulty of earthly conditions.”¹

Only in this indefinite and ideal way can Christ be called the founder of the Christian Church. He did, indeed, choose apostles and commission them to proclaim the glad-tidings, or Gospel of his kingdom. He drew men to himself, and by this personal bond he bound them to one another, in a manner quite superior to that of the founder of any of the other great world-religions. A religious community, which should take definite forms of religious organization, was therefore a natural and necessary result of the working of man’s social nature, under the then existing conditions, and as stirred and guided by religious impulses and ideas of the Christian kind. But the earliest believers, being under the influence of the expectation of a speedy return of Christ (the *parousia*), and being doubtful about their own relations to Judaism, did not plan any definite and permanent form of organization; they remained together for a time as a sect of Judaism. Thus the earliest idea of the Christian social organization was a social incident, although an incident made important and even necessary under the circumstances. “It was,” says Weizsäcker,² “the uprising of Judaism against the Christians which forced them to take up an independent position. They saw themselves for the first time persecuted in the name of the Law, and the light then dawned upon them that, as a matter of fact, the Law was no longer to them what it was to the rest.” Thus in their earliest conflicts with Judaism the members of the Christian social community—retaining, as they did, their faith in the Old-Testament revelation—were driven, both logically and as a practical necessity, to the position that they themselves were the successors of the

¹ Quoted from the Essay on The Teaching of Christ, by Rev. H. L. Wild; *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 130.

² *Apostolic Age*, I, p. 73.

true community of the Lord, the genuine Israel, the heirs to the divine promises to the faithful.¹

This spiritual community, the essential nature and inevitable outcome of whose faith was a life of self-sacrificing love and earnest effort for the highest good of all men, was, however, profoundly modified in its conceptions of its own genesis and mission, in its forms of organization, and in its practical operations, by the political and social environment in which it was extended by the preaching of the Gospel and the making of multitudes of converts. When, then, Christianity began rapidly to overstep the boundaries of Judaism and to overrun the Græco-Roman world, an enlarged conception of its own social mission, and a development of its forms of social organization, were the natural and inevitable results. Outside the sphere of its converts from Judaism—a sphere which was of constantly diminishing importance—the peculiar views of Judaism respecting the true nature of the religious social community were relatively unimportant; and, consequently, its forms of organizing the social religious life were found unsatisfactory.

Between this later elaboration of the doctrine and practice of the Christian social community and the conceptions and usages spontaneously adopted from Judaism, lies that social development of early Christianity which is chiefly owing to the ministry among the Gentiles of the Apostle Paul. The fact that this ministry was among the Gentiles made necessary a series of injunctions and provisions which were designed to define the relations of the Christian communities to the social and political views and practices of the time. A Christian form of worship, a Christian discipline, a Christian code of ethics, and the beginning of ecclesiastical laws all seemed neces-

¹ The oldest predicate which was given to the Christian Church, and which was always associated with it as defining its essential character, was "*holiness*." The New-Testament writers, the earliest Apologists, and the Church Fathers of the second and third centuries, all agree in its use; (see the note in Harnack, *History of Dogma*, II, p. 75).

sary; and because they seemed necessary, they were provided by the influence of the man who had chiefly assisted in the planting of the churches. And although certain later exaggerated growths from the Pauline teachings¹ and enactments became serious departures from the specific type of social and practical religion which Jesus founded, the solution which this Apostle recommended and secured for the difficult problems justly excites admiration for its moderation and wisdom. Not only, says Wernle,² did he "personally renounce the part of lawgiver in favor of free development of the Churches, but he saved Christianity itself from the fate of everlasting immobility by setting up a code of laws. . . ." "Thanks to the Apostle Paul, Christianity is bound to no other law than that of the Christian conscience." Thus Christianity has escaped becoming *stereotyped* as Muhammadanism has been.

The entire development of the Christian social community has been influenced in important ways by the political constitution of the Roman Empire. In this development the appointment of Bishops who became spiritual rulers over considerable districts, with several churches in each, was the most distinctive factor. This arrangement directly contributed to the efforts of the Church to control the political, commercial, and other institutions of its social environment—government, education, art, and even the industries—in the interests of Christianity, as these interests were conceived of by its own

¹ For example, in his disesteem of other religions, and of the ripe and helpful fruits of Greek philosophy; in his departure from the confidence and courage of Jesus as respects the will of the individual; in his *quasi*-Rabbinical attitude toward many practices and especially his Rabbinical and ascetic estimate of celibacy; in his narrowing of the doctrine of brotherly love ("The love of one's brother no longer means the love for every human being, who is my brother, but love for the Christian alone"); in certain accommodations to Greek superstitions (*e. g.*, baptism for the dead); and in the estimate of the value, for the salvation of the individual, of a formal connection with the religious community. On all these points, see Wernle, *The Beginnings of Christianity*, vol. I, chap. xiii.

² *Ibid.*, I p. 195.

leaders and officers. Such an effort may naturally take either one of two main directions. It may either make an alliance with the existing political organizations; or it may gain control over these organizations themselves. In the one case, the Church rules through the State; in the other case, the Church rules the State, or the two become (as in the Muslim development from the first) identified. In the gradual realization of this conception of the Church as a hierarchical institution, an imperial power, as it were, the higher conception of the Church as an ethically holy and heavenly Ideal, became, of necessity, relatively depressed and ineffective. But it was by no means wholly lost out of sight. Its modern revival, although most intelligent, consonant with its fundamental ideas, and practically effective, in the Christian religion, is by no means to be confined to the future of this religion alone. There are signs in the other great world-religions that a social unity of a spiritual order, as due to a common faith and the obligation to a common form of the moral life, is to be accepted as the ideal after which all claimants to the characteristics of universality are compelled to strive.

The yet later development of the Christian Church was determined by two most important stages; these were: (1) The separation and relatively independent growth of the Eastern or Greek, and the Western or Roman Church; and (2) the rise and growth of Protestantism, which was chiefly a schism in the Western Church. But the development of the religious communities founded in Palestine, Syria, the interior parts of Asia Minor, and the upper parts of Egypt, has been from the first of a somewhat different character, owing chiefly to the different political and social character of the populations involved. The most recent stage of the development of the Christian Church has thus far been characterized by the modern tendency to a certain unity of life and activity (in spite of the divisive influences of racial jealousies and commercial rivalries); and by the revival in modern form of the Apostolic

function of the religious community,—namely, the missionary enterprise of the Church, both home and foreign so-called.

Thus has the Christian community in its development been subject to the same strife and untoward forces which, making allowance for the differences in the social and political environments, have operated upon the other great world-religions. Since the nations among which Christianity has been, for the last decade or more of centuries, the prevalent religion, are the more progressive nations, the development of the Christian Church has necessarily been largely dependent upon, and has always been intimately connected with, the physical, social, and political evolution of these same nations.

What precise form will be given in the nearer future to the expression of this religious unity, and especially what its final expression will be, it is impossible confidently to predict. But the spirit and life of the Christian faith is, on the one hand, so free from dependence upon institutional forms, whether political, more distinctively ecclesiastical, or otherwise social, and, on the other hand, so powerful as a universal fraternity bond and so productive of organizations that are adaptable to every form of social environment, as to give the Christian Church on the whole, important advantages over all competitors in the contest for universality. Undoubtedly, the "survival of the fittest" furnishes a law applicable to the different forms of the religious community. But beyond and above the testing given to ecclesiastical institutions by the political and social environment appears the "standard of religious values." If religious humanity is destined to advance, in the future as a whole, somewhat as parts of the race have advanced in the past, toward the Ideal set up by this standard, then the spread of the greater world-religions in the future will more and more be determined by their conformity to this standard. The standard of religious values itself (see Chap. III) is predominately a social standard; the ideal which it, at the same time, proposes, commands, and applies, is a social ideal. The

growth of the religious community will, therefore, be determined, to an even increasing extent, by its power to conform itself, and to transform society according to this social ideal. It is only in this way that the Christian Church, or any other religious community, can ever approximately realize the ideal of an accomplished universal acceptance and sway over the religious conceptions, sentiments, and cult of mankind. This is equivalent to saying that the Christian Church (or any other religious community) can realize its claim to be the religion for mankind only by actually showing its power to unite all men in a holy and blessed social communion.

Various theories have been propounded as to the manner in which institutional religion can become, or is destined to become, universal. But none of these theories is at all satisfactory; much less is any one of them a certain and safe guide, when it assumes the rôle of prophecy. Even the conception of any sort of unity for the social organization of religion in the future is combated by some writers. M. Guyau, for example, proposes, as a corollary of the doctrine of the "*irreligion* of the future," what he calls¹ a state of religious "*anomy*." This is the condition in which every individual has his own belief and cult; or, the rather, each individual is characterized by such an absence of positive belief or preferred form of worship that union with any other is rendered undesirable and even impossible. So undesirable a condition is to be brought about by the gradual (or, as many of these theorists think, the increasingly rapid) decay of all positive religion! But no student of the phenomenology of religion, from the historical and psychological points of view, in any sympathetic and comprehensive fashion, can for a moment credit the probability of any such solution of the problem. As long as man is both religious and social, he will cultivate institutional expressions of the religious life.

Other theories which credit the possibility of arriving at some

¹ L'Irreligion de l'Avenir, p. 323f.

one universal form of institutional religion appeal, as does Tiele, to the actual historical unities brought about by all the greater religions, in accordance with the principle that like seeks like, and recognizes and forms fellowships with its like. Thus mankind has formed in the past the Persian Church, the Buddhist Church, the Muhammadan Church, and the various great Christian Churches. But, on the contrary, it must be noted how all these more extended forms of institutional religion have split up into warring sects, have developed differences of creed and cult which they regarded as irreconcilable with the continuance of any real and effective social unity; and it must also be observed that all the tendencies of modern times are toward an increased freedom of form and expression for the religious life of the individual. Still other writers have so elevated themselves to the standpoint of faith and hope, as to advocate and expect the final absorption of all churches in the Christian state (so Rothe). And at the other extreme are they who hold that complete separation of all political organization from every form of institutional religion, and the universal extension of independent, but fraternizing, local religious communities, afford all the unity for the social expression of the religious consciousness which ought to be, or which is destined to prevail. Meantime, each one of the various great Churches, that represent in an institutional way the great world-religions, entertains the faith that *it* will become universalized by the conversion to, or absorption into, itself of all the other religions. And in each one of these great Churches there are individuals who, because they appreciate more genially and intelligently the important and profound agreements of the religions themselves, are looking hopefully for a higher form of social unity in the future through a certain process of syncretism.

A survey of the religious history of mankind, and a study of man as a religious being afford, in our own judgment, no answer to the problem: How will a unity of institutional re-

ligion be brought about? Only as the spirit of unity, and as an essential agreement concerning the content of religious faith and concerning the way of salvation, are secured and perfected, is any tendency toward an all-embracing social organization desirable or at all likely to be effected. As contributing to such a religious, social communion, all truly devout minds must welcome (1) an increased understanding of each other's positions; (2) a continued improvement of those conceptions, sentiments, and forms of life, which are characteristic of what is best in all the purest and most rational religions; (3) a growing willingness to abandon the false for the true, the ethically inferior for the ethically superior, wherever truth and moral excellence are to be found; and, finally, (4) the general progress of intellectual enlightenment and social betterment.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE INDIVIDUALITY OF RELIGION

All our investigations hitherto have tended to emphasize the common factors and more nearly universal traits of the religious life and development of humanity, whether regarded from the historical or from the psychological points of view. The very nature of the task imposed upon philosophy by the phenomena of religion has made this necessary. An inductive study of large classes of facts affords the only safe approach to the reflective and speculative treatment of the more general conceptions and principles implicated in the facts. And yet the neglect to bear in mind the interests represented by the concrete and individual would be quite fatal to the success of any undertaking to philosophize upon a basis of the actual phenomena. It is not an unmeaning paradox, therefore, but an essential truth, when it is said that, after all, the most important universal character of religion is its *Individuality*. Here, if anywhere, the really existent *is* the individual.

It is a commonplace saying that religion is not a science, or a theory, or a system of dogmas, or an affair of ceremonies and cult; it is a life, an interior experience. But left in this way, the saying is not particularly distinctive or illumining as to the real nature of religion. For in the broadest, and yet most appropriate meaning of the word, science, theory, dogma, and cult, are all items of *experience*. Nothing that is not somehow experienced can exist for man,—not even as a flight of imagination, a plunge of intellect, a soaring of sentiment, or a despair of agnosticism. And to speak of an “inner” experience is, of

course, tautological. The most occult sciences, the most abstruse theories, the most complicated systems of abstract dogmas, and the feelings and observances of the most mysterious cult, can only become real as they are experiences of the inner life, the soul of man. And each real experience, of whatever kind, and whether communicable and acceptable to the common consciousness, or not, belongs to some particular Self. *It is only in the reality of the living experience of the Individual Self that the Universal and Absolute becomes known and believed in or dimly apprehended as felt.*

Yet this saying, which makes religion peculiarly subjective and individual, means well and has an important truth to convey. These intuitions of truth and reality, together with their convictions, which we feel powerless to produce by any form of demonstration within other minds; these aspirations, hopes, fears, and sentimental attractions and repulsions, in which others do not seem always to share; these moral, artistic, and other ideals, together with the stirrings of soul which they produce in us without seeming in the same way to affect our fellows;—these, and such as these, are the experiences which we consider “our very own.” The individual life consists in them rather than in the knowledge of matters of common-sense perception, or of accepted scientific formulas; neither do the opinions and social habits which are received from others as a part of the common life of the family, the tribe, the nation, the race, when regarded as common, seem to be so peculiarly the possession of the individual. Such common beliefs, sentiments, and influential practices, characterize the religious life and religious development of every human being,—as has already been abundantly shown. And it is these, we repeat, which must chiefly form the data for a reflective study of religion. But after all, religion as an actual experience of the individual, is always something more than what is common to others. It is a very special and deeply interior experience, in its higher forms of realization; and even in its lower forms, it is some-

thing which, from its very nature, each personal being feels to be of peculiar value to, not only the family, the tribe, the nation, or the race, but to his own Self. Doubtless, then, there is something about this experience which entitles every man to speak of *my* religion, in a different way from that in which he feels justified in speaking of my science, or my politics, or even of my morality. Doubtless also, the individual who seeks a satisfactory religious belief and cult, a religion that shall "find" him, is not satisfied with what he finds until it becomes a satisfaction especially adjusted to his particular experience.

What we have ventured to call the peculiar "individuality" of religion is, therefore, a characteristic which belongs to the very nature of all religious experience. In having this experience, indeed, the individual cannot separate himself from the life of the race. The social and racial influences will fuse with his peculiar experience of every form, whether he wishes it or not, and whether he is conscious of these influences or not. And yet every one is quite justified in seeking to have his own religious needs satisfactorily met. And the thesis to which attention is now called maintains that religion ought to be, and in its highest forms of development actually is, able to meet the peculiar needs of the individual. For what, indeed, we mean by the individuality of religion is just this:—the adaptability of the common and essential elements of the religious experience to all the differences which characterize, not only the different races and temperaments, the different epochs of history and changes of political and social environment, and the two sexes, but also the infinite differences in constitution and culture which mark the individuals among mankind.

If the statement just made is tested by an examination of the religious history of man in the past, several modifying conditions must be borne in mind. The principal one of these conditions concerns the development of the individual Self, as a psychological product, and considered not only with respect to the religious

experience, but also with respect to every other kind of experience. Now the individuality of every human being is characterized by these two truths: (1) It is something unique, and without any precise likeness elsewhere in the world of reality; and (2) it is always a development. The individual man, that is, must be in possession of *one* Self that, as respects its peculiarities is not shared, and cannot be shared, by any other Self; but no individual is a momentary achievement or an original endowment; every individual Self is a growth. These truths of fact are true, both for the individuality of every human being, and for all the individuals of the race. "As individual," says Professor Royce,¹ "the Unique Being is to be precisely something that *has no likeness*;" and the same writer speaks² of the "Self of the child" growing and forming itself, etc. These truths are also essentially and eternally true, both for the individual and for the race. Their proof belongs to the most clear evidence and invulnerable reasonings of the metaphysics of mind.

In the lower stages of religious culture, however, the multitude of individuals all think, feel, and act, more nearly alike—perhaps, precisely alike, so far as external scrutiny can determine. Yet even in these stages each individual's religious experience is, on account of the very nature of the individual Self and the nature of this particular kind of experience, peculiarly subjective and individualistic. Nor is the nearer approach to an apparently exact likeness, in these lower stages, due to the fact that the many individuals composing the multitude have arrived at any self-conscious and rational basis of agreement. The external conformity in cult and other expressions of the religious life among savage and primitive men is not to be taken as the sign of a high degree of spiritual unity. The individuality of the factors composing the social religious compound, if these factors themselves have, as it were, only

¹ *The World and the Individual*, * p. 293.

² *Ibid.*, ** p. 261f.

a low degree of individuality, does not fit them to form a high degree of spiritual unity. Conformity in belief and cult may be the result, the rather, of a lack of thoughtfulness about religious truth, of a deficiency in spontaneity and refinement of religious feeling, and of an unreflecting acceptance of the current practices. In a word, in the lower stages of religious development, every Self has the same religion, and there is lacking a variety of strongly characteristic experiences, because Selfhood itself is as yet so crude and unformed. Yet even this lack of individuality in the lower religions is only relative. Each tribe has its own totem; each family has its family gods; each worshipper has his own fetish; each people has its own popular divinities. And when the individual has some want or trouble that signalizes and makes emphatic his own peculiar being to himself, and seems, for the time at least, to make him to himself very special and unlike any other existing human being, he betakes himself to the very god that, for one reason or another, he feels to be peculiarly suited to his own present case. At least, in this instance, the worshipper wishes to make some divine power *his very own*.

In those more elaborate stages of religious social development, where a common faith and rule of practice has been adopted and given a more or less fixed institutional form, the perpetual recurrence of sects illustrates the individualizing tendency of religion. The formation of sects is, indeed, both an evidence of, and a necessity to, the life of any religion. The actual variety of individual experiences—and, we repeat again, only in these individual experiences has religion any real existence—will not tolerate a statement of beliefs or a form of cult that takes no proper account of this variety. Whose, indeed, is the religion, which is formulated and expressed; whose can it be, but the religious experience of individual souls? And if in morality, while, on the one hand, there can be no experience corresponding to the word without the existence of society and of social relations, and yet, on the other hand, in

forming the moral code each individual moral Self must somehow "count for one;" why is not the same thing *a fortiori* true of religion? Therefore, every large Church, unless it somehow cherish within its unity a variety of subordinate groups, and even a certain indefinable complexity of individual experiences, must inevitably be broken up into sects.

The survey of the field of religion as an historical development emphasizes the essential individuality of all religious experience, together with the presence of certain common and universal factors, in yet another way. Religion, in order to get itself realized and to exist as an experience and a power in human life, must always take the individual at the level of intelligence and mental capacity at which it finds him. Moreover, the truths of religion are, of necessity, largely given to the mind of man in symbolic forms of representation; therefore, the symbols themselves, in order that they may convey the truth, arouse the appropriate feelings, and guide to the right practice, must be consonant with the experience of the individual. To tell, for example, the Alaskan Indians, who know nothing of sheep, that "Our God is a first-class mountain goat-herd" makes an appeal to them equivalent to that made to the Hebrews in the opening sentence of the twenty-third Psalm. The Fatherhood of God, the son-ship of Christ and of his followers, the way of salvation,—all the great Christian truths about the Divine Being and his relations to men,—have to be conveyed by symbolic language which is converted into real religious experience only as it is transformed by the conscious life of each human soul. In this way, the relativity of all religious conceptions and sentiments, and their necessary dependence upon the development of the personality of the subject of the conceptions and sentiments, becomes an acknowledged principle for the control of the study of the history of the different religions.

What seems to be lost, however, by way of a rational guaranty of the ontological validity and worth of the religious ex-

perience, through the discovery of its relativity to the stage of mental development reached by the individual subject of the experience, is much more than compensated for in another way. Comparative study of religion, especially of the greater world-religions, discloses the important fact that, in them all, the believer who has the spirit answering to the truth incorporated into any special symbolic form, finds in this experience something valuable and adapted to supply certain imperative needs. And if the question be asked, "What is the test of this truth of religion?" the answer would have to be, that the most nearly final test which man can have, or of which he can ever conceive, is essentially the same as the corresponding test in any other realm of truth. It is the completeness and self-consistency of the answer which the conception of Reality gives to the total experience of the subject.

This fact of the essential truthfulness of the religious experience of the individual, when regarded as complementary to the fact of the relativity of the same experience, may be illustrated by the history of man's religious development in many ways. There is, for example, a profound truth in the experience of the worshipper of nature, or of the invisible spirits of his dead ancestors. And even when the Sun is worshipped with the horrid slaughter of the ancient Aztec religion, this truth is scarcely more completely submerged than was the same truth when the Israelites meted out the punishment of death to all enemies of Yahweh; and by no means so wholly lost out of sight as the truth of Christianity is in many modern wars, indulged in, as they are, by Christian nations from motives of greed and not at all rendered the holier by the public prayers offered for triumph over their enemies. Thus also, in the higher developments of religious experience, the essential truth of Pantheism was given figurative rather than philosophic expression in the Old Testament, was more clearly expounded by the most profound of the Fathers of the Christian Church, and is now being incorporated into all the philosophy

and theology of Christendom, as the doctrine of the "immanence" of God.

That spirit of charity and insight which recognizes in the history of the development of religion both its relativity and its essential truthfulness, as growing out of the very nature of this development, gives room for more of a reasonable individuality to religious experience. At the same time, it does not negative or destroy all positive religion, but, the rather, lays the basis for a higher, more spiritual, and more practically effective unity. For, just as the universal beginnings of religion in human history both presuppose and clearly evince a certain vague, undeveloped, but real spiritual unity for the race; so does the end of universality which the historical development of religion is destined to serve, anticipate a more rational, highly developed, and intensely and effectively real, spiritual unity for the same race. But nowhere in the course of the development, from beginning to end, can the power, and the worth, and the actuality of religion be considered apart from its individuality. It is the individual, when he has attained the Being of a true Self, whose experienced relations to the Being of the World give the reality and value which they have, to all forms of religion. And it is the adaptability of any particular form of religion to meet the religious needs of every soul which largely determines its position in the history of the religious development of mankind. But as the individual becomes more and more a person, a true Self in the higher meaning of the word, this adaptability becomes more and more a matter of conformity to those standards of religious values which were discussed at the beginning of our investigation.

The psychological nature of religion is such as to corroborate and explain the individuality of religious experience, as well as the relative and yet, in some sort, absolute value of this experience, as dependent upon its adaptability to the needs of each person. Our examination has shown in detail that

religion has its roots in, and that it gives employment to, every aspect and function of the psychical life of man. But every individual *is* just that peculiar and unique mixture of all these forms of functioning in which his individuality consists. And every individual is a more or less perfected Selfhood, according to the intensity and comprehensiveness attained by the development of the so-called faculties of self-consciousness, recognitive memory, reasoning, and the susceptibilities to the higher forms of ethical, æsthetical, and religious feeling—all suffused with, and controlled by, the self-determining activity called a “free will.”¹ Of necessity, then, religion considered as an experience, must have a certain adaptability to all the varied characteristics of human experience. Of necessity, also, the peculiar form, the ontological validity, and the practical value, of the religious experience will depend upon the character and stage in personal development of the particular Self, whose is the experience.

Closely connected with this central view as to the essential individuality of religion, when regarded from the psychological point of standing, are several subordinate but important considerations. First among them is this: The variables in the peculiar admixture and characteristic development of which the individuality of religion consists, are, of course, identical with those forms of psychic functioning which constitute the peculiarity of religious experience. Now men naturally differ more indeterminately, as it were, in respect of their religious natures than in their capacities for the practical affairs of the life of sense-experience, or even for a certain amount of scientific attainment. The reason for this is not difficult to discover. The activities of intellect, feeling, and will, which constitute the essential content of the religious experience itself are themselves more indeterminate. So much depends upon ability to image the invisible, to think out “figurate

¹ For this doctrine of Selfhood, see the author's *Philosophy of Mind, and A Theory of Reality* (The passages treating of the conception of Self.).

knowledge " into clear conceptions, to pass judgments of value in accordance, not only with private experience but also with what will commend itself to the so-called "social consciousness," to respond to suggestions by appropriate ethical, æsthetical, and more definitely religious feelings. The powers of mind exercised in the contemplative attitude toward natural phenomena, the interest in and the striving for the interpretation of their more ultimate significance, are also called into peculiar activity in the religious life. Especial importance must be attached to those forms of self-consciousness which are peculiarly favorable to the search and the finding, where God, the Object of religion, is best sought and surest found. And this is *one's own Self*.

"I searched for God with heart-throbs of despair,
'Neath ocean's bed, above the vaulted sky ;
At last I searched myself, my inmost I,
And found him there."

In dependent connection with this truth stands, second, the typical varieties of religious experience which characterize the different temperaments, the two sexes, and even every individual believer. Each religion which essays to become a world-religion, by the conversion of other races than those in which it is indigenou, experiences at once the necessity for adapting itself to the psychological peculiarities of these races. This is even true—perhaps it would be more pertinent to say that it is preëminently true—of Christianity. The Chinese, the Japanese, the Indian convert is a Christian with an experience, which, as respects belief, feeling, and tendency to cult, is characteristic of the race to which he belongs. The graft bears a different fruit from that which is native to the stock: but the graft cannot escape the influences from this stock. And what is true of the different races of the one human race is also true of the different temperaments and of the different members of any one of these races. The individual of a senti-

mental temperament will have his religious experience tinged with sentimentality—whether of the lower or the higher kind. The individual of characteristically phlegmatic or choleric temperament will be religious after his own kind. All the mixtures which in fact disturb the purity of the theoretical divisions of psychologists into four or more temperaments—all the so-called “mixed temperaments”—will, of course, exhibit their peculiar colorings in the stream of the religious experience. This is as true of those cases that lie near the outer borders of what is normal and sane, or even of those persons whose blend of religious experience partakes largely of the morbid and insane, as it is of the ordinary types. Religion is not a disease; but the religious consciousness may become diseased. Pathological phenomena abound in the life of religion; and these phenomena are by no means confined to believers in religious magic, or to devil-worshippers, or to practitioners of mysterious and obsolete cults. No insane asylum, and no organized religious community, of any size, is free from persons whose faiths, feelings, and worship, are more or less shaded with the grey, or the black complexion of some form of religious abnormality. And even the sanest experience of the most rational mind is not, at all times, a perfectly balanced and symmetrical whole.

But these characteristic psychological differences of the religious experience of different individuals do not essentially discredit the truth of religion or diminish its practical value for the life of man. On the contrary, they establish the truth of its universality, its thorough humanity, and its ontological significance. They make the value of religion all the greater and richer for the individual and for the race. Indeed, were it not for this universal trait of individuality, religion could not serve its own sacred purposes, at once peculiar and personal and also adaptable to the social whole.

The phenomena which suggest and enforce this view offer themselves to the reflective and speculative treatment of philos-

ophy as of the greatest importance for the theoretical determination of the nature of the Object of religion, and of the actual relations in which this Object stands to the individual and to society. The Reality which answers to this Object must be an infinitely varied and active Life. In terms of religion, the God who reveals himself in and to every individual human being, as a unique and individual experience, is understood with the utmost fullness possible for man, only as He is characterized by all the varieties of these experiences.

Judging, then,—however prematurely—in the light of the phenomenology of religion, we must say: God is not really a barren abstraction, an abstract entity; He is not “The Infinite,” or “The Absolute,” as characterized by negatives, and by the absence of all relations to the daily life of the individual. He is, the rather, just this infinitely varied Life, this Living God, who manifests his presence within the experience of the individual in this infinite variety of ways. And because *my* God manifests himself to *me* differently from the manner in which *your* God manifests himself to *you*, is not necessarily evidence for the conclusion that one or the other of us must be entertaining a fictitious and illusory experience. For the omnipresence of the Divine Being cannot be shown by a cry of “Lo here!” in opposition to another cry of “Lo there!” His omnipresence is both here, and there, and everywhere. Nor is his wisdom discredited because He reveals himself differently to the primitive man and to the man of modern culture, to the philosopher and to the child, to the student of science and to the man who cannot see, or think, far beyond the horizon within which his hot and doubtful strife is going on for daily bread. The rather would the Infinite One fail of the omnipresence and wisdom which the best ideas, sentiments, and practices of the religious consciousness attribute to Him, if He could not be the God, who is *my* God, for every individual man.

Some such conception of the Divine Being as this is sug-

gested by the historical and psychological survey of the phenomena of man's religious life and religious development. But the future definition, limitation, and defense of such a conception, cannot be undertaken in the name of history and psychology alone. Moreover, there have arisen in the course of this survey—now brought to an end—a number of other important factors of the same conception, and important problems concerning the essential truthfulness of even the most approved deliverances of the religious experience, which await critical examination by the method of philosophy. It only remains, therefore, to summarize the data, which the inductive study of religion hands over to the critical and reflective method of philosophy as constituting its principal problems in the sphere of the religious experience of humanity.

CHAPTER XXV

THE PROBLEM RESTATED

The survey of the phenomenology of religion has led to two results: it has, on the one hand, established certain conclusions respecting the religious experience and development of humanity, upon an inductive basis; but, on the other hand, it has more sharply defined and more strongly emphasized the problems for the further discussion and solution of which the induction must rely upon the critical and speculative treatment of philosophy. Both the conclusions already established and the problems proposed for solution may now conveniently be divided into three classes.

At the very beginning (see pp. 3ff.) it was pointed out that the term "philosophy of religion" implies the validity of a twofold assumption. It implies that the phenomena grouped under the title of religion—the subject-matter for treatment by the philosophic method—are of universal and permanent significance and value. They are fit material for philosophy to expend its energy in investigating. But, moreover, the term implies that these phenomena admit of more or less successful treatment by the method of philosophy. They are not only worthy of that painstaking critical reflection which the philosophic mind bestows upon all the problems of life and reality that come before it; but they also yield themselves, and yield fruits produced by themselves, in response to this method of treatment. In order to justify this latter claim it is not necessary by any means to assert the possibility of a final and infallible solution of all the problems proposed by the religious

experience; much less of any systematic and demonstrated exposition of the inmost nature of the Absolute. It is only necessary to remember that this experience is itself full of seeming mysteries and apparent oppositions and even contradictions; that it is a prime and exhaustless source of questions which are most provocative of intellectual curiosity, and which are of the utmost practical importance. The very existence of such problems in every field of human experience which is universal and permanent is an irresistible challenge to philosophy. For such is the special mission of philosophy in its function of reconciliation. And this mission philosophy should always undertake with perpetually self-renewing interest, and with a modest, but undisturbed hope, of at least a partial and constantly improving success.

The conversion of what was at first an assumption, that more or less imperfectly, "begged the question," into a conclusion placed upon a wide inductive basis, is the first of the three principal results of the inductive study of religion. Religion *is* a universal and permanent thing in the life and development of humanity; its experiences, and its various forms of manifestation and influence, afford to philosophy problems which are worthy and capable of receiving the beneficial results of its best efforts. The history of the development of religion, and the psychological analysis of its sources and of its interrelations with the other principal forms of his mental and spiritual reactions, unite in proving the universality and permanency of the religious being of man. Religion, as objective, is a factor always and everywhere projected upon the field of universal history. It is an evolution, distinctive of the historical life of humanity, which evinces an indefinite number of differentiations, but which is everywhere marked by certain common characteristics; and which, in certain instances when the conditions are peculiarly favorable, advances through several more or less clearly marked stages to the beliefs and cult of an ethical and spiritual Monotheism. Religion, too,

when considered as subjective, is found to have its roots so deeply bedded in the primeval and essential nature of man, that we may safely say:—Man would not be man were he not religious. And, conversely, religion cannot cease to be human, as long as man continues to be man. Moreover, the religious experience of humanity is no isolated affair. Indeed, this experience cannot be isolated. It essentially consists in certain reactions upon the physical and social environment; and, at the same time, itself modifies profoundly the social, and even the physical environment. And, finally, its expression in faith and dogma, in cult and conduct, and in the way of social union with those of like mind and like experience, is also a universal and ever-recurring phenomenon.

But, second among the conclusions which the study of the phenomenology of religion enforces, is the dependence of the character of religion, both objective and subjective, upon the conception formed of the *Object*. The strivings of the religious consciousness are in this regard not essentially different from those of the scientific, the social, and the philosophical life of man. On the intellectual side more particularly, and as stated in relatively abstract terms, we may say that man desires to know the Being of the World, the nature and the mode of operation belonging to the Reality which environs him, and of which he is himself a portion, a product, a child. In the religious experience of humanity the conception of the Object of religious faith and worship has undergone a characteristic development; and the study of this development—that is, of religion as objective—has enabled us to understand its character and main lines of direction. For the influential and distinctive thing about man's religious evolution, considered from the point of view of its satisfactoriness to reason, is the increasing clearness and richness of the conception under which this Being of the World has been brought. The form which this conception has attained, in the highest developments of religious experience hitherto reached, is that of an Alone God who is

perfect Ethical Spirit. Invisible, human-like and yet super-human, and spiritual—such are the characteristics which the mind of man always attributes to whatever it hails as Divine. But at the *acme*, the crowning point of its religious evolution, humanity idealizes the Ultimate Reality as the perfection of that which it has come to comprehend as best in itself; and this is a Unity that realizes the Ideal of ethical and spiritual perfection.

The justification of the conclusion from this historical process, with its culmination in that conception of God which is held by Christian Theism, is further helped by a study of religious experience from the psychological point of view. From this point of view it becomes apparent how all the strivings of intellect and feeling, and all the practical needs, which constitute the totality of the religious experience, coöperate in the production of an ever grander and truer conception of the Object of religious faith and worship. These same functionings find their highest satisfaction and their best sustenance in the same conception. Thus religion which, considered as subjective, is itself a progressive perfection of the human Self as ethical and spiritual finds its example, and the stimulus, source, and guide of its struggle toward ethical and spiritual perfection, in the conception of God as the perfect Ethical Spirit. Thus do the Self that is man in a process of historical development, and the Self that is God in History, answer to each other as though it were one face beholding, though dimly, its own idealized image in a glass. The obligation to create this Ideal, and the confidence that the Reality corresponds to the Ideal, hold the human mind to its task with an ever tightening rather than a loosening grip;—in spite of the fact that God, the more god-like man becomes, is ever conceived of as more superhuman, more transcendently superior to the most god-like of mankind.

The third class of conclusions established by the study of the phenomenology of religion concerns the conceptions which the religious experience of the race has come to form concern-

ing the actual, and the morally right, as well as reasonable, relations in which man stands to the Object of religious faith and worship. This class of conclusions is necessarily, to a large and increasing extent, dependent upon the conclusions of the second class. This is only to say that the way in which the religious consciousness regards the possible and the proper reactions between God and man depends, as a matter of course, upon the conception which it has framed of the being and attributes of God. Indeed, in some sort, the two questions may be said to be parts, or aspects, of one and the same question. For that Being of God, in which the religious experience is interested, is not the so-called "pure being" of the Absolute; it is, the rather, the nature of the Divine Being in so far as it is of interest to man; or in any way concerns the welfare of man. And the attributes of God with regard to which religious faith desires to be informed are precisely those modes of action upon man of which the religious experience, in its totality, takes account.

To understand what has just been said in too narrow a way, however, leads to conclusions which are not only intolerable to the philosophy of religion but which are also distinctly injurious to the religious life and to the religious development of humanity. For it has been shown that religion itself, even in its most subjective form, arises in intellectual curiosity and is essentially a certain theory of reality. Religious man wants to know, if possible, what really is the Being of the World; and what actually are the relations in which this Being of the World stands to the being of man.

Nevertheless, religion has its own peculiar point of view; and this point of view is never wholly, or even chiefly, speculative. It is always also, and chiefly, practical and having relation to the adjustments of life, and to the improvement of the Self as ethical spirit, and of society as a communion of ethical spirits. Therefore religion aims to effect—Nay! we may say, the rather, that it essentially is—a certain adjust-

ment of the human Self to the Divine Self, of man to God. The reasonableness and variety of these more specifically religious adjustments depends upon what religion conceives of God as doing for man.

Now the study of the phenomenology of religion, both from the historical and from the psychological points of view, has warranted us in drawing certain conclusions. Choosing our ground of standing from the higher religions, but without forgetting that the germs of the same conceptions and faiths are to be found with the lower religions, we discover that the religious experience claims validity and value for certain forms of relationship between God and man. God is conceived of by the religious consciousness as, not only the creator of the world of things and men, but as the present Life of the human soul. He is Moral Ruler and Providence ; He is Redeemer ; and He is the Revealer and Inspirer, as well. The religious life of faith and conduct, of dogmas and social communion, demands, and virtually consists in, the actualizing of these relations. For religion cannot maintain itself between man and an absentee or unknown God.

It may be concluded, then, that the history and psychology of the religious experience establishes, first, the universal and permanent character of the experience itself, and its worth and capacity for receiving the critical and reflective treatment of philosophy ; second, that the supreme development hitherto reached by this experience presents it as a faith that the Being of the World is perfect Ethical Spirit ; and, third, that this supreme development has also the faith that God, this perfect Ethical Spirit, stands toward man in the actual relations of Creator, Preserver, Moral Ruler, Redeemer, Revealer of Truth and Inspirer of a spiritual life for man, which is to be after the pattern of His own Life.

But these conclusions from the phenomenology of religion themselves suggest and include the three great problems—or, the rather, classes or groups of problems—which constitute the

task, excite the interest, and challenge the energies, of the philosophy of religion. They may be very briefly set forth, as problems in the following terms: (1) The problem afforded by the religious conception of the Being of the World; (2) the problem afforded by the religious views as to the relations in which man stands toward this Being of the World; (3) the problem which arises out of the answer which religion gives to these two problems, and which concerns the essential and lasting results of these relations,—or, in a word, the problem of human destiny as determined by the relations of man to God.

The greatest and most profound and comprehensive problem which the history and psychology of man's religious life and development proposes to philosophy concerns the ontological validity and ethical value of the religious conception of the Being of the World. More definitely stated in terms of the religious experience, it is the problem of the being and attributes of God. Thrown into terms of a question, this problem may be stated in the following form: Is the religious conception of God, as perfect Ethical Spirit, consonant with, or at least reconcilable with, the conception of the Being of the World held by modern science and by philosophy? For physical science, as a precious result of centuries of investigation and intellectual achievement and development, has its own conception of the nature of that Reality, of which all finite realities are portions and on which they are all dependent. The Being of the World for the modern physical sciences is a Unity, in which all the forces manifested in the various species of phenomena are conserved and correlated, and in which law and order reign undisturbed and supreme over all. Philosophy, too, has its conception of the Absolute or World-Ground. Its conception, like that of science, is a growth—the resultant of many centuries of critical and speculative thinking, and of the reflective treatment of human experience in the aspect of its more fundamental questionings and more universal and unchanging

principles. Can the Being of the World be conceived of in terms that satisfy both the conclusions of religious experience in its culminating form of Christian Theism, and also the conceptions arrived at as the high-water mark of man's scientific and philosophical development? Or, to state the question from the more practical point of view: May one have a rational faith in God as perfect Ethical Spirit, and at the same time remain faithful to those conceptions of the nature of Ultimate Reality to which one seems impelled by the conclusions of the scientific and philosophical development of the race?

The second great problem, or group of problems, for an answer to which the phenomenology of religion makes demands upon the critical and speculative method of philosophy concerns the relations of man, both as an individual and as joined with other individuals in society, to the Being of the World. This problem—as has already been explained—is dependently related to the problem of the being and attributes of God. Not only the physical, but also the biological and social sciences, give to us different views, derived from different standpoints, as to the more essential relations in which the individual man and the human race stand toward the Universe. Acquaintance with nature's system of forces and laws, ability to use these forces for his own benefit and a wise submission to these inevitable laws,—the adjustment of the Self and of Society to the physical Cosmos according to the terms which it imposes ;—such are the relations, with which it behooves man to acquaint himself, according to the advices of scientific authority. To know this Absolute and Infinite Being, to rejoice with pride in such knowledge, and—either calling It “The Unknown” and unknowable, or else regarding it with a vague and undefined, impersonal wonder and admiration—to adjust one's being to its Being by processes of reflective thinking, would seem to exhaust the doctrine of relations suggested and enforced by an Ontology that takes no account of the faiths and cult of religion. But

religion bids man have faith, worship, and obey; it encourages the individual to regard as Father, Redeemer, Revealer, and Inspirer of the soul,—this Being of the World, of whom its conception is such as to identify it with the Ideal of perfect Ethical Spirit. Is it possible to look upon this same Ultimate Reality as sustaining all these seemingly diverse and incompatible relations to the human individual and to society?

And, finally, what will be the end of it all; what is the destiny of the world of things and of selves? Physical science has its conjectures; some of which it is obliged to leave ever in the form of *mere* conjectures, and to others of which it feels justified in giving the hardened character of hypotheses or theories. As to the destiny of each individual Self or Thing it has no manner of doubt. As to the coming fate of the present total order of things, it ventures freely upon more or less detailed speculation. Modern physical science has, then, its own answer to the third of the Kantian inquiries: "What may I hope for?" The anthropological and sociological sciences (so-called) more or less confidently assume the predictive rôle of the prophet; they tell to their students, on the basis of principles derived from an inductive study of man's history, what is probably coming in the future to the individual and to the race. Meanwhile the philosophy of the Absolute calmly and confidently continues to view all things *sub specie æternitatis*; it therefore, assumes deductively to know that, whatever happens to man, as individual or as race, *The Absolute* will remain eternally unmoved and the same. But religion speaks of fears and of hopes that are reasonably determined by the attitude in which man stands to this perfect Ethical Spirit—its own peculiar conception of the Being of the World. It makes destiny depend upon the relation of finite selves to this Infinite and Absolute Self; while, at the same time, the infiniteness and the absoluteness are determined after the pattern of an ethical and spiritual Ideal. Can this *religious* conception of human destiny, by any process of reflective thinking, be made to seem a reasonable faith in

harmony with the predictions of science and the confidences of philosophy?

In all the subsequent discussion of these problems two considerations must constantly be borne in mind. One of these concerns, so to say, the rights of the phenomenology of religious experience. Its view of God, of man's relations to God, and of man's probable destiny, is as firmly bedded in experiential facts, and is as important and persistent a development, as is the view of the similar problems taken by science or by philosophy. There is as much experience, and as sure and valid a growth of experience, to authorize the religious answer to these problems as can be appealed to by any rival or conflicting answer. The solution of religion is no less fairly ontological, and no more dubiously anthropomorphic and developmental, than is the solution of the same problems, whether as proposed by physical science or by the philosophy of the Absolute.

What, then, is needed is the service of critical and reflective thinking in a mediating way;—or, in one word, of philosophy in the most generous and sympathetic form of its function of reconciliation. For, in truth, it is the totality of experience which needs, and which ever needs anew and more profoundly, a more satisfactory and complete explanation. It is the totality of the human nature, whose is this experience, which demands the satisfactions of the philosophy of religion. And better that no attempt at philosophizing should be made, and that the problems should be left in their old-time condition of imperfect solution, than that the different aspects of this experience should have their differences exaggerated and acerbated anew; or that the schisms and dissatisfactions of the mind inquiring into these problems should be made more extended and disturbing. But so unfortunate and unreasonable a result can come only from either the unworthy contempt, or the unwarranted over-confidence, of the mission of philosophy in its relation to the religious life and development of humanity.

2006
2/11 - 5/10

