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PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

A CRITICAL AND SPECULATIVE TREATISE OF MAN'S
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT
IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN SCIENCE
AND REFLECTIVE THINKING

BY

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
FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN YALE UNIVERSITY

VOLUME II

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"All living Things are indebted to Thy goodness,
. . . . It is Thou alone, O Lord, who art the
true Parent of all things." PRAYER TO SHANG TI.

"Among themselves all things
Have order; and from hence the form, which makes
The Universe resemble God." DANTE.

"Is not God i' the world His power first made?
Is not His love at issue still with sin,
Visibly when a wrong is done on earth?" BROWNING.

CONTENTS OF VOLUME II

PART IV

GOD: THE OBJECT OF RELIGIOUS FAITH

CHAPTER XXVI

IMPORTANCE OF THE CONCEPTION

	PAGE
The Change in Point of View — The Conception of Divine Being — Its Influence on Morals — and on Social and Political Life — Positive Content of the Christian Conception — Influence on Philosophical Development — God, the Central Problem of Religion — Indifferentism, Syncretism, and Agnosticism — The Removal of Prejudice	3

CHAPTER XXVII

NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE

The Two Problems involved — Knowledge and Faith distinguished — Conception of the "Unknowable" — Theory of Rational Intuition — The "Vision of God" — The so-called "God-Consciousness" — The Claim of Demonstration — The Experience of the Race — Anthropomorphism again	21
--	----

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE CUSTOMARY PROOFS EXAMINED

Use of the Word "Proof" — The Ontological Argument — Anselm and Descartes — The Cosmological Argument — The Conception of a World-Ground — The Teleological Argument — Conception of Universal Order — The Moral Argument — The Argument from Human Ideals	45
--	----

CHAPTER XXIX

THE ARGUMENT RECONSTRUCTED

Necessity for Criticism — The Nature of the Task — Further as to the Conception of a World-Ground — The Unity of Reality — Force expressive of Will — Immanence of Mind — Will and Mind as Conscious — Negative Conception of the Unconscious — Possibility of	
--	--

	PAGE
an Absolute Self-Consciousness — Bearing of the Categories — The Personal Absolute — God as Ethical Being — Conception of Personal Life	66
CHAPTER XXX	
GOD AS INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE	
Purely Negative Notions Valueless — The Absolute not the Unrelated — The Infinite not the Unknowable — Adjective Nature of the Terms — Quantitative Meaning inapplicable to Persons — The Absoluteness of Self-hood — Ideal Being of the World-Ground	107
CHAPTER XXXI	
THE METAPHYSICAL PREDICATES	
Meaning of the Term — Conception of Omnipotence — of Omnipresence — and of Eternity — The Divine Omniscience — Nature of Time-Consciousness — Self-Consciousness and Other-Consciousness of God — The Unity of God	122
CHAPTER XXXII	
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL	
Deficiencies in the Conception of Personal Absolute — The Problem of Evil unsolvable — Estimates of Happiness and Misery — Estimates of Moral Evil — Pain as Means of Development — The Defects of the "Medicinal Theory" — Problem of Evil as a Theodicy — Help from the Theory of Development — The Answer of Ethical Dualism — The Answer of Monistic Philosophy — Brāhmanism and Buddhism — The Christian Answer — The Individual and the World	146
CHAPTER XXXIII	
THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES	
God as Ethical Spirit — The Divine Justice — Belief in its Perfection — The Attribute of Goodness — Christian Conception of God — The Stoical Conception — The Logos Doctrine — Religious Pessimism — Perfection of the Divine Moral Attributes	177
CHAPTER XXXIV	
HOLINESS AND PERFECTION OF GOD	
Unethical Conceptions of Holiness — The Ideal of Ethics — Jesus' Conception of Purity — Defects of Historical Christianity — The Divine Wisdom — Union of the Metaphysical Predicates and Moral Attributes — God as the Ideal-Real — Absolute Will as perfect Good-Will	200

PART V

GOD AND THE WORLD

CHAPTER XXXV

THE THEISTIC POSITION

	PAGE
Reality of the Divine Relations — The Concept of Relation — The Relations of Dependence and of Manifestation — The Figurative Speech of Theism — The Conflict between Theism and Science — The Reconciliation of Science and Theology — The two Forms of Denial	221

CHAPTER XXXVI

ATHEISM AND PANTHEISM

The Denial of Agnosticism — Religious and anti-Religious Agnosticism — The Content of Truth — Materialism — The modern Conception of Mechanism — Failure of Mechanism as a Principle — A Developing Mechanism — The Position of Pantheism — The Conception of Identification — The Truth of Pantheism — The Supremacy of Personal Being	237
---	-----

CHAPTER XXXVII

NATURE AND THE SUPERNATURAL

Complexity of the Terms employed — The Existing Conceptions — Distinction between the Two — The Standpoint of Science — Limits to the Conception of Nature — Deficiencies of the Naturalistic View — God as the Supernatural — Immanency and Transcendency — Jesus' View of Nature — Reconciliation of the two Conceptions — Return to the Conception of A Personal Absolute	264
--	-----

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THEISM AND EVOLUTION

The Tenet of Evolution — The Modern Conflict — The Two Forms of the Theory — Materialistic Evolution — Evolution as Descriptive History — The Metaphysical Assumptions of Science — Reconciliation of Science and Faith — The Conception of Development as applied to Divine Being — God as Personal Absolute and Ethical Spirit	290
--	-----

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXXIX

GOD AS CREATOR AND PRESERVER

PAGE

Early Beliefs in "Creator Gods" — Ancient Cosmogonies — Special Relation of Man — God as Creator, Upholder, and Destroyer — The Old-Testament View — The Doctrine of the Logos — Time and Manner of Creation — Creation and Development — Idealism and Realism — Progressive Making of the "Over-Man"	314
---	-----

CHAPTER XL

GOD AS MORAL RULER AND PROVIDENCE

Necessity for Ethical Conceptions — Absolute and Finite Wills — The Fact of related Self-Activity — Conception of God as Moral Ruler — Nature of a Moral Unity — Theanthropic and Theocratic Religions — Deity as perfect Moral Reason — Perfection of the Divine Rule — Method of the Divine Rule — God in Nature and Human Society — Doctrine of Universal Providence — The Supernatural in Nature — Corollaries as to the Place of Prayer	344
--	-----

CHAPTER XLI

GOD AS REDEEMER

Religions of Salvation — Need of Redemption — The Conflict in Human Nature — Conception of a Mediator — Doctrines of Hindüism and Buddhism — Divine Redemption in Judaism — Christian View of God as Redeemer — Significance of Jesus' Death — Reality of the Divine Redemption — The Witness of Experience — The New Life in God	382
---	-----

CHAPTER XLII

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION

Religion as Revelation — Source, Subject, and Object of Revelation — Its Historical Nature — The Psychology of Revelation — Means of Revelation — Significance of Human Speech — Inspiration defined — A Relation between Persons — The Men of Revelation — Christianity as Divine Self-Revealing — The Doctrine of Inspired Scriptures — The Miracle as Means of Revelation — False and True Conceptions of the Miraculous — Place of the Miraculous — The <i>Modus Operandi</i> of Revelation and Inspiration — Religion as the "Psychic Uplift" of the Race	410
--	-----

PART VI

THE DESTINY OF MAN

CHAPTER XLIII

THE FUTURE OF RELIGION

	PAGE
The two Forms of Optimism — Religion and Race-Culture — Office of the Christian Church — “The Irreligion of the Future” — The Permanence of Essentials — Universality and Absoluteness of Christianity — The Rival Religions — The Final Testing	453

CHAPTER XLIV

IMMORTALITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Belief in Existence after Death — Causes for this Belief — The “Ontological Consciousness” again — Connection with Ancestor-Worship — Various Conceptions of the Soul — Lower Historical Forms of the Belief — The Doctrine of Karma — Egyptian Notions — Other Ancient Views — Greek Doctrine of Man — The Early Hebrew Conceptions — Old-Testament Doctrine — Later Judaism — The Doctrine of Jesus — and of the New-Testament — Later Christian Developments	479
---	-----

CHAPTER XLV

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL [CONTINUED]

Naturalness of the Belief in Immortality — Separability of the Soul from the Body — The two Ways of Believing — Modern Objections to the Doctrine — The Objections Answered — Conclusion from the Biological Standpoint — The Primacy of Psychological Life — The Problem of Developed Selfhood — Arguments against Natural Indestructibility — Reality of the Self — Value of the Self — The Positive Arguments — Significance of the Individual — The Guaranty of the Moral Being of God — The Witness of Religious Experience — The Assurance of the Christian Hope — Concluding Deductions	516
--	-----

CHAPTER XLVI

THE FUTURE OF THE RACE

The Conflict of Different Religions — The Christian Conception of the Divine Kingdom — The Conception of the Church Universal — The

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Uncertainties of Scientific Prediction — The Social Ideal — Rising Spirituality of the Race — The Triumph of the Divine Kingdom . 550

CHAPTER XLVII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Man as potential Son of God — Reality of the Religious Ideal — The Being of the World as perfect Ethical Spirit — The Harmony of the Totality of Spiritual Experience 567

PART IV

GOD: THE OBJECT OF RELIGIOUS FAITH

"Blessed are the pure in heart ; for they shall see God."

JESUS.

"Worthy art thou, our Lord and our God, to receive the glory, and the honor and the power; for thou didst create all things, and because of thy will they were, and were created."

APOCALYPSE.

"I will pass then beyond this power of my nature also, rising by degrees unto Him who made me Yea, I will pass beyond it, that I may approach unto Thee, O sweet Light."

AUGUSTINE.

"Whom shall we worship but Him, who is the sole King of the seeing and living creation ?"

RIG VEDA.

"There is only one thing needful; to know God."

AMIEL.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

PART IV

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CHAPTER XXVI

IMPORTANCE OF THE CONCEPTION

A certain obvious change in the point of view and in the method of discussion now becomes necessary in order to make further progress toward a systematic and satisfactory treatment of the more important problems of the philosophy of religion. The method of the phenomenology of man's religious experience is comparative, historical, and psychological. But the method for determining the truth of these phenomena is critical, synthetic, speculative. As was explained with sufficient fullness in the last chapter, it is therefore proposed from this point onward to subject the religious conceptions, beliefs, sentiments, and practices which humanity has cherished—especially in the form which they have attained as the result of their highest development in the past—to the judgment of that supreme court which universal reason provides.

It is fitting, then, that we should remind ourselves anew of certain rights which may be considered as already guaranteed, and not less of certain duties which are both enjoined and demanded. Among the former the chief and most comprehensive is the right of the religious experience of the race to fair

and sympathetic treatment from the rational points of view and by the method of systematic philosophy. Such treatment guards the conclusions of historical and psychological study against the more general objections of Agnosticism and Positivism. As to the abstract possibility of establishing any truth whatever respecting the realities of man's religious knowledge or religious faith, the philosophy of religion is under no obligation to argue. This important aspect of human experience has the same rights as any other to be defended by the critical studies of epistemology and metaphysics. And we cannot keep on raising the question over and over again, whether man can know anything worthy of being called "real," in the fullest possible ontological signification of that very misty and much abused word. What we have said in other works, and in certain chapters of this treatise on religion,¹ must suffice to explain our confidence in the possibility of attaining truth about God and about man's relations to Him, through the complex but disciplined activities of man's rational nature.

As to any more definite conception of the Object of religious faith, whether framed from the point of view held by some one of the world's great religions or by some one of its various schools of religious philosophy, the case is by no means the same. The appropriate and the supremely difficult task of the critical and speculative method of philosophy is directed toward every such conception; the special purpose of the philosophy of religion is accomplished when some one of them all is seen to unite most harmoniously and perfectly with that conception of the Being of the World which is particularly favored by modern science and reflective thinking. For example, doubt, or the agnostic position toward the problem of attributing certain moral characteristics to this Being, and, indeed, toward the effort to unite such conceptions as those of

¹ Especially in the "Philosophy of Knowledge" (chap. XVIII and XXI), and "A Theory of Reality" (chap. XVIII and XIX); and in chapters XII-XIV of Volume I of this work.

“the Infinite,” “the Absolute,” with the fundamental attributions of an ethically perfect Personal Spirit, must be met by argument and as far as possible removed. It is, then, with the faith of reason in itself, and yet with a faith which is chastened by a knowledge of its own limitations, that all further approach should be made to the discussion of the problems before us.

Among the several investigations which the phenomena of man's religious life and development imperatively demand, that necessary for validating the religious doctrine of the Divine Being stands preëminent. Is the conception of God as Absolute and also perfect Ethical Spirit able to maintain itself in the full light of modern science and modern philosophy? It is well to enter upon this investigation with some preliminary appreciation of its importance for a system of religious philosophy.

The importance of the conception of Divine Being, both for thought and for life, follows from the very nature of religion itself. This is true whether we consider religion in its aspect of belief, or of feeling, or of practice. It is also true if we consider any particular religion from the point of view of its development and of the reciprocal reactions between it and the other related factors of an advancing race-culture. “Now the character of a religion,” says Tiele,¹ “and, therefore, also the direction of its development, depend chiefly upon the conception which people form of their god or gods, their conception of what the deity is toward man, and conversely of man's relation to the deity, and of the relation of God, and therefore of God-serving man also, to the world of phenomena.” In the lower, and even in the lowest forms of religious belief, this intimate and influential connection is manifest. Wherever the mysterious, bodeful, and harmful side of nature is deified, and her superhuman powers are regarded as embodied in poisonous serpents and ravenous beasts, in destructive storm, or blight on the crops, or in diseases of men and animals, there we have

¹ Elements of the Science of Religion, First Series, p. 752.

superstitious and magical propitiatory rites, to restrict human life in its activities by manifold *tabus* and to make it miserable with sordid fears. Darkness and cruelty among men correspond to the dark and cruel conceptions of the superhuman powers which are over man. When, however, the conception of these superhuman powers is more helpful and kindly, the beneficent effect upon the entire life, even of savage or half-civilized man, through this channel of religious belief is most obvious. Among peoples who have attained a relatively high degree of artistic and scientific development, the same important influence from the conception which the multitude entertain of their gods, or of their supreme God, remains in force. This might be illustrated by a comparison of the attitude of mind toward life, and of the social customs, prevalent in Japan to-day, with those of the South-Sea Islands or of portions of Central or Southern Africa. In the former country the early conception of the gods answering to the word *Kami*, while not of a lofty spiritual and moral character, was of beings that awakened a certain respect, and kindly sentiments of a mysterious and *quasi*-æsthetical quality. Our previous researches have shown how in nominally Christian lands, great multitudes of the people still cling to these more primitive superstitions in their conception of the superhuman powers; and in this way are their lives profoundly influenced.

Special instances might be noticed to illustrate the influence of the conception of Divine Being upon the morals of sex and of eating and drinking;—for example, the effect of the ideas respecting Astarte among the Phœnicians and Aphrodite among the Greeks; or of phallic worship in “Old Japan” and of the worship of the *lingam* in India to-day. The “liquor-cult” among the early Aryan peoples was undoubtedly more truly religious and less degrading morally than our modern ideas on such subjects might lead us to suppose; but we can scarcely believe the worship of the intoxicating juice of the Soma-plant as “wisest in understanding,” and as a

guide "along the straightest pathway," to have been devoid of baleful influence. As to the somewhat similar cult of Bacchus among the Greeks there is even less doubt.

The influence of the conception of Divine Being upon all the religious and social life of any people is illustrated in a notable way by the worship of the greater nature-gods,—especially of the Sun. Among the early Aryans, where this luminary was conceived of as the *deva*, or divine One, the shining god *par excellence*, the god of life who bestows children, "the active force, the power that wakens, arouses, enlivens," and the giver of all good things to mortals and to gods, sun-worship contributed a variety of uplifting spiritual impulses to the entire life of the people. Thus he is prayed to as a purifying force: "Do thou from that (*viz.*, foolishness and human insolence), O Savitar, make us here sinless." So in Egypt, the sun, deified as the god of light, became a symbol, and to a certain extent a source, of moral illumination and purifying. Among the unreflecting but warlike and cruel Aztecs, however, the worship of the sun, regarded as lord of life and death, bore quite different fruitage. It was to their sacrifices to the sun that they attributed their successes in war and the prosperity of the empire. Never did the "imperialistic" conception of the Supreme Being among a warlike and cruel race bear witness more unmistakably to its own potently bad influence over social and political affairs. They "pushed the superstitious practice of human sacrifice to absolute frenzy." In "the abode" of this god the Spaniards could count 136,000 symmetrically piled skulls of the victims sacrificed since the founding of the sanctuary. But even this number is small compared with that which might be counted on the battle-fields on which have fallen the victims of the conception of Jehovah, or of the Christian God, as the relentless "God of Battles."

The important influence over all the social and political life of the people, both for good and for evil, which flows from the

more elaborate forms of ancestor-worship in China and Japan has already been sufficiently illustrated.¹ The conservative power over the Chinese which their conception of Divine Being has exercised is almost incalculable.

The scope and strength of the relation between the conception of the gods, or of God, and all the other tenets of religious belief and the practices of religious life, as well as the influence of the same conception upon every important factor in race-culture, increases with the height in the scale of development reached by any particular religion. The whole religious, social, and political history of Israel has justly been declared to be "virtually a development in the idea of God." Where, as in Buddhism and in much of Hindūism, this idea is characterized by vagueness and mysticism, such as are descriptive of the Oriental temperament and habit of meditative thinking, its very negative character, when considered from the logical point of view, becomes a powerful and positive influence over the opinions and practices of the people. It would be difficult better to describe all this for one who can read between the lines than to reflect upon the declaration attributed to him who became "enlightened." "There is, O disciples, something not born, not originated, not made, not formed. If, O disciples, there were not this not-born, not-originated, not-made, not-formed, there would be no escape from the born, the originated, the formed, the made." (In the Udāna, viii, 3.)

Above all in Christianity it is the positive content of its conception of personal life as applied to God, and of personal relations as existing between man and God, which chiefly determines its superiority over all other religions. This is true, as respects both the satisfactions which it affords to the intellect and to the sentiments, and also as respects the influence which it exerts over the social and political institutions and life of the people. We have already seen (Vol. I, pp. 205*ff.*) how this conception arose and developed. It derived from that branch

¹ Vol. I, pp. 403*ff.*

of Semitic religions which Judaism produced, the conception of Divine Being as the fount and guardian of righteousness. It owes to the personal experience and unique religious insight of Jesus that modification of its contents, as they had ripened and matured in the later Judaism, which brought it near to the affections of the human heart and immensely increased its comforting and purifying power. But it also derived from Greek reflective thinking certain elements which increased its potency and charm as a stimulus to the imagination and a supreme satisfaction to man's aspirations after the highest truths within the grasp of his rational activities. Where it has been most free from those superstitious elements that emerge out of the darkness of primitive times and linger in the beliefs, sentiments, and practices, even of Christian communities, and from those defects of the Judaistic conception which religious experience has hitherto not quite succeeded in displacing, this conception of God as perfect Ethical Spirit has been a measureless influence for good to the modern world.

In subsequent chapters it will be made clear how the conception of God logically and practically determines one's attitude toward all the other principal problems of the philosophy of religion. Its reciprocal relations with the problem of evil are obvious at once and from the very nature of this problem. Without attaining the knowledge or rational faith in the perfect divine wisdom and goodness, the problem of evil admits of no hopeful answer, not to say satisfactory solution. But, on the other hand, this very problem, when considered from the historical and *quasi*-scientific points of view, is the most difficult obstacle in the path to such a faith. Hence it comes about that all human conceptions of what is really good and really evil, of the forces and laws which the ethical evolution of the race exhibits, of the goal of this evolution, and of the prospect of reaching this goal, are interdependently related to the conception of God. All problems of good and evil—every kind of good and every kind of evil—are influenced as respects both

the method employed and the conclusions reached in their attempted solution, by our beliefs regarding the nature of that Being of the World, which religious faith calls God.

The same important relation exists, as a matter of course, to influence all such contentions of science and religion as are raised over "nature" and "the supernatural," law and miracle, order and so-called "intervention;" and to decide all such inquiries as concern themselves with revelation, inspiration, and sacred scripture, in view of the conceptions which the contestants entertain as to the Divine predicates and attributes. For these predicates and attributes are little else than religion's way of conceiving of the dependence of the physical universe and of the history of the race upon the Divine Being. What God is, must be judged by what God seems to be doing in the universe of things and minds. And what the rational procedure in such questions can conceive of him as doing, depends much upon the conception already formed as to his Being, when the questions themselves are first approached. All this, to be sure, involves a certain logical circle in conception and in argument. But it is only the same kind of an apparent circle as describes the form of all human advances in knowledge. It is the apparent return upon itself of the uprising spiral curve.

The importance of the conception of God, in its influence upon all religious thought and religious life, and even upon the social and philosophical development of the race, will also appear in a somewhat startling way when we come to say the few words which can safely be said upon the problems of the immortality of the individual and the destiny of the race. The Universal Life can never be conceived of in any particular way without carrying along with the process not a few assumptions and factors which determine the tenets to which our rational thinking must hold respecting the nature and final purpose of human life. Neither the descriptive history of the past, nor any deductive theory from the conceptions which such a history supports, can afford a wholly satisfactory basis

for that hope and faith which the religious nature of man craves and even demands. As a man conceives of God, the Fountain and Author of Life, so will he believe, with more or less assurance of conviction, respecting the life hereafter of the individual and of the race.

But the importance of forming a rational and defensible conception of God is even greater and more obvious for the philosophy of religion than for the religious life and religious development of man, so far as these can be considered independently of philosophy. It is the unifying and systematizing instinct and practice of the reason which makes itself felt here. It is, indeed, a mistaken and narrowing view of the philosophy of religion which defines it as the investigation of the foundations of the conception of Deity "in the principles of belief as applied to the data produced by science and philosophy."¹ Nor is any complete identification of the philosophy of religion with Theism and with the critical examination of anti-theistic theories satisfactory. Yet this tendency to concentrate reflection and speculation upon the treatment of the problem of the Divine Being, as this problem appears in the light of modern evolutionary science and agnostic or positivistic philosophy, is significant of an important truth. It is, indeed, impossible to determine the true conception of God by the critical and speculative processes of philosophy, in independence of the facts and laws of man's religious development. Emphatically true is it—to repeat the conclusions of our study of the phenomena—that no man can separate himself from the race in his opinions and sentiments touching the Divine Being and the Divine relations to the world of finite things and minds. To attempt this in the name of reason is to commit reason to an effort which is, historically and psychologically considered, impossible and absurd.

The central problem of the philosophy of religion is afforded by the conception of God. The question in debate between

¹ So Caldecott, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 3.

Theism so-called and the anti-theistic theories is the most important which the reflective powers of man can undertake to answer. And the answer given to this question is the more influential in determining the answers given to all the other problems with which the philosophy of religion attempts to deal, the more systematic and thorough such attempts become. It is, indeed, impossible to develop a system of religious philosophy which shall arrange its theorems after the manner of the "Ethics" of Spinoza, or which shall successfully employ in the solution of its problems the methodology of geometry. But every theorem in any system of theology or of religious faith is influenced by the assumptions and tenets displayed or concealed in its handling of the theistic problem.

The truth of this statement reaches its greatest intensity of expression when we come to consider, in the light of modern science and philosophy, the possibility of uniting such conceptions as those subsumed under the terms "Absolute," "Infinite," etc., with the conceptions described in the familiar language of the domestic affections and of the popular beliefs and sentiments on matters of ethics. The study of the phenomenology of religion has placed before us as our most important problem the conception of the Being of the World as perfect Ethical Spirit. But agnosticism contends that no knowledge, or even rational faith, is possible regarding that Ultimate Reality, or Infinite and Absolute Being, about which philosophy has been accustomed, somewhat over-confidently and with excess of details, to discourse. And if we dismiss—as we have agreed to do—this extreme position of agnosticism, as belonging to epistemology and to general metaphysics, we cannot so easily escape in this connection the next attack from the agnostic position. For when we ask ourselves the question which Professor Howison has put in this form: "Does a Supreme Being, or Ultimate Reality, no matter how assuredly proved, deserve the name of 'God' simply by virtue of its Reality and Supremacy?" we are obliged to give a prompt and negative answer to this

question. Certainly, No: if under the title, "God," it is proposed to cover a conception that shall meet the intellectual, emotional, and practical needs which all religion expresses to some degree, and which every so-called "universal" or "greater" religion must measurably, at least, be able to satisfy. The conception of *God*, which the highest development of the race has adopted, is that of an Absolute or Infinite Being *who is also perfect Ethical Spirit*. But not only the agnosticism which denies the possibility of any philosophy of religion, but also certain important schools of religious philosophy, deny the possibility of a rational union between these two sets, or classes, of conceptions. It is this and kindred contentions, therefore, which serve yet more heavily to weight the importance for the philosophy of religion of the central problem of Theism.

Thus it comes about that from the philosophical standpoint, as well as from that of history, the doctrine of God as both Absolute Self and perfect Ethical Spirit, furnishes to the philosophy of religion its most important and difficult problem. To establish the conception of an Absolute Self, and the relations of dependence sustained to such a Being by the world of finite Things and finite Minds, upon the basis of a critical survey of the facts experienced by the race, is the supremely difficult task of metaphysics. The approximately successful accomplishment of this task includes the discussion of the following questions: (1) What is it to be a person, or Self, as I, the subject of religion, am a person? (2) What is it to be a person, or Self, as God the Object of religious faith and worship must be conceived of as personal? and (3) What are the most essential relations, conceivable and defensible in a rational way, between me the dependent and finite Self and God the Absolute Self? These questions embody and give form to the very problems which the historical and psychological survey of the phenomena of man's religious life and development has forced upon our attention. But the truth in answer to them is not of such a nature that either history or psychology can

either establish or refute it. And until we grapple with the logical consistency and ontological value of the conception of God as Absolute Self our studies of the religious experience of the race seem to lead us farther and farther away from any ultimate and systematic views on the entire subject of religion. The more we dig into the history and the psychology of man's religious development, the more heterogeneous does the material thrown out by pickax and spade appear to be; and the more imperative becomes the demand for some kind of critical testing, which shall separate the refuse from the rich ore and fuse the ore into some worshipful image of Reality. It is "the truth or untruth of the Whole" which our rational nature seeks to know.¹ Unless the religious experience of the race leads on in a helpful way toward the apprehension of the ultimate truth of religion, the investigation of the details is of comparatively small importance. In this respect the science of religion is not like the other particular sciences; if, indeed, it is to be given any place among them. It is the knowledge of, or rational faith in, the Reality which answers to the central conception of religion,—the conception, namely, of God as Absolute Self and perfect Ethical Spirit—which sets the goal of scientific endeavor. And here we are reminded of the truth of what Leibnitz affirmed: "It is at once the easiest and hardest thing to become acquainted with God in this way; the first and easiest in the way of the light, the hardest and last in the way of the shadow."

The practical importance of the conception of God in the beginning of the individual's religious experience may be indicated by the statistics collected by a recent writer on the subject. Starbuck² found that from ninety to ninety-four per cent. of the persons who reported to him regarded a belief in God as the central thing in their religious experience. Next in importance among the positive beliefs of religion, as tested

¹ Compare Eucken, *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, p. 8.

² *The Psychology of Religion*, Table on p. 320.

by this somewhat shifty and uncertain but suggestive method, stood the belief in immortality. "The belief in God," says he, "in some form is by far the most central conception, and grows in importance as years advance. . . . There is advance likewise in the quality of the belief. . . . These younger persons are often found in the process of awakening to the significance of the idea of God. . . . Belief in God as a larger unnamed Force or Spirit, or as a Power that works for righteousness, while common among the older persons, is almost never given by the younger." These testimonies express the similarity between the stages of intellectual development as characterized by this central conception of religion, in the individual and in the race.

That attitude of mind appropriate to the metaphysics of religion, or the speculative discussion of the conception of God, which properly follows from the importance of the subject, has to contend against a number of current tendencies of thought and feeling. These tendencies may be somewhat roughly classified under the three heads of Indifferentism, Syncretism, Agnosticism. Neither of these tendencies is, however, either rational or morally justifiable in view of the immense importance of the questions raised by the speculative discussion of the conception of Divine Being. Indifference to this conception is not only the very essence of irreligion, but it is also subject to the charge of being an intellectually unworthy and morally wrong attitude of mind. By whatever name we call the product of man's attempt to grasp and hold together in one conception his most fundamental and ultimate convictions and knowledge respecting the Being of the World, not to have an interest in this conception is an irrational attitude of mind. Granting all that can be said as to the difficulty of the process, and as to the vague and uncertain character of the product, this supreme effort of human reason to comprehend the Whole, and to view and interpret the particulars in the light of the comprehension of the Whole, can never be deprived of the

right to charm the mind and to command its supreme endeavor.

By Syncretism in this connection I mean that attitude of mind which so frequently follows the first discovery of the great variety of views with regard to the true and valid conception of God, and of the undoubted general fact of an evolutionary process as characterizing and conditioning this conception in all the places and periods of human history. A certain confusion of thought, and a time of hesitation and doubt is almost certain to follow this discovery. Such a result is not necessarily discreditable to any inquirer. But when "polytheism, monism, and pantheism are supposed to cancel each other, leaving the enlightened mind with no belief in God," the mental attitude of syncretism may become the opposite of reasonable. In every form of progress in race-culture essentially the same experience prevails. The phenomena are manifold, complex, apparently self-contradictory. The truths which they substantiate cannot be discovered by approaching them with a tendency to this kind of syncretism. Reality is, indeed, no patently logical system which appears as such to the first observations of the chance observer. The rather is it always, at first sight, and even more at second and third sight, an infinitely varied play of struggling existences, contending forces, and diverse and mysterious modes of behavior.

To conclude off-hand that one religion is as good and true and worthy of a man's acceptance and adherence as another, that all alike are coins of an equally genuine ring and of quite completely interchangeable values, is to dismiss altogether too summarily the obligation of human reason to prolonged and searching criticism as a basis for its fundamental beliefs. The conceptions of science and of philosophy respecting the Being of the World have in the past exhibited no less baffling variety and patent inconsistencies than have the conceptions of religion. The very metaphysical categories under which they subsume the phenomena are scarcely less vague and indefinite

than are those with which the religious experience is accustomed to consort. Indeed, the categories which necessarily claim validity in any Theory of Reality, whether its peculiar point of departure be derived from science, from philosophy, or from religion, are substantially the same. Being and attribute, force and causation, law and order, number and quantity, etc., when applied to finite things and finite minds, or to the so-called infinite and absolute God, are, after all, essentially considered, equally anthropomorphic, equally valid or invalid ontologically. And this sort of loose syncretism is no more, but rather less, justifiable in religion than in either science or philosophy.

There is indeed truth in all religions ; because all religions are essentially, and by their very nature, the expression in man's developing life, of an eternal and unchanging truth. But it belongs to the growing faculty of the race to criticise and synthesise, and to appreciate better the values, of its own experience ; and thus more and more clearly and comprehensively to apprehend what that truth is. This is the express task of the philosophy of religion.

The attitude of mind toward the discussion of the ontological nature and value of that conception of God which man's obligations to his own rational nature seem to command, is, in the third place, opposed to several of the many forms of Agnosticism. Undoubtedly at the present time it is agnosticism, rather than any form of so-called false religion or any school of religious philosophy, from which come the principal obstacles to a rational belief in God. In its extremer form the agnostic attitude will not admit even the propriety or the hopefulness of any effort of human reason to attain such a belief.

That the human mind refuses to remain quiet in the agnostic attitude toward the conception of God, the history of religion shows most convincingly. According to the earlier doctrine of the Upanishads, Ātman is the Alone Reality and is forever and

wholly uncognizable by man. But as Deussen¹ well says, the investigating human spirit refuses to stop with this. And Hindūism, "in spite of the unknowableness of Ātman proceeded to treat of Ātman as an Object of cognition; in spite of the non-reality of the World outside of Ātman it proceeded to busy itself with the world as 'a real.'" The same truth was illustrated by the earlier history of Buddhism. Its original agnosticism was, indeed, rather negative than positive; it was practical rather than dogmatic. Of philosophy about the Divine Being there was then in existence enough and to spare; but the people were miserable and perishing because they knew not "the Way." The new voice said to them all: "It belongs to you of yourselves, and not through the medium of priestly intervention or of schools of metaphysics, to attain the desired good. The knowledge most necessary for this does not concern the hidden nature of the gods, or indeed whether the gods of Hindūism exist in reality or not; it concerns the way to live, the way of salvation."

This attitude of the practical religious teacher toward the ontology of religious faith and religious philosophy has a certain warrant in the necessities of the religious life. To wait for the full assurance of a reasoned metaphysics before entering upon the path of salvation would be for the great multitude of the people, and indeed for every man of a most reflective turn, to postpone indefinitely the most pressing concerns of religion. Yet more is true. A certain large measure of agnosticism is, historically and speculatively considered, the critic, the foil, and the cure, of a demonstrative and mathematical theology. The metaphysics of the Divine Being must grow out of human experience historically and reflectively interpreted. But Buddhism itself soon constructed a positive doctrine of the gods; and it afterward gave birth to various schools of religious philosophy. There are few more interesting studies in the evolution of religious opinions than that af-

¹ Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, I, ii, p. 213.

forded by the wonderful process by which this agnostic religion—especially the Northern Buddhism—proceeded upon the view of Voltaire: “If we had no God, it would be necessary to create one.”

A certain agnostic attitude toward any attempt to unite the conception of an Absolute Self with the conception of perfect Ethical Spirit is, undoubtedly, appropriate to the difficulties inherent in the very nature of the attempt. It is so easy to juggle with words when reflecting upon such subjects. It is so difficult to avoid mistaking the glitter of superficial but hollow abstractions for great and sublime ideas that have been derived from a full and rich storehouse of human experience. It is well not to affirm certain knowledge when only a somewhat hesitating faith is appropriate;—and this, without accepting the validity of the Kantian effort to remove knowledge in order to make room for faith. If by “agnosticism” be meant a somewhat extreme caution about drawing hard and fixed lines around the conception of God, or about venturing to affirm that human distinctions and qualifications, negative or affirmative, wholly avail to define, much more make comprehensible, its content; then every student of the philosophy of religion may properly cultivate no small measure of the agnostic attitude.

Such a reasonable agnosticism, which wishes to adjust the certitude of one’s mental attitude toward the object, to the agreement and clearness of the various lines of evidence, is a quite different affair from much which goes by this name. There are, however, two kinds of the agnostic attitude toward the conception of God which deserve especially to be avoided. Of these one is that dogmatic agnosticism which we have already twice or thrice rejected, and which is taught by those of whom Schurman declares:¹ “The burden of their message is always the incapacity of the human mind to know anything but the phenomena of the sensible world, or the contradictions in which it is involved when it essays to reach Infinite and

¹ Agnosticism and Religion, p. 86.

Absolute Reality." Such dogmatic agnosticism, when confined chiefly to questions of ethics and religion, and when coupled—as it often is—with an uncritical credulity toward the current metaphysics of the physical and natural sciences, is the very opposite of a legitimate attitude of mind. Legitimate agnosticism—"Removal of prejudice, intellectual honesty, judicial temperament."

Yet more disturbing and irrational was the agnosticism which resulted from the attempt, by Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel, to unite the most negative results of the Kantian Critique with the orthodoxy of the Church of England. Fortunately on the whole for the philosophy of religion this attempt soon spent itself.

It is a current opinion that modern science, historical criticism, and critical philosophy, have placed the assumptions of the extreme form of dogmatic agnosticism toward the conception of God upon unassailable foundations. It is true that the recent advances in scientific discovery and reflective thinking have made certain forms of this conception quite untenable. But it is also true that the same science, historical criticism, and philosophy, have enormously widened our acquaintance with every sphere of reality, and thus have provided new materials for the thought of the race to combine in so incomparable and incomparably grand a conception. The lesson of the hour is not that we should despair of framing any valid idea of the Being of the World in a way to satisfy the religious as well as the scientific and philosophical needs of humanity. The lesson is, the rather, that we should so heighten, deepen, broaden, and enrich this conception, by use of all the available material, that it shall more adequately than ever correspond to these magnified needs. For the relation which is sustained by the way in which the race conceives of God to the entire development of the race, and especially to the solution of the problems proposed to philosophy by the religious experience of mankind, is an essentially unchanging relation.

CHAPTER XXVII

NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE

In preparation for the critical and reflective examination of the central conception of religion it is not simply desirable to estimate adequately the importance of the task; it is also necessary to comprehend, at least in a preliminary way, the nature of the evidence to be sought for, and reasonably to be expected. Otherwise the student of the philosophy of religion is liable to one of two errors. Either, on the one hand, he may claim a degree or kind of proof for his conclusions which is inappropriate to the subject and unreasonable to expect; or else, on the other hand, he may esteem too lightly the *consensus* of evidence, and the robust tenure of the composite thread of argument which can be woven to his command. Our present inquiry may, then, be stated in the following way. Of what kind and degree of evidence—of argument, or of so-called “proof”—does the conception of God admit?

Any attempt to estimate the nature and value of the evidence for the conception of God involves an intelligent opinion upon these two subjects. In the first place, it requires a correct view, in general of man's mental activities and products as related to the different classes of objects,—especially, of the nature and the validity of knowledge, faith, science, opinion, etc. But it also involves, in particular, the detailed appreciation and adjustment of the different lines of evidence which converge upon the Object of religious belief and worship,—namely, the conception of God.

The former of these two problems is that attempted by the

psychology and philosophy of the cognitive processes. The net result of the attempt is a body of epistemological doctrine which, in order to be available for use in the discussion of any particular application of this doctrine, requires to be combined with a careful observance of the principles of logic and an acquaintance with the methodology of the positive sciences. From this body of doctrine we may profitably borrow the following three tenets. And, first: Knowledge is from its very nature a matter of degrees, so to say. No degree of knowledge that amounts to perfectly absolute and indisputable certainty of the reality of its object can be reached otherwise than by self-consciousness. Even here, the only object thus absolutely and indisputably known is the "here-and-now" existence of the Self, with its concrete present object, whether envisaged as some state of the Self or as some manifestation of a not-self. Various theories of the intuition or intellectual vision of God, or of some mystical union of the finite soul with the Divine Being, have attempted to establish the knowledge of God upon this indisputable basis of self-consciousness. But such a knowledge of God could come only through a consciousness of the Object as a species of Self-consciousness; and this would seem to be intrinsically impossible, both from the nature of self-consciousness, and also from the nature of the Object which is alleged to be known in self-consciousness. On the other hand, to refuse to consider any degree of the cognitive attitude, any manner of *knowledge*, as attainable with regard to the Being of God, is to overlook the fundamental doctrine which regards the cognitive attitude itself as admitting of an indefinite variety of degrees.¹

But, second, the distinction ordinarily made between so-called knowledge and so-called faith is an unstable and vanishing distinction. Belief that rests upon no grounds of knowledge, if such belief is possible even for human beings of the lowest intellectual order, certainly is to be rejected by the philosophy

¹ For a further discussion of this subject, see chapter VIII on "Degrees, Limits, and Kinds of Knowledge" in the author's *Philosophy of Knowledge*.

of religion, as without evidential value. On the other hand, knowledge that does not involve large elements of belief—and often elements of belief which are varied in character, subtle in origin, and extremely difficult to estimate with regard to their evidential value—is not to be had by human minds, whether in the form of religion, or science, or philosophy. The reasons why the term “faith,” rather than the term “knowledge,” is appropriate with reference to the verities of religion in general, and especially when treating of man’s conception of God, have already been made sufficiently clear.¹

By combining the two preceding conclusions we arrive at the following position: In matters theoretical as well as practical, our attitudes of mind, both those which we are pleased to call “knowledge” and those which are often deprecated as only “faith,” can claim only a higher or lower degree of *probability* with regard to the real existence of their objects. We do not increase the ontological value of any judgment by bringing it under the category “knowledge”; we do not necessarily diminish the ontological value of any judgment by being content to let it rest under the rubric “faith.” Some men’s knowledges are by no means so rational, or so certain, as other men’s beliefs. And much of the development of the particular sciences, as well as of the evolution of religious faith, consists in finding out that what was thought to be assuredly known is no longer worthy even of belief; but that many of the insights of faith have turned out to be anticipations of future assured knowledge, whether of law or of fact.

From this point of view again it is pertinent to call attention to the kind of agnosticism which is appropriate to a critical examination of the religious conception of God. In spite of his reasoned agnostic attitude toward this conception as an object of knowledge, and of his continued adherence to the tenet of a fundamental distinction between the scientific and the theological, and between knowledge and faith, we find Kant

¹ Vol. I, pp. 366ff.

referring to "the supersensible substrate of all our faculties," and to "the intelligible substrate of nature both external and internal, as the Reality-in-itself (*Sache an sich Selbst*)."¹ Thus, the *other way* of getting at God, through the postulates of the practical reason rather than through a demonstrative conclusion based upon phenomena of an external and physical sort, may lead to an attitude as truly and securely cognitive as any that the fundamental conceptions and postulates of the particular sciences can boast. And Kant himself, if we may excuse a certain almost grotesque mixture of precision and squeamishness in his use of terms, may be made to agree with a recent writer in holding: "Strictly, to be an Agnostic, is to be a heathen" (this means, I suppose, a human being who has not as yet been subject to the influences of religious race-culture); "and we are not heathens, for we are members of Christendom." All of which favors a critical and moderate attitude toward the evidence for the Being of God, rather than the attitude of an already convinced and dogmatic agnosticism.²

The same epistemological considerations may fitly guard us against another mental attitude which not infrequently goes under the name of agnosticism. It is the attitude of a vague unreasoned mysticism, a sort of agnostic sentimentalism. Because it is held, previous to examination, that the idea attaching itself to the contemplation of the evidence must always remain wholly negative and undefined, both knowledge and faith are denied their rights in the central field of religion. God as Reality, it is said, can neither be known nor believed in; but a certain stirring of æsthetical feeling is permissible even in the presence of the conception of the "Unknowable."

¹ See the *Kritik of Judgment*, Bernard's Translation, pp. 238 and 240.

² The ground in debate between Theism and dogmatic Agnosticism has been so thoroughly gone over by such writers as Flint, "Agnosticism," Fraser, "Philosophy of Theism," Schurman, "Belief in God," Ward, "Naturalism and Agnosticism," and others, as not to require further treatment at our hands.

It is certainly obligatory upon the philosophy of religion to furnish evidence for something more clearly *rational* than this feeling. The case is surely one for argument, and for the consideration and balancing of evidence. It cannot be dismissed with the exclamation :

“ Alas! how is it with you
That you do bend your eye on vacancy,
And with the incorporal air do hold discourse ? ”

The outcome of a detailed examination into the theoretical and practical problems in debate between Theism and Agnosticism, ends in advice similar to that given in a declaration attributed to Confucius : “ When you know a thing, to hold that you know it; and when you do not know a thing, to allow that you do not know it—this is knowledge.” Perhaps we might modify this advice, as applying to the object of religious belief, in somewhat the following way : “ To have a rational faith in God, and logically to proceed from, and intelligently to hold by, the grounds in experience on which that faith is based; and when any form of belief proves doubtful or untenable on such grounds, to decline or postpone accepting it as *your* faith;—this is to have all the ‘ knowledge ’ which is appropriate or possible with reference to such an Object.” But is this so very far, in the last analysis, from what science and philosophy both advise with reference to the attainment and growth of so-called *knowledge* respecting all classes of objects? Only in this way, can religion be made as scientific and rational as its intrinsic nature admits. But only in the same way, can science and philosophy be committed to the cause of religion.

In attempting to co-ordinate and to appreciate the different lines of evidence leading toward a rational faith in God, one is met by several claims the testing of which is in a large measure dependent upon one’s views in general, as to the nature of faith and of knowledge. Among these claims is that of an infallible intuition, or envisagement, of the reality of the object. This claim may take either of two principal forms. One of

these is the more mystical; the other the more argumentative, or even rational.

The claim to have an immediate vision of Deity almost undoubtedly originated in the experience of dream-life. It is this experience that gives apparent warrant to the otherwise quite untenable theory which finds in dreams the origin of the belief in spirits and in immortality. In its most ancient, and by far most frequent form, the vision is of some particular god—divine animal, deified ancestor, or individual member of the pantheon. Such are the appearances to believers, in their dreams, of Apollo, Minerva, Venus, and the other Greek divinities, whether as narrated in the Homeric poems or in the annals of historians. But it has been shown that such alleged visions of the divine beings imply an already existing belief in the gods. They may confirm the belief; they do not originate it. Undoubtedly, however, when the tendency to believe is undeveloped, or the dreamer has been in doubt, the evidence of the dream may turn the scale with him. Thus men have come in all ages of the world to trust the reality of their conception of Divine Being, because some manifestation of such Being has appeared to them, has seemed to be actually envisaged by them, in a dream or in a vision.

Quite different in some important respects, although similar in others, is the intuition of God which is claimed by the doctrine of Yoga, or "mental concentration."¹ "He that everywhere devotes himself to Him (that is, Ātman as Lord), and always lives accordingly; that by virtue of Yoga recognizes Him, the subtle One, shall rejoice in the top of heaven." Again: "He that devotes himself in accordance with the law"—*i. e.*, to avoiding certain vices and attaining certain virtues—and "practices Yoga," "he becomes sārvaḡāmin," or "one belonging to the All-soul." The tradition as to the "illumination" of Gautama tells us that it was attained by the means of contemplation, after the process of self-torture and the Yoga-

¹ See Hopkins, *Religions of India*, p. 262.

discipline had been found unavailing. In both these cases, however, the envisagement of reality is reached not so much by way of a vision, or any form of intuition precisely, as by a kind of absorption into the essence of Reality itself. The Yoga doctrine teaches that by a process, partly physical and partly psychical, called "mental concentration," the human individual may attain *union* with God (jugum=yoke). He who became "the Buddha," however, found out another equally mystical path to a complete mental satisfaction in the object sought by religious feeling. And both doctrines agree as to the possibility of putting the faith of the individual upon a basis of experience which has the immediacy and certainty, up to the point of an infallibility, which belong to a species of intuitive cognition. There is, then, a certain amount of truth in the statement of Professor Flint:¹ "To find intuitionists which in this connection really mean what they say, we must go to Hindu Yogi, Plotinus and the Alexandrian Mystics, Schelling and a few of his followers—or in other words, to those who have thought of God as a pantheistic unity or a Being without attributes."

It was chiefly under the influence of Greek thinking that the conception of God was itself made more rational, and that the way of verifying this conception by intuition became more of a rational process. Outside of Christianity this doctrine of God as the Object of knowledge by means of a rational intuition came, perhaps, to its highest development, as judged by ethical and spiritual standards applied to the conception itself, in the writings of Philo Judæus. As Bousset says:² "For the Greek idealistic philosophy" (that is, as it culminated in Plotinus and the other Neo-Platonists) "God remained, fundamentally considered, a pretty barren abstraction, a limiting concept, the Highest, Unknowable, and Nameless. For Philo God is, and remains, a highest living Reality." Much of the

¹ Theism, p. 356.

² Die Religion des Judentums, p. 420.

best of the Old-Testament conception had united with the best of the Greek philosophical thinking in the conception of Divine Being held by Philo. "God only is the truest and actual Peace;" and although he is "One and All," He is also the "Good God." Citing Plato in the *Timæus*, Philo tells us¹ that "the Father and Maker" is good. And do we inquire of Philo, "How do you know this?" We are elsewhere² informed: "I once heard a yet more serious story from my soul, when seized, as it often was, with a divine ecstasy. . . . It told me that in the One really existing God there are two supreme and primary powers (*δυνάμεις*), Goodness and Might; and that by Goodness, he beget the Universe and in Might he rules that which hath been begotten." It is instructive to notice in this connection that, without any claim to a mystical intuition or any toleration for the method of ecstasy, but in the cool and practical manner of his race, the great Confucian thinker, Shushi, entertained a parallel conception of the Being of the World, or the Ultimate Reality. But with the Chinese philosopher Reason embraces the ethical conception of goodness, and more. The substantial or more primary Being of the Universe is Reason; its manifestation, or derived activity, is Force. By a union of Rî or Reason, and Ki or Force, the Universe and every particular thing in it exists. And wherever there is Reason, there is also Force. Reason itself is immaterial and invisible; but all manifestations, whether of minds or of things, are due to its activities. The Ultimate Reality is, therefore, active Reason; and this, of necessity, includes all moral principles and all social order.

Now nothing is plainer from the historical point of view than the contention that neither the most successful practitioner of Yoga, nor Gautama who became the Buddha, nor the Chinese thinker Shushi,—not to mention Plotinus and all his more ancient and modern disciples—did in fact arrive at the con-

¹ De Opif. Mundi i, 5: *δοκεῖ μοι . . . ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸν πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν.*

² De Cherubim, 9.

ceptions they held (not now to speak of the claim to know the *extra-mental* validity of these conceptions) by way of the intuitive, or mystical, or ecstatic vision of God. They were all like us, children of the race. The conceptions they came to hold of God had their roots in the historical development of humanity. However sudden and immediate their upspringing in the consciousness of the individual might seem to be, it was the growth of many centuries of toilsome reflection upon the witnesses of experienced fact, which bore fruit in the form taken by the conception.

In estimating the evidential value of the claims to a vision of God, in the sense of an ecstatic or otherwise intuitive knowledge, two contrasted, not to say antithetic truths must be borne in mind. On the one hand, in no case does this form of evidence, when critically examined, turn out really to be what it claims, or at first even seems to be. The subjective conviction is no guaranty to others of the reality of the object;—and this is true, all the way from the savage or half-civilized man who dreams of the gods appearing to him in most grotesque forms, and with the most extravagant messages, up to the Indian Yogin, the ecstatic Philo, the devotional Christian saint. Let it be remembered that the question at issue does not concern the use of dreams, and visions, and even—or if you will, even especially—the “mental concentration” of Yogism, or the disciplined and self-forgetful contemplation of Buddhism, as *means* of revelation. Indeed, from both the historical and the psychological points of view, that the faith of man in God has been confirmed and developed in this way is matter of fact. But this experience is an individual affair. However convincing it may become to the individual, it can never, on account of its own intrinsic nature as an experience, be converted into a universally convincing, not to say indisputable kind of evidence. Indeed, just the contrary is true. This kind of evidence is inherently such as is most difficult to employ in defence of any universal propositions with regard to the existence

and nature of its object. It is also most liable to all sorts of impure mixtures and misleading and harmful elements.

Still further, if the concrete vision of God were always accepted at the full value claimed for it by the individual whose experience it is, it could at best be considered as only one particular manifestation,—a religious phenomenon. But so varied and conflicting are these manifestations that, unless they are subjected to a critical testing, they furnish no trustworthy evidence, not to say proof, on which to base a rational conception of the Divine Being. That the Ultimate Reality, if it be ethical Spirit, might graciously condescend to bring some rays of a comforting belief about himself to the human soul through dreams or visions, may be a tenable enough view. But to construct one's conception of God by patching together these fragmentary and elusive individual experiences would lead in quite the opposite direction from a rational procedure.

And, finally, there is no form of intuition or envisagement of any sort of finite reality—Things or Minds—which cannot be subjected to analysis, seen to be composite, and to contain factors of more or less doubtful inference. Immediate cognition of this sort belongs only to the finite and the particular. It is only by rational procedure that the mind can obtain and validate so subtle, complex, and changeful a conception as is afforded by the Object of religious faith.

On the other hand, it would be unfair to the claims of religion, and indeed a violence done to the scientific and logical way of treating similar facts in every sphere of knowledge, to deny all evidential value to those experiences upon which the intuitional proof, by way of a vision of God, or union with God, is based. For here is certainly a pretty persistent and by no means unimportant phase of man's religious life and development. Even if this experience were much more largely pathological than it is, a certain evidential value would still belong to it. But there are modified forms of this religious consciousness, which to call "pathological" would be promptly to

go wide of the mark. Doubtless the saying of Jesus—"Blessed are the pure in heart for they shall *see* God"—is figurative and cannot be quoted in support of the intuitive theory, strictly interpreted. But the truth which it does express lies deeper still,—too deep and yet too high to be wholly covered by its figurative expression. That the mind's grasp upon Reality—That it is, and What it is—should be conditioned upon culture of the powers employed in the effort to grasp, is good enough psychological and epistemological doctrine; and it is doctrine of universal applicability. The experiences which have led many of the choicest characters of the race to be perfectly confident of the reality of Divine Being, and of the actuality of his spiritual immanence in their own souls, cannot be considered devoid of all evidential value. It is not simply the fanatics or extreme mystics in Christianity who have attained to this sort of a vision of God. In the Confessions of Augustine, as well as of Thomas à Kempis or St. Francis of Assisi, and in the Memoirs of theologians like Jonathan Edwards, as well as of men prominent in the developments of the positive sciences, similar experiences are not infrequently recorded. After his vision of the risen Jesus—abnormal and pathological as this vision may have been—the Apostle Paul expressed the secret of his entire life as a perfect confidence that he, the man, was in some real and vital way united with God through faith in Christ. Nor are such experiences by any means confined to the Christian religion.

That certain experiences should have a great, and even a supreme evidential value for those minds whose experiences they are, is not only to be expected as a fact; it is also in good measure to be justified in a *quasi*-scientific and philosophical way. Their number and quality, and the connection which they have had with the religious development of the race, are such, as to constitute an argument for the reality of the religious conception of the Being of the World. This argument may, if one choose, be looked upon as a part either

of the ethical and psychological or of the historical proofs of Theism. "Religious history," says Réville,¹ is "one unbroken attestation to God." All so-called proofs may be summed up in this: Religion itself could not be accounted for without God. There must be such a Being of the World as will account for the religious life and development of humanity.

The claim to have an intuitive knowledge of God may take yet another and more rational form; it may become a theory affirming what is known as a "God-consciousness" in all men. If by this be meant that the human cognitive consciousness has the power of making an immediate seizure, so to say, of the Object God, as we envisage the Self in self-consciousness, or the something not-self in sense-perception, then the claim is psychologically indefensible. The argument against this view of a so-called "God-consciousness" is substantially the same as that already advanced against the other form of the intuitional theory. Neither the nature of conscious intuition, psychologically considered, nor the nature of the object of religious cognition, historically and analytically considered, would seem to admit of such a theory.

There is much important truth, however, in the evidence for the Being of God which is customarily offered by the advocates of this view. What we do really find in the religious consciousness of the race is a spontaneous interpretation of experience both internal and external, both of things and of selves, as due to other spiritual existences;—with its accompaniment of confidence in the ontological value of the interpretation. This process is, indeed, the ever-developing source of the knowledge of God. Thus the One Other-Self comes to be believed in, or mediately known, as implicated in all our conscious cognitive acts. And it becomes the duty of a critical philosophy of religion to explicate and to estimate the value of that evidence for the Being of God which is, indeed, implicate in the very nature and working of the cognitive con-

¹ *The Native Religions of Mexico and Peru* (Hibbert Lectures, 1884), p. 6.

sciousness of humanity, and of its progress in knowledge of every kind.

By an easy and almost inevitable transition the claim to have an intuitive knowledge of the reality and attributes of Divine Being passes over into the claim to have demonstrative, or what Kant called "apodeictic," proof on these matters. It has for centuries been the ideal of philosophy and theology, by a process of reasoning which shall start from an absolutely indisputable major premise, and shall proceed by equally indisputable logical steps, to establish deductively the conclusion that God is, and—at least in some degree—as to What God is. The author of the critical philosophy,¹ on the contrary supposed himself to have demonstrated once for all the illogical character of all the existing "proofs" of the reality of God; and to have shown in an *a priori* way that the very nature of man's cognitive faculty makes any knowledge of God impossible. But like other *demonstrations* which were to settle for all time the limits of metaphysics as ontology, this one has been quite persistently disputed both by those who believe—as Kant himself did—in God, and also by those who are either agnostic or sceptical toward the conception.

So far as the claim to demonstrate the Being of God has taken the form of the so-called "ontological argument," it will be discussed in its proper place. But there are two or three somewhat modified attempts at a demonstrative proof which may fitly receive consideration in this connection. Of these one may be called the mathematical or geometrical, *par excellence*; and this, either because it finds in the nature of pure mathematics an argument amounting to a demonstration of God; or because it aims to demonstrate his Being *more mathematico* but starting from some *quasi*-mathematical conception

¹ Especially in the *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*; and see *per contra* the earlier treatises, *Dilucidatio Nova*, and *Der Einzig Mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes*; and the position assumed in the later work, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*.

or principle as its major premise. In the latter of these two cases, some conception of "Substance"—as with Spinoza for example—or of "Pure Being," as in the views of the early Neo-Platonists, is customarily made the *principle* of the argument. Under this head may be classed the ancient Platonic argument from geometry to God. "All the judgments of geometry," says a modern advocate of this view,¹ "imply that there are unchanging relations in the one system of reality which alone is or can be known, and these unchanging relations constitute the objectivity of that system, so far as it comes within the view of geometry."

As to this claim to demonstrate God, out of the nature of pure mathematics or by methods employed in the development of mathematical conceptions and relations, the objections, if we adhere to the strict construction of our terms, are quite decisive. Religious conceptions in general are not formed after the analogy of mathematical conceptions, nor are they arrived at and confirmed by proof which can be presented in a form similar to that of a mathematical argument. Indeed, this, which is the Kantian conception of pure mathematics, and of its *a priori* origin and nature, is now thoroughly discredited among mathematicians themselves. "Pure mathematics," just so far as it maintains and perfects its "purity," abstracts its conceptions and propositions from all experience with concrete realities and their actual relations. Yet, these same conceptions and propositions are themselves derived from experience. Its demonstrations are therefore complete, are indeed, strictly speaking, *demonstrations*, only when it is agreed to accept some small group of postulates, of the actuality of which it is impossible to arrive at an empirical proof, and proceed with the strictest regard for the laws of logical deduction. In this way nothing whatever is demonstrated as to the nature of reality, except the mind's own possibility of being logical and, if logical, of avoiding inherent self-contradictions. The moment,

¹ Professor Watson, *Christianity and Idealism*, p. 158/.

however, we try to picture reality in terms of these *purely* mathematical conceptions and propositions, we find our attempt developing not a few most stubborn contradictions. All this might well enough convince us that reality is not constructed according to purely mathematical conceptions, arranged in the attractive form of a system of interrelated abstractions. As Schurman¹ has well said in contrasting this religious conception with the conceptions of geometry: "God, on the other hand, who is the ground and source and moving spirit of all reality, must be the most concrete object of our thought. By no possibility, therefore, can a theology or science of God follow the demonstrative method of mathematics."² This conclusion avails also against the somewhat looser opinion of Locke,³ who regarded the demonstration not one whit inferior to mathematical certainty.

On the other hand, the possibility of applying mathematics to the experienced realities of the world of concrete existences and actual relations, is one of the most convincing of arguments for the position that the Being of the World is some kind of an orderly and rational totality. Or if we take the position of religious faith and regard the system of minds and things, of which we have an ever-growing experience, and an ever-improving conception, as related to God the Creator and Preserver, we find in the procedure of mathematics, and in the control which it gives the human mind over the understanding of phenomena, a very convincing form of evidence that Reason rules Force in the cosmic constitution and cosmic development. There is, therefore, no conviction of modern science more welcome to the philosophy of religion—as it is indispensable to modern science itself—than the conviction of the unity and systematic connection of all Reality.

¹ Belief in God, p. 39.

² See also Flint, Theism, Appendix, 425ff. on the impossibility of demonstration, in mathematical or a *priori* fashion, of the Being of God.

³ Comp. Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, chap. X.

The inner connection of all the so-called arguments for the Being of God is shown again,—as it was shown in the transition from the claims of the intuitional theory to the claim of the ontological argument,—when we consider what is really involved with reference to the nature of the human mind by the application of mathematical conceptions to concrete realities and their relations. For another form of the demonstrative argument sees in the very possibility of any knowledge whatever an unanswerable proof of the Divine Being. That all knowledge, whatever be its object or the method of its ascertainment, and whatever the degree and nature of its so-called evidence, involves a certain theory of reality, may be maintained successfully from both the epistemological and the metaphysical points of view. For knowledge is always of reality. The mind's cognitive attitude toward its object is essentially some sort of a grasp—by belief, intuition, inference, primitive and unanalyzable feeling, or by all these and other hands and tentacles of the soul—upon the actuality of the existence and of the relations of just this same object. Psychologists may try in vain to agree, or they may quarrel eternally, over the nature of the cognitive process. A sceptical theory of knowledge may carry doubt as to the *extra-mental* validity of knowledge to the extreme of solipsism. But in religion which is invariably, as we have already seen, a theory of reality, as well as in science and in philosophy, the confidence in reason as a vital and effective commerce between the knower and the reality of the object known will always prevail. Knowledge itself implies indubitably the actuality of certain universal standards of a rational order. This is true, whatever the specific object cognized may be. The same thing is true of all reasoning, whatever the subject about which the reasoning is ; and whatever the subjective condition of the cognitive and reasoning mind in which the process terminates—whether it be affirmation, denial, or doubt. To this extent a so-called proof of the immanence of Reason in both minds and things may be drawn from that experience

which we call "knowledge." In this experience lie the grounds of all argument and proof. But to say this is not equivalent to affirming a demonstration of the Being of God.

We shall see subsequently, however, what a consensus of evidence is reached by following to the place where they unite, the particular and partial arguments for the conception of religion; and as well by considering the relation in which all these arguments stand to certain fundamental conceptions of science—to the categories of Being, Cause, Law, Final Purpose, etc. In this way the proof amounts to showing that certain unchanging factors in the conception of God are essential, unchanging, and necessary features of all human cognitive consciousness. Stated in figurative and somewhat exaggerated form, the argument then concludes that "To desire to know God without God is impossible; there is no knowledge without him who is the Prime Source of knowledge." Or, to employ the more philosophical language of Hegel:¹ "What men call the proofs of God's existence are, rightly understood, the ways of describing and analyzing the native course of the mind, the course of *thought*, thinking the *data* of the senses. . . . The leap into the supersensible which it takes when it snaps the chain of sense, all this transition is thought and nothing but thought." Here we encounter, to be sure, the customary Hegelian over-emphasis and extension of "thought" as concerned in both faith and knowledge. But this is far truer to the facts of the case, whether the objects of thought be those proposed as problems to science, to philosophy, or to religion, than is the sceptical epistemology of the Critique of Pure Reason. And religious feeling, as well as the sentiment for the ideal of philosophy, leads us to sympathy with Hegel when he elsewhere² asks: "What knowledge would be worth the pains of acquiring, if knowledge of God is not attainable?" Indeed,

¹ The Logic of Hegel, Wallace's Translation, p. 103; and compare the remarks on the method of demonstration as applied to God, p. 72f.

² Philosophie der Religion (Edition of Marheineke), I, p. 37.

all rivulets and larger streams may contribute to swell the river that bears humanity toward that ocean of truth which is the knowledge of God.

It is scarcely necessary to show that processes of induction similar to those by which the particular conceptions or laws of the chemico-physical and biological sciences are established do not comport with the essential nature of the conception of God. Yet in the larger, but no less true and valid meaning of the words, this conception may be placed upon a basis of experience.

If the proof of the Being of God is to be found neither in some infallible vision of an intuitive sort, nor in some form of demonstrative argument, nor in an induction which proceeds upon a purely empirical basis: Where is proof to be found? Or must the human mind renounce all effort to reason its way to the truth about this central conception of religious faith; not to say, all pretence of being able to prove the objective validity of the conception? To such questions it may be answered that the alternative which they imply is neither well conceived nor fortunately expressed. There is a middle way between exaggerated affirmations of proof and the negative position of early Buddhism:

"No god of heaven or Brahma-world
Doth cause the endless round of birth;
Constituent parts alone roll on,
From cause and from material spring."

But this is a childish philosophy, if philosophy at all it can be called; it is as inadequate to explain the religious experience of the race as the childish theogony it would displace was inadequate to compete with modern physical science. The scientific and philosophical, as truly as the religious nature and needs of man, can never be satisfied with so barren a conclusion.

The one inexhaustible source of evidences for the true conception of God is the *experience of the race*. But these words must not be interpreted in any narrow and half-hearted way.

This experience must be considered in its totality and as itself subject to development. This experience is all we have on which to base any kind of proof; but it is enough, and even more than enough, to satisfy all the reasonable demands made upon it. Indeed, in all the lines of evidence, the so-called proofs, the attempt at a satisfactory understanding of the origin, laws, historical course, and meaning, of the world can never disregard the origin, nature, needs, destiny, and historical development of man as chiefly necessary to its full account.¹ The proof of God for the individual searcher may, therefore, take some such form of argument as the following: Whatever else really is, or is not really, in the world, I am here; and I want myself explained to myself, made self-consistent and helped in self-development, in a satisfactory way. This "myself" includes not only my bodily organism and dependent connection with external nature and with the race, but also my own truest and highest self, with its hidden potentialities and aspirations, its hopes, fears, and ideals touching its own destiny. "With the mass of faculties and capacities and experiences, which constitute my personal nature," said Cardinal Newman, "I believe in God."

The generalizations and courses of reasoning by which this intelligent, but personal faith in God may be converted into a *quasi*-scientific and philosophical proof of the validity of the conception of God, have themselves no other source than the experience of the race. We may say with Schultz² then: "To be certain of the existence of God means, fundamentally considered, to recognize as necessary the religious view of the world." But just what is the truth of this view of the Being of the World, and how it is so to be stated and expounded as

¹ As says Sabatier (*Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion*, p. 120): "Pour se représenter le divin, l'homme n'a jamais eu que les ressources qui sont en lui. C'est dire que, ces représentations varieront avec le progrès général de l'expérience et de la pensée."

² *Grundriss der Christlichen Apologetik*, p. 73.

to harmonize with all the other cognitions and reasonable faiths of humanity, is a task for the philosophy of religion to accomplish. The different lines of consideration which it pursues, and which it endeavors to arrange in logical and at least approximately harmonious and systematic form, constitute the arguments for the trustworthiness of the religious view. But this experience of the race to which philosophy looks for its proof of the Being of God must be taken sincerely, sympathetically, and in its totality. With regard to parts of it, that is doubtless true which Schopenhauer asserted, namely, that the proof is "Keraunological" rather than purely theoretic; that is to say, it is based on needs of the will rather than on notions of the intellect. But this is only partial truth. The scientific and logical considerations must not be separated from the ethical, the æsthetical, and the more definitively religious. For as Professor Howison has well said:¹ "There will be, and will ever remain, an impassable gulf between the religious consciousness and the logical, *unless the logical consciousness reaches up to embrace the religious, and learns to state the absolute Is in terms of absolute Ought.*" In a word, the implication of God in human experience is not a simple intuition, nor is it a single line of demonstrative or inductive reasoning. On the contrary—counting only the "moments" which can be explicated—it is an enormously subtle and complex network of considerations. And reason cannot be content with the assumption, or the conclusion, of an "impassable gulf" between any two parts of the one experience of the one race.

From this preliminary survey of the nature of the evidence which may reasonably be expected, and which is in fact attainable, for the validity of the religious view of the Being of the World, we may derive these three practical considerations. They will serve to guide the subsequent examination of the so-called "proofs" to a safer, if a somewhat lower ground. And, first: The final purpose of the argument is not to demon-

¹ Introduction to Professor Royce's *Conception of God*, p. 124.

strate some particular conception of God, as though no history of religious experience, and of rational endeavor to understand this experience, lay back of us in the past of the 'race. We are not going to assume the airs, or play the part, of "upstarts" in this field of the philosophy of religion. This belief in God has been in the world through untold centuries; it has already undergone a significant process of development. It has, at least in certain quarters, been rising into nobler proportions and purer form, for no inconsiderable part of these untold centuries. The men of to-day did not create it; and they cannot undo it. No individual can construct or understand this conception by trying to separate himself either from the racial experience which justifies it, or from the more or less successful students of this experience. New proofs are scarcely to be expected, except in so far as this ever unfolding experience affords an unfailing source of such proof. The critical but constructive attitude toward the arguments for the Being of God cannot escape from the historical limitations or dispense with the historical helps. But neither can the sceptical or agnostic attitude. If we men of the hour are not rational beings, and potential sons of God, but only "moving shadow-shapes;" still we must stand in order, where we are "held by the master of the show."

And, second, every conception of God must, as a matter of course, be both anthropomorphic and inadequate. But, properly understood, the charges usually conveyed by these words are neither deterrent nor wholly discouraging. The one postulated principle of an epistemological order which underlies and validates all reasoning on this subject is, indeed, the right to argue from the human personality to the Divine Personality. Of course, such procedure is anthropomorphic. But, of course, and in essentially the same way, those who attempt to answer, to refute, or to criticise the arguments will be anthropomorphic, will also personify. Essentially the same procedure characterizes every form of argument, by which men

either advance their knowledge or lift up their faith to loftier heights of purer air and brighter sunshine. It is anthropomorphic experience, *human* experience, which must be accepted in fact, and accounted for, evaluated, and explained. It is *human* thinking which accounts for and explains all this experience; it is *human* ethical and æsthetical feeling which estimates the varying values of the different experiences. Such Anthropomorphism is as truly present in science as it is in religion. In a word, all growth of humanity in knowledge or rational belief is dependent upon the validity of a certain *quasi*-personifying process. And when it is proclaimed that this process may be valid to discover *that* God is, but can never reveal anything true about *what* God is, the mind is mocked unworthily. To establish by argument that mere undefined or Unknowable Being is at the core of the universe, is to conclude the dream about reality with a Fiction so grotesque that we may fitly find ourselves awaking with an explosion of uncontrollable laughter.

Finally, every one of the so-called arguments for the Being of God, and indeed every one of the natural sources of man's religious experience, may lead to either valid or worthless conclusions, according to the degree of rational elaboration, and of ethical discipline and refinement which it receives. As Oakesmith says¹ of the "sense of personal dependence upon a benevolent supernatural power" which Plutarch associated with the teachings of Demonology: "It may be identical with the purest and loftiest religion, or may degenerate into the meanest and most degrading superstition, according to its development in the mind of the individual believer." In respect of every moral attribute which religion ascribes to Deity, and every metaphysical predicate which philosophy assigns to the Personal Absolute, and indeed with regard to the entire subtle and complex conception which answers in different minds, and in different stages of race-culture, to the name of "God," the

¹ The Religion of Plutarch, p. 174.

same thing is true. Both the monistic and the dualistic view of God and the World may lead to their respective bad or good results. Helpful truths or pernicious errors may be logically joined to many of the factors which enter into either the pantheistic or the deistic conception of the Divine. Superstition is not confined to savage or primitive man. But wherever it occurs, its cure requires more light from reason and experience, rather than agnosticism or the denial of the grounds and rights of religious faith. Superstition is, indeed, a "dimming rheum;" but we must not "knock the eye out for the sake of removing the rheum." We must not, because false and inadequate views of Deity accompany all the thought of the race upon the subject, "turn the sight of faith into the blindness of Atheism." Both superstition and atheism, as Plutarch held, spring from ignorance. And Goethe averred that "the profoundest, the most essential and paramount theme of human interest is the eternal conflict between atheism and superstition."

Our problem may then be stated anew in essentially its old form but as seen from an advanced point of view. We seek for a harmony between that conception of God which the highest religious experience of the race has brought into existence—the conception, namely, of God as perfect Ethical Spirit, the Father and Redeemer of mankind—and that conception of the Being of the World which is most tenable in accordance with the conclusions of modern science and philosophy. We do not dream of discovering this harmony by means of any infallible intuition; or of demonstrating it after the methods of pure mathematics or of experimentation in the more restricted fields of the physico-chemical sciences. We enter upon the attempt, being aware of the limitations of our method and certain of attaining, at best only a relative success. Our conception of the Divine Being will be a human conception; and it will therefore be inadequate, incomplete, and possibly in some of its elements lacking in a desirable self-consistency. But we shall try to remain obedient to the voices of history, and trust-

ful of that light of reason which has been always illumining the race. Yet more : We find warrant for regarding even such a conception of God as a rational postulate on which converge so many lines of evidence that it may be accepted with confidence, and held with a firm tenure ;—and this, because it affords the fullest attainable explanation for the experience of the race, and the fullest satisfaction for the intellectual, ethical, æsthetical, and spiritual needs of humanity.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE CUSTOMARY PROOFS EXAMINED

It has for a long time been the custom of believers in Theism to throw the different lines of evidence for the Reality answering to the conception of God into the form of definite arguments or so-called "proofs."¹ The nature of these proofs is manifold; and each one of them corresponds more or less accurately to some one or more permanent phase or aspect of man's thoughts about himself and about the world in which he lives. It has already been indicated, however, that the true and conclusive argument is based upon the way in which the conception accords with the sum-total of the experience of the race, and thus assists us in understanding that experience and in promoting the satisfaction of its needs.

These proofs have been so often and so ably presented and criticised in their customary form, that any new examination of this great problem may be excused from the effort to contribute original and important material to their discussion.² But they are all so important to an understanding of the nature of the problem, and so essential to every attempt at its improved statement and solution, that they cannot be wholly passed over by the philosophy of religion. We shall content ourselves with

¹ The so-called cosmological argument, as it has influenced Christian theology, goes back to Aristotle; the teleological, to Socrates, etc.

² Among the numerous books on Theism, perhaps none gives a more satisfactory popular survey and criticism of the customary arguments for the Being of God than that by Professor J. J. Tigert: "Theism. A Survey of the Paths that Lead to God." The discussion of the Theologian J. A. Dorner, *System der Christlichen Glaubenslehre*, I, pp. 173-330, is particularly valuable.

a brief attempt to estimate the value which they seem to possess in their relations as factors to the reconstructed argument.

At the head of the arguments for the Being of God it has been customary to place the so-called "Ontological." From its very nature this argument in its more modern form implies a high development of the speculative and metaphysical interests and aptitudes of man. Historically considered it is, therefore, of course a relatively late product of his reasoning faculties. In that more positive statement in which it has influenced theology and the philosophy of religion it was shaped principally by The Church Father Anselm (1033-1109) and by the philosopher Descartes (1596-1650). The distrust of it, and the partial if not complete overthrow of its independent (?) influence, was brought about by the trenchant criticism of Kant. "The conception of God to which, on cosmological grounds, by a logical ascent from the particular to the universal, Anselm had arrived in the *Monologium*, he seeks in the *Proslogium* (originally entitled *Fides querens Intellectum*) to justify ontologically by a simple development of the conception of God." The argument ran thus: Every man, even "the fool," has in his mind the conception of, or belief in, a good than which no greater can be thought. But that is not the greatest thinkable good which exists merely in the mind, but does not also exist in reality. Therefore this greatest good must exist in reality, as well as in the human intellect; and this greatest really existent Good is "our Lord God."

The argument of Anselm was considered unsound even by some of his contemporaries among the believers in Christianity; it was estimated as a pure paralogism, especially by the monk Gaunilo, Count of Montigni, in a controversial treatise, *Liber pro Insipiente*. The critical Kant pointed out that the ontological argument cannot be considered as an independent, much less a demonstrative proof. It does, however, enter in an essential way into the ontological validity of all the arguments. It is—to use the phrase of Kant—their *nervus probandi*.

For the system of thought which Descartes elaborated, the conception of God was not simply of supreme moral and religious significance; the demonstrable ontological validity of this conception was the bridge over which the human mind must pass from the last inner retreat of consciousness to a world of verifiable experienced realities. With this thinker the ontological argument took more than one form. In the Third Meditation, Descartes, in accordance with his general doctrine of Method, proceeds to argue from the perfectly clear idea of an infinite, eternal, and unchangeable Being to the Infinite Reality corresponding to the idea. Such an idea demands a corresponding reality as its cause. In the Fifth Meditation the claim is advanced that, just as it follows of necessity from the essence of a triangle that the sum of its angles = 2 right angles, so it follows from the essence of the idea of a most perfect Being that such a Being really exists. Existence in reality is a perfection; hence God exists.

The essential thing about all these forms of the so-called ontological argument is the claim that we may conclude with a perfect conviction—Nay! that we must conclude—from the conception of the Divine Being, as it exists in human thought, to the extra-mental reality of the same Being. In this very fact Kant found its fatal defect:—namely, that it did, without additional warrant as it were, pass from idea to actuality;—from the object as conceived to the Thing-in-itself. Thus all the arguments of theology became the conspicuous instance of that vain pretence of knowledge, of which metaphysics—in the sense of ontological doctrine—is perpetually guilty. To state the objection in the terse manner of Ueberweg:¹ The ontological argument is a “meaningless tautology;” and “the only conclusion which is logically valid is this: so surely as God exists, so surely is he a real being.” On the other hand, it is complained of such curt dismissal of the ontological argument, and with reason, that the objection overlooks the very

¹ A History of Philosophy (English Translation of 1872), I, p. 384.

consideration on which the argument is based; and this consideration is, *the peculiar nature of the conception itself*. Certainly, to borrow the figure of speech with which even Kant stooped to ridicule this so-called proof, the conceived hundred dollars that are not in my pocket do not add a penny to the sum that is really there. But if what Descartes set out to prove is this—"That God is the only sufficient source or cause of the idea of God,—*i. e.*, the Infinite and the Perfect,"¹—the alleged proof may fall far short of a demonstration without by any means losing all claim to evidential value.

Differently understood and more fairly rated, this argument can be so employed as to turn Kant's criticism of it against himself. For with Kant—and this is the central positive position of the critical philosophy—Reality is always apprehended by the human mind under the formal conditions of a synthetic judgment *a priori*. Only then, if we regard the judgment which affirms the self-existence of the Absolute as a merely logical and analytical judgment, a sort of equation between adjectives, can we demolish it in so summary a fashion. But in fact, this judgment is not merely abstract, logical, and analytical. It is, the rather, an exceedingly complex *synthetic affair*, a summing up of many threads of argument, taken from the complex web of Reality, and woven together by human thinking. The grounds, the necessary conditions, and the substance of the experience, which enter into the argument, belong to the constitution of reason itself. Something like this Kant was himself forced to confess in his "Critique of the Practical Reason," and even more in his "Critique of Judgment."

In its peculiarly Cartesian form the ontological argument is therefore, on the one hand, refuted as a demonstration of a purely *a priori* sort, and on the other, confirmed as a necessary and rational explanation of the historical conditions under which,

¹ This argument is presented at length by Gratry in his *Connaissance de Dieu*: "C'est-à-dire l'idée de Dieu, laquelle dès qu'elle est obtenue, prouve par elle-même que Dieu existe." (2 vols., 5th ed., Paris, 1856.)

slowly and through the centuries and in dependence upon all the ideal lines of human development, this conception of God as perfect personal Being has come to the fore. We cannot, perhaps, say with Principal Caird: ¹ "The true meaning of the Ontological proof is this, that as spiritual beings our whole conscious life is based on a universal self-consciousness, an Absolute Spiritual Life, which is not a mere subjective notion or conception, but which carries with it the proof of its necessary existence or reality." We cannot argue with Anselm and Descartes that what I conceive of as *worthiest* of existence is *thereby* proved actually to exist. But we may draw in sympathy near to the truth as Fichte affirmed it: "We must end at last by resting all existence which demands an extrinsic foundation upon a Being the fountain of whose life is within Himself; by allying the fugitive phenomena, which color the stream of time with ever-changing lives, to an eternal and unchanging existence." The World is only intelligible to us, if our thinking is true thinking; if it brings us, so to say, into commerce with Reality. Figurative and poetical ways of stating this metaphysical postulate, which is entitled to reverse the entire sceptical conclusion of the Kantian theory of knowledge, are abundant enough in the literature both of philosophy and of religion. "The 'is' between subject and predicate," said Herder, "is my demonstration of God." "God is the truth in us," said Leibnitz. And Harms declared that "in all finite spirits the idea of the truth is contained *a priori* as an original thought which arises out of the essence of the spirit itself."

In the opinion of Pfleiderer ² the argument from religion and that from the theory of knowledge were both originally identical—as seen in the Confessions of Augustine and in the writings of Anselm—with "the kernel of the ontological argument." The history of philosophy in its relations to religion seems to suggest this view. Even in Buddhism, with its fundamental

¹ Philosophy of Religion, p. 150.

² Philosophy of Religion (English Translation, ed. 1888), III, p. 274f.

doctrine that "all the constituents of Being are transitory," the distinction has to be introduced between "Karma-existence" and "Originating-existence."¹ "Existence is twofold; there is Karma-existence and an Originating-existence." The Wheel of Existence is indeed without known beginning; and yet, just as the ignorant and desiring Mind has made it to exist, so the blessed and wise Mind may cause it to cease to be. Thus also in the "Discussion of Dependent Origination" between Sakya-muni and Ananda, where Name and Form are made the cause, the occasion, and the origin of all dependent existence, both are personified and deified in the fashion of Oriental mystical metaphysics. Elsewhere,² however, in the effort to escape all ontology, and playing with mere words and symbols and figures of speech, Buddhism assures us that Form itself is caused by ignorance, desire, attachment, and Karma; while Name depends on the senses and attention.

Man, in a germinal form found everywhere existing but only ripening along certain lines of development under the more favorable conditions into the fruitage of a rational Theism, conceives of and reasons about the Ground in Reality of his own being and of the existence of things. His conceptions are thus variously shaped by the effort to give such an account of his varied experiences as shall satisfy the constitutional and permanent demands of his own life. What the ontological proof so-called amounts to is, therefore, this: It is difficult or impossible, from the point of view of reflective and self-consistent thought, to regard the conception of God as a purely subjective development. This conception, as human reason has somehow succeeded in framing it, seems to the same reason to demand the Reality of God.

The gist of the Cosmological argument is found in the logical and, as well, the practical necessity of referring the de-

¹ The quotations are from *Buddhism in Translation*; Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 3.

² *Visuddhi-Magga*, Chapters XVII and XX.

pendent and relative character of finite beings and events to the Unity of some Independent or Absolute Ground. Its point of starting is, then, to be located in man's concrete, particular knowledge of the world; its impulse proceeds from the feeling of dissatisfaction with the fragmentary and discrete character of the explanation which this point of view affords; its movement is along the argument from causation onward and upward towards a resting place in some ultimate or primal causative Principle. Against this argument, as it has customarily been employed by theology, two powerful objections may be brought: First, that the argument involves the attempt at an impossible *regressus ad infinitum*, a search for cause beyond cause, and other cause still back of this,—the whole process being without power or prospect of ever reaching the end of the chain of causation. It is also objected, secondly, that any application of the law of causality under which man knows the phenomenal world, to a region which is qualitatively different from the phenomenal, involves a misconception of the principle of causality itself. Both these objections do, indeed, bear heavily against the cosmological argument, as it has been customary to employ it; but they both involve a misconception of the principle of causality, and of the use which it is proper to make of this principle in the reconstruction of the argument.

The conception of a "World-Ground," or so-called "First Cause" of all finite beings and events, has been an exceedingly slow and painful evolution. But the conception is an important product of man's mental development; and any inquiry into its validity requires a criticism which profoundly concerns not only the faiths of religion but also the rational beliefs postulated, and the conclusions confirmed, by science and by philosophy. For untold ages the race existed without any clear and reasoned conception of the unity and personality of the Divine Being. Not until late did man aim at the position from which to frame the conception of a Personal Absolute as

the Ground of all cosmic existences and events, the First and the Final Cause of all human experiences. But all the way, in its gropings after the true idea of God, as well as in its growth of scientific and reflective knowledge, the human mind has made use of the cosmological argument. This is simply to say that man has been trying to explain his own experience, and to satisfy his own needs, by interpreting the world of things and of selves in terms of a higher and more universal, real Principle.

In all such work of the interpretation of experience, the human mind both posits and infers entities that act upon it and upon one another. This is true of savage man; it is true of childish man; it is true of insane man; it is true of scientific and cultured man. It is as true of the Berkeleian idealist, or the Comtean positivist, as it is of the common-sense realist or the so-called "reconstructed" realist. Without some such intellectual movement of a metaphysical character neither science nor religion could arise and develop.

Our study of the phenomena of man's religious life and religious development has shown us the truth of the declaration of D'Alviella: ¹ "The savage, wherever he finds life and movement, refers them to the only source of activity of which he has any direct knowledge, namely the will." And this *will* is never the "pure activity" of "non-being," but the will of some spiritual agent. In this way mythology, whether of the religious order or not, grows up and flourishes with its instructive and yet grotesque and monstrous contributions to the cosmological argument with reference to the Being of the World. Of the primitive man Roskoff ² truly says: "His conclusion is the joining of the phenomena together, according to the laws of thought, in the relation of ground and consequence; he operates in general according to the principle of causality." The same author adds: "This inner impulse has

¹ Origin and Growth of the Conception of God p. 52.

² Das Religionswesen der rohesten Völkerstämme, p. 129.

been called a 'metaphysical instinct.'” With chastened and corrected imagination, and enlarged and more penetrating observation, modern science refers the same phenomena to physical entities, to masses, atoms, corpuscles, ions, or ether, etc.; and it weaves new connections between these entities, of a most marvelous and incredible intricacy, according to the same principle of causality.

In one of its oldest forms the cosmological argument led Aristotle from motion in the world of things to a Being which must be conceived of as a Prime Mover. Through the Middle Ages, and in its most subtle and refined modern form, this argument implies that the rational conceptions of cause, ground, and law, may be applied to reality in the interests of a better explanation of concrete human experiences. The implication is undoubtedly true. There is no form of contesting it that does not either employ essentially the same argument, or else end in some absurd and self-contradictory form of scepticism in matters of science as well as of religion.

At the same time any use of the cosmological argument which relies upon the mere recoil of the mind from an infinite regressus, and upon the incomprehensible and absurd nature of the infinite series of causal connections, in order to justify the conception of a so-called First Cause, deprives itself of all real cogency. “First Cause,” in the cosmological argument, cannot mean simply, at the beginning in time; it must mean, as Mr. Spencer admits¹—“Infinite and Absolute.” The moment this argument separates the Ground of the Universe from present human experience, and thus conceives of a God that is aloof from the actually existing world, its tendency is toward a Deism which science rejects as unnecessary for an explanation of phenomena, and which religious feeling regards as cold and unsatisfying. The God man needs, if he needs any God at all, whether to come near to his heart or to quicken and support his intellect, is not a Being whose living relations

¹ First Principles (edition of 1872), p. 38.

with the world of things and selves lie chiefly antecedent to, or run mostly separate from, this same known world of things and selves. On this point it has been well said:¹ "Not a mere foundation of Being in the abstract . . . but a real, actually existing, primitive Ground (*Urgrund*) of all reality," is what the cosmological argument seeks to establish.

In the use of the cosmological argument it is essential that we should, on the one hand, guard against such agnostic prejudices as render both modern science and critical reflection wholly doubtful about the nature of Reality; and, on the other hand, that we should not accept that extreme of dogmatic confidence which concedes to either physical science or to current theological systems the exclusive right to give a complete and final form to their respective conceptions of this Reality. Moreover, the very terms which both science and theology employ for the statement of their postulates and their conclusions are greatly in need of a more fundamental criticism. "Laws of nature" have no meaning in a world which is not essentially orderly and teleological. "Efficient causes," or whatever substitutes the most skillful scepticism may devise for this complex notion, signify nothing for an exposition of facts that does not repose upon the experience of intelligent wills. Indeed, the detailed and elaborate recognition of causal connections everywhere in the world, taking place under so-called laws,—this universal fact *is* the cosmological argument. "Intelligence endowed with will," said Kant, "is causality." Better said: Will, realizing its own immanent ideas,—this is what physical science speaks of in such terms as cause, law, relation, etc.

The Teleological Argument, or Argument from Design, may be said in general to proceed from the obviously playful nature, or orderliness, of particular existences and their relations, as man has an increasing experience of them, to the conclusion that they all have their Ground in One Mind.

¹ Lindsay, *Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy of Religion*, p. 143.

From this point of regard it may be considered as based upon the self-confidence of human reason in its ability to know the cosmical forces, existences, and laws, as they really are and actually operate. Thus the teleological is an extension of the cosmological argument; and both are supported by the ontological postulate which underlies all forms of the argument. On the value of this argument the judgment of the founder of the modern critical movement is well known. "It is," said Kant,¹ "the oldest, the clearest, and most in conformity with human reason;" and he adds that it would be "not only extremely sad, but utterly vain, to attempt to diminish the authority of that proof." Socrates² is represented as giving this argument naively when he convinces Aristodemus that "man must be the masterpiece of some great artificer." Plato presents it in detail in the *Timæus*. But Aristotle's profounder view justifies us in saying that the recognition which he gave to the immanent end of every object, and of the Totality, made his doctrine of finality worthy to be "radically distinguished from the superficial utilitarian teleology of later philosophers."³ Bacon, the reputed founder of the modern theory of the inductive method, declares in his *Essay on Atheism* that when the mind of man beholdeth the chain of causes "confederate and linked together," "it must needs fly to Providence and Deity." The fact that Kant rejected the claims of the Teleological Argument to "apodeictic certainty" need not greatly disturb those who neither seek nor expect such certainty in an argument for the Object of religious faith. And the confession—"The old argument from design in nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so conclusive, fails, now that the law of natural selection has been discovered"—is even less disturbing for one who

¹ *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, in the section, *Von der Unmöglichkeit des physiko-theologischen Beweises*.

² Xenophon, *Mem.* I, iv; comp. IV, iii.

³ For a note on the history of the teleological argument, see Flint, *Theism*, pp. 387 ff.

has passed quite beyond the philosophical standpoint of either Paley or Darwin.

The phrase "superficial utilitarian teleology" may very fitly give us our point of starting for an intelligent appreciation of the nature, value, and cogency of the so-called argument from design. It is an important introductory consideration that the human mind has always, and of necessity, made use of the teleological conception in finding its way to a belief in the object of religious worship. That which does not seem to have a *mind*, and at least to some extent to show its mind, cannot stir or guide the religious nature of man. All our historical study of religion illustrates this statement.

In order not only to reconcile modern science and philosophy with the teleological view of the world, but also to commit them to it, and to the proof which it affords of the truth of the religious conception of the Divine Being, the teleological argument must, indeed, be apprehended in a generous, broad-minded, and magnanimous fashion (*man muss die Frage im grösseren Stil behandeln*). For such a treatment modern science has prepared anew the way. Its very efforts to intensify and to extend the mechanical conception of the universe, and, in spite of all its splendid success in these efforts, its complete failure thus to furnish an adequate and satisfactory explanation, have expanded and strengthened this argument. Nowhere do we find any "dead mechanism," worked upon, as it were, by blind forces that reside upon the outside. Even the kind of mechanism which we do find, and of which the particular sciences can make use for a limited and partial explanation of phenomena, is itself unthinkable without an indwelling final purpose. What modern science presents is a lively picture of the ceaseless, indescribably intricate, and richly productive Life of Nature, regarded as a system of interacting Things and Selves. In this system there is everywhere present an immanent teleology—a vast, complex, and all-comprehensive network of final purposes.

Into a detailed exhibition of the facts upon which the conception of this universal "immanent teleology" relies, there is the less need to enter, because it has been so repeatedly and so fully made. The criticisms which have been most recently given to the conception in its modern form have abundantly shown its power to adapt itself to such minor modifications as the facts require, without losing anything whatever from its inherent impressiveness. Indeed, the greater number of these criticisms scarcely touch the nerve of the argument; much less do they weaken or destroy it. For example, when one writer¹ maintains that the proof from the observed adaptation of means to ends, to the intelligence which adapts them, is either tautological or false, because the very conception of ends necessarily involves intelligence, his objection, when examined, comes perilously near to being a mere verbal quibble. The distinctions, which are then introduced in the effort to substitute for this "argument from design" a so-called "eutaxiological argument" based upon the "reign of law," are, for the most part, either superficial and unnecessary or inconclusive as to the points at issue. To establish for the world of human experience a reign of law it is necessary to deal with the same facts to which the teleological argument appeals. "Order" and "the reign of law" everywhere imply both internal and external relations, really existing and actually effective, among the different parts of the world's individual beings, and also between those individual beings; these relations themselves indicate that the beings do in fact serve, or oppose, one another as means to the realization of common or of different ends. The very conceptions of "Order" and "Law" therefore involve the idea of the adaptation of means to ends. Nor does the proposal to substitute the conception of "function" for that of "purpose" either throw any glare of new light upon the phenomena or avail to weaken the force of

¹ Hicks, Critique of Design Arguments, p. vij.

the teleological argument. For function, too, is a fact from which we legitimately infer a purposing mind; just as order is a fact from which we infer an ordering mind. And if things cannot, without putting *mind* into them, be conceived of as ordering themselves, or as performing their several functions properly, then surely they cannot without putting mind into them, be conceived of as adapting themselves to one another with the result of constituting a vast system of apparent means and ends. At this point, of course, it is the vast and even universal extent of the system which seems to human reflective thinking to require the Unity of one intelligent First Cause. Thus the teleological argument extends the cosmological and ontological arguments.

The objections and concessions of another critic may be held to affect, as little as those of the writer just noticed, the re-statement of the argument from the observed "immanent teleology" of man's experienced world to the Being of God conceived of as Intelligent Will. "The argument," says this critic,¹ "as popularly pursued, proceeds upon the analogy of a personal agent, whose contrivances are limited, etc., . . . an argument leading only to the most unworthy and anthropomorphic conceptions." Yet we are soon told that "the satisfactory view of the whole case can only be found in those more enlarged conceptions which are furnished by the grand contemplation of cosmical order and unity, and which do not refer to inferences of the *past*, but to proofs of the *ever-present* mind and reason in nature." And elsewhere,² the critic of the teleological argument already quoted, does not hesitate to say: "The instances in which we can trace a *use* and a *purpose* in nature, striking as they are, after all constitute but a very small and subordinate portion of the vast scheme of universal order and harmony of design which pervades and connects

¹ Baden Powell, *Order of Nature*, p. 237f.

² Baden Powell, *Unity of Worlds* (2d ed.), p. 142.

the whole. Throughout the immensely greater part of nature we can trace *symmetry* and *arrangement*, but not the *end for which* the adjustment is made."

Now the truth which the modern developments of the particular sciences are enforcing and illustrating is this: Everywhere, in the large and in the small, in the parts of individual things and in the relations of these things to one another, in the past and in the present, in the realm of so-called matter and in the realm of so-called mind, and as respects the relations between the two, there is increasingly manifest the evidence "of universal order and harmony of design." At the same time, the inexplicable facts, and even the facts which seem to contradict the universality of this order and the harmony of this design, are greatly multiplied. Nevertheless, the human mind, working anthropomorphically but ever more and more after the pattern of the Universal Reason, refuses to accept as final that interpretation of such facts which does not relate them, too, to the all-ordering and all-harmonizing purposes of the "ever-present Mind and Reason."

Let it be granted, then, that the so-called teleological argument may more properly be called "the Argument from an universal Order." Combined, as it always must be, if it is to produce a rational conviction, with reasoning from the nature of the effect to the nature of the cause, and implying the validity of the ontological postulate, the argument from design becomes a cosmological argument in a truer, profounder, and more complete form. It is an argument from cosmic existences, processes, forces, as man has experience of them, to the Being of the Cosmos in respect of its real nature. Briefly stated it runs thus: (1) Man's experience with the world shows, and shows increasingly, as the different positive sciences extend the domain of human knowledge and bring their separate conclusions into greater harmony, that IT is an orderly totality; (2) The proper, rational, and only satisfactory explanation of this general fact of experience is the postulate of a World-

Ground, conceived of as an absolute Will and Intelligence—an intelligent Will, a willing Mind.

“ Among themselves all things
Have order; and from hence the form which makes
The Universe resemble God.”

At this point, the purely negative and quite unthinkable conception of the “Unconscious” intervenes. And doubtless, the unconscious for us as individuals and for the whole race of men is by far the greater part of what really is, and of what actually happens. But the “Unconscious” in general, employed as an explanatory principle or as the conclusion of an argument, is the mentally unrepresentable; it is the *Unding*, the vast, the infinite envelope of night, in the center of which floats the expanding daylight of man’s cognitive strivings and cognitive attainments. The same thing is equally true of such negative and mystical conceptions as are involved in Eckhart’s distinction of “God and Godhead,” which “differ as deed and not-deed;” and of all the negative predicates assigned to the “Godhead,” such as “non-spirit,” “non-good,” “non-moral,” etc.

Emphatically true is it that the net result of the various theories of evolution, all of which have tended to replace the older mechanical conception of the world with the conception of the physical Cosmos as a developing Life, has increased rather than diminished the scope and the cogency of the teleological argument. The Mind and Will which this evolution of living forms manifests, indicate that the teleological principle is so deeply bedded in the heart of Reality as to make it impossible for any individual existence to come actually to be, or even to be conceived of as being, without an implied conformity to a plan. If biological evolution starts, as most modern forms of the theory seem inclined to do, with the fundamental principle of variability assumed as a general fact of all life, and as a resultant from the composite nature of the germ and the infinitely varying forms of its environment, then science

must account for the plan-full, specific limitations of this variability. The principle of heredity must somehow co-operate, and must direct the variable along certain lines of development. But if biology start with heredity, and take for granted all that goes with this principle in order to secure a plan-full stability for living forms, then it must also discover some real principle which will account for the obvious restriction of the effects of inheritance. Only in this way can the progressive order and continuity of development in the different generations having the same ancestor be satisfactorily explained. But from whichever point of view science takes its start, the final problem remains essentially the same;—namely, to get all the principles so adjusted to one another and to common ends, that the actual, observed history of the development of life on the earth shall be adequately explained. And this cannot be done without the hypothesis of an immanent teleology, an indwelling and ordering Mind. Surely, in the interests of every theory of biological evolution we cannot say less, even if we cannot say more, than Weismann¹ has said upon this point: “I nevertheless believe that there is no occasion for this reason to renounce the existence of, or to disown, a directive Power.” “Behind the co-operating forces of nature which ‘aim at a purpose’ must we admit a Cause, which is no less inconceivable in its nature, and of which we can only say one thing with certainty, —viz., that it must be teleological.”

The cosmological and teleological arguments so-called reach their supreme form of expression in what is denominated, with a somewhat loose and expansive signification, the “Moral Argument” for the Being of God. In considering the evidence of immanent final purpose which the world-order shows, it is especially important to comprehend, if possible, the teleology of man himself, both of the individual and of the race. In some sort, and in spite of no little confusion and much darkness, the Universe as known to man seems to have realized in his pro-

¹ Theory of Descent (ed. London, 1882), II, p. 708; 712.

duction and development one of its most obvious final purposes. But IT has made him moral and capable of pronouncing judgments of value on things and on himself from the moral point of view. What sort of a universe must "IT" be, which can bring to actuality the moral being that man certainly is?

According to Pfeiderer¹ the moral argument falls into two parts: (1) "From the existence of the absolute moral law in our consciousness we arrive at God as absolute *lawgiver*;" and (2) "for the possibility of the realization of the moral law in the visible world, we postulate God as absolute *ruler* of the world." In one word, only absolute, or independent moral Being, can serve as the Ground of that ethical nature and ethical development which man knows himself to have attained. In a more tentative way Wundt² finds in human ethical experience the proof of a principle which seems to demand a source for itself that can neither lie in the individual animal or the individual man; nor in nature, considered as an unideal and unethical environment. How such a principle can be, Wundt thinks is "one of the questions which we shall in all probability never be able to answer." We shall subsequently express more in detail our agreement with Pfeiderer in thinking that the existence of such a principle demands the postulate of an ethical World-Ground.

The so-called moral proof, like all the other arguments, is not improved or made more theoretically convincing and practically effective by any of the various attempts to throw it into a demonstrative or intuitive form. For example, when one author³ affirms, "What we are immediately conscious of is, that the Ultimate Ground of all reality is asserting itself in us, and revealing to us an objective norm of conduct which is felt to possess a universality and an authority such as nothing fi-

¹ Philosophy of Religion, III, p. 264f.

² Ethics, I, p. 130f.

³ Upton, Bases of Religious Belief (Hibbert Lectures, 1897), p. 37.

nite or created could originate,"—he is leaping at a bound the steps in the argument through which the race has slowly found its way upward, in the evolution of moral and religious experience. Neither can we accord the verdict of success to Kant for his effort, in the "Critique of the Practical Reason," to connect the conception of God in a perfectly indisputable way with the absoluteness of the moral law, conceived of as a so-called categorical imperative. But undoubtedly, as Schultz argues,¹ the teleological argument is greatly strengthened by the facts and principles of man's moral life and moral development. "Every man," says he, "who believes unconditionally in moral obligation has in his heart an altar to the unknown God." The moral argument in truth puts the crown on the other forms of the cosmological and teleological arguments. But it can do little or nothing to overcome a determined agnosticism or materialism, because the citadel in which these views entrench themselves lies on the other side of the moral domain, so to say. It must, therefore, be taken by siege or by assault before religious experience can approach the discussion of problems of an ethical sort in their bearing upon the proof for the Being of God. "Unless a man really believes in God on other grounds," says the Roman Catholic writer, R. F. Clarke,² "I should be very sorry to have to convert him by means of the argument from conscience."

In the conceptions of Deity which are formed by savage or primitive man, the moral elements are either largely wanting; or else they are so uncertain and shifty as only slightly to influence his conduct or his cult. The same gods—whether conceived of as natural powers personified or in a more definite anthropomorphic fashion—may be regarded as well-disposed or ill-disposed to the individual and to the tribe, without calling into question the purity of the morals, either of themselves or of their worshippers. But as the development of man raises him

¹ Grundriss der Christlichen Apologetik, p. 82f.

² Existence of God, p. 43.

in the scale of morality, and elevates and purifies his ideas of the inviolability of moral principles and of the value of moral ideals, it also compels him to improve his conception of God as judged by moral standards.

The argument—if such it can be called—from man's æsthetic sentiments and ideals for the religious conception of the Being of the World as perfect Ethical Spirit is a part of the moral argument, in the wider signification of the term. The considerations which belong to this argument may be presented from two related but not identical points of view: (1) The stimulus which these sentiments—the feelings with which man greets his ideals of what is admirable, sublime, venerable, or mysterious, etc.—furnish toward the belief in God; and (2) the stimulus and the shaping which the sentiments and ideals themselves receive from the conception of God. Evidence for the existence of God, as a Being fit to satisfy the higher religious ideals of humanity, cannot be obtained without taking the facts of ethics and art chiefly into the account. In some real and important way, then, it is true that the ethical and æsthetic experience and development of man give God to man, and in themselves prove the reality of the God whom they give. They are forms of experience which will never rest satisfied with a view of the cosmos, and of man's cosmic relations, which reduces him to a merely dependent piece of a universal Mechanism, called "Nature," or what you will. The *Cosmos* itself must be interpreted so as to make room for all that is in man. For who is it that interprets this cosmos in terms, whether of the cosmological, or other forms of argument and belief? It is man himself. From this truly human point of view, all arguments must be regarded as only fragmentary parts of one argument; and that one argument may properly be designated "cosmological"—based however, on the ontological postulate which expresses the confidence of the race in its rational and cognitive development. To give up the faith that man may know the Being of the World, in a way, progressively the better to satisfy his own

enlarged mind, is to adopt a discouraging and dishonorable attitude of scepticism.

The Historical Argument is in no respect a separate form of evidence, or proof, for the Being of God. But, on the other hand, all the arguments, in order to be presented in the most convincing way, require the constant recognition of the value of historical studies. They themselves are, in their present most approved form, the results—each one—of an historical process. The proofs *are* developments, dependent upon the growing experience of the race, and upon its increasing ability to interpret and evaluate this experience. The motto of this argument may be stated in these words of Augustine, which are said to have converted Newman: *Securus judicat orbis terrarum*. From another point of view it resolves itself, as evidence, into the objective side of the psychological problems offered by the nature, origin, and development of religions, as those problems have already been discussed. “Given man such as he is, and given the world such as it is, a belief in divine beings, and, at last, in One Divine Being, is not only a universal, but an *inevitable* fact.”¹

¹See Max Müller, *Anthropological Religion*, Lecture IV.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE ARGUMENT RECONSTRUCTED

The reflective mind cannot remain uncritically "secure" in the judgment of the multitudes of mankind (the *orbis terrarum*) with regard to the being and attributes of God. This judgment may be claimed for nature-worship in some form, as chronologically prior to Theism; or for Buddhism, as to-day more "multitudinous" than Christianity. "Collective humanity," considered as the subject of religious experience, believes in the Object of religion, in God, in a very confused and unsatisfactory manner. The content of its conception, "the accumulation of centuries," is not such as to make it acceptable "in the raw" to a cultivated reason.

We have, indeed, seen the truth of the declaration that "The arguments in question (that is, for the Being of God) are so fundamental as to have commended themselves to man as soon as he began seriously to reflect upon religion, and at the same time so inexhaustible as to admit of continued adaptation to the ideas and idiosyncrasies of every successive age." But this very declaration implies the claim that the same arguments make upon the human reason a ceaseless demand for reconstruction. The total proof will always be an unfinished work. Its main outlines may remain, indeed, substantially unchanged in character; but they are constantly widening their scope, constantly accumulating the content with which they are to be filled, and constantly challenging renewed examination from changing points of view. Indeed, the Reality corresponding to the conception of God reveals

itself in no more convincing way than through a critical study of the history of man's religious development ; for this amply proves that the essentials of the conception endure through all the centuries of progressive rectification which the conception itself undergoes.

Such a perpetual challenge to humanity never to give over its attempt the better to sound the profounder depths of this Ideal of the religious experience, and to discover more comprehensively and surely what Reality sustains and validates its development, is enforced by powerful social considerations. *Life*, in the noblest, broadest, and highest meaning of the term, is impossible without that attitude of filial piety toward the Being of the World which is the very heart and pulse of genuine subjective religion. The social nature of man, therefore, becomes an unceasing stimulus of the demand for so-called proof upon this subject. Indifference is impossible. If I believe, why argue with myself? If I do not believe, why argue with another? Why should men generally strive so mightily to convince their fellows that God is, or that he is not? It is not my experience which alone needs to be explained. It is the experience of the race, the universal and typical experience of mankind. All the rational and social interests which belong to humanity at large are concerned in the constant inquiry of the race for a renewed investigation of the grounds on which reposes its own undying faith in God.

On the other hand, the history of discussion, as well as the nature of the problems discussed, warns us that no individual thinker, however fruitful or bold his thinking may be, need expect to make any considerable contribution toward the answer to this problem of the ages. At most the individual can only set forth his own view of the particular considerations which should, in his judgment, most powerfully influence the men of his own day to a more rational faith in the Object of the universal religious experience. This work, like every work of thought, must be done by the *individual thinker*; for

there is no argument, either for the display or for the criticism of any kind of evidence, which is not some *individual's thought*.

At this point it is necessary to recall the nature of the task which is before us now, and which will remain before us until the end. This task is (1) to establish the Unitary Being of God in such manner as to meet the legitimate demands of modern science and philosophy; and, at the same time, (2) to vindicate and expound the Spirituality of this Being in such manner as to satisfy the higher æsthetical and ethical sentiments and ideals, and so to afford evidence for the essential truth of humanity's religious experience.

In the accomplishment of such a task, no matter how partially, we are, however, entitled to whatever advantages flow naturally from certain considerations established by our historical and psychological studies, and by our previous criticism of the arguments customarily proposed. One of these considerations is the necessity of combining the historical and the philosophical methods. But as says D'Alviella:¹ "These methods do not exclude each other; nay, each finds in the other its necessary supplement." The rather is it true that these methods represent different aspects of the one rational movement of the race in its effort to attain and to justify a satisfying faith in God.

When the inquiry is raised, What conception of God, if it can be established by evidence, whether of the indisputable or of the probable sort, would best meet the intellectual, ethical, æsthetical, and social needs of men? a tolerably sure clue to the right answer is found in the nature and development of the religious experience of the race. There is undoubted truth in the observation of Pascal,² that different minds both

¹ Origin and Growth of the Conception of God, p. vii.

² *Pensées*, Partie I, art. x, sec. 33: "Ceux qui sont accoutumés à juger par le sentiment ne comprennent rien aux choses de raisonnement; car ils veulent d'abord pénétrer d'une vue, et ne sont point accoutumés à chercher les principes. Et les autres, au contraire, qui sont accoutumés à raisonner par principes, ne comprennent rien aux choses de sentiment, y cherchant des principes, et ne pouvant voir d'une vue."

approach and estimate the truth of this conception in quite different ways. Inasmuch, however, as the religious experience of the race—religion when considered subjectively—includes activities and attitudes of thought, of feeling, and of the life of conduct, the Object toward which, considered as a Reality, this experience is directed, must necessarily assume a form to correspond with the subjective experience. It is desirable at once, then, to define clearly in the interests of critical and reflective thinking, the goal which it is intended to reach. This is the conclusion that *the World-Ground may reasonably be conceived of as personal, and perfect Ethical Spirit*. The many difficulties in the way of such a conclusion must, indeed, be candidly and thoroughly examined. But to forejudge the conclusion by warning us that “we must not fall down and worship as the source of our life and virtue, the image which our own minds have set up;” and to ask, “Why such idolatry is any better than that of the old wood and stone?” is to retreat before the struggle, and fall back upon the otiose and unreasonable positions of a worn-out dogmatic agnosticism. “The image which our own minds set up” is our only standard of any form of truth, our only medium of commerce with reality. Man *does* fall down and worship such an image; this is one of the very things chiefly to be accounted for. But that other image which takes its name from metaphysical babblings similar to those of the pseudo-Dionysius when he characterizes Deity as “Super-essential Indetermination, supra-rational Unity, super-essential Essence, the Absolute No-Thing above all existence,” is quite as much comparable to “old wood and stone” as are the idol gods of the most intellectually degraded races.

Since the conception of personality, as well as the conception of Divine Being, has been and still is subject to a process of development, the effort to combine the two into a self-consistent and harmonious idea, such as that which is covered by the term “personal Absolute,” must also be, for its perfection and rationality, so to say, dependent upon develop-

ment. In religion the conception of God as perfect Ethical Spirit marks the highest point hitherto reached by one form of the evolution of mankind. In philosophy, so far as philosophy deals with the fundamental problem proposed by this conception, its chief difficulties of the more strictly logical order concern the Idea to be subsumed under such a term (*i. e.*, *personal Absolute*). In order to overcome these difficulties two things must be made to appear:—First, that the conception of Personality, or self-conscious Spirit, is not necessarily limited from without,—*ab-extra*, as it were; that it is, on the contrary, the one positive standpoint (or *Blickpunkt*) from which all concrete realities and actual relations are necessarily regarded; and that, when thought out in its most essential and highest form, it is a *self-limiting* and *self-consistent* conception. But, second, it must also be made to appear that the Absoluteness of God is not annulled, but the rather enriched, confirmed to thought, and made intelligible, by the system of particular and individual beings in which He is immanent, and through which He manifests himself. Thus, in some sort, the problem for the philosophy of religion becomes, not so much whether God exists or not, as what is the Nature of the Ultimate Reality. And the best possible solution of this problem is attained, if we are warranted in conceiving of this Reality as the Ground of all that we hold true in science, of all that we admire in art, of all that we esteem most worthy in morals; and, as well, as the valid Object of religious belief and worship.

The logical process of constructing, on the basis of man's total and ever-developing experience, the conception of the Ultimate Reality, or World-Ground, as an Absolute Person, while this process in some sort constitutes a unity of argument, cannot claim for all parts of itself an equally convincing kind or amount of evidence. Especially is this true when the attempt is made to incorporate into the conception those ethical and æsthetical elements which are most important and dear to the religious consciousness. It is comparatively easy to show

that all such categories as Force, Cause, Relation, and the more complex categories of Law, Matter, Nature, etc., imply for the human mind One Absolute Will and Mind as constituting the Ground of that system of things and of finite selves of which man has experience. Certain metaphysical predicates, all of which speak in terms that are meaningless as applied to beings devoid of self-consciousness, may also be inferred. But at the point where this conclusion from the data of experience to the rational conception of a World-Ground, as Will and Mind, meets the objections derived from the category of *self-consciousness*, the difficulties of reconciling the absoluteness of God with his personality culminate in a way to demand a more searching analysis. It is, however, where reflective thinking seeks to ascribe the perfection of so-called *moral* attributes to the World-Ground, that the difficulties become most perplexing and acute. For at this point the dark problem of evil seems to block the path of reason. And, indeed, this blocking is effectual, unless it can be agreed to expand the scope of so-called "reason," and at the same time to throw the weight of the argument over upon certain other aspects of human experience. Hence, while the candid investigator might be able to say that he *knows* the sum-total of the experience of the race is best explained by reference to the unitary principle of one intelligent Will, he would conform his language to his mental attitude better if he only claimed that there seem to be good reasons for his *faith* in the moral and spiritual perfection of God.

In all that movement of reason, by which it seeks grounds for a belief in God, it is important to keep the teachings of history in view. The admonition to do this has already been several times repeated. It is history which supplies us with the knowledge of certain of the more constant elements in man's conception of Deity. These elements, by virtue of their very constancy, have a peculiar claim upon the student of the philosophy of religion. They may be grouped under the fol-

lowing two heads: The "root-conception," always found on digging down into human consciousness, is the super-humanity of God. This conception must not, however, be confused with that of the super-natural; much less with the belief that the Divine Being is so above man as to be unknowable or incommunicable by way of relations of thought, feeling, or will. In power, majesty, control over the conditions of space, time, and causation, in wisdom, justice, and, finally, in goodness and purity, the Divine is to be esteemed as *more* than human. At the same time, and as the complement of the elements just enumerated, the likeness of God and man is somehow or other, always either tacitly assumed or openly advocated. Such a likeness is the only conceivable basis on which any degree or kind of communion between the two can take place. "That God is a Spirit is, in brief," says Tiele,¹ "the creed of man throughout all ages; and religious man feels the need of ascribing to God in perfection all the attributes he has learned to regard as the highest and noblest in his own spirit."

We shall now sketch in barest outline the argument for the religious conception of the Being of the World as it presents itself in the light of modern science and philosophy, and of modern life, leaving to subsequent chapters the work of completing the details, especially at those places where difficulty and dispute chiefly arise.

"Does the world explain itself, or does it lead the mind above and beyond itself?"² Science, philosophy, and religion, all have their birth in the negative answer to this question. In some sort, unless we assume that things and selves, as they appear to the senses under the conditions of space and time, are not self-explanatory, neither science, nor philosophy, nor religion, could even come into existence.³ But all three—religion, science, and, especially, philosophy—have been con-

¹ Elements of the Science of Religion, Second Series, p. 103.

² So Professor Flint, Theism, p. 12.

³ Comp. Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte d. Philosophie, I, ii, p. 204f.

stantly placing upon surer and broader convictions the knowledge of the World's Unity as presented in all these forms of human experience. The path of the progress of each of the three is indeed strewn with hasty and over-confident generalizations. The various subordinate unities, whether they are known as related species of things, or as those more or less uniform ways of the behavior of things which we call laws, have often enough been misapprehended. Thus it is essential to progress that the old unities should be reduced to their constituent elements and new conceptions should be formed. But all the while there has been an increasing conviction, supported by an accumulating mass of evidence, as to some sort of a Unitary Being belonging to the manifold varied and incessantly changing complex of existences and events. Indeed, all the terms in which the growth of any kind of knowledge expresses itself signify man's undying confidence in this truth. In some sort, the many are connected; they are in a system; they constitute a cosmos; there is a "reign of law"; there is a real order underlying the apparent confusion; the world of man's experience is undergoing a process of interdependent evolution. The Being of the World is One; or at least, it is on its way to becoming One.

That this conception of the unitary Being of the World is a pleasing and helpful postulate for all the particular sciences, there is no necessity to prove. That the conception corresponds to the reality, the achievements of science tend either to assume with more confidence or to show with an increasing amount of evidence. In man's religious development we have already seen what powerful forces have been successfully at work to compel his mind to the belief in one God rather than in indefinitely many gods. Even in the case of the ancient Egyptians who, as Renouf affirms,¹ probably saw no inconsistency in holding at one and the same time the doctrine of many gods and One God, there was evolved the conception expressed—in however

¹ The Religion of Ancient Egypt, p. 96.

esoteric form—in the hymn to Amon Rā : “ The ONE, Maker of all that is ; the One, the only One, the Maker of existences.”

Philosophy may then appeal to both science and religion, and may base its appeal upon the achievements in development of both, when it claims that, either in the course of argument or in the form of a postulate, some one *real Principle* must be arrived at which shall assist in explaining the unitary nature of our experience with the manifold world of things and of men.

This explanatory Principle must be not merely logical but *real* ; it must be believed in, or known, as having an existence independent of the constructive activity of human imagination and human thinking. It must serve as the Ground, both of these activities and of the objects which they construct. To use the abstract and often misleading, but expressive term of the Hegelian philosophy, it must have its “ Being-in-itself.” And this real principle must be One. It must have some *unity* in reality. Since the world of fact and law is constantly revealing itself in human experience as more and more an interconnected whole, the real Being which explains this whole in a fundamental way, must also be conceived of as a unifying *actus*. It is the Unitary Being of this principle which accounts for the interconnection and orderly relations of the world of man’s varied experiences.

When, however, such metaphysical abstractions as the foregoing are examined, it soon becomes obvious how unsatisfactory, if left in their abstractness, they are to account for the manifold, vital, and intensely real, concrete facts of daily life. In spite, however, of this dissatisfaction which philosophy shares with common sense and with popular feeling, let us call for the present that Unitary Being which is to serve as a real explanatory Principle of these varied facts, by the title of “ The World-Ground.” Such a term has confessedly an uncouth structure and harsh acoustic properties ; but it is, perhaps, as well fitted as any other to express the conclusion of

the present moment in the argument. For, (1) it is impersonal; (2) it nevertheless expresses some sort of a unity; and (3) it indicates some sort of a real relation, a vital and productive connection, between our experience of the world and the explanatory principle which we seek.

It was Schopenhauer who more clearly than any other modern philosopher brought forward a thought which, after all, is necessarily regulative of all the attempts to explain experience that depend upon the belief in, or knowledge of, a World-Ground. No conception can explain this experience that does not incorporate in itself our human but fundamental idea of *causative activity*. *The World-Ground cannot serve as a real and unitary principle unless It is itself conceived of as Will.* This contention may be argued in the light of the psychological study of that universal experience from which man derives all his categories of Force, Power, Energy, Cause;—and whatever other conceptions seem necessary to distinguish being from non-being, doing from not-doing, life from death. It is in this knowledge of himself as essentially an active will that man finds the warrant for all these categories as he applies them to external things. The application is, indeed, made as a kind of fundamental anthropomorphism. But it enters into all knowledge; and without it nothing can be known to act or even to be.¹

The same conclusion may be argued on the authority of modern science. The conceptions which it has embodied in the so-called law of the conservation and correlation of energy are in evidence here. This “energy” of the Being of the World appears to scientific insight more and more of a kind to bring into orderly connections and sequences all the separate manifestations of energy, whether these manifestations are located, so to say, in selves or in things. To be sure, no one specific kind of energizing, and no one established formula to

¹ This truth is shown in detail throughout the author's treatises on the “Philosophy of Knowledge” and “A Theory of Reality.”

express the relations of the different centers of energy has been discovered hitherto. Moreover, any expression for the dynamic relations which seem to be maintained *between* selves and things is as yet a formula so hidden, if indeed it exist in reality at all, that the mind can scarcely imagine words in which such an expression could be framed. Still further, the behavior of radio-active substances, and other physical phenomena, as well as the growing tendency to look on psychoses themselves as active forces, and the difficulties of reconciling so static a conception as the "conservation of energy" offers with the evidences that the World is an evolving Life, are just now shaking the confidence of the thoughtful in the finality and supremacy of the scientific conception of Energy as a unifying principle. Still the positive sciences cling, and very properly cling, to their determination to regard the separate forces as somehow resolvable into different forms of the manifestation of that which is essentially One. To fill the abstract and barren conception of One Force with a vital experience we are obliged to refer to the unifying *actus* of a single Will.¹

In some form the reflections of philosophy have, from time immemorial, virtually endowed the Being of the World with that capacity for causal energy which man knows in himself

¹ A careful analysis of any of those terms in which modern science attempts to summarize its views as to the nature of that substantial and ultimate unity in which it wishes to ground all its explanations of physical phenomena will illustrate this statement. According to a recent writer the latest conclusions as to what is known about this unity may be summarized as follows: "*Ether* under strain constitutes 'charge'; *ether* in locomotion constitutes current and magnetism; *ether* in vibration constitutes light. What *ether* itself is we do not know, but it may, perhaps, be a form or aspect of matter. Now we can go one step further and say: Matter is composed of *ether* and nothing else." [Address by Professor Edward L. Nichols on "The Fundamental Concepts of Physical Science," before the International Congress at St. Louis; see *Popular Science Monthly*, Nov. 1904, p. 62.] The "in-itself" being of this *Ether*, out of which Matter in the different forms of its manifestation and activity is composed, so far as it is known or knowable is statable only in terms of Will and Mind.

as his will. On the basis of that irresistible experiential proof to which we have already referred, man believes that such capacity, although limited and subject to development, is the fundamental thing with himself. It is the very core of his being, to will. So must it be, according to the testimony of the world's reflective thinkers, after an enlarged and more mysterious fashion, with the Being of the World. With Plato the Good was conceived of as a fountain of quenchless and exhaustless energy. With Aristotle the Prime Mover was the responsible agent for the changes of which men's senses and reasonings took account. With Kant the Ultimate Reality was personal Will. And Hegel's "Thought" is no passive entity or merely abstract arrangement of dead categories; it, too, is the energizing of a self-revealing Will.

Although we have no experience from which to derive a content that shall give the conception of the World-Ground its right to exist as an explanatory principle, which does not refer to the core of its reality as an actual energizing, the conception of *mere* Will is quite inadequate. It is both too meagre and too abstract. Just as our experience is not an experience of things and minds *merely* acting and interacting, so its explanatory Principle cannot be a *mere* Being of the World conceived of after the analogy of Will. Order and adaptation—as the so-called cosmological argument has already been justified in asserting—imply that the syntheses of Will which everywhere abound must be directed by Mind. Order and adaptation are facts. They are facts which require co-operating energies that are somehow converged, as it were, upon the attainment of an end. Such is the comprehensive conclusion of the so-called cosmological and teleological view of the world, from the beginning of human reflection down to the present time. We have already seen (pp. 45 ff.) that the nature of the argument has not changed essentially, from first to last. Essentially considered, it cannot change. When the world of man's experience was conceived of as "dead matter," as a machine

moved upon by forces from without, the Mind which it displayed, and on which it depended for its forms and laws, was located *ab-extra*, and operated upon it from afar, as it were,—albeit through subordinate agencies and secondary causes and intermediary existences. When, however, the subtler conception of a mechanism, molecular and atomic, had supplanted the coarser notion of a world made like a machine, the intelligent Will, the willing Mind, was conceived of as interpenetrating and immanent in every detail of the world's beings and doings. Yet subtler is that more modern conception of the world which likens it to an indwelling and unfolding Life. With this conception, Mind becomes, not only that intelligent force which makes things so to exist that human beings can apprehend and understand them, but also that explanatory Principle which gives the warrant to assert that things themselves are manifestly all informed with mental life.

For centuries astronomy afforded both the most influential line of thinking along which men were carried from mythological nature-worship toward theistic views, and also the most impressive argument for the Being of God. Of Confucius' use of the vague term "Heaven," which he employed to win the people from idolatry, Dr. Martin affirms:¹ "He ascribed to the object of his reverence more of personality than they (his followers of to-day) are willing to admit." In the Chinese conception, Heaven has always possessed certain indwelling capacities of will and mind. The modern sciences of chemistry, physics, and biology—especially the latter with its microscopic investigation of the evolution of cell-structure and cell-growth—directs our attention the rather to that immanent Life of the world, whom religion worships as the "living and life-giving God." On the level of the chemico-physical sciences, this thought is put into realistic and highly figurative language by a celebrated writer on physics, when he says:² "The atoms are

¹ The Lore of Cathay, p. 43.

² Life of James Clerk Maxwell, p. 391.

a very tough lot, and can stand a great deal of knocking about, and it is strange to find a number of them combining to form a man of feeling." And again: "I have looked into most philosophical systems, and I have seen that none will work without a God."

This vitalistic view of Nature as implying an indwelling Mind and Will is a return, in the name of science and in vastly improved and more profoundly significant form, to the same point of view from which so much of religious belief and practice took its rise. In this connection it should be noticed that those categories under which all scientific research, and all the expositions of the sciences, relate their discovered phenomena, imply essentially the same conclusion. Causation means nothing intelligible unless it means active will endowed with intelligence. *Bare Cause, mere Force or Energy*, causes and forces and kinds of energy that are not directed toward some end, are not only inconceivable as having place in a system of existences, but they also are quite unable to effect the reality of such a system.

If, then, God is to be known or knowable as the Ground of the World, it cannot be as bare Will, or as unconditioned Primal Cause, or as mere and indefinite Principle of existence. For the world itself, as known or knowable, is not a mere "lump," so to say, of existences and occurrences; nor do its existences, forces, and so-called causes, operate upon each other, or stand together in the totality of the world, in an undefined, unclassifiable, unspecialized way. This is to say that "causes" are always, and of their very nature, teleological. They serve their own and one another's ends. God is the Ground of the co-operation of existences and causes to whatsoever ends are—whether we can discover what they are, or not—actually being fulfilled. As I have elsewhere said,² in conclusion of a detailed discussion of the conceptions involved: "This is, indeed, just

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 426.

² A Theory of Reality, p. 360.

what a 'principle of causation' necessarily means—*Will energizing in conformity to ideal forms and aims.*"

On the one hand, then, this One Will, the Will of God, is not something apart from, or wholly beside and above, the many finite and concrete centers of energy—human wills and willing things, considered as relatively independent centers of activity, which by their co-operating bring about the manifestation of the One Will of God. Or as Professor Royce has forcefully but not quite adequately stated the case:¹ "The Divine Will is simply that aspect of the Absolute which is expressed in the concrete and differentiated individuality of the World." But, on the other hand, God as Will is not mere undifferentiated Power; in order to "get his will done," this infinite Power must be translated into many finite powers. The forms and laws of the translation, as we actually see it constantly going on in the processes of so-called Nature, implies the immanent presence of Mind. Thus much at least is demonstrably true.

It is enough at this stage of the argument to say, that the very words and formulas which man is obliged to use in all his attempts to construct a scientific and systematic interpretation of his experience, shows him to be obliged to conceive of the Ground of it all as an ordering and designing Will, or Mind. But other experiences enable us to consider this Divine Will as rising above the blind strivings and desires which the phenomena of nature exhibit, and lead our thought beyond the more definite specializations of energy, its kinds and laws, with which the particular sciences make us familiar, upward to the conception of moral will as choice; and this moral will, blended with emotion, is the Divine Love and the precondition of the Divine Blessedness.

The argument for the Being of God still remains, however, in the region of inadequate abstractions. May this Mind-Will be conceived of as a self-conscious personal Life, an Absolute

¹ The Conception of God, p. 202/.

Self in the supremest meaning possible for these words? At this point the argument undoubtedly begins to grapple with the objections of those who will go only so far as Schopenhauer and Hartmann, and many others both in ancient and modern times have gone. If it stops here, however, it rests in such a largely negative and abstract conception of the Divine Being as has seemed sufficient to Brāhmanical and Buddhistic philosophy, to most of what is called Pantheism in Western thinking, and to not a little of both ancient and modern Christian mysticism. But it fails either to explain or to satisfy the demands of the religious consciousness, both psychologically and historically considered; and it denies or minimizes the ontological value of the Object of religious faith and worship, conceived of as perfect Ethical Spirit and so as the Father and Redeemer of the race. We must, then, in spite of defects in the cogency of the argument we are following, and of obstacles from counter-arguments, accept still further the leadership of the history of the race in its religious experience and religious development. It may well be that we shall discover that both science and philosophy, if not wholly able to accept and substantiate the convictions of religion, are at least unable successfully to dispute or to displace them.

It must at once be admitted that we cannot affirm the self-consciousness, and so the complete Self-hood or Personality of God, in quite the same way as that in which we are led to believe that the World-Ground must be conceived of as Will and Mind. All reasoning about the interactions and relations of finite things and minds, and all forms of mentally representing these interactions and relations, imply the immanence and control of an active, teleological principle in the world. This truth must be accepted, with all that it implicates, or else all attempt to give a rational explanation to any form of human experience must be abandoned. But there are many exhibitions of this principle concerning which experience cannot affirm the presence of self-conscious and personal Life, in the

fuller meaning of this term. Molecules, atoms, ions, as well as everything animate or inanimate, from expanding iron to growing cell, from flower in crannied wall to star overhead, are individual beings whose actions and relations exemplify the truth of immanent Will and Mind. But that each of these beings is self-conscious and personal, or even conscious so as to have any awareness of the ends which it seems to us to serve, or of any ends whatever, we cannot claim to know in any demonstrative way.

It has been claimed in the interests of the theistic position, that the conception of a mind which is not self-conscious or at least conscious, is like the conception of "wooden iron;" it involves, that is to say, a contradiction in terms. Now it is undoubtedly true that all knowledge of the nature of mind is conscious experience. The results of such knowledge are presentable and intelligible only in terms of consciousness. Moreover, in order to know what it is to be a Self, or Person, in the fullest meaning of the word, one must have had the experience of self-consciousness. It is also true that selfhood, or personality, is impossible—cannot exist, cannot be conceived of—without self-consciousness. Undoubtedly, too, the measure of mind which is credited to the lower animals, as well as to our fellow men, and even to plants and inorganic things, is realizable for human minds, only in terms of consciousness. All psychology, even that which assumes to deal with the "unconscious," or the "subliminal," is descriptive and explanatory of conscious states in terms of such states. And yet there remains the undoubted fact that, so far as immediate experience or observation can go, the greater part by far of all the world's happenings take place without either the consciousness, or the self-consciousness, of finite beings availing to account for them as an immanent cause. These happenings, too, all make upon the mind the irresistible impression of being manifestations of intelligent will. This is the lesson of the religious development of humanity, all the way from the low-

est stage of unreflective spiritism to the highest form of philosophical monotheism.

Whenever, then, it is proposed to attribute the unifying *actus* of a self-conscious Life to the world at large, or to justify religious faith in the Selfhood of God on grounds of the obvious self-conscious and personal characteristics belonging to this world, the proposal voices certain well-founded impressions, which can be supported by credible proofs; but the argument rests upon somewhat tentative and doubtful grounds.

For, in the first place, the enormous complexity and bewildering variety of causes and happenings which the world, conceived of as a totality, exhibits, seem to make it difficult or impossible to unite them in any one event, so to say, like that of an act or state of self-consciousness. Each atom, molecule, ion, ovum, thing, finite mind from the beginning to the end of its development, surely cannot be said always to be self-conscious and so personal in the higher meaning of the term. Much less would it seem that the totality of them all, in all their relations, could be demonstrably proved to coexist—not simply at some one time, but always and essentially—within the grasp of the self-consciousness or other-consciousness of some one Personal Life. That the Being of the world shall be explained as the dependent manifestation of a Personal Absolute, who is conscious and self-conscious; that It shall be considered as only the impersonal term for that Principle which is, essentially considered, the Absolute Self;—this is, indeed, an exalted conception and one worthy of the most serious and prolonged consideration. But there is no safe and sure short-cut in the argument by which to justify the conception. On the contrary, there are many and great difficulties which lie along the way.

The contemptuous manner in which some writers have dismissed the rational postulate that the World-Ground is self-conscious and personal Being is even less worthy of the thoughtful mind than is the easy-going dismissal of the

difficulties involved in its proof. To affirm off-hand that "absoluteness" and "personality" are incompatible and self-contradictory conceptions, or that an Infinite Being cannot be self-conscious, because this implies limitation, is again to mistake mere juggling with abstract terms for sound criticism of an impressive argument. Especially is this manner of procedure impertinent, when it is accompanied by the proposal to make some purely negative notion play the part of a valid explanatory principle. If God cannot be infinite and also personal, it is *a fortiori* true that "The Infinite," "the Unconscious," "the Unknowable," cannot in any wise be made to take the place of an infinite, personal God. Neither does it help either head, heart, or conscience, to proclaim the dictum—so fashionable of late—that the Infinite and Ultimate Reality is something "more" and "higher" than personal. More and higher than all human conceptions of his personal Being, God undoubtedly is. This truth has always been insisted upon by the highest religious experience, and by the most penetrating insight and elaborate reasoning of the philosophy of religion. But, so far as human imagination and thought can compass what that something is like, it must be imagined and thought in terms of the most perfect self-conscious and personal Life. It is the Ideal of such Life which sets to humanity its standard of value. Anything higher and better than this ever-advancing Ideal is not to be spoken of as a substitute for the Ideal itself. And all the negative and limiting conceptions proposed as substitutes are quite devoid of either theoretical or practical worth.

It is significant to note that the one form of religious philosophy which has most keenly felt and boldly expressed the difficulty of conceiving of God as both absolute and self-conscious, infinite and personal, has itself been exceedingly vacillating and equivocal in the use of its terms. This form of the philosophy of religion is customarily called pantheistical; even when it is not charged with being pantheism outright. Abun-

dant illustrations of this historical fact might be derived from the treatment given to this conception, whether as embodied in the *Nous* of Anaxagoras and Plotinus, or the *Logos* of Philo and of much of Christian mysticism. Even Islam, with its stern and fanatical assertion of the sovereignty of a personal God, when its later theological developments brought it face to face with this problem, fell into the same vacillation and habit of equivocating. "The anthropomorphic God of Muhammad, who has face and hands, is seen in Paradise by the believer and settles himself firmly upon his throne, becomes a spirit, and a spirit, too, of the vaguest kind."¹ This rejection of personal qualifications as limitations inconsistent with the absoluteness of the One God led such a theologian as Ibn Hazm to the startling conclusion that all the human and moral attributes ascribed to Allah by the Koran are *mere names*; they indicate nothing belonging to the real essence of the Infinite. To regard these names as ontologically valid would involve multiplicity in God's nature; for there would at least be introduced into the Divine Being the distinction of quality and the thing qualified. Along this path the later Sufis come to the wholly pantheistic position, which denies the self-conscious personality of God and identifies God and the world. "It is part of the irony of the history of Muslim theology," says a writer² on this subject, "that the very emphasis on the transcendental unity should lead thus to pantheism."

In the religious philosophy of India—the reflective thinking which is, on the intellectual side, the religion of Brāhmanism—the confusion caused by the efforts to unite the factors necessary to the conception of an Absolute Person is conspicuous. This philosophy, indeed, includes within its entire circuit every important phase of belief respecting the nature of the One Divine Being—from Theism to Pantheism, from Material-

¹ Macdonald, *Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*, p. 145.

² Macdonald, *Ibid.*, 233.

ism to monistic Spiritualism. But for this reason, and throughout it all, it shows the characteristics of vacillation and equivocation. Brahma is variously conceived of and defined in shifting manner, with the obvious intention of escaping the charge of limiting the conception, and at the same time securing a fuller satisfaction both to the philosophical and to the religious consciousness.¹ "All this (universe) is *Brahma*." "This (universal being) is my ego, spirit, and is *Brahma*, force (absolute being)." Brahma is "the self-determining principle manifesting itself in all the determinations of the finite without losing its unity with itself." It is "absolute thought and being." The world of our experience, which is *Māyā*, came into existence because Brahma "thought and willed to become many and accordingly became many."² Brahma may even be called, when the thought of the thinker escapes from the leashes, "self-conscious spirit." But when the stricter interpretation of the nature of this spirit, with its self-conscious activity, is demanded, the fear of limiting the Absolute, defining the Infinite, calls the thought back to the necessity of employing more vague and flexible terms. Then Brahma is incomprehensible and is to be described only by negatives. That the more modern thinking over this problem finds itself beset at this point with the same difficulties, and tempted to the same mode of escape from them, there is no need to show in detail, in the present connection.

It is therefore imperative for religion, if it proposes to reconcile that philosophical conception of the Being of the World which is supported by the assumptions and discoveries of the positive sciences, with the conception which it holds respecting the Object of its own faith and worship, that it should arrive at

¹ For illustrations, see Hopkins, *Religions of India*, p. 221f.

² Comp. the *Vedānta Sūtra*, 1-5; and, as a modern Hindū writer declares: "Thus Rationalism (that is of the Vedānta philosophy) reveals the Supreme Being both as personal and impersonal (*The Hindū System of Religious Science and Art*, by Kishori Lal Sarkar, p. 19).

some clear understanding of its position in the face of these difficulties. Is God to be conceived of, not simply as Absolute Will and Mind, in the vague and shifty fashion in which Theism and Pantheism may be now antagonistic and now agreed; but, the rather, as a self-conscious Person, a true and complete Self?

The more recent discussions of this problem have been accustomed to minimize its importance by passing it by on the one side or the other. Those who take the left-hand path, assume that the complete incompatibility of absolute and infinite Being with the limiting conditions of self-consciousness has been so established as to make unnecessary further discussion. Those who pass the same problem by upon the right-hand side are apt to shield themselves by an appeal to the claim of Lotze¹: "Perfect personality is in God only, to all finite minds there is allotted but a pale copy thereof; the finiteness of the finite is not a producing condition of this Personality but a limit and a hindrance of its development." We do not find it, alas! so easy on merely metaphysical grounds to settle this contention. That the antinomies in the conception of an Absolute Self-conscious Person are largely introduced there by those who find them, or by their predecessors in the same line of research, we have no doubt. On the other hand, it is well to remember that Lotze himself came to his conclusion only at the end of a lengthy discussion of related problems; and that the conclusion, as applied in the philosophy of religion, follows from a doctrine of the reality of things and of their dependent existence² which is by no means either a universally accepted postulate of science or an undisputed principle of ontology.

What better, then, can philosophy do at this point for the conception of religion than accord to it the favorable consideration to which, on historical and psychological grounds, it is clearly entitled? To such a consideration the following thoughts

¹ *Microcosmus* (English Translation), II, p. 688.

² As given at length in his *Metaphysik*, Book I.

prepare the way. And, first, there can be no doubt that the more purely religious beliefs, sentiments, and practical life of mankind are better satisfied with, than without, the conception of God as self-conscious Spirit, a true Person, or Self. This fact is evidenced by the form taken by the highest developments of religious experience in the past. It is, indeed, involved in a very important way in the most essential characteristics of this experience. The experience itself is one of personal and spiritual relations ; the most important beliefs, sentiments, and practical life of religion cannot be understood or justified in terms of a conception which denies self-consciousness to the Absolute Will and Mind. If the undoubted conclusions of the particular sciences or of modern philosophy should discover that the World-Ground cannot be, or rightfully be conceived of as being, a self-conscious Spirit, then these sciences and this philosophy could not be brought into a rational harmony with the supreme product of the religious experience. But the persistence and development of religious experience, with its beliefs, sentiments, and practices, is as much a fundamental fact as is the persistence and development of either science or philosophy. And philosophy is especially charged with the responsible task of a perpetual effort to bring about harmony in the total life of humanity.

But, second, a critical examination of the conceptions currently subsumed under such titles as Absolute, Infinite, The Unconscious, Self-consciousness, Personality, etc., shows that every one of them is in constant need of revision and improvement. Especially is such need apparent in the case of those vague, negative conglomerates of thought and imagination that are wont to be clothed in some of these terms. Small wonder, then, that they refuse to lie quietly side by side in the same bed with any rational conception of a self-conscious and personal existence. It may be possible, however,—and we need not, at least antecedently to renewed trials, despair of this possibility,—to remove from these terms some of their more unwar-

rantable and objectionable factors; and thus to make them fitter companions for union with the factors really belonging to the nature of a Self. Or, even in the last resort: What if one should feel obliged to deny the absoluteness and infinity of God, in the stricter meaning of these terms, in order to save some intelligible and practical concept of his personality? This would, indeed, be a disappointing result. It might force the mind back upon the Kantian position of a recognized powerlessness to transcend the limits of the cognitive reason; but, as Kant held, we might be none the less compelled to believe in God as Infinite Person, in the interests of moral and practical reason. And to sacrifice—at least for the time being—something from our conception of God on the side of his absoluteness and infinitude, would not necessarily be more irrational than to surrender all claim to a belief in Him as Self-conscious Spirit.

Indeed, even on metaphysical and purely cognitive grounds, the finger-point of the highest rationality would seem to indicate that the path to Reality lies in the opposite direction. For, in the third place, if it cannot be affirmed that all real Being must be, and essentially is, self-conscious, it can be demonstrated that man's best-known being, as well as the most highly developed and valuable form of being conceivable by man, is that of a self-conscious Person. Whether other apparent beings have any reality, real unity, or indeed real place in the Universe of beings and events, or not, our own self-conscious selves are known to be real and unitary, in a very special and undeniable way. And what is even more important for the argument: Self-conscious beings, so far as the human mind can know or conceive of Reality, stand at its very head in the scale of values. Or—to express the same truth in a more abstract way—to be self-conscious, to be-for-oneself, to have "For-Self-Being," is to have attained the very most distinguished and intensely actual and profoundly worthy kind of existence. It is such self-conscious personal existence, which, in the example of man as a

species, and supremely in the example of the few most highly gifted and developed of humanity, is altogether the choicest known or conceivable product of Nature's evolution through the ages.

It is not of morbid, or of excessive and vain self-consciousness, in the popular acceptance of the term, that we are speaking in this connection. Neither does the argument depreciate the value and significance of those artistic and constructive activities in which the Self seems to lose itself; or even of those states of religious contemplation or intuition, in which a certain immediacy of the knowledge of the object seems largely or wholly to exclude the reflective attitude. But that a being who could form no conception of a Self, could never know what itself was about, could only be *mere* intelligent Will without being a self-comprehending Mind, must not be regarded as vastly inferior to a developed self-conscious Person, it is impossible to concede. Mind, without self-consciousness, if such mind could really be at all, would not be *self*-comprehending, *self*-directing, *self*-determining—all of which capacities are most essential for the existence and development of a Self, and themselves stand highest in the scale of rational values.

It is in order now to notice that the existence and development of selves are facts, the account of which must somehow be found in this same World-Ground. Even to take the scientific point of view is to accept the warrant for regarding man himself as a child of Nature. A society of selves is to be explained as the product somehow resulting, under the laws which physics, chemistry, and biology have discovered, from the forces that are conceived of as differentiations of Nature's exhaustless Energy. For however the human species came to be such, it is in fact composed of self-conscious as well as intelligent wills. In the case of the individual man it is his own psychical activities that construct the peculiar type of self-hood which each individual has. A true person, or Self, cannot come

into existence, unless the forces and stimuli existing outside serve to arouse the dormant will and inchoate reason to the full measure of an energy that is something more and higher than that of *blind* will, or *unconscious* mind. Only self-conscious and self-determined activity can create a Self.

When, then, the conception of a Nature which can so bring into co-operation the external and internal or psychological forces as to create a Self is reflectively examined, this conception is found to be no barren and meagre affair. Can an unconscious, or a non-self-conscious Nature create and develop a race of self-conscious personal beings? Can *mere* willing Mind, or *mere* intelligent Will, without experience of the nature, the method, and the value of personality, serve as a satisfactory explanatory principle for this human species which is, in fact, self-conscious; and for its historical evolution into even so high a grade of selfhood as man has already attained? It seems to us that the only credible, not to say conceivably tenable, answer to such an inquiry is a decisive No. In order to beget and to nourish self-conscious existences the World-Ground, or some important part of It, must itself be a self-conscious Personal Life, a true Self. And by so much as the positive sciences are becoming confident about the real unity and absoluteness of this World-Ground, by just so much the more should philosophy be confirmed in the opinion that its real Unitary Being is that of an Absolute Self.

The logical conviction that it is impossible to derive the personal from the Impersonal, a multitude of developing finite selves from a World-Ground that is wholly lacking in the possession and appreciation of Selfhood, is strengthened by considerations which flow from the social life of humanity. Now the problem which presses for an answer is this: What sort of Being must the World have in order that it may serve as the rational and real Ground of a community of selves—a network of common experiences, a social existence, between one self-conscious Self and other selves? Here am I—a

Self; but I am not, and I cannot conceive of myself as being, a *lone* Self. Even my physical environment is, fundamentally considered, a social affair. Even "Things" manifest themselves to me as not merely my objects, but as essentially the same objects for others, whose conscious and self-conscious experience is essentially like my own. The totality of physical existences is not for me, or for my fellows, an Absolute that is a mere aggregate, or lump sum, of things. Much less is the environment of other selves a mere multitude, or gross number, of the human species. It is the rather a society, in which individual persons are bound together by an infinite number of bonds, both the so-called physical and the so-called psychical, all of which are knowable and useable, only on the assumption that the Being of the World in which they have their Ground, has the nature of a social, a humanly Universal, an all-embracing Self.

That this is anthropomorphizing, is preparing the image and ideal of our own thought, in a way fit to be worshipped and obeyed, may undoubtedly be charged against the argument. But the word "anthropomorphism" should have ceased by this time either to deter or to terrify our minds. For all the æsthetical and moral values which characterize the conception of God contribute to the weight of argument in favor of the same truth. Undoubtedly, the reflective thinker experiences a feeling of awesomeness and of mystery before such vague conceptions as endeavor to represent the Divine Being without limiting Him by any terms that apply to human and finite, self-conscious existence. This feeling is genuinely worthy and true to reality in the view of any attempt to explicate and defend the conception of God. But it is least of all appropriate when the very process of thought which has framed the conception has neglected to introduce into it those factors that are most appropriately greeted with feelings of awe and mystery; and they are just those factors which can be actualized only in the lives of self-conscious and

personal beings. Respect for the mystery, the grandeur, and the worth, of Personal Being is the most rational kind of respect. For Things, as such, there is little or no reason to have respect; they are awful and respectable only in so far as they are means and servants of persons. The religious feelings are appropriate toward things, because religion regards them as somehow being partial and undeveloped selves, or else as manifestations of the thought and will of the Absolute Person. In living and conscious beings it is not the blind and instinctive psychical stirrings and strivings which we observe with most of respect. We feel the mysterious nature and profound value of these lower forms of soul-life, only when we regard them as the beginnings of Nature on her way to the production of self-conscious personality. And even among men—who differ so enormously in the amounts of self-hood, so to say, which they achieve—it is those individuals that attain the heights of personal experience and personal development, who seem most worthy of an awesome veneration and of the regard appropriate to what is most sublime. Kant has nowhere arrived at a more satisfactory position than that which he assumes when he claims that our human “feeling of the Sublime in Nature” implies a respect for what in less degree we find in ourselves—the Personal—and which we then by an irresistible law of our rational activities attribute in supreme measure to the Impersonal. It is plainly, to use his own phrase, a “conversion of respect for the Idea of humanity in our own subject into respect for the object.”¹

There are many other similar considerations derived from a study of the nature of human knowledge, and from an analysis and criticism of those fundamental characteristics which the mind attributes to all reality,—the so-called categories,—that compel us, finally, to place the argument for the self-consciousness of the World-Ground, the personality of God, upon a yet surer and broader philosophical basis. No meaning can be

¹ Kritik der Urtheilskraft, I, § 27.

given to such abstract terms as "the Absolute" or "the Infinite," unless these adjectival words are further defined by being attached to some Subject. The only kind of a subject to which they can be attached in such manner as to make the completed conception serve the purposes of a real explanatory principle is that kind of a subject which is known as a self-conscious Being, a Person, a Self. Unity amidst multiplicity and variety, real Identity of some sort that is compatible with actual change, Individuality that maintains its essential being through all processes of becoming, Law that reigns over things or exists as immanent idea in things, a Whole that admits of, and depends upon, interactions and causal relations between its parts—these and all like conceptions and principles under which the human mind is obliged to view and to interpret its experience, are, without exception, taken from the experience of a self-conscious person with himself and with other things and selves. To try to combine any or all of them in a description of the Absolute, and to leave self-consciousness out, is to overlook and to discredit that very experience in which they all originate; and for the description and explanation of which they are appropriate and serviceable. "Self-consciousness" is the one category which is rich enough in content, and real enough in its nature, to envelope and validate all the others. This category we cannot, indeed, ascribe to all manner of things, organic and inorganic, or even to all forms of animal life, as though they were, each one, centers of self-conscious, or even of conscious, functioning. Individual self-conscious beings, or selves, are comparatively rare; finite persons, as we know them, are always developments whose preconditions and antecedents seem to belong to the realm of the—to us—Unconscious; that is—to the Unknown or the Unknowable. But, when the mind tries to connect such unconscious individual beings with those that appear to be conscious, and finally with self-conscious beings, it can discover no active Principle that seems capable of uniting them all into a self-consistent and self-regarding

system, except that which implies the reality of a self-conscious Absolute Person.

If, then, the argument is carried through it is found to establish this conclusion: Nothing can be known about the Unitary and Real Being of the World, unless this knowledge be known and stated in terms of a self-conscious Life. All the terms in which science, philosophy, and the plain man's observation and reflection express themselves, are based upon this awareness of self, of other selves, and of so-called not-selves. These other selves are known or imagined after the analogy of the self-known Self; the not-selves are either not-known—mere negative and barren abstractions; or they are known as imperfect and half-finished selves. And although human knowledge does not guarantee the right to affirm that each thing, or part of an individual thing, is a center of conscious and self-conscious life, the human mind cannot imagine what it really is to be an individual, as a dependent part of an intelligible system, without using terms that have meaning only for self-consciousness.

In conclusion, then, we are obliged to say that the conception of the World-Ground as unconscious will and mind does not remove the limitations of human self-consciousness from the conception. On the contrary, it deprives the conception of what is clearest and most valuable in all the cognitive processes of humanity. It proposes to substitute an attempt to conceive the inconceivable for a thought which, although it is necessarily limited by the nature of our finite human experience, is, nevertheless, representative of what is intellectually most well-founded, and æsthetically and ethically most valuable, in this experience; its inevitable logical result is a return to dogmatic agnosticism.

For these reasons the theistic argument is entitled to postulate the conception of God as the Personal Absolute, a Self in the supremest possible meaning of that word. All the various lines of argument converge upon this conclusion. It is, how-

ever, a conclusion which needs still further critical examination with a view, if possible, to relieve the conception from some of the internal contradictions with which it has so frequently been charged. But the argument is strengthened in a preliminary way by noticing the very terms employed by those who deny self-conscious personality to the Being of the World. What—Pray! is the real meaning, the meaning for Reality, of the oft-repeated categories applied to the totality of the cosmic existences, forces, and processes? On the basis of a confidence in the modern chemico-physical sciences, it is styled a “*self-explanatory*,” “*self-contained*,” “*self-maintaining*” System. What, that is intelligible to human minds, can this mean unless it be to say: The Cosmos is a Self, whose explanation comes not from without itself? Its circuit and content are not included, as our selves are, in Somewhat greater. Its independence is absolute; for no other than Itself has the task of maintaining itself. But all this, as we shall see, is precisely what must be understood by an Absolute Person or Self.

Certain predicates of that Absolute Person, “whom faith calls God,” seem to follow of necessity from the very nature of the conception. The argument here is not a return to the ontological argument in the form in which it has already been rejected. The “proof” does not claim to move demonstratively from the nature of the conception to the reality of the object thus conceived. The rather does it seem certain that, if the reality of a Personal Absolute as the World-Ground be somehow proved or made a sure object of rational faith, then certain predicates necessarily follow from the absoluteness of this Personality. Among such predicates the following five are chief: Omnipotence, Omnipresence, Eternity, Omniscience, and Unity. These qualifications must be characteristic of an Absolute Self which shall be so conceived of as to afford a satisfactory real Principle explanatory of the world of things and of selves. It is an important task of the philosophy of religion to expound these predicates in a manner consistent

with the truths of fact and with the nature of the conception.¹

The conclusion that God is a Person in the sense that he is self-conscious and intelligent Will is, at one and the same time, the most original and fundamental assumption of the cruder forms of religious belief, and the most mature and conclusive tenet of scientific and philosophical Theism. On the one hand, the Dakota dialects express "the hidden and mysterious power of the universe" by the word *wakan*—"the deification of that peculiar quality or power of which man is conscious within himself, as directing his own acts or willing a course to bring about certain results." In the Islands of the Pacific, too, is found the conception of a wonder-working power called *mana*=(apparently) "that which is within one," the principle of life and motion consciously directed to an end. But it is the higher religions, and above all Christianity, which round out this conception of God as self-conscious and personal Life with the fullness of moral attributes. "God is Spirit," said Jesus, "and they that worship him must worship in spirit and in truth."

A study of the ethical nature and development of man undoubtedly makes upon philosophy the demand that the Ground of the phenomena of his moral life should be found in a self-conscious Personal Absolute. But this is not the same thing by any means as to say that this Personal Absolute must be conceived of as perfect Ethical Spirit, in a manner to satisfy the claims of the highest religious faith. The former conclusion rests upon a tolerably firm and exceedingly broad speculative basis. It is only a further and quite legitimate exten-

¹ Pfeiderer's statement scarcely does justice to the nature of the problem when he affirms that "these predicates do not arise out of philosophical speculation on the nature of God, but out of the religious consciousness of God which they seek directly to describe." They do arise "out of the religious consciousness," but they are more specifically adapted to treatment in a speculative way. See his discussion of the arguments, *The Philosophy of Religion*, III, sec. II.

sion of the cosmological argument, with its appreciation of the principle of "immanent teleology," and its confidence in the ontological validity of the work of human reason. In a word: Because the world of human experience is shot through and through with facts, forces, and other manifestations, that have an ethical, or, at least, a *quasi*-ethical significance, the conclusion is demanded that the real principle, in whose Being this world has its Ground, must be so conceived of as to explain these ethical facts, forces, and other manifestations. But the further conclusion, which attributes the *perfection* of justice, goodness, and holiness, to this same World-Ground, can only appeal to one side of even the religious experience of the race; and this side is shown chiefly by a triumph of faith over many seemingly contradictory facts, forces, and manifestations.

The undoubted truth of man's ethical history is that somehow he has come to create for himself ideals of conduct and character; and that his conceptions of moral laws and principles seem to him to have a very great, if not a supreme and absolutely unconditional value. For these ideals and laws he has never had—and he never can attain—a wholly satisfactory warrant in his experience of the physical world or of his own social and political environment. Moreover, religion and morality, although they are by no means wholly to be identified, have throughout human history exercised an enormous influence each upon the other; they have either aided or hindered each other's development to an almost incalculable extent. "The best religion as related to ethics is, then, the faith in an Ideal Personality, whose real Being affords the source, the sanctions, and the guaranty of the best morality; and to whom reverential and loving loyalty may be the supreme principle for the conduct of life."¹

• If an examination be made of these "universals" in ethics

¹ Vol. I. chap. XIX, and for the following quotations not otherwise credited as well as a much fuller statement of the same argument, see the author's *Philosophy of Conduct*, chap. XXIV and XXV.

which the philosophy of religion must chiefly take into its account, they are found to be of two orders: (1) Certain functions of human nature, and their products, which belong to all men in whatever stage of moral evolution; and (2) certain ideals which, although variously conceived in respect of their details and always conceived imperfectly, are shared in by all men, and are recognized as powerful forces in the moral evolution of humanity. This moral nature of man, with its functions and their products, but especially with that sort of activity of thought and imagination which creates moral ideals, comes out of the larger Nature which has produced, environs, and develops humanity. The experienced world of moral facts, laws, forces, and ideas, no more "explains itself" than does any other part or aspect of this same world. Just as little, and even much less satisfactory to the demands of the reflective reason, is it perpetually to revise and to recite the description of the mechanism, when we are seeking to account for this form of the evolution of mankind. An unconscious, impersonal, non-moral Nature cannot be conceived of as producing a race of self-conscious personal and moral beings. A Nature which has absolutely no capacity for appreciating the value of moral ideals, and of character conformable to these ideals, cannot serve as the explanatory real Principle of natures which develop such ideals. A systematic study of those conceptions and principles which control the activities of men's cognitive faculties shows that "our human way" of knowing the "Being of the World" conceives of it "after the analogy of the Life of a Self, as a striving toward a completer self-realization under the consciously-accepted *motif* of immanent Ideas."¹ To Mr. Spencer's question, "If the ethical man is not a product of the cosmic process, what is he a product of?" it must undoubtedly be answered that the psychological and historical sciences are sufficiently justified in maintaining this view. But philosophy wants to know what is the last

¹ A Theory of Reality, p. 547; comp. Philosophy of Conduct, p. 598.

word as to the inmost Being of a Cosmos whose process results in such a product. And it cannot rest satisfied in any answer which denies to this Being a self-conscious apprehension, and an appreciation of the value, of what it is about in going through with this process. From the point of view of ethics, the best and most valuable known cosmic product is just this same ethical man,—what he now is ; but more especially what he may become, when his moral ideals are raised to their highest potency, and are realized in their best form by a regenerated human society. That the World-Ground should have got even as far as it has on its sad and weary way toward the realization of these ideals, without knowing what it is about, and without caring for its own success, and without appreciating its own failures or triumphs, is a conclusion which human reason refuses to entertain. Better no God at all than one so unworthy of the respect, veneration, and service of “the ethical man.”

On this subject we can neither approve of the critical scepticism of Kant in his treatise of the “Pure Reason,” nor of his critical dogmatism in the treatise of the “Practical Reason.” What our argument requires is not a compulsion to believe in God as prepared to “back up” with reward and punishment an impersonal law—itsself apodeictically demonstrable—by an appeal to human wills that may *think of* themselves as free, although they can only *know* themselves as mechanism. What the argument seeks, is a sufficient reason for the rational faith in a God who knows and appreciates the value of righteousness ; and who really is somehow the fountain, source, and reality, of man’s moral being and moral ideals. And this faith is justified—although it must be confessed only in a partial way, so far as the *perfection* of ethical spirit is concerned—by the same sort of an argument as that by which the knowledge of God as the World-Ground is reached.

The objections to the procedure of the theistic argument up to this point are for the most part essentially those of a dog-

matic and uncritical agnosticism. The alleged contradictions, and even the difficulties, which are found in the conception of God as moral Personality, are chiefly due to the metaphysical habit of juggling with abstractions. The absoluteness and infiniteness of the Divine Being are not more inherently contradictory of the characteristics assigned to him as the self-conscious and rational Ground of man's *moral* nature and *moral* development than of the position which assigns to him intelligence and will. On the other hand, the interests of man's religious experience and religious ideals demand in a peculiar way, and with a most imperative urgency, a rational faith in the moral personality of God. In the view of those religions which have reached the higher stages of development, God is not God unless he is conceived of after the type of "the ethical man." Indeed, chief among the works of God, the *gesta Dei* in which a recent writer¹ finds the "religious proof" for the Being of God, is this same ethical man, with his history of a moral evolution.

The one objection which may be urged most strongly against any conception of God as ethical personality is undoubtedly this: It attributes *feeling* to the Divine Being. And upon this point much of Christian theology, as well as most of the philosophy of religion, Oriental and Occidental, ancient and modern, has been really, although not usually in a conscious and avowed fashion, opposed to regarding God as, so to say, through and through moral. Religion, as distinguished from its philosophical and theological statements, has, on the contrary, always emphasized the feeling-full nature of God. This is especially true of Judaism and of Christianity—the pre-eminently ethical and practical religions of humanity. It is true also—not less intensely but far less satisfactorily—of the Muslim faith. It is even true in a vague and indecisive way of Buddhism.

Of the assumptions which underlay the Catholic orthodoxy,

¹ A. Dorner, *Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie*, p. 236f.

as it formed itself by the end of the third century, Hatch declares¹: "It is assumed that rest is better than motion, that passionlessness is better than feeling, that changelessness is better than change." This view has been fortified in modern as well as ancient times by the further assumption that weakness, temptation, and the overcoming of these finite and limiting conditions by an act of will, are indispensable to moral character; for morality is always and essentially a matter of development and growth. God, therefore, cannot be both absolute and infinite, and also moral.

The more complete answer to these objections must await a fuller consideration of the meaning in which, and the extent to which, moral attributes may be ascribed to God. We remain for the present in the conclusion that if God is a rational, self-conscious Will, active in the interest of moral ideals, or moral ends, then he is properly called an Ethical Being. That he is such a Being, all the ethical experience of the race contributes to the argument to prove. And it is true, and grandly true, that this conclusion necessarily implies that God is a Being of feeling, as certainly as of mind and will. This latter conclusion is so intimately connected with the argument, at every stage and in every form, that if man's reflective thinking is valid for any factor in the conception of God, it is valid for this factor. The world of man's experience—things as well as selves, and natural events as well as occurrences in human political and social life—is everywhere as truly a manifestation of feeling, and as vividly an appeal to feeling, as of mind and will. Indeed, the affective factors can no more be analyzed out of both the knowing subject and the known object, than can the factors indicative of intelligence and volition. Yet more: Personality itself is not such a compound of intellect, feeling, and will, as that it could still preserve its essential character if only it should happen to lose out some one of these three groups of characteristics. To be a "person," limited or infinite, dependent or absolute, implies self-con-

¹ Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church, p. 281.

scious feeling as truly as self-conscious thought, or will consciously directed toward ends. But especially absurd is it to conceive of ethical personality that has no feeling appreciative of values; that is neither approving nor disapproving of courses of conduct and of the aims and ends of conduct. No contradiction between the absoluteness and the affective nature of the Divine Being can equal that which emerges in the attempt to think of this Being as at one and the same time without feeling and yet an ethical Spirit,—not to say a perfectly righteous, good, and holy God.

The history of the treatment of this problem of the Personality of God by the reflective thinking of mankind is exceedingly suggestive. Its principal features are well illustrated in the attempt at a philosophy of religion made by Plutarch. This attempt, according to Oakesmith,¹ was “a compound of philosophy, myth, and legalized tradition.” Plutarch had respect for the conception of Deity embodied in the Demiurgus of the Timæus, the One and Absolute of the Pythagoreans, the Πρώτον κινούν, the Νόησις, or Νοήσεως νόησις of Aristotle, the immanent World-Soul, or Λόγος ὄν τῆ Ἔλῃ of the Stoics, etc. But “the metaphysical Deity thus created from these diverse elements is made personal by the direct ethical relation into which He is brought with mankind.” “And I am of opinion,” says this ancient philosopher,² “that the blessedness of that eternal life which belongs to God consists in the knowledge which gives Him cognizance of all events; for take away knowledge of things, and the understanding of them, and immortality is no longer life, but mere *duration*.” The Divine One must, then, be conceived of as the life of a Knower who rejoices in his knowledge, and who is on account of that knowledge an inexhaustible fountain of feeling worthy to be called blessedness. It must, indeed, never be forgotten that the difficulty of reconciling a certain acceptance of the truths of the popular polythe-

¹ The Religion of Plutarch, p. 87.

² Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, 351 E.

ism with a somewhat highly spiritual monotheistic conception of Deity was for the thought of antiquity, and is for the thought of the great multitudes of Christian believers in the present day, by no means the same as that encountered by the Western philosophic mind. And yet for all minds, and all times, the problem is essentially the same. Without feeling and moral attributes the absolute Will and Mind cannot become an object of religious belief, feeling, and worship. And the conception of the Absolute as a "self-consistent" One falls apart as surely, and becomes as intrinsically absurd, if we rule out of it all the ethical factors as it does if we rule out of the same conception the factors of rationality.¹

The cosmological argument as it advances along the lines drawn by man's æsthetical conceptions, ideals, and development, pursues a course similar to that of the so-called "moral argument,"—not identical with it, or strictly parallel to it, but crossing it back and forth at many points. Here the facts are, in important respects, essentially the same. That the race has created for itself ideals of sublimity and beauty, and that in thought the mind gives an objective character and appreciative estimate to whatever, in concrete forms, seems to embody these ideals, are matters of undoubted fact. The reflective treatment of such facts, in its search for a rational ground, seems to make clear that the race recognizes in whatever is regarded as beautiful, or sublime, some manifestation of the unchanging characteristics of an ideal Personal Life. The necessity for finding the ontological source and ultimate explanation of this experience in the World-Ground, conceived of as an absolutely sublime and perfectly beautiful self-conscious Spirit, is not, indeed, the same as that felt by the mind when dwelling upon the phenomena of man's ethical development. Yet somehow, the "cosmic process" has evolved "the

¹ This is eminently true of Mr. Bradley's efforts to construct the Idea of the Absolute as "self-consistent" and yet "non-moral." See his *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 430ff.

æsthetical man" as well as "the ethical man." And if man were not æsthetical, as well as ethical, he could not be the religious personality which he certainly is. The conclusion that the source of his æsthetical experience must be found in the æsthetical Being of the World-Ground is certainly somewhat vague and difficult to state in logical terms. Æsthetical experience itself is, essentially considered, largely a matter of inarticulate emotions and sentiments. But the very mysterious, expansive, and inexpressible character of these sentiments and ideals fits them the better to suggest and to confirm faith in the reality of the Object which goes farthest in the direction of satisfying their demands. Humanity's thirst for the sublime and the beautiful knows not, indeed, precisely what it wants: it therefore none the less, but even all the more, is an unquenchable thirst.

At every turn, then, along the pathway of exploration into the conception of God as perfect Ethical Spirit, it will be found that the combined impulse of æsthetical and ethical feeling is present in power, and that the ideals of moral goodness, and of sublimity and beauty, tend to converge and to appear as, after all, only different aspects of the One Ideal-Real.

In this attempt at a reconstruction of the argument for the Being of God we shall for the present add nothing by way of a so-called "historical argument." All argument, it has already been said, even the most speculative, must constantly cling fast to the facts of history, and must proceed on its way with full allowance of respect for the historical method. Indeed, from a certain point of view it may be claimed that the one and only argument *is* the historical. For the history of the evolution in humanity of the belief in God as perfect Ethical Spirit is the all-inclusive and satisfactory proof of the reality of the Object answering to the belief.

In order, however, to make this argument, which is both historical and speculative, the more convincing, it must be subjected to a detailed examination—especially at several critical

points. In this examination two sets of considerations must be given the great weight which they deserve. These are (1) the evidences of a Development, as applied to the progressive realization of the eudæmonistic, ethical, and æsthetical *ideals* of the race; and (2) the more permanent faiths, hopes, and practical results of man's *best* religious Experience—above all, of that which is embodied in the religion of Christ. Argument and reasoning, logically conducted, there must be; but the argument must, at every step in its advance, respect the truths supported by these two sets of considerations.

CHAPTER XXX

GOD AS INFINITE AND ABSOLUTE

The conflict which has been waged from antithetic points of view, and between contradictory conclusions, through the attempt to use the words "infinite" and "absolute" in relation to the Object of religious faith, is one of long standing. This fact is certainly indicative of difficulties inherent in the conception of a Personal Absolute; and these difficulties cannot be said to have been wholly resolved at the present time. But to admit this truth is by no means the same as to say that all the grounds of the conflict render its perpetual waging inevitable; even less, that the continuance of the conflict hitherto shows the conception to be self-contradictory or absurd. On the one hand, history teaches us how the human mind, in its effort to escape from the limitations, and even the degrading elements, of that conception of Deity which the lower forms of religion have espoused has tried the extreme of negation. It has shaken off contemptuously all the seemingly anthropomorphic and anthropopathic factors. In this way progress toward a purer and more defensible monotheistic conception of God has been made possible. But on the other hand, the ethical and æsthetic demands to which the experience of religion gives rise, and to which this experience is itself in turn subject, lead the mind to reject as unsatisfactory the barren and abstract notion covered by such phrases as "The Infinite," or "The Absolute." Thus polytheism and pantheism contribute irreconcilable factors to the human conception of God. Periods of that dogmatism which claims to have sounded to its depths

the Divine Being, and to have systematized for faith all his attributes and his relations to the world, alternate with an agnosticism which goes to the length of asserting that finite minds do not know and never can know, anything about God. Neither of these conclusions, however, satisfies for any long time the great majority of thoughtful minds.

It is a reasonable claim when we are told¹ that Brāhmanism, with its doctrine of the Being of God, and its goal of religion as a mystical union of the finite Self with God, has truth in it which Christianity and the philosophy of religion must recognize. What kind of Being, however, must be attributed to God? and, How, in view of the answer to this question, must the supreme goal of religion be understood? A "metaphysics-shy, purely practical Christianity," or a purely "pragmatical philosophy," cannot reply to either of these questions. The reply which we are trying to establish, rejects the abstract Absolute of Brāhmanism and of all similar religious philosophies; on the other hand, it defines the Being of God as active, ethical, spiritual. It affirms that God is at one and the same time, infinite and absolute, and also perfect Ethical Spirit. By this affirmation it aims to avoid the errors of agnosticism and pantheism, on the one hand; and on the other, it rejects all forms of Dualism which find the *ultimate* Ground of any part of the experienced world of finite existences and events in some other Being than God;—whether in "Law," or the "Nature of things," or in some limiting personal existences, such as a kingdom of evil, or a personal Devil, or what not.

The more recent discussions of such conceptions as are possible or tenable, under the terms "Infinite" and "Absolute," have undoubtedly helped to harmonize differences and to clear up obscurities. In the field of pure mathematics, where the notion of infinity has been most easily and properly allowed, as it were, to roam at large, certain valuable restrictions have now been put upon its use. As a *purely* negative notion it can no

¹ See A. Dorner, *Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie*, p. 168f.

longer, even in mathematics, be involved in self-contradictions that are introduced by applying to its treatment the methods of an *a priori* and demonstrative proof. To show that Achilles cannot overtake the tortoise, or that the arrow cannot fly, by an abstract analysis of the notions of infinity and infinitesimals is to juggle with words, by shifting the content of their meanings, in and out, with the dexterity of a practiced prestidigitateur. In mathematics, then, one must always tell what sort of an infinite—be it line, succession of separate points, series of numbers, or extension of surface—one is talking about; and without some noun of positive content to qualify the negative qualification, no denial of limit can logically take place. Moreover, in the argument, the character of the infinity which is, so to say, made the subject of the argument, must remain unchanged throughout.

The advances of physical science in the knowledge of the world as a system of interrelated and interacting things and minds, as well as the psychological analysis of the cognitive act itself, forbid all attempts to treat the conception of the Absolute as purely negative and unlimited. First of all, and in importance above all, must the true doctrine of God as Infinite and Absolute be distinguished from the negative doctrine of the ancient Greek and Hindū philosophy; and as well from the fast vanishing, purely agnostic or pantheistic type.¹ The motto of the latter is ever No, No; and whatever goes beyond this is held to be significant of illusion or self-deception. The absolutism of the theistic conception is, on the contrary, in the form of an ever enlarging, loftier, and more comprehensive affirmation.

¹ According to Tigert (*Theism, etc.*, p. 39f.), with one exception, "Perhaps no competent thinker of the present day holds that our notion of the infinite is (merely?) negative." Although there is no doubt much historical warrant for the charge of Max Müller (*Anthropological Religion*, p. 101) that Christian theology has held the negative conception of God, it cannot now be urged against its more gifted teachers.

The harsher contradictions and graver difficulties which have been introduced into the conception of God as Infinite and Absolute Person are removed when the following three considerations are borne in mind. Without some preliminary agreement the disputants cannot, in any intelligible way, take even the first steps in this argument. For it is only when starting from points of view thus established, that argument is appropriate to the problem at all; or, indeed, that any problem can be set clearly before the mind.

And first: To identify the Infinite or the Absolute with the Unknowable or the Unrelated is absurd. To know is to relate; and all knowing is, in respect of one group of its most essential elements or factors, relating activity. Thinking is relating; and although thinking is not the whole of knowing, knowledge and the growth of knowledge are impossible without thought. Moreover, all human knowing is finite; man's knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute God is a very finite and relative kind of knowledge. But to speak of the knowledge of God, the Infinite, as impossible, because the knowing mind is finite; or of God, the Absolute, as impossible, because knowing is essentially relating;—this is so to mistake the very nature of mental life as to render the objection nugatory and ridiculous. This strange psychological fallacy, although it so frequently entraps writers to whom credit must be given for ordinary acquaintance with mental phenomena, scarcely deserves other treatment than a reference to the most elementary psychological principles. Man's cognitive capacity is not to be compared with the capacity of some material vessel; the content of the mind is not to be likened to the contents of a wooden measure. As to "The Infinite"="the Unknowable," or "The Absolute"="the Unrelated," we are indeed warranted in affirming: "Such a metaphysical idol we can never, of course, know, for it is cunningly devised after the pattern of what knowledge is not."¹

¹ Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 117.

But, secondly, the words "infinite" and "absolute" as applied to God cannot be used with a *merely* negative significance. Absolutely negative conceptions are not conceptions at all; thinking and imagining cannot be wholly negative; words that have no positive meaning are not words, are not in any respect signs or symbols of mental acts. Preëminently true is all this of an Idea so infinitely rich in content as that arrived at by thought, when, reflecting upon the significance for Reality of man's total experience, it frames the ultimate explanation of it all in terms of infinite and absolute self-conscious and rational Will. In arguing about the possibility of an Infinite Personality this rule, which forbids laying all the emphasis on the negation, must always be rigidly observed. Personal qualifications do not necessarily lose their characteristic personal quality, when it is affirmed that certain particular limitations, under which we are accustomed to experience them, must be thought of as removed. No removal of the limit destroys, as a matter of course, the essential nature of the qualification itself.

Yet, again,—to express essentially the same cautionary truth in another way—the words "infinite" and "absolute" as applied to God must always be taken with an adjectival signification; they are predicates defining the character, as respects its limit, of some positive factors of the God-Idea. "*The Infinite*," "*the Absolute*,"—these and all similar phrases, when left wholly undefined—are barren abstractions; they are, too often, only meaningless sound. The negative and sceptical conclusions, which it is attempted to embody in this way, are controverted by all the tendencies of the modern sciences—physical as well as mental. All these sciences, in their most comprehensive conclusions and highest speculative flights, point toward the conception of a Unity of Reality, a Subject (or *Träger*) for the phenomena. The Oneness of all beings that are "real," we may call *the Being of the World*. But, as has already been seen, we can not rest in this abstraction. What really is this

Being which has the manifold qualities, and performs the varied operations? This Subject of all the predicates, we desire more positively to know. Meantime, we call it Absolute; because, Itself unconditioned, It is the Ground of all conditions. We call it Infinite; because, Itself unlimited from without, or Self-limited, It sets the limits for all finite and dependent existences.

In speaking, then, of God as Infinite and Absolute Person, or Self, it is not meant simply to deny that the limitations which belong to all finite and dependent things and selves apply to Him; it is also meant positively to affirm the confidence that certain predicates and attributes of Personal Life reach their perfection, and are harmoniously united in the self-conscious and rational Divine Will. It follows from this that the conceptions of infinity and absoluteness apply to the different predicates and attributes of a person, in quite different ways. Thus a Personal God can be spoken of as "infinite," in any precise meaning of this term, only as respects those aspects or activities of personal life to which conceptions of quantity and measure can intelligibly be applied. His infiniteness of power for example becomes his omnipotence; his infiniteness of knowledge his omniscience; his complete freedom from control by the limiting conditions of forces that act in space becomes his omnipresence, etc. To such moral attributes, however, as wisdom, justice, goodness, and ethical love, the negating aspect of the conception of infinity does not apply, except in a figurative way which, by being mistaken, may become misleading. It is at once more intelligible, appropriate, and safe, to speak of the *perfection* of God in respect of these moral attributes. For the very conception of measure and quantity, strictly understood, has nothing to do with moral dispositions or attributes, as such; but only with the number of the objects toward which the corresponding acts of will go forth. An infinitely wise person is one whose wisdom is perfect as respects all other beings; but this perfection of

wisdom could not be unless the same person were omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good.

By calling God "absolute" it is meant, on the one hand, to deny that he, in respect of his Being or of any of its manifestations, is dependent on any other than his own self-conscious, rational Will. No others, no finite things and selves belonging to the world of which man has experience, constitute the original ground and reason of the divine limitations, whether of power, knowledge, wisdom, or love. He is, in his essential nature, *ab-solved*, absolute, as respects dependence upon others. But, positively considered, his absoluteness is such that He is the One on whom all beings, both things and selves, are dependent. In his self-conscious rational Will, finite existences and events have their Ground. Outside of this self-conscious rational Will, no real uniting principle for the cosmic existences, forces, and events, can anywhere be found.

In brief, by speaking of God as Infinite and Absolute the philosophy of religion means to affirm that there are no limitations to the self-conscious rational will of God which can arise elsewhere than in this same self-conscious rational Will. God is dependent on no other being for such limitations as his will chooses to observe. God wills his own limitations. And he would not be infinite, or absolute, or morally perfect, if he did not. Will that is not self-controlled, or limited by the reason or purposes known to the Self, is not rational, or morally perfect will. On the other hand, all finite and dependent beings and events do have the original ground and final purpose of their being and happening in this same Divine Will. All the many finite and dependent beings have the only satisfactory explanation of their existence and their natures in the Infinite and Absolute One; and this infinite and absolute Being is the Personality whom faith calls God.

The objections to so thoroughgoing a doctrine of the infiniteness and absoluteness of the Divine Being arise chiefly on two grounds. They are either predominatingly metaphysical

or—perhaps it would be more accurate to say psychological ;— or else they are ethical. The metaphysical objections revive the claim that self-conscious personal Being cannot be infinite and absolute ; the ethical objections interpose cautions and fears connected with the integrity and practical value of the moral and religious life. The former may be removed by a profounder metaphysics based upon a truer psychological analysis ; the latter may be reassured by showing the way to a more philosophically satisfying and tenable kind of faith.

In considering critically the first class of objections the thought is brought back to the point at which the argument was left unfinished in the last Chapter (see p. 83*f*). It can now be made clear that these objections derive their power to confuse and deter the mind, largely through their misuse of the terms “infinite” and “absolute.” That a self-conscious and personal being cannot be also conceived of as infinite and absolute turns out by no means the self-evident proposition which it is assumed to be. Indeed, certain indications point in the opposite direction. Even our human, finite, and dependent self-consciousness does not have its essential characteristics described by such terms as finite and dependent ; much less by such meaningless terms as *not*-infinite or *not*-absolute. In other words, there is nothing in the essential nature of self-consciousness, as we know it, to show that the range of its grasp, either as respects the number of its objects or its speed in time, determines the possibility of its very existence. On the contrary, the more perfect our self-consciousness becomes, the more manifold are the objects which it clearly displays within the grasp of the one activity of apprehending the Self. Human self-consciousness is, indeed, a development ; and at its highest degree, whether considered as respects the multitude of its objects, or their relations to each other and to the Self, is a meagre, a limited affair. It is always dependent upon conditions over which the self-conscious Self has no control, either direct or indirect. But in it

is the very type and supreme example of clear, certain, and ontologically valid knowledge. The amount of the small approaches, which the human mind can make in the direction of becoming like the Infinite and Absolute Mind, is tested by the increase, and not by the decrease, of the region covered by the individual's self-conscious life. The richer and more comprehensive the individual's self-consciousness becomes, the more do the limitations of his finiteness recede. The more the Self immediately and certainly knows of itself, the more it is capable of knowing about other selves and things. Thus does the individual Self become a larger and clearer "mirror of the World." For example, in cases of intimate friendship between human beings, the one person may come to know another person with a suddenness, clearness, and certainty of intuition, which converts the ordinarily slow, obscure, and uncertain inferences that serve us men for knowing, or rather guessing at, the thoughts of others, into the semblance of a satisfactory and genuine self-consciousness. And great minds, who observe with a loving sympathy the transactions and laws of the physical world, rise at times to experiences which seem to approach, if they do not attain, the likeness of an intuitive envisagement of Nature's deeds and of the meaning of those deeds. In general, the more of objects and relations the human mind can take up into its own apperceptive and self-conscious experience, the more freed from limitations this finite and dependent mind becomes. *The perfecting of self-consciousness tends to raise the mind toward a more boundless and absolute knowledge.*

But it is urged that self-consciousness, since it involves the distinction of subject and object, and implies the setting of the Self over against the non-self, is essentially an affair of limitation and of dependent relation to some other than the Self. That self-consciousness is, in fact, for all human selves thus limited and dependent, may be admitted as often as the object will. Why need keep on repeating that, of course,

this is so? But when this human limitation and dependence, in fact, is converted into an essential characteristic of Self-Being as such, the argument violates every truth with which the study of the phenomena seems to make us familiar. And the use of the words infinite and absolute reaches the height of their misuse, when the *object* of self-consciousness becomes invested with a sort of mystical negating and limiting power. Thus, my Self considered as object, is declared in some sort to hedge in and confine the activity of my same Self, considered as subject. Under this view, the more the extension of the object is increased, the more the intensity and reality of the subject should be diminished. On the contrary, in the growth of a Self, the subject becomes more real according as it is able to unite in the grasp of its conscious life a greater number of objects,—whether these, its objects be its own states or so-called “external objects.” For in the cognitive act the relation of subject and object is not, essentially considered, one in which the two limit each other; it is, the rather, a relation whose essence is a living commerce of realities. In the knowledge of self-consciousness this commerce is between different aspects of essentially one and the same reality.

It is, therefore, the perfection of the self-consciousness of God which makes it possible to predicate of Him that He is infinite and absolute. Only this conception of Him as self-conscious Spirit enables the mind to transcend the inscription on the shrine of Athene-Isis at Sais: “I am all that was, and all that is, and all that shall be; and my vail hath yet no mortal raised.” But this affirmation of the infinite and absolute character of the self-conscious Personal Life of God is not the equivalent of an identification of all particulars under some abstract term which can only assert, but cannot account for, their unity. It is, the rather, the positing of such an all-comprehending and unifying Principle as only the conception of a Personal Absolute can supply. It permits the mind to conceive of God’s knowledge as always having that perfect immediacy, comprehensiveness, cer-

tainty, value for truth, of which man's faint, limited, and meagre self-consciousness is, nevertheless, the highest type of our human experience. It also bids the mind to regard all finite beings and events as essentially and constantly dependent upon the self-conscious and rational Will of God. Thus all objects become objects of the Divine Self-consciousness.

The ethical recoil from certain conclusions, to leap to which from the standpoint of such a postulate of the infiniteness and absoluteness of God seems required by logical consistency, is deserving of the utmost tenderness and patient consideration. Further treatment of this objection must be deferred to the discussion of the moral qualifications, and of the ethical relations to the world, which religion attributes to God. But one most fundamental truth should be stated in this connection. No one of the predicates or attributes of personal being can be conceived of in a perfectly unlimited or absolute way. No one of them is a solitary affair. Of necessity, they limit each other; and both in their essence, and in their manifestation, they are mutually dependent. Selfhood is not a merely unrestricted aggregate of independent activities. And instead of its perfection requiring or permitting the increase of the unlimited and independent exercise of any of these activities, the truth is quite the contrary. No finite Self makes progress towards an escape from its limitations by letting its psychic forces loose from the control of wisdom and goodness. Neither can wisdom and goodness grow in any human Self while the core of selfhood, the control of will, is slipping away. The very constitution of personality is such that its different attributes are mutually dependent, reciprocally limited. And the nicer and more harmonious the adjustment becomes, in which wisdom and goodness guide power, and power greatens under their control, and for the execution of their ends, the nearer does personality approach toward the type of the infinite and the absolute. Or—to cease from so abstract a manner of speaking—growth toward the perfection of personality can be

attained, only as the various forces of personal activity, not only become greater in amount, but also more harmoniously active in the unity of the one personal life.

On applying these considerations to the Divine Being our conclusion is not hidden, nor does it lie far away. Because God is essentially personal, a self-conscious and rational Will, the different predicates and attributes under which he must be conceived, are *self-limiting* and *self-consistent*. This is to say that they limit each other according to that conception of perfect personality which is realized alone in God. But the ground of this limitation is, in no respect, essentially considered, outside of, or independent of, God himself. God's infinite power is not blind and brutish force, extended beyond all limit whatsoever in a purely quantitative way; God's infinite power is always limited by his perfect wisdom. Neither is the divine omniscience an ability to know, or mentally to represent, as real and true, what is not real or what is irrational. God's knowledge is limited by the laws of reason; but in the case of the omniscient One, these "laws" are only the forms of his absolute, rational Life; Reality is only that to which this Infinite and Absolute Will imparts itself according to these rational forms.

But, in even a more special way, it is to be said that the moral attributes of God are *self-consistent* limitations of certain of the metaphysical attributes. If the divine justice or goodness is to be considered as perfect, then these moral attributes must constantly and completely qualify the divine omnipotence. And to say that God "cannot" do wrong, when once one is satisfied that his righteousness is perfect, is not to limit the divine power from without, or to render it any the less worthy to be called omnipotence. In all discussion of the problems evoked by the attempt to apply such terms as "infinite" and "absolute" to God, it is the unifying and harmonizing nature of his Personality—or perfect self-dependent, and self-consistent Selfhood—which affords both the theoretical and the practical solution of the same problems. How can God be

infinite and absolute, and at the same time personal? To this inquiry one may answer: Just because he *is* personal. How shall self-consistency be introduced into this complex of metaphysical predicates and moral attributes with which man's religious feeling and philosophical thought have filled the conception of God? By more and more expanding and perfecting this same conception as that of a perfect, and therefore infinite and absolute Self.

The growth of that Ideal of the Being of the World, which is represented by the conception of God as Infinite and Absolute Personal Life, has its roots deep down in religious feeling and also in philosophical reflection. The impression made upon the mind of man by his total environment is one of mystery, majesty, and illimitable extent of force, in space and in time. What is greater than all his eye can see, or his hand touch, or his intellect measure and comprehend, but this Being of the World; in the midst of which he is set, and of which he seems to himself so significant a part? In these vague feelings religion and art have their common impulse; and later on, if not at once, philosophy as well. But science and philosophy aim not simply to feel, but also to comprehend, this mysterious, majestic, and infinitely extended Being of the World. And by their studies of IT, through centuries of time, they arrive at the conviction of the Unity of its Reality. This Being of the World is not only real, but it is the exhaustless Source of all that is actual; and It gives laws and life to all the forms and relations of finite realities. Such is the *reasoned conviction* that comes to enforce the feeling of mystery, majesty, and limitless power and extent, in space and time, that is called forth by man's experience of the cosmic existences, forces, and processes.

In what terms, then, shall the mind best express its grasp upon the Object of this "reasoned conviction"? That it is a perfectly comprehensible, not to say a perfectly comprehended, conception, cannot, of course, be maintained. The most dogmatic theology, or self-confident philosophy, or boastful science,

would scarcely venture to affirm as much as this. With somewhat different meanings, and yet in substantial unison, they all confess: "There was the door to which I found no key." Inasmuch as no finite thing, however mean, and no casual event, however trifling, offers itself to man's mind in a way to ensure a complete comprehension, one may be the more ready to hasten the admission: "It is as high as heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou know?" This attitude of reflection is everywhere met in the history of human experience; it is the inevitable and logical result of contemplating the problems offered by this conception of God as infinite and absolute; it is found alike in pantheistic theosophy and in Christian mysticism. Hence it is that *Pistis Sophia*, whose very title is significant of the determination to resolve faith into an esoteric theory of the Divine Being, makes Mary Magdalene, when Jesus has solved for her the first mystery, inquire: ¹ "Now, therefore, O Master, how is it that the first mystery hath twelve mysteries, whereas that ineffable hath but one mystery?" And the Upanishads, whose discovery, says Professor Hopkins,² is "the relativity of divinity" abound in passages declaring the incomprehensible character of God. Scarcely less true, however, is this of the Biblical writings. "But men," declares a modern Hindū writer,³ "for the practical purposes of their existence, need to *get* God and not merely to *have a knowledge* of Him."

Neither this, nor any other rational view, regarding the incomprehensible nature of the conception of God as Infinite and Absolute is the equivalent of the doctrine that the tenet itself is "inconceivable," in the meaning in which this word is so frequently employed. The infiniteness of God cannot, indeed, be conceived by repeated cumulative activities of the mind in a

¹ See the Translation published by the Theosophical Society (London, 1896), p. 235.

² The Religions of India, p. 224.

³ Kishori Lal Sarkar, The Hindū System of Religious Science and Art, p. 137.

time-series ; or by pushing imagination, as it were, to transcend at a bound the limitations of spatial perception or of the numerical expressions for sums of energy. But the relief from such futile attempts is by no means to be found in a sluggish repose of intellect, or in so-called faith in a Reality which is inconceivable, because such faith implies the effort to grasp together, in a single ideal, mutually exclusive or self-contradictory ideas. An irrational faith is no worthy substitute for an irrational thought.

The valid conclusion of our discussion is, the rather, that we may—nay, must—both believe in God, and think God, in terms of self-conscious and rational, that is, personal Life. And this we may do without fear that the course of our believing and thinking will be compelled to end, either against an impassable wall at the end of a blind alley, or in a bottomless and darksome bog, where shadows of abstractions allure the mind on to increased dangers, but can never lead it out into a region of light and safety. The conception of God as Infinite and Absolute is, indeed, an ideal which can never be exhaustively explored, or fully compassed by the finite mind. But just as modern science, while it is learning more and more the limitations which beset its utmost efforts to expound its own fundamental conceptions and postulates, nevertheless understands better and better these conceptions, and continually validates more satisfactorily these postulates ; so may it be with the philosophy of religion. From similar efforts, when directed toward the Object of religious faith, the reflective thinking of mankind can never be deterred, whether by agnostic fears, or by awe in the presence of incomprehensible mysteries. This conception of God justifies, while it does not destroy but the rather enhances, the profoundest æsthetical and religious feeling. And it is at the same time so increasingly satisfactory to the reason, as the reason is employed in the growth of science and in the speculations of philosophy, as to entitle its conclusions to the position of an accepted theory of reality.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE METAPHYSICAL PREDICATES

A distinction has already been made (p. 96) between those ascriptions which, in the aim to define the conception of God, arise out of the reasoned conviction that He is an Infinite and Absolute Person, and those which have their origin rather in the attempt to satisfy the emotional and practical interests of religion. The former we have called "metaphysical predicates;" the latter, "moral attributes." And these predicates, which our thought must ascribe to the Divine Being, in order to conceive of Him as Infinite and Absolute, are chiefly his omnipotence, omnipresence, eternity, omniscience, and unity. Each of these predicates, since each involves an attempt of the human mind to render certain characteristics of human personal life in terms that imply the removal of the limits of human experience, leads to what is essentially mysterious and not fully comprehensible. But each of them has, and retains, its positive character and so contributes its quota of the elements necessary to the complete conception.

All religions, which have developed beyond the very lowest stages of that vague belief which characterizes an "unreflecting spiritism," attach the same predicates to their divine beings, while not in an infinite or absolute degree, at least in a degree relatively superior to that in which human beings possess the same attributes. The gods are universally esteemed to be powerful, superhumanly so; they have means of getting about, so to say, and thus of being immanent in things and near at all times to the worshipper, which are superior to

those ordinarily in use among men. The gods also know certain matters which are hidden from man; and the knowledge of these matters may best be obtained by petition and propitiatory offerings, either directly by revelation from them, or through some one of their specially favored means of communication. If the gods are not immortal, in the stricter meaning of this word, they are at least blessed with lives more enduring than are human mortals; the generations of the gods are superior to those of mankind. It has, indeed, required a long and painful process of reflection to bring the mind of the race to the conception, in any worthy and intelligent way, of the unity of God. This conception, even as applied to the human and finite Self, is shifty and late in its attainment of any rational form. But the growth of man's belief in the Oneness and Aloneness of the Divine Being is the most notable thing, from the intellectual and scientific point of view, about his religious development. In power and knowledge, in escape from the limiting conditions of space and time, the divine beings are held to be superior to man. And, indeed, it is chiefly for this reason that they are esteemed and worshipped.

It has already been shown that the idea of *Power* is the central idea of the beings regarded by mankind as worthy to be considered as divine. Among primitive peoples, says Brinton,¹ "the god is one who can do more than man." The exciting and nourishing source of this belief is found in those natural phenomena which exhibit energy; and in the cruder stages of religion, especially in such happenings as thunderstorms, earthquakes, and tidal waves, where the manifestations of enormous energy are most impressive, most completely beyond the control of man, and most fatal to his interests. To see infinite power displayed in the dewdrop, the living cell, the growing child, the corpuscle or ion sending out its emanations, and especially in the spiritual control and elevating of human souls, requires a scientific development and an insight quite

¹ Religions of Primitive Peoples, p. 81.

beyond the possibilities of the uncultured mind. It is not strange, therefore, that we find the Australians saying that Mumpal, the Thunderer personified, is the universal creator; or that Parjanya, the rain-cloud personified, is the "mighty one" among the Vedic gods. In Hebrew, Elohim or the "strong ones" becomes the title of Israel's God; and Yahweh is extolled for his might and majesty which are superior to that of all other tribal divinities. In Egypt and Assyria the deity is clothed with the attributes of a mighty monarch. In the former country this conception is degraded to the extent of providing the god with a royal harem and other equipments of royalty as known among men¹. In this most ancient religion the local divinity might be called "Lord of Abydos," or "Mistress of Senem;" or might be hailed as "the Mighty," "the August," or "the Beneficent"—not ethically, but from the point of view of a grand and lavish monarchy. Thus Osiris was "the Great One" at Thebes and "the Sovereign" at Memphis. On each of the massive blocks of limestone, with which the broad way leading from the East side of the palace of Nebuchadnezzar is paved, centuries ago was inscribed this witness: "The highway of Babylon for the procession of the great Lord Merodach." The gods of the Greek and Teutonic mythologies were the "powers of nature," or the "strong ones," etc. In the naïve monotheism of Islam the omnipotence of God is affirmed in the question:² "Is not he who hath created the heavens and the earth *able* to create the like thereof? Yea! He is the knowing Creator; His bidding is only, when he desires anything, to say unto it: Be,—and it is."

That conception of the Omnipotence, or unlimited and absolute power, of the Divine Being, which is warranted not only by physical science but also by the reflections of philosophy, and which supports and satisfies religious experience, has both

¹ See Erman, *Ægypten und Ægyptisches Leben in Altertum*, p. 400.

² Koran, Sura XXXVI.

its negative and its positive aspect. Negatively taken, this predicate denies that there is any limitation to the divine power which arises, or can arise, from without the Divine Being. Conceived of as Power, God is absolute and infinite. For the possession and for the exercise of his energy he is dependent on no other; he is bounded by no other. This is true of its amount, direction, occasion of expenditure, and whatever other conditioning characteristics belong to all finite displays of energy. Negatively taken also, the conception of the divine omnipotence denies that all the hitherto actual, or all the conceivable exhibitions of power, exhaust this source of them all. The Divine Energy is to be thought of as *not* limited. It never has, nor will, come to its limit or its end.

It is only, however, when the predicate of omnipotence is positively conceived that it affords the requisite satisfactions to the emotions and practices of the religious life of man. By calling God omnipotent it is meant to acknowledge that all the actual and possible energy of finite beings, Things and Selves, has its source in Him. The inexhaustible fountain of all the cosmic manifestations of energy, from the innumerable suns rushing with incredible velocity through boundless spaces, to the radio-active performances of those beings whose magnitude lies far below the highest powers of the microscope, is the Will of God. From this same source comes all the energy which characterizes the experience and behavior of the human Self. In the Will of God, and only in His Will, our finite wills find the explanation of their secondary and derived energizing. They are not *omnipotent*: the potency they have is from the Omnipotent. In a word, all the self-limiting and self-determining as well as reciprocally determining, activity of finite beings is a derived power—a loan from the inexhaustible resources of energy which belong, of native and inalienable right, only to the Being of the World.

In the experience of religion this view excites and supports those feelings and that conduct which are appropriate to each

particular case. If the experience is filial piety, trust, and hope; then the human heart finds its most rational and satisfactory support in this view. If the experience, however, is one of opposition, distrust, or despair, then the painful discipline necessary to bring the subject of the experience into a right adjustment toward his cosmic, social, and ethical environment is inevitable. For the Omnipotent Will is sweet or bitter to the taste according to the way it is taken. And the essential good of religion is the increasingly better "squaring" of the human Self, to the larger, the environing and supporting, Infinite and Absolute Self.¹

The very nature of the metaphysical predicates of God is such that they are, like the so-called categories of Being and Thought, both mutually dependent and yet, each one, irresolvable into any other. This is especially true of the divine omnipotence and the divine omnipresence. Negatively taken, the Omnipresence of God denies all limitations from space and spatial conditions, to his will and to his knowledge. Nothing is, and nothing happens, where God is not in the fullness of all his divine attributes. This process of freeing the Divine Being from the limitations under which the conditions of the spatial attributes and spatial relations place the human body and mind has gone on throughout the centuries of man's religious development. It is a process contributed to by the scientific requirements and philosophical aspirations and reflections of the race. It has been sometimes checked and hindered, and sometimes favored and refined, by those religious feelings which demand the *nearness* of God to the human soul.

The earlier and cruder forms of religion conceive of the gods as, temporarily at least, embodied in some extended object, or as especially present here, to the impairment or the exclusion of their presence there. The gods may be thought of as local divinities. Only in this way can the untutored

¹ This thought is admirably wrought into Professor Royce's discussion of "The Union of God and Man," *The World and the Individual*, chap. X.

mind satisfy the heart's craving for some very special and definite manifestation of God. Men want *their* god to be in their neighborhood. Even Yahweh was conceived of as a local divinity by his worshippers—present especially, and particularly powerful, in certain localities. His people could not offer sacrifices to him in Egypt, for they were in a "strange land." The prophets themselves considered it offensive to God to worship him away from the appointed place. And Jesus proclaimed a heresy, when he told the Samaritan woman that the true worship of the Father was "neither in this mountain nor at Jerusalem."

When the growth of scientific knowledge and the conquests of reflective thinking have succeeded in banishing, even partially, from the minds of man, the conceptions which are contrary to the belief in the omnipresence of God, his thinking is apt to take either a deistic or a pantheistic form. The deistic conception virtually denies the divine universal presence by conceiving of God as over against the World, separated from it in a *quasi*-spatial and temporal way. There is, indeed, the World *and* God; but the former is, at least so far as our knowledge about it goes, the construction and reconstruction of beings and forces, that, whatever their original source may have been, are now to be thought of as independent of the universally present Will of God. The pantheistic conception, on the contrary, identifies God and the World in such manner as to save the omnipresence and omnipotence of his Being, at the sacrifice of his self-conscious, ethical, and personal Life. All attempt to adjust the claims of so-called "naturalism" and "supernaturalism," in their efforts to define the relations of God to the sum-total of finite things and finite selves, must be for the present postponed. It is enough in this connection to repeat that a self-consistent conception of God as Personal Absolute is impossible without involving the denial of all limitations of a spatial order to his power and to his presence.

Positively taken, the predicate of omnipresence as applied to

God repeats the truth already stated from other points of view; everywhere is the present power and co-conscious mind of the Divine Being. Poetically stated,¹ He is the One,—

“Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man.”

But the deeper significance of this truth is seen only when the ontological value is recognized of those mental activities, and of those constitutional forms of mental life, in which all human space-perceptions and space-notions have their origin. These perceptions and notions compel the assumptions: (1) That a certain way of construing the being and the relations of all things and all selves is native and inevitable for the human mind; and, therefore, (2) that this way has its ground, not solely in the human mind, but in the nature of that reality which is thus construed. “In these two assumptions we recognize again the Self as a constructive and differentiating principle, which acts according to its own nature in its apprehension of a World of Things.” And when the final ground and explanation of this agreement between Self and the World is sought, the conclusion is confirmed: “The category of space must be referred for its trans-subjective ground to a World-Force, that arranges in a determinate way all the different beings of the world, including each Self whose pictorial representation of the spatial qualities and spatial relations of things is determined by this same Force.”² Or, in the words of Pfeleiderer³: “God is neither in space, nor outside of space, but himself spaceless, founds space—that is, embraces in himself all that is in space as mutually related, and connects it in himself to the unity of the articulated whole.”

¹ So in the *Pharsalia* of Lucan (?), IX, 578, Cato is made to ask:

“Estque Dei sedes, ubi terra et pontus et aer
Et coelum et virtus. Superos quid quærimus ultra?
Juppiter est quodcumque vides quocumque moveris.”

² For these quotations and a detailed discussion of the category of Space, see the author's “A Theory of Reality,” chap. IX.

³ *Philosophy of Religion*, III, p. 297.

Rightly understood, this view of the omnipresence of God is the only rational and satisfactory explanation and support of the highest and most valuable religious feeling. The shock of vulgar prejudice which follows the definite application of this profound and holy truth to concrete instances passes away, when the reason is lifted to the loftier and diviner point of view. Is God indeed here, in the fullness of His presence, in this stone which I build into my dwelling; in this clod which my ploughshare turns or on which my careless foot is treading; in this bodily system of pulsating brain and beating heart and—it may be—even disordered and diseased system, which I am myself so likely to prostitute to uses unworthy of its divine origin and significance? Yes, indeed, this is so. And modern science is doing royal service, as it explores more profoundly with microscope and physical and chemical analysis the nature of these “common” things, to extract all sting of degradation or frivolity from such admissions as these. That stone, that clod, or even that diseased bodily organ, is no dead, insignificant bit of worthless “matter” so-called. It is instinct with the universal Life; it embodies all the mysteries of existence; it may at any moment become a most important factor in shaping the history of the Universe and of the race of man.

As to the body of man, nothing can be more salutary from the point of view of practical religion than the reminder of the eminently Christian doctrine that it is the temple of the Holy Ghost. And he who can intelligently say, and live as though he knew the meaning of what he is saying,—All my life of body and soul is *in* God, is a manifestation of his indwelling presence in wisdom and in power,—has conquered the inner citadel of obstacles to complete filial piety. “Dost thou not see,” says the Koran, “that God knows what is in the heavens and what is in the earth? and that there cannot be a privy discourse of three but he makes the fourth?” “If I ascend up into heaven,” says the Psalmist (cxxxix, 8*f.*),

“thou art there ; if I make my bed in Sheol, behold, thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea ; even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me.”

Negatively taken, the predicate of Eternity does much the same thing with the temporal limitations of Divine Being, which the predicate of omnipresence does with the spatial limitations. And yet there is an important difference between the two. God is eternal, because his Being, attributes, and activities, are *not* subject to the limitations of time. He had no beginning in time ; nor will He cease to be in time. The conception of a “coming to be,” a development in time, does not apply to the Infinite and Absolute, as it certainly does apply to the entire system of finite things and finite selves. “Lacking the idea of eternal duration,” says Frazer,¹ “primitive man naturally supposes the gods to be mortal like himself.” But so-called “primitive man,” although he knows that he is himself mortal, does not believe that death ends all with him. On the contrary, he has little doubt that he shall survive death, as he believes his deified ancestors have done. Nor does the divine soul perish, even when the sacred tree or stone, or the animal body, which was worshipped because of its indwelling there, ceases to exist. The divine ones may indeed die ; that is, they may, like other invisible spiritual existences, be driven out of their temporary abodes. But they die hard, as it were ; or they are regarded, as they rise in the scale of life which corresponds to the improved and exalted conception of their nature, as essentially immortal. And when this conception attains the moral dignity and the philosophical consistency of a Personal Absolute, the eternity of God becomes one of those predicates which are inevitably incorporated in the conception itself. To make Him subject to the limitations of time would be to sacrifice all the essential characteristics of his infiniteness and absoluteness. Therefore the

¹ The Golden Bough, II, p 1.

mind denies that these limitations are applicable to its idea of God.

The denial, however, does not mean that the self-conscious Life of God is to be described as an "eternal now"; or that the time-concept has no applicability whatever to man's necessary and true thought about the nature of this Life. Let it be confessed at once that in its negative aspect this phrase, an "eternal now," covers a thoroughly vain and foolish attempt at thinking away one of the most indispensable and absolutely immovable conditions of all thought. To conceive of God's Life as an eternal-now is as impossible as it is to conceive of God's Being as essentially unrelated to the cosmic processes and to human history. Indeed, such an attempt, if it could succeed, would result in the destruction at once of all the essential characteristics of personality. "Wooden iron" is not a more intolerable conception than "eternal now," in the negative meaning which theology and philosophy have too frequently attempted to attach to this phrase.

It is in dealing with the thought of the divine omniscience that this conception of the divine freedom from all time-limitations has its most important influence. Taken in the negative meaning which denies any application of the time-concept to the self-conscious Life of God, the conception of his eternity would at once annihilate the conception of his omniscience. Knowledge, whether of self or of things, is inconceivable apart from their time-form. God's consciousness of the world could be true, could be knowledge, only if God knew the world as He wills it actually to be,—namely, a development in time. But what is meant—if anything even abstractly conceivable is meant—by denying that the divine knowledge is limited by time, is the assertion that all this knowledge is after the type, in its perfection, of that which in man's case reaches its highest pitch in Self-knowledge; and this is immediate knowledge of what is the here-and-now object of cognitive activity. It is demonstrably certain that it *takes time* for

us to come to self-consciousness, or to achieve a so-called sense-intuition of any particular thing. But with God it is not so.

In its positive significance the predicate of eternity expresses the confidence of the human mind in two truths which are of great importance, both for its own theoretical self-consistency and also for the assurance of religious faith. Whatever God is essentially, that He is in an original and unchanging way. This is not the attribution of an inconceivable and practically worthless statical nature to the Divine Being. Science and philosophy, as well as religion, require a living God. Life involves activity; and activity involves change. But the successive manifestations and phases, if we may so speak, of this living God are all self-consistent, self-regulated, and independent of the compulsions and limitations which affect our human life in time. "God is eternal," says the Koran,¹ in that chapter which is declared to be equal in value to a third part of it all. He is "the everlasting God;" He is God "from everlasting to everlasting;" He is the "living God, and an everlasting king;" "the King, eternal, immortal, invisible:"—if, say the writers of the Old Testament,² the Personal Absolute is ever omnipotent, omniscient, just, wise, holy, etc.; then he is this, and is all that he essentially is, in an unchanging and original way.

There is, however, a yet profounder significance, in a positive manner and from the point of view of an ontological philosophy, which belongs to the predicate of eternity as applied to God. The ground of all the happenings in a time-series of that world of things and selves, of which the race has experience, and which science aims to know and philosophy to expound in a fundamental way, must be posited in the Divine Being. These finite beings and events condition and, from man's point of view, produce one another in the order of a time that applies to them all—a universal category, so to say,

¹ Sura CXII.

² Gen. xxi, 33; Ps. ciii, 17; Jer. x, 10; 1 Tim. i, 17.

of a serial order. That there should be any time-order at all, and that the time-order should be in each particular just what it is, as well as that this order should be apprehended in the same way by different minds, and as a matter of objective certainty and validity,—all this must have its ultimate explanation in the nature of the World-Ground.

Facts of universal experience, therefore, compel the question: "What sort of a Being must the World have in order that it may satisfy the conditions imposed upon it by this category of Time?" In answer to such a question it would seem that no better conclusion could be reached than that which requires statement in somewhat like the following terms:¹ "The world's absolute and universal time is the actual succession of states in the all-comprehending Life of God. If then one is willing to substitute for the mathematical symbol of ∞ the conception of the Life of an Absolute Self, one may validate both the popular and the scientific assumption of an absolute time in which all the events of the world are ever taking place. This conception is that of a series which must be conceived of time-wise and yet involves the denial of a beginning or end to itself; a series that, from every 'now', or ∞_1 , reaches both backward and forward to ∞_n . *The transcendental reality of time is the all-comprehending Life of an Absolute Self.*"

"Our time-consciousness is, indeed, limited; its present grasp, its recall of memory, and its anticipatory seizures of the future, are all feeble and defective enough. But really to be in time is not *per se* to be finite and limited. And surely the conception symbolized by a simple ∞ (the eternal now) is no grander or more absolute than that symbolized by a series, $\infty_1, \infty_2, \infty_3, \dots, \infty_n$. Just as surely is all human thought about Reality made grander and more worthy to stand, when for this symbol, ∞ , there is substituted the conception of the Life of an

¹ Quoted from A Theory of Reality, p. 212f., in which Treatise, chap. VIII, the whole subject is discussed in detail.

Absolute Self. At any rate, only this conception seems able to validate the category of time in that trans-subjective and universal application of it which the development of human knowledge presupposes, demands, and perpetually confirms."

There is much to justify the contention of Professor Royce¹ that the Omniscience of God constitutes not simply *a*, but *the* most fundamental predicate of his Divine Being. It is not possible, indeed, to derive the other predicates from this, or to resolve them all into it; nor does omniscience alone fully serve the purpose of even a "preliminary definition" of God. From the point of view of science and of naïve religious experience alike, it is *power* which constitutes the central factor in man's conception of Deity. But omniscience is so related to the other metaphysical predicates, on the one hand, and to all the moral attributes, on the other, that it seems, in some sort, to include the possibility of them all within itself. God could not be omnipotent if he did not know all; nor could he be perfectly just and good, without perfection of knowledge, in his position as moral ruler of the world.

Like all the other metaphysical predicates, that of omniscience has its negative as well as its positive aspect. It involves, first of all, a denial that any of the limitations, which apply to finite cognitive processes, apply to the knowledge of the Personal Absolute. In making and interpreting this denial, however, we are to beware of the sophistry which finds in the essential nature of knowledge, whether as cognitive Self-consciousness or as Other-consciousness, such internal and irremovable contradictions as make it absurd or unmeaning to apply this predicate of omniscience to God.

The historical development of the belief that God is omniscient has followed essentially the same lines as those which mark out the program of thought concerning all the other divine predicates and attributes. This conception also has been dependent upon essentially the same conditions of ad-

¹ See *The Conception of God*, pp. 7ff.

vancing race-culture. As has already been repeatedly pointed out, the most important of these conditions are determined by the stage in self-knowledge and self-culture at which the race has arrived. What it is to be a Knower—a person, as respects the *cognitive* activities and attainments of personal existence—is an inquiry which can be answered only with increasing fullness and depth, as the experience of self-conscious beings provides the answer to themselves. As far back in history as the time of Esarhaddon, the priest who acted as mediator for this monarch when he was hard pressed by a group of nations to the Northeast of Assyria, inquired into the future with the prayer:¹ “Thy great divine power knows it. . . . Is it definitely ordained by thy great and divine Will, O Shamash? Will it actually come to pass?” The Koran has reached the conclusion with respect to Allah:² “With him are the keys of the unseen. None knows them save He; He knows what is in the land and in the sea; and there falls not a leaf, save that He knows it; nor a grain in the darkness of the earth; nor aught that is dry, save that this is in his perspicuous book.”

The doctrine of the divine omniscience denies that the limitations of space and time apply to the knowledge of God. Thus, the omniscience becomes interdependently connected with the omnipotence and the omnipresence of God. Distance puts no obstacle in the way of his knowledge. Being equally present and powerful everywhere, he is also cognizant of all events and causes, as man, on account of his spatial limitations, cannot possibly be. Since he is eternal, the time-limits of human cognitive activities are not applicable to him.

Again, limitations of content, and of clearness and accuracy, to which all finite experience of knowledge is subject, do not apply to the absolute and infinite knowledge of God. The grasp of human cognitive consciousness, whether its activities

¹ See Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, p. 334.

² Sura, XXXVII.

are regarded as intuitive or ratiocinative, perceptual or conceptual—and whatever form of so-called knowledge or so-called faith is invoked—is narrowly circumscribed. It has a certain capacity for extending its range; and certain men have, when they are compared either with their fellows or with the lower animals, a relatively large range of cognitive experience. Aristotle and the Bushman, or Aristotle and his dog, are indeed far apart in their intellectual powers and accumulations. But as compared with the knowable, the known by Aristotle is as a drop to the ocean, a corpuscle to the universe. So, too, is all human knowledge infected with obscurities, and charged with the risk of errors. All man's clearest seeing is in part; all his surest knowing falls short of the infallible. But in the self-conscious, rational Life of the Personal Absolute, these limitations, too, are thought of only to be removed.

In attempting, however, to form a positive conception of the Divine Omniscience, certain peculiar and, indeed, irremovable difficulties stand in the way. These difficulties, when properly understood and fairly criticized, do not indeed avail to involve the conception in hopeless confusion through convicting it of inherent contradiction; but they do emphasize its incomprehensibility in respect of certain of its most essential factors.

If the conception of omniscience is not to remain purely negative, and so of little use for the attempt to establish a rational faith in the object of religion, all its more positive factors must be derived from our most highly developed experience with ourselves as self-conscious beings. It is only in this experience that human knowledge reaches the highest possible, and even conceivable type of immediateness, certainty, clearness, and fullness of content. It would seem, therefore, that the omniscience of God must be conceived of, if positively conceived of at all, as infinite, absolute, and perfect Self-consciousness. This is to affirm that God's knowledge has in perfect degree those qualities of absoluteness,

which in man's case reach their highest form in the development of his self-conscious experience; and that this knowledge extends to all actual and conceivable objects of knowledge. Such a conception is not, indeed, picturable or fully comprehensible by the human mind. But it may be elucidated in a way by the following considerations.

Since all that is and that happens depends, without limitations of space or time, upon the Infinite and Absolute Will of God; and since nothing can arise, or exist, or occur, in independence of, or separation from, this Will; there is a profoundly significant and true meaning to the declaration that, with God, all knowledge *is* essentially self-conscious. All beings and all happenings are *in* Him; all beings and all happenings are known *by* him as *in* Him. With God all knowledge is self-conscious knowledge. After having gained, for the defense of a rational faith in God as perfect Ethical Spirit, the position that the World-Ground must be self-conscious and personal, we cannot relinquish this position in the face of the difficulties caused by the attempt to comprehend the Divine Omniscience. That God knows what he wills, and feels, and thinks,—to speak after the only manner which can give positive content to the conception of Him as Person,—is now no longer to be denied. God knows Himself—to the very depths of his, to us, incomprehensible being, and to the utmost extent of his infinite activities.

But the Other-consciousness of God, or his knowledge of the existences, relations, interactions, and changes, of the universe of finite things and finite selves, is embraced in the infinite grasp of his self-consciousness. The world-consciousness of God, too, is self-consciousness. Indeed, since the world has, without ceasing, its dependence upon God's Will; and since its indwelling forces are forms of the manifestation of this Will; and since its immanent teleology—the world-order—is the expression of his Mind; God, in order to know all truly, as things and souls really are, and as events actually happen,

must know them all as being and happening "in Him." In whatever sense they really are in Him, in that same sense they are truly known as in Him.

Objections to that positive conception of God's omniscience which identifies it with his infinite and absolute self-consciousness, apart from those which arise from a false conception of the nature of a Self, are chiefly three: One is mainly ethical, one psychological, and the third is more definitely metaphysical. These objections can best be answered, so far as answer at all is possible, only when all the evidence has been examined which bears upon the religious doctrine of God as perfect Ethical Spirit.

None of our ideas of value are disturbed, and none of the ethical, æsthetical, or religious feelings are hindered or degraded, by regarding Things as so dependent upon God's will that his knowledge of them may be thought of by us as a species of self-consciousness. But undoubtedly the case of other selves is by no means precisely the same. To preserve the integrity and *quasi*-independence of man's selfhood seems to the highest forms of religious experience a matter of the utmost ethical importance. How can the human being be so related to the Divine Being as that his self-conscious, cognitive life and development shall all be open to the divine self-consciousness, without impairing, or even destroying, the reality of his moral and religious character? In reply to this question it may be said that, so far as the conception of omniscience is concerned, the difficulty is scarcely an ethical one at all. Man certainly can, and certainly will, have just so much, and no more, of independent and self-conscious existence as God wills that he should have. Whether this shall be enough to constitute him a truly moral being, and to make it possible to regard his relations to God as truly moral, in so far as these relations affect the independence of man's will, this, too, depends upon the same Divine Will. If God's Will is "Good Will,"—in the supremely ethical meaning of this term,—and if this

Good-Will wills that man should have and exercise such attributes, including moral freedom, as are necessary to moral relations between the two; then God may know man as a true finite Self and at the same time as a dependent factor in his own all-embracing Self-consciousness. In a word, the true ethical problem is one that concerns a relation of wills.

From this point of view, therefore, the entire objection to making God's omniscience identical with his perfect and absolute self-consciousness becomes, the rather, a psychological difficulty. The inquiry becomes one of a *modus operandi*. *How can* the Infinite Self-consciousness embrace the consciousness of a finite self-conscious being, in such manner that both consciousnesses shall, from their respective points of view, correspond to the reality? I am conscious of myself as thinking, feeling, willing thus and so. In spite of all psychological juggling with this complex and yet fundamental experience, I am certain that this knowledge is of a Self, that is *my* Self and no Other; and that it is immediate, certain, and indubitably true. After the pattern of this experience I construct—feebly to be sure, and yet as best I may—the ideal of an Infinite and Absolute Self-consciousness. But now I am asked to believe that this Other conscious Being, whom my self-consciousness refuses to identify with me, is after all conscious of me as a “moment,” so to say, in his own all-embracing self-conscious Life. Thus the psychological objection resolves itself into a metaphysical puzzle. Can a multitude, a social community of finite selves exist and develop in ontological dependence upon, and in truly moral relations with, an Infinite and Absolute Self? The more detailed argument in defense of an affirmative answer to this question requires the reflective study of all those problems which are raised by the religious doctrine of “God and the World.” But the conclusion of the argument may be anticipated by saying that just this ontological relation is the ground and the guaranty of all truly moral relations. Only an Infinite and Absolute Self, embracing in his omnipotence and

omniscience all other selves, could be God over, and God in, all beings existing in the one World.

If it were necessary to leave this puzzle as it is stated in the most harsh and uncompromising way, it would not even then amount to an inherently self-contradictory conception of man's complex experience with himself and with other selves. For in the essentially mysterious, subtle, and tangled web of this experience, the whole of it may be regarded from several points of view. The individual's self-consciousness is everywhere penetrated with factors which are often spoken of variously as "social consciousness," or "race consciousness," etc.; and at its base, even when its apex is in the highest heavens and clearest sunlight, there is always a vast deal that requires to be classified as "instinctive," "subliminal," or under other similar obscure terms.

In general, it is psychologically true that *co*-consciousness and *self*-consciousness are by no means mutually exclusive experiences; they may be regarded as different aspects of one undivided experience. Even in man's limited way of knowing, there is that which illustrates this possibility. In the case of any two most intimate and familiar friends, for example, the cognitive consciousness of each tends to become more immediately and surely representative of the other; and this tendency, instead of limiting or destroying the self-consciousness of each, may even have the effect of enlarging and reënforcing it. For self-consciousness is not an abstract awareness of the Self as out of all relation to other selves. Without other consciousness, self-consciousness cannot develop. In man's case this other-consciousness is of things and selves that exist independent of his will, and that are therefore known, not only as related to the Self, but as somehow essentially not-self. But as we have already said, the more intimate becomes the individual's knowledge of those who are most completely of his own kind, or kinship, the more does his self-consciousness tend to blend perfectly with the objective consciousness which has ref-

erence to other self-consciousness. I know my fellow in knowing myself; because of the perfection which my knowledge of him has attained. At one and the same time this state of knowledge is self-consciousness, and also consciousness most perfectly representative of another Self. In a word, the slow and doubtful process of interpreting signs from the outside, as it were, is being replaced by an intuitive knowledge, a sympathetic consciousness, or co-consciousness.

What is somewhat dimly adumbrated in certain choicest human experiences may well enough be thought to be perfectly realized in the self-conscious Life of the Personal Absolute. Is there consciousness, or self-consciousness, anywhere in the wide world of things and selves, from star to starfish, from starfish to man, and from the most degraded savage to the most comprehensive, spiritual individual among men? In this consciousness, or self-consciousness, God is co-conscious. From one point of view, every state of the finite being, if it has attained the sufficient degree of development, may be realized by this being as his own state; but from another point of view, every such state is also to be regarded as known by the Absolute Being through this, His universal and all-embracing co-consciousness. Here, again, the mind is thrown back once more upon the ethical difficulty, only when the attempt is made to adjust the relations of human wills and the Divine Will, so as to save both the moral freedom of the former and also the absoluteness of the latter. But this problem is, ultimately, not the concern of the metaphysical predicate of omniscience, but the care of the moral attributes of justice, goodness, and ethical love.

The conception of the Divine Omniscience as a species of cognitive activity which is at one and the same time "Self-consciousness," and "Other-consciousness," in the form of an all-embracing co-consciousness, meets with its supreme psychological objection when it is applied to God's knowledge of the future. What has been. and what is, may, with com-

parative self-consistency, be regarded as all known in every "moment" of that omniscient and eternal Life which has been figuratively represented as $\infty_1, \infty_2, \infty_3, \dots \infty_n$. But how can God know the future in any such manner as to warrant us in representing this knowledge as having the immediacy, certainty, and perfection of self-consciousness; and if *He* knows the future in this way, how can man be free, and how shall be preserved the ethical interests about which religion is chiefly concerned? In answer to all such inquiries, the mind is compelled to resort to a species of thinking which suggests a real truth that, however, cannot be pictorially represented in its perfection by the imagination or fully comprehended by the intellect.

In man's case we hesitate about speaking of his mental attitude toward the future as one of *knowledge* in the fullest meaning of that word. On the other hand, an analysis of any act of cognition shows that without a reference to the future, and indeed to the "timeless" character of the cognitive judgment, no knowledge of any sort can take place.¹ Nor is this future, or timeless character, of the reference to reality which belongs to every cognitive judgment, an affair wholly of hesitating and doubtful calculation. The more human knowledge grows, the more does all of it become a sort of insight into the nature of Reality, which makes the certainty of what is known independent of the limitations of time. To say this is in no way to deny the growth of knowledge; or to depreciate the development of the mental activities and mental achievements of the human race. But the very principles which underlie this growth, and the fundamental postulates of this development, are themselves evidence of man's undying conviction that it is possible to put knowledge on a basis which shall not leave it, as respects the future even, what it now most evidently is,—namely, a species of more or less probable calculation as to what is more or less likely to be and to take place.

¹ See the author's *Philosophy of Knowledge*, p. 263f.

We are not, then, to regard the divine omniscience in its reference to the future as a kind of calculation, which is made accurate only by the extent of the same omniscience with reference to the present and to the past. God—to speak *more humano*—does not need to take account of his present stock of information, and to figure out a balance sheet, when he wishes to *know* how the business of his world is coming out. We may, indeed, be unable pictorially to represent or fully to comprehend the *modus operandi* of a knowledge of the future which takes the shape of an immediate, certain, and perfect cognitive attitude in the self-conscious Life of the Personal Absolute. But the possibility of such knowledge cannot be denied on grounds that belong to the inherent nature of knowledge. On the contrary, certain human experiences suggest its possibility. In the highest flights of the finite mind, in the intuitions of genius,—whether they occur in prophecy, science, or art,—something approaching this seizure of the truth of Reality which escapes the limits of time, becomes an affair of actual experience. That it should always be so with God we are led to affirm, both in the interests of the self-consistency of our conception of Him as the omniscient One; and also in support of our religious feelings as they are appealed to by the idea of an all-sufficing moral government of the World. And here again the difficulty of making the predicate of omniscience square with the valid ideal of moral government becomes the problem of adjusting the relation of finite free-wills to the Will of the Personal Absolute.

All the metaphysical predicates are gathered together and expressed in their mutual relations, and in harmony, by the conception of the Unity of God. This unity is the unitary being of an Absolute Self. At this most comprehensive idea of Selfhood the race has been slowly arriving through many centuries of religious, scientific, and philosophical development. “He is God Alone,” says the Koran: “Nor is there like unto him any one.” So far, however, has this process of evolution

now been completed that the negative aspect of the doctrine of the Divine Unity needs comparatively little consideration. Negatively taken, this predicate denies all polytheistic or dualistic conceptions of God. It is this denial which a philosophical monotheism puts forth as the confident conclusion of its survey and interpretation of the facts of the religious history of mankind; it is the goal of man's speculative endeavor to give a rational explanation of the world that shall harmonize the conflicting elements. There cannot be two or more Infinite and Absolute Beings.

But positively taken, the conception of God as the Personal Absolute is the conception of One, the Alone God. And this involves much more than the denial of a plurality of divine beings in the absolute sense. No other being is to be put beside Him as comparable with Him in respect of the relations it sustains to the world of finite things and finite selves. When, however, the inquiry arises, What kind of unity, or oneness, is that which characterizes the Divine One? there is no other satisfying or even intelligible reply than this: God's Unity is the Unity of a Person; and it is perfect because He is the one Infinite and Absolute Person. All those abstract and impersonal conceptions of oneness, which some philosophical systems have ascribed to the Divine Being are quite as powerless and inappropriate as are the crude notions of animism or of polytheism. The same thing must be said of those trinities of divine beings which either implicitly, or obviously, deny the personal Unity of God. They all show their instability by their constant vacillation between a doctrine of different aspects, or manifestations, of One Divine Being, and a relapse into the tenets of a virtually polytheistic theology.¹

¹ This truth is curiously illustrated by the conceptions and practices of the Chinese. In the Buddhist temples of China, the common people suppose that the three gigantic images of the "San P'ao" ("Three Precious Ones") are representations of three different divinities; in reality, however, according to Legge (*The Religions of China*, p. 166f.) they represent (1) "Intelli-

All, therefore, that this predicate of Unity guarantees and expresses can only be conceived of, in terms of the Infinite and Absolute personal Life. But it is such life, and only such life, in whose native activities and experiences any true unity, whether of subject or object, whether of Self or of Things, or of the one World of many selves and things, can possibly be found. To expound this Unity is to elaborate the doctrine of the Being of God and of his relations to the Cosmos; to comprehend fully this Unity would be to know the Infinite and the Absolute through and through; and this is not knowledge accessible to finite minds. But to know about this Unity in any degree is to lay the basis in knowledge for a rational faith in the Object which is presented to man for his supreme adoration and service in the religious experience of the race.¹

gence personified in Buddha; (2) The Law, and (3) The Church." In the Tâoist temples of the same land, however, the San Ch'ing (or "Three Pure Ones") are, each one, called Shang Tî, or God. They are (1) Chaos personified; (2) the "Most High Prince Lâo" deified; and (3) the "God of mysterious existence." That is, they are not trinities in any proper meaning of the word.

¹ Says Sir Isaac Newton in the celebrated scholium at the end of his *Principia*: "*Deus est vox relativa, et ad servos refertur; et deitas est dominatio Dei, non in corpus proprium, uti sentiunt quibus deus est anima mundi, sed in servos. Deus summus est ens æternum, infinitum, absolute perfectum; sed ens ut-cunque perfectum sine dominio non est dominus deus.*"

CHAPTER XXXII

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

It is well yet again at this point to recall the goal toward which our entire course of reflection has been leading. The conclusion which has already been reached affirms that the only *real* Principle, worthy to be considered as a World-Ground, must be found in the unity of an absolute and infinite Personal Life. This conclusion seems to involve the following four important philosophical tenets: (1) All beings and events are united, in respect of their real relations and actual history, in the Will of God; (2) All physical beings and events are immediately known to God, are "moments" in the cognitive consciousness of God; (3) Of all the conscious and self-conscious life of finite beings, God is co-conscious; for his omniscience is an essential of his Unity as a Person; and, therefore, (4), the World, or Universe of things and selves, with all their interrelations and changes, lies "mirrored" perfectly in the unity of the rational self-consciousness of God.

But the ultimate purpose of our study, lies yet beyond all this. It is to test the reasonableness of a faith in the Object of religious experience, as this Object is conceived of by the highest reflective developments of that experience. In other words, it is to establish, if possible, a rational belief in the Being of a God, to whom may be attributed in perfection the moral attributes of justice, goodness, holiness, and ethical love. Across the pathway to the realization of this purpose lies the problem of evil. And it cannot be denied that the philosophical conception of God as absolute and infinite self-conscious

Person, makes, in several important respects, the completed realization of this purpose increasingly difficult. This statement will become more obvious, the further the discussion of the problem of evil proceeds.

Another important feature, if it be not a defect, in the argument by which religion supports its faith in God as perfect Ethical Spirit, is its plainly "circular" character. No satisfactory approach to a solution of the problem of evil can be made without giving a generous confidence to the evidential value of the faith of the highest religious developments, that there is indeed a perfectly just, good, holy, and loving God. But on coming to examine the grounds on which this faith itself depends, it appears that the evidential value of the faith *is not* wholly or chiefly objective, but *is* chiefly subjective,—that is, consists in the faith itself. Or, to state the case of this *circulus in arguendo* more bluntly: When we ask, How do you solve, even partially, the problem of evil? the answer of religion is: By the faith in a perfectly good God. And, then, when we further ask: How do you arrive at and justify this faith? we are virtually told that it is because the faith either solves, or greatly relieves, the problem of evil.

It may as well be confessed at once that the relation between the problem of evil and the problems offered by the faith of religion in the moral perfections of the Absolute Self, whom this faith recognizes and worships as God, is a relation of reciprocal dependence. If evil is actually supreme, or even on a par with the good, then no man can reasonably believe in a perfectly good God. But if one cannot believe in a perfectly good, as well as an omnipotent and omniscient God, then how shall one believe in the supremacy and final triumph of the good? All this shifting of the argument's point of view shows that religious faith in the Divine Being as perfect Ethical Spirit is a postulate which cannot be placed on independent grounds so as to afford a strictly scientific solution of the problem of evil. It does not follow, however, that it cannot be made rea-

sonable ;—chiefly on the ground that it most perfectly satisfies man's ethical, æsthetic, and religious sentiments, and most effectively secures the ontological value of his ethical, æsthetic, and religious ideals.

Does, then, the problem of evil admit of any solution? Certainly not; if by its solution we mean to indicate the possibility of explaining by any scientifically established law, or general truth, the actual experience of the race with the really existing amount and kinds of evil. If, however, one becomes willing to accept at their full evidential value the sentiments and ideals, which both produce and justify the faith of religion, then one may find the solution which this faith proposes, the best attainable, not to say the perfectly satisfactory, answer to this dark and meaningful problem. Nor will evidence in favor of this solution, which lies somewhat outside of the experience of religion, be wholly wanting. "*Solutions*" (*sic*) so-called, which go beyond this modest claim, are sure to be untenable as theories, and likely to prove injurious to practical morality.

As to the fact of the existence of evil, in vast amount and widely, or even universally distributed, both temporally and territorially, there can be no dispute. From the point of view of the impartial investigator, as well as from the religious point of view, the customary distinction may be maintained between the two related, but by no means identical, forms of evil. This problem, then, faces the facts of evil as either suffering, or else as moral failure; or—to use the term of religious experience—as sin.

If inquiry be made whether, on the whole, the amount of evil as suffering exceeds the amount of good as happiness, it seems, on examination, to prove not only unanswerable, but even vain and idle. The estimate for which it calls, must always be made from the point of view of some individual's experience. Thus the result, since suffering is essentially subjective and no adequate objective and universal measure of its

amount can be obtained, is liable to both exaggerations and excessive minimizing, in dependence upon temperament, mood, personal experience, and, especially, the adopted point of view. How can the opinion of the comfortable well-fed Englishman, who is perfectly certain that, if any future after death is in store for him, it is immediate entrance into a condition of beatitude, or the judgment of the successful American man of business, whose highest ideal is no other than just this sort of success, agree with the opinion and judgment of the ascetic Brāhman or of the starving millions of India? As a matter of fact, the two opinions do not agree. Again, with the Buddhist, existence itself seems so fraught with inescapable evil that to get out of it, to get "off the wheel," is esteemed the supreme good. And to attain this good, the way is not through the gratification but, the rather, through the extinction, of desire.

Valid considerations, based upon facts, may be opposed to both extreme views of this problem. To those who estimate the evil of suffering as greatly preponderating, it may be opposed: (1) That the physiological and psychological constitution of animal life is such as to set limits, both of time and of degree, to the endurance of suffering; (2) that, on the contrary, there is everywhere a more abundant provision for the easement of pain and for the promotion of a variety of kinds of pleasure; (3) that the animals, the lower races, and the children of the more sensitive races, do not in fact suffer at all as the hyperæsthetic observer imagines that they do; or, when reflecting in quiet and ease upon the unutterable woes of total humanity, the confirmed æsthete imagines that they must. In fact, the fearsome burden of unrewarded and unappreciated toil and service, of egoistic or sympathetic pains, of disappointed ambitions and hopes, of superstitious or well-founded fears, does not prevent the life of the multitudes from being, on the whole, an experience of prevailing comfort and large and somewhat varied happiness. While those who seem to have been especially selected victims of an unusual and

seemingly intolerable load of suffering, most often manage to secure that greater measure of cheerful endurance and triumphant faith, which might well enough make them the objects of envy by ordinary mortals.

But, on the other hand, let one maintain that, after all, human suffering is in amount relatively insignificant and greatly exceeded by the gross sum of human happiness: then one stands convicted, either of an insensitive and unsympathetic mind, or of a lack of varied and comprehensive experience. For (1) that very physiological and psychological constitution which, as it were of necessity, sets limits to the sufferings of animal and human life, is so elastic and enduring that these same limits admit of a quite unbearable amount of suffering as judged by finite capacity. In other words, most men have about all of suffering they can bear. (2) The same provision of a nervous system, however rudimentary or highly developed, which is made for the enjoyment of a suitable environment, when itself in healthy condition, is just as certainly adapted for painful reactions whenever the environment is unsuitable or the apparatus itself is out of tune. And (3) there is much evidence in support of the contention of Schopenhauer;—namely, that the very conditions which favor the advancement of the race in what is called civilization are essentially such as to provide for a large increase in certain forms of suffering. They who vibrate most rapidly and intensely between the opposite poles of painful craving and painful satiety and ennui, are not the lower animals, or the lower races, or the children of the more sensitive races. In a word, the development of the capacity for happiness is also, in even greater degree, a development of the capacity for suffering. Moreover, the very *motif* and desired end of religious faith, *so far as this faith takes account of this two-sided human capacity*, is to furnish satisfactions for the soul in such manner as to increase the one and abate the other. For this filial attitude toward the omnipotent, omniscient, and ethically perfect Will of God (“sweet”

and "holy" Will), brings the finite spirit into such relations with the Infinite Sufferer, that the woes of mankind are more keenly and painfully felt. It was just this highest refinement of altruistic suffering which made that Apostle, who was always ready "to be offered," declare: "The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now,"—a figure of speech taken from the extreme of human anguish. It was the same experience which wrung a bitter cry from Jesus, and forced the temporary obscuration of his sense of complete union with God, as he hung upon the sacrificial cross.

The facts, then, furnish sufficient reason for that vacillation of mind with which one passes from observing certain kinds of experience to the observation of other and seemingly contradictory kinds,—in the lower animals and in men,—as interpreted by a variety of so-called laws, physical, physiological, psychological, economical, and social. Confusion seems to be rife in the phenomena. The sympathetic soul is torn asunder by the evidences of this cosmic strife.

The difficulty of estimating amounts of happiness and suffering, of making up a satisfactory balance sheet, and of debiting and crediting the appropriate sums to the different kindly or malignant forces of nature, is made more profound, if not more unanswerable, by the discoveries of modern science. Biology reveals the astonishing fact that innumerable destructive living forms—bacteria, bacilli, and germs of various kinds—have been provided for all sentient, and especially for human life; these instruments of torture and death have made for man an inescapable environment of incredible suffering. The constitution of the world in which man lives has monstrous pain firmly embedded in its very texture. What biological science has demonstrated in its most convincing way, the anthropological, economical, and social sciences have also adopted as a theoretical tenet. The evolution of animal life, the progress of the race in every form and degree of race-culture, is purchasable,

only by the payment of enormous sums of suffering. The history of art confirms the testimony of the sciences. The poets "learn by suffering what they teach in song." The greatest painters, sculptors, and musicians proclaim the same truth. The highest art culminates in tragedies, in passion music, in the graphic or plastic delineation of suffering heroes. That this *must be*, all modern science is agreed in proclaiming. •

More slowly, and as yet not quite so surely, has this same science been making clear that similar instrumentalities for an increased amount, and higher kind, of happiness are embedded in the same constitution of the world. Biology is talking of the beneficent, as well as of the maleficent, bacteria and other forms of lower life, very much as "unreflecting spiritism" was wont to talk of good and bad spirits, of kindly and hateful gods. So do the other sciences of human life try to discover how the evils of iniquitous government, the inequalities of social life, the horrid barbarities of war, and the monstrous suffering inflicted by the severer "acts of God," by earthquake, volcanic eruptions, pestilences, etc., somehow "work together" for the greater good. And with these sciences, "greater good" means more of human happiness.

When, again, the mind tries to estimate the fact of moral evil, and to do sums in its measurement with precision somewhat approaching the mathematical, its failure is even more complete. It is no mere liking for a defunct Augustinian theology, in its excess of judgment over the Pauline type, which compels the moral consciousness, when viewing certain classes of facts, to feel: "There is none that doeth good, no, not one;" "They are all gone out of the way, they are together become unprofitable." But, given more of insight and of human sympathy, there are other classes of facts which show how much native capacity for certain virtues, and for a response to any appeal made in the name of the higher moral and religious ideals, characterizes human nature in general. Thus the arguments for "total depravity," in the theological

meaning of this term, serve very largely to cancel those for the native goodness of humanity. Taken together, they leave our judgment as to the relative amounts of moral evil and moral goodness in the same uncertain state. The conclusion seems inevitable; the problem as to the preponderance of good and evil, in fact, is unanswerable by any species of calculation. Whether there is more of happiness, and of essential moral goodness, in the human race now than was four thousand years ago is no easy sum in arithmetic or algebra: it is much too big and abstruse a problem to be solved by collections of economical and social statistics.

When the different abstract solutions of the problem of evil, which leave largely out of account the religious experience of humanity as enforced by the doctrine of development, are examined, they are all found to be very far from satisfactory. Especially true is this of any theory which denies the reality of evil—whether of suffering or of sin. Such theories are accustomed to start out with the sonorous declaration that evil, both suffering and sinning, is only relative and negative. To this one might oppose the equally untenable declaration of Schopenhauer that pain is the only positive thing, and that pleasure or happiness is only negative. Man's experience with suffering and with moral obliquity is, like all his experience, a relative and, in some sort, a negative affair. Both pain and pleasure imply relations; they depend upon reactions that are relative to the condition of the subject in his objective environment. In this meaning of the words, it is not true that "Mind can, in itself and of its own place, make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven." Pain negates pleasure; suffering negates happiness; moral badness negates moral goodness; and sin negates holiness. Even these unproductive and figurative uses of the terms "relative" and "negative" are subject to the undoubted fact of human experience that, for the individual and for the race, life is always a strange and confusing and largely inexplicable mixture of good and evil, of suffering and happiness, of wrong-

doing and right-doing, in the same individual, the same community, the same social status ; and even in the same conscious state.

To actual human experience, and to the reflective thinking which deals seriously with this experience, all solutions of the problem of evil which deny the reality of evil must always seem no better than juggling with words. With the religious point of view such optimism, and its opposite of pessimism, are alike untenable. The conclusion of religion is substantially expressed in Voltaire's poem, *Le Désastre de Lisbonne* :—

“ *All will one day be well, we fondly hope ;
That all is well to-day, is but the dream
Of erring men, however wise they seem,
And God alone is right.*”

Much more helpful is that attempt at the solution of the problem of evil which regards both suffering and moral failure, or sin, as instrumental, as means, and even as necessary means, to a higher good of happiness and of moral purity. This view undoubtedly seems to relieve the problem of some of its more difficult and dark features ; but it does not afford a completely satisfactory solution, especially of the problem of moral evil. Indeed, unless the postulates of religious experience, and the anticipations of a theory of evolution which shall give the fullest expression to the value of the religious ideals, are both taken into our confidence, the “instrumental theory” of evil fails of offering even a partial solution of its problem.

That pain is a necessary means to the development, and even to the existence, of all finite, spiritual, and self-conscious life has been held by various writers. “Without it,” says Sabatier,¹ “it does not seem that the life of the spirit could arise from the physical life.” Indeed, there is reason for declaring that, with man in his present environment, the consciousness of self and the separation of the soul from the organism, as a

¹ *Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion*, p. 15.

self-cognitive reality with interests and ideals that somehow transcend the organism, could not take place without pain. Thus the thought is led on to estimate highly the value of suffering of various sorts as disciplinary, and as means to the arousing and cultivation of the higher powers of man's spiritual life. Such a solution of the problem of evil seems to agree, of necessity, with religion in rejecting a purely eudæmonistic ethics. It affirms the value of happiness, either positive or as freedom from suffering, to consist largely in its instrumental relations to the realization of a higher form of Good. Pain is means to an end that is higher than happiness. Thus this theory reverses the position of all utilitarian systems of ethics; only thus does it prepare the ground for considerations which help to establish a theodicy from the religious point of view. "It is difficulties," says an ancient writer, "which show what men really are. Therefore when a difficulty falls upon you remember that God, like a trainer of wrestlers, has matched you with a rough young man. For what purpose? you may say. Why that you may become an Olympic conqueror; but it is not accomplished without sweat."

We have already seen how the theory of evolution, as applied to every form of life and of human progress, emphasizes the instrumental value of arrangements which are inevitably connected with an overwhelming amount of suffering and of death. Science, the philosophy of art, and the philosophy of religion, are all coming to agree as never before, in realizing the immense and seemingly indispensable utility of struggle and pain; and also the ontological value of ideals, the effort to reach, and even to approach, which has caused the race so much of struggle and pain.

The instrumental worth of moral evil, or sin, is a much more difficult thesis to maintain. Man learns, indeed, by trials; in trials, mistakes are inevitable; and where conduct, or action that has moral concernment, is the stake, undoubtedly the facts justify the contention that much conduct which is moral

failure, or sin, is the inevitable concomitant of progress in the realization of moral values.¹ It may, of course, also be said, that the very moral freedom—whatever “moral freedom” may mean, and however much or little of it man can attain—which makes possible moral goodness and the progressive approaches to rising moral ideals, makes also possible moral evil and the supreme and final failure to attain these ideals. In view of the subjective limitations of man’s constitution and the nature of his physical and social environment, speculative ethics seem compelled to maintain that much moral evil is inevitable. When the conditions of man’s ethical progress are viewed from the developmental point of view, moral failure and obliquity, and even moral disease and death, in overwhelming numbers of the human race appear to have served as means to the spiritual uplift of humanity. The essential value of struggle with temptation, and of experience with the results of yielding to temptation, may also be estimated in a way greatly to reinforce the claim that much sinning is an indispensable prerequisite to some holiness.

Even to admit all this, however, leaves the mind far indeed from a solution of the problem of evil. In fact, there would seem to be much truth in Eucken’s contention² that the “medicinal” theory makes the whole subject yet more of an insoluble riddle. This it does most effectually for minds that will not accept the postulates of the supremest religious experience of the race. For these are the postulates that guarantee the hope of Redemption.

The instrumental theory, with its proposed solution of the problem of evil, does not bear altogether well being submitted

¹ This thought is beautifully expressed in the following stanza from a German poem:—

*“Wer nie sein Brod mit Thränen ass,
Wer nie die kummervolle Nächte,
Auf seinem Bette weinend sass,
Der kennt Euch nicht, Ihr himmlischen Mächte.”*

² Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, p. 388f.

to the testing of the facts of experience. These facts support its critics in making the following objections: (1) Much pain does not appear to serve the ministrations of a higher good, whether of happiness or of moral purity. Indeed, in the actual experience of the multitude of the race, it is just this inevitable and overwhelming amount of suffering which prevents the higher and more valuable forms of intellectual, social, artistic, and even of ethical and religious satisfaction. That it is suffering, either through bodily pains, unsatisfied cravings, or satiety and ennui, which leads to much, Nay! to most, of the prevalent moral evils, there is little reasonable doubt. But (2) the way that suffering is distributed constitutes, perhaps, the darkest part of the problem of evil. It cannot be said with any confidence that most of such evil comes, either to those who most deserve it, or to those who can best endure and profit by it. (3) Without accepting the postulate of a continued and improved existence for the race after death, much of the cogency of the argument which justifies suffering as instrumentally necessary for human development is lost; but this postulate itself depends upon the acceptance of the religious conception of the Divine Being as perfect Ethical Spirit.

When the attempt is made to apply the instrumental theory to the solution of the problem of moral evil, the mind is met by yet more serious objections. All three of the objections just recited recur with added emphasis. At this point, too, appears the gravest danger of undermining the very foundations of ethics; and so of invalidating the higher forms of religious life and development. These attain their supreme worth, only if they are regarded as ways of freeing the Self from the thralldom of moral evil, of triumphing completely over it, rather than chiefly of making use of it as means to a higher moral good. And when the instrumental theory of moral evil is affiliated with the deterministic doctrine of the will and with a *quasi*-, if not quite completely mechanical view of the development of the race, its logical outcome is antithetic

to the interests of religion ; it is even abhorrent to Christian experience.

The mind of man, when reflecting most intelligently and seriously upon the problem of evil, whether as suffering or as sin, naturally and inevitably turns to religion for a solution. Thus the problem of evil becomes a theodicy. The more the so-called "goods" of human living increase, and the more what is called (oftentimes with hypocrisy, often with cynicism, oftenest with flippancy) "modern civilization" advances, the more does the consciousness of evil deepen and greaten in thoughtful minds. Thus the demand for relief from life's burdens, theoretical and practical, gains in insistency and emphasis. For the ideal good, which the higher religions promise and expect, the need of humanity increases rather than diminishes with advancing race-culture. "It is the yearning cry," says Wellhausen, remarking on the dark side of the modern world, "that goes through all the peoples ; as they advance to civilization, they feel the value of the goods they have sacrificed for it."

In treating the Problem of Evil as a Theodicy the following three considerations require to be kept constantly in view. And, first, monotheistic religion is compelled to find the *ultimate* origin of the facts which constitute the problem, in the Will of God. Whence comes the evil of the World? For religion this pressing question cannot be confused by logical abstractions or metaphysical evasion. Evil is not a bulk of being, a lump sum of existence, or an impersonal entity. It is nothing else than the actual misery and degradation of sentient and, especially, of human life. So far, then, as its problem can be made an object of investigation, the origin of evil must be found in the nature of sentient and self-conscious life as necessarily related, in its being and in its development, to its environment. And it is just this necessity, which the medicinal or instrumental theory emphasizes, in the thought thus to help out the solution of the problem, that makes the theistic answer all the

more difficult. The pantheistic and pessimistic theories of Schopenhauer and of Hartmann allow of making the irrationality of blind Will, or the unconscious striving of an immanently teleological, but impersonal Will, responsible for this necessity. But monotheistic religion, and especially Christianity, regards God as the Creator, Preserver, and Moral Ruler of the Universe; the existence of evil, with all its enormous amount and seemingly inevitable character must have its ground, therefore, in his Will. This "ultimate responsibility" of God constitutes the fundamental problem of every theodicy.

In God also must the solution be found, if found at all. Plato saw this truth; and his solution of the problem of evil, in the Republic (book x), is in all essential respects a theistic and Christian theodicy. The Stoics added the conception of a more perfect necessity, which so binds together the evil and the good that the former cannot be removed without destroying also the possibility of the latter. And Christian theologians¹ have quite generally held, that the fundamental and chief, if not the sole, principle of a theodicy is faith in the supremacy of God as "Absolute Reason," which may be identified with a "scientifically ordered system." The conception which the philosophy of religion vindicates—namely, that of God as Infinite and Absolute self-conscious Person—leaves no escape from the conclusion that the only possible theory of the origin of evil is some form of a theodicy.

In the second place, the possibility of a theodicy rests upon and embraces the postulate, or the proved truth, that the world is a moral system. Here the thought of Martineau is most pertinent. "We seek," says he,² "to know whether the system to which we belong corresponds to the *righteousness* ascribed to its author. Well, then, by hypothesis it is to be a *moral* system, and must comprise the requisites for the formation,

¹ See, for example, S. Harris, *God, the Creator and Lord of All*, I, p. 210f.

² *A Study of Religion*, II, p. 54.

the exercise, and the discipline of *character*." This assumption underlies all human attempts to judge God by his doings; thus it leads to the strange antithetic attitudes of such writers as John Stuart Mill, on the one hand, and Dean Mansel on the other. For piety agrees with the testimony of science and of experience, when they furnish evidence of the justice and goodness of God; but piety has always espoused the cause of God against the evidence, on the ground that God is too high, and his ways too mysterious, for human judgment. Meantime all the arguments *pro* and *con*, and the very effort to erect or to destroy a tenable theodicy, agree upon the postulate that the Universe is a subject for *moral* judgments. Indeed, were this not so: How could the Universe give evidence either for, or against, the justice and goodness of God?

And, third, the problem of a theodicy cannot be satisfactorily discussed at all without the constant, intelligent, and well-informed effort to consider the subject in its totality. But herein is the vastness of it; here extends the valid ground for the plea that much must be left, and even no little positive force given, to the "argument from ignorance." In viewing the problem of evil—and especially when this problem is viewed as a theodicy—the World must be taken as a whole; it must be considered as that kind of a connected and interdependent totality which it is on good grounds assumed, but only very partially and imperfectly known, to be. Its totality embraces the boundless stretches of the World's time, not only backward but into its prospective future. The problem of evil is, therefore, not the problem of any individual existence, or particular set of relations; it does not concern simply some group of individual human beings, whether particularly favored or especially unlucky. It is, the rather, the problem of the universe's construction and history; it is the problem of the race. It is not the problem of an hour, or of a day, or even of a single century; it is, the rather, the problem of all the countless centuries. It can be solved, if solved at all, only by

the realization of an ultimate purpose,—a purpose which determines the evolution of the race, regarded as a divinely ordered and divinely conducted process.

When, then, certain individual experiences or particular sets of facts seem to oppose those postulates of religious faith which sustain the conviction that God is perfectly wise and good, the so-called “argument from ignorance,” illogical and unscientific as such an argument often is, seems by no means necessarily out of place. Indeed, without a similar use of the argument, there are few of the conceptions and laws of the physico-chemical sciences which can establish themselves. These conceptions are uniformly based upon partial evidence; they make an appeal for patient waiting for further evidence, in order to accomplish the removal of antithetic conclusions, and so to bring about a perfect internal harmony. These so-called “laws,” too, are customarily honeycombed with holes or flaw-like specks, which indicate the gnawing corrosion of *exceptions*, or the vanishing mould of discarded *fallacies*. Above all is the argument with which modern science supports its conception of the vast complex of obscurely related beings, and of unexplained and inexplicable transactions, as an orderly Whole, a true Cosmos, obliged to make constant and extensive appeal to human ignorance. Many things in this vast complex do indeed indicate that it has the nature of an Orderly Whole; but many other things look as though “chaos and old night,” instead of the “reign of law,” were in supreme control. It is largely because reason, and more especially moral reason, will not contentedly tolerate the idea of “Chaos,” but insists on the supremacy of its ideals, that the conclusion of a universal Cosmic Order wins the human mind. Science always espouses the cause of Order even against the evidence;—and it has often justified this breach of strict logic, on the ground that Nature is too vast and mysterious, and as yet unexplored, to be fully comprehended by human judgments.

It cannot be denied, however, that on the whole the progress

of modern science is in the direction of increasing, not only our wonder and admiration before the vastness and mystery of the Cosmos, but also our insight into the wisdom and beneficence of its contrivances. It is no longer possible to explain the performances of natural objects after the type of a machine, or even of an infinitely intricate molecular mechanism.¹ The very elements of all living beings seem themselves to be endowed with a selective and purposeful self-activity. No known,—and we may well say,—no conceivable combination of laws will explain, for example, the behavior of the white blood-corpuscles in their phagocytic functions, as they suddenly develop the power of adapting themselves to situations and performances which are as new to them as they are obscure and intricate to human observation. These cells behave like conscious, purposeful, and benevolent living souls, rather than like *merely* mechanical structures. They are, of course, dependent upon their own structure and upon the means to their hand, so to say, for their ability to discharge wisely and well their peculiar functions. But so is man himself. The spermatozoa, too, seem to know well how to proceed upon the way to the execution of the purposes for which their structure, when the opportunity comes, has previously fitted them. They, too, behave like living and embodied souls, rather than like *merely* mechanical existences. And the ovum which they fertilize goes straight about its incredibly intricate and mysterious business, marshalling the corpuscles upon which it can lay hold and building, with marvellous intelligence and wisdom, on the whole, and yet not without many incidental and evil mistakes, a structure infinitely more complex than anything within the power of human wisdom and skill. Nay! the very atoms themselves can no longer be considered as simple and structure-

¹ For the confession of the failure of modern science to "re-express any vital phenomenon in terms of physics and chemistry," see Professors J. Arthur Thomson and Patrick Geddes, and the authorities they quote: *Ideals of Science and Faith*, p. 54f.

less beings, that are driven hither and thither by external forces in accordance with fixed laws imposed from without. Each kind, and even each individual of its kind, appears to have a constitution and a mission of its own; appears also to know how to make use of this constitution in the fulfillment of its peculiar mission. Each one of these atoms is forever solving wholly new problems, by entering into wholly new combinations;—and all this is done in the interests of that vast Whole of which each atom is an incredibly minute and yet quite specially significant part.

The modern scientific view of the good and the evil that have been, and are, in the world, and of the manner and direction in which the world's infinitely numerous beings are co-operating to the apparent realization of some vastly profound and vastly remote end, does not, indeed, completely effect a solution of the problem of evil. But it may well make our minds the readier to listen to what religion has to offer in the way of at least an improved mental and practical attitude toward this problem.

The attitude of religious experience toward the problem of evil depends, of course, upon the kind of religious belief and sentiment in which the experience consists. And this varies greatly in dependence upon the stage reached by each religion in respect, especially, of its intellectual and ethical ideals. The religions which were grouped together under the vague title of an "unreflecting spiritism," cannot even raise the questions involved in this profound problem. For their ethical standards are too low and too little integrated with their religious beliefs; and their reflective thinking, or philosophical culture, is of too primitive a type. Even "polytheism," says Tiele,¹ "found no difficulty in answering this question." Its world of gods is of too classes. There are evil spiritual powers that need to be propitiated and must be feared. And there are kindly and good gods with which man may have

¹ Elements of the Science of Religion, Second Series, p. 91.

more or less of friendly intercourse,—at least, if one knows how to keep on good terms with them. Of Shintō, as says Griffis,¹ “it is to be noted that in the god-way the origin of evil is to be ascribed to evil gods. These *Kami* pollute, and pollution is iniquity. From this iniquity the people are to be purged by the gods of purification, to whom offerings are duly made.” All kinds of mischief and trouble come from the bad *Kami*. Physical and moral or spiritual defilement were thus identified; and out of this identification grew many cruel, and also some sanitary and beneficent, customs. The position of all the religions at a certain stage of their development is essentially similar on this matter.

But indifference to the problem of evil, and so crude a way of attempting its solution, cannot abide the tests which the advances of race-culture bring to bear upon religious belief. As an inevitable result of this advance, the great importance of the problem becomes heightened; and the process of the unification of knowledge brings the attempts to solve the problem into more immediate relations with the conception of Divine Being. In this way a sort of ethical Dualism is the inevitable result. It now appears plain that there are immanent and effective in the World of man's larger experience, certain forces—powerful, mysterious, and inescapable—which make for good; and that there are others—even more powerful, and to the awakened moral consciousness more mysterious, while no less unavoidable—which make for evil. These two sets of forces seem to work in a sort of internal harmony of action with themselves; but with antithetic tendencies, and indeed in the form of a fierce and passionate struggle, between the two sets. Hence the mind concludes that there is a unity to evil, and a kind of opposed unity to the good. There is a kingdom of happiness, purity, and life; there is a kingdom of suffering, sinning, and death. There is God, and there is the Devil,—personified Good in its totality and personified Evil in

¹ The Religions of Japan, p. 78.

its totality; and there is eternal warfare between the two. Nor is the question as to which is superior and likely, or sure, to win the final victory, easy to solve. For the mind that clings persistently to the empirical points of view, especially when these points of view set a high value upon the good of happiness, it is easier to believe in many devils than in one perfectly good and holy God. The question of the suffering and puzzled patriarch Job: "Why do the wicked live, become old, yea, are mighty in power?" becomes an unanswerable question. "How canst thou," asked Theognis, "O son of Saturn, put the sinner and the just man on the same footing?" But even at this stage of reflection over the diverse phenomena, and of immaturity in ethical conceptions and ideals, the faith of religion espouses the cause of God against the evidence of facts.

The resulting Dualism of religious philosophy may take either one of two principal forms. It may associate the good divine beings and the evil ones, respectively, after the manner of a human social organization; or it may hypostasize each of the collective superhuman powers for good and for evil in some one Divine Being,—thus representing both these two sides, or aspects, of human experience. But in either case the tendency of the improved religious consciousness is to make the Good superior in power to, and finally triumphant over, the Evil. The highest and typical example of this dualistic tendency is given by the Persian religion in the form in which it was established by its great religious teacher. "The peculiarity of the reform of Zarathustra," says Pfeleiderer,¹ "appears to have consisted in this, that he placed the opposed spirits of the Iranian nature-religion in two hostile kingdoms, each presided over by a spiritual power; and that by his exalted idea of the nature of the good God and Creator he approached closely to monotheism." According to the Bundehesh, the Eternal and Absolute Being, or First Cause, produced out of his own

¹ The Philosophy of Religion, III, p. 79f.

substance two great divine beings. Of these one, Ahura-Mazda, was good and true to his Creator, a King of Light; and he became head of all that is pure and good in the world's existence. He, indeed, is himself to be praised as the creator and preserver and sole lord of the world. But the other was Ahriman, King of Darkness, head of an army of bad spirits, and bringer of all kinds of evils into a good world. Between the two a great world-struggle takes place and continues through immense stretches of time. But at the last Ahura triumphs over Ahriman. For, in truth, Ahura is rather the true and only absolute divine being; Ahriman is but a limitation, a barrier, which will cease in time, to his perfect and absolute goodness. And thus the Persian religion comes very near to the doctrine of a creation by a good God, that is somehow doomed to "groan and travail together," while it waits for the completion of the process of redemption. In cruder form the North Germans and Scandinavians looked on human experience of good and evil as though it could be explained by a struggle of "the good world-preserving gods with hostile elemental powers." And the Manichæan heresy regarded evil as so deeply and extensively bedded in the world that it is impossible to regard a perfectly good God as the Creator and Redeemer of mankind.

All such Dualism, however, great as is the temptation to cling to it as a needed explanation of man's complex experience, and enormous as are the difficulties which any logical and consistent Monism finds with the problem of evil, is unable to endure the strain of the uprising and uplifting reflection of the race. The problem of evil as a theodicy may, indeed, be intensified and made more profoundly mysterious by the higher ethical conceptions of God. But the optimistic faith of religion, confirmed or assisted by philosophy, seems to increase its strength of persuasion and power to convince, in even greater ratio.

The different forms of a monistic philosophy of religion offer to religious faith the solution of the problem of evil in different

ways. In general, however, a doctrine of salvation is its solution. In the theodicy of Hindūism the conception of Brahma is the fundamental postulate. All is one; and as Anaximander long ago said: "Whence is the origin of existing things, thence also in their passing away, according to an inner necessity." From this point of departure it is but a step to the Heraclitean doctrine of the periodic destruction and reconstruction of all existences through Brahma. "All comes from One, and One from All." But this doctrine must be harmonized with the other doctrine of the Upanishads,—namely, that man's soul is an eternal and indestructible entity;¹ and that it is of such nature as to carry over the consequences of conduct from one to another of the stages of its eternal existence. This, however, is an ethical postulate. The assumption is therefore made that Ātman, or the true Self of things, is the alone real; the world of appearances in space and time is Māyā, an illusion, a deceptive image of the true. It is, then, the mistaking of the illusory for the true and the real, of that which is only māyā for Ātman, which is the source of all evil, both physical and moral. The essence of evil is ignorance, is illusion. How, then, shall salvation or the rescue of the soul, the triumph of good over evil, be attained? By being disillusioned; by coming to know Ātman as the Alone Real. Through the knowledge of God the soul triumphs over all evil; for to know Him is to know that there is no real evil. God, when known, is his own theodicy. The glad tidings come announcing to the seeker for relief from evil: "I have heard it said that he who knows the Spirit passes beyond grief."² Naturally enough, this way of resolving the problem of evil is too high

¹ See Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, I, ii, pp. 78ff.

² See Deussen, *Ibid*, pp. 68ff. The same thought is expressed in the following lines:—

Durch Wissen steigen sie aufwärts
 Dorthin wo das Verlangen schweigt;
 Nicht Opfergabe reicht dorthin,
 Nicht Busse des Nichtwissenden.

and steep for the naked and bleeding feet of the millions who toil over the rough pathway of life. And the popular Brāhmanic faith emphasizes for them the need of strict compliance with ritual and of obedience to the priest.

Buddhism¹ modifies essentially the Brāhmanical doctrine of evil and its dependent doctrine of the way to escape from the evil—the way of salvation. For the philosopher it calls in question his conception of the reality of soul. As to the ātman of the individual man, Buddhism altogether denies its reality; as to the universal Ātman, the World-Soul, it is sceptical or agnostic. Evil is, therefore, no longer conceived of simply as māyā, the illusion which mistakes appearance for reality, and which knows not the One Alone Real. The real evil is Karma, or the resultant of mental and bodily actions, considered as though it were an indestructible entity—the deathless self-inherited character which results from bad deeds. The way of overcoming this evil, the way of salvation, is therefore neither the intuitive nor the contemplative knowledge of Ātman, with a view to union with him; nor is it the cultivation of elaborate ritual, or of obedience to the priesthood. It is rather the life of purity and love. By perpetual cultivation of Self in the eightfold path, one may at last obtain release from the ceaseless round of rebirths,—may reach the goal, Nirvāna. Then he can use the words of an ancient poem :

“ My heart as it is, is Buddha, the living Buddha,
And there is no water apart from the billow.”

The problem of evil has always weighed heavily upon the brain and heart of Brāhmanism and of Buddhism. Both find its origin in that Being of the World with which human weal and woe is so inextricably bound up that the responsibility for the evil must somehow be divided between God and man. Both offer the hope of relief from evil only to those few who can somehow so enter into union with this Being of the World

¹ See further, Vol. I of this work, chap. XXII: The Way of Salvation.

as to lose their selves in It. And if we consider the later philosophical developments of Buddhism as they are recorded in the Greater Vehicle, and as they have constituted the various sects and schools of Japan, and compare them with the *whole round* of doctrines taught in the Upanishads, the main features of all these attempts to solve the problem of evil do not differ essentially.

Strictly speaking, then, neither Brāhmanism nor Buddhism offers any solution of the problem of evil. Their doctrine of the Divine Being is not a theodicy; that is to say, it does not find in God an explanation of all existing evils which makes it possible to have a rational faith in Him, not only as their ultimate origin, but also as the guaranty of their overcoming by the development of that Kingdom of God which is the goal of the Universe and its all-inclusive Good. The same thing must be said of Islam and of all those forms of Christianity which, like Islam and like popular Hindūism and Buddhism, fail of finding the essence of the Divine Being in ethical love, and of fixing the goal of man's creation and history in the perfected Divine Kingdom. It is, indeed, in some sort true as Eucken¹ has said, that the religious solution of the problem of evil does not attempt to annihilate evil or even to lessen it; it strives, the rather, to secure an inner triumph over the evil, and thus to raise humanity above every form of evil into participation in the Supreme Good. On the other hand, it is also true that the complete and final triumph of Divine Love over every form of evil must be made an invincible faith of religion, if religion is to afford any satisfactory help in the solution of the problem of evil. Later Buddhism saw this; and it accordingly teaches that the attainment of Nirvāna by the individual is not enough to satisfy him who has the true spirit of the Buddha (or the "enlightened"). The individual can find the solution of the problem *for himself* only in a faith and a service which accept the same solution *for the race*. Chris-

¹ Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, p. 387f.

tianity, too, after many sad departures from its own better and truer conceptions of God and of His Kingdom, shows signs of a return to the same faith: God is perfect Ethical Spirit, and His plan of Redemption is all-inclusive.

It is unnecessary to add much in this connection to what has already been said in treating of the Christian doctrine of the Way of Salvation.¹ As to the origin of evil, Christianity has been encompassed by the same theoretical and practical difficulties, from which only partial deliverance is to be found in an improved philosophy, as those that have encompassed other forms of religious faith. In Christ's time the current views on demonology are made apparent in the Gospel narratives. Indeed, "the present dominion of evil demons, or of one evil demon, was just as generally presupposed as men's need of redemption, which was regarded as a result of that dominion." And this opinion, which comes down substantially unchanged through all the centuries of man's religious development, has always maintained a firm hold upon the popular, and even upon the more technical theology of Christian communities. But with this theory another related but not identical theory was combined; and "the obvious difficulty which the actual world, with its failures and imperfections, presents to all theories of evolution which assume the existence of a good and perfect God, was bridged over by the hypothesis of a lapse."² One section who held this hypothesis carried back the fall out of original righteousness "from the earthly Paradise to the sphere of divinity itself." So Valentinus taught; and Marcion was even accused of speaking of "two gods." Another section held the less heretical view—corresponding to that of Milton's Paradise Lost—that there had been a revolt among the supernal powers. And, indeed, this opinion seems to be that of the deutero-canonical book of Revelation (xx, 1-3).

¹ Vol. I, chap. XXII.

² See Hatch, *Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church*, p. 193f.

No such solution of the origin of the evil could, however, be accepted by the more thoughtful and logically consistent theologians of the Christian Church. Any "fall" from original righteousness, and the consequent prevalence of evil in a world that came from a good and perfect God, must have somehow originated in this world itself. But how could this be, and yet the sovereignty and perfection of God remain unimpaired? Two hypotheses were indeed at hand: (1) That evil was inherent in matter; or (2) that the world was itself created by subordinate and imperfect agents. But as the conception of the unity and absoluteness of God developed, in reflection upon a basis of extending experience as to the nature of the world, it excluded more and more decisively both these explanations. Thus the view which may be called, of all others the most distinctly Christian, came to prevail. God made the world by the power of his Logos, or the divine and rational expression of his Will; therefore this world is good in its essential nature. But man, by the wrong exercise of his own free will has brought evil in the form of sin, and its consequences, into this good world. Perhaps, no better answer from the religious point of view will ever be devised for the problem of the origin of evil. It is an attempt to adjust the various elements that enter into that religious experience which reaches its culminating expression in the Christian consciousness. This experience affirms man's exceeding ill-desert, and also the incomparable Divine graciousness. God made a good world and made man good; but man made himself evil, and thus brought much evil into the world.

From the modern point of view as held by science, and by a philosophy based upon the particular sciences, the religious doctrine of the origin of evil is, indeed, partial and unsatisfactory. But thus far the utmost insight and profoundest reasonings of man do not take him beyond these conclusions: In God's Will, as expressed in the constitution of nature and of man, must be found the ultimate Ground of both that which

seems to us evil and of that which seems to us good. Yet somehow or other, man is now astray and the world is now awry. Both in religion and in science and philosophy, the mind seeks reasons for the faith that the end will finally vindicate the *perfect* wisdom and goodness of God.

For the individual believer the problem of evil is solved by his changed estimate of the values of the different goods, and by his faith that the changed attitude in which he stands toward God secures for him the supreme and all-inclusive good. This attitude is a voluntary, ethical, and spiritual union with God. Indeed, all the higher religions make this good, which, in the scales of a mind that can see truly, outweighs all the evils of life, to consist in some sort of communion with the divine beings. Even the lower forms of religion show intimations of the same confidence. In Greece, to dwell with the gods on Olympus was the highest wish of good fortune for the believer after death. The supreme desire of the old-Vedic Rishis was to be united with Agni, Varuna, or Indra. And when the impersonal principle Brahma is elevated above the gods, the gods themselves are only gateways to the soul that longs to be absorbed in the higher good of Brahma. But above all does the Christian faith convert the bearing of all suffering for the individual Self into a loving and cheerful submission to the will of God, and the triumph over all moral evil, however much of painful self-sacrifice it may involve, into a loving divine service. Thus there is something of the fine Stoicism about it, with which the crippled slave philosopher Epictetus referred to God's dealing with him: "What about my leg being lamed, then?" "Slave! do you really find fault with the world on account of one bit of a leg? Will you not give that up to the universe? Will you not let it go? Will you not gladly surrender it to the giver?" But there is also something yet finer in the way that Christian faith answers, for the individual believer, the dark problem of evil. As seen from its point of view, the minutest details of the life of the pious man

are under the merciful and loving care of a Heavenly Father ; and suffering is only a filling-up of the measure which Jesus had poured so full from the fountain of his self-sacrificing love.

Thus, for a humanity that has the fullness of the Christian faith, God is so conceived of as to be his own theodicy. But the question recurs as to the basis in fact upon which this faith is reposed ; and as to the rationality of the faith itself, when taken in that large way which is necessary in order, even partially, to compass the problem of the *World's* suffering and moral failure. To this question there are these three considerations to be advanced. First, and now most important of all, the appearance and growth of religious experience itself is of immense value in support of the claim that God is indeed perfect Ethical Spirit. The experience is a fact. It is one of those facts of an abiding and rising confidence in the reality of human ideals, which constitute the most significant and influential factors in human history. The grand conceptions of a perfectly good God, and of his Kingdom, are with the race. Whence did they come ? To tabulate, to estimate and to criticise, the empirical sources, does not suffice to account for the conceptions themselves. The experience claims to be *about*, or *of*, the World-Ground ; its ultimate sources must be sought and found, if found at all, in the reality of the World-Ground. If the World-Ground can be convicted of producing so comforting and lofty an illusion, then it is surely capable—given time enough—of vindicating its own character and of proving that the faith is not an illusion but an insight into the Reality corresponding to its own Ideal. Such testimony from religious experience, and especially from the highest Christian consciousness, is not indeed a demonstration. But it is of essentially the same nature as all of the complex argument by which we are compelled to establish the rationality of man's faith in God. Only this particular experience is still *in the making*, as it were ; and the problem, to the better solution of which

it promises its contribution, is so deep, and high, and vast in extent, and so dark, that a few centuries can scarcely be expected to contribute a complete empirical solution. Have all the countless records of the countless biological ages served as yet fully to answer the problems of biological evolution?

In saying this we touch upon the second of the more important suggested considerations. The nearest which human reason can come to any theoretical solution of the problem of evil must be found in a doctrine of *Becoming*,—in a theory of the development of the world within which man's total experience lies. Such a theory must be founded upon facts; and the facts upon which it is founded, if it is to have any value beyond that of a pleasant dream or a fanciful hypothesis, must be facts of the world's actual history. Among these facts, however, and by no means of least account in determining the character of man's evolution, are those which pertain to the religious and moral history of mankind. Christianity's doctrine of this development regards it all as somehow falling under the divinely ordered scheme of redemption; it is all the history of the coming in its perfection of the Kingdom of God.

It must not be forgotten, however, that Christianity—like Brāhmanism, Buddhism, and Zoroastrianism, in this respect—does not offer itself as an *immediate* and *direct* cure for all the evils of the world. Neither does it promise any indirect and final cure in this life for all those experiences which are esteemed evil by man, and which are really evil from the point of view of his sentient nature and natural desire for happiness. Salvation offers primarily a cure for man's sinful attitude toward God, and for *its* evil nature and consequences.

The reasonableness and hopefulness of this offer is supported by two tenets of faith, in which all the greater religions have a share, but which Christianity has perfected in their more elaborate and logically consistent form. These are the doctrine of the Future Life, and the related doctrine of the final triumph of the Social Ideal. In general, the religions which have,

partly through other considerations, arrived at the belief in immortality, have felt the need of this belief in order to maintain any satisfactory view of the problem of evil. "Thus," says D'Alviella, "most peoples have sought in doctrines of a future life the means of repairing the evils and injustices of the present." It is Christianity, however, which, by its unfolding of the belief of Judaism in a social redemption of the righteous and the faithful, has offered for the solution of the problem of evil a faith in the progressive and finally perfected triumph of the Kingdom of God. But these tenets of religious faith await the critical and reflective but sympathetic treatment offered by the philosophy of religion.

In conclusion it should be noticed that, for the faith of religion, much of the evil of the world can scarcely be said to be evil at all. So far does religion go in its use of the instrumental theory of the evil of suffering, and even of sin. Religion itself is, indeed, born in humanity through the travail of desire to get rid of the evil—both the evil without and the evil within. As the development of religion proceeds, the moral purification and spiritual insight that lead to communion with God, and to a union with Him which—we might almost say—is "for better or for worse," become the things of highest worth to the religious mind. This longing for deliverance then develops that despair of self-deliverance, or of other deliverance at the hand of man, which is, on its other side, the yearning for redemption. The great and final function of religion is the ministry to this yearning; this is the Work of Redemption. To this subjective attitude religion holds out the hope of vanquishing the evil. The evil of suffering is to be overcome by piously bearing it as an expression of God's will under the conditions of living assigned to the individual; and by doing what can wisely be done to remove it from others, by use of means that accord with the Divine righteousness. The evil of sin is to be vanquished by availing one's self of the Divine help, and by helping others to escape; in

a word, by conforming to the conditions set by God's good Will for the establishment, growth, and final triumphs of his Kingdom among men.

Let us, therefore, be content at present to put the solution of the problem of evil which religion offers, in hypothetical and negative form. Unless the historical evolution of the human race, as a part of the World-All, may be believed to be directed toward, and to be secure in, the final triumph of that all-inclusive Good, which all the other great religions dimly foreshadow, and which Christianity denominates "Eternal Life in the Kingdom of God," there is no possible solution to be discovered or even imagined for this dark problem. The summation of what is called "earthly good," were it possible, as it is not, that it should be attained for the race under the fixed conditions of its earthly environment, would not abolish the conflict between good and evil, and the resulting schism in man's soul. The hope of an Ideal Good, that is spiritual and collective, is held out by religion. *The faith in the securing of this good as the fixed purpose of God, through a process of development, is religion's solution of the problem of evil.* Confirmations, that find a certain broadening basis in our experience of the world, are accumulating in the storehouses of the particular sciences. And although the evidence is far from being theoretically complete, its general nature is similar to that upon which repose the most important postulates of man's intellectual and practical life and development.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES

It is impossible logically to explain and defend, or to make practically effective, the demands of religion upon the soul of man for a right attitude toward the Object of religious faith, without endowing the conception of this Object with certain moral attributes. In a word, God cannot be realized as God in man's life, if conceived of as devoid of all ethical qualifications. This is true, however obscure, meagre, and abstract, that conception of the Divine Being which is presented in order to arouse the feelings and control the life. If, for example, the Chinese conception of Heaven and Earth as Shang Ti is often made to appear as distinctly impersonal, and at best is never fully personal; none the less are Heaven and Earth treated in Chinese thought and practice, as worthy, for their justice and beneficence, of the adoration, confidence, and service of man. The vaguest pantheism of India is customarily most pronounced in that kind of "emotionalism" which is impossible without some belief in the *quasi*-moral character of its object. "When one loves Him, fixes himself on Him and makes himself at one with Him, then comes about the cessation of the world of delusion"¹ (that is, salvation). But especially in Judaism did the "righteousness," and later the "loving kindness," or mercifulness, of God serve, above all other attributes, to define and commend Him to the believer's faith. While Christianity reiterates and enforces the declaration that God is most essentially,—not omnipotence, and omniscience, and omnipresence (although He is all these), but Ethical Love.

¹ See chap. I, of the Upanishad of the Krishna Yajur Veda.

In the case of all the so-called "moral attributes," before approaching the problem of their applicability to the Divine Being, it is of primary importance to understand precisely what it is proposed to attribute. And here the inquiry is immediately involved in serious difficulties that arise from two somewhat antithetic positions, and that lead in two opposite directions. On the one hand, if the ordinary and uncriticised conceptions of the moral attributes—of what it is, to be "perfectly just and good"—are applied to the Personal Absolute, the immensity of the problems suggested is such as to surpass the limitations of human thinking and imagination. In their range over vast multitudes, through incalculable stretches of space and time, and with so many considerations that are obscure, or wholly hidden, these problems are quite unmanageable by the empirical method. We end by saying: God may be perfectly just and good; but it cannot be told "how" in terms of our human experience with ethical conditions, maxims, and ideas. But, on the other hand, if we follow the unfortunate method which makes a demand for *faith* in God's perfect justice and goodness, after God has virtually been convicted of injustice and cruelty, we disturb in a yet more serious way the very foundations of every degree and kind of religious *knowledge*.

What has just been said is particularly true of so vague and shifty, yet fundamental, a conception as that of Justice. The world over, in modern times, all classes of men are coming to regard the claim to "justice" as an inalienable right of humanity; in the name of justice they are passionately demanding such a redistribution of the "goods" of life as would seem to be inherently inconsistent with the very nature of their physical and social environment. What wonder, then, that God seems unjust, when the same conception of the right to just treatment, with its accompanying demand, is transferred to Him? In the same way, and largely as due to the same causes, the notion of mankind as to what it is to be perfectly

“good” and “kind” has undergone important changes. No serious student of the fundamental conceptions of ethics can for a moment admit that all these changes are for the better. When men call by these titles those persons, laws, and institutions, which for the time being at least seem to contribute most abundantly to their own individual happiness, how shall one manage to convince them that the omnipotent and omniscient God is *perfectly* good—after the same low and unworthy pattern of goodness? A preliminary examination of the nature of these moral attributes themselves would seem, then, to be indispensable to a theodicy.¹

The psychological origin and character of the conception of Justice, as well as its historical evolution and progressive application to the Divine Being, are very complex and, in many important respects, obscure. In general, however, the conception of this moral attribute has followed the same law which has characterized the evolution of the conceptions attached to all the other so-called virtuous forms of human conduct. Its progress has been in the direction of recognizing the essential unity of the virtues, and the essential spiritual unity of the human race. In this way a certain imperfect and faulty practice of justice has been extended, from its former application to favored classes, to a more general application over a larger proportion of mankind. Yet nothing ever done by the most savage people can exceed the essential injustice, which is still done in the name of justice by the so-called “superior” to the so-called “inferior” races; and by the favored classes in the most civilized nations, to classes that are less fortunate.

When we ask ourselves, What are the essential marks of the most rational conception of justice as men apply this term to their own behavior toward their fellows? these two considerations become important. First, the conception of even

¹ For a fuller treatment of these topics see the author's *Philosophy of Conduct*, Part Second, “The Virtuous Life.”

the lowest savages is much superior to their practice. "Their notions," says Mariner of the Tongan Islanders, "in respect to honor and justice, are tolerably well-defined, steady, and universal; but in point of practice, both chiefs and people are irregular and fickle." What better, however, can be said of "both chiefs and people" of America or of Great Britain, where the acknowledged rights of justice have perhaps reached their highest development? But, second, the so-called "even-handed justice" which

" Commends the ingredients of our poisoned chalice
To our own lips"—

as well as to the lips of others, is not the equivalent of *perfect* justice, in the higher meaning of the words. The higher meaning recognizes the compatibility of this moral attribute with the attributes of kindness, goodness, and benevolence. It is the "higher justice" which Aristotle recognized¹ as a "complete virtue, although not complete in an absolute sense, but in relation to one's neighbor." Such justice is "not a part of virtue, but the whole of virtue;" it is "the chief of virtues;" it is so supreme a quality of personal life that "neither evening nor morning star is so lovely." It is such justice, then, that the most developed religious faith attributes, in its perfection, to the Divine Being.

From this point of view, justice is conceived of as an ideal virtue, worthy to determine all the relations and behavior of men to one another. It is "the voluntary judgment (and corresponding practice) which duly apportions to individual men their share of the goods and the evils of life, so far as these goods and evils are dependent upon human conduct."² But all attempts at *perfect* justice among men are doomed to failure because of the inescapable limitations, in spite of the best intentions, both of wisdom to determine what this fair share is, and also of power to carry out the apportionment of

¹ Nicom. Eth., Book V.

² Quoted from the author's *Philosophy of Conduct*, p. 287.

the goods and evils of life in accordance with the wisest and best judgment. When, then, inquiry is made into the perfection of God's justice, the essential limitations to it which come from man's lack of wisdom and power have already been theoretically set aside. But the difficulties which these limitations impose upon man's critical estimate of this perfection remain irremovably attached to the very conditions of the problem. What *are* these "real" goods; and what these "real" evils? What *is* each man's fair share? *How* and *when* should the distribution take place in order to vindicate the perfection of Divine Justice?

This, then, is the question which the religious faith of humanity presents to experience for an answer: "Art Thou, then, perfectly just after the pattern of my heart's highest and noblest ideal?" The history of man's religious development shows that the answers to this question have depended upon the ethical attainments, and ethical ideals, which have characterized the different stages of this development. There is always something strange and paradoxical about man's belief in the Divine Justice. The very experiences which make it so difficult to believe that God is perfectly just are the experiences out of which has chiefly arisen the belief in His perfect justice. Were not man's social environment in this life so full of the oppressive marks of iniquity and injustice, there would be little or no impulse to appeal from earthly and temporal experience, to the justice to be done in the future life, to the justice of heaven, or of God. Were perfect justice possible of realization at the hands of men, then men would not look elsewhere in prayer, faith, and hope, for any nearer approaches to such justice. "May neither I nor my son," sings Hesiod,¹ "now be just among men, since it is an evil thing for a man to be just; if indeed the unjust are to secure the larger rights. Yet I do not hold that Zeus, who exults in the thunderbolt, will allow this." The most lofty ascriptions of this virtue to

¹ Works and Days, 270-273

the gods on the part of the early religions of Babylonia and Assyria are incantations. They attribute it to the divine powers in the hope that these powers will assist the believer in getting justice done to him by his fellow men.

The belief in the Divine Justice, which has always so largely had its origin in the experience of injustice, has undergone a development in dependence upon the rising grades of race-culture, especially in the form of an improvement in civil and political morals and in moral ideals. In the stage of unreflecting spiritism little demand for this virtue is made upon the invisible superhuman powers. But, as says D'Alviella,¹ "man comes at last to ascribe to his deity only the two loftiest sentiments of the human soul, justice and love." The improved expression and stability of the conception of that virtue which Aristotle called "general justice" is the effect of growth in those moral elements of political and social life to which these sentiments correspond. It was a slow and weary climb of religious belief to the place where this moral attribute became an essential factor in the conception of the Divine Being. Israel did not reach it, as the teachings of the Old Testament plainly show. Yahweh was indeed a righteous God; but his righteousness did not exclude passionate resentment, jealousy, love of praise, and partiality.

In the earlier centuries of the development of Semitic religion the type which prevailed among the Babylonians and Assyrians had reached certain expressions—although in the form of incantations—which are quite upon a level morally with most of the teachings of Judaism. In one of the hymns to Shamash, the sun-god, he is addressed as the judge of all mankind²:—

"The law of mankind, dost thou direct,
Eternally just in the heavens art thou,
Of faithful judgment toward all the world art thou.
Thou knowest what is right, thou knowest what is wrong."

¹ Origin and Growth of the Conception of God, p. 202.

² See Jastrow, Religion of Babylonia and Assyria, p. 300f.

On ascending his throne Nebuchadnezzar addresses the great God Marduk: "Guide me on the right path. . . . Cause me to love thy supreme rule." And an elaborate hymn to the moon-god Sin affirms: "Thy strong command produces right and proclaims justice to mankind." To the early gods of India, on the contrary, justice is seldom or never attributed. The sun-god, addressed as Savitar, is called "He who distributes gifts unto the sons of men," and is appealed to for the best of all gifts to mortals, "a long enduring life." Of Indra it is said: "What he hath established, there is none impairs it." And of Agni it is affirmed: "Thou doest good to every man that serves thee. Although in the later beliefs Dharma, or personified Right, "takes his seat with shadowy Brahmā among the other gods," and although the conception persists as Dharma Vāivasvata, or Justice, the belief in a perfect overruling Divine Righteousness has never, down to the latest times, been vital and potent in the indigenous religions of India. "Few of the older gods are virtuous," says Professor Hopkins,¹ "and Right, even in the Rig Veda, is the moral power, Right as Order, correct behavior, the prototype both of ritual and of *ācāra*, custom, which rules the gods." The doctrine of the Chinese, however, as might be expected, holds to very strict tenets respecting the application to human affairs of the perfect justice which belongs to Heaven, as the Supreme Lord. Confucius taught that if the people cease to follow Tāo ("the heavenly way"), Heaven will in its turn upset the cosmic order. A proclamation of the emperor Yong-Tcheng, 1731, declares: "Justice, originally aroused by heaven and by man, answers more swiftly than the echo. The floods and droughts, or disasters, which trouble all the earth come from the acts of man."

Among the Greeks, in the period of the greater tragedians, faith in the perfection of the divine justice was growing in the minds of the thoughtful. Hesiod had indeed declared that

¹ Religions of India, pp. 249f., 554f. and note.

“Justice is the virgin daughter of Zeus, honored and revered by the gods who hold Olympus.” “If the gods do aught that is base,” said Euripides, “they are not gods.” But it was Plutarch who reached the height of intelligent conviction when he could affirm: “God, being perfectly good, lacks not any virtue: and least of all in what concerns justice and love.” Indeed, the theodicy¹ of this Greek theologian is, in respect of philosophical insight, moral spirit, and courageous facing of the facts, quite superior to that of Leibnitz. Among the Romans, the tendency early developed to personify the ethical attributes and assign them to separate gods; this tendency led to the conception of Fides who, according to Preller, was attached to Jupiter, Concordia to Venus, Pudicitia to Juno, etc. But the Roman mind seemed unable to develop the conception of one perfectly just and loving Divine Being. Among the early Teutons, a conception of the gods as representing and enforcing principles of order, and certain rude and cruel practices connected with the execution of justice, were not wholly wanting. “In the popular assemblies,” says De la Saussaye² “at full and new moon, the functions performed by the priest were, next to the influence and authority of the leaders, almost the only element that brought some degree of regularity to the frequently unordered deliberations.” In some sort, the gods and their earthly representatives took the part of an attempt at justice in the distribution of the goods and evils of life. But up to the time when the Teutonic tribes accepted Christianity, and for the multitude long after that time, the conception of God as the Source of even an imperfect justice was scarcely formed. In general, the pagan deities were, as respects the standard of their moral character, below rather than above that set by the lives of the leaders or by the councils of the people. Christianity itself “was not preached to the Norseman as a new (and higher)

¹ De Sera Numinis Vindicta, and compare Oakesmith, *The Religion of Plutarch*, p. 104 and note.

² *The Religion of the Teutons*, p. 103.

moral ideal." "Put your faith in God, and believe that he is so merciful that he will not let us burn both in this world and in the next"—is an exhortation which measures the purity of their best conception of the Divine moral rule.

By the moral attribute of Goodness as applied to God, men mean something more than justice as this latter word is ordinarily understood; and yet goodness cannot exist apart from, or to the exclusion of, the attribute of justice. The "general justice," which Aristotle considered the complete virtue so far as the relations of an individual to his neighbors are concerned, is nearly, if not quite, the equivalent of "being good" in the fuller meaning of the term. But goodness emphasizes the kindness, the positive well-wishing and active disposition to benefit others, for which, when the attribute is applied to Deity, the title of benevolence or love (in the theological meaning of the words) often seems more appropriate.

The history of the evolution of religious faith in the goodness of God corresponds, in all essential points to that of faith in his justice; indeed, the conception of justice and goodness go forward hand in hand, although not always with an equal step; and both represent a slow and painful uplifting of man's reflective thought in his effort to account for his total experience. In the lower stages of an unreflecting spiritism, the impressive thing is the consciousness of the powers of evil that reside somewhere in the external world and are beyond the control of man's will. It is, therefore, much easier for man at this stage to believe in many devils than in a few good and controlling divine powers. Faith in One perfectly good and loving Divine Being is still far away from either the grasp of intellect or the seizure of emotion. The persistence of devil-worship in Ceylon, Burmah, and elsewhere, and of prophylactic ceremonials in China and other lands, where the kindly religion of Buddhism has been dominant for centuries, illustrates the same truth. The widespreading existence of incantations, of magic, and propitiatory prayers and sacrifices, does

not have its origin in the consciousness of sin, and of dependence for help and salvation upon the gracious love of God; it springs, the rather, from the experience of manifold physical and social evils, and from the desire to influence the spiritual powers which are showing their ill-will by inflicting these evils.

Yet even in not a few of the earlier prayers, hymns, and other expressions of religious belief, as well as in certain forms of ceremony and worship, there are discoverable the germs of a confidence in the goodness and love of the divine powers. Some, at least, of the gods are good fellows, and are well-disposed toward mankind. The development of belief in the Divine goodness reaches its next higher stage in the confidence that the domestic and tribal divinities are kindly disposed toward the families and tribes whose special divinities they are chosen to be. At this stage, one of the most marked evidences of the goodness of the god is his defence of his followers against their enemies, or his willingness to inflict evil upon these enemies.

Thus the virtue of goodness, in the dawning conception of God as ethical spirit, is little more than good-nature or good-fellowship. But few of even the evil gods are so malignant that they cannot be made good-natured by treating them properly. In Genesis xviii, Yahweh comes down and sits with Abraham at a meal. But when the deity is thought of as having his seat in heaven, the burning of the sacrifice sends up a "sweet savor;" and he is thus made well-disposed. Out of this stage the belief of Judaism in the goodness of Yahweh scarcely succeeded in rising during the entire history of the Old-Testament religion. The belief that he was merciful and loving toward his people,—*i. e.*, *good* as well as *just* in the stricter meaning of the latter term as a faithful keeper of his covenanted word—did, however, come to make a more or less integral part of the faith of Judaism in the perfect righteousness of God. And Judaism had the rare merit, in its later and higher developments, of proclaiming, with certain irregular

flashes of moral insight, that faith in the perfect Divine goodness as perpetually shown toward all mankind, which, however difficult of reconciliation with the facts of experience and with the conception of a complete retributive justice, was the settled and divinely inspired conviction of the Founder of Christianity.

If by Christianity we understand the "religion of Christ," in the meaning which Lessing attached to this phrase, we find that an unquestioning faith in the perfect justice and goodness of God springs as an unquestioned conviction from the full consciousness of perfect moral union with God. This consciousness is the essence of religion, namely, the attitude of filial piety toward the Divine Being; and in Jesus it reaches its highest expression through the perfection of the spirit of sonship in him. As has already been said, this view of God, under the Christian figure of speech which regards Him as the Heavenly Father, had been coming into the better and higher religious beliefs of Judaism. "When Israel was a child, then I loved him and called my son out of Egypt (Hos. xi, 1) does, indeed, only succeed in glorifying God as the tribal divinity. "Have we not all one Father? Hath not God created us?" (Mal. ii, 10) are questions, and the answer, "Doubtless thou art our Father, O Lord; thou art our Father, our Redeemer" (Isa. lxiii, 16) is an answer, which prepares the way for the Christian position. Some of the later rabbis extended the belief in the fatherhood of God beyond the tribal and national limits. Rabbi Zadok, for example, addresses the Divine Being as "Lord of the world; Thou Father in Heaven."

The "religion of Christ" does not, however, furnish ready-made arguments for the perfect justice and goodness of God; nor does it embark upon the effort to minimize, or even to understand, the meaning of all that evil of the world which seems to contradict its own sublimely audacious faith. According to Jesus, the sunshine and the rain are bestowed upon the good and the bad alike; but this is not a proof of the injustice,

but of the supreme goodness, of God. The tower of Siloam falls upon certain seemingly selected victims, and others escape; this, however, does not go toward showing that these victims were sinners above other men. The most faithful followers of a good and loving, as well as all-wise and powerful, Heavenly Lord, often enough have scanty food and raiment; but they may always be sure that He who notes the fall of the sparrow and clothes the lily with beauty never forgets them. While the foxes are provided with holes, and the birds with nests, the Son of Man has not where to lay his head. Beatitudes are showered upon those who, in the spirit of unwavering confidence in the justice and goodness of God suffer with meekness and poverty of spirit, all manner of physical and social ills.

The Christian conception of God as the perfectly just and good One is embodied in two terms which appeal to universal human experiences. God is the Father of mankind; and God is their Redeemer. The evidence that these conceptions correctly represent to man the inmost real nature of the Divine moral Being, and explain the fundamental relations in which man, as himself a spiritual existence and a potential but wandering and sinful son, stands to this Divine Being, Christ professed to have in his own experience of sonship. As the son, he knew the Father; and as a true son, God the Father knew him. There was such a perfect union between them that the revelation of the essential truth as to the Father became an immediate experience of the Son. What God is, the Son of God knows by virtue of his conscious likeness to God. But what is true preëminently of the only begotten Son of the Heavenly Father, is also true of all the sons of God. God is the Father of humanity; and man, being himself an ethical spirit, is kindred to the Divine Ethical Spirit, and may be united with Him and so become God's accepted child. It is this truth of Christianity, as says Harnack,¹—the belief which

¹ History of Dogma, I, p. 180, note 4.

has been called "too good to be true"—that the Almighty God of creation is "the merciful God of Redemption," which is the tacit presupposition of the Christian declaration about the Divine Being.

It cannot be claimed that the attempts of the Pauline theology, or of any subsequent type of Christian theology, to argue the perfect justice and goodness of God in consistency with the religious consciousness of Christ himself, are altogether successful. On the contrary, many of these attempts do violence to the rising moral ideals of the race and are a plain descent from the lofty attitude of the Great Teacher. When, for example, the Apostle to the Gentiles, after having announced (Rom. ix) the tenet that God, in order to declare his name "throughout all the earth" hath "mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth," adds the question: "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?" he may be understood as fitly suggesting the limitations of human knowledge and insight as to the conditions under which the Divine justice and goodness are operating. But when he avails himself of the truly Oriental but quite un-Christian illustration of the clay and the potter, in the place of Jesus' doctrine of the erring son and yet loving Father, he distinctly departs, in his zeal for the argument, from the ethical doctrine of his Master.

Indeed, it is doubtful if much has ever been done by Christian theology, *as such*, to make rational or acceptable, by its arguments, the faith of Christ in the perfect justice and goodness of God. The direct contributions to the support of this faith, whether in the form of facts or of a rational adjustment of the involved difficulties, have come chiefly from Christian experience, in so far as it has been moulded after the pattern of Christ. In a secondary way, the broadening and deepening by the positive sciences of man's knowledge of the beneficent cosmic processes and of their tendencies in ideal directions, has thrown light upon the problem. But it is especially that calm, self-effacing, and reflective attitude toward nature and human

life, which practical philosophy encourages, that has added most to support the testimony of religious faith. Hence, as far as the improvements from science and philosophy have penetrated Christian theology, they have chiefly arisen outside of the Christian Church itself. In brief, the experience of increasing numbers of the race, who have accepted and made their very own the faith of religion in the perfect justice and goodness of God, and who have found proof of His Fatherly and Redeeming Love by living in the attitude of filial piety toward God has furnished to the world the principal empirical data upon which the faith itself can rely. But the effective rationalizing of this faith, and the placing of it upon the broader basis of a cosmic theory that shall satisfy the requirements of reflective thinking, had its origin chiefly in Greek sources.

The pre-Christian Greek philosophical developments were by no means wanting in a rational confidence in the perfect Divine Justice and Goodness. According to Aristotle¹ the love of men for the gods is like the love of dutiful children for their parents; it is based upon acknowledgment of their superiority, and grateful recognition of the benefits they have bestowed upon humanity. The confidence of Plutarch² in the goodness of God is such that he introduces into his theodicy a fantastic doctrine of Dæmons to whom this goodness commits the souls of men; and each one of whom "loves to help the soul committed to its care, and to save it by its inspirations." There are, indeed, some men for whom it is best to fear God; and a greater number combine fear of Him with their honor and worship. But this feeling is totally eclipsed by the hope and joy that attend communion with God. The best of the Stoics, also, represented God as a stern but wise and loving Father, who educates men as good parents do their children. God—it is the teaching of Seneca³—does not keep a good man in pleasures,

¹ Nicom. Eth., VIII, 7.

² Compare Oakesmith, *The Religion of Plutarch*, chap. VIII.

³ *De Vita Beata*, XV; comp. *De Providentia*, I, 5f.; II, 6, 9.

but tries him, hardens him and prepares him for Himself. All this is necessary in order that man may "*follow God*" and become like Him. The burden of the teaching of Epictetus¹ is that we should continue in thankful and entire obedience to God, being sure that God neither hates us, nor cares for us above others: "He does not neglect any even of the smallest things." And Marcus Aurelius,² than whom no more noble and truly pious soul ever lived in the ancient Roman world, would have all men love and follow the good God and Father of all, and live in love with all mankind.

Thus on a Jewish basis, but by union with Greek philosophy, there developed a conception of the Divine Being in his moral attributes which was destined most profoundly to influence the thought of all time. The view that the world of natural objects and of human history came into being because God *willed* it for good is that of the Old and New Testaments. It is the goodness of God, our Father, as manifested in Nature and, more marvelously and unmistakably in human history, which impresses the minds of the Biblical writers, in spite of many pessimistic utterances about the world as evil, and as lying in the "wicked one," etc. But it was Philo's conception of which Bousset³ declares: In his mind the best of the Old-Testament conception had found a union with the best of the Greek philosophical thinking. Thus for Philo "God only is the truest and actual Peace . . . and although He is 'One and All,' He is also the Good God."

Subsequent Christian doctrine based upon the experience of redemption certain factors of the conception of the Divine justice and goodness which Stoicism and Neo-Platonism could not in the same way take into their account; and which Judaism had left in a state of arrested development. These were: (1) Faith in the pity and redeeming love of God; (2) Hope

¹ Discourses, Translation by Higginson, I, 3, 6, and III, 22, 24.

² Thoughts (Long's Translation), VII, 31.

³ Die Religion des Judentums, p. 420.

in the future and final triumph of the Good; and (3) an active Love for mankind, which became a mighty world-force for the uplifting of the race of men by the self-sacrificing and Christ-like exertions of men themselves. It continued, nevertheless, to be the Platonizing conception of God, although as modified by union with elements from the Old-Testament doctrine of Messiah and of the suffering Servant of God, which the Christian Apologists used in their efforts at showing the consistency of the world's evil with the justice and goodness of the world's Creator and Lord. Thus Greek philosophy attempted to make rational the moral faith of religion. The attempt involved the following principal assumptions: (1) God cannot be conceived of as without reason (*λογος*); He is the fullness of reason; He has the Logos in Himself. (2) For the sake of creation, which is motived by an expressive and rational love, God sends forth the Logos from himself, the Logos becomes hypostasized. (3) This Logos whose essence is identical with God becomes in this way distinct from God,—*i. e.*, has an origin, as God has not. (4) This Logos becomes incarnate in Jesus; thus (5) through his redemptive work as the son of God, preëminent, and through his followers, the other sons of God, the race is to be won back to God, and the perfect Divine justice and goodness is to be vindicated.

We have called the faith of religion in the moral attributes of God a "sublime and sublimely audacious" belief. We now turn to certain considerations, lying more or less completely outside, by which this faith may be supported. These considerations are largely identical with those which are antithetic to the ethics of Hedonism. For it is difficult, Nay! it is impossible, to believe in the justice and goodness of God on grounds of a consistent hedonistic theory of morals. On the one hand, if God has no regard at all for human happiness, he cannot be conceived of as displaying moral attributes in his dealings with the race. Every attempt at a theodicy seems to compel the admission: "Susceptibility to privation of good

and to suffering and sorrow is essential to the existence of a moral system consisting of finite persons under a government of God.”¹ The very conceptions of justice and goodness imply that the goods and evils of life are distributed according to some plan that, if completely known, commends itself in the interest of moral ideals. But if this Divine ideal is the hedonistic ideal, and if the supreme good for man is happiness and the supreme evil is suffering, then a hopeless and irreconcilable breach is made between the ideals of morals and the ideals of religious faith.

The prior question, in the light of the rational answer to which the Divine Morality must be vindicated, if vindicated at all, is, bluntly expressed, just this: “*What is God after?*” What is the end which the Divine Being wishes to secure in the application of the actual cosmic processes to the race of mankind? But every answer to this question implies a reference back to human conceptions of worth. What kind of worth is that, kinship with which God’s kindness aims to secure? To this question religion, can give only one answer: It is kinship with Him, as the pure and Holy One who is blessed in being this and in suffering that others may become like himself. To regard the divine goodness as caring only, or chiefly, for the divine happiness, or for the happiness of those who are upon his side, so to say, is to degrade this moral qualification. For the most genuine and perfect goodness prizes and seeks that which is most good; and this no longer appears to be happiness, if once we have agreed to take the point of view offered by subjective religion. In this respect, the ethics of Christianity is in agreement with the ethics of Stoicism.

Moreover, when we come fairly to survey, and consistently to reflect upon, the actual condition of the world’s affairs,—whether in the past, the present, or the prospective future, however distant—their planful character, so far as they exhibit any planful character at all, does not seem to agree with the

¹ So Professor Harris, *God the Creator and Lord of All*, I, p. 223.

assumption which makes happiness the supreme end of it all. The aversion of religion to a pessimistic estimate of the final result of the cosmic and social processes cannot be based upon a hedonistic view of the working of these processes. On the contrary, the chief effective cause of disbelief in the perfect justice and goodness of God is wont to be an aversion to the suffering which is inevitable under the laws of his discipline—physical, ethnic, but especially ethical, in the larger meaning of this word. It is the immorality of insubordination to these laws which religion would cure by substituting the spirit of filial piety, of trust, hope, and love. It is by no means a mere, although a biting sarcasm, when a Greek writer represents the *advocatus diaboli* as “gathering together, from various sources, an undigested mass of confused observations, and then scattering them upon Providence in one contemptuous stream of spleen and anger.” And a modern writer strikes the true note when he says¹: “Pessimism can only establish itself in the minds of those who think that pleasure is the goal of life, or—which comes to the same—that life has no goal at all.”

When, then, we take the higher point of view and assume it to be true that God is in the world, redeeming the world and securing thus for mankind the supreme and all-inclusive ideal good, the vindication of His perfect justice and goodness follows in this way; thus, and thus only, is a religious theodicy placed upon its more unassailable grounds. From this same point of view, in the absence of other considerations, it would even be possible to turn the evidence so squarely around as to make it attack God's justice and goodness, on the other side, so to say. For, then, it is not those who, although being more righteous than others, suffer more than others in this life, that seem to be most unjustly treated. For they have the larger share in the benefits of the discipline of suffering. But the Divine injustice seems greatest toward those few, if any such

¹ D'Alviella, *Ibid*, p. 292.

there be, whom He permits to be most happy and prosperous, although they continue unrighteous and even prosper by means of their unrighteousness. Verily, they *have* their reward! "Let molten coin be thy damnation," says Providence to the miser: "Be thou for ever drowning in a butt of sack," to the drunkard.¹

There are, however, not a few considerations to which modern science and philosophy are most firmly and intelligently committed, that assist the mind in its desire to look favorably upon the moral optimism of religious faith. These considerations are chiefly of the following three classes: (1) Those derived from the solidarity of the race; (2) the enormous complexity and flexibility, combined with tenacity, which characterize the connections of humanity with Nature at large; and (3) the fact of an enormously complicated and indefinitely long development. Each one of these three considerations will be seen in its higher value, when we come to treat critically the religious doctrine of God's relations to the World. But a remark upon each is quite unavoidable at this point. If it is attempted to take the individual out of his connections with the race, it immediately becomes quite impossible to conceive of what would be just or unjust, kind or unkind, treatment of the individual. How would Providence manage to treat men justly and benevolently as parents, husbands, friends, members of a tribe, citizens of the nation, or of the world, without reference to the essential character of these very relations? The parents do, indeed, eat sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge. Modern science—physico-chemical, physiological, psychological, and social—is constantly emphasizing the fundamental import and supreme value of all these relations, in the solidarity of the one race. *This fact of solidarity is the basic fact of all moral development.*

¹ Οὐδὲ γηράσωντες ἐκολάσθησαν, ἀλλ' ἐγήρασαν κολαζόμενοι; "Not when they had grown old were they punished, but they grew old in punishment,"—was the startling Greek way of stating this mystery.

And if the essential justice and beneficence of this fact are impugned or disproved, then Divine government becomes inconceivable under any circumstances similar to those of the real world ; and all question of the moral nature of such government becomes absurd. But if this solidarity of the race is essentially just and good, then to treat individuals in accordance with it cannot be essentially unjust and bad.

Again, the modern conception of Nature, and of man's place in Nature, is such as to warn us from tampering in the supposed interest of our desires for a speedy realization of the divine plan, with those cosmic processes which are themselves to be considered as somehow the expressions of the same divine moral attributes. He who begins finding fault with God because He has not made a quite different world, begins digging a grave in which to bury, if he can only make it wide and deep enough, not only all the choicest and most comforting religious beliefs, but the whole structure of a rational and beautiful, though mysterious Universe. Science and philosophy have their sane endeavor and their safe limits, not in trying to build a better world than God himself has built, but in trying to understand this God's world just as it has been, and constantly is being, built. And religion, leaning on the arm of science and looking through the eyes of philosophy, sees the God she believes in and worships, immanent in the cosmic processes and in human history. A science, or a philosophy, which cannot see this same God when religion points Him out, is blind to the inmost truth as to the Being of Nature itself. From the scientific point of view, belief in the goodness of Nature's indwelling spiritual Life is not, indeed, a matter of exchanging a few smiles and greetings, in a garden of roses on a June morning. Nor is it wholly true of the Universe that

"He that has light within his own clear breast
May sit in the centre and enjoy bright day."

Nor can all those who go through life as through a valley of death-shadow, be alleged to belong among men who "hide a

dark soul and foul thoughts." But the vastness and intricacy of the cosmic system, and the hidden nature of man's place in that system, arouse thoughts which may always give pause to emotions of repining and fault-finding against the perfect justice and goodness of its indwelling spiritual Life.

And, finally, in order to tolerate even a provisional and probable answer to the inquiry into the essential justice and goodness of God, it is necessary to view the history of humanity as a divinely ordered course of development. Men have always been asking themselves impatiently: "What is the good of the mills of the gods that grind so exceedingly slowly?" But their perfection consists in just this, that they do grind so slowly and yet so as truly to fulfill at the last their appointed work. This cosmic process of evolution, considered as an ethico-rational affair is itself God's work in justice and goodness with the human race. At any rate, such is the faith of religion. The whole discussion of God's moral attributes implies, then, the realization in human history of certain Divine ideas; or else, it implies nothing of any sort that can be estimated as either good or bad by human ideals and judgments of worth. And here it is that the controlling conceptions of Christianity come into force. For with this religion, God's justice and goodness are not abstract qualities, of interest merely to an ideal construction of an absentee Divinity. They are, the rather, evolutionary forces realizing themselves in the historical growth of what they mentally represent. The Divine moral attributes are seen in the actual reconciliation—slow and progressive—of man to God; in the abolition by a redemptive process, of the suffering and sinful condition into which man has somehow fallen. It is at this point that the religious doctrine of the future, the doctrine of destiny, for the individual and for the race, becomes so important a part of a theodicy. Faith in the future triumph of the principles of justice and goodness, and faith in the eternal justice and goodness of God, thus mutually support each other.

After all, however, it is in this faith itself—its existence, its persistence, and its growth—that its own most convincing proofs are to be found. Somehow or other, in spite of much evidence to the contrary, there has established itself in human experience the comforting and helpful assurance that the World-Ground, the Personal Absolute, is a Being of perfect justice and perfect benevolence. “In moments of philosophical depression,” says a writer on this subject, “what I have asked myself is not whether there is a God in whom we live and move and have our being; it has been whether that mysterious power has any purpose, and specifically any benevolent purpose.” On the one hand, it would seem :

“The evil that men do lives after them ;
The good is oft interred with their bones.”

But, on the other hand, we are confident that the memory of the man of righteousness and good-will survives and widens, while that of the wicked decays. And poetical insight joins with religious faith to say :—

“My own hope is, a sun will pierce
The thickest cloud earth ever stretched;
That, after last, returns the first,
Though a wide compass round be fetched;
That what began best, can't end worst;
Nor what God blessed once prove accursed.”

This individual hope, however, religious experience sets into reality, only just so far as it becomes the experience of more and more of the race. It is only in the extension of this experience that the better evidence for the Divine justice and love accumulates. The quite convincing and perfectly irresistible proof of the perfection of the moral attributes of God will come only when the process of historic redemption is actually accomplished.

Thus the argument in further support of a theodicy terminates in a conclusion similar to that with which the problem of

evil was partially solved; only now the conclusion is lifted to a higher and more extensive point of view. The evolution of the Kingdom of Redemption is the postulate of religious experience; it carries with it the evidence of the vanishing of evil and the vindication of the perfect justice and goodness of God.

CHAPTER XXXIV

HOLINESS AND PERFECTION OF GOD

The attribute of "holiness" as applied to Deity was originally, and indeed has been down to its later developments, rather a ceremonial and priestly or theological, than a distinctively ethical, conception. On the human side, this conception emphasizes the need of some special purification in order acceptably to approach the invisible superhuman Power in which the worshipper believes; on the side of the Object of his faith, the conception implies certain qualities which make fitting, or even demand, such purification. Outside of Judaism and Christianity, however, there are no other religions which insist in the same way upon holiness as an essential ethical attribute of God, or as a characteristic essential to the worshipper's acceptance with God.

Even in the lower stages of religious development there are abundant expressions of the feeling that some sort of purifying ceremony or process is necessary in order most acceptably to worship the gods. And the natural complement of this feeling is the belief that the nature of the gods is such as to lead them to appreciate the purification. Thus, for example, in Shintō, the indigenous religion of Japan previous to the introduction of Buddhism into that country, the need of purification in order to please the gods was an important tenet. "If Shintō has a dogma," says one writer (Kaburagi), "it is purity." Its emblem, the mirror, is commonly interpreted as emblematic of the belief that the *Kami no Michi* (or "Way of the Gods") requires "purity," in the one who wishes to tread

it successfully. Its dogmatic exponent, or bible, ("Kojiki") lays emphasis on cleanliness. In its view "pollution was calamity, defilement was sin, and physical purity at least, was holiness."¹ "Disease, wounds, and death, were defiling;" and the physical distaste or disgust for these things led to a treatment of women in childbirth, of the sick and the dying, such as prevails in India to-day, but is from the modern point of view immoral and cruel. The priests of this religion purified themselves by putting on clean garments before making offerings or chanting liturgies. But the purity of early Shintō, as of religions generally in the same stage of development, was almost exclusively a physical and ceremonial affair. What the improved ethico-religious sentiment considers as essential to purity was so wanting that as Professor Chamberlain says² of the Kojiki, "The shocking obscenity of word and act to which the 'Records' bear witness is another ugly feature which must not quite be passed over in silence."

In the religions of India, too, the ceremonial and propitiatory value of at least the appearance of purity is early emphasized. To appear somewhat "cleaned-up" gives one a better chance of obtaining favor with the gods. The priest who is acceptable with his sacrifice is either antecedently and officially purified as being a Brāhman, or else, in addition, he has in some manner especially purified himself for the occasion. In the laws and customs of Hindūism there is found the same crude mixture of things really important from the moral point of view, with things that are ethically trivial, but are considered important because they meet the requirements of the gods, in order that men may be "holy" in their sight. For example, Yama's law in regard to the horse-sacrifice, as expounded to Gautama, declares:—"The acts by which one gains bliss hereafter are austerities, purity, truth, worship of parents, and the horse-sacrifice." The popular religion of India to-day is an elaborate system of regu-

¹ Compare Griffis, *The Religions of Japan*, p. 84f.

² *Kojiki*, p. xlii.

lations as to bathings and anointings and repeating of formulas, which are supposed to render the worshipper "holy"; but both gods and worshippers alike may be lamentably deficient in even the elements of a true ethical purity. And, in general, the purification of the religions of India has this mark of inferiority to that of the ancient Shintō; it does not even secure physical cleanliness, but often the very reverse. But in Japan the modern revival of Shintō, and in India the higher reflections of Brāhmanism, agree with Christianity in teaching that purity of heart, or moral "holiness," is necessary in order to be acceptable to God.

Buddhism, however, both in the doctrine and in the life of its founder, advocated the essential nature of purity of heart and conduct for the attainment of any measure of real blessedness,—of actual salvation. The traditional parting-injunctions of Gautama, at the beginning of the "Book of the Great Decease," are richly laden with this thought: "As long as the brethren shall exercise themselves in the seven-fold higher wisdom, that is to say in mental activity, search after truth, energy, joy, peace, earnest contemplation, and equanimity of mind, so long may the brethren be expected not to decline but to prosper." These injunctions were given to those who were supposed to have long passed beyond the need of exhortation to put away the vulgar sins of the flesh, such as indulgence of the appetites, covetousness, or greed. But these excellent practical rules can have little or no bearing upon the conception we are now examining, without such modifications as almost completely reverse some of the tenets of earlier Buddhism. To apply the term "holiness" to the Being of the World, conceived of in an impersonal or pantheistic way, involves an obvious contradiction. Only personal, self-conscious Will can be either holy or unholy, in any meaning of the words appropriate to ethical ideas. "*I* am holy," may be claimed by the anthropomorphic gods of any religion. "*It* is holy," can only mean "consecrated to some sacred use." For, as Kuenen truly says:

“Holy signifies a relationship” that can only exist between persons. Therefore, man’s strivings after purity, even in the lowest forms of their religious expression, imply the belief that there is some personal and spiritual power over man which demands and appreciates purity. They testify to man’s faith in the existence of an over-Life, not his own, in whose estimate the holiness has worth.

This truth is not destroyed, or even abated by the undoubted fact that immoralities and unspeakable orgies of cruelty and lust have not only accompanied, but have sometimes been deemed an essential part of, many of the ceremonials and forms of worship in religions of a low ethical grade. Examples are the cruelties of the Mexican and Aztec religions, and the sexual impurities of the religions of India, Syria, and of ancient Greece. “It is not until a late period,” says Tiele,¹ “that the religiously disposed man strives to express the superhuman character of his gods by ascribing to them ethical attributes.”² The ideal of the undeveloped belief of all religions tends constantly to the opinion that the independent power of the gods renders them under no obligations themselves to keep the moral laws, with the enactment and enforcement of which over men they are so much concerned. But this is the same ethical fallacy which, in monarchical countries, condones or excuses moral excesses in the rulers, and which in republics, allows the influential and law-making classes to commit with impunity breaches of the very laws they have themselves enacted. But religious development involves forces to counteract this tendency. And as the moral consciousness comes to demand higher satisfactions, conceptions of divine beings that behave immorally become intoler-

¹ Elements of the Science of Religion, Second Series, p. 89.

² The ideas of “holiness” which primitive man attaches to divine things are amply and vividly illustrated by Frazer (*The Golden Bough*, I, p. 241f.; comp. p. 343) in the case of the restrictions and prohibitions which the *Flamen Dialis* must observe at Rome in order to keep himself “holy,” and so fit for his sacred functions.

able. For the law which rules over all the genuine religious progress of humanity is this: *The ideal of Ethics and the ideal of Religion must be completely united in the Idea of God.* God therefore must be perfect Ethical Spirit in order to be God at all. The process of effecting this complete union of the two ideals is the most essential thing about the growth of a rational conception of Deity. Thus "holiness," in a new and higher meaning, becomes the essential moral attribute of Deity, and the essential thing required *by* Deity, in order that man may be acceptable in His sight.

The greater religions, even in very ancient times, have not been without the dawnings of conviction with regard to the importance of the attribute of ethical purity, or holiness, in the relations between man and God. In the Turin copy of the Egyptian "Book of the Dead," the deceased is made to appear before the gods, saying:—"I have brought you Law, and for you I have subdued iniquity." The earthly monarch must be able to enter into the hall of the Two-fold *Maât* (*la double justice*, or "Right and Wrong," or "heaven and earth" [?]) with these words: "I am not a doer of fraud and iniquity against men." Otherwise he cannot be acceptable to the holiness enthroned there. We have already seen what a high degree of moral purity some of the prayers of believers in the ancient religion of Babylonia and Assyria attribute to their gods. So, in spite of the inconsistency with its agnostic or atheistic teachings, the Buddhistic writing, "The Way of Purity" (*Visuddhi-Magga*¹) virtually motives the call to holiness among men by the conception of a perfectly pure and noble spiritual Existence, to be united with which is the rational goal of all human endeavor and the highest blessedness.

It was, however, in Judaism that the more just and efficient conception of the Divine Holiness had its source; and it is in Christianity that this same conception reaches its supreme development. On the legal side of Judaism the conception

¹ See Buddhism in Translation, pp. 285ff.

found expression in such raptures as these: "Thy law is my delight; thy commandment is exceeding broad." "Thy law do I love: great peace have they who love it." The conclusion which the higher Judaism reached, in its fullest interpretation, from its loftiest point of view, enforced the injunction: "Be ye holy, for I, Yahweh, am holy." It thus prepared the way for the companionable and reassuring example and law of "the religion of Christ" as expressed in the striving to aspire toward keeping the command: "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father in Heaven is perfect."

But in Judaism the conception of the Divine Holiness was no sudden appearance; nor was its development at any point independent of the developing moral ideals of the race. Robertson Smith's statement¹ that, primarily, "holiness has nothing to do with morality and purity of life" is probably extreme, even when applied to the earlier developments of any of the greater religions. It is certainly inapplicable to the lower stages of the Old-Testament religion.² "Israel as Yahweh's people," says Montefiore,³ "must keep itself free from uncleanness of every kind, that the land may not be defiled and Yahweh's name profaned. Sin is impurity." In the Deuteronomic code, to which Professor Klostermann has given the commonly accepted surname of the "Law of Holiness," the

¹ The Religion of the Semites, p. 140f.

² The adjective customarily employed in Hebrew is the genitive of the noun, קֹדֶשׁ. In the Septuagint and New Testament it is *ἅγιος* (holy) and the noun is *ἁγιωσύνη* (holiness). Throughout the Old Testament and the Old-Testament Apocrypha the title uniformly means, either (1) as applied to God, "reverend, worthy of veneration," on account of his majesty; or (2) as applied to things and men, "set apart for God,"—ceremonially clean, or purified in heart and life. In the New Testament the adjective comes to mean "purified" or "upright," in a more distinctively moral sense (as, *e. g.*, the the "holy" kiss of charity). In a very few cases (only two?) the noun "holiness" signifies moral purity (1 Thes. iii, 13; 2 Cor. vii, 1). In Romans i, 4, Christ is said to have been declared "the son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness."

³ Origin and Growth of Religion (Hibbert Lectures, 1892) p. 236.

conception is more communistic and social; the sin of the members of the religious community defiles the land. But in Ezekiel, who emphasizes the priestly conception, the matter is considered in a more individualistic way. Of this conception, "Be holy, for I, Yahweh, am holy," Kuenen truly remarks:¹ "In these words the priestly thorah itself sums up its conception of religion. It is with this demand that it comes to the whole people and to every several Israelite. . . . Holy signifies a relationship. It is applied to the person or thing which is consecrated to the deity, which belongs to Him and is set aside for His service. What does it mean, then, to be consecrated to Yahweh? The answer reveals the character of the priestly conception of Yahweh's demands. . . . Holiness is *purity*. . . . The centre of gravity for him (the priest) lies in man's attitude toward God, not in his social but in his personal life." In spite of the limitations which always cling to this *priestly* conception of the Divine Holiness, and notwithstanding the corruptions which it is so difficult to exclude from it and which maintain themselves in Judaism and in Christianity down to the present day, the emphasis which it places upon personal and particular relations, of an essentially ethical character, which exist between the individual man and the Infinite Spirit, has proved of inestimable value to the religious development of the race.

It is in Christianity, however, that faith in the perfect ethical purity of God, and the belief that man must somehow attain, in his measure, the same sort of purity, has reached the highest development. Thus the conception of "holiness" assumes the steadfast and complete commitment of the Divine Will to what is morally good. God's Will is the perfectly pure and unsoiled Fountain, the flawless Ideal of Morality. This same Will revolts against moral impurity in human beings, and it desires and plans that they too, shall be shaped after its

¹ National Religions and Universal Religions (Hibbert Lectures, 1882), p. 160f.

own ethical likeness. At this stage God's holiness is no longer conceived of as an aversion to physical uncleanness, or to a lack of ceremonial preparation for paying due respect to his majesty; and human morality is required to aspire to a standard that represents the perfect Divine ideal of morality. Since such ethical purity cannot be attained by bathings, incantations, and ceremonials, but must be gained by completing the inner conquest over moral defilement, it is the Holiness of God which provides the means of man's purification.

It has already been shown¹ how the mental reactions which characterize the development of morality, on the one hand, and of religion, on the other, necessarily bring about some union of the two in a higher ideal common to both. This higher ideal, in its perfection, is the attainment by man of an ethical and spiritual likeness to, and union with, God, conceived of as perfect Ethical Spirit. But, for the religious consciousness, holiness is the essential element, the very core, of the perfection of Divine, moral and spiritual Being. Hence the consciousness of wrongdoing becomes the consciousness of sin; and the wrongdoer regards himself as offensive to the divine holiness and alienated from the divine favors.

When, however, the divine holiness is conceived of as a cold, passionless, and austere, but perfect moral purity, the conception of God lacks those elements which win the heart, encourage the hopes, and inspire the moral life, of humanity. Indeed, the moral consciousness infallibly judges that *such* so-called "holiness" is not the perfection of moral and spiritual Personality. Therefore "the religion of Christ," in the highest degree, and certain other religions (especially some of the later developments of Buddhism) in inferior degree, soften and modify the characteristic of holiness as applied to God, by an infusion or saturation, as it were, of the feelings of kindness and pity. Thus the one supreme and comprehensive moral attribute of the Divine Being becomes his righteous, but piti-

¹ Vol. I, chap. XIX.

ful and forgiving, ethical love. Later Judaism, as its conceptions find expression in the Old-Testament Apocrypha, had begun to emphasize this forgiving aspect of the Law, of the divine nature, and of the way of salvation for sinful man. "If ye turn yourselves to Him, then will he forgive all your transgressions and pardon all your sins." "To whom wilt thou be merciful, O God, if not to those who call upon the Lord."

The summons of Jesus was to penitence and to the forsaking of sin; but it was to a penitence which is the reaction of sorrow in view of the newly discovered self-sacrificing Divine Love; and to a forsaking of sin as the result of a joyful entrance upon the life of communion with the purifying Divine Spirit. That this view of the purity which was required by the perfect holiness of God actually pervaded the early Christian community to a commendable extent, their history does not leave us in doubt. "The Christians," says the Apology of Aristides (c. 15) "know and believe in God, the creator of heaven and earth, the God by whom all things consist; *i. e.*, in Him from whom they have received the commandments written in their hearts, commandments which they observe in faith and in expectation of the world to come. *For this reason* they do not commit adultery, nor practice unchastity, nor bear false witness, nor covet that with which they are intrusted, or what does not belong to them."

Historical Christianity, considered as a system of dogmas, or as an ecclesiastical organization, or as a moral code, has oftentimes really departed from the true conception of the Divine holiness. Its entire doctrine of sin, and its dependent doctrine of salvation, have too often been such as quite to sacrifice the essential justice and goodness of God by espousing some morally repulsive, mechanical view of the measure of the individual's wrongdoing, and of the primitive reactions of the Divine Will against this wrongdoing. Or, on the other hand, it has provoked others so to soften and weaken the element of justice, and so to degrade the element of goodness, as to

bring about a return to that lower stage in the development of the conception of the gods, when they are highly regarded for their "companionable" qualities—virtually after the type of the Vedic era. Then it was that the gods were so good to men, that both practiced immoralities together! Or, yet again, the attempt has prevailed to satisfy the conception of God's holiness by the purely priestly method of conformity to an elaborate ritual; or by strict obedience to ecclesiastical decrees and ordinances; or by the practice of the minute details of a life of asceticism.

It is, therefore, the faith of religion in God's holiness that alone secures the kind of Optimism which is the peculiar possession of him who has this faith; and all other optimism seems insecure, and not founded in reason, when examined from the religious point of view. For religion holds that the chief good of human beings is the attainment of a perfect moral union with the Divine Being. As says Kaftan¹: "*There is no chief good in the World.* If there is to be such a good it must be conceived and sought as one which is above the world, *i. e.* in the sense of religion—as participation in a life which is not of the world, as participation in the life of God." If, however, this insufficiency of the world to provide the "chief good" is pressed to such an extreme as to create a complete antagonism between the demands of the Divine holiness and the conditions of this present life, the effect is to render the conception of holiness itself too abstract and practically invalid. Even in the current Christian conception of God a perfect union has by no means been effected between the religious ideal of a Being who must be adored and served in order to attain salvation for the individual, and the nobler and more inclusive Ideal of a Will eternally and wholly committed to what is morally good.²

¹ The Truth of the Christian Religion (English Translation), II, p. 335.

² Thus Sir Wm. Hamilton could make the astonishing statement that "a God is, indeed, to us only of practical interest, inasmuch as he is the condi-

As to *proofs* of the perfect Divine Holiness, they do not, of course, exist, in any strict meaning of the word. Certain empirical evidences may, indeed, be appealed to in support of the belief that, on the whole, the cosmic and social forces which represent to the particular sciences what the philosophy of religion regards as the immanent Divine Will, are on the whole contending against moral impurity, and are making for the gradual moral uplift of the race. Such evidences will be brought forward in connection with a critical examination of the views of religion respecting God's relations to the World. Certain suggestions, however, may fitly be presented in the present connection.

And, first, many of the objections to this faith of religion—by which we understand, the perfect commitment of the Divine Will to moral purity—are partially, if not wholly removed, by the thought that God, as the Moral Ruler, is dealing with the race in the entire course of its moral evolution. Among these objections some are being either lessened or removed by the discoveries of modern science. These discoveries are constantly showing how the influences from that part of man's physical and social environment over which he has no direct control, tend somewhat steadily, when given time enough, to effect the improvement, by their discipline and punitive action, of his moral purity.

When, in the second place, the history of man's ethical and religious development is carefully examined, it is discovered that, in fact, the highest forms of this development have actually attained the most assured and effective faith in the

tion of our immortality" (Metaphysics, Lecture II, p. 23). And in his *La Vie éternelle* M. Ernest Naville, according to Brinton, "takes pains to distinguish that Christianity is not a means of living a holy life so much as one of gaining a blessed hereafter." And Brinton himself declares that "most of the recommendations of action and suffering in this world are based on the doctrine of compensation in the world to come," (The Religious Sentiment, p. 256f.).

perfection of God's holiness. Moreover, this faith has itself exercised a supremely valuable influence over the efforts of individual men, and of considerable communities, to purify and make "holy," both themselves and the society of which they have been members.

But, thirdly, this sublime faith itself is, in some sort, its own best defense, and its own most convincing proof. How significant *the fact* that, after countless centuries of groping their way upward, the race has, in the persons of some at least of its most trustworthy portion, attained to faith in the perfect holiness of God! In practical, as well as theoretical, dependence upon this faith, the religious life of humanity tends more and more towards an Ideal which unites within itself all the satisfactions of the moral, æsthetical, and religious demands of the mind and heart of man. God—the all-holy, the all-sublime, the all-commanding Ideal—is One with the Reality which science postulates as the "Nature," out of whose womb come all things and all souls, and at whose breasts they are all nourished. Thus this Nature appears as not only in its essential content, identical with the Personal Absolute of philosophy, but also with the perfect Ethical Spirit of religion.

That the conception of such an Ideal-Real should be actually reached in a course of intellectual, ethical, æsthetical, and religious development, and yet no semblance of a Reality corresponding to this Ideal exist as its Ground,—this is a difficult thing for reflection to credit. It is this difficulty which, as we have seen, gives its cogency to the negative way of stating the so-called ontological argument. The Ideal has formed itself; it has emerged, in fact, in the course of the world's development. This, its existence, could not be—cannot be made rational at least—unless the nature of Reality has called it forth. There may be no demonstration *more mathematico*, concealed in this inference. *It is the leap from real experience to faith in the Reality of the experienced Ideal.* But no reality is known to man by processes of mathematical demonstration.

Let us then call this process *the postulate of faith in the Reality of its own Ideal*.

There is one composite virtue which good men display in varying degrees and which religious faith attributes in its perfection to God. This attribute is Wisdom: and in order to vindicate his moral completeness and ideal perfection, God must be conceived of as infinitely wise. That the gods, or at least some of them, know more than human beings and are shrewder in the use of what they know, is a persuasion common to all the lower religions. For example, even Glooskap, the gross divinity of the Micmacs, is represented as so powerful over the forces of nature that he could call "Earthquake" to his service and have him transform men into cedars or pines by planting their feet in the ground. But in another version of this tale Glooskap himself, when he had converted an old man into a gnarled and twisted cedar said: "I cannot say how long you will live; only the Great Spirit above can tell that."¹ Wisdom implies, whether in God or in man, both power and knowledge; but it implies something more; for wisdom is a moral attribute. This attribute, therefore, embodies the conceptions of knowledge and power employed in the interests of what is morally good. Good-will is necessary to wisdom. And if the wisdom is to be perfect, not only must the power and the knowledge be perfect, but the good which is chosen and pursued by all the means that the perfect knowledge and wisdom provide, must be the highest and supremely valuable Good. This good, the human mind is obliged to conceive of as uniting the three recognized forms of good—the good of happiness, the good of beauty, and the good of morality—in one Ideal of all that has worth.

The Divine Wisdom is, then, both a choice of an ideal end, and a use of the best means for attaining this end. And if, as the faith of religion affirms, God has chosen and is employing his power and his knowledge in the realization of an Ideal

¹ See Algonquin Legends of New England, by C. G. Leland (2d ed. 1885).

which includes every form of good, then He is himself, so to say, entitled to the attribute of perfect wisdom. If he is omnipotent and omniscient; God can be wise if he wants to be. If he is also holy, then he is also, as a matter of course, perfectly wise.

The ethical and artistic efforts of man to improve his conception of Deity constitute the most important and interesting feature of the history of his religious evolution. The architectonic of the gods, however, has been a matter of slow development. Even now it is far enough from perfection;—whether one take, for one's point of observation, the ethical, the æsthetical, or the more purely practical position. The gods of ancient Egypt, for example, were conceived of with a most excessive naturalism, and as subject to all manner of degrading limitations and lack of perfection. They suffer from hunger, thirst, old age, disease, fear, and sorrow. They perspire, have headaches, and bleeding at the nose. Their limbs shake; their teeth chatter; they shriek and howl with pain; they are not immune as against either snakes or fire. Even the great gods of the Egyptian pantheon cannot perfect themselves by throwing off these depressing natural burdens. But as man's ideal of personality and of personal relations, as viewed from ethical and æsthetical points of view, has improved, he has more and more idealized the objects of his religious belief and worship. In the other greater world-religions, but preëminently in the best efforts of reflective thought to interpret the experience which Christianity has brought into the world, the result has been the framing of the conception of an Absolute Self, who shall stand in the Unity of his Being for the realization of all humanity's ideals.

There must, however, be a *complete union* of the "metaphysical predicates" and the "moral attributes," in order to fill out the conception of the Perfection of the Divine Being. This union can be effected—whether in thought or in actuality—only as it exists in the Unity of a Personal Life. In answer

to this demand for such a unity, religious faith attempts to blend all the ideal predicates and attributes in the one idea of eternal, omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient, Goodness personified. In a word, its Object is conceived of as perfect Ethical Spirit. But in the mixed scientific, philosophical, and religious development of man there has been a constant tendency for two lines of reasoning upon the data of experience to fall apart; and so to prevent or to impair the perfection of this idea. To state the case in a somewhat extreme way: The God of science and philosophy, and the popular God, have been at war with each other. Philosophy, in fidelity to the data furnished by the positive sciences, has evolved the conception of an Absolute, or World-Ground. In this conception the attributes of eternity, power, absoluteness as respects limitations of time and space, have been the factors which have claimed the preëminence. Thus the philosopher's God, even if he ceases to be a barren abstraction and gains the title of "Supreme Being," or the "Power which the Universe manifests," is not so personified as to come near to man, to touch his heart, and to influence his life profoundly on its ethical and spiritual side. But, on the other hand, the more popular conceptions so anthropomorphize God as to dissatisfy, if not to shock and revolt, the higher and more permanent demands of the scientific and rational interpretation of human experience in its highest, most dignified, and noblest developments.

Now neither of these lines of human development, or of the conceptions for which they stand, can be safely discredited or left out of our total account. The "philosopher's God" cannot be dismissed from consideration with an outcry against its metaphysical origin and abstract characteristics. It is a constantly recurrent and permanent force in the evolution of the religious life of humanity. It represents the highest flights of human reason in the attempt to reach the lofty altitude where the atmosphere is so free from the mists of ignorance, and the dust of superstition and passion, that the purged eye may look

into the very face of the Infinite One. Nor is this true of the mystical speculations of India or of later Greece alone. It is also true of the Fourth Gospel, of some of the Epistles ascribed to Paul, and of other passages in the New Testament. And the history of the first four centuries of Christianity shows how, on a basis laid by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, the Christian view rose to a conception of God, not only as the Father and Redeemer of men and the author of the form and qualities of things, but as the very Being, Substance, and Reason, of the world of things and souls. "The cosmogony of Origen," says Hatch,¹ "was a theodicy." And Augustine's "City of God" is a treatise on cosmology. The Christian conception of the Object of faith can no more be made henceforth to return to the alleged simplicity and freedom from metaphysics of early Christianity than can the existing cosmos be forced back into the mythical egg from which it was brought forth.

On the other hand, the God who dwells ever near the popular heart, even in the lower forms of religious development; he who sits by the fireside and guards the hearth, who presides over the boundaries of the fields, and is the guardian angel of each newborn child; he who makes the clouds his messengers and rides upon the wings of the wind; he who springs to life before us in every fountain and whirls by the frightened mariner in every storm;—*He*, even *He*, represents a conception that cannot be denied its correlate in Reality. The homely, domestic Divinity, the God of the child and of the lowly in intellect and life, He is no less a reality than is the philosopher's God. But ever must we reiterate the supreme triumph of man's religious development: There is only One God; He is the Alone God.

As the development of man has gone forward, the greater religions, and especially the more thoughtful forms of Christian doctrine, have presented in a more harmonious union the different factors of the conception which appeal to the various

¹ Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church, p. 204.

interests of humanity. Thus God is more perfectly known ; because known as a perfect Ethical Spirit, as well as the Infinite and Absolute One. But this union is disturbed, rather than assisted, when there arise within the same religion two conceptions of God,—one esoteric and one popular ; and when two sets of doctrines as to the divine relations to the world of things and of selves are evolved. In its efforts to perfect the conception of Divine Being, Christian dogma has centered its attention chiefly upon the Fatherhood of God and the sonship of Christ ;—that is, upon the relations of God to man in those conditions of weakness, suffering, and temptation, which are inseparable from man's existence in the world. This fact has made this religion of inestimable value for the comfort and uplift of mankind. But when the doctrine of God's Fatherhood, and of the sonship and mediatorial office of Christ, is taught so as to disregard, or to contradict, the ideals of Divine Being which have been evolved by the reflective use of human reason, in its highest forms of functioning ; then even this doctrine ceases to represent the Perfection of God in the worthiest and most effective way. Then science and philosophy become arrayed against Christian dogma ; and the latter is sternly called upon to improve and to elevate its conceptions. For the Reality of all man's supremest Ideals, as well as the pledge of their progressive realization, must be found by religion in the *perfection* of the Object of its faith. With this conviction agrees the central philosophic principle of the confidence of the poetical insight :—

“ All we have willed, or hoped, or dreamed of good shall exist ;
Not its semblance but itself.”

From the highest point of view reached by religious experience when reflectively treated, all the ideals of humanity appear, for their origin, ground, and guaranty, to converge in One Ideal-Real. This Being of the World science calls by various titles,—such as “ Nature ” (*natura naturans*), or the one “ Force,” of which all the varied forms of energy are species

or examples,—and places it under the “reign of law,” in a course of evolution. By further reflective thought, philosophy arrives at the conclusion that the essential characteristics of this same Being of the World, or “Ultimate Reality,” can only be expressed, or even conceived of, in terms of self-conscious and rational Personal Life. But religion has needs that science and philosophy, apart from the further reflective treatment which the latter can give to religious experience, taken in the large, are quite unable to satisfy. Through thousands of years of groping, and yet at times led rapidly forward by great individual teachers or by more popular movements, humanity has attained the conception of an Object for religious faith. In this, its Object, religion finds some thing much more than science and philosophy can furnish, as respects its power to meet the moral, æsthetical, and religious needs of human nature. For to the experience of religion, the Object of its faith appears as One, like man, an ethical spirit,—but immeasurably, and as yet incomprehensibly superior to man, a *perfect* Ethical Spirit.

The objections to this conception of the Object of religious belief and adoration, which arise on various empirical grounds, still remain. Neither man’s physical environment, nor his moral and spiritual constitution, nor his social relations thus far evolved, nor his demands for a speculative harmony and unity in his great postulate, *completely* correspond to his faith in the Divine Perfection. Faith is troubled, baffled, forced into conflict, on this account. But faith persists; and, on the whole, as it seems to us, it can scarcely be denied that both science and philosophy are in the way of explaining it as surely grounded in reality; and also of commending it as practically worthy and effective, more and yet more. The limitations of the perfection of the Divine Being are, indeed, no less apparent, because the world-order is becoming somewhat better known, and much more implicitly trusted than ever before. In fact, as will appear when we come to consider critically the relations of God to the world, as conceived of by religious faith, there

are many important respects in which modern science and philosophy have, so to say, been constantly making these limitations more obvious and difficult to remove. But the philosophy of religion welcomes this discovery; for it considers them as *self-limitations*; and it is ready with a nobler, more rational, and morally more effective, conception of that Absolute Self, who in wisdom, love, and holiness, thus limits himself. *For Absolute Will could not be Good-Will, were it not limited by a self-imposed deference and devotion to ethical and spiritual ideals.*

And, finally, our study of the faith of religion, as it manifests itself both in history and in the most illustrious individual examples, enforces the conviction that, after all, this experience of faith itself is its own most convincing argument. Its conclusions are obtainable only through a realization of the redeeming and gracious love, and the perfect holiness of God. They come to the individual who has embraced the faith, and who is living according to the influences of this love and this holiness. They are coming to the race as the actual redemptive process more and more embraces, in the extent and in the perfection of its operation, the social constitution and social relations of mankind.

PART V
GOD AND THE WORLD

"The High and Lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy."

ISAIAH.

"Who laid the foundations of the earth that it should not be removed forever."

PSALMIST.

"The ONE, maker of all that is; the one, the only one, the Maker of all existences."

HYMN TO AMON.

"These are the works of the second and co-operative causes which God uses as his ministers when executing the idea of the best, as far as possible."

PLATO.

"If our view of the world is defective, our notions of Deity will not advance beyond the mythological stage."

SCHLEIERMACHER.

PART V

GOD AND THE WORLD

CHAPTER XXXV

THE THEISTIC POSITION

That God is, and what God is, could of course become known to man only in and through the "world;" if within this latter term it be meant to include the sum-total of human experience with things and with selves. Were it not for certain relations existing between the Infinite Being and these finite objects, as known to man, then no account of the formation in human thought of the conception of this Being could have any claim to represent, however imperfectly, the truth about the reality. It is, therefore, these relations to which our thought is compelled to appeal, in the effort to vindicate in the light of modern science and philosophy the conception which religious faith holds of its Object. But the more detailed criticism of the content of this faith, with respect to the several main classes of these relations, will, of necessity, always have the effect of either confirming or modifying our conceptions of God. For God *is not* at all for man, *except as God is related to man* in and through that physical, social, and spiritual environment, that system of media, of which man has experience.

In discussing the religious doctrine of God and the World, however, we cannot rightfully be expected to keep slipping back into points of view that have already been transcended. And besides it is desirable, as far as possible, to avoid even the appearance of repetition of the same conclusions from somewhat different points of view. It will then facilitate progress

if two or three of the most important of these conclusions are recalled in the form in which they have appeared to be, if not quite demonstrated, at least made most reasonable. And, first: For the religious experience God does not appear as the "Absolute" or the "Infinite," in the sense of being the Unknowable or the Unrelated. For religion God is known as a spirit,—by the lower religions in a variety of crude and imperfect, or even irrational, immoral, and grotesque forms of representation, but by the most highly developed religious consciousness, as perfect Ethical Spirit. It no longer, then, becomes unmeaning or self-contradictory to inquire into the relations existing between this Spirit and that sum-total of known or legitimately inferred finite existences which we call the world. God *and* the World may be thought of as brought into some sort of actual connection.

And, second: In speaking of the relations of God *to* the World, or of God *and* the World, it is implied that the two terms of the relation are not strictly identical. The problem, therefore, cannot be approached with the virtual assumption that it makes no difference with the truth of any proposition concerning their relation, which of the two terms is subject, and which predicate of the proposition. Even the strictest form of pantheistical or materialistic theory could scarcely hold that it is a matter of no real significance whether one says: God *is* the World, or the World *is* God; God *made* the World, or the World *made* God. It is most surely, as the entire discussion shows, no such use of the copula which leads Professor Royce to declare, "The Absolute *is* (the italics are mine) the whole system of which the finite experience is a fragment."

But, third, there are certain ways of conceiving more precisely of the relations of God to the cosmic existences, forces, and processes, which have already been transeended. These ways have indeed been traversed by systems of religious philosophy in the past. They are of historical interest to the

student of man's religious evolution. They are constantly revived, in whole or in part, by the popular theology and philosophy. But they are so foreign to principles now somewhat firmly established, and to thoughts fitted for getting a significant grasp upon the mind of the age, that our present speculations need do no more than merely mention them. Among these "worn-out" theories of the divine relation to the world of things and selves is the view which regards God as the maker of the world out of some preëxistent and *quasi*-independent "stuff" or material. There is scanty need to thresh again the straw of a religious cosmogony which can fitly be ridiculed after the fashion of the late Professor Huxley; or which resembles the conception of the "*idiotes*," whom Origen considered to be the only person capable of believing that Elohim planted trees in the garden of Eden after the fashion of the human gardener. Neither the "carpenter theory," nor "the gardener theory," of creation need be revived for serious discussion.

Scarcely more tenable from the modern scientific and philosophical points of view is the conception which would virtually limit God's relations to the world to an act of creation *ex nihilo* which launched the present system of things and selves, as a vast chaos of self-existent and self-sufficient "stuff," endowed with multitudinous so-called qualities and forces, out of which "It" proceeded, without further divine aid, to develop itself. And, indeed, the need which was once felt in the interests of this view—namely, to save the purity and sublimity of the Absolute by keeping it as much as possible away from immediate contact with finite creations—is no longer a dominant motive in the speculations of religious philosophy.

Not much superior, or more worthy of prolonged discussion for present-day purposes, are the older forms of the theory which related God to the World through some process of "emanation." In its oldest and crudest form, this theory regarded the gods as making the earth and men out of certain

portions of their own bodies. These divine fragments, or pieces broken off from the divine beings, have life in themselves and can grow and produce their like. Thus the older emanation theories united a certain crude theory of evolution with the view which considers the gods to be the makers of the world. But a still more vital and subtly anthropomorphic view regards the gods as the procreators, or progenitors by sexual processes, of the world of things and men. In the coarse language of the Kamchatkans, their chief god has married all creatures and become the common father of all. With the Redskins of the North the Divine Being is the "Great Father." But the various productive and protecting divinities of India are addressed also as "Mother." And all over the earth, from the crude belief of the Zulus, or the Navajos, to the teachings of some of the Church Fathers, God's nature is represented as "father-mother," or "mother-father;" and so, as partaking of both sexes at one and the same time. A more scientific view of evolution, on the one hand, and a more spiritual view of the Divine Fatherhood, on the other hand, have saved us from the necessity of giving further attention to these grosser forms of the emanation theory.

The attempt at summarizing all the endless variety of connections which individual and finite things and selves have with the totality of the Being of the World, so as to express them as they truly and essentially are, in a few confessedly figurative terms, is agreed by all thinkers to suggest the profoundest and most unanswerable problems of speculative philosophy. But these problems are, of necessity, involved in the question: How can we more definitively conceive of the most eternal and fundamental relations which exist between the World and God? In their answers to these problems, few philosophers have the audacity to propose formulas that claim to be accepted as perfectly clear, satisfactory, and final definitions. Lotze, for example, in one place,¹ holds that the relation

¹ Outlines of Metaphysics (English Translation), p. 155.

of finite selves to the Absolute is best expressed by saying that they, as "spiritual elements" of Him, have "*Being-for-self*;" while the meaning of things and of their general laws of existence and relation among themselves, is wholly "to be found in their being consequences of that Idea of the Good" which is the very own nature of the Infinite Spirit. But of those relations on which religion fixes its attention, the same author elsewhere affirms:¹ "It is not required that there be found a speculatively unobjectionable expression for that which is essentially Transcendent, but that we have figurative expressions to which the mind may attach the same feelings that are appropriate to the content of religion." And yet again, he concludes the discussion of the world's immanence in God by affirming: "It will lead directly to our view that every single thing and event can only be thought as an activity, constant or transitory, of the one Existence, its reality and substance as the mode of being and substance of this one Existence, its nature and form as a consistent phase in the unfolding of the same."

Of the conclusions which would seem to follow in logical consistency from such theses as the foregoing it is not our purpose to speak at length in the present connection. But the two principal conceptions under which may be summed up the real meaning and value of all the symbolical ways in which religion regards the relations of God and the World are the following: *Dependence* and *Manifestation*. The former is chiefly emphasized in the religious doctrines of God as the Creator, Preserver, and Moral Ruler of the World. The latter conception is chiefly emphasized in the doctrines of God as Moral Ruler, as Providence, and as the Redeemer of the World; but also, in the doctrines of Revelation and Inspiration as means of the Divine rule and of redemption. The World depends upon God; and the World manifests, or reveals, God. The word "dependence" expresses relations mainly of finite existence to Infinite

¹ Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion, p. 147.

Being, of human feeling and will to Absolute Will; but the words "manifestation" and "revelation" express chiefly the relations essential to religious faith or knowledge. But just as feeling and will enter into faith, so does knowledge give reasonableness to feeling, and light and guidance to the will. Thus the filial attitude which is subjective religion, or true piety, understands and accepts as the guide and source of blessedness for man's life, the belief that all which exists, or can happen, in the world is ceaselessly dependent upon God; and that all which is, or happens, if its deepest and truest significance can be understood, is manifestation of God.

The theistic conception, which affirms that all cosmic existences and events are dependent upon God and are manifestation of God, becomes a doctrine whose ontological significance and practical value are incorporated into the very essence of religion itself. In obscure but germinal form, this conception is found in all those lower forms of religion, the nature of which was defined as "man's belief in the existence of superhuman spiritual powers, on his relations to which his welfare is dependent, and to which he is in some respects at least responsible,—together with the feelings and practices which are naturally and necessarily connected with such belief" (Vol. I. p. 89). But especially does a reflective and developed monotheism involve the elaboration of this conception, so as to include all the relations in which the Absolute Being stands toward all dependent and relative beings, the Infinite toward the system of finite existences. Indeed, the theistic doctrine of God is essentially an exposition of the "experienced world" as a dependent manifestation of Divine Being. This doctrine rests upon the fundamental assumption that this experienced world is *God's World*. Take away the possibility, and the right, of speaking of the relations which human experience explains in terms of the two conceptions, *dependence* and *manifestation*, and religion becomes dumb, and wholly unable to explain or to defend itself.

More precisely, the entire content of a rational faith in the

ontological value of the divine predicates and attributes is little else than an interpretation of what man finds to be true respecting his environment of things and of other selves, regarded as a dependent manifestation of God. Thus the declaration that God is "omnipotent" amounts to the assumption that all the forms of cosmic energy, known or conceivable, must be regarded as dependent manifestations of the divine power. To say that God is "omnipresent" signifies that, everywhere in the world's space and time, as respects phenomena observable by the senses or causes inferred to explain these phenomena, God is manifested, then and there, by the dependence of the world on Him. And he who intelligently holds to the full value of the "omniscience" of God, must do so by interpreting the orderly behavior, the rationality and unity of this known complex of things and selves, as a dependent manifestation of the self-conscious and playful mind of God. The revelation of the ethical attributes of the Divine Being requires indeed, a much more intricate and subtly profound but genuine insight. But this revelation, also, is not made in the form of a process of pure logic, or of an intuition unmixed with the contents of an experience with actual things. *The revelation is an interpretation of experience.*

This, then, is, essentially considered, what Theism means when it represents the relations of God to natural objects and to the race of men, under such figures of speech as are embodied in the words Creator, Preserver, Moral Ruler, or Father and Redeemer; or in the terms Providence, Revelation, Inspiration, etc. But these terms we have chosen—"Dependence" and "Manifestation"—are themselves, of course, significant only as they express classes of relations with which man's universal experience makes him familiar. They are, like all words, essentially anthropomorphic; and like all words which are employed to suggest the more profound, invisible and spiritual experiences, their use has been transferred from physical things to self-conscious and personal life. In this

transference they, therefore, carry along with them certain sensuous limitations which are derived from their physical uses. The escape from these limitations is a progressive affair, a subject of development. Thus it means something different, and much more, for a reflective monotheism than for an unreflective spiritism, to represent the relations of finite beings to the invisible spiritual Power, in terms of a dependent manifestation.

Moreover, it must be confessed that neither of these two words is exactly fitted to express in the best conceivable manner what the philosophy of Theism means to teach respecting the true and ontologically valid relations of the World to God. For things and selves are not in precisely the same way *dependent* upon the Divine Being; much less are things and selves in precisely the same way, or to the same degree, *manifestations* of this Being. And besides, the word "manifestation" is apt to be tainted with the notion of display. Too often the term savors of the theatrical and the spasmodic. For this reason, in part, religion prefers the term "revelation." But this term also has been perverted by theology and made to serve as the embodiment, either of distinctions between the natural and the supernatural which are not fortunate and tenable in view of the facts, or else of obscurities arising from the failure properly to distinguish things that are, in fact, quite distinctly unlike.

The word "manifestation," as applied to the entire relation between the divine immanent activity in the world and the development of man's religious belief and practice, also encounters certain other difficulties peculiar to itself. These arise at the different points at which the various agnostic, materialistic, or pantheistic conceptions regarding this relation, part company with the theistic argument. Such difficulties are illustrated in a somewhat startling manner by all such tenets as that which Mr. Herbert Spencer proposed as the basis of reconciliation between religion and science: "The Power which the Universe

manifests to us is utterly inscrutable." For here "the Power" is first regarded as something invisible and superhuman; it is superior and prior to, or else immanent in, the Universe,—*i. e.* in the experienced system of interdependent beings and connected changes, in the sum-total of the phenomena. But the Power is then declared to be "manifested" in this Universe, in this system as given to man in his actual experience. Now all this is, indeed, precisely what the reflective religious consciousness maintains. It is such a Power in which religion believes; and religion regards the Universe as a manifestation of this Power. How, then, can the Power that is *manifested* also be *utterly inscrutable*? But just here is where Theism refuses to stop. It interprets the experienced world as a significant and trustworthy manifestation of a Being of whom we may predicate more than mere power. And if the word "manifestation" is applicable at all to the interpretation of the relations between the One active Power and the complex of phenomena called the Universe, then we cannot stop in the application, at the point of arrest assumed by the agnosticism of Mr. Spencer. We must go either forward or backward; we must be more logical and thoroughgoing either in our denial or in our affirmation. Either the Universe does not manifest the Absolute at all, or else it manifests the Absolute as something more than mere Power.

It becomes necessary, then, for religion, in order to commend its faith to science and to philosophy, that it should explain more precisely in what manner it employs the conceptions of dependence and of manifestation in its various symbolical ways of representing the relations of God and the World. And here we are at once reminded of the differences which exist between the two interconnected but not identical fields of experience in which these relations display themselves. They are Nature and human nature; or the world of physical phenomena and the Soul of man. In both these fields the primary interest of religion is to support its own beliefs, to purify and minister

to its emotions, and to nourish and improve its practical activities. Religion aims to interpret the world so that God may thereby be the more truthfully apprehended and faithfully loved, adored, and obeyed. This aim characterizes its adoption and use of various figures of speech in its effort to express its doctrine of the relations between God and the World. But the same aim requires various important distinctions to be made between the way in which physical things and self-conscious spirits depend upon, or manifest, the will and mind of God. Thus, while the theistic position regards both things and finite spirits as "dependent manifestations" of the Divine Being, it does not regard both as manifesting this Being, or as existing in dependence upon this Being, in the same way. On the contrary, it makes an important distinction between the two. With religion as a subjective affair, however, the reason for the distinction is chiefly its regard for the feelings of value, and for the practical interests essential to its very life and growth. But the philosophy of religion must critically estimate the distinction, and must determine, if possible, its validity and its limitations in the light of modern science and reflective thinking.

It is at this point that Theism is most apt to come into conflict with some of the tenets which the positive sciences—especially those of the physical order—are maintaining as of universal applicability and absolute authority. Religion believes that the World is one, and that this one world is all a dependent manifestation of the One God. It designs, without identifying the two, to establish some rational scheme of the essential and permanent relations between them; and this scheme must be such as to secure, as far as possible, all the intellectual and moral interests involved. But the feelings of religion are hurt, its beliefs shaken, and its motives for practical activity weakened, when the unity of the world is stated in terms only of a mechanism that embraces in its all-including and unrelaxing grasp, not only all physical existences, but

the history and destiny of the souls of all men. Such a form of materialism, or of materialistic pantheism, seems quite as much a fell destroyer of all the confidences, hopes, and aspirations, of the religious experience, as does the most complete agnosticism or dogmatic atheism. And should the Mechanism itself be called divine, this would not serve to appease the fears, or encourage the hopes, or fortify the faith, of the believer in the verities of religion. A Power that manifests itself in terms of pure mechanism only does not satisfy the convictions on which the religious life of humanity is based.

One of the most interesting and suggestive evidences of the present attitude toward each other, of theology and of the natural and physical sciences, is the way in which both have come to regard that branch of religious apologetics which was designed to harmonize their interests, and which was formerly called "natural theology." The natural sciences have themselves been verging of late toward the conclusion, that their former conceptions of the world as a closed mechanical system were quite too crude and inadequate; in order to fit all the phenomena, they must be largely modified or wholly abandoned. To this conclusion the biological discoveries, and the enormously finer analyses,—chemical, microscopic, and theoreticophysical—of the elements of both organic and inorganic existences, have forced open the way. Into this opening way there would seem to be a demand made upon the philosophy of religion that it should boldly and hopefully enter. This wonderful new world—so vastly richer, so infinitely more complex and mysterious in its operations, so much more alive, and even throbbing with life, in every germ, and cell, and atom, and corpuscle, than was the world as known to science only a brief century ago—is still none the less, but all the more, God's world. God has not been driven out of Nature; neither has a merely mechanical Nature been substituted for a living God. But meantime theology, frightened and beaten away from the older forms of its dogmas with respect to the natural and the

supernatural, revelation and miracle, etc., has been weakening its claims to find in cosmic existences and cosmic processes any evidence of an immanent Spiritual Life. With this has come a period of comparative silence about religion's right to regard the world, throughout, as a dependent manifestation of God. But having failed—as was reasonable—to effect a complete reconciliation on the agnostic basis of a confession that the Power which both acknowledge to be manifested in the Universe is “utterly inscrutable,” science and theology have become more disposed, for the time, to leave each other unmolested in their respective spheres of labor. Hence the decay of so-called “natural theology,”—and the conclusion of writers like Macaulay: “Natural theology is not a progressive science. . . . But neither is revealed religion of the nature of a progressive science.”

No reconciliation of science and theology by way of indifference to each other's interests, no truce which follows a tacit agreement not to use each other's ideas or to talk in each other's terms, can be of long endurance. Such an arrangement is in its very nature destined to fall asunder through the pressure of forces inherent in the very being, and persistent throughout the entire history of this long-standing controversy. Both science and religion inevitably lead the mind toward the problems of “natural theology.” To shirk them is to cease to think;—and this, just at the point where thinking becomes most imperative and most fascinating. The problems are ever new and always changing; the problem is always the same old and unchanging problem. For *to correlate God and the World is philosophy's fundamental inquiry and supreme interest.*

Man gets the data for both his science and his religion out of one and the same Cosmos, or “Nature,” in the most inclusive meaning of this word. And the scientific and religious developments are both the outflow of one and the same nature of man. These are, to be sure, two not precisely identical lines of actual experience; for Universal Nature has two

sides; the one which appeals to the scientific instincts and interests, and the other which appeals to the religious instincts and interests. It is, then, in accordance with the constitution, both of the nature of man and of that larger nature in which man "lives, and moves, and has his being," that the terms, whether of peace or of strife, between science and theology, must be settled by his own reflective thinking upon his own total experience. In fact, the natural sciences, whenever free rein is given to reflection upon their principles and their conclusions, inevitably lead up to theology; and theology inevitably results from the attempt to give scientific form to the content of religious faith as touching that Reality which is revealed in the relations and interactions of finite things and finite selves. From both points of starting, then, the experience of humanity leads straight on to the problems of "natural theology." And whenever the proper stage of intellectual advance has been reached by any portion of the human race, an absorbing interest of reflective thinking in the problems of natural theology is sure to appear. This is true of the conception of the ancient Chinese religious philosophy answering to T'ien or Shang-Ti; although this conception does not indicate, any more than do the similar conceptions of the older Greek philosophy, a distinct separation between the sensuous and the spiritual. T'ien, or Heaven, is Shang-Ti or "Great Ruler," over both physical and spiritual things and relations. It is thus the object of both scientific and religious interest and inquiry. Its nature is also a matter of practical importance; for "It" is represented as punishing the bad and rewarding the good,—a Power that makes for righteousness, a physical Reality, which is at the same time an Ethical Spirit. The attempts of the Vedantic philosophy, also, to represent the Divine Being in right relations with its several manifestations in the one world ran, in some sort, parallel with the early cosmogonies of the Greeks. Thus in the Bhagavadgîtâ¹ Aruna

¹ See Sacred Books of the East, VIII. p. 96*f.*

addresses the "high-souled One" as "first cause," "infinite lord of gods," "pervading the universe;" and also as "wind, Yama, fire, the moon, Pragâpati, and the great grandsire."

It is, then, of essential interest to religious faith that philosophy should vindicate the truthfulness and ontological value of its rational conviction that the World is indeed a dependent manifestation of God. On the one hand, this postulate affirms: "God latent in nature is the tacit fundamental postulate of the faith which is the foundation of natural science."¹ On the other hand, the postulate of religion affirms: God manifest in nature is the perfect Ethical Spirit to whom humanity looks up, and upon whom the human heart reposes in confidence and love. And what is true of the Whole is true of every part of this Whole. The "scientific trust" in the evolution of the "universal cosmic order" is, for the purpose of religious belief, elevated into, and absorbed in, the "religious trust" in a "providential activity forever at work throughout the evolving universe." To represent the two forms of trust as antithetic and the two conceptions of the relations of God and the World as irreconcilably antagonistic, is to make impossible a rational view of our total experience. For the thinker it is to expose himself to the sarcasm which Spinoza directs against all those who deny the Divine Immanence in the World: "They suppose that God is doing nothing, so long as nature is moving on in the accustomed order; and, on the other hand, that the powers of nature and natural causes are idle whenever God is acting by interference with nature. They imagine, therefore, two powers, distinct from each other—to wit, the power of God and the power of natural things. . . . But what they mean by *nature*, and what by *God*, they know not."

This theistic position, which regards the cosmic existences and processes—The World, or Nature taken in a larger sense—as a dependent manifestation of God, is either wholly negatived or largely invalidated by various scientific and philosoph-

¹ So Fraser, *Philosophy of Theism*, p. 137.

ical theories. So different are the points of view held by these theories, and so almost imperceptible the various divergencies upon minor considerations under the one great problem, that any rigid classification could not be made to fit the facts. Different degrees of agnosticism, for example, with its accompaniment of different forms of positivism, reach upward through one sort of materialism to a kind of Deism; and through another sort of materialism, they terminate in a more or less spiritual Pantheism. Thus it comes about that the application of the general theistic tenet to the satisfaction of those religious beliefs and practical activities which respond to the doctrines of creation, preservation, moral government, providence, and redemption through revelation and inspiration, finds itself at times traveling along the borders of deistical and pantheistic tenets, and coming so near to them that it is easy to clasp hands and journey together for a certain distance in a common direction. But *names* should count for little here. And he who accepts the view of Theism in its integrity, and carries it out with consistency, must be prepared to be called a variety of names, however inconsistent, or even antithetic, those names may really be. The main positions which he is obliged either tacitly to reject or openly to antagonize are of two kinds. One of these is Atheism as a virtual denial that the World is any sort of a manifestation of God. The other is Pantheism as a virtual denial of the theistic position, by an identification of the World with God. But both the theistic and the pantheistic view of the relations of the World and God may involve a conception which is essentially materialistic, because it regards the sum-total of cosmic existences and cosmic processes as self-explanatory in terms of the physical and natural sciences;—and so “without God.” Here again, however, the necessity for further examination and definition begins. For before one can explain experience either “without nature” or “without God,” one must know what one “means by *nature*, and what by God.”

The positions which it is necessary to review in a preliminary and somewhat polemical way, before undertaking the detailed examination of the theistic view, may, therefore, be classified under two heads : They are, as to the relations of God and the World, (1) atheistic denial, and (2) pantheistic identification. With one of these two positions a philosophical Theism is compelled to enter upon a life-and-death struggle. With the other, its first effort is to come to an understanding ; and in this effort further definition of terms and mutual exchange of explanations serves, not infrequently, to mitigate, and even largely to abolish, the spirit of strife. For the theistic position with reference to the relations of God and finite beings is taken in the interests of securing a rational faith in the Object of religion as perfect Ethical Spirit ; and of supporting and encouraging that life of filial piety on man's part in which subjective religion essentially consists. For the accomplishment of this end, our reflective thinking finds it quite as necessary to maintain the Divine immanence in the World, as the Divine transcendency of the World ;—quite as important to realize in practical ways the union of man with God, as to emphasize his separation and his need of redemption in order to effect this union. In the effort to accomplish this reconciliation, the student of the philosophy of religion cannot afford to be frightened by words.

CHAPTER XXXVI

ATHEISM AND PANTHEISM

Of logically consistent and dogmatic denial of the reality of some Being corresponding, in part at least, to the theistic conception of God, there is little or none to be found in evidence at the present time. In view of this fact it is even customary to say that, strictly speaking, Atheism has no advocates left among the classes given to scientific culture or philosophical reflection. But of A-theistic views respecting the relations between the Ultimate Reality and the world of things and selves as known in human experience, there is now an unusual abundance of intelligent, sincere, and skillful advocates. A philosophy of religion which thinks to show how Theism is tenable in the light of modern science and reflective thinking cannot, therefore, afford to pass by in silence the virtual denials of its point of view and of its conclusions. And while these antithetic positions may perhaps best be quietly displaced or transcended, as the different doctrines of religion regarding God's relations to the World are critically examined, a brief survey of them is in place here.

Atheistic denial of the truth that the World is, in reality, a dependent manifestation of God, may take either the form of a certain kind of Agnosticism or of a certain kind of Materialism. In speaking of the agnostic denial of the theistic position in this connection, the term "agnosticism" must be employed in a qualified way. Of absolute and logically consistent agnosticism the philosophy of religion can, of course, take no account whatever. Its conflict with this form of negation must begin,

and end, before philosophy can establish its right to deal with the theistic problem. And in the possession and exercise of its right, this branch of philosophy has no particular advantage or disadvantage. For the denial of thorough-going agnosticism goes to the extent of holding that neither science, nor philosophy, nor religious faith, can achieve any knowledge of reality,—least of all, any defensible and systematic knowledge of so-called “Ultimate Reality.” The agnosticism of which we are now speaking, however, admits *that* the world, as somewhat more than can properly be meant by “appearance” or “phenomena,” really is, and even that we may know something true about *what* it really is. Indeed, many of the agnostics of this stamp proclaim with confidence elaborate systems of a high-and-dry metaphysical sort, touching what science most assuredly knows as to the constitution and the history of a “really real” world, both of things and of selves. On the other hand, it is claimed that neither through science, nor in any other way, can man reach the knowledge of how God, if there be any God, stands related to the world.

Curiously enough, this agnostic denial of the position of Theism, has frequently been advocated in the supposed interests of religious faith, as well as of scientific certitude. This fact is stated in somewhat startling language by Professor Flint:¹ “The two forms of agnosticism which directly refer to God and religion are the theistic and antitheistic, the religious and anti-religious.” Both deny that through the knowledge of the world’s existences, forces, and laws, regarded as a dependent manifestation of God, man can reach any science or rational justification of the contents of religious faith. But the one affirms, and the other denies, the trustworthiness and ontological value of this faith itself. The one would substitute faith for all attempts at science,—accepting the content of faith on authority, or by way of influence from unreasoned feeling or from valuable practical interest. The other form of agnos-

¹ Agnosticism, p. 423.

ticism would reject religious faith, because it finds no scientifically defensible content in this faith; it would refuse, in the name of science, to be influenced by religious feeling or by the practical interests of religion, in the pursuit of scientific truth. Both forms of agnosticism exist to-day, largely as the historical results of that natural and inevitable reaction against the excessive dogmatism of the metaphysical theology current in the Mediæval and post-Reformation eras, which came to its masterpiece of constructive thinking in the Kantian criticism; and which has been disintegrating this theology ever since the time of Kant.

The arguments against agnosticism, whether "religious" or "anti-religious," are no other than all those considerations, both of an historical and of a psychological and philosophical sort, upon which the philosophy of religion relies in rendering its account of the ways in which God has actually been manifested to the religious consciousness of man. In a word, the complete argument is the total religious experience of the race. This experience is an actual making of God known, in and through the world of things and selves; this is what the experience definitively and essentially is. And the larger and the richer this ever expanding and growing experience becomes, the greater and surer is that knowledge of God which is manifested in and through the world. To treat this race-experience in agnostic fashion is to do it an indignity; it is also to do an injustice and a mischief to the reason of the agnostic himself. There is no higher knowledge for man than that which comes in just this way. The knowledge of the divine relations to the world of things and of souls, like all other knowledge, is no outgrowth of abstract reasoning alone; it depends upon the careful observation and skillful interpretation of actual life in its environment of reality. Neither the faiths of religion nor the faiths of science spring up and grow in the soul of man, cut off from its physical and social environment. Moreover, the fact that the influence of ethical and æsthetic feelings and

ideals is so powerful, not only in urging, but also in the justification and defence of the faith of religion, is no reason for assuming the agnostic position toward this faith. This fact, indeed, constitutes a valid reason for the opposite attitude of mind.

It is well at this point to refer again¹ to the conception of religious faith which is implied in the theistic position as anti-thetic to the agnostic and atheistic denial. "*Faith*," in order to be anything more than vague feeling or untrustworthy credulity,—in order, that is, to be faith for beings that reason and that find themselves in a world which may be known, in part at least, as a rational affair, must have some content of truth in charge. "Having a content of truth" implies a source of the particular faith, which must be sought somewhere in the experience of a rational being, and which must be established by some sort of rational judgments. Only reason can issue, and only reason can receive, a "content of truth." Now with the greater world-religions, and especially with Christianity, the very claim to be worthy of universal acceptance is an appeal to the court of human reason as a judge of the content of truth held by their faith. With all such religions a "reasoned faith" is the only kind of faith which can abide.

Religions which make a claim to universality are, therefore, constantly called upon to adjust their beliefs to the truths which have become established in the name of science and philosophy. But the postulate of every science, which is not flippantly agnostic, is that it furnishes an essentially true, though very partial and limited, knowledge of the real existences, and actual relations and changes, of the World; and the postulate of religious faith is that this World is God's World, is a dependent manifestation—though as yet a very partial and limited manifestation—of the real Being of God. However, the world of science, and the world of religion, is one and the same World. For science to deny the truth of religion, as given in the content of its faith,

¹ Comp. Vol. I, p. 493f.

is to rule out one most important aspect of human experience that is contributory to a knowledge of the essential nature of things and of selves. And for religion to deny the truth of science is, so far forth, to be unfaithful to the fundamental postulate of religion, which is that this essential nature of things and of selves is a dependent manifestation of God. The one form of denial mutilates man's experience; the other narrows and debases the conception of God. In both science and religion, faith and reason, reasoned faith and fidelity to the insights and ideas of value which are an essential part of reason, go hand in hand.

The religious experience of humanity demands an attempt to form a rational system of the relations existing between the Divine Being and the World as a dependent manifestation of this Being. The complete theoretical refutation of the essentially negative position toward this attempt—whether “religious” or “anti-religious” agnosticism—requires from its advocates a thorough readjustment of their opinions on the most fundamental problems of philosophy, both epistemological and metaphysical. The theory of knowledge held by agnostic atheism is uniformly one-sided and partial. In its current form, its roots lie in the soil of the negative results of the Kantian criticism. But the most important outcome of this criticism, in the view of its author, was the conclusion that, while the knowledge of the World as an independent reality is no less impossible than is the knowledge of God as the Absolute, man does attain, through the immediately given and indubitable *datum* of the moral law, a rational faith in the realities of morals and religion which transcends the irremovable limits fixed for the physical and natural sciences. In a word, by the aid of ethico-religious reason the mind escapes the bounds set to its knowledge of the world by use of intellect and speculative reason. Faith thus reaches knowledge of the Ultimate Reality; while science can only arrange in logical but “objective” connections the otherwise disparate elements of phenomenal reality.

But a truer than the Kantian theory of knowledge shows us that the fundamental postulates, permanent convictions, and supreme conclusions, of both science and religion are essentially equal, so far as their claim to represent truthfully the real Being of the World is concerned. All human knowledge is, indeed, "anthropomorphic," partial, subject to admixture of error, and an affair of development; but the completer systematizing of its various elements in the cognitive evolution of the race cannot safely neglect any of the permanent aspects of human experience, whether these aspects seem at first most properly to be arranged under the title of "science" or under the title of "religion"; or whether—which is most often the case—they admit of being regarded from both the scientific and the religious points of view.¹

It follows, in logical consistency, that before this kind of atheistic denial of the possibility that the world should reveal the true Being of God, religious faith does not stand or fall alone. If its assault upon the position of Theism is successful, all claim to what men universally understand by knowledge falls into ruin. Knowledge so-called—whether scientific or religious, and whether or not its character inclines us to speak of its constituents as properly called only a "reasonable belief"—becomes a merely logical co-ordination of phenomena. It tells, neither to the scientific observer nor to the religious believer, anything whatever about the real Being of the World.

The other form of atheistic denial which Theism encounters at the present time is still, in spite of all protests, most properly to be denominated "materialistic;" and this, even if it falls short of a systematic and self-consistent Materialism. This position has so far transcended that of a positive agnosticism as to affirm a certain knowledge of what the world, as a vast complex of interrelated things and selves, essentially is.

¹ For the elaboration of these positions, see the author's *Philosophy of Knowledge (passim)*.

It is ; but It needs no God to explain what It is. This complex of cosmic existences and events, as it is given to man in experience, is self-explicable; it requires no postulate of a Being on whose Will it is dependent, or whose self-conscious Life it reveals through the evidences of a teleology immanent in it. And if one asks for some term under which one may most conveniently summarize the essential characteristics of such a world, one is invited to discard all words that sound like echoes from the conception of Selfhood; and to substitute for them such words as "Nature," or "Mechanism," or the like. For atheism in this form the World is simply a self-contained, closed, and in itself complete Mechanism.

It is easy to show, however, that the conception of "Mechanism" is quite as anthropomorphic as the crudest conception of Deity; it is also much more meagre in content, and much less effective as a summary of our *total* experience than is the most refined and philosophical, as well as deeply religious, conception of God. The monstrous character of the proposal to regard the whole system (?) of things and selves as mere mechanism, can only be estimated when the mind has forced itself to think the proposal through, without swerving a hair's breadth from the strictest logical fidelity to its theory. Then one comes to sympathize warmly with the declaration of Voltaire: "One must have lost all sound human understanding to believe that the mere movement of matter is sufficient to call into existence feeling and thinking beings." The more modern form of this theory, however, cannot be dismissed in any such off-hand manner as that employed by the French thinker. For its conception of "matter," and of "the movement of matter," is by no means the same as that which prevailed in Voltaire's time. What needs to be shown, therefore, is precisely this: *Just as far as the conception of Mechanism is modified and extended so as to serve the better as a principle under which to arrange our total experience, just so far is it made to include more of the very elements which legitimately constitute the conception of God.* In

a word *consistent Materialism turns out to be incipient Spiritualism*. Atheism inevitably uses veiled terms, and misinterpreted figures of speech, to precisely the same extent to which it succeeds at all in presenting a tenable conception of the Being of the World. The truth of this statement is made perfectly clear by a critical examination of the assumptions which are absolutely essential to the conception of Mechanism as an explanatory Principle.

Any complete and consistent conception of mechanism must begin with the assumption of an infinitely great number of elements, distributed in no planful way in a self-existent space, and having an enormously complex endowment of capacities, or inherent selective forces, which fit them for the inconceivably intricate actions and reactions that are necessary to enable them to play their several parts in the building of the structure of the one World. Until very recently these elements, have been called "atoms;" and the business of the physico-chemical sciences has been to discover their irreducible kinds, the conditions under which each kind enters into definite relations with the other kinds, and the resulting properties of the masses which are composed of aggregations of these atoms. But who that reflects does not see at once what sort of a mental picture is this, to which the reality of the so-called atom is supposed to correspond? Each atom is somehow able to thread its way amidst the world of change; it is always entering into more or less new relations, with an accuracy and promptness which cannot be born of usage or of experience; and it invariably returns to its old and tried relations, whenever the proper opportunity is offered for it to show in this way what its essential nature, as an atom, really is. Now science is empirical. The terms, therefore, in which all this facile ability and varied but legally constituted life of the atom is expressed, must be derived from experience. But "experience" itself must be understood in the broadest and most genial way; and the only experience which can clear up the behavior of these atoms is

that of a self-active being, or will, behaving itself teleologically, or according to immanent ideas, in varying relations to other beings of various so-called "classes" or "kinds." That is to say, the atom must be conceived of, if at all, *as behaving like a will in society.*

Modern science, however, is of late discovering that the chemical conception of a material atom, even with all its enormous complexity, is quite insufficient to explain our experience with things. Accordingly it seems necessary to supplement the atomic theory of ordinary matter with the assumption that this matter, which has mass, is everywhere interpenetrated with a yet more mysterious and incomprehensible entity; and to this entity, on account of its extremely tenuous and subtile character, the name of "ether" seems most appropriate. This branch, or arm, of the universal mechanism, so to say, must now take upon itself the more spirit-like (*sic*) actions and reactions for which its older-born and more grossly constituted companion seems inadequate. But just now the conception of both atom and ether is being raised, it would almost seem, to the *n*th power of both teleological constitution and efficiency, and also of incomprehensibility. For what appears to sense-experience as ordinary enough matter turns out to have, hitherto concealed, the most *extraordinary* and even astounding properties. The number of so-called "radio-active" substances is on the increase; and he would be a bold prophet who should venture confidently to predict where the increase will stop. At the same time, and in consequence largely of the same discoveries, the scientific view of the nature and constitution of the now old-fashioned atom is undergoing a rapid change. What the plain man's perceptive consciousness assures him is only just common kind of "stuff," incapable of self-movement or of the realization of immanent purposes, and only made—whether by nature or by God, it matters not—for man's convenient use, now appears to be all alive with profoundly mysterious and quite inexplicable *self-active* qualities. To its core, every Thing

is more than *mere* thing ; through and through it is penetrated with the semblances of a playful life.

All this experience undoubtedly gives warrant to renewed attempts to bridge the gaps, and to break down or over the barriers that have been acknowledged to exist hitherto within the world's mechanism itself. Very naturally and properly, too, this attempt takes in modern times the same form which it took in antiquity ;—that is to say, science tries to account for the Unity in terms of greater simplicity. Hence the infinitely varied real elements which, by their combination and recombination, form the mechanism of the world, are reduced to the smallest number possible ; the kinds of energy which operate in and through these elements are considered as species of One Force ; the existing relations between them are stated in general formulas of a mathematical order ; and they themselves are figuratively represented as possibly all belonging to one essentially identical type. Thus the *appearance* of simplicity is produced ; thus the real, but infinitely varied Unity, of the World is explained in terms of a purely mechanical system.

Far be it from us to scoff at science for its failure to explain experience in terms of mere mechanism. Its attempts are perfectly justifiable in deference to its own rights, its aims and its estimate of values. But when the resulting theoretical construction of Reality is assigned the place of an ultimate explanatory Principle, its failure to explain is conspicuous throughout. The appearance of simplicity is only specious ; the forms of energy remain as truly varied and characteristic as before. The actual relations are found to be much too complicated and constantly shifting to admit of a satisfactory expression in any mathematical formulas ; and the elements of reality themselves are only the symbols of beings that are packed full of a yet more profoundly mysterious and indefinitely varied outfit of original qualities and capacities.

All this entrancing picture which modern science furnishes

of a cosmic mechanism, that is self-explanatory and able to represent the final truth which man may know concerning the real Being of the World, comes far short of meeting the rational demands made by the larger and more vitally interesting part of human experience. For this part is an experience of life, and growth;—of *life* in every form of that comprehensive word, and of growth which pervades the entire mechanism and compels us to consider it all under the conception of *development*. The Being of the World is confessedly not a fixed and unchanging piece of mechanism—however complicated and mysterious. Its explanatory principle cannot be unfolded in any adequate way by considering the condition, relations, and interactions, of the mechanism at any one brief moment of time. The mechanism, which is the world, has a life-history; it has grown *from* a condition conceived of as more primitive, *toward* a condition which must be thought of as in some sense furnishing a goal. But this growth of the mechanism, which is the evolution of the World as known in the totality of human experience, is only the aggregate of an infinite number of interrelated individual growths. Out of itself must this mechanical whole produce all manner of living individual existences, each one of which in some obvious or mysterious way partakes of the disposition and the power to aid in the development of the whole.

And now the mind is thrown violently back upon the original proposal of the materialistic denial of that tenet of religious philosophy which regards the World as a dependent manifestation of God. This proposal was to furnish such a conception of the elements which combine to form the mechanism, that they shall somehow contain in themselves, *as elements*, the satisfactory account of all the cosmic existences and cosmic processes. It is, indeed, a very common opinion, that the modern theory of evolution greatly assists both the negative and the positive conclusions of materialism. But the very opposite is true, as will be shown more in detail further on. For,

in one word, a self-evolving Mechanism, composed of elements which contain within themselves the potentiality of will and reason in a form necessary to accomplish such a life-history for themselves, is a conception vastly more difficult than any which the philosophy of religion has ever invited the mind of man to entertain. A Demiurge, an Ātman or World-Soul, a Personal Absolute,—to conceive of either of these is a trifling task as compared with that demanded by a purely mechanical theory of evolution. From the demands of this theory the rebound toward the midnight of a complete agnosticism, a total distrust of both science and religious faith, seems inevitable.

Further examination of the view which would substitute the conception of mechanism for the theistic position introduces in exaggerated form the difficulty of filling in the so-called "gaps." In spite of the increased refinement and potency which has been given to this conception by the most recent discoveries of chemistry, molecular physics, and biology, it seems little better able than before to handle any of the higher forms of living beings, their reactions, and their experiences. The actual world contains innumerable existences which not only move in ways to correspond with the complex natural endowments of atoms and of the ether, but which live, in the sense of feeling, thinking and planning. Of these living beings some are human; and they are profoundly influenced by ethical and æsthetical sentiments. Of these human beings, multitudes believe in God and regard themselves as somehow under the influence of invisible spiritual agencies. When life begins amidst the physical mechanism; when sensation and feeling first emerge from the concourse of atoms; when man commences to think logically and to make ontological assumptions and postulates; when moral and artistic sentiments and ideals show their alluring and inspiring forms to the upturned face of humanity; when invisible but super-human powers are almost felt as the environment of the visible and the human; or when One Infinite, Absolute, and perfect

Ethical Spirit appears as the all-encompassing and all-vivifying Power; then the elements of physical reality, as conceived of in terms of a consistent and pure mechanism, are indeed hard pressed by the inquirer for an explanation of the phenomena. And here, as everywhere, it is not the principle of continuity, or the conceptions of unity and order that are at stake in the controversy. The problem is, the rather, whether the actually existing continuity, unity, and order, can be at all satisfactorily explained in terms of a mechanical theory. It is not at the "gaps" alone that the conception of mechanism breaks utterly down. But it is at the gaps that its utter break-down and inability throughout becomes most obvious and conspicuous.¹

The philosophy of religion is in search of some theory of the relations between the World, as known by ordinary or scientifically construed experience, and the Object of religious faith. The hypothesis of materialism not only fails to account for man's religious life and development, but it distinctly shocks and discredits the religious convictions, sentiments, and ideals. Certainly, on the one hand, these convictions, sentiments, and ideals, must adapt themselves to the truth about the cosmic existences and events as this truth is made known more completely by the advances of science and philosophy. On the other hand, religion is a fact, and it is a very stubborn and persistent fact. It therefore is perpetually asking science to explain it to itself; to admit somehow into the circle of important scientific considerations the evidences for the beliefs, sentiments,

¹ It seems to us that all this may be felt very keenly, on reflecting upon the phenomena of the formation of the living cell, or the behavior of the impregnated ovum. Each such cell is, somehow, a center of definitely selective and planful processes, although composed of a vast number of atomic elements. Each such ovum starts a process of evolution, which is so intricately and yet definitely a movement toward a goal under the control of an immanent idea, that the part which science can assign to the known physical and chemical properties of the atoms as compared with the part conspicuously played by the control of this idea, is relatively insignificant.

and cult of religion. The question, then, keeps recurring, whether both science and religion may not be true and faithful to reality, in holding their respective views of the world. To answer this question satisfactorily to both, it would appear necessary that science, on the one hand, should greatly modify its conception of the world as *mere* mechanism; and that religion, on the other hand, should adapt its conceptions of God to the demands of scientific truth, so far as such truth is statable in *terms of mechanism*. Now this is precisely the problem which is essayed by the theistic doctrine of the relations actually existing between God and the World. Science must suffer no other restrictions to its theory of mechanism than such as are put upon it, in fact, by the cosmic existences and processes themselves; and religion must suffer no other shock or damage to its convictions, sentiments, and ideals than that which comes to ignorance or to bigotry, when the call is sounded for a reëxamination of the evidence for such convictions, sentiments, and ideals.

The extremity of materialistic atheism is reached in the declaration that all natural phenomena, including plant-life and all human consciousness, are reducible solely to terms of atomic mechanism. But this extreme, although sometimes reached by a sudden leap from certain premises in fact to a general conclusion, is seldom or never held and applied with strict logical consistency. In fact, as everyone acquainted with the most patent limitations of science knows, very few natural phenomena are *wholly* "reducible to atomic mechanism." Many, even of the chemical phenomena themselves, have as yet persistently refused to submit to such reduction; and it is in chemistry, with its wonderful advances, that such terms are most strictly applicable. In plant-life, not only as the life of an organism, but even as the life of the single cell, atomic mechanism has as yet succeeded in affording almost no explanation of the phenomena. And the very proposal to reduce human consciousness to an atomic mechanism involves

the imagination in illusory figures of speech, that are not only unscientific, but for the most part prejudicial to the true interests of scientific explanation. Only he who has quite failed to possess the simplest elements of an accurate conception of the nature of man's conscious life, can think of speaking of it in terms of a merely molecular or atomic mechanism. And in all these cases criticism quite invariably shows that, after all, not so much is really meant as is actually said.

Pantheism has its origin in a much more profound and even deeply religious view of the world, and of the relations which its varied finite existences and transactions sustain to the great Whole. The feelings which contribute to excite and to support the pantheistic view are vague, but legitimate and powerful; they are chiefly these two: The feeling of the unity of the world, both of things and of selves, and the feeling of the mystery of the world. It is for this reason that the more reflective forms of Pantheism arise in reaction against an extreme form of dualism (like that, for example of John Stuart Mill), which posits a good but not omnipotent and absolute Deity in only a limited control of the world;¹ or, the rather, in reactions against the conceptions of a Deism that aims to banish the feeling of mystery by presenting to the intellect precise and apparently final definitions of God. The same reasons account for the fact that a certain form of Theism—that, for example, advocated by Schleiermacher who reduced religion itself so completely to a vague and mystical feeling of dependence upon the Unity of the World—so easily becomes almost or quite indistinguishable from certain pantheistic views.

The fundamental difference between the pantheistic and the theistic positions concerns the work of reason in representing to itself the nature of the relations which exist, in fact, between the system of finite things and selves and the Object of religious faith,—that is, between the World and God. As applied to

¹ Compare the remarks in A. Dorner's *Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie*, p. 124f.

the religious experience of man, the question becomes : Does the World, conceived of as a totality, account for the origin and development of self-conscious ethical spirits, who pursue an Ideal of a spiritual order and attribute to it a supreme worth ; or must this world itself be conceived of as having its Ground, and the Law and Goal of its evolution, in an Absolute Ethical Spirit? To this question, Pantheism replies by a theory of identification ; Theism answers with the conception of dependent manifestation, or revelation.

As soon, however, as the pantheistic theory begins to explain in detail what it means by identifying the World and God, it is apt to introduce distinctions which profoundly modify, or perhaps completely destroy, its own doctrine of identification. As soon, on the other hand, as the theistic conception begins so to enlarge itself, and to abandon the enormous limitations and errors of a quite untenable dualism, it, too, seems compelled to modify, by extending, the conception of "dependent manifestation." Thus certain very significant approaches of the two views—the pantheistic and the theistic—are certain to show themselves in all the contending answers to the difficult problem: How shall the relations of the World to God be so conceived of as, on the one hand, to satisfy the postulates and conclusions of science and philosophy, and, on the other hand, to do justice to the convictions, sentiments, ideals, and practical life of religion?

Certain forms of the identification of the World and God might quite as well be called atheism, or atheistic agnosticism, as pantheism. This is true of much of the doctrine of philosophic Hindūism,—especially as taught in parts, at least, of the Upanishads, where it is affirmed that the true nature of Deity can be known only by negations. "There is a visible and invisible *Brahma*;" but the real *Brahma* is incomprehensible and is described only by a series of universal denials. So, also, to identify the world, considered as a lump-sum of finite existences and after all reality of the human soul has been de-

nied, with God—as certain forms of Buddhistic theory have done—is not to be distinguished in any important respect from an atheistic materialism.¹

In the strictest sense of the words, all *identification* of the World and God is atheistic. The world, as we are now using the term, is the sum-total of the finite existences, physical and psychical, of which man has experience. To say that this *is* God, and then to refuse to explain either subject, predicate, or copula,—that is, to make the judgment one of identification in the simplest and most absolute form possible—is equivalent to denying the Being of God, in any meaning of the word God which the religious experience can tolerate, or of which the doctrines of religion can make use. Even the most ignorant fetish-worshipper, or worshipper of some relatively insignificant and transitory natural phenomenon, knows better than this. The fetish or the phenomenon is not identified with what he worships. For he himself is a spirit; and he at least dimly knows that his god is a spirit, too.

But even after the exclusion of pantheistic atheism and materialism, philosophical criticism has the greatest difficulty in fixing definitely the content of the conception to be included under the word “Pantheism.” For, as says Professor Flint:² “It has been so understood as to include the lowest atheism and the highest theism—the materialism of Holbach and Büchner, and the spiritualism of St. Paul and St. John.” “There is probably no pure pantheism.” In tracing the way in which the change from naïve polytheism to a more and more reflective pantheism came about in India our attention is called

¹ For example, we are told by the Mahajana of Japan that Buddha-tathata, or Nature Absolute, is the essence of all things. Essence and Form were originally combined and identical. Fire and water, from which so many concrete existences apparently originate, were themselves originally not differentiated. Indeed, Matter and Thought are one—are Buddha-tathata. See Griffis, *The Religions of Japan*, p. 243.

² *Antitheistic Theories*, p. 334.

to these historical facts:¹ "The older divinities show one by one the transformation that they suffered at the hands of theosophic thinkers. Before the establishment of a general Father-god, and long before that of the pantheistic All-god, the philosophical leaven was actively at work. . . . One reads of the god's 'secret names,' of secrets in theology which are not to be revealed, till at last the disguise is withdrawn, and it is discovered that all the mystery of former generations has been leading up to the declaration now made public: 'All the gods are but names of the One.'" This declaration "Brahma alone is" now becomes coupled with the declaration: "Every thing else is illusion." "All these gods are but names of the One!" In itself considered, this way of representing the true relation of the One to the many which had formerly been worshipped as the true gods, is quite capable of being made to run parallel with the teaching of the Apostle: "Whom ye ignorantly worship, him I make known to you."

All the greater religions, as they develop toward monotheistic views, under the influence of reflective thinking and of the various forces that are constantly at work to produce a more complete unification of human experience, feel themselves impelled to admit certain important truths which the various forms of pantheism try to incorporate into their theory of the identification of the World and God. The very predicates and attributes of God, as a philosophical monotheism conceives of Him, are dependent upon the recognition of these truths. As we have already seen, for example, God is "omnipotent," can mean nothing less than that there is no form of energy, physical or psychical, that has not its source and ground in the Divine Power. God is "omnipresent," can mean nothing else than that there is nowhere in the world, where God is not in the fullness of his Divine Being; all "wheres" are equally his "whereabouts;" there is for Him no "here," nor "there," which is exclusive of any other here or

¹ See Hopkins, *The Religions of India*, p. 40f.

there. God is "omniscient," can mean nothing else than that there is no existence or happening outside of his cognitive consciousness; no movement or change in anything, no phase of any animal or human consciousness, that escapes his universal co-conscious Mind. All these relations of dependence, and all the manifestations of the Divine Being which these relations are, apply to the *whole* World. Collectively and individually—with an "all" which is what the logicians are accustomed to style the "universal" and, as well, the "distributive" all—is it true that finite beings "live and move and have their being" in God.

Those scriptures in which the Christian religion finds its standard of doctrine regarding the relations of God and the World, abound in declarations that arise from pantheistical feelings and points of view. The pious soul, conscious of the divine indwelling and favor, affirms: "If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the earth, even there shall thy hand lead me." Yahweh asks of himself, in confidence as to what the answer must be: "Am I God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off? Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him? saith the Lord. Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord." And when the consciousness of the ethical perfection of this Divine One has reached the supreme heights, it is ready to declare: "Of Him, and through Him, and to Him, are all things;" and "He that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God, and God dwelleth in him." "Infinite is the Buddha, infinite the doctrine, infinite the Order;" but "finite are creeping things, snakes, scorpions, centipedes, spiders, lizards, mice!;" and yet "the good priest is in a sublime state of friendliness to them all." In its underlying *motif* this Buddhistic sentiment is not essentially unlike that of St. Francis of Assisi's love of our "dear brethren" the birds; or the faith of Jesus in the divine care for the sparrow.

The philosophical criticism of every form of Pantheism must begin its work with an examination into what is really meant by applying the concept of *identification* to the relations of the World and God. Such an examination takes the mind back to a problem in the theory of knowledge; or in the application of abstract logical categories to real beings and to actual events. Logic was formerly accustomed to symbolize the so-called principle of identity, as it was supposed to underlie and to limit, in a perfectly absolute way, all thinking and knowing, by the abstract formula A is A ; or $A=A$. But this formula, even when taken as a mere abstraction, turns out not to be true. A in the place of subject to any sentence cannot be identical with, or precisely equal to, A in the place of predicate. Nor can any conceivable meaning be given to the copula—whether this copula be the verb “is” or the sign “=” unless some *difference* be recognized between the two terms which it unites. The much profounder logic of the modern mathematics has therefore come to affirm that no relations can be stated, as relations merely, and without specifying or defining what objects are thus related; and that, between any two real objects, there is always postulated at least one relation which obtains between no other two knowable or conceivable objects. We cannot even say, “I am I,” without implying an important difference between the “I” that is subject, and the “I” that it predicates of itself; and of which it somehow affirms an essential and living unity with itself. For, really to be *self-identical* is actually to live the life of a self-differentiating and self-identifying being. And one moment of this life is given to the finite Self whenever it knows itself as self-conscious and cognitive.

The attempt, therefore, to apply the category of Identity to the relations existing between the Absolute and the sum-total of cosmic existences and happenings is above all other attempts of this sort, illogical and even absurd. And, indeed, this is never what Pantheism, when it tries to take its terms out from

behind the misty veil of feeling which envelops them, really does. The World which it affirms *to be* God is never conceived of as, in all its terms, precisely *the same as* God. The affirmation, when strictly interpreted, turns out to be one of relations and not of strict identification. And the relations especially apt to be selected for expounding the real meaning of the copula—"is" or "equals to"—are those of dependence and manifestation! Otherwise, it would be quite as effective to say, "The World is the World;" or "God is God;" as to say, "The World is God." To identify the sum-total of existences and events, as known or knowable by man, with the Absolute or World-Ground, is to destroy the absoluteness of the Absolute, by making it dependent wholly upon the exercise of man's faculties of knowing. Whereas, to regard this World, and all that man can discover about, or know of it, as only a very partial and temporary but real, dependent manifestation of God, is to make rational and consistent the beliefs and feelings which befit the Divine Absoluteness and Infinity.

There is one class of relations, however, to which the category of identity, in its more strictly pantheistic signification, has absolutely no applicability whatever. Such are the relations which arise and maintain themselves between persons. But religion, whether as belief, sentiment, or cult,—on the side of man at least,—is a personal affair. Only a being which has developed some capacity for knowing itself as a person, and for entering voluntarily into personal and social relations with other beings, can be religious. Only as this same being imparts to cosmic existences, the *quasi*-personal and spiritual qualities which he recognizes in himself, does he regard these existences as objects of religious belief and worship. But personal beings cannot be unified by a process of logical identification, as it were. As long as I remain I, or am *self*-identical at all, I cannot identify myself, or be identified by others, with any other thing or person. This power of self-identification, with its reverse or complementary power of distinguishing the

Self from others, may indeed be lost; but when it is lost, the Self ceases, either temporarily or permanently, to exist at all. In a word, the conception of two persons, "identical" as persons, is a purely negative conception; it cannot be stated in terms that are not self-contradictory. *Selves cannot be identified otherwise than by self-identification and self-differentiation.*

Both Pantheism and Theism, therefore, are forced to use such terms as "communion," or "union," in order to express the most intimate relations which can possibly exist between finite persons and the Divine Being. Or if such terms as "absorption," or "reëtrance" into the Divine Being, be made the goal of pious desire and endeavor; unless these terms continue to bear a wholly inappropriate and purely physical signification, they cannot be interpreted as any species of identification. To say that the human Self is so absorbed in God at death as to return to the condition of an unconscious, or non-selfconscious part of Divine Being, is simply to deny the Self's continued existence.

When, therefore, the conceptions of Pantheism and Theism are examined, in order to discover in what important respects they differ concerning the relations of the World and God, it is discovered that the differences all center about the idea of personality. To say that the World *is* God, or may be *identified with* God, in the pantheistic meaning of the words, is equivalent to affirming that the sum-total of cosmic existences and processes implies only an impersonal World-Ground. In brief, the only Pantheism, which is not virtually *a*-theism, differs from Theism, in failing to rise to the full-orbed conception of the personality of God. In its sight, the Being of the World is, indeed, somehow worthy of the mystical and worshipful feelings, and even of the loving service, which is due to the Divine. In the view of pantheism, however, this Being is not properly conceived of when given the predicates and attributes of an Absolute Self.

Yet here again it is true that so-called Pantheism has many

shades of meaning and degrees of approach to the highest and best thoughts of Theism. For it has the figurative and flowery way of dealing with its conception of the World, which makes it correspond to the theory of Mechanism as God. Thus the Divine Being of the World is identified with the sum-total of cosmic existences and processes, when conceived of after the analogy of an impersonal World-Soul, or of an Idea which the cosmic processes are realizing, or of a Universal Life which is immanent in the phenomena. The God, which the World is, now becomes thought of as somehow transcending—potentially at least—all the phenomena of the universe, whether considered in their temporal, their spatial, or their more especially dynamic, relations. But this view brings the thought hopefully near to the theistic position. And from this position we need not be disturbed, and cannot be dislodged, by being told that God, when “qualified by his relation to an Other” is “distracted finitude.”¹ We may even admit that the Absolute is not “merely personal;” until, at least, the term personal has itself been interpreted in a higher than the ordinary sense.

How possible it is to mingle the higher theistic with *a*-theistic conceptions, in the attempt to reach a more satisfying form of Pantheism, may be illustrated by such declarations as the following:² “Personality is a self-comprehending Selfhood in opposition to Another; on the contrary, Absoluteness is the All-comprehending, the Unlimited, which excludes from itself nothing but just that exclusiveness which belongs to the very conception of personality; absolute personality is, therefore, sheer nonsense, an absurd idea (*a non ens*). God is not a person by the side of and above other persons; but the eternal movement of universal existence, which is only realized and becomes objective in the subject. The personality of God, therefore, must not be conceived of as individual but as a uni-

¹ See Mr. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 445, and 531.

² Compare Strauss, *Christliche Glaubenslehre*, I, § 33, *Von der Persönlichkeit Gottes*.

versal personality (*Allpersönlichkeit*); and instead of personifying the Absolute, we must learn to conceive of it as personifying itself."

The mixture of truths, half-truths, and self-contradictory errors, which characterizes this classical example of the arguments advanced by the pantheistic conception of the World and God, has been essentially the same all the way from the Vedanta philosophy down to the writers quoted above. When we are told that "God is not a person by the side of and above other persons;" and that "the personality of God must not be conceived of as individual," but as "a universal personality," we may recognize a certain essential truth to the statements, in spite of the awkwardness of their form. To say that, "in place of personifying the Absolute, we must learn to conceive of it as personifying itself *ad infinitum*," is to remind Theism of considerations which it, indeed, needs to take into its account. These very considerations are, indeed, most effective means to controvert the conclusions of Pantheism. For an Absolute that *is* "universal personality," or is capable of "personifying itself *ad infinitum*," can be conceived of only in terms of personality. But what becomes of the warning that, to try to unite the conceptions "absolute" and "personality" is to perpetuate "sheer nonsense," to construct an "absurd idea?" And if we could succeed in conceiving of this Absolute as personifying itself, and as continuing to do this very thing *ad infinitum*, how should we escape the charge of making the Absolute itself responsible of realizing "sheer nonsense," and an "absurd idea"? Theism, on the contrary, may hold that to personify one's self expresses admirably the very essence of personality. No finite person can become a person without personifying itself. But every finite person, who progressively better and better accomplishes this task, who makes his own Self a more and higher Self, does this only in dependence upon the Absolute Self. Religion crowns the task of self-personifying, with its gift of that spirit of filial confidence and

ethical love which, by an habitual attitude of the self-determining will, unites the finite person in a moral and spiritual union with God.

While, then, Theism needs constantly to incorporate into itself those profound considerations which are emphasized by the higher and more spiritual forms of the pantheistic theory, and to which certain religious sentiments of the highest value naturally and promptly respond, it cannot loosen its grasp upon the conception of a personal God; it cannot take to itself the impersonal, or imperfectly personal, Deity which Pantheism offers in his stead. To do this is to dream rather than to think; the dreamer, if he continues sane and logical, is sure to awaken from his dream to find that he has embraced no more reality than that of a vanishing cloud. On this cardinal point the real and final issue between Pantheism and Theism is joined; the *ultimatum* is stated, upon the basis of which alone, if at all, a lasting peace can be secured. A final choice must be made between the Ideal of self-conscious, rational, and Ethical Spirit, as the Ground of all Reality, and all the many vague conceptions which the pantheistic theory has to oppose to this ideal.

Further in favor of maintaining a firm tenure of the complete theistic position is that inevitable vacillation between atheism and the extreme of mysticism to which the more fervidly religious forms of the pantheistic hypothesis are constantly liable. Spinoza, for example, in his doctrine of God as Universal Substance, or of *natura naturans* devoid of truly personal qualities, was correctly judged atheistic by the orthodoxy of the seventeenth century. In the last chapter of his *Ethica*, however, he states the theory of the Divine Love as the true moral bond and real union of all souls, in a manner which might well seem acceptable to the Christian mystics of all ages of Christianity.

The imperfect or erroneous conception of personality, which differences the pantheistic from the theistic notion of the Divine

Being, becomes particularly obvious in the doctrine of *man's* nature and relations to God. By Pantheism the personality of which the human individual is capable is not conceived of in its true, full, and highest significance. This defective conception is expressed in various figures of speech which are not only taken from physical relations but which are appropriate only to things and to the relations of things. Thus, for example, the Hindū doctrine, in its more purely pantheistic form, although it regards man's ātman, or soul, as some sort of an indestructible entity, represents its relation to the Ātman of the World, as that of a "portion" or "fragment" to the whole. Union of the two is, therefore, made complete by an "absorption" of one in the Other, to the loss of its own personal existence. All is Ātman; and my ātman is part of the impersonal absolute All-being; which may, indeed, as properly be called Brahma as Ātman. The Buddhistic doctrine of the non-reality of soul, on the contrary, destroys the personality of man in another way;—namely, by resolving it into a *mere* series of states, having moral significance indeed, but not implying or revealing that self-active, self-personifying power which is the essence of even finite personality. In similar way the modern pantheism of Schopenhauer and his followers and successors, where it does not vacillate—as, indeed, it is constantly doing—between the theistic and the strictly pantheistic conception of the relations which man sustains, for his origin, continued existence, moral welfare, and destiny, toward the Absolute, is equally defective and confused.

Much, if not all, therefore, of the contested difference between Pantheism and Theism, as to the Divine Being and as to the relations sustained to this Being by finite things and finite selves, depends upon a fundamental difference in the conception of self-hood or personality. And since religious experience seems always impelled, if not compelled, to express itself with reference to these matters in symbolic and figurative terms, the settlement of the controverted difference between

the two forms of religious philosophy is largely dependent upon the way in which each interprets these symbols and figures of speech. In the one case, the interpretation is wont to regard all cosmic existences, processes, and events, as only the phenomenal and illusory aspects, the apparent modifications or parts, of an impersonal and eternal Substance. In the other case, the existences, processes, and events are regarded as a real, though partial and dependent, manifestation of One self-conscious, rational, and ethical Will.

But while Theism regards man, like all other finite beings, as a dependent manifestation of the Divine Being,—a child of the World, so to say—it also places him in other and quite distinctly different relations, than those which things and animals have, to God. Man is “God’s child,” in a peculiar sense; his nature is the inchoate and undeveloped image of God, as a self-determining ethical spirit; and, therefore, God and man may come into more definitely reciprocal personal relations. These relations it is the end of religion to establish and to perfect. Thus man’s personality, instead of being lost in the impersonal World-Ground, may be saved and raised to a higher potency by a voluntary and ethical union with God.

A philosophy of religion which helps to secure this supreme good for humanity, in accordance with the approved truths of science and history, has done all that reflective thinking can do for religious experience. And in this attempt the important considerations for which the pantheistic conception has stood, in all the greater religions and not least of all in Christianity, must be accorded the high estimate of their worth which is their due.

CHAPTER XXXVII

NATURE AND THE SUPERNATURAL

The possibility and the reality of "the Supernatural" so-called, as well as the character of the relations, if any, to be established between it and the existences and forces which are called "natural," cannot be discussed without some preliminary examination of the value of the terms employed. Both these terms—Nature and Supernatural—are very complex and abstract. They cover conceptions whose content needs analysis and reflection, before any theory of the two can be stated,—much less justified by an appeal to experience. The word nature, when used in contrast with the supernatural, should always be understood in the meaning properly given to it by a pure empiricism. It is just that complex of existences and changing relations which is actually given in human experience. Its evidence consists of the observations, and reasonable and defensible inferences, of the positive sciences. In Kantian terminology, nature is the sum-total of known, or knowable, "phenomenal realities." The moment, however, metaphysics is employed, whether in the alleged interests of a more profound science or of a more rational exposition of the religious experience, so to break up the conception of nature as to find within it some inner Principle, whether of Being or of Unity of Force, which, as a self-consistent Totality, shall account for the order and orderly evolution of natural phenomena, then there has virtually been introduced, not only the problem, but the explanatory conception, of the *super-natural*. That is, over and beyond that which appears in experience, there is now implied a

Something-More, a Super-Being of the World. Reflective thinking finds itself compelled to recognize that which is beyond the natural—in the restricted meaning of the word; and to which it attributes the chief ontological value. It is for this reason that the metaphysics of physics likes so well to spell with imposing capitals such words as Order, Law, Nature, and Unity of Force.

For Theism the Supernatural is God—nothing more; but then also, nothing less.

The distinction set up between nature and the supernatural, or rather between the naturalistic and the supernaturalistic way of regarding and explaining finite beings and finite events, is as old as either science or religion. It appears primarily to rest upon the difference between what is known to be done by man's agency and what is, on account of some peculiar mystery about its causation, conjectured to be done by some other spirit than man. In this form, it is merely the distinction between the human and the superhuman. For according to the belief of primitive religion, all things are done by spiritual agencies, and what is not done by my spirit or your spirit is, of course, done by some invisible spirit. Should this deed seem the more remarkable, because it is something which neither you nor I can do,—unless, indeed, the invisible spirits accomplish it *through* one of us,—then it is essentially superhuman; and because it excites wonder and worshipful feeling, it is divine. Thus among the Peruvians the word *Huacas*, or “the extraordinary,” is the term for the godlike; and the word *Kami*, or “the admirable,” among the Japanese. On the other hand, savage or primitive man is by no means wholly without knowledge of that regular, dependable, and understandable, nature and interconnection of things which contains the germ of the conception of “Nature” and the “natural.”¹ Whatever may be conjectured as to the mental capacities and attitudes

¹ So Waitz and compare D'Alviella, Lectures on the Origin and Growth of the Conception of God, p. 63*f*.

of so-called primitive man, the arts of making a fire, of constructing and using stone implements, and of preparing food, imply the naturalistic, as well as the supernatural, point of view. For savage logic, as Jevons maintains,¹ is in no important respect different from the logic of the trained man of science. The same necessity tends powerfully in the direction of compelling the most scientific minds to resort to some hypothesis of unifying invisible principles;—that is, of the essentially *super-natural* (*above the natural*, as it is empirically known in terms of the positive sciences) in some one of its several possible forms. By the multitude the distinction is made, although more reluctantly, scarcely less naïvely to-day than it was decades of centuries ago.

The conceptions of the natural and the supernatural, although persistent and universal, are in their application exceedingly vague, shifty, and unintelligent. For example, the erysipelas due to bathing when overheated is thought by the Australian black-man to be caused by an evil water-spirit. The illness of the Peruvian mountaineer, when he descends to live in the valley, is ascribed to the supernatural power of the sea. The Kafir, however skillful he may be in the multiplication and care of his cattle by resources under his control, nevertheless prays:² “This kraal of yours is good; you have made it great . . . you have given me many cattle; you have blessed me greatly. Every year I wish to be thus blessed, etc.” It is customary to say that, with the advances of natural science, the sphere of activities allowed to the supernatural has been constantly contracting; until now he who trusts the empirical evidences for his conception of nature can no longer tolerate the conception of the supernatural in any of its hitherto current meanings. This conclusion is then taken to mean that God has been driven out of the World; at least, as this world is known to man in terms of the positive sciences. To this con-

¹ Introduction to the History of Religion, p. 18f.

² Shooter, Kafirs of Natal, p. 166.

clusion, theological orthodoxy has opposed in vain a view similar to that of Cleombrotus; and which regards those who exclude the Divine Being altogether from secondary causes and those who see Him everywhere, as equally in error. The remedy for such an error is to draw the line between the natural and the supernatural just behind the footsteps of Providence, after it directly "intervenes," "interposes," or "interferes," in the world's affairs. Thus God is either altogether banished from, or is made a meddler in, the World of which he is the Ground!

The distinction between Nature and the Supernatural must be made satisfactory both to science, if not to all the "scientists," and to the religious experience, if not to all the theologians. Both the scientific and the religious points of view are truly taken; both conceptions are sure to be somehow held, and employed, in the effort to express and to explain the total experience of the human race. The reconciliation of the two, so that they shall no longer be antithetic and mutually exclusive, must be found in some higher conception which includes them both.

In this laudable effort at reconciliation, certain mistaken ideas as to the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, and as to the character of the theistic position, so far as it commends itself to thoughtful minds, must be recognized and abandoned from the very start. The truths of experience are indeed embodied in both these two conceptions; both views call loudly for recognition at the hands of the philosophy of religion. These truths are either wholly abrogated or much impaired, by (*a*) the materialistic rejection of the supernatural altogether; by (*b*) the idealistic denial of the reality of nature (in the form of solipsism); or by (*c*) the agnostic denial of all possibility of relations between the two. Neither can these truths be secured if the natural and supernatural are regarded as mutually exclusive spheres of existence and of activity.

The word *super-natural* does, indeed, suggest a spatial relation; but to take the suggestion seriously would, in the light of the modern scientific view of the world, be absurd. God no longer appears to enlightened thought as spatially superior to nature,—over the natural—, as though managing it from above. Nor can our thought truthfully represent the natural and the supernatural as regularly (*i. e.*, except upon occasions, as it were), taking no account of each other. Such a form of representation is not only antithetic to the conclusions of the positive sciences, but it also leads logically to the position that revelation and inspiration are *unnatural* and *unreasonable*,—or foreign to the rational nature of either man or God. Indeed, if we understand nature and reason in this limited way, we seem obliged to say that all revelation, and all religion, must be both *super-natural* and *super-rational*.

The reconciliation of the two contrasted, but not antithetic, aspects of human experience with the world of things and selves, can be accomplished in only one way. The immanency of God in nature and in human society, and his transcendency as Personal Absolute and perfect Ethical Spirit, must both be maintained and harmonized. But the considerations which not only make this view possible, but which require it, are amply provided by both the scientific and the religious experience of the race. For even from the lower points of view, as required by the positive sciences, every existence and every event in the world—*i. e.*, in nature as presented empirically to man's perception and intellect—may be, and indeed must be, regarded from several points of view. Reality is rich enough to justify and to harmonize the conclusions from all these points of view. No individual Thing, or meanest Self among men, is so poor as not to display more or less of all this wealth actually existent in its peculiar content. This tree, this watch, for example, is indeed just a *mere* tree, a *mere* watch. It has its own species, or own manufacture; it can grow a form and fruitage of a definite kind; or it can tell

time to serve the practical conveniences of its owner. But even when taken thus, the tree, or the watch, is a concrete embodiment, an accomplished realization, of all the natural and psychological forces. Its individual being actualizes all the so-called categories.

But how vastly different a thing to science is this tree, this watch; and how different its being and qualities, when viewed from the different scientific standpoints! To chemistry, the watch is no longer a material continuum, that is movable only from without, and analyzable by ordinary mechanical processes—such as breaking, pounding, pulling apart, etc.,—into bits of the same kind of stuff, appreciable by the unaided senses. It is, the rather, when regarded from the chemist's chosen point of view, what no eye can see, or hand touch, or other sense-perception immediately apprehend and appreciate. It is a vast collection of invisible and intangible elements, with mysterious natures of their own, and uniform modes of self-activity in ever changing relations to other elements. Moreover, these elements "obey laws;" and the laws are, partially at least, expressible in terms of mathematical formulas. But what can be meant by "obeying laws," is to be explained only when a return in thought is made to this same mysterious "nature" of that which is invisible and intangible. The *real* watch is no longer a mere Thing, as things appear to the plain man's everyday experience. From the point of view of the senses, in their appreciation of the natural, science has raised this Thing to the realm of the *super*-natural. For this watch is, in all its essential qualities as known to chemistry and as described in chemical terms, so much "over" and "above" the everyday nature of that same watch, as to make it quite another kind of existence. Yet it is the same Thing, only regarded from different points of view, and with a profounder insight, and as subjected to more comprehensive observations and trains of reasoning. The watch of "common sense," and the watch of chemistry, are not two watches; they are not anti-

thetic or opposed to each other; they do not negate each other, as though they belonged to wholly distinct and mutually exclusive spheres of reality. It is one watch, seen from two different points of view. And if the one watch were shown to the fetish-worshipper, he would doubtless be easily persuaded to recognize its divinity, and to propitiate its mysterious, invisible, but indwelling divine power.

When the tree—just this plain thing of a tree, with which every beholder is sufficiently familiar in many aspects of its being—reveals its inner nature, not only to physiological chemistry but also to biology, it transcends its own apparent nature, even much more than does the watch. For the tree not only “moves,” and “has its being,” in the Being of the World; it “lives” in this Being. And being alive, every element of this common and familiar thing, would have to be declared most *super-natural*, as contrasted with that which is ordinary and natural from the common-sense point of view.

To appreciate this “miracle of life”¹ let the thinker take his stand at one end of the microscope, while beneath the other end there is going on those cosmic processes which result in the evolution of the living cell. Here is Nature transcending her other works, producing something quite beyond and above what she has done before. Here is the natural rising to supernatural heights; but on this new level, it is a higher order of nature still. In recognizing this nature of the living tree, as known to the chemical and biological sciences, there is involved no contradiction of the nature of the same tree, as known by the common gardener. This new scientific knowledge gives, indeed, an acquaintance with hitherto unknown and unsuspected invisible and intangible beings and forces. These beings and forces, by their obedience to law and by their display of an immanent teleology, show their superior spiritual and self-like character. From the scientific point of view, the

¹ It is not strange that Haeckel has called his latest treatise on this subject, *Das Lebenswunder*.

tree now appears as something that has already far transcended its old nature as *mere* tree. Its particular being is now seen to be only one among an infinite number of manifestations of the larger and all-inclusive Being of the World.

Thus does the nature of every Thing, when more perfectly and interiorly understood, rise above its own inferior nature; but in thus rising, its more inclusive conception becomes, not antithetic to, but comprehensive of, its own less inclusive conception.

Let us now return to the conclusion which we have been illustrating. Every being in the whole world, as this world is empirically known, must have its nature considered from an indefinite number of points of view. As known from the superior point of view, its whole nature appears changed; but the change is not one which puts its new nature over against its old; its superior nature does not oppose, or negate, its inferior. *The one Thing really has these various natures*, as aspects of its one nature; and no thing is so poor as not to share in this infinite, and infinitely complex, wealth of natures rising above natures, but all having their ground in the one all-comprehending Nature. And the positive sciences, instead of discovering and exposing this all-comprehending Nature in its naked simplicity, are compelled to clothe It, and veil It, with garment piled upon garment, each more elaborately wrought and richly ornamented.

It is not likely that any advocate of the view which modern science takes of so-called Nature, "writ large," would dispute what has been said hitherto. The scientific conception of what should be included under the term "natural" is, indeed, now far more comprehensive and rich than it has ever been before. And just on this very account it is claimed that the natural no longer needs to be supplemented by the supernatural; that, indeed, the former positively excludes the latter. This claim could be justifiable only on two conditions. Of these conditions, one is that the conception of Nature shall be so illogically ex-

panded as to include those points of view which belong more properly to the conception of the Supernatural; and the other is, that the natural and the supernatural shall be regarded as mutually exclusive spheres. But it has been agreed to limit the conception of the natural to that system of existences and transactions which is described, and descriptively explained, by the positive sciences. We cannot, therefore, be satisfied with such a metaphysics of the chemico-physical, biological, and psychological sciences, as either unconsciously, or by a species of illegitimate smuggling, provides for the Supernatural under cover of the natural. Our reconciliation of the factitious antithesis of the two conceptions must, the rather, be open, intelligent, and deliberate.

Religion cannot dispense with the conception of the Supernatural. But religion cannot afford to hold this conception in antagonism to modern science and philosophy. We seek a reconciliation, therefore, in some larger Idea which shall include both the natural and the supernatural, in harmony. According to this larger Idea, every existence and every event is capable of being regarded from two different but not antithetic points of view as both natural and supernatural. This is only to say, indeed, every existence and every event must be so regarded; because all cosmic beings, processes, forces, and happenings, however they may be explained by the positive sciences, must also be regarded as, essentially considered, dependent manifestations of the Supernatural,—of God.

The account which naturalism gives, therefore, affords no perfect substitute for the account which supernaturalism offers; the account which supernaturalism offers, is not intended to displace, or to annul, and does not in fact contradict, the account which naturalism gives. The totality of human experience, in the realm of scientific endeavor, and in the realm of ethical, æsthetical, and religious beliefs, sentiments, and ideals, demands the satisfaction afforded by both points of view. The Reality which this experience increasingly apprehends, and

dimly comprehends, is an infinite sphere of Being,—vast, mysterious, and rich enough to satisfy all demands. Science may, then, say to religion: “If He is not here, manifested in these things and these souls, whose ways of behavior and history of development I am studying, and striving to reduce to order; Where, then, is your God?” and, “How shall man know either that He is, or what He is?” And religion can only answer: “He is here; and He is known as immanent in these things and in these souls.” And then, in its turn, religion may say to science: “Can you explain the unity and order of these things, and especially the experiences of these souls, without discovering or postulating some Principle such as that I may reasonably make it the Object of my admiration, trust, and love?” Or better: “Show me your natural forces and the laws of their working, and I will expound to you the power and wisdom of my God; tell me how, out of the Being of the World, came Christ and the religion of Christ, and I will show you why I take toward this Being the attitude of a loving and forgiven son.”

And, indeed, the more thoughtful it has become, the more has science recognized the necessity of resorting to some theory of the Supernatural, as immanent in Nature, and demanded for the completer explanation of natural phenomena. In history, the larger conceptions of the world have always tried to provide for a “something more” than could be caught and described in terms familiar to the positive sciences, so long as these sciences felt compelled to remain within the limits of an experience that assigns no ontological value to the beliefs and sentiments of religion. “Nature” is therefore conceived of as somehow capable of separation into two parts; one of these must be put “over” the other, must play the missing part of the *super-natural*. This one nature is after all, both a *natura naturans* and a *natura naturata*. It includes some active unifying Principle as well as an obvious complex of interrelated phenomena. This truth is virtually admitted, but not well ex-

pressed by such statements as that of Professor Le Conte:¹ "To the deep thinker, now and always, there is and always has been the alternative;—materialism or theism. God operates Nature or Nature operates itself; but evolution puts no new phase on this old question." It is indeed true that evolution does not change any of the essential factors of the problem proposed by such terms as Nature and the Supernatural. But the problem is not well expressed as an alternative of this sort. The World, and all that is in it, is always, and necessarily, and by virtue of its very conception, both natural and supernatural. It is capable, on the one hand, of being looked at as naturalism demands; but its more complete understanding demands that it should be looked at in another way. Looked at in this other way, Nature becomes the name that masks the immanency of the Divine Will and Mind in all the cosmic phenomena.

It is, however, when we come to consider human nature in its historical development that the merely naturalistic view reveals its special and most marked deficiencies. For the history of humanity is replete with signs of a presence and power that is above nature, in the narrower meaning of this term. The student of history feels himself compelled to admit that there are "hidden influences" at work "shaping the religious fortunes of mankind," which "cannot be wholly accounted for by historical investigation."² To the same conclusion, writers like Wellhausen, Strauss, and others, are found assenting, when, on making a cross-section in the historical evolution of humanity, they have recognized two somewhat exclusive spheres of reality,—the so-called natural and the so-called supernatural. But of the history of humanity, as well as of so-called physical nature, a clear-sighted philosophy affirms that it is all capable of being looked upon from both these points of

¹ See the chapter on "Nature and Spirit" in his *Theory of Religion*; and compare the chapters on "Matter," "Nature and Spirit," and the "World and the Absolute," in the author's *A Theory of Reality*.

² So Jastrow, *The Study of Religion*, p. 178f.

view. In this field of research the distinction exists ; but it must be held in a relative and shifting way. And it is not to be applied by picking out bits of history here and there ; and by assigning some to one conception exclusively, and some to the other. The distinction is indeed permanent and important ; but its ultimate intention is to pay respect to the different aspects, as regarded from different points of view, of the one life of humanity. In this evolving life of human nature, God, the Supernatural is always and everywhere immanent. As the Abbé de Broglie,¹ argues : It seems a strange inconsistency when the naturalistic school, which proposes to bring everything to the test of historical facts, rejects *a priori* and often with scorn all those ideas of the supernatural, miracle, divine revelation, etc., which history shows to be universally spread among, and tenaciously adhered to by all religious peoples. Further examination usually shows, however, some provision for recognizing these ideas under another form or name. And Matthew Arnold's "Power that makes for righteousness," some unifying Force, or resultant of *quasi*-spiritual forces, is called upon to perform the same gigantic task which Baron Bunsen assigned to "God in History."

Thus by the naturalistic party, the demand to enlarge the scope and increase the efficiency of its explanatory principle has been met by expanding and intensifying the conception of "Nature," "the Cosmos," "the World," or the "Unknown Force" which, however, the Universe manifests to us. In its best condition of development, this conception is made to cover, not only all the existences, forces, and processes, that are "natural" in the narrower meaning of the word, but also the origin and history of the human race regarded as the expression or product of forces that are also "natural" in the widest meaning of the word. Thus Mother Nature is conceived of as made big, strong, and wise enough to bring forth from her womb all that has become or can become, objects of

¹ Problèmes et Conclusions de L'Histoire des Religions, p. ix.

human experience. And now our question returns upon us in other forms, but in essence the same. All experience is now enfolded in "the natural." Outside of Nature, or over or above it, nothing real or even imaginary can be; and whatever is regarded as immanent in Nature is confessed to be a part of It. But if Nature is the all-surrounding, all-upholding, all-producing One, where now is the place for the *Supernatural*?

To this question the reply must be that we are here dealing with a species of logical jugglery. But the trick is not hard to discover. For the extension of the conception of the natural to such dimensions reveals its own inherent inconsistencies by the perpetual tendency to break up again into two parts; and each of these parts has for its important business, the reëstablishing and safeguarding of the same distinction with which, by their hasty union, the conception was itself constituted. This distinction between the natural and the supernatural was originally introduced in order to contrast "the manifested," or what has priority and superior immediacy and certainty from the empirical point of view, with what has the logical priority and the ontological primacy from the reflective point of view. But now the distinction has been abolished by making the whole sphere of the natural equivalent to the Absolute; in other words, the conception of Nature has absorbed the conception of God. In this way the mind has returned to the standpoint of atheism, so far as the Divine manifestation in the cosmic existences, forces, and processes is concerned. But this conclusion is intolerable to the religious experience.

For religion, I repeat, the Supernatural is God; and all the so-called natural is the manifestation of his immanent Self. How, then, is God, the Supernatural, "over," or "more than," the natural; when these figurative expressions are translated in terms for which some rational meaning and ontological value may properly be claimed? The prefix "*Super*," when wrongly interpreted, does indeed set the World and God into relations of antagonism or mutual exclusiveness. Yet religion certainly

demands for its satisfaction "something more" to the content of the Object of faith and worship than the positive sciences can impart, so long as their investigations and conclusions with regard to the Being of the World remain within their proper spheres. Even the vaguest pantheistic conception of the natural, like that attached to the Chinese word *Táo*, is brought to a rest before the confession: "There was something undefined and complete, coming into existence before Heaven and Earth. How still it was and formless, standing alone and undergoing no change, reaching everywhere and in no danger (of being exhausted). It may be regarded as the Mother of all things. I do not know its name, and I give it the designation of the *Táo* (The Way). Making another effort to give it a name, I call it The Great."¹

The doctrine of God as supernatural assigns to Him both logical priority and ontological primacy *in contrast with, but not in opposition to*, the natural. Three subordinate conclusions—one negative and two positive—follow from this doctrine. First: Nature, as known or knowable by man, is not, and never can be, exhaustive of the Supernatural. In order to satisfy the religious consciousness, in its highest and its profoundest reflections upon the Object of its faith, there is always to be assumed and imagined, something "over," or "yet-more-than," the sum-total of all its manifestations, as inherent in the essential reality of the Personal Absolute. Doubtless this demand has the same origin as that which refuses to regard the essential reality of man's spirit as nothing more than the total "stream of consciousness," so-called. Nature as known, or conceivable, is finite; God is infinite. Nature, as known or conceivable now, is dependent and limited; God is absolute. All the world's beings and events, in all their historical development, do not exhaust the Divine power, wisdom and goodness. Man's world is not, and never can become, a manifestation of all that God really is.

¹ Sacred Books of the East, XXXIX, p. 67f.

But there is a second and positive conclusion which is of greater theoretical and practical consequence. God is the Supernatural One, since Absolute Personality and perfect Ethical Spirit is, ever and essentially, "over," and "above," and "more than," the sum-total of its own particular manifestations. The personality of the individual man even is more than the simple aggregate of its manifestations. I am not able to take myself as nothing but the summing-up of the events that have happened, or are happening, in the stream of consciousness I call *mine*. In some good meaning of the words, I, the person, am "over" them all; I am "more than" are they all. But this superiority of the human Self to the doings and happenings which manifest it to itself and to others, is a dependent being. With God the case is not the same. The human Self is dependent upon nature: this is the scientific point of view, which does not however contradict the convictions to which religion appeals, and which convince us that somehow this human nature partakes of the essentially *super-natural*. But God's Personality is not dependent upon Nature, in even the most inclusive meaning of that term. The Absolute Self is not only for man's thinking the logical *prius* of the natural; He is the real Ground of all the natural; Nature is the dependent manifestation of Him.

For, third, in God, as Absolute Will and Reason, as the Supernatural One, the ultimate source and explanation of all natural existences and events must be found. In the language of religion, He is the Creator, Preserver, and Moral Ruler of all things and of all souls. To use figures of speech which originally expressed spatial relations, the *super-natural* is now conceived of as "under," and "in," all the natural. He is the *Träger*, the Immanent Power, omnipresent and teleological, which must be recognized as forming an important part of the accounting for every being and every event. For every being and every event—no matter how firmly set it may seem to be in that complex and ever shifting framework which we

call Nature, nevertheless bears also the stamp of being at the same time a significant manifestation of the Supernatural One. To be a part of the natural, as seen from one point of view, is to exist "in God"—that is, by the purposeful Divine Will—as beheld with the insight of religion and philosophy, when looked upon from another point of view.

Such a view of the relations of the natural and the supernatural raises the problem of the Immanency and, at the same time, the Transcendency of God. "No one," says a modern writer on this subject,¹ "can form a clear conception of how the immanence of Deity is consistent with personality, and yet we must accept both, because we are irresistibly led to each of these by different lines of thought." On the contrary, only the full conception of a Personal Absolute who is immanent in all that system of beings and changes which, in its historical evolution, corresponds to the full conception of "Nature," can afford the best available explanation of the total experience of the race. As the same author goes on to say, "the gradual individuation of the universal Divine energy reaches completeness in man;"—but not of energy alone, but, the rather, of energy as guided by ideas in the realization of ends. In other words, the "individuation" of the Absolute Self reaches its highest grade of realization as manifested to human experience, in the developed selfhood of man. This is the conclusion with which philosophy meets and satisfies the beliefs, sentiments, and practical needs, of the religious life of humanity.

Can God be conceived of as both immanent and transcendent? The answer to this question depends, as a matter of course, upon the meaning attached to these terms. *No*: if by the very terms employed we mean to affirm conceptions or judgments respecting the Divine Being and its relation to the world which are inherently self-contradictory. Any original inconsistency and confusion of thought cannot be annulled, but is rather made obvious, by the subsequent attempt to unite

¹ Prof. Le Conte, *Evolution and its Relation to Religious Thought*, p. 314.

the two terms in a common judgment of a wider extent and richer content. *Yes*: in case we are ready to take to our confidence the profound truths embodied in both these terms; and, after interpreting them in the light of these truths, combine them in a higher and harmonious conception.¹ This confidence must be gained in the face of the consideration that the terms, "immanency" and "transcendency," are in their very constitution figurative. Nor is the confidence disturbed by the admission that we have no immediate experience which can be transferred uncritically to the Absolute, in order to illustrate just how such relations to the world are realized, as united in Him.

The history of man's religious development, especially when viewed in the light of his reflective thought upon his own religious experience, shows how he has more and more satisfactorily dealt with the problem of uniting in a harmonious conception the immanency and the transcendency of God. In this advance toward harmony he has followed suggestions and analogies derived from a growing knowledge of himself as a person; and of his own changing relations to other persons and things. In its most intimate form, the experience of a Self is just this:—a will and mind somehow *dwelling within* and *yet ruling over*—with a consciousness of superiority to—an animated body. From this experience arises the pantheistic conception which represents the Divine Being as *Ātman*, or *Paratman*; that is, as the Supreme Soul, manifested in and through the material universe and the world of finite spirits. Such a conception does indeed strike the keynote to an eternal and infinitely valuable truth. But the tune played upon it is not harmonious and true to all the most profound and lasting sentiments and thoughts of man. Its failure is due to the fact

¹ Compare the view of Dr. Busse (*Philosophie und Erkenntniss-theorie*) who, while holding to the view that God is both immanent and transcendent, declares we shall never be able to explain how this can be so. But here all depends upon what is meant by "explain."

that the conception of the Self, or Supreme Soul, is so incomplete and inadequate. By providing a more perfect Ideal, Theism attempts to furnish, and thus to validate, if it does not comprehensively explain, both the immanency and the transcendency of God. So often as the conception of God as Personal Absolute and perfect Ethical Spirit gets driven from any portion of the space or time which science needs for the operation of its cosmic forces and cosmic processes, religion brings the conception back and plants it yet more firmly within more extended areas of the world's space and time. And when religious experience comes to a recognition of its own truest meaning and most invulnerable postulates, it affirms that in all natural existences, forces, and changes, God is immanent. The world, which truly and yet from a partial and lower point of view appears to science as a complex of such forces, is indeed his immanent, manifested Will. Its uniform sequences, its laws so-called, and its order, as all these are observed and inferred by science, are the immanent, manifested Reason of God.

This dependent manifestation of an immanent Will and Reason, as known to man, is a process in time; it is an evolution which, so far as the positive sciences can discover its origin, destiny, and significance, comes, we know not Whence, and goes we know not Whither—with, we know not what final Purpose, or Wherefore, to secure its goal. Religion, with its beliefs, hopes, and experience of facts, joins ethics and æsthetics, to discover and establish a confidence in the realization of the ideals common to them all. It affirms, therefore, that the Will and Reason immanent in and through this cosmic process must be conceived of as a presiding and over-ruling Personal Spirit. Thus God is conceived of as both immanent and transcendent. Because He is immanent, we know that He is, and what He is, as manifested in Nature. Because He is transcendent, we believe that His final purposes of Good, which are more and more clearly revealed in the evolution of the eth-

ical, æsthetical, and religious sentiments and ideals of the race, will finally be realized. "All is well," says religion, "because God is both in and over the World." "God *in* all," and "God *over* all," are both true; neither is antithetic to the other. In a word: *It is the conception of an Absolute Self, who is perfect Ethical Spirit, which unites and harmonizes the two otherwise conflicting conceptions of the immanency and the transcendency of God.*

Approaches to the true doctrine of the relations of the natural and the supernatural have been made by all the greater religions of the world. Indeed, the germs of the doctrine exist in the very nature of religion itself, even in the form which its beliefs and feelings take at the stage of unreflecting spiritism. Judaism was especially productive of this thought, deemed by so many modern thinkers "too good to be true." The Old Testament, in its choicest utterances about the relations of natural existences and events to the presence, power, and moral concerns of Deity, although it uses only figurative terms, freely expresses the belief in both His immanency and His transcendency.

Nothing can exceed the dignity, beauty, and sublimity of Jesus' teaching and practical attitude with reference to natural objects and natural events. He always expresses the unwavering conviction that the world is God's world, and the clear and constant consciousness that the "son of man" is also God's son. Indeed, so true is this that the conception of God which Jesus reveals becomes—though only in a secondary, and yet legitimate way—a revelation of the real nature of the physical universe. It is to his doctrine of Providence, as producing and justifying the filial spirit in its perfection toward all the dealings of God through natural means, that an appeal must be made, if the question is raised as to what Jesus thought of the relations between nature and the Supernatural One. The true son of the Heavenly Father may always be so confident of his Father's presence in, and power over, all earthly existences

and events, as not to be disturbed by anxious and corroding cares about his food, clothing, and other similar interests. Let him seek first the Kingdom of God and *his* righteousness, and all *these* things shall be provided for him. For all nature is but his Father's garment, too thin even to veil the indwelling Divine presence; and nothing can happen, which is not the manifestation of the Father's wise and loving Will; or which is prejudicial to the real good of those who lovingly will as He wills. The world of men—human nature, too—is God's child; it is wandering, indeed, in ignorance and forgetfulness of the Father's love and of the natural relations which bind it to God; but it needs only the knowledge and the effectual working of the immanent Divine Spirit to realize that universal ethical unity of man with God which it is the mission of Jesus to bring about.

The task of adjusting this conception of the Founder of Christianity, respecting the relations of the natural and the supernatural, to the facts of science and of human history has, indeed, been most difficult; and it has only very imperfectly been performed or even undertaken. The early Apologists tried to unite the thoughts of Jesus with those of Greek philosophy. They held in general that God created the world a fair and orderly whole for the sake of man. Some of them went so far as to express the opinion that beautiful natural objects are maintained only for the sake of Christians. "I have no doubt," says Aristides,¹ "that the earth continues to exist only on account of the prayers of Christians." It was the Logos doctrine which undertook a theoretical reconciliation between Jesus' faith in God, the Father, as both in and over the world, and the ideal of Greek sages and philosophers who thought of Absolute Reason as manifested in control of the cosmic processes and cosmic events. In later Christian thought the controlling conception has been, as it was in the pre-Christian Jewish view, that God *willed* the world for ideally

¹ Apol. [Syriac Version] 16.

good ends. Meantime science and philosophy have been constantly employed upon a basis of enlarging and more certain experience, in the effort to develop the conception of the extent, complexity, and mystery of these cosmic processes and cosmic events, both as respects their ultimate origin and their ultimate significance. But still, and with no relaxing of tenacity, as Sabatier has well said¹: "For piety, the laws of Nature which have since then been revealed to us in their sovereign constancy, become the immediate expression of the will of God." Or, to employ the more comprehensive statement of Tiele:² "It is Christianity which unites the two opposite doctrines of transcendency and immanency by its ethical conception of the Fatherhood of God, which embraces both the exaltation of God above man and man's relationship with God." Both these statements, however, apply more directly to the union of the Divine immanency and transcendency in human history. How this union may be most fitly conceived as applicable to the totality of the cosmic existences, processes, and events has now been sufficiently explained.

In the interests of religious feeling, two questions regarding the more precise relations of Nature and the Supernatural require further consideration. To regard all human experience in this "wholesale" fashion, so to say, seems at first sight to offend the religious consciousness. For this consciousness recognizes the Divine presence and superintending providence as being greatest and most valuable when manifested in certain select kinds of existences or certain preferred classes of events. These are such existences and events as seem most essential to the truthfulness and efficiency of religion itself. Indeed, there is a constant tendency, in even the greater, more liberal, and genial forms of religious belief, to restrict the recognition of the Divine activity to special cases; and thus to exclude God, as it were, from any immediate participation in those beings and happen-

¹ *Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion*, p. 88.

² *Elements of the Science of Religion, First Series*, p. 209.

ings which appear to have little relation to the interests of faith and of practical piety. In this way, the one world, which should be for faith and piety, all of it God's world, is divided into two worlds, whose existences and processes run on in some sort of independence of each other. God is recognized as present and interested in one of these two worlds,—namely, that in which faith and piety find grounds for their existence and growth; but the other world is, at best, since its creation, a piece of self-dependent and self-adjusting mechanism; if indeed it is not the devil's own world. From this point of view the problem of evil reappears, with all its gloom and weight of difficulties; and with it, returns the thought of limiting the immanency and transcendency of God in order to save the perfection of his moral and spiritual Being. His manifestation belongs only to that part of the sum-total of the cosmic existences, processes, and history, which seems fair and good to those creatures of His, whom he invites to have their faith and hope in Him.

The attempt to treat rationally the problem of God's relations to the world can meet with no more disastrous repulse than the recurrence, in the form just stated, of the distinction between Nature and the Supernatural. For it must never be forgotten that if we expect to base our evidence for the being and attributes of God on our experience of the world at all, we must take the world as it actually is, and not as we vainly imagine it ought to have been. And if we aim consistently to establish the doctrine of One Alone God, having the attributes which relate him essentially and eternally to man's total experience, we cannot proceed with this aim after having rejected from consideration the larger part of this experience. If faith and piety exclude God from such portion of his world as finite understanding does not readily recognize to be agreeable to their ideals; then faith and piety cut themselves off from their own very roots. The attitude of true religion toward the world is essentially just the reverse of all this. It

believes in God as the Ideal-Real; and it trusts God, in his own good way and time, to realize those ideals which He has himself placed and nourished in the history of the race.

Without retreating one hair's breadth, then, from the position which recognizes the abiding presence and power of what religion regards as supernatural in what science calls the natural, and in all the world's history, it is possible to advance certain considerations which tend to alleviate the distress, and quiet the doubts, of a too weak unreflective faith. And, first: When it is said that God is *equally* immanent and transcendent in all his relations to all the world's existences and events, or that all the natural is also *equally super-natural*, the terms are not used in a quantitative or mathematical way. Neither is their use designed to deny all qualitative distinctions in the beings and events that affect the religious experience of the race. Strictly speaking, the word "equality," in its mathematical meaning, in connection with the discussion of this problem, is scarcely applicable at all. With respect to the omnipotence, or limitless power of God, had we the data, we might assume to measure amounts of the Divine immanency, in the cosmic beings and processes. To say that there is more of the energy of the Being of the World present in the movement of the sun than emanates from so many pounds of some radio-active substance, might be of interest to physics; but it would not enlighten, or change the standpoint of, an intelligent piety. God's power is in the radium, the dewdrop, the grain of wheat, the beating human heart or pulsating human brain, as truly as in the moving solar system or in the distant star. For all of the energy which the physico-chemical sciences, first differentiate and then endeavor to integrate under a theory of conservation and correlation, the reflections of faith and piety regard, and rightly, as the manifestation of the everywhere present Divine Will.

Doubtless, too, it is possible to speak of God's wisdom being displayed more abundantly in some things and some events

than in other things and events. But this attempt to measure the amount of the Divine wisdom is likely itself to turn out folly. To intelligent piety the profoundly mysterious architectonic skill of the Divine World-builder is no less impressive,—and it is more available, near at hand, and verifiably certain,—in the evolution of the impregnated ovum than in that of the solar system. Any one can see the former under the microscope to-day; astronomy knows little that is certain about the latter. But especially in considering the history of human events, as bearing on the question of less and more of the presence and power of God, it is well to avoid an unseemly arrogance in one's attempts at measurement. For it is in this history that small beginnings are pregnant with great issues; and that seemingly little deeds on the part of man work out the most significant and tremendous of the Divine plans. It is this fact which gives force to the pantheistic representation of the Being of the World as dealing with men after the fashion of the chess-player with his pawns:—

“Hither and thither moves, and checks, and slays,
And one by one back in the closet lays.”

But it is the same fact which the religion of Christ uses to illustrate the confidence of the pious soul that he who wills the fall of the sparrow is also immanent in, and transcendent over, every event in the life of man. Moreover, the human mind is never so placed as to see what is really great or really small, in this vast, intricate, and ever-growing network of human history. If a dream had not warned Joseph to escape with the young child into Egypt from Herod's murderous wrath, what would have become of the Founder of Christianity? If some chance bird, driven by unconscious impulse or wafted by a momentary breeze, had flown to left rather than to right, would Cæsar have crossed the Rubicon and the Roman World have been prepared for the spread of the Christian faith?

Undoubtedly, certain problems which arrange themselves under the different main theories as to the relations between

the natural and the supernatural, and whose partial solution depends upon the method adopted for reconciling the conceptions of immanency and transcendency, are exceedingly difficult even to state in a way satisfactory to religious experience. How can God be said to be immanent in, and transcendent over, all the processes and events in a world where so much of ugliness and sin abound? As has already been said, this question raises again the dark problem of evil; it can, therefore, only be answered in the same partial and tentative way which is becoming for finite knowledge in the face of this problem. But the doctrine which regards all cosmic existences and events as a dependent manifestation of the Personal Absolute, does not in any way impair those facts of experience which testify to the myriad forms in which this manifestation takes place. The Supernatural, in and over the natural, is no dull monotone which prevents the listening ear from recognizing the other tones that must all blend together to make the harmony. God is immanent "in" different things, in different ways; and God is transcendent "over" different events, in different forms of control.

The faith of both science and religion—a faith that is increasingly confirmed by accumulating experience—recognizes the presence of a certain wonderful and mysterious beauty in what seems ugly from other points of view and to eyes which have less of penetration and of insight. The broader studies in ethics are more and more emphasizing the place which tragedy holds in the moral and æsthetical evolution of the race. In this way the ugly and the painful appear, the rather, as the necessary elements and factors—however mysterious in their origin and incomprehensible in respect of their complete significance—of a system, such as the world is, on its way to the realization of a far distant but divinely beautiful and blessed end. This does not, indeed, enable us to call pain pleasure, or to do away with the distinction between the ugly and the beautiful. But it does lend support to the faith which

regards the means in the light of the final accomplishment. Thus even pain becomes welcomed as instrumental for a higher good; and the ugly appears, as either the imperfectly developed on its way to perfection, or as the humbler servant of some more obviously grand and beautiful object in the vast economy. The lowly forms of life have the place—most interesting, both to the moral and to the artistic sentiment—of scavengers, or scrubs, in the royal palace, or court, or “mews;” they may seem really good and beautiful themselves, when separated from the fictitious associations with which they have been accidentally bound up, as seen by the nearsighted eyes of the superficial looker-on.

How God can be “immanent in” sinful human nature, and also “transcendent over” the world in which sin abounds, is, indeed, the most difficult problem for reflective thinking in its effort so to adjust the Divine relations to this world as at the same time to satisfy the speculative reason and the ethico-religious consciousness. Christianity especially (but all the other greater religions also in some degree) gives the answer of faith to this problem in its doctrine of God as the Moral Ruler and Redeemer of the world. In these other connections, therefore, we shall have abundant occasion to consider the subject again.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THEISM AND EVOLUTION

The discussion of the positions taken by the various theistic theories, and by the equally various theories of evolution with reference to Nature and the Supernatural, if pursued with the intent to adjust the claims of both, requires that we should recall what has already been said regarding the relations of science and religious experience.¹ It was then found that in their aims, methods, satisfactions, and benefits to humanity, the scientific and the religious points of view are, indeed, notably different. In all these regards science and religion are often so antithetic as not to seem reconcilable by any considerations which shall command the fields of experience legitimately assigned to both. In their historical development, too, they have almost constantly been engaged in conflict. At no age of the world has this conflict between science and religion been more fiercely and intelligently waged than between modern Theism and Modern Evolution.

In spite of these facts, however, it was also found that the fundamental psychological relations of science and religion are such as to make it impossible that either should displace the other from the confidence or the culture of mankind. Nor can they themselves be satisfied to remain in the attitude of antagonism and hostility toward each other. For man is one; human nature is at the same time both scientific and religious in the most serious activities and most permanent needs of its complex constitution. Therefore the ideal, and the morally and

¹ Vol. I, chap. XVII.

æsthetically correct, relations of science and religion, flow from that unity of the spirit which seeks the one truth, by whatever paths of experience it may be reached. The history of every fierce conflict between the two contains, in fact and as an important part, a narrative of the attempt to terminate the conflict by the discovery and adoption of some common principle which is discoverable from a higher point of view.

The characteristic scientific tenet of the last half-century is Evolution. The genetic point of view has, indeed, been taken, from which to regard the series of cosmic phenomena, ever since man began to reflect upon nature or upon his own life. That man and things *grow* is by no means a foreign or uninteresting observation for the savage mind. Indeed, for the species to secure good, and to escape evil, it is quite imperative that he should possess the knowledge that both things and men develop, and how they develop. The religious consciousness notes this with a peculiar stress of interest; for whatever grows is most certainly alive, and life is preëminently a manifestation of the Divine to man. Moreover, conjectures as to derivation from the gods, and as to change and increase by reason of the indwelling or down-coming divine presence, characterize the cruder religious theories devised to account for the most ordinary experiences. Thus the history of religious mythology and speculation is strewn with wrecks of childish narratives, or more elaborate attempts to show how, through successive generative acts, or by emanation or unfolding, an impartation of divine qualities to the present world of things and men can be traced backward to a Divine Source. Theories of development, from both the religious and the non-religious points of view, are sure to follow upon any considerable reflection over the most patent facts of experience. And development is even a more important conception for religion than for science.

The peculiar excellencies of the modern theories of evolution are due to their greater success in building upon facts of

observation and experiment; and to the thoroughness and subtlety of the processes of reasoning which have carried them far beyond the limits of possible observation and experiment. These very elements of success, however, have not infrequently served as pitfalls into which their advocates have fallen. This is true even within the fields where empirical methods are most readily and surely applicable. But it is more extensively and disastrously true within fields where such methods are more strictly limited or nearly impossible; and where figures of speech, which have at least a verifiable and definable meaning in biology, are employed to enforce theories of origins and of relations to which they have really little or no valid application. Thus it has come about that scientific (*sic*) guesses as to the method, order, and laws of evolution are not much less numerous or conjectural than are religious cosmogonies or theological theories of creation.

Really admirable results are, however, emerging from this last half-century of conflict between Theism and Evolution. The application of the genetic and historical method to the study of man's religious life and progress has been peremptorily demanded in the name of all the modern sciences. While looking on its alleged facts in the statical and unhistorical way, and considering its beliefs and dogmas as a long ago finished and unchanging but priceless possession, religion found itself totally unable to compete with science in the unequal strife for enlightened credence and sincere devotion. It was thus forced to define itself in the light of the same conception of development. And now, after agonies of fear, urging it on to agonies of industry and sweat, religion is beginning to reap an increase of reward in its ability to defend the view, that whatever the positive sciences may discover about the details of the world's history, the contention of Theism still holds good; for the mind which takes the attitude of a reasonable piety, the world's history is the history of the progressive Divine Self-manifestation.

Meantime, science itself, especially as its utterances come through the pens and the speech of its more mature and cautious students, is growing more genial toward the reasonable beliefs, the purer sentiments, and the more valuable practices of religion; as well as also, perhaps, less sure of its own ability to furnish explanations that shall not call for yet more fundamental explanatory principles, or that shall not themselves seem to include, in the form of concealed postulates, the very things which most need to be explained. By the time, then, that the new science has agreed upon its most approved theory of evolution, the prospect is good that theistic religion will be ready to accord this theory a cordial reception, and to regard it as a grateful tribute to the incomprehensible majesty, power, wisdom, and goodness of God.

At the present time, two forms of evolution appear which, when carefully examined and consistently thought through to a conclusion, stand in distinctly different relations to the theistic conception of the world as a dependent manifestation of God. One of these is an ontological theory, a system of metaphysics, which virtually claims to make evolution self-explanatory, in a form to exclude the unifying Principle of an absolute, self-conscious, and rational Will. This is Evolution as antithetic to Theism. It is a theory of the development of realities, stated in terms that contradict the religious theory of the nature of Ultimate Reality. The other form of the evolutionary hypothesis aims, the rather, at being a descriptive history;—or, if the term is employed with a properly restricted significance, a science—of how the different existences of the world have come into being, and of how the different events of the world have come to happen, in their actual relations of sequence and mutual dependence. This latter hypothesis, or science of the world's development, accordingly makes use only of the more strictly scientific forms of judgment and reasoning. Its formula is: "If *A* is *B*, then *C* is *D*," provided some relation of dependence can be established between the two judgments.

But whether *A* really *is B*, and *C* really *is D*; and whether the relation of dependence is one of actuality;—these are not matters for easy and off-hand settlement, when the object of our inquiry is no less than the whole history of the universe from its conjectural beginning, through its conjectural changes, down to the present time. Our reserve of judgment is further encouraged, when it is remembered that the law and the goal of man's higher and more comprehensive scientific endeavors are not determined merely by the desire for a consistent logical system, but for a better understanding of actuality,—that is, of the world as the race really finds it given in its experience. And this real world does not appear to be much less difficult *completely* to describe in terms of modern evolutionary science than in terms of religious mythology or theological speculation.

Both these classes of theories, and indeed all theories of world-building, whether scientific or theological, may therefore well enough learn modesty and caution from the vastness of the problem. It is not at all likely that man will ever know, however much gain may be made by the race in scientific knowledge or in rational faith, “just how” the world began to be; and even less precisely what has been the history of its development in the more distant times and spaces. Let us, then, be more reasonably agnostic about all this. And let us also remember that the cosmic existences, cosmic forces, and cosmic processes are never to be conceived of as antithetic to, or independent of, the Being of the World; nor are the Supernatural One and the natural many to be considered as belonging to mutually exclusive spheres.

The first of the two forms taken by the modern theory of evolution is, of course, *anti-theistic*; in its most extreme statement, it becomes *a-theistic*. Indeed, in this form the evolutionary hypothesis is simply modern materialism, dressed in the only clothing in which materialism can now hope to claim the attention of minds possessed of even a rudimentary scientific

culture. That the world, as known to human experience, is a development,—this is a conclusion upon which all our positive sciences so converge their evidence as to render it substantially unassailable from any point of standing. Wherever any one of them turns its search-light, there it reveals some portion of Nature—physical nature, including plants and animals, or human nature—placarded, as it were, with the sign “Evolution.” No theory of world-building which is not evolutionary can at present hope to gain credence. Both Theism and Materialism, or the denial of the theistic postulate and theistic beliefs, must be evolutionary.

While, however, this is true, it does not by any means follow that no choice remains of a higher order than that which simply permits the combination, at will, of any of the elements that may be selected from the two-score biological theories already proposed, and the other two-score or more theories of the psychological and historical sciences, which too often avail themselves of biological terms to set forth doubtful conclusions in misleading figures of speech. Nor can reflective thinking over the problem offered by the attempt to reconcile the scientific and the religious conceptions allow itself to be mystified by such declarations as the following¹: “The self-generation of natural law is a necessary corollary from the persistence of matter and force. . . . For aught that speculative reason can ever from henceforth show to the contrary, the evolution of all the diverse phenomena of inorganic nature, of life, and of mind, appears to be as necessary and as self-determined as is the being of that mysterious Something which is Everything—the Entity we must all believe in, and which without condition and beyond relation holds its existence in itself.” That all such conceptions as “the self-generation of natural law,” “a self-determined (but non-self-like) evolution,” “a mysterious Something which is Everything,” and an “unconditioned and unrelated Entity,” are alike untenable and worthless as explanatory

¹ Physicus—A Candid Examination of Theism (3d ed. 1892), p. 57.

principles, whether put forth in the name of science or in the name of religion, it is quite unnecessary to show again in this connection. As long as the quarrel is over the relative values of such utterly abstract and quite worthless conceptions as are confusedly gathered under these terms, neither the man who takes his science seriously nor the seriously pious soul need much care as to how the quarrel ends.

Materialistic evolution encounters, in even more effective form, all the objections which can be urged against materialism in general. As we have already seen, these objections concern especially the assumptions with regard to the material elements out of which the unity of the world must be built; the gaps that have to be filled in, even after the original endowment of these elements has been made as mysteriously gifted as possible; the revolt of man's moral, æsthetic, and religious beliefs and sentiments against the picture of the Being of the World which is constructed in this way; and the acknowledged increasingly difficult nature of all such crude attempts at the metaphysics of physics and of chemistry. "The self-generation of natural law" is not only an inadequate substitute for personal Will, teleologically immanent in the world; but it is also, in itself considered, an inert and self-contradictory conception. For natural law has no generative power, even within the relatively narrow domain to which the idea of biological generation properly applies. It is living beings that somehow carry within certain of their elements the mysterious power to produce, by fission, proliferation, and other processes, other living beings more or less similar to themselves. The "laws" of this procedure are only the more or less uniform and consistent ways in which the procedure takes place. This procedure is in some sort a case of self-generation for every living cell; because each such cell has within itself the atomic or molecular outfit (or what not) which makes the process of generation possible. But it has already been said, that the theory which endeavors to explain even the single cell as a mere col-

lection of atoms or corpuscles, in respect to its unitary and purposeful activities,—of which generation is only one,—loads down the atoms or the corpuscles with an enormous weight of occult, original, and unchanging, metaphysical assumptions. Just here the theory of evolution comes forward and increases the necessity for further assumptions of the same sort, by showing that atoms and corpuscles themselves must be subjects of development. The very elements of things, organic and inorganic, must therefore be not only self-generating but also capable of generating other elements with a different kind of selves;—otherwise the World of things, as we know it, could not be developed. And so sure of all this is the author whom we have just quoted, that he calls Clerk Maxwell's statement—“none of the processes of nature, *since the time when nature began*, have produced the slightest difference in the properties of any molecule”—“an atrocious piece of arrogance.”¹

However all this may be, and it is as yet the very imperfectly finished task of science to tell how it actually is, there can be no doubt that the acceptance of the modern theory of evolution enormously increases the task proposed to any materialistic theory of the world's history. On this point the exact opposite of the customary assumption is true. Evolution does, indeed, succeed in basing itself upon facts of experience. It can at least present to our minds an attempt to unify those facts in terms of a general conception or hypothesis. In this way it greatly extends man's knowledge of, and it deepens and strengthens his confidence in, the essential unity of the world. For it exhibits this world as everywhere moving forward, through countless ages of time, in some planful way toward some distant but perhaps incomprehensible goal. Thus its entire history seems to be penetrated throughout and guided unceasingly by one indwelling Principle, one immanent Life. But such a unitary Being of the World is not “*Self-explanatory*”;

¹ Physicus, *Ibid.*, p. 156.

nor can either the scientific or the religious interest in appreciating more fully what It really is, be evaded (much less can it be satisfied) by such vague conceptions as the "self-generation of natural law," etc. This wonderful new world, with its vastly greater subtilty of physical elements and mystery of new and hitherto unrecognized forces, is all the more in need, so to say, of the help of Theism for its explanation. Only, as a matter of course, Theism must so modify and enlarge the conception of the explanatory principle which it has to offer, as will enable this principle the better to meet the increased demands of the hour. For the world, as we now know it, is much vaster, richer, and more profoundly mysterious than the world our fathers knew. This fact, on the one hand, enormously increases the objections to materialism; on the other, it also puts increased obligations upon the reflective thinking which takes the theistic point of view. In the days of Lucretius, materialism was a comparatively credible hypothesis. But a world that is, as it were, all alive inward to the minutest corpuscle, and outward beyond the remotest visible star, would seem to make a revival of the materialistic hypothesis in any form, forever impossible.

Evolution, as a descriptive history or strictly scientific theory of the world, is not, however, incompatible with Theism. On the contrary, when rightly expounded and docilely received, it informs religious faith on matters which lie quite beyond faith's province and outside the limits of its powers of insight. It is not by faith that knowledge is acquired of the *modus operandi* of the Being of the World. Nowhere, whether in the form of deductions from its conception of the Divine Being, or of inspired revelation in its records of history or of doctrine, does religion furnish any trustworthy picture of the order, or processes in time, of God's creation of the world. This is as true of the early chapters of Genesis as it is of the corresponding records of the beliefs and stories prevailing in early Babylonian or other religions. In all such accounts there may be, and there are, profound religious truths given in the form of

myth, or tradition, or shrewd guesses which anticipate facts and laws not yet established; but of scientific and assured knowledge there is none. It is this conviction which has led the defenders of a theistic view of God's relations to the world, so largely to cease from trying to reconcile Genesis and geology; and, indeed, to accept, if not to welcome, whatever the positive sciences can show of truth as to the history of the Divine creation of the cosmic system of finite existences, forces, and laws.

As a descriptive history merely, Evolution does not move along the same levels as Theism; and therefore the two cannot come into deadly conflict, or even into hostile contact. In this form the evolutionary hypothesis, whatever its subordinate and detailed opinions may be, claims the value only of a narrative of how, in time, the world became what we now know it actually to be. Part of this narrative is based upon verifiable facts of experience; far the larger part, however, has for its basis the conjectures of gifted and brilliant imaginations as to what might have been, in places and times forever inaccessible to human experience. Further efforts, reaching through long periods of future time, may enable science greatly to enlarge the field covered by fact, and better to secure the basis of conjecture. But conjecture must always remain far the larger portion of every theory of evolution that ventures to include the whole world of things and selves within the grasp of its endeavor. For religion, no theory of evolution can ever be any thing more than *a very partial and incomplete descriptive history of the way in which God has been creating the World*. The grander and more inclusive this picture becomes, the more profound and reasonable are the religious feelings of awe and mystery with which true piety will hold it in view; but the more necessary and valuable, in the interest of rational satisfactions, will be the theistic view of God's relations to the World.

While, however, many authorities in modern science are ready to admit that no evolutionary theory can claim to be more than

a largely conjectural, descriptive history of the world as known by man in time, there are others who are by no means satisfied with so limited a claim. The former hold a conception of science which limits it to description; for them science is the discovery and statement under appropriate formulas of the uniform sequences of phenomena in time. But the latter insist on adding to this conception a very important clause which, indeed, largely transforms the very nature of the evolutionary theory. In their view, scientific evolution must also explain "the gradual passage of the simple into the complex, the rise of the differentiated out of the undifferentiated, *by the action of purely natural causes.*" To this view also the beliefs, sentiments, and practical life, of religion cannot reasonably object, if only it be understood that so-called "purely natural causes" —whatever may be meant by this profoundly mysterious term—do not, anywhere or at any time or under any conceivable circumstances, exclude the Supernatural in the sense already defined.

In the interest of its completeness and efficiency as a scientific theory, we therefore find evolution itself explained in terms of postulated entities, forces, and invisible agencies and processes, of a highly metaphysical character. About the nature, number, and relative or absolute value, of these ontological postulates there is scarcely any measure of agreement on the part of the various authorities and schools at the present time. For this reason, and for other reasons inherent in the very character of the experience to which all evolutionary theory must appeal, its metaphysics is a most complicated and confusing affair. Among such postulated but sensuously undiscoverable entities we have Darwin's "primordial germs," or "gemmules;" Huxley's abandoned *Urschleim*, and "bioplasts," or other form of the as yet undifferentiated "matter-of-life"; Haeckel's *Monera*, or "primeval parent of all other organisms," which is "nothing but a semifluid albuminous lump;" Weismann's "ontogeny," and especially that most mysterious part

of it which is "reserved unchanged for the formation of the germ-cells of the following generation." In order so to work these entities that they shall efficiently perform the processes of development, a goodly number of occult forces, some of which are of a decidedly psycho-physical character, need also to be assumed. Such are Darwin's "innate tendency to new variations," Huxley's variability, "determined by conditions inherent in that which varies"; or "natural selection,"—a term which, when analyzed, seems to cover a large number of forces, external and internal to the organism, which somehow serve the common psychical purpose of a preference for certain forms over others. Thus do metaphysical entities and occult forces somehow *mind-fully* co-operate to evolve the unitary being of the world, as it reveals itself to the observer from the scientific point of view.

Now religion has no objection to offer to any of these metaphysical assumptions, which the theory of evolution may find it necessary or desirable to make in the interests of a better explanation of the facts of experience, so long as the assumptions are kept within the limits of legitimate scientific theory. If their value is only logical, they seem the better to unify for thought and imagination a pleasing and admirable picture of the World, which must still, no less than before be regarded as having for religious faith the significance of a dependent manifestation of God. If science succeeds in giving a place of undisputed ontological value in the real world to these postulated entities, forces, and processes; even then, neither the beliefs and feelings of piety, nor the views and doctrines of a theistic philosophy, need be greatly disturbed. And surely such a "scientific view" of the way that the world of things and selves has evolved and is still evolving, can scarcely reject the religious view, on the sole ground that the latter is only the result of a deplorable anthropomorphic, metaphysical tendency!

Strictly speaking, no theory of evolution can be made to

serve as a sufficient explanatory cause, or "ground," of any individual existence. Evolution may give, for every such existence, a more or less complete, but always largely conjectural, narrative of the order in which its different stages have appeared. In similar manner also, it may connect the origin and orderly evolution of this particular existence with other more or less similar existences that are known, or are conjectured, to have existed in past time. But the causes of all this process, whether they lie in the individual existence itself, or in antecedent existences of the same or allied species, are concealed in the theory under such inexplicable assumptions as "heredity," "variability," etc.; or as the chemico-physical "properties" of atoms, corpuscles, gemmules, etc. It is to these assumed beings and laws, or general facts, that we must look for the proximate, explanatory causes. Yet after all, every individual existence—thing or self, corpuscle or star—always has to be taken in the last analysis as a fact, a datum of experience, which can never be wholly resolved into grounds, or causes, that consist in the mere order of the occurrences connected with its coming into existence. The history of this order, therefore, never tells the whole rich content of what the particular Thing, or particular Self, really is; much less does it afford a summary of all the causes that explain just why that particular Thing, or that particular Self, came to be what indeed it really is.

The barriers which are met by the theory of evolution in the attempt to explain any individual existence, are yet higher and more insuperable, when the proposal is made to explain in terms of evolution the sum-total of the system of all existences, through infinite time and boundless space. It then appears even more evident that the very factors which the theory claims as its own rightful and necessary postulates, themselves imply, for their real existence and effective application to the task of world-building, the co-ordinating influence of an intelligent Will. Or, the rather, these factors are themselves only

so many different aspects of the manifested Power, the Will and Mind, which is the Ground of the World as it is known in human experience. Thus the same line of scientific research which leads to the theory of evolution, when reflected upon and understood in its deeper significance, leads to the conclusion of the philosophy of religion: *Evolution itself cannot even be conceived of, except in connection with some unitary Being, immanent in the evolutionary process, which reveals its own Nature by the nature of the Idea which, in fact, is progressively set into reality by the process.*

The whole problem now returns upon us in a more impressive and insistent way. For it is now the problem of an infinitely complex, and indefinitely prolonged, "self-evolving" World. This obliges the mind to raise anew the question: What sort of a world—meaning by this, the sum-total of cosmic existences, forces, and processes, as known, or reasonably imagined or conjectured, can be capable of *self*-evolution? It is this very "Being of the World" which we desire to apprehend; but it must now be apprehended in the completeness of the outfit necessary, not only to continue its existence, but also to realize by a series of intricate and inter-related changes, through millions and millions of years, some all-inclusive Idea. A self-evolving World requires an immanent Will and Mind;—"Something far more deeply interfused"

"A motion and a spirit that impels

All thinking things, all objects of all thought."

The philosophy of religion should, therefore, have little difficulty in reconciling permanently the conflict between Theism and evolutionary science over the relations existing between God and the World. On the one hand, religious faith has only the interest of preserving the rational grounds for that attitude toward its Object which requires that all the existences, events, and processes of the things and selves which compose our total experience, should be regarded as dependent parts of the one planful manifestation of God. This

faith is not only favorable to the conception of development, but some of its most essential beliefs and doctrines require the application of this conception to the experience of the individual and of the race. Without help from the tenet of evolution, the doctrine of God as perfect Ethical Spirit cannot be vindicated against the charges offered by the prevalence of evil; and the most precious dogmas of Christianity concerning the Divine work of redemption, the growth of the Divine Kingdom by revelation and inspiration, and the final triumph of that Kingdom as the realized Ideal of an all-inclusive good, cannot even be stated in intelligible terms. Thus the beliefs, hopes, and practical motives of a religion that is compatible with the advance of race-culture, require the unquestioning acceptance of the truth, that wherever "the earth bringeth forth fruit of herself," there it is always, "first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear."

On the other hand, it is only history and science that can tell religion what, more precisely, this evolutionary process has been in the past, is now, or will probably continue to be. For the question of the precise order, and the exact how, of the world's development is not a problem to be solved by faith. The unfolding of the life of religion itself, whether in the individual or in the race, demands an investigation, conducted after historical methods, into scientifically established facts. And, finally, the picture which studies in evolution enable the present age to draw of the way in which the world has been made in the past, and is still in process of making, stirs to their profoundest depths the religious feelings of awe, mystery, dependence, and worshipfulness. Evolution makes more reasonable those beliefs which attribute to the Being of the World such majesty and sublimity of Will, and such rationality and benevolence of purpose as are satisfied only by the conception of this Being as Absolute Personality, and perfect Ethical Spirit. It is, however, when the history of humanity is regarded as manifesting the Divine holiness, and the redemp-

tive processes which derive from it their potency, that religious experience finds its demands for satisfaction most fully met by the doctrine of development.

Let us, then, for a brief moment indulge the imagination in prophetic insight and foresight, with a spirit that is at the same time docile toward the conclusions of evolutionary science and genial toward the ideas of value, and the valuable faiths, of man's religious experience. According to science, countless decades of centuries lie behind us in the past, during which the life that is, so to say, latent in the Being of the World, has been coming to a higher and more complete manifestation in the history of human selves. All the lower forms of this manifestation, both inorganic and organic, have their value and significance in the process of evolution. They stand, each species, and even every individual in each species, not only for some good-in-itself, but also for some higher good in respect of the contribution which they have made toward the onward movement of this process. The evolution is, indeed, *necessarily* accompanied by, and dependent upon, a vast, an incalculable amount of struggle, suffering, and death. But, from a religious point of view, this "necessity" is not that which compels a mechanical system, like a mill to grind on, regardless of the results produced in the condition of the material that is being fed into it. Neither is it fitly described as a "Will-to-live," that cannot, however, justify itself by an appeal to those highest products of its own volition, which it has mysteriously made capable of passing judgment upon its moral character, and of consenting or refusing to conform themselves to its Will. This necessity is, the rather, somehow—although man can only dimly apprehend, and never fully comprehend, this "how"—inherent in the Good-Will of the Being of the World itself. For faith, now not blind and credulous, but made more hopeful and reasonable by evolutionary science itself, holds that all this necessary struggle, suffering, and death, is the expression of an absolute and perfect Ethical Spirit, whose absoluteness guar-

antees the certainty of the end, and whose ethical perfection will secure the realization, by the totality of the process, of what is supremely worthy of the cost, because it is the supreme and all-inclusive good.

From this height of religious faith the beholder may look upon all of the process of evolution, so far as observation or imagination can bring it under review, with feelings of pity and sympathy, for the cost, but with feelings of trust, calmness, and resignation, as respects the justness of the process and the value of the end. And inasmuch as religious experience leads to the belief that,—

“The loving worm within its clod,
Were diviner than a loveless God
Amid his worlds,”—

it also induces the participation, in thought and in action, in that work of Divine redemptive struggle, suffering, and death, which the very perfection of God makes ethically necessary for Him.

From the same height of faith, too, the theory of evolution is seen to afford a new significance to all the upward striving of the Life that is immanent in the history of the biological series, as modern science so forcefully describes this history. “Death and birth,” said Fichte, “is simply the struggle of life with itself, in order to display itself more clearly and more like itself.” All the lower forms of life, as regarded from this point of view, have a specific reality and value of their own; but they are the more real and the more valuable, because they are the necessary pioneers, and forerunners, of the life of man’s moral and spiritual Self. But man, too—not only as an individual Self, but also as that member of the biological series who has the superlatively great share in the benefits to procure which all the members of this series have struggled, suffered, and died—must purchase for himself, under the plan still necessitated by God’s Good-Will, the higher and yet higher development of self-hood in the society of redeemed selves. This

personal and social redemption, too, must pay the price. The higher life costs heavily; but faith credits it with a value that is greater than its cost. And thus, from the religious point of view, the entire process of biological evolution may be regarded as a demonstration of how the lower soul—

"Grows into, and again is grown into
 By the last soul, that uses both the first,
 Subsisting, whether they assist or no,
 And, constituting man's self, is what *Is*
 and, tending up,
 Holds, is upheld by God, and ends the man
 Upward in that dread point of intercourse,
 Nor needs a place, for it returns to Him."

For God, in his relation to the evolutionary process, cannot be conceived of, with any approach to satisfaction of either intellect, heart, or will, unless the enormous amount of loss and death with which this process seems, of necessity, to be accompanied, may be regarded as only preparatory to a higher, and, finally, to the highest and most permanently valuable, form of life. Such a life is the spiritual life; the sharing by the human race in the fullness of the life of God. Thus all the "travail" of creation, to which the Apostle Paul refers, is introduction, as it were, to the work of religion regarded as the spiritual uplift of humanity. The preface is tragic. The scene of the great drama is itself full of tragedy; but the conclusion of it all is the triumph of that social Ideal which biblical religion denominates the Kingdom of God.

Against this faith evolutionary science can have no reason for complaint; since every barrier is removed to its freest ranging in the fields where either logical consistency, or ontological values, give the law to the hunter and the reward of his success. The World is no less God's World because evolved by God, whose immanent Will and Reason are the fundamental and the final principle of the evolutionary process.

He who is the Ground of its being at all, is no less the Ground of its ceaseless becoming. For it is not with an *alpha* and an *omega* alone,—and leaving out all letters between the two,—that we should spell the title which God possesses to be recognized by any theory of the evolution of the world. From religion's point of view evolution itself is just this,—*the way of the World in becoming, in time, a more and more full, but always dependent manifestation of God.*

The problem which is offered by the conflict between Theism and Evolution, and which is answered by the theistic position so as to include in harmony the claims of both, is not infrequently proposed in a yet more difficult form by the philosophy of religion itself. In its desire to do full credit to the important conception of development, especially when this conception is made to cover the whole world as known in the totality of human experience, an attempt is made to apply it to God Himself. The world is known in its essential nature only as it is known to be in a process of evolution. The essential Being of God is known only as manifested in and through the world. What, then, should prevent us from holding that this essential Being is itself, in its real essence, evolutionary?

The attempt to conceive of God, or the Divine Being, as undergoing a process of development, profoundly changes the whole philosophy of religion. This change appears in its conception of the predicates and attributes appropriate to this Being, and in its theory of Nature and the Supernatural. God, if we continue to apply this term to the World-Ground, is no longer, as it were, inherently possessed of infinite and absolute power and knowledge; He is, the rather, coming unceasingly to the more perfect possession of these predicates. He is not essentially and eternally wise, holy, and good,—a perfect Ethical Spirit; He is Himself constantly becoming more and more conscious, as it were, and observant of the moral principles, which have from the beginning somehow lain dormant in his

nature. A Deity that develops, may be, indeed, essentially Spirit; but the completeness of this spiritual essence must be discovered, not in what He has eternally been, but the rather in what He will in the future become. And if the inquiry be pressed as to the particular form, under cover of which this evolution of the Divine Being is going on, the answer must of course point to the development of the human race. As the race becomes, in the person of its highest representatives, or as represented by the general average of humanity, more truly cultured, and especially more spiritual ethically; this hitherto hidden and unconscious spirituality of God the more fully realizes itself. For it is preëminently *in* man, and *in* man's historical development that God is always immanent. On the other hand, the character of this immanence being judged by its highest manifestation, we are compelled to say that it consists in the way it perfects itself by a process of becoming. In a word, the Divine omniscience must be conceived of as the sum-total of the evolution of more and higher knowledge in the science of the race. The Divine spirituality must be thought of as the increasing, collective growth of human society, organized and guided in accordance with ethical principles, in the realization of spiritual ideals. Indeed, God's so-called *Absolute* Personality merits this title, only because it is not conceived of after the analogy of the individual man, whose personality is always relative to, and dependent upon, that of others in the race. The Divine Self is the sum-total of the finite selves which compose the race, and which are ever on the way to becoming more and more truly personal.

Such a view as the foregoing of the relations which maintain themselves between the Divine Being and a world which is known to be in a process of evolution, has a fascination for minds enamored of logical consistency. Besides this, it undoubtedly presents certain features that appear favorable to some of the more important beliefs and feelings of religion. The latter excellence is due chiefly, if not wholly, to the graphic

and seemingly intimate way in which it presents the doctrine of the immanence of God in all human experience. That the power, cunning, and purpose toward men, of the divine invisible beings, are present in all the life and growth of other concrete beings, is a tenet essential and dear to all the lower forms of religious belief. That God's Infinite Spirit is sympathetically and helpfully present in all the struggles, sufferings, and even failures, of human finite spirits, is a conviction with the truth of which no religion that offers to man "a way of salvation" can possibly dispense. "He knoweth our frame; he remembereth that we are dust." And of him whom Christianity regards as manifesting more than any other the real nature of the Divine Spirit, it is said: "Though he were a Son, yet learned he obedience by the things which he suffered; and being made perfect, he became the author of eternal salvation unto all them that obey him." Moreover, in attempting to elaborate the theistic theory of the Divine relations to the World, it was found necessary to regard God as "co-conscious," and thus consciously immanent, in every act, and phase of the unfolding spiritual life of the individual and of the race. And, finally, any even tentative and partial solution of the problem of evil seemed to require that God, as perfect Ethical Spirit, should be conceived of, not as abiding in a blessed aloofness from the sufferings and sins of humanity, but as the Suffering though Blessed One, and as the immanent Redeemer of man, by an historical process, from his condition of suffering and of sin.

All attempt to apply the conception of evolution to the Divine Being, however, when more closely examined and thoroughly thought out, is seen to defeat itself. It represents the immanency of God in a way largely to render it ineffective; and the doctrine of the Divine transcendency is quite overlooked or made impossible from its point of view. Collective humanity is not a satisfactory substitute for the Absolute Personality, the Unitary Being of an omnipotent will and an om-

niscient mind; much less is it an adequate representative of man's Ideal of ethical perfection. If the conception of God is to serve human reason as an explanatory principle, as a real "World-Ground," God must be conceived of as the adequate *Ground* of this world as we actually find it. But the world, as we actually find it, is in a process of evolution. God as the Ground of the World must, therefore, be so conceived of as to account, not only for what, according to the evolutionary hypothesis, the world has been and is now, but also for all that which, according to the expectations and predictions based upon this hypothesis, the world is destined in the future to become. And in this connection, the development of human society toward the better realization of its cherished ideals must, in a very special way, be taken into the account.

The conception of a self-evolution of God, therefore, turns out to be a resort to the lower form of an unconscious and impersonal Mechanism, or a semi-personal and undeveloped World-Soul, as a substitute for the theistic conception of God as Absolute Person and perfect Ethical Spirit. It has some of the excellences, and also most of the defects, which always accompany the views entertained by the different forms of pantheism. It is, however, in its application to the various religious doctrines which symbolize those relations of God to the world that are most vital and valuable in the religious experience of the race, that this conception fails most conspicuously of affording satisfaction either to philosophy or to faith. Only if the evolution of things and selves, as it appears in history and to modern science, may be regarded as a process of Divine self-revelation, can philosophy and religious faith be harmonized upon a basis of historical and scientific facts. Evolution is manifestation of the Absolute; evolution can never be its producing cause.

In conceiving of the relations between God as Personal Absolute and the process of the world's evolution, the inescapable limitations which belong to all human knowledge—whether

scientific, philosophical, or implicate in the content of religious faith—must constantly be kept in mind. In its doctrine of God as Creator, Preserver, and Moral Ruler and Redeemer, theology has too often striven for conceptions that should be spaceless, timeless, unconditional; and so should represent these relations between the World and its Ground, *sub specie æternitatis*, as it were. On the other hand, in order to escape the necessity of introducing Deity as an explanatory principle, even at the beginning of the world, evolutionary science has tried to help itself out by postulating an infinite amount of undifferentiated material; and this material is thought of as self-existent, or as “left over” from the wreck to which some preëxistent world had already been brought by an evolutionary process. If we inquire after the ground of this preëxistent world, with its “self-generating natural law,” we are referred to another still preëxistent world; and so on, *ad infinitum*. Now this abstract conception of a Divine Being, that may be conceived of in terms not drawn from experience, but as existing *sub specie æternitatis*, and the equally abstract conception of an eternally self-existent and self-generating World, are alike useless both to religion and to philosophy. The only Divine Being man knows, or can know, is God *as manifested in the totality of an experienced world*,—a world that is essentially conditioned upon relations which are realized in space and time, and as an historical development.¹ The only world that science can know is just this same experienced world. To experience God by faith, as manifested in this world, is the essence of religion. To know God as revealed in this religious experience is the aim of the philosophy of religion. Both religious experience and philosophical knowledge are subject to development. But so is evolutionary science itself. Religion, science, and philosophy, all have their roots in the unitary being of man;

¹ For a discussion of the way in which the categories of Time and Space are related to the conception of an Absolute Self, see the author's *A Theory of Reality*, chapters VIII and IX.

and by his progress toward the realization of his ideals, all these aspects and experiences of his own nature are more and more to be harmonized and united as permanent and fundamentally important factors in the total evolution of the race.

CHAPTER XXXIX

GOD AS CREATOR AND PRESERVER

That the invisible divine beings, or gods, have much to do with the shaping and even with the production of things, has been the conviction of the religious consciousness from the beginning until now. Indeed, it is this conviction that gives to the popular divinities much of the influence which they possess, to excite the fears, hopes, and other affections, of their worshippers. Yet the impulse, or *motif*, which leads the mind to believe in creator gods, or in the one God as the Creator, is not precisely the same as that which leads to the belief in the popular divinities. Neither is the development of religious cosmogonies by any means wholly parallel to the development of the doctrine of God as perfect Ethical Spirit and Moral Ruler of the world. The more primary and practically operative impulses to religion have been seen to be the fears of evil, and the desires for good, which lead the sensitive spirit of man toward the invisible and *other*-spiritual Being which environs him. But the belief in divine creation is a matter chiefly of theoretical and speculative interest.

In the very beginning, however, so far as definite information enables us to describe this beginning, man employs his religious belief in the construction of a theory of reality. He asks most imperatively, it is true, the pressing practical questions: How may I so "square myself" with the gods as to save my crops, my cattle, my wife and my children; But he also asks: How did things come to be as they are? Who made the world? and How shall I account for the ceaseless

process of the coming and going of individual existences? It is, then, a most natural phenomenon to find the races which, from certain points of view, are rated lowest, believing in creator gods; and in the generation of men, animals, and things, by the divine beings.

As to the manner of the divine making of the world, a number of views prevail among savage or primitive peoples. Of these the most naïvely anthropomorphic may be called the Potters' or Moulders' view. Thus Tzacol, or the "builder," and Patol, the "moulder," are terms used for some of their gods by the Mayan tribe of Indians.¹ Certain Australians call a similar divinity by the name Baiame, or the "cutter-out"—as of a sandal from a skin. Physical generation, the primitive form of the belief in the divine fatherhood, by associating the creator with a wife who is the genatrix of all things, or a universal mother, furnishes another analogy under which to conceive of the divine act of creation. Under this form appear most of the East Indian myths. But the Bushmen, too, whose material poverty and physical degradation are undoubted, believe in a male and a female divinity, who are, themselves, the invisible parents of visible objects. The Hottentots, whom certain of the earlier anthropologists rated as only slightly above the Orang-Utang, boast, as did the early Greeks, that their ancestors are descended from a god, called Jouma (the "Great Captain"), to whom they ascribe the work of creation, and whom they regard as the giver of all life.

The Hebrews, however, were by no means the only people who early arrived in a largely independent way at some more spiritual conception of the divine method in creation. Among the Zuñis of New Mexico the god Awonawilona was said to have conceived the world "within himself and thought it outward in space." Or, since the word expresses the wish of the mind, he speaks in kinglike fashion and it is done; he commands and it stands fast. But the following view of the same

¹ See Brinton, *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, p. 179 and chap. VII.

people would seem to require that it should be placed somewhere between the second and the third of those views described above: "With the substance of himself did the all-father impregnate the great waters, the world-holding sea." In like fashion the Mixtecs asserted that before there ever were years or days, the world lay in darkness; all things were orderless, and "a water covered the slime and ooze that the earth then was." But by the efforts of the two winds, one personified as a bird and the other as a winged serpent, the waters subsided and the dry land appeared.¹

In similar lofty manner, certain of the native Australians believe that, besides the demons and bad spirits, there is a good god "Tian" who dwells in heaven and made all things, even including the heavens themselves. All another creator god needed to do was to say: "Let earth appear; let water appear;" and it was so.² Like beliefs are held by those natives of Queensland whom Sir John Lubbock classified, on the authority of Dr. Lang, as without any religion. And a strange old chant of the Dinkas runs:

"At the beginning, when Dendid made all things,
 He created the Sun.
 And the Sun is born, and dies, and comes again!
 He created the Stars,
 And the Stars are born, and die, and come again!
 He created Man,
 And Man is born, and dies, and returns no more!"

Similar views are held by the Polynesians regarding the so-called "high gods," and are expressed in their creation myths.³ Tangaloa is worshipped by them, under different names, as the special "head-god" of them all, by whom all the other gods, and men, and all things, were made; though some of the myths attribute the creation of the heavens, clouds, stars, wind,

¹ So Garcia, as quoted by Brinton, *The Myths of the New World*, p. 230f.

² See Roskoff, *Das Religionswesen der rohesten Naturvölker*, pp. 36ff.

³ See Waitz and Gerland, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, VI, pp. 231f., 336f.

plants, and animals to his son Raitubu. In the Samoan creation-myths Tangaloa is spoken of as dwelling "in the pure air," where he "hovered as a bird" and had power over the rest of the gods, who were for the most part his children. Among the Polynesians, as elsewhere, the "high gods," or "creator gods," are not wont to concern themselves particularly about the details of present affairs going on among men. They do not need, therefore, to be propitiated; and there is little occasion for offering sacrifices or prayers to them. It is this relation of the god and man which leads Waitz¹ to say of the Redskins that the "Great Spirit" "stands at the head of their religion," but "not at its center." Of the fetish-worshippers on the West Coast of Africa, Nassau declares "I have yet to be asked, 'Who is God?'" Njambi, or the 'One-who-made-us,' is "the *name* of that Great Being which was everywhere and in every tribe, before any of them had become enlightened; varied in form in each tribe by the dialectic difference belonging to their own, and not imported from others."²

While, then, we are not able to affirm that all tribes, even the lowest in race-culture, have always believed in creator gods, we are able to point to this attempt to account for the coming and going of the world's visible existences by reference to the creative agency of the divine invisible powers, as a natural and inevitable factor in the origin and development of religion.

This view is further confirmed by the fact that all the most ancient cosmogonies are religious in their character and their origin. They ascribe the beginnings of things to the gods; although they nowhere rise to the speculative conception of creation in the stricter significance of that word (a *creatio ex nihilo*). In this respect, however, the more ancient religious cosmogonies—with the possible exception of the Hebrew cosmogony as detailed in Genesis i, 1–ii, 3—do not differ from

¹ *Ibid.*, III, p. 178.

² Fetichism in West Africa, p. 37.

the philosophical theories of world-building which began among the Greeks. Both assume certain preëxistent and unexplained material,—a kind of “stuff” “found on hand,” as it were; they then undertake to tell how the successive differentiations and elaborations of this material took place. In the one case, however, the world proceeds to make itself; in the other case, a divine invisible spirit shapes this material into a more or less orderly system of things. This same difference in point of view, and in the character of the principles postulated in the interests of explanation, forms the principal distinction between the doctrine of theism and the theory of scientific materialism at the present time.

The cosmogonic ideas of the Semitic, the Indo-Aryan, and the other ancient religions, although they differ in details, and although certain characteristics of superiority must be conceded to the Hebrew cosmogony, are in most important points essentially alike. There are two versions of the Babylonian, as there are of the Hebrew cosmogony. In the Creation Epic or “Epic of Marduk” we are informed:—

“There was a time when above the heaven was not named;
Below, the earth bore no name.
Apsu (or Ocean) was there from the first, the source of both,
And raging Tiâmat (T’hom), the mother of both.”

Then follows a conception of the making of the world which is foreign to the Hebrew thought. For, according to Professor Jastrow,¹ “Apsu represents the male, and Tiâmat the female principle of the primæval universe.” Out of the chaotic mixture, where all was darkness and water, strange monsters arose. “Then were the gods created in their totality.” It was the god Marduk who subdued the “raging Tiâmat” and reduced the seething and ungovernable chaos to order and to cosmic form.

“He established the stations for the great gods.
The stars, their likeness he set up as constellations.
He fixed the year and marked the divisions.”

¹ Religion of Babylonia and Assyria, p. 411.

For all this he is called the “creator of abundance and fullness” and “the lord of lands;” for “he created the heavens and formed the earth.”

In the earlier Vedic religion “there is also a vague nascent belief in a creator apart from any natural phenomenon, but the creed for the most part is poetically, indefinitely stated.”¹ Dhâtâr (“maker”) is, however, called “most wonder-working of the wonder-working gods, who made heaven and earth.” In the Rig-Veda (vi, 48, 22) it is expressly said: “Only once was heaven created, only once was earth created”; but this creation is attributed to different gods. The speculative mind of the Hindûs, however, could not rest satisfied with so naïvely anthropomorphic a conception of the way in which the present system of things and souls came into being; and therefore at the end of the Vedic period theosophy invented the “god of the golden germ”—a pantheistic conception. This pantheistic and evolutionary view expressed itself in such myth-making as follows: “The world was at first water; thereon floated a cosmic golden egg (the principle of fire). Out of this came Spirit that desired; and by desire he begat the world and all things.” But all through its history the religion of Hindûism, in spite of its speculative tendencies, furnishes no clear picture of the process of creation. The same thing is even more true of the Shintō cosmogony, as taken from the Preface of Yasumarō to the Kojiki. In some respects this description of the history of creation is not inferior to Genesis. But its differences, and its relatively defective character, become apparent when we are told how, after Heaven and Earth had parted and the three Deities had performed the commencement of creation, the Passive and Active Essences developed, and the two became the generators and ancestors of all things.

The principal points of superiority in the Hebrew cosmogony, regarded as a doctrine of creation, are these three: (1) Elohim *is* in the beginning; (2) Elohim speaks into being all other

¹ See Hopkins, *Religions of India*, pp. 173*f.*, 207*ff.*

things and finally creates man in his own image—*i. e.*, does not generate him ; and (3) Elohim is not represented as developing, or as himself developed out of the preëxistent. It is noteworthy, however, that all the ancient religious cosmogonies, even the Hebrew, begin with some lofty guesses at a truth which forms an important part of the content of religious faith—namely, that all things have their origin in the Divine productive Life ; but they then, on trying to imagine details as to the nature of the process, drop down into the region of tradition, childish myth, or unverifiable folk-lore. This is due to the fact that, as has already been shown, religion has no means of knowing *how* God created the world ; and philosophical thinking had not at the time of these cosmogonies developed so abstract a conception as that of a creation out of no preëxistent material by mere fiat of will. Even in Plutarch's view¹ the original, or prime Creator of the World, only bestowed upon the stuff of the phenomenal universe the principle of change by which, without his intervention and under the operation of natural causes, this stuff is constantly reshaping itself.

The absence of scientific knowledge, and the limitations of man's earliest philosophic endeavors, make all the more wonderful the sublime conceptions to which the impulses of religious faith, joined to those of intellectual curiosity, have raised the mind of certain favored individuals. Renouf, in proof of the assertion that John Henry Newman's "true notion of God could more easily be matched from Egyptian than from Greek or Roman religious literature," instances the following: "The great God, Lord of heaven and earth, who made all things that are"; "O my God and Lord, who hast made me, and formed me, give me an eye to see, and an ear to hear, thy glories." According to Menant,² the doctrine of creation taught by Zoroastrianism was that of Judaism rather than of Hindüism: "The universe is a true creation in the full force of the word,

¹ See *De Defectu Orac.*, 36 and 37.

² *Zoroastre*, p. 191.

and not at all an emanation. As soon as the creature appears, it is to remain forever distinct from the creator." Perhaps the most spiritual and ideally lofty of all the ancient religious cosmogonies is that of the Avesta. Ahura-Mazda surrounds himself with seven spirits who are his creatures,—good thoughts, holiness, majesty, humility, sanity, obedience, purity. He created man for good thoughts, words, and works; and then the elements of fire, water, and earth, which should therefore be kept pure; and lastly, wholesome trees and good animals. All noxious and bad things and animals were created by an evil spirit; but religion is trust, love, and obedience to Ahura-Mazda alone; and over all the evils the good God will conquer at the last.

It was from an intellectual rather than a more purely ethical point of view that the doctrine of the Chinese philosopher Shushi, much later, maintained the creative activity of eternal reason to be the origin of the universe of things and minds. "Before the existence of the heaven and the earth, there was—Reason." "In the beginning there was no being except Reason." This eternal reason is at once the Great Limit and the Limitless. Every particular object shares in the Great Limit, or in Eternal and Universal Reason; but the particularity of each is due to the quality of the force which it manifests. Equally lofty is the Buddhistic view of creation, which explains that in the beginning there was no thing; all was emptiness and the five elements had no existence. Then Adi-Buddha revealed himself under the form of a flame of light. He is indeed the great Buddha, who exists of himself. All things that exist in the three worlds have their cause in him; he it is who sustains their being. From him, and out of his profound meditation, the universe has sprung into life.

A special relation of man to God as creator is quite uniformly recognized by the religious cosmogonies,—even by those of the lower order from the intellectual and scientific points of view. This relation is more usually conceived of in terms of physical

generation, or fatherhood, in the early stages of man's religious development. The most direct form of this relation is also customarily regarded as limited to the divine ancestor, or to the more highly privileged, of the then existing race. The Pharaoh in Egypt was regularly looked upon as the son of the gods;¹ and when the queen was the progeny of a deceased monarch and the sister of her spouse, the reigning king, she was called "the daughter of god." Under the new monarch, however, she bore a title derived from her relation to the king, who is god or son of god; she was therefore called the "spouse of god," or the "mother of god." According to Preiss,² in the Chinese theology Heaven and Earth are father and mother of all things; and man stands somehow midway between this Supreme Productive Principle and the host of lower powers, heavenly and chthonic. When this lofty doctrine of his origin is coupled with the ancient and immemorial doctrine of the Chinese sages, that man is by nature good and inclined to virtue because he received his nature from Heaven, the influence which religious belief has always had upon civil affairs in China is seen to have been, with good reason, enormous. It is environment, especially bad government, which, according to Chinese views, leads the people astray. In biblical religion, however, the doctrine of man's moral fall is incorporated into one of the earliest versions of the Hebrew cosmogony; and thus, although man is indeed a special creation of the Divine Being, and is made in the Divine image, he is at present a wandering and sinful child. Christianity, with its doctrine of redemption, emphasizes, on the one hand, man's low moral condition and need of God's help, in order to realize worthily the end of his creation; and, on the other hand, it exalts man's spiritual potentiality and incomparable value, since all his religious history is to be looked upon as a manifestation, in the progressive establishment of the Kingdom of Redemption, of the Divine redeeming Love.

¹ See Eriuan, *Ægypten und Ægyptisches Leben im Altertum*, p. 112f.

² *Religionsgeschichte*, p. 38.

The religious experience has from the earliest times regarded God as the Preserver, or "Upholder," as well as the Creator, of the world. Little definiteness and insistency, it is true, has been given to this conception of the relations between the cosmic existences and processes and the One World-Ground. The reason for the fact is obvious. Once made, things and selves seem, both to naïve and to scientific realism, to be capable of continuing and upholding themselves. Their "*properties*" are conceived of as preserving them. But the phenomena of death and destruction make a very vivid appeal to man's religious beliefs and sentiments; and therefore destroying gods, or some one divinity known as *the* Destroyer, are readily projected into the field of experience by the imagination and thought of the worshipper.

The attempt to unite in some systematic way the various divine works of creation, preservation, and destruction, was most elaborately made by the Hindū religious philosophy of the fifth and following centuries after Christ. By the earlier date there had developed a sort of pantheistic triad composed of Brahmā, the All-god, the Creator in the sense of being the Ātman or World-soul, and two of the great sectarian gods, Vishnu and Shiva.¹ Of these two Vishnu was originally the sun, and Shiva the lightning. But Vishnu had also been worshipped as the All-god, who may, however, be incarnated in temporary forms. As the "Divine Song" affirms: "He is not born, he does not die at any time; nor will He, having been born, cease to be. Unborn, everlasting, eternal, He, the ancient One, is not slain when the body is slain. As one puts away an old garment and puts on another that is new, so He the embodied Spirit puts away the old body and assumes one that is new."

But Shiva, too, must be celebrated by his sectarian devotees as equally an All-god. He is indeed a "bestower of gifts"

¹ On the history of this development, see Hopkins, *Religions of India*, especially pp. 410ff.

and a creator; but he is also and especially, "the terrible, great, fearful god." He represents, as says Professor Hopkins, "the ascetic, dark, awful, bloody side of religion." Neither of these sectarian divinities, however, could dethrone, or prove a substitute for, the indestructible Brahmā. He could still say of himself: "I am the inexhaustible seed." "I am being and not-being." "I am immortality and death." "I am the beginning, the middle, and the end of all created things. I am Vishnu among sun-gods. . . . Among the Rudras I am Shiva. . . . I am the letter *A* among the letters, and the compound of union among the compounds. I am indestructible time and I am the Creator. I am the death that seizes all, and I am the origin of things to be."

But how shall this puzzle of three "All-gods" be answered, this conflict of rival claims be adjusted? The later trinitarian Hindū pantheism is the answer. Of the Supreme God the Bhagavadgîtâ declares (iii, 272): "Having the form of Brahmā he creates, having a human body (as Krishna) he protects, in the nature of Shiva he would destroy;—these are the three manifestations, or conditions, of the Father-god." Thus, not so much "by unfolding the riches of the one great god" as by "compounding the claims of three gods who were rivals,"¹ the later philosophic Hindūism arrived at the conception of Deity as Creator, Preserver, and Destroyer. Brahma, or the neuter and impersonal All, thus analyzes himself, as it were, into the three personified phases of the World's Life, represented by Brahmā, Vishnu, and Shiva.

Crude in ideas, inconsistent in logic, and mythological in form, as the later doctrine of Hindūism certainly is, it is an attempt to recognize and express a truth of essential moment, eternal persistence, and profoundest import. The world of human experience is a process of becoming, in which all individual things and selves appear as arising and continuing only for a time, and then ceasing to be. Somehow, therefore,

¹ So Menzies, *History of Religion*, p. 350.

the Ground of their origin, of their persistence, and of their disappearance, must be found in the one Being of the World. It is this truth which the religious consciousness postulates in its doctrine of God as the Creator, the Upholder, and the Destroyer, of all finite existences. This truth religious experience finds necessary, in order to establish to its satisfaction the content of its beliefs; and in order to meet the needs of its most profound and valuable feelings. In making this postulate of faith, the religious consciousness sees further into the truth of the World than is possible for descriptive and explanatory science. For it finds the origin, the upholding, and the passing away, of all finite existences to be in the One planful Will which also manifests itself to piety as fatherly and redeeming Love.

The doctrine which refers the whole process of world-building, and especially the evolution of spirituality in humanity, to the active Divine Love in creating, upholding, and controlling all beings and all events, is preëminently that adopted by the reflective thought of Christianity.

In the Old Testament, apart from the attempt at a cosmogony in the earlier chapters of Genesis, no descriptive history or *quasi*-scientific theory of the order and manner in which God creates and preserves the world is anywhere to be found. It is enough that the presence of Yahweh in all the phenomena of nature should be recognized in poetical language, and in a form to stir the heart of man to wonder, gratitude, and praise. But as in other religions, so particularly in Judaism, God is regarded as the Lord of life and death; He it is who giveth and also taketh away. He is also the Lord of Hosts and by no means indifferent to human history,—especially when the interests of his covenanted people are concerned. He comes down and scatters the kings which have assembled against Israel; and when he has conquered, he ascends on high again leading captivity captive. He makes and keeps alive every man; for man is indeed but clay, until the breath of Yahweh

has breathed a soul into him. When this breath is removed by divine act, the body returns to dust. Whether it can live again, God knows; but if it does live, it will be by renewal of life through the same inspiring breath. This idea of God as the creative and renewing source of all life is continued in the New Testament; but it is made more ethical and spiritual, until the apocalyptic vision where, on the testimony of the angels, it is said: "O Lord God Almighty, which art, and wast, and art to come," to Thee belong "salvation, and glory, and honor, and power;" for Thou art "Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end."

Christianity expresses its maturer views as to the doctrine of God, Creator, Upholder, and Destroyer of the generations of men, under two markedly different and yet not irreconcilable forms of symbolism. One of these, although it is not wanting in elements which convey the profoundest speculative truths, is mainly emotional in origin and of practical value. The other, although it also appeals to certain sentiments and is of influence in the religious life as an affair of conduct, is mainly speculative and designed to answer to rational demands. The one corresponds to a conception which is found germinal and growing in all the various forms of religion. As it appears in Christianity, it is of Jewish origin, but springs more especially out of Jesus' consciousness of sonship and moral union with God. The other is not, indeed, wholly foreign to Old-Testament ideas and figures of speech; but it is chiefly Greek, both in origin and in its form of expression. The one tenet represents God as the Lord of Life and Father of man,—as creating, preserving, and dealing with humanity after the likeness of the father's treatment of his sons. The other doctrine accounts for what the Divine Being is, and does, for the race, as due to the quickening and uplifting activity of the Logos which proceeds forth from Him. The creative, upholding, and destroying energy of God is essentially both paternal and rational.

Attention has already been called to the fortunate fact that the religion of the Old Testament, even in its earliest and crudest form, does not regard the Divine Being as originating human physical or psychological life by an act of generation. Man's entire being, indeed, comes from God, but not in a way analogous to that in which it comes from his human progenitors. The imparting of the Divine Life to humanity is conceived of as essentially a *spiritual* affair; although the conception of spirit itself remains all through the Old Testament relatively crude and undeveloped. That God is the Father of men, the Source of their life, and especially, and in a unique degree of the Son of Man, is a tenet of faith which springs resistlessly forth from the profoundest depths of the consciousness of Jesus. It is this steadfast consciousness of living the life that is in God, of being fully and unceasingly one, as son, with the Father, in which Jesus finds the unquestioned proof for the reference of all his experiences to the wise and loving Divine Will. Such a life—constantly re-created as it is from the exhaustless Well of all vitality—cannot perish; it is in the Father's hand, and no man can pluck it out of his hand. Moreover, it is by union with him, in the same vital way, that those who live the life which follows the secret of Jesus, become partakers of eternal life. They are branches of him, the vine; and the branches that remain in living union with the vine, cannot fail to live and grow, for they are planted in God. But this same God is the Destroyer as well as the Creator and Preserver of human life; for the branches which do not abide in the vine are surely doomed to wither and to be burned. This, too, is the law of the Divine evolutionary procedure. This conception of spiritual existence and development for man as attainable only under the conditions of vital union with God, the Source of all Life, is expanded in the New Testament especially in the writings which bear the name of John.

The more speculative doctrine which endeavored to express

both the transcendency and the immanence of God, and to justify the unique relation of humanity to Christ as the Son of God, was derived largely from Greek sources. The Old Testament had imparted majesty, and all the qualities of kingship and rule to the conception of God, by representing him as acting through mediators,—not merely physical beings and natural forces, but also angels, prophets, seers, etc. In the earlier Christian doctrine the invisible and mysterious but really spiritual nature of God, was expressed in similar ways. The first conception of the sonship of Jesus was rather practical and spiritual than metaphysical. The views of the earlier apologetic and Greek development, concerning the relations of God to the cosmic existences and processes, are summarized by one writer¹ in the following way: Christians believe in “a God who is unbegotten, eternal, unseen, impassible, incomprehensible, and uncontained; comprehended by mind and reason only, invested with ineffable light and beauty and spirit and power by whom the Universe is brought into being and set in order and held firm, through the agency of his own LOGOS.”

The philosophy of Christianity had, of course to attempt the problem which is the *crux* of the philosophy and theology of all time,—namely, how to represent to thought and imagination the method of procedure by which the Absolute and Transcendent Being becomes immanent in the cosmic processes and existences as the creative, upholding, and destroying agency of them all. It was therefore necessary, on the one hand, that its speculative solution of this problem should sacredly guard the unity of God; and on the other hand, that it should exalt and make more effective the mediating and redeeming work of Christ. That form of the Logos-doctrine which may be called “catholic” (leaving out of account the dogmatic inquiry whether this doctrine is defensible, or even essentially and permanently “Christian”), was the answer which was given to this difficult, and perhaps forever unanswerable,

¹ Athenagoras, *Legatio*, 10.

problem. In its development three stages, or factors, to the inquiry may be recognized : (1) As to the Genesis of the Logos ; (2) as to the Nature of the Logos ; and (3) as to the relation of the Logos to the man Jesus.¹ A theory of cosmology was to be incorporated into a doctrine of the way of salvation.

The tracing of the development of the Logos doctrine in the history of Christian theology or dogmatics, and the criticism or defence of this doctrine, do not constitute a part of our appointed task. It is enough in this connection that two features of the entire history, with its hot debate and even bloody conflicts, should be borne in mind. One of these concerns the inestimable religious truth that God is really present in the world, and, especially, in human souls and human history, as the immanent and rational All-Spirit ; and that He has set into reality this, his abiding spiritual presence, in a quite uniquely impressive and effective way, through the person and work of Jesus Christ. But the other truth emphasizes the doubt, vacillation, and inherent difficulty, if not impossibility, that belong to all attempts to represent the method of this real immanence in a completely satisfying way.²

Modern psychological science, and a philosophy of mind which bases itself upon experience, distinctly favor a return to the position which interprets the immanence of God in the human soul in the more practical and spiritual way. For the

¹ On all this inquiry, compare Harnack, *History of Dogma* (English Translation), Vol. I, pp. 110, 328; III, 1-50; and Hatch, *Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church*, pp. 256ff.

² For example, the nature of the Logos soon came to be regarded as God-like, not simply by partaking but by essence (*οὐσία*). But the value and meaning of *ousia* becomes doubtful; for it may be used as the equivalent of material substance, or of abstract substance, or of the species or genus. In time this term was made convertible with "hypostasis" (*ὑπόστασις*),—a word which was intended to emphasize *real* existence in contrast with *mere* appearance, or *potential* existence. Then *persona*=a character in a play, or a party in a juristic sense, became the equivalent of "hypostasis." Later *Φύσις* and *Πρόσωπον* came into use.

doctrine of "soul-essence," or "spiritual reality," or "personal substance," which the later forms of the Logos-doctrine embody, is itself both unscientific and unphilosophical. But the essential truth which Christianity postulates as based upon a more profound and highly illumined experience than belongs to the other great world-religions, remains essentially untouched. This experience is that of a spiritual presence and of a moral and spiritual union. Its essence, or reality, consists in just this.

What, then, is the essential truthfulness of the religious doctrine of God as Creator, Upholder, and Destroyer, when critically interpreted and examined in the light of modern scientific and philosophical opinion? This question is answered by comparing this doctrine with the conclusions of the positive sciences as respects the origin, continuance, and cessation of the cosmic existences and forces. In general it may be claimed that the evolutionary conception of Matter is not unfavorable to the essential truth of the theistic doctrine of God's relation to the World. On the one hand, so-called "matter" can no longer be regarded as originally a quite lawless and as yet unordered "stuff," upon which mind must come from without, as it were, in order to impress it with order and law. Its "properties," so-called, were not subsequently imposed as superficial and unessential qualifications for its future work as a world-building material. In a word, the doctrine of the ancient religious cosmogonies, which regarded Deity as an artificer, or worker-over of ready-made material, is no longer tenable. But equally untenable, on the other hand, is the conception which thinks to account for the World's evolution by ascribing to its material, under the guise of impersonal qualifications of most intricate and inconceivable kinds, the necessary equipment for *building itself* without the presence or aid of indwelling Will and Mind.

By all of the positive sciences the World is now known as a ceaseless Becoming. It is, in fact, a continuous process of

change in time; and all individual existences, in their own life-history as well as in their changing relations to other existences, are parts of this process. The process itself is brought about by—is indeed the expression of, a vast and inconceivably intricate network of forces which co-operate by combination or collision, to bring about the result. But the World is not a *mere* Becoming; it is an Evolution, a more or less orderly and law-abiding series of changes, which have a certain ideal Unity, and which are moving forward toward the accomplishment of certain ideal ends. In this Evolution the origin, continued existence, and destruction of all individual beings, things and selves, and even—if this were possible—of the material elements themselves, are moments in the world's Time and fragments, or factors, in the world's Energy.

With this evolutionary conception of the Being of the World, we have already seen that the religious doctrine of God as Creator, properly understood, does not conflict. The essential thing about the doctrine of creation is that the creature shall be regarded as dependent for its origin upon the rational and free Will of God. The only answer which religious faith can give to the inquiry after the origin of any individual existence, or of the World as a whole, is a reference to the Divine Will. But this Will must not be conceived of as blind force, or as an unconscious and unintelligent World-Ground; it is immanent and purposeful Reason, as well as Power, that is displayed in all creation. For God is not compelled to create; neither is He unaware of the causes which lead to, and express themselves in, his creative acts. The causes are God's "reasons;" for the causes lie in the ethical and spiritual Being of God himself. He brings all things and selves into being of his own wise and good will. Therefore religion simply answers the child-like question, "Who made the World, when first it began to be?" by proclaiming its faith in equally child-like fashion: "God made the World; and He who is its maker did not begin to be, but was, and is, and eternally will be." The

further question, "Why was the World so made?" the same faith has the courage, born of religious experience, to answer: "Because God so willed it, in his wisdom and goodness, and for the fulfillment of his own wise and good purposes."

The *time* at which the world began, and whether we conceive of the world as beginning at any particular time or not, does not concern religion. Its answer in no respect alters the relation in which God as Creator stands to those cosmic existences and processes which science undertakes to investigate. As to the time of creation—if by this be meant, How long is it since the present elements of the known world came into existence? or even, How many æons is it since they assumed substantially their present cosmic form?—neither science nor revelation now give, or ever can give, any trustworthy information. Indeed, the whole problem of the *absolute* origin of the world is essentially insolvable; but fortunately, it is of no theoretical or practical importance for either science or religion. Both science and religion are obligated, if they desire to keep within the limits of the known and the knowable, to take the world as human experience finds it. The arguments of science, both for and against the eternity of matter and force, in any strict meaning of the word "eternity," are equally inconclusive. And as to religious experience, it should be distinctly understood, that if God is not needed now, to render a rational account of the origin, existence, and passing away, of the finite minds and finite things of the experienced world; then He is not needed at all. If religion can do without God to explain what *is*, it can equally well do without Him to explain what *was*, or what *will be*. If the present recognized cosmic processes are in need of no spiritual Principle to render them explicable and effective in carrying forward the world to its ideal goal; then they may be left to take care of themselves, as it were from an eternity *ab ante* to an eternity *ad post*. For neither religion nor science can profit by following the links of a logical chain with an infinite *regressus*, under the illusory hope

of capturing an abstract Absolute or Prime Cause, at the end of this chain. Both religion and science should, the rather, seek by insight into the real world of present experience, to discern the ways of an immanent and ever-living God. In this search of reason, the essential reality and logical cogency of the discovered truths are not in the least disturbed by the confession of man's inability to render cognizable, or even imaginable, an absolute beginning of the world at some point in time.

Within the limits of experience, and of the reasonable conclusions from known facts to inferred cosmic processes and cosmic laws, it is the task of the positive sciences to tell when, and how, God creates the particular existences of the world. But religion, acting in the spirit of piety, refers every particular new existence to the rational, wise and good Will of God. By whatever combination of preëxisting elements under the action of whatever so-called cosmic forces, this or that individual thing or soul began to be, it must still be piously considered as a dependent manifestation of the creative energy of the Divine Being. Each thing, each soul, is God's creature; each *status*, or period of the world's existence, each phase of the cosmic process, is God's doing. The philosophy of religion supports this tenet of religious faith.

In spite of the inability to solve the problem of an absolute beginning of the world in time, both science and religion regard the experienced world as somehow completing a cycle of events. The world we know, or imagine, begins in time, continues through æons of time, and will reach at last some goal toward which the entire process of development has carried it onward. In its cosmogony the Hebrew scriptures represent Elohim, who *was* in the beginning, as beginning to create an orderly world out of materials then existing in a state of chaos; as continuing the work of creation in a succession of periods characterized by the origin of higher and higher orders of being; and then, finally, as taking for himself a Sabbath of rest. This idea of God's resting—in the sense of becoming an inac-

tive and absentee God—is not only rejected as unworthy by the religious consciousness of Jesus, but is also rendered quite untenable by the established views of science and philosophy. The *motif* which existed in the mind of the writer of Genesis—namely, to authenticate the divine command of the Sabbath by the divine example—has no longer any bearing on the problem. It remains true, however, that all the resources of human knowledge, now obtained or presumably obtainable, only enable us to paint a picture, whose frame is indeed obscure and expansible, but which always represents only a very small section from the eternal Life of the Personal Absolute. For the physical sciences this picture shows a limited number of successive periods in the self-evolving existence of the Cosmos. For religion, the same picture gives the history of the founding, growth, and triumphant establishment of the Kingdom of God.

From the point of view of the positive sciences, no physical thing, or animal soul, or human spirit, is created all at once, as it were. Its creation *is* its own peculiar evolution; its being *is* its process of becoming. It follows, then, that God the Preserver, or Upholder, in the view of the philosophy of religion, cannot be an Other than God the Creator. In no case of any individual existence, however insignificant and speedily transient in time, does the creative act consist in the placing of something already finished and “ready-made” within the self-evolving system of previously existing things. Indeed, the very essential being of every particular existence consists in its ability to go through a certain series of changes which are peculiar to itself. Even of the atoms, or of the corpuscles which modern physics thinks itself entitled to make use of, in order to give a satisfactory internal constitution to certain species of atoms, we must say that they—each one—have their own peculiar round of changes to go through; their value in the world of reality consists in their continued faithful performance of this task. It is just this ability which designates

the "nature" of the thing. And its more common features and characteristics are spoken of as the "laws" of things.

To piety, and to the philosophy of religion, this perseverance of things along the courses of conduct which make them to realize their own ideas, and to play their own part in the cosmic complex, is a manifestation of God as the "Upholder" of all things. According to this view, the impious man may be reminded that neither he, nor his possessions, can be continued independently of the Divine Will; and the pious man, by the same view, obtains a perfect rest in God. That things keep on existing, just because they have existed in the past, is as foreign to the conceptions of modern science as it is unwelcome to the beliefs and sentiments of religion. For, as has already been said, their very being does not consist in maintaining a sort of death-like existence *statu quo*; indeed, the word death-like cannot be used in this connection; death itself is change, with just as much of immanent force and purposeful idea displayed by it as is displayed by the phenomena of life. This denial of the possibility of any existence independent of God, is a vital truth with the religious experience. Therefore, from this point of view, the philosophy of religion proclaims again the truth that, for the World as a totality of cosmic existences and cosmic processes, its continuance is an *uninterrupted* manifestation of the Divine Will. And what is true for the continued existence of the World as a totality, is true for every moment and every change in the existence of all particular existences. For the flow of the Divine energy into the several currents of the world's life is a steady stream, and it is He who is the Ground of the continued reality of all the system of finite things and finite selves.

Since the conservation of things and of selves does not consist in the holding of them in statical condition, the destruction or passing of the old is as essential to their continued existence as is the becoming of the new. Indeed, the two are reverse sides, or rather complementary phases, of one and the

same evolutionary process. Conservation involves destruction. If, therefore, God is to be the Creator and Upholder of a World which under existing conditions is a system of beings in a process of development, He must also be the destroyer as well. While this is true even of the relatively most unchangeable of material objects, it is more obviously true of all things that live and grow. Metabolism—or the displacement and ejection of worn-out material by new material appropriated from the world's supply—is the essential process by which the units of the living organism continue in existence. By the same process, multiplied millions of times over, the organisms of all living creatures support themselves and continue to be.

The multiplication, conservation, and development of species, is also a ceaseless process of destruction and reconstruction carried on in accordance with immanent controlling ideas. In the larger world of all plant and animal life, the succession and improvement of species takes place in the same way. It is of man, as the most complex and highly organized of all known existences, both physically and psychically considered, that this creation and preservation by a process involving destruction is most impressively true. Thus the individual human being comes to be, continues to exist, and passes away. The history of the human species, in all the forms of its development, illustrates the same truth. Race after race arises, propagates itself, decays, and dies, in order to make way for, or to contribute some needed element to, the evolution of the human race. And in that spiritual kingdom, upon whose realities and ideals the faith of religion fixes its eye, life is secured and conserved only by losing it; the members of this kingdom, and the institutions they build, are ever somehow undergoing a wonderful and mysterious process of destruction and reconstruction. For the King of the kingdom is *the* Destroyer, as He is also the Creator and Upholder. Its law of growth is to become as a grain of mustard seed, or a field sown with wheat, having tares to be plucked up and needing constantly the purification of burning.

Among the speculative questions in which the philosophy of religion has no small interest, as connected with its view of the Divine Being in relation to the cosmic processes of creation, conservation, destruction, and re-creation, are those in debate, from time immemorial, between Realism and Idealism. It would seem, however, that certain factors from both these philosophical systems are needed in order to validate the religious view of the world in a semi-logical way. That solipsistic idealism which denies that the world of things has any reality independent of the finite subject, and which considers the essential being of things to be exhausted, as it were, by the repeated and collective experiences of humanity, would seem to make faith in God as the World-Ground irrational by making the world itself unreal. On the other hand, the Kantian conception of reality as noumenal, or Thing-in-itself, and so forever excluded from the realm of the knowable, considered as an experienced world, is destructive of the ontological value of that procedure of intellect by which the philosophy of religion thinks to establish the conception of God as the Creator, Upholder, and Destroyer of cosmic existences. Any of the several forms of the doctrine of the World as *Māyā*—illusory and like the fleeting shapes of a dream—makes it illogical to regard the cosmic existences and events as a trustworthy manifestation of an immanent, rational Will and Mind. And, in fact, such Idealism has been historically associated either with Pantheism, or with the effort (as in Kant's case) to arrive at the transcendental realities in which religion places its confidences, in some other than a truly and completely rational manner. For a rational and ontologically valid interpretation of religious experience it seems necessary that the existences, forces, and processes of the cosmic system should *have* a reality which is not imparted to them, or constructed for them, by the cognitive activity of the human subject. That *God* made the World—or rather, that *God*, by a ceaseless process of creation, upholding, and destroying, is making the World—is the doctrine of

religion. That the human *Ego* makes the World, and that this "Ego-made" World has only the "appearance" of reality, or is only "phenomenally real," is a tenet of speculative philosophy which appears antithetic to the postulates and convictions of religion.

On the other hand, the Realism which recognizes in the World nothing but the cosmic existences, forces, and processes, as the positive sciences, in however justifiable manner from their proper point of view, are wont to do, is even yet more destructive of the rational grounds of religious beliefs, sentiments, and practices. It is to an Ideal Unity, which is not a *mere* idea, but is an immanent and unitary, real Being of the World, that the highest religious experience of humanity responds. To this Being, this experience, when critically examined and rationally interpreted, awards the guaranty of an Ultimate and Supreme Reality. As the idea of It develops in the experience of the race, the Reality is better comprehended as corresponding to the Ideal of the race. From the highest religious point of view, it is made the Object of religion, as perfect Ethical Spirit. Thus humanity's Ideal is recognized, with an appropriate filial attitude by all personal finite spirits, as the Ultimate and Supreme Reality, the true Being of the World.

As to the precise manner and degree of reality which should be ascribed to the different finite existences, and as to the exact way in which we ought to conceive of the *modus operandi* of God in his progressive Self-revelation, religious experience has little to impart. It can the more safely leave these problems to the various schools of science and philosophy. About their most probable solution, the existing schools, and all schools to follow, during the indefinite æons of the remaining world's time, will probably continue curiously to inquire. The object of such inquiry cannot properly be said to be "transcendent," in the Kantian meaning of the word. Its answer is not, indeed, of such a nature as to put it essentially, and from the

beginning, beyond the limits of all possible experience. But the complete answer is essentially too deep in its hiding places, and too boundless in the stretches of space and time which it covers, ever to fall wholly within the field covered by human experience. Meantime and always, however, the faith of religion in God as the Creator, Upholder, and Destroyer of the cosmic existences and forces can be held in the interests of a rational explanation, as well as of a devout and efficient life.

The supremely important thing for the religious consciousness is, of course, that Man himself shall be consciously and voluntarily placed in right relations to God as *his* Creator, Preserver, and the Ruler of his destiny. With piety it is essential that human life and death should be in God's safe keeping. In order to find the fullest satisfaction for his religious needs and aspirations man must believe himself to be the creature of God, and yet capable of attaining the abiding life in God by becoming his son in a moral and spiritual union with Him. This new creation of man, to which piety aspires and which it is the promise of the religions of salvation and especially of Christianity to impart, cannot be hoped for or obtained as the resulting product of cosmic processes when these processes are regarded as themselves devoid of all direction by an indwelling rational and ethical life. In order, then, to place upon good and defensible grounds the hopes of religion, God must be conceived of as the Moral Ruler and Redeemer of mankind. This special work of the "*new creation*" of humanity, which involves the originating and development of a capacity for spiritual life, is the chief concern of the religious view of God's relations to the World of things and selves.

But the creation of the "over-man" is an intricate and indefinitely prolonged evolutionary process. The origin of spirituality in finite things can no longer be thought of as an endowment, once for all, with body and mind capable of responding to the highest moral, æsthetical, and religious aspirations and ideals. Neither in the case of the individual, nor in

that of the species, is this kind of Divine creative activity like the launching from the well-greased ways into smooth water of a ship that is already full-rigged, fully stored, and fully manned. There is no "common clay" of personality from which the individual human being may be constructed as a piece broken off from the gross lump of humanity. God's activity in creating and upholding the spirit in man is co-extensive with the history of the development of the human race.

In studying the forces operative in the creation of finite spirits, the part that physical nature has played must be everywhere duly recognized. What the natural sciences describe as man's discipline from his environment, in endurance, courage, industry, and in the intelligent use of his powers of body and mind, is, from religion's point of view, God's work creative and preservative of spirituality in man. From the evolutionary standpoint the credit for this is due to the Divine Being immanent in the World; even when the so-called natural forces seem themselves to be waging a fierce and unfeeling conflict with the lower forms of a beginning spiritual life. God the Destroyer is present even here as God the Creator and Upholder. The same truth enlightens and steadies the mind, as it observes the evolution of spirituality in man through the more interior and trying conflict between his lower nature and the higher and more rational powers, when these latter dawn and rise slowly to the place of control. For the ideals which now begin to appear prove to be indomitable forces, that greaten and lift up the whole life of humanity. And, finally, it is such religions as Zoroastrianism, early Buddhism, and, above all, the religion of Christ, which accentuate the conflict between the "world," as comprising those enticements to prize and seek the lower values of which man has experience, and that Kingdom of God in which all the supreme spiritual and ideal values are, so to say merged.

In all this process of the evolution of man as spirit, man himself has taken no unimportant part. For selves cannot be

made from without, or by other selves, but must also always be self-made. Such a view of the origin, continuance, and possible destruction of a true Self, accords with all that we know about the subject from the point of view of the psychology and metaphysics of mind. The reality of the human person is always a development, admitting of different degrees, and having its many conditions and phases as a process taking place in time; but it is also always a *self*-development. To quote the summary of arguments given elsewhere in detail:¹ "The peculiar, the only intelligible, and indubitable reality which belongs to Mind (*i. e.*, the human mind) is its being for itself, by actual functioning of self-consciousness, of cognitive memory, and of thought." And in all these forms of functioning, self-determining will is ever present, as the "heart of the heart" of the human Self. But every man's making of himself is none the less the work of God in creating and upholding the spirit that is in the man.

In some such way the science and philosophy of the mind corroborates the postulate of religious experience. And we may say with a recent writer on this subject:² "The reality of the Ego belongs to the metaphysical presuppositions of religion." The creation of a Self is, therefore, always a two-sided affair. Every Ego becomes, and continues to be, a real person, just so soon, and just as long, and just as completely, as it is actually able by self-activity, as self-conscious will, to construct in a living process its selfhood in this way. Actually to become a self-conscious, knowing, and self-determining will, is an achievement in which this very same developing Self takes part. But this activity is also a gift of God, and it is constantly sustained by God; it is His immanent, rational Will which ever constitutes and upholds this self-hood of every man. All this being which I properly call *mine* is a being in Him;

¹ See the author's Philosophy of Mind, where this conclusion is established in detail.

² A. Dorner, Religionsphilosophie, p. 244.

whether I will it or not, and whether I know it or not, I am absolutely dependent upon him for its existence and its exercise. By virtue of these divinely imparted and divinely sustained powers, I take part in the creation and conservation of my Selfhood. This co-operation renders me a Self,—apart from God and over against God; but at the same time, it is in this power to be myself that the highest potency of my being in God consists; because this is, of all my being, most like the being of God. It is, therefore, the self-conscious choice of, and the steady adherence to, this divine ideal of a real spiritual Selfhood which makes it possible for man to realize his peculiar kinship to God.

Religion maintains that the conflict with evil, and the triumph over evil which is at the same time divinely induced and self-determined, is the supreme good possible for man within the sphere in which he has been divinely set. *It*, and not the successful seizure and control of physical goods, is man's supreme good. But this good is only the beginning of a good which will come to humanity in the form of that "far-off divine event" which is to include all the ideals of value. A life of conflict, and of triumph through conflict is, indeed, the greatest possible good that can be realized here and now; and yet the anticipations of religion agree in saying, in the words of Luther: "It is not the End, but the Way." Thus we are brought back to the thought that man's religious experience is of a process that is necessary for the development of spirituality; and that this particular aspect of his total development is dynamically related to all those other aspects to which the positive sciences give their especial attention. This is but to say, that man's evolution is the manifestation of the creative, upholding, and disciplinary presence of that perfect Ethical Spirit in whom the faith of religion is firmly fixed.

It is the feeling of the value of this doctrine of man's ceaseless dependence upon God, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of his capacity to take a responsible part in his own

spiritual development, which has made Christian theology so sensitive to the opinions of science, and of the different schools of philosophy, as to man's place in Nature, as to the nature of the human Self, and as to the personal relations of this self to the Infinite and Absolute Divine Being. What religion aims chiefly to secure is a rational ground for the ethico-religious virtues of humility, gratitude, and the spirit of obedience and service. But it cannot sacrifice man's relatively independent personality to demands for a spurious humility; nor can it foster genuine gratitude by denying the dependence of truly virtuous character, and of true piety, upon the choice of the human individual. Moreover, the obedience which religion asks, and the service which it prizes, are not of the nature of a psychical mechanism which runs true because it is bound blindly and unsympathetically to do its maker's will. On the contrary, genuine piety, and the growth of all the ethico-religious virtues, are quite impossible practically, and are even theoretically inconceivable, without that constant conviction of dependence upon the Infinite Spirit in which the best humility, the warmest gratitude, and the most cheerful and efficient obedience have their roots. Such piety constantly reminds itself: "I truly live, according to the fulness of the Divine Life in me." And when this twofold aspect of the one life is recognized as somehow forming one truth, and is greeted with those convictions and made to serve those practical purposes in which the interests of religion are concerned, the illustration and enforcement of the details of the divine methods in the creation, preservation, and successive passing-away, of the generations of men are left to science to discover. The reconciliation of the points of view from which these two aspects of the origin, preservation, and destruction of human life—the scientific and the religious—appear, becomes a problem for the philosophy of religion to consider with ever renewing industry and zeal.

CHAPTER XL

GOD AS MORAL RULER AND PROVIDENCE

Those conceptions in which religious experience expresses—although largely in symbolic or figurative speech—its most valuable beliefs and cherished sentiments regarding the relations of the World to God, are dependent for their rational justification, in a very special manner, upon the validity of our ideas of personal being and personal relations. For the history of humanity is understood by the greater religions as a totality which has a profound *ethical* import, and which rests upon a sure basis in the ontological value of *ethical* ideals. This history may, indeed, be considered from different points of view; but as it is viewed by these religions, it bears the marks of some sort of a moral government. When regarded as having an evolutionary character and as being a real advance of the race toward moral ideals, it is at least conceivable in terms of the history of a redemptive process. The very essence of Christianity consists in the adoption of this point of view; its life-history is the progressive realization of the redemption of the race. Stripped of the characteristics which make it an ethical Uplift of Humanity, it loses all its claims to distinctive excellence; failing in this historical task, it loses all right to success in its missionary enterprise. But what is preëminently true of the Christian religion is true in a subordinate way of such religions as Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and even of the better side of Islam.

Now unless God is Person, in the fullest conceivable meaning of the word, and unless men are true persons, in no su-

perfidial or illusory meaning of the same word, there can be no such reality as Divine Government. To be Moral Ruler, in any conceivable meaning of the phrase, God must be something more than impersonal Force or Law, or even Personal Absolute—with no more significance attached to this latter phrase than philosophy has often assigned to it. The Being of the World, conceived of as an all-inclusive mechanism, self-evolving and self-explanatory, cannot stand in relations of moral rule toward individual human beings; or toward these same beings when considered from the point of view of their social development. Mechanism *cannot* govern its own parts, “morally.” An Absolute, regarded merely as personal, *might* be a moral ruler over certain of its creatures, if it chose to be so. But an absolute and perfect Ethical Spirit *must* be a “moral ruler,” in the fullest meaning of this phrase. For this “must-be” is not of the nature of a compulsion arising from without; it is a holy and blessed choice which expresses the essential nature of the perfection of such a Spirit.

Equally plain, though not of the same nature, is the necessity that man shall have attained at least the beginnings of a capacity for personal relations and personal development, in order to be a subject of moral government. Things cannot be “governed” in any proper ethical meaning of the word. Animals may be said to be governed, only so far as *quasi*-personal characteristics and capacities are assigned to them. In the lower forms of religious belief, indeed, little or no distinction is made in this regard between man and the lower animals. Some of the latter are readily imagined to be upon preferred terms of a political and social order with the divine beings; certain animals are more nearly allied to the divine nature than are some men. But in the more sober reflections of the ethically developed religions, it is man, as god-like in his personal being and as having the capacity for a moral and spiritual development, who is the favored, if not the sole, subject of the moral rule of God.

It is just at this point, however, that the philosophy of religion encounters some of its most persistent and, in certain respects, insurmountable difficulties. Therefore, a return to impersonal, or to imperfectly personal, or to mystical and pantheistic conceptions of God, of humanity, and of the relations between the two, so often occurs at this point. We have already found frequent occasion to remark how the *modus operandi* of the immanent agency of a personally transcendent God is the problem which forms the *crux* for all the schools of religious philosophy. It is in the case of man, however, that this problem becomes at the same time most important, most sensitive to any rude handling of its various faces, and most expressive of religious experience. God is Absolute Person and perfect Ethical Spirit; only as such can he be the Moral Ruler and Redeemer of man. Personal relations, therefore, must be established and maintained between God and man; otherwise there can be no such thing as moral government.

But how can Absolute and Infinite Personality coexist with a multiplicity of real finite personalities; and, more particularly, how can other than merely seeming and illusory personal relations exist between the two? The One Self must, we are told, be absolute and infinite, in order to deserve the predicates and attributes, which belong to God. The many selves have their limited and conditioned existences as parts of the world, only because they, too, are dependent manifestations of God. Their life, which appears to themselves and to one another, as at least partially that of an independent self-being and self-development, is, after all, in reality only their being in God, and their continuing to be by the ceaselessly creative and unholding Will of God. How shall such relations be realized in consistency with the demands of religious experience? This is the problem which underlies every theory of the divine government of the world. Religion answers the problem with its conception of God as perfect Ethical Spirit, immanent in human history as man's moral Ruler and Redeemer, and op-

erating in the totality of human experience as Providence; and in the form of revelation and inspiration.

At the stage of the discussion already reached, little more is necessary than to refer to the conclusions of the previous chapters, respecting the predicates and attributes of Divine Being, concerning Nature and the Supernatural and concerning the immanence and the transcendence of God. It has already been shown that by the infinity of the Divine Being the philosophy of religion does not understand the all-comprehending nature of this Being in any merely quantitative or *quasi*-mathematical fashion. It can scarcely be too often remembered that the relations of the Infinite One to the finite many are not to be worked out like sums in arithmetic or geometry; neither are they to be adequately symbolized by terms of calculus or quaternions. And as for "*the Absolute*," in the meaning of "the Unrelated," or Unknowable "Thing-in-Itself," we have once for all relegated this lifeless abstraction to the "death-kingdom" of barren and negative ideas. Nor is any one of the predicates or moral attributes of God so to be conceived of as to exclude the possession by man of the same predicates and moral attributes in his own limited and imperfect way. God's *omni*-potency does not prevent human beings from the possession, or the progressive realization, of just so much, and such kind of potencies as are in fact their own. On the contrary, the former is the real ground and guaranty of the latter. God's *omni*-presence in no way interferes with my being to myself here-and-now present; or with the presence of other things and selves then-and-there.¹ Nor, again, does the divine *omni*-science make any man less wise or less foolish than he really is.

With the sentiment which ascribes all human goodness to a Divine Source, the pious soul has been familiar in all re-

¹ Most of the difficulties and antinomies which have characterized both orthodox theology and pantheistic philosophy upon these points, come from a thoroughly mistaken psychology and metaphysics of the Self.

ligions, and among all peoples, that have reached a certain stage of race-culture. "God be praised;" and "To God be the glory;"—these are exclamations of the most mature religious experience in view of all the triumphs of truth and righteousness over conflicting forces; or at the discovery of what is true and good in unexpected places, and in extraordinary degree. But these same individuals and peoples whose language abounds in such phrases, are, above all others, those which are also most ready to admit the reality of human responsibility, as well as the justice of the divine discipline and retribution, even when it bears most heavily upon themselves. With this sentiment goes the more or less instinctive or highly intelligent shrinking which piety feels, from regarding God as the author of evil—especially of that evil which the ethico-religious consciousness regards as sin. The spirit of piety is unwilling, even in the interests of a logical consistency, to bring any taint of unwisdom or moral obliquity upon the perfection of that Ethical Spirit which is the Reality of religion's most precious Ideal.

It appears, then, that the problem of man's moral freedom, and the yet larger problem of moral evil, are both involved in the effort to imagine how strictly moral relations can exist between an Absolute and Infinite Person and a multitude of finite and dependent personalities. The discussion of the problem which underlies the religious doctrine of the Divine Government of the World, therefore, soon meets with difficulties of a sort that cannot be wholly removed. This fact may be admitted without argument. Such an admission, however, is far from the conclusion that the intrinsic nature of these problems furnishes a legitimate ground for charging human reason with hopeless and inescapable internal contradictions.

Contradictions between human freedom and the ethically perfect government of an Absolute Person exist only when, either on the one hand the self-determination of the human will is understood in a too mechanical fashion; or, on the other hand, the action of the Divine Will upon the human will is conceived

of in too absolute fashion.¹ But a relation of wills is *intrinsically not* of a mechanical character; all figures of speech taken from mechanical relations as subject to quantitative measurements fly wide of the mark, when directed to this relation. This is no more true, and is scarcely any less true, when the wills of two finite selves are under consideration. How I can, by willing, influence another will, may be to me a mystery; it may remain a mystery for all human thinking, until the end of time. But that it is so, and that its being so, does not destroy the consciousness of moral freedom or impair the entire fabric of human society which is built upon this consciousness, remains no less a fact of experience. The fact of self-activity, culminating in the choice of ideal ends—which fact, however, and also all realization of those ideal ends, are dependent upon the influence and inter-action of wills—appears to be an experience beyond which we cannot go. I choose, and I assert my self-active and independent being by my choice; but I choose as a being, dependent upon and environed by, other beings in the One Being of the World. I will to influence others, as myself a will; but in this willing, I acknowledge and I realize my debt of influence received from others.

A yet more fundamental examination of this problem of moral freedom, from the point of view of a philosophy of knowledge, shows that the mysterious character of the ultimate facts involved is not so essentially different from that mystery which eludes all attempts at investigation, because it marks the limits of the knowable. Physical science explains all the transactions which occur in the world of its experience by referring them to interdependent and mutually related self-active beings. *This related self-activity is the ultimate and the forever inexplicable fact.* It is mysterious and inexplicable, not because it contradicts other facts, which are, like it, based upon experience; nor yet because it is essentially antinomic

¹ See the discussion in the Chapter on Moral Freedom in the author's *Philosophy of Conduct*.

and self-contradictory. On the contrary, it is the ultimate fact on which, as fact, science builds itself up; as does also all ordinary and practical knowledge. It is mysterious, because it is ultimate fact; and as fact, it is the basis of all knowledge. Things, that are "*mere things*," are supposed to be neither conscious of their self-activity, nor of their relations in fact to other things; nor of the reasons why they should act as they do, or why they should act at all. Mere things cannot, therefore, choose to act this way rather than some other; they cannot see why they should, or will that they should, act in any way at all. But it is distinctive of selves that they do see, to some extent at least, why they act; they do, at least sometimes, very deliberately choose how they will act. More especially it is distinctive of selves, in the higher stages of personal life, that certain ethical, æsthetical, and religious ideals arise in their field of consciousness; and that they may choose either to pursue, or to refuse to pursue, these ideals. It is in this field of rational apprehension, of choice, and of practical activities, that the highest attainments of moral freedom lie.

That men may choose, and may be influenced to choose, and may influence others to choose, the life whose ideal is a moral and spiritual union with God, is an undoubted fact of religious experience. The *modus operandi* of this choice, and of the relations between God's will and man's will which the choice implies, may have the insolvable mystery of ultimate facts of relation between self-active wills. But this is quite a different thing from saying that the relation in fact is, from the rational point of view, antinomic and self-contradictory.

The claim, therefore, that the absoluteness of the Divine Will necessarily excludes all finite wills from any manner, or measure, of moral freedom is based upon a complete misapprehension of the fundamental nature of the relation between wills. This is as true, when the misapprehension affects the religious conception of God, as it is when the same misapprehension results in the dogmatic or agnostic denial of the Being

of God. The theology of Islam and even of Christianity has wrought as much mischief here as atheism has. A God whose infinite and absolute sovereignty is so conceived of as to reduce to nothingness the personal being of man, can no more be made tolerable to reason as a *moral* Ruler than can a self-explanatory, self-contained and self-developing mechanism. To purchase the omnipotence and omniscience of Deity at the expense of his wisdom, and of the moral attributes of justice and love, is the worst sort of a bargain which religion can possibly make.

Moreover, to deny the possibility of full personal relationship between God and man—in which God's holy Will is absolute, and man's dependent but limited personal freedom is actual and effective—is really to deny the divine omnipotence. Speaking anthropomorphically, one may safely declare that the Divine Wisdom can find a way, if the Divine Being wills it, to have its own Will perfectly, and at the same time to let other beings have so much of their wills as it seems wise and good for them to have. Beyond this, the religious conception of God as Moral Ruler requires no postulates with regard either to the absoluteness of the Divine Will, or to the independent and free wills of the subjects of his rule. But to imagine that this conception impairs the foreknowledge of God, or jeopardises the fulfilment of his purposes, is to conceive of omniscience as a species of uncertain calculation, and of the development of God's Kingdom as a complex of incidental and chance occurrences.

When human reason, under the compulsions of its inherent demand the better to understand the Being of the World, and through the enticements and needs of the higher æsthetic, ethical, and religious sentiments, has once framed the conception of God as perfect Ethical Spirit, then the inherent, rational necessity for conceiving of the history of humanity as under the divine moral rule becomes obvious. In no other way than as the Creator, Upholder, and Distributor of the des-

tiny of personal beings in the furtherance of ethical ideals can the perfection of ethical spirit exist, or maintain, or express itself. An *ethical* spirit is essentially a *social* spirit. Were there no other selves in his universe, then the Absolute Self could not be perfect Ethical Spirit.

It is scarcely needful again in this connection, however, to revive the answer to the antiquated and worn-out objection, that such a view makes God dependent upon others for his being what he really is. For the answer to the objection, whenever made, must be always the same. The Absolute that God is, is not the Unrelated, but the Ground of all relations. The compulsion to be the Father of spirits has its source in the Fatherhood of God Himself; just as the necessity to redeem and to develop spiritually his many sons, springs from the exhaustless fountain of the Divine Love.

Man's personality, then, with all the so-called freedom of will which it implies, is to be considered from the point of view of religion as the gift of God. This gift God can make, because he is omnipotent; this gift he has made, in the way in which his omniscience provides, and which is illustrated by all our experience of personal relations. Its profounder "mode of operation" lies hidden from human sight. But the rational *motif* and final purpose of all that Divine governance, under whose control the evolution of humanity takes place, must be found in that perfection of Spirit which God is.

Such a view of God as Moral Ruler is certainly most consonant with the beliefs and sentiments of the highest religious experience. And if psychology and metaphysics would only cease from trying to show that, much which really is, cannot possibly be; and how things are not, as they really are; or how they are, as they really are not; then this view would seem to science and philosophy, if not without its mysteries, at least as rational as any other view. And, indeed, the religious is the more rational of the several views proposed. The guardianship of the ethical interests concerned in the answer

to the problem of the *quasi*-moral relations between man and the Being of the World, both a scientific materialism and a mystical pantheism seem incompetent to secure. To quote what has been said in other connections: ¹ "The attempt to construe the World-Ground in a so-called scientific and totally impersonal way tends always to minimize the authority and value of personal life. A bubble rising, briefly remaining, and then soon bursting upon the surface of Nature's boundless sea, seems scarcely worth the attention which the study of the Moral Self of man, and of his rising moral Ideals urges us to bestow. But a single child of God may surely be held to have no small potential value. And to believe that what is done for one—whether that be one's self or some other one—is somehow done for all, and that the Ethical Spirit in whom all have their life and being is the Source and Guarantor of the moral interests of all, can scarcely fail to assist in both the theoretical and the practical solution of the antithesis between the egoistic and altruistic virtues so called."

If, however, the search for philosophy's answer to this problem is turned in another direction, it appears that "the oneness of man in God" has not infrequently been so taught by the metaphysics of ethics as to do away with all intelligible apprehension of the nature and grounds of morality itself. I am *one* person,—in my moral Selfhood exclusive of all other personality and individually responsible in a very real and significant way. *My* morality is my own; there is no reality answering to the term the "Social Self," but the morality of each Moral Self is ever an individual and concrete affair. The moral self of every human being is, indeed, peculiarly lonely. A metaphysics of ethics, which either alienates the attribution of good and bad conduct to the individual, or which merges it all together in the Universal Person, is above all forms of the solution of this problem most to be avoided and dreaded. Such a method of reconciling moral antitheses cuts morality up by the

¹ See the author's *Philosophy of Conduct*, p. 633f.

very roots. It breaks the force of the practical maxim: "Stand up, and take your full share of the blame for the world's evil, like a man."

None the less, however, it is necessary to emphasize the social nature of morality, and the amelioration which all moral conflicts receive from the religious doctrine of the Fatherhood of God, and of the membership of all men in the one divine family. All finite spirits derive their being from One Ethical Spirit; the sons of men are also sons of God. From this point of view, the hard and sharp antithesis between the so-called egoistic and the so-called altruistic duties softens and seems to melt away. If any one Self in its conduct, strives to conserve and promote the moral interests of its better Self; then this is done by it, as one of the members of the divine family and with their interests as truly as its own, at heart. In all such devotion to others—to consider the individual's conduct from the other and reverse point of view—the Self is realizing its own ideal of the morally most worthy Self. Thus the "suffusion of vague personality" which everywhere appears in the study of ethical phenomena is made to crystallize into a definite doctrine of a personal Ground for all these phenomena. The distinction between persons (whether human or divine) is not abrogated; the rather is it emphasized and elevated.

In the light of this anticipatory survey of objections, which is borrowed from the metaphysics of ethics, reference to the nature of the historical development of the belief of man in the divine moral government becomes more suggestive and even convincing. In defining the nature of religion it was seen¹ that, even when taken at its lowest terms, it embraces the belief in some sort of a rule of the invisible spiritual powers, or the gods, over human affairs. The conception of sin, or of wrongdoing as contrary to the will of the gods, is, of course, an adjunct to the development of the conception of their moral rule. Thus "in Tahiti sickness was the occasion for making

¹ Compare Vol. I, pp. 455ff.

reparation for past sins, *e. g.*, by restoring stolen property.”¹ In Peru, in the time of the Incas, “when any general calamity occurred, the members of the community were rigorously examined, until the sinner was discovered and compelled to make reparation.” Hence among the “more advanced races,” in addition to various means of exorcism, “a method of aiding in the cure of disease was found in the confession of sins.”²

It is true that we may direct attention, as Tiele has done,³ to a later difference arising between the “theanthropic” and the “theocratic” religions so-called. But this author himself explains:⁴ “We therefore only mean that one of the two families (Aryan and Semitic) develops more in the theocratic, the other in the theanthropic direction.” Even with this explanation the difference is not so great as it at first sight appears; for with those peoples who dwell most upon the theocratic side, the conception of fatherhood, and of allied domestic relations, is bound up with the conception of God as sovereign, king, or ruler under some other kindred term. The king is also, in some sort, the father of his subjects. On the other hand, even in the title of Father and Mother as applied to Deity by the Rig Veda, or by the Avesta (where Ahura-Mazda is frequently called “Father”), or by the Greeks and Romans, the idea of control and rulership is always included. Indeed, the conception of *patria potestas* as held by the entire ancient world emphasized the authority of paternal government in the family. In a word, in all these religions the theocratic idea, or the assumption that the gods have to do with the control of human affairs, seems present, although in varying degrees. Even in those cases where the invisible powers are thought of as existent, but not as meddling with mundane

¹ See Waitz and Gerland, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, VI, p. 396.

² Compare Dorman, *Origin of Primitive Superstitions*, p. 57f.

³ *Elements of the Science of Religion*, First Series, Lecture VI.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

matters, they still rule, as it were, by proxy, or through the order which they have previously established.

This conception of a theocratic government of human affairs, like every other conception of ethics and of religion, grows from crude beginnings to higher degrees of purity and of influence over conduct. This is even true of those developments which are more likely—as, for example, the ethico-religious ideas and ideals of the Greeks—to be classed as distinctly “theanthropic.” Indeed, the Greek conceptions of *Moirā* or Fate, and *Anangkê* or Necessity, vacillate in their meaning;—sometimes being equivalent to what the gods have themselves decreed, sometimes being represented as a sort of impersonal Power superior to the gods themselves. On the other hand, again, the man-like divinities either preside over human beings, in the person of some deified man who is for the time being the appointed ruler of the people; or else some one god, as is fitting in matters of government, holds the supreme control; or, again, as in the Homeric period, the gods have a sort of confederated government and rule by council with one another, or by intriguing against one another, after the fashion of an Oriental court, or of the gathering of the clans in some Occidental country.

Indeed, among the Greeks, the very idea of moral order and government, in its more rational and absolute form, developed only in a pretty constant relation to religious ideas. All things were, it is true, early conceived of as coming under the ordering power of “number;” in this way they were invested with a sort of rational necessity.¹ All things happened as they were allotted to men by destiny; the gods themselves had their positions assigned to them; the dark impersonal shadow of necessitated Fate hung over the throne of Zeus himself. But even this impersonal rule contained the factors of an assured and perfect world-order; and essentially considered, it resembled the ideal of a rationally ordained Law rather than a blind

¹ Compare Plutarch, *De Plac. Phil.*, I, 25–28.

and irrational Fate. For the World was also conceived of as a social whole; and in it there were gods and men, both truly personal,—the former as rulers and the latter as citizens and subjects. According to Epictetus, for example, Zeus, who was somehow bound so that he could not make the body or the possessions of Epictetus to be as they would have been, had Zeus been unhindered, nevertheless had given to the philosopher a share in his Divine Self. This share consisted in “the power of making or not making effort, the power of indulging or not indulging desire; in short, the power of dealing with all the ideas of the mind.” In a word: God must not be conceived of as the source of disorder or as setting aside the rational system of things; and yet he has given to man that best gift of free and rational being, in order that man, being like God, might prefer the same supreme good which God himself prefers. Thus the Stoic philosopher nearly, but not quite, caught the Christian idea of the divine moral rule over mankind.

In the most theocratic of the monotheistic religions, and in the religions which arise under monarchical conditions, even before they become distinctly monotheistic, Deity is regarded as a sovereign whose judgment cannot be questioned and whose will must be unhesitatingly obeyed. Human conduct must, on account of the essential relations existing between the Divine Person and finite persons, be regulated according to divine ideas of right and wrong. And it is well for man to have it actually so. For Deity, like any earthly sovereign, does not brook resistance to its rule. Thus, in the conception of the most ancient Chinese religious doctrine, the sovereignty of Heaven under the title of Shang-Ti, or Supreme Lord, however impersonally conceived of in other respects, enforces a strict moral government over human affairs. Indeed, so fundamental and so thoroughly inwrought into the entire political and social structure of China is this doctrine of the ethical rule of Heaven, that nothing concerning the history of the people in the past or

their better thoughts in the present, can be understood without taking it into the account. In the ancient Babylonian and Syrian religions, too, the sovereign rule of God is made prominent. In the hymns of Babylonia¹ Deity is addressed as "Father Nannar" (or "Illuminator"), as "powerful One," "merciful One," "Ruler of the Land," etc.; over and over again is reference made to his "strong command;" and it is declared, "Lord, in heaven is thy sovereignty, on earth is thy sovereignty." The extreme of this type of conception of the divine government is reached in Islam, where, although the thought of the essential good of a moral and spiritual likeness to the perfection of God as Ethical Spirit is not wholly disregarded, submission to the fateful and all-powerful will of Allah is made the essence of all religion. "Thus Allah wills," becomes the sufficient reason for all occurrences, the sufficient excuse for all failures and lapses. This irresistible Will of Allah rules autocratically; and Muhammadan literature abounds with both serious and facetious illustrations of what comes to those mortals who try to do things, whether Allah will, or no.

We have already had frequent occasion to note the changes in the moral and social ideas and practices of any people, which logically and necessarily accompany the growing conviction that the gods are good and righteous; and which culminate in the belief that Deity is perfect Moral Reason, and is therefore worthy to set the ideal standard of morality for men. In this Ideal of a rational and ethical Spirit, the longings of mankind to believe in Providence and the sinking of soul toward despair before the conception of Destiny, are peacefully reconciled. God now becomes the source, the pattern and the guardian of righteousness. His Will is now conceived of, not wholly, or even chiefly, as omnipotent and omniscient, but as good and gracious Will. The so-called moral law loses its im-

¹ See, for example, the Hymn to Sin, as given in Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, p. 303/.

personal character. The awareness of having somehow gone wrong, becomes the consciousness of sin; and this begets a feeling of separation in spirit and ideals from that One Self in moral likeness to whom, and in vital spiritual union with whom, all man's highest good must forever consist.

This conception of God as moral ruler it is which the religion of Christ sustains; although the current Christianity has only very imperfectly conserved it, and still largely and criminally neglects the endeavor to realize it for the regulation of human affairs. By common consent it is to Judaism, among all the ancient religions, that the great distinction must be accorded of having most highly developed the conception of the divine rule in righteousness. The few pious ones of this wonderful people, in spite of all the temptations to distrust which come from seeing the prosperity of wickedness and the distress and temporary discomfiture of goodness, still clung to the persuasion that the rule of Yahweh followed an eternally unchangeable and supremely worthy end. The reasons why the divine purpose failed of a fuller and more nearly perfect realization were to be found in the unfaithfulness of man. In feeling the responsibility for this failure it was then, as it ever has been, not the careless but the most pious souls which took upon themselves their more than full share. To the piercing questions: "Art thou He who hast created all things?" "Art thou the Almighty who governest all things and rulest over all things?" their faith could give only an affirmative reply. And when the facts seem more than usually contradictory of this reply, their confession is made with bowed heads: "Behold I am vile, what shall I answer Thee? I will lay my hand upon my mouth."

The faith in the perfection of the Divine rule, and in the final triumph of righteousness, which is necessarily so faint and vacillating when based upon *purely* empirical considerations, becomes a steadfast conviction when the highest notes of religious experience are sounded in the soul. For God as Provi-

dence is "the hope of courage, not the pretext of cowardice." This view which the Emperor Augustus tried to revive, as having been the inspiration and guide of the early Romans, is embodied in Vergil's *Æneid*;—how the race, "which from burned Ilium came forth brave," formed Rome in reliance on Jove, and by doing, in virtuous deeds, as the gods would have them, made Rome great and strong. But it is the religion of Christ, above all others, that incites, illumines, and confirms the doctrine which Zoroastrianism made an essential part of its beliefs, and which the best of ancient Israel struggled so nobly to maintain.

How the central and essential truths of Christianity emphasized the conception of God as the Father and Ruler of mankind because He was perfect Ethical Spirit, in and over the world of things and men; and how the moral code of Christianity springs directly from the inspiring command to every follower of Christ that he shall realize in his own life and development this same Spirit which was so perfectly manifested in "the Master;"—this has already been explained with sufficient detail. It is, therefore, only necessary in this connection to remind ourselves that the picture thus presented of the divine ethical relations to the affairs of humanity is not that of an autocratic sovereign, after the pattern of the Oriental absolute monarchy, but the rather that of an immanent, inspiring, and redeeming Spiritual Life. God is *in* the World, the indwelling and controlling Power which is shaping human history toward the progressive realization of ethical ideals.

If, then, the question is raised, as to the Divine Method,—meaning now, not the occult and mysterious *modus operandi* of Absolute Will, in ethical relations with finite wills, but the means, experientially known, by which this process of government is conducted; certain answers at once suggest themselves as obviously appropriate. How does God govern the world of men? His government is in and through all the controlling forces and influences, visible and invisible, so-called "natural"

and more manifestly spiritual, which constitute the changing and evolving environment of man. The more detailed answer belongs to experience, in the form of the positive sciences.

And, first, what is called "nature" (in the narrower meaning of the word) is a most fundamental and important sphere of the divine government over the human race. God is the Moral Ruler of mankind, in and through the evolution of their physical environment. It has been quite too common on the part of apologists and theologians, to depreciate the moral influences that can be brought to bear upon man only through this physical environment. Even the most serious and unprejudiced attempts at a philosophy of religion frequently need to be reminded that argument cannot play fast and loose with the cosmic existences and processes. If God is surely revealed at all to the human mind and the human heart by this system of things in the midst of which man's life is set, then the revelation must be received by the mind and laid upon the heart, *as it in fact and actually is*. Having once appealed to Cæsar, to Cæsar we must go. If the goodness and wisdom of God are shown in those so-called "benevolent" contrivances which are more easily recognized and appreciated as the primary conditions of sentient life and happy experiences; then the same goodness and wisdom must be trusted as affording to faith the rational explanation of the abundant provision made for pain, disappointment, and death. These latter contrivances too, in their deeper and more mysterious meaning, must somehow be benevolent. If Nature evinces the goodness and wisdom of God as the Creator, the same Nature evinces the goodness and wisdom of the same God as the Destroyer.

That the system of things which constitutes man's close-fitting inescapable environment has a moral purpose to serve is, indeed, a truth, or a postulate which cannot be derived from any objective or purely scientific study of natural phenomena. Natural science so-called, properly takes the point of view which regards these phenomena as *a*-moral. From the point

of view suggested by the most advanced moral ideals, there is undoubtedly much in nature, especially at first sight and on the surface, which appears horribly immoral; many of its transactions do seem to be the expression of selfishness, cruelty, and lust. Ethics cannot account for, much less justify, man's developed ethical opinions and the sanctions which he attaches to his ethical ideals, by appeals to the behavior of things or of the lower animals. But, whether by processes of evolution that lie far back in the obscure and hypothetical realm of the prehistoric and the prehuman, or by some divinely imparted impulse that has resulted in a "leap" from the merely natural to a share in the supernatural, man *is*, in fact, raised above the need of an appeal to nature by way of imitation and example. He is also forbidden the right to make this appeal. To be human one must be more than "natural," in the lower meaning of this word. The natural is the not-moral, if not the immoral; and human beings cannot indulge in the silly selfishness of bovine creatures, or the cruelty of tigers and hyenas, or the lust of dogs and monkeys, without a really unnatural dehumanizing of themselves. This reaction of the higher nature from the "will to live" as the lower nature unwittingly behaves herself, leads to an irrational denunciation and abhorrence of those as yet undeveloped and less than half self-like beings which constitute so large a portion of the environment of humanity. Thus, in fact, the outspeaking of religious experience, and the reflections of theology, have quite too often looked upon so-called Nature as essentially antithetic and even violently opposed to the true moral and religious life. The literature of religion abounds in hard words spoken against man's physical constitution and physical environment, as though these things were essentially the "devil's own," and not like ourselves, a vast assemblage of God's creatures and children, of a lower scale of reality than that which has graciously been bestowed upon us.

There is, however, no more startling fact in human ethical

experience than the way in which even those who avowedly assume the "purely" scientific attitude toward the cosmic forces and processes, feel themselves impelled to confess their deeper faith in the moral World-order. As long as this attitude is kept strictly pure, neither praise nor blame, neither the admiration which approaches reverence nor the denunciation which, when extreme, savors of blasphemy, becomes man's judgment as to the Being of the World. But when one's "luck" goes wrong, or "fate" seems not only unkind but positively malignant, the tendency to an irrational feeling of resentment, or to whispered, if not outbreaking, curses is as strong in the scientific atheist, or agnostic, as in the devil-worshipper. When he is good-natured and successful, however, nobody likes to hear the Being of the World abused. How fair and admirable, and bent on securing in the long run some higher good, does the Cosmos usually appear to the scientific devotee! The railing accusation, brought against *It (sic)* in the name of science by a recent writer,¹ who speaks of the divine dealings as "the hand which is red with millions of years of murder;" of Providence as "a scatter-brained, semi-powerful, semi-impotent monster;" and of the thunder and the whirlwind as suggestive of some "blackguardly larrikin kicking his heels in the clouds,"—is almost as shocking and repulsive from the point of view of Haeckel and Huxley, as it would have been from that of Paul or Augustine. But if this innate spirit of piety does not express the scientific confirmation of the instinctive attitude of religion toward the mystery of man's physical environment; What, pray! in the name of rationality, does it express? Man may not, without condign punishment, not only from his own religious and moral nature, but also from those precious æsthetical and *quasi*-ethical sentiments and ideals which are inseparable from science itself, abuse or opprobriously treat Nature,—however conceived of, or regarded from whatever point of view. The cosmic forces and processes do,

¹ See Mallock, *Religion as a Credible Doctrine*, p. 174f.

indeed, deserve the better treatment. If there is anything which the modern doctrine of evolution tends to establish as an essential truth, it is just this: The losses are somehow—although mysteriously—compensated by the higher gains; the reign of death is the advancing kingdom of life; the passing of the generations of men is the uplift of the race. To return to the language of religion: “The earnest expectation of the creation waiteth for the revealing of the sons of God. For the creation was subjected to vanity, not of its own will, but by reason of him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only so, but ourselves also, who have the first-fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for our adoption, *to wit*, the redemption of our body” (Rom. viii, 19–23).

It is true that the conception of the cosmic processes which is properly gained by the physical sciences is not, primarily considered, that of the rule of a perfect Ethical Spirit. But as our acquaintance with Nature becomes more profound, and our insight the keener, and especially as we take to our confidence the beneficent and hopeful side of evolution, our views undergo important modifications. Undoubtedly, these modifications are largely due to the habit of reading into natural phenomena man's better Self—ethically, just as truly as aesthetically. And perhaps the system of things would have to be pronounced largely *a-moral*, in itself, or conducive to immorality in the human species, *if* the investigation *could be* conducted *purely* from the scientific point of view. But it cannot be so conducted; for the fundamental fact remains that science itself cannot escape admitting æsthetical and ethical considerations and ideals into its conclusions from its own points of view. And when these æsthetical and ethical points of view are once assumed, and consistently occupied, the truth becomes clearer

that much of the most essential moral culture comes to the race perpetually, in the way of God's rule in and through man's physical environment.

In this connection a word of rebuke, and of the calling of "shame," at the current hypocrisy in morals and religion seems demanded. For an age that calls itself Christian, and that shudders at tales of its savage ancestors celebrating their victories by drinking strange intoxicants from human skulls, or worshipping their gods by displaying the bones of their victims in the temples, makes war with just as essential selfishness, and quaffs costly wines in honor of its victorious generals, or buries them under epitaphs of immodest laudation in the choice places of its cathedrals, and in the graveyards of its churches.

In truth, the human race owes most of its discipline in the more fundamental social virtues to the moral rule of God through, and in, its physical environment. Such virtues are courage, endurance, frugality, and respect for order and for law. They are, indeed, *basic* virtues; Nature unaided by higher revelations of God as the perfection of Ethical Spirit, cannot raise these virtues to their highest refinement and potency; much less can it add to them the sweetness and light which the inner experiences of revelation and inspiration impart. But they *are* basic virtues. And unless the foundations of individual and national character are laid in them, and are preserved in their constant cultivation, the higher moral and religious perfection can never follow. For this higher ethical refinement, when helped out by all the sweet consolations and comforting hopes of religion, will not suffice to dispense with the stern discipline of God the Moral Ruler of the World by his immanent presence in Nature.

It is the characteristic excellence of the religion of Christ that it does for the human soul, and for human society, what all the better religions do, only in a higher degree. It inculcates, and effects, the recognition of God's presence and spirit-

ual control over man by his immanence in man's physical environment. For this reason, the truly pious soul endures bravely the toils and misfortunes of life, submits resignedly to the divine will, after living conscientiously, gives thanks for all the good things which come to him, and sees in them signs of the gracious and wise, though complexly mysterious, ordering of the interrelations of men with one another, and of men with things.

That God is the Moral Ruler of the World through his immanence in human society is a belief which is in some respects more easy to entertain and more comforting to hold than that of the divine rule in nature; in other respects, however, the truth is quite the reverse. Without social relations no moral government of any sort is possible, or even conceivable. Government implies society;—in some crude and nascent state at first, but with more complexity afterwards, if government itself is to become more highly developed. Indeed, moral rule and social relations cannot be dissociated. On the other hand, for the mind which holds lofty and uncompromising conceptions of justice, truth, and benevolence, the ills that have their origin in the region of purely physical causes are far easier to bear with resignation, and to reconcile with the divine moral perfection, than are those ills which come through the ill-constituting or ill-managing of human social organizations. From a certain not unhistorical point of view it may be said that the principal curses of humanity at large have been laid upon them by the leaders and rulers of these organizations. Hence, on the one hand, springs the doctrine of the divine right of kings, emperors, and other civil and military officers, of written and unwritten laws, and of the customs and requirements of the different forms of social relations; hence, on the other hand, arises that call to reform, and even to revolution, which must at times be answered, if the moral government of humanity is to advance toward higher ideals and more satisfactory results. At one extreme, stands the demand, enforced

in God's name, for a complete and unquestioning submission. At the other extreme stands theoretical and practical Nihilism. Therefore, the representatives of religious interests, at one time consign to hell, without hope of pardon, him who ventures to lay hand upon, or even speak evil of, the "Lord's anointed;" at another time, they call upon all believers, and all good and true men, to rise and by violence put down the tyrant. Between these two demands many a pious soul has been sadly perplexed to find the way which God would have him take.

In spite of such perplexity, however, the teachings of the philosophy of religion, both from the theoretical and the historical points of view, cannot be called in question. God is the Moral Ruler of mankind, immanent as the Creator, Upholder, and the Destroyer of human society. For all these forms of social organization, one profound and profoundly mysterious but admirably noble law always reigns supreme. In the long run and in the large, it is righteousness which "exalteth the nation;" but "sin is a reproach to any people." And that solidarity of the race which involves the innocent with the wicked, is so essential to even the conception of an historical process of divine government, that to attempt to remove it, even theoretically, involves the complete reversal and utter confusion of all our ideas of God's method of moral control. To see the wicked flourish, while the righteous seem forsaken, has always afforded a hard problem to religious faith. But good sense and religion both require that the faithful soul should reflect upon the fact, enter into the house of the Lord, and await the end.

When the student of the philosophy of history considers the grand sweep upward and downward, but on the whole upward, of the lines that mark the course of human social evolution, he may well feel less difficulty in believing that God as Moral Ruler is indeed, and always has been, present there in power. The synthesis of forces employed, the overcoming of obstacles

effected, the ruthless clashing of interests that by their blind and selfish strivings are, after all, only unwittingly serving other unseen and altruistic ends, afford a drama of incomparable interest and magnitude. Piety, on contemplating this drama, acknowledges that God's ways are not as man's ways, and that His meaning for it all is not the meaning which most of the actors have chiefly in mind. The actors are not, indeed, mere puppets which are pulled from the divine hand by invisible strings. But, although they are agents, they are for the most part unconsciously working out the Will of the Moral Ruler who is in and over it all.

The particular institutions of Family, State, and Church, are yet more specific modes of the divine moral government of the race. In the better significance of the word, with all the faults belonging to their special forms of organization and of the individuals composing them, they are still distinctly *theocratic* institutions. Between the State and its government, and between the Church and its particular form of constituting and officering itself, we are always warranted in making a distinction. That human beings should live in families, develop statehood, and organize themselves as brethren for a common religious life, is so plainly the Divine Will, that to deny it would seem to make all attribution of a moral purpose to the Being of the World quite impossible. And in fact, it is in and through these institutions chiefly that the ethical control and the ethical evolution of humanity has taken place. It is also within the limits of the same institutions chiefly that those more immediate modes of the moral rule, and of the redemption of the world, which are known as revelation and inspiration, have produced their greatest results.

The results of the psychological and historical sciences are not inconsistent with this conception of the moral evolution of the race under the immanent divine control; even when they have not as yet come to announce essentially the same truths, although in a different form of words. The conception of the

Being of the World as indwelling and dominant Ethical Spirit is entirely consonant with all that these sciences can most surely say of the past, or most confidently predict of the future. The proofs that God is indeed the Moral Ruler of the World are commensurate—no more, and yet no less—with the moral nature and moral development of the human race. Certainly, if man had not himself become an ethical spirit, he would not conceive of the gods, the invisible and superhuman spirits, as moral rulers. And only when he has developed a higher degree of moral spirituality, and has also found expression for it in certain forms of social organizations, does he arrive at the conception of One perfect Ethical Spirit as the Moral Ruler of the World. But man has developed an ideal of ethically perfect government, and he has felt himself impelled to, and justified in, attributing this ideal to the Supreme Reality. While, then, an empirical method, which aims to treat of the phenomena of man's moral life and development without resort to metaphysics or to the faiths of religion, leaves unsolved the more profound and ultimate problems of ethics; the same phenomena receive illumination and enforcement from the higher ethico-religious point of view. To repeat here the conclusions derived from a survey of the field of ethics:¹ "The answer of psychological analysis and of historical insight does not furnish all that the philosophy of conduct demands. How can man do for himself this significant work of idealizing, unless his nature is born of an Absolute Ethical Spirit? How can he develop such an Ideal, in whose life he shares, unless his history may be understood from the side of the 'Overman' as under the inspiration and guidance of this Spirit? It is in the answer to these inquiries that the metaphysics of ethics finds itself obliged to adopt some position corresponding to that from which religion regards all the development of humanity. Of this tenet of the religious consciousness Pfleiderer forcefully

¹ See the author's *Philosophy of Conduct*, p. 628; and for a fuller discussion of the whole problem, chapters XXV and XXVI of the same work.

says: ¹ ‘ And here too Paul pointed out the right way, founding his philosophy of religion on the thought which in modern thinking must always be the principal point of view: the thought, namely, of a *development* of the moral spirit under the guiding education of God. Each stage of the development has its corresponding moral ideal; none of them is fortuitous or arbitrary; each rests on a divine ordinance and is good and necessary for its own time, and for its own time only.’ ”

It is clear, then, from the very essential nature of man’s moral ideals and moral development that an impersonal and non-moral view of the grounds on which these ideals and this development repose, can never afford the least semblance of a satisfactory solution for ethical problems. In a word, if the ideals have in fact influenced human history, and if under this influence actual progress of an ethical character has taken place, then the ultimate explanation of such a racial experience must be found in the religious doctrine of God as the moral Ruler of the World. Undoubtedly the proximate explanation of this form of man’s progress must be found in his own nature, with its reactions upon his changing environment, under the laws of an ethical and spiritual evolution. But the more this proximate explanation is expanded and perfected, with a view to account for the facts of experience, the more imperatively and comprehensively does it demand some more ultimate explanation. The ultimate explanation can only be found in the Being of the World; and it can only be found there, if this Being is conceived of as Ethical Spirit, manifesting itself progressively as the Moral Ruler of the World. As a modern writer has said: ² “The moral World-order, regarded as an active Principle, is God as Spirit. Only the Self, only Ego-hood, is the home of all that is Ideal.”

The faith that is founded on religious experience, when taken

¹ The Philosophy of Religion, IV, p. 254.

² Moriz Carriere, Die sittliche Weltordnung, p. 405.

at its highest expression, does give, and it alone gives, a satisfactory answer to the ultimate problems of ethics. This answer is the rational postulate that the Personal Absolute, conceived of as perfect Ethical Spirit, is the Ground of the moral order of the world. Or more naïvely and popularly expressed, and in a more restricted way: God is the Moral Ruler of humanity. "In man's *moral* nature the voice of the Personal Absolute is more plainly to be heard. Faith in this voice is imperative here. The account of the origin and the ongoing of the physical universe may seem complete without the recognition of a Spirit whose self-conscious Life is the source and the inspiration of an otherwise dead and even non-existent nature. . . . But for the origin and the development of man's ethical and spiritual life—with its laws that transcend all experience of consequences, its sanctions that evoke a devotion which oversteps all the bounds of a merely personal regard, its ideals that are ever arising and fading, but only to appear more bright and alluring and inspiring still—what account can possibly be found in impersonal cosmic processes, or in a World-Ground that is not itself an ethical and spiritual Life?"

"Especially, however, does the heart of man crave the assistance of some well-assured hope in its effort to bear dutifully the grave contradictions which everywhere exist between the actual and the ethically Ideal. That things are not as they ought to be, is a much more trying discovery than that things are not as they seem. The antithesis between Appearance and Reality which has so often been exploited in a showily dialectical rather than in a profoundly philosophical manner is, for the most part, a specious and not very alarming affair. But the contradictions which exist between the moral and social ideals of humanity and what is actual in human conduct, and in the constitution of human affairs, so far as it is dependently related to conduct, are very real and very disturbing. That whatever *appears*, really *is*,—this is a proposition which may well command the attention, and finally the consent, of every

thoughtful mind. But that whatever *is* in conduct and in character among men is *right*—this is a proposition which, however often it is made and with whatever brilliant dialectics it may be supported, is opposed to all the most firmly seated and valuable moral convictions of mankind.”

“The conflict between the real of human experience and the Ideal constructed by human thought and imagination, and followed—however fitfully and imperfectly—by human endeavors, is the eternal conflict. According to the myths of the ancients and the theologies of modern times, it was waged in invisible, supermundane regions, before it began to be waged upon earth. The theoretical solution of the conflict, as respects its origin, its fullest significance, and its ultimate issue, is, however, as satisfactorily treated as is compatible with the limitations of human knowledge, when it is shown how one may believe that the ultimate Source both of the reality and of the ideals which still await realization is one and the same World-Ground. This World-Ground is a Personal Will, that is pledged and able to effect the progressive realization of the ideals which, too, owe their origin and historical development to Him. In a word, the same Ethical Spirit who inspires the moral ideals of man, and who reveals his own being in their historical evolution, will secure, and is securing, the realization of the ideals in the world’s actual on-going. If one may have a reasonable faith in this conclusion, then certainly, however severe the temporary conflict may be, and whether this conflict be raging within the soul of the individual or within the social organization, its final issue and fuller significance are secure. Well-founded moral Optimism makes large demands upon religious faith. Only when one is confident that there is a Power in human history, which is over and throughout it all, and which effectively makes for righteousness, can one hopefully survey the large and long-existing disruption between the actual moral conditions of humanity and humanity’s own highest moral ideals. The only power which can be conceived of as at once interested and

suitable to effect this progressive realization of the actual with the Ideal is God.”¹

Belief in God as the Moral Ruler of the World leads directly and logically to the doctrine of a universal Providence. The conception of Providence is based upon the conviction that all single events, as well as the whole course of the individual's life, are items in, or parts of, the Moral Order of the World. If, however, this religious doctrine is to be defensible from the points of view held by a philosophy of religion, it must be freed from certain defects, which both the popular feeling and the reflections of systematic theology have too often imparted to it. These defects are chiefly the following three: (1) Such a separation between the sphere of Providence and the sphere of Nature, as constitutes a return to the antithesis between the natural and the supernatural; (2) a restriction of the doctrine to special instances or particular experiences, or a classification, based on essentially different marks, into so-called “special providences” and “general Providence;” and finally (3), a selfish form of conception, which, if carried to its legitimate conclusion, destroys the perfection of those very moral attributes that make the doctrine of Providence a teacher and inspirer of the spirit of true piety.

All Providence is a manifestation of the Supernatural; but the true conception of Providence does not place the emphasis upon God's foresight in a manner to suggest that the world has, in part at least, or quite habitually—in its ordinary operations and humdrum life—slipped from the divine control. Providence does not interrupt the order of nature; it does not prevent Deity from making His “sun to rise on the evil and on the good;” or from sending His “rain on the just and on the unjust.” While, on the one hand, the conception points the pious soul to the way that divine wisdom and goodness show themselves in the feeding of the birds, and in the clothing with beauty of the flowers; on the other hand, it

¹ Quoted from the *Philosophy of Conduct*, p. 633f.

teaches that the same wisdom and goodness destroys the former by starvation, cold, and other enemies, and breaks up the lovely structure of the other by sunshine, drought, and frost. In this divine activity Nature and the Supernatural are not antagonistic or even temporarily separated ; they remain united in the same Moral Order as regarded from different points of view. The peculiar impressiveness of any incident, as regards the directness and clearness with which it points to a Supernatural presence, is a purely subjective affair. All providences are alike natural and supernatural, according to the point of view from which the observer chooses, or is temporarily interested or impelled, to regard them.

So, too, does the distinction sometimes made between general Providence and especial providences appear as a wholly subjective affair. Certain happenings in the life of the individual, or of the community, and certain events in the world's history, have, indeed, a special impressiveness, on account of their more obvious and important bearing upon those spiritual interests in which religion finds its chief concern. This is mere matter of fact ; and it is matter of fact which, although consisting originally of human opinion and emotion, tends to realize itself as an important force in objective events. He who *thinks* that the divine presence has been manifested in an unusual way in any event of his life, *does* something different in view of this thought. In this way God specializes His Will through the impression made upon the conduct of man ; therefore, to maintain that all events are equally important for the securing of the divine final purposes contradicts the apparent truth, while not making the belief in the universality of Providence any more reasonable or practically helpful. But from the point of view of pragmatic history, as well as from that of the philosophy of religion, a division of providences into two classes is quite untenable. So closely interwoven are seemingly trivial events with those of the most stupendous importance, that the web of this history cannot safely be broken

in any place, either to let God within or to let him escape without. Providence is, then, always and everywhere, at the same time special and universal.¹ Its universality does not contrast with, but the rather provides for and includes, all special and minute providences. It is at once most intimate and close-fitting, and also most comprehensive.

In order to have the complete trust in Providence which the spirit of piety invokes and demands, it is not necessary to think of one's self, or one's family, or one's country, as the favorite of God. Indeed, all such thought is itself essentially impious. But a rational faith sees no reasons for setting limits to the divine wisdom and love in its regard for all the details of every individual's life. Indeed, since all—both things and souls, and among souls, both the lower animals and men—are parts of that one Moral Order, in and over which God rules, the care of each individual being is ever present in the mind of God. This, at least, is religion's supreme faith in Providence. I and mine, but also you and yours, and he and his,—all selves and all things, are duly and lovingly taken account of in the divine moral government.

The belief in Providence is religion's way of expressing its confidence in the moral order of the world, and in the final triumph of moral ideals. That which the metaphysics of ethics, so often and yet so inadequately, tries to express in impersonal terms, the philosophy of religion refers to the moral and providential rule of a personal God. Something approaching the confidence that all which comes to the individual is the ordering of a wise and holy Divine Will has belonged to the more enlightened of the pious in all ages. "I call upon thee, O my father Amon," exclaimed Rameses II at the battle of Kadshu:² "My many soldiers have abandoned me; none of my horsemen hath looked toward me; and when I called them, none hath listened to my voice. But I believe that thou art

¹ See what has already been said, Chap. XXXVII of this Volume.

² Renouf, *The Religion of Ancient Egypt*, p. 237.

worth more to me than a million of soldiers, than a hundred thousand horsemen." Though Yahweh slay me, yet will I trust in him, was the persuasion of the Psalmist. And not in times of emergency alone, but in the quiet life of every day, God's manifestation of himself as Providence to the pious soul is a constant experience. In a manuscript volume from which Dr. Martin quotes,¹ we may read the declaration of faith from a Buddhist abbot: "If we sincerely remember how near to us is Buddha, then we may dare to accept the nourishment that heaven and earth affords." To pray, "Give us this day our daily bread," is to utter vain and mocking words for the man who has no faith in Providence.

It has been in the virtual possession of this faith that the best of the race, the noblest thinkers and actors in human history, have with an increasing confidence, and often with a passionate and undying enthusiasm, proclaimed the ultimate triumph of righteousness. Their optimism has not been economic or anthropological; it has been ethical and religious. They do not now believe that commerce, or science, or art, without righteousness, can regenerate humanity, or elevate the race to its highest attainable, much less to an ideally perfect, social condition. In all these respects, believers in Providence are, perhaps, oftener pessimistic than optimistic. They die—generation after generation, for hundreds of years, they have been dying—with faith unwavering, but with eyes unblest by the sight of what they have so greatly longed to see. They have no weak complaints to offer, because they have themselves suffered much in the interests of righteousness; for the cause is their ideal, and devotion to the ideal still appears to them worth far more than all it can have cost. To these pious souls the religious truth of a Divine Moral Order, which incloses and protects the things that have worth, is a comfort of the supremest kind. This is the real doctrine of Providence. It is the voice which breaks and scatters the darkness brought on

¹ Lore of Cathay, p. 255.

by the temporary eclipse of righteousness, with the command: "Let there be light." Say ye to the righteous: "It shall be well with him;"—and not in isolation, or as one of a select few.

It is in connection with the religious doctrine of God as Moral Ruler and Providence that the place of prayer in the world-order deserves recognition anew. As to its subjective value for the life of religion, its moral effect upon the man who prays, enough has already been said.¹ But that conception of the system of cosmic existences, forces, and processes, with their laws, as a dependent manifestation of God, which religion teaches under the symbols of Creator, Upholder, and Moral Ruler or Providence, opens up further possibilities, and proposes yet more difficult problems to our reflective thinking. Is man's prayer, when it is the expression of the filial attitude toward the Divine Being, so related to the world-order as to have an effect on its events?

It would seem to need little reflection in order to reach the conclusion that neither of two extreme opinions in answer to this inquiry can justify itself at the bar of either science or philosophy. Even the most strictly mechanical view of the world-order must admit that prayer may, under certain circumstances, have an important effect in modifying the course of physical events. Indeed, within certain limits not easy to be fixed, the more strict and minute the tenure of the principle of mechanism, the more sure and widespreading becomes the physical influence of the subjective attitude of prayer. Taken in its strictest form, the mechanical conception regards the Cosmos as a totality, including all of man's life, which is so sensitive throughout the whole to every slightest change in every minutest part, that ceaseless and boundless vibrations proceed from every finger-point, no matter how delicate its touch may seem to be. Especially does this conception connect together, in terms of some comprehensive theory of relations,

¹ Vol. I, chap. XXI.

all the phenomena of human consciousness and certain correlated changes in the bodily mechanism. No most interior, unheard whisper, or even muttered thought, of a prayer could, then, fail of its record in some corresponding physical event. Some Hindū devotee, or Buddhist monk, or Christian saint, is always praying in silence; and in silence, too, a responsive throb is issuing from this center of activity, and going out on every side to the ends of the universe, and to the end of time. Or, shall we not rather say, that the same Being of the World which expresses its will in souls as the conscious attitude of prayer, is expressing the same will in countless, unknown other ways, throughout its own entire Being?

If now this scientific picture of the relation of the subjective attitude of prayer to the World-order is translated into terms familiar to the experiences of religion, the two seem to be by no means wholly antithetic. Given the belief that all this strict correlation of human desires and feelings with the ongoing of things is the total expression of the wise and good Will of Him who is in and over all; then piety may well be satisfied and encouraged thereby. The soul of the true believer in Providence can have no higher ambition than to fulfil the purposes of this Will, in just such place in this world-order, and by just such measure and manner of activities, as accords with these purposes. Thus the one prayer which underlies and interpenetrates the spirit and meaning of all concrete petitions becomes: "*Thy Will be done*"—universally, "as in Heaven, so on Earth."

That this habitual spirit of prayer and all its particular expressions, whether inarticulate or spoken, should influence the bodily mechanism, and through this mechanism the physical environment, of him who prays, is a scientific inference based upon all that we most surely know of the dynamic relations existing in the order of nature between the human mind and the human body. Modern psycho-physics and physiological psychology abound with forceful illustrations of this principle.

Upon this conclusion converges our experience with the most ordinary transactions of the Self in its everyday life, and also with the curious phenomena of nerve-anastomosis, mental healing, hypnosis with hallucinations by suggestion, etc. The proposal to test the efficacy of prayer by experiment with two hospitals, otherwise equally favorable for the recovery of their patients, but one of which encourages and practices petition to the Divine Will for recovery of the sick, and the other not, is in its very nature impossible of accomplishment. But could it be carried out, there is no doubt as to what the result would show. *Of course* other things being equal, those who pray for themselves, or who know that others are praying for them, are likeliest to overcome the attacks of certain kinds of disease. This is simply to predict a result in accordance with what we know experimentally of the powerful effect of psychological influences upon the most primary processes of digestion and nutrition.

On the contrary, to hold that the Divine Will, as manifested in a Providence that is at once universal and minute, is subject to alteration of its wise and good purposes at the instance of human desire, however capricious, if only it be insistent and credulous enough, is as abhorrent to piety as it is intolerable to science. Such a conception of God is indeed impious. Neither can the philosophy of religion hesitate to affirm once for all, and firmly to hold, the position that this Will has expressed itself irrevocably—so to say—in certain uniform ways of the behavior of things. Indeed, were this not so, there could be no world-order for science to study from its point of view, and for religious faith to accept as coming from the hand of the Moral Ruler of mankind. A certain so-called “uniformity of nature” is indispensable as a basis for all ethical and spiritual control. At the same time, science needs perpetually to remind itself, and religious faith may reasonably cherish the conviction, that this so-called “uniformity” is itself no rigid, machine-like affair. That “like produces like,” or that “the

same causes are followed by the same effects," and all similar formulas, are as useless practically as they are barren of real truth.

For exact likeness and precise sameness of causes nowhere occur in human experience, whether with things or with selves. Each individual being, from star to atom, and each center of psychical activity from amœba to man, is unlike every other; each has somehow a special constitution, value, and mission of its own. Nor are there any recurrences of like events, either in conscious lives or unconscious things. The World-order is itself a ceaseless process of new productions, both of existences and of events. So far as man's history is a part of this order, a single atom or amoeba may exert a more powerful immediate influence than the bulkiest star.

It would seem, then, both scientific and pious to recognize the peculiar sphere of influence of prayer over physical events, as comprising those happenings in the production of which human wills and natural forces co-operate. Within this sphere, it is both a matter of scientific fact and a postulate of the faith of piety, that the expression of human wills, whether in prayer or otherwise, is, so to say, taken account of by the Being of the World. From the point of view of science on the one hand, prayer itself is a dynamic factor, the value and efficiency of which must be recognized, and which may be—although only obscurely and partially—experienced and estimated. In particular cases, however, it must be left an open question for the full solution of which the data are never likely to come to hand. But this same thing is true of every such factor which contributes its quota—how large, how small, we know not—to the evolution of the Cosmos as a whole. For science, beyond a very limited sphere, agnosticism, and not dogmatic denial, is the only rational attitude. From the point of view of religion, however, prayer is an essential of its subjective life; and it is also a valuable and a valid expression of the rational faith, which piety has in God as Moral Ruler, and as Providence, for

every individual event in any individual's experience. Between these two views, philosophy sees no theoretical incompatibility; while it recognizes the superior worth of the religious view for the practical ends of moral and religious development.

CHAPTER XLI

GOD AS REDEEMER

The relations in which religion places God toward the World, in order that he may become its Redeemer, are above all others distinctly personal and spiritual. In a word, the very culmination of that manifestation which God makes of Himself as omnipotent and omnipresent Holy Spirit is reached in the historical and progressive redemption of the race. Thus it is the doctrine of Divine Redemption which includes the answer that alone fully satisfies the most enlightened and profound religious experience—its needs, its hopes, its aspirations, and its ideals. In the form of this doctrine, religious faith bears its supreme witness to the reality of God and to the actuality of his presence among men. Without this doctrine, and without the actual progressive realization of its truth by humanity, religion itself fails of its highest mission.

It is, indeed, no superficial mark which suggests the division of all religions into "religions of salvation" and those that are not. The history of man's religious development expressly shows that those forms of belief which do not promise redemption to their adherents and to the race, must, as the race advances in culture, be set aside as unworthy of serious attention. And those religions which make the promise to the ear, but break it to the heart and brain and busy hand of man, must finally be convicted of having contributed to the superabundant illusion and vanity of human life. What, then, will remain for humanity? It may try to console itself, and to quench its insatiable thirst for the Ideal, with socialistic dreams, imperial-

istic plans, or selfish strivings for the place of the "Overman" among the common herd of men. A few may comfort themselves with imaginary constructions of a universal but non-religious altruism. But religion, as a rational faith in an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfect Ethical Spirit, must be renounced. The alternative for religion is either itself to perish or else actually, but progressively, to effect the redemption of mankind.

These seemingly abstract propositions may be somewhat firmly placed upon an historical basis by considering how it has come about that the great world-religions are in general pre-eminently "religions of salvation." This fact is the essential truth in man's religious evolution. The evolution itself includes the development of two correlated factors in the religious experience of mankind. One of these is the consciousness of wrongdoing as sin against the Divine Being, and the consequent feeling of need of Divine forgiveness and help; the other is the belief in the holiness of God, conceived of as Himself perfect Ethical Spirit, and so, at the same time, anti-thetic to moral imperfection in his creatures.

Man's need of redemption, and the growing consciousness of that need, is the conclusion reached by a study of his ethico-religious development. The "consciousness of sin," in the stricter meaning of these words,—the meaning, that is, to which the promise of redemption corresponds,—is a relatively late experience. The more primitive expressions of the religious consciousness contain it, if at all, only in germinal and undeveloped form. With savage man, if the things go wrong that are supposed to be under the control of any particular god, the supposition arises that this same god is offended at some neglect or indignity on the part of the worshipper. But as man's ethical conception of Deity becomes more exalted and comprehensive, he regards his own moral weaknesses and impurities as offences against Deity. In general, when the gods are idealized as themselves more perfect, they require a higher ethical

standard in their followers. Some of the divine beings at least become the especially strenuous promoters of righteousness, the defenders of those who do what is right in the divine sight, the punishers of those who do what is wrong. Finally, as man identifies his highest Ideal of moral perfection with the omnipotent and omniscient Holy Will, all his own moral weaknesses and impurities are felt to be offences against God. *The consciousness of sin is, then, the theocratic form of conscience.*

The order which is actually traceable in the history of man's development accords with the psychological principle which controls this form of ethico-religious exercise at the present time. Devout souls feel their wrongdoing as sin, grieve over their moral imperfections as a breach of perfect moral union with the Ethical Spirit who is the Object of their faith and worship—their supreme Ideal of a worthy Life. The frequency and the poignancy of this consciousness of sin do not depend upon the multitude and magnitude of the individual's transgressions, objectively considered. The rather are they dependent upon the subjective condition of the religious life; upon that filial attitude toward God in which subjective religion essentially consists. Thus the startling experience is explained, that those most sensitively constituted, and most highly developed from the ethico-religious point of view, are most disturbed by the thought of their own wrongdoing. To lack this form of consciousness is, indeed, no sign of ethical perfection, but the reverse. To have it is to feel the spur which drives the soul toward God as Redeemer of the World.

The consciousness of sin necessarily results in a conflict; and this conflict becomes a most important factor in the development of spirituality, both in the individual and in the race. Such a conflict, wherever the race-culture has reached a certain stage, is characterized by the three following marks: (1) An appreciation of the supreme value of rational and ethical will—or spirit—in the World-order and in human life; (2) an increased insight into the nature of spiritual ideals and

of the means for their more effective realization; and (3) a firmer and more intelligent purpose to achieve these ideals—both in one's Self and in Society,—or the determination to win at whatever cost, the good of spiritual worth.

Now it is this struggle for spirituality, for the realization of the dawning and rising ideal of union with God, conceived of as perfect Ethical Spirit, in that environment which man's undeveloped nature and the seemingly hostile attitude of the physical world necessitate, that develops the conscious need of redemption. This conscious need is at first vague and indefinite; but in its higher potency, it becomes the fixed conviction, based upon indubitable experience, that man cannot achieve the ideal life, or even make satisfactory progress toward it, without divine assistance. The human soul, aspiring and struggling to become spirit, is made aware of that highest of all the forms of the feeling of dependence, in which so much of subjective religion, in its emotional aspect, essentially consists. As in all his so-called natural life—organic and psychic—man momentarily depends upon the One Universal Life in which he lives, and moves, and has his being, so does his spiritual life recognize a yet more absolute dependence upon its being and movement in God, the perfect Ethical Spirit. This conscious need of God as Redeemer is an historical development; it is as forceful and insistent in demanding satisfaction for itself as is any other human need. Just as the experience of need, and the conflict and suffering which accompany this experience in every form, has resulted in the economic, scientific, artistic, and social evolution of the race; so has this same impulse and imperative demand, in this its most profound and supremely important form, developed the religious conception of Divine Redemption in a way best to satisfy itself. Were it not for this result, the history of the religious life of humanity up to this present time would be an anomaly.

A certain pessimistic view of human nature and of human life is, therefore, essential to the religious doctrine of God as

Redeemer. All the religions of salvation cherish this truth as something fundamental to their appeal for acceptance and for the control of practice—especially, the greatest of them all, Judaism, Buddhism, and Christianity. Scarcely less true is this of the Hindū doctrine of Karma, as it had established itself before the teaching of Gautama; and also as it continued, after his teaching had suffered a relapse in this respect.¹ As a recent writer² has said: “John and Paul, Augustine and Pascal, Innocent III and Beeri, as well as Rousseau and Kant, are in this sense *pessimists*.” The same thing is true of the yet more modern thinkers, John Stuart Mill, Comte, and Nietzsche. Even the extremes of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, in their low appreciation of man’s “native ability” to improve himself morally, or to attain his ideal of happiness by success in the struggle for earthly existence, are nearer to the standard religious view than is much of the current, superficial, and unintelligent so-called “optimism.” Nothing is more needed at the present time, in order to counteract the dominant tendencies, political, social, and religious, than a stronger emphasis upon the powerlessness of all sensuous, and even æsthetical satisfactions, to lift the individual and the race to the blessed life. In this way a religion, that is somewhat more true to its own inherent convictions and to its mission for humanity, might more effectually cure the unrest of soul that torments the individual, and might check the unholy and dangerous ambitions of “that recurrent curse of the world, a dominant race.”

Side by side with this consciousness of need, and the struggle for spirituality which it evokes, but also complementary to it, there has gone on in the religious history of humanity a development of the ethical and spiritual conception of the Divine Being. The doctrine of God as Moral Ruler and Divine Redeemer of mankind must be preceded by, and founded upon,

¹ See Rhys Davids, *Origin and Growth of Religion*, p. 86f.

² D. H. Schultz, *Grundriss der Christlichen Apologetik*, p. 70.

a confidence in the good-will and friendship of the gods toward man. As we have already seen, this usually takes one of two earliest forms. Either, as in communities where the more primitive kind of social constitution prevails, the special divinities of the tribe or clan are regarded as friendly to all of this, their tribe or clan; or else, as in communities where the ruling and priestly classes are more separate from the people, these classes are supposed to be in a special manner the friends and beloved of the gods. In Egypt, for example, there are hundreds of texts in which the Pharaoh is called by his title, the "friend of the gods;" or the gods are said to have set their son, the Pharaoh, upon the throne.

Another allied conception plays a most important part in the development of the doctrine of God as the Redeemer. This is the conception of mediation, and of mediator, between the divine beings and human beings. Under such a conception may be ranged religious developments so different otherwise as the Egyptian or Greek belief in good and kindly ministering dæmons and the Hebrew doctrine of the "angel of Yahweh," or the Suffering Messiah.

In Hesiod¹ we are told how,—

"Thrice ten thousand holy Daemons rove
This breathing world, the delegates of Jove,
Guardians of man, etc."

In Plutarch,² Cleombrotus, the traveller, asserts that the existence of beings with a nature intermediate between that of God and man can be demonstrated by incontrovertible evidence. Such beings naturally become classified into the good and kindly and the bad and harmful. Thus they contribute in an important but temporary manner to the development of the conception of Deity as ethical spirit, by relieving him of the weight of responsibility for evil; and also by accentuating the

¹ Works and Days, Elton's translation, Specimens of the Classic Poets, I, p. 72.

² De Defect. Orac., 21.

multiform character of his goodness. The bad dæmons are made "scape-goat for everything obscene, cruel, selfish, traditionally imputed to the gods;" and, on the other hand, the good dæmons afford great satisfaction to one in whose consciousness God has been put far away, without removing, however, the craving for some close, intimate, illumining and comforting means of personal intercourse.¹ Thus later on the good dæmons may easily become identified with the gods; and the evil dæmons sink to the rank of malicious spirits. Some of the early Christian Fathers identified these intermediary spirits with the heathen divinities. But a higher and holier truth gleamed upon the world in the Egyptian myth of Isis, who is described "as having given a sacred lesson of consolation to men and women involved in similar sorrows." The same thing is true of the conception of *Ea* among the Babylonian divinities; and of Prometheus who, among the Greeks, was pre-eminently the suffering friend of man.

It is, however, the idea of a divine man, who acts as the mediator or representative of God among his fellows, which the religious consciousness has seized upon, in its effort to make its doctrine of redemption more comprehensive, intimate, and popularly effective. Sometimes this Mediator is a king—God's vicegerent upon earth, who rules in righteousness, but who also loves, pities, strives and even suffers for his people. In such cases the redemption effected is, of course, largely a rescue from miseries of a physical or social kind. Sometimes it is, the rather, a priestly mediator who has special favor with Deity, because he is in some special meaning a "son of God;" he, therefore, knows how, and is pitifully willing, to propitiate the divine favor. Sometimes, again, the mediator is more purely a prophetic leader, who has attained to the secrets of the Divine Being with respect to the way of salvation in general, or to some particular way of escape in an emergency. Yet, again, the mediator may be regarded as the very incarnation of

¹ On this whole subject see Oakesmith, *The Religion of Plutarch*, pp. 132//.

Deity in human form. God himself has come down to man, in pity and in love, to lift man up to God. All these various forms of the conception of God as man's Redeemer through some kind of human mediation imply the belief in a spiritual and divine nature that may be awakened within man. The human being is potentially a son of the Divine Being. Every man may become aware of, and possessed of, his spiritual likeness to the perfect Ethical Spirit, in whom the faith of religion reposes for the redemption of the world.

Thus in various ways the different religions have expressed their felt need of a Mediator who, when the ethical conception of man's relations to God has reached its higher developments, must also be conceived of as a Redeemer from misery and from sin. And if, whether under the influence of lingering superstitions, or of immature philosophical theories, or of austere theological dogma, the Divine Being has lost touch with the human heart and the practical interests of humanity, then the office of this mediator is considered to be juridical, theatrical, or otherwise expressive of the transcendent nature of God. As says D'Alviella:¹ "It should be remarked that, almost everywhere, as the supreme God became more powerful and majestic, the popular conscience had spontaneously fixed upon some other divine personage nearer to its own sentiments, aspirations, or even passions, to fulfil the function of interceder, or rather mediator, between man and the Sovereign of the skies." But in its highest manifestations religious belief attributes to the Divine Being the realization of all the supremely worthy ideals of man, in the Personal Life of an omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient, perfect Ethical Spirit. Thus the attributes, of redeeming pity and ethical love are restored to God; and God, as Himself the Redeemer, is made immanent in human life and in human history.

All the religions of salvation—and all the greater world-religions are religions of salvation—share in the effort to satisfy

¹ Origin and Growth of the Conception of God, p. 229.

the needs of humanity in its struggle for an improved spirituality, and for a better standing and more perfect union with God. Germs of the idea of a helpful and even a self-sacrificing divine work in the behalf of humanity, therefore, exist in all such religions. Their very mission is to hold out some hope of escape through divine assistance from the weaknesses, miseries, and sins of this earthly life. Heaven throws some needed light upon earth's darkness—so the proclamation of religious faith is ever declaring to mankind. Salvation is indeed the end which all those religions that have arisen above the lower stages of egoism and superstition propose for their adherents. But, *from religion's point of view, salvation can come only through redemption.* As Eucken points out, religion always has its negative and its affirmative side. It is this two-sidedness of Christianity—its admission of the reality of suffering and sin, as inherent in the existence of the individual and of the race, and its hope of relief, individual and social, by the expansion and elevation of personal life—which constitutes its chief claim to superiority.¹

In the remotest antiquity of which we have historical witness, cries are heard appealing to Deity for succor and help, with confidence that the appeal will not be altogether in vain. Such was the outbreathing of that humble soul whose prayer is recorded in one of the papyri of the British Museum: "Oh! Amon, lend thine ear to him who is alone before the tribunal; he is poor. The court oppresses him. . . . My Lord is my Defender. . . . There is none mighty except him alone." But a more universal doctrine of a spiritual redemption of the world finds also a place in the religions of antiquity.

The Persian Apocalyptic proclaimed the belief in redemp-

¹ In this connection all that was formerly said (vol. I, chap. XXII) concerning the "Way of Salvation" must be recalled and supplemented—and perhaps, in certain instances, repeated—from another point of view. For the doctrine of the path which man should follow in order to be redeemed, and the article of faith embodied in the conception of God as the Redeemer, are, of course, interdependent.

tion by the triumph of Ahura-Mazda, the highest God, over the bad spirit, Ahriman, after a long period of struggle. At the end of the first of the four world-periods, which had been an unbroken rule of evil, arose the mediator, Zarathustra, the first of the world's divinely sent rescuers. But his work only gave a temporary check to the power of evil. At the last, the final redemption of the world, the bringing to perfection of the work of rescue, will be accomplished by one born of a virgin, and begotten of divine seed hidden in the lake in which she bathes; and his name is Saoshyas.

The Hindū doctrine as to the way and end of salvation, although it nowhere reaches the full and clear conception of God as the Redeemer of mankind, in places approaches and even coincides with the Christian doctrine. In the "Divine Song" (Bhagavadgītā) the Deity himself informs the devout knight Arjuna, who is inquiring as to "the Way," that salvation is by a twofold law. The Sāṅkhya system had taught that knowledge is salvation. But the fuller truth about the divine way adds faith to knowledge. Knowledge of God, and faith in God, are the appointed means of redemption from the weaknesses, miseries, and sins of man's mortal existence. Wisdom, implying morality, is indeed necessary; but even more necessary is faith. Salvation is only for the believer that is wise, and for the wise man that believes. This way of faith is Yoga, or serene devotion, "action-devotion,"—the "balanced mind, that is free from all attachments, serene, emancipated from desires, self-controlled, and perfectly tranquil." Renunciation without Yoga is a thing hard to obtain; but renunciation, when united with Yoga, receives salvation from the Divine Being. The soul is thus redeemed; for its salvation is secured by absorption into Deity. Thus he who perfects himself in the discipline of Yoga obtains the highest bliss,—namely, Brahma. The follower of the Yoga path of salvation "enters" Brahma¹.

¹ That the more precise views as to the conditions and nature of Redemption differ as widely in modern Hindūism as in modern Christianity, the

That reform of Brāhmanism, which was chronologically earlier than, but ethically much inferior to, Buddhism—the doctrine of the Jains—had also its way of salvation. According to the *Yogacāstra*, besides the practice of the five-fold conduct, (1) non-injury, (2) kindness, (3) honorableness, (4) chastity, (5) renunciation,—there were the other two “gems” which must be possessed by him who would experience the divine redemption. They were “right knowledge,” or the possession of the truth respecting the relations of spirit and non-spirit, and “right intuition,” or absolute faith in the word of the master and the declarations of the sacred texts. The reality of redemption is attained by escape from the body with its passions, desires, weaknesses, and sins.

It is Buddhism, however, which in some of its forms has made the nearest approaches to that doctrine of salvation which, upon a basis of Judaism, has brought to its highest excellence and practical potency the conception of the Divine Being as the Redeemer of the World. But this Buddhistic doctrine, in its latest example, is far enough removed from the doctrine of Buddha, the one chief excellence of whose teaching lay in its leveling or democratic character. To find his way to *Nirvāna* the plain man need not resort to the Brāhman or the sage. “He that is pure in heart is the true priest, not he that knows the Vedas. . . . The Vedas are nothing; the priests are of no account, save as they be morally of repute.” Again: “What use to mortify the flesh? Be pure, be good;

world over, I can myself bear witness. For I have heard the *Çankara-ācārya* of one sect (See *Journal of Am. Oriental Society*, xxii, pp. 227–236), in a discourse following a ceremonial designed only for the faithful, proclaim that absolute and unquestioning acceptance of the Vedic scriptures, as interpreted by the Brāhman, is the only way of salvation; and within a few weeks been told in private conversation with no less an authority than the “ascetic Rajah of Benares,” that most of these scriptures are mere “rubbish,” interspersed with “nuggets of gold,” that the Brāhmins are in general blind leaders of the blind, and that reflection, prayer, and self-renunciation constitute the only way to attain the redemption which is *Nirvāna*.

this is the foundation of wisdom. This is the foundation of wisdom—to restrain desire, to be satisfied with little. He is a holy man who doeth this.” “Go into all lands,”—such is the tradition as to the parting words of this teacher to his disciples—“and preach the gospel; tell them that the poor and lowly, the rich and high, all are one; and that all castes unite in this religion, as unite the rivers in the sea.” As to the end of salvation, this is Nirvāna, the release from *Karma* or the endless round of rebirths, in each of which would be embodied, as it were, the punishment for all the indulgences, weaknesses, and sins, of the previous existence. Doubtless, as says Professor Hopkins,¹ “Nirvāna meant to Buddha the extinction of lust, anger, and ignorance;”—this primarily; but although he does not seem to have preached it as an essential truth, he probably in his own mind identified Nirvāna with the extinction of all consciousness—with annihilation.

The later developments of the Buddhistic doctrine of the Divine Being as the Redeemer of the World, especially in Japan, have gone much further than the simple and chiefly negative teachings of the Founder. Indeed Hindūism, Jainism, and early Buddhism, can scarcely be said to have recognized in any clear and practically helpful way the doctrine of *God* as concerned in the salvation of mankind. For them the way of salvation was more obviously a practice of *self*-redemption. Yet, on the other hand, the tenet of the necessity of faith, however imperfectly developed, and even the insistence upon the practice of Yoga as an “action-devotion,” were recognitions of the great truth that for the redemption of man there is necessary on his part, the receptive and filial attitude; and that from the Divine Being, there comes an immanent spiritual influence which actually accomplishes a moral union between this Being and humanity. It was in opposition to the doctrine of salvation by following the eight-fold path of primitive Buddhism, or the ceremonialism and Phariseeism of India, that one

¹ Religions of India, p. 321.

of the Chinese propagators of *Jo-do* proclaimed the doctrine of salvation by a simple faith in the pitying and all-saving power of Amida—"the personification of boundless light." Shinran (1173-1262 A. D.), the founder of the Shin sect in Japan, taught as his central religious idea, that man is to be saved by faith in a compassionate Divine Being, who pities and loves him; and not by works or vain repetitions in prayer. That this faith has so generally degenerated into credulity, and has thus become powerless as an ethically purifying and inspiring force, is no essentially different phenomenon in Japanese Buddhism from that with which the history of numerous Christian sects has made the student entirely familiar. In general, it is the most lofty and inspiring of the tenets of religion, as of morality and of art, which are most readily misinterpreted and practically most abused.

The doctrine of a redeeming God developed in ancient Egypt with the cult of Osiris. The myth proclaimed that he was indeed a son of the gods, but he came to earth and sojourned among men in order to bring to them the blessings of civilization. By the devices of the Wicked One he was slain; but in dying Osiris passed into the other world, where he reigns over the dead as the "Good Being." Like the god, every man, no matter how good and noble, must die; but the good deeds live forever, and immortal life under the protection of this Divine One awaits the doer beyond the tomb. This doctrine of redemption found its way into Greece; and there, as well as in Egypt and throughout the Roman Empire, it prepared the way for Christianity.

From the sixth century B. C. onward to the coming of Christ, the joyous Greek nature, which had been without abiding consciousness of sin, had been toned down from its native high pitch of sensuousness; it had also been toned up ethically by the suffering of political calamities, and by the teachings of its dramatists and philosophers. The gift-sacrifices of the traditional religion no longer satisfied those profounder ethico-

religious ideas and feelings which had now become somewhat popular. The tramp "purifiers" and dispensers of valuable magic rites (*agyrtæ*), as well as the more permanent religious associations (*thiasi*; and *orgeones*) had aroused a demand for deeper spiritual satisfaction. What has been called that "wave of revivalism which spread from the Northern Semites over Hellas" had resulted in expanding and deepening the religious experience of the age. This took the form of a more imperative sense of need, and of the struggle for a higher spirituality which inevitably follows the feeling of this need. Love philtres, fanatical and even impure rites and ceremonies, were offered to meet this sense of need. In the ancient world as in the modern world, in so-called heathenism as in so-called Christianity, few probably pursued righteousness for its own sake, or inquired the way of salvation with an unmixed desire for an increased freedom from sin and a more perfect union with God. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the words of the candidate for the mystery of redemption from human suffering, weakness, and sin, when he rose from his knees—"Bad have I escaped, and better have I found,"—were sincerely uttered, and in the future effectively realized, by thousands of souls. For the Græco-Roman world was awakening to the conscious longing for redemption, and to the sense of the value for the aspiring spiritual life of the conception of God as the immanent, all-pitiful, and all-saving Redeemer.

It is not necessary to present again in detail the conception of Divine Redemption which was developed by Old-Testament Judaism. In the Semitic religions generally, the Divine Being was regarded as interested in the trials and distresses of his faithful followers in the present life. But as the grand ethical ideals of Judaism emerged and became dominant—first in the consciousness of the prophetic few, and then in the national consciousness, as expressed and cultivated by its sacred writings—a more distinctly moral and widely universal conception of God as the Redeemer arose and prevailed. To the last,

however, the conception of Judaism was national rather than individual, political rather than distinctly spiritual. The chosen people had sinned by being unfaithful to Yahweh; their weaknesses and miseries were the righteous punishment for their sins. God would be their Redeemer by establishing them anew, whenever they became convinced by the words of his messengers and returned to their allegiance to Him. But the need of a promise of redemption for the individual, and for the departed saints, could not be met in this way.

The answer which sprang from the consciousness of Jesus was a faith in God as the Redeemer of every individual soul that would take toward God the attitude of piety; and of the race through the continued proclamation and growing efficacy of the offer of redemption. Thus, as we have already said, the whole significance of the religion of Christ is found in its doctrine of redemption.

The Christian view of God as the Redeemer is characterized especially by two classes of conceptions, or groups of factors. One of these concerns the unique position which it gives to Christ himself as, in some peculiar meaning of the word, *the* Redeemer of mankind; the other is the completeness of the promised redemption, both as respects its moral and spiritual intensiveness and its extension over humanity. In it the eyes are focused upon the historical person; but from this center they are directed abroad over the whole range of human history and even of the cosmic evolutionary process. Jesus is God's appointed Redeemer; but his redemption is thoroughly democratic.

In his earlier conceptions of his mission and life-work, Jesus definitively and unqualifiedly locates himself in the historical Israel; his work is related to the divine revelation of redemption as made in the sacred writings of Israel. He has come to the "lost sheep" of this house; he brings bread from God's hand to "the children." He is the fulfilment of the Law and of Prophecy; he will claim nothing for himself that

has not already been claimed for Messiah by the prophets before him. It is, however, the prophets and the ethical, rather than the legal and ceremonial, contents of these Scriptures, with which he finds himself in accord. He is "the genial Restorer of the true content of Old-Testament religion." This claim, however, has its negative side. Jesus is almost from the first in revolt against the pharisaical spirit and the minute and petty discriminations and exactions of the scribes. Their pride and hatred toward other peoples, and their contempt for the great body of Israel who were not learned in the law, he opposes with the doctrine of faith in God's fatherly love and care. We soon begin to hear the voice of the divine pity and desire to redeem, for all the "wandering sheep" and "the sheep of other folds."

A more exalted and comprehensive conception of his office and work belongs to the later and latest period of the ministry of Jesus. He appears to regard himself as no longer merely a prophet of Israel, but a King in the Kingdom of Redemption; "no longer merely subject of religion, but its Object." This conviction was not with him a theological proposition, but an expression of his inner consciousness of communion with God. It is especially as "Son of Man," in the Messianic sense, that Jesus claims preëminence for his personality.¹ At the end of his life, the religious instructions, exhortations, and promises which constitute his doctrine of redemption may be summed up in the word "Gospel." In the religion of Christ this doctrine takes to itself the marks of a true and complete universality. Upon the content of the word a mod-

¹ In spite of the objections which have been made to Jesus' use of this title, and to his acceptance of the prevailing Apocalyptic conception of Messiah for himself, it is difficult to interpret the Gospels and the earlier Apostolic writings fairly without admitting something of the kind. On the other hand, the consciousness of sonship, and of his mission to lead many into this relation of sonship with God, is much the most essential thing about Jesus' claims to be a Divine Redeemer.

ern student¹ of unquestioned authority makes these observations: "The Gospel, which appears in these three elements, the dominion of God, a better righteousness embodied in the law of love, and the forgiveness of sin, is inseparably connected with Jesus Christ; for in preaching this gospel Jesus Christ everywhere calls men to himself. In him the Gospel is word and deed; it has become his food, and therefore his personal life; and into this life he draws all others. He is the son who knows the Father. In him men are to perceive the kindness of the Lord; in him they are to feel God's power and government of the world, and to become certain of this consolation; they are to follow him, the meek and lowly, and while he, the pure and holy one, calls sinners to himself, they are to receive the assurance that God through him forgiveth sin."

It is an integral part of this Gospel of Redeeming Love that the death of Jesus had significance in his own thought. It was the death of the shepherd in behalf of the sheep. He makes himself a voluntary offering for his own; and this end of his life is according to the will of his Father concerning him. The rescuing love of God is thus expressed; the revelation of the divine grace is thus accomplished; his life-work and Messianic office are thus finished and given completion.

From the purely historical point of view the death of Jesus was an event of little significance. He had scarcely become the object of attention and interest to any considerable number of people, when he perished, leaving behind a handful of insignificant followers. Nor was there anything about the manner of his death to excite the popular feeling; it was not through the fear or ill-will of the hated Roman government, or the hostile persecution of the Jewish public; it was due to his having incurred the enmity of a small party of priests and Pharisees. At first, this event seemed to his few disciples to put an end to their hopes for the redemption of Israel, and for the establishment of the divine government in the world upon

¹ See Harnack, *History of Dogma*, I, p. 59f

a new and more favorable basis. This, in spite of the fact that, at least in the latest days of his ministry, Jesus had himself become aware that his death was inevitable; and had taught that it was a most important factor in the plan of God his Father for the redemption of mankind. In proof of this teaching appeal may be made to the institution of the memorial supper; to the agony and prayer in the Garden of Gethsemane; and to his complaints that his disciples did not comprehend the true nature of his kingdom, or the way in which his salvation was to be established. "If," as says the authority already several times quoted,¹ "we also consider that Jesus himself described his death as a service which he was rendering to many, and that by a solemn act he instituted a lasting remembrance of it . . . we can understand how this death and the shame of the cross were bound to take the central place."

The significance of this event respecting the truth of God as the Redeemer of mankind comprises, therefore, these three principal elements: (1) The death of Jesus is an example of self-sacrificing service, which has the divine authority and approval to commend it, and which has reached the furthest possible limit; (2) it is a victory which, when followed by the belief in his resurrection, awakens in his followers the conviction that God is with man, as Lord of life and Moral Ruler of the living and the dead; and (3) it is somehow, by this supreme self-sacrifice that the deliverance of man from sin and death is to be accomplished,—and this, for all mankind who will follow in the "way of Jesus."

As to how the death of Jesus operates to complete the work of redemption to which he gave himself, or becomes a central, efficient factor in this work, the Apostles and other writers of the New Testament do not make clear. Theories of the atonement and of the person of Christ followed, as soon as reflection began its work upon the facts of Christian experience, and as a matter of course; their history is an essential part of the

¹ Harnack, *What is Christianity?* p. 172.

history of Christian dogma. Nor can it be denied that the efforts to throw light upon this problem have been significant and potent factors in the philosophy of religion as cultivated by the modern Christian world. But almost from the first there were different conceptions as to the ontological relations of the man Jesus to the Divine Being; and, also, as to the value of the death of Jesus in securing the redemption of mankind. That he was in a unique sense "Son of God" and divinely appointed Messiah, and that his death has somehow a saving value, all the writings of the New Testament, including those of Paul, the Johannine, First Peter, Hebrews, and the Apocalypse, are agreed. But no theory, whether formed in a germinal way in these writings or developed later by schools of Christian philosophy and theology, can confidently appeal to the authority of Jesus himself. They must all, so to say, stand upon their own merits, and be subjected to the tests of experience as undergoing an historical development. This development, itself, when regarded from the Christian point of view,—a point of view identical with that taken by Christ himself,—is nothing else than the progressive realization of the work of God as an immanent Divine Redeemer. In its totality, the work is equivalent to the establishment of the Kingdom of God among, and over, mankind. The tendency, which has often prevailed and still prevails, to separate the death of Jesus from his personality and work, and to make a theory of its *modus operandi* the essential tenet in Christian faith, incurs the risk of a mischievous mistake. His death cannot be appreciated properly except in indissoluble connection, both historical and doctrinal, with the totality of that work. And the totality of that work can be appreciated properly—not to say, wholly comprehended—only when the testimony of the experience of his individual followers and of the race, as affected by that work, has been called to our aid. In this experience, if anywhere, must the proof of the Christian conception of God as the Redeemer of the World be found.

When raising the question of evidence for the religious conception of God as the Redeemer of mankind, it must be remembered in what sense only "proof" is possible in such a case. In general, it may be said, then, that the only evidence for this conception must be given in the actual experience of redemption. There are, indeed, obscure intimations, vague hints, and even impressive anticipations, of such a truth in that behavior of the cosmic forces, and that course of the cosmic processes, with which the physico-chemical sciences have to deal. Certain remedial agencies, and even certain *quasi*-redeeming operations, of so-called Nature may be pointed out. But these evidences are quite balanced, if not overwhelmed, by considerations which would lead the candid observer of nature's way of dealing with human weaknesses and human sins, away from rather than toward a confidence in the divine redemptive processes. The evidence of evolution is, indeed, on the whole—though by no means so conclusively as is customarily claimed—in favor of a reasonable belief in the continued betterment of the race. But betterment, especially of the form sought by an age that is extraordinarily greedy of gain in wealth, political power, and the prestige of empire, and which is relatively indifferent to the highest ethical and religious ideals, is not "Redemption" in the meaning in which Christ and the other great leaders and reformers of religion have used this sacred term. For the Christian Church now to renew the claim of Augustine that its borders are inclusive of the Kingdom of Redemption is to excite the ridicule and scorn of intelligent minds. And the moment that the evolutionary process itself is converted into a *purely* mechanical or biological affair, it is separated from the ideal beliefs and sentiments which give it force; and it then loses all resemblance to a truly redemptive process.

If we could distinguish the redeeming forces in the history of the race which are not "natural," in the more restricted meaning of the term, from the definitively religious life and

development of humanity, we should find that they afford only very doubtful evidence for the conception of God as the Redeemer. In a word, it is in religious experience itself that our confidence in the divine redemptive wisdom and goodness has its roots, its evidence, and its hope of attaining its end. The very conception of Redemption is supremely a *religious* conception; its proof is therefore necessarily to be found in *religious* experience. In interpreting this experience, however, our notions of religion must emphasize the intimate and comprehensive relations which its beliefs and sentiments sustain to the whole life and progress of humanity. The self-sacrificing services of all the good, in every grade of society and of every people, may undoubtedly be regarded as contributions to this one, great divine work of relieving man from his condition of weakness, misery, and sin. But these services, too, in order to be interpreted as "moments," or factors, in this work must take their proper place in the history of humanity. It is, then, in the total experience of humanity, when regarded from the religious point of view, that our proof of the doctrine must be sought for, and found, if found at all.

The conception of God as the Redeemer of mankind reaches its highest form in Christianity; and by "highest form" must be understood the form that is most intimate, most effective, most comprehensive, and most rational. To establish its intimacy an appeal to the experience of the Christian believer is the only available or conceivable proof; for this quality is expressed in the subjective attitude of the personal consciousness toward its own weaknesses, miseries, and sins. To feel relief from these is to be, so far forth, here and now redeemed. From the individual's point of view, the redemption *is* the relief. The efficiency of the redemption offered and furnished by Christianity may also be in a measure shown historically; for an appeal may be made to the fact that the religion of Christ evinces its own essential being in diminishing, as judged by all the objective signs, the amount of human misery and

sin. In similar manner, the comprehensive character of the redemptive process is shown both by the essential content of Christian truth, with its democratic offer of salvation, and by its actual entrance into the life of humanity, as a redeeming force, irrespective of differences of race, of social condition, of stages of culture, or even, in a marvelous way, of previous moral condition. And, finally, it is the work of Christian apologetics, in the broadest meaning of this study, to show the rationality of the Christian doctrine of God as the Redeemer.

In order to maintain this last contention, however, it is necessary for the apologist constantly to distinguish between the essential content of truth as it was given to the world in the person and work of Jesus, and all the theological or philosophical accretions which have been, or may be, mingled with this content. The truth of this content is contained in the faith of the Christian that the redeeming grace of God, meeting in life with man's need of redemption, is realizable by every man; and in the experience which is the concrete realization of this faith. Thus, for the individual, when he has experienced the consciousness of sin and of the need which is a part of this consciousness, and has entered upon the struggle for spirituality that naturally follows, the Christian resolution of this consciousness is essentially subjective religion itself. It is the rational attitude of a finite spirit, when recognizing its own weaknesses, miseries, and sins, toward that perfect Ethical Spirit which constitutes the Object of religious faith. This is not religion for angels, or for perfected finite spirits, if such spirits exist. It is religion for man, when man comes to know himself from the higher spiritual point of view.

In order, however, to maintain that the Christian experience of redemption fits the universal need of humanity for that dependent manifestation of God's presence in the world which is embodied in the conception of God as the Redeemer, allowance must be made for all the differentiations which characterize the

individuality of religion,¹ and for disregarding the admixtures and idiosyncrasies that characterize these individual experiences and the various so-called "types" of religious subjectivity. The redemptive work of the Divine Being is as mysteriously varied, and at the same time universal, as any other form of his work.

Moreover, the divine work with the race is an historical process. The history of religions shows how man's dissatisfaction with his own relation to God, his dawning and deepening consciousness of weakness and sinfulness, and his consequent struggle to realize his own ideal of spiritual being, are essential factors in the religious development of the race. So, too, is the rising faith of humanity in God as Ethical Spirit, pitiful and gracious Father, and willing to redeem, an historical development. The various mediators, or assistants, in the divine manifestation—royal, priestly, prophetic, or political—have been appointed, equipped, and located in humanity, as historical characters. The preparation for him who was to be called, above others, *the Redeemer*, was an historical process. Jesus was essentially, not a speculative construction or a mythical idea, but an historical personality. What has gone on since his appearance, by way of realizing the ideals concretely presented in his person and work, lies before the student of Christianity chiefly in the form of historical facts.

The evidence for, or testimony to the ontological value of, the conception of God as the Redeemer, has, therefore, two sources of experience, which are really only two ways of expressing the one source. This one source is the totality of human religious experience, as that of a race developing under conditions which somehow make necessary the divine work of redemption, and which show this needed divine work actually in progress toward its own realization in the perfected spirituality of the race. But this experience may be considered by the philosophy of religion in two ways:—either as it is felt by

¹ Comp. Vol. I, chap. XXIV.

the individual consciousness and observed by those who note the conduct of the individual ; or else as it manifests itself and its products in the larger, but more obscure and doubtful, fields of the history of humanity. In both these ways, while the activities and achievements of all the greater world-religions should be gratefully acknowledged, there can be little doubt that the religion of Christ exceeds them all in the character of its doctrine of redemption and in the results of the redeemed life.

For the individual, therefore, the proof of the doctrine of redemption must always continue to be chiefly his own experience of religion as the power of a new life. The earliest form of the Christian experience attached itself directly to the personal presence of Jesus. They who saw and heard him, and who then believingly followed him, *actually experienced* a new life. On this account, they regarded Jesus as the Savior and Lord of the individual soul. But after death removed his personal presence from them, they still regarded him as the source of a vivifying spiritual influence—the source of life, a life-imparting Spirit, for his disciples. Thus, as says Harnack,¹ “the characteristic feature of the primitive community is, that every individual in it, even the very slaves, possesses a living experience of God.” This life, however, was never, from the very first, an exclusive devotion to the traditional words of Jesus, or a punctilious imitation of his life, or even a slavish submission to his thoughts and his will,—much less to the teachings and injunctions of his chosen Apostles. It was, rather, a free working of the perfect Ethical Spirit transforming the weak and sinful finite spirit into likeness to itself. “This mutual union of a full, obedient, subjection to the Lord with freedom in the Spirit is the most important feature in the distinctive character of this religion, and the seal of its greatness.”

But like every powerful vital influence, and especially like every powerful religious influence, the redeemed life of the

¹ What is Christianity? p. 177f.

Christian is a social affair. It is the power to live one's own life with, and for, others in a new and higher form of the social relation. Thus this spirit was destined to effect a redemption in the life of the community of believers. It must penetrate the entire body and weld them together, as it were, in holy living—in purity and brotherly fellowship. We have seen how the idea of purification, as somehow essential for the proper religious life, is nearly as old and as universal as religion itself. In the later period of the Greek religion, participation in the mysteries required a laver of regeneration followed by a sacrifice of salvation. So Christian baptism properly stood at the entrance to an enjoyment of the purifying influence of this life. But baptism, and all other ceremonial observances, were of small importance compared with that experience of transformation in the whole temper and mind in which reposed the faith in God as the Redeemer of the human soul.

Yet this new life, although it had all the fullness and exuberance of the Spirit, was also a very sober practical sort. There are traces, indeed, of excesses breaking out among the early Christians; and numerous excesses constantly show themselves in connection with the Christian life during the centuries of Church history. But to correct or repress such exhibition accords with the real and essential spirit of the Christian life. At present, however, the conception of God as the Redeemer of the World by the work of the Spirit that was immanent in Christ has issued in rather shallow notions of a semi-socialistic order; or in confidence in the so-called laws of economics and sociology; rather than in a just valuation of those forces and ideals which are more independent of the externals and superficialities of social and economic conditions.

And, finally, the work of the Spirit of Christ in the human soul, which begins by finding its entrance through faith, and by effecting subjective reconciliation and the assurance of relief from human weaknesses, miseries, and sins, as the indwelling spiritual force of a new life, ends in the conferring of im-

mortality, or the eternal and blessed existence in union with God and his redeemed ones. Completed salvation, or the goal and end of redemption, is then for the individual, not so-called "natural" immortality, happily circumstanced, as believed in by the savage or by the modern Christian theologian; nor is it Hindū absorption into Deity, or Buddhistic Nirvāna, or the Paradise of Islam. It is, the rather, a complete ethical correspondence, or habitual voluntary response, of the human will to the Divine Will; it is the reception into the human spirit of the fullness of the Divine Spirit. In this meaning of the words, *union with God* is redemption, the ideal consummation of religion.

It is matter of historical fact that the experience of redemption, and the confident belief in God as the Redeemer through his immanence in humanity as specialized, so to say, in Jesus Christ, became a most potent factor in the regeneration of the ancient world. The vitalizing power of Christianity, as the experience of subjective redemption and as the confident hope in the success of the divine process of redeeming society, wrought everywhere important changes in the moral impulses and practices of men. In spite of the poverty, lowness of estate, and frequent and bitter persecutions of its believers the vitality of their experience as a force propagated in society, is the noteworthy feature of early Christianity. It operated like the introduction of new life-blood into the social and political body. And this continued to be true for centuries, in spite of the alterations, and in some important respects, deteriorations, which the later social and political prestige of this religion brought about.

The best philosophical results of the doctrine of Redemption were undoubtedly, in the earlier centuries of the Christian Church, developed by the application of the prevailing Hellenizing spirits to the fact and truths of historical Christianity. On the one hand, these results cannot be identified as a whole, or by selecting any one of the prominent theories thus developed,

with the essential and unchanging features of the ontologically valid conception of God as the Redeemer of mankind. On the other hand, they cannot be rejected as unworthy of consideration, or as wholly unessential accretions about the true content of this conception. Like all developments of religious beliefs and sentiments,—and, indeed, like all human opinions and conclusions based in a similar way upon special aspects, or classes, of experiences,—they, too, must be judged by the evidence appropriate to their case. Of this, however, there can be little doubt: The construction of dogma, as it took place in the form adopted by the early Church Catholic, and still later in the form of the revived Paulinism of the Augustinian theology, was the liveliest movement in philosophy belonging to those centuries. And the religious organization which it produced, in order that the Christian Church might step into the place then being vacated by the decline of the Roman Empire, was the most powerful of all the political constructive movements of the same centuries. These philosophical results were continued and developed yet further by the Mediæval theologians; but even more fruitfully by the later Christian Mystics. At the present time they are being quite properly subjected to the reflections of the reigning philosophical Idealism, upon the basis of Christian experience and of the history of the Christian development. The real problem involved, when fundamentally considered, is this: How shall we truly conceive of those spiritual relations and activities which exist between the Personal Absolute, who is perfect Ethical Spirit, and the finite spirit of man, taken as he is, in all his weakness, misery, and sinfulness, so as to explain, his experience of redemption, and so as to realize progressively his ideals of the redeemed life?

The profound and far-reaching problem which the philosophy of religion raises in the form just announced, the experience of religion answers in a more concrete and practical way. The special answer of Christian faith is its doctrine of redemption through the divine immanence in humanity, as revealed in the

person, work, and abiding spiritual influence of Jesus Christ. *Proof* of the truth of religion's answer, in the stricter meaning of the words, can come only in, and through, the effective working and final triumph of the experience itself. Is God, indeed, the Redeemer, by a spiritual and yet historical process, of the race of man? The individual who has the experience, may reply for himself. The observer, who notes the facts of history and reasons profoundly in their explanation, may be reasonably confident of an affirmative answer. *But the final and conclusive proof is the completion of the process.* Thus the conception of God as the Redeemer becomes connected with, and merged in, the conception of the Kingdom of Redemption; and this implies the actual triumph in the history of the race, of the most comprehensive and exalted of human ethico-religious and social ideals.

CHAPTER XLII

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION

It has been the belief of man's religious experience, in all stages and forms of its expression and development, that the gods somehow make themselves known to man; and also that the invisible, superhuman spirits exercise some hidden influence upon the spirits of visible, human beings. It may be said, then, that the conceptions of revelation and inspiration are essential, in order to account for the experience of religion, when looked at either from the point of view offered by an analysis of the content and nature of religion itself, or from that of an attempt to interpret the religious development of humanity. The two aspects of religion may, indeed, be viewed together in some such declaration as the following: "God's revelation to man, and man's discovery of God, are but two sides of the same divine education of the race." Or better still: What is called, when considered from one point of view, the history of the self-revelation of God, may also with equal propriety, when regarded from another point of view, be called man's progress in the knowledge, feeling, and service of God.

Essentially considered, all religion is a Divine Self-revelation, —a revealing, or making of God known, by God, to man. As says a recent writer on apologetics:¹ "Religion is consciousness of God, awakened by impressions of God upon the rational personality. It is therefore either an illusion, or else God himself must have called it forth in man." This is to say, that either the central truth of religion, as it is involved in

¹ D. H. Schultz, *Grundriss der Christlichen Apologetik*, p. 20.

man's attitude toward God, has reality because it is produced and validated by the Spirit of God; or else religion itself is the product of man's undeveloped fancy, is without cosmic correlate, and is rather a dream, from which, when his brain is better nourished, and his mind more illumined, he may awake to the knowledge of having been self-deceived.

The Source of revelation is God. This statement follows as a matter of course from the conception of the Being of God as omniscient and holy Spirit, and of his ever living, active and omnipresent relations to the world. However various the modes emphasized in the different religions, and however numerous the media employed by them, there is one, and only one source of revelation; from the point of view of theistic religious philosophy, this source is the perfect Ethical Spirit, the Self-Revealer in all the religious experience of the individual and of the race.

The Object of revelation is also God:—not, however, as an abstract conception, or as a system of religious philosophy given, as it were, ready-made; but as a personal Life, working in immanent and historically continuous communion with the developing life of humanity. It is the making known, that He is, and what He is, in all those relations which religion symbolically recognizes in its doctrines of God, the Creator, Upholder, Destroyer, Moral Ruler, and Redeemer, of the world, which constitutes the one object of the Divine work of revelation.

The Subject of revelation is man:—primarily, the individual to whom the revelation comes, and in whose experience God makes himself to be felt and known; but secondarily and supremely, in the religious experience of the race considered as an historical series of human, individual consciousnesses, who are related in space and time, by a variety of political, ethical, and social bonds. It is humanity to which God is revealing Himself. From this general truth, two most important corollaries follow. And, first, the very nature of religion, consid-

ered as a Divine Self-revelation, is such that, from the psychological point of view, the process of revealing requires the co-operating activity of the entire nature of man. Although the term "revelation" lays emphasis on *knowledge* as the product of man's intellectual and cognitive activities, it does not exclude, but the rather of necessity includes, the accompanying functions of affection and will. Only through the spirit of piety in man is God made known to man. He that *wills* to do God's will, as Jesus said, shall know of the doctrine. But, secondly, revelation is in its very nature an act of divine condescension. The character of the individual, or of the community, always furnishes conditions to the character of the revelation itself. To use the figurative language of the religious consciousness: In every act of revelation, and in its entirety as an historical process, God "stoops" to man; He adapts himself to the capacities and necessities of those to whom he would make himself known.

The "historical conditionateness" of revelation follows from all this. Revelation is always some fact in history; and the series of "revealings," when discovered, treated pragmatically, and interpreted according to their significance for the religious development of the race, is nothing other than the actual history of revelation. Like every other narrative, that of revelation should be studied with reserve, with candor, with a critical estimate of claims, but with a due evaluation of the significance of the facts. For the history of man's religious evolution is not antithetic to the rational doctrine of a Divine Self-revealing. On the contrary, the historical view of religion, as an important and necessary phase of man's complex development, *demand*s a doctrine of revelation which shall be so framed as to accord with the historical facts. If, on the one hand, we try to weaken or to escape the force of the conclusion by a wrong use of such terms as "special revelation," "special divine dispensation," etc., we are at once convicted of a retreat to that lower point of view, from which it is impossible

to estimate fairly the phenomena of man's religious life and religious development. On the other hand, it is indicative of a lingering narrowness of conception, of a painful failure to rise to the higher point of view, when such terms as "supernatural," "revelation," "inspiration," etc., are discredited by the advocates of the study of religious phenomena from a purely historical point of view.

As in the case of all the other great religious conceptions and doctrines, the conception of Revelation has undergone a process of clarifying and uplift from the earliest dawn of religious consciousness, so far as history enables us to trace this process, until the present time. We may not, indeed, be able to accept with confidence the contention of M. de Bonald, that a primitive supernatural revelation is "the absolute condition of human life, such as it is unfolded in history."¹ But this inability, if conceded, would not controvert the truth of the facts upon which Brinton relies in making the statement:² "I shall tell you of religions so crude as to have no temples or altars, no rites or prayers; but I can tell you of none that does not teach the belief of the intercommunion of the spiritual powers and man. Every religion is a Revelation—in the opinion of its votaries." "Not only that 'God is above us,' but also that 'God is in us,'" says Tiele,³ "is a belief common to all religions." But it is the special character given to the idea of revelation by the two great world-religions, Buddhism and Christianity, which distinguishes them above others. All religions accept, and virtually originate in, revelation; oracles, prophets, signs and wonders, belong to them all. Most religions identify the organs or books of revelation with the revelation itself. But these two regard the individual Founders as special and supreme revealers of a new religious doctrine.

¹ See Réville, *Prolegomena of the History of Religions*, chap. III, on "The Primitive Revelation."

² *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, p. 50.

³ *Elements of the Science of Religion*, Second Series, p. 103f.

Otherwise, they differ in their doctrine of revelation. With Buddhism, incarnations of the Divine Being come at different epochs to make known, and illustrate, the way of salvation to man. With Christianity, God is regarded as steadfastly immanent in humanity, revealing Himself as its Redeemer by an historical, but spiritual process, that has for its goal the founding of the perfect social community, the Kingdom of God among men.

All these truths as to the source, object, subject, and process of revelation, which are only dimly foreshadowed and presented in a fragmentary way by the lower religions, are absolutely essential factors in that theistic conception which regards the relations of God to the world as those of a perfect Ethical Spirit to finite spirits existing under the conditions of an historical redemptive process. "Atheism may consistently aver that all religions, Judaism and Christianity included, are only differing forms of superstition; Deism may deny that any one form of revelation can really possess those supernatural characteristics which all these religions, in fact, claim for themselves; Pantheism may assert that there is no substantial and personal distinction between the object and subject of revelation. But according to the theistic conception of God and his relations to the world, religion, which involves real relations of fear, obedience, and love, between the Absolute Personality and the personality of man, cannot exist without revelation. The Divine must come forth from the unknown, from that which he is 'in-himself,' in order to make himself known, in order to reveal himself to man."¹

On the other hand, the historical nature and "conditionateness" of all religious revelation can least of all be denied by the theist and believer in Biblical religion. The facts of Biblical religion, as known by modern scholarship, show that, however special its development, it had, back of and around it, the same so-called "natural," heathenish, and even super-

¹ Quoted from the author's *Doctrine of Sacred Scripture*, II, p. 306

stitious and mythical elements, which are found in all the other greater religions. Moreover, the statements and attitudes of the most illumining of the Biblical writers themselves, and of the teachers of the Christian Church, ancient and modern, confirm the view that this revelation was a movement from the imperfect to the more perfect, from that adapted to lower conditions upward toward the higher and more universal. Though divinely produced and fostered, it occurred under the conditions of an actual, historical process. Indeed, the teachings of Biblical religion can be summed up in no better way than to declare: It is God making himself known as the Redeemer by his immanence in the history of humanity. The *specialty* of this religion is its possession, in a special degree, of those characteristics by which we rightly judge the theoretical and practical worth of all religious experience.

The psychology of revelation requires little special discussion, in view of what has already been said with so much detail regarding the religious nature of man, and the nature of man's religion, from the psychological point of view. The tendency to believe in revelation, and indeed the somewhat imperative need of this belief, comes from the inexhaustible spring of religious experience. But this tendency is especially aroused and fostered, it would appear, by the following three considerations: (1) The mystery of speech and the other mysterious signs of intelligence which man's environment shows to him; (2) the need of authority, and the longing for it, in order to attain some, at least temporarily and partially satisfactory theory of existence, that shall allow an ontological value to the fundamental principles and higher ideals of human reason; and (3) the pressure of life's practical interests, as contrasted with man's ignorance of the causes which favor or hinder these interests, and in particular, his ignorance of the future, both of his bodily life and also of what comes to him after death. It is in the demand which arises out of these needs, and in the effort to meet the demand, that religions in general have their

origin. It is by the way in which they meet this demand, and supply these needs, that the different religions are valued by their disciples and devotees. *Knowledge*, or at least the semblance of knowledge, is craved by the aspiring soul of man. Religion claims to furnish this knowledge; Revelation is, therefore, of its essence, so to say.

In their work of revealing, the divine beings or superhuman invisible powers have traditionally been supposed to make use of a great variety of Means. And why should it not be so; since a great variety of means is at their disposal, and is plainly serviceable for their purposes. Among such media of revelation as are chiefly employed in the relatively non-moral and irrational stages of religion, are a great diversity of omens, the casting of lots, oracles, dreams, and strange and unintelligible events.¹ Among the Romans the college of augurs was the appointed and legally regulated way of ascertaining the will of the gods. Their cult was neither petitionary nor piacular, but rather a kind of refined and elaborated magic. With this people the "haruspices" or diviners, appear to have been of Etruscan origin; and the three classes of divination were viewing the entrails, the token of lightning, and the interpretation of unnatural and significant occurrences, or portents (*ostenta*).² In Old-Testament times, as in the Chinese Joss-house to-day, the casting of lots was thought to afford a way of discovering the secrets of the divine mind as to the future; then, and always, because they are subject to the control of the unscrupulous priest or seer, oracles are of all the alleged media of revelation most uncertain and liable to misuse. In the development of Biblical religion dreams and visions had no unimportant place. In the experiences of the founder of the faith of Islam, the first beginnings of his inspiration came in the form of "real

¹ For a classified list of omens among the Assyrians and Babylonians, see Jastrow, *Ibid.*, pp. 352ff.

² See Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, pp. 461ff.

visions." "Every vision that he saw was clear as the morning-dawn," says one of the biographers of Muhammad.

He who holds to a rational faith in Providence, at once universal and also special, detailed, and minute, cannot fail to admit the possibility of the divine will making itself known through any of these ethically inferior means of revelation. The smoking entrails of animals just slain, the flight of birds, the flash of lightning, the natural portent, or the sepulchral utterance from the seer's cave, may give a new impression that God is, and an expanded idea of what he is, to men in the lower stages of their ethico-religious evolution. But, on the other hand, no means of revelation are adequate to convey a finished product of comprehensive knowledge; and no inspiration guarantees such infallibility that the truth revealed needs no examination or further expansion by other divinely illumined minds. Revelation, by whatever means accomplished, is an act of divine condescension, which is conditioned upon the psychological development, and physical and historical environment, of those to whom the revelation comes. Imperfection and admixture of error, and even factors due to self-deceit or to the selfish desire to deceive others, are present quite as a rule. But even liars and fools may reveal God, if only their word comes, as in the long run it is sure to do, to be taken at its real worth. While always, and in all religions, it is largely out of the mouths of babes and sucklings that he has ordained his strength to be made known.

As humanity rises in race-culture, however, it is not the most marvelous and extraordinary natural occurrences, but the rather the established cosmic order which becomes the preferred means of the Divine Self-revelation in nature. The relation of this cosmic order to the work of making God known is expressed by certain teachings in even the earlier stages of the world's religious history. That the heavens reveal the glory of God is the voice of Old-Testament piety. And Paul declares (Rom. i, 19-25) that they are "without excuse," and

have "vain imaginations" and "darkened, foolish hearts," who do not understand "the invisible things of the eternal power and Godhead," as they are clearly seen and "understood by the things that are made." In the same spirit, the denial of the divine revelation in and through nature has been declared heretical by an ecumenical council of the Roman Catholic Church. And if an appeal is taken to the æsthetical appreciation of nature as it is expressed in the more exalted strains of poetry, we find it confirming the religious consciousness in its conviction:—

"Forever at the loom of time I ply,
And weave for God the garment thou seest Him by."

On the other hand, modern science in its effort to substitute for the God of religion the more abstract conception of a "Mother-Nature" (so Haeckel) or a Nature-God (Goethe), and modern religious dogma in its reactions against the former extremes of so-called "natural" theology, have combined to depreciate the divine revelation in the cosmic forces and processes. And, indeed, nature cannot reveal God to the man who is *merely* a child of nature. What nature is to the individual and to the race, depends upon what the individual is, and what the race is—æsthetically, ethically, and religiously. The history of man's moral and social elevation evinces the preparation which the race has undergone in order to receive and interpret this form of the Divine Self-revelation. Nature "in-itself," or considered from the *purely* scientific point of view, does not make God known.

The human mind never—not even (it might almost be said, least of all) when it faces natural phenomena in the scientific attitude—receives and interprets its impressions in a purely unsentimental and unideal way. Through natural phenomena God did, in fact, reveal himself to primitive man in the form of the invisible spiritual environment, with which man must reckon, and to which he must "square himself," in order to attain the good he desires and to avoid the evils he dreads. But

as man rises in the ethical scale and conceives of the Divine Being as more distinctively ethical, nature itself appears to him to be the minister of the divine, ethical purposes. God then appears *in* the natural phenomena, ruling the world thus in righteousness. Finally, to the more mature, reflective religious consciousness God becomes the active principle of that rational order which both science and religion attribute to the Cosmos; in, and through, that order God is perpetually making himself known.

The self-revelation of God in human history and in Providence is yet more distinctly and forcefully evinced as a tenet of the philosophy of religion. Among all the various forms of history this process is especially significant in the historical development of religion itself. By accepting this statement a return is once more made to the point of view from which the process of the Divine Self-revealing and the history of man's religious evolution seem to run parallel to the end; if they do not, the rather, perfectly coincide.

In the religious history of humanity it is human thought and human speech which are the most distinctive and effective media of the Self-revelation of God; and yet more especially, the thought and speech of the divinely selected and inspired men of revelation. Above all the other means, then, which the Divine Being employs to make himself known are the prophets, religious teachers and reformers, and the founders of new and epoch-making religious movements. As in every other form of the development of humanity, so in religion it is the few that lead the race. And such is the very nature of religion, that only finite spirit can afford to Infinite Spirit the fullest and the most effective medium of revelation. Humanity reveals the Superhuman as entering its own conscious thoughts and utterances; but this is God *in* man, making God known *to* man. Only through finite selves can the Absolute Self reveal his own Self.

As they have risen above the earlier and cruder stages of

their development, all religions have, therefore, been dependent upon their prophets, priests, and religious teachers, for their knowledge of religious truth. Nor is such dependence ceremonial or external merely; it is, the rather, of the same nature essentially as that which the history of race-culture everywhere exhibits; it is the dependence of the relatively obscure and unreflective, upon the more enlightened and thoughtful minds. This voice of God to man, through man, has been variously expressed. In the creeds of these different religions, the avatars of Vishnu, the various incarnations of the Buddha, the demi-gods that descended from the Scandinavian Heimdallr, the prophets and seers of Old-Testament religion, and Jesus and his Apostles in the New Dispensation, all have the office of revealing God to man. Indeed, the doctrine of religious revelation culminates in the belief, which the facts amply warrant;—namely, that some members of the race are constitutionally, and by habits of thought and feeling, and by purity of life, as well as by what we are entitled to consider especial spiritual impulses and insights, fitted to convey the truths of religion to their fellow men. To these “men of revelation” the race does, in fact, chiefly owe its growing and improved religious conceptions and practices.

It is at this point that the religious doctrine of Inspiration becomes intimately and necessarily connected with the doctrine of revelation. Revelation, or God’s making Himself known as immanent Spirit in human history, is indeed the primary conception; inspiration is a secondary, dependent, and yet necessarily correlated conception. Inspiration is the subjective or inward influence upon the whole mental life, which makes possible the revelation. Religious inspiration differs from other allied forms of inspiration, according as the character of the mental activities necessary for the apprehension of new religious truth differs from that necessary for the apprehension of other new truth. More definitively, these three distinctions are important: (1) Revelation lays emphasis upon growth in

the knowledge of religious truth rather than upon the excitement of the feelings, and the culture of the practical activities of religion; (2) Revelation lays emphasis upon a product rather than upon a process, considered as a kind of reciprocity or functioning of the mind,—upon truth gained rather than upon the way of gaining it; (3) Revelation lays emphasis upon the more permanent and organic factors, but inspiration upon a state that may temporarily be induced under divine influences. As says a great German theologian¹: “Revelation, in process of being imparted to the spirit of man, *is*, so far as its form is concerned, inspiration.” This is to say that, from the point of view of religious experience, the formal process which occurs in the mental life while the truth is being made known, is itself an inspiration;—or, as the figure of speech suggests, a stirring-up of the finite human spirit by the Infinite Spirit. Spiritual truth is made known by communion of human spirits with the Spirit of God.

The relation between revelation and inspiration may be considered from the point of view of religious experience, as this relation finds application both to the individual soul and also to the religious development of the race. In the case of the individual, the attitude of piety is one of receptivity toward the truth, of reverence for its appearance, and of thankfulness and praise for its possession. Thus the soul is open to the Revealer of all truth, to Him in whose right hand the gift of truth is held. But in its larger application, the immanence of the revealing and inspiring presence of God is recognized as necessary to interpret the religious development of the race. As God is made known to humanity in an historical way; so a process of ethical illumining, elevating, and purifying, has made humanity susceptible to the advancing degrees of revelation. But this two-fold process itself has always been chiefly achieved by the activity of the inspired men of revelation. Through them has come about the mental seizure of religious truth, and

¹ J. A. Dorner, *Christliche Glaubenslehre*, I, p. 620.

the convincing proclamation and living manifestation of this truth.

Inspiration is, therefore, a term which applies, primarily, only to personal beings. To be capable of being inspired is to be a Self; and the religious doctrine of inspiration assumes the Selfhood of the Divine Being. From this important general truth, the psychologically correct inference follows in a necessary way. The kinds and degrees of inspiration vary with the personal characteristics, development, and environment, of the inspired personality. The subject always furnishes limiting conditions to the character and extent of the inspiration. "That the inspiration of different persons will differ in the degree and mode of its manifestation, is a corollary from the general truth which makes inspiration a truly personal affair."¹ In different individuals, or in different inspirations of the same individuals, the subjective conditions are always made prominent, both in respect of the functions involved and also of the product of truth evolved. Now the psychology of the inspired mental state must take account of temperament, mood, constitutional and acquired capacity; of the character of the theme upon which feeling and thought are concentrated, and of the conditions surrounding the expression of this feeling and thought. The inspiration of the poet is not the inspiration of the inventor, or the warrior. The inspiration of Sakya-Muni differs from that of Zarathustra; nor is either of these like that of Muhammad. Within the sphere of Old-Testament religion we find inspired poets, statesmen, artisans, and warriors, all serving Yahweh, and all made ready for this service by the inflatus of his Spirit. While, in their mental apprehension and unfolding of the truth of the religion of Christ, the inspiration of Peter is markedly different from that of the writer of the Gospel and Epistles of John; and neither of these furnishes the pattern to be copied exactly by such revelations and inspirations as were divinely accorded to Paul.

¹ Quoted from the author's *Doctrine of Sacred Scripture*, II, p. 474.

Particularly characteristic, however, of the higher and more efficient kinds of religious inspiration is its *ethical dynamics*,—its moral insight, moral conviction, moral choice inflexibly directed toward doing the Divine Will. In the lower stages of man's religious life, on the contrary, the form, the product, and the testing of the supposed divine influence are of correspondingly low and unethical character. The earliest conception of inspiration is, indeed, chiefly confined to the theory and practice of witchcraft and demoniacal possession. This conception implies that the god being of an evil disposition, has *possessed* the soul of the human being, or has sent some of his subject spirits to take possession of it. But the witch or devil-priest knows the formula necessary to dispossess this bad spirit, and perhaps to substitute another more kindly spirit in its stead. Again, the priest or priestess goes into a condition of trance or ecstasy, under the influence of the god, and during this condition some secret as to the future becomes divinely revealed, or some special insight into present fact or truth is obtained. In the Babylonian texts containing incantations, for example, one series which covered no less than sixteen tablets, bore the name of "the evil demon"—these incantations being supposed to afford special protection against various classes of demons.¹ Another series which dealt with various mental derangements, was known as the series of "head-sickness, etc." But the priests, since they had even superior knowledge revealed to them by the gods, and were inspired for this mediating and protecting office, could exorcise the male and female witches "by command of Marduk, the lord of charms," or could threaten them in the name of the Lord with the same evils which they had inflicted.

In the Old-Testament religion, plain indications of the same low views of inspiration belong to the earlier writings. In the

¹ On this subject see the recently published book by R. C. Thompson, "The Devils and Evil Spirits of Babylonia" (2 vols.), in Luzac's Semitic Text and Translation Series.

development of Biblical religion, as in all religious developments,—and, indeed, as a general principle illustrated by every form of evolution,—progress consists, not so much in totally suppressing any of the ancient beliefs concerning the gods, as in purifying, expanding, and elevating them to a higher degree of moral value and of practical power. The command, “Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live,” and the penalty for those who consulted spirits supposed to be raised from the dead, were, at first, directed against oracles that were not under the patronage of Yahweh. Prophetic ecstasy continues even in the New-Testament era to be highly regarded as a kind of inspiration. And some of the greater prophets, as well as the Apostles, have important communications of truths made to them while in a condition of trance, “having the eyes open.”

Here also, however, the value of calm, rational insight, and of the thoughts that are either “borne in upon the mind,” or are matured there more slowly, as reflection broods over experience, and experience itself is made richer, broader, and more profound thereby, becomes increasingly greater. “What think you of God?” and “What of man, his life, his relations to God, his duty, and his destiny?” These problems, rather than how to secure one’s crops or boats from stress of weather, or to guard one’s sanitary or business interests by incantations and sacrifices, become the great and pressing inquiries for the human soul. He who can throw light upon these inquiries is now esteemed as the “man of revelation;” he who is raised in spirit to the point of view where he catches and reflects the pure glow of the perfect Ethical Spirit, is the “inspired man.”

Such inspired men of revelation are found as historical characters in all the various progressive religions which have arisen in the past; especially so, in ancient times, both in numbers and in quality, among the Prophets and Psalmists of Israel. More and more, as the centuries of Israel’s broken national life went on, did those great truths of religion which address and command the reason, stir the heart, and form the life of conduct,

clarify themselves in the utterances of this remarkable succession of inspired men. Both as revealing religious truth and as shaping religious history, they prepared the way for the coming, higher and even unique Divine Self-revelation.

In Christianity, the special self-revelation of Divine Being as the Father and Redeemer of mankind is considered to have been made through Jesus Christ. This relationship of Jesus to God as revealer is summarized in the claims which are attributed to him, such as the following: "All things are delivered unto me of my Father, and no man knoweth who the Son is but the Father, and who the Father is, but the Son and he to whom the Son will reveal it" (Luke x, 22; and Matt. xi, 27). But especially is it the purpose of John's Gospel to set forth the claims of Jesus to be the revealer of God. The one thought on which the early Apologists—those Greek thinkers who strove by reflection upon the content of Christian experience to make Christian doctrine acceptable to the reason and common-sense of the Græco-Roman world—was this: Christianity is revelation indeed, is *real* revelation. This truth they undertook to prove by an appeal to what is universal in man. But what *is* universal in man? His reason, his capacity for discovering and recognizing the truth. This apologetic attempt, as a matter of historical development under the circumstances of the mental life and philosophical speculations of the time, brought about a demand that the position of the Church Catholic should differ itself from that of the Gnostics, who were to be rejected as heretics by the Church.¹ What is Christianity, in its character as a Revelation? was the speculative question of the age. The Gnostics proposed

¹ That a certain ground was afforded for Gnostic claims by the teachings of the New-Testament writers, and even by those recorded of Christ himself, there can be little doubt. Even in the declarations cited above, the distinguished commentator, H. A. W. Meyer (on Luke x, 22), says the Marcionite reading $\epsilon\gamma\gamma\omega$ is more probably original, and not a Gnostic alteration; since the testimony for it is of a higher antiquity than that for the reading $\gamma\iota\nu\acute{\omega}\sigma\kappa\epsilon\iota$.

tests of the absolute character of this particular form of religious belief, which transcended the rights, and rightful limits, of human reason and of so-called common-sense. Thus Christianity became for them a revelation adapted only to the speculative few—an esoterical religion, and absolute only so far as esoterical.

The emphasis laid upon the ethical and practical aspects of the Divine Self-revelation in Jesus Christ saved the great body of Christian dogma and Christian life from being lifted out of the atmosphere of history and of universal experience into the thin air of speculations over the Unknown and the Unknowable. Thus the view which Christianity takes of itself as *The Revelation par excellence* keeps the evidence for itself within the limits of experienced fact. Like that of the Old Testament, the Christian revelation is preëminently prophetic; it is God making himself known to man by a human life and voice. A life actually lived, and a voice which has been heard by real and living witnesses, brings to mankind messages of truth about God and about his relations to the world. In this way all the prophetic content of the Old-Testament religion is fulfilled,—not as a matter of correspondence to details of prediction; the rather does the life, work, and death of Jesus give the “filled-full” answer to the prophetic anticipations and ideals of salvation. But the Christian revelation is more than prophetic; it is eminently historical. In the case of the Revealer himself this characteristic of all genuine and effective revelation holds true. The revealing *to* him, of the truth he came to teach, to manifest, to be, was progressive. On the other hand, however, his insight appears more like the marvelous and inexplicable outburst of genius—or, as Jesus himself regarded it, an inner, spiritual making-known of God’s truth and God’s will—than like the product of prolonged reflection upon facts carefully observed. As regarded from this point of view, therefore, the consciousness of Jesus with respect to its revelations of religious truth has those supreme marks of in-

spiration which characterize the mental movements of the men of genius in every line.

The Christian revelation has always been, and it still is, a progressive and historical affair. On this matter, the various attempts of reflective thinking and philosophical speculation to account for the religious experience which refers itself to the life, work, and teachings of Jesus, compel us to agree with Harnack¹: "The question as to what new thing Christ has brought, answered by Paul in the words, 'If any man be in Christ he is a new creature, old things are passed away, behold all things are become new,' has again and again been pointedly put since the middle of the Second Century by Apologists, Theologians, and Religious Philosophers, within and without the Church, and has received the most varied answers. Few of the answers have reached the height of the Pauline confession. But when one cannot attain to this confession, one ought to make clear to one's self that every answer which does not lie in the line of it is altogether unsatisfactory."

If, then, we ask, In what does the alleged perfection and finality of the Christian Revelation consist? we can, perhaps, give no more satisfactory answer than something like the following²: A new ethical and religious form of humanity, called the Kingdom of Redemption, or the Kingdom of God, was brought to clear light in the person and work of Jesus Christ; and this in such a way as to afford a new, and more nearly perfect satisfaction to man's religious needs and religious longings. This answer, however, connects the perfect, final, and so-called absolute Divine Self-revelation with the progress, spread, and complete triumph of a society which answers to man's ethical and religious ideals. This Society is itself an historical development,—a process of the Becoming of humanity more and more into the right relations with nature, with fellow finite spirits; but especially, and as including all the rest, with that

¹ History of Dogma, I, p. 72f.

² Compare Schultz, Grundriss der Christlichen Apologetik, p. 166f.

Being of the World which religion conceives of as perfect Ethical Spirit, manifested in religious, and especially in Christian experience, as the Father and Redeemer of men.

Attention has already been called to the significance for religion of Speech and of the Divine revealing Word. If religious truth is to assume clear form, whether in the inspired mind or in the form of a message to other minds, it must be expressed, either by the revealer or by those to whom the revelation is given, in articulate language. "Inspiration," said Muhammad, "cometh to me in one of two ways. At times Gabriel speaketh the word unto me, as one man speaketh to another; and this is easy to understand. At other times it is like the ringing of a bell; it penetrateth my heart and rendeth me; and this afflicteth me most." In Plutarch's time, the silence of the oracles was "a common topic of speculation, of anxious alarm to the pious, of ribald sarcasm to the profane."¹ Even the revelations which come through natural events, or through the higher media of pure lives and noble deeds, however impressive and inspiring in themselves they may be, must somehow be translated into written, spoken, or unuttered language, if they are to be "revelations" in the fuller meaning of the word.

In its lowest form this persuasion as to the value of words is a superstitious belief that certain magical formulas—like the incantations of the ancient Egyptians and Babylonians, or the "Honovar" among the ancient Persians—have a peculiar influence with the divine invisible spirits. Among the Persians, however, the *Honovar* became a personification of the divine revealing will—a sort of Logos. In a more highly organized and pretentious form the same view originates the doctrine that a certain fixed form of words, as recorded in the sacred writings of the religion, expresses the precise truth about the Divine Being and the Divine Will; and that their unquestioning acceptance and use has some sort of magical, or *quasi-*

¹ So Oakesmith, *The Religion of Plutarch*, p. 139.

magical influence with God. All the greater religions unite in this claim for their own sacred books. For example, supernatural origin is claimed for certain of the Confucian classics. Among them is a table of mystical symbols, from which was afterwards derived the diagrams of the "Book of Changes." A monstrous myth was devised to account for the origin of this sacred table. But even in China, when the more barbarous ages were left behind, it was holy and inspired men (*Shêng Jên*), providentially raised up, who become the organs of divine revelation. Confucius, greatest of them all, made no claim to infallible authority: "If it be the will of Heaven to preserve my doctrine for the benefit of mankind, what power can my enemies have over it?" or to supernatural means of its derivation: "How does Heaven Speak? The seasons follow their course, and all things spring into life,—this is the language of Heaven." On the contrary, however, the Hindū orthodoxy of to-day regards the Vedas as wholly divine and infallible; and orthodox Islam affirms a belief in the "uncreate origin" of the Koran; while the post-Reformation dogma¹ of the verbal inspiration and infallibility of the Hebrew and Christian sacred writings is everywhere being either silently or openly withdrawn.

Since, however, speech is always subject to misconstruction and misunderstanding,—cannot, indeed, from its very nature possess the qualities of an unchanging meaning and of the bearer of infallible truth,—the Divine Word is quite uniformly held by the different religions to stand in need of inspired interpretation. Thus the Spirit, which is the Revealer through the original message, must continue to exercise its function of revelation and inspiration within the consciousness of every one who would understand, appropriate, and apply this message. In this way the democratic and universal nature of the divine

¹ That the verbal infallibility of Scripture is a post-Reformation dogma and not a Christian or even a Church-Catholic doctrine, has been abundantly shown. See *Doctrine of Sacred Scripture*, vol. II, part III.

activities of revelation and inspiration vindicates itself in the experience of mankind. The priestess at Delphi needed the help of an exegete; the infallible Vedas demand the infallible Brāhman to make their obscurities clear; the Sacred Scriptures of the Christian religion require an endless series of commentaries, many of which use language that is much more difficult to interpret into experience than is the language they set themselves to explain. Over and above this chance for the confusion, and for the growth, of opinion which the freedom of the Spirit requires, there is yet more abundant room provided in the dissemination of the truth.

The demand for further revelations to other inspired minds, in order that new truths may come to light, or that old truths may be seen and experienced in new light, must, therefore, be provided for, even in connection with the strictest adherence to the most bigoted views of the verbal inspiration and the infallible and final authority of the sacred religious writings. In Hindūism, the Brāhman may raise himself by contemplation to a state of communion with the Divine Being which gives to him an insight superior to the Vedas themselves. In all the ages of Christian experience, too, believers have found some way—either by resort to allegorizing and mystical hermeneutics, or by distinguishing between different classes of contents (ceremonial and ethical, temporary teachings and fundamental truths, etc.), or by tricks of interpretation and accusation of corruptions and glosses of text, or by the more intelligent and courageous assertion of the rights of the Spirit—for perpetuating in a measure the spiritual freedom of the Founder of the religion and of his earlier followers. In all religions, moreover, as in all art, and even to no small extent in much of scientific discovery, some theory of mystical intuition has been a most important and fruitful method for the acquisition of knowledge and for the improved grasp of faith upon its content of truth. What is needed, however, in religion as well as in science, is a prolonged and severe critical testing of what the

intuition sees and foresees, by the accumulations of experienced facts. On these terms, all men of revelation, and all inspired seers, whether in the realm of science, art, philosophy, or religion, may believe the truth of the claim:—

“While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony and the deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things;”—

OR

“But God has a few of us whom he whispers in the ear:
The rest may reason and welcome: 'tis we musicians know.”

For in religion, as in science, art, and philosophy, every claim gets itself either accepted, modified, or rejected, by its endurance in history; and by the place which it finds itself able to maintain in the changing and growing system of human beliefs, sentiments, ascertained truths, and institutions built upon these attitudes of man's developing life.

The superiority of the Old and New Testaments over all other religious scriptures consists chiefly in just this combination of the historical qualities of continuity, progressiveness, and adaptability to changes of social conditions and to intellectual growth, with the insights and foresights of that “mystical intuition” which is always, and properly, attributed to the Spirit of God. The content of truth which these Scriptures convey is, as we have seen, the faith that God is in humanity, progressively redeeming it, by bringing it to a spiritual likeness and union with Himself. But this content of truth is conveyed in the form of a record which was itself an historical growth. Even in the finished form, as record, which it attained at the completion of the Canon of the New Testament, it did not escape, and it was not designed or constructed so as to escape, from all further testing by history and by the developments of religious experience. Its alleged histories will always be subject to the critical application of the historical method, for the proof of their historicity. Its practical maxims, or ethical generalizations, require the continued exercise of

enlightened moral consciousness for their approbation and their right to control conduct. Its insights into the world of invisible realities and spiritual ideals, and its foresights as to the destiny of the individual and of the race, both incite and cultivate, and also appeal for verification to the most exalted and trustworthy religious experiences and developments of mankind. The proof of the practical value and of the ontological validity of the content of the Christian faith is not dependent upon details of past history ; but it must continue to exhibit itself in the history of the present and of the centuries to come. It is not a matter of scientific induction ; and yet it is constantly subject to the testing of universal experience. It is not to be derived by the method of philosophical deduction from any preconceived, or so-called *a priori* conception of "the Absolute" ; and yet it offers itself ever anew as an object for the reflective thinking and maturing judgment of those speculatively inclined.

There is one species of the media of revelation of which all religions make more or less use, that offers peculiar difficulties to the modern scientific and philosophical conception of the Being of the World. This is the Miracle. Indeed, so serious is the objection to the miraculous, and so heated and disastrous has been the conflict occasioned by its claims, that the present tendency on the part even of the apologists of the Christian religion is very strongly set in the direction of dispensing altogether with the conception. Curiously enough, however, the most recent discoveries of the physical sciences appear to be making a rift in the solid, dead, spherical Mechanism of the eighteenth-century Universe, through which a modified form of the religious idea of a God-revealing wonder may, perhaps, enter anew.

The candid student of man's religious evolution from the point of view of historical facts discovers, however, that much of the conflict between science and faith over the miraculous, has been due to misapprehension or to over-assurance on both

sides. All religions have, indeed, made demands for belief in the miraculous. As a modern Apologist has said: "Faith sees miracles everywhere that it unmistakably discerns God's revelation in the events which affect human interests and human life. But it does not even raise the question in the lower stages of development whether these same events have a natural side or not." Primitive and savage, or even civilized but not scientifically instructed, man feels no inconsistency between the two points of view from which the same event may be considered. Thus the same phenomenon is now natural,—*i. e.*, ordinary,—and now a specially impressive sign of the divine will and intent. This same naïve and unreflective view of the matter characterizes the writings of the Old Testament throughout. The writers of these sacred books have no prejudice against the miraculous. But it is absurd to suppose that during all the Old-Testament period the Jews had little common-sense, not to say scientific information, about the so-called natural causes of storms and calm, good fortune and evil fortune, birth and death. The coming of a child might indeed be prayed for, or accounted an omen of extraordinary significance from Yahweh. But the formula for genealogies is frankly naturalistic: "Abraham begat Isaac, etc." In this very case of purely natural generation, the Patriarch and his wife are represented as offending the Lord by laughing in his face, because they regarded it as naturally impossible, when a son is promised to parents of such an extreme old age.

Indeed, the established orderliness of nature is poetically celebrated in the Old Testament, and is made the type of the divine behavior in spiritual matters. "If ye can break my covenant of the day, and my covenant of the night, and that there should not be day and night in his season; then may also my covenant be broken with David, my servant." (Jer. xxxiii, 19*f.*) In that beautiful hymn of praise to Yahweh (Ps. civ), He is represented as covering himself with light as with a garment, as moving on the winds as on wings, as using the light-

nings as his messengers; and yet his law is over all; for to the perpetual redistribution of the waters He has "set a bound that they may not pass over," and he has "appointed the moon to fix the seasons"; as well as given every living creature its place in the great system of the Universe. So in the other greater religions: for centuries in China and India belief in miracles and divine wonders as daily occurrences has subsisted side by side with a nearly statical social condition and conservation of the popular habits. Nor has the wide-spread belief in miracles been inconsistent with considerable development of astronomy, that most exact and certain of the applied sciences. Even in the case of the most nearly primitive and savage peoples, where the conception of the extraordinary and the miraculous is of the lowest possible order, the modern judgment is quite too much given to underestimating the current intelligence with respect to what is ordinary, or natural, the thing for the occurrence of which the causes are more or less completely known. In general the seeming incompatibility of the scientific and the religious view is a comparatively late development.

It is when science puts forward its theory of the cosmic system as a self-contained and self-explanatory impersonal Mechanism, perfectly and rigidly unyielding in its adherence to so-called fixed laws, that theology responds with its conception of the miraculous as a violation of these laws, as a breach somehow made in the system by a personal Will from without. And now begins a terrible battle. On the one side, it is insisted that the whole body of science will be wounded to the death, if God should be allowed to shoot a single arrow at man's heart through the joints of its rigid and impenetrable armor. On the other side, it is claimed that the destruction of all belief in the Supernatural and in the divine work of spiritual betterment would follow, if somehow God could not occasionally break through, and by a species of violence committed really against himself, readjust the working of the mechanism. To

the philosophy of religion, such a scientific conception of the world is a mockery; to it, such a theological conception of the miracle is absurd.

Were this the place it could be shown that the conception of the miraculous as a violation of natural law, as a something *contra naturam*, is by no means the only ancient and honorable theological conception.¹ The Church-Father Augustine, in one of his several treatments of this subject, considers all events in nature as alike miraculous, because they are all alike the work of God. The great mediæval theologian, Thomas Aquinas, calls miracles those things done by God "beyond the order of nature"—that is, beyond the natural causes that are known to us. And the work of Schleiermacher, Rothe, and others, may truly be said to have banished forever from modern thought this view of the miracle as a violation of natural law, among other views of the post-Reformation theology.

The conception of the miracle as a violation of natural law is from the very nature of the case untenable. There are countless events—and the progress of modern science has perhaps increased rather than diminished their number—for which it is at present quite impossible to assign adequate causes, or to bring them into harmony with other events under general formulas called laws. But from the scientific point of view, these events must all be looked upon as "natural," because they are events in nature. They are, therefore, potentially capable of being at some future time located, so to say, in the general scheme of events, in accordance with the methods and generalizations of science. Each one of them may, however, in its relations to human experience and to human history, be of such a nature as to have a very special, and even a unique and not repeatable place and value in the cosmic system. On the other hand, for the philosophy of religion there is no event so ordinary or completely explicable that it may not be entitled

¹ For the proof of this, see *Doctrine of Sacred Scripture*, vol. I, part II, chap. iii.

to recognition as revealing in some special way, from the standpoint of the individual observer, the immanent presence of the Divine Being. Indeed, the same events which science regards as natural, religion is quite at liberty to regard, without contradicting or limiting the scientific conception, as dependent manifestations of that Supernatural Power and Presence which religious faith believes in, and adores, as God.

The whole significance of the miraculous in the history of the Divine self-revelation is, therefore, amply secured when it is regarded as a natural occurrence, which, by its special adaptation to the experience of the observer, is providentially made to serve as a sign, or reminder, of some divine thought or purpose. It is its special relation to the experience of man, and not its altogether unique relation to the divine will, or to other events and processes in so-called nature, which gives its religious significance and value to the miracle. This is especially true of the Biblical miracles. The Old Testament has, indeed, no name for the miraculous which is not as readily applicable to events that, in the modern scientific use of the word, are plainly "natural." The miracles said to have been performed by Jesus all belong to one of the following four classes; they all, therefore, readily conform to the same conception of the miraculous from the religious point of view. They are either (1) *tokens* from which to draw a conclusion as to something not perceivable by the senses; or (2) *symbols* which testify to the nature of the Messianic work; or (3) *witnesses* to the divine power and authorization of the one who performed them; or (4) *prophecies* which carry suggestive moral lessons as to the present and the future.¹

The place of the so-called miraculous in the history of revelation is, therefore, always dependent upon the varying conditions of the religious experience and religious development of humanity. The attempt of certain theologians to discredit

¹ Compare Steinmeyer, *Die Wunderthaten des Herrn in Bezug auf die neueste Kritik betrachtet*.

the so-called "relative" miracle, and the attempt of certain "scientists" to rule out miracles altogether on grounds of an *a priori* conception of what is possible or impossible in the sphere of natural phenomena, are alike mistaken. The feeling of mystery and awe in the presence of natural phenomena has been seen to be a most important factor in the origin and growth of religious experience, and of the religious view of the World. Modern science has, in the thought of the most thoughtful of its own devotees, done nothing to diminish, but much to increase and deepen this feeling. A relative necessity for the miracle in the historical and progressive Divine Self-revelation may, therefore, well enough be admitted. Especially in the lower stages of race-culture, and for the man who is unable to receive and hold steadily the general truths and ideals of the race's higher religious experience, any wonder, or portent, of a concrete physical kind may become an important means of making God known. Such an event arrests attention, arouses feelings of dependence and awe, demands and effectuates the entrance into consciousness of the invisible and intangible potencies that so make or mar the success of human life. In a word, the miraculous stirs up the crude, but most primary and indispensable elements out of which the evolution of the higher forms of religious belief, sentiment, and practice are to issue.

That so-called miracles have in the past, in the case of all religions not excepting the Christian religion, actually been powerful means for enforcing the conviction of the Reality corresponding to the subjective content of faith, is a matter of indubitable historical fact. All the errors, imperfections, and even encouragement to degrading superstitions and immoral practices, which have doubtless accompanied this historical process do not destroy the truth of the main fact. Errors, imperfections, and degrading superstitions, and immoral practices, have been connected with all forms of the evolution of humanity. Neither science, nor art, nor politics, nor industry has been free from them. Man's religious evolution, if we

could consider it apart from the other forms of his evolution, has probably been as little tainted and corrupted in these ways as have any of these other forms. The blame of it all can scarcely be laid upon human credulity with respect to the religious miracle. Priests, oracle-mongers, and medicine-men have not deluded and corrupted the people more to their harm than have the politicians and the "captains of industry"; probably not more than the artists and even the so-called men of science.

With a rising estimate of the value of ethico-religious truth, and with a more rational conception of God, of his relations to the World, and of the real nature and significance of religious revelation and inspiration, the place of the miracle becomes less important for the religious evolution of humanity. It is undoubtedly true that modern Christianity, where it continues at all to believe in its own miraculousness, receives the essential content of truth, not on account of, but the rather in spite of, the record of miracles. There are not wanting signs, however, that this attitude is an extreme concession to a scientific conception of the world which is, even in the minds of those who hold fast to the scientific standpoints in the most unprejudiced and liberal fashion, itself only partial, lacking in comprehensiveness, and destined soon to yield to some larger and more spiritual conception. "Nature" appears to modern science so much more grand, subtile, shrewd in resources, and marvelously wonder-working; she is ready always to move on and even to overstep, in her march toward her goal, the limits which she seemed previously to have irrevocably set for herself! From her fertile womb what incomprehensible but significant new products may not at any moment come forth? The life which nature is, in fact, momentarily producing is, as to its causes, limits, and possibilities of development, so full of hitherto inexplicable riddles, that we will not rate in too lowly fashion the potentialities now concealed, but ready to be revealed at any moment to the insight of the true seer.

The persistent belief in miracles is a fact of no small significance. And since miracles are not to be regarded as violations of the laws of nature so-called, or as interferences with the established divine order, their reality and their value are not discredited by man's growing ability to explain phenomena from the scientific point of view. The awakening of the human mind to the presence of that Spirit on whose Life man's life depends, and to the belief that this same Spirit is the illumining and redeeming One whose help for his salvation man everywhere and always needs, is a divinely induced event in every age. The means of this awakening may change from age to age. There was truth in the poetical expression of Jean Paul Richter: "Miracles on earth are nature in heaven."

Since, however, every miracle is a particular, definite event in nature, the reality of every alleged miracle is a matter of evidence. Each alleged occurrence of the seemingly miraculous order raises, therefore, a question of fact. This question can never be settled, in a perfectly definite and finally satisfactory way, either by a reference of science to the domination of so-called "general laws," or by a reference of theology to its confidence in the generally miraculous nature of the facts and truths that constitute the content of religious faith. No particular fact is ever to be explained by general laws, even when admittedly and incontestably coming under those laws. Many events which have been contested or derided in the name of established laws of nature, have subsequently vindicated themselves as facts. "What we call the 'laws of nature' must vary according to our frequent new experiences" (Virchow). "Science is a foe to systematic negation" (Charcot). Nor can we avoid noticing the extraordinary credulity of many who promptly deny the possibility of an alleged fact when it is called "a miracle"; but who are entirely ready to credit the same mysterious fact, if you will only consent to call it "sub-conscious," "hypnotic," "telepathic," or what not. On the other hand, the greater number of alleged miracles, even when

before examination they appeared to have sufficient evidence in their behalf, have failed to establish themselves as facts. This experience reasonably creates the cautious and non-committal attitude of the wise man toward the seemingly miraculous, whether deemed important to confirm the religious beliefs of humanity, or not; and this is not because he is ready on *a priori* grounds to pronounce the alleged facts impossible, but because he has learned how untrustworthy is most of the evidence that is claimed in support of such alleged facts.

All this, however, puts no intolerable—not to say unreasonable—burden upon religious faith. Nor does it, on the other hand, convict of unreason faith's attitude toward the miraculous in general, or toward any miracle in particular. The same thing is constantly coming to the front in the conclusions of modern science itself. Have we not had the believers in spontaneous generation convicted of seeing new living forms in shreds of cloth, or of detecting the origin of all life in some *Urschleim* that was not living at all? Is not the whole history of biological evolution paved with corrected mistakes in matters of fact—mistakes due chiefly to the prejudices and credulity of the observers? Is the marvel of the resurrection of Jesus, in itself considered as mere fact, any more difficult to comprehend than—to compare mysteries great from the religious point of view with mysteries great from the scientific point of view—the new life of the impregnated ovum from which Aristotle came? Is the testimony of the witnesses to this marvel any more conflicting than that of those who bear witness to the self-regeneration of the cut nerve-fiber? Doubtless the men of faith, not only in religion but in all other matters of evidence that needs sifting and can never amount to more than a certain degree of probability, will continue to credit as fact what those who have not the same faith will continue to doubt or to deny. In the large way, and in the long run, the growth of human experience, reflected upon in its totality, will reveal such truth as men may hope to know. But in both science and religion,

there will be no lack of unexplained mysteries of fact until the end of time.

There are certain considerations, however, which the believer in the superior credibility of the Biblical miracles may reasonably urge in his own behalf. There is, first of all, even in the alleged miraculous events of the Old-Testament narratives a certain commendable moderateness, which in comparison with the example of all the other most important sacred writings of the different religions may be called a marked paucity of the miraculous. Moreover, if we refrain in the interests of sound scholarship, and in sympathy with the Oriental way of teaching moral and religious truth, from regarding narratives like that of the book of Jonah, for example, as making any claim to an historical character, we may note a lack of exuberance and wildness about these alleged miraculous happenings.

It can scarcely be questioned, in the second place, that from the standpoint of a rational faith the intimate connection of many of these natural wonders with the orderly, historical development of that ethical and religious truth which the world owes to Judaism, is favorable to their historical credibility. That is to say, the place which the miraculous takes in an organism of revelation, for the mind which accepts the truth thus revealed respecting God's spiritual relations to the race, lends an important support to the claim of its reasonableness; in this way it also aids in removing antecedent objections to the authenticity of the record of alleged miracles. To reason thus does not necessarily contravene the accepted scientific method of historical research. On the contrary, it is itself an example of the use of that method. Physical science, as soon as the absurd conception of God "violating" natural law or "interfering" with the world-order is withdrawn, has no more right to assume dictatorship over the history of the Divine Self-revelation than over any other species or aspect of the historical evolution of mankind. The abstractions of chemistry, physics, and biology, cannot suffice to demonstrate what, by

way of concrete individual fact, has happened in the past; much less can they show to the religious consciousness that it is mistaken in interpreting the accomplished fact as a sign, token, or symbol of some true thought, or holy choice of God. The entire religious doctrine of the relations of the world of things and selves to the Divine Being interprets them all as factors in an interconnected but dependent manifestation.

To Christian faith, however, it is the relation of the alleged miraculous occurrences recorded in the Biblical writings to Jesus Christ, as preëminently and uniquely the revealer of religious truth, which is the most potent influence in authenticating these occurrences. Jesus himself never appears as a miracle-monger; in no instance does he work a wonder for its own sake, or for the sake of the applause, or even of the confidence, which it might be expected to win to himself.¹ The miracles he is said to have wrought seem, for the most part, to flow from his personality with a certain perfect naturalness. And if the attitude of faith in this personality, as somehow uniquely divine, is needed in order to accept the truthfulness of the narrative of his miraculous deeds; on the other hand, a certain attitude of reserve, or even—if it seems a better word—of *agnosticism*, is more truly scientific here than is the position which boldly issues, in the face of the modern mysteries of both physical and psychical phenomena, a blunt and unqualified denial to them all.²

As to the *modus operandi* of revelation and inspiration little can be added with assurance to what has already been said. That most of the religious truth, of which the race has become possessed, has arisen and developed through the reflection of a few minds upon man's experience with things and with his-

¹ "Faire des miracles était une chose à laquelle il se refusait obstinément, ce qui est ridicule à un sorcier. Ne soyez pas sorcier, mais si vous l'êtes, faites votre métier."

² On miracles in general, and on the Christian miracles in particular, see Harnack, *What is Christianity?* pp. 26ff.

torical events, is undeniable historical fact. The naturalistic way of explaining this fact speaks of "suggestions," "influences," "reasons," etc.;—as though they somehow had an existence external to human consciousness and operated upon it as true causes for the production of its insights into, and inferences about, religious truth. This way of speaking has its rights and its advantages. From another point of view, however, not only the religious seer, teacher, and philosopher, but also the scientific observer, if only his attitude toward human experience be that of a devout mind, has always been ready to ascribe the gift of truth to God, and the power to apprehend, receive, and interpret truth to the "inspiration of the Almighty." This conviction of personal and spiritual relations between man, as a discoverer and knower of the truth, and God as the Revealer and Inspirer of man, is too deeply set in human experience to be easily eradicated. The "men of revelation"—with their superior insights and cognitions in science, art, philosophy, morals, and politics, as well as in religion—have uniformly believed themselves to be divinely helped to "read after" Him "the thoughts of God."

The revelations and inspirations of the Almighty, however, have been too democratic to be confined to the select few. Great upward-movements in the religious development of the race,—like that which extended from the seventh to the fifth century B. C., and not only gave to the world such names as Isaiah, Pythagoras, Zoroaster, Buddha, Confucius, and Lao-tse, but also effected a religious revolution among millions of human kind; or like that which surrounded on both sides for a century or two the appearance of Christ; or, again, like that which swept over the whole Western World and brought about a "Reformation" *par excellence*:—great upward movements in the religious development of the race bear witness at intervals to the enormous and epoch-making energy of the Divine Spirit. The appearance is as though, after slumbering and slowly gathering itself, this divine energy burst forth with

increased violence of spiritual uplift upon humanity. And, indeed, in spite of all that may justly be said to the contrary, it always has been and still is *Religion* which is "The Great Psychic Lift of the Race."¹

This work of revelation and inspiration from the Infinite Spirit within the finite spirit of the individual man can, in some sort, be put to an experimental testing. And if any seeker after truth thinks himself to have tried the experiment and failed, or to have proved a negative experimentally, he may quite properly remind himself anew of the conditions on which all successful scientific experimentation is known to depend. Let, then, any human soul voluntarily remove all obstacles from prejudice, or from the desire to exclude the free and fuller manifestations of the revealing and inspiring Spirit of God. With a mind voluntarily opened to an appreciation of those ideals, in whose ontological and practical value the race has so persistently believed, let one reflect upon the problems of human life and human destiny in their manifold relations to the mystery of the cosmic forces and processes. Let the higher lights come down to illumine the level of the spirit's better impulses and strivings. Let the profounder aspirations raise these impulses and strivings beyond their customary heights. Let heaven and earth be wooed to come together for at least a momentary embrace. Tear away the mask of the phenomena in whose frowns and smiles and grimaces our daily interests are so absorbed; and now behold! if possible, the Reality of things. Some new truth, divinely wrought, about that Reality; some new confidence in its supreme value as serving with its Will to accomplish a "far-off divine event" in the interests of Truth, Righteousness, and Blessedness; some added energy and purity of spirit in the daily strife with weakness, suffering, and temptation;—all this will surely come to the soul which thus prepares itself. And whence does it

¹ A phrase used in *Ideals of Science and Faith*, in the Essay by Victor V. Branford, called "A Sociological Approach toward Unity."

come? The answer of the growing religious experience of mankind is this: It comes from the Revealer and Inspirer of all Truth, Righteousness, and Blessedness; and He is our God.

The phenomena of religious revelation and inspiration are the crowning proof of the truth of the religious conception of God as perfect Ethical Spirit. "The abiding presence of the Supernatural in nature is necessary to account for nature and her process of development. . . . The abiding presence of the Supernatural in consciousness and in human history—as the object and source of religion, as the giver of moral and religious truth, light, and life, as the eternal and quickening Holy Spirit—must also be accounted necessary to explain the ethical and spiritual progress of humanity. But these fundamental facts do not exclude the further fact of a special and more truly creative activity within certain more definite fields of human consciousness and human history. Such a special creative activity is exercised in bringing to the race, through prophetic and inspired souls, certain great and preëminently new moral and religious truths concerning the being and work of God in history as the Redeemer of mankind."¹

In estimating and explaining the phenomena of religious revelation and inspiration, the historical qualities of a certain continuity and gradualness, diversified by epochs and even by apparent revolutions, are never to be excluded from the account. In and through his experience with God—an experience which correctly and reasonably refers itself to God as its source—man grows in the knowledge and spiritual likeness of God. The experience is never free from defects, fragmentary and erroneous elements, blinding and misleading factors; but in all these respects religion is not different from science, philosophy, politics, or art. *Religion, which is itself an historical development, is also a progressive Self-revelation—through a Spiritual Presence immanent in all humanity, but especially ener-*

¹ Quoted substantially as found in the Doctrine of Sacred Scripture, II, p. 316.

getic in certain individual spirits—of the perfect Ethical Spirit of God.

Neither a naturalistic science, which would deny God's work of revelation and inspiration altogether, nor a super-naturalistic theology, which refuses to recognize the physical and historical limitations of this work, is tenable in view of all the phenomena. The conception of God in humanity furnishes the only key to an understanding of their nature, their source, and their significance.

That the experience of man with his environment of things and selves, and with his own development in history, may, from the point of view of one who takes the attitude of piety, be considered as warranting the belief that the World is a dependent manifestation of the perfect Ethical Spirit of God, has been our contention throughout all this Part of our treatise. But our thought must now be called back to the *proviso* which the contention includes. *If one looks* upon the World with that spirit of filial piety which is itself subjective religion, *one may* rationally interpret the World in this way. But the attitude of faith itself is not a purely scientific attitude; science, as such, is powerless to bestow the spirit of religion. Nor can it be denied that the religious attitude constantly tends somewhat strongly to come into conflict with certain of the beginning principles, and certain of the terminal conclusions, of the scientific attitude. The reason for this tendency was partially disclosed in the treatment given to science and religion, and to the psychological and historical relations of the two. In the progress, however, of that reconciliation which the reflective thinking of philosophy endeavors to accomplish, the lines drawn upward from these two points of view may be seen to converge. Science, with all its progress, is not now able, and never will be able, to comprehend, to constitute, or to control, the entire experience of man. Its best established formulas and principles are partial, in respect of their power

both to interpret and to direct human life ; and also to satisfy completely the aspirations and ideals of the human soul.

Religion, too, in all its more definitely established views and practices, if these are divorced from or opposed to the interests of science, art, and philosophy, represents only partially the interests, the cognitive and affective advances, and the noblest ideals, of humanity. Whether there is not a yet higher point of view, from which all these sides of human experience may be disclosed in organic unity, and where all human history and human ideals appear merged in the realization by man of the fullness of the Life that is in God, is a question upon which neither technical science nor religious dogma and ceremonial can throw any clear light. When the Unity of the Spirit, as pervasive of all things and of all men, and of man in the totality of his interests and ideals, has completely manifested itself ; then both the theoretical and the practical differences of science and religion will be completely reconciled.

But if the picture of the cosmic existences, forces, and processes, which the modern physico-chemical and biological sciences have formed, does not everywhere coincide line for line with the picture of this same Cosmos drawn in the interests of religious faith, it cannot be said that the one either wholly obscures or obliterates the other. Doubtless much of man's experience can be partially explained as though it were of a "self-contained," "self-explanatory," and "self-maintaining" Mechanical System. But much of it, even in the realm of fact and of the ways of the observed behavior of things and selves, cannot be thus explained. Nor, if the positive sciences should completely succeed in their ever laudable effort to regard all existences and their changing relations as explicable from the scientific point of view, would the religious view of the World and of its relations to the Object of religious faith, be either disproved or essentially altered. For religion, conservative as its particular beliefs are, has also a great gift of adaptability. This has been abundantly shown by the history of the evolu-

tion of religion. This human interest can survive, and keep its ideals unchanged, after learning from science all the many valuable lessons of method and of fact which science has to impart. "Even so, as you have taught me," religion can say to science, "do I recognize with a worshipful and grateful spirit this system of cosmic existences, forces and processes, which you describe and explain, as a dependent manifestation of the perfect Ethical Spirit of God."

But science, in the narrower meaning of that word, is not the whole of human experience; it is not even the whole of cognitive experience. The ideals of art and of morality impel men to a view, and philosophy introduces them to a reasoned doctrine, of the Universe, which in many most important characteristics coincides with the view and the doctrine of religion itself. Art and morality can never look upon the Cosmos, or upon man's relations to the Cosmos, as satisfactorily stated and explained in terms of mechanism. Art and morality, either instinctively or by elaborate processes of ratiocination, come to regard the Being of the World as Spirit revealing Itself to the spirit of man. In art, the revelation is significant of what the world ought to be, because this Spirit is a Spirit of Beauty; in morality, it is the revelation of what man ought to be because this Spirit is a Spirit of Goodness and of Truth. All revelation is a source of inspiration, too; for the recognition of this spiritual nature of the World inflames, vivifies, greatens, purifies, and ennobles, that spirit of humanity within which it takes place. This is essentially the same process which religious faith carries to a higher stage.

And always, in some form and to some degree, when the reflective thinking of the "men of revelation"—whether in science, morals, art, or religion—considers fairly and develops fruitfully the ontological meaning and value of these ideals of humanity, philosophy gives its authorization to the conception which they suggest and embody, of the Being of the World. That which the race experiences, and which the positive sci-

ences partially reduce to formulas that state the observed relations of the phenomena, is indeed the manifestation to finite spirits, in a process of historical evolution, of the Reality of Infinite Spirit. But religion, with an assured confidence in its own experience, which is also an important form of the evolution of humanity, extends its Ideals onward beyond the place where art and morality feel obliged to stop. It thus affirms its conviction that this very process of evolution itself must be regarded as a manifestation in history of the divine purpose to bring humanity into a blessed state of spiritual union and communion with that perfect Ethical Spirit whom religion calls God.

PART VI
THE DESTINY OF MAN

"Light is sown for the righteous, and gladness for the upright in heart."

PSALMIST.

"In my Father's house are many mansions; . . . I come again, and will receive you unto myself; that where I am, there ye may be also."

JESUS.

"He who has known me as the Lord of sacrifice and of penance, the mighty Ruler of all the worlds and the Lover of all beings, goeth to peace."

BHAGAVADGÎTÂ.

"Dare to look up to God and say, 'Make use of me for the future as thou wilt. I am of the same mind. I am one with Thee.'"

EPICETUS.

*"Till this truth thou knowest;
'Die to live again'—
Stranger-like thou goest
In a world of pain."*

GOETHE.

PART VI

THE DESTINY OF MAN

CHAPTER XLIII

THE FUTURE OF RELIGION

The final stage of the attempt which philosophy makes to test critically and to refine the conceptions, beliefs, and practices of religion, brings us face to face with the third of those questions into which, according to Kant, the rational nature of man desires to gain insight. This question, as he gives expression to it, asks: "What may I hope for?" Expressed in a way to heighten its significance, it becomes an inquiry into the destiny of man, both of the individual and of the race. Since, however, like every question of expectation or hope, it concerns the future, and in its most important aspects, a far-distant and only dimly discernible future, the answer cannot be demonstrative, whether as afforded by science or by the faith of religion. The most trustworthy answer possible can only serve to establish a rational hope. Like every other similar question also, this reach of expectation or reasoned confidence into the future, must ground itself in human experience belonging to the present and to the past. From the standpoint of religion, human destiny is dependent in a large, if not absolute way, upon the future of religion itself. Our first inquiry is, then, briefly stated this: "What, in view of man's religious life and development in the past, and of his present religious nature and condition, is a most reasonable hope with regard to the Future of Religion?"

To this inquiry, as a search after a reasonable hope, two answers are possible and worthy of serious consideration. These may be stated as follows: (1) In the future development of humanity, the other factors and interests of race-culture will displace religion altogether and will render its function inert and unnecessary; or (2) Religion will always remain an important and even indispensable factor and interest in the advancing culture of the race, and it will itself be so improved and developed as to render it worthy and efficacious in the better and wider performance of its peculiar function. Or, to state these conflicting hopes in another form: The highest social good of humanity will come to exclude religion as something unessential and *passé*; or, The highest social good of humanity will not only include an improved religious condition, but will be realized as essentially connected with, if not absolutely dependent upon, the religious development of the race.

Before considering these two forms of an essentially optimistic view of the future of mankind, it is well to glance at several other possible attitudes of mind toward the problem, "What of the future of religion?"—none of which, however, can be called "reasonable hopes" by the student of the philosophy of religion. The essentially optimistic view of man's progress in race-culture may be opposed *in toto* by a view that is essentially pessimistic. In this contrast between Optimism and Pessimism, the terms are used in their most nearly absolute significance. But the pessimistic as well as the optimistic view of religion's future may itself be either religious or irreligious. In either case, however, it is held as a fundamental tenet that the race is going to the bad. In the one case, only a remnant will be saved; for the future triumph of religion is in retribution rather than in redemption. In the other case, not even a remnant will be saved; for the machine is grinding out poorer and poorer stuff, and is itself getting more and more worn out. Now whatever may be said in the name either of theology or

of science in support of these ultimately pessimistic views, they can scarcely satisfy any philosophical inquiry after the ground for a "rational hope."

Another untenable position holds that religion will continue to dominate mankind in the future, in the same way in which it has dominated in the past, and still dominates, large portions of the race. By *religion* in this connection is meant, either a mass of terrifying or comforting superstitions, or a formalism enforced by custom and law, or an ecclesiastical or hierarchical institution, or a system of dogmas rigidly required and enforced as articles of a standing or falling faith. All these hopes, however,—if we may use the word "hope" without irony in this connection—imply such a reversal of progress in all the forms of race-culture, such a turning-back to conceptions and institutions which humanity seems in the process of transcending, as would seem to render them quite unacceptable to those whose expectations of the future depend upon acquaintance with the facts of history and of psychology. If one of these forms of pessimism as to the future of religion is rational without being hopeful; the other is hopeful without being rational. We reject both because we are seeking the grounds in the nature and history of man's religious experience for a *rational hope*.

Of all other religions Christianity has the least semblance of right to expect to dominate mankind in the future by any forceful means, or by the method of bribes with promises of material good, on the one hand, and on the other by threats of exclusion from any measure or manner of that which is really good. The hope for the future of the religion of Christ certainly does not lie in a direction to be reached by repeating, under changed and more hostile and essentially impracticable conditions, the errors and mistakes of the Christian Church in the past.

There is little doubt of the prevalence at present of the sociological doctrine that, in the future development of human

society, other factors and interests of race-culture are destined largely or wholly to displace religion. This doctrine is already realizing itself in the practical attitude toward all positive religious beliefs and ceremonials, of the great body of the so-called "working-classes" and also of the men of science and of culture. An increasing number are ready to say: "He who already possesses science and art, has also religion. He who does not possess these two, let him have religion."¹ If in the light of such an attitude toward the values of Reality and the interests and ideals of Human Life we examine the history of Occidental and European civilization during the last one thousand years, we may make a rough but suggestive division of the entire time into three periods. Before the so-called Renaissance, or during the early Mediæval time, the dominating view, which seemed to find expression in the very structure of human society, attributed to religion without social thrift, or political freedom, or intellectual culture, the power of being the supreme, if not the quite sufficient, good for mankind. But this very good of religion itself was not of a character to stimulate the increase of these other forms of good; nor was it in itself considered adapted to satisfy the more profound intellectual, ethical, and social demands and ideals which properly belong to the religious development of the race. It is certain, however, that during all this period many aspiring souls found their higher and purer satisfactions in religion; and that multitudes of lives were made happier and purer by religious beliefs and sentiments, however mingled these may have been with both intellectual and emotional factors of a quite inferior and even depressing kind.

According to the ideas and practices which were characteristic of the Renaissance, religion and culture are closely akin, if indeed they are not intended and destined to be wholly identified. During the period of gestation preparatory to this rebirth of that estimate of the value of culture which had charac-

¹ See Eucken, *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, p. 21.

terized an earlier age,—especially wherever the influences of the Greek spirit and of its achievements had made their way,—the evolution of the other greater factors of race-culture had gone on, while that of religion had either been relatively stationary or had fallen behind. It was inevitable then, that the very awakening to higher ideals of social thrift, political freedom, and intellectual advancement should result in a conflict with the reigning beliefs, practices, and ideals of religion. If religion—the age rightly argued—and culture *are* akin; it cannot be *such* religion as has prevailed in the past and *such* culture as the new era is bringing in. It was largely the arousing of that moral consciousness which always, and by assumed divine right, holds court over all the other forms of race-culture, that excited and gave its greatest intensity to this conflict. Thus conscience—at first of the select few and then of the multitudes of the nations—became arrayed against a morally ineffective religion, as well as against selfish and sensuous art and social unrighteousness. A time of upheaval, of the breaking-up of the old and the collision of its fragments as the attempts at reconstruction became more energetic, was the inevitable result.

Religion, as represented and guarded by those forms of social organization and ecclesiastical discipline which, when taken in their entirety and considered as essentially one, may be called the Christian Church of the Occident, is necessarily conservative of the historical standards of belief and the traditional views and ideals as to the value of life. It has undoubtedly been, therefore, on the whole opposed to the greater part of the modern advances in the other factors and interests of race-culture. This fact may as well frankly be confessed. Whether such opposition be regarded as a mistake and a fault, or as an excellence in the fulfillment of a divinely appointed mission, the truth of fact remains unchanged. It is not the Church of Rome alone, but the Christian Church of every name and in spite of every form of protest arising within itself, which is by

its very constitution, and by virtue of the conception of its mission, compelled to regard itself as "the official and divinely appointed guardian of the *depositum fidei*." This function of the religious social organization is thus stated in graphic, if somewhat extreme form, by a recent writer:¹ "She (*i. e.* the Church) plays, so far as scientific proof is concerned, the part taken by the 'Devil's advocate,' in the process of canonization. She is jealous of disturbing changes in the human *medium* by which faith in the unseen is habitually preserved *hic et nunc*; science is placed by her on the defensive; excesses and fanciful theories are gradually driven out of court; a truer and more exact assimilation of assured results in science and theology is thus obtained by the thinkers; then, and not until then, Authority accepts such results passively. She is the guardian, not of the truths of science, but of the things of the spirit. It is not for her to initiate inquiries beyond her special province."

But while the modern tendency to separate between religion and the culture of the positive sciences may be excused or justified by advocating the rights and duties of the Christian Church as the guardian of the *depositum fidei* and of the things of the spirit *hic et nunc*, there are other causes of this tendency which cannot be so favorably regarded. That modern opinion, as shown by both theory and practice, considers social thrift, political freedom, and intellectual and artistic culture, without religion, to be the supreme goods for humanity, is made evident in many ways. Most of these ways reveal and emphasize a relative neglect of religion; if by religion we are to understand any experience or interest essentially identical with that which the Founder of Christianity, and indeed the founders, reformers, and teachers of all the great religions, have had in their minds and upon their hearts. It is not part of the task set to a student of the philosophy of religion to discover and discuss at length the causes of this prevailing

¹ Wilfrid Ward, *Ideals of Science and Faith*, p. 318.

relative neglect of religion. But he cannot overlook the dark spots in modern Western civilization, if he is intelligently to make predictions regarding the future of Christianity.

The rapid growth of material prosperity, the increase of political enfranchisement (the growth of democracy), the wide-spreading of a rather superficial and somewhat spurious culture, have lately absorbed the interests and exertions of the multitude of mankind. All this has led to an excessive greed for, and estimate of wealth; to an exaggerated and disappointing appreciation of the degree of wisdom and righteousness attainable by popular self-government; and to a vain-glorious boasting over the value of such intellectual and aesthetic attainments as come from reading many books, and from learning scattered facts of so-called science or smatterings of many languages. On the contrary, that training of mind and heart by reflection upon God and his relations to the world and to the soul of man; that steady and elevating of the standards of commercial and political righteousness in obedience to a perfect Ethical Spirit; that appreciation of the refined beauties of the higher order, as they are manifested by the Divine in nature, art, and heroic character,—all these things, which religion especially undertakes to achieve, have been correspondingly neglected and esteemed of relatively small account. Meantime, under these same influences the organized bodies of religious believers, and their officers, the clergy and the priests, have been less efficient than formerly in the use of both the direct and the indirect means for promoting the interests of practical piety. What wonder, then, that so many—thoughtful and thoughtless alike—have come to the conclusion that positive religion will in the future have little or no place in the progressive development of the race! Growth in material prosperity, in political freedom, in social organization, and in intellectual and artistic culture, without religion, will quite sufficiently serve to represent the increased good realized by the labors and achievements of mankind.

In opposition to all this, we believe that religion will always remain an important and indispensable factor and interest in the total development of humanity. To do this, however, it must itself rise in purity and grow in effectiveness; only in this way can it gain in the future an even more influential and beneficent place in the progressive realization of the supreme good for humanity. In support of this expectation, and in defence of the rationality of this hope, we offer all that has been said in the previous chapters of this book. The grounds for the hope may be summarized, however, under the three following heads. And, first: From religion's point of view all that the positive sciences have to say about the natural evolution of humanity is necessarily considered as a divinely ordered and divinely induced process—a progressive manifestation of God the Personal Absolute, as perfect Ethical Spirit in man. The rise and fall of religious sects and organizations, the successive periods of depression or exaltation of the more obvious religious interests, the devotion to religion or the neglect of it on the part of generations of men, may influence the speed or change the form and direction of this process. But its essential nature remains unchanged; and the same far-off divine event remains aloft to the uplifted eye of faith. This faith itself, with its undying confidence in its own glorious Ideal, remains its own chief evidence, and most convincing proof. And the reflective thinking which traces its evolution in the race, and the evolution of the race as dependent upon the purity and power of this faith, gains an ever increasing rational confidence, not only in its practical value but also in its ontological validity. This is only to say that the religious view of the meaning and destiny of those cosmic existences, forces, and processes, which constitute the environment of man, and the religious doctrine of the nature, significance, and final purpose of man's historical evolution within this environment, are as likely to vindicate their essential truthfulness in the future, as is any other view, from whatsoever stand-

point of science, history, or philosophy, such view may be taken.

More specifically, in the second place, the psychological truths as to the nature and origin of religion tend to confirm the same conclusion as to the future of religion in the development of the race. They show that man's religious nature is no fragmentary and evanescent affair. Religion is neither a freak, nor a disease, nor a whim, of human nature. Religion is essentially *natural* with man, in the profoundest and most comprehensive meaning of the words. There is no contradiction inherent in the saying that belief in the Supernatural, and the outgoing of heart and will, and the shaping of conduct in view of such belief, are essentially natural. If ever—as frequently happens—a quarrel arises between nature and the supernatural, still it is in man's total experience that both the sources and the solution of this quarrel must subsist. As long as man remains man, he will have religion—will, so to say, make religion for himself. And as long as humanity continues to advance in the varied important ways of its evolution in history, humanity will develop also its religious beliefs, sentiments, and the practical piety which expresses in conduct the sincerity of these beliefs and sentiments. He must indeed be a shallow or a credulous student of religion from the psychological point of view who can persuade himself that the coming years are going so to disentangle and detach the interwoven threads of man's mental and social reactions as to let escape the *religious* nature and still leave *human* nature essentially the same. For, what has our study of these varied reactions shown to be true? They are so involved with one another, and with the entire mental, moral, and social life of humanity, that they are not parts of the structure which can be separated from the structure itself; they are, the rather, material of the structure, built into it from footing-stone to cornice, and from wall to wall. Religious experiences are not fringes of the complex web; they are portions of its very warp and woof.

If now we turn from the psychological to the historical study of religion, the same truth appears, displayed and emphasized in another form. For history, too, displays and emphasizes the universality of religion. This service to a rational hope for the future of religion it renders in three important ways. It establishes the fact that, as far back and as far afield as man's historical evolution can be traced, some form of religious belief and practice has characterized the process, and has formed a more or less important means of differentiating him from the lower animals. It also shows the difficulty, amounting to a practical impossibility, of any considerable community, not to say any people or nation, dispensing altogether with religion and yet retaining the other factors and interests of the community and national life. After each attempt at banishing the old beliefs, there has been hung out some such placard as this: "Wanted a new Religion!" And, finally, the less obvious but no less real failure of all efforts to reform and elevate the multitudes by any degree of progress in social thrift, political freedom, and intellectual and æsthetic culture, with religion left out of the account, is as significant as the corresponding failure to effect the same thing by means of a religion which maintains a standing opposition to these other forms of culture.

In a word, some form of beliefs, sentiments, and practical maxims, which will afford satisfactions and motives to aspiration and to endeavor after certain ideal values, such as religion recognizes, is an essential and permanent interest in the life of the individual and of the race. The admission of this truth is customarily made, at the last, even by those who most violently oppose all forms of positive religion, and who most confidently predict its somewhat speedy decline and extinction as of important *moment* in the development of humanity. A notable instance of this is the work of M. Guyau on "The Irreligion of the Future."¹ According to this author, all the most

¹ *L'Irréligion de L'Avenir, Étude Sociologique*, 7th ed., Paris, 1900.

cherished dogmas of religion are untenably and irrationally anthropomorphic, and so doomed by the advances of scientific knowledge. Religious morality, which is based upon fear and an unwarrantable feeling of mysticism, with its cult of prayers, will suffer dissolution. Nor will the popular morality be injured thereby. For religion is not a condition *sine qua non* of superiority in the struggle for existence; and science, free thought, and art, will be able to find their own rules for the control of themselves and of human conduct. Nor is the definitively religious sentiment innate and imperishable, as some of those (*e. g.* Renan, Taine, and others) who held the dogmas of religion to be absurd, have taught. Children can be educated, the purity and devotion of woman secured, and the fecundity of the race sufficiently assured, without influence from the faith of any form of positive religion.

But what will subsist, after all positive religion has disappeared from that structure of human beliefs, sentiments, and practices, which so many thousands of years of human experience and of human historical evolution has built up? To this important question, M. Guyau, in the rôle of prophet, confidently gives the following categorical reply:¹ "That which will subsist of the diverse religions in the irreligion of the future, is this idea that the supreme ideal of humanity, and even of nature, consists in the establishment of ever stricter social relations among the different beings" that constitute this complex totality. It is, indeed, by force of their secret or open associations that the greater religions have conquered the world. But what force accounts for, and imparts its force to these associations, M. Guyau seems largely unable to comprehend, or even to admit to his thoughtful consideration, except in a very partial and rather patronizing way. And when he comes finally to the discussion of that theory of reality, or metaphysics, in which the faiths, sentiments, and practices of religion cohere, he has his own conception to propose as one better able than

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 339f.

any religious faith to fill the vast vacuum which his negative criticism has created. It is a "naturalistic monism" which is to replace the dogmas of every form of positive religion. For this metaphysical hypothesis, with its deification of Nature (spelled large and with a capital) really embraces and expresses in better form the ontological values and virtues of theism, pantheism, and atheism. And yet this "irreligion of the future" can scarcely be called a rational hope for humanity. "To resume," says M. Guyau,¹ "in this age of crisis, of religious, moral, and social ruin, of reflective and destructive analysis, the reasons for suffering abound, and they end by seeming to be motives for despair. Each new progress of intelligence or sensibility, as we have seen, would appear to be productive of new pains." But what for the individual? To borrow the author's own figure of speech;²—"In all that remains of sensation or thought for us, one sentiment only is dominant, that of being weary, very weary." And so the wise man, like some traveller through an endless desert, when afflicted with that fever of torrid climes which exhausts before it kills, will be glad to lie down upon the sand, and "amicably contemplate, without a tear, without a desire, with the fixed look of fever, the undulating caravan of his brethren which is losing itself in the limitless horizon, toward the unknown which he will never see."

This view of the future of religion, developed with so much of learning, dialectical and critical skill, fine feeling, and polished rhetoric, has not been brought forward either for criticism or for refutation. It, the rather, evinces the indestructible nature of man's religious life itself; it really reveals more clearly the grounds on which reposes the rational hope of its continuance and continued development in the future. For even M. Guyau must have a theory of the Universe which will satisfy his ideals. He, too, is compelled to estimate at something approaching their real value the satisfactions of an emotional

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 408.

² *Ibid.*, p. 478.

and sentimental character which must be provided by this theory. Therefore he virtually adopts the beliefs and sentiments thus awakened, as though of the highest importance in the effort at securing the social evolution and social betterment of mankind. He would have the individual, in the confidence of these beliefs and in the experience of these emotions, suffer and hope and labor to the end for the social good of his brethren among men. He even regards the higher interests of science, free thought, and art, as somehow inseparably connected with the attitude of the individual and of society toward the Universe at large. And when the end comes for the idealist, the believer, the self-denying devotee who ever hopes against hope, and persistently expects the triumph of his ideals, he would have him die as one—

“Who wraps his cloak about him
And lies down to pleasant dreams.”

Now there is nothing new about all this;—nothing, indeed, that does not leave the witness of psychology and of history substantially the same. It has the value of M. Guyau's solution of the problems of religion, as they are proposed to reflective thinking in a form that is dictated absolutely—we might almost say—by the mental and social characteristics of the present age. In several important respects, indeed, this answer, which predicts the “irreligion of the future,” is essentially the same as the answer which encourages a rational hope for the future of religion. In a word, the problem remains unsolved: *What* beliefs, sentiments, and practices, concerning the Ultimate Ground of man's experience, best accord with the totality of this experience? We do not believe that a *naturalistic* Monism, after the type which M. Guyau proposes, affords the most satisfactory answer to this problem. Indeed, the problem itself is proposed by this writer in a manner which leaves large areas of this experience quite out of the account.

But if religion is surely to have a future, the questions log-

ically follow: Will the future belong to any one of the now existing forms of religion? and, If to any one form now existing, to which one? These inquiries are certain to provoke differences and hot discussions amongst even the most candid and well-instructed adherents to the different forms of positive religion. For the most dispassionate student of the phenomena of man's religious life and religious development from the philosophical point of view, they do not admit of an answer with the same assurance which may reasonably be had with reference to the future of religion in general.

The philosophy of religion has no data for a detailed description of the particular religion which will surely solve the problem of the future. Nor if an appeal be made to the assurance with which the content of any existing form of religious faith is at present received, does this appeal serve the purpose of furnishing the desired evidence. In the case of Christianity, for example, no particular scheme of dogmas, or plan of ecclesiastical organization, or show of ritual and ceremonial, or set of practical maxims for the governance of life, could command the assent of all the so-called authorities. In the cases of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, the confusion of opinion on all these topics would be no less great. Even if the inquiry be made after the barest so-called "essentials" of any one of the greater world-religions, a harmonious answer is by no means easy to obtain. Reference to the original constitution of these religions does not avail either to define the limits within which their present developments must be accepted as legitimate and true to the norm; neither does such reference afford a sure guaranty for the constitution which they will assume in the developments of the future. Could the Founders of any of them—especially, *e. g.*, Jesus and the Apostles—pronounce judgment upon all that which is to-day covered by their names; who can doubt that the character of the judgment would greatly surprise the multitude of their followers? What would Christ say about the beliefs, institutions, profes-

sions, and practices, which bear the name of Christianity at the present day?

Uncertainty over the more precise form of its future historical evolution is not, however, a matter peculiar to the content of religious beliefs or to the religious life. Such uncertainty belongs, of their very nature, to all the more complex historical developments. The world is indeed old; the world is ever building itself anew. There is a certain permanency of norm, a semblance of an enduring and all-comprehending plan; but change is everywhere the very life and reality of things, of institutions, of beliefs, and of ideals. Since man is man, however, and since a certain constitution of human nature with relatively, if not absolutely permanent characteristics, subsists throughout the historical evolution of the race, predictions as to the future of religion may make a rightful claim to our confidence. At their very least, they are entitled to be received as a rational hope.

But what—more specifically said—may we reasonably hope for with reference to the future of religion? Three things may be said with most well-founded and comfortable assurance in answer to this question. And, first, the religion of the future will be *social*, in the higher and better meaning of this word. It will more and more be a power to transform society—the “Great Psychic Uplift” of the race. No form of positive religion which does not actually effectuate in a large and generous way the social improvement of mankind can reasonably hope to have its future prolonged. Second: The religion of the future will be *ethical*—in the higher and better meaning of this word. It will be more and more an inspiring and illuminating motive for the control of the conduct of the individual in the interests of righteousness, trueness, and all the virtues of mind, will, and heart. No form of religion which does not in fact make men better morally can reasonably hope to have its future prolonged. But, third, the religion of the future will be a *faith*,—in the sense that it will retain a certain character-

istic view of the world, of human life and human destiny, and of what has worth of the highest and most imperishable kind. This faith within the soul of man, as subjective religion, will be the spirit of practical piety, or of loving trust toward the Divine Being, and of filial feeling and conduct toward all finite spirits as sons of the Infinite and ethically Perfect Spirit. And the normal relation between this faith and the social and ethical functions of religion will be retained; since it belongs to the very constitution of man that his positive view of life, when warmed with emotion, should realize itself in his behavior as a member of society.

The earnest and enlightened believer in any positive form of religion that has advanced a claim to absoluteness and to universality will naturally shape his hopes in the future of religion yet more definitely than this. The religion of the future is to be *his* religion—perhaps expanded and modified, necessarily purified, and yet essentially the same. From this position of hope he will not be driven easily, even when he encounters all the difficulty of trying to discover just what is “essential” about the religion to which his hope for the future is so firmly attached. We, too, are Christians. As students of the history, psychology, and philosophy of religion in general, we think to enlighten and confirm the hope that an essentially Christian religion will be the religion of the future of humanity. In order, however, to impart any semblance of rationality to this hope, two things must be accomplished. We must introduce again the distinction with which all our previous investigations have already made us so familiar:—namely, “between the parts played in the complex result by the spirit of Christ on the one hand and by the doctrines and institutions of the Church on the other;” and we must also try to determine what is meant by “essential Christianity.” In a word: What is the essence of the religion of Christ?

The claims of the religion of Christ to be universal, and to have an absolute content of truth, are themselves a matter of

historical development and therefore of historical investigation. But these claims are also open to reëxamination by reflective thinking in the light of all the other truths which humanity has achieved; they are therefore in a measure matters upon which philosophy is called to pronounce.

In their original form the claims to universality put forth in the name of the Christian religion arose in the belief that it inherited those hopes of Judaism which were founded upon a sure divine promise. The principal stages by which this claim rose to such an height were the following: (1) Yahweh, the tribal and then the national god, is the only true God; (2) the heathen, or worshippers of other gods, are going to submit to Yahweh and in fact become Jews; (3) the Jewish religion will continue in spite of the cessation of the national life, will spread and become universal (this, chiefly through the influence of the *Diaspora*); (4) Christianity, as the fulfillment of the Law and the Prophets, inherits the claims of Judaism to universal acceptance and dominion; and (5), finally, Christianity progressively has realized, and is still realizing, its universal character. This last stage of the claim implies that the Christian faith is becoming, in fact, adaptable to mankind; and that it is being actually adopted by mankind, irrespective of differences in race, position in history, or stages of race-culture. This is that characteristic of "historicalness" in the broader meaning of the word, the necessity and value of which for the religious life and development of humanity has already been made clear.¹ All these claims however, with the exception of the last, have of necessity largely lost their influence over the minds of men. The closing words of the Old Testament upon this subject must now be understood in a quite different meaning from that which they had in the thought of him who uttered them; if, indeed, its prophetic foresight of the future of religion is to be justified at all by the history of the race: "From the rising even to the setting of the sun is my name

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 62 ff.

great; and everywhere will incense be offered unto my name, and a pure offering" (*i. e.*, sacrifices and burnt-offerings.)¹ "Yahweh of hosts," even among the remnant of his "chosen people," is no longer pleased with the sight and smell of burnt-offerings; but the sacrifice of a pure heart and an unselfish life is the moral and social ideal of all believers in the "true God."

The content of truth for which the claim of absoluteness and universality is made under the name of Christianity is, as has already been said, not an altogether easy thing to determine, either by the historical or by the speculative method of inquiry. From the days of the earliest Apologists onward it has been assumed that Christianity is both a revealed and a rational religion. As Harnack² has comprehensively stated the case: It comprises "the rational truths, revealed by the prophets in the Holy Scriptures, and summarized in Christ (*Χριστὸς λόγος καὶ νόμος*); which in their unity represent the divine wisdom, and the recognition of which leads to virtue and eternal life." More comprehensively defined, this includes—"Christianity viewed as monotheistic cosmology (God as the Father of the world); Christianity as the highest morality and righteousness (God as the Judge, who rewards goodness and punishes wickedness); Christianity regarded as redemption (God as the Good One who assists man and rescues him from the power of the demons.)" And to all this the truth of history requires that we should add the claim: The divine redemption comes to man as a revelation of God's gracious love in the person and work of Jesus Christ, who stands in a unique relation of sonship to God, and to man as their Savior, example, and the imparter to them of eternal life.

In the subsequent development of the religion called after the name of Christ, many important elements of doctrine, ritual, and practice, have been added by all the various Christian

¹ Malachi, i, 11.

² History of Dogma, II, p. 203.

churches and sects ; and not a few of these additions have been proclaimed as belonging to the "essentials of Christianity." As a result, there is not one of the greater divisions of Christianity that can to-day substantiate the claim to represent faithfully and purely the "religion of Christ." Indeed, those first three centuries which resulted in the formation of the Church Catholic were preëminently characterized by the addition of doctrines, drawn chiefly from the sources of the Greek philosophy of the age. And never since has Christian dogma developed itself in any considerable independence of the influences of its scientific and philosophical environment. On the contrary, its development has largely consisted in the incorporation of elements derived from this environment ; or in the new interpretation of its more primitive and original content of truth, so as to make it consistent with the truths furnished by this environment. What is true of its dogma, is true also of its ecclesiastical organization, its forms of worship, and its system of maxims for the control of the Christian life in matters of conduct. So often in the entire history of this religion, as the attempt has been made to check development by a return to the so-called simplicity of the original Christian faith, practice, or exact form of association, the attempt has failed. From the very nature of the case such an attempt must always fail. In not a few instances a result far worse than mere failure has been the experience of such reactionary movements. In dogma, there has come in this way a new form of bigotry ; in ritual, a new form of extravagance or of barrenness ; in organization, a new form either of license or of repressive control ; and in life, new forms of fanaticism or of sensuous excesses. Reform, renovation, reconstruction, *full-filling* of the content of truth, and improved realization of the spirit of life—these are as much "essentials" of Christianity, if it is to make good its claim to universality, as are those precious and immortal truths which were given in concrete, symbolic, and personal form, by the Founder of this religion.

With these thoughts in mind the rationality of the hope for the future of the religion of Christ may be confirmed by comparing it, as respects its nature and present condition with the other greater religions. Like every other religion which makes similar claims to a certain absoluteness and universality, Christianity is now, and for an indefinite time will continue to be, face to face with friendly or hostile rivals. In not a few places it is to-day distinctly inferior to some of these rivals in aggressive force and adaptation to its environment. For example,—as all our previous psychological and historical induction, as well as the speculative conclusions which we have endeavored to found upon it, would lead us to reaffirm,—Coptic Christianity can never displace the surrounding Muhammadism; and the same thing is probably true of Armenian Christianity. Nor do we believe that the Greek Church can successfully compete with reformed Buddhism in Japan, or with Confucianism in China. All the nature-religions may, indeed, at once be set aside. They can make no claim to the promise of the future. That they are to be displaced by higher and purer forms of faith is as certain as that the lower stages of race-culture with which they are allied will give way to the higher, in the historical evolution of the race. When the decadent ceremonial, the intolerable bondage of caste, and the superstitious and largely immoral nature-worship of Hindüism are set aside, there remains of it only its religious philosophy. In some of its best and most distinguishing features this philosophy is already almost, or quite essentially in accord with that of modern Christian Theism. So far forth, the expectation is reasonable that both will abide. But philosophy, no matter how interesting, impressive, devout, and true to Reality, cannot of itself, constitute a universal religion.

They err greatly, whatever reasons may seem to encourage the confidence in the decay of the Turkish government, who regard the faith of Islam as destined speedily to pass away. On the contrary, this religion has a strong and unbroken hold

on some of the most vigorous races; and where it gains and has kept such a hold, it is of all rival religions the most difficult to displace by Christianity. Its sturdy, combative, and unquestioning monotheism, and the strength of the appeal which it makes to those who wish to "square" themselves with the interests of both worlds, promises to endure through an indefinite time in the future. And here is where the current Christianity is especially weak. It wants both worlds; and it has, therefore, either deliberately or unthinkingly placed itself in an alliance—too often obviously and discredibly contrary to the "religion of Christ"—with the regnant material interests, however oppressive and unrighteous those interests may, for the present, seem to be. But to serve God *and* mammon is less easy and less really profitable for a follower of Jesus than for a follower of Muhammad. The weakness of Islam, however, when considered from the definitively religious point of view, is its inability to satisfy the needs of a soul that longs to be assured of the redeeming love of God; nor does Islam furnish to the individual and to society those purifying and elevating spiritual influences, and that power of a new life of inner righteousness in union of spirit with God, which is, after all, the deepest and most honorable craving of the age.

While Islam has been distinguished for its exclusiveness, the easy, rapid, and widely spreading syncretism of Buddhism has always been one of its most distinguishing features. The best spirit of the religion of Buddha is in accord with the spirit of the religion of Christ, in its presentation to human need and human hope of the great and comforting truth of the divine pity, as evinced in a manner irrespective of considerations of caste, rank, political distinctions, or social standing. In this most important respect Buddhism is, like Christianity, a distinctly universal religion. But even its most ardent and devoted advocates cannot face the facts without being compelled to admit that its cult and traditional dogmas are still in

the Mediæval period; that there is a lamentable lack (not to fail gratefully to acknowledge individual exceptions) of intellectual culture and moral principle among its priesthood; and that, in spite of current, and in certain spots more or less successful efforts at increased enlightenment and ethical improvement, its present beliefs, sentiments, and practices are not adapted to become universal.

Our conclusion, then, as to the reasonableness of the claim of Christianity to be the religion of the future is a two-fold conclusion. Its claim to universality, to be the absolutely true and permanently satisfying religion for all mankind, is a claim which every generation, and every individual, may rightly examine anew—may properly challenge and put to the test. No age, no school of theologians, no ecclesiastical organization with its collection of dogmas or rule of faith, can answer infallibly and for all time these inquiries: "What is essential Christianity?" and, "Is it the final and absolutely true religion, destined to be accepted by all mankind?" The experience of the individual believer, both as a form of belief and as an informing spirit of life, may be compared, indeed, with the norm of experience furnished in the records of his religion. The comparison may warrant him in affirming the truth of the declaration: "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, and to-day, and forever." (Heb. xiii, 8.) But in order to convert this personal conviction into a scientifically established prediction, or into a confident hope for all of the race, much more must be established than can be furnished by any individual's experience. The question is ever recurring anew: What is meant by the "Jesus Christ," whose name embodies this content of unchanging experience, and of permanent and absolute truth? And again: In what sense can that be called "the same," which was in Jesus' own case, the unfolding of a life according to some hidden norm, or ideal? How can that remain "the same" which has confessedly ever since consisted in a history of changes, a progressive realization of an ideal? Hence the

perpetual demand for inquiries as to what this Ideal is ; and as to its correspondence to some Ultimate Reality.

Whatever criticism may decide, therefore, concerning the alleged infallibility and authority of the sacred writings of Christianity, or concerning the truthfulness and practical value of any of the factors which have been added to its content since the canon of the New Testament was closed, the conception of development cannot be denied in its application to this, as to all other claimants to be the religion of the future. On the contrary, the ideal of a religion that is absolutely fixed in an unchanging but infallibly true creed, with an unalterable form of cult, and a universally binding set of practical maxims, does not apply to Christianity, in fact. From the very nature of man, of religion, and of human history, such an ideal could not be realized in any form of religion. Could any religion take on such a form, it would on this very account be the furthest possible from the ideal.

It is just this capacity for variation, united with the persistence of its one high practical aim, and of its point of view from which to regard all that is, and happens, as manifestation of the good-will and redeeming love of the Absolute and perfect Ethical Spirit, which makes Christianity adapted to become in the future the religion of mankind. This claim to universality involves the persuasion that Christianity will be able to throw off all that the growing knowledge of man shows to be untrue ; all that man's increasing refinement of æsthetic feeling shows to be inconsistent with the sublime beauty of the Divine Nature ; and all that the rising and purified moral consciousness of the race pronounces morally unworthy of God's perfect Ethical Spirit. There can be no more suitable and convincing proof of the claim to an absolute value than the power of the life and truth belonging to any religion, to advance itself to higher stages of self-realization and self-purifying.

The same claim involves the conviction that Christianity is

able to appropriate, reconcile with itself, and incorporate into its doctrine and life, man's growing knowledge of religious truth, increased refinement and elevation of feeling, and purified morality. Organized Christianity must undoubtedly in the future leave science, art, and in a larger measure than heretofore, ethics and social life, to a free and independent development. That is to say, henceforth it cannot assume by its dogmas to control scientific discovery, or the statement and applications of natural laws. It can no longer, as in the Middle Ages, absorb the devotion and practice of the arts. Neither can it assume to control directly the functions of civil government, or the associations and procedure of society. But the spirit of the religion of Christ may be expected to recognize all truth as God's truth, all beauty as the revelation of the all-beautiful Being of Him who is the World's Redeemer (the "beauty of holiness" in a magnified meaning of this ancient phrase), and all human conduct and social association as having its significance in the effort to obey Him, whose righteous and loving command is life, and to disobey whom is to enter upon the course of death eternal. It is this magnanimity and hospitality toward all the good of truth, beauty, and righteousness that must take the place of the original exclusiveness and narrow intensity, which was natural and inevitable under its original conditions; if Christianity is to become in the future the religion of all mankind.

A certain rare combination of the rational with the practical, of the ideal and mystical with the effectual direction of the daily life of the individual and society, of what is universally human with the possibility of adaptation to what is peculiar to particular races and even to particular persons, has been throughout its history a distinctive merit of the Christian religion. This same qualification is a distinction in greater or less degree of all those religions which, like Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity, have proclaimed salvation for man as man; and these same religions have been conquering and wide-

spreading world-religions. But the traditional sayings of the founders of these three great missionary movements, given as parting commissions to their disciples, are not without significance in determining the differences of the three. According to Buddha the future of his religion was to be characterized by a succession of "Great Uproars,"—(1) the Cyclic Uproar, (2) the Buddha-Uproar, and (3) the Universal-Monarch-Uproar. The method of meeting these times of emergency was to be passive; and the final result was pessimistically conceived. Muhammad, on the contrary, thought to leave to his followers a finished religion, that could be enforced in his name upon a resisting and unbelieving world. "This day," said he at the "Farewell Pilgrimage," "have I perfected your religion unto you." But Jesus, recognizing the futility of all attempts to realize in Judaism a universal mission, and foreseeing more clearly than Buddha the ages of conflict and strife which were before the new religion he had been divinely commissioned to establish among men, planted his word, as a seed, a kernel containing the spirit and norm of a higher and ever higher form of moral and spiritual life. This seed he bade his followers disseminate, as truth should always be disseminated,—not by violence but by inspired proclamation of the word. He then looked confidently into the future to see it winning the acceptance and controlling the lives of the multitude of mankind.

In a word, we find in the nature and past history of what we may call—although confessedly in a somewhat loose and indefinite way—"essential Christianity," the grounds for a rational hope in the future realization of its claims to universality, to be *the* religion of mankind. In saying this it is to be noticed that by a long circuit around-about, our thought has returned to the point from which the investigation began. A certain ideal standard for the evaluation of religion was then set up. This standard took account of the adaptation of any group of religious beliefs, sentiments, and practices, to satisfy

the needs of human nature, to abide in history, and to grow in correspondence to the advancing and rising life of man. Nor did the standard admit of religion being in an attitude of passivity only toward this ideal. On the contrary, it must itself be the great force in the progressive realization of its own ideal; and the ideal was complex, including the ideals of truth, beauty, goodness, and happiness. How it is that religion—and above all other religions, the Christian religion—progressively corresponds to, and contributes toward, these ideals, as a living force in history, our examination should now have made more clear. The more permanent factors and universal values of religious experience have been tested by the method of philosophy. The result has been to establish faith and hope as rational postulates. As to *proof*—in the strictest meaning of the word—for the claims to universal and absolute validity of so-called “essential Christianity,” we cannot do better than to say in the words of another¹: “From the point of view of philosophy the absoluteness of Christianity is an hypothesis, like any other philosophic theory, which must be tested by its ability to explain all the facts, and as to the truth or falsehood of which the final decision belongs to the future.” But to him who accepts the content of its faith and has experience of its inner life, this religion converts what might otherwise remain a faint but rational hope into a firm and joyful conviction.

¹ Professor William Adams Brown, *The Essence of Christianity*, p. 310.

CHAPTER XLIV

IMMORTALITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL

During the entire history of man's religious development the belief in an existence after death has been connected with the body of beliefs and practices that have determined the very nature of religion. In the cruder and more primitive stages of this development the connection has, indeed, been neither consciously intimate nor logical and consistent. Examination from the psychological point of view shows, however, that the same instinctive and impulsive sources of emotion, and the same activities of imagination and intellect, in which religion has its rise, form also the springs for the belief in the immortality of the individual. An unreflecting spiritism has its origin in the projection of the idealized human spirit into the environment, filling it with a variety of superhuman, invisible spiritual powers. The projection of the same human spirit into time future originates a belief in its existence after death. In fetishism, totemism, and in most forms of animal and nature worship, as well as in all ancestor-worship or worship of deified man, the same process supports in their interdependent relations the belief in invisible spirits and the belief in the continued existence of the human spirit after bodily death. Only in some such meaning of the words, then, can this earliest form of belief in a future existence for the individual be called a religious belief at all.

In the higher forms of religion the connection just referred to becomes more consciously intimate and logical. Still later, the belief in the continued existence of the human spirit after

death rises to the significance of an important religious doctrine, and becomes related to the conception of God as Ethical Spirit in a manner powerfully to affect the whole logical structure and moral significance of man's religious beliefs and practices. In these various degrees of its development, and of its dependent connection with the development of religion among mankind, we may therefore say that this belief if not strictly universal, is exceedingly wide-spread and extends back into the remotest history of the race. Wundt, indeed, affirms¹ that all primitive races believe that the spirit is a sensible existence separable from the body. This, although not convertible with the belief in immortality, is contributory to it. Neither must the separability of the soul be confounded with its immateriality. In remarking upon the religion of the Greeks, Rohde declares²: "We have sufficient reason to conjecture that a soul-cult, an honoring of the spiritual essence which lies hidden in man, and after his death separates itself for an independent existence, belonged in the land of the Greeks, *as, indeed, everywhere on the earth*, to the most ancient practices of religion." According to D'Alviella,³ the primitive custom of burying the dead in the uterine posture, and the wide-spread primitive belief in one's own double, are evidences of the existence of this tenet of faith in prehistoric times. Indeed, the characteristic mental attitude of savage and primitive man is the complete absence of doubt. As Von den Steinen says⁴ of the native of Brazil: "He knows he will not die."

As to the details of the belief in the soul's existence after death, what can be said of one people can generally be said of all who are in the same stage of race-culture. But so manifold and confused are, of necessity, the beliefs connected with a subject about which nothing can be known by immediate ex-

¹ Ethics, I, p. 100.

² Die Religion der Griechen, Rectoratsrede, Heidelberg, 1894. (Italics ours.)

³ Origin and Growth of the Conception of God, pp. 15 and 78f.

⁴ Naturvölker Zentral-Brasiliens, p. 348f.

perience, that no definite and concordant doctrine of immortality is anywhere to be found. A medley of views, arising from similar *motifs*, is everywhere existent.

The problem of destiny as connected with the beliefs of religion concerns either the individual man or the race; and these two forms of the problem, while interdependent, are not by any means the same. On the one hand, it might be that the species should live on indefinitely and perhaps make progress toward some worthy social ideal; but that the individual members of it should drop out of conscious existence,—that is, should cease to be individuals at all. Or, on the other hand, it might be that the race should quite perish from the face of the earth; but that some, or all, of its individual members should continue to exist under other and non-earthly conditions of existence. In examining the doctrine of the immortality of the individual as a tenet of religion, therefore, it is necessary to know from the beginning what that doctrine, in its most highly developed form, means to assert. For as Professor Royce has well said¹: “Now when we ask about the immortality of man, it is the permanence of the individual man about which we mean to inquire, and not primarily the permanence of the human type, as such, nor the permanence of any other system of laws or relationships.” Yet more definitely said: It is the reality of the existence of a Self, of the self-conscious life, connecting itself by recognitive memory with its own past, and so related in character to this past as to constitute a continuous self-development, about the continuance of which, after death, religion is chiefly concerned.

It has already been said that the same impulsive and emotional stirrings and activities of intellect and imagination in which religion arises give birth to the belief in a soul separable from the body and so capable of being permanently continued in existence after the death of the body. But the causes for

¹ See the entire very suggestive discussion of “The Place of the Self in Being,” in *The World and the Individual*, * * Lecture VII.

the belief in the immortality of the individual, and for the characteristic development of this belief, may be conveniently grouped under the following three heads: (1) The psychological and metaphysical; (2) the social and sympathetic; and (3) the more definitely ethical and religious, in the higher meaning of these words. This belief seems to man to be demanded in order to explain the phenomena of his dreams, and those other psychic manifestations which indicate the separability of the soul from the body. It also seems needed to satisfy his emotional and affectional relations,—such as fear, reverence, pride, love, etc.,—toward members of his family, his circle of friends, or his tribe. And, finally, the same belief affords to his maturer reflection additional ground for faith in a moral and religious significance of the world-order; and for an ethical conception of the World-Ground. In the reverse process of reasoning, man's ethical view of God and of the divine manifestation in the world of human experience nourishes and supports, on grounds of moral reason, the belief in immortality.

When we speak of the psychological *and* metaphysical source of man's belief in immortality, the addition of the latter of these two terms is no matter of indifference, either to the historical account or to the rationality of the argument. Indeed, a recognition of the activity and validity of the "ontological consciousness" is indispensable, if the causes of this belief are to be converted into reasons or rational arguments in its defense. That objective and constitutive action of the mind of man which endows the Self and things with their *real being*, is at the base of the belief in the immortality of the Self as truly as it is at the base of all scientific and religious beliefs. The consciousness of being real, bestows upon the flowing stream of conscious states, with their fringes of past memories and anticipations of the future and with their referableness to the same Subject as its objects, certain enduring qualities necessary to its *An-sich-Sein* ("In-itself-being") and its *Für-sich-Sein*

(“For-self-being”). Thus when in dreams,¹ and in other experiences, primitive man becomes aware of the familiar presence of the dead, or of those whose bodily selves are known to be far away, he explains the phenomena by the persistent existence in reality of the active, self-constituting *Ego*. For the same reason he cannot think of himself as dead; for to think of himself at all, he must be thoroughly alive,—self-conscious and thoughtful,—an attentive Subject picturing himself as an object for himself.

The force of these natural impulses to the belief in the immortality of the individual is made yet more impressive by the fact that quite universally among some people, and extensively among others, a continuance of conscious existence is regarded as a thing greatly to be dreaded and deplored. “Life is like a horrid corpse bound to the neck,” is the dictum of Buddhism in a land where the only known conditions of continued existence are fraught with pain and suffering; where the temperament of the people is not favorable to strenuous endurance of the struggle upward; and where religious superstitions are mainly terrifying. This fact goes far toward depriving of its cogency the so-called argument for immortality from the satisfaction of the soul’s irrepressible longings. On the other hand, the same fact shows how man’s imagination persists in prolonging existence, even in spite of the desire to cease from the pain and strife of life. Hence the pathetic meditation of the Buddhist faith: ²—

“Subject to birth, old age, disease,
Extinction will I seek to find,
Where no decay is ever known,
Nor death, but all security.”

¹ It is easy, however, to attribute too much influence to dreams in forming the belief in the immortality of the individual. As Rohde has remarked, although the separability of soul from body, and the endowment of every living thing with the dual existence which man knows himself to have, is Homeric enough, the Homeric world is not troubled with ghosts, and the soul after the body is burned does not any longer show itself even in dreams (*Psyche*, pp. 8; 10f.).

² Compare Buddhism in Translations, p. 6.

Or, in the more bitter form of complaint, the same fact expresses itself as in Marlowe's Dr. Faustus:—

“ Why wert thou not a creature wanting soul ?

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All beasts are happy,
For when they die,
Their souls are soon dissolved in elements;
But mine must live still to be plagued in hell.”

In this connection it becomes clear that, from the psychological and metaphysical points of view, the expectation of living on—or even of living again, so to say—is an integral, constant, and essential factor in the Self's consciousness of *really* being alive at all. If the *Ego* could not project itself into the future, by activity of imagination and intellect suffused with the ever-present “ontological consciousness,” it could not in the present serve the purposes of that self-knowledge which characterizes a real Self. This self-projection into the near future we achieve, however, every time we lie down to sleep, expecting whether sleep be dreamless or not, to awake in the morning. The awakening itself may easily be imagined under greatly changed conditions, both internal and appertaining to the states of the soul, or external and having to do with the soul's physical and social environment. But to imagine the extinction of the Self is simply to refuse to apply imagination to the case at all; it is to rest in a purely negative attitude toward the future.

The intelligent recognition of the significance and value of the “ontological consciousness” in the performances just described, implies a relatively advanced stage of culture. On the contrary, the social and sympathetic causes of the belief in the continued existence of the individual after death are powerfully operative in all stages of civilization. The emotions of fear, resentment, awe before the mystery of the invisible or unintelligible, and the domestic and friendly affections of pride, love, admiration, and desire for communion, furnish strong

motives to induce and to foster this belief. Universally among primitive and savage peoples, and as well as among multitudes of civilized communities, the dead are feared. They are naturally endowed with more or less of those superhuman qualities which the invisible and divine spiritual beings inherently possess. They continue to exist—so it is imagined and believed—in relations toward the living that are similar to those which were maintained when they were themselves alive. But perhaps these spirits of the dead may have wrongs to set right or to avenge; or they may have needs and desires to be satisfied which it is difficult for their survivors to meet or even to anticipate; then, indeed, they must be feared. If, however, they have been objects of pride, admiration, or affection, while they have lived as men among men; why should they not be conceived of as still living in such relations as to satisfy, perhaps in increased measure, the same feelings of pride, admiration, and affection?

It is for these reasons that the belief in the immortality of the individual is so universal in its logical and necessary connection with ancestor-worship.¹ Propitiatory offerings to ancestors, as though they were in active and living relations with men, are everywhere to be found. The worship of the *Fravashis*² among the Iranians, of the *Pitris* among the Hindūs, the *ἐναγίσματα* among the Greeks, the *Inferiæ* or *Parentalia* among the Romans, are in evidence on this point. Among prehistoric men, as in the relics at Aurignac, somewhat doubtful evidences of the same belief are found.³ The pathetic outstretching of vain hands toward the dreaded or the beloved dead, even among the most degraded savages, reveals the same work of human

¹ Compare Renouf, *Origin and Growth of Religion*, p. 129f.

² The *Fravashis* were heavenly types, or "spiritual doubles" of all created things,—gods, men, mountains, rivers, etc. Each man had his own *fravashi*, or genius. So the *Ka*, or disembodied spirit, of the Egyptian. *Ka*=the *εἶδωλον*, or *imago*, or ghost, or genius.

³ See Sir Charles Lyell, *Antiquity of Man*, p. 193 (?); but, *per contra*, Mr. Dawkins, in *Nature*, IV, p. 208.

imagination prompted by the human heart.¹ In the tombs of Egypt, at the foot of the memorial tablet which invariably faced the East, there lay a tablet of granite, limestone, or alabaster, which was designed to hold the offerings for the dead. Thus, as elsewhere, belief in immortality, and honor approaching, if not amounting to worship, were bound together in ancient Egypt.² The spirit of this belief is finely caught as we read the inscription of Rameses II at Abydos. "Awake!" he addresses his deceased father, Seti I, "raise thy face to heaven, behold the sun, my father Mineptah, thou who art like God. Here am I who make thy name to live." Connected with this worship was the belief that the most terrible curse which could light upon a man was to have "no son or daughter to give him the lustral water." Just as the Brāhman believes that his entrance into Nirvāna depends upon his having a son to perform the funeral rites.

The third class of causes which operate to produce the belief in the immortality of the individual are the more definitively ethical and religious. These causes come into efficient operation later, and only as the moral and religious development of man attains a certain stage. But they furnish the more permanent grounds for belief; they are, indeed, the only secure reasons for a rational faith and hope. In this case, as in all others, the defensible character of the religious belief is chiefly dependent upon the ethical development which has been given to its form. The conception of righteousness as somehow seated at the heart of the Universe, the impression that the cosmic existences, forces, and processes, are somehow interpretable in terms of a moral World-order, stimulates and strengthens the belief in immortality. As man's conception of God in terms of Ethical Spirit becomes established in human

¹ Compare the Chapter on "Life and Death" in Jevon's Introduction to the History of Religion; and see Nassau, *Fetichism in West Africa*, p. 52f.

² See the Articles of E. de Rougé in the *Revue Archéologique* (New Series), vol. I; *Études sur le Rituel Funéraire des Anciens Égyptiens*.

belief, the ethical considerations bearing upon the tenet of his own continued existence become more influential. In the highest form of the doctrine, it is the moral Being of God, and the divine work with the race as their Moral Ruler and Redeemer, which guarantees that sort of a future for the individual man in which the hope of immortality becomes a reasonable hope. In fact, it is the presence or absence, the degree and the development, of these ethical factors which more than anything else, characterizes and differences this belief as it exists amongst different peoples and in different eras of their history. There is, therefore, no little historical support to the claim of Schopenhauer, that if man could sustain the belief in his own unending existence without belief in the existence of God, then "faith in the existence of God would cool." But the more rational point of view reverses this *dictum* and finds in the kind of God whose existence faith accepts, the power to sustain the belief in at least the possibility of an unending existence for the "sons of God."

Now since the activity and value of the "ontological consciousness" makes itself felt throughout the entire process of religious belief, the particular conception held as to the character of the entity called "soul," conditions the belief in its immortality in a very important way. What *really is* this soul, which is regarded as somehow separable from its body, and so capable of continuance after death? Beyond the earlier stages of an "unreflecting spiritism," three principal answers have been given to this inquiry by the reflective thinking of mankind. Of these one affirms that the soul is an indestructible entity, which may be conceived of as continuing in existence without manifesting those activities of self-consciousness, cognitive memory, and rational and ethical self-determination, in which the very essence of the self-known Self consists. Its being may be conceived of as persisting after the analogy of the permanent material elements, or units of force. Another opinion affirms that the soul is really only a succession of

psychoses,—the character of which is, however, self-like, because it falls under the law of habit and thus has a sort of self-perpetuating quality. Or, in the third place, the soul may be conceived of as just that reality which it knows itself to be, and which consists in its being actually the self-determining subject of its own peculiar forms of functioning. To be self-conscious, to exercise recognitive memory, and rational inference, and to shape conduct in the pursuit of moral and æsthetical ideals,—this is really to be a Self.

So vague and shiftily are the notions of the nature of the soul's reality which are in general held by savage and primitive peoples, that their beliefs make it impossible to determine which one of the several souls possessed by any individual is going to be preserved. Indeed, it seems easily possible that several of them should continue at least for a time in existence after death. The savage, in his effort to account for all his experiences, readily endows himself with the necessary number of souls. The natives of West Africa¹ are the possessors of no fewer than four spirits each; the Sioux have three souls; some Dakota tribes rejoice in the sacred number four; and the Navajos, according to Dr. Matthews, think of one of their souls as a sort of "astral body." Other tribes of savages are proud of, or troubled with, no fewer than six or seven. Tâoism in China provides each individual with three souls; one remains with the corpse, one with the spirit's tablet, and one is carried off to purgatory. And lest the civilized sceptic scoff at this, he may be asked to remember, not only the threefold designation of the Hebrews, of the animal (*nephesh*), the human (*ruach*), and the divine (*neshamah*) soul, but also Plato's *thumos*, *epithumia*, and *nous*; or the various conscious, subconscious or "subliminal," and dual, triple, or quadruple selves of some modern psychologists. From the only tenable point of view,² as it seems to us, so far as the interests of the re-

¹ See Nassau, *Fetichism in West Africa*, p. 52f.

² Compare the author's *Philosophy of Mind*, chapters IV-VI.

ligious doctrine of immortality are concerned, the modern scientific divisions of the classes of phenomenal experience are no more important than are those belonging to the centuries-old spiritism of savage and primitive tribes. It is enough to secure a reasonable hope in the permanency of one soul, if only that one be enough of a soul. And this sufficiency of values can, from the nature of the case, belong only to the rational and moral Self, with its developing forms of life in the realization of its legitimate ideals.

The doctrine of Ātman in ancient and modern Brāhmanism, the mediæval and scholastic pre-Kantian conception of the soul, and much of both the popular and the scholastic theology of to-day, require a conception of the soul's entity in the first of the three meanings of the term. This conception, however, when logically carried through, naturally allies itself either with the doctrine of transmigration in some of its cruder forms, or with the theories of pantheism touching the absorption of the human individual soul-entity into the all-embracing entity of the Absolute. From the point of view of modern psychology the conception itself is as invalid scientifically as the conclusion derived from it is unsatisfactory to the æsthetical and ethical sentiments of value. Buddhism was in the right, in an exceedingly important way, when it rejected in the interests of morals and of religion the Brāhmanical tenet of an imperishable and substantial soul-entity, separable from all contingencies of change in its environment and independent, for its continued existence, of its own conscious and voluntary manner of behavior. But it committed a fatal mistake when it put forth the doctrine that the substantial existence of the soul is a *mere name* for the presence of the "five attachment-groups": "In the absolute sense," said its doctrine, "there is no living entity there to form a basis for such figments as 'I am,' or 'I.'" The *Ego* thus becomes only a "serial succession"; one element perishes and another arises. But this doctrine of Buddhism, like that of Brāhmanism which it was intended to displace,

is based upon a quite insufficient and even false conception of the nature of that unity and permanency of existence which makes the so-called "serial succession" a really existing Self.

The dependence in a rational way of the belief in the immortality of the individual upon the conception held as to the nature of the soul's reality is intimate and unalterable. If the reality of man's Selfhood consists in the imperishable existence of some unconscious "soul-stuff"; or if it is exhausted by a mere series of conscious or half-conscious states, that may at any time cease to be articulated by self-consciousness, memory, and rational inference, into the life-history of a true Self; then, in either of these cases, we cannot identify its existence after death with an immortality that is satisfactory to the tenets of monotheistic religion, or with an ideal of the future that calls for an exercise of rational faith and hope. More definitely stated: A belief in the immortality of the individual must, on the one hand, satisfy the modern scientific views as to the soul's nature and relations to bodily existence; and on the other hand, it must take its place in a system of religious beliefs which emphasizes the significance and value of the self-conscious and rational life of personal spirit in the progressive realization of its ideals. Neither of these conditions is fulfilled by that view of the soul's entity which destroys or impairs the conception of it as a true Self. *It is the Self that is immortal, if immortality await man in any form whatever.*

Neither is a merely figurative permanency, in the "life of the race," or by way of influence over others (as, for example, is indicated in George Eliot's hymn, beginning: "O might I join the choir invisible"), a real immortality of the individual.

The belief in the immortality of the individual, like all religious beliefs, has been the subject of development in dependence, more or less immediate and complete, upon the advance of race-culture. In determining the stages and rapidity of this advance, the principal factors have been the prevailing conceptions (1) as to the nature and value of the Self; (2) as to the

Being of God and his relations to men ; and (3) as to the social conditions and ideals which evoke the feelings and judgments of value. Here, as in general with human efforts to picture the invisible and the ideal, no rigid application of any so-called laws of the evolution of the belief can be made in reliance upon the facts of history. A certain order may, however, be said to control the appearance and the prevalence of the various forms of this belief. They may, therefore, be arranged under the following four heads ; although they are not actually kept distinct or free from various admixtures with one another.

The lowest historical form of the belief in the continued existence of man's soul after death affirms of it some shadowy and ghost-like character. In this form, the belief fits in with that stage of religious development which was characterized as an unreflecting spiritism. Indeed, the belief in immortality at this stage is akin to the belief in ghosts, and is motivated chiefly by fear. Although some of the dead may be supposed to be, as some of the living certainly are, more powerful than others, and better situated and conditioned in the spirit world, any division among the dead does not appear to rest upon ethical grounds. Hence ancestor-worship may form a hindrance to the rise of the doctrine of immortality toward a higher ethical and spiritual form. To make the condition of the dead depend upon their relation to the passions and affections of the living, whether fear, pride, hatred, or love, is certainly injurious to the conception of a moral world-order, extending into invisible regions of time and space.

A next higher stage—at least in some respects—of this belief takes the form of the opinion that all souls pass upon death into some other embodied manifestation ; and that the character of this transmigration depends somehow upon considerations realized in the life of those souls previous to death. The more elaborate and definite doctrine of the transmigration of souls seems to have arisen, especially in ancient Egypt and in India,

in the sixth and fifth centuries B. C.; and to have resulted from a development of the ethical views of the next life mingled with a basis of totemism and animal-worship. In Egypt this doctrine appears to have been first taught as a means of rewarding the good and then of punishing the bad; in India of both alike.¹ Thus one Upanishad declares: "All who depart from this world go to the moon. In the bright fortnight the moon is gladdened by their spirits; but in the dark fortnight it sends them forth into new births. Verily the moon is the door of heaven. Him who rejects it, it sends on beyond; but whoso rejects it not, him it rains down upon this world. And here is he born either as a worm, or a grasshopper, or a fish, or a bird, or a lion, or a boar, or a serpent, or a tiger, or a man, or some other creature, according to his deeds and his knowledge."²

The belief in the continued existence of the soul as a human individual, and under conditions dependent for their character upon "deeds done in the body," represents a still higher stage of development. In connection with this form of belief, the growth of moral sentiment from which it proceeds results in either adding special miseries to the wicked in the underground world common to all; or else, finally, in separating locally the abode of the good dead from that of the wicked dead. The modification of this view which is introduced by the Buddhist doctrine of Karma emphasizes, indeed, the doctrine of retribution, but in such a manner that it can scarcely be said to apply to the human individual. For Buddhism holds that no soul which corresponds to the true conception of a Self exists, either before or after death; what persists after death is only "the ac-

¹ The doctrine of transmigration is a natural and almost inevitable deduction from the belief of Animism; and some anthropologists have therefore argued for its universality. Rhys Davids denies, however, that any trace of it is found among the Aryans previous to their migration into India; and also that the Aryan races generally held to the belief. See *Origin and Growth of Religion*, p. 74; and the quotations, p. 76f.

² Rhys Davids, *Ibid.*, p. 81f.

cumulated results of all your actions, words, and thoughts." Yet popular Buddhism has its doctrine of heaven and hell, as vividly pictorial and intensely realistic as that of any other of the greater world-religions.

A still greater maturity of philosophical reflection leads to the belief that the character of the soul's future after death depends upon the relations it will sustain to the Absolute Being from which its existence is derived. In a word, the immortality of the individual is secured by, and subsists in, the relation which it permanently assumes toward its own Source or Ground. Thus the immortality of the Pantheism of the Brāhmanical type is conceived of as an absorption of the soul of the individual into Ātman, or the World-Soul, from which it came forth. The immortality of the enlightened Buddhist is Nirvāna, or the cessation of that otherwise endless succession of conscious states, rendered miserable by unsatisfied desires, in which the necessity of Karma involves the soul. Metempsychosis is now the object of dread, as the prospect of it extends indefinitely into the remotest future. But when reflection puts a sufficiently high estimate upon the ethical values involved, and adopts the conceptions of God as perfect Ethical Spirit, and of man as potentially a son of God, then it is a moral and spiritual union with the Divine Being, in a kingdom of redeemed and blessed spirits, which furnishes the highest type of the soul's immortality and which becomes the object of the soul's highest endeavor.

Among peoples which have attained a considerable degree of civilization, the most various forms of belief may coexist—either as distributed somewhat definitely amongst the corresponding grades of existing culture, or as a rather confused mingling of elements from them all. Even among rude tribes there are traces to be found of higher views; and whether such views are survivals from a far distant and better past or are due to the later reflections of the more thoughtful few, it is not always possible to say. The more general theory of the continu-

ance of soul-life affirms that each tribe or clan somehow lives on as it knows life to be when men are associated in bodily shapes. Wounds, sicknesses, mutilations, etc., are carried over into the beyond. As a belief which was perhaps originally connected with burial in the earth, the dead inhabit the vast and gloomy and indefinite "underground." Thus was conceived of, the Hebrew Sheol and the Babylonian "land whence none return." But the place of souls may be on the summit of some mountain, as on the top of Kina Balu in Borneo, or of Gunjung Danka in West Java. It may be over the mountains, or over the seas; as with the Chilians, who located among the peaks of Mexico the joyous garden of Tlalocan, where their dead ancestors were. Some peoples, quite below the Hebrews in their conception of Deity, have been altogether in advance of them in their conceptions of the future life of the individual. When men come to regard a separation of the dead as demanded on moral grounds, the division is facilitated by the natural phenomenon of the setting sun. Through the gate which its arrival in the Western horizon seems to open, the blessed may enter into a place of light and happiness, which is made all the more attractive through its striking contrast with the darkness and gloom of the underworld. Natural, however, as it appears to suppose that the different views of the fate of the soul after death must be connected with the treatment, by burial or by burning, of the corpse, the supposition is not borne out by all the facts. Among the Teutons in the North, both customs seem to have been practiced without any clear demarcation of either topography or periods of time.¹ And the same thing is substantially true of India.

From time immemorial in ancient Egypt the "darling idea" of the people was the continued existence of the souls of their dead.² An elaborate doctrine of immortality is proved by in-

¹ See De la Saussaye, *The Religion of the Teutons*, p. 57f.

² Comp. Erman, *Ägypten und Ägyptisches Leben im Altertum*, pp. 413ff.

scriptions on the walls of pyramids of the Fifth and Sixth Dynasties, that are as old as 3000 B. C. But as to the How? and the Where? there were no clearly sustained and universally recognized views. Some thought the departed souls were in heaven among the stars; others that they were with the birds on the trees, or with their bones under the ground. Some held that the dead changed their form, and existed "to-day as herons and to-morrow as beetles, and the day after as a lotus blossom on the water." The part that survived was the spirit or *Ka*,—a self-existent entity which dwells in man and by its presence bestows upon him life and health and joy. For the uses of this spiritual entity the body must be preserved, in order to become again its dwelling-place. But the *Ka* itself needed food and drink to preserve it, and to prevent hunger and thirst. In the thought of the ancient Egyptians, a combination of magical with ethical elements determined the condition of the dead, whether good or bad. Besides the righteousness of the Osiris, the candidate for a happy immortality needed to know the names of the bolt on the door, of the panels, the sill, the lock, the door-posts and the door-keeper, of the "Hall of Truth." Moreover, the continuance of the complete man in a satisfied life depended upon getting together the component parts which had become separated by death. And although in the later doctrine the *Ka* had become so completely identified with the Self that even the king is represented as presenting offerings and petitions to it, as to his own personality, and as receiving the reply: "I give unto thee all Life, all Stability, all Power, all Health, and all Joy; and although even the gods of Egypt had their *Kas*, which were embodied and represented in their statues; still there were at least two other immortal parts of the individual man. One of these was his heart or *âb*. The immortal heart of man, which stood in somewhat the same relation to the material heart as the *Ka* to the whole body,¹ left

¹ See Wiedermann, *The Ancient Egyptian Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul*, p. 29; and *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, p. 240f.

him at death and journeyed to the "Abode of hearts." An artificial scarabæus of hard greenish stone, to represent the provisional heart between death and the renewal of the complete life, was the symbol of the expected event of resurrection. The third immortal part of man was his *Ba*, or soul; and this was symbolized by a human-headed bird (or later, a ram-headed scarabæus), which at death flew away to be with the gods. The same thought was set forth among the Greeks by a winged human figure; and among the Romans by a butterfly.

That higher moral and spiritual Self-hood, however, which needed somehow to be preserved if the belief in immortality was to become both rational and satisfying to the higher sentiments and ideals, was provided for by the conception of Osiris. The Egyptians called their dead Osiris. For as the first Divine King of Egypt, when overcome by death, descended into the under-world, but afterwards rose from there and went to dwell with the gods and to lead the deathless life of the blessed, so each man might hope it would be with his Osiris. Therefore the soles of the mummy's feet were excised, that the mire of earth might be removed and that he might tread the Hall of Judgment with pure feet. The view of the retribution he was sure to meet was, indeed, emphasized chiefly by the "Negative Confession": "I have not robbed, nor murdered, nor lied, nor caused any to weep, nor injured the gods"—and so on. The punishment of the wicked consisted in withholding his heart and other immortal parts; his real Self accordingly perished.¹ But the state of blessedness with which the good were rewarded, in the Egyptian doctrine, was not an absorption into the All, nor a condition corresponding to the Buddhist Nirvāna. In his independent individuality he continued on with the gods, being especially devoted to the successful and happy pursuit of agriculture in the "fields of the blessed." Thus in the later doctrine, at least of the Egyptians, transmigration of souls

¹ On the "Doctrine of the Heart" see Wiedermann, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, p. 285f.

was not compulsory; nor was it a reason for depressing fear. And in general the Egyptian doctrine of immortality is in most favorable contrast with most of the pre-Christian views. The lofty ethics of the Egyptian "Book of the Dead" has already been referred to in another connection.

The prosaic and intensely practical character of the Chinese appears in their prevalent belief as to the continued existence of the dead. Still their doctrine is by no means wanting in strongly ethical factors. The view of Tâoism promised, as a reward for a prolonged discipline of the body, that it should undergo a sort of refining or *quasi*-dematerializing process which would render it unassailable by death. Its doctrine is like that of Egypt, a species of conditional immortality. At the ferry of death, "the profane multitude, not being sufficiently concentrated to resist the inroads of decay, vanish into air, and cease to be; while the favored few, by dint of persevering effort, subdue their animal nature and weave its fibres into a compact unity that defies its destruction." Of this view Dr. Martin¹ says: "It is scarcely possible to represent the extent to which this idea fires the minds of the Chinese for ages after its promulgation, or to estimate the magnitude of its consequences." If we may trust the tradition, however, Confucius himself refused to lend his authority either for or against the belief in the immortality of the individual. He was an agnostic on grounds of practical results. A discourse attributed to him makes him teach: "If I should say the dead have knowledge of the services rendered to them, I fear the filial would neglect their living parents in their zeal to serve their deceased ancestors; if, on the contrary, I should say the dead have not such knowledge, I fear lest the unfilial should throw away the bodies of their parents and leave them unburied."² While the earlier doctrine of retribution punished

¹ Lore of Cathay, p. 182.

² In the Chiá Yü—a collection the authority of which, however, is not above suspicion.

the wrong-doer in this life, and let the residue of retribution fall upon his descendants after his death, the Tâoism and Buddhism of the popular religion of China to-day is a frightful doctrine of purgatory and hell, with only a chance of obtaining by special and expensive ceremonies the deliverance of the three souls and perhaps also, their reunion "for an ascent to the region of the Immortals or for a new career of trial on earth."¹

In China—probably above all other countries,—the development of the moral elements in the belief in immortality has been checked and degraded by the increased prominence given to the benefits of ancestor-worship. According to the highest and purest notions the rule of personified and deified Heaven was over all spirits, and could not be bribed or influenced to do wrong. Speaking of It, the words of the young King Ch'âng in the twelfth century B. C. assure us :

"There in the starlit sky
It round about us moves,
Inspecting all we do,
And daily disapproves
What is not just and true."

But later a tyrannical or notoriously wicked imperial or other ancestor could apparently, when dead, be put upon an equality with the virtuous by being worshipped and prayed to for succour and help.

Of the ancient Babylonian and Assyrian belief, we may affirm with Professor Jastrow, it "does not transcend the belief characteristic of primitive culture everywhere, which cannot conceive of the possibility of life coming to an absolute end."² Even "a divine fiat could not wipe out what was endowed with life and the power of reproduction." The dead

¹ See Legge, *The Religions of China*, pp. 189ff. This author affirms, however, that he has never found the doctrine of "reunion" discussed in any Tâoist book.

² On the entire subject, see his *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, chap. XXV.

were accordingly thought of as continuing their existence in a great cave underneath the earth,—in the “house of Aralû.” Another name for this abode was Shuâlu, or a “place of inquiry”; for the dead have superior means of information about certain matters, and can aid living men by answering their questions and by furnishing them with oracles. Indeed, the dead are often also closely associated with the divine beings, or even identified with them. The nether world is, however, a joyless prison; and although a goddess may escape, no man who enters there can ever return. This view is quite similar to that of Sheol as depicted in the classic passages, Isaiah xiv, 9–20 and Ezekiel xxxii, 18–31.

The continued existence from which the religion of Buddha desired to furnish a way of escape was a ceaseless succession of births, deaths, and rebirths—a doctrine of inescapable metempsychosis controlled by the principles of Karma. But this inability to die was the very antithesis to immortal life considered as the promise and goal of a religion of salvation such as Buddhism designed to be. The immortal life was Nirvāna, which in its more primitive form is thus described: “When the fire of lust is extinct, that is Nirvāna; when the fires of infatuation and hatred are extinct, that is Nirvāna; when pride, false belief, and all other passions and torments are extinct, that is Nirvāna.”¹ In another passage,² in that exceedingly touching account of the Death of the Buddha (so like, in some respects, to Plato’s account of the death of Socrates), “The Blessed One” is made to speak as follows: “Enough, Ānanda, do not grieve, nor weep. Have I not already told you, Ānanda, that it is in the very nature of all things near and dear unto us that we must divide ourselves from them, leave them, sever ourselves from them? How is it possible, Ānanda, that whatever has been born, has come into being, is organized and perishable, should not perish? That

¹ See Buddhism in Translation, Introduction to Jataka, i, 60.

² Namely, Mahā-Parinibbāna-Sutta, v. 53.

condition is not possible." . . . "And now, O priests, I take my leave of you; all the constituents of being are transitory; work out your salvation with diligence."

And this was the last word of the Tathāgata. And then we are told how the Buddha entered a series of four trances; and rising from the last of these he passed through the four realms of (1) "the infinity of space," (2) "the infinity of consciousness," (3) "the realm of nothingness," (4) "the realm of neither perception nor yet non-perception;" and rising from this "he arrived at the cessation of perception and sensation." But it was only after traversing in reverse order the same four realms and four trances, that "immediately The Blessed One passed into Nirvāna." The saint who reaches this release from consciousness is "deep, immeasurable, unfathomable, like the mighty ocean." To say that he is either reborn or not reborn, does not "fit the case."¹ This "incomparable security," free from birth, this "incomparable peaceful state," is the *summum bonum* of Buddhism—its fulfilled promise of immortal life. Just as the individual trance is a sort of "temporary equation made between Karma and nullity," whereby subjective terms are wiped out and only nothingness remains, so when the condition is regarded as permanent, it is called Nirvāna.

It was, however, neither the Semitic nor the Oriental, but the rather the Greek conception of the immortality of the individual, which, through its essential agreement with the teachings of Jesus Christ as to the value of the soul and of its life of trust and love toward God, the Father, and through its early incorporation into the body of Christian beliefs, seemed for centuries most fit to endure the assaults of science and of a sceptical and agnostic philosophy. To say this is not to deny the existence, contemporaneously or even earlier, of similar lofty views of the soul's nature and destiny, in India and, especially, in ancient Egypt; nor is it easy to solve the historical

¹ So the Majjhima-Nikāya, i, 487.

problem by deriving—one from the other of these countries—any of the particular factors of these views. Notions similar to those of the Greek philosophy existed in Egypt centuries before Plato. And when much later,—about 300 B. C.—Megasthenes was in India, he found those “most estimable” philosophers, the Brāhmins, “discussing with many words concerning death;” and to him they seemed in many things to “hold the same opinions with the Greeks.” Although they regarded “death as being, for the wise, a birth into real life—into the happy life,” they weaved in myths, just as Plato did, “in regard to the soul’s immortality, judgment in hell, and such things.”¹ In spite of all such similarities, however, and quite independently of the answer to questions of historical priority, it was *Greek* thinking which wrought into terms corresponding with *Greek* philosophy those conceptions which seemed to the Church Catholic also to correspond best with the truthfulness and practical effectiveness of a certain aspect of its own teachings respecting the nature and destiny of the individual human soul.

From time immemorial the Greeks regarded man as a dual being, body and soul; and the soul as an existence which could be separated from the body, and leaving it behind could go away to another place.² This dual way of thinking of every living being might be extended not only to single objects, but even to the elements out of which the earlier philosophers built up the world of experience. On the one hand, these elements seemed to have souls; and the Cosmos which they built up, since it was a rational and beautiful unity, was worthy of being endowed with a World-Soul. But, on the other hand, the soul had some sort of shadowy corporeality. In the Homeric times and much later among the Greeks the life of the individual soul after death of the body had much the

¹ Quoted from Schwanbeck’s *Megasthenes*, by Hopkins, *Religions of India*, p. 1*f*.

² See Rohde, *Psyche*, pp. 1–62.

same colorless character which has nearly or quite universally prevailed at a certain stage in the evolution of this belief. With them, as with the Egyptians, the love of life and the feeling that it was good to be in conscious existence always availed to prevent the gloomy and depressing dread of immortality, and the frightful doctrine of metempsychosis, as these maintained themselves in India. And the effort to realize this hope of a better life after death, upon condition of compliance with certain moral and spiritual requirements, was a comparatively early development with this people. As Rohde has shown,¹ what was needed was not so much a strengthening of the belief in the fact of continued existence after death; for the Greeks already shared with all other peoples in this belief. The need was, the rather, of some assurance as to the content of this life; as to a preferred form of existence for those who fitted themselves to realize the hope of it. The change to the higher point of view was in large measure due to the spread and the democratizing of the Eleusinian Mysteries. "The testimony of all antiquity," says one writer,² "to the inspiring and uplifting influence of the mysteries is impressively unanimous; no voice is raised in criticism." A certain marked resemblance exists between the confidence in the overcoming power of spiritual life which these mysteries produced and the triumphant note of the Apostle Paul in his Epistle to the Corinthians. According to the Orphic theology, too, the body is a prison house; but the soul is akin in its nature to God. If purified, then, this spiritual part of man is fitted and destined for a union with the Divine Spirit. The rites of the mysteries were, therefore, not mere ceremonials, or magical perform-

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 256ff. According to Rohde, the confidence which those initiated into the mysteries had as to a blessed life for themselves after death was not derived from any doctrine, whether taught by a form of words or of ceremonial, that confirmed their belief in the natural indestructibility of the soul. It was the promise of *blessed* life for the initiated which gave to the mysteries their hold upon the mind.

² Wheeler, *Dionysus and Immortality*, p. 32.

ances : they were symbolic of that inner purification which is the beginning and the pledge of immortal life. "Blessed is he," says Pindar, "who having seen these rites goeth under the earth. He knoweth the end of life ; he knoweth, too, its god-disposed beginning." "Thrice-happy they among mortals," exclaims Sophocles, "who depart into Hades after their eyes have seen these rites. Yea, for them alone is there a life ; for all other men there is ill." "He who arrives there after initiation and purification," declares Plato, "will dwell with the gods."

It was philosophy, however, which by its reflections upon the everywhere-present, architectonic Life of the World, developed among the Greeks the more permanent and higher conception of the nature and destiny of man's soul. With this people "immortal" and divine, or "godlike," were interchangeable conceptions. "Immortality," says Rohde,¹ "is the essential predicate of God and only of God." To become immortal, therefore, is to partake of the Divine Life. Thus the hylozoistic doctrine of the soul became the forerunner of the Platonic and, then, of the Christian philosophic conception.

Indeed, the Platonic philosophy of the soul's nature and destiny may not improperly be said to have been, in some of its most important factors, the doctrine prevalent in Christian theology almost down to the present time. Plato's firmly rooted belief in the soul's immortality depends upon the ontological and necessary priority of reason to matter ; it is also essential in order to make reasonable a moral view of the world-order and of its future history. For the whole of man's life is a process of education ; but the process is only begun in this life and is to be carried on into a future existence. For the individual soul there are in his doctrine, as in the doctrine of the Catholic Church, three possibilities : those who have been purified by virtue and knowledge will find eternal blessedness ; some will pass at death into a state of purgatory ; others will

¹ Psyche, p. 296.

be finally condemned without hope of future redemption.¹ In other respects, indeed, Plato's doctrine of the future for the individual soul differed from that evolved by the Christian Church. But it can scarcely be questioned that the most powerful outside influence in developing the Christian doctrine of immortality was that which came from Greek, and especially from the Platonic philosophy.

If it were not for the connection which the development of the belief in a future existence for the individual had among the early Hebrews with the entire body of beliefs and doctrines constituting the religion of the Old Testament, its history would scarcely be worthy of special recognition. Up to the beginning of the third century B. C. the Hebrew conceptions of the state of the dead—its nature and relations to the character of the life before death—remained in the crude and unformed stage characteristic, for example, of the Homeric age among the Greeks. The conception of Yahweh had indeed undergone a considerable ethical development; he had for some time been worshipped as the Living God, the Giver of life, and had been prayed to in order that death might be averted. Yet this shadowy realm of the dead did not seem particularly to concern Him. The gloomy underworld was not thought of as an integral part of Yahweh's moral dominion, over which He reigned, as He did over Israel and over the heathen, in righteousness and fidelity. Sheol lay outside of the Divine Rule.²

This backwardness and lack of interest in, and this absence of intelligent conceptions of, the destiny and condition of the dead, were largely due to two causes:—namely, to the want of any development in psychological instincts and philosophical insight; but more particularly, to the fact that the people as a whole were regarded as the subject of religion, and the object

¹ See Sir A. Grant, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, Introductory Essay, III.

² See R. H. Charles, *A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life*, p. 35f.

of divine care, rebuke, warning, reward, and punishment. In other words, the thought of the dignity and value of a Self, and of the importance of the relations to the Divine Spirit of the individual finite spirit, had scarcely dawned upon the Jewish mind. The eschatology of Judaism was particularly defective as respects the individual.¹ Even in the writings of Jeremiah, with their predictions of retributive judgment for the heathen and for disobedient Israel, and of comfort and rescue for the faithful, and in spite of certain strong individualistic tendencies, it is still "a people" that are for the future to be the real "subject of religion."²

Influences were at work, however, in the very heart of Judaism which, in response to the historical experiences of the people, could not fail to bring about an improved view of the relations of the individual to God, both in this life and especially in the future. More and more, under the influence of that marvelous succession of prophetic teachers, did the Divine Being appear to believing minds as perfectly righteous, just in keeping the covenant, and tenderly merciful and graciously forgiving as well. But more and more was the fate of the nation impressing upon these same minds the truth that their sad fortune was Yahweh's punishment for the nation's sins. This punishment culminated in the exile. "With the destruction of Jerusalem the prophetic threatening had been completely fulfilled, and at the same time the prophetic faith had definitely prevailed over the popular religion."³ In two respects an important change in the attitude of the believer's mind toward the future was thus brought about. The whole body of the Jewish people could no longer expect to reap the reward of their fidelity to God in the form of national prosperity; they must henceforth be treated as two classes,—the

¹ Compare Charles, *Ibid.*, p. 19f.

² See Smend, *Lehrbuch der Alttestamentlichen Religionsgeschichte*, p. 248f.

³ Smend, *Ibid.*, p. 307.

faithful and the faithless, the righteous and the wicked, the godless and the true worshipper of the true God. But since there is now nothing more in sight of a character corresponding to the older notions of good or evil for the entire people, that need be feared by the wicked or hoped for by the good, it is comfort for the present, through hope for the future, which gives the key-note to prophecy. The individual who trusts the righteousness of Yahweh shall no longer satisfy his demand for a theodicy by saying that the "fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge;" let him rather believe that "the soul that sinneth, *it* shall die," and make himself righteous by turning from his sins in the faith that thus "it shall be well with him." With such messages as these, Ezekiel and the later prophets became caretakers of the souls of individuals, and held out to themselves and to others the hope that by the gathering together of those who repented and made a truly spiritual return to God, a "new Israel" might arise, "a remnant" might be saved.¹

But in what should this salvation, now promised to the righteous few, consist? It must be in some form of life; in the rescue of individuals somehow from the gloom and non-being of death. For how can the dead praise God? How can those, who are as though they were not, magnify the Yahweh who has rescued them? Still—as with the second Isaiah pre-eminently—the prophetic eye sees in the future the whole people arising to a new and glorious height of national life, through the regenerating influence of the faithful remnant. For "Judaism is from the beginning, and remained to the end, a religion of hope." This form of future welfare was, then, to be effected by Messianic influences. This is the prophetic solution. A much less confident answer, but also from the ethical point of view, was given by the books of Wisdom which tried—with a trial that must always end vainly—to *fill-full* the

¹ Compare Charles, *Ibid.*, p. 101/.

future of the righteous with promises of good that stop with the present life. Religion, however, can never be converted into mere prudence.

Another movement of religious thought and feeling, which was to change the ideal of hope, was both arising from within and being imported from without. This movement was the "individualizing of religion" as a "pre-condition for the establishment of a people" such as God demanded for his own.¹ Thus the hope of the future detached itself from the mass, considered indiscriminately and without reference to personal and moral worth, and attached itself to the personality of the few devotees of righteousness. They were the men who risked all, for this life and for that which, if anything, is beyond death, in confidence that God is wholly righteous, is indeed the perfection of Ethical Spirit in whom the man of the same spirit may repose a hope which the fear of extinction, or of the gloomy underworld, cannot destroy. The doctrine finally evolved by this individualizing and intensely ethical movement, in order to meet the disappointed hopes of the pious, was a doctrine of the resurrection.

The production of the belief in a resurrection of the dead was on Jewish soil the result of no little contest with unbelievers, and of no inconsiderable heart-burning and painful doubt and struggle with temptation. At all costs the dogma of Divine Righteousness must be maintained, unimpaired in its control over the heart and the life, and undiminished in moral dignity and comprehensiveness. But, in fact, if the pious often had occasion to rejoice, because the godless were visited with retributive justice; the latter had even more frequent occasion for scorn and mocking, when the righteous died unfortunate and forsaken. At the last, however, somehow and at some time in the future, the perfect justice and goodness of God would surely be vindicated. Such a hope necessarily pro-

¹ See Smend, *Ibid.*, p. 456, and Comp. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums im Neutestamentlichen Zeitalter*, pp. 277 ff.

jects itself beyond death; out of the dead themselves it creates a realm for its own realization in the future.

It has been well said that the hope of the resurrection of the dead constitutes the most significant difference between the prophetic ideal of the Old Testament and the apocalyptic ideal of the later Judaism.¹ This expectation not only divides all men, whether living or dead, into classes with respect to their character and their destiny; but it also separates the entire history of man's existence into two great æons. As an ethical doctrine, in solution of the problem of the future life of the individual, it indeed emerged relatively late in Judaism. But it wrought powerfully and widely when it once became established. At first it was apparently promulgated as a divine judgment upon the inhabitants of the earth who did not glorify God, and a call to the righteous to trust Him as their everlasting strength; it was also a promise that those in the dust who did thus trust should hear a voice calling them to arise, to awake, and sing (Isaiah xxiv—xxvii). But in Daniel (xii, 2) the dogma is put forth that certain individuals at least shall have a resurrection: "Many of those that sleep in earth's dust shall awake, some to everlasting life, others to scorn and everlasting shame." It is, however, the yet later Apocalyptic writings of Judaism which for the first time in perfectly definite form announce the expectation that all the dead—those on the earth, and in Sheol, and in hell—shall arise.

In spite of opposition, the belief in the resurrection of all the dead seems to have established itself as a dogma throughout Palestine and to have become the faith of multitudes of the people. "The Gospels and the Acts show us plainly that, at the time of the life and work of Jesus and his disciples this stage of the development of the Jewish religion had been reached."² In the popular belief, however, the characteristics and conditions of this new life were conceived of in a gross and materialistic fashion. Eating and drinking, being free from labor, pain, and

¹ So Bousset, *Ibid.*, p. 255.

² Quoted from Bousset, *Ibid.*, p. 261.

sickness, and wandering by pleasant streams and in green meadows, were then, as they are to-day among multitudes of Christian believers, the objects of the popular desire and hope. Only some of the more spiritual of the Rabbis would have anticipated the truth of Paul's declaration (Rom. xiv, 17): "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink; but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost." Everlasting life had its foil in everlasting damnation; to happiness and light and healthful life were opposed darkness, nothingness, or pain of burning and other tortures. That is to say, at last and most tardily of all the greater religions, Judaism had developed a doctrine of the immortality of the individual upon a *quasi*-ethical basis of the individual's relations in this life to the Object of religious faith and worship. The same process of individualizing and democratizing, which had been applied to the other religious beliefs and practices of Judaism (as, *e. g.*, in the substitution of the service of the Synagogue for that of the temple), had moulded this belief also. "The religious development of the later Judaism had prepared the way for the 'high-strung' individualism of the Gospel. But, indeed, the Prophet and Master must first come, who with the magical might of his personality could stir the sleeping forces to action and energetic development."

The apocalyptic views of the later Judaism shaped the pictorial and symbolic form in which early Christianity received the doctrine as to the future after death of the individual man. Jesus represents the Old-Testament worthies as still alive,—Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob;—for their God is not a God of the dead but of the living. Those that are accounted worthy to obtain the resurrection from the dead are the children of God and henceforth became equal to the angels (Lk. xx. 35-38). But one's place in this kingdom of the departed is determined differently according to the "deeds done in the body." The righteous beggar Lazarus is in "Abraham's bosom," but the unjust rich man is "afar off" and "in torments

(Lk. xvi, 19-31). This separation of the dead on moral grounds is connected, in the thought of the writers of the Gospels, with the resurrection and the judgment of the world which terminates the present world-age; and these momentous events are dependent upon his "Return" (*Parousia*), which will be sudden and unexpected. Then all nations of the earth will be called to judgment; sentence will be passed according to the standard of the filial spirit toward God and of brotherly love toward man; and the decision in respect of the future's weal and woe will be definitely pronounced.¹ All this corresponds quite completely, so far as imagery is concerned, with the Rabbinical notions of the time. There are, however, certain other utterances which, if they are not obvious departures from this point of view, are difficult to reconcile with it. Such are Jesus' conversation with the Sadducees (Matt. xxii, 23-33), his mention of "everlasting tabernacles" into which are received those who arrive at the end before the general resurrection (Lk. xvi, 9), and his promise to the penitent thief of an immediate entrance into Paradise (Lk. xxiii, 43).

Whether it is possible to obtain a consistent doctrine of the immortality of the individual from such teachings as the foregoing, or not, is in our judgment a matter of comparatively little moment. The large sweep of thought about the future of the person who becomes attached to God, in the spirit of Christ, comes into view in connection with the promise of salvation as a new and higher spiritual life; more emphatically yet when the future of the race is made to be determined by the progress and increasing triumph of God's Kingdom. The advance of this salvation, as it belongs to the earthly life, carries with it the sure promise of its perfection in the super-earthly life; and death cannot put any insuperable obstacles in the way of this triumphant progress. The Spirit, which has controlled Christ himself, has been *in* him, he will continue to send from the Father; and this same

¹ See Matt. xxv, 31-46; xiii, 39-42; xix, 28.

Spirit *in* all who are his followers, will unfold itself as life, and will secure the soul against perishing by being cut off from God.

Such a spiritual development has two sides. On the one side, it is the unfolding of the life of faith in higher and higher degrees of self-denying love, after the pattern of Christ, and in purifying the soul from all the imperfections, weaknesses, and sins, which belong to its natural existence amidst its earthly environment. On the other side, it is the securing of more and more of peace, joy, and blessedness, by a constant and increasingly complete union of the soul with God.¹

It is, however, in the heavenly future and not in the earthly present that the perfection of life, which is "eternal life," the "life in God," is to be attained by true, faithful, and persevering believers. There, "in the heavens," is their great reward (Matt. v, 12). What matters it, if the gate be strait and the way narrow; or if the cost be a hand, a foot, or an eye; the life to come is worth it all. For it is the true life, and there is the "Father's house" (John, xiv, 2), the "everlasting mansions" (Lk. xvi, 9), where Christ is and where his disciples shall be glorified with him. In the confidence of this hope his followers were to cast all their cares for this life and the life to come upon God. To secure, by being of its Spirit, a place in the Kingdom of God should be their chief aim; and all else desirable and really good would follow. The fate of the sparrow was embraced in the Divine Love; how much more the lives of God's dear children. With them, as with him, eternity should ever be near at hand, in the mind's eye and in the affections of the heart. The veil between the two worlds is thin; indeed, there are no two separate worlds, but only one—the realm of the Father—in which the life of the man of filial spirit is spent. "The approach of eternity awakened in Jesus the recognition of all that is essential, of all that endures in the sight of God."² This is the

¹ Compare Schmid, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, 264f.

² Wernle, *Beginnings of Christianity*, I, p. 94.

attitude of mind and will toward all life, present and future, earthly and super-earthly, which essentially accords with the religion of Christ. "And even though later on the eschatological drama receded ever further into the background, and this earth and the present raised their claims on man ever louder, yet eternity surrounds us ever in the garb of time, and its demands are the same, yesterday, to-day, and forever. . . . Jesus' words condemn His own Church down to the present day."

Within the New-Testament period, the doctrine of the perfecting of salvation for the individual, and the connected view of the immortality of the human soul, were chiefly developed in the writings ascribed to the Apostles Paul and John. The former had his training in the apocalyptic views of the Jewish Rabbis. The terms which he employs, and the pictures which he draws, to represent his conceptions of the future destiny of the individual and of the race are, therefore, saturated with the influences of this training. Yet in his conception of the resurrection, as made an assured hope for the believer, he far transcends the doctrine of later Judaism. It is his firm confidence that the same loving Divine Will which has bestowed countless bodily forms upon all created things, from fish to sun and bird to star, will not be defeated in his purpose by the dissolution which must overtake the "natural body" of those who have put their trust for life eternal in him (I Cor. xv). Nor is Paul's conception of the way in which this triumph over death will actually be brought about, at all the gross material thing which has so often been attributed to him. Just as the *psyche*, or natural soul, has had its body appropriated to its uses in its earthly existence, so when it has been "sown in corruption," will there be developed by the divine power another incorruptible bodily manifestation for the spirit that has been made truly alive by the same Lord who is the Giver of all life. In this connection the apostolic vision is greatly enlarged until its horizon encircles the

entire race from first to last. What has already taken place with him who was the Son of Man, and is now the glorified Son of God, shall take place with all his many brethren. Death shall have its sting drawn; and from the grave shall be taken away its boast of victory. Thus this Apostle is led on to indite a hymn of triumph which has resounded through the centuries ever since, to the uplift and comfort of millions of mourning and doubting souls; and which there is every reason to believe, in spite of all criticism of the details of its conception, will go on resounding to the end of time. In yet another passage (Rom. viii, 19-23) this same Apostle sees all Nature (even that *κτῆσις* which includes the irrational creation in distinction from man), which hitherto has been "subjected to bondage" by the Will of the Creator, regenerated, uplifted, and made gloriously to share in the comprehensive process of redemption by this same Will.¹

In the writings that bear the name of John, the conception of eternal life as a supreme good which comes through spiritual union with its source, is dominant. The essence of this "eternal life" is a spiritual likeness to Christ; as to its form, this has not yet been made manifest, but will be at Christ's appearing (I John, ii, 28—iii, 3; iv, 17). In that New-Testament writing which is preëminently called the "Apocalypse," there is a decidedly backward movement upon a confusion of imagery and lurid pictorial representations such as characterize the Jewish Apocalyptic, and from which only a few clear thoughts occasionally emerge. Yet the promises afforded in this way are full of words of consolation and hope to those who face death with the consciousness of a personal and spiritual agreement between themselves and the Will of God as made known in redemption.

As has already been shown, the hope of immortality for the

¹ According to Charles (*Ibid.*, pp. 379*f.*), there were four stages in Paul's eschatology. It is probably more correct to say that four different points of view may be detected, which were never quite brought into harmony.

individual which Christianity held out came to an age prepared to embrace the hope. As says Harnack¹ of the religious disposition of the Greeks and Romans in the first two centuries, and of the current Græco-Roman philosophy of religion: "What was sought above all, was to enter into an inner union with the Deity, to be saved by him and become a partaker in the possession and enjoyment of his life." The Platonic, the Stoic, and the Cynic philosophical speculation had led the minds of men almost universally to the recognition of something divine in man's spirit (*πνεῦμα* or *νοῦς*). But the popular belief in the bodily appearance of the gods among men still prevailed; and the need of repentance, purification, and an improved life was keenly and widely felt. All this was favorable to the spread of the Christian doctrine of immortality for the individual. But this doctrine, in order to gain acceptance, needed a certain remoulding, or at least an explanation and development, which should the better fit it to accord with the conceptions of the soul's nature, rights, and destiny, then held by the current philosophy of religion. This belief, too, like all the other beliefs, began to assume new forms in adaptation to the demands of the age. Under this process of development, we have on the one side, the extremely sublimated ideas of Gnosticism, and on the other, the lingerings of the crass eschatological notions of the later Judaism. Between the two, although with many differences of opinion as to details, and amidst much hot and wordy strife over obscure and even unintelligible thoughts, the belief of the Church Catholic succeeded in maintaining as an essential part of its creed the doctrine that Christianity is the religion which delivers man from death and leads him to a blessed union with God.²

It is not necessary, and it would be profitless, to follow the Christian belief in the immortality of the individual through all its changes of opinion as to How, and Where, and When, and under What Conditions, and by Whom primarily, this pos-

¹ History of Dogma, I, p. 117. ² Harnack, *Ibid.*, II, pp. 169ff.

session of life beyond death is effectuated. All the more important differences of view on all these points have thought themselves able to appeal for support to the teachings of Jesus and of the Apostles ; or to some valid psychology of the nature and potential development of the human soul ; or to some indisputably true conception of the Being of God, and of his permanent and essential relations to the history and destiny of man.

From this brief historical survey certain tentative conclusions may be drawn respecting the religious conception of immortality for the individual as it appears for examination in the light of modern science and philosophy. And, first, eschatology, or the attempt at a rational doctrine of the future, is, historically considered, a relatively late development. "The eschatology of a nation," says Charles,¹ "is always the last part of their religion to experience the transforming power of new ideas and new facts." For the same reasons the very structure, and the confirmatory evidence, of any particular belief on this subject must always remain relatively imperfect. But, second, as the ethical and spiritual conception of the nature of man's self-hood expands and deepens and becomes more surely founded, the belief in the immortality of the individual Self becomes at the same time more rational and more purified from mechanical and unethical elements. Even in the eschatology of the New Testament, and certainly in much of theology down to the present time, the existence of such elements is undoubted. And, third, it is above all the conception of the ethical being and rule of God, as extending over the whole race and as concerned in the historical process of redemption, as the Spirit that is in the World of humanity to effect its Uplift toward a moral union with the Divine, which itself purifies, confirms, and elevates the hope of immortality for the individual Self and for humanity.

¹ Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life, p. 310.

CHAPTER XLV

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL [CONTINUED]

The belief in the existence of the individual after death, on account of its spontaneous origin and nearly universal extension, may properly be called "natural;" in its highest religious form this belief becomes the confident trust that God will, in his dealings with each human being, maintain the perfection of his own ethical Being. Our inquiry now becomes, whether the doctrine as to the soul's nature and destiny which the belief produces can sustain itself in the light of scientific knowledge respecting man's constitution and his place in Nature at large. Is the faith of religion in the immortality of the individual tenable in view of other classes of facts? Any satisfactory answer to this question requires that certain distinctions, which in the history of the belief have often been confused or not properly made, should now be rendered clear. The clearing-up of these distinctions is required both by the complexity of the problem and by the variety of the forms of belief which have attempted its solution. The grounds for the distinctions lie in the nature of the problem itself, and in these same varied forms of the belief. Their examination, therefore, involves the reaffirmation of certain religious faiths and sentiments, with the psychological origin and development in history of which we have by this time become so familiar.

There is one fundamental assumption which, whether in a somewhat naïve or elaborately scientific and philosophical form, underlies all belief in the immortality of the individual. This is the assumption that the so-called "soul" is separable from the

body. Whatever the essential nature of the principle of thought, feeling, and will, may appear to be, and however loosely or intimately related to the bodily organism, unless its separability from this organism may be affirmed, its existence after death is incredible. For the fact of death, and the accompanying more or less complete destruction of the body, is the one indisputable and universal fact. But the observation that the vital processes not infrequently continue after all signs of *self*-existence (as with the dying) have forever ceased, and even (as in sleep) when such signs are temporarily suspended, leads the primitive mind to the belief in two souls. Thus one of these souls can leave the body and go elsewhere, while the other is left to perish with the body, or to take its departure later.

The belief in the separability of the soul from the body is not, however, in itself dependent upon any mature conception as to the nature of the soul's essence ; much less is it equivalent to the doctrine of its immateriality or ability to get along, so to say, without any bodily manifestation. On the contrary, in all the more primitive forms of the belief in the individual's immortality, some shadowy, ghost-like form of a body is, as of necessity, implied. And along that line of the development upon which at the beginning the Christian faith seized, the doctrine of a resurrection—or coming again into the possession of a living body—was an essential part of the belief in an existence after death. Even the grossest conception, however, such as would make the new body consist of a reunion of the material elements that had composed the former body at the time of its death, must somehow provide for a temporary continued existence of the soul, apart from its former material organism. In a word, either for a short time, or for a long time, or for ever, the soul of the individual man must be capable of existence apart from its present tenement of flesh, if the belief in immortality is to be maintained. The senses testify in the most unequivocal fashion to the dissolution of *this*, its present, bodily manifestation.

Now it is just this separability of the soul from the bodily organism, to which modern science offers such strenuous, and—as they seem to many—quite conclusive objections. Unless these objections can be answered, at least so far as to negative their seemingly conclusive character, the doctrine of the immortality of the individual cannot maintain itself in the light of the evidence to the contrary. To scientific evidence it is vain to oppose the so-called “natural belief” in an existence after death. For this belief itself, when regarded from the scientific point of view, is seen to be “natural” in much the same manner as is the belief in ghosts or in the reality of the objects which visit us in dreams. At the best, this is what seems true from the purely scientific standpoint: The same activity of imagination and thought which projects itself into the future always, and of necessity, appears to itself as a living thing, a conscious process of a here-and-now existing soul. To try to imagine how it will be, not to be at all, is to try something quite foreign to the powers of the human mind; equally so, to ask the mind to express in thoughts what it will be to have no thoughts at all. Therefore, a mental picture of the non-existence of the Self, drawn true to life—or rather, to the absence of all life—by the Self’s own constructive skill is impossible. No positive conception can be gained of that which negates all conception. Such an inability is, however, in no respect a guaranty, or even an argument to establish the probability, of the soul’s everlasting life. Every night that is spent, in part, in dreamless sleep, is an *experience* which includes the reality of that of which, from its very nature, no positive conception can possibly be formed. Imagination and intellect close over the gap in the life of the Self by bringing together the conscious states on either side. *What* it was, if anything, for us meanwhile to be a soul, we can no easier tell ourselves than what it would have been to cease forever to be; if we had indeed never awakened from that dreamless sleep. For so little, then, until the Self has attained the consciousness of its *moral worth* and its *ideal*

value in a world where Ethical Spirit is supreme, does the so-called natural belief in the soul's existence after death count as a valid argument for the immortality of the individual.

The brief historical survey of the last Chapter was sufficient to show that the rational grounds on which the attempts of reflection to establish the immortality of the individual have relied, have had a two-fold character. These attempts themselves, however, have by no means always recognized this fact. Indeed, in Christian theology, from the time when it came under the dominating influence of Greek philosophy onward, both these lines of evidence have been employed to establish the rationality of the hope of immortal life. Of these two, the one builds upon a certain view of the soul as an entity; the other turns the rather in faith toward God as pledged to be the soul's Redeemer. The former culminates in a demonstration of the so-called natural immortality, or inherent indestructibility, of the principle of the individual's self-conscious and personal life. It claims to know the human soul to be of such a nature, that we may safely deduce from its very conception a *non posse mori*. The other line of argument, if taken by itself, reaches its supreme expression in the confidence that a finite spirit, which has entered by a voluntary act into a moral and spiritual union with the Infinite and perfect Ethical Spirit, has in this very fact a pledge for its continued existence and development. It places in this experience of faith and life in God, the valid reasons for the firm conviction of a *posse non mori*. Such a Self has acquired the ability to triumph over death; it has received the divine gift of immortal life.

The feeling of the difficulties which arise from the very nature of man's two-fold being and from the more obvious facts which show the dependence of his highest spiritual experiences upon the condition of the bodily organism is no modern affair. The materialistic view of the problem is as old as human reflective thinking. But the more definite, scientific knowledge on which similar difficulties are now

supported is comparatively modern. Its effects upon the religious beliefs and hopes that are connected with the tenet of immortality are already only too obvious. The estimate of the moral value of the individual has, indeed, been on the whole much enhanced. In the light of modern science man's life seems more than ever worth the saving and perpetual improving. But the study of his mental activities and development from the biological, physiological and psycho-physical points of view places a tremendous weight of emphasis upon the absolute and complete dependence of these activities, and of this development, on the functions and the evolution of the material organism. One may easily refuse to go to the absurd length of regarding the life of self-consciousness, cognitive memory, rational thinking, and self-determination in view of a possible realizing of æsthetical and ethical ideals, as a mere series of "*epi*-phenomena," as the effluence of brain functions. One may indignantly reject the position of out-and-out materialism; but it is still a short and easy step over a seductive path from the phenomena to the conclusion that the soul's dependence upon the bodily life, really is, as it seems to these sciences, final and absolute.

The candid searcher for the truth of the religious doctrine of the immortality of the individual must, therefore, face again the problem of the separability of the soul from the body. This problem undoubtedly appears more complex and tremendous than ever before, in the light of modern scientific discoveries. The objections offered by these discoveries may be conveniently summarized under the six following heads.¹ Of these lines of evidence, the first is derived from studies in general biology, and considers man's place in the biological series. This objection looks upon all psychical phenomena, upon *life* from

¹ It will not, perhaps, be out of place in this connection to say that the following necessarily brief summary expresses the conclusions of many years of careful and detailed study of the subject, "*Mind and Body*," and the relations actually existing between the two.

the psychological point of view, as dependently related to the *life* which the biologist regards simply as the phenomena of natural organic bodies. This physical life has its explanation in the character of the chemical processes which perpetually construct these bodies: "The miracle of life," says Haeckel,¹ "is essentially nothing else but a change in the material of the living substance, or metabolism of the plasma." These processes, although their products vary enormously in complexity, all the way from a single living cell which, however, in spite of its relative simplicity somehow knows the way to go through the most astonishing performances, up to the incredibly gifted and ingenious nervous structure of man,—composed of countless millions of such highly differentiated elements,—are essentially the same. The evolution of biological life is one vast continuous process. And the human animal, although standing at the head of the process, is only one member in the biological series; man is a development, embodying all that is behind him in time, and below him in the scale of the entire series. Everywhere in this series, however, biological death consists in the ceasing of that balance of interplay, in whose continuance biological life consists, between the building-up and the falling-apart of the "protoplasmic molecules." Everywhere, biological death is at once followed by the cessation of all signs of psychical life. The amœba seems to have a "will of its own"; the white blood-corpuscle behaves as though moved by some sort of a purposeful, conscious soul. But dissolve the atomic structure of the amœba, desiccate the blood-corpuscle, and thus stop once for all the "metabolism of the plasma," and this purposeful, soul-like behavior of the living thing never returns. With the cessation of the chemical processes goes the cessation of all signs of psychical life. In man's case, although he stands at the head of countless æons of continuous or violently interrupted evolution, the conditions of biological life and development are

¹ Das Lebenswunder, p. 111f.

known to be the same; the dependence of his psychical life and development upon the fulfilment of organic conditions appears to be equally complete.

What conclusion, then, in man's behalf does general biology warrant other than the conclusion to which it is forced by its experience with the whole of the series of natural living bodies? Nowhere does the psychical, however inexplicable in terms of the physical, its origin, development, and essential characteristics may be, seem to escape this dependence upon the integrity of its supporting organism. We may not indeed affirm that immortality for the individual cannot develop in that soil of the organic, where a definite race between the up-building and down-pulling forces must always terminate in favor of the latter. But is not the science of life compelled to assert that all its experience of the facts forbids its holding out any promise to the hope that it will be so?

When attention is directed more particularly to the development of the individual man, the second of the objections to belief in the separability of the soul from the bodily organism at once becomes obvious. This objection arises from the apparently complete parallelism between the psychical and the organic processes of evolution. The beginnings of the life of the human individual, like those of the individual member of all the higher animal species, coëxist with the fusion of a cell from the male (a *spermatozoon*) with a cell from the female (an *ovum*). The *spermatovum*, which originates from this fusion of the two cells, straightway proceeds upon its business of building out of the pabulum with which it is supplied—whether from the maternal organism or after it has left this organism—a complicated structure of the species from which it was itself derived. Not only does this cell, with its elements derived from the two parents, somehow serve as the bearer of all the characteristics common to the species; but it also transmits those more particular traits of a physical and organic or temperamental sort which have come down from countless gener-

ations of its own ancestors; even minute idiosyncrasies of bodily and mental sort are carried over in this same compound of living cells. At every step in the evolution of this physical germ, the same relation between it and the psychical development seems to be illustrated. As the embryo develops in the mother's womb, signs that the lower and more plant-like forms of a *quasi*-psychical functioning have already begun, are by no means wanting. At birth the development of the nervous system has proceeded just far enough to fit it for the prompt and effective responses to those attacks from the sensory stimuli of its new and strange physical environment, in which the foundations of a psychical development must be laid. But the association-elements in the brain are not as yet ready for use; and even the fibers in the voluntary tracts of the higher part of the spinal cord have not yet been myelinated;—so determined is nature to have the functions and manifestations of the so-called soul develop only *pari passu*, as it were, with, if not in absolute dependence upon, the evolution of the physical organism. All the way through life, the semblance of at least this rough form of a parallel evolution is maintained. In connection with the increasing use of the higher cerebral centers, the higher functions of thought and of feeling display themselves. Memory—or rather a complex system of more or less definitively allied and interrelated memories—develops in dependence upon the creation and preservation, intact, of association-tracts in the brain. With the maturing vigor and continued soundness of the nervous system, and its education in the prompt and unimpeded performance of its functions, the period of greatest mental vigor is reached; and with the decaying strength and impaired character of these functions, in which old age compels the human individual to share the law of all life, the psychical weaknesses peculiar to this period begin more abundantly to appear.

What is illustrated by the details of the physical and psychical evolution of each individual man is also impressively en-

forced by a study of the parallelism between the two, in the entire human species; it is even yet more impressively illustrated by a comparative study of all the animal kingdom. In this way more or less successful attempts have been made to scale the intellectual capacities of different species of animals and different races of men, according to the size of the brain, and the complexity of the convolutions of its cortex. Nor have such attempts been willing to stop short of estimating the place in the mental scale of the two sexes, or of different individuals from either sex, by weighing and observing the differences in this rind of gray matter, the more abundant possession of which is the crowning physical glory of the human species.

This general and relatively rough paralleling of the characteristics and evolution of body and mind in man, for purposes of emphasizing the dependence of the latter upon the former, has now become much more definite and scientific through the recent discoveries in the so-called localization of cerebral function. Since the year 1870, more especially, physiological science has been somewhat steadily winning its way in this direction. What areas of the brain-cortex are somehow especially concerned in the motor functions of the different principal parts of the body, and—more surprising and important still—in psychical or intelligent seeing and hearing, is now so well known as to serve the purposes of the surgeon in the locating and relief of various psychical troubles that originate in diseased conditions of the brain. And there are just now indications which cannot be wholly discredited, that a number of those beliefs of the early explorers in this field—like Gall and Spurzheim,—which have hitherto been discarded as altogether fanciful, are by no means devoid of foundation in fact. Thus does cerebral physiology seem to be pinning ever more tightly to the cerebral areas the different principal forms of conscious psychical functioning.

In close sequence upon the third class of objections to the

separability of the soul of the individual from the bodily organism follows another. This fourth class comes from observing the mental effects of functional bodily disturbances. It is the fundamental character of this dependence of the conscious experiences of the soul upon the healthy or the abnormal discharge of the organic functions which gives all their significance to such phrases as "feeling well" or "feeling ill." Indeed, in not a few diseases the psychical symptoms are quite as specific as are the physical; the obvious results in consciousness serve to characterize their causes in the concealed disturbances of the bodily system. Especially noteworthy is the dependence of the train of associated ideas for the rapidity and trustworthiness of its flow, for its coloring, and indeed for its very continuance, upon the quantity and the character of the blood-supply furnished to the brain. Thought and memory stumble, when this supply is interrupted or is loaded with the decomposition products of diseased or exhausted tissues. All psychical phenomena cease entirely when pressure on the arteries cuts off this supply altogether. Different drugs, when introduced into the circulation either through the lungs or the digestive tracts, or directly by injection into the veins, produce specific forms of hallucination and other kinds of psychical disturbances. There is little need, however, to multiply illustrations of the dependence of mind upon the healthy discharge of the organic functions; every man's daily life is full of such illustrative experiences.

When, instead of temporary functional disturbances, with their inevitable accompaniment of disturbed conditions of the psychical life, we have to consider the mental effects of serious organic lesions or other injuries, the evidence appears yet more conclusive against the separability of the soul from the bodily organism. Especially impressive is this evidence in all cases of organic diseases of the brain. If wounding, or a tumor, or an abscess, attacks and destroys certain cerebral areas, then aphasia is the result; and the character of the aphasia will de-

pend upon the seat and the extent of the disease. In one case, the articulate word-image is lost; in another, the written word-image; in still a third, the unfortunate patient can recognize, select, and will the proper sound or visual sign for the idea, but he has lost command of the center of voluntary control. As that degeneracy of the tissues which is the misfortune of old age invades the cerebral areas, memory of the higher and more intelligent sort begins to fail. And if that progressive paralysis of the brain-centers known as general paresis attacks our friend, we stand by helpless while we see the divine and god-like faculties of the spirit fade away, one by one, and mark the inevitable end, which will be the reduction of them all to the lowest terms of the merest animal or plant-like existence.

In concluding this list of objections to the separability of the soul from the bodily organism, the admissions of modern psychology may be summoned to support the lines of evidence adduced by modern biology and physiology. These admissions emphasize the dependence of even the higher forms of the mental life upon that sensory-motor basis of experience, which, in turn, we know to be most intimately and obviously dependent upon the functions of the nervous system. Thus the highest spirituality in man is made to appear as mediated only by the sensuous and the physical. For "we seem warranted in insisting that the following five great groups of correlations between body and mind are always maintained during the mind's conscious existence."¹ (1) "The quality and intensity of the sense-element in our experience is correlated with the condition of the nervous system as acted on by its appropriate stimuli." (2) "The combination, whether simultaneous or successive, of our conscious experiences is correlated with the combination of the impressions made, from whatever source, upon the nervous organism." (3) "Those phenomena of consciousness

¹ Quoted—as are the succeeding statements upon this point—from the author's *Elements of Physiological Psychology*, p. 579f.

which we designate as 'memory' and 'recollection,' as well as the play of the reproduced images in general, are correlated with the molecular constitution and tendencies, and with the so-called 'dynamic associations' of the elements of the nervous system." (4) "The course of thought, and all the higher forms of self-conscious experience are correlated with the condition of the cerebral centers." (5) "The statical condition of the body (by which we mean all those inherited peculiarities of the organism, the sexual and tribal bodily characteristics, the corporal constitution as dependent upon age, which change only slowly and within narrow limits, or do not change perceptibly at all) and the general tone or coloring of conscious experience, are correlated."

What wonder, then, that those who are either ignorant or deliberately neglectful of other considerations, regard the arguments against the immortality of the individual as quite conclusive? For, whatever might be said to encourage the hope of life after death, this hope seems already cut up at the very roots, as it were, by the proof of the inseparability of the supposedly immortal, from the confessedly mortal, nature of man. But the complex problem offered by this religious doctrine is not so easily and quickly solved, even when the arguments are kept within their lowest and most manageable stage. For no one of these six groups of considerations is conclusive; neither is a fatal argument against the doctrine to be made complete by all of them combined. On the contrary, each one of these groups of phenomena is not only equivocal and inconclusive, even when taken at its highest valuation, but is also inclusive of phenomena whose interpretation encourages, if it does not demand, another explanation.² This

² It is doubtless partly on this account, as well as partly on account of a certain tenderness toward so dear a hope that, as Professor James has said (*Human Immortality*, note 2. p. 49). while there are plenty of passages in modern writers which maintain that mind is coterminous with brain-function, there is hardly one in which the author explicitly denies the possibility of immortality.

reverse aspect makes it apparent that, in the unity of man's total experience, the functioning and even the upbuilding of the structure of the bodily organism is dependent upon the activities and the development of the self-conscious, and rational Self.

Evidence in support of a certain primacy and relative independence of the psychical life may be derived from man's relation to the other members of the biological series. In the case of all the countless species which compose this series, the value of the psychical and the conscious activities, for their structural development and specific variation, is becoming more apparent to students of biology. From the lowest members upward, conscious strivings that appear like anticipations of future realizations, have served as stimuli to induce important changes in the constitution and functioning of the organism. Everywhere the psychical appears as a force, which modifies and shapes to higher and higher uses the physical and the structural. So that from a no less realistic—however less scientifically productive—point of view, the entire development of animal life upon the globe may be treated, in respect of its sources and causes, from the point of view of comparative psychology. From this point of view, biology becomes a history of the way in which the obscure feelings of irritation, unrest, need, desire, or the more definite forms of the appetites of food, drink, and sex, and the emotions of pride, love, hate, and domestic affection, have driven onward toward their goal the more and more organically complex evolutions of the "protoplasmic molecules." Thus considered, even "the metabolism of the plasma" is a psychical function. When man is reached, and taking into account the whole history of his past evolution as a species, it becomes eminently impracticable to regard his spiritual development as standing only in the relation of effect to cause, toward his organic and specific supremacy. With the first beginnings of Selfhood—whenever or however these beginnings may have come about—the psychical life commences in

no unimportant way to dominate the physical. From this time onward, it is quite as true to the facts to say that man *has raised himself* above all the other members of the biological series, as to say that he *has been raised* by the forces of organic evolution to the headship of this series.

When we turn to consider the evidence from the parallel developments of body and of mind, we find abundant proof that the relation of dependence is not a one-sided relation. In fact, the most impressive thing, however mysterious, about the evolution of the human nervous organism is just this discovery that the building of the structure anticipates the psychical uses of that structure; and at the same time waits for these uses for its own maturing. It is under the excitement of the soul by the external sense-stimuli and from its own blind strivings and cravings, that the nervous organs acquire their complete ability to perform their higher functions. Thus it is a by no means inapt figure of speech that enables us to say: The soul demands of the body those forms of service which the vital energies, stimulated by the demand, prepare the body to perform.

It is also possible to regard the phenomena which have led to the more definite localization of cerebral function from a point of view more favorable to the separability of the soul from the body. For within certain limits, not easy definitely to fix, when the appropriate cerebral areas are so injured, destroyed, or otherwise hindered, that they can no longer function in the customary way, other closely contiguous areas on the same hemisphere, or corresponding areas on the opposite hemisphere, can be substituted in their place. But in order to effect this substitution the enlistment of the soul's strivings and efforts is of the first importance. The whole theory of training, and the perfection and ease in the performance of function which are acquired through practice, when regarded from this psychological point of view, emphasizes the dependence of the histological structure and the functioning of the

cerebral centers upon psychical preconditions. The most patent thing about this acquisition of skill by striving and trying is this: Changes in different localities of the nervous mechanism, and in the association-tracts connecting these localities, are actually dependent upon causes that are conscious and voluntary.¹

If now attention be given to the relations actually existing between organic disturbances of function and the accompanying psychical excitements and disturbances, these relations, too, no longer appear as a one-dimensioned affair. Indeed, here the case can be even more favorably made out for the advocate of the primacy and supremacy of the psychical over the physical, of the mind over the body. Even the flow of the gastric juice in the stomach seems to be a psychically initiated rather than a purely mechanical affair. The pleasures of taste, experienced or anticipated, are the potent cause of this form of organic functioning rather than the action of the food-substance in the organ and upon its walls. "The nutrition of the tissues, the circulation of the blood, the secretion of different kinds of fluids, the healthy or diseased nature of the vital processes, are dependent upon the states of the mind. If abnormal digestion produces melancholy, it is equally true that melancholy causes bad digestion." Care, chagrin, and ennui poison the arterial blood. The sthenic and asthenic effect of various emotions upon the organic functions is quite as obvious and undoubted as is the effect of the functional disturbances of the organs in producing the various emotions themselves. In the curing or relief of acute mania or of the melancholy of grief, the diverting of interest and the enlisting of will are of primary importance. Indeed, the attitude of will is of prime importance for the recovery from disease generally. All the explanatory theories of the strange phenomena of hypnosis depend chiefly,

¹ In proof of this contention see "A Suggestive Case of Nerve-Anastomosis" as discussed by the author, in the *Popular Science Monthly*, for August, 1895.

or largely, upon the principle of "suggestion." But suggestion is a psychological principle; it is a way of inducing functional results in the organism through the introduction of ideas and the stirring of desire and effort within the mind. So far as "suggestive therapeutics" is concerned, this is only another name for what is more vulgarly called, and dangerously employed, under the term "mental healing."

Not even in the most desperate, incurable, and fatal cases of organic disease is the complete and final dependence of the soul upon the body indisputably evinced. Indeed, the power of the cheerful mind, the resolved and indomitable will, the trustful and joyful religious spirit, over the nutrition and repair of abnormal changes and lesions in the bodily organs, is not altogether easy to reduce within clearly assignable limits. When the bewitched Redskin wraps himself in his blanket, turns his face to the wall, and dies to order as he has been told that he will do; he illustrates to the extreme the same undoubted principle to which many cases of recovery from severe illnesses must be referred. If "suggestion" can elicit brands, stigmata, and other more deeply-seated observable organic and permanent responses, it can fairly be said also to be able to stimulate and effectuate organic repairs in the highly sensitive and responsive tissues of the brain. But it is from these tissues outward that the peripheral organs have their nutrition and upbuilding so largely controlled. On the one extreme, stand the dangerous errors of fanaticism; on the other, lie the risks and misses of opportunity to which the over-estimate of the physical and the depreciation of the spiritual is always subject. Somewhere between lies the truth; but it is a truth which reaffirms our confidence in a certain important dependence of the body upon the soul. Even in the case of that soul-destroying disease, the progressive paralysis of the insane, there have been instances, where the psychical life has seemed to reappear in a manner approaching its natural vigor, as though it had by one supreme effort broken loose from the

barriers which had been closing round it through the decadence of the brain.¹

When at the close of this re-survey of facts from the dominant psychical point of view, we come to consider the relations in which its higher activities stand to the lower, and through them to the bodily organism, the argument is strengthened for the possibility of an existence for the soul after the death of the body. However necessary the sensational and motor basis may be for the development and bodily manifestation of these higher activities, they themselves distinctly transcend the limits of this basis. Changes in the intensity, the time-rate, the combinations, the locality, of the organic excitements are correlated with changes in the intensity, the time-rate, the combinations, and the qualities, of our sensory-motor experiences. In these and closely allied respects the relation between soul and body can be thought of, in accordance with the facts of experience, as a relation of reciprocal dependence. Body influences mind, and mind influences body;—this is the popular, the common-sense way of expressing the two sides, or two directions, of this relation. And psycho-physical science cannot improve upon the expression, cannot essentially alter its accepted meaning as stated to explain the universal experience. Science can only investigate more minutely, and formulate more accurately, what these reciprocal influences, these actions and reactions, actually are experienced to be.² But above the sphere of these investigations, rises a development of the soul's self-conscious and self-determining life, as related to certain ethical and æsthetical ideals, to which all language derived

¹ The reference here is not to those periods of seeming improvement in general paresis, which give to friends false hopes of recovery, but to certain cases where, in spite of the most undoubted *post-mortem* proofs of the disease, an exhibition of a still vigorous mind has been made, near the time of death. Such cases have seemed to the attending physicians like the coming to life of an already dead soul.

² Compare an Article by the author in *Mind* (new series), vol. XII, pp. 374*ff.*

from a study of psycho-physical formulas seems utterly inapplicable. Certainly, artistic and moral sentiments and ideals, religious beliefs and conceptions, and the spirit of filial piety in which the essence of subjective religion consists, are all experiences of the same soul whose sensory-motor life is so strictly correlated with the functions of the bodily organism. Certainly, too, these higher activities are rarely or never divorced from their accompaniment of the lower. For it is as an embodied soul, and not as an already disembodied spirit, that the human being is an artist, a devotee, a religious idealist. On the other hand, neither a scientific psychology, nor a metaphysics of the Self when based upon such a psychology, can fail to recognize this so-called "higher nature" in which—to use the language of Kant—is the root that furnishes "the indispensable condition of the only worth that men can give themselves." This is the "power which elevates man above himself; . . . a power which connects him with an order of things that only the understanding can conceive, with a world that commands the whole sensible world, . . . as well as the sum-total of all ends." "This power is nothing but *personality*, that is, freedom and independence of the mechanism of nature, . . . a faculty of a being which is subject to special laws . . . given by its own reason."¹

In a word, this species of animal called "human," by whatever processes stretching through æons of time the result has come about, and however conditioned upon lower psychical and organic attainments, has, in fact, developed *Self-hood*. And having developed selfhood, man has felt within him, and has responded to, the obligations inherent in the very being of a Self; the feeling and the response pledges him to develop this selfhood in higher and higher stages toward the realization of its own Ideal. Indeed, he has made this Ideal of Selfhood the Object of his supreme faith, the pattern of his loftiest aspiration and endeavor, and the guaranty of the realization of

¹ See the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, chap. III.

his purest and most uplifting hopes. All this experience of the present actuality, and the further possibility, of a share in the Divine Life can neither be accounted for nor understood, in terms of the physical organism or of that life which biology investigates. All this experience tends to emphasize the primacy and the supremacy of spirit over a material body.

The conflict between modern science and the ancient hopes of religion over the separability of the soul from the bodily organism, when fought out fairly within the province of experience open to biological, physiological, and psycho-physical researches, ends, at the worst, in a drawn battle. If religion cannot establish its affirmative view, and demonstrate experientially this separability; neither can science bring to the point of a demonstration the opposite and negative view. Can the psychical life, or any part of it, escape destruction when that mechanism of "protoplasmic molecules," in connection with which it has developed, is dissolved? Neither biology, nor physiology, nor psychology of the physiological or psycho-physical type, can give a final answer to this question.

One conclusion, however, which is of service to the religious hope is fairly to be derived from our survey of the problem upon these scientific grounds. No words that imply the possibility of resolving either series—the organic and physical, or the conscious and psychical—into the other, fitly express the real connections between the two. The psychical is neither the "product" nor the "function"¹ of the organic; nor is the

¹ For this reason we may well take exception to the admission with which Professor James (*Ibid.*, p. 10) begins his attempt to remove objections to the belief in the immortality of the individual:—namely, that thought is a "function" of the brain, and that "the various special forms of thinking are functions of special portions of the brain." The word *function* seems to us wholly inappropriate to such a correlation. Moreover, the distinction between different kinds of functions does not seem necessarily to help the case. A "permissive" or "transmissive" function may just as properly, and just as probably, have an indissoluble and necessary connection with the brain as a "productive" function. If the glass is shattered,

reverse statement any more true. No such words reduce the mystery of the connection ; no *such* words express the truth of fact. What we have to observe, is two intimately interrelated developments of wholly different species ; neither of which can be resolved into the other, and neither of which is either completely describable or wholly explicable in terms of the other. To scientific observation merely, they seem to begin together ; in a measure only, they proceed with something like an equal pace ; and, then, they seem to cease together. But the traces of both are permanently made in the world's subsequent history. Science assumes that the physical elements continue to exist and to have their value expressed in the reality of the system of things ; religion believes in, and hopes for, something of the same sort for the life of self-conscious striving, doing, and realizing of its own spiritual ends.

If modern psychology supports the religious hope of immortality for the individual by refusing credence to the objections of biology and physiology, the same thing cannot be said of some of the more positive grounds on which this hope has tried to build an argument in its own defence. This is especially true of the doctrine of the so-called "natural immortality" of the human soul. The essential feature of this doctrine in each of its several forms consists in the belief that the known unity and reality of the soul can properly be stated in such terms as necessarily to imply its indestructibility. So it was held by the Hindū conception of Ātman ; and in like manner by that theological proof which the Kantian criticism undertook to overthrow. In the latter case the argument ran : (a) The soul is known to be a unity, in the strictest meaning of the term ; (b) it is, therefore, indiscerptible and cannot, like the body be resolved into its elemental constituents ; (c) but this or resolved into sand and potash, it will no longer *transmit* the light. A complete disagreement would seem to be inevitable with all the *quasi*-materialistic ways of representing the relations of mind and body, if one is to make room in this sphere for the doctrine of the separability of the one from the other.

is the equivalent of its absolute indestructibility. It is customary to represent Kant as overthrowing this so-called proof by the force of his criticism. On the one hand, this criticism showed that what we really know as the *Ego*, or soul, in consciousness, is only a phenomenal reality and no "thing-in-itself;" on the other hand, it was pointed out that in experience the soul plainly shows itself to be capable of parting with its existence by a process of diminishing down to zero, or to the vanishing point, all the activities in which its phenomenal reality consists.

Both the theological proof, and its critical and sceptical refutation, have alike ceased to have much pertinence or available meaning for modern psychology. In its scientific estimate there is no actual, or even conceivable evidence to show the existence, either within consciousness or out of consciousness, either as inseparably connected with the bodily organism or as presumably separable from this organism, of a "thing-in-itself" soul. From the very nature of the case, an *Ātman*-like entity, which could continue to exist after it had ceased to vindicate its existence by doing anything knowable or imaginable in the system of actualities, cannot be empirically known. Nor need religion mourn the loss of such a soul. For it would be as totally without value as it is confessedly without characteristics. To lose it and to save it would be alike a matter of indifference.

It is at this point that modern psychology reveals the path along which the hope of religion may travel to its desired goal. *The unity and reality of the human soul consists in its actually being a Self.* To be self-conscious, to remember recognitively, to reason rationally, to feel the worth of ethical and æsthetical obligations and ideals, and to determine conduct with a view to discharge these obligations and to realize these ideals—this it is really to be, and to be one, after the pattern of a human soul, or Self. To attain more in quantity, and higher degrees of quality, of this life of Selfhood;—this is to reach more com-

pletely the ends of unity and reality, as these ends are divinely natural for man—the potential son of God. It is the hope that death does not set the final limit, the impassable barrier, to this process of the realization of immortal life which religion aims to secure. If these aims cannot be furthered by a demonstration of the natural indiscerptibility, and separableness from the dissolving organism, of an indescribable “thing-in-itself” soul, the disappointment has its sting quite withdrawn when it is shown that the modern psychological view recognizes no such present existence of a soul.

It remains, then, to inquire on what positive grounds the hope of immortality for the individual can most securely repose? To this question the one inclusive answer can be given: On the grounds of that faith in the Being of the World as perfect Ethical Spirit, and in man’s potential likeness to this Being, which religion itself accepts and establishes. If this faith is rational; then the hope of immortality may be esteemed rational. If this faith cannot sustain the tests of modern science and reflective thinking; then much less can the hope of immortality for the individual sustain these tests. In other words, it is the world-view of religion which is on trial;—and this as enfolding and involving the destiny of the race and of the individual man. He who believes that the system of cosmic existences, forces, and processes, in the midst of which man has hitherto developed, in which he is now set, and with which his destiny is interlocked, is moral and spiritual to the core, he may cherish the hope of immortality without being inherently inconsistent in his thinking and his beliefs. For him, however, who finds in this system no Presence of the Infinite Personal Life, to expect his own conscious life to transcend the particular combination of “protoplasmic molecules” which forms for it a temporary physical abode, is to indulge an illogical, if not an altogether illusory, hope. The hope of immortality for the individual is a hope in God as perfect Ethical Spirit, regnant over all life in every stage and form of its manifestation.

This general argument, or ground of confidence, may be analyzed, as it were, into a number of particulars. In considering the value of each of these so-called "proofs," however, it should be remembered what is the essential character of the tenability—the *nervus probandi*—belonging to them all. For example, while it must be held that the naturalness of the belief in the continuance of the psychical life after death is not a proof of the natural immortality of the individual, the cravings, anticipations, fears, and hopes, of the race with regard to the future are a most impressive spectacle. They show how deeply set in persistent human feeling, and in permanent allied convictions, is the belief of man in his own power to survive death. The spectacle is no less impressive when it takes the form of those fears of this permanency, which give the doctrine of Karma such control over millions of minds. At the other extreme, stands the joyful expectation of realizing at once the blessings of a more intimate communion with, and a more perfect likeness to, the Divine Being, with which millions of Christian and other religious devotees have contemplated death. There is in this spectacle no demonstration, indeed, of a reality for that which awakens such fears or such hopes; science can, indeed, point its finger to many another wide-spread fear and hope for which it has been compelled to expose the absence of any correlated actuality. But on the assumption that God is in the world, and in the race, as a righteous Ruler and a loving Redeemer, these persistent feelings and permanent beliefs acquire a new significance and a greatly increased value.

When these more primitive forms of feeling are developed into the more refined forms of æsthetical and ethical sentiment, they become powerful and effective pleaders for the belief in the possibility of the finite Self attaining the gift of immortal life. Our entire study of man's religious experience and religious development has made us familiar with the undoubted ontological value of his æsthetical ideals. Whether from the scientific and philosophical, or from the more definitely reli-

gious point of view, the human mind insists upon constructing its theory of reality under the influence of these ideals. Only in this way can the world seem actually to be the sublime, beautiful and orderly, though profoundly mysterious totality, which affords satisfaction to this side of human nature. If the astronomical and physical sciences compel him to believe that this marvelous mechanism of a Cosmos has built itself up, only to end in self-destruction, and then to begin over again the process of self-building, the lover of truth tries to remain faithful in feeling as well as thought to the truth, and comforts himself as best he may. But by universal confession, the conclusion that the end-all is the destruction of all, takes much of the admiration, and most of the æsthetical satisfaction, out of the spirit with which man regards the totality of the cosmic processes and forces. If, at the last, it all comes to this: Why was it at all? and Is it worth while that it should be at all? And when his own destiny is so conceived of as to be helplessly and inextricably entangled in this march to final ruin of the cosmic Mechanism, there is evolved a strong reaction against so shocking and repulsive a theory of the purposeless and ideally unproductive character of man's evolution in history. It is difficult, or impossible, to state this theory in terms that do not rob human history of its æsthetically grand and sublime features. And when the attempt is further made—as it is pretty sure to be made, so strong and persistent are the demands for satisfaction which the æsthetical nature continues to put forth—to elevate our depressed spirits by lauding the artistic qualities of the Mechanism, or by praising the system under terms of domestic endearment, as our “Universal Mother,” etc.; the success of the attempt is measured by the exact distance of its virtual departure from its own chosen point of view. In the cosmic family circle Dame Nature's character cannot be improved at the expense of the perfection of God the Father.

It is under the same pressure of demands from the rising and broadening æsthetical ideals of humanity that science has built

up its engaging picture of a perfect cosmic order, and that religion has attained to the conception of the all-admirable and sublime Being of God. Worshipful admiration and obedience is the correct attitude of the human soul toward this Object. If the one structure has, for the time being, seemed the rather to belittle the importance of man in the World-All ; the other structure has more and more emphasized his importance. The social and political development of humanity has taken sides with the religious in this regard. The lives and the destiny of the millions of mankind can no longer be regarded as of little or no account, without giving a shock to the dominant æsthetical ideals. Neither the Court of Heaven nor the courts of earth are longer tolerated by the more truly refined æsthetical feeling, if they continue to treat these millions as things of little worth. The very fact that the physical and biological sciences recognize the obligation to make grander and more beautiful the brief earthly life of these lowly ones, is an unconscious testimony toward the confirmation of the truth for which we are contending. The belief in the value of human Selfhood—that supreme product of evolution which has cost the Cosmos so many countless æons of struggle, pain, and sacrifice—is a belief which is ever taking firmer roots in the æsthetical nature of humanity. This estimate of value is greatly enhanced by the belief in the immortality of the individual. Thus this belief has increasingly on its side the demands for satisfaction of the profoundest æsthetical sentiments of human nature.

Closely allied with, and indeed scarcely separable from, the influence of æsthetical sentiments and ideals is the powerful influence which comes from the demands for satisfaction of the choicest affections and purest altruistic sentiments. It has already been repeatedly shown how, in their cruder form, these feelings have operated in the production and development of certain nearly or quite universal religious beliefs. Especially true is this of the worship of ancestors and of deified men.

This pathetic and persistent following of the beloved dead with the hope of future life and the expectation of future reunion, is not an argument for immortality which can be thrown into the form of a syllogism; much less is it a demonstration that is unassailable by modern science. That it is, however, a most potent cause of the actual arising and persistence of the belief in immortality, those who have had experience with the thoughts of men cannot for a moment doubt. Plutarch speaks for countless millions of human souls when, in a letter of consolation to his wife on the death of their young daughter, he tries to show that those who die in infancy and youth will earlier feel at home in the other world.¹ This is the reason why the laws do not allow mourning for children of such tender years: "because they have gone to dwell in a better land, and to share a diviner lot." Plutarch is well aware that such questions are involved in great uncertainty; but he finds it more difficult to disbelieve than to believe.² All such beliefs and sentiments, however, are only "outstretching of vain hands," if the fundamental faith of religion in God as perfect Ethical Spirit, and in the experienced world as a dependent manifestation of God, cannot be rationally sustained. When connected with this fundamental faith, however, they rise to a quite different level of significance and value as arguments for the belief in the immortality of the individual.

These æsthetical and altruistic affections and sentiments are, moreover, closely allied with certain demands for satisfaction of the moral consciousness itself, on the side both of feeling and of thought. In trying to estimate that evidence from the presence and the persistence of evil which makes a theodicy so difficult, it was found that the unfinished, imperfect, fragmentary character of human ethical experience had chiefly to be taken into the account. At this point the doctrine of development afforded us a logical retreat and a source of con-

¹ *Consolatio ad Uxorem.*

² Compare also his thought as expressed, *De Defect. Orac.*, 43f.

solation and hope. The extension of this doctrine into the life beyond, both for the individual and for the race, is connected in a most important way with the belief in God as perfect Ethical Spirit—the Moral Ruler and the Redeemer of mankind, in and through a process of history. If death ends all for all men, it is difficult or impossible to see how the perfect Divine righteousness can vindicate itself. An “over-World” seems required in order that the “over-Man” may be evolved, and secure his appropriate sphere of conduct; in order that justice may be done, wrong righted, and character find its legitimate, full expression and outcome. It was confidence in the perfection of the World’s moral order, if only the theatre for the exhibition of this order could be made extensive enough, and if the play could be carried through to the end, which gave to the Kantian critique its argument for immortality as the necessary postulate of an absolute truth for the moral reason. This moral reason *must be* somehow satisfied. The conditions of man’s earthly existence, however, could never be conceived of as so modified that the unconditioned and perfect ideal could be set into reality in the midst of them. Thus the largeness and the permanency of the faith of moral reason in its own ideal guaranteed the realization, somewhere and somehow, of this same ideal. But such a realization implied the immortality of the individual; for it could only be accomplished through the continuance of a kingdom of ends, in which personal wills, and the relations of such wills, attained their completeness in an historical development. Defective as the Kantian argument is, in respect of its alleged apodeictic character, the considerations which flow from those ethical ideals and principles to which the argument appeals, will always remain the most firm and reasonable of the supports for this important hope of the religious man.

It is at this point that the considerations to which Greek philosophy gave a preference unite with the later faith of

Judaism, as modified and reinforced by the religion of Christ and by the Christian experience. Greek religious philosophy had come to appreciate the intrinsic worth of the life of the Self;—the lofty, imperative character of its ideals, and the promise of a higher and more perfect realization of those ideals. Thus it gave the legitimacy of reason to the attempt of the individual to realize the ideal life. All the Platonic arguments, for example, spring from the deathless conception of a worth to the soul-life, which can neither be measured nor expressed in terms of this sensuous and earthless existence. But Judaism had developed the conception of God as the perfectly righteous ruler of the living and of the dead. And Jesus, out of his own consciousness of a perfect union between his own spirit and the perfectly holy and pitiful Spirit of the Father and Redeemer of mankind, had brought the hope of immortal life into the clear light of an experienced fact.

This Greek estimate of the inherent worth and dignity of Selfhood, and of the place and value of the individual's soul in the universal scheme, is not precisely the equivalent of the arguments current in Christian theology for the so-called "natural immortality" of the individual. But so far as it tends to secure the interests of the individual as against the specific and the general, and especially of the individual person as against all that has only material values or physical magnitudes upon its side, it is thoroughly in accord with the most indisputable conclusions of modern idealistic philosophy. The current physical science tends constantly to overestimate the importance of what bulks large; or of what is so minute, and at the same time multitudinous, that to express it requires impressive rows of figures long drawn-out. The greatness of individual men is something to be scaled accurately and put into mathematical terms with marketable values; and the worth of nations is deemed to be best statable in terms of the size of their populations, of their armies and navies, of their agricultural and other products, their imports and their exports. Biological science

emphasizes the value of the improved species—at however great expense of countless individuals. But there is another side to all this, even in the case of individual beings far below the scale of moral and spiritual values which are applicable to human lives. Under certain not inconceivable, but frequently recurring circumstances in human history, a few atoms may be more influential to determine its course, than are scores of the bulkiest worlds; and a single fertilized human ovum may become the bearer of a soul that shall influence the destiny of millions of the race.

There are not wanting indications that both science and philosophy are approaching a common point of view, from which the significance and the value of *the individual*—of whatever species or kind—are made much more important and emphatic than has hitherto been the case. From this point of view it would seem that every atom, every mass, every organized being, every ovum or germ, has its own peculiar existence, special value, and unique part to play in the planful system of the universe at large. Nothing is to be regarded as accurately defined or sufficiently estimated, when it has simply been classified and assigned to its proper species. Everything has just that reality which it has, because it is an individual being, the exact like of which never has been, and never will be again; that is to say, the essence of its reality, and the pledge of its continuance in existence, whether for a longer or a shorter time, is its individuality. No thing is so mean, no existence so transitory, no so-called force so impotent to produce actual changes, as that it can be adequately conceived of, or expressed, in terms of the species, or in the nomenclature of the universal. For us, and also “in-itself,” the Ultimate Reality, is concretely present and actual, in the infinite differentiations of individual beings—self-like Things or developed Selves.

When any individual member of the species called “human” has reached that *acme* of all evolutionary processes, so far as

these processes are subject to investigation at all, which consists in the attainment of a moral and spiritual Selfhood, something has come into being which reflection pronounces to have an incomparable worth. Each individual Self is, indeed, only one of many; but this fact gives a supreme value to the existence and destiny of a race which is the summing-up of all that lies behind in the history of the Cosmos, and the promise of all that is to come. Nature has now produced a kind of individual which, however it may be compelled to sacrifice itself for others of its kind, can never be *reasonably* compelled to this sacrifice by the offer of a good less valuable than that which measures up to the full value of the perfected life of a Self. Hence the determination of the multitudes—essentially reasonable and sure to prevail, however blind and unconscious in its exercise—to force the few to count them all, each one therein, too, as a thing of greatest worth; because each individual of these multitudes is a Self among selves, is one among the many brethren that are all children of God.

This estimate of the “cosmic value” of a perpetuated self-existence, such as the human species has already somehow come to share, is further enhanced by considering its inherent capacity for an unlimited future development. There is no sadder or more impressive example of a certain incongruity between the spiritual potentials and the actual achievements of the evolutionary forces than that afforded by the fate of the individual man. If his development is fortunate, it is just when this development becomes most promising and most aspiring that its physical basis begins to show most marked signs of an oncoming decay. In the order of nature, it requires all the earlier years of youth and manhood, well spent, to equip the Self with such self-possession as fits it for the beginning of a truer realization of its awakening and rising ideals. Then comes almost at once an experience born of the degeneration of animal tissues,—a sure prognostic of the approaching dissolution of the organism. The spirit has just got ready to live,

and the body is beginning already to die. Thus the capacity of the individual man for self-development—a capacity which is inherent in the very being of every Self—does not seem to be exhausted, or in any satisfactory degree provided for, by even the four or five-score years which mark the extreme limit of time allowed by nature for this development. However we may seem compelled by the facts to assume an attitude of indifference to the influence of such considerations, it is difficult not to sympathize with the complaints of the most highly gifted men as they contemplate this seemingly premature cessation of opportunity. All their most worthy and cherished attainments of knowledge, skill, social influence, and moral character, seem as nothing compared with what might be in the future—if only that future lay open before them.

Of course, if the Being of the World has no mind to comprehend or heart to feel this pitiful irrationality in its procedure, then all such arguments are powerless to produce a rational expectation of immortality for the individual. But we have not so learned the Being of the World. We may, therefore, agree with the declaration of a modern writer who has approached this problem from a quite different point of view. This writer maintains that the belief in immortality is “a supreme act of faith in the reasonableness of God’s work.”¹ This so-called “reasonableness,” however, is not that which science recognizes as inherent in the Cosmos when regarded only as a system of physical forces subject to the poetic sovereignty of a so-called “reign of law.” It is moral reason immanent in Selfhood, and regnant, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, in human history. He who holds valid the conception of God as Ethical Spirit, absolute in power and infinite in perfections,

¹ Fiske, *Destiny of Man*, p. 115*f*. This statement is made in agreement with the view of the authors of the “Unseen Universe;” and the opinion is added that our increase of knowledge as to the process of evolution enables us to claim “the everlasting persistence of the spiritual element in man,” or else we “rob the whole process of its meaning.”

and who therefore takes the predominatingly æsthetical and moral view of the cosmic system of things and selves, secures in this way a reasonable ground of hope for the immortality of the individual.

As to the formal and material details of the immortal life of the individual, a confession of ignorance is the only justifiable attitude of mind. In its highest realization the hope of immortality is an experience of a relatively small number of those who have most closely followed Jesus, the founder of the hope in its more definitely Christian form. Such examples are afforded by the Apostles Paul and John and by other Christian saints. In all the experience of these men, the central and controlling factor is the consciousness of a new spiritual life already begun, the essential character of which is expressed by calling it a life "in Christ" or "in God." The actuality and progress of this life, it is not in the power of death, either to destroy or effectually to interrupt. It may, indeed, be momentarily obscured by periods of bodily weakness and mental depression. But such periods are succeeded by an increase of confidence, by a more assured hope brought about by a more perfect trust in God. It is on account of the characteristic marks of such a life of ecstasy, longing, and faith, that the Apostle Paul is said to have become "the type of the mystics."¹ As to his detailed teachings about the way in which the hope of immortality is to be realized, this Apostle, in common with other writers of the New Testament, shows the influence of the current views of the later Jewish apocalypse, although in a form modified by intimations of those profounder and more ultimate spiritual conceptions which were inherent in the Christian doctrine of redemption.

Such experiences prove that it is possible for the individual believer, who has realized the convictions of subjective religion in their highest intensity, to develop a certainty of immortal life, which admits no doubt, and which feels no lack of joyful

¹ Wernle, *Beginnings of Christianity*, I, p. 354.

assurance. The Self is convinced that it has already gained possession of life eternal. But such experiences cannot be converted into an argument valid for all. The experience itself, however, is a fact; it is not confined to the Christian religion; in varying degrees and intensities its conviction of hope has been, and still is, the possession of millions of mankind.

As to the doctrine of the resurrection more particularly, the modern highly refined theories of the molecular constitution and amazingly subtle nature of material bodies may perhaps be held to favor the prospect of finding in the near future a more firmly established scientific basis for this doctrine. They certainly on the whole tend toward confirming the conclusion: "Matter is not that which produces consciousness, but that which limits it and confines its intensity within certain bounds."¹ In this connection a passing reference to physical manifestations of the continued existence of the dead, is not inappropriate. Judged by those standards of moral and spiritual values which the philosophy of religion must ever keep in mind, these alleged manifestations, even if their reality be admitted, cannot be given any important place. They may serve as comforting and cheering phenomena to those who believe in them, but they contribute little or nothing to the rationality of religious hope and faith, in the large, so to say. Toward them the open and yet somewhat severely critical attitude of mind is still the only rational attitude. The essential beliefs, sentiments, and practices of the religious life cannot safely be allowed to be at all intimately entangled with the so-called "spiritualistic" proofs of an existence after death.

There are two important deductions, however, from the conception of God as perfect Ethical Spirit which may confidently be held to be applicable to the immortal life of the individual. One of these establishes the moral continuity of the two lives—or rather the two stages of the one life of the same Self. In this reasonable conviction the Egyptian harper sang: "Mind

¹ So Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx*, p. 293.

thee of the days when thou, too, shalt start for the land to which one goeth to return not thence. Good for thee will have been a good life; therefore be just and hate iniquity; for he who loveth what is *Right* shall triumph." About all this there is no word to be uttered more penetrating and final than the prophetic exhortation: "Say ye to the righteous, that it shall be well with him"; "Woe unto the wicked, it shall be ill with him."

With this moral principle in its application to the life after death, if such life there is to be for the individual man, goes another as its supplement, which is the specially precious gift of the religion of Christ to the faith and hope of mankind. Widespreading restorative and redemptive influences are in the Divine plan; and these influences cannot be limited to this side of bodily death. Here again, a confession of ignorance, in closest conjunction with a confession of faith in the perfect justice and goodness of God, best accords with the spirit of piety. As, however, the conception of the perfection of the Divine Spirit, and so of the fullness and completeness of the work to be expected from Him, rises and greatens, one of two consequences would seem to follow with reference to the permanent condition and values of the life of every individual human Self. This life must either come to be rooted in a voluntary, moral union with the Divine Life; or else it must perish, lacking life in itself; it cannot attain immortality apart from life in God. In a word: The essentials of the belief in immortality for the individual can be maintained only in the form of a confidence that God, in whom every individual of the human race lives and moves and has his being, will continue to preserve and to develop the life of all those whose preservation and progress accord with his most holy and beneficent World-plan. But the rising faith of religion is that this Divine World-plan will somehow show itself in the future as the redemption of the race.

CHAPTER XLVI

THE FUTURE OF THE RACE

It has been made obvious by our historical and psychological investigation that religion, in accordance with its very nature and especially in its more important developments, does not fail in adaptability either to the individual or to the race. It is for each human being a very particular affair; it provides for him an object of belief, feeling, and devotion, which is specific, and which comes into the most intimate relations with his daily life. But religion is also preëminently a social influence of incalculable power and worth. This two-fold aspect of experience applies to the hopes as well as to the more definite dogmas, rites, ceremonies, and practices of religion. Religious hopes are not merely individual, but appertain also to the community of believers. Thus in a broad way the race's expectation of a better future, from the religious point of view, may be said to be the *social aggregate* of the expectations respecting the future of individual believers.

The different religions differ greatly, however, in regard to their interest in, and their hopes for, the future of mankind. At the one extreme stand such beliefs as Brāhmanism and Buddhism; at the other, are Judaism and Christianity. The former concentrate the endeavors of the religious life upon the individual's obtaining for himself that relief from the miseries of a changeful existence which is afforded by Nirvāna. It is true that early Buddhism showed an almost Christian pity for the multitude of men; and that, in the spirit of this pity, it strove to point out to the multitude the way of a salvation in

which all might have a share. But Buddhistic salvation itself was not a social affair. All those desires and affections which go out toward others must be extinguished as the indispensable condition, on the part of the individual, of his realizing its hope of salvation. The good which was for all, was as far as possible removed from being a supreme social good. On the contrary, early Judaism held out to the individual little or no hope of any realized good in the future, except as he could in imagination continue to picture for the earthly religious community an era of prosperity in which he was to share. The important hope was Israel's hope; the future belonged to the people;—but to the people as continuing to live in their descendants and not as inclusive of the faithful dead. When, however, the hope of Judaism for the future burst through the gates of Hades, it retained its valuable and distinguishing social characteristics. It enlarged its own heart and became the hope of the nations, extending through time and over both the dead and the living. It was Christianity, above all other religions, that answered for the individual the inquiry, What may I hope for? in the name, and in the behalf, of all mankind. Thus it alone of all religions combined the more egoistic appeals to the individual's longing for an immortal life, with the more altruistic promises of the fulfillment of the most extensive social hope.

Christianity answers the question of hope for the future of the race with a conception which is the loftiest and grandest ever framed by the human mind. This conception bears the title of the "Kingdom of God," or the "Kingdom of Heaven"—the realization of the perfect social Ideal. Christianity received this conception from Judaism, in whose prophetic and poetical imagination and thought it had been developing through several centuries of national experience, both joyful and distressing. But the religion of Christ did something far more than merely to commend and hand on this conception in unaltered form. We have already seen that its Ideal is too comprehensive and

lofty to be identified with any ecclesiastical organization, or even with the conception of the Christian Church Universal. The latter has constantly, on the one hand, to guard itself against collective tyranny and, on the other, to avoid an excessive individualism. The religious community must have its dogmatic formulas, its modes of worship, and its practical rules that are enforceable by discipline over its members. But the supreme social Ideal which offers itself to the hope of the believer in God as perfect Ethical Spirit, and as the Redeemer of mankind by a complex historical process, is a much larger and more incorporeal affair. It is the equivalent in its reach and in its perfect realization, to the refinement, intensifying, universal extension, and perfect sway, of spirituality among men. As organized and visible Christianity has repeatedly proved itself faithless or ineffectual in the work of transforming society in accordance with this social Ideal, there has been a return to the original and fundamentally Christian position. This position affirms that the significance of the work of Jesus and his followers is to be found in just this transforming and uplifting spiritual power for the whole race of men. The express design of the religion of Christ is to bring the spirit of man into right relations of faith, love, and obedience, with the Absolute Ethical Spirit who is man's Father and Redeemer. Only in this way of repeated self-purification, and of increasing reform, does the Christian Church accomplish, at all satisfactorily, its great mission of devotion to the progressive realization of the Kingdom of God among men.

But all the meanwhile, the uplifting and purifying spiritual forces which exist and are effective in other religions, and in other forms than the definitely religious activities of man's developing life, are tending toward the same supreme Good. Science, philosophy, art, and industrial and commercial as well as political and social improvement, furnish forms of energy which co-operate with religion in furthering the coming of the Kingdom of Heaven to mankind. This at any rate, is the

answer which religion itself offers to the question: What may I hope for as to the future of the race?

Merely to raise the question of the ultimate destiny of humanity, as measured by its prospective approach in the remotest future of its existence to its own most highly developed social Ideal, implies an advance in race-culture of no mean degree. The problem of the future of the race is, in its very nature, not one to concern the mind of the savage or so-called primitive man. Yet tribes of a low degree of culture do entertain certain beliefs of a future idealized existence, or improved destiny, for their own members. Such an ideal has also been developed repeatedly in a semi-speculative way by individual thinkers who represented the highest expressions of the culture of their own age;—as, for example, in Plato's "Republic," Augustine's "City of God," and in a more restricted way, in the admissions and suggestions of the latter part of Kant's "Critique of Judgment." But the one most distinguished example of an historical evolution of this social Ideal, under the influence mainly of religious beliefs, but not by any means uninfluenced by collateral considerations, is the biblical conception of the "Kingdom of God." At the one end of this historical evolution we are invited to see how the conception of a happy and prosperous Israel under the rule of Yahweh arose; at the other stands the picture in the Apocalypse of "a new heaven and a new earth," a "great city, the holy Jerusalem, descending out of heaven from God," where "the nations of them which are saved shall walk in the light of it:" "and there shall be no more curse; but the throne of God and of the Lamb shall be in it; and his servants shall serve him: and they shall see his face, and his name shall be in their foreheads."

The barest attempt to criticise this conception of an ideal social future for mankind, involves the investigation of an inconceivably vast range of subordinate inquiries; and it requires a confidence in the conclusions of speculation as to the probable outcome of tendencies extending over vast stretches of

time, which is not both easily and wisely to be attained. Yet here is this beautiful dream of humanity, which the convictions and faiths of a religion of redemption undertake to convert into a rational hope.

In support of this hope, which is the somewhat peculiar gift of Christian faith to the world, no appeal can indeed be made to considerations which are worthy to be called proofs, much less demonstrations of the irresistible kind. And yet the hope is by no means left without support. Thus the reflective mind may come either confidently to believe in, or at least to indulge the rational expectation of a realization of the social Ideal in the future of the race. The considerations which lead to this faith, this hope, may be said to be of two kinds. One kind is chiefly collateral, and is not derived from definitely religious beliefs and conceptions. But the more positive and convincing considerations depend upon certain fundamental faiths of religion.

Neither science nor philosophy is at present able to propose any certain, or even highly probable, solution for the problem of the future destiny of the human race. Nor does it seem likely that either will acquire a firm grasp upon the data necessary for such a solution, for a long time to come. Both science and philosophy, however, create expectations which may serve even now to modify and correct, or to corroborate, those faiths and hopes respecting the future of humanity, which the developed religious consciousness has come to entertain. The astronomical and physico-chemical sciences are now dealing largely in the rôle of prediction as to the final fate of the earthly habitation of man. On the whole, it cannot be said that their utterances are encouraging to the literal interpretation of the apocalyptic vision of a "new heaven and a new earth," which shall be wholly free from those physical discomforts and restrictions whose effects in the social evolution of mankind are now quite universally held to have been so indispensable. The advocate of the possibility of a realization of

this vision cannot safely forget that the recognition of the imperative need and extreme value of the struggle for existence, with its immense toll of hardship, suffering, and death, is an important part of that theodicy which is made somehow necessary in order to place the religious doctrine of the Divine Love and of the reality of the redemptive process upon grounds of fact and of history. On the other hand, these sciences may properly be reminded—a thing which their most prudent and learned students are readiest to admit—that they really *know* little or nothing of an assured scientific character about even the remotest *physical* future of the earth. Indeed, the sceptical and agnostic attitude toward the prophecies of astronomy, physics, and chemistry, is peculiarly appropriate just at present. For all the most assured principles of these sciences are undergoing a very severe testing which is resulting in exceedingly rapid and diversified revision. Moreover, if the most pessimistic conclusions were indubitably warranted with regard to the future physical condition of the earth, this would not of necessity settle the destiny of the human race as considered from the point of view of the religious ideal. In the expression of this ideal, whether for the individual man or for human society, the detailed descriptions of those most gifted with insight and firmest in faith and hope, are confessedly figurative and symbolic. How far the actual fulfillment of the faith, the realization of the hope, is dependent upon the continuance of the cosmic system in substantially its present form, we are quite unable to say, either in the name of science, religion or speculative philosophy. We simply do not know. And physical science does not know, whether this cosmic system may not retain substantially its present form through incalculable æons yet to come. On the other hand, when philosophy and theology begin to discourse about “eternity,” in the strictest temporal application of the word, the conceptions of both are equally misty, negative, and unfit for discussion in terms of knowledge or even of reasoned opinion.

The predictions of biology and anthropology, when these sciences attempt to extend the rôle of prophecy to the end of the existence of the human race, while they come nearer to our daily experiences and to our more immediate interests, cannot be said to have any truly scientific character. And, indeed, as they are actually made by the students of these sciences, they are indefinite and vacillating in a high degree. There are existent in man's past history and present experience grounds for each one of several quite different opinions as to what the far-away future destiny of the race will be. One of these opinions sees the inevitable conditions of human existence, and of the multiplication of the species, slowly but irresistibly tending to increased and more complicated miseries, and to a condition of arrested development followed by decay and death. In the natural history of the individual man this opinion reads the future history of the race of men. According to another sociological theory which can make at least an equally trustworthy appeal to certain sides of experience, the time will come when the forces that favor the various kinds of progress, and those forces that induce retrogradation, will be in a state of equilibrium. A third opinion is yet more frankly and joyously optimistic; and they who are blessed with the ability to hold it firmly in prospect see a continual advance of humanity—unlimited by time and bounded only by the geographical limits of the habitable globe—toward the realization of its economical and social ideals. Each one of the three views, which the biological and anthropological sciences attempt to place upon a basis of recognized facts, has had its counterpart in the religious doctrine of the future of the race. Religious pessimists have held that even at the last only a few will be saved; and these few will be translated to some Paradise apart, while misery and death eternal will be the fate of the race at large. Others, more optimistically inclined, have pictured the social salvation which is in the end to come to the great majority, if not to all of the race, as a fortunate condition, either

of stable equilibrium or of ceaseless and indefinite progress in blessedness. In the details of its pictures of the future, historical Christianity has varied all the way from the grossest and most revolting to the most refined and spiritual conceptions.

If these forms of natural science contribute little either to the defense or to the refutation of the hopes of religion for the future of humanity, the case is somewhat more illumining when we regard the indications which are offered by the past history of man's spiritual development, as to the probabilities of his future development. Here the notable thing is the rising of the Social Ideal in the consciousness of mankind, and the increasing dissatisfaction with the conditions already attained toward the realization of this ideal. No other social phenomenon is so impressive at the present time as this constantly rising and widespreading restlessness under existing conditions of every sort. This pervasive spiritual influence is stirring the millions of Russia; and the more numerous millions of the Orient are awakening as from centuries of sleep. The interest of the present age in the social future of the race, whether its life is to be continued in the environment, physical and psychical, of an earthly existence, or amidst other unimaginably different circumstances, although it is congenial to the spirit of the religion of Christ, is a comparatively modern affair. "The sense of duty to the race," as Rhys Davids has said,¹ is largely a result of the "continuity of human progress."

If we study more profoundly this social unrest, as respects both its causes and its significance for the future, we cannot fail to realize several important respects in which it resembles the belief and hopes that sustain the religious doctrine of the coming, in an historical way, of the kingdom of God among men. One of the marked points of resemblance is a certain divinely induced pessimism. With all the advances of the social status, whether over smaller or wider areas of society, there has almost uniformly come an increased dissatisfaction

¹ Origin and Growth of Religion, p. 111.

with the advances already made. The ideal end seems no nearer than before ; indeed, the ideal has risen faster than man has risen in his progress toward its realization. Thus the cry of the reformer who is intensely interested in the social betterment of humanity, whether from the more purely social or the more definitively religious point of view, is the same in all periods of history and under all changes of race-culture. He is always a John the Baptist ; and his cry is always the same : "Repent and bring forth fruits of repentance in righteousness, for the end is pressing but is not yet attained." It is only the final and far-away look of either sociology or religion that can be thoroughly optimistic. Changes of governments and of other forms of social organization, no matter how much of social betterment they may seem to carry with them, never fully satisfy the demands for reconstruction. They all leave behind, or they actually produce, a more intense feeling of the schism between the actual and the Ideal, between what is and what ought to be. There follows, of course, a yet more keen and imperative demand for further progress.

In this way the doctrine of social betterment, considered as a purely natural and mechanical process, suggests the insufficiency of its own conception, and the hopelessness of all attempts that are governed solely by this conception. The conception itself implies a process of the conservation and summation of a vast number of spiritual and "worth-having" energies, co-operating through long stretches of time to produce a common valuable result. But this is to say that the conception is an Ideal. In order progressively to realize such an ideal in the actual experience of mankind, confidence must be placed in some discriminating and unifying Force which is at work in and through all the conflicting, or the sympathetic and mutually assisting, human organizations. This force we may call *the rising Spirituality of the race*. But this is substantially what religion means when it regards its own mighty social uplift of humanity as the work of God's Spirit in advancing the

coming of God's Kingdom among men. From this point of view we may regard the restlessness and dissatisfaction of the present age, whose imperative demands for spiritual gifts, spiritual development, and spiritual greatness, seem so inconsistent with its extravagant estimate of the worth of sensuous and temporal goods, as humanity's unceasing cry to God for the presence and work of his Holy Spirit with redeeming power. The cry is also prophetic of the confession to which this same age will soon be forced; for the social Ideal will never be reached, or even successfully followed, except by means of a progressive purification and transformation of finite spirits by the omnipotent Ethical Spirit of God. That which so-called sociology, too often ignorantly, worships is declared by religion to be the Kingdom of God that is ever coming, but is not yet, among the children of men.

No breach is made, then, in the continuity of human science when we turn to the beliefs of religion for a more positive support to our hope for the future of the race. As for the individual's hope of immortal life, so for humanity's hope of a progressive realization of the social ideal, it is the conception of God as perfect Ethical Spirit, in which the rational grounds must, if at all, be chiefly found. This conception attributes to the Being of the World, to the Personal Absolute, the titles of the loving Father and Redeemer, as well as the Creator and Preserver of mankind. Thus there is seated in the very heart of Reality the unchanging ground, as a conscious final purpose, of the progressive realization of the social Ideal. God will see to it that his Kingdom in its perfection is brought to actuality for the race. Intimations of this hope, as based upon faith in the moral perfection of the divine purpose, are expressed by the inspired seers, poets, and philosophers of all ages. But the hope itself is an essential deduction, or corollary, from the central truths and most firmly founded faiths of the Christian religion.

When, however, this hope is taken before the facts of history

and of present experience, and its validity tested by estimating the power actually inherent in Christianity to overcome the enormous obstacles in the way of its own Ideal, the answer is not so clear and confident as could well be wished. As estimated by the tendencies of the times, the redeeming force of the religion nominally espoused by those nations which are at present inherently most vigorous, and most influential in moulding the destiny of humanity, seems to present two diverse, if not contradictory, aspects. On the one side, the forces which make for the advancement of race-culture, and for the social progress of mankind, appear to be separating themselves more and more from socially organized religion. On the other side, religion itself as an affair of the human spirit seems to be more and more friendly to every other important influence that advances this culture and that contributes to social progress. The observer who is chiefly influenced by one set of appearances might conclude that the social ideal is being realized apart from the active participation of religion, either as subjectively considered—a filial attitude toward God—or as a system of beliefs and a form of social organization. But on regarding more patiently the other set of appearances, he might experience the encouraging impression that, in Christian communities at least, all the forces of civilization and of social progress are becoming, if less obviously and, so to say, technically, still more truly religious than ever before.

Upon the present tendencies to divorce science, art, business, politics, and all other forms of social organization except the Church, from definite connections of control or influence from religion, we have already remarked at sufficient length. It has been made sufficiently clear that this divorce, if it could be accomplished, would not result in the lasting benefit of any of these interrelated forms of race-culture and of social progress. But it is now in place to notice that religion was never before so cordial—not to say *complaisant*—in its attitude toward all these forms of human interest, as it is in the so-called Christian

nations of to-day. In all kinds of charitable works, and of efforts for the education, increased culture, and social improvement of the multitudes, the believer and the unbeliever, the man esteemed a saint and the so-called sinner, are more than ever before standing side by side and working together with a common will. It is true that irreligious and immoral ways of acquiring the resources which are dispensed in these efforts at promoting the social ideal are tolerated in the very bosom of the Christian churches. Thus religion is more discredited on the side of the acquisition, than it is credited on the side of the disbursement, of the good things provided by God for man. And certain grave risks,—such as arise from remoteness of personal connection, the breeding of dependence, of laziness, and of professional pauperism, official extravagance, and loss of the reactionary beneficial influence over the giver,—encompass the present form of so-called “organized charities.” Essentially the same thing is true of much of the non-sectarian and non-religious education, of the practice of art, and the pursuit of social advantages and comforts, without regard to religious restraints, which is characteristic of the age. Above all is it becoming palpably felt that no merely economic arrangements, or legal enactments, or civil organizations, which leave the Christian principle of brotherly love out of their working, will avail to effect the desired social uplift of the race. Yet this prevailing spirit of co-operation is doing much to resolve antagonisms and to unite the forces of all kinds that make for man’s betterment; it is, therefore, most divinely significant and divinely promising with respect to the progressive realization of the religious Ideal.

The modern conception of an ideal Social Democracy, and all that this conception means when taken at its highest terms and in its most comprehensive form, is the product of Christianity more than of any other influence. At its very beginning this religion broke away from the old tribal notion, which united a certain group of men under the social principle: “Thy

god is my god," because "thy people is my people." But Christianity became, as of necessity, a Church or social organization; and then, instead of steadfastly adhering to its fundamental idea of a spiritual unity which should include all redeemed humanity, it gave itself a variety of more or less rigid constitutions in conjunction with the locally prevalent forms of the social organizations of family and of state. If, therefore, we cannot quite completely condemn (following a modern writer on apologetics) all state churches and territorial ecclesiastical systems as "heathenish," we certainly cannot consider them as fit to represent the Christian social Ideal.

Good citizenship is an essential manifestation of all truly religious spirit; it is especially so of the Christian life, whose principle of brotherly love is the highest and mightiest of all forces to initiate and to accomplish political and social reforms. But here it is necessary to clear the mind of certain errors as to what good citizenship really is, in the truly Christian significance of the phrase. The religious ideal has no tendency to secure the support of the existing government in all its policy, whether this policy be in accordance, or not, with the present wishes and aims of the multitude of the people. Neither is it patriotism, as that word is too frequently employed. For the fact remains substantially unchanged among the modern Christian nations, as it was of old among the heathen empires:—they are governed very largely by selfish and hypocritical men, and their behavior toward one another and toward the weaker races is anything but pious and benevolent. Indeed, there is no more awful and absurd mockery of the spirit of Christ than to call these governments by his name. Therefore good citizenship of the truly religious sort is sometimes forced into passive compliance with what can neither be approved nor changed at once; and sometimes it is active resistance and steadfast refusal to conform to the existing regulations. But it is uniformly an active co-operation, according to the individual's opportunity, with all other good citizens to secure a more

moral and truly enlightened government; and especially to reform the abuses existing in the present government. And never, under any circumstances, does fidelity to the principles of religion allow the individual to fail of regarding the exhortation, whatever others may think or do, "to keep *himself* unspotted from the world."

All other ways of realizing the social Ideal by a progressive betterment of human conditions are, however, secondary and subordinate when regarded from the more definitely religious point of view. From this point of view, the supreme good for the individual is that immortal life whose essence is a union of the finite spirit with the Infinite Holy Spirit; and the perfection of which is attained through the continuance of this spiritual union. From the realization of this ideal in an increasing number of the race there follows of necessity the realization of the social Ideal. For as has been already said, the Kingdom of God is the "social aggregate" of all the redeemed ones of the individuals who have become true "sons of God." Thus Christianity attempts to unite the hope of the future after death of the individual with the hope of the future of the race. Thus would it bind together in one holy society all men of good-will, quite irrespective of the time at which their spirits have been released by death from their connection with the bodily organism. Here, too, however, the manner of effecting this social unity is not made clear to religious faith. From the very nature of the case, it is probable that it cannot be made clear. The expectant mind is invited to look along two lines which do not run parallel, but which cannot be seen, but can only be imagined, somehow to converge and to come together at the last. Looking along one line, the observer is bidden to behold the Christian Church, or social organization of believers, universal and triumphant. This organization is to extend itself through all the ages, and over every age, tribe, people, and nation—until all the *earth* shall know the Lord. Then the race is bound together in bonds of love and fraternal

union ; war is no more ; all preventable disease and death are abolished ; and the world that " lay in the Wicked One," according to the early Christian conception and figure of speech, has become a new world, an ideal social community of redeemed ones. But looking along another line, he is bidden to imagine the fulfilment of that apocalyptic vision which early Christianity received from Judaism ; and which, largely by the speculative insight and skill of Paul, was made for centuries the prevalent belief of the orthodox Christian Church. Christ returns to earth ; the dead are raised ; the judgment is made final ; and the union of all the sons of God in one community of the blessed is made complete.

The extravagance of views and of conduct which the apocalyptic beliefs of early Christianity produced, and the patent failure of the subsequent history to correspond to these beliefs, brought them into disfavor with the more reflective thinking of the Christian world. A similar experience has been repeated over and over again in the history of the Christian Church. At whatever cost to a dogmatic confidence in the teachings of the New Testament, the growing indisposition to conceive of the future of humanity after the precise pattern of this apocalyptic cannot be overlooked or easily overcome. The great truths that the righteous dead, and the righteous among the living, are to be considered as subjects of one glorious hope, as members of one Divine society, and that the time is coming when this union of interest and of life shall be obvious, are better conserved by taking them out of their more definite, sensuous and symbolical setting. That which is pictured in temporal and cataclysmal fashion by this Apocalypse may then be believed in, and hoped for, as a good that is ever present, and ever accumulating in higher and higher degrees of energy and of extension. Thus for the individual believer the saying of Jesus becomes the more impressive, that the Kingdom of God is within him ; and that its universalizing is the very process that is going on around him, in which he is bidden to take

his part. And although neither science nor private experience have served to penetrate the veil which separates all the members of the Kingdom on this side, from those who are on the other side of death, still this veil is to Christian faith a very thin one. And to that one larger faith, which unites the individual's hope of immortality with humanity's hope of its social ideal, this veil is destined ultimately to disappear completely.

The light which science and philosophy can throw along either of the historic lines of the early Christian expectation for the future is, indeed, dim and quite insufficient to encourage the attempt at further definition and argument to establish details. There remains, however, the fact of the hope itself; religion, in the highest form of its manifestation of faith and hope respecting the future of mankind, expects the progressive realization of the social Ideal, in the establishment, by an historical process of redemption, of the Kingdom of God among men. This hope reposes in the faith that such is the Good-Will of the omnipotent, omnipresent, and perfect Ethical Spirit, who is the Fountain, Guarantor, and Goal, of every form of good. Of a share in this hope every finite spirit who shares in the good-will of this Infinite Spirit is invited to partake. Somehow, and at some time, God is pledged to unite all his many sons in a common life that shall realize the conception which the experience of redemption has inspired, but which the imagination has striven in vain definitely to reproduce. Thus the promise of religion for the future remains: "What eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath entered into the heart of man to conceive, God hath laid up for them that love him." And, "forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before," the effort to realize this promise in their own lives and influence is the practical religion of all the true sons of God.

CHAPTER XLVII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

It remains only to gather into a few sentences the more obvious and important truths which our long journey of exploration may be said fairly to have established. And first among them is the profound depth, measureless extent, and sublime height, of the facts, suggestions, and implicates of the religious experience of humanity. Were we in need of another picturesque and on the whole truthful, but not strictly scientific definition of man, we might be tempted to say that he is above everything else, *a religious animal*. For a faithful and full description of the sources, aspects, and products, of human religious experience involves all those forms of functioning in their most extensive and intensive energy, which constitute what is more vaguely connected by any such term as a "human nature." In the development of the race, therefore, no other concourse of motives, and of guiding psychical and spiritual influences, has been more productive of important results, than that which may be fitly designated as Religion, in the most comprehensive meaning of this term.

To point out the same essential and fateful truth as seen from a slightly different path of approach: Man alone is capable of conceiving of the Being of the World as an invisible, spiritual Power, and of feeling the desire, and making the effort to adjust himself to this power and to secure good-fellowship with it. Since this way of conceiving reality is necessarily anthropomorphic—*i. e.*, is essentially his own way,

is man's way—the Divine Being is imagined, thought of, and treated, as though it were self-like. But as humanity develops, and as the conception of what it is to be a Self greatness and rises in character, in accordance with the progressive realization of a larger and higher Selfhood in human history, the mental picture of the Being of the World is correspondingly changed. In the greater religions of humanity, and above all in the highest and purest types of Christian belief, this Ideal of religious faith and worship has come to be represented by the conception of a personal Absolute, who is at the same time perfect Ethical Spirit, and who stands in relations to humanity that are fitly symbolized by such terms as Father and Redeemer. And, indeed, the formation of this Ideal is the crowning achievement of man's religious experience; it has actually gathered together and incorporated into itself all the supremest efforts of reflective thinking, of purest and noblest feeling, and of the practical life of piety and devotion, on the part of the religiously best of the race. This Ideal therefore, appears to religious experience, to be the revelation of the true nature of the Being of the World as made in and through the "sons of God." Supreme among these sons of God and religious leaders and revealers, is Jesus the Christ. So much as this, together with all the manifold and profound influences which this form of the development of man has exercised upon the other principal forms of his development, would seem to be properly placed amongst the indubitable facts of human history.

But at once must we remind ourselves that such an Ideal cannot be regarded as *mere idea*, that has been hatched in warmth of sentiment and has thus grown wings which enable it to rise above the realm of fact and reason, and to float with rhythmic and beautiful motion in the thin air where science and even philosophy lose their breath and fear to ascend. Against a similar conception of the ideals of humanity in general we must once more utter our most emphatic protest, not only in the name of

history and psychology, of art, ethics, and religion, but also of science and philosophy as well. None of man's ideals—such as abide in history, because they spring from, and are nourished by, the most permanent and fundamental needs and aspirations of human nature—can by any means reasonably be treated as purely subjective, as so-called *mere ideas*. On the contrary, they all have a most well assured and an inexpressibly precious ontological value. What is called “science”—in the hardest, narrowest, and if you please most bigoted meaning of the word—cannot afford to overlook their valuable and productive presence even in the midst of its own self. For, indeed, there would be no science, in any tenable meaning of the word, were it not for the impulsive energy and moulding force of the ideal. And the so-called scientific conception of the Being of the World, especially as this conception has framed itself in the most modern times, is all interfused with the presence, and dominated by the power, of the ideal. Were this not the fact, this conception would not be the respectable and interesting theory, explanatory of a certain limited aspect of the total experience of humanity, which it most certainly is. But to argue that philosophy accepts the truth of the ontological value of ideals is quite unnecessary; for this is the assumption which alone makes even the beginning of any positive form of philosophical opinion to be a possibility for the reflective thinker.

In this treatise we have been interested chiefly, and indeed exclusively, in affirming and testing the truth that a candid examination of the problems of the philosophy of religion establishes yet more firmly, upon a broad basis of trustworthy and unquestioned facts of human experience, the ontological value of man's *religious* ideals. In a word, this form of the experience of humanity is just as entitled to judge clearly concerning the real nature of the Ultimate Reality, the invisible and mysterious Being of the World, as are the various forms of the positive, physico-chemical sciences. There are no charges of unverified conjecture, extravagant imaginings, or

anthropomorphic procedure, which science can hurl at religion in the field of belief as to the nature of this Reality, which religion cannot return with equal force and show of violence. For religion, too, has its firm foothold over a vast area of the most indubitable human experiences. And if there are many truths about all things, even including man's soul, to which only the investigations of these sciences can contribute, there are other truths concerning the same things, and especially concerning man's soul, about which religion is chiefly entitled to be heard. Science, in any of the several stricter meanings of that word, can never explain all experience. Its theory of reality is always one-sided, partial, and in certain aspects unsatisfying. Religious beliefs, religious sentiments, and the practical life of piety—these are actual facts of a limited form of experience. But they are also integral parts of that total experience which science, in the broadest and vaguest meaning of the word, and philosophy are ever striving to explain. The Ideal of religion is therefore rooted in actuality. It is a valid evidence for the essential nature of that Reality out of which its own nature is a never-ceasing growth. Indeed, above all other ideals do those of religion incorporate themselves into the actualities of man's life, in an abiding, influential, and indestructible way.

The religious conception of the Being of the World, when taken at its best estate and in the form of its supreme development, and after being subjected to critical testing in the light of the allied conceptions of science and philosophy, is indeed, of the very highest evidential value. This conception is, of course, subject to continuous development, always in need of reconstruction, of improved construction. There are many unsolved problems still latent or obvious within its content; there are many differences as to the expression of its details or even of its more important characteristics; there is the enveloping mist of the incomprehensible and the inexpressible;—all this, and more, to perplex us in the religious Ideal of God as

absolute and perfect Ethical Spirit. But such defects belong in an inevitable way to ideals in general ; and especially to that Ideal which, whether primarily assuming the scientific or the philosophical or the religious point of view, aims to comprehend within itself the entire system of experienced realities, in the form of one explanatory principle that shall satisfy best the intellectual, affective, and practical needs of human life. Neither in the name of science nor in that of philosophy can the finite mind escape these defects. But neither in religion, nor in science, nor in philosophy, does their presence warrant us in indulging either in dogmatic agnosticism, or indifference, or despair. All human truth is approximate, subject to re-examination and restatement, interfused with the mysterious and as yet uncognizable. If, however, our knowledge has been advanced by the foregoing critical investigation somewhat further toward the clearer light, and our faith in the greater verities of religious experience has been somewhat strengthened and made more rational, the long labor of the investigation has been by no means without its sufficient reward.

And, finally, we should be glad to have it understood that the result of the investigation corresponds to the spirit in which it was begun, and in which it has been conducted throughout. This is constructive, irenic, conciliatory ; and wherever it has seemed to be for the moment destructive, polemical, or antagonizing, the change has been merely seeming and necessitated by the momentary exigencies of the discussion. Science, philosophy, and religion, all have their own peculiar theories of reality, their own more proper conceptions of the Being of the World. To science the sum-total of experienced realities seems best conceived of as an orderly, law-abiding, self-evolving, mechanical system. To philosophy, with its profounder insights and more far-reaching critical analysis, this same totality appears as the expression of a Unitary Being, that is absolute Will, functioning teleologically as omnipresent, immanent Idea. But religion conceives of the ground of its experience in a

way to satisfy more immediately and perfectly certain æsthetical and ethical cravings and certain demands for support to exigencies of the practical life. As its thought becomes more comprehensive and deeply reflective, it frames the conception of God, as perfect Ethical Spirit, the Object of faith, of worship, and of service.

The World, however, is One and man is one. Therefore the steady pressure of the demands for some theory of reality that shall take fuller account of the different aspects of this cosmological Unity, and that shall appeal to the *total experience*, in a harmonizing way, of this psychological and anthropological unity, can never be long resisted. Science and religion, and philosophy and religion, cannot long refuse to take account of each other's truths. They are all aiming at the One Truth; and this one truth must base itself upon, and be understood in the light of, the totality of human experience. Inasmuch, however, as only a prolonged study of history and of psychology can tell us what the so-called religious experience actually is, and inasmuch as only the critical, reflective, and speculatively constructive method of thought can fruitfully avail itself of the data furnished by this study, the Philosophy of Religion is the only arbiter and reconciler of all strife in this domain. But the very data are never all given; the exploration of those which belong to the past is scarcely as yet more than well begun. Moreover, the powers and achievements of reflective thought are taxed to their utmost, and very speedily transcended, when employed upon the profounder problems and larger thoughts of the religious life and development of humanity. Religion itself is an ever-developing experience. Its Object of faith is essentially an ever-expanding Ideal-Real. Therefore any attempt to treat the truths of the religious experience of humanity by the method of philosophy can only terminate in a still imperfect condition of knowledge, although in an improved condition of rational faith.

INDEX

- ÀB, Egyptian doctrine of, II, 495 f.
Abbé de Broglie, I, 45, 72, II, 275.
Absolute, the, Neo-Platonic views of,
I, 6; as Self, I, 253 f., 263 f., 333 f.,
344 f., 347 f., 359, 493 f., 605 f.,
II, 13 f., 81 f., 94 f., 117 f., 139 f.,
147 f., 217 f., 259 f., 282, 345 f.,
449 f.; as indetermined conception,
I, 267 f., 615, II, 111 f., 117 f., 222
f., 259 f., 347.
Absoluteness, of religion, I, 71 f., II,
467 f.; of God, I, 431, II, 107-121,
348 f.
Aequoy, Prof., I, 5 f.
Adi-Buddha, as Creator, II, 321.
Agni, worship of, I, 175, 183.
Agnosticism, in religion, I, 24, II,
15, 20, 23 f., 238 f.; arguments
against, II, 239 f.; both religious
and anti-religious, II, 239 f.
Agriculture, connection of, with re-
ligion, I, 392 f.
Ahura-Mazda, I, 184, 199, 246,
II, 166, 321, 355, 391.
Akbar, I, 7, 10.
Akiba, Rabbi, I, 475.
Al-Ash' Ari, I, 582.
Algonkins, worship of manito, I, 101.
Allah, conception of, I, 200 f., 406,
II, 129, 132, 135, 358.
Al-Uzza, I, 201.
Amalgamation, nature of, in religion,
I, 166 f., 194 f.
Amon-Rā (see Rā, the god).
Ānanda, II, 499 f.
Ancestor-worship, in China, I, 148,
171 f., 268, II, 7 f., 498; Japan,
I, 149, 403, 571, II, 7 f.; and
Babylonia, I, 170; among the
Hindūs, I, 171; of the dead, II,
479, 484 f.
Ani, Maxims of, I, 532.
Animals, as worshipped, I, 97 f.,
101 f. (see also, Theriolatry).
Animism, nature of, I, 89, 90 f.
(note), 101 f., 385.
Anselm, his argument for the Being
of God, II, 46.
Anthropology, relation of, to philoso-
phy of religion, I, 12 f., 31 f., 110 f.;
on primitive man, I, 135 f.
Anthropomorphism, necessary to re-
ligion, I, 321 f., 347 f., 352 f.,
II, 41 f., 92 f., 241 f., 566 f.
Apocalyptic, of Buddha, I, 577 f.,
II, 499 f.; the Persian, II, 390 f.;
of later Judaism, II, 508 f., 512 f.,
547; the Christian, II, 509 f., 511 f.,
513 f., 547 f., 553, 564 f.
Apollo, I, 280, 465.
Apollonius, I, 437.
Apologists, the Christian, I, 431 f.,
II, 283, 425 f.
Aquinas, his conception of miracle,
II, 435.
Arabia, its worship of trees and
stones, I, 102 f., 155; natural
characteristics of, I, 165 f.; bloody
sacrifices of, I, 525.
Aricia, Frazer on priest of, I, 34 f.,
188 (note).
Aristides, Apology of, II, 283.
Aristotle, on conception of Deity, I,
317, II, 53, 55; nature of justice, II,
180, 185; on love of the gods, II,
190.

- Arnold, Matthew, I, 348, II, 275.
- Art, relation of, to religion. I, 435 f., 437 f., 447 f.; of Egypt, I, 447; and Babylonia, I, 447.
- Aryans, primitive religion of, I, 34, 58, 221 f., II, 6 f.
- Ashera, I, 521.
- Asoka, King, I, 54, 117.
- Atheism, position of, II, 237 f., 244 f.
- Athenagoras, II, 328.
- Ātman, conception of, I, 107, 326, 354, II, 17 f., 167 f., 262, 280, 323, 489 f., 493, 535.
- Augustine, on "two-fold truth," I, 56 (note); nature of Christianity, I, 70, 127, 553; mysticism of, I, 344; on doctrine of the Church, II, 401; his conception of miracle, II, 435.
- Aurora, worship of, I, 291.
- Australia, religion of tribes of, I, 122 f., 225 f., II, 315, 316; tribes of, as primitive, I, 136.
- Awonawilona, the god, II, 315 f.
- Aztecs, religion of, II, 7 (see Mexico and Peru).
- BABISM, I, 167.
- Babylonia (and Assyria), religion of, I, 105, 287, 396, 399, 518 f., 524, II, 318, 358; incantations of, I, 517 f.; sacrifices of, I, 524; cosmogony of, II, 318 f.; belief of, in existence after death, II, 498 f.
- Bacon, on proof for God, I, 55.
- Barton, on primitive Semitic community, I, 166, 176 f. (note), 571; on the conception of Allah, I, 201.
- Being of the World, conceived of as spiritual Entity, I, 108 f., 111 f., 234, 351 f., 614 f., II, 331 f., 537 f., 546 f., 568 f.; and Universal Principle, I, 114 f., 614 f., II, 9 f., 331 f., 537 f.; as Ideal-Real, I, 114 f., 331 f., 351 f., 614 f., II, 568 f., 570 f.
- Ben Dosa, I, 208.
- Ben Zakkai, I, 208.
- Bhagavadgītā, I, 294, 545, II, 233 f., 324.
- Bhūts, worship of, I, 58.
- Bonhomie*, as religious feeling, I, 292.
- Book of the Dead, I, 179, II, 204, 496 f.
- Book of the Great Decease, II, 202.
- Bosanquet, on Christian art, I, 209 (note), 408, 441 f., 445 (note), 450.
- Bousset on later Judaism, I, 209, 407, 475, 501, II, 507; on Philo, I, 501, II, 27 f., 191.
- Bradley, Mr., I, 271, II, 259 f.
- Brahma (neuter), I, 222, 439, II, 86, 172, 252.
- Brahmā (personal), I, 316, 401, II, 324.
- Brāhma-Ātma, I, 222.
- Brāhmanas, the, I, 543 f.
- Brāhmanism, as a religion, I, 108, 197, 380 f., 401, 427, 461 f., 543 f.; its doctrine of the World-Soul, I, 197, 363, II, 108, 167 f.; as post-Vedic Pantheism, I, 380 f.; ethics of, I, 461 f., 543 f.; doctrine of salvation, I, 543 f., II, 168 f.; higher morality of, II, 202.
- Brinton, origin of religion, I, 281, 292, 418 (note), II, 413; nature of religious sentiment, I, 292 (note), II, 210; difference between science and religion, I, 418 (note); power of the word, I, 513; conception of Deity, II, 123.
- Brown, Prof. Wm. A., on essential Christianity, II, 478.
- Bruchmann, K., I, 21 (note).
- Buddha, the, nature of his salvation, I, 197 f., 547 f., II, 499 f.; "Book of the Decease" of, I, 547 f., 576 f., II, 499 f.; founder of a religious community, I, 575 f.; "Apocalypse" of, I, 577 f., II, 499 f.; death of, II, 499 f.
- Buddha-tathata, II, 253 (note).

- Buddhism, as religion, I, 106 f., 130 f., 195 f., 197, 427, 472, 491 f., 522, II, 18 f., 168 f., 255, 550 f.; its power of amalgamation, I, 107, 195 f., 578 f.; and claim to universality, I, 130 f., II, 473 f.; development of, I, 197 f., 578 f., II, 393, 476 f.; as moral reform, I, 106, 472 f., 491 f., 546, II, 202; its alleged lack of a creed, I, 491 f.; its cult of prayer, I, 522; and doctrine of salvation, I, 546 f., II, 168 f., 392 f., 551; and of existence, II, 49 f., 483 f.; of moral evil, II, 168 f.; belief of, in the future, II, 483 f.; on nature of the soul, II, 489 f.
- Bundehesh, II, 165.
- Bunsen, Baron, I, 48.
- Burnouf, I, 12 (note), 42 (note), 151.
- Bushmen, shyness of, in religious matters, I, 122 f.; their views of creation, II, 315.
- Busse, Dr., II, 280.
- CAIRD, Principal, on the ontological proof, II, 49.
- Caldecott, II, 11.
- Callery, M., I, 515.
- Carlyle, I, 109 f.
- Carlyle, Rev. A. J., I, 559.
- Carus, Dr., on Christianity, I, 255.
- Castrén, M., I, 96, 265, 405.
- Chabas, M., I, 463.
- Chamberlain, Prof., on *Kojiki*, II, 201.
- Charles, R. H., on Hebrew view of the under-world, II, 504 f.; on eschatology of Judaism, II, 506, 514; and of Paul, II, 513 (note).
- China, religion of, I, 94, 98, 104, 148, 156, 164, 171 f., 194 f., 268 f., 384, 403, 541, II, 144 (note), 321 f.; idol-worship in, I, 156; religious literature of, I, 464 f.; cosmogony of, II, 322 f.
- Christianity, an historical religion, I, 63 f., 204 f., II, 404 f., 407 f.; a world-religion, I, 64 f., 70 f., 407 f., II, 407 f., 455 f., 468 f., 471 f., 474 f.; its claims to absoluteness, I, 71 f., 113 f., II, 468 f., 471 f., 474 f., 477 f.; as doctrine of supreme good, I, 82, 209 f., 283 f., 476, II, 396 f., 470; and universality, I, 130 f., 295 f., II, 407 f., 455 f., 468 f., 471 f., 474 f.; relations to Judaism, I, 204 f., 209 f., 295 f., 407 f., 474, 500, 529, II, 187; and to Neo-Platonism, I, 213; its conception of God, I, 247, 296 f., 409 f., 476, 501 f., 529 f., II, 7 f., 187 f., 206 f., 359 f., 470; and influence on development, I, 407 f., 428 f., 449 f.; its *clan*, I, 475 f.; as faith in Christ, I, 501 f.; its spirit and form of worship, I, 529 f.; and way of salvation, I, 552 f., II, 396 f.; as the "religion of Christ," II, 187 f., 400 f.; and doctrine of redemption, II, 402 f.; as a special Revelation, II, 425 f., 427 f.
- Church, the Christian, early attitude to art, I, 450 f.; its moral code, I, 476 f., 587 f.; and dogmatic development, I, 505 f., 587 f., 589 f., II, 458 f.; its social character, I, 572, 587 f. (note), II, 457 f.; and organization, I, 588 f., II, 457 f.; as guardian of the faith, II, 458 f.
- Cicero, I, 57, 429.
- Civilization, relation of, to religion, I, 215, II, 158, 459 f.; present characteristics of, II, 459 f.
- Clarke, R. F., II, 63.
- Clement of Alexandria, I, 48.
- Community, the religious, formation of, a necessity, I, 564 f., 568 f., 591 f.; as a "Church," I, 569 f.; in Babylonia, I, 573 f.; the Hindū, I, 574 f.; the Buddhistic, I, 576 f., 578 f.; the Muslim, I, 581 f., 583 f.; the Jewish, I, 584 f.

- Comparative Religion, its nature, I, 7 f., 18 f., 31 f.; effects of travel on, I, 9 f.; recent advances in, I, 31 f., 124 f.; limitations of, I, 32 f., 34 f.
- Confucianism, its ethics, I, 171 f., II, 183; as religion, I, 193 f., 195, II, 497; in Japan, I, 195.
- Confucius, his teaching as to ancestor-worship, I, 268, II, 497; as to knowledge, II, 25; use of term "Heaven," II, 78, 183, 429.
- Consciousness, the religious, I, 36 f., 51 f., 112, 137 f., 261 f., 269 f., 274 f., 299 f., 346 f., II, 30 f.; of sin, I, 60, 471, 528; awakening of, I, 138 f., 374 f.; analysis of, I, 261-277; curiosity as spring of, I, 300; rational elements in, I, 303 f.; necessarily anthropomorphic, I, 321; influences of environment on, I, 374 f.; the so-called "God consciousness," II, 31 f.
- Cooke, Prof. J. P., I, 417 f.
- Corban, nature of, I, 325.
- Creation, theistic doctrine of, II, 223 f., 226 f., 313 f., 317 f., 319 f., 326 f.; *creatio ex nihilo*, II, 317 f.
- Creation Epic, II, 318 f.
- Creator gods, early views regarding, I, 225 f., 346, II, 314 f., 317.
- Creeks, absence of, among early religions, I, 490 f.
- Criticism, Kantian, the, I, 303 f., 309.
- Crooke, W., on folk-lore in India, I, 67, 79 f., 141.
- Crozier, I, 70, 256 (note), 373 f., 476.
- Cult, the religious, forms of, I, 512 f., 516 f., 520 f.; among the Romans, I, 517, II, 416; motives of, I, 520 f., 523 f.; the Hebrews, I, 524 f.
- D'ALVIELLA, on nature of religion, I, 115, 126, 154, 456; on palæolithic man, I, 126 (note), 240; growth of personality, I, 243; on conception of God, I, 364 f., II, 52, 68, 182, 389; religion and morality, I, 456 f., II, 175; on belief in existence after death, II, 480.
- Danziger, I, 207.
- Darmstetter, I, 199.
- Darwin, on religious devotion, I, 514; argument from design, II, 55.
- Dauids, Rhys, on science of religion, I, 10, 239; on doctrine of Buddha, I, 197, 547 f., 575, 576 f.; and order of development in religion, I, 239; on the Brāhmanas, I, 543 f.; and transmigration, II, 492 (note); on future progress, II, 557.
- Dead, the, worship of, I, 170 f., 184 (note), 268 f., II, 479, 488 f.; belief in continued existence of, II, 479 f., 488 f.
- De Groot, on religious system of China, I, 94; on fetishism, I, 98.
- Deism, its theory of origin of religion, I, 141 f., II, 53 f.; among savages, I, 153 (note).
- Demeter-Ceres, I, 280, 392 f.
- Demons, early Christian belief in, I, 432 f., II, 170, 388; Plutarch on the, II, 42 f., 387.
- Descartes, on argument for Being of God, II, 46 f.
- Design, in nature, II, 54 f., 59; argument for God, from, II, 55, 58 f., 77 f., 103 f.
- Determinism, influence of, I, 336 f.
- Deussen, I, 10, 118, II, 167.
- Development, conception of, a necessity, I, 26 f., 69 f., 85, II, 154 f., 335 f.; as distinguished from differentiation, I, 159 f., 166 f., 168, 187 f.; theory of, as applied to religion, I, 203-258; forces at work in, I, 176 f., 203 f., 214 f., 218 f., 229 f., II, 154 f.; order of, I, 236 f., 247 f.; laws of, I, 247 f.
- Devil-worship, I, 156, 164, 167, 233, 578.
- Dharma, conception of, I, 235, II, 183.

- Dhâtar, II, 319.
 Diana, origin of worship of, I, 188.
Di Indigetes, I, 178 f., 186.
Di Novensides, I, 186.
Divi famuli, I, 186.
 Divine Being, importance of conception of, I, 59 f., 76 f., 309 f., 431 f., II, 5 f., 7 f.; developed conception of, I, 113, 130 f., 322 f., 353 f., 431 f., 494 f.; as a unity, I, 175, 322 f., 381 f., II, 213 f.; as Universal Life, I, 190, 376 f., 438 f., 444 f., II, 213 f.; pantheistic ideal of, I, 438 f., II, 178, 252 f., 258 f.; perfection of the, II, 213 f.
Djinns, I, 102 (and note).
 Dogma, the religious, I, 487 f., 490, 495 f., 503 f., 506; importance of, I, 503 f.
 Dorman, II, 355.
 Dorner, A., on nature of religion, I, 118, 274, 493, 510, 539 (note); on Protestantism, I, 213; on religious faith, I, 496, 510; and reality of the Ego, II, 341.
 Dorner, J. A., nature of revelation, II, 421.
 Dravidians, religion of the, I, 169, 170 f.
 Dualism, on moral grounds, II, 165 f.
 Dühring, I, 116.
 Durga, worship of, I, 96.
- EARTH, worship of, I, 175, 294 f., 392 f.
 Egypt, Religion of, material for study, I, 33; character of, I, 52, 149, 181 f., 220 f., 224, 365, 392, 463 f., 537; II, 204, 213, 387, 494 f.; morality of, I, 463, II, 204; gods of, II, 213, 387; belief in existence after death, II, 494 f.
 Emerson, I, 55 f., 510.
 En-lil, the god, I, 168.
 Epictetus, his conception of God, I, 467, 474 f., 476, II, 191; and of the problem of evil, II, 172.
- Epistemology, assumptions of, I, 23 f.; relations to philosophy of religion, I, 23 f., 44 f.
 Erman, on religions of Egypt, I, 181 f., 529, 537, II, 494.
 Eskimos, religion of, I, 100, 227.
 Etruscans, religion of, I, 111.
 Eucken, on religious truth, I, 56, 81 (note), 86, 217, 425, II, 156, 390, 456; on irreligious culture, I, 217, II, 456; and virtues of the ancients, I, 340 f.; on problem of evil, II, 156, 169.
 Everett, Prof. C. C., I, 270, 342.
 Evil, the problem of, II, 148 f., 156 f., 160 f., 193 f.; principal kinds of, II, 148; of suffering, II, 149 f.; and of sin, II, 152 f.; "medicinal theory" of, II, 156 f.; as a theodicy, II, 158 f., 193 f.; polytheistic view of, II, 163 f.
 Evolution, theories of, II, 290 f., 330 f.; conflict of, with Theism, II, 292 f., 299 f., 308 f.; anti-theistic, II, 294 f., 296 f.; failure of, II, 301 f.; concept of, as applied to God, II, 308 f.; parallel between bodily and mental, II, 524 f.
 Experience, the Religious, its characteristics, I, 4 f., 24 f., 263 f., 360 f., 406; 493 f., 595 f., 603 f., II, 312, 403 f.; factors of knowledge in, I, 24 f., 298 f., 333 f., 493 f., 360, II, 38 f.; basis of philosophizing, I, 27 f., 279 f., II, 38 f., 312 f.; untrustworthy statistics of, I, 36 (note); as evidence for God, II, 38 f., 311 f.; and for redemption, II, 403 f.
- FAITH, the religious, I, 88 f., 240 f., 288 f., 415 f., 485 f., 492 f., 499 f., II, 240, 306 f., 359 f.; relation of, to dogma, I, 487 f., 490 f.; specific nature of, I, 480, 493 f., 496, 499, II, 23 f., 511; Christian doctrine of, I, 500 f., 502 f.; God as Object of,

- II, 3 f., 21 f., 306 f.; as way of Salvation, I, 559 f.
- Fakirs, I, 67.
- Fate, Greek conception of, II, 356 f.
- Feeling, the religious, I, 269 f., 271 f., 284, 289 f., 292 f., 297 f., 377 f., 439 f.; the so-called "cosmic," I, 275 f., 377; not simply fear, I, 284; the sexual, in religion, I, 293; higher forms of, I, 298 f., 439 f.; the æsthetical, in religion, I, 327 f., 377 f., 439 f.
- Festival, the religious, I, 571 f.
- Fetishism, I, 92; nature of, I, 96 f., 104 f., 124, 233 f., 385, II, 317; combined with higher conceptions, I, 124 f., 385; forms of, I, 223 f.
- Fichte, on nature of religion, I, 117 f.; and the ontological proof, II, 49; nature of life, II, 306.
- Finns, religion of, I, 386.
- Fire, worship of, I, 174 f., 281, 386.
- Fiske, on destiny of man, II, 546 (note).
- Flint, Prof., on proof for Being of God, II, 27, 35 (note), 72; on agnosticism, II, 238; and pantheism, II, 253.
- Fravashis*, II, 485 (note).
- Frazer, J. G., I, 34 (and note), 103, 144 f., 188 (note), 265, II, 130, 203 (note).
- Freedom, nature of the human, I, 334 f., 338, 601 f., II, 156, 157, 349 f.; necessity of, to religious experience, II, 342 f., 344 f.
- Fuegiens, morals and religion of, I, 461.
- Funeral Rites, I, 126.
- GATRY, on the argument for the Being of God, II, 48 (note).
- Gaunilo, on Anselm's argument, II, 46 f.
- Gautama (see Buddha).
- Genius*, worship of, at Rome, I, 402 f.
- Glooskap, II, 212.
- Gnostics, doctrine of, I, 343 f., II, 425 f.
- God (see also Divine Being), conception of, I, 59 f., 132, 206 f., 231 f., 333 f., 349 f., 432 f., 444 f., II, 3 f., 41 f., 53 f., 101 f.; as infinite and absolute, I, 185 f., 265, 333 f., 344 f., 347 f., II, 4 f., 12 f., 53 f., 94, 105 f., 111 f., 122 f.; his Fatherhood, I, 205 f., 245, 247 f., 410, II, 187 f., 191 f., 216, 354; Old-Testament conception of, I, 206 f., II, 186 f.; as righteous, I, 206 f., 333 f., 460 f., 471, II, 177, 204 f.; and a unity, I, 206 f., 231 f., 246 f., 288 f., 310 f., 369 f., II, 68, 143 f., 230, 254 f.; savage conceptions of, I, 224 f., 364 f., II, 314 f., 317; various names for, I, 252, 364 f.; as "Ultimate Reality," I, 309, 357 f., II, 12 f.; and the "Good One," I, 333, II, 179 f., 185 f., 213 f.; as Spirit, I, 349 f., 369 f., 409 f., 493, 511 f., 534, 611 f., II, 12 f., 64, 68, 105 f., 147 f., 213 f., 268 f., 310 f., 345 f., 445 f., 537 f., 546 f., 559 f.; as Ideal-Real, I, 369 f., II, 98 f., 105, 211 f.; and transcendent, I, 432 f., II, 279 f.; importance of conception of, II, 3 f., 8 f., 19 f.; argument for Being of, II, 21 f., 26 f., 32 f., 36 f., 40 f., 45 f., 50 f., 54 f., 66 f., 80 f.; as "First Cause," II, 53 f.; as self-conscious, II, 71 f., 81 f., 90 f., 115 f., 136 f.; metaphysical predicates of, II, 122 f.; as power, II, 123 f., 128, 214, 230; eternity of, II, 130 f., 132 f.; omniscience of, II, 134 f., 137 f., 141 f.; moral attributes of, II, 177-199; holiness of, II, 200 f., 202 f., 210 f.; wisdom of, II, 212 f., 286 f.; perfection of, II, 213 f.; relations of, to the world, II, 222 f., 226 f., 237 f., 247 f., 254 f., 266 f., 276 f., 286 f., 307 f., 363 f.; equal the Supernatural

- II, 265, 278 f., 282 f.; as Creator, II, 314 f., 320, 326 f., 330 f., 337 f.; as "Upholder," II, 335 f.; and Moral Ruler, II, 343-381, 386 f.; perfection of his rule, II, 359 f.; as Providence, II, 373 f.; and Redeemer, II, 382-409; as source and object of revelation, II, 411 f., 419 f., 444 f.
- Goethe, I, 4, 116, 430.
- Gospel, the, its nature, I, 132 (note), 210 f., II, 396 f., 398 f.
- Granger, I, 21.
- Grant, Sir A., II, 504.
- Grasserie, Raoul de la, on classification of religions, I, 162 f.; his theory of "expropriation," I, 324 f.
- Greeks, religion of, I, 177 f., 183 f., 244, 400 f., 465 f., II, 394 f.; naturalistic divinities of, I, 400; democratic influence over, I, 400 f.; ethics and morality of, I, 465 f., 474 f., II, 394 f.
- Gregory, the Great, I, 451.
- Griffis, on ancestor-worship in Japan, I, 172; and unwritten religions, I, 242; on Ku-Sha teaching, 511; and doctrine of evil *Kami*, II, 164.
- Grimm, J., I, 32 f.
- Gruppe, I, 104 f., 140, 177.
- Gûga, worship of, I, 67.
- Guyau, M., I, 16, 82, 115 (note), 276, 591, II, 462 f., 464 f.
- HAECKEL, I, 240, II, 270, 521 f.
- Hamilton, Sir Wm., II, 209 (note).
- Harms, II, 49.
- Harnack, on nature of Christianity, I, 70, 132 (note), 210, 478, 507, 554, II, 188 f., 329, 398, 427, 470, 514; on the work of Paul, I, 212; the asceticism of Jesus, I, 478; on dogma, I, 507; on the Logos-doctrine, II, 329 (note); on the primitive community, II, 405.
- Harris, Prof. S., on a theodicy, II, 159, 192 f.
- Hartmann, von, on nature of modern criticism, I, 71 (note); nature of religious consciousness, I, 138, 283 f., 298, 327 f.
- Hatch, on assumptions of early orthodoxy, I, 71, II, 101 f.; influences of Greek philosophy, I, 212 f., 432 f., 501; early Logos-doctrine, II, 329.
- Heaven, worship of, I, 148, 348 f., 463 f., 549 f., II, 322 f., 357 f., 498; rule of, II, 357 f.
- Hebrews, cosmogony of, II, 317 f., 319 f., 325 f., 333 f.; doctrine of souls among, II, 488 f., 504 f.
- Hegel, on philosophy of religion, I, 8, 56; on nature of religion, I, 118, 510; and proofs for the Being of God, II, 37.
- Henotheism, I, 154 f., 179, 189.
- Herder, I, 8, II, 49.
- Herodotus, I, 30.
- Hesiod, I, 387.
- Hillel, I, 208, 475.
- Hindûism, its metaphysics, I, 77, 180 f., 381 f., 543 f., II, 319; its *jumble* of religions, I, 94, 180, 574 f., II, 391 f. (note); and schools of philosophy, I, 180 f.; its ritual, I, 294 f.; its emotionalism, I, 381; and bondage to tradition, I, 461 f.; its doctrine of salvation, I, 543 f., II, 391; cosmogony of, II, 319.
- Höfding, on nature of religion, I, 274 f., 498; validity of faith, I, 498.
- Hoernes, on palæolithic man, I, 126 (note).
- Holiness, early conceptions of, I, 233 f., II, 200 f.; not passionless, II, 207 f.; God as the All-Holy, II, 204 f. (note), 211.
- Honovar*, Persian conception of, II, 428.
- Hooker, Dr., I, 123 f.
- Hopkins, on religion of Dravidians, I, 169; and of the Vedas, I, 242, 401, 544, II, 183; on the pantheism

- of the Upanishads, II, 120, 323; Vedic conception of Right, II, 183; on the Hindū cosmogony, II, 319, 323; on Nirvāna, II, 393.
- Howard, I, 156.
- Howison, II, 12 f., 40.
- Howitt, I, 145.
- Hozumi, Prof. N., on ancestor-worship in Japan, I, 173, 403, 571.
- Huacas, II, 265.
- Humboldt, I, 282.
- IDEAL, the, of religion, I, 26, 74 f., 129 f., 257 f., 351 f., 443 f., II, 211 f., 559 f., 562 f., 565 f., 567; the moral, I, 76 f., 258 f.; the social, II, 557 f., 561 f.
- Idol, the, forms of, I, 155 f.; origin of, I, 155 f.
- Imagination, use of, in religion, I, 93 f., 315 f., 367, 436 f., 448 f.; and in art, I, 436 f.
- Incantation, nature of, I, 267, 517 f., II, 423; relation of, to prayer, I, 517 f.
- India, religions of, I, 28, 31, 58 f., 94, 182 f., 401, 518 f., II, 201 f.; their motley character, I, 182 f.; conception of worship, I, 518 f., II, 201 f.; and of purity, II, 201 f.
- Individual, the, reality of, I, 594 f., II, 543 f.; religion, as related to, I, 595 f., 598 f., 602 f.; experience of, I, 600 f., 604 f.; immortality of, II, 479 f., 503 f., 510 f., 516 f., 520 f.; physical development of, II, 522 f.; value of, II, 543 f.
- Indra, worship of, I, 58, 519 f., II, 183; as destroyer of Nāga, I, 101.
- Infinite, the, conception of, in religion, I, 153 f., II, 108 f.; as applied to Deity, II, 107 f., 111 f.; as negative notion, II, 109 f.
- Inspiration, as distinguished from revelation, II, 422 f.; the Christian, II, 421, 431 f.; a personal affair, II, 422 f.; through ecstasy, II, 424; post-Reformation doctrine of, II, 429 (note); Hindū doctrine of, II, 430.
- Instinct, influence in religion, I, 279 f.
- Ishtar, worship of, I, 162, 467.
- Islam, its claim to universality, I, 130 f., 199 f., 550 f., II, 472 f.; its characteristics, I, 199 f., 201 f., 217, 235, 406, 550 f., II, 472 f.; attitude toward civilization, I, 215 f., 397 f.; conception of Allah, I, 406, 582 f., II, 85, 124; church of, I, 581 f.
- JACOBI, I, 510.
- Jainism, as a reform, I, 159, II, 392; its doctrine of salvation, II, 392.
- James, Prof. Wm., II, 527 (note), 534 (note).
- Japan, ancestor-worship in, I, 149, 172, 403, 571; influence of Buddhism in, I, 396, 492, 578, II, 393; sects in, I, 492; the Ku-Sha teaching, I, 511; and that of Shinran, II, 394.
- Jastrow, Morris, on study of religion, I, 8 (note), 218, 239, 456; on religion of Babylonia and Assyria, I, 68, 90 (note), 234, 287, 396, 399, 421, 447 f., 518, 573, II, 318, 498; on Judaism, I, 206; on founders of religion, I, 229 f. (note); religion and morality, I, 456, 471.
- Jehovah (see Yahweh).
- Jesus, his attitude toward Judaism, I, 209 f., 407, 529 f., 536, 556 f., II, 396 f.; Gospel of, I, 210 f., 407 f., 432, 501 f., 554 f., II, 187 f., 396 f.; personal influence of, I, 228 f., II, 400 f.; as Founder of Christianity, I, 407 f., 546, 554 f., II, 187 f., 425 f.; doctrine of his sonship, I, 431 f.; II, 187 f., 397, 400; asceticism of, I, 478; faith in, I, 501 f., 530, II, 400 f.; his doctrine

- of prayer, I, 536, 538 f.; and self-sacrifice, I, 558 f.; of God as Father, II, 187 f., 282 f., 425 f.; view of nature, II, 282 f.; as Redeemer, II, 396 f.; and "son of man," II, 397 (note); death of, II, 399 f.; as special Divine revelation, II, 425 f., 442; miracles of, II, 442 f.; views of the future, II, 509 f., 511 f., 564; his doctrine of "the Kingdom," II, 564 f.
- Jevons, on origin of religion, I, 143, 155 f.; and nature of cult, I, 517, 521 (note); on savage logic, II, 266.
- Judaism, an historical religion, I, 63 f., 204 f., 558, II, 469 f.; its exclusiveness, I, 82, 208, 407; development of, I, 204 f., 407 f., II, 469 f.; characteristic tenets of, I, 206 f., 209, 247 f., 295 f., 473 f., 538; its conception of God, I, 295 f., 407, 473 f., 500 f., 558, II, 8 f., 177 f., 204 f., 469 f.; as religious faith, I, 500, 558 f.; its "Priestly Code," I, 524, 534; as doctrine of salvation, I, 558, II, 395 f.; "churchifying of," I, 584 f.; eschatology of, II, 505 f., 507, 509 f.
- June, I, 188 f.
- Jupiter, I, 187 f.
- Ka*, conception of, 485 (note), 495 f.
- Kami*, conception of, II, 6, 164, 265.
- Kami-no-Michi* (see *Shintō*).
- Kafir, logic of, II, 266.
- Kaftan, II, 209.
- Kamschatka, religion of, I, 112, II, 224.
- Kant, on nature of religion, I, 115, 142, 303 f., 442, 486; his conception of reason, I, 303 f., II, 34; on argument for Being of God, I, 309 f., II, 33 f., 46 f., 48 f., 54 f., 63, 100; feeling of the sublime, I, 327 f., 440, II, 93; on faith and knowledge, I, 367, 487 f., II, 23 f., 240 f.; the ends of life, I, 486 f., II, 453 f.; on value of personality, II, 533; his argument for immortality, II, 535, 542.
- Karma, doctrine of, I, 285, 472, 547 f., II, 50, 168 f., 386, 492 f., 500.
- Keary, Mr., I, 300, 388 f.
- Khonds, legends of, I, 385; prayer of, I, 532.
- Kingdom of God, conception of, I, 410, 585, II, 427 f., 551 f., 553, 559 f., 563 f.; Jewish hope of, II, 551, 553; Christian view of, II, 551 f., 559 f., 563 f., 565 f.; not identical with the Church, II, 552 f., 560 f.
- Kitchen-Middens, I, 126 (note).
- Klostermann, II, 205 f.
- Knowledge, character of the religious, I, 24 f., 426 f., II, 22 f., 36, 100, 141 f., 242 f.
- Kojiki*, I, 173, 520, 531, II, 201, 319.
- Koran, I, 232, 469, II, 129, 132, 135, 143.
- Krishna, I, 294 f., 467.
- Kuan Yin (see *Kwannon*).
- Kuenen, II, 202 f., 206.
- Kwannon, worship of, I, 164, 253.
- LANG, ANDREW, on origin of religion, I, 153 (note), 223 (note), 226; on belief in "creator gods," I, 226; and relation of morality and religion, I, 461.
- Lares*, the, I, 187, 393.
- Law, Wm., I, 272.
- Law, the, Jesus' attitude toward, I, 209 f.; Judaism's conception of, I, 209, 407; the Levitical, I, 526.
- Laws, in development of religion, I, 247 f.; in nature, II, 54 f., 57 f., 161 f., 311 f., 435 f., 439.
- Lea, H. C., I, 468.
- Le Conte, Prof., II, 279.
- Legge, on fetishism in China, I, 97; on Confucianism, I, 194; and *Táoism*, II, 498 (note).

- Leibnitz, II, 14, 49.
 Lepchas, I, 124.
 Lessing, I, 8 (note).
 Levens, R., I., 343.
 Li-ceremonial, I, 515.
 Lindsay, II, 54.
Lingam, worship of, I, 155, 162, 294, II, 6.
 Lippert, on nature of religion, I, 147.
 Livingstone, David, on religious beliefs of Africa, I, 127.
 Locke, on argument for Being of God, II, 35.
 Logos, doctrine of, I, 431 f., II, 191 f.; the Greek, II, 191 f.; the Christian, II, 327 f. (note), 328 f.
 Longinus, I, 441.
 Lotze, on relations of theology and science, I, 422; on personality of God, II, 87 f., 244 f.; and Divine relations to the world, II, 224 f.
 Lubbock, Sir John, claims religion, not universal, I, 121 (note), II, 316.
- Maāt*, the two-fold, II, 204.
 Magic, as religion, I, 103 f., 153 f., II, 416; impulses of, I, 208.
Maha-jana, II, 253 (note)
Mahā-Vagga, I, 576 f.
 Malloek, I, 363 f.
- Man, a religious being, I, 3 f., 12 f., 25, 133 f., 138 f., 215 f., 262 f., 323 f., 346 f., II, 306 f., 339, 383 f., 411 f., 566 f.; spiritual unity of, I, 20, 25, 134 f., 215, II, 558 f.; as differenced from lower animals, I, 20, 138 f., 324 f.; palæolithic, I, 126 (note), 240; as "maker of religion," I, 262 f., 346 f., II, 383 f., 411 f.; as rational, I, 324 f., 333 f.; self-determining, I, 333 f., 338 f., II, 339 f.; in "the divine image," I, 345-371, 339 f.; his place in nature, II, 306 f.; need of redemption, II, 383 f., 385 f., 386 f.; as subject of revelation, II, 411 f., 424 f.; dual existence of, II, 483 f., 520 f.; animal nature of, II, 520 f.; future of the race of, II, 550-565.
- Manichæism, II, 166.
 Manito, I, 101, 316, II, 317.
 Marcion, I, 170.
 Marcus Aurelius, II, 191.
 Marduk, the god, I, 52, 168, 220, 287, 531, 533, II, 183, 318 f.
 Mariner, II, 180.
 Martin, Dr., on religions of China, I, 164, 172 f., II, 78, 376, 497.
 Martineau, I, 115, 159.
 Maxwell, Clerk, on nature of atoms, II, 78 f., 297.
 Mâyâ, I, 359, II, 167 f., 337.
 Meadows, Dr., I, 464.
 Mechanism, as theory of origin, II, 243 f., 247 f., 250 f.; in modern science, II, 245 f., 434 f.
 Mediator, conception of, II, 388 f.
 Megasthenes, on religion of India, II, 501.
 Menant, on Zoroastrianism, II, 320 f.
 Mencius, I, 532.
 Mercury, I, 280.
 Merz, I, 17.
 Metaphysics, in religious experience, I, 23 f., 47, 274; necessary to religion, I, 47 f., 274 f., 309, 354 f.; the Hindū, I, 77.
 Mexicans, religion of the, I, 386.
 Mexico (and Peru), religions of, I, 20 f., 127 f., 149, 457 f.
 Meyer, H. A. W., II, 425 (note).
 Mill, J. S., I, 116.
 Miracles, present objections to, II, 432 f., 437 f.; Old-Testament conception of, II, 433 f.; not violation of law, II, 435 f., 441 f.; of Jesus, II, 436 f., 442 f.
 Mithras, worship of, in Rome, I, 189, 254.
 Monism, philosophical, as a religious doctrine, I, 27 f., 204, 438 f.; ethical, I, 333 f., II, 166 f.
 Monotheism, Hebrews did not origi-

- nate, I, 206; early advances toward I, 224 f.
- Montefiore, II, 205.
- Morality, ideal of, I, 76 f.; relation of, to religion, I, 59, 78, 89, 116 f., 454 f., 457 f., 460 f., 466 f., 480 f., II, 353 f.; "double code" of, I, 476 f.; involves personality, II, 353 f.; of natural law, II, 360 f.
- Morris, Mr. Wm., I, 451.
- Mosaism, I, 205 f.
- Müller, Max, on savage religions, I, 106; and primitive man, I, 136, 148; origin of religion, I, 148, 153 f., 275 (note), II, 65.
- Müller, Otfried, I, 111.
- Muhammad, as a prophet, I, 200, 581, II, 416 f.; his doctrine of salvation, I, 550 f.; as founder of a church, I, 581 f.; inspiration of, II, 416 f., 428.
- Muhammadism (see Islam).
- Mungan-ngaur, belief in, I, 145.
- Mura Mura, the "rain-givers," I, 145.
- Mysticism, I, 344, 381.
- Myth, the, in religion, I, 145 f., 456 f.
- Mythology, not same as religion, I, 146 f.
- NĀGA, worship of, I, 79, 101.
- Nassau, on fetishism in Africa, II, 317, 488.
- Nature, religious conception of, I, 230, 355 f., 383 f., II, 269 f., 273 f., 276 f., 284 f., 362 f., 418 f.; scientific conception of, I, 355 f., II, 269 f., 271 f., 283, 292, 294 f., 301 f., 434 f., 438 f.; influence of, on man, I, 375 f., 377 f., 383 f., II, 360 f.; Unity of, I, 384, II, 72, 230, 246; distinguished from the Supernatural, II, 264-289; moral elements in, II, 360 f., 418 f.; revelation in, II, 418 f.
- Nature-worship, mystery in, I, 16 f., 230, 383 f.; extension of, I, 173 f., 394 f.; elevation of, I, 394 f.
- Navajos, religion of, I, 100, 532, II, 224, 488.
- Naville, M., II, 210 (note).
- Ndengei, the god, I, 226.
- Nebuchadnezzar I, religious character of, I, 52, 287, 574.
- Neo-Platonism, its views of the Absolute, I, 6; influence upon Christianity, I, 213, 256.
- Newton, Sir Isaac, II, 145 (note).
- Nichols, E. L., II, 76 (note).
- Nirvāna, II, 168, 169, 391, 392 (note), 493, 496, 499, 500.
- Nitzsch, C. I., I, 137.
- Njambi, the god, II, 317.
- Novalis, I, 284.
- OAKESMITH, II, 42, 103, 428.
- Old Testament, as revelation, I, 210, II, 431 f.; attitude of Jesus toward, I, 210 f.; views of, on inspiration, II, 423 f., 431 f.; and miracle, II, 433 f., 436 f.
- "Ontological Consciousness," I, 47, 309 f., 311 f., 332 f., 351, 358 f., 493 f., II, 484 f., 487.
- Ophiology (see Serpent, worship of).
- Orelli, on classification of religions, I, 162 f. (note); and conception of civilization, I, 215.
- Osiris, I, 179, 181, 392, II, 124, 394 f., 496 f.
- "Other-Soul," belief in, I, 89 f.
- "Over-Soul," belief in, I, 89 f.
- Owen, I, 57.
- PANPSYCHISM, I, 438 f.
- Pantheism, that of India, I, 183, 380 f., 438 f., II, 178, 236, 252 f.; its conception of God, I, 438 f., II, 178, 252 f., 258 f.; as theory of origins, II, 251 f.; identifies God and the World, II, 252 f., 256 f., 258 f.; criticism of, II, 256 f.
- Paradise, early pictures of, I, 146.
- Parsis, their worship of fire, I, 175.
- Pascal, I, 327, II, 68 (note).

- Paul, his influence on Christianity, I, 211 f., 587 f., II, 189 f., 369 f., 547; founder of the Church, I, 587 f.; theology of, II, 189; doctrine of spiritual development, II, 369 f., 509; and of revelation, II, 417 f., 427; eschatology of, II, 509, 512 f., 547.
- Personality, conception of, in religion, I, 154 f., 362 f., 443 f., II, 259 f., 346 f., 354 f.; the religious Ideal, I, 353 f., 443 f., II, 87 f., 259 f., 346 f.; relations of, between Divine and human, II, 344 f.
- Personification, process of, I, 238 f., 352 f., 354 f., 362 f., 386.
- Peru (see Mexico and Peru).
- Peschel, I, 299.
- Petronius, I, 284.
- Pfleiderer, on nature of religion, I, 111 f., 118, 151, II, 49 f.; and its origin, I, 151; on religious cult, I, 516; and the ontological argument, II, 49 f.; the moral argument, II, 62 f.; the Divine predicates, II, 97 (note), 128; on Zoroastrianism, II, 165; and Paul, II, 369 f.
- Phallus*, worship of, I, 155 (see also *Lingam*).
- Philo, his Logos-doctrine, I, 433 (note), II, 27 f., 191 f.; his doctrine of faith, I, 502 f.; and conception of God, II, 27, 191 f.
- Philosophy, nature of, I, 4 f., 21 f., 43 f., 61 f., 607 f., II, 213 f.; method of, I, 6 f.; need of, I, 12 f., 65 f., 428 f., 607 f., II, 213 f.; temper of, I, 22 f.; a "Mystagogue" to theology, I, 43, 429; relation of, to religion, I, 428 f., 607 f., II, 213 f.
- Physicus, II, 295 f., 297.
- Pistis Sophia*, I, 506 (note), 120.
- Pitris*, worship of, I, 172, II, 485.
- Plato, on the gods of mythology, I, 316, 466; on the teleological argument, I, 55; and nature and destiny of the soul, II, 503 f.
- Plotinus, I, 445 (note), II, 28 f.
- Plutarch, attempt of, to construct a philosophy of religion, I, 42 f., 430, II, 42 f.; on the mysteries, I, 524; and demonology, II, 42 f., 190; on the conception of God, II, 103 f., 184, 190, 387; doctrine of creation, II, 320; on immortality, II, 541.
- Pluvius, prayer to, I, 285.
- Powell, Baden, II, 58 f.
- Prayer, as form of cult, I, 512 f., 516 f., 530 f., II, 377 f.; universality of, I, 516 f.; Christian practice of, I, 530 f.; theory of, II, 377 f.
- Preiss, on classification of religions, I, 161 f.; on primitive man, I, 241; on Chinese religions, II, 322.
- Priesthood, influence of, I, 404 f.; legislation of Jewish, I, 407.
- "Primitive Man," our ignorance of, I, 134 f., 137, 391 f.
- Prophetism, in Israel, I, 207 f.
- Prophets, the Hebrew, work of, I, 63 f., 206 f., 208, 220, 534 f.; inspiration of, II, 424 f.
- Providence, Jesus' view of, II, 282 f.; doctrine of, II, 373 f., 379 f., 417; general and especial, II, 374.
- Prussians, worship of the dead among, I, 170 f.
- Psychology, relation of, to philosophy of religion, I, 12 f., 18 f., 21, 55, 60, 261 f., 275 f.; tests furnished by, I, 60, 125 f.
- Ptah, I, 155; maxims of, I, 463.
- Pünjer, I, 7.
- Puluga, I, 226.
- QUATREFAGES, on universality of religion, I, 124.
- Rā, the god, I, 52, 149, 181, 532, II, 73 f., 375.
- "Race-culture," conception of, I, 215 f., II, 456 f., 459 f., 467 f.
- Rainmakers, I, 103.

- Rameses II, religion of, I, 52, 533, II, 375, 486.
- Rationality, as final test of religion, I, 73 f., 80, 274 f., 303 f., 312 f., 320 f.; of the savage man, I, 305, 310; analysis of the human, I, 305 f., 309 f., 312, 324 f., 330 f.; divine nature of, I, 346 f., 356 f.; of belief in God, II, 43 f., 50, 74 f.
- Rationalism, I, 351.
- Reality, religion a theory of, I, 18, 73 f., 115, 274 f., 350 f., 357, II, 70, 568 f.; man a believer in, I, 47, 274 f., 308 f., 357 f.; Ideal of, I, 73 f., 115 f., 350 f., II, 568 f.; of the Object of religion, I, 307 f., II, 568 f.
- Reason, conception of, I, 40 f., 43 f., 54 f., 303 f., II, 28 f., 358 f.; according to Kant, I, 303 f.; appeal to, by Plutarch, I, 43; God, as the Universal, II, 28, 358 f.
- Redskins, theriolatry among, I, 100 f., 170; regarded as not human, I, 123; belief of, in "creator gods," I, 226 f.
- Religion, nature of, I, 3 f., 11 f., 15 f., 18, 24 f., 35 f., 39, 57 f., 60, 85 f., 93 f., 103 f., 110 f., 114 f., 125 f., 269 f., 274 f., 319 f., 411 f., 594 f., II, 383 f., 410 f., 412 f., 444, 461 f., 566 f.; origin of, I, 19 f., 86 f., 133 f., 142, 150 f., 261 f., 269 f., 274 f., 281 f., 346 f., II, 411 f., rationality of, I, 40 f., 54 f., 73 f., 274 f.; meaning of word, I, 87; definition of, I, 89; as "unreflecting spiritism," I, 89 f., 103 f., 110 f., not same as magic, I, 103 f.; development of, I, 112 f., 158 f.; 190 f., 203-258, II, 412, 454 f.; as doctrine of Divine Being, I, 113; universality of, I, 120 f., 125 f.; characteristics of, fitted to survive, I, 129 f., 159 f., II, 454 f.; cause of the differentiation of, I, 159 f., 165 f., 185 f.; founders of, I, 229 f.; impulsive sources of, I, 278 f.; rational sources of, I, 305 f.; as belief in the supernatural, I, 319; ethical elements in, I, 326 f., 369, 456 f.; physical environment of, I, 372 f., 377 f.; relation of, to science, I, 412 f., 419 f., 423 f.; and to art, I, 435-453; and to morality, I, 455 f.; the cult of, I, 512 f.; individuality of, I, 594 f.; as doctrine of salvation, II, 383 f.; and as revelation, II, 410 f., 445 f.; as "psychic uplift," II, 443 f., 467 f.; future of, II, 453 f., 462 f., 465 f.
- Religion, Philosophy of, its nature, I, 3 f., 7 f., 27 f., 607 f.; as criterion in religion, I, 110 f.; relation to different sciences, I, 12 f., 17 f., 22; its method, I, 3 f., 7 f., 10 f., 13 f., 17-28, 62 f., 607 f.; is psychological, 19 f.; epistemological assumptions of, I, 23 f., 607 f.; basis in racial experience, I, 27 f., 66 f.; difficulties of, I, 29 f., 35 f., 42 f., 121 f.; conditions of success in, I, 46; value of, I, 46 f., 65 f.; standard of values in, I, 51 f.
- Religion, Science of, I, 10 f., 42 f.; possibility of, I, 10 f., 42; a psychological study, I, 11 f., 18, 21; early mistakes in, I, 30 f., 35 f.; recent advances in, I, 31 f.
- Religions, variety of, I, 88, 157 f., II, 355 f.; so-called world-religions, I, 128 f.; differentiation of, I, 158 f., 165 f., 185 f.; classification of, I, 161 f., II, 355 f.; amalgamation of, I, 166 f.; syncretism in, I, 166 f., 179 f.; theocratic and theanthropic, II, 355 f.; of salvation, II, 382 f., 389 f.
- Renan, M., I, 530 f.
- Renouf, M., on religion of ancient Egypt, I, 33, 155, 224, 392, 463, II, 73, 320.
- Resurrection, Jewish belief in, II, 507 f., 509 f.; Paul's doctrine of, II, 512 f., 548 f.

- Revelation, as origin of religion, I, 153 f., 432, II, 410 f., 413 f., 415 f., 426 f., 442 f., 445 f.; early Christian belief in, I, 432 f.; source of, II, 411; subject of, II, 411 f.; conditions of, II, 412 f.; psychology of, II, 415 f., 442 f.; means of, II, 416 f.; Christianity as, II, 425 f., 442; by miracle, II, 432 f., 442 f.; *modus operandi* of, II, 442 f.; epochs of, II, 443 f.
- Réville, M., on religions of Mexico and Peru, I, 20 f., 127 f., 227 (note), 457 f., 520; on science of religion, I, 42 (note); universality of religion, I, 125, II, 32; and religious cult, I, 520.
- Ri, Chinese conception of, II, 28.
- Richet, M., on *rapport*, I, 266.
- Rohde, on soul-cult among the Greeks, II, 480; and dual existence, II, 489 (note), 501 f.; on Eleusinian mysteries, II, 502 f. (note); and Greek doctrine of immortality, II, 503 f.
- Romanes, I, 418 (note).
- Romans, worship of, I, 174 f., 186 f. (note), 392 f., 402, 517, 522 f.; list of gods of, I, 186 f., 394 f.; mental characteristics of, I, 186 f.; later phase of their religion, I, 189 f., 401 f.
- Roskoff, on fetishism, I, 96; on magic, I, 104; on universality of religion, I, 122 (note), 124 f., 279; and religious consciousness, I, 279, II, 52 f.
- Roth, I, 264.
- Rougé, M., I, 224.
- Royce, Prof., I, 281, 496, 597, II, 80, 134, 222, 481.
- SABATIER, on characteristics of the age, I, 50, 479; on the word "religion," I, 87; and its nature, I, 116, 125, 236 f., 272; classification of religions, I, 163; on influence of Jesus, I, 229 (note); on the formation of the religious community, I, 564; and belief in God, II, 39, 284; and ministry of pain, II, 152.
- Sacrifice, as form of cult, I, 511 f., 519 f., 523 f.; origin of, I, 519 f.; bloody, I, 522 f., 524 f.; connection of, with mysteries, I, 523 f.; of the "Priestly Code," I, 524; value of, I, 523 f., 538 f.; early Jewish, I, 526 f., 534.
- Sākya-Muni, not a founder of new religion, I, 106 f.; his ethical teaching, I, 473 f.
- San-Pão, II, 141 (note).
- Santāls, I, 227.
- Sarkar, Kishori Lal, I, 77, 246, 381.
- Saussaye, De la, on religion of the Teutons, I, 146, 190 f., 480 f., II, 184; on origin of religion, I, 151; and its classification, I, 161; on cult, I, 513.
- Savage, the religious experience of, I, 35 f., 106, 122 f., 137 f., 156 f., 277 f., 205, 391 f., 461; shyness of, in religious matters, I, 122 f.; our knowledge of, I, 134 f.; conception of spirit, I, 156 f., II, 383; belief of, in "creator gods," I, 225 f.; rationality of, I, 305 f., II, 266 f.; ethics of the, I, 461, II, 180; logic of, II, 265 f.
- Sayce, I, 154.
- Sbok, the god, I, 181 f.
- Schleiermacher, on nature of religion, I, 116 (note), 269.
- Schmid, on Jesus' views of the future, II, 511 f.
- Schopenhauer, his conception of religion, I, 117, 279; on argument for Being of God, II, 40; and belief in immortality, II, 487.
- Schultz, D. H., on Judaism, I, 82, 207; origin of religion, I, 379 f.; religious faith, I, 496, II, 39 f., 63, 410; on pessimism, II, 386.
- Schurman, on argument for Being of God, II, 19 f., 35, 110.

- Science, anthropomorphizing necessary in, I, 321 f.; aims and ideals of, I, 412 f.; methods of, I, 413 f.; influence of, on religious development, I, 423 f.; restrictions of, II, 448 f.
- Scotus, Erigena, I, 344, 446.
- Self, the Absolute, I, 253 f., 263 f., 265, 333 f., 344 f., 347 f., 595, II, 13 f., 81 f., 91 f., 139 f., 143 f., 259 f., 345 f.; the so-called "subliminal," I, 266 f., 345; man, as self-determining, I, 333 f., II, 341 f., 349 f.; the individual, I, 341 f., 353 f., 595 f., 603 f., II, 482 f., 484 f., 490, 528 f.; the so-called "social," II, 353 f.; immortality of the, II, 481 f., 490 f., 510 f., 518 f., 528 f., 538 f.; actuality of, II, 536 f., 544 f.; value of the, II, 544 f.
- Selfhood, knowledge of, I, 16 f., II, 341 f.; developing conception of, I, 112 f., 232 f., 253 f., 362 f., 366, 598 f., II, 533 f.; the gods as having, I, 177 f., 232 f., 598; ideal of, II, 533 f.; Greek estimate of, II, 543 f.
- Semites, religion of the early, I, 141, 204 f., 219, II, 182, 395 f.; general characters of, I, 204 f., 219 f.
- Seneca, I, 430, II, 190 f.
- Serpent, worship of, I, 79 f., 100, 170, 268, 402, 519.
- Shamanism, I, 92; nature of, I, 95 f., 385, 405.
- Shamash, I, 287, II, 135, 182.
- Shang Ti, I, 193 f., 224, 386, 393, 533, 549 f., II, 177, 233, 357.
- Shêng Jên, II, 429.
- Sheol (and Shuâlu), II, 494, 499, 504.
- Shinran, I, 394.
- Shintô, I, 164, 173, 385, 520, II, 164, 200, 201; cosmogony of, II, 319.
- Shiu-Ki, I, 172.
- Shiva, II, 323 f.
- Shiwaiism, I, 295.
- Shrâddha, I, 171.
- Shushi, his doctrine of creative Reason, II, 321.
- Sin, consciousness of, I, 60 f., 233 f., 470, II, 152 f., 384; committed against God, I, 470 f., II, 152 f., 384; as evil, II, 152 f.; the theocratic form of conscience, II, 384.
- Smend, on the worship of Israel, I, 526, 527; sacrifice among the Arabs, I, 534; on eschatology of Judaism, II, 505 f., 507.
- Smith, Arthur H., on Chinese religion, I, 173 (note); and morality, I, 464.
- Smith, W. Robertson, on nature of *tabu*, I, 37; religion among the Semites, I, 141, 204 f., 455, 525; and Greeks, I, 400; on creeds, I, 490.
- Sociology, relation of, to study of religion, I, 15 f., 276 f.
- Soma*-plant, worship of, I, 58, 101 f.
- Sorcerer, different examples of, I, 104.
- Soul, conception of, in all things, I, 103 f., 111 f., 147 f., 177 f., II, 488, 500 f.; the World-Soul, I, 147 f., 183, 326 f., II, 501 f.; importance of, in religion, I, 232 f.; existence of, after death, II, 479 f., 484 f., 493 f., 516 f.; immortality of the, II, 481 f., 487 f., 490 f., 500 f., 518 f., 542 f.; reality of, II, 482 f.; number of souls, II, 488 f., 501 f.; transmigration of the, II, 492 (note), 496 f.; Greek conception of, II, 500 f., 542 f.; Platonic philosophy of, II, 503; separability of, from the body, II, 516 f., 518 f.; arguments against, II, 519 f., 526 f.; and for, II, 528 f., 531 f., 540 f.
- Spencer and Gillen, on totemism in Australia, I, 99; religion of tribes of Australia, I, 136, 145.
- Spencer, Herbert, on origin of religion, I, 148; God as infinite, II, 53, 228 f.; on ethical man II, 99 f.

- Spinoza, I, 5, 286; on nature of substance, II, 261 f.
- Spirit, conception of, in religion, I, 157, 349, II, 69 f.; God as, I, 349 f., 409 f., II, 69 f., 105 f., 403; spirituality, struggle for, II, 385 f.
- Spiritism, religion as "unreflecting," I, 89 f., 92 f., 104 f., 112 f., 137, 142 f., 220 f., 370, II, 122, 479.
- Starbuck, I, 276 f. (note), 292 (note), 342 (note), II, 14.
- Steinen, von den, I, 480.
- Steinmeyer, on miracles, II, 436.
- Stones, worship of, I, 101 f., 104; as fetishes, 104 f.
- Strauss, II, 259.
- Sun, worship of, I, 149, 164, 227 (note), II, 7.
- Supernatural, The, conception of, necessary to religion, I, 39 f., II, 264 f., 272 f., 276 f.; relations of, to the natural, II, 264 f., 272 f., 282 f.
- Symbolofideismus*, I, 511.
- Syncretism, nature of, in religion, I, 166 f., 179 f., II, 16.
- Tabu*, nature of, I, 37 f., 139, 324, 565.
- Tangaloa, the god, II, 316 f.
- Tãoism, as form of Spiritism, I, 104, 282, 384, 541, II, 488; asceticism of, I, 397, 541; its doctrine of salvation, I, 541; and of souls, II, 488, 498.
- Tellus, cult of, I, 392 f.
- Tengere Kaira Kan, I, 385.
- Tertullian, I, 56 (note).
- Teutons, religion of, I, 146, 190 f., 192 f., 389, 480 f., II, 184; principal gods of, I, 190 f.; influence of Christianity on morals of, I, 480 f., II, 184.
- Theism, mystical forms of, I, 381; its doctrine of God as Ethical Spirit, I, 473 f., 610 f., II, 64 f., 147 f.; arguments for, II, 45 f. (note), 82 f., 221 f., 294 f.; position of, II, 221 f., 230 f.; doctrine of God and the World, II, 221 f., 252 f., 258 f., 262 f., 307 f.; conflict of, with theory of evolution, II, 291 f., 294 f., 299 f., 308 f.
- Theodicy, problem of, II, 158 f., 169 f., 193 f.; the Christian, II, 170 f., 193 f., 215.
- Theology, relation of, to science, I, 421 f., II, 231 f.; and to philosophy, I, 429 f.; the so-called "natural," II, 231 f., 418 f.
- Theriolatry, I, 93 f., 99 f., 101 f., 181.
- Thiasi*, the, I, 400.
- Thibet, religion of, I, 578.
- Thing, conception of, I, 367 f., II, 269 f.
- Thompson, R. C., on evil spirits of Babylonia, II, 423.
- Thurn, Im, I, 226.
- Tiāmat, Babylonian conception, II, 318.
- Tiele, on science of religion, I, 11 f., II, 355 f.; on animism, I, 90 (note); on fetishism, I, 97 (note); on universality of religion, I, 125; and its cult, I, 516; on the religious community, I, 564; the conception of God, II, 5, 72, 203, 284; and problem of evil, II, 163; theanthropic religion, II, 355; religion as revelation, II, 413.
- T'ien, worship of, I, 193 f., 386, II, 233 (see also Shang Ti).
- Tigert, on conception of the infinite, II, 109 (note).
- Totemism, I, 92; nature of, I, 97 f., 143 f., 365, 385; among Redskins, I, 98 f.; not the original religion, I, 143 f., 155 f.
- Toy, Prof., on sacrifice, I, 228.
- Trees, worship of, I, 101 f., 104, 141.
- Trinity, of gods among Saxons, I, 191; and Hindūs, II, 323 f.
- Tulsi, the plant, worship of, I, 102, 381.

- Tylor, I, 49; analysis of religious consciousness, I, 266.
- UEBERWEG, on the ontological argument, II, 47 f.
- Uitzilopochtli, I, 297, 458.
- "Unconscious," the, a negative conception, I, 267, II, 60, 94 f.
- Upanishads, the, I, 197, 222, 544, 545, II, 120, 167, 252 f., 492.
- "Unknowable," the, conception of, I, 351, 416 f., II, 24 f., 110 f., 222, 347.
- VALENTINUS, II, 170.
- Value-judgments, place of, in religion, I, 51, 54 f., 61 f., 80 f., 336 f.; philosophy deals with, I, 61 f.
- Vedanta, philosophy of, II, 260.
- Vedas, writings of, I, 222, 242 f., 401, 438 f., II, 260, 430 f.
- Vernes, M., I, 243.
- Vignoli, Prof., on primitive society, I, 399.
- Virgin, the, worship of, I, 164 f.
- Vishnu, II, 323 f.
- Voltaire, I, 142, II, 19, 154.
- WAITZ, on man's spiritual unity, I, 20; on fetish-worship, I, 96, 154; and primitive man, I, 135, 152, 154 (note), 241 f.; early monotheism, I, 225; influence of religion on civilization, I, 405 f., 455; on religion and morality, I, 455; on prayer, I, 516; and religion of the Redskins, II, 317.
- Waitz and Gerland (see Waitz).
- Ward, Wilfrid, on mission of the Church, II, 458.
- Watson, Prof., I, 206, 271, II, 34.
- Way of Salvation, religion a doctrine of, I, 60 f., 197, 485 f., 540 f., 559 f., 561 f.; Buddhistic doctrine of, I, 197, 472 f., 546 f.; by faith, I, 485 f., 552 f.; Dionysiac doctrine of, I, 543; Chinese view of, I, 549 f.; the Christian, I, 552 f., 554 f., II, 174 f.
- Weismann, II, 61.
- Wellhausen, II, 158.
- Wernle, I, 588 (note), II, 511, 547.
- "Wheel of Existence," the, I, 546 f.
- Wheeler, B. I., on religion among Greeks, I, 178, 183 (note); on Eleusinian mysteries, II, 502.
- Wiedemann, on religion of ancient Egypt, I, 94, 181, II, 495 f.
- Will, the human, I, 333 f., 338, 601 f., II, 156 f., 349 f.; the Divine, I, 334 f., II, 75, 125 f., 150 f., 206, 217 f., 349 f.; World-Ground as, II, 75 f., 91 f., 125.
- Williams, Sir Monier, on religions of India, I, 94, 171, 461 f., 574; on Brāhmanism, I, 108.
- Wilson, J. Leighton, I, 127.
- Wissowa, on religion of the Romans, I, 186 f. (note), 190, 280, 394 f., 523.
- Wōdan, I, 190 f.
- World, unity of, I, 112, II, 72, 230, 246; philosophical conception of, II, 222 f., 303 f.; scientific theory of, II, 330 f., 447 f.; different conceptions of, II, 446 f.
- "World-Ground," conception of, II, 51 f., 62 f., 69 f., 74 f., 91 f., 146 f., 173, 225 f., 311 f., 370 f., 446 f.; as Will, II, 75 f., 79 f., 91 f., 102 f., 372; and Mind, II, 77 f., 83 f., 91 f.; as Personal Life, II, 145 f., 370 f.
- Worship, nature of, I, 155 f., 518 f.; Greek notion of, I, 178; higher forms of, I, 536 f. (see also Cult).
- Wundt, on origin of religion, I, 146; and its relation to morality, I, 456, 460, II, 62; belief in existence after death, II, 480.
- YAHWEH, "first-word" of, I, 52; moral nature of, I, 77 f., 206 f., 460 f., 525, II, 182, 186 f., 255 f.,

- 359; origin of conception of, I, 128, 206 f., 525 f., II, 127; as "Lord of hosts," I, 220; holiness of, I, 527 f., II, 204 f. (note), 206; and Power, II, 124; as God of the nations, II, 469.
- Yoga, nature of, I, 180, II, 26 f., 391 f., 393.
- Yogins (or Yogis), I, 397, II, 27, 29.
- ZARATHUSTRA (see Zoroaster).
- Zeller, on origin of religion, I, 151.
- Zend-Avesta, I, 198, 245, II, 391.
- Zeus, Æschylus' conception of, I, 185, 465 f.; justice of, II, 183 f., 357; Epictetus' conception of, II, 357 f.
- Zi, worship of, I, 155.
- Zoroaster, I, 198, II, 165, 391.
- Zoroastrianism, its worship of fire, I, 175; its general characteristics, I, 198 f., II, 165 f.; doctrine of evil, II, 165 f., 320 f.; and of creation, II, 320 f.
- Zulus, belief of, in "creator gods," I, 225 f.; clairvoyance among, I, 267.
- Zunis, II, 315.

