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PHILOSOPHY

OF

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, BART.,

PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN EDINBURGH
UNIVERSITY;

ARRANGED AND EDITED BY

O. W. WIGHT,

TRANSLATOR OF COUSIN'S "HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY."

FOR THE USE OF SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES.

Noûs êrêi kai Noûs âkoûei, τὰλλα χωφὰ και τυφλά.

Mind it seeth, Mind it heareth; all beside is deaf and blind.

EPICHRMUS (?).

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AT LOS ANGELES

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TO

REV. LAURENS P. HICKOK, D. D.,

VICE-PRESIDENT OF UNION COLLEGE, LATE PROFESSOR OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY IN
AUBURN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, AUTHOR OF "RATIONAL
PSYCHOLOGY," ETC., ETC..

THIS COLLECTION OF SIR WM. HAMILTON'S

PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSIONS AND DISSERTATIONS,

Is Dedicated;

AS A TOKEN OF THE EDITOR'S ADMIRATION OF

ONE OF THE VERY ABLEST METAPHYSICIANS AMERICA HAS PRODUCED;

AS

A TRIBUTE JUSTLY DUE TO THE FAITHFUL TEACHER,

WHO HAS DEVOTED

MANY YEARS OF HIS LIFE TO PREPARING YOUNG MEN FOR

HIGH PUBLIC DUTIES,

THUS FULFILLING THE RESPONSIBLE OFFICE OF

A "KEEPER OF THE KEEPERS."

432006

MAR 27 1853

GIFT OF MRS. C. F. HARRISON

P R E F A C E.

IN this publication we give to the readers and students of philosophy in America all, except part of an unfinished Dissertation, that Sir Wm. Hamilton has published directly on the subject of metaphysics. The completed supplementary Dissertations on Reid,¹ the foot-notes to Reid that have an enduring interest, and the philosophical portion of the 'Discussions,² etc.,' have been used to make up this work. The article on Logic and the Appendix Logical, in the Discussions, might have been added, but these do not properly belong to the metaphysical system of Hamilton, and, moreover, have been reserved for another purpose. The place where each part of this volume may be found in the work from which it is taken, has been designated by a foot-note.

In our collection and arrangement of Hamilton's Philosophy, we have followed a systematic plan. Any explanation or vindication of this plan would be, to those who are unacquainted with Sir Wm.'s system, unintel-

¹ The works of Thomas Reid, D. D., now fully collected, with selections from his unpublished letters. Preface, Notes, and Supplementary Dissertations, by Sir Wm. Hamilton, Bart. London and Edinburgh: Third Edition, 1852: pp. 914 (not completed).

² Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform. By Sir Wm. Hamilton, Bart. London and Edinburgh, 1852: pp. 758.

ligible; to those who have mastered its principles, superfluous. Our foot-notes are not very numerous, and consist mostly in references to other parts of the work, where some point indicated is more fully treated; and in explanations of a few, more than usually difficult, passages. In a single instance we have expressed our dissent from a position taken by Hamilton, the grounds of which we have briefly designated, without entering upon a systematic discussion. A severer study may convince us that Sir Wm. is right and that we are wrong.

Hamilton has promised a General Preface to his Reid, and a Sequel of the Dissertations. When these appear, they will be added to this work in a separate volume, in which the Indices will be given to the whole.

New York, *June*, 1853.

INTRODUCTION.

WE do not propose to give here a resumé of Sir Win. Hamilton's philosophy. A correct list, in technical language, of the principles of his system, would not be a clear exposition of his metaphysical doctrines. To attempt to put in a brief introduction the substance of several hundred pages of Hamilton's *Philosophical Discussions and Dissertations* would be presumptuous and preposterous. A philosopher, who thinks like Aristotle; whose logic is as stern as that of St. Thomas, 'the lawgiver of the Church;' who rivals Muretus as a critic; whose erudition finds a parallel only in that of the younger Scaliger; whose subtlety of thought and polemical power remind us of the dauntless prince¹ of Verona; whose penetrating analysis reaches deeper than that of Kant,—such a one, it is our pleasure to introduce to the students of philosophy in America; who, in a style severely elegant, with accuracy of statement, with precision of definition, in sequence and admirable order, will explain a system in many respects new,—a system that will provoke thought, that, consequently, carries in itself the germs of beneficial revolutions in literature and education, in all those things that are produced and regulated by mind in action. True to our plan of making the work as completely Hamilton's as possible, we shall offer, mostly in the language of our author, a few considerations on the utility of the study of philosophy.

Philosophy is a necessity. Every man philosophizes as he thinks. The worth of his philosophy will depend upon the value of his thinking. 'If to philosophize be right,' says Aristotle, in his *Exhortative*, 'we must philosophize to realize the right: if to philosophize be

¹ The elder Scaliger.

wrong, we must philosophize to manifest the wrong: on any alternative, therefore, philosophize we must.¹

No philosopher can explore the whole realm of truth. No single mind can compass the aggregate of what is possessed by all. Every system must, then, be incomplete; it cannot be taken as an equivalent for all that can be thought. The most that any system can do for us is to aid us, to stimulate our minds, to infuse higher intellectual energy. 'If the accomplishment of philosophy,' says Hamilton (Dis. p. 39, et seq.), 'imply a cessation of discussion—if the result of speculation be a paralysis of itself, the consummation of knowledge is the condition of intellectual barbarism. Plato has profoundly defined man "the hunter of truth;" for in this chase as in others, the pursuit is all in all, the success comparatively nothing. "Did the Almighty," says Lessing, "holding in his right hand *Truth*, and in his left, *Search after Truth*, deign to proffer me the one I might prefer, in all humility, but without hesitation, I should request—*Search after Truth*." We exist only as we energize; pleasure² is the reflex of unimpeded energy; energy is the *mean* by which our faculties are developed; and a higher energy the *end* which their development proposes. In *action* is thus contained the existence, happiness, improvement, and perfection of our being; and knowledge is only previous, as it may afford a stimulus to the exercise of our powers, and the condition of their more complete activity. Speculative truth is, therefore, subordinate to speculation itself; and its value is directly measured by the quantity of energy which it occasions—immediately in its discovery—mediately through its consequences. Life to Endymion was not preferable to death; aloof from practice, a waking error is better than a sleeping truth.—Neither, in point of fact, is there found any proportion between the *possession* of truths, and the *development* of the mind in which they are deposited. Every learner in science is now familiar with more truths than Aristotle or Plato ever dreamt of knowing; yet, compared with the Stagirite or the Athenian, how few among our *masters* of modern science rank higher than intellectual barbarians! Ancient Greece and modern Europe prove, indeed, that the "march of intellect" is no inseparable concomitant of

¹ Εἰ μὲν φιλοσοφητίον, φιλοσοφητίον· καὶ εἰ μὴ φιλοσοφητίον, φιλοσοφητίον· πάντως ἄρα φιλοσοφητίον.

² Aristotle defined happiness, Energizing according to virtue. It results from the healthy, unimpeded activity of every element of our nature.—W.

“the march of science;” that the cultivation of the individual is not to be rashly confounded with the progress of the species.

‘But if the possession of theoretical facts be not convertible with mental improvement, and if the former be important only as subservient to the latter, it follows that the comparative utility of a study is not to be *principally* estimated by the complement of truths which it may communicate, but by the degree in which it determines our higher capacities to action. But though this be the standard by which the different methods, the different branches, and the different masters of philosophy ought to be *principally* (and it is the *only* criterion by which they *can all* be *satisfactorily*) tried, it is nevertheless a standard by which neither methods, nor sciences, nor philosophers, have ever yet been even inadequately appreciated. The critical history of philosophy, in this spirit, has still to be written; and when written, how opposite will be the rank which, on the higher and more certain standard, it will frequently adjudge to the various branches of knowledge, and the various modes of their cultivation—to the different ages, and countries, and individuals, from that which has been hitherto partially awarded, on the vacillating authority of the lower!

‘On this ground (which we have not been able fully to state, far less adequately to illustrate), we rest the pre-eminent utility of metaphysical speculations. That they comprehend all the sublimest objects of our theoretical and moral interest; that every (natural) conclusion concerning God, the soul, the present worth and future destiny of man, is exclusively metaphysical, will be at once admitted. But we do not found the importance on the paramount dignity of the pursuit. It is as the best *gymnastic of the mind*—as a mean principally and almost exclusively conducive to the highest education of our noblest powers, that we would vindicate to these speculations the necessity, which has too frequently been denied them. By no other intellectual application (and least of all by physical pursuits) is the soul thus reflected on itself, and its faculties concentrated in such independent, vigorous, unwonted, and continued energy; by none, therefore, are its best capacities so variously and intensely evolved. “Where there is most life, there is the victory.”

‘Let it not be believed that the mighty minds who have cultivated these studies, have toiled in vain. If they have not always realized truth, they have always determined exertion; and in the genial elo-

quence of the elder Scaliger:—"Eæ subtilitates, quanquam sint animis otiosis atque inutiles, vegetis tamen ingeniis summam cognoscendi afferunt voluptatem,—sicut, scilicet in fastigio ejus sapientiæ, quæ rerum omnium principia contemplatur. Et quamvis harum indagatio non sit utilis ad machinas farinarias conficiendas; exiit tamen animum inscitie rubigine, acutique ad alia. Eo denique splendore afficit, ut præluceat sibi ad nanciscendum primi opificis similitudinem. Qui, ut omnia plene ac perfecte est, at præter et supra omnia; ita eos, qui scientiarum studiosi sunt, suos esse voluit, ipsorumque intellectum rerum dominum constituit."¹

'The practical danger which has sometimes been apprehended from metaphysical pursuits, has in reality only been found to follow from their stunted and partial cultivation. The poison has grown up; the antidote has been repressed. In Britain and in Germany, where speculation has remained comparatively free, the dominant result has been highly favorable to religion² and morals; whilst the evils which arose in France, arose from the benumbing influence of a one effete philosophy;³ and have, in point of fact, mainly been corrected by the awakened spirit of metaphysical inquiry itself.'

Hamilton again says ('Discussions,' p. 696, et seq.): 'Yet is Philosophy (the science of science—the theory of what we *can* know and think and do, in a word, the knowledge of ourselves), the object of liberal education, at once of paramount importance in itself, and the requisite condition of every other liberal science. If men are really

¹ Bacon, himself, the great champion of physical pursuits, says:—"Those sciences are not to be regarded as useless, which, considered in themselves, are valueless, if they sharpen the mind and reduce it to order. Hume, Burke, Kant, Stewart, &c., might be quoted to the same effect.—Compare Aristotle, *Metaph.* i. 2, *Eth. Nic.* v. 7.

² The philosophers of Germany, not as it is generally supposed in this country, and even by those who ought to know, have been more orthodox than the divines. Fichte, who was, for his country and his times, a singularly pious Christian, was persecuted by the theologians, on account of his orthodoxy.—W.

³ 'Since the metaphysic of Locke,' says M. Cousin, in 1819, 'crossed the channel on the light and brilliant wings of Voltaire's imagination, sensualism has reigned in France without contradiction, and with an authority of which there is no parallel in the whole history of philosophy. It is a fact, marvellous but incontestable, that from the time of Condillac, there has not appeared among us any philosophical work, at variance with his doctrine, which has produced the smallest impression on the public mind. Condillac thus reigned in peace; and his domination, prolonged even to our own days, through changes of every kind, pursued its tranquil course, apparently above the reach of danger. Discussion had closed: his disciples had only to develop the words of their master: philosophy seemed accomplished.'—(*Journal des Savans*.) During the reign of sensualism in France, religion languished, for she was deprived of the aid of her most efficient servant—philosophy.—W.

to know aught else, the human faculties, by which alone this knowledge may be realized, must be studied for themselves, in their extent and in their limitations. To know,—we must understand our instrument of knowing. “Know thyself” is, in fact, a heavenly precept, in christianity as in heathenism. And this knowledge can be compassed only by reflection,—only from within: “Ne te quæsieris extra.” It tells us at once of our weakness and our worth; it is the discipline both of humility and hope. On the other hand, a knowledge, drawn too exclusively from without, is not only imperfect in itself, but makes its votaries fatalists, materialists, pantheists—if they dare to think; it is the dogmatism of despair. “Laudabilior,” says Augustin, “laudabilior est animus, cui nota est infirmitas propria, quam qui, ea non respecta, mœnia mundi, vias siderum, fundamenta terrarum et fastigia cœlorum, etiam cogniturus, scrutatur.” We can know God only as we know ourselves. “Noverim me, noverim Te,” is St. Austin’s prayer; St. Bernard:—“Principale, ad videndum Deum, est animus rationalis intuens seipsum;” and even Averroes:—“Nosce teipsum, et cognosces creatorem tuum.”

‘Nor is the omission of philosophy from an academical curriculum equivalent to an arrest on the philosophizing activity of the student. This stupor, however deplorable in itself, might still be a minor evil; for it is better, assuredly, to be without opinions, than to have them, not only superlatively untrue, but practically corruptive. Yet, even this paralysis, I say, is not accomplished. Right or wrong, a man must philosophize, for he philosophizes as he thinks; and the only effect, in the present day especially, of a University denying to its alumni the invigorating exercise of a right philosophy, is their abandonment, not only without precaution, but even prepared by debilitation, to the pernicious influence of a wrong:—“Sine vindice præda.” And in what country has a philosophy ever gravitating, as theoretical towards materialism, as practical towards fatalism, been most peculiar and pervasive?

‘Again:—Philosophy, the thinking of thought, the recoil of mind upon itself, is the most improving of mental exercises, conducing, above all others, to evolve the highest and rarest of the intellectual powers. By this, the mind is not only trained to philosophy proper, but prepared, in general, for powerful, easy, and successful energy, in whatever department of knowledge it may more peculiarly apply itself. But the want of this superior discipline is but too apparent in

English [American] literature, and especially in those very fields of erudition by preference cultivated in England [America].

‘Of English [American] scholars as a class, both now and for generations past, the observation of Godfrey Hermann holds good:—“They read but do not think; they would be philologists, and have not learned to philosophize.” The philosophy of a philology is shown primarily in its grammars, and its grammars for the use of schools. But in this respect, England [America] remained, till lately, nearly two centuries behind the rest of Christendom. If there were any principle in her pedagogical practice, “*Gaudent sudoribus artes,*” must have been the rule; and applied it was with a vengeance. The English [American] schoolboy was treated like the Russian pack-horse; the load in one pannier was balanced by a counter-weight of stones in the other. . . . The unhappy tyro was initiated in Latin, through a Latin book; while the ten declensions, the thirteen conjugations, which had been reduced to three and two by Weller and Lancelot, still continued, among a mass of other abominations, to complicate, in this country, the elementary instruction of Greek. . . . But all has now been changed—except the cause: for the same inertion of original and independent thought is equally apparent. As formerly, from want of thinking, the old sufficed; so now, from want of thinking, the new is borrowed. In fact, openly or occultly, honorably or dishonorably, the far greater part of the higher and lower philology published in this country is an importation, especially from Germany: but so passive is the ignorance of our compilers, that they are often (though affecting, of course, opinions), unaware even of what is best worthy of plagiarism or transplantation.

‘Theology—Christian theology is, as a human science, a philology and history applied by philosophy; and the comparatively ineffectual character of our British [American] theology has, for generations, mainly resulted from the deficiency of its philosophical element. The want of a philosophical training in the Anglican [American] clergy, to be regretted at all times, may soon, indeed, become lamentably apparent, were they called on to resist an invasion, now so likely, of certain foreign philosophico-theological opinions.¹ In fact, this is the

¹ This invasion has already come with us. Dr. Hickok and a few others, who alone see the real danger, have faced it manfully and well armed. The spirit of the Absolute, which has found its way hither through various channels, from the country of Schelling

invasion, and this the want of national preparation, for which even at the present juncture, I should be most alarmed. On the Universities,¹ which have illegally dropped philosophy and its training from their course of discipline, will lie the responsibility of this singular and dangerous disarmature.'

We commend Hamilton's philosophy to educators, not only for its great excellence as a metaphysical system, for its profound thought and affluent erudition, for its spirit of free inquiry, and, consequently, its power to quicken the mind; but, above all, we commend it for its accordance with the principles of revealed religion. Sir Wm., though metaphysically the 'most formidable man in Europe,' is an humble Christian; though the most learned of men, he is ready to bow before the spirit that 'informed' the mind of Paul. Hamilton says that he is confident that his philosophy is founded upon truth. 'To this confidence I have come, not merely through the convictions of my own consciousness, but by finding in this system a centre and conciliation for the most opposite of philosophical opinions. Above all, however, I am confirmed in my belief, by the harmony between the doctrines of this philosophy, and those of revealed truth. "Credo equidem, nec von fides." The philosophy of the Conditioned is indeed pre-eminently a discipline of humility; a "learned ignorance," directly opposed to the false "knowledge which puffeth up." I may say with St. Chrysostom:—"The foundation of our philosophy is humility."—(Homil. de Perf. Evang.) For it is professedly a scientific demonstration of the impossibility of that "wisdom in high matters" which the apostle prohibits us even to attempt; and it proposes, from the limitations of the human powers, from our impotence to comprehend what, however, we must admit, to show articulately why the "secret things of God" cannot but be to man "past finding out." Humility thus becomes the cardinal virtue, not only of revelation, but of reason. This scheme proves, moreover, that no difficulty emerges in theology, which had not previously emerged in philosophy; that in fact, if the divine do not transcend what it has pleased the Deity to reveal, and wilfully indentify the doctrine of God's word with some arrogant ex-

and Hegel, will not be exercised by a solemn reading of creeds, and by repeating some stereotyped theological phrases; it must be brought into the clear white light of thought; like every other spectre of the night, it will vanish at the real dawn.—W.

¹ Our American colleges, instead of having 'dropped philosophy and its training from their course of discipline,' have never seriously taken it up.—W.

treme of human speculation, philosophy will be found the most useful auxiliary of theology. For a world of false, and pestilent, and presumptuous reasoning, by which philosophy and theology are now equally discredited, would be at once abolished, in the recognition of this rule of prudent nescience; nor could it longer be too justly said of the code of consciousness, as by reformed divines it has been acknowledged of the Bible:—

“This is the book, where each his dogma seeks;
And this the book, where each his dogma finds.”

C O N T E N T S.

PART FIRST.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE; OR, OUR PRIMARY BELIEFS CONSIDERED AS THE ULTIMATE CRITERION OF TRUTH.

SECTION I. The Meaning of the Doctrine, and Purport of the Argument, of Common Sense	19
II. The Conditions of the Legitimacy, and legitimate application, of the argument.....	36
III. That it is one strictly Philosophical and scientific.....	41
IV. The Essential Characters by which our primary beliefs, or the principles of Common Sense, are discriminated	47
V. The Nomenclature, that is, the various appellations by which these have been designated.....	50
VI. The Universality of the philosophy of Common Sense; or its general recognition, in reality and in name, shown by a chronological series of Testimonies from the dawn of speculation to the present day.....	85

PART SECOND.

PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION.

CHAPTER I.—ELUCIDATION OF REID'S DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION, AND ITS DEFENCE AGAINST SIR THOMAS BROWN	165
---	-----

CHAPTER II.—PRESENTATIVE AND REPRESENTATIVE KNOWLEDGE.

SECTION I. The distinction of Presentative, Intuitive, or Immediate, and of Representative or Mediate cognition; with the various significations of the term Object, its conjugates and correlatives	238
II. Errors of Reid and other Philosophers, in reference to the preceding distinctions	256

CHAPTER III.—VARIOUS THEORIES OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION.

- SECTION I. Systematic Schemes, from different points of view, of the various theories of the relation of External Perception to its Object; and of the various systems of Philosophy founded thereon 265
- II. What is the character, in this respect, of Reid's doctrine of Perception? 272

CHAPTER IV.—DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION MAINTAINED BY THE ABSOLUTE IDEALISTS.—DISCUSSION ON THE SCHEME OF ARTHUR COLLIER.. 285

CHAPTER V.—DISTINCTION OF THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES OF BODY.

- SECTION I. Historically considered 306
- II. Critically considered. Three classes (Primary, Secundo-Primary, and Secondary Qualities) established 352

CHAPTER VI.—PERCEPTION PROPER AND SENSATION PROPER.

- SECTION I. Principal momenta of the Editor's doctrine of Perception, (A) in itself, and (B) in contrast to that of Reid, Stewart, Royer-Collard, and other philosophers of the Scottish School..... 412
- II. Historical notices in regard to the distinction of Perception proper and Sensation proper 432

 PART THIRD.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED.

CHAPTER I.—REFUTATION OF THE VARIOUS DOCTRINES OF THE UNCONDITIONED, ESPECIALLY OF COUSIN'S DOCTRINE OF THE INFINITO-ABSOLUTE 441

CHAPTER II.—LIMITATION OF THOUGHT AND KNOWLEDGE.

- SECTION I. A Doctrine of the Relative; the Categories of Thought.... 484
- II. Philosophical Testimonies to the Limitation of our Knowledge, from the Limitation of our Faculties..... 517

PART FIRST.

PHILOSOPHY

OF

COMMON SENSE.

“THERE is nothing that can pretend to judge of Reason but itself: and, therefore, they who suppose that they can say aught against it, are forced (like jewellers, who beat true diamonds to powder to cut and polish false ones), to make use of it against itself. But in this they cheat themselves as well as others. For if what they say against Reason, be without Reason, they deserve to be neglected; and if with Reason, they disprove themselves. For they use it while they disclaim it; and with as much contradiction, as if a man should tell me that he cannot speak.”

AUTHOR OF HUDIBRAS (*Reflections upon Reason*).

PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE,¹

OR,

OUR PRIMARY BELIEFS CONSIDERED AS THE ULTIMATE
CRITERION OF TRUTH.

§ I.—THE MEANING OF THE DOCTRINE, AND PURPORT OF THE ARGUMENT, OF COMMON SENSE.

IN the conception and application of the doctrine of Common Sense, the most signal mistakes have been committed ; and much unfounded prejudice has been excited against the argument which it affords, in consequence of the erroneous views which have been held in regard to its purport and conditions. What is the veritable character of this doctrine, it is, therefore, necessary to consider.

Our cognitions, it is evident, are not all at second hand. Consequents cannot, by an infinite regress, be evolved out of antecedents, which are themselves only consequents. Demonstration, if proof be possible, behooves us to repose at last on propositions, which, carrying their own evidence, necessitate their own admission ; and which being, as primary, inexplicable, as inexplicable, incomprehensible, must consequently manifest themselves less in the character of cognitions than of *facts*, of which consciousness assures us under the simple form of *feeling* or *belief*.

Without at present attempting to determine the character, number, and relations—waiving, in short, all attempt at an artic-

¹ The Philosophy of Common Sense properly comes first in Hamilton's System, for he sets out from the ultimate facts of consciousness, or the primary beliefs of mankind. The leading Supplementary Dissertation in his edition of Reid, constitutes the first general division in our arrangement of his philosophy.—*W*.

ulate analysis and classification of the primary elements of cognition, as carrying us into a discussion beyond our limits, and not of indispensable importance for the end we have in view;* it is sufficient to have it conceded, in general, *that such elements there are*; and this concession of their existence being supposed, I shall proceed to hazard some observations, principally in regard to their authority as warrants and criteria of truth. Nor can this assumption of the existence of some original bases of knowledge in the mind itself, be refused by any. For even those philosophers who profess to derive all our knowledge from experience, and who admit no universal truths of intelligence but such as are generalized from individual truths of fact—even these philosophers are forced virtually to acknowledge, at the root of the several acts of observation from which their generalization starts, some law or principle

* Such an analysis and classification is however in itself certainly one of the most interesting and important problems of philosophy; and it is one in which much remains to be accomplished. Principles of cognition, which now stand as ultimate, may, I think, be reduced to simpler elements; and some which are now viewed as direct and positive, may be shown to be merely indirect and negative; their cogency depending, not on the immediate necessity of thinking them—for if carried unconditionally out, they are themselves incogitable—but in the impossibility of thinking something to which they are directly opposed, and from which they are the immediate recoils. An exposition of the axiom—That positive thought lies in the limitation or conditioning of one or other of two opposite extremes, neither of which as unconditioned, can be realized to the mind as possible, and yet of which, as contradictories, one or other must, by the fundamental laws of thought, be recognized as necessary:—The exposition of this great but unenounced axiom would show that some of the most illustrious principles are only its subordinate modifications as applied to certain primary notions, intuitions, data, forms, or categories of intelligence, as Existence, Quantity (protensive, Time—extensive, Space—intensive, Degree) Quality, etc. Such modifications, for example, are the principles of, Cause and Effect,¹ Substance and Phenomenon, etc.

I may here also observe, that though *the primary truths of facts* and the *primary truths of intelligence* (the *contingent* and *necessary* truths of Reid) form two very distinct classes of the original beliefs or intuitions of consciousness; there appears no sufficient ground to regard their sources as different, and therefore to be distinguished by different names. In this I regret that I am unable to agree with Mr. Stewart. See his *Elements*, vol. ii. ch. 1, and his account of Reid.

See Part Third of this vol. *passim*.—W.

to which they can appeal as guaranteeing the procedure, should the validity of these primordial acts themselves be called in question. This acknowledgment is, among others, made even by Locke; and on such fundamental guarantee of induction he even bestows the name of Common Sense. (See below, in Testimonies, No. 51.)

Limiting, therefore, our consideration to the question of authority; how, it is asked, do these primary propositions—these cognitions at first hand—these fundamental facts, feelings, beliefs, certify us of their own veracity? To this the only possible answer is—that as elements of our mental constitution—as the essential conditions of our knowledge—they *must* by us be accepted as true. To suppose their falsehood, is to suppose that we are created capable of intelligence, in order to be made the victims of delusion; that God is a deceiver, and the root of our nature a lie. But such a supposition, if gratuitous, is manifestly illegitimate. For, on the contrary, the data of our original consciousness must, it is evident, *in the first instance*, be presumed true. It is only if proved false, that their authority can, *in consequence of that proof*, be, in the second instance, disallowed. Speaking, therefore, generally, to argue from common sense, is simply to show, that the denial of a given proposition would involve the denial of some original datum of consciousness; but as every original datum of consciousness is to be presumed true, that the proposition in question, as dependent on such a principle, must be admitted.

But that such an argument is competent and conclusive, must be more articulately shown.

Here, however, at the outset, it is proper to take a distinction, the neglect of which has been productive of considerable error and confusion. It is the distinction between the data or deliverances of consciousness considered simply, *in themselves, as apprehended facts or actual manifestations*, and those deliverances considered *as testimonies to the truth of facts beyond their own phenomenal reality*.

Viewed under the former limitation, they are above all skepticism. For as doubt is itself only a manifestation of consciousness,

it is impossible to doubt that, what consciousness manifests, it does manifest, without, in thus doubting, doubting that we actually doubt; that is, without the doubt contradicting and therefore annihilating itself. Hence it is that the facts of consciousness, as mere phenomena, are by the unanimous confession of all Sceptics and Idealists, ancient and modern, placed high above the reach of question. Thus, *Laertius*, in *Pyrrh.*, L. ix. seg. 103;—*Sextus Empiricus*, *Pyrrh. Hypot.*, L. i. cc. 4, 10, et passim;—*Descartes*, *Med.*, ii. pp. 13, and iii. p. 16, ed. 1658;—*Hume*, *Treatise on Human Nature*, vol. i. pp. 123, 370, et alibi, orig. ed.;—*Schulze*, *Aenesidemus*, p. 24, *Kritik*, vol. i. p. 51;—*Platner*, *Aphor.*, vol. i. § 708;—*Reinhold*, *Théorie*, p. 190;—*Schad*, in *Fichte's Philos. Jour.*, vol. x. p. 270. See also *St. Austin*, *Contra. Academ.*, L. iii. c. 11; *De Trin.*, L. xv. c. 112; *Scotus*, in *Sent.*, L. i. dist. 3, qu. 4, 10;—*Buffier*, *Prem. Verit.*, § 9—11 40;—*Mayne's Essay on Consciousness*, p. 177, *sq.*;—*Reid*, p. 442, b. et alibi;—*Cousin*, *Cours d'Hist. de la Philosophie Morale*, vol. ii. pp. 220, 236.

On this ground, *St. Austin* was warranted in affirming—*Nihil intelligenti tam notum esse quam se sentire, se cogitare, se velle, se vivere*; and the *cogito ergo sum* of *Descartes* is a valid assertion, that in so far as we are *conscious* of certain modes of existence, in so far we possess an absolute certainty that we really exist. (*Aug. De Lib. Arb.*, ii. 3; *De Trin.*, x. 3; *De Civ. Dei.*, xi. 26; *Desc.*, ll. cc., et passim.)

Viewed under the latter limitation, the deliverances of consciousness do not thus peremptorily repel even the possibility of doubt. I am conscious for example, in an act of sensible perception, 1°, of myself, the subject knowing; and 2°, of something given as different from myself, the object known. To take the second term of this relation:—that I am conscious in this act of an object given, as a *non-ego*¹—that is, as *not a modification of my mind*—of this, as a *phenomenon*, doubt is impossi-

¹Hamilton always uses *ego*, and *non-ego*, instead of *me* and *not-me*, which, though convenient and common, involve a grammatical error.—*W.*

ble. For, as has been seen, we cannot doubt the actuality of a fact of consciousness without doubting, that is subverting, our doubt itself. To this extent, therefore, all skepticism is precluded. But though it cannot but be admitted that the object of which we are conscious in this cognition is given, not *as* a mode of self, but *as* a mode of something different from self, it is however possible for us to suppose, without our supposition at least being *felo de se*, that, though *given as* a non-ego, this object may, *in reality*, be only a *representation* of a non-ego, in and by the *ego*. Let this therefore be maintained: let the *fact* of the testimony be admitted, but the *truth* of the testimony, to aught beyond its own ideal existence, be doubted or denied. How in this case are we to proceed? It is evident that the doubt does not in this, as in the former case refute itself. It is not suicidal by self-contradiction. The Idealist, therefore, in denying the existence of an external world, as more than a subjective phenomenon of the internal, does not advance a doctrine *ab initio* null, as a skepticism would be which denied the phenomena of the internal world itself. Yet many distinguished philosophers have fallen into this mistake; and, among others, both Dr. Reid, probably, and Mr. Stewart, certainly. The latter in his *Philosophical Essays* (pp. 6, 7), explicitly states, "that the belief which accompanies consciousness, as to the present existence of its appropriate phenomena, rests on no foundation more solid than our belief of the existence of external objects." Reid does not make any declaration so explicit, but the same doctrine seems involved in various of his criticisms of Hume and of Descartes (*Inq.*¹ pp. 100 a., 129, 130; *Int. Pow.*, pp. 269 a., 442 b). Thus (p. 100 a.) he reprehends the latter for maintaining that consciousness affords a higher assurance of the reality of the internal phenomena, than sense affords of the reality of the external. He asks—Why did Descartes not attempt a proof of the existence of his thought? and if consciousness be alleged as avouching this, he asks again,

¹The reference is to Hamilton's edition of Reid.—*W.*

—Who is to be our voucher that consciousness may not deceive us? My observations on this point, which were printed above three years ago, in the foot-notes at pp. 129 and 442 b.,¹ I am

¹The following are the foot-notes referred to :

“There is no skepticism possible touching the facts of consciousness in themselves. We cannot doubt that the phenomena of consciousness are real, in so far as we are conscious of them. I cannot doubt, for example, that I am actually conscious of a certain feeling of fragrance, and of certain perceptions of color, figure, etc., when I see and smell a rose. Of the reality of these, as experienced, I cannot doubt, because they are facts of consciousness; and of consciousness I cannot doubt, because such doubt being itself an act of consciousness, would contradict, and, consequently, annihilate itself. But of all beyond the mere phenomena of which we are conscious, we may—without fear of self-contradiction at least—doubt. I may, for instance, doubt whether the rose I see and smell has any existence beyond a phenomenal existence in my consciousness. I cannot doubt that I am conscious of it *as* something different from self, but whether it have, indeed, any reality beyond my mind—whether the *not-self* be not in truth only *self*—that I may philosophically question. In like manner, I am conscious of the memory of a certain past event. Of the contents of this memory, as a phenomenon given in consciousness, skepticism is impossible. But I may by possibility demur to the reality of all beyond these contents and the sphere of present consciousness.

“In Reid’s strictures upon Hume, he confounds two opposite things. He reproaches that philosopher with inconsequence, in holding to ‘the belief of the existence of his own impressions and ideas.’ Now, if, by *the existence of impressions and ideas*, Reid meant their existence as mere phenomena of consciousness, his criticism is inept; for a disbelief of their existence, as such phenomena, would have been a suicidal act in the skeptic. If, again, he meant by *impressions and ideas* the hypothesis of representative entities different from the mind and its modifications; in that case the objection is equally invalid. Hume was a skeptic; that is, he *accepted* the premises afforded him by the dogmatist, and carried these premises to their legitimate consequences. To blame Hume, therefore, for not having doubted of his borrowed principles, is to blame the skeptic for not performing a part altogether inconsistent with his vocation. But, in point of fact, the hypothesis of such entities is of no value to the idealist or skeptic. *Impressions and ideas*, viewed as mental modes, would have answered Hume’s purpose not a whit worse than *impressions and ideas* viewed as objects, but not as affections of mind. The most consistent scheme of idealism known in the history of philosophy is that of Fichte; and Fichte’s idealism is founded on a basis which excludes that crude hypothesis of ideas on which alone Reid imagined any doctrine of Idealism could possibly be established. And is the acknowledged result of the Fichtean dogmatism less a nihilism than the skepticism of Hume? ‘The sum total,’ says Fichte, ‘is this:—There is absolutely **nothing permanent** either without me or within me, but only an unceasing change. I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even of my own.

happy to find confirmed by the authority of M. Cousin. The following passage is from his Lectures on the Scottish School, constituting the second volume of his "Course on the History of the Moral Philosophy of the Eighteenth Century," delivered in the years 1819, 1820, but only recently published by M. Vacherot.¹ "It is not (he observes in reference to the preceding strictures of Reid upon Descartes) as a fact attested by consciousness, that Descartes declares his personal existence beyond a doubt; it is because the negation of this fact would involve a contradiction." And after quoting the relative passage from Descartes:—"It is thus by a reasoning that Descartes establishes the existence of the thinking subject; if he admit this existence, it is not because it is guaranteed by consciousness; it is for this reason, that when he thinks—let him deceive himself or not—he exists in so far as he thinks."

It is therefore manifest that we may throw wholly out of account the phenomena of consciousness, considered merely in themselves; seeing that skepticism in regard to them, under this limitation, is confessedly impossible; and that it is only requisite to consider the argument from common sense, as it enables us to

I myself know nothing, and am nothing. Images (Bilder) there are: they constitute all that apparently exists, and what they know of themselves is after the manner of images; images that pass and vanish without there being aught to witness their transition; that consist in fact of the images of images, without significance and without an aim. I myself am one of these images; nay, I am not even thus much, but only a confused image of images. All reality is converted into a marvellous dream, without a life to dream of and without a mind to dream; into a dream made up only of a dream of itself. Perception is a dream; thought—the source of all the existence and all the reality which I imagine to myself of *my* existence, of my power, of my destination—is the dream of that dream.'

"In doubting the fact of his consciousness, the skeptic must at least affirm his doubt; but to affirm a doubt is to affirm the *consciousness* of it; the doubt would therefore be self-contradictory—*i. e.* annihilate itself."—*W.*

¹Since the above was written, M. Cousin has himself published the Course of 1819–20, and the Lectures on the Scottish School may now be found, amplified, in the fourth volume of his first series. The same thing is stated with precision, clearness, and force, here and there in Cousin's second series, the whole of which we have recently translated and published.—*W.*

vindicate the truth of these phenomena, viewed as attestations of more than their own existence, seeing that they are not, in this respect, placed beyond the possibility of doubt.

When, for example, consciousness assures us that, in perception, we are immediately cognizant of an external and extended non-ego; or that, in remembrance, through the imagination, of which we are immediately cognizant, we obtain a mediate knowledge of a real past; how shall we repel the doubt—in the former case, that what is given as the extended reality itself is not merely a representation of matter by mind—in the latter, that what is given as a mediate knowledge of the past, is not a mere present phantasm, containing an illusive reference to an unreal past? We can do this only in one way. The legitimacy of such gratuitous doubt necessarily supposes that the deliverance of consciousness *is not to be presumed true*. If, therefore, it can be shown, on the one hand, that the deliverances of consciousness must philosophically be accepted, *until* their certain or probable falsehood has been positively evinced; and if, on the other hand, it cannot be shown that any attempt to discredit the veracity of consciousness has ever yet succeeded; it follows that, as philosophy now stands, the testimony of consciousness must be viewed as high above suspicion, and its declarations entitled to demand prompt and unconditional assent.

In the first place, as has been said, it cannot but be acknowledged that the veracity of consciousness must, at least in the first instance, be conceded. “*Neganti incumbit probatio.*” Nature is not gratuitously to be assumed to work, not only in vain, but in counteraction of herself; our faculty of knowledge is not, without a ground, to be supposed an instrument of illusion; man, unless the melancholy fact be proved, is not to be held organized for the attainment, and actuated by the love of truth, only to become the dupe and victim of a perfidious creator.

But, in the second place, though the veracity of the primary convictions of consciousness must, in the outset, be admitted, it still remains competent to lead a proof that they are undeserving

of credit. But how is this to be done? As the ultimate grounds of knowledge, these convictions cannot be redargued from any higher knowledge; and as original beliefs, they are paramount in certainty to every derivative assurance. But they are many; they are, in authority, co-ordinate; and their testimony is clear and precise. It is therefore competent for us to view them in correlation; to compare their declarations; and to consider whether they contradict, and, by contradicting, invalidate each other. This mutual contradiction is possible, in two ways. 1°, It may be that the *primary data themselves* are directly or immediately contradictory of each other; 2°, it may be that they are mediately or indirectly contradictory, inasmuch as the *consequences* to which they *necessarily* lead, and for the truth or falsehood of which they are therefore responsible, are mutually repugnant. By evincing either of these, the veracity of consciousness will be disproved; for, in either case, consciousness is shown to be inconsistent with itself, and consequently inconsistent with the unity of truth. But by no other process of demonstration is this possible. For it will argue nothing against the trustworthiness of consciousness, that all or any of its deliverances are inexplicable—are incomprehensible; that is, that we are unable to conceive through a higher notion, how that is possible, which the deliverance avouches actually to be. To make the comprehensibility of a datum of consciousness the criterion of its truth, would be indeed the climax of absurdity. For the primary data of consciousness, as themselves the conditions under which all else is comprehended, are necessarily themselves incomprehensible. We know, and can know, only—*That they are*, not—*How they can be*. To ask how an immediate fact of consciousness is possible, is to ask how consciousness is possible; and to ask how consciousness is possible, is to suppose that we have another consciousness, before and above that human consciousness, concerning whose mode of operation we inquire. Could we answer this, “verily we should be as gods.”¹

¹ From what has now been stated, it will be seen how far and on what grounds I hold, at once with Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart, that our original

To take an example:—It would be unreasonable in the Cosmothetic or the Absolute Idealist, to require of the Natural Realist¹ a reason, through which to understand how a self can be conscious of a not-self—how an unextended subject can be cognizant of an extended object; both of which are given us as facts by consciousness, and, as such, founded on by the Natural Realist. This is unreasonable, because it is incompetent to demand the explanation of a datum of consciousness, which, as original and simple, is necessarily beyond analysis and explication. It is still further unreasonable, inasmuch as all philosophy being only a development of the primary data of consciousness, any philosophy, in not accepting the truth of these, pro tanto surrenders its own possibility—is *felo de se*. But at the hands of the Cosmothetic Idealists—and they constitute the great majority of philosophers—the question is peculiarly absurd; for before proposing it, they are themselves bound to afford a solution of the far more insuperable difficulties which their own hypothesis involves—difficulties which, so far from attempting to solve, no Hypothetical Realist has ever yet even articulately stated.²

This being understood, the following propositions are either self-evident, or admit of easy proof:

1. The end of philosophy is truth; and consciousness is the instrument and criterion of its acquisition. In other words, philosophy is the development and application of the constitutive and normal truths which consciousness immediately reveals.

2. Philosophy is thus wholly dependent upon consciousness; the possibility of the former supposing the trustworthiness of the latter.

3. Consciousness is presumed to be trustworthy, until proved mendacious.

4. The mendacity of consciousness is proved, if its data, imme-

beliefs are to be established, but their authority not to be canvassed; and with M. Jouffroy, that the question of their authority is not to be absolutely withdrawn, as a forbidden problem, from philosophy.

¹ On these terms see the third and fourth chapters of the second part of this vol.—*W.*

² For the illustration of this, see chapter first of the second part.—*W.*

diately in themselves, or mediately in their necessary consequences, be shown to stand in mutual contradiction.

5. "The immediate or mediate repugnance of any two of its data being established, the presumption in favor of the general veracity of consciousness is abolished, or rather reversed. For while, on the one hand, all that is not contradictory is not therefore true; on the other, a positive proof of falsehood, in one instance, establishes a presumption of probable falsehood in all; for the maxim, "*falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*," must determine the credibility of consciousness, as the credibility of every other witness.

6. No attempt to show that the data of consciousness are (either in themselves, or in their necessary consequences) mutually contradictory, has yet succeeded; and the presumption in favor of the truth of consciousness and the possibility of philosophy has, therefore, never been redargued. In other words, an original, universal, dogmatic subversion of knowledge has hitherto been found impossible.

7. No philosopher has ever formally denied the truth or disclaimed the authority of consciousness; but few or none have been content implicitly to accept and consistently to follow out its dictates. Instead of humbly resorting to consciousness, to draw from thence his doctrines and their proof, each dogmatic speculator looked only into consciousness, there to discover his pre-adopted opinions. In philosophy, men have abused the code of natural, as in theology, the code of positive, revelation; and the epigraph of a great protestant divine, on the book of scripture, is certainly not less applicable to the book of consciousness:

*"Hic liber est in quo quærit sua dogmata quisque;
Invenit, et pariter dogmata quisque sua."*¹

8. The first and most obtrusive consequence of this procedure has been, the multiplication of philosophical systems in every conceivable aberration from the unity of truth.

¹ "This is the book where each his dogma seeks;
And this the book where each his dogma finds."

9. The second, but less obvious, consequence has been, the virtual surrender, by each several system, of the possibility of philosophy in general. For, as the possibility of philosophy supposes the absolute truth of consciousness, every system which proceeded on the hypothesis, that even a single deliverance of consciousness is untrue, did, however it might eschew the overt declaration, thereby invalidate the general credibility of consciousness, and supply to the skeptic the premises he required to subvert philosophy, in so far as that system represented it.

10. And yet, although the past history of philosophy has, in a great measure, been only a history of variation and error (*variasse erroris est*); yet the cause of this variation being known, we obtain a valid ground of hope for the destiny of philosophy in future. Because, since philosophy has hitherto been inconsistent with itself, only in being inconsistent with the dictates of our natural beliefs—

“For Truth is catholic, and Nature one;”

it follows, that philosophy has simply to return to natural consciousness, to return to unity and truth.

In doing this we have only to attend to the three following maxims or precautions:

1°, That we admit nothing, not either an original datum of consciousness, or the legitimate consequence of such a datum;

2°, That we embrace all the original data of consciousness, and all their legitimate consequences; and

3°, That we exhibit each of these in its individual integrity neither distorted nor mutilated, and in its relative place, whether of pre-eminence or subordination.

Nor can it be contended that consciousness has spoken in so feeble or ambiguous a voice, that philosophers have misapprehended or misunderstood her enouncements. On the contrary, they have been usually agreed about the fact and purport of the deliverance, differing only as to the mode in which they might evade or qualify its acceptance.

This I shall illustrate by a memorable example—by one in reference to the very cardinal point of philosophy. In the act of sensible perception, I am conscious of two things;—of *myself* as the *perceiving subject*, and of an *external reality*, in relation with my sense, as the *object perceived*. Of the existence of both these things I am convinced: because I am conscious of knowing each of them, not mediately, in something else, *as represented*, but immediately in itself, *as existing*. Of their mutual independence I am no less convinced; because each is apprehended equally, and at once, in the same indivisible energy, the one not preceding or determining, the other not following or determined; and because each is apprehended out of, and in direct contrast to the other.

Such is the fact of perception as given in consciousness, and as it affords to mankind in general the conjunct assurance they possess, of their own existence, and of the existence of an external world. Nor are the contents of the deliverance, considered *as a phenomenon*, denied by those who still hesitate to admit the truth of its testimony. As this point, however, is one of principal importance, I shall not content myself with assuming the preceding statement of the fact of perception as a truth attested by the internal experience of all; but, in order to place it beyond the possibility of doubt, quote in evidence, more than a competent number of authoritative, and yet reluctant testimonies, and give articulate references to others.

Descartes, the father of modern idealism, acknowledges, that in perception we suppose the qualities of the external realities to be themselves apprehended, and not merely represented, by the mind, in virtue or on occasion of certain movements of the sensuous organism which they determine. “*Putamus nos videre ipsam tædam, et audire ipsam campanam: non vero solum sentire motus qui ab ipsis proveniunt.*” *De Passionibus art. xxiii.* This, be it observed, is meant for a statement applicable to our perception of external objects in general, and not merely to our perception of their secondary qualities.

De Raai, a distinguished follower of *Descartes*, frequently ad-

mits, that what is commonly rejected by philosophers is universally believed by mankind at large—" *Res ipsas secundum se in sensum incurrere.*" De Mentis Humanæ Facultatibus, Sectio II. § 41, 70, 89. De Cognitione Humana, § 15, 39, et alibi.

In like manner, *Berkeley*, contrasting the belief of the vulgar, and the belief of philosophers on this point, says :—"The former are of opinion that *those things they immediately perceive are the real things* ; and the latter, that the things immediately perceived are ideas which exist only in the mind." Three Dialogues, &c., Dial. III. prope finem. His brother idealist, *Arthur Collier*, might be quoted to the same purport ; though he does not, like Berkeley, pretend that mankind at large are therefore idealists.

Hume frequently states that, in the teeth of all philosophy, "men are carried by a blind and powerful instinct of nature to suppose the very images presented by the senses to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion that the one are nothing but representations of the other." Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, Sect. XII., Essays, ed. 1788, vol. ii. p. 154. Compare also *ibid.* p. 157 ; and Treatise of Human Nature, vol. i. B. i. P. iv. Sect. 2, pp. 330, 338, 353, 358, 361, 369.

Schelling, in many passages of his works, repeats, amplifies, and illustrates the statement, that "*the man of common sense believes, and will not but believe, that the object he is conscious of perceiving is the real one.*" This is from his Philosophische Schriften, I. p. 274 ; and it may be found with the context, translated by Coleridge—but given as his own—in the "Biographia Literaria," I. p. 262. See also among other passages, Philos. Schr., I. pp. 217, 238 ; Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur, Einleit. pp. xix. xxvi. first edition (translated in Edinb. Rev., vol. lii. p. 202) ; Philosophisches Journal von Fichte und Niethammer, vol. vii. p. 244. In these passages Schelling allows that it is only on the believed identity of the object known and of the object existing, and in our inability to discriminate in perceptive consciousness the representation from the thing, that mankind at large believe in the reality of an external world.

But to adduce a more recent writer, and of a different school.—“From the natural point of view,” says *Stiëdenroth*, “the representation (*Vorstellung*) is not in sensible perception distinguished from the object represented; for it appears as if the sense actually apprehended the things out of itself, and in their proper space.” (*Psychologie*, vol. i. p. 244.) “The things—the actual realities are not in our soul. Nevertheless, from the psychological point of view on which we are originally placed by nature, we do not suspect that our representation of external things and their relations is naught but representation. Before this can become a matter of consideration, the spatial relations are so far developed, that it seems as if the soul apprehended out of itself—as if it did not carry the image of things within itself, but perceived the things themselves in their proper space” (p. 267). “This belief (that our sensible percepts are the things themselves) is so strong and entire, that a light seems to break upon us when we first learn, or bethink ourselves, that we are absolutely shut in within the circle of our own representations. Nay, it costs so painful an effort, consistently to maintain this acquired view, in opposition to that permanent and unremitting illusion, that we need not marvel, if, even to many philosophers, it should have been again lost” (p. 270).

But it is needless to accumulate confessions as to a fact which has never, I believe, been openly denied; I shall only therefore refer in general to the following authorities, who, all in like manner, even while denying the *truth* of the natural belief, acknowledge the *fact* of its existence. *Malbranche*, Recherche, L. iii. c. 1; *Tetens*, Versuche, vol. i. p. 375; *Fichte*, Bestimmung des Menschen, p. 56, ed. 1825; and in *Philos. Journal*, VII. p. 35; *Tennemann*, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. ii. p. 294 (translated in *Edinb. Rev.*, vol. lii. p. 202); *Fries*, Neue Kritik, Vorr., p. xxviii. sec. ed.; *Herbart*, Allgemeine Metaphysik, II. Th., § 327; *Gerlach*, Fundamental Philosophie, § 33; *Beneke*, Das Verhaeltniss von Seele und Leib, p. 23; and *Kant und die Philosophische Aufgabe unserer Zeit*, p. 70; *Stoeger*, Pruefung, &c., p.

504. To these may be added, *Jacobi*, Werke, vol. i. p. 119; and in vol. ii., his "David Hume" passim, of which see a passage quoted *infra* in Testimonies, No. 87 c.

The contents of the *fact* of perception, *as given* in consciousness, being thus established, what are the consequences to philosophy, according as the *truth* of its testimony (I.) *is*, or (II.) *is not*, admitted?

I. On the *former* alternative, the veracity of consciousness, in the fact of perception, being unconditionally acknowledged, we have established at once, without hypothesis or demonstration, the reality of mind, and the reality of matter; while no concession is yielded to the skeptic, through which he may subvert philosophy in manifesting its self-contradiction. The *one* legitimate doctrine, thus possible, may be called *Natural Realism* or *Natural Dualism*.

II. On the *latter* alternative, *five* great variations from truth and nature may be conceived—and all of these have actually found their advocates—according as the testimony of consciousness, in the fact of perception, (A) is *wholly*, or (B) *partially*, rejected.

A. If *wholly* rejected, that is, if nothing but the phenomenal reality of the fact itself be allowed, the result is *Nihilism*. This may be conceived either as a dogmatical or as a skeptical opinion; and Hume and Fichte have competently shown, that if the truth of consciousness be not unconditionally recognized, Nihilism is the conclusion in which our speculation, if consistent with itself, must end.

B. On the other hand, if *partially* rejected, *four* schemes emerge, according to the way in which the fact is tampered with.

i. If the veracity of consciousness be allowed to the equipoise of the subject and object in the act, but disallowed to the reality of their antithesis, the system of *Absolute Identity* (whereof Pantheism is the corollary) arises, which reduces mind and matter to phenomenal modifications of the same common substance.

ii., iii. Again, if the testimony of consciousness be refused to

the equal originality and reciprocal independence of the subject and object in perception, two Unitarian schemes are determined, according as the one or as the other of these correlatives is supposed the prior and genetic. Is the object educed from the subject? *Idealism*; is the subject educed from the object? *Materialism*, is the result.

iv. Finally, if the testimony of consciousness to our *knowledge* of an external world existing be rejected with the Idealist, but with the Realist the *existence* of that world be affirmed, we have a scheme which, as it by many various hypotheses, endeavors, on the one hand, not to give up the reality of an unknown material universe, and on the other, to explain the ideal illusion of its cognition, may be called the doctrine of *Cosmothetic Idealism*, *Hypothetical Realism*, or *Hypothetical Dualism*. This last, though the most vacillating, inconsequent, and self-contradictory of all systems, is the one which, as less obnoxious in its acknowledged consequences (being a kind of compromise between speculation and common sense), has found favor with the immense majority of philosophers.¹

From the rejection of the fact of consciousness in this example of perception, we have thus, in the first place, multiplicity, speculative variation, error; in the second, systems practically dangerous; and in the third, what concerns us exclusively at present, the incompetence of an appeal to the common sense of mankind by any of these systems against the conclusions of others. This last will, however, be more appropriately shown in our special consideration of the conditions of the argument of Common Sense, to which we now go on.

¹ See, in connection with this more general distribution of philosophical systems from the whole fact of consciousness in perception, other more special divisions, from the relation of the object to the subject of perception, in the second part, chapter iii.—*W*.

§ II.—CONDITIONS OF THE LEGITIMACY, AND LEGITIMATE APPLICATION, OF THE ARGUMENT FROM COMMON SENSE.

From what has been stated, it is manifest that the argument drawn from Common Sense, for the truth or falsehood of any given thesis, proceeds on two suppositions :

1°. *That the proposition to be proved is either identical with, or necessarily evolved out of, a primary datum of consciousness ;* and,

2°. *That the primary data of consciousness are, one and all of them, admitted, by the proponent of this argument, to be true.*

From this it follows, that each of these suppositions will constitute a condition, under which the legitimate application of this reasoning is exclusively competent. Whether these conditions have been ever previously enounced, I know not. But this I know, that while their necessity is so palpable, that they could never, if explicitly stated, be explicitly denied ; that in the hands of philosophers they have been always, more or less violated, implicitly and in fact, and this often not the least obtrusively by those who have been themselves the loudest in their appeal from the conclusions of an obnoxious speculation to the common convictions of mankind. It is not therefore to be marvelled at, if the argument itself should have sometimes shared in the contempt which its abusive application so frequently and so justly merited.

1. That the first condition—that of *originality*—is indispensable, is involved in the very conception of the argument. I should indeed hardly have deemed that it required an articulate statement, were it not that, in point of fact, many philosophers have attempted to establish, on the principles of common sense, propositions which are not original data of consciousness ; while the original data of consciousness, from which their propositions were derived, and to which they owed their whole necessity and truth—these data the same philosophers were (strange to say !)

not disposed to admit. Thus, when it is argued by the Cosmothetic Idealists—"The external world exists, because we naturally believe it to exist;" the illation is incompetent, inasmuch as it erroneously assumes that our belief of an external world is a primary datum of consciousness. This is not the case. That an outer world exists is given us, not as a "miraculous revelation," not as a "cast of magic," not as an "instinctive feeling," not as a "blind belief." These expressions, in which the Cosmothetic Idealists shadow forth the difficulty they create, and attempt to solve, are wholly inapplicable to the real fact. Our belief of a material universe is not ultimate; and that universe is not unknown. This belief is not a supernatural inspiration; it is not an infused faith. We are not compelled by a blind impulse to believe in the external world, as in an unknown something; on the contrary, we believe it to exist only because we are immediately cognizant of it as existing. If asked, indeed—How we know that we know it—how we know that what we apprehend in sensible perception is, as consciousness assures us, an object, external, extended, and numerically different from the conscious subject?—how we know that this object is not a mere mode of mind, illu- sively presented to us as a mode of matter?—then indeed we must reply, that we do not in propriety *know* that what we are compelled to perceive as not-self, is not a perception of self, and that we can only on reflection *believe* such to be the case, in reliance on the original necessity of so believing, imposed on us by our nature,

Quæ nisi sit veri, ratio quoque falsa fit omnis.

That this is a correct statement of the fact has been already shown; and if such be the undenied and undeniable ground of the natural belief of mankind, in the reality of external things, the incompetence of the argument from common sense in the hands of the Cosmothetic Idealist is manifest, in so far as it does not fulfil the fundamental condition of that argument.

This defect of the argument may in the present example in-

deed, be easily supplied, by interpolating the medium which has been left out. But this cannot consistently be done by the Cosmothetic Idealist, who is reduced to this dilemma—that if he adhere to his hypothesis, he must renounce the argument; and if he apply the argument, he must renounce his hypothesis.

2. The second condition, that of *absolute truth*, requires that he who applies the argument of common sense, by appealing to the veracity of consciousness, should not himself, directly or indirectly, admit that consciousness is ever false; in other words, he is bound, in applying this argument, to apply it thoroughly, impartially, against himself no less than against others, and not according to the conveniences of his polemic, to approbate and reprobate the testimony of our original beliefs. That our immediate consciousness, if competent to prove any thing, must be competent to prove every thing it avouches, is a principle which none have been found, at least openly, to deny. It is proclaimed by Leibnitz:—“Si l'expérience interne immédiate pouvait nous tromper, il ne saurait y avoir pour moi aucune vérité de fait, j'ajoute, ni de raison. And by Lucretius:

Denique ut in fabrica si præva 'st Regula prima,
 • Omnia mendosa fieri atque obstipa necessum 'st;
 Sic igitur Ratio tibi rerum præva necesse 'st,
 Falsaque sit, falsis quæcumque ab Sensibus orta 'st.

Compare *Plotinus*, En. V. Lib. v. c. 1; *Buffier*, Pr. Ver., § 71; *Reid*, Inq., p. 183, b. I. P. p. 260, b.

Yet, however notorious the condition, that consciousness unless held trustworthy in all its revelations cannot be held trustworthy in any; marvellous to say, philosophers have rarely scrupled, on the one hand, quietly to supersede the data of consciousness, so often as these did not fall in with their preadopted opinions; and on the other, clamorously to appeal to them, as irrecusable truths, so often as they could allege them in corroboration of their own, or in refutation of a hostile doctrine.

I shall again take for an example the fact of perception, and the violation of the present condition by the Cosmothetic Ideal-

ists—1°, in the constitution of their own doctrine; 2°, in their polemic against more extreme opinions.

In the first place, in the constitution of their doctrine, nothing can be imagined more monstrous than the procedure of these philosophers, in attempting to vindicate the reality of a material world, on the ground of a universal belief in its existence; and yet rejecting the universal *belief in the knowledge* on which the universal *belief in the existence* is exclusively based. Here the absurdity is twofold. Firstly, in postulating a conclusion though rejecting its premises; secondly, in founding their doctrine partly on the veracity, and partly on the mendacity, of consciousness.

In the second place, with what consistency and effect do the Hypothetical Realists point the argument of common sense against the obnoxious conclusions of the thorough-going Idealist, the Materialist, the Absolutist, the Nihilist?

Take first their vindication of an external world against the Idealist.

To prove this, do they, like Dr. Thomas Brown, simply found on the natural belief of mankind in its existence? But they themselves, as we have seen, admitting the untruth of one natural belief—the belief in our immediate knowledge of external things—have no right to presume upon the truth of any other; and the absurdity is carried to its climax, when the natural belief, which they regard as false, is the sole ground of the natural belief which they would assume and found upon as true. Again, do they like Descartes, allege that God would be a deceiver, were we constrained by nature to believe in the reality of an unreal world? But the Deity, on their hypothesis, is a deceiver; for that hypothesis assumes that our natural consciousness deludes us in the belief, that external objects are immediately, and in themselves perceived. Either therefore maintaining the veracity of God, they must surrender their hypothesis; or, maintaining their hypothesis, they must surrender the veracity of God.

Against the Materialist, in proof of our Personal Identity, can they maintain that consciousness is able to identify self, at one

period, with self, at another; when, in their theory of perception, consciousness, mistaking self for not-self, is unable, they virtually assert, to identify self with self, even at the same moment of existence?

How, again, can they maintain the substantial Individuality and consequent Immateriality of the thinking principle, on the unity of consciousness, when the duality given in consciousness is not allowed substantially to discriminate the object from the subject in perception?

But to take a broader view. It is a maxim in philosophy,—*That substances are not to be multiplied without necessity*; in other words,—*That a plurality of principles are not to be assumed, when the phenomena can possibly be explained by one.* This regulative principle, which may be called the law or maxim of Parcimony,¹ throws it therefore on the advocates of a scheme of psychological Dualism, to prove the necessity of supposing more than a single substance for the phenomena of mind and matter.—Further, we know nothing whatever of mind and matter, considered as substances; they are only known to us as a twofold series of phenomena: and we can only justify, against the law of parcimony, the postulation of two substances, on the ground, that the two series of phenomena are, reciprocally, so contrary and incompatible, that the one cannot be reduced to the other, nor both be supposed to cohere in the same common substance. Is this ground shown to be invalid?—the presumption against a dualistic theory at once recurs, and a unitarian scheme becomes, in the circumstances, philosophically necessary.

Now the doctrine of Cosmothetic Idealism, in abolishing the incompatibility of the two series of phenomena, subverts the only ground on which a psychological Dualism can be maintained. This doctrine denies to mind a knowledge of aught beyond its own modifications. The qualities, which we call material—Exten-

¹The rule of philosophizing, which Hamilton felicitously calls the law of parcimony, was often keenly applied by the logical Ocean; hence it is sometimes designated as “Occam’s razor.”—W.

sion, Figure, &c.,—*exist for us*, only as they are *known by us*; and, on this hypothesis, they are known by us *only as modes of mind*. The two series of phenomena, therefore, so far from being really, as they are apparently, opposed, are, on this doctrine, in fact, admitted to be all only manifestations of the same substance.

So far, therefore, from the Hypothetical Dualist being able to resist the conclusion of the Unitarian—whether Idealist, Materialist, or Absolutist; the fundamental position of his philosophy—that *the object immediately known is in every act of cognition identical with the subject knowing*—in reality, establishes any and every doctrine but his own. On this principle, the Idealist may educe the object from the subject; the Materialist educe the subject from the object; the Absolutist carry both up into indifference; nay the Nihilist subvert the substantial reality of either: and the Hypothetical Dualist is doomed to prove, that, while the only salvation against these melancholy results is an appeal to the natural convictions of mankind, that the argument from common sense is in his hands a weapon, either impotent against his opponents, or fatal equally to himself and them.

§ III.—THE ARGUMENT FROM COMMON SENSE IS ONE STRICTLY PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC.

We have thus seen, though the argument from common sense be an appeal to the natural convictions of mankind, that it is not an appeal from philosophy to blind feeling. It is only an appeal, from the heretical conclusions of particular philosophies, to the catholic principles of all philosophy. The prejudice, which, on this supposition, has sometimes been excited against the argument, is groundless.

Nor is it true, that the argument from common sense denies the decision to the judgment of philosophers, and accords it to the verdict of the vulgar. Nothing can be more erroneous. We admit—nay we maintain, as D'Alembert well expresses it, “that the truth in metaphysic, like the truth in matters of taste, is a

truth of which all minds have the germ within themselves; to which indeed the greater number pay no attention, but which they recognize the moment it is pointed out to them. . . . But if, in this sort, all are able to understand, all are not able to instruct. The merit of conveying easily to others true and simple notions is much greater than is commonly supposed; for experience proves how rarely this is to be met with. Sound metaphysical ideas are common truths, which every one apprehends, but which few have the talent to develop. So difficult is it on any subject to make our own what belongs to every one." (Melanges, t. iv. § 6.) Or, to employ the words of the ingenious Lichtenberg—"Philosophy, twist the matter as we may, is always a sort of chemistry (Scheidekunst). The peasant employs all the principles of abstract philosophy, only *inveloped, latent, engaged*, as the men of physical science express it; the Philosopher exhibits the *pure principle*." (Hinterlassene Schriften, vol. ii. p. 67.)

The first problem of Philosophy—and it is one of no easy accomplishment—being thus to seek out, purify, and establish, by intellectual analysis and criticism, the elementary feelings or beliefs, in which are given the elementary truths of which all are in possession; and the argument from common sense being the allegation of these feelings or beliefs as explicated and ascertained, in proof of the relative truths and their necessary consequences;—this argument is manifestly dependent on philosophy, as an art, as an acquired dexterity, and cannot, notwithstanding the errors which they have so frequently committed, be taken out of the hands of the philosophers. Common Sense is like Common Law. Each may be laid down as the general rule of decision; but in the one case it must be left to the jurist, in the other to the philosopher, to ascertain what are the contents of the rule; and though in both instances the common man may be cited as a witness, for the custom or the fact, in neither can he be allowed to officiate as advocate or as judge.

Μηδέποτε κρίνειν ἀδαήμονας ἄνδρας ἐάσσης·
Τὴν σοφίην σοφῶς ἰθύνει, τέχνας δ' ἄμωστρον.

PHOCYLIDES.

It must be recollected, also, that in appealing to the consciousness of mankind in general, we only appeal to the consciousness of those not disqualified to pronounce a decision. "In saying" (to use the words of Aristotle), "simply and without qualification, that this or that *is a known truth*, we do not mean that it is in fact recognized by all, but only by such as are of sound understanding; just as in saying absolutely that a thing is wholesome, we must be held to mean, to such as are of a hale constitution." (Top. L. vi. c. 4. § 7.)—We may, in short, say of the true philosopher what Erasmus, in an epistle to Hutten, said of Sir Thomas Moore:—"Nemo minus ducitur *vulgi judicio*; sed rursus nemo minus abest *a sensu communi*."

When rightly understood, therefore, no valid objection can be taken to the argument of common sense, considered in itself. But it must be allowed that the way it has been sometimes applied was calculated to bring it into not unreasonable disfavor with the learned. (See C. L. Reinhold's *Beyträge zur leichtern Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie*, i. p. 61; and Niethammer in his *Journal*, i. p. 43 sq.) In this country in particular, some of those who opposed it to the skeptical conclusions of Hume did not sufficiently counteract the notion which the name might naturally suggest; they did not emphatically proclaim that it was no appeal to the undeveloped beliefs of the unreflective many; and they did not inculcate that it presupposed a critical analysis of these beliefs by the philosophers themselves. On the contrary, their language and procedure might even, sometimes, warrant an opposite conclusion. This must be admitted without reserve of the writings of Beattie, and more especially of Oswald. But even Reid, in his earlier work, was not so explicit as to prevent his being occasionally classed in the same category. That the strictures on the "Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense" by Feder, Lambert, Tetens, Eberhard, Kant, Ulrich, Jacob, &c., were inapplicable to Reid, is sufficiently proved by the more articulate exposition of his doctrine, afterwards given in his *Essays on the Intellectual and Active Powers*. But these

criticisms having been once recorded, we need not wonder at their subsequent repetition, without qualification or exception, by philosophers, and historians of philosophy.

To take, as an example, the judgment of the most celebrated of these critics. "It is not" (says Kant, in the preface to his *Prolegomena*) "without a certain painful feeling, that we behold how completely Hume's opponents, Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and, at last, Priestley, missed the point of his problem; and whilst they, on the one hand, constantly assumed the very positions which he did not allow, and on the other, demonstrated warmly, and often with great intemperance, what he had never dreamt of calling into question, they so little profited by the hint which he had given towards better things, that all remained in the same position as if the matter had never been agitated at all. The question mooted, was not—*Whether the notion of Cause were right, applicable, and, in relation to all natural knowledge, indispensable*; for of this Hume had never insinuated a doubt; but—*Whether this notion were to the mind excogitated a priori, whether it thus possessed an intrinsic truth, independent of all experience, and consequently a more extensive applicability, one not limited merely to objects of experience*; on this Hume awaited a disclosure. In fact, the whole dispute regarded the origin of this notion, and not its indispensability in use. If the former be made out, all that respects the conditions of its use, and the sphere within which it can be validly applied, follow as corollaries, of themselves. In order satisfactorily to solve the problem, it behoved the opponents of this illustrious man to have penetrated deeply into the nature of the mind, considered as exclusively occupied in pure thinking: but this did not suit them. They, therefore, discovered a more convenient method, in an appeal to the common understanding of mankind (*gemeiner Menschenverstand*)"—and so forth; showing that Kant understood by the common sense of the Scottish philosophers, only good sense, sound understanding, &c. (*Prolegomena*, p. 10.)

I will not object to the general truth of the statements in this passage; nor to their bearing in so far as they are applied to the British philosophers in general. For Reid, however, I must claim an exemption; and this I shall establish with regard to the very notion of Cause to which Kant refers.

That from the limited scope of his earlier work, the "*Inquiry*," Reid had not occasion to institute a critical analysis of the notion of Causality, affords no ground for holding that he did not consider such analysis to be necessary in the establishment of that and the other principles of common sense. This, indeed, he in that very work, once and again, explicitly declares. "We have taken notice of several original principles of belief in the course of this inquiry; and when *other faculties* of the mind are examined we shall find *more*. * * * * A *clear explication and enumeration* of the principles of a common sense, is *one of the chief desiderata* in Logic. We have *only* considered such of them as occurred in the examination of the *five senses*." And accordingly in his subsequent and more extensive work, the "*Essays on the Intellectual powers*," published within two years after Kant's "*Prolegomena*," we find the notion of Causality, among others, investigated by the very same critical process which the philosopher of Koenigsberg so successfully employed; though there be no reason whatever for surmising that Reid had ever heard the name, far less seen the works, of his illustrious censor. The criterion—the index by which Kant discriminates the notions of *pure* or *a priori* origin from those elaborated from experience, is their quality of *necessity*; and its quality of necessity is precisely the characteristic by which Reid proves that, among others, the notion of causality cannot be an educt of experience, but must form a part of the negative cognitions of the mind itself. It is doubtful, indeed, whether Reid, like Kant, was even indebted to Leibnitz for his knowledge of this touchstone; but the fact of its familiar employment by him in the discrimination and establishment of the fundamental principles of thought, more especially in his later works, sufficiently shows,

that the reproach of an uncritical application of the argument from common sense, made against the Scottish philosophers in general, was, at least in reference to him, unfounded. Reid, however—and to his honor be it spoken—stands alone among the philosophers of this country in his appreciation and employment of the criterion of necessity.

[Since writing the above, I have met with the following passage in the "Lettere Filosofiche" of Baron Galuppi, one of the two most distinguished of the present metaphysicians of Italy.

"The philosopher of Koenigsberg makes Hume thus reason:—'Metaphysical Causality is not in the objects observed; it is, therefore, a product of imagination engendered upon custom.'—This reasoning, says Kant, is inexact. It ought to have proceeded thus:—'Causality is not in the things observed; it is therefore in the observer.' But here Kant does not apprehend Hume's meaning, whose reasoning, as I have stated in the eighth letter, is altogether different. Metaphysical causality, he argues, is not in the things observed; it cannot, therefore, be in the observer, in whom all is derived from the things observed. Reid fully understands the purport of Hume's argument, and meets it precisely and conclusively with this counter-reasoning:—'Metaphysical Causality is a fact in our intellect; it is not derived from the things observed, and is therefore a subjective law of the observer.' Kant objects, that Reid has not attended to the state of the question. There is no dispute, he says, about the existence of the notion of metaphysical causality; the only doubt regards its origin. This is altogether erroneous. Hume being unable to find the origin of the notion in experience, denied its existence. Kant's criticism of Reid is therefore unjust." P. 225.

Kant, I think, is here but hardly dealt with. Hume did not, certainly, deny the existence of the notion of causality, meaning thereby its existence as a mental phenomenon; he only (on the hypothesis of the then dominant doctrine of sensualism) showed that it had no objective validity—no legitimate genesis. In different points of view, therefore, Hume may be said to deny, and

not to deny, its reality. The dispute is a mere logomachy. Kant also stands clear of injustice towards Reid, when it is considered that his strictures on the Scottish philosophers were prior to the appearance of the "Essays on the Intellectual Powers," the work in which Reid first expounded his doctrine of causality.]

§ IV.—ON THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERS BY WHICH THE PRINCIPLES OF COMMON SENSE ARE DISCRIMINATED.

It now remains to consider what are the essential notes or characters by which we are enabled to distinguish our original from our derivative convictions. These characters, I think, may be reduced to four;—1^o, their *Incomprehensibility*—2^o, their *Simplicity*—3^o, their *Necessity* and *absolute Universality*—4^o, their *comparative Evidence* and *Certainty*.

1. In reference to the first;—A conviction is incomprehensible when there is merely given us in consciousness—*That its object is* (ὅτι ἔσται); and when we are unable to comprehend through a higher notion or belief, *Why or How it is* (διότι ἔσται). When we are able to comprehend why or how a thing is, the belief of the existence of that thing is not a primary datum of consciousness, but a subsumption under the cognition or belief which affords its reason.

2. As to the second;—It is manifest that if a cognition or belief be made up of, and can be explicated into, a plurality of cognitions or beliefs, that, as compound, it cannot be original.

3. Touching the third;—Necessity and Universality may be regarded as coincident. For when a belief is necessary it is, *eo ipso*, universal; and that a belief is universal, is a certain index that it must be necessary. (See Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais*, L. i. § 4, p. 32.) To prove the necessity, the universality must, however, be absolute; for a relative universality indicates no more than custom and education, howbeit the subjects themselves may deem that they follow only the dictates of nature. As St. Jerome has it—"Unaquæque gens hoc legem naturæ putat, quod didicit."

It is to be observed, that the necessity here spoken of, is of two kinds. There is one necessity when we cannot construe it to our minds as possible, that the deliverance of consciousness should not be true. This logical impossibility occurs in the case of what are called necessary truths—truths of reason or intelligence; as in the law of causality, the law of substance, and still more in the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle. There is another necessity, when it is not unthinkable, that the deliverance of consciousness may possibly be false, but at the same time, when we cannot but admit, that this deliverance is of such or such a purport. This is seen in the case of what are called contingent truths, or truths of fact. Thus, for example, I can theoretically suppose that the external object I am conscious of in perception, may be, in reality, nothing but a mode of mind or self. I am unable, however, to think that it does not appear to me—that consciousness does not compel me to regard it—as external—as a mode of matter or not-self. And such being the case, I cannot practically believe the supposition I am able speculatively to maintain. For I cannot believe this supposition, without believing that the last ground of all belief is not to be believed; which is self-contradictory. “Nature,” says Pascal, “confounds the Pyrrhonist;” and, among many similar confessions, those of Hume, of Fichte, of Hommel may suffice for an acknowledgment of the impossibility which the Skeptic, the Idealist, the Fatalist finds in practically believing the scheme which he views as theoretically demonstrated. The argument from common sense, it may be observed, is of principal importance in reference to the class of contingent truths. The others, from their converse being absolutely incogitable, sufficiently guard themselves.

As this criterion of Necessity and Universality is signalized by nearly the whole series of authorities adduced in the sequel, it would be idle to refer to any in particular.

4. The fourth and last character of our original beliefs is their comparative Evidence and Certainty. This, along with the third, is well stated by Aristotle.—“What *appears to all*, that we affirm

to be; and he who rejects this belief will assuredly advance *nothing better deserving of credence.*" And again:—"If we know and believe through certain original principles, we must know and believe these with *paramount certainty*, for the very reason that we know and believe all else through them." And such are the truths in regard to which the Aphrodisian says,—“though some men may verbally dissent, all men are in their hearts agreed.” This constitutes the first of Buffier’s essential qualities of primary truths, which is, as he expresses it,—“to be so clear, that if we attempt to prove or to disprove them, this can be done only by propositions which are manifestly *neither more evident nor more certain.*” Testimonies, nn. 3, 10, 63. Compare the others, *passim*.

A good illustration of this character is afforded by the assurance—to which we have already so frequently referred—that in perception, mind is immediately cognizant of matter. *How* self can be conscious of not-self, *how* mind can be cognizant of matter, we do not know; but we know as little *how* mind can be percipient of itself. In both cases we only know the fact, on the authority of consciousness; and when the conditions of the problem are rightly understood—when it is established that it is only the *primary* qualities of body which are apprehended in themselves, and this only in so far as they are in immediate relation to the organ of sense, the difficulty in the one case is not more than in the other. This in opposition to the simple Idealists. But the Cosmothetic Idealists—the Hypothetical Realists are far less reasonable; who, in the teeth of consciousness, on the ground of inconceivability, deny to mind all cognizance of matter, yet bestow on it the more inconceivable power of representing, and truly representing to itself the external world, which, *ex hypothesi*, it does not know. These theorists do not substitute, in place of the simple fact which they repudiate, another more easy and intelligible. On the contrary, they gratuitously involve themselves in a maze of unwarrantable postulates, difficulties, improbabilities, and self-contradictions, of such a character, that we well may wonder, how the doctrine of Cosmothetic Idealism has been able to enlist

under its banners, not a few merely, but the immense majority of modern philosophers. The Cosmothetic Idealists, in truth, violate in their hypothesis every condition of a legitimate hypothesis.¹

§ V.—THE NOMENCLATURE, THAT IS, THE VARIOUS APPELLATIONS BY WHICH THE PRINCIPLES OF COMMON SENSE HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED.

It is evident that the foundations of our knowledge cannot properly be themselves the objects of our knowledge; for as by them we know all else, by naught else can they themselves be known. We know them indeed, but only in the fact, that with and through them we know. This it is, which has so generally induced philosophers to bestow on them appellations marking out the circumstance, that in different points of view, they may, and they may not, be regarded as cognitions. They appear as cognitions, in so far as we are conscious *that* (ὅτι) they *actually* are; they do not appear as cognitions, in so far as in them we are not conscious *how* (διδίτι) they *possibly* can be. Philosophers accordingly, even when they view and designate them as cognitions, are wont to qualify their appellation under this character, by some restrictive epithet. For example, Cicero styling them *intelligentiæ* does not do so simply; but *i. inchoatæ, i. adumbratæ, i. obscuræ, &c.* A similar limitation is seen in the terms *ultimate facts, primary data, &c., of consciousness*; for these and the analogous expressions are intended to show, that while their existence is within our *apprehension*, the reason or ground of their existence is beyond our *comprehension*.

On the other hand we see the prevalence of the opposite point of view in the nomenclatures which seem to regard them not as cognitions wholly within consciousness, but as the bases of cognition, and therefore partly without, and partly within consciousness. Such is the scope of the analogical designations applied to

¹ For illustration of this see chapter first of the second part of this vol.—*W.*

them, of *Senses, Feelings, Instincts, Revelations, Inspirations, Suggestions, Beliefs, Assents, Holdings, &c.* It is the inexplicable and equivocal character which the roots of our knowledge thus exhibit, to which we ought to attribute the inadequacy, the vacillation and the ambiguity of the terms by which it has been attempted to denote them; and it is with an indulgent recollection of this, that we ought to criticise all and each of these denominations,—which, after this general observation, I proceed to consider in detail. In doing this, I shall group them according to the principal points of view from which it would seem they were imposed.

I. The first condition, the consideration of which seems to have determined a certain class of names, is that of *Immediacy*. In our primitive cognitions we apprehend existence at once, and without the intervention of aught between the apprehending mind and the existence apprehended.

Under this head the first appellations are those which, with some qualifying attribute, apply to these cognitions the name of —*Sense*.

It is hardly necessary to observe, that the words corresponding to the term *Sense* and its conjugates, have in no language been limited to our perceptions of the external world, or to the feeling of our bodily affections. In every language they have been extended to the operations of the higher faculties. Indeed, it can be shown, in almost every instance, that the names which ultimately came to be appropriated to the purest acts of intelligence, were, in their origin, significant of one or other of the functions of our organic sensibility. Such among others is the rationale of the terms *moral sense* (*sensus boni*), *logical sense* (*sensus veri*), *æsthetical sense* (*sensus pulchri*), which, even in modern philosophy, have been very commonly employed, though not employed to denote any thing lower than the apprehensive faculty of intelligence in these different relations. On this transference of the term *Sense*, see *Aristotle* (*De Anima*, L. iii. c. 3)—*Quintilian* (*Instit.* L. viii. c. 5)—*Budæus* (in *Pandectas*, Tit. i.)—*Sal-*

masius (ad Solinum, p. 141)—*Grotius* (ad Acta Apostolorum, vii. 32, and I. Petri, i. 12)—*Claubergius* (Exercitationes, 83–88)—*Burmamnus* (ad Phædrum, L. ii. Ep. 13)—*Gronovius* (Diatriba ad Statium, c. 43)—*J. A. Fabricius* (Programma De Gustatu Pulcri, p. 5), &c., &c.

This being, in general, premised, we have now to consider in particular: 1^o, the ancient term *Common Sense*; and 2^o, the modern term *Internal Sense*, as applied to our elementary consciousness.

1. SENSE *Common* (*sensus communis, sensus communes, sensus publicus, sens commun, senso comune, Gemeininn*), *principles, axioms, maxims, truths, judgments, &c.*, of.

The Greek tongue was for a long period destitute of any word to denote *Consciousness*; and it was only after both the philosophy and language of Greece had passed their prime, that the terms *συναίσθάνομαι* and *συναίσθησις* were applied, not merely to denote the apperception of sense, but the primary condition of knowledge in general. The same analogy explains how in the Latin tongue the term *Sensus Communis* came, from a very ancient period, to be employed with a similar latitude; and as Latin, even after its extinction as a living language, was long the exclusive vehicle of religion and philosophy throughout western Europe, we need not wonder that the analysis and its expression, the thing and the word, passed not only into the dialects in which the Romanic, but into those also in which the Teutonic element was predominant. But as the expression is not unambiguous, it is requisite to distinguish its significations.

The various meanings in which the term *Common Sense* is met with, in ancient and modern times, may I think be reduced to *four*; and these fall into *two* categories, according as it *is*, or *is not*, *limited to the sphere of sense proper*.

As restricted to sense proper.

a.—Under this head *Common Sense* has only a single meaning; that, to wit, which it obtained in the Peripatetic philosophy and its derivative systems. *Common Sense* (*κοινὴ αἴσθησις*) was

employed by Aristotle to denote the faculty in which the various reports of the several senses are reduced to the unity of a common apperception. This signification is determinate. The others are less precisely discriminated from each other.

(I may observe, however, that a second meaning under this category might be found in the *Cœnæsthesis*, *common feeling* or *sensation*, by which certain German physiologists have denominated the *sensus vagus* or vital sense, and which some of them translate by common sense (*Gemeinsinn*). But as the term in this signification has been employed recently, rarely, abusively, and without imposing authority, I shall discount it.)

As not limited to the sphere of sense proper, it comprises three meanings.

b.—The second signification of Common Sense is when it denotes the complement of those cognitions or convictions which we receive from nature; which all men therefore possess in common; and by which they test the truth of knowledge, and the morality of actions. This is the meaning in which the expression is now emphatically employed in philosophy, and which may be, therefore, called its *philosophical* signification. As authorities for its use in this relation, Reid (I. P. p. 423–425¹) has adduced legitimate examples from Bentley, Shaftesbury, Fenelon, Buffier, and Hume. The others which he quotes from Cicero and Priestley, can hardly be considered as more than instances of the employment of the words; for the former, in the particular passage quoted, does not seem to mean by "*sensus communes*" more than the faculty of *apprehending sensible relations* which all possess; and the latter explicitly states, that he uses the words in a meaning (the third) which we are hereafter to consider. Mr. Stewart (Elements, vol. ii. c. 7, sect. 3, p. 76), to the examples of Reid, adds only a single, and that not an unambiguous instance, from Bayle. It therefore still remains to show that in this signification its employment is not only of authorized usage, but, in fact, one

¹ The reference is to Hamilton's edition of Reid.—W.

long and universally established. This is done in the series of testimonies I shall adduce—principally indeed to prove that the *doctrine* of Common Sense, notwithstanding many schismatic aberrations, is the one catholic and perennial philosophy, but which also concur in showing that this too is the *name* under which that doctrine has for two thousand years been most familiarly known, at least, in the western world. Of these Lucretius, Cicero, Horace, Seneca, Tertullian, Arnobius, and St. Augustin exhibit the expression as recognized in the language and philosophy of ancient Rome; while some fifty others prove its scientific and colloquial usage in every country of modern Europe. (See Nos. 5-8, 12, 13, 15, 23, 25, 27-29, 31, 32, 34, 36, 38-44, 47, 48, 51-53, 55, 56, 58-69, 71-75, 78-85, 90.)

The objections to the term Common Sense in this its philosophical application are obvious enough. It is not unambiguous. To ground an objection it has sometimes unintentionally, more frequently willingly, been taken in the third signification (v. p. 56 c.); and its employment has even afforded a ground for supposing that Reid and other Scottish philosophers proposed under it a certain peculiar sense, distinct from intelligence, by which truth is apprehended or revealed. See *Fries*, in Testimonies No. 70, and *Franke*, *Leben des Gefuehls*, § 42.

On the other hand, besides that no other expression, to which valid objection may not be taken, has yet been proposed; and besides, that it has itself been ratified by ancient and general usage; the term Common Sense is not inappropriately applied to denote an original source of knowledge common to all mankind—a fountain of truths intelligible indeed, but like those of the senses revealed immediately as facts to be believed, but not as possibilities to be explained and understood. On this ground the term Sense has found favor, in this application, with the most ancient and the most recent philosophers. For example—*Aristotle* (*Eth. Nic. L. vi. c. 11*, and *Eth. Eud. L. v. c. 11*) says that *νοῦς*, Intelligence proper, the faculty of first principle is, in certain respects, a Sense; and the ancient Scholiast, Eustratius, in his commentary

on the former work (f. 110, b) explains it by observing, "that Intelligence and Sense have this exclusively in common—they are both *immediate cognitions*." Hence it is that Aristotle (Metaph. xii. 7), Theophrastus (see Test. No. 4), and Plotinus (En. vi. L. vii. cc. 36, 39, L. ix. c. 7) assimilate intellection, the noetic energy, to *touching* in particular.* In reference to the apprehension

* Among the Greeks the expression "Common Intellect" was, however, rarely, if ever, used for Common Sense in this its second, or philosophical meaning. The learned Mr. Harris (in a note on his Dialogue concerning Happiness) in stating the doctrine of the Greek philosophers, says—"The recognition of self-evident truths, or at least the ability to recognize them, is called *κοινὸς νοῦς*, 'common sense,' as being a sense common to all, except lunatics and idiots." This is inaccurate; for his statement of what was usual among the Greeks is founded (I presume, for he does not allege any authority) on a single, and singular, example of such usage. It is that of Epictetus (Diss. Arriani, L. iii. c. 6). This philosopher seems in that passage to give the name of common intellect (*κοινὸς νοῦς*, which H. Wolfius and Upton translate by *sensus communis*) to the faculty of those common notions possessed by all who are of sound mind. Now were the epithet *common* here applied to intellect *because* intellect is the repository of such common notions or inasmuch as it is common to all men—this, however likely a usage, is, I am confident, the only, or almost the only, example to be found in antiquity of such a nomenclature; for though the expression in question is frequent among the Greek writers, I do not recollect to have elsewhere met with it in a similar import. It is employed in two significations.—1^o, with *νοῦς* in its stricter meaning, for the highest faculty of mind, *κοινὸς* is used to mark its impersonality, its unity, its general identity in men, or in man and God. 2^o, With *νοῦς*, in its looser meaning for mind in general, it denotes a community of opinion or a community of social sentiment, corresponding to *Sensus Communis* among the Romans, to be spoken of as the fourth signification. The only second instance, I believe, that can be brought is from the Aphrodisian. (On the Soul, f. 138, ed. Ald.) But there the epithet *common* is given to the natural in opposition to the acquired intellect, exclusively from the circumstance that the former is possessed by all of sound mind, the latter only by some; nay, from a comparison of the two passages it is evident, that Alexander in his employment of the expression had *Epictetus* and *this very instance* immediately in his eye. But it is in fact by no means improbable that Epictetus here uses the expression only in the first of its two ordinary significations—as a Stoic, to denote the individual intellect, considered as a particle of the universal; and this even the commentators are inclined to believe. See Upton, ad locum. In illustration of this:—Pintarch in his treatise 'On Common Notions against the Stoics,' uses (after *παρὰ* or *κατὰ*) *τὴν κοινὴν ἔννοιαν* or *τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας* at least *twenty-three* times, and without the adjective *τὴν ἔννοιαν* or *τὰς ἐννοίας*, at least

of primary truths, 'the soul,' says Dr. John Smith, 'has its senses, in like manner as the body' (Select Discourses); and his friend Dr. Henry More designates the same by the name of *intellectual sense*. (Test. n. 45.) Jacobi defines Vernunft, his faculty of 'intellectual intuitions' as 'the sense of the supersensible.' (Test. n. 87.) De la Mennais could not find a more suitable expression whereby to designate his theological system of *universal consent*, or *general reason*, than that of *Common Sense*; and Borger in his classical work 'De Mysticismo' prefers *sensus* as the least exceptionable word by which to discriminate those notions, of which, while we are conscious of the existence, we are ignorant of the reason and origin. 'Cum igitur, qui has notiones sequitur, illum *sensum* sequi dicimus, hoc dicimus, illas notiones non esse ratione [ratiocinatione] quæsitæ, sed omni argumentatione antiquiores. Eo autem majori jure eos *sensus* vocabulo complectimur, quod, adeo obscuræ sunt, ut eorum ne distincte quidem nobis conscii simus, sed eas *esse*, ex efficacia earum intelligamus, i. e. ex vi qua animum afficiunt.' (P. 259, ed. 2.) See also of Testimonies the numbers already specified.

c.—In the third signification, Common Sense may be used with emphasis on the adjective or on the substantive.

In the former case, it denotes such an ordinary complement of intelligence, that, if a person be deficient therein, he is accounted mad or foolish.

Sensus communis is thus used in Phædrus, L. i. 7;—but Hor-

twenty-one times; which last, by the by, Xylander always renders by 'Sensus communis.' Now how many times does Plutarch use as a synonym, *κοινὸν νοῦν*? Not once. He does, indeed, once employ it and *κοινῶς φρένας* (p. 1077 of the folio editions); but in the sense of an agreement in thought with others—the sense which it obtains also in the only other example of the expression to be found in his writings. (P. 529 D).

I see Forcellini (voce Sensus) has fallen into the same inaccuracy as Harris.

I may here notice that Aristotle does not apply the epithet *common* to *intellect* at all; for *τοῦ κοινῶν* (De An. i. S. § 5) does not, as Themistius supposes, mean 'of the common [intellect]' but 'of the composite,' made up of soul and body.

ace, Serm i. iii. 66, and Juvenal, Sat. viii. 73, are erroneously, though usually, interpreted in this signification. In modern Latinity (as in Milton contra Salmasium, c. 8) and in most of the vulgar languages, the expression in this meaning is so familiar that it would be idle to adduce examples. Sir James Mackintosh (Dissertations, &c., p. 387 of collected edition) indeed, imagines that this is the only meaning of *common sense*; and on this ground censures Reid for the adoption of the term; and even Mr. Stewart's objections to it seem to proceed on the supposition, that this is its proper or more accredited signification. See Elements ii. ch. 1, sec. 2. This is wrong; but Reid himself, it must be acknowledged, does not sufficiently distinguish between the second and third acceptations; as may be seen from the tenor of the second chapter of the sixth Essay on the Intellectual Powers, but especially from the concluding chapter of the Inquiry.

In the latter case, it expresses native, practical intelligence, natural prudence, mother wit, tact in behavior, acuteness in the observation of character, &c., in contrast to habits of acquired learning, or of speculation away from the affairs of life. I recollect no unambiguous example of the phrase, in this precise acceptance, in any ancient author. In the modern languages, and more particularly in French and English, it is of ordinary occurrence. Thus, Voltaire's saying, 'Le sens commun n'est pas si commun;'—which, I may notice, was stolen from Buffier (Métaphysique, § 69).

With either emphasis it corresponds to the *κοινός λογισμὸς* of the Greeks, and among them to the *ἰσθῆδὸς λόγος* of the Stoics, to the *gesunde Menschenverstand* of the Germans, to the *Bons Sens* of the French, and to the *Good Sense* of the English. The two emphases enable us to reconcile the following contradictions:—'Le bon sens (says Descartes) est la chose du monde la mieux partagée;' 'Good sense (says Gibbon) is a quality of mind hardly less rare than genius.'

d.—In the fourth and last signification, Common Sense is no longer a natural quality; it denotes an acquired perception or

feeling of the common duties and proprieties expected from each member of society,—a gravitation of opinion—a sense of conventional decorum—communional sympathy—general *bien-séance*—public spirit, &c. In this signification—at least as absolutely used—it is limited to the language of ancient Rome. This is the meaning in which it occurs in Cicero, *De Orat.* i. 3, ii. 16—*Or. pro Domo* 37; in Horace, *Serm.* i. iii. 66; in Juvenal, *Sat.* viii. 73; in Quintilian; *Instit.* i. 2; and in Seneca, *Epp.* 5, 105, whose words in another place (which I cannot at the moment recover) are—‘*Sic in beneficio sensus communis, locum, tempus, personam observet.*’ Shaftesbury and others, misled probably by Casaubon, do not seize the central notion in their interpretation of several of these texts. In this meaning the Greeks sometimes employed *κοινὸς νοῦς*—an ambiguous expression, for which Antoninus seems to have coined as a substitute, *κοινωνορημοσύνη*. To this head may be referred Hutcheson’s employment of *Sensus Communis* for Sympathy. *Synopsis Metaphysicæ*, P. ii. c. 1.

2.—SENSE *inmost, interior, internal (sensus intimus, interior, internus, sens intime, interne)*. This was introduced as a convertible term with *Consciousness* in general by the philosophers of the Cartesian school; and thus came to be frequently applied to denote the source, complement, or revelation of immediate truths. It is however not only in itself vague, but liable to be confounded with *internal sense*, in other very different significations. We need not therefore regret that in this relation it has not (though Hutcheson set an example) been naturalized in British Philosophy.

The third appellation determined by the condition of Immediacy is that of

3.—INTUITIONS—INTUITIVE *cognitions, notions, judgments (Intuitiones—Intuitus—cognitio Intuitiva—Intuitiones—faculté Intuitive—Anschauungen)*. We may add, *ἐπιβολαί—γνώσις κατὰ πρῶτην ἐπιβολήν*. In this sense *αὐτοπτικός, ἑποπτικός* are rare.

The term Intuition is not unambiguous. Besides its original and proper meaning (as a visual perception), it has been em-

ployed to denote a kind of *apprehension*, and a kind of *judgment*.

Under the former head, Intuition, or intuitive knowledge, has been used in the six following significations :

a.—To denote a perception of the actual and present, in opposition to the ‘abstractive’ knowledge which we have of the possible in imagination, and of the past in memory.

b.—To denote an immediate apprehension of a thing in itself, in contrast to a representative, vicarious, or mediate, apprehension of it, in or through something else. (Hence by Fichte, Schelling, and others, Intuition is employed to designate the *cognition*, as opposed to the *conception*, of the Absolute.)

c.—To denote the knowledge which we can adequately represent in imagination, in contradistinction to the ‘symbolical’ knowledge which we cannot image, but only think or conceive, through and under a sign or word. (Hence probably Kant’s application of the term to the forms of the Sensibility—the imaginations of Space and Time—in contrast to the forms or categories of the Understanding.)

d.—To denote perception proper (the objective), in contrast to sensation proper (the subjective), in our sensitive consciousness.

e.—To denote the simple apprehension of a notion, in contradistinction to the complex apprehension of the terms of a proposition.

Under the latter head, it has only a single signification ; viz. :

f.—To denote the immediate affirmation by the intellect, that the predicate does or does not pertain to the subject, in what are called self-evident propositions.

All these meanings, however, with the exception of the fourth, have this in common, that they express the condition of an immediate, in opposition to a mediate, knowledge. It is therefore *easy* to see how the term was suggested in its application to our original cognitions ; and how far it marks out their distinctive character. It has been employed in this relation by Des-

cartes, Leibnitz, Locke, Hemsterhuis, Beattie, Jacobi, Ancillon, Degerando, Thurot, and many others.

II. The second condition, which, along with their Immediacy, seems to have determined a class of names, is the *Incomprehensibility* or *Inexplicability* of our original cognitions.

Under this head there are two appellations which first present themselves—*Feeling* and *Belief*; and these must be considered in correlation.

A thing mediately known is conceived under a representation or notion, and therefore only known as possibly existing; a thing immediately known is apprehended in itself, and therefore known as actually existing.

This being understood, let us suppose an act of immediate knowledge. By external or internal perception, I apprehend a phenomenon, of mind or matter, as existing; I therefore affirm it to be. Now if asked how I know, or am assured, that what I apprehend as a mode of mind may not be, in reality, a mode of matter, or that what I apprehend as a mode of matter may not, in reality, be a mode of mind, I can only say, using the simplest language, 'I know it to be true, because I *feel* and cannot but *feel*,' or 'because I *believe* and cannot but *believe* it so to be.' And if farther interrogated how I know or am assured that I thus *feel* or thus *believe*, I can make no better answer than, in the one case, 'because I *believe* that I *feel*,' in the other, 'because I *feel* that I *believe*.' It thus appears, that when pushed to our last refuge, we must retire either upon *Feeling* or upon *Belief*, or upon both indifferently. And accordingly, among philosophers, we find that a great many employ one or other of these terms by which to indicate the nature of the ultimate ground to which our cognitions are reducible; while some employ both, even though they may accord a preference to one.

1.—*FEELING*, in English (as *Sentiment* in French, *Gefuehl* in German, &c.), is ambiguous:—And in its present application (to say nothing of its original meaning in relation to Touch) we must discharge that signification of the word by which we denote

the phenomena of pain and pleasure. Feeling is a term preferable to Consciousness, in so far as the latter does not mark so well the simplicity, ultimacy, and incomprehensibility of our original apprehensions, suggesting, as it does, always something of thought and reflection. In other respects, Consciousness—at least with a determining epithet—may be the preferable expression. In the sense now in question, Feeling is employed by Aristotle, Theophrastus, Pascal, Malebranche, Bossuet, Leibnitz, Buffier, D'Aguesseau, Berkeley, Hume, Kames, Hemsterhuis, Jacobi, Schulze, Bouterweck, Fries, Köppen, Ancillon, Gerlach, Franke, and a hundred others. In this meaning it has been said, and truly, that 'Reason is only a developed Feeling.'

2.—BELIEF OR FAITH (Πίστις, *Fides*, *Croyance*, *Foi*, *Glaube*, &c.). Simply, or with one or other of the epithets *natural*, *primary*, *instinctive*, &c., and some other expressions of a similar import as *Conviction*, *Assent*, *Trust*, *Adhesion*, *Holding for true or real*, &c. (Συγκατάθεσις, *Assensus*, *Fuerwahr-und-wirklich-halten*, &c.), have, though not unobjectionable, found favor with a great number of philosophers, as terms whereby to designate the original warrants of cognition. Among these may be mentioned Aristotle, Lucretius, Alexander, Clement of Alexandria, Proclus, Algazel, Luther, Hume, Reid, Beattie, Hemsterhuis, Kant, Heidenreich, Fichte, Jacobi, Bouterweck, Köppen, Ancillon, Hermes, Biunde, Esser, Elvanich, &c., &c.

Nor can any valid objection be taken to the expression. St. Austin accurately says—"We *know* what rests upon *reason*; we believe what rests upon *authority*." But reason itself must rest at last upon authority; for the original data of reason do not rest on reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself. These data are, therefore, in rigid propriety, Beliefs or Trusts. Thus it is, that in the last resort, we must, per force, philosophically admit, that belief is the primary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimate ground of belief. We are compelled to surrender the proud *Intellige ut*

*credas*¹ of Abelard, to content ourselves with the humble *Crede ut intelligas*² of Anselm.

3.—A third denomination, under this head, is that of

INSTINCTS, *rational or intellectual* (*Instinctus, Impetus spontanei, Instinctus intelligentiæ, rationales*).

INSTINCTIVE *beliefs, cognitions, judgments, &c.*

These terms are intended to express not so much the light as the dark side which the elementary facts of consciousness exhibit. They therefore stand opposed to the conceivable, the understood, the known.

Notre faible Raison se trouble et se confond ;
Oui, la Raison se tait, mais l'Instinct vous répond.

Priestley (Examination, &c., passim) has attempted to ridicule Reid's use of the terms Instinct and Instinctive, in this relation, as an innovation, not only in philosophy, but in language; and Sir James Mackintosh (Dissert. p. 388) considers the term Instinct not less improper than the term Common Sense.

As to the impropriety, though like most other psychological terms these are not unexceptionable, they are however less so than many, nay than most, others. An Instinct is an agent which performs blindly and ignorantly a work of intelligence and knowledge. The terms, *Instinctive belief,—judgment—cognition* are therefore expressions not ill adapted to characterize a belief, judgment, cognition, which as the result of no anterior consciousness, is, like the products of animal instinct, the intelligent effect of (as far as we are concerned) an unknowing cause. In like manner, we can hardly find more suitable expressions to indicate those incomprehensible spontaneities themselves, of which the primary facts of consciousness are the manifestations, than *rational or intellectual Instincts*. In fact if Reason can justly be called a developed Feeling, it may with no less propriety be called an illuminated Instinct:—In the words of Ovid,

Et quod nunc Ratio, Impetus ante fuit.

¹ "Know that you may believe."—*W.*

² "Believe that you may know."—*W.*

As to an innovation either in language or philosophy, this objection only betrays the ignorance of the objector. Mr. Stewart (Essays, p. 87, 4to ed.) adduces Boscovich and D'Alembert as authorities for the employment of the terms Instinct and Instinctive in Reid's signification. But before Reid he might have found them *thus* applied by Cicero, Scaliger, Bacon, Herbert, Descartes, Rapin, Pascal, Poiret, Barrow, Leibnitz, Musæus, Feuerlin, Hume, Bayer, Kames, Reimar, and a host of others; while subsequent to the 'Inquiry into the Human Mind,' besides Beattie, Oswald, Campbell, Fergusson, among our Scottish philosophers, we have, with Hemsterhuis in Holland, in Germany Tetens, Jacobi, Bouterweck, Neeb, Köppen, Ancillon, and many other metaphysicians who have adopted and defended the expressions. In fact, Instinct has been for ages familiarized as a philosophical term in the sense in question, that is, in application to the higher faculties of mind, intellectual and moral. In proof of this, take the article from the 'Lexicon Philosophicum' of Micraelius, which appeared in 1653:—'*Instinctus* est rei ad aliquid tendentis inclinatio; estque alius materialis in corporibus; *alius rationalis in mente;*' and Chauvin is to the same purport, whose 'Lexicon Philosophicum' was first published in 1691. In a moral relation, as a name for the natural tendencies to virtue, it was familiarly employed even by the philosophers of the sixteenth century (v. F. Piccolominei 'Decem Gradus,' &c. Gr. iii. c. i. *sq.*); and in the seventeenth, it had become, in fact, their usual appellation (v. Velthuysen De Principiis Justi, &c., p. 73 *sq.*)

4.—REVELATIONS—INSPIRATIONS.—These expressions are intended metaphorically to characterize the incomprehensible manner in which we are made suddenly aware of existence; and, perhaps, to indicate that our knowledge rests ultimately on a testimony which ought to be implicitly believed, however unable we may be explicitly to demonstrate, on rational grounds, its credibility. They have been thus employed, one or both, by

Reid, Stewart, Degerando, Cousin, and others, but most emphatically by Jacobi.

5.—SUGGESTIONS (*Suggestiones, Suggestus*).—This term with some determining epithet is a favorite word of Reid, and in a similar signification. So also was it of St. Augustin and Tertulian.—By the *νοῦς* of Aristotle, the latter says—"non aliud quid intelligimus quam *suggestum animæ ingenitum et insitum et nativitus proprium*." De Anima, c. 12. See also Testimonies, *infra*, No. 12 d; and, *supra*, p. 111 a, note.¹

6.—FACTS—DATA (*ultimate—primary—original, &c.*) of *Consciousness* or *Intelligence*. These expressions have found

¹ The following is the note referred to:

"The word *suggest*' (says Mr. Stewart, in reference to the preceding passage) 'is much used by Berkeley, in this appropriate and technical sense, not only in his 'Theory of Vision,' but in his 'Principles of Human Knowledge,' and in his 'Minute Philosopher.' It expresses, indeed, the cardinal principle on which his 'Theory of Vision' hinges, and is now so incorporated with some of our best metaphysical speculations, that one cannot easily conceive how the use of it was so long dispensed with. Locke uses the word *excite* for the same purpose; but it seems to imply an hypothesis concerning the *mechanism* of the mind, and by no means expresses the fact in question with the same force and precision.

'It is remarkable, that Dr. Reid should have thought it incumbent on him to apologize for introducing into philosophy a word so familiar to every person conversant with Berkeley's works. 'I beg leave to make use of the word *suggestion*, because,' &c.

'So far Dr. Reid's use of the word coincides exactly with that of Berkeley; but the former will be found to annex to it a meaning more extensive than the latter, by employing it to comprehend, not only those *intimations* which are the result of experience and habit; but another class of *intimations* (quite overlooked by Berkeley), those which result from the original frame of the human mind.'—*Dissertation on the History of Metaphysical and Ethical Science*. P. 167. Second edition.

"Mr. Stewart might have adduced, perhaps, a higher and, certainly a more proximate authority, in favor, not merely of the term in general, but of Reid's restricted employment of it, as an intimation of what he and others have designated the Common Sense of mankind. The following sentence of Tertulian contains a singular anticipation, both of the philosophy and of the philosophical phraseology of our author. Speaking of the universal belief of the soul's immortality:—'*Natura pleraque suggeruntur, quasi de publico sensu quo animam Deus ditare dignatus est.*'—DE ANIMA, c. 2.

"Some strictures on Reid's employment of the term *suggestion* may be seen in the 'Versuche' of Tetens, I. p. 508, sqq."—*W*.

favor with many philosophers, among whom Fergusson, Fichte, Creuzer, Krug, Ancillon, Gerlach, Cousin, Bautain, may be mentioned. They are well adapted to denote, that our knowledge reposes upon what ought to be accepted as actually true, though why, or in what manner it is true, be inexplicable.

III.—The third quality, in reference to which our primary cognitions have obtained certain appellations, is their *Originality*. Under this head :

1.—FIRST—PRIMARY—PRIMITIVE—PRIMORDIAL—ULTIMATE, as epithets applied to *truths, principles of thought, laws of intelligence, facts or data of consciousness, elements of reason, &c.*, are expressions which require no comment.

2.—PRINCIPLES (*Ἀρχαί*, *Principia*, literally commencements—points of departure) *Principles of Common Sense—first, proper, authentic* (*κυριωταταί*) *Principles of thought, reason, judgment, intelligence—Initia naturæ, &c.*

Without entering on the various meanings of the term Principle, which Aristotle defines, in general, *that from whence any thing exists, is produced, or is known*, it is sufficient to say that it is always used for that on which something else depends ; and thus both for an original *law*, and for an original *element*. In the former case it is *regulative*, in the latter a *constitutive*, principle ; and in either signification it may be very properly applied to our original cognitions. In this relation, Mr. Stewart would impose certain restrictions on the employment of the word. But admitting the propriety of his distinctions, in themselves,—and these are not new—it may be questioned whether the limitation he proposes of the generic term be expedient, or permissible. See his *Elements*, ii. c. 1, particularly pp. 59, 93 of 8vo editions.

3.—ANTICIPATIONS—PRESUMPTIONS—PRENOTIONS (*προλήψεις, προεπίρροσα γνώσεις, anticipationes, præsumptiones, prænotiones, informationes anteceptæ, cognitiones anticipatæ, &c.*), with such attributes as *common, natural, native, connate, innate, &c.*, have been employed to indicate that they are the antecedents, causes, or conditions of all knowledge. These are more especially the

terms of ancient philosophy.—To this group may be added the expression *Legitimate Prejudices*, borrowed from the nomenclature of theology, but which have sometimes been applied by philosophers in a parallel signification.*

4.—A PRIORI—*truths, principles, cognitions, notions, judgments, &c.*

The term *a priori*, by the influence of Kant and his school, is now very generally employed to characterize those elements of knowledge which are not obtained *a posteriori*,—are not evolved out of experience as factitious generalizations; but which, as native to, are potentially in, the mind antecedent to the act of experience, on occasion of which (as constituting its subjective conditions) they are first actually elicited into consciousness. These like many—indeed most—others of his technical expressions, are old words applied in a new signification. Previously to Kant the terms *a priori* and *a posteriori* were, in a sense which descended from Aristotle, properly and usually employed,—the former to denote a reasoning from cause to effect—the latter, a reasoning from effect to cause. The term *a priori* came, however, in modern times to be extended to any abstract reasoning from a given notion to the conditions which such notion involved; hence, for example, the title *a priori* bestowed on the ontological and cosmological arguments for the existence of the deity. The latter of these, in fact, starts from experience—from the observed contingency of the world, in order to construct the supposed notion on which it founds. Clarke's cosmological demonstration, called *a priori*, is therefore, so far, properly an argument *a posteriori*.

5.—CATEGORIES of *thought, understanding, reason, &c.*

The Categories of Aristotle and other philosophers were the

* As by Trembley of Geneva. It is manifest, though I have not his treatise at hand, that he borrowed this, not over-fortunate, expression from the *Préjugés Légitimes contre les Calvinistes* of Nicole, the work in which originated the celebrated controversy in which Pajon, Basnage, &c., were engaged. Of this Mr. Stewart does not seem to be aware.

highest classes (under Being) to which the objects of our knowledge could be generalized. Kant contorted the term Category from its proper meaning of attribution; and from an objective to a subjective application; bestowing this name on the ultimate and necessary laws by which thought is governed in its manifestations. The term, in this relation, has however found acceptance; and been extended to designate, in general, all the *a priori* phenomena of mind, though Kant himself limited the word to a certain order of these.

6.—TRANSCENDENTAL *truths, principles, cognitions, judgments, &c.*

In the Schools *transcendentalis* and *transcendens*, were convertible expressions, employed to mark a term or notion which *transcended*, that is, which rose above, and thus contained under it the categories, or summa genera, of Aristotle. Such, for example, is Being, of which the ten categories are only subdivisions. Kant, according to his wont, twisted these old terms into a new signification. First of all, he distinguished them from each other. *Transcendent* (*transcendens*) he employed to denote what is wholly beyond experience, being given neither as an *posteriori* nor a *priori* element of cognition—what therefore transcends every category of thought. *Transcendental* (*transcendentalis*) he applied to signify the *a priori* or necessary cognitions which, though manifested in, as affording the conditions of, experience, transcend the sphere of that contingent or adventitious knowledge which we acquire by experience. *Transcendental* is not therefore what transcends, but what in fact constitutes, a category of thought. This term, though probably from another quarter, has found favor with Mr. Stewart; who proposes to exchange the expression *principles of common sense* for, among other names, that of *transcendental truths*.

7.—PURE (*rein*) is another Kantian expression (borrowed with a modification of meaning from previous philosophers*) for cogni-

* *Pure knowledge* (*cognitio pura*) was a term employed by the Cartesians and Leibnicians to denote that knowledge in which there was no mixture of

tions, in which there is mingled nothing foreign or adventitious, that is, nothing from experience, and which consequently are wholly native to the mind, wholly a priori. Such elements, however, are obtained only by a process of sundering and abstraction. In actual, or concrete, thinking, there is given nothing pure; the native and foreign, the a priori and a posteriori are there presented in mutual fusion.

IV. The fourth determining circumstance, is that the cognitions in question are *natural*, not conventional, *native*, not acquired. Hence their most universal denominations:

1.—NATURE (φύσις *natura*); as, *common Nature of man—light of Nature**—*primary hypotheses of Nature—initia Naturæ*, &c.

NATURAL (φυσικός, *naturalis*) as conjoined with cognitions, *notions, judgments anticipations, presumptions, prenotions, beliefs, truths, criteria*, &c.

2.—NATIVE, INNATE, CONNATE, IMPLANTED, &c. (ἐνὼν, ἔμφυτος, σύμφυτος, *innatus, ingenitus, congenitus, insitus*, &c.), as applied to *cognitions, notions, conceptions, judgments, intellections, beliefs*, &c. These terms may be used either to express a correct or an erroneous doctrine.

V. The fifth ground of nomenclature, is the *Necessity* of these cognitions, constituting as they do the indispensable *foundations* and *elementary* ingredients of every act of knowledge and thought. Hence they have been called in the one point of view,

sensible images, being purely intellectual. Using the term *Intellect* less precisely than the Aristotelians, the Cartesians found it necessary to employ, in ordinary, for the sake of discrimination, the expression *pure Intellect* (*intellectus purus*) in contrast to Sense and Imagination. This term was, however, borrowed from the Schools; who again borrowed it, through the medium of St. Augustine, from the Platonists.—See Scoti Comm. Oxon. in Sen. L. i. dist. iii. qu. 4, § 22, Op. V. p. 491.

* *Light of Nature*, or *Lumen naturale* (*intellectus se. agentis*) a household expression with the Schoolmen, was, however, used to denote the natural revelation of intelligence, in opposition to the supernatural light afforded through divine inspiration. The analogy of the *active Intellect* and light was suggested by Aristotle.—(De An. iii. § 1.)

FUNDAMENTAL—*truths, laws of belief, principles of knowledge, intelligence, reason, &c.*; in the other,

ESSENTIAL OR CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS of *reason*—Original STAMINA, of *reason*—ELEMENTAL *laws of thought, &c.* These are Mr. Stewart's favorite denominations.

VI. The sixth circumstance is, that they afford the conditions and regulative principles of all knowledge. Hence they obtain the name of

LAWS, or CANONS—*fundamental, ultimate, elemental, necessary, &c., of human belief, knowledge, thought, &c.*

VII. The seventh circumstance is their *Universality*; this being at once the consequence of their necessity, and its index. Hence to designate them the attributes of

COMMON—UNIVERSAL—CATHOLIC—PUBLIC, &c. (*κοινός, communis, καθολικός, universalis, publicus*), applied to *sense, reason, intelligence*—to *cognitions, notions, conceptions, judgments, intellections, prenotions, anticipations, presumptions, principles, axioms, beliefs, nature of man, &c., &c.* I may observe, however, that a principle, &c., may be called common for one or other, or for all of *three* reasons:—1^o, because common to all men (philosophers in general); 2^o, because common to all sciences (Aristotle, Anal. Post. L. i. c. ii. § 5); 3^o, by relation to the multitude of conclusions dependent from it (Calovius, Nool. c. 2).

VIII. The eighth is their presumed *Trustworthiness*, either as veracious enouncements, or as accurate tests of truth. Hence, in the one relation, they have been styled

1.—TRUTHS (*veritates*) *first, primary, a priori, fundamental, &c.*; and in the other

2.—CRITERIA (*κριτήρια, normæ*) *natural, authentic, &c.*

IX. The ninth is that the principles of our knowledge must be themselves *Knowledges*.*

* *Knowledges*, in common use with Bacon and our English philosophers till after the time of Locke, ought not to be discarded. It is, however, unnoticed by any English Lexicographer.

If viewed as cognitions, in general, they have been called

1. a.—COGNITIONS OR KNOWLEDGES (*γνώσεις, cognitiones, notitiæ, informationes, &c.*), with the discriminative attributes, *first, primary, ultimate, original, fundamental, elemental, natural, common, pure, transcendental, a priori, native, innate, connate, implanted, &c.*

2. b.—CONSCIOUSNESS (*conscientia, conscience, Bewusstseyn*) facts, data, revelations, &c., of, have been very commonly employed; while

CONSCIOUSNESSES (*conscientiæ, consciences*), with or without an epithet, as *connate, innate*, has the authority of Tertullian, Keckermann, D'Aguesseau, Huber, and many others.

If viewed as *incomplex* cognitions, they have more properly obtained the names of

3.—NOTIONS, CONCEPTIONS, PRENOTIONS (*ἔννοιαι, ἐννοήματα, νοήματα, προλήψεις, notiones, conceptiones, conceptus, &c.*), sometimes simply, but more usually limited by the same attributes; though these terms were frequently extended to complex cognitions likewise.

If viewed as *complex* cognitions they have been designated, either by the general name of

4.—JUDGMENTS, PROPOSITIONS (*judicia, ἀποφάνσεις, πράξεις, effata, pronunciata, enunciata, &c.*), qualified by such adjectives as *self-evident, intuitive, natural, common, a priori, &c.*;—or by some peculiar name. Of these last there are two which deserve special notice—Axiom and Maxim.

5.—AXIOMS (*ἀξιώματα, dignitates, pronunciata honoraria, effata fide digna, propositiones illustres, κύρια δόξαι, rata, firmæ sententiæ, &c.*).

The term Axiom is ambiguous; the history of its employment obscure, and uninvestigated; and the received accounts of its signification, and the reasons of its signification, very erroneous.—I am aware of *three* very different meanings in which it has been used. Of these the first and second are of ancient, and the

third of modern usurpation. The verb ἀξιόω, originally and properly, means *to rate a thing at a certain worth or value, to appreciate, to estimate*. Now it is evident, that from this central signification it might very easily be deflected into two collateral meanings.

a.—To rate a thing at its value, seems to presuppose that it has some value to be rated; hence the verb came very naturally to signify—*I deem worthy, &c.* From it in this signification we have ἀξίωμα, *worth, dignity, authority*; and, applied in a logical relation, a *worthy, an authoritative proposition*. But why worthy?—why authoritative? Either because a proposition worthy of acceptance (πρότασις ἀξιόπιστη); or because a proposition commanding and obtaining acceptance (κυρία δόξα, pronunciatum honorarium, illustre). But of what nature are the propositions worthy of, or which command, universal credence? Manifestly not, at least primarily, those which, though true, and even admitted to be true, shine in a reflected light of truth, as dependent on other propositions for their evidence; but those out of which the truth beams directly and immediately, which borrow not the proof from any which they afford to all, which are deserving of credit on their own authority—in a word, *self-evident propositions* (πρότασις αὐτοπίστη). Hence the application of the term to judgments true, primary, immediate, common. To this result converge the authorities of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Alexander, Themistius, Proclus, Ammonius Hermiæ, and Philoponus.

In this signification, as I can recollect, the oldest example of the word is to be found in Aristotle. That this philosopher limited the expression Axiom to those judgments which, on occasion of experience, arise naturally and necessarily in the conscious mind, and which are therefore virtually prior to experience, cannot, I think, be reasonably doubted. ‘Of the immediate principles,’ he says, ‘of syllogism, that which cannot be demonstrated, but which it is not necessary to possess as the prerequisite of all learning, I call *Thesis*; and that *Axiom*, which he who would

learn aught must himself bring, [and not receive from his instructor]. For some such principles there are; and it is to these that we are accustomed to apply this name.' (Anal. Post., L. i. c. 1, § 14.) And again, distinguishing the Axiom from the Hypothesis and Postulate, of the two latter he says—'Neither of these of itself necessarily exists, and necessarily manifests its existence in thought.' (Ibid. c. 10, § 7.) He consequently supposes that an Axiom is not only something true, but something that we *cannot but think to be true*. All this is confirmed by sundry other passages. (Of these, some will be seen in Testimonies, n. 3; where also, in a note, is given a solution of what may be said in opposition to the attribution of this doctrine to the Stagirite.) The same is confirmed, also, by the ancient interpreters of the Posterior Analytics—Themistius (f. 2, a, ed. Ald.), and Philoponus, or rather Ammonius Hermiæ (f. 9, b, ed. Ald.) These harbor no doubt in regard to the purport of the texts now quoted;—and the same construction is given to Aristotle's doctrine on this point, by Alexander, elsewhere, but especially in his Commentary on the Topics (p. 12, ed. Ald.), and by Proclus in his Commentaries on Euclid. (Libb. ii. iii.)

The following definition by Theophrastus is preserved by Themistius (l. c.). I translate the context, cautioning the reader that it is impossible to determine whether the latter part of the passage belongs to Theophrastus, or, what is more probable, to Themistius himself. 'Theophrastus thus defines an Axiom:—An axiom is a certain kind of opinion [or judgment], one species of which is [valid] of all things of the same class, as [under the category, Quantity]—*If equals be taken from equals, the remainders are equal*; while another is [valid] of all things indifferently, as—*Between affirmation and negation there is no medium*. For these are, as it were, connate and common to all. Whence also the reason of the denomination Axiom [worth, dignity, authority]. For what is set over, either all things absolutely, or certain classes of things universally, that we judge to have precedence, authority, by reference to them.'

In this sense the word is universally supposed to have been technically employed by the mathematicians, from a very ancient period. But whether it was so prior to Aristotle, I should be vehemently disposed to doubt; both from the tenor of the former passage of the Posterior Analytics, just quoted, in which the philosopher seems to attribute to himself this application of the term, and from the absence of all evidence to prove its earlier introduction. I am aware indeed of a passage in the Metaphysics (L. iii. [iv.] c. 3), which, at first sight, and as it has always been understood, might appear unfavorable to this surmise; for mention is there made of ‘what in mathematics (*ἐν τοῖς μαθημασιν*) are called Axioms.’ But this text is, I suspect, misunderstood, and that it ought to be translated—‘what in our “Mathematics” are called Axioms.’ But did Aristotle write on this subject? He did, one, if not two treatises; as appears from the lists of Laertius (L. v. § 24) and the Anonymus Menagii. In the former we have *Μαθηματικὸν, ἅ*, ‘*On Mathematics, one book;*’ in the latter—*Περὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς μαθημασιν οὐσίας*, “*On the existence treated of in Mathematics.*’ Nay, the term is not to be found in the writings we possess of those geometricians who ascend the nearest to the age of Aristotle. Euclid, what may surprise the reader, does not employ it. There it stands, certainly, in all the editions and translations of the Elements in ordinary use. But this is only one of the many tamperings with his text, for which the perfidious editors and translators of Euclid are responsible; and in the present instance the Aristotelizing commentary of Proclus seems to have originally determined the conversion of ‘Common Notions’ into ‘Axioms.’ Archimedes (*De Sphæra et Cyliandro*, sub initio) is, after Aristotle, the oldest authority extant for the term, in a mathematical relation; though Archimedes, who only *once* employs it, does not apply it in the Aristotelic limitation, as equivalent to the Common Notions of Euclid, and exclusive of Postulates and Definitions. On the contrary, with him *axiom* is, if not convertible with *definition*, used only in the second or Stoical sense, for an *enunciation* in general. Turning indeed to the

works of the other Greek Mathematicians which I have at hand, I cannot find the term in Apollonius of Perga, in Serenus, Diophantus, Pappus, Eutocius, Hero, or the Samian Aristarchus. Sextus Empiricus, in all his controversy with the Mathematicians, knows it not; nor, except in the second technical meaning, is it to be found in Plutarch. Its application in mathematics was therefore, I surmise, comparatively late, and determined by the influence of Aristotle. This is not the only instance by which it might be shown that the Mathematicians are indebted to the Stagirite for their language; who, if he borrowed a part of his Logical nomenclature from Geometry, amply repaid the obligation.

This first meaning is that which Axiom almost exclusively obtains in the writings of the Aristotelian, and (though Plato does not philosophically employ the term) of the Platonic school.

b.—To rate a thing at its value, that is, to attribute or not to attribute to it a certain worth, is a meaning which would easily slide into denoting the affirmation or negation of qualities in regard to a subject; for its qualities determine, positively or negatively, the value of any thing. Hence, in general, *to be of opinion, to think so and so, to judge*. (In like manner, among other analogical examples, the Latin verb *existimo* (that is *ex-æstimo*), its primary meaning falling into desuetude, was at last almost exclusively employed in the secondary, as—*I think that, or I opine*.) From this signification of the verb flowed a second logical meaning of the substantive; Axiom being applied to denote, in general, an *enunciation or proposition* (properly a categorical), *whether true or false*. In this sense it was used, sometimes by Aristotle (v. Top., L. viii. cc. 1, 3—if this work be his—et ibi, Alexandrum), and, as far as I am aware, to say nothing of the Epicureans and Sceptics, *always* by the Stoics—though Simplicius (ad. Epict. Ench., c. 58) asserts, that they occasionally employed it, like the Aristotelians, in the first. Lælius, Varro, Cicero, Sergius, Agellius, Apuleius, Donatus, Martianus Capella, &c., render it by various Latin terms, in all of which, however, the present meaning exclusively, is embodied; and in the same signification the Greek

term *axioma* itself was, in modern times, adopted by Ramus and his school, as their common logical expression for "proposition."

Thus in neither of its logical significations, I make bold to say, is the word *Axiom* to be found in any writing extant, prior to Aristotle; and in its second, only in a work, the *Topics*, which is not with absolute certainty the production of the Stagirite. I may observe, that there is another account given of the logical applications of the word, but to this I think it wholly needless to advert.

c.—The third and last meaning is that imposed upon the word by Bacon. He contorted *Axiom* to designate any higher proposition, obtained by generalization and induction from the observation of individual instances—the enunciation of a general fact—an empirical law.

So much for the meanings of the term *Axiom* itself—now for its translation.

Dignitas was employed by Boethius to render *Axioma* in its first or Aristotelic meaning; and from him came, in this application, into general use among the Latin schoolmen. But before Boethius, and as a translation of the term in its second or Stoical meaning, I find *Dignitas* employed by Priscian (*Instit. Grammat.*, L. xvii. c. 1). No lexicographer, however, no philologist has noticed these authorities for the word, while Latin was still a living language. It has, indeed, till this hour, been universally taken for granted by philologers that *dignitas* in this relation is a mere modern barbarism. 'Inepte faciunt (says Muretus) qui ἀξιώματα *dignitates* vocant; cujus pravæ consuetudinis Hermolaus Barbarus auctor fuit.' (*Variae Lectiones*, L. vi. c. 2.) This is wrong, more especially as regards the author and era of the custom: nay, II. Barbarus is only reprehensible for not always, instead of rarely, translating the term, as it occurs in Themistius, by *Dignitas*, if translated into Latin it must be; for his usual version by *Proloquium* or *Pronuntiatum*—expressions which only render the word in its Stoical meaning—has been the cause of considerable error and confusion among subsequent logicians, who,

unable to resort to the one rare edition of the original, were thus led to suppose that the nomenclature of Theophrastus and Themistius were different from that of Aristotle. The authority of Muretus has obtained, however, for his mistake a universal acceptance; and what is curious, Nicolaus Loensis (Misc. Epiph., L. i. c. 1), in his criticism of the very chapter in which it occurs, omitting this solitary error, stupidly or perfidiously inculpates Muretus for assertions, which that illustrious scholar assuredly never dreamt of hazarding.

6. MAXIMS—(*maximæ, propositiones maximæ, supremæ, principales, &c.*)

In Maxim we have the example of a word which all employ, but of whose meaning none seem to know the origin or reason.* Extant in all the languages of Christendom, this term is a bequest of that philosophy, once more extensive than Christianity itself, through which Aristotle, for a thousand years, swayed at once and with almost equal authority, the theology of the Bible and the Koran. But it was not original to the scholastic philosophy. The schoolmen received it from Boethius, who is the earliest author to whom I trace the expression. He propounds it in his two works—‘In Topica Ciceronis,’ and ‘De Differentiis Topicis.’ The following is one of his definitions:—‘Maximas propositiones [which he also styles *propositiones supremæ, principales, indemonstrabiles, per se notæ, &c.*] vocamus quæ et universales

* I have had the curiosity to see how far this ignorance extended. Our English Lexicographers, Johnson, Todd, Webster, are in outer darkness. They only venture to hint at some unknown relation between *maxim* and “*maximum, the greatest!*” Richardson is not positively wrong. He is aware (probably from Furetiere or his copyist the *Dictionnaire de Trevoux*, for there is a verbal coincidence in all three) that *maxima* was in low Latin used in a similar signification; but his explanation of the reason is not only defective, but erroneous. In other dictionaries, real and verbal, if we find the word noticed at all, we find nothing beyond a bare statement of its actual meaning; as may be seen in those of Goelenius, Micælius, Martinius, Ducange, the Zedlerian Lexicon, to say nothing of our more modern Encyclopedias. Even the great Selden (On Fortescue, c. 8) in attempting to explain the term in its legal application, betrays his unacquaintance with its history and proper import.

sunt, et ita notæ atque manifestæ, ut probatione non egeant, eaque potius quæ in dubitatione sunt probent. Nam quæ in dubitatæ sunt, ambiguum demonstrationi solent esse principia ; qualis est—*Omnem numerum vel parem vel impari, et—Æqualia relinqui si æqualibus, æqualia detrahuntur, cæteræque de quarum nota veritate non quæritur.*'

With Boethius *maxima propositio* (maxima he never uses absolutely) is thus only a synonym for axiom or self-evident judgment. He however applies the term specially to denote those dialectical principles, axioms, or canons, those catholic judgments which constitute what in logic and rhetoric have since Aristotle been called *common-places*, that is, the sources or receptacles of arguments applicable to every matter, and proper to none. Such propositions, he says, are styled *maximæ* or *greatest*, because as universal and primary, they implicitly contain the other propositions (minores posterioresque), and determine the whole inference of a reasoning (reliquas in se propositiones complectuntur, et per eas fit consequens et rata conclusio).* But he also sometimes indicates that they are entitled to this epithet, because, as evident

* Thus in arguing, *that a wise, is not an intemperate, man*, by the syllogism—

He is wise who controls his passions ;

He is intemperate who does not control his passions ;

Therefore a wise, is not an intemperate, man ; the whole reasoning is contained under, and therefore presupposes, the proposition—*To what the definition is inapplicable, to that is inapplicable the thing defined (cui non convenit definitio, non convenit definitum)*. This proposition (one of six co-ordinates which make up the common-place called of Definition) as containing under it a multitude of others (e. g., *Cui non convenit definitio sapientis, nec convenit nomen ; cui non convenit definitio iusti, pulchri, timidi, &c., &c., nec nomen*) is not inappropriately styled *p. maxima*. I may observe, however, that, as thus employed, *maxima* can only, in strict propriety, qualify a proposition relatively, not absolutely, greatest. For every maxim of every dialectical Place is itself contained within the sphere of one or other of the four logical laws of Identity, Contradiction, Excluded Middle, and Reason and Consequent, of which it is only a subordinate modification. Thus the maxim adduced, is only a special application of the law of Contradiction. To the *four laws*, therefore, the name of *propositiones maximæ* should be exclusively applicable, if this expression were intended to denote an unconditioned universality.

in themselves and independent of all others, they afford to the unintuitive judgments they support, their primary proof (*anti-quissimam probationem*), and their greatest certainty (*maximam fidem*). Compare *In Top. Cic. L. i. Op. p. 765—De Diff. Top. L. i. p. 859, L. ii. p. 865 sq.* Boethius had likewise perhaps Aristotle's saying in his thought—'that principles, though what are least in magnitude, are what are *greatest* in power.'

Maxima propositio, as a dialectical expression, was adopted from Boethius by his friend and brother-consul, the patrician Cassiodorus; and from these 'ultimi Romanorum' it passed to the schoolmen, with whom so soon as it became established as a common term of art, *propositio* was very naturally dropt, and *maxima* thus came to be employed as a substantive—by many at last, who were not aware of the origin and rationale of its meaning. Finally, from the Latinity and philosophical nomenclature of the schools, it subsided, as a household word, into all the vernacular languages of Europe; with this restriction however—that in them it is not usually applied except in a practical relation; denoting a moral apophthegm, a rule of conduct, an ethical, a political, a legal canon, &c., and this too, enouncing, not so much what is always and necessarily, but what is for the most part and probably, true. It sounds strange in our ears to hear of a mathematical or logical maxim, in the sense of axiom, self-evident principle, or law—though this is the sense in which it was commonly employed, among others, by Locke and Leibnitz. To this restriction, its special employment in Dialectic (the logic of contingent matter) probably prepared the way; though by the schoolmen, as by Boethius, it continued to be used as convertible with axiom. '*Dignitas dicitur* (says Albertus Magnús) *quia omnibus dignior est, eo quod omnibus influit cognitionem et veritatem; et dicitur Maxima, eo quod virtute influentiæ lucis et veritatis omnia excedit immediata principia.*' (In *i. Post. Anal., c. 1.*) St. Thomas and Scotus might be adduced to the same effect; see also P. Hispanus (*Summulæ, tr. v. c. 3, et ibi Versor*). At an early period, it was borrowed as a term of art, into the Common Law of Eng-

land; *Maxims* there denoting what by the civilians were technically denominated *Regulæ Juris*. (Fortescue, *De Laudibus legum Angliæ*, c. 8.—Doctor and Student, c. 8.) By Kant *Maxim* was employed to designate a subjective principle, theoretical or practical, i. e. one not of objective validity, being exclusively relative to some interest of the subject. *Maxim* and *Regulative principle* are, in the Critical philosophy, opposed to *Law* and *Constitutive principle*.

Besides the preceding designations under this head, names have been given to the original deliverances of Consciousness, considered as the manifestations of some special faculty; that is, Consciousness as performing this peculiar function has obtained a particular name. In this respect it has been called *Reason*, and, with greater propriety, *Intellect* or *Intelligence*.

7. REASON (λόγος, *ratio, raison, Vernunft*), *truths, principles, beliefs, feelings, intuitions, &c., of.*

Reason is a very vague, vacillating, and equivocal word. Throwing aside various accidental significations which it has obtained in particular languages, as in Greek denoting not only the *ratio* but the *oratio* of the Latins; throwing aside its employment, in most languages, for *cause, motive, argument, principle of probation, or middle term of a syllogism*, and considering it only as a philosophical word denoting a faculty or complement of faculties; in this relation it is found employed in the following meanings, not only by different individuals, but frequently, to a greater or less extent, by the same philosopher.

a.—It has both in ancient and modern times been very commonly employed, like *understanding* and *intellect*, to denote our intelligent nature in general (λογικόν μέρος); and this usually as distinguished from the lower cognitive faculties, as sense, imagination, memory—but always, and emphatically, as in contrast to the feelings and desires. In this signification, to follow the Aristotelic division, it comprehends—1°, *Conception*, or *Simple Apprehension* (ἐννοια, νόησις τῶν ἀδιαφύπτων, *conceptus, conceptio, apprehensio simplex, das Begreifen*); 2°, the *Compositive* and *Divi-*

sive process, *Affirmation and Negation, Judgment* (συνθέσις καὶ διαίρεσις, ἀπόφανσις, *judicium*);—3°, *Reasoning* or the *Discursive faculty* (διάνοια, λόγος, λογισμὸς, τὸ συλλογίζεσθαι, *discursus, ratiocinatio*);—4°, *Intellect* or *Intelligence* proper, either as the intuition, or as the place, of principles or self-evident truths (νοῦς, *intellectus, intelligentia, mens*).

b.—In close connection with the preceding signification, from which perhaps it ought not to be separated, is that meaning in which *reason*, the *rational*, the *reasonable*, is used to characterize the legitimate employment of our faculties in general, in contradistinction to the irregular or insubordinate action of one or more even of our rational faculties, which, if exercised out of their proper sphere, may be viewed as opposed to *reason*. Thus the plain sense of one of Moliere's characters complains—

Raisonner est l'emploi de toute ma maison,
Et le *raisonnement* en bannit la *raison*.

c.—It has not unfrequently been employed to comprehend the *third* and *fourth* of the special functions above enumerated—to wit, the *dianoetic* and *noetic*. In this meaning it is taken by Reid in his *later* works. Thus in the *Intellectual Powers* (p. 425 ab.) he states, that *Reason*, in its first office or degree [the *noetic*], is identical with *Common Sense*, in its second [the *dianoetic*], with *Reasoning*.

d.—It has very generally, both in ancient and modern philosophy, been employed for the *third* of the above special functions;—λόγος and λογισμὸς, *Ratio* and *Ratiocinatio*, *Reason* and *Reasoning* being thus confounded. Reid thus applied it in his *earlier* work the *Inquiry*. See pp. 100, b., 108, a., 127, a. b.

e.—In the ancient systems it was very rarely used exclusively for the *fourth* special function, the *noetic* in contrast to the *dianoetic*. Aristotle, indeed (*Eth. Nic.*, L. vi. c. 11 (12), *Eth. Eud.*, L. v. c. 8), expressly says that *reason* is not the faculty of principles, that faculty being *Intelligence* proper. Boethius (*De Cons. Phil.*, L. v. Pr. 5) states that *Reason* or *Discursive Intellect* belongs to man, while *Intelligence* or *Intuitive Intellect* is the exclu-

sive attribute of Divinity. ‘*Ratio* humani tantum generis est, sicuti *Intelligentia* sola divini;’ while Porphyry somewhere says ‘that we have Intelligence in common with the Gods, and reason in common with the brutes.’ Sometimes, however, it was apparently so employed. Thus St. Augustine seems to view Reason as the faculty of intuitive truths, and as opposed to Reasoning:—‘*Ratio* est quidam mentis adspetus, quo, per seipsam non per corpus, verum intuetur; *Ratiocinatio* autem est rationis inquisitio, a certis ad incertorum indagacionem nitens cogitatio.’ (De Quant. An., § 53—De Immort. An., §§ 1, 10.) This, however, is almost a singular exception.

In modern times, though we frequently meet with Reason, as a general faculty, distinguished from Reasoning, as a particular; yet until Kant, I am not aware that Reason (*Vernunft*) was ever exclusively, or even emphatically, used in a signification corresponding to the noetic faculty, in its strict and special meaning, and opposed to understanding (*Verstand*) viewed as comprehending the other functions of thought—unless Crusius (*Weg. &c.* § 62 sq.) may be regarded as Kant’s forerunner in this innovation. Indeed the *Vernunft* of Kant, in its special signification (for he also uses it for Reason in the first or more general meaning, as indeed nothing can be more vague and various than his employment of the word), cannot without considerable qualification be considered analogous to *Νοῦς*, far less to Common Sense; though his usurpation of the term for the faculty of principles, probably determined Jacobi (who had originally, like philosophers in general, confounded *Vernunft* with *Verstand*, Reason with Reasoning) to appropriate the term Reason to what he had at first opposed to it, under the name of Belief (*Glaube*). Accordingly in his maturer writings, ‘*Vernunft*, Reason—‘*Vernunft-Glaube*,’ Belief of Reason—‘*Vernunft-Gefuehl*,’ Feeling of Reason—‘*Rationale Anschauung*,’ Rational Intuition—‘*Sinn, Organ fuer das Ueber-sinnliche*,’ Sense or Organ of the Supersensible, &c., are the terms by which we may roundly say that Jacobi denominates the noetic faculty or common sense.

Kant's abusive employment of the term¹ Reason, for the faculty of the Unconditioned, determined also its adoption, under the same signification, in the philosophy of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; though Νοῦς, Intellectus, Intelligentia, which had been applied by the Platonists in a similar sense, were (through Verstand, by which they had been always rendered into German) the only words suitable to express that cognition of the Absolute, in which subject and object, knowledge and existence, God and man, are supposed to be identified. But even in this, to add to the confusion, no consistency was maintained. For though that absolute cognition was emphatically the act of Reason, it was yet by Fichte and Schelling denominated the Intuition of *Intellect* (intellectuale Anschauung). F. Schlegel was therefore justified in his attempt to reverse the relative superiority of Vernunft and Verstand. What were his reasons I know not; but as they have excited no attention, they were probably of little weight.

Though Common Sense be not therefore opposed to Reason, except perhaps in its fourth signification, still the term Reason is of so general and ambiguous an import, that its employment in so determinate a meaning as a synonym of Common Sense ought to be avoided. It is only, we have seen, as an expression for the noetic faculty, or Intellect proper, that Reason can be substituted for Common Sense; and as the former is hardly allowable, still less is the latter.

Besides the more precise employment of Reason as a synonym for Common Sense by the recent German philosophers, it will be found more vaguely applied in the same meaning—usually, however, with some restrictive epithet, like *common, universal, fundamental, &c.*—by many older authorities, of whom Heraclitus, the Stoics, Turretin, Lyons, Bentley, Shaftesbury, De la Mennais, are among the Testimonies adduced in the sequel.

8.—INTELLECT, INTELLIGENCE (νοῦς,² *intellectus, intelligentia,*

¹ See below, p. 454.—*W.*

² See above, p. 54, b. note.—*W.*

mens, entendement, intelligence, intellect, Verstand), *truths, principles, axioms, dicta, intuitions, &c.*, of.

INTELLECTIONS (*νοήσεις, intellectiones, intelligentiæ, intellections, intelligences*), *primary, natural, common, &c.*

By Aristotle, from whom it finally obtained the import, which it subsequently retained, the term *Νοῦς* is used in two principal significations. In the one (like Reason in its first meaning) it denotes, in general, our higher faculties of thought and knowledge; in the other it denotes, in special, the faculty, habit, place, of principles, that is, of self-evident and self-evidencing notions and judgments. The schoolmen, following Boethius, translated it by *intellectus* and *intelligentia*;* and some of them appropriated the former of these terms to its first, or general signification, the latter to its second or special. Cicero does not employ the term *intellectus*; and the Ciceronian epidemic prevalent after the revival of letters, probably induced the Latin translators of the Greek philosophers to render it more usually by the term *mens*. In one and all of our modern languages the words derived from, or corresponding to, *Intellectus, Intellectio, Intelligentia*, have been so loosely and variously employed, that they offer no temptation to substitute them for that of Common Sense. The case is different with the adjective *noetic*. The correlatives *noetic* and *dianoetic* would afford the best philosophical designations—the former for an intuitive principle, or truth at first hand; the latter for a demonstrative proposition, or truth at second hand. *Noology* and *Noological*, *Dianoiology* and *Dianoiological* would be also technical terms of much convenience in various departments of philosophy. On the doctrine of first principles as a department of

* *Intelligentia* (like *Intellectio*) properly denotes the *act or energy of Intellectus*. How it came that the term *Intelligentiæ* was latterly applied to denote the higher order of created existences, as angels, &c., is explained by Aquinas (S. Th., P. i. qu. 79, art. 10), as an innovation introduced by certain translations from the Arabic. I shall not commemorate the distinction of *Intellectus* and *Intelligentia* given in the contradictory farrago attributed to St. Augustine, under the title *De Spiritu et Anima*. See ec. 37, 38.

'Gnostology,' the philosophy of knowledge, we have indeed during the seventeenth century, by German authors alone, a series of special treatises, under the titles—of '*Noologia*,' by Calovius, 1651, Mejerus, 1662, Wagnerus, 1670, and Zeidlerus, 1680,—and of '*Intelligentia*,' by Gutkius, 1625, and Geilfussius, 1662. '*Archelogia*,' again, was the title preferred for their works upon the same subject by Alstedius, 1620, and Micrælius, 1658. Of these treatises, in so far as I have seen them, the execution disappoints the curiosity awakened by the title and attempt.

In this sense, besides the ordinary employment of *Intellectus*, and *Intelligentia* by the ancient and modern Aristotelians; Cicero, St. Austin, and others, in like manner, use *Intelligentiæ*, either simply, or with some differential epithet, as *inchoatæ*, *adumbratæ*, *complicatæ*, *involutæ*, *primæ*, *communes*, &c.; as is done likewise by Pascal and other French philosophers with the terms *Intelligence* and *Intelligences*.

X. The tenth and last circumstance is, that the native contributions by the mind itself to our concrete cognitions have, prior to their elicitation into consciousness through experience, only a *potential*, and in actual experience only an *applied, engaged, or implicate*, existence. Hence their designation of—

HABITS (possessions), DISPOSITIONS, VIRTUALITIES, &c., with some discriminating epithet. Thus, by Aristotle, noetic Intelligence is called the (natural) *Habit of principles* (ἔξις τῶν ἀρχῶν); and principles themselves are characterized by Leibnitz, as *natural Habits, Dispositions, Virtualities*. As prior to experience, Galen styles them things *occult* or *delitescens* (κεκρυμμένα), in contrast to the manifestations made in experience itself (φανόμενα). Cicero and others call them *Intelligentiæ, obscuræ, inchoatæ, complicatæ, involutæ*, &c. To the same head are to be referred the metaphorical denominations they have obtained of—*Seeds* (λόγοι σπερματικοί, *semina scientiæ, semina æternitatis*, &c.)—or *Sparks* (*scintillæ, igniculi, ζώπυρα ἐνάσματα, σπινθήρες*, &c.)

§ VI. THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE; OR ITS GENERAL RECOGNITION, IN REALITY AND IN NAME, SHOWN BY A CHRONOLOGICAL SERIES OF TESTIMONIES FROM THE DAWN OF SPECULATION TO THE PRESENT DAY.*

1.—HESIOD thus terminates his Works and Days:

Φήμη δ' οὔποτε πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται ἢν τινα πολλοὶ
 Λαοὶ φημίζουσι· θεὸς γὰρ τις ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

'The Word proclaimed by the concordant voice
 Of mankind fails not; for in man speaks God.'

Hence the adage?—Vox Populi, vox Dei.

2.—HERACLITUS.—The doctrine held by this philosopher of a Common Reason (ξυνὸς λόγος), the source and the criterion of truth, in opposition to individual wisdom (ιδία φρόνησις), the principle of opinion and error, may be regarded as one of Common Sense. Its symbol—τὰ κοινῇ φαινόμενα πιῆτα—Sextus Empiricus thus briefly expounds:—'What appears to all, that is to be believed; for it is apprehended by the Reason which is Common and Divine; whereas, what is presented to individual minds, is unworthy of belief, and for the counter cause.'—I. Adv. Log. § 131.

In so far, however, as our scanty sources of information enable us to judge, Heraclitus mistook the import, and transgressed the boundaries of the genuine doctrine, in the same way as is done

* In throwing together these testimonies, I had originally in view, merely to adduce such as bore explicitly and directly on the doctrine of Common Sense, word and thing; subsequently, I found it proper to take in certain others, in which that doctrine is clearly, though only implicitly or indirectly, asserted. These last, I have admitted, in preference, from those schools which ascribe the least to the mind itself, as a fountain of knowledge, and a criterion of truth; and have, in consequence, taken little or nothing from the Platonic. I have also been obliged to limit the testimonies, almost exclusively, to Common Sense, considered on its speculative side. On its practical, there could have been no end.

in the system of 'Common Sense,' 'Universal Consent,' or 'Common Reason,' so ingeniously maintained by the eloquent Abbé De La Mennais (No. 101). Both vilipend all private judgment as opinion; and opinion both denounce as a disease. Both sacrifice the intelligence of individual men at the shrine of the common reason of mankind; and both celebrate the apotheosis of this Common Reason or Sense, as an immediate ray of the divinity. Both, finally, in proclaiming—'that we ought to follow the Common' (δεῖν ὡπεσθαί τῷ ἕνῳ), mean, that we should resort to this, not merely as a catholic criterion, or a source of elementary truths, but as a magazine of ready fabricated dogmas. Heracitus and La Mennais are the first and last philosophers in our series: philosophy would thus seem to end as it began.—In relation to the former, see Schleiermacher, in Wolf and Buttmann's Museum, i. pp. 313, seq.; and Brandis Geschichte der Philosophie, i. § 44. In relation to the latter, see his Catechisme du Sens Commun—Essais sur L'Indifference, &c., *passim*; with Bautain, Psychologie, i. Disc. Prelim., pp. xlv. seq.; and Biunde, Fund. Phil., pp. 129, seq. 166. (To these is now to be added the Esquisse d'une Philosophie par F. Lamennais, 1840, L. i. ch. 1. Here the doctrine in question is presented in a far less objectionable form; but as its previous statements are not withdrawn, I have not thought it necessary to cancel the preceding observations, which were written before I had received this remarkable work.)

3.—ARISTOTLE.—He lays it down in general as the condition of the possibility of knowledge that it does not regress to infinity, but depart from certain primary *facts, beliefs, or principles*—true, and whose truth commands assent, through themselves, and themselves alone. These, as the foundations, are not objects, of Science; as the elements of Demonstration they are themselves indemonstrable. The fountains of certainty to all else, they are themselves pre-eminently certain, and if denied in words, they are still always mentally admitted. The faculty of such principles is not Reason, the discursive or *dianoetic* faculty (λόγος, διάνοια),

but Intellect or Intelligence proper, the *noetic* faculty ($\nu\omicron\tilde{\upsilon}\varsigma$). Intellect as an immediate apprehension of what is, may be viewed as a *Sense* ($\alpha\tilde{\iota}\sigma\theta\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$). Compare *Analyt. Post.* L. i. cc. 2, 3, 10, 32—L. ii. c. ult.—*Top.* L. i. c. 1—*Metaph.* L. i. c. 7—L. ii. (A minor) c. 2—L. ii. (iii. Duvallio) cc. 3, 4, 6—L. iii. (iv.) c. 6—*Eth. Nic.* L. vi. cc. 6, 11, (12)—*Eth. Eud.* L. v. cc. 6, 8—L. vii. c. 14—*Mag. Mor.* L. i. c. 35.

In particular, that Aristotle founds knowledge on belief, and the objective certainty of science on the subjective necessity of believing, is, while not formally enounced, manifest from many passages—though he might certainly have been more explicit. Compare *Post. Anal.* L. i. c. 2, §§ 1, 2, 16, 17, 18; c. 10, § 7; c. 31, § 3; *Top.* L. i. c. 1, § 6, &c.; *Eth. Nic.* vii. c. 3; *Magn. Mor.* L. ii. c. 6.

‘Since Aristotle,’ says the profound Jacobi (*Werke* ii. p. 11), ‘there has been manifested a continual and increasing tendency in the philosophical schools to subordinate, in general, immediate to mediate knowledge—the powers of primary apprehension, on which all is founded, to the powers of reflection as determined by abstraction—the prototype to the ectype—the thing to the word—the Reason [Vernunft—Aristotle’s noetic faculty or Intellect] to the Intellect [Verstand—Aristotle’s dianoetic faculty or Reason]; nay, to allow the former to be wholly subjugated and even lost.’ In this Jacobi (and to Jacobi may be added Fries) does Aristotle the most signal injustice; for there is no philosopher who more emphatically denounces the folly of those ‘who require a reason of those things of which there is no reason to be given, not considering that the principle of demonstration is not itself demonstrable.’ *Metaph.* iii. 6. See No. 4 a. In fact Jacobi’s own doctrine in its most perfect form, will be found to bear a wonderful analogy to that of Aristotle. See No. 87 d. In determining indeed the question whether Aristotle does or does not derive all our knowledge from experience and induction, there is some difficulty, from the vagueness with which the problem has usually been stated. In so far, however, as it con-

cerns the doctrine of Common Sense, the opinion of Aristotle admits of no reasonable doubt.*

* The doctrine of those passages (as Post. An. L. ii. c. ult., Eth. Nic. L. v. c. 3. Eth. Eud. L. v. c. 3, &c.) in which Aristotle asserts that our knowledge of principles is derived from sense, experience, induction, may be reconciled with the doctrine of those others in which he makes the intellect itself their source (see above, p. 70 b, and quotations a. b. c. that follow)—in two ways.

The first is that adopted by a majority of his Greek and Latin expositors. They suppose that our knowledge of principles is dependent on both, but in different manners, and in different degrees. On the intellect this knowledge is principally dependent, as on its proximate, efficient, essential cause (*αἰτία γεννητική, ποιητική, causa, causa per se, origo, &c.*) On sense, experience, induction, it is dependent, as on its exciting, disponent, permissive, manifestative, subsidiary, instrumental, occasional cause (*ἀφορμή, ἐφορμή, πρόφασις, αἰτία ὑπουργός, λάτρις, ὑπέρτις, &c.*) Of the Greek interpreter, see Alexander in Top. pp. 12, 47, 48, ed. Ald. (Test n. 10)—Themistius in Post. An. ff. 2, 14, 15, and De An. f. 90, ed. Ald.—Philoponus (or Ammonius), in Post. An. f. 100, ed. Ald. and De Anima, Proem.—Eustratius in Post. An. f. 63, sq., ed. Ald. in Eth. Nic. f. 89 b, ed. Ald. Of the Latin expositors, among many, Fonseca, in Metaph. L. i. c. 1, q. 4—Conimbricenses, Org. Post. Anal. L. i. c. 1. q. 1—Sonerus in Metaph. L. i. c. 1, p. 67, sq. Of Testimonies infra, see Nos. 10, 20, 21, 22. On this interpretation, Aristotle justly views our knowledge as chronologically commencing with Sense, but logically originating in Intellect. As one of the oldest of his modern antagonists has incomparably enounced it,—‘*Cognitio nostra omnis a Mente primam originem, a Sensibus exordium habet primum;*’—a text on which an appropriate commentary may be sought for in the opening chapter of Kant’s Critique of pure Reason, and in the seventeenth Lecture of Cousin upon Locke.

The second mode of reconciling the contradiction, and which has not I think been attempted, is—that on the supposition of the mind virtually containing, antecedent to all actual experience, certain universal principles of knowledge, in the form of certain necessities of thinking; still it is only by repeated and comparative experiment, that we compass the certainty—on the one hand, that such and such cognitions cannot but be thought, and are, therefore, as necessary, native generalities,—and on the other, that such and such cognitions may or may not be thought, and are, therefore, as contingent, factitious generalizations. To this process of experiment, analysis, and classification, through which we attain to a scientific knowledge of principles, it might be shown that Aristotle, not improbably, applies the term Induction.

In regard to the passage (De An. L. iii. c. 5) in which the intellect prior to experience is compared to a tablet on which nothing has actually been written, the context shows that the import of this simile is with Aristotle very different from what it was with the Stoics; to whom, it may be noticed, and not, as is usually supposed, to the Stagirite, are we to refer the first enunciation of the brocard—*In Intellectu nihil est, quod non prius fuerit in Sensu.*

But to adduce some special testimonies. These I shall translate.¹

a.—Top. L. i. c. 1, § 6.—‘First truths are such as are believed, not through aught else, but through themselves alone. For in regard to the principles of science we ought not to require the reason *Why* [but only the fact *That* they are given]; for each such principle behooves to be itself a *belief* in and of itself.’

b.—Pr. Analyt. L. i. c. 3, § 4.—Maintaining against one party that demonstrative science is competent to man, and against another, that this science cannot itself be founded on propositions which admit of demonstration, Aristotle says—‘We assert not only that science does exist, but also that there is given a certain beginning or principle of science, *in so far as* [or on another interpretation of the term $\tilde{\eta}$ —‘*by which*’] we recognize the import of the terms.’ On the one interpretation the meaning of the passage is—‘We assert not only that [demonstrative] science does exist, but also that there is given a certain [indemonstrable] beginning or principle of science [that is, Intellect which comes into operation], so soon as we apprehend the meaning of the terms.’ For example, when we once become aware of the sense of the terms *whole* and *part*, then the intellect of itself spontaneously enounces the axiom—*The whole is greater than its part*.—On the other interpretation;—‘We assert not only that [demonstrative] science does exist, but also that there is given a certain [indemonstrable] beginning or principle of science [viz. intellect] by which we recognize the import of the terms,’ i. e. recognize them in their necessary relation, and thereupon explicitly enounce the axiom which that relation implies.

In making intellect a source of knowledge, Aristotle was preceded by Plato. But the Platonic definition of ‘*Intellection*’ is ‘*The principle of science*,’ and Aristotle’s merit is not the abolition of intellect as such, but its reduction from a sole to a conjunct principle of science.

¹ The original of the more essential points:—*Ζητεῖν λόγον ἀφέντας τὴν αἰσθησιν, ἀβήρωτα τίς ἐστι διανοίας.—Aristotle. Προσέχειν οὐ δεῖ πάντα τοῖς διὰ τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις μᾶλλον τοῖς φαινόμενοις.—Id. Τῇ αἰσθήσει μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λογῶ πισυντέον· καὶ τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν ἠμολογοῦμενα δεικνύωσι τοῖς φαινόμενοις.—Id. Ἡ αἰσθησις ἐπισημῆς ἔχει δόναμιν.—Id*

c.—Anal. Post. L. i. c. 2, § 16.—‘But it is not only necessary that we should be endowed with an antecedent knowledge of first principles—all or some—but that this knowledge should, likewise, be of paramount certainty. For whatever communicates a quality to other things must itself possess that quality in a still higher degree; as that on account of which we love all objects that partake of it, cannot but be itself, pre-eminently, an object of our love. Hence if we know and believe through certain first principles, we must know and believe these themselves in a superlative degree, for the very reason that we know and believe [all] secondary truths through them.’

In connection herewith, compare the passages quoted above, p. 70 b.

d.—Rhet. L. i. c. 1.—‘By nature man is competently organized for truth; and truth, in general, is not beyond his reach.’

e.—Metaph. L. ii. (A minor) c. 1.—‘The theory of Truth is in one respect difficult, in another easy; as shown indeed by this—that while enough has been denied to any, some has been conceded to all.’

f.—Eth. Nic. L. x. c. 2.—Arguing against a paradox of certain Platonists, in regard to the Pleasurable, he says—‘But they who oppose themselves to Eudoxus, as if what all nature desiderates were not a good, talk idly. For what *appears to all*, that we affirm *to be*; and he who would subvert this *belief*, will himself assuredly advance nothing more deserving of credit.—Compare also L. vii. c. 13 (14 Zuing.).

In his paraphrase on the above passage, the Pseudo-Andronicus (Heliodorus Prusensis) in one place uses the expression *common opinion*, and in another all but uses (what indeed he could hardly do in this meaning as an Aristotelian, if indeed in Greek at all) the expression *common sense*, which D. Heinsius in his Latin version actually employs. ‘But, that what all beings desire is a good, this is manifest to every one endowed with sense’ —(πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν αἰσθησει, ‘omnibus communi sensu præditis’.) See No. 31.

g.—Eth. Eud. L. i. c. 6.—‘But of all these we must endeavor to seek out rational grounds of belief, by adducing manifest testimonies and examples. For it is the strongest evidence of a doctrine, if all men can be adduced as the manifest confessors of its positions; because every individual has in him a kind of private organ of the truth. . . . Hence we ought not always to look only to the conclusions of reasoning, but frequently rather to what appears [and is believed] to be.’ See Nos. 10, 30.

h.—Ibid. L. vii. c. 14.—‘The problem is this:—What is the beginning or principle of motion in the soul? Now it is evident, that as God is in the universe, and the universe in God, that [I read *κινεῖν καὶ*] the divinity in us is also, in a certain sort, the universal mover of the mind. For the principle of Reason is not Reason, but something better. Now what can we say is better than even science, except God?’—The import of this singular passage is very obscure. It has excited, I see, the attention, and exercised the ingenuity of Pomponatius, J. C. Scaliger, De Raet, Leibnitz, Leidenfrost, Jacobi, &c. But without viewing it as of pantheistic tendency, as Leibnitz is inclined to do, it may be interpreted as a declaration, that Intellect, which Aristotle elsewhere allows to be pre-existent and immortal, is a spark of the Divinity; whilst its data (from which, as principles more certain than their deductions, Reason, Demonstration, Science must depart) are to be revered as the revelation of truths which would otherwise lie hid from man. That, in short,

‘The voice of Nature is the voice of God.’

By the by, it is remarkable that this text was not employed by any of those Aristotelians who endeavored to identify the Active Intellect with the Deity.

i.—Phys. L. viii. c. 3.—Speaking of those who from the contradictions in our conception of the possibility, denied the fact of motion:—‘But to assert that all things are at rest, and to attempt a proof of this by reasoning, throwing the testimony of sense out of account, is a sign not of any strength, but of a cer-

tain imbecility of reason.' And in the same chapter—'Against all these reasonings, there suffices the belief [of sense] alone.' See Simplicius ad locum, ed. Ald. ff. 276, 277.

k.—De Gen. Anim. L. iii. c. 10.—'We ought to accord our belief to sense, in preference to reasoning; and of reasonings, especially to those whose conclusions are in conformity with the phenomena.' And somewhere in the same work he also says, 'Sense is equivalent to, or has the force of science.'

l.—See also De Cœlo, L. i. c. 3, text 22.

m.—Ibid. L. iii. c. 7, text 61.

n.—Meteor. L. i. c. 13.

4.—THEOPHRASTUS.—a.—Metaph. c. 8 (ed. Sylb. p. 260, Brand. p. 319). The following testimony of this philosopher (if the treatise be indeed his) is important, both in itself, and as illustrative of the original peripatetic doctrine touching the cognition of first principles, which he clearly refuses to Sense and induction, and asserts to Intelligence and intuition. It has, however, been wholly overlooked; probably in consequence of being nearly unintelligible in the original from the corruption of the common text, and in the version of Bessarion—also from a misapprehension of his author's meaning.

Having observed that it was difficult to determine up to what point, and in regard to what things the investigation of causes or reasons is legitimate;—that this difficulty applies to the objects both of Sense and of Intelligence, in reference to either of which a regress to infinity is at once a negation of them as objects of understanding and of philosophy;—that Sense and Intelligence, severally furnish a point of departure, a principle, the one relative, or to us, the other absolute, or in nature;—and that each is the converse of the other, the first in nature being the last to us;—he goes on to state what these counter processes severally avail in the research, or, as he calls it, after Aristotle, the speculation of principles. 'Up to a certain point, taking our departure from the Senses, we are able, rising from reason to reason, to carry on the speculation of principles; but when we arrive at those which

are [not merely comparatively prior but] absolutely supreme and primary, we can no more; because, either that a reason is no longer to be found, or of our own imbecility, unable, as it were, to look from mere excess of light. [Compare Arist. Metaph. A minor, c. 1; which supports the reading, *φαινιότατα*.] But the other procedure is probably the more authentic, which accords the speculation of principles to the *touch*, as it may be called, and *feeling* of Intelligence (*τῷ νῷ δίγεται καὶ οἷον ἀψαμένῳ*). [Comp. Aristot. Metaph. xii. 7.] For in this case there is no room for illusion in regard to these.' He then observes—'That it is even in the sciences of detail, of great, but in the universal sciences, of paramount importance, to determine wherein, and at what point the limit to a research of reasons should be fixed.' And why? '*Because they who require a reason for every thing, subvert, at once, the foundations of reason and of knowledge.*'

b.—See above, p. 74 a, where from his doctrine in regard to first principles it appears that Theophrastus, like Aristotle, founds knowledge on natural Belief.

5.—LUCRETIVS.—De Rerum Natura, L. i. v. 423, sq.

'Corpus enim per se *communis* deliquat esse
Sensus; quo nisi prima *fides* fundata valebit,
 Haud erit, occultis de rebus quo referentes,
 Confirmare animi quicquam ratione queamus.'

Sensus communis here means Sense, strictly so called, as testifying not only in all men, but in all animals. It is a translation of the expression of Epicurus—*ἡ αἰσθησις ἐπὶ πάντων* (Laert. x. 39); and as in the Epicurean philosophy all our knowledge is merely an educt of Sense, the truth of the derived, depends wholly upon the truth of the original evidence. See L. iv. vv. 480, sq.

6.—CICERO.—a.—De Fin. L. iv. c. 19.—Speaking of the Stoical paradoxes ('recte facta omnia æqualia,—omnia peccata paria,' &c.) he says—'Quæ cum magnifice primo dici videntur, considerata, minus probantur. *Sensus enim cujusque* [i. e. *S. communis*] et natura rerum, atque ipsa veritas clamant, quodam

modo, non posse adduci, ut inter eas res quas Zeno exæquaret, nihil interesset.' (See No. 7.)

b.—Tusc. Disp. L. i. c. 13.—'Omnia autem in re consensio omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est.' Compare also c. 15.

c.—De Nat. Deor. L. i. c. 16.—The Epicurean Velleius there speaking the doctrine of his sect:—'Intelligi necesse est, esse Deos, quoniam insitas eorum, vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus.* *De quo autem, omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est. Esse igitur Deos confitendum est.*' Compare Plato, De Legibus, L. x.; Aristotle, De Cælo, L. i. c. 3; Plutarch, Amatores; Seneca, Epistolæ, 117.

d.—For '*Sensus Communis*,' and '*Sensus Communes*,' as the sources of moral judgment, see the Orations Pro Cluentio 6.—Pro Plancio, 13, 14.—Pro Domo, 36.

e.—For '*Sensus Communis*' as criterion of judgment in the arts, see De Orat. L. iii. c. 50; quoted by Reid, p. 424, b; compare L. i. c. 3.

7.—HORACE.—Sermones, I. iii. 96. Speaking like Cicero (No. 6, a.) of the Stoical paradox, he says—

'Queis paria esse fere placuit peccata, laborant,
Quum ventum ad verum est; *Sensus* moresque repugnant.'

That is, as Acro (to say nothing of Torrentius, Baxter, and other moderns) interprets it—'*communis hominum sensus*.' †

* It is not to be supposed that the *κοινὰ ἔννοιαι*, *φυσικαὶ προλήψεις*, of the Stoics, far less of the Epicureans (however, as in the present instance, styled *innate* or *implanted*), were more than generalizations *a posteriori*. Yet this is a mistake, into which, among many others, even Lipsius and Leibnitz have fallen, in regard to the former. See Manud. ad Stoic. Philos. L. ii. diss. 11; and Nouv. Ess. Pref.

† This gloss of Acro is not to be found in any of the editions of the two Horatian scholiasts. But I am in possession of extracts made by the celebrated William Canter, from a more complete MS. of these commentators, than any to which Fabricius and their other editors had access. This codex belonged to Canter himself; and he gives its character, and a few specimens of its *anecdota*, in his *Novæ Lectiones*. The copy of Horace (one of the first editions of Lambinus) in which these extracts are found, contains also the full collation of Canter's '*Manuscripti Codices Antiquissimi*' of the poet (*two*

8.—SENECA.—a.—Epist. 117.—‘Multum dare solemus præsumptioni omnium hominum. Apud nos veritatis argumentum est, aliquid omnibus videri.’

b.—Ep. 9. ‘Ut scias autem hos *sensus communes* esse, natura scilicet dictante, apud poetam comicum invenies,

“Non est beatus, esse se qui non putet.”

c.—Ep. 120. ‘Natura *semina* nobis scientiæ dedit, scientiam non dedit.’

9.—PLINY the Younger.—Paneg., c. 64.—‘Melius omnibus quam singulis creditur. Singuli enim decipere et decipi possunt: nemo omnes, neminem omnes fefellerunt.’

9*—QUINTILIAN.—Inst., L. v. c. 10, § 12.—‘Pro certis habemus ea, in quæ communi opinione consensus est.’

10.—ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS, the oldest and ablest of the interpreters of Aristotle whose writings have come down to us, follows his master, in resting truth and philosophy on the natural convictions of mankind.

a.—On Fate, § 2, edd. Lond. et Orell. Οὐ κενὸν οὐδ’ ἄστοχον τ’ ἀληθοῦς ἢ κοινῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσις, κ.τ.λ. ‘The common nature of man is neither itself void of truth, nor is it an erring index of the true;* in virtue whereof all men are on certain points mutually agreed, those only excepted, who, through preconceived opinions, and a desire to follow these out consistently, find themselves compelled verbally† to dissent.’ And he adds, that ‘Anaxagoras of Clazomene, however otherwise distinguished as a physical philosopher, is undeserving of credit in opposing his testimony touching fate to the common belief of mankind.’ This he elsewhere calls their ‘*common presumptions*,’ their ‘*common and natural notions*.’ See §§ 8, 14, 26, of the same work, and

only, I can prove, and not three, as the Novæ Lectiones fallaciously state), and which, from the many remarkable readings to be found exclusively in them, must, in all probability, have perished—perhaps in the inundation by which Canter’s celebrated library was, in a great measure, destroyed.

* See Aristotle, No. 3, d.

† *Verbally*, not mentally. He has Aristotle (Anal. Post., L. i. c. 10, § 7) in view. See Buffier, No. 63.

the chapter on Fate in the second book of his treatise On the Soul, f. 161, ed. Ald. 1534.

b.—On the Topics of Aristotle (p. 48, ed. Ald.) ‘The induction useful in the employment of axioms is useful for illustrating the application to particulars of the axiomatic rule [read *περὶ λαμβανόμενα*], but not in demonstrating its universality; for this, as an object of intellect, is self-evident, nor can it, in propriety, be proved by induction at all.’ Compare also p. 12.

11.—CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.—Stromata. After stating (L. v., Op. ed. 1688, p. 544) that there is neither knowledge without belief, nor belief without knowledge, and having shown (L. viii. p. 771), after Aristotle and others, that the supposition of proof or demonstration being founded on propositions themselves capable of being proved, involves the absurdity of an infinite regress, and therefore subverts the possibility of demonstration, he says—‘Thus the philosophers confess that the beginnings, the principles of all knowledge, are indemonstrable; consequently if demonstration there be, it is necessary that there should be something prior, *believable of itself*, something first and indemonstrable. All demonstration is thus ultimately resolved into an *indemonstrable belief*.’

12.—TERTULLIAN.—a.—De Testimonio animæ adversus Gentes, c. 5.—‘Hæc testimonia animæ, quanto vera tanto simplicia, quanto simplicia tanto vulgaria, quanto vulgaria tanto communia, quanto communia tanto naturalia, quanto naturalia tanto divina; non putem cuiquam frivolum et frigidum videri posse, si recogitet naturæ majestatem, ex qua censetur auctoritas animæ. Quantum dederis magistræ, tantum adjudicabis discipulæ. Magistra natura, anima discipula. Quicquid aut illa edocuit, aut ista perdidicit, a Deo traditum est, magistro scilicet ipsius magistræ. Quid anima possit de principali institutore præsumere, in te est æstimare de ea quæ in te est. . . . Sed qui ejusmodi eruptiones animæ non putavit doctrinam esse naturæ, et congenitæ et ingenitæ *conscientiæ** tacita commissa, dicet potius de ventilatis in

* Tertullian is the only ancient writer who uses the word *Conscientia* in a psychological sense, corresponding with our *Consciousness*.

vulgus opinionibus, publicatarum litterarum usum jam, et quasi vitium, corroboratum taliter sermocinandi. Certe prior anima quam littera, et prior sermo quam liber, et prior sensus quam stylus, et prior homo ipse quam philosophus et poeta. Nunquid ergo credendum est ante litteraturam et divulgationem ejus, mutos absque hujusmodi pronunciationibus homines vixisse? . . . Et unde ordo ipsis litteris contigit, nosse, et in usum loquelæ disseminare, quæ nulla unquam mens conceperat, aut lingua protulerat, aut auris exceperat?—He alludes to I. Corinthians ii. 9, &c.

b.—De Resurrectione Carnis, c. 3.—‘Est quidem et de *communibus sensibus* sapere in Dei rebus. . . . Utar et *conscientia* populi, contestantis Deum Deorum; utar et reliquis *communibus sensibus*, etc. . . . *Communes enim sensus* simplicitas ipsa commendat, et compassio sententiarum, et familiaritas opinionum, eoque fideiores existimantur, quia nuda et aperta et omnibus noto definiunt. *Ratio* enim divina in medulla est, non in superficie, et plerumque æmula manifestis.’

c.—Ibid., c. 5.—‘Igitur quoniam et rudes quique de *communibus* adhuc *sensibus* sapiunt,’ &c.

d.—De Anima, c. 2.—Speaking of the sources from which a merely human philosophy had derived its knowledge of the mind, he concludes—‘Sed et natura pleraque suggeruntur quasi de *publico sensu*, quo animam Deus dotare dignatus est.’

e.—Præser. 28.—‘Quod apud multos unum invenitur, non est erratum sed traditum.’

13.—ARNOBIUS.—Adversus Gentes, L. ii. p. 92, ed. 1651. ‘Quid est a nobis factum contra *sensum* iudiciumque *commune*, si majora et certiora delegimus, nec sumus nos passi falsorum religionibus attineri?’ Add., pp. 66, 127.

14.—LACTANTIUS.—Institut., L. iii. c. 5.—‘Debit ergo Arcesilaus siquid saperet, distinguere, quæ sciri possent, quæve nesciri. Sed si id fecisset, ipse se in populum redigisset. Nam vulgus interdum plus sapit, quia tantum, quantum opus est, sapit.’

Quære—Had Lactantius the line of Martial in his eye?

‘Quisquis plus justo non sapit, ille sapit;’

or the precept of St. Paul?—‘Non plus sapere quam oportet sapere, sed sapere ad sobrietatem.’

15.—ST. AUGUSTINE.—a.—De duabus Animabus, c. 10. ‘Quis enim homines, quos modo a *communi sensu* generis humani nulla dirupisset amentia,’ &c.

b.—De Trinitate., Lib. xiii. c. 1.—‘Novimus certissima scientia et clamante Conscientia.’ That is, Conscience, not Consciousness, as sometimes supposed.

c.—De Magistro, c. 11.—‘Ait Propheta [Is., vii. 9], *Nisi credideritis non intelligetis*; quod non dixisset profecto, si nihil distare judicasset. Quod ergo intelligo, id etiam credo; at non omne quod credo, etiam intelligo. Omne autem quod intelligo scio; non omne quod credo scio. Quare pleraque cum scire non possim, quanta tamen utilitate credantur scio.’

16.—PROCLUS (In Platonis Theologiam, Lib. i. c. 25) has still more remarkable declarations of the truth, that *Belief* is the foundation of knowledge. Speaking of the faith of the gods, which he describes as anterior to the act of cognition (*πρεσβύτερον τῆς γνωστικῆς ἐνεργείας*), he says that it is not only to be distinguished from our belief, or rather error, in regard to things sensible; but likewise from the belief we have of what are called Common Notions, with which it, however agrees, in that these common notions command assent, prior to all reflection or reasoning: (*καὶ γὰρ ταῖς κοιναῖς ἐννοίαις πρὸ παντὸς λόγου πιστεύομεν*). See below, Hermes, No. 99. Among other Platonists the same doctrine is advanced by the pseudo Hermes Trismegistus, L. xvi. sub fine, p. 436, ed. Patricii, 1593.

17.—AMMONIUS HERMIÆ (as extracted and interpolated by Philoponus) in his Commentary on Aristotle ‘On the Soul,’ Introduction, p. 1–3, ed. Trincavelli, 1535. ‘The function of Intellect (*νοῦς*) is by immediate application [or intuition, *ἀπλᾶς προσβολαῖς*], to reach or compass reality, and this end it accom-

plishes more certainly than through the medium of demonstration. For as Sense, by applying itself at once to a colored or figured object, obtains a knowledge of it better than through demonstration—for there needs no syllogism to prove that this or the other thing is white, such being perceived by the simple appliance of the sense; so also the Intellect apprehends its appropriate object by a simple appliance [a simple intuitive jet, ἀπλῆ ἐπίεσις], better than could be done through any process of demonstration.’ . . .

‘I say that the rational soul has in, and co-essential with it, the reasons (λόγους) of things; but, in consequence of being clothed in matter, they are, as it were, oppressed and smothered, like the spark which lies hid under the ashes. And as, when the ashes are slightly dug into, the spark forthwith gleams out, the digger not however making the spark, but only removing an impediment; in like manner, Opinion, excited by the senses, elicits the reasons of existences from latency into manifestation. Hence they [the Platonists] affirm that teachers do not infuse into us knowledge, but only call out into the light that which previously existed in us, as it were, concealed. . . . It is, however, more correct to say that these are Common Notions or adumbrations of the Intellect; for whatever we know more certainly than through demonstration, that we know in a common notion.’ . . . Such common notions are—‘Things that are equal to the same are equal to one another,’—‘If equals be taken from equals the remainders are equal,’—‘Every thing must be either affirmed or denied.’

18.—ST. ANSELM professes the maxim—‘Crede ut intelligas; which became celebrated in the schools, as opposed to the ‘Intellige ut credas’ of Abelard.

19.—ALGAZEL of Bagdad, ‘the Imaum of the world,’ somewhere (in his Destruction of the Philosophers, if I recollect aright) says, as the Latin version gives it—‘Radix cognitionis fides.’

20.—ST. THOMAS AQUINAS.—a.—De veritate fidei catholicæ contra Gentiles, L. i. c. 7, § 1. ‘Ea quæ naturaliter rationi insi-

ta, verissima esse constat; intantum, ut nec ea falsa esse possibile cogitare. . . . Principiorum *naturaliter* notorum cognitio nobis *divinitus* est indita, cum ipse Deus sit auctor nostræ naturæ. Hæc ergo principia etiam divina sapientia continet. Quicquid igitur principiis hujusmodi contrarium est, est divinæ sapientiæ contrarium: non igitur a Deo esse potest. Ea igitur quæ ex revelatione divina per fidem tenentur, non possunt naturali cognitioni esse contraria.'

b.—Expositio in Libb. Metaph. Aristot. Lect. v.—'Et quia talis cognitio principiorum (those of Contradiction and of Excluded Middle) inest nobis *statim a natura*, concludit,' &c.

c.—Summa Theologiæ, P. i. Partis ii. Qu. 51, art. 1.—'Intellectus principiorum dicitur esse *habitus naturalis*. Ex ipsa enim natura animæ intellectualis convenit homini, quod, statim cognito quid est totum et quid est pars, cognoscat quod omne totum est majus sua parte, et simile in cæteris. Sed quid sit totum et quid sit pars cognoscere non potest, nisi per species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus acceptas, et propter hoc Philosophus, in fine Posteriorum, ostendit quod cognitio principiorum provenit ex sensu.'

d.—De Veritate, Qu. xi. De Magistro, conclusio.—'Dicendum est similiter de scientiæ acquisitione, quod præexistunt in nobis principia quæ statim *lumine intellectus agentis* cognoscuntur, per species a sensibilibus abstractas, sive sint complexa ut *dignitates*, sive incomplexa, sicut *entis* et *unius* et hujusmodi quæ statim intellectus apprehendit. Ex istis autem principiis universalibus omnia principia sequuntur, sicut ex quibusdam *rationibus seminalibus*,' &c.

e.—Summa Theologiæ, P. i. Partis ii. Qu. 5, art. 3.—'Quod ab omnibus dicitur non potest totaliter falsum esse. Videtur enim naturale quod in pluribus est; natura autem non totaliter deficit.' Compare Nos. 1 and 3, f.

21.—JOANNES DUNS SCOTUS holds a doctrine of *Common Sense*, with reference, more especially, to necessary truths, in which the genuine doctrine of Aristotle is admirably enounced, and cogently defended.

On the one hand he maintains (against Averroes) that principles are not, in a certain sense, innate in the Intellect; *i. e.* not as actual cognitions chronologically anterior to experience.—‘*Dicendum quod non habet aliquam cognitionem naturalem secundum naturam suam, neque simplicium, neque complexorum, quia omnis nostra cognitio ortum habet ex sensu. Primo enim movetur sensus ab aliquo simplici non complexo, et a sensu moto movetur intellectus, et intelligit simplicia, quod est primus actus intellectus; deinde post apprehensionem simplicium, sequitur alius actus, qui est componere simplicia ad invicem; post illam autem compositionem, habet intellectus ex lumine naturali quod assentiat illi veritati complexorum, si illud complexum sit principium primum.*’ Quæstt. super libros Metaph. L. ii. q. 1, § 2.

On the other hand he maintains (against Henry of Ghent) that, in a different sense, principles are naturally inherent in the mind. For he shows that the intellect is not dependent upon sense and experience, except accidentally, in so far as these are requisite, in affording a knowledge of the terms, to afford the occasion on which, by its native and proper light (in other words, by the suggestion of common sense), it actually manifests the principles which it potentially contained; and that these principles are certain, even were those phenomena of sense illusive, in reference to which they are elicited. ‘*Respondeo, quod quantum ad istam notitiam (principiorum sc.), intellectus non habet sensus pro causa [vel origine, as he elsewhere has it], sed tantum pro occasione: quia intellectus non potest habere notitiam simplicium nisi acceptam a sensibus, illa tamen accepta potest simplicia virtute sua componere et, si ex ratione talium simplicium sit complexio evidenter vera, intellectus virtute propria et terminorum assentiet illi complexioni, non virtute sensus, a quo accipit terminos exterius. Exemplum;—si ratio totius et ratio majoritatis accipiantur a sensu, et intellectus componat istam—Omne totum est maius sua parte, intellectus virtute sui et istorum terminorum assentiet indubitanter isti complexioni, et non tantum quia vidit terminos conjunctos in re, sicut assen-*

tit isti—*Socrates est albus, quia vidit terminos in re uniri. Immo dico, quod si omnes sensus essent falsi,* &c. In Libros Sent. Comm. Oxon. L. i. Dist. 3, qu. 4, § 8.—See also §§ 12, 23; and Quæstt. super Metaph., L. i. qu. 4, §§ 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, 14, 16; L. ii. qu. 1, §§ 2, 3, et alibi; where it is frequently repeated that sense and experience are not the *cause* or *origin*, but only the *occasion* on which the *natural light of Intellect* reveals its principles or first truths.

I may observe, that like Locke, the *Subtle Doctor* divides our acquisition of knowledge between two sources, *Sense* and *Reflection*.—‘*Nihil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu, vera est de eo quod est, primum intelligibile, scilicet quod quid est* [τὸ ὄντι] rei materialis, non autem de omnibus per se intelligibilibus; nam multa per se intelliguntur, non quia speciem faciunt in *Sensu*, sed per *Reflexionem intellectus*.’ Quæstt. super Univ. Porph. q. 3. But what Locke was sometimes compelled virtually to confess, in opposition to the general tenor of his doctrine (see No. 51), Scotus professedly lays down as the very foundation of his—that Reflection finds in the mind, or intellect itself, principles, or necessary cognitions, which are not the educts of experience, howbeit not actually manifested prior to, or except on occasion of, some empirical act of knowledge.*

22.—ANTONIUS ANDREAS, an immediate disciple of Scotus,—the Doctor Dulcifluus. Quæstt. super libros Metaph. L. ii. qu. 1.—‘Respondeo, et dico duo.

‘PRIMUM;—*Quod notitia Primorum Principiorum non est nobis a natura; quia omnis nostra cognitio intellectiva habet ortum a sensu, et, per consequens, non inest a natura. . . Primo*

* The edition I use, is that by the Irish Franciscans, Lyons, 1639, of the Opera Omnia of Scotus, 12 vols. in folio. This is the only edition in which the Subtle Doctor can be conveniently studied. His editor and commentators of course maintain him to be a countryman; but the patriotism of Father Maurice (t. iii. p. 254), makes no scruple in holding him out as actually inspired:—‘Suppono, cum Moyse in monte hoc vidit, aut cum Paulo ad tertium cœlum ascendit, aut certe cum alio Joanne supra pectus sapientiæ recubuit.’

enim motu movetur sensus ab objecto simplici non complexo; et a sensu moto movetur intellectus, et intelligit simplicia, qui est primus actus intellectus. Deinde post apprehensionem simplicium sequitur alius actus, qui est componere simplicia ad invicem; et post istam compositionem habet intellectus, *ex lumine naturali* ut assentiat illi veritati complexæ, si illud complexum sit primum principium.

‘SECUNDUM;—*Quod notitia Primorum Principiorum [recte] dicitur nobis inesse naturaliter, quatenus, ex lumine naturali intellectus, sunt nobis inesse nota, habita notitia simplici terminorum, quia “principia cognoscimus inquantum terminos cognoscimus” (ex primo Posteriorum).’*

To this schoolman we owe the first enunciation of the Principle of Identity.

Those who are curious in this matter will find many acute observations on the nature of principles in the other schoolmen; more especially in Averroes on the Analytics and Metaphysics, in Albertus Magnus on the Predicables and Pr. Analytics, and in Hales, 3d and 4th books of his Metaphysics.

23.—BUDÆUS.—In Pandectas, Tit. i.—‘Ista igitur fere quæ juri naturali ascribuntur, id est, quæ natura docuisse nos creditur, versantur in *Sensu Communi*,’ &c.

24.—LUTHER.—Weisheit, Th. iii. Abth. 2.—‘All things have their root in *Belief*, which we can neither perceive nor comprehend. He who would make this Belief visible, manifest, and conceivable, has sorrow for his pains.’

25.—MELANCHTHON.—a.—De Dialectica, ed. Lugd. 1542, p. 90.—Speaking of the Dicta de Omni et de Nullo—‘Neo opus est procul quærere harum regularum interpretationem; si quis *sensum communem* consuluerit, statim intelliget eas. Nam ut⁶ Arithmetica et aliæ artes initia sumunt a *sensu communi*, ita Dialecticæ principia nobiscum nascuntur.’

b.—Ibid., p. 103.—Speaking of the process in the Expository Syllogism,—‘Habet causam hæc consequentia in natura positam quandam *κοινωνίαν ἐννοίας*, ut vocant, hoc est, sententiam quam om-

nis natura docet, de qua satis est *sensum communem* consulere.' And again,—‘Est et hujus consequentiæ ratio sumpta a *communi sensu*.’

c.—Erotemata Dialectica L. iv. in Loco, ab Absurdo, p. 1040, ed. 3, Strigelii, 1579—‘*Absurdum* in Philosophia vocatur opinio pugnaus cum *Sensu Communi*, id est vel cum principiis naturæ notis, vel cum universali experientia.’ Reid (see n. 79 a) says repeatedly the very same.

d.—Ibid., p. 853.—‘Quare Principia sunt certa? I. Quia notitia principiorum est *lumen naturale*, insitum humanis mentibus divinitus. II. Quia dato opposito sequitur destructio naturæ.’ See also pp. 798, 857, and the relative commentary of Strigelius, What Melanchthon states in regard to the cognition of Principles and Light of Nature is borrowed from the schoolmen. See above, Nos. 20, 21, 22. Consult also his treatise *De Anima* in the chapters *De Intellectu*; more especially that entitled—*Estne verum dictum, notitias aliquas nobiscum nasci?*

26.—JULIUS CÆSAR SCALIGER.—De Subtilitate, Exerc. cccvii. § 18.—‘Sunt cum anima nostra quædam *cognatæ notitiæ*, quæ idcirco *νοῦς* dicuntur a philosopho. Nemo enim tam infans est, quem cognitio lateat pluris et paucioris. Infanti duo poma apponito. Uno recepto, alterum item poscet. Ab his principiis actus Mentis, a sensilibus excitatus.’—Such principles, he contends, are innate in the human Intellect, precisely as the *instincts* of the lower animals are innate in their highest power. They may therefore be denominated Intellectual Instincts. Compare §§ 21, 22.

The doctrine of this acute philosopher was adopted and illustrated, among others, by his two expositors Rodolphus Goclenius of Mafburg, and Joannes Sperlingius of Wittemberg; by the former in his *Adversaria* and *Scaligeri Exercitationes*, 1594 (qq. 41, 51, 60); by the latter, not indeed in his *Meditationes ad Scaligeri Exercitationes*, but in his *Physica Anthropologica*, 1668 (L. i. c. 3, § 8). In these the arguments of Gassendi and Locke for the counter opinion. are refuted by anticipation; though, in fact,

Locke himself is at last, as we shall see, obliged to appeal to *Common Sense*, identical with the *Intellectus*, *Mens*, and *Lumen Naturale* of these and other philosophers. (No. 51.) Otto Casmann, the disciple of Goelenius, may also be consulted in his *Psychologia Anthropologica*, 1594. (c. 5, § 5.)

27.—OMPHALIUS.—*Nomologia*, f. 72 b. ‘Non eget his præceptis [dictis scilicet de omni et de nullo] qui *Sensum Communiem* consulit. Natura siquidem plerasque κοινὰς ἐννοίας animis nostris insevit quibus rerum naturam pervidemus.’

28.—ANTONIUS GOVEANUS.—*Pro Aristotele Responsio adversus Petri Rami Calumnias*. Opera Omnia, ed. Meermaniana, p. 802 a.—‘An non ex *hominem communi sensu* desumptæ enunciationum reciprocationes hæ videntur? . . . Sumpta hæ Rame, sunt e *communi hominum intelligentia*, cujus cum mater natura sit, quid est, quæso, cur negemus naturæ decreta hæc et præcepta esse?’

29.—NUNNESIUS.—*De Constitutione Dialecticæ*, f. 56 b. ed. 1554.—‘Sed cum *Dialectica contenta sit Sensu Communi*,’ &c.

30.—MURETUS.—*In Aristotelus Ethica ad Nicomachum Commentarius*, 1583. Opera Omnia, Ruhnkenii, t. iii. p. 230.

In proof of the immortality of the soul, in general, and in particular, in disproof of an old and ever-recurring opinion—one, indeed, which agitates, at the present moment, the divines and philosophers of Germany—that the intellect in man, as a merely passing manifestation of the universal soul, the Absolute, can pretend to no individual, no personal, existence beyond the grave; he adduces the argument drawn from the common sense of mankind, in the following noble, though hitherto unnoticed passage:—touching the eloquence of which, it should be borne in mind, that what is now read as a commentary was originally listened to by a great and mingled auditory, as improvisations from the mouth of him, for whose equal as a Latin orator, we must ascend to Cicero himself.

‘Neque laborandum est etiamsi hæc [nisi] naturalibus argumentis probare nequeamus, neque fortassis dissolvere rationes quasdam, quas afferunt ii, qui contrarias opiniones tuentur. Na-

turalis enim omnium gentium consensus multo plus ponderis apud nos, quam omnia istorum argumenta, habere debet. Neque quicquam est aliud gigantum more bellare cum diis, quam repugnare naturæ,* et insitas ab ea in omnium animis opiniones acutis ac fallacibus conclusiunculis velle subvertere. Itaque ut senes illi Trojani, apud Homerum, dicebant, pulchram quidam esse Helenam, sed tamen ablegandum ad suos, ne exitio esset civitati; ita nos, si quando afferetur nobis ab istis acutum aliquod argumentum, quo colligatur animos interire una cum corporibus, aut si quid supersit, commune quiddam esse, et ut unum solem,† ita unum esse omnium mentum, respondeamus:—Ingeniosus quidem es, o bone, et eruditus, et in disputando potens; sed habe tibi istas præclaras rationes tuas; ego eas, ne mihi exitiosæ sint, admittere in animum meum nolo. Accipite, enim, gravissime viri, . . . studiosissimi adolescentes, . . . præclaram, et immortalis memoria dignam, summi philosophi Aristotelis sententiam, quam in omnibus hujus generis disputationibus teneatis, quam sequamini, ad quam sensus cogitationesque vestras perpetuo dirigatis. Ex illius enim divini hominis pectore, tanquam ex augustissimo quodam sapientiæ sacrario, hæc prodierunt, quæ primo Ethicorum ad Eudemum leguntur—Προσέχειν οὐ δεῖ πάντα τοῖς διὰ τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις μᾶλλον τοῖς φαινομένοις. Convertam hæc in Latinum sermonem, utinamque possem in omnes omnium populorum linguas convertere, atque in omnium hominum animis, ita ut nunquam delerentur, insculpere:—*non semper, neque omnibus in rebus, assentiendum est iis quæ rationibus et argumentis probantur; immo potius ea ple-*

* Cic. De Sen. c. 2. Quid enim est aliud gigantum more bellare cum diis, nisi naturæ repugnare?

† Had Muretus the following passage of Bessarion in his eye?—*Intellectum deforis advenire* [Aristotle's dictum], Theophrastus, Alexander, Themistius, Averroes, ita accipiunt, ut jam quisque ortus, illico intellectus sibi applicatam excepiat portionem, ita extinetus relinquat in commune; non aliter, ac si quis *Sole, nascens, participare dicatur, moriens, privari*; et non esse animam particularem, quæ deforis advenit, sed ex communi acceptam applicationem.' In Calumn. Plat. L. iii. c. 27.—The simile of the sun is however to be found in Plotinus, and—I think—in Themistius.

rumque tenenda, quæ communi hominum sententia comprobantur. Quid enim est tam falsum, tamque abhorrens a vero, ut non ad id probandum ab ingeniosis et exercitatis hominibus argumenta excogitari queant? . . . Vidistisne unquam in tenebrosa nocte accensam aliquam facem e longinquo loco micantem? Illam, igitur, quamvis dissitam, videbatis; neque tamen quicquam, in illo longo, interjecto inter oculum vestrum et facem, densis ob-sito tenebris spatio, videre poteratis. Idem putatote animis acci-dere. Sæpa animus noster veritatem alicujus enunciationis tan-quam eminus fulgentem ac collucentem videt, etiamsi propter illam, qua circumfusum est, caliginem, videre ea quæ intermedia sunt, et per quæ ad eam pervenitur, non potest. . . Si iter ali-quod ingressurus, duas videres vias, quæ eodem ferrent; unam ex-peditam, planam, tutam, et eo quo constituisses, sine ulla erratione, ducentem; alteram tortuosam, asperam, periculosam, et quam qui sequerentur, propter varios et multiplices anfractus, sæpe aberarent; —dubitares utram potius eligeres? Duæ sunt viæ quibus homines ad aliquam cognitionem Dei et animi sui pervenire posse se putant. Aut enim eo contendunt disputando, et cur quicquam ita sit sub-tiliter inquirendo; aut sine dubitatione ulla assentiendo iis, quæ majores summo consensu, partim naturali lumine cognita, partim divinitus inspirata, tradiderunt. Illam qui secuti sunt, omnibus sæ-culis in multiplices errores inciderunt. At hæc illorum signata est vestigiis, quos in cælum sublatos veneramur et colimus.*

31.—GIPHANIUS.—Commentarii in libros Ethicorum ad Nico-

* Of none of the great scholars of the sixteenth century—the second golden age of Latin letters—have the works been so frequently republished, so learnedly annotated, so industriously collected, as those of the pattern critic, the incomparable Muretus. There however still remains a considerable gleanings. I have myself taken note of some twenty scattered *anecdota*, in prose and verse, in Greek, Latin, and French, which, if the excellent edition (excellent, even after that of Ruhnkenius) of the *Opera Omnia*, by Professor Frotcher of Leipsie, now unfortunately interrupted, be not finally abandoned, I should have great pleasure in communicating to the learned editor.—How is it, that whilst Italy, Germany, and Holland have, for centuries, been emulating each other in paying homage to the genius of Muretus, France has done absolutely nothing to testify her admiration of so illustrious a son?

machum, L. x. c. 2.—‘Quod omnibus videtur, id (inquit Aristoteles) esse dicimus. Nam *communis* hominum *sensus* et *judicium* est tanquam *lex naturæ*.’ See n. 3, f.

32.—MARIANA. De Rege et Regis institutione, L. i. c. 6. ‘Et est *communis sensus* quasi quædam *naturæ vox* [lex ?] mentibus nostris indita, auribus insonans *lex* [vox ?] qua a turpi honestum secernimus.’

33.—SIR JOHN DAVIES. Of the immortality of the Soul, 1 ed. 1599, pp. 63, 97.

‘If then all souls, both good and bad, do teach,
With general voice, that souls can never die;
’Tis not man’s flattering gloss, but nature’s speech,
Which, like God’s oracle, can never lie.’

* * * * *

‘But how can that be false, which every tongue
Of every mortal man affirms for true?
Which truth has in all ages stood so strong,
That, loadstone-like, all hearts it ever drew.
For not the Christian or the Jew alone,
The Persian or the Turk, acknowledge this;
This mystery to the wild Indian known,
And to the Cannibal and Tartar is.’

These latter stanzas were probably suggested by a passage in the first Dissertation of Maximus Tyrius. This ‘learned poet’ requires and eminently deserves, a commentary.

34.—KECKERMANNUS (*Systema Logicum*, L. iii. c. 13), treating of Necessary Testimony:—‘*Testimonium necessarium est vel Dei vel Sensuum*.’ Having spoken of the former, he proceeds: ‘*Restat testimonium sensuum*, quod suus cuique *sensus* dictat. Estque vel *externum* vel *internum*. Internum est, quod *leges naturæ*, tam *theoreticæ* quam *practicæ* dictant; itemque *conscientia*. Externum est, quod *sensus externi*, ut *visus*, *auditus*, &c., recte dispositi, adeoque ipsa *sensualis observatio*, et *experientia* comprobant.’ In illustration of the testimony of Internal Sense, *Conscientia*, he says: ‘*Magna est vis testimonii Conscientiæ in utramque partem*; et sicut *leges seu principia naturæ* duplicia sunt—theo-

retica, ut, *totum est major sua parte*—et practica, ut, *quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris*: ita duplex est *Conscientia*, *theoretica* nimirum et *practica*, per quam conclusiones theoreticæ et practicæ firmiter nobis probantur.’

The employment here of *Conscientia*, for the noetic faculty or faculty of principles, is (if we except the single precedent of Terullian) unexampled, as far as I have observed, previous to the extension given to the word by Descartes. The *internal* and *external sense* of Keckermann are, taken together, nearly equivalent to the expression *common sense*, in the meaning under consideration; an expression, it may be added, which this author had himself, in the same work, previously employed. (L. i. c. 5.)

35.—LORD HERBERT OF CHERBURY.—In 1624, at Paris and London, was first published his work ‘*De Veritate*,’ and to the third edition, London, 1645, was annexed his correlative treatise ‘*De Causis Errorum*.’ These works, especially the former, contain a more formal and articulate enunciation of the doctrine of Common Sense, than had (I might almost say than has) hitherto appeared. It is truly marvellous, that the speculations of so able and original a thinker, and otherwise of so remarkable a man, should have escaped the observation of those who, subsequently, in Great Britain, philosophized in a congenial spirit; yet he is noticed by Locke, and carefully criticised by Gassendi. The following is an abstract of his doctrine—strictly in reference to our present subject. The edition I use is the third, that of 1645.

Lord Herbert makes a fourfold distribution of the human faculties;—into *Natural Instinct*—*Internal Sense*—*External Sense* and the *Discursive faculty* (*Discursus*) p. 37. These names he employs in significations often peculiar to himself. Each of these powers is the guarantee of a certain class of truths; and there is given no truth which is not made known to us through one or other of these attesting faculties. Let us not, therefore, be wise beyond our powers. (*Ne sapiamus ultra facultates*.)

But of these there is one whose truths are of a relatively higher order, as commanding universal assent, and therefore of indubita-

ble certainty. This faculty, which he calls *Natural Instinct* (*Instinctus Naturalis*), might with more discriminative propriety have been styled *Intellectual Instinct*; and it corresponds, as is manifest, with the *Noûs* of Aristotle, the *Intelligentia* of the schoolmen, and the *Common Sense* of philosophers in general. *Natural Instinct* may be considered either as a faculty or the manifestation of a faculty. In the former signification, *Instinct*, or the *Noetic* faculty, is the proximate instrument of the universal intelligence of God; in fact, a certain portion thereof ingrafted on the mind of man. In the latter signification, *Natural Instincts* are those *Catholic Cognitions* or *Common Notions* (*κοινὰί ἐννοίαι*, *notitiæ communes*) which exist in every human being of sound and entire mind; and with which we are naturally or divinely furnished, to the end that we may truly decide touching the objects with which we are conversant during the present life (pp. 27, 29, 44). These *Instincts* or *Common Notions* he denominates also *Primary Truths*—*Common Principles*—*Received Principles of Demonstration*—*Sacred Principles*, against which it is unlawful to contend, &c. These are so far from being mere products of experience and observation, that, without some of them, no experience or observation is possible (pp. 28, 48, 54). But, unless excited by an object, they remain silent; have then a virtual, not an actual existence (pp. 39, 42). The comparison of the mind to a *tabula rasa* or blank book, on which objects inscribe themselves, must be rejected; but it may be resembled to a *closed book*, only opened on the presentation of objects (p. 54). The sole criterion by which we can discriminate principles, natural or divine, is *universal agreement*; though, at the same time, the higher and more necessary the truth, the more liable it is to be alloyed with error (p. 52). Our natural *Instincts* operate irrationally; that is, they operate without reasoning or discussion; and *Reason* (*Ratio*), which is the deduction of these common notions to their lower and lowest applications, has no other appeal, in the last resort, except to them (p. 42).

The primary truths, or truths of *Instinct*, are discriminated

from secondary truths (those, to wit, which are not obtained without the intervention of the Discursive faculty) by six characters.

1°. By their *Priority*. For Natural Instinct is the first, Discursion the last of our faculties.

2°. By their *Independence*. For if a truth depend upon a common notion, it is only secondary; whereas a truth is primary, which itself hanging upon no superior truth, affords dependence to a chain of subordinate propositions.

3°. By their *Universality*. Universal consent is indeed the most unequivocal criterion of an instinctive truth. The Particular is always to be suspected as false, or, at least, as partially erroneous; whereas Common Notions, drawn, as it were, from the very wisdom of nature, are, in themselves, universal, howbeit, in reasoning, they may be brought down and applied to particulars.

4°. By their *Certainty*. For such is their authority, that he who should call them into doubt, would disturb the whole constitution of things, and, in a certain sort, denude himself of his humanity. It is, therefore, unlawful to dispute against these principles, which, if clearly understood, cannot possibly be gainsaid. (Compare No. 25, d.)

5°.—By their *Necessity*. For there is none which does not conduce to the conservation of man.

6°.—By the *Manner of their Formation or Manifestation*. For they are elicited, instantaneously and without hesitation, so soon as we apprehend the significance of the relative objects or words. The discursive understanding, on the other hand, is in its operation slow and vacillating—advancing only to recede—exposed to innumerable errors—in frequent confliction with sense—attributing to one faculty what is of the province of another, and not observing that each has its legitimate boundaries, transcending which, its deliverances are incompetent or null (pp. 60, 61).*

* I was surprised to find an eloquent and very just appreciation of Herbert (for he it is who is referred to), by a learned and orthodox theologian at Cambridge—Nathaniel Culverwell, in his ‘Discourse of the Light of Nature,’

36.—JOANNES CAMERON, the celebrated theologian.—De Ecclesia iv. Op. ed. 1642, p. — ‘*Sensus Communis seu Ratio,*’ &c.

37.—DESCARTES proclaims as the leading maxim of philosophy a principle which it would have been well for his own doctrine had he always faithfully applied. ‘Certum autem est, nihil nos unquam falsum pro vero admissuros, si tantum iis assensum præbeamus quæ *clare et distincte* percipiemus. Certum, inquam, quia *cum Deus non sit fallax, facultas percipiendi, quam nobis dedit [sive Lumen Naturæ], non potest tendere in falsum*; ut neque etiam facultas assentiendi, cum tantum ad ea, quæ *clare percipiuntur*, se extendit. Et quamvis hoc nulla ratione probaretur, ita omnium animis a natura impressum est, ut quoties aliquid *clare percipimus*, ei sponte assentiamur, et nulla modo possimus dubitare quin sit verum.’ Princ. i. § 43, with §§ 30, 45; De Meth. § 4; Med. iii. iv.; Resp. ad Obj. ii. passim. What Descartes, after the schoolmen, calls the ‘Light of Nature,’ is only another term for Common Sense (see Nos. 20, 21, 22, 25); and Common Sense is the name which Descartes’ illustrious disciple, Fenelon, subsequently gave it. See No. 60. There are some good observations on Descartes’ *Light of Nature*, &c. in Gravii Specimina Philosophiæ Veteris, L. ii. c. 16; and in Regis, *Metaphysique*, L. i. P. i. ch. 12, who identifies it with consciousness.

That Descartes did not hold the crude and very erroneous doctrine of innate ideas which Locke took the trouble to refute, I may have another opportunity of more fully showing. ‘Nunquam scripsi vel judicavi (he says) mentem indigere id eis innatis, quæ sint *aliquid diversum ab ejus facultate cogitandi.*’ Notæ in Programma (Regii) § 12.—Compare § 13 with Responsiones et Objectiones iii. rr. 5, 10. By innate ideas in general, Descartes means simply the innate faculty we possess of forming or eliciting certain manifestations in consciousness (whether of necessary or

written in 1646, p. 93. Culverwell does not deserve the oblivion into which he has fallen; for he is a compeer worthy of More, Spencer, Smith, Cudworth, and Taylor—the illustrious and congenial band by which that university was illustrated during the latter half of the seventeenth century.

contingent truths) on occasion of, but wholly different from, both the qualities of the reality affecting, and the movements of the organism affected; these manifestations or ideas being nothing else than states of the conscious substance itself. On this ground he occasionally calls the *secondary* qualities innate; in so far as they are, actually, mere modes of mind, and, potentially, subjective predispositions to being thus or thus modified.

His doctrine in regard to principles, when fully considered, seems identical with that of Aristotle, as adopted and expounded by the schoolmen; and I have no doubt that had he and Locke expressed themselves with the clearness and precision of Scotus, their opinions on this subject would have been found coincident both with each other and with the truth.

38.—SIR THOMAS BROWN (*Religio Medici*, First Part, sect. 36) has '*Common Sense*,' word and thing.

39.—BALZAC in *Le Barbon* (*Sallengre Histoire de Pierre de Montmauer*, t. ii. p. 88, and *Œuvres de Balzac*), '*Sens Commun*,' word and thing.

40.—CHANET (*Traité de l'Esprit*, p. 15) notices that the term *Common Sense* had in French a meaning different from its Scholastic or Aristotelic signification, 'being equivalent to *common* or *universal reason*, and by some denominated *natural logic*.'

41.—P. IRENÆUS A SANCTO JACOBO, a Thomist philosopher, and Professor of Theology at Rennes.—*Integra Philosophia*, 1655; *Logica* c. iv. sectio 4. § 2.—In reference to the question, '*Quid sit habitus ille primorum principiorum?*' he says—'*Probabilior apparet sententia dicentium habitum primorum principiorum esse lumen naturale, seu naturaliter inditum (intellectus sc.)*

. . . Favet *communis omnium sensus*, qui diffiteri nequit aliqua esse naturaliter et seipsis cognoscibilia; ergo principium talis cognitionis debet censi signatum super nos *naturæ lumen*.'

42.—LESCALOPIER.—*Humanitas Theologica, &c.*, L. i. p. 87.—'*Quid gravius in sentiendo, quod sequamur, habere possumus, quam constans naturæ judicium, ætatum omnium eana sapien-*

tia et perpetuo suffragio confirmatum ? Possunt errare singuli ; labi possunt viri sapientes sibi suoque arbitrio permissi ; at totam hominis naturam tanta erroris contagio invadere non potest. . . . Quod in communibus hominum sensibus positum, id quoque in ipsa natura situm atque fixum esse, vel ipse Orator coram iudice non diffitetur. [Pro Cluentio, c. 6.] Itaque *communis* ille *sensus*, naturæ certissima vox est ; immo, ‘ vox Populi,’ ut trito fertur adagio, ‘ vox Dei.’

43.—PASCAL.—Pensées ; editions of Bossut and Renouard.

a.—Partie i. art. x. § 4 (ch. 31 old editions), ‘ Tout notre raisonnement se réduit à céder au *Sentiment*.’ This feeling he, before and after, calls ‘ *Sens Commun*.’ Art. vi. § 17, (ch. 25)—art. xi. § 2 (wanting in old editions).

b.—Partie ii. art. i. § 1 (ch 21). Speaking the doctrine of the Sceptics—‘ Nous n’avons aucun certitude de la vérité des *principes* (hors la foi et la revelation) sinon en ce que nous les *sentons naturellement* en nous.’ . . . And having stated their principal arguments why this is not conclusive, he takes up the doctrine of the Dogmatists.

‘ L’unique fort des Dogmatistes, c’est qu’en parlant de bonne foi et sincèrement, on ne peut douter des *principes naturels*. Nous connoissons, disent-ils, la vérité, non seulement par raisonnement, mais aussi par *sentiment*, et par une *intelligence vive et lumineuse* ; et c’est de cette dernière sorte que nous connoissons les *premiers principes*. C’est en vain que le raisonnement, qui n’y a point de part, essaie de les combattre. Les Pyrrhoniens, qui n’ont que cela pour objet, y travaillent inutilement. Nous savons que nous ne rêvons point, quelque impuissance où nous soyons de le prouver par raison [which he uses convertibly with *raisonnement*]. Cette impuissance ne conclut autre chose que la foiblesse de notre raison, mais non pas l’incertitude de toutes nos connoissances, comme ils le pretendent : car la connoissance des premiers principes, comme, par exemple, qu’il y a *espace*, *temps*, *mouvement*, *nombre*, *matière*, est aussi ferme qu’aucune de celles que nos raisonnements nous donnent. Et c’est sur ces connois-

sances *d'intelligence et de sentiment* qu'il faut que la raison s'appuie, et qu'elle fonde tout son discours. Je sens qu'il y a trois dimensions dans l'espace, et que les nombres sont infinis; et la raison démontre ensuite qu'il n'y a point deux nombres carrés dont l'un soit double de l'autre. Les *principes se sentent*; les *propositions se concluent*; le tout avec certitude, quoique par différentes voies. Et il est aussi ridicule que la raison demande au *sentiment et à l'intelligence* des preuves de ces premiers principes pour y consentir, qu'il seroit ridicule que *l'intelligence* demandât à la raison un *sentiment* de toutes les propositions qu'elle démontre. Cette impuissance ne peut donc servir qu'à humilier la raison qui voudroit juger de tout, mais non pas à combattre notre certitude, comme s'il n'y avoit que la raison capable de nous instruire. Plût à Dieu que nous n'en eussions au contraire jamais besoin, et que nous connussions toutes choses par *instinct* et par *sentiment*! Mais la nature nous a refusé ce bien et elle ne nous a donné que très peu de connoissances de cette sorte; toutes les autres ne peuvent être acquises que par le raisonnement.' . . .

'Qui démêlera cet embrouillement? La nature confond les Pyrrhoniens, et la raison confond les Dogmatistes. Que deviendrez vous donc, ô homme, qui cherchez votre véritable condition par votre raison naturelle? Vous ne pouvez fuir une de ces sectes, ni subsister dans aucune. Voilà ce qu'est l'homme à l'égard de la vérité.'

44.—LA CHAMBRE.—Systeme de l'Ame, L. ii. c. 3.—'Sens Commun,' word and thing.

45.—HENRY MORE.—Confutatio Cabbale: Opera Omnia, p. 528. 'Hoc Externus Sensus, corporeave Imaginatio non dictat, sed *Sensus Intellectualis, innataque ipsius mentis sagacitas*, inter cujus notiones communes seu axiomata, nœmaticæ vel immediate vera, supra numeratum est.'—Compare Epistola H. Mori, ad. V. C. § 17, Opera, p. 117, and Enchiridion Ethicum, L. i. cc. 4, 5.

46.—RAPIN.—Comparaison de Platon et d'Aristote, ch. vii. §

11.—‘Ce consentement general de tous les peuples, est un *instinct de la nature* qui ne peut estre faux, estant si universel.’

47.—DUHAMEL.—Philosophia Burgundiae, t. i. Disp. ii. in Categ. qu. 4, art. 2. ‘*Communis Sensus*,’ name and thing.

48.—MALEBRANCHE.—Récherche de la Verité—Entretiens sur la Metaphysique—Traité de Morale, &c., passim.

He holds, 1^o, that there is a supreme absolute essential Reason or Intelligence, an eternal light illuminating all other minds, containing in itself and revealing to them the necessary principles of science and of duty; and manifesting also to us the contingent existence of an external, extended universe. This Intelligence is the Deity; these revelations, these manifestations, are Ideas. He holds, 2^o, that there is a natural Reason common to all men—an eye, as it were, fitted to receive the light, and to attend to the ideas in the supreme Intelligence; in so far therefore an infallible and ‘*Common Sense*.’ But, 3^o, at the same time, this Reason is obnoxious to the intrusions, deceptions, and solicitations of the senses, the imagination, and the passions; and, in so far, is personal, fallible, and factitious. He opposes objective knowledge, ‘*par idée*,’ to subjective knowledge, ‘*par conscience*,’ or ‘*sentiment interieur*.’ To the latter belong all the Beliefs; which, when necessary, as determined by Ideas in the Supernal Reason, are always veracious.—It could, however, easily be shown that, in so far as regards, the representative perception of the external world, his principles would refute his theory. A similar doctrine in regard to the infallibility and divinity of our Intelligence or Common Sense was held by Bossuet.

49.—POIRET.—The objects of our cognitions are either things themselves—*realities*; or the representations of realities, their shadows, pictures,—*ideas*. Realities are divided into two classes; *corporeal* things, and *spiritual* things. Each of these species of object has an appropriate faculty by which it is cognized. 1^o, Corporeal realities are perceived by the *animal* or *sensual Intellect*—in a word by *Sense*; this is merely passive. 2^o, Spiritual realities—original truths—are perceived by the *passive* or *receptive*

Intellect, which may be called *Intelligence* ; it is the sense of the supersensible. [This corresponds not to the passive intellect of Aristotle, but to his intellect considered as the place of principles and to Common Sense ; it coincides also with the Vernunft of Jacobi and other German philosophers, but is more correctly named.]—These two faculties of apprehension are veracious, as God is veracious. 3^o, The faculty of calling up and complicating Ideas is the *active—ideal—reflective Intellect*, or *human Reason*. [This answers not to the active or efficient, but to the discursive or dianoetic, intellect of Aristotle and the older philosophers in general, also to the Verstand of Kant, Jacobi, and the recent philosophers of Germany, but is more properly denominated.] (De Eruditione Solida, &c., ed. 2. Meth. P. i. § 43–50, and Lib. i. § 4–7, and Lib. ii. § 3–8, and Def. p. 468 sq.—Cogitationes Rationales, &c., ed. 2, disc. pr. § 45, L. ii. c. 4, § 2.—Fides et ratio, &c., p. 28 sq. p. 81, sq. p. 131 sq.—Defensio Methodi, &c. Op. post. p. 113 sq.—Economia Divina, L. iv. c. 20–25.—Vera et Cognita, passim.)—‘Innate principles’ he indifferently denominates ‘Instincts.’ (Fides et Ratio, Pr. pp. 13, 45.—Def. Meth. Op. post. pp. 131, 133, 136, 172.—Vindiciæ, ibid. p. 602.)

This profound but mystical thinker has not yet obtained the consideration he deserves from philosophers and historians of philosophy ;—why, is sufficiently apparent.

50.—BOSSUET.—Œuvres inédites, Logique, L. iii. c. 22.—‘*Le Sentiment de genre humain est considéré comme la voix de toute la nature, et par consequent en quelque façon, comme celle de Dieu. C’est pourquoi la preuve est invincible.*’—Alibi.

51.—LOCKE.—Essay, B. i. c. 3. § 4. ‘He would be thought void of *common sense*, who asked on the one side, or on the other, went to give, a reason, why it is impossible for the same thing to be or [and] not to be.’ In other words—Common Sense or intellect, as the source, is the guarantee, of the principle of contradiction. There is here a confession, the importance of which has been observed neither by Locke nor his antagonists. Had Locke, not relying exclusively on Gassendi, prepared himself by

a study of the question concerning the origin of our knowledge in the writings of previous philosophers, more especially of Aristotle, his Greek commentators, and the Schoolmen (see Nos. 3, 10, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, &c.) ; and had he not been led astray in the pursuit of an ignis fatuus, in his refutation, I mean of the Cartesian theory of Innate Ideas, which, certainly, as impugned by him, neither Descartes, nor the representatives of his school, ever dreamt of holding ; he would have seen, that in thus appealing to common sense or intellect, he was, in fact, surrendering his thesis—that all our knowledge is an educt from experience. For in admitting, as he here virtually does, that experience must ultimately ground its procedure on the laws of intellect, he admits that intellect contains principles of judgment, on which experience being dependent, cannot possibly be their precursor or their cause. Compare Locke's language with that of the intellectualist, Price, as given in No. 78. They are, in substance, identical.—What Locke here calls common sense, he elsewhere by another ordinary synonym denominates *Intuition* (B. iv. c. 2, § 1, c. 3, § 8 et alibi) ; also *Self-evidence* (B. iv. c. 7, § 1, sq.) As I have already observed, had Descartes and Locke expressed themselves on the subject of innate ideas and principles with due precision, the latter would not so have misunderstood the former, and both would have been found in harmony with each other and with the truth.

52.—BENTLEY.—Quoted by Reid, I. P., p. 423 a. ‘Common Sense,’ word and thing.

53.—SERJEANT, Locke's earliest antagonist.—Solid Philosophy Asserted, p. 296.—‘These Ideas of Act and Power are so natural that *common sense* forces us to acknowledge them,’ &c. So alibi.

53.*—ABERCROMBY.—Fur Academicus, Sectt. 2, 30.—‘*Communis hominum Sensus*,’—name and thing.

54.—LEIBNITZ.—This great philosopher held a doctrine, on the point in question, substantially corresponding to that of Aristotle, the Schoolmen, and Descartes. It is most fully evolved in his posthumous work the *Nouveaux Essais* ; which I refer to in the

original edition by Raspe. Leibnitz admitted innate truths, which he explains to be cognitions not actually, but only virtually, existent in the mind, anterior to experience; by which they are occasioned, excited, registered, exemplified, and manifested, but not properly caused or contributed, or their infallibility and eternal certainty demonstrated (pp. 5, 6, 37). For, as necessary to be thought, and therefore absolutely universal, they cannot be the product of sense, experience, induction; these at best being only competent to establish the relatively general (pp. 5, sq. 36, 116). See also *Opera* by Dutens, t. v. p. 358, and t. vi. p. 274. These truths are consequently given 'as natural habitudes, that is, dispositions, aptitudes, preformations, active and passive, which render the intellect more than a mere *tabula rasa*' (p. 62). Truths thus innate are manifested in two forms; either as *Instincts*, or as the *Light of Nature* (p. 48). But both become known to us as facts of consciousness, that is, in an immediate, internal experience; and if this experience deceive us, we can have no assurance of any truth, be it one *of fact*, or be it one *of reason* (p. 197).—Leibnitz's *Natural Light* and *Instinct* are, together, equivalent to *Common Sense*.

55.—TOLAND.—Christianity not Mysterious, Sect. i. ch. i. p. 9. 'Common Sense, or Reason in general.' See Leibnitz (*Opera*, t. v. p. 143). This testimony belongs perhaps rather to the third signification of the term.

56.—CHRISTIAN THOMASIVS gave 'Fundamenta Juris Naturæ et Gentium ex *Sensu Communi* deducta;' and in his introductory chapter, § 26, he says—'Rogo ut considerent, quod ubique mihi posuerim sequi *sensum communem*, atque non stabilire intenderim sententias, quæ multis subtilibus abstractionibus opus habent, sed quarum veritatem quilibet, si modo paululum attentior esse velit, *intra se sentit*.' Compare also his *Philosophia Aulica*, c. v. §§ 26, 35.

57.—RIDIGER, in 1709 published his work '*De Sensu Veri et Falsi*.' By this he does not, however, designate the Common Sense of mankind as a natural principle, but the dexterity,

‘qua quid in unaquaque re sit verum, falsumve, sentire queamus.’

58.—FEUERLIN.—De genuina ratione probandi a consensu gentium existentiam Dei.—‘Hæc est præcipui argumenti facies:—Ad cujuscunque rei existentiam agnoscendam mentes humanæ [ab *instinctu naturali*, to wit, as he frequently states], peculiarem habent inclinationem, ea vere existit,’ &c., p. 28.

59.—A. TURRETINUS.—Cogitationes et Disputationes Theologicæ, Vol. i. p. 43, sq.

‘DE SENSU COMMUNI.

§ xv. Religio *sensum communem* supponit; nec enim truncos, aut bruta, aut ebrios aut mente captos, sed homines sui compotes, alloquitur.

§ xvi. In artibus omnibus atque disciplinis, non modo licet, sed et necesse est adhibere *sensum communem*. Quis capiat eam solam artem, eam solam disciplinam, quæ omnium præstantissima est, *sensus communis* usum adimere?

§ xvii. Nisi supponatur *sensus communis*, nulla fides, nulla religio, consistere potest: Etenim, quo organo res sacras percipimus, verasque a falsis, æquas ab iniquis, utiles a noxiis, dignoscimus, nisi ope *sensus communis*?

§ xviii. Quomodo gentes notitiam Dei habuerunt, nisi ope *sensus communis*?—Quid est ‘Lex in cordibus scripta,’ de qua Paulus (Rom. ii.), nisi ipsemet *sensus communis*, quatenus de moribus pronuntiat?

§ xix. Divinitas Scripturæ, quibus argumentis probari potest, nisi argumentis e *sensu communi* depromptis?

§ xx. Sensus Scripturæ, quibus regulis erui potest, nisi regulis a *sensu communi* subministratis?

§ xxi. Scriptura perpetuo provocat ad *sensum communem*: etenim quotiescunque ratiocinatur, toties supponit *sensum communem* esse in nobis, et *sensu communi* utendum esse.

§ xxii. In syllogismis theologicis pene omnibus, quis nescit præmissarum alteram, imo sæpissime utramque, a *sensu communi* desumptam esse?

§ xxiii. Divinæ veracitati non minus repugnat, *sensum communem* nos fallere, quam Scripturam Sacram aliquid falsum docere ; etenim *sensus communis* non minus opus Dei quam Scriptura Sacra.

§ xxiv. Pessimum est indicium, cum aliquis non vult de suis placitis ex *sensu communi* judicari.

§ xxv. Nullus est error magis noxius, magisque Religioni injuriosus, quam is qui statuit, Religioni credi non posse, quin *sensui communi* nuntius mittatur.

§ xxvi. Nulla datur major absurditas, quam ea quæ nullis non absurditatibus portam aperit, quæque ad eas revincendas omnem præcludit viam : atque talis est eorum sententia, qui nolunt *sensum communem* adhiberi in Religione.

§ xxvii. Quæ hactenus diximus de *sensu communi*, a nemine, ut quidem putamus, improbabitur : at si loco *Sensus Communis*, vocem *Rationis* subjiciamus, multi illico caperata fronte et torvis oculis nos adspicient. Quid ita ? cum *sensus communis*, *lumen naturale*, et *ratio*, unum idemque sint ?

60.—FENELON.—De l'Existence de Dieu. Partie ii. ch. 2.—
 ‘ Mais qu'est-ce que le *Sens Commun* ? N'est-ce pas les premières notions que tous les hommes ont également des mêmes choses ? Ce Sens Commun qui est toujours et par-tout le même, qui prévient tout examen, qui rend l'examen même de certaines questions ridicule, qui réduit l'homme à ne pouvoir douter quelque effort qu'il fit pour se mettre dans un vrai doute ; ce Sens Commun qui est celui de tout homme ; ce Sens, qui n'attend que d'être consulté, qui se montre au premier coup-d'œil, et qui découvre aussitôt l'evidence ou l'absurdité de la question ; n'est-ce pas ce que j'appelle mes idées ? Les voilà donc ces idées ou notions générales que je ne puis ni contredire ni examiner, suivant lesquelles au contraire j'examine et je décide tout : en sort que je ris au lieu de répondre, toutes les fois qu'on me propose ce qui est clairement opposé à ce que ces idées immuables me représentent.

‘ Ce principe est constant, et il n'y auroit que son application qui pourroit être fautive : c'est-à-dire qu'il faut sans hésiter sui-

vre toutes mes *idées claires* ; mais qu'il faut bien prendre garde de ne prendre jamais pour idée clair celle qui renferme quelque chose d'obscur. Aussi veux-je suivre exactement cette règle dans les choses que je vais méditer.' •

Common Sense is declared by Fenelon to be identical with the *Natural Light* of Descartes. See No. 37. The preceding passage is partly quoted by Reid from a garbled and blundering translation (p. 424). The obeli mark the places where the principal errors have been committed. Like Melancthon, Reid, &c. (Nos. 25, 79), Fenelon calls what is contrary to common sense, the *absurd*.

61.—SHAFTESBURY.—Quoted by Reid, I. P. p. 424 a., '*Common Sense*,' word and thing.

62. D'AGUESSEAU.—Meditations Métaphysiques, Med. iv. Œuvres, 4^o t. xi. p. 127.—'Je m'arrête donc à ces deux principes, qui sont comme la conclusion générale de tout ce que je viens d'établir sur l'assurance où l'homme peut être d'avoir découvert la vérité.

'L'un, que cet état de certitude n'est en lui-même qu'un *sentiment* ou une *conscience intérieure*.

'L'autre, que les trois causes que j'en eu distinguées se réduisent encore à un autre *sentiment*.

'Sentiment simple, qui se prouve lui-même comme dans ces vérités, *j'existe, je pense, je veux, je suis libre*, et que je puis appeler un *sentiment de pure conscience*.

'Sentiment justifié, ou sentiment de l'évidence qui est dans le chose même, ou de cette proposition, que *tout ce qui est évident est vrai*, et je l'appellerai un *sentiment d'évidence*.

'Enfin, sentiment que peut aussi être appelé, un sentiment justifié par le poids du témoignage qui l'excite, et qui a pour fondement une évidence d'autorité. Je l'appellerai donc par cette raison, le *sentiment d'une autorité évidente*.'

62.*—BERKELEY.—Quoted by Reid, I. P. pp. 283, 284 ; compare p. 423 a., '*Common Sense*,' name and reality.

63.—BUFFIER'S '*Traité des Premières Vérités*,' was first pub-

lished in 1717, his 'Elemens de Metaphysique' in 1724. If we except Lord Herbert's treatise 'De Veritate,' these works exhibit the first regular and comprehensive attempt to found philosophy on certain primary truths, given in certain primary sentiments or feelings: these feelings, and the truths of which they are the sources, he distinguishes into two kinds. One is *Internal Feeling* (sentiment intime), the self-consciousness of our existence, and of what passes in our minds. By this he designates our conviction of the facts of consciousness in themselves, as merely-present and ideal phenomena. But these phenomena, as we have seen, testify also to the reality of what lies beyond themselves; and to our instinctive belief in the truth of this testimony, he gives, by perhaps an arbitrary limitation of words, the name of *common natural feeling* (sentiment commun de la nature), or employing a more familiar expression, *Common Sense* (sens commun). Buffier did not fall into the error of Mr. Stewart and others, in holding that we have the same evidence for the objective reality of the external world, as we have for the subjective reality of the internal. 'If,' he says, 'a man deny the truths of *internal feeling*, he is self-contradictory; if he deny the truths of *common sense*, he is not self-contradictory—he is only mad.'

Common Sense he thus defines:—'J'entens donc ici par le Sens Commun la disposition que la nature a mise dans tous les hommes ou manifestment dans la plupart d'entre eux; pour leur faire porter, quand ils ont atteint l'usage de la raison; un jugement commun et uniforme, sur des objets différens du sentiment intime de leur propre perception; jugement qui n'est point la consequence d'aucun principe interieur.'—Prem. Vér. § 33. And in his 'Metaphysique,'—'Le sentiment qui est manifestement le plus commun aux hommes de tous les temps et de tous les pays, quand ils ont atteint l'usage de la raison, et des choses sur quoi ils portent leur jugement.'—§ 67.

He then gives in both works not a full enumeration, but examples, of First Truths or sentiments common to all men. These are more fully expressed in the 'Metaphysique,' from which as

the later work, and not noticed by Reid (p. 467 b), I quote, leaving always the author's orthography intact.

1. Il est quelque chose qui existe hors de moi ; et ce qui existe hors de moi, est autre que moi.

2. Il est quelque chose que j'appelle *âme, esprit, pensée*, dans les autres hommes et dans moi, et la pensée n'est point ce qui s'appelle *corps* ou matière.

3. Ce qui est connu par le sentiment ou par l'expérience de tous les hommes, doit être reçu pour vrai ; et on n'en peut disconvenir sans se brouiller avec le sens commun.'—§ 78.

[These three he calls 'véritez externes, qui soient des sentiments communs à tous les hommes.' The third is not given in the 'Traité des Premières Véritez.']

4. Il est dans les hommes quelque chose qui s'appelle *raison* et qui est opposé à *l'extravagance* ; quelque chose qui s'appelle *prudence*, qui est opposé à *l'imprudence* ; quelque chose qui s'appelle *liberté*, opposé à *la nécessité d'agir*.

5. Ce qui réunit un grand nombre de parties différentes pour un effet qui revient régulièrement, ne sauroit être le pur effet du hazard ; mais c'est l'effet de ce que nous apellons une intelligence.

6. Un fait atesté par un très grand nombre de gens senséz, qui assurent en avoir été les temoins, ne peut sensement être revoqué en doute.'—§ 82.

These examples are not beyond the reach of criticism.

In the Treatise on First Truths he gives a statement and exposition of their three essential characters. The *statement* is as follows :

'1. Le premier de ces caractères est, qu'elles soient si claires, que quand on entreprend de les prouver, ou de les ataquér, on ne le puisse faire que par des propositions, qui, manifestement, ne sont ni plus clairs ni plus certaines.

2. D'être si universellement reçues parmi les hommes en tous tems, en tous lieux, et par toutes sortes d'esprits ; que ceux qui les ataquent se trouvent dans le genre humain, être manifestement moins d'un contre cent, ou même contre mille.

3. D'être si fortement imprimées dans nous, que nous y conformions notre conduite, malgré les raffinemens de ceux qui imaginent des opinions contraires; et qui eux-mêmes agissent conformément, non à leurs opinions imaginées, mais aux premières vérités universellement reçues.'—§ 51–52. Compare Alexander, n. 10 a.*

* We are now only considering the natural data of consciousness in their most catholic relations,—and it would be out of place to descend to any discussion of them in a subordinate point of view. But, though alluding to matters beyond our present purpose, I cannot refrain from doing, by the way, an act of justice to this acute philosopher, to whom, as to Gassendi, his countrymen have never, I think, accorded the attention he deserves.

No subject, perhaps, in modern speculation, has excited an intenser interest or more vehement controversy than Kant's famous distinction of *Analytic and Synthetic judgments a priori*, or, as I think they might with far less of ambiguity be denominated, *Explicative and Ampliative judgments*. The interest in the distinction itself was naturally extended to its history. The records of past philosophy were again ransacked; and, for a moment, it was thought that the Prussian sage had been forestalled, in the very groundwork of his system, by the Megaric Stilpo. But the originality (I say nothing of the truth) of Kant's distinction still stands untouched; the originality of its author, a very different question, was always above any reasonable doubt. Kant himself is disposed, indeed, to allow, that Locke (B. iv. ch. 3, § 9, sq.) had, perhaps, a glimpse of the discrimination; but looking to the place referred to, this seems, on the part of Kant, an almost gratuitous concession. Locke, in fact, came far nearer to it in another passage (B. i. ch. 2, §§ 19, 20); but there although the examples on which the distinction could have been established are stated, and even stated in contrast, the principle was not apprehended, and the distinction, consequently permitted to escape.

But this passage and its instances seem to have suggested, what was overlooked by Locke himself, to Buffier; who, although his name has not, as far as I am aware, ever yet been mentioned in connection with this subject, may claim the honor of having been the first to recognize, to evolve, and even to designate, this celebrated distinction, almost as precisely as the philosopher who erected on it so splendid an edifice of speculation. I cannot now do more than merely indicate the fact of the anticipation; mentioning only that, leaving to Kant's *analytic* judgment its previous title of *identical*, Buffier preoccupies Kant's designation of *synthetic* in that of *con-junctive* (or logical) judgment, which he himself proposes. Those interested in the question will find the exposition in the 'Véritez de Conséquence,' Log. ii. Art. xxi.

I may further, however, when on this matter, notice, that before Kant, another philosopher had also signalized the same distinction. I refer to

I should not have deemed it necessary to make any comment on Buffier's doctrine of Common Sense, were it not that it is proper to warn my readers against the misrepresentations of the anonymous English translator of his *Treatise on Primary Truths*; for not only have these never been exposed, but Mr. Stewart has bestowed on that individual an adventitious importance, by lauding his 'acuteness and intelligence,' while acquiescing in his 'severe but just animadversions' on Dr. Beattie. (*Elements*, vol. ii. c. 1, § 3, pp. 87, 89, 2 ed.)

Buffier does not reduce Reason (which he employs for the complement of our higher faculties in general) to Reasoning; he does not contra-distinguish Common Sense from Reason, of which it is constituent; but while he views the former as a natural sentiment, he views it as a sentiment of our rational nature; and he only requires, as the condition of the exercise of common sense in particular, the actual possession of Reason or understanding in general, and of the object requisite to call that Reason into use. Common Sense, on Buffier's doctrine, is thus the primary, spontaneous, unreasoning, and as it were, instinctive energy of our rational constitution. Compare *Pr. Vér.* §§ 41, 66-72. 93. *Met.* §§ 65, 72, 73.

The translator to his version, which appeared in 1780, has annexed an elaborate Preface, the sole purport of which is to

Principal Campbell of Aberdeen, in the chapter on intuitive evidence, of his philosophy of Rhetoric (*B. i. c. 5, S. 1, p. 1*)—first published in 1776, and therefore four years prior to the *Critique on Pure Reason*; for the distinction in question is to be found, at least explicitly, neither in the treatise '*Ueber die Evidenz*,' nor in the Dissertation '*De Mundi Sensibilis atque Inteligibilis forma et principiis*,' which appeared in 1763 and 1770. But Campbell manifestly only repeats Buffier (with whose works he was intimately acquainted, and from which he frequently borrows), and with inferior precision; so that, if we may respect the shrewdness, which took note, and appreciated the value, of the observation, we must condemn the disingenuity which palmed it on the world as his own. Campbell's doctrine, I may finally observe, attracted the attention of Mr. Stewart (*El. ii. p. 32 sq.*); but he was not aware either of its relation to Buffier or of its bearing upon Kant.

inveigh against Reid, Beattie, and Oswald—more especially the two last—for at once *stealing* and *spoiling* the doctrine of the learned Jesuit.

In regard to the *spoiling*, the translator is the only culprit. According to him, Buffier's 'Common Sense is a disposition of mind not natural but acquired by age and time' (pp. iv. xxxiv.) 'Those first truths which are its object require experience and meditation to be conceived, and the judgments thence derived are the result of exercising reason,' (p. v.) 'The use of Reason is Reasoning;' and Common Sense is that degree of understanding in all things to which the generality of mankind are capable of attaining by the exertion of their rational faculty' (p. xvii.) In fact Buffier's *first* truths, on his translator's showing, are *last* truths; for when 'by time we arrive at the knowledge of an infinitude of things, and by the use of reason (i. e. by reasoning) form our judgment on them, *those judgments are then justly to be considered as first truths*'!!! (p. xviii.)

But how, it will be asked, does he give any color to so unparalleled a perversion? By the very easy process of—1^o, throwing out of account, or perverting, what his author does say;—2^o, of interpolating what his author not only does not say, but what is in the very teeth of his assertions; and 3^o, by founding on these perversions and interpolations as on the authentic words of his author.

As to the *plagiarism*, I may take this opportunity of putting down, once and for ever, this imputation, although the character of the man might have well exempted Reid from all suspicion of so unworthy an act. It applies only to the 'Inquiry;' and there the internal evidence is almost of itself sufficient to prove that Reid could not, prior to that publication, have been acquainted with Buffier's Treatise. The strongest, indeed the sole, presumption arises from the employment, by both philosophers, of the term Common Sense, which, strange to say, sounded to many in this country as singular and new; whilst it was even commonly believed, that before Reid Buffier was the first, indeed the only

philosopher, who had taken notice of this principle, as one of the genuine sources of our knowledge. See Beattie, n. 82; Campbell's *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, B. i. c. 5, part 3; and Stewart's *Account of Reid*, p. 27.

After the testimonies now adduced, and to be adduced, it would be the apex of absurdity to presume that none but Buffier could have suggested to Reid either the principle or its designation. Here are given *forty-eight* authorities, ancient and modern, for the philosophical employment of the term Common Sense, *previous to Reid*, and from any of these Reid may be said to have borrowed it with equal justice as from Buffier; but, taken together, they concur in proving that the expression, in the application in question, was one in general use, and free as the air to all and each who chose thus to employ it.—But, in fact, what has not been noticed, we know, from an incidental statement of Reid himself—and this, be it noticed, prior to the charge of plagiarism,—that he only became acquainted with the treatise of Buffier, after the publication of his own *Inquiry*. For in his *Account of Aristotle's Logic*, written and published some ten years subsequently to that work, he says—'I have *lately* met with a very judicious treatise written by Father Buffier,' &c., p. 713, b. Compare also *Intellectual Powers*, p. 468, b. In this last work, however, published *after* the translation of Buffier, though indirectly defending the less manifestly innocent partners in the accusation, from the charge advanced, his self-respect prevents him from saying a single word in his own vindication.

64.—LYONS.—About the year 1720 was published the first edition of the following curious, and now rare, work:

'The Infallibility of Human Judgment, its Dignity and Excellence. Being a New Art of Reasoning, and discovering Truth, by reducing all disputable cases to general and self-evident propositions. Illustrated by bringing several well-known disputes to such self-evident and universal conclusions. With the Supplement answering all objections which have been made to it and the design thereby perfected, in proving this method of Reasoning

to be as forcibly conclusive and universal as Arithmetick and as easie. Also a Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity. The fourth edition. To which is now added a postscript obviating the complaints made to it, and to account for some things which occurred to it and the author. By Mr. Lyons. London, 1724.'

He gives (p. 83-94) 'A Recapitulation of the whole work, being the principles of a Rationalist reduced to certain stated articles containing the Laws of Reason, the Elements of Religion, of Morals, and of Politicks; with the Art of reducing all disputes to universal determinations.' From these articles (twenty-three in number) I extract the first three.

1. '*Reason* is the distinguishing excellency, dignity, and beauty of mankind.

2. 'There is no other use of Reason—than to judge of Good and Bad, Justice and Injustice, Wisdom and Folly, and the like; that a man may thereby attain Knowledge to distinguish Truth from Error, and to determine his Actions accordingly.

3. 'This Reason is known to us also by the names of *Judgment*, *Light of Nature*, *Conscience*, and *Common Sense*; only varying its name according to its different uses and appearances, but is one and the same thing.'

The conclusion of the whole is given in the maxim—'*Exert with Diligence and Fortitude the Common Use of Common Sense.*'

It is probable that Lyons was not unacquainted with the treatise of Turretini.

65.—AMHERST.—*Terræ Filius*, No. 21.—'*Natural reason* and *common sense*,' used as convertible terms.

66.—WOLLASTON.—*Religion of Nature Delineated* (ed. 1721, p. 23). 'They who deduce the difference between good and evil from the *Common Sense* of mankind, and certain *principles that are born with us*, put,' &c.

67.—VULPIUS (Volpi).—*Scholæ Duæ*, p. 45. 'Non certe quod putaret Aristoteles, summos illos viros (Parmenidem et

Melissum) tam longe a *communi sensu* abhorruisse, ut opinarentur nullam esse omnino rerum dissimilitudinem,' &c.

68.—VICO frequently employs the terms '*communis sensus*' and '*sensu comune*' for our primary beliefs. See his Latin and Italian works, passim.

69.—WOLFIUS.—*Ontologia*, § 125.—'Veritates ad *sensum communem* reducimus, dum in notiones resolvuntur, quas ad iudicandum utitur ipsum vulgus imperitum naturali quodam acumine, quæ distincte enunciata maxime abstracta sunt, in rebus obviis confuse percipiens. . . . Id igitur in Philosophia prima agimus, ut notiones quæ confusæ vulgo sunt, distinctas reddamus, et terminis generalibus enunciemus: ita enim demum in disciplinis cæteris, quæ sublimia sunt, et a cognitione vulgi remota, ad notiones eidem familiares revocare, sicque ad *Sensum Communem* reducere licebit.' . . .

§ 245. . . . 'Nemo miretur, quod notiones primas, quas fundamentales merito dixeris, cum omnis tandem nostra cognitio iisdem innitatur, notionibus vulgi conformes probemus. Mirandum potius esset, quod non dudum de reductione philosophiæ ad notiones communes cogitaverint philosophi, nisi constaret singulare requiri acumen, ut, quid notionibus communibus insit, distincte et pervidere, et verbis minime ambiguis enunciare valeamus, quod nonnisi peculiari et continuo quodam exercitio obtinetur in Psychologia exponendo.'—See also a curious letter of Wolf among the '*Epistolæ Physicæ*' of Krazenstein, regarding Common Sense.

70.—HUBER.—In 1732 appeared the first edition of *Le Monde Fou préféré au Monde Sage*. This treatise is anonymous, but known to be the work of Mademoiselle Huber. Its intrinsic merit, independently of its interest as the production of a Lady, might have saved it from the oblivion into which it seems to have fallen.—Consciousness (conscience) is considered as the faculty of 'uncreated, primary, simple, and universal truths,' in contrast to 'truths created, particular, distinct, limited' (i. pp. 180, 220). Consciousness is superior to Reasoning; and as primitive

is above all definition († pp. 103, 130, 140). ‘Les vérités les plus simples sont, par leur relation avec la vérité primitive si fort au-dessus des preuves, qu’elles ne paroissent douteuses que parce qu’on entreprend de les prouver; leur idée seule, ou le sentiment que l’on en a, prouve qu’elles existent; l’existence de la Conscience, par exemple, est prouvé par son langage même; elle se fait entendre, donc elle est; son témoignage est invariablement droit, donc il est infaillible, donc les vérités particulières qu’il adopte sont indubitables, par cela seul qu’elles n’ont pas besoin d’autres preuves’ (i. p. 189).

71.—GENOVESI.—*Elementorum Metaphysicæ, Pars Prior*, p. 94. In reference to our moral liberty, he says—‘Appello ad *sensum*, non plebeiorum modo, ne tantas res iudicio imperitorum iudicari quis opponat, sed philosophorum maxime, *communem*, quem qui erroris reprehendere non veretur, is vecors sit oportet.’ See also *Pars Altera*, p. 160, et alibi.

72.—HUME.—Quoted by Reid, p. 424 b. ‘*Common Sense*,’ word and thing.

73.—CRUSIUS.—a.—Weg zur Gewissheit, § 256, et alibi. ‘The highest principle of all knowledge and reasoning is—*That which we cannot but think to be true, is true; and that which we absolutely cannot think at all, [?] or cannot but think to be false, is false.*’

b.—Entwurf nothwendigen Vernunftwahrheiten, Pref. 2 ed. ‘The Leibnitio-Wolfian system does not quadrate with the *common sense* of mankind (*sensus communis*).’ His *German* expression is ‘*gemeyner Menschensinn.*’

74.—D’ALEMBERT holds that philosophy is an evolution from, and must, if legitimate, be conformed to, the primary truths of which all men are naturally in possession. The complement of these truths is ‘*sens commun.*’ Compare *Melanges*, t. iv. §§ 4, 6, pp. 28, 46 t. v. § 76, p. 269, ed. Amst. 1763.

75.—OETINGER.—*Inquisitio in Sensum Communem et Rationem, necnon utriusque regulas, pro dijudicandis philosophorum theoriis, &c.* Tübingæ, 1753.—‘*Sensus Communis*’ is defined (§ 11), ‘*Viva et penetrans perceptio objectorum, toti humanitati*

obviorum, ex immediato *tactu et intuitu* eorum, quæ sunt simplicissima, utilissima et maxime necessaria,' &c.—§ 18. . . .
 'Objecta *Sensus Communis* sunt veritates omni tempore et loco omnibus utiles, apprehensu faciles, ad quas conservandas Deus illos secreto impulsu indesinenter urget, ut sunt moralia,' &c., &c. So far, so well. The book, however, turns out but a mystical farrago. The author appears to have had no knowledge of Buffier's treatise on First Truths. Solomon and Confucius are his staple authorities. The former affords him all his rules; and even materials for a separate publication on the same subject, in the same year—'Die Wahrheit des *Sensus Communis* in den erklaerten Spruechen Salomonis.' This I have not seen.

76.—ESCHENBACH.—Sammlung, &c. 1756. In the appendix to his translation of the English Idealists, Berkeley and Collier, after showing that the previous attempts of philosophers to demonstrate the existence of an external world were inconclusive, the learned Professor gives us his own, which is one of common sense.—'How is the Idealist to prove his existence as a thinking reality? He can only say—*I know that I so exist, because I feel that I so exist.*' This feeling being thus the only ground on which the Idealist can justify the conviction he has of his existence, as a mind, our author goes on to show, that the same feeling, if allowed to be veracious, will likewise prove the existence, immediately, of our bodily organism, and, through that, of a material world. P. 549-552.

77.—GESNER, prelecting on his 'Isagoge in Eruditionem Universalem,' § 808, speaking of Grotius, says:—'De jure gentium eleganter scripsit, et auctor classicus est. Imprimis, quod reprehendunt imperiti, laudandum in eo libro est hoc, quod omnia veterum auctorum locis ac testimoniis probat. Nam ita provocatur quasi ad totum genus humanum. Nam si videmus, illos viros laudari, et afferri eorum testimonia, qui dicuntur *sensum communem* omnium hominum habuisse; si posterii dicant, se ita sentire, ut illi olim scripserint: est hoc citare genus humanum. Proferuntur enim illi in medium, quos omnes pro sapientibus

habuerunt. Verum est, potest unusquisque stultus dicere; 'Ego habeo *sensum communem*;' sed *sensus communis* est, quod consensu humano dictum sit per omnia sæcula. Ita etiam in religione naturali videndum est, quid olim homines communi consensu dixerint: nec ea ad religionem et theologiam naturalem referenda sunt, quæ aliunde accepimus. Sic egit Grotius in opere præstantissimo. Ostendit, hoc Romanorum, hoc Gallorum, legatos dixisse; hoc ab omni tempore fuisse jus gentium, hoc est, illud jus, ex quo totæ gentes judicari, et agi secum, voluerint. Sermo est de eo jure quod toti populi et illi sapientissimi scriptores nomine et consensu populorum totorum, pro jure gentium habuere; de eo, quo gentes inter se teneantur; non de jure putativo, quod unusquisque sibi excogitavit. Hæc enim est labes, hoc est vitium sæculi nostri, quod unusquisque ponit principium, ex quo deducit deinde conclusiones. Bene est, et laudandi sunt, quod in hoc cavent sibi, ut in fine convenient in conclusionibus; quod ex diversis principiis efficiunt easdem conclusiones: Sed Grotius provocat simpliciter ad consensum generis humani et *sensum communem*.¹

78.—PRICE, in his Review of the principal Questions on Morals, 1 ed. 1758, speaking of the necessity of supposing a cause for every event, and having stated examples, says—'I know nothing that can be said or done to a person who professes to deny these things, besides referring him to *common sense* and *reason*,' p. 35. And again: 'Were the question—whether our ideas of number, diversity, causation, proportion, &c., represent truth and reality perceived by the understanding, or particular impressions made by the object to which we ascribe them on our minds;—were this, I say, the question, would it not be sufficient to appeal to *common sense*, and to leave it to be determined by every person's private *consciousness*?' p. 65. See also 2 ed. p. 81, note: 'Common sense the faculty of self-evident truths.'

79.—REID.—a.—Inquiry, &c., p. 108¹—'If there be certain

¹ Here, as elsewhere, Hamilton refers to his own edition of Reid.—W.

principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them; these are what we call the *principles of common sense*; and what is manifestly contrary to them is what we call *absurd*.'—See also p. 209. Compare Melancthon n. 25, c., Fenelon n. 60, Buffier n. 63.

b.—Intellectual Powers, p. 425.—'It is absurd to conceive that there can be any opposition between Reason and Common Sense. Common Sense is indeed the first-born of Reason; and they are inseparable in their nature. We ascribe to Reason two offices or two degrees; the first is *to judge of things self-evident*; [this is Intellect, *νοῦς*.] The second is *to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are*; [this is Reasoning, or *διάνοια*.] The first of these is the province, and the sole province of Common Sense; and therefore it coincides with Reason in its whole extent, and is only another name for one branch or one degree of Reason.'—I have already observed that of these offices, the former (Common Sense) might be well denominated the *noetic* function of Reason, or rather Intellect, and the latter (Reasoning) its *dianoetic* or discursive. See p. 81.

80.—HILLER.—Curriculum Philosophiæ, 1765. Pars iii. § 34.—'*Sensus communis*' used in its philosophical meaning.

81.—HEMSTERHUIS, 'the Batavian Plato,' founds his philosophy on the original feelings or beliefs of our intelligent nature, as on ultimate facts. Feeling, or the faculty of primitive intuition (sentiment, sensation, faculté intuitive) is prior to reasoning; on which it confers all its validity, and which it supplies with the necessary conditions of its activity. It is not logical inference which affords us the assurance of any real existence; it is *belief—feeling—the instinctive judgment of the intuitive faculty*. (This he sometimes calls common sense—*sens commun*.) Demonstration is the ladder to remoter truths. But demonstrations can yield us information neither as to the ground on which the ladder rests, nor as to the points on which it is supported.—Of his

works, see in particular, 'Sophyle' and 'Lettre sur l'Homme et ses Rapports,' passim.

82.—BEATTIE.—Essay on Truth, 1773, p. 40. 'The term *Common Sense* hath, in modern times, been used by philosophers, both French and British, to signify that power of the mind which perceives truth, or commands belief, not by progressive argumentation, but by an instantaneous, instinctive, and irresistible impulse; derived neither from education nor from habit, but from nature; acting independently of our will, whenever its object is presented, according to an established law, and therefore properly called *Sense*; and acting in a similar manner upon all, or at least upon a great majority of mankind, and therefore properly called *Common Sense*.'

I should hardly have thought it necessary to quote Beattie's definition of common sense any more than those of Campbell, Oswald, Fergusson, and other Scottish philosophers in the train of Reid, were it not to remark that Mr. Stewart (*Elements*, vol. ii. c. 1, sect. 3), contrary to his usual tone of criticism, is greatly too unmeasured in his reprehension of this and another passage of the same Essay. In fact if we discount the identification of Reason with Reasoning—in which Beattie only follows the great majority of philosophers, ancient and modern—his consequent distinction of Reason from Common Sense, and his error in regard to the late and limited employment of this latter term, an error shared with him by Mr. Stewart, there is far more in this definition to be praised than censured. The attack on Beattie by the English translator of Buffier is futile and false. Mr. Stewart's approbation of it is to me a matter of wonder. See No. 63.

83.—VON STORCHIENAU.—*Grundsätze der Logik*, 1774. *Common Sense* (der allgemeine Menscheninn) defined and founded on, as an infallible criterion of truth, in reference to all matters not beyond its sphere.

84.—STATTLER.—*Dissertatio Logica de valore Sensus Communis*, 1780.—A treatise chiefly in reference to the proof of the

being of a God from the general agreement of mankind.—See also his *Logica*.

85.—HENNERT.—*Aphorismi philosophici Utrecht, 1781.*—‘*Sensus Communis, seu sensus immediatæ evidentiæ, intimus est sensus,*’ § 112. ‘*Sensus Communis est cos et norma omnis veri,*’ § 2. ‘*Natura mortalibus tribuit sensum communem, qui omnes edocet quibus in rebus consentire debeant,*’ &c., § 1.

86.—KANT is a remarkable confessor of the supreme authority of natural belief; not only by reason of his rare profundity as a thinker, but because we see him, by a signal yet praiseworthy inconsequence, finally re-establishing in authority the principle, which he had originally disparaged and renounced. His theoretical philosophy, which he first developed, proceeds on a rejection, in certain respects, of the necessary convictions of mankind; while on these convictions his practical philosophy, the result of his maturer contemplations, is wholly established. As Jacobi well expresses it—‘The Critical philosophy, first out of love to science, theoretically subverts metaphysic; then—when all is about to sink into the yawning abyss of an absolute subjectivity—it again, out of love to metaphysic, subverts science’ (*Werke* ii. p. 44). The rejection of the common sense of mankind as a criterion of truth, is the weakest point of the speculative philosophy of Kant. When he says—‘Allowing idealism to be as dangerous as it truly is, it would still remain a scandal to philosophy and human reason in general, to be forced to accept the existence of external things on the testimony of mere belief’ (*Cr. d. r. V. Vorr.*): yet, that very belief alone is what makes the supposition of an external world incumbent; and the proof of its reality which Kant attempted, independently of that belief, is now admitted by one and all of his disciples, to be so inconsequent that it may reasonably be doubted whether he ever intended it for more than an exoteric disclaimer of the esoteric idealism of his doctrine. But the philosopher who deemed it ‘a scandal to philosophy and human reason’ to found the proof of a material world—in itself to us a matter of supreme indifference—

on belief; on belief, on feeling, afterwards established the proof of all the highest objects of our interest—God—Free Will—and Immortality. In the character he ascribes to this Feeling and Belief, Kant, indeed, erred. For he ought to have regarded it, not as a mere spiritual craving, but as an immediate manifestation to intelligence; not as a postulate, but as a datum; not as an interest in certain truths, but as the fact, the principle, the warrant of their cognition and reality. Kant's doctrine on this point is too prominent and pervading, and withal too well known, to render any quotation necessary; and I only refer to his Critique of Practical Reason, and his moral treatises in general.—See also on Kant's variation in this respect, among others, Jacobi's Introduction to his collected philosophical writings (Werke vol. ii. p. 3–126), with the Appendix on Transcendental Idealism (ibid. p. 289–309); and Platner's Philosophical Aphorisms (vol. i. Pref. p. vi.); to which may be added Schopenhauer's letter in preface to the first volume of Kant's collected works by Rosenkrantz and Schubert.

87.—JACOBI.—The philosophy of Jacobi—who from the character and profundity of his speculations merited and obtained the appellation of the Plato of Germany—in its last and most perfect exposition establishes two faculties immediately apprehensive (vernehmend, wahrnehmend) of reality; *Sense* of corporeal existence, *Reason* (Vernunft) of supersensible truths.* Both as primary are inconceivable, being only cognitions of the *fact*. Both are therefore incapable of definition, and are variously and vaguely characterized as *revelations, intuitions, feelings, beliefs, instincts*.

* This last corresponds to the *νοῦς* proper of the Greek philosophers; and the employment of the term Reason in this limitation by Jacobi in his later works (to which he was manifestly led by Kant), is not a fortunate nomenclature. In his earlier writings he does not discriminate Reason from Understanding (Verstand), viewing it as a faculty of mediate knowledge, and as opposed to Belief, in which Jacobi always held that we obtain the revelation of all reality—all original cognition. See p. 80.

The resistless belief or feeling of reality which in either cognition affords the surrogate of its truth, is equivalent to the common sense of Reid. Reid was an especial favorite with Jacobi; and through Jacobi's powerful polemic we may trace the influence of the Scottish philosophy on the whole subsequent speculation of Germany. See Preface.

a.—Die Lehre des Spinoza, &c., 1785, p. 162. sq.—Werke, vol. iv. p. 210. 'Dear Mendelsohn, we are all born in belief (Glaube*), and in belief we must remain, as we were all born in society, and in society must remain. How can we strive after certainty, were certainty not already known to us; and known to us, how can it be unless through something which we already know with certainty? This leads to the notion of an immediate certainty, which not only stands in need of no proof, but absolutely excludes all proof, being itself, and itself alone, the representation (Vorstellung†) corresponding with the represented thing, and therefore having its sufficient reason within itself. The conviction, through proof or demonstration, is a conviction of second hand; rests upon comparison; and can never be altogether sure and perfect. If, then, all *assent*, all *holding for true* (Fuerwahrhalten), not depending on such grounds of reasoning, be a *belief*; it follows, that the conviction from reasoning itself, must spring out of belief, and from belief receive all the cogency it possesses.

'Through belief we know that we have a body, and that, external to us, there are found other bodies, and other intelligent existences. A truly miraculous [marvellous‡] revelation! For

* The Germans have only this one word for philosophical *Belief* and theological *Faith*. Hence much scandal, confusion, and misrepresentation, on its first employment by Jacobi.

† *Vorstellung* in this place might perhaps be rendered *presentation*. But I adhere to the usual translation; for Jacobi never seems to have risen to the pure doctrine of Natural Realism.

‡ The Germans have only one word, *wunder*, *wunderbar*, to express *marvel* and *miracle*, *marvellous* and *miraculous*. Hence often confusion and ambi-

we have only a sensation (Empfinden) of our body, under this or that modification; and whilst we have a sensation of our body thus modified, we are at the same time, aware or percipient, not only of its changes, but likewise of—what is wholly different from mere sensation, or a mere thought—we are aware or percipient of other real things, and this too with a certainty, the same as that with which we are percipient of our own existence; for without a *Thou* an *I* is impossible. [?—See above, p. 19. sq.]

‘We have thus a revelation of nature, which does not recommend merely, but compels, all and each of us to believe, and, through belief, to receive those eternal truths which are vouchsafed to man.’

P. 223.—‘V. We can only demonstrate similarities (coincidences, conditioned necessary truths) in a series of identical propositions. Every proof supposes, as its basis, something already established, the principle of which is a revelation.

‘VI. The element of all human knowledge and activity is Belief.’

P. 193. (Given as an aphorism of Spinoza.)—‘An immediate cognition, considered in and for itself, is without representation—is a Feeling.’—The three last words do not appear in the original edition; and I cannot find their warrant in Spinoza.

b.—From the Dialogue entitled ‘David Hume upon Belief, or Idealism and Realism,’ which appeared two years later (1787), Werke, vol. ii. p. 143, sq.

‘I.—That things appear *as* external to us, requires no argument. But that these things are not mere appearances *in us*—are not mere modifications of our proper self, and consequently null *as representations of aught external to ourselves*; but that *as representations in us*, they have still reference to something really external and self-existent, which they express, and from which they are taken—in the face of this, not only is doubt possible, it has

guity in their theology. The superiority we have over them in the two instances noticed in this and the penult note is, however, rare. The making perception a *revelation* and not an *apprehension* of existence belongs also to a Cosmothetic Idealism, struggling into Natural Realism.

been often satisfactorily demonstrated, that such doubt cannot be solved by any process of reasoning strictly so denominated. Your immediate certainty of external things would, therefore, on the analogy of my Belief, be a *blind certainty*.'

(After defending the propriety of the term *Glaube* employed by him in his previous writings (which, in consequence of the word denoting in German both positive faith and general belief, had exposed him to the accusation of mysticism), by examples of a similar usage of the word *Belief*, in the philosophical writings of Hume, Reid, &c. ; he proceeds to vindicate another term he had employed—*Offenbarung*, revelation.)

'I.—In so far as the universal usage of language is concerned, is there required any special examples or authorities? We say commonly in German, that objects *offenbaren*, reveal, i. e. manifest, themselves through the senses. The same expression is prevalent in French, English, Latin, and many other languages. With the particular emphasis which I have laid on it, this expression does not occur in Hume ;—among other reasons because he leaves it undetermined, whether we perceive things really *external* or only *as external*. . . . The decided Realist, on the contrary, who unhesitatingly accepts an external existence, on the evidence of his senses, considers this certainty as an original conviction, and cannot but think, that on this fundamental experience, all our speculation touching a knowledge of the external world must rest—such a decided Realist, how shall he denominate the mean through which he obtains his certainty of external objects, as of existences independent of his representation of them? He has nothing on which his judgment can rest, except the things themselves—nothing but the fact, that the objects stand there, actually before him. In these circumstances, can he express himself by a more appropriate word than the word Revelation.* And should we not rather inquire, regarding the *root* of this word, and the origin of its employment.

* This looks very like Natural Realism.

‘*He*.—So it certainly appears.

‘*I*.—That this Revelation deserves to be called *truly miraculous* [marvellous] follows of course. For if we consider sufficiently the reasons for the proposition—“That consciousness is exclusively conversant with the modifications of our proper self,” Idealism will appear in all its force, and as the only scheme which our speculative reason can admit. Suppose, however, that our Realist, notwithstanding, still remains a Realist, and holds fast by the belief that—for example—this object here, which we call a table, is no mere sensation—no mere existence found only in us, but an existence external and independent of our representation, and by us only perceived; I would boldly ask him for a more appropriate epithet for the Revelation of which he boasts, inasmuch as he maintains that something external to him is presented (*sich darstelle*) to his consciousness. For the presented existence (*Daseyn*) of such a thing external to us, we have no other proof than the presented existence of this thing itself; and we must admit it to be wholly inconceivable, how that existence can possibly be perceived by us. But still, as was said, we maintain that we do perceive it; maintain with the most assured conviction, that things there are, extant really out of us, that our representations and notions are conformed to these external things, and that not the things which we only *fancy* external are conformed to our representations and notions. I ask on what does this conviction rest? In truth on nothing, except on a revelation, which we can denominate no otherwise than one *truly miraculous* [marvellous].’

c.—Allwills Briefsammlung, 1792. Werke, vol. i. p. 120.—
‘We admit, proceeded Allwill, freely and at once, that we do not comprehend how it is that, through the mere excitation and movement of our organs of sense, we are not only sensitive but sensitive of something;—become aware of, perceive, something wholly different from us; and that we comprehend, least of all, how we distinguish and apprehend our proper self, and what pertains to our internal states, in a manner wholly different from all

sensitive perception. But we deem it more secure here to appeal to an original *Instinct*, with which every cognition of truth *begins*, than, on account of that incomprehensibility, to maintain—that the *mind can conceive and represent in an infinitely various fashion not itself, and not other things, but, exclusively and alone, what is neither itself, nor any other thing.*’*

d.—From the Preface to the second volume of his Works, forming the ‘Introduction to the author’s collected philosophical writings;’ this was published in 1815, and exhibits the last and most authentic view of the Jacobian doctrine.

P. 58 sq.—‘Like every other system of cognitions, Philosophy receives its *Form* exclusively from the Understanding (*Verstand*) as, in general, the faculty of Concepts (*Begriffe*). Without notions or concepts there can be no reconsciousness, no consciousness of *cognitions*, consequently no discrimination and comparison, no separation and connection, no weighing, re-weighing, estimating, of these; in a word, no seizing possession (*Besitzergreifung*) of any truth whatever. On the other hand the contents—the peculiar contents, of philosophy are given exclusively by the Reason (*Vernunft*),† by the faculty, to wit, of cognitions, independent of sense, and beyond its reach. The Reason fashions no concepts, builds no systems, pronounces no judgments, but, *like the external senses*, it merely reveals, it merely announces the fact.

‘Above all, we must consider—that as there is a sensible intuition, an *intuition* through the *Sense*, so there is likewise a rational *intuition* through the *Reason*. Each, as a peculiar source of knowledge, stands counter to the other; and we can no more educe the latter from the former, than we can educe the former from the latter. So likewise, both hold a similar relation to the Understanding (*Verstand*), and consequently to demonstration.

* And to be represented, a thing must be known. But *ex hypothesi*, the external reality is unknown; it cannot therefore be represented.

† See note at p. 137 a, and references.

Opposed to the *intuition of sense* no demonstration is valid ; for all demonstration is only a reducing, a carrying back of the concept to the *sensible intuition* (empirical or pure), which affords its guarantee : and this, in reference to physical science, is the first and the last, the unconditionally valid, the absolute. On the same principle, no demonstration avails in opposition to the *intuition of reason*, which affords us a knowledge of supersensible objects, that is, affords us assurance of their reality and truth.*

‘ We are compelled to employ the expression *rational intuition*, or *intuition of reason* (Vernunft-Anschauung), because the language possesses no other to denote the mean and the manner, in which the understanding is enabled to take cognizance of what, unattainable by the sense, is given by *Feeling* alone, and yet, not as a subjective excogitation, but as an objective reality.

‘ When a man says—*I know*, we have a right to ask him—*Whence he knows?* And in answering our question, he must, in the end, inevitably resort to one or other of these two sources—either to the *Sensation of Sense* (Sinnes-Empfindung), or to the *Feeling of the Mind* (Geistes-Gefuehl). Whatever we know from mental *feeling*, that, we say, we *believe*. So speak we all. Virtue—consequently, Moral Liberty—consequently, Mind and God—these can only be *believed*. But the sensation on which knowledge in the intuition of sense—knowledge properly so called—reposes, is as little superior to the Feeling on which the *knowledge in belief* is founded, as the brute creation is to the human, the material to the intellectual world, nature to its creator.†

‘ The power of Feeling, I maintain, is the power in man paramount to every other ; it is that alone which specifically distinguishes him from the brutes, that is, which, affording a differ-

* Compare this with Aristotle’s doctrine, No. 3, especially a. b. c. f. and p. 86, b.

† As will be seen from what follows, Jacobi applies the terms *Feeling* and *Belief* to both Sense and Reason. *Sensation*, as properly the mere consciousness of a subjective sensual state,—of the agreeable or disagreeable in our corporeal organism, is a term that ought to have been here avoided.

ence not merely in degree but in kind, raises him to an *incomparable* eminence above them: it is, I maintain, one and the same with reason; or, as we may with propriety express ourselves—what we call Reason, what transcends *mere* understanding solely applied to nature, springs exclusively and alone out of the power of Feeling. As the senses refer the understanding to Sensation, so the Reason refers it to Feeling. The consciousness of that which Feeling manifests, I call *Idea*.*

P. 107.—‘As the reality, revealed by the external senses, requires no guarantee, itself affording the best assurance of its truth; so the reality, revealed by that deep internal sense which we call Reason, needs no guarantee, being, in like manner, alone and of itself the most competent witness of its veracity. Of necessity, man believes his senses; of necessity, he believes his reason; and there is no certainty superior to the certainty which this belief contains.

‘When men attempted to demonstrate scientifically the truth of our representations (*Vorstellungen*) of a material world, existing beyond, and independent of, these representations, the object which they wished to establish vanished from the demonstrators; there remained naught but mere subjectivity, mere *sensation*: they found Idealism.

‘When men attempted to demonstrate scientifically the truth of our representations of an immaterial world, existing beyond these representations,—the truth of the substantiality of the human mind,—and the truth of a free creator of the universe, distinct from the universe itself, that is, an administrator, endowed with consciousness, personality, and veritable providence; in like manner the object vanished from the demonstrators; there remained for them mere logical phantasms: they found—Nihilism.

‘All reality, whether corporeal, revealed by the senses, or spir-

* Without entering on details, I may observe that Jacobi, like Kant, limits the term *Idea* to the highest notions of pure intellect, or Reason.

itual, revealed by the reason, is assured to us alone by Feeling ;* beyond and above this there is no guarantee.'

Among those who have adopted the principles of Jacobi, and who thus philosophize in a congenial spirit with Reid, besides Koeppen and Ancillon (Nos. 96, 97), I may refer, in general, to Bouterwek, *Lehrb. d. philos. Wissensch.*, i. § 26, 27, and *Lehrb. d. philos. Vorkent.*, §§ 12, 27.—Neeb, *Verm. Schr.*, vol. i. p. 154 sq. vol. ii. p. 18, 70, 245 sq. 251, vol. iii. p. 141 sq.

88.—HEIDENREICH, one of the most distinguished of the older Kantians. *Betrachtungen, &c.*, P. i. p. 213, 227.—'Inasmuch as the conviction of certain cognitions (as of our own existence, of the existence of an external world, &c.), does not depend upon an apprehension of reasons, but is exclusively an immediate innate reliance of the subject on self and nature, I call it *natural belief* (*Natur-glaube*). Every other cognition, notion, and demonstration, reposes upon this natural belief, and without it cannot be brought to bear.'

89.—L. CREUZER.—*Skeptische Betrachtungen, &c.*, p. 110.—'We accord reality to the external world because our consciousness impels us so to do. . . . That we are unable to explain, conceive, justify all this, argues nothing against its truth. Our whole knowledge rests ultimately on facts of consciousness, of which we not only cannot assign the reason, but cannot even think the possibility.' He does not however rise above Hypothetical Realism ; see p. 108.

90.—PLATNER.—*Philosophische Aphorismen*, 2d ed. Pref. p. vi.—'There is, I am persuaded, only one philosophy ; and that the true ; which in the outset of its inquiries departs from the principle, that the certainty of human knowledge is demonstrable, only relatively to our faculty of knowing, and which, at the end of its speculative career, returns within the thoughts—Experience, *Common Sense*, and Morality—the best results of our whole earthly wisdom.'

* In regard to the term Feeling, see p. 60, a.

91.—FICHTE is a more remarkable, because a more reluctant, confessor of the paramount authority of Belief than even Kant. Departing from the principle common to Kant and philosophers in general, that the mind cannot transcend itself, Fichte developed, with the most admirable rigor of demonstration, a scheme of Idealism, the purest, simplest, and most consistent which the history of philosophy exhibits. And so confident was Fichte in the necessity of his proof, that on one occasion he was provoked to imprecate eternal damnation on his head, should he ever swerve from any, even the least, of the doctrines which he had so victoriously established. But even Fichte in the end confesses that natural belief is paramount to every logical proof, and that his own idealism he could not believe.

In the foot-note at page 129 b,¹ I have given the result as stated by himself of his theoretical philosophy—*Nililism*. After the passage there quoted, he thus proceeds:—‘All cognition strictly so called (*Wissen*) is only an effigiation (*Abbildung*), and there is always in it something wanted, that to which the image or effigies (*Bild*) corresponds. This want can be supplied through no cognition; and a system of cognitions is necessarily a system of mere images, destitute of reality, significance, or aim.’ These passages are from the conclusion of the second book of his ‘*Bestimmung des Menschen*,’ entitled ‘*Wissen*,’ pp. 130, 132, ed. 1825.

But in his Practical Philosophy Fichte became convinced that he had found an organ by which to lay hold on the internal and external worlds, which had escaped from him in his Theoretical. ‘I have discovered, he says, the instrument by which to seize on this Reality, and therewith, in all likelihood, on every other. Knowledge (*das Wissen*) is not this instrument: no cognition can be its own basis and its own proof; every cognition supposes another still higher, as its reason, and this ascent has no termination. The instrument I mean, is *Belief* (*Glaube*).’ (Ib. book

¹ The note may be found above p. 24.—*W*.

third, entitled 'Glaube,' p. 146.)—'All my conviction is only Belief, and it proceeds from Feeling or Sentiment (Gesinnung), not from the discursive Understanding (Verstand).' (Ib. p. 147.) 'I possess, when once I am aware of this, the touchstone of all truth and of all conviction. The root of truth is in the Conscience (Gewissen) alone.' (Ib. p. 148.) Compare St. Austin, *supra*, No. 15, b.—See also to the same effect Fichte's 'System der Sittenlehre,' p. 18; his work 'Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre,' p. 21, sq., and the 'Philosophische Journal,' vol. x. p. 7. Still more explicit is the recognition of 'internal sense' and 'belief' as an irrecusable testimony of the reality of our perception of external realities, subsequently given by Fichte in his lectures at Erlangen in 1805, and reported by Gley in his 'Essai sur les Elements de la Philosophie,' p. 141, sq., and in his 'Philosophia Turonensis,' vol. i. p. 237.—I regret that I have not yet seen Fichte's 'Hinterlassene Schriften,' lately published by his son.

After these admissions it need not surprise us to find Fichte confessing, that 'How evident soever may be the demonstration that every object of consciousness (Vorstellung) is only illusion and dream, I am unable to believe it;' and in like manner maintaining, that Spinoza never could have believed the system which he deduced with so logical a necessity. (Philos. Journ. vii. p. 35.)

93.—KRUG.—The Transcendental Synthetism of this philosopher is a scheme of dualism founded on the acceptance of the original datum of consciousness, that we are immediately cognizant, at once, of an internal, and of an external world. It is thus a scheme of philosophy, really, though not professedly, founded on Common Sense. Krug is a Kantian; and as originally promulgated in his 'Entwurf eines neuen Organons,' 1801 (§ 5), his system was, like Kant's, a mere Cosmothetic Idealism; for while he allowed a *knowledge* of the internal world, he only allowed a *belief* of the external. The polemic of Schulze against the common theory of sensitive representation, and in professed conformity with Reid's doctrine of perception, was published in the same year; and it was probably the consideration of this that deter-

mined Krug to a fundamental change in his system. For in his treatise 'Ueber die verschiedenen Methoden,' &c. 1802 (p. 44), and still more explicitly in his 'Fundamental Philosophie,' 1803 (§ 68), the mere belief in the unknown existence of external things is commuted into a cognition, and an immediate perception apparently allowed, as well of the phenomena of matter, as of the phenomena of mind. See also his pamphlet 'Ueber das Verhaeltniss der Philosophie zum gesunden Menschenverstande,' 1835, in reference to Hegel's paradox,—'That the world of Common Sense, and the world of Philosophy, are, to each other, worlds upside down.'

94.—DEGERANDO.—Histoire comparée des Systemes de Philosophie, t. iii. p. 343, original edition. 'Concluons : la réalité de nos connaissances [of the external world] ne se démontre pas ; elle se reconnaît. Elle se reconnaît, par l'effet de cette même conscience qui nous révèle notre connaissance elle-même. Tel est le privilège de l'intelligence humaine. Elle aperçoit les objets, elle s'aperçoit ensuite elle-même, elle aperçoit qu'elle a aperçu. Elle est toute lumière, mais une lumière qui réfléchit indéfiniment sur elle-même. On nous opposera ce principe abstrait : *qu'une sensation ne peut nous instruire que de notre propre existence. . . .* Sans doute lorsqu'en commence par confondre la sensation avec la perception, par définir celle-ci *une manière d'être du moi*, on ne peut leur attribuer d'autre instruction que celle dont notre propre existence est l'objet. Mais évitons ici les disputes de mots ; il s'agit seulement de constater un fait ; savoir, si dans certains cas, en réfléchissant sur nos opérations, en démêlant toutes leurs circonstances, nous n'y découvrons pas la perception immédiate et primitive d'une existence étrangère, perception à la quelle on donnera tel nom qu'on jugera convenable. Si ce fait est exact, constant, universel, si ce fait est primitif, il est non seulement inutile, mais absurde, d'en demander le *pourquoi* et le *comment*. Car nous n'avons aucune donnée pour l'expliquer.'

95.—FRIES, a distinguished philosopher of the Kantian school, but whose opinions have been considerably modified by the influ-

ence of the Jacobian philosophy of belief, professes in his *Feeling of Truth* (Wahrheitsgefuehl) a doctrine of common sense. This doctrine is in every essential respect the same as Reid's ; for Fries is altogether wrong in the assertion which, in different works, he once and again hazards, that, under Common Sense, Reid had in view a special organ of truth—a peculiar sense, distinct from reason or intelligence in general. See in particular his *Krit.* vol. i. § 85.—*Metaph.* § 17.—*Gesch. d. Phil.* vol. ii. § 172. *Anthr.* vol. i. § 52. ii. *Vorr.* p. xvi.—*Log.* § 84.

96.—KOEPPEN—a philosopher of the school of Jacobi.—*Darstellung des Wesens der Philosophie*, § 11.—‘ Human knowledge, (Wissen) considered in its totality, exhibits a twofold character. It is either *Apprehension* (Wahrnehmung) or *Conception* (Begriff) : either an immediate conviction, or a mediate insight obtained through reasons. By the former we are said to *believe*, by the latter to *conceive* [or comprehend].’ After an articulate exposition of this, and having shown, with Jacobi and Hume, that *belief* as convertible with *feeling* constitutes the ultimate ground both of action and cognition, he proceeds :—‘ In a philosophical sense, *believed* is tantamount to *apprehended*. For all apprehension is an immediate conviction which cannot be founded upon reflection and conception. In our human individuality we possess a double faculty of apprehension—*Reason* [intelligence, νοῦς] and *sense*. What, therefore, through reason and sense is an object of our apprehension is *believed*. . . . The belief of reason and the belief of sense, are our guarantees for the certainty of what we apprehend. The former relies on the testimony of reason, the latter on the testimony of sense. Is this twofold testimony false, there is absolutely no truth of apprehension. The combinations of conceptions afford no foundation for this original truth. *Belief* is thus the *first* in our cognition, because apprehension is the first ; *conception* is the *second*, because it regards the relations of what is given through apprehension. If, then, I exclusively appropriate to the result of conceptions the name of *knowledge* (Wissen)—still all knowledge presupposes belief, and on belief does the truth of

knowledge repose. Belief lays hold on the originally given; knowledge develops the relations of the given, in conformity with the laws of thought,' &c.

97.—ANCILLON (the Son).—German by birth, French by lineage, writing in either language with equal elegance, and representing in himself the highest and most peculiar qualities of both his nations; we have still farther to admire in the prime minister of Prussia, at once, the metaphysician and moralist, the historian and statesman, the preacher and man of the world. He philosophized in the spirit of Jacobi; and from his treatise *Ueber Glaube* (On Belief), one of his later writings, I translate the following passages:—

P. 36.—‘Existences, realities, are *given us*. We apprehend them by means of an internal *mental intuition* (*geistige Anschauung*), which, in respect of its clearness, as in respect of its certainty, is as evident as universal, and as resistless and indubitable as evident.

‘Were no such internal, immediate, mental intuition given us, there would be given us no existence, no reality. The universe—the worlds of mind and matter—would then resolve themselves into apparencey. All realities would be mere appearances, appearing to another mere appearance—Man; whilst no answer could be afforded to the ever-recurring questions—*What is it that appears?* and *To whom is the appearance made?* Even language resists such assertions, and reproves the lie.

‘Had we no such internal, immediate, mental intuition, existences would be beyond the reach of every faculty we possess. For neither our abstractive nor reflective powers, neither the analysis of notions, nor notions themselves, neither synthesis nor reasoning, could ever lead us to reality and existence.’*

(Having shown this in regard to each of these in detail, he proceeds: p. 40.)—‘This root of all reality, this ground of exist-

* Fichte says the same:—‘From cognition to pass out to an object of cognition—this is impossible; we must therefore depart from the reality, otherwise we should remain forever unable to reach it.’

ence, is the Reason (Vernunft),¹ out of which all reasonings proceed, and on which alone they repose.

‘The Reason of which I here speak is not an instrument which serves for this or that performance, but a true productive force, a creative power, which has its own revelation; which does not show what is already manifested, but, as a primary consciousness, itself contemplates existence; which is not content to collect data, and from these data to draw an inference, but which itself furnishes Reality as a datum. This Reason is no arithmetical machine, but an active principle; it does not reach the truth after toil and time, but departs from the truth, because it finds the truth within itself.

‘This Reason, this internal eye,* which immediately receives the light of existence, and apprehends existences, as the bodily eye the outlines and the colors of the sensuous world, is an immediate *sense* which contemplates the invisible.

‘This Reason is the ground, the principle, of all knowledge (Wissen); for all knowledge bears reference to reality and existences.

‘All knowledge must, first or last, rest on *facts* (Thatsachen), universal facts, necessary facts, of the internal sense;—on facts which give us ourselves, our own existence, and a conviction of the existence of other supersensible beings.

‘These facts are for us *mental intuitions*. Inasmuch as they give us an instantaneous, clear, objective perception of reality, they are entitled to the name of *Intuition* (Anschauung); inasmuch as this intuition regards the objects of the invisible world, they deserve the attribute of *mental*.

‘Such an intuition, such a mental feeling (Gefuehl), engenders *Philosophical Belief*. This belief consists in the immediate apprehending of existences wholly concealed and excluded from the

¹ On the employment of the word *Reason* by the German philosophers, supra, p. 79, sq.—*W*.

* Plato, Aristotle, and many philosophers after them, say this of Intelligence, *νοῦς*.

senses, which reveal themselves to us in our inmost consciousness, and this too with a necessary conviction of their objectivity (reality).

‘Belief, in the philosophical sense, means, the apprehension without proof, reasoning or deduction of any kind, of those higher truths which belong to the supersensible world, and not to the world of appearances.’

P. 43.—‘Philosophical belief apprehends existences which can neither be conceived nor demonstrated. Belief is therefore a knowledge conversant about existences, but it does not know existences, if under knowledge be understood—demonstrating, comprehending, conceiving.’

P. 44.—‘The internal intuition which affords us the apprehension of certain existences, and allows us not to doubt in regard to the certainty of their reality, does not inform us concerning their nature. This internal intuition is given us in *Feeling* and through *Feeling*.’

P. 48.—‘This internal universal *sense*, this highest power of mental vision in man, seems to have much in it of the *instinctive*, and may therefore appropriately be styled *intellectual Instinct*. For on the one hand it manifests itself through sudden, rapid, uniform, resistless promptings; and on the other hand, these promptings relate to objects, which lie not within the domain of the senses, but belong to the supersensible world.

‘Let no offence be taken at the expression *Instinct*. For, &c.’

P. 50.—‘Had man not an intellectual instinct, or a reason giving out, revealing, but not demonstrating, truths rooted in itself, for want of a point of attachment and support, he would move himself in all directions, but without progress; and on a level, too, lower than the brutes, for he could not compass that kind of perfection which the brute possesses, and would be disqualified from attaining any other.

‘The *immediate Reason* elicits internal *mental intuitions*; these intuitions have an evidence, which works on us like an *intellec-*

tual instinct, and generates in us a *philosophical belief*, which constitutes the foundation of our knowledge. To which soever of these expressions the preference be accorded, all their notions have a common character, and are so interlinked together, that they all equally result in the same very simple proposition:—*There is either no truth, or there are fundamental truths, which admit as little of demonstration as of doubt.*

P. 51.—‘Had we not in ourselves an active principle of truth, we should have neither a rule, nor a touchstone, nor a standard, of the true. Had we not in ourselves the consciousness of existences, there would be for us no means of knowing, whether what comes from without be not mere illusion, and whether what the mind itself fashions and combines be aught but an empty play with notions. In a word—the truth must be in us, as a constitutive, and as a regulative, principle; or we should never attain to truth. Only with determinate points of commencement and termination, and with a central point of knowledge, from which every thing departs, and to which every thing tends to return, are other cognitions possible; failing this primary condition, nothing can be given us to know, and nothing certain can exist.’

And in the Preface (p. xi.) he had said:—‘The Reason invents, discovers, creates, in propriety, nothing; it enounces only what it harbors, it only reveals what God himself has deposited within it; but so soon as it is conscious to itself of this, it speaks out with a force which inspires us with a rational belief, a faith of reason (Vernunftglaube),—a belief which takes priority of every other, and which serves to every other as a point of departure and of support. How can we believe the word of God, if we do not already believe that a God exists?’

Compare also his ‘Zur Vermittlung der Extreme,’ vol. ii. p. 253, sq., and his ‘Moi Humain’ passim.

98.—GERLACH.—Fundamental Philosophie, § 16.—‘So soon as a man is convinced of any thing—be his conviction of the True, of the Good, or of the Beautiful—he rests upon his Consciousness; for in himself and in his Consciousness alone does he

possess the elements which constitute the knowledge of things, and it is herein alone that he finds the necessity of all and each of his judgments. In a word, that only has an existence for us of which we are conscious.'

99.—HERMES, the late illustrious ornament of the Catholic faculty of Theology in Bonn, a thinker of whom any country may well be proud, is the author of a philosophy of cognition which, in its fundamental principles, is one of Common Sense. It is contained in the first volume of his 'Introduction to Christian Catholic Theology,' a work which, since the author's death, has obtained a celebrity, apart from its great intrinsic merits, through the agitation consequent on its condemnation at Rome, for doctrines, which, except on some notoriously open questions, the Hermesians—in Germany, now a numerous and able school—strenuously deny that it contains.

To speak only of his theoretical philosophy.—For the terms *Feeling of Truth, Belief, &c.*, Hermes substitutes the term *Holding-for-true* (Fuerwahrhalten) which is only inadequately expressed by the Latin *assensus, assentio, adhesio*, the Greek *συχνασάθεσις*, or any English term. *Holding-for-true* involves in it a duplicity;—viz: a *Holding-for-true* of the *knowledge*, and a *Holding-for-real* (Fuerwirklichhalten) of the thing *known*. Both of these parts are united in the decision—that the knowledge and the thing known coincide.

Holding-for-real is not consequent on reflection; it is not the result of a recognition; it is the concomitant, not the consequent of apprehension. It is a constituent element of the primary consciousness of a perception external or internal; it is what, in the language of the Scottish philosophers, might be called an instinctive belief. 'This holding-for-real (says Hermes) is manifestly given in me *prior* to all Reflection; for, with the first consciousness, with the consciousness "that I know," from which all Reflection departs, the consciousness is also there, "that I hold the thing known for real,"' Einl., vol. i. p. 182. See Nos. 3, 15* (at end), 16, &c.

The *necessity* we find of assenting or holding is the last and highest security we can obtain for truth and reality. The necessary holding of a thing for real is not itself reality; it is only the instrument, the mean, the surrogate, the guarantee, of reality. It is not an objective, it is only a subjective, certainty. It constitutes, however, all the assurance or certainty of which the human mind is capable. 'The [necessary] Holding,' says Hermes, 'of something known [for real], can afford no other certainty of the objective existence of what is known but this—*that I (the subject) must hold the thing known for objectively existent; or* (meaning always by the word *subjective* what is *in me, in the subject*)—of the *objective existence* of a thing known there can possibly be given only the highest *subjective certainty*. But no one who knows what he would be at, will ever ask after any other certainty; not merely because it is unattainable, but because it is contradictory for human thought: in other words, can a subject be any otherwise certain than that *it* is certain—than that *itself, the subject*, is certain? To be *objectively* certain (taking the term *objective* in a sense corresponding to the term *subjective* as here employed) the subject, must, in fact, no longer remain the subject, it must also be the object, and, as such, be able to become certain; and yet in conformity to our notion of certainty (*Gewissheit*)—or whatever more suitable expression may be found for it—all questions concerning certainty must be referred to the subject (to the *Ego*): the attempt to refer them to the object involves a contradiction.' *Ibid.* p. 186.

This is clearly and cogently stated; and it would seem as if we had only to appeal to the subjective certainty we have, in our being compelled to hold that in perception the *ego* is immediately cognisant, not only of itself as subject, but of a *non-ego* as object—to prove that the *external world* being actually known as existing, actually exists. (See above, p. 26, sq.) This Hermes does not, however, do. He seems not, indeed, to have contemplated the possibility of the mind being conscious or immediately cognitive of aught but self; and only furnishes us

with an improved edition of the old and inconclusive reasoning, that an external world must be admitted, as the necessary ground or reason of our internal representation of it.

100. — COUSIN. — *Fragmens Philosophiques*, Third edition, Vol. i.

a.—P. 243.—‘Philosophy is already realized, for human thought is there.

‘There is not, and there cannot be, a philosophy absolutely false; for it would behoove the author of such a philosophy to place himself out of his own thought, in other words out of his humanity. This power has been given to no man.

‘How then may philosophy err?—By considering thought only on a single side, and by seeing, in that single side, the totality of thought. There are no false, but many incomplete systems;—systems true in themselves, but vicious in their pretensions, each to comprise that absolute truth which is only found distributed through all.

‘The incomplete, and by consequence, the exclusive—this is the one only vice of philosophy, or rather, to speak more correctly, of philosophers, for philosophy rises above all the systems. The full portrait of the real, which philosophy presents, is indeed made up of features borrowed from every several system; for of these each reflects reality; but unfortunately reflects it under a single angle.*

‘To compass possession of reality full and entire, it is requisite to sist ourselves at the centre. To reconstitute the intellectual life, mutilated in the several systems, it behooves us to re-enter Consciousness, and there, weaned from a systematic and exclusive spirit, *to analyze thought into its elements, and all its elements, and to seek out in it the characters, and all the characters under which it is at present manifested to the eye of consciousness.*’—*Du Fait de Conscience*.

b.—P. 181.—‘The fundamental principle of knowledge and

* The like has been said by Leibnitz and Hegel; but not so finely.

intellectual life is *Consciousness*. Life begins with consciousness, and with consciousness it ends: in consciousness it is that we apprehend ourselves; and it is in and through consciousness that we apprehend the external world. Were it possible to rise above consciousness, to place ourselves, so to speak, behind it, to penetrate into the secret workshop where intelligence blocks out and fabricates the various phenomena, there to officiate, as it were, at the birth, and to watch the evolution of consciousness;—then might we hope to comprehend its nature, and the different steps through which it rises to the form in which it is first actually revealed. But, as all knowledge commences with consciousness, it is able to remount no higher. *Here a prudent analysis will therefore stop, and occupy itself with what is given.*

Other testimonies might easily be quoted from the subsequent writings of M. Cousin—were this not superfluous; for I presume that few who take an interest in philosophical inquiries can now be ignorant of these celebrated works.

100.—DE LA MENNAIS.—See No. 2.

OMITTED.

9**.—ÆLIUS ARISTIDES.—Platonic Oration, ii. (Opera, ed. Canter, t. iii. p. 249; ed. Jebb. t. ii. p. 150)—‘That the Many are not to be contemned, and their opinion held of no account; but that in them, too, there is a presentiment, an unerring instinct, which by a kind of divine fatality, seizes darkling on the truth; this we have Plato himself teaching, and ages earlier than Plato, this old Hesiod, with posterity in chorus, in these familiar verses sang:—

*‘The Fame, born of the many-nation’d voice
Of mankind, dies not; for it lives as God.’*

For Hesiod, see No. 1. These verses are likewise adduced by Aristotle as proverbial. (Eth. Nic. vii. 13 [14]). They may be also rendered thus:—

*‘The Word, forth sent by the conclamant voice
Of mankind, errs not; for its truth is God’s.’*

Fame (Public Opinion) had her temple in Athens. See Pausanias.

Plato is referred to in the Laws (L. xii. § 5, ed. Bekk. t. ii. p. 950, ed. Steph.). Another passage, in the Crito, which Canter indicates, is irrelevant. In the former, Plato attributes to mankind at large a certain divine sense or vaticination of the truth (*θεῖον τι καὶ εὐστοχόν*), by which, in our natural judgments, we are preserved from error. I did not, however, find the statement sufficiently generalized to quote the context as a testimony.

15*.—THEODORET.—The Curative of Greek Affections, Sermon i., on Belief. (Opera, ed. Sirmondi, t. iv. p. 478.)—‘Belief [or Faith], therefore, is a matter of the greatest moment. For, according to the Pythagorean Epicharmus,

*Mind, it seeth ; Mind, it heareth ;
All beside is deaf and blind :*

and Heraclitus, in like manner, exhorts us to submit to the guidance of belief, in these words:—*Unless ye hope, ye shall not find the un hoped for, which is inscrutable and impermeable. . . .* And let none of you, my friends, say aught in disparagement of belief. For belief is called by Aristotle the *Criterion of Science* ; whilst Epicurus says, that it is the *Anticipation of Reason*, and that anticipation, having indued Knowledge, results in Comprehension.—But, as we define it, Belief is—*a spontaneous assent or adhesion of the mind,—or the intuition of the unapparent,—or the taking possession of the real* (*περὶ τὸ ὄν ἐνστάσις*—v. Bud. in Pand. et Com. L. G.), *and natural apprehension of the unperceivable,—or an unvacillating propension established in the mind of the believer.*—But, on the one hand, Belief requires knowledge, as on the other, Knowledge requires belief. For there can subsist, neither belief without knowledge, nor knowledge without belief. Belief precedes knowledge, knowledge follows belief ; while desire is attendant upon knowledge, and action consequent upon desire. For it is necessary,—to believe first ; then to learn ; knowing, to desire ; and desiring to

act. . . .—Belief, therefore, my friends, is a concern common to all; . . . for all who would learn any thing must first believe. [So Aristotle.] Belief is, therefore, the foundation and basis of science. For your philosophers have defined Belief—*a voluntary assent or adhesion of the mind*; and Science—*an immutable habit, accompanied with reason.*—This is a testimony which I should regret to have totally forgotten. Compare Nos. 3, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, 24, 81, 86, 87, 91, 96, 97, 99, &c.

17*.—SIMPLICIUS.—Commentary on the Manual of Epictetus; and there speaking in the language of the Porch, rather than in that of the Lyceum or the Academy.

a.—C. 33, Heins. 23, Schweigh.—‘The Common Notions of men concerning the nature of things, according to which, in place of varying from each other, they are in opinion mutually agreed (as, that *the good is useful, and the useful good, that all things desiderate the good, that the equal is neither surpassing nor surpassed, that twice two is four*)—these notions, and the like, suggested in us by right reason, and tested by experience and time, are true, and in accordance with the nature of things; whereas the notions proper to individual men are frequently fallacious.’

b.—C. 72, Heins. 48, Schweigh.—‘But Reason, according to the proverb, is a Mercury common to all; for, although, as in us individually, reasons are plural, or numerically different, they are in species one and the same; so that, by reason all men follow after the same things as good, and eschew the same things as bad, and think the same things to be true or to be false.’

In these passages, *Reason*, in the vaguer meaning of the Stoics, is employed, where *Intellect*, in the precise acceptation of the Aristotelians and Platonists, might have been expected from Simplicius. But he is here speaking by accommodation to his author.

As a chronological table was luckily omitted at the head of the Series, I here append, ethnographically subarranged, the following

LIST OF THE PRECEDING TESTIMONIES.

GREEK.—1, Hesiod; 2, Heraclitus; 3, Aristotle; 4, Theophrastus; 9 * *, Ælius Aristides, see at end; 10, Alexander Aphrodisiensis; 11, Clemens Alexandrinus; 15, Theodoret, see at end; 16, Proclus; 17, Ammonius Hermiæ; 17 *, Simplicius, see at end.

ROMAN.—5, Lucretius; 6, Cicero; 7, Horace; 8, Seneca; 9, Pliny the younger; 9 *, Quintilian; 12, Tertullian; 13, Arnobius; 14, Lactantius; 15, St. Augustin.

ARABIAN.—19, Algazel.

ITALIAN.—18, St. Anselm (ambiguously French); 20, Aquinas; 26, Julius Cæsar Scaliger; 67, Vulpius; 68, Vico; 71, Genovesi.

SPANISH.—22, Antonius Andreas; 28, Antonius Goveanus (*Portuguese*); 29, Nunnesius; 32, Mariana.

FRENCH.—23, Budæus; 27, Omphalius; 30, Muretus; 37, Descartes; 39, Balzac; 40, Chanet; 41, Irenæus a Sancto Jacobo; 42, Lescalopier; 43, Pascal; 44, La Chambre; 46, Le Pere Rapin; 47, Du Hamel; 48, Malebranche; 49, Poiret; 50, Bossuet; 59, John Alphonso Turretini (*Genevese*); 60, Fenelon; 62, D'Agnesseau; 63, Buffier; 70, Huber; 74, D'Alembert; 94, Degerando; 100, Cousin; 101, De La Mennais.

BRITISH.—21, Duns Scotus; 33, Sir John Davies; 35, Lord Herbert; 36, Cameron; 38, Sir Thomas Brown; 45, Henry More; 51, Locke; 52, Bentley; 53, John Serjeant; 53 *, Abercromby; 55, Toland; 61, Shaftesbury; 62 *, Berkeley; 64, Lyons; 65, Amherst; 66, Wollaston; 72, Hume; 78, Price; 79, Reid; 82, Beattie. (Of these, 21, [?] 36, 53 *, 72, 79, 82, are *Scottish*.)

GERMAN.—24, Luther; 25, Melancthon; 34, Keckermann; 54, Leibnitz; 56, Christian Thomasius; 57, Ridiger; 58, Fuerlin; 69, Christian Wolf; 73, Crusius; 75, Ctinger; 76, Eschenbach; 77, John Matthew Gesner; 80, Hiller; 83, Storehenau; 84, Stattler; 86, Kant; 87, Jacobi; 88, Heidenreich; 89, Leonhard Creuzer; 90,

Platner; 91, Fichte; 93, Krug; 95, Fries; 96, Kœppen; 97, Ancillon, the son; 98, Gerlach; 99, George Hermes.

BELGIAN.—31, Giphanius; 81, Hemsterhuis; 85, Hennert.

In all, one hundred and six Witnesses.

We are amazed at such a shoreless sea of erudition, but it has a use beyond mere show, for it is an important contribution to the history of opinion. Our confidence in the Common Sense Philosophy is increased when we see that the greatest thinkers of every age have, directly or indirectly, recognized its principles. The pursuit of Philosophy is ennobled when some higher ground is reached, whereon apparently conflicting systems may be conciliated. Bossuet somewhere says, 'Every error is a truth abused.' Cousin, the most catholic of all the historians of Philosophy, continually repeats the same pregnant truth. Hamilton claims that in his own system may be found 'a centre and conciliation for the most opposite of philosophical opinions.' — *W.*



PART SECOND.



PHILOSOPHY

OF

P E R C E P T I O N .

“No man seeks a reason for believing what he sees or feels; and, if he did, it would be difficult to find one. But, though he can give no reason for believing his senses, his belief remains as firm as if it were grounded on demonstration. . . . The statesman continues to plod, the soldier to fight, and the merchant to export and import, without being in the least moved by the demonstrations that have been offered of the non-existence of those things about which they are so seriously employed. And a man may as soon, by reasoning, pull the moon out of her orbit, as destroy the belief of the objects of sense.”—REID, *Essay ii. chap. xx. pp. 273-4.*

PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION.

CHAPTER I.

ELUCIDATION OF REID'S DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION, AND ITS DEFENCE AGAINST SIR THOMAS BROWN.¹

WE rejoice in the appearance of this work,² and for two reasons. We hail it as another sign of the convalescence of Philosophy in a great and influential nation; and prize it as a seasonable testimony, by intelligent foreigners, to the merits of a philosopher whose merits are under a momentary eclipse at home.

Apart from the practical corruption, of which (in the emphatic language of Fichte) 'the dirt philosophy' may have been the cause, we regard the doctrine of mind, long dominant in France, as more pernicious, through the stagnation of thought which it occasioned, than for the speculative errors which it set afloat. The salutary fermentation which the skepticism of Hume³ deter-

¹ The substance of this chapter was, originally, an article in the Edinburgh Review for October, 1830. It may be found in 'The Discussions on Philosophy, etc.,' pp. 38-98. It has been translated into French by M. Peisse; into Italian by S. Lo Gatto; and is contained in Cross's Selections from the Edinburgh Review.—*W.*

² The work referred to is the 'Œuvres Complètes de Thomas Reid, Chef de l'École Ecossaise. Publiées par M. Th. Jouffroy, avec des Fragments de M. Royer-Collard, et une Introduction de l'Éditeur.' Tomes ii.-vi. 8vo., Paris, 1828-9, (not completed).—*W.*

³ The usual criticism of Hume, as Hamilton well remarks (Reid, p. 444), proceeds upon the erroneous hypothesis that he was a *Dogmatist*. He was a Skeptic, that is, he *accepted* the principles asserted by the prevalent Dogmatism; and only showed that such and such conclusions were, *on these principles*, inevitable. Hume destroyed Sensualism (Sensuism is better, and still better is Sensism, as Mr. Brownson has it) by reducing it to absurdity. Yet

mined in Scotland and in Germany, did not extend to that country; and the dogmatist there slumbered on, unsuspecting of his principles, nay even resigned to conclusions which would make philosophy to man the solution of the terrific oracle to Œdipus:

‘Mayst thou ne’er learn the truth of what thou art!’

The present contrast,¹ indeed, which the philosophical enthusiasm of France exhibits to the speculative apathy of Britain, is any thing but flattering to ourselves. The new spirit of metaphysical inquiry, which the French imbibed from Germany and Scotland, arose with them precisely at the time when the popularity of psychological researches began to decline with us; and now, when all interest in these speculations seems here to be extinct, they are there seen flourishing, in public favor, with a universality and vigor corresponding to their encouragement.

The only example, indeed, that can be adduced of any interest in such subjects, recently exhibited in this country, is the favorable reception of Dr. Brown’s *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Mind*. This work, however, we regard as a concurrent *cause* of the very indifference we lament, and as a striking *proof* of its reality.

As a *cause*:—These lectures have certainly done much to justify the general neglect of psychological pursuits. Dr. Brown’s high reputation for metaphysical acuteness, gave a presumptive authority to any doctrine he might promulgate; and the personal relations in which he stood to Mr. Stewart afforded every assurance that he would not revolt against that philosopher’s opin-

in the human mind there is something that could see the absurdity, something that could make the absurdity apparent; ‘intelligence supposes principles, which, as the *conditions* of its activity, cannot be the *results* of its operation.’ Seizing this higher truth, Reid and Kant have reared a new philosophy, the last word of which is the incomparable system of Hamilton. — *W.*

¹ We have omitted six paragraphs and part of another, which were omitted when the article was first published in the *Edinburgh Review*. They are, with the exception of a few lines, contained in the Introduction to this volume. See p. 7.—*W.*

ions, rashly, or except on grounds that would fully vindicate his dissent. In these circumstances, what was the impression on the public mind; when all that was deemed best established—all that was claimed as original and most important in the philosophy of Reid and Stewart, was proclaimed by their disciple and successor to be *naught but a series of misconceptions, only less wonderful in their commission than in the general acquiescence in their truth?* Confidence was at once withdrawn from a pursuit, in which the most sagacious inquirers were thus at fault; and the few who did not relinquish the study in despair, clung with implicit faith to the revelation of the new apostle.

As a *proof*:—These lectures afford evidence of how greatly talent has, of late, been withdrawn from the field of metaphysical discussion. This work has now been before the world for ten years. In itself it combines many of the qualities calculated to attract public, and even popular attention; while its admirers have exhausted hyperbole in its praise, and disparaged every philosophic name to exalt the reputation of its author. Yet, though attention has been thus concentrated on these lectures for so long a period, and though the high ability and higher authority of Dr. Brown, deserved and would have recompensed the labor; we are not aware that any adequate attempt has yet been made to subject them, in whole or in part, to an enlightened and impartial criticism. The radical *inconsistencies* which they involve, in every branch of their subject, remain undeveloped; their unacknowledged *appropriations* are still lauded as original; their endless *mistakes*, in the history of philosophy, stand yet uncorrected; and their frequent *misrepresentations* of other philosophers continue to mislead.* In particular, nothing has more

* We shall, in the sequel, afford samples of these 'inconsistencies,' 'mistakes,' 'misrepresentations,'—but not of Brown's 'appropriations.' To complete the cycle, and vindicate our assertion, we may here adduce one specimen of the way in which discoveries have been lavished on him, in consequence of his omission (excusable, perhaps, in the circumstances) to advertise his pupil when he was not original. Brown's doctrine of *General-*

convinced us of the general neglect, in this country, of psychological science, than that Dr. Brown's ignorant attack on *Reid*, and, through *Reid*, confessedly on *Stewart*, has not long since been repelled;—except, indeed, the general belief that it was triumphant.

In these circumstances, we felt gratified, as we said, with the present honorable testimony to the value of Dr. Reid's speculations in a foreign country; and have deemed this a seasonable opportunity of expressing our own opinion on the subject, and of again vindicating, we trust, to that philosopher, the well-earned reputation of which he has been too long defrauded in his own. If we are not mistaken in our view, we shall, in fact, reverse the marvel, and retort the accusation; in proving that Dr. Brown himself is guilty of that 'series of wonderful misconceptions,' of which he so confidently arraigns his predecessors.

'Turpe est doctori, cum culpa redarguit ipsum.'

This, however, let it be recollected, is no point of merely personal concernment. It is true, indeed, that either *Reid* accomplished nothing, or the science has retrograded under *Brown*. But the question itself regards the cardinal point of metaphysical philosophy; and its determination involves the proof or the refutation of skepticism.

The subject we have undertaken can, with difficulty, be compressed within the limits of a single article. This must stand our excuse for not, at present, noticing the valuable accompaniment

ization is identical with that commonly taught by philosophers—not Scottish; and, among these, by authors, with whose works his lectures prove him to have been well acquainted. But if a writer, one of the best informed of those who, in this country, have of late cultivated this branch of philosophy, could, among other expressions equally encomiastic, speak of *Brown's return* to the vulgar opinion, on such a point, as of '*a discovery, &c., which will, in all future ages, be regarded as one of the most important steps ever made in metaphysical science;*' how incompetent must ordinary readers be to place *Brown* on his proper level—how desirable would have been a critical examination of his *Lectures* to distribute to him his own, and to estimate his property at its true value.—See Part ii. chap. v. p. 393, 399, alibi.

to Reid's *Essays on the Intellectual Powers*, in the *Fragments of M. Royer-Collard's Lectures*, which are appended to the third and fourth volumes of the translation. A more appropriate occasion¹ for considering these may, however, occur, when the *first* volume, containing M. Jouffroy's Introduction, appears; of which, from other specimens of his ability, we entertain no humble expectations.

'Reid,' says Dr. Brown, 'considers his confutation of the ideal system as involving almost every thing which is truly his. Yet there are few circumstances connected with the fortune of modern philosophy, that appear to me more wonderful, than that a mind like Dr. Reid's, so learned in the history of metaphysical science, should have conceived, that on this point, any great merit, at least any merit of originality, was justly referable to him particularly. Indeed, the only circumstance which appears to me wonderful, is, that the claim thus made by him should have been so readily and generally admitted.' (*Lect. xxv. p. 155.*)

Dr. Brown then proceeds, at great length, to show: 1° That Reid, in his attempt to overthrow what he conceived 'the common theory of ideas,' wholly misunderstood the catholic opinion, which was, in fact, identical with his own; and actually attributed to all philosophers 'a theory which had been universally, or, at least, almost universally, abandoned at the time he wrote;' and 2° That the doctrine of perception, which Reid so absurdly fancies he had first established, affords, in truth, no better evidence of the existence of an external world, than even the long abandoned hypothesis which he had taken such idle labor to refute.

In every particular of this statement, Dr. Brown is completely, and even curiously, wrong. He is out in his prelusive flourish,—out in his serious assault. Reid is neither 'so learned in the history of metaphysical science' as he verbally proclaims, nor so sheer an ignorant as he would really demonstrate. Estimated by

¹ The hopes of Sir William, like those of every mortal, have not all been fulfilled.—W.

aught above a very vulgar standard, Reid's knowledge of Philosophical opinions was neither extensive nor exact; and Mr. Stewart was himself too competent and candid a judge, not fully to acknowledge the deficiency.* But Reid's merits as a thinker are too high, and too securely established, to make it necessary to claim for his reputation an erudition to which he himself advances no pretension. And be his learning what it may, his critic, at least, has not been able to convict him of a *single error*; while Dr. Brown himself rarely opens his mouth upon the older authors, without betraying his absolute unacquaintance with the matters on which he so intrepidly discourses.—Nor, as a speculator, does Reid's superiority admit, we conceive, of doubt. With all admiration of Brown's general talent, we do not hesitate to assert, that, in the points at issue between the two philosophers, to say nothing of others, he has *completely misapprehended Reid's philosophy, even in its fundamental position,—the import of the skeptical reasoning,—and the significance of the only argument by which that reasoning is resisted.* But, on the other hand, as Reid can only be defended on the ground of misconception, the very fact, that his great doctrine of perception could actually be reversed by so acute an intellect as Brown's, would prove that there must exist some *confusion and obscurity* in his own development of that doctrine, to render such a misinterpretation possible. Nor is this presumption wrong. In truth, Reid did not generalize to himself an adequate notion of the various possible *theories of perception*, some of which he has accordingly confounded: while his error of commission in discriminating *consciousness* as a special faculty, and his error of omission in not discriminating *intuitive* from *representative* knowledge,—a distinction without which his peculiar philosophy is naught,—have contributed to render his doctrine of the intellectual faculties prolix, vacillating, perplexed, and sometimes even contradictory.

Before proceeding to consider the doctrine of perception in

* (Dissertation, &c., Part ii. p. 107.) [In my foot-notes to Reid will be found abundant evidence of this deficiency.]

relation to the points at issue between Reid and his antagonist, it is therefore necessary to disintricate the question, by relieving it of these two errors, bad in themselves, but worse in the confusion which they occasion; for, as Bacon truly observes,—‘*citius emergit veritas ex errore quam ex confusione.*’ And, first, of *consciousness*.

Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, and philosophers in general, have regarded Consciousness, not as a particular faculty, but as the universal condition of intelligence. Reid, on the contrary, following, probably, Hutcheson, and followed by Stewart, Royer-Collard, and others, has classed consciousness as a co-ordinate faculty with the other intellectual powers; distinguished from them, not as the species from the individual, but as the individual from the individual. And as the particular faculties have each their peculiar object, so the peculiar object of consciousness is, the *operations of the other faculties themselves, to the exclusion of the objects* about which these operations are conversant.

This analysis we regard as false. For it is impossible: in the *first* place, to discriminate consciousness from all the other cognitive faculties, or to discriminate any one of these from consciousness; and, in the *second*, to conceive a faculty cognizant of the various mental operations, without being also cognizant of their several objects.

We know; and *We know that we know*:—these propositions, *logically* distinct, are *really* identical; each implies the other. *We know* (*i. e.* feel, perceive, imagine, remember, &c.) only as we *know that we thus know*; and we *know that we know*, only as we know in *some particular manner* (*i. e.* *feel, perceive, &c.*). So true is the scholastic brocard:—‘*Non sentimus nisi sentiamus nos sentire; non sentimus nos sentire nisi sentiamus.*’ The attempt to analyze the cognition *I know*, and the cognition *I know that I know*, into the separate energies of distinct faculties, is therefore vain. But this is the analysis of Reid. Consciousness, which the formula *I know that I know* adequately expresses, he views as a power specifically distinct from the various cognitive faculties

comprehended under the formula *I know*, precisely as these faculties are severally contradistinguished from each other. But here the parallel does not hold. I can feel without perceiving, I can perceive without imagining, I can imagine without remembering, I can remember without judging (in the emphatic signification), I can judge without willing. One of these acts does not immediately suppose the other. Though modes merely of the same indivisible subject, they are modes in *relation to each other*, really distinct, and admit, therefore, of psychological discrimination. But can I feel without being conscious that I feel?—can I remember, without being conscious that I remember? or, can I be conscious, without being conscious that I perceive, or imagine, or reason,—that I energize, in short, in some determinate mode, which Reid would view as the act of a faculty specifically different from consciousness? That this is impossible, Reid himself admits. ‘Unde,’ says Tertullian,—‘unde ista tormenta cruciandæ simplicitatis et suspendendæ veritatis? Quis mihi exhibebit sensum non intelligentem se sentire?’ But if, on the one hand, consciousness be only realized under specific modes, and cannot therefore exist apart from the several faculties *in cumulo*; and if, on the other, these faculties can all and each only be exerted under the condition of consciousness; consciousness, consequently, is not one of the special modes into which our mental activity may be resolved, but the fundamental form,—the generic condition of them all. Every intelligent act is thus a modified consciousness; and consciousness a comprehensive term for the complement of our cognitive energies.

But the vice of Dr. Reid’s analysis is further manifested in his arbitrary limitation of the sphere of consciousness; proposing to it the various intellectual operations, but excluding their objects. ‘I am conscious,’ he says, ‘of perception, but not of the object I perceive; I am conscious of memory, but not of the object I remember.’

The reduction of consciousness to a particular faculty entailed this limitation. For, once admitting consciousness to be cognizant of *objects* as of *operations*, Reid could not, without ab-

surdity, degrade it to the level of a special power. For thus, in the *first* place, consciousness coextensive with *all* our cognitive faculties, would yet be made co-ordinate with *each*; and, in the *second*, two faculties would be supposed to be simultaneously exercised about the same object, to the same intent.

But the alternative which Reid has chosen is, at least, equally untenable. The assertion, that we can be conscious of an act of knowledge, without being conscious of its object, is virtually suicidal. A mental operation is only what it is, by relation to its object; the object at once determining its existence, and specifying the character of its existence. But if a relation cannot be comprehended in one of its terms, so we cannot be conscious of an operation, without being conscious of the object to which it exists only as correlative. For example, We are conscious of a perception, says Reid, but are not conscious of its object. Yet how can we be conscious of a *perception*, that is, how can we *know* that a perception exists,—that it is a perception, and not another mental state,—and that it is the perception of a rose, and of nothing but a rose; unless this *consciousness* involve a knowledge (or consciousness) of the object, which at once determines the existence of the act,—specifies its kind,—and distinguishes its individuality? Annihilate the object, you annihilate the operation; annihilate the consciousness of the object, you annihilate the consciousness of the operation. In the greater number indeed of our cognitive energies, the two terms of the relation of knowledge exist only as identical; the object admitting only of a logical discrimination from the subject. I imagine a Hippogryph. The Hippogryph is at once the object of the act and the act itself. Abstract the one, the other has no existence: deny me the consciousness of the Hippogryph, you deny me the consciousness of the imagination;¹ I am conscious of zero; I am not conscious at all.

¹ 'Aristotle and Hobbes call imagination a *dying sense*; and Descartes is equally explicit.' 'Imagining should not be confounded with Conceiv-

A difficulty may here be started in regard to two faculties,—*Memory* and *Perception*.

Memory is defined by Reid 'an *immediate* knowledge of the *past*;' and is thus distinguished from consciousness, which, with all philosophers, he views as 'an *immediate* knowledge of the *present*.' We may therefore be conscious of the act of memory as *present*, but of its object as *past*, consciousness is impossible. And certainly, if Reid's definition of memory be admitted, this inference cannot be disallowed. But memory is not an immediate knowledge of the past; an *immediate knowledge of the past* is a contradiction in terms. This is manifest, whether we look *from the act to the object*, or *from the object to the act*.—To be known *immediately*, an *object* must be known *in itself*; to be known in itself, it must be known as actual, now existent, *present*. But the object of memory is *past*—not present, not now existent, not actual; it cannot therefore be known in itself. If known at all, it must be known in something different from itself—i. e. *mediately*; and memory as an '*immediate knowledge of the past*,' is thus impossible.—Again: memory² is an *act* of knowledge; an

ing, &c.; though some philosophers, as Gassendi, have not attended to the distinction. The words *Conception*, *Concept*, *Notion*, should not be limited to the thought of what cannot be represented in the imagination, as the thought suggested by the general term. The Leibnitzians call this *symbolical*, in contrast to *intuitive* knowledge. This is the sense in which *conception* and *conceptus* have been usually and correctly employed. Mr. Stewart, on the other hand, arbitrarily limits conception to the reproduction, in imagination, of an object of sense as actually perceived.'—Foot-notes to Reid, pp. 227, 360.—*W.*

² 'In memory, we cannot possibly be conscious or immediately cognizant of any object beyond the modifications of the *ego* itself. In perception (if an *immediate perception* be allowed) we must be conscious, or immediately cognizant, of some phenomenon of the *non-ego*.' 'An *immediate knowledge of a past thing* is a contradiction. For we can only know a thing immediately, if we know it in itself, or as existing; but what is past cannot be known in itself, for it is non-existent.' 'The datum of *Memory* does not stand upon the same ground as the datum of simple Consciousness. In so far as memory is consciousness, it cannot be denied. We cannot, without contradiction, deny the fact of memory as a present consciousness; but we may, without contradiction, suppose that the past given therein, is only an illusion of the

act exists only as present; and a present knowledge can be immediately cognizant only of a present object. But the object known in memory is *past*; consequently, either memory is not an *act* of knowledge at all, or the object immediately known is present; and the past, if known, is known only through the *medium* of the *present*; on either alternative memory is not 'an *immediate* knowledge of the *past*.' Thus, memory, like our other faculties, affords only an immediate knowledge of the present; and, like them, is nothing more than consciousness variously modified.*

present.' 'Whatever is the immediate object of thought, of that we are necessarily conscious. But of Alexander, for example, as existing, we are necessarily not conscious. Alexander, as existing, cannot, therefore, possibly be an immediate object of thought; consequently, if we can be said to think of Alexander at all, we can only be said to think of him mediately, in and through a representation of which we are conscious; and that representation is the immediate object of thought. It makes no difference whether this immediate object be viewed as a *tertium quid*, distinct from the existing reality and from the conscious mind; or whether as a mere modality of the conscious mind itself—as the mere act of thought considered in its relation to something beyond the sphere of consciousness. In neither case can we be said (be it in the *imagination* of a possible or the *recollection* of a past existence) to know a thing as existing—that is, immediately; and, therefore, if in these operations we be said to know aught out of the mind at all, we can only be said to know it mediately—in other words, as a mediate object. The whole perplexity arises from the ambiguity of the term object, that term being used both for the external reality of which we are here not conscious, and cannot therefore know in itself, and for the mental representation which we know in itself, but which is known only as relative to the other. Reid chooses to abolish the former signification, on the supposition that it only applies to representative entity different from the act of thought. In this supposition, however, he is wrong; nor does he obtain an immediate knowledge, even in *perception*, by merely denying the *crude* hypothesis of representation.'—Foot-notes to Reid, pp. 329, 339, 444, 279.—*W.*

* The only parallel we know to this misconception of Reid's is the opinion on which Fromondus animadverts. 'In primis displicet nobis plurimorum recentiorum philosophia, qui sensuum interiorum operationes, ut phantasiationem, memorationem, et reminiscenciam, circa imaginez, recentur aut olim spiritibus vel cerebro impressas, versari negant; sed proxime circa objecta quæ foris sunt. Ut cum quis meminit se vidisse leporem currentem; memoria, inquit, non intuetur et attingit imaginem leporis in cerebro asservatam, sed solum leporem ipsum qui cursu trajiciebat campum, &c., &c.' (*Philosophia Christiana de Anima*. Lovanii. 1649. L. iii. c. 8.

In regard to *Perception* : Reid allows an *immediate knowledge* of the affections of the subject of thought, mind, or *self*, and an *immediate knowledge* of the qualities of an object really different from self—*matter*. To the former, he gives the name of *consciousness*, to the latter, that of *perception*. Is consciousness, as an immediate knowledge, *purely subjective*, not to be discriminated from perception, as an immediate knowledge, *really objective* ?—A logical difference we admit ; a psychological we deny.

Relatives are known only together : the science of opposites is one. Subject and object, mind and matter, are known only in correlation and contrast,—and by the same common act : while knowledge, as at once a synthesis and an antithesis of both, may be indifferently defined an antithetic synthesis, or a synthetic antithesis of its terms. Every conception of self, necessarily involves a conception of not-self : every perception of what is different from me, implies a recognition of the percipient subject in contradistinction from the object perceived. In one act of knowledge, indeed, the object is the prominent element, in another the subject ; but there is none in which either is known out of relation to the other. The immediate knowledge which Reid allows of things different from the mind, and the immediate knowledge of mind itself, cannot therefore be split into two distinct acts. In perception, as in the other faculties, the same indivisible consciousness is conversant about both terms of the relation of knowledge. Distinguish the cognition of the subject from the cognition of the object of perception, and you *either* annihilate the relation of knowledge itself, which exists only in its terms being comprehended together in the unity of consciousness ; *or* you must postulate a higher faculty, which shall again reduce to one, the two cognitions you have distinguished ;—that is, you are at last compelled

art. 8.) Who the advocates of this opinion were, we are ignorant ; but more than suspect that, *as stated*, it is only a misrepresentation of the Cartesian doctrine, then on the ascendant. [Lord Monboddo has, however, a doctrine of the sort.]

to admit, in an unphilosophical complexity, that common consciousness of subject and object, which you set out with denying in its philosophical simplicity. *Consciousness* and *immediate knowledge* are thus terms universally convertible; and if there be an immediate knowledge of things external, there is consequently the *consciousness of an outer world*.*

Reid's erroneous analysis of consciousness is not perhaps of so much importance in itself, as from causing confusion in its consequences. Had he employed this term as tantamount to immediate knowledge in general, whether of self or not, and thus *distinctly expressed* what he *certainly* [?] *taught*, that mind and matter are both equally known to us *as existent and in themselves*; Dr. Brown could hardly have so far misconceived his doctrine, as actually to lend him the very opinion which his whole philosophy was intended to refute, viz. that an *immediate*, and

* How correctly Aristotle reasoned on this subject, may be seen from the following passage:—'When we perceive (*αἰσθανόμεθα*)—the Greeks, perhaps fortunately, had no special term for *consciousness*—'when we perceive that we see, hear, &c., it is necessary, that by sight itself we perceive that we see, or by another sense. If by another sense, then this also must be a sense of sight, conversant equally about the object of sight, color. Consequently, there must either be two senses of the same object, or every sense must be percipient of itself. Moreover, if the sense percipient of sight be different from sight itself, it follows, either that there is a regress to infinity, or we must admit, at last, some sense percipient of itself; but if so, it is more reasonable to admit this in the original sense at once.' (*De Anima*, L. iii. c. 2. text. 136.) Here Aristotle ought not to be supposed to mean that every sense is an independent faculty of perception, and, as such, conscious of itself. Compare *De Som. et Vig.* c. 2. and *Probl.* (if indeed his) sect. xi. § 33. His older commentators—Alexander, Themistius, Simplicius—follow their master. Philoponus and Michael Ephesius desert his doctrine, and attribute this self-consciousness to a peculiar faculty which they call Attention (*τὸ προσεκτικόν*). This is the earliest example we know of this false analysis, which, when carried to its last absurdity, has given us *consciousness*, and *attention*, and *reflection*, as distinct powers. Of the schoolmen, *satis est silere, quam parum dicere*. Nemesius, and Plutarchus of Athens preserved by Philoponus, accord this reflex consciousness to *intellect* as opposed to *sense*. Plato varies in his *Theatetus* and *Charmides*. Some, however, of the Greek commentators on Aristotle, as I have elsewhere observed, introduced the term *Συναισθησις*, employing it, by extension, for consciousness in general.

consequently a *real*, knowledge of external things is impossible. But this by anticipation.

This leads us to the *second* error,—the non-distinction of *representative* from *presentative* or *intuitive* knowledge.¹ The reduction of consciousness to a special faculty, involved this confusion. For had Reid perceived that all our faculties are only consciousness, and that consciousness as an immediate knowledge is only of the present and actual, he would also have discovered that the *past* and *possible*, either could not be known to us at all, or could be known only *in* and *through* the present and actual, i. e. *mediately*. But a mediate knowledge is necessarily a *representative* knowledge. For if the present, or actual *in* itself, makes known to us the past and possible *through* itself, this can only be done by a vicarious substitution or representation. And as the knowledge of the *past* is given in *memory* (using that term in its vulgar universality), and that of the *possible* in *imagination*, these two faculties are powers of representative knowledge. Memory is an immediate knowledge of a *present* thought, involving an absolute belief that this thought represents another act of knowledge that *has been*. Imagination (which we use in its widest signification, to include conception or simple apprehension) is an immediate knowledge of an *actual* thought, which, as not subjectively self-contradictory (*i. e.* logically possible), involves the hypothetical belief that it objectively *may be* (*i. e.* is really possible).

Nor is philosophy here at variance with nature.² The learned

¹ See Part Second, chapter ii. pp. 239–260.—*W.*

² ‘The term *Nature*,’ says Hamilton (Reid, p. 216), ‘is used sometimes in a wider, sometimes in a narrower extension. When employed in its most extensive meaning, it embraces the two worlds of mind and matter. When employed in its more restricted signification, it is a synonym for the latter only, and is then used in contradistinction to the former. In the Greek philosophy, the word φύσις was general in its meaning; and the great branch of philosophy styled “*physical* or *physiological*,” included under it not only the sciences of matter, but also those of mind. With us, the term *Nature* is more vaguely extensive than the terms, *physics*, *physical*, *physiology*, *physiological*, or even than the adjective *natural*; whereas, in the philosophy of Germany, *Natur*, and its correlatives, whether of Greek or Latin derivation,

and unlearned agree, that in memory and imagination, naught of which we are conscious lies beyond the sphere of self, and that in these acts the *object known is only relative to a reality supposed to be*. Nothing but Reid's superstitious horror of the ideal theory, could have blinded him so far as not to see that these faculties are, of necessity, mediate and representative. In this, however, he not only over-shot the truth, but almost frustrated his whole philosophy. For, he thus affords a ground (and the only ground, though not perceived by Brown), on which it could be argued that his doctrine of perception was *not intuitive*—was *not presentative*. For if he reject the doctrine of ideas not less in memory and imagination, which *must* be representative faculties, than in perception, which *may* be intuitive, and if he predicate *immediate knowledge* equally of all; it can plausibly be contended, in favor of Brown's conclusion, that Reid did not really intend to allow a proper intuitive or presentative perception, and that he only abusively gave the name of immediate knowledge to the simplest form of the representative theory, in contradistinction to the more complex. But this also by anticipation.

There exists, therefore, a distinction of knowledge,—as *immediate, intuitive, or presentative*, and as *mediate or representative*.—

are, in general, expressive of the world of matter in contrast to the world of intelligence.'

'Nature,' says the great Pascal, 'confounds the Pyrrhonians, and Reason confounds the Dogmatists.'

'Nature,' says Hume, (Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, § 12, part ii.), 'is always too strong for principle; and, though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings, the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same in every point of action and speculation with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act, and reason, and believe, though they are not able, by their most diligent inquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of the operations, or to remove the objections which may be raised against them.'—*W.*

The former is logically *simple*, as only contemplative: the latter logically complex, as both representative and contemplative of the representation.—In the one, the *object is single*, and the word univocal: in the other it is double, and the term æquivocal; the object known and representing, being different from the object unknown and represented.—The knowledge in an intuitive act, as convertible with existence, is *assertory*; and the reality of its *only* object is given unconditionally, as a *fact*: the knowledge in a representative act, as not convertible with existence is *problematical*; and the reality of its principal object is given hypothetically as an *inference*.—Representative knowledge is purely *subjective*, for its object known is always *ideal*; presentative may be either subjective or objective, for its one object may be either ideal or material.—Considered in *themselves*: an intuitive cognition is complete, as absolute and irrespective of aught beyond the compass of knowledge; a representative incomplete, as relative to a transcendent something, beyond the sphere of consciousness.—Considered in relation to their *objects*: the former is complete, its object being known and real; the latter incomplete, its object known, being unreal, and its real object unknown.—Considered in relation to *each other*: immediate knowledge is complete, as all sufficient in itself; mediate incomplete, as realized only through the other.*

* This distinction of intuitive or presentative and of representative knowledge, overlooked, or rather abolished, in the theories of modern philosophy, is correspondent to the division of knowledge by certain of the schoolmen, into *intuitive* and *abstractive*. By the latter term, they also expressed *abstract* knowledge in its present signification.—‘Cognitio *intuitiva*,’ says the *Doctor Resolutissimus*, ‘est illa quæ immediate tendit ad rem sibi *præsentem* objective, *secundum ejus actualem existentiam*; sicut eum video colorem existentem in pariete, vel rosam, quam in manu teneo. *Abstractiva*, dicitur omnis cognitio, quæ habetur de re *non sic realiter præsentem* in ratione objecti *immediate* cogniti.’ Now, when with a knowledge of this distinction of which Reid was ignorant, and rejecting equally with him not only species but a representative perception, we say that *many of the schoolmen* have, in this respect, left behind them all modern philosophers; we assert a paradox, but one which we are easily able to prove. Leibnitz spoke truly, when he said—‘*Aurum latere in stercore illo scholastico barbarici.*’

So far there is no difficulty, or ought to have been none. The past and possible can only be known mediately by representation. But a more arduous, at least a more perplexed question arises, when we ask :—Is all knowledge of the present or actual intuitive? *Is the knowledge of mind and matter equally immediate?*

In regard to the immediate knowledge of *mind*, there is *now* at least no difficulty; it is admitted not to be representative. The problem, therefore, exclusively regards the intuitive perception of the qualities of *matter*.

(To obviate misapprehension, we may here parenthetically observe, that all we *do* intuitively know of self,—all that we *may* intuitively know of not-self, is only *relative*.¹ Existence *absolutely and in itself*, is to us as zero; and while nothing *is*, so nothing is *known* to us, except those phases of being which stand in analogy to our faculties of knowledge. These we call *qualities, phenomena, properties, &c.* When we say, therefore, that a thing is *known in itself*, we mean only that it stands face to face, in direct and immediate relation to the conscious mind; in other words, that, *as existing*, its phenomena form part of the circle of our knowledge,—exist, *since* they are known, and are known *because* they exist.)

If we interrogate consciousness concerning the point in question, the response is categorical and clear. When I concentrate my attention in the simplest act of perception, I return from my observation with the most irresistible conviction of *two* facts, or rather, two branches of the *same* fact,—that *I am*,—and that *something different from me exists*. In this act, I am conscious of myself as the perceiving subject, and of an external reality as the object perceived; and I am conscious of both existences in the same indivisible amount of intuition. The knowledge of the subject does not precede or follow the knowledge of the object;—neither determines, neither is determined by, the other. The

¹ See Part Third, Philosophy of the Conditioned.—*W.*

two terms of correlation stand in mutual counterpoise and equal independence; they are given as connected in the synthesis of knowledge, but as contrasted in the antithesis of existence.

Such is the fact of perception revealed in consciousness, and as it determines mankind in general in their equal assurance of the reality of an external world, and of the existence of their own minds. *Consciousness declares our knowledge of material qualities to be intuitive.* Nor is the fact, as given, denied even by those who disallow its truth. So clear is the deliverance, that even the philosophers (as we shall hereafter see) who reject an intuitive perception, find it impossible not to admit, that their doctrine stands decidedly opposed to the voice of consciousness and the natural conviction of mankind. [This doctrine is, however, to be asserted only in subordination to the distinction of the *Primary, Secundo-primary, and Secondary Qualities of Matter.*¹]

According as the truth of the fact of consciousness in perception is *entirely* accepted, accepted *in part*, or *wholly* rejected, six possible and actual systems of philosophy result. We say explicitly—the *truth* of the fact. For the fact, as a phenomenon of consciousness cannot be doubted; since to doubt that we are conscious of this or that is impossible. The doubt, as itself a phenomena of consciousness, would annihilate itself.²

1. If the veracity of consciousness be unconditionally admitted, —if the intuitive knowledge of mind and matter, and the consequent reality of their antithesis be taken as truths, to be explained if possible, but in themselves are held as paramount to all doubt, the doctrine is established which we would call the scheme of *Natural Realism* or *Natural Dualism*.—2. If the veracity of consciousness be allowed to the equipoise of the object and subject in the act, but rejected as to the reality of their antithesis, the system of *Absolute Identity* emerges, which reduces both mind and matter to phenomenal modifications of the same common substance.—3 and 4. If the testimony of consciousness

¹ See Part Second, chapter v.—*W.*

² See Part Second, chapter iii.—*W.*

be refused to the co-originality and reciprocal independence of the subject and object, two schemes are determined, according as the one or the other of the terms is placed as the original and genetic. Is the object educed from the subject, *Idealism*; is the subject educed from the object, *Materialism*, is the result.—5. Again, is the consciousness itself recognized only as a phenomenon, and the substantial reality of both subject and object denied, the issue is *Nihilism*.

6. These systems are all conclusions from an original interpretation of the fact of consciousness in perception, carried intrepidly forth to its legitimate issue. But there is one scheme, which, violating the integrity of this fact, and, with the complete idealist, regarding the object of consciousness in perception as only a modification of the percipient subject, or, at least, a phenomenon numerically different from the object it represents,—endeavors, however, to stop short of the negation of an external world, the reality of which and the knowledge of whose reality, it seeks by various hypotheses, to establish and explain. This scheme, which we would term *Cosmothetic Idealism*, *Hypothetical Realism*, or *Hypothetical Dualism*,—although the most inconsequent of all systems, has been embraced, under various forms, by the immense majority of philosophers.¹

Of these systems, Dr. Brown adheres to the last. He holds that the mind *is conscious or immediately cognizant of nothing beyond its subjective states*; but he assumes the existence of an external world beyond the sphere of consciousness, exclusively on the ground of our irresistible belief in its unknown reality. Independent of this belief, there is no reasoning on which the existence of matter can be vindicated; the logic of the idealist he admits to be unassailable.

But Brown not only embraces the scheme of hypothetical realism himself, he never suspects that Reid entertained any other doctrine. Brown's transmutation of Reid from a *natural* to a

¹ See page 292, *infra*.—W.

hypothetical realist, as a misconception of the grand and distinctive tenet of a school, by one even of its disciples, is without a parallel in the whole history of philosophy: and this portentous error is prolific; *Chimæra chimæram parit*. Were the evidence of the mistake less unambiguous, we should be disposed rather to question our own perspicacity, than to tax so subtle an intellect with so gross a blunder.

Before establishing against his antagonist the true opinion of Reid, it will be proper first to generalize the *possible forms under which the hypothesis of a representative perception* can be realized, as a confusion of some of these as actually held, on the part both of Reid and Brown, has tended to introduce no small confusion into the discussion.

The hypothetical realist contends, that he is wholly ignorant of *things in themselves*, and that these are known to him, only through a vicarious phenomenon, of which he is conscious in perception;

‘—*Rerumque ignarus, Imagire gaudet.*’

In other words, that the object immediately known and representing is numerically different from the object really existing and represented. Now this vicarious phenomenon, or immediate object, must *either* be numerically different from the percipient intellect, *or* a modification of that intellect itself. If the latter, it must, again, *either* be a modification of the thinking substance, with a transcendent existence beyond the act of thought, *or* a modification identical with the act of perception itself.

All possible forms of the representative hypothesis are thus reduced to three, and these have all been actually maintained.

1. *The representative object not a modification of mind.*
2. *The representative object a modification of mind, dependent for its apprehension, but not for its existence, on the act of consciousness.*
3. *The representative object a modification of mind, non-existent out of consciousness;—the idea and its perception only different relations of an act (state) really identical.*

In the *first*, the various opinions touching the nature and origin of the representative object; whether material, immaterial, or between both; whether physical or hyperphysical; whether propagated from the external object or generated in the medium; whether fabricated by the intelligent soul or in the animal life; whether infused by God, or angels, or identical with the divine substance:—these afford in the history of philosophy so many subordinate modifications of this form of the hypothesis. In the *two latter*, the subaltern theories have been determined by the difficulty to connect the representation with the reality, in a relation of causal dependence; and while some philosophers have left it altogether unexplained, the others have been compelled to resort to the hyperphysical theories of divine assistance and a pre-established harmony. Under the *second*, opinions have varied, whether the representative object be innate or factitious.

The *third* of these forms of representation Reid does not seem to have understood. The illusion which made him view, in his doctrine, memory and imagination as powers of *immediate* knowledge, though only *representative* faculties, under the *third* form, has, in the history of opinions regarding perception, puzzled him, as we shall see, in his exposition of the doctrine of Arnauld. He was not aware that there was a theory, neither identical with an intuitive perception, nor with the *first* or *second* form of the representative hypothesis; with both of which he was sufficiently acquainted. Dr. Brown, on the contrary, who adopts the *third* and simplest modification of that hypothesis, appears ignorant of its discrimination from the *second*; and accordingly views the philosophers who held this latter form, as not distinguished in opinion from himself. Of the doctrine of *intuition* he does not seem almost to have conceived the possibility.

These being premised, we proceed to consider the greatest of all Brown's errors, in itself and in its consequences,—his miscon-

¹ See below, chapter iii. Various Theories of External Perception.—*W*.

ception of the cardinal position of Reid's philosophy, in supposing that philosopher as a *hypothetical* realist, to hold with himself the *third* form of the *representative* hypothesis, and not, as a *natural* realist, the doctrine of an *intuitive* perception.¹

In the *first* place, *knowledge* and *existence* are then only convertible when the reality is known *in itself*; for then only can we say, that it is known *because* it exists, and exists *since* it is known. And this constitutes an *immediate, presentative, or intuitive* cognition, rigorously so called. Nor did Reid contemplate any other. 'It seems admitted,' he says, 'as a first principle, by the learned and the unlearned, that *what is really perceived must exist*, and that to *perceive what does not exist is impossible*. So far the unlearned man and the philosopher agree.'—(*Essays on the Intellectual Powers*, p. 142.)

In the *second* place, philosophers agree, that the *idea* or representative object in their theory, is in the strictest sense *immediately perceived*. And so Reid understands them. 'I perceive not, says the Cartesian, the external object itself (so far he agrees with the Peripatetic, and *differs from the unlearned man*); but I perceive an image, or form, or idea, in my own mind, or in my brain. *I am certain of the existence of the idea; because I immediately perceive it.*' (L. c.)

In the *third* place, philosophers concur in acknowledging, that *mankind at large* believe, that the *external reality itself* constitutes the *immediate and only object of perception*—So also Reid. 'On the same principle, the unlearned man says, *I perceive the external object*, and *I perceive it to exist.*' (L. c.)—'The vulgar undoubtedly believe, that it is the *external object* which we *immediately perceive*, and not a representative image of it only. It is *for this reason*, that they look upon it as *perfect lunacy to call in question the existence of external objects.*' (L. c.)—'The vulgar are firmly persuaded, that the *very identical objects which they perceive* continue to exist when they do not perceive them; and

¹ See Part Second, chapter iii. § 2.—W.

are no less firmly persuaded, that when ten men look at the sun or the moon they all see the *same individual object*.' (P. 166.)—Speaking of Berkeley: 'The vulgar opinion he reduces to this, that the *very things which we perceive* by our senses do *really exist*. This he *grants*.' (P. 165.)—'It is therefore acknowledged by this philosopher (Hume) to be a natural instinct or prepossession, a universal and primary opinion of all men, that the objects which we *immediately perceive*, by our senses, are *not images in our minds*, but *external objects*, and that their existence is independent of us and our perception.' (P. 201. See also pp. 143, 198, 199, 200, 206.)

In these circumstances, if Reid: either 1°,—maintains, that his immediate perception of external things is convertible with their reality; or 2°,—asserts that in his doctrine of perception, the external reality stands to the percipient mind face to face, in the same immediacy of relation which the idea holds in the representative theory of the philosophers; or 3°,—declares the identity of his own opinion with the vulgar belief, as thus expounded by himself and the philosophers:—he could not more emphatically proclaim himself a *natural realist*, and his doctrine of perception, as intended, at least, a *doctrine of intuition*. And he does *all three*.

The first and second.—'We have before examined the reasons given by philosophers to prove that ideas, and not external objects, are the immediate objects of perception. We shall only here observe, THAT IF EXTERNAL OBJECTS BE PERCEIVED IMMEDIATELY' [and he had just before asserted for the hundredth time that they were so perceived], 'WE HAVE THE SAME REASON TO BELIEVE THEIR EXISTENCE, AS PHILOSOPHERS HAVE TO BELIEVE THE EXISTENCE OF IDEAS, WHILE THEY HOLD THEM TO BE THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION.' (P. 589. See also pp. 118, 138.)

The third.—Speaking of the perception of the external world—'We have here a remarkable conflict between two contradictory opinions, wherein all mankind are engaged. On the one side

stand *all the vulgar*, who are unpractised in philosophical researches, and guided by the uncorrupted primary instincts of nature. On the other side, stand *all the philosophers, ancient and modern; every man, without exception, who reflects*. IN THIS DIVISION, TO MY GREAT HUMILIATION, I FIND MYSELF CLASSED WITH THE VULGAR.' (P. 207.)

Various other proofs of the same conclusion, could be adduced; these, for brevity, we omit.—Brown's interpretation of the fundamental tenet of Reid's philosophy is, therefore, not a simple misconception, but an absolute reversal of its real and even unambiguous import. [This is too strong.¹]

But the ground on which Brown vindicates his interpretation, is not unworthy of the interpretation itself. The possibility of an intuition beyond the sphere of self, he can hardly be said to have contemplated; but on one occasion, Reid's language seems, for a moment, to have actually suggested to him the question:—Might that philosopher not possibly regard the material object, as identical with the object of consciousness in perception?—On what ground does he reject the affirmative as absurd? His reasoning is to this effect:—*To assert an intuitive perception of matter, is to assert an identity of matter and mind (for an immediacy of knowledge is convertible with a unity of existence); But Reid was a sturdy dualist: Therefore he could not maintain an immediate perception of the qualities of matter.* (Lect. xxv. pp. 159, 160.) In this syllogism, the major is a mere *petitio principii*, which Brown has not attempted to prove; and which, as tried by the standard of all philosophical truth, is not only false, but even the converse of the truth; while, admitting its accuracy, it cannot be so connected with the minor, as to legitimate the conclusion.

If we appeal to consciousness, consciousness gives, even in the last analysis,—in the unity of knowledge, a *duality of existence*; and peremptorily falsifies Brown's assumption, that *not-self, as known, is identical with self as knowing*. Reid therefore, as a

¹See p. 278, below.—W.

dualist, and on the supreme authority of consciousness, might safely maintain the immediacy of perception ;—nay, as a dualist Reid *could not*, consistently, have adopted the opinion which Brown argues, that, as a dualist, he *must* be regarded to have held. Mind and matter exist to us only in their qualities ; and these qualities exist to us only as they are known by us, *i. e.*, as phenomena. It is thus merely from *knowledge* that we can infer *existence*, and only from the supposed repugnance or compatibility of *phenomena*, within our experience, are we able to ascend to the transcendent difference or identity of *substances*. Now, on the hypothesis that all we immediately know, is only a state or modification or quality or phenomenon of the cognitive subject itself,—how can we contend, that the phenomena of mind and matter, *known* only as modifications of the *same* must be the modifications of *different substances* ;—nay, that only on this hypothesis of their substantial unity in knowledge, can their substantial duality in existence be maintained ?● But of this again.

Brown's assumption has no better foundation than the exaggeration of a crotchet of philosophers ; which, though contrary to the evidence of consciousness, and consequently not only *without* but *against* all evidence, has yet exerted a more extensive and important influence, than any principle in the whole history of philosophy. This subject deserves a volume ; we can only afford it a few sentences.—Some philosophers (as Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, Alcmaeon) maintained that knowledge implied even a *contrariety* of subject and object. But since the time of Empedocles, no opinion has been more universally admitted, than that the *relation of knowledge* inferred the *analogy of existence*. This analogy may be supposed in two potences. What knows and what is known, are either 1°, *similar*, or, 2°, the *same* ; and if the general principle be true, the latter is the more philosophical. This principle it was, which immediately determined the whole doctrine of a representative perception. Its lower potency is seen in the *intentional species* of the schools, and in the *ideas* of Malebranche and Berkeley ; its higher in the *gnostic reasons* of

the Platonists, in the *pre-existing species* of Avicenna and the Arabians, in the *ideas* of Descartes and Leibnitz, in the *phenomena* of Kant, and in the *external states* of Dr. Brown. It mediately determined the *hierarchical gradation of faculties or souls* of the Aristotelians,—the *vehicular media* of the Platonists,—the theories of a *common intellect* of Alexander, Themistius, Averroes, Cajetanus, and Zabarella,—the *vision in the Deity* of Malebranche,—and the Cartesian and Leibnitian doctrines of *assistance* and *predetermined harmony*. To no other origin is to be ascribed the *refusal of the fact of consciousness in its primitive duality*; and the unitarian systems of *identity, materialism, idealism*, are the result.

But however universal and omnipotent this principle may have been, Reid was at once too ignorant of opinions, to be much in danger from authority, and too independent a thinker, to accept so baseless a fancy as a fact. ‘Mr. Norris,’ says he, ‘is the only author I have met with who professedly puts the question, Whether material things can be perceived by us *immediately*? He has offered four arguments to show that they cannot. First, Material objects are without the mind, and therefore there can be no *union* between the object and the percipient. Answer—This argument is lame, until it is shown to be necessary, that in perception there should be an union between the object and the percipient. Second, *material objects are disproportioned to the mind, and removed from it by the whole diameter of Being*.—This argument I cannot answer, because *I do not understand it*.’¹ (*Essays, I. P.* p. 202.)

¹ ‘This confession would, of itself, prove how superficially Reid was versed in the literature of philosophy. Norris’s second argument is only the statement of a principle generally assumed by philosophers—that the relation of knowledge infers a correspondence of nature between the subject knowing, and the object known. This principle has perhaps, exerted a more extensive influence on speculation than any other; and yet it has not been proved, and is incapable of proof—nay, is contradicted by the evidence of consciousness itself. To trace the influence of this assumption would be, in fact, in a certain sort, to write the history of philosophy; for, though this influence

The principle, that the relation of knowledge implies an analogy of existence, admitted without examination in almost every school, but which Reid, with an ignorance wiser than knowledge,

has never yet been historically developed, it would be easy to show that the belief, explicit or implicit, that what knows and what is immediately known must be of an analogous nature, lies at the root of almost every theory of cognition, from the very earliest to the very latest speculations. In the more ancient philosophy of Greece, three philosophers (Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, and Alcmaeon) are found, who professed the opposite doctrine—that the condition of knowledge lies in the contrariety, in the natural antithesis, of subject and object. Aristotle, likewise, in his treatise *On the Soul*, expressly condemns the prevalent opinion, that the similar is only cognizable by the similar; but, in his *Nicomachian Ethics*, he reverts to the doctrine which, in the former work, he had rejected. With these exceptions, no principle, since the time of Empedocles, by whom it seems first to have been explicitly announced, has been more universally received, than this—that the *relation of knowledge* infers an *analogy of existence*. This analogy may be of two degrees. *What knows*, and *what is known*, may be either *similar* or the *same*; and, if the principle itself be admitted, the latter alternative is the more philosophical. Without entering on details, I may here notice some of the more remarkable results of this principle, in both its degrees. The general principle, not, indeed, exclusively, but mainly, determined the admission of a representative perception, by disallowing the possibility of any consciousness, or immediate knowledge of matter, by a nature so different from it as mind; and, in its two degrees, it determined the various hypotheses, by which it was attempted to explain the possibility of a representative or mediate perception of the external world. To this principle, in its lower potency—that what knows must be *similar* in nature to what is immediately known—we owe the *intentional species* of the Aristotelians, and the *ideas* of Malebranche and Berkeley. From this principle, in its higher potency—that what knows must be *identical* in nature with what is immediately known—there flow the *gnostic reasons* of the Platonists, the *pre-existing forms*, or *species* of Theophrastus and Themistius, of Adelandus and Avicenna, the (mental) *ideas* of Descartes and Arnauld, the *representations*, *sensual ideas*, &c., of Leibnitz and Wolf, the *phenomena* of Kant, the *states* of Brown, and (shall we say?) the vacillating doctrine of perception held by Reid himself. Mediately this principle was the origin of many other famous theories:—of the hierarchical gradation of souls or faculties of the Aristotelians; of the vehicular media of the Platonists; of the hypotheses of a common intellect of Alexander, Themistius, Averroes, Cajetanus, and Zabarella; of the vision in the deity of Malebranche; and of the Cartesian and Leibnitzian doctrines of assistance and pre-established harmony. Finally, to this principle is to be ascribed the refusal of the evidence of consciousness to the primary fact the duality of its perception; and the unitarian schemes of Absolute Identity, Materialism, and Idealism, are the results.' Reid, p. 300.—IV.

confesses he does not understand ; is nothing more than an irrational attempt to explain, what is, in itself, inexplicable. How the similar or the same is conscious of itself, is not a whit less inconceivable, than how one contrary is immediately percipient of another. It at best only removes our admitted ignorance by one step back ; and then, in place of our knowledge simply originating from the *incomprehensible*, it ostentatiously departs from the *absurd*.

The slightest criticism is sufficient to manifest the futility of that hypothesis of representation, which Brown would substitute for Reid's presentative perception ;—although this hypothesis, under various modifications, be almost coextensive with the history of philosophy. In fact, it fulfils none of the conditions of a *legitimate* hypothesis.

In the *first* place, it is *unnecessary*.—It cannot show, that the fact of an intuitive perception, as given in consciousness, ought not to be accepted ; it is unable therefore to vindicate its own necessity, in order to explain the possibility of our knowledge of external things.—That we cannot show forth, *how* the mind is capable of knowing something different from self, is no reason to doubt *that* it is so capable. Every *how* ($\delta\acute{\iota}\omega\tau\iota$) rests ultimately on a *that* ($\tilde{\omega}\tau\iota$) ; every demonstration is deduced from something *given* and *indemonstrable* ; all that is comprehensible, hangs from some *revealed fact*, which we *must believe as actual*, but, *cannot construe to the reflective intellect in its possibility*. In consciousness,—in the original spontaneity of intelligence ($\nu\omicron\tilde{\omega}\tilde{\nu}\zeta$, *locus principiorum*), are revealed the primordial facts of our intelligent nature. Consciousness is the fountain of all comprehensibility and illustration ; but *as such*, cannot be itself illustrated or comprehended. To ask how any fact of consciousness is possible, is to ask how consciousness itself is possible ; and to ask how consciousness is possible, is to ask how a being intelligent like man is possible. Could we answer this, the Serpent had not tempted Eve by an hyperbole :—‘ We should be as Gods.’ But as we did not create ourselves, and are not even in the secret of our creation ; we

must take our existence, our knowledge *upon trust*: and that philosophy is the only true, because in it alone *can* truth be realized, which does not revolt against the *authority* of our natural *beliefs*.

‘The voice of Nature is the voice of God.’

To ask, therefore, a *reason* for the possibility of our intuition of external things, above the *fact* of its reality, as given in our perceptive consciousness, betrays, as Aristotle has truly said, an *imbecility of the reasoning principle itself*:—‘Τούτου ζητεῖν λόγον, ἀφέντας τὴν αἴσθησι, ἀρρώστια τίς ἐστὶ διανοίας.’ The natural realist, who accepts this intuition, cannot, certainly, explain it, because, as ultimate, it is a fact inexplicable. Yet, with Hudibras:

‘He knows *what’s what*; and that’s as high
As metaphysic wit can fly.’

But the hypothetical realist—the cosmothetic idealist, who rejects a consciousness of aught beyond the mind, cannot require of the natural realist an explanation of how such a consciousness is possible, until he himself shall have explained, what is even less conceivable, the possibility of *representing* (i. e. of *knowing*) the *unknown*. Till then, each founds on the *incomprehensible*; but the former admits the veracity, the latter postulates the falsehood of that principle, which can alone confer on this incomprehensible foundation the character of truth. The natural realist, whose watchword is—*The facts of consciousness, the whole facts, and nothing but the facts*, has therefore naught to fear from his antagonist, so long as consciousness cannot be explained nor redargued from without. If his system be to fall, it falls only with philosophy; for it can only be disproved, by proving the mendacity of consciousness—of that faculty,

‘Quæ nisi sit veri, ratio quoque falsa fit omnis;’
(‘Which unless true, all reason turns a lie.’)

This leads us to the *second* violation of the laws of a legitimate hypothesis;—the doctrine of a representative perception *annihilates itself*, in subverting the universal edifice of knowledge.—Belying the testimony of consciousness to our immediate percep-

tion of an outer world, it belies the veracity of consciousness altogether. But the truth¹ of consciousness, is the condition of the possibility of all knowledge. The first act of hypothetical realism, is thus an act of suicide; philosophy, thereafter, is at best but an enchanted corpse, awaiting only the exorcism of the skeptic, to relapse into its proper nothingness.—But of this we shall have occasion to treat at large, in exposing Brown's misprision of the argument from common sense.

In the *third* place, it is the condition of a legitimate hypothesis, that the *fact or facts* for which it is excogitated to account, be not *themselves hypothetical*.—But so far is the principal fact, which the hypothesis of a representative perception is proposed to explain, from being certain; its reality is even rendered problematical by the proposed explanation itself. The facts, about which this hypothesis is conversant, are two: the fact of the *mental modification*, and the fact of the *material reality*. The problem to be solved is their connection; and the hypothesis of *representation* is advanced, as the ratio of their correlation, in supposing that the former *as known* is vicarious of the latter *as existing*. There is, however, here a see-saw between the hypothesis and the fact: the fact is assumed as an hypothesis; and the hypothesis explained as a fact; each is established, each is expounded, by the other. To account for the possibility of an unknown external world, the hypothesis of representation is devised; and to account for the possibility of representation, we imagine the hypothesis of an external world. Nothing could be more easy than to demonstrate, that on this supposition, the fact of the external reality is not only petitory but improbable. This, however, we are relieved from doing, by Dr. Brown's own admission, that '*the skeptical argument for the non-existence of an external world, as a mere play of reasoning, admits of no reply*;' and we shall afterwards prove, that the only ground on which he attempts to vindicate this existence (the ground of our natural

¹ See Part First, *passim*.—*W*.

belief in its reality), is one, not competent to the hypothetical realist. We shall see, that if this belief be true, the *hypothesis* itself is superseded; if false, that there is no *fact* for the hypothesis to explain.

In the *fourth* place, a legitimate hypothesis must account for the phenomenon, about which it is conversant, adequately and without violence, in all its dependencies, relations, and peculiarities. But the hypothesis in question, only accomplishes its end,—nay, only vindicates its utility, by a mutilation, or, more properly, by the *destruction and re-creation*, of the very phenomenon for the nature of which it would account. The *entire* phenomenon to be explained by the supposition of a representative perception, is the fact given in consciousness, of *the immediate knowledge or intuition of an existence different from self*. This simple phenomenon it hews down into two fragments; into the *existence* and the *intuition*. The existence of external things, which is given only *through* their intuition, it admits; the intuition itself, though the *ratio cognoscendi*, and *to us* therefore the *ratio essendi* of their reality, it rejects. But to annihilate what is prior and constitutive in the phenomenon, is, in truth, to annihilate the phenomenon altogether. The existence of an external world, which the hypothesis proposes to explain, is no longer even a truncated fact of consciousness; for the *existence given in consciousness*, necessarily fell with the intuition on which it reposed. A representative perception, is therefore, an hypothetical explanation of a *supposititious* fact: it creates the nature it interprets. And in this respect, of all the varieties of the representative hypothesis, the *third*, or that which views in the object known a modification of thought itself, most violently outrages the phenomenon of consciousness it would explain. And this is Brown's. The *first*, saves the phenomenon of consciousness in so far as it preserves always the numerical, if not always the substantial, difference between the object perceived and the percipient *mind*. The *second* does not violate at least the antithesis of the object perceived and the percipient *act*. But in the *third* or simplest form of repre-

sentation, not only is the object known, denied to be itself the reality existing, as consciousness attests; this object revealed as not-self, is identified with the mental *ego*; nay, even, though given as permanent, with the *transient energy of thought* itself.

In the *fifth* place, the *fact*, which a legitimate hypothesis is devised to explain, *must be within the sphere of experience*. The fact, however, for which that of a representative perception accounts (the existence of external things), transcends, *ex hypothesi*, all experience; it is the object of no real knowledge, but a bare *ens rationis*—a mere hyperphysical chimera.

In the *sixth* and last place, an *hypothesis itself* is probable *in proportion as it works simply and naturally*; that is in proportion as it is dependent on no subsidiary hypothesis, and as it involves nothing, petitory, occult, supernatural, as an element of its explanation. In this respect, the doctrine of a representative perception is not less vicious than in others. To explain at all, it must not only postulate *subsidiary hypotheses*, but *subsidiary miracles*. The doctrine in question attempts to explain the *knowledge of an unknown world*, by the ratio of a representative perception: but it is impossible by any conceivable relation, to apply the ratio to the facts. The mental modification, of which, on the doctrine of representation, we are exclusively conscious in perception, either *represents* (*i. e.* affords a mediate knowledge of) a real external world, or it does not. (We say *only the reality*; to include all systems from Kant's, who does not predicate even an existence in *space* and *time* of *things in themselves*, to Locke's, who supposes the transcendent reality to *resemble* its idea, at least in the *primary qualities*.) Now, the latter alternative is an affirmation of absolute Idealism; we have, therefore, at present only to consider the former. And here, the mind either *knows* the reality of what it represents, or it does not. On the *prior* alternative, the hypothesis under discussion would annihilate itself, in annihilating the ground of its utility. For as the *end* of representation is knowledge; and as the hypothesis of a representative perception is only required on the supposed impossibility of that

presentative knowledge of external things, which consciousness affirms:—if the mind is admitted to be cognizant of the outer reality in itself, previous to representation, the *end* towards which the hypothesis was devised as a *mean*, has been already accomplished; and the possibility of an intuitive perception, as given in consciousness, is allowed. Nor is the hypothesis only absurd, as superfluous. It is worse. For the mind would, in this case, be supposed to *know before it knew*; or, like the crazy Pentheus, to *see its objects double*,—

(‘Et solem geminum et duplices se ostendere Thebas’);

and, if these absurdities be eschewed, then is the *identity of mind and self*,—of *consciousness and knowledge*, abolished; and *my intellect* knows, what *I* am not conscious of it knowing! The *other* alternative remains:—that the mind is *blindly* determined to *represent*, and *truly* to represent, the reality which it does not know. And here the mind either *blindly determines itself*, or is *blindly determined by an extrinsic and intelligent cause*. The former lemma is the more philosophical, in so far as it assumes nothing hyperphysical; but it is otherwise utterly irrational, inasmuch as it would explain an effect, by a cause wholly inadequate to its production. On this alternative, knowledge is supposed to be the effect of ignorance,—intelligence of stupidity,—life of death. We are necessarily ignorant, ultimately at least, of the mode in which causation operates; but we know at least, that no effect arises without a cause—and a cause proportionate to its existence. The absurdity of this supposition has accordingly constrained the profoundest cosmthetic idealists, notwithstanding their rational abhorrence of a supernatural assumption, to embrace the second alternative. To say nothing of less illustrious schemes, the systems of Divine Assistance, of a Pre-established Harmony, and of the Vision of all things in the Deity, are only so many subsidiary hypotheses,—so many attempts to bridge, by supernatural machinery, the chasm between the *representation* and the *reality*, which all human ingenuity had found, by natural

means, to be insuperable. The hypothesis of a representative perception, thus presupposes a *miracle* to let it work. Dr. Brown, indeed, rejects as unphilosophical, those hyperphysical subsidies. But he only saw less clearly than their illustrious authors, the necessity which required them. It is a poor philosophy that eschews the *Deus ex machina*, and yet ties the knot which is only soluble by his interposition. It is not unphilosophical to assume a miracle, if a miracle be necessary; but it is unphilosophical to originate the necessity itself. And here the hypothetical realist cannot pretend, that the difficulty is of nature's, not of his creation. In fact it only arises, *because* he has closed his eyes upon the light of nature, and refused the guidance of consciousness: but having swamped himself in following the *ignis fatuus* of a theory, he has no right to refer its private absurdities to the imbecility of human reason; or to generalize his own factitious ignorance, by a *Quantum est quod nescimus!* The difficulty of the problem Dr. Brown has not perceived; or perceiving, has not ventured to state,—far less attempted to remove. He has essayed, indeed, to *cut* the knot, which he was unable to *loose*; but we shall find, in the sequel, that his summary postulate of the reality of an external world, on the ground of our belief in its existence, is, in his hands, of all unfortunate attempts, perhaps the most unsuccessful.

The scheme of Natural Realism (which it is Reid's honor to have been the first, among not forgotten philosophers, virtually and intentionally, at least, to embrace) is thus the only system, on which the truth of consciousness and the possibility of knowledge can be vindicated; whilst the Hypothetical Realist, in his effort to be 'wise above knowledge,' like the dog in the fable, loses the substance, in attempting to realize the shadow. '*Les hommes*' (says Leibnitz, with a truth of which he was not himself aware),—'*les hommes cherchent ce qu'ils savent, et ne savent pas ce qu'ils cherchent.*'

That the doctrine of an *intuitive* perception is not without its difficulties, we allow; but these do not affect its possibility, and

may in a great measure be removed by a more sedulous examination of the phenomena. The distinction of *perception proper* from *sensation proper*; in other words, of the *objective* from the *subjective* in this act, Reid, after other philosophers, has already turned to good account; but his analysis would have been still more successful, had he discovered the law which universally governs their manifestation:—*That Perception and Sensation, the objective and subjective, though both always coexistent, are always in the inverse ratio of each other.* But on this matter we cannot at present enter.¹

Dr. Brown is not only wrong in regard to Reid's own doctrine; he is wrong, even admitting his interpretation of that philosopher to be true, in charging him with a 'series of wonderful misconceptions,' in regard to the opinions universally prevalent touching the nature of ideas. We shall not argue the case upon the *higher ground*, that Reid, as a natural realist, could not be *philosophically* out, in assailing the hypothesis of a representative perception, even though one of its subordinate modifications might be mistaken by him for another; but shall prove that, supposing Reid to have been, like Brown, a hypothetical realist, under the *third* form of a representative perception, he was not *historically* wrong in attributing to philosophers in general (at least after the decline of the Scholastic philosophy), the *first* or *second* variety of the hypothesis. Even on this *lower ground*, Brown is fated to be unsuccessful; and if Reid be not always correct, his antagonist has failed in convicting him even of a *single* inaccuracy. We shall consider Brown's charge of misrepresentation in detail.

It is always unlucky to stumble on the threshold. The paragraph (Lect. xxvii.) in which Dr. Brown opens his attack on Reid, contains more mistakes than sentences; and the etymological discussion it involves supposes as true, what is not simply false, but diametrically opposite to the truth. Among *other* errors:—In

¹ See Part Second, chap. vi.—*W.*

the *first* place, the term '*idea*' was never employed in any system, previous to the age of Descartes, to denote 'little images derived from objects without.' In the *second*, it was never used in any philosophy, prior to the same period, to signify the immediate object of perception. In the *third*, it was not applied by the 'Peripatetics or Schoolmen,' to express an object of human thought at all.* In the *fourth*, ideas (taking this term for *spe-*

* The history of the word *idea* seems completely unknown. Previous to the age of Descartes, as a philosophical term, it was employed exclusively by the Platonists—at least exclusively in a Platonic meaning; and this meaning was *precisely the reverse* of that attributed to the word by Dr. Brown;—the *idea was not an object of perception*,—the *idea was not derived from without*. In the schools, so far from being a current *psychological* expression, as he imagines, it had no other application than a *theological*. Neither, after the revival of letters, was the term extended by the Aristotelians even to the objects of *intellect*. Melancthon, indeed (who was a kind of semi-Platonist) uses it on *one* occasion as a synonym for notion, or intelligible species (*De Anima*, p. 187, ed. 1555); but it was even to this solitary instance, we presume, that Julius Scaliger alludes (*De Subtilitate*, vi. 4), when he castigates such an application of the word as neoterie and abusive. "*Melanch.*" is on the margin. Goelenius also probably founded his usage on Melancthon.—We should have distinctly said, that previous to its employment by *Descartes himself*, the expression had never been used as a comprehensive term for the immediate objects of thought, had we not in remembrance the *Historia Animæ Humanæ* of our countryman, David Buchanan. This work, originally written in French, had, for some years, been privately circulated previous to its publication at Paris, in 1636. Here we find the word *idea* familiarly employed, in its most extensive signification, to express the objects, not only of intellect proper, but of memory, imagination, sense; and this is the *earliest* example of such an employment. For the *Discourse on Method* in which the term is usurped by Descartes in an equal latitude, was at least a year later in its publication—viz., in June, 1637. Adopted soon after also by Gassendi, the word under such imposing patronage gradually won its way into general use. In England, however, Locke may be said to have been the first who naturalized the term in its Cartesian universality. Hobbes employs it, and that historically, only once or twice; Henry More and Cudworth are very chary of it, even when treating of the Cartesian philosophy; Willis rarely uses it; while Lord Herbert, Reynolds, and the English philosophers in general, between Descartes and Locke, do not apply it psychologically at all. When in common language, employed by Milton and Dryden, *after* Descartes, as *before* him by Sidney, Spenser, Shakspeare, Hooker, &c., the meaning is Platonic. Our Lexicographers are ignorant of the difference.

The fortune of this word is curious. Employed by Plato to express the

cies) were not 'in all the dark ages of the scholastic followers of Aristotle' regarded as '*little images derived from without*;' for a numerous party of the most illustrious schoolmen rejected *spe-*

real forms¹ of the intelligible world, in lofty contrast to the unreal images of the sensible; it was lowered by Descartes, who extended it to the objects of our consciousness in general. When, after Gassendi, the school of Condillac had analyzed our highest faculties into our lowest, the *idea* was still more deeply degraded from its high original. Like a fallen angel, it was relegated from the sphere of Divine intelligence to the atmosphere of human sense, till at last *Ideologie* (more correctly *Idealogie*), a word which could only *prop-*
erly suggest an *a priori* scheme, deducing our knowledge from the intellect, has in France become the name peculiarly distinctive of that philosophy of mind which exclusively derives our knowledge from the senses. Word and thing, *ideas* have been the *crux philosophorum*, since Aristotle sent them packing (*χαϊρέωσαν ιδέα*) to the present day.

A few notes, which we transfer from Hamilton's Reid, will complete the history and definition of the word *idea*.—*W.*

Whether Plato viewed Ideas as existences independent of the divine mind, is a contested point; though, upon the whole, it appears more probable that he did not. It is, however, admitted on all hands, to be his doctrine, that Ideas were the patterns according to which the Deity fashioned the phenomenal or ectypal world.

It should be carefully observed that the term *Idea*, previous to the time of Descartes, was used exclusively, or all but exclusively, in its Platonic signification. By Descartes, and other contemporary philosophers, it was first extended to denote our representations in general. Many curious blunders have arisen in consequence of an ignorance of this. I may notice, by the way, that a confusion of ideas in the Platonic with ideas in the Cartesian sense has led Reid into the error of assimilating the hypothesis of Plato and the hypothesis of Malebranche in regard to our vision in the divine mind. The Platonic theory of *Perception*, in fact, bears a closer analogy to the Cartesian and Leibnitzian doctrines than to that of Malebranche.

Reid, in common with our philosophers in general, had no knowledge of the Platonic theory of *sensible perception*; and yet the *gnostic forms*, the *cognitive reasons* of the Platonists, held a far more proximate relation to ideas in the modern acceptation than the Platonic ideas themselves.

This interpretation² of the meaning of Plato's comparison of the cave exhibits a curious mistake, in which Reid is followed by Mr. Stewart and many others,³ and which, it is remarkable, has never yet been detected. In the similitude in question (which will be found in the seventh book of the Republic), Plato is supposed to intend an illustration of the mode in which

¹ Whether, in the Platonic system, Ideas are or are not independent of the Deity, is, and always has been, a *vezata questio*.—See Hamilton's Reid, p. 370.—*W.*

² The interpretation given in the text of Reid—*W.*

³ Hamilton has shown in another place that Bacon has also wrested Plato's similitude of the cave from its genuine signification—*W.*

cies, not only in the *intellect*, but in the *sense*. In the *fifth*, 'phantasm,' in 'the old philosophy,' was not the 'external cause of perception,' but the *internal object of imagination*. In

the shadows or vicarious images of external things are admitted into the mind—to typify, in short, an hypothesis of sensitive perception. On his supposition, the identity of the Platonic, Pythagorean, and Peripatetic theories of this process is inferred. Nothing can, however, be more groundless than the supposition; nothing more erroneous than the inference. By his *cave, images, and shadows*, Plato meant simply to illustrate the grand principle of his philosophy—that the Sensible or Eetypal world (phenomenal, transitory, *γινόμενον, ὄν καὶ μὴ ὄν*) stands to the Noetic or Archetypal (substantial, permanent, *ὄντος ὄν*) in the same relation of comparative unreality in which the *shadows of the images* of sensible existences themselves, stand to the things of which they are the dim and distant adumbrations. In the language of an illustrious poet—

‘An nescis, quæcunque hæc sunt, quæ hac nocte teguntur,
 Omnia res prorsus veras non esse, sed umbras,
 Aut specula, unde ad nos aliena elucet imago?
 Terra quidem, et maria alta, atque his circumfluis aer,
 Et quæ consistunt ex iis, hæc omnia tenuis
 Sunt umbræ, humanos quæ tanquam somnia quædam
 Pertingunt animos, fallaci et imagine ludunt,
 Nunquam eadem, fluxu semper variata perenni.
 Sol autem, Lunæque globus, fulgentiaque astra
 Cætera, sint quamvis meliori prædita vita,
 Et donata ævo immortalis, hæc ipsa tamen sunt
 Æterni specula, in quæ animus, qui est inde profectus,
 Inspiciens, patriæ quodam quasi tactus amore,
 Ardescit. Verum quoniam licet non perstat et ultra
 Nescio quid sequitur secum, tacitusque requirit,
 Nosse licet circum hæc ipsum consistere verum,
 Non finem: sed enim esse aliud quid, ejus imago
 Splendet in iis, quod per se ipsum est, et principium esse
 Omnibus æternum, ante omnem numerumque diemque:
 In quo alium Solem atque aliam splendescere Lunam
 Adspicias, aliosque orbes, alia astra manere,
 Terramque, fluviosque alios, atque æra, et ignem,
 Et nemora, atque aliis errare animalia silvis.’

And as the comparison is misunderstood, so nothing can be conceived more adverse to the doctrine of Plato than the theory it is supposed to elucidate. Plotinus, indeed, formally refutes, as contrary to the Platonic, the very hypothesis thus attributed to his master. (Enn. IV., l. vi. cc. l. 3.) The doctrine of the Platonists on this point has been almost wholly neglected; and the author among them whose work contains its most articulate

the *sixth*, the term 'shadowy film,' which here and elsewhere he constantly uses, shows that Dr. Brown confounds the matterless

development has been so completely overlooked, both by scholars and philosophers, that his work is of the rarest; while even his name is mentioned in no history of philosophy. It is here sufficient to state, that the *εἰδῶλα*, the *λόγοι γνωστικοί*, the forms representative of external things, and corresponding to the *species sensiles expressæ* of the schoolmen, were *not held by the Platonists to be derived from without*. Prior to the act of perception, they have a latent but real existence in the soul; and, by the impassive energy of the mind itself, are elicited into consciousness, on occasion of the *impression* (*κίνησις, πάθος, ἔμφασις*) made on the external organ, and of the *vital form* (*ζωτικῶν εἶδος*), in consequence thereof, sublimated in the animal life. The verses of Boethius, which have been so frequently misunderstood, contain an accurate statement of the Platonic theory of perception. After refuting the Stoical doctrine of the passivity of mind in this process, he proceeds:

'Mens est efficiens magis'
 Longe causa potentior,
 Quam quæ materiæ modo
 Impressas patitur notas.
Præcedit tamen excitans
 Ac vires animi movens
Vivo in corpore passio,
 Cum vel lux oculos ferit,
 Vel vox auribus instrepit:
 Tum *mentis vigor excitus*
Quas intus species tenet,
 Ad motus similes vocans,
 Notis applicat exteris,
Introrsumque reconditis
Formis miscet imagines.'

I cannot now do more than *indicate* the contrast of this doctrine to the Peripatetic (I do not say *Aristotelian*) theory, and its approximation to the Cartesian and Leibnitzian hypotheses; which, however, both attempt to explain, what the Platonic did not—how the mind, *ex hypothesi*, above all *physical influence*, is determined, on the presence of the unknown reality within the sphere of *sense*, to call into consciousness the representation through which that reality is made known to us. I may add, that not merely the Platonists, but some of the older Peripatetics held that the soul virtually contained within itself representative forms, which were only excited by the external reality; as Theophrastus and Themistius, to say nothing of the Platonizing Porphyry, Simplicius and Ammonius Hermiæ; and the same opinion, adopted, probably from the latter, by his pupil, the Arabian Adelundus, subsequently became even the common doctrine of the Moorish Aristotelians.

species of the Peripatetics with the corporeal effluxions of Democritus and Epicurus :

‘ Quæ, quasi *membrana*, summo do cortice rerum
Dereptæ, volitant ultro citroque per auras.’

Dr. Brown, in short, only fails in victoriously establishing against Reid the various meanings in which ‘*the old writers*’ employed the term *idea*, by the petty fact—that the old writers did not employ the term *idea* at all.

Nor does the progress of the attack belie the omen of its outset. We shall consider the philosophers quoted by Brown in chronological order. Of three of these only (Descartes, Arnauld, Locke) were the opinions particularly noticed by Reid; the others (Hobbes, Le Clerc, Crousaz) Brown adduces as examples of Reid’s general misrepresentation. Of the *greater number* of the philosophers specially criticised by Reid, Brown *prudently says nothing*.

Of these, the first is DESCARTES; and in regard to him, Dr. Brown, not content with accusing Reid of simple ignorance, contends ‘that the opinions of Descartes are *precisely opposite* to the representations which he has given of them.’ (Lect. xxvii. p. 172.)—Now Reid states, in regard to Descartes, that this philosopher appears to place the idea or representative object in perception, sometimes in the *mind*, and sometimes in the *brain*; and he acknowledges that while these opinions seem to him contradictory, he is not prepared to pronounce which of them their author held, if he did not indeed hold both together. ‘Descartes,’ he says, ‘seems to have hesitated between the two opinions, or to have passed from one to the other.’ On any alternative, however, Reid attributes to Descartes, either the *first* or the *second* form of representation. Now here we must recollect, that the question is not whether Reid be *rigorously right*, but whether he be *inexcusably wrong*. Dr. Brown accuses him of the *most ignorant* misrepresentation,—of interpreting an author, whose perspicuity he himself admits, in a sense ‘*exactly the*

reverse' of truth. To determine what Descartes' doctrine of perception actually is, would be difficult, perhaps even impossible; but in reference to the question at issue, certainly superfluous. It here suffices to show, that his opinion on this point is one mooted among his disciples; and that Brown, wholly unacquainted with the difficulties of the question, dogmatizes on the basis of a single passage—nay, of a passage in itself irrelevant.

Reid is justified against Brown, if the Cartesian *Idea* be proved either a *material image in the brain*, or an *immaterial representation in the mind, distinct from the percipient act*. By those not possessed of the key to the Cartesian theory, there are many passages* in the writings of its author, which, taken by themselves, might naturally be construed to import, that Descartes supposed the mind to be conscious of certain *motions in the brain*, to which, as well as to the *modifications of the intellect itself*, he applies the terms *image* and *idea*. Reid, who did not understand the Cartesian philosophy as a system, was puzzled by these superficial ambiguities. Not aware that the cardinal point of that system is—that mind and body, as essentially opposed, are *naturally* to each other as zero, and that their mutual intercourse can only be *supernaturally* maintained by the concurrence of the Deity; † Reid attributed to Descartes the possible opinion, that

* *Ec. gr. De Pass.* § 35—a passage stronger than any of those noticed by De la Forge.

† That the theory of *Occasional Causes* is necessarily involved in Descartes' doctrine of *Assistance*, and that his explanation of the connection of mind and body reposes on that theory, it is impossible to doubt. For while he rejects all physical influence in the communication and conservation of motion between bodies, which he refers exclusively to the ordinary concurrence of God (*Princ. P. II. Art. 36, etc.*); consequently he deprives conflicting bodies of all proper efficiency, and reduces them to the mere occasional causes of this phenomenon. But *a fortiori*, he must postulate the hypothesis, which he found necessary in explaining the intercourse of things *substantially the same*, to account for the reciprocal action of two substances, *to him*, of so *incompatible a nature* as mind and body. De la Forge, Geulinx, Malebranche, Cordemoi, and other disciples of Descartes, only explicitly evolve what the writings of their master implicitly contain. We may observe,

the soul is immediately cognizant of *material images in the brain*. But in the Cartesian theory, mind is only conscious of itself; the affections of body may, by the *law of union*, be the proximate *occasions*, but can never constitute the immediate *objects* of knowledge. Reid, however, supposing that nothing could obtain the name of *image* which did not represent a prototype, or the name of *idea* which was not an object of thought, thus misinterpreted Descartes; who applies, abusively, indeed, these terms to the *occasion* of perception (*i. e.* the motion in the sensorium, *unknown in itself* and *resembling nothing*), as well as to the *object* of thought (*i. e.* the representation of which we are conscious in the mind itself). In the Leibnitio-Wolfian system, *two* elements, both also denominated *ideas*, are in like manner accurately to be contradistinguished in the process of perception. The *idea in the brain*, and the *idea in the mind*, are, to Descartes, precisely what the '*material idea*' and the '*sensual idea*' are to the Wolfians. In both philosophies, the two ideas are harmonic modifications, correlative and coexistent; but in neither is the organic affection or material idea an object of consciousness. It is merely the unknown and arbitrary condition of the mental representation; and in the hypotheses both of Assistance and of Pre-established Harmony, the presence of the one idea implies the concomitance of the other, only by virtue of the hyperphysical determination. Had Reid, in fact, not limited his study of the Cartesian system to the writings of its founder, the twofold application of the term *idea*, by Descartes, could never have seduced him into the belief that so monstrous a solecism had been committed by that illustrious thinker. By De la Forge, the personal friend of Descartes, the verbal ambiguity is, indeed, not only noticed, but removed; and that admirable expositor applies the term '*corporeal species*' to the affection in the brain, and the

though we cannot stop to prove, that Tennemann is wrong in denying De la Forge to be even an advocate, far less the first articulate expositor of the doctrine of *Occasional Causes*.

terms 'idea,' 'intellectual notion,' to the spiritual representation in the conscious mind.—*De l'Esprit*, c. 10.

But if Reid be wrong in his supposition, that Descartes admitted a consciousness of ideas *in the brain* ;* is he on the *other alternative* wrong, and inexcusably wrong, in holding that Descartes supposed ideas *in the mind not identical with their perceptions*? Malebranche, the most illustrious name in the school after its founder (and who, not certainly with less ability, may be supposed to have studied the writings of his master with far greater attention than either Reid or Brown), ridicules as 'contrary to common sense and justice' the supposition that Descartes had rejected ideas in 'the ordinary acceptance,' and adopted the hypothesis of their being representations, not really distinct from their perception. And while 'he is as certain as he possibly can be in such matters,' that Descartes had not dissented from the general opinion, he taunts Arnauld with resting his paradoxical interpretation of that philosopher's doctrine, 'not on any passages of his *Metaphysic* contrary to the *common opinion*,' but on his own arbitrary limitation of 'the ambiguous term *perception*.' (*Rep. au Livre des Idées, passim*; ARNAULD, *Œuv.* xxxviii. pp. 388, 389.) That ideas are 'found in the mind, not formed by it,' and consequently, that in the act of knowledge the representation is really distinct from the cognition proper, is strenuously asserted as the doctrine of his master by the Cartesian Roell, in the controversy he maintained with the Anti-Cartesian De Vries. (ROELLI *Dispp.*; DE VRIES *De Ideis innatis*.)—But it is idle to multiply proofs. Brown's charge of ignorance falls back upon himself; and Reid may lightly bear the reproach of 'exactly reversing' the notorious doctrine of Descartes, when thus borne, along with him, by the profoundest of that philosopher's disciples.

Had Brown been aware, that the point at issue between him

* Reid's error on this point is, however, surpassed by that of M. Royer-Collard, who represents the idea in the Cartesian doctrine of perception as exclusively situate in the brain.—(*Œuvres de Reid*, III. p. 334.)

and Reid was one agitated among the followers of Descartes themselves, he could hardly have dreamt of summarily determining the question by the production of one vulgar passage from the writings of that philosopher. But we are sorely puzzled to account for his hallucination in considering this passage pertinent. Its substance is fully given by Reid in his exposition of the Cartesian doctrine. Every iota it contains of any relevancy is adopted by Malebranche;—constitutes, less precisely indeed, his famous distinction of *perception* (*idée*) from *sensation* (*sentiment*): and Malebranche is one of the two modern philosophers, admitted by Brown to have held the hypothesis of representation in its *first*, and, as he says, its most 'erroneous' form. But principles that coalesce, even with the hypothesis of ideas *distinct from mind*, are not, *a fortiori*, incompatible with the hypothesis of ideas *distinct only from the perceptive act*. We cannot, however, enter on an articulate exposition of its irrelevancy.

To adduce HOBBS, as an instance of Reid's misrepresentation of the 'common doctrine of ideas,' betrays on the part of Brown a total misapprehension of the conditions of the question;—or he forgets that Hobbes was a materialist.—The doctrine of representation, under all its modifications, is *properly* subordinate to the doctrine of a spiritual principle of thought; and on the supposition, all but universally admitted among philosophers, that the relation of knowledge implied the analogy of existence, it was mainly devised to explain the possibility of a knowledge by an immaterial subject, of an existence so disproportioned to its nature, as the qualities of a material object. Contending, that an immediate cognition of the accidents of matter, infers an essential identity of matter and mind, Brown himself admits, that the hypothesis of representation belongs exclusively to the doctrine of dualism (Lect. xxv. pp. 150, 160); whilst Reid, assailing the hypothesis of ideas, only as subverting the reality of matter, could hardly regard it as parcel of that scheme, which acknowledges the reality of nothing else.—But though Hobbes cannot be adduced as a competent witness *against Reid*, he is however valid evidence

against Brown. Hobbes, though a materialist, admitted no knowledge of an external world. Like his friend Sorbiere, he was a kind of *material idealist*. According to him, we know nothing of the qualities or existence of any outward reality. All that we know is the '*seeming*,' the '*apparition*,' the '*aspect*,' the '*phenomenon*,' the '*phantasm*,' within ourselves; and this *subjective object* of which we are conscious, and which is consciousness itself, is nothing more than the '*agitation*' of our internal organism, determined by the unknown '*motions*,' which are supposed, in like manner, to constitute the world without. *Perception* he reduces to *sensation*. Memory and imagination are faculties *specifically* identical with sense, differing from it simply in the *degree* of their vivacity; and this difference of intensity, with Hobbes as with Hume, is the only discrimination between our dreaming and our waking thoughts.—A doctrine of perception identical with Reid's!

In regard to ARNAULD, the question is not, as in relation to the others, whether Reid conceived him to maintain a form of the ideal theory which he rejects, but whether *Reid admits Arnauld's opinion on perception and his own to be identical*.—'To these authors,' says Dr. Brown, 'whose opinions on the subject of perception, Dr. Reid has misconceived, I may add one, whom even he himself allows to have shaken off the ideal system, and to have considered the idea and the perception as not distinct, but the same, a modification of the mind, and nothing more. I allude to the celebrated Jansenist writer, Arnauld, who maintains *this doctrine as expressly as Dr. Reid himself*, and makes it the foundation of his argument in his controversy with Malebranche.' (Lecture xxvii. p. 173.)—If this statement be not untrue, then is Dr. Brown's interpretation of Reid himself correct. A representative perception, under its *third* and simplest modification, is held by Arnauld as by Brown; and his exposition is so clear and articulate, that all essential misconception of his doctrine is precluded. In these circumstances, if Reid avow the identity of Arnauld's opinion and his own, this avowal is tanta-

mount to a declaration that his peculiar doctrine of perception is a scheme of representation ; whereas, on the contrary, if he signalize the contrast of their two opinions, he clearly evinces the radical antithesis,—and his sense of the radical antithesis,—of the doctrine of *intuition*, to every, even the simplest form of the hypothesis of *representation*. And this last he does.

It cannot be maintained that Reid admits a philosopher to hold an opinion convertible with his, whom he states ‘to profess the doctrine, *universally received*, that *we perceive not material things immediately*,—that it is their *ideas, which are the immediate objects of our thoughts*,—and that it is *in the idea of every thing that we perceive its properties*.’ This fundamental contrast being established, we may safely allow, that the radical misconception, which caused Reid to overlook the difference of our presentative and representative faculties, caused him likewise to believe that Arnauld had attempted to unite two contradictory theories of perception. Not aware, that it was possible to maintain a doctrine of perception, in which the idea was not really distinguished from its cognition, and yet to hold that the mind had no immediate knowledge of external things : Reid supposes, in the *first* place, that Arnauld, in rejecting the hypothesis of ideas, as representative entities, really distinct from the contemplative act of perception, coincided with himself in viewing the material reality as the immediate object of that act ; and in the *second*, that Arnauld again deserted this opinion, when, with the philosophers, he maintained that the idea, or act of the mind representing the external reality, and not the external reality itself, was the immediate object of perception. But Arnauld’s theory is one and indivisible ; and, as such, no part of it is identical with Reid’s. Reid’s confusion, here as elsewhere, is explained by the circumstance, that he had never speculatively conceived the possibility of the simplest modification of the representative hypothesis. He saw no medium between rejecting ideas as something different from thought, and the doctrine of an immediate knowledge of the material object. Neither does Arnauld, as

Reid supposes, ever assert against Malebranche, 'that we perceive external things immediately,' that is, in themselves.* Maintaining that all our perceptions are modifications essentially representative, Arnauld everywhere avows, that he denies ideas, only as existences distinct from the act itself of perception.†

* This is perfectly clear from Arnauld's own uniform statements; and it is justly observed by Malebranche, in his *Reply to the Treatise on True and False Ideas*, (p. 123, orig. edit.)—that, 'in reality, according to M. Arnauld,† we do not perceive bodies, we perceive only ourselves.'

† Œuvres, t. xxxviii. pp. 187, 198, 199, 389, et passim. It is to be recollected that Descartes, Malebranche, Arnauld, Locke, and philosophers in general before Reid, employed the term *Perception* as coextensive with *Consciousness*.—By Leibnitz, Wolf, and their followers, it was used in a peculiar sense,—as equivalent to *Representation* or *Idea proper*, and as contradistinguished from *Apperception*, or consciousness. Reid's limitation of the term, though the grounds on which it is defended are not of the strongest, is convenient, and has been very generally admitted.

† On this point may be added the following (Reid, p. 296):—'Arnauld did not allow that perception and ideas are really or numerically distinguished—i. e. as one thing from another thing; not even that they are modally distinguished—i. e. as a thing from its mode. He maintained that they are really identical, and only rationally discriminated as viewed in different relations; the indivisible mental modification being called a *perception*, by reference to the mind or thinking subject—an *idea*, by reference to the mediate object or thing thought. Arnauld everywhere avows that he denies ideas only as existences distinct from the act itself of perception.—See Œuvres, t. xxxviii. pp. 187, 198, 199, 389.'

'The opinion of Arnauld in regard to the nature of ideas was by no means overlooked by subsequent philosophers. It is found fully detailed in almost every systematic course or compend of philosophy, which appeared for a long time after its first promulgation, and in many of these it is the doctrine recommended as the true. Arnauld's was indeed the opinion which latterly prevailed in the Cartesian school. From this it passed into other schools. Leibnitz, like Arnauld, regarded Ideas, Notions, Representations, as mere modifications of the mind (what by his disciples were called *material* ideas, like the cerebral Ideas of Descartes, are out of the question), and no cruder opinion than this has ever subsequently found a footing in any of the German systems.

"I don't know," says Mr. Stewart, "of any author who, prior to Dr. Reid, has expressed himself on the subject with so much justness and precision as Father Buffier, in the following passage of his Treatise on 'First Truths:'

"If we confine ourselves to what is intelligible in our observations on *ideas*, we will say they are nothing but mere modifications of the mind as a thinking being. They are called *ideas* with regard to the object represented; and *perceptions* with regard to the faculty representing. It is manifest that our ideas, considered in this sense, are not more distinguished than motion is from a body moved."—(P. 311, *English Translation*.)"—Idem, iii. Add. to vol. i. p. 16.

'In this passage, Buffier only repeats the doctrine of Arnauld, in Arnauld's own words.

Dr. Thomas Brown, on the other hand, has endeavored to show that this doctrine

Reid was therefore wrong, and did Arnauld less than justice, in viewing his theory 'as a weak attempt to reconcile two inconsistent doctrines:' he was wrong, and did Arnauld more than justice, in supposing that one of these doctrines is not incompatible with his own. The detection, however, of this error only tends to manifest more clearly, how just, even when under its influence, was Reid's appreciation of the contrast subsisting between his own and Arnauld's opinion, considered *as a whole*; and exposes more glaringly Brown's general misconception of Reid's philosophy, and his present gross misrepresentation, in affirming that the doctrines of the two philosophers were identical, and by Reid admitted to be the same.

Nor is Dr. Brown more successful in his defence of LOCKE.

Supposing always, that ideas were held to be something distinct from their cognition, Reid states it, as that philosopher's opinion, 'that images of external objects were conveyed to the brain; but whether he thought with Descartes [*erratum* for Dr. Clarke?] and Newton, that the images in the brain are perceived by the mind, there present, or that they are imprinted on the mind itself, is not so evident.' This Dr. Brown, nor is he original in the assertion, pronounces a flagrant misrepresentation. Not only does he maintain, that Locke never conceived the idea to be substantially different from the mind, as a material image in the brain; but, that he never supposed it to have an existence apart from the mental energy of which it is the object. Locke, he asserts, like Arnauld, considered the idea perceived and the percipient act, to constitute the same indivisible modification of the conscious mind. We shall see.

In his *language*, Locke is, of all philosophers, the most figurative, ambiguous, vascillating, various, and even contradictory;—

(which he identifies with Reid's) had been long the catholic opinion; and that Reid, in his attack on the Ideal system, only refuted what had been already almost universally exploded. In this attempt he is, however, singularly unfortunate; for, with the exception of Crousaz, all the examples he adduces to evince the prevalence of Arnauld's doctrine are only so many mistakes, so many instances, in fact, which might be alleged in confirmation of the very opposite conclusion.'—W.

as has been noticed by Reid, and Stewart, and Brown himself,—indeed, we believe by every author who has had occasion to comment on this philosopher. The opinions of such a writer are not, therefore, to be assumed from isolated and casual expressions, which themselves require to be interpreted on the general analogy of his system; and yet this is the only ground on which Dr. Brown attempts to establish his conclusions. Thus, on the matter under discussion, though *really* distinguishing, Locke *verbally* confounds, the objects of sense and of intellect,—the operation and its object,—the objects immediate and mediate,—the object and its relations,—the images of fancy and the notions of the understanding. Consciousness is converted with Perception,—Perception with Idea,—Idea with Ideatum, and with Notion, Conception, Phantasm, Representation, Sense, Meaning, &c. Now, his language identifying ideas and perceptions, appears conformable to a disciple of Arnauld; and now it proclaims him a follower of Digby,—explaining ideas by mechanical impulse, and the propagation of material particles from the external reality to the brain. The idea would seem, in one passage, an organic affection,—the mere occasion of a spiritual representation; in another, a representative image, in the brain itself. In employing thus indifferently the language of every hypothesis, may we not suspect, that he was anxious to be made responsible for none? One, however, he has formally rejected; and that is the very opinion attributed to him by Dr. Brown,—*that the idea, or object of consciousness in perception, is only a modification of the mind itself.*

We do not deny, that Locke occasionally employs expressions, which, in a writer of more considerate language, would imply the identity of ideas with the act of knowledge; and, under the circumstances, we should have considered suspense more rational than a dogmatic confidence in any conclusion, did not the following passage, which has never, we believe, been noticed, appear a positive and explicit contradiction of Dr. Brown's interpretation. It is from Locke's *Examination of Malebranche's Opinion*, which

as subsequent to the publication of the *Essay*, must be held authentic, in relation to the doctrines of that work. At the same time, the statement is articulate and precise, and possesses all the authority of one cautiously made in the course of a polemical discussion. Malebranche coincided with Arnauld, and consequently with Locke, *as interpreted by Brown*, to the extent of supposing, that *sensation proper* is nothing but a state or modification of the mind itself; and Locke had thus the opportunity of expressing, in regard to this opinion, his agreement or dissent. An acquiescence in the doctrine, that the *secondary* qualities, of which we are conscious in *sensation*, are merely mental states, by no means involves an admission that the *primary* qualities of which we are conscious in *perception*, are nothing more. Malebranche, for example, affirms the one and denies the other. But if Locke be found to ridicule, as he does, *even* the opinion which *merely* reduces the secondary qualities to mental states, *a fortiori*, and this *on the principle of his own philosophy*, he must be held to reject the doctrine, which would reduce not only the non-resembling sensations of the secondary, but even the resembling, and consequently extended, ideas of the primary qualities of matter, to modifications of the immaterial unextended mind. In these circumstances, the following passage is superfluously conclusive against Brown, and equally so, whether we coincide or not in all the principles it involves:—‘But to examine their doctrine of *modification* a little further. Different sentiments (sensations) are different modifications of the mind. The mind, or soul, that perceives, is one immaterial indivisible substance. Now I see the white and black on this paper, I hear one singing in the next room, I feel the warmth of the fire I sit by, and I taste an apple I am eating, and all this at the same time. Now, I ask, take modification for what you please, *can the same unextended, indivisible substance have different, nay, inconsistent and opposite (as these of white and black must be) modifications at the same time? Or must we suppose distinct parts in an indivisible substance, one for black, another for white, and another for red ideas,*

and so of the rest of those infinite sensations, which we have in sorts and degrees; all which we can distinctly perceive, and so are distinct ideas, some whereof are opposite, as heat and cold, which yet a man may feel at the same time? I was ignorant before how sensation was performed in us: this they call an explanation of it! Must I say now I understand it better? If this be to cure one's ignorance, it is a very slight disease, and the charm of two or three insignificant words will at any time remove it; *probatum est.*' (Sec. 39.)—This passage, as we shall see, is correspondent to the doctrine held on this point by Locke's personal friend and philosophical follower, Le Clerc. (But, what is curious, the suppositions which Locke here rejects, as incompatible with the spirituality of mind, are the very facts on which Ammonius Hermiæ, Philoponus, and Condillac, among many others, found their proof of the immateriality of the thinking subject.)

But if it be thus evident that Locke held neither the *third* form of representation, that lent to him by Brown, nor *even* the *second*; it follows that Reid did him any thing but injustice, in supposing him to maintain that ideas are objects, *either* in the *brain*, or in the *mind* itself. Even the *more material* of these alternatives has been the one generally attributed to him by his critics,* and the one adopted from him by his disciples.† Nor is this to be deemed an opinion too monstrous to be entertained by so enlightened a philosopher. It was, as we shall see, the common opinion of the age; the opinion, in particular, held by the most illustrious of his countrymen and contemporaries—by Newton, Clarke, Willis, Hook, &c.‡ The English psychologists have indeed been generally very mechanical.

* To refer only to the *first* and *last* of his regular critics:—see *Solid Philosophy asserted against the Fancies of the Ideists*, by J. S. [JOHN SERGEANT.] Lond. 1697, p. 161,—a very curious book, *absolutely*, we may say, *unknown*; and COUSIN, *Cours de Philosophie*, t. ii. 1829; pp. 330, 357, 325, 365—the most important work on Locke since the *Nouveaux Essais* of Leibnitz.

† TUCKER'S *Light of Nature*, i. pp. 15, 18, ed. 2.

‡ On the opinion of Newton and Clarke, see Des Maizeaux's *Recueil*, i. pp. 7, 8, 9, 15, 22, 75, 127, 169, &c.—Genovesi notices the erudity of New-

Dr. Brown at length proceeds to consummate his imagined victory by 'that most decisive evidence, found not in treatises read only by a few, but in the popular elementary works of science of the time, the *general text-books* of schools and colleges.' He quotes, however, only two:—the *Pneumatology* of Le Clerc, and the *Logic* of Crousaz.

'LE CLERC,' says Dr. Brown, 'in his chapter on the nature of ideas, gives the history of the opinions of philosophers on this subject, and states among them the very doctrine which is most forcibly and accurately opposed to the ideal system of perception. "*Alii putant ideas et perceptiones idearum easdem esse, licet relationibus differant. Idea, uti censent, proprie ad objectum refertur, quod mens considerat;—perceptio, vere ad mentem ipsam quæ percipit: sed duplex illa ratio ad unam modificationem mentis pertinet. Itaque, secundum hosce philosophos, nullæ sunt, proprie, loquendo, ideæ a mente nostra distinctæ.*" *What is it, I may ask, which Dr. Reid considers himself as having added to this very philosophical view of perception?* and if he added nothing, it is surely too much to ascribe to him the merit of detecting errors, the counter statement of which had long formed a part of the elementary works of the schools.'

In the *first* place, Dr. Reid certainly 'added' nothing 'to this

ton's doctrine, 'Mentem in *cerebro* præsidere atque *in eo*, suo scilicet sensorio, rerum *imagines* cernere.'—On Willis, see his work *De Anima Brutorum*, p. 64, *alibi*, ed. 1672.—On Hook, see his *Lect. on Light*, § 7.—We know not whether it has been remarked that Locke's doctrine of particles and impulse, is precisely that of Sir Kenelm Digby; and if Locke adopts *one* part of so gross an hypothesis, what is there improbable in his adoption of the *other*?—that the object of perception is, a 'material participation of the bodies that work on the outward organs of the senses' (Digby, *Treatise of Bodies*, c. 32). As a specimen of the mechanical explanations of mental phenomena then considered satisfactory, we quote Sir Kenelm's theory of memory.—'Out of which it followeth, that the little similitudes which are in the caves of the brain, wheeling and swimming about, almost in such sort as you see in the washing of currants or rice by the winding about and circular turning of the cook's hand, divers sorts of bodies do go their course for a pretty while; so that the most ordinary objects cannot but present themselves quickly,' &c., &c. (*ibidem*).

very philosophical view of perception,' but he *exploded it altogether*.

In the *second*, it is false, either that this doctrine of perception 'had long formed part of the elementary works of the schools,' or that Le Clerc affords any countenance to this assertion. On the contrary, it is virtually stated by him to be the *novel paradox* of a *single* philosopher; nay, to carry the blunder to hyperbole, it is already, as such a singular opinion, discussed and referred to its author by *Reid himself*. Had Dr. Brown proceeded from the tenth paragraph, which he quotes, to the fourteenth, which he *could not have read*, he would have found, that the passage extracted, so far from containing the statement of an old and familiar dogma in the schools, was neither more nor less, than a statement of the *contemporary hypothesis* of—ANTONY ARNAULD! and of Antony Arnauld *alone!!*

In the *third* place, from the mode in which he cites Le Clerc, his silence to the contrary, and the general tenor of his statement, Dr. Brown would lead us to believe that Le Clerc himself coincides in 'this very philosophical view of perception.' So far, however, from coinciding with Arnauld, he pronounces his opinion to be false; controverts it on very solid grounds; and in delivering his own doctrine touching ideas, though sufficiently cautious in telling us what they are, he has no hesitation in assuring us, among other things which they cannot be, that they *are not modifications or essential states of mind*. '*Non est (idea sc.) modificatio aut essentia mentis: nam præterquam quod sentimus ingens esse discrimen inter ideæ perceptionem et sensationem; quid habet mens nostra simile monti, aut innumeris ejusmodi ideis?*'—(*Pneumat., sect. i. c. 5, § 10.*)

On all this no observation of ours can be either so apposite or authoritative, as the edifying reflections with which Dr. Brown himself concludes his vindication of the philosophers against Reid. Brown's precept is sound, but his example is instructive. One word we leave blank, which the reader may himself supply.—'That a mind so *vigorous as that of Dr.* ——— *should have*

been capable of the series of misconceptions which we have traced, may seem wonderful, and truly is so ; and equally, or rather still more wonderful is the general admission of his merit in this respect. I trust it will impress you with one important lesson—to consult the opinions of authors in their own works, and not in the works of those who profess to give a faithful account of them. From my own experience I can most truly assure you, that there is scarcely an instance in which I have found the view I had received of them to be faithful. There is usually something more, or something less, which modifies the general result ; and by the various additions and subtractions thus made, so much of the spirit of the original doctrine is lost, that it may, in some cases, be considered as having made a fortunate escape, if it be not at last represented as directly opposite to what it is.—(Leet. xxvii. p. 175.)

The cause must, therefore, be unconditionally decided in favor of Reid, even on that testimony, which Brown triumphantly produces in court as ‘*the most decisive evidence*’ against him :—here then we might close our case. To signalize, however, more completely the whole character of the accusation, we shall call a few witnesses ; to prove, in fact, nothing more than that Brown’s own ‘*most decisive evidence*’ is not *less* favorable to himself, than any other that might be cited from the great majority of the learned.

MALEBRANCHE, in his controversy with Arnauld, everywhere *assumes* the doctrine of ideas, really distinct from their perception, to be the one ‘*commonly received* ;’ nor does his adversary venture to dispute the assumption. (*Rep. au Livre des Idées.*—ARNAULD, *Œuv.* t. xxxviii. p. 388.)

LEIBNITZ, on the other hand, in answer to Clarke, *admits*, that the *crude* theory of ideas held by this philosopher, *was the common*. ‘*Je ne demeure point d’accord des notions vulgaires. comme si les Images des choses étoient transportées, par les organes, jusqu’à l’ame. Cette notion de la Philosophie Vulgaire n’est point intelligible, comme les nouveaux Cartesiens l’ont assez*

montré. L'on ne sauroit expliquer comment la substance *immatérielle* est affectée par la *matière* : et soutenir une chose non intelligible là-dessus, c'est recourir à la notion scholastique chimérique de je ne sai quelles *espèces intentionnelles* inexplicable, qui passent des organes dans l'ame.' (*Opera*, II. p. 161.) Nor does Clarke, in reply, disown this doctrine for himself and others.—(*Ibid.* p. 182).

BRUCKER, in his *Historia Philosophica Doctrinæ de Ideis* (1723), speaks of Arnauld's hypothesis as a '*peculiar opinion*,' rejected by '*philosophers in general* (plerisque eruditis),' and as not less untenable than the paradox of Malebranche.—(P. 248.)

Dr. Brown is fond of *text-books*. Did we condescend to those of *ordinary* authors, we could adduce a cloud of witnesses against him. As a sample, we shall quote only three, but these of the *very highest* authority.

CHRISTIAN THOMASIUS, though a reformer of the Peripatetic and Cartesian systems, adopted a grosser theory of ideas than either. In his *Introductio ad Philosophiam aulicam* (1702), he defines thought in general, a mental discourse '*about images, by the motion of external bodies, and through the organs of sense, stamped in the substance of the brain.*' (c. 3. § 29. See also his *Inst. Jurispr. Div.*, L. i. c. 1, and *Introd. in Phil. ration.*, c. 3.)

S'GRAVESANDE, in his *Introductio ad Philosophiam* (1736), though professing to leave undetermined, the *positive* question concerning the origin of ideas, and admitting that *sensations* are '*nothing more than modifications of the mind itself*;' makes no scruple, in determining the *negative*, to dismiss, as absurd, the hypothesis, which would reduce sensible *ideas* to an equal subjectivity. '*Mentem ipsam has Ideas efficere, et sibi ipsi representare res, quarum his solis Ideis cognitionem acquirit, nullo modo concipi potest. Nulla inter causam et effectum relatio daretur.*' (§§ 279, 282.)

GENOVESI, in his *Elementa Metaphysicæ* (1748), lays it down

as a fundamental position of philosophy, *that ideas and the act cognitive of ideas are distinct* ('*Prop. xxx. Idæ et Perceptiones non videntur esse posse una eademque res*'); and he ably refutes the hypothesis of Arnauld, which he reprobates as a paradox, unworthy of that illustrious reasoner. (*Pars II. p. 140.*)

VOLTAIRE'S *Dictionnaire Philosophique* may be adduced as representing the intelligence of the age of Reid himself. '*Qu'est ce qu'une Idée?—C'est une Image qui se peint dans mon cerveau. —Toutes vos pensées sont donc des images?—Assurement,*' &c. (voce Idée.)

What, in fine, is the doctrine of the two most numerous schools of modern philosophy—the LEIBNITIAN and KANTIAN? Both maintain that the mind involves representations of which it is not, and never may be, conscious; that is, both maintain the second form of the hypothesis, and one of the two that Reid understood and professedly assailed. [This statement requires qualification.]

In Crousaz, Dr. Brown has actually succeeded in finding *one* example (he might have found twenty), of a philosopher, before Reid, holding the same theory of ideas with Arnauld and himself.†

* LEIBNITZ;—*Opera, Dutensii, tom. ii.* pp. 21, 23, 33, 214, *pars ii.* pp. 137, 145, 146. *Euvres Philos. par Raspe*, pp. 66, 67, 74, 96, ets. WOLF;—*Psychol. Rat.* § 10, ets. *Psychol. Emp.* § 48. KANT—*Critik d. r. V. p.* 376, *ed. 2.* *Anthropologie*, § 5. With one restriction, Leibnitz's doctrine is that of the lower Platonists, who maintained that the soul actually contains representations of every possible substance and event in the world during the revolution of the *great year*; although these *cognitive reasons* are not elicited into consciousness, unless the reality, thus represented, be itself brought within the sphere of the sensual organs. (*Plotinus, Enn. V. lib. vii. cc. 1, 2, 3.*)

† In speaking of this author, Dr. Brown, who never loses an opportunity to depreciate Reid, goes out of his way to remark, 'that precisely the same distinction of *sensations* and *perceptions*, on which Dr. Reid founds so much, is stated and enforced in the different works of this ingenious writer,' and expatiates on this conformity of the two philosophers, as if he deemed its detection to be something new and curious. Mr. Stewart had already noticed it in his *Essays*. But neither he nor Brown seem to recollect, that Crousaz

The reader is now in a condition to judge of the correctness of Brown's statement, 'that with the exception of Malebranche and Berkeley, who had peculiar and very erroneous notions on the subject, ALL the philosophers whom Dr. Reid considered himself as opposing' (what! Newton, Clarke, Hook, Norris, Porterfield, &c. ?—these, be it remembered, ALL *severally* attacked by Reid, Brown has neither ventured to defend, nor to acknowledge that he could not), 'would, if they had been questioned by him, have admitted, before they heard a single argument on his part, that their opinions with respect to ideas were precisely the same as his own.' (Lect. xxvii. p. 174.)

We have thus vindicated our original assertion:—BROWN HAS NOT SUCCEEDED IN CONVICTING REID, EVEN OF A SINGLE ERROR.

Brown's mistakes regarding the opinions on perception, entertained by Reid and the philosophers, are perhaps, however, even less astonishing, than his total misconception of the purport of Hume's reasoning against the existence of matter, and of the *argument* by which Reid invalidates Hume's *skeptical* conclusion. We shall endeavor to reduce the problem to its simplicity.

Our knowledge rests ultimately on certain facts of consciousness,¹ which as primitive, and consequently incomprehensible, are

only copies Malebranche, *re et verbis*, and that Reid had himself expressly assigned to that philosopher the merit of *first* recognizing the distinction. This is incorrect. But M. Royer-Collard (*Reid, Œuvres*, t. iii. p. 329) is still more inaccurate in thinking that Malebranche and Leibnitz (Leibnitz!) were perhaps the *only* philosophers before Reid, who had discriminated perception from sensation. The distinction was established by Descartes; and after Malebranche, but long before Reid, it had become even common; and so far is Leibnitz from having any merit in the matter, his criticism of Malebranche shows, that with all his learning he was strangely ignorant of a discrimination then familiar to philosophers in general, which may indeed be traced under various appellations to the most ancient times. [A contribution² towards this history, and a reduction of the qualities of matter to *three* classes, under the names of *Primary*, *Secundo-primary*, and *Secondary*, is given in the Supplementary Dissertations appended to Reid's Works (p. 825-875.)]

¹ See Part First, Philosophy of Common Sense.—*W*.

² It forms the fifth chapter of the second part of this vol.—*W*.

given less in the form of *cognitions* than of *beliefs*. But if consciousness in its last analysis—in other words, if our *primary experience*, be a faith; the reality of our knowledge turns on the veracity of our constitutive beliefs. As ultimate, the quality of these beliefs cannot be inferred; their truth, however, is in the first instance to be presumed. As given and possessed, they must stand good until refuted; ‘*neganti incumbit probatio.*’ It is not to be presumed, that intelligence gratuitously annihilates itself;—that Nature operates in vain;—that the Author of nature creates only to deceive.

‘Φήμη δ’ ὕποπτε πάντα ἀπόλλυται, ἤντινα πάντες
 Λαοὶ φημιζουσι· Θεοῦ γὰρ τι ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτῆ.’

But though the truth of our instinctive faiths must *in the first instance* be admitted, their falsehood may *subsequently* be established: this, however, only through themselves—only on the ground of their reciprocal contradiction. Is this contradiction proved, the edifice of our knowledge is undermined; for ‘*no lie is of the truth.*’ Consciousness is to the philosopher, what the Bible is to the theologian. Both are professedly revelations of divine truth; both exclusively supply the constitutive principles of knowledge, and the regulative principles of its construction. To both we must resort for *elements* and for *laws*. Each may be disproved, but disproved only by itself. If one or other reveal facts, which, as mutually repugnant, cannot but be false, the authenticity of that revelation is invalidated; and the criticism which signalizes this self-refutation, has, in either case, been able to convert assurance into skepticism,—‘to turn the truth of God into a lie,’

‘Et violare *fidem primam*, et convellere tota
 Fundamenta quibus nixatur *vita salusque.*’—LUCR.

As psychology is only a developed consciousness, that is, a scientific evolution of the facts of which consciousness is the *guarantee and revelation*; the positive philosopher has thus a primary

presumption in favor of the elements out of which his system is constructed ; whilst the skeptic, or negative philosopher, must be content to argue back to the falsehood of these elements, from the impossibility which the dogmatist may experience, in combining them into the harmony of truth. For truth is one ; and the end of philosophy is the intuition of unity. Skepticism is not an original or independent method ; it is the correlative and consequent of dogmatism ; and so far from being an enemy to truth, it arises only from a false philosophy, as its indication and its cure. ‘ *Alte dubitat, qui altius credit.*’ The skeptic must not himself *establish*, but from the dogmatist *accept*, his principles ; and his conclusion is only a reduction of philosophy to zero, on the hypothesis of the doctrine from which his premises are borrowed.—Are the principles which a particular system involves, convicted of contradiction ; or, are these principles proved repugnant to others, which, as facts of consciousness, every positive philosophy *must* admit ; there is established a *relative skepticism*, or the conclusion, that philosophy, in so far as realized in this system, is groundless. Again, are the principles, which, as facts of consciousness, philosophy in general must comprehend, found exclusive of each other ; there is established an *absolute skepticism* ;—the impossibility of all philosophy is involved in the negation of the one criterion of truth. Our statement may be reduced to a dilemma. Either the facts of consciousness can be reconciled, or they cannot. If they cannot, knowledge absolutely is impossible, and every system of philosophy therefore false. If they can, no system which supposes their inconsistency can pretend to truth.

As a legitimate skeptic, Hume could not assail the foundations of knowledge in themselves. His reasoning is from their subsequent contradiction to their original falsehood ; and his premises, not established by himself, are accepted only as principles universally conceded in the previous schools of philosophy. On the assumption, that what was thus unanimously admitted by philosophers, must be admitted of philosophy itself, his argument against the certainty of knowledge was triumphant.—Philosophers

agreed in rejecting certain primitive beliefs of consciousness as false, and in usurping others as true. If consciousness, however, were confessed to yield a lying evidence in one particular, it could not be adduced as a credible witness at all:—‘*Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.*’ But as the reality of our knowledge necessarily rests on the assumed veracity of consciousness, it thus rests on an assumption implicitly admitted by all systems of philosophy to be illegitimate.

‘*Faciunt, nā, intelligendo, ut nihil intelligant!*’

Reid (like Kant) did not dispute Hume’s inference, *as deduced from its antecedents*. He allowed his skepticisms, as *relative*, to be irrefragable; and that philosophy could not be saved from *absolute* skepticism, unless his conceded premises could be disallowed, by refuting the principles universally acknowledged by modern philosophers. This he applied himself to do. He subjected these principles to a new and rigorous criticism. If his analysis be correct (and it was so, at least, in spirit and intention), it proved them to be hypotheses, on which the credulous sequacity of philosophers,—‘*philosophorum credula natio*’—had bestowed the prescriptive authority of self-evident truths; and showed, that where a genuine fact of consciousness had been surrendered, it had been surrendered in deference to some groundless assumption, which, in reason, it ought to have exploded. Philosophy was thus again reconciled with Nature; consciousness was not a bundle of antilogies; certainty and knowledge were not evicted from man.

All this Dr. Brown completely misunderstands. He comprehends neither the reasoning of skepticism, in the hands of Hume, nor the argument from common sense, in those of Reid. Retrograding himself to the tenets of that philosophy, whose contradictions Hume had fairly developed into skepticism, he appeals against this conclusion to the argument of common sense; albeit that argument, if true, belies his hypothesis, and if his hypothesis be true, is belied by it. Hume and Reid he actually represents as maintaining precisely the same doctrine, on precisely the same

grounds; and finds both concurring with himself, in advocating that very opinion, which the one had resolved into a negation of all knowledge, and the other exploded as a baseless hypothesis.

Our discussion, at present, is limited to a single question,—to the truth or falsehood of consciousness in assuring us of the reality of a material world. In perception, consciousness gives, as an ultimate fact, *a belief of the knowledge of the existence of something different from self*. As ultimate, this belief cannot be reduced to a higher principle; neither can it be truly analyzed into a double element. We only believe that this something *exists*, because we believe that we *know* (are conscious of) this something as existing; the *belief of the existence* is necessarily involved in the *belief of the knowledge of the existence*. Both are original, or neither. Does consciousness deceive us in the latter, it necessarily deludes us in the former; and if the former, *though* a fact of consciousness, be false; the latter, *because* a fact of consciousness, is not true. The beliefs contained in the two propositions:

1°, *I believe that a material world exists;*

2°, *I believe that I immediately know a material world existing,*
(in other words, *I believe that the external reality itself is the object of which I am conscious in perception*):

though distinguished by philosophers, are thus virtually identical.

The belief of an external world, was too powerful, not to compel an acquiescence in its truth. But the philosophers yielded to nature, only in so far as to coincide in the dominant result. They falsely discriminated the *belief in the existence*, from the *belief in the knowledge*. With a few exceptions, they held fast by the truth of the first; but, on grounds to which it is not here necessary to advert, they concurred, with singular unanimity, in abjuring the second. The object of which we are conscious in perception, could only, they explicitly avowed, be a representative image present to the mind;—an image which, they implicitly confessed, we are necessitated to regard as identical with the unknown reality itself. Man, in short, upon the common doctrine

of philosophy, was doomed by a perfidious nature to realize the fable of Narcissus; he mistakes self for not-self,

—— ‘*corpus putat esse quod umbra est.*’

To carry these principles to their issue was easy; and skepticism in the hands of Hume was the result. The absolute veracity of consciousness was invalidated by the falsehood of one of its facts; and the belief of the *knowledge*, assumed to be delusive, was even supposed in the belief of the *existence*, admitted to be true. The uncertainty of knowledge in general, and in particular, the problematical existence of a material world, were thus legitimately established. To confute this reduction on the conventional ground of the philosophers, Reid saw to be impossible; and the argument which he opposed, was, in fact, immediately subversive of the dogmatic principle, and only mediately of the skeptical conclusion. This reasoning was of very ancient application, and had been even long familiarly known by the name of the *argument from Common Sense*.

To argue from common sense is nothing more than to render available the presumption in favor of the original facts of consciousness,—that *what is by nature necessarily BELIEVED to be, truly is*. Aristotle, in whose philosophy this presumption obtained the authority of a principle, thus enounces the argument:—‘What *appears to all*, that we affirm *to be*; and he who rejects this *belief*, will, assuredly, advance nothing better worthy of credit.’ (*Eth. Nic. L. x. c. 2.*) As this argument rests entirely on a presumption;¹ the fundamental condition of its validity is, that this presumption be not disproved. The presumption in favor of the veracity of consciousness, as we have already shown, is redargued by the repugnance of the facts themselves, of which consciousness is the complement; as the truth of all can only be vindicated on the truth of each. The argument from common

¹ ‘There is,’ says Hamilton (Reid p. 447), ‘a presumption in favor of the veracity of the primary data of consciousness. This can only be rebutted by showing that these facts are contradictory. Skepticism attempts to show this on the principles which the dogmatism postulates.’—*W.*

sense, therefore postulates, and founds on the assumption—
 *THAT OUR ORIGINAL BELIEFS BE NOT PROVED SELF-CONTRADICTORY.

The harmony of our primary convictions being supposed, and not redargued, the argument from common sense is decisive against every deductive inference not in unison with them. For as every conclusion is involved in its premises, and as these again must ultimately be resolved into some original belief; the conclusion, if inconsistent with the primary phenomena of consciousness, must, *ex hypothesi*, be inconsistent with its premises, *i. e.* be logically false. On this ground, our convictions *at first hand*, peremptorily derogate from our convictions *at second*. ‘If we know and believe,’ says Aristotle, ‘through certain original principles, we must know and believe these with *paramount certainty*, for the very reason that we know and believe all else through them;’ and he elsewhere observes, that our approbation is often rather to be accorded to what is revealed by nature as actual, than to what can be demonstrated by philosophy as possible:—‘Προσέχειν οὐ δεῖ πάντα τοῖς διὰ τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις μᾶλλον τοῖς φαινομένοις.’*

‘*Novimus certissima scientia, et clamante conscientia*’ (to apply the language of Augustine, in our acceptation), is thus a proposition, either *absolutely true* or *absolutely false*. The argument from common sense, if not omnipotent, is powerless: and in the hands of a philosopher by whom its postulate cannot be allowed, its employment, if not suicidal, is absurd. This condition of non-contradiction¹ *is unexpressed by Reid*. It might seem to him too evidently included in the very conception of the argument to require enunciation. Dr. Brown has proved that he was wrong.

* Jacobi (*Werke*, II. *Vorr.* p. 11, ets.) following Fries, places Aristotle at the head of that absurd majority of philosophers, who attempt to *demonstrate* every thing. This would not have been more *sublimely false*, had it been said of the German Plato himself.

¹ The two maxims,—*whatever is, is*; and *it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, are called the principle of *Identity*, and the principle of *Contradiction*, or, more properly, *Non-Contradiction*.—*W.*

Yet Reid could hardly have anticipated, that his whole philosophy, in relation to the argument of common sense, and that argument itself, were so to be mistaken, as to be actually interpreted by contraries.—These principles established, we proceed to their application.

Dr. Brown's error, in regard to Reid's doctrine of perception, involves the other, touching the relation of that doctrine to Hume's skeptical idealism. On the supposition, that Reid views in the immediate object of perception a mental modification, and not a material quality, Dr. Brown is fully warranted in asserting, that he left the foundations of idealism, precisely as he found them. Let it once be granted, that the object known in perception, is not convertible with the reality existing; idealism reposes in equal security on the hypothesis of a representative perception,—whether the representative image be a modification of consciousness itself,—or whether it have an existence independent either of mind or of the act of thought. The former indeed as the simpler basis, would be the more secure; and, in point of fact, the egoistical idealism of Fichte, resting on the *third* form of representation, is less exposed to criticism than the theological idealism of Berkeley, which reposes on the *first*. Did Brown not mistake Reid's doctrine, Reid was certainly absurd in thinking a refutation of idealism to be involved in his refutation of the common theory of perception. So far from blaming Brown, on this supposition, for denying to Reid the *single* merit which that philosopher thought peculiarly his own; we only reproach him for leaving, to Reid and to himself, any possible mode of resisting the idealist at all. It was a monstrous error to reverse Reid's doctrine of perception; but a greater still not to see that this reversal stultifies the argument from common sense; and that so far from '*proceeding on safe ground*' in an appeal to our original beliefs, Reid would have employed, as Brown has actually done, a weapon, *harmless to the skeptic, but mortal to himself*.

The belief, says Dr. Brown, in the existence of an external

world is *irresistible*, therefore it is *true*. On his doctrine of perception, which he attributes also to Reid, this inference is however incompetent, because on that doctrine he cannot fulfil the condition which the argument implies. *I cannot but believe that material things exist:—I cannot but believe that the material reality is the object immediately known in perception.* The former of these beliefs, explicitly argues Dr. Brown, in defending his system against the skeptic, *because irresistible, is true.* The latter of these beliefs, implicitly argues Dr. Brown, in establishing his system itself, *though irresistible, is false.* And here not only are two primitive beliefs, supposed to be repugnant, and consciousness therefore delusive; the very belief which is assumed as true, exists in fact only through the other, which, *ex hypothesi*, is false. Both in reality are one.* Kant, in whose doctrine as in Brown's the immediate

* This reasoning can only be invalidated either, 1^o, By disproving the belief itself of the knowledge, as a fact; or—2^o, By disproving its attribute of originality. The latter is impossible; and if possible, would also annihilate the originality of the belief of the existence, which is supposed. The former alternative is ridiculous. That we are naturally determined to believe the object known in perception, to be the external existence itself, and that it is only in consequence of a supposed philosophical necessity, we subsequently endeavor by an artificial abstraction to discriminate these, is admitted even by those psychologists whose doctrine is thereby placed in overt contradiction to our original beliefs. Though perhaps superfluous to allege authorities in support of such a point, we refer, however, to the following, which happen to occur to our recollection.—DESCARTES, *De Pass.* art. 26.—MALEBRANCHE, *Rech.* l. iii. c. 1.—BERKELEY, *Works*, i. p. 216. and quoted by Reid, *Es. I. P.* p. 165.—HUME, *Treat. H. N.* i. pp. 330, 338, 353, 358, 361, 369, *orig. ed.*—*Essays*, ii. pp. 154, 157, *ed.* 1788.—As not generally accessible, we translate the following extracts.—SCHELLING (*Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur. Einl.* p. xix. 1st ed.)—‘When (in perception) I represent an object, *object and representation are one and the same.* And simply in this our inability to discriminate the object from the representation during the act, lies the conviction which the common sense of mankind (*gemeine Verstand*) has of the reality of external things, although these become known to it, only through representations.’ (See also p. xxvi.)—We cannot recover, at the moment, a passage, to the same effect, in Kant; but the ensuing is the testimony of an eminent disciple.—TEN-NEMANN (*Gesch. d. Phil. II.* p. 294), speaking of Plato: ‘*The illusion that things in themselves are cognizable, is so natural, that we need not marvel if*

object of perception constitutes only a subjective phenomenon, was too acute, not to discern that, on this hypothesis, philosophy could not, without contradiction, appeal to the evidence of our elementary faiths.—‘Allowing idealism,’ he says, ‘to be as dangerous as it truly is, it would still remain a *scandal to philosophy* and human reason in general, to be compelled to accept the existence of external things on the testimony of mere belief.’*

even philosophers have not been able to emancipate themselves from the prejudice. The common sense of mankind (*gemeine Menschenverstand*) which remains steadfast *within the sphere of experience*, recognizes *no distinction between things in themselves* [unknown reality existing] and *phenomena* [representation, object known]; and the philosophizing reason, commences therewith its attempt to investigate the foundations of this knowledge, and to recall itself into system.’—See also JACOBI’S *David Hume, passim* (*Werke*, ii.) and his *Altwills Briefsammlung* (*Werke*, i. p. 119, *ets.*) Reid has been already quoted.

* *Cr. d. r. V.—Vorr.* p. xxxix. Kant’s marvellous acuteness did not however enable him to bestow on his ‘*Only possible demonstration of the reality of an external world*’ (*ibid.* p. 275, *ets.*), even a logical necessity; nor prevent his *transcendental*, from being apodeictically resolved (by Jacobi and Fichte¹) into *absolute*, idealism. In this argument, indeed, he collects more in the conclusion, than was contained in the antecedent; and reaches it by a double *saltus*, overleaping the foundations both of the egoistical and mystical idealists.—Though Kant, in the passage quoted above and in other places, apparently derides the common sense of mankind, and altogether rejects it as a metaphysical principle of truth; he at last, however, found it necessary (in order to save philosophy from the annihilating energy of his *Speculative Reason*) to rest on that very principle of an ultimate belief (which he had originally spurned as a basis even of a material reality), the reality of all the sublimest objects of our interest—God, Free Will, Immortality, &c. His *Practical Reason*, as far as it extends, is, in truth, only another (and not even a

1 ‘The doctrine of Kant has been rigorously proved by Jacobi and Fichte to be, in its legitimate issue, a doctrine of absolute Idealism; and the demonstrations which the philosopher of Königsberg has given of the existence of an external world, have been long admitted, even by his disciples themselves, to be inconclusive. But our Scottish philosophers appeal to an argument which the German philosopher overtly rejects.—the argument, as it is called, from common sense. In their hands, however, this argument is unavailing; for, if it be good against the conclusions of the Idealist, it is good against the premises which they afford him. The common sense of mankind only assures us of the existence of an external and extended world, in assuring us that we are conscious, not merely of the phenomena of mind in relation to matter, but of the phenomena of

But Reid is not like Brown, *felo de se* in his reasoning from our natural beliefs; and on his genuine doctrine of perception, the argument has a very different tendency. Reid asserts that his doctrine of perception is itself a confutation of the ideal system; and so, when its imperfections are supplied, it truly is. For it at once denies to the skeptic and idealist the premises of their conclusion; and restores to the realist, in its omnipotence, the argument of common sense. The skeptic and idealist can only found on the admission, that the *object known* is not convertible with the *reality existing*; and, at the same time, this admission, by placing the facts of consciousness in mutual contradiction, denies its postulate to the argument from our beliefs. Reid's analysis therefore in its result,—THAT WE HAVE, AS WE BELIEVE WE HAVE, AN IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MATERIAL REALITY,—accomplished every thing at once.*

Dr. Brown is not, however, more erroneous in thinking that the argument from common sense *could* be employed by him, than in supposing that its legitimacy, as so employed, *was* admit-

better) term for *Common Sense*.¹—Fichte, too, escaped the *admitted nihilism* of his speculative philosophy, only by a similar inconsequence in his practical. —(See his *Bestimmung des Menschen*.) '*Naturam expellas furca,*' &c.

* [This is spoken too absolutely. Reid I think was correct in the aim of his philosophy; but in the execution of his purpose he is often at fault, often confused, and sometimes even contradictory. I have endeavored to point out and to correct these imperfections in the edition which I have not yet finished of his works.]

matter in relation to mind—' in other words that we are immediately percipient of extended things.

Reid himself seems to have become obscurely aware of this condition; and, though he never retracted his doctrine concerning the mere *suggestion* of *extension*, we find in his "Essays on the Intellectual Powers," assertions in regard to the immediate perception of external things, which would tend to show that his later views were more in unison with the necessary conviction of mankind.' Reid, p. 129.—W.

¹ 'This philosopher, in one of his controversial treatises, imprecates eternal damnation on himself not only should he retract, but should he even waver in regard to any one principle of his doctrine; a doctrine, the speculative result of which left him, as he confesses, without even a certainty of his own existence. It is Varro who speaks of the *credulo philosophorum natio*; but this is to be credulous even in credulity.'—Reid, p. 281.—W.

ted by Hume. So little did he suspect the futility, in his own hands, of this proof, he only regards it as superfluous, if opposed to that philosopher, who, he thinks, in allowing the belief in the existence of matter to be *irresistible*, allows it to be *true*. (Lect. xxviii. p. 176.) Dr. Brown has committed, perhaps, more *important* mistakes than this, in regard to skepticism and to Hume;—none certainly more *fundamental*. Hume is converted into a dogmatist; the essence of skepticism is misconceived.

On the hypothesis *that our natural beliefs are fallacious*, it is not for the Pyrrhonist to reject, but to establish their authenticity; and so far from the admission of their strength being a surrender of his doubt, the very triumph of skepticism consists in proving them to be *irresistible*. By what demonstration is the foundation of all certainty and knowledge so effectually subverted, as by showing that the principles, which reason constrains us speculatively to admit, are contradictory of the facts, which our instincts compel us practically to believe? Our intellectual nature is thus seen to be divided against itself; consciousness stands self-convicted of delusion. ‘Surely we have eaten the fruit of lies!’

This is the scope of the ‘*Essay on the Academical or Skeptical Philosophy*,’ from which Dr. Brown quotes. In that essay, previous to the quotation, Hume shows, on the admission of philosophers, that our *belief in the knowledge* of material things, *as impossible is false*; and on this admission, he had irresistibly established the *speculative* absurdity of our belief in the existence of an external world. In the passage, on the contrary, which Dr. Brown *partially* extracts, he is showing that this idealism, which in *theory* must be admitted, is in *application* impossible. Speculation and practice, nature and philosophy, sense and reason, belief and knowledge, thus placed in mutual antithesis, give, as their result, the uncertainty of every principle; and the assertion of this uncertainty is—*Skepticism*. This result is declared even in the sentence, with the preliminary clause of which, Dr. Brown abruptly terminates his quotation.

But allowing Dr. Brown to be correct in transmuting the skeptical nihilist into a dogmatic realist; he would still be wrong (on the supposition that Hume admitted the *truth* of a belief to be convertible with its *invincibility*) in conceiving, on the one hand, that Hume could ever acquiesce in the same inconsequent conclusion with himself; or, on the other, that he himself could, without an abandonment of his system, acquiesce in the legitimate conclusion. On this supposition, Hume could only have arrived at a similar result with Reid; there is no tenable medium between the *natural realism* of the one and the *skeptical nihilism* of the other.—‘Do you follow,’ says Hume in the same essay, ‘the instincts and propensities of nature in assenting to the veracity of sense?’—I do, says Dr. Brown. (Lect. xxviii. p. 176, alibi.)—‘But these,’ continues Hume, ‘lead you to believe that the *very perception or sensible image is the external object*. Do you *disclaim this principle* in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external?—It is the vital principle of my system, says Brown, that the mind knows nothing beyond its own states (Lect. passim); philosophical suicide is not my choice; I must recall my admission, and give the lie to this natural belief.—‘You here,’ proceeds Hume, ‘depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove, that the perceptions are connected with any external objects.’—I allow, says Brown, that the existence of an external world cannot be proved by *reasoning*, and that the skeptical argument admits of no logical reply. (Lect. xxviii. p. 175.)—‘But’ (we may suppose Hume to conclude) ‘as you truly maintain that the confutation of skepticism can be attempted only in *two* ways (ibid.),—either by showing that its arguments are inconclusive, or by opposing to them, as paramount, the evidence of our natural beliefs,—and as you now, voluntarily or by compulsion, abandon *both*; you are confessedly reduced to the dilemma, either of acquiescing in the conclusion of the skeptic, or of refusing your

assent upon no ground whatever. *Pyrrhonism or absurdity?*—choose your horn.'

Were the skepticism into which Dr. Brown's philosophy is thus analyzed, confined to the negation of matter, the result would be comparatively unimportant. The transcendent reality of an outer world, considered absolutely, is to us a matter of supreme indifference. It is not the idealism itself that we must deplore; but the mendacity of consciousness which it involves. Consciousness, once convicted of falsehood, an unconditional skepticism, in regard to the character of our intellectual being, is the melancholy, but only rational, result. Any conclusion may now with impunity be drawn against the hopes and dignity of human nature. Our *Personality*, our *Immateriality*, our *Moral Liberty*, have no longer an argument for their defence. 'Man is the dream of a shadow;' God is the dream of that dream.

Dr. Brown, after the best philosophers, rests the proof of our *personal identity*, and of our *mental individuality*, on the ground of *beliefs*, which, as 'intuitive, universal, immediate, and irresistible,' he not unjustly regards as 'the internal and never-ceasing voice of our Creator,—revelations from on high, omnipotent [and veracious] as their author.' To him this argument is however incompetent, as contradictory.

What we know of *self* or *person*, we know, only as given in consciousness. In our perceptive consciousness there is revealed as an ultimate fact a *self* and a *not-self*; each given as independent—each known only in antithesis to the other. No belief is more 'intuitive, universal, immediate, or irresistible,' than that this antithesis is real and known to be real; no belief is therefore more true. If the antithesis be illusive, *self* and *not-self*, *subject* and *object*, *I* and *Thou* are distinctions without a difference; and consciousness, so far from being 'the internal voice of our Creator,' is shown to be, like Satan, 'a liar from the beginning.' The reality of this antithesis, in *different parts* of his philosophy Dr. Brown *affirms and denies*.—In establishing his theory of perception, he articulately denies, that mind is conscious of aught be-

yond itself; virtually asserts that what is there given in consciousness as *not-self*, is only a phenomenal illusion,—a modification of self, which our consciousness determines us to believe the quality of something numerically and substantially different. Like Narcissus again, he must lament,—

‘*Ille ego sum sensi, sed me mea fallit imago.*’

After this implication in one part of his system that our belief in the distinction of self and not-self is nothing more than the deception of a lying consciousness; it is startling to find him, in others, appealing to the beliefs of this same consciousness as to ‘revelations from on high;’—nay, in an especial manner alleging ‘as the voice of our Creator,’ this very faith in the distinction of self and not-self, through the fallacy of which, and of which alone, he had elsewhere argued consciousness of falsehood.

On the *veracity* of this *mendacious* belief, Dr. Brown establishes his proof of our PERSONAL IDENTITY. (Lect. xii.—xv.) Touching the object of perception, when its evidence is *inconvenient*, this belief is quietly passed over as incompetent to distinguish *not-self from self*; in the question regarding our personal identity, where its testimony is *convenient*, it is clamorously cited as an inspired witness, exclusively competent to distinguish *self from not-self*. Yet, why, if in the one case, it mistook *self* for *not-self*, it may not, in the other, mistake *not-self* for *self*, would appear a problem not of the easiest solution.

The same belief, with the same inconsistency, is again called in to prove the INDIVIDUALITY OF MIND. (Lect. xevi.) But if we are fallaciously determined, in perception, to believe what is supposed *indivisible, identical, and one*, to be *plural and different and incompatible* (self = self + not-self); how, on the authority of the same treacherous conviction, dare we maintain, that the *phenomenal unity of consciousness* affords a guarantee of the *real simplicity of the thinking principle*? The materialist may now contend, without fear of contradiction, that *self* is only an *illusive phenomenon*; that our consecutive identity is that of the Delphic

ship, and our present unity merely that of a system of co-ordinate activities. To explain the phenomenon, he has only to suppose, as certain theorists have lately done, an organ to tell the lie of our personality; and to quote as authority for the lie itself, the perfidy of consciousness, on which the theory of a representative perception is founded.

On the hypothesis of a representative perception, there is, in fact, no salvation from materialism, on the one side, short of idealism—scepticism—nihilism, on the other. Our knowledge of *mind* and *matter*, as substances, is merely relative; they are known to us only in their qualities; and we can justify the postulation of *two different substances*, exclusively on the supposition of the incompatibility of the double series of phenomena to cohere in *one*. Is this supposition disproved?—the presumption against dualism is again decisive. ‘*Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity*’—‘*A plurality of principles is not to be assumed where the phenomena can be explained by one.*’ In Brown’s theory of perception he abolishes the incompatibility of the two series; and yet his argument, as a dualist, for an immaterial principle of thought, proceeds on the ground, that this incompatibility subsists. (Lect. xvi. pp. 646, 647.) This philosopher denies us an immediate knowledge of aught beyond the accidents of mind. The accidents which we refer to body, as known to us, are only states or modifications of the percipient subject itself; in other words, the qualities we call *material*, are known by us to *exist*, only as they are known by us to *inhere in the same substance as the qualities we denominate mental*. There is an *apparent* antithesis, but a *real identity*. On this doctrine, the hypothesis of a double principle losing its necessity, becomes philosophically absurd; and on the law of parsimony, a psychological unitarianism, at best, is established. To the argument, that the qualities of the *object* are so repugnant to the qualities of the *subject* of perception, that they cannot be supposed the accidents of the same substance; the unitarian—whether materialist, idealist, or absolutist—has only to reply: that so far from the attri-

butes of the object being exclusive of the attributes of the subject in this act; the hypothetical dualist himself establishes, as the fundamental axiom of his philosophy of mind, *that the object known is universally identical with the subject knowing*. The materialist may now derive the subject from the object, the idealist derive the object from the subject, the absolutist sublimate both into indifference, nay, the nihilist subvert the *substantial* reality of either;—the hypothetical realist so far from being able to resist the conclusion of any, in fact accords their assumptive premises to all.

The same contradiction would, in like manner, invalidate every presumption in favor of our LIBERTY OF WILL. But as Dr. Brown throughout his scheme of Ethics advances no argument in support of this condition of our moral being, which his philosophy otherwise tends to render impossible, we shall say nothing of this consequence of hypothetical realism.

So much for the system, which its author fondly imagines, ‘*allows to the skeptic no resting-place for his foot,—no fulcrum for the instrument he uses* ;’ so much for the doctrine which Brown would substitute for Reid’s;—nay, which he even supposes Reid himself to have maintained.

‘SCILICET, HOC TOTUM FALSA RATIONE RECEPTUM EST!’*

* [In this criticism I have spoken only of Dr. Brown’s mistakes, and of those only with reference to his attack on Reid. On his appropriating to himself the observations of others, and in particular those of Destutt Tracy, I have said nothing, though an enumeration of these would be necessary to place Brown upon his proper level. That, however, would require a separate discussion.]

CHAPTER II.

REPRESENTATIVE AND PRESENTATIVE KNOWLEDGE.¹

§ I.—THE DISTINCTION OF PRESENTATIVE, INTUITIVE OR IMMEDIATE, AND OF REPRESENTATIVE OR MEDIATE COGNITION; WITH THE VARIOUS SIGNIFICATIONS OF THE TERM OBJECT, ITS CONJUGATES AND CORRELATIVES.

THE correlative terms, *Immediate* and *Mediate*, as attributes of *knowledge* and its modifications, are employed in more than a single relation. In order, therefore, to obviate misapprehension, it is necessary, in the first place, to determine in what signification it is, that we are at present to employ them.

In apprehending an individual thing, either itself through sense, or its representation in the phantasy, we have, in a certain sort, an absolute or irrelative cognition, which is justly denominated *immediate*, by contrast to the more relative and *mediate* knowledge, which, subsequently, we compass of the same object, when, by a comparative act of the understanding we refer it to a class, that is, think or recognize it, by relation to other things under a certain notion or general term. With this distinction we have nothing now to do. The discrimination of *immediate* and *mediate* knowledge, with which we are at present concerned, lies within and subdivides what constitutes, in the foregoing division, the branch of *immediate* cognition; for we are only here to deal with the knowledge of individual objects absolutely considered, and not viewed in relation to aught beyond themselves.

This distinction of immediate and mediate cognition it is of the

¹ Hamilton's second Supplementary Dissertation on Reid constitutes this chapter.—*W.*

highest importance to establish ; for it is one without which the whole philosophy of knowledge must remain involved in ambiguities. What, for example, can be more various, vacillating, and contradictory, than the employment of the all-important terms *object* and *objective*, in contrast to *subject* and *subjective*, in the writings of Kant ?—though the same is true of those of other recent philosophers. This arose from the want of a preliminary determination of the various, and even opposite meanings, of which these terms are susceptible,—a selection of the one proper meaning,—and a rigorous adherence to the meaning thus preferred. But, in particular, the doctrine of Natural Realism cannot, without this distinction, be adequately understood, developed, and discriminated. Reid, accordingly, in consequence of the want of it, has not only failed in giving to his philosophy its precise and appropriate expression, he has failed even in withdrawing it from equivocation and confusion,—insomuch, that it even remains a question, whether his doctrine be one of Natural Realism at all.—The following is a more articulate development of this important distinction than that which I gave some ten years ago¹ and since, by more than one philosopher adopted.

For the sake of distinctness, I shall state the different momenta of the distinction in separate *Propositions* ; and these for more convenient reference I shall number.

1.—A thing is known *immediately* or *proximately*, when we cognize it *in itself* ; *mediately* or *remotely*, when we cognize it *in or through something numerically different from itself*. Immediate cognition, thus the knowledge of a thing in itself, involves the *fact* of its existence ; mediate cognition, thus the knowledge of a thing in or through something not itself, involves only the *possibility* of its existence.

2.—An immediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is *itself presented* to observation, may be called a *presentative* ; and inasmuch as the thing presented is, as it were, *viewed by*

¹ See previous chapter, p. 178.—W.

the mind face to face, may be called an *intuitive** cognition.—A mediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is *held up or mirrored to the mind in a vicarious representation*, may be called a *representative †* cognition.

3.—A *thing known* is called an *object* of knowledge.

4.—In a presentative or immediate cognition there is *one sole object*; the thing (immediately) known and the thing existing being one and the same.—In a representative or mediate cognition there may be discriminated *two objects*; the thing (immediately) known, and the thing existing being numerically different.

5.—A thing known *in itself* is the (sole) *presentative* or *intuitive object* of knowledge, or the (sole) object of a *presentative* or *intuitive knowledge*.—A thing known *in and through something else* is the *primary, mediate, remote, † real, § existent, or represent-*

* On the application of the term *Intuitive*, in this sense, see in the sequel of this Excursus, p. 256, a. b.

† The term *Representation* I employ always strictly, as in contrast to *Presentation*, and, therefore, with exclusive reference to individual objects, and not in the vague generality of *Representatio* or *Vorstellung* in the Leibnitzian and subsequent philosophies of Germany, where it is used for any cognitive act, considered, not in relation to what knows, but to what is known; that is, as the genus including under it Intuitions, Perceptions, Sensations, Conceptions, Notions, Thoughts proper, &c., as species.

‡ The distinction of *proximate* and *remote* object is sometimes applied to perception in a different manner. Thus Color (the White of the Wall for instance), is said to be the *proximate* object of vision, because it is seen immediately; the colored thing (the Wall itself for instance) is said to be the *remote* object of vision, because it is seen only through the mediation of the color. This however is inaccurate. For the Wall, that in which the color inheres, however mediately *known*, is never mediately *seen*. It is not indeed an *object* of *perception* at all; it is only the *subject* of such an *object*, and is reached by a cognitive process, different from the merely perceptive.

§ *On the term Real*.—The term *Real* (*realis*), though always importing *the existent*, is used in various significations and oppositions. The following occur to me:

1. As denoting *existence*, in contrast to the *nomenclature* of existence,—the *thing*, as contradistinguished from its *name*. Thus we have definitions and divisions *real*, and definitions and divisions *nominal* or *verbal*.

2. As expressing the *existent* opposed to the *non-existent*,—a *something* in

ed, object of (mediate) knowledge,—*objectum quod* ; and a thing through which something else is known is the secondary, imme-

contrast to a *nothing*. In this sense the diminutions of existence, to which reality, in the following significations, is counterposed, are *all real*.

3. As denoting *material* or *external*, in contrast to *mental*, *spiritual*, or *internal*, existence. This meaning is improper ; so, therefore, is the term *Realism*, as equivalent to *Materialism*, in the nomenclature of some recent philosophers.

4. As synonymous with *actual* ; and this (a. as opposed to *potential*, b.) as opposed to *possible* existence.

5. As denoting *absolute* or *irrespective*, in opposition to *phenomenal* or *relative*, existence ; in other words, as denoting things in themselves and out of relation to all else, in contrast to things in relation to, and as known by, intelligences, like men, who know only under the conditions of plurality and difference. In this sense, which is rarely employed and may be neglected, the Real is only another term for the Unconditioned or Absolute,— $\tau\delta\ \delta\upsilon\omega\varsigma\ \delta\upsilon$.

6. As indicating existence considered as a *subsistence in nature* (*ens extra animam, ens naturæ*), it stands counter to an existence considered as a *representation in thought*. In this sense, *reale*, in the language of the older philosophy (Scholastic, Cartesian, Gassendian), as applied to *esse* or *ens*, is opposed to *intentionale, notionale, conceptibile, imaginarium, rationis, cognitionis, in anima, in intellectu, prout cognitum, ideale, &c.* ; and corresponds with a *parte rei*, as opposed to a *parte intellectus*, with *subjectivum*, as opposed to *objectivum* (see p. 240 b. sq. note), with *proprium, principale, and fundamentale*, as opposed to *vicarium*, with *materiale*, as opposed to *formale*, and with *formale in seipso*, and *entitativum*, as opposed to *representativum, &c.* Under this head, in the vacillating language of our more recent philosophy, *real* approximates to, but is hardly convertible with *objective*, in contrast to *subjective* in the signification there prevalent.

7. In close connection with the sixth meaning, *real*, in the last place, denotes an identity or difference founded on the conditions of the existence of a thing in itself, in contrast to an identity or difference founded only on the relation or point of view in which the thing may be regarded by the thinking subject. In this sense it is opposed to *logical* or *rational*, the terms being here employed in a peculiar meaning. Thus a thing which *really* (*re*) or in itself is one and indivisible may *logically* (*ratione*) by the mind be considered as diverse and plural, and vice versa, what are *really* diverse and plural may *logically* be viewed, as one and indivisible. As an example of the former ;—the sides and angles of a triangle (or trilateral), as mutually correlative—as together making up the same simple figure—and as, without destruction of that figure, actually inseparable from it, and from each other, are *really* one ; but inasmuch as they have peculiar relations which may, in thought be considered severally and for themselves, they are *logically* twofold. In like manner take apprehension and judgment. These are *really* one, as each involves the other (for we apprehend only as we judge something to be, and we judge only, as we apprehend the existence of the terms compared), and as together

mediate, proximate, ideal, vicarious or representative, object of (mediate) knowledge,—objectum quo, or per quod.* The former may likewise be styled *objectum entitativum.*

6.—The Ego as the subject of thought and knowledge is now commonly styled by philosophers simply *The Subject*; and *Subjective* is a familiar expression for what pertains to the mind or thinking principle. In contrast and correlation to these, the terms *Object* and *Objective* are, in like manner now in general use to denote the Non-ego, its affections and properties,—and in general the Really existent as opposed to the Ideally known. These expressions, more especially *Object* and *Objective*, are ambiguous; for though the Non-ego may be the more frequent and obtrusive object of cognition, still a *mode of mind* constitutes an *object of thought and knowledge*, no less than a *mode of matter*. Without, therefore, disturbing the preceding nomenclature, which is not only ratified but convenient, I would propose that, when we wish to be precise, or where any ambiguity is to be dreaded, we should employ on the one hand, either the terms *subject-object* or *subjective object* (and this we could again distinguish as *absolute* or as *relative*)—on the other, either *object-object*, or *objective object.*†

they constitute a single indivisible act of cognition; but they are *logically* double, inasmuch as, by mental abstraction, they may be viewed each for itself, and as a distinguishable element of thought. As an example of the latter; individual things, as John, James, Richard, &c., are *really* (numerically) different, as coexisting in nature only under the condition of plurality; but, as resembling objects constituting a single class or notion (man) they are *logically* considered (generically or specifically) identical and one.

* I eschew, in general, the employment of the words *Idea* and *Ideal*—they are so vague and various in meaning. But they cannot always be avoided, as the conjugates of the indispensable term *Idealism*. Nor is there, as I use them, any danger from their ambiguity; for I always manifestly employ them simply for subjective—(what is in or of the mind), in contrast to objective—(what is out of, or external to, the mind).

† *The terms Subject and Subjective, Object and Objective.*—I have already had occasion to show, that, in the hands of recent philosophers, the principal terms of philosophy have not only been frequently changed from their original meanings and correlations, but those meanings and correlations sometimes even simply reversed. I have again to do this in reference to the cor-

7.—If the representative object be supposed (according to one theory) a mode of the conscious mind or self, it may be distin-

relatives *subjective* and *objective*, as employed to denote what Aristotle vaguely expressed by the terms τὰ ἡμῖν and τὰ φύσει—the things in us, and the things in nature.

The terms *subject* and *object* were, for a long time, not sufficiently discriminated from each other.—Even in the writings of Aristotle τὸ ὑποκείμενον is used ambiguously for *id in quo*, the *subject proper*, and *id circa quod*, the *object proper*;—and this latter meaning is unknown to Plato. The Greek language never, in fact, possessed any one term of equal universality, and of the same definite signification, as *object*. For the term ἀντικείμενον, which comes the nearest, Aristotle uses, like Plato, in the plural, to designate, in general, the various kinds of *opposites*; and there is, I believe, only a single passage to be found in his writings (De An. ii. c. 4), in which this word can be adequately translated by *object*. The reason of this, at first sight, apparent deficiency may have been that as no language, except the Greek, could express, not by a periphrasis, but by a special word, the *object* of every several faculty or application of mind (as αἰσθητόν, φανταστόν, νοητόν, γνωστόν, ἐπιστητόν, βουλευτόν, ὀρεκτόν, βουλευτόν, πιστόν, &c., &c.), so the Greek philosophers alone found little want of a term precisely to express the abstract notion of *objectivity* in its indeterminate universality, which they could apply, as they required it, in any determinate relation. The schoolmen distinguished the *subjectum occupationis*, from the *subjectum inhæasionis, prædicationis, &c.*, limiting the term *objectum* (which in classical Latin had never been naturalized as an absolute term, even by the philosophers) to the former; and it would have been well had the term *subjectum*, in that sense, been, at the same time, wholly renounced. This was not, however, done. Even to the present day, the word *subject* is employed, in most of the vernacular languages, for the *materia circa quam*, in which signification the term *object* ought to be exclusively applied. But a still more intolerable abuse has recently crept in; *object* has, in French and English, been for above a century vulgarly employed for *end, motive, final cause*. But to speak of these terms more in detail.

The term *object* (*objectum, id quod obicitur cognitioni, &c.*) involves a two-fold element of meaning. 1º, it expresses something absolute, something in itself that is; for before a thing can be presented to cognition, it must be supposed to exist. 2º, It expresses something relative; for in so far as it is presented to cognition, it is supposed to be only as it is known to exist. Now if the equipoise be not preserved, if either of these elements be allowed to preponderate, the word will assume a meaning precisely opposite to that which it would obtain from the preponderance of the other. If the first element prevail, *object* and *objective* will denote that which exists of its own nature, in contrast to that which exists only under the conditions of our faculties;—the *real* in opposition to the *ideal*. If the second element prevail, *object* and *objective* will denote what exists only as it exists in thought;—the *ideal* in contrast to the *real*.

Now both of these counter meanings of the terms *object* and *objective* have obtained in the nomenclature of different times and different philosophies,—

guished as *Egoistical* ; if it be supposed (according to another) something numerically different from the conscious mind or self,

may in the nomenclature of the same time and even the same philosophy. Hence great confusion and ambiguity.

In the scholastic philosophy in which, as already said, *object* and *objective*, *subject* and *subjective*, were first employed in their high abstraction, and as absolute terms, and, among the systems immediately subsequent, in the Cartesian and Gassendian schools, the latter meaning was the one exclusively prevalent. In these older philosophies, *objectivum*, as applied to *ens* or *esse*, was opposed to *formale* and *subjectivum* ; and corresponded with *intentionale*, *vicarium*, *representativum*, *rationale* or *rationis*, *intellectuale* or *in intellectu*, *prout cognitum*, *ideale*, &c., as opposed to *reale*, *proprium*, *principale*, *fundamentale*, *prout in seipso*, &c.

In these schools the *esse subjectivum*, in contrast to the *esse objectivum*, denoted a thing considered as inhering in its subject, whether that subject were mind or matter, as contradistinguished from a thing considered as present to the mind only as an accidental object of thought. Thus the faculty of imagination, for example, and its acts, were said to have a *subjective* existence in the mind ; while its several images or representations had, *qua* images or objects of consciousness, only an *objective*. Again, a material thing, say a horse, *qua* existing, was said to have a *subjective* being out of the mind ; *qua* conceived or known, it was said to have an *objective* being in the mind. Every thought has thus a *subjective* and an *objective* phasis ;—of which more particularly as follows :

1. The *esse subjectivum*, *formale*, or *proprium* of a *notion*, *concept*, *species*, *idea*, &c., denoted it as considered absolutely for itself, and as distinguished from the thing, the real object, of which it is the notion, species, &c. ; that is, simply as a mode inherent in the mind as a subject, or as an operation exerted by the mind as a cause. In this relation, the *esse reale* of a notion, species, &c., was opposed to the following.

2. The *esse objectivum*, *vicarium*, *intentionale*, *ideale*, *representativum* of a *notion*, *concept*, *species*, *idea*, &c., denoted it, not as considered absolutely for itself, and as distinguished from its object, but simply as vicarious or representative of the thing thought. In this relation the *esse reale* of a notion, &c., was opposed to the mere negation of existence—only distinguished it from a simple *nothing*.

Hitherto we have seen the application of the term *objective* determined by the preponderance of the second of the two counter elements of meaning ; we have now to regard it in its subsequent change of sense as determined by the first.

The cause of this change I trace to the more modern Schoolmen, in the distinction they took of *conceptus* (as also of *notio* and *intentio*) into *formalis* and *objectivus*,—a distinction both in itself and in its nomenclature, inconsistent and untenable.—A *formal* concept or notion they defined—‘the immediate and actual representation of the thing thought ;’ an *objective* concept or notion they defined—‘the thing itself which is represented or thought.’—

it may be distinguished as *Non-Egoistical*.¹ The former theory supposes *two* things numerically different: 1°, the object repre-

Now, in the first place, the second of these, is, either not a concept or notion at all, or it is indistinguishable from the first. (A similar absurdity is committed by Loeke in his employment of *Idea* for its object—the reality represented by it—the *Ideatum*.)—In the second place, the terms *formal* and *objective* are here used in senses precisely opposite to what they were when the same philosophers spoke of the *esse formale* and *esse objectivum* of a notion.

This distinction and the terms in which it was expressed came however to be universally admitted. Hence, though proceeding from an error, I would account in part, but in part only, for the general commutation latterly effected in the application of the term *objective*. This change began, I am inclined to think, about the middle of the seventeenth century—and in the German schools. Thus Calovius—‘*Quicquid objective fundamentaliter in natura existit,*’ &c. (*Scripta Philosophica*, 1651, p. 72.) In the same sense it is used by Leibnitz; e. g. *N. Essais*, p. 187; and subsequently to him by the Leibnitio-Wolffians and other German philosophers in general. This application of the term, it is therefore seen, became prevalent among his countrymen long before the time of Kant; in the ‘*Logica*’ of whose master Knutzen, I may notice, *objective* and *subjective*, in their modern meaning are employed in almost every page. The English philosophers, at the commencement of the last century, are found sometimes using the term *objective* in the old sense,—as Berkeley in his ‘*Siris*,’ § 292; sometimes in the new,—as Norris in his ‘*Reason and Faith*’ (ch. 1), and Oldfield in his ‘*Essay towards the improvement of Reason*’ (Part ii. c. 19), who both likewise oppose it to *subjective*, taken also in its present acceptation.

But the cause, why the general terms *subject* and *subjective*, *object* and *objective*, came, in philosophy, to be simply applied to a certain special distinction; and why, in that distinction, they came to be opposed as contraries—this is not to be traced alone to the inconsistencies which I have noticed; for that inconsistency itself must be accounted for. It lies deeper. It is to be found in the constituent elements of all knowledge itself; and the nomenclature in question is only an elliptical abbreviation, and restricted application of the scholastic expressions by which these elements have for many ages been expressed.

All knowledge is a relation—a relation between that which knows (in scholastic language, the *subject* in which knowledge inheres), and that which is known (in scholastic language, the *object* about which knowledge is conversant); and the contents of every act of knowledge are made up of elements, and regulated by laws, proceeding partly from its object and partly from its subject. Now philosophy proper is principally and primarily the *science of knowledge*; its first and most important problem being to determine—*What can we know?* that is, what are the conditions of our knowing, whether

¹ See the next chapter.—W.

mented,—2°, the representing and cognizant mind :—the latter, *three* ; 1°, the object represented,—2°, the object representing,—3°, the cognizant mind. Compared merely with each other, the former, as simpler, may, *by contrast* to the latter, be considered,

these lie in the nature of the object, or in the nature of the subject, of knowledge ?

But Philosophy being the *Science of Knowledge* ; and the science of knowledge supposing, in its most fundamental and thorough-going analysis, the distinction of the *subject and object of knowledge* ; it is evident, that, to philosophy the *subject of knowledge* would be, by pre-eminence, *The Subject*, and the *object of knowledge* by pre-eminence, *The Object*. It was therefore natural that the *object* and the *objective*, the *subject* and the *subjective* should be employed by philosophers as simple terms, compendiously to denote the grand discrimination, about which philosophy was constantly employed, and which no others could be found so precisely and promptly to express. In fact, had it not been for the special meaning given to *objective* in the Schools, their employment in this their natural relation would probably have been of a much earlier date ; not however that they are void of ambiguity, and have not been often abusively employed. This arises from the following circumstance :—The subject of knowledge is exclusively the Ego or conscious mind. *Subject* and *subjective*, considered in themselves, are therefore little liable to equivocation. But, on the other hand, the *object* of knowledge is not necessarily a phenomenon of the Non-ego ; for the phenomena of the Ego itself constitute as veritable, though not so various and prominent, objects of cognition, as the phenomena of the Non-ego.

Subjective and *objective* do not, therefore, thoroughly and adequately discriminate that which *belongs to mind*, and even that which *belongs to matter* ; they do not even competently distinguish what is *dependent*, from what is *independent, on the conditions of the mental self*. But in these significations they are and must be frequently employed. Without therefore discarding this nomenclature, which, as far as it goes, expresses, in general, a distinction of the highest importance, in the most apposite terms ; these terms may by qualification easily be rendered adequate to those subordinate discriminations, which it is often requisite to signalize, but which they cannot simply and of themselves denote.

Subject and *subjective*, without any qualifying attribute, I would therefore employ, as has hitherto been done, to mark out what inheres in, pertains to, or depends on, the knowing mind whether of man in general, or of this or that individual man in particular ; and this in contrast to *object* and *objective*, as expressing what does not so inhere, pertain, and depend. Thus, for example, an art or science is said to be *objective*, when considered simply as a system of speculative truths or practical rules, but without respect of any actual possessor ; *subjective* when considered as a habit of knowledge or a dexterity, inherent in the mind, either vaguely of any, or precisely of this or that, possessor.

But, as has been stated, an *object* of knowledge may be a mode of mind, or

but still inaccurately, as an immediate cognition.¹ The latter of these as limited in its application to certain faculties, and now in fact wholly exploded, may be thrown out of account.

8.—*External Perception* or *Perception* simply, is the faculty *presentative* or *intuitive* of the phenomena of the Non-Ego or Matter—if there be any *intuitive* apprehension allowed of the Non-Ego at all. *Internal Perception* or *Self-Consciousness* is the faculty *presentative* or *intuitive* of the phenomena of the Ego or mind.

9.—*Imagination* or *Phantasy*,² in its most extensive meaning, is the faculty *representative* of the phenomena both of the external and internal worlds.

10.—A representation considered as an *object* is logically, not really, different from a representation considered as an *act*. Here object and act are merely the same indivisible mode of mind viewed in two different relations. Considered by reference to a (mediate) object represented, it is a representative object; con-

it may be something different from mind; and it is frequently of importance to indicate precisely under which of these classes that object comes. In this case by an internal development of the nomenclature itself, we might employ, on the former alternative, the term *subject-object*; on the latter, the term *object-object*.

But the *subject-object* may be either a mode of mind, of which we are conscious as absolute and for itself alone,—as, for example, a pain or pleasure; or a mode of mind, of which we are conscious, as relative to, and representative of something else,—as, for instance, the imagination of something past or possible. Of these we might distinguish, when necessary, the one, as the *absolute* or the *real subject-object*, the other, as the *relative* or the *ideal* or the *representative subject-object*.

Finally, it may be required to mark whether the *object-object* and the *subject-object* be immediately known as present, or only as represented. In this case we must resort, on the former alternative, to the epithet *presentative* or *intuitive*; on the latter, to those of *represented*, *mediate*, *remote*, *primary*, *principal*, &c.

¹ This observation has reference to Reid. See sequel of this chapter, § ii. and the following chapter, § ii. A, 4.—H.

² 'The Latin *Imaginatio*, with its modifications in the vulgar languages, was employed both in ancient and modern times to express what the Greeks denominated *φαντασία*. *Phantasy*, of which *Phansy* or *Fancy* is a corruption, and now employed in a more limited sense, was a common name for Imagination with the old English writers.'—Reid, p. 379.—H.

sidered by reference to the mind representing and contemplating the representation, it is a representative act. A representative *object* being viewed as posterior in the order of nature, but not of time, to the representative *act*, is viewed as a *product*; and the representative act being viewed as prior in the order of nature, though not of time, to the representative object, is viewed as a *producing process*. The same may be said of Image and Imagination. (Prop. 21, and p. 259, a b, and note.)

11.—A thing to be known *in itself* must be known as *actually existing* (Pr. 1), and it cannot be known as actually existing unless it be known as existing in its *When* and its *Where*. But the *When* and *Where* of an object are *immediately* cognizable by the subject, only if the *When* be now (*i. e.* at the same moment¹ with the cognitive act), and the *Where* be *here* (*i. e.* within the sphere of the cognitive faculty); therefore a presentative or intuitive knowledge is only competent of an object *present* to the mind, both in *time* and in *space*.

12.—E converso—whatever is known, but not as *actually existing now* and *here*, is known not in itself, as the presentative

¹ Time is cognizable and conceivable only as an indefinite past, present, or future. An absolute minimum we cannot fix—an infinite division we cannot carry out. We can conceive Time only as a relative. The Present, so far as construable to thought, has no reality. (See p. 488.) Will Sir William then explain to us what he means by the phrase—*at the same moment with*? In Extensive Quantity he wisely does not demand an *absolute* 'present,' for in that case the Eleatic Zeno's demonstration would hold him motionless. He does seem to demand an absolute present in Extensive Quantity. Absolute present, has no place in *thought*. Perception must take place in time, *i. e.* in an *indefinite* present. Add that Memory, as Hobbes, Descartes, and Aristotle call Imagination, is a dying sense; and what hinders us from saying, with Reid, that Memory is an immediate (=non-mediate) knowledge of the past? It seems to us that Hamilton is here crossing a shadow of the Absolute, and that the question may in part be redargued from his own ground of Relativity. We do not mean that Sir William is wrong in making a distinction between Presentative and Representative knowledge, but that the line of demarkation might be shifted. We here speak briefly, and only to the initiated; and regret that these sheets are passing so rapidly through the press that we cannot discuss the question at some length, for it is one of the most important in philosophy.—W.

object of an intuitive, but only as the remote object of a representative cognition.

13.—A representative object, considered irrespectively of what it represents, and simply as a mode of the conscious subject, is an intuitive or presentative object. For it is known in itself, as a mental mode, actually existing now and here.*

* Propositions 10–13 may illustrate a passage in Aristotle's treatise on Memory and Reminiscence (c. 1), which has been often curiously misunderstood by his expositors; and as it, in return, serves to illustrate the doctrine here stated, I translate it:

‘Of what part of the soul memory is a function, is manifest;—of that, to wit, of which imagination or phantasy is a function. [And imagination had been already shown to be a function of the common sense.]

‘And here a doubt may be started—Whether the affection [or mental modification] being present, the reality absent, that what is not present can be remembered [or, in general, known]. For it is manifest that we must conceive the affection, determined in the soul or its proximate bodily organ, through sense, to be, as it were, a sort of portrait, of which we say that memory is the habit [or retention]. For the movement excited [to employ the simile of Plato] stamps, as it were, a kind of impression of the total process of perception† [on the soul or its organ], after the manner of one who applies a signet to wax. . . .

‘But if such be the circumstances of memory—Is remembrance [a cognition] of this affection, or of that from which it is produced? For, if of the latter, we can have no remembrance [or cognition] of things absent; if of the former, how, as percipient [or conscious of this present affection], can we have a remembrance [or cognition] of that of which we are not percipient [or conscious]—the absent [reality]? Again,‡ supposing there to be a resembling something, such as an impression or picture, in the mind; the perception [or consciousness] of this—Why should it be the remembrance [or cognition] of another thing, and not of this something itself?—for in the act of remembrance we contemplate this mental affection, and of this [alone] are we percipient [or conscious]. In these circumstances, how is a remembrance [or cognition] possible of what is not present? For if so, it would seem that what is not present might, in like manner, be seen and heard.

‘Or is this possible, and what actually occurs? And thus:—As in a portrait the thing painted is an animal, and a representation (*εἰκὼν*) [of an animal], one and the same being, at once, both (for, though in reality both are not the same, in thought we can view the painting, either [absolutely] as animal, or [relatively] as representation [of an animal]); in like manner, the phantasm in us, we must consider, both absolutely, as a phenomenon (*θεώ-*

† *Αἰσθηματος*:—this comprehends both the objective presentation—*αἰσθητόν*, and the subjective energy—*αἰσθησις*.

‡ I read *ἐτι εἰ τι*. Themistius has *ἐτι εἴνε*.

14.—*Consciousness* is a knowledge solely of what is now and here present to the mind. It is therefore only intuitive, and its objects exclusively presentative. Again, *Consciousness* is a knowledge of all that is now and here present to the mind: every immediate object of cognition is thus an object of consciousness, and every intuitive cognition itself, simply a special form of consciousness.

15.—*Consciousness comprehends every cognitive act*; in other words, whatever we are not conscious of, that we do not know. But consciousness is an immediate cognition. Therefore all our mediate cognitions are contained in our immediate.

16.—The actual modifications—the present acts and affections of the *Ego*, are objects of immediate cognition, as themselves objects of consciousness. (Pr. 14.) The past and possible modifications of the *Ego* are objects of mediate cognition, as represented to consciousness in a present or actual modification.

17.—The *Primary Qualities*¹ of matter or body, now and here, that is in proximate relation to our organs, are objects of immediate cognition to the Natural Realists,² of mediate, to the Cosmothetic Idealists:³ the former, on the testimony of consciousness, asserting to mind the capability of intuitively perceiving what is not itself; the latter denying this capability, but asserting to the

φνμα) in itself, and relatively, as a phantasm [or representation] of something different from itself. Considered absolutely, it is a [mere] phenomenon or [irrespective] phantasm; considered relatively, it is a representation or recollective image. So that when a movement [or mental modification] is in present act;—if the soul perceive [or apprehend] it as absolute and for itself, a kind of [irrespective] concept or phantasm seems the result; whereas, if as relative to what is different from itself, it views it (as in the picture) for a representation, and a representation of Coriscus, even although Coriscus has not himself been seen. And here we are differently affected in this mode of viewing [the movement, as painted representation], from what we are when viewing it, as painted animal; the mental phenomenon, in the one case is, so to say, a mere [irrelative] concept; while in the other, what is remembered is here [in the mind], as there [in the picture], a representation.'

¹ On the distinction of the Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter—its history and completion, see below, chap. v.—*W.*

² On these Designations, see above, Part I. and the chapter following this.
—*W.*

mind the power of representing, and truly representing, what it does not know. To the Absolute Idealists' matter has no existence as an object of cognition, either immediate or mediate.

18.—The *Secondary Qualities*² of body *now* and *here*, as only present affections of the conscious subject, determined by an unknown external cause, are, on every theory, now allowed to be objects of immediate cognition. (Pr. 16.)

19.—As not *now present in time*,³ an immediate knowledge of the *past* is impossible. The past is only mediately cognizable in and through a present modification relative to, and representative of it as having been. To speak of an immediate knowledge of the past involves a contradiction *in adjecto*. For to know the past immediately, it must be known *in itself*;—and to be known in itself it must be known as *now existing*. But the past is just a negation of the now existent: its very notion, therefore, excludes the possibility of its being immediately known. So much for Memory, or Recollective Imagination.

20.—In like manner, supposing that a knowledge of the *future* were competent, this can only be conceived possible, in and through a now present representation; that is, only as a mediate cognition. For, as *not yet existent*, the future cannot be known in itself, or as *actually* existent. As *not here present*, an immediate knowledge of an object *distant in space* is likewise impossible.³ For, as beyond the sphere of our organs and faculties, it cannot be known by them in itself; it can only, therefore, if known at all, be known through something different from itself, that is mediately, in a reproductive or a constructive act of imagination.

21.—A *possible* object—an *ens rationis*—is a mere fabrication of the mind itself; it exists only ideally in and through an act of

¹ On these Designations see above, Part I. and the chapter following this.—*W.*

² On the assertions of Reid, Stewart, &c., that the mind is *immediately* percipient of *distant* objects, see § ii. of this chapter, and § ii. of the next chapter.—*W.*

³ See note 1, p. 248.—*W.*

imagination, and has only a logical existence, apart from that act with which it is really identical. (Pr. 10. and p. 259, a b, with note.) It is therefore an intuitive object in itself; but in so far, as not involving a contradiction, it is conceived as prefiguring something which may possibly exist some-where and some-when—this something, too, being constructed out of elements which had been previously given in Presentation—it is Representative.¹

Compared together, these two cognitions afford the following *similarities* and *differences*.

A. Compared by reference to their *simplicity or complexity, as Acts*.

22.—Though both as really considered (*re, non ratiōe*), are equally one and indivisible; still as logically considered (*ratiōe, non re*), an Intuitive cognition is *simple*, being merely intuitive; a Representative, *complex*, as both representative and intuitive of the representation.

B. Compared by reference to the *number of their Objects*.

23.—In a Presentative knowledge there can only be a *single* object, and the term object is here therefore univocal. In a Representative knowledge *two* different things are viewed as objects, and the term object, therefore, becomes equivocal; the secondary object within, being numerically different from the primary object without, the sphere of consciousness, which it represents.

C. Compared by reference to the *relativity of their Objects, known in consciousness*.

24.—In a presentative cognition, the object known in consciousness, being relative only to the conscious subject, may, by contrast, be considered as *absolute* or *irrespective*. In a representative cognition, the object known in consciousness, being, besides the necessary reference to the subject, relative to, as vicarious of, an object unknown to consciousness, must, in every point

¹ See the next chapter, § i.—*W*.

of view, be viewed as *relative* or *respective*. Thus, it is on all hands admitted, that in Self-consciousness the object is subjective and absolute; and, that in Imagination, under every form, it is subjective and relative. In regard to external Perception, opinions differ. For on the doctrine of the Natural Realists, it is objective and absolute; on the doctrine of the Absolute Idealists subjective and absolute; on the doctrine of the Cosmothetic Idealists, subjective and relative.¹

D. Compared by reference to the *character of the existential Judgments* they involve.

25.—The judgment involved in an Intuitive apprehension is *assertory*; for the fact of the intuition being dependent on the fact of the present existence of the object, the existence of the object is unconditionally enounced as actual. The judgment involved in a Representative apprehension is *problematic*; for here the fact of the representation not being dependent on the present existence of the object represented, the existence of that object can be only modally affirmed as possible.

E. Compared by reference to their *character as Cognitions*.

26.—Representative knowledge is admitted on all hands to be exclusively *subjective* or *ideal*; for its proximate object is, on every theory, *in* or *of* the mind, while its remote object, in itself, and except in and through the proximate object, is unknown.—Presentative knowledge is, on the doctrine of the Natural Realists, *partly subjective and ideal, partly objective and real*; inasmuch as its sole object may be a phenomenon either of *self* or of *not-self*: while, on the doctrine of the Idealists (whether Absolute or Cosmothetic) it is *always subjective or ideal*; consciousness, on their hypothesis, being cognizant only of mind and its contents.

F. Compared in respect of their *Self-sufficiency or Dependence*.

27.—a.—In *one* respect, Representative knowledge is *not self-sufficient*, inasmuch as every representative cognition of an object

¹ See the next chapter, § i.—IV.

supposes a previous presentative apprehension of that same object. This is even true of the representation of an imaginary or merely possible object; for though the object, of which we are conscious in such an act, be a mere figment of the phantasy, and, as a now represented whole, was never previously presented to our observation; still that whole is nothing but an assemblage of parts, of which, in different combinations, we have had an intuitive cognition. Presentative knowledge, on the contrary, is, in this respect, *self-sufficient*, being wholly independent on Representative for its objects.

28.—b.—Representative knowledge, in *another* respect, is *not self-sufficient*. For inasmuch as all representation is only the repetition, simple or modified, of what was once intuitively apprehended; Representative is dependent on Presentative knowledge, as (with the mind) the concause and condition of its possibility. Presentative knowledge, on the contrary, is in this respect *independent* of Representative; for with our intuitive cognitions commences all our knowledge.

29.—c.—In a *third* respect Representative knowledge is *not self-sufficient*; for it is only deserving of the name of knowledge in so far as it is conformable with the intuitions which it represents.—Presentative knowledge, on the contrary, is, in this respect, *all-sufficient*; for in the last resort it is the sole vehicle, the exclusive criterion and guarantee of truth.

30.—d.—In a *fourth* respect, Representative knowledge is *not self-sufficient*, being wholly dependent upon Intuitive; for the object represented is only known through an intuition of the subject representing. Representative knowledge always, therefore, involves presentative, as its condition.—Intuitive knowledge, on the contrary, is, in this respect, *all-sufficient*, being wholly independent of representative, which it, consequently, excludes. Thus in different points of view Representative knowledge contains and is contained in, Presentative (Pr. 15).

G.—Compared in reference to their *intrinsic Completeness and Perfection*.

31.—a.—In *one* respect Intuitive knowledge is *complete and perfect*, as irrespective of aught beyond the sphere of consciousness; while Representative knowledge is *incomplete and imperfect*, as relative to what transcends that sphere.

32.—b.—In *another* respect, Intuitive knowledge is *complete and perfect*, as affording the highest certainty of the highest determination of existence—the Actual—the Here and Now existent;—Representative, *incomplete and imperfect*, as affording only an inferior assurance of certain inferior determinations of existence—the Past, the Future, the Possible—the not Here and not Now existent.

33.—c.—In a *third* respect, Intuitive knowledge is *complete and perfect*, its object known being at once real, and known as real;—Representative knowledge, *incomplete and imperfect*, its known object being unreal, its real object unknown.

The precise distinction between Presentative and Representative knowledge, and the different meanings of the term Object,—the want of which has involved our modern philosophy in great confusion,—I had long ago evolved from my own reflection, and before I was aware that a parallel distinction had been taken by the Schoolmen, under the name *Intuitive* and *Abstract* knowledge (*cognitio Intuitiva et Abstractiva*, or *Visionis et Simplicis Intelligentiæ*). Of these, the former they defined—the *knowledge of a thing present as it is present* (*cognitio rei præsentis ut præsens est*); the latter—the *knowledge of a thing not as it is present* (*cognitio rei non ut præsens est*). This distinction remounts, among the Latin Schoolmen, to at least the middle of the eleventh century; for I find that both St. Anselm and Hugo a Sancto Victore notice it. It was certainly not borrowed from the Arabians; for Averroes, at the end of the following century, seems unaware of it. In fact, it bears upon its front the indication of a Christian origin; for, as Scotus and Ariminensis notice, the term

Intuitive was probably suggested by St. Paul's expression, '*facie ad faciem*,' as the Vulgate has it (1 Corinth. xiii. 12). For intuitive, in this sense, the Lower Greeks sometimes employed the terms ἐποπτικός, and αὐτοπτικός—a sense unknown to the Lexicographers;—but they do not appear to have taken the counter distinction. The term *abstract* or *abstractive* was less fortunately chosen than its correlative; for besides the signification in question, as opposed to *intuitive*, in which case we look away from the existence of a concrete object; it was likewise employed in opposition to *concrete*, and, though improperly, as a synonym of *universal*, in which case we look away from each and every individual subject of inhesion. As this last is the meaning in which *abstract* as it was originally, is now exclusively, employed, and as *representative* is, otherwise, a far preferable expression, it would manifestly be worse than idle to attempt its resuscitation in the former sense.

The propriety and importance of the distinction is unquestionable; but the Schoolmen—at least the great majority who held the doctrine of intentional species—wholly spoiled it in application; by calling the representative perception they allowed of external things, by the name of an intuitive cognition, to say nothing of the idle thesis which many of them defended—that by a miracle we could have an intuitive apprehension of a distant, nay even of a non-existent, object. This error, I may notice, is the corollary of another of which I am soon to speak—the holding that external things, though known only through species, are immediately known in themselves.

§ II.—THE ERRORS OF REID AND OTHER PHILOSOPHERS, IN REFERENCE TO THE DISTINCTION OF PRESENTATIVE OR IMMEDIATE AND REPRESENTATIVE OR MEDIATE KNOWLEDGE, AND OF OBJECT PROXIMATE AND REMOTE.

The preceding distinction is one which, for the Natural Realist, it is necessary to establish, in order to discriminate his own

peculiar doctrine of perception from those of the Idealists, Cosmothetic and Absolute, in their various modifications. This, however, Reid unfortunately did not do; and the consequence has been the following imperfections, inaccuracies, and errors.

A. In the first place, he has, at least in words, *abolished the distinction of presentative and representative cognition.*

1°, He asserts, in general, that every object of thought must be an immediate object (I. P. 427 b).

2°, He affirms, in particular, not only of the faculties whose objects are, but of those whose objects are not, actually present to the mind,—that they are all and each of them immediate knowledges. Thus he frequently defines memory (in the sense of recollective imagination) ‘an immediate knowledge of things past’ (I. P. 339 a, 351 b. 357 a); he speaks of an immediate knowledge of things future (I. P. 340 b); and maintains that the immediate object in our conception (imagination) of a distant reality, is that reality itself (I. P. 374 b). See above, Propp. 10, 11, 12, 19, 20, 21.

Now the cause why Reid not only did not establish, but even thought to abolish, the distinction of mediate cognition with its objects proximate and remote, was, 1°, his error, which we are elsewhere to consider,¹ in supposing that philosophers in the proximate object of knowledge, had in view, always, a *tertium quid* different both from the reality represented and the conscious mind (Inq. 106 a, I. P. 226 b, 369 ab); and 2°, his failing to observe that the rejection of this complex hypothesis of non-egoistical representation, by no means involved either the subversion of representative knowledge in general, or the establishment of presentative perception in particular. (See Prop. 7.²)

But Reid’s doctrine in this respect is perhaps imperfectly developed, rather than deliberately wrong; and I am confident that had it been proposed to him, he would at once have acquiesced in the distinction of presentative and representative knowledge, above stated, not only as true in itself, but as necessary to lay a solid

¹ See next chapter, § ii.—*W.*

² See next chapter, § i.—*W.*

foundation for a theory of intuitive perception, in conformity with the common sense of mankind.

B. In the *second* place, Reid maintains *that in our cognitions there must be an object (real or imaginary) distinct from the operation of the mind conversant about it ; for the act is one thing and the object of the act another.* (I. P. 292 b, 305 a, also 298 b, 373 a, 374 b.)

This is erroneous—at least it is erroneously expressed. 'Take an imaginary object, and Reid's own instance—a centaur. Here he says, 'The sole object of conception (imagination) is an animal which I believe never existed.' It 'never existed,' that is never really, never in nature, never externally, existed. But it is 'an object of imagination.' It is not therefore a mere non-existence ; for if it had no kind of existence, it could not possibly be the positive object of any kind of thought. For were it an absolute nothing, it could have no qualities (*non-entis nulla sunt attributa*) ; but the object we are conscious of, as a Centaur, has qualities,—qualities which constitute it a determinate something, and distinguish it from every other entity whatsoever. We must, therefore, per force, allow it some sort of imaginary, ideal, representative, or (in the older meaning of the term) *objective*, existence in the mind. Now this existence can only be one or other of two sorts ; for such object in the mind, either *is*, or *is not*, a *mode of mind*. Of these alternatives the latter cannot be supposed ; for this would be an affirmation of the crudest kind of non-egoistical representation—the very hypothesis against which Reid so strenuously contends. The former alternative remains—that it is a mode of the imagining mind,—that it is in fact the plastic act of imagination¹ considered as representing to itself a certain possible form—a Centaur. But then Reid's assertion—that there is always an object distinct from the operation of the mind convers-

¹ The elements, thus to speak, of the possible form which the imagination in its plastic act, represents to itself, have an objective existence. The form itself, is only a combination of real forms ; the combining of these is the only purely subjective act.—W.

ant about it, the act being one thing, the object of the act another—must be surrendered. For the *object* and the *act* are here only one and the same thing in two several relations.—(Prop. 21.) Reid's error consists in mistaking a logical for a metaphysical difference—a distinction of relation for a distinction of entity. Or is the error only from the vagueness and ambiguity of expression?*

C. In the *third* place, to this head we may refer Reid's *inaccuracy in regard to the precise object of perception*. This object is not, as he seems frequently to assert, any distant reality (Inq. 104 b, 158 b, 159 a b, 160 a, 186 b.—I. P. 299 a, 302 a, 303 a, 304 a, et alibi); for we are percipient of nothing but what is in

* In what manner many of the acutest of the later Schoolmen puzzled themselves likewise, with this, apparently, very simple matter, may be seen in their discussions touching the nature of *Entia Rationis*. I may mention in general, Fonseca, Suarez, Mendoza, Ruvius, Marcia, Oviedo, Arriaga, Carleton, &c., on the one hand; and Biel, Mirandulanus, Jandunus, Valesius, Erice, &c., on the other. I may here insert, though only at present, for the latter paragraph in which Reid's difficulty is solved, the following passage from Biel. It contains important observations to which I must subsequently refer:

'Ad secundum de figmentis dicitur, quod (intelligendo illam similitudinem quam anima fingit, i. e. abstrahit a rebus) sic figmenta sunt actus intelligendi, qui habent esse verum et subjectivum (v. p. 243 a b, note) in anima. Sunt enim qualitates animæ inhærentes; et hi actus sunt naturales similitudines rerum a quibus formantur, quæ sunt objecta eorum; nec oportet ponere aliquod objectum medium inter cognitionem intellectivam actus, et reale ejus objectum.

'Dicuntur autem hujusmodi actus figmenta, quia tales sunt *in representando* rem, quales sunt res representatæ. Non autem talia *in existendo*, i. e. in qualitativis realibus; quia sunt qualitates spirituales, objecta vero frequenter res materiales; sunt autem naturaliter *similes in representando*, quia representant res distincte cum suis habitudinibus sicut sunt realiter; non autem sunt *similes in essendo*, i. e. quod actus [actu] haberent esse reale ejusdem speciei cum suis objectis.

'Quod additur de Chimæra; patet quod aliter chimæra dicitur figmentum, et aliter cognitio rei possibilis. Verum conceptus chimæra, id est actus cognoscendi correspondens huic voci "*Chimæra*," est vera qualitas in mente; tamen illud quod significat nihil est.' In i. Sent. Dist. ii. Qu. 8.

The author of the preceding passage, it must be remembered, allowed no *intentional species*, that is, no representative entities different from the operations of the mind itself.

proximate contact, in immediate relation, with our organs of sense. Distant realities we reach, not by perception, but by a subsequent process of inference founded thereon : and so far, as he somewhere says (I. P. 284 b), from all men who look upon the sun perceiving the same object, in reality, every individual, in this instance, perceives a different object, nay, a different object in each several eye. The doctrine of Natural Realism requires no such untenable assumption for its basis. It is sufficient to establish the simple fact, that we are competent, as consciousness assures us, immediately to apprehend through sense the non-ego in certain limited relations ; and it is of no consequence whatever, either to our certainty of the reality of a material world, or to our ultimate knowledge of its properties, whether by this primary apprehension we lay hold, in the first instance, on a larger or a lesser portion of its contents.

Mr. Stewart also (Elem. vol. i. ch. i. sect. 2, p. 79 sq. 6 ed.), in arguing against the counter doctrine in one of its accidental forms, maintains, in general, that we may be percipient of distant objects. But his observations do not contemplate, therefore do not meet the cardinal questions ;—Is perception a presentative cognition of the non-ego, or only a representative cognition of it, in and through the ego?—and if the former,—Can we apprehend a thing immediately and not know it in itself?—Can we apprehend it as actually existing?—and, Can we apprehend it as actually existing, and not apprehend it in the When and Where of its existence, that is, only as present ?

A misapprehension analogous to that of Reid and Stewart, and of a still more obtrusive character, was made by a majority of those schoolmen, who, as non-egoistical representationists, maintained the hypothesis of intentional species, as media of sensitive perception, imagination, &c. They, in general, held, *that the species is not itself perceived, but the reality through the species*,—and on the following as the principal grounds :—The present objects we perceive by sense, or the absent objects we imagine, are extended, figured, colored, &c. ; but the species are not themselves

extended, figured, colored, &c., they are only representative of these qualities in external objects; the species are not, therefore, themselves objects of knowledge, or, as they otherwise expressed it, do not themselves terminate the cognition.* See, *instar omnium*, De Raconis, Physica, Disp. iii. de An. Sens. App. sect. ii. qu. 4, art. 3.—Irenæus, De Anima, c. 2, sect. 3, § 3.

The error of this doctrine did not, however, escape the observation of the acuter even of those who supported the theory of intentional species. It is exposed by Scaliger the father; and his exposition is advanced as a 'very subtle' speculation. Addressing Cardan, whose work 'De Subtilitate' he is controverting, he says:

'Cum tam præclare de visu sentires, maximam omisisti subtilitatem. Doce me prius sodes—Quid est id quod video? Dices, "Puerilem esse interrogationem—*Rem* enim esse, quæ videatur." At doce quæso nos pueros per salebras hasce Naturæ perreptantes. *Si sensio est receptio; nec recipitur Res; demonstrabitur certissima demonstratione sic;—ergo non sentitur Res.* Aiunt—"Rem videri per Speciem." Intellego; et concludo:—*Species ergo sentitur.* Rem ipsam haud percipit sensus. Species ipsa non est ea res, eujus est species. Isti vero ausi sunt ita dicere;—"Non videri speciem, sed Rem *per* Speciem. Speciem vero esse videndi rationem." Audio verba; rem haud intellego. Non enim est species ratio videndi, ut Lux. Quid igitur?—"Per speciem (inquiunt) vides rem; non potes autem videre speciem, quia necesse esset ut, per speciem, videres." Quæ sententia est omnium absurdissima. Dico enim jam;—*Rem non videri, sed Speciem.* Sensus ergo, recipit speciem; quam rei similem judicat Intellectus, atque sic rem cognoscit per reflexionem.' (De Subtilitate, Ex. cxcviii. § 14.)

* This doctrine, his recent and very able biographer (M. Huët) finds maintained by the great Henry of Ghent, and he adduces it as both an original opinion of the Doctor Solennis, and an anticipation of one of the truths established by the Scottish school. There was, however, nothing new in the opinion; and if an anticipation, it was only the anticipation of an error.—*Récherches, &c.*, pp. 130, 119.

But in correcting one inconsistency Scaliger here falls into another. For how can the reflective intellect judge the species to resemble, that is, correctly to represent the external reality, when, *ex hypothesi*, the reality itself is unknown; unknown in its qualities, unknown even in its existence? This consideration ought to have led 'the Master of Subtilties' to doubt concerning the doctrine of perception by species altogether.

But long before Scaliger, the error in question had been refuted by certain of those Schoolmen who rejected the whole doctrine of intentional species. I was surprised to find the distinction between an immediate and a mediate object, in our acts cognitive of things not actually present to apprehension, advanced by Gregory of Rimini, in a disputation maintained by him against a certain 'Joannes Scotus'—not the Subtle Doctor, who was already gone, but—a Scotchman, who appears to have been a fellow Regent with Gregory in the University of Paris. This doctrine did not, however, obtain the acceptance which it merited; and when noticed at all, it was in general noticed only to be re-dargued—even by his brother Nominalists. Biel rejects the paradox, without naming its author. But John Major, the last of the regular Schoolmen, openly maintains on this point, against the Authentic Doctor, the thesis of his earlier countryman, Joannes—a thesis also identical with the doctrine of his later countryman, Reid. 'Dico (he says, writing in Paris), quod notitiam abstractivam quam habeo pinnaculi Sanctæ Genovefes in Scotia, in Sancto Andrea, ad pinnaculum *immediate terminatur*; verum, ob notitiæ imperfectionem et naturam, nescio certitudinaliter an sit dirutum exustumve, sicut olim tonitruo conflagravit.'* In Sent. L. i. dist. 3, qu. 2.

I have omitted however to notice, that the vulgar doctrine of

* The existence of a Pinnacle of St. Genevieve in St. Andrew's is now unknown to our Scottish Antiquaries; and this, I may notice, is one of a thousand curious anecdotes relative to this country, scattered throughout Major's writings, and upon matters to which allusions from a Doctor of the Sorbonne, in a Commentary on the Sentences, were least to be expected.

the Schools in regard to the immediate cognition of real objects, through their species or representations, was refuted, in anticipation, by Plotinus, who observes—‘That if we receive the impressed forms (ἑντυπώσεις) of objects perceived, it cannot be that we really perceive the things which we are said to perceive, but only their images or shadows; so that the things existing are one distinct order of beings, the objects perceived by us, another. (Ennead. v. L. vi. c. 1.) His own doctrine of perception is however equally subjective as that which he assails; it is substantially the same with the Cartesian and Leibnitzian hypotheses.

Representationists are not however always so reluctant to see and to confess, that their doctrine involves a surrender of all immediate and real knowledge of an external world. This too is admitted by even those who, equally with Reid, had renounced ideas as representative entities, different either from the substance of mind, or from the act of cognition itself. Arnauld frankly acknowledges this of his own theory of perception; which he justly contends to be identical with that of Descartes.¹ Other Cartesians, and of a doctrine equally pure, have been no less explicit. ‘Nota vero (says Flender, whose verbosity I somewhat abridge), mentem nostram percipere vel cognoscere *immediate tantum seipsam* suasque facultates, per intimam sui conscientiam; sed *alias res a se distinctas, non nisi mediate*, scilicet per ideas. . . Nota porro, quod *perceptio* seu *idea rei* spectari duplicitur: vel *in se ipsa*, prout est *modus cogitandi* cujus mens est conscia,—quo modo a mente ut causa efficiente fluit; vel *relata*

¹ ‘I am convinced that in this interpretation of Descartes’ doctrine, Arnauld is right; for Descartes defines mental ideas—those, to wit, of which we are conscious—to be “*Cogitationes prout sunt tanquam imagines*—that is, thoughts considered in their representative capacity; nor is there any passage to be found in the writings of this philosopher, which if properly understood, warrants the conclusion, that, by ideas *in the mind*, he meant aught distinct from the cognitive act. The double use of the term *idea* by Descartes has, however, led Reid and others into a misconception on this point.’ Reid, p. 296.—W.

ad objectum quod per eam representatur, prout est cogitatio intellectus hanc vel illam rem representans,—quo modo forma seu essentia ideæ consistit *in representatione rei*, sive in eo *quod sit representamen* vel imago ejus rei quam concipimus.' (Phosph. Philos. § 5.)

CHAPTER III.

VARIOUS THEORIES OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION.¹

§ 1.—SYSTEMATIC SCHEMES, FROM DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW, OF THE VARIOUS THEORIES OF THE RELATION OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION TO ITS OBJECT, AND OF THE VARIOUS SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY FOUNDED THEREON.*

SCHEME I.—*Table of distribution, General and Special.*—In the perception of the external world, the object of which we are conscious may be considered—either, (I.) as *absolute* and *total*—or, (II.) as *relative* and *partial*, i. e., *vicarious* or *representative* of another and principal object, beyond the sphere of consciousness. Those who hold the former of these doctrines may be called *Presentationists* or *Intuitionists*: those who hold the latter, *Representationists*.† Of these in their order.

I.—The *Presentationists* or *Intuitionists* constitute the object, of which we are conscious, in perception, into a sole, absolute, or total, object; in other words, reduce perception to an act of immediate or intuitive cognition; and this—either (A) by abolishing any immediate, ideal, subjective object, representing;—or, (B) by abolishing any mediate, real, objective object, represented.

A.—The former of these, viewing the one total object of perceptive consciousness as *real*, as existing, and therefore, in this case, as material, extended, external, are Realists, and may dis-

¹ This chapter is Hamilton's third Supplementary Dissertation on Reid.—W.

* Compare the more comprehensive evolution of Philosophical Systems from the total fact of Consciousness in perception, given above, p. 28 a, sq. An acquaintance with that distribution is here supposed.

† On the terms *Intuition* and *Representation*, and on the distinction of *immediate* and *mediate*, of *ideal* and *real*, *object*, see previous chapter, § 1.

tinctively be called *Intuitional* or *Presentative Realists*, and *Rea-Presentationists* or *Intuitionists*; while, as founding their doctrine on the datum of the natural consciousness, or common sense, of mankind, they deserve the names of *Natural Realists* or *Natural Dualists*. Of this scheme there are no subordinate varieties; except in so far as a difference of opinion may arise, in regard to—what qualities are to be referred to the object perceived, or non-ego,—what qualities to the percipient subject, or ego. Presentative Realism is thus divided (i.) into a philosophical or developed form—that, to wit, in which the Primary Qualities of body, the Common Sensibles,¹ constitute the objective object of perception; and (ii.) into a vulgar or undeveloped form—that, to wit, in which not only the primary qualities (as Extension and Figure), but also the secondary (as Color, Savor, &c.), are, as known to us, regarded equally to appertain to the non-ego.

B.—The latter of these, viewing the object of consciousness in perception as ideal (as a phenomenon in or of mind), are Idealists; and as denying that this ideal object has any external prototype, they may be styled *Absolute Idealists*, or *Idealist Unitarians*.—They are to be again divided into two subaltern classes, as the Idea—(i.) is,—or (ii.) is not, considered a modification of the percipient mind.

i.—If the Idea be regarded as a mode of the human mind itself, we have a scheme of *Egoistical Idealism*; and this again admits of a twofold distinction, according as the idea is viewed—(a) as having no existence out of the momentary act of presentative consciousness, with which it is, in fact, identical;—or (b) as having an (unknown) existence, independent of the present act of consciousness by which it is called up, contemplated, but not created. Finally, as in each of these the mind may be determined to present the object either—(1.) by its own natural laws,—or (2.) by supernatural agencies, each may be subdivided into a *Natural* and *Supernatural* variety.

¹ See chapter v.—W.

ii.—If, on the other hand, the Idea be viewed not as a mode of the human mind, there is given the scheme of *Non-Egoistical Idealism*, which, in all its forms, is necessarily hyperphysical. It admits, in the first place, of a twofold distinction, according as the ideal object is supposed—(a) to be,—or (b) not to be, in the perceiving mind itself.

a.—Of these the former may again be subdivided according as the ideas are supposed—(1.) to be connate with the mind and existent in it out of consciousness;—or (2.) infused into it at the moment of consciousness,—(a) immediately by God,—(ε) by some lower supernatural agency.

b.—The latter supposes that the human mind is conscious of the idea, in some higher intelligence, to which it is intimately present; and this higher mind may either be—(1.) that of the Deity, or (2.) that of some inferior supernatural existence.

All these modifications of Non-Egoistical Idealism admit, however, in common, of certain subordinate divisions, according as the qualities (primary and secondary) and the phenomena of the several senses may be variously considered either as *objective* and *ideal* or as *subjective* and *sensational*.*

II.—The *Representationists*, as denying to consciousness the cognizance of aught beyond a merely subjective phenomenon,

* The general approximation of thorough-going Realism and thorough-going Idealism, here given, may, at first sight, be startling. On reflection, however, their radical affinity will prove well grounded. Both build upon the same fundamental fact—that the extended object immediately perceived is identical with the extended object actually existing;—for the truth of this fact, both can appeal to the common sense of mankind;—and to the common sense of mankind Berkeley did appeal not less confidently, and perhaps more logically, than Reid. Natural Realism and Absolute Idealism are the only systems worthy of a philosopher; for, as they alone have any foundation in consciousness, so they alone have any consistency in themselves. The scheme of Hypothetical Realism or Cosmothetic Idealism, which supposes that behind the non-existent world perceived, there lurks a correspondent but unknown world existing, is not only repugnant to our natural beliefs, but in manifold contradiction with itself. The scheme of Natural Realism may be ultimately difficult—for, like all other truths, it ends in the inconceivable; but Hypothetical Realism—in its origin—in its development—in its result, although the favorite scheme of philosophers, is philosophically absurd.

are likewise Idealists; yet as positing the reality of an external world, they must be distinguished as *Cosmothetic Idealists*. But, as affirming an external world, they are also Realists, or Dualists. Since, however, they do not, like the Natural Realists, accept the existence of an external world directly on the natural testimony of consciousness, as something known, but endeavor to establish its unknown existence by a principal and sundry subsidiary hypotheses; they must, under that character, be discriminated as *Hypothetical Realists* or *Hypothetical Dualists*. This Hypothesis of a Representative perception has been maintained under one or other of two principal forms,—a finer and a cruder,—according as the representation—either (A) is,—or (B) is not, supposed to be a mode of the percipient subject itself. (And, be it observed, this distinction, in reference to Reid's philosophy, ought to be carefully borne in mind.)

A.—If the immediate, known, or representative, object be regarded as a modification of the mind or self, we have one variety of representationism (the simpler and more refined), which may be characterized as the *Egoistical Representationism*. This finer form is, however, itself again subdivided into a finer and a cruder; according as the subjective object—(i.) is—or (ii.) is not, identified with the percipient act.

i.—In the former case, the immediate or ideal object is regarded as only logically distinguished from the perceptive act; being simply the perceptive act itself, considered in one of its relations,—its relation, to wit (not to the subject perceiving, in which case it is properly called a *perception*, but) to the mediate object, the reality represented, and which, in and through that representation alone, is objectified to consciousness and perceived.

ii.—In the latter case, the immediate object is regarded, as a mode of mind, existent out of the act of perceptive consciousness, and, though contemplated in, not really identical with, that act. This cruder form of egoistical representationism substantially coincides with that finer form of the non-egoistical, which

views the vicarious object as spiritual (II. B, i. b.) I have therefore found it requisite to consider these as identical; and accordingly, in speaking of the finer form of representation, be it observed, I exclusively have in view the form of which I have last spoken (II. A, i.)

This form, in *both* its degrees, is divided into certain subaltern genera and species, according as the mind is supposed to be determined to represent by causes—either (a) natural, physical,—or (b) supernatural, hyperphysical.

a.—Of these, the *natural* determination to represent, is—either (1.) one foreign and external (by the action of the material reality on the passive mind, through sense);—or (2.) one native and internal (a self-determination of the impassive mind, on occasion of the presentation of the material object to sense);—or finally (3.) one partly both (the mind being at once acted on, and itself reacting).

b.—The *hyperphysical* determination, again, may be maintained—either to be (1.) immediate and special; whether this be realized—(α) by the direct operation or concurrence of God (as in a scheme of Occasional Causes)—or (ε) by the influence of inferior supernatural agencies:—or (2.) mediate and general (as by the predetermined ordination of God, in a theory of Pre-established Harmony).

B.—If the representative object be viewed as something in but not a mere mode of, mind;—in other words, if it be viewed as a *tertium quid* numerically different both from the subject knowing and the object represented; we have a second form of Representationism (the more complex and cruder) which may be distinguished as the *Non-egoistical*. This also falls into certain inferior species: for the ideal or vicarious object has been held (i.) by some to be spiritual;—(ii.) by others to be corporeal;—while (iii.) others, to carry hypothesis to absurdity, have regarded it, as neither spiritual nor corporeal, but of an inconceivable nature, intermediate between, or different from, both.

i.—*Spiritual*. Here the vicarious object may be supposed—

either (a) to be some supernatural intelligence, to which the human mind is present; and this—either (1.) the divine,—or (2.) not the divine:—or (b) in the human mind; and if so—either (1.) connate and in-existent, being elicited into consciousness, on occasion of the impression of the external object on the sensual organ;—or (2.) infused on such occasions, and this—either (α) by God,—or (ξ) by other supernatural intelligences,—and of these different theorists have supposed different kinds.

ii.—*Corporeal*, in the common sensory (whether brain or heart). This—either (a) as a propagation from the external reality—(1.) of a grosser;—(2.) of a more attenuated nature:—or (b) a modification determined in the sensory itself—(1.) as a configuration;—(2.) as a motion (and this last—either (α) as a flow of spirits—or (ξ) as a vibration of fibres—or (γ) as both a flow and a vibration);—or (3.) as both a configuration and a motion.

iii.—*Neither spiritual nor corporeal*. This might admit, in part, of similar modifications with B, i. and B, ii.

All these species of Representationism may be, and almost all of them have been, actually held. Under certain varying restrictions, however, inasmuch as a representative object may be postulated in perception for all, or only for some of the senses, for all or only for some of the qualities made known to us in the perceptive act. And this latter alternative, which has been most generally adopted, again admits of various subdivisions, according to the particular senses in which, and the particular qualities of which, a vicarious object is allowed.

SCHEME II.—*Table of General Distribution; with references for details to Scheme I.*

The object of Consciousness in Perception is a quality, mode, or phenomenon—either (I.) *of an external reality*, in immediate relation to our organs;—or (II.) *not of an external reality*, but either of the mind itself, or of something in the mind, which internal object, let us on either alternative, here call *Idea*.

I. The former opinion is the doctrine of *real presentative* perception. (I. A.)

II. The latter is the doctrine of *ideal* perception ; which either—

A—supposes that the Idea is an original and absolute presentment, and thus constitutes the doctrine of *ideal presentative* perception (I. B) ; or

B—supposes that the Idea only represents the quality of a real object ; and thus constitutes the doctrine of *ideal representative* perception (II.)

SCHEME III.—Merely *General Table*.

In relation to our perception of an external world, philosophers are (I.) *Realists* ; (II.) *Idealists*.

I. The Realists are (A) *Natural* ; (B) *Hypothetical* (= Cosmothetic Idealists).

II. The Idealists are (A) *Absolute or Presentative* ; (B) *Cosmothetic or Representative* (= Hypothetical Realists). See above, p. 266, b, and 30 a.

Such is a conspectus in different points of view of all the theories touching perception and its object ; and of the different systems of philosophy founded thereon, which, as far as they occur to me, have been promulgated during the progress of philosophy. But it is at present only requisite for the student of philosophy to bear in mind the more general principles and heads of distribution. To enumerate the individual philosophers by whom these several theories were originated or maintained, would require a far greater amplitude of detail than can be now afforded ; and, though of some historical interest, this is not required for the purposes which I am here exclusively desirous of accomplishing. Similar tables might be also given of the opinions of philosophers, touching the object of *Imagination* and of *Intellect*. But the relation of these faculties to their object does not, in like manner, afford the fundamental principles of difference, and therefore a common starting point, to the great philosophical systems ; while a scheme of the hypotheses in regard to them, would, at

least in the details, be little more than an uninteresting repetition of the foregoing distribution. There is therefore little inducement to annex such tables; were they not, in other respects, here completely out of place. I have only, at present, two ends in view. Of these the primary, is to display, to discriminate, and to lay down a nomenclature of, the various theories of Perception, actual and possible. This is accomplished. The secondary, is to determine under which of these theories the doctrine of Reid is to be classed. And to this inquiry I now address myself.

§ II.—OF WHAT CHARACTER, IN THE PRECEDING RESPECT, IS REID'S DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION ?

As in this part of his philosophy, in particular, Mr. Stewart closely follows the footsteps of his predecessor, and seems even to have deemed all further speculation on the subject superfluous; the question here propounded must be viewed as common to both philosophers.

Now, there are only *two* of the preceding theories of perception, with one or other of which Reid's doctrine can possibly be identified. He is a Dualist;—and the only doubt is—whether he be *Natural Realist* (I. A), or a *Hypothetical Realist*, under the finer form of *Egoistical Representationism* (II. A, i.)

The cause why Reid left the character of his doctrine ambiguous on this the very cardinal point of his philosophy, is to be found in the following circumstances.

1°, That, in general (although the same may be said of all other philosophers), he never discriminated either speculatively or historically the three theories of Real Presentationism, of Egoistical, and of Non-Egoistical, Representationism.

2°, That, in particular, he never clearly distinguished the first and second of these, as not only different, but contrasted, theories; though on one occasion (I. P. p. 297 a b) he does seem to have been obscurely aware that they were not identical.

3°, That, while right in regarding philosophers, in general, as

Cosmothetic Idealists, he erroneously supposed that they were all, or nearly all, Non-Egoistical Representationists. And—

4^o, That he viewed the theory of Non-Egoistical Representationism as that form alone of Cosmothetic Idealism which when carried to its legitimate issue ended in Absolute Idealism; whereas the other form of Cosmothetic Idealism, the theory of Egoistical Representationism, whether speculatively or historically considered, is, with at least equal rigor, to be developed into the same result.

Dr. Thomas Brown considers Reid to be, like himself, a Cosmothetic Idealist, under the finer form of egoistical representationism; but without assigning any reason for this belief, except one which, as I have elsewhere shown, is altogether nugatory.* For my own part, I am decidedly of opinion, that, as the great end—the governing principle of Reid's doctrine was to reconcile philosophy with the necessary convictions of mankind, that he intended a doctrine of natural, consequently a doctrine of presentative, realism; and that he would have at once surrendered, as erroneous, every statement which was found at variance with such a doctrine. But that the reader should be enabled to form his own opinion on the point, which I admit not to be without difficulty; and that the ambiguities and inconsistencies of Reid, on this the most important part of his philosophy, should, by an articulate exposition, be deprived of their evil influence: I shall now enumerate—(A) the statements, which may, on the one hand, be adduced to prove that his doctrine of perception is one of *mediate* cognition under the form of *egoistical representationism*;—

* Edinb. Rev.,¹ vol. iii. p. 173-175;—also in Cross and Peisse. In saying, however, on that occasion, that Dr. Brown was guilty of 'a reversal of the real and even *unambiguous* import' of Reid's doctrine of perception, I feel called upon to admit, that the latter epithet is too strong;—for on grounds, totally different from the untenable one of Brown, I am now about to show, that Reid's doctrine, on this point, is doubtful. This admission does not, however, imply that Brown is not, from first to last,—is not in one and all of his strictures on Reid's doctrine of perception, as there shown, wholly in error.

¹ See above, p. 188.—W.

and (B) those which may, on the other hand, be alleged to show, that it is one of *immediate cognition*, under the form of *real presentationism*. But as these counter statements are only of import, inasmuch as they severally imply the conditions of mediate or of immediate cognition; it is necessary that the reader should bear in mind the exposition which has been given of these conditions.¹

A.—*Statements conformable to the doctrine of a mediate perception, under the form of an egoistical representation, and inconsistent with that of immediate perception, under the form of a real presentation, of material objects.*

1. On the testimony of consciousness, and in the doctrine of an intuitive perception, the mind, when a material existence is brought into relation with its organ of sense, obtains two concomitant, and immediate, cognitions. Of these, the one is the consciousness (sensation) of certain subjective modifications in us, which we refer, as effects, to certain unknown powers, as causes, in the external reality; the secondary qualities of body: the other is the consciousness (perception) of certain objective attributes in the external reality itself, as, or as in relation to our sensible organism;—the primary qualities of body. Of these cognitions, the former is admitted, on all hands, to be subjective and ideal: the latter, the Natural Realist maintains, against the Cosmothetic Idealist, to be objective and real. But it is only objective and real, in so far as it is immediate; and immediate it cannot be, if—either, 1^o, dependent on the former, as its cause or its occasion—or, 2^o, consequent on it, as on a necessary antecedent. But both these conditions of a presentative perception Reid and Stewart are seen to violate; and therefore they may be held, virtually, to confess, that their doctrine is one only of representative perception.²

Touching the former condition: Reid states, that the primary qualities of material existences, Extension, Figure, &c., are *suggested* to us through the secondary; which, though not the sufficient

¹ See previous chapter, § 1.—*W.*

² See below, chapter v. § 1. No. 23.—*W.*

causes of our conception, are the *signs*,* on occasion of which, we are made to 'conceive' the primary. (Inq. 188 a, 122 a, 123 b, 128 b note.) The secondary qualities, as mere sensations, mere consciousness of certain subjective affections, afford us no immediate knowledge of aught different from self. If, therefore, the primary qualities be only '*suggestions*,' only '*conceptions*' (Inq. 183 a, I. P. 318 a b), which are, as it were, 'conjured up by a kind of natural magic' (Inq. 122 a), or 'inspired by means unknown' (Inq. 188 a); these conceptions are only representations, which the mind is, in some inconceivable manner, blindly determined to form of what it does not know; and as perception is only a consciousness of these conceptions, perception is, like sensation, only an immediate cognition of certain modes of self. Our knowledge of the external world, on this footing, is wholly subjective or ideal; and if such be Reid's doctrine, it is wholly conformable to that enounced in the following statement of the Cartesian representationism by Silvain Regis:—'We may thus, he says, affirm, that the cognition we have of any individual body which strikes the sense is composed of two parts,—of a *sensation* (sentiment), and of an *imagination*; an imagination, which represents the extension of this body under a determinate size; and a sensation of color and light, which renders this extension visible.' (Metaph. L. ii. P. i. ch. 5. Cours, t. i. p. 162, ed. 1691.) The statement may stand equally for an enouncement of the Kantian doctrine of perception; and it is, perhaps, worth noticing, that Regis anticipated Kant, in holding the imagination of space to be the a priori form or subjective condition of perception. 'L'idée de l'Entendus (he says) est née avec l'âme,' &c. (ibid. c. 9, p. 171 et alibi).—This theory of Suggestion, so explicitly maintained in the 'Inquiry,' is not repeated in the 'Es-

* This application of the term *sign* suits the Cosmothetic Idealist, as the Cartesian Bossuet (Connaissance de Dieu, &c., ch. 8, § 8), or the Absolute Idealist, as Berkeley (passim), but not the Natural Realist. In this doctrine of natural signs, I see Reid was, in a manner, also preceded by Hutcheson (Syn. Met., P. ii. e. 1—Syst. of Mor., B. i. ch. 1, p. 5).

says on the Intellectual Powers.' Reid, therefore, as I have already observed, may seem to have become doubtful of the tendency of the doctrine advanced in his earlier work; and we ought not, at all events, to hold him rigorously accountable for the consequences of what, if he did not formally retract in his later writings, he did not continue to profess.

Touching the latter condition:—Reid in stating, that 'if sensation be produced, the corresponding perception *follows* even when there is no object' (I. P. 320 b.)—and Stewart in stating, that 'sensations are the constant *antecedents* of our perceptions' (L. i. c. 1, p. 93, ed. 6), manifestly advance a doctrine, which if rigidly interpreted, is incompatible with the requisites of an intuitive perception.

2. It is the condition of an intuitive perception, that a sensation is actually felt there, where it is felt to be. To suppose that a pain, for instance, in the toe, is felt really in the brain, is conformable only to a theory of representationism. For if the mind cannot be conscious of the secondary qualities, except at the centre of the nervous organism, it cannot be conscious of the primary, in their relation to its periphery; and this involves the admission that it is incompetent to more than a subjective or ideal or representative cognition of external things. But such is the doctrine which Reid manifestly holds. (I. P. 319 b, 320 a b.)

3. On the doctrine of Natural Realism, that the ego has an intuitive perception of the non-ego in proximate relation to its organs, a knowledge and a belief of the existence of the external world, is clearly given in the fact of such intuitive perception. In this case, therefore, we are not called upon to explain such knowledge and belief by the hypothesis, or, at least, the analogy, of an inspired notion and infused faith. On the doctrine of Cosmthetic Idealism, on the contrary, which supposes that the mind is determined to represent to itself the external world, which, ex hypothesi, it does not know; the fact of such representation can only be conceived possible, through some hyperphysical agency; and therefore Reid's rationale of perception, by an inspiration or

kind of magical conjuration, as given in the Inquiry (122 a, 188 a; Stewart, El. i. 64, 93), may seem to favor the construction, that his doctrine is a representationism. In the Essays on the Intellectual Powers he is, however, more cautious; and the note¹ I have appended in that work at p. 257 a, is to be viewed in more especial reference to the doctrine of the Inquiry; though in the relative passage 'the will of God' may, certainly, seem called as a *Deus ex machina*, to solve a knot which the doctrine of intuitive perception does not tie.

4. The terms *notion* and *conception* are, in propriety, only applicable to our mediate and representative cognitions.—When

¹ The following is the note referred to:

'The doctrine of Reid and Stewart, in regard to our perception of external things, bears a close analogy to the Cartesian scheme of *divine assistance*, or of *occasional causes*. It seems, however, to coincide most completely with the opinion of Ruardus Andala, a Dutch Cartesian, who attempted to reconcile the theory of *assistance* with that of *physical influence*. "Statuo," he says, "nos clarissimam et distinctissimam hujus *operationis et unionis* posse habere *ideam*, si modo, quod omnino facere oportet, ad Deum, causam ejus primam et liberam ascendamus, et ab ejus beneplacito admirandum hunc effectum derivemus. Nos possumus huic vel illi motui e. gr. campanæ, sic et hederae suspensæ literis scriptis, verbis quibuscunque pronuntiatis, aliisque signis, varias ideas alligare, ita, ut per visum, vel auditum in mente excitentur variae ideæ, perceptiones et sensationes: annon hinc clare et facile intelligimus, Deum creatorem mentis et corporis potuisse instituire et ordinare, ut per varios in corpore motus variae in mente excitentur ideæ et perceptiones; et vicissim, ut per varias mentis volitiones, varii in corpore excitentur et producantur motus? Hinc et pro varia alterutrius partis dispositione altera pars variis modis affici potest. Hoc autem a Deo ita ordinatum et effectum esse, a posteriori, continua, certissima et clarissima experientia docet. Testes irrefragabiles omnique exceptione majores reciproci hujus commercii, operationis mentis in corpus, et corporis in mentem, nec non eommunionis status, sunt *sensus* omnes tum *externi*, tum *interni*; ut et omnes et singulae et continuæ actiones mentis in corpus, de quibus modo fuit actum. Si quis verò a *proprietatibus* mentis ad *proprietates* corporis progredi velit, aut ex *natura* diversissimarum harum substantiarum deducere motum in corpore, & perceptiones in mente, aut hos effectus ut necessario connexos spectare: nã is frustra erit, nihil intelliget, perversissime philosophabitur nullamque hujus rei ideam habere poterit. Si vero ad Deum Creatorem adscendamus, eumque vere agnoscamus, nihil hic erit obscuri, hunc effectum clarissime intelligemus, et quidem per causam ejus primam; quæ perfectissima demum est scientia.'—W.

Reid, therefore, says that 'the perception of an object consists of, or implies, a *conception* or *notion* of it' (Inq. 183 a, 188 a, I. P. 258 a, b, 318 b, 319 a, et alibi); there is here, either an impropriety of language, or perception is, in his view, a mediate and representative knowledge. The former alternative is, however, at least equally probable as the latter; for Consciousness, which on all hands, is admitted to be a knowledge immediate and intuitive, he defines (I. P. 327 a) 'an immediate *conception* of the operation of our own minds,' &c. Conception and Notion, Reid seems, therefore, to employ, at least sometimes, for cognition in general.

5. In calling imagination of the past, the distant, &c., an immediate knowledge, Reid, it may be said, could only mean by *immediate*, a knowledge effected not through the supposed intermediation of a vicarious object, numerically different from the object existing and the mind knowing, but through a representation of the past, or real, object, in and by the mind itself; in other words, that by *mediate* knowledge he denoted a *non-egoistical*, by *immediate* knowledge an *egoistical*, representation.¹ This being established, it may be further argued—1°, that in calling *Perception* an *immediate* knowledge, he, on the same analogy, must be supposed to deny, in reference to this faculty, only the doctrine of non-egoistical representation. This is confirmed—2°, by his not taking the distinction between perception as a representative, and Memory, for instance (i. e. recollective imagination), as a representative, cognition; which he ought to have done, had he contemplated, in the former, more than a faculty, through which the ego represents to itself the non-ego, of which it has no consciousness—no true objective and immediate apprehension. This, however, only proves that Reid's Perception *may be* representative, not that it actually is so.

6. The doctrine maintained by Reid (I. P. 199 a, 298 b, 299 a, 302 e, 305 b) and by Stewart (Elem. vol. i. c. I. sect. 2) that

¹ See previous chapter, §1, Pr. 7, p. 241.—W.

perception is possible of distant objects, is, when sifted, found necessarily to imply that perception is not, in that case, an apprehension of the object in its place in space—in its Where; and this again necessarily implies, that it is not an apprehension of the object, as existing, or in itself. But if not known as existing, or in itself, a thing is, either not known at all, or known only in and through something different from itself. Perception, therefore, is, on this doctrine, at best a mediate or representative cognition; of the simpler form of representation, the egoistical, it may be, but still only vicarious and subjective.¹

7. In some places our author would seem to hold that Perception is the result of an inference, and that what is said to be perceived is the remote *cause*, and therefore not the *immediate object* of Perception. If this be so, Perception is not a presentative knowledge. (Inq. 125 a, I. P. 310 a b, 319 a.) In other passages, that perception is the result of inference or reasoning, is expressly denied. (I. P. 259 b, 260 a b, 309 b, 326 a, 328 b, &c.)

8. On the supposition, that we have an immediate cognition or consciousness of the non-ego, we must have, at the same time, involved as part and parcel of that cognition, a *belief* of its existence. To view, therefore, our belief of the existence of the external world, as any thing apart from our knowledge of that world,—to refer it to instinct—to view it as unaccountable—to consider it as an ultimate law of our constitution, &c., as Reid does (Inq. 188 a b, I. P. 258 b, 309 b, 326 a, 327 a, et alibi), is, to say the least of it, suspicious; appearing to imply, that our cognition of the material world, as only mediate and subjective, does not at once and of itself, necessitate a belief of the existence of external things.

B. *Counter statements, conformable to the doctrine of a real presentation of material objects, and inconsistent with that of a representative perception.*

¹ See the previous chapter.—W.

1. Knowledge and existence only infer each other when a reality is known in itself or as existing ; for only in that case can we say of it,—on the one hand, *it is known, because it exists*,—on the other, *it exists, since it is known*. In propriety of language, this constitutes, exclusively, an *immediate, intuitive, or real*, cognition. This is at once the doctrine of philosophers in general, and of Reid in particular. ‘It seems,’ he says, ‘admitted as a first principle, by the learned and the unlearned, that what is really perceived must exist, and that to perceive what does not exist is impossible. So far the unlearned man and the philosopher agree.’ (I. P. p. 274 b.) This principle will find an articulate illustration in the three proximately following statements, in all of which it is implied.

2. The *idea or representative object*, all philosophers, of whatever doctrine, concur in holding to be in the strictest sense of the expression, itself immediately apprehended ; and that, as thus apprehended, it necessarily exists. That Reid fully understands their doctrine, is shown by his introducing a Cosmothetic Idealist thus speaking:—‘I perceive an image, or form, or idea, in my own mind, or in my brain. I am certain of the existence of the idea ; because I immediately perceive it.’ (Ibid.) Now then, if Reid be found to assert—that, on his doctrine, we perceive material objects not less immediately, than, on the common doctrine of philosophers, we perceive ideal objects ; and that therefore his theory of perception affords an equal certainty of the existence of the external reality, as that of the Cosmothetic Idealist does of the existence of its internal representation ; if Reid, I say, do this, he unambiguously enounces a doctrine of presentative, and not of representative, perception. And this he does. Having repeated, for the hundredth time, the deliverance of common sense, that we perceive material things immediately, and not their ideal representations, he proceeds:—‘I shall only here observe that if external objects be perceived immediately, we have the same reason to believe their existence as philosophers have to believe the existence of ideas, while they hold them to

be the immediate objects of perception.' (I. P. 446 a b. See also 263 b, 272 b.)

3. Philosophers—even Skeptics and Idealists—concur in acknowledging that mankind at large believe that the external reality is itself the immediate and only object in perception. Reid is of course no exception. After stating the principle previously quoted (B, st. 1), 'that what is really perceived must exist,' he adds;—'the unlearned man says, I perceive the external object, and I perceive it to exist. Nothing can be more absurd than to doubt it.' (I. P. 274 b.) Again:—'The vulgar undoubtedly believe, that it is the external object which we immediately perceive, and not a representative image of it only. It is for this reason, that they look upon it as perfect lunacy to call in question the existence of external objects.' (Ibid.) Again:—'The vulgar are firmly persuaded that the very identical objects which they perceive continue to exist when they do not perceive them; and are no less firmly persuaded that when ten men look at the sun or the moon they all see the same individual object.'* (I. P. 284 b.) Again, speaking of Berkeley:—'The vulgar opinion he reduces to this—that the very things which we perceive by our senses do really exist. This he grants.' (I. P. 284 a.) Finally, speaking of Hume:—'It is therefore acknowledged by this philosopher to be a natural instinct or prepossession, an universal and primary opinion of all men, that the objects which we immediately perceive by our senses, are not images in our minds, but external objects, and that their existence is independent of us and our perception.' (I. P. 299 b; see also 275 a, 298 b, 299 a b, 302 a b.)

It is thus evinced that Reid, like other philosophers, attributes to men in general the belief of an intuitive perception. If, then, he declare that his own opinion coincides with that of the vulgar, he will, consequently, declare himself a Presentative Realist.

* The inaccuracy of this statement¹ does not affect the argument.

¹ See p. 259.—W.

And he does this, emphatically too. Speaking of the Perception of the external world: 'We have here a remarkable conflict between two contradictory opinions, wherein all mankind are engaged. On the one side stand all the vulgar, who are unpractised in philosophical researches, and guided by the uncorrupted primary instincts of nature. On the other side, stand all the philosophers, ancient and modern; every man, without exception, who reflects. In this division, to my great humiliation, *I find myself classed with the vulgar.*' (I. P. 302 b.)

4. All philosophers agree that self-consciousness is an immediate knowledge, and therefore affords an absolute and direct certainty of the existence of its objects. Reid (with whom consciousness is equivalent to self-consciousness) of course maintains this; but he also maintains, not only that perception affords a sufficient proof, but as valid an assurance of the reality of material phenomena, as consciousness does of the reality of mental. (I. P. 263 b, 269 a, 373, et alibi.) In this last assertion I have shown that Reid (and Stewart along with him) is wrong; for the phenomena of self-consciousness cannot possibly be doubted or denied;¹ but the statement at least tends to prove that his perception is truly immediate—is, under a different name, a consciousness of the non-ego.

5. Arnauld's doctrine of external perception is a purely egoistical representationism; and he has stated its conditions and consequences with the utmost accuracy and precision. (I. P. 295-298.) Reid expresses both his content and discontent with Arnauld's theory of perception, which he erroneously views as inconsistent with itself (297 a b). This plainly shows that he had not realized to himself a clear conception of the two doctrines of Presentationism and Egoistical Representationism, in themselves and in their contrasts. But it also proves that when the conditions and consequences of the latter scheme, even in its purest form, were explicitly enounced, that he was then suffi-

¹ See Part First.—*W.*

ciently aware of their incompatibility with the doctrine which he himself maintained—a doctrine, therefore, it may be fairly contended (though not in his hands clearly understood, far less articulately developed), substantially one of Natural Realism.*

To Reid's inadequate discrimination—common to him with other philosophers—of the different theories of Perception, either as possible in theory, or as actually held, is, as I have already noticed, to be ascribed the ambiguities and virtual contradictions which we have now been considering.

In the first place (what was of little importance to the Hypothetical, but indispensably necessary for the Natural Realist), he did not establish the fact of the two cognitions, the presentative and representative;—signalize their contents; evolve their several conditions;—consider what faculties in general were to be referred to each;—and, in particular, which of these was the kind of condition competent, in our Perception of the external world.

In the second place, he did not take note, that representation is possible under two forms—the egoistical and non-egoistical; each, if Perception be reduced to a representative faculty, affording premises of equal cogency to the absolute idealist and skeptic. On the contrary, he seems to have overlooked the egoistical form of representationism altogether (compare Inq. 106 a, 128 a b, 130 b, 210 a, I. P. 226 a b, 256 a b, 257 a b, 269 a, 274 a,

* It will be observed that I do not find any argument on Reid's frequent assertion, that *perception* affords an *immediate knowledge* and *immediate belief* of external things (*e. g.* I. P. 259 b, 260 a b, 267 a, 309 b, 326 b). For if he call memory an immediate knowledge of the past—meaning thereby, in reference to it, only a negation of the doctrine of non-egoistical representation, he may also call Perception an immediate knowledge of the outward reality, and still not deny that it is representative cognition, in and by the mind itself.

277 b, 278 a b, 293 b, 299 a, 318 b, 427 a b); and confounded it either with the non-egoistical form, or with the counter doctrine of real presentationism. In consequence of this, he has been betrayed into sundry errors, of less or greater account. On the one hand;—to the confusion of Presentationism and Non-egoistical representationism, we must attribute the inconsistencies we have just signalized, in the exposition of his own doctrine. These are of principal account. On the other hand; to the confusion of Egoistical and Non-egoistical representationism, we must refer the less important errors;—1°, of viewing many philosophers who held the former doctrine, as holding the latter; and 2°, of considering the refutation of the non-egoistical form of representation, as a subversion of the only ground on which the skeptic and absolute idealist established, or could establish their conclusions.

CHAPTER IV.

DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION MAINTAINED BY THE ABSOLUTE IDEALISTS.—DISCUSSION ON THE SCHEME OF ARTHUR COLLIER.

WE deem it our duty to call attention to these publications:² for in themselves they are eminently deserving of the notice of the few who in this country take an interest in those higher speculations to which, in other countries, the name of *Philosophy* is exclusively conceded; and, at the same time, they have not been ushered into the world with those adventitious recommendations which might secure their intrinsic merit against neglect.

The fortune of the first is curious.—It is known to those who have made an active study of philosophy and its history, that there are many philosophical treatises written by English authors—in whole or in part of great value, but, at the same time, of extreme rarity. Of these, the rarest are, in fact, frequently the most original: for precisely in proportion as an author is in advance of his age, is it likely that his works will be neglected; and the neglect of contemporaries in general consigns a book,—especially a small book,—if not protected by accidental concomitants,

¹ This was first published in the *Edinburgh Review*, for April, 1839, and has recently been published in the 'Discussions,' under the title of *Idealism*. That portion of it which shows that Catholicism is inconsistent with Idealism is a new, and very important, contribution to the history of philosophy. It also does justice to the name of an almost forgotten idealist, who was scarcely inferior to Berkeley himself.—*W.*

² The following are the titles of the books reviewed:

1. *Metaphysical Tracts by English Philosophers of the Eighteenth Century.* Prepared for the Press by the late Rev. Sam. Parr, D. D. 8vo. London. 1837.

2. *Memoirs of the Life and Writings of the Rev. Arthur Collier, M. A., Rector of Langford Magna, in the County of Wilts. From A. D. 1704 to A. D. 1732. With some Account of his Family.* By Robert Benson, M. A. 8vo. London. 1837.—*W.*

at once to the tobacconist or tallow-chandler. This is more particularly the case with pamphlets, philosophical, and at the same time polemical. Of these we are acquainted with some, extant perhaps only in one or two copies, which display a metaphysical talent unappreciated in a former age, but which would command the admiration of the present. Nay, even of English philosophers of the very highest note (strange to say !) there are now actually lying unknown to their editors, biographers, and fellow-metaphysicians, published treatises, of the highest interest and importance : [as of Cudworth, Berkeley, Collins, &c.]

We have often, therefore, thought that, were there with us a public disposed to indemnify the cost of such a publication, a collection, partly of treatises, partly of extracts from treatises, by English metaphysical writers, of rarity and merit, would be one of no inconsiderable importance. In any other country than Britain, such a publication would be of no risk or difficulty. Almost every nation of Europe, except our own, has, in fact, at present similar collections in progress—only incomparably more ambitious. Among others, there are in Germany the *Corpus Philosophorum*, by Gfroerer ; in France, the *Bibliothèque Philosophique des Temps Modernes*, by Bouillet and Garnier ; and in Italy, the *Collezione de' Classici Metafisici*, &c. Nay, in this country itself, we have publishing societies for every department of forgotten literature—except *Philosophy*.

But in Britain, which does not even possess an annotated edition of Locke,—in England,¹ where the universities teach the little philosophy they still nominally attempt, like the catechism, by rote, what encouragement could such an enterprise obtain ? It did not, therefore, surprise us, when we learnt that the publisher of the two works under review,—when he essayed what, in the language of 'the trade,' is called 'to subscribe' The Metaphysical Tracts, found his brother booksellers indisposed to venture even on a single copy.—Now, what was the work which

¹ As much might be said of philosophy in America.—W.

our literary purveyors thus eschewed as wormwood to British taste?

— The late Dr. Parr, whose erudition was as unexclusive as profound, had, many years previous to his death, formed the plan of reprinting a series of the rarer metaphysical treatises, of English authorship, which his remarkable library contained. With this view, he had actually thrown off a small impression of five such tracts, with an abridgment of a sixth; but as these probably formed only a part of his intended collection, which, at the same time, it is known he meant to have prefaced by an introduction, containing, among other matters, an historical disquisition on Idealism, with special reference to the philosophy of Collier, the publication was from time to time delayed, until its completion was finally frustrated by his death. When his library was subsequently sold, the impression of the six treatises was purchased by Mr. Lumley, a respectable London bookseller; and by him has recently been published under the title which stands as Number First at the head of this article.

The treatises reprinted in this collection are the following:

‘1. *Clavis Universalis; or a new Inquiry after Truth: being a demonstration of the non-existence or impossibility of an external world.* By Arthur Collier, Rector of Langford Magna, near Sarum. London: 1713.

‘2. *A specimen of True Philosophy; in a discourse on Genesis, the first chapter and the first verse.* By Arthur Collier, Rector of Langford Magna, near Sarum, Wilts. Not improper to be bound up with his *Clavis Universalis*. Sarum: 1730.

‘3. (An Abridgment, by Dr. Parr, of the doctrines maintained by Collier in his) *Logology, or Treatise on the Logos, in seven sermons on John i. verses 1, 2, 3, 14, together with an Appendix on the same subject.* 1732.

‘4. *Conjecturæ quædam de Sensu, Motu, et Idearum generatione.* (This was first published by David Hartley as an appendix to his Epistolary Dissertation, *De Lithonriptico a J. Stephens nuper invento* (Leyden, 1741, Bath, 1746); and contains the principles of that psychological theory which he afterwards so fully developed in his observations on Man.)

‘5. *An Inquiry into the Origin of the Human Appetites and Affections, showing how each arises from Association, with an account of the entrance of Moral Evil into the world.* To which are added some remarks on the independent scheme which deduces all obligation on God’s part and man’s from certain abstract relations, truth, etc. Written for the use of the young gentlemen at the universities. Lincoln: 1747. (The author is yet unknown.)

'6. *Man in quest of himself; or a defence of the Individuality of the Human Mind, or Self.* Occasioned by some remarks in the Monthly Review for July, 1763, on a note in Search's Freewill. By Cuthbert Comment, Gent. London: 1763. (The author of this is Search himself, that is, Mr. Abraham Tucker.)'

These tracts are undoubtedly well worthy of notice; but to the first—the *Clavis Universalis* of Collier—as by far the most interesting and important, we shall at present confine the few observations which we can afford space to make.*

This treatise is in fact one not a little remarkable in the history of philosophy; for to Collier along with Berkeley is due the honor of having first explicitly maintained a theory of Absolute Idealism; and the *Clavis* is the work in which that theory is developed. The fortune of this treatise, especially in its own country, has been very different from its deserts. Though the negation of an external world had been incidentally advanced by Berkeley in his *Principles of Human Knowledge* some three years prior to the appearance of the *Clavis Universalis*, with which the publication of his *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* was simultaneous; it is certain that Collier was not only wholly unacquainted with Berkeley's speculations, but had delayed promulgating his opinion till after a ten years' meditation. Both philosophers are thus equally original. They are also nearly on a level in scientific talent; for, comparing the treatise of Collier with the writings of Berkeley, we find it little inferior in metaphysical acuteness or force of reasoning, however deficient it may be in the graces of composition, and the variety of illustration, by which the works of his more accomplished rival are distinguished. But how disproportioned to their relative merits has been the reputation of the two philosophers! While Berkeley's became a name memorable throughout Europe, that of Collier was utterly forgotten,—it appears in no British biography; and is not found even on the list of local authors in the elaborate history

* [*It never rains but it pours.* Collier's *Clavis* was subsequently reprinted, in a very handsome form, by a literary association in Edinburgh. Would that the books wanting reimpression were first dealt with!]

of the county where he was born, and of the parish where he was hereditary Rector! Indeed, but for the notice of the *Clavis* by *Dr. Reid* (who appears to have stumbled on it in the College Library of Glasgow), it is probable that the name of Collier would have remained in his own country absolutely unknown—until, perhaps, our attention might have been called to his remarkable writings, by the consideration they had by accident obtained from the philosophers of other countries. In England the *Clavis Universalis* was *printed*, but there it can hardly be said to have been *published*; for it there never attracted the slightest observation; and of the copies now known to be extant of the original edition,

——— ‘*numerus vix est totidem, quot
Thebarum portæ vel divitis ostia Nili.*’

The public libraries of Oxford and Cambridge, as Mr. Benson observes, do not possess a single copy. There are, however, two in Edinburgh; and in Glasgow, as we have noticed, there is another.

The only country in which the *Clavis* can truly be said to have been hitherto published, is Germany.

In the sixth supplemental volume of the *Acta Eruditorum* (1717) there is a copious and able abstract of its contents. Through this abridgment the speculations of Collier became known—particularly to the German philosophers; and we recollect to have seen them quoted, among others, by *Wolf* and *Bilfinger*.

In 1756, the work was, however, translated, without retrenchment, into German, by *Professor Eschenbach* of Rostock, along with Berkeley's Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. These two treatises constitute his ‘Collection of the most distinguished Writers who deny the reality of their own body and of the whole corporeal world,’—treatises which he accompanied with ‘Counter observations, and an Appendix, in which the existence of matter is demonstrated.’ These are of considerable value. [I have spoken of them, in Stewart's Dissertation, Note SS.] Speaking

of Collier's treatise, the translator tells us :—' If any book ever cost me trouble to obtain it, the *Clavis* is that book. Every exertion was fruitless. At length, an esteemed friend, Mr. J. Selk, candidate of theology in Dantzic, sent me the work, after I had abandoned all hope of ever being able to procure it. . . . The preface is wanting in the copy thus obtained—a proof that it was rummaged, with difficulty, out of some old book magazine. It has not, therefore, been in my power to present it to the curious reader, but I trust the loss may not be of any great importance.'—In regard to the preface, Dr. Eschenbach is, however, mistaken ; the original has none.

By this translation, which has now itself become rare, the work was rendered fully accessible in Germany ; and the philosophers of that country did not fail to accord to its author the honor due to his metaphysical talent and originality. The best comparative view of the kindred doctrines of Collier and Berkeley is indeed given by *Tennemann* (xi. 399, *sq.*) ; whose meritorious *History of Philosophy*, we may observe, does justice to more than one English thinker, whose works, and even whose name, are in his own country as if they had never been !

Dr. Reid's notice of the *Clavis* attracted the attention of *Mr. Dugald Stewart* and of *Dr. Parr* to the work ; and to the nominal celebrity which, through them, its author has thus tardily attained, even in Britain, are we indebted for *Mr. Benson's* interesting *Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Arthur Collier* : forming the second of the two publications prefixed to this article. What was his inducement, and what his means for the execution of this task, the biographer thus informs us.

* * * * *

Arthur Collier was born in 1680. He was the son of Arthur Collier, Rector of Langford-Magna, in the neighborhood of Salisbury—a living, the advowson of which had for about a century been in possession of the family, and of which his great-grandfather, grandfather, father, and himself, were successively incumbents. With his younger brother, William, who was also

destined for the Church, and who obtained an adjoining benefice, he received his earlier education in the grammar-school of Salisbury. In 1697 he was entered of Pembroke College, Oxford; but in the following year, when his brother joined him at the University, they both became members of Balliol. His father having died in 1697, the family living was held by a substitute until 1704, when Arthur having taken priest's orders, was inducted into the Rectory, on the presentation of his mother. In 1707 he married a niece of Sir Stephen Fox; and died in 1732, leaving his wife, with two sons and two daughters, in embarrassed circumstances. Of the sons:—Arthur became a civilian of some note at the Commons; and Charles rose in the army to the rank of Colonel. Of the daughters:—Jane was the clever authoress of *The Art of Ingeniously Tormenting*; and Mary obtained some celebrity from having accompanied Fielding, as his wife's friend, in the voyage which he made in quest of health to Lisbon. Collier's family is now believed to be extinct.

Besides the *Clavis Universalis* (1713), *The Specimen of True Philosophy* (1730), and the *Logology* (1732), Collier was the author of two published *Sermons* on controversial points, which have not been recovered. Of his manuscript works the remains are still considerable, but it is probable that the greater proportion has perished. Our author was hardly less independent in his religious, than in his philosophical, speculations. In the latter he was an Idealist; in the former, an Arian (like Clarke),—an Apollinarian,—and a High Churchman, on grounds which high churchmen could not understand. Of Collier as a parish priest and a theologian, Mr. Benson supplies us with much interesting information. But it is only as a metaphysician that we at present consider him; and in this respect the *Memoirs* form a valuable supplement to the *Clavis*. Besides a series of letters in exposition of his philosophical system, they afford us, what is even more important, an insight into the course of study by which Collier was led to his conclusion. With philosophical literature he does not appear to have been at all extensively conver-

sant. His writings betray no intimate acquaintance with the works of the great thinkers of antiquity; and the compends of the German Scheiblerus and of the Scottish Baronius, apparently supplied him with all that he knew of the Metaphysic of the Schools. Locke is never once alluded to. Descartes and Malebranche, and his neighbor Mr. Norris, were the philosophers whom he seems principally to have studied; and their works, taken by themselves, were precisely those best adapted to conduct an untrammelled mind of originality and boldness to the result at which he actually arrived.

Without entering on any general consideration of the doctrine of Idealism, or attempting a regular analysis of the argument of Collier, we hazard a few remarks on that theory,—simply with the view of calling attention to some of the peculiar merits of our author.

Mankind in general believe that an external world *exists*, only because they believe that they *immediately know it as existent*. As they believe that they themselves exist because conscious of a *self* or *ego*; so they believe that something different from themselves exists, because they believe that they are also conscious of this *not-self*, or *non-ego*.

In the first place, then, it is self-evident, that the existence of the external world cannot be doubted, if we admit that we do, as we naturally believe we do,—know it immediately as existent. If the fact of the *knowledge* be allowed, the fact of the *existence* cannot be gainsaid. The former involves the latter.

But, in the second place, it is hardly less manifest, that if our natural belief in the *knowledge* of the existence of an external world be disallowed as false, that our natural belief in the *existence* of such a world can no longer be founded on as true. Yet, marvellous to say, this has been very generally done.

For reasons to which we cannot at present advert, it has been almost universally denied by philosophers, that in sensitive perception we are conscious of any external reality. On the contrary, they have maintained, with singular unanimity, that what

we are immediately cognitive of in that act, is only an *ideal object* in the mind itself. In so far as they agree in holding this opinion, philosophers may be called *Idealists* in contrast to mankind in general, and a few stray speculators who may be called *Realists*—*Natural Realists*.

In regard to the relation or import of this ideal object, philosophers are divided; and this division constitutes two great and opposing opinions in philosophy. On the one hand, the majority have maintained that the ideal object of which the mind is conscious, is vicarious or representative of a real object, unknown immediately or as existing, and known only mediately through this its ideal substitute. These philosophers, thus holding the existence of an external world—a world, however, unknown in itself, and therefore asserted only as an hypothesis, may be appropriately styled *Cosmothetic Idealists*—*Hypothetical* or *Assumptive Realists*. On the other hand, a minority maintain, that the ideal object has no external prototype; and they accordingly deny the existence of any external world. These may be denominated the *Absolute Idealists*.

Each of these great genera of Idealists is, however, divided and subdivided into various subordinate species.

The *Cosmothetic Idealists* fall primarily into *two* classes, inasmuch as some view the ideal or representative object to be a *tertium quid* different from the percipient mind as from the represented object; while others regard it as only a modification of the mind itself,—as only the percipient act considered as representative of, or relative to, the supposed external reality. The former of these classes is again variously subdivided, according as theories may differ in regard to the nature and origin of the vicarious object; as whether it be material or immaterial,—whether it come from without or rise from within,—whether it emanate from the external reality or from a higher source,—whether it be infused by God or other hyperphysical intelligences, or whether it be a representation in the Deity himself,—whether it be innate, or whether it be produced by the mind, on occasion

of the presence of the material object within the sphere of sense. &c., &c.

Of *Absolute Idealism*¹ only two principal species are possible ;

¹ 'If idealism supposed the existence of ideas as *tertia quædam*, distinct at once from the material object and the immaterial subject, these intermediate entities being likewise held to originate immediately or mediately in sense—if this hypothesis, I say, were requisite to Idealism, then would Reid's criticism of that doctrine be a complete and final confutation. But as this criticism did not contemplate, so it does not confute that simpler and more refined Idealism which views in ideas only modifications of the mind itself; and which, in place of sensualizing intellect, intellectualizes sense. On the contrary, Reid (and herein he is followed by Mr. Stewart), in the doctrine now maintained, asserts the very positions on which this scheme of Idealism establishes its conclusions. An Egoistical Idealism is established, on the doctrine that all our knowledge is merely subjective, or of the mind itself; that the Ego has no immediate cognizance of a Non-Ego as existing, but that the Non-Ego is only represented to us in a modification of the self-conscious Ego. This doctrine being admitted, the Idealist has only to show that the supposition of a Non-Ego, or external world really existent, is a groundless and unnecessary assumption; for, while the law of parcimony prohibits the multiplication of substances or causes beyond what the phenomena require, we have manifestly no right to postulate for the Non-Ego the dignity of an independent substance beyond the Ego, seeing that this Non-Ego is, *ex hypothesi*, known to us, consequently exists for us only as a phenomenon of the Ego.—Now, the doctrine of our Scottish philosophers is, in fact, the very groundwork on which the Egoistical Idealism reposes. That doctrine not only maintains our sensations of the secondary qualities to be the mere effects of certain unknown causes, of which we are consequently entitled to affirm nothing, but that we have no direct and immediate perception of extension and the other primary qualities of matter. To limit ourselves to *extension* (or *space*), which *figure* and *motion* (the two other qualities proposed by Reid for the experiment) suppose, it is evident that if *extension* be not immediately perceived as externally existing, *extended* objects cannot be immediately perceived as realities out, and independent of, the percipient subject; for, if we were capable of such a perception of such objects, we should necessarily be also capable of a perception of this, the one essential attribute of their existence. But, on the doctrine of our Scottish philosophers, Extension is a notion suggested on occasion of sensations supposed to be determined by certain unknown causes; which unknown causes are again supposed to be existences independent of the mind, and extended—their complement, in fact, constituting the external world. All our knowledge of the Non-Ego is thus merely ideal and mediate; we have no knowledge of any really objective reality, except through a subjective representation or notion; in other words, we are only immediately cognizant of certain modes of our own minds, and, in and through them, mediately warned of the phenomena of the material universe. In all essential respects, this

at least, only two have been actually manifested in the history of philosophy;—the *Theistic* and the *Egoistic*. The former supposes that the Deity presents to the mind the appearances which we are determined to mistake for an external world; the latter supposes that these appearances are manifested to consciousness, in conformity to certain unknown laws by the mind itself. The Theistic Idealism is again subdivided into three; according as God is supposed to exhibit the phenomena in question in his own substance,—to infuse into the percipient mind representative entities different from its own modification,—or to determine the *ego* itself to an illusive representation of the *non-ego*.¹

Now it is easily shown, that if the doctrine of Natural Realism be abandoned,—if it be admitted, or proved, that we are deceived in our belief of an immediate knowledge of aught beyond the mind; then Absolute Idealism is a conclusion philosophically inevitable, the assumption of an external world being now an assumption which no necessity legitimates, and which is therefore philosophically inadmissible. On the law of parsimony it must be presumed null.

It is, however, historically true, that Natural Realism had been long abandoned by philosophers for Cosmothetic Idealism, before the grounds on which this latter doctrine rests were shown to be unsound. These grounds are principally the following:

1.)—In the *first* place, the natural *belief in the existence* of an external world was allowed to operate even when the natural *belief of our immediate knowledge* of such a world was argued to be false. It might be thought that philosophers, when they maintained that one original belief was illusive, would not contend that another was veracious,—still less that they would assume, as true, a belief which existed only as the result of a

doctrine of Reid and Stewart is identical with Kant's; except that the German philosopher, in holding *space* to be a necessary form of our conceptions of external things, prudently declined asserting that these unknown things are *in themselves* extended.¹—Reid, p. 128.—*W.*

¹ For a more detailed view of these distinctions, see the previous chapter.
—*W.*

belief which they assumed to be false. But this they did. The Cosmothetic Idealists all deny the validity of our natural belief in our knowledge of the existence of external things; but we find the majority of them, at the same time, maintaining that such existence must be admitted on the authority of our natural belief of its reality. And yet the latter belief exists only in and through the former; and if the former be held false, it is therefore, of all absurdities the greatest to view the latter as true. Thus Descartes, after arguing that mankind are universally deluded in their conviction that they have any immediate knowledge of aught beyond the modifications of their own minds; again argues that the existence of an external world must be admitted,—because if it do not exist, God deceives, in impressing on us a belief in its reality; but God is no deceiver; therefore, &c. This reasoning is either good for nothing, or good for more than Descartes intended. For, on the one hand, if God be no deceiver, he did not deceive us in our natural belief that we know something more than the mere modes of self; but then the fundamental position of the Cartesian philosophy is disproved: and if, on the other hand, this position be admitted, God is thereby confessed to be a deceiver, who, having deluded us in the belief on which our belief of an external world is founded, cannot be consistently supposed not to delude us in this belief itself. Such melancholy reasoning is, however, from Descartes to Dr. Brown, the favorite logic by which the Cosmothetic Idealists in general attempt to resist the conclusion of the Absolute Idealists. But on this ground there is no tenable medium between Natural Realism and Absolute Idealism.

It is curious to notice the different views which *Berkeley* and *Collier*, our two Absolute Idealists, and which *Dr. Samuel Clarke*, the acutest of the Hypothetical Realists with whom they both came in contact, took of this principle.

Clarke was, apparently, too sagacious a metaphysician not to see that the proof of the reality of an external world reposed mainly on our natural belief of its reality; and at the same time

that this natural belief could not be pleaded in favor of his hypothesis by the Cosmothetic Idealist. He was himself conscious, that his philosophy afforded him no arms against the reasoning of the Absolute Idealists; whose inference he was, however, inclined neither to admit, nor able to show why it should not. Whiston, in his Memoirs, speaking of Berkeley and his Idealism, says:—‘He was pleased to send Dr. Clarke and myself, each of us a book. After we had both perused it, I went to Dr. Clarke and discoursed with him about it to this effect:—That I, being not a metaphysician, was not able to answer Mr. Berkeley’s subtile premises, though I did not at all believe his absurd conclusion. I, therefore, desired that he, who was deep in such subtilties, but did not appear to believe Mr. Berkeley’s conclusions, would answer him; *which task he declined.*’ Many years after this, as we are told in the Life of Bishop Berkeley, prefixed to his works:—‘There was, at Mr. Addison’s instance, a meeting of Drs. Clarke and Berkeley to discuss this speculative point; and great hopes were entertained from the conference. The parties, however, separated without being able to come to any agreement. Dr. Berkeley declared himself not well satisfied with the conduct of his antagonist on the occasion, *who, though he could not answer, had not candor enough to own himself convinced.*’

Mr. Benson affords us a curious anecdote to the same effect in a letter of Collier to Clarke. From it we learn,—that when Collier originally presented his *Clavis* to the Doctor, through a friend, on reading the title, Clarke good-humoredly said:—‘Poor gentleman! I pity him. He would be a philosopher, but has chosen a strange task; for he can neither prove his point himself, nor can the contrary be proved against him.’

In regard to the two Idealists themselves, each dealt with this ground of argument in a very different way; and it must be confessed that in this respect Collier is favorably contrasted with Berkeley.—*Berkeley* attempts to enlist the natural belief of mankind in his favor against the Hypothetical Realism of the philos-

ophers. It is true, that natural belief is opposed to scientific opinion. Mankind are not, however, as Berkeley reports, Idealists. In this he even contradicts himself; for, if they be, in truth, of his opinion, why does he dispute so anxiously, so learnedly against them?—*Collier*, on the contrary, consistently rejects all appeal to the common sense of mankind. The motto of his work, from Malebranche, is the watchword of his philosophy:—‘*Vulgi assensus et approbatio circa materiam difficilem, est certum argumentum falsitatis istius opinionis cui assentitur.*’ And in his answer to the Cartesian argument for the reality of matter, from ‘that strong and natural inclination which all men have to believe in an external world;’ he shrewdly remarks on the inconsistency of such a reasoning at such hands:—‘Strange! That a person of Mr. Descartes’ sagacity should be found in so plain and palpable an oversight; and that the late ingenious Mr. Norris should be found treading in the same track, and that too upon a solemn and particular disquisition of this matter. That whilst on the one hand, they contend against the common inclination or prejudice of mankind, that the visible world is not external, they should yet appeal to the same common inclination for the truth or being of an external world, which on their principles must be said to be invisible; and for which, therefore (they must needs have known if they had considered it), there neither is, nor can be, any kind of inclination.’ (P. 81.)

2.)—In the *second* place it was very generally assumed in antiquity, and during the middle ages, that an external world was a supposition necessary to render possible the fact of our sensitive cognition. The philosophers who held, that the immediate object of perception was an emanation from an outer reality, and that the hypothesis of the latter was requisite to account for the phenomenon of the former,—their theory involved the existence of an external world as its condition. But from the moment that the necessity of this condition was abandoned, and this was done by many even of the scholastic philosophers;—from the moment that sensible species or the vicarious objects in per-

ception were admitted to be derivable from other sources than the external objects themselves, as from God, or from the mind itself; from that moment we must look for other reasons than the preceding, to account for the remarkable fact, that it was not until after the commencement of the eighteenth century that a doctrine of Absolute Idealism was, without communication, contemporaneously promulgated by Berkeley and Collier.

3.)—In explanation of this fact, we must refer to a *third* ground, which has been wholly overlooked by the historians of philosophy; but which it is necessary to take into account, would we explain how so obvious a conclusion as the negation of the existence of an outer world, on the negation of our immediate knowledge of its existence, should not have been drawn by so acute a race of speculators as the philosophers of the middle ages, to say nothing of the great philosophers of a more recent epoch. This ground is:—*That the doctrine of Idealism is incompatible with the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist.* It is a very erroneous statement of Reid, in which, however he errs only in common with other philosophers, that ‘*during the reign of the Peripatetic doctrine, we find no appearance of scepticism about the existence of matter.*’ On the contrary, during the dominance of the scholastic philosophy, we find that the possibility of the non-existence of matter was contemplated; nay, that the *reasons* in support of this supposition were expounded, *in all their cogency.* We do not, however, find the conclusion founded on these reasons formally professed. And why? Because this conclusion, though philosophically proved, was theologically disproved; and such disproof was during the middle ages sufficient to prevent the overt recognition of any speculative doctrine; for with all its ingenuity and boldness, philosophy during these ages was confessedly in the service of the church,—it was always *Philosophia ancillans Theologicæ.* And this because the service was voluntary;—a thralldom indeed of love. Now, if the reality of matter were denied, there would, in general, be *denied the reality of Christ’s incarnation*; and in particular *the transubstantiation*

into his body of the elements of bread and wine. There were other theological reasons indeed, and these not without their weight ; but this was, perhaps, the only one insuperable to a Catholic.

We find the influence of this reason at work in very ancient times. It was employed by the earlier *Fathers*, and more especially in opposition to Marcion's doctrine of the merely phenomenal incarnation of our Saviour.—'Non licet' (says *Tertullian* in his book *De Anima*, speaking of the evidence of sense)—'non licet nobis in dubium sensus istus revocare, ne et in Christo de fide eorum deliberetur: ne forte dicatur, quod falso Satanam prospectârit de cælo præcipitatum; aut falso vocem Patris audierit de ipso testificatam; aut deceptus sit cum Petri socrum tetegit. . . . Sic et Marcion phantasma eum maluit credere, totius corporis in illo dedignatus veritatem.' (Cap. xvii.) And in his book, *Adversus Marcionem*:—'Ideo Christus non erat quod videbatur, et quod erat mentiebatur; caro, nec caro; homo, nec homo: proinde Deus Christus, nec Deus; cur enim non etiam Dei phantasma portaverit? An credam ei de interiore substantia, qui sit de exteriori frustratus? Quomodo verax habebitur in occulto, tam fallax repertus in aperto? . . . Jam nunc quum mendacium deprehenditur Christus caro; sequitur ut omnia quæ per carnem Christi gesta sunt, mendacio gesta sint,—congressus, contactus, convictus, ipsæ quoque virtutes. Si enim tangendo aliquem, liberavit a vitio, non potest vere actum credi, sine corporis ipsius veritate. Nihil solidum ab inani, nihil plenum a vacuo perfici licet. Putativus habitus, putativus actus; imaginarius operator, imaginariæ operæ.' (Lib. iii. c. 8.)—In like manner, *St. Augustin*, among many other passages:—'Si phantasma fuit corpus Christi, fefellit Christus; et si fefellit, veritas non est. Est autem veritas Christus; non igitur phantasma fuit corpus ejus.' (*Liber De lxxiii. Quæstionibus, qu. 14.*)—And so many others.

The repugnancy of the Catholic dogma of transubstantiation with the surrender of a substantial prototype of the species presented to our sensible perceptions, was, however, more fully and

precisely signalized by the *Schoolmen*; as may be seen in the polemic waged principally on the great arena of scholastic subtilty—the commentaries on the four books of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. In their commentaries on the first book, especially, will be found abundant speculation of an idealistic tendency. The question is almost regularly mooted:—*May not God preserve the species* (the *ideas* of a more modern philosophy) *before the mind, the external reality represented being destroyed?*—*May not God, in fact, object to the sense the species representing an external world, that world, in reality, not existing?* To these questions the answer is, always in the first instance, affirmative. Why then, the possibility, the probability even, being admitted, was the fact denied? Philosophically orthodox, it was theologically heretical; and their principal argument for the rejection is, that on such hypothesis, the doctrine of a transubstantiated eucharist becomes untenable. A change is not,—cannot be,—(spiritually) real.

Such was the special reason, why many of the acuter *Schoolmen* did not follow out their general argument, to the express negation of matter; and such also was the only reason, to say nothing of other Cartesians, why *Malebranche* deformed the simplicity of his peculiar theory with such an assumptive *hors d'œuvre*, as an unknown and otiose universe of matter. It is, indeed, but justice to that great philosopher to say,—that if the incumbrance with which, as a Catholic, he was obliged to burden it, be thrown off his theory, that theory becomes one of Absolute Idealism; and that, in fact, all the principal arguments in support of such a scheme are found fully developed in his immortal *Inquiry after Truth*. This *Malebranche* well knew; and knowing it, we can easily understand, how Berkeley's interview with him ended as it did.*

* [I cannot, however, concur in the praise of novelty and invention, which has always been conceded to the central theory of *Malebranche*. His '*Vision of all things in the Deity*,' is, as it appears to me, simply a transference to man in the flesh, to the *Viator*, of that mode of cognition, maintained by

Malebranche thus left little for his Protestant successors to do. They had only to omit the Catholic¹ excrescence; the reasons vindicating this omission they found collected and marshalled to their hand. That Idealism was the legitimate issue of the Malebranchian doctrine, was at once seen by those competent to metaphysical reasoning. This was signaled, in general, by Bayle, and, what has not been hitherto noticed, by Locke.* It was,

many of the older Catholic divines, in explanation of how the saints, as disembodied spirits, can be aware of human invocations, and, in general, of what passes upon earth. '*They perceive,*' it is said, '*all things in God.*' So that, in truth, the philosophical theory of Malebranche is nothing but the extension of a theological hypothesis, long common in the schools; and with scholastic speculations, Malebranche was even intimately acquainted. This hypothesis I had once occasion to express:

‘*Quidquid, in his tenebris vitæ, carne latebat,
Nunc legis in magno cuncta, beate, Deo.*’]

¹ ‘They (the Catholics) admit that *physically* the bread and wine are bread and wine; and only contend that *hyperphysically* in a spiritual, mysterious, and inconceivable sense, they are really flesh and blood. Those, therefore, who think of disproving the doctrine of transubstantiation, by proving that in the eucharist bread and wine remain physically bread and wine, are guilty of the idle sophism called *mutatio elenchi*.’—Reid, p. 518.—*W.*

* Compare Locke’s *Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion* (§ 20).

When on this subject, we may clear up a point connected therewith, of some interest, in relation to *Locke* and *Newton*, and which has engaged the attention of Dr. Reid and Mr. Dugald Stewart.

Reid, who has overlooked the passage of *Locke* just referred to, says, in deducing the history of the Berkeleian Idealism, and after speaking of Malebranche’s opinion:—‘It may seem strange that *Locke*, who wrote so much about ideas, should not see those consequences which *Berkeley* thought so obviously deducible from that doctrine. . . . There is, indeed a single passage in *Locke*’s essay, which may lead one to conjecture that he had a glimpse of that system which *Berkeley* afterwards advanced, but thought proper to suppress it within his own breast. The passage is in Book IV. c. 10, where, having proved the existence of an eternal, intelligent mind, he comes to answer those who conceive that matter also must be eternal, because we cannot conceive how it could be made out of nothing; and, having observed that the creation of mind requires no less power than the creation of matter, he adds what follows:—“Nay, possibly, if we could emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts, as far as they would reach, to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some dim and seeming conception, how matter might at first be made and begin to exist, by the power of that eternal first Being; but to give beginning and being to a spirit, would be found a more inconceivable effect

therefore, but little creditable to the acuteness of *Norris*, that he, a Protestant, should have adopted the Malebranchian hypothesis, without rejecting its Catholic incumbrance. The honor of

of omnipotent power. But this being what would, perhaps, lead us too far from the notions on which the philosophy now in the world is built, it would not be pardonable to deviate so far from them, or to inquire, so far as grammar itself would authorize, if the common settled opinion oppose it; especially in this place, where the received doctrine serves well enough to our present purpose." Reid then goes on at considerable length to show that 'every particular Mr. Locke has hinted with regard to that system which he had in his mind, but thought it prudent to suppress, tallies exactly with the system of Berkeley.' (*Intellectual Powers*, Ess. II. ch. 10.)

Stewart does not coincide with Reid. In quoting the same passage of Locke, he says of it, that 'when considered in connection with some others in his writings, it would almost tempt one to think that a theory concerning matter, somewhat analogous to that of Boscovich, had occasionally passed through his mind;' and then adduces various reasons in support of this opinion, and in opposition to Reid's. (*Philosophical Essays*, Ess. II. ch. 1, p. 63.)

The whole arcanum in the passage in question is, however, revealed by *M. Coste*, the French translator of the Essay, and of several other of the works of Locke, with whom the philosopher lived in the same family, and on the most intimate terms, for the last seven years of his life; and who, though he has never been consulted, affords often the most important information in regard to Locke's opinions. To this passage there is in the fourth edition of Coste's translation, a very curious note appended, of which the following is an abstract. 'Here Mr. Locke excites our curiosity without being inclined to satisfy it. Many persons having imagined that he had communicated to me this mode of explaining the creation of matter, requested, when my translation first appeared, that I would inform them what it was; but I was obliged to confess, that Mr. Locke had not made even me a partner in the secret. At length, long after his death, Sir Isaac Newton, to whom I was accidentally speaking of this part of Mr. Locke's book, discovered to me the whole mystery. He told me, smiling, that it was he himself who had imagined this manner of explaining the creation of matter, and that the thought had struck him, one day, when this question chanced to turn up in a conversation between himself, Mr. Locke, and the late Earl of Pembroke. The following is the way in which he explained to them his thought:—"We may be enabled" (he said) "to form some rude conception of the creation of matter, if we suppose that God by his power had prevented the entrance of any thing into a certain portion of pure space, which is of its nature penetrable, eternal, necessary, infinite; for henceforward this portion of space would be endowed with impenetrability; one of the essential qualities of matter; and as pure space is absolutely uniform, we have only again to suppose that God communicated the same impenetrability to another portion of space, and we should then obtain in a certain sort the notion of the mobility of matter, another quality which is also

first promulgating an articulate scheme of absolute idealism was thus left to *Berkeley* and *Collier*; and though both are indebted to Malebranche for the principal arguments they adduce, each is also entitled to the credit of having applied them with an ingenuity peculiar to himself.

It is likewise to the credit of Collier's sagacity, that he has noticed (and he is the only modern philosopher, we have found, to have anticipated our observation) the incompatibility of the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist with the non-existence of matter. In the concluding chapter of his work, in which he speaks 'of the use and consequences of the foregoing treatise,' he enumerates as one 'particular usefulness with respect to religion,' the refutation it affords of 'the real presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist in which the Papists have grafted the doctrine of transubstantiation.' He says :

'Now nothing can be more evident, than that both the sound and explication of this important doctrine are founded altogether on the supposition of external matter; so that, if this be removed, there is not any thing left whereon to build so much as the appearance of a question.—For if, after this, it be inquired *whether the substance of the bread in this sacrament, be not changed into the substance of the body of Christ, the accidents or sensible appearances remaining as before; or suppose this should be affirmed to be the fact, or at least possible, it may indeed be shown to be untrue or impossible, on the supposition of an external world, from certain consequential absurdities which attend it; but to remove an external world, is to prick it in its punctum saliens, or quench its very vital flame.* For if there is no external matter, the very distinction is lost between the substance and accidents, or sensible species of bodies, and these last will become the sole essence of material objects. So that, if these are supposed to remain as before, there is no possible room for the supposal of any change, in that the thing supposed to be changed, is here shown to be nothing at all.' (P. 95.)

very essential to it." Thus, then, we are relieved of the embarrassment of endeavoring to discover what it was that Mr. Loeke had deemed it advisable to conceal from his readers: for the above is all that gave him occasion to tell us—"if we would raise our thoughts as far as they could reach, we might be able to aim at some dim and seeming conception how matter might at first be made," &c.—This suffices to show what was the general purport of Locke's expressions, and that Mr. Stewart's conjecture is at least nearer to the truth than Dr. Reid's.

But we must conclude.—What has now been said in reference to a part of its contents, may perhaps contribute to attract the attention of those interested in the higher philosophy, to this very curious volume. We need hardly add, that Mr Benson's Memoirs of Collier should be bound up along with it.

CHAPTER V.

DISTINCTION OF THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES OF BODY.¹

THE developed doctrine of Real Presentationism, the basis of Natural Realism, asserts the consciousness or immediate perception of certain essential attributes of matter objectively existing; while it admits that other properties of body are unknown in themselves, and only inferred as causes to account for certain subjective affections of which we are cognizant in ourselves. This discrimination, which to other systems is contingent, superficial, extraneous, but to Natural Realism necessary, radical, intrinsic, coincides with what, since the time of Locke, has been generally known as the distinction of the Qualities of Matter or Body, using these terms as convertible into Primary and Secondary.

Of this celebrated analysis, I shall here, in the first place, attempt an *historical survey*; and in the second, endeavor to place it on its proper footing by a *critical analysis*; without however in either respect proposing more than a contribution towards a more full and regular discussion of it in both.

§ I.—DISTINCTION OF THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES OF BODY CONSIDERED HISTORICALLY.

In regard to its History²—this, as hitherto attempted, is at once extremely erroneous, if History may be called the incidental

¹ This is the fourth supplementary Dissertation in Hamilton's Reid.—*W.*

² Sir William is exploring a new tract in the history of philosophy. No one has preceded him in this research, and if he has not completed the history of the distinction of the Primary and Secondary Qualities of Body, he has given us, with accurate criticism, the opinions of those most worthy of being consulted. No one, from Brucker to the present time, has traced the history of particular opinions with such affluent and unerring erudition, as that of Hamilton. In this respect, he stands unrivalled and alone. We

notices in regard to it of an historical import, which are occasionally to be met with in philosophical treatises.—Among the most important of these, are those furnished by Reid himself, and by M. Royer-Collard.

The distinction of the real and the apparent, of the absolute and the relative, or of the objective and the subjective qualities of perceived bodies is of so obtrusive a character, that it was taken almost at the origin of speculation, and can be shown to have commanded the assent even of those philosophers by whom it is now commonly believed to have been again formally rejected. For in this, as in many other cases, it will be found that while philosophers appear to differ, they are, in reality, at one.

1.—LEUCIPPUS and DEMOCRITUS are the first on record by whom the observation was enounced, that the Sweet, the Bitter, the Cold, the Hot, the Colored, &c., are wholly different, in their absolute nature, from the character in which they come manifested to us. In the latter case, these qualities have no real or independent existence (ὅτι κατὰ ἀλγήθειαν). The only existence they can pretend to, is merely one phenomenal in us; and this in virtue of a law or relation (νόμῳ), established between the existing body and the percipient mind; while all that can be denominated Quality in the external reality, is only some modification of Quantity, some particular configuration, position, or co-arrangement of Atoms, in conjunction with the Inane. (*Aristoteles*, *Metaph.*, L. i. c. 4—*Phys. Ausc.*, L. i. c. 5—*De Anima*, L. iii. c. 1—*De Sensu et Sensili*, c. 4—*De Gen. et Corr.*, L. i. cc. 2, 7, 8;—*Theophrastus*, *De Sensu*, §§ 63, 65, 67, 69, 73, ed. Schneid.;—*Sextus Empiricus*, *adv. Math.*, vii. § 135—*Hypot.* i. § 213;—*Galenus*, *De Elem.*, L. i. c. 2;—*Laertius*, L. ix. seg. 44;—*Plutarchus*, *adv. Colot.*, p. 1110, ed. Xyl.;—*Simplicius*, in *Phys.*

hope that many will follow his example, who, each working in a separate field, will at length complete the history—not of philosophers, not of men, not of systems even, but of the human mind itself, in the various forms of its manifestation.—W.

Ausc., ff. 7, 10, 106, 119, ed. Ald.;—*Philoponus*, De Gen. et Corr., f. 32, ed Ald.)

2, 3.—This observation was not lost on PROTAGORAS or on PLATO. The former on this ground endeavored to establish the absolute relativity of all human knowledge; the latter the absolute relativity of our sensible perceptions. (*Theætetus*, passim.)

4.—By the CYRENÆAN philosophers the distinction was likewise adopted and applied. (*Cic. Qu. Acad.*, iv. c. 24.)

5.—With other doctrines of the older Atomists it was transplanted into his system by EPICURUS. (*Epist. ad Herod.* apud *Laert.*, L. x. seg. 54; *Lucret.*, L. ii. v. 729—1021.)

6.—In regard to ARISTOTLE, it is requisite to be somewhat more explicit. This philosopher might seem, at first sight, to have rejected the distinction (*De Anima*, L. iii. c. i.); and among many others, Reid has asserted that Aristotle again ignored the discrimination, which had been thus recognized by his predecessors. (*Inq.*, 123 a, I. P. 313 b.) Nothing, however, can be more erroneous than the accredited doctrine upon this point. Aristotle does not abolish the distinction;—nay, I am confident of showing, that to whatever merit modern philosophers may pretend in this analysis, all and each of their observations are to be found, clearly stated, in the writings of the Stagirite.

In the *first* place, no philosopher has discriminated with greater, perhaps none with equal, precision, the difference of corporeal qualities considered *objectively* and *subjectively*. These relations he has not only contrasted, but has assigned to them distinctive appellations. In his *Categories* (c. viii. § 10, Pachian division, by which, as that usually adopted, I uniformly quote), speaking of Quality, he says:—‘A third kind of Quality [Suchness] is made up of the *Affective Qualities* and *Affections* (παθητικά καὶ ποιότητες, πάθη). Of this class are Sweetness, Bitterness, Sourness, and the like, also Heat and Cold, Whiteness and Blackness, &c. That these are qualities [suchnesses] is manifest. For the subjects in which they are received, are said to be such and such by relation to them. Thus honey is called sweet, as recipi-

ent of sweetness, body, white, as recipient of whiteness, and so of the rest. They are called *affective* [i. e. causing passion or affection*] not because the things to which these qualities belong, have been themselves affected in any way (for it is not because honey, or the like, has been somehow affected that it is called sweet, and in like manner heat and cold are not called affective qualities because the bodies in which they inhere have undergone any affection); but they are called *affective*, because each of the

* The activo-potential term *παθητικός*, primarily and properly denotes that which *can in itself suffer or be affected*; it is here employed in a secondary and abusive sense (for *πάσχω* is intransitive), but which subsequently became the more prevalent—to signify that which *can cause suffering or affection in something else*. The counter passivo-potential form, *παθητός*, is not, I venture to assert, ever used by Aristotle, though quoted from him, and from this very treatise, by all the principal lexicographers for the last three centuries; nay, I make further bold to say, there is no authority for it (Menander's is naught), until long subsequently to the age of the Stagirite. [The error, I suspect, originated thus:—Tusanus, in his *Lexicon* (1552), says, under the word—'Vide Fabrum Stapulensem apud Aristotelem in *Prædicamentis*;' meaning, it is probable (for I have not the book at hand), to send us to Faber's Introduction to the *Categories*, for some observations on the term. The *Lexicon Septemvirale* (1563), copying Tusanus, omits Faber, and simply refers 'Aristoteli, in *Prædicamentis*,' as to an authority for the word; and this error, propagated through Stephanus, Constantine, Scapula, and subsequent compilers, stands uncorrected to the present day.] But this term, even were it of Aristotelic usage, could not, without violence, have been twisted to denote, in conjunction with *ποιήτης*, what the philosopher less equivocally, if less symmetrically, expresses by *πάθος*, *affection*. *Patibilis*, like most Latin verbals of its class, indiscriminately renders the two potentials, active and passive, which the Greek tongue alone so admirably contradistinguishes. But, in any way, the word is incompetent to Aristotle's meaning, in the sense of *affective*. For it only signifies either that which *can suffer*, or that which *can be suffered*; and there is not, I am confident, a single ancient authority to be found for it, in the sense of that which *can cause to suffer*,—the sense to which it is contorted by the modern Latin Aristotelians. But they had their excuse—necessity; for the terms *passivus*, used in the '*Categoriæ Decem*' attributed to St. Augustine, and *passibilis*, employed by Boethius in his version of the present passage, are even worse. The words *affective* and *affection* render the Greek adjective and substantive tolerably well.

This distinction by Aristotle is very commonly misunderstood. It is even reversed by Gassendi; but with him, of course, only from inadvertence. Phys. Sect. i. Lib. vi. c. 1.

foresaid qualities has the power of causing an affection in the sense. For sweetness determines a certain affection in tasting, heat in touching, and in like manner the others.'

Nothing can be juster than this distinction, and it is only to be regretted that he should have detracted from the precision of the language in which it is expressed by not restricting the correlative terms, *Affective Qualities* and *Affections*, to the discrimination in question alone. In this particular observation, it is proper to notice, Aristotle had in view the secondary qualities of our modern philosophy exclusively. It suffices, however, to show that no philosopher had a clearer insight into the contrast of such qualities, as they *are*, and as they are *perceived*; and, were other proof wanting, it might also of itself exonerate him from any share in the perversion made by the later Peripatetics of his philosophy, in their doctrine of Substantial Forms;—a doctrine which, as Reid (I. P. 316) rightly observes, is inconsistent with the distinction in question as taken by the Atomic philosophers, but which in truth is not less inconsistent with that here established by Aristotle himself.* It may be here likewise observed that Andronicus,

* The theory of what are called Substantial Forms, that is, qualities viewed as entities conjoined with, and not as mere dispositions or modifications of matter, was devised by the perverse ingenuity of the Arabian philosophers and physicians. Adopted from them, it was long a prevalent doctrine in the Western schools, among the followers of Aristotle and Galen; to either of whom it is a gross injustice to attribute this opinion. It was the ambiguity of the word *ὀνόματα*, by which the Greeks express what is denoted (to say nothing of Arabic) by both the Latin terms *essentia* and *substantia*, that allowed of, and principally occasioned the misinterpretation.

I may likewise notice, by the way, that Aristotle's doctrine of the assimilation, in the sensitive process, of that which perceives with that which is perceived, may reasonably be explained to mean, that the object and subject are then so brought into mutual relation, as, by their coefficient energy, to constitute an act of cognition one and indivisible, and in which the reality is to us as we perceive it to be. This is a far easier, and a far more consistent interpretation of his words than the monstrous doctrine of *intentional forms* or *species*;—a doctrine founded on one or two vague or metaphorical expressions, and for which the general analogy of his philosophy required a very different meaning. For example, when Aristotle (*De Anima*, iii. 1), in showing that an objection was incompetent, even on its own hypothesis,

as quoted by Simplicius (Categ. f. 55 ed. Velsii), explicitly states, that the Affective Qualities are, in strict propriety, not *qualities* but *powers* (οὐ ποιὰ ἀλλὰ ποιητικά). Aristotle himself, indeed, accords to these apart from perception, only a potential existence; and the Peripatetics in general held them to be, in their language not παθητικῶς, *formally, subjectively*, but ἐνεργητικῶς, *virtually, eminently*, in the external object. Locke has thus no title whatever to the honor generally accorded to him of first promulgating the observation, that the secondary qualities, as in the object, are not so much *qualities* as *powers*. This observation was, however, only borrowed by Locke from the Cartesians. But of this hereafter.

In the *second* place, Aristotle likewise notices the ambiguity which arises from languages not always affording different terms by which to distinguish the *potential* from the *actual*, and the *objective* from the *subjective* phases, in our perception by the different senses. Thus, he observes (De Anima, L. iii. c. 1) that, 'Though the actuality or energy of the *object of sense* and of the *sense itself* be one and indivisible, the nature, the essence, of the energy is, however, not the same in each; as, for example, *sound* in energy, and *hearing* in energy. For it may happen, that what has the power of hearing does not now hear, and that what has the power of sounding does not always sound. But when what has the faculty of hearing, on the one hand, operates, and what

dialectically admits—'that what sees color is, in a certain sort, itself colored;'—is this more than a qualified statement of what modern philosophers have so often, far less guardedly, asserted—that color is not to be considered merely as an attribute of body, since, in a certain respect, it is an affection of mind? And when he immediately subjoins the reason—'for each organ of sense is receptive of its appropriate object,' or, as he elsewhere expresses it, 'receptive of the form without the matter;' what is this but to say—that our organs of sense stand in relation to certain qualities of body, and that each organ is susceptible of an affection from its appropriate quality; such quality, however, not being received by the sense in a material efflux from the object, as was held by Democritus and many previous philosophers? Yet this is the principal text on which the common doctrine of Intentional Species is attributed to Aristotle.

has the faculty of sounding, on the other, sounds, then the actual hearing and the actual sounding take place conjunctly; and of these the one may be called *Audition*, the other *Sonation*;—the subjective term, *hearing*, and the objective term, *sound*, as he afterwards states, being twofold in meaning, each denoting ambiguously both the actual and the potential.—‘The same analogy,’ he adds, ‘holds good in regard to the other senses and their respective objects. For as affection and passion are realized in the patient, and not in the efficient, so the energy of the *object* of sense (αἰσθητόν), and the energy of the *faculty* of sense (αἰσθητικόν) are both in the latter;—but whilst in certain of the senses they have obtained distinct names, (as *Sonation* and *Audition*), in the rest, the one or the other is left anonymous. For *Vision* denotes the energy of the visual faculty, whereas the energy of color, its object, is without a name; and while *Gustation* expresses the act of what is *able to taste*, the act* of that *capable of being tasted* is nameless. But seeing that of the object, and of the faculty, of sense the energy is one and the same, though their nature be different, it is necessary, that hearing and sound, as actual (and the same is the case in the other senses), should subsist and perish together; whereas this is not necessary, in so far as these are considered as potentially existing.’

He then goes on to rectify, in its statement, the doctrine of the older physical philosophers; in whom Philoponus (or Ammonius) contemplates Protagoras and his followers, but Simplicius, on better grounds, the Democriteans. ‘But the earlier speculators on nature were not correct in saying, that there is nothing white or

* In English, and in most other languages, there are not distinct words to express as well the objective as the subjective, coefficient in the senses, more particularly of Tasting and Smelling; and we are therefore obliged ambiguously to apply the terms *taste* and *smell* (which are rather subjective in signification) in an objective sense, and the terms *savor*, *flavor*, &c. (which have perhaps now more of an objective meaning), in a subjective signification. In reference to the sense of touch, the same word is often equivocally used to denote, objectively, a primary quality, and subjectively, a secondary. As *hardness*, *roughness*, &c.

black, apart from sight, and nothing sapid apart from taste. This doctrine is, in certain respects, right, in certain respects, wrong. For *sense* and the *object of sense* having each a two-fold signification, inasmuch as they may severally mean either what is *potentially*, or what is *actually*, existent; in the latter case, what is here asserted, takes place, but not so in the former. These speculators were therefore at fault, in stating absolutely what is only true under conditions.' (De Anima, iii. c. 1.)

This criticism, it is evident, so far from involving a rejection of the distinction taken by Leucippus and Democritus, is only an accommodation of it to the form of his own philosophy; in which the distinction of the *Potential* and *Actual* obtain as great, perhaps an exaggerated importance. And it is sufficiently manifest that the older philosophers exclusively contemplated the latter.

But, in the *third* place, not only did Aristotle clearly establish the difference between qualities considered absolutely, as in the existing object, and qualities considered relatively, as in the sentient subject; and not only did he signalize the ambiguity which arises from the poverty of language, employing only a single word to denote these indifferently:—he likewise anticipated Descartes, Locke, and other modern philosophers, in establishing, and marking out by appropriate terms, a distinction precisely analogous with that taken by them of the *Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter*. The Aristotelic distinction which, *in its relation to the other*, has been wholly overlooked, is found in the discrimination of the *Common and Proper Percepts, Sensibles, or objects of Sense* (αἰσθητὰ κοινὰ καὶ ἴδια). It is given in the two principal psychological treatises of the philosopher; and to the following purport.

Aristotle (De Anima, L. ii. c. 2, L. iii. c. 1, and De Sensu et Sensili, c. 1) enumerates five *percepts* common to all or to a plurality of the senses,—viz, *Magnitude (Extension), Figure, Motion, Rest, Number*. To these in one place (De Anima, iii. 1) he adds *Unity*; and in another (De Sensu et Sensili, c. 4), he states, as

common, at least to sight and touch, besides Magnitude and Figure, the *Rough* and the *Smooth*, the *Acute* and the *Obtuse*. Unity however he comprises under Number; and the *Rough* and *Smooth*, the *Acute* and *Obtuse*, under Figure. Nay, of the five common sensibles or percepts, he gives us (*De Anima*, iii. 1) a further reduction, resolving Figure into Magnitude; while both of these, he says, as well as Rest and Number, are known through Motion; which last, as he frequently repeats, necessarily involves the notion of Time; for motion exists only as in Time. (Compare *Phys. Ausc. L. iv. passim.*) His words are—‘All these we perceive by Motion.* Thus Magnitude (Extension) is apprehended by motion, wherefore also Figure, for figure is a kind of magnitude; what is at Rest by not being moved; Number, by a negation of the continuous,† even in the sensations proper to the sev-

* This doctrine of Aristotle is rejected by Theophrastus, as we learn from the fragments concerning Sense preserved in the rare and neglected treatise of Priscianus Lydus, p. 285. Many modern philosophers when they attempted to explain the origin of our notion of extension from motion, and, in particular, the motion of the hand, were not aware that they had the Stagirite at their head. It is to be remembered, however, that Aristotle does not attempt, like them, to explain by motion our necessary concept of space, but merely our contingent perception of the relative extension of this or that particular object.

This, however, takes it for granted, that by motion (*κίνησις*), Aristotle intends *local motion*. But motion is with him a generic term, comprising four, or six species; and, in point of fact, by motion Aristotle may here, as in many, if not most, other places of his psychological writings, mean a subjective mutation (*ἀλλοίωσις*) or modification of the percipient. This, too, is the interpretation given to the passage by the great majority, if not the whole of the ancient expositors—by Plutarchus of Athens, Ammonius or Philoponus, Simplicius, and Priscianus Lydus; Themistius alone is silent. I say nothing of the sequacious cloud of modern commentators. It is therefore remarkable that Dr. Trendelenburg, in his late valuable edition of the *De Anima*, should have apparently contemplated the interpretation by local motion, as the only one proposed or possible. This may, however, adduce in its favor the authority of Theophrastus, among the ancients—among the moderns, of the subtle Scaliger. From both interpretations, however, a defensible meaning can be elicited.

† This explicitly shows that by Number, Aristotle means only the necessary attribution of *either unity or plurality* to the object of sense. *Divisibility* (in extension, intension, protension) is thus contained under Num-

eral senses, for each of these is itself percipient of what is one.'—This attempt at simplification was followed out by his disciples. Thus St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiæ*, P. i. Qu. 78, art. 3), in showing that the common sensibles do not primarily, and of themselves, act upon and affect the sense, carries them all up into modifications of Quantity (*Quantitatis*);—and in another book (*De Sensu et Sensibili*, Lect. ii.) by a variation of the expression (for in both cases he contemplates only the Extended) into species of the Continuous. To quote the latter:—'Sensibilia communia omnia pertinent aliquo modo ad *Continuum*; vel secundum inensuram ejus, ut *Magnitudo*; vel secundum divisionem, ut *Numerus*; vel secundum terminationem, ut *Figura*; vel secundum distantiam et propinquitatem, ut *Motus*.'

Aristotle indeed (*De Anima*, L. ii. c. 6) virtually admits, that the *common* are abusively termed *sensibles* at all: for he says, 'the proper alone are accurately, or pre-eminently, objects of sense' (τὰ ἴδια κυρίως ἔστι αἰσθητά); and the same seems also to be involved in his doctrine, that the *common* percepts (which in one place he even says are only apprehended *per accidens*) are, in fact, within the domain of sense, merely as being the concomitants or consequents (ἀκολουθοῦντα, ἐπομένα) of the proper.* (*Ibid.* L. iii. cc. 1, 4.) See also Alexander on the Soul. (A. ff. 130 b, 134 a b—B. ff. 152, 153, ed. Ald.)

ber. Number in the abstract is, of course, a merely intellectual concept, as Aristotle once and again notices. See Philoponus on 63 text of second book *De Anima*, Sign. i. 8 ed. Trinc. 1535. Of this again under Locke, No. 19; and Royer-Collard, No. 25.

* I have already noticed that Hutcheson,¹ in saying that 'Extension, Fig-

¹ 'It is not easy,' says Hutcheson, 'to divide distinctly our several *sensations* into classes. The division of our External Senses into the five common classes, seems very imperfect. Some sensations, received without any previous idea, can either be reduced to none of them—such as the sensations of Hunger, Thirst, Weariness, Sickness; or if we reduce them to the sense of Feeling, they are perceptions as different from the other Ideas of Touch—such as Cold, Heat, Hardness, Softness—as the ideas of taste or smell. Others have hinted at an external sense, different from all these.' [This allusion has puzzled the Scottish psychologists. Hutcheson evidently refers to the sixth sense, or sense of veneral titillation, proposed by the elder Scallger, and approved of by Bacon, Buffon, Voltaire, &c.] 'The following general account may possibly be useful. (1°)—

The more modern Schoolmen (followed sometimes unwittingly by very recent philosophers) have indeed contended, that on the principles of Aristotle the several common sensibles are in reality apprehended by other and higher energies than those of sense. Their argument is as follows :—*Motion* cannot be perceived with-

ure, *Motion*, and *Rest*, seem to be more properly ideas accompanying the sensations of *Sight* and *Touch* than the sensations of either of these senses' only, mediately or immediately, repeats Aristotle; to whom is therefore due all the praise which has been lavished on the originality and importance of the observation. [I might have added, however, that Hutcheson does not claim it as his own.¹ For in his *System of Moral Philosophy* (which is to be

That certain motions raised in our bodies are, by a general law, constituted the *occasion of perceptions in the mind*. (2^o) These perceptions never come entirely alone, but have some other perception joined with them. *Thus every sensation is accompanied with the idea of Duration, and yet duration is not a sensible idea, since it also accompanies ideas of internal consciousness or reflection: so the idea of Number may accompany any sensible ideas, and yet may also accompany any other ideas, as well as external sensations.* Brutes, when several objects are before them, have probably all the proper Ideas of sight which we have, without the idea of number. (3^o) Some ideas are found *accompanying* the most different sensations, which yet are not to be perceived separately from some sensible quality. Such are *Extension, Figure, Motion and Rest*, which accompany the ideas of *Sight* or *Colors*, and yet may be perceived without them, as in the ideas of *Touch*, at least if we move our organs along the parts of the body touched. *Extension, Figure, Motion, or Rest, seems therefore to be more properly called ideas accompanying the sensations of Sight and Touch, than the sensations of either of these senses; since they can be received sometimes without the ideas of Color, and sometimes without those of Touching, though never without the one or the other.* The *perceptions which are purely sensible*, received each by its proper sense, are *Tastes, Smells, Colors, Sound, Cold, Heat, &c.* The *universal concomitant ideas* which may attend any Idea whatsoever, are *Duration and Number.* The ideas which accompany the most different sensations, are *Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest.* *These all arise without any previous ideas assembled or compared—the concomitant ideas are reputed images of something external.*—Sect. I., Art. 1. The reader may, likewise consult the same author's 'Synopsis Metaphysicæ,' Part II., cap. i., § 3.—W.

¹ Hamilton says, referring to the passage from Hutcheson: 'But here I may observe, in the first place, that the statement made in the preceding quotation (and still more articulately in the "Synopsis"), that *Duration or Time* is the inseparable concomitant both of sense and reflection, had been also made by Aristotle and many other philosophers; and it is indeed curious how long philosophers were on the verge of enunciating the great doctrine first proclaimed by Kant—that Time is a fundamental condition, form, or category of thought. In the second place, I may notice that Hutcheson is not entitled to the praise accorded him by Stewart and Royer-Collard for his originality in "the fine and important observation that *Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest*, are rather ideas accompanying the perceptions of touch and vision, than perceptions of these senses, properly so called." In this, he seems only to have, with others, repeated Aristotle, who, in his treatise on the Soul (Book II., Ch. 6, Text 64, and Book III., Ch. 1, Text 135), calls *Motion and Rest, Magnitude (Extension), Figure, and Number* (Hutcheson's very list), the common concomitants (*ἀκολουθῶντα καὶ κοινὰ*) of sight and touch, and expressly denies them to be Impressions of sense—the sense having no passive

out the collation of past and present time, without acts of memory and comparison. *Rest*, says Aristotle, is known as a privation, but sense is only of the positive; let it, however, be considered as a state, and as opposed to motion, still this supposes comparison. *Number* in like manner as a negation, a negation of the continuous, is beyond the domain of sense; and while Aristotle in one treatise (*Phys.* iv. 14) attributes the faculty of numeration to intelligence; in another (*Problem*, sect. 30, § 5, if this work be his), he virtually denies it to sense, in denying it to the brutes. *Magnitude* (extension), if considered as comparative, is likewise manifestly beyond the province of mere sense; Aristotle, indeed, admits that its apprehension, in general, presupposes Motion. Finally, *Figure*, as the cognition of extension terminated in a certain manner, still more manifestly involves an act of comparison. (*Scaliger*, *De Subtilitate*, Ex. lxvi. and ccxcviii. § 15.—*Toletus*, in lib. de Anima, L. ii. c. 6.—*Conimbricenses*, *ibid.*—*Irenæus*, *De An.* p. 40.—Compare *Gassendi*, *Phys.* Sect. iii. Memb. Post. L. vi. c. 2.—*Du Hamel*, *Philos. Vetus et Nova*, *Phys.* P. iii. c. 4.—and *Royer-Collard*, in *Œuvres de Reid*, t. iii. p. 428 sq.—to be quoted in the sequel, No. 25.)

annexed to the other references) he speaks of 'what *some* call the Concomitant ideas of Sensation.' (*B.* i. c. 1, p. 6)]. Dr. Price extols it as 'a very just observation of Hutcheson.' (*Rev.* p. 56, ed. 1.) Mr. Stewart calls it 'a remark of singular acuteness'—'a very ingenious and original remark'—and 'a sentence which, considering the period at which the author (Hutcheson) wrote, reflects the highest honor on his metaphysical acuteness.' (*Essays* pp. 31, 46, 551, 4^o ed.) M. Royer-Collard says—'Hutcheson est le premier des philosophes modernes qui ait fait cette observation aussi fine que juste que,' &c. (*Œuvres de Reid*, t. iii. p. 431.)

I may here observe that Philippon (*Υλη ἀνθρωπινη*, p. 335) is misled by an ambiguous expression of Aristotle in stating that he assigned the *common sensibles* as objects to the *Common Sense*. See the Commentaries of Philoponus and Simplicius on the 134 common text of third book *De Anima*. But compare also Alexander, in his treatise on the Soul, first Book, in the chapter on the Common Sense, f. 134, ed. Ald.

affection from these qualities. To these five common concomitants, some of the schoolmen added also (but out of Aristotle), *Place*, *Distance*, *Position*, and *Continuity*.—*Reid*, p. 124.—*W.*

The common sensibles thus came, in fact, to be considered by many of the acutest Aristotelians, as not so much perceptions of sense (in so far as sensible perception depends on corporeal affection) as concomitant cognitions to which the impression on the organ by the proper sensible only afforded the occasion. 'Sensibile Commune dicitur (says Compton Carleton) quod vel percipitur pluribus sensibus, vel ad quod cognoscendum, ab intellectu vel imaginatione desumitur *occasio* ex variis sensibus; ut sunt Figura, Motus, Ubiatio, Duratio, Magnitudo, Distantia, Numerus,' &c. (Philosophia Universa, De Anima Disp. xvi. Sect. 2, § 1.)

But before leaving Aristotle, I should state, that he himself clearly contemplated, in his distinction of Common and Proper Sensibles, a classification correspondent to that of the Primary and Secondary Qualities of bodies, as established by the ancient Atomists. This is expressly shown in a passage wherein he notices that 'Democritus, among others, *reduced the proper sensibles to the common*, in explaining, for example, the differences of color by differences of roughness and smoothness in bodies, and the varieties of savor by a variety in the configuration of atoms.' (De Sensu et Sensili, c. 4.)

Of a division by Aristotle, in a physical point of view, of the Qualities of body into *Primary* and *Secondary*, I shall speak in the sequel, when considering this nomenclature, as adopted, and transferred to the psychological point of view, by Locke, No. 19.

7.—GALEN, whose works are now hardly more deserving of study by the physician than by the philosopher, affords me some scattered observations which merit notice, not merely in reference to the present subject. Sensitive perception, he well observes, consists not in the passive affection of the organ, but in the discriminative recognition—the dijudication of that affection by the active mind. *Ἔστι δὲ αἰσθησις οὐκ ἀλλοίωσις, ἀλλὰ διάγνωσις ἀλλοιώσεως. This function of diagnostic apprehension he accords to the dominant principle (τὸ ἰγμεμονικόν) that is, the imaginative, recollective, and ratiocinative mind. (De Placit. Hipp. et Plat.

L. vii. cc. 14, 16, 17.)*—Again :—‘The objects in propriety called Sensible, are such as require for their discriminative recognition no other faculty but that of sensitive perception itself: whereas those objects are improperly called sensible, whose recognition, besides a plurality of the senses, involves memory and what is called the compositive and collective (generalizing) reason. [I read *συνθετικῶ* and *κεφαλαιωτικῶ*.] Thus Color is an object proper of sense, and Savor and Odor and Sound; so likewise are Hardness and Softness, Heat and Cold, and, in a word, all the Tactile qualities.’ Then, after stating that no concrete object of sense—an apple for instance—is fully cognizable by sense alone, but, as Plato has it, by opinion with the aid of sense; and having well shown how this frequently becomes a source of illusion,—in all which he is closely followed by Nemesius,—he goes on :—‘But to carry sense into effect in all its various applications, is impossible without the co-operation of *memory* and *connumeration* (*συναρίθμησις*), and this, which likewise obtains the name of *summation* (*συγκεφαλαίωσις*, conceiving, thinking under a class), is an act neither of sense nor of memory, but of the discursive or dianoetic faculty of thought. (Com. i. in Hipp. Lib. De Medici Officina, text. 3.)—In another work we have the same doctrine applied to solve the question—By what faculty is Motion apprehended? and it affords the result,—‘That all motion is manifestly recognized, not by a mere act of sensitive perception, not even by sense with the aid of memory, but principally by a compositive act of thought’ (*συλλογισμῶ*). This is a fourth synonym for the three other convertible terms which occur in the previous passage. They are Platonic. (De Dignoscendis Pulsibus, L. iii. c. 1.)

8.—A remarkable but neglected passage relative to the present subject is to be found in the *Saggiatore* of GALILEO, a work first published in 1623. Mamiani della Rovere is the only phi-

* The annotators of Nemesius have not observed that this philosopher is indebted to Galen, really and verbally, for the whole of his remarkable doctrine of sense. See his treatise *De Nat. Hom.* c. 6-11, ed. Matthiæ.

losopher, as far as I am aware, who has ever alluded to it. Galileo there precedes Descartes in the distinction, and anticipates Locke in its nomenclature. The following is an abstract of his doctrine, which coincides with that of the ancient Atomists, in some respects, and with that of Kant, in others.

In conceiving *matter* or corporeal substance we cannot but think that it is somehow terminated, and therefore of such and such a figure; that in relation to other bodies it is large or small; that it exists in this or that place; in this or that time; that it is in motion or at rest; that it does or does not touch another body; that it is single or composed of parts; and these parts either few or many. These are conditions from which the mind cannot in thought emancipate the object. But that it is white or red, bitter or sweet, sonorous or noiseless, of a grateful or ungrateful odor;—with such conditions there is no necessity for conceiving it accompanied.* Hence Tastes, Odors, Colors, &c., considered as qualities inherent in external objects, are merely names; they reside exclusively in the sentient subject. Annihilate the animal percipient of such qualities, and you annihilate such qualities themselves; and it is only because we have bestowed on them particular names different from those by which we designate the other *primary and real affections of matter* (*primi e reali accidenti*), that we are disposed to believe that the former are in objects truly and really different from the latter.

Having illustrated this doctrine at considerable length in relation to the senses of Touch, Taste, Smell, and Hearing; and, in imitation of Aristotle, shown the analogy which these severally hold to the elements of Earth, Water, Fire, and Air, he adds:—*‘Ma che ne’ corpi esterni per eccitare in noi i sapori, gli odori, e i*

* But, as Aristotle has observed, we cannot imagine body without *all* color, though we can imagine it without *any one*. In like manner where the qualities are mutual contradictories, we cannot positively represent to ourselves an object without a determination by one or other of these opposites. Thus we cannot conceive a body which is not either sapid or tasteless, either sonorous or noiseless, and so forth. This observation applies likewise to the first class.

suoni, si richiegga altro, que grandezze, figure, moltitudini, e movimenti tardi o veloci, io non lo credo. Io stimo, che tolti via gli orecchi, le lingue, e i nasi, restino bene le figure, i numeri, e i moti, ma non già gli odori, nè i sapori, nè i suoni, li quali fuor dell' animal vivente, non credo che sieno altro che nomi, come appunto altro che nome non è il solletico, e la titillazione, rimosse l' ascelle, e la pelle in torno al naso; e come a i quattro sensi considerati hanno relazione i quattro elementi, così credo, che per la vista, senso sopra tutti gli altri eminentissimo, abbia relazione la luce, ma non quella proporzione d' eccellenza, qual' è tra 'l finito, e l' infinito, tra 'l temporaneo, e l' instantaneo, tra 'l quanto, e l' indivisibile, tra la luce, e le tenebre.'

He then applies this doctrine to the case of Heat, and says,—
 'Ma che oltre alla figura, moltitudine, moto, penetrazione, e toccamento, sia nel fuoco altra qualità, e che questa sia caldo, io non lo credo altrimenti, e stimo, che questo sia talmente nostro, che rimosso il corpo animato, e sensitivo, il calore non resti altro che un semplice vocabolo.' (Opere, t. ii. p. 340 sq. ed. Padov. 1744.)

9.—DESCARTES is always adduced as the philosopher by whom the distinction in question was principally developed; and by whom, if not first established, it was, at least in modern times, first restored. In truth, however, Descartes originated nothing. He left the distinction as he found it. His only merit is that of signaling more emphatically than had previously been done, the different character of the knowledge we are conscious of in reference to the two contrasted classes; although this difference is not, as he thinks, to be explained by a mere gradation in the clearness of our perceptions. But neither of the one nor of the other is his enumeration of the contents exhaustive; nor did he bestow distinctive appellations on the counter classes themselves.—His 'Meditationes' were first published in 1641, his 'Principia' in 1644: and in these works his doctrine upon this matter is contained.

In the latter, he observes—'Nos longe alio modo cognoscere quidnam sit in viso corpore Magnitudo, vel Figura, vel Motus (saltem localis, philosophi enim alios quosdam motus a locali

diversos affingendo, naturam ejus sibi minus intelligibilem reddiderunt), vel Situs, vel Duratio, vel Numerus, et similia, quæ in corporibus clare percipi jam dictum est; quam quid in eodem corpore sit Color, vel Dolor, vel Odor, vel Sapor, vel quid aliud ex iis, quæ ad sensus dixi esse referenda. Quamvis enim videntes aliquod corpus, non magis certi simus illud existere, quatenus apparet figuratum, quam quatenus apparet coloratum; longe tamen evidentius agnoscimus, quid sit in eo esse figuratum, quam quid sit esse coloratum.' (Princ. i. § 69.)

Of the *former* class we find enumerated by a collation of different passages, Magnitude (or Extension in length, breadth, and thickness), Figure, Locomotion, Position, Duration, Number, Substance, and the like;—all (with the exception of Substance, which is erroneously and only once enumerated) corresponding with the Common Sensibles of the Peripatetics. Of the *latter* class, he instances Colors, Sounds, Odors, Savors, the Tactile qualities* in general, specially enumerating, as examples, Heat, Cold, Pain, Titillation, and (N. B.) Hardness, Weight;—all conformable to the Proper Sensibles of Aristotle.—In the one class we have an idea of the property, such as it exists, or may exist ('ut sunt, aut saltem esse possunt'), in the external body; in the other, we have only an obscure and confused conception of a something in that body which occasions the *sensation* of which we are distinctly conscious in ourselves, but which sensation does not represent to us aught external—does not afford us a real knowledge of any thing beyond the states of the percipient mind itself. (Princ. P. i. §§ 70, 71, P. iv. §§ 191, 197, 199.—Medit. iii. p. 22, vi. pp. 43, 47, 48.—Resp. ad. Med. vi. p. 194, ed. 1658.) Of these two classes, the attributes included under the latter, in so far as

* I am not aware that Descartes, anywhere, gives a full and formal list of the Tactile qualities. In his treatise De Homine, under the special doctrine of Touch (§§ 29, 30) we have Pain, Titillation, Smoothness, Roughness, Heat, Cold, Humidity, Dryness, Weight, 'and the like.' He probably acquiesced in the Aristotelic list, the one in general acceptance,—viz., the Hot and Cold, Dry and Moist, Heavy and Light, Hard and Soft, Viscid and Friable, Rough and Smooth, Thick and Thin. De Gen. et Corr. ii. 2.

they are considered as residing in the objects themselves of our sensations, Descartes, like Democritus and Galileo, held to be only modifications of those contained under the former. ‘Exceptis Magnitudine, Figura et Motu, quæ qualia sint in unoquoque corpore explicui, nihil extra nos positum sentitur nisi Lumen, Color, Odor, Sapor, Sonus, et Tactiles qualitates; quæ nihil aliud esse in objectis, quam *dispositiones quasdam in Magnitudine, Figura et Motu consistentes*, hactenus est demonstratum. (Princ. P. iv. § 199.—Med. Resp. vi. p. 194.) This distinction, by their master, of the two classes of quality, was, as we shall see, associated by the Cartesians with another, taken by themselves,—between *Idea* and *Sensation*.

I have previously shown, that Aristotle expressly recognizes the coincidence of his own distinction of the proper and common sensibles with the Democritean distinction of the apparent and real properties of body. I have now to state that Descartes was also manifestly aware of the conformity of his distinction with those of Aristotle and Democritus. Sufficient evidence, I think, will be found—of the former, in the Principia, P. iv. § 200, and De Homine, § 42;—of the latter, in the Principia, P. iv. § 200–203. All this enhances the marvel, that the identity of these famous classifications should have hitherto been entirely overlooked.

10.—The doctrine of DERODON—an acute and independent thinker, who died in 1664—coincides with that of Aristotle and his genuine school; it is very distinctly and correctly expressed. Sensible qualities, he says, may be considered in two aspects; as they are in the *sensible object*, and as they are in the *sentient animal*. As in the latter, they exist *actually* and *formally*, constituting certain affections agreeable or disagreeable, in a word, sensations of such or such a character. The feeling of Heat is an example. As in the former, they exist only *virtually* or *potentially*; for, correctly speaking, the fire does not contain heat, and is, therefore, *not hot*, but only *capable of heating*. ‘Ignis itaque, proprie loquendo, non habere calorem, atque adeo non esse *culidum*

sed *calorificum* ;* nisi vocabalum *caloris* sumatur pro virtute producendi calorem in animali. Sed philosophi (he refers to the scholastic Aristotelians with their substantial Forms, and Intentional Species, though among them were exceptions)—sed philosophi sunt prorsus inexcusabiles, qui volunt calorem, sumptum pro virtute calefaciendi, quæ est in igne, aut potius identificatur cum ipso igne, et calorem productum in animali, esse ejusdem speciei, naturæ et essentiæ ; nam calor moderatus productus in animali consistit in aliqua passione et quasi titillatione grata quæ sentitur ab animali, quæ passio non potest esse in igne.’ And so forth in regard to the other senses. (Philos. Contr. Phys., p. 190.)

11.—I may adduce to the same purport GLANVILLE, who, in his ‘Vanity of Dogmatizing’ (1661, p. 88 sq.), and in his ‘Scep sis Scientifica’ (1665, p. 65 sq.), though a professed, and not over-scrupulous antagonist of Aristotle, acknowledges, in reference to the present question, that ‘the Peripatetic philosophy teaches us, that Heat is not in the body of the sun, as *formally* considered, but only *virtually*, and as *in its cause*.’ I do not know whether Glanville had Aquinas specially in view ; but the same general statement and particular example are to be found in the Summa contra Gentes, L. i. cc. 29, 31, of the Angelic Doctor.

12.—It is remarkable that Mr. BOYLE’S speculations in regard to the classification of corporeal Qualities should have been wholly overlooked in reference to the present subject ; and this not only on account of their intrinsic importance, but because they probably suggested to Locke the nomenclature which he has adopted, but, in adopting, has deformed.

In his treatise entitled ‘The origin of Forms and Qualities,’ published at Oxford in 1666, Boyle denominates ‘Matter and Motion’ ‘the most Catholic Principles of bodies.’ (P. 8.) ‘Magnitude (Size, Bulk, or Bigness), Shape (Figure), Motion or Rest,’ to

* The chemists have called *Caloric* what they ought to have called *Calorific*. The Lavoisierian nomenclature, whatever it merits in other respects, is a system of philological monstrosities, in which it is fortunate when the analogies of language are only violated, and not reversed.

which he afterwards adds 'Texture,' he styles 'the *Primitive Moods or Primary Affections of bodies*, to distinguish them from those less simple Qualities (as Colors, Tastes, Odors, and the like) that belong to bodies upon their account' (p. 10). The former of these, he likewise designates '*the Primitive or more Catholic Affections of Matter*' (pp. 43, 44); and in another work (Tracts 1671, p. 18), '*the Primary and most Simple Affections of Matter.*' To the latter he gives the name of '*Secondary Qualities*, if (he says) I may so call them' (p. 44).

In reference to the difficulty, 'That whereas we explicate colors, odors, and the like sensible qualities, by a relation to our senses, it seems evident that they have an absolute being irrelative to us; for snow (for instance) would be white, and a glowing coal would be hot, though there were no man or any other animal in the world' (p. 42). And again (p. 49):—'So if there were no sensitive Beings, those bodies that are now the objects of our senses, would be so *dispositively*, if I may so speak, endowed with Colors, Tastes, and the like, but *actually* only with those more catholic affections of bodies, Figure, Motion, Texture, &c.' Is this intended for an Aristotelic qualification of the Democritean paradox of Galileo?

In his Tracts, published at Oxford, 1671—in that entitled 'History of particular Qualities,' he says:—'I shall not inquire into the several significations of the word *Quality*, which is used in such various senses, as to make it ambiguous enough. But thus much I think it not amiss to intimate, that there are some things that have been looked upon as Qualities, which ought rather to be looked on as States of Matter or complexions of particular Qualities; as animal, inanimal, &c., Health, Beauty. And there are some other attributes—namely, Size, Shape, Motion, Rest, that are wont to be reckoned among Qualities, which may more conveniently be esteemed the *Primary Modes* of the parts of Matter, since from these *Simple Attributes or Primordial Affections*, all the Qualities are derived' (p. 3). This is accurate; and it is to be regretted that Locke did not profit by the caution.

13.—DE LA FORGE, whose able treatise ‘De l’Esprit de l’Homme’ was first published in 1666, contributes little of importance to the observation of Descartes, of whose psychology he there exhibits a systematic view. To the ideas of the primary attributes, enumerated by Descartes, he inconsistently adds those of Solidity and Fluidity; and among the secondary he mentions the sensations of the Dry and the Humid (ch. 10). In showing that our sensations of the secondary qualities afford us no knowledge of what these are, as in the external object; and in explanation of the theories of Aristotle and Descartes, he says:—‘Mais sans examiner ici lequel a le mieux rencontré, je ne pense pas qu’aucun des sectateurs de l’un ni de l’autre fassent difficulté, d’avouer que le *Sentiment* qu’excitent en lui les corps chauds ou froids, et l’*Idee* qu’il en a ne lui représente rien de tout cela.’ He thus correctly places the Aristotelians and Cartesians on a level, in admitting that both equally confess our ignorance of what the secondary qualities are in themselves,—an ignorance which is commonly regarded as a notable discovery of Descartes alone.

14.—GEULINX, a Cartesian not less distinguished than De la Forge, and who with him first explicitly proclaimed the doctrine of Occasional Causes, died in 1669; but his ‘Annotata’ and ‘Dietata’ on the ‘Principia’ of Descartes were only published in 1690 and 1691. In these works, like most other Cartesians, he uses the term *Idea*, in reference to body, exclusively to denote the representations of its primary qualities; but he adopts the scholastic term *Species*, instead of *Sensatio* (sensation, sentiment) as employed by them, to express our consciousness of the secondary.—(*Species*, De la Forge had made a better use of, in relieving an ambiguity in the philosophical language of Descartes, who had sometimes abusively usurped the word *idea* for the organic motion in the brain, to which the idea proper—the intellectual representation in the mind itself, was by the law of union attached.) Geulinx is the Cartesian who, from the occasional paradox of his expression, has afforded the most valid foundation for the charge so frequently, but so erroneously, preferred against the sect, of

denying all objective reality to the secondary qualities of matter.

15.—ROHAULT, another illustrious Cartesian, whose ‘Physique’ was first published in 1671 (and which continued until about the middle of last century to be a *College* text-book of philosophy in the University of Newton), may be adduced in disproof of this accusation—an accusation which will be further refuted in the sequel by the testimonies of Malebranche and Sylvain Regis.—Speaking of Heat and Cold, he says,—‘Ces deux mots ont chacun deux significations. Car, premièrement, par la Chaleur et par la Froideur on entend deux *sentimens* particuliers qui sont en nous, et qui ressemblent en quelque façon à ceux qu’on nomme douleur et chatouillement, tels que les sentimens qu’on a quand on approche du feu, ou quand on touche de la glace. Secondement, par la Chaleur et par la Froideur on entend le *pouvoir* que certains corps ont de causer en nous ces deux sentimens dont je viens de parler.’ He employs likewise the same distinction in treating of Savors (ch. 24)—of Odors (ch. 25)—of Sound (ch. 26)—of Light and Colors (ch. 27).

16.—DUIAMEL.—I quote the following passage without the comment, which some of its statements might invite, from the treatise ‘De Corpore Animato,’ 1673, of this learned and ingenious philosopher. It contains the most explicit (though still a very inadequate) recognition of the merits of Aristotle, in reference to our present subject, with which I am acquainted.—‘Quocirca, ut id, quod sentio, paucis aperiam. Corpus omne sensibile *vim* habet in se, qua sensum moveat; sed *forma* ipsa, qua percipimus, vel est motus, vel effluvium, vel quidam substantiæ modus, quem possumus *qualitatem* appellare. Nec sensibile solius qualitatis prædicamento continetur, sed per omnia fere vagatur genera. Corporum enim Figura, Dimensiones, Motus, et variæ Positiones sensum impellunt. Itaque Humor Siccitas, Durities, Figura, atque alii modi, tales sunt, quales a nobis percipiuntur. Rotunditas enim circuli, vel terræ siccitas a sensuum cognitione non pendet. Idem fortassis erit de Colore, Luce, atque aliis activis qualitibus

judicium. Sonus vero nihil est quam percussio organi ex motione aëris, aut conflictu corporum orta. Sapor item et Odor positi sunt in sola sensus impressione. Tolle animalia, nullus erit sapor, nullus odor. Quanquam, ut mihi videtur, *rem totam optime distinguit Aristoteles, cum Patibilem Qualitatem vocat id quod in objecto est sensibili, Passionem vero eandem vocat qualitatem, ut a nobis percipitur.* (Lib. i. c. 3, § 11.)

17.—In the following year (1674), was first published the celebrated ‘Recherche de la Vérité’ of MALEBRANCHE. The admissions already quoted of his immediate predecessor might have guarded him, at least on the point under consideration, from the signal injustice of his attack on Aristotle, the philosophers, and mankind in general *as confounding our subjective sensations with the objective qualities of matter*; and it is only by a not unmerited retribution, that he likewise has been made the object of a counter accusation, equally unfounded, by authorities hardly inferior to himself. Buffier,* Reid,† Royer-Collard,‡ and many besides, reproach Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, and others, with advancing it, without qualification, as a new and an important truth, *that the sensible or secondary qualities have no existence in external objects, their only existence being as modes of the percipient mind.* The charge by Malebranche in the following passage, has been already annihilated, through what has been previously adduced; and the passage itself sufficiently disproves the charge against Malebranche.—‘As regards the terms expressive of Sensible ideas, there is hardly any one who recognizes that they are equivocal. On this Aristotle and the ancient philosophers have not even bestowed a thought. [!] What I state will be admitted by all who will turn to any of their works, and who are distinctly cognizant of the reason why these terms are equivocal. For there is nothing more evident, than that philosophers have believed on this subject quite the contrary of what they ought to have believed. [! !]

* Logique, § 222, Cours, p. 819.

† P. 181.

‡ Œuvres de Reid, t. iii. pp. 386, 447.

‘For example, when the philosophers say that fire is hot, the grass green, the sugar sweet, &c., they mean, as children and the vulgar do, that the fire contains what they feel when they warm themselves; that the grass has on it the colors which they believe to be there; that the sugar contains the sweetness which they taste in eating it; and thus of all the objects of the different senses. It is impossible to doubt of it in reading their writings. They speak of sensible qualities as of sensations; they mistake motions for heat; and they thus confound, by reason of the ambiguity of these terms, the modes in which bodies with the modes in which minds, exist. [! !]

‘It is only since the time of Descartes that those confused and indeterminate questions whether fire be hot, grass green, sugar sweet, &c., have been answered by distinguishing the ambiguity of the terms in which they are expressed. If by heat, color, savor, you understand such a motion of the insensible parts, then fire is hot, grass green, and sugar sweet. But if by heat and the other sensible qualities, you mean what I feel when near the fire, what I see when I look at the grass, &c., in that case the fire is not hot, nor the grass green, &c.; for the heat I feel and the color I see are only in the soul.’ (Recherche, liv. vi. P. ii. c. 2.)

Malebranche contributed to a more precise discrimination between the objective or primary, and the subjective or secondary qualities, by restricting the term *Idea* to the former, and the term *Sensation* to the latter. For though the other Cartesians soon distinguished, more accurately than Descartes himself, *Idea* from *Sensation*, and coincided with Malebranche, in their application of the second; yet in allowing *Ideas* of the modes, both of *extension* and of *thought*, they did not so precisely oppose it to *sensation* as Malebranche, who only allowed *ideas of extension* and its modes. (See Recherche, L. iii. P. ii. cc. 6, 7, and relative Eclaircissement). It has not, I believe, been observed that Locke and Leibnitz, in their counter-criticisms of Malebranche’s theory, have both marvellously overlooked this his peculiar distinction,

and its bearing on his scheme; and the former has moreover, in consequence of neglecting the Cartesian opposition of Idea and Sensation altogether, been guilty of an egregious *mutatio elenchi* in his strictures on the Cartesian doctrine of Extension, as the essential attribute of body. (Essay, B. ii. c. 13, § 25.)

18.—The ‘Système de Philosophie’ of the celebrated Cartesian SYLVAIN REGIS appeared in 1690. The following, among other passages of a similar import, deserve quotation from the precision with which the whole ambiguity of the terms expressive of the secondary qualities in their subjective and objective relations, is explained and rectified.

‘It is evident that savors, taken *formally*, are nothing else than certain sensations (sentimens) or certain perceptions of the soul, which are in the soul itself; and that savors, taken for the *physical cause* of formal savors, consist in the particles themselves of the savory bodies, which according as they differ in size, in figure, and in motion, diversely affect the nerves of the tongue, and thereby cause the sensation of different savors in the soul in virtue of its union with the body.’ This doctrine, as the author admits, is conformable to that of Aristotle, though not to that of his scholastic followers, ‘who maintain that savor in the savory body is something similar to the sensation which we have of it.’ (Phys. L. viii. P. ii. ch. 4.)

The same, *mutatis mutandis*, is repeated in regard to Odors (ch. 5), and to Sounds (ch. 7); and so far, the distinction with its expression of *formal* as opposed to *virtual* is wholly borrowed from the Aristotelians.

But a more minute analysis and nomenclature are given in regard to Light and to Color.

‘The word Light is not less equivocal than those of Savor, Smell, and Sound; for it is employed sometimes to express the peculiar *sensation* which the soul receives from the impression made by luminous bodies on the eye, and sometimes to denote *what there is in those bodies by which they cause* in the soul this peculiar sensation.

‘Moreover, as luminous bodies are not applied immediately to the eye, and as they act by the intervention of certain intermediate bodies, as air, water, glass, &c., whatsoever that may be which they impress on these media is also called Light, but light *Secondary* and *Derived*, to distinguish it from that which is in the luminous body, which last is styled *Primitive* or *Radical* Light.’ (ch. 9.)

‘We call the Sensation of Color, *Formal* color; the quality in bodies causing this Sensation, *Radical* color; and what these bodies impress on the medium, *Derivative* color.’ (ch. 17.)

But this acute subdivision of objective Light and Color into *primitive* or *radical*, and into *secondary* or *derivative*, is not original with Regis, nor indeed with any Cartesian at all. It is evidently borrowed from the following passage of Gassendi:— ‘Lumen, ut Simplicius ait, est quasi baculus qui uno sui extremo a sole motus, alio extremo oculum moveat: sicque motio in ipso sole (non movit quippe nisi moveatur) est ipsa *radicalis* et quasi *fontana* lux;—motio vero perspicui per omnia spatia a sole ad terram extensa, est lux diffusa *derivataque*;—et motio in oculo est *perceptio conspectiove* ipsius lucis.’ (Animadv. in x. lib. Diog. Laertii, p. 851.) Though apparently the whole sentence is here given as a quotation from Simplicius (or, as I suspect, Priscianus) in his commentary on the *De Anima* of Aristotle; the comparison of the staff (or more correctly of the lever) is alone his; and therefore the merit of the distinction in question would belong to Gassendi, were it not that the term *radical* was an expression common in the Schools as a synonym of *fundamental*, and as opposed to *actual* or *formal*. The distinction is thus substantially Aristotelian.

19.—The Essay of LOCKE on the Human Understanding was published in the same year with the *Système de Philosophie* of Regis,—in 1690. His doctrine in regard to the attributes of bodies, in so far as these have power to produce sensations, or perceptions, or simple ideas in us, contains absolutely nothing new; and it is only in consequence of the prevalent ignorance in

regard to the relative observations of previous philosophers, that so much importance has been attached to Locke's speculations on this matter. The distinction is, however, far more correctly given by him than by many of those who subsequently employed it.

Neglecting what Locke calls qualities mediately perceivable, but which lie altogether beyond the sphere of sense, being in reality powers, which, from the phenomena manifested in certain bodies, we infer to exist in other bodies of producing these phenomena as their effects—neglecting these, the following is an abstract of the doctrine given, at great length, and with much repetition, in the eighth chapter of the second book of the Essay.

a.—Locke discriminates the attributes of sensible objects into the same two classes which had been established by all his predecessors.

b.—To the one of these he gives the name of *Primary*, to the other that of *Secondary*, Qualities ;* calling likewise the former *Real* or *Original*, the latter *Imputed*, Qualities.

Remark.—In this nomenclature, of which Locke is universally regarded as the author, there is nothing new. Primary or Original and Secondary or Derived Qualities had been terms applied by Aristotle and the Peripatetics to mark a distinction in the attributes of matter ;—a distinction, however, not analogous to that of Locke, for Aristotle's Primary and Secondary qualities are exclusive of Locke's Primary.† But Galileo had bestowed the

* The term *Quality* ought to have been restricted to the attributes of the second class ; for these are the properties of body as such or such body (*corporis ut tale corpus*), whereas the others are the properties of body as body (*corporis ut corpus*) ; a propriety of language which Locke was among the first to violate.

† Corporeal qualities, in a physical point of view, were according to *Aristotle* (*De Gen. et Corr. L. ii. and Meteor. L. iv.*)—and the distinction became one classical in the Schools—divided into *Primary* and *Secondary* ; the former being original, the latter derived.

The *Primary* are four in number, and all tactile—Hot and Cold, Humid (Liquid) and Dry ; and are subdivided into two classes—the two former being *active*, the two latter *passive*.

The *Secondary* are either less or more properly secondary. The former are

names of Primary or Real on the same class of attributes with Locke, leaving, of course, the correlative appellations of Secondary, Intentional, Ideal, &c., to be given to the other; while Boyle had even anticipated him in formally imposing the names of Primary and Secondary on the counter-classes. It is indeed wholly impossible to doubt, from many remarkable coincidences of thought and expression, that Locke had at least the relative treatises of his countryman, friend, and correspondent under his eye; and it is far more probable, that by Boyle, than by either Aristotle or Galileo, were the names suggested, under which Locke has had the honor of baptizing this classical distinction.

c.—To the *first* class belong Extension (or Bulk), Solidity (or Impenetrability), Figure, Motion and Rest, (or Mobility), Number;* and to these five (or six) which he once and again formally enumerates, he afterwards, without comment, throws in Situation and Texture.

common to elementary and to mixed bodies; and are all potentially objects of touch. Of these Aristotle enumerates fourteen—the Heavy and Light, the Dense and Rare, the Thick and Thin (Concretescent and Fluid), the Hard and Soft, the Viscid and Friable, the Rough and Smooth, the Tenacious and Slippery.—The latter are Color, Savor, Odor [to which ought to be added Sound]—the potential objects of the senses of Sight, Taste, Smell [and Hearing].

This whole distinction of Qualities, Primary and Secondary, is exclusive of Locke's class of Primary. To these, Aristotle would not indeed have applied the term *Quality* at all.

Cicero also may have given the hint. 'Qualitatum aliæ principes (vel primæ), aliæ ex iis ortæ,' &c. The former are the corporeal elements, the latter the bodies constituted by them. (Acad. i. 7.)

* Locke borrowed Number (*i. e.* Unity or Plurality) from the Cartesians—Descartes from Aristotle. It corresponds in a sort with Divisibility, for which it has latterly been exchanged. See Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25. Locke is not therefore primarily liable to Mr. Stewart's censure for the introduction of Number among the Primary Qualities, were that censure in itself correct. But it is not; for Mr. Stewart (with M. Royer-Collard, No. 25) has misapprehended the import of the expression. (Essays p. 95 4^o ed.) For Number is not used only for the measure of discrete quantity, but likewise for the continuation (unity) or discontinuation (plurality) of a percept. The former is an abstract notion; the latter is a recognition through sense.¹

¹ See above, p. 314, note †, and below, chapter vi. § 1.—W.

Remark.—In all this there is nothing original. To take the last first:—Situation (relative Position or Ubication) was one of the Common Sensibles current in the Schools. Texture is by Boyle, in like manner, incidentally enumerated, though neither formally recognized as a co-ordinate quality, nor noticed as reducible to any other. Solidity or Impenetrability is, to go no higher, borrowed from Gassendi; De la Forge's Solidity is only the contrast of Fluidity. But Solidity and Extension ought not thus to be contradistinguished, being attributes of body only, as constituting its one total property—that of occupying space.* The other attributes are those of Aristotle, Descartes, and the philoso-

* The term *Solidity* (τὸ στερεόν, solidum), as denoting an attribute of body, is a word of various significations; and the non-determination and non-distinction of these have given rise to manifold error and confusion.

First Meaning.—In its most unexclusive signification, the Solid is that which fills or occupies space (τὸ ἐπίχρον τόπον). In this meaning it is simply convertible with Body; and is opposed, 1^o, to the unextended in all or in any of the three dimensions of space, and 2^o, to mere extension or empty space itself. This we may call *Solidity* simply.

But the filling of space may be viewed in different phases. The conditions it involves, though all equally essential and inseparable, as all involving each other, may, however, in thought, be considered apart; from different points of view, the one or the other may even be regarded as the primary; and to these parts or partial aspects, the name of the unexclusive whole may be conceded. The occupation of space supposes two necessary conditions;—and each of these has obtained the common name of Solidity, thus constituting a second and a third meaning.

Second Meaning.—What is conceived as occupying space, is necessarily conceived as extended in the three dimensions of space (τὸ τριχῆ διασπαστόν). This is the phasis of Solidity which the Geometer exclusively contemplates. Trinal extension has accordingly, by mathematicians, been emphatically called the Solid; and this first partial Solidity we may therefore distinguish as the *Mathematical*, or rather the *Geometrical*.

Third Meaning.—On the other hand, what is conceived as occupying space, is necessarily conceived as what cannot be eliminated from space. But this supposes a power of resisting such elimination. This is the phasis of solidity considered exclusively from the physical point of view. Accordingly, by the men of natural science the impossibility of compressing a body from an extended to an unextended has been emphatically styled Solidity; and this second partial solidity we may therefore distinguish as the *Physical*. The resisting force here involved has been called the *Impenetrability* of matter; but most improperly and most ambiguously.

phers in general ;—their legitimacy will be considered in the sequel.

d.—The principle which constitutes the preceding qualities into

It might more appropriately be termed its *Ultimate* or *Absolute Incompressibility*.¹

In each of these its two partial significations, Solidity denotes an essential attribute of body ; and which soever of these attributes be sisted as the prior, the other follows, as a necessary consequent. In regard to their priority, opinions are divided. Precedence is accorded to *trinal extension* by Descartes, at the head of one body of philosophers ; to *impenetrability* by Leibnitz, at the head of another. Both parties are right, and both are wrong. Each is right as looking from its peculiar point of view ; each is wrong in not considering that its peculiar is only a *partial* point of view, and neither the one sole, nor even the one absolutely preferable. From the *psychological* point of view, Descartes is triumphant ; for extension is first in the order of thought. From the *physical* point of view, Leibnitz is victorious ; for impenetrability is the more distinctive attribute of body. The two properties, the two points of view, ought not, in truth, to be disjoined ; and the definitions of body by the ancients are, as least exclusive, still the most philosophical that have been given ;—τὸ ἐπέχον τόπον, and τὸ τριχῆ διαστατὸν μετ' ἀντιπνίας, and ὄγκος ἀντίτυπος ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ.

Locke is therefore wrong, really and verbally. *Really* he is wrong, in distinguishing trinal extension and impenetrability (or ultimate incompressibility) as two primary and separate attributes, instead of regarding them only as one-sided aspects of the same primary and total attribute—the occupying of space. Each supposes the other. The notion of a thing trinally extended, eo ipso, excludes the negation of such extension. It therefore includes the negation of that negation. But this is just the assertion of its ultimate incompressibility. Again, the notion of a thing as ultimately incompressible, is only possible under the notion of its trinal extension. For body being, ex hypothesi, conceived or conceivable only as that which occupies space ; the final compression of it into what occupies no space, goes to reduce it, either from an *entity* to a *non-entity*, or from an *extended* to an *unextended entity*. But neither alternative can be realized in thought. Not the former ; for annihilation, not as a mere change in an effect, not as a mere resumption of creative power in a cause, but as a taking out from the sum total of existence, is positively and in itself incogitable. Not the latter ; for the conception of matter, as an unextended entity, is both in itself inconceivable, and ex hypothesi absurd. *Verbally*, Locke is wrong, in bestowing the name of solidity, without a qualification, exclusively on the latter of these two phases ; each being equally entitled to it with the other, and neither so well entitled to it, without a difference, as the total attribute of which they are the partial expressions.—But these inaccuracies of Locke are not so important as the errors of subsequent philosophers, to which, however, they

¹ See below, p. 356.—W.

a separate class, is that the mind finds it impossible to think any particle of matter, as divested of such attributes.

Remark.—In this criterion Locke was preceded by Galileo.

seem to have afforded the occasion. For under the term Solidity, and on the authority of Locke, there have been introduced as primary, certain qualities of body to which in common language the epithet Solid is applied. but which have no title whatever to the rank in question. Against this abuse, it must be acknowledged, Locke not only guarded himself, but even to a certain extent, cautioned others; for he articulately states that Solidity, in his sense, is not to be confounded with Hardness. (B. ii. c. 4, § 4.) It must, however, also be confessed, that in other passages he seems to identify Solidity and Cohesion; while on Solidity he, at the same time, makes 'the mutual impulse, resistance and protrusion of bodies to depend.' (Ibid. § 5.) But I am anticipating.

In a psychological point of view—and this is that of Locke and metaphysicians in general—no attribute of body is primary which is not necessary in thought; that is, which is not necessarily evolved out of, as necessarily implied in, the very notion of body. And such is Solidity in the one total and the two partial significations heretofore enumerated. But in its *physical* application, this term is not always limited to denote the ultimate incompressibility of matter. Besides that necessary attribute, it is extended, in common language, to express other powers of resistance in bodies of a character merely contingent in reference to thought. (See § ii.) These may be reduced to the five following:

Fourth Meaning.—The term Solid is very commonly employed to denote not merely the absolutely, but also the relatively incompressible, the Dense, in contrast to the relatively compressible, the Rare, or Hollow. (In Latin, moreover, *Solidus* was not only employed, in this sense, to denote that a thing fully occupied the space comprehended within its circumference; but likewise to indicate, 1^o, its *entireness in quantity*—that it was whole or complete; and, 2^o, its *entireness in quality*—that it was pure, uniform, homogeneous. This arose from the original identity of the Latin *Solidum* with the Oscan *sollum* or *solum*, and the Greek *ὅλον*. See Festus or Verrius Flaccus. vv. *Solitaurilia* and *Sollo*; also J. C. Scaliger, *De Subtilitate*, ex. 76.)

Fifth Meaning.—Under the *Vis Inertiae*, a body is said to be Solid, *i. e.* Inert, Stable, Immoveable, in proportion as it, whether in motion or at rest, resists, in general, a removal from the place it would otherwise occupy in space.

Sixth Meaning.—Under *Gravity*, a body is said to be Solid, *i. e.* Heavy, in proportion as it resists, in particular, a displacement by being lifted up.

The two following meanings fall under *Cohesion*, the force with which matter resists the distraction of its parts; for a body is said in a

Seventh Meaning, to be Solid, *i. e.* Hard, in contrast to Soft; and in an

Eighth Meaning, to be Solid, *i. e.* Concrete, in opposition to Fluid.

The term Solidity thus denotes besides the absolute and necessary property of occupying space, simply and in its two phases of Extension and Impenetrability, also the relative and contingent qualities of the Dense, the

But it does not, alone, suffice to discriminate the primary from the secondary qualities. For, as already noticed, of two contradictory qualities, one or other must, on the logical principle of excluded middle, be attributed to every object. Thus, odorous or inodorous, sapid or tasteless, &c., though not primary qualities, cannot both be abstracted in thought from any material object; and, to take a stronger example, color, which, psychologically speaking, contains within itself such contradictions (for light and darkness, white and black, are, in this relation, all equally colors) is thus a necessary concomitant of every perception, and even every imagination, of extended substance; as has been observed by the Pythagoreans, Aristotle, Themistius, and many others.

e.—These attributes really exist in the objects, as they are ideally represented to our minds.

Remark.—In this statement Locke followed Descartes; but without the important qualification, necessary to its accuracy, under which Descartes advances it. On the doctrine of both philosophers, we know nothing of material existence in itself; we know it only as represented or in idea. When Locke, therefore, is asked, how he became aware that the known idea truly represents the unknown reality; he can make no answer. On the first principles of his philosophy, he is wholly and necessarily ignorant, whether the idea does, or does not, represent to his mind the attributes of matter, as they exist in nature. His assertion is, therefore, confessedly without a warrant; it transcends,

Inert, the Heavy, the Hard, the Concrete; and the introduction of these latter, with their correlative opposites, into the list of Primary Qualities was facilitated, if not prepared, by Locke's vacillating employment of the vague expression Solid; in partial designation of the former. By Kames, accordingly, Gravity and Inertia were elevated to this rank; while Cohesion, in its various modifications and degrees, was, by Kames, Reid, Fergusson, Stewart, Royer-Collard, and many others, not only recognized as Primary, but expressly so recognized as in conformity with the doctrine of Locke. See the sequel of this § and § ii.

¹ It is an axiom in Logic, that of *two* contradictory propositions, if one be false, the other must be true. This is called the *principle of Excluded Middle*; *i. e.* between two contradictories.—*W.*

ex hypothesi, the sphere of possible knowledge. Descartes is more cautious. He only says, that our ideas of the qualities in question represent those qualities as they are, or as they may exist;—‘ut sunt, vel saltem esse possunt.’ The Cosmothetic Idealist can only assert to them a problematical reality.

f.—To the *second* class belong those qualities which, as in objects themselves, are nothing but various occult modifications of the qualities of the former class; these modifications possessing, however, the power of determining certain manifest sensations or ideas in us. Such, for example, are colors, sounds, tastes, smells, &c.,—all, in a word, commonly known by the name of Sensible Qualities. These qualities, *as in the reality*, are properly only *powers*; powers to produce certain sensations in us. *As in us*, they are only *sensations*, and cannot, therefore, be considered as attributes of external things.

Remark.—All this had, long before Locke, become mere philosophical commonplace. With the exception of the dogmatical assertion of the hypothetical fact, that the subjective sensations of the secondary depend exclusively on the objective modifications of the primary qualities, this whole doctrine is maintained by Aristotle; while that hypothetical assertion itself had been advanced by the ancient Atomists and their followers the Epicureans, by Galileo, by Descartes and his school, by Boyle, and by modern philosophers in general. That the secondary qualities, as in objects, are only powers of producing sensations in us—this, as we have seen, has been explicitly stated, after Aristotle, by almost every theorist on the subject. But it was probably borrowed by Locke from the Cartesians.

It is not to be forgotten, that Locke did not observe the propriety of language introduced by the Cartesians, of employing the term *Idea*, in relation to the primary, the term *Sensation*, in relation to the secondary, qualities. Indeed Locke’s whole philosophical language is beyond measure vague, vacillating, and ambiguous; in this respect, he has afforded the worst of precedents, and has found only too many among us to follow his example.

20.—PURCHOT'S doctrine on this subject deserves to be noticed—which it never has been. It struck me from its correspondence, in certain respects, with that which I had myself previously thought out. The first edition of his *Institutiones Philosophicæ* did not appear at Paris until a year or two after the publication of Loeke's Essay,—the second was in 1698; but the French cursualist does not appear to have been aware of the speculations of the English philosopher, nor does he refer to Boyle. His doctrine—which is not fully stated in any single place of his work—is as follows :

a.—The one *Primary Affection* or *Attribute* of Body is *Extension*. Without this, matter cannot be conceived. But in the notion of Extension as an attribute is immediately involved that of *Solidity* or *Impenetrability*, i. e. the capacity of filling space to the exclusion of another body.

b.—But extended substance (co ipso, solid or impenetrable)—

1°, Necessarily exists under some particular mode of Extension, in other words, it has a certain *magnitude* ; and is *Divisible* into parts ;

2°, Is necessarily thought as capable of *Motion* and *Rest* ;

3°, Necessarily supposes a certain *Figure* ; and in relation to other bodies a certain *Position* ;

These five, 1, *Magnitude* or measure of extension, involving *Divisibility* ; 2, *Motion* ; 3, *Rest* ; 4, *Figure* ; 5, *Position* or *Situation*, he styles the *simple and secondary attributes, affections, or qualities* which flow immediately from the nature of Body, i. e. Extension.

e.—Out of these Primary Affections of Body there are educed, and as it were compounded, other affections to which the name of *Quality* in a more emphatic and appropriate sense belongs ; such among others are *Light, Colors, Sounds, Odors, Tastes*, and the *Tactile qualities, Heat, Cold, Moisture, Dryness, &c.* These he denominates the *secondary and composite qualities or affections of Body*. (Instit. Philos. t. ii. Phys. Sectt. i. iv. v. pp. 87, 205, 396, ed. 4.)

21.—LE CLERC does not borrow his doctrine on this head from his friend Locke; and his point of view is not purely psychycological. The five properties common to all bodies—Extension—Divisibility—Solidity (Impenetrability)—Figure—Mobility—he very properly does not denominate *Qualities*, but reserves that name for what serves to distinguish bodies from each other. Under this restriction, he divides Qualities into *Primitive* and *Derivative*. By Primitive he designates those occult qualities in body which are known to us only in their effects; as, for example, the cause of Solidity. The Derivative, he says, are those which flow from the Primitive and affect our senses, as color, savor, odor, &c. His doctrine is, however, neither fully evolved nor unambiguously expressed. (Clerici Opera Philos. Phys., L. v. cc. 1, 6.)

22.—LORD KAMES, in the *first* edition of his 'Essays on the principles of Morality and Natural Religion,' (1751), touches only incidentally on the present subject. He enumerates *Softness, Hardness, Smoothness, Roughness*, among the Primary Qualities (p. 248); and he was, I am confident, the only philosopher before Reid, by whom this amplification was sanctioned, although Mr. Stewart has asserted that herein Reid only followed the classification of most of his immediate predecessors.* (Essays, p. 91.) The *second* edition I have not at hand. In the *third* and last (1779), there is introduced a chapter expressly on the distinction, which is treated of in detail. He does not here repeat his previous enumeration; but to *Size, Figure, Solidity* (which he does not define), and *Divisibility*, he adds, as primary qualities, *Gravity*, the *Vis Inertiæ*, and the *Vis Incita*; the two last being the *Vis Incita* or *Vis Inertiæ* of Kepler and Newton divided into a double power. See Reid's Correspondence, pp. 55, 56. Kames unwittingly mixes the psychological and physical

* Mr. Stewart also says that Berkeley 'employs the word Solidity as synonymous with Hardness and Resistance.' This is not correct. Berkeley does not consider hardness and resistance as convertible; and these he mentions as two only out of *three* significations in which, he thinks, the term Solidity is used.

points of view ; and otherwise, his classification in so far as original, is open to manifold objections. See the foot-note * at p. 334 c. and § ii.

23.—REID.—We have seen that Descartes and Locke, to say nothing of other metaphysicians, admitted a fundamental difference between the primary and the secondary qualities: the one problematically, the other assertorily, maintaining, that the primary qualities, as known, correspond with the primary qualities, as existent: whereas that the secondary qualities, as sensations in us, bear no analogy to these qualities as inherent in matter. On the general doctrine, however, of these philosophers, both classes of qualities, as known, are confessedly only states of our own minds; and, while we have no right from a subjective affection to infer the existence, far less the corresponding character of the existence, of any objective reality, it is evident that their doctrine, if fairly evolved, would result in a dogmatic, or in a skeptical, negation of the primary, no less than of the secondary qualities of body, as more than appearances in and for us. This evolution was accordingly soon accomplished; and Leibnitz, Berkeley, Hume, Condillac, Kant, Fichte, and others, found no difficulty in demonstrating, on the principles of Descartes, and Locke, and modern Representationists in general, that our notions of Space or Extension, with its subordinate forms of Figure, Motion, &c., has no higher title to be recognized as objectively valid, than our sensations of Color, of Savor, of Odor; and were thus enabled triumphantly to establish their several schemes of formal or virtual idealism. Hence may we explain the fact that this celebrated distinction is overlooked or superseded in the speculation, not of some merely, but of all the more modern German Schools.

It is therefore manifest that the fundamental position of a consistent theory of dualistic realism is—that our cognitions of Extension and its modes are not wholly ideal;—that although Space be a native, necessary, a priori, form of imagination, and so far, therefore, a mere subjective state, that there is, at the same time, competent to us, in an *immediate* perception of external things,

the *consciousness* of a really existent, of a really objective *extended* world. To demonstrate this was therefore prescribed, as its primary problem to a philosophy which, like that of Reid, proposed to re-establish the philosophy of natural realism—of common sense, on a refutation of every idealism overt or implied. Such is the problem. It remains for us to see how it was dealt with.

Reid's doctrine, in regard to the Primary and Secondary Qualities, is to be found in the *Inquiry*, ch. 5, sect. 4-6, p. 123-126, and in the *Intellectual Powers*, Essay ii. ch. 17, p. 313-318.

In his enumeration of the Primary qualities Reid is not invariable; for the list in the *Inquiry* is not identical with that in the *Essays*. In the former, without professing to furnish an exhaustive catalogue, he enumerates *Extension*, *Figure*, *Motion*, *Hardness* and *Softness*, *Roughness* and *Smoothness*. The four last are, as we have seen, to be found, for the first time, in the earliest edition of Lord Kames's *Essays on Morality*, which preceded Reid's *Inquiry* by thirteen years. In the latter he gives another list, which he does not state to be an altered edition of his own, but which he apparently proposes as an enumeration identical with Locke's. 'Every one,' he says, 'knows that *Extension*, *Divisibility*, *Figure*, *Motion*, *Solidity*, *Hardness*, *Softness*, and *Fluidity*, were by Locke called primary qualities of body.' In reference to himself—this second catalogue omits *Roughness* and *Smoothness*, which were contained in his first: and introduces, what were omitted in the first, *Divisibility* (which Kames had also latterly added), *Solidity*, and *Fluidity*. In reference to Locke—this and the former list are both very different from his. For, allowing *Divisibility* to replace *Number*, and say nothing in regard, either to the verbal inaccuracy of making *Motion* stand for *Mobility*, or to the real inaccuracy of omitting *Rest* as the alternative of *Motion*; we find in both lists a series of qualities unrecognized as primary by Locke; or, as far as I know, by any other philosopher previous to Lord Kames and himself. These are *Roughness* and *Smoothness* in the *Inquiry*; *Fluidity* in the *Essays*; and *Hard-*

ness and *Softness* in both. But these five qualities are not only not to be ascribed to the list of primary qualities by Locke; they ought not to be viewed as co-ordinate with *Extension*, *Solidity* (which Reid more rigorously than Locke limits to the ultimate incompressibility of matter), *Figure*, *Mobility*, and *Divisibility*, i. e. not as primary qualities at all. Of these five qualities, the last three, as he himself states (p. 314 a), are only different degrees of *Cohesion*; and the first two are only modifications of *Figure* and *Cohesion* combined. But *Cohesion*, as will be shown (§ ii.), is not a character necessarily involved in our notion of body; for though *Cohesion* (and we may say the same of *Inertia*), in all its modes, necessarily supposes the occupation of space, the occupation of space while it implies a continuity does not necessarily imply a cohesion of the elements (whatever they may be) of that which occupies space. At the same time, the various resistances of cohesion and of inertia cannot be reduced to the class of Secondary qualities. It behoves us therefore, neither with Locke and others, to overlook them; nor to throw them in without qualification or remark, either with Descartes among the Secondary, or with Reid among the Primary, qualities. But of this again.

Independently of these minor differences, and laying also out of account Reid's strictures on the cruder forms of the representative hypothesis, as held by Descartes and Locke, but which there is no sufficient ground to suppose that Descartes, at least, adopted; Reid's doctrine touching the present distinction corresponds, in all essential respects, with that maintained by these two philosophers. He does not adopt, and even omits to notice, the erroneous criterion of inseparability in thought, by which Locke attempts to discriminate the primary qualities from the secondary. Like Descartes, he holds that our notions of the primary qualities are clear and distinct; of the secondary, obscure and confused; and, like both philosophers, he considers that the former afford us a knowledge of what the corresponding qualities are (or, as Descartes cautiously interpolates, *may be*) in themselves,

while the latter only point to the unknown cause or occasion of sensations of which we are conscious ourselves. Reid therefore calls the notion we have of the primary qualities, *direct*; of the secondary, *relative*. (I. P. 313 b.) On this subject there is, thus, no important difference of opinion between the three philosophers. For if we modify the obnoxious language of Descartes and Locke; and, instead of saying that the ideas or notions of the primary qualities *resemble*, merely assert that they *truly represent*, their objects, that is, afford us such a knowledge of their nature as we should have were an immediate intuition of the extended reality in itself competent to man,—and this is certainly all that one, probably all that either philosopher, intended,—Reid's doctrine and theirs would be found in perfect unison. The whole difficulty and dispute on this point is solved on the old distinction of *similarity in existences* and *similarity in representation*, which Reid and our more modern philosophers have overlooked. Touching this, see, as stated above, the doctrine of those Schoolmen who held the hypothesis of species (p. 257 a b); and of those others who, equally with Reid, rejected all representative entities different from the act itself of cognition (p. 257 b. note).

But much more than this was called for at Reid's hands. His philosophy, if that of Natural Realism, founded in the common sense of mankind, made it incumbent on him to show, that we have not merely a notion, a conception, an imagination, a subjective representation—of Extension, for example, 'called up or *suggested*,' in some incomprehensible manner to the mind, on occasion of an extended object being presented to the sense; but that in the perception of such an object, we really have, as by nature we believe we have, an immediate knowledge or consciousness of that external object, *as extended*. In a word, that in sensitive perception the extension, as known, and the extension, as existing, are convertible; known, because existing, and existing, since known.

Reid, however, unfortunately, did not accomplish—did not attempt this. He makes no articulate statement, even, that in per-

ception we have an immediate knowledge—an objective consciousness, of an extended non-ego, actually existing; as in imagination we have a subjective consciousness of a mode of the ego, representing such an extended non-ego, and thereby affording us a mediate knowledge of it as possibly existing. On the contrary were we to interpret his expressions rigidly, and not in liberal conformity with the general analogy of his philosophy, we might, as repeatedly noticed, found on the terms in which he states his doctrine of the primary qualities, and, in particular, his doctrine concerning our cognition of extension, a plausible argument that his own theory of perception is as purely subjective, and therefore as easily reducible to an absolute Idealism, as that of any of the philosophers whom he controverts.

Thus when Reid, for example (Inq. 123 b), states 'that Extension¹ is a quality *suggested* to us by certain sensations,' i. e. by certain merely subjective affections; and when (324 b) he says 'that Space [Extension] whether tangible or visible, is not so properly an object of sense as a necessary *concomitant*² of the objects both of sight and touch;' he apparently denies us all immediate perception of any extended reality. But if we are not percipient of any extended reality, we are not percipient of body as existing; for body exists, and can only be known immediately and in itself, *as extended*. The material world, on this supposition, sinks into something unknown and problematical; and its existence, if not denied, can, at best, be only precariously affirmed, as the occult cause, or incomprehensible occasion, of certain subjective affections we experience in the form, either of a sensation of the secondary quality, or of a perception of the primary.

¹ 'According to Reid, Extension (Space) is a notion *a posteriori*, the result of experience. According to Kant, it is *a priori*; experience only affording the occasions required by the mind to exert the facts, of which the intuition of space is a condition. To the former it is thus a *contingent*: to the latter, a *necessary* mental possession.'—*W*.

² 'It seemingly requires but little to rise to Kant's view of the conception of space as an *a priori* or native form of thought.'—*W*.

Thus interpreted, what is there to distinguish the doctrine of Reid from the undeveloped idealism of Descartes or of Kant? ¹

Having noticed the manifest incongruity of Reid's doctrine on this point with the grand aim of his philosophy,—an incongruity which I am surprised has not been long ago adverted to either by friend or foe,—I may take this opportunity of modifying a former statement (p. 123 b, note*), ²—that, according to Reid, Space is a notion a posteriori, the result of experience. On reconsidering more carefully his different statements on this subject (Inq. 123 sq. I. P. 324 sq.), I am now inclined to think that his language implies no more than the chronological posteriority of this notion; and that he really held it to be a native, necessary, a priori form of thought, requiring only certain prerequisite conditions to call it from virtual into manifest existence. I am confirmed in this view by finding it is also that of M. Royer-Collard. Mr. Stewart is however less defensible, when he says, in opposition to Kant's doctrine of Space—'I rather lean to the common theory which supposes our first ideas of Space or Extension to be *formed by other* qualities of matter.' (Dissertation, &c. p. 281, 2d ed.)

Passing over the less important observations of several intermediate philosophers in the wake of Reid, I proceed to the most distinguished of his disciples.

·24.—STEWART, while he agrees with his master in regard to the contrast of Primary and Secondary Qualities, proposes the following subdivision, and change of nomenclature in reference to the former. 'I distinguish,' he says, 'Extension and Figure by the title of *mathematical affections of matter*; restricting the phrase *primary qualities* to Hardness and Softness, Roughness and Smoothness, and other properties of the same description. The line which I would draw between *primary* and *secondary* qualities is this; that the former necessarily involve the notion of

¹ See above, chapter iii. § ii. p. 270, sq.—*W.*

² See note 1, on the preceding page.—*W.*

extension, and consequently of *externality* or *outness*; whereas the latter are only conceived as the unknown causes of known sensations; and when *first apprehended by the mind* do not imply the existence of any thing locally distinct from the subjects of its own self-consciousness.' (Essays, p. 94.)

The more radical defects of this ingenious reduction are, as they appear to me, the following :

1°. That it does not depart from the central notion of body—from Solidity Absolute, the occupying of space. (See p. 334 c, note *.) In logical propriety Extension and Figure are not proximately attributes of body but of space; and belong to body only as filling space. Body supposes them; they do not suppose body; and the inquiry is wholly different in regard to the nature of extension and figure as space, and of the extended and figured as body.

2°. This original defect in the order of evolution, has led, however, to more important consequences. Had Mr. Stewart looked at Extension (Solidity Mathematical), as a property of body, in virtue of body filling space, he would not only not have omitted, but not have omitted as an attribute co-ordinate with extension, the Ultimate Incompressibility or Impenetrability of body (Solidity Physical).

3°. But while omitting this essential property, the primary qualities which, after Reid, he enumerates (Hardness, Softness, Roughness, Smoothness), are, as already noticed, and to be hereafter shown, not primary, not being involved in the necessary notion of body. For these are all degrees or modifications of Cohesion; but a Cohesion of its ultimate elements it is not necessary to think as a condition or attribute of matter at all. See § ii. Moreover, Roughness and Smoothness, as more than the causes of certain *sensations* in us, therefore only *secondary* qualities, are modifications, not only of Cohesion, but of Figure, and would, therefore, on Mr. Stewart's distribution, fall under the category of the Mathematical Affections of Body.

As regards the great problem of Natural Realism,—to prove

that we have an immediate perception of the primary qualities of body,—this was left by Mr. Stewart where it was left by Reid.

25.—The last philosopher to be adduced is the illustrious founder of the Scoto-Gallican School, M. ROYER-COLLARD. The sum of his doctrine touching the Primary Qualities is given in the following passage, which I translate from the Fragments of his Lectures, published by M. Jouffroy as Appendices to his version of the Works of Reid (Vol. iii. p. 429 sq.);—Fragments which, with M. Jouffroy's general Preface, I have reason to hope will be soon given to the British public by a translator eminently qualified for the task. My observations I find it most convenient to subjoin in the form of notes; and admiring as I do both the attempt itself and the ability of its author, I regret to differ here so widely, not only from the doctrines which M. Royer-Collard holds in common with other philosophers, but from those which are peculiar to himself. On the former, however, in so far as, with his more immediate predecessors, he confounds in one class qualities which I think ought to be discriminated into two, I deem it unnecessary to make any special comment; as this matter, which has been already once and again adverted to, is to be more fully considered in the sequel. (§ ii.) As to the latter, it will be seen that the more important differences arise from the exclusive point of view from which M. Royer-Collard has chosen to consider the Qualities in question.

‘Among the Primary Qualities, that of *Number* is peculiar to Locke.* It is evident that Number, far from being a quality of matter, is only an abstract notion, the work of intellect and not of sense.†

* Number is, with Locke, common to Aristotle and the Aristotelians, Galileo, Descartes, and the Cartesians, &c.

† Number, as an abstract notion, is certainly not an object of sense. But it was not as an abstract notion intended by the philosophers to denote an attribute of Body. This misprision was expressly guarded against by the Aristotelians. See Toletus in Aristotelem *De Anima*, L. ii. c. 6, qu. 15. Number may be said to correspond to Divisibility; see p. 315 a, and p. 334 a. If it cannot be said that sense is percipient of objects as many, it can-

‘*Divisibility* is proper to Reid.* On this quality and *Mobility* I will observe, that neither ought to have been placed among the qualities manifested through sense; and yet this is what Reid understands by the Primary Qualities, for he distinguishes them from the Secondary by this—that we have of the former a direct notion.† *Divisibility* is known to us by division; and a body divided is known to us, as such, by memory. For did we not recollect that it had previously been one, we should not know that it is at present two; we should be unable to compare its present with its past state; and it is by this comparison alone that we become aware of the fact of division. Is it said that the notion of *Divisibility* is not acquired by the fact of division, but that it presents itself immediately to the mind prior to experience? In this case it is still more certain that it is not a cognition proper to sense.‡

not be said to be percipient of an object as one. Perception, moreover, is a consciousness, and consciousness is only realized under the condition of plurality and difference. Again, if we deny that through sense we perceive a plurality of colors, we must deny that through sense we perceive a figure or even a line. And if three bodies are not an object of sense, neither is a triangle. Sense and intellect cannot thus be distinguished.

* Sundry philosophers preceded Reid in making *Divisibility* (which corresponds also to Number) one of the Primary Qualities. See Nos. 20, 21, 22.

† M. Royer-Collard not only takes his point of view exclusively from Sense; but sense he so limits, that, if rigorously carried out, no sensible perception, as no consciousness, could be brought to bear. The reason he gives why Reid must be held as of the same opinion, I do not understand. Psychologically speaking, an attribute would not be *primary* if it could be thought away from body; and the notion of body being supposed given, every primary quality is to be evolved out of that notion, as necessarily involved in it, independently altogether of any experience of sense. In this respect, such quality is an object of intellect. At the same time, a primary quality would not be an attribute of *body*, if it could not, contingently, to some extent, at least, be apprehended as an actual phenomenon of sense. In this respect, such quality is an object of perception and experience.

‡ I am afraid that this, likewise, is a misapprehension of the meaning of the philosophers. *Divisibility*, in their view, has nothing to do with the process of dividing. It denotes either the alternative attribute, applicable to all body, of unity or plurality; or the possibility that every single body may, as extended, be sundered into a multitude of extended parts. Every material object being thus, though actually one, always potentially many, it is thus convertible with Number; see foot-note †.

‘As to the notion of *Mobility* it is evidently posterior to that of motion;* that of motion supposes not less evidently the exercise of memory and the idea of time; it is thus not derived exclusively from sense.† As *Divisibility* also supposes motion, this again is an additional proof that the notion of divisibility is not immediate.

‘*Figure* is a modification of *Extension*.

‘*Solidity, Impenetrability, Resistance*, are one and the same thing;‡ *Hardness, Softness, Fluidity*, are modifications of *Solidity* and its different degrees; while the *Roughness* and *Smoothness* of surfaces express only sensations attached to certain perceptions of *Solidity*.

‘The Primary Qualities may be thus generalized, if I may so express myself, into *Extension* and *Solidity*.’

The distinction of these different classes of material qualities has, as already noticed, no real importance, no real foundation, on the hypothesis of Idealism, whether absolute or cosmthetic, —in no philosophy, indeed, but that of Natural Realism; and its recognition, in the systems of Descartes and Locke, is, therefore, with them a superficial observation, if not a *hors d'œuvre*. It was, accordingly, with justice formally superseded, because virtually null, in the philosophy of Leibnitz, the complement of the Cartesian, and in the philosophy of Condillac, the complement

* *Mobility*, as applied in this relation, is merely a compendious expression for the alternative attributions of *motion or rest*; and both of these, as possible attributes, are involved in the notion of body. See § ii. of this Excursus.

† Compare above pp. 312-314. But Perception can no more be separated from all memory than from all judgment; for consciousness involves both.

‡ This is only correct from M. Royer-Collard's exclusive point of view—from sense alone. On the various meanings of the term *Solidity*, see p. 334, note *. The confusion also resulting from the ambiguity of the word *Impenetrability* as denoting both a resistance absolute and insuperable, and a resistance relative and superable, both what is necessary, and what is contingent to body, is here shown, either in the reduction to a single category of qualities of a wholly heterogeneous character, or in the silent elimination of the higher.

of the Lockian. The Kantian system, again, is built on its positive negation, or rather its positive reversal. For Kant's transcendental Idealism not only contains a general assertion of the subjectivity of all our perceptions; its distinctive peculiarity is, in fact, its special demonstration of the absolute subjectivity of Space or Extension, and in general of the primary attributes of matter; these constituting what he calls the *Form*, as the Secondary constitutes what he calls the *Matter*, of our Sensible intuitions. (See, in particular, Proleg., § 13, Ann. 2.) This, I repeat, may enable us to explain why the discrimination in question has, both in the intellectualism of Germany and in the sensualism of France, been so generally overlooked; and why, where in relation to those philosophers by whom the distinction has been taken, any observations on the point have been occasionally hazarded (as by Tetens with special reference to Reid), that these are of too perfunctory a character to merit any special commemoration.*

Such, then, are the forms under which the distinction of the

* To this also are we to attribute it, that the most elaborate of the recent histories of philosophy among the Germans, slur over, if they do not positively misconceive, the distinction in question. In the valuable expositions of the Cartesian doctrine by the two distinguished Hegelians, Feuerbach and Erdmann, it obtains from the one no adequate consideration, from the other no consideration at all. In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy by their illustrious master, a work in which the erudition is often hardly less remarkable than the force of thought, almost every statement in reference to the subject is, to say the least of it, inaccurate. Hegel, as he himself employs, apparently makes Aristotle and Descartes employ, the term Solidity simply for Hardness. This, however, neither one nor other ever does; while by Locke, the terms are even expressly distinguished. (Vol. iii. pp. 360, 431.) He confounds Descartes' distinction (baptized by Locke that) of the Primary and Secondary qualities, with Descartes' distinction of the Primitive and Derivative attributes of body; distinctions not coincident, though not opposed. Figure, for example, in the one is primary, but not in the other primitive. In regard to his criticism of Locke (p. 431), suffice it to say, that Locke, so far from opposing, in fact follows Descartes in making 'Figure and so forth' primary qualities; nor does Descartes denominate any class of qualities 'secondary.'—(pp. 359, 430.) Finally Aristotle's distinction of 'external qualities' into primary and secondary, if this be referred to, corresponds with that so styled by Locke only in the name.

Primary and Secondary Qualities of the Body has been presented, from its earliest promulgation to its latest development. In this historical survey, I have to acknowledge no assistance from the researches of preceding inquirers; for what I found already done in this respect was scanty and superficial, even when not positively erroneous. Every thing had thus anew to be explored and excavated. The few who make a study of philosophy in its sources, can appreciate the labor of such a research; and from them, at least, I am sure of indulgence for the imperfections of what I offer not as a history, but as a hasty collection of some historical materials.

§ II.—DISTINCTION OF THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES OF BODY CRITICALLY CONSIDERED.

From what has been said in the foregoing section, it will be seen that I am by no means satisfied with the previous reduction of the Qualities of Body to two classes of Primary and Secondary. Without preamble, I now go on to state what I deem their true and complete classification; limiting the statement, however, to little more than an enunciation of the distribution and its principles, not allowing myself to enter on an exposition of the correlative doctrine of perception, and refraining, in general, from much that I might be tempted to add, by way of illustration and support.

The Qualities of body I divide into *three* classes.

Adopting and adapting, as far as possible, the previous nomenclature—the first of these I would denominate the class of *Primary*, or *Objective*, Qualities; the second, the class of *Secundo-Primary*, or *Subjectivo-Objective*, Qualities; the third, the class of *Secondary*, or *Subjective*, Qualities.

The general point of view from which the Qualities of Matter are here considered is not the *Physical*, but the *Psychological*. But, under this, the ground of principle on which these qualities are divided and designated is, again, two-fold. There are, in

fact, within the psychological, two special points of view ; that of *Sense*, and that of *Understanding*. Both of these ought to be taken, but taken separately, into account in a classification like the present ; and not, as has been often done, either one only adopted, or both fortuitously combined. Differing, however, as these widely do from each other, they will be found harmoniously to conspire in establishing the three-fold distribution and nomenclature of the qualities in question which I have ventured to propose.

The point of view chronologically prior, or first to us, is that of *Sense*. The principle of division is here the different circumstances under which the qualities are originally and immediately apprehended. On this ground, as apprehensions or immediate cognitions through Sense, the *Primary* are distinguished as *objective*, not subjective,* as *percepts proper*, not sensations proper ; the *Secundo-primary*, as *objective and subjective*, as *percepts proper and sensations proper* ; the *Secondary*, as *subjective*, not objective, cognitions, as *sensations proper*, not percepts proper.

The other point of view chronologically posterior, but first in nature, is that of *Understanding*. The principle of division is here the different character under which the qualities, already apprehended, are *conceived* or construed to the mind in thought. On this ground, the *Primary*, being thought as *essential* to the notion of Body, are distinguished from the *Secundo-primary* and *Secondary*, as *accidental* ; while the *Primary* and *Secundo-primary*, being thought as *manifest or conceivable in their own nature*, are distinguished from the *Secondary*, as *in their own*

* All knowledge, in one respect, is *subjective* ; for all knowledge is an energy of the Ego. But when I perceive a quality of the Non-Ego, of the object-object, as in immediate relation to my mind, I am said to have of it an *objective* knowledge ; in contrast to the *subjective* knowledge, I am said to have of it when supposing it only as the hypothetical or occult cause of an affection of which I am conscious, or thinking it only mediately through a subject-object or representation in, and of, the mind. But see below, in foot-note to Par. 15, and first foot-note to Par. 18.

nature occult and inconceivable. For the notion of Matter having been once acquired, by reference to that notion, the Primary Qualities are recognized as its a priori or necessary constituents; and we clearly conceive how they must exist in bodies in knowing what they are objectively in themselves; the Secundo-primary Qualities, again, are recognized as a posteriori or contingent modifications of the Primary, and we clearly conceive how they do exist in bodies in knowing what they are objectively in their conditions; finally, the Secondary Qualities are recognized as a posteriori or contingent accidents of matter, but we obscurely surmise how they may exist in bodies only as knowing what they are subjectively in their effects.

It is thus apparent that the primary qualities may be *deduced a priori*, the bare notion of matter being given; they being, in fact, only evolutions of the conditions which that notion necessarily implies: whereas the Secundo-primary and Secondary must be *induced a posteriori*; both being attributes contingently superadded to the naked notion of matter. The Primary Qualities thus fall more under the point of view of understanding, the Secundo-primary and Secondary more under the point of view of Sense.

Deduction of the Primary Qualities.—Space or extension is a necessary form of thought. We cannot think it as non-existent; we cannot but think it as existent. But we are not so necessitated to imagine the reality of aught occupying space; for while unable to conceive as null the space in which the material universe exists, the material universe itself we can, without difficulty, annihilate in thought. All that exists in, all that occupies space, becomes, therefore, known to us by experience: we acquire, we construct, its notion. The notion of space is thus native, or *a priori*; the notion of what space contains, adventitious, or *a posteriori*. Of this latter class is that of Body or Matter.

But on the hypothesis, always, that body has been empirically apprehended, that its notion has been acquired;—What are the a priori characters in and through which we *must* conceive that

notion, if conceived it be at all, in contrast to the a posteriori characters under which we *may*, and probably *do*, conceive it, but under which, if we conceive it not, still the notion itself stands unannihilated? In other words, what are the necessary or essential, in contrast to the contingent or accidental properties of Body, as apprehended and conceived by us? The answer to this question affords the class of Primary, as contradistinguished from the two classes of Secundo-primary and Secondary Qualities.

Whatever answer may be accorded to the question—How do we come by our knowledge of Space or trinal extension? it will be admitted on all hands, that whether given solely a priori as a native possession of the mind, whether acquired solely a posteriori as a generalization from the experience of sense, or whether, as I would maintain, we at once must think Space as a necessary notion, and do perceive the extended in space as an actual fact; still, on any of these suppositions, it will be admitted, that we are only able to conceive Body as that which (I.) *occupies space*, and (II.) *is contained in space*.

But these catholic conditions of body, though really simple, are logically complex. We may view them in different aspects or relations, which, though like the sides and angles of a triangle, incapable of separation, even in thought, supposing as they do each other, may still, in a certain sort, be considered for themselves, and distinguished by different appellations.

I.—The property of *filling space* (Solidity in its unexclusive signification, *Solidity Simple*) implies two correlative conditions: (A) the *necessity of trinal extension, in length, breadth, and thickness* (*Solidity geometrical*); and (B) the corresponding *impossibility of being reduced from what is to what is not thus extended* (*Solidity Physical, Impenetrability*).

A.—Out of the absolute attribute of Trinal Extension may be again explicated three attributes, under the form of necessary relations:—(i.) *Number or Divisibility*; (ii.) *Size, Bulk, or Magnitude*; (iii.) *Shape or Figure*.

i.—Body necessarily exists, and is necessarily known, either as

one body or as many bodies. *Number*, i. e. the alternative attribution of unity or plurality, is thus, in a first respect, a primary attribute of matter. But again, every single body is also, in different points of view, at the same time one and many. Considered as a *whole*, it is, and is apprehended, as actually one; considered as an *extended* whole, it is, and is conceived, potentially many. Body being thus necessarily known, if not as already divided, still as always capable of division, *Divisibility* or *Number* is thus likewise, in a second respect, a primary attribute of matter. (See p. 314 a.)

ii.—Body (multo majus this or that body) is not infinitely extended. Each body must therefore have a certain finite extension, which by comparison with that of other bodies must be less, or greater, or equal; in other words, it must by relation have a certain Size, Bulk, or Magnitude; and this, again, as estimated both (a) by the quantity of space occupied, and (b) by the quantity of matter occupying, affords likewise the relative attributes of *Dense* and *Rare*.

iii.—Finally, bodies, as not infinitely extended, have, consequently, their extension bounded. But bounded extension is necessarily of a certain *Shape* or *Figure*.

B.—The negative notion—the impossibility of conceiving the compression of body from an extended to an unextended, its elimination out of space—affords the positive notion of an insuperable power in body of resisting such compression or elimination. This force, which, as absolute, is a conception of the understanding, not an apprehension through sense, has received no precise and unambiguous name; for *Solidity*, even with the epithet *Physical*, and *Impenetrability* and *Extreity* are vague and equivocal.—(See p. 334 c, note *.) We might call it, as I have said, *Ultimate* or *Absolute Incompressibility*. It would be better, however, to have a positive expression to denote a positive notion, and we might accordingly adopt, as a technical term, *Autantitypy*. This is preferable to *Antitypy* (ἀντιτυπία), a word in Greek applied not only to this absolute and essential resistance

of matter, *qua* matter, but also to the relative and accidental resistances from cohesion, inertia, and gravity.

II.—The other most general attribute of matter—that of *being contained in space*—in like manner affords, by explication, an absolute and a relative attribute: viz. (A) the *Mobility*, that is, the possible motion, and, consequently, the possible rest, of a body; and (B) the *Situation, Position, Ubication*, that is, the local correlation of bodies in space. For

A.—Space being conceived as infinite (or rather being inconceivable as not infinite), and the place occupied by body as finite, body in general, and, of course, each body in particular, is conceived capable either of remaining in the place it now holds, or of being translated from that to any then unoccupied part of space. And

B.—As every part of space, i. e. every potential *place*, holds a certain position relative to every other, so, consequently, must bodies, in so far as they are all contained in space, and as each occupies, at one time, one determinate place.

To recapitulate:—The necessary constituents of our notion of Matter, the Primary Qualities of Body, are thus all evolved from the two catholic conditions of matter—(I.) the occupying space, and (II.) the being contained in space. Of these the former affords (A) *Trinal Extension*, explicated again into (i.) *Divisibility*, (ii.) *Size*, containing under it *Density* or *Rarity*, (iii.) *Figure*; and (B) *Ultimate Incompressibility*: while the latter gives (A) *Mobility*; and (B) *Situation*. Neglecting subordination, we have thus eight proximate attributes; 1, Extension; 2, Divisibility; 3, Size; 4, Density, or Rarity; 5, Figure; 6, Incompressibility absolute; 7, Mobility; 8, Situation.

The primary qualities of matter thus develop themselves with rigid necessity out of the simple datum of—*substance occupying space*. In a certain sort, and by contrast to the others, they are, therefore, notions *a priori*, and to be viewed, *pro tanto*, as products of the understanding. The others, on the contrary, it is manifestly impossible to *deduce*, i. e. to evolve out of such a given

notion. They must be *induced*, i. e. generalized from experience; are, therefore, in strict propriety, notions *a posteriori*, and, in the last resort, mere products of sense. The following may be given as consummative results of such induction in the establishment of the two classes of the Secundo-primary and Secondary Qualities.

Induction of the Class of Secundo-primary Qualities.—This terminates in the following conclusions.—These qualities are modifications, but contingent modifications, of the Primary. They suppose the Primary; the Primary do not suppose them. They have all relation to space, and motion in space; and are all contained under the category of Resistance or Pressure. For they are all only various forms of a relative or superable resistance to displacement, which, we learn by experience, bodies oppose to other bodies, and, among these, to our organism moving through space;—a resistance similar in kind (and therefore clearly conceived) to that absolute or insuperable resistance, which we are compelled, independently of experience, to think that every part of matter would oppose to any attempt to deprive it of its space, by compressing it into an inextended.

In so far, therefore, as they suppose the primary, which are necessary, while they themselves are only accidental, they exhibit, on the one side, what may be called a quasi primary quality; and, in this respect, they are to be recognized as percepts, not sensations, as objective affections of things, and not as subjective affections of us. But, on the other side, this objective element is always found accompanied by a secondary quality or sensorial passion. The Secundo-primary qualities have thus always two phases, both immediately apprehended. On their primary or objective phasis they manifest themselves as *degrees* of resistance opposed to our locomotive energy; on their secondary or subjective phasis, as *modes* of resistance or pressure affecting our sentient organism. Thus standing between, and, in a certain sort, made up of the two classes of Primary and Secondary qualities, to neither of which, however, can they be reduced; this

their partly common, partly peculiar nature, vindicates to them the dignity of a class apart from both the others, and this under the appropriate appellation of the Secundo-primary qualities.

They admit of a classification from two different points of view. They may be *physically*, they may be *psychologically*, distributed.—Considered *physically*, or in an objective relation, they are to be reduced to classes corresponding to the different sources in external nature from which the resistance or pressure springs. And these sources are, in all, three :—(I.) that of *Co-attraction* ; (II.) that of *Repulsion* ; (III.) that of *Inertia*.

I.—Of the resistance of *Co-attraction* there may be distinguished, on the same objective principle, two subaltern genera ; to wit (A) that of *Gravity*, or the co-attraction of the particles of body in general ; and (B) that of *Cohesion*, or the co-attraction of the particles of this and that body in particular.

A.—The resistance of Gravity or Weight according to its degree (which, again, is in proportion to the Bulk and Density of ponderable matter) affords, under it, the relative qualities of *Heavy* and *Light* (absolute and specific).

B.—The resistance of Cohesion (using that term in its most unexclusive universality) contains many species and counter-species. Without proposing an exhaustive, or accurately subordinated, list ;—of these there may be enumerated (i.) the *Hard* and *Soft* ; (ii.) the *Firm* (Fixed, Stable, Concrete, Solid), and *Fluid* (Liquid), the Fluid being again subdivided into the *Thick* and *Thin* ; (iii.) the *Viscid* and *Friable* ; with (iv.) the *Tough* and *Brittle* (Irruptile and Ruptile) ; (v.) the *Rigid* and *Flexible* ; (vi.) the *Fissile* and *Infissile* ; (vii.) the *Ductile* and *Inductile* (Extensible and Inextensible) ; (viii.) the *Retractile* and *Irretractile* (Elastic and Inelastic) ; (ix.) (combined with Figure) the *Rough* and *Smooth* ; (x.) the *Slippery* and *Tenacious*.

II.—The resistance from *Repulsion* is divided into the counter qualities of (A) the (relatively) *Compressible* and *Incompressible* ; (B) the *Resilient* and *Irresilient* (Elastic and Inelastic).

III.—The resistance from *Inertia* (combined with Bulk and

Cohesion) comprises the counter qualities of the (relatively) *Movable* and *Immovable*.

There are thus, at least, fifteen pairs of counter attributes which we may refer to the Secundo-primary Qualities of Body;—all obtained by the division and subdivision of the resisting forces of matter, considered in an objective or physical point of view. [Compare Aristotle, Meteor. L. iv. c. 8.]

Considered *psychologically*, or in a subjective relation, they are to be discriminated, under the genus of the *Relatively resisting*, [I.] according to the *degree* in which the resisting force might counteract our locomotive faculty or muscular force; and, [II.] according to the *mode* in which it might affect our capacity of feeling or sentient organism. Of these species, the former would contain under it the gradations of the quasi-primary quality, the latter the varieties of the secondary quality—these constituting the two elements of which, in combination, every Secundo-primary quality is made up. As, however, language does not afford us terms by which these divisions and subdivisions can be unambiguously marked, I shall not attempt to carry out the distribution, which is otherwise sufficiently obvious, in detail.—So much for the induction of the Secundo-primary qualities.

But it has sometimes been said of the Secundo-primary qualities as of the Primary, that they are necessary characters in our notion of body; and this has more particularly been asserted of Gravity, Cohesion, and Inertia. This doctrine, though never brought to proof, and never, I believe, even deliberately maintained, it is, however, necessary to show, is wholly destitute of foundation.

That Gravity, Cohesion, Inertia, and Repulsion, in their various modifications, are not conceived by us as necessary properties of matter, and that the resistances through which they are manifested do not therefore, psychologically, constitute any primary quality of body: this is evident, 1^o, from the historical fact of the wavering and confliction of philosophical opinion, in regard to the nature of these properties; and, 2^o, from the response

afforded to the question by our individual consciousness. These in their order :

1.—The vacillation of philosophical opinion may be shown under two heads ; to wit, from the Psychological, and from the Physical, point of view.

As to the *Psychological point of view*, the ambiguous, and at the same time the unessential, character of these qualities, is shown by the variation of philosophers in regard to which of the two classes of Primary or Secondary they would refer them ; for the opinion, that philosophers are in this at one, is an error arising from the perfunctory manner in which this whole subject has hitherto been treated. Many philosophers in their schemes of classification, as Galileo, Boyle, Le Clerc, overlook, or at least omit to enumerate these qualities. In point of fact, however, they undoubtedly regarded them as *Sensible*, and therefore, as we shall see, as *Secondary*, qualities. The great majority of philosophers avowedly consider them as secondary. This is done, implicitly or explicitly, by Aristotle and the Aristotelians, by Galen, by Descartes* and his school, by Locke,† by Purchot, &c. ; for these philosophers refer Hardness, Softness, Roughness, Smoothness, and the like, to the Tactile qualities—the sensible qualities of Touch ; while they identify the sensible qualities in general, that is, the sensations proper of the several senses, with the class of Secondary, the percepts common to more than a single sense, with the class of Primary, qualities. In this Aristotle, indeed, is

* See, besides what is said under Descartes, No. 9, Regis, Phys. L. viii. P. ii. ch. 2. Spinoza, Princ. Philos. Cartes. P. ii. Lem. 2, pr. 1.

† Compare Essay, B. ii. c. 3, § 1, and c. 4, § 4, and c. 8, §§ 14, 23 ; with Lee's Notes, B. ii. c. 8, § 4, p. 56. Looking superficially at certain casual ambiguities of Locke's language, we may, with Kames, Reid, and philosophers in general, suppose him to have referred the qualities in question to the class of Primary. Looking more closely, we may hold him to have omitted them altogether, as inadvertently stated at p. 341 b. But looking critically to the whole analogy of the places now quoted, and, in particular, considering the import of the term 'sensible qualities,' as then in ordinary use, we can have no doubt that, like the Peripatetics and Descartes, he viewed them as pertaining to the class of Secondary.

found not always in unison with himself; or rather, at different times he views as proximate the different phases presented by the qualities in question. For though in general he regards the Rough and the Smooth as sensations proper to Touch (De Gen. et Corr. ii. 2, et alibi), on one occasion he reduces these to the class of common percepts, as modifications of Figure (De Sensu et Sensili, c. 4). Recently, however, without suspecting their confliction with the older authorities, nay, even in professed conformity with the doctrine of Descartes and Locke, psychologists have, with singular unanimity, concurred in considering the qualities in question as Primary. For to say nothing of the anomalous and earlier statements of De La Forge and Du Hamel (Nos. 13, 14), and passing over, as hardly of psychological import, the opinion of Cotes (Præf. ad Newtoni Prin. ed. 2), this has been done by Kames, Reid, Fergusson, Stewart, and Royer-Colliard—philosophers who may be regarded as the authors or principal representatives of the doctrine now prevalent among those by whom the distinction is admitted.

Looking, therefore, under the surface at the state of psychological opinion, no presumption, assuredly, can be drawn from the harmony of philosophers against the establishment of a class of qualities different from those of Primary and Secondary. On the contrary, the discrepancy of metaphysicians, not only with each other, but of the greatest even with themselves, as to which of these two classes the qualities I call Secundo-primary should be referred, does, in fact, afford a strong preliminary probability that these qualities can with propriety be reduced to neither; themselves, in fact, constituting a peculiar class, distinct from each, though intermediate between both.

As to the *Physical point of view*, I shall exhibit in detail the variation of opinion in relation to the several classes of those qualities which this point of view affords.

a.—*Gravity*. In regard to weight, this, so far from being universally admitted, from the necessity of its conception, to be an essential attribute of body, philosophers, ancient and modern,

very generally disallow all matter to be heavy; and many have even dogmatically asserted to certain kinds of matter a positive levity. This last was done by Aristotle, and his Greek, Arabian, and Latin followers; i. e. by the philosophic world in general for nearly two thousand years. At a recent period, the same doctrine was maintained, as actually true, by Gren and other advocates of the hypothesis of Phlogiston, among many more who allowed its truth as possible; and Newton had previously found it necessary to clothe his universal ether with a quality of negative gravity (or positive lightness), in order to enable him hypothetically to account for the phenomenon of positive gravity in other matter.

Of Gravity, some, indeed, have held the cause to be internal and essential to matter. Of these we have the ancient Atomists (Democritus, Leucippus, Epicurus, &c.), with Plato and a few individual Aristotelians, as Strato and Themistius; and in modern times a section of the Newtonians, as Cotes, Freind, Keill, with Boscovich, Kant, Kames, Schelling, and Hegel. But though holding (physically) weight to be, *de facto*, an essential property of matter, these philosophers were far from holding (psychologically) the character of weight to be an essential constituent of the notion of matter. Kant, for example, when speaking psychologically, asserts that weight is only a synthetic predicate which experience enables us to add on to our prior notion of body (*Cr. d. r. Vern.* p. 12, ed. 2—*Proleg.* § 2, p. 25, ed. 1.); whereas, when speaking physically, he contends that weight is a universal attribute of matter, as a necessary condition of its existence (*Met. Anfangsgr. d. Naturwiss.* p. 71, ed. 2).

But the latter opinion—that weight is only, in reality, as in thought, an accident of body—is that adopted by the immense majority, not only of philosophers, but of natural philosophers. Under various modifications, however; some, for example, holding the external cause of gravity to be physical, others to be hyperphysical. Neglecting subordinate distinctions, to this class belong Anaxagoras, Democritus, Melissus, Diogenes of Apollonia, Aristotle and his school, Algazel, Avicembron, Copernicus, Bruno,

Kepler, Gilbert, Berigardus, Digby, Torricelli, Descartes, Gassendi, Lana, Kircher, Andala, Malebranche, Rohault, De Guericke, Perrault, H. Moore, Cudworth, Du Hamel, Huygens, Sturmius, Hooke, Is. Vossius, Newton, S. Clarke, Halley, Leibnitz, Saurin, Wolf, Mueller, Bilfinger, the Bernoullis James and John, Canz, Hamberger, Varignon, Villemot, Fatio, Euler, Baxter, Colden, Saussure, Le Sage, L'Huillier, Prevost, De Luc, Monboddo, Horsley, Drummond, Playfair, Blair, &c. In particular this doctrine is often and anxiously inculcated by Newton—who seems, indeed, to have sometimes inclined even to an immaterial cause; but this more especially after his follower, Cotes, had ventured to announce an adhesion to the counter theory, in his preface to the second edition of the 'Principia,' which he procured in 1713. See Newton's letter to Boyle, 1678—Letters, second and third, to Bentley, 1693;—Principia, L. i. c. 5. L. iii. reg. 3, alibi;—in particular, Optics, ed. 1717, B. iii. Qu. 21.

b.—*Cohesion*, comprehending under that term not only Cohesion proper, but all the specific forces (Adhesion, Capillarity, Chemical Affinity, &c.), by which the particles of individual bodies tend to approach, and to maintain themselves in union—Cohesion is even less than Gravity, than the force by which matter in general attracts matter, a character essential to our notion of body. Upon Gravity, indeed, a majority of the earlier Newtonians maintained Cohesion, in some inexplicable manner, to depend; and the other hypotheses of an external agency, all proceed upon the supposition that it is merely an accident of matter. Cohesion, the cause of which Locke wisely regarded as inconceivable, Descartes attempted to explain by the quiescence of the adjoining molecules; Malebranche (as an occasional cause), by the agitation of a pervading invisible matter; Stair, by the pressure (whence, he does not state) of the physical points, his supposed constituents of body, to a common centre; and James Bernoulli, by the pressure of a circumambient fluid—an hypothesis to which Newton likewise seems to have inclined: while a host of others, following Algazel and Avicembron, Biel and D'Ailly, spurned all

mechanical media, these being themselves equally inexplicable as the phenomenon in question, and resorted to the immediate agency of an immaterial principle. The psychologists, therefore, who (probably from confounding hardness with solidity, solidity with impenetrability) have carried up the resistance of cohesion into the class of primary qualities, find but little countenance for their procedure, even among the crude precedents of physical speculation.

c.—*Vis Inertiæ*. But if, on the ground of philosophical agreement, Gravity and Cohesion are not to be regarded as primary qualities of matter; this dignity is even less to be accorded to that force by which bodies resist any change of state, whether that be one of quiescence or of motion. This, variously known under the names of *Vis Inertiæ*, *Inertia*, *Vis Insita Resistentiæ*, *Resistentia Passiva*, &c., was, indeed, if not first noticed, only first generalized at a comparatively recent period—to wit, by Kepler; while the subsequent controversies in regard to its nature and comprehension, equally concur in showing that there is no necessity for thinking it as an essential attribute of matter. The Cartesians, among others, viewed it as a quality not only derivative, but contingent; and even those Newtonians, who, in opposition to Newton, raised Gravity to the rank of a primary quality, did not, however, venture to include inertia under the same category. (See Cotes's Preface to the second edition of the *Principia*.) Leibnitz, followed, among others, by Wolf, divided this force into two;—discriminating the *vis activa* or *motrix*, from the *vis passiva* or *inertiæ*. The former they held not to be naturally inherent in, but only supernaturally impressed on, matter. Without reference to Leibnitz, a similar distinction was taken by D'Alembert, in which he is followed by Destutt de Tracy; a distinction, as we have seen, which also found favor with Lord Kames, who in this, however, stands alone among metaphysicians, that he places both his *vis inertiæ* and *vis incita* among the primary qualities of body.

Finally, Physical speculators, in general, distinguish *Inertia* and

Weight, as powers, though proportional, still distinct. Many, however, following Wiedeburg, view the former as only a modification or phasis of the latter.

d.—*Repulsion*, meaning by that term more than the resistance of impenetrability, gravity, cohesion, or inertia, has, least of all, authority to plead in favor of its pretension to the dignity of a primary quality. The dynamical theories of matter, indeed, view Attraction and Repulsion not merely as fundamental qualities, but even as its generic forces; but the ground of this is the necessity of the hypothesis, not the necessity of thought.

2.—But the voice of our individual consciousness is a more direct and cogent evidence than the history of foreign opinion;—and this is still less favorable to the claim in question. The only resistance which we think as necessary to the conception of body, is a resistance to the occupation of a body's space—the resistance of ultimate incompressibility. The others, with their causes, we think only as contingent, because, one and all of them we can easily annihilate in thought.

Repulsion (to take them backwards)—a resistance to the approximation and contact of other matter—we come only by a late and learned experience to view as an attribute of body, and of the elements of body; nay, so far is it from being a character essential in our notion of matter, it remains, as apparently an *actio in distans*, even when forced upon us as a fact, still inconceivable as a possibility. Accordingly, by no philosopher has the resistance of Repulsion been psychologically regarded as among the primary qualities.

Nor has *Inertia* a greatly higher claim to this distinction. There is no impossibility, there is little difficulty, in imagining a thing, occupying space, and therefore a body; and yet, without attraction or repulsion for any other body, and wholly indifferent to this or that position, in space, to motion and to rest; opposing, therefore, no resistance to any displacing power. Such imagination is opposed to experience, and consequently to our acquired

habitudes of conceiving body ; but it is not opposed to the necessary conditions of that concept itself.

It was on this psychological ground that Descartes reduced inertia to a mere accident of extension. Physically reasoning, Descartes may not perhaps be right ; but Kames is certainly, as he is singularly wrong, in psychologically recognizing Inertia as a primary attribute of body.

Of the two attractions, *Cohesion* is not constituent of the notion of what occupies, or is trinally extended in space. This notion involves only the supposition of parts out of parts ; and although what fills an uninterrupted portion of space, is, pro tanto, considered by us as one thing ; the unity which the parts of this obtain in thought, is not the internal unity of cohesion, but the external unity of continuity or juxtaposition. Under the notion of repletion of space, a rock has not in thought a higher unity than a pile of sand. Cohesion, consequently, is not, in a psychological view, an essential attribute of body. [In saying this, I may notice parenthetically, that I speak of cohesion only as between the ultimate elements of body, *whatever these may be* ; and fortunately our present discussion does not require us to go higher, that is, to regard cohesion in reference to our conception of these considered in themselves. In forming to ourselves such concept, two counter inconceivabilities present themselves,—inconceivabilities from the one or other of which, as speculators have recoiled, they have embraced one or other of the counter theories of Atomism and Dynamism.] But if cohesion be not thought as an essential attribute of body, Kames, Reid, Fergusson, Stewart, Royer-Collard, and other recent philosophers, were wrong to introduce the degrees of cohesive resistance among the primary qualities ; either avowedly under the explicit titles of the Hard, the Soft, &c., or covertly, under the ambiguous head of Solidity. But though Locke did not, as they believe, precede them in this doctrine, his language, to say the least of it, is unguarded and inaccurate. For he employs *cohesion* and *continuity* as convertible terms ; and states, without the requisite qualification, that ‘ upon the solidity [to him

the impenetrability or ultimate incompressibility] of bodies depend their mutual impulse, resistance, and protrusion.' (ii. 4, 5.)

As to *Weight*,—we have from our earliest experience been accustomed to find all tangible bodies in a state of gravitation; and by the providence of nature, the child has, even anteriorly to experience, an instinctive anticipation of this law in relation to his own. This has given weight an advantage over the other qualities of the same class; and it is probably through these influences, that certain philosophers have been disposed to regard gravity, as, physically and psychologically, a primary quality of matter. But instinct and consuetude notwithstanding, we find no difficulty in imagining the general co-attraction of matter to be annihilated; nay, not only annihilated, but reversed. For as attraction and repulsion seem equally *actiones in distans*, it is not more difficult to realize to ourselves the notion of the one, than the notion of the other.

In reference to both Cohesion and Gravity, I may notice, that though it is only by experience we come to attribute an internal unity to aught continuously extended, that is, consider it as a system or constituted whole; still, in so far as we do so consider it, we think the parts as held together by a certain force, and the whole, therefore, as endowed with a power of resisting their distraction. It is, indeed, only by finding that a material continuity resists distraction, that we view it as more than a fortuitous aggregation of many bodies, that is, as a single body. The material universe, for example, though not *de facto* continuously extended, we consider as one system, in so far, but only in so far, as we find all bodies tending together by reciprocal attraction. But here I may add, that though a love of unity may bias us, there is no necessity for supposing this co-attraction to be the effect of any single force. It may be the result of any plurality of forces, provided that these co-operate in due subordination. Thus we are not constrained to view the universe of matter as held together by the power of gravity alone. For though gravity be recognized as the prime, proximate, and most pervading principle of co-attrac-

tion, still, until the fact be proved, we are not required to view it as the sole. We may suppose that a certain complement of parts are endowed with weight; and that the others, immediately and in themselves indifferent to gravitation, are mediately drawn within its sphere, through some special affinity or attraction subsisting between them and the bodies immediately subjected to its influence. Let the letters A, B, C, x, y, z, represent in general the universe of matter; the capital letters representing, in particular, the kinds of matter possessed of, the minor letters representing the kinds of matter destitute of weight. Of themselves, A, B, C will, therefore, gravitate; x, y, z will not. But if x have a peculiar affinity for A, y for B, and z for C; x, y, z, though in themselves weightless, will, through their correlation to A, B, C, come mediately under the influence of gravitation, and enter along with their relatives, as parts, into the whole of which gravity is the proximate bond of unity. To prove, therefore, a priori, or on any general principle whatever, that no matter is destitute of weight, is manifestly impossible. All matter may possibly be heavy: but until experiment can decide, by showing, in detail, that what are now generally regarded as imponderable fluids, are either in truth ponderable substances, or not substances at all, we have no data on which to infer more than a conjectural affirmative of little probability. On the dynamical theories of matter, the attempts made from Boscovich to Hegel, to demonstrate that weight is a catholic property, as a fundamental condition of matter, are all founded on petitory premises. This is justly acknowledged by Hegel himself of the Kantian deduction (*Werke*, vol. vii. p. i. § 262); and, were the proof of psychological concernment, the same might no less justly be demonstrated of his own.*

* Since writing the above, I am indebted to the kindness of Mr. Whewell for his 'Demonstration that all Matter is Heavy,' published in the *Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society*, Vol. vii. Part ii.;—an author whose energy and talent all must admire, even while convinced the least by the cogency of his reasoning. As this demonstration proceeds not on a mere physical ground, but on the ground of a certain logical or psychologi-

Induction of the Secondary Qualities.—Its results are the following.—The Secondary as manifested to us, are not, in propriety, qualities of Body at all. As apprehended, they are only sub-

cal law, and as it is otherwise diametrically opposed to the whole tenor of the doctrine previously maintained, I shall briefly consider it in its general bearing;—which Mr. Whewell thus states, afterwards illustrating it in detail:

‘The question then occurs, whether we can, by any steps of reasoning, point out an inconsistency in the conception of matter without weight. This I conceive we may do, and this I shall attempt to show. The general mode of stating the argument is this:—The quantity of matter is measured by those sensible properties of matter [Weight and Inertia] which undergo quantitative addition, subtraction, and division, as the matter is added, subtracted, and divided. The quantity of matter cannot be known in any other way. But this mode of measuring the quantity of matter, in order to be true at all, must be universally true. If it were only partially true, the limits within which it is to be applied would be arbitrary; and, therefore, the whole procedure would be arbitrary, and, as a method of obtaining philosophical truth, altogether futile.’ [But this is not to be admitted. ‘We must suppose the rule to be universal. If any bodies have weight, all bodies must have weight.’]

1°. This reasoning assumes in chief that we cannot but have it in our power, by some means or other, to ascertain the quantity of matter as a physical truth. But gratuitously. For why may not the quantity of matter be one of that multitude of problems, placed beyond the reach, not of human curiosity, but of human determination?

2°. But, subordinate to the assumption that some measure we *must* have, the reasoning further supposes that a measure of the weight (and inertia) is the *only* measure we *can* have of the quantity of matter. But is even this correct? We may, certainly, attempt to estimate the quantity of matter by the quantity of *two*, at least, of the properties of matter; to wit—a) by the quantity of space of which it is found to resist the occupation; and—b) by the quantity of weight (and inertia), which it manifests. We need not inquire whether, were these measures harmonious in result, they would, in combination, supply a competent criterion; for they are at variance; and, if either, one must be exclusively selected. Of the two, the former, indeed, at first sight, recommends itself as the alone authentic. For the quantity of matter is, on all hands, admitted to be in proportion to the quantity of space it fills, extension being necessarily thought as the essential property of body; whereas it is not universally admitted that the quantity of matter is in proportion to its amount of weight and inertia; these being, on the contrary, conceivable and generally conceived as adventitious accidents, and not, therefore, as necessary concomitants of matter. But then it may be competently objected,—The cubical extension of compressed bodies cannot be taken as an authentic measure of the quantity of space they fill, because we are not assured that the degree of compressing force which we can actually

jective affections, and belong only to bodies in so far as these are supposed furnished with the powers capable of specifically determining the various parts of our nervous apparatus to the peculiar action, or rather passion, of which they are susceptible; which determined action or passion is the quality of which alone we are immediately cognizant, the external concause of that internal effect remaining to perception altogether unknown. Thus, the Secondary qualities (and the same is to be said, *mutatis mutandis*, of the Secundo-primary) are, considered subjectively, and considered objectively, affections or qualities of things diametrically opposed in nature—of the organic and inorganic, of the sentient and insentient, of mind and matter: and though, as mutually correlative, and their several pairs rarely obtaining in common language more than a single name, they cannot well be considered, except in conjunction, under the same category or general class; still their essential contrast of character must be ever carefully borne in mind. And in speaking of these qualities, as we are here chiefly concerned with them on their subjective side, I

apply is an accurate index of what their cubical extension would be in a state of ultimate or closest compression. But though this objection must be admitted to invalidate the certainty of the more direct and probable criterion, it does not, however, leave the problem to be determined by the other; against which, indeed, it falls to be no less effectually retorted. For as little, at least, can we be assured that there is not (either separately, or in combination with gravitating matter) substance occupying space, and, therefore, material, but which, being destitute of weight, is, on the standard of ponderability, precisely as if it did not exist. This supposition, be it observed, the experiments of Newton and Bessel do not exclude. Nay, more; there are, in fact, obtruded on our observation a series of apparent fluids (as Light, or its vehicle, the Calorific, Electro-galvanic, and Magnetic agents), which, in our present state of knowledge, we can neither, on the one hand, denude of the character of substance, nor, on the other, close with the attribute of weight.

3^o. This argument finally supposes, as a logical canon, that a presumption from analogy affords a criterion of truth, subjectively necessary, and objectively certain. But not the former; for however inclined, we are never necessitated, *a posteriori*, to think, that because *some are*, therefore *all* the constituents of a class *must be*, the subjects of a predicate *a priori* contingent. Not the latter; for though a useful stimulus and guide to investigation, analogy is, by itself, a very doubtful guarantee of truth.

request it may be observed, that I shall employ the expression *Secondary qualities* to denote those phenomenal affections determined in our sentient organism by the agency of external bodies, and not, unless when otherwise stated, the occult powers themselves from which that agency proceeds.

Of the Secondary qualities, in this relation, there are various kinds; the variety principally depending on the differences of the different parts of our nervous apparatus. Such are the proper sensibles, the idiopathic affections of our several organs of sense, as Color, Sound, Flavor, Savor, and Tactual sensation; such are the feelings from Heat, Electricity, Galvanism, &c.; nor need it be added, such are the muscular and cutaneous sensations which accompany the perception of the Secundo-primary qualities. Such, though less directly the result of foreign causes, are Titillation, Sneezing, Horripilation, Shuddering, the feeling of what is called Setting-the-teeth-on-edge, &c., &c.; such, in fine, are all the various sensations of bodily pleasure and pain determined by the action of external stimuli.—So much for the induction of the Secondary Qualities in a subjective relation.

It is here, however, requisite to add some words of illustration.—What are denominated the secondary qualities of body, are, I have said, as apprehended, not qualities of body at all; being only idiopathic affections of the different portions of our nervous organism—affections which, however uniform and similar in us, may be determined by the most dissimilar and multiform causes in external things. This is manifest from the physiology of our senses and their appropriate nerves. Without entering on details, it is sufficient to observe, that we are endowed with various assortments of nerves; each of these being astricted to certain definite functions; and each exclusively discharging the function which specially belongs to it. Thus there are nerves of feeling (comprehending under that term the sensations of cutaneous touch and feeling proper, of the muscular sense, and of the vital sense, or sensus vagus, in all its modifications), of seeing, of hearing, of smelling, of tasting, &c.

The nerves of feeling afford us sensations to which, in opposite extremes, we emphatically, if not exclusively, attribute the qualities of pain and pleasure. Acute pain—pain from laceration—may, indeed, be said to belong exclusively to these; for the nerves appropriated to the other and more determinate senses, are, like the brain, in this respect altogether insensible; and it is even probable that the pain we experience from their over-excitement is dependent on the nerves of feeling with which they are accompanied. Now pain and pleasure no one has ever attributed as qualities to external things: feeling has always been regarded as purely subjective, and it has been universally admitted that its affections, indicating only certain conscious states of the sentient animal, afforded no inference even to definite causes of its production in external nature. So far there is no dispute.

The case may, at first sight, seem different with regard to the sensations proper to the more determinate senses; but a slight consideration may suffice to satisfy us that these are no less subjective than the others;—as is indeed indicated in the history already given of the distinction of Primary and Secondary qualities. As, however, of a more definite character, it is generally, I believe, supposed that these senses, though they may not precisely convey material qualities from external existence to internal knowledge, still enable us at least to infer the possession by bodies of certain specific powers, each capable exclusively of exciting a certain correlative manifestation in us. But even this is according greatly too large a share in the total sensitive effect to the objective concause. The sensations proper to the several senses depend, for the distinctive character of their manifestation, on the peculiar character of the action of their several nerves; and not, as is commonly supposed, on the exclusive susceptibility of these nerves for certain specific stimuli. In fact every the most different stimulus (and there are many such, both extra and intra-organic, besides the one viewed as proper to the sense), which can be brought to bear on each several nerve of sense, determines that nerve only to its one peculiar sensation. Thus the stimulus

by the external agent exclusively denominated Light, though the more common, is not the only stimulus which excites in the visual apparatus the subjective affection of light and colors. Sensations of light and colors, are determined among other causes, *from within*, by a sanguineous congestion in the capillary vessels of the optic nerve, or by various chemical agents which affect it through the medium of the blood; *from without*, by the application to the same nerve of a mechanical force, as a blow, a compression, a wound, or of an imponderable influence, as electricity or galvanism. In fact the whole actual phenomena of vision might be realized to us by the substitution of an electro-galvanic stimulus, were this radiated in sufficient intensity from bodies, and in conformity with optical laws. The blind from birth are thus rarely without all experience of light, color, and visual extension, from stimulation of the interior organism.—The same is the case with the other senses. Apply the aforementioned or other extraordinary stimuli to their several nerves; each sense will be excited to its appropriate sensation, and its appropriate sensation alone. The passion manifested (however heterogeneous its external or internal cause) is always—of the auditory nerves, a sound, of the olfactory, a smell, of the gustatory, a taste. But of the various common agencies which thus excite these several organs to their idiopathic affection, we are manifestly no more entitled to predicate the individual color, sound, odor, or savor of which, in each case, we have a sensation, than we are to attribute the pain we feel to the pin by which we are pricked. But if this must per force be admitted of the extraordinary external causes of these sensations, it is impossible to deny it of the ordinary.

In this respect Aristotle (and the same may also be said of Theophrastus) was far in advance of many of our modern philosophers. In his treatise on Dreams, to prove that sensation is not a purely objective cognition, but much more a subjective modification or passion of the organ, he shows, and with a detail very unusual to him, that this sensible affection does not cease

with the presence, and, therefore, does not manifest the quality, of the external object. 'This (he says) is apparent so often as we have the sensation of a thing for a certain continuance. For then, divert as we may the sense from one object to another, still the affection from the first accompanies the second; as (for example) when we pass from sunshine into shade. In this case we at first see nothing, because of the movement in the eyes still subsisting, which had been determined by the light. In like manner if we gaze for a while upon a single color, say white or green, whatever we may now turn our sight on will appear of that tint. And if, after looking at the sun or other dazzling object, we close our eyelids, we shall find, if we observe, that, in the line of vision, there first of all appears a color such as we had previously beheld, which then changes to red, then to purple, until at last the affection vanishes in black;'—with more to the same effect. (C. 2.) And in the same chapter he anticipates modern psychologists in the observation—that 'Sometimes, when suddenly awoke, we discover, from their not incontinently vanishing, that the images which had appeared to us when asleep are really movements in the organs of sense; and to young persons it not unfrequently happens, even when wide awake, and withdrawn from the excitement of light, that moving images present themselves so vividly, that for fear they are wont to hide themselves under the bed-clothes.' (C. 2.) See also *Ockham*, in Sent., L. ii. qq. 17, 18.—*Biel*, in Sent., L. ii. Dist. iii. q. 2.—*Berigardus*, Circulus Pisanus, P. vi. Circ. 12, ed. 2.—*Hobbes*, Human Nature, ch. ii. § 7--10.—*Boerhaave*, Prælectiones in proprias Institutiones, §§ 284, 579.—*Sprengel*, Semiotik, § 770-773; Pathologie, vol. ii. § 719.—*Gruithuisen*, Anthropologie, § 449.—*Sir Charles Bell*, An Idea, &c. (in Shaw's Narrative, p. 35, sq.); The Hand, &c., p. 175, sq.—*Plateau*, Essai d'une Theorie, &c., p. .—*J. Mueller*, Physiology, Book v., Preliminary Considerations, p. 1059, sq., Engl. Transl.

Such being the purely subjective character of the secondary qualities, as apprehended or immediately known by us, we must

reject as untenable the doctrine on this point, however ingeniously supported, of the celebrated Neapolitan philosopher, Baron Galluppi; who, while, justly I think, dissatisfied with the opinion of Reid, that the perception of the primary qualities is a conception instinctively suggested on occasion of our sensation of the secondary, errs on the opposite extreme, in his attempt to show that this sensation itself affords us what is wanted,—an immediate cognition, an objective apprehension, of external things. The result of his doctrine he thus himself states :—‘ *Sensation is of its very nature objective ; in other words, objectivity is essential to every sensation.*’ *Elementi di Filosofia*, vol. i. c. 10, ed. 4, Florence, 1837. The matter is more amply treated in his *Critica della Conoscenza*, L. ii. c. 6, and L. iv.—a work which I have not yet seen. Compare Bonelli, *Institutiones Logico-Metaphysicæ*, t. i. pp. 184, 222, ed. 2, 1837.

Such is the general view of the grounds on which the psychological distinction of the Qualities of Bodies, into the three classes of Primary, Secundo-primary, and Secondary is established. It now remains to exhibit their mutual differences and similarities more in detail. In attempting this, the following order will be pursued.—I shall state of the three relative classes,—(A) *What they are, considered in general* ; then, (B) *What they are, considered in particular*. And under this latter head I shall view them, (1°) *as in Bodies* : (2°) *as in Cognition* ; and this (a) *as in Sensitive Apprehension* ; (b) *as in Thought* ; (c) *as in both*.—For the conveniency of reference the paragraphs will be numbered.*

A.—*What they are in general.*

1. The Primary are less properly denominated Qualities (Suchnesses), and deserve the name only as we conceive them to distinguish body from not-body,—corporeal from incorporeal substance. They are thus merely the attributes of *body as body*,—*corporis ut corpus*. The Secundo-primary and Secondary, on the contrary, are in strict propriety denominated Qualities, for

they discriminate body from body. They are the attributes of *body as this or that kind of body,—corporis ut tale corpus.**

2. The Primary rise from the universal relations of body to itself; the Secundo-primary from the general relations of this body to that; the Secondary from the special relations of this kind of body to this kind of animated or sentient organism.

3. The Primary determine the possibility of matter absolutely; the Secundo-primary, the possibility of the material universe as actually constituted; the Secondary, the possibility of our relation as sentient existences to that universe.

4. Under the Primary we apprehend modes of the Non-ego; under the Secundo-primary we apprehend modes both of the Ego and of the Non-ego; under the Secondary we apprehend modes of the Ego, and infer modes of the Non-ego. (See par. 15.)

5. The Primary are apprehended as they are in bodies; the Secondary, as they are in us; the Secundo-primary, as they are in bodies, and as they are in us. (See par. 15.)

6. The term *quality* in general, and the names of the several qualities in particular, are—in the case of the primary, univocal, one designation unambiguously marking out one quality; †—in the case of the Secundo-primary and Secondary, equivocal, a single term being ambiguously applied to denote two qualities, distinct though correlative—that, to wit, which is a mode of existence in bodies, and that which is a mode of affection in our organism. ‡ (See par. 24.)

* Thus in the Aristotelic and other philosophies, the title *Quality* would not be allowed to those fundamental conditions on which the very possibility of matter depends, but which modern philosophers have denominated its Primary Qualities.

† For example, there is no subjective Sensation of Magnitude, Figure, Number, &c., but only an objective Perception. (See par. 15-19.)

‡ Thus, in the Secundo-primary the term *Hardness*, for instance, denotes both a certain resistance, of which we are conscious, to our motive energy, and a certain feeling from pressure on our nerves. The former, a Perception, is wholly different from the latter, a Sensation; and we can easily imagine that we might have been so constituted, as to apprehend Resistance as we do Magnitude, Figure, &c., without a corresponding organic passion. (See par. 18.)—In the Secondary the term *Heat*, for example, denotes ambiguously both

7. The Primary, and also the Secundo-primary qualities, are definite in number and exhaustive; for all conceivable relations of body to itself, or of body to body merely, are few, and all these found actually existent. The Secondary, on the contrary, are in number indefinite; and the actual hold no proportion to the possible. For we can suppose, in an animal organism, any number of unknown capacities of being variously affected; and, in matter, any number of unknown powers of thus variously affecting it;* and this though we are necessarily unable to imagine to ourselves what these actually may be.

B.—*What they are in particular; and 1°, Considered as in Bodies.*

8. The Primary are the qualities of body in relation to our organism, as a body simply; the Secundo-primary, are the qualities of body in relation to our organism, as a propelling, resisting, cohesive body; the Secondary are the qualities of body in relation to our organism, as an idiopathically excitable and sentient body. (See p. 374 b—376 a.)

9. Under this head we know the Primary qualities immediately as objects of perception; the Secundo-primary, both immediately as objects of perception and mediately as causes of sensation; the Secondary, only mediately as causes of sensation. In other words:—The Primary are known immediately in themselves; the Secundo-primary, both immediately in themselves and mediately in their effects on us; the Secondary, only mediately in their effects on us. (See par. 15.)

10. The Primary are known under the condition of sensations; the Secundo-primary, in and along with sensations; the Secondary, in consequence of sensations. (See par. 20.)

the quality which we infer to be in bodies and the quality of which we are conscious in ourselves.

* Sextus Empiricus, Montaigne, Voltaire, Hemsterhuis, Krueger, &c., notice this as possible; but do not distinguish the possibility as limited to the Secondary Qualities.

11. The Primary are thus apprehended objects ; the Secondary, inferred powers ; the Secundo-primary, both apprehended objects and inferred powers.

12. The Primary are conceived as necessary and perceived as actual ; the Secundo-primary are perceived and conceived as actual ; the Secondary are inferred and conceived as possible.

13. The Primary are perceived as conceived. The Secundo-primary are conceived as perceived. The Secondary are neither perceived as conceived, nor conceived as perceived ;—for to perception they are occult, and are conceived only as latent causes to account for manifest effects. (See par. 15, and foot-note *.)

14. The Primary may be roundly characterized as mathematical ; the Secundo-primary, as mechanical ; the Secondary, as physiological.

2°. *Considered as Cognitions ; and here (a) As in Sensitive Apprehension, or in relation to Sense.*

15. In this relation the Primary qualities are, as apprehended, unambiguously objective (object-objects) ; the Secondary, unambiguously subjective (subject-objects) ;* the Secundo-primary, both objective and subjective (object-objects and subject-objects). In other words :—We are conscious, as objects, in the Primary qualities, of the modes of a not-self ; in the Secondary, of the modes of self ;* in the Secundo-primary, of the modes of self and of a not-self at once.†

* How much this differs from the doctrine of Reid, Stewart, &c., who hold that in every sensation there is not only a subjective object of sensation, but, also an objective object of perception, see Note D*, § 1.¹

† In illustration of this paragraph, I must notice a confusion and ambiguity in the very cardinal distinction of psychology and its terms—the distinction I mean of *subjective* and *objective*, which, as far as I am aware, has never been cleared up, nay, never even brought clearly into view.

Our nervous organism (the rest of our body may be fairly thrown out of account), in contrast to all exterior to itself, appertains to the concrete human Ego, and in this respect is *subjective, internal* ; whereas, in contrast to the

16. Using the terms strictly, the apprehensions of the Primary are perceptions, not sensations; of the Secondary, sensations, not perceptions; of the Secundo-primary, perceptions and sensations together. (See par. 15, foot-note *.)

abstract immaterial Ego, the pure mind, it belongs to the Non-ego, and in this respect is *objective, external*. Here is one source of ambiguity sufficiently perplexing; but the discrimination is here comparatively manifest, and any important inconvenience from the employment of the terms may, with proper attention, be avoided.

The following problem is more difficult. Looking from the mind, and not looking beyond our animated organism, are the phenomena of which we are conscious in that organism all upon a level, i. e., equally objective or equally subjective; or is there a discrimination to be made, and some phenomena to be considered as objective, being modes of our organism viewed as a mere portion of matter, and in this respect a Non-ego, while other phenomena are to be considered as subjective, being the modes of our organism as animated by or in union with the mind, and therefore states of the Ego? Without here attempting to enter on the reasons which vindicate my opinion, suffice it to say, that I adopt the latter alternative; and hold further, that the discrimination of the sensorial phenomena into objective and subjective, coincides with the distinction made of the qualities of body into Primary and Secondary, the Secundo-primary being supposed to contribute an element to each. Our nervous organism is to be viewed in two relations;—1°, as a body simply, and—2°, as an animated body. As a body simply it can possibly exist, and can possibly be known as existent, only under those necessary conditions of all matter, which have been denominated its Primary qualities. As an animated body it actually exists, and is actually known to exist, only as it is susceptible of certain affections, which, and the external causes of which, have been ambiguously called the Secondary qualities of matter. Now, by a law of our nature, we are not conscious of the existence of our organism, consequently not conscious of any of its primary qualities, unless when we are conscious of it, as modified by a secondary quality, or some other of its affections, as an animated body. But the former consciousness requires the latter only as its negative condition, and is neither involved in it as a part, nor properly dependent on it as a cause. The object in the one consciousness is also wholly different from the object in the other. In that, it is a contingent passion of the organism, as a constituent of the human self; in this, it is some essential property of the organism, as a portion of the universe of matter, and though apprehended by, not an affection proper to, the conscious self at all. In these circumstances, the secondary quality, say a color, which the mind apprehends in the organism, is, as a passion of self, recognized to be a *subjective object*; whereas the primary quality, extension, or figure, or number, which, when conscious of such affection, the mind therein at the same time apprehends, is, as not a passion of self, but a common property of matter, recognized to be an *objective object*. (See par. 16-19, with foot-note †, and par. 18, with foot-note ‡.)

17. In the Primary there is, thus, no concomitant Secondary quality; in the Secondary there is no concomitant primary quality; in the Secundo-primary, a secondary and quasi-primary quality accompany each other.

18. In the apprehension of the Primary qualities the mind is primarily and principally active; it feels only as it knows. In that of the Secondary, the mind is primarily and principally passive; it knows only as it feels.* In that of the Secundo-primary

* Thus in vision the secondary quality of color is, in the strictest sense, a passive affection of the sentient ego; and the only activity the mind can be said to exert in the sensation of colors, is in the recognitive consciousness that it is so and so affected. It thus knows as it feels, in knowing that it feels.

But the apprehension of extension, figure, divisibility, &c., which, under condition of its being thus affected, simultaneously takes place, is, though necessary, wholly active and purely spiritual; inasmuch as extension, figure, &c., are, directly and in their own nature, neither, subjectively considered, passions of the animated sensory, nor, objectively considered, efficient qualities in things by which such passion can be caused. The perception of parts out of parts is not given in the mere affection of color, but is obtained by a reaction of the mind upon such affection.—It is merely the recognition of a relation. But a relation is neither a passion nor a cause of passion; and, though apprehended through sense, is, in truth, an intellectual, not a sensitive cognition;—unless under the name of sensitive cognition we comprehend, as I think we ought, more than the mere recognition of an organic passion.¹ The perception of Extension is not, therefore, the mere consciousness of an affection—a mere sensation.—This is still more manifest in regard to Figure, or extension bounded. Visual figure is an expanse of color bounded in a certain manner by a line. Here all is nothing but relation. ‘*Expanse of color*’ is only colored extension; and extension, as stated, is only the relation of parts out of parts. ‘*Bounded in a certain manner*,’ is also only the expression of various relations. A thing is ‘*bounded*,’ only as it has a limited number of parts; but *limited*, *number*, and *parts*, are, all three, relations: and, further, ‘*in a certain manner*’ denotes that these parts stand to each other in one relation and not in another. The perception of a thing as bounded, and bounded in a certain manner, is thus only the recognition of a thing under relations. Finally, ‘*by a line*’ still merely indicates a relation; for a line is nothing but the negation of each other, by two intersecting colors. Absolutely considered, it is a nothing; and so far from there being any difficulty in conceiving a breadthless line, a line is, in fact, not a line (but a narrow surface between two lines) if thought as possessed of breadth. In such perceptions, therefore, if the mind can be said to feel, it can be said to feel only in being conscious of itself as purely active; that is, as spontaneously apprehensive of an object-object or mode of the non-ego,

¹ See the next chapter, § i.—W.

the mind is equally and at once active and passive; in one respect, it feels as it knows, in another, it knows as it feels.*

and not of a subject-object or affection of the ego. (See par. 16-19, and relative foot-note †.)

The application of the preceding doctrine to the other primary qualities is even more obtrusive.

To prevent misunderstanding, it may be observed, that in saying *the mind is active, not passive, in a cognition*, I do not mean to say that the mind is free to exert or not to exert the cognitive act, or even not to exert it in a determinate manner. The mind energizes as it lives, and it cannot choose but live; it knows as it energizes, and it cannot choose but energize. An object being duly presented, it is unable not to apprehend it, and apprehend it, both in itself, and in the relations under which it stands. We may evade the presentation, not the recognition of what is presented.¹ But of this again.

* This is apparent when it is considered that under the cognition of a secundo-primary quality are comprehended both the apprehension of a secondary quality, i. e. the sensation of a subjective affection, and the apprehension of a quasi-primary quality, i. e. the perception of an objective force. Take, for example, the Secundo-primary quality of Hardness. In the sensitive apprehension of this we are aware of two facts. The first is the fact of a certain affection, a certain feeling, in our sentient organism (Muscular and Skin senses). This is the *sensation*, the apprehension of a feeling consequent on the resistance of a body, and which in one of its special modifications constitutes Hardness, viewed as an affection in us;—a sensation which we know, indeed, by experience to be the effect of the pressure of an unyielding body, but which we can easily conceive might be determined in us independently of all internal movement, all external resistance; while we can still more easily conceive that such movement and resistance might be apprehended independently of such concomitant sensation. Here, therefore, we know only as we feel, for here we only know, that is, are conscious that we feel.—The second is the fact of a certain opposition to the voluntary movement of a limb—to our locomotive energy. Of this energy we might be conscious, without any consciousness of the state, or even the existence, of the muscles set in motion; and we might also be conscious of resistance to its exertion, though no organic feeling happened to be its effect. But as it is, though conscious of the sensations connected both with the active state of our muscular frame determined by its tension, and of the passive state in our skin and flesh determined by external pressure; still, over and above these animal sensations, we are purely conscious of the fact, that the overt exertion of our locomotive volition is, in a certain sort, impeded. This consciousness is the *perception*, the objective apprehension, of resistance, which in one of its special modifications constitutes Hardness, as an attribute of body. In this cognition, if we can be said with any propriety to feel, we can be said only to feel as we know, because we only feel, i. e. are conscious, that we know. (See par. 18, foot-note †, and par. 25, first foot-note, Part I.)

¹ See Cousin's History of Philosophy, second series, lecture xxv.—W.

19. Thus Perception and Activity are at the maximum in the Primary qualities; at the minimum in the Secondary; Sensation and Passivity are at the minimum in the Primary, at the maximum in the Secondary; while, in the Secundo-primary, Perception and Sensation, Activity and Passivity, are in equipoise.— Thus too it is, that the most purely material phenomena are apprehended in the most purely inorganic energy.*

* The doctrine of paragraphs 16-19 seems to have been intended by Aristotle (see above, page 314 b), in saying that the Common Sensibles (= the Primary Qualities) are percepts *concomitant* or consequent on the sensation of the Proper (= the Secondary Qualities), and on one occasion that the Common Sensibles are, in a certain sort, only to be considered as apprehensions of sense per accidens. For this may be interpreted to mean, that our apprehension of the common sensibles is not, like that of the proper, the mere consciousness of a subjective or sensorial passion, but, though only exerted when such passion is determined, is in itself the spontaneous energy of the mind in objective cognition.

Tending towards, though not reaching to, the same result, might be adduced many passages from the works of the Greek interpreters of Aristotle. In particular, I would refer to the doctrine touching the Common Sensibles, stated by Simplicius in his Commentary on the *De Anima* (L. ii. c. 6, f, 35 a, L. iii. c. 1, f, 51 a, ed. Ald.), and by Priscianus Lydus, in his *Metaphrase of the Treatise of Theophrastus on Sense* (pp. 274, 275, 285, ed. Basil. Theoph.):—but (as already noticed) these books ought, I suspect, from strong internal evidence, both to be assigned to Priscianus as their author; while the doctrine itself is probably only that which Iamblichus had delivered, in his lost treatise upon the Soul. It is to this effect:—The common sensibles might appear not to be sensibles at all, or sensibles only per accidens, as making no impression on the organ, and as objects analogous to, and apprehended by, the understanding or rational mind alone. This extreme doctrine is not, however, to be admitted. As sensibles, the common must be allowed to act somehow upon the sense, though in a different manner from the proper. Comparatively speaking, the proper act primarily, corporeally, and by causing a passion in the sense; the common, secondarily, formally, and by eliciting the sense and understanding to energy. But though there be, in the proper more of passivity, in the common more of activity, still the common are, in propriety, objects of sense per se; being neither cognized (as substances) exclusively by the understanding, nor (as is the sweet by vision) accidentally by sense.

A similar approximation may be detected in the doctrine of the more modern Aristotelians. (See page 315 a.) Expressed in somewhat different terms, it was long a celebrated controversy in the schools, whether a certain class of objects, under which common sensibles were included, did or did not modify the organic sense; and if this they did, whether primarily and of themselves, or only secondarily through their modification of the proper

20. In the Primary, a sensation of organic affection is the condition of perception, a mental apprehension; in the Secundo-primary, a sensation is the concomitant of the perception; in the Secondary, a sensation is the all in all which consciousness apprehends. (See par. 10.)

21. In the Primary, the sensation, the condition of the perception, is not itself caused by the objective quality perceived; in

sensibles, with which they were associated. Ultimately, it became the prevalent doctrine, that of Magnitude, Figure, Place, Position, Time, Relation in general, &c., 'nullam esse efficaciam vel actionem:' that is, these do not, like the affective qualities (qualitates patibiles) or proper sensibles, make any real, any material impress on the sense; but if they can be said to act at all, act only, either, as some held, spiritually or intentionally, or as others, by natural resultance (vel spiritualiter sive intentionaliter, vel per naturalem resultantiam). See *Toletus*, Comm. De Anima, L. ii. c. 6, qq. 14, 15;—*Zabarella*, Comm. De Anima, L. ii. Text. 65; De Rebus Naturalibus, p. 939 sq., De Sensu Agente, cc. 4, 5;—*Goclenius*, Adversaria, q. 55;—*Suarez*, Metaphysicæ Disputationes, disp. xviii. sec. 4;—*Scheibler*, Metaphysica, L. ii. c. 5, art. 5, punct. 1; De Anima, P. ii. disp. ii. § 24; Liber Sententiarum, Ex. vi. ax. 4, Ex. xii. ax. 10.

The same result seems, likewise, confirmed indirectly, by the doctrine of those philosophers who, as Condillac in his earlier writings, Stewart, Brown, Mill, J. Young, &c., hold that extension and color are only mutually concomitant in imagination, through the influence of inveterate association. In itself, indeed, this doctrine I do not admit; for it supposes that we could possibly be conscious of color without extension, of extension without color. Not the former; for we are only, as in sense, so in the imagination of sense, aware of a minimum visible, as of a luminous or colored point, in contrast to and out of a surrounding expanse of obscure or differently colored surface; and a visual object, larger than the minimum, is, ex hypothesi, presented, or represented, as extended. Not the latter; for, as I have already observed, psychologically speaking, the sensation of color comprehends contradictory opposites; to wit, both the sensation of positive color, in many modes, and the sensation of a privation of all color, in one. But of contradictory predicates one or other must, by the logical law of excluded middle, be attributed in thought to every object of thought. We cannot, therefore, call up in imagination an extended object, without representing it either as somehow positively colored (red, or green, or blue, &c.), or as negatively colored (black). But though I reject this doctrine, I do not reject it as absolutely destitute of truth. It is erroneous, I think; but every error is a truth abused; and the abuse in this case seems to lie in the extreme recoil from the counter error of the common opinion,—that the apprehension through sight of color, and the apprehension through sight of extension and figure, are as inseparable, identical cognitions of identical objects.—See Reid, Inq. 145.

the Secundo-primary, the concomitant sensation is the effect of the objective quality perceived : in the Secondary, the sensation is the effect of an objective quality supposed, but not perceived. In other words :—In the apprehension of the Primary, there is no subject-object determined by the object-object ; in the Secundo-primary, there is a subject-object determined by the object-object ; in the Secondary, a subject-object is the only object of immediate cognition.

22. In the Primary, the sensation of the secondary quality, which affords its condition to the perception of the primary, is various and indefinite ;* in the Secundo-primary, the sensation

* The opinions so generally prevalent, that through touch, or touch and muscular feeling, or touch and sight, or touch, muscular feeling, and sight,—that through these senses, exclusively, we are percipient of extension, &c., I do not admit. On the contrary, I hold that all sensations whatsoever, of which we are conscious, as one out of another, eo ipso, afford us the condition of immediately and necessarily apprehending extension ; for in the consciousness itself of such reciprocal outness is actually involved a perception of difference of place in space, and consequently, of the extended. Philosophers have confounded what supplies the condition of the more prompt and precise perception of extension, with what supplies the condition of a perception of extension at all.

And be it observed, that it makes no essential difference in this doctrine, whether the mind be supposed proximately conscious of the reciprocal outness of the sensations at the central extremity of the nerves, in an *extended sensorium commune*, where each distinct nervous filament has its separate locality, or at the peripheral extremity of the nerves, in the places themselves where sensations are excited, and to which they are referred. From many pathological phenomena the former alternative might appear the more probable. In this view, each several nerve, or rather, each several nervous filament (for every such filament has its peculiar function, and runs isolated from every other), is to be regarded merely as one sentient *point* ; which yields one indivisible sensation, out of and distinct from that of every other, by the side of which it is arranged ; and not as a sentient *line*, each point of which, throughout its course, has for itself a separate local sensibility. For a stimulus applied to any intermediate part of a nerve, is felt not as there, but as if applied to its peripheral extremity ; a feeling which continues when that extremity itself, nay, when any portion of the nerve, however great, has been long cut off. Thus it is that a whole line of nerve affords, at all its points, only the sensation of one determinate point. One point, therefore, physiologically speaking, it is to be considered. (See *Plutarch*, De Plac. Philos. L. iv. c. 23 ;—*Nemesius*, De Hom. c. 8 ;—*Fabricius Hildanus*, Obs. Cent. iii. obs. 15 ;—*Descartes*, Princ. P. iv. § 196 ;—*Blancard*, Coll. Med.

of the secondary quality, which accompanies the perception of the quasi primary, is under the same circumstances, uniform and definite; in the Secondary, the sensation is itself definite, but its

Phys. cent. vii. obs. 15;—*Stuart*, De Motu Musc. c. 5;—*Kaau Boerhaave*, Inp. fac. § 368 sq.;—*Sir Ch. Bell*, Idea, &c. p. 12; The Hand, p. 159;—*Magendie*, Journ. t. v. p. 38; *Mueller*, Phys. pp. 692–696, Engl. tr.)

Take for instance a man whose leg has been amputated. If now two nervous filaments be irritated, the one of which ran to his great, the other to his little toe—he will experience two pains, as in these two members. Nor is there, in propriety, any deception in such sensations. For his toes, as all his members, are his only as they are to him sentient; and they are only sentient and distinctly sentient, as endowed with nerves and distinct nerves. The nerves thus constitute alone the whole sentient organism. In these circumstances, the peculiar nerves of the several toes, running isolated from centre to periphery, and thus remaining, though curtailed in length, unmutated in function, will, if irritated at any point, continue to manifest their original sensations; and these being now, as heretofore, manifested out of each other, must afford the condition of a perceived extension, not less real than that which they afforded prior to the amputation.

The hypothesis of an extended sensorium commune, or complex nervous centre, the mind being supposed in proximate connection with each of its constituent nervous terminations or origins, may thus be reconciled to the doctrine of natural realism; and therefore what was said at page 276 a, No. 2, and relative places, with reference to a sensorium of a different character, is to be qualified in conformity to the present supposition.

It is, however, I think, more philosophical, to consider the nervous system as one whole, with each part of which the animating principle is equally and immediately connected, so long as each part remains in continuity with the centre. To this opinion may be reduced the doctrine of *Aristotle*, that the soul contains the body, rather than the body the soul (*De An. L. i. c. 9, § 4*)—a doctrine on which was founded the common dogma of the *Schools*, that the Soul is all in the whole body, and all in every of its parts, meaning, thereby, that the simple, unextended mind, in some inconceivable manner, present to all the organs, is percipient of the peculiar affection which each is adapted to receive, and actuates each in the peculiar function which it is qualified to discharge. See also *St. Gregory of Nyssa* (*De Hom. Opif. cc. 12, 14, 15*), the oldest philosopher I recollect by whom this dogma is explicitly enounced. Compare *Galen*, De Sympt. Causis. L. ii. c. 01 modern authorities to the same result, are—*Perrault* (*Du Mouv. des Yeux*, p. 591, and *Du Toucher*, p. 531); *Tabor* (*Tract. iii. c. 3*); *Stuart* (*De Motu Musc. c. 5*); *Leidenfrost* (*De Mente Humana*, c. iii. §§ 11, 14, 15); *Tiedemann* (*Psychologie*, p. 309, sq.); *Berard*, (*Rapports &c. ch. i. § 2*); *R. G. Carus* (*Vorles ueb. Psychologie*, passim); *Umbreit* (*Psychologie*, c. 1, and *Beilage*, passim); *F. Fischer* (*Ueb. d. Sitz d. Seele*, passim, and *Psychologie*, c. 4). The two last seem to think that their opinion on this matter is something new? Rosmini also maintains the same doctrine, but as I have not

exciting cause, the supposed quality in bodies, various and indefinite. (See p. 374 b—376 a.)

23. The Primary and Secondary qualities are, in this relation,

yet obtained his relative works, I am unable to refer to them articulately.—See *Bibl. Univ. de Genève*, No. 76, June, 1842, p. 241 sq.

As to the question of materialism this doctrine is indifferent. For the connection of an unextended with an extended substance is equally incomprehensible, whether we contract the place of union to a central point, or whether we leave it coextensive with organization.

The causes why the sensations of different parts of the nervous apparatus vary so greatly from each other in supplying the conditions of a perception of extension, &c., seem to me comprehended in two general facts, the one constituting a physiological, the other a psychological, law of perception; laws, neither of which, however, has yet obtained from philosophers the consideration which it merits.

The *Physiological law* is—*That a nervous point yields a sensation felt as locally distinct, in proportion as it is isolated in its action from any other.* Physiological experiment has not yet been, and probably never may be, able to prove anatomically the truth of this law which I have here ventured to enounce; physiologists indeed, seem hitherto to have wholly neglected the distinction. So far, however, is it from being opposed to physiological observation, it may appeal in its confirmation to the analogy of all the facts to which such observation reaches (see par 25, first note, III.); while the psychological phenomena are such as almost to necessitate its admission. To say nothing of the ganglionic fusions, which are now disproved, the softness and colligescence of the olfactory nerves and nervous expansion, for example, correspond with the impossibility we experience, in smell, of distinctly apprehending one part of the excited organism as out of another; while the marvellous power we have of doing this in vision, seems, by every more minute investigation of the organic structure, more clearly to depend upon the isolation, peculiar arrangement, and tenuity of the primary fibrils of the retina and optic nerve; though microscopical anatomy, it must be confessed, has not as yet been able to exhibit any nervous element so inconceivably small as is the minimum visibile. Besides the older experiments of Porterfield, Haller, &c., see *Treviranus*, *Beytraege*, 1835, p. 63 sq.;—*Volkmann*, *Neue Beytraege*, 1836, pp. 61 sq., 197 sq.;—*Mueller*, *Phys.* 1838, pp. 1073 sq., 1121 sq. *Engl. tr.*;—also *Baer*, *Anthropologie*, 1824, § 153.—Of *Toneh* and *Feeling* I am to speak immediately.

And here I may say a word in relation to a difficulty which has perplexed physiologists, and to which no solution, I am aware of, has been attempted.—The retina, as first shown by *Treviranus*, is a pavement of perpendicular rods terminating in papillæ; a constitution which may be roughly represented to imagination by the bristles of a thick-set brush. The retina is, however, only the terminal expansion of the optic nerve; and the rods which make up its area, after bending behind to an acute angle, run back as the constituent, but isolated fibrils of that nerve, to their origin in the brain.

simple and self-discriminated. For in the perception of a primary, there is involved no sensation of a secondary with which it can be mixed up; while in the sensation of a secondary there is

On the smaller size of the papillæ and fibrils of the optic nerve, principally depends, as already stated, the greater power we possess, in the eye, of discriminating one sensation as out of another, consequently of apprehending extension, figure, &c.—But here the difficulty arises: Microscopic observations on the structure of the retina give the diameter of the papillæ, as about the eight or nine thousandth part of an inch. Optical experiments, again, on the ultimate capacity of vision, show that a longitudinal object (as a hair), viewed at such a distance that its breadth, as reflected to the retina, is not more than the six hundred thousandth or millionth of an inch, is distinctly visible to a good eye. Now there is here—1^o, a great discrepancy between the superficial extent of the apparent ultimate fibrils of the retina, and the extent of the image impressed on the retina by the impinging rays of light, the one being above a hundred times greater than the other; and, 2^o, it is impossible to conceive the existence of distinct fibrils so minute as would be required to propagate the impression, if the breadth of the part affected were actually no greater than the breadth of light reflected from the object to the retina. To me the difficulty seems soluble if we suppose, 1^o, that the ultimate fibrils and papillæ are, in fact, the ultimate units or minima of sensation; and, 2^o, that a stimulus of light, though applied only to part of a papilla, idiopathically affects the whole. This theory is confirmed by the analogy of the nerves of feeling, to which I shall soon allude. The objections to which it is exposed I see; but I think that they may easily be answered. On the discussion of the point I cannot however enter.

The *Psychological law* is—*That though a perception be only possible under condition of a sensation; still, that above a certain limit the more intense the sensation or subjective consciousness, the more indistinct the perception or objective consciousness.*

On this, which is a special case of a still higher law, I have already incidentally spoken, and shall again have occasion to speak.¹

1^o. That we are only conscious of the existence of our organism as a physical body, under our consciousness of its existence as an animal body, and are only conscious of its existence as an animal body under our consciousness of it as somehow or other sensitively affected.

2^o. That though the sensation of our organism as animally affected, is, as it were, the light by which it is exhibited to our perception as a physically extended body; still, if the affection be too strong, the pain or pleasure too intense, the light blinds by its very splendor, and the perception is lost in the sensation. Accordingly, if we take a survey of the senses, we shall find, that exactly in proportion as each affords an idiopathic sensation more or less capable of being carried to an extreme either of pleasure or of pain, does it afford, but in an inverse ratio, the condition of an objective perception more or less distinct. In the senses of Sight and Hearing, as contrasted with those

¹ See the next chapter.—W.

no perception of a primary at all. Thus prominent in themselves, and prominently contrasted as mutual extremes, neither class can be overlooked, neither class can be confounded with the other.

of Taste and Smell, the counter-proportions are precise and manifest; and precisely as in animals these latter senses gain in their objective character as means of knowledge, do they lose in their subjective character as sources of pleasurable or painful sensations. To a dog, for instance, in whom the sense of smell is so acute, all odors seem, in themselves, to be indifferent. In Touch or Feeling the same analogy holds good, and within itself; for in this case, where the sense is diffused throughout the body, the subjective and objective vary in their proportions at different parts. The parts most subjectively sensible, those chiefly susceptible of pain and pleasure, furnish precisely the obtusest organs of touch; and the acutest organs of touch do not possess, if ever even that, more than an average amount of subjective sensibility. I am disposed, indeed, from the analogy of the other senses, to surmise, that the nerves of touch proper (the more objective) and of feeling proper (the more subjective) are distinct; and distributed in various proportions to different parts of the body. I should also surmise, that the ultimate fibrils of the former run in isolated action from periphery to centre, while the ultimate fibrils of the latter may, to a certain extent, be confounded with each other at their terminal expansion in the skin; so that for this reason, likewise, they do not, as the former, supply to consciousness an opportunity of so precisely discriminating the reciprocal outness of their sensations. The experiments of Weber have shown, how differently in degree different parts of the skin possess the power of touch proper; this power, as measured by the smallness of the interval at which the blunted points of a pair of compasses, brought into contact with the skin, can be discriminated as double, varying from the twentieth of an English inch at the tip of the tongue, and a tenth on the volar surface of the third finger, to two inches and a half over the greater part of the neck, back, arms, and thighs.—(De Pulsu, &c., p. 44-81, in particular, p. 58. An abstract, not altogether accurate, is given by Mueller, Phys. p. 700). If these experiments be repeated with a pair of compasses not very obtuse, and capable, therefore, by a slight pressure, of exciting a sensation in the skin, it will be found, that while Weber's observations, as to the remarkable difference of the different parts in the power of tactile discrimination, are correct; that, at the same time, what he did not observe, there is no corresponding difference between the parts in their sensibility to superficial pricking, scratching, &c. On the contrary, it will be found that, in the places where objectively, touch is most alive, subjectively feeling is, in the first instance at least, in some degree deadened; and that the parts the most obtuse in discriminating the duplicity of the touching points, are by no means the least acute to the sensations excited by their pressure.

For example;—the tip of the tongue has *fifty*, the interior surface of the third finger *twenty-five*, times the tactile discrimination of the arm. But it will be found, on trial, that the arm is more sensitive to a sharp point applied, but not strongly, to the skin, than either the tongue or the finger,

The Secundo-primary qualities, on the contrary, are, at once, complex and confusive. For, on the one hand, as perceptions approximating to the primary, on the other, as sensations identi-

and (depilated of course) at least as alive to the presence of a very light body, as a hair, a thread, a feather, drawn along the surface. In the several places the phenomena thus vary:—In those parts where touch proper prevails, a subacute point, lightly pressed upon the skin, determines a sensation of which we can hardly predicate either pain or pleasure, and nearly limited to the place on which the pressure is made. Accordingly, when two such points are thus, at the same time, pressed upon the skin, we are conscious of two distinct impressions, even when the pressing points approximate pretty closely to each other.—In those parts, on the other hand, where feeling proper prevails, a subacute point, lightly pressed upon the skin, determines a sensation which we can hardly call indifferent; and which radiates, to a variable extent, from the place on which the pressure is applied. Accordingly, when two such points are thus, at the same time, pressed upon the skin, we are not conscious of two distinct impressions, unless the pressing points are at a considerable distance from each other; the two impressions, running, as it were, together and thus constituting one indivisible sensation. The discriminated sensations in the one case, depend manifestly on the discriminated action, through the isolated and unexpanded termination of the nervous fibrils of touch proper; and the indistinguishable sensation in the other, will, I have no doubt, be ultimately found by microscopic anatomy to depend, in like manner, on the nervous fibrils of feeling proper being, as it were, fused or interlaced together at their termination, or rather, perhaps, on each ultimate fibril, each primary sentient unit being expanded through a considerable extent of skin. The supposition of such expansion seems, indeed, to be necessitated by these three facts:—1^o, that every point of the skin is sensible; 2^o, that no point of the skin is sensible except through the distribution to it of nervous substance; and, 3^o, that the ultimate fibrils, those minima, at least, into which anatomists have, as yet, been able to analyze the nerves, are too large, and withal too few, to carry sensation to each cutaneous point, unless by an attenuation and diffusion of the finest kind.—Within this superficial sphere of cutaneous apprehension, the objective and subjective, perception and sensation, touch proper and feeling proper, are thus always found to each other in an inverse ratio.

But take the same places, and puncture deeply. Then, indeed, the sense of pain will be found to be intenser in the tongue and finger than in the arm; for the tongue and finger are endowed with comparatively more numerous nerves, and consequently with a more concentrated sensibility, than the arm; though these may either, if different, lie beneath the termination of the nerves of touch, or, if the same, commence their energy as feeling only at the pitch where their energy as touch concludes. Be this, however, as it may, it will be always found, that in proportion as the internal feeling of a part becomes excited, is it incapacitated for the time, as an organ of external touch.

fied with the secondary, they may, if not altogether overlooked, lightly be, as they have always hitherto been, confounded with the one or with the other of these classes. (See pp. 361 b, 363 a.)

24. In the same relation a Primary or a Secondary quality, as simple, has its term univocal. A Secundo-primary, on the contrary, being complex, its term, as one, is necessarily equivocal. For, viewed on one side, it is the modification of a primary; on the other, it is, in reality, simply a secondary quality.—(How, in a more general point of view, the Secondary qualities are no less complex, and their terms no less ambiguous than the Secundo-primary, see par. 6.)

25. All the senses, simply or in combination, afford conditions for the perception of the Primary qualities (par. 22, note); and all, of course, supply the sensations themselves of the Secondary. As only various modifications of resistance, the Secundo-primary qualities are all, as percepts proper, as quasi-primary qualities, apprehended through the locomotive faculty,* and our conscious-

I do not therefore assert, without a qualification, that touch and feeling are everywhere manifested in an inverse ratio; for both together may be higher, both together may be lower, in one place than another. But whilst I diffidently hold that they are dependent upon different conditions—that the capacity of pain and pleasure, and the power of tactual discrimination, which a part possesses, are not the result of the same nervous fibres; I maintain, with confidence, that these senses never, in any part, coexist in exercise in any high degree, and that wherever the one rises to excess, there the other will be found to sink to a corresponding deficiency.

In saying, in the present note, that touch is more objective than feeling, I am not to be supposed to mean, that touch is, in itself, aught but a subjective affection—a feeling—a sensation. Touch proper is here styled objective, not absolutely, but only in contrast and in comparison to feeling proper; 1^o, inasmuch as it affords in the cycle of its own phenomena a greater amount of information; 2^o, as it affords more frequent occasions of perception or objective apprehension; and, 3^o, as it is feebly, if at all, characterized by the subjective affections of pain and pleasure.

* I.—*On the Locomotive Faculty and Muscular Sense, in relation to Perception.*—I say that the Secundo-primary qualities, in their quasi-primary phasis, are apprehended through the *locomotive faculty*, and not the *muscular sense*; for it is impossible that the state of muscular feeling can enable us to be immediately cognizant of the existence and degree of a resisting force. On the contrary, supposing all muscular feeling abolished, the power of moving the muscles at will remaining, however, entire, I hold (as will anon be

ness of its energy ; as sensations, as secondary qualities, they are apprehended as modifications of touch proper, and of cutaneous and muscular feeling.*

shown) that the consciousness of the mental motive energy, and of the greater or less intensity of such energy requisite, in different circumstances, to accomplish our intention, would of itself enable us always to perceive the fact, and in some degree to measure the amount, of any resistance to our voluntary movements ; howbeit the concomitance of certain feelings with the different states of muscular tension, renders this cognition not only easier, but, in fact, obtrudes it upon our attention. Scaliger, therefore, in referring the apprehension of weight, &c., to the locomotive faculty, is, in my opinion, far more correct than recent philosophers, in referring it to the muscular sense. (See II. of this foot-note.)

We have here to distinguish three things :

1°. The still immanent or purely mental act of will : what for distinction's sake I would call the *hyperorganic* volition to move ;—the *actio elicit*a of the schools. Of this volition we are conscious, even though it do not go out into overt action.

2°. If this volition become transeunt, be carried into effect, it passes into the mental effort or *nisus* to move. This I would call the *enorganic volition*, or, by an extension of the scholastic language, the *actio imperans*. Of this we are immediately conscious. For we are conscious of it, though by a narcosis or stupor of the sensitive nerves we lose all feeling of the movement of the limb ;—though by a paralysis of the motive nerves, no movement in the limb follows the mental effort to move ;—though by an abnormal stimulus of the muscular fibres, a contraction in them is caused even in opposition to our will.

3°. Determined by the enorganic volition, the cerebral influence is transmitted by the motive nerves ; the muscles contract or endeavor to contract, so that the limb moves or endeavors to move. This motion or effort to move I would call the *organic movement*, the *organic nisus* ; by a limitation of the scholastic term, it might be denominated the *actio imperata*.

It might seem at first sight,—1°, that the organic movement is immediately determined by the enorganic volition ; and, 2°, that we are immediately conscious of the organic nisus in itself. But neither is the case.—Not the former : for even if we identify the contraction of the muscles and the overt movement of the limb, this is only the mediate result of the enorganic volition, through the action of the nervous influence transmitted from the brain. The mind, therefore, exerts its effort to move, proximately in determining this transmission ; but we are unconscious not only of the mode in which this operation is performed, but even of the operation itself.—Not the latter : for all muscular contraction is dependent on the agency of one set of nerves, all feeling of muscular contraction on another. Thus, from the exclusive paralysis of the former, or the exclusive stupor of the latter, the one function may remain entire, while the other is abolished ; and it is only because certain muscular feelings are normally, though contingently, associated with the different muscular states, that, independently of the consciousness

b)—As in Thought ; as in relation to Intellect.

26. As modes of matter, the Primary qualities are thought as necessary and universal ; the Secundo-primary, as contingent and common ; the Secondary, as contingent and peculiar.

of the enorganic volition, we are indirectly made aware of the various degrees of the organic *nisus* exerted in our different members.* But though indirect, the information thus forced upon us is not the less valuable. By the associated sensations our attention is kept alive to the state of our muscular movements ; by them we are enabled to graduate with the requisite accuracy the amount of organic effort, and to expend in each movement precisely the quantum necessary to accomplish its purpose. Sir Charles Bell records the case of a mother who, while nursing her infant, was affected with paralysis or loss of muscular motion on one side of her body, and by stupor or loss of sensibility on the other. With the arm capable of movement she could hold her child to her bosom ; and this she continued to do so long as her attention remained fixed upon the infant. But if surrounding objects withdrew her observation, there being no admonitory sensation, the flexor muscles of the arm gradually relaxed, and the child was in danger of falling. (*The Hand*, p. 204.)

These distinctions in the process of voluntary motion, especially the two last (for the first and second may be viewed as virtually the same), are of importance to illustrate the double nature of the secundo-primary qualities, each of which is, in fact, the aggregate of an objective or quasi-primary quality, apprehended in a perception, and of a secondary or subjective quality caused by the other, apprehended in a sensation. Each of these qualities, each of these cognitions, appertains to a different part of the motive process. The quasi-primary quality and its perception, depending on the enorganic volition and the nerves of motion ; the secondary quality and its sensation, depending on the organic *nisus* and the nerves of sensibility.

* I must here notice an error of inference, which runs through the experiments by Professor Weber of Leipsic, in regard to the shares which the sense of touch proper and the consciousness of muscular effort have in the estimation of weight, as detailed in his valuable '*Annotaciones de Pulsu, Resorptione, Audita et Tactu*,' 1834, pp. 81-113, 134, 159-161.—Weight he supposes to be tested by the Touch alone, when objects are laid upon the hand, reposing, say, on a pillow. Here there appears to me a very palpable mistake. For without denying that different weights, up to a certain point, produce different sensations on the nerves of touch and feeling, and that consequently an experience of the difference of such sensation may help us to an inference of a difference of weight ; it is manifest, that if a body be laid upon a muscular part, that we estimate its weight proximately and principally by the amount of lateral pressure on the muscles, and this pressure itself, by the difficulty we find in lifting the body, however imperceptibly, by a contraction or bellying out of the muscular fibres. When superincumbent bodies, however different in weight, are all still so heavy as to render this contraction almost or altogether impossible ; it will be found, that our power of measuring their comparative weights becomes, in the one case feeble and fallacious, in the other null.

27. Thought as necessary, and immediately apprehended as actual, modes of matter, we conceive the Primary qualities in what they objectively are. The Secundo-primary, thought in

The quasi-primary quality is, always, simply a resistance to our enorganic volition, as realized in a muscular effort. But, be it remembered, there may be muscular effort, even if a body weighs or is pressed upon a part of our muscular frame apparently at rest. (See foot-note * of page 293.)—And how is the resistance perceived? I have frequently asserted, that in perception we are conscious of the external object immediately and in itself. This is the doctrine of Natural Realism. But in saying that a thing is known in itself, I do not mean that this object is known in its absolute existence, that is, out of relation to us. This is impossible; for our knowledge is only of the relative. To know a thing in itself or immediately, is an expression I use merely in contrast to the knowledge of a thing in a representation, or mediately.¹ On this doctrine an external quality is said to be known in itself, when it is known as the immediate and necessary correlative of an internal quality of which I am conscious. Thus, when I am conscious of the exertion of an enorganic volition to move, and aware that the muscles are obedient to my will, but at the same time aware that my limb is arrested in its motion by some external impediment:—in this case I cannot be conscious of myself as the resisted relative without at the same time being conscious, being immediately percipient, of a not-self as the resisting correlative. In this cognition there is no sensation, no subjectivo-organic affection. I simply know myself as a force in energy, the not-self as a counter force in energy.—So much for the quasi-primary quality, as dependent on the enorganic volition.

But though such pure perception may be detected in the simple apprehension of resistance, in reality it does not stand alone; for it is always accompanied by sensations, of which the muscular nixus or quiescence, on the one hand, and the resisting, the pressing body, on the other, are the causes. Of these sensations, the former, to wit, the feelings connected with the states of tension and relaxation, lie wholly in the muscles, and belong to what has sometimes been distinguished as the muscular sense. The latter, to wit the sensations determined by the foreign pressure, lie partly in the skin, and belong to the sense of touch proper and cutaneous feeling, partly in the flesh, and belonging to the muscular sense. These affections, sometimes pleasurable, sometimes painful, are, in either case, merely modifications of the sensitive nerves distributed to the muscles and to the skin; and, as manifested to us, constitute the secondary quality, the sensation of which accompanies the perception of every secundo-primary.

Although the preceding doctrine coincide, in result, with that which M. Maine de Biran, after a hint by Locke, has so ably developed, more especially in his '*Nouvelles Considerations sur les Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme*;' I find it impossible to go along with his illustrious ed-

¹ See chapter II. above.—W.

their objective phasis, as modifications of the Primary, and, in both their objective and subjective phases, immediately apprehended, we conceive them in what they objectively, as well as in

itor, M. Cousin (p. xxv. of Preface), in thinking that his examination of Hume's reasoning against the deduction of our notion of Power from the consciousness of efficacy in the voluntary movement of our muscles, 'leaves nothing to desire, and nothing to reply.' On the contrary, though always dissenting with diffidence from M. Cousin, I confess it does not seem to me, that in any of his seven assaults on Hume, has De Biran grappled with the most formidable objections of the great skeptic. The *second*, *third*, and *seventh*, of Hume's arguments, as stated and criticised by Biran, are not proposed, as arguments, by Hume at all; and the *fourth* and *fifth* in Biran's array constitute only a single reasoning in Hume's. Of the three arguments which remain, the *first* and *sixth* in Biran's enumeration are the most important.—But, under the *first*, the examples alleged by Hume, from cases of sudden palsy, Biran silently passes by; yet these present by far the most perplexing difficulties for his doctrine of conscious efficacy. In another and subsequent work (*Réponses, &c.*, p. 386) he, indeed, incidentally considers this objection, referring us back for its regular refutation to the strictures on Hume, where, however, as stated, no such refutation is to be found. Nor does he in this latter treatise relieve the difficulty. For as regards the argument from our non-consciousness of loss of power, prior to an actual attempt to move, as shown in the case of paralysis supervening during sleep,—this, it seems to me, can only be answered from the fact, that we are never conscious of force, as unexerted or in potentia (for the ambiguous term *power*, unfortunately after Locke employed by Hume in the discussion, is there equivalent to *force, vis*, and not to mere *potentiality* as opposed to *actuality*), but only of force, as in actu or exerted. For in this case, we never can possibly be conscious of the absence of a force, previously to the effort made to put it forth.—The purport of the *sixth* argument is not given, as Hume, notwithstanding the usual want of precision in his language, certainly intended it;—which was to this effect:—Volition to move a limb, and the actual moving of it, are the first and last in a series of more than two successive events; and cannot, therefore, stand to each other, immediately, in the relation of cause and effect. They may, however, stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect, mediately. But, then, if they can be known in consciousness as thus mediately related, it is a necessary condition of such knowledge, that the intervening series of causes and effects, through which the final movement of the limb is supposed to be mediately dependent on the primary volition to move, should be known to consciousness immediately under that relation. But this intermediate, this connecting series is, confessedly, unknown to consciousness at all, far less as a series of causes and effects. It follows therefore, a fortiori, that the dependency of the last on the first of these events, as of an effect upon its cause, must be to consciousness unknown. In other words:—having no consciousness that the volition to move is the efficacious force (power) by which even the event immediately

what they subjectively are. The Secondary being neither thought as necessary, nor immediately apprehended in their external reality, we conceive adequately what they are in their

consequent on it (say the transmission of the nervous influence from brain to muscle) is produced, such event being in fact itself to consciousness occult; multo minus can we have a consciousness of that volition being the efficacious force, by which the ultimate movement of the limb is mediately determined? This is certainly the argument which Hume intended, and as a refutation of the doctrine, that in our voluntary movements at least, we have an apprehension of the causal nexus between the mental volition as cause and the corporeal movement as effect, it seems to me unanswerable. But as stated, and easily refuted, by De Biran, it is only tantamount to the reasoning—That as we are not conscious *how* we move a limb, we cannot be conscious of the feeling *that* we do exert a motive force. But such a feeling of force, action, energy, Hume did not deny.

II.—*Historical notices touching the recognition of the Locomotive Faculty as a medium of perception, and of the Muscular Sense.*—That the recognition of the Locomotive Faculty, or rather, the recognition of the Muscular Sense as a medium of apprehension, is of a recent date, and by psychologists of this country, is an opinion in both respects erroneous.—As far as I am aware, this distinction was originally taken by two Italian Aristotelians, some three centuries ago; and when the observation was again forgotten, both France and Germany are before Scotland in the merit of its modern revival.

It was first promulgated by Julius Cæsar Scaliger about the middle of the sixteenth century (1557). Aristotle, followed by philosophers in general, had referred the perception of weight (the heavy and light) to the sense of Touch; though, in truth, under Touch, Aristotle seems to have comprehended both the Skin and Muscular senses. See Hist. An. i. 4. De Part. An. ii. 1. 10. De Anima, ii. 11. On this particular doctrine, Scaliger, inter alia, observes: ‘Et sane sic videtur. Namque gravitas et levitas tangendo deprehenditur. Ac nemo est, qui non putet, attractione sese cognoscere gravitatem et levitatem. Mihi tamen hand persuadetur. Tactu motum deprehendi fateor, gravitatem nego. Est autem maximum argumentum hoc. Gravitas est objectum motivæ potestatis: cui sane competit *actio*. At tactus non fit, nisi *patiendo*. Gravitas ergo percipitur a motiva potestate, non a tactu. Nam duo cum sint instrumenta (de nervis atque spiritibus loquor), ad sensum et ob motum, a se invicem distincta: male confunderemus, quod est motricis objectum, eum objecto motæ. Movetur enim tactus, non agit. Motrix autem movet grave corpus, non autem movetur ab eo. Idque manifestum est in paralyti. Sentitur calor, non sentitur gravitas Motrici namque instrumenta sublata sunt.—An vero *sentitur* gravitas? Sentitur quidem a motrice, atque ab ea judicatur: quemadmodum difficile quippiam enunciatu [enunciatur?] ab ipsa intellectus vi: quæ tamen agit, non patitur, eum enunciat. Est enim omnibus commune rebus nostratibus hisce, quæ pendent a materia: ut agendo patiantur.—Poterit aliquid objici de compressione. Nam etc....Sunt præterea duæ rationes. Quando et sine tactu sentimus gravita-

subjective effects, but inadequately what they are as objective causes.

28. Our conceptions of the Primary are clear and distinct ; of

tem. et quia tactu non sentimus. Nempe cuiquam gravi corpori manus imposita contingit illud : at non sentit gravitatem. Sine tactu, vero, virtus motrix sentiet. Appensum filo plumbum grave sentitur. Manus tamen filum, non plumbum tanget. Deinde hoc. Brachium suo pondere eum deorsum fertur, sentitur grave. At nihil tangit.' (De Subtilitate, contra Cardanum, ex. 109.)

It should, however, be noticed, that Scaliger may have taken the hint for the discrimination of this and another sense, from Cardan. This philosopher makes Touch fourfold. One sense apprehending the four primary qualities, the Hot and Cold, the Dry and Humid; a second the Pleasurable and Painful; a third the Venereal sensations; a fourth the *Heavy* and *Light*. (De Subtilitate, L. xiii.)

This doctrine did not excite the attention it deserved. It was even redargued by Scaliger's admiring expositor Goelenius. (Adversaria, p. 75-89); nor do I know, indeed, that previous to its revival in very recent times, with the exception to be immediately stated, that this opinion was ever countenanced by any other philosopher. Towards the end of the seventeenth century it is indeed commemorated by Chauvin, no very erudite authority, in the *first* edition of his Lexicon Philosophicum (vv. *Tactile* and *Gravitas*), as an opinion that had found supporters; but it is manifest from the terms of the statement, for no names are given, that Scaliger and Scaliger only is referred to. In the subsequent edition the statement itself is omitted.

By another philosophical physician, the celebrated Cæsalpinus of Arezzo, it was afterwards (in 1569) still more articulately shown, that only by the exercise of the motive power are we percipient of those qualities which I denominate the Secundo-Primary; though he can hardly be said, like Scaliger, to have discriminated that power as a faculty of perception or active apprehension, from touch as a capacity of sensation or mere consciousness of passion. It does not indeed appear that Cæsalpinus was aware of Scaliger's speculation at all.

'Tactus igitur si unus est sensus, circa unam erit contrarietatem, reliquæ autem ad ipsam reducentur. [Compare Aristotle, De Anima, ii. 11.] Patet autem Calidum et Frigidum maxime proprie ipsius tactus esse; solum enim tangendo comprehenduntur. Humidum autem et Siccum (Fluid and Solid), Durum et Molle, Grave et Leve, Asperum et Lene, Rarum et Deusum, aliaque hujusmodi, ut tactu comprehendantur, non satis est ea tangere, sed necesse est motum quendam adhibere, aut comprimendo, aut impellendo, aut trahendo, aut alia ratione patiendi potentiam experiendo. Sic enim quod proprium terminum non retinet, et quod facile dividitur, Humidum esse cognoscimus; quod autem opposito modo se habet, Siccum: et quod cedit comprimenti, Molle, quod non cedit, Durum. Similiter autem et reliquæ tactivæ qualitates sine motu non percipiuntur. Idecirco et a reliquis sensibus cognosci possunt, ut a visu. [But not immediately.] Motus enim inter communia sensibilia ponitur. [There is here through ambiguity a mutatio elenchi.] Nihil autem

the Secundo-primary, both as secondary and quasi-primary qualities, clear and distinct; of the Secondary, as subjective affections, clear and distinct, as objective, obscure and confused. For

refert, an motus in organo an in re fiat.' [?] (Quæstiones Peripateticæ, L. iv. qn. 1.)

In more recent times, the action of the voluntary motive faculty and its relative sense in the perception of Extension, Figure, Weight, Resistance, &c., was in France brought vaguely into notice by Condillac, and subsequently about the commencement of the present century more explicitly developed, among others, by his distinguished follower M. Destutt de Tracy, who established the distinction between *active* and *passive* touch. The speculations of M. Maine de Biran on muscular effort (from 1803) I do not here refer to; as these have a different and greatly higher significance. (*Condillac*, *Traité des Sensations*, P. ii. cc. 3, 12.—*De Tracy*, *Ideologie*, t. i. cc. 9-13; t. iii. cc. 5, 9.—Compare *Degerando*, *Histoire des Systèmes*, t. iii. p. 445, sq. orig. ed., and *Laboulinière*, *Précis*, p. 322, sq.)—In Germany, before the conclusion of the last century, the same analysis was made, and the active touch there first obtained the distinctive appellation of the Muscular Sense (*Muskel Sinn*.) The German physiologists and psychologists not only—what had been previously done—professedly demonstrated the share it had in the empirical apprehension of Space, &c., and established its necessity as a condition even of the perceptions of Touch proper—the Skin Sense; they likewise for the first time endeavored to show how in vision we are enabled to recognize not only figure, but distance, and the third dimension of bodies, through the conscious adjustment of the eye. (*Tittel*, *Kantische Denkformen* (1787), p. 188, sq.—*Tiedemann*, in *Hessische Beytraege* (1789), St. i. p. 119, sq.; *Theætet* (1794), *passim*; *Idealistische Briefe* (1798), p. 84, sq.; *Psychologie* (1804), p. 405, sq.—*Schulz*, *Pruefung* (1791), i. p. 182, sq.—*Engel*, in *Mémoires de l'Académie de Berlin* (1802).—*Gruithuisen*, *Anthropologie* (1810), pp. 130, sq. 361, sq. and the subsequent works of *Herbart*, *Hartmann*, *Lenhossek*, *Tourtual*, *Beneke*, and a host of others.) But see Reid, 188, b.

Britain has not advanced the inquiry which, if we discount some resultless tendencies by Hartley, Wells, and Darwin, she was the last in taking up; and it is a curious instance of the unacquaintance with such matters prevalent among us, that the views touching the functions of the will, and of the muscular sense, which constitute, in this relation certainly, not the least valuable part of Dr. Brown's psychology, should to the present hour be regarded as original, howbeit these views, though propounded as new, are manifestly derived from sources with which all interested in psychological disquisitions might reasonably be presumed familiar. This is by no means a solitary instance of Brown's silent appropriation; nor is he the only Scottish metaphysician who has borrowed, without acknowledgment, these and other psychological analyses from the school of Condillac. De Tracy may often equally reclaim his own at the hands of Dr. John Young, Professor of Philosophy in Belfast College, whose frequent coincidences with Brown are not the marvels he would induce us to believe, when we know the common sources from

the Primary, Secundo-primary, and Secondary, as subjective affections, we can represent in imagination; the Secondary, as objective powers, we cannot.

which the resembling doctrines are equally derived. It must be remembered, however, that the Lectures of both Professors were posthumously published; and are therefore not to be dealt with as works deliberately submitted to general criticism by their authors. Dr. Young, it should likewise be noticed, was a pupil of the late Professor Mylne of Glasgow, whose views of mental philosophy are well known to have closely resembled those of M. De Tracy. I see from M. Mignet's eloquent *éloge* that this acute philosopher was, like Kant, a Scotsman by descent, and 'of the clan Stott,' (Stott?)

These notices of the gradual recognition of the sense of muscular feeling, as a special source of knowledge, are not given on account of any importance it may be thought to possess as the source from which is derived our notion of Space or Extension. This notion, I am convinced, though first manifested in, cannot be evolved out of, experience; and what was observed by Reid (Inq. p. 126, a), by Kant (Cr. d. r. V. p. 38), by Schulz (Pruef. i. p. 114), and Stewart (Essays, p. 564), in regard to the attempts which had previously been made to deduce it from the operations of sense, and in particular, from the motion of the hand, is equally true of those subsequently repeated. In all these attempts, the experience itself is only realized through a substitution of the very notion which it professes to generate; there is always a concealed *petitio principii*. Take for example the deduction so laboriously essayed by Dr. Brown, and for which he has received such unqualified encomium. (Lectt. 23 and 24).—Extension is made up of three dimensions; but Brown's exposition is limited to length and breadth. These only, therefore, can be criticised.

As far as I can find his meaning in his cloud of words, he argues thus:—The notion of Time or succession being supposed, that of *longitudinal* extension is given in the succession of feelings which accompanies the gradual contraction of a muscle; the notion of this succession constitutes, ipso facto, the notion of a certain length; and the notion of this length [he quietly takes for granted] is the notion of longitudinal extension sought (p. 146 a).—The paralogism here is transparent.—Length is an ambiguous term; and it is length in space, extensive length, and not length in time, protensive length, whose notion it is the problem to evolve. To convert, therefore, the notion of a certain kind of length (and that certain kind being also confessedly only length in time) into the notion of a length in space, is at best an idle begging of the question.—Is it not? Then I would ask, whether the series of feelings of which we are aware in the gradual contraction of a muscle, involve the consciousness of being a succession or length (1), in time alone? or (2) in space alone?—or (3) in time and space together? These three cases will be allowed to be exhaustive. If the first be affirmed, if the succession appear to consciousness a length in time exclusively, then nothing has been accomplished; for the notion of extension or space is in no way contained in the notion of duration or time.—Again, if the second or the third be affirmed,

29. Finally—The existential judgments are of the Primary assertory; of the Secundo-primary, in both their aspects, assertory; of the Secondary, as modes of mind, assertory, as modes of matter, problematic. (See par. 11, 12, 13.)

if the series appear to consciousness a succession of length, either in space alone, or in space and time together, then is the notion it behooved to generate employed to generate itself.

In the deduction of the notion of *superficial* extension he is equally illogical; for here, too, his process of evolution only in the end openly extracts what in the commencement it had secretly thrown in. The elements, out of which he constructs the notion of extension, in the second dimension, he finds in the consciousness we have of several contemporaneous series of muscular feelings or lengths, standing in relation to each other, as *proximate*, *distant*, *intermediate*, &c.—Proximate! In what? In time? No; for the series are supposed to be in time coexistent; and were it otherwise, the process would be unavailing, for proximity in time does not afford proximity in space. In space, then? Necessarily. On this alternative, however, the notion of space or extension is already involved doubly deep in the elements themselves, out of which it is proposed to construct it; for when two or more things are conceived as proximate in space, they are not merely conceived as in different places or out of each other, but over and above this elementary condition in which extension simply is involved, they are conceived as even holding under it a secondary and more complex relation. But it is needless to proceed, for the petition of the point in question is even more palpable if we think the series under the relations of the *distant*, the *intermediate*, &c.—The notion of Space, therefore, is not shown by this explanation of its genesis to be less a native notion than that of Time, which it admits. Brown's is a modification of De Tracy's deduction, the change being probably suggested by a remark of Stewart (l. c.); but though both involve a paralogism, it is certainly far more shrewdly cloaked in the original.

III.—*Historical notices in regard to the distinction of Nerves and nervous Filaments into Motive and Sensitive; and in regard to the peculiarity of function, and absolute isolation, of the ultimate nervous Filaments.*—The important discovery of Sir Charles Bell, that the spinal nerves are the organs of motion through their anterior roots, of sensation through their posterior; and the recognition by recent physiologists, that each ultimate nervous filament is distinct in function, and runs isolated from its origin to its termination;—these are only the last of a long series of previous observations to the same effect,—observations, in regard to which (as may be inferred from the recent discussions touching the history of these results) the medical world is, in a great measure, uninformed. At the same time, as these are the physiological facts with which psychology is principally interested; as a contribution towards this doctrine and its history, I shall throw together a few notices, which have for the most part fallen in my way when engaged in researches for a different purpose.

The cases of paralysis without narcosis (stupor), and of narcosis without

c)—*As both in Sensitive Apprehension and in Thought ; as in relation both to Sense and Intellect.*

30. In the order of nature and of necessary thought, the Pri-

paralysis—for the ancient propriety of these terms ought to be observed—that is, the cases in which either motion or sensibility, exclusively, is lost, were too remarkable not to attract attention even from the earliest periods ; and at the same time, too peremptory not to necessitate the conclusion, that the several phenomena are, either the functions of different organs, or, if of the same, at least regulated by different conditions. Between these alternatives all opinions on the subject are divided ; and the former was the first, as it has been the last, to be adopted.

No sooner had the nervous system been recognized as the ultimate organ of the animal and vital functions, and the intracranial medulla or encephalos (*encephalon* is a modern misnomer) ascertained to be its centre, than *Erasistratus* proceeded to appropriate to different parts of that organism the functions which, along with Herophilus, he had distinguished, of sensibility and voluntary motion. He placed the source—of the former in the meninges or membranes, of the latter in the substance, of the encephalos in general, that is, of the Brain-proper and After-brain or Cerebellum. And while the nerves were, mediately or immediately, the prolongations of these, he viewed the nervous membranes as the vehicle of sensation, the nervous substance as the vehicle of motion. (Rufus Ephesius, L. i. c. 22 ; L. ii. cc. 2, 17.) This theory which is remarkable, if for nothing else, for manifesting the tendency from an early period to refer the phenomena of motion and sensation to distinct parts of the nervous organism, has not obtained the attention which it even intrinsically merits. In modern times, indeed, the same opinion has been hazarded, even to my fortuitous knowledge, at least thrice. Firstly by Fernelius (1550, *Physiologia*, v. 10, 15) ; secondly by Rosetti (1722, *Raccolta d'Opuscoli*, &c., t. v. p. 272 sq.) ; thirdly by Le Cat (1740, *Traité des Sensations*, Œuv. Phys. t. i. p. 124, and *Diss. sur la Sensibilité des Meninges*, § i.)—By each of these the hypothesis is advanced as original. In the two last this is not to be marvelled at ; but it is surprising how the opinion of *Erasistratus* could have escaped the erudition of the first. I may observe, that *Erasistratus* also anticipated many recent physiologists in the doctrine, that the intelligence of man, and of animals in general is always in proportion to the depth and number of the cerebral convolutions, that is, in the ratio of the extent of cerebral surface, not of cerebral mass.

The second alternative was adopted by *Galen*, who while he refutes apparently misrepresents the doctrine of *Erasistratus* ; for *Erasistratus* did not, if we may credit Rufus, an older authority than *Galen*, derive the nerves from the membranes of the encephalos, to the exclusion of its substance ; or if *Galen* be herein correct, this is perhaps the early doctrine which *Erasistratus* is by him said in his maturer years to have abandoned ;—a doctrine, however, which, under modifications, has in modern times found supporters in *Rondeletius* and others. (*Laurentii Inst. Anat.* iv. qu. 13.)—Recognizing,

mary qualities are prior to the *Secundo-primary* and *Secondary*; but in the order of empirical apprehension, though chronologically simultaneous, they are posterior to both. For it is only

what has always indeed been done, the contrast of the two phenomena of sensibility and motion, Galen did not, however, regard them as necessarily the products of distinct parts of the nervous system, although, *de facto*, different parts of that system were often subservient to their manifestation. As to the problem—Do the nerves perform their double function by the conveyance of a corporeal fluid, or through the irradiation of an immaterial power?—Galen seems to vacillate; for texts may be adduced in favor of each alternative. He is not always consistent in the shares which he assigns to the heart and to the brain, in the elaboration of the animal spirits; nor is he even uniform in maintaining a discrimination of origin, between the animal spirits and the vital. Degrading the membranes to mere envelopments, he limits every peculiar function of the nervous organism to the enveloped substance of the brain, the after-brain, the spinal chord and nerves. But as the animal faculty is one, and its proximate vehicle the animal spirits is homogeneous, so the nervous or cerebral substance which conducts these spirits is in its own nature uniform and indifferently competent to either function; it being dependent upon two accidental circumstances, whether this substance conduce to motion, to sensation, or to motion and sensation together.

The first circumstance is the degree of hardness or softness; a nerve being adapted to motion, or to sensation, in proportion as it possesses the former quality or the latter. Nerves extremely soft are exclusively competent to sensation. Nerves extremely hard are pre-eminently, but not exclusively, adapted to motion; for no nerve is wholly destitute of the feeling of touch. The soft nerves, short and straight in their course, arise from the anterior portion of the encephalos (the Brain proper); the hard, more devious in direction, spring from the posterior portion of the brain where it joins the spinal chord (*Medulla oblongata?*) the spinal chord being a continuation of the After-brain, from which no nerve immediately arises; the hardest originate from the spinal chord itself, more especially towards its inferior extremity. A nerve soft in its origin, and, therefore, fitted only for sense, may, however, harden in its progress, and by this change become suitable for motion.

The second circumstance is the part to which a nerve is sent; the nerve being sensitive or motive as it terminates in an organ of sense, or in an organ of motion—a muscle; every part being recipient only of the virtue appropriate to its special function.

This theory of Galen is inadequate to the phenomena. For though loss of motion without the loss of sense may thus be accounted for, on the supposition that the innervating force is reduced so low as not to radiate the stronger influence required for movement, and yet to radiate the feebler influence required for feeling; still this leaves the counter case (of which, though less frequently occurring, Galen has himself recorded some illustrious examples) not only unexplained, but even renders it inexplicable. In this the-

under condition of the Sensation of a Secondary, that we are percipient of any Primary quality.

31. The apprehension of a Primary quality is principally an

ory Galen is, likewise, not always consistent with himself. The distinction of hard and soft, as corresponding with the distinction of motory and sensitive, nerves, though true in general, is, on his own admission, not absolutely through-going. (I must observe, however, that among other recent anatomists this is maintained by Albinus, Malacarne, and Reil.) And to say nothing of other vacillations, Galen, who in one sentence, in consistency with his distinction of cerebral and (mediately) cerebellar nerves, is forced to accord exclusively to those of the spine the function of motion; in another finds himself compelled, in submission to the notorious fact, to extend to these nerves the function of sensation likewise. But if Galen's theory be inadequate to their solution, it never leads him to overlook, to dissemble, or to distort, the phenomena themselves; and with these no one was ever more familiarly acquainted. So marvellous, indeed, is his minute knowledge of the distribution and functions of the several nerves, that it is hardly too much to assert, that, with the exception of a few minor particulars, his pathological anatomy of the nervous system is practically on a level with the pathological anatomy of the present day. (De Usu Partium, i. 7, v. 9, 7, 14, viii. 3, 6, 10, 12, ix. 1, xii. 10, 11, 15, xiii. 8, xvi. 1, 3, 5, xvii. 2, 3.—De Causis Sympt., i. 5.—De Motu Musc., i. 13.—De Anat. Adm., vii. 8.—Ars parva, 10, 11.—De Locis Aff., i. 6, 7, 12, iii. 6, 12.—De Diss. Nerv., 1.—De Plac. Hipp. et Plat. ii. 12, vii. 3, 4, 5, 8.)

The next step was not made until the middle of the fourteenth century, subsequent to Galen's death; when *Rondeletius* (c. 1550), reasoning from the phenomena of paralysis and stupor, enounced it as an observation never previously made, that 'All nerves, from their origin in the brain, are, even in the spinal marrow itself, isolated from each other. The cause of paralysis is therefore not so much to be sought for in the spinal marrow, as in the encephalic heads of the nerves; Galen himself having indeed, remarked, that paralysis always supervenes, when the origin of the nerve is obstructed or diseased.' (Curandi Methodus, c. 32.)

This observation did not secure the attention which it deserved; and some thirty years later (1595), another French physiologist, another celebrated professor in the same university with *Rondelet*, I mean *Laurentius* of Montpellier, advanced this very doctrine of his predecessor, as 'a new and hitherto unheard-of observation.' This anatomist has, however, the merit of first attempting a sensible demonstration of the fact, by resolving, under water, the spinal chord into its constituent filaments. 'This new and admirable observation,' he says, 'explains one of the obscurest problems of nature; why it is that from a lesion, say of the cervical medulla, the motion of the thigh may be lost, while the motions of the arms and thorax shall remain entire. In the second edition of his Anatomy, *Dulaurens* would seem, however, less confident, not only of the absolute originality, but of the absolute accuracy, of the observation. Nor does he rise above the Galenic doctrine,

intellectual cognition, in so far as it is, in itself, a purely mental activity, and not the mere sensation of an organic passion; and secondarily, a sensible cognition, in so far as it is the perception

that sensibility and motion may be transmitted by the same fibre. In fact, rejecting the discrimination of hard and soft nerves, he abolishes even the accidental distinction which had been recognized by Galen. (Compare *Hist. Anat.*, later editions, iv. c. 13, qq. 9, 10, 11; x. c. 12, with the relative places in the first.)

The third step was accomplished by *Varollius* (1572) who showed Galen to be mistaken in holding that the spinal chord is a continuation of the After-brain alone. He demonstrated, against all previous anatomists, that this chord is made up of four columns, severally arising from four encephalic roots; two roots or trunks from the Brain-proper being prolonged into its anterior, and two from the After-brain into its posterior columns. (*Anatomia*, L. iii: *De Nervis Opticis Epistolæ*.)

At the same time the fact was signalized by other contemporary anatomists (as *Coiter*, 1572, *Laurentius*, 1595), that the spinal nerves arise by double roots; one set of filaments emerging from the anterior, another from the posterior, portion of the chord. It was in general noticed, too (as by *Coiter*, and *C. Bauhinus*, 1590), that these filaments, on issuing from the chord, passed into a knot or ganglion; but, strange to say, it was reserved for the second *Monro* (1783), to record the special observation, that this ganglion is limited to the fibres of the posterior root alone.

Such was the state of anatomical knowledge touching this point at the close of the sixteenth century; and it may now seem marvellous, that aware of the independence of the motory and sensitive functions,—aware that of these functions the cerebral nerves were, in general, limited to one, while the spinal nerves were competent to both,—aware that the spinal nerves, the nerves of double function, emerged by double roots and terminated in a twofold distribution,—and, finally, aware that each nervous filament ran distinct from its peripheral extremity through the spinal chord to its central origin; aware, I say, of all these correlative facts, it may now seem marvellous that anatomists should have stopped short, should not have attempted to lay fact and fact together, should not have surmised that in the spinal nerves difference of root is correspondent with difference of function, should not have instituted experiments, and anticipated by two centuries the most remarkable physiological discovery of the present day. But our wonder will be enhanced, in finding the most illustrious of the more modern schools of medicine teaching the same doctrine in greater detail, and yet never proposing to itself the question—May not the double roots correspond with the double function of the spinal nerves? But so has it been with all the most momentous discoveries. When *Harvey* proclaimed the circulation of the blood, he only proclaimed a doctrine necessitated by the discovery of the venous valves; and the *Newtonian* theory of the heavens was but a final generalization, prepared by foregone observations, and even already partially enounced.

of an attribute of matter, and, though not constituted by, still not realized without, the sensation of an organic passion.—The apprehension of a Secondary quality is solely a sensible cogni-

The school I refer to is that of Leyden—the school of Boerhaave and his disciples.—*Boerhaave* held with *Willis* that the Brain-proper is the organ of animality; a distinct part thereof being destined to each of its two functions, sense and voluntary motion; that the After-brain is the organ of vitality, or the involuntary motions:—and that the two encephalic organs are prolonged, the former into the anterior, the latter into the posterior, columns of the spinal chord. In his doctrine all nerves are composite, being made up of fibrils of a tenuity, not only beyond our means of observation, but almost beyond our capacity of imagination. Some nerves are homogeneous, their constituent filaments being either for a certain kind of motion alone, or for a certain kind of sensation alone; others are heterogeneous, their constituent fibrils being some for motion, some for sensation;—and of this latter class are the nerves which issue from the spine. On *Boerhaave's* doctrine, however, the spinal nerves, in so far as they arise from the anterior column, are nerves both of the sensation and voluntary motion—of animality; in so far as they arise from the posterior column, are nerves of involuntary motion—of vitality. A homogeneous nerve does not, as a totality, perform a single office; for every elementary fibril of which it is composed runs from first to last isolated from every other, and has its separate sphere of exercise. As many distinct spheres of sensation and motion, so many distinct nervous origins and terminations; and as many different points of local termination in the body, so many different points of local origin in the brain. The Sensorium Commune, the centre of sensation and motion, is not therefore an indivisible point, not even an undivided place; it is, on the contrary, the aggregate of as many places (and millions of millions there may be) as there are encephalic origins of nervous fibrils. No nerve, therefore, in propriety of speech, gives off a branch; their sheaths of dura mater alone are ramified; and there is no intercourse, no sympathy between the elementary fibrils, except through the sensorium commune. That the nerves are made up of fibrils is shown, though inadequately, by various anatomical processes; and that these fibrils are destined for distinct and often different purposes, is manifested by the phenomena of disjoined paralysis and stupor. (*De Morbis Nervorum Prælectiones*, by *Van Eems*, pp. 261, 490–497, 696, 713–717. Compare *Kaau Boerhaave*, *Impetum faciens*, § 197–200.)

The developed doctrine of *Boerhaave* on this point is to be sought for, neither in his *Aphorisms* nor in his *Institutions* and his *Prælectiones* on the *Institutions*—the more prominent works to which his illustrious disciples, *Haller* and *Van Swieten*, appended respectively a commentary. The latter adopts, but does not advance the doctrine of his master. (*Ad Aph.* 701, 711, 774, 1057, 1060.)—The former, who in his subsequent writings silently abandoned the opinion that sensation and motion are conveyed

tion ; for it is nothing but the sensation of an organic passion.—The apprehension of a Secundo-primary quality is, equally and at once, an intellectual and sensible cognition ; for it involves

by different nervous fibrils, in two unnoticed passages of his annotations on Boerhaave (1740), propounds it as a not improbable conjecture—that a total nerve may contain within its sheath a complement of motory and of sensitive tubules, distinct in their origin, transit, and distribution, but which at their peripheral extremity communicate ; the latter, like veins, carrying the spirits back to the brain, which the former had, like arteries, carried out. (Ad. Boerh. Instit. §288, n. 2, §293, n. 2.)

The doctrine of the school of Leyden, on this point, was however still more articulately evolved by the younger (Bernard Siegfried) *Albinus* ; not in any of his published works, but in the prelections he delivered for many years, in that university, on physiology. From a copy in my possession of his dictata in this course, very fully taken after the middle of the century, by Dr. William Grant (of Rothiemurens), subsequently a distinguished medical author and practical physician in London, compared with another very accurate copy of these dictata, taken by an anonymous writer in the year 1741 ; I am enabled to present the following general abstract of the doctrine taught by this celebrated anatomist, though obliged to retrench both the special cases, and the reasoning in detail by which it is illustrated and confirmed.

The nerves have a triple destination as they minister (1.) to voluntary motion, (2.) to sensation, (3.) to the vital energies—secretion, digestion, &c. *Albinus* seems to acquiesce in the doctrine, that the Brain-proper is the ultimate organ of the first and second function, the After-brain of the third.

Nerves, again, are of two kinds. They are either such in which the function of each ultimate fibril remains isolated in function from centre to periphery (the cerebro-spinal nerves) ; or such in which these are mutually confluent (the ganglionic nerves).

To speak only of the cerebro-spinal nerves, and of these only in relation to the functions of motion and sensation ;—they are to be distinguished into three classes according as destined, (1.) to sense, (2.) to motion, (3.) to both motion and sensation. Examples—of the first class are the olfactory, the optic, the auditory, of which last he considers the portio mollis and the portio dura to be, in propriety, distinct nerves ;—of the second class, are the large portion of those passing to muscles, as the fourth and sixth pairs :—of the third class are the three lingual nerves, especially the ninth pair, fibrils of which he had frequently traced, partly to the muscles, partly to the gustatory papillæ of the tongue, and the subcutaneous nerves, which are seen to give off branches, first to the muscles, and thereafter to the tactile papillæ of the skin. The nervous fibres which minister to motion are distinct in origin, in transit, in termination, from those which minister to sensation. This is manifest, in the case of those nerves which run from their origin in separate sheaths, either to an organ of sense (as the olfactory and

both the perception of a quasi-primary quality, and the sensation of a secondary. (See par 15, sq.¹)

optic), or to an organ of motion (as the fourth and sixth pairs, which go to the muscles of the eye); but it is equally, though not so obtrusively true, in the case where a nerve gives off branches partly to muscles, partly to the cutaneous papillæ. In this latter case, the nervous fibrils, or fistulæ, are, from their origin in the medulla oblongata to their final termination in the skin, perfectly distinct.—The Medulla Oblongata is a continuation of the encephalos; made up of two columns from the Brain-proper, and of two columns from the After-brain. Immediately or mediately, it is the origin, as it is the organ, of all the nerves. And in both respects it is double; for one part, the organ of sense, affords an origin to the sensitive fibrils; whilst another, the organ of motion, does the same by the motory. In their progress, indeed, after passing out, the several fibrils, whether homogeneous or not, are so conjoined by the investing membranes as to exhibit the appearance of a single nerve; but when they approach their destination they separate, those for motion ramifying through the muscles, those for sensation going to the cutaneous papillæ or other organs of sense. Examples of this are afforded—in the ninth pair, the fibres of which (against more modern anatomists), he holds to arise by a double origin in the medulla, and which, after running in the same sheath, separate according to their different functions and destinations; and in the seventh pair, the hard and soft portions of which are respectively for motion and for sensation, though these portions, he elsewhere maintains, ought rather to be considered as two distinct nerves than as the twofold constituents of one.

The proof of this is of various kinds.—In the *first* place, it is a theory forced upon us by the phenomena; for only on this supposition can we account for the following facts:—(1) That we have distinct sensations transmitted to the brain from different parts of the same sensitive organ (as the tongue) through which the same total nerve is diffused. (2) That we can send out from the brain a motive influence to one, nay, sometimes to a part of one muscle out of a plurality, among which the same total nerve (e. g. the ischiatic) is distributed. (3) That sometimes a part is either, on the one hand, paralyzed, without any loss of sensibility; or, on the other, stupefied, without a diminution of its mobility.

In the *second* place, we can demonstrate the doctrine, proceeding both from centre to periphery, and from periphery to centre.—Though ultimately dividing into filaments beyond our means of observation, we can still go far in following out a nerve both in its general ramifications, and in the special distribution of its filaments, for motion to the muscles and for sensation to the skin, &c.; and how far soever we are able to carry our investigation, we always find the least fibrils into which we succeed in analyzing a nerve, equally distinct and continuous as the chord of which they were constituent.—And again, in following back the filaments of motion from the muscles, the fila-

¹ And the next chapter, § 1.—W.

ments of sensation from the skin, we find them ever collected into larger and larger bundles within the same sheath, but never losing their individuality, never fused together to form the substance of a larger chord.—The nerves are thus not analogous to arteries, which rise from a common trunk, convey a common fluid, divide into branches all similar in action to each other and to the primary trunk. For every larger nerve is only a complement of smaller nerves, and every smallest nerve only a fasciculus of nervous fibrils; and these not only numerically different, but often differing from each other in the character of their functions.

In the *third* place, that in the nerves for both motion and sensation are enveloped distinct nerves or fibrils for these several functions—this is an inference supported by the analogy of those nerves which are motive or sensitive, exclusively. And in regard to these latter, it becomes impossible, in some cases, to conceive why a plurality of nerves should have been found necessary, as in the case of the two portions of the seventh pair, in reality distinct nerves, if we admit the supposition that each nerve, each nervous fibril, is competent to the double office.

In the *fourth* place, the two species of nerve are distinguished by a difference of structure. For he maintains the old Galenic doctrine, that the nerves of motion are, as compared with those of sensation, of a harder and more fibrous texture;—a diversity which he does not confine to the homogeneous nerves, but extends to the counter filaments of the heterogeneous.—This opinion, in modern times, by the majority surrendered rather than refuted, has been also subsequently maintained by a small number of the most accurate anatomists, as Malacarne and Reil; and to this result the recent observations of Ehrenberg and others seem to tend. (See memoirs of the Berlin Academy for 1836, p. 605, sq.; Mueller's Phys. p. 598.)

Finally, to the objection—Why has nature not, in all cases as in some, enclosed the motive and the sentient fibrils in distinct sheaths?—as answer, and *fifth* argument, he shows, with great ingenuity, that nature does precisely what, in the circumstances, always affords the greatest security to both, more especially to the softer, fibrils; and he might have added, as a *sixth* reason and second answer—with the smallest expenditure of means.

The subtlety of the nervous fibres is much greater than is commonly suspected; and there is probably no point of the body to which they are not distributed. What is the nature of their peripheral terminations it is, however, difficult to demonstrate; and the doctrines of Ruysch and Malpighi in this respect are, as he shows, unsatisfactory.

The doctrine of Albinus, indeed, of the whole school of Boerhaave, in regard to the nervous system, and, in particular, touching the distinction and the isolation of the ultimate nervous filaments, seems during a century of interval not only to have been neglected but absolutely forgotten; and a counter opinion of the most erroneous character, with here and there a feeble echo of the true, to have become generally prevalent in its stead. For, strange to say, this very doctrine is that recently promulgated as the last consummation of nervous physiology by the most illustrious physiologist in Europe. 'That the primitive fibres of all the cerebro-spinal nerves are to be regarded as isolated and distinct from their origin to their termination, and as radii issuing from the axis of the nervous system,' is the grand result, as

stated by himself, of the elaborate researches of *Johann Mueller*; and to the earliest discovery of this general fact he carefully vindicates his right against other contemporary observers, by stating that it had been privately communicated by him to Van der Kolk, of Utrecht, so long ago as the year 1830. (Phys. p. 596-603.)

In conclusion, I may observe that it is greatly to be regretted that these Prelections of Albinus were never printed. They present not only a full and elegant digest of all that was known in physiology at the date of their delivery (and Albinus was celebrated for the uncommon care which he bestowed on the composition of his lectures); but they likewise contain, perdué, many original views, all deserving of attention, and some which have been subsequently reproduced to the no small celebrity of their second authors. The speculation, for example, of John Hunter and Dr. Thomas Young, in regard to the self-contractile property of the Crystalline lens is here anticipated; and that pellucidity and fibrous structure are compatible, shown by the analogy of those gelatinous mollusca, the medusæ or sea-blubbers, which are not more remarkable for their transparency, than for their contractile and dilative powers.

As I have already noticed, the celebrity of the Leyden School far from commanding acceptance, did not even secure adequate attention to the doctrine of its illustrious masters; and the Galenic theory, to which Haller latterly adhered, was, under the authority of Cullen and the Monros, that which continued to prevail in this country, until after the commencement of the present century. Here another step in advance was then made by *Mr. Alexander Walker*, an ingenious Physiologist of Edinburgh; who, in 1809, first started the prolific notion, that in the spinal nerves the filaments of sensation issue by the one root, the filaments of motion by the other. His attribution of the several functions to the several roots—sensation to the anterior, motion to the posterior—with strong presumption in its favor from general analogy, and its conformity with the tenor of all previous, and much subsequent observation, is, however, opposed to the stream of later and more precise experiment. Anatomists have been long agreed that the anterior column of the spinal marrow is in continuity with the brain-proper, the posterior, with the after-brain. To say nothing of the Galenic doctrine, Willis and the School of Boerhaave had referred the automatic, Hoboken and Poutean the automatic and voluntary, motions to the cerebellum. Latterly, the experiments of Rolando, Flourens, and other physiologists, would show that to the after-brain belongs the power of regulated or voluntary motion; while the parallelism which I have myself detected, between the relative development of that part of the encephalos in young animals and their command over the action of their limbs, goes, likewise, to prove that such motion is one, at least, of the cerebellic functions. (See Munro's Anatomy of the Brain, 1831, p. 4-9.) In contending, therefore, that the nervous filaments of sensation ascend in the anterior rachitic column to the brain-proper, and the nervous filaments of motion in the posterior, to the after-brain; Mr. Walker originally proposed, and still maintains, the alternative which, independently of precise experiment, had the greatest weight of general probability in its favor. (Archives of Science for 1809; The Nervous System, 1834, p. 50, sq.)

In 1811, *Sir Charles Bell*, holding always the connection of the brain-

proper with the anterior, of the after-brain with the posterior, column of the spinal chord, proceeding, however, not on general probabilities, but on experiments expressly instituted on the roots themselves of the spinal nerves, first advanced the counter doctrine, that to the filaments ascending by the posterior roots belongs exclusively the function of sensation; and thereafter, but still, as is now clearly proved, previously to any other physiologist, he further established by a most ingenious combination of special analogy and experiment, the correlative fact, that the filaments descending by the anterior roots are the sole vehicles of voluntary motion. These results, confirmed as they have been by the principal physiologists throughout Europe, seem now placed above the risk of refutation. It still, however, remains to reconcile the seeming structural connection, and the manifest functional opposition, of the after-brain and posterior rachitic column; for the decussation in the medulla oblongata, observed, among others, by Rolando and Solly, whereby the cerebellum and anterior column are connected, is apparently too partial to reconcile the discordant phenomena. (*Bell's Nervous System*; *Shaw's Narrative*; *Mueller's Physiology*, &c.)

As connected with the foregoing notices, I may here call attention to a remarkable case reported by M. Rey Regis, a medical observer, in his 'Histoire Naturelle de l'Ame.' This work, which is extremely rare, I have been unable to consult, and must therefore rely on the abstract given by M. de Biran in his 'Nouvelles Considerations,' p. 96, sq. This case, as far as I am aware, has escaped the observation of all subsequent physiologists. In its phenomena, and in the inferences to which they lead, it stands alone; but whether the phenomena are themselves anomalous, or that experiments, with the same intent, not having been made, in like cases, they have not in these been brought in like manner into view, I am unable to determine.—A man lost the power of movement in one half of his body (one lateral half, probably, but in De Biran's account the paralysis is not distinctly stated as hemiplegia); while the sensibility of the parts affected remained apparently entire. Experiments, various and repeated, were, however, made to ascertain with accuracy, whether the loss of the motive faculty had occasioned any alteration in the capacity of feeling; and it was found that the patient, though as acutely alive as ever to the sense of pain, felt, when this was secretly inflicted, as by compression of his hand under the bed-clothes, a sensation of suffering or uneasiness, by which, when the pressure became strong, he was compelled lustily to cry out; but a sensation merely general, he being altogether unable to localize the feeling, or to say from whence the pain proceeded. It is unfortunately not stated whether he could discriminate one pain from another, say the pain of pinching from the pain of pricking; but had this not been the case, the notice of so remarkable a circumstance could hardly, I presume, have been overlooked. The patient, as he gradually recovered the use of his limbs, gradually also recovered the power of localizing his sensations.—It would be important to test the value of this observation by similar experiments, made on patients similarly affected. Until this be done, it would be rash to establish any general inferences upon its facts.

I may notice also another problem, the solution of which ought to engage the attention of those who have the means of observation in their power. Is the sensation of heat dependent upon a peculiar set of nerves? This to me seems probable; 1°, because certain sentient parts of the body are insensible to this feeling; and, 2°, because I have met with cases recorded, in which, while sensibility in general was abolished, the sensibility to heat remained apparently undiminished.¹

¹ Here may be added a curious item, from the foot-notes to Reid (p. 246): 'However astonishing, it is now proved beyond all rational doubt, that, in certain abnormal states of the nervous organism, perceptions are possible through other than the ordinary channels of the senses.'—*W.*

CHAPTER VI.

PERCEPTION PROPER AND SENSATION PROPER.*

§ I.—PRINCIPAL MOMENTA OF THE EDITOR'S DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION.

A)—*In itself*:

i.—*Perception in general*.

I. *Sensitive Perception*, or *Perception* simply, is that act of Consciousness whereby we apprehend in our body,

* A word as to the various meanings of the terms here prominent—*Perception, Sensation, Sense*.

i.—*Perception* (Perceptio; Perception; Percezione; Perception, Wahrnehmung) has different significations; but under all and each of these, the term has a common ambiguity, denoting as it may, either 1° the perceiving Faculty, or 2° the Perceiving Act, or 3° the Object perceived. Of these the only ambiguity of importance is the last; and to relieve it I would propose the employment, in this relation, of *Percept*, leaving *Perception* to designate both the faculty and its act; for these it is rarely necessary to distinguish, as what is applicable to the one is usually applicable to the other.

But to the significations of the term, as applied to *different* faculties, acts, and objects; of which there are in all four:

1. *Perceptio*—which has been naturalized in all the principal languages of modern Europe, with the qualified exception of the German, in which the indigenous term *Wahrnehmung* has again almost superseded it—*Perceptio*. in its primary philosophical signification, as in the mouths of Cicero and Quintilian, is vaguely equivalent to Comprehension, Notion, or Cognition in general.

2. From this first meaning it was easily deflected to a second, in which it corresponds to an apprehension, a becoming aware of, in a word, a consciousness. In this meaning, though long thus previously employed in the schools, it was brought more prominently and distinctively forward in the writings of Descartes. From him it passed, not only to his own disciples, but, like the term *Idea*, to his antagonist, Gassendi, and, thereafter, adopted equally by Locke and Leibnitz, it remained a household word in every subsequent philosophy, until its extent was further limited, and thus a third signification given to it.

Under this second meaning it is, however, proper to say a word in regard

- a.) Certain *special affections*, whereof as an *animated organism* it is contingently susceptible; and
- b.) Those *general relations of extension* under which as a *material organism* it necessarily exists.

to the special employment of the term in the Cartesian and Leibnitzio-Wolfian philosophies.—Perception the Cartesians really identified with *Idea* (using this term in its unexclusive universality, but discounting Descartes' own abusive application of it to the organic movement in the brain, of which the mind has, ex hypothesi, no consciousness)—and allowed them only a logical distinction;—the same representative act being called *Idea*, inasmuch as we regard it as a representation, i. e. view it in relation to what through it, as represented, is mediately known, and Perception, inasmuch as we regard it as a consciousness of such representation, i. e. view it in relation to the knowing mind.—The Leibnitzio-Wolfians, on the other hand, distinguished three acts in the process of representative cognition:—1° the act of representing a (mediate) object to the mind; 2° the representation, or, to speak more properly, representamen, itself as an (immediate or vicarious) object exhibited to the mind; 3° the act by which the mind is conscious, immediately of the representative object, and, through it, mediately of the remote object represented. They called the first *Perception*; the last *Apperception*; the second *Idea—sensual*, to wit, for what they styled the *material Idea* was only an organic motion propagated to the brain, which, on the doctrine of the pre-established harmony, is in sensitive cognition the arbitrary concomitant of the former, and, of course, beyond the sphere of consciousness or apperception.

3. In its third signification, Perception is limited to the apprehensions of Sense alone. This limitation was first formally imposed upon the word by Reid, for no very cogent reason besides convenience (222 b); and thereafter by Kant. Kant, again, was not altogether consistent; for he employs '*Perception*' in the second meaning, for the consciousness of any mental presentation, and thus in a sense corresponding to the *Apperception* of the Leibnitzians, while its vernacular synonym '*Wahrnehmung*' he defines in conformity with the third, as the consciousness of an empirical intuition. Imposed by such authorities, this is now the accredited signification of these terms, in the recent philosophies of Germany, Britain, France, Italy, &c.

4. But under this third meaning it is again, since the time and through the authority of Reid, frequently employed in a still more restricted acceptation, viz. as Perception (proper) in contrast to Sensation (proper). The import of these terms, as used by Reid and other philosophers on the one hand, and by myself on the other, is explained in the text.

ii.—*Sensation* (Sensatio; Sensation, Sentiment; Sensazione; Empfindung) has various significations; and in all of these, like Perception, Conception, Imagination, and other analogous terms in the philosophy of mind, it is ambiguously applied;—1°, for a Faculty—2°, for its Act—3°, for its Object. Here there is no available term like Percept, Concept, &c., whereby to discriminate the last.

Of these Perceptions, the former, which is thus conversant about a *subject-object*, is *Sensation proper*; the latter, which is thus conversant about an *object-object*, is *Perception proper*.¹

2. All Perception is an act of Consciousness; no Perception, therefore, is possible, except under the conditions under which Consciousness is possible. The eight following conditions are partly common to perception with the other acts of Consciousness; partly proper to it as a special operation.

3. The first is a certain *concentration* of consciousness on an object of sense;—an act of *Attention*, however remiss.*

4. The second is (independently of the necessary contrast of a subject and an object), a *plurality, alteration, difference* on the part of the perceived object or objects, and of a recognition or

There are two principal meanings in which this term has been employed.

1. Like the Greek *æsthesis*, it was long and generally used to comprehend the process of sensitive apprehension both in its subjective and its objective relations.

2. As opposed to Idea, Perception, &c., it was limited, first in the Cartesian school, and thereafter in that of Reid, to the subjective phasis of our sensitive cognitions; that is, to our consciousness of the affections of our animated organism,—or on the Neo-Platonic, Cartesian, and Leibnitzian hypotheses, to the affections of the mind corresponding to, but not caused by, the unknown mutations of the body. Under this restriction, Sensation may, both in French and English, be employed to designate our corporeal or lower feelings, in opposition to Sentiment, as a term for our higher, i. e. our intellectual and moral, feelings.

iii.—*Sense* (Sensus; Sens; Senso; Sinn) is employed in a looser and in a stricter application.

Under the former head it has two applications;—1^o, a psychological, as a popular term for Intelligence: 2^o, a logical, as a synonym for Meaning.

Under the latter head, Sense is employed ambiguously;—1^o, for the Faculty of sensitive apprehension; 2^o, for its Act; 3^o, for its Organ.

In this relation, Sense has been distinguished into External and Internal; but under the second term, in so many vague and various meanings, that I cannot here either explain or enumerate them.

On the analogical employments of the word, see above, p. 378 sq.

* St. Jerome—'Quod mens videat et mens audiat, et quod nec audire quidpiam nec videre possumus, nisi sensus in ea quæ cernimus et audimus *intentus*, vetus sententia.' (Adv. Jovin. ii. 9.) See Aristotle (Probl. xi. 33), whom Jerome manifestly had in his eye; Strato Physicus, as quoted by Plutarch (De Sol. An. Opera, t. ii. p. 961); and Plutarch himself (ibid.)

¹ See p. 380.—W.

discrimination thereof on the part of the perceiving subject.*— This supposes the following:—*Quality proper*; *Quantity*, *Pro- tensive* (Time), *Extensive* (Space), *Intensive* (Degree); and *Relation*. Therefore—

5. The third is *Quality*, quality strictly so called. For one affection is distinguished from another as it is, or is not, such and such; in other words, as it has, or has not, this or that quality (suchness).

6. The fourth is *Time*; which supposes *Memory*, or, to speak more correctly, a certain *continuous representation* of the late and latest past, known with and in contrast to our apprehension of the passing present. For without such continuity of consciousness, no consciousness is possible.

7. The fifth is *Space*. For we are only conscious of perceiving, as we are conscious of perceiving something as discriminated from other coexistent things. But this in perception is to be conscious of one thing as out of another, that is, as extended, that is, as in space.

8. The sixth is *Degree*. For all sensations are, though possibly of any, actually of one definite intensity; and distinguished not only by differences in Quality, Time, Space, but also by differences in Degree.

9. The seventh is *Relation*. For discrimination, which all perception supposes, is a recognition of a relation, the relation of contrast; and differences in Quality, Time, Space, Degree, are only so many various kinds of such relativity.

10. Finally, the eighth is an *Assertory Judgment*, that within the sphere of sense an object (a) *exists*, and (b) *exists thus or thus conditioned*.† All consciousness is realized in the enunciation—

* It has been well said by Hobbes, in regard to the former,—‘*Sentire semper idem, et non sentire, ad idem recidunt*’ (Elem. Philos. P. iv. c. 25, § 5); and by Galen and Nemesius in reference to the latter,—‘Sensation is not an alteration (affection, modification), but the recognition of an alteration.’

† Aristotle in various passages asserts that Sensitive perception is a discrimination or a *judgment*. (Anal. Post. L. ii. c. 19, § 5.—Top. L. ii. c. 4,

That is there (or *This is here*). All Perception consequently enounces—*That is there*; but in this case, there is especially understood by the *That*—an object manifested through one or more qualities, Secondary, Secundo-primary, Primary; and by the *is there*—apprehended in, or in immediate relation to, our organism.*

11. Such being the general conditions of Perception, it is manifestly impossible to discriminate with any rigor Sense from Intelligence. Sensitive apprehension is, in truth, only the recognition by Intelligence of the phenomena presented in or through its organs.†

§ 2.—De An. L. iii. c. 1, § 10; c. 10, § 1; alibi.) And the Aphrodisian:—‘Although sensation be only brought to bear through certain corporeal passions, yet Sensation itself is not a passion, but a *judgment*.’ (On the Soul, f. 138 b, ed. Ald.) Reid has the merit among modern philosophers of first approximating to the recognition of judgment as an element or condition of consciousness in general, in laying it at the root of Perception, Sensation, Memory, and [Self] Consciousness; though he unfortunately fell short of the truth in refusing an existential judgment also to the acts of the representative faculty, his Conception, Imagination, or Simple Apprehension.

* In this qualitative judgment there is only the consciousness of the quality perceived in itself as a distinct object. The judgment, again, by which it is recognized of such a class or such a name, is a higher energy, and ought not, as is sometimes done, to be styled Perception; it is *Judgment*, emphatically so called, a simple act of, what I would call, the elaborative, or dianoetic, or discursive faculty, the faculty of relations, or comparison.

† Tertullian:—‘Non enim et sentire intelligere est, et intelligere, sentire. At *quid erit Sensus, nisi ejus rei quæ sentitur intellectus?* Quid erit intellectus, nisi ejus rei quæ intelligitur sensus? Unde ista tormenta cruciandæ simplicitatis, et suspendendæ veritatis? Quis mihi exhibebit sensum non intelligentem quod sentit; aut intellectum non sentientem quod intelligit?’—(De Anima, c. 18; compare De Carne Christi, c. 12.)—To the same effect St. Gregory of Nyssa. (De Opif. Hom. ec. 6, 10; and De Anima et Resur., Opera, t. ii. p. 623 ed. Paris, 1615.)—See also St. Jerome as quoted in note * 414.—But this doctrine we may trace back to Aristotle and his school, and even higher. ‘There is extant,’ says Plutarch, ‘a discourse of Strato Physicus, demonstrating—*That a sensitive apprehension is wholly impossible without an act of Intellect.*’ (Op. Mor. p. 961.) And as to Aristotle himself:—‘To divorce (he says) Sensation from Understanding, is to reduce Sensation to an insensible process; wherefore it has been said—*Intellect sees, and Intellect hears.*’ (Probl. xi. 33.)

This saying, as recorded by Aristotle, constitutes in the original (a differ-

12. All perception is an *immediate* or *presentative* cognition : and has, therefore, in either form, only one univocal object ; that, to wit, which it apprehends as *now* and *here* existent.¹

ence of dialect discounted) the first hemistich of the famous verse of Epicharmus :

Νοῦς ὁρῆ καὶ Νοῦς ἀκούει, τὰλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.

Mind it seeth, Mind it heareth ; all beside is deaf and blind ;

or less literally—

What sees is Mind, what hears is Mind ;

The ear and eye are deaf and blind.

Though overlooked as a quotation, by both the commentators on the Problems, by Erasmus, and many others, it has never been suspected that these words, as quoted, are not a quotation from the Syracusan poet. This negative I, however, venture to maintain, at least, as a probable thesis ; for I am inclined to think that the line, however great its merit, does not ascend to Epicharmus, but was forged and fathered on him in an age considerably later than Aristotle's. My reasons are these :

1. Epicharmus was a Pythagorean philosopher and a Doric poet. But to fabricate Pythagorean treatises in the Doric dialect seems to have become in the latter ages a matter of exercise and emulation among the Greek Sophistæ and Syneretists. In fact, of the numerous fragments under the names of Pythagoras, Theano, Timæus, Ocellus, Arehytas, Hippodamus, Euryphamus, Hipparchus, Theages, Metopus, Clinias, Crito, Polus, Lysis, Melissa, Mya, &c. ; there are hardly any to a critical eye not manifestly spurious, and none whatever exempt from grave suspicion. On general grounds, therefore, forgeries on Epicharmus are not only not improbable, but likely.

2. And that such were actually committed we are not without special evidence. We know from Athenæus (L. xiv.), that there were many *Pseudopicharmia* in circulation. Besides Apollodorus, he cites, as authorities for this, Aristoxenus (who was a scholar of Aristotle) in the eighth book of his Polity, and Philochorus (who lived about a century later) in his treatise on Divination. Among the more illustrious fabricators, the former of these commemorates Chrysogonus the flute-player ; the latter, Axiopistus of Locrus or Sieyon, with the names of his two supposititious works, the *Canon* and the *Gnomæ*. Of either of these, judging from their title, the line in question may have formed a part ; though it is not improbably of a still more recent origin.

3. The words (and none could be more direct and simple) which make up the first hemistich of the verse, we find occasionally quoted as a proverbial philosopheme, subsequently to the time of Plato. To Plato's doctrine, and his language, I would indeed attribute its rise ; for it is idle to suppose, with Jacobs, that Sophocles (Ed. T. 389) and Euripides (Hel. 118) had either the verse or dogma in their eye. Aristotle, at least, the author of the Problems,

¹ See chapter iii. § i. 4, 5, 11.—W.

13. All Perception is a *sensitive* cognition : it, therefore, apprehends the existence of no object out of its organism, or not in immediate correlation to its organism ; for thus only can an object exist, *now* and *here*, to sense.

is the oldest testimony for such a usage ; and long after Aristotle, after, indeed, the line had been already fathered on Epicharmus, we have Pliny (II. N. xi. 37), Cassius Felix (Pr. 22), St. Jerome (Adv. Jovin. ii. 9), the *manuscripts* of Stobæus (iv. 42), and the Scholiast of Aristophanes (Pl. 43), all adducing it only as an adage. It is not, however, till nearly *six centuries after Epicharmus*, and considerably more than *four centuries after Aristotle*, that we find the saying either fully cited as a verse, or the verse ascribed to the Syracusan. But from the time of Plutarch, who himself thrice alleges it, its quotation in either fashion becomes frequent ; as by Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Maximus Tyrius, Julian, Theodoret, Olympiodorus (twice), and Tzetzes (four times). Porphyry (thrice) records it—but as a saying of Pythagoras ; and Iamblichus, as a dictum of the Pythagorean School. These authors both had learning, though neither, certainly, was ever critical in its application. Their statements can only, therefore, be held to favor the opinion that they were unaware of any decisive evidence to vindicate the verse to Epicharmus.

4. But if improbable, even at first sight, that such a verse of such an author, should not, if authentic, have been adduced by any writer now extant, during the long period of six hundred years, the improbability is enhanced when we come to find, that during that whole period it is never quoted, even under circumstances when, had it been current as a line of Epicharmus, it could not but have been eagerly appealed to. Plato, as observed by Alcimus and Laertius, was notoriously fond of quoting Epicharmus ; and there were at least two occasions—in the Theætetus (§ 102, sq.), and in the Phædo (§ 25 [11 Wyt.])—when this gnome of his favorite poet would have confirmed and briefly embodied the doctrine he was anxiously inculcating. Could he fail to employ it ? In fact, it comes to this ;—these passages must either be held to follow, or to found, the philosopheme in question.—In like manner Cicero, in his exposition of the first passage (Tusc. i. 20), could hardly have avoided associating Epicharmus with Plato, as Tertullian and Olympiodorus have done in their expositions of the second—had the line been recognized in the age of the former, as it was in the age of the two latter. Nor could such an apothegm of such a poet have been unknown to Cicero,—to Cicero, so generally conversant with Hellenic literature,—and who, among other sayings of Epicharmus himself, adduces in Greek, as his brother Quintus paraphrases in Latin, the no less celebrated maxim—

Be sober, and to doubt inclin'd :
These are the very joints of mind ;

or on the other reading—

Be cool, and eke to doubt propense :
These are the sinews of good sense.

ii.—*Sensation proper and Perception proper, in correlation.*

14. In perception proper there is a higher energy of intelligence, than in Sensation proper. For though the latter be the apprehension of an affection of the Ego, and therefore, in a certain sort, the apprehension of an immaterial quality; still it is only the apprehension of the *fact* of an organic passion; whereas the former, though supposing Sensation as its condition, and though only the apprehension of the attributes of a material Non-ego, is, however, itself without corporeal passion, and, at the same time, the recognition not merely of a fact, but of *relations*. (See 22, 29, and p. 379 note †.)

15. Sensation proper is the *conditio sine qua non* of a Perception proper of the Primary qualities. For we are only aware of the existence of our organism, in being sentient of it, as thus or thus affected; and are only aware of it being the subject of extension, figure, division, motion, &c., in being percipient of its affections, as like or as unlike, and as out of, or locally external to, each other.

16. Every Perception proper has a Sensation proper as its condition; but every Sensation has not a Perception proper as its conditionate—unless, what I think ought to be done, we view the general consciousness of the locality of a sensorial affection as a Perception proper. In this case, the two apprehensions will be always coexistent.

17. But though the fact of Sensation proper, and the fact of Perception proper imply each other, this is all,—for the two cognitions, though coexistent, are not proportionally coexistent. On the contrary, although we can only take note of, that is perceive, the special relations of sensations, on the hypothesis that these sensations exist; a sensation, in proportion as it rises above a low degree of intensity, interferes with the perception of its relations, by concentrating consciousness on its absolute affection alone. It may accordingly be stated as a general rule—*That, above a certain point, the stronger the Sensation, the weaker the Perception;*

and the distincter the perception the less obtrusive the sensation ; in other words—Though Perception proper and Sensation proper exist only as they coexist, in the degree or intensity of their existence, they are always found in an inverse ratio to each other. (See 387 b, sq.)

18. The organism is the field of apprehension, both to Sensation proper and Perception proper ; but with this difference,—that the former views it as of the Ego, the latter, as of the Non-ego ; that the one draws it within, the other shuts it out from the sphere of self. As animated, as the subject of affections of which I am conscious, the organism belongs to me ; and of these affections, which I recognize as mine, Sensation proper is the apprehension. As material, as the subject of extension, figure, divisibility, and so forth, the organism does not belong to me, the conscious unit ; and of these properties, which I do not recognize as mine, Perception proper is the apprehension.*—(See 38, 39, and p. 379 a †.)

19. The affections in Sensation proper are determined, (a) by certain intra-organic, or (b) by certain extra-organic causes. The

* It may appear, not a paradox merely, but a contradiction to say, that the organism is, at once, within and without the mind ; is, at once, subjective and objective ; is, at once, Ego and Non-ego. But so it is ; and so we must admit it to be, unless on the one hand, as Materialists, we identify mind with matter, or, on the other, as Idealists, we identify matter with mind. The organism, as animated, as sentient, is necessarily ours ; and its affections are only felt as affections of the indivisible Ego. In this respect, and to this extent, our organs are not external to ourselves. But our organism is not merely a sentient subject, it is at the same time an extended, figured, divisible, in a word, a material, subject ; and the same sensations which are reduced to unity in the indivisibility of consciousness are in the divisible organism recognized as plural and reciprocally external, and, therefore, as extended, figured, and divided. Such is the fact : but how the immaterial can be united with matter, how the unextended can apprehend extension, how the indivisible can measure the divided,—this is the mystery of mysteries to man. 'Modus (says the Pseudo-Augustin)—Modus quo corporibus adherent spiritus, omnino mirus est, nec comprehendi ab hominibus potest ; et hoc ipse homo est.' Thus paraphrased by Pascal :—' Man is, to himself, the mightiest prodigy of nature. For he is unable to conceive what is Body, still less what is Mind, and, least of all, how there can be united a body and a mind. This is the climax of his difficulties ; yet this is his peculiar nature.'

latter, as powers in bodies, beyond the sphere of perception, and their effects in us, the objects of Sensation, are both (therefore ambiguously) denominated, either, in the language of modern philosophers, the *Secondary Qualities of Matter*, or, in the language of Aristotle and his school, the *Proper Sensibles*.¹

20. Sensation proper has no object but a *subject-object*, *i. e.* the organic affection of which we are conscious. The cause of that affection, whether without organism or within, that is, whether or not a secondary quality of body, is immediately or in its own nature unknown; being known only, if known it ever be, mediately, by observation, induction, inference, conjecture. Even in the perception of the Secundo-primary qualities, where there is the perception proper of a quasi-primary quality, in some degree of resistance, and the sensation proper of a secondary quality, in some affection of the sentient organism, its effect; still to Sensation proper there is no other object but the subjective affection; and even its dependence, as an effect, upon the resistance, as a cause, is only a conclusion founded on the observed constancy of their concomitance. (See 36, 37, and p. 376 b, sq.)

21. Nay, the Perception proper, accompanying a sensation proper, is not an apprehension, far less a representation, of the external or internal stimulus, or concause, which determines the affection whereof the sensation is the consciousness.—Not the former; for the stimulus or concause of a sensation is always, in itself, to consciousness unknown. Not the latter; for this would turn Perception into Imagination—reduce it from an immediate, and assertory, and objective, into a mediate, and problematic, and subjective cognition. In this respect, Perception proper is an apprehension of the relations of sensations to each other, primarily in Space, and secondarily in Time and Degree. (See 31.)

iii.—*Sensation proper.*

22. Sensation proper, viewed on one side, is a passive affection

¹ See previous chapter.—*W.*

of the organism ; but viewed on the other, it is an active apperception, by the mind, of that affection. And as the former only exists for us, inasmuch as it is perceived by us ; and as it is only perceived by us, inasmuch as it is apprehended, in an active concentration, discrimination, judgment, of the mind ;—the latter, an act of intelligence, is to be viewed, as the principal factor in the percipient process, even in its lower form, that of Sensation proper.* (See 4, 10, 11, 14, with notes.)

iv.—*Perception proper.*

23. In Perception proper, the object-object perceived is, always, either a *Primary* quality, or the *quasi-Primary* phasis of a Secundo-primary. (See p. 376 b, sq.)

24. The primary qualities are perceived as *in our organism* ; the Quasi-primary phasis of the Secundo-primary as *in correlation to our organism.* (See 394 a.)

25. Thus a perception of the Primary qualities does not,

* This is the true doctrine of Aristotle and his school, who are, however, not unfrequently misrepresented by relation to the extreme counter-opinion of the Platonists, as viewing in the cognitions of Sense a mere passion—a misrepresentation to which, undoubtedly, a few of the Latin Schoolmen have afforded grounds. It is, indeed, this twofold character of the Sensitive process that enables us to reconcile the apparent conflict of those passages of Aristotle, where (as *De Anima*, L. ii. c. 4, § 8 ; c. 5, § 2 ; c. 11, § 14 ; c. 12, § 1 ; *De Sensu et Sensili*, c. 1, § 5 ; *Physica*, L. vii. c. 3, § 12, Pacian division) he calls Sensation a passion or alteration of the Sentient ; and those others where (as *De Anima*, L. iii. c. 8, § 2) he asserts that in Sensation the Sentient is not passively affected. In the former passages the sentient faculty is regarded on its organic side, in the latter on its mental. Compare *De Somno et Vigilia*, c. 1, § 6, where it is said, that ‘Sensation is a process belonging exclusively neither to the soul nor to the body, but, as energy, a motion of the soul, through the [medium of the] body ;’—a text which, however, may still be variously expounded.—See Alexander, in note †, p. 415 ; who, with the other Greek interpreters, Ammonius, Simplicius, Philoponus, solves the difficulty by saying, that it is not the sentient *mind* that suffers, but the sentient *organ.* To the same effect are Galen and Nemesius, as quoted in note *, p. 415. Reid is partly at one with the Peripatetics ; with whose doctrine, indeed, he is more frequently in accordance than he is always himself aware. (Inq. 114 a.)

originally and in itself, reveal to us the existence, and qualitative existence, of aught beyond the organism, apprehended by us as extended, figured, divided, &c.

26. The primary qualities of things external to our organism we do not perceive, *i. e. immediately know*. For these we only learn to *infer*, from the affections which we come to find that they determine in our organs;—affections which, yielding us a perception of organic extension, we at length discover, by observation and induction, to imply a corresponding extension in the extra-organic agents.

27. Further, in no part of the organism have we any apprehension, any immediate knowledge of extension in its true and absolute magnitude; perception noting only the fact given in sensation, and sensation affording no standard, by which to measure the dimensions given in one sentient part with those given in another. For, as perceived, extension is only the recognition of one organic affection in its outness from another; as a minimum of extension is thus to perception the smallest extent of organism in which sensations can be discriminated as plural:—and as in one part of the organism this smallest extent is, perhaps, some million, certainly some myriad times smaller than in others; it follows that, to perception, the same real extension will appear, in this place of the body, some million or myriad times greater than in that.* Nor does this difference subsist only as between sense and sense; for in the same sense, and even in that sense which has very commonly been held exclusively to afford a

* This difference in the power of discriminating affections, possessed by different parts of the body, seems to depend partly on the minuteness and isolation of the ultimate nervous fibrils, partly on the sensation being less or more connected with pleasure and pain. In this respect the eye greatly transcends all the other organs. For we can discriminate in the retina sensations, as reciprocally external, more minutely than we can in touch—as over the greater part of the body two million five hundred thousand fold—as at the most sensitive place of the hand, a hundred thousand fold—as at the tip of the tongue, where tactile discrimination is at its maximum, fifty thousand fold. I am, however, inclined to think, for reasons already given, that we must reduce millions to myriads.—(See p. 387, note.)

knowledge of absolute extension, I mean Touch proper, the minimum, at one part of the body, is some fifty times greater than it is at another. (See p. 389 ab, note.)

28. The existence of an extra-organic world is apprehended, not in a perception of the Primary qualities, but in a perception of the quasi-primary phasis of the Secundo-primary; that is, in the consciousness that our locomotive energy is resisted, and not resisted by aught in our organism itself. For in the consciousness of being thus resisted is involved, as a correlative, the consciousness of a resisting something external to our organism. Both are, therefore, conjunctly apprehended. (See p. 394 a, note.) This experience presupposes, indeed, a possession of the notions of space and motion in space.

29. But on the doctrine that space, as a necessary condition, is a native element of thought; and since the notion of any one of its dimensions, as correlative to, must inevitably imply the others; it is evident that every perception of sensations out of sensations will afford the occasion, in apprehending any one, of conceiving all the three extensions; that is, of conceiving space. On the doctrine, and in the language of Reid, our original cognitions of space, motion, &c., are instinctive; a view which is confirmed by the analogy of those of the lower animals, which have the power of locomotion at birth. It is truly an idle problem to attempt imagining the steps by which we may be supposed to have acquired the notion of extension; when, in fact, we are unable to imagine to ourselves the possibility of that notion not being always in our possession.

30. We have, therefore, a twofold cognition of space: a) an *a priori* or *native* imagination of it, in general, as a necessary condition of the possibility of thought; and b) under that, an *a posteriori* or *adventitious* percept of it, in particular, as contingently apprehended in this or that actual complexus of sensations.*

* This doctrine agrees with that of Kant and Reid in the former; it differs certainly from that of Kant, and probably from that of Reid, in the latter. But see chapter i.

B.) *Editor's doctrine of Perception, in contrast to that of Reid, Stewart, Royer-Collard, and other philosophers of the Scottish School.**

31. Perception (proper) is the *Notion* or *Conception* of an object, *instinctively suggested, excited, inspired*, or, as it were, *conjured up, on occasion or at the sign* of a Sensation (proper).† *Reid*, Inq. 111 b, 121 a, 122 a, 123 b, 128 b, note, 130 b, 159 a, 183 a, 188 a. I. P. 258 ab, 259 b, 260 b, 318 ab, 327 a; *Stewart*, El. vol. i. pp. 92, 93; *Royer-Collard*, in Jouffroy's *Reid*, vol. iii. pp. 402, 403.

* I here contrast my own doctrine of perception with that of the philosophers in question, not because their views and mine are those at farthest variance on the point, but, on the contrary, precisely because they thereon approximate the nearest. I have already shown that the doctrine touching Perception held by Reid (and in the present relation he and his two illustrious followers are in almost all respects at one) is ambiguous. For while some of its statements seem to harmonize exclusively with the conditions of natural presentationism, others, again, appear only compatible with those of an egoistical representationism. Maintaining, as I do, the former doctrine, it is, of course, only the positions conformable to the latter, which it is, at present, necessary to adduce.

† This is not the doctrine, at least not the language of the doctrine of real presentationism. It is the language, at best, of an egoistical representationism; and, as a doctrine, it coincides essentially with the theory of mediate perception held by the lower Platonists, the Cartesians, and the Leibnitzians—as properly understood. The Platonizing Cudworth, in different parts of his works, gives, in fact, nearly in the same terms, the same account of the process of Sensitive Perception. He signalizes, firstly, the bodily affection, determined by the impression of an external something [precisely as Reid]; secondly, the sympathetic recognition thereof by the soul [Reid's Sensation]; thirdly, to quote his expressions, 'whereby according to *nature's instinct*, it hath several *Seemings* or *Appearances* begotten in it of those resisting objects, without it at a distance, in respect of color, magnitude, figure, and local motion.'—[Reid's Conceptions or Notions of which Perception is made up.] (Imm. Mor. B. v. ch. 2, § 3. Compare B. iii. ch. 1, § 5.) See also above, the Neoplatonic doctrine as stated, p. 387 b, note; the Cartesian Sylvain Regis, as quoted, p. 275 a; and the Cartesian Andala, as quoted, p. 377 b, note; and to these may be added the Aristotelian Compton Carlton (who did not reject the doctrine of a *representative* perception of the Common Sensibles), as quoted, p. 318 a. But that Reid might possibly employ the terms *notion* and *conception* in a vague and improper sense, for cognition in general, see p. 318, b, 4.

On the contrary, I hold, in general, that as Perception, in either form, is an immediate or presentative, not a mediate or representative cognition, that a Perception proper is not, and ought not to be called a Notion or Conception. And, I hold in particular, that, on the one hand, in the consciousness of sensations, out of each other, contrasted, limited, and variously arranged, we have a Perception proper, of the primary qualities, in an externality to the mind, though not to the nervous organism, as an immediate cognition, and not merely as a notion or concept of something extended, figured, &c. ; and on the other, as a correlative contained in the consciousness of our voluntary motive, energy resisted, and not resisted by aught within the limits of mind and its subservient organs, we have a Perception proper of the secundo-primary quality of resistance, in an extra-organic force, as an immediate cognition, and not merely as a notion or concept, of a resisting something external to our body,—though certainly in either case, there may be, and probably is, a concomitant act of imagination, by which the whole complex consciousness on the occasion is filled up. (See '21.)¹

32. On occasion of the Sensation (proper), along with the notion or conception which constitutes the Perception (proper), of the external object, there is *blindly created* in us, or *instinctively determined*, an invincible *belief* in its existence. (Reid, Inq. 159 a, 122 ab, 183 a, I. P. 258 a, 327 a, alibi ; Stewart and Royer-Collard, ll. cc.)

On the contrary, I hold, that we only believe in the existence of what we perceive, as extended, figured, resisting, &c., inasmuch as we believe that we are conscious of these qualities as existing ; consequently, that a belief in the existence of an extended world external to the mind, and even external to the organism, is not a faith blindly created or instinctively determined, in supplement of a representative or mediate cognition, but exists in, as an integral constituent of, Perception proper, as an act of intuitive or immediate knowledge.

¹ And chapter ii. § ii.—W.

33. The object of Perception (proper) is a *conclusion*, or *inference*, or *result* (instinctive, indeed, not ratiocinative), from a Sensation proper. (*Reid*, Inq. 125 a, 186 b, I. P. 310 ab, 319 a; —*Royer-Collard*, l. c.)

On the contrary, I hold, that the object of Perception proper is given immediately in and along with the object of Sensation proper.

34. Sensation (proper) *precedes*, Perception (proper) *follows*. (*Reid*, Inq. 186 b, 187 b. I. P. 320 b; *Stewart and Royer-Collard*, ll. cc.)

On the contrary, I hold, that though Sensation proper be the condition of, and therefore anterior to, Perception proper in the order of nature, that, in the order of time, both are necessarily co-existent,—the latter being only realized in and through the present existence of the former. Thus visual extension cannot be perceived, or even imagined, except under the sensation of color; while color, again, cannot be apprehended or imagined, without, respectively, a concomitant apprehension or phantasm of extension.

35. Sensation (proper) is not only an antecedent, but an *arbitrary antecedent*, of Perception (proper.) The former is only a sign on occasion of which the latter follows; they have no necessary or even natural connection; and it is only by the will of God that we do not perceive the qualities of external objects independently of any sensitive affection. This last, indeed, seems to be actually the case in the perception of visible extension and figure. (*Reid*, Inq. 111 b, 121 a, 143 b, 122 a, 123 b, 187 b, 188 a. I. P. 257 b, 260 b, alibi; *Stewart and Royer-Collard*, ll. cc.)

On the contrary, I hold that Sensation proper is the universal condition of Perception proper. We are never aware even of the existence of our organism except as it is somehow affected; and are only conscious of extension, figure, and the other objects of Perception proper, as realized in the relations of the affections of our sentient organism, as a body extended, figured, &c. As to color and visible extension, neither can be apprehended, neither

can be even imagined apart from the other. (V. 320 a, footnote, et alibi.)

36. In a Sensation (proper) of the secondary qualities, as affections in us, we have a *Perception (proper) of them as properties in objects* and causes of the affections in us. (*Reid*, I. P. 310 ab, and *Inq.* passim; *Royer-Collard*, l. c.)

On the contrary, I hold, that as Perception proper is an immediate cognition; and as the secondary qualities, in bodies, are only inferred, and therefore only mediately known to exist as occult causes of manifest effects; that these, at best only objects of a mediate knowledge, are not objects of Perception. (See 20, 21, and p. 378.)

37. In like manner, in the case of various other bodily affections, as the toothache, gout, &c., we have not only a Sensation proper of the painful feeling, but a conception and belief, i. e. a *Perception (proper) of its cause*. (*Reid*, I. P. 319 a, alibi.)

On the contrary, and for the same reason, I hold, that there is in this case no such Perception.

38. Sensation (proper) is an affection *purely of the mind*, and not in any way an affection of the body. (*Reid*, *Inq.* 105 a, 159 ab, 187 a, I. P. 229 ab, 310.)

On the contrary, I hold with Aristotle (*De An.* i. 5, *De Som.* c. 1, § 6), indeed, with philosophers in general, that Sensation is an affection neither of the body alone nor of the mind alone, but of the composite of which each is a constituent; and that the subject of Sensation may be indifferently said to be our organism (as animated) or our soul (as united with an organism). For instance, hunger or color, are, as apprehended, neither modes of mind apart from body, nor modes of body apart from mind. (See 18.)

39. Sensations (proper) as merely affections of the mind, have *no locality* in the body, no locality at all. (*Reid*, I. P. 319 ab, 320 ab.) From this the inference is necessary, that, though conscious of the relative place and reciprocal outness of sensations, we do not in this consciousness apprehend any real externality and extension.

On the contrary, I hold, that Sensation proper, being the consciousness of an affection, not of the mind alone, but of the mind as it is united with the body, that in the consciousness of sensations, relatively localized and reciprocally external, we have a veritable apprehension, and consequently, an immediate perception of the affected organism, as extended, divided, figured, &c. This alone is the doctrine of Natural Realism, of Common Sense. (See 18.)

40. In the case of Sensation (proper) and the Secondary qualities, there is a *determinate quality in certain bodies*, exclusively competent to cause a determinate sensation in us, as color, odor, savor, &c.; consequently, that from the fact of a similar internal effect, we are warranted to infer the existence of a similar external concause. (*Reid*, Inq. 137-142. I. P. 315, 316, alibi.)

On the contrary, I hold, that a similar sensation only implies a similar idiopathic affection of the nervous organism; but such affection requires only the excitation of an appropriate stimulus; while such stimulus may be supplied by manifold agents of the most opposite nature, both from within the body and from without.

41. Perception excludes *memory*; Perception (proper) cannot therefore be apprehensive of *motion*. (*Royer-Collard*, supra 352 ab.)

On the contrary, I hold, that as memory, or a certain continuous representation, is a condition of consciousness, it is a condition of Perception; and that motion, therefore, cannot, on this ground, be denied as an object apprehended through sense. (See 6.)

42. An *apprehension of relations* is not an act of Perception (proper). (*Royer-Collard* [apparently], *ibid.*)

On the contrary, I hold, in general, that as all consciousness is realized only in the apprehension of the relations of plurality and contrast; and as perception is a consciousness; that the apprehension of relation cannot, simpliciter, be denied to perception: and, in particular, that unless we annihilate Perception proper, by

denying to it the recognition of its peculiar objects, Extension, Figure, and the other primary qualities, we cannot deny to it the recognition of relations; for, to say nothing of the others, Extension is perceived only in apprehending sensations out of sensations—a relation; and Figure is only perceived in apprehending one perceived extension as limited, and limited in a certain manner by another—a complexus of relations. (See 9, pp. 352 a, 380 a.)

43. *Distant* realities are objects of Perception (proper). *Reid*, Inq. 104 b, 145 a, 158 b, 159 ab, 160 a, 186 b; I. P. 299 a, 302 a, 303 a, 304 a, 305 b; *Stewart*, El. i. 79 sq.)

On the contrary, I hold, that the mind perceives nothing external to itself, except the affections of the organism as animated, the reciprocal relations of these affections, and the correlative involved in the consciousness of its locomotive energy being resisted. (See pp. 260, 270.)

44. Objects not in contact with the organs of sense are perceived by a *medium*. (*Reid*, Inq. 104 b, 186 ab, 187 b; I. P. 247 ab.)

On the contrary, I hold, that the only object perceived is the organ itself, as modified, or what is in contact with the organ, as resisting. The doctrine of a medium is an error, or rather a confusion, inherited from Aristotle, who perverted, in this respect, the simpler and more accurate doctrine of Democritus.

45. *Extension* and *Figure* are first perceived through the sensations of *Touch*. (*Reid*, Inq. 123–125, 188 a; I. P. 331; *Stewart*, El. i. 349, 357; Ess. 564.)

On the contrary, I hold, that (unless by Extension be understood only extension in the three dimensions, as Reid in fact seems to do, but not Stewart) this is erroneous, for an extension is apprehended in the apprehension of the reciprocal externality of all sensations. Moreover, to allow even the statement as thus restricted to pass, it would be necessary to suppose, that under Touch it is meant to comprehend the consciousness of the Locomotive energy and of the Muscular feelings. (See 390 b, sq.)

46. *Externality* is exclusively perceived on occasion of the sensations of *Touch*. (*Reid*, Inq. 123, 124, 188, a ; I. P. 332 and alibi ; *Royer-Collard*, Jouffroy's *Reid*, iii. 412.)

On the contrary, I hold, that it is, primarily, in the consciousness of our locomotive energy being resisted, and, secondarily, through the sensations of muscular feeling, that the perception of *Externality* is realized. All this, however, might be confusedly involved in the *Touch* of the philosophers in question. (See 28.)

47. *Real* (or absolute) *magnitude* is an object of perception (proper) through *Touch*, but through touch only. (*Reid*, I. P. 303.)

On the contrary, I hold, that the magnitude perceived through touch is as purely relative as that perceived through vision or any other sense ; for the same magnitude does not appear the same to touch at one part of the body and to touch at another. (303 b, note ; 863 ab, note ; and n. 27.)

48. *Color*, though a secondary quality, is an object not of Sensation (proper) but of Perception (proper) ; in other words, we perceive *Color*, not as an affection of our own minds, but as a quality of external things. (*Reid*, Inq. 137 ab, 138 a ; I. P. 319 b.)

On the contrary, I hold, that color, in itself, as apprehended or immediately known by us, is a mere affection of the sentient organism ; and therefore like the other secondary qualities, an object not of Perception, but of Sensation, proper. The only distinguishing peculiarity in this case, lies in the three following circumstances :—a) That the organic affection of color, though not altogether indifferent, still, being accompanied by comparatively little pleasure, comparatively little pain, the apprehension of this affection, qua affection, i. e. its Sensation proper, is, consequently, always at a minimum.—b) That the passion of color first rising into consciousness, not from the amount of the intensive quantity of the affection, but from the amount of the extensive quantity of the organism affected, is necessarily apprehended under the condition of extension.—c) That the isolation, tenuity,

and delicacy, of the ultimate filaments of the optic nerve, afford us sensations minutely and precisely distinguished, sensations realized in consciousness only as we are conscious of them as out of each other in space.—These circumstances show, that while in vision Perception proper is at its maximum, and Sensation proper at its minimum (17), the sensation of color cannot be realized apart from the perception of extension: but they do not warrant the assertions, that color is not, like the other secondary qualities, apprehended by us as a mere sensorial affection, and, therefore, an object not of Sensation proper but of Perception proper.

§ II.—HISTORICAL NOTICES IN REGARD TO THE DISTINCTION OF PERCEPTION PROPER AND SENSATION PROPER.

This distinction is universally supposed to be of a modern date; no one has endeavored to carry it higher than Malebranche; and, in general, the few indications of it noticed previous to Reid, have been commemorated as only accidental or singular anticipations.* This is altogether erroneous; the distinction is ancient; and

* The only attempt of which I am aware, at any historical account of the distinction in hand, is by Mr. Stewart, in Note F of his *Essays*. It contains, however, notices, and these not all pertinent, only of Hutcheson, Crousaz, Baxter, and D'Alembert, and none of these have any title to an historical commemoration on the occasion. For Hutcheson (as already once and again mentioned) only repeats, indeed, only thought of repeating, Aristotle; while the others, at best, merely re-echo Malebranche and the Cartesians.

I may here observe, that in that Note, as also repeatedly in the *Dissertation*, Mr. Stewart (who has been frequently followed) is wrong in stating, exclusively, that Reid's writings were anterior to Kant's; founding thereon a presumption against the originality of the latter. The priority of Reid is only true as limited to the 'Inquiry;' but, on the ground of this alone there could be proved, between the philosophers, but little community of thought, on points where either could possibly claim any right of property. But though Kant's first 'Critik' and 'Prolegomena' preceded Reid's 'Essays' by several years, no one will assuredly suspect any connection whatever between these several works. In general, I must be allowed to say, that the tone and tenor of Mr. Stewart's remarks on the philosopher of Koenigsberg are remarkable exceptions to the usual cautious, candid, and dignified character of his criticism.

adopting, for the standard, my own opinion of what the distinction ought to be, I find it taken more simply and less incorrectly by Aristotle than by any modern philosopher whatever.

Aristotle's discrimination of the Common and Proper Sensibles or Percepts (which has been already explained, 312 b, sq.) embodies not only the modern distinction of the Primary and Secondary Qualities of matter, but also the modern distinction of the two Perceptions, Perception proper and Sensation proper. The generalization of these two correlative distinctions into one, constitutes indeed the first peculiar merit of Aristotle's analysis and nomenclature. But a second is, that in his hands at least, the Common Sensibles, the immediate objects of Perception proper, are viewed as the *object-objects* of an intuitive, and not perverted into the *subject-objects* of a representative cognition. For in the writings of Aristotle himself I can find no ground for regarding him as other than a presentationist or natural realist. In this respect his doctrine stands distinguished from all the others in which the distinction in question has been recognized; for the Neo-Platonic, the Neo-Aristotelic, the Scholastic (with certain exceptions), and the Cartesian, all proceed on the ideality or representative character of the objects of which we are conscious in Perception proper. Even Reid himself, as we have seen, and the Scottish School in general, can only with doubt and difficulty be held as qualified exceptions.¹

Nay, the canon I have endeavored to establish of the universal coexistence in an inverse ratio of Perception proper and Sensation proper (and in general of Feeling and Cognition), though not enounced in its abstract universality by Aristotle, may still be detected as supposed and specially applied by him. In his treatise On the Soul (ii. 9, 1), speaking of the sense of Smell, and of the difficulty of determining the nature and quality of its objects—odors, he says: 'The cause is, that we do not possess this sense in any high degree of accuracy, but are, in this respect, inferior

¹ See § I. B of this chapter, and § II. of chapter iii.—*W.*

to many of the brutes; for man smells imperfectly, and has no perception of things odorous, unaccompanied by either pain or pleasure; the organ of this sense not being nicely discriminative.' And the same is implied, in what he adds touching the vision of the sclerophthalma. Does not this manifestly suppose the principle—that in proportion as a sense rises as a mean of information, it sinks as a vehicle of pleasure and pain?—Galen, I may notice, has some remarkable observations to the same effect. In considering 'the causes of pleasure and pain in the several senses;' and after stating, in general, the order of intensity in which these are susceptible of such affections, to wit, Touch or Feeling—Taste—Smell—Hearing—Vision; he goes on to treat of them in detail. And here it is evident, that he also deems the capacity of pain and pleasure in a sense to be inversely as its power of cognitive discrimination. For, inter alia, he says of Hearing: 'The pleasurable is more conspicuous in this sense [than in that of Vision], because it is of a coarser nature and constitution; but the pleasurable becomes even more manifest in the sensations of Smell, because the nature and constitution of this sense is coarser still.' (De Synt. causis L. i. c. 6.)

The distinction of the Common and Proper Sensibles, and virtually, therefore, the distinction in question, was continued, with some minor developments, by the Greek and Latin Aristotelians. (See 318 a, 385 ab.) As to the interesting doctrine, on this point, of those Schoolmen who rejected *intentional species* in Perception, I may refer, instar omnium, to Biel. (Collect. L. ii. dist. 3. qu. 2.)

Sensation proper and Perception proper were, however, even more strongly contradistinguished in the system of the lower Platonists. They discriminated, on the one hand, in the body, the organic passion and its recognition—that is, Sensation proper; and on the other in the impassive soul, the elicitation into consciousness (through some inscrutable instinct or inspiration) of a *gnostic reason*, or subjective form, representative of the external object affecting the sense—that is, Perception proper. There might also

be shown, in like manner, an analogy between the distinction in question, and that by the Schoolmen of the *species impressa et expressa*; but on this I shall not insist. Nor on the Neo-Platonic theory of Perception which has rarely been touched upon, and when touched on almost always misrepresented (even Mr. Harris, for instance, has wholly misconceived the nature of the *gnostic reasons*);—nor on this can I now enter, though, as recently noticed, it bears a striking analogy to one phasis of the doctrine of Reid. In special reference to the present distinction I may, however, refer the reader to a passage of Plotinus. (Enn. III. vi. 2.)

In the Cartesian philosophy, the distinction was virtually taken by Descartes, but first discriminated in terms by his followers. In general, Perception proper, and the Primary qualities as perceived, they denoted by *Idea*; Sensation proper, and the Secondary qualities as felt by *Sensation* (*sensatio*, *sentiment*). See *De Ræi* (Clavis, &c., p. 299, alibi, ed. 1677); *De la Forge* (De l'Esprit, ch. 10, p. 109 sq., ch. 17, p. 276, ed. Amst. et supra 328 a); *Geulinx* (*Dictionnaire des Principes*, pp. 45, 48, alibi, et supra 328 a); *Rohault* (*Physique*, passim); *Malebranche* (*Recherche*, L. iii. P. ii. ch. 6 and 7, with *Éclairc.* on last, et supra 330 b); *Silvain Regis* (*Cours*, t. i. pp. 60, 61, 72, 145); *Bossuet* (*Connaissance de Dieu*, ch. iii. art. 8); while *Buffier*, *S'Gravesande*, *Crousaz*, *Sinsert*, *Keranflech*, *Genovesi*, with a hundred others, might be adduced as showing that the same distinction had been very generally recognized before Reid; who, far from arrogating to himself the credit of its introduction, remarks that it had been first accurately established by Malebranche.

As already noticed (330 b), it is passing strange that Locke, but truly marvellous that Leibnitz, should have been ignorant of the Cartesian distinction of Sensation and Idea (*Sentiment*, *Idée*). Locke's unacquaintance is shown in his 'Essay,' besides other places, in B. ii. ch. 13, § 25, but, above all, in his 'Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion;' and that of Leibnitz, elsewhere, and in L. ii. ch. 8 of his 'Nouveaux Essais,' but more particularly

in the 'Examen du Sentiment du P. Malebranche,' both of which works he wrote in opposition to the relative treatises of Locke. As for Locke, he seems wholly unaware that any difference subsisted in the Cartesian school, between *Idea* and *Sensation*; while Leibnitz actually thinks that Malebranche 'entend par *sentiment* une perception d'imagination!' In his own philosophy, Leibnitz virtually supersedes the discrimination. I am, therefore, doubly surprised at the observation of M. Royer-Collard, that 'Malebranche is the first among modern philosophers, and, *with Leibnitz*, perhaps the only one before Reid, who accurately distinguished perception from the sensation which is its forerunner and sign.' (Jouffroy's Reid, iii. 329.)

In the Kantian school, and generally in the recent philosophy of Germany, the distinction is adopted, and marked out by the terms *Anschauung* or *Intuitio* for the one apprehension, and *Empfindung* or *Sensatio* for the other. In France and Italy, on the other hand, where the distinction has been no less universally recognized, Reid's expressions, *Perception* and *Sensation*, have become the prevalent; but their ambiguity, I think, ought to have been avoided, by the addition of some such epithet as—*proper*.

Since generalizing the *Law of the coexistence, but the coexistence in an inverse ratio, of Sensation and Perception, of the subjective and objective, and, in general, of feeling and cognition*; I have noticed, besides those adduced above from Aristotle and Galen, other partial observations tending to the same result, by sundry modern philosophers. *Sulzer*, in a paper published in 1759 (*Vermischte Schriften*, vol. i. p. 113), makes the remark, that 'a representation manifests itself more clearly in proportion as it has less the power of exciting in us emotion;' and confirms it by the analogy observed in the gradation of the agreeable and disagreeable sensations. *Kant* in his *Anthropologie* (1798, § 14), in treating of the determinate or organic senses (*Sensus fixi*), says:—'Three of these are rather objective than subjective—i. e. as empirical intuitions, they conduce more to the cognition of the

external object, than they excite the consciousness of the affected organ; but two are rather subjective than objective—i. e. the representation they mediate is more that of enjoyment [or suffering] than of the cognition of the external object. . . . The senses of the former class are those—1) of *Touch* (tactus), 2) of *Sight* (visus), 3) of *Hearing* (auditus); of the latter, those—a) of *Taste* (gustus), b) of *Smell* (olfactus).’ This and the Galenic arrangement will appear less conflictive, if we recollect, that under Touch Galen comprehends Feeling proper, whereas Feeling proper is by Kant relegated to his vital sense or sensus vagus, the *coenæsthesis* or common sense of others. See also *Meiners*, *Untersuchungen*, i. p. 64; *Wetzel*, *Psychologie*, i. § 225; *Fries*, *N. Kritik*, i. § 14–19; *Anthropologie*, i. §§ 27, 28, &c., &c.

M. Ravaisson, in an article of great ability and learning on the ‘Fragments de Philosophie’ which M. Peisse did me the honor to translate, when speaking of the reform of philosophy in France, originating in *Maine de Biran’s* recoil against the Sensualistic doctrine, has the following passage:—‘Maine de Biran commence par séparer profondément de la passion l’activité, que Condillac avait confondue avec elle sous le titre commun de Sensation. La sensation proprement dite est une affection tout passive; l’être qui y serait réduit irait se perdre, s’absorber dans toutes ses modifications; il deviendrait successivement chacune d’elles, il ne se trouverait pas, il ne se distinguerait pas, et jamais ne se connaîtrait lui-même. Bien loin que la connaissance soit la sensation seule, la sensation, en se mêlant à elle, la trouble et l’obscurcit, et elle éclipse à son tour la sensation. De là, la loi que M. Hamilton a signalée dans son remarquable article sur la théorie de la perception: *la sensation et la perception, quoique inséparables, sont en raison inverse l’une de l’autre*. Cette loi fondamentale, Maine de Biran l’avait découverte près de trente ans auparavant, et en avait suivi toutes les applications; il en avait surtout approfondi le principe, savoir, que la sensation résulte de la passion, et que la perception résulte de l’action.’ (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, Nov. 1840.) It is perhaps needless for me to say,

that when I enounced the law in question (in 1830), I had never seen the printed memoir by De Biran, which, indeed, from the circumstances of its publication, was, I believe, inaccessible through the ordinary channels of the trade, and to be found in no library in this country; and now I regret to find that, through procrastination, I must send this chapter to press before having obtained the collective edition of his earlier works, which has recently appeared in Paris. All that I know of De Biran is comprised in the volume edited in 1834 by M. Cousin, from whose kindness I received it. In this, the 'Nouvelles Considérations sur les Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme,' the treatise in which, as his editor informs us, the full and final development of his doctrine is contained, was for the first time published. But neither in that, nor in any other of the accompanying pieces, can I discover any passage besides the following, that may be viewed as anticipating the law of coexistence and inversion:—'Souvent une impression perçue à tel degré cesse de l'être à un degré plus élevé ou lorsqu'elle s'avive au point d'absorber la conscience ou le *moi* lui-même qui la *devient*. Ainsi plus la sensation serait éminemment *animale*, moins elle aurait le caractère vrai d'une perception humaine.'

PART THIRD.

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

CONDITIONED.

“Laudabilior est animus, cui nota est infirmitas propria, quam qui, ea non respecta, mœnia mundi, vias siderum, fundamenta terrarum et fastigia cœlorum, etiam cogniturus, scrutatur.”—ST. AUGUSTINE, (*De Unitate*, proem to the fourth book.)

CHAPTER I.¹

REFUTATION OF THE VARIOUS DOCTRINES OF THE UNCONDITIONED, ESPECIALLY OF COUSIN'S DOCTRINE OF THE INFINITO-ABSOLUTE.*

THE delivery of these Lectures² excited an unparalleled sensation in Paris. Condemned to silence during the reign of Jesuit ascendancy, M. Cousin, after eight years of honorable retirement,

¹ This was originally published in the Edinburgh Review, for October, 1829. It has since been republished in the Discussions, pp. 1-87.—*W.*

² Hamilton is reviewing a work entitled, '*Cours de Philosophie*, par M. Victor Cousin, Professeur de Philosophie à la Faculté des Lettres de Paris. *Introduction à l'Histoire de la Philosophie*, 8vo. Paris, 1823.' See our translation of 'Cousin's History of Philosophy,' vol. i.—*W.*

* [Translated into French, by M. Peisse; into Italian, by S. Lo Gatto: also in Cross's Selections from the Edinburgh Review.

This article did not originate with myself. I was requested to write it by my friend, the late accomplished Editor of the Review, Professor Napier. Personally I felt averse from the task. I was not unaware, that a discussion of the leading doctrine of the book would prove unintelligible, not only to 'the general reader,' but, with few exceptions, to our British metaphysicians at large. But, moreover, I was still farther disinclined to the undertaking, because it would behoove me to come forward in overt opposition to a certain theory, which, however powerfully advocated, I felt altogether unable to admit; whilst its author, M. Cousin, was a philosopher for whose genius and character I already had the warmest admiration,—an admiration which every succeeding year has only augmented, justified, and confirmed. Nor, in saying this, need I make any reservation. For I admire, even where I dissent; and were M. Cousin's speculations on the Absolute utterly abolished, to him would still remain the honor, of doing more himself, and of contributing more to what has been done by others, in the furtherance of an enlightened philosophy, than any other living individual in France—I might say in Europe. Mr. Napier, however, was resolute; it was the first number of the Review under his direction; and the criticism was hastily written. In this country the reasonings were of course not understood, and naturally, for a season, declared incomprehensible. Abroad, in France, Germany, Italy, and latterly in America, the article has been rated higher than it deserves. The illustrious thinker, against one of whose doctrines its argument

not exempt from persecution, had again ascended the chair of Philosophy; and the splendor with which he recommenced his academical career, more than justified the expectation which his recent celebrity as a writer, and the memory of his earlier prelections, had inspired. Two thousand auditors listened, all with admiration, many with enthusiasm, to the eloquent exposition of doctrines intelligible only to the few; and the oral discussion of philosophy awakened in Paris, and in France, an interest unexampled since the days of Abelard. The daily journals found it necessary to gratify, by their earlier summaries, the impatient curiosity of the public; and the lectures themselves, taken in shorthand, and corrected by the Professor, propagated weekly the influence of his instruction to the remotest provinces of the kingdom.

Nor are the pretensions of this doctrine disproportioned to the attention which it has engaged. It professes nothing less than to be the complement and conciliation of all philosophical opinion; and its author claims the glory of placing the key-stone in the arch of science, by the discovery of elements hitherto unobserved among the facts of consciousness.

Before proceeding to consider the claims of M. Cousin to originality, and of his doctrine to truth, it is necessary to say a few words touching the state and relations of philosophy in France.

After the philosophy of Descartes and Malebranche had sunk

is directed, was the first to speak of it in terms which, though I feel their generosity, I am ashamed to quote. I may, however, state, that maintaining always his opinion, M. Cousin (what is rare, especially in metaphysical discussions) declared, that it was neither unfairly combated nor imperfectly understood.—In connection with this criticism, the reader should compare what M. Cousin has subsequently stated in defence and illustration of his system, in his Preface to the new edition of the *Introduction à l'Histoire de la Philosophie*, and Appendix to the fifth lecture (*Œuvres*, Serie II. Tome i. pp. vii. ix., and pp. 112-129);—in his Preface to the second edition, and his Advertisement to the third edition of the *Fragments Philosophiques* (*Œuvres*, S. III. T. iv.)—and in his Prefatory Notice to the *Pensées de Pascal* (*Œuvres*, S. IV. T. i.)—On the other hand, M. Peisse has ably advocated the counter-view, in his Preface and Appendix to the *Fragments de Philosophie*, &c.]

into oblivion, and from the time that Condillac, exaggerating the too partial principles of Locke, had analyzed all knowledge into sensation, Sensualism (or, more correctly, Sensuism), as a psychological theory of the origin of our cognitions, became, in France, not only the dominant, but almost the one exclusive opinion. It was believed that reality and truth were limited to experience, and experience was limited to the sphere of sense; while the very highest faculties of mind were deemed adequately explained when recalled to perceptions, elaborated, purified, sublimated, and transformed. From the mechanical relations of sense with its object, it was attempted to solve the mysteries of will and intelligence; the philosophy of mind was soon viewed as correlative to the physiology of organization. The moral nature of man was at last formally abolished, in its identification with his physical: mind became a reflex of matter; thought a secretion of the brain.

A doctrine so melancholy in its consequences, and founded on principles thus partial and exaggerated, could not be permanent: a reaction was inevitable. The recoil which began about twenty years ago, has been gradually increasing; and now it is perhaps even to be apprehended, that its intensity may become excessive. As the poison was of foreign growth, so also has been the antidote. The doctrine of Condillac was, if not a corruption, a development of the doctrine of Locke; and in returning to a better philosophy, the French are still obeying an impulse communicated from without. This impulsion may be traced to two different sources,—to the philosophy of Scotland, and to the philosophy of Germany.

In Scotland, a philosophy had sprung up, which, though professing, equally with the doctrine of Condillac, to build only on experience, did not, like that doctrine, limit experience to the relations of sense and its objects. Without vindicating to man more than a relative knowledge of existence, and restricting the science of mind to an observation of the fact of consciousness, it, however, analyzed that fact into a greater number of more im-

portant elements than had been recognized in the school of Condillac. It showed that phenomena were revealed in thought which could not be resolved into any modifications of sense,—external or internal. It proved that intelligence supposed principles, which, as the *conditions* of its activity, cannot be the *results* of its operation; that the mind contained knowledges, which, as primitive, universal, necessary, are not to be explained as generalizations from the contingent and individual, about which alone all experience is conversant. The phenomena of mind were thus distinguished from the phenomena of matter; and if the impossibility of materialism were not demonstrated, there was, at least, demonstrated the impossibility of its proof.

This philosophy, and still more the spirit of this philosophy was calculated to exert a salutary influence on the French. And such an influence it did exert. For a time, indeed, the truth operated in silence, and Reid and Stewart had already modified the philosophy of France, before the French were content to acknowledge themselves their disciples. In the works of Dege-rando and Laromiguière, may be traced the influence of Scottish speculation; but it is to Royer-Collard, and, more recently, to Jouffroy, that our countrymen are indebted for a full acknowledgment of their merits, and for the high and increasing estimation in which their doctrines are now held in France. M. Royer-Collard, whose authority has, in every relation, been exerted only for the benefit of his country, and who, once great as a professor, is now not less illustrious as a statesman, in his lectures, advocated with distinguished ability the principles of the Scottish school; modestly content to follow, while no one was more entitled to lead. M. Jouffroy, by his recent translation of the works of Dr. Reid, and by the excellent preface to his version of Mr. Dugald Stewart's 'Outlines of Moral Philosophy,' has likewise powerfully co-operated to the establishment, in France, of a philosophy equally opposed to the exclusive Sensualism of Condillac, and to the exclusive Rationalism of the new German school.

Germany may be regarded, latterly at least, as the metaphysical antipodes of France. The comprehensive and original genius of Leibnitz, itself the ideal abstract of the Teutonic character, had reacted powerfully on the minds of his countrymen; and *Rationalism* (more properly *Intellectualism**), has, from his time, always remained the favorite philosophy of the Germans. On the principle of this doctrine, it is in Reason alone that truth and reality are to be found. Experience affords only the occasions on which intelligence reveals to us the necessary and universal notions of which it is the complement; and these notions constitute at once the foundation of all reasoning, and the guarantee of our whole knowledge of reality. Kant, indeed, pronounced the philosophy of Rationalism a mere fabric of delusion. He declared that a science of existence was beyond the compass of our faculties; that pure reason, as purely subjective,† and con-

* [On the modern commutation of *Intellect* or *Intelligence* (*Noûs*, *Mens*, *Intellectus*, *Verstand*), and *Reason* (*Λόγος*, *Ratio*, *Vernunft*), see Dissertations on Reid, pp. 668, 669, 693. (This has nothing to do with the confusion of *Reason* and *Reasoning*.) Protesting, therefore, against the abuse, I historically employ the terms as they were employed by the philosophers here commemorated. This unfortunate reversal has been propagated to the French philosophy, and also adopted in England by Coleridge and his followers.—I may here notice that I use the term *Understanding*, not for the *noetic* faculty, intellect proper, or place of principles, but for the *dianoetic* or discursive faculty, in its widest signification, for the faculty of relations or comparison; and thus in the meaning in which *Verstand* is now employed by the Germans. In this sense I have been able to be uniformly consistent.]

† In the philosophy of mind, *subjective* denotes what is to be referred to the thinking subject, the Ego; *objective* what belongs to the object of thought, the Non-Ego.—It may be safe, perhaps, to say a few words in vindication of our employment of these terms. By the Greeks the word *ὑποκείμενον* was equivocally employed to express either the *object of knowledge* (the *materia circa quam*), or the *subject of existence* (the *materia in qua*). The exact distinction of *subject* and *object* was first made by the schoolmen; and to the schoolmen the vulgar languages are principally indebted for what precision and analytic subtilty they possess. These correlative terms correspond to the first and most important distinction in philosophy; they embody the original antithesis in consciousness of self and not-self,—a distinction which, in fact, involves the whole science of mind; for psychology is nothing more than a determination of the subjective and the objective, in themselves, and in their reciprocal relations. Thus significant of the primary and most extensive analysis in philosophy, these terms, in their substan-

scious of nothing but itself, was therefore unable to evince the reality of aught beyond the phenomena of its personal modifications. But scarcely had the critical philosopher accomplished the recognition of this important principle, the result of which was, to circumscribe the field of speculation by narrow bounds; than from the very disciples of his school there arose philosophers, who, despising the contracted limits and humble results of a philosophy of observation, re-established, as the predominant opinion, a bolder and more uncompromising Rationalism than any that had ever previously obtained for their countrymen the character of philosophic visionaries—

‘Gens ratione ferox, et mentem pasta chimæris.’*
 (‘Minds fierce for reason, and on fancies fed.’)

tive and adjective forms, passed from the schools into the scientific language of Telesius, Campanella, Berigardus, Gassendi, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Wolf, &c. Deprived of these terms, the Critical philosophy, indeed the whole philosophy of Germany, would be a blank. In this country, though familiarly employed in scientific language, even subsequently to the time of Locke, the adjective forms seem at length to have dropt out of the English tongue. That these words waxed obsolete was perhaps caused by the ambiguity which had gradually crept into the signification of the substantives. *Object*, besides its proper signification, came to be abusively applied to denote *motive, end, final cause* (a meaning not recognized by Johnson). This innovation was probably borrowed from the French, in whose language the word had been similarly corrupted after the commencement of the last century (Dict. de Trevoux, voce *objet*). *Subject* in English, as *sujet* in French, had been also perverted into a synonym for *object*, taken in its proper meaning, and had thus returned to the original ambiguity of the corresponding term in Greek. It is probable that the logical application of the word (*subject of attribution or predication*) facilitated or occasioned this confusion. In using the terms, therefore, we think that an explanation, but no apology, is required. The distinction is of paramount importance, and of infinite application, not only in philosophy proper, but in grammar, rhetoric, criticism, ethics, politics, jurisprudence, theology. It is adequately expressed by no other terms; and if these did not already enjoy a prescriptive right, as denizens of the language, it cannot be denied, that, as strictly analogical, they would be well entitled to sue out their naturalization.—[Not that these terms were formerly always employed in the same signification and contrast which they now obtain. For a history of these variations, see Part II. chapter ii. p. 243 sq.—Since this article was written, the words have in this country re-entered on their ancient rights; they are now in common use.]

* [This line, which was quoted from memory, has, I find, in the original,

Founded by Fichte, but evolved by Schelling, this doctrine regards experience as unworthy of the name of *science*; because, as only of the phenomenal, the transitory, the dependent, it is only of that which, having no reality in itself, cannot be established as a valid basis of certainty and knowledge. Philosophy must, therefore, either be abandoned, or we must be able to seize the One, the Absolute, the Unconditioned, immediately and in itself. And this they profess to do by a kind of *intellectual vision*.* In this act, reason, soaring above the world of sense, but beyond the sphere of personal consciousness, boldly places itself at the very centre of absolute being, with which it claims to be, in fact, identified; and thence surveying existence in itself, and in its relations, unveils to us the nature of the Deity, and explains, from first to last, the derivation of all created things.

M. Cousin is the apostle of Rationalism in France, and we are willing to admit that the doctrine could not have obtained a more eloquent or devoted advocate. For philosophy he has suffered;

'furens;' therefore translated—'Minds mad with reasoning—and fancy-fed.' The author certainly had in his eye the 'ratione insanias' of Terence. It is from a satire by Abraham Remi, who in the former half of the seventeenth century, was professor Royal of Eloquence in the University of Paris; and it referred to the disputants of the Irish College in that illustrious school. The 'Hibernian Logicians' were, indeed, long famed over the continent of Europe, for their acuteness, pugnacity, and barbarism; as is recorded by Patin, Bayle, Le Sage, and many others. The learned Menage was so delighted with the verse, as to declare that he would give his best benefice (and he enjoyed some fat ones) to have written it. It applies, not only with real, but with verbal accuracy, to the German *Rationalists*; who in Philosophy (as Aristotle has it), 'in making reason omnipotent, show their own impotence of reason,' and in Theology (as Charles II. said of Isaac Vossius),—'believe every thing but the Bible.']

* [*Intellectuelle Anschauung*.]—This is doubly wrong.—1°, In grammatical rigor, the word in German ought to have been '*intellektuale*.' 2°, In philosophical consistency the intuition ought to have been called by its authors (Fichte and Schelling), *intellectual*. For, though this be, in fact, absolutely more correct, yet relatively it is a blunder; for the intuition, as intended by them, is of their higher faculty, the Reason (*Vernunft*), and not of their lower, the Understanding or Intellect (*Verstand*). In modern German Philosophy, *Verstand* is always translated by *Intellectus*; and this again corresponds to *Nóv̄s*.]

to her ministry he has consecrated himself—devoted without reserve his life and labors. Neither has he approached the sanctuary with unwashed hands. The editor of Proclus and Descartes, the translator and interpreter of Plato, and the promised expositor of Kant, will not be accused of partiality in the choice of his pursuits; while his two works, under the title of *Philosophical Fragments*, bear ample evidence to the learning, elegance, and distinguished ability of their author. Taking him all in all, in France M. Cousin stands alone: nor can we contemplate his character and accomplishments, without the sincerest admiration, even while we dissent from the most prominent principle of his philosophy. The development of his system, in all its points, betrays the influence of German speculation on his opinions. His theory is not, however, a scheme of exclusive Rationalism; on the contrary, the peculiarity of his doctrine consists in the attempt to combine the philosophy of experience, and the philosophy of pure reason, into one. The following is a concise statement of the fundamental positions of his system.

Reason, or intelligence, has three integrant elements, affording three regulative principles, which at once constitute its nature, and govern its manifestations. These *three ideas* severally suppose each other, and, as inseparable, are equally essential and equally primitive. They are recognized by Aristotle and by Kant, in their several attempts to analyze intelligence into its principles; but though the categories of both philosophers comprise all the elements of thought, in neither list are these elements naturally co-arranged, or reduced to an ultimate simplicity.

The *first* of these ideas, elements, or laws, though fundamentally one, our author variously expresses, by the terms *unity, identity, substance, absolute cause, the infinite, pure thought, &c.*; (we would briefly call it the *unconditioned*.) The *second*, he denominates *plurality, difference, phenomenon, relative cause, the finite, determined thought, &c.*; (we would style it the *conditioned*.) These two elements are relative and correlative. The *first*, though absolute, is not conceived as existing absolutely in

itself ; it is conceived as an absolute cause, as a cause which cannot but pass into operation ; in other words, the first element must manifest itself in the second. The two ideas are thus connected together as cause and effect ; each is only realized through the other ; and this *their connection*, or *correlation*, is the *third* integrant element of intelligence.

Reason, or intelligence, in which these ideas appear, and which, in fact, they make up, is not individual, is not ours, is not even human ; it is absolute, it is divine. What is personal to us, is our free and voluntary activity ; what is not free and not voluntary, is adventitious to man, and does not constitute an integrant part of his individuality. Intelligence is conversant with truth ; truth, as necessary and universal, is not the creature of my volition ; and reason, which, as the subject of truth, is also universal and necessary, is consequently impersonal. We see, therefore, by a light which is not ours, and reason is a revelation of God in man. The ideas of which we are conscious, belong not to us, but to absolute intelligence. They constitute, in truth, the very mode and manner of its existence. For consciousness is only possible under plurality and difference, and intelligence is only possible through consciousness.

The divine nature is essentially comprehensible. For the three ideas constitute the nature of the Deity ; and the very nature of ideas is to be conceived. God, in fact, exists to us, only in so far as he is known ; and the degree of our knowledge must always determine the measure of our faith. The relation of God to the universe is therefore manifest, and the creation easily understood. To create, is not to make something out of nothing, for this is contradictory, but to originate from self. We create so often as we exert our free causality, and something is created by us, when something begins to be by virtue of the free causality which belongs to us. To create, is, therefore, to cause, not with nothing, but with the very essence of our being—with our force, our will, our personality. The divine creation is of the same character. God, as he is a cause, is able to create ; as he is an absolute cause,

he cannot but create. In creating the universe, he does not draw it from nothing; he draws it from himself. The creation of the universe is thus necessary; it is a manifestation of the Deity, but not the Deity absolutely in himself; it is God passing into activity, but not exhausted in the act.

The universe created, the principles which determined the creation are found still to govern the worlds of matter and mind.

Two ideas and their connection explain the intelligence of God; two laws in their counterpoise and correlation explain the material universe. The law of *Expansion* is the movement of unity to variety; the law of *Attraction* is the return of variety to unity.

In the world of mind the same analogy is apparent. The study of consciousness is psychology. Man is the microcosm of existence; consciousness, within a narrow focus, concentrates a knowledge of the universe and of God; psychology is thus the abstract of all science, human and divine. As in the external world, all phenomena may be reduced to the two great laws of Action and Reaction; so, in the internal, all the facts of consciousness may be reduced to one fundamental fact, comprising, in like manner, two principles and their correlation; and these principles are again the *One* or the *Infinite*, the *Many* or the *Finite*, and the *Connection of the infinite and finite*.

In every act of consciousness we distinguish a *Self* or *Ego*, and something different from self, a *Non-ego*; each limited and modified by the other. These, together, constitute the finite element. But at the same instant, when we are conscious of these existences, plural, relative, and contingent, we are conscious, likewise, of a superior unity in which they are contained, and by which they are explained;—a unity absolute as they are conditioned, substantive as they are phenomenal, and an infinite cause as they are finite causes. This unity is God. The fact of consciousness is thus a complex phenomenon, comprehending three several terms: 1°, The idea of the Ego and Non-ego as Finite; 2°, The idea of something else as Infinite; and, 3°, The idea of the Rela-

tion of the finite element to the infinite. These elements are revealed in themselves and in their mutual connection, in every act of primitive or Spontaneous consciousness. They can also be reviewed by Reflection in a voluntary act; but here reflection distinguishes, it does not create. The three ideas, the three categories of intelligence, are given in the original act of instinctive apperception, obscurely, indeed, and without contrast. Reflection analyzes and discriminates the elements of this primary synthesis; and as will is the condition of reflection, and will at the same time is personal, the categories, as obtained through reflection, have consequently the appearance of being also personal and subjective. It was this personality of reflection that misled Kant: caused him to overlook or misinterpret the fact of spontaneous consciousness; to individualize intelligence; and to collect under this personal reason all that is conceived by us as necessary and universal. But as, in the spontaneous intuition of reason, there is nothing voluntary, and consequently nothing personal; and as the truths which intelligence here discovers, come not from ourselves; we have a right, up to a certain point, to impose these truths on others as revelations from on high; while, on the contrary, reflection being wholly personal, it would be absurd to impose on others what is the fruit of our individual operations. Spontaneity is the principle of religion; reflection of philosophy. Men agree in spontaneity; they differ in reflection. The former is necessarily veracious; the latter is naturally delusive.

The condition of Reflection is separation: it illustrates by distinguishing; it considers the different elements apart, and while it contemplates one, it necessarily throws the others out of view. Hence, not only the possibility, but the necessity of error. The primitive unity, supposing no distinction, admits of no error; reflection in discriminating the elements of thought, and in considering one to the exclusion of others, occasions error, and a variety in error. He who exclusively contemplates the element of the Infinite, despises him who is occupied with the idea of the Finite; and *vice versa*. It is the wayward development of the

various elements of intelligence, which determines the imperfections and varieties of individual character. Men under this partial and exclusive development, are but fragments of that humanity which can only be fully realized in the harmonious evolution of all its principles. What Reflection is to the individual, History is to the human race. The difference of an epoch consists exclusively in the partial development of some one element of intelligence in a prominent portion of mankind; and as there are only three such elements, so there are only three grand epochs in the history of man.

A knowledge of the elements of reason, of their relations and of their laws, constitutes not merely Philosophy, but is the condition of a History of Philosophy. The history of human reason, or the history of philosophy, must be rational and philosophic. It must be philosophy itself, with all its elements, in all their relations, and under all their laws, represented in striking characters by the hands of time and of history, in the manifested progress of the human mind. The discovery and enumeration of all the elements of intelligence enable us to survey the progress of speculation from the loftiest vantage ground; it reveals to us the laws by which the development of reflection or philosophy is determined; and it supplies us with a canon by which the approximation of the different systems to the truth may be finally ascertained. And what are the results? *Sensualism, Idealism, Skepticism, Mysticism*, are all partial and exclusive views of the elements of intelligence. But each is false only as it is incomplete. They are all true in what they affirm, all erroneous in what they deny. Though hitherto opposed, they are, consequently, not incapable of coalition; and, in fact, can only obtain their consummation in a powerful *Eclecticism*—a system which shall comprehend them all. This Eclecticism is realized in the doctrine previously developed; and the possibility of such a catholic philosophy was first afforded by the discovery of M. Cousin, made so long ago as the year 1817,—‘that consciousness contained many more phenomena than had previously been suspected.’

The present course is at once an exposition of these principles, as a true theory of philosophy, and an illustration of the mode in which this theory is to be applied, as a rule of criticism in the history of philosophical opinion. As the justice of the application must be always subordinate to the truth of the principle, we shall confine ourselves exclusively to a consideration of M. Cousin's system, viewed absolutely in itself. This, indeed, we are afraid will prove comparatively irksome; and, therefore, solicit indulgence, not only for the unpopular nature of the discussion, but for the employment of language which, from the total neglect of these speculations in Britain, will necessarily appear abstruse—not merely to the general reader.

Now, it is manifest that the whole doctrine of M. Cousin is involved in the proposition,—*that the Unconditioned, the Absolute, the Infinite, is immediately known in consciousness, and this by difference, plurality, and relation.* The unconditioned, as an original element of knowledge, is the generative principle of his system, but common to him with others; whereas the mode in which the possibility of this knowledge is explained, affords its discriminating peculiarity. The other positions of his theory, as deduced from this assumption, may indeed be disputed, even if the antecedent be allowed; but this assumption disproved, every consequent in his theory is therewith annihilated. The recognition of the absolute as a constitutive principle of intelligence, our author regards as at once the condition and the end of philosophy; and it is on the discovery of this principle in the fact of consciousness, that he vindicates to himself the glory of being the founder of the new *eclectic*, or the one catholic, philosophy. The determination of this cardinal point will thus briefly satisfy us touching the claim and character of the system. To explain the nature of the problem itself, and the sufficiency of the solution propounded by M. Cousin, it is necessary to premise a statement of the opinions which may be entertained regarding the Unconditioned, as an immediate object of knowledge and of thought.

These opinions may be reduced to *four*.—1°, The Unconditioned is incognizable and inconceivable; its notion being only negative of the conditioned, which last can alone be positively known or conceived.—2°, It is not an object of knowledge; but its notion, as a regulative principle of the mind itself, is more than a mere negation of the conditioned.—3°, It is cognizable, but not conceivable; it can be known by a sinking back into identity with the absolute, but is incomprehensible by consciousness and reflection, which are only of the relative and the different.—4°, It is cognizable and conceivable by consciousness and reflection, under relation, difference, and plurality.

The first of these opinions we regard as true; the second is held by Kant; the third by Schelling; and the last by our author.

1. In our opinion the mind can conceive, and consequently can know, only the *limited, and the conditionally limited*. The unconditionally unlimited, or the *Infinite*, the unconditionally limited, or the *Absolute*, cannot positively be construed to the mind; they can be conceived, only by a thinking away from, or abstraction of, those very conditions under which thought itself is realized; consequently the notion of the Unconditioned is only negative,—negative of the conceivable itself. For example, on the one hand we can positively conceive, neither an absolute whole, that is, a whole so great, that we cannot also conceive it as a relative part of a still greater whole; nor an absolute part, that is, a part so small, that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible into smaller parts. On the other hand, we cannot positively represent, or realize, or construe to the mind (as here understanding and imagination coincide),* an infinite whole,

* [The Understanding, thought proper, notion, concept, &c., may coincide or not with Imagination, representation proper, image, &c. The two faculties do not coincide in a general notion; for we cannot represent Man or Horse in an actual image without individualizing the universal; and thus contradiction emerges. But in the individual, say, Socrates or Bucephalus, they do coincide; for I see no valid ground why we should not *think*, in the strict sense of the word, or *conceive* the individuals which we *represent*. In

for this could only be done by the infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes, which would itself require an infinite time for its accomplishment; nor, for the same reason, can we follow out in thought an infinite divisibility of parts. The result is the same, whether we apply the process to limitation in *space*, in *time*, or in *degree*.¹ The unconditional negation, and the unconditional affirmation of limitation; in other words, the *infinite* and the *absolute*, *properly so called*,* are thus equally inconceivable to us.

like manner there is no mutual contradiction between the image and the concept of the Infinite or Absolute, if these be otherwise possible; for there is not necessarily involved the incompatibility of the one act of cognition with the other.]

* It is right to observe, that though we are of opinion that the terms, *Infinite* and *Absolute*, and *Unconditioned*, ought not to be confounded, and accurately distinguish them in the statement of our own view; yet, in speaking of the doctrines of those by whom they are indifferently employed, we have not thought it necessary, or rather, we have found it impossible, to adhere to the distinction. The Unconditioned in our use of language denotes the genus of which the Infinite and Absolute are the species.

[The term Absolute is of a twofold (if not threefold) ambiguity, corresponding to the double (or treble) signification of the word in Latin.

1. *Absolutum* means what is *freed or loosed*; in which sense the Absolute will be what is aloof from relation, comparison, limitation, condition, dependence, &c., and thus is tantamount to τὸ ἀπόλυτον of the lower Greeks. In this meaning the Absolute is not opposed to the Infinite.

2. *Absolutum* means *finished, perfected, completed*; in which sense the Absolute will be what is out of relation, &c., as finished, perfect, complete, total, and thus corresponds to τὸ ὅλον and τὸ τέλειον of Aristotle. In this acceptation,—and it is that in which for myself I exclusively use it,—the Absolute is diametrically opposed to, is contradictory of, the Infinite.

Besides these two meanings, there is to be noticed the use of the word, for the most part in its adverbial form;—*absolutely (absolute)* in the sense of *simply, simpliciter* (ἀπλῶς), that is, considered in and for itself—considered not in relation. This holds a similar analogy to the two former meanings of Absolute, which the Indefinite (τὸ ἀόριστον) does to the Infinite (τὸ ἄπειρον). It is subjective as they are objective; it is in our thought as they are in their own existence. This application is to be discounted, as here irrelevant.]

¹ The distinction between the *absolute* and the *infinite* is one of the most important points in Hamilton's philosophy. Inasmuch as it is somewhat difficult to apprehend this distinction, we will illustrate it, with reference to the three species of quantity that constitute the relation of Existence. In regard to *time* :—the distinction may be made in three ways :—1^o, we cannot conceive it as having an *absolute* commencement, or an *infinite* non-com-

As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call the *conditioned*) is thus the only possible object of knowledge and of positive thought—thought necessarily supposes conditions. *To think is to condition*; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the possibility of thought. For, as the greyhound cannot outstrip his shadow, nor (by a more appropriate simile) the eagle out-soar the atmosphere in which he floats, and by which alone he may be supported; so the mind cannot transcend that sphere of limitation, within and through which exclusively the possibility of thought is realized. Thought is only of the conditioned; because, as we have said, to think is simply to condition. The *absolute* is conceived merely by a negation of conceivability; and all that we know, is only known as

— ‘won from the void and formless *infinite*.’

How, indeed, it could ever be doubted that thought is only of the conditioned, may well be deemed a matter of the profoundest admiration. Thought cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and object of thought, known only in correlation, and mutually limiting each other; while, independently of this, all that we know either of subject or object, either of mind or matter, is only a knowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of the different, of the modified, of the phenomenal. We admit that the consequence of this doctrine is,—that philosophy, if viewed as more than a science of the conditioned, is impossible. Departing from

mencement; 2°, we cannot conceive it as having an *absolute* termination, or an *infinite* non-termination; 3°, we cannot conceive it as an *absolute* minimum, or as one of the parts of an *infinite* division. In regard to *space*;—the distinction may be made in two ways:—1°, we cannot conceive it as a whole, *absolutely* bounded, or *infinitely* unbounded; 2°, we cannot conceive it as a part, which is *absolutely* indivisible, or is the product of an *infinite* division. In regard to *degrees*;—the distinction may also be made in two ways:—1°, we cannot conceive it as *absolutely* greatest, or, in increase, as *infinitely* unlimited; 2°, we cannot conceive it as an *absolute* least, or, in diminution, as *infinitely* without limit.—The mind takes cognizance of no other quantities, and it is impossible to carry the distinction any further.—*W.*

the particular, we admit that we can never, in our highest generalizations, rise above the finite ; that our knowledge, whether of mind or matter, can be nothing more than a knowledge of the relative manifestations of an existence, which in itself it is our highest wisdom to recognize as beyond the reach of philosophy, — in the language of St. Austin,—‘*cognoscendo ignorari, et ignorando cognosci.*’

The conditioned is the mean between two extremes,—two inconditionates, exclusive of each other, neither of which *can be conceived as possible*, but of which, on the principles of contradiction and excluded middle, one *must be admitted as necessary*. On this opinion, therefore, reason is shown to be weak, but not deceitful. The mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions subversive of each other, as equally possible ; but only, as unable to understand as possible, either of two extremes ; one of which, however, on the ground of their mutual repugnance, it is compelled to recognize as true. We are thus taught the salutary lesson, that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of existence ; and are warned from recognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessarily coextensive with the horizon of our faith. And by a wonderful revelation, we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality.*

2. The second opinion, that of KANT, is fundamentally the same as the preceding. Metaphysic, strictly so denominated, the

* [True, therefore, are the declarations of a pious philosophy:—‘A God understood would be no God at all;’—‘To think that God is, as we can think him to be, is blasphemy.’—The Divinity, in a certain sense, is revealed ; in a certain sense is concealed : He is at once known and unknown. But the last and highest consecration of all true religion, must be an altar—‘*Ἀγνώστῳ Θεῷ*—‘*To the unknown and unknowable God.*’ In this consummation, nature and revelation, paganism and Christianity, are at one ; and from either source the testimonies are so numerous that I must refrain from quoting any.—Am I wrong in thinking that M. Cousin would not repudiate this doctrine ?]

philosophy of Existence, is virtually the doctrine of the unconditioned. From Xenophanes to Leibnitz, the infinite, the absolute, the unconditioned, formed the highest principle of speculation; but from the dawn of philosophy in the school of Elea until the rise of the Kantian philosophy, no serious attempt was made to investigate the nature and origin of this notion (or notions) as a psychological phenomenon. Before Kant, philosophy was rather a deduction from principles, than an inquiry concerning principles themselves. At the head of every system a cognition figured which the philosopher assumed in conformity to his views; but it was rarely considered necessary, and more rarely attempted, to ascertain the genesis, and determine the domain, of this notion or judgment, previous to application. In his first *Critique*, Kant undertakes a regular survey of consciousness. He professes to analyze the conditions of human knowledge,—to mete out its limits,—to indicate its point of departure,—and to determine its possibility. That Kant accomplished much, it would be prejudice to deny; nor is his service to philosophy the less, that his success has been more decided in the subversion of error than in the establishment of truth. The result of his examination was the abolition of the metaphysical sciences,—of rational psychology, ontology, speculative theology, &c., as founded on mere *petitiones principiorum*. Existence is revealed to us only under specific modifications, and these are known only under the conditions of our faculties of knowledge. ‘Things in themselves,’ Matter, Mind, God,—all, in short, that is not finite, relative, and phenomenal, as bearing no analogy to our faculties, is beyond the verge of our knowledge. Philosophy was thus restricted to the observation and analysis of the phenomena of consciousness; and what is not explicitly or implicitly given in a fact of consciousness, is condemned, as transcending the sphere of a legitimate speculation. A knowledge of the unconditioned is declared impossible; either immediately, as a notion, or mediately as an inference. A demonstration of the absolute from the relative is logically absurd; as in such a syllogism we must collect in the

conclusion what is not distributed in the premises : And an immediate knowledge of the unconditioned is equally impossible.— But here we think his reasoning complicated, and his reduction incomplete. We must explain ourselves.

While we regard as conclusive, Kant's analysis of Time and Space into conditions of thought, we cannot help viewing his deduction of the 'Categories of Understanding,' and the 'Ideas of Speculative Reason,' as the work of a great but perverse ingenuity. The categories of understanding are merely subordinate forms of the conditioned. Why not, therefore, generalize the *Condition—Existence conditioned*, as the supreme category, or categories, of thought?—and if it were necessary to analyze this form into its subaltern applications, why not develop these immediately out of the generic principle, instead of preposterously, and by a forced and partial analogy, deducing the laws of the understanding from a questionable division of logical propositions? Why distinguish Reason (*Vernunft*) from Understanding (*Verstand*), simply on the ground that the former is conversant about, or rather tends towards, the unconditioned; when it is sufficiently apparent, that the unconditioned is conceived only as the negation of the conditioned, and also that the conception of contradictories is one? In the Kantian philosophy both faculties perform the same function, both seek the one in the many;—the Idea (*Idee*) is only the Concept (*Begriff*) sublimated into the inconceivable; Reason only the Understanding which has 'overleaped itself.' Kant has clearly shown, that the idea of the unconditioned can have no objective reality,—that it conveys no knowledge,—and that it involves the most insoluble contradictions. But he ought to have shown that the unconditioned had no objective application, because it had, in fact, no subjective affirmation,—that it afforded no real knowledge, because it contained nothing even conceivable,—and that it is self-contradictory, because it is not a notion, either simple or positive, but only a fasciculus of negations—negations of the conditioned in its opposite extremes, and bound together merely by the aid of lan-

guage and their common character of incomprehensibility. And while he appropriated Reason as a specific faculty to take cognizance of these negations, hypostatized as positive, under the Platonic name of *Ideas*; so also, as a pendant to his deduction of the categories of Understanding from a logical division of propositions, he deduced the classification and number of these ideas of Reason from a logical division of syllogisms.—Kant thus stands intermediate between those who view the notion of the absolute as the instinctive affirmation of an encentric intuition, and those who regard it as the factitious negative of an eccentric generalization.

Were we to adopt from the Critical Philosophy the idea of analyzing thought into its fundamental conditions, and were we to carry the reduction of Kant to what we think its ultimate simplicity, we would discriminate thought into *positive* and *negative*, according as it is conversant about the conditioned or unconditioned. This, however, would constitute a logical, not a psychological distinction; as positive and negative in thought are known at once, and by the same intellectual act. The twelve Categories of the Understanding would be thus included under the former; the three Ideas of Reason under the latter; and to this intent the contrast between understanding and reason would disappear. Finally, rejecting the arbitrary limitation of time and space to the sphere of sense, we would express under the formula of—*THE CONDITIONED IN TIME AND SPACE*—a definition of the conceivable, and an enumeration of the three categories of thought.¹

The imperfection and partiality of Kant's analysis are betrayed in its consequences. His doctrine leads to absolute skepticism. Speculative reason, on Kant's own admission, is an organ of mere delusion. The idea of the unconditioned, about which it is conversant, is shown to involve insoluble contradictions, and yet to be the legitimate product of intelligence. Hume has well ob-

¹ See the next chapter, § I., for a more matured view of these categories or conditions of thought.—*W.*

served, 'that it matters not whether we possess a false reason, or no reason at all.' If 'the light that leads astray, be light from heaven,' what are we to believe? If our intellectual nature be perfidious in one revelation, it must be presumed deceitful in all; nor is it possible for Kant to establish the existence of God, Free-will, and Immortality, on the presumed veracity of reason, in a practical relation, after having himself demonstrated its mendacity in a speculative.

Kant had annihilated the older metaphysic, but the germ of a more visionary doctrine of the absolute, than any of those refuted, was contained in the bosom of his own philosophy. He had slain the body, but had not exorcised the spectre of the absolute; and this spectre has continued to haunt the schools of Germany even to the present day. The philosophers were not content to abandon their metaphysic; to limit philosophy to an observation of phenomena, and to the generalization of these phenomena into laws. The theories of Bouterweck (in his earlier works), of Bardili, of Reinhold, of Fichte, of Schelling, of Hegel, and of sundry others, are just so many endeavors, of greater or of less ability, to fix the absolute as a positive in knowledge; but the absolute, like the water in the sieves of the Danaides, has always hitherto run through as a negative into the abyss of nothing.

3. Of these theories, that of SCHELLING is the only one in regard to which it is now necessary to say any thing. His opinion constitutes the third of those enumerated touching the knowledge of the absolute; and the following is a brief statement of its principal positions:

While the lower sciences are of the relative and conditioned, *Philosophy*, as the science of sciences, must be of *the absolute—the unconditioned*. Philosophy, therefore, supposes a science of the absolute. Is the absolute beyond our knowledge?—then is philosophy itself impossible.

But how, it is objected, can the absolute be *known*? The absolute, as unconditioned, identical, and one, cannot be cognized under conditions, by difference and plurality. It cannot, there-

fore, be known, if the subject of knowledge be distinguished from the object of knowledge; in a knowledge of the absolute, existence and knowledge must be identical; the absolute can only be known, if adequately known, and it can only be adequately known, by the absolute itself. But is this possible? We are wholly ignorant of existence in itself:—the mind knows nothing, except in parts, by quality, and difference, and relation; consciousness supposes the subject contradistinguished from the object of thought; the abstraction of this contrast is a negation of consciousness; and the negation of consciousness is the annihilation of thought itself. The alternative is therefore unavoidable:—either finding the absolute, we lose ourselves; or retaining self and individual consciousness, we do not reach the absolute.

All this Schelling frankly admits. He admits that a knowledge of the absolute is impossible, in personality and consciousness: he admits that, as the understanding knows, and can know, only by consciousness, and consciousness only by difference, we, as conscious and understanding, can apprehend, can conceive only the conditioned; and he admits that, only if man be himself the infinite, can the infinite be known by him:

‘Nec sentire Deum, nisi qui pars ipse Deorum est;’*
(‘None can feel God, who shares not in the Godhead.’)

* [This line is from *Manilius*. But as a statement of Schelling’s doctrine it is inadequate; for on his doctrine the Deity can be known only if fully known, and a full knowledge of deity is possible only to the absolute deity—that is, not to a sharer in the Godhead. *Manilius* has likewise another (poetically) laudable line, of a similar, though less exceptionable, purport:

‘Exemplumque Dei quisque est in imagine parva;’
(‘Each is himself a miniature of God.’)

For we should not recoil to the opposite extreme; and, though man be not identical with the Deity, still is he ‘created in the image of God.’ It is, indeed, only through an analogy of the human with the Divine nature, that we are percipient and recipient of Divinity. As *St. Prosper* has it:—‘Nemo possidet Deum, nisi qui possidetur a Deo.’—So *Seneca*:—‘In unoquoque virorum honorum habitat Deus.’—So *Plotinus*:—‘Virtue tending to consummation, and irradiated in the soul by moral wisdom, reveals a God; but a God destitute of true virtue is an empty name.’—So *Jacobi*:—‘From the enjoyment of virtue springs the idea of a virtuous; from the enjoyment of freedom, the idea of a free; from the enjoyment of life, the idea of a living;

But Schelling contends that there is a capacity of knowledge above consciousness, and higher than the understanding, and that this knowledge is competent to human *reason, as identical with the Absolute itself*. In this act of knowledge, which, after Fichte, he calls the *Intellectual Intuition*, there exists no distinction of subject and object,—no contrast of knowledge and existence; all difference is lost in absolute indifference,—all plurality in absolute unity. The Intuition itself,—Reason,—and the Absolute are identified. The absolute exists only as known by reason, and reason knows only as being itself the absolute.

This act (act!) is necessarily ineffable :

‘The vision and the faculty divine,’

to be known, must be experienced. It cannot be conceived by the understanding, because beyond its sphere; it cannot be described, because its essence is identity, and all description supposes discrimination. To those who are unable to rise beyond a philosophy of reflection, Schelling candidly allows that the doctrine of the absolute can appear only a series of contradictions; and he has at least the negative merit of having clearly exposed the impossibility of a philosophy of the unconditioned, as founded on a knowledge by difference, if he utterly fails in positively proving the possibility of such a philosophy, as founded on a knowledge in identity, through an absorption into, and vision of, the absolute.

from the enjoyment of the divine, the idea of a godlike—and of a God.’—
So *Goethe* :

‘Waer nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,
Wie koennten wir das Licht erblicken?
Lebt’ nicht in uns des Gottes eigne Kraft,
Wie koennte uns das Goettliches entzuecken?’

So *Kant* and many others. (Thus morality and religion, necessity and atheism, rationally go together.)—The Platonists and Fathers have indeed finely said, that ‘God is the life of the soul, as the soul is the life of the body.’

‘Vita Animæ Deus est; hæc Corporis. Hæc fugiente,
Solvitur hoc; perit hæc, destituenta Deo.’

These verses are preserved to us from an ancient poet by John of Salisbury, and they denote the comparison of which Buchanan has made so admirable a use in his *Calvini Epicedium*.]

Out of Laputa or the Empire it would be idle to enter into an articulate refutation of a theory, which founds philosophy on the annihilation of consciousness, and on the identification of the unconscious philosopher with God. The intuition of the absolute is manifestly the work of an arbitrary abstraction, and of a self-delusive imagination. To reach the point of indifference,—by abstraction we annihilate the object, and by abstraction we annihilate the subject, of consciousness. But what remains?—*Nothing*. ‘*Nil conscimus nobis.*’ We then hypostatize the zero; we baptize it with the name of *Absolute*; and conceit ourselves that we contemplate absolute existence, when we only speculate absolute privation.* This truth has been indeed virtually confessed by the two most distinguished followers of Schelling. Hegel at last abandons the intuition, and regards ‘*pure or undetermined existence*’ as convertible with ‘*pure nothing*,’ whilst Oken, if he adhere to the intuition, intrepidly identifies the Deity or Absolute with zero. God, he makes the Nothing, the Nothing, he makes God;

‘And Naught
Is every thing, and every thing is Naught.†

* [The Infinite and Absolute are only the names of two counter imbecillities of the human mind, transmuted into properties of the nature of things,—of two subjective negations, converted into objective affirmations. We tire ourselves, either in adding to, or in taking from. Some, more reasonably, call the thing unfinishable—*infinite*; others, less rationally, call it finished—*absolute*. But in both cases, the metastasis is in itself irrational. Not, however, in the highest degree; for the subjective contradictories were not at first objectified by the same philosophers; and it is the crowning irrationality of the Infinito-absolutists, that they have not merely accepted as objective what is only subjective, but quietly assumed as the same, what are not only different but conflictive, not only conflictive, but repugnant. Seneca (Ep. 118) has given the true genealogy of the original fictions; but at his time the consummative union of the two had not been attempted. ‘*Ubi animus aliquid diu protulit, et magnitudinem ejus sequendo lassatus est, infinitum coepit vocari. Eodem modo, aliquid difficulter secari cogitavimus, novissime, crescente difficultate, insecabile inventum est.*’]

† [From the *Rejected Addresses*. ‘Their ingenious authors have embodied a jest in the very words by which Oken, in sober seriousness, propounds the first and greatest of philosophical truths. Jacobi (or Neeb?) might well say, that, in reading this last consummation of German speculation, he did not

Nor does the negative chimera prove less fruitful than the positive; for Schelling has found it as difficult to evolve the one into the many, as his disciples to deduce the universe and its contents from the first self-affirmation of the 'primordial Nothing.'

'Miri homines! *Nihil* esse aliquid statuante negentve;
Quodque negant statuunt, quod statuuntque negant.'

To Schelling, indeed, it has been impossible, without gratuitous and even contradictory assumptions, to explain the deduction of the finite from the infinite. By no *salto mortale* has he been able to clear the magic circle in which he had inclosed himself. Unable to connect the unconditioned and the conditioned by any natural correlation, he has variously attempted to account for the phenomenon of the universe, either by imposing a necessity of self-manifestation on the absolute, *i. e.* by conditioning the unconditioned; or by postulating a fall of the finite from the infinite, *i. e.* by begging the very fact which his hypothesis professed its exclusive ability to explain. The veil of Isis is thus still unwidrawn;* and the question proposed by Orpheus at the dawn of speculation will probably remain unanswered at its setting:

'Πῶς ἐέ μοι ἕν τι τὰ πᾶν' ἔσται καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστων;'
('How can I think each, separate, and all, one?')

In like manner, annihilating consciousness in order to recon-

know whether he were standing on his head or his feet. The book in which Oken so ingeniously deduces the All from the Nothing, has, I see, been lately translated into English, and published by the Ray Society (I think). The statement of the paradox is, indeed, somewhat softened in the second edition, from which, I presume, the version is made. Not that Oken and Hegel are original even in the absurdity. For as Varro right truly said:—'*Nihil tam absurde dici potest, quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum;*' so the Intuition of God = the Absolute, = the Nothing, we find asserted by the lower Platonists, by the Buddhists, and by Jacob Boehme.]

* [Isis appears as the Ægypto-Grecian symbol of the Unconditioned. ('*Ἴσις—Ἰσία—Ὀύσια: Ἰστίον, —γνώσις τοῦ ὄντος.* Plut. I. et O.) In the temple of Athene-Isis, at Sais, on the fane there stood this sublime inscription:

I AM ALL THAT WAS, AND IS, AND SHALL BE;

NOR MY VEIL, HAS IT BEEN WITHDRAWN BY MORTAL.

('*Ἐγὼ εἶμι πᾶν τὸ γεγονός, καὶ ὄν, καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ τὸν ἐμὸν πέπλον οὐδεὶς πᾶθνητός ἀπκάλυψε.*')]

struct it, Schelling has never yet been able to connect the faculties conversant about the conditioned, with the faculty of absolute knowledge. One simple objection strikes us as decisive, although we do not remember to have seen it alleged. 'We awaken,' says Schelling, 'from the Intellectual Intuition as from a state of death; we awaken by Reflection, that is, through a compulsory return to ourselves.*' We cannot, at the same moment, be in the intellectual intuition and in common consciousness; we must therefore be able to connect them by an act of memory—of recollection. But how can there be a *remembrance* of the absolute and its intuition? as out of time, and space, and relation, and difference, it is admitted that the absolute cannot be construed to the understanding. But as remembrance is only possible under the conditions of the understanding, it is consequently impossible to remember any thing anterior to the moment when we awaken into consciousness; and the *clairvoyance* of the absolute, even granting its reality, is thus, after the crisis, as if it had never been. We defy all solution of this objection.

4. What has now been stated may in some degree enable the reader to apprehend the relations in which our author stands, both to those who deny and to those who admit a knowledge of the absolute. If we compare the philosophy of Cousin with the philosophy of Schelling, we at once perceive that the former is a disciple, though by no means a servile disciple, of the latter. The scholar, though enamored with his master's system as a whole, is sufficiently aware of the two insuperable difficulties of that theory. He saw that if he pitched the absolute so high, it was impossible to deduce from it the relative; and he felt, probably, that the Intellectual Intuition—a stumbling-block to himself—would be arrant foolishness in the eyes of his countrymen. Cousin and Schelling agree, that as philosophy is the science of the unconditioned, the unconditioned must be within the compass of science. They agree that the unconditioned is known,

* In Fichte's u. Nieithhammer's Phil. Journ., vol. iii. p. 214.

and immediately known; and they agree that intelligence, as competent to the unconditioned, is impersonal, infinite, divine. But while they coincide in the fact of the absolute, as known, they are diametrically opposed as to the mode in which they attempt to realize this knowledge; each regarding, as the climax of contradiction, the manner in which the other endeavors to bring human reason and the absolute into proportion. According to Schelling, Cousin's absolute is only a relative; according to Cousin, Schelling's knowledge of the absolute is a negation of thought itself. Cousin declares the condition of all knowledge to be plurality and difference; and Schelling, that the condition, under which alone a knowledge of the absolute becomes possible, is indifference and unity. The one thus denies a notion of the absolute to consciousness; whilst the other affirms that consciousness is implied in every act of intelligence. Truly, we must view each as triumphant over the other; and the result of this mutual neutralization is—that the absolute, of which both assert a knowledge, is for us incognizable.*

* [*Quod genus hoc pugnæ, qua victor victus uterque!*]

is still further exhibited in the mutual refutation of the two great apostles of the Absolute, in Germany—Schelling and Hegel. They were early friends—contemporaries at the same university—occupiers of the same bursal room (college chums): Hegel, somewhat the elder man, was somewhat the younger philosopher; and they were joint editors of the journal in which their then common doctrine was at first promulgated. So far all was in unison; but now they separated, locally and in opinion. Both, indeed, stuck to the Absolute, but each regarded the way in which the other professed to reach it as absurd. Hegel derided the Intellectual Intuition of Schelling, as a poetical play of fancy; Schelling derided the Dialectic of Hegel as a logical play with words. Both, I conceive, were right; but neither fully right. If Schelling's Intellectual Intuition were poetical, it was a poetry transcending, in fact abolishing, human imagination. If Hegel's Dialectic were logical, it was a logic outraging that science and the conditions of thought itself. Hegel's whole philosophy is indeed founded on two errors;—on a mistake in logic, and on a violation of logic. In his dream of disproving the law of Excluded Middle (between two Contradictories), he inconceivably mistakes Contraries for Contradictories; and in positing pure or absolute existence as a mental datum, immediate, intuitive, and above proof (though, in truth, this be palpably a mere relative gained by a process of abstraction), he not only mistakes the fact, but violates the logical law

In these circumstances, we might expect our author to have stated the difficulties to which his theory was exposed on the one side and on the other; and to have endeavored to obviate the objections, both of his brother absolutists, and of those who altogether deny a philosophy of the unconditioned. This he has not done. The possibility of reducing the notion of the absolute to a negative conception is never once contemplated; and if one or two allusions (not always, perhaps, correct) are made to his doctrine, the name of Schelling does not occur, as we recollect, in the whole compass of these lectures. Difficulties, by which either the doctrine of the absolute in general, or his own particular modification of that doctrine, may be assailed, are either avoided or solved only by still greater. Assertion is substituted for proof; facts of consciousness are alleged, which consciousness never knew; and paradoxes, that baffle argument, are promulgated as intuitive truths, above the necessity of confirmation. With every feeling of respect for M. Cousin as a man of learning and genius, we must regard the grounds on which he endeavors to establish his doctrine as assumptive, inconsequent, and erroneous. In vindicating the truth of this statement, we shall attempt to show:— in the *first* place, that M. Cousin is at fault in all the authorities he quotes in favor of the opinion, that the absolute, infinite, unconditioned, is a primitive notion, cognizable by our intellect; in the *second*, that his argument to prove the correality of his three ideas proves directly the reverse; in the *third*, that the conditions under which alone he allows intelligence to be possible, necessarily exclude the possibility of a knowledge, not to say a conception, of the absolute; and in the *fourth*, that the absolute, as defined by him, is only a relative and a conditioned.

which prohibits us to assume the principle which it behooves us to prove. On these two fundamental errors rests Hegel's dialectic; and Hegel's dialectic is the ladder by which he attempts to scale the Absolute.—The peculiar doctrine of these two illustrious thinkers is thus to me only another manifestation of an occurrence of the commonest in human speculation; it is only a sophism of relative self-love, victorious over the absolute love of truth:—'Quod volunt sapiunt, et nolunt sapere quæ vera sunt.']

In the *first* place, then, M. Cousin supposes that Aristotle and Kant, in their several *categories*, equally proposed an analysis of the constituent elements of intelligence; and he also supposes that each, like himself, recognized among these elements the notion of the infinite, absolute, unconditioned. In both these suppositions we think him wrong.

It is a serious error in a historian of philosophy to imagine that, in his scheme of categories, Aristotle proposed, like Kant, 'an analysis of the elements of human reason.' It is just, however, to mention that in this mistake M. Cousin has been preceded by Kant himself. But the ends proposed by the two philosophers were different, even opposed. In their several tables:—Aristotle attempted a synthesis of things in their multiplicity—a classification of objects real, but in relation to thought;—Kant, an analysis of mind in its unity—a dissection of thought, pure, but in relation to its objects. The predicaments of Aristotle are thus objective, of things as understood; those of Kant subjective, of the mind as understanding. The former are results *a posteriori*—the creations of abstraction and generalization; the latter, anticipations *a priori*—the conditions of those acts themselves. It is true, that as the one scheme exhibits the unity of thought diverging into plurality, in appliance to its objects, and the other exhibits the multiplicity of these objects converging towards unity by a collective determination of the mind; while, at the same time, language usually confounds the subjective and objective under a common term;—it is certainly true, that some elements in the one table coincide in name with some elements in the other. This coincidence is, however, only equivocal. In reality, the whole Kantian categories must be excluded from the Aristotelic list as *entia rationis*, as *notiones secundæ*—in short, as determinations of thought, and not genera of real things; while the several elements would be specially excluded, as *partial*, *privative*, *transcendent*, &c. But if it would be unjust to criticise the categories of Kant in whole, or in part, by the Aristotelic canon, what must we think of Kant, who, after magnifying the idea of

investigating the forms of pure intellect as worthy of the mighty genius of the Stagirite, proceeds, on this false hypothesis, to blame the execution, as a kind of patchwork, as incomplete, as confounding derivative with simple notions; nay, even, on the narrow principles of his own *Critique*, as mixing the forms of pure sense with the forms of pure understanding? * If M. Cousin also were correct in his supposition that Aristotle and his followers had viewed his categories as an analysis of the fundamental forms of thought, he would find his own reduction of the elements of reason to a double principle anticipated in the scholastic division of existence into *ens per se* and *ens per accidens*.

Nor is our author correct in thinking that the categories of Aristotle and Kant are complete, inasmuch as they are coextensive with his own. As to the former, if the Infinite were not excluded, on what would rest the scholastic distinction of *ens categoricum* and *ens transcendens*? The logicians require that predicamental matter shall be of a limited and finite nature; † God, as infinite, is thus excluded: and while it is evident from the whole context of his book of categories, that Aristotle there only contemplated a distribution of the finite, so, in other of his works, he more than once emphatically denies the infinite as an object not only of knowledge, but of thought;—τὸ ἄπειρον ἀγνωστον ἢ ἄπειρον—τὸ ἄπειρον οὐτε νοητὸν, οὐτε αἰσθητόν. ‡ But if Aristotle thus regards the Infinite as beyond the compass of thought, Kant views it as, at least, beyond the sphere of knowledge. If M.

* See the *Critik d. r. V.* and the *Prolegomena*.

† [M. Peisse, in a note here, quotes the common logical law of categorical entities, well and briefly expressed in the following verse:

‘Entia per sese, finita, realia, tota.’

He likewise justly notices, that nothing is included in the Aristotelic categories but what is susceptible of definition, consequently of analysis.]

‡ *Phys. L. iii. c. 10*, text. 66, c. 7, text. 40. See also *Metaph. L. ii. c. 2*, text. 11. *Analyt. Post. L. i. c. 20*, text. 39—et alibi.—[Aristotle’s definition of the *Infinite* (of the ἄπειρον in contrast to the ἄσπαστον)—‘that of which there is always something beyond,’ may be said to be a definition only of the *Indefinite*. This I shall not gainsay. But it was the only Infinite which he contemplated; as it is the only Infinite of which we can form a notion.]

Cousin indeed employed the term category in relation to the Kantian philosophy in the Kantian acceptation, he would be as erroneous in regard to Kant as he is in regard to Aristotle; but we presume that he wishes, under that term, to include not only the 'Categories of Understanding,' but the 'Ideas of Reason.'* But Kant limits knowledge to experience, and experience to the categories of the understanding, which, in reality, are only so many forms of the conditioned; and allows to the notion of the unconditioned (corresponding to the ideas of reason) no objective reality, regarding it merely as a regulative principle in the arrangement of our thoughts. As M. Cousin, however, holds that the unconditioned is not only *subjectively conceived*, but *objectively known*; he is thus totally wrong in regard to the one philosopher, and wrong in part in relation to the other.

In the *second* place, our author maintains that the idea of the infinite, or absolute, and the idea of the finite, or relative, are equally real, because the notion of the one necessarily suggests the notion of the other.

Correlatives certainly suggest each other, but correlatives may, or may not, be equally real and positive. In thought contradictories necessarily imply each other, for the knowledge of contradictories is one. But the reality of one contradictory, so far from guaranteeing the reality of the other, is nothing else than its negation. Thus every positive notion (the concept of a thing by what it is) suggests a negative notion (the concept of a thing by what it is not); and the highest positive notion, the notion of the conceivable, is not without its corresponding negative in the notion of the inconceivable. But though these mutually suggest

* ['The *Categories* of Kant are simple forms or frames (schemata) of the *Understanding* (*Verstand*), under which, an object to be known, must be necessarily thought. Kant's *Ideas*, a word which he expressly borrowed from Plato, are concepts of the *Reason* (*Vernunft*); whose objects transcending the sphere of all experience actual or possible, consequently do not fall under the categories, in other words, are positively unknowable. These ideas are God, Matter, Soul, objects which, considered out of relation, or in their *transcendent reality*, are so many phases of the *Absolute*.?—M. Peisse.]

each other, the positive alone is real ; the negative is only an abstraction of the other, and in the highest generality, even an abstraction of thought itself. It therefore behooved M. Cousin, instead of assuming the objective correality of his two elements on the fact of their subjective correlation, to have suspected, on this very ground, that the reality of the one was inconsistent with the reality of the other. In truth, upon examination, it will be found that his two primitive ideas are nothing more than contradictory relatives. These, consequently, of their very nature, imply each other in thought ; but they imply each other only as affirmation and negation of the same.

We have already shown, that though the Conditioned (conditionally limited) be one, what is opposed to it as the Unconditioned, is plural : that the unconditional negation of limitation gives one unconditioned, the Infinite ; as the unconditional affirmation of limitation affords another, the Absolute. This, while it coincides with the opinion, that the Unconditioned in either phasis is inconceivable, is repugnant to the doctrine, that the unconditioned (absoluto-infinite) can be positively construed to the mind. For those who, with M. Cousin, regard the notion of the unconditioned as a positive and real knowledge of existence in its all-comprehensive unity, and who consequently employ the terms *Absolute*, *Infinite*, *Unconditioned*, as only various expressions for the same identity, are imperatively bound to prove that their idea of the *One* corresponds—either with that *Unconditioned* we have distinguished as the *Absolute*—or with that *Unconditioned* we have distinguished as the *Infinite*—or that it includes both,—or that it excludes both. This they have not done, and, we suspect, have never attempted to do.

Our author maintains, that the unconditioned is known under the laws of consciousness ; and does not, like Schelling, pretend to an intuition of existence beyond the bounds of space and time. Indeed, he himself expressly predicates the absolute and infinite of these forms.

Time is only the image or the concept of a certain correlation

of existences—of existence therefore, *pro tanto*, *as conditioned*. *It is thus itself only a form of the conditioned*. But let that pass.—Is, then, the *Absolute* conceivable of time? Can we conceive time as unconditionally limited? We can easily represent to ourselves time under any relative limitation of commencement and termination; but we are conscious to ourselves of nothing more clearly, than that it would be equally possible to think without thought, as to construe to the mind an absolute commencement, or an absolute termination, of time; that is, a beginning and an end, beyond which, time is conceived as non-existent. Goad imagination to the utmost, it still sinks paralyzed within the bounds of time; and time survives as the condition of the thought itself in which we annihilate the universe:

‘ Sur les mondes détruits le Temps dort immobile.’

But if the Absolute be inconceivable of this form, is the *Infinite* more comprehensible? Can we imagine time as unconditionally unlimited?—We cannot conceive the Infinite regress of time; for such a notion could only be realized by the infinite addition in thought of finite times, and such an addition would, itself, require an eternity for its accomplishment. If we dream of affecting this, we only deceive ourselves by substituting the *indefinite* for the infinite, than which no two notions can be more opposed. The negation of the commencement of time involves likewise the affirmation, that an infinite time has at every moment already run; that is, it implies the contradiction, that an infinite has been completed.—For the same reasons we are unable to conceive an infinite progress of time; while the infinite regress and the infinite progress, taken together, involve the triple contradiction of an infinite concluded, of an infinite commencing, and of two infinities, not exclusive of each other.

Space, like time, is only the intuition or the concept of a certain correlation of existence—of existence, therefore, *pro tanto*, *as conditioned*. *It is thus itself only a form of the conditioned*. But apart from this, thought is equally powerless in realizing a

notion either of the *absolute totality*, or of the *infinite immensity*, of space.—And while time and space, as wholes, can thus neither be conceived as absolutely limited, nor as infinitely unlimited ; so their parts can be represented to the mind neither as *absolutely individual*, nor as *divisible to infinity*. The universe cannot be imagined as a whole, which may not also be imagined as a part ; nor an atom be imagined as a part, which may not also be imagined as a whole.

The same analysis, with a similar result, can be applied to *cause and effect*, and to *substance and phenomenon*. These, however, may both be reduced to the law itself of the conditioned.¹

The Conditioned is, therefore, that only which can be positively conceived ; the Absolute and Infinite are conceived only as negations of the conditioned in its opposite poles.

Now, as we observed, M. Cousin, and those who confound the absolute and infinite, and regard the unconditioned as a positive and indivisible notion, must show that this notion coincides either, 1°, with the notion of the Absolute, to the exclusion of the infinite ; or 2°, with the notion of the Infinite, to the exclusion of the absolute ; or 3°, that it includes both as true, carrying them up to indifference ; or 4°, that it excludes both as false. The last two alternatives are impossible, as either would be subversive of the highest principle of intelligence, which asserts, that of two contradictories, both cannot, but one must, be true. It only, therefore, remains to identify the unity of the Unconditioned with the Infinite, or with the Absolute—with either, to the exclusion of the other. But while every one must be intimately conscious of the impossibility of this, the very fact that our author and other philosophers *a priori* have constantly found it necessary to confound these contradictions, sufficiently proves that neither term has a right to represent the unity of the unconditioned, to the prejudice of the other.

The Unconditioned is, therefore, not a positive concept ; nor

¹ See the next chapter, § I. for the applications of that doctrine.—W.

has it even a real or intrinsic unity ; for it only combines the Absolute and the Infinite, in themselves contradictory of each other, into a unity *relative to us* by the negative bond of their inconceivability. It is on this mistake, of the relative for the irrelative, of the negative for the positive, that M. Cousin's theory is founded : And it is not difficult to understand how the mistake originated.

This reduction of M. Cousin's two ideas of the Infinite and Finite to one positive conception and its negative, implicitly annihilates also the *third* idea, devised by him as a connection between his two substantive ideas ; and which he marvellously identifies with the relation of cause and effect.

Yet before leaving this part of our subject, we may observe, that the very simplicity of our analysis is a strong presumption in favor of its truth. A plurality of causes is not to be postulated, where one is sufficient to account for the phenomena (*Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem*) ; and M. Cousin, in supposing three positive ideas, where only one is necessary, brings the rule of parsimony against his hypothesis, even before its unsoundness may be definitely brought to light.

In the *third* place, the restrictions to which our author subjects intelligence, divine and human, implicitly deny a knowledge—even a concept—of the absolute, both to God and man. 'The condition of intelligence,' says M. Cousin, '*is difference* ; and an act of knowledge is only possible where there exists a *plurality of terms*. Unity does not suffice for conception ; variety is necessary ; nay more, not only is variety necessary, there must likewise subsist an intimate relation between the principles of unity and variety ; without which, the variety not being perceived by the unity, the one is as if it could not perceive, and the other as if it could not be perceived. Look back for a moment into yourselves, and you will find, that what constitutes intelligence in our feeble consciousness, is, that there are there several terms, of which the one perceives the other, of which the other is perceived by the first : in this consists self-knowledge,—in this consists self-

comprehension,—in this consists intelligence: intelligence without consciousness is the abstract possibility of intelligence, not intelligence in the act; and consciousness implies diversity and difference. Transfer all this from human to absolute intelligence;—that is to say, refer the ideas to the only intelligence to which they can belong. You have thus, if I may so express myself, the life of absolute intelligence; you have this intelligence with the complete development of the elements which are necessary for it to be a true intelligence; you have all the *momenta* whose relation and motion constitute the reality of knowledge.'—In all this, so far as human intelligence is concerned, we cordially agree; for a more complete admission could not be imagined, not only that a knowledge, and even a notion, of the absolute is impossible for man, but that we are unable to conceive the possibility of such a knowledge, even in the Deity, without contradicting our human conceptions of the possibility of intelligence itself. Our author, however, recognizes no contradiction; and, without argument or explanation, accords a knowledge of that which can only be known under the negation of all difference and plurality, to that which can only know under the affirmation of both.

If a knowledge of the absolute were possible under these conditions, it may excite our wonder that other philosophers should have viewed this supposition as utterly impossible; and that Schelling, whose acuteness was never questioned, should have exposed himself gratuitously to the reproach of mysticism, by his postulating for a few, and through a faculty above the reach of consciousness, a knowledge already given to all in the fact of consciousness itself. Monstrous as is the postulate of the Intellectual Intuition, we freely confess that it is only through such a faculty that we can imagine the possibility of a science of the absolute; and have no hesitation in acknowledging, that if Schelling's hypothesis appear to us incogitable, that of Cousin is seen to be self-contradictory.

Our author admits, and must admit, that the Absolute, as absolutely universal, is absolutely *one*; absolute unity is convertible

with the absolute negation of plurality and difference; *the absolute*, and *the knowledge of the absolute*, are therefore *identical*. But knowledge, or intelligence, it is asserted by M. Cousin, supposes a plurality of terms—the plurality of subject and object. Intelligence, whose essence is plurality, cannot therefore be identified with the absolute, whose essence is unity; and if known, the absolute, as known, must be different from the absolute as existing; that is, there must be two absolutes—an absolute in knowledge, and an absolute in existence, which is contradictory.

But waiving this contradiction, and allowing the non-identity of knowledge and existence, the absolute as known must be known under the conditions of the absolute as existing, that is, as absolute unity. But, on the other hand, it is asserted, that the condition of intelligence, as knowing, is plurality and difference; consequently the condition of the absolute, as existing, and under which it must be known, and the condition of intelligence, as capable of knowing, are incompatible. For, if we suppose the absolute cognizable: it must be identified either,—1°, with the subject knowing; or, 2°, with the object known; or, 3°, with the indifference of both. The *first* hypothesis, and the *second*, are *contradictory of the absolute*. For in these the absolute is supposed to be known, either as contradistinguished from the knowing subject, or as contradistinguished from the object known; in other words, the absolute is asserted to be known as absolute unity, *i. e.* as the negation of all plurality, while the very act by which it is known, affirms plurality as the condition of its own possibility. The *third* hypothesis, on the other hand, is *contradictory of the plurality of intelligence*; for if the subject and the object of consciousness be known as one, a plurality of terms is not the necessary condition of intelligence. The alternative is therefore necessary:—Either the absolute cannot be known or conceived at all; or our author is wrong in subjecting thought to the conditions of plurality and difference. It was the iron necessity of the alternative that constrained Schelling to resort to the hypothesis of a knowledge in identity through the intellectual

intuition ; and it could only be from an oversight of the main difficulties of the problem that M. Cousin, in abandoning the intellectual intuition, did not abandon the absolute itself. For how that, whose essence is all-comprehensive unity, can be known by the negation of that unity under the condition of plurality ;—how that, which exists only as the identity of all difference, can be known under the negation of that identity, in the antithesis of subject and object, of knowledge and existence :—these are contradictions which M. Cousin has not attempted to solve,—contradictions which he does not seem to have contemplated.

In the *fourth place*.—The objection of the inconceivable nature of Schelling's intellectual intuition, and of a knowledge of the absolute in identity, apparently determined our author to adopt the opposite, but suicidal alternative, of a knowledge of the absolute in consciousness, and by difference.—The equally insuperable objection,—that from the absolute defined as absolute, Schelling had not been able, without inconsequence, to deduce the conditioned, seems, in like manner, to have influenced M. Cousin to define the absolute by a relative ; not observant, it would appear, that though he thus facilitated the derivation of the conditioned, he annihilated in reality the absolute itself.—By the former proceeding, our author virtually denies the possibility of the absolute in thought ; by the latter, the possibility of the absolute in existence.

The absolute is defined by our author, ' an absolute *cause*,—a cause which *cannot but pass into act*.'—Now, it is sufficiently manifest that a thing *existing absolutely* (*i. e.* not under relation), and a thing *existing absolutely as a cause*, are contradictory. The former is the absolute negation of all relation, the latter is the absolute affirmation of a particular relation. A cause is a relative, and what exists absolutely as a cause, exists absolutely under relation. Schelling has justly observed, that ' he would deviate wide as the poles from the idea of the absolute, who would think of defining its nature by the notion of *activity*.' *

* Bruno, p. 171.

But he who would define the absolute by the notion of a *cause*, would deviate still more widely from its nature; inasmuch as the notion of a cause involves not only the notion of a determination to activity, but of a determination to a particular, nay a dependent kind of activity,—an activity not immanent, but transeunt. What exists merely as a cause, exists merely for the sake of something else,—is not final in itself, but simply a mean towards an end; and in the accomplishment of that end, it consummates its own perfection. Abstractly considered, the effect is therefore superior to the cause. A cause, as cause, may indeed be better than one or two or any given number of its effects. But the *total* complement of the effects of what exists *only* as a cause, is better than that which, *ex hypothesi*, exists merely for the sake of their production. Further, not only is an absolute cause dependent on the effect for its *perfection*,—it is dependent on it even for its *reality*. For to what extent a thing exists necessarily as a cause, to that extent it is not all-sufficient to itself; since to that extent it is dependent on the effect, as on the condition through which alone it realizes its existence; and what exists absolutely as a cause, exists, therefore, in absolute dependence on the effect for the reality of its existence. An absolute cause, in truth, only exists in its effects: it never *is*, it always *becomes*; for it is an existence *in potentia*, and not an existence *in actu*, except through and in its effects. The absolute is thus, at best, a being merely inchoative and imperfect.

The definition of the *absolute* by absolute *cause*, is, therefore, tantamount to a negation of itself; for it defines by relation and conditions that which is conceived only as exclusive of both. The same is true of the definition of the absolute by *substance*. But of this we do not speak.

The vice of M. Cousin's definition of the absolute by absolute cause, is manifested likewise in its applications. He maintains that his theory can alone explain the nature and relations of the Deity; and on its absolute incompetency to fulfil the conditions

of a rational theism, we are willing to rest our demonstration of its radical unsoundness.

'God,' says our author, 'creates; he creates in virtue of his creative power, and he draws the universe, not from nonentity, but from himself, who is absolute existence. His distinguishing characteristic being an absolute creative force, which cannot but pass into activity, it follows, not that the creation is possible, *but that it is necessary.*'

We must be very brief.—The subjection of the Deity to a necessity—a necessity of self-manifestation identical with the creation of the universe, is contradictory of the fundamental postulates of a divine nature. On this theory, God is not distinct from the world; the creature is a modification of the creator. Now, without objecting that the simple subordination of the Deity to necessity, is in itself tantamount to his dethronement, let us see to what consequences this necessity, on the hypothesis of M. Cousin, inevitably leads. On this hypothesis, one of two alternatives must be admitted. God, as necessarily determined to pass from absolute essence to relative manifestation, is determined to pass either *from the better to the worse, or from the worse to the better.* A third possibility, that *both states are equal,* as contradictory in itself, and as contradicted by our author, it is not necessary to consider.

The *first* supposition must be rejected. The necessity in this case determines God to pass from the better to the worse; that is, operates to his partial annihilation. The power which compels this must be external and hostile, for nothing operates willingly to its own deterioration; and, as superior to the pretended God, is either itself the real deity, if an intelligent and free cause, or a negation of all deity, if a blind force or fate.

The *second* is equally inadmissible:—that God, passing into the universe, passes from a state of comparative imperfection, into a state of comparative perfection. The divine nature is identical with the *most perfect nature,* and is also identical with the *first cause.* If the first cause be not identical with the most

perfect nature, there is no God, for the two essential conditions of his existence are not in combination. Now, on the present supposition, the most perfect nature is the derived; nay the universe, the creation, the *γινόμενον*, is, in relation to its cause, the real, the actual, the *ὄντως ὄν*. It would also be the divine, but that divinity supposes also the notion of cause, while the universe, *ex hypothesi*, is only an effect.

It is no answer to these difficulties for M. Cousin to say, that the Deity, though a cause which cannot choose but create, is not however exhausted in the act; and though passing with all the elements of his being into the universe, that he remains entire in his essence, and with all the superiority of the cause over the effect. The dilemma is unavoidable:—Either the Deity is independent of the universe for his being or perfection; on which alternative our author must abandon his theory of God, and the necessity of creation: Or the Deity is dependent on his manifestation in the universe for his being or perfection; on which alternative, his doctrine is assailed by the difficulties previously stated.

The length to which the preceding observations have extended, prevents us from advertng to sundry other opinions of our author, which we conceive to be equally unfounded.—For example (to say nothing of his proof of the *impersonality of intelligence*, because, forsooth, truth is not subject to our will), what can be conceived more self-contradictory than his theory of *moral liberty*? Divorcing liberty from intelligence, but connecting it with personality, he defines it to be a cause which is determined to act by its proper energy alone. But (to say nothing of remoter difficulties) how liberty can be conceived, supposing always a plurality of modes of activity, without a knowledge of that plurality; how a faculty can resolve to act by preference in a particular manner, and not determine itself by final causes;—how intelligence can influence a blind power, without operating as an efficient cause;—or how, in fine, morality can be founded on a liberty which, at best, only escapes necessity by taking refuge

with chance:—these are problems which M. Cousin, in none of his works, has stated, and which we are confident he is unable to solve.

After the tenor of our previous observations, it is needless to say that we regard M. Cousin's attempt to establish a general peace among philosophers, by the promulgation of his Eclectic theory, as a failure. But though no converts to his Unconditioned, and viewing with regret what we must regard as the misapplication of his distinguished talents, we cannot disown a strong feeling of interest and admiration for those qualities, even in their excess, which have betrayed him, with so many other aspiring philosophers, into a pursuit which could only end in disappointment:—we mean his love of truth, and his reliance on the powers of man. Not to despair of philosophy is 'a last infirmity of noble minds.' The stronger the intellect, the stronger the confidence in its force; the more ardent the appetite for knowledge, the less are we prepared to canvass the uncertainty of the fruition. 'The wish is parent to the thought.' Loth to admit that our science is at best the reflection of a reality we cannot know, we strive to penetrate to existence in itself; and what we have labored intensely to attain, we at last fondly believe we have accomplished. But, like Ixion, we embrace a cloud for a divinity. Conscious only of, conscious only in and through, limitation, we think to comprehend the infinite; and dream even of establishing the science—the *nescience* of man, on an identity with the omniscience of God. It is this powerful tendency of the most vigorous minds to transcend the sphere of our faculties, which makes a 'learned ignorance' the most difficult acquirement, perhaps, indeed, the consummation of knowledge. In the words of a forgotten, but acute philosopher,—'*Magna, immo maxima pars sapientiæ est,—quædam æquo animo nescire velle.*'¹

¹ See the next chapter, § 2, for testimonies in regard to the limitation of our knowledge.—*W.*

[‘ INFINITAS ! INFINITAS !

Hic mundus est infinitas.
 Infinitas et totus est,
 (Nam mente numquam absolveris;)
 Infinitas et illius
 Pars quælibet, partisque pars.
 Quod tangis est infinitas;
 Quod cernis est infinitas;
 Quod non vides corpusculum,
 Sed mente sola concipis,
 Corpusculi et corpusculum,
 Hujusque pars corpusculi,
 Partisque pars, hujusque pars,
 In hacque parte quicquid est,
 Infinitatem continet.

Secare mens at pergito,
 Numquam secare desine;
 In sectione qualibet
 Infinitates dissecas.
 Quiesce mens heic denique,
 Arctosque nosce limites
 Queis containeris undique;
 Quiesce mens, et limites
 In orbe cessa quærere.
 Quod quæris in te repperis:
 In mente sunt, in mente sunt,
 Hi, quos requiris, termini;
 A rebus absunt limites,
 In hisce tantum infinitas,

INFINITAS ! INFINITAS !

Proh, quantus heic acervus est!
 Et quam nihil quod nostra mens
 Ex hoc acervo intelligit!
 At illa Mens vah, qualis est,
 Conspecta cui stant omnia!
 In singulis quæ perspicit
 Quæcunque sunt in singulis
 Et singulorum singulis !’]

CHAPTER II.

LIMITATION OF THOUGHT AND KNOWLEDGE.

§ I.—A DOCTRINE OF THE RELATIVE: THE CATEGORIES OF THOUGHT.

THINKING (employing that term as comprehending all our cognitive energies¹) is of two kinds. It is either A) Negative or B) Positive.

A.) Thinking is NEGATIVE (in propriety, a negation of thought), when *Existence* is not attributed to an object. It is of two kinds; inasmuch as the one or the other of the conditions of positive thinking is violated. In either case, the result is *Nothing*.

I.) If the condition of *Non-contradiction* be not fulfilled, there emerges *The really Impossible*, what has been called in the schools, *Nihil purum*.

II.) If the condition of *Relativity* be not purified, there results *The Impossible to thought*; that is, what may exist, but what we are unable to conceive existing. This impossible, the schools have not contemplated; we are, therefore, compelled, for the sake of symmetry and precision, to give it a scholastic appellation in the *Nihil cogitabile*.

B.) Thinking is POSITIVE (and this in propriety is the only real thought), when *Existence* is predicated of an object. By existence is not, however, here meant real or objective existence, but

¹ 'Thought and thinking are used in a more, and in a less, restricted signification. In the former meaning they are limited to the *discursive* energies alone; in the latter, they are co-extensive with consciousness. In the Cartesian language, the term *thought* included all of which we are conscious.'—Reid, pp. 222, 270.—W.

only existence subjective or ideal. Thus, imagining a Centaur or a Hippogryph, we do not suppose that the phantasm has any being beyond our imagination; but still we attribute to it an actual existence in thought. Nay, we attribute to it a possible existence in creation; for we can represent nothing, which we do not think, as within the limits of Almighty power to realize.—Positive thinking can be brought to bear only under two conditions; the condition of I) Non-contradiction, and the condition of II) Relativity. If both are fulfilled, we think *Something*.

I. NON-CONTRADICTION. This condition is insuperable. We think it, not only as a law of thought, but as a law of things; and while we suppose its violation to determine an absolute impossibility, we suppose its fulfilment to afford only the *Not-impossible*. Thought is, under this condition, merely *explicative* or *analytic*; and the condition itself is brought to bear under three phases, constituting three laws: i.)—the law of *Identity*; ii.)—the law of *Contradiction*; iii.)—the law of *Excluded Middle*. The science of these laws is *Logic*; and as the laws are only explicative, Logic is only *formal*. (The principle of *Sufficient Reason*¹ should be excluded from Logic. For, inasmuch as this principle is not material (material=non-formal), it is only a derivation of the three formal laws; and inasmuch as it is material, it coincides with the principle of Causality, and is extra-logical.)

Though necessary to state the condition of Non-contradiction, there is no dispute about its effect, no danger of its violation. When I, therefore, speak of the *Conditioned*, I use the term in

¹ *Sufficient Reason*=*Sum of Causes*.—‘The principle of the *Sufficient Reason* (*p. rationis sufficientis*).—called, likewise, by Leibnitz, that of the *Determining Reason* (*p. rationis determinantis*)—of *Convenience* (*p. convenientiæ*)—of *Perfection* (*p. perfectionis*)—and of the *Order of Existences* (*p. existentiarum*)—is one of the most extensive, not to say ambiguous, character. For it is employed to denote, conjunctly and severally, the two metaphysical or real principles—1°, Why a thing *is* (*principium* or *ratio essendi*); 2°, Why a thing *becomes* or *is produced* (*p. or r. fiendi*); and, 3°, the logical or ideal principle, Why a thing *is known* or *conceived* (*p. or r. cognoscendi*).’ Reid, p. 464.—*W*.

special reference to Relativity. By existence conditioned, is meant, emphatically, existence relative, existence thought under relation. Relation may thus be understood to contain all the categories and forms of positive thought.

II.) RELATIVITY. This condition (by which, be it observed, is meant the *relatively or conditionally*¹ *relative*, and, therefore, not even the relative, absolutely or infinitely)—this condition is not insuperable. We should not think it as a law of things, but merely as a law of thought; for we find that there are contradictory opposites, one of which, by the rule of Excluded Middle, must be true, but neither of which can by us be positively thought, as possible.—Thinking, under this condition, is *ampliative or synthetic*. Its science, *Metaphysic* (using that term in a comprehensive meaning) is therefore *material*, in the sense of non-formal. The condition of Relativity, in so far as it is *necessary*, is brought to bear under three principal relations; the first of which springs from the *subject* of knowledge—the mind thinking (*the relation of Knowledge*); the second and third from the *object* of knowledge—the thing thought about (*the relations of Existence*).

(Besides these *necessary* and original relations, of which alone it is requisite to speak in an alphabet of human thought, there are many relations, *contingent* and derivative, which we frequently employ in the actual applications of our cognitive energies. Such for example (without arrangement), as—True and False, Good and Bad, Perfect and Imperfect, Easy and Difficult, Desire and Aversion, Simple and Complex, Uniform and Various, Singular and Universal, Whole and Part, Similar and Dissimilar, Congru-

¹ We can know, we can conceive, only what is relative. Our knowledge of *qualities* or *phenomena* is necessarily relative; for these exist only as they exist *in relation to our faculties*. The knowledge or even the conception, of a substance in itself, and apart from any qualities in relation to, and therefore cognizable or conceivable by, our minds, involves a contradiction. Of such we can form only a *negative* notion; that is, we can merely *conceive it as inconceivable*. But to call this negative notion a *relative notion*, is wrong; 1^o, because all our (positive) notions are relative; and 2^o, because this is itself a negative notion—*i. e.* no notion at all—simply because there is no relation. Reid, p. 323.—*W.*

ent and Incongruent, Equal and Unequal, Orderly and Disorderly, Beautiful and Deformed, Material and Immaterial, Natural and Artificial, Organized and Inorganized, Young and Old, Male and Female, Parent and Child, &c., &c. These admit of classification from different points of view; but to attempt their arrangement at all, far less on any exclusive principle, would here be manifestly out of place.)

i.) The relations of *Knowledge* are those which arise from the reciprocal dependence of the subject and of the object of thought, SELF AND NOT-SELF (*Ego and Non-ego,—Subjective and Objective*). Whatever comes into consciousness, is thought by us, either as belonging to the mental self, exclusively (subjectivo-subjective), or as belonging to the not-self, exclusively (objectivo-objective), or as belonging partly to both (subjectivo-objective). It is difficult, however, to find words to express precisely all the complex correlations of knowledge. For in cognizing a mere affection of self, we objectify it; it forms a subject-object or subjective object, or subjectivo-subjective object: and how shall we name and discriminate a mode of mind, representative of and relative to a mode of matter? This difficulty is, however, strictly psychological. In so far as we are at present concerned, it is manifest that all these cognitions exist for us, only as terms of a *correlation*.

The relations of *Existence*, arising from the object of knowledge, are twofold; inasmuch as the relation is either Intrinsic or Extrinsic.

ii.) As the relation of Existence is *Intrinsic*, it is that of SUBSTANCE AND QUALITY (form, accident, property, mode, affection, phenomenon, appearance, attribute, predicate, &c.) It may be called *qualitative*.

Substance and Quality are, manifestly, only thought as mutual relatives. We cannot think a quality existing absolutely, in or of itself. We are constrained to think it, as inhering in some basis, substratum, hypostasis, or substance; but this substance cannot be conceived by us, except negatively, that is, as the un-

apparent—the inconceivable correlative of certain appearing qualities. If we attempt to think it positively, we can think it only by transforming it into a quality or bundle of qualities, which, again, we are compelled to refer to an unknown substance, now supposed for their incogitable basis. Every thing, in fact, may be conceived as the quality, or as the substance of something else. But absolute substance and absolute quality, these are both inconceivable, as more than negations of the conceivable. It is hardly requisite to observe, that the term substance is vulgarly applied, in the abusive signification, to a congeries of qualities, denoting those especially which are more permanent, in contrast to those which are more transitory. (See the treatise 'De Mundo, attributed to Aristotle, c. iv.)

What has now been said, applies equally to Mind and Matter.

As the relation of Existence is *Extrinsic*, it is threefold; and as constituted by three species of quantity, it may be called *quantitative*. It is realized in or by: 1°. Protensive quantity, Protension or Time; 2°. Extensive quantity, Extension or Space; 3°. Intensive quantity, Intension or Degree. These quantities may be all considered either as *Continuous* or as *Discrete*; and they constitute the three last great relations which we have here to signalize.

iii.) TIME, *Protension* or protensive quantity, called likewise Duration, is a necessary condition of thought. It may be considered both in itself and in the things which it contains.

Considered in itself.—Time is positively inconceivable, if we attempt to construe it in thought;—either, on the one hand, as absolutely commencing or absolutely terminating, or on the other, as infinite or eternal, whether *ab ante* or *a post*; and it is no less inconceivable, if we attempt to fix an absolute minimum or to follow out an infinite division. It is positively conceivable: if conceived as an indefinite past, present, or future; and as an indeterminate mean between the two unthinkable extremes of an absolute least and an infinite divisibility. For thus it is relative.

In regard to Time Past and Time Future there is comparatively no difficulty, because these are positively thought as protensive quantities. But Time Present, when we attempt to realize it, seems to escape us altogether—to vanish into nonentity. The present cannot be conceived as of any length, of any quantity, of any protension, in short, as any thing positive. It is only conceivable as a negation, as the point or line (and these are only negations) in which the past ends and the future begins, in which they limit each other.

‘Le moment où je parle, est déjà loin de moi.’

In fact, we are unable to conceive *how* we do exist; and, speculatively, we must admit, in its most literal acceptation—‘*Victuri semper, vivimus nunquam.*’ The Eleatic Zeno’s demonstration of the impossibility of Motion, is not more insoluble than could be framed a proof, that the Present has no reality; for however certain we may be of both, we can positively think neither. So true is it as said by St. Augustin: ‘What is Time,—if not asked. I know; but attempting to explain, I know not.’

Things in Time are either co-inclusive or co-exclusive. Things co-inclusive—if of the same time are, *pro tanto*, identical, apparently and in thought; if of different times (as causes and effect, *causæ et causatum*), they appear as different, but are thought as identical. Things co-exclusive are mutually, either prior and posterior, or contemporaneous.

The impossibility we experience of thinking negatively or as non-existent, non-existent, consequently in time (either past or future), aught, which we have conceived positively or as existent.—this impossibility affords the principle of *Causality*, &c. (Specially developed in the sequel.)

Time applies to both Substance and Quality; and includes the other quantities, Space and Degree.

iv.)—SPACE, *Extension* or extensive quantity is, in like manner, a necessary condition of thought; and may also be considered, both in itself, and in the things which it contains.

Considered in itself.—Space is positively inconceivable :—as a whole, either infinitely unbounded, or absolutely bounded ; as a part, either infinitely divisible, or absolutely indivisible. Space is positively conceivable :—as a mean between these extremes ; in other words, we can think it either as an indefinite whole, or as an indefinite part. For thus it is relative.

The things contained in Space may be considered, either in relation to this form, or in relation to each other.—In relation to Space : the extension occupied by a thing is called its place ; and a thing changing its place, gives the relation of motion in space, space itself being always conceived as immovable,

—‘*stabilisque manens dat cuncta moveri.*’

—Considered in relation to each other. Things, spacially, are either inclusive, thus originating the relation of containing and contained ; or co-exclusive, thus determining the relation of position or situation—of here and there.

Space applies, proximately, to things considered as Substance ; for the qualities of substances, though they are in, may not occupy, space. In fact, it is by a merely modern abuse of the term, that the affections of Extension have been styled *Qualities*. It is extremely difficult for the human mind to admit the possibility of unextended substance. Extension, being a condition of positive thinking, clings to all our conceptions ; and it is one merit of the philosophy of the Conditioned, that it proves space to be only a law of thought, and not a law of things. The difficulty of thinking, or rather of admitting as possible, the immateriality of the soul, is shown by the tardy and timorous manner in which the inextension of the thinking subject was recognized in the Christian Church. Some of the early Councils and most of the Fathers maintained the extended, while denying the corporeal, nature of the spiritual principle ; and, though I cannot allow, that Descartes was the first by whom the immateriality of mind was fully acknowledged, there can be no doubt that an assertion

of the inextension and illocality of the soul, was long and very generally eschewed, as tantamount to the assertion that it was a mere nothing.

On space are dependent what are called the *Primary* Qualities of body, strictly so denominated, and Space combined with Degree affords, of body, the *Secundo-primary* Qualities.¹

Our inability to conceive an absolute elimination from space of aught, which we have conceived to occupy space, gives the law of what I have called *Ultimate Incompressibility, &c.*²

v.) DEGREE, *Intension* or intensive quantity, is not, like Time and Space, an absolute condition of thought. Existences are not necessarily thought under it; it does not apply to Substance, but to Quality, and that in the more limited acceptation of the word. For it does not apply to what have (abusively) been called by modern philosophers the Primary Qualities of body; these being merely evolutions of Extension, which, again, is not thought under Degree.³ Degree may, therefore, be thought as null, or as existing only potentially. But thinking it to be, we must think it as a quantity; and, as a quantity, it is positively both inconceivable and conceivable.—It is positively inconceivable: absolutely, either as least or as greatest; infinitely, as without limit, either in increase or in diminution.—On the contrary, it is positively conceivable; as indefinitely high or higher, as indefinitely low or lower.—The things thought under it; if of the same intension are correlatively uniform, if of a different degree, are correlatively higher or lower.

Degree affords the relations of *Actuality and Potentiality*,—of *Action and Passion*,—of *Power active, and Power passive, &c., &c.*

Degree is, likewise, developed into what, in propriety, are called the *Secondary* Qualities of body; and combined with Space, into the *Secundo-primary*.⁴

¹ On this distinction, see Part Second, chapter iii. pp. 352, 370.—*W.*

² *Ib.* p. 356.—*W.* ³ *Ib.* p. 354.—*W.* ⁴ *Ib.* p. 370, p. 353, sq.—*W.*

So much for the Conditions of Thinking, in detail.

If the general doctrine of the Conditioned be correct, it yields as a corollary, that *Judgment*, that Comparison is implied in every act of apprehension; and the fact, that consciousness cannot be realized without an energy of judgment, is, again, a proof of the correctness of the theory, asserting the Relativity of Thought.

The philosophy of the Conditioned even from the preceding outline, is, it will be seen, the express converse of the philosophy of the Absolute,—at least, as this system has been latterly evolved in Germany. For this asserts to man a knowledge of the Unconditioned,—of the Absolute and Infinite; while that denies to him a knowledge of either, and maintains, all which we immediately know, or can know, to be only the Conditioned, the Relative, the Phenomenal, the Finite. The one, supposing knowledge to be only of existence in itself, and existence in itself to be apprehended, and even understood, proclaims—‘Understand that you may believe’ (‘Intellige ut credas’); the other, supposing that existence, in itself, is unknown, that apprehension is only of phenomena, and that these are received only upon trust, as incomprehensibly revealed facts, proclaims, with the prophet,—‘Believe that ye may understand’ (‘Crede ut intelligas.’ Is. vii. 9, sec. lxx.)—But extremes meet. In one respect, both coincide; for both agree, that the knowledge of Nothing is the principle or result of all true philosophy:

‘*Scire Nihil*,—studium, quo nos lætamur utrique.’

But the one doctrine, openly maintaining that the Nothing must yield every thing, is a philosophic omniscience; whereas the other, holding that Nothing can yield nothing, is a philosophic nescience. In other words: the doctrine of the Unconditioned is a philosophy confessing relative ignorance, but professing absolute knowledge; while the doctrine of the Conditioned is a phi-

losophy professing relative knowledge, but confessing absolute ignorance. Thus, touching the absolute: the watchword of the one is,—‘Noscendo cognoscitur, ignorando ignoratur;’ the watchword of the other is,—‘Noscendo ignoratur, ignorando cognoscitur.’

But which is true?—To answer this, we need only to examine our own consciousness; there shall we recognize the limited ‘extent of our tether.’

‘Tecum habita, et nôris quam sit tibi curta supellex.’

But this one requisite is fulfilled (alas!) by few; and the same philosophic poet has to lament:

‘Ut nemo in sese tentat descendere,—nemo;
Sed præcedenti spectatur mantica tergo!’

To manifest the utility of introducing the principle of the Conditioned into our metaphysical speculations, I shall (always in outline) give one only, but a signal illustration of its importance.—Of all questions in the history of philosophy, that concerning the origin of our judgment of Cause and Effect is, perhaps, the most celebrated; but strange to say, there is not, so far as I am aware, to be found a comprehensive view of the various theories, proposed in explanation, not to say, among these, any satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon itself.

The phenomenon is this:—When aware of a new appearance, we are *unable* to conceive that therein has originated any new existence, and are, therefore, *constrained* to think, that what now appears to us under a new form, had previously an existence under others. These *others* (for they are always plural) are called its cause; and a cause (or more properly causes) we cannot but suppose; for a cause is simply every thing without which the effect would not result, and all such concurring, the effect cannot but result. We are utterly unable to construe it in thought as possible, that the complement of existence has been either increased or diminished. We cannot conceive, either, on the one hand, nothing becoming something, or, on the other, something becoming

nothing. When God is said to create the universe out of nothing, we think this, by supposing, that he evolves the universe out of himself; and in like manner, we conceive annihilation, only by conceiving the creator to withdraw his creation from actuality into power.

‘ Nil posse creari

De Nihilo, neque quod genitu 'st ad Nil revocari ;’

——— ‘ Gigni

De Nihilo Nihil, in Nihilum Nil posse reverti :’—

—these lines of Lucretius and Persius enounce a physical axiom of antiquity ; which, when interpreted by the doctrine of the Conditioned, is itself at once recalled to harmony with revealed truth, and expressing, in its purest form, the conditions of human thought, expresses also, implicitly, the whole intellectual phenomenon of causality.

The mind is thus compelled to recognize an absolute identity of existence in the effect and in the complement of its causes,—between the *causatum* and the *causa*. We think the causes to contain all that is contained in the effect ; the effect to contain nothing but what is contained in the causes. Each is the sum of the other. ‘ *Omnia mutantur, nihil interit,*’ is what we think, what we must think ; nor can the change itself be thought without a cause. Our judgment of causality simply is :—We necessarily deny in thought, that the object which we apprehend as beginning to be, really so begins ; but, on the contrary, affirm, as we must, the identity of its present sum of being, with the sum of its past existence.—And here, it is not requisite for us to know, under what form, under what combination this quantum previously existed ; in other words, it is unnecessary for us to recognize the particular causes of this particular effect. A discovery of the determinate antecedents into which a determinate consequent may be refunded, is merely contingent,—merely the result of experience ; but the judgment, that every event should have its causes, is necessary, and imposed on us, as a condition of our human intelligence itself. This necessity of so thinking, is the only phenomenon to be explained.

Now, throwing out of account the philosophers, who, like Dr. Thomas Brown,* quietly eviscerate¹ the problem of its sole difficulty, and enumerating only the theories which do not accommodate the phenomenon to be explained to their attempts at explanation,—these are, in all, seven.

1°,—And, in the first place, they fall into two supreme classes. The one (A) comprehends those theories which consider the causal judgment as *adventitious*, empirical, or a *posteriori*, that is, as derived from experience; the other (B) comprehends those which view it as *native*, pure, or a *priori*, that is, as a condition of intelligence itself.—The two primary genera, are, however, severally subdivided into various species.

2°,—The former class (A) falls into two subordinates; inasmuch as the judgment is viewed as founded either on an *original* (a) or on a *derivative* (b) cognition.

3°,—Each of these is finally distributed into two; according as the judgment is supposed to have an *objective* or a *subjective* origin. In the former case (a) it is objective, perhaps *objectivo-objective*, (1) when held to consist in an *immediate apprehension of the efficiency of causes in the external and internal worlds*; and subjective, or rather *subjectivo-objective*, (2) when viewed as given through a *self-consciousness alone of the efficiency of our own volitions*.—In the latter case (b) it is regarded, if objective (3), as *a product of induction and generalization*; if subjective (4), as *a result of association and custom*.

4°,—In like manner, the latter supreme class (B) is divided into two, according as the opinions under it, view in the causal judgment, a law of thought:—either *ultimate, primary* (c); or *secondary, derived* (d).

* The fundamental vice of Dr. Brown's theory has been, with great acuteness, exposed by his successor, Professor Wilson. (See Blackwood's Magazine, July 1836, vol. xl. p. 122, sq.)

¹ 'In this theory, the phenomenon to be saved is silently or in effect evacuated of its principal quality—the quality of *Necessity*; for the real problem is to explain how it is that we *cannot but* think that all which begins to be has not an absolute but only a relative commencement. These philosophers do not *anatomize* but *truncate*.'—Reid, p. 604.—W.

5°,—It is a corollary of the former doctrine (c), (which is not subdivided), that the judgment is a *positive act, an affirmative deliverance of intelligence* (5).—The latter doctrine (d), on the other hand, considers the judgment as of a *negative* character; and is subdivided into two. For some maintain that the principle of causality may be resolved *into the principle of Contradiction*, or, more properly, non-contradiction (6); whilst, though not previously attempted, it may be argued that the judgment of causality is a derivation from the *Condition of Relativity in Time* (7).

First and Second theories.—Of these seven opinions, the first has always been held in combination with the second; whereas, the second has been frequently held by those who abandon the first. Considering them together, that is, as the opinion, that we immediately apprehend the efficiency of causes external or internal;—this is obnoxious to two fatal objections.

The first is,—that we have no such apprehension, no such experience. It is now, indeed, universally admitted, that we have no perception of the causal nexus in the material world. Hume it was, who decided the opinion of philosophers upon this point. But though he advances his refutation of the vulgar doctrine as original, he was, in fact, herein only the last of a long series of metaphysicians, some of whom had even maintained their thesis not less lucidly than the Scottish skeptic. I cannot indeed believe, that Hume could have been ignorant of the anticipation.—But whilst surrendering the first, there are many philosophers who still adhere to the second opinion; a theory which has been best stated and most strenuously supported by the late M. Maine de Biran, one of the acutest metaphysicians of France. I will to move my arm, and I move it. When we analyze this phenomenon, says De Biran, the following are the results:—1°, the consciousness of an act of will; 2°, the consciousness of a motion produced; 3°, the consciousness of a relation of the motion to the volition. And what is this relation? Not one of simple succession. The will is not for us an act without efficiency; it is a productive energy;

so that, in a volition, there is given to us the notion of cause; and this notion we subsequently project out from our internal activities into the changes of the external world.—But the empirical fact, here asserted, is incorrect. For between the overt fact of corporeal movement, which we perceive, and the internal act of the will to move, of which we are self-conscious, there intervenes a series of intermediate agencies, of which we are wholly unaware; consequently, we *can* have no consciousness, as this hypothesis maintains, of any causal connection between the extreme links of this chain, that is, between the volition to move and the arm moving.¹

But independently of this, the second objection is fatal to the theory which would found the judgment of causality on any empirical apprehension whether of the phenomena of mind or of the phenomena of matter. Admitting the causal efficiency to be cognizable, and perception with self-consciousness to be competent for its apprehension, still as these faculties can inform us only of individual causations, the quality of necessity and consequent universality by which this judgment is characterized remains wholly unexplained. (See Cousin on Locke.) So much for the two theories at the head of our enumeration.

As the first and second opinions have been usually associated, so also have been the third and fourth.

Third theory.—In regard to the third opinion it is manifest, that the observation of certain phenomena succeeding certain other phenomena, and the generalization, consequent thereon, that these are reciprocally causes and effect,—it is manifest that this could never of itself have engendered, not only the strong, but the *irresistible*, conviction, that *every* event *must* have its causes. Each of these observations is contingent, and any number of observed contingencies will never impose upon us the consciousness of necessity, that is, the consciousness of an inability to think the opposite. This theory is thus logically absurd. For it

¹ See p. , above.—*W.*

would infer as a conclusion, the universal necessity of the causal judgment, from a certain number of actual consecutions; that is, it would collect that *all must be*, because *some are*. Logically absurd, it is also psychologically false. For we find no difficulty in conceiving the *converse* of one or of all observed consecutions; and yet, the causal judgment which, ex hypothesi, is only the result of these observations, we cannot possibly think, as possibly unreal. We have always seen a stone returning to the ground when thrown into the air; but we find no difficulty in representing to ourselves some or all stones rising from the earth; nay, we can easily suppose even gravitation itself to be reversed. Only, we are unable to conceive the possibility of this or of any other event,—without a cause.

Fourth opinion.—Nor does the fourth theory afford a better solution. The *necessity* of so thinking, cannot be derived from a *custom* of so thinking. The force of custom, influential as it may be, is still always limited to the customary; and the customary never reaches, never even approaches, to the necessary. Association may explain a strong and special, but it can never explain a universal and absolutely irresistible belief.—On this theory, also, when association is recent, the causal judgment should be weak, and rise only gradually into full force, as custom becomes inveterate. But we do not find that this judgment is feebler in the young, stronger in the old. In neither case, is there less and more; in both cases the necessity is complete.—Mr. Hume patronized the opinion, that the causal judgment is an offspring of experience engendered upon custom. But those have a sorry insight into the philosophy of that great thinker who suppose, like Brown, that this was a dogmatic theory of his own, or one considered satisfactory by himself. On the contrary, in his hands it was a reduction of the prevalent dogmatism to palpable absurdity, by showing out the inconsistency of its results. To the Lockian sensualism, Hume proposed the problem,—to account for the phenomenon of necessity in our thought of the causal nexus. That philosophy afforded no other principle than the

custom of experience, through which even the attempt at a solution could be made; and the principle of custom Hume shows could never account for the product of any real necessity. The alternative was plain. Either the doctrine of sensualism is false; or our nature is a delusion. Shallow thinkers admitted the latter alternative, and were lost; profound thinkers, on the contrary, were determined to build philosophy on a deeper foundation than that of the superficial edifice of Locke; and thus it is, that Hume has, immediately or mediately, been the cause or the occasion of whatever is of principal value in the subsequent speculations of Scotland, Germany, and France.

Fifth theory.—In regard to the second supreme genus (B), the first of the three opinions which it contains (the fifth in general) maintains that the causal judgment is a primary datum, a positive revelation of intelligence. To this are to be referred the relative theories of Leibnitz, Reid, Kant, Stewart, Cousin, and the majority of recent philosophers. To this class Brown likewise belongs; inasmuch as he idly refers what remains in his hands of the evacuated phenomenon to an original belief.

Without descending to details, it is manifest in general, that against the assumption of a special principle, which this doctrine makes, there exists a primary presumption of philosophy. This is the law of parsimony; which prohibits, without a proven necessity, the multiplication of entities, powers, principles, or causes; above all, the postulation of an unknown force where a known impotence can account for the phenomenon. We are, therefore, entitled to apply 'Occam's razor' to this theory of causality, unless it be proved impossible to explain the causal judgment at a cheaper rate, by deriving it from a common, and that a negative, principle. On a doctrine like the present is thrown the burden of vindicating its necessity, by showing that unless a special and positive principle be assumed, there exists no competent mode to save the phenomenon. The opinion can therefore only be admitted provisorily; and it falls, of course, if what it would explain can be explained on less onerous conditions.

Leaving, therefore, this theory, which certainly does account for the phenomenon, to fall or stand, according as either of the two remaining opinions be, or be not, found sufficient, I go on to this consideration.

Sixth opinion.—Of these, the former, that is, the sixth theory, has been long exploded. It attempts to establish the causal judgment upon the principle of Contradiction. Leibnitz was too acute a metaphysician to attempt the resolution of the principle of Sufficient Reason or Causality, which is ampliative or synthetic, into the principle of Contradiction, which is merely explicative or analytic. But his followers were not so wise. Wolf, Baumgarten, and many other Leibnitians, paraded demonstrations of the law of Sufficient Reason on the ground of the law of Contradiction; but the reasoning always proceeds on a covert assumption of the very point in question. The same argument is, however, at an earlier date, to be found in Locke, while modifications of it are also given by Hobbes and Samuel Clarke. Hume, who was only aware of the demonstration, as proposed by the English metaphysicians, honors it with a refutation which has obtained even the full approval of Reid; whilst by foreign philosophers, the inconsequence of the reduction, at the hands of the Wolfian metaphysicians, has frequently been exposed. I may therefore pass it in silence.

Seventh opinion.—The field is thus open for the last theory, which would analyze the judgment of causality into a form of the mental law of the Conditioned. This theory, which has not hitherto been proposed, comes recommended by its cheapness and simplicity. It postulates no new, no express, no positive principle. It merely supposes that the mind is limited; the law of limitation,—the law of the Conditioned constituting, in one of its applications, the law of Causality. The mind is astricted to think in certain forms; and, under these, thought is possible only in the conditioned interval between two unconditioned contradictory extremes or poles, each of which is altogether inconceivable, but of which, on the principle of Excluded Middle, the one or the

other is necessarily true. In reference to the present question, it need only be recapitulated, that we must think under the condition of *Existence*,—*Existence Relative*,—and *Existence Relative in Time*. But what does *existence relative in time* imply? It implies, 1°, that we are unable to realize in thought: on the one pole of the irrelative, either an *absolute* commencement, or an *absolute* termination of time; as on the other, either an *infinite* non-commencement, or an *infinite* non-termination of time. It implies, 2°, that we can think, neither, on the one pole, an *absolute* minimum, nor, on the other, an *infinite* divisibility of time. Yet these constitute two pairs of contradictory propositions; which, if our intelligence be not all a lie, cannot both be true, whilst, at the same time, either the one or the other necessarily must. But, as not relatives, they are not cogitables.

Now the phenomenon of causality seems nothing more than a corollary of the law of the conditioned, in its application to a thing thought under the form or mental category of *existence relative in time*. We cannot know, we cannot think a thing, except under the attribute of *existence*; we cannot know or think a thing to exist, except as in *time*; and we cannot know or think a thing to exist in time, and think it *absolutely to commence*. Now this at once imposes on us the judgment of causality. And thus:—An object is given us, either by our presentative, or by our representative, faculty. As given, we cannot but think it existent, and existent in time. But to say, that we cannot but think it to exist, is to say, that we are unable to think it non-existent, —to think it away,—to annihilate it in thought. And this we cannot do. We may turn away from it; we may engross our attention with other objects; we may, consequently, exclude it from our thought. That we need not think a thing is certain; but thinking it, it is equally certain that we cannot think it not to exist. So much will be at once admitted of the present; but it may probably be denied of the past and future. Yet if we make the experiment, we shall find the mental annihilation of an object, equally impossible under time past, and present, and fu-

ture. To obviate, however, misapprehension, a very simple observation may be proper. In saying that it is impossible to annihilate an object in thought, in other words, to conceive as non-existent, what had been conceived as existent,—it is of course not meant, that it is impossible to imagine the object wholly changed in form. We can represent to ourselves the elements of which it is composed, divided, dissipated, modified in any way; we can imagine any thing of it, short of annihilation. But the complement, the quantum, of existence, thought as constituent of an object,—*that* we cannot represent to ourselves, either as increased, without abstraction from other entities, or as diminished, without annexation to them. In short, we are unable to construe it in thought, that there can be an atom absolutely added to, or absolutely taken away from, existence in general. Let us make the experiment. Let us form to ourselves a concept of the universe. Now, we are unable to think, that the quantity of existence, of which the universe is the conceived sum, can either be amplified or diminished. We are able to conceive, indeed, the creation of a world; this indeed as easily as the creation of an atom. But what is our thought of creation? It is not a thought of the mere springing of nothing into something. On the contrary, creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the evolution of existence from possibility into actuality, by the fiat of the deity. Let us place ourselves in imagination at its very crisis. Now, can we construe it to thought, that the moment after the universe flashed into material reality, into manifested being, that there was a larger complement of existence in the universe and its author together, than, the moment before, there subsisted in the deity alone? This we are unable to imagine. And what is true of our concept of creation, holds of our concept of annihilation. We can think no real annihilation,—no absolute sinking of something into nothing. But, as creation is cogitable by us, only as a putting forth of divine power, so is annihilation by us only conceivable, as a withdrawal of that same power. All that is now *actually* existent in the universe, this we think and

must think, as having, prior to creation, *virtually* existed in the creator; and in imagining the universe to be annihilated, we can only conceive this, as the retractation by the deity of an overt energy into latent power.—In short, it is impossible for the human mind to think what it thinks existent, lapsing into non-existence, either in time past or in time future.

Our inability to think what we have once conceived existent in *time*, as in time becoming non-existent, corresponds with our inability to think, what we have conceived existent in *space*, as in space becoming non-existent. We cannot realize it to thought, that a thing should be extruded, either from the one quantity or from the other. Hence, under extension, the law of *ultimate incompressibility*; under protension, the law of *cause and effect*.

I have hitherto spoken only of one inconceivable pole of the conditioned, in its application to existence in time, of the absolute extreme, as absolute commencement and absolute termination. The counter or infinite extreme, as infinite regress or non-commencement and infinite progress or non-termination, is equally unthinkable. With this latter we have, however, at present nothing to do. Indeed, as not obtrusive, the Infinite figures far less in the theatre of mind, and exerts a far inferior influence in the modification of thought, than the Absolute. It is, in fact, both distant and delitescens; and in place of meeting us at every turn, it requires some exertion on our part to seek it out. It is the former and more obtrusive extreme—it is the Absolute alone which constitutes and explains the mental manifestation of the causal judgment. An object is presented to our observation which has phenominally begun to be. But we cannot construe it to thought, that the object, that is, *this determinate complement of existence*, had really no being at any past moment; because, in that case, once thinking it as existent, we should again think it as non-existent, which is for us impossible. What then can we—must we do? That the phenomenon presented to us, did, *as a phenomenon*, begin to be—this we know by experience; but that the elements of its existence only began, when the phenome-

non which they constitute came into manifested being—this we are wholly unable to think. In these circumstances how do we proceed? There is for us only one possible way. We are compelled to believe that the object (that is, the certain *quale* and *quantum* of being), whose *phenomenal* rise into existence we have witnessed, did *really* exist prior to this rise, under other forms. But to say, that a thing previously existed under different forms, is only to say, in other words, that *a thing had causes*. (It would be here out of place to refute the error of philosophers, in supposing that any thing can have a *single* cause;¹—meaning always by a cause that without which the effect would not have been. I speak of course only of second causes, for of the divine causation we can form no conception.)

I must, however, now cursorily observe, that nothing can be more erroneous in itself, or in its consequences more fertile in delusion than the common doctrine, that the causal judgment is elicited, only when we apprehend objects in consecution, and uniform consecution. No doubt, the observation of such succession prompts and enables us to assign particular causes to particular effects. But this assignation ought to be carefully distinguished from the judgment of causality absolutely. This consists, not in the empirical and contingent attribution of this phenomenon, as cause, to that phenomenon, as effect; but in the *universal necessity* of which we are conscious, to think causes for every event, whether that event stand isolated by itself, and be by us referrible to no other, or whether it be one in a series of successive phenomena, which, as it were, spontaneously arrange themselves

¹ 'There is no reason why whatever is conceived as necessarily going to the constitution of the phenomenon called the *effect*—in other words, why all and each of its *coefficients*—may not be properly called *causes*, or rather *con-causes*; for there must always be more causes than one to an effect. This would be more correct than to give exclusively the name of Cause to any partial constituent or coefficient, even though proximate and principal. In this view, the doctrine of Aristotle and other ancients, is more rational than that of our modern philosophers.'—Reid, p. 607.—W.

under the relation of effect and cause. On this, not sunken, rock, Dr. Brown and others have been shipwrecked.

The preceding doctrine of causality seems to me the one preferable, for the following, among other reasons.

In the first place, to explain the phenomena of the casual judgment, it postulates no new, no extraordinary, no express principle. It does not even proceed on the assumption of a *positive power*; for while it shows, that the phenomenon in question is only one of a class, it assigns, as their common cause, only a *negative impotence*. In this respect, it stands advantageously contrasted with the only other theory which saves the phenomenon, but which saves it, only on the hypothesis of a special principle, expressly devised to account for this phenomenon alone. But nature never works by more, and more complex instruments than are necessary—*μηδὲν περιττῶς*: and to excogitate a *particular force* to perform what can be better explained on the ground of a *general imbecility*, is contrary to every rule of philosophizing.

But, in the second place, if there be postulated an express and positive affirmation of intelligence, to account for the mental deliverance,—that existence cannot absolutely commence; we must equally postulate a counter affirmation of intelligence, positive and express, to explain the counter mental deliverance,—that existence cannot infinitely not commence. The one necessity of mind is equally strong as the other; and if the one be a positive datum, an express testimony of intelligence, so likewise must be the other. But they are contradictories; and, as contradictories they cannot both be true. On this theory, therefore, the root of our nature is a lie. By the doctrine, on the contrary, which I propose, these contradictory phenomena are carried up into the common principle of a limitation of our faculties. Intelligence is shown to be feeble, but not false; our nature is, thus, not a lie, nor the author of our nature a deceiver.

In the third place, this simpler and easier doctrine, avoids a most serious inconvenience which attaches to the more difficult

and complex. It is this. To suppose a positive and special principle of causality, is to suppose that there is expressly revealed to us, through intelligence, an affirmation of the fact, that there exists no free causation; that is, that there is no cause which is not itself merely an effect, existence being only a series of determined antecedents and determined consequents. But this is an assertion of Fatalism. Such, however, many of the partisans of that doctrine will not admit. An affirmation of absolute necessity is, they are aware, virtually the negation of a moral universe, consequently of the moral governor of a moral universe. But this is Atheism. Fatalism and Atheism are, indeed, convertible terms.¹ The only valid arguments for the existence of a God, and for the immortality of the human soul, rest on the ground of man's moral nature; consequently, if that moral nature be annihilated, which in any scheme of thorough-going necessity it is, every conclusion, established on such a nature, is annihilated likewise. Aware of this, some of those who make the judgment of causality a positive dictate of intelligence, find themselves compelled, in order to escape from the consequences of their doctrine, to deny that this dictate, though universal in its deliverance, should be allowed to hold universally true; and accordingly, they would exempt from it the facts of volition. Will, they hold to be a free cause, a cause which is not an effect; in other words, they attribute to it the power of absolute origination. But here their own principle of causality is too strong for them. They say, that it is unconditionally promulgated, as an express and positive law of intelligence, that every origination is an apparent only, not a real, commencement. Now to exempt certain phenomena from this universal law, on the ground of our moral consciousness, cannot validly be done.—For, in the first place, this

¹ 'It can easily be proved to those who are able and not afraid to reason, that the doctrine of Necessity is subversive of religion, natural and revealed; and, Fatalism involving Atheism, the Necessitarian who intrepidly follows out his scheme to its consequences, however monstrous, will consistently reject every argument which proceeds upon the supposition of a Deity and divine attributes.'—Reid, p. 617.—*W.*

would be an admission, that the mind is a complement of contradictory revelations. If mendacity be admitted of some of our mental dictates, we cannot vindicate veracity to any. If one be delusive, so may all. 'Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.' Absolute skepticism is here the legitimate conclusion.—But, in the second place, waving this conclusion, what right have we, on this doctrine, to subordinate the positive affirmation of causality to our consciousness of moral liberty,—what right have we, for the interest of the latter, to derogate from the former? We have none. If both be equally positive, we are not entitled to sacrifice the alternative, which our wishes prompt us to abandon.

But the doctrine which I propose is not obnoxious to these objections. It does not maintain, that the judgment of causality is dependent on a *power* of the mind, imposing, as necessary in thought, what is necessary in the universe of existence. On the contrary, it resolves this judgment into a mere mental *impotence*,—an impotence to conceive either of two contradictories. And as the one or the other of contradictories must be true, whilst both cannot; it proves that there is no ground for inferring a certain fact to be impossible, merely from *our inability to conceive it possible*. At the same time, if the causal judgment be not an express affirmation of mind, but only an incapacity of thinking the opposite; it follows that such a negative judgment cannot counterbalance the express affirmative, the unconditional testimony, of consciousness,—that we are, though we know not how, the true and responsible authors of our actions, not merely the worthless links in an adamant series of effects and causes. It appears to me, that it is only on such a doctrine, that we can philosophically vindicate the liberty of the human will,—that we can rationally assert to man—'fatis avolsa voluntas.' *How* the will can possibly be free, must remain to us, under the present limitation of our faculties, wholly incomprehensible.¹ We are

¹ 'To conceive a *free act*, is to conceive an act which, being a *cause*, is not itself an *effect*; in other words, to conceive an absolute commencement. But is such by us conceivable?'—Reid, p. 602.—*W*.

unable to conceive an absolute commencement; we cannot, therefore, conceive a free volition. A determination by motives, cannot, to our understanding, escape from necessitation.¹ Nay,

¹ 'A motive, abstractly considered, is called an *real* or *final cause*. It was well denominated in the Greek philosophy, *τὸ ἐνεκα αὐτῆς*—that for the sake of which. A motive, however, in its concrete reality, is nothing apart from the mind; only a mental tendency.'

'If Motives "*influence* to action," they must co-operate in producing a certain effect upon the agent; and the determination to act, and to act in a certain manner—is that effect. They are thus, on Reid's own view, in this relation, *causes*, and *efficient causes*. It is of no consequence in the argument whether motives be said to determine a man to act or to influence (that is to determine) him to determine himself to act. It does not, therefore, seem consistent to say that motives are *not causes*, and that they *do not act*.'

'I shall now,' says Leibnitz, in his controversy with Clark, 'come to an objection raised here, against my comparing the weights of a balance with the motives of the Will. It is objected, that a balance is merely passive, and moved by the weights; whereas agents intelligent and endowed with will, are active. To this I answer, that the principle of the want of a sufficient reason, is common both to agents and patients. They want a sufficient reason of their action, as well as of their passion. A balance does not only not act when it is equally pulled on both sides, but the equal weights likewise do not act when they are in an equilibrium, so that one of them cannot go down without the other rising up as much.'

'It must also be considered that, properly speaking, motives do not act upon the mind as weights do upon a balance; but it is rather the mind that acts by virtue of the motives, which are its dispositions to act. And, therefore, to pretend, as the author does here, that the mind prefers sometimes weak motives to strong ones, and even that it prefers that which is indifferent before motives—this, I say, is to divide the mind from the motives, as if they were without the mind, as the weight is distinct from the balance, and as if the mind had, besides motives, other dispositions to act, by virtue of which it could reject or accept the motives. Whereas, in truth, the motives comprehend all the dispositions which the mind can have to act voluntarily; for they include not only the reasons, but also the inclinations arising from passions or other preceding impressions. Wherefore, if the mind should prefer a weak inclination to a strong one, it would act against itself, and otherwise than it is disposed to act. Which shows that the author's notions, contrary to mine, are superficial, and appear to have no solidity in them, when they are well considered.'

'To assert, also, that the mind may have good reasons to act, when it has no motives, and when things are absolutely indifferent, as the author explains himself here—this, I say, is a manifest contradiction; for, if the mind has good reasons for taking the part it takes, then the things are not indifferent to the mind.'—*Collection of Papers, &c.*, Leibnitz's Fifth Paper, §§ 14–16.

were we even to admit as true, what we cannot think as possible, still the doctrine of a motiveless volition would be only casualism; and the free acts of an indifferent, are, morally and rationally, as worthless as the pre-ordered passions of a determined will. *How*, therefore, I repeat, moral liberty is possible in man or God, we are utterly unable speculatively to understand.¹ But

'The death of Leibnitz terminated his controversy with Clarke; but a defence of the fifth and last paper of Leibnitz against the answer of Clarke, by Thummig, was published, who, in relation to the point in question, says—"The simile of the balance is very unjustly interpreted. No resemblance is intended between scales and motives. . . . It is of no consequence whether, in their reciprocal relations, the *scales are passive*, while the *mind is active*, since, in this respect, there is no comparison attempted. But, in so far as the principle of Sufficient Reason is concerned, that principle applies equally to *actions* and *passions*, as has been noticed by Baron Leibnitz. . . . It is to philosophize very crudely concerning mind, and to image every thing in a corporeal manner, to conceive that actuating reasons are something external, which make an impression on the mind, and to distinguish *motives* from the *active principle* (principio actionis) itself." (*In Koehler's German Translation of these Papers.*)

'On the supposition that the sum of influences (motives, dispositions, tendencies) to volition A, is equal to 12, and the sum of influences to counter volition B, equal to 8—can we conceive that the determination of volition A should not be necessary?—We can only conceive the volition B to be determined by supposing that the man *creates* (calls from non-existence into existence) a certain supplement of influences. But this creation as actual, or, in itself, is inconceivable, and even to conceive the possibility of this inconceivable act, we must suppose some cause by which the man is determined to exert it. We thus, *in thought*, never escape determination and necessity. It will be observed, that I do not consider this inability to the *notion*, any disproof of the *fact* of Free Will.'—Reid, pp. 607, 610-11.—*W.*

¹ Is the person an *original undetermined* cause of the determination of his will? If he be not, then is he not a *free* agent, and the scheme of Necessity is admitted. If he be, in the first place, it is impossible to *conceive* the possibility of this; and, in the second, if the fact, though inconceivable, be allowed, it is impossible to see how a *cause, undetermined by any motive*, can be a *rational, moral, and accountable, cause*. There is no conceivable medium between *Fatalism and Casualism*; and the contradictory schemes of Liberty and Necessity themselves are inconceivable. For, as we cannot compass in thought an *undetermined cause—an absolute commencement*—the fundamental hypothesis of the one; so we can as little think an *infinite series of determined causes—of relative commencements*—the fundamental hypothesis of the other. The champions of the opposite doctrines, are thus at once resistless in assault, and impotent in defence. Each is hewn down, and appears to die

practically, the *fact*, that we are free, is given to us in the consciousness of an uncompromising law of duty, in the consciousness of our moral accountability; and this fact of liberty cannot be redargued on the ground that it is incomprehensible, for the philosophy of the conditioned proves, against the necessitarian, that things there are, which *may*, nay *must* be true, of which the understanding is wholly unable to construe to itself the possibility.¹

But this philosophy is not only competent to defend the fact of our moral liberty, possible though inconceivable, against the as-

under the home-thrusts of his adversary; but each again recovers life from the very death of his antagonist, and, to borrow a simile, both are like the heroes in Valhalla, ready in a moment to amuse themselves anew in the same bloodless and interminable conflict. The doctrine of Moral Liberty cannot be made conceivable, for we can only conceive the determined and the relative. As already stated, all that can be done, is to show—1^o, That for the *fact* of Liberty, we have, immediately or mediately, the evidence of consciousness; and, 2^o, That there are, among the phenomena of mind, many facts which we *must* admit as actual, but of whose possibility we are wholly unable to form any notion. I may merely observe, that the fact of *Motion* can be shown to be impossible, on grounds not less strong than those on which it is attempted to disprove the fact of *Liberty*; to say nothing of many contradictories, neither of which can be *thought*, but one of which must, on the laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle, necessarily *be*.—Reid, p. 602.—*W*.

¹ We must be *unable to conceive the possibility of the fact of Liberty*. But, though inconceivable, this fact is not therefore false. For there are many contradictories (and, of contradictories, *one must*, and *one only can*, be true) of which, we are equally unable to conceive the possibility of either. The philosophy, therefore, which I profess, annihilates the theoretical problem—How is the scheme of Liberty, or the scheme of Necessity, to be rendered comprehensible?—by showing that both schemes are equally inconceivable; but it establishes Liberty practically as a fact, by showing that it is either itself an immediate *datum*, or is involved in an immediate *datum* of consciousness.

Hommel, certainly one of the ablest and most decided fatalists, says, 'I have a feeling of Liberty even at the very moment when I am writing against Liberty, upon grounds which I regard as incontrovertible. Zeno was a fatalist only in theory; in practice, he did not act in conformity to that conviction.'

Among others, Reid's friend, Lord Kames, in the first edition of his 'Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion,' admitted this natural conviction of freedom from necessity, maintaining it to be illusive. On this melancholy doctrine,—

sault of the fatalist; it retorts against himself the very objection of incomprehensibility by which the fatalist had thought to triumph over the libertarian. It shows, that the scheme of freedom is not more inconceivable than the scheme of necessity. For whilst fatalism is a recoil from the more obtrusive inconceivability of an absolute commencement, on the fact of which commence-

‘Man fondly dreams that he is free in act:
Naught is he but the powerless, worthless plaything
Of the blind force that in his Will itself
Works out for him a dread necessity.’

All necessitarians do not, however, admit the reality of this deceitful experience, or fallacious feeling of liberty. ‘Dr. Hartley,’ says Mr. Stewart, ‘was I believe, one of the first, if not the first, who denied that our consciousness is in favor of free agency;’ and in this assertion, he observes, ‘Hartley was followed by Priestley and Belsham.’ Speaking of the latter, ‘We are told,’ he says, ‘by Mr. Belsham, that the popular opinion that, in many cases, it was in the power of the agent to have chosen differently, the previous circumstances remaining exactly the same, arises either from a mistake of the question, or from a forgetfulness of the motives by which our choice was determined.’—(Philosophy of the Active Powers, ii. p. 510.)

To deny, or rather to explain away, the obnoxious phenomenon of a sense of liberty, had, however, been attempted by many Necessitarians before Hartley, and with far greater ingenuity than either he or his two followers displayed. Thus Leibnitz, after rejecting the Liberty of Indifference, says, ‘*Quamobrem ratio illa, quam Cartesius adduxit, ad probandum actionum nostrarum liberarum independentiam, ex jactato quodam vivido sensu interno, vim nullam habet. Non possumus proprie experiri independentiam nostram, nec causas a quibus electio nostra pendet semper percipimus, utpote sæpe sensum omnem fugientes.* [He here refers to his doctrine of latent mental modifications.] *Et perinde est ac si acus magnetica versus polum converti letaretur; putaret enim, se illuc converti independenter a quacunque alia causa, cum non perciperet motus insensibiles materiæ magneticæ.*’ But, previously to Leibnitz, a similar solution and illustration, I find, had been proposed by Bayle—his illustration is a conscious weather-cock, but both philosophers are, in argument and example, only followers of Spinoza. Spinoza, after supposing that a certain quantity of motion had been communicated to a stone, proceeds—‘*Porro concipe jam si placet, lapidem dum moveri pergit cogitare et scire, se quantum potest conari ut moveri pergat. Hic lapis sane, quando quidem sui tantum modo conatus est consensit et minime indifferens, se liberrimum esse et nulla alia de causa in motu perseverare eredet quam quia vult.—Atque hæc humana illa libertas est quam omnes habere jactant, et quæ in hoc solo consistit—quod homines sui appetitus sunt conscii, et causarum a quibus determinantur ignari.*’ Chrysippus’s Top or Cylinder is the source. Reid, pp. 599, 616, 617.—*W.*

ment the doctrine of liberty proceeds; the fatalist is shown to overlook the equal, but less obtrusive, inconceivability of an infinite non-commencement, on the assertion of which non-commencement his own doctrine of necessity must ultimately rest. As equally unthinkable, the two counter, the two one-sided, schemes are thus theoretically balanced. But practically, our consciousness of the moral law, which, without a moral liberty in man, would be a mendacious imperative, gives a decisive preponderance to the doctrine of freedom over the doctrine of fate. We are free in act, if we are accountable for our actions.

Such (*φωνήματα συνετοῖσιν*) are the hints of an undeveloped philosophy, which, I am confident, is founded upon truth. To this confidence I have come, not merely through the convictions of my own consciousness, but by finding in this system a centre and conciliation for the most opposite of philosophical opinions. Above all, however, I am confirmed in my belief, by the harmony between the doctrines of this philosophy, and those of revealed truth. 'Credo equidem, nec vana fides.' The philosophy of the Conditioned is indeed pre-eminently a discipline of humility; a 'learned ignorance,' directly opposed to the false 'knowledge which puffeth up.' I may indeed say with St. Chrysostom:—'The foundation of our philosophy is humility.'—(Homil. de Perf. Evang.) For it is professedly a scientific demonstration of the impossibility of that 'wisdom in high matters' which the Apostle prohibits us even to attempt; and it proposes, from the limitation of the human powers, from our impotence to comprehend what, however, we must admit, to show articulately why the 'secret things of God' cannot but be to man 'past finding out.' Humility thus becomes the cardinal virtue, not only of revelation but of reason. This scheme proves, moreover, that no difficulty emerges in theology which had not previously emerged in philosophy; that, in fact, if the divine do not transcend what it has pleased the Deity to reveal, and wilfully identify the doctrine of God's word with some arrogant extreme of human speculation, philosophy will be

found the most useful auxillary of theology. For a world of false, and pestilent, and presumptuous reasoning, by which philosophy and theology are now equally discredited, would be at once abolished, in the recognition of this rule of prudent nescience; nor could it longer be too justly said of the code of consciousness, as by reformed divines it has been acknowledged of the Bible:

‘This is the book, where each his dogma seeks;
And this the book, where each his dogma finds.’

Specially; in its doctrine of causality this philosophy brings us back from the aberrations of modern theology, to the truth and simplicity of the more ancient church. It is here shown to be as irrational as irreligious, on the ground of human understanding, to deny, either, on the one hand, the foreknowledge, predestination, and free grace of God, or, on the other, the free will of man; that we should believe both, and both in unison, though unable to comprehend either even apart. This philosophy proclaims with *St. Augustin*, and Augustin in his maturest writings:—‘If there be not free grace in God, how can He save the world; and if there be not free will in man, how can the world by God be judged?’ (Ad Valentinum, Epist. 214.) Or, as the same doctrine is perhaps expressed even better by *St. Bernard*: ‘Abolish free will, and there is nothing to be saved; abolish free grace, and there is nothing wherewithal to save.’ (De Gratiâ et Libero Arbitrio. c. i.) *St. Austin* repeatedly declares, the conciliation of the foreknowledge, predestination, and free grace of God with the free will of man, to be ‘a most difficult question, intelligible only to a few.’ Had he denounced it as a fruitless question, and (to understanding) soluble by none, the world might have been spared a large library of acrimonious and resultless disputation. This conciliation is of the things to be believed, not understood. The futile attempts to harmonize these antilogies, by human reasoning to human understanding, have originated conflictive systems of theology, divided the Church, and, as far as possible, dishonored

religion. It must however be admitted, that confessions of the total inability of man to conceive the union, of what he should believe united, are to be found; and they are found, not, perhaps less frequently, and certainly in more explicit terms among Catholic than among Protestant theologians.

Of the former, I shall adduce only one testimony, by a prince of the Church; and it is the conclusion of what, though wholly overlooked, appears to me as the ablest and truest criticism of the many fruitless, if not futile, attempts at conciliating 'the ways of God' to the understanding of man, in the great articles of divine foreknowledge and predestination (which are both embarrassed by the self-same difficulties), and human free-will. It is the testimony of *Cardinal Cajetan*, and from his commentary on the *Summa Theologiæ* of Aquinas. The criticism itself I may take another opportunity of illustrating.


'Thus elevating our mental eye to a loftier range [we may suppose that], God, from an excellence supernally transcending human thought, so foresees events and things, that from his providence something higher follows than evitability or inevitability, and that his passive prevision of the event does not determine the alternative of either combination. And can we do so, the intellect is quieted; not by the evidence of the truth known, but by the inaccessible height of the truth concealed. And this to my poor intellect seems satisfactory enough, both for the reason above stated, and because, as Saint Gregory expresses it, "The man has a low opinion of God, who believes of Him only so much as can be measured by human understanding." Not that we should deny aught, that we have by knowledge or by faith of the immutability, actuality, certainty, universality, and similar attributes of God; but I suspect that *there is something here lying hid*, either as regards the relation between the Deity and event foreseen, or as regards the connection between the event itself and its prevision. Thus, reflecting that the intelligence of man [in such matters] is as the eye of the owl [in the blaze of day (he refers to Aristotle)], I find its repose in ignorance alone. For it is more consistent, both with Catholic faith and with philosophy, to confess our blindness, than to assert, as things evident, what afford no tranquillity to the intellect; for evidence is tranquillizing. Not that I would, therefore, accuse all the doctors of presumption; because, stammering, as they could, they have all intended to insinuate, with God's immutability, the supreme and eternal efficiency of His intellect, and will, and power,—through the infallible relation between the Divine election and whatever comes to pass. Nothing of all this is opposed to the foresaid suspicion—that *something too deep for us lies hid herein*. And assuredly, if it were thus promulgated, no Christian would err in the matter of Predestination, as no one errs in the doctrine

of the Trinity;* because of the Trinity the truth is declared orally and in writing,—that this is a mystery concealed from human intellect, and to which faith alone is competent. Indeed, the best and most wholesome counsel in this matter is:—To begin with those things which we certainly know, and have experience of in ourselves; to wit, that all proceeding from our free-will may or may not be performed by us, and therefore are we amenable to punishment or reward; but how, this being saved, there shall be saved the providence, predestination, &c., of God,—to believe what holy mother Church believes. For it is written, “*Altiora te ne quæsieris*” (“Be not wise in things above thee”); there being many things revealed to man above thy human comprehension. And this is one of those.’ (Pars. I. q. xxii., art. 4.)

Averments to a similar effect, might be adduced from the writings of *Calvin*; and, certainly, nothing can be conceived more contrary to the doctrine of that great divine, than what has latterly been promulgated as Calvinism (and, in so far as I know, without reclamation), in our Calvinistic Church of Scotland. For it has been here promulgated, as the dogma of this Church, by pious and distinguished theologians, that man has no will, agency, moral personality of his own, God being the only real agent in every apparent act of his creatures;—in short (though quite the opposite was intended), that the theological scheme of the absolute decrees implies fatalism, pantheism, the negation of a moral governor, and of a moral world. For the premises, arbitrarily assumed, are atheistic; the conclusion, illogically drawn, is Christian. Against such a view of Calvin’s doctrine, I for one must humbly though solemnly protest, as not only false in philosophy, but heterodox and ignorant in theology.

* This was written before 1507; consequently long before Servetus and Campanus had introduced their unitarian heresies.

(A.) CONDITIONS OF THE THINKABLE SYSTEMATIZED; ALPHABET OF HUMAN THOUGHT.



§ II.—PHILOSOPHICAL TESTIMONIES TO THE LIMITATION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, FROM THE LIMITATION OF OUR FACULTIES.

THESE, which might be indefinitely multiplied, I shall arrange under *three* heads. I omit the Skeptics, adducing only specimens from the others.

I. *Testimonies to the general fact that the highest knowledge is a consciousness of ignorance.*

There are two sorts of ignorance: we philosophize to escape ignorance, and the consummation of our philosophy is ignorance; we start from the one, we repose in the other; they are the goals from which, and to which, we tend; and the pursuit of knowledge is but a course between two ignorances, as human life is itself only a travelling from grave to grave.

‘*Ἦτις βίος;—Ἐκ τύμβοιο θορῶν, ἐπὶ τύμβον δδέτω.*’

The highest reach of human science is the scientific recognition of human ignorance; ‘*Qui nescit ignorare, ignorat scire.*’ This ‘learned ignorance’ is the rational conviction by the human mind of its inability to transcend certain limits; it is the knowledge of ourselves,—the science of man. This is accomplished by a demonstration of the disproportion between what is to be known, and our faculties of knowing,—the disproportion, to wit, between the infinite and the finite. In fact, the recognition of human ignorance, is not only the one highest, but the one true, knowledge; and its first fruit, as has been said, is humility. Simple nescience is not proud; consummated science is positively humble. For this knowledge it is not, which ‘puffeth up;’ but its opposite, the conceit of false knowledge,—the conceit in truth, as the Apostle notices, of an ignorance of the very nature of knowledge:

‘*Nam nesciens quid scire sit,
Te scire euncta jactitas.*’

But as our knowledge stands to Ignorance, so stands it also to Doubt. Doubt is the beginning and the end of our efforts to know; for as it is true,—‘*Alte dubitat qui altius credit*,’ so it is likewise true,—‘*Quo magis quærimus magis dubitamus*.’

The grand result of human wisdom, is thus only a consciousness that what we know is as nothing to what we know not (‘*Quantum est quod nescimus*!’)—an articulate confession, in fact, by our natural reason of the truth declared in revelation,—that ‘*now* we see through a glass, darkly.’

1.—**DEMOCRITUS** (as reported by Aristotle, Cicero, Sextus Empiricus, &c.):—‘We know nothing in its cause [or on a conjectural reading—in truth]; for truth lies hid from us in depth and distance.’

2.—**SOCRATES** (as we learn from Plato, Xenophon, Cicero, &c.) was declared by the Delphic oracle the wisest of the Greeks; and why? Because he taught,—that all human knowledge is but a qualified ignorance

3.—**ARISTOTLE** (*Metaphysica*, L. ii., c. 1).—‘A theory of Truth, is partly easy, partly difficult. This is shown by the fact—that no one has been wholly successful, no one wholly unsuccessful, in its acquisition; but while each has had some report to make concerning nature, though the contributions, severally considered, are of little or no avail, the whole together make up a considerable amount. And if so it be, we may apply the proverb—“Who can miss the gate?” In this respect a theory of Truth is easy.—But our inability to compass some Whole and Part [or, to c. both W. and P.], may evince the difficulty of the inquiry; (*Τὸ δ’ ὅλον τι (ὁ ἴ) ἔχειν καὶ μέρος μὴ δύνασθαι, δηλοῖ τὸ χαλεπὸν αὐτῆς.*)—As difficulty, however, arises in two ways; [in this case] its cause may lie, not in things [as the objects known], but in us [as the subjects knowing]. For as the eye of the bat holds to the light of day, so the intellect [*νοῦς*, which is, as it were (*Eth. Nic. i. 7*), the eye] of our soul, holds to what in nature are of all most manifest.’ *

* In now translating this passage for a more general purpose, I am strongly impressed with the opinion, that Aristotle had in view the special doctrine of the Conditioned. For it is not easy to see what he could mean by saying, that ‘we are unable to have [compass, realize the notions of] Whole and Part,’ or of ‘some Whole and Part;’ except to say, that we are unable to conceive (of space, or time, or degree) a whole, however large, which is not conceivable as the part of a still greater whole, or a part, however small, which we may not always conceive as a whole, divisible into parts. But this would be implicitly the enunciation of a full doctrine of the Conditioned.

4.—PLINY. (*Historia Naturalis*, L. ii. c. 32.)—‘*Omnia incerta ratione, et in naturæ majestate abdita.*’

5.—TERTULLIAN. (*Adversus Hæreticos*, N. iv.)—‘*Cedat curiositas fidei, cedat gloria saluti. Certe, aut non obstrepant, aut quiescant adversus regulam—Nihil scire omnia scire est.*’—(*De Anima*, c. 1.)—‘*Quis revelabit quod Deus texit? Unde scitandum? Quare ignorare tutissimum est. Præstat enim per Deum nescire quia non revelaverit, quam per hominem scire quia ipse præsumperit.*’

6.—ARNOBIUS. (*Contra Gentes*, L. ii.)—‘*Quæ nequeunt sciri, nescire nos confiteamur; neque ea vestigare curemus, quæ non posse comprehendere liquidissimum est.*’

7.—ST. AUGUSTIN. (*Sermo xxvii. Benedictine Edition*, vol. v.)—‘*Quæris tu rationem, ego expavesco altitudinem. (“O altitudo divitiarum sapientiæ et scientiæ Dei!”) Tu ratiocinare, ego mirer; tu disputa, ego credam; altitudinem video, ad profundum non pervenio. . . . Ille dicit, “Inscrutabilia sunt judicia ejus:” et tu scrutari venisti? Ille dicit,—“Ininvestigabiles sunt viæ ejus:” et tu investigare venisti; crede, jam peristi.*’—(*Sermo xciii.*)—‘*Quid inter nos agebatur? Tu dicebas, *Intelligam, ut credam*; ego dicebam, *Ut intelligas, crede*. Nata est controversia, veniamus ad judicem, judicet Propheta, immo vero Deus judicet per Prophetam. Ambo taceamus. Quid ambo dixerimus, auditum est. *Intelligam, inquis, ut credam; Crede, inquam, ut intelligas. Respondeat Propheta: “Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis.”* [Isaiah vii. 9, according to the Seventy.]—(*Sermo cxvii.*)—‘*De Deo loquimur, quid mirum, si non comprehendis? Si eum comprehendis, non est Deus. Sit pia confessio ignorantie magis quam temeraria professio scientiæ. Adtingere aliquantum mente Deum, magna beatitudo est; comprehendere autem, omnino impossibile.*’*—(*Sermo clxv.*)—‘*Ideo multi de isto profundo quærentes reddere rationem, in fabulas vanitatis abierunt.*’ [Compare *Sermo cxxvi. c. i.*]—(*Sermo cccii.*)—‘*Con-**

Be this however as it may, Aristotle’s commentators have been wholly unable to reach, even by a probable conjecture, his meaning in the text. Alexander gives six or seven possible interpretations, but all nothing to the point; whilst the other expositors whom I have had patience to look into (as Averroes, Javellus, Fonseca, Suarez, Sonerus), either avoid the sentence altogether, or show that they, and the authorities whom they quote, had no glimpse of a satisfactory interpretation. I have been unable to find (on a hurried search) in the able and truly learned ‘*Essay on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*,’ by M. Ravaisson, a consideration of the passage.

* A century before Augustin, St. Cyprian had said:—‘*We can only justly conceive God in recognizing Him to be inconceivable.*’ I cannot, however, at the moment, refer to the passage except from memory.

fessio ignorantiae, gradus est scientiae.'—(Epistola cxc. vol. ii.)—'Quæ nullo sensu carnis explorari possunt, et a nostra experientia longe remota sunt, atque in abditissimis naturæ finibus latent, non erubescendum est homini confiteri se nescire quod nescit, ne dum se scire mentitur, nunquam scire mereatur.'—(Epistola cxcvii.)—'Magis eligo cautam ignorantiam confiteri, quam falsam scientiam profiteri.'

8.—ST. CHRYSOSTOM. ()—'Nothing is wiser than ignorance in those matters, where they who proclaim that they know nothing, proclaim their paramount wisdom; whilst those who busy themselves therein, are the most senseless of mankind.'

9.—THEODORET. (Therapeutica, &c., Curative of Greek Affections, Sermon l.)—'The beginning of science is the science of nescience;' or—'The principle of knowledge is the knowledge of ignorance.'

10.—ST. PETER CHRYSOLOGUE. (Sermo li.)—'Nolle omnia scire, summa scientiæ est.'

11.—'THE ARABIAN SAGE.' (I translate this and the two following from Drusus and Gale):—'A man is wise while in pursuit of wisdom; a fool, when he thinks it to be mastered.'

12.—A RABBI:—'The wiser a man, the more ignorant does he feel; as the Preacher has it [i. 18]—"To add science is to add sorrow."'

13.—A RABBI:—'Who knows nothing, and thinks that he knows something, his ignorance is twofold.*'

14.—PETRARCH. (De Contemptu Mundi, Dial. ii.)—'Excute pectus tuum acriter; invenies cuncta quæ nosti, si ad ignorata referantur, eam proportionem obtinere, quam, collatus oceano, rivulus æstivis siccandis ardoribus: quamquam vel multa nosse, quid revelat?'

15.—CARDINAL DE CUSA. (Opera ed. 1565; De Docta Ignorantia, L. i. c. 3, p. 3.)—'Quidditas ergo rerum, quæ est entium veritas, in sua puritate inattingibilis est; et per omnes Philosophos investigata, sed per neminem,

* Literally:

'Te, tenebris jactum, ligat ignorantia duplex;
Scis nihil, et nescis te modo scire nihil.'

Or, with reference to our German evolves of the Nothing into the Everything; and avoiding the positio debilis:

'Te, sophia insanum, terit insipientia triplex;
Nil sapis, et nil non te sapuisse doces!'

nti est, reperta; et quanto in hac ignorantia profundius docti fuerimus, tanto magis ad ipsam accedemus veritatem.'—(*Ib.* c. 17, p. 13).—'Sublata igitur ab omnibus entibus participatione, remanet ipsa simplicissima entitas, quæ est essentia omnium entium, et non conspicimus ipsam talem entitatem, nisi in doctissima ignorantia, quoniam cum omnia participantia entitatem ab animo removeo, nihil remanere videtur. Et propterea magnus Dionysius [Areopagita] dicit, intellectum Dei, magis accedere ad nihil, quam ad aliquid. Sacra autem ignorantia me instruit, hoc quod intellectui nihil videtur, esse maximum incomprehensibile.'—(*Apologia Doctæ Ignorantiæ*, p. 67).—'Augustinus ait:—"Deum potius ignorantia quam scientia attingi." Ignorantia enim abjicit, intelligentia colligit; docta vero ignorantia omnes modos quibus accedi ad veritatem potest, unit. Ita eleganter dixit Algazel in sua *Metaphysica*, de Deo: "Quod quisque scit per probationem necessariam, impossibilitatem suam apprehendendi eum. Ipse sui est cognitor, et apprehensor; quoniam apprehendit, scire ipsum a nullo posse comprehendi. Quisquis autem non potest apprehendere, et nescit necessario esse impossibile eum apprehendere, per probationem prædictam, est ignorans Deum: et tales sunt omnes homines, exceptis dignis, et prophetis et sapientibus, qui sunt profundi in sapientia." Hæc ille.'—See also: *De Beryllo*, c. 36, p. 281; *De Venatione Sapientiæ*, c. 12, p. 306; *De Deo Abscondito*, p. 338; &c., &c.*

* So far, Cusa's doctrine coincides with what I consider to be the true precept of a 'Learned Ignorance.' But he goes farther: and we find his profession of negative ignorance converted into an assumption of positive knowledge; his Nothing, presto, becoming every thing; and contradictions, instead of standing an insuperable barrier to all intellectual cognition, employed in laying its foundation. In fact, I make no doubt that his speculations have originated the whole modern philosophy of the Absolute. For Giordano Bruno, as I can show, was well acquainted with Cusa's writings; from these he borrowed his own celebrated theory, repeating even the language in which its doctrines were originally expressed. To Cusa, we can, indeed, articulately trace, word and thing, the recent philosophy of the Absolute. The term *Absolute* (*Absolutum*), in its precise and peculiar signification, he everywhere employs. The *Intellectual Intuition* (*Intuitio Intellectualis*) he describes and names; nay, we find in him, even the process of Hegel's *Dialectic*. His works are, indeed, instead of the neglect to which they have been doomed, well deserving of attentive study in many relations. In Astronomy, before Copernicus, he had promulgated the true theory of the heavenly revolutions, with the corollary of a plurality of worlds; and in the science of Politics, he was the first perhaps to enounce the principles on which a representative constitution should be based. The Germans have, however, done no justice to their countryman. For Cusa's speculations have been most perfunctorily noticed by German historians of philosophy; and it is through Bruno that he seems to have exerted an influence on the Absolutist theories of the Empire.

16.—ÆNEAS SYLVIUS. (Piccolomini, Pope Pius II. Rhet. L. ii.)—‘*Oui plura nosse datum est, eum majora dubia sequuntur.*’

17.—PALINGENIUS. (Zodiacus Vitæ, Virgo v. 181, sq.)—
 ‘Tunc mea Dux tandem pulcro sic incipit ore:—
 Simia cœlicolum* risusque jocusque Deorum est
 Tunc homo, quum temere ingenio confidit, et audet
 Abdita naturæ scrutari, arcanaque Divum,
 Cum re vera ejus crassa imbecillaque sit mens.
 Si posita ante pedes nescit, quo jure videbit
 Quæ Deus et natura sinu occuluere profundo?
 Omnia se tamen arbitratur noscere ad unguem
 Garrulus, infelix, cæcus, temerarius, amens;
 Usque adeo sibi palpatur, seseque licetur?’

18.—‘*Multa tegit sacro involucro natura, neque ullis
 Fas est scire quidem mortalibus omnia; multa
 Admirare modo, nec non venerare: neque illa
 Inquires quæ sunt arcanis proxima; namque
 In manibus quæ sunt, hæc nos vix scire putandum.
 Est procul à nobis adeo præsentia veri!*’†

(‘Full many a secret in her sacred veil
 Hath Nature folded. She vouchsafes to knowledge
 Not every mystery, reserving much,
 For human veneration, not research.
 Let us not, therefore, seek what God conceals;

* The comparison of man as an ape to God, is from Plato, who, while he repeatedly exhibits human beings as the jest of the immortals, somewhere says—‘The wisest man, if compared with God, will appear an ape.’ Pope, who was well read in the modern Latin poets, especially of Italy, and even published from them a selection, in two volumes, abounds in manifest imitations of their thoughts, wholly unknown to his commentators. In his line—

‘And show’d a Newton as we show an ape’

—he had probably this passage of Palingenius in his eye, and not Plato. Warburton and his other scholiasts are aware of no suggestion.

† I know not the author of these verses. I find them first quoted by Fernelius, in his book ‘*De Abditis Rerum Causis*’ (L. ii. c. 18), which appeared before the year 1551. They may be his own. They are afterwards given by Sennertus, in his *Hypomnemata*, but without an attribution of authorship. By him, indeed, they are undoubtedly taken from Fernelius. Finally, they are adduced by the learned Morhof in his *Polyhistor*, who very unlearnedly however, assigns them to Lucretius. They are not by Palingenius, nor Palaris, nor Hospitalis, all of whose versification they resemble; for the last, indeed, they are almost too early.

For even the things which lie within our hands—
 These, knowing, we know not. So far from us,
 In doubtful dimness, gleams the star of truth ![†])

19.—JULIUS CÆSAR SCALIGER. (De Subtilitate, Ex. cclxxiv.) ‘Sapientia est vera, nolle nimis sapere.’ (Ib. ex. cccvii, sect. 29.; and compare Ex. cccxliv. sect. 4.) ‘Humanæ sapientiæ pars est, quædam æquo animo nescire velle.*’ (Ib. Ex. lii.) ‘Ubique clamare soleo, nos nihil scire.’

20.—JOSEPH JUSTUS SCALIGER. (Poemata : Iambi Gnomici. xxi.)

‘*Ne curiosus quære causas omnium.*

Quæcunque libris vis Prophetarum indidit

Afflata cælo, plena veraci Deo,

Nec operta sacri supparo silentii

Irrumpere aude, sed pudenter præteri.

Nescire velle, quæ magister maximus

Docere non vult, erudita inscitia est.’†

21.—GROTIUS. (Poemata ; Epigrammata, L. i.)

ERUDITA IGNORANTIA.

‘Qui curiosus postulat Totum suæ

Patere menti, ferre qui non sufficit

Mediocritatis conscientiam suæ,

Judex iniquus, æstimator est malus

Suique naturæque. Nam rerum parens,

Libanda tantum quæ venit mortalibus,

Nos scire pauca, multa mirari jubet.

Hic primus error anctor est pejoribus.

Nam qui fateri nil potest incognitum,

Falso necesse est placet ignorantiam ;

Umbrasque inanes captet inter nubilia,

Imaginosæ adulter Ixion Deæ.

Magis quiescet animus, errabit minus,

Contentus eruditione parabili,

Nec quæret illam, siqua quærentem fugit.

Nescire quædam, magna pars Sapientie est.’‡

* I meant, in another place, to quote this passage of Scaliger, but find that my recollection confused this and the preceding passage, with, perhaps, the similar testimony of Chrysologus (No. 10). Chrysologus, indeed, anticipates Scaliger in the most felicitous part of the expression.

† It is manifest that Joseph, in these verses, had in his eye the saying of his father. But I have no doubt, that they were written on occasion of the controversy raised by Gomarus against Arminius.

‡ In this excellent epigram, Grotius undoubtedly contemplated the corresponding verses of his illustrious friend, the Dictator of the Republic of

22.—PASCAL. (*Pensées*, Partie I. Art. vi. sect. 26.)—‘ Si l’homme commençoit par s’étudier lui-même, il verroit combien il est incapable de passer outre. Comment pourroit-il se faire qu’une partie connût le tout ?* . . . ‘ Qui ne croiroit, à nous voir composer toutes choses d’esprit et de corps, que ce mélange-là nous seroit bien compréhensible ! C’est néanmoins la chose que l’on comprend le moins. L’homme est à lui-même le plus prodigieux objet de la nature ; car il ne peut concevoir ce que c’est que corps, et encore moins ce que c’est qu’esprit, et moins qu’aucune chose comment un corps peut être uni avec un esprit. C’est là le comble de ses difficultés, et cependant c’est son propre être : *Modus, quo corporibus adhæret spiritus, comprehendi ab hominibus non potest ; et hoc tamen homo est.*†

II. *Testimonies to the more special fact, that all our knowledge, whether of Mind or of Matter, is only phenomenal.*

Our whole knowledge of mind and of matter is relative,—conditioned,—relatively conditioned. Of things absolutely or in themselves, be they external, be they internal, we know nothing, or know them only as incognizable ; and we become aware of their incomprehensible existence, only as this is indirectly and accidentally revealed to us, through certain qualities related to our faculties of knowledge, and which qualities, again, we cannot think as unconditioned, irrelative, existent in and of themselves. All that we know is therefore phenomenal,—phenomenal of the

Letters ; but, at the same time, he, an Arminian, certainly had in view the polemic of the Remonstrants and anti-Remonstrants, touching the Divine Decrees. Nor, apparently, was he ignorant of testimonies Nos. 17, 18.

* This testimony of Pascal corresponds to what Aristotle says : ‘ There is no proportion of the Infinite to the Finite.’ (*De Cælo*, L. i. cæ. 7, 8.)

† Pascal apparently quotes these words from memory, and, I have no doubt, quotes them from Montaigne, who thus (*L. ii. ch. 12.*) adduces them as from St. Augustin : ‘ *Modus, quo corporibus adhærent spiritus, omnino mirus est, nee comprehendi ab homine potest ; et hoc ipse homo est.*’—Montaigne’s commentator, Pierre Coste, says that these words are from Augustin, *De Spiritu et Anima*. That curious farrago, which is certainly not Augustin’s, does not however contain either the sentence or the sentiment ; and Coste himself, who elsewhere gives articulate references to the quotations of his author, here alleges only the treatise in general.

unknown.* The philosopher speculating the worlds of matter and of mind, is thus, in a certain sort, only an ignorant admirer. In his contemplation of the universe, the philosopher, indeed, resembles Æneas contemplating the adumbrations on his shield; as it may equally be said of the sage and of the hero,—

‘*Miratur ; Rerumque ignarus, Imagine gaudet.*’

Nor is this denied; for it has been commonly confessed, that as substances, we know not what is Matter and are ignorant of what is Mind. With the exception, in fact, of a few late Absolutist theorizers in Germany, this is, perhaps, the truth of all others most harmoniously re-echoed by every philosopher of every school; and, as has so frequently been done, to attribute any merit, or any singularity to its recognition by any individual thinker, more especially in modern times, betrays only the ignorance of the encomiasts.

1.—PROTAGORAS (as reported by Plato, Aristotle, Sextus Empiricus, Lærtius, &c.).—‘Man is [for himself] the measure of all things.’ (See Bacon, No. 14.)

2.—ARISTOTLE. (Metaphysica, L. vii., c. 10.)—‘Matter is incognizable absolutely or in itself.’—(De Anima, L. iii., c. 5.)—‘The intellect knows itself, only in knowing its objects.’—The same doctrine is maintained at length in the Metaphysics, b. xii. cc. 7 and 9, and elsewhere.

3.—ST. AUGUSTIN. (De Trinitate, L. ix., cc. 1, 2.) The result is—‘Ab utroque notitia paritur; a cognoscente et cognito.’—(Ib. L. x., cc. 3–12.) Here he shows that we know Mind only from the phenomena of which we are conscious; and that all the theories, in regard to the substance of what thinks, are groundless conjectures.—(Confessionum, L. xii. c. 5.)—Of our attempts to cognize the basis of material qualities he says; ‘Dum sibi

* *Hypostasis* in Greek (of *ὄβητα* I do not now speak, nor of hypostasis in its ecclesiastical signification), and the corresponding term in Latin, *Substantia* (per se *subsistens*, or *substans*, i. e. *accidentibus*, whichever it may mean), expresses a relation—a relation to its phenomena. A basis for phenomena, is, in fact, only *supposed*, by a necessity of our thought; even as a relative it is *not positively known*. On this real and verbal relativity, see St. Augustin (De Trinitate, l. vii., cc. 4, 5, 6).—Of the ambiguous term *Subject* (*ὑποκείμενον*) I have avoided speaking.

hæc dicit humana cogitatio, conetur eam, vel nosse ignorando, vel ignorare noscendo.'

4.—BOETHIUS. (De Consolatione Philosophiæ, L. v., pr. 4.)—'Omne quod cognoscitur, non secundum sui vim, sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem.'—(Pr. 6.)—'Omne quod scitur, non ex sua, sed ex comprehendentium, natura cognoscitur.'

5.—AVERROES. (In Aristotelem De Anima, L. iii. Text 8.)—'Intellectus intelligit seipsum modo accidentali.'

6.—ALBERTUS MAGNUS. (Contra Averroem de Unitate Intellectus, c. 7.)—'Intellectus non intelligit seipsum, nisi per accidens fiat intelligibile; ut materia cognoscitur per aliquid, cujus ipsa est fundamentum. Et si aliqui dicant intellectum intelligi per hoc, quia per essentiam est præsens sibi ipsi, hoc tamen secundum philosophiam non potest dici.' (See also *Aquinas* (Summa Theologiæ, P. i. Qu. 89, Art. 2; De Veritate, Qu. 10, Art. 8) and *Ferrariensis* (Contra Gentes, L. iii. c. 46.)

7.—GERSON. (De Concordia Metaphysicæ.)—'Ens quodlibet dici potest habere duplex Esse; sumendo Esse valde transcendentaliter. Uno modo, sumitur Ens, pro natura rei in seipsa; alio modo, prout habet esse, objectale seu representativum, in ordine ad intellectum creatum vel increatum. —Hæc autem distinctio non conficta est vel nova; sed a doctoribus, tam metaphysicis quam logicis subtilibus, introducta. Ens consideratum seu relictum prout quid absolutum, seu res quædam in seipsa, plurimum differt ab esse, quod habet objectaliter apud intellectum. Ens reale non potest constituere scientiam aliquam, si non consideretur in suo esse objectali, relato ad ipsum ens reale, sicut ad primarium et principale objectum.'

8.—LEO HEBRÆUS. (De Amore, Dial. i.)—'Cognita res a cognoscente, pro viribus ipsius cognoscentis, haud pro rei cognitæ dignitate recipi solet.'

9.—MELANCHTHON. (Erotemata Dialectices, L. i. Pr. Substantia.)—'Mens humana, per accidentia, agnoscit substantiam. Non enim cernimus oculis substantias, tectas accidentibus, sed mente eas agnoscimus. Cum videmus aquam manere eandem, sive sit frigida, sive sit calida, ratiocinamur:—aliquid quiddam esse formas illas discedentes, et aliud quod eas sustinet.'

10.—JULIUS CÆSAR SCALIGER. (De Subtilitate, Ex. cccvii. § 12.)—'Nego tibi ullam esse formam nobis notam plene, et plane: nostramque scientiam esse umbram in sole [contendo]. Formarum enim cognitio est rudis, confusa, nec nisi per *περιστάσεις*. Neque verum est,—formæ substantialis speciem recipi in intellectum. Non enim in sensu unquam fuit.'—(Ib. Ex. cccvii. § 21.)—'Substantias non sua specie cognosci a nobis, sed per earum accidentia. Quis enim me doceat, quid sit substantia, nisi illis

miseris verbis,—*res subsistens?* Quid ipsa illa substantia sit, plane ignoras; sed, sicut Vulpes elusa a Ciconia, lambimus vitreum vas, pulterem haud attingimus.’

11.—FRANCIS PICCOLOMINI. (De Mente Humanâ. L. i. c. 8.)—‘Mens intelligit se, non per se primo, sed cum cætera intellexerit; ut dicitur in L. iii. de Anima, t. 8, et in L. xii. Metaphysicæ, t. 38.’

12.—GIORDANO BRUNO. (De Imaginum, Signorum et Idearum Compositione; Dedicatio.)—‘Quemadmodum, non nosmetipsos in profundo et individuo quodam consistentes, sed nostri quædam externa de superficie (colorem, scilicet, atque figuram), accidentia, ut oculi ipsius similitudinem in speculo, videre posumus: ita etiam, *neque intellectus noster se ipsam in se ipso, et res ipsas omnes in seipsis*, sed in exteriori quadam specie, simulacro, imagine, figura, signo. Hoc quod ab Aristotele relatam, ab antiquis prius fuit expressum; at a neotericorum paucis capitur. Intelligere nostrum (id est, operationes nostri intellectus), aut est phantasia, aut non sine phantasia. Rursum. Non intelligimus, nisi phantasmata speculamur. Hoc est, quod non in simplicitate quadam, statu et unitate, sed in compositione, collatione, terminorum, pluralitate, mediante discursu atque reflexione, comprehendimus.’*

13.—CAMPANELLA. (Metaphysica. L. i. c. 1, dub. 3, p. 12.)—‘Ergo, non videntur res prout sunt, neque videntur extare nisi respectus.’

14.—BACON. (Instauratio Magna; Distr. Op.)—‘Informatio sensus semper est ex analogia hominis, non ex analogia universi; atque magis prorsus errore asseritur, sensum esse mensuram rerum.’ (See Protagoras, n. 1.)

15.—SPINOZA. (Ethics, Pars II. Prop. xix.)—‘Mens humana ipsum humanum corpus non cognoscit, nec ipsum existere scit, nisi per ideas affectionum quibus corpus afficitur.’—(Prop. xxiii.)—‘Mens se ipsam non cognoscit, nisi quatenus corporis affectionum ideas percipit.’ Et alibi.—(See Bruno, n. 12.)

16.—SIR ISAAC NEWTON. (Principia, Schol. Ult.)—‘Quid sit rei alicujus substantia, minime cognoscimus. Videmus tantum corporum figuras et colores, audimus tantum sonos, tangimus tantum superficies externas, olfacimus odores solos, et gustamus sapes: intimas substantias nullo sensu, nulla actione reflexa, cognoscimus.’

* Had Bruno adhered to this doctrine, he would have missed martyrdom as an atheist; but figuring to posterity, neither as a great fool (if we believe Adelung), nor as a great philosopher (if we believe Schelling). Compare the parallel testimony of Spinoza (15), a fellow Pantheist, but on different grounds.

17.—KANT. (*Critik der reinen Vernunft*, Vorr.) ‘In perception every thing is known in conformity to the constitution of our faculty.’ And a hundred testimonies to the same truth might be adduced from the philosopher of Koenigsberg, of whose doctrine it is, in fact, the foundation.

III.—*The recognition of Occult Causes.*

This is the admission that there are phenomena which, though unable to refer to any known cause or class, it would imply an irrational ignorance to deny. This general proposition no one, I presume, will be found to gainsay; for, in fact, the causes of all phenomena are, at last, occult. There has, however, obtained a not unnatural presumption against such causes; and this presumption, though often salutary, has sometimes operated most disadvantageously to science, from a blind and indiscriminate application; in two ways. In the first place, it has induced men lightly to admit asserted phenomena, false in themselves, if only confidently assigned to acknowledged causes. In the second place, it has induced them obstinately to disbelieve phenomena, in themselves certain and even manifest, if these could not at once be referred to already recognized causes, and did not easily fall in with the systems prevalent at the time. An example of the former is seen in the facile credence popularly accorded, in this country, to the asserted facts of Craniology; though even the fact of that hypothesis, first and fundamental—the fact, most probable in itself, and which can most easily be proved or disproved by the widest and most accurate induction, is diametrically opposite to the truth of nature; I mean the asserted correspondence between the development and hypothetical function of the cerebellum, as manifested in all animals, under the various differences of age, of sex, of season, of integrity and mutilation. This (among other of the pertinaciously asserted facts) I know, by a tenfold superfluous evidence, to be even ludicrously false. An example of the latter, is seen in the difficult credence accorded in this country to the phenomena of Animal Magnetism; phenomena in themselves the most unambiguous, which, for nearly

half a century, have been recognized generally and by the highest scientific authorities in Germany; while, for nearly a quarter of a century, they have been verified and formally confirmed by the Academy of Medicine in France. In either case, criticism was required, and awaiting.

So true is the saying of Cullen:—‘There are more false facts current in the world than false theories.’ So true is the saying of Hamlet:—‘There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.’ But averse from experiment and gregariously credulous—

‘L’homme est de glace aux vérités ;
Il est de feu pour les mensonges.’

1.—JULIUS CÆSAR SCALIGER.* In his commentary on Theophrastus touching the Causes of Plants, he repeatedly asserts, as the Aristotelic doctrine, the admission of Occult Causes. Thus (L. ii. c. 5)—‘Hoc dixit (Theophrastus), nequis ab eo nunc exigat occultas illarum, quas subiect. causas. Quasi dicat,—Sapienti multa licet ignorare.’ In like manner (L. iv. c. 13).—‘Hunc quoque locum simul cum aliis adducere potes adversus eos qui negant Peripateticis ab occulta proprietate quicquam fieri. Apud hunc philosophum sæpe monuimus inveniri. Est autem asyllum humanæ imbecillitatis, ac simile perflugium illi Periclis,—*εἰς τὰ δέσπορα*.’ This we may translate—‘Secret service money.’ The same he had also previously declared in his book *De Subtilitate*; where, for example (Ex. ccxviii., § 8), he says:—‘Ad manifestas omnia deducere, qualitates summa impudentia est;’ for there are many of these, ‘quæ omnino latent animos temperatos, illudunt curiosis;’ and he derides those, ‘qui irrident salutare asyllum illud, occultæ proprietatis.’

2.—ALSTEDIUS. (*PHYSICA* (1630), Pars. I. c. xiii., reg. 4.)—‘Quod Augustinus ait, “Multa cognoscendo ignorari, et ignorando, cognosci,” hic impri-

* I have quoted the elder Scaliger under all the three heads of this article, for a truth in his language is always acutely and strikingly enounced. The writings of no philosopher, indeed, since those of Aristotle, are better worthy of intelligent study; and few services to philosophy would be greater than a systematic collection and selection of the enduring and general views of this illustrious thinker. For, to apply to him his own expressions, these ‘zopyra,’ these ‘semina æternitatis,’ lie smothered and unfruitful in a mass of matters of merely personal and transitory interest. I had hoped to have attempted this in the appendix to a work ‘*De vita, genere et genio Scaligerorum*;’ but this I hope no longer.

mis habet locum, ubi agitur de Occultis Qualitatibus, quarum investigatio dicitur Magia Naturalis, id est, præstantissima naturæ indagatio in qua verbum modestiæ, Nescio, subinde usurpandum est. Verbum modestiæ dico, non autem stultitiæ.’

3.—VOLTAIRE. (Dictionnaire Philosophique, voce *Occultes*).—‘Qualités Occultes.—On s’est moqué fort longtemps des qualités occultes; on doit se moquer de ceux qui n’y étoient pas. Répétons cent fois, que tout principe, tout premier ressort de quelque œuvre que ce puisse être du grand Demiourgos, est occulte et caché pour jamais aux mortels.’ And so forth.—(Physique Particulière, ch. xxxiii).—‘Il y a donc certainement des lois éternelles, inconnues, suivant lesquelles tout s’opère, sans qu’on puisse les expliquer par la matière et par le mouvement. . . . Il y a dans toutes les Académies une chaire vacante pour les vérités inconnues comme Athènes avait un autel pour les dieux ignorés.’*

* Besides the few testimonies adduced, I would refer, in general, for some excellent observations on the point, to Fernelius ‘De Abditis Rerum Causis,’ and to the ‘Hypomnemata’ of Sennertus.

FINIS.

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