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THE
PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
BY
P. N. SRINIVASACHARI, M.A.,
Retired Principal and Professor of Philosophy, Perch aiyappa's College
THE ADYAR LIBRARY, ADYAR 1943
Price Rs. 10
Printed by
C. SUBBARAYUDU,
Ax THE VASANTA PRESS, ADYAU, MADRAS.
DEDICATED TO
SREE MAHARAJAH RAO VENKATA KUMARA MAHIPATHI SURYA RAU BAHADUR, D.LiTT.,
Maharajah of Pithapuram
AS A TOKEN OF THE AUTHOR'S GRATITUDE FOR HIS PATRONAGE AND DEEP INTEREST IN VlS'lSTADVAITA
PREFACE
THE main purpose of this work is to give a critical and comprehensive exposition of the central features of the philosophy of Vis'ist&dvaita and its relation to other schools of Vednnta. Vis'ist&dvaita is not as widely known as Advaitct among students of Philosophy. It has also suffered at the hands of its few expositors who use the misleading term ' qualified monism ' as its English equivalent and who in their interpretations identify it with the Bhednbheda system of VedUnta and Hegelian thought. With a view to do justice to Vi&ist&dvaita and set the balance right so far as influence on modern thought is concerned, I published in 1928 Rcimnnujd's Idea of the Finite Self in a very concise form. My later work, The Philosophy of Bhednbheda, published in 1934, was designed to serve as an exhaustive introduction to the study of Ramanuja and the development of his system in the history of Indian Philosophy. The present work is a comprehen- sive but modest survey of the system of Visfistadvaita as outlined in a series of eight lectures delivered by me under the auspices of the University of Madras. The delay in its publication was largely due to the pre- occupations of administrative work.
Viii THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTlDVAITA
Vi&istadvaita maintains its position in the history of Indian thought by establishing its own siddh&nta by a criticism of rival systems. It has, at the same time, a synthetic insight into the essentials of other darsfanas and accepts whatever in them is consistent with its own basic principles. It is a true philosophy of religion which reconciles the opposition between philosophy and religion and the conflict between monism and pluralism. If it is liberally interpreted in terms of contemporary philosophy and comparative religion without in any way sacrificing its foundational princi- ples, it is capable of satisfying the demands of science and philosophy on the one hand, and of ethics and religion on the other ; and an attempt is made in the following pages to give such an interpretation.
It is a pleasure to acknowledge my indebtedness to all those who have helped me in the preparation of this book. I had the rare privilege of sitting at the feet of the late Mahamahopadhyaya Kapistalam Des'ikacariar Svami, and being instructed by him in the essentials of the Vi&ist&dvaita Dar&ana. My thanks are due to my teacher, Sri S. Vasudevachariar, who warmly encour- aged me in this venture by reading the type-script and offering valuable suggestions ; to my esteemed friend, Professor M. Hiriyanna for the great care with which he went through the MS. and for important and friendly counsel ; to Dewan Bahadur V. K. Ramanujachariar, who, in spite of the infirmities of old age, read portions of the type-script and commended this * labour of love ' and to Rao Bahadur K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar who
PREFACE IX
also read portions of the work and helped to secure its early publication. I record my gratitude to my friends, Rao Saheb M. R. Rajagopala Aiyangar, Sri G. K. Rangaswami Aiyangar and Sri K. R. Sarma for their continued and enthusiastic assistance in reading through the proofs and in the citation of authorities ; I am also beholden to Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma who willingly read portions and offered valuable criticism and to Sri D. Ramaswami Aiyangar for similar help on some of the concluding chapters. My thanks are due to Sri P. Sankaranarayanan and to Dr. T. R. Chintamani for kindly preparing the Index and the Errata respectively. I take this opportunity of acknowledging my obligations to the Madras University for the kind permission to utilise my lectures on Ramanuja in the preparation of this work. Dr. G. Srinivasa Murti, the Honorary Direc- tor of the Adyar Library, has placed me under heavy obligation by publishing the work in the Adyar Library Series; I thank Dr. C. Kunhan Raja for his kind support ; I also thank Sri A. N. Krishna Aiyangar for his hearty co-operation and supplying all the necessary aids in the successful completion of the work. The elegant and expeditious printing of the Vasanta Press in these difficult times is mainly due to its enthusiastic Superin- tendent, Sri C. Subbarayudu. Sri P. T. Srinivasa Aiyangar and Sri R. C. Srinivasa Raghavan prepared the typed press copy and went through the proofs.
Sri Krishna Library, P. N. SRINIVASACHARI
Mylapore, 30th April 1943
CONTENTS
PAGES
DEDICATION v
PREFACE vii
INTRODUCTION . . . xxv
CHAPTER
I. VIS'ISTADVAITA AS A PHILOSOPHY
OF RELIGION . . . 1-20
Mere Philosophy is speculative and has no finality ; Mere Religion is dogmatic ; Hosti- lity between Philosophy and Faith in five different levels : (l) Naturalism vs. Super- naturalism, (2) Vitalism vs. Animism or Pranaism, (3) Sensationalism vs. Anthro- pomorphism, (4) Rationalism vs. Dogmatism, (5) Intuttionistn or Mysticism vs. Revelational Faith ; Philosophy and Religion reconciled in the Philosophy of Religion as Vis'istadvaita dars'ana, enshrined in the Upanisad " Brah- ma vid apnOti param ; " tattva, hit a and,' purusartha ; Metaphysics, morals and religion.
II. THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE . . 21-60
Vis'istadvaitic Theory of Perception : Co- ordination of five factors — The object or visaya, sense-organ or indrtya, manas, atman, Param atman ; Dharmabhiitajnana—The key word of Epistemology — The Self and its con- sciousness ; finite-infinite ; no contradiction.
Xli THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
CHAPTER PAGES
Value in religious experience. Jftana is substance-attribute : Dravya-guna. Theory of Judgment or Predication : No Self-con- tradiction in Subject-object relation. Pratya- ksa — savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka : differ- ence in degree and not in kind. The ultimate subject of every judgment is Brahman, the Inner Self. The Theory of Relations — aprthak- siddha vi&esana : internal or organic relation : reconciles realism and idealism. Theory of Truth — Satkarya vada, Integrity of experi- ence in all levels : pratyaksa, anumana and S'abda. Theory of Error — Partial knowledge is not an illusion : Pragmatic test. Illusions, Dreams, Hallucinations can be explained by physiological psychology and ethics. The Advaitic view criticised and re-interpreted. Each theory of truth, pragmatism, realism and coherence has its own place in the Vi&istad- vaitic theory of knowledge leading to ontology.
III. THE THEORY OF TWO BRAHMANS
CRITICISED . . . 61-92
The nature of Brahman as the sat — The Absolute of Philosophy as the God of Re- ligion ; S'arikara's theory of two Brahmans in the Sutras, sadvidya, anandamayadhikarana, Ubhayalinga, karya Brahman ; criticised. Three types of Advaita — The Illusion theory, the Phenomenal theory and the Realistic theory ; Criticism of Advaita by the Bhaskara and other Bhedabheda schools ; criticism of Bhedabheda by Ramanuja ; Vis'istadvaita —
CONTENTS Kill
CHAPTER PAGES
not an adjectival Theory : not Pantheistic or Theistic ; RamEnuja's clinching argu- ment— Brahman as B'anrin, avidya as karma ; the creational process is for mukta-making ; categories reinterpreted : Brahman as saguna with metaphysical, moral and aesthetic per- fections.
IV. ONTOLOGY I. BRAHMAN AS ADHARA . 93-121 The Metaphysical attributes of Satyam, jnatiam, anantam ; no sublation of ap- pearances of reality ; Reality and value ; Criticism of the theory of nirvis'esa Brah- man by Bhedabheda ; Ramanuja's criti- cism of Bhedabheda ; Brahman as satyasya satya, Real Reality, True of the True ; Brahman as jHanam ; jy&tisam jy&tis, no contradiction in self-consciousness ; Brahman as the Inner Self ; Brahman as anantam — infinity explained.
V. ONTOLOGY II. BRAHMAN AS
NIYANTA .... 122-149 The evils of mere Intellectualism — Transi- tion to ethical philosophy. Criticism of the NiyGga view of the Mlmamsaka and the Advaita view of akarma — Criticism of Advaita by Dhyana-niyOga vada : criticism of the latter by Bhaskara — Criticism of NisprapaHcfkarana niyOga vada — Refutation of rival theories by Ramanuja : Transition from niyQga to niyanta — The parable of the prince — Brahman as the Inner Ruler Immortal or
xiv THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
CHAPTER PAGES
antaryamin of cit and acit, eminent as well as immanent — the Inner Self of all beings ; Is'vara : The chief actor in the moral universe, chief of the five factors in moral experience ; Divine and human freedom reconciled.
VI. ONTOLOGY III. BRAHMAN AS RULER
AND REDEEMER . . . 150-180
Is'vara as dispenser of justice according to desert : No caprice or cruelty in the divine nature ; J&vara as Redeemer or Raksaka : Emancipation by expiation impossible, Re- moval of karma by krpa ; Is'vara as the " Hound of Heaven " seeking the sinner to devour his sin ; five forms of Brahman : para, vyuha, vibhava, antaryamin, and area : the true meaning of avatara and area as the reservoir of mercy ; the five forms equally real ; The attributes of the Raksaka ex- plained ; Vis'istadvaita as Sri Vaisnavism : S'riyahpati — Law and love as one in two ; analysis of evil — Physical, moral and meta- physical ; Criticism of the theories of Advaita and Bhedabheda ; Analysis of karma — Psy- chological, ethical and religious aspects ; Karma and krpa reconciled ; the extremes of Buddhism and Christianity refuted by the Glta view.
VII. ONTOLOGY IV. BRAHMAN AS S'ESI . 181-194 Sest defined : No hedonistic theory ; Sest as svamin ; Is'vara as Father of all ; Motherhood of God ; Kaiiikarya. Service to all jivas.
CONTENTS XV
CHAPTER PAGES
VIII. ONTOLOGY V. BRAHMAN AS THE
BEAUTIFUL . . . 195-219
Vis'istadvaitic Aesthetics, as the philosophy of the Beautiful. Beauty of God as Param- jyOtis, Bhuvanasundara and Manmatha Man- matha ; Cosmology reinterpreted in terms of the Ilia theory ; Five forms of Divine Beauty ; the theory of Brahmarasa \ the moods of devotion ; Krsna Ilia — the Ilia of love ; srngararasa ; the meaning of Brahmananda ; the Advaitic view criticised by Bhaskara and Ramanuja.
IX. ONTOLOGY VI. BRAHMAN AS THE
S'ARIRIN .... 220-249 Co-ordination of metaphysical, moral and aesthetic qualities : Satyam, jJlanam, anan- tarn, amala and ananda ; Sarira-varlri relation ; a synoptic view ; pradhana prati- tantra, key-note of Vedanta\ A synthetic view : Satkarya vada, samanadhikaranya^ aprthaksiddha-vis'esanaa.ndprakara-prakari relation reinterpreted in the light of the synthe- tic view as extolled in the Antaryamividya : the meaning of the term s'aririn defined : faulty definitions examined ; This view recon- ciles all contradictions, all texts, all schools of thought ; Brahman is the source, sustenance and satisfaction of finite existence and experience.
X. COSMOLOGY .... 250-273 Meaning and value described in the Sad- vidya as expounded in the section called
xvi THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
CHAPTER PAGES
" arambbana " in the Sutras ; non-difference in the causal relation ; Brahman, the immanent and transcendent cause of the cosmos ; criti- cism of vivartavada, brahmaparinamavada, asatkaryavada and the Sankhya view ; the true meaning of cause as applied to acit, cit and Ts'vara ; the mechanical, the teleological and the ontological views reconciled ; cosmic, moral and spiritual order ; process, progress and purpose ; pralaya and srsti ; unity and uniformity of nature ; evolution of prakrti ; Comparison with western theories ; the creative urge — a Ilia of love in terms of aesthetic philosophy ; the religious motive of the cosmic process ; the moulding of the mukta or soul-making.
XI. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE JIVA . 274-303
Terms Spirit, Self and Soul ambiguous ; the term atman clear, distinct and adequate ; Negative definitions ; criticism of mechanis- tic, biological, sensationalistic and rationalis- tic views; Positive definitions: Atman different from the 23 categories of prakrti ; experience definition ; The Glta view : Self and its consciousness ; the three functions of consci- ousness : cognitive, conative and affective, jfiatrtva, kartrtva and bhokrtva ; the three states of consciousness continuous and not contradictory ; metempsychosis and the sor- rows of samsara ; the philosophical view of the self as the logical, ethical and aesthetic ego, as the prakara or S'arlra of the Atman ; the
CONTENTS XVII
CHAPTER PAGES
paradox of the jiva as mode and monad explained.
XII. MUMUKSUTVA . . . 304-319
Transition to ethical Religion — The Adven- tures of the empirical Self. The cycle of samsara : the see -saw of avidya-karma ; The shallow optimism of the materialistic hedo- nist ; Sickmindedness ; Pessimism — an inevit- able stage in spirituality ; The mumuk§u idea of the summum bonum of life or puru$artha ; Steps to self-realisation — Karma Jftana Ydga, Bhakti Ydga.
XIII. KARMA YOGA . . . 320-333
The psychology of the moral self as determin- ed by the three gunas ; the self as thinker and agent ; the meaning of niskama karma, the master thought of Vedantic morals developed by a criticism of the hedonistic theories of the Vedavadin and the rationalistic views of the Buddhist and the Sankhya; Refutation of the activistic and ascetic views of morals ; Duty for duty's sake : an end in itself ; Formu- lation ; Advantages : Moral autonomy, dig- nity, inner value ; determined by each man's station in life or svadharma ; Concrete illustrations : YajHa, dana, tapas and yuddha. +
XIV. JNANAYOGA . . . 334-351
The goal of conduct as self-realisation or atma- valokana : Transition from the metaphysics B
THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA CHAPTER PAGES
of morals to the spiritual philosophy of attnakama, from the " ought " to the deeper " is " ; atma different from dehatma or the empirical self ; self-realisation, the result of moral and spiritual discipline ; the need for samatva and spiritual service and benevolence to all beings, concrete illustra- tions : the significance of marriage, property, warfare as social institutions ; the four stages mentioned in the Glta : Egoism and altruism reconciled and transcended ; spiritual knowledge of the atman, a stepping stone to religion which consists in shifting the centre of activity from atman to Paramatman.
XV. BHAKTI YOGA . . . 352-379
Mumuk$utva : A progression in God-realisa- tion and bhakti the supreme means to mukti ; the extremes of the Mimaihsaka view of karma and the Advaita view oiffiana rejected by non-S'ankara Vedantins '. Intermediate theories examined : Dhyananiyoga vada% nisprapdficlkaraiia nty&ga vada, and the Bhedabheda discipline of Jf&nakarma- samuccaya rejected ; Ramanuja's idea of the relation between the two Mlmaihsas ; Their organic unity and common aim ; criticism of the Advaittc view of two kinds of vidyas and meditation >on saguqa Brahman and nirguna Brahman ; Brahman is one and the upasanas have the same goal ; Sadhana saptaka, upa- sand, an Upani§adic command just as duty is a Vedic imperative ; vedana is dhyana or
CONTENTS Xix
CHAPTER PAGES
loving meditation on Brahman or bhakti ; Brahman is the variri of the self ; the chief among the 32 vidyas ; bhakti is illumined by fnana', fruition through grace; bhakti is continuous meditation in which representation acquires the vividness of a living presence ; it involves reciprocity, unconditionality and in- trinsic value : the Git a as Bhakti Sastra ; the paramaikantin ; Higher stages : Para bhakti, para ffiana and parama bhakti : S'ri Vedanta Des'ika on steps to salvation : Paramapada Sopana.
XVI. PRAPATTI YOGA OR NYASA VIDYA . 380-411 Prapatti a Brahmavidya, not an alien graft on the Upanisad ; S'ri Vedanta Des'ika's view ; an alternative to bhakti : it has intrinsic and independent value, ease, naturalness, im- mediate efficacy and universal applicability and appeal ; the sacred rahasyas : Mulamantra, Dvaya and Carama Sloka ; the six angas of prapatti : Mahavi&vasa, the central sadha* na ; the three requisites of atmaniksepa,phala- samarpana, bharasamarpana and svarftpa- samarpana or the renouncement of the hedonistic, moralistic and egoistic views ; I&vara Himself upaya and upeya ; the theory of vyaja reconciles the upaya-upeya problem or paradox ; Ramayarja as Sarana- gati Veda ; Vadakalai and Tenkalai views of prapatti : Markata and Marjara nyayas ; Tenkalai view : Prapatti not an upaya as grace is unconditioned ; Five forms of the
XX THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
CHAPTER PAGES
Redeemer, embodiments of antecedent grace ; Piljai Lokacarya's Srivacana Bhusana as classical exposition of the theory ; com- parison of the two views : contrast ; and reconciliation ; A Christian parallel : justifica- tion by works and by faith : thejNazarene and Nammalvar compared ; Supernatural, historic and mystic views : the view of the Alvar more comprehensive and tolerant ; the religion of daya or the religion of universal deliverance.
XVII. UBHAYA VEDANTA . . . 412-436
Section I. The religion of the Sri Bha$ya, The Vedanta as spiritual experience. Every adhikarana establishes the supreme tattva and expounds it as an anubhava as illustrated in the first two chapters of the Sutras. Section II : The Philosophy of the Bhagavad Vi§aya< Ubhaya Vedanta, as a true darvana. The metaphysis of Vedanta embodied in the mystic experience of Nammalvar as expound- ed in the Idu and by Vedanta Des'ika in his Dram idOpani$ad.
XVIII. THE MYSTICISM OF VIS'ISTADVAITA . 437-459
Transition from the theistic to the mystic experience ; Mysticism defined : the proof of the existence of God is experience of God ; three stages : Self-renouncement, Introver- sion, and self-realisation ; unitive conscious- ness— Karma Yoga, Jfiana Yoga and Bhakti Yoga ; The Bhagavata enshrines mystic ex- perience par excellence ; Bhagavad Vi§aya ;
CONTENTS XXI
CHAPTER PAGES
Bhagavan as Beauty, Love and Bliss ; the game of love to brahmanise the self ; Bhaga- vat kama, not erotism ; sams'lesa and vi- s'lesa ; Nammalvar's experience of the agony of separation and the bliss of the unitive consciousness ; the Upani§adic view ; the bhavas of bhakti : five stages : Nayaka- nayaki bhava : the spiritual marriage of AQdal revelling in Krsna-prema : Gopi-love tran- scendental ; freed from all taint of sensuality and sin ; consummation in Rasa Llla.
XIX. MUKTI .... 460-500
The ' homing instinct ' of the Vidvan or the mystic ; the ascent to the absolute : Criticism of jlvanmukti ; mukti is freedom from embodi- ment and not in embodiment ; S'ankara's view of karya Brahman criticised ; Ramanuja's siddhanta ; the mystic description of mukti in the Kausltaki Upanisad : Brahma- gandha, Brahmarasa, Brahmadrsti, Brah- manubhava ; mukti is alogical, amoral and supra-personal experience ; criticism of the other theories of mukti ; mukti is chiefly sayujya '. not svarupa aikya, but vi&ista aikya avibhaga, avinabhava ; no mergence, absorp- tion or identity or destruction of the self ; three ways of describing the indescribable state of Brahmanubhava ; Cosmic conscious- ness : ffiana as all-pervasive knowledge : Free- dom : equality of attributes ; kaiftkarya — the chief rasa, no slave mentality ; Bliss, samya, self-forgetfulness in the bliss state ; Thought
XXii THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
CHAPTER PAGES
expires in enjoyment ; Time as eternity ; three meanings : temporal series in the phenomenal world of Ilia ; the eternal c now ' in nitya ; Advaita view countered : Suddha sattva : matter without its mutability ; aprakrta form ; the realm of ends ; the self brahmanised in Brahmal&ka ; all eternal values conserved in Paramapada ; no loss of self.
XX. A BRIEF HISTORY OF VlS'ISTAD-
VAITIC VAISNAVISM . . 501-540
The place of Vaisnavism in the history of Indian Philosophy ; Pre-Ramanuja Vi&istad- vaita : The Alvars and their mystic experi- ences. The Acaryas as the followers and ex- positors of the A/var-experience : Nathamuni, the founder of Ubhaya Vedanta ; Alavandar, the immediate precursor of Raman uja ; His chief works ; Ramanuja, the greatest exponent of Vis'istadvaita and his chief works ; Post- Ramanuja Vis'istadvaita : Pillai LokacSlrya and his works ; Vedanta Des'ika and his works. Siddhanta as synthesis. The two schools of Sri Vaisnavism ; differences reconciled.
XXL THE INFLUENCE OF RAMANUJA ON
OTHER SYSTEMS IN INDIA . 541-572:
Bhakti movement in India in the Mahomedan and Christian periods traced to the influence of Ramanuja : Chief features ; Monotheistic faith in Visnu as the all-sustaining Self and Saviour ; Bhakti , the chief means to mOk§a ; The establishment of the spiritual brotherhood
CONTENTS XXIlt
CHAPTER PAGES
of man ; The proselytising influences of Islam and Christianity overcome ; Vaisna- vism in the United Provinces — Ramananda ; his chief disciple, Kablr ; reconciles Hinduism and Islam. The Nimbarka school of Bheda- , bheda ; The Dvaita dars'ana of Madhva- carya ; The Suddhadvaita of Vallabhacarya ; The Acintya Bhedabheda of S'ri Caitanya and Bengal Vaisnavism ; Bhakti religion in Maha- rastra ; Saiva Siddhanta ; Sikhism ; Arya Samaj ; Brahma SamEj : reconciles Hinduism and Christianity ; The Vaisnavism of S'ri Ramakrsna Paramahamsa ; Mahatma Gandhi's Song of the True Vaisnava ; The Influence of Vaisnavism on Islam and Christianity : Its claims to be a universal religion. >
XXII. CONCLUSION . . . 573-600
Section I : The central truth of Vis'istadvaita summed up methodically ; the main charges levelled against it, examined and refuted. Section II : A critical estimate of Vis'isiad- vaita as a Ved antic system. Section III. Dvaita, Advaita and Vis'ist- advaita contrasted with the western systems, Theism, Monism and Pantheism ; Different views of the Upani$ad " Thou art That " ; Synthesis, the chief merit of Vis'istad- vaita ; the need for the reorientation of the system in the light of modern thought without impairing its integrity ; Vis'i$tadvaita as the mediating link between Dvaita and Advaita, a link of love; The claims of Vedanta to
THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
CHAPTER PAGES
universality summed up in the twin truths of the brahmanisation of the ntntan and service to humanity ; its spiritual hospitality.
SANSKRIT GLOSSARY . . . 601-614
BIBLIOGRAPHY .... 615-616
ERRATA .... 617-618
INDEX .... 619-642
INTRODUCTION
"'T^HE Philosophy of Vedanta is enshrined in the Upanisads, -*• the Gitd and the Brahma Sutras, which together constitute its foundation and supreme authority. Its truths are true for ever and impersonal, and do not depend on the personality of a historic founder. The impersonal is embodied in the experience of seers, prophets and philosophers, who only discover the truth and do not create it de novo. The Upanisads contain the wisdom of Vedanta ; the Gltd gives its cream ; and the Sutras expound its philosophic value. The fundamental problem of Vedanta is: "What is that by know- ing which everything else is known ? " and its solution is that by realising Brahman everything is realised. The solution is not merely metaphysically satisfactory, but also spiritually satisfying. When finite consciousness is purified and exalted, it can break through the confines of finiteness, intuit the Infinite or Brahman, and thus realise the supreme goal of experience. By an immanent criticism of the categories of experience and by spiritual induction, it is possible for the metaphysician as a mumuksu to renounce the ephemeral values of worldliness and reach his eternal home in the absolute. He then becomes a wise man or vidvan, and, with his philosophic illumination and moral exaltation, he becomes a. pattern of perfection, and works for world welfare. Vedanta is thus the highest exposition of Indian philosophy in its
XXVI THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
theoretical and practical aspects, and there is nothing good' and true in the world more elevating and beneficial than Vedantic thought and life. It is therefore essential for a seeker after truth and eternal happiness to know and appreciate the meaning and value of Vedanta, the most precious gift of India to mankind.
The Vedanta Sutras of Badarayana, identified with Vyasa, are, by common consent, regarded as the most authori- tative and systematic exposition of the Upanisads and recog- nised as the best manual of Vedanta. On a superficial view, the Upanisads appear to be conflicting and self-contradictory without any trace of logical consistency. But the Sutrakdra, with his genius for synoptic knowledge, affirms the continuity and unity of all the texts1, and the Sutras string together the teachings of the Upanisads and present them as a systematic whole. The Sutra is cryptic or laconic, and is defined as a clear, concise and comprehensive aphorism that should be faultless and free from repetition. The method of employing connected catchwords to arrive at systematic unity is planned1 and perfected in the Brahma Sutras. It is unrivalled for its metaphysical profundity and spiritual power. From the first Sutra to the last, the arguments develop rhythmically step by step until the whole scheme is completed. The parts are so organically related with one another and with the whole, that, if a part is destroyed, the symmetry of the whole will also- be destroyed. The central idea that pervades the constituent elements is the truth that Brahman is absolutely re$l. and. spiritually realisable. The aphorist is also a supreme artist and Sy the method of samanvaya, he reconciles the apparently conflicting Upanisads, and harmonises them into a coherent
1 Brahma S&tras, III. in. 1.
INTRODUCTION XXvil
whole. The dominant motive of the Sutrakdra is to combine philosophic speculation with spirituality and communicate the wisdom so gained to aspiring humanity. The Sutras in their exposition start with the aspiration of the philosopher or mumuksu for Brahmajndna and end with the attainment by the mukta of Brahmdnubhava.
The Veddnta Sutras consist of four chapters divided into sixteen sections or pddas, each of which is sub-divided into adhikaranas or topics of Veddntic interest. While, according to S'ahkara, there are 555 aphorisms, and according to Purna- prajna, 564, Ramanuja counts only 545. The first chapter expounds the nature of Brahman as the ultimate ground of the universe of acit, and cit, in the light of the kdrana-vdkyas of the Upanisads dealing with the cause or ground of the universe. The second chapter called the Avirodhddhydya establishes the same truth negatively by refuting and rejecting non- Veddntic theories. The third chapter deals exhaustively with the sddhanas or means of attaining Brahman in accord- ance with the Veddntic truth that the metaphysical ground of all beings is the goal of religious meditation.1 The last chapter known as the Phalddhydya brings to light the nature of mukti as the fruition of the whole philosophical enquiry. The end and aim of the whole system is summed up in the first four Sutras called the Catussutn. They assert ' that Brahman is the subject of enquiry in its philosophical and spiritual aspect and the supreme end of experience. The first Sutra states that the ultimate question of philosophy which is also the quest of religion is the knowledge of Brahman, and thus identifies the metaphysician with the mumuksu. The second Sutra solves the supreme problem of ontology by declaring that the supreme
1 kara^antu dhyeyah.
XXviii THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
Reality of the universe is Brahman and that it is the One without a second. The third insists on the vastra as the supreme source of this knowledge on the ground that spiritual wisdom is the criterion and crown of all experience, and that it can only /be spiritually discerned. Dialectics leads to endless disputations : and ultimate doubts and cannot solve the quest of the mumuksu which is supra-sensuous and supra-rational. The fourth Sutra, tat tu samanvaydt, establishes the comprehensive truth of Vedanta that the philosophic knowledge of Brahman also satisfies the spiritual quest and imparts the eternal bliss .of Brahmdnanda to the mukta. The true philosopher is thus a synoptic thinker and spiritual seer, who, by knowing Brah- man, realises everything else, and communicates his wisdom to others.
The Upanisads, the Gita and the Sutras teach the same Veddntic truth in its mystical, moral and metaphysical aspects respectively, in spite of their apparent self-contradictions and diversities of interpretation. The reference in the Sutras to different ancient dcdryas like As'marathya, Audulomi Kas'akrtsna, Badari and Jaimini is sufficient internal evidence to prove the prevalence, from very ancient times, of a variety of Veddntic schools, each claiming to be the true representative of the teaching of the Upanisads. All the Veddntic teachers expound the Sutras in a coherent way, though they represent different types of philosophy. They claim the authority of immemorial tradition for their siddhdnta and satisfy the triple tests of s'dstraic support, philosophical stability and intuitive certainty (or s'ruti, yukti and anubhava). All the Veddntic schools generally agree in the refutation of non- \Veddntic schools and the establishment of the truth that the supreme endeavour and end of man is Brahmajndna or the
INTRODUCTION XXIX
realisation of Brahman. But they differ in the exact determi- nation of the nature of Brahman and the means and value of attaining Him. Among the chief exponents of the Sutras are the well-known dcdryas, S'ahkara, Bhaskara, Yadava, Nim- barka, Ramanuja, S'rikantha, Madhva, Vallabha and Baladeva. S'ankara's Advaita, claiming to follow the teaching of Badari, is the oldest of the extant expositions of the Sutras. The Bheddbheda schools of Bhaskara and Yadava are midway, log- ically and chronologically, between S'ankara and Ramanuja, and may be said to follow the tradition of Audulomi and As'marathya. The bhasya of Yadava is not now available, though there are re- ferences to it in the works of Ramanuja and Vedanta Des'ika. The Nimbarka school of Dvaitadvaita marks the logical transi- tion from the Bheddbheda of Yadava to the Vis'istadvaita of Ramanuja. The system of Vijnana Bhiksu also rejects Mdyd- vada and the theory of aikya. The exposition of S'rikantha, in its purely metaphysical aspect, is not very different from the system of Ramanuja, though the siddhdntas and sam- praddyas are different. The Dvaitadar&ana of Madhvacarya brings out the philosophic theism of Vedanta in its Vaisnava aspect and the Acintya Bheddbheda of Caitanya and the S'uddhddvaita of Vallabha stress the mystic side of Vaisnavite experience.
The systems of Advaita, Dvaita and Vis>istddvaita are the most popular forms of Vedanta at present, and the other systems are either forgotten chapters in the history of Indian philosophy like the schools of Bheddbheda or different versions or variations of the three fundamental types like those of Nimbarka or S'rlkara. Each school has a sanctified tradition or sampraddya and an ever-growing critical and constructive philosophy ; the 'best exponents of each school have always
7CXX THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'I§TADVAITA
been the patterns of their essential teachings. The position of each system is further strengthened by the opposition of 'rival schools in an atmosphere of disinterested criticism and becomes for that reason enriched by vakyas, vrttis and com- mentaries revealing rare dialectic and constructive skill. In the comparative study of Vedanta in the world of con- temporary philosophy, eastern and western, the systems of Dvaita and Vi&istddvaita are not so well-known and ap- preciated as Advaita ; and this is as much due to the default of the followers of the two systems, as to the defects in the provision of facilities for their study in the seats of learning. The study of Vis'istadvaita is of absorbing interest to all thinkers not only on account of its intrinsic value but also on account of its synthetic insight as a philosophy of religion. It mediates between philosophic monism on the one hand and the theism of Dvaita on the other. It has a universal appeal to humanity because it recognises the immanence of God in all beings and the innate spirituality and salvability of all jwas, thus shedding the twin evils of exclusiveness and hatred. Vis'is- tadvaita gives an extended meaning to ihepramanas, liberalises the theory of the sadhanas and exalts the value and destiny of the individual. In the highest sense of Vedanta, spiritual truth is true for ever and the worth of a true philoso- pher or Vedantin does not depend on his birth, the status he may acquire or the language in which he may communicate his spirituality, though these conditions may have some deter- mining influence on his character and scope for service. He has a soul sight of Brahman (Brahmadrsti) and realises Him in all beings and all beings in Him. Thus its supreme claim consists in its synthetic power and its uniqueness is expressed in its universality. VJ^^wij^^Sidd^jSnta is synthetic in the sense that it defines God as love and the
INTRODUCTION XXXI
universe as having its source aoid sustenance in that love. iFisT universal in the sense that it has a spiritual appeal to one and all.
Ramanuja accepts the authority of the ancient and weighty tradition of the Sutras established by Vedantic teach- ers like Tanka, Guhadeva, Dramida, Kapardin and Bharuci, and follows faithfully their teaching as expounded in the mtti of Bodhayana and the bhasya of Dramidacarya who is referred to as the Bhdsyakdra. He not only recognises the eternity and self-validity of the Veda but also its integrity as a whole and its all-inclusive authority. The two Mlmdmsds of Jaimini and Badarayana are an organic whole which enquire into the con- nected meaning of the Veda. Ramanuja considers the Purva Mlmamsd philosophy of karma or duty as a necessary step to the Uttara Mlmamsd philosophy of Brahman. Jaimini collects and collates in the sixteen chapters of the Karma Mlmamsd Sutras the nature of the Vedic imperative or dharma^ and leaves it to Badarayana to develop in the remaining four chapters of the Brahma Mlmamsd the full implications of the temporal and logical transition from the enquiry into karma to the enquiry into Brahman, and thus thinks together the inter- relations of moral and philosophic experience. The vrttikdra also supports the view that the S'dnraka is a continuation of the Sutras of Jaimini. The truths of the s'ruti are intuitive and self -valid and are called pratyaksa ; those of the smrti, like the Bhagavad Gltd which are deduced from the s'ruti, are as valid as the s'ruti itself. As the Pdncardtra is the word of God leading to the supreme spiritual goal of godliness, it is as valid as the Vedd. The highest proof of the existence of God is the experience of God by godly men. The Alvdrs, like the Vedic rsis, had a direct experience of God, and they invite humanity
XXxii THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
to share in the joy of their divine life. In an extended sense, the Veda is definable as a body of eternal spiritual truths which are verified and verifiable by spiritual experience, and Ramanuja's exposition of s'astra thus satisfies the supreme demands of sfruti, tarka and anubhava. Revelation is an ocean of knowledge, and the mumuksu relies on revelation that is relevant to his spiritual needs, and thus selects only the essentials of Vedanta. This spiritual selection is different from the Advaitic method of sublation, which leads eventually to the sublation of the Veda itself. Ramanuja adopts the sutra method of samanvaya in solving the nature of truth which is vi&vatomukha or many-sided. Because truth is com- prehensive, it is many-sided, and the many sides point to the same supreme goal of Brahmajnana.
While the ancient acaryas accept the self-evident and eternal spiritual truths of the Veda and Veddnta, modern ex- ponents apply the methods of historic and philosophic criticism to scriptural interpretation, and reject the traditional a priori way as scholastic or theological, as it subordinates reason to revelation and exposes itself to the fallacies of literalism and dogmatism. To them the Vedas are the compilations of different rsis at different times and places and the Vedic period is the age of groping and guessing at God. The transition to the Upanisadic period marks a gradual historic progression of thought from primitive naturalism, polytheism, and anthropomorphism to henotheism and from henotheism to pantheism and monistic idealism. The leading speculative ideas of the Upanisads are creative, floating mental posses- sions and do not hang together. While the earlier Upanisads, like the Chandogya are pre-Buddhistic and monistic, the later like the «S?vetas'vatara are post- Buddhistic and theistic. In
INTRODUCTION XXXill
ethics, the Vedic rta anticipates the later theory of karma* The Upanisads, on the whole, present divergent and conflicting views, but if they reveal any system at all, it is idealistic monism, and theism is incompatible with this doctrine. In the Epic period, which comes next, intuition gave place to in- tellectual enquiry. The Ramayana was at first an epic poem, but it was later changed into a Vaisnavite treatise, especially in Books I and VII which are later additions. The Mahabharata is a syncretism or vast mosaic of conflicting beliefs, and k was in this period that Visnu and S'iva were made superior to other gods. The Glta in the story is an adaptation made of the absolutism of the Upanisads to the popular needs of theism, if not the degeneration of their monistic thought. It is an amalgamation of the pure philo- sophy of the Upanisads with the theism of the Bhagavata, whose origin is non- Vedic. The Glta theory of Purusottama is a synthesis of being- becoming or the impersonal and the personal, and its theism is only an idealisation of Varuna wor- ship.. The concept of the ten avatars is a symbolic expression of the main stages in the onward march of the world from dust to deity. The Sutra period, which came later, marks the rise of the critical spirit in philosophy and the summarisations of its teachings in the cryptic form of the Sutras. The succeeding scholastic period witnessed the growth of polemic thought employed by dialecticians skilled in the art of logical and verbal warfare. Thus, historically and philosophically, there is a gradual fall from the monism of Yajfiavalkya and Uddalaka to the theism of the S'vetas'vatara and later deism, and philoso- phy had to compromise itself with the claims of logical faith, and satisfy the demands of popular religion. Visnu and S'iva, who were minor deities in the Vedic pantheon, now became the chief deities of Vaisnavism and S'aivism. In the Brdhmaya C
THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
period, Visnu emerged into the supreme deity and still later into Visnu Narayana. The cult of Visnu Narayana was then blended with that of Bhagavdn, which was non-Vedic in origin ; it was then brahmanised and changed into Vaisna- vism ; Visnu Narayana was then called Bhagavdn and the Glta identifies Narayana with Krsna Bhagavan. The theologian Raman uja tried to synthesise the conflicting claims of Upanisadic monism and non- Vedic theism by identifying the Brahman of the Upanisads with the successive ideas of Visnu Narayana, Bhagavdn and Krsna, and thus reconciled the philosophy of Vis'istadvaita with the beliefs of Vaisnavism and S'n Vaisnavism by fusing together Veddntic non-dualism, the non- Vedic monotheism of the Pdncardtra, the theism of the Gltd and the faith of the Dravidian saints or Alvars. Thus it will be seen that while Advaita is a pure philosophy of the Upanisads, Vis'istadvaita is a mosaic of many trends of thought, Upanisadic and non- Upanisadic. Such, in brief, is the conclusion arrived at by those who apply the critico- historical method to the study of our ancient religious literature.
The application of the above method to the study of Veddnta has, however, neither the definiteness of the time- honoured method of the dcdryas nor the disinterestedness associated with the principles of historic and scientific criticism. History describes certain unique events in space and time, and sticks to the particular and the personal, and cannot explain the eternal truths of Veddnta. Besides, we know more about the philosophies than the philosophers, as these authors of old effaced the personal factor in the dis- semination of impersonal truths, and it was their invariable practice to begin their teaching thus : " It was said by*
INTRODUCTION XXXV
them of old," " Thus states the Veda" The historic origins are lost in sacred mystery. Besides, in Veddnta, the value of a truth is more important than its genesis. The scientific method is different from the conclusions of science, which have no finality, and is not much different from the Vedantic method. Vedanta, as fully unified know- ledge, is more concrete and comprehensive than scienti- fic thought, which is only partially unified. It is the philo- sophic faith of the Vedantin that divine truths are divinely revealed and intuited by the rsis who were specialists in spirituality. The intuition of Brahman transcends the limits of the logical intellect, though it is the fulfilment of logical thinking. But when the analytic intellect, in the interests of criticism, dissects the living pulsation of intuition, it gives us only dead things and discontinuous bits. It is inadmissible in Vedanta to apply to transcendental truths, the categories which have only an empirical use. The higher alone can explain the lower, and not the lower the higher. Vedantic truths are true for ever, and have higher value than those given in sense perception, history and even philosophic speculation. While historic criticism may be plausible with regard to historic revelations, which depend on their founders, the eternal founda- tions of Vedanta stand for ever without the need for any prophets to reveal them or historic witnesses. Even S'ri Krsna, the Divine teacher of the Glta, who uses the first personal pronoun more than any other, is content to say that He only finds and formulates an ancient s'dstraic truth and does not found it. The eternal and impersonal'nature of s'astra is accepted by all schools of Vedantins wTho cannot be lightly dismissed as dog- matists and word-worshippers, and they insist on the philo- sophic faith in the integrity of s'astra as the only source and 'guide to spiritual knowledge and the need for Vedantic disci-
XXXVI THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
pline as the only way to the realisation of Brahman. Every Vedantic teacher is fully equipped with the knowledge of the canons of Vedic interpretation derived from his encyclopaedic mastery of the Vedas and the Veddngas and he claims to be a seer of truth or tattvadars'z. S'dstra is an integral whole including the Vedas, smrtis, itihdsas and purdnas, and it has either to be accepted in toto or rejected. The dstika deals with Vedic affirmations, and the ndstika with the negation of Vedic truths, but the position of the modern exponent, who accepts the Veda like the former and denies its eternity like the latter, is neither clear nor convincing. It is more confusing, when the critic is also a Vedantic rationalist who affirms the identity philosophy by the denial of dualistic texts. The mumuksu is on safer ground when he treads the ancient path, and seeks the guidance of the Brahmavddins who have seen Brahman and can communicate their knowledge to him. S'ruti is what is immediately intuited by the rsis and smrti is what is inferred from s'ruti ; the itihdsas reveal the epic grandeur of the avatars as redeemers of mankind, and the purdnas bring out the glory of the cosmic order and the sublime revelation of the divine comedy. The dgamas are manuals for the practical realisation of Vedic truths. But in all cases of conflict and casuistry, the Veddntin falls back on the fundamental truths of the Veda ; he is neither a fundamentalist nor a modernist, but a seeker after eternal truths enshrined in sdstra and verifiable by intuitive experience.
The truth, that all the Upanisads teach the same coherent system and have the same consistency of logic and intuition, follows from their integrity as a whole in spite of the apparent discrepancies noticed in the bheda texts, abheda texts and texts affirming bheddbheda. The agreement among the
INTRODUCTION XXXvil
^different Veddntic commentators in ascribing the same topic or visaya-vdkya to each adhikarana testifies to the prevalence of a common Upanisadic tradition among them and the spiritual atmosphere in which they lived. Both S'ankaia and Ramanuja agree as to the general drift of the Sutras and the arrangement of the topics. The texts quoted by them are largely from the Chdndogya Upanisad and from the other recognised Upanisads like the Brhaddranyaka9 Katha, Kattsitaki, Isfa, Kena, Pras'na, Taittirlya, Mundaka, and S'vetd&vatara. The systematic ex- position of the Upanisads given by Badarayana in the four chap- ters falls into line with the unity of Upanisadic import. The first two chapters define the nature of Brahman as the supreme tattva, the third chapter expounds the hita or the sadhanas for knowing Brahman, and the fourth chapter deals with the nature of mukti as the supreme purusdrtha or end of life. The Bhagavad Gitd contains the cream of Veddnta ; and the unity of the teaching of the Sutras and the Gitd is further strengthened by the identity of the authorship of the Maha- bhdrata containing the Gitd and of the Veddnta Sutras. Vyasa, the arranger of the Vedas, the systematiser of the Upanisads in the Sutras and the synthetic or syncretist author of the epic including the Gitd, may be the same rsi or different rsis ; but the Vyasa genius for synoptic philosophy is clearly discernible in the three principal sources of Veddnta. All the exponents of the Sutras including S'ankara and Rama- nuja accept the three prasthdnas as equally valid and valuable, deal with the same ultimate problems of philosophy, and adopt the traditional method of exposition with the aid of nydya, mlmdmsd and vydkarana.
Though S'ankara and Ramanuja agree that the supreme end .and aim of the Veddntin as mumuksu is to know Brahman and
XXXV111 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
thus attain freedom from ignorance and misery, and they bring out this truth in their exposition of the prasthanas, their conclu- sions are divergent, if not discrepant. As each siddhdnta is en- riched by a criticism of rival systems, a knowledge of the outlines of Advaita is presupposed in understanding Vis'istdd- vaita ; and a brief summary of the former may serve as a critical introduction to the latter. Brahmajndna in Advaita isjndna that is Brahman and not of Brahman, and is therefore pure consci- ousness (nirvis'esa cinmdtra) which simply is and cannot be described, as it transcends or sublates relational thought. But as a philosophy, it has to establish this truth, and it does so in a negative way by denying false knowledge or ajndna. Owing to avidyti, the dtman, which is pure consciousness, mistakes itself for andtman as the shell is mistaken for silver, and this leads to adhydsa or the superimposition of andtman on dtman. Owing to mdyd which is avidyd in its objective or cosmic aspect, the world of ndma-rupa is superposed on* Brahman, and therefore appears to be real. How the real co-exists with the unreal and is conjoined with it is the crux of monistic metaphysics. The problem is admitted, but the - solution is that it somehow exists there, indeterminable philo- sophically. But the problem is dissolved when ajndna is sub- lated by jndna in the state' of Brahma nirvana or pure consci- ousness just as one thorn is used to remove another and both are thrown away afterwards. Pure consciousness is eternal or time- less, effulgent, beyond the subject-object consciousness and thus absolutely transcends the relation of the enjoyer or bhoktd* and the object enjoyed or bhogya. It is sat, cit, dnanda not in the adjectival sense but as absolute experience realised in jlvanmukti. Really speaking ^there is no mumuksu or mukta, as the jiva is ever identical with Brahman. Mumuksutva is, in a sense, a process of negating negation by eliminating the false *
INTRODUCTION XXXIX
by renouncing the pleasures of sensibility and by transcending the vrttis. The only sadhana is the sublation of the dual consciousness of avidya by the awakening of non-dual consci- ousness. Vidya shines by itself when avidya is dispelled^ Reality transcends relational thought and difference. Then the One remains without a second, ever self-effulgent and as infinite bliss.
But as only a few can rise to the heights of Advaitic experience and its world-negating logic, S'ankara, follow- ing s'ruti, recognises the principle of adhikaribheda and s'akha-candra nyaya, and adapts his teaching to the needs of the popular consciousness. The aspirant is led gradually from truth to higher truth till the highest is self-realised. The religious consciousness is the nearest approach to Advaita and a distinction is drawn between para vidya and apara vidya. The former refers to the esoteric knowledge of nirguna Brahman and the need for the stultification of avidya and adhydsa by the intuition of the self-identity of Brahman or aparoksa jnana. But the latter describes the exoteric know- ledge of saguna Brahman as the supreme cause of the universe and the need for attaining Brahman in the world yonder by means of upasana or bhakti. Thus from the practical or vyavaharika point of view, the theist is fully justified when he posits the reality of iagat, jlva and Is'vara or nature, self and God on the basis of srastra, insists on moral and spiritual dis- cipline as essential steps to salvation and regards bhakti and3 kainkarya as the supreme end of spiritual life. But this dual- istic view is itself a stage and not a stopping place and it is transcended in the experience of Advaita. Though S'ankara is theoretically an uncompromising Advaitin, he is tolerant enough to recognise the needs of the empirically-minded. It*
xl THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
his theory of apard vidyd he provides for the ignorant-minded by conceding the phenomenal existence of saguna Brahman as the cosmic goal of the jiva and the truth of krama-mukti. But when the adhikan rises to the pdramdrthika level of para vidya, he is fit for the knowledge of nirguna Brahman and jlvanmukti by the sublation of avidyd and by becoming a jlvanmukta.
Some modern expositors of Advaita, European as well as Indian, who apply the methods of philosophic criticism to the study of Vedanta do not clearly define the boundary line between Buddhism, Advaita, Bheddbheda and Vis'istddvaita. Deussen, for example, is so much drawn by the identity philo- sophy expressed in the equation " Thou art That," that he feels philosophically constrained to separate metaphysics from exo- teric religion and thus free S'ankara from his theological bias which obliges him to compromise with commonsense and ignorance and to refer to two standpoints. To him, the funda- mental want of Vedanta or Advaita is the absence of proper morality such as is found in the Christian ideal of human brotherhood and of the lack of the solution of what corresponds to the theological faith in the saving grace of God. But in his desire to synthesise reason and will and the theory of unio mysticoy he drifts unconsciously into the views of jnana- karma-samuccaya and eklbhdva of Bhaskara. Gough wrongly thinks that S'ankara is the generally recognised expositor of the true Veddntic doctrine traditionally handed down to him by a line of teachers from the age of the S'utrakdra and that there existed from the beginning only one Veddntic doctrine agreeing in all essential points with Advaita. But he concludes that it is a philosophy of stagnation favouring a life of inertia and void, and that it is an empty intellectual abstraction
INTRODUCTION xli
devoid of spirituality and of the virility of western thought. A large portion of the western criticism of Vedanta is directed against pan-illusionism and the reflection theory, and the absence of proper morality. This is mainly due to a confused understanding of the relations between Madhyamika Buddhism, Yoga practice and Mayavada and the alliance between intellectual monism and atheistic Buddhism against the main currents of Indian life.
In a critical investigation of the teaching of the Sutras based on a comparative study of the commentaries of S'ankara and Ramanuja, Thibaut thinks that he is able to judge for himself the general drift of the text without the aid of scholiasts who often strain the texts to suit their pre-con- ceived siddhdnta, and concludes that the system of Bada- rayana agrees more with that of the theologian Ramanuja than with that of S'ankara with his two standpoints. The Upanisads are so conflicting that no coherent theory can be evolved from them ; the Sutras may not set forth the same doctrine as the Upanisads, and S'ankara is not anxious to strengthen his own case by appeal to ancient authorities. But if the task of systematisation is once given, S'ahkara's system is probably the best and safest that can be devised. It represents orthodox Brahminical theology at its best and is alone called Vedanta, and no other system can compare with it in boldness, depth and subtlety of speculation. But Advaita is too little in sympathy with the wants of the human heart ; and the system of Ramanuja influenced by the Bhdgavata school and the Bhagavad Glta alone satisfies the needs of love. After having assigned the Upanisads to S'arikara and the Sutras to Ramanuja, Thibaut suggests a synthetic view of some " other commentator," ,who may be
Xlii THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
Bhaskara. According to other interpreters of Advaita, it is only a non-dualism that denies difference and not a monism that affirms identity ; the illusion theory is audacious but not adequate, and should give place to the view that the world of space and time has phenomenal reality and is not fictitious, and that Brahman can be intuited and not conceived by the logical intellect. Still others rely on the adequacy of reason to understand Advaita without seeking the aid of revelation and intuition, and think that by the analysis of the three states of consciousness, especially of sleep, duality is sublated and pure consciousness is self-established. Extreme idealists accept only eka-jiva, deny the objective order and the religious consciousness of a Thou or Is'vara and conclude that the inner seer or drk is alone real and absolute.
If, as the Advaitins generally say, S'ankara came to estab- lish religions and not to eliminate them finally, then it is not clear whether his attitude to religions was one of compro- mise, condescension or synthetic understanding. The view that his siddhanta is not the rejection of religious values but is based on the ideal that truth admits of a passage from truth to more truth is commendable but not satisfactory. It is not consistent with the philosophy of sublation, as there is really no middle ground between satya and mithya. The spirit of compromise has no place in philosophy, especially if it is to accommodate itself to ignorance. The view that there is a Vedantic ladder from Dvaita to Vis'istddvaita and finally to Advaita as the highest stage savours of the spirit of condescen- sion arising from the sense of superiority complex.1 This tendency is clearly discernible in their comparative estimate
1 The Sarva Dars'ana Sangraha of Madhavacarya describes sixteen-, systems in an ascending order and gives the highest place to Advaita.
INTRODUCTION xliii>
of Advaita and Vis'istddvaita. Nirguna Brahman is said to- be the intuitional highest, and saguna Brahman the highest conceptual reading of the absolute, and the logical highest. God is made in man's image and is less than the Godhead! and to speak of the world of Brahman is to limit in terms of space and time what is infinite and eternal. Rama- nuja is therefore only in the level of theology and theism, and he does not rise to the level of Advaita jndna. His view is an amalgam of Upanisadic monism, the theism of the Pdiica* rdtra which is znti-Vedic, and the emotionalism of the Dravi- dian saints or Alvars, and therefore it has not the philosophic dignity and integrity of Advaita. But as it satisfies the aspirations of the religious consciousness of the ignorant man, it is pragmatically plausible and true. This method of approach is open to serious objections and cannot be accepted. On the other hand the theory of dual standpoints involves S'ahkara in the dualism between jndna and avidyd and defeats the purpose of non-dualism. If Advaita is identity-conscious- ness, then no philosophy or religion can be strictly deduced from it ; such a deduction is purely dogmatic. But if it should satisfy the needs of philosophy and religion and the highest values of life, it should come into line with* Vis'istddvaita.
The problem of Veddnta is stated thus : " What is that One by knowing which all things are known ? " S'ahkara solves it by saying that Brahman only is real and therefore jagat is false, and that falsity is stultified by Brahmajndna or jndna that is identical with Brahman. Avidyd causes the sense of dif- ference and plurality, and by the removal of avidyd, Brahman is known to be identical with itself.^ Ramanuja answers the same problem by his theory that, as Brahman is the All-Self
Xliv THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
or s'arlrin of the world of cit and acit, by knowing Him, the worl<l, HIsTVanra or prakdra, is also known. Is'vara is the absolute and not a lapse from it. Since Brahman is real as the All-Self, all things and thoughts are equally real. The world is a living expression of the Infinite and not an illusory phantom. Ii jnana is pure consciousness without a self to illumine it and an object to be illuminated by it, it is a soulless, bloodless abstraction ; and it would lapse into the unconscious. Brahma- jnana therefore means the jnana of Brahman by the freed self who intuits Him in all beings and all beings in Him. This is true knowledge, and truth is an immanent standard which is fully realised only when the absolute or Brahman is realised. With Ramanuja, reality and value go together. Brahman as Supreme Reality is also the home of eternal values such as truth, goodness, beauty and bliss ; Brahman is therefore defined as the ground of all existents and the goal of all experients. This knowledge is the alpha and the omega of the Brahma Sutras. He is the All-Self that is in all things but not as all things, and is therefore immanent in the world of nature as the causal order, having parinamic changes, and at the same time transcendent, as He is beyond the moral order, free from the imperfections of karma. This view remedies the defects of deism and immanent- ism. The perfect enters into the imperfect with a view to per- fecting it and imparting its nature to it. This is the Ilia of love which is not a mystery like the Advaita theory of avidya, but a reality which the mystic realises. The self is an eternal entity like the All-Self, but at the same time, it is an irradia- tion of the supreme Light, the Light of the universe. It is a monad and a mode, and has substantive and adjectival existence. This jwa is not a mere self-subsisting exclusive ^entity, as it has its meaning and life only in Brahman.
INTRODUCTION xlv
While the jiva is infinitesimal like a spark, its intelligence is all-pervasive and can know all things if it is freed from karma. When the philosopher turns mumuksu, he recollects his divine heritage and by moral and spiritual discipline sheds his avidyd and ahankara, intuits the absolute and enjoys eternal bliss. Thus Veddnta points to Brahman as the only source and security of the self or jlva which is subject to the ills of avidyd and karma. The vidvan knows Brahman and works for world-welfare and for the attainment of Brah- man by all.
Thus, in their siddhanta, S'ankara and Ramanuja have fundamental differences as regards s'astraic authority, ontology and the destiny of the self. S'ankara applies the Occam's razor of sublation to all branches of study and even the Veda is stultified in the transcendental self-identity of Brahman. But to Ramanuja, the Veda leads the aspirant step by step to the supreme goal. S'astra is a body of eternal truths which are verified by rsis and Alvars ; the very word of God revealed in the Pdncardtra is realised in the Tamil Prabandha. Thus he synthesises revelation, reason and intuition and recognises the full value of Vdda as a disinterested pursuit of Truth with- out jalpa or vitandd and as a divine quality.1 In his ontology Ramanuja postulates that Brahman is the absolute of meta- physics and Bhagavdn or God of religion and he rejects the theory of two Brahmans on the ground that s'dstra no- where accepts God at first with a view to denying His existence later. S'ankara's cosmology is ultimately merged in psychology and subjectivism. But to Ramanuja Brahman is the Self of the universe and the Self of the dtman, and the mumuksu medi- tates on Brahman as the world-ground with a view to avoiding 1 Bhagavad Gitct, X. 32.
xlvi THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
the perils of subjectivism and the ego-centric feeling. As regards the finite self, S'ankara posits its monadic nature and moral freedom by following the Sutras, and then explains it away as a mere appearance or illusion. The reality of the self as jivdtma and Paramdtma is insisted on by Ramanuja ; but they are treated as mere appearances of the absolute by S'ankara. While S'ankara explains mukti as the knowledge of the self- identity of Brahman by the removal of the self-contradictions of jiva-Is'vara, Ramanuja, recognising the full value of moral and spiritual discipline, expounds mukti as the direct appre- hension and attainment of Brahman and as freedom from embodiment and not in embodiment, and from the whole phenomenal series of space-time and the fetters of karma.
In all crucial cases in the textual and philosophic exposi- tion of the Veddnta Sutras, like the topics on the nature of Brahman as dnandamaya, on cosmic evolution and on thejlva and its destiny, Ramanuja faithfully follows the Sutrakdra ; but S'ankara first accepts the Sutras and then rejects their direct meaning on independent grounds by his all-destroying concept of nirguna Brahman, vivartavdda and jlvanmukti. The main object of Ramanuja in his siddhdnta is to join issue with S'ankara in his dialectic speculation, by appeal to sfdstra> the rules of Mlmdmsd and logic and secular and spiritual experi- ence and to repudiate the theory of two Brahmans, the two cosmic ideas of parindma and vivarta and the two kinds of mukti and to establish the unity of Veddntic knowledge. He is entirely opposed to dogmatism as he insists on the integrity of the pramdnas as a whole. In contemporary Indian philo- sophy, Veddnta is overweighted on the side of Advaita ; and the balance will be restored only when the other systems of Veddnta, notably that of Ramanuja, are widely known and
INTRODUCTION xlvii
appreciated in the west as well as in the east. A comparative study of Vedanta is essential to the understanding of Indian culture and its synthetic genius, and this can be best achieved by a knowledge of the fundamental features of Vedanta as a whole. But before this task is attempted, it is necessary that Vis'istddvaita comes to its own in the world of modern Vedantic thought as a siddhanta as well as a synthesis. The method adopted in this work is both critical and constructive ; it is based on an appeal to conviction and not to credulous- ness and is the time-honoured method of Indian philosophy, which consists in the establishment of one's siddhanta by the refutation of opposing theories which are called purva paksas.
The concluding chapter, however, adopts the synthetic method and considers the points of convergence between the main schools of Vedanta. What is called synthesis in philosophy is equivalent to the unifying power of love in religion. Vis'istadvaita is the meeting ground of the extremes in philo- sophy like monism and pluralism, and has the intrinsic value of containing what is true, good and beautiful in other systems, though it rejects what contradicts its essentials. It accepts the practical Advaita of S'ahkara as a Brahmavddin who follows the way of ethical religion as opposed to the Maya- vdda of pure Advaita with its leanings towards the negative method of Nagarjuna. It also supports Vedantic theism in so far as its metaphysical theory of Bhedavada supports mysticism. The principles of Sankhyan psychology, the ethical discipline contained in the yogic sddhanas, the Nyaya view that the study of the pramanas or organon of knowledge is essential to philosophic construction and the Mimamsd theory of the primacy of dharma or duty are the living truths of the
xlviii THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
*
six dar&anas and they naturally fit into the scheme of advaita. . It may even include in its sweep the philanthropic ideas of Jainism and Buddhism if they go far enough and accept their Vis'istadvaitic background. There can be no metaphysics without physics ; physics has its completion in the psychology of the self. Psychology leads to ethics, and ethics has its meaning only in religion. Thus in Vis'ist advaita all these sciences are vitally related and related to philosophy as a whole. Vis'istadvaitic religion has no objection to other reli- gions if they accept the immanence of Vasudeva in all gods and in all faiths. With its loyalty to the Upanisads as the source of wisdom, the Sutras as their philosophical criterion and the Gita as the crown of spirituality, it enters into the soul of humanity and extends the hospitality of love to all sects. If Vis'istadvaita is reinterpreted in terms of modern thought without doing violence to its essentials, it is sure to throw fresh light on the vexed problems of to-day including even the eco- nomic, political and educational ideals and to remedy the ills of humanity. This work is a humble attempt at presenting the central features of the philosophy of Vis'istadvaita as an in- troduction to its detailed study.
The study of Vis'istadvaita will be found to have immense value even to the western thinker who is deeply interested in philosophy, which is speculative as well as spiritual and synthetic. The problem of philosophy is formulated in a threefold way by Kant — What can I know ? What should I do ? What may I hope for ? His three critiques dealing with the examination of theoretic reason, morality and aesthetics fail to offer any solution. The first concludes that one can know only the phenomena or the appearances of Reality and not Reality itself and it leads to agnosticism and scepticism. The
INTRODUCTION xlix
second postulates the freedom of the will, immortality of the self and the existence of God as a moral necessity ; but it creates a wide gulf between reason and feeling and makes the moral law formal and empty. The third recognises the impor- tance of aesthetic imagination ; but it also suffers from the abstract method. The chief successors of Kant, namely, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, think that Reality can be explained. Hegel identifies logic with ontology and makes Reality rational ; but his panlogism has the defects of mere intellec- tualism. Fichte stresses the ethical side of Kant when he explains philosophy in terms of acts of will as opposed to facts of knowledge, but his idealism is mere progressivism without any finality. Schelling expounds the nature of the absolute in terms of artistic creation and intellectual intuition ; but his pantheism does not fully satisfy the demands of aesthetic philosophy. Thus the answers to the three problems given by the three idealist philosophers are also fractional and abstract and liable to the defects of intellectualism, voluntarism and emotional mysticism ; and they tend to explain away the facts of error, evil and ugliness. Vis'istadvaita is free from their one-sidedness as it co-ordinates thought or theoretic reason, will or morality and feeling or aesthetics, synthesises the values of truth, goodness and beauty and harmonises all con- tradictions. It furnishes the true philosophic justification for the dominant interest in contemporary philosophy in integrat- ing all kinds of knowledge. The tendency in western thought to-day is the increasing good-will between science and philos- ophy by avoiding the evils of sectional thinking and sterile speculation, the rapprochement between realism and ideal- ism by overcoming the defects of materialism and mentalism, the reconciliation of religion and philosophy by giving up the pitfalls of dogmatism and scepticism and recognising the
1 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
innate spirituality of man. Vis'istadvaita is a synoptic philos- ophy par excellence as it solves the agelong problems of life and furnishes an inspiring motive for the meeting of the east and the west in philosophy and promoting inter-religious understanding.
CHAPTER I PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
VIS'ISTADVAITA is neither pure philosophy nor pure religion, but is really a philosophy of religion. As such, it offers a contrast, on the one hand, to mere philosophical speculation on the whole of reality, especially of the western -type, and, on the other hand, to religion in the sense of a faith in revealed theology based on the evidence of miracles. Theo- logy insists on dogmatic faith in truths regarded as infallible on account of scriptural authority or divine disclosure, and is therefore antagonistic to the free exercise of reason on the facts provided by human experience. Philosophy revolts against slavish allegiance to the dictatorship of dogmatic theology. It insists on the critical examination of all facts and doctrines at the bar of reason and criticises and clarifies ideas which are accepted uncritically. Ramanuja's system of Vis'istddvaita recognises the claims of both faith and reason and aims at har- monising or reconciling them by admitting a free play of reason not only on the data of sense-perception and inference, but also on the spiritual intuition or anubhava of the great seers and the doctrines or views recorded in the scriptures.
The friction between faith and philosophy is sought to be removed by some thinkers by defining and restricting their spheres and by assigning to the former the realm of the super- . natural and to the latter the world of nature. But the frontier
2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
line between the two realms is hazy and arbitrary, and in- creases the tension instead of relieving it. The conflict between faith and philosophy is mainly due to the difference in their method of approach or enquiry. Faith claims finality, and, when it is supported by reason working in a subordinate capacity as its handmaid, it becomes dogmatic. When dogma is crystallized by tradition and sanctified by the worship of the word, it claims absolute allegiance ; faith then ends in fanaticism. Philosophy, on the other hand, rejects the way of faith, accepts only the guidance of reason, and follows its conclusions, whatever they may be. But it often starts with doubting everything, and ends also with doubts without offer- ing any solution to the problems posed by it. The natural light of reason often suffers from the perils of free thinking and leads to atheism. Theology, therefore, condemns its guidance and takes refuge in faith. This conflict between faith and philosophy will cease only if they retrace their steps and become reconciled in a true philosophy of religion.
The warfare between scientific and secular thought on one side and religious and supersensuous knowledge on the other is waged in five different regions with varying results. The first stage is that of the tension between naturalism and supernaturalism ; the second is that of the collision between vitalism and animism. The third is that of the opposition between mentalism and anthropomorphism. Next comes the controversy between rationalism and theology in their answers to the question of the nature of reality. The fifth or last stage of conflict is in the region where intuition and revealed religion confront each other as irreconcilable enemies. A few words of explanation may be necessary for a clearer and fuller understanding of this five-fold conflict.
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 3
The points at issue between naturalism and super- naturalism may be considered first. Natural science has no doubts in thinking that its realm of enquiry, namely, that of matter, is alone worth while, and it rejects theological doctrines as the flights of fancy. The scientific thinker, who explains the facts given in sense-perception, turns realist when he traces the source of knowledge solely to the external world. He is a naturalist affirming the priority and primacy of matter and an upholder of the truth of svabhava-vdda. To him matter alone is real and mind is, as it were, a by-product of matter and a late arrival in the world-process. The world of nature is a series of physico-chemical changes. Life evolves out of non- living matter. Consciousness and self-consciousness emerge, in the course of evolution through the ages, from the pri- mordial physical stuff. All changes in nature should be explained naturally and not supernaturally. The universe of space-time moves endlessly in a soulless, mechanical way and without any purpose or design, because it is its svabhava or nature to do so. The atomic theory, for instance, traces the universe to the existence of primordial atoms and their varied combinations. Even the beliefs of the mind arise out of the dance, so to speak, of the atoms in the brain* Moral freedom is a fiction, and spiritual craving a dis- ease of the brain. Religious faith may be traced to fear or the aberrations caused by the suppression of instincts. Natural science finds no proof or evidence for the existence of God and rejects the belief in a god as an unnecessary hypothesis.
The Carvdka, or the Indian materialist, is even more thorough in his repudiation of religion than the western
4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
naturalist. He accepts only the immediate evidence of sense- perception and rejects the validity of inference or anumana as well as the seer's or yogin's sense of the supernatural. True knowledge is, according to the Carvaka, given only in sense- perception which refers to the here and now. The universal or vyapti can never be derived from the particulars of sense- perception or pratyaksa-jnana. The world of nature is made up of four bhutas or elements, earth, water, tire and air, and it alone is real. The so-called atman is only an aggregate of these elements, and it is dissolved with the dissolution of the body at the time of death. Mind emerges from the combi- nation of elements even as the red colour does when the betel leaf, the arecanut and lime are chewed together. It is only a function of matter. Sense-perception being the only test of truth, there is no evidence of the survival of a soul after death. The Carvaka holds that pleasure is the end of conduct and the sole aim of life. The Veda is false and of no validity and appeals only to the ignorant mind. There is no heaven nor hell, and mukti or release cannot mean anything but death. Virocana, the king of the Asuras, is on the level of the Carvaka when he accepts the identification of the atman with the body.1
Materialism, western as well as eastern, is common sense io a thinking mood. As the protest of science against supersti- tion, it may have some significance ; but the religious con- sciousness is outraged by its denial of moral and spiritual values. The immediate reaction of the religious conscious- ness to materialism is faith in the supernatural. The religious nature is apt to exclaim : " Even if God does not exist, He
1 sa ha s'antahrdaya eva virocano'suranjagama tebhyo haitamupanisadam prOvacall (Ch. Upan., Chap. VIII, Khanda 8.)
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 5
has to be invented for the satisfaction of faith and the con- servation of moral values." Faith distrusts the evidence of sense-perception and reason as they are not infallible. It believes, even regardless of reason, in a spiritual universe of which the visible and tangible world is only a part. Beyond the natural, there is a realm of the supernatural. There is a ' more ' that controls man from without and often frustrates all his calculations. The mechanical view of the uniformity of nature which is the cardinal principle of materialistic science is discarded in favour of a belief in the miraculous and in the suspension of the natural law by the intervention of supernatural agencies. These exercise a mysterious control over man's destiny and often overturn his expectations. The believer in the supernatural may be a monotheist, but is more often a polytheist. He believes in the saving power of prayer and propitiation by means of sacrifices and expects to be re- warded for his acts of propitiation.
The contest between naturalism and supernaturalism is of value in so far as it leads to a recognition of the fact that matter is real, though the materialistic outlook is false. It is clear also that a metaphysical system cannot be built on the foundations of the physico-chemical sciences and mathematics. Polytheism, crass or refined, cannot satisfy the demand of reason for unity and the ethical claims of righteousness. The polytheistic heaven is often soiled by ugly passions and unrighteous wars. Its pleasures, too, are perishing and, in their result, painful. The faith in miracles demoralises the believer and attributes caprice to the divine nature.
The next phase in the conflict of reason and faith is that between vitalism and animism. Vitalism accepts the
6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
primacy of reason, and denies the validity of faith ; but it repudiates the mechanistic view of life. According to vitalism, as held by biological thinkers, life is a higher category than matter. It is autonomous and is not originated from matter or externally determined in any other way. Life cannot be explained by mere physico-chemical changes, as it is sui generis, having the power of spontaneity and self-emergence. Nature is alive and has the activities of moving and changing, It is self-sustained and possesses persistence and variation. It can reproduce and multiply itself. The vitalist-philosopher who reflects on the conclusions of biological science considers the essence of reality as a vital essence, entelechy or elan vital. Life is an inner creative activity, according to him, or an entelechy midway between the physical thing and the mental process since it does not act in space, but acts into it. This primal principle or impulse contains the potency of the later growth into plant, animal and man. Life breaks up and blends and becomes more life. Reality is, therefore, creative evolution, though the practical intellect, in trying to under- stand it, mechanises its spontaneity. The intellect spatialises the free flow of life and makes sections of it ; but the philo- sophic seer should intuit the inner creative urge in nature and not be misled by the mechanising intellect. But philo- sophy as vitalism cannot satisfy the thinker. The category of life which it postulates is only the result of speculative activity and may be useful in secular life. The religious con- sciousness cannot accept vitalism and it protests against this view by opposing to it the theories of animism and pranaism.
Animism attributes life and divinity to nature. It assumes different forms such as metempsychosis, fetichism, totemism and
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 7
spiritism. Every natural object is looked upon as animate and endowed with a spirit. This spirit survives after death in a disembodied state. Animism often deifies the spirits of the dead who become objects of worship. The divine spirit may be encased in metals and even in pebbles. Prdtiaism posits the pre-eminence of prana or the life-breath as the life-giving deity in the universe. It is illustrated in the well-known story of the Upanisads of the deities of speech, sound, sight, mind and prana contending for supremacy in the maintenance of the body. While the first four left the body, it continued alive ; but when prana attempted to leave the body, it tore, as it were, the indriyas or senses from the body along with itself. The other deities were then obliged to acknow- ledge the supremacy of prana} " Prana is the sum-total of the physical and mental forces in the universe resolved to their original state." By controlling it everything else is controlled also. Mukhya-prana is the deity that leads the freed soul back to its home in the world of Brahman and is worthy of adoration. The Pratardana Vidyd of the Kausitaki Upanisad refers to meditations on prana, which the purvapaksin or objector identifies as the primal source of all sentient and non-sentient beings."
Vis'istddvaita is opposed to both the philosophy of vitalism and the religion of animism. Reality is life, but the category of life does not exhaust the whole range of reality ; and the highest moral and spiritual values of experience
1 athah prana uccikramisan sa yatbasuhayah sadvls'as'ankun sankhided evam itaran pranan samakhidat tarn habhisametya ucur Bhagavannedhi tvam nas' s'resthosi ma utkramiriti, (Ch. Up., V. i. 12). tasminnutkramatyathStare sarva eva utkramante tasmins'ca prathisthamane sarva eva pratisthante te pritah pranam stunvanti (Praynopanisad, II, 4.) te ho'cur ma bhagava utkaramtr na vai s'aksyamas tvad rte jivltum itl. (By. Up., VI. i. 13.)
2 prano'smi prajnatma tarn mam ayur amrtam ityupasva (Kausi. Up., III. 1).
8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
cannot be adequately expressed by living cells and proto- plasm. Vedanta does not accept animism in any form as- true religion and the term prdna in the Kausitaki Upanisad connotes not the vital breath or vital principle but the absolute Brahman as the life of our life. True religion begins with theism and not with animism. To identify area or image worship with fetichism betrays ignorance and scientific prejudice, as the area is the incarnation of the infinite in the finite. The category of life or prdna has, however, a vital influence in religious experience, though the vivifying power comes from the Paramdtman or Supreme Self who is the life of all life. The conflict between vitalism and animism i& continued and carried on in a higher plane as sensationalism versus anthropomorphism, which, as has already been pointed out, is the third phase of the struggle.
Reality, according to sensationalism, is not to be explain- ed mechanically or biologically, but as a mental continuum or stream of psychic presentations. Buddhism is, in some of its forms, of the nature of sensationalism. Consciousness is sni generis and not an emergence from matter and life according to it. The materialist errs in thinking that mind evolves and emerges from matter. External objects are not self-existent substances having extra-mental reality, but are only a cluster of atomic sensations or configurations. There is no substance like matter or self forming the substratum of sensations. The self is only a stream of perceptions and a series of psychic states. Likewise there are no data by which the existence of God can be demonstrated. From the genetic point of view, the faith in a future world and in religion may be traced to the fear of death and the passion for revenge. Buddhism, as a psychological theory of reality, denies the permanence
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 9
of the self and holds the view that consciousness is only momentary and that the soul is only a stream of succes- sive presentations. The so-called dtman or self is a complex of form, feeling, will and thought and is a fleeting flux. The theory of an enduring self is a delusion.
Psychology is descriptive and it does not accept the metaphysical view of a psyche or self. Consciousness is a. mere continuum without a self. The so-called subject is a» series of momentary mental states and is not a metaphysical entity. The mental process is a ceaseless becoming, and per- manence is an illusion. The religious consciousness is explained psychologically as the effect of psycho-physical degeneration like hysteria and sexual morbidity. Closely allied to this denial of the existence of a psyche or soul and of God is the view held by certain modern thinkers that there is an innate tendency in man to create a God and to attribute to Him qualities which belong to himself. Many psychologists trace the origin of the religious feeling to this anthropomorphic tendency. As examples of anthropomorphism, we may con- sider the two types described by Orientalists in their study of the evolution of religion. The lower type is exemplified in> their description of the development of the Aryan religion, and represents the God-making process that is in human nature. God is made in the image of man and invested witht the feelings and motives of the votary. " If oxen and horses could paint like men they would paint Gods as oxen and horses." In the earlier stages the powers of nature were personified and deified into distinct gods with supernatural powers and were often combined by a process of syncretism.- Anthropomorphism has affinities to the myth -making tend- ency of primitive religion, which consists in organising them
10 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
into a pantheon. Polytheism develops into henotheism when it exalts a departmental deity into a supreme god and ends in monotheism. Man fulfils a design in life and it is analogically inferred that there is a cosmic designer or God. In the process of deification, relapse is as common as progress, e.g., it is said that in the Vedic pantheon Varuna and Brahma were at first idealised and elevated into the supreme heights of monotheism and pantheism respectively and were later somehow dethroned and replaced by other gods. The Vedic Rudra has now evolved into the Rudra S'iva of S'aivism who is both an angry and an auspicious deity. Likewise, the worship of the Vedic deity Visnu is fused with the Narayana cult and the Vasudeva cult and has now become the Yisnu- Narayana religion of Vaisnavism. The story of the avatars of Visnu is the puranic way of tracing the evolutionary ascent of man from the sub-human levels and zoomorphic incarnations. While this God-making tendency is common to the Aryan mind, the Semitic race is stated always to have retained a higher anthropomorphic and monotheistic level. Its essential faith is the reverse of the crasser type, as it holds that man is made in the image of God and not God in the image of man.
Vis'istddvaita rejects the psychological view of reality as inadequate and unsatisfactory. The postulation of a mental series without an enduring self behind it is self-contradictory. Being is always presupposed in the process of becoming. The view that consciousness is momentary and perishing fails to explain the reality of the persistence of the self based upon personal identity. The self is not a mere aggregate of the five skandas, but is a permanent subject which makes possible the synthetic unity of different sensations. The
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 11
sensationalistic view would lead to nihilism as is illustrated in the history of European thought in the transition from Locke to Hume. The critico-historic method of the psychologists .applied to the evolution of religion oversteps its limits and militates against the integrity of religious experience. No reli- gious man would accept the view that he makes God in his own image. The theory that Vedic polytheism grows into Upanisadic pantheism and relapses again into the theism of the Gltd is a dogmatic assertion based on illegitimate speculation. Religious truths are supersensuous and eternal and they cannot be discerned wholly by historic judg- ments which apply only to events in sense-perception. The true Vedic method is spiritual instruction according to the qualification and needs of the aspirant or adhikdri. This is well brought out in the teaching of Varuna to Bhrgu and of Sanatkumara to Narada.1 The Veddnta Sutras, accepted by all the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, afford the true insight into Vedic religion when they explain the worship of the different Vedic gods as that of their inner self or antaryd- min who is the supreme Brahman. The object of Veddnta is to raise man to the level of God. The finite is to be in- finitised and not the Infinite humanised. True religion is therefore not a nature-religion but is a self-revelation of God to the self with a view to perfect it. The idea that religious faith is induced by the psychological conditions of life like fear, anger and sex is beside the mark, as religious consciousness is spiritual and not sensual. The con- flict between philosophy and religion is not reconciled on the mental level, but it is carried on in the higher plane of reason, as the warfare between rationalism and belief.
1 Taitt. Up., Bhrguvalli and Ch. Up., Ch. VII.
12 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
The fourth phase of the contest between philosophy and faith has been referred to as that between rationalism and theology. Reason marks the transition in knowledge fron> consciousness to self-consciousness, and the rationalist employs the logical method of determining truth in a clear and distinct way. Metaphysics, according to the rationalist, is based upon* physics and is not hostile to it. The distinction between science and philosophy is only in the range of unified know- ledge and not in their method. Both throw off the fetters of theology and strike into the path of free enquiry. The rationalist's position may be described as follows :
Philosophy seeks the liberation of thought from the tyranny of dogmatic theology and it is the pursuit of knowT~ ledge for its own sake founded on the inner light of reason and reflection. It is a process of self-criticism freed from subjection to external authority and its method is rationalistic on account of its acceptance of reason as the highest authority in the acquisition of truth. The mind should be freed from the prejudices arising from what Bacon calls the idols of'the tribe, the den, the market and the theatre. By doubting and destroying every received or inherited opinion or belief, it is possible to reconstruct knowledge and make it coherent. It is the task of philosophy as an intellectual enquiry into the whole of reality to frame the ultimate problems of life. Of the three persistent problems of philosophy, namely, those of God, nature and the self,^ the enquiry into the nature of God is the most valuable. The existence of God is established by the well-known theistic proofs and not by revealed theology. The teleological argument infers from the beauty and goodness in the universe the existence of a world architect. The uni- verse is purposeful and requires a designer. Creation is the
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 13
workmanship of a wise God. The cosmological argument employs the idea of causation and proves God as the first cause that exists per se. As the Naiyayika or logician says, the world is an effect and must have been produced by an agent or controller called Is'vara. Everything that exists is produced and should refer to a Being that is the real ground of all things. The ontological argument consists in showing that the idea of a perfect being that is in the mind should have been implanted in it by the infinite God and He should therefore exist. Moral reason demands the union of duty and happiness and requires us to postulate a moral Being who connects the natural and moral orders. In this way reason becomes the ally of religion and this rational religion is called natural theology as contrasted with revealed theology, which relies entirely on belief. Monism, which also claims to be based on reason rather than on revelation, allies itself with scepticism in rejecting the theistic proofs and dethroning the God of religion. The proofs are said to make an illegitimate use of categories which are applicable only to phenomenal reality, and we cannot go from the WHAT to the THAT which is beyond thought. The teleological proof, it is argued, is no proof at all, as there is no design or goodness in the world and it can be proved by appeal to experience that the world is irrational and is the worst of all possible worlds, as it is rooted in arbitrariness, injustice and cruelty. The idea of an external Designer, a remote God who has no intimate relation with the world, is based on false analogy. It is spiritually worthless and the very term * Almighty ' brings out the despotic might of the Deity and His delight in inflicting unmerited suffering.
The cosmological theory of a first cause, an uncaused cause and a prime mover is a nest of self-contradictions from
14 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
which there is no escape. Inference is a logical method and there is no passage from finite knowledge to the infinite. The proof admits of a plurality of causes and creators and is not therefore theistic. As regards the ontological argument it is not permissible to infer from the idea of a perfect being its existence, as the concept of reality is different from reality itself. It is absurd to prove the existence of God from the idea of God ; existence can never be the predicate of a judg- ment and can only be the subject. The moral postulate is admittedly not a proof and is a mere faith not justified by moral experience. The demand made by moral reason for the union of duty and happiness is mere wishful thinking based neither on reason nor on experience. A consistent rationalism logically leads to agnosticism and scepticism. A Berkeley is followed by a Hume in Western thought. In the same way Nydya theism is rejected by Buddhistic agnosticism. Natural theology is a misnomer as it is neither reason nor faith, and it is impossible to apprehend the existence of God or comprehend His nature by its method. Traditionalism can never thrive in an atmosphere of free thought. The truths of theology cannot therefore be demonstrated by natural reason. They are articles of faith drawn from dogmatics. Theology is therefore revealed and not natural, and there is a deep cleavage between philosophy and dogma, the former being founded on sense-perception and reason and the latter, on a belief in the sacred truths of God. The religious dogmatist holds that the word of scripture is God. The Veda is the very breath of Brahman and is its own evidence. While in natural theology faith is justified by reason and philosophy proceeds from nature to divine nature, in revealed theology reason is subservient to faith and it proceeds from God to nature. An estrangement is thus effected between
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 15
reason and faith, and theology is withdrawn from the jurisdic- tion of philosophy and philosophy from the domain of faith. Faith and reason belong to different realms, and it is impossi- ble to prove the existence of God by logical thinking. Mere reason is ill-founded and self-contradictory as is evidenced by the arguments advanced by the Buddha, Jina, Kanada and Kapila. The history of philosophy reveals the barrenness of intellectual speculation, and its conclusions admit of no finality or convic- tion. The theologian maintains, therefore, that faith requires no proof as it is its own evidence. Free thought leads to atheism and is to be condemned as a heresy. The fight be- tween philosophy and theology is then carried on on a higher level between intuitionism and revelationism.
Though the existence of God cannot be proved, He can be experienced by means of direct intuition. Intuition is said to be an immediate experience of God and to transcend the realms of sentient experience and reason. The logical intellect dissects reality and gives us only diagrams or abstractions and partial pictures. The categories of the understanding can ex- plain only the phenomenal and not the absolute. But intuition transcends the level of instinct and intelligence and is a direct insight into God or atman and is ineffable and incommuni- cable. Atman is alogical and amoral and cannot be ap- prehended by discursive reason or attained by moral effort. The alogical and amoral is the fulfilment of logical and moral experience and is therefore not hostile to them. Vis'istddvaita accepts the Nydya method of testing truth by means of the disciplined logical intellect and emancipating it from the fallacies incidental to the investigation of truth, but repudi- ates Nydya theology and its materialistic idea of mukti.. It also welcomes the Mimdtnsaka view of Vedic dharma and
16 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
insists on the authority of the moral consciousness ; but it subordinates the imperative of duty to the philosophic need of immediately intuiting Brahman that is ever self-realised and not something to be accomplished. The Vedavddin who performs his duties should develop into the Vedantin who seeks the Deity and intuits Him.
But theology does not favour this mystic philosophy as the mystic experience of Brahman is private, particular and arbitrary without any objective validity and has no faith in the infallibility of revelation or s'astra. Scripture is the word of <iod, not in the sense of a miraculous revelation or direct dictation of God, but in the sense that it is eternal and infal- lible. A literal faith in scriptural revelation is, according to the theologian, more important to religion than personal religion. Religion is essentially theo-centric and cannot be traced to personal experience. The proofs of God are meant either for the theist or for the atheist. The former is a be- liever who needs no proof and the latter is an unbeliever who rejects the proofs. Scripture is its own proof and every word of it is an eternal truth and should be considered as holy as a shrine of God. Philosophic explanation is admissible only if, like a handmaid, it is subservient to faith and justifies the truth of revelation deductively without resorting to the heretic method of historical and logical criticism. Faith is sanctified by tradition or sat sampradaya and is a heritage bequeathed to posterity in the form of divinely ordained truths. The main duty of the believer is submission to authority and loyalty to sampradaya or sacred tradition and the spiritual community. It is the essence of scholasticism that dogma as an article of faith should regulate life. Philosophy should learn to square with dogma and not conflict with it. Philosophy is read into
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 17
faith, and conduct should conform to the will of God as ex- pressed in the sacred tradition which is the final truth.
r
The warfare between faith and reason thus reaches its climax when intuition tries to oust faith in revelation and when faith tries to oust intuition. Authoritarianism fights intuitionism on the ground that it refers to mere subjective and private experience which can never be the same for all. It strengthens itself by alliance with the forces of verbalism, dogmatism and fanaticism. Intuitionism is anti-theological and is a spiritual quest for immediate religious experience, and it allies itself with mysticism. Another form of intuitionism rejects religion as a mere appearance of reality betraying the self-contradiction between man and God. Religion and its God disappear in the non-dual experience of oneness. But there cannot be a more solid reality than religious experience. The philosopher thinks that he alone enquires into the whole of experience and that religion is only an appearance of the whole. Religion condemns philosophy as mere theory and philosophy rejects religion as arbitrary and intuitional. No man can be a free thinker in philosophy and, at the same time, a believer in religion. The religious thinker should be consistent and have a reasonable religion or religious system. The esse of religion is not credo or belief and the esse of philosophy is not cogito or ' I think '. A true philosopher accepts the truths of religious faith, experiments with them and experiences them. The dif- ferentia of philosophy is the venture of the mumuksti to know reality, and that of religion is the realisation of reality as Brahman. A true philosophy of religion is thus neither a free rational speculation on the nature and value of reality nor is it a theology which has no faith in the 2
18 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
trustworthiness of the pramanas of sense-perception and reasoning.
The problem of Vedanta as the attempt to think out all things and discover their spiritual meaning and value is stated in a classical way in the TaittirJydpanisad in the dialogue between Varuna and his son Bhrgu. The prob- lem is : " What is that from which these beings are born, by which they are sustained and into which they return ? " Bhrgu, as the true son of a philosopher-mystic, seeks to understand the problem and solve it by a resolute spiri- tual effort and consecrated life. The true Veddntin seeks to know the right way of framing questions and gradually recognises that Vedanta is not the obstinate questioning of outward things or mere resolute thinking, but is a spiritual quest or induction. Bhrgu attempts various definitions of Brah- man as suggested by the teacher, like anna may a 9 pranamaya, manomaya and vijndnamaya, which have their parallels in western thought as materialism, vitalism, mentalism and rationalism. But none of these definitions satisfies him as they do not exhaust the nature of the Absolute. The hunger for the Absolute can be satisfied only by the Absolute. It is the perfect alone that is self -complete and supremely valuable. Bhrgu then realises that Brahman is anandamaya, the intui- tional Highest, and that this mystic experience of Brahman is the crown and consummation of knowledge.
Vedanta is thus an enquiry into the meaning of Brahman and is really a dars'ana. The term dars'ana adequately expresses the foundational truths of Vedanta as the philo- sophic knowledge of reality strengthened by viveka or discrimi- nation and vairagya or freedom from sense desires, as well as
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 19
the spiritual realisation of that knowledge. It is an organic integration of s'ruti or scripture, yukti or logic, and anubhava or intuitive experience, or, to put it in other words, the claims of revelational faith, rational enquiry and intuitive verinability. A dars'ana is a body of eternal and impersonal spiritual truths enshrined in s'ruti which can be logically tested and verified by personal experience. S'ruti is self-valid and the self-explanation of existence in its whole- ness and of experience in its integrity. The Veddntic dars'ana affords insight into the nature of Brahman, and the ultimate proof of the existence of Brahman is the experi- ence of Brahman. It is not tarka drsti or the natural light of reason and dialectic thinking on all things, but is tatva drsti or the soul-sight of Brahman by knowing which everything is known. The Upanisadic rsis were specialists in spirituality and were philosopher-seers. Reason mediates between object- ive revelation and intuitive realisation and corrects the dog- matic tendency of the former and the subjectivistic experiences of the latter. The truths of Brahmajnana are out there in their absoluteness ; but they are inductively discovered by intuit- ive insight and deductively deduced from the s'niti. To the guru such jndna is self-revelatory and deductive ; but to the disciple it is a spiritual induction by self-criticism. Spiritual truths are spiritually discerned and experienced and they are true for ever, and whatever is spiritually satisfactory is true. It is the aim of Vis'istddvaita as a philosophy of religion to reconcile the extremes of reason and faith by the sublime truth that Brahman is the ultimate explanation of the world of cit and acit or the sentient and the non-sentient, and the supreme end of spirituality and that outside Brahman there is no reality. The more the Jlva is spiritual the more Brahman- ised it is. The sdtvata religion of the Pdncardtra is the word
20 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
of God promoting godliness and is therefore true. Pragma- tically speaking, the divine experiences of the Alvars have Vedantic validity and value. Vis'istddvaita as a philosophy of religion reconciles revelation, reason and intuition, and claims to be universal and accepts whatever is coherent with its cardinal truths. It summons humanity to participate in the riches of Brahmamibliava or the experience of Brahman, and its spiritual hospitality knows no geographical or racial barriers.
CHAPTER II RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
THE central idea of Vis'istcidvaita as a philosophy of religion is the integration and harmonisation of all know- ledge obtained through sense-perception, inference and revela- tion. The key-thought of revelation is enshrined in the Upanisadic text ' Brahmavid apnoti param ' (He who knows Brahman attains the highest).1 This text affirms the inter- related unity of the threefold system of Veddntic wisdom known as tatva, hita and purusartha, as elaborated in the four chapters of the Veddnta Sutras. TatvajMna is the philosophic exposition of Brahman as the immanent ground of existence and the inner self of all things. Hita involves the determination of the moral and the spiritual means or sddhanas of realising Brahman and purusdrtha is the attainment of Brahman as the summtttn bontitn of life by realising which everything is realised. To forget this interpretation is to take .a false step in the philosophy of religion, leading to a blind alley. This is illustrated in the philosophy of Kant and S'ankara. The problem of philosophy as the criticism of knowledge is formulated in western thought by Kant in the classical form "What can I know, what ought I to do ? and what may I hope for ? " The Kantian solution lies in showing the impossibility of metaphysics being explained as rational
1 Tatt. Vpan., II. i.
22 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
psychology, cosmology and theology. The transcendental ideas of the self, nature and God are transcendental illusions which have no constitutive use and are therefore deceptive. But ethics as practical reason needs the postulation of the ideas of God, freedom and immortality. This method has led to the opposition between reality and appearance and the im- possibility of bridging the gulf between thought and reality. For example, the metaphysical theory of adhydsa or erroneous predication held by Advaita brings out the self-contradictions of experience and reduces nature, self and God to mere ap- pearances. But, on the practical side, it restores what was demolished by dialectics and accepts the pragmatic value of cit9 acit and Ls'vara. In this way, there is a fissure in philos- ophy due to the antagonism between the pure reason of Advaita and its practical, ethical and religious side. What reason declares to be erroneous and deceptive is accepted as having relative truth because the world of practical life would be impossible without it. But Vis'istadvaita avoids this blind alley by accepting the trustworthiness of thought, and it is therefore a philosophy of affirmation and valuation. Its answer to the three questions is that Brahman is knowable as the supreme tatva. Hita is doing one's duty as Brah- marpana, and the purusartha is the Brahmanisation of the self, whereby the self attains the eternal nature of Brahman. Philosophy is thus a criticism of knowledge and is a revolution in method, as it gathers up the divergent lines of thought and combines them in a new and synthetic way. All the currents of knowledge converge in Brahman, by knowing which every- thing is known. The first problem of philosophy is " What can I know ?" It is the problem of the theory of knowledge, its origin and nature, and this chapter brings out the solution, offered by Vis'istadvaita epistemology.
RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 23
The problem of epistemology is the problem of the re- lation between knowledge and reality. It is stated thus : 11 What is the connection between the course of conscious- ness in the individual self and the world of persons and things which constitute the objective world par excellence and the all-self ? " This question does not presuppose a radical dis- tinction between rational psychology, cosmology and theology or the knowledge of the self, nature and God, as the three are inter-related. The world of knowledge has a unity sustained by the intelligent self which endures in all the levels of experience including the perceptual, the rational and the revelational sides. The first question in epistemology is about the origin and possibility of knowledge. Vis'istddvaita affirms the knowability of reality and says that we can know- things as they are. In the perceptive judgment, which is the beginning and foundation of all knowledge as in the example " I see a rose," the self with its jndna perceives the object 4 rose ' and does not passively receive the visual sensation. The knowledge presupposes a knowing self and an object of thought. It is ordinarily explained as an ascent from the sensation to the self. Sensations form the raw material of knowledge and they become percepts by means of the a priori form prescribed by the mind. The perceived objects are conceived and arranged by the synthetic mind or understanding. The mind or understanding brings together the perceived objects and forms judgments ; without the unity of self-consciousness sensa- tion cannot pass into perception and conception or judgment. Reason unifies the judgments, and is a higher principle than understanding and arrives at the idea of self, nature and God as the highest unity. In this way epistemology is said to start with sensation as the matter of knowledge and proceed through perception and conception to the self as the synthetic
24 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
unity of knowledge. Vis'istddvaita, however, lays stress on the work of thought as a revelatory function. Knowledge is not a synthetic construction, but is purely a process by which things are revealed. The objects in nature are given and are not made by thought. It is the function of thought only to reveal them and not to create them. The Vis'istadvaita theory of knowledge is thus different from western theories. According to it, jnana, the attributive intelligence of the self, as contrasted with the antahkarana of the Advaita philo- sophy, can reveal both itself and the object outside it. In the act of perception, it streams out from the self towards the object and illumines it. Jndna or knowledge starts from the dtman and, with the manas and the indriyas, comes into con- tact with the object (artha), assumes its form and thus reveals it. The knowledge of the object thus arises when jnana contacts the object through the inner and the outer senses.1 The theory has the merit of recognising the priority and the primal fact of consciousness or jtldna and the relative inde- pendence of the conscious self and the non-conscious object. The object is not a vrtti or idea or psychosis objectified by avidyd or nescience, nor is the subject the counter- feit self of ahankara or egoism. Both are inter-dependent reals essential to knowledge. This view escapes the perils of materialism and mentalism, as it predicates the reality of the perceiving self and of the external world that is perceived.
The theory of perception adopted by Vi&istddvaita is neither mediaeval nor unscientific as it is sometimes said to be, but contains a profound truth which satisfies the demands of science and the claims of philosophic thought. Many of
1 Yattndramatadipika, I. 15.
RlMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 25
the current theories of the origin of knowledge fail to give a satisfactory account of pratyakm or sense-perception. Science is specialised knowledge of some aspect of reality, and its •explanation is therefore fractional, fragmentary and abstract. In the judgment of sight perception, * I see the rose ', the physicist may trace the visual sensation to the light vibrations starting from the object and stimulating the eye, which is like a photographic camera, and to the formation of the visual image on the retina. The physiologist then refers to the re- sponse of the neurone to the external stimulus and also to the passage of the impulse to the visual area where it is resisted by the synapses, causing the flash of consciousness. The psychologist takes up the story and explains sensation as the report of the sensory stimulation in consciousness which gives <us acquaintance with the object. Each sensation has its specific function on account of which the eye can only see •the thing and the ear, hear the sound. The feel of a thing -is different from its look. But the sense object is not the bare atomic sensation. A philosopher like Kapila or Kant goes a step further and traces the knowledge of the object to .the synthetic unity of apperception that is in one's self- consciousness. The exponent of each succeeding view thus Jbegins where the other ends, with the result that there is no real explanation of the process by which the self knows the •object * rose '.
It is only by the synthetic co-ordination of the ab- stract truths of physics, physiology and psychology, genetic .and rational, that the concrete experience as such can be explained. The Visristadvaitic theory of knowledge avoids the perils of the analytic method by stating the simple fact that the self with its jndna knows the object which
26 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
is relatively external to it. The self seeks to know the external object through the channels of the senses as a whole, just as white light is perceived as a whole in spite of its separate spectral colours. This synthetic view is thus the criticism and completion of the conclusions of the special sciences like physics', physiology and psychology. Knowledge is the self-revelation of the real object as a whole and is not a piecing together or juxtaposition of the a priori or the rational with the a posteriori or the empirical. It is neither an ascent from the particulars of sense to a pervading identity nor a descent from the universal to the concrete facts. The object is not the copy of the idea nor is the idea the archetype of the object, and neither is deduced from the other. To say that the mind or its vrtti or form creates the object and takes its form is to take no account of the object at all. The object is not a not-self made of avidya opposed to the self but a real thing in terra firma, and it includes other selves also as social objects. The world of physical objects is for consciousness and not in consciousness. Objects have an existence independent of consciousness. The subject can real- ise itself as the eternal self-conscious dtman different from the object. How does the subjective consciousness then perceive the object that is outside it and different from it ? The answer of Vis'istadvaita may be stated as follows : The ultimate explanation of the subject-object relation is afforded by the religious insight that the real subject of every judg- ment is Brahman that is in all things not as a tertium quid but as their inner self. When I say " I think/' it really means " Brahman thinks in me as my self." Brahman as infinite intelligence is the prius and presupposition of finite thought and has more affinity with it than with external things.
RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 27
THE NATURE OF DHARMABHUTAJINANA
The concept of dharmabhutajndna or attributive know- ledge is the foundational truth of the Vis'istadvaita theory of knowledge as it alone throws light on the nature of reality, and the idea is well expounded in the Yatlndramatadipika (Ch. VII). It alone furnishes the meaning of the three ultimate facts of cosmic consciousness, self-consciousness and Brahman- consciousness. Consciousness cannot be aware of itself, but presupposes a self of which it is the idea or attribute. Jndna is not identical with reality or the self ; the two are separate but are not separable. If being and knowing are identical, the theory of knowledge or epistemology is identical with the theory of being or ontology, and there is no need for the theorising activity at all. If what is is in itself, then there is no ' ism ' as a metaphysical explanation of what is. The other alternative that knowing is entirely unrelated to being is equally inadmissi- ble as it would land us in scepticism. If there is a self- discrepancy between thought as ' what ' and reality as ' that ', thought can never grasp reality or get merged in it. The neti method, or method of negation, that consists in abstracting pure consciousness from its quality of consciousness is a denial of consciousness itself. The true neti method has nothing to do with doubting knowledge and denying it. It is a false step in monistic philosophy to start with doubt and end with denial. The monist answers the question of how the conscious subject within can perceive what is external to it by denying the reality of an external object and declaring the percept as a false appearance projected by the mind, which is itself unreal. This view is also allied to scepticism. It stultifies itself and is sterile. The act of denial at least exists as an act. If it is regarded as an illusion, the illusion exists as a
28 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
fact and if it is causally explained, it leads to the fallacy of infinite regress. It is difficult for the monist to explain how the illusion arises. If it is explained as the result or effect of a cause like avidya, the origin of this avidya crops up for •explanation. Even the statement that nothing exists assumes the conceivability of something which it denies. Thought •constitutes reality as its inner quality and is not super-added to, or super-posed on, it. The fact that something exists affirms a quality of that something. What is has a quality apart from its existence. Since a quality cannot exist by itself and be its own predicate, it presupposes a substance of which it is a quality. A substance has a quality and is not a quality or aggregate of qualities. If monism affirms mere being or substance and denies its having qualities, or in other words, predication and determination, it is combated by phenomenalism (like that of Buddhism) which admits qualities and denies substance. Even monism is constrained to concede the truth of substance and qualities when it refers to the .a&raya or adhistaiia as the locus of illusion. Dhanna or quality presupposes dharmin, the substance, and dharmin presupposes dharma ; the denial of the one is the denial of the other, and such denial is opposed to all pramanas or instru- ments of knowledge. When substance is svaprakas'a or self- illumined, it is called ajada and is different from jada like the world of space and time. , Ajada is consciousness with con- tent classified into pratyak or conscious self existing by itself and its knowledge or parak (existing for another) which is its essential quality or dharmabhutajnana . Substance as ajada or the immaterial is thus conceived as a conscious self, finite or infinite. It is the subject of experience that has jnana as its inseparable attribute. Atman is and has •consciousness. It is substantive intelligence and has
RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 29
attributive intelligence as well, which manifests its nature. The two can be logically distinguished but cannot be divided.
Dharmabhntajnana is self-illumined (svayam prakds'a) and it also illumines objects (artha prakds'aka). It is also called mati, prajnd, s'emusl and sainvit. It can reveal itself and the objects, but it is only revelatory and is not self-realised like the dtman. It is midway between cetana and jada, as it manifests itself and objects like cetana and is for another like acetana. It is like physical light which can only " show but cannot know " l ; and it exists in the self and is sustained by its intelligence. The relation between the dtman and its^ jndna is like that between light and its luminosity. The self is a knowing subject and is not mere intelligence. Nor is it true to say that intelligence is an adventitious quality or creation of ajndna or ignorance. Jndna is self-originated and sui generis and self-valid. We can think away all things, but we cannot think away thought or jndna. In affirming the * I ' in the judgment * I am conscious/ consciousness is predicated of the self that is affirmed, but it does not imply the identity of being and knowing. The self that exists and is conscious is not mere consciousness. Jndna explains itself and things and it is an act of inner necessity. It is the idea that has concourse with the thing and makes the world of nature intelligible and imparts meaning and value to buddhi and other mental states which are the modifications of jndna and not its creations. Reason and understanding, perception and sensation are illumined and explained by jndna, but jndna is self-explanatory. Jndna functions in the empirical states
1 Hiriyanna's article on Ramanuja's Theory of Knowledge in the Pro- ceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1925.
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through the medium of manas or the auxiliary cause and is often identified with it as a matter of convention (upacara) . All states of consciousness ranging from the lowest instinct to the highest state of bhakti, including viveka (discrimination), pratyaksa (perception), anumana (inference), and s'abda (scrip- tural faith) are only modifications or avasthas of jnana. The knowledge of things in the external world is explained by the object-revealing character of jnana. In the empirical or samsdra state of the jlva, jtiana radiates from the centre and illumines the objects through the medium of the senses. The distinction drawn by some western objective idealists between idea in the psychological sense of a perishing psychical present- ation and idea in the logical sense of reference to reality is artificial, since jnana is as real as the object known and since there is no barrier between the subjective and the objective. The object is not a mental construction or creation or shadow of the idea, nor is the idea a faint copy or duplicate of the object as jnana is both svayam prakdsra or capable of illumining itself and artha prakds'aka or capable of illumining objects. If modern psychology has to retrace its steps and find its solution in metaphysics, it will receive a flood of light from the Vis'is- tddvaitic truth of the self and its consciousness. The view that the self-consciousness of the self is the source of all men- tal states and that it is its nature to reveal external objects has the merit of simplicity which is a true test of truth and affords a basis for the reconciliation of the claims of realism and idealism. Sensation has a metaphysical foundation in the self and the self itself has its meaning and value in its inner Self. Vis'istddvaita prefers the method of tracing psychology to metaphysics and religion to the reverse process of deriving religion and metaphysics from psychology.
RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 31
The self is cidriipa or of the nature of consciousness and has caitanya or consciousness for its essential quality. While the finite self is ami or monadic and infinitesimal in nature, its consciousness is vibhu or all-pervasive and infinite. The self abides in its own monadic being, but has windows and its •consciousness has no limitations as it can mirror the whole universe as its content. During the phenomenal state of sam-sdra, jndna is causally determined by the moral law of avidyd-karma and is limited in the embodied state. Con- sciousness which is capable of becoming infinite is spatialised, cribbed and confined and it is this finitised existence of jndna that accounts for the difference in the states of the jlva from the butterfly to Brahma. In the noumenal state of mukti, jndna is infinite consciousness and is all-pervasive. It is then freed from the contractions due to karma. It is co-eval with cosmic consciousness and God-consciousness. While the self is im- mutable and eternal and abides in its own being, its conscious- ness changes. But it endures through time and persists even in dreamless sleep, swoon or senselessness as is evidenced by the experience ' I slept well.' In sleep the revelatory nature of jndna is overpowered by tamas, but is not absent. Its non- experience during sleep is no argument to prove its non-exist- ence and the fact of memory refutes the so-called antecedent non-existence of jndna. The self persists in its subjective modification as a pervading identity and while it illumines other objects it is not illumined by them. Besides, the three states of consciousness are continuous and are not self-con- tradictory. It is meaningless to explain youth as the contra- diction of childhood and as sublated by manhood. The three are different phases of a single life having the same biological end and not the three discrepant unreals of monistic logic. Even monism admits the co-existence of the self as sdksin and the
32 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
antalikarana persists as a possibility in the so-called non-dual experience of sleep. Jnana is there, but its light is hidden and is not known and the sdksin in sleep is a witness of something. A witness that witnesses nothing is srunya and serves no- purpose. Consciousness is continuous, distinct and clear in the waking state, dim and confused in the sub-conscious and dream states, and divine in mukti. It is implied in sleep and stupor, and even in the abnormal states of dispersal and dis- sociation of personality. The differences are to be accounted for psychologically as the changing states of the same self and its consciousness because of its being affected by avidyd-karma. The unmanifest state of jnana is not ajnana or illusion but jnana as essence or real possibility. When the confusions of avidya and the contractions of karma are removed, jnana wakes to itself, expands and shines again in its infinite and eternal splendour and the monadic self radiates its light every- where besides mirroring forth the universe from its own point of view. Then perceptual and inferential knowledge expands into full integral experience. Thejiva as the bare monad of matter can become the pure monad freed from it and theyogin can evolve into the Is'vara state of having cosmic consciousness. The jnana of Is'vara, unlike that of the bound jiva, is ever all- pervasive (nitya and vibhtt). The idea of the finite self with infinite consciousness as its essential and eternal nature is not inconceivable. Even absolutism is constrained psychologically to posit the existence of an infinity of finite selves or nana jlva. The Vis'istadvaita theory of jnana has the merit of recognising the reality of the finite and the infinite and re- conciling the claims of pluralism and monism. The infinite pervades the finite and removes its exclusive feeling of indivi- dualism. By knowing the one we know the other and the intelligence of thejiva, finite and infinite has its home in the
RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 33
absolute intelligence of Brahman. Thus the theory of intelli- gence being both finite and infinite and changing and change- less is not really self-contradictory or paradoxical, for it alone bridges the gulf between the moveless infinite and the chang- ing consciousness. If the infinite is infinite and the finite is finite, knowledge would become impossible. But the theory of dharmabhutajndna sacrifices neither the finite nor the infinite as it mediates between the two and traces spiritual conscious- ness to its headquarters in Brahman.
Dharmabhutajndna not only illuminates itself and the objects of nature but is also substance-attribute (dravya-guna). It has already been analogically explained by comparison with light. Light or prabha, as in sun light or lamp light, illumines objects and is a quality inhering in a substance. At the same time, as the substratum of colour and the shades of colouration, it is a substance. Likewise the term jnana ex- presses an essential and eternal attribute that inheres in the self ; but as it contracts and expands like a substance owing to the determining influence of karma, it is the substratum of change and may be defined as a substance as well. Eternal consciousness changes when it is caught up in the world of karma, but comes to itself in the state of mukti when it i$ freed from sense contact. Jnana is thus both changing and changeless and is both substance and quality. It is thus the peculiar spiritual quality of the dtman and is contrasted with the qualities of objects or their secondary sensations. Dharma- bhutajndna is said to be, like the infinite mode of Spinoza, a link between the changeless state of reality and the changing phenomenal states. Jnana is one though it realises itself in various mental modifications starting with the animal instincts and ending with the divine impulse of bhakti. Jnana functions 3
34 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
as conation and feeling and therefore every state of con- sciousness is cognitive, conative and affective. It contains within itself the principle of self-differentiation and self- activity. Jnana is not thought which is abstract and move- less or a self-identical blank, but is a mode of thinking with infinite variations. It is not the sum of mental processes, nor an identity that pervades the differences, but is the self-same consciousness that exhibits itself, owing to the influence of avidya-karma as particular perishing present- ations. Thus it is not, strictly speaking, like Spinoza's infinite modes, a device to bridge the gap between the infinite that is indeterminate and the finite modes. It is equally futile to reduce jnana to the level of jadatva or inertness and ajnana on the ground that whatever knowledge belongs to anatman or non-self is objectified thought or ajnana. This view of jadatva cuts at the root of the theory of know- ledge and is like saying that one's own mother is a barren woman. Jnana is the mother of metaphysics and if it becomes ajnana it is sterile. Cit and caitanya are, like light and its luminosity, inseparable though distinguishable. If knowledge veils the self, the desire for mukti and for knowing the self would only be a make-believe and scepticism would be the only conclusion.
THE THEORY OF JUDGMENT
Every judgment is the affirmation of reality and not the apprehension of identity devoid of content or differentiation. For example, when we say " this tree is green ", the predicate, t>/z., the idea of greenness, is attributed to the subject * tree ' which is given in sense-perception. In other words, the new idea qualifies and amplifies the meaning of the subject. If, on
RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 35
the other hand, the subject and the predicate are identical, there is no knowledge at all. Thought qualifies reality and pre- supposes the distinction between the subject and the object of the judgment. Judgment as an act of predication is the fundamental principle of philosophic logic and the two elements of subject and predicate are integrally united and not isolated bits or opposites. If thought is identical with reality, the judg- ing process is tautological and is needless. But if thought is opposed to reality and cannot reach it, it is shipwrecked in the very entrance to the harbour of knowledge and is therefore useless. The only way of solving the problem lies in the affirmation that reality is knowable by thought on account of the inseparable relation and of the logical faith in the reality of predication as a subject-object relation. Reality is therefore samsfesa or determinate and not nirvis'esa or indeterminate. A nirvis'esa vastu is a self-contradiction. Consciousness ab- stracted from the knowing self or the subject and the object is inconceivable and non-existent. If consciousness as such is self-proved, it has at least the quality of being self-proved. If it is permissible to argue that pure consciousness remains identical with itself when jndna dispels ajnana and destroys itself, it is equally justifiable to say that self-consciousness can- not be sublated and the self remains as an eternal subject and cannot have antecedent or consequent non-existence. Judg- ment is the unity which explains the different elements. It does not explain them away. The two are correlated and dis- tinguishable elements of knowledge. Determination is not negation, but negation is determination and acquires positive meaning in a judgment by defining its nature, and it presup- poses self-determination. Substance as an entity would be an empty abstraction if it is devoid of content. Substance is .not the mere aggregate of attributes, but is their organic unity
36 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
and underlying reality. The distinction between indeterminate and determinate perception (nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka) is- not a difference in kind between the undifferentiated, which is devoid of difference, and the differentiated. Both are com- plex presentations. Knowledge, even primitive sensation, is significant and is in the form of judgment. It is a development of the objective. The indefinite becomes the definite and clear. The substantive-quality relation is implicit in the former and explicit in the latter. If the first is bare identity,, it is non-relational and no amount of subsequent knowledge can introduce difference into it. But, as a matter of fact, the first called prathama piiida grahana is the absence not of differ- ence and discrimination altogether but of some specific differ- ence as " this is such " and is articulate, and the second called dvitlya piiida grahana is the extension to what is already affirmed of the generic character of a class. The first judg- ment " this is a cow " is indefinite but not indeterminate \ the second " this is also a cow " is revival based on similarity of structure, and both are savis'esa and not nirvis'esa. Every judgment is in the form " this is such" in which the predicate qualifies the subject1. There is no boundary line between what is given and its extension. What is immediate knowledge is, by its own necessity, medi- ated. We give a reason for what is immediately felt. When we say that there is a fire, we try to give a reason for the assertion. In every judgment extent and intent go to* gether. The Naiyayika says that samanya or generality is out there as a distinct category ; but it is not true, as such a general • idea is a mere abstraction. The jati or genus is realised in the vyakti or individual owing to the intimate structural
1 Vedartha Sangraha (edited by S. Vasudevachariar) , p. 94, and S. B. E., Vol. XLVIII, p. 41.
RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 37
similarity of pattern or samsthdna. Therefore sdmdnya or genus is practically the same as samsthdna and is structured. Thus there is no contradiction between savikalpaka and nir- vikalpaka jndna. Two different things are contradictory only when they stand in the same relation to the same subject. But different qualities like whiteness and redness may co-exist in the same object cow. To say that there is being as such without any quality is the result of progressive abstraction. It is wrong to say that the first perception is a knowledge of pure being or nirvis'esa cinmdtra. A pure sensation as such is psychologically impossible.
Even in a perceptive judgment like " this is a jar," the factors of knowledge can be distinguished and they are all •equally real though their values may differ. The perceived object in its presentness is a given spot in the world of space- time which is in sensuous contact with the percipient subject or sensitive self. It comes into contact with a particular spot which is only a this-now. The judging activity belongs to jndna which illumines the mental world and the world of nature and in" this case it directly reveals the external object which is the illuminated spot or focus of attention. The sensitive self is the spiritual dtman different from the body, the senses, manas and jndna. The dtman is self-revelatory as well as self-realised and is the subject of every kind of knowledge ; but the ultimate subject of knowledge is the inner self of all thinking beings and objects of thought which is their prius and presupposition. Thus the logical subject is jndna* the philosophical subject is the dtman or dharmin behind the dharma, and the subject of the religious consciousness is the Paramdtman which is the whole reality that enters into the Mman as its self and then enters into the world of nature as
38 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
its source and centre. Therefore every term, thought and thing ultimately connotes Brahman on account of its all-per- vasive character. This is only from the connotative point of view, as Brahman, cit or ksetrajna, and acit or ksetra are ulti- mate reals and are therefore different denotatively.
The grammatical subject of a sentence is distinguished from the logical subject of the proposition. The grammatical subject also refers to reality qualified by difference in the light of the grammatical principle of the co-ordination of words in a sentence or samanadhikaranya. It conveys the idea of one thing being qualified by several attributes.1 The words denote the same thing but connote its different qualities. It is the application to one thing of several words, for the application of each of which there is a different purpose. In the sentence " this is a tree ", the terms * this ' and ' tree ' standing for a vyakti or individual and a jati or class respectively have different func- tions (bhinna-pravrtti-nimitta); but they refer to the same thing. In the sentence " this is green ", the guna ' greenness ' in the guni ' this ' refers to the same subject of discourse. Contradict- ories cannot co-exist at the same time and in the same context. But distincts may co-exist side by side as different qualities of the same object. The judgment " this person is that Devadatta " connotes the same entity existing in two different contexts and not absolute identity or non-differ- ence. A sentence construed as a connected idea referring to reality is called a judgment and the above sentence explicitly refers to personal identity and means that Devadattatva in a particular former context belongs to him in the pre- sent context. The Advaitic interpretation of the theory of
1 bhinna pravptti nimittanara s'abdanam ekasmin arthe vrttissamanadhi- karanyamiti hi tadvidah. — Vedartha Sangraha, p. 80 ; samanadhikarapyam hi dvay5£ padayoh prakaradvaya-mukhena ekartha-nisthatvam. Ibid, p. 189.
RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 39
sdmdnddhikaranya in terms of absolute identity is untenable as the implied affirmation of such identity cuts at the very root of grammatical construction. To speak of bare identity as the implied sense or laksya as opposed to the apparent sense or mukhya-vrtti really implies nothing and applies to nothing. Likewise the interpretation of the principle in terms of differ- ence between subject and predicate as mere otherness has no meaning. Identity in difference is also impossible as the two are self-contradictory. The principle of co-ordination is ulti- mately the relation between prakdra and prakdrin. In the sentence " the cow is white ", whiteness depends for its meaning on the subject with which it is inseparably related as aprthaksiddhavis'esana and the quality is therefore termed the prakdra 'or mode of the substance or prakdrin. Likewise the sentence " he is Devadatta, a god " or " Yajnadatta a man " implies that the body is a mode or prakdra of the self which animates it. Therefore the term connoting the body connotes also the self, and ultimately, all terms referring to things and thinking beings are used in co-ordination with their inner self or Brahman, and therefore extend their meaning up to the self, which is their prakdrin. Every kind of knowledge, perceptive, inferential or scriptural, refers to the ultimate knower or subject. Atman and dtman alone is the inner meaning of all experience.
THE THEORY OF RELATIONS
Philosophical logic is thus based on the truths of deter- minate knowledge or savis'esa jndna and the principle of samanddhikaranya, and it throws light on the problem of external and internal relations. In the theory of external relations, the relations are said to make no difference to the terms related. The relata are external to the relation and one
40 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
substance does not pass into and become another. What exists is alone cognised. Knowledge is the awareness of external objects by the knowing subject, and such experience makes no difference to the existing objects. The external objects are given not as things but as objects to a subject and they form the ksetra. They do not depend on the self or ksetrajna for their existence. Cit, the percipient self, and acit, the perceived object, are externally connected, mutually ex- clusive and eternally real. Knowledge presupposes not only the independence of the subject and the object but also the existence of a plurality of knowing subjects and knowable objects. The self is not always the sub- ject of knowledge, as, in social relations, each self is both subject and object. Inter-subjective intercourse and social love would be impossible if there is no subject-object relation among different persons and even the non-dualistic theory of nana-jlva would be demolished if the existence of a spiritual society of interacting individuals is denied. The view that the relata are external to the relation is, however, self-con- tradictory and makes knowledge impossible. If the object is out there, outside the mind, it cannot be known, and if the subject is inside, it is shut up in itself. Thus there is no way of escape from scepticism on the one hand and subjectivism on the other. To avoid these fatal pitfalls, the theory of external relations and epistemological realism is to be re- stated in terms of the logic of aprthaksiddhavis'esana or inseparable attribute and the theory of ontological non- dualism. For example, the relation between the hand and the pen is external, while that between the hand and the fingers is internal and organic. Externality implies the reality of the eternal differences of the facts of cit and acit ; but in relation to the whole which is their inner meaning, they become
RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 41
inseparable and correlative factors and lose their independence and exclusiveness. Thus the plurality of cit and acit is accepted, but the pluralistic view is rejected. The cosmos is not subject or object, but is subject-object and it is appro- priately defined as universe and not multiverse. As parts cit and acit are mutually exclusive and indifferent ; but, as parts of the all-pervasive consciousness of the inner self which sustains them, they are internally and organically related. Qualities and relations depend on the whole of reality as their back- ground. Internal relations are grounded in the nature of the terms related not as separate terms as such, but as terms connoting the ultimate ground of existence and experience as vis'ista and vis'esya. The vis'esana is an attribute of the vis'esya or adjective of the whole and is vitally related to it as its mode or prakara, like the fragrance of the flower, the vowel related to the consonant and the body and its self. The vis'ista is thus not a mechanical whole of indifferent parts, nor the totality of attributes. The judgment " the lotus is fragrant " is not a unity of the substance and its quality or the subject-object relation as explained by the bhedabheda theory of identity in difference which regards identity and difference as two moments of reality. In its philosophic aspect, this view expounds reality as the absolute consisting of God and the finite centres. Vis'istadvaita, however, holds that the absolute is not God and the finite beings, but is God in the finite beings as their sustaining ground. While the vis'esya or prakarin is one, the vis'esanas or prakdras are many. Brahman and the world should be really Brahman in the world and are not two but one. The mathematical view of addition is opposed to the metaphysical view of Vis'istadvaita. The latter is likewise different from the adjectival theory of the absolute which explains the finite
42 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
self as the essential quality of the infinite and its connection of content and renders the term Vis'istddvaita as qualified or modified monism. The finite self is an inseparable attribute of the infinite as its aprthaksiddhavi&esana or prakdra but is, at the same time, a separate self persevering in its own being. The visfesatia is both substance and quality or dravya guna like light and its radiation. As quality or mode, it derives its substantiality from the self-effulgent dtman, but as sub- stance it has its own monadic being. A quality is a quality of a substance ; but when it is also a substance it admits of relation. The connection between dtman and Paramdtman is thus not merely the logical view of substance and attribute but the spiritual view of two selves and these two are eter- nally existent. They are not externally related as Paramdtman is defined as the inner self and meaning of the jwa, or its antarydmin. This view has the merit of avoiding the defects of the monadic exclusiveness of Leibnitz and the modal inclusiveness of Spinoza. Real exclusiveness and ideal in- clusiveness are incompatible, and the Vis'istddvaita insight into Brahman as the antarydmin throws a flood of light even on logical problems and provides an all-comprehensive view of reality. The self and the objects in nature are independent entities existentially and are externally related ; but, as they have their meaning and value in the absolute as the all-self, they are related to it internally as its modes or prakdras. The absolute is self-related and has its own inner identity ; but at the same time it is related to cit and acit which are its prakdras or modes. This interpretation avoids the fallacies of scepticism and of infinite regress.
The Vi&istddvaitic theory of knowledge may be summed up as a theory of the knowability of reality in all its levels
RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 43<
and aspects and the acceptance of what is valuable in other systems in so far as they do not contradict its main truths. It cannot be defined as realistic or idealistic in the western sense of the term, as manas in Veddntic psychology along with buddhi and aharikara is apart of prakrti or matter, and the body or ksetra is distinguished from the atman with itsjnana* which is called ksetrajna. When Ramanuja says that all knowledge is of the real (sarvam vijndna jdtam yathdrthamY r he does not accept the realistic contention that knowledge comes from the external object through the sense organs and the mind passively receives the sense impressions like a blank sheet of paper. The self with its jnana and its psycho-physical changes is as real as the external object or prakrti with its twenty-three tatvas. Knowledge is revelatory and not re- presentative. Since what exists is alone cognised, R§ma- nuja's view is called sat khydti or yathartha khyati? Realism is justified in its conclusion that the existence of a thing is independent of our experience of it and that there is an external relation between an object and its awareness by the self. The thought of an object is not the object but is about it. A thing is known as it exists and it is wrong to say that it exists because it is known. Nature exists for consciousness and not in consciousness as its idea. But if realism as a philosophy insists on the primacy and priority of matter over the self as in western thought and rules out the work and worth of jnana, it leans towards pan-objectivism and lapses into materialism. Idealism is justified if it accepts dharma- bhutajnana as the presupposition of experience ; but it is to be refuted if it ignores the reality of the external object given in
1 Sri Bhasya, I. i. 1, p. 87 (Ananda Press Edition).
s The other views known as akhyati, atmakhyati and anirvacaniya- khyati are not accepted by him.
44 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VI£'ISTADVAITA
sense-perception and explains it as a mental state or construc- tion based on relations, internal or relevant. If esse \spercipi or cogitare, then the object is the idea and the idea is the object, and idealism becomes subjectivism. If the internal relation alone is accepted, then space, time and causality are a priori forms 'belonging to the very structure of thought super-imposed on the manifold of sense. The world, according to this view, seems to be real and is not real. Then there would be no difference between waking and dream consciousness and what we know is what we seem to know and it is only an as if. Then thought cannot grasp reality and the theory of knowledge is the theory of no knowledge. S'ahkara is well aware of the defects of extreme idealism and its Buddhistic leanings and affiliations and combats it by admitting the realistic view that the external object is not an idea or a projection of thought but has objective reality and that the -waking state is different in kind from the dream state. No Veddntin accepts the atomic idealism and nihilism of Bud- dhistic epistemology. Vi&istadvaitic absolutism checks the -extremes of realism and idealism and points out the defects of the pure object philosophy and the pure subject philosophy by insisting on the reality of ksetrajiia or the knowing subject and the ksetra or the knowable object, the correlativity of the subject-object relation and the immanence of the super- subject or atman in cit and acit. Atman enters into cit as itself and enters into the object and then becomes the self of the self. In the five factors of knowledge analysed already if the object alone is taken as the real, then there arises the realistic view ending in materialism ; if manas and buddhi ^constitute reality, there is mentalism and rationalism ; if the self alone exists, it is monadism or personalism ; and if Brahman alone exists, it is acosmism. But Vis'istadvaita
RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 4S
accepts all these existents, assigns a place and value to, each of them and with its synthetic insight explains all selves and objects of knowledge as the living embodiments of the inner self. It thus affirms the duality of the subject-object relatioa within the unity of experience between the experient and the thing experienced, but denies their dualism. It relies on the eternity of cit and acit as bhokta or the experient and bhogya or the experienced, but abolishes their externality.
THE Vis'iSTlDVAiTic THEORY OF TRUTH
Vis'istddvaita as a synoptic philosophy accepts the integrity of experience in all its levels as given in pratyaksa (perception), anumdna (inference), and s'astra (scripture), on the ground that jfidna is self- valid and true, that the sat or the real alone is cognised and that there is no knowledge of asat or the unreal. If Brahman alone is real or satya and the world of experience is futile, false and non-existent (tuccha and mithyd) on account of the self-contradictions of dualistic knowledge, no knowledge is possible or desirable. Meticulous monistic logic cannot admit the co-existence of Brahman and may a or different degrees of reality. Maya is non-existence and cannot therefore co-exist with Brahman. If may a refers to the world of illusion, then it contradicts the theory of degrees of reality and the truth of two standpoints as the vydvahdrika (or of the world of practical life) and thepdramar- thika which is absolutely real. If truth is self-existent and the false non-existent, there is no need for a theory of truth or a test of truth based on abddha or non-contradiction. Absolutism does recognise the distinction between reality and existence but this distinction is not an opposition. To Rama- nuja, Brahman is the sat or supreme reality that is the
46 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
pervading essence of the universe and its indwelling self and is therefore satya or true. The universe is not Brahman enveloped by may a and avidya, but is Brahmamaya or per- vaded by Brahman. It is illumined by its radiant light. It exists in Brahman and not as Brahman, and does not exhaust its content. Reality exists as Brahman in clt and acit. Acit is matter which is ever-changing and perishing and may be called asatya. Cit is the eternal self with a uniform nature or intelligence which is realised as distinct from the perishing prakrti or matter, and may be called satya or the true and the inner self of the existent prakrti ; Brahman may be called satyasya satyam, the real of all reals or the true of the true, or Vasudeva. Reality and value co-exist and while matter has an extrinsic and ephemeral value and is asatya, the self has intrinsic value and is satya. Brahman is the true of the true and gives value to both. This view repudiates realism, idealism and monism as one-sided and abstract and recognises the reality and value of nature, the individual self and Brahman.
Truth is the knowledge of a thing as it is and as it works or satisfies the practical interests of life 1. This definition is •clear and distinct and is free from the defects of sams'aya and viparyaya which arise from want of logical and moral discipline. The first is doubt as in the example " Is this a post or a person ? " and the second is mistaking one thing for another as in the rope-snake illusion. According to Rama- nuja, every kind of knowledge is true if it is consistent with ^experience in its exactitude, and he accepts the trustworthi- ness of the three pramanas, viz., (1) pratyaksa including abhava, (2) anumana including upamana and arthdpatti and <3) sabda.
1 yath§vasthitavyavaharanugvjnam jnanam prama. (y. /)., I. 9)
RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 47
In pratyaksa, the indriya in its normal state has a direct knowledge of the thing as it is. Anumana arises from the knowledge of vydpti or the invariable concomitance between cause and effect. The inference need not consist of the five members in all cases. Reasoning is both deductive and inductive and it should be free from prejudice and lead to truth. It should avoid fallacies like contradiction (viruddha), circular reasoning (anyonyas'raya) and infinite regress (ana- vastha). S'ruti, as verbal testimony, is eternal, impersonal and true and all its parts are inter-connected and have a unity of import. All the three pramanas are coherent and they are not contradictory. Pratyaksa is the foundation of knowledge and reasoning is based on it and does not supersede it. S'ruti is the consummation of all knowledge, but it cannot be at variance with pratyaksa l. Truth is an immanent criterion and includes the more of itself and the three pra- manas in their integral unity and perfection enable the truth- seeker to know the whole of reality.
THE THEORY OF ERROR
Since truth is revelatory or svatahpramdnya * and every ^cognition is real, strictly speaking, there is no need for a theory of truth, and a theory of error is meaningless. Truth is the natural and normal feature of knowledge in the state of spiritual freedom, where there is no distinction between prama and bhrama or truth and error. While the jnana of the all- self is eternally pure and perfect and free from the confusion of avidya, the intelligence of the finite self is subject to the self- vcontradictions and contractions of avidya-karma which deprive
1 s'astrasya pratyak?ena virodhe sati durbalatvat.
2 Yatindramata Dipika, I. 17.
48 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
it of its pure and all-pervasive character and this privation1 is called error. Jnana is normally true cognition and even a false cognition like the bent stick is perspective and is real. Its extent and variety are determined by the logical and moral development of the self. If error is traced to the fissure between knowing and being and the self-contradictions of relatipnal experience and if avidya is the obscuring principle of reality, we can never go from degrees of truth to the absoluter and the absolute would itself be infected by illusion. The Advaitic theory of non-contradiction is no theory at all, as it says that error is abhdva or non-existent and reality is beyond pramd and bhrama. The merit of Ramanuja's theory of error consists in saving the absolute from its self-deceptive mdyd or avidya and its illogical appearances and in attributing error to the finite self which has inexplicably allowed itself to be obscured by avidya. Every empirical experience is incomplete or partial knowledge and even pramd is only partial truth.. The distinction between pramd and bhrama is only one of degree and vanishes when jndna is freed from the moral deter- minations of karma. Vis'istddvaita utilises every theory of error which fits in. with its central idea and accepts the tests of pragmatism and realism so far as they go in harmonising experience. The experience of an object as having gray colour owing to colour blindness is a psychic fact and is real. The shade of coloration is an aspect of the whole spatial order. The criterion of truth comprises the three theories of coher- ence, correspondence and workability in so far as they con- form to the method of Vis'istddvaita. There is coherence if the given judgment is consistent with all other judgments and with the whole of knowledge. There is correspondence if there is exact conformity between the object as it is and its perception by the senses. Knowledge is true if it satisfies the ends
RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 49
of life by its workability. In this way it may be shown that correspondence follows from coherence and verification results from the inner value of truth. Thus pragmatism, realism and idealism are all inter-related in Vis'istadvaitic epistemology.
Falsity is abnormal and pathological as in mental dis- orders, and each case has to be judged on its own merits. Though error is too chaotic for classification, it may be grouped into certain types, like hallucinations, illusions and dreams which may be explained psychologically and by the criteria furnished by pragmatism and realism. In hallucina- tion, an object is known to be physically present though there is no such object. An illusion is an erroneous perception in which one thing is mistaken for another. The dreamer seems to experience things which do not exist in the objective world. These abnormal phenomena are explained by the psycho- logist in terms of peripheral and interpretative factors and psycho-physical disorders ; and all these are psychic occur- rences and manifestations oijnana that subsist and are facts of experience which cannot be dismissed as non-existent. The cause is real and therefore the effect also is real. The illu- sion of the double moon, of the white conch seen as yellow and of the firebrand seen as a continuous circle of light when whirled round are respectively traceable to the distorting medium, neural disorder, and the law of rapid rotation. In the first case, the illusion arises from some defect of the eye or the pres- sure of the finger on it. In the second case, the yellowness of the diseased eyeball is actually transmitted to the conch. One colour of the spectrum is abstracted from the whole, and the experience is purely subjective. In the third example, successiveness is omitted and simultaneity alone is felt.1
1 S.B.E., Vol. XLVIII, p. 123. 4
50 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTlDVAITA
But if these mental states do not serve an end and satisfy the needs of practical life (vyavahara anuguna), they are false. In the mirage experience, for example, the water element that is seen is alone apprehended owing to some defect in the eye, and the experience is not verified. Truth is selective and serviceable and, as it promotes the ends of life, it has a prag- matic value. Logic is related to psychology and it explains thought as a thinking process, and truth as a practical value. Truth is thus what works, but whatever works is not true. Truth is prior to its workability and it is not only vyavahara anuguna but also yathartha and has both conative and cogni- tive value. A judgment is true if the idea corresponds to the external object. It is objective in the sense that truth is true for all and is not personal and private. In accounting for illusions like the cognition of silver in the shell, and the snake in the rope, Ramanuja accepts the fundamental unity of nature or prakrti as composed of the five elements and the thinghood of things singled out in the act of sense-perception and defines truth as the apprehension of the dominant and relevant parts of the perceived object, and error as the non-observation of this essential part. The Vedantic theory of pancikarana or quintuplication1 states that every object in nature is composed of all the five bhutas or elements in varying proportions and insists on the structural affinity and solidarity of the visible and tangible universe though its thinghood is largely shaped by one predominant element among the ingredients. In the normal perception of the external object, jndna reveals only this main part ; but in error, owing to certain psycho-physical conditions, the self perceives only the non-essential and insigni- ficant portion of the thing. In the shell-silver illusion the silver element which resembles the shell is singled out from
1 Sri Bhasya. I. i. 1, p. 83 (Ananda Press Edition) and II. iv. 17.
RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 51
the complex of experience, and disillusionment arises when the silver content is known practically to have no economic value. Everything participates in the nature of everything else and all things or bhantikas are composed of all the elements or bhiitas. The thinghood of a thing as a part of the whole spatial order is so complex that the particular sciences can have only a practical and a partial knowledge of those aspects of the thing that are relevant to it and it is only the jndni whose jnana is perfected that can know all things as a whole. His mind transcends the one-to-one relation and acquires knowledge of the whole truth. But fragmentary knowledge is not a fiction or illusion projected by avidya and sublatable by jnana. The reality of nature and its inter-related elements is due to the pervasive character of the dtman that has entered into it as its self. Even the dream state is a psychic experience which may be traced to previous experiences registered in the psycho-physical complex and dreams often reveal the char acter of the dreamer and sometimes have a prophetic value. But Ramanuja explains them morally as the wonderful creations of Is'vara in accordance with the merit or demerit of the dreamer. In dreams the divinity creates specific objects suited to the specific merit or demerit of thejlva.* The pleasure or pain experienced in that state is the result of the law of retribution and is as real as the moral life lived in the waking state. But it is purely subjective or private and has not the objective reality of the waking state which is the common theatre for all individuals and at all times. The distinction between what is private and \\hat is public is one of degree and does not affect their reality. The theory of sublation is not applicable to these distinct and real experiences.
1 S.B.E., Vol. XLVIII. p. 120 ; Br. Up., VI. iii. 10 and Vednnta Sutras. III.ii.3.
52 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
Epistemology is ultimately founded on the philosophy of religion which combines validity and value in the concept of the self as real reality and the true of the true. Thus all empirical knowledge is a partial revelation of reality or Self as the truth of truths and the distinction between prama and bhrama (truth and error) is not absolute. When the ideal of knowledge is realised in mttkti, jnana becomes all-pervasive and the mukta knows everything. Then essence and existence become one.
Ramanuja devotes a special section to the criticism of the theory of avidyd held by S'ankara. The Advaitic theory of avtdyd holds that avidya is neither real nor non-real, nor both and is therefore inexplicable. For example, in the illusion caused by mistaking the shell for silver, there is a misunder- standing which is indeterminable. It is first felt to be real and then rejected as unreal when there is true knowledge of the thing and it cannot be both real and unreal. It is adhyasa or false super-imposition, because the silver cognition is super- imposed on the shell cognition which is a felt ' this '. While the Advaitin frankly admits the indefinability of this illusion, he severely condemns other theories and gives them no quarter. The asatkhyati of the S'iinyavadin is, according to the Advai- tin, untenable, as it says that the void is knowable in the same way as the substance on which the super-imposition occurs is itself non-existent. In the given example, silver is tuccha or non-existent. But it is impossible to cognise s'unya. The Vijnanavadin belongs to a more moderate school of Buddhism and his theory of error known as atmakhyati is based on a kind of subjective idealism. It explains the illusion as a mental state or psychic presentation which appears to be something external. But the idea is really of the object and not the object itself. A perishing
RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 53
psychosis cannot cognise itself. The defects of idealism are sought to be remedied by the realistic schools of Vaibhasika and Sautrdntika and by the Mlmamsaka and the Naiydyika. The Mlmamsaka theory of akhyati or non-apprehension ac- cepts the reality of both the cognitions, the perceived shell and the conceived or remembered silver, and traces the mistake to a defect in the tools of knowledge on account of which we fail to notice that silver is a recollected element. In the anyathdkhydti of the logician or Naiyayika also, both shell and silver are real things. Shell is, however, wrongly perceived as another real object, namely, silver. The non-existence of shell means the existence of another object, silver, and this error is subjective. Ramanuja's theory is also realistic and is objected to by the Advaitin on the ground that nothing can exist outside consciousness. His pragmatic method of verification may be convenient, but is not consistent. Truth may work, but what works is not necessarily true. The Advaitin thus demolishes all other theories of illusion and then says that his own theory cannot be explained and is anirvacanlya.
Av'idya, according to Advaita, is said to be the innate obscuration of pure consciousness which somehow divides the absolute and distorts it into the world of difference. It is an innate error which is beginningless, positive and indetermin- able, though it can be removed by jndna. The universal experience * I do not know ' refers to ignorance and is in- definite. In sleep where there is a temporary cessation of the consciousness of duality and difference, ignorance remains in its causal state or kdrana s'arlra. It is owing to avidyd that Brahman, which is sat, cit, dnanda, is confused with the empirical self which is anrta or transient, jada or inert and
54 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
duhkha or miserable, and this confusion is called adhyasa and is the cause of all the evils of samsdra. Avidya is thus the root of error in philosophy, original confusion or misconception. It is the basis of this baseless world of space-time-cause like the rope-snake illusion. Brahman alone is and what is not Brahman is false as it is different from it as in the rope-snake illusion. Difference cannot exist by itself, and it is only a distortion of reality. To trace the cause of avidya is illegitimate as the concept of causality itself has its origin in avidya. Pure con- sciousness is the locus (as'raya) of avdiyd and also its object* It is ever self-effulgent and avidya cannot really conceal it, nor does it reside in thejiva as ihejwa itself is its creation. Like the sun that shines unaffected by the mist, the dtman is svayamjyutis and is not affected by avidya. Avidya is somehow there in Brahman, we know not why, and it only means that thought cannot reach what is beyond thought. Avidya is indefinable, as it is neither real nor unreal nor both. It is not real as it is dissolved in the state of mukti ; it is real as it now exists : and it cannot be both. It is a frank state- ment of the self-contradictions of life, though the absolute is beyond such discrepancy.
Though avidya transcends explanation, many explana- tions are given to account for its origin and nature. According to the ' reflection theory', the/mr or ahankdra is a reflection of Brahman in the antahkarana due to avidya which is the subjective side of may a. It makes the world a dream and a delusion, and ihejlva a mere phantasm. The ' pheno- menon theory ' refutes the view and defines avidya as a fact of finiteness which somehow limits the limitless. Avidya is a fall from jndna, and is not a fictitious something. The world is unreal, but not illusory, and the/mr is a fact of
RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 55
experience and not a phantasm. The world has relative reality though its relation to the absolute cannot be explained. A third theory of avidyd denies phenomenal reality and explains the external object as the illusory projection of the perceiving consciousness and makes l&vara Himself a super- jiva. A fourth view denies avidya itself as its recognition as a separate entity is an admission of the reality of two states, jnana and ajndna. Brahman exists for ever and avidya is non-existent like the son of a barren woman. All schools of Advaita are on the whole agreed that it is avidya that is the cause of all confusion and misery in life. Though it has no beginning, it has an end and in mukti it is stultified. The chief value of the concept of avidya in the philosophy of Advaita is that it exposes the inadequacy of all dualistic theories though it is by itself inexplicable.
Ramanuja, in his masterly introduction to his S'n Bhdsya, subjects this theory to severe criticism and his classical refutation of it is know*n as saptavidha anupa- patti or the sevenfold inadmissibility. The seven charges are as'raya amipapatti, tirodhdna anupapatti, svarilpdnu- papatti, anirvacamya anupapatti, pramdna anupapatti, nivartakdnupapatti, and nivrtti anupapatti. The first charge is that there can be no basis for the baseless fabrication of avidya. The illusionist seeks to avoid the nihilism of the Mddhyamika by positing a locus, substratum or adhistdna for avidya. The seat of avidya should be either the jlva or Brahman, neither of which is conceivable. It cannot be the jlva as the jlva itself is the fictitious creation of avidyd, nor can it be Brahman as Brahman is self-illumined and can never be enveloped by avidyd. To trace the locus of avidyd to the jlva and that of the jlva to avidyd is to commit
56 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
the fallacy of anyonyds'raya or mutual dependence. How the non-dual consciousness is caught up in duality is the supreme riddle of Advaita. Besides, a philosophy which discards the notion of substance and substratum as mediaeval and scholastic is not justified in utilising it in its own doctrine of ds'raya. Avidyd has no resting place and is therefore nothing. The next objection is that there can be really no obscuration or tirodhdna of Brahman at all. Brahmasvarupa is jndna and is self-luminous. Either it is pure consciousness or not. If it is the former, it cannot be obscured, obstructed or destroyed by nescience. But if it is covered by avidyd, it is virtually destroyed by it. How or why svayamjyotis veils itself is the stumbling block of S'aiikara Veddnta. The tjiird objection "relates to the understanding of the svanlpa or nature of avidyd. Avidyd is either real or unreal. If it is an entity or bhdva rfipa, then it is inherent in Brahman as muldvidyd and cannot be destroyed ; Advaita is disproved by positing two reals. If it is unreal, as the more thoroughgoing monist says, there is no muldvidyd or tuldvidyd as one or many. The fourth criticism is levelled against the anirvacanlya theory of inde- finability. Theorising activity is the actual work of thought and to say that there is a theory which is indefinable (sadasadvilaksana) is meaningless. If avidyd is neither bare negation nor significant negation, but is an inde- terminable something which somehow infects reality, it is a something which can never be sublated. The philo- sophic humility which underlies the admission of anirvacanlya is mere mock humility as the avidyd theory mercilessly attacks other theories with the devastating dialectics of a Nagarjuna. The Advaitin first explains avidyd as a pheno- menon, then as an illusion, and, when he is cornered, explains it away as indeterminable. The fifth charge is that the theory
RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 57
oi avidya is not supported by vdstraic authority or any other pramana.1 Illusion is an abnormal phenomenon and it is opposed to the first principles of philosophy to treat the abnormal as its starting point. The terms asatya (unreal) and nasti (is not), which are opposed to satya (the real) and asti (is), refer not to the unreal or the non-existent but to non- sentient objects. Nivartaka anupapatti is the criticism of the theory of the sublation of avidya. Ajndna cannot be sublated or dispelled by jnana, as jnana is itself the effect of ajnana. But if it is something given, it can be removed only by spiritual discipline and not by the mere knowledge of self-identity. If Brahman is ever existent and avidya non-existent, then the term mumuksutva conveys no meaning at all. The last criticism is known as nivrttiy anupapatti and is the objection to the Advaitic theory of mukti. Brahma jnana is not, according to Advaitins, the jndna of Brahman,' but it is jndna that is Brahman. It is said thztjudna stultifies a jnana and then stultifies itself ; if so, jndna is an act of spiritual suicide. With the vanishing of avidya, jagat and Is'vara also perish and Advaita is nihilistic.
These charges are further elaborated by Vedanta Des'ika in his polemical work, the S'ata Diisani. The objections may be classified under the different headings adopted in this philosophic study and summarised as follows : From the standpoint of epistemology, the theory of avidya and adhydsa leads to agnosticism and scepticism. If
1 The recognition of anupalabdhi, or the absence of apprehension as a separate pramana is riddled with self-contradiction as avidya which obscures pure consciousness is felt to be there as positive indefinite and yet is false. Even in the proposition ' I do not know,' I admit the fact of avidya and the * I ' persists as a real self. To say that avidya is somehow there and sublated later by jnana is to admit the duality of avidya and jnana and get involved in the dualism between the two. If avidya is bare negation, the question of removing it does not arise.
58 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
Brahman is ever self-realised, there is no need for a philosophy to expound it. If Brahman cannot be the object of knowledge, it cannot be sought by the mumuksit. If whatever is know- able is false, Brahman is also false. The indeterminate has at least the quality of being indeterminate. To say that it transcends all relational thought including Vedic knowledge is to commit intellectual suicide and s'ntticide. The theory of knowledge is thus the theory of the denial of knowledge. The monistic ontology of nirguna Brahman as pure consciousness without any content borders on nihilism. Nirguna Brahman has the quality of being nirguna. Consciousness cannot be aware of itself without the self as its subject. Advaita fails to explain the relation between the one and the many, being and becoming, affirmation and negation and the absolute and the relative. Difference cannot be denied without denying identity as the two are relative. Advaitic cosmology suffers from the defects of pan-illusionism and acosmism. If Brah- man, the subject or substratum, is real, the universe is equally real and not an illusion. If the universe is an illusion, Brah- man also is conditioned by it and is illusory. Nescience is an inexplicable something, and the distinction between mdya and avidyd is meaningless. To say that the world is a magic show- created by the may in makes the creator a conjurer. If the effect is an illusion superposed on the cause, the cause is also infected. The psychology of Advaita is equally defective as it virtually refutes the existence of ihejiva and is engulfed in subjectivism. The denial of many selves on logical grounds is also the denial of even the single self theory. If the self that has consciousness is false, consciousness itself is false.. There is no need for the theory of a saksin as its purpose is served by the self as a knowing entity. Monistic ethics brings out the discrepancy between karma and jiiana, and concludes
RAMANUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 59
that the pure consciousness sublates the moral ego and transcends the distinction between good and evil. In Advaita religion occupies a subordinate position in relation to philos- ophy, as the God of religion is said to be less than the absolute owing to the discrepancy between two wills, finite and infinite. If so, religion is finally sublated in philosophy, and has no meaning at all. Jndna is said to dispel the dualistic con- sciousness arising from avidya. But even jnana results from ajnanii, and is not different from it. Jwammtkti is self-con- tradictory as jivdtman with embodiedness cannot co-exist with mukti, which is freedom from it. Mukti cannot admit of degrees, stages and divisions. If the jlva is identical with Is'vara, then mukti is absolute and there can no longer be any question of other jlvas and Is'vara or kdrya Brahman existing in the empirical state of avidya and may a. Besides, the world process should cease to exist after the first instance of jlvanmukti, but it continues in spite of it. If avidya or may a is ultimately non-existent and Brahman is ever identical with itself, there is no problem for the imunuksu, and therefore no need for mukti. Thus, from every standpoint, Advaitic monism is found to be inconsistent with every kind of pramdna.
Ramanuja sums up the defects of the monistic theory of avidya ending in the philosophy of eka-jlva as follows : From the standpoint of pure consciousness everything is false. Sdstra is false, the knowledge derived from the sdstra is false, the guru-disciple relation is false. The idea that everything is false itself arises from the falsity of sdstra itself.1 This relentless refutation of Advaita leads him to the reconstruction of philosophy in terms of satkhydti or yathdrtakhydti or what may be called the ' yes ' philosophy. It affirms that what exists
1 Vedcirtha SangraJia (Vasudevachariar's edition), p. 19.
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(sat) is alone known. Reality is always savis'esa and not nirvis'esa, and in apprehending a thing as it is we also comprehend what it is. The * that ' is qualified by the * what.' Satkhydti is not realism in its modern sense as it insists on the reality of nature in all its aspects, physical, spiritual and divine. Its meaning is fully brought out in the thesis of sad- vidyd, that by knowing the one all is known (eka vijndnena sarva-vijnanani). By knowing Brahman, the ground of the universe, the universe also is known. The universe is ensouled by Brahman (Brahmatmakd). It comes from sat, and not from asat, and therefore is sat. Brahman is one as the prakdnn and the many as theprakaras, and both are real. The system of nature and the society of jivas derive their meaning and value from Brahman who is the inner self of all. There- fore everything — thought and word — ultimately connotes Brah- man. Thus, by knowing the one we know the many, as its vis'esatia, prakdra or sranra and, by knowing the many, we know the one that is changeless and eternal. In this way Ramanuja gives an extended meaning of satkhydti in the light of sadvidyd and concludes that, since Brahman is real, the world is also real and true. He interprets avidyd ethically by equating it with karma and concludes that the jlva freed from avidya-karma sees all things in Brahman and Brahman in all things.
CHAPTER III
THE THEORY OF TWO BRAHMANS CRITICISED
THE chief issue in metaphysics is the problem whether the absolute of philosophy is the God of religion and whether there are two Brahmans, saguna and nirguna., Of all the Ved antic schools, Advaita alone makes a dis- tinction between saguna Brahman or Brahman with attri- butes and nirguna Brahman or Brahman without attributes and supports it by the authority of the S'ruti and the Sutras. It is in the light of this dual standpoint that S'ahkara ex- pounds the Veddnta Sutras dealing with the meaning of sad- vidyd, dnandamaya, ubhaya linga and karya Brahman. Firstly sadvidyd brings out, according to S'ankara, the contrast between the sat without a second or the indeterminate and Is'vara, the determinate. The sat is advitlya (without a second) and nirguna and the moment it wills the many and becomes the manifold, it is said to entangle itself in the illusions of relatedness. Caught up, as it were, in the duality of the subject-object relation, it becomes Is'vara or the determinate. Determination is negation and therefore saguna Brahman is finite and is a mere ap- pearance. But nirguna Brahman is pure undifferentiated being or consciousness without the distinction of subject and object. Secondly, Brahman as dnandamaya is sagurta Brah- man, the logical highest, or the absolute made in the moulds of thought. The moment we think of Brahman, dnanda
-62 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
lapses into vijnana and the not-self enters into the integrity of being and makes it being-becoming.1 The absolute as the intuitional highest becomes Is'vara as its highest conceptual reading. Predication as a logical relation perverts reality. When the contentless bliss of Brahman is logically defined as blissfulness, it is only maximum bliss with an element of imperfection. In saguna Brahman there is a * balance of plea- sure over pain/ but there is no absolute joy. Thirdly, in the Ubhaya Liriga Adhikarana, S'ankara makes the same distinc- tion. Strictly speaking, Brahman cannot at the same time be transcendentally formless being and phenomenalised Is'vara, on account of the self-contradiction of the finite-infinite inherent in the dual idea. The neti method of the Upanisad denies only the pluralistic consciousness fictitiously superimposed on Brahman and not Brahman itself, as such denial would favour the nihilistic philosophy of universal void and be a stultification of the entire Vedanta. The formless, characterless Brahman is, however, spatialised and personalised by the religious consciousness in the interests of devout meditation. Fourthly, Brahman is apprehended metaphysically as the self-identical absolute and is the 'metaphysical highest and not Is'vara or karya Brahman or effected Brahman who is the God of theo- logy. It is only the effected Brahman that has a world of His • own which is attained by devotion. Spatial and temporal categories apply to the empirical world and cannot have a transcendental use. Jaimini who refers to the world of Brah- man is only on the theological level, but Badari, the meta- physician, rejects the illusions of space and time and the values of progress and attainment.2 Nirguna Brahman is
1 Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p, 168. a Param jaiminir mukhyatvat. S. B.t IV. iii. 11
karyam bSdarir asya gatyupapatteh. S. B. IV. iii. 6.
THE THEORY OF TWO BRAHMANS 63
alogical, amoral and impersonal and the idea of sciguna ± Brahman is only a concession to ignorance.
Advaita as a critical analysis of reality without seeking the aid of S'ruti may be viewed as subject philosophy, subject- object philosophy or object philosophy. The first is an ideal- istic view that accepts the Upanisadic truth that the knower cannot be known, that it is the * I ' beyond the ' me ' and that it alone constitutes reality. Avidyd objectifies pure con- sciousness and makes it a semblance and Isrvara Himself is drsya or an object of thought. Drsya is illusion externalised and can be thought away. Idealism ends in subjectivism and subjectivism ends in the super-subjectivism of eka-jlva-vada in which the whole universe emerges from the single ' 1 ' and merges into or is sublated in it. This method is adopted by the Yogavdsista and has a Buddhistic tinge. According to the illusion theory, Is'vara is the may in or the arch-illusionist, the * first figment of cosmic nescience ', who projects the world show like a juggler. He is the self-luminous Brahman reflected in the sdtvic medium of may a or the infinite finitised by the upddhis ' or the sum-total of semblances. The pheno- menon theory says that relational thought betrays the self- contradiction and disruption between existence and content, and is therefore dualistic and divisive. The idea of saguna 'Brahman is riddled with the contradictions of being-becoming, one-many. The God of religion is thus less real than the abso- lute of philosophy and though there is no real difference between dust and deity, there are degrees of reality. God is the logical highest or the highest reading of the absolute. Is'vara is an aggregate of the jlvas and is the concrete universal realised in
1 These ideas are developed in the theories known as bimba-pratibimba vada and avaccheda vada.
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the world of particulars. The distinction between phenomena* and transcendental reality is a recognition of the object philosophy and the need for theistic faith in a personal god. Sagutia Brahman is the absolute cast in the moulds of religion and has the inner necessity of self-transcendence. Still another school of Advaita holds that Brahman is ever existent and may a is ever non-existent and Advaita is no philosophy or religion as it affirms what is and does not theorise about it, in its academic and practical aspects. Advaita thus oscillates between Buddhistic idealism and theism and either accepts or denies I&vara. If it accepts the existence of I&vara, it implies the co-existence of two Brahmans, the Per- sonal and the Impersonal, and, guided by ethico-religious^ motive, posits the practical reality of saguna Brahman ; but, if it denies Is'vara, it follows the devastating dialectic of Nagarjuna and ends in s'unyavdda.
The Advaitic distinction between two Brahmans is con- troverted and rejected by the other Vedantins, especially by the other monistic schools like the Bheddbheda of Bhaskara, as a speculation riddled with fallacies, without possessing any value. The contention of the Mdydvddin that determination is negation is not supported by S'ruti and has no rational basis. The Upanisad points to the reality of spiritual truths which can be determined only spiritually and not dialectically. The dialectic of Mdydvdda is self-destructive and affirms nothing.1 The thesis of sadvidyd is the discovery of the sat or ades'a by realising which everything else is realised and it is a cosmological account of the One differentiating itself into the many and becoming the manifold of the
1 For a detailed criticism of Maynvftda, vide, Chap. V of the author's work The Philosophy of Bhedabheda.
THE THEORY OF TWO BRAHMANS 65
subjects and objects of experience. The manifold consists of distincts and not of opposites. The Advaitic acceptance of parindma-vdda or the theory that Brahman evolves into the universe with a view to its later rejection in terms of vivaria or phenomenal or illusory development is a typical example of the self-contradiction implied in its philosophy of two stand- points. In addition to this fallacy it is open to the charge of s'ruta-hdni or text torture and as'ruta kalpana or mere fabrica- tion. That the absolute divides itself into finite centres may be a cosmological mystery. The self-creative activity of Brahman may be a puzzle, but not a fiction. Self-differentiation is no denial of the integrity of Brahman as it is savis'esa and not nirvi&iesa, and the true meaning of negation is not bare negation or nothingness, but is significant negation presuppos- ing affirmation. Abhdva is not a separate category or pra- mdna. When it fills up in meaning with reference to the context, it is on a par with affirmation. When we say that there is no jar on the ground, we mean that we see only the ground and not the jar. When we say that Brahman is nirguna, we mean that it is not prakrti, but the supreme self other than prakrti. This view is called the bhdvdntardbhdva theory of negation or negativing the existence of something else. All abhdva resolves itself into a bhdva other than the correlate. But if determination is considered a defect of reality or avidyd, then Brahman would be infested by the all-enveloping darkness that somehow arises from it and there would be no way of escape from this gloom. The causal category that explains Brahman as the first cause and final cause of the world order is different from the Sdnkhyan theory of parindma or evolution from prakrti or matter and the Naiydyika theory of samavdyar as the term cause is ultimately identical with the ground and the inner purpose of world progress. It is thus not a category 5
66 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
of thought that is used to explain what is beyond it. It is not an altar to an unknown God, but is a spiritual way of stating that the infinite expresses itself in the finite as its informing self with a view to infinitise it and thus of overcom- ing the conflict between the mechanical and the teleological applications of the term. The Veddnta Sutras begin with the philosophic definition of Brahman as the ground or reason of finite existence and end with the knowledge of Brahman as the goal of spiritual experience. The Kantian problem of metaphysics and religion " What can I know ? " and " What may I hope for ? " is thus satisfactorily solved. The Sadvidyd enquires into the meaning of sat as the ultimate fact of knowr- ledge and concludes that the secondless sat is the supreme self and is the home of the eternal values of life. But the Sanmdtravddin refers to bare being ^as a logical abstraction which may lapse into the universal void and the eternal night of the absolute.
The Taittirlya text that says that Brahman is ananda- maya is an aesthetic description of the abounding and boundless bliss of Brahman which cannot be explained in terms of the logical intellect. It has no reference to the dialectic opposition between the thesis of dnanda and the antithesis of dnandamaya as a fall from dnanda. As the text starts with Brahmajndna and ends with Brahmdnanda as the highest end of life,1 it is not aware of the distinction between the knowledge of nirguna Brahman as the intuitional highest and the attainment of saguna Brahman as the logical highest. To say that S'ankara is on the intuitional level and Ramanuja on the logical is unfair to both of them ; and the distinction between intuition and logic becomes a yawning 1 anandam brahmano vidvan, Taitt. Up., Ananda-valli, 4 and 9.
THE THEORY OF TWO BRAHMANS 67
gulf between the two. Brahman is and has bliss, and the predication of bliss to Brahman does not pervert its nature but enriches it. The idea of transcendental bliss does not sublate saguna Brahman, but affirms its knowability by purified thought. The description of Is'vara as a self caught up in the contradiction of pleasure and pain and as a glorified samsarin is not supported by s'astra or by practical reason. Is'vara, according to S'aiikara, controls mdyd and is not controlled by it.
S'ruti would stultify itself if it defined the nature of Brahman as saguna or having attributes with a view to deprive it of all content by later thought. The neti or negative method employed b) the Upanisad denies only the adequacy of em- ploying the categories of logic to establish the reality of Brahman and its chief aim is the criticism of the pantheistic view that all is Brahman and the denial of the finitude of reality but not of the finite itself. The absolute is in the conditioned as cit and acit and it is not as the conditioned. It transcends the world of relativity, but does not sublate it. Brahman is formless but not characterless. If the absolute of metaphysics is not the god of npdsana or meditation and worship but the effectuation of illusion, there would be no need for spirituality and the striving for mukti. The distinc- tion between the metaphysical highest realised here and now in jlvanmukti and the theological highest or the phenomenal- ised or spatialised Brahman attained in the world of Brahman that is yonder is refuted by Bhaskara on the ground that Vedantic freedom is won by spiritual effort by transcending the phenomenal world in its macrocosmic and microcosmic aspects. Avidyd is dispelled only when may a, of which it is a part, is stultified. Jnana connotes the removal of avidyd. If
68 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
mukti is only a case of partial disillusionment, it is no mukti at all, and, strictly speaking, it should be l&vara mukti or Brahma mukti as avidya-maya envelops not the jiva which is the effect of avidya but the self-identity and integrity of Brahman itself. Brahman is transcendental because it is beyond the empirical world or samsara mandala. If mukti is the sublation of avidya which is really non-existent like the square-circle, it is immaterial whether it is freedom in embodiment here and now or freedom from embodiment in the world beyond. S'ankara, however, makes a concession to anthropomorphism and guarantees eventual freedom or krama mukti to the theist who in his ignorance clothes the absolute in space-time and humanises it. Even from the standpoint of textual interpreta- tion, the opinion of S'ankara that Badari's view expounded first is the Sutrakara's siddhdnta and that it is followed by the prima facie view of Jaimini which it rebuts, is " altogether inadmissible," l it being the invariable practice of the Vedanta Sutras as well as the Piirva Mimamsa Sutras to conclude the discussion of contested points with the statement of that view which is to be accepted as the authoritative one. It is arbi- trary to say that Jaimini is only on the theological level and is without the rational insight of Badari. The religious consciousness is outraged by the relegation of saguna Brahman who is at first described as the creator of the cosmic process to the level of Hiranyagarbha, the first born of Brahman, when evaluating mukti. If saguna Brahman is less than the absolute,. it suffers from self-deception as it is the first figment of cosmic nescience, from the self-contradiction of its finite- infinite nature and from the infinite hardships of samsara as the aggregate of the jlvas and finally it has less chance of mukti than the jivanmukta. But if it is conjoined
1 S. B. E.t No. XXXIV ? p. 91 (Introduction),
THE THEORY OF TWO BRAHMANS 69
with mdyd and its sfakti and becomes its controller, the theory has a family resemblance to the parindma-vdda of Bhedabheda.
The other schools of Bhedabheda are equally strong in their repudiation of the theory of nirguna Brahman and in upholding the reality of saguna Brahman in the bhinnabhinna relation which does equal justice to the aspects of identity and difference. According to Yadava, being or sanmatra is the essential nature of Brahmatva, and it is the undifferentiated that differentiates itself by its parinama s'akti or power of evolution into Is'vara, cit and acit, each having its own form and function. The absolute streams forth in a series of emanations till its irradiation reaches the realm of matter. It is the plenitude of being and is not to be confused with the bad or quantitative infinite. The absolute is not Is'vara, but is Is'vara and the finite centres. There is a unity in trinity, but each has its own distinctness and content. Is'vara, though an element of the absolute, is not the effectuation of mdya, but has the perfections of God. The jlva is not fictitious or formal, but is a real modal expression or feature of reality and is both finite and infinite. Is'vam and ihejlva do not suffer from inner contradiction, but are correlative factors in the totality of being. The infinite evolves into the finite and remains as itself in spite of its modal manifestations. Nim- barka, in his philosophy of mono-dualism, avoids the extremes of monism and pluralism when he explains the absolute as both static and dynamic. In relation to the world, Brahman is dynamic, but is not a relative absolute and, when it is out of relation to it, it is static and exists in itself as self-com- plete. In its abheda or non-difference aspect, Brahman is s'akta and is self-related, and in the bheddbheda aspect it is
70 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
&akti and connotes distinction and dependence and evolves into the forms of cit and acit. The Dvaita-advaita school of Nimbarka has greater affinities with Vis'istadvaita than with the schools of Bhaskara and Yadava owing to its in- sistence on the jiva as a distinct entity that derives its form from Brahman and depends on it.
The Veddntic exposition of bhedabheda is serviceable to Vis'istadvaita on account of its refutation of the theory of nirgutia Brahman. The view of Bhaskara that saguna Brah- man is determinate but formless is repugnant to the other schools which accept the reality of Isrvara as distinct from the finite centres. Likewise the theory of Yadava, that Brah- matva inheres in Is'vara, cit and acit, is an abstract universal without any connection of content. As being is fully present in its parts, the whole is the part, and dust and divinity would become one. But if the whole is greater than the part, Is'vara is Brahmdms'a or part of Brahman, and is less than the ab- solute and is finite and helpless like thejlva itself. The view that Brahman is conditioned by upadhis or limiting adjuncts is wild and vicious1 and is more mischievous than the illusion theory as it attributes the evils, errors and other imperfections of life to Brahman that is eternally pure and perfect. If the unconditioned Brahman is conditioned by these limiting ad- juncts, good and evil follow necessarily from the divine nature, and God suffers from the sorrows of samsdra in His own infinite way. From the supreme light of sat there blaze forth a Rama and a Ravana. This view affords no hope of the stability of mukti. Likewise the Nimbarka view that the vakti of Brahman alone changes and not Brahman is futile,
1 Brahmajnanapak§adapi paplyanayam bhedabhedapaksah.— Vedartha Sangraha, p. 177.
THE THEORY OF TWO BRAHMANS 71
as Brahman and its pakti are inseparable. S'aktavada does not favour the theory of mdyd or upddhis as it posits an eternal measuring or finitising principle or s'akti that is im- manent in the infinite and refers to Brahman as impersonal and personal at the same time. The infinite is in each part and each part is infinite and aspires to become God. But S'dktavada traces evil and error to the heart of reality and sees no dif- ference between Brahman and a block of stone. The concept of identity in difference is palpably false as the co-existence of contradictories is impossible. The true meaning of sdmana- dhikaranya is not identity, non -duality or unity, but is the inseparable relation between a thing and its attribute or dhannin and dharma. The relation between the infinite and the finite is to be understood in terms not of Advaita or Bhedabheda but of the Vis'istadvaitic truth of prakdra and prakdrin. Bhedabheda is on the horns of a dilemma. If it stresses the abheda or non -different side of eklbhdva or one- ness like the school of Bhaskara, its logical conclusion is Mdydvdda which it rejects. But if it stresses the bheda or difference side like the schools of Yadava and Nimbarka, its logical and ethical conclusion is Vis'istddvaita and the history of Bhedabheda definitely favours the latter alternative. Ws'/s- tddvaita alone takes the dilemma by the horns.
The absolutistic tradition in the west which affords parallels to Veddntic thought may be shown to have more affinity with Bhedabheda than with Advaita. A study of this question is essential to the understanding of Vis'istddvaita, as Bhedabheda is often confused with it by western scholars. It is fully discussed in my book " The Philosophy of Bhedabheda ". It is said that, if a man has no Spinozism, he has no standing in philosophy and some modern Indian philosophers discern
72 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
the Vis'istadvaitic strain in the fundamental idea of Spinoza. Spinoza is interpreted in different ways. If substance excludes all determination, and the attributes are not real but only what the intellect perceives as the essence of the substance, the view of Spinoza resembles that of S'ankara more than that of Ramanuja. But John Caird rejects this theory of substance as a barren abstraction and gives a Hegelian version of Spinozism. Substance is to be explained by the principle of self-determination and not indetermination. The absolute is the self that, by its inner impulse, goes out of itself to objects that are opposed to it and then returns to itself. But others interpret it as a philosophy of religion which suggests similar lines of thought in the Yadava school. Substance is self- conditioned and all-inclusive and its modes are conditioned reals that derive their being from substance. Substance or God is the free cause of all things and is natura naturans ; but in the form of mode it is natura naturata. Substance determines itself to modes. It is not the totality of modes but is the modes. The modes of matter are as divine as the modes of the mind. The mode in its particularity and con- tingence is finite and perishing, but as part of the essence of reality it is infinite and eternal. If this exposition is correct, the theory of natura naturans and the truth that the unity of the absolute is realised in the modal multiplicity of thinking things and objects resemble more the Bhedabheda idea of Brahman and Brahma parinama vada than the Vi&istddvaitic truth of Brahman as the prakarin. If substance is the same as the world of nature, there is no need for God, and the theory becomes a kind of materialistic monism ; if it is inter- preted idealistically, it very nearly affirms the illusoriness of the finite. Some Indian thinkers recognise the affinity between the monadic theism of Leibnitz and the teaching of Ramanuja.
THE THEORY OF TWO BRAHMANS 73
The resemblance is, on the whole, superficial as the idea of God as the monad of monads is distinct from the Vis'istdd- vaitic idea of Brahman as the antaryamin or Inner Self of all beings. Reality is qualified by plurality, but is not itself plural, as the existence of exclusive monads does not make for unity.
A very close affinity is recognised between Ramanuja and Hegel in some notable expositions of Indian thought. To both, the absolute is the real for thought with an element of negativity in it, and is the synthetic unity of relational and logical experience. It is the triune unity consisting of God, soul and nature. Brahman is Is'vara cast in the moulds of logic and is a self-conscious personality with the not-self as an integral element of His being, and He loses Himself in order to find Himself. Experience is an identity in difference, a synthesis of opposites, and Is'vara is the generalised concept of such experience, and is the one-many, being-becoming, infinite-finite. A distinction is drawn by some thinkers be- tween the Hegelian synthesis or dialectic unity of opposites and Ramanuja's synthesis of distincts. The modern Advaitic exponents are generally agreed that Ramanuja is only on the vijfiana or logical level while S'arikara is on the higher level of intuition. Ramanuja's Brahman, according to them, is the logical highest or the real for thought, and is less than S'ankara's Brahman or the intuitional highest which is the real in itself. The logical intellect changes the intuition of the indeterminate or nirguna Brahman into the organic unity of the concrete universal or saguna Brahman. But the pan- logism of Hegel is entirely distinct from Vis'istddvaitic thought and has more affinity with Bhedabheda, and calls for similar criticism. In attempting the fusion of the opposites of identity
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and difference, panlogism ends in confusion, and its ration- alism lapses into materialism, as it fails to explain the reality of the contingent elements in experience. In mounting to the higher category, the lower is not surmounted or transcended, and finitude and evil remain as integral factors of reality. An infinity of universals cannot make the'universe. If the world pro- cess is the perfection of the Idea, then samsdra is more real and valuable than salvation. No upasaka or seeker after mukti adores an evolving, synthetic unity or a college of selves or a deified samsarin. The dialectical view of the one-many lands us in the defects of intellectualism, as the logical idea is hypostatised as the absolute. Every school of Veddnta is clear that divinity can be established not by dialectic skill but by reve- lational faith and direct intuition.
The method of equating Vis'istadvaita with the notion of qualified non-dualism or the adjectival theory of the absolute like that of Bosanquet is equally misleading and futile. Bosan- quet's theory of judgment on its philosophical side rightly affirms that reality is knowable and that every thought refers to the absolute as the ultimate subject. To Bosanquet, the whole of reality is the subject of predication, and the life of logic is the spirit of totality that seeks the stability of thought in the concrete universal. The absolute is the self-related and unconditioned real, but is realised in the relative, and the finite self is a predicate having connection of content with the whole and derives its meaning from it. The finite self is finite-infinite, and has a double nature. As the finite, it is self-contradictory, has formal distinctness and exclusive self- feeling ; but, as the infinite, it transcends itself and becomes stable in the whole. The finite thing is a collection of adjec- tives housed in the infinite and its individuation is due to the
THE THEORY OF TWO BRAHMANS 75>
limitations of space and time. The absolute is the meeting of extremes, and the God of religion is less than the all-inclusive whole and is only an appearance. Finiteness and imperfec- tion are not annulled, but are transfigured, and they contribute to the whole. The adjectival theory of the absolute developed by Bosanquet denies svanlpa aikya or absolute identity, and affirms vis'ista aikya or attributive oneness ; but it is more allied to Bheddbhcda than to Vis'istadvaita. Both Bosanquet and Yadava insist on the postulation of identity in difference as the supreme law of thought, and expound the nature of the absolute as a concrete unity. But while Bosanquet accepts imperfection as an element of perfect life, though in a trans- muted state, the Bhedabheda-vadin, relying on sruti, refers to Brahman as the Perfect untainted by finitude and evil. Rama- nuja may agree with both in the logical idea of the finite self being a mode of the absolute, but he rejects the adjectival theory, and affirms the reality of the finite self as a substantive mode having focalised being or uniqueness.
Some modern Advaitins favour the dialectic method of Bradley and Nagarjuna in demolishing the reality of the God of religion as only an appearance of reality riddled with self- contradictions. Every thought is relational and sunders the * what ' from the ' that '. Relation is external to the relata- and involves self-discrepancy ; but it points to the absolute which is trans-relational. If God is a self against other selves^ he is only an appearance of the absolute and is finite. Short of the absolute, God cannot rest; but if he reaches it, he is lost. In the unity of the absolute, all ethical and religious contra- dictions are reconciled, and it is richer for every discord that it embraces and transmutes. Bradley, like Nagarjuna and the monistic dialecticians, is very effective in abolishing the
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appearances ; but in his constructive philosophy he tries to save them as revelations of the absolute. The supra-relational and the relational are not continuous, and the dualism between the two is not overcome. While Hegel trusts thought, Bradley distrusts it. The scepticism of Kantian metaphysics has its conclusion in the agnosticism of Bradley, though, to escape scepticism, he says that reality is sentient experience. This is entirely different from the mystic intuition of Brahman,1 There is as much contrast between S'ahkara and Bradley as there is between Ramanuja and Hegel ; and both Bradley and Hegel belong on the whole to the Bhedabheda type. The absolute is not only beyond relational thought, but is conscious of that experience and is therefore the Supreme Self. It cannot, " like a sponge, suck in its own selfhood." The self is affirmed even in the act of denying it. Relations do relate and relational thought presupposes the absolute as a self-conscious being ; and Royce identifies it with will. The absolute is unique with infinity as its character, and its will is expressed through in- dividual wills. Fichte also stresses the ethical side of philo- sophy and his realistic idealism resembles Bhedabheda. The absolute is the self-active ego that posits itself by opposing the non-ego. This opposition is not external to consciousness, but is in consciousness itself. Like the white light broken up into coloured rays, the absolute limits itself and conquers the limita- tions. The pantheism of Fitchte is midway between the views of S'ankara and Ramanuja, and is allied to Bhedabheda and it is not free from the perils of subjectivism. Schelling's idea of the absolute ego is aesthetic and mystical rather than metaphysical, and its idealism is like that of Yadava as it in- vests nature also with consciousness. But the unity is more of substance than of the self, and the absolute is
1 Vide Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 526.
THE THEORY OF TWO BRAHMANS 77
a neutrem though it divides itself into subject and object, As Hegel observes, it is like the night in which all cows are black.
Vis'istadvaita cannot be identified with western pantheism, as the history of pantheism does not bring out any definite meaning, especially in its concept of the absolute and its relation to the finite. If pantheism means that all is God and equates God with the universe, no Vedantic school is pantheistic. The universe has its being in God, but is not God, and does not exhaust His infinity. If pantheism means the theory of ' one prodigious aggregated god,' everything is equally divine and equally worthless, and the moral and religious consciousness is outraged by this shallow pantheism. But if it means that God is all and that the universe is false, it is allied to pan-illusion- ism and acosmism. Acosmism has some relation to the theory of nisprapafica-niydga-vcida, but it is not Vis'istadvaita. If pantheism has an idealistic trend and drifts towards monism, it starts with the self and ends with subjectivism. If it is identity or a/frya-consciousness, it is akin to' Advaita. If it is identified with the neo-Platonic theory of emanation which says that the wx>rld is the overflow of the one, it is an echo of the Bhedabheda view of Brahmaparinama. Likewise the world view of Spinoza as natitra naturata does not bring out the Vis'istddvaitic distinction between Brahman, cit and acit. The panlogism of Hegel, the realistic idealism of Fitchte and the mysticism of Schelling have already been shown to blur the boundary lines between Advaita and Vis'istadvaita and drift towards Bhedabheda. Pantheism has the merit of re- cognising the divineness of the universe and rejecting the ego-centric standpoint ; but its fatal defect is the denial of the evilness of evil and the reality of the moral.
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consciousness. The all-God theory destroys God and the self that seeks God, and gives man a logical and moral holiday. The all-inclusive absolute of pantheism is so elastic as to provide for truth and error, goodness and evil, and it accommo- dates itself both to perfection and to imperfection. To say that whatever is is right is a denial of moral distinctions and a lapse into fatalism. If pantheism is the philosophy of pure immanence in which God merely transforms Himself into the universe, no Ved antic school is pantheistic as Vedanta affirms transcendence as well as immanence. Vedanta, including Advaita in its vyavaharic or practical aspect, insists on the distinction between Brahman, cit and acit, the moral law of karma and the need for mtikti.
The western concept of theism is also vague and is, in its modern version, influenced by the pantheistic idea of immanence, and is sometimes equated with personalism. Theism may be denned as the faith in a personal God as the Creator of the universe entering into personal relations with man with a view to redeeming him from his career of sin. Vis'istadvaita is not strictly theistic, as theism does not favour the idea of aprthaksiddhavis'esana (of the jlva being an inseparable attribute of God), vis'ista aikya or attributive oneness, the mystic experience of ecstasy, and s'anra-s'arlri unity. Nor is it to be identified with panillusionism which says that God is all and everything else is illusion. It is likewise different from emanational theories like those of Plotinus and the panlogism of Hegel which affirms that reality is rational. The term Vedanta connotes not only a dialectic philosophy, but also a dar&ana which is different from western philosophy. The terms Dvaita, Advaita and Vis'istadvaita have each a clear and distinct meaning
THE THEORY OF TWO BRAHMANS 79
and are different from the corresponding western varieties of theism, monism and pantheism. While the latter expound the nature of the relation between God and the universe, the former stress the spiritual side of experience and expound the nature of the relation between the finite self and the Infinite or God.
The criticism of the various theories of the absolute in the east as well as in the west enables us to determine precisely the Vis'istddvaitic idea of Brahman. The Advaitic view of two Brahmans is admittedly self-contradictory and refuted by the other Veddntins, notably by the Bheddbheda- vadins who uphold the monistic view of the absolute as sat or saguna Brahman. While Bhaskara affirms the reality of Brahman as formless but not characterless, Yadava and Nim- barka deny its being nirguna or attributeless and niravayava or formless ; but Nimbarka's view of Brahman as the self- related (svatantra satbhdva) in its abheda aspect and the distinct and the dependent (paratantra satbhdva) in its bheddbheda aspect has affinities with Ramanuja's idea of God as niyantd or the immanent and eminent cause of the world order. Bhaskara denies the idea of an indefinable may a or being-non-being infecting the very source of reality and making the finite a figment of may a. He traces the world order to the self-conditioning nature of the absolute which is therefore satyopddhi or real limiting adjuncts and not mithyopddhi or unreal limiting adjuncts. If we substitute parinama for upadhi, we arrive at the Yadava version of Bheddbheda which attributes equal reality to the aspects of identity and difference. If the cosmic process is traced to the creative urge of srakti at the heart of reality, the Yadava view is replaced by the account of Nimbarka. The
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philosophical transition from Nimbarka to Ramanuja is the transition from Bhedabheda to Vis'istddvaita. Brahman is alogical and amoral, as it transcends reason, and Vedantic exposition is often clothed in symbology and analogical ideas. For the rope-snake analogy employed by the Mdyavadin, Bhaskara uses the example of dkds'a in its unconditioned and conditioned aspects, or the spider and its web ; Yadava relies on the illustration of the simile of the sea and its waves and Nimbarka, on the closing and disclosing of the snake's body. Ramanuja thinks of the analogy of light and luminosity or the relation between s'arlra and s'aririn as the most appropriate analogy that brings out the nature of Brahman and its rela- tion to the world of cit and acit. In the tradition of absolutism in the west, the being of Parmenides is like the nirguna Brahman of S'ankara, the One of Plotinus reminds us of the sat of Bhaskara, the substance of Spinoza suggests a similar trend of thought in Yadava and the ego of Fitchte marks a definite transition from the indeterminate to the determinate, from the vague concepts of Being, One and Substance to the clear idea of the self. In this way, the history of philosophy in the east and the west discloses by its method of self- criticism, the inner truth that the metaphysical sat which is the one without a second is the supreme self of all beings, and that the absolute of philosophy is the God of religion.
Ramanuja clinches the whole argument by the classical statement of his siddhdnta which may be stated in his own words. " Brahman is at all times differentiated by the sentient and non-sentient beings that constitute its body, and it can be said to be one only without a second previous to creation. At that time, the differentiation of names and forms did not exist. That which makes the difference between plurality
THE THEORY OF TWO BRAHMANS 81
and unity is the presence or absence of differentiation through names and forms. Says the Brhaddranyaka Upanisad : 4 Now all this was undifferentiated. It became differentiated by name and form.' Those who hold that the finite self is due to nescience and those who hold it to be due to a real limiting adjunct and those who hold that Brahman, whose essential nature is mere being, assumes by itself the threefold form of enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment and supreme ruler — all the three of them explain the unity of Brahman in the pralaya or dissolution state only on the basis of the absence of differentiation by name and form. According to all the three, there is no absolute unity at any time for the potentiality of nescience, the limiting adjunct, or of the threefold distinc- tion of subjects and objects of experience, and their ruler persists in the pralaya state also. There is, however, the following difference among the several views. The first implies that Brahman itself is under the illusive influence of beginningless avidya. The second says that Brahman is itself in the state of bondage owing to the real and beginningless limiting adjunct. According to the third view, Brahman itself assumes different forms and experiences the unpleasant •consequences of karma. But, according to our view, Brahman has for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings in the subtle and in the gross state. In the effected as well as in the causal condition, it is free from all shadow of imperfection, and is an infinity of perfections. All imperfection and suffer- ing and all change belong not to Brahman, but only to the sentient and non-sentient beings which are its modes. This view removes all difficulties."1 How the absolute divides itself into finite centres may be a riddle of thought or a mystery, but that it does so is a fact to the mumuksu and
1 S'rlBhasya, II. iii. 18.
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Vis'istadvaita explains it in terms of the making of sentient beings into muktas.
The author of the Veddnta Siltras is a synoptic philosopher who identifies Brahman as the cosmological ground of all exist- ents, acit as well as cit, with the same Brahman as the spiritual goal of experience. The term ' cause ' is not a category of the ' understanding ' as it cannot be really applied to transcen- dental reality, but is a cosmological 'idea' employed to bring out the self-identity of Brahman in the pralaya or dissolution, and the s'rsti or creation, stages. The sat without a second is the ' unity of composition ' in the pre-cosmic stage of pralayar and is the cosmic self as the * unity of manifestation,' in the srrsti stage. In both the stages, acit qualifies and embodies cit and cit qualifies and embodies Brahman which is the Self of the self. But in pralaya, the manifold of acit and cit is a real possibility. Ramanuja accepts the theory of sat-karya-vada and denies asat-karya-vada. Creation is not out of nothing, but out of something. Sat is pre-existent and not non-existent. The possibility is so subtle that it is practically non-existent. Even in the non-dual experience of sound sleep which is said to prove Advaita analogically, nescience co-exists with the saksin as a real possibility. Possibility is said to be real when it can become actual. The difference between the two is thus only the difference between what is potential and what is actual. The term non-existence connotes the absence not of non- differentiation, but of cosmic self-differentiation into the world of nama-rtipa. There is non-division in the sense that there is no distinction of name and form in pralaya. In both the states, Brahman, cit and acit are distinguishable, but are not divisible. S'r$fi is the self-differentiation of
THE THEORY OF TWO BRAHMANS 83
the absolute into the pluralistic universe of nama-r&pa. Brahman with the creative urge wills the many and becomes the manifold. It is the absolute that externalises itself into the endless variations of space-time and embodied beings by entering into matter with the living self and energising it. The cause and the effect in the Veddntic sense are non-different and their relation is not external or arbitrary, but is internal and organic. Effectuation is not an illusion or a self-envelop- ing process of reality, but it reveals the inner purpose of the divine nature and enriches spiritual life. Brahman as the cause is nature* naturans and is Brahman as the effect or natura naturata, as the Self is the same in both the stages. The world is non-different from Brahman in so far as it is the effect or upadeya of Brahman. The essential nature of Brahman is, however, pure and perfect, and is not affected by these changes.
Vis'istadvaita as a philosophy of religion is not a mere metaphysical enquiry into the nature of Brahman as the ground of existence, but is also the spiritual method of attaining Brahman as the goal or supreme end of life. The first four Vedanta Sutras sum up the wisdom of the Upanisads by estab- lishing the reality of Brahman as the ultimate reason, of the universe and by connecting such knowledge by the saman- vaya method or method of co-ordination with the supreme value of life consisting in the realisation of Brahman. The wisdom of the Upanisads is the crown of knowledge and not its con- tradiction and sublation, as it reconciles the logical validity of the physical sciences and the value of moral life with Brahma-* jnana and thus gives a new meaning to them. Brahman is saguna and realises Himself through Hisprakaras or modes, acit and cit. The scientist deals with the domain of matter
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and explains natural phenomena according to the law of causation and the Veddntin accounts for the events in nature in terms ot prakrti and itsparindmic changes. Prakrti under- goes essential changes in infinite ways and it is a moving panorama which is like the evershifting changes of the cinema. But these processes of prakrti are not mechanical, but are governed by teleological laws. They form a suitable environment for the progress of the moral self and its perfec- tion. The self is subject to karma and undergoes moral expansion and contraction in accordance with the law of retribution and the endless variety of moral experiences accounts for the variations in the birth and status of the migrating jlva. Spiritually, the self is eternal, and it is only its jndna that is subject to adventure and has a history. The self can attain freedom only when it regains its religious con- sciousness and realises its relation as a prakdra of Brahman. The process of nature and the progress of the self can thus be understood only in terms of the inner purpose of Brahman. The universe is a place for making muktas. Matter is moulded for the making of souls. Brahman is ever pure and perfect, but it realises its nature only by entering into matter with the jlva for creating the world of ndma-rupa and Brahmanising the self. The natural cause of parindma, the moral cause of karma and the cosmic cause or Brahmanis- ation have their ultimate explanation in the concept of acit, cit and Brahman.
Every school of Veddnta admits the futility of logical and temporal categories to account for the ultimate origin of the world. Time, in the phenomenal sense, has no beginning. When the Sadvidyd speaks of the world process, it refers only to a particular event in the series of srrsti and pralaya,
THE THEORY OF TWO BRAHMANS 85
which is really cyclic and not a sudden creation out of nothing. The beginninglessness of the cosmic process is thus a logical mystery. But the Vedantic schools seek to explain the inexplicable in terms of mdyd, upddhis, parindma s'akti and karma. While Mdydvdda and the schools of Bheddbheda with their parallels in western thought attribute, in the name of absolutism, the errors, evils and other imperfections of life to the absolute itself, it is the supreme merit of Vis'istddvaita as a philosophy of religion that, while it realises the sacred mystery and the wonders of nature, it traces the imperfections to the finite self alone. Brahman is immanent in ihejlva as its antaryamin, but is, at the same time, unaffected by the modifications of matter and the imperfections of the self. This view satisfies the metaphysical demand for an all-inclusive unity and the religious quest for the pure and perfect self. It fits in with the grammatical rule of co-ordination or sdmdnddhikaranya, wrhich says that words having different meanings may denote only one thing. A term connoting the effect state of Brahman, including its modal self, connotes also the same Brahman in the causal state. * The unity of manifestation ' is the ' unity of composition ' owing to the non-difference of cause and effect and the self- identity of Brahman. Every term or thought that refers to the finite being also connotes the Supreme Being or Logos because it enters along with the individual selves into the world of matter for the evolution of names and forms and the eliciting of the self. The term s'artra connoting the body connotes the s'arlrin or the Self which is ultimately Brahman itself. In this way the problem of the Sadvidyd, namely, ' what is that by knowing which everything else is known ', is solved satisfactorily. By knowing the cause, the effect is known ; by knowing Brahman, the one without a second, the universe of cit and acit, which
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is its effectuation, is also known. This view bridges the gulf between monism and pluralism, and there is really no self- discrepancy at all as Brahman is eternally existent as the Self of all beings. It also satisfies the quest of the mumuksu for eternal life. Mukti or deliverance from samsara would be impossible or undesirable if Brahman is enveloped by illusion or conditioned by upddhis. Complete disillusionment or freedom would then be impossible as long as there is an infinity of avidya-ridden or conditioned selves to get mukti, and no mumuksu would seek a Brahman infected by avidyd or affected by upadhi.
Vis'istddvaita is thus the only philosophy of religion that frees philosophy from agnosticism and religion from dogmatism, and enables the finite self as a seeker after mukti to go from visayajnana or sense-perception to Brahmajndna or the intuition of saguna Brahman. The Vedantic categories or 4 ideas ' are different from the categories of thought, as categories can be explained only in terms of the self, and they bridge the gulf between phenomenal and noumenal reality. This truth may be explained by giving a Veddntic meaning to the terms ' absolute ', ' infinite/ * whole ', ' cause/ * substance/ and ' subject/ The absolute that is sought to be known by the neti or negative method is not what sublates relational thought, but what resides in it as its prius and pre- supposition. It gives a meaning to the relative and the rela- tional as its source and transmuting power. Brahman is Self-related and is at the same time the Inner Self of finite beings without being affected by their imperfections. The absolute of thought is Bhagavdn, the God of religion. Brah- man is the ' infinite ' not in the sense that it is quantitative endlessness or the infinite that is conditioned by the finite, and
THE THEORY OF TWO BRAHMANS 87
is therefore finite, but it is the infinite that dwells in the finite with a view to infinitise the self (brhattvdt ca brahmanatvat ca) and give it the eternal value of mukti. Brahman is the ' whole ' of existence not in the sense of an aggregate or totality, an identity in difference or an all-inclusive unity, but is the im- manent self in all beings and is pfirna (infinite) and perfect. Brahman is the * whole ' of metaphysics and the ' Holy ' of religion. Brahman is the first cause and the final cause of creation. The potential or the enfolded becomes the actual or the unfolded, and this becoming is the inner purpose of soul- making. The cause is ultimately identified with the ground and it means that the form and the function of the self are rooted in the infinite. The self emerges from Brahman and merges into it. The seed of ihejlva is sown in the womb of matter in order that it may have its fruition in mukti. The Vedantic formula kdrayam tu dhyeyalt brings out the truth that Brah- man is the all-inclusive whole and the ultimate home of eternal values. It is the ground of the universe of cit and •acit that can be reflected upon as the goal of religious endea- vour. Brahman is the substance that exists in itself and by itself, and the world of acit and cit is rrtodally dependent on it as its aprthaksiddhavis'esana or inseparable attribute. The finite self has adjectival and substantive being and lives and moves and has its being in Vasudeva, the Self of all beings or s'arlrin. Thejlva as a ray of the supreme light of Brahman is its attribute, but is also a self sustained by Brahman and is different from the abstract determining qualities of Brahman like infinity. From the denotative point of view, the jiva is a unique being ; but, from the connotative point of view, it refers to Brahman as its ultimate meaning. The vi&esana or attribute is a prakara or mode that is inseparably related as avtnabhdva to the prakarin that is the only individual.
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Brahman imparts substantiality to the self and makes it one with itself. Finally the term * subject ' connotes the Supreme Self which is the real subject of all knowledge. Conscious- ness stultifies itself if there is no self as the subject of predi- cation. Brahman is the Inner Self of the subjects and objects of experience. The cosmic Self which thinks in all beings is identical with the inmost self of the jiva, and this truth ensures spiritual intimacy between God and the souL The idea of Brahman as the s'anrin furnishes the key to the meaning of Vis'istddvaita. This will become more intelligible in the subsequent development of the theme.
The theory that Brahman, the Inner Self of the/Tw, is the same Brahman as the cosmic Ruler is well brought out by showing the unity of the subject and object philosophy. The philosopher who seeks to know the absolute may start with the self within or the world of nature without. From these two starting points he may be led either to monistic idealism or deism. The former begins with the analysis of the * I ', while the latter proceeds from a study of the object without. To the Advaitin the knowledge of the self is the main theme of metaphysics and it is founded on the psychological analysis of the three states of consciousness or avasthatraya. Knowledge is a transition from the external to the internal and from the gross to the subtle, till every rational thought is abolished in the super-conscious state of samddhi. It is a transition from the realism of the waking consciousness to the mentalism of the dream state, the presum- ed non-dual state of dreamless sleep and the Advaitic experience of the fourth state or turiya. The Advaitic method consists in dispelling avidya or negating negation and affirming the ever existent. The self alone is real and self-proved and the object
THE THEORY OF TWO BRAHMANS 89*
that is perceived, inferred or intuited is false and fictitious. The furniture of the cosmos is an illusory creation of the self and is non-existent. Is'vara is the illusory highest and He disappears in pure consciousness. The jivanmukta who has realised the ' I ' says : " In me all is born, by me all things are sustained and in me all things are dissolved. I am the secondless Brahman." " I am that Brahman which illumines all things, which is truth, knowledge and bliss absolute.'' This knowledge is at first imparted by the guru and is mediate (paroksa). It then becomes immediate (aparoksa). The knowledge is really no becoming, but is only a return to being. The chief defect of monistic idealism as a mere metaphysical enquiry is its tendency to subjectivistic quietism. The idealist as eka-jjva-vadin insists on the single self as the absolute * I ' which exists by itself. The philosophy of deism demolishes Advaita as atheistic and gives a fresh orientation to Vedanta by stressing the objective side and establishing the supremacy of Is'vara as the extra-cosmic ruler. The object philosophy, as we may call it, turns our attention from the absolute ' I ' as pure thought to the absolute * Thou ' as the extra-cosmic ruler. The cosmic Ruler is deistically conceived as the transcendent being that creates the cosmos by a mere fiat of His will. True religion from this standpoint consists in the knowledge that God is omnipotent and that the/mr is impotent and in absolute submission to His will by the feeling " Not I, but Thou." The finite will is reduced to nothing and the will of the Almighty alone is absolute. 'If God is, I am not/ While the subject philosophy makes the * I ' the one without a second, the object philosophy makes the cosmic will of the Creator absolute and the will of the creature is reduced to impotence. Vis'istddvaita does not favour these extreme views,, and it provides both for religious adoration and for mystic
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intimacy by its idea of Brahman as the cosmic ruler who is at the same time the Paramatman in the jivatman. The -Chandogya text " Thou art That " does not posit the identity .of l&vara and jlva by removing their self-contradictions in the light of the principle of jahat-ajahal laksana according to -which the jlva and h'vara become identical by the sublation of the self-contradictions of nescience. It intimates the truth that I&vara, the cosmic Lord, is the Inner Self of the jlva and guarantees the bliss of spiritual communion between the two. The infinite that transcends the starry heavens is the same infinite that is immanent in the finite self. Thus the * I ' of the subject philosophy or the Self that illumines the jlva within is the " Thou " that is the Iwara of the object philo- sophy. This view frees the subject philosophy from the charges of subjectivism and atheism and the object philosophy from the charges of deism and divine determinism. And it is the philosophy of truth, as it defines Brahman as not only what is, but also what is self-revealing.
The practical Advaita of S'arikara dealing with vya- vaharic reality has some kinship with the Vis'istadvaita philosophy of the absolute as saguna Brahman. S'ahkara is often greater than his dialectical method. In his practical Advaita dealing with moral and spiritual discipline and the meditations on Brahman, he restores the ideas destroyed in his esoteric monism or pure Advaita. The same dual stand- point is noticeable in the transition effected by Kant from the Critique of Pure Reason to the Critique of Practical Reason and by Spinoza from the mathematical concept of substance to that of his ethics, dealing with the intellectual love of God. The transition is not a concession to the needs of the ignorant and the empirically minded, but arises from the deepest springs
THE THEORY OF TWO BRAHMANS 91
of moral and religious consciousness. When mumuksutva is emptied of its ethical and spiritual earnestness by I&vara and His divine glory being analysed away, it becomes a barren concept and has no moving power. S'ankara, as a practical idealist and theist, came to destroy the Buddhistic philosophy of negation and agnosticism and to fulfil the faith of religion. S'ankara, the devotee of Vasudeva, who ardently adores Govinda in his im- mortal work 'Bhaja Govinda', and commentator of the Sahasra- nama, who restored many a shrine, notably of Badarinarayana, and who dedicated himself to world welfare, is greater than S'ankara, the relentless dialectician, who dismisses the world as an evil, illusion or dream, and its Is'vara as a God for the de- luded mind, h'vara, the cosmic ruler, who has omniscience and omnipotence is greater than thejlva with its nescience and impotence, at least from the vyavaharic point of view. The concept of God or Brahman varies and develops with the spiritual development of the adhikari or the seeker and when the concept is exalted into an intuition of Brahman, Brahman as such is apprehended. But the attempt to define God from the anthropomorphic point of view and state with an air of toleration that it is an accommodation to the mass mind is an unwarranted assumption and defeats the very purpose for which the theory is . started. Veddnta speaks with one voice and not with a double voice, and S'ankara as a ' man of action ' and practical mystic, as jndni and bhakta, meditates lovingly on the absolute of the Upanisads as the God of the Gltd or Vasudeva. Brahman as sat-cit-dnanda is and has existence, consciousness and bliss. If it is a negative defini- tion and is a negation of negation, there is no meaning in the mumuksu seeking mukti. But Brahman is the highest self or Vasudeva having the fulness of being and bliss. In S'ankara's practical philosophy, there is no direct criticism of Vteistad-
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vaita and if he had been fully aware of its spiritual significance and value, he would probably have been the Vedantic precursor of Ramanuja. In Gaudapada, the negative logic of the Madhyamikas is more prominent than the positive.1 If S'ankara prefers, in his practical Vedanta, the positive teaching of Badarayana to the negative logic of S'unyavada, his view is not much different from that of Ramanuja.
1 Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy , Vol. II, p. 465 ; vide, also Das- Gupta, Indian Philosophy, p. 494.
CHAPTER IV ONTOLOGY I: BRAHMAN AS ADHARA
* 1 ^HE philosophic enquiry into Brahman as the supreme -*• tatva or reality is the central theme of Vedanta. The aim of the Veddntin is the clear and distinct knowledge of saguna Brahman with its defining attributes as enshrined in the Upanisads. Veddntic philosophy is a comprehensive consideration of all sides of spiritual experience without sacrificing their integrity and exhibiting them in a systematic way as its fundamental truths. The truths of Vedanta are self-valid, impersonal and eternal, and they can be intuited by consciousness when it is freed from the imperfections of avidyd-karma. The philosophy of religion makes such intui- tions intelligible, and evaluates them in the light of S'ruti. The philosopher thinks God's thoughts after Him in the light of revelation. These thoughts consist mainly of the meta- physical, moral and aesthetic qualities, which are the deter- mining qualities of Brahman. Brahman is knowable by rela- tional thought, which is revelatory and not self-contradictory. There is no self-discrepancy in the defining qualities. Meta- physics, morals and aesthetics are inter-related and related to the whole, and they bring out the nature of the First Cause and the Final Cause of all things. Brahman is the whole of reality and the home of all eternal values like truth, goodness and
94 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
beauty. Veddntic metaphysics defines the ontological nature of Brahman as satyam (real reality), jnanam (self -consciousness) and anantam (infinity). Its ethical philosophy predicates good- ness or amalatva as the moral content of Brahman as Is'vara. Its aesthetics defines Brahman as sundara or the beautiful and anandamaya or the blissful. Reality and value are one,, and the highest values of life like truth, goodness and beauty are intrinsic and eternal, and are conserved in the absolute Self as its essential nature. The metaphysician meditates on saguna Brahman as satyam, jnanam and anantam 1 as the one ideal of life in which all ideals are self-realised. The moral philosopher seeks sanction for conduct in the purity and righteousness of Is'vara. The aesthetic philosopher is attracted by the beauty of Brahman who is bhuvana sundara or the . supremely beautiful. Brahman is thus defined as satyam, jnanam, anantam, amala and anandamaya and these are His determining qualities (svarupa nirilpaka dharma). Undue emphasis on one aspect to the exclusion of others is un- philosophic. It leads to the errors and evils of intellectualism, voluntarism and emotionalism. They are really co-ordinate values, and do not suffer from the errors of self-contradiction* and the evils of subordination. The absolute as saguna Brahman alone satisfies the demands of metaphysical, moral, and aesthetic consciousness in their entirety and integrity. The logical and philosophical intellect starts with the trust- worthiness of thought and ends with the knowledge of Brahman as truth. The logical leads to the alogical and is fulfilled in it. The intuition of Brahman is the consummation of reason. Likewise, the moralist postulates the freedom of the will and seeks its meaning in the goodness of God. The moral leads to the amoral and is fulfilled in it. Goodness is
1 satyam jnanam anantam Brahma.— Taitt* Up., Anandavalli, 1.
ONTOLOGY I : BRAHMAN AS ADHARA 95
perfected in the holiness of God. The aesthetician is drawn by physical beauty and feels in the end that such beauty has its meaning only in the transcendental beauty of Brahman.
The Vedantic study of reality as tatva relates not only to the nature of Brahman per se, but also to its modal expres- sions of cit and acit. It is, however, not directly interested in the bewildering problems presented by cosmology and psy- chology. The ontological theory of being or reality is governed by the religious need for realising it, because it is a philosophy of religion, which seeks to know the tatva with a view to attain it as pumsdrtha or the aim of life. The meta- physician is also a muimiksu or seeker after salvation, and selects the revelational truths of the Veda, which are relevant to his spiritual need, and specialises in the knowledge of the essentials of Veddnta. Vedic knowledge thus deepens into Vedantic wisdom. The most essential truth of Vis'istddvaita (sdratamam) is the concept of Brahman as saririn and of cit and acit as His sarira or sarirdtma-bhdva (the relationship of body and soul), and it is its differentia. It is the key word of Veddnta, which is therefore called S'driraka S'dstra, and it is as simple as it is comprehensive. It satisfies the tests of logical consistency, the Mimdmsa rules of Vedic interpreta- tion and linguistics and the requirements of ethics and aesthetics as also the needs of religious consciousness. S'arlra is defined by Ramanuja as a substance, which a sentient soul or self can completely support and control for its own purposes and which stands to the soul in a sub- ordinate relation.1 The self abides in the absolute, and lives, moves, and has its being in it ; it depends on it for its form
1 yasya cetanasya yadravyam sarvatmana svarthe niyantum dharayitum ca s'akyam taccesataikasvarupam ca tat tasya s'artram.— S.B., II. i. 9, p. 15 of Vol. II.
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and functioning, and subserves its end. Brahman sustains the jiva as its Self and inner ruler, and uses the jiva for its satisfaction in the same way in which the jiva animates and sustains the body, and uses it for its own satisfaction. This relation is known as that of adhara and ddheya (the sustainer and the sustained), niyanta and niydmya (the controller and the controlled) and sesi and sesa1 (the independent and the dependent), which may be generally called the metaphysical, moral and aesthetic aspects of reality. They can be analysed, but not separated, and the Visristadvaitic philosophy is the synthetic exposition of these foundational truths. Every school of Vedanta points to supra-sensuous and supra- rational knowledge as its ultimate truth, and, in formulating it, has to rely on analogies drawn from sensuous experience. The concept of s'arlrin is a fitting analogical explanation of the vital intimacy between jlvatman and Paramatman, but it is only an analogy. Explanation is the beginning of know- ledge and its end, and the full implication of this definition will become clear in the course of the argument. Brahman, the sarlrin, is metaphysically the ground of existents, morally their inner ruler, and aesthetically the beauty and bliss of life. The first basic truth of ontology that calls for explanation is the knowledge of Brahman as adhara and it is revealed by the Taittirlya definition that Brahman is satyam, jnanam and -anantam.
The Upanisad defines Brahman as saguna and refers to its three ontological predicates of satyam, jnanam and anan- jtam. The Advaitin, however, combats this view and declares that the definition is negative and laksana (figurative) and that it refers to nirguna Brahman. He employs the principle of 1 Vide, Vedanta Des'ika, Rahasyatrayasdra, Chap. III.
ONTOLOGY I : BRAHMAN AS ADHARA 97
avaccheda and sublation, and argues that, since determination is negation, the saguna idea is sublated or negated by the nirguna truth. When two cognitions are conflicting and self- discrepant, what is self-explained sublates what can be accounted for in other ways. Nirguna is non-dual conscious- ness which is self-established and saguna is the consciousness of duality and difference which is relational, and therefore self -contradictory. Abhedajnana or the knowledge of non- difference thus sublates bhedajnana (that of difference). The pramanas are a process of self-criticism based on the theory of non-contradiction and degrees of truth. S'ruti is self-valid and has greater authority than the testimony afforded by sense-perception and reasoning, and the nirguna texts in the S'ruti which teach non-difference have greater force than the saguna texts. They sublate the saguna ideas which teach duality and distinction. Thus what comes later in the Vedantic development of truth like abhedajnana stultifies the earlier and less developed idea. Ultimately, Brahman transcends all degrees and values, and there is nothing that can be subsumed and sublated. The Taittiriya definition of Brahman as satyam, jnnnam and anantam is negative, and is therefore no definition at all. The term satyam denies the temporal and phenomenal nature of Brah- man,1 and affirms the absolute as the sat without a second* The term jndnam refutes the ultimate reality of matter or acit and the term anantam negates the limitations of space and time. These three terms are not synonymous, as they contro- vert the three different states of empirical and illusive experi- ence of anrta, jada and vicchinna. But they have, in the light of the linguistic rule of samanadhikarayya, one meaning and only one meaning. The unity of judgment is not a unity
1 S>* Bhasya, I, i. 1, p. 19,
1
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underlying difference or a whole consisting of parts, as unity cannot co-exist with difference. The copula in the judgment " Brahman is satyam " implies absolute identity. Bare differ- ence is unthinkable and sterile, and identity in difference as the identity of opposites or distincts is self-contradic- tory. Sfmti is clear that the man who perceives difference suffers from delusion and subjects himself to death. Advaita, therefore, declares that pure consciousness alone is real and that it cannot be sublated. Nirvi&esa cinmatra or absolute thought is self-established and not sublated, and whatever is savis'esa or determinate is sublatable and therefore unreal. It is the purpose of Veddntic philosophy to refute the dualistic views and destroy nescience. By negating the false, the true is virtually affirmed. Nirguna Brahman is self-proved and avidyd is self-stultified, and the false jlva dies a nameless death in the spaceless expanse of eternal and boundless bliss. Jlvahood alone disappears ; the jlva does not die.
Bheddbheda joins issue with Mdydvdda in its exposition of the Taittirlya text, and its polemical warfare with Advaita is more relentless than the classical criticism of avidyd by Ramanuja known as saptavidha anupapatti. Bheddbheda is as keenly interested in combating the nirguna theory as in con- structing the theory of saguna Brahman. Bheddbheda has no sympathy with a dialectic philosophy which mercilessly destroys other theories without any constructive theory of its own, and which, when placed on the horns of a dilemma, takes refuge in the theory of anirvacanlyatva which is confessedly no theory at all. Every vdkya or word has some meaning, and if mdyd or avidyd is anirvacanlya, it is neither bhdva (existent) nor abhdva (non-existent), and it explains nothing. Then there is no Mdydvdda or Advaitic explanation at all. The Mdydvddin
ONTOLOGY I : BRAHMAN AS ADHlRA 99
'dichotomises reality firstly into the S'aksin and ihejlva, second- Jy, identity consciousness and cosmic nescience, and thirdly, the transcendental one and the phenomenal many, and this •duality ends in an unbridgeable dualism. The first theory slides into subjectivism, the second into pan-illusionism and the third, into agnosticism. The rationalist rejects scriptural authority, vyavahdrika satya and the idea of l&vara, and seeks the knowledge of the ' I ' or prajndna or witnessing self. But he lapses into the error of solipsism, the evils of egoism, and the perils of quietism. The illusion theory makes mdya envelop Brahman and I&vara, the first figment of cosmic nescience. A magnified samsarin seeking sarvamtikti then becomes a make- believe. Maya does not predicate falsity to the absolute, nor is it false predication, as the upddhi or limiting circumstance is real and not a baseless fabrication. Illusion is a fact of ex- perience, and it is not true that the fact of illusion is an illu- sion. The phenomenon theory is more realistic, but its view of Is'vara as a conceptual reading of the absolute caught in the contradictions of the subject-object relation does no justice to the autonomy of religious consciousness. The self-contradiction of relational thought infects reality, and the creator becomes the very crown of such contradictions. His omniscience is nescience on a cosmic scale. The only way of avoiding the discrepancies of the contradiction theory is to accept ajatavada and deny philosophy itself or retrace the steps and follow the way of sagtma Brahman. Bheddbheda accepts the theory of predication as an affirmation of reality. It defines Brahman as a super-personal self with metaphysical, moral and spiritual perfections. Brahman is the uncondition- ed ; but it limits itself by its real upddhis and becomes the conditioned. It is the one Being that becomes God and the finite centres. Though cosmologically Brahman becomes the
100 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
universe by its limiting adjuncts and parittama s'akti, it is spiritually perfect and has the attributes of satyam, jnanam and anantam.
Ramanuja also repudiates and rejects the Mdyavdda view of Brahman as nirvi&esa cinmatra or pure consciousness, and concludes that Brahman is saguna and savi&esa, having the ontological predicates of satyam, jnanam and anantam. To thought belongs the quality of thought and self- luminosity. There is no self-contradiction in the subject- object consciousness. The relation between the subject and the object is between distinct s and not opposites. The theory of sublation applies only to contradictories and not to dis- tincts. In the spatial and temporal order, each thing has its own and distinct position, and there is no contradiction in the relation between a jar and a piece of cloth.1 Likewise it is meaningless to say that youth contradicts the manhood of a person in social life. One man Devadatta does not con- tradict another person Yajiiadatta. Distincts become opposites only when they are predicated of the same thing, at the same time, in the same sense. Even the principle of sublation pre- supposes the distinction between what sublates and what is sublated, and no jnana is known to sublate itself. The real can be known through the real, but never through the unreal. If pure consciousness as anubhuti or experience is self-proved, it means that it has the quality of being self-proved, as proof is a relational way of thought. But if it is not proved, it is non-existent like the flower in the sky. Negation is not nothingness, but is significant, and meaning is meaning for a self. Consciousness is thus the attribute of the conscious self. The self is essentially intelligent or cid-riipa and has caitanya
lSri Bha^ya, I. i. 1. p. 30.
ONTOLOGY I : BRAHMAN AS ADHARA 101
or consciousness for its quality, and is not mere being or nirvis'esa cintnatra or indeterminate consciousness. Selfhood thus precedes and presupposes the experience of the self. To say that the moment the self knows itself as the * I ', it is en- tangled in the not-self and negation enters into its being and contradicts it, is the negation of consciousness itself. Self- knowledge presupposes self-consciousness or awareness in the ordinary way. Self-positing is the positing of the self and there is no oppositing in the process. The ' I ' does not pose and oppose itself with a view to repose in itself. If ajnana or illu- sion ever gnaws at the root of self-consciousness and changes the self into the non-self, knowledge would be a process of self- deception and not self-revelation. Then jnana and ajnana will produce each other, leading to the fallacy of see-saw and infinite regress, and disillusionment will never be complete, till there is jlvanmukti of all the jlvas and Is'vara-mtikti. Advaita will be on safe ground if it trusts Vedantic authority and follows the way of saguna Brahman as the logical and intuitional highest, and then it will go hand in hand with Vis'istadvaita. Ramanuja accepts the logic of Bhedabheda that proves the reality of saguna Brahman, but condemns its ethics which traces the imperfections of life to the bheda ele- ment in Brahman. Saguna Brahman has dharmabhuta jnana, Avhich is eternal and all-pervasive unlike that of the finite self and is not featureless. Ramanuja gives a new orienta- tion to Vedantic thought by insisting on the co-ordination of logical, ethical and aesthetic experiences. Several attri- butes, which are non-contradictory, may define the same reality by distinguishing it from other objects, and the plurality- of these qualities does not mean the plurality of the object defined. Reality is qualified by plurality, but is not itself plur al. The qualities co-exist as distincts and as the ways
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of knowing Brahman. Thus the Infinite shines by itself with its infinite radiations and these radiations enhance the glory of the self-effulgent absolute. Saguna brahman has an infinity of perfections of which some are defining qualities (svanlpa nirnpaka dharma) and the others are derived from the de- finition (nirupita svarfipaka vis'esaiia). Of the five essential attributes of Brahman already mentioned are the metaphy- sical ideas of satyam, jnanam and anantam. Amalatva or holiness is the ethical perfection of Brahman or Bhagavaii,. and ananda brings out His aesthetic nature. The metaphysical qualities will be first considered in their due order.
BRAHMAN AS SATYAM
The definition of" Brahman as satyam ! brings out its nature as the absolutely unconditioned reality, and distin- guishes it from the conditioned reals of cit and acit. The philosophy of acit or prakrti is explained by the scientific and cosmological law of causation known as the satkarya vada or parinama vada, which affirms the non-difference of cause and effect. This view is opposed to the theories of asatkdrya vada, which explains the effect as creation out of nothing ; to vivarta vada, which makes it an illusory appearance; and also to the parinama vada of the Sankhya which refers only to the evolution of prakrti and ignores the progress of purusa and the inner purpose of Purusdttama. It affirms the truth that the cause was pre-existent and not non-existent, and that the effect brings out the continuity, and does not betray any self-contradiction. What is non-existent cannot become the existent and what exists cannot be unreal. A substance enters
1 Sri BhQsya, I. i. 2, p, 123.
ONTOLOGY I : BRAHMAN AS ADHlRA 103
into different states in succession. What passes away is the substance in its previous state or avastha and what comes into being is the same substance in its subsequent state as effect. It is the identical object that changes and the plurality of changes is the outcome of the primal unity of the thing. Parinama is a perpetual unfolding of what is enfolded. It is the potential or implicit alone that becomes the actual or explicit. The one physical substance, clay, enters into many states, like pots and pitchers, and is their immanent cause or upaddna karana. The same prana has biological variations of form as well as function. The same mind has varied psychic presentations. Uevadatta changes from day to day and yet he is identical with himself. Such continuity, which is physical, biological, psychical and historical, does not show any opposition between one state and another. The son does not contradict the mother, manhood does not sublate youth, nor do lovers stultify themselves. Development thus brings out the inner value of the thing and does not suffer from self-discrepancy. Prakrti is subject to the law of parinama and evolves into the ever-changing phenomenal universe. Matter is not merely what is, but what becomes, and is a series of particular perishing presentations. It is a perpetually fleeting flux without any stability. Each object is fugitive, passes over into different states, and each later state is out of connection with the earlier one. Things in the spatial world come and go in quick succession. Events in the temporal order likewise vary and vanish. The body is subject to mobility, metabolism and katabolism. One form of energy is transformed into another, and the psychic process is a stream of momentary modifications, and no thought re- peats itself. Thus every phenomenon, physical as well as psychical, is happening by way of cause and effect. It
104 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
combines and dissolves again. It happens and then disappears. Thus what is static is dynamic and endless becoming or duration. The wheel of becoming moves without beginning and end and without intermission. But this idea of an ever- changing universe is opposed to the Buddhistic theory of momentariness, wherein there is no stable substance. Change implies self-maintenance and dynamic stability. If everything lasts only for a moment, life would become impossible, and there would be no social order. Prakrti is not pure passivity or non-being, nor is its movement the outcome of the strife of the opposites of pure being and non-being. Prakrti is eternally real, but its primal unity is in constant change and it never stands still. It is the perpetual that changes. The pralaya state is the reverse order of srrsti in which each effect is reabsorbed into its immediate cause. Sfrsti and pra- laya thus succeed each other in endless cyclic order. In the causal state sat is subtle and undifferentiated ; but in the effect state it evolves itself into the infinite variety of ndma riipa. This account is different from the Brahma-parindma-vada of the Bhedabhedavadin, as, according to the former, Brahman is ever pure and matter alone is mutable.
While prakrti exists for consciousness and not in the medium of consciousness and is therefore jada * and parak, atman is the self-conscious subject or pratyak, and is different from the psycho-physical organism or srartra consisting of the body, the indriyas, manas zndpranas, the categories of prakrti. This view is opposed to the materialism of the Carvakas, the vitalism of the prdnaists, the mentalism of the Buddhists and the idealism of the monists. The atman is not the aggregate
1Vedanta Des'ika, " parata eva bhasamanam jadam " — Yatindrawata , sec. 57.
ONTOLOGY I : BRAHMAN AS ADHARA 105
of physical changes, nor a stream of perishing psychic presenta- tions, nor an element of the absolute, but is an eternal self persevering in its own being. Though thejlva is monadic, its jndna is infinite, and all /was are equal in so far as their nature consists of pure consciousness. The idealistic contention that matter is congealed or concealed spirit and that mind is a grade caught up in a higher unity that overcomes the antithesis between the two favours subjectivism. The self is the subject of consciousness and is distinct from the body ; but, in the empirical state of samsara, its jndna is obscured and limited by avidya-karma. It falsely identifies itself with the body, becomes ahankara and subjects itself to endless psycho- physical changes, and is caught up in the wheel of samsara. It is subject to the moral law of karma, and since virtue is knowledge, it is exalted by good conduct and frees itself from the consciousness of exclusiveness. While the modifications (parinama) of matter are changes of its essential nature, the moral experiences of the jlva determined by its karma affect only its jndna and not the jlva which is essentially free. The hazards and hardships of moral adventure have no beginning and cannot be causally accounted for.
Both acit and cit as the modes of Brahman have their being in Brahman as their ultimate ground, and are sustained by its inner purpose. The parinamic changes of pradhana or prakrti are not self-originated, but subserve the divine purpose of soul-making. Matter is moulded for the making of the self. Likewise the moral law of karma is governed by the supreme divine end. In pralaya or universal dissolution, the sat is without a second in the sense that cit and acit, which .are inseparably related to it as its modes, are in a state of non-differentiation. Srsti is the self-differentiation of the
106 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
same sat into the universe. The creative act gives content and outward form to the cosmic will. Brahman with acit and cit as its modes in the subtle or causal state becomes Brahman with acit and cit in the effect state, for, as has been said before, cause and effect are non-different in the light of the principle of co-ordination. Natura naturans becomes natura naturata. Prakrti changes on account of parindma. The consciousness of the jlva changes on account of karma, and Brahman wills the many and becomes the manifold, without being affected by these changes. The inner purpose of cosmic creation is the making of muktas. Prakrti serves as the environment for the evolving self and Brahma s'rsti or God's creation is for Brah- manising the self. The universe of acit and cit has its unity only in Brahman.
The definition of Brahman as the true of the true or sat- yasya satyam brings to light the full implication of the idea of Brahman as satyam. While acit is termed asat and the jivar sat, Brahman is known as the true of the true. Reality is not opposed to existence, and the distinctions in reality are due to the relative values of the reals. Acit is a fleeting flux, and, as it is a perishing thing passing over into different states, it is, prag- matically speaking, asatya or non-existent. The self is eternal,, though its self-consciousness undergoes contraction and ex- pansion according to karma. Its essential nature does not con- tract or expand, and it is therefore called satya. It is not changed by the evolutionary process of prakrti. Brahman is real reality and the true of the true1, as it is free from the mutations of matter and the contractions of karma.2 As it is the most real, it is also the most spiritual. Prakrti exists, but its being is identical
1 Sri Bhasya. Ill, ii. 21.
2 Ibid.. I. i. 1, p. 92.
ONTOLOGY I : BRAHMAN AS ADHARA 107
with becoming and has no ultimate value. The self abides in its being with its essential self-consciousness. But, in the empirical state, its consciousness is limited by the free causality of karma. Brahman is ever perfect and supremely true as distinguished from the processes of prakrti and the pro- gressing self with its infinite hazards in the realm of karma. The negative definition of Brahman in the Upanisad by the net I method does not deny the finite, but denies only the finitude of Brahman. Brahman is beyond the perishable and the imperishable. Thus cit, acit and Is'vara have their own reality and value. The monist confuses distincts with op- posites. The distincts may co-exist without any contradiction. The different states of the same substance at different times do not betray any self-discrepancy. They are not false (mithya)' or futile (tucca). Sat is the absolute or the unconditioned one without a second, and is the supreme self unaffected by falsity or error and untainted by falsehood or evil. When the non- differentiated enters into the finite and becomes self-differen- tiated, it does not expose itself to the perils of the contradiction between being and becoming, or reality and existence. Every cause is a because, and the world is real because it is rooted in Brahman and is sustained by it as its eternal self ; and the supreme end of the self-determination of Brahman is the mould- ing of the self. When the empirical self is freed from avidya or karma, it knows its non-difference from Brahman and realises the being of its being. The manifold distinctions ofjlvas into gods, men and animals are traceable to avidya-karma and when the feeling of distinction is destroyed in mukti, thejiva attains the nature of Brahman ormadbhdva and has the essential nature of intelligence. The being of being (tadbhava-bhdva) is attained not by the self -stultification of avidya, but by the spiritual transformation of the empirical self into the essential
108 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
self. The predicate of omnipresence should be construed pantheistically in terms of immanence and the divineness of reality. The universe of cit and acit lives, moves and has its being in Brahman, and derives its form and function from its omnipenetrativeness. Just as the self pervades the body, Brahman vivifies the universe as the life of its life. Though Brahman is in space, it is not space or spatialized, or limited to a particular locality.
BRAHMAN AS JNANAM
Brahman is the sat without a second, the self-existent and self-contained substance that is self-caused, and, at the same time, the creative source or unity that differentiates itself into thinking things and objects of thought, and realises itself in its infinite determinations. Substance as sat is not the nega- tion of determination, but is its affirmation and the explanation of the diversity of life. The substantive is immanent in its adjectives. Whatever is is in Brahman which is its truth and explanation. Being and consciousness are not one, and Brah- man as jnana transforms the idea of sat or substance with 'differentiation into the self-conscious subject with self-differ- entiation. It has infinite consciousness which is unlike the jnana of the jlva, and is never limited by karma. One who knows Brahman becomes Brahmanlike and realises its infinite intelligence or consciousness. The Vedantin is not merely interested in apprehending the existence of Brahman, but also in comprehending its nature. It is not knowledge about Brahman in an external way but the integral knowledge of Brahman as the ultimate subject of experience. The supreme subject is self-luminous and does not depend for its light on any outside object ; and is therefore defined as
ONTOLOGY I : BRAHMAN AS ADHARA 109s
jyotisam jyotih or the light of lights ' that illumines the stars above and the self within. By the light of Brahman all this is lighted. There the sun does not shine, nor the moon, nor the stars/ The self is distinct from its consciousness just as light is from its luminosity, and illumines itself and its objects. The self shines by itself as pratyak or self -con- sciousness ; but its consciousness is not in itself, but exists for the self, and is therefore called parak. Brahman thinks in the self and as the self and is called not only the eternal of eternals, but the thinker of thinkers. The absolute is self- realised and seU-subsistent, and it is above relations, and yet it includes them.
Consciousness shines forth through its own being to its own substrate at the moment of experience.* Pure conscious- ness as such without a self is non-existent like the son of a barren woman, and is undefinable. If it is self-proved, it means that it is the proof of some truth to some one. Thought presupposes distinction and difference and demands their ground or underlying unity. If there is no diversity, the intellect would, as Bradley remarks, invent it. The identity philosopher not only insists on the denial of difference and distinction, but also on the affirmation of absolute identity or pure consciousness that transcends or stultifies the subject- object relation. But identity is not bare existence, and the view of Brahman as Being or the highest generalisation of existence is the result of regressive abstraction. Existence
1 tacchubhram jyoti§am jyotih,— Mund. Up., II. ii. 9.
2 na tatra suryO bhati na candra tarakam nema vidyuto bhanti kutoyam agni£ tameva bhantam anubhati sarvam tasya bhasa sarvam idam vibhati. —Kath. Up., II. v, 15 and Mun<i. Up., II. ii. 10.
3 anubhutitvam nama var tarn ana das'Syam svasattaya eva svas'rayam prati- prakas'amanatvam. S. B., I. i. 1, p. 31.
110 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
^without content and character is inconceivable and self- contradictory. Absolute consciousness without the self is •equally unthinkable. Brahma-jnana or self-knowledge is the knowledge of the self as the absolute. The self is affirmed even in denying it, and, if consciousness remains self-identical when jnana sublates ajnana and sublates itself, it is equally true that the self cannot sublate itself. The dialectic that destroys the self also destroys con- sciousness and leads to scepticism. Self-hood presupposes and precedes self-consciousness, and the absolute is not * a self -absorbing sponge which sucks in its own selfhood ' and destroys it, but is the self-conscious being that is above relational thought and knows it is above it.
Brahman is eternally self-realised, is above relations and yet includes them as their pervading identity or self. Identity ;has different meanings : it may be bare identity lapsing into nothingness ; or it may be the systematic unity of selves or •elements based on identity in difference of the Bheddbheda or Hegelian variety, which is self-contradictory. It may also be numerical identity, which is a mechanical whole of parts •or qualitative sameness which is only partial identity. Finally it may be personal identity based on recognition. The Vis'istadvaita view of Brahman as the self is contra-distin- .guished from all these views. If self-consciousness is an inner defect of thought which veils reality, it can ex hypothese never reveal it, and, if the self is destroyed in the process of discovering itself, there is no mumuksutva or desire for deliverance, or tnoksa or deliverance. There is no passage from the philosophy of nescience to that of identity-conscious- ness. The view that thought collides with reality offers no scope for escaping from its self-contradictions ; and there is no
ONTOLOGY I: BRAHMAN AS ADHARA 111
spiritual hope of freedom from its imperfections. Identity in difference is an original confusion infecting systematic unity, and there is no way of ending the confusion. Hegel who aims at fusion is also regarded as the prince of confusionists. Discord and division cannot be transcended by the reblending of the material. The theory of numercial identity, which says that Brahman is the whole of cit, acit and Is'vara, is equally in- admissible, as no mumttksti is known to adore a whole consist- ing of many parts. Mere togetherness, as in the case of tri-coloured cloth, is only an external relation and does not bring out the real conjunction or identity, which is the inner ground of content. Personal identity is, no doubt, a fact of recognition, as it recognises self-sameness and continuity ; but the self is not a construction nor a creature, but is eternal and self -realised, and its existence does not require mere psychological proof. The idea of Brahman as the ever- •effulgent Self is free from the defects inherent in the other theories and is the true subject of the Upanisadic enquiry. The Self cannot exist without content or character. As the absolute, it is above relational thought and is at the same time the ground of thought. Brahman is conscious and has consciousness (cit and caitanyd), and the two can be philo- sophically analysed, but cannot be really separated. The Self without self-consciousness is as inconceivable as self-con- sciousness without the self. The Self has dharmabhutajnana or attributive consciousness as its sine qua non. " Consciousness is either proved or not proved. If it is proved, it follows that it possesses attributes ; if it is not, it is something absolutely nugatory, like a sky flower ! " Consciousness is the attribute of a permanent conscious self.1 In the judgment * I know ', the thinker is different from the thought and the dharmin and
1 S. B. E.t XLVIII, p. 55.
112 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
the dharma are inseparable like light and its luminosity.1 Where the self is, its consciousness is and there is agreement in presence. Where the self is not, there consciousness is not, and there is agreement in absence ; but the negative test is really inapplicable, as the absence is not real. The self is the whole only in the sense that it is self-complete, and jndna is its self-explanation. Jndna cannot exist without the self as its ground, and the self cannot exist without jndna to reveal it. Brahman is self-realised and jndna is revelatory, and the attribute enriches the self and does not impoverish or attenuate it. The finite self has, like Brahman, self-conscious- ness ; but it is contracted by karma and is mutable, finite and imperfect in the empirical state of samsdra, though it is really self-effulgent. Jndna is the differentia of the self, though it has infinite self-expressions in the divine nature and modifications in the finite self. In both cases knowledge is of reality and not reality itself.
Dialectical monism is oppressed by a sense of self- contradiction infecting the very centre of Brahman and obscuring its nature. According to it, thought in all its levels is self-discrepant and cannot know reality. The moment Brahman or pure being thinks and wills to be the many, negation enters into it, and it is caught up in the self- contradiction of the subject-object relation. The knower cannot be known, as it transcends thought ; but, when it be- comes the known, it is infected by may a or avidyd, and is the non-self or the object. Whether lsfevara is the illusory highest, the first figment of cosmic nescience, or the conceptual highest made in the moulds of logic or the aggregate of avidyd- made jwas, He is * subject-object, one-many, being-becoming
1 S. B., I. i. l,p. 34.
ONTOLOGY I: BRAHMAN AS IDHARA 113
or the light affirmed in and through darkness.' His omni- science is nescience on a cosmic scale. When once Is'vara lapses from the absolute and is objectified by illusion, He falls by degrees from the summit of being, loses His Is'varatva and becomes eka-jlva or the finite self. At first Is'vara exists conjoined with mayd, then becomes its creation and reflection, then an aggregate of individuated phantoms and finally becomes the avidya-ridden jlva itself. As being-non-being, He is absolute-relative, and mediates or wavers between Brahman and non-self, and is finally rejected as useless. In the history of Vedantic warfare between opposing systems, there is action and reaction, and while the uncompromising Advaitin, who seeks his inner ' I ' as the only reality, avails himself of the dialectics of Nagarjuna and Bradley to demolish Is'vara, the Vis'istadvaitins, especially of the post-Ramanuja period, ally themselves with the logicians and the theists in demolishing the subjectivism and nihilism of Advaitic thought. Vedanta is not a dialectic that traces the process of self-deception, but is a dars'ana interested in the progress of self-realisation. The absolute is the self of all beings, cit as well as acit, as it is the highest and most real, and is not riddled with the self-con- tradictions of the subject-object relation. The knowing self is different from the known object, and is not opposed, confronted or externalised by it. The subject is never objectified by the negative element of avidya and robbed of its reality. If the logic of adhyasa or false appearance is accepted, ajndna infects jnana, the jlva is a figment, mumuksutva, a mockery and mukti, a make-believe. There is no transition from the unreal to the real. What is called the non-self or anatman is not self-opposition feigning bare negation, but is a positive entity. When a mukta knows Brahman, communicates his jnana to another atman, and is aware of the world of 8
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space-time, he does not, by the fact of that knowledge, become anatman or jada. Non-self is not a negative term, but has a positive meaning. The physical object is out there, and it exists for the evolving self. It is the object in relation to the subject, which is a centre of experience without the opposition of the self or the non-self. Inter-subjective intercourse would become impossible if the other selves were anatman on the ground that what is known is jada. If the self is defined as personality, Brahman is more than personal, as it is free from the limitations of prakrti and karma, but is not impersonal. If Advaita identifies Brahman with sat and not sattd or bare being, then it defines Brahman as an entity and is not very different from Vi&istadvaita.
The term dtman has a specific spiritual meaning, which is not conveyed by the western concepts of spirit, self or souL When it connotes the finite self or atman, it refers to it as the eternal, essential self intuited in dtmajndna and different from the empirical ' me ' or the bodily self of ahankara. The reality of inter-subjective intercourse and social life is affirmed even by the ndnd-jiva-vada or the theory of ' many selves' of Advaita and by the fact of transmission of Brahmajnana to the disciple. Otherness is not hostile to the self, nor is the world process the othering of h'vara due to His being confronted by the not-self or anatman. The atman is distinguishable not from Brahman but within Brahman, and it is not shut in by a wall of externality or exclusiveness.
The true meaning of Brahman as Paramdtman can now be brought out in the light of sruti, yukti and anubhava (reve- lation, reasoning and experience). The Paramdtman is the all-self or Vasudeva that pervades all beings as their inner self
ONTOLOGY I: BRAHMAN AS ADHARA 115
or reason, and the s'dstraic intuition that He is the universe does not equate the two as a pantheistic identity of the pervading self and the pervaded object. Brahman is in the world, but not the world. To the Brahmajndni, Brahman alone is real, and the world viewed apart from Brahman is unreal and worthless. The absolute exists in the finite centres of experience as their ground and ultimate mean- ing. Brahman is not the substrate (ds'raya or adhistand) of nescience, but is the ultimate subject of experience in its individual and social aspects. To the spiritual philosopher interested in atmajnana or kaivalya, the dtman is also a self different from prakrti, and persists in all states of conscious- ness, including mukti. Even in deep sleep, it shines in its own light as s'aksin or seer with its jnana only, but with- out objective consciousness. The aham consciousness is different from ahankdra or the bodily feeling arising from avidyd-karma that accounts for the contingencies of birth and status. In visayajndna, the attributive consciousness contacts the external object, and it results in the aware- ness of the external object. Jnana is thus substantive and adjectival, whether it is Brahmajndna, atmajnana or visayajndna or God-consciousness, self-consciousness or world- consciousness, and this knowledge enhances the value of Veddntic life. If reality is Brahma-mdyd, it is infected by all- enveloping darkness, and everything would be jugglery or make- believe. But if reality is Brahmamaya, everything is pervaded by Brahman as its inner self and throbs with its life and light. Brahman is the thinker that thifcks in the self and as the self, with a view to imparting Brahmabhdva to it and perfect it.
The Vis'istddvaitic theory of Brahmajndna is neither realistic nor idealistic, but is the criticism of both these
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theories and their completion. The realist, who insists on the priority and primacy of matter and traces consciousness and self-consciousness to mulaprakrti, becomes materialist. Idealism is at the opposite pole to realism, as it explains the external world as a mental construction. All schools of idealism including subjective idealism, mentalism, objective idealism and absolutism are only refined variations of subjectivism. If the object-philosophy makes prakrti or nature the whole of reality and leads to pan-materialism, the subject-philosophy makes the * I ' the sole reality, and leads to super-solipsism. Vis'istadvaita reconciles these extremes by recognising the equal reality of prakrti and purusa as the expressions of the all-self, and evaluating them in the light of religious consciousness. Matter exists for the evolving self, and the self has its being in Brahman and has supreme value. Subject and object are externally related, but they are not external to Brahman who is their in-dwelling self. There is difference in denotation and identity in connotation, and all thinking beings and objects of thought connote Brahman as their ultimate meaning and truth. In other words, cit, acit and Brahman denote different entities ; but from the point of view of content, cit and acit ultimately connote Brahman, as it is their self. The omniscience of Brahman as a metaphysical predicate connotes the eternally all-pervasive character of its jnana in the universal and the particular aspect. Human knowledge is finite and fragmen- tary, and offers no analogy to the all-knowing character of Brahman. But when the discursive intellect is perfected, it expands into the intuitive knowledge of reality, and the self freed from the contraction of karma, has cosmic consciousness, and sees everything with the eye of Brahman. Brahman has the character of infinity or anantatva as a determinate
ONTOLOGY I: BRAHMAN AS ADHARA 117
quality, which distinguishes it from prakrti and the finite self. Brahman is free from all the limitations of space, time and causality, and this view excludes the perishing prakrti full of changes, the finite self implicated in prakrti and subject to the adventures of karma and the freed selves whose nature is not unsurpassable. Infinity belongs to the essential nature of Brahman or its svarilpa } and to its jnana (perfection) and spiritual form/ The Upanisad defines it as higher than the high and as indestructible, and excludes the elements in their subtle condition. Brahman is also different from Hiranyagarbha, samasti purusa or the aggregate of finite souls known asjiva ghana and is free from all imperfections, which are attributable only to the empirical self. It is formless, as embodiedness arises from subjection to karma. Though it abides in all be- ings, it is not soiled or sullied by their changes and imperfec- tions. The theory of two Brahmans involving the affirmation of saguna Brahman and its later denial is opposed to logic and life, as truth is one and does not admit of ambiguity and com- promise. The negative method of neti, neti does not deny the finite, but denies the finitude of the infinite. The Vedantin thus concludes that there is no being higher than the highest Brah- man, and it is the Supreme Self that is the goal of experience.
The term "infinite " has different meanings in philosophy, giving rise to ambiguity and misconception. If it is the not finite, it is non-existent. If the infinite is what is not finite, it is bounded by the finite and therefore finite. If the infinite implies endless series without a last term like infinite space, time and number, it is indefinite and has no meaning. It
1 anantapadam des'akala vastu pariccedarahitam svarupam aha I sagunatvat svarupasya svarupena gunaisca anantyam. il
— S.B., I. i. 2, p. 123.
2 Yatindramata Dipika. Sec. 127.
118 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
is an empty generalisation arrived at by abstracting them from their concrete content. An infinity of self -repeating units is emptied of living contact with intelligence, and is cut loose from reality. When the intellect is spatialised, it dis- sects the tree of knowledge into lifeless sections, and delights in counting the leaves. Another view of the finite is that it betrays self-contradiction, and points beyond itself. The finite is itself and not its opposite. It excludes the other, and is yet invaded by it. It exists through its other, and it is the understanding that treats being as such and non-being as such as absolute and self-contradictory. But the opposites are absorbed by the inner dialectic of thought in a higher unity, and then it is the identity of opposites. The absolute is self-complete and all-inclusive, and transcends the contradic- tions of relational experience by the reblending of material. Still another view of the infinite is that relational thought with its categories is deceptive and illusory, and the infinite stulti- fies thought or dual consciousness and remains identical with itself as pure consciousness without any content. Every category is, according to it, infected by avidya and is dbhdsa or illusory. Cinmdtra or pure thought without the opposition of self and non-self alone is real and non-sublatable, and the neti method is said to deny dual consciousness. When the false is denied, the true remains as a self-identity.
The term * infinite ' in the philosophy of religion corrects the tendency of thought to abstract itself from the thinking process or the pulsation of intelligence and gives a positive meaning to the infinite as actual and determinate. This mean- ing is defined by the idea of " inner plan and purpose " for which it is employed. The infinite may be the perceptual, the conceptu- al or the intuitional. The infinite of space-time is called the
ONTOLOGY I: BRAHMAN AS ADHARA 119
quantitative infinite. In the negative sense, it is endlessness and indefiniteness. The endlessness of an infinite series is a mathematical abstraction and is philosophically said to be worthless. Since the infinite is defined as the unconditioned, the quantitative infinite is condemned as a contradiction in terms. But the infinity of space-time has a positive meaning. As mere parts of a series, they may exist externally in conjunc- tion ; but as parts of a whole, they reveal a plan and a purpose. The particulars given in sense-perception may be disconnected and cause an endless fission. This is due to the sundering of reality into abstract units and the ignoring of the inner unity. What are called infinitely small and infinitely big are still concepts referring to space, time or number. Space is a totality and is real ; time is a real process and is not an appearance, and the infinity of space-time is an ordered and orderly plan of creation, whose purpose is to arouse the sense of sublimity and wonder, and it has its own value in the religious consciousness. Scientific imagination is overwhelmed by the immensity of the cosmos with its vast stretch of space extending beyond the starry heavens and the Milky Way and by the immense sweep of time and the idea that the relation between a point on the black board and the known universe is the ratio between the known and the unknown universe crushes the conceit of man and inspires humility and reverence. This is strengthened by the puranic theory of endless brahmas and their age in terms of aeons and yugas. The cosmic consciousness of Arjuna brings out the spiritual significance of the infinity of space- time as a partial expression of the wonderful maya of Is'vara. The infinite of the mathematician and the philosopher is a concept, and is therefore determinate and not endless. The endlessness of an infinite series results from abstraction.
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Infinite number is yet number and its succession is governed by that central idea. Bare thought may refer to endless ideal possibilities. But the true infinite excludes bare possibility, and the possible is the real positive concept. The barely possible may be logically valid, but really it may be void. When it is said that the finite world is a self-limitation of the infinite, it means that the infinite excludes mere possibilities as abstractions. Thought is not thought till its possibility is realised as an inner purpose.
The infinite as anantam is ultimately the quality of the absolute as a single experience. It excludes bare possibility and is determinate. Experience presupposes the experiencing self* The self remains the self even in transcending its selfhood, and it is above distinction and not below it. Even if the absolute absorbs the many, it should, as Royce remarks, be aware of this absorption. It should have the quality of transcending many- ness. When I reflect that I know that I know and so on, the process is not liable to the fallacy of endlessness, as knowledge presupposes the self having that knowledge. There can never be a thought without a thinker thinking it. Thought reveals reality and has no lying nature, and it can find itself only in the self which it reveals. The absolute is the unconditioned and perfect, and is the supreme self or the ' individual of indivi- duals/ It is beyond the passing shows of prakrti, the fleeting flux of time and the endless chain of causation. Brahman is in the phenomenal world of space-time, but exceeds their con- tent. The empirical self subjects itself to the samsaric series of births and deaths, and has not the purity and perfection of the transcendent self, which is higher than the highest. The true meaning of the infinite is the eternally unconditioned and perfect Brahman, which is beyond the phenomenal changes of
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prakrti and the imperfections of the empirical self and the finite nature of the freed self. The three determining quali- ties of Brahman, namely, satyam, jnanam and anantam, differentiate Brahman from acit and cit. The first excludes the ever-changing world of prakrti and the evolving jiva ; the second, the muktas whose jnana was once imperfect, and the third, the eternally free jlvas or nitya-muktas who have no cosmic control. Reality as Brahman has the quality of truth which is the True of the true ; of self-consciousness which is ever self-effulgent as the Light of lights and of infinity as the Creator of creators and the Eternal of eternals. The idea of Brahman as the adhara of cit-acit is the life-blood of Vis'istadvaita. It affirms the reality of the separate elements but denies their separate reality and offers the mystic assurance that every jiva lives, moves and has its being in the All-Self or Vasudeva.
CHAPTER V ONTOLOGY II: BRAHMAN AS NIYANTA
^TTHE metaphysical relation between Brahman and the uni- verse of cit and acit in terms of adhara and ddheya can now be formulated clearly and distinctly. While western absolutists define reality as the all-comprehensive unity, the ultimate and the universal, they are not clear about the exact relation between the philosophy of nature, the self and their ontological significance. But the Veddntic view of prakrti with its evolutionary changes, of atman as the eternal self subjecting itself to the moral law of karma, and of Brahman as the ground of all thinking beings and objects of thought, has more speculative accuracy and spiritual value than the * one ' of Plotinus, the ' substance ' of Spinoza, the ' absolute idea ' of Fichte and the ' neutrum ' of Schelling. The Veddntic schools that refer to the universe as an appearance or aberra- tion of reality or to the transformation of Brahman cannot escape the perils of acosmism and pan-cosmism. But the Vis'istadvaita idea of Brahman as ddhdra, with the ontological predicates of satyam, jndnam and anantam, has the merit of being philosophically satisfactory and spiritually satisfying. Reality and value cannot be separated, and this is clearly brought out by the further explanation of Brahman as satyasya satyam 1 and jyotisdm jydtih \ The term satyasya satyam
1 Br. Up., II. i. 20 and II. iii. 6, 3 Br. Up., IV. iv. 16.
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refers to Brahman as real reality as well as the true of the true. It is the source and sustenance of finite existents as their per- vading unity and imparts substantiality to them. The sat has also supreme value, and, while acit exists and cit is real, Brahman is their supreme goal or value. The predicate jyotisam jyotih defines Brahman as the limitless light that illumines the physical luminaries of suns and stars and is the supreme inner light of the individual self. The sat as substance or real reality is also the ultimate subject of knowledge. Brah- man as the all-self is the prius and presupposition of all thinking beings and objects of thought. The finite self has its own being, but its consciousness coalesces with that of the absolute. There is inclusion only of content and not of extent. The object exists for the subject and is not in it, and both con- note the absolute as their ultimate meaning. Brahman is the subject of subjects, and it is in the finite self with a view to impart its being or brahmabhava to it. Brahman is anantam or the eternal of eternals. The infinite is the unconditioned and perfect, and, while it is in the finite, it transcends its limitation. Brahman is the life of our life, and it pours its life into the finite to infinitise its content and to impart eternal value to it.
The metaphysical idea of Brahman as adhara is to be reinterpreted in terms of Brahman as niyanta. Philosophy takes a false step when it contrasts the ' pure reason ' of metaphysics with the ' practical reason ' of moral philoso- phy and explains experience as riddled with antinomies and self-contradictions. The ' noumenon ' of Kant becomes the ' unknowable ' of Herbert Spencer and the ' absolute beyond all appearances ' of Bradley. If reality is a thing in itself, it is unknowable, and relational thought becomes a riddle and is
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barren and futile. The absolutism of the rationalist thus leads to a blind alley and lands one in agnosticism and scep- ticism. The modern Indian absolutist goes a step further when he employs the method of Hume and Bradley and Nagarjuna and explains the religious consciousness as a dogma and defect of thought. To the speculative idealist, God is confronted by the contradictions of being-becoming, lapses into the finite and finally disappears as a figment of nescience. But philosophical idealism often starts with the subject and ends with subjectivism. The identity philosopher uses the mathematical logic of equation, and, since conclusion and premises are identical, his reality is moveless and content- less and affords no scope for speculative enquiry or spiritual quest. If dialectic is employed to dissect theism and thought and lay bare their self-discrepancy, it is self-destructive and has a benumbing effect. Analytic thinking has a tendency to abolish the process of thinking itself and the absolute beyond thought may become decapitated and bloodless and lapse into the unconscious. Philosophy should, therefore, retrace its steps, avoid the pitfalls of mere speculative thinking and scepticism, and accept the trustworthiness of thought and the adequacy of the religious consciousness. To reinterpret Buddhistic negation in the light of Vedantic affirmation may be desirable ; but to misinterpret Vedantic theism by an alli- ance with Buddhistic nihilism is to doubt and destroy the foundations of spirituality and paralyse the integrity of philo- sophy itself. By abolishing saguna Brahman, Brahman itself is abolished. In a true philosophy which is the philosophy of religion, the absolute of metaphysics is the Is'vara of religion. The pure reason of metaphysics has to ally itself with the practical reason of moral consciousness and become the philosophy of spiritual activism. Consciousness is essentially
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conative and purposive. It is more an act of the will than a fact of knowledge, and Kant thinks that ' practical reason ' has primacy over * pure reason.' Reality is rooted in ethical experi- ence, and it is ethical religion that takes us to the heart of reality. It gives a new meaning to Brahman by predicating the quality of niyantrtva to the inner ruler of all beings, who is absolutely pure and holy. Vis'istadvaita as a philosophy of spiritual activism defines Brahman as l&vara who has apahatapdpmatva or purity and holiness as His essential quality.
The idea of Is'vara as niyanta is developed by a criticism and reconstruction ot the theories of dharma and niyoga as held by the Vedavadin and expounded by the Mimamsaka. Karma Mlmdmsa whose central aim is the elucidation of the meaning of Vedic dharma or duty is the metaphysic of morals. It is different from economics dealing with artha or the goods of earthly life and psychological hedonism which makes egoistic pleasure the end of conduct. Dharma is a super- sensuous law of conduct or karma which can be established only by Vedic pramdna or the authority of the Vedas. The Veda is eternal and infallible and is the only sanction for the performance of dharma. The conception of dharma has its seat a priori only in the Veda. The Veda aims at some practical end to be attained by the will, and is not interested in conveying a knowledge of an accomplished thing.1 Every fact of consciousness is conative whether it is sensory-motor or idea-motor, and it arises only as a response to a practical situation. Doing is thus prior to knowing and has primacy over it. Every sentence, Vedic or non- Vedic, is an imperative, and even affirmative sentences are only imperatives in
1 S.B,, I. i, 1. p. 107l(Ananda Press Edn.) and S.B.JS., Vol. XLVIII.p. 149.
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disguise. The affirmative proposition ' The sun shines in the east ' really means ' Look at the sun shining in the east/ When a man mistakes the rope for the snake and is seized with fear, the fear is dispelled not by mere knowledge, but by the conative activity involved in actual perception. Dis- illusionment is practical owing to the perception of the motionless state of the rope, and it means ' Do not be afraid as it is only a rope and not a snake.' The important element in karma is the endeavour to achieve something and is not the end itself, and the Vedic ideal of karma lies not in thephala or the satisfaction of a desire, but in the moral law of dharma as a duty to be done. It is kdryatd jndna or the knowledge of what ought to be done, which instils the sense of duty, the will to do it and the overt act. Dharma is thus not a means to an end, but is the end itself, and it is a Vedic imperative of the form * Do it ' and is therefore unconditional and absolute. The only motive for the Vedic ' ought ' is the moral feeling of reverence for the law.
* Ought ' implies ' can ' and the Mlmdmsaka insists on the freedom of the self as the essential truth of the moral consciousness. The very term s'astra means a com- mand, which is freely obeyed by the atman. The moral law is addressed to the free self, and the object of moral freedom is not the realisation of dtman or Brahman, as activity is more valuable than self-awareness. The performance of duty as a Vedic injunction is the only aim of life and not the Veddntic view of apavarga or moksa. Karma is of three kinds, viz., nisiddha or pratisiddha or what is forbidden by the Veda, kdmya or what is connected with a wish to be fulfilled and nitya or what is compul- sorily prescribed. The performance of ydga or sacrifice is
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kdmya karma and is a conditional imperative ; it is a means to a desired end ; but nitya karma like sandhyavandana is a categorical imperative and an end in itself. The obligation is unconditional and absolute, and does not admit of excep- tions. The system of Purva Mimamsa is thus rooted in the moral law of karma and the reign of dharma. The Veda is self-posited and eternally existent. It is not the utterance of God as the creator of the universe, but is God or Brahman in the form of s'abda. The Purva Mimamsa does not need a beneficent personal God as the creator who distributes rewards^ though it posits a polytheistic world of Devas. The term * Devas ' refers only to names. If h'vara created the world, He is limited by its imperfections and ceases to be omnipotent. If Is'vara is, however, all-powerful, dharma will be dethroned by the arbitrary fiat of the divine will. The Mlmdmsaka therefore concludes that karma alone is Brahman, and regards God as a superfluity to be dispensed with. Even atmavidya which states that the atman should be known that it is so, is only an artha-vada and is subordinated to the law of duty. Royal philosophers like As'vapati Kekaya and Janaka preferred the way of dharma to the wisdom of atmajnana*
The right, as conformity to law, cannot, however, be separated from the good as an end to be attained. Every act has its own result. The end of good conduct is the attain- ment of pleasure here or in svarga and the avoidance of pain. Every act of karma leaves a moral effect which cannot always be physically perceived, and it generates a new super-sensuous force called apurva or niyoga in the agent or action, which is a mediating link between the act and its function. If a man, for example, performs the jyotistoma sacrifice, the act creates 1 S. B., III. iv. 3 and S.B.E., XLVIII, p. 688.
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an unseen super-sensuous potency in him, which will in the future lead to beneficial sensible results, and duty is crowned with happiness in svarga.1 It is apurva or the unseen force that distributes rewards and apportions pleasure and pain to the agent in accordance with his karma. Owing to the plura- lity of effects, there should be a corresponding plurality of causes, and it is not therefore justifiable to trace them to a single supreme cause called Is'vara. Each cause remains as a potency which leads to the attainment of its result, and apurva is the one eternal potency that manifests itself in different ways. The potency of the action takes some time before it produces the desired effect.
The Advaitin is dissatisfied with the Purva Mimdmsa as a system of philosophy and goes to the other extreme of naiskarmya siddhi or the philosophy of non-action. The ethics of ritualism is mechanical and secular and as a dars'ana it does not solve the ultimate problems of life. While Karma Mimamsa concerns itself with acts of <luty which are to be accomplished in the future and which have for their fruit the temporary felicity of svarga, Brahma Mimamsa has, as its subject of enquiry, Brahman which is eternally self-existent and blissful. The changeless dtman falsely identifies itself somehow with the non-self or andtman consisting of the mind-body and becomes the fictitious aham- kartr. Adhydsa or false appearance leads to aviveka or want of discrimination and lapses into abhimdna or egoism, and the false self gets entangled in the duality of the doer-deed relation. Every act of karma presupposes the kartd or doer, and this relation is due to adhydsa by which the immutable appears as the changing until avidya is sublated by jndna.
1 S. B., I. i. 1. p. 110 and S.B.E. XLVIII, p. 153.
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What is eternally existent, is opposed to what is to be accomplished. Jnana and karma can never co-exist and it is only by sublating avidya, on which the dual consciousness of karma and karta is based, that the knowledge of the existent Brahman is intuited. The object of a karma may be utpatti or origination, vikara or modification, sams- kara or purification, and prdpti (attainment), but none of these four can apply to the case of Brahman. As Brahman is ever-existent, the idea of origination does not apply to it. What is existent can never emerge or emanate. What is is and never becomes, and the theory of moral progress betrays the inner discrepancy between being and becoming. What- ever is made or modified is fictitious. The ever-existent alone is perfect, and the idea of attaining something new stultifies itself. If being is not perfect in itself, it can never be made perfect. Brahman is the knowing self which cannot be the object, as the seer cannot be seen and the hearer cannot be heard, and even the metaphysical enquiry into Brahman as the object of thought is a defect of thought. Veddntic thinking is mainly negative, as its aim is to negate negation. When avidyd is disproved and annul- led, Brahman reveals itself, or, to be more accurate, is realised, and it is self-proved, and in mukti, the jiva continues as Brahman and is Brahman. To the rationalist thinker who seeks the inner s'aksin or seer by analysing away thought, the philosophy of activism is bound to be repugnant. When the Mlmdmsaka turns theistic and substitutes for niyoga or potency the idea of Is'vara as niyanta, he does not improve his position. The idea of Is'vara as the cosmic designer and its moral governor is honeycombed with antinomies and refers only to the illusory highest. No theist can explain how or why I&vara creates the world, and is yet free from the limitations of
9
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creative activity and the self-discrepancy between human and divine freedom. It is more logical to affirm the self-identity of the absolute as nirguna Brahman than to believe in the deity of theology, whose cosmic will is ever confronted by evil and other imperfections. Advaita Veddnta is thus opposed to the theory of deism, as light is opposed to darkness.
The Dhyana-niyoga-vadin accepts the Advaitic conclu- sions, but controverts its intellectualistic and ascetic trend. To him, there is no contradiction between the two Mlmamsas, as the Vedic imperative implies the Vedantic affirmation. The imperative refers to what is to be attained and is unconditional. It creates the unseen agency of niyoga in the case of the worldly man. The seeker after mukti relies on the Upanisadic truth of Brahman as the one without a second, tree from the dualistic distinctions arising from avidya. The knowledge of absolute unity contained in texts like " Thou art that " can- not, however, be obtained by the mere cognition of the sense of Advaitic texts. The intuition of Brahman can be attained only by following the Vedantic injunctions which have for their aim the meditation on Brahman. The Upanisadic text " The self is to be heard and to be reflected and meditated upon " insists on the need for Vedantic culture and knowledge as a progressive realisation of Brahman. The immediate intuition is impossible without the discipline of mediate or reflective knowledge. Since avidya is a positive something and not bare negation like the square-circle, it can be removed only by moral discipline and metaphysical reflection. The attainment of Brahman is not the logical stability of non-con- tradiction, but the spiritual realisation of mukti, which involves progress and perfection. Mukti is won by endeavour and is
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not a state of sublation. The fear aroused by mistaking a cord for a cobra is not dispelled by mere cognition or logical sublation, but by the activity causing the direct sense-percep- tion of what the thing before the fear-stricken man really is. The oral evidence of the bystander can never have the validity and stability of ocular and perceptual evidence. The direct intuition of Brahman can therefore be attained only by a process of meditation on its nature in the light of the Vedantic imperative. The self should be heard and reflected upon. Intuition and injunction relate to the same subject ; if not, the result is the fallacy of reciprocal dependence. Textual know- ledge is the cause of meditation and meditation is the cause of textual knowledge. The object of injunction and the sub- ject of intuition are thus one, and therefore, by following the command, the mumuksu attains unity with Brahman and is freed from avidya.1
Bhaskara combats the theory of the Dhydna-niyoga-vddin by his philosophy of jnana-karma-samuccaya which holds that karma and jndna are both necessary to the seeker after Brahman. He rejects the theory of niyoga as a fanciful and fallacious notion which has no Vedantic foundation in the Mimdmsa S'astra or the S'ariraka Sutras. Besides, if the Upanisad stresses the imperatives of duty and explains away the truths of Brahman as merely explanatory or glorificatory (artha-vada) , then niyoga alone would be the supreme reality and Brahman would be valueless. If Vedantic jnana were true, it would lead to agnosticism and ritualistic formalism. While the non- dualist prefers the contemplative ideal to that of activism and favours the way of asceticism, the moralist of the Mlmamsa type extols the supreme law of dharma as the 1 S. B,, I. i, p. 47 and S. B. E.t XLVIII, p, 185.
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only sanction for life and condemns the idea of abandoning activity as a lapse into inertia. Bhaskara claims to avoid the extremes of intellectualism and voluntarism by synthesising karma &ndjfiana by rationalising karma and moralising jftana. If jnana is immediate knowledge of Brahman, there can be no degrees in sublation and stages in mukti\ hence it is both mediate and immediate. Karma is both for the avidvdn and for the vidvan. While activity is the same, the inner attitude is changed. The former impelled by inclination and utilitarian ideas seeks the pleasures of life here and in svarga, which are tinged with pain and are ephemeral. But when karma is changed into niskama karma (deed done in detachment) and becomes an offering to Brahman (Brahmdrpana) , it becomes one with jnana and the dynamic element in spiritual life. Jnana does not mean identity-consciousness, but connotes the intellectual knowledge of Brahman and spiritual meditation on its nature as saguna and not as nirguna. Brahman is thus the perfect self that is apprehended as well as attained. By His self-transforming will or parinama s'akti, Is'vara emanates into the finite as cit and acit without abandoning His moral perfection of apahatapftpmatva or purity. The spiritual object of the emanational process is to transform the finite self and remove its upadhis or limitations of finitude.
The Nisprapanclkaraipa-niydga-vadin l comes forward with his world-destroying view and says that Brahman can be realised with niyoga and by cosmic dissolution. The universe is Brahman objectified ; and since what is originated is liable to destruction, the universe can be destroyed. When the illusory effect is destroyed, the cause remains identical with itself, and Brahman is self-realised when its effect, the universe, ceases
1 S. B., I. i. 4, p, 141, and S.B.B., XLVIII, p. 176.
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to be. Bhaskara objects to this view also on the ground that it has no s'astraic sanction or rational justification. Sruti nowhere refers to mukti as cosmic destruction. In pralaya or dissolution, the world is, no doubt, dissolved ; but such dissolution is not destruction, but is only the absorption of the effect in the cause. If the world order is, however, destroyed, it would result in 'sarva mukti or universal freedom, which is not a fact. Ramanuja's criticism of the theory is more acute than that of Bhaskara. He asks the Niyoga-vadin whether the world that is to be destroyed is false or reaL If it is false, it can be put an end to only by knowledge and not by niyoga or injunction. If the world is true, the injunction that seeks world destruction is either from Brahman or different from Brahman. If it is the former, the world cannot exist, as Brahman is eternal. If it is the latter, persons perish along with the world, and niyoga remains with- out a substrate. Besides, the theory does not clearly state whether the object of the injunction is Brahman or the cessa- tion of the world. It cannot be Brahman, as Brahman is then something to be accomplished and not eternal. It cannot be world dissolution, as it follows from the injunction and the injunction is carried out by the dissolution, and this mutual dependence is a vicious circle. Injunctions cannot therefore have for their object the non-dual knowledge of Brahman by the cessation of the world order.
Though Ramanuja agrees with Bhaskara and other Bhedabhedavadins in their criticism of the theory of nirguna Brahman with its consequent rejection of the Purva Mimamsa, he condemns their moral philosophy of the upadhis or limiting adjuncts and parinama s'akti or the power of emanation or transformation. If the absolute conditions itself as the finite
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subjects and objects of experience (bhokta and bhogya), it suffers from the dualistic and dividing consciousness of the upddhis and is infected by its imperfections. The ' immanence * theory has the merit of recognising the divineness of all reality ; but has the fatal defect of predicating evil and error to Brahman. Brahman is both the supreme ground of the universe and the source of all imperfections and He has to suffer from the sorrows of samsdra in His own infinite way. The absolut- ism of Vis'istddvaita differs from the schools of Advaita and Bhedabheda in its insistence on the equal value of metaphysics and morals and the acceptance of the philosophic validity of Divine immanence and the moral value of eminence. Though monism establishes the unity of reality, it is constrain- ed to recognise the fact of the dual consciousness and face the dualism between the one which is real and the many which are an illusion, and the effect of upddhis and parindma s'akti ; but its most vulnerable point is its failure to realise the reality of moral and social experience and the distinction between good and bad. To Ramanuja, the needs of ethical religion are as important as the demands of the dialectic method of metaphysics, and he concludes with the aid of revelational insight that the absolute purity and perfection of Brahman can be maintained only by affirming the reality of the finite self and attributing the imperfections of life to its moral freedom. The empirical life of samsdra is traceable, if at all, to the upddhis, whether they are mithyd or satya (false or true) ; but the true meaning of avidyd or upddhi is contained in the moral concept of karma. Ethical religion restates the adhdra-ddheya relation of metaphysics in terms of niyantd and niydmya (the ruler and the ruled), and defines Brahman as Is'vara, the moral ruler of the universe who controls mdyd and is not conditioned by it.
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Ramanuja repudiates and rejects the niyoga theories advanced by the Purva Mimdmsaka, the Dhydna-niyoga-vddin and the Nisprapanca-niyoga-vddin as mere mental con- structions without any Vedantic foundation and insists on reformulating the system in the light of the theistic idea of Is'vara. Niyoga is a mechanical device without any spiritual content and immanent purpose, and is therefore atheistic, and is to be reinterpreted as niyantd or the Creator and Ruler of the universe who dispenses justice according to merit. The motive of conduct is not only an imperative to be obeyed, but also a good to be attained, and there can be no endeavour without an end. The Mimdmsaka himself (that is the Bhatta) admits this truth when he says that the Vedic ' ought ' like 4 Do this yaga ' presupposes an end to be attained like the pleasures of svarga. Doing duty for the sake of duty will be formal and empty, if it is emptied of emotional content and the moral assurance that dutifulness will be crowned with happiness. The Vedic imperative of dharma, which is the subject-matter of the Purva Mimdmsa (karma vicdra), there- fore, requires reorientation in the light of the Vedantic philo- sophy of Brahman. The end of moral endeavour is the realisation of Brahman and the attainment of eternal bliss. The ethics of the Purva Mimdmsa has its value only when it is related to the Vedantic good as revealed in the Uttara Mimdmsa ; but there is no contradiction between the two. The two Mlmdmsas are really integral parts of one systematic whole, and their object is to lead the seeker after truth step by step till he ascends to his home in the absolute. Ramanuja, following Bodhayana, therefore thinks that the entire Mimdmsa Sfdstra with its sixteen chapters beginning with the Sutra 1 Now therefore the enquiry into dharma ' and ending with the Sutra ' From there, there is no return ' has a definite spiritual
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meaning and value. The path of Vedic duty is the devious way to svarga, and its pleasures are particular and perishing (alpa and asthira) ; but the path to Brahman is straight and shining, and it leads to eternal and infinite bliss. The boat of the sacrificial cult is frail and leaky, but the way of Brahma- jndna leads to the shore of infinity. The Vedavddin who follows karma thus realises its perishing value and tries to become the Brahmavadin. The transition from karma vicara to Brahma vicara thus involves temporal sequence as well as logical consequence. The seeker after truth goes from karma to Brahman, from the world of perishing pleasures to eternal bliss. The finite self which is essentially jndndnandamaya, self-effulgent and blissful, forgets its nature, suffers from the ills of samsara, and finally attains immortality by realising its true nature and purpose.
Ramanuja and Vedanta Des'ika illustrate this truth by the parable of a young prince who in a boyish way strays away from his royal father, enters the huts of wild tribes and identi- fies himself with them.1 But an apta or trustworthy friend weans him away from his wicked surroundings by reminding him of his royal destiny and succeeds in reclaiming him. The father who was searching for his lost son is over- joyed to meet him, and the two are at once reunited in love. Likewise, the dtman, who belongs to Brahman, somehow superimposes on himself the idea that he belongs to prakrti, sleeps in and as matter in the pralaya state, identifies himself with the body of a god or an animal or a man in creation and subjects himself to the wheel of samsdra with all its hazards and hardships till he is made to realise his folly by a loving
1 S.B., I. i. 4, p. 157 and S.B.E., XLVIII, p. 199, and RahasyatrayasBra, Ch, I.
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guru. He at last retraces his steps, regains his self-knowledge, is freed from the fetters of karma and enters his home in the absolute. He belongs to Brahman and is, as it were, Brah- manised, and attains the infinite riches of spiritual sove- reignty. The realisation of Brahman is an awakening as well ,as an attainment. The world of samsdra is not a subjective imagining like a dream, but an objective order, which is the same to all the infinite individuals experiencing it. The view that space and time are mental constructions and that the Avorld is created and destroyed by the mind suffers from the fallacy of super-subjectivism and its fatal consequences. As admitted by S'ankara, there is difference in kind between the world imagined or ideally constructed by the mind asjiva s'rsti and the world par excellence which is created by Is'vara, and what is given in the waking consciousness is more real and valuable than that of dreams and of the inert tdmasic state of sleep and stupor. An Alnascar's dream is, in practical life, justly rejected as a folly that is futile, idle and empty. The analogy of the idealistic monist that the mumuksu is like the king on the throne who, falling into a reverie and imagin- ing that he is a hunter eating and procreating like other hunters, awakens from the dream, may be adequate for subjectivism, but is not true to facts. Life is real and arduous and mumuksutva is not a make-believe, but involves strenuous- ness. I&vara is not Brahman reflected in mdyd, an eternal dreamer without any chance of disillusionment, a mdyin that, as virdt, Hiranyagarbha and Is'vara, suffers, like ihejiva, from the hazards of the three states of consciousness and the hard- ships of cosmic evolution, but is the inner ruler of all beings without any taint or trace of imperfection, who is eternally self-realised and enables the jiva also to realise its self. Mukti is not moony effulgence or candrodaya that is an awakening
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from avidya, but the solar light (suryodaya) of sankalpa that is an awakening of God-consciousness by the destruction of avidyd-karma. Vis'istddvaita steers clear of the extremes of the Purva Mimdmsa view of the mediacy of niyoga and the monistic view of the immediacy of Advaitic consciousness and regards Brahman as niyanta, who is the ruler of the moral universe and the supreme end of spiritual life.
The central truth of Upanisadic ethics that Brahman is the inner ruler of all subjects and objects of experience is brought to light in the antarydmin text of the Brhaddranyaka Upanisad as the answer to Uddalaka's question, " Do you know that ruler who is the inner controller of all the universe ? " l The immortal answer of Yajnavalkya is " That is Brahman, who is immanent in all beings as their eternal ruler, having the quality of sarva niyantrtva ". Paramdtman, the all-pervading self, is further defined by the Subalopanisad as Purusottama or the Supreme Self, who is eternally pure and perfect (apahata- papma). He sees without eyes/ hears without ears, knows everything without the instruments of knowledge and the im- pediments of avidya-karma. The antarydmi vidyd of the Veddnta Sutras 3 makes it clear that the essential quality of the sarvdtman, the all-self, is the attribute of inner rulership (niyantrtva) and immortality (amaratva) that differentiates Him from the finite centres of experience and their objects. The all-self that can be intuited metaphysically as the ddhdra in which all beings live, move and have their being is now revealed as the immortal ruler. Sarvdtman or the universal self is now identified with Purusottama, the Supreme Self of
1 Br. Up., III. 7. 8Sv. Up., III. 19. 8 I, ii. 19.
ONTOLOGY II : BRAHMAN AS NIYANTA
the universe, who wills the true and the good, and whose will is eternally self- realised. There is no other seer or ruler, and He is the Ruler of rulers for fear of whom suns and stars and the whole universe move, and the Devas do their cosmic duties.1 Cosmic rulership cannot therefore belong to the non- sentient pradhana or the self-conscious purusa. In the marvellous figurative language of the Mundaka Upanisad " Upon the same tree there are two inseparable birds of beautiful plumage. One of them on the lower branch eats the sweets and bitters of life in turn and is bewildered by his own impotence, but the other on the top is the glorious Lord (Isfa)t the brilliant Maker who is ever serene and majestic and by knowing Him he shakes off his sorrows and shines in his glory."2 With a divine vision vouchsafed by the Lord, Arjuna beheld the cosmic form of Is'vara and was awe-struck by its sublimity and infinity.
The idea of Brahman as the inner self of the self insists on the eternal distinction and difference between prakrti, purusa and Purusottama, 3 but denies their externality. Vi&is- tadvalta as a philosophy of religion recognises the equal reality of the three existents, but gives different values to them in the realm of ends. Philosophy explains facts of experience as well as acts of will, and knowledge is not only what is logically apprehended, but what is ethically achieved. Reality is not only self-expressive but also self-determining, and there can be no self-directing activity without an active self. Moral
1 Br. Up., III. viii. 9.
2 dva suparna sayuja sakhaya samanan vrksam pari§asvajate I
tayoranyah pippalam svadvatyanas'nan nanyo abhicakas'Iti II
samane vrkse puruso nimagnah anls'aya, s'ocati muhyamanah I justam yada pas'yatyanyam Is'am asya mahimanam iti vltas'okah II
—Mund. Up., III. i. 1 & 2.
3 Vedanta Sutras, I. ii. 23.
140 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
•consciousness presupposes the freedom of the finite self and its immortality and the eternity of the inner self or h'vara. This view corrects the extremes of materialism, monadism and singularism. A philosophy of nature that makes matter the mother of the universe puts the cart before the horse, as it seeks to explain the reason and purpose of creation in terms of the non-sentient pradhana. Selfhood and internal rulership, as S'ankara observes, cannot belong to pradhana or matter. It is a materialistic view of morals to regard the self as a mode of matter subject to the determinism of prakrti and its gunas and the causal chain of karma. Matter is not a thing in itself as physical absolutism maintains, but is a thing for the self. It is not a projection of thought nor a non-ego, which is its opposite that resists the ego with a view to enable it to realise itself. The physical order has objective reality, but the natural ego that identifies itself with the physical world has no moral value, as it becomes the slave of sense and sensuality. Atman is essentially free, but it cannot escape the determinism of karma and the endless perils of samsara, unless it realises its spiritual nature and attunes its will to the will of h'vara who is its inner Ruler. Nature is adapted to the moral needs of the self, and the moral law finally demands the immortality of the self and the existence of Is'vara. The difference between the two atmans lies in the truth that Para- matman is eternal and the empirical self with its endless births and deaths can attain immortality only by freeing itself from the slavery of karma and earthly life. The Self as the eternal of eternal sand their inner Ruler lives, thinks and acts in us as the srarlrin and the finite will is enriched by self-donation to the supreme will, and its value is conserved and consummated in the absolute. While the self has its own being, it is deprived of its monadic exclusiveness by the idea of antaryamin
ONTOLOGY II : BRAHMAN AS NIYANTA 141
as the in-dwelling self of the individual. The absolute of philosophy which is the sat without a second is thus the same as the inner ruler of all beings distinct from prakrti and purusa, on account of His essential eternity.
The non-dualist affirms the reality of the antarydmin as distinct from cit and acit, but refutes and rejects it finally by denying the truths of practical reason and the god of ethical religion. Ethical religion may, he argues, be justified by saying that the atman is a person having moral sovereignty and not a thing as a slave of sense. But will itself is self-dis- crepant and superimposed on Brahman by adhyasa or false appearance. While metaphysics deals with what is, morals deal with what ought to be, and if the ought is realised, the moral concept ceases to be. An infinite will is self- contradictory, and the co-existence of two wills in the same body is inconceivable. The jlva is fictitiously hypostatised by buddhij its false limiting adjunct. The very idea of agency, human or divine, arises from ahankara or egoism and the self-contradiction between pure consciousness and self-con- sciousness and it is sublated by the knowledge of the self-identity of Brahman, when the will and its world disappear for ever. The Bhedavadin counters this absolutism of Advaita by arguing that, since the impersonal transcends the ethical distinctions of good and evil, it may be less than moral and that, therefore, the absolute offers a moral holiday to man. The reasons adduced by the Advaitin to prove the fictitious nature of the jlva apply mutatis mutandis to I&vara and nirguna Brahman as well, and the nihilism and atheism of Nagarjuna will be the only logical conclusion. If Brahman is beyond relational thought, it is beyond philosophic thought, and the monistic view is empty and idle. The Advaitin is
142 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
thus a light unto himself and denies what is alien to, or other than, himself, even if it is an inner ' other ' as antaryamin. If this be true, the reverence to the highest self or Vasudeva, adored by S'ankara is strictly inadmissible as such adoration has no place in Advaita metaphysics. If the absolute sublates the relational consciousness and is the ' I ' in the transcendent- al sense, there is no need in the mumuksu or mukti state for spiritual love and service which form the foundation of social solidarity, and egoism and self-culture may take the place of altruism. The Bhedabhedavadin accepts the direct meaning of the antaryamin text, but his view of the abso- lute self existing as the conditioned self destroys the purity of Paramatman. Vis'istddvaita reconciles the claims of absolutism and theism by co-ordinating the values of episte- mology based on ' intellectus ' and ethics based on ' voluntus ' and defining Brahman as adhara and niyanta. The first category expresses the ontological immanence of Brahman as the updddna kdrana or material cause and the second defines Brahman as the 6perative cause or nimitta kdrana stressing its ethical eminence and holiness. The absolute is the one that is the meaning of the manifold, but it is not infected by the imper- fections of the universe. As the sat, Brahman is the all-inclusive unity or whole, but as the self or niyanta, He is transcendentally pure, perfect and holy. Sat is in space-time and not as space-time and is the self, while prakrti is parindma-ridden andpurusa is karma-ridden. Paramatman is the all-self, but is absolutely free from the mutations of matter and the ethical defects of the em- pirical self, and is the Purmottama. There is none good but God, and the supreme end of life consists in attaining godliness*
. The moral idea of Brahman as the Parama Purusa or the pure and perfect self, who abides in the jlva as its antaryamin
ONTOLOGY II : BRAHMAN AS NIYANTA . 143
or indwelling Self is to transfigure its mind-body into a living temple of the Lord or Brahmapuri, and brahmanise the/n?a. The Dahara Vidyd in the Chandogya Upanisad l enjoins the meditation on Brahman as the small ether within the lotus of the heart which, without a taint or tinge of physical and moral evil, wills the true and the good, that are ever self-realised (satya kama, satya sankalpa). This definition excludes the elemental ether and the finite self, and frees the Self from the charge of anthropomorphism. The infinite that is the abode of the entire universe has its home in the infinitesimal ether of the heart without being spatialised or conditioned and untaint- ed even by a shadow of evil with a view to infinitise and perfect the self. The transcendental one does not lose its nature when it transforms the self. Likewise, the description of Brahman in the Kathavalli* as the Person of the size of the thumb, as the Lord of the past and the future, that resides in the heart of humanity, is of the absolute that has no his- tory, but enters into history to make the mortal immortal. The infinite, therefore, does not lose its infinity by residing in the finite and redeeming it from its evil nature. There is no con- tradiction in the co-existence of two selves in the same body. If contradiction as bare negation or abhava is non-existence like the flower in the sky, jlva-Is'vara is non-existent. Jwa- h'vara cannot be the identity of opposites as the opposing quality cannot belong to the same subject in the same relation. The monistic theory of a hypothetical entity named h'vara,
1 atha yadidam asmin brahmapure daharam pupdarikam ves'ma daharosmin- nantarakasah tasmin yadantastadanve§tavyam tad'vava vijijiXasitavyam iti I Ch. Up., VIII. i. 1.
esa atma apahatapapma vijaro vimptyur vis'5ko vijighatso apipasah satyakamah satyasankalpah. — Ch. Up.t VIII. i. 5.
* angu$tha matrah puru$o madhye atmani ti^tati I Is'anS bhutabhavyasya,— Kafh. Up., II. iv* 12.
ahguftha matrah. puru§ontaratma
sada jananam hrdaye sannivi?ta£ — Kath. Up.t II. vi. 17.
144 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
which is the infinite-finite or being-becoming as a true lie to accommodate the empirically-minded, is unsatisfactory to the theist, useless to the monist and liable to the charge of srrutahani or violation of scriptural integrity. If the two are not contradictories or contraries but are differents, then an identity of distincts is conceivable, as jlva and Is'vara can be together in peace without being sublated and swallowed up by nirguna Brahman. The jlva realises its nature as atman ; it attunes itself to the will of the Supreme Self. Brahman is alogical and amoral and there is a real progression in spiritual life from the logical to the alogical or intuitional and from the moral idea of karma and punya-papa to the amoral idea of essential immortality. The Being that is beyond space-time as the greater than the greatest seeks its abode in the heart of all sentient beings as the smaller than the smallest in order to impart its infinity and eternal life to them.
The subject-object relation is applicable to ethical as well as intellectual experience, and the ultimate subject of every moral judgment is the inner ruler or Paramatman. This truth is elicited by the Gita analysis of every act of karma or voluntary action into the five factors of the body, the vital functions, the mind and the conative sense-organs, the finite self and Is'varaJ The body composed of the five elements provides the physical foundation for moral life. The five pranas sustain the life of the bodily organism as without the prana the physiological organs would cease to function, and the body would be dissolved. The conative sense organs and the mind in its volitional aspect represent the dynamic side of moral endeavour. The finite self with its free will is the doer of the deed and is the subject of moral experience. It uses 1 E.G., XVIII. 14.
ONTOLOGY II : BRAHMAN AS NIYANTA 145
the tools of action when it chooses to do so, and does not use them when it ceases to act. But the final subject of all action from the religious point of view is the inner Divinity that is in the self as the Creator of creators. The integrity of -ethical religion is destroyed if any one of these factors is omitted, and the result will be fractional views of the philo- sophy of morals. The Cdrvdka or materialist like Virocana may regard the self as the bye-product of matter and the result of sexual selection. To him the gratification of the lusts of the flesh would be the supreme end of conduct. The prdnaist may be interested in maintaining vital efficiency and in attaining physical immortality by a process of prdridydma. To the psychological hedonist the motive of conduct may be the satisfaction of sensual desires. If the empirical self is impelled by egoistic inclinations, it follows the way of exclu- sive individualism and selfishness. The true aham or ego is the serene spiritual self as realised in the kaivalya state, but ahankara or egotism is the pseudo-self of prakrti that claims to be l&vara Himself, but, as a pretender to paramdtmahood, it betrays its ego-centric nature, fights against goodness, and seeks to destroy the moral and spiritual order of the universe. ,
The Manichean fight between God and the devil is really the war in our moral nature between the soul power of the at man and the brute force of ahankara. When the moral philo- sopher seeks in the light of the Upanisad to become a spiritual seer, he recognises the religious foundation of morals, and dis- covers Is'vara as the real Subject of all action. This discovery is more revolutionary than the Copernican theory that the earth moves round the sun and not vice versa. It gives a new orientation to moral and spiritual life, as it shifts the centre •of . activity from the little * I ' of ahankara to the absolute * I ' 10
146 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
that is the real Ruler of the cosmos. The living body is the ksetra or arena of moral warfare; conflicting desires fight for supremacy, the self deliberates, decides and acts on account of its free will, and knows the final truth that its will is the fulfilment of the Divine will.
The exact relation between human and Divine freedom may be determined by contrasting causality and free will. Science employs the category of causality to explain the phenomena of nature, and such causal determination implies necessity and denies freedom. On the naturalistic view of morals, the spiritual self is phenomenalised and subjected to causal necessity. The dtman identifies itself with prakrti and is therefore constrained to obey the laws of nature. As its conduct is determined by animal inclination and not by reason, it becomes the slave of sensibility, and freedom becomes a fiction. But when the self realises its folly and knows that it is the atman and not prakrti, it raises itself from the scientific to the moral level, sheds its materialistic consciousness and acquires sovereignty over animal nature. Freedom and activity belong to purusa and not to prakrti, but, if activity is a feature of prakrti, then, as prakrti is a common possession of all jlvas, all actions would be experi- enced by all jlvas, which is absurd.1 The very term s'astra connotes an imperative or moral ' ought ' and therefore pre- supposes the freedom of the finite self. The world of prakrti is the common theatre for moral and spiritual life and it is really the object and not the subject of experience. In the transition from ethics to religion, moral freedom is trans- figured into spiritual attunement to the will of the supreme Self. The self as the karta or free agent becomes the willing
1 S. B., II. iii. 36 and S. B. E.t XLVIII, p. 555.
ONTOLOGY II : BRAHMAN AS NIYANTl 147
instrument of the highest Self or para (the Supreme). The empirical self in a sense suffers from the dilemma of determinism. As a mode of matter, its action is subject to causal necessity and it is not free; as a mode of the highest self its activity depends on the inward Ruler who by His wonderful maya moves all creatures as if they were mere machines.1 The self as a passive instrument of Is'vara becomes a conduit pipe of His cosmic energy. This idea of divine determinism and pre-destination is forcibly expounded by the Kaitsitaki Upanisad. " Whom the Lord elects to lead upwards from these worlds, He makes him do a good deed. Whom He elects to lead downwards from these worlds, He makes him do a wicked deed." 2 Freedom of the self would thus appear to be a fiction from the religious as well as the scientific point of view.
But ethical religion proves the fallacies of the dilemma by taking it by the horns, offering a way of escape between the horns and by rebuttal. The dilemma is taken by the horns by insisting on the ^ethical personality of the jlva as different from the phenomenalised mode of prakrti and the depersonalised instrument of divinity. Moral autonomy has its own intrinsic value, which cannot be explained by scientific necessity or the theory of divine determinism. The self can attain sovereignty over brute nature, and no one can subdue a man who has subdued himself. The spiritual self
1 Is'varassarva bhutanam hfddes'erjuna ti^tati I
Bhramayan sarvabhutani yantrarudhani mayaya. The Gita, XVIII, 61. Vcdanta Sutras, II. iii. 40.
* esa hyevainamsadhu karma karayati tarn yamanvanunesyati I esa evainam asadhu karma karayati tarn yamebhyo lokebhyO nunutsate II
—Katts. Up.. III. 9.
148 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
is different from the empirical self of prakrti and, being eter- nal by nature, it can neither slay another self nor be slain by it.1 Besides, Is'vara is a silent but not indifferent spectator of the moral self, as He permits moral possibility, and the moral self has the freedom to grow into the goodness and perfection of God or lapse into demoniac malignity by choos- ing the way of evil. Duty is the command of the inner voice, and the imperative implies ^:he obligation to obey it. The S'ri Bhasya illustrates this truth by the analogy of the joint ownership of the same property by two persons, A and B.- If B wishes to transfer it to a third person C, he can do so only after obtaining the permission of A. The grant of permission by A depends on the imperative, initiative and persuasive effort of B, who desires the transfer. Likewise I&vara permits its * other ' to use its freedom. At first a silent seer with upeksatva (indifference), unaffected by good and evil, He enters into the moral life of the jtva, and per- mits it to exercise its freedom (anumantrtva) . He then apportions pleasure and pain which are the fruits of action according to desert (prayojitvatva)? Ethical religion also points out the way of escaping between the two horns of the dilemma by the doctrine that the self is not a thing or means to an end, but is a karta that can choose its way in a conflict of desires, and not drift between destiny and divinity. It is not fated to follow karma or s'dstra, but has the free will to choose its own career. The whole argument of determinism
1 hanta cenmanyate hantum
hatahcen manyate hatam I
ubhau tau na vijanitQ
nayam hanti na hanyate II
—Kath. Up., I. ii. 19. * S. B.. II. Hi. 41 and S.B.E.. XLVIII, p. 557.
3Yatha dvayoh sadharane dhane parasvatvapadanam anyataranumatim antarena nQpapadyate; athapi itaranumateh svenaiva krtam iti tatphalain svasyaiva bhavati. — Sri Bhasya, II. iii. 41.
ONTOLOGY II : BRAHMAN AS NIYANTA 149
can be rebutted by saying that the moral realm is autonomous and cannot be reduced to the physical realm or religious absolutism. Ethical religion reconciles ethics and religion by its conclusion that the self acquires moral sovereignty over its animal inclination with a view to offering itself as a self -dona- tion to the Supreme Self, who is the ultimate Subject of moral endeavour. The two wills then co-exist as one will, when the finite will is in tune with the infinite and there is no self- contradiction in such co-existence or self-communication. At any rate, this view is preferable to the illusion theory of ethics, which concedes that the Lord with super-excellent limiting adjuncts rules the jlvas with inferior limiting instincts, as it makes morality a make-believe and moksa sddhana a semblance*
This chapter may be concluded by summing up its main thesis that Brahman, the all-inclusive One, is Is'vara, the inner Controller of all beings. The ontological view of Brah- man as the Life of our life and the True of the true stresses the idea of divine immanence which pulsates through all beings and sustains their form and function. Truth is an essential quality of reality and is not reality. The idea of niyantd brings out the idea of the ethical eminence of Brahman and shows that the finite is not only rooted in the infinite (svarft~ pdsrrta) but is also controlled or directed by it (sankalpd&rta). By His entry into the jlva as its inner self He is at once the Sovereign and Saviour of all jlvas. Like a king that inspects the prison as a free man, He is the king of the dark chamber* He is within all beings and without, near and yet far. Owing to the unity of purport of all Vedic knowledge the terms sat, Brahman and antaryamin connote the same Being. In the light of the rule of chagapasrunydya, these terms ultimately connote Narayana as the Supreme Self.
CHAPTER VI
ONTOLOGY III: BRAHMAN AS RULER AND
REDEEMER
IS'VARA is not the illusory highest nor the highest concep- tual interpretation of the absolute, but is the ethical highest in us, and His omnipotence makes for righteousness. The will of the Almighty is not the arbitrary fiat of a despot, but is rooted in justice. S'dstra, the only authority for discerning spiritual truths, no doubt, attributes absolute power to Brah- man which '-transcends human understanding. But the idea of Providence as a Being with infinite benevolence cannot be reconciled with omnipotence. It may be contended that this is the worst of all possible worlds, as no merciful divinity Would create a universe so full of inequality and cruelty (vaisamya and nairghrnya). The existence of evil and un- merited suffering appears as a blot on the Almighty, and is evidence of the reign of a malignant power rather than of a benign ruler. This is a serious charge against theism, but Badarayana, the Veddntin, meets it by tracing evil to the moral responsibility of the jlva.1 The inequalities in the moral experiences of men and communities and the injustices are the outcome of their karma and are not due to any caprice
1 S. B., II. i. 34 and S. B. E.t XLVIII, p. 478.
ONTOLOGY III : BRAHMAN AS RULER AND REDEEMER 151
in the Creator. The material cause of creation is, as Paras'ara says, the karma of the jlva. The law of karma is the law of causation on the moral level, and every man reaps what he sows 1 ; karma and its juridical rigour are so relentless that not «ven the gods can escape the consequences of their karma. The law of karma does not, however, connote mechanical or mathe- matical necessity, in which each deed is the child of the past and the parent of the future. But it presupposes a free agent, who is accountable for his actions. The moral judgment is passed not on the deed, as the Buddhist thinks, but on the doer doing the deed, and it recognises the intrinsic value of moral freedom. When ethics develops into a religion, it becomes a theodicy with a moral and spiritual faith in the Law-giver. Duty is a divine command and its transgression is a moral perversity or evil that deepens into sin, and merits punishment. Righteousness is fulfilled in the law of retribu- tion. The lie in the soul arouses moral disapproval and incurs wrath, and it is by punishment alone that the righteousness of the law can be vindicated. But the picture of a vindictive -God who hurls the offender into everlasting hell fire is revolt- ing to the religious consciousness of Ramanuja. The will of the Almighty is rooted in the righteousness by which He dispenses justice according to the merit of the doer. Theology insists on the absoluteness of the divine will, and ethics on the value of righteousness ; but ethical religion defines Is'vara as satya kama and satya sankalpa, who wills the true and the good and realises them at once ; and the view that God wills the good is preferable to the view that what God wills is good, The former makes Him righteous and the latter despotic. The idea of Is'vara as karma -phala- data or the Lord that judges man according to his karma steers clear of the evils of deism
lBr. Up.t IV. iv. 5.
152 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
and Manicheism. The theory of an external Designer or absolute Deity, who makes the world and lets it go, is as repugnant as the idea that God forever fights with the devil or that evil exists as an impediment to goodness to be finally overcome by it. The view of Ramanuja that h'vara is the operative cause and the karma of each jlva the material cause of the diversities of moral experience, satisfies the needs of ethical transcendence and logical immanence. Brahman as the sat is the immanent unity of the universe, and as Parama- purusa is transcendentally pure and perfect ; the evils of life are traceable to the moral freedom of the finite self. The idea of evil as an illusion that envelops Brahman, an upddhi or limitation that conditions the infinite, or a defect in the absolute, carries no conviction, and admits of no religious satisfaction. A consistent monism should deny avidya, if it is to avoid the dualism between dtman and mulavidya and should destroy the plurality of jlvas if it is to avoid the perils of pluralism. Ramanuja traces avidya to karma instead of tracing karma to avidya as S'ankara does, and he finally equates the two.1 The former view attributes the illusions- and ills of life to the jiva and leaves the absolute absolutely perfect.
The ethical religion of Vis'isfadvaita is rounded off by the theory of Is'vara as Raksaka or redeemer. The idea of Is'vara as karma-phala-data, who apportions pleasures and penalties in exact proportion to the moral worthiness of the karta or doer, is a legal conception which affords no scope for religious consolation or hope of salvation. The law of retri- bution demands an exact mathematical recompense for karma,
1 Avidya karmasamjSa V, P. VI. vii. 61 quoted in S. B., I. i. 1, p. 72 and S. B. E., XL VIII, p. 101.
ONTOLOGY III : BRAHMAN AS RULER AND REDEEMER 155
as every act of karma should bear its fruit, which can be exhausted only by enjoyment or expiation. It develops an attitude of quiscent passivity and resignation to the inevitable rather than that of optimistic activism. The maxim that what cannot be cured should be endured belongs to the ethics of passivity, but the maxim that what cannot be endured should be cured is the ethics of dynamic activism. It is shallow optimism to say that whatever is is right, but the deeper optimism asserts that whatever is right is. Evil exists as a fact of experience, but evil ought not to be, and the mumuksu seeks to destroy it by active endeavour. Physical evil is equat- ed with suffering, and may not be the effect of sin. Sin may result in suffering, but suffering may not be due to sin. But moral evil arises from the violation of a moral law, and it deepens into sin when duty, which is a divine command, is violated. Duty is the voice of God in the will of man, and it is a sin to omit what is commanded and commit what is prohibited, as it is an offence against Is'vara. The sinfulness of sin is so deep that it cannot be exhausted by expiation. The law of recompense is an endless see-saw which offers no- hope to the seeker after mukti, and it has religious value only when righteousness is fulfilled in redemption. Justice is not merely tempered with mercy, but is consummated in it, and the aim of punishment is not retribution but redemption. Dandana or punishment is daya-karya or the work of com- passion. Punishment is for the redemption of the wrong-doer from his career of sin by the inflow of divine grace or krpa. Forgiveness does not cancel karma, but transforms it by the organic blending of goodness and mercy. The grace of the Raksaka is not a supernatural potency that is infused into the sinner from without. The law of karma finds its fulfilment in the redemptive grace of God. Forgiveness is the foundation*
154 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
of the moral law, and redemption from sin is its religious fruition ; and this view overcomes the dualism between the .supernatural realm of krpa and the moral realm of karma. There is no discrepancy or discontinuity between the super- natural and the natural, as the former is a consummation of the latter.
While philosophy explains the quest of reality by the self as rnumuksu, religion explains the quest of the self by the Raksaka or Redeemer. The idea of Brahman interested in brahmanising the jlva is the key thought of religion. God seeks the self even more than the self seeks God, and He is aptly called the " Hound of Heaven." To the logical intel- lect Brahman transcends the categories of the understanding, .and the absolute is beyond description and definition, but to -the religious consciousness, He is the inescapable Redeemer who, in His infinite mercy, assumes suitable forms to recover, and reunite with, the lost self. The ascent of the self to the absolute is not so valuable as the descent of God into evolutionary forms and into humanity. The five forms of Brahman known as para, vyuha, vibhava, antaryamin and '.area1 are not emanational categories but concrete expres- sions of divine krpa. Daya is eternal and infinite, and it incarnates into humanity and is immanent in all living beings. Para-Brahman is the self-realised absolute as the Eternal of eternals, which is formless, changeless and tran- scendental (tripadosya amrtam divi). In Paramapada, matter -exists without its mutability, time exists as eternity, and the mukta lives without the moral limitations of karma. But in that divine life there is no scope for daya and af everything is moveless and perfect, perfection has no
1 Yatindramata Dipika, IX. 129.
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meaning or value. There is more joy in the pursuit of the lost self than in the possession of the free selves of Parama- pada, and therefore the metaphysical absolute becomes Vasudeva, the perfect, to satisfy the meditational needs of the mumuksu. Is'vara as vyiiha, with His infinite cosmic will, is the creative source and sustenance of the universe and is also the all-destroyer. The idea of Is'vara as the ' eater ' referred to in the Kathavalli Upanisad and the Vedanta Sutras,1 connotes the awe-inspiring nature of the all-destroyer, whose wrath breaks forth on all beings, causing universal destruction. But really, the devourer is a life-giving healer, and what is popularly termed destruction is the re-absorption of the universe in the pralaya state, in which the distinctions of nama rupa caused by parinama and karma disappear, and cit-acit exists as a mere possibility. In the history of the adven- ture of souls occur certain epochs of moral crisis, when egoism becomes so inflated and sinfulness becomes so iniquitous that Is'vara in His infinite mercy withdraws the instruments of evil and thus arrests the wrong-doers from their career of crime and sin.2 This is called pralaya and has a soothing effect on the self. Srsti is also a redemptive process and after the refreshment of pralaya, the jlva wakes up to moral activity, •enters on a new life, and is given a fresh opportunity for attaining freedom. The making and the unmaking of the universe thus reveal the redemptive mercy of the Raksaka and cosmology is to be reinterpreted as a dayd s'astra
1 yasya brahma ca ksatram ca ubhe bhavata odane I
mrtyur yasyQpasecanam — K.U., I. ii. 25. atta caracara grahapat— S.B. I. ii. 9.
2 asr§ti santatanam aparadhanam nirodhinlm jagatah I
padmasahaya karupe pratisancara kelim acarasi I!
— Dayfisatakam, 16.
acidavis'i^tan pralaye jantun avalokya jatanirveda I karapa kalebara yOgam vitarasi vpgasailanatha karu^e tvam II
—Ibid., 17.
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or philosophy of redemption. The third concrete form of dayd is the immanence of Brahman in the hearts of all beings as their antaryamin without being affected by their evils. It transforms the perishing body into a living temple of the Raksaka and is capable of being intuited by the yogi. Vasudeva, the perfect Self, manifests Himself in the interests of the meditational needs of the devotee, as Sankarsana with the two qualities of jnana and bala, as Pradyumna with the qualities of ai&varya and vlrya and as Aniruddha with srakti and tejas without any dimunition of Divinity.1
Avatara or vibhava incarnation is the next concrete manifestation of krpa, and it is the periodic invasion of krpd into all species and into the history of humanity, when evil triumphs over goodness and creates a crisis in moral life.1 It is the embodiment of the redemptive working of the raksaka in the moral will of humanity with a view to recover it from its sinfulness. The theory of the ten avatars is often misunder- stood by its friendly as well as hostile critics as is evident in the following nine accounts : (1) The asuric type of men con- demns the avatara as the incarnation of Visnu or deceptive mdyin that allies himself with the daivic order in crushing the asura order in a covert way, (2) The popular view that incar* nation is a supernatural descent of h'vara causing a vacancy in Vaikunta misses the truth of divine omnipresence and errs by giving a spatial interpretation to a spiritual truth. (3) The method of historic criticism finds in the avatara cult a crude combination of history and mythology, which is said to characterise the epics and the purdnas and illustrates it by
1 Yatindramata Dipika. IX. 132.
* yada yada hi dharmasya glanirbhavati bharata I
abhyutthanamadharmasya tadatmanam srjamyaham — B.G., IV* 7.
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tracing the modern idea of Krsna to the fusion of three different earlier Krsnas. The Krsna of the Upanisads is said to be identified with Vasudeva of the Satvata sect and later on with the idea of Narayana in the Pancaratra. (4) The evolutionary view describes the nine avatars as successive stages in the evolution of species. The fish, the tortoise and the boar mark the animal level ; the man-lion, the dwarf and the mili- tant Rama, a higher stage in the ascent, and Rama and Krsna would, according to this view, represent the triumph of the whole process. Dust and deity mark the two poles of the plan of life, and even the worm can mount up to the level of Vasudeva. (5) S'aivism is inclined to accept the biological exposition of incarnation and point out the imperfections in- herent in the repeated birth and death of the embodied avatar -, though it is the evolutional highest. (6) Natural religion is opposed to the supernatural account of incarnation, and gives a moral version, when it explains the incarnational process as stages in perfection. Any one can by yoga awaken the dormant Kundalini srakti, that is coiled up in the M^ilddhara, and become a divine being or yogls'vara. Is'vara is purusot- tama or uttama purusa, and every man can become a pattern of perfection and heroic exemplar of humanity. (7) Super- naturalism protests against this psychological view, and insists on suprarational truths being explained in a scriptural way. It is like the Christian faith that Jesus is the only begotten Son «of God, who has entered into the history of humanity as the embodiment of infinite redemptive mercy with a view to annex it to God. God descends into man so that man may ascend to Him. Whom the Lord elects, unto him He reveals Him- self and the Lord chose Israel as a race fit for His redemptive revelation. The theory of descent and ascent is an anthropo- morphic idea, which has no philosophic value, and the
158 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
incarnational event as a unique phenomenon presupposes the arbitrary nature of the divine will, and susbstitutes magic for mercy. An appeal to the miraculous to frighten man to accept God takes away from the dignity of moral autonomy. (8) The allegorical view therefore explains away the avatara as the symbolic expression of the atman entering into the inner nature and witnessing the fight between good and evil. The Kafha Upanisad portrays the character of the atman as the charioteer within, with reason as the driver, the senses as the horses and the sense objects as the highway. The vision of the vis'varupa or universal form is a poetic metaphor of the working of the spirit in man, but is historically worthless. Some theosophic interpreters of the Gita say that while Para- Brahman does not incarnate, the logos descends to the plane of thejwa and works for world welfare. (9) The monist thinks that the Upanisadic absolute degenerates into the theistic avatar of the Gltd, which is less real, though it may be more useful. The moment we think of nirguna Brahman, negation enters into its pure being and changes it mtopurusottama. The concept of the brooding Narayana is a symbol of the absolute ' I ' confronted by the pseudo ' I ' or non-ego.1 The ' I * posits itself and opposites itself, and the universe betrays the self-contradiction of being-becoming from the post to purusot- tama, though the latter is the highest conceptual reading of the absolute. An avatara is, in this view, an extraordinary mani- festation of human goodness and glory and not a supernatural descent of Is'vara. The avatara has birth and body composed of elements, though they are illusory appearances of Brahman.
The Gltd is the exposition of the avatara by S'ri Krsna, the perfect incarnation, and is an Upanisad that enshrines the
1 Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy , Vol. I, p. 539.
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essentials of all the Upanisads. Every critic of the incarnationai theme is constrained to accept its elevating morals, though he may explain it in his own way or even explain it away. But the value of the avatdra is that it is not a view of the map-making intellect that stains the incarnationai Light, but the intuitive vision or the soul sight of the Redeemer as its self. Such soul-sight destroys age-long avidyd-karma and the Glta guarantees God to every one, demoniac or divine, and offers universal salvation. An uncompromis- ing infidel like S'is'upala, who is consumed by the hatred of the incarnation, is worthy of grace as well as a condescending rationalist to whom a theistic incarnation is a concession tx> the ignorant. The allegorical view is often a reaction of re- ligion as a philosophy to the attack of the rationalist and the sceptic, and is colourless and timid. The Indologist as a historian who traces the evolution of God and dissects Krsna into three aspects, applies the categories of time and space to what is supersensuous. The theory of one unique incarna- tion and a chosen people has the fascination of fanaticism, but implies divine favouritism. The monist who explains avatdra as the incarnation of the mdyd-ridden Is'vara and finally re- duces Him to the status of the avidyd-ridden jlva follows the God-destroying logic of subjectivism, and does not respond to the logic of the heart. If monistic logic is vigorously followed, it should abandon the compromising attitude which says that the Gitd is the adaptation of Upanisadic absolutism to the needs of theism, and reject theism altogether. The theory of the avatdra is a spiritual truth which is entirely opposed to the geographical idea of descent, the evolutionary idea of the progress of purusa into purusottama or the super- naturalistic view of a'miraculous advent suspending the laws of nature. The Vis'istddvaitic theory is faithful to the Glta
160 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
when it expounds the avatara as the invasion of the redemp- tive grace of the Raksaka into history in moments of moral crisis with a view to arrest the progress of social disrup- tion, redeem the sinner from his sinfulness, and commune with the devotee who thirsts for His living presence.1 The redemptive grace of vtbhava is realised in the recovery of the Veda from itst destroyers, the extraction of immortality from the waters of life, the maintenance of the cosmic order and the law of righteousness and the living assurance of salvation to all beings.2 Besides these historic incarnations there are permanent incarnations known as area or the concretion of krpd consecrated by bhakti and mantra. Area wor- shipped in temples is the reservoir of the redemptive mercy of Is'vara who enters into a formless form of His own without being affected by the changes of prakrti and purusa. Area is a Vaisnavite idea which is often misinterpreted as image worship or idolatry. The materialist who condemns it as a relic of fetichism and sees the stone or the wood and not the living and speaking God is like the scientist, who tries to understand the tears of love by the anatomical dissection of the lachrymal glands. To the idealist image worship is the projection of the idea of God into forms of matter or a symbolic representation of spiritual truths. The pantheist who sees God in everything sees Him in the image as well. The monotheist hates the anthropomorphic view that humanises the transcendental Holy and the paganism of the idolater that moulds God into a graven image, as an anti-God cult and a heresy. The non-dualist accepts the logic that the infinite cannot be spatialised and localised, but draws a different
1 paritrapaya sadhunam vinas'aya ca duskrtam I dharmasamsthapanarthaya sambhavami yuge yuge II. — B. C., IV. 8.
2 Yatindramata Dipika. IX. 131.
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conclusion by recognising the psychological needs of the devotee and conceding the distinction between two Brahmans. The Lord may, when He pleases, assume a bodily shape formed of maya in order to gratify thereby His devout worshippers.1 The contemplation of God in the form of the sacred saligram is not therefore contrary to reason. Logic should subserve the demands of psychology and become psychological. Anthro- pomorphism in some form is inescapable, though, finally, saguna Brahman is only an illusory appearance of the abso- lute. The Vis'istadvaitin does not accept the theory of two standpoints with its double view of philosophy and religion nor the monotheism (like Bhaskara's) that attributes qualities to divine personality and denies His divine form. If the theory of two standpoints is true and the real needs of the mumuksu are conceded, it logically follows that Brahman is niravayava and nirguna in the spiritual sense, that it is beyond prakrti and its constituent qualities of satva, rajas and tamas and saguna in the religious sense that He is the redeeming self. The Infinite finitises itself by having an aprdkrta s'arlra or eternal formless form of its own for the sake of the finite self that seeks it, and this divine form is the concrete embodiment of the will to save humanity. It is made of love and not of matter or karma, and it is not a concession to the mass mind steeped in avidya. As the Infinite is the boundless Lord of tenderness and compassion, such self-limitation enriches the divine nature instead of conditioning it or diminishing its content. The Person with sunlike splendour individualises the form as special pro- vidence in order to gratify His devotees and is the image and not in the image.8 The divine form is called s'ubh&srraya as
1 Sankara Bhfisya, I. i. 20, p. 80 of Thibaut's translation. (S. B, Et XXXIV )
2 S.'fi., I. i. 21 and S.B.E., XLVJII, p. 340,
11
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it purifies and is accessible to them. The object is to render the divine form perceptually obvious and accessible to all as area, and this self-manifestation is a miracle of mercy. The five forms of Brahman as para, vyuha, vibhava, antaryamin and area are equally real in the philosophical sense, though from the point of view of religious value each succeeding self- manifestation may be more valuable to the mumuksu. The Vi&istddvaitin equates the Brahman andtheantarydminoi the Upanisads with Vasudeva of the Pdncardtra, the Bhagavdn of the Purdnas, the avatars of the Jtihdsas and the area of the Alvdrs, and is opposed to the theories of sublation and subordination^ To a monist like Deussen, with his view of non-contradiction and degrees of reality, the absolute of Yajnavalkya lapses into the pantheistic unity of the antaryamin and pan-cosmic dtman, then into the God of theism and finally deteriorates into the God of deism. The theist counters this argument by employ- ing the tu quoque method and says that the history of Indian philosophy witnesses the gradual triumph of theism over monism and pantheism. One school of Vaisnavism with its faith in advaya-jndnatatva and Bheddbheda distinguishes be- tween Brahman, Paramdtman and Bhagavdn by relying on the Bhdgavata text (I. ii. 12) and the definition of Bhagavdn and Vasudeva in the Visnu Purdna (vi. 5). Bhagavdn is the supreme sat or advaya-tatva who is svayam-siddha or self existent and the source of other existences, and who cannot be logically defined by means of genus and differentia. The letter bha implies the source and substance of the universe ; by ga is meant the inner ruler ; the dissylable bhaga connotes the six qualities of dominion, might, glory, splendour, wisdom and dispassion ; and the letter vd refers to the self which exists in all beings and in which all beings exist and this mahdvdkya or great text of Bhagavdn is applied in a specific
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sense to Vasudeva who abides in all beings as their self. Though immanent in all beings as their inner self, He is eternally perfect and the Supreme of the supreme, and is the summum genus and summum bonum. The Brahman of pure monism is, like the invisible ray of the sun, the eternal light radiating from the spiritual body of Bhagavan. Paramatman is finite-infinite and a partial expression of Bhagavan. Though Brahman and Paramatman are less than Bhagavan the absolute, they are in a bhedabheda relation with Him, and are different from the jlva. Vallabha in his Suddhadvaita extols Krsna as Parabrahman or sacchiddnanda rupa that is at once the Brahman of the Upanisad, the Paramatman of the Smrti and the Bhagavan of the Bhagavata. Owing to the s'akti of dvirbhdva or evolution Parabrahman emanates into the many like sparks from fire and from the sat form emerges jagat, from the cit tormjivas flow out and the antarydmins arise from dnanda. But according to Ramanuja, Brahman, Bhagavdnr Paramatman and area connote the one absolute as the perfect Self whose sole aim is to perfect the finite self and make it immortal. His self-manifestations are therefore not due to self-contradiction, bhedabheda limitation or emanation.
The infinite perfections of I&vara are dominated by the redemptive motive of dayd, and this view is a reorientation of the metaphysical qualities of satyam,jfldnam and anantam, the ethical idea of amalatva or purity and the cosmoligical ideas of omnipotence and omniscience. They are restated in the light of the redemptive motive of God as the attribute of dayd.1 Brahman transcends the form and matter of prakrti, and is niravayava or formless and nirguna or attributeless, but He embodies Himself as dayd to redeem thejlva. There is
1 Vedanta Des'ika, Day a Sataka.
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no God like unto the God of daya, and His mercy endures for ever and rains on all. His infinite perfections become valueless without daya. The Lord not only blesses the pure in heart, that follow the way of righteousness and keep the Vedic commandments, but saves the sinner that transgresses the law and has done evil in His sight. He is the rock of love and the sole refuge of those who are immersed in desolation and distress. The Lord as judge saves the righteous but, as the deliverer with His infinite loving kind- ness, He seeks the iniquitous and forgives their transgression. His juridical severity is outdone by the tenderness of His forgivingness and He makes haste to redeem the wicked from their wicked course and gives succour to the lowly and the meek. Daya inspires confidence in God as the God of salva- tion, and it soothes the broken heart and the contrite spirit. The Vaisruivite experience of mercy is more marvellous and varied than the Semitic variety, and its unique feature lies in its universality. Deliverance works in multitudinous ways and enriches the nature of the Deliverer and entitles Him to be called by the following names : He is sarva bhuta suhrt or the friend of all beings, parama audara or all-bountiful and gambhlra whose quality of mercy cannot be quantitatively measured. He is sulabha or easily accessible to all jivas, as'rta-para- tantra, who depends on His devotees, and samya or approachable by all irrespective of their birth and worth. Sauyilya is the intimacy that grows between the infinitely great or Is'vara and the infinitesimally small or jlva. Vat- salya is the tenderness and affection that overpowers, as it were, divine omniscience and makes it forget the sin- fulness of the sinner. The Lord of love may relish physi- cal but not moral evil. Mardava is the softness of love that cannot bear the pangs of separation from its lost self and
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includes sweet reasonableness. Sthairya is the will to save the postulant in spite of his sinfulness. Kdrunya is the sym- pathetic love of the Redeemer to seek and heal the afflicted jiva and give it succour and stability. Mddhurya is the inner sweetness that ever resides in the Saviour, who conquers evil by His seductive beauty and love and imparts His bliss tothejiva. Auddrya is the divine quality of treating the bestowal of boons a privilege granted to the Giver of all good by His beloved and He is never satisfied with what He gives to him. Arjava is the full, frank and free expression of the redemptive quality without reservation. Sauharda is the heartfelt desire to help all beings and redeem them from their sinfulness.1 The multitude of mercies has, however, one ruling motive, which lies in transforming the nature of Is'vara as righteous judge into the deliverer or universal saviour.
The Vis'istddvaitic philosophy of the sat without a second transforms itself into the Vaisnavite pantheism that extols Vasudeva as the All-Self and the S'rl Vaisnavite theism that equates Godhead with the dual self of Laksmi-Narayana or S'riyah-Pati* This transition is not due to the grafting of a new theory on the old or a historic growth due to the adapta- tion of Upanisadic monism to the anthropomorphic require- ments of the mass mind, but is the self-expression of the inner redemptive necessity that follows from the divine nature of day a. Brahman, who is beyond prakrti and purusa, ex- presses its will to redemption by having a twofold spiritual form of its own as Lord and S'ri that are philosophically insepar- able though functionally distinguishable.3 The cosmic ruler is
1 Vide Ramanuja's Saranagati Gadya.
2 Hris'ca te laksmis'ga patnyau. — Purusa Sukta. 8 Is'varim sarvabhutanam. — Sri Sukta.
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ruled by love, and S'ri resides in the ever blooming lotus of love and is the very heart of the divine nature. Is'vara rules the world by His relentless law of karma and His holy wrath against the evil-doer is inescapable, but the rigour of karma is overpowered by the redemptive love of krpd. Evil is destroyed and the evil-doer saved. The Lord rules by law and S'n rules by love and the love of law and the law of love are so vitally intertwined in the divine nature as to render nugatory any attempt at the philosophic analysis of their exact nature. The majesty of the holy law of justice is eter- nally wedded to the all-conquering might of mercy. While ethics insists on the reign of karma, and religion on the abso- luteness of krpd, ethical religion reconciles the claims and counter-claims of karma and krpd by regarding the law of righteousness as the root of moral and spiritual endeavour and deliverance by dayd as its fruition. Goodness is changed into godliness by the inner mediating link of daya. Karma is a criticism of caprice and is rooted in justice, but in its relentlessness, it affords no hope of deliverance and might lead to despair. Krpd is a criticism of karma, and is rooted in forgiving kindness, but in its inner flow it may afford no scope for moral responsibility and con- trition. But the dual principle of karma and krpd over- comes their dualism by their harmonious interplay. Law is then pervaded by love and love is pervaded by law and in this interdependence lie the stability of the moral order and the guarantee of universal salvation. But Ramanuja's Vi&is- tddvaita, as S'n Vaisnava theology, is deeply interested in the exact determination of the relation between the Lord and S'n and has given rise to two divergent schools of interpretation formulated respectively by Vedanta Desdka and Pillai Loka- carya. The former defines S'riyah-Pati as Lord and S'n
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as a dual self which is one in two and two in one and their co-operative identity is indispensable to the seeker after mukti. Redemptive mercy is coeval with exacting righteousness and in the eternal marital fusion of Divine law and Divine love lies the assurance that krpa is the crown and consummation of a contrite heart. If I&vara is omnipotent and mercy has only monadic power, the triumph of krpa over harm* will be only contingent. Therefore S'rl is infinite and not finite ' ; and the concept of S'riyah-Pati recognises the foundational truth of ethical religion, that the holiness of law is ever wedded to the forgiveness of love. Each acts and reacts on the other, and in their interaction lie the stability of the social and moral order and the salvability of the sinner. Pillai Lokacarya combats this view by the counter-argument that there cannot be two infinites which are all- pervasive. The monotheistic truth that there is no God but God is negatived by the idea of a dual divine personality and frustrat- ed by it. Laksmi is, therefore, according to Pillai Lokacarya, finite like the jiva, but is ever free unlike the bound self and she may be regarded as finite-infinite and as a living link of love between Is'vara and the jlva. She is the divine mediatrix that intervenes between human culpability and the holy wrath of the Lord, softens the severity of divine justice, and changes the responsibility of the sinner into the mood of responsiveness to mercy. Dayd conquers Is'vara by its innate sweetness and beauty, and converts the sinner by love and thus mediates between the saviour and the sinner.2 While one school stresses the logic of monotheism, the other recognises the equal validity and value of the logic of the heart and the
1 Vedanta Des'ika's commentary on Yamuna's Catus'S'ldki.
2 Pillai Lokacarya's SVf Vacana Bhusana : cetananai arulale tiruttum fs'varanai alagale tiruttum.
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heart of logic and refuses to subordinate the ethical claims of theism to the religious demands of redemption. To the S'n Vaisnavite as a Vis'istddvaitin it is a sufficient assurance that Isfvara is not merely a judge but is also a deliverer and the essential nature of Brahman is to brahmanise the jwa and, from the pragmatic point of view, there is not much difference between the disputants as followers of S'n Vaisnavism.
That the formulation of a philosophical problem is more easy than its solution is borne out by the question of the origin and meaning of evil. It will conduce to clear thinking, if it is viewed from the standpoints of physical, moral and metaphysical evil. Physical evil is suffering due to hunger, poverty, disease, misery inflicted on us by nature as in earth- quakes and volcanic irruptions, and pain caused by super- natural agencies, and is classified as adhyatmika, ddhibhautika, and adhi-daivika, centrally, peripherally or supernaturally originated. Physical evil is contrasted with moral evil, and suffering is not always the consequence of wickedness. Self- less workers devoted to world-welfare often court suffering. Besides, pain is> not always a punishment for transgressing the moral order. Matter is not essentially evil. Embodiment is invariably conjoined with misery, but there is no causal or necessary relation between the two. Embodiment is an evil only when it is the result of the false identification of the atman with the body on account of avidya-karma and not when it is voluntarily sought by the Lord and the mukta. The theory that Is'vara has created the world to provide for human wants and that He bestows His ais'varya or wealth on virtuous men, assigns a commercial value to karma and destroys its intrinsic worth. It is not consoling to be told that evil is a blessing in disguise, and that pain is beneficial especially when it is
ONTOLOGY III : BRAHMAN AS RULER AND REDEEMER 169:
unmerited suffering. Moral evil is the violation of the laws of conduct based on rational determination, and is rooted in sensuality and the self-will of ahankdra. Ahankdra is- the dsuric propensity in man that impels him to gratify the lusts of the flesh and indulge in voluptuousness, pugnacity and self-aggrandisement, and is therefore the matrix of all moral evil. Virtue is impelled by the sdtvika quality, and induces the moral agent to choose a course of conduct that avoids egoism and promotes the ends of social welfare. While a good act is better than a good motive or intention, a wicked motive is worse than a wicked act, especially when it deepens into villainy, and taints the inner moral nature and subtly infects society itself. The dsuric or satanic man makes evil his good, and is moved by motiveless malignity and cruelty for their own sake. Moral evil is intensified into sin, when it is a deliberate transgression of a moral law regarded as a divine command, and is a revolt against the law of God. The world of samsdra is the battle-ground between dharma and adharma, which seems to justify the Manichean theory of the fight between good and evil. The eternal warfare between the God of good and light and the force of evil and darkness referred to in Zoroastrianism involves a dualism opposed to the theistic idea of the Raksaka. Even the view of Christian theology that Satan fights against God and that man suffers from original sin is not helpful in solving the problem of evil. Good and bad are mutually exclusive, and this logical truth of exclusiveness is applied to the realm of ethical religion, and becomes the raison de etre of the division of persons into the good and the wicked, based on the principle of exclusion or antagonism. While the sdtvika or good man who keeps the commandments of God merits the loving kindness of God and attains salvation, the sinner who offends*
170 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
«
-God is condemned as a heretic and hurled into eternal hell- fire. Ethical religion, in a more pronounced form, affirms the theory of pre-destination, when it holds that the Lord Him- self elects some to pursue the good and follow the path of mukti and others to follow the downward path of malignity and sin, .and hurls them into demoniac wombs and hellish torture. From the metaphysical point of view evil is, but ought not to be. God is good, and therefore the existence of evil and other imperfections has to be traced to the freedom of the finite self. Moral freedom is a real choice between different possible courses of action, and ihejiva is responsible for the choice of evil, and Is'vara is responsible not for the choice between good and evil, but for the pleasures and pains that follow the deed. The existence of evil in the divine plan is only a bare possibil- ity, but it is the self that makes the possible actual and enjoys the fruits of its karma. Pleasure and pain are determined by the nature of karma, and they vary with different persons at different times. Nothing, cit or acit, is intrinsically good or bad {apurusartha) / pleasant or painful and the hedonistic value of a thing is relative to the moral differences caused by karma. Thus it is the finite self that is accountable for the existence of evil and the experience of pain and not the Supreme Self which is its inner ruler and which is ever pure and perfect. But the ultimate problem of evil is not solved by analysing it into the physical, moral and metaphysical aspects and making the finite self accountable for its existence. To say that Is'vara permits the possibility of evil, which He could have prevented, does not free Him from His responsibility, and this difficulty results in the dualism between human and divine will and their collision. The existence of evil as an instrument of .goodness having an educative value is still a menace to
1 S. B.( III. ii. 12 and S. B. £., XLVIII, p. 609.
ONTOLOGY III : BRAHMAN AS RULER AND REDEEMER 171
theism as an ethical religion. The Christian doctrine of ori- ginal sin as an inner depravity of the soul and a propensity inherited from the fall of the first man is contrary to the innate dignity of man as the son of God and to the redemptive mercy of God. If evil is real, it denies the omnipotence of the Lord and makes Him finite and helpless. The Advaitin holds that the moral distinction between good and evil is self- contradictory, illusory and stultified by jnana. If evil is real, it cannot be destroyed ; if it is unreal and non-existent, there is no moral problem at all. Karma deals with the * ought ' .and jnana with what exists for ever, and the former is due to avidya, which is sublated by vidyd which eventually sublates itself. The Bhedabhedavddin refutes this theory of illusion as an illusory theory, which makes moral striving a semblance and mumuksutva a mockery. Karma is as much a fact of experience as avidya, and the two are subdued by moral and spiritual discipline and not sublated by mere jnana. But the Bheddbheda theory of upadhis, makes the absolute the abode of evil and other imperfections. When the absolute finitises itself, good and evil, pleasure and pain follow necessarily from the divine nature, and Brahman is both saint and sinner, and being infinite, He has to suffer from evil and sin in infinite ways. Western absolutists like Bradley regard error and evil as only an appearance of reality, which is finally transmuted into harmony by the reblending of material. " Every flame of passion, chaste or •carnal, would still burn in the absolute like a note absorbed in a higher harmony." Heaven's design can realise itself as effectively in a Borgia as in a Buddha, and the absolute is richer for every discord. To Bosanquet, good is made of the same stuff as evil, and evil is good in the wrong place. Suffering is due to finiteness and externality, but, when the
172 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
self is linked with the whole, which is the absolute, then evil and suffering are not annexed but absorbed, and they contri- bute to the whole. Thus the absolutist, eastern or western, is compelled by his intellectualistic zeal for unity to ignore the reality of moral evil and explain it away by a volte face as self-contradictory and illusory, Ramanuja re- cognises the equal claims of pure reason and practical reason, and rejects the monism that traces evil and error to the heart of reality as wild and vicious and as an outrage on the moral and religious consciousness. To him evil is a grim reality, but he throws the blame on the finite self, and absolves the absolute from any taint and trace of evil. The theory that avidya-karma is anadi or without beginning is a frank admis- sion of the inadequacy of the category of cause and effect to explain its origin and nature. The causal series leads to infinite regress, and the theory of its temporal origin is also inadmissible. Evil is neither an original sin nor an inherited propensity, neither an illusion nor a self-limitation, but it presupposes freedom of choice. To the mumuksu suffering from the ills of samsdra, the removal of evil and sin is more urgent than the logical analysis of its cause, and when he has Brahma drsti or divine vision, he sees God everywhere and good in all beings, and the question is dissolved.
The exact bearing of the problem of evil on the theory of karma may now be gathered up. The criticism of karma as a fatalistic and individualistic view of morals is controvert- ed by distinguishing its three aspects, namely, the psycho- logical, the ethical and the religious. The first explains the facts of moral experience by the category of causality and is the only theory that scientifically accounts for the inequalities of moral life, the tragedy of unmerited suffering and the
ONTOLOGY III : BRAHMAN AS RULER AND REDEEMER 173
so-called triumph of vice over virtue. The moral law of causation denies contingency and caprice, and explains each karma as the child of the past and the parent of the future. The scientific view denies moral freedom, and is therefore deterministic. Consciousness is conative, whether it is sensory-motor or idea-motor, and the effect of every act, word and deed is conserved in the mind-body of the moral self tending to produce its own consequences with mathematical precision. What a man sows he reaps, and karma therefore involves the inexorable law of retribution, which affords no hope of escape from the iron chains of necessity. It is this side of karma, that savours of fatalism and breeds pessimism and passivity. But it applies only to a part of karma called prdrabdha karma, which has already been set in motion, or which has already begun to bear fruit, like the birth of an individual. Many of our actions are derived from, and deter- mined by, inherited psycho-physically organised instincts and dispositions and by habits of character, which have become a part of our nature. The natural self in us, which is a mode of prakrti and its gunas, is externally determined by mechanical causality, and the laws of retribution and prarabdha karma can only be endured and not cured and conquered. Every karma presupposes a karta who is not determined ab extra, but who determines himself, and in every voluntary situation he deliberates on possible alternatives and decides on a particular course of action. The act of decision is an evidence of moral freedom and value, and the moral self is not a phenomenalised thing of prakrti, subject to the law of causality, but is a person, who is self-legislative and can attain self-sovereignty by subduing his animal nature. The moral self can wrestle with destiny, gain mastery over his animal appetitions like raga
174 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
and dvesa> and acquire self-sovereignty. He has the freedom to grow into the goodness of God or lapse inta wickedness and be the slave of sensibility. Freedom of the self presupposes the possibility of self-realisation or the knowledge of the atman as different from the bodily self of prakrti. When the moral self thus realises his spiritual nature,, the theory of karma acquires a religious motive based on the redemptive nature of krpa and work is transfigur- ed into the worship of God. Freedom is the gift of God in order that it may be turned into the gift of the self to God, who is its inner self. Karma is then consecrated into kainkarya, and the conflict of two wills ceases when the finite self attunes itself to the infinite.
The problem of the relation between karma and krpa involves a dualism between the principles of righteousness and redemption and constitutes the paradox of S'rl Vaisnavism as an ethical religion. In every philosophic system as an intellectual speculation, there is an ultimate gap or surd which baffles the logical intellect and leads it to ultimate doubts and agnosticism or to a sense of holy mystery. The crux of Advaita is the dualism between Brahman and may a and it is, like the riddle of the rope-snake, the riddle of reality itself. It may be a self-contradiction or a misunderstanding or an indefinable something. But it leaves us broken and barren by its God-devouring dialectics and the denial of the working of grace. The philosophy of SVl Vaisnavism as an ethical religion is likewise faced/with the baffling question of the relation between karma and krpa, but in all humility it accepts it as a holy my- stery which cannot be solved by logic, but can only be dissolved by direct divine experience. The mumuksu cannot rely on the inner light of reason without the grace of God and the guru.
ONTOLOGY III : BRAHMAN AS RULER AND REDEEMER 175
Ethical religion has however to avoid the extremes of rationalistic ethics based on the law of karma, and the religion* of redemption deduced from the idea of krpd. The for- mer is the ethical philosophy of karma or karma vada as the inviolable law of recompense and retribution, which, as in Buddhism, has for its background the postulation of dharma as an eternal natural and moral order. It repudiates the reality of the finite self and of the absolute self and affirms that things are a flowing flux, and that the self is a fleeting process. It accepts Sahkhyan rationalism by denying the value of a theodicy founded on a faith in a theos or cosmic ruler, and goes further than Sahkhyan thought by sub- stituting for the theory of purusa a cosmodicy deduced from the moral faith in the impersonal law of kamma and dhamma. The cosmos is akartr, without a designer or first cause and final cause. The deed continues without a doer as the wheel of becoming by way of cause. The theistic idea that Providence crowns virtue with happiness and that retribution is the penalty for vice is supplanted by the cosmodicy or way of dhamma which is as exact as the orbits of the planets round the sun. Pleasure and pain alone con- stitute the moral sanction for virtue and vice. The law of cyclic recompense is so austere that not even a god can escape its rigour. The law of righteousness or srila is con- tained in the noble eightfold path, and its aim is to face the grim fact of universal suffering or dukka and end it by right- eous living and benevolence. Buddhism is a revolt against the ills of life, and does not favour the attitude of resignation to the inevitable, as it insists on stilling the will to live and the cessation of the process of becoming. But the moral faith in the law of cyclic recompense in which the effect can be ex- hausted only by expiation offers no hope of deliverance from
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the ills of life on account of its mathematical rigour and relentlessness. Reflection on the ills of life and their univer- sality promotes a mood of pessimism and sickmindedness which condemns the world as the worst of all possible worlds. Civilisation is the flowering of life and its fading away. Life itself, with its unsatisfied desires, is a mockery and an illusion. The theory of recompense does not furnish any incentive for the exercise of- sympathy. Buddha's insistence on buddhi as the only way of attaining enlightenment was answered by the Buddhist enthroning Buddha in the place of btiddhi, as the saviour of life. The ethics of karma and dharma is rooted in the religion of redemptive krpd, and the moral feeling of the law of retribution is a failing which gives way to the religious faith in the Bodhisatva or the Lord of Redemption. The world is not the domain of karmic necessity, but is the living expres- sion of the incarnation of mercy.
The Christian religion of redemption is a criticism of the Buddhistic law of dharma. Christianity is the gospel of the forgiveness of sin. The propensity to evil is, according to Christianity, an innate depravity, and deepens into sin, when it is a transgression of a divine law. Sin is the sense of guilt arising not from ignorance or error but from the collision of the human will with the divine, is blameworthy, and entails punishment. It is the doer that is punished and not the deed. The hideousness of sin is a measure of the forgiveness of God. Forgiveness is not the cancellation of debt but the assurance of mercy and the free gift of God. It is the offer of pardon to the sinner sunk in sin and soiled by it and not to the self-righteous man who conforms to the codes of statutory religion with meticulous accuracy and rigour. It is only the legalistic view of morals
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that regards mercy as the reward of merit. To merit mercy is self-contradictory, and it breeds the bargaining temper. Justification is the work of God, and is not won by human merit ; and the good man is not the pietist that seeks pardon and has the consciousness of desert, but the sinner that is sought by the pardoning and suffering God. Incarnation is the invasion of divine mercy in a supernatural way into the history of humanity with a view to redeeming it from its sinful course. Israel was chosen by the Father in Heaven who sent His only begotten Son as the seed of Abraham to atone for the sins of humanity and thus annex it to God. The sinner is made righteous by the infusion of grace into his inner nature, and the burden of sin is removed for ever. Forgive- ness and penitence go together, and the fact that sin is forgiven presupposes the faith that it is forgivable. Penitence implies the sense of unworthiness and utter humility and the absence of self-complacence and conceit ; it is analysed into three factors, namely, the knowledge of the sinfulness of sin, the feeling of sorrow that results from the thought of sin, and the will to abandon the way of sin by seeking the mercy of God, the Redeemer. The Son of God, who is the Son of Man, is a living link of love between sinning humanity and the holiness of the Father in Heaven, and history is the process of the pardoning God incarnate in human society with a view to annexing it to God by atoning for its sins. The problem of the relation between merit and grace will be fully dealt with in the chapter on prapatti.
Christianity recognises the need for forgiveness, but its justification by faith or works does not satisfy the demands of ethical religion and solve the dualism between the ethical idea of righteousness and the religious faith of redemption.
12
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Buddhism rightly stresses the moral law of karma and dharma ; but, in its distrust of the moral self and the denial of the saving grace of God, it has starved religious consciousness and exposed it to relentless Vedantic criticism. The Bud- dhistic theory of the non-existence of the soul is refuted by the Veddnta Siitras as nihilistic and incapable of proof, and its futility is brought out in the history of philosophy, both in the west and in the east. Just as the realism of Locke led to the subjectivism of Berkeley and the nihilism of Hume and the reconstruction of philosophy by Kant in his Critique of Practi- cal reason, the realism of the Sautrantikas and the Vaibhdsikas led to the subjectivism of the Yogdcdra, the nihilism of the Mddhyamika, and finally to the re-enthronement of Upanisadic wisdom by Badarayana, which enshrines the truth of the self- revelation of Brahman in the immortal words " Whom the self chooses, unto him It reveals Itself." l The Christian doctrine of original sin and vicarious atonement does not elucidate the nature of moral freedom, the immortality of the self and the nature of God. The problem of unmerited suffer- ing and ethical responsibility is more fully explained by the theory of karma and the eternity of the self than by the theory of one birth and creation out of nothing and immortal- ity of the self. The Vedantic truth of the immanence of Brahman in all beings without abandoning His holiness is more valuable to a religion of redemption than the idea of God as the Heavenly Father, Lastly, the doctrine of a chosen people and a single incarnation does not satisfy the spiritual needs of the jivas for a universal redeemer. The " Song on the Chariot " is therefore more satisfactory ethically than the " Teaching under the Bo Tree " and spiritually more satisfying than the " Sermon on the Mount " ; arid it is
1 yam evai§a vgpute tena labhyah. — Ka. Up., I. ii. 22.
ONTOLOGY III: BRAHMAN AS RULER AND REDEEMER 179.
the Glta that is the ethical completion of Buddhism and the spiritual fulfilment of Christianity. Its ethical religion alone solves the dualism between retribution and redemptive mercy. Christianity is undoubtedly the religion of a pardoning God, but its Semitic doctrine of the Judgment Day with its theory of wheat and chaff, when the faithful are summoned to the throne of God and the heathen is hurled into eternal hell, is entirely foreign to the S'n Vaisnavite theory which starts with the idea of God as judge and ends with the incarnational assurance of salvation of all jlvas including the sub-human species, contained in the Carama S'loka of the Gtta.1
The oft-repeated criticism that Hinduism is not historic betrays a misunderstanding of the true import of religion. If religion deals with supra-sensuous and supra-rational reality and history with the temporal succession of events, a historic religion is a contradiction in terms. But if history is studied scientifically by turning sequence into consequence and philosophically by discerning the ultimate meaning of human progress, the conflict between history and religion is narrowed down. The moral and spiritual progress of the purusa should be contrasted with the concept of the process of the nature of prakrti and the purpose of God as parama- purusa. The world of prakrti is an ever-changing parindmic process and serves as a common theatre for the moulding of muktas. Matter is not false or evil, but the materialistic view of the dtman is false and evil. Moral progress pre- supposes the freedom of the purusa to gain self-sovereignty or be the slave of sensibility. Moral progress is a means to
1 sarva dharman parityajya mamekam s'arapam vraja I aham tva sarvapapebhyO mdk§ayi§yami ma s'ucah II — B.G,, XVIII. 66. t
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self-realisation. But even the realisation of the citman should point beyond itself to escape the perils of the ego-centric pre- dicament, and it should find its completion in the religious knowledge of the paramapurttsa as the home of all eternal values. The redemptive sankalpa of God is immanent in the human self with a view to freeing it from the fetters of karma and making it pure and perfect. The temporal process has a meaning only in the supra-temporal, and redemption is not a far-off divine event, as the idea of grace fulfils itself through karma. The purpose of Brahman is to brahmanise the jlva. The process of prakrti and the progress of the self have their meaning in the saving sankalpa of the Redeemer. Divine daya enters into the history of humanity with a view to moulding matter for the making of muktas and the inner meaning of human history is the brahmanisation of all jwas.
CHAPTER VII ONTOLOGY IV : BRAHMAN AS
nr^HE idea of Brahman as s'esi completes the triadic thought •*• of Vis'istddvaita and is essential to its practical side known asprapatti. The metaphysics of Vis'istddvaita deals with the definition of Brahman as the absolute sat as the ddhtira or all-Self, that pervades all beings as their immanent ground, and imparts its substantiality to them as their inner sustain- ing life. The value of this concept of ddhdra consists in the ontological knowledge that Brahman is the Being of our being and the real Reality that is the meaning of finite existence both as its cause and as its effect (updddna and upddeya). The self has its own separate being, but its ultimate meaning is Brahman, and it is therefore indistinguishable from it. The two can be metaphysically analysed but cannot be physically divided owing to their aprthaksiddha or inseparable relation. The ethical concept of Brahman as niyantd or Ruler corrects the pantheistic tendency to equate Brahman with the world by its definition of Brahman as nimitta kdrana or instrumen- tal cause and its insistence on the quality of moral eminence and holiness. While cit and acit have their being in Brahman, Brahman is not in them, as it exceeds their content, and is absolutely perfect. The value of this concept of niyantrtva consists in the ethical realisation that the self has the freedom
182 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
to gain sovereignty over its animal orprdkrta nature and attune its will to that of the infinite. The self thus derives its modal being and form from Brahman and depends on His will for its functioning. While adheyatva brings out the former truth of svarupas'ritatva or modal dependence, niydmyatva or the state of being ruled explains the latter idea of sankalpddhina or dependence on the divine will. The idea of Brahman as s'esi is a further determination of the divine nature and it is the consummation of the moral consciousness. Brahman is not only the ground of our being and the inner ruler, but is the goal of all our endeavour. He is the endeavour (updya) as well as the end of life (upeya) ; a task and a fact ; and all thinking beings and objects of thought exist not in their own right but as means to His satisfaction. Acit or cit is not a being-in-itself, but a being-for-another. Matter exists as a medium for self-realisation, and self-realisation is not for self- satisfaction, but for the satisfaction of the inner Self. On the religious view, paramapurusa the Supreme Self wills the true and the good, and the conation is immediately self-realised, but moral life implies an aspiration not yet changed into fruition, and it is the paradox of ethical religion that moral and spiritual life is a pursuit as well as a possession. It is solved by the spiritual faith that religion is the truth of moral life ; and that the inner Redeemer is Himself the way and the goal. Just as the moral law is the truth of the natural law, ethical religion is the philosophy of fruition in action. The finite self has its being in Brahman, belongs to it and exists for its satisfaction, and Brahman enters into the jiva as its self to brahmanise it. The joy of such fruition is not a hedonistic pleasure of self-elation but is a divine quality. In the divine nature, activity and attainment go together.
ONTOLOGY IV: BRAHMAN AS S'ESI 183
While everything in the universe, acit as well as cit, has its being in Brahman and depends on its will for its form and function, cit alone is conscious of this sustenance and depend- ence. The self-consciousness of the jiva implies reason and freedom of the will by which the atman eliminates everything that belongs to the world of prakrti from the motive of •conduct, and realises its spiritual nature. If the atman falsely identifies itself with prakrti and its gunas, it becomes the sensitive self or the product of nature, is phenomenalised and subjects itself to the external determinations of sense inclinations, and becomes the slave of desire. But if it exercises its moral freedom, it realises its noumenal nature as a spiritual being and attains self-mastery and autonomy. Every cetana, as a rational being, has the self-legislative will to free itself from the fetters of sensuous, spurious individuality and elevate itself to the autonomy of the pure atman. The true meaning of spiritual freedom thus won by moral effort consists in the knowledge that the real author of all our actions is the inner Ruler of all beings and in the dedication of every act of ours as the adoration of the highest Self or Paramapurusa. The transition from the spiritual conscious- ness of atman to the religious consciousness of paramatman or sarva s'esi is a revolution in life from the ego-centric outlook to the theo-centric. The motive of conduct is shifted from the self to its inner self and every karma is consecrated as kainkarya. The self gains its freedom to dedicate it to the inner atman who is eternally free and self-dependent. In this way the s'esa-s'esi relation between the finite and the infinite is transformed and deepened into the relation between dasa and svamin or servant and master.1 While cit serves the supreme will of the s'esi, the 1 Rahasyatrayasara, Chap. III.
J84 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VISTSTADVAITA
cetana or spiritual self has the conception of this end and offers his freedom as a self-gift to God as the real Self or author ,of all activity. While the aharikara-ridden jiva regards itself as the centre of the universe, and suffers from self-conceit and moral destruction, the spiritual self attunes itself to the will of the infinite as the sarva s'esi and svamin. There is no- God but God ; He alone is omnipotent and His will is eter- nally self-realised. Every creature depends on His redemptive will for its being and function. But the self has the creature- consciousness that it is made in the image of God, and owes its nature and value to Him as the svamin. Dasyatva or the idea of being a servant of God is thus ihejiva's consciousness of the eternal self-dependence of Is'vara and the dependence of the jwa on Is'vara and its free submission to His redemptive purpose. The supreme end of life is attained not in the natural world of prakrti or the spiritual world of atman, but in the religious sphere of paramatman. The idea of the s'esi gives the highest meaning to moral and spiritual experience as He is the means as well as the end of conduct. This is the true meaning of conduct as kaitikarya, and the highest freedom of life lies in the selfless service to the Supreme who is the only Self without a second. We cannot live except when we die to live. When ahankara is destroyed and the aham or ' I ' is offered to its inner Ruler as svamin, selfhood has its true mean- ing and culmination in consecrated service to the Lord and in self-oblation to Him, freed from the taint of self-conceit and self-righteousness.
The principle of selfhood is central to religious experience, and to know the self is to know the s'esi who is in us and with us as the Self of our self and is the fruition of our moral and spiritual consciousness. The terms ' philosophy of fruition ' and
ONTOLOGY IV : BRAHMAN AS S'ESI 185
' anthropotheism ' employed by Boyce Gibson in his " God with Us " may be restated in terms of the sfesa-sfesi relation. Fruition is not the attainment of hedonistic pleasure by means of egoistic effort, but is the end attained by self-effacement. It is the freedom of absolute self-surrender to the redemptive will of the s'esi as svamin. Moral experience has its true meaning only in the religious consciousness that the s'esi alone is the actor. This view provides for the freedom of the self and also for the self-activity of the Lord as the ultimate determiner of human destiny. It steers clear of the extremes of monadic ex- clusiveness and monistic absorption. The absolute includes our selfhood and does not destroy it, and it is therefore the Self of selves smaller than the smallest and greater than the greatest.
Vis'istddvaitic idealism admits the plurality of spiritual selves, but rejects the pluralistic or monadistic conclusion by regarding the jiva as pervaded or interpenetrated by the all- Self as s'esi. Religion transfigures the neuter Brahman, the ' It ' into the living presence of the Lord as the * Thou ' and the sense of the * Other ' as the svamin is essential to monism changed into monotheism to meet the demands of ethico- religious experience. God is not the ultimate or the unmoved Mover or Designer beyond the cosmos, but is the intimate Self that is closer to us than our own breath. The spiritual withinness of the s'esi is an assurance of His sure grace, but the intimacy does not connote identity or indistinguish-
ability, as the intimate Self is also without us as the tran-
•
scendentally Holy.1 Otherness does not mean externality or
1 e?a ma atmantarhrdaye aniyan vriberva yavadva sarsapadva s'yamakad- va s'yamakatanduladva e§a ma atmantarhrdaye jyayan prthivya jyayan antariksat jyayan divo jyayan ebhyo 15kebhyahl sarva karma sarvakamah sarvagandhah sarvarasSh sarvamidam abhyatto avakyanadarah esa ma atman- tarhrdaye etad brahma etam itah pretya abhisambhavitasmi.
—Ch. Up., III. xiv, 2 and 3.
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<exclusiveness. The relation of unity in duality thus brings out the immanence of Brahman and also His transcendence. Unity explains divine intimacy which is essential to redemptive love, and duality, the eternal otherness of the Holy beyond us by demanding reverence and self-surrender. When the jlva is caged in karma, it is exclusive and egoistic, but when it sheds its self-centredness and surrenders itself to the sfesi in Butter humility, a revolution is wrought in its nature, and its spiritual content is enriched by the inrush of divine grace. Faith in the s'esi as the only svdmin or Deliverer leads to absolute fidelity and loyalty, and self-surrender is the highest fulfilment of freedom. The jlva finds itself in order to resign itself to the Self that sustains it. The self derives its sub- stantiality from the ddheya aspect and its function from the niyanta aspect, and exists for the satisfaction of the s'esi. The idea that the s'esi is the means and the end of ethico- religious consciousness entitles Vis'istadvaita to be called the monistic philosophy of fruition and activism or theistic monism, as it does justice to the claims of the jlva as a self .and the s'esi as the Self of the self, and solves the dualism between human freedom and divine determinism.1
The svdmi-ddsa relation is rooted in the living faith that Bhagavdn as svdmin alone is the Lord of our being, .and in the feeling of absolute dependence of the jlva on Him. Ddsyam or service is not prostration to God as enforced obedi- ence is the pathological expression of a slave mentality which makes Deity a capricious demoniacal despot and the creature a -cringing crawling servitor, but is the self-gift of the dtman that is not the slave of sense and sensibility or indriya
1 c/. Spinoza. The Self is the eye with which the Seer of all things sees Himself and knows Himself to be divine.
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kinkara, but is the autonomous sovereign of the ethical realm that exalts itself by submitting to the will of the sv&min and is Bhagavadkinkara or the servant of God. The motto ' I serve ' (Ich Dien) was the spiritual motive of Bharata and Laksmana, and the free man's worship is really like that of the wise Hanuman who, by serving Rama, his Lord, could conquer the whole universe.
The concept of the jlva as a prakara or mode of the prakarin is enriched by the prakarin being regarded as a personality. There is a difference between a quality and a relation. While a quality is the quality of a substance, a relation is between two substances. The jlva is now conceived not as a mere quality of Brahman as its •aprthaksiddha vis'esana but as a self related to the Supreme Being as sfesi. Relational experience rightly understood is not self-contradictory but is inter-subjective intercourse and loving relation between God and man, and enriches spiritual consciousness. The idea of God as an ^xtra-cosmic Designer involves an external relation between the finite self and the infinite which is as prejudicial to religion as the absolute of metaphysics arrived at by the neti method of the logical intellect. The absolute is not mutable like matter nor karma-ridden like the jlva, but is the parama- purusa that permeates all things and is the inner Self of all selves. The self is a centre of immediate experience and is a person and not a thing, but it has a sense of finitude. The sfesa exists in the s'esi and for the s'esi. While the &esi is self-conscious and self-conditioned, the s'esa derives its sub- stantiality from Him and depends absolutely on His will. The western terms, spirit, soul and self, are not free from the defects of animism, anthropomorphism and personalism.
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The finite self is the atman which is different from matter, life and mind, and abides for ever as an eternal entity. Paramat- man is the Self of all selves and is immanent in them without being tainted by their imperfections of avidya and karma* The term personality applied to paramdtman requires clear definition by contrast with the jlvatman. It is different from the mind-body made of the stuff of prakrti and the jlvatman conditioned by karma and therefore the application of the human analogy is not quite relevant and adequate. The will of Is'vara differs from the will of man, and He is absolutely pure and perfect and does not suffer from self-contradiction. Man is made in the image of God and it is false anthropomor- phism to say that God is made in the image of man. It is crude teleology to attribute the world-order to a beneficent Provi- dence who has designed everything externally for the good of man. If nature is bountiful, it is also red in tooth and claw. But prakrti is a non-moral process of nature, and good and bad and pleasure and pain are entirely determined by the moral law of karma. The divine purpose consists in the deifica- tion of the self by paramdtman entering into it and atmanising it. The will of Is'vara is redemptive and the making of muktas is the supreme end of the mundane order. Brahman as the s'esi is not the personal God of western theism as that view ignores the truth of the antaryamin or indwelling Self. The absolutist criticism that personality, human and divine, involves the antithesis between the self and the non-self and that God is less than the all-inclusive absolute, has therefore no bearing on the Vis'i$tadvaitic view of the s'esi. The term supra- personal may be equated with it, if the distinction between prakrti, purusa and puru$6ttama or s'esi is borne in mind, and the religious consciousness of purusottama or s'esi is contrasted with the spiritual nature of the atman and the mechanical view
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•of prakrti. The philosophy of religion expounds the identity of existence and value by the comprehensive term of the absolute as paramdtman that is not an ' It ' or a ' He ', but a supra-personal self that enters into matter with the jlva with a view to dtmanise it. The relation between the s'esi and the &esa is personal and spiritual only in this sense, and the concepts of svdmin in terms of the Fatherhood and the Motherhood of the Deity bring out symbolically the spiritual experience of this relation in different forms. These experiences may now be briefly considered.
The concept of the Fatherhood of God connotes more spiritual intimacy than the external view of Is'vara as the Lord or King, and marks a transition from the attitude of the subject of a king to that of sonship or putratva. The true Infinite is not the Almighty but the giver of all good, and every jlva is an image of the Infinite. Is'vara is not a mere life-force or creative will, but a self-communicating love and the conserver of the eternal values of life. The Creator sows the seed of the self into the womb of matter and makes it into His own image. The divineness of the self consists in its regaining the quality of godliness and the eternal values of life. Prahrti is moulded for the making of the cetana and every jlva is, as it were, the son of God, and is the heir to immortal life and joy. The theistic idea of God as the Father of all is a living faith in the Lord of Paramapada or the supreme abode, entering into the self with a view to redeeming it from its career of self-alienation and sinfulness and transforming it into His own likeness or s&rupya and sdyujya. Theism, in the strict sense, holds that the Lord is the life-giver and also a law-giver, who demands absolute obedience to the law of righteousness, and burns with holy wrath against the offender
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who defies His will. Creative unity pre-supposes the unique- ness of the Creator and the fidelity of the creature to God the Father, and collision with His will entails punishment. He elects the good and eliminates the wicked, and is thus a saviour and a judge. He accepts the good and the godly, and hurls the sinner into hell. Meek submission to the will of the Father, in utter self-abasement and prayerfulness, is pleasing to Him, and merits justification and redemption. The act of prayer arises from the inner attitude of prayerful- ness ; it is not a vain repetition of words in a mood of self-righteousness, nor bargaining with God for worldly goods, but is the absolute trust in the Father, which consists in the thought " Thy will be done." Sonship extols the childlike simplicity and instinctive fidelity of the jiva to the Father without the sophistry of the dialectician and the service mentality of the subject. The son then knows the Father and the Father knows the son, and their reunion and the attainment of godlikeness by the jiva are the flower and fruition of the moral religion of the Fatherhood of God and the sonship of the jiva or pitr-putra-sambandha. Thus understood, the idea of the Father of all is entirely different from that of the father complex of psycho-analysis and the anthropomorphism of theology, higher or lower. Every jwa is divine and its divineness consists in regaining the quality of godlikeness.
When religion is conceived in terms of will and justice,, it demands the adoration of the Creator as the Father of all or jagat pita; but in the religion of redemption, justice is trans- formed into mercy. Maha Laksm! resides in the heart of religion as the embodiment of saving grace. She is the con- cretion of krpa and karutiya and offers an eternal assurance to
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erring humanity that the reign of righteousness is at heart also the reign of redemptive mercy. The Lord is the dis- penser of justice* according to merit or karma-phala-ddtdr though He is the saviour, and justice is an insistence on the fulfilment of the moral law by retribution and recompense. But retribution is transformed into forgiving love. Law is pervaded by love and overpowered by tenderness. Laksm! lives in the everblooming lotus of creative life, and is the heart of divinity. She depends absolutely on the Lord (pdratantrya) , belongs to Him only (ananydrha s'esatva) and is depended on by the s'esa. As the link of love, she mediates between the infinite that is omnipotent and the finite that is impotent, and transforms the majesty of law into the might of mercy. Daya has supernal beauty and sweetness. By her beauty Laksmi lures the Lord and turns Him into- the saviour ; she draws the sinner by her sweetness, and the sinner is saved by entire submission to His will. Thus, in the ethical religion of Vis'istddvaita or S'n Vaisnavism, the metaphysical truth of the absolute as the Supreme Self and a& &anrin and thejiva as His aprthaksiddha vis'esana is restated in terms of the non-dualism of s'riyahpati as the creator of the world and the conserver of values. To the mumuksu the Lord and S'n are one, though, to the analytic intellect,, they may appear as different and discrepant. The ethical idea of justice and dandadharatva and the religious idea of redemption and dayd are reconciled in ethical religion. It has its roots in justice and fruition in forgive- ness. The Lord rules by law and S'n lives by love, and the twa are indissoluble and eternally wedded to each other. While in Judaism and other schools of monotheism controlled by ethical ideas, law dominates love, in mystic religions love overflows law. Ethical monism co-ordinates and controls the two sides by the
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non-dual unity of law and love. To the mumuk$u who seeks God and is sought by Him, his faith in s'riyahpati is chang- ed into a soul-sight of the two as one, and, like the fragrance of the flower, the luminosity of light and the embodied soul, Narayana and SVf are indistinguishable.1 The ontological problem whether S'ri is finite or infinite is not so important to the mumuksu as the problem of mukti, and, judged from this point of view, the faith in S'ri as the concretion of karund and the heart of divinity is vital to the religion of redemption.
Atmaddsya is the realisation of the atman as different from the bodily-self made by prakrti and the three gunas and is the gift of the self-realised atman to s'riyahpati who is its real self. The self has monadic being and is at the same time a mode of God. The more it sheds its spurious indivi- duality made of ahankdra and the dross of sensuality, the more godly it becomes. Self-gift or dtmaddsya changes the ego-centric outlook into JW^ra-centric insight and the arc of individuality becomes so enlarged that the circumference is everywhere. In self-gift, exclusive selfishness alone is aban- doned and not the self. Ddsyatva connotes self-gift to God, its inner Ruler, in the vertical sense, and the attribute of serviceability to other jvvas in the horizontal sense. This truth may be formulated as the idea of God as s'riyahpati or divine Fatherhood and Motherhood, and the fraternity of all jivas as regards their essential nature. It brings out the spiritual intimacy between paramdtman and jwdtman more truly than the ideas of the Fatherhood of God and the brother- hood of man alone. Every jlva is made in the image of
1 Ananya raghavepaham bhaskarenaprabhayatha.-— Ramayana, Sundara- ka*da, XXI, 15,
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Paramatman, and has His eightfold perfections in so far as they are not obscured by avidya-kanna ; and all jivas are alike in so far as their essential intelligence is one. In their spiritual nature all jivas are one, as they are selves different -from the embodiment of prakrti. It is the bodily feeling that ^separates a Devadatta who is a god from a Yajnadatta that is a dog, and fosters the separatist consciousness and hatred. But as selves, all jivas are alike, though not identical, and in their essential intelligence they are one. The social ethics of Vis'istadvaita is thus founded on the solidarity of the spiritual universe and on the fraternity of all jivas. The philosopher, who has realised the atman, has the spiritual consciousness of samatva or the similarity of all jivas ; but, when the philosopher becomes religious, he knows that Paramatman is the meaning of his self and the means and end of his conduct. The self belongs to God, exists for His satisfaction, and sur- renders itself to His redemptive mercy. Bhagavad kainkarya or service to God implies service to all jivas. It extends in its meaniag to acarya kainkarya or service to the guru, who has the mercy of God without His juridical severity, service to bhagavatas who have devoted their lives to the worship of the Supreme and ultimately to all jivas, owing to the indwelling of Divinity in their hearts. Visnu pervades the universe as its Self and communicates His love to all beings and the whole Vaisnavised world pulsates with daya. The true Vaisnavite prefers renewed births as an opportunity for spiritual service to the suffering jivas to his own attainment of salvation and security, and he never rests satisfied till all jivas are freed from the ills of life. He makes no distinction between the elect and the eliminated or between wheat and chaff. The Vis'istadvaitic ideas of the indwelling of God in all jivas and of jivakarunya leading
13
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to kainkarya to all jlvas are more comprehensive than those of the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man as the term jwa includes even the sub-human species and the term antaryamin stresses the intimacy between the two atmans. The view that the idea of brotherhood is ulti- mately based on the identity between the jlva and Brahman, provides no motive for kainkarya and spiritual love.
CHAPTER VIII
ONTOLOGY V : BRAHMAN AS BHUVANA SUNDARA OR THE BEAUTIFUL
'HP HE philosophy of beauty makes the realm of beauty as -*- autonomous as those of truth and goodness, and an essential feature of reality. Metaphysical thinking, following the logico-mathematical method, dissects reality into blood- less abstractions, and dries up the fountains of emotional experience. Even Practical Reason, which affirms the primacy of moral consciousness, does not overcome the opposition between will and feeling, and reconcile the claims of free will and causality, and karma and krpa. Beauty is destroyed by intellectualising it. While the tools of thought and the rules of conduct reduce the spiritual spontaneity of life into dead symbols and rigid formulae, it is the ' vision and faculty divine ' of the artist that intuits the beauty that is in nature and man and beyond them. It is the aesthetic experience of Brahman as the Beautiful that dissolves the riddles of thought as Pure Reason and Practical Reason, and leads to immortal bliss. While the epistemological enquiry into truth and the ethical determination of goodness are problems of life, the aesthetic experience of beauty is immediate and not mediate. It is more a possession than a problem. Though beauty is alogical, it can be analysed and rendered articulate. Beauty is more
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attractive than truth and goodness, and Vis'istadvaita is the* only religion that recognises the eternal value of beauty as an essential factor in the divine plan of soul-making^ While the Vedanta Sutras systematise the truths of Vedanta and the Gltti formulates its ethics, the Bhaga- vata intuits the nature of Brahman as bhuvana sundara or the Beauty of the world that is expressed in nature and is not exhausted by it. The cosmos is concord and not discord, and is the creative expression of the divine Ilia or sport of love, and the Lord vivifies the jlva by sowing the seed of His primal beauty into its inner being. The beauties of nature and the fair forms of human and celestial beings are but partial revelations of the unsurpassed beauty of Brahman. Reality is essentially beautiful, but the world- ling steeped in sensuality renders it ugly. When, however,, the worldling turns into a mystic, his vision is transformed," and he communes with Beauty, and is lost in the ecstasy of that communion. Vis'istddvaitic aesthetics is a systematic exposition of the nature of Brahman as bhuvana sundara and has more value than the ideas of Brahman as ddhdra and niyantd. Though it may not fit into the triad of ddhdra, niyantd and s'esi, it satisfies the triple ideals of value-philos- ophy familiarly known as truth, goodness and beauty.
Aesthetics as a philosophy deals with the discovery of beauty and its criticism. Its nature and scope can be deter- mined by a constructive criticism of the theories advocated by its different western exponents in the light of the Upani- sadic method of spiritual elimination or induction.1 The naturalistic view of the beautiful merges aesthetics into
1 Vide the author's work, The Philosophy of the Beautiful, for a detailed study of what is summarised here.
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physics and traces it to the harmony that somehow arises in the hang of things. The beautiful can be explained mechanically by analysing its elements like symmetry, variety and smooth- ness. The next is the biological theory, which derives it from the vital functions. The play impulse is, according to it, the spontaneous expenditure of surplus energy. Beauty is also gene- tically explained as the bye-product of the sexual urge. Phallic and Freudian literature is the development of sexual monstro- sity and is the explanation of the normal by the abnormal, and it has little religious value. The third is the psychological view which describes beauty in terms of sense-impressions and their harmonious associations resulting in the agreeable feeling of pleasure. The pleasure theory, that a thing is beautiful if it causes pleasure, is too wide, and the con- verse is not true. All these theories explain the higher by the lower and fail to recognise the intrinsic nature of beauty, which shines like a star in its own light and has a self-communicating value. Beauty is not the quality of a thing that causes pleasure, to the subject, nor is it a subjec- tive creation. It is an immediate spiritual experience exalted by disinterested imagination, and is therefore the object of universal appreciation and satisfaction. Beauty, as an intuitional expression, has more aesthetic value than beauty as a dialectic unity like that of Hegel. Dialectics, however, has no direct influence on aesthetics. Aesthetics, as an organ of philosophy, defines beauty as an essential quality of Reality, which is transfigured into a mystic vision. In this way, the science of beauty is reinterpreted as a philosophy first by a process of creative criticism and then as a mystic view. Art criticism may be made in a realistic and idealistic way. While the realist relies on the representation of external beauty, the idealist defines beauty as a mental construction and
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an inner contemplation, and makes art subjective. Vis'istadvaita corrects these extremes by explaining beauty as both im- manent in nature and transcendent. Beauty is also evaluated from the standpoints of classicism and romanticism. The former type follows the a priori way, accepts absolute standards, and breeds the attitude of loyalty and reverence to tradition. But the romantic temper revolts against dogmatism and scho- lasticism, and delights in self -creative freedom and spontaneity. Its motto is not acceptance but adventure, and it is expression for the sake of expression. But the Vis'istddvaitic view of rasa and dhvani avoids scholasticism and sentimentalism, when it insists on the intuition of the beautiful as the fulfil- ment of a disciplined mind freed from sensual ugliness. Aesthetics as art criticism applies the criteria of immanence and transcendence, and elevates the science and art of aesthe- tics into a philosophy as the critique of the creative impulse. It is the intuitive expression of infinite beauty through the medium of the finite, and it portrays the beauties of nature and the embodied self as partial revelations of the absolute beauty of God as param jyotis or the supreme shining self and bhuvana sundara without any shade of ugliness.
Aesthetics, like ethics and epistemology, is ultimately rooted in metaphysics. In modern western thought it was Kant who first recognised the autonomous value of the beauti- ful ; but he defined it subjectively as a construction by contem- plative imagination. Post-Kantian thought, like that of Schel- ling and of Hegel, formulated aesthetic philosophy, and it was further developed in the absolutism of Bradley and Bosanquet.- To Schelling, the pantheistic idealist, art is the only organ of philosophy, and it is by an organic view and aesthetic intuition and not by scientific understanding that the
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artist -philosopher knows the harmony of things, which pulsates rhythmically in all beings. The absolute is the identity of nature and spirit. The universe is a work of art, and nature itself is a great poem. Nature is not dead but alive, and has kinship with man. It evolves and becomes self-conscious in man ; and, in artistic intuition, the absolute becomes fully conscious of its creative activity. Hegel stresses the rational, as constrasted with the romantic, side of the world of experi- ence and regards philosophy as conceptual knowledge and not as artistic intuition. The absolute mind reveals itself dialecti- cally in art, religion and philosophy, and art is the lowest stage, as it represents sensible knowledge and not spirit. Beauty is the ideal of art, and its evolution is symbolic, classi- cal and romantic. The first is the primitive pantheism of the east, which shows the inadequacy of form and content. The classical stage is anthropomorphic, and in the final or romantic type, art transcends itself. The triumph of art is thus the defeat of art, when it becomes aware of itself, and passes into the absolute * idea ' of philosophy. Bradley also brings out the inadequacy of relational and discursive thought to know the absolute and regards beauty as self-contradictory and only an appearance of reality. Beauty is neither im- mediate nor harmonious in itself. It is self -existent, pleasant and self-contained ; but what is pleasant should be pleasant for some one, and therefore it cannot be self-contained. If beauty is to be harmonious in itself, it should transcend this opposition. If it does so, it ceases to be beauty. But in the unity of the absolute, evil, error and ugjiness are transmuted and they somehow contribute to its wealth. Bosanquet also thinks that beauty and ugliness are self-contradictory and are synthesised in the absolute. He defines beauty as what is aesthetically excellent, and it is feeling become plastic. The
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philosophy of the beautiful fails to recognise the autonomy of aesthetic experience, the distinction between the beauties of nature and the spiritual self, and the difference between beauty and ugliness. Western absolutism, on the whole, has a bhedabheda tendency, and its fatal defect is the predication of ugliness to the absolute in its intrinsic or transmuted form.
Reality is essentially beautiful and it is ugliness that is a problem and not beauty, and the proneness to uglify the world is traceable to the creative freedom of the finite self and not to the infinite. Aesthetic philosophy thus affirms the intrinsic nature and eternal value of the beautiful as an essential quality of reality and not as an illusory appearance, and presupposes the distincticn between the beautiful and the ugly. To say that the distinction is due to avidya which is sublated by jnana, or that ugliness heightens the effect of intricate and difficult beauty is to deny the value of aesthetics itself. The pluralistic view that there are atomic bits of beauty, which cannot be unified and harmonised, is as futile as the absolutistic contention that beauty and ugliness are relative and discrepant and that they should be absorbed or annulled. Ugliness is an empirical experience, but, in the transcendental state, it ought not to be. Plato is the foremost of the aesthe- tic thinkers of ancient Greece and his classical account of the absolute as the beautiful in ascending stages is highly sugges- tive owing to its kinship with Hindu thought. Bosanquet's exposition of the beautiful has the merit of recognising the interplay of form and matter in aesthetic appreciation, though it has to be Vedantically reinterpreted. Beauty is formless, and yet has a form of its own. The form of beauty varies with its matter and determines its value. The soul of beauty vani- shes if it is not embodied in its own idealised or spiritualised
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medium. Beauty is in the look and feel of the medium The beauties of nature are less attractive than the fair forms of birds and other animals. The triumph of beauty is the •creation of the human form with all its intricacy and stability ; but absolute beauty has a transcendent charm and eternal value. Vis'istadvaita recognises the relativity of form and matter and constructs a ladder of beauty from earth to heaven, and its view of absolute beauty is finally transfigured into an enchanting vision. Ugliness is the result of the finite self being soiled by sensuality ; but when the self is released from its dross, it realises itself as the embodiment of divine beauty.
The aesthetic philosophy of Vis'istadvaita transforms the Brahman of metaphysics and the I&vara of ethics into the bhuvana sundara of the Bhagavata. The absolute of metaphysics becomes the beautiful God of aesthetic religion. The self-resplendent and unsurpassable beauty of Brahman is embodied in the universe, but exceeds its finiteness and imper- fections. Brahman is niravayava or without parts and, in the ontological sense, transcends the psycho-physical changes of prakrti, and is nirguna. In the ethical sense He is free from the imperfections of the karma-ridden self and has infinite perfections. As the True of the true and the super-Subject, He is infinite and beyond all conceptual categories, and, at the same time, has an infinity of perfections. But, to the mumuksu, as a mystic who seeks the intimacy of communion, the ontolo- ,gical Beyond and the ethically Perfect have no value or attrac- tion. It is aesthetics that mediates between metaphysics and -ethics, and brings down heaven to earth, and elevates earth to heaven. Aesthetics is midway between sensuousness and spirituality, and bridges the gulf between the finite and the in- finite. This truth is beautifully expressed in the triple idea
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of Brahman as possessing svarupa, rupa and guna. His svarupa, as sat without a second as causa sui, cosmic ground and super-Subject, creates a feeling of remoteness, and His gunas arouse the sense of the Holy and the feeling of reverence. But His rupa or form as bhuvana sundara and Manmatha-manmatha acts as an aesthetic copula between His svarupa and His gunas and brings to light the attributes of intimacy and attractiveness, which are so vital to the mystic consciousness. Brahman that transcends the world of cit and acit enters into the atman with a view to deify it and, to satisfy the mumuksu who is a mystic, He individualises an aprakrta or super-sensuous form of His own with bewitching beauty designed to remove the fleshly feeling of the jlva and beautify it. The brilliant self that, as param jyotis, illumines the sun and the stellar worlds is the inner beauty that illumines individuality. He, who dwells in the sun, the moon and the stars, whom the sun, the moon and the stars do not know, but whose body they are, is the inner Ruler Immortal.1 The golden Person within the solar orb is the Person that shines in the atman with a divine form of infinite beauty. This beauteous form of Brahman is not a concession to the avidya- ridden jlva caught up in the self-contradiction of the finite- infinite, but is the incarnation of the super-sensuous Beauty that allures the self and ravishes it out of its fleshly feeling. The mundane beauty of Manmatha or Eros that soils the jiva is conquered by the supramundane beauty of bhuvana sundara, and He is therefore called Manmatha-manmatha or
1 ya aditye ti§than aditySd antarah yamadityo na veda yasya Sdityah s'arlram ya adityam antaro yamayati esa ta atma antarySmyamrtah. — Br. Up,, III. vii. 9.
yas'candratarake tisthan candratarakad antarah yam candratarakam na veda yasya candratarakam s'ariram yas'candratarakam antaro yamayati e?a ta itma antaryamyamrtah. — Br. Up.t III. vii. 11.
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Madana Mohana and not Madana-dahana who transforms and transcends Eros but does not destroy him.
The cosmos is a concord and not a discord, and is a living expression of the beauty of Brahman. From the metaphysical point of view, creation is explained as the self-differentiation of the absolute in which Brahman wills to be the many and be- comes the manifold of acetana and cetana. On the ethical view the immanent world ground becomes the eminent Is'vara or moral ruler of the world. The avidya theory of Advaita and the parinama-vdda of Bheddbheda are criticised by, and restated as, the ethical theory of karma, which traces the evolution of the species and their variations to the moral differences caused by the karma of the individual. The idea of an extra-cosmic Deity with an increasing cosmic purpose militates against the ideas of omniscience and perfection. The theory of Kid remedies this defect by insisting on the primacy of aesthetic consciousness and regarding the cosmic process as the spontaneous creative expression of Brahman as the divine artist.1 Brahman is pure and perfect, and His will is eternally self-realised. But His omnipotence and perfection cannot be reconciled with the reality of evil and the fact of unmerited suffering. This is the most irrational and worst of all possi- ble worlds, and no merciful divinity would make a world so full of evil and suffering. But aesthetic philosophy, as the completion of metaphysics and ethics, elevates the problem to the level of mystic intuition and gives a new meaning to existence and experience. While thought dissects life and creates ultimate doubts, moral earnestness breeds a sense of responsibility and sinfulness. The aesthetic consciousness disciplined by logic and freed from the uglifying effect of 1 S.B., II. i. 33.
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karma sees everything with the eye of Brahman, and the world view is transfigured into an artistic vision. Creation is then intuited as the play or sport of the divine Artist, and is regarded as His recreation or Ilia. Srsti is the creative joy of self-expression and self-division and the •evolution of nama-rupa is the evolution of infinite forms of beauty from the infinite Beauty that has formless form. The world of space-time is the eternal interplay between the static and the dynamic aspects of beauty. The free duration of time intuited as creative evolution but spatial- ised by the intellect is as one-sided as the static theory of reality which denies teleology, and explains the universe mathematically in terms of space. But the creative activity of God in the world of space and time or space-time is a symphony without any jarring note. Each self is like a note in the musical scale,1 and marks a rhythm in the dance of divine beauty. The world is a poem of beauty, and its sonorousness is imparted to every part of it and makes it vibrate with its music. The divine Artist pours beauty into nature with a view to removing the fleshly feeling and other blemishes of the finite self, beautifying it and playing the game of love with it.
The beauty of Brahman is self-resplendent, and it radiates its entrancing joy to the world by beautifying the self. This art is known in mystic literature as the process of spiritual alchemy. The divine Artist assumes five enchanting forms of beauty in order to beautify the ugly self, which is sullied by visaya kama or the lusts of the flesh. These forms are the transcendental or para, the infinite or vyuha, the imma- ,nent or antaryamin, the incarnational which is historical or 1 S. B., I. i, 1, p. 67 ; S. B. E., XLVIII, p. 96 and V. P., II. xiv, 32.
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avatdra and the permanent or area. The Upanisads glorify the transcendental beauty of Brahman as param jydtis (jydtisdm jydtis)1 where the sun does not shine, nor the moon, nor the stars, nor lightning. The Vedanta Sfttras identify the Light, which shines above this heaven,8 higher than everything else, in the highest world, beyond which there are no higher worlds, with the highest Person of infinite splendour in the supreme world of eternal glory or nitya vibhuti* of which this phenomenal world is only a partial expression due to His yoga-mdyd. In that world of beauty Yonder, nature as s'uddha satva shines for ever as space- less space without the passing shadows of parindma, bodying forth the ideas of absolute beauty. The Pdnca- rdtra as Brahmopanisad enshrining the foundational truths of Vedanta exalts the vyuha form of beauty and the Purdnas glorify the sleeping beauty that reposes on the milky ocean of infinity and, with perfect art, portray the creation of the cosmos as the awakening to life of the archetypal forms of beauty. The divine Artist is not an arch-illusionist that projects an as-if world nor an extra-cosmic personality that has an ever increasing purpose, but is an alchemist who makes a beautiful soul by removing its dross of sensuality or kdma and plays with it the game of love. The third aspect of divine love is the antarydmin or Beauty that dwells in the lotus heart of all living beings as their inner Enchanter making them pulsate with its creative life and participate in its inner joy.
1 tac cubhram jyotisam jyOtis tad yadatmavido viduh II
na tatra suryo bhati na candratarakam nema
vidyuto bhant ikutoyam agnih. — Mund. Up.t II. ii, 9 and 10. Vide, pi 109§
2 jyotis'caraaabhidhanat. — V. S. I. i. 25.
9 atha yad atah parO divo jyOtir dipyate visVatalji prsthesu sarvatah p^thesu anuttamesu uttamesu lokesu idam vava tad yad idam asminnantah puruse jyOtih. — Ch. Up., III. xiii, 7.
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The body is not composed of dust or conceived in sin, but is Brahmapuri or the city of Brahman,1 and is a living temple of divine beauty. The devas delight in dwelling in the human body and Deva-deva, the God of all gods, as bhuvana sundara, abides in its dahardkdsra with a view to vivifying the moral self and making it immortal. The great Alchemist transmutes the ascetic that shuns the body as a house of sin into a hedonist allured by the beauty of God and entranced by it.
The Rdmdyana and the Bhdgavata have specialised in the philosophy of the beautiful and have glorified the ava~ tdras as the incarnation of the super-sensuous and supra- personal beauty of Brahman in sensuous forms. The wisdom of Veddnta is summed up in the avatdra rahasya, which is the most sacred truth or uttama rahasya of revelation and which cannot be described by words or defined by thought. The incarnation is not an illusory appearance of the absolute (indra jdla) caught up in the contradictions *>f space-time-causality nor the embodied self with a psycho- physically organised mind-body conditioned by karma and subject to birth and death. The beauteous form of the avatdra is aprdkrta, not made of perishing prakrti nor the pro- duct of karma, but is self-determined and self-evolved. Even the view of ethical religion is not adequate when it •describes the avatdra as the descent of I&vara into the empirical life of the jlva and the history of humanity in moments of cosmic moral crisis with a view to punish the wicked by taking away their tools of wickedness and re- 'establish the law of righteousness. The avatdra satisfies the mystic yearning of the jndni, who hungers for God and pines for the soul-sight of His enchanting beauty. The Ravisher of 1 Ch. up.t Vin. i. i.
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souls is also a self-suffering God who cannot bear separation from His ' other,' and His captivating beauty is even physically enjoyable. The beauty of avatara is elusive and not illusory or erroneous. It has a seductive and irresistible charm. The beauty of S'ri Rama was so entrancing that the rsis and the yogis of the forest of Dandaka rapt in samadhi were spell- bound and became the Gopis of Brndavan to relish its immortal bliss. The Bhagavata is a poem par excellence of the dalliance of divine Beauty with the beloved beings of the enchanted land of Brndavan. The transcendent Beauty that is infinite and eternal, incarnates according to a divinely ordered plan on the metamorphosed beauty spot, Brndavan, with a world-bewitching form (trailokya kanta) to play the Ula of love. The metaphysical concept of maya is now changed into the aesthetic idea of the mayin or divine Artist. The silvery Yamuna glides on in ever-swelling joy, the trees bloom, the lotus and the lilies blossom, and the gentle wind spreads its fragrance, the birds sing their sweetest songs and all nature wears a festive garb. The shining gods abandon their celes- tial homes and the munis renouncing their meditation are drawn into this charmed circle by its strange spell of beauty. The Holy of holies who is absolutely free from evil (yogesrva- ris'vara) transforms Himself into the Ravisher of souls or Manmatha-manmatha, and it is only the pure in heart, that are free from the lusts of the flesh or trsnas, that can revel in the bliss of Krsna lila. The righteousness of S'ri Rama is consummated in the rapture of Krsna lila, and the Lord of beauty is jara cora s'ikhdmani, who steals away the hearts of all and ravishes them out of their fleshly feeling. The fifth abode of Beauty is the permanent incarnation of area, «in which the transcendental Beauty beyond the phenomenal world enters into the chosen forms of prakrti as vigraha.
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Area is not the idealised projection of creative imagination' touched by religious feeling nor the symbolic expression of the infinite in the finite, but is the incarnation of divine beauty itself and the embodiment of His accessibility even in the world of sense-perception. Infinite Beauty enters into finite forms without losing His infinity and Isrvaratva to com- mune with the devotee that longs for His contact and to infinitise his aesthetic consciousness. Thus the sleeping beauty of ksirabdhi, the Ocean Pacific, reposing on infin- ity becomes the speaking beauty in the stone. Only those who have eyes can see the enchanting form, and only those who have ears can hear the divine song. The Alvars with a genius for intuiting the area had a soul-sight of Beauty and their inspiring utterances are an invitation ta humanity to share in the mystic rapture of such aesthetic communion.
The Vis'istadvaitic philosophy of art is ultimately founded on the idea that the beauty of Brahman leads to eternal bliss and the exposition of this truth brings out the vital relation between aesthetics or Alankara S'astra and Vedanta. In the synthetic philosophy of Vis'istddvaita, science and art are exhibited as a way of approach to Brahmajnana and Brahma- nanda. Alankara S'astra, as aesthetic science, has its ultimate meaning in the artistic philosophy of Brahman as the Beautiful and the Blissful. Every aesthetic experience has its emotional content, though every emotion is not aesthetic ; and the theory of rasa is a basic concept in Hindu art. While every living being or jlva is attracted by beauty, man alone knows that he has such responsiveness, and con- structs an aesthetic philosophy. When the philosopher not only thinks of beauty but is moved by it, he becomes an
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artist and poet. Beauty is an intuition-expression, and, with- out a medium or sensuous content, it loses its soul. Poetry holds the sceptre among the arts, spatial and temporal, owing to its affinity to mystic experience. The poet, with his divine vision, catches a glimpse of the beauty that never was in nature, and, by the magic of his words, communicates its inner charm to others. Literature as poetry or kdvya is word- magic, having a moving appeal and leading to immediate enjoyment. Rasa or spiritual exaltation is the very soul of poesy (vdkyam rasdtmakam) and is experienced by responsive minds, as aesthetic joy accompanies the contemplation of a bhdva. Rasa is the feel of a ruling aesthetic mood ; it is not, like taste, a physical joy, but is an inner spiritual enjoyment. It is an intuition with its own artistic expression. Each rasa is sui generis and a specific feeling tone having its own aesthetic necessity and value, and is not a response to an alien situation. Being self-creative, a bhdva involves the more of itself and its joy is fecundative. The immortal beauty of the Rdmdyana is intuited and cannot be linguistically explained on account of its infinite suggestiveness, sweetness and inner grace. These qualities have an eternal appeal to the heart of humanity. The aesthetic moods are classified according to their feeling tone into nine types, namely, blbhatsa or disgust, bhaydnaka or fear, vira or heroism, adbhuta or the marvellous, raudra or the angry, hdsya or the humorous, karuna or the pathetic, s'dnta or the peaceful and s'rngdra or love. S'rrigdra rasa is the queen of the rasas, and has supreme value in aesthetic religion.
Aesthetic religion utilises the emotion of fear, anger, wonder and sex, and, by sublimating and spiritualising them, removes their sensual content and directs them Godward.
14
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This view avoids the perils of sensualistic hedonism and asceticism, and makes feeling furnish the dynamic element of the religious motive. Voluptuousness is the exhibition of feeling in excelsis, and asceticism is its inhibition in excelsis, and both are fatal to aesthetic religion. Though Freudian psycho-anlaysis in its application to religion is an education in ugliness or nastiness, it has a negative value inasmuch as it has laid bare the evils of the disease of abnormal repression. But aesthetic religion is founded on normal psychology ; it recognises the truth that the instincts can only be spiritual- ised and not destroyed. The Bhdgavata, in its inimitable way, furnishes the raison de etre for the education of instinct- ive life, and offers hope even to the asuric type like Kamsa and S'is'upala. It declares that those who with devotion direct their sexual passion or kama, hatred or krodha, fear or bhaya, feeling of friendship or sneha, feeling of comradeship or aikya and love or bhakti (sauhrda), ceaselessly to Hari, become one with Him and attain His likeness or tanmaya.1 The evil in them is destroyed by Hari and their goodness leads to godliness. In the alchemy of Krsna love, the blemish of every jwa is removed and the jlva is brahmanised. When the bhdvas are spiritualised, they become the essential factors of aesthetic religion. The vision of the cosmic form or vis'varupa granted to Arjuna by the Lord is an instance of the sentiments of bhayanaka, vlra, raudra and adbhuta which are intrinsically -spiritual. Arjuna was awe-struck by the vision of the formless form of Krsna as Is'vara, with its endless stretch of space and sweep of time, appearing as the world destroyer. The infinity and omnipotence of Is'vara
1 kamam krodham bhayam sneham aikyam sauhrdam eva ca I nityamharau vidadhatah yanti'tanmayatam hi te II
— Bhagavata, X. xxix, 15*
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contrasted with the impotence and the infinitesimal nature of the jlva as the atomic self, generate the feeling of one's own - insignificance and arouse the sentiment of reverence. Cosmic aesthetic pleasure results from the experience of the incongrui- ties of life, and is opposed to serious-mindedness and light- heartedness. Nammalvar enjoys the wonder of the self- contradictions of the world play or viruddha vibhuti of the Mayin l and seeks to laugh it away by trying to go beyond it. In the blending of the joy of the eternal realm and the tragic tension of the realm of samsara, there results the aesthetic feeling that the cosmos has a comic touch. The Ramayana is the epic of the reign of karuna rasa, and with consummate poetic genius, to which there is no parallel, the other rasas are harmoniously blended with karuna by the rsi to arouse the mood of pity and develop it to perfection. S'rngara rasa is the joy of seeking the beauty of sex and revelling in love as in the S'akuntala and is regarded as the rasa par excellence, as it is the consummation of human love. Sex is the master device of nature to draw souls together, and cosmic creation is itself traced to the sat without a second realising itself as the male and female principles of life. The science of erotics or Kama S'astra is an aesthetic education, which consists in changing the brute feeling into human love and bringing about the psycho-physical at-one-ment of two souls. The joy of sam- s'lesa or the union of lovers is more than the logical satisfaction of the synthesis of opposites. The paradox of love lies in con- quest by submission and the heightening of love by separation. Mystic idealism utilises the fidelity and mutualness given in smgara rasa, and elevates it to the level of the divine love of Radha and Andal. It is not erotism but the fulfilment of divine love, and the love of S'ri Krsna as Manmatha-manmatha
1 Nammalvar, Tiruvoymozhi, VI. iii.
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subdues Eros and turns the visaya kama of the earth- bound selves into Bhagavad kama of the bhakta, and s'rngara rasa becomes Brahmarasa and Brahmananda.
The attainment of bliss and the removal of sorrow are the end and aim of life ; but the nature of bliss and the means of securing it can be determined only by Vedantic aesthetics. To the materialistic and egoistic hedonist or Carvaka, the highest good of life is the feeling of pleasure derived by the gratification of the cravings of the senses and of the animal appetite. What is pleasant or pleasurable for the moment has alone the greatest attraction. In a more moderate form, it is the pursuit of the pleasures of life as a whole under the guid- ance of prudence and these pleasures as different from the feeling of pleasure are the objects of sense presented to the purusa as desired ends or visaya kama. But when the desire is not satisfied, there is disappointment followed by krodha and mental confusion. Sense-pleasures are desired, no doubt, but they are not desirable, as they are fleeting and defective. Pleasure and pain always go together, and reflection on the hedonistic values of life breeds the mood of pessimism and sick-mindedness. Pleasures excite the mind and exhaust it ; they tickle us for the moment, and pass away the next moment. Even the pleasures of Svarga come and go, and they have no stability or inner value. Man finds satis- faction in the life of reason, aesthetic contemplation and altruistic service, and mental happiness is more valuable than the external pleasures derived from the objects of sense. More valuable than mental happiness is the spiritual joy of self-reali- sation or kaivalya. The knowledge of dtman as contrasted with prakrti is an inner joy, which is qualitatively different from the pleasures of hedonism. While the pleasures of
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prakrti are transient and trivial, the joy of self-knowledge or kaivalya is stable, and is an instance of s'dnti. But even this state is not the highest end, as it is ego-centric and may lapse into quietism. The value of Bhagavad kdma is higher than that of dtma kama and visaya kdma, and by intuiting the beauty of Brahman, the dtman is immersed in immortal bliss. Vis'istddvaita is the only religion that equates the absolute with the God of Beauty and Bliss and that may therefore be called aesthetic religion. In this regard, it is allied to mysti- cism, which may be explained as the spiritual yearning of the jlva for communion with its inner Self of Beauty and absorp- tion in the ecstasy of such communion. The Upanisad pours out in unsurpassable poetry the beauty of this truth in the Anandavalli, the Bhumavidyd and the Madhuvidyd.
The Taittirlya Upanisad says that all living beings are born in dnanda, live, move and have their being in dnanda and enter into it, and defines Brahman as dnandamaya? The S'ruti employs a calculus of pleasures in an ascending scale of values, and ends with the highest bliss of Brahman. It is supreme and not to be surpassed, and cannot be adequately described and defined. The pleasures of the finite self ranging from earthly paradise to the perennial delights of Brahma (as distinguished from Brahman) are tinged with pain, and pale into nothingness when compared to Brahmd- nanda. Though Brahman is the inner self of the jiva, it is not touched or tainted by its imperfections and is absolutely blessed. The term dnandamaya does not connote maximum pleasure, implying the presence of pain, as the concepts of quantity and causality are only empirical categories applicable
1 anandaddhyeva khalvimani bhfltSni jayante I anandena jatani jivanti I Anandam prayantyabhisamvis'antiti II— Taitt. Up., Bhrguvalli, 6.
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to the self of samsara, and have no transcendental use. Besides, the mantra which defines Brahman as satyam, jnanam and anantam also defines it as abounding bliss and, in the light of the rule of coordination, the term dnandamaya connotes Brahman and not the jiva. The Upanisad " He who knows Brahman attains the highest " l distinguishes between the self that attains bliss and Brahman that is attained. Brahman, the cosmic self, is also the inner self of the jlva, and it finally imparts its bliss to it and brahmanises it. The enjoy- ment of Brahmarasa by the freed self does not connote the absolute identity of the experiencing subject and the experienc- ed object. The Madhuvidya is also a Brahmopanisad, as it explains the nectar of the sun extracted by the devas in a Vedic * way as the bliss of Brahman that is the Light of lights and the inner Self of the sun. The self within the eye is Brahman the beautiful and the blissful 3. He is called vdmanlh for He bestows all blessings, bhamanlh for He is thejyotis or splendour that shines in all the worlds. He is ka or pleasure and kha, the all-pervading infinite. In the exposition of the Bhumavidya, Ramanuja, following the author of the Sutras (I. iii. 7-8), concludes that Brahman is bhuman or infinite bliss. By intuiting Brahman the freed self intuits His vibhuti or ai&varya, where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else and knows nothing else.4 There is nothing apart from
1 Brahmavid apndti param I tad e^abhyukta I satyam jfianam anantam brahma I— Taitt. Up., Anandavalli, 1.
9 asau va adityQ deva madhu. — Ch. Up,, III. i. 1.
8 ya esoksini purus.5 drs'yate e§a atmeti hovaca etad amrtam abhayam etad brahma I— Ch. Up., IV, *xv. 1, e§a u eva vamanlh — IV* xv. 3. esa u eva bhamanih — IV. xv. 4, pranobrahma kambrahma khambrahma .... yadvava- kam tadevakham yadeva kham tadevakamiti — IV. x. 5.
4 yatra nanyatpas'yati nanyat s'ynSti nanyad vijanati sa bhumah atha yatranyat pas'yati anyat s'rnOti anyad vijanati tadalpam yO vai bhuma tad amrtam I— Ch. Up., VII. xxiv. 1.
sa eva adhastat sa uparisthat sa pas'cat sa purastat sa dak§inata(i sa uttaratah sa evedam sarvam iti I — Ch. Up,, VII, xxv. 1.
ONTOLOGY V: BRAHMAN AS BHUVANA SUNDARA 215
Brahman, and the mystic who rejoices in the self and revels in it, sees everything with the eye of Brahman, and obtains everything everywhere. Pleasure is what is agreeable to man, and pain is what is disagreeable to him. To a patient suffering from excessive bile, drinking water which is pure and agree- able is not pleasant ; but to the healthy man it is whole- some and pleasant. In the same way the jlva suffering from avidya-karma views the world as distinct from Brahman and subjects himself to the ills of samsara. But the mukta freed from avidya-karma intuits the same world as the ais'varya of Brahman, and feels no pain or sorrow at all. The intuition of Brahman as the All-Self leads to infinite and immortal bliss. The author of the Sutras following S'ruti thus concludes that the term anandamaya refers to Brahman and not to the jlva or pradhana and Vi&istadvaita with its genius for coordination and harmonising apparent contradictions accepts the Sutras and the S'ruti and affirms that the absolute as the sat without a second is ananda- maya without any shadow of imperfection, and is the Highest Self.
The Advaitin also follows the same line of reasoning and comes to the same conclusion, but his pet theory of Mayavada overpowers his aesthetic inclinations ; and he suddenly arrests with his destructive dialectics the free flow of aesthetic intuition. He concludes the adhikarana by saying that the self consisting of bliss is the highest self and then springs a surprise by contradicting it. The term anandamaya has a false meaning and a true meaning. The text seems to have a context, but it has really a relative value alone as the absolute is not limited logic- ally and linguistically. From the point of view of the author of the Sutras, Brahman is anandamaya but, on the grounds of
216 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
Mayavada, the concept of anandamaya involves the self- contradiction of maya, and has to be rejected for three reasons. The whole topic refers to the absolute beyond the appearances, when it lays down the truth : yatovaco nivartante aprapya manasd saha. The nature of Brahman cannot be described or defined, because reality is beyond all relational thought. Thought is self-discrepant, as it claims to know reality, but fails in its attempt. It appears to be real, but is not real. Every act of predication is, therefore, ultimately futile and false, and is shipwrecked in its entrance to the harbour of reality. The term anandamaya seeks to define the nature of Brahman by attributing to Brahman the quality of ananda. But Brahman is beyond all ideas of predication, and therefore the definition is futile and should be rejected. Secondly, the term anandamaya cannot refer to Brahman as the suffix maya implies modification or vikara as in the case of annamaya, pranamaya and manomaya. Whatever is made or modified is an effect and, is imperfect, and, if Brahman is ananda- maya or made of bliss, it is defective. The concept of causality does not adequately expound the nature of the absolute. It is therefore held by the Advaitin that determi- nation is negation. Brahman as the infinite is the not-finite, and the quality of anandamaya is a limiting concept, which cannot be ascribed to Brahman. The symbology employed in the whole topic is to be contrasted with the metaphysical exposition of the absolute. Thirdly, even if the suffix maya connotes not vikara, butpracurya as stated in the Sutra I. i. 14, it implies maximum bliss with minimum pain and the moment we think the absolute, we give it an empirical dress and finitise it. The topic thus conveys a knowledge of the absolute or nirguna Brahman and the concept of anandamaya intimates the nature of savi&esa Brahman. The absolute is
ONTOLOGY V: BRAHMAN AS BHUVANA SUNDARA 21>
the intuitional highest and is ananda, but Is'vara is ananda maya, the logical highest or the highest conceptual reading oi the absolute.
Bhaskara's criticism of the theory of two Brahmans ij violent, as he condemns it as a case of sruticide or s'rutihan (sacrifice of scripture) and as'rutakalpana or mere fabrication The Upanisad follows the a priori road that the knower o Brahman attains the highest and repudiates the agnostii view that the absolute transcends relational thought. Th< Brahma Sutras would be stultified if thought could no reach reality, and the ' That ' is beyond the ' What '. It is th< first principle of philosophy that Brahman can be apprehendec by the mind purified by meditating on Brahman and not b] the impure in heart. When consciousness is freed from th< effect of karma, it can intuit the infinite. The term ananda maya refers to the blissfulness of Brahman and not to thi absolute identity between Brahman and bliss. Nirgunt Brahman is bare being without any positive content, anc therefore the bliss of Brahman is not the bliss that is Brah man. If predication is a perversion of reality and not it affirmation, the result is scepticism and there will be no theon of bliss at all. Ananda in the state of mukti is the fulnesi of bliss and mukti is not the negation of sorrow as the Vais'esikc says. The third view that the abundance of bliss impliei the co-existence of pain is countered by the argument tha the topic adopts a calculus to prove that the bliss of Brahmai is the highest in the scale and not the absolute beyonc thought. Just as lamp light fades into nothing in the pre sence of sun light, the pleasures of life are as nothing com pared to the ecstasy of Brahmanubhava or the experience 01 Brahman. It is the contention of some Advaitic aestheticians
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that just as white light is refracted and stained, the absolute bliss that is Brahman acquires the colour of saguna Brahman. This view is untenable because the absolute can never be reflect- ed or refracted. Besides, aesthetics cannot fit into Advaita and a consistent Advaitin has to reject the ultimacy of aesthetic values, in the same way in which he rejects those of ethics and religion. If the white light of rasa or bliss is refracted by avidya and becomes aesthetic joy, then aesthetics ceases to- have any value, and there would be no theory of rasa at alL Vedanta Des'ika turns the tables when he refers to the awaken- ing of bhakti as sankalpa suryodaya and contrasts it with the rise of Advaitic consciousness as prabodha candrodaya or moony effulgence. Analogy apart, it is inconceivable that bliss can experience itself. Though the lover and the beloved become one and are lost in bliss, there is only coalescence of content and not identity. The experients are different though the experience is non-dual.
The philosophy of aesthetics is as valid as metaphysics and ethical thought, for it is the enquiry into the nature of Brahman as the beautiful and the blissful. As a speculative philosophy, it affords a new insight into the realistic and idealistic aspects of beauty, and synthesises its formal and material character. As Vis'istddvaitic aesthetics, it defines Brahman as bhuvana sundara and Manmatha-manmatha and identifies cosmic beauty with the inner beauty of the self. It then expounds the five beautiful forms of Brahman and the different kinds of rasas giving the highest value to s'rngdra rasa in its spiritualised aspect. Beauty leads to bliss. After controverting the nirguna theory, it insists on the aesthetic definition of Brahman as bhuvana sundara and anandamaya and concludes that the absolute of metaphysics is the
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anandamaya of the philosophy of art. Vis'istadvaita is thus the only philosophy of religion that recognises the eternal value of beauty and defines Brahman as the beautiful and the blissful*.
CHAPTER IX
ONTOLOGY VI : BRAHMAN AS THE S'ARIRIN
/T*HE analysis of the metaphysical, ethical and aesthetic -*• sides of spiritual experience in terms of adheyatva, vidheyatva and s'esatva dissects the integral intuition of Brahman into bloodless categories, and it is the task of Vis'isfadvaita as a true synthetic view of experience to co- ordinate the values of truth, goodness and beauty and restore their living unity. The metaphysical problem " what is that by knowing which everything else is known ? " is solved by the definition of Brahman as the ground of the universe and as the adheya or source and centre of the universe. This definition insists on the divine immanence of the universe of cit and acit and Brahman as the Being of our being, the True of the true, the Light of lights and the Eternal of eternals. It states further that Brahman is in nature but is not nature, as held by naturalistic pantheism. Brahman is in the self but is not the self as viewed by the monists. All things live, move and have their being in Brahman. They draw their substantiality from it. It is their svarupas'raya. But Brahman is not affected by the changes of nature or the imperfections of the jlva. The absolute of ontology as the sat without a second is the truth that God alone is the Real.
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But it is not bare being or the ' That ' without the ' what,' a unit among other units, or a systematic unity ; it is real reality which communicates its life to cit and acit. The absolute is not only the Being of being, but is the super- subject that is the prius and presupposition of predication and the ultimate reason of things, the universal which, while giving meaning to the universe, exceeds its content. The true Subject does not sublate thought but is its ultimate source. It is the true Infinite different from the mathe- matical infinite of quantity ; and, from the cosmological point of view, it enters with the finite self as its s'anra into nature, evolves names and forms and thus becomes the cosmic ground. The cause or upadana itself becomes the effect or upadeya. The infinite is in the finite without losing its infiniteness. In this way, epistemology, ontology and cosmology as branches of metaphysics determine the nature of Brahman as absolute truth and consciousness and as the world- ground. The metaphysician who seeks Brahman ascends to the heights of the Upanisad and views Brahman as the im- manent unity and indwelling reason of all things, the sat or substance that exists per se, the jyotis or Self that is the thinker of - thinkers, and the absolute or supreme Being. Metaphysics is the food of thought But, in its zeal for abstrac- tion and dialectic analysis, it often misses its true spirit and gives stone instead of bread. The intellect is justified in its desire to know Brahman (Brahtnajijnasa) , but it becomes dry-as-dust intellectualism if it leads to mere dialectics or logic chopping and theological sophistry.
The logico-mathematical method tends to depersonalise the self and deprive it of its moral value. Brahman is not only the immanent, but is also the transcendental, cause of the
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The idea of mere divine immanence, as held by pan- theists, commits itself to the perils of the theory of Brahman evolving into the cosmos (Brahma parinamavada) and the follies of the pantheist's identification of Brahman with the -world of evil and sin. It paralyses moral consciousness. * This -defect is overcome by voluntarism or the theory of God as the author of all good which exalts the ethical eminence of Brahman as niyanta and the righteousness of I&vara as the moral ruler of the world who dispenses justice according to the karma of the jlva. This view stresses the primacy of Practical Reason or the absoluteness of moral consciousness and transforms the meta- physical view of the absolute as the whole into the view of the Holy One of ethical religion. Ethical idealism marks the tran- sition from the idea of Brahman as pure Being into that of Brahman as l&vara or niyanta and may be termed theistic monism. The universe is a realm of righteousness, and divine justice functions through the moral freedom of the finite self. The idea of h'vara as righteous Ruler and Redeemer corrects the extremes of fatalism and determinism due to divine will. The moral self realises its freedom by subduing the self of ahari- kara, attunes its will to that of h'vara and views every act of karma as kainkarya. The jlva not only derives its substantiality from Brahman (sfvarupasfraya) but also depends entirely on His redemptive will (sankalpas'raya) and exists wholly for His satisfaction ; this view steers clear of the pitfalls of pantheism and pluralism. The omnipotence of h'vara is self-limited by His redemptive love, working through the moral law of karma, in the history of humanity. The infinite love of God is eternally wedded to the majesty of His law in the <lual personality of S'rlman Narayana and enters into history in the interests of universal redemption. The jlva realizing its absolute dependence on the Lord and S'n freely dedicates
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itself to divine service. This self-surrender enriches the consciousness of freedom instead of enslaving it. Ethical idealism or monism has the merit of establishing the unity of finite endeavour and the supreme end and of viewing the s'esi as both upaya and upeya ; its idea of the Holy One arouses the numinous sense of Is'vara as the inspirer of awe revealed in His visvantpa dars'ana to Arjuna and ethical idealism instils reverence rather than love. It exalts will at the expense of feeling and presents a trun- cated view of philosophy. Its ideal of a theocracy, in which the good or the satvikas are saved and the wicked who are tamasic are hurled into hell, may satisfy theistic rigour, but not the Vis'istadvaitic doctrine of universal redemption. Aesthetic philosophy, on the other hand, insists on the primacy of feeling, and transforms the niyanta into the bhuvana sundara, the supremely Beautiful, whose transcen- dent beauty shines as the inner beauty of the self with a view to ravish it out of its fleshly feeling. The Lord with His unsurpassed and enchanting beauty is also the blissful, and, •when the self is beautified, it sheds its egoistic self-satisfaction and forgets itself in the bliss of Brahman or Brahma rasa. But aesthetics by itself has a tendency to encourage senti- mentalism, which is fatal to philosophic disinterestedness and discipline, and has to be ^coordinated with ethics and metaphysics.
Vis'istadvaita as a true philosophy of religion corrects the one-sidedness of metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics and coordinates them into a synthetic unity. Mere intellectual- ism, voluntarism or emotionalism is but a fragment of philosophy and it is only by the thinking together of all the sides of experience that philosophy can be reconstructed and
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regarded as a synoptic view. Vi&istadvaita satisfies this supreme test of comprehensiveness by gathering together the concepts employed by metaphysics, morals and aesthetics and discovering the fundamental truth that underlies them. Brahman, the subject of Vedantic enquiry, is also, according to Vi&istadvaita, the goal of the spiritual quest. Brahmajijnasa and the apprehension of Brahman are followed by the attain- ment of the eternal values of the experience of beauty, good- ness and truth and their conservation in the divine content* The philosopher who thinks God's thoughts after Him sums up the ultimate values of life in terms of cognition, cona- tion and feeling and these are not merely subjective experiences, but are objective factors that constitute the determining qualities of Brahman itself. They are appre- ciated as divine qualities revealing the character of God^ Vis'istadvaitic metaphysics, as an intellectual quest, defines Brahman as satyam, jndnam and anantam ; its ethics is based on the idea of amalatva and its aesthetics, on ananda. These five qualities may be grouped under the ideas of Brahman as ddhdra, niyansd s'esi and sundara. The finite is rooted in the infinite, is sustained and con- trolled by it and exists for its satisfaction. Brahman is the metaphysical ground of the world of cit and acit, the inner ruler of the finite self and the goal of life. The key thought of Vis'istddvaita which reveals this inner relation between Brahman and the world of acit and cit is known as s'arira- srariri bhdva. It is regarded as the differentia of the whole system (its pradhdna pratitantra) . Veddnta is for this reason known as the S'drlraka S'dstra. It is this central idea that serves as the fulcrum of the philosophy of Ramanuja, and it alone satisfies all the pramdnas. It solves the riddles of thought and dispels the ills of life. It alone is philosophically
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satisfactory as it fulfils the claims of the samanvaya method. It is spiritually satisfying as it alone harmonises the apparent discords of the scriptural texts. The supreme test of a philosophy lies in its simplicity and suggestiveness and the idea of Brahman as sarva-s'arlrin, the Self whose body is the universe, eminently conforms to this acid test. An attempt is made in this chapter to sum up the arguments developed in the four preceding chapters dealing with the three concepts of adheya, vidheya and s'esa and present them as distinguishable features of the term s'arira in order to define the exact mean- ing and value of the relation between the s'arira and the s'aririn.
The concept of Brahman as the s'aririn and the world as the s'arira strikes the keynote of the ontology of Rama- nuja as revealed in the Sadvidya and developed by the satkarya- vada which is often wrongly identified with western realism. The Sadvidya states the classical truth of Vedanta that Brahman is real Reality by knowing which everything else is known. Brahman is self-proved and it can be known because it is real. It is not true to say that it is real because it can be known. It is not only self-revelatory but is also the Inner Self of all beings. It enters into the world of acit along with the finite selves and evolves the names and forms that con- stitute the world of space-time. The universe is rooted in the True and rests in the True, and knowledge is not a passage from falsity to reality but from reality to more and more reality. Because Brahman is real, the world, which is not different from it as it is its effect or upadeya, is also real and shares its constraining character ; this view is entirely different from pan-illusionism and acosmism which affirm the reality and self-identity of Brahman by denying the reality of the world order. There is a world of difference between the 15
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Vi&istadvaitic affirmation that the finite is real because it is rooted in the infinite and pulsates with its life and the ^dvaitic negation that the finite is a fictitious imagining of the absolute due to the distorting and pluralising power of avidyd. If Brahman is mere indeterminate consciousness (nir- visesa cinmdtra) and the world is a baseless fabrication of maya, then Is'vara, the first figment of cosmic nescience or avidyd, is unreal ; the jlva, the reflection of the absolute in avidyd, is unreal ; every social relation is a magic show ; s'dstraic omniscience is only the product of nescience on a cosmic scale ; and metaphysics itself is a mere make-believe. The only way of avoiding this scepticism and nihilism is the acceptance of the theory of the divine nature of reality and of the immanence of Brahman, without the pan-cosmic identification of the cosmos with God. Vasudeva is the All-Self that pervades the universe as paramdkds'a without being affected by its imperfections. The sat or the absolute in the pralaya state contains the real possibility of cit and acit in posse, but without any distinction or differentiation ; and s'rsti is the self-differentiation of the absolute in which the possible becomes the actual. The One without a second wills to be the many and differentiates itself into the pluralistic universe ; this self- differentiation is not an act of self-deception or false predi- cation but the process of self-revelation. Brahman enters into the world of matter with the jlva as its s'arira, vivifies it and -evolves the heterogeneous world of space-time. Brahman with cit-acit as its s'arira in the undifferentiated (avibhakta) state becomes Brahman with cit-acit as the s'arira in the affect state of differentiation (vibhakta). Since the effect is cause in another form and non-different from it, by know- ing Brahman or natura naturans, the world order as
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natura naturata is likewise known. The world is false only if it is viewed as separate from Brahman. This view repudiates the asatkaryavada of the Vais'esika which regards the effect or karya as asat or non-existent before it is produced and explains the world as creation out of nothing ; the monistic theory which affirms the reality of Brahman and the unreality of the causal relation, the Madhyamika contention that both cause and effect are unreal ; and also the satkaryavada of the Sankhya which traces the reality of the world order to pra- dhana. On the Visristadvaita view prakrti is real, though, as asat, it is liable to change in the process of parinama, and the dtman is sat as it can shine by itself though itsjnana is subject to the imperfections of karma. No fact of experience is an illusion, and even illusion itself as a psychic occurrence is a fact of experience. Even dreams are moral experiences though they have only a subjective and transient value. Thus every experience has Reality as its subject and is therefore real. The ultimate Reality is Brahman which pervades all beings as the Paramatman. The universe is big with Brahman or instinct with divinity though only a Prahlada with the eye of Brahman can discover it.
The ontological realism of Ramanuja enables him to utilise the grammatical rule of samanadhikaranya in the further exposition of the s'arira-s'arlri relation between the world and Brahman. It conveys the idea of one thing being equally qualified by several attributes each of which has its own dis- tinctive meaning and motive and embodies the unity of differ- ence.1 If the import of a proposition were bare unity of its the terms, it would be meaningless. Every proposition, secular or Vedic, predicates a quality or qualities of a subject in reality and
1 S. B., I. i. also I. i, 13, p. 181. (Vide, p. 38)
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is therefore significant. The meaning is gathered by reference to the context, convention and relevance. Every term as such has meaning only when it is functionally related to other terms in living language, and language is itself a system of meanings due to the operative identity that pervades differences. The ultimate subject of language which ensouls it is Brahman itself. In the term ' blue lotus ', the adjective qualifies the noun and there is no discrepancy between the two words just as there is no contradiction between a man and his ear-ring or between the yellow colour of the orange and its sweet taste. The proposition ' This is that Devadatta ' reveals the primary meaning of his personal identity and states that Devadatta in this spatial and temporal environment and context is the same Devadatta that was referred to in a former context. The two words ' thou ' and * that ' in the text * Thou art that ' have their specific and direct meaning (mukhyavrtti) and connote different attributes of the same reality. To say that the text means absolute identity by the elimination of spatial and tem- poral differences is meaningless tautology. To say that the text 'Thou art that' affirms the identity of ihejwa and Is'vara by elimi- nating their self-contradictions has no meaning in philosophy, nor has it any religious value. While co-ordination enriches the meaning, sublation destroys it. But the Vis'istadvaitic inter- pretation of samanddhikaranya frees it from the pitfalls of monism, pluralism and bhedabheda. The monistic view that it refers to unity devoid of difference is as unthinkable as the pluralistic view that several terms have several meanings which cannot be unified. The bhedabheda theory that identity and difference are both aspects of reality is self-contradictory. The true meaning of samanadhikaranya is that the same thing can be qualified by several attributes, each of which has its own meaning and content. They can co-exist in peace side by side
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in the same thing without suffering from self-contradiction and seeking self -extinction. This truth is eminently appli- cable to the Vedantic knowledge of the relation between Brah- man and the world in terms of s'anrin and s'arira. The determining qualities of Brahman like satyam, jndnam, and anantam bring to light its infinite perfections and it is idle to say that such predication is a perversion of reality. If Brah- man were identified with itself there would be no point or purpose in enquiring into its nature, as such enquiry would itself be self-discrepant and suicidal. The cosmological truth that Brahman as updddna kdrana is also Brahman as upddeya falls into line with the law of co-ordination and there is no self-discrepancy between the two states, just as there is no self -discrepancy between the childhood of a person and his youth. The pantheistic affirmation that the world is He, brings out the all-pervasive nature of Brahman as the inner self or s'arlrin of all beings. Lastly the text * Thou art that ' refers directly to co-ordination and non-contradiction as it reveals the self-identity of Brahman existing in the objective and subjective forms. It states the truth that the cosmic self connoted by ' That ' is the same as the inner self or s'aririn of the jiva connected with the body connoted by the term ' Thou ', and stresses the inner intimacy between Para* mdtman, the Supreme Self, and jivdtman, the individual self. There is no point in sacrificing the direct meaning and resort- ing to laksand or indirect designation. The text in that case is torn from the context and becomes mere pretext.
The rule of sdmdnddhikaranya as the grammar of Vedantic thought enables us to understand the epistemological exposition that the world of matter and souls is the aprthaksiddha vi&esana of Brahman. The problem of the
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relation between guna and guni is a crucial test for decid- ing the rival claims of Advaita and Vis'istddvaita. The Advaitic view of nirguna Brahman as nirvi&esa cinmdtra or indeterminate consciousness is mainly a philosophy of nega- tion, as its interest lies in affirming the reality of saguna Brahman as a religious necessity with a view to demolishing it dialectically by subsequent jnana and declaring its philosophic futility. But Vis'istadvaita is an ' yes ' philosophy as it affirms everything and denies nothing, owing to its insistence on the self-revelation of Brahman in the universe as its all- sustaining soul. Determination is not negation, as negation itself is determination and has positive meaning. That the sat in the Sadvidyd is savi&esa and not nirvis'esa is proved by the fact of creation as the self-differentiation of the absolute, by its consistency with the grammatical rule of.co-ordination and the requirements of the pramdnas and by its coherence with the Mimamsa rule of the unity of the beginning .and the end of a topic. What is called nirguna Brahman in philosophic thought is itself saguna, as pure consciousness emptied of content is the hypostatisation of an abstraction. 'To be intelli- gent ' means ' to have the quality of intelligence ' as there can be no vis'esana without a vis'esya. The absolute as contentless consciousness approximates to the unconscious. The judg- ment * The lotus is blue ' refers to the substance or vis'ista, namely, the lotus, having the quality or vis'esana of blueness and the predication of an ideal content to a subject in reality. Reality or vis'ista is the organic unity of the vis'esana-vis'esya relation and the two are distinguishable but not divisible. The unity of Brahman and the world as vi&esya and vis'esana is vis'ista aikya and not svarupa aikya. The Buddhistic view of quality without substance is countered by the monistic view of substance without qualities and these
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extremes find their reconciliation in the Vis'istadvaitic theory of the world as the vis'esana of Brahman. In the judgment ' He is a dandin or staff-bearer/ the predicate * holding the staff ' is what is called * separable accidens ' as the staff can exist by itself apart" from the staff-bearer ; but in the judgment * Man is rational/ the quality is the differ- entia of the subject. As the attribute cannot be appre- hended apart from the subject, of which it is the distin- guishing attribute, it is called its aprthaksiddha vis'esana. The genus or jdti is vitally related to the individual or vyakti and the guna or quality is embodied in the gunl, its subject. Terms denoting jati and guna denote also vyakti and guni according to the rule of co-ordination. " Whenever a thing (whether species, or quality, or substance) has exis- tence as a mode only — owing to its proof, existence and conception being inseparably connected with something else — the words denoting it enter into co-ordination with other words denoting the same substance as characterised by other attributes." '
The reals that constitute the world are not un- related or isolated bits, but are inter-related and related to the whole of reality. Every judgment, scriptural or secular, is an attribute of Brahman which is the ultimate Reality. The jlva is related to Brahman as its aprthaksiddha vis'esana like the light of a luminous body, the fragrance of a flower and the body of the self. The distinguishing self-consciousness (dharmabhtitajnana) is differ- ent from the self or dharmi distinguished by it and yet the two are non-different in the sense that the essential attribute of a subject cannot exist apart from the subject. The
1 S. B. E., XLVIII, p. 228.
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non-sentient world is likewise an ams'a or attribute of Brahman as it cannot be apprehended apart from Brahman. Brahman is thus the vis'esya and matter and self are the vi&esana, and the vis'esya is nirvikdra and is not affected by the imperfections of the vis'esana.
The jlva is a prakdra of Brahman which is there- fore called the prakdrin. In the judgment * this is such ' 1 the predicate * such ' is inseparably related to the ' this ' which is given, finds its accomplishment in it, and is therefore called its niyamena prakdra. One thing is called the prakdra of another if it cannot subsist by itself without its substrate or sustaining life and final cause or pray oj ana. Like jdti and guna, a dravya or substance may be regarded as the determining attribute of another in so far as it is its mode.2 The body is the mode of the embodied self and a word connoting a mode has its functioning and fruition in the self of which it is the mode and therefore connotes the self. The body of a deva, man or animal is the mode of the self which sustains it and uses it for its own satisfaction. Words connoting these physical bodies of the jlvas connote also the jwas to which the bodies belong.3 Likewise words connoting prakrti and purusa also connote Paramdtman or the Highest Self of which they are the prakdras.4 The body is a mode of the self and the self is a mode of the Highest Self.5
1 S. B,, I. L 13 p. 187 & S. B. E., XLVIII, p. 227. * S. B,, I. i. i. p. 97 & S. B. £., XLVIII, p. 135.
3 sarirasya saririnam prati prakaratvat prakaravacinam ca s'abdanam prakarinyeva paryavasanat s'ariravacinam s'abdanam s'arirlparyavasanam nyayyam.— S. B., I. i. 13. p. 187.
4 prak^tipurusavacinas' s'abdah tatprakaravis'istataya, avasthite paramatmani mukhyataya vartante, jivatmavSci devamanu^yadi s'abda.va,t.—Vedartha Sangraha (Vasudevachariar's edition), p. 205.
6 S.B., I. i. i. p. 99 and S.B.E., XLVIII. p. 138.
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Thus all sentient and non-sentient beings are the self- 'differentiations or modes of the absolute, as they are derived from it and depend on it for their form and function. Brahman, with its energising creative will, enters into the aggregate of matter, with the finite self as its s'arira, and as their informing spirit, becomes sat and tyat or self and material things and thus evolves the heterogeneity of names and forms which make up the universe.1 All words therefore ultimately refer to the Paramdtman with its modal modification of cit and acit. On the principle of co-ordination, it follows that the Self or prakarin is one though the prakdras or cit and acit are many. That the self is their substrate and supreme end is well .brought out by the Vdkyakara as well.
Vis'istadvaita is, however, not to be misconstrued as the adjectival theory of the absolute, as it resembles it only in non-essentials. The finite self has not only an adjectival, but also a substantive, mode of being. Matter and self are the adjectives of the absolute only in the sense that the attribute cannot be known apart from its substance or subject. The self has substantive being in the sense that it is different from the absolute, as it is itself a centre of experience. If it is mere vis'esana, the world of souls would be a sum of adjectives housed in the absolute. But an infinity of universals cannot constitute the universe with its infinite wealth of individual experience. Brahman is the vis'esya or prakarin and the world is the vis'esana or prakdra and the two are indissolubly blended as the self and its body. Brahman with
1 seyam devataik?ata hantaham imastisrO devata anena jivenatmana anupravis'ya namarupe vyakaravajiiti II — Ch. Up., VI. iii. 2
sokamayata I bahusyam prajayeyeti I satapotapyata I satapas taptva I idam sarvam asrjata I yad idam kifica I tat srstva I tadevanupravis'at I tad anupra- •vis'ya I sacca tyaccabhavat I niruktamcaniruktamca I — Taitt. Anandavalll, VI.
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the attributes of cit and acit in the gross state of srrsti is the same as Brahman with the attributes of cit and acit in the pralaya state, owing to the principle of non-differ- ence of cause and effect and of the unity of co-ordination. This does not mean the pantheistic identity of Brahman and the world like the unity of the snake and its coils nor the absolute that includes Is'vara, cit and acit. The self as aprthak- siddha vis'esana has both modal dependence and monadic uniqueness. This view mediates between the pluralistic theory of self-subsistent and atomic reals and the monis- tic theory of the absolute as the substance that exists in and by itself without an/ determination. By knowing Brahman, the vi&esya or prakan+i, every vis'esana or prakara that constitutes the universe :s known. Brahman is nirguna only in the sense that it is the abode of all blessed quali- ties as contrasted with the changing world and the karma- ridden jlva distinguished by evil as well. The view that the world of cit-acit is the prakara of Brahman, the prakarin, is deduced from the ultimate truth of Brahman as the s'arlrin and the world as the s'arira.
The idea of Brahman as the s'arlrin furnishes the key to the understanding of Vedanta and is deduced from the S'ruti, the source of spiritual knowledge, and the systematically organised Sutras which are therefore called the S'ariraka S'astra or what is called the philosophy of pan-organismal monism. The scriptural texts are not divergent and self- discrepant but are dominated by the one and only aim of enabling the mumuksu to apprehend Brahman and attain its eternal bliss. The truths of revelation are impersonal (apauru- seya) and infallible and they can be verified by intuitive experience and thus rationally justified. The Upanisads
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are not guesses at God nor even the inductions of indivi- dual seers or ms, but are a body of objective spiritual truths which the rsi intuits and the philosopher renders intelligible to the discursive understanding with the aid of perceptual evidence. The Upanisads have the consistency of intuition as well as of logic, and the real, as it is in itself, is the real revealed to thought and realised in spiritual experi- ence. The Vis'istadvaitic philosopher with his loyalty to truth in all its levels finds no need to strain the texts to sup- port his position. With his genius for synthetic know- ledge, he intuits the s'arira-s'ariri relation as the central truth of Veddnta. By knowing Brahman as the s'arlrin of all beings, everything is known. It is the thread or sutra that binds plurality into unity, reconciles the apparent con- tradictions and confusions in the scriptural texts and secular experience. It solves the riddles of reason and dispels the sorrows of samsara. The Sadvidyd, Ch. Up., VI, brings out the inner unity between Brahman and the/mz by the similes of salt dissolved in water, honey gathered from different juices, the rivers merging into the sea, the seed and the tree, and the sap of the tree. Just as the branches and leaves of the tree draw their sustenance from the life of the whole tree, the universe pulsates with the life of the All-Self. But it is the Antaryamividya, Ch. Ill, vii of the Brhadaranyakopanisad that reveals explicitly the truth of the sfarira-sfariri relation and it is extolled by Ramanuja as the ghataka s'ruti that reconciles the extremes of pluralism and monism and satisfies the highest demands of life in all its aspects. The seer, Yajnavalkya, who is a Brahmavadin, tells Gautama that he knows Brahman and defines His nature in the immortal words of the Vidya. The section refers to Brahman as the antaryamin and ctmrta, the indwelling immortal self
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that abides in all beings as their antarydmin and rules them from within. Definition and division complete the meaning of a term in intent and extent and in defining the -essential nature of Brahman as the s'arlrin, the Vidya also makes an exhaustive division of the kinds of beings that form its sfarlra and starting from the elements that constitute the objective world of space-time, it ends with the subjective world of thejlva or vijnana which is the subject of all know- ledge. The central teaching of the whole section is enshrined in the last mantra.1 He, who dwells in thejlva and with the jiva, whom the jlva does not know, whose body the jwa is, and who rules it from within, He is the Self, the Inner Ruler immortal. He is unseen, unheard, unperceived, and unknown ; but sees, hears, perceives, and knows, not like any of us with the help of the senses but directly without their help. There is no other seer like Him, no other hearer like Him, no other perceiver like Him, and no other knower like Him. Everything else is of evil.2 The objects of sense and the living beings are not self-existent and self-maintained but spring from Brahman, are sustained by its pulsating life and exist for its satisfaction. This mantra is, as Jt were, the mahdvdkya >of Vis'istddvaita in the sense that the universe has its mean- ing and motive only in Brahman as the Life of its life and the Lord of the lords of experience without the imperfections of the s'arira.
The exact definition of thes'anra-s'arlri relation may now be attempted. The knowledge of the ontology of satkdryavdda, of
1 yo atmani ti^than atmano antarah yam atma na veda yasyatma s'ariram ya atmanam antarS yamayati sa ta atma antaryamyamytah, — Br. Up., III. vii. 22.
9 adjrste dra§ta as'rutas' s'rota amato manta avijriats vijSata nanyOtSsti drasta nanyOtOsti s'rota nanyOtOsti manta nanyotOsti vijffata e§a ta atmantarya- myamrtah atonyadartam. — Br. Up.t III. vii. 23.
ONTOLOGY VI: BRAHMAN AS THE S'ARlRIN 237
the grammatical rule of samanadhikaranya, of the epistemo- logy of aprthaksiddha vis'esana and of the importance of the ghataka s'rutis is presupposed in the understanding of this bhava, and the preceding sections were devoted to the exposition of these truths. Really they are interrelated and form a single theme though they were logically distinguished and studied as separate truths. The definition of this bhava also pre- supposes a knowledge of the logical definition of the meaning of the term s'anrin. In ordinary language the word varira does not, like the word 'jar', denote a thing of a definite character, but applies to beings of entirely different make like worms, insects, moths, snakes, quadrupeds and men. In the Veda, the term s'anra is classified into higher and lower types on the principle of duration. The body of I&vara, s'uddhasatva, time and the self, are eternal while the ephe- meral srarira is either created for the atman or made by karma. The created bodies of the Lord and the eternals (nityasuris) belong to the former class, while the latter are sub-divided into bodies which are both volitional and karma-ma.de. The karma-ma.de are further classified into the immovables like trees and shrubs and movables like devas, human beings, and animals. On the principle of division according to genesis, the beings are seed-born (udbhij-ja), sweat- born (sveda-ja), egg-born (anda-ja) and womb-born (jarayu-ja) and there are also s'anras not produced in this way. In the case of bodies that are injured or paralysed, there is no actual control and coordination ; but the power of control is only obstructed for the time being and not destroyed. The above classification includes (1) the physical bodies that are perceiv- ed by the senses and traced to biological conditions, (2) the subtle bodies or suksma s'arlras caused by karma and con- served in the moral order of the universe, (3) the gross
238 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
-elements of prakrti that form the physical basis of reality according to Vedantic cosmology as defined in the Antaryamimdya and (4) the spiritual bodies or aprakrta ^arlras which embody the spiritual universe. Broadly speak- ing, the s'arlras comprise cit and acit. Brahman is essentially •niravayava (without the material forms of prakrti), nirguna (free from the gunas of prakrti), and unconditioned by karma. While the ephemeral s'arlras are subject to the perishing forms of matter and the moral vicissitudes of karma, the s'aririn or Mman is pure and perfect. The definition of s'arira should include all these given elements or data and attain positive- Jiess, clearness and comprehensiveness by avoiding the fallacies of definition like ativyapti (being too wide) and avyapti (being too narrow). The infinite is really alogical in the sense that it transcends the logical intellect. The logical definition of supersensuous Reality as the end of knowledge is therefore an attempt to make a spiritual intuition intelligible to reason and commonsense by employing the language of sense and .sense-symbolism.
In arriving at a true definition of the s'arira, certain faulty •definitions have to be criticised and ruled out. The definition given by the logician or Naiyayika is that the s'arira is a particular aggregate of earth and other physical elements depending for its subsistence on vital breath with its five modifications and serving as an abode to the sense organs which mediate experiences of pleasure and pain resulting from lormer works by way of retribution.1 This is not one defini- tion but a series of definitions which violate the essential rules of laksana. The definition that the s'arira is a com- bination of different elements is too narrow as it excludes
1 V, M, D., IV. 75 and S. B,, II, i, 8, and S, JB, E,t XLVIII, p, 420.
ONTOLOGY VI : BRAHMAN AS THE S'ARlRIN 239
aprakrta s'ariras and the body of Bhagavan which is s'ubhas'raya and divya-mangala vigraha or the spiritual form of Beauty. The view that the s'arlra is composed of head and trunk and limbs is too wide as it includes dolls and dancing puppets and other physical models of the body. The body is thus not a mechanical whole made by the addition of parts. In the case of the tri-coloured piece of cloth which is an ex- ample of such a whole as cited in the S'rl Bhdsya, the material cause consists of threads which are white, green and black and which form its warp and woof. It may likewise be argued as is done by Yadava that Brahman is the sat or whole which is made of Is'vara, cit and acit. But the analogy is unsound, as there is no essential resemblance between the woven cloth and the universe created by Brahman. The notion of a potter-God that moulds things as an external artificer is foreign to Vedanta. In the case of the cloth, the parts are only conjoined, but the universe is vitally related to Brahman who is its inner Self. The term, ' the body of a machine, car or ship/ is only descriptive and not definitory. A better definition of the s'arlra therefore would be that the life of which depends on the vital breath with its five-fold functions. This is too narrow as it would exclude plants whose vital air does not function in these five ways. The view of Brahman as the s'aririn of the universe is sometimes called the philosophy of organism as it brings out the truth that Brahman is the life of all life. The finite self is, like the foetus in the womb, sustained by the life of the whole organism and every self like the cell in the body pulsates with the all-sustaining life of Paramatman. The cosmos is explained biologically as creative evolution as in the Purusa Sukta, and is said to be animated by the vital impulse of Brahman as prdnasya prdna or the life of life that enters into the womb of matter and reproduces its
240 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
own infinite variations of life. But the idea of the s'aririn cannot be equated with the philosophy of organism or vitalism as in the organism the self is the whole, whereas in the s'aririn, the whole consists of wholes ; the finite self is itself a mode or am&a and a monad or entity. The two selves, the finite and the infinite, exist like two birds on the same tree ; the Self of all is in the heart of finite life.
The definition that the body is the abode of the sense organs (indriya&raya) is also too narrow as it excludes the bodies of jivas devoid of such sense organs, like Ahalya after she was transformed into a bare monad, and also many parts of the bodily organism which are not sense organs. In the spiritual interpretation of the universe, sensation has more value than cell or atom but a sensationalistic view is not adequate enough to explain reality. The antahkarana or sense, commune which is allied to the Kantian theory of the synthetic unity of apperceptien may be the soul of the psycho- physical process. But the atman is more than this synthetic unity and the organism which is a combination of the mind and the body, is itself the s'arira of the self or jiva and is its bodily basis. There is an allied definition of the s'arira that it is the seat of action or activity (cestasraya) , but it is too wide, If cesta means kriya, the jar would also be a s'arira as it is the locus of kriyd. Still another definition of the s'arira that it is what causes the enjoyment of the fruit of actions (bhoga- yatana) is unsatisfactory as it excludes physical existents which are affirmed by the S'ruti to be the s'arira of the antaryamin and also aprakrta forms assumed by the Lord by His redemp- tive will and by the free selves (nityasuris) none of which are the fruition of the results of karma. The definition is too wide as it would include the residence of a person which is his
ONTOLOGY VI : BRAHMAN AS THE S'ARlRIN 241
place of enjoyment. Brahman is itself the updddna kdrana and the upddeya, the updya and the upeya, and the idea of egoistic hedonism has no place in the Vis'istddvaitic philosophy of frui- tion. Nature lives, moves and has its being in Brahman and is the living embodiment of His creative will. There is still another definition of s'arira, that it is created out of nothing by the fiat of the omnipotent will of God and it may be entirely destroyed by the same God as the all-destroyer. No Veddntin accepts this view of sudden creation, and, according to Rama- nuja, clt and acit are eternal but not external to Iffvara who is the all-inclusive Infinite. The Infinite enters into the finite and evolves the names and forms of the finite and resides in them as their eternal inner Ruler without being tainted by their imperfections.
We are now in a position to understand the exact mean- ing of Brahman as the s'arlrin and the universe as the s'arira. According to Ramanuja 1 that is called the dtman or s'arlrin which is always the container (ddhdra) and controller (niyanta) of another and which uses it for its own satisfaction (s'esi). The s'arira is so called by reason of its being in its entirety the ddheya, the niydmya and the sresa ; it is insepar- able from the s'arlrin and forms its aprthaksiddha vis'esana or prakdra. Any substance which a sentient self can com- pletely control and support for its own purposes and which stands to the self in an entirely dependent relation is called its sfarlra.2 All sentient and non-sentient beings together constitute the s'arira of Paramdtman, for they live, move and have their being in Him and exist for His satisfaction. Owing to the entry of the Infinite into the finite as its
1 Vedartha Sangraha, p. 207.
2 S. B., II. i. 9 & S. B. E.. XLVIII, p. 424.
16
242 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
antarydmin and the evolution of names and forms, each term that connotes the s'arlra of Paramdtman connotes also I&varar the s'aririn. Brahman is the source and sustenance of the self and uses it for its satisfaction. While prakrti is a fleeting flux and the empirical self is subject to the imperfections of embodiment due to karma, Brahman, the s'aririn, is pure and perfect and is unaffected by these changes and imperfections^ The finite self is both s'arira and s'aririn as it ensouls its body and is ensouled by its inner Ruler. When we say one is, born as a man or god, or that one is a child and then a youth, we mean that the changes due to birth and age belong to the ensouled body and not to the dtman which is eternal and immutable. In the same way when we say that Brahman is the s'aririn of the self, we refer to the inner Self as different from the karma-ridden jlva.
The interpretation of Vedantic texts in terms of the s'arlra- yariri bhdva has the advantage of reconciling l apparently contradictory texts without sacrificing their primary and natural meaning or mukfiyartha. The monistic texts like 4 There is no plurality/ which deny difference, deny not the pluralistic universe but only the pluralistic view of reality. The s'aririn or prakdrin is one, but the s'arlras or prakdraS' are many. The Antarydmi Brdhmana defines Brahman as the inner self of the cetana and the acetana. The absolutist as jndnamdtravddin, who affirms the reality of pure consciousness and denies its self-consciousness and conscious- nature, fails to explain the saguna texts like Brahman, being the All-Self and the knower of all things (sarvajna^ sarvavit and jndnamaya). These texts define the nature of Brahman as the cosmic ground (sarvddhdra), the inner ruler 1 Vedartha Sangraha, pp. 237 to 247 and S.B.H., XLVIII, pp. 139 to 144.
ONTOLOGY VI : BRAHMAN AS THE S'ARlRIN 243
(niyanta) and sarva s'esi. Brahman is and has intelligence as its essential quality and from this definition (svarupa- nirupaka dharma) follows an infinity of perfections. By deny- ing predication, knowledge itself is denied and stultified. To affirm saguna Brahman with a view to reject it finally is neither consistent nor conciliatory and is opposed to the integrity and unity of scriptural knowledge. The texts that declare the essential distinction and differences between non- sentient matter, sentient selves and the Lord (Sv. Up. I. 6 and 10) affirm the difference between the s'anrin and the s'arira. Thejlvas andprakrti are the subjects and objects of experience, and the antaryamin or the inner Self of thejlva is the super- subject. The difference between the s'aririn and the s'arira is well illustrated by the Upanisadic analogy of two birds sitting on the same tree, one of which is self-resplendent and blissful while the other tastes the sweets and bitters of life (Sv. Up., IV. 6). The jlva partakes of the nature of I&vara, and prakrti is His lower nature.1 Vis'istddvaitic cosmology declares the non-difference of cause and effect * and concludes that Brahman is in its causal or effected condition according as it has for its s'arira intelligent and non-intelligent beings in the subtle or in the gross state. The text ' Brahman is the world ' connotes not absolute identity or svarupa aikya but only the unity of the two as s'arira and s'anrin, as upadana karana and upadeya, and does not contradict nirvikaratva (changelessness) or the state of the transcen- dental purity of Brahman. The nirguna texts do not negative determination but deny only the predication of evil and other imperfections to the s'aririn, as bare negation would lead to nihilism or s'unyavada. Aikyavada or the philosophy
1 B. G.. VII. 4&5.
2 Ch> Up.. VI. ii. 1 & 2 and Br. Up., I. iv. 7.
244 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
of identity as contained in the texts ' Thou art that/ 1 ' All this is Brahman/ * affirms the unity of the self and its sranra in the light of the rule of coordination without abandoning the primary meaning of the texts. The term that connotes S'vetaketu connotes also the inner self or s?arlrin of S'vetaketu as terms connoting the sarira also connote the s'aririn, and this &aririn is saguna Brahman.3 It brings out the truth that the inner Self or atma of the jlva is Brahman, 4 the ground of the universe, and not the identity of the finite and the Infinite. The finite self is identical with the infinite in connotation, though there is difference between the two in denotation. They are different existentially but they are similar in their guna. Even the Advaitin that believes in jlvanmukti or liberation during life has to accept only partial identity and the existence of an infinity of jlvas who are yet clouded by avidyd, if he is to escape the charge of solipcism and acosmism. Thus Ramanuja concludes that all the S'dkhas of the Veda and Veddnta have the unity of Brahman as their purport and purpose.
From the standpoint of philosophic thinking no less than that of revelational authority, the synoptic view of sarlra- srarlri bhdva is justified and justifiable. In a critical summary in the Veddrtha Satigraha, Ramanuja concludes that this view is a reconciliation of the extremes of Veddntic doctrines like the schools of abheda, bheddbheda and bheda. Abheda is established by the idea of Brahman as the unity of the &arlra-srariri relation in which the srarlrin is the one without a second that sustains the manifold of cit and acit. The view
1 Ch. Up.t VI. viii. 7 2Cfc. Up.t III. xiv. 1
3 As Dramitjacarya says 4 ' Brahman is what is adored as saguna (tad V5pasa.n&t)—Vedartha Sangraha, p. 247.
4 S. B.t I. i. 1. p. 94 & S. B. E.t XLVIII, p. 130.
ONTOLOGY VI : BRAHMAN AS THE S'ARlRIN 245
that the prakdrin is the one that exists as the many pra- kdras supports the truth of bheddbheda, and bheda is proved by the fact of the eternal distinction between cit, acit and Is'vara in their nature and character (svarupa and sva~ bhdva). In summing up and estimating the philosophy of the S'driraka Sutras in the first two chapters relating to ontology and cosmology, Ramanuja reveals his synthetic insight into the soul of Veddntic thought by his attitude to the other systems of Vedic and dsthika philosophy and the method of interpreting their inner connection. In solving the problem raised in the Mahdbhdrata composed by the same rsi, Vyasa, namely, whether the Sdnkhya, the Yoga, the Veda, thePd&upata and the Pdncardtra systems have a common philosophic founda- tion, Ramanuja adopts the samanvaya method by his accept- ance of the essentials only (svarupa mdtra) of these schools in so far as they do not contradict the central truth of the S'dnraka S'astra.1 While the Sdnkhyan cosmology of the twenty-five categories has its meaning in the basic idea that the twenty-five tatvas have Brahman, the twenty-sixth tatva or Truth, as their source and sustaining self, the scheme of yoga discipline has its final end in the meditation on Brahman. The Vedic insistence on the performance of karma has its consummation in the Veddntic view of regarding work as the worship of the Supreme Self (drddhana). It also recognises the Pds'upata variety in so far as it accepts the immanence of the antarydmin or s'aririn and its ethics. The Pdncardtra as the direct revelation of Narayana contains the essentials of of all these systems and is their very soul. Thus the S'driraka S'dstra as a synthetic view of Veddnta accepts whatever is
1 s'arirakeca sankhyokta tat van am abrahmatmakatamatram nirakrtam na svarupam I yoga pas'upatayes'ca is'varasya kevala nimittakara^ata * * * nirakf tah-na yDgasvarupam pas'upatisvarupam ca. — Sri Bha$ya, II. ii. 43.
246 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
true, good and beautiful in other systems owing to its criterion of comprehensiveness which means that what is true works as opposed to the pragmatic view that what works is true. It is also to be distinguished from eclecticism which pieces together what is good in all systems without proving their vital relations. The truth of Brahman as the s'arlrin of all beings is clearly intuited by the Alvars and summed up in the Tamil Veda " udaltnisrai uyir." Ramanuja thus shows that the founda- tional truth of Brahman as the s'arlrin furnishes the key to the understanding of all philosophical systems.
In the highest sense of the term, the S'rl Bhdsya con- cludes with the very significant note of the S'drlraka Mlmdmsa * sarvam samanjasam ' (everything is satisfactorily explain- ed). This includes philosophical satisfactoriness as well as spiritual satisfyingness which is traceable to the infinite sug- gestiveness of the synthetic insight afforded by the s'arlra-s'arlri bhdva called the differentia and raison-d-etre of Ramanuja dars'ana. It satisfies the fundamental Upanisadic text " What is that by knowing which everything else is known ? " by the solution that it is Brahman which is the s'arlrin of all beings. Brahman is saguna and the distinction between saguna and nirguna Brahman is itself saguna. The relation between Brahman and the world as s'arlrin and s'arlra is defined in terms of ddhdra and ddheya, niyantd and niydmya, and s'esi and s'esa, which are only logically distinguishable and not separable. The first aspect which is the ontology of Vis'istddvaita, dev- eloped in Chapter IV, defines Brahman as satyam or satyasya satyam as real reality or the true of the true and the life of our life, as the subject of subjects or the super-subject, (jndnam) or jydtisam jyotis (the light of all lights) and the true infinite as the eternal of eternals. The second aspect of Brahman as
ONTOLOGY VI : BRAHMAN AS THE S'ARlRIN 247
niyanta, as expounded in Chapter V, defines the Brahman of metaphysics as the Is'vara of ethical religion who is the righ- teous ruler of the universe without any taint of caprice, cruelty or evil and sarva raksaka or universal redeemer. The third as- pect of Brahman as s'esi, the independent, which is described, in Chapter VII stresses the self -related and the self -realised nature of Brahman as contrasted with the nature of cit and acit as eternally dependent on His redemptive will or sankalpa and as existing and working for His satisfaction. The aesthetic philosophy of Vis'istadvaita as formulated in Chapter VIII •dwells on the bewitching beauty of Brahman as bhuvana sundara and its entrancing bliss or anandamaya. These are distinguishing marks of Brahman. They are the systole and the diastole of the all-sustaining and pulsating life of Paramdtman as s'arlrin which is to be intuited rather than logically defined. The cosmological explanation of Brahman as the upadana and nimitta kdrana, the material and efficient cause of the world, satisfies the requirements of logical immanence and ethical •eminence and removes the apparent conflict between the abso- lute of dialectic metaphysics and the God of ethical religion. The essential qualities of Brahman described as satyam, jndnam, anantam, amalam and dnandam embody the eternal values of truth, goodness and beauty and therefore satisfy the highest demands of epistemology, ethics and aesthetics. The apparent contradictions of s'astra are removed by the all- •conciliatory nature of the ghataka s'rutis or reconciling texts and the concept of &arlra-sfariri satisfies the triple pramdnas of revelation, reasoning and sense-perception in their integral unity. It fits in with the ontological realism of satkdryavada, the grammatical rule of sdmdnddhikaranya, the logical correlations of aprthaksiddha vis'esana and the mlmdmsd rules of interpretation. It furnishes the inspiring motive for
248 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
mystic communion by insisting on the ultimacy of Brahmans and the inner intimacy between Brahman and the self, and for spiritual service to alljlvas owing to the similarity of their spiritual nature and the kinship due to their one indwelling Ruler. In this way every thought, word and deed refer ultimate- ly to the s'anrin who is the life of our life, the light of the universe and the love of ouj" love, and everything is satis- factorily explained.
The synthetic system of s'anra-s'arlri bhdva is thus the one universal philosophy that satisfactorily explains every aspect of existence and experience. The categories of thought do not sublate reality but exist in it as pulsations of the living intelligence of atman as every proposition or judgment has its meaning in Brahman as the meaning of meanings. The s'arlrin is the source and sustenance of all thinking beings and objects, which therefore exist as and for His satisfaction. He is the first cause of all things and their final cause and the root of life and its fruit. The world is Brahmamaya and not bhramamaya, and maya has its meaning only in the mayin whose alluring Beauty and lild transform the ugly self into the shining forms in S'n Vaikuntha. He is the immanent reason of the universe and the eminent Holy beyond it. He is the ground of existence and the goal of experience. He is the summum genus and the summum bonum, the supreme ground of all and the supreme goal of life. He is the highest ideal of life in whom all the ideals of rational- ity, righteousness and rapture are eternally self-realised. He alone has universal validity, unsurpassed valour and absolute value. He is the supreme subject of jndna or thought, the supreme actor in the world of will and the most blissful rasa in the realm of emotion. He is the thinker of thinkers,.
ONTOLOGY VI : BRAHMAN AS THE S'ARlRIN 249
the creator of creators and the rasa of rasas. Viewed from the idealistic tradition of western thought, the s'aririn is not the mindless and motionless Being of Parmeanides, nor the abstract universal of Plato, He is neither the Transcendent One of Plotinus, nor the Indeterminate substance of Spinoza. He is not the panlogical subject of Hegel nor the Ego of Fichte. From the realistic standpoint, Brahman is not the concrete universal of Aristotle nor the monad of monads of Leibnitz, nor the God of Personalism and theism. Western idealism and realism with their different variations may be acceptable to Vis'istddvaita in so far as they do not contradict the essentials of the sfarira-sfanri sambandha. Western philo- sophy will gain in clearness and distinctness by recognising the Veddntic ideas of the moral law of causation or karma by which the self has the freedom to lapse into vice and lower life or grow into godliness, the eternity of the dtman as different from its endless migrations, the immanence and eminence of Brahman and the view of the unity of nature as the environment for transforming the self into the likeness of Brahman and the truth that the philosophical knowledge of Brahman leads to the spiritual realisation of Brahman and its eternal bliss.
CHAPTER X COSMOLOGY
VEDANTIC cosmology is contained in the Sadvidya of the Chandogya Upanisad and expounded in the Arambhana .Adhikarana of the Vedanta Sutras (II. i. 15). In the Sad- mdya, the teacher, Uddalaka, initiates the pupil, S'vetaketu, into the Vedantic truth that Brahman is the ground of the universe, by knowing which everything is known. Deity is the beginning .of the evolutionary process and its end. The non-difference .between Brahman and the universe is brought out by illustra- tive instances drawn from ordinary experience. One and the same substance like a lump of clay or a bar of gold enters into ^different states in succession, and thereby assumes different configurations.1 The same substance, clay, enters into many states like pots and pitchers, and becomes their immanent •cause or upadana kdrana. The one transfigures into the many, and the process subserves a practical interest. What -exists as a real possibility in the subtle state becomes actual- ,ised in the gross state. It is the non-differentiated which exists without name and form that becomes differentiated. This principle explains the true meaning of cosmology, and shows tthe unity of the causal relation. In pralaya, Brahman exists
1 yatha sSmyaikena mrtpip4ena sarvam mtpmayam vijiSatam syadvaca- .rambhanam vikar5 namadheyam mpttiketyeva satyam. — Ch. Up.t VI. i. 4. S. B., II. i. 15, p. 40 of Vol. II & S. B. E., XLVIII, p. 454.
COSMOLOGY 251
with the modes of cit-acit in such a subtle state that the modes may be treated as practically non-existent. Brahman is then in the causal state as natura naturans. It is then the absolute, the one without any distinction or difference of name and form. In the srrsti state, the one wills the many and becomes the manifold with an infinity of sentient and non-sentient beings. Brahman is in the effected state as natura naturata. Since the cause and its effect are non- different, the effect, namely, the cosmic order, is the same as the cause or Brahman. The Upanisads repeatedly proclaim this truth of causal immanence in different ways. The Chandogya Upanisad says : " All this indeed is Brahman." l The Brhaddranyaka says : " There is no plurality here." a " When the self is known, all this is known." 3 By knowing the cause, the effect is known. By knowing Brahman, the abso- lute, the universe with its manifold differences is known. This cosmological unity has its completion only in the spiritual wisdom resulting in the intuition of S'vetaketu that Brahman is the cosmic ground and also his own inner Self. The Upanisadic truth " Thou art that " is a realisation that the cosmic ground is the same as the inner self of the jlva. Brahman thus moulds the universe for the making of the dtman and brahmanising it. The central principle on which the theory of the origin and development of the universe is based is familiarly known as satkdryavdda and is different from that of the atheistic Sdnkhya. According to it, nothing new comes into being, nor is anything created out of nothing. The creationist objects to this view by citing the Upanisad
1 sarvam khalvidam brahma I Ch. Up., III. xiv. 1. atmaivedam sarvam I Ch. Up., VII, xxv. 2.
2 neha nanasti kincana,— Br. Up., IV. iv. 19 & Kath. Up., II. iv. 11.
3 atmani khalvare drste s'rute mate vijSate idam sarvam viditam I — Br. Up., IV. v. 6.
252 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
that asat alone existed in the beginning.1 But his view is wrong, as another Upanisad* makes the meaning clear by saying that the asat is the implicit and not the non- existent. " This was then undistinguished at first ; it became distinguished by name and form." " In the true, all beings have their root ; in the true, they abide and in the true they rest."5 In pralaya the cosmos exists potentially without any distinction, but in &rspi, what remained enfolded becomes unfolded. It is not the emergence of something new, but the self-differentiation of the same reality. Being alone becomes, and is the cause of the becoming. The one alone becomes the many, and is the cause of the manifold. In this way, the cause is immanent in the effect and is non-different from it. Brahman with cit-acit in a state of non-differentiation becomes Brahman with cit-acit in a state of differentiation with an infinity of distinctions in name and form. The absolute broods and becomes the many by evolving the world-body (parindmat) ,4 The contention of the illusionist, that creation is not real, does not hold good, as there is no discrepancy in the process of self -development. The Arambhana Adhikarana combats also the Dvaitavada of Kanada and its atomistic and pluralistic account of the universe. Kanada's theory of samavdya as the external and eternal relation between cause
1 asad va idam agra a sit I tato vai sad ajayata I tad atmanam svayam akuruta I tasmat tat sukrtam ucyata iti I — Taitt. Up.t Anand. vii.
2 taddhedam tarhyavyakrtam asit tan nama rupabhyameva vyakriyate f Br. Up., I. iv. 7.
sad eva sOmyedam agra asidekamevadvitiyam taddhaika ahurasadevedam
agra asidekam evadvitiyam tasmad asatas sajjayata I
kutastu khalu sQmyaivam syad iti hSvaca katham asatas sajjayeteti
sattveva somyedam agra asid ekam evadvitiyam I
tad aiksata bahu syam prajayeyeti I— Ch. Up., VI. ii. 1, 2, 3,
8 sanmulas sOmyemas sarvah prajas sadayatanas satpratisthah. — Ch. Up.,. VI. viii, 6.
4 S. B., I. iv. 27, p. 405 and S. B. B.t XLVIII. p. 403.
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and effect is open to the charge of infinite regress. The idea that the cosmos is caused by the motion of atoms due to the adrstas of the jiva does not improve the case, as the inter- action between the atoms and the adrstas is mechanical and unintelligible. The idea of God as an extra-cosmic designer militates against the idea of divine immanence. If the plural- istic origin were accepted, the cosmos would not be a universe. It would then be a multiverse, and there would be as many worlds as there are jlvas and adrstas.
The Mayavddin comes forward with his theory of vivarta and adhyasa to repudiate Dvaitavada or dualism, and affirms that the idea of causality involves self-con- tradiction, and that the effect is only an illusory ap- pearance of the absolute. Brahman falsely appears as the world of nama-rupa. According to him, Brahman is eternally self-illumined, but, owing to adhyasa, it illusorily manifests itself as the world. If, as the Vais'esika urges, the relation between cause and effect is external, it is a manifest self-contradiction, as externality and relation cannot both be true. Besides, every cause will have its cause and so on ad infinitum. If the relation is not external, but internal, in- ternality would lead to the identity of cause and effect. Then Brahman and the world would be identical, which is absurd. The view that Brahman is partially manifest as the world is also indefensible. Brahman is without parts, and it is therefore a fallacious argument to say that a part of Brahman changes into the world and that another part is outside it, nor can Brahman change in its entirety and become the world.1 The so-called parinamic process or vikara, by which the cause becomes the effect, is really vivarta. What is is and it can
1 S.B., II. i. 26 and 27, & S.BJ5., XLVIII, p, 473.
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never become. Becoming is only a trick of speech, and is figurative and not a fact at all. The modification of the cause into the effect is only illusory like the phantoms of a dream. The world of nama-rupa is super-imposed on Brahman, like the shell erroneously seen as silver, and it is due to avidya. No doubt, from the vyavaharika or practical standpoint, the world process has phenomenal reality, and serves our practical; interests. But it is an appearance only and, like dreams- that are sublated in the subsequent waking state, the world phantom disappears in the absolute, when true knowledge arises. The theory of the universe as the self-manifestation of Brahman is a case of self-deception like the illusion created by the magician. Nescience veils the one and makes it the seeming many whether it is the contrary of vidya or its contradictory. Isrvara is himself said to be * the first born of cosmic nescience ' and such nescience is logically a case of subjective illusion or avidya. Strictly speaking, the whole world of sentient and non-sentient beings is fictitiously created by the avidya of the single soul or ekajlva and the theory of ekajlva is irrefutable. It therefore follows that I alone create all beings and sustain them by my intelligence.1 Thus from the higher metaphysical or esoteric standpoint, cosmology is dissolved into psychology and causality is proved to be illusory. The Adhikarana disproves the theories of samavaya and parinama, and concludes that the effect in the world process is an illusion and that Brahman, the cause, alone is real.
The Bhedabhedavadin steps in at this stage and joins issue with the illusionist. He attacks the Mayavadin on all fronts, and shows that the theory contradicts all pramanas, and is spiritually futile. Every Vedantin is agreed that
1 Kaiv. Up., I. 19, & S.B.E., XLVIII. p. 448.
COSMOLOGY 25$
the nature of Brahman as the world ground can be as- certained only by means of s'dstra and not by means of anumdna and that the s'dstra nowhere favours the doctrine of mdyd or amdyd. The theory is an alien graft on Veddnta and not an inner growth and the Sadvidyd, on which the whole cosmological theory is based, nowhere refers to the shell-silver example or the dream analogy- Causality is nowhere condemned to be self-contradictory or illusory, but is employed as the fundamental category to> expound the origin of the universe. The terms sadeva and drambhana bring out the fact of causality as parindma or transformation l and not of illusoriness or vivarta. If,, as the illusionist urges, the cause is real and the effect is false, this falsity will infect the integrity of the cause itself,, and then even the Veda and the mumuksu who relies on it will be false. Bheddbhedavddins like Bhaskara, Yadava and Nimbarka, therefore, reject the illusion theory as arc illusory idea, and adopt the method of satkdrya vdda and: Brahma parindma vdda or the emanation theory. In the causal relation the cause is the abheda or non-different aspect, and the effect the bheda or difference aspect, and the relation itself is bheddbheda or identity in difference. According to Bhaskara, Brahman exists as the one without a second in pralaya ; but in s'rsti it energises itself and emanates successively into the manifold of sentient and non-sentient beings. Brahman is saguna and has a twofold sfakti or power, namely, jiva parindma and acetana parindma, by which He becomes the finite centres and objects of experi- ence. The causal relation is not temporal or logical, as it es- sentially brings out the immanent unity and self-activity of God* Like the spider weaving its web, the absolute transforms itselfc 1 S.B., n. i. is.
256 THE PHILOSOPHY 'OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
into the relative by its parinama s'akti or evolving power. Brahman, the unconditioned, becomes the conditioned, and dif- ferentiates itself into the infinity of beings, each having its own form and function. The infinite finitises itself, and yet tran- scends the limitation of finitude. Brahman emerges into the jlva, and the jlva merges finally into Brahman. The emanation of the jlva is the downward process, and its ascent to the absolute means absorption or eklbhava and the ecstasy result- ing from it.
The other Bheddbhedavadins accept the parinama vada of Bhaskara, but reject his spiritual monism. They insist on the eternal difference and non-difference between Brahman on the one hand and cit and acit on the other. The one is in and as the many, and is their causal explanation. According to Yadava, Brahmatva is the causal unity of the universe constituted by the threefold distincts of Isrvara, the cosmic Ruler, cit, the ex- periencing subject, and acit, the object of experience. Just as the water of the sea turns itself into waves, foam and bubbles, Brahman manifests itself in the triadic forms. The absolute as pure being divides itself into Isrvara, finite centres and material things, and being as such is present in all its parts as the sat. In pralaya these distinctions exist in a potential state, and srr$ti is the self-differentiation of this triune unity. Parinama s'akti is the creative urge at the heart of reality, and the finite self that fulgurates from Brahman is an integral element of the absolute. Bhartrprapanca holds that Brahman divides itself into the trinity of Isfvara, cit and acit. They exist as the basis of reality as a unity in trinity, and owing to avidya that belongs to the jlva, the infinite finitises itself into the avasthas of the jlva? Nimbarka also explains the origin of 1 Prof. Hiriyauna's pamphlet on Bhartrprapanca.
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the universe as the self-actualisation of saguna Brahman. In the abheda aspect, Brahman is self-related (svatantra sad- bhdva) ; and in the bhedabheda aspect of creation, there is distinction as well as dependence between I&vara on the one hand and cit and acit on the other. Brahman is the s'akta or Almighty and owing to His immanent &ahti, the world order, which is enfolded in pralaya like the coils of a snake, becomes actualised in srrsti. Brahman is thus immanent in the universe as its updddna karana and transcends it as its nimitta karana. Whatever their minor differences, all the Bheddbhedavddins agree in thinking that Brahman is the cause of the universe in the sense that the two have a bhedabheda relation. Brahman is identical with the universe of cit and acit as well as different from it ; and the Sadvidyd as well as the Sutras expounds Veddntic cosmology in terms of Brahma parindma vada.
The chronological transition from S'ankara, Bhaskara and Yadavaprakas'a to Ramanuja is also a logical transi- tion. Bhaskara rejects S'ankara, Yadava refutes Bhaskara and Ramanuja repudiates Yadava and the other Veddntins and establishes the truth of Visristddvaitic cosmology. They all agree in disproving the asat kdrya vdda of the Vai&esika and his doctrine of samavaya and in demo- lishing the Buddhistic theories of momentariness or ksana bhangavdda and atheism. The theory of momentariness makes life and even the stability of the theorising activity impossible. Ramanuja brings to light the absurdity of the whole position thus : If everything is momentary, the sentient subject has perished and the object of sensation has perished. One person cannot cognise what has been apprehended by another.1 All the schools of Veddnta including the exoteric
1 S. B., II. ii. 17 and S. B. E., XLVIII, p. 501. 17
258 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
side of Advaita accept the truth that there is uniformity i» nature and that every new sr$ti is a repetition of the past l and! that srsti and pralaya are a cyclic process whose origin is not logically accountable. The Advaitic theory of Mdydvdda is attacked by all the other Veddntins on the ground that its intention is Buddhistic though the motive may be Veddntic* The Advaitin relies on the principle of non-contradiction and sublation to prove his thesis that Brahman, the cause or ground^ is identical with itself, and the world, the effect, as such, is illusory and non-existent. On the principles of sublation or apaccheda it follows that what cannot be subsequently sublated is alone real and that nirguna Brahman alone is the sat without a second which defies sublation. RamSnuja sees no reason- why the argument should not be extended further up to uni- versal void. The only reality is thus the universal void because it alone cannot be subsequently sublated as no negative move* ment can go beyond the void. Pan-illusionism may thus- lapse into pure nothingness by negating negation. To avoid this cul de sac, the Mdydvddin has to retrace his steps,, abandon the idea of l&vara as the arch -illusionist, who some- how takes to self-deception, and follow the way of sagunat Brahman as the self -revealing and self-communicating dtman, that enters into life with a view to enrich it and not stultify or impoverish its content. The Bheddbhedavddin has no- doubt corrected the subjectivism and pan-illusionism of Mdyd- vdda, but is guilty of attributing the imperfections of life to Brahman. If, as Bhaskara says, the infinite is finitised by real limiting adjuncts or satyopddhis and becomes the jlva, it may become the victim of karma and of the hazards of samsdra. The Yadava theory is equally wild and mischiev- ous, as it leads to shallow optimism. If being is present in.
1 S. B., II. i. 35 and S. B. E.. XLVIII, p. 479.
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all its parts, then reality is as fully present and perfect in dust as in the deity. The absolute will be richer for every dis- cord, error and evil. Is'vara as less than the absolute is then not worthy of worship.
The Sadmdyd, according to Ramanuja, brings out the non -difference in the relation between cause and effect as applied to cosmology. The creative urge expressed in the thought that the sat without a second willed to be the many is not the fall into ajndna in which negation enters into nirguna Brahman, but is the energising, dynamic idea of self- revelation. Being alone becomes, and becoming has its mean- ing only in being. The same substance enters into different states without losing its substantiality. . The sat in pralaya is homogeneous without any distinction of ndma-rupa and the same sat in srsti differentiates itself and evolves into the hete- rogeneity of names and forms and becomes their inner self. The one enters into the many and becomes sat, the sentient, and tyat, the non-sentient.1 The manifold of cit and acit is pre- existent in the pralaya state, but it is so subtle that it may be practically treated as non-existent. In the condition of s'rsti, the manifold as the infinity of living and non-living beings is fully evolved and made explicit. In the causal as well as the effected state the same Brahman exists with its modes implicit or explicit. Creation is therefore not out of nothing. It is only a process of the undifferentiated becoming the differentiated. Cause and effect are therefore non-different2, and by knowing Brahman, the cause, the effect, namely, the universe, is also known. If Brahman alooe is real and the cosmic process is false', the Veddntic question
1 S. B., II. i. 15, p. 42 and S, B. E.t XLVIII, p. 457. a S. B. E.t XLVIII, p. 459.
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41 What is the one that explains the many ? " would be stultified and made meaningless. The Advaitin contends that bheda is a bar to the infinity of Brahman and is therefore false. But his case is not better than that of the Dvaitavadin as, on his view also, avidya is something different from Brahman, and, to that extent, limits its nature. Difference as well as otherness is essential to the understanding of identity.
* Causality in Vedantic cosmology is different from the Sahkhyan concept of teleology and the mechanical views of creation. The term * cause ' is not merely used in the logical sense of an invariable and essential antecedent or avastha of a phenomenon. Every cause is a ' because ' and is identified with the ground. The mechanical view is to be reinterpreted teleologically, and the term then connotes immanent causality. The apt illustrations of the causal relation are not clay and its modifications or the different vital airs which arise from the one air, but the development of life from childhood to youth.1 The causal relation is analogous to that of the child and the youth. The mechanical and the teleological views receive a new orientation from the idea of biographical or spiritual develop- ment. Personality implies inner growth and the unfolding of the infinite consciousness that belongs to thejiva. Causality thus implies continuity, immanent unity and free causality.' From a still higher point of view, it refers to the sat without a second as the inner Self of all living and non-living beings. They have their source and sustenance in the Self and cannot exist apart from it. The universe is rooted in Brahman and pulsates with its life. Every sentient being is sustained by its adaptation to the living intelligence of Brahman. Ultimately the term causality may
1 S. B., II. i. 16 and S. B. E., XLVIII, p. 463.
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be employed in a comprehensive sense and made to include these related ideas. It refers to the parinamic modifications of prakrti, the free causality of the karma of the finite self or jiva and the supra-personal identity of Brahman as the inner ground of the system of nature and the society of selves.1 Nature not only is but also becomes, and the process of nature is ever changing and is so made as to adapt itself to the spiritual progress of the jiva, and the plan or purpose of creation is the perfection of the jiva as an ams'a or part of Brahman. The cosmological problem is the threefold problem of philosophy relating to nature, self and God. It is by the will of I&vara that nature changes and the self progresses, and it is by knowing Him as the inner Self of all beings that all beings are known, Brahman is the ultimate meaning of the universe, and the philosophy of nature and that of the self have their foundations only in the Vedantic knowledge of Brahman. Thus understood, causality is not an altar to the unknown God, but is an adequate idea, which explains the nature of Brahman as the world- ground and goal.
The order of creation as set forth in the s'astra may now be considered in detail and the evolution of prakrti may first be studied in the light of the principle of parinama or trans- formation. Prakrti is differently spoken of as aksara, avidya and maya and is defined as the locus or substratum of the three gunas, satva, rajas and tamas. It exists for consciousness and not in consciousness. Though prakrti is eternal or aksara, it is ever changing in its form and function. It is called avidya, as it obscures and obstructs the knowledge of Brahman, and is known as maya as it connotes the wonders of creation. In pralaya, it is matter in its static or undifferentiated state and
1 S. B., II. i. 22 and 23 and S. B. E., XLVIII, p. 469.
262 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
is known as avibhakta tamas. The next stage is the first tension of differentiation or vibhakta tamas. Like the seed that swells, sprouts, becomes a sapling and grows into a mighty tree, prakrti, which is static in the primordial state, energises, begins to grow and becomes the infinite universe. Prakrit evolves into mahat with the three states of satva, rajas and tamas. Mahat changes into ahankara with the same three states according to their predominance of a particular phase and ahankara is called vaikarika, taijasa and bhutddi. Ahankara in this sense is different from conceit. From the first kind of ahankara aided by the second originate the eleven sense organs or indriyas. They are the psychical and satvic sides of evolution. The indriyas are two-fold, namely, the cognitive sense organs or jndnendriyas and the conative sense organs or karmendriyas. The first enable the self to apprehend external objects and are classified into manas9 sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch. Manas is the inner sense organ or antahkarana, the sense commune which is the inner coordinating organ of sense knowledge and is the seat of me- mory. Manas functions as ahankara, citta and buddhi and is the cause both of bondage and of mukti. It is called ahankara when the atman is falsely identified with the body, citta when it desires a thing and buddhi when it discriminates between what is true and what is false. The eye is the specific sense organ that apprehends the sensation of colour or rupa, the ear of hearing, the nose of odour, the tongue of taste and the skin of touch. The five conative sense organs are speech, movement, grasping, excretion and generation. The indriyas are minute and are conjoined with thejtva in all its adven- tures of birth and death till the attainment of mukti. Even then they are not destroyed, but enter into the lives of other migrating selves. The indriyas are neither good nor evil by
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themselves, and they are so subtle that yogis can see even through walls and know all things. From the tdmasdhankdra called bhutddi arise the cosmic factors of the five subtle elements or tanmdtras, and the five gross elements or bhutas are the successive evolutions of the tanmdtras. The tanmdtras are sound, touch, colour, savour, and odour (s'abda, spars'a, riipa, rasa and gandha) and the five corresponding gross ele- ments are ether (dkds'a), air (vdyu), fire (tejas), water (ap) and earth (prthivi). From ether springs air, from air fire, from fire water, and from water earth. When vdyu sustains the body, it is called the vital air and is minute and is fivefold, namely, prdna, apdna, vydna, uddna and samdna. In this way the universe is the self-differentiation in successive forms of the same acit into the twenty-four categories of prakrti, mahat, ahankdra, eleven indriyas, five tanmdtras and five bhutas. Since they all evolve from one cosmic stuff, they prove the •unity and continuity of nature.
The creation of the elements and sense organs con- stitutes only the collective aspect or samasti which precedes the vyasti aspect. The Sadvidyd refers to the divine act of tripartition which implies quintuplication. The principle underlying this process consists in the inclusion of all the qualities in all the elements.1 Each of the five elements, earth, water, fire, air and ether, is divided into two parts and one half of each is combined with one-eighth of the remaining elements. The universe is composed of the five mixed elements and each substance is so called because of the preponderance of one or other element. It is only by such quintuplication that particular things with specific names and
1 Nothing in this world is single. All things by a law divine in each other's being mingle.— Shelley.
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forms are created. In explaining the meaning of the Sutra (II. iv. 17), which dwells on this topic, Ramanuja, following the Sutrakara, says : " Having entered into these elements, with my- self qualified by the collective soul as its body, let me differen- tiate names and forms, that is, let me produce gods and all the other kinds of individual beings and give them names." l Says the Stnrti : " Separate from each other without connection, these elements were incapable of producing creatures. But having entered into mutual conjunction, the principles from mahat to individual things produced the mundane egg."2 The process of individuation or vyasti sfrsti is also due to Brahman acting through Brahma and not merely to Brahma, the aggregate of the jivas, who is only the first born of the absolute. Brahma himself evolved out of the Brahmatula containing the fourteen worlds, and after the creation of Brahma, the remaining cosmic process dealing with the origin of the species takes place through his agency. The souls are eternal, and joined to acit they persist even in pralaya in a subtle state destitute of names and forms, and therefore incapable of being desig- nated as something apart from Brahman. In yrsti, Brahman as the omnipotent h'vara, bestows on all jlvas bodies and sense organs suited to their karma and He enters into them as their inner Ruler. Entry is opposed to immanence and, strictly speak- ing, connotes self-differentiation. Each s'aririn or jiva has^ its own s'arira or ksetra composed of prakrti, mahat, ahankdra and the five elements.3 The eleven senses are conjoined with
1 imah tejobannarupas t isrO devattth anena jivena jivasamastivis'istena atmana anupravisya namarupe vyakaravani devadi vicitras'r§titannSmadhe- yani ca karavapi.— S.B., II. iv. 17 and S.B.E., Vol. XLVIII, p. 580.
2 nanavlryati prthakbhuta^. tataste samhatim vina I nas'aknuvan prajas sra$tum asamagamya krtsnas'ah II sametyanyOnya samyogam paraspara samas'rayah I mahadadya vis'e?antahya^am utpadayanti te II— V. P., II. i. 52-53.
8 B^G., XIII. 5 & 6.
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the purusa and are like gems set in a jewel. S'arira is either immovable (sthavara) like trees and shrubs or movable like the bodies of devas, human beings and animals (tiryak). From the genetic standpoint, the bodies may be seed-born, sweat-born, egg-born or womb-born. There may also be spontaneous generation. In this way all jlvas from the barest monad to Brahma, the highest monad, form a hierarchy accord- ing to their karma and an amoeba may develop into an amara or god just as a deva or god may be born as a crawling insect. Even Brahma, the other devas and superhuman beings have their bodies, sense organs and places of experience. It is, however, possible for a deva or a yogin like Saubhari to reside in several bodies at the same time.
The Sutrakara next addresses himself to the question, whether a new s"rsti is a repetition of the past or a new creation and solves it by an appeal to S'ruti and Smrti which are the highest authority on the subject. The Veda as the very breath of Brahman is self-valid and is eternal, infallible and im- personal. It is a body of spiritual truths which are spiritually discernible ; and it is in the light of the Veda which is the idea and word of God that cosmic creation proceeds. Brahma by his tapas intuits the Vedic truths of the world-order and creates the rsis or mantra-drastas who are blessed with an in- sight into the inner meaning of Vedic mantras and hymns which are hidden at the end of the yugas. Says the S'ruti : " By means of the Veda, Prajapati or Brahma evolved names and forms." * Smrti derived from S'ruti also says : " In the beginning there was sent forth by the creator the eternal word of the Veda and from it there originated all creations." * " He created from the words of the Veda the whole world of
1 S. B. E., XLVIII, p. 332.
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names, works and shapes of all things." l S'ankara whose ex- position of the Sutras in this matter is not much different from that of Ramanuja, says that, before the creation the Vedic words (" re-issues of an eternal edition ") became manifest in the mind of the creator and then he created the things corresponding to those words.8 Plato had a faint glimpse of the truth in his theory of ideas and archetypes of things. The Vedantin dis- misses the sphota vada of the grammarian which holds that there is a supersensuous entity known as sphota which is mani- fested by the letters of the word and which manifests its meaning as the object of auditory perception. This sphota is as much a fiction as the adrsta of the Naiyayika and the niydga of the Mlmdmsaka. Owing to the eternity of the Veda as the word of God, there originate eternal species like devas and other cosmic deities. At the beginning of a new s'rsti, Brahman manifests the Vedas in exactly the same order as they were before and entrusts to Brahma the new creation of the different classes of gods and other beings just as they were before. The Vedic words like Indra and Agni are not conventional marks of identification but denote by their own power particular, species of beings.3 Indras come and go, but indratva with its class characteristics is eternal and Brahma recollecting the Vedic meaning of the class concept creates a new Indra satisfying the requirements. In this way Brahman, the absolute, with the creative urge becomes the infinity of sentient and non-sentient beings and enters into them as their inner Self. The changeless and perfect evolves the world-body of cit and acit and becomes the changing world without losing its purity and
1 S. B. E., XLVIII, p. 332.
3 Sabkara Bha$ya, S.B.K., Vol. XXXIV, p. 204.
8S, B., I. Hi. 27.
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perfection.1 This Veddntic view of creation has the supreme merit of positing the reality of the cosmic order and the uni- formity of nature in every sfrsti. Pralaya and srsti form a regular succession of involution and evolution and bring out the rhythmic perfection of the cosmic plan. This view ensures the unity of the universe and its uniformity and stability and at the same time provides for novelty and infinite individual variations.
The cosmic order is also a moral order and, though the highest divinity is omnipotent, and by the fiat of His will can make the world the worst of all worlds, He is not capricious and cruel. It is the favourite theme of the atheist and the monist to dwell on the evils of life and cosmic injustice resulting in unmerited suffering and waste of virtue. No merciful divinity would create a world so full as ours is of evils of all kinds like poverty, ignorance, warfare, disease and death. " Why should vice triumph over virtue and life live on death ? " is the cry of the bruised heart, which is as old as creation. The absolutist pities I&vara on account of His being a magnified samsarin. If the finite self suffers from the ills of finite life, the infinite self should a fortiori subject itself to the infinite evils and sufferings of all jivas. The atheist and the antitheist relying on the verdict of pratyaksa and anumana and on pseudo-scientific evidence deny the fact of religious experience. But the Vedantic monist, who seeks the support of s'dstra to prove his siddhdnta is not fair to himself, when he accepts l&vara as a s'dstraic necessity and rejects Him by following Mddhyamika dialectics and allying himself with the free-thinker. The Sutrakdra takes his stand on Vedic authority and denies the sceptic view that there is
1 S. B.. I, iv, 27 and S. B. E.. XLVIII, p. 403.
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cruelty and caprice in the divine nature.1 He admits the inequalities of life but traces them to the karma of the jlvas. As Paras'ara puts it, " Is'vara is the operative cause only in the creation of new beings ; the material cause is constituted by the karma of the jlvas to be created.'12 The activity of the jlva no doubt proceeds from the Supreme Self, which is his inner Ruler, but at the same time. His omnipotence is self- limited by His righteousness. Is'vara, as the moral ruler of the world, dispenses justice according to the nature of the karma resulting from the free will of the jlva. The Lord makes the soul act having regard to its past karma, whether meritorious or non-meritorious/ Every person is primarily responsible for his conduct and it is morally unjustifiable to throw the blame on supernatural agencies or on the highest Lord. The cosmic system has a moral foundation and Is'vara is Isfvara only because He is righteous. The sun shines on all alike. Rain is the common cause for different kinds of vegetation and the inequalities in their growth cannot be traced to it. Likewise divine justice is the same to all, and it reigns supreme in the kingdom of moral experience.
A new objection may be raised that the idea of a divine purpose contained in the Upanisad " It willed ' Let me become many ' " 4 is self-contradictory and argues imperfection in Is'vara. The word purpose refers to an end that is not yet attained, and therefore it affects the perfection of Brahman.
1 vai^amya nairghj-nye na sapek^atvat taths hi dars'ayati.— S. S., II, i. 34.
* nimittamatramevasau spjyanam sargakarmani I pradhanakaraplbhuta^ yatovai srjyas'aktayah II nimittamatram muktvaiva nanyatkificidapeksate I nlyate tapatam s're^ta svas'aktya vastu vastutam il — V.P., I. iv, 51, 52.
5 S.B.. II. ii. 3 and S. B. E.t XLVIII, p. 488. 4 tad aik§ata bahu syam. — Ch. Up., VI. ii. 3.
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But this criticism is controverted by the fact that the will of Js'vara is different from the will of thejiva just as the constel- lation bearing the name of the dog differs from the canine species. The wishes of the divine Self are eternally fulfilled, and every purpose is immediately fulfilled. As the Lord says in the Glta, " There is nothing in the three worlds that remains to be done by me nor anything unattained that might be attained." ! The motive that prompts the Lord to the creation of a world comprising all kinds of sentient and non-sentient beings depending on His volition is nothing else but sport or Ilia. The Sutrakara therefore says that what is called the creation, sustenance and destruction of the world by Is'vara is mere sport. The creation of the world is really an act of recreation or sportive spontaneity on the part of the divine Actor or Artist. The logical and moral ideas of Brahman as the upddana and nimitta karana of the universe is now trans- figured into the aesthetic idea of Ilia. This view was fully developed in the chapter on aesthetic philosophy. There it was shown that the creative act is the purposeless purpose of the sat as the bhuvanasundara to make beauties out of nature and the self and enjoy the art of beauty. The universe is a divine comedy and it is the play of the Artist as kapata nataka sutra- dhara that fully satisfies the sense of humour arising from the infinite becoming the finite and ends with the aesthetic joy that the finite experiences when it becomes united with the infinite.
A brief reference to the western theories of Evolution and Emergence enables us to avoid their confusions and have a clear grasp of the distinction between the happenings in
1 na me parthasti kartavyam trisu loke§u kiflcana I nanavSptamavaptavyam varta eva ca karmani II — B. G., III. 22.
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nature, the moral and spiritual conduct of the self and the inner purpose of Is'vara as the creator, sustainer and redeemer of the universe. The evolution of matter is not an ascending movement having the promise and potency of spiritual perfec- tion, nor is it an impediment to the creative impulse of the- spirit. Matter is not a bare monad or congealed spirit just as spirit is not an offshoot of matter. The naturalistic view like the nebular theory affirms the ultimate reality of matter and explains life, consciousness and personality as the by- products of physico-chemical changes. According to the theory of natural selection, variation and heredity, the living comes from the non-living and mind evolves from life ; life is an adjustment to the environment and the fittest alone survives in the struggle for existence. The theory makes nature hostile to morals and the world a gladiatorial show. The theories. of emergence are opposed to the principle that evolution is only the unfolding of what was already implicit, but there is difference in the explanation of the source of the emerg- ence. According to the theory of Alexander, the nature of space-time is an ultimate fact from which new qualities like life and mind emerge, and the next higher stage in the historic growth of the world is the nisus towards deity. Another theory, as held by Lloyd Morgan, accepts God as the nisus through whose activity emergents emerge and is thus less naturalistic, while Whitehead refers to a realm of eternal objects which require God as the principle of concretion for achieving actuality and thus abandons naturalism entirely. The view is further developed by distinguishing between the absolute which is infinite possibility and God as possibility actualised. The pan-logical absolutism of Hegel insists on the principle that in evolution the implicit alone becomes the explicit and that Reality is the gradual dialectic unfolding in a rhythmic
COSMOLOGY 27T
way of the One that goes out of itself and then returns ta« itself. Absolutism in its transcendental aspect, like that of Bradley, ' points to Reality as pure consciousness which' somehow divides itself into finite centres and gradually be- comes the world of empirical experience. Naturalism and' absolutism agree in destroying the autonomy of ethical religion' and explaining away the existence of the self and God as mere emergents or appearances. But a true theory of cosmo- logy has to recognise the reality of nature, self and God by avoiding the extremes of naturalism, personalism and singu- larism. Nature as prakrti or ksetra evolves into the world,, but is not itself purposive. It serves the purpose of Is'vara as a suitable medium for the perfection of the purusa. The purusa or jlva is an eternal entity distinct from prakrti and* its evolution is not a mere becoming or happening, but a self -choice of infinite forms of life as god, man or animal till* it discovers or recovers itself. Is'vara is distinct from both and is the immanent ground of the evolutionary process of nature and the transcendent goal of the moral progress of the jlva.
The ultimate meaning of cosmology is spiritual and' mystic, and the universe may be described as a place of mukta making. The Sadvidya is a Brahmavidya and the Upanisadic motive in putting the question : " What is that ddes'a 1 by knowing which everything else is known ? " is to turn S'vetaketu the philosopher into a mumuksu. Ramanuja explains cosmology in terms of the s'arlra-s'arlri relation. Brahman in all its states has souls and matter for its body ,• when they are subtle, Brahman is in the causal condition, and
1 uta tarn Sdes'am aprak§y5 yena as'rutam s'rutam bhavati amatam matam avijfiatam vijnatam \—Ch. Up., VI. i. 3.
272 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
when they are in the gross state, Brahman is in the effected state and is called the world. There is no confusion in the nature of acit, cit and Brahman, as non-sentient matter is ever changing, sentient souls are liable to suffering, and Brahman is ever pure and perfect. Brahman is Narayana with cit and acit as His s'arlra and He created the naras and placed His seed of immortality in them. As the Lord of lords and the Creator of creators, He is free from blemish and ever blissful, and it is the essential nature of Brahman to brahmanise the self and impart His entire bliss to it. S'rsti is the evolution of the cosmic purpose and pralaya is the involution and reversal of the whole process, and the two alternate like the waking and sleep states of the jlva. S'rsti provides an environ- ment for the evolving self to grow into godliness and pralaya is the withdrawal of the instruments of activity when the Lord finds that the self chooses the way of darkness and sin, and there is moral corruption and spiritual death in the world. In this way, the process is repeated till the jlva realises the folly -of its self-alienation, and returns to its home in the absolute. The freed self withdraws itself for ever from the twenty-four tatvas of prakrti in the same way in which it entered into them and became practically a mode of matter. Being Brahman He becomes Brahman.1 When the seer sees the brilliant Self he shakes off avidya-karma, realises his self as theprakara or s'arlra of Brahman and becomes a mukta. S'vetaketu is thus made to realise that the sat without a second which dif- ferentiates into the universe as its s'aririn is identical with the Self that is the s'aririn of his own spiritual nature. The ' that ' or the sat is the Self of S'vetaketu, and it is to the immortal glory of the Upanisads that they declare the identity of Brah- man as the cosmological subject with the inner atman of the
1 brahmaiva san brahmapyeti.
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individual self and thus reveal the mystic unity between Paramatman and thejlvdtman as summed up in the Siitra : " in non-division or avibhdga." l Says the Glta : " At the end of many births in the universe, the wise man reaches me, saying ' All is Vasudeva.' '"
The full religious value of meditating on Brahman as the cosmic Highest is brought out in the tenth book of the Bhaga- vata and the fifth chapter of the Rahasyatraya Sara of Vedanta Desdka. The former extols Brahman as satyatmaka, satyasya satya and trisatya. That He is the soul and saviour of the universe with cit-acit as His sfarira is expressed by Vedanta Des'ika in his literal and symbolic description of the formless Form. In that beatific Form the jlva is the jewel Kaustubha, mulaprakrti is S'rwatsa and the five weapons for preserving righteousness are mahat, ahankara, and the indriyas. The idea of the jlva abiding in the heart of Reality as Redeemer furnishes the raison-de-etre for universal salvation.*
1 avibhagena drstatvat.— S. S.t IV. iv. 4.
9 bahunam janmanam ante jnanavan mam prapadyate I
vasudevassarvamiti sa mahatma sudurlabhah II— B. G., VII. 19. 8 satyavratam satyaparam trisatyam satyasya y6nim nihitafica satye I satyasya satyam ^tasatyanetram satyatmakam tvSm s'arapam prapannaji II — Bhagavata, X. i. 27 and Rahasyatraya Sara (Narasimhachariar's edition, p. 238). 18
CHAPTER XI THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE JIVA
HP* HE metaphysical knowledge of Brahman as the sole reality •*• or tatva is followed by an enquiry into the hita or updya which is the means of attaining Him, But a know- ledge of the spiritual self or atman is essential to practical Veddntic culture, and the psychological study of the atman has therefore a unique value and meaning in determining the nature of such culture. Veddntic psychology is not an empiri- cal science that follows the method of mere perceptual and conceptual knowledge, but is founded on metaphysi- cal and metapsychical analysis which relies more on the introspective, than on the genetic, method to find out the essential nature of selfhood. The nature of the dtman is discovered by yogic intuition and not by the method of behaviourism, psycho-analysis or ideational construction. The self is sui generis and perseveres in its own selfhood, though materialism makes it a mode of matter and absolutism deper- sonalises it and makes it phenomenal and fictitious. Philo- sophy, western as well as eastern, has not fully recognised the eternity of the self and its intrinsic moral and spiritual worth. Visristddvaitic psychology is founded on the authority of the Upanisads, the Sutras and the Gitd and the inner experi- ence, dtmdnubhava or experience of the self. The western
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE JlVA 275
terms, * spirit ' and ' soul ', have no definite meaning and are often conceived in an animistic and anthropomorphic sense. The physical object is often invested with life and spirit, per- sonified and endowed with human feelings and strivings. Even the term ' self ', though metaphysically more adequate than the terms ' spirit ' and 4 soul ', does not bring out the primacy of what is called the dtman as contrasted with religious consci- ousness and the ontology of the Paramdtman. The Veddntic term 1 dtman ' as expounded in the Sutras and in the first six chapters of the Gltd is therefore to be preferred to the terms ' spirit/ ' soul ' and ' self,' in Vis'istddvaitic nomenclature. The nature of the dtman will be determined first dialectically by examining certain faulty definitions. The meaning of its dharmabhuta-jndna along with the three functions of cognition, conation and feeling and the abnormal and supranormal states of conscious- ness will then be considered in the light of Veddntic thought aided by the method of psychology.
The concept of dtman is more easily explained by what it is not than by what it is and by a criticism of the negative definitions, the positive meaning may be recon- structed. The Dehdtmavddin or materialist who holds that the body is the self, or the physical philosopher, with his aversion for metaphysics, insists on the priority and potency of matter and explains away the self as an epiphenomenon and superfluity. To use the Cdrvdka's well-known analogy, like the red colour produced by the mixture of the betel leaf, areca nut and lime, the combination of the five elements creates the self. The self is said to be a fortuitous concourse of atoms. The brain secretes consciousness in the same way as the liver secretes bile. The materialist establishes the physical basis of the self by the positive test that the self lives when the
276 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
four-elemental body lives and by the negative test that, wheni the body disintegrates and dies, the self also dies. He thus denies the pre-natal existence of the self and its survival after death. The naturalist, as a refined materialist, explains the higher by the lower, by tracing the self to sensation, sensation to cellular activity and cellular activity to physico-chemical changes. Personality is a product of evolution by natural selection. Materialism has a seductive charm owing to its epicurean appeal. But the concept of the self is central to psychic unity. The self is a vera causa and not a mere assemblage of atoms and physical changes. It has its own primacy and purposiveness which cannot be accounted for by the category of pradhana, and no material thing is known to think and to seek for mukti or liberation. The mechanistic concept of the self is exploded by the biological category of life. The Prandtntavddin contends that the soul is prana (vital breath). In the presence of prana, the self is present, and in its absence it is dissolved. Vitalism allied to Prdnaism holds that life is an inner activity that has the character of self-maintenance and self-multiplication. It is therefore pre- ferable to the mechanical view. While matter repeats itself, life is spontaneous and creative. But the theory that it is an entelechy or non-mechanical agency midway between matter and mind is a hypothesis that cannot be verified. The Indriydtmavddin, who holds that the senses form the self, and the sensationalist maintain that the self is constituted by the indriyas, on the basis of perceptual evidence, which, according to them, is the only test of truth ; it is the cognitive and conative sense organs that cause sensations and the self is only a cluster of these sensations. Even in introspection, when we seek for the self, we stumble on a particular perception. But the self
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE JlVA 277
has a synthetic unity and configuration which sensationalist psychology cannot explain. Each sense organ has its specific function ; the eye cannot hear and the ear cannot see, and the unity of the experiencing self cannot be attributed to the manifold given in sense-knowledge. If knowledge is to be considered as only of external origin, the psychic experience of dreams would remain unexplained. The term deha or body includes the subtle and the gross elements of prakrti, and the self survives after death, because the linga s'arlra or subtle body is not dissolved with the dissolution of the gross body. The Suksmadehatmavddin^ therefore, maintains that the self is mot merely the gross body but includes also the potential body. But the dehi or embodied self is different from its embodi- ment, both in its potential and in its actual condition. The mentalist or the Antahkaranavddin goes a step further and argues that, without the a priori synthetic unity of the mind or antahkarana, psychic experience would lose ground and become chaotic. Unity is implied in experience and does not •evolve from it. Atomistic psychology explains the mind as .an aggregation of isolated sensations in terms of the laws of .association and starts with the manifold of sense, but fails to .reduce it to unity or give it a meaning. Psycho-analysis is, •on the other hand, a deeper study of consciousness as it lays bare its different levels, explores the interior of the mind and traces consciousness from the unconscious states. The normal .and the sub-normal are related, and, in dreams, the sub- .conative tendencies and repressed desires come to the surface and are fulfilled. But the account given by the psycho-analysts, .of moral and religious life in terms of repressed sex and the Oedipus complex fails to recognise the inner dignity of life. Psycho-analysts trace moral worth to morbid conditions. Meta- psychics is a more critical enquiry into consciousness, as it
278 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
includes a study of its abnormal and also supra-normal states. In the background of consciousness are embedded the sub- conscious and the super-conscious, and yogic psychology works out scientifically the infinite possibility of consciousness and the supermind. But even this unfolding of the mental life relates only to the attributive consciousness of the jiva and not to the jwa itself. Psychology without a psyche or self fis inconceivable, like playing Hamlet without the prince of Denmark. Bud- dhistic psychology, likewise, describes the mental process and denies the existence of an enduring self. Consciousness arises according to Buddhism, by way of cause and effect and is an unbroken flux like the flow of a river. No person can step twice into the same river as fresh waters are ever flowing past him. The self is only a sanghata or aggregation and it is an^ ever-fleeting flux without any substantiality or causal power. Mental activity is a psycho-physical process and is a continual- phenomenal happening without any static being as the sub- stratum. The so-called self is a series made of the five aggre- gates or skandas consisting of the body, consciousness, percep- tion, feeling and will. In the light of the law of becoming by cause and effect, the past flows into the present and conditions, the future without any intermission. Re-birth is itself a becoming without a transmigrating entity. The transmis- sion of light from one lamp to another is only a change of energy and does not mean transmigration from lamp* to lamp. This Buddhistic psychology is untenable as its* phenomenalism leads to nihilism. The self cannot be known by the cinematographic method of studying the vary- ing and vanishing presentations. Buddhistic ethics is equally faulty as there can be no deed without a doer who- is free and immortal. Finally its philosophy of no-self and nirvana is a denial not only of theodicy but also of
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE JiVA 279
cosmodicy, the existence of a cosmos, and leads to S'unyavada or the theory of universal void. Knowledge stultifies itself, if it does not presuppose as its ground a knowing or rational self. Rationalism accepts reason as the a priori principle of knowledge. The most certain knowledge that occurs to one who philosophises in a clear and distinct way is the self-evident truth that thinking implies a thinker. As Descartes puts it 4 I think, therefore I am '. The self is a thinking unextended thing distinct from the body and from the qualities derived from sense experience and is its own proof or evidence. The rationalist offers a more adequate view of the self than the empiricist but his view is not adequate enough, as it does not include the other functions of manas like citta and ahankara. It does not define the exact nature of personality as distinct from buddhi or reason, nor does it recognise the graduated, progressive series of selves from the lowest amoeba to the highest Brahma. This spiritual evolution is not analogous to the unfolding of the monads from the bare monad of matter to the monad of monads, namely, God. The concept of the self is different from that of the material atom and of the metaphysical monad and is founded on the distinction between the cetana or the spiritual and the acetana or the material. By way of summing up, it may be concluded that the self is not deha, indriya, prdna, manas or buddhi though it uses all these as its instruments of expression.
The concept of the self as formulated in western thought may be determined by distinguishing its different meanings. The ' I ' as the subject self is contrasted by William James with the ' me ' as the object self arising from the identification of the self with all its belongings. The latter is the sum total of all that a man can call his, including his body, his clothes, his
280 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
house and the whole range of other things which are called his property. But the metaphysical ' I ' is different from the empirical ' me ' as it persists in its being, even after it is stripped of all its possessions. The former is self- originated and the latter is secondary and has only an economic or market value. Spiritual experience is of the form * I am the self and have a body ' and not * I am the body and I have the self.' The self is sometimes defined as a simple substance, as a substratum of qualities, as a thing-in-itself, or as a something we know not what. If the self is a thing-in-itself, we cannot know it and are landed in scepticism ; if, to avoid this impasse, it is held that it is only a bundle of qualities, we cannot escape the charge of phenomenalism. The category of substance and qualities is a logical distinction which does not strictly apply to spiritual experience. The self as an individual is said to be an instance of the universal which pervades its individual character. ] The judgment of history is regarded as a half-way house between the perceptual which refers to the thing and the universal which refers to the concept. But individuality has a uniqueness which cannot be exhausted by universals. As it does riot repeat a type, it eludes the grasp of science and does not admit of generalisa- tion. On the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, no two real beings are exactly the same. The idea of wholeness fails to do justice to the integral unity of the self and its inner purposiveness. The self is not an arithmetical unit but is a metaphysical unity. The category of quality and causality is only empirically valid and has no transcendental use. The term self-consciousness presupposes selfhood and it is by reflection and introspection that self-knowledge is attained. In the subject-object relation, the object is not invariably the
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE JlVA 281
material thing or non-ego opposed to the self but is also a spiritual entity admitting of inter-subjective intercourse without any loss of content. The world of space-time is given .and is not a mental construction super-imposed on things. Likewise, the self as the subject of experience is in itself and is not derived from outside and does not change into another. The self is different from the material object and the two are equally real, though materialism denies the primacy of the self and personalism denies the thing or object.
The self is its own evidence and its continued existence is self -posited and not proved by metaphysical tests. It is more true to say that because I am, therefore I think, than to :say that because I think, therefore I am. The self does not Always think and there are deep layers of thought including the self-conscious, the unconscious, the abnormal and the .supra-normal states. Its persistence in all these states is indicated by the fact of memory, recognition and spiritual self-feeling, though this unity is broken up in trances and alternations and dissociations of personality caused by drugs and psycho- physical disorders. An ethical distinction is sometimes drawn between individuality and personality. The former is said to refer to the irrational animal nature in man when he is drawn by inclination and the latter connotes the self-legislative character of the rational self and its freedom from servitude to matter. The first view regards the self as a thing which is a means to an end and the second, as a person who is an end unto himself, but not ego-centric. To the sociologist, the self is an element of the social organ- ism or community. But a free society is not an organised community but a communion of free selves as persons. Each .self exists in itself and also for others by shedding its
282 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
exclusiveness. From the real metaphysical standpoint, the self abides in its own being without being depersonalised by the matter of the materialist or the absolute of the monist. Its self-identity is not to be confused with bodily and* psychical continuity, as the self is a spiritual entity different from the material changes of the organism or mind-body. It has uniqueness like a monad,1 but is not a spiritual atom,, as its all-pervasive consciousness is opposed to monadic exclusiveness or windowless nature ; this view is not per- sonalistic, as personalism denies the existence of physical things. The self is not a mode of the absolute, if modal being denies the unique existence of the self. The adjectival theory of the self which defines it as adjectival to ultimate reality, as its connection of content or as an eternal differentiation of the absolute, also suffers from the defec^ of denying the uniqueness of the spiritual self. The monistic, contention that the self betrays a fissure between the ' that ' and the ' what ' is equally indefensible. The concept of the self is not a vicious circle in the sense that the self is the construction of thought and that thought is a state of the self.- The monist himself admits that the absolute somehow divides itself into finite centres and that the self is not an element of the absolute but is a member thereof. Lastly, from the eschato- logical standpoint, the self is an entity different from the mind- body and the sensible and intelligible world and therefore the theories of interaction and parallelism and one-sided action> have no value. The self is not only immortal but is also eternal and its value is never destroyed. The creationist view that the self is created out of nothing at the time of birth is as repugnant as the nihilistic view that it is annulled at the time: of the death of the body.
S.B., II. iii. 20 and S.B.E., XLVIII, p. 546.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE JlVA 283*
The Vi&istadvaitic view of the atman as a knowing sub- ject or jnata l is clearer and more distinct than the western concepts of the self, spirit and soul and is free from animistic associations and the difficulties arising from the problem of the relation between mind and body. By adopting San- khyan psychology, Vis'istadvaita defines the self negatively as* the purusa different from the twenty-four categories of prakrti. The latter is composed of the five gross elements or bhutas, the five subtle elements or tanmatras, the five cognitive sense organs, the five conative sense organs, manas, buddhi, ahan- kara and primal prakrti. Purusa is the twenty- fifth category and is termed the higher prakrti on account of its spiritual value. The Glta states the truth more briefly by defining the body as the ksetra or field of knowledge composed of the five gross elements with the five subtle elements, manas with the ten sense organs, ahankara, buddhi and avyakta or the primal matter-stuff. The atman is the ksetrajna * or knower of the field of knowledge. The subject of experience is as different from the object as a person is different from his dwelling place. Owing to the false identification of the self with the body, it is called the empirical self or dehi and its life is influenced by the three gunas of prakrti, namely satva, rajas and tamas. As the deha is composed of the elements of prakrti, it is also subject to decomposition and is therefore mutable or asat and perishable or vinas'i, while the atman is immutable or sat and indestructible or avinasri. This exposition has, however, no bearing on the satkaryavada. The atman is eternal or nitya 3 and stable or sfdsfvata. The six changes of the body or sadvikaras like birth, childhood and'
1 S. B.. II. iii. 19 and S.B.E., XLVIII, p. 546.
2 B. G., VII. 5 and XIII, 2 and 6. 9Kufh. Up., I. ii. 18.
284 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
age are the parindmic changes of prakrti ; and the atman is never tainted by the gunas of prakrti. It is therefore nirguna. The empirical self puts on a body at birth and puts it off at death when it is worn out. Fire does not con- sume the atman, water does not wet it and air does not dry it.1 It slays not another atman nor is slain by any.' It cannot be perceived by the senses (avyakta) nor conceived of (acintya)* The atman cannot be logically proved (aprameya) as it is the basis of proof (pramatr). It works through the means of knowledge (pramana) to obtain knowledge or jnana. The nature of the atman is thus difficult to know and therefore it arouses philosophical wonder (d&caryavat) / What cannot be logically defined in terms of genus and differentia can be defined only in terms of experience by direct intuition or atmanubhava as the eternal knower or subject of experience. Owing to avidyd-karma, the atman mistakes itself for the anatman, is entangled in samsara and migrates from body to body, from the butterfly to Brahma. But it is really change- less, pure and eternal.
The atman is self-illuminated (svayamprakas'a) and its in- telligence is both substantive and adjectival or attributive. While the atman exists by and for itself (pratyak)? its dharmabhuta- jnana exists for another (parak), i.e., for the atman. The atman is self -realised and at the same time the subject of jnana or jndnds'raya. Selfhood is knowledge of itself, but jnana is knowledge about the objects. The former is dharmijnana and
1 nainam chindanti s'astrapi nainam dahati pavakah
na cainam kledayanti apo na s'osayati marutah. — B. G., II. 23.
2 nayam hanti na hanyate. — B. G.f II. 19.
3 avyaktoyam acintyoyam.— B. G.t II, 25.
4 as'caryavatpas'yati kas'cid enam. — B. G., II. 29.
5 y.M.D., VIII.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE JlVA 285
the latter dharmabhutajnana and the two are inseparable. Self-experience or atmanubhava is different from the ex- periences of the self as the expression of its conscious- ness. While the jlva is infinitesimal in its monadic existence, its attributive jnana can be infinite and all-pervasive like the light of the sun '. The self is infinitely smaller than the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundred times and yet it is infinite in its range.3 The infinitesimal atman is known to have more potentiality than the stars above, and the infinitesimal and the infinite are ultimately alike. The jlva is windowless in the sense that it perseveres in its unique being ; but its consciousness is capable of having a cosmic range and can mirror the whole universe. Like light and its luminosity, the centre of a circle and its circumference, the atman and its jnana are logically distinguishable, but not physically separable. If consciousness were considered as a complex of qualities without the self as its subject or basis, it would lead to Buddhistic phenomenalism and nihilism, just as the theory of the self being without attributive intelligence leads to the Vais'esika view in which the self finally lapses into the unconscious as a blank state. The atman without jnana would be void of content and jnana without the atman would be chaotic and meaningless. The two are organically related and form an illustration of the Vi&istadvaitic truth that, though a substance or dravya is logically defined as the locus or basis of attributes (avasthas'raya) , it may have a unique value in Vedanta as dravya. This value is justified by the law of relativity and perspective and the same thing may be viewed as attribute from one standpoint and as substance from another. Jnana is the determining quality of the atman ; but it is also
1 S.B., II. iii. 26 and S.B.E., XLVIII, p, 549.
2 Svet. Up., v. 9.
'286 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
•substantive as it is subject to the changes of contraction and •expansion. It is eternal and all-pervasive ; but in the empirical -State of samsara it is enveloped by avidya-karma and under- goes contraction and expansion (sankoca and vikasa). Jnana is ever identical with itself though its manifestations are liable to change. It changes without losing its nature and remains the same entity. In the state of mukti, jnana regains its ^essential state and is eternal and infinite. Consciousness, which is now finite and conditioned, has therefore the pos- sibility of becoming infinite or super-mind. Owing to its unity .and continuity, it is a continuous affirmation of the self. In perceptual knowledge, it is particularised and is given as a this-now. But it is not really a bit of jnana as an isolated :and exclusive state, as all conscious states are interrelated : only a section of the whole is selected or abstracted in the interests of practical life. In the higher stages of scientific and philosophic thinking, consciousness is more articulate and expansive. Consciousness is a continuum and is really cosmic. What is given in the normal waking state as a distinct thought is only a stratum or section and it is continuous with, and shades off into, what is dim in the sub-conscious and the distant in the unconscious state. Even the abnormal and the supra-normal states are but layers of the ocean of conscious- ness, and finally, in the state of mukti when the conditionate- ness of karma is destroyed, it returns to itself and shines for ever as infinite consciousness or the ocean pacific in a super- sensuous and supra-rational realm.
Jnana is the differentia or svarupanirupaka dharma of the jiva and is synonymous with prajna, mati and medha. It manifests itself in numberless ways in the subject-object rela- .tions into which it enters as well as in the subjective
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE JlVA 287
3ife. They may all be included in the usual tripartite -division of knowing, feeling and willing and this division is adequate to the empirical description of the jlva a.sjnataor iknower, bhokta or enjoyer and karta or doer. They are not isolated facts of experience, but are factors of all-inclusive con- sciousness. True psychology is not genetic or empirical as, •according to its method of starting with reflex action and sensation and ending with reflection, the self lacks inner synthetic unity. The method has to be reversed in the light •of dtmanistic psychology which relies on the philosophic method of tracing the particulars as expressions of their under- lying unity and discovering the whole of knowledge which is its soul. Jfiana is not a mere continuum or a synthesis, but is the integral consciousness of the self and is more than its partial expressions of cognition, feeling and conation. The self is different from the knowing processes and is presupposed in the subject-object consciousness. As a knowing subject it is different from the Vais'esika view of it as substance and also from the Sankhyan concept of the purusa. The Kanada theory regards intelligence as an adventitious quality and the jlva in its essence as being non-intelligent like a piece of stone. The Sankhyan theory of the purusa as an indifferent spectator is equally futile as it is a knower that knows nothing and does nothing. If the jlva is the reflection of Brahman in avidya, it would only be a semblance of reality, and spiritual striving would then be a mere make-believe and there would be no jnana or jnani. Transcendental jnana devoid of content is a transcendental illusion, and thought would become a vacuum. But the Vis'istddvaitic exposition of the dharml- dharma relation between the dtman and its jnana rescues know- ledge from scepticism and solipsism. The denial of the guna or dharma is the denial of the gunin or dharmin itself. There
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can be no quality without the substance possessing it, no- experience without an experiencing entity. As jnana is in- variably conjoined with manas which is its instrument of objective knowledge, it is often identified with it in a figurative way. When jnana functions as a cognitional process, it is described as reasoning and includes the stages of scientific and philosophic knowledge. It stresses the nature of the logical ego employing the criteria of truth and the pramanas, with a view to discriminating between truth and falsity including samsraya (doubt), viparyaya (wrong opinion), bhrama (illusion), and durmati (false knowledge), by means of viveka (discrimi- nation) and seeking srreyas or final beatitude. The view that the self is merely rational, would lapse into the evils of intel- lectualism and this defect is removed by the ethical concept of the jlva as karta.1 Consciousness is conative and every fact of knowledge is also an act of the ethical ego. Every judgment involves the factors of karma and kartd and this moral experience presupposes the primacy and free- dom of the will. Self-consciousness as will is free activ- ity or self-caused change and is not an unconscious striving or a moral process which is externally determined. The inequalities of moral life with all its hazards and hard- ships are entirely traceable to the responsibility of the finite self and not to prakrti or Is'vara. The very term sfastra implies the existence of moral freedom in worldly and Vedic conduct and the imperative of duty. If purposive activity belonged to prakrti and not to the jiva, then it would follow that, since prakrti belongs to all, all actions would be experi- enced by all jlvas and the uniqueness of personal experience would be destroyed.2 Matter is not known to meditate on
1 S. B.. II. iii. 33 and S.B.E., XLVIII, p. 553.
2 S. B., II. iii. 36 and S.B.E.. XLVIII, p. 555.
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itself and become desirous of liberation. If activity were determined by the divine will, the self would only be an automaton or a conduit-pipe of the cosmic purpose which would then appear capricious and cruel, and freedom of the will would be an illusory fiction. The acceptance of passivity and of the fatalistic theory itself is an act of free will. Moral freedom implies deliberation, when there is a conflict of desires, and decision. In the process of deliberation the self weighs alternative possibilities and oscil- lates between them, then the choice is made and the motive develops into a will and becomes an overt act. In this moral situation the self does not remain an indifferent spectator watching the conflict of motives and the triumph of the strongest motive, but identifies itself with the whole process as the doer doing the deed. Freedom is a skill or capacity as well as an activity and the jlva has moral freedom even if it does not exercise it actively just as a carpenter is a workman whether he uses his tools or not.1 ' Ought ' implies ' can ' and •the moral self can attain self-sovereignty or svarajya by subduing its animal inclinations consisting of instincts like self-assertion, anger, jealousy and fear, and choosing the ways of the mumuksu including bhakti (devotion) and prapatti (self- surrender) or sink into animality by choosing the way of sensuality and becoming its slave. It can become a god or a dog and no being on earth or beyond can destroy its conscious- ness of freedom and initiative. But if morals be given priority over metaphysics and aesthetics, the result may lead to the evils of moralism, ending in the ritualism of the Mtmamsaka and the rigorism of the Kantian view of morals and mere progres- sivism. The evils of intellectualism and voluntarism are .avoided by recognising the affective side of consciousness
1 S. B.. II. iii. 39 and S.B.JS., XLVIII, p. 556. 19
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or feeling as being midway between cognition and conatior* and describing jnana in terms of bhoktrtva (the capacity for experiencing). Feeling is the essence of the empirical self as bhokta (the experient) and pleasure-pain is the stuff of feeling and is regarded as its hedonistic tone. Every state of con- sciousness has feeling tone, which includes organic and bodily feeling, psychic feeling and the feeling caused by the reaction of the subject to the object that is presented to it.
James Ward distinguishes five meanings of feeling, namely a touch, an organic sensation, an emotion, a purely subjective state and the pure affective state like the feeling of pleasure or pain. Of these the last is the most appropriate meaning implying a hedonistic tone. Feeling is not immediate, sentient experience which is infra- intellectual, inarticulate and confused, as there is no such self- sufficient feeling in the mental complex. The faculty psycho- logy that maps out the mind-body into separate faculties is entirely faulty and out of date as it ignores the need for a synthetic knowledge of the whole self and the whole-making functions of its jnana. Every sensation is significant and determinate. The affective tone of the specific sensations varies with their intensity, duration and quality. Pleasurable sensations promote organic life and welfare. Emotions like fear, anger, jealousy and sexual feeling have a wider range and greater persistence than a momentary feeling, and they cannot always be abstracted from their bodily expression. An emotional disposition is said to be a feeling in the presence of an object which persists and is different from the emotional mood which is mainly subjective. When an emotion qualifies a more stable centre, it is called a sentiment, like patriotism. A spiritual intuition is not mere feeling which is precognitive
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE JlVA 291
and primitive but is supra-intellectual. What is known as the gregarious instinct brings out the nature of the jiva as the social self realised in its inter-subjective intercourse and spiritual communion. The highest sentiments of the social self are friendship (maitn), mercy or benevolence (day a), bhakti (devotion to God) and prapatti (self -surrender to God). The atman as the material self is imprisoned in its mind-body or sthula (gross) and suksma (subtle) s'arlra and enjoys the pleasures of sense and sensibility. When its desires are rationalised by viveka, it rises to a higher level of self-feeling and enjoys the happiness of self-realisation. But when it intuits the Lord who is its inner Self, it enjoys eternal bliss.
The three states of consciousness are one continuous con* text and are not contradictory, and each state shades off without any gap or leap into innumerable other states which are equally real. Dharmabhutajnana with its possibility of be- coming infinite has a unity and identity of content which runs through all its varying and vanishing presentations and is one single affirmation about the dharmi and is sustained by its intelli- gence. The analysis of avasthatraya or the three states is founded on the principle of the evolution and integration of conscious- ness and not on self-contradiction. Monistic Vedanta inter- prets the consciousness of difference like that involved in sense- perception and the fanciful and fantastic states of the dream world, as a self-discrepancy requiring sublation. The subject* object relation that creates the dualistic experience is essential to knowledge and does not imply any dualism between reality and thought as is said to be involved in the Advaitic analysis of avasthatraya. When the self passes from the unconscious to the conscious, the transition is from the potential to the actual and from the subtle to the gross and it does not mark any stages
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of reality. Just as childhood does not contradict youth, the unconscious state does not sublate the waking consciousness. Vikara is not vivarta and passing from one state to another does not betray any inner perversity or misunderstanding. In our waking consciousness the self is aware of the external world which satisfies the practical needs of life and is the same to all individuals. The objective world of space-time is given as the common theatre of our actions and it is not a mental construction confined to finite thought. The world in which we all live and move is neither a mere course of consciousness as a perishing psychical state nor a significant idea having objective reference, but is external to the perceiving subject. Even the Advaitin is logically constrained to accept this view and reject the subjective idealism of the Buddhist. The philosophy of the objective does not, therefore, contradict com- monsense but gives a deeper and wider view of it by its comprehensive insight. Our waking consciousness in its aspects of knowledge and will is double-edged as it presupposes the logical and moral subject which is the finite self and the world of space-time and sense-life which is the object of experi- ence. The monist reverses the commonsense view when he seeks to explain the normal psychic experience of integration in terms of the abnormal process of disintegration and con- fusion and traces the genesis of both to avidya and adhydsa. If knowledge in all its levels including omniscience is attri- buted to nescience, scepticism will be the only inevitable result of such pan-illusionism.
But Vis'istadvaita affirms the reality of all cognitions, makes no radical distinction between the normal and the abnormal, and explains all changes of consciousness in a scientific and moral way. The self abides in its being in the
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE JlVA 293
states of waking, dream and sleep including the so-called abnormal states of dissociation of personality and multiple personality and the supra-normal states of yogic intuitions, super-mind and cosmic consciousness. The difference between waking and dreaming consists in the fact that the self is awake when it contacts the external world and is in the dreaming condition if it has broken away from the objective world which is common to all beings, and experiences a succession of memory images without logical coherence and co-ordination. Psychic presentations are not fantastic fabrications woven with the images of memory but are wonderful objects created by Is'vara according to individual desert.1 The prophetic character of dreams is further evidence of the divine creation of dream objects.2 As pure subjective experience, dreams are of the nature of retribution whether as reward or as punishment for minor deeds,3 and the subjective is as real as the objective. From the ethical point of view every dream is expiatory and its feeling tone is determined by the conduct of thejlva that is morally judged. According to psycho-analysts, the subcona- tive tendencies that are suppressed come to the surface in dreams and there is wish-fulfilment. But the term ' uncon- scious ' employed in the method of psycho-analysis is vague and its sexual version of desire is not only inexplicable but is also repugnant to the moral consciousness. The ethical and religious significance of dream -psychology is completely ignored by psycho-analysis and subjectivism. When the self suffers from fatigue, it seeks relaxation and retires into the condition of sleep for recuperation of energy. The sleeping self puts off the tools of thought and the instruments of action
1 S. B.t III. ii. 3 and S.B.E., XLVIII, p. 602. 3 S. £., III. ii. 6 and S.B.E., XLVIII, p. 604. * S. B.. III. ii. 5 and S. B. E., XLVIII, p. 603.
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and refreshes itself ; but even in that state, consciousness persists as a potentiality like masculinity in a male child.1 It is lulled to rest in the nadis (nerve-centres) of the pericardium and is united there with the True or Brahman, the real resting place of the tired self/ Sleep is the period of repose and recuperation when the spent tissues are again built up ; prana functions in sleep, when the mind and the sense organs are inactive, and maintains life. The view that waking is a realistic state and dream an idealistic creation followed often by pre- sumed non-dual consciousness in perfect sleep is controvert- ed by the fact that states are real avasthas and are not stages of sublation in which negation is negated. If the avidya- ridden self progresses or regresses from the sheaths which make it vi&va, taijasa and prajna and stultifies itself ap- parently in sleep and really in turiya, pure consciousness will itself be sublated by the self, and all knowledge will be ship- wrecked at the entrance to the harbour of the absolute. If the bliss of samadhi is allied to the bliss of sleep, no spiritual endeavour is needed to attain it as every one slides into sleep and lapses into the unconscious.3 The logical conclusion of Advaita should be the denial of mulavidya (original nesci- ence) and avasthatraya. The Advaitin, however, fights shy of the philosophy of bare negation or s'unya, into which Buddhistic logic would force him, and makes a compromise with the realist. In describing the different avasthas of the self, the Sutras no- where refer to their self-contradictions and the need for subldtion.
All the avasthas mark the transition of jnana from the conscious to the sub-conscious and to the unconscious which are different states of jnana determined by karma. Drowsiness,
1 S. B., II. iii. 31 and S. B. E.t XLVIII. p. 551. 8 S. B., III. ii. 7 and S. B. E., XLVIII, p. 604. 8 Ch. Up.t VIII. ii. I.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE JlVA 295
-waking dreams and reverie form an interim stage between waking and dreaming. While psychology explains the normal process of integration, psychiatry deals with the opposite process of mental disruption as in the phenomena of hyp- notism, multiple personalities and alternation of personalities. Hypnotism, whether self-induced or caused by another, is partial quiescence and is the result of concentration when some mental processes are suspended and others heightened. Hysteria is also a case of a break in the feeling of self and its unity. In cases of dissociation and alternation of personal- ity, memory is paralysed by drug, disease or psycho-physical disorders in the sthula and the suksma s'arlras or gross and subtle bodies of the jiva. But when these counteracting causes are overcome, the unity of consciousness is restored and the self recognises its identity based on smrti or memory. Personal identity is a real psychological experience and is con- firmed by the Upanisad. "From the ethical standpoint of karma, moral life presupposes the freedom and eternity of the self.1 The religious consciousness insists on the preservation of the eternal values of the freed self. When the gross body is dissolved in death, the jiva goes to heaven or hell, svarga or naraka, to enjoy the fruits of its good deeds or punya or to undergo suffering, as the consequence of its evil deeds or papa. No jiva can escape the consequences of its karma, and the law of retribution presupposes the immortality of the jiva, the existence of I&vara as the dispenser of justice, and the unity of the universe of space-time as the field of activity and the sphere of retribution. Deeds, good as well as bad, are never lost, and the jiva that has done punya ascends after death to svarga by the way of the pitrs or the manes and enjoys the pleasures
1 S.B., III. ii. 9 and S. B. E.. XLVIII, p. 605.
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resulting from such punya. But the pleasures of svarga are as fleeting as earthly pleasures and are besides infected by the mental depression due to servility to gods. When its punya is exhausted by enjoyment, the jlva returns to the earth and reincarnates in a new body determined by its re- sidual karma and begins a fresh career in the new environ- ment.1 The jlva having a record of wickedness is hurled into hell, suffers from pains proportionate to its evil deeds and is reborn in the world with a fresh opportunity to undo the past. The self has thus freedom to grow into sdtvic goodness or lapse into tamasic wickedness. It subjects itself to the adven- ture of numberless births and deaths, and is caught up in the see-saw of samsdra. While destiny drags the jlva down and subjects it to sorrow, the inner divinity in each jlva urges it to choose the way of blessedness, and it drifts between destiny and divinity till it decides on mukti and becomes a mumuksu.
The dtman and its jndna were till now described from the standpoint of psychology as the subject of a separate s'dstra, but Veddntic psychology is really founded on its philosophy of religion and forms a half-way house in the passage from meta- physics to religion as expounded in the Veddnta Sutras. The nature of the dttnan cannot be known apart from that of the Paramdtman as the two are indissolubly related as s'arlra and s'arlrin, ams'a and ams'in.* This truth is explained at some length in my short work Ramanuja's Idea of the Finite Self and may be briefly summarised in this context. The jlva or finite self is a prakdra of the Paramdtman as a logical, ethical
1 tasminyavatsampatamusitvSthaitam evadhvanam punarnivartante .... tad ya iha rama$iyacarana abhyas'o ha yatte ramaijiyam ySnimapadye- ran .... atha ya iha kapuyacarana abhyas'o ha yatte kapuyam yOnim-Spadyeran . . . .— Ch. Up., V. x. 5 and 7.
J S. B., II. iii. 42 and S. B. E.t XLVIII, p. 559.
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and aesthetic ego and is finally intuited as His s'anra. Relations, are not self-discrepant, but they do relate and the logical relation between the finite and the infinite self is brought out by the categories of cause and effect, substance and attribute and whole and parts. The jlva is the effect of Brahman in the sense that a term connoting Brahman in the effected or differentiated state is co-ordinated with another connoting the same in the causal or non-differentiated state. This view leads to the second concept of the jlva as the inseparable attribute or aprthaksiddhavis'esana of sat which is the ultimate substance. The substance is the subject of qualities and there is connection of content between the supreme self and its quality, the jlva. The vi&esana is not only an eternal differen- tiation of the absolute but also an eternal part or ams'a of Brahman who is the vibhuor the whole of Reality ; the jlva is a spark of the brilliant Self.1 The jlva is not merely a mode of Brahman but is a spiritual monad, though not an atom in the quantitative sense. The idea that Brahman is one entity and that the jlva is separate is mathematical and not metaphysical, as the true infinite transcends the category of quantity. The vibhu is the viraf that is immanent in the ami or the monadic jlva as its inner Self, but it exceeds its finite content. Though monadic as a substance, the jlva has intelligence which is capable of becoming infinite. Vis'istadvaita thus reconciles the discrepancy between monism and pluralism by its inter- pretation of the terms causality, substantiality and infinity. The jlva is the upadeya, vis'esana and ams'a and Brahman is the supreme Source, Super-Subject and the inner Self.
The ethical ego stresses the aspect of transcendence* and external relation with Is'vara in terms of s'esa and
1B. G., XV. 7.
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&esi and ddsa and svdmin. While a quality is a quality of a substance, a relation is strictly between two substances. The jlva is not a vis'esana, but is a self-active personality or vi&esa which is essentially free. Is'vara is the niyantd and Purusottama, who wills the true and the good and whose conation is immediately self-realised. He is absolutely pure, perfect and holy. The jlva attains self-sovereignty by sub- jugating sensibility and egoism or ahankara and dedicating its freedom to the service of Is'vara. The self realises its utter dependence (s'esatva) on Is'vara, its inner Ruler, and its being a means to His satisfaction as the s'esa. While acit also subserves the divine end of soul-making, cit is conscious of such instrumentality and is therefore called ddsa. Every deed is consecrated service to Is'vara, as kainkarya and the gift of self is the supreme kainkarya to the Lord who is its real Self and Redeemer. The aesthetic ego reconciles imman- ence and transcendence by the concept of the jlva as not only the jndtd (knower), and the kartd (doer), but also as the bhoktd (enjoyer). While the logical view promotes intimacy and unity, the ethical way fosters reverence to the Holy. The aesthetic self combines the two by intuiting Brahman as bhuvana- sundara, who creates for Himself a beautiful form of His own to attract the self and transmit beauty and bliss to it. The logical, ethical and aesthetic ego are ultimately transfigured into the three-fold expression of the s'arira of Brahman in terms of ddhe- yatva, vidheyatva and s'esatva. The term s'arlrin as appplied to the dtman should satisfy the three conditions of modality, dependence and serviceability. Firstly as a mode it derives its being from Brahman as the very life of its life (srvarupa •ds'rta) and is sustained by its immanence (dtmaika prakd- ratva). Secondly it is controlled by its will (sankalpds'rita) iand absolutely depends on it (atmaikds'rayatva) . Finally the
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE JlVA 299
-self subsists as a means to the realisation of the divine purpose {dtmaika praydjanatva). Thus the jiva derives its substantial- ity from the Brahman as the adhara, depends on His redemptive will as the niyantd and exists as a means to the satisfaction of the s'esi. Brahman as the source, sustenance and satisfaction of the finite sdf is called its .s'arlrin. Every term connoting the s'arlra connotes the s'arlrin and the jiva connotes also Brahman, its s'arlrin. There is a plurality of jlvas each having its own distinct character, .although all jlvas are alike in so far as they have intelligence for their essential nature.1
The Vis'istddvaitic view that the jiva or individual self is a prakdra of Brahman, the supreme Self who is its prakdrin, is, on the face of it, paradoxical, because the jiva is also considered as a separate entity or centre of existence -distinct from Brahman and having qualities of its own. It amounts to saying that the jiva is both a monad having an existence of its own and a mode or inseparable attribute of Brahman. Exception has been taken to this view of the .relationship between the self and Brahman on the following .grounds by objectors : (1) How can the same thing be both substance and attribute ? (2) If the self is a mode or insepar- able attribute of Brahman, how can it be at the same time a distinct centre of existence ? If the self is a separate centre of -experience, its relationship to Brahman would be external and this would be inconsistent with its being a mode of Brahman. <(3) If a substance is different from the qualities by which only it is known, it is unknowable as a thing-in-itself. If, on the other hand, a substance is the same as its qualities, it cannot be ^called a monad as there would then be no substrate or
1 S. B., II. iii. 48, and S. B. £?., XLVIII, p. 565.
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locus. (4) Again in perceptions like * I see the rose ' and more especially in self-consciousness, the self, which, according to the Vi&istadvaitic view, is a separate centre of consciousness, is both the experiencing subject and the experienced object* How can the conscious subject which is cit be also the object which is acit or jada ? (5) If the self and its consciousness be one, how can it be maintained that its jnana is cap- able of becoming infinite when its own nature is atomic ? It is difficult to conceive how the changeless can change* The Vi&istddvaitin replies to these objections as follows : (1) That a thing can both be a substance and an attribute to another substance is not inconceivable. The lamp emits light ; light is here an attribute of the lamp and at the same time it is in itself a substance. (2) The experienced object is not always acit or jada. When Devadatta perceives or infers the existence of his neighbour Somadatta, the latter, though experienced by the former, is himself a thinking or experiencing self. (3) It is only the relationship of the s'arlra and s'arlrin which Vis'istadvaita postulates between the self and Brahman, that can adequately bring out the intimacy that exists between the two, as in spiritual communion. This view has also the supreme merit of conveying the truth that the Paramatman as s'arlrin enters into the jwatman which is Its s'arlra with a view to imparting substantiality and com- municating Its infinite love to thejlva.
The other systems of philosophy, while trying to- explain the relationship between Brahman and the self, fail to give satisfaction. The pluralist posits the existence of an infinite number of self-thinking and self-active entities persist- ing in their own right. This would make God a monad amongf many monads, or an each as a purusa among other purusas. It
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reduces God to the position of a finite being. Some schools of .theism define God as an extra-cosmic creator and insist on eternal distinctions between the creator and his creation. On this view God is too remote for the purpose of spiritual com- munion which is so essential to the religious consciousness. The Bhedabhedavadins contend that Brahman is both identical with the jlva and different from it. This would imply that Brahman is tainted with the imperfections of the self. The Advaitin concedes phenomenal reality to the finite self on the empirical plane, but maintains that it is only an illusory appear- ance shot through with self-contradiction and imposed on the absolute, which is sublatable ultimately by jnana. He does not explain how Brahman came to be clouded by avidya. Further, he is unable to define the nature of mukti and show why selves ridden by avidya should continue to exist when avidya has been destroyed by the jnana of any one single self. Even a determined absolutist like Bradley admits that ' we do not know how or why the absolute divides itself into finite centres or the way in which, so divided, it remains as one '.
The existence of a plurality of selves is a fact of experi- ence in all its levels though philosophy is unable to explain it. The mystic who has a soul-sight of God assures us that, in the state of communion, his separate consciousness is swallowed up and not his separate being and invites others to share his joy. The existence of a plurality of jlvas is proved by appeal to experience in all its aspects, perceptual, inferential and intuitive, and is generally affirmed by all schools of philosophy except by that of Ekajlva-vada. It holds the view that esse is percipi and that drsti is sfrsti and that there can be only one sdksin or seer of all things and that whatever is known asjada is false. The world of space-time-cause is only * my ' idea and is
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created and sustained only by ' me ' and by knowing the ' I r the * me ' including the whole known world disappears. The logic of Ekajlva-vdda is irrefutable and inescapable and all attempts made by the Advaitic idealist to avoid subjectivism are futile and have proved a failure. The theories of avidya and mdyd and their relation only prove the thesis that non-dual- ism cannot free itself from the charge of the dualism between mdyd and avidya. If Brahman is conjoined with mdyd, it either controls mdyd or is controlled by it. In either case, it creates the jlva and causes the confusions and delusions of avidya. To say that a false creation is only a play makes matters worse, when it makes Brahman a dreamer dreaming the world and enacting a false play to delight false persons* To avoid this God-destroying and world-negating logic, other Advaitins impute nescience only to the jlva and not to Brah- man which is ever pure consciousness. Brahman is ever self- effulgent, but the jlvas are its myriad reflections due to the distortion of avidya. The plurality of avidya causes the plurality of jlvas and they are ever conjoined and mutually dependent and form a beginningless stream. This view does not improve the position as it makes the desire for freedom and freedom itself a make-believe. If avidya is a stream, so is the jlva, and it is no entity. If mukti is the destruction of avidya only, the nature of the jlva exists as distinct from Brahman, but if it is the destruction of the nature of the jlva, it is suicidal. The release of one jlva should at once result in that of all other jlvas. The whole difficulty arises out of assuming a false medium between Brahman and the jlva. The only logical way out of this impasse is to accept the view that Brahman is the locus of avidya and is caught up in its self-contradiction. The limitation theory is more realistic than the reflection theory, as it gives some meaning to the need for, and the nature of, mukti,
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and marks a transition to the Bheddbheda view of real limiting adjuncts or satyopddis and not mithyopadis. But even this explanation is not free from the charge of importing a real defect in the nature of Brahman. Ramanuja gives a new orientation to the whole problem by giving a moral meaning to avidyd in terms of karma, imputing avidya-karma to the jiva and recognising a plurality of jlvas and the need for moral and spiritual endeavour on the part of every jiva to attain Brahman.
CHAPTER XII MUMUKSUTVA
A PSYCHOLOGICAL insight into the imperfections of the karma-ridden jtva is essential to the practice of vairagya or self-renouncement as a preparation for Vedantic life and the Sutrakara therefore devotes a special section called the Vairagya Pdda to its study. The metaphysician that enquires into the nature of ultimate reality and truth becomes on the religious level a mumuksu or spiritual seeker after Brahman. Vi&istddvaita as a philosophy of religion is founded on the fundamental Vedantic truth that the knower of Brahman attains the highest (Brahmavid dpnoti param) . The enquiry into Brahman (Brahmajijnasa) is governed by the supreme spiritual end of attaining immortality (na ca punardvartate) . The knowledge of Brahman as the ground of existence obtained by employing the pramdnas enables the self to determine the practical methods of attaining mukti or liberation from the hazards of birth and death. Ontology as a logical and dialec- tical account of reality has its completion only in teleology and value philosophy. Brahman as the ultimate tatva is spiritually realisable as the supreme purusdrtha by moral and spiritual discipline which is known as the hita. The word vedand in the Upanisad connotes not merely the philosophic apprehension of Brahman but also the spiritual attempt at realisation in
MUMUKSUTVA 305
which jnana deepens into updsana or meditation on Brah- man. The attainment of God is the supreme and complete good which includes the moral and spiritual effort to realise it. Brahman is eternally self-realised and perfect, but the jiva in its empirical state forgets its divine destiny, like the prince who, forgetting his royal descent, lives as a hunter with other hunters in the woods and is providentially restored to his father's kingdom. The finite self has its source and sustenance in Brahman, but it forgets its divineness, wanders in the wilderness of samsdra, and finally regains the paradise of Paramapada. Brahmajndna is not merely disillusionment but a spiritual ascent of the enlightened self to its home in the absolute. The supreme end of the mumuksu is thus the realisation of Brahman which is the consummation of moral discipline. Moral discipline is the process of self- purification elaborated in Karma Yoga, and spiritual culture is the method of self-realisation prescribed in Jnana Yoga. Bhakti Yoga is the scheme of God-realisation as the completion of the moral and spiritual disciplines. In this way the three Yogas are the triple ways of Veddntic culture leading to the know- ledge of Brahman.
The dtman is essentially free and eternal, and lives, moves and has its being in the Paramdtman as its inner Self. But somehow it falsely identifies itself with prakrti, and the dtman which is a mode of Brahman imagines itself to be the mode of matter. Like attracts like and the prakrti -ridden purusa acts as if it were a bodily self drawn by the objects of sense and thus becomes the slave of sensibility. The dtman as the self-conscious subject that is eternally free and bliss- ful has Brahman as its source, centre and sustenance. But owing to the influence of avidyd-karma whose origin cannot
20
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be temporally or logically explained, the atman forgets its home in the absolute, is enticed by prakrti and is caught up in the cycle of birth and death and pleasure and pain. Avidya creates the confusion of dehdtma-bhrama or abhi- mdna, due to the failure to distinguish between the self and the body. Abhimdna generates kama or the lusts of the flesh. Kama lapses into hatred if the desire for the objects of sense is frustrated. The effect of avidyd-karma is conserved in the mind-body as the infinite causal chain of karma containing the possibility of future births and deaths. The jlva by forget- ting its divine heritage, enters into the body of every kind of living being, — human, sub-human and celestial, — is tossed up and down in the scales of evolution from the amoeba to the archangel and subjects itself to the infinite hazards and hard- ships of metempsychosis. Even the hedonistic satisfaction of svarga gained by the practice of yajna (sacrifice), ddna (gifts) and tapas (penance) is trivial and transient (alpa, asthira). The jlva ascends to svarga by its meritorious karma but is used by the devas not as a free self but as a thing, and, as a means to the gratification of their celestial desires.1 It is like a beast for the devas.2 The will of the gods to rule others is made possible because of the will to serve them that is present in the punya-ridden jlva loaded with karma. Corresponding to the pleasures of svarga are the pains *of naraka or hell and both follow the law of re- tribution with mathematical precision.3 The monistic view that heaven and hell are mere mental experiences without a place in the objective universe is a form of subjective idealism which ignores the reality of the world of space- time and social
1 S. B., III. i. 7 and S. B. E.t XLVIII, p. 589.
8 tarn devah baksayanti yatha pas'ur evam sa devanSm.— Br. Up.t I. iv. 10.
3 S. B., III. i. 9 and S. B. E., XLVIII, p. 591.
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order and explains away the facts of cosmic life as figurative •expressions. But the Vedantin accepts the reality of the cosmic -order and the solidarity of society in all its levels in the three-storeyed universe of the sub-human, human and celes- tial orders.
Self-renouncement or virakti is the first requisite of the mumuksu who seeks the infinite bliss of Brahman, and it is freedom from the desires of terrestrial and celestial pleasures. The sensualist regards the world as a carnal feast and revels in the joys of earthly paradise, without looking before and after. The sense-bound Lokayata or materialistic hedonist sings the glory of sensual life, luxuriates in ease and voluptu- ousness and rolls in the soft cushions of sense-born joys designed by Eros. Nothing is more pleasing than pleasure and the story of Prince Siddhartha sums up poetically the joys of a hedonistic heaven in a pleasure-palace with its softened light, sweet odours, delicious foods, with juicy fruits and soothing amorous songs, with dreamy dances and delicate ministers of love. To the seeker after the pleasures of svarga, the joys of devaloka, the world of the gods, with the shining wealth of Kubera, soft Gandharva melodies and revels in the company of Rambha and others exceed in range and variety human pleasures, as they are satisfactions without any strife or satiety. Life is, on the whole, rich and rosy and its pleasure ranges in intensity and extent from the pleasure -of the pig to the happiness of Brahma. The body is not a tomb of the soul but is a poem of beauty and the senses ex- press the joy of the union of purusa with prakrti. It is a bond and not a bondage. The lights of heaven gladden the hearts of all beings. Everything in the universe, ' high and low, great and small, tile and tower, bush and brake ' is born
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of this joy. Even the holy ascetic that is rapt in yoga in his. Himalayan retreat and suppresses his cravings, cannot resist the seductive charms of kama. Even the devas that reign in their heavenly worlds are ruled by Eros and carnal desires. The seeker after pleasure therefore summons all rational beings to employ their reason in the enjoyment of sensual' pleasures as the sole end of life. If it is said that pleasure is mixed with pain, it is prudence to avoid the pain and1 relish the pleasure, and not to renounce the latter. The Vedas that deny the value of sense-pleasures are self-con- tradictory and false and are the reasonings and rhapsodies of fools. Therefore, concludes the Carvdka, the self is the body and every one should eat, drink and be merry and feed on pleasures by fair means or foul. The philosophy of the Carvaka is thus an appeal to commonsense and sensibi- lity and though it may seem repugnant to reason is yet ineradicable, as its foundations are deeply kid in human nature and animal faith.
Pleasures are indeed pleasant but they are tinged with pain and lead to pain. Therefore hedonistic optim- ism inevitably leads to the pessimistic feeling that life is rooted in suffering.1 The pessimist thinks that optimism is shallow and is founded on ignorance and that the superficial man alone possesses the happy-go-lucky frame of mind. The world is a vale of woe and it is false to say that nature is benign, as it is red in tooth and claw. Life lives on death and leads to death and there is a chain of destruction everywhere. Life is based on strife and cut-throat competition. The spectre of death stalks at the very centre of being and is the
1 vide the chapter on " Sickmindedness " in James' Varieties of Religious Experience.
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^retribution of the will to live. Every pleasure is fraught with pain and the pursuit of happiness as the end and aim of life is a ;mere will-o'-the-wisp. The socalled agreeable feeling is, to the pessimist, neither a present experience nor one of anticipa- tion or recollection. The present is ever-fleeting and momentary pleasure is self-stultified. The aching thirst for life is a living 'Contradiction. The world is irrational and " full of sound and fury." It is a monstrous error and is the worst of all possible worlds, and sorrow is inherent in the very nature of things .and in the human will. Everything in life is passing away without any stability or substantiality ; youth and manhood fade away, beauty perishes like the perfume of a minute, wealth vanishes, and power and reputation are shadows and not substantial things. Even the joy of falling in love is followed by the dejection of falling out of love. Behind the glories of life, there lurks a curdling gloom. Life is not merely evanescent ; it has also no inner value, and reflection on its inner meaning constrains one to draw the conclusion that it is a tragic waste fraught with sadness and the agony of despair. Wickedness is the lawless law of life and goodness is only a show ; vice gushes out of every pore of our being in torrential profusion. History is a record of the gradual decline of civili- sation and the extinction of life. The poet who at first enjoys the comedy of life with its carnival of pleasures is driven by the logic of facts to the tragic conclusion that virtue and •wisdom are only a delusion and have no abiding value. In the conflict between good and evil, evil overpowers good, and in the final catastrophe, both perish ; the triumph of virtue over vice is only an ethical dream. The logician who seeks truth is confronted by the self-contradictions of intellectual life and is shipwrecked at the very entrance to the harbour. The artist delights in fancy and fiction, but devotion to art is only
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an escape from life, akin to opium-eating followed by life-killing^ depression. The philosopher who knocks at the gates of know- ledge is oppressed by the riddles of the Sphynx and finds no answer to them. Even the philanthropist that delights in humanitarian service is troubled by the thought that the indi- vidual withers in social uplift and that the perfection of society is itself futile like the attempt to straighten a dog's curly tail. This desperate discontentment with life and its values begets a mood of sceptical cynicism and the pessimist in his desperation is tortured by the dilemma * whether it is nobler to endure the failure of life or take up arms against a sea of troubles ' and end life at one stroke.
Vedanta does not accept or justify the thoroughgoing pessimism outlined above, as: it is opposed to the view that death is complete extinction and that the self is only a perish- ing series. Ontologically speaking, the atman is eternal and the changes of birth and death apply only to the phenomenal or the bodily self. When purusa, the self, falsely identifies himself with prakrti and its gunas, he subjects himself to the confusions of amdya and the contractions of karma and suffers from the infinite hazards and hardships of metempsy- chosis. Life is neither entirely good nor entirely evil. It is neither wholly pleasant nor wholly painful, but is condition- ed by their relativity and is of dual character. The moral experiences of punya and papa are ultimately traceable to the responsibility of the empirical self and are in no way attributable to fatalism or supernaturalism. Punya and papa are not determined by reflective thought but are due to Vedic imperatives and dharma is what ought to be desired and done and adharma is what is prohibited. Every man reaps what he sows and evil is expiated by suffering, though every case of
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suffering, like that experienced in motherly love, is not due to- evil. Good and evil are relative as they are linked by causal necessity and both are chains that fetter the soul, though the former is golden and the latter i£ of iron. Even in svarga, the punya-ndden puru$a is like a beast of burden to the devas, a thing ministering to their satisfaction, and when a man's punya is exhausted, he is hurled down to the fetters of foetus-life. The happy jlvas of Brahmaloka are also subject to the causal necessity of karma arising from past volitional acts and will be born again in this world. Every jlva has the freedom to grow into godliness or lapse into dsuric or demoniac life, but no one — not even a god — can escape the law of retribution, when once the deed is done. He has free will, but suffers from his wilfulness. All jlvasr from the butterfly to Brahma, are alike conditioned by the law of karma and are subject to the cycle of births and deaths. Life is not a chapter of accidents, but has its foundation in the moral order. The noumenal self aspurusa is free, but some- how and somewhen it gets phenomenalised, becomes bound to prakrti and is caught up in the causal necessity of karma* Purusa is imprisoned in the ,body made of prakrti and suffers from the succession of birth and death, pleasure and pain, till he regains his lost freedom. He is now in chains owing to himself ; but he can be free.
The origin of avidya-karma cannot be logically or temporally accounted for, as the ideas of logical and temporal priority belong to the phenomenal realm and have no tran- scendental value. But in the infinity of the temporal process of s"rsti and pralaya, the avidyd- ridden self has somehow followed its downward career of wickedness and sin, though this is not due to any inner depravity or original sin. The
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removal of evil is more important to the mumuksu than a logical account of its origin. Owing to the fall from spiritual- ity, the evil wayward will of the jlva gathers momentum and the self has to pay the penalty by increased suffering. Karma causes rebirth and rebirth adds to the propensity to evil, and this vicious circle throws us into the maelstrom of misery. Suffering was already described as three-fold, namely ddhidai- vika, adhibhautika, and adhyatmika. The first is due to supernatural causes like the influence of the devas or gods ; the second is also externally originated, but is due not to the gods but to animate and inanimate beings like the devastations caused by earthquakes and the third is subjective as it has a psycho-physical or central origin. Pain is sensational, super- natural or emotional ; but in all cases misery follows from the law of retribution. Evil and suffering result from the abuse of freedom and cannot be explained in terms of fatalism and supernaturalism. True pessimism is not founded on morbidity or .melancholia but is the result of philosophic or Vedantic reflection. Desire and aversion (kdma and krodha) are the twin laws of the life of sensibility and they are the root cause of all evil and suffering.1 Kama is generated by the con- tact of the purusa with the objects of sense. Man hopes to be, but never is blest and the frustration of desire results in the feeling of disappointment and defeatism which brings on a mood of dejection and anger. Kdma-krodha causes mental and moral confusion and self-deception and the dispersal of personal- ity. Confusion feeds confusion and ends at last in the cata- strophe of moral and spiritual death.2 The primary cause of suf- fering is therefore traceable to the desire for the objects of sense. While the moth, the deer, the elephant, the fish and the bee are
1 B.G., III. 37.
2B.G., II. 62. 63.
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drawn to death in the act of gratifying a single sense organ, man is allured by the cumulative charm and solicitation of the five senses and suffers physical and moral death. From the cradle to the cremation ground life is a will-o-'the-wisp. The mind is ever haunted by fear and the sense of insecurity, even in the celestial planes ; the rosy romance of youth fades away and gives place to the gloom of old age and death. This mood of sickmindedness induced on the empirical self by its adven- tures in the unstable world of samsara is brought out in the story of the weary traveller in the desert who, chased by a wild beast, jumps into a dry well and clings to some root, half way down, while a dragon is ready below to devour him, and yet he delights in licking off drops of honey where he clings. The jlva tortured by the ills of samsara hangs on to the boughs of life, faces the gnawing of time and the dragon of death and yet he eagerly sucks the drops of pleasure like a frog that fondly seizes flies while it is itself being slowly devoured by a snake.
This sickmindedness is a temporary stage of reflective life and not a real resting place. The transition from the superficial and self-satisfied optimism of the Lokayata or voluptuary to the pessimism of the philosopher marks the rise and development of vairdgya through different stages. In the first stage, the worldly man pursues the pleasures of the senses and becomes a slave of passion, receives blows from nature .and turns into a sceptic and cynic, but this change arrests the philosophical and moral development of the individual and is spiritually untenable as its effect is not far different from the morbidity and melancholia of the psychopathic temperament. In the second stage, when the feeling of disappointment .assumes a religious colouring, it becomes a species of pseudo- .sanyasa of the sour-grape variety. When disappointments
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increase, they deepen into disgust and life loses its zest and value and the feeling of world-weariness creeps on the soul and the mood of healthy-mindedness is changed into that of sickmindedness. While the optimist makes the most of life by regarding even pains as blessings in disguise, the sickmind- ed philosopher thinks that life is a tale of woe and that the- world is a Vanity Fair. He dreads every pleasure as a feeling fraught with pain. In a still higher stage of self-renun- ciation, pleasure and pain cancel each other and the mumuksu cultivates the attitude of S'ankhyan or Stoic detachment. The dvandvas or pairs of opposites like success and failure, pleasure and pain, have no attraction for him, as he, in a mood of masterly inactivity, no longer identifies himself with the contending passions, but remains aloof as a spectator practising. samatva (equanimity of mind). Even this state may lapse into a state of indifference or neutral point and life may become a contentless void without any positive value*. Mumuksutva, as a desire for freedom from the world of samsara, is a negative state ; but freedom is not only freedom from a life of evil and misery but freedom towards another state, as every negation has a positive meaning and the exclusion of one alternative implies the affirmation of another.. The idea of self-renouncement as a spiritual ideal implies the abandonment of the lower self of sensibility in favour of the higher self in the kaivalya state or the aloneness of the atman.. Ahankdra or the will to live a selfish life should stultify itself and thus affirm the true aham or self. Even the end as self- realisation is only a half-way house, as it is ego-centric and not theo-centric ; it is on the road to real freedom but is not the end itself. In the highest state of mumuksutva, self- renouncement acquires its full positive meaning, and, by abandoning the carnal self of prakrti and the spiritual
MUMUKSUTVA 315-
self-centredness of kaivalya the mumuksu regards God as the centre and source of his life and becomes a bhakta or devotee^ Renunciation of ahankara and the realisation of the self go together, and by renouncing the lower self the highest Self is realised. The failure of life on the phenomenal plane is inevitable and the mood of sickmindedness brought on by such failure is justifiable. Virakti is essential to spiritual life, as it destroys the sensualism and the self-complacency of the Lokdyata who is satisfied with the world as it is and it transcends the negations of Buddhistic pessimism and the indifferentism of the Stoic. The mumuksu with his genius for the absolute at first seeks the false infinite in the senses, but later realises that the joy of sensibility is fragment- ary and fleeting and then seeks the true infinite that is beyond the senses. Visaya rdga or the desire for the pleasures of sense is alpa (insignificant) and asthira (evanescent) ; but Bhagavad rdga or love of God leads to infinite and eternal bliss.
The ontology of Veddnta has no meaning apart from its teleology and the philosophy of values. Brahman is not merely the ultimate subject of rationalistic metaphysics, but is also the highest reality present in volitional and emotional consciousness. It is the ground of existence as well as the supreme good of life or purusdrtha. The good is that at which all rational beings aim as the supreme value or summum bonum, and it is fourfold, viz., dharma, artha, kdma and moksa. Economic goods like artha have only instrumental or market value and are a means to an end and not the end itself and not all the wealth of a Croesus or Kubera can give lasting satisfaction. The pursuit and possession of political power is equally futile on account of the instability inherent in it an$ the jealousy which it excites in the have-nots. This truth is-
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forcibly expressed by the instance of Carlyle's shoeblack whose greed increases with satisfaction. Even when half the uni- verse is offered to him, he grumbles and declares himself * the most maltreated of men '. Moral good or dharma has no doubt an intrinsic value, as the only thing that is good without qualification is the performance of duty for its own sake. Moral effort is itself worth while and there is no substitute for it in this world or beyond it. But what is right or dharma cannot be separated from the goodness of the end, and moral good has no value apart from the supreme good as summum bonum. The end as pleasure is the agreeable feeling that arises when the object of desire is attained and is the sense of value, but it has neither definiteness nor duration. Hedonism in the psychological, ethical, or spiritual aspect cannot serve as a final theory in the philosophy of values. The first is meaning- less, because, if every one seeks happiness as a psychological fact, it is absurd to say he ought to seek it as a purusdrtha. The second is incomplete as it does not fully bring out the content of the ideal of happiness in the quantitative and qualitative aspects. There are degrees of pleasure as well as kinds of pleasure and there is no definite criterion or standard of preference. Besides, it is not the feeling of pleasure alone that a man seeks but also the object that yields satisfaction. If pleasure is the feeling of selt-realisedness, it is not clear whether it is the animal, rational or spiritual self that is realised. The pleasure that arises when the purusa is gratified with the objects of sense varies and vanishes ; the happiness of realising the purusa as distinct from prakrti is more enduring, but has no altruistic or religious motive. The bliss of know- ing the inner Self or Brahman alone has abiding value ; but this doctrine abandons the hedonistic view of kdma as the end of life and accepts a non-hedonistic criterion. The highest
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end of life is thus neither the acquisition of wealth and power, nor the performance of moral duty or dharma nor the satisfaction of desires, but the realisation of Brahman which is the highest good, the supreme duty and the infinite bliss.
If virtue and knowledge go together, bliss also is insepar- able from them and therefore Brahmajnana, Brahmaprayatna and Brahmananda cannot be really separated though they may be logically analysed as the cognitional, conational and affective elements of the same spiritual experience. The mumuksu who enquires into the nature of Brahman as the supreme sat or Reality also desires to realise Brahman as the highest end of moral and aesthetic life. What is ap- prehended as the most valid truth is also attained as the most valuable end or good. Knowledge and value are thus mediate and immediate and the pursuit of truth as of pleasure is a pro- gressive and immediate attainment. While the progres- sionist prefers pursuit to possession, the perfectionist as absolutist prefers possession or the state of eternal self-realised- ness to pursuit. But the Vis'istadvaitin recognises the value of spiritual progress and the philosophical truth of the self- realised nature of Brahman. The mumuksu equipped with jnana and vairagva seeks Brahman because he knows that Brahman is his Self. The moral and spiritual good which a man chooses and strives for presupposes the complete good of which the moral choice and the spiritual endeavour are in- tegral aspects. The main steps in the path to perfection consist in the moral discipline or self-purification brought about by the performance of duty or Karma Yoga, the spiritual illumination of Jnana Yoga and the loving meditation on Brah- man or Bhakti Yoga.
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The Upanisadic conception of the mumuksu transcends in its lofty sublimity the nature of the mere philosopher who speculates on the nature of reality without the requisite sddhanas or means. Before setting out in some detail the nature of the yogas or steps to realisation, the essential character of the mumuksu as a seeker after immortal bliss as indicated in the Upanisads may be considered. When Yama, the god of death, offers to young Naciketas boons, earthly and celestial, which cannot be easily attained by mortals, Naciketas declines all of them on the ground that they are evanescent, chooses the good by rejecting the pleasant and thus follows the way of wisdom and eternal life.1 Narada says to Sanatkumara that he knows every science, art and philoso- phy but is still stricken with sorrow 2 and learns that the weary search to find eternal bliss is not in secular and Vedic knowledge but in the Veddntic wisdom of Brahman. There is no bliss in anything finite, but it is in the infinite alone. Brahman alone is free from evil, sin and suffering. Indra likewise comes to know that, if he realises Brahman by freeing himself from his bodily self, he would obtain all the worlds and attain all desires in the world of Brahman.3 In the immortal words of the Veda or the Upanisad, on the same tree there are two inseparable birds and while one of them eats the sweet and bitter fruits, the other with brilliant plumage shines in all serenity. The finite self should shake off good and evil and soar heavenward till it becomes one with its eternal Other and shed its sorrows of samsara.4 Maitreyi tells her husband Yajnavalkya that the
1 Kafh, Up., I. i. 26 to 29.
2 seham bhagavo mantravid evasminatmavit . . . tarati s'Okam atmavid iti sQham bhagavan s'ocami.— Ch. Up., VII. i. 3.
3 sa sarvams'ca lokan apnoti sarvSms'ca kaman yastam atmanam anuvidya vijanati.— Ch. Up., VIII. vii. 1.
4 dva suparjia sayuja sakhaya samanam vrk§am pari§asvajate 1 tay6r anyah pippalam svadvatti anas'nan any 6 abhicakas'iti. — Mund. Up., III. i.l.
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possession of the whole earth would not satisfy her and seeks the way of eternal life. l Brahmajndna is not for the material- istic optimist that seeks the lusts of the flesh nor to the pessimistic philosopher to whom life is not worth living, but for the Vedantic mumuksu who seeks to return to Brahman, his real self, and thus regain the eternal values of divine life.
sa hevaca Maitreyi yannu me iyam bhagOh sarva prthivi vittena purna syat katham tenamrta syamiti neti hGvaca YajSavalkyah . . . I sa hfivaca Maitreyi yenaham namrta syam kimaham tena kurvam — Br. Up., IV. iv. 2 and 3,
CHAPTER XIII KARMA YOGA
* ARM A is different from Karma Yoga, as the former furnishes the datum of the moral life, and the latter its discipline. The study of karma is the subject-matter of the psychology of the moral self, while Karma Yoga deals with the moral determination of the ideal involved in conduct^ Consciousness is essentially conative, whether it is sensory- motor or idea-motor, and karma refers to the conative tendency of consciousness in all its levels. Even introspection is an activity. Cessation from karma in thought, word or deed is a psychological impossibility.1 Karma as voluntary action is purposive, and involves the idea of end, which is called kama or desire. Kama is either externally originated (sparsraja) or centrally initiated (sankalpaja) ; but in either case, it is the desire for the objects of sense. Owing to the conservation of moral values, the effect of every karma leaves its impress in the psycho-neural mechanism or mind-body, and it is then known as an instinct, disposition or vasana. This mind-body, which contains the karma-complex, acts on the empirical self, and is acted on by it, and the millions of nerves embedded in the human nervous system is evidence of the infinite chain of the causality
1B. G., III. 5.
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of karma. The story of the evolution of karma has no beginning, in the sense that it cannot be logically or temporally explained, and karma may therefore be described as a matter of moral faith, as the result of anadi-avidya (beginningless ignorance). The jlva is therefore impelled by its ancient propensity of avidya-karma to seek the pleasures of sensibility, and it follows the previously shaped pathways of error and evil and the career of transmigration or samsara. Owing to its proneness to evil, which is self-created, and not innate or inherited, the self desires the objects of sense ; but the infinite, which alone can give true satisfac- tion, is not in the senses but beyond them, and no finite object gives true satisfaction. When the desire is frustrated, it generates anger, anger clouds the intellect and confounds the natural light of reasoning. Confusion destroys practical reason and leads to moral decay.1 The empirical self is imprisoned in the see-saw of avidya-karma, and subjects itself to the hazards of metempsychosis, and when it is overpowered by tamas, it almost becomes a bare monad or mode of matter without any moral consciousness. But the infinite within the jiva urges it to emerge into higher stages and ascend to the human level. While animals act unconsciously towards an end not realised morally, man alone is conscious of the end, as he has practical reason as well as feeling. Every voluntary action involves the idea of an end and presupposes the distinction be- tween the doer, the deed and the satisfaction that results from the realisation of the end. When the sensualist desires an object, it is a felt want, and the object of desire is said to be as a thing that would satisfy that want. The self
1 sarigat sanjayate kamah kamat krodhobhijayate II k rod had bhavati sammohali sammohat smrtivibhramah I smrtibhrams'ad buddhinas'o buddhi nas'at prapas'yati II.
— B. G., II. 62 and 63. 21
322 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA.
desires pleasure in the object, and this pleasure is different from the object of pleasure. The natural self, as the mode of prakrti, is influenced by its three gunas of satva, rajas and tamas, and a knowledge of the gunas is therefore essential in ascending from the psychology of what is given in conduct to the ethics of what ought to be. The tamasic mind is steeped in ignorance, slothfulness ! and hesitancy. It does not resist evil, but lazily acquiesces in it. It lacks decision of character and drifts mechanically in a stupid and stubborn way. The rdjasic mind is roving and restless, and delights in the pleasures of self-domination and self-glorification. The restless ragl is compared to a maddened monkey stung by a scorpion and possessed by an evil spirit, and life to him is a " fitful fever full of sound and fury." The ragl is swayed by the love of power and possession, and he exerts his will to power by enslaving others and seeking world-dominion. When the self is dominated by satva, it transcends the tamasic state of animal existence and the rajasic life of adventure, and develops moral consciousness. The satvic person has clear and distinct ideas, and knows the distinction between the life of passion and the life of reason, and, since knowledge and virtue go together, he practises virtue on account of its intrinsic value. The psycho- logy of the three gunas 2 throws light on the moral character of the doer, the deed and the self-satisfaction resulting from the realisation of the end. The satvic agent is an anahamvadi, who sheds his egoism and self-love by means of his sanity and sobriety. His deed is emptied of kama, and his feeling is not quite pleasant to start with, but is happiness in the end* When the animal self is thus moralised, it rises from the tamasic level of inertia to the rajasic state of restless adven- ture, and at last evolves into satvic serenity.
1 B, G,. XIV. 8. 2 B. G,, XVIII.
KARMA YOGA 323
The ethics of Karma Yoga may be developed by a cri- ticism of the extreme theories of hedonism and rationalism in the west and the east. The hedonist seeks the satisfaction of sensibility and aims at pleasure for the sake of pleasure. as the only end and aim of human conduct. The extreme hedonist or Cdrvaka distrusts reason, refuses to look before or after, and tries to secure the pleasure of the moment ; but his theory stultifies itself, as rationality is the essential quality of man* The more moderate hedonist therefore utilises reason as the ally of passion, and thinks of happiness as the end and aim of life as a whole. The altruist pursues the logic of hedonism still further, and defines the end of conduct as the attainment of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The Vedavadin,1 who seeks Vedic sanction for his conduct, does not accept the sensuous and rational origin of pleasure, but relies on the Vedic imperatives and their hedonistic value here and in svarga. But all the hedonistic theories are ship- wrecked on the distinction between pleasure and the objects of pleasure and on their differences in quality and quantity. Pleasure is not only freedom from pain, but is also positive enjoyment, and it is never attained in the world of the objects of sense. Even the joys of svarga or extra-mundane delights are only sensual or kama-rupa and have only transient and not lasting value. Hedonistic ritualism is formal and extrinsic, and has no intrinsic worth. Buddhistic and Sankhyan ethics go to the opposite extreme, and uphold the rationalistic view that pas- sion should be subdued by reason. The Buddhistic formula of the eightfold noble path insists on the destruction of the will to live and the doer-consciousness, and favours exit from life as the end of conduct. The Sankhyan view is more concrete, as it affirms the immutability of the purusa and the mutability
1 J3.G., II. 42.
324 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
of prakrti, and defines the moral end as the practice of the detachment of ihepurusa from the allurements of prakrti. But this view is also untenable, as the Sankhyan spectator sees nothing and does nothing. The Stoic and Kantian theory of morals also recognises the dignity of reason, but it is also a negative account, as reason without emotional content is empty and formal. Feeling without reason is blind, and reason without feeling is empty, and the Vedantic view of Karma Yoga avoids these pitfalls, and follows the golden mean.
i The meaning of Karma yoga is further developed by a
refutation of the activistic and ascetic view of morals. The activist, like the virile westerner, engages himself in incessant work for promoting his own welfare or for altruistic service or for a co-operative adventure with the finite god, who has the will to fight evil, and wins in the end. The man of action, with his will to work and win, hates the motto of the fatalist, who resigns himself to the inevitable, and endures the burden of life with indifferent acquiescence. With restless rajasic feeling and explosive energy, he plunges into work with a view to cur- ing the ills of life and conquering his environment. The man with a precipitate will or mercurial temperament often goes for- ward with reckless energy and without due deliberation. As William James says in his " Psychology," the pent-up passion suddenly breaks through the dam and discharges itself in catas- trophic activity without any controlling power. A higher type of volition presupposes forethought before the final decision is taken, and it implies the feeling of effort and the fiat of the will by which we thrive and strive for ever. There is more joy in the pursuit of an ideal than in its possession. The world-shatterers and reformers belong to this activistic type. But incessant work without rest or reflection is morally
KARMA YOGA 325
undesirable, as it stresses overt action at the expense of inner purity and peace. The ascetic attitude offers a striking con- trast to the rdjasic condition of mind, as it inhibits the free flow of motor-energy and blocks it up. It begins with self- mortification or suppression of the flesh in the physiological sense, and may end in moral inanity, in which introspection may never reach the level of effectiveness. The habit of inhi- biting the external senses and motor-energy and cherishing morbid feelings and calling it virtue is rightly condemned as cold-blooded hypocrisy.1 In the higher stages, the ascetic be- comes a contemplative, who is interested in subduing his animal propensities and vanquishing all vasands or dispositions. But this introspective habit of arresting thought atrophies thought and the very springs of life. Introspection para- lyses effort and leads to moral impotence. The highest stage of introversion consists in absolute self-renouncement and conversion to the stage of sannydsa by withdrawal from the world. Sannydsa may be fascinating and beneficial to the reflective philosopher at certain stages of his life, but it is only a means to an end and not the end itself. Besides, it cannot be universalised. The ethics of Karma Yoga strikes a middle path between activism in excess and asceticism in excess, as it favours renunciation in action as opposed to renunciation of action as the ideal of conduct.
The ethics of niskdma karma or action without the desire for the fruit thereof may now be expounded in the light of the Gltd metaphysics of morals, which, for profundity and practi- cal value, stands unmatched in the history of ethics in the east and in the west. While every living being does its karma according to a purpose, man alone has the conception of karma
1B.G., III. 6,
326 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
owing to his practical reason or moral consciousness, including reason and will. In a moral situation arising from a conflict of desires, he can exercise his discrimination by weighing its pros and cons and arrive at a decision. By his buddhi he can distinguish between the ksetrajna or dehi (the embodied self) and the ksetra or deha and know that as the atman, he is aparindma or free from the mutations of matter or prakrti, Pramdtd or the subject that is conscious of himself and the world of nature different from the atman, and avind&l or the immortal self distinct from the pseudo-self of prakrti, which is subject to a series of births and deaths. Buddhi develops into vyavasdydtmikd buddhi or the disciplined thought of the mumuksu, which frees karma from the distractions of visaya kama or sensual desire and the perils of moral particularism, and fosters the one-pointed aim of moksa kama or desire for release. The sensitive self is withdrawn from the seductions of sensibility and given a moral direction and fixity by the idea of niskdma karma or the performance of karma without kdma or visaya rdga. Niskdma karma as a negative concept has a twofold meaning, as it excludes the subjective influence of animal inclinations of rdga and dvesa and the objective ends of utility or Idbha and aldbha (gain and loss). Karma Yoga does not rest on the desire for pleasure or personal likes and dislikes, which are the ruling motives of our empirical conduct ; nor is it conditioned by any external end as economic gain or political power. Niskdma karma is thus the performance of action without being impelled by the hedonistic ends of pursuing sukha (pleasure) and avoiding duhkha (pain) or the pairs of opposites or the utilitarian ends of securing success or Idblia and avoiding failure or aldbha. Even the good 'deeds performed to please the gods and win favours from them are commercial transactions that impair the dignity
KARMA YOGA 327
and intrinsic worth of moral life. Niskdma karma is thus good in itself without qualification, and has its own intrinsic value. It is duty for the sake of duty irrespective of con- sequences.1 Such duty as a negative view of morals may be different from a positive account, but it is not bare negation. None in this world is free from karma and even the state of naiskarmya or philosophic inaction is influenced by the inter- play of the three gunas of prakrti. Thejnani himself has to maintain his body by activity. The whole cosmic order is also a moral order, and is sustained by the law of karma. The devas have to do their duty in the interests of world welfare. Even Is'vara, the supreme Lord, who is not bound by karma, is ever active as the moral ruler of the uni- verse.2 The law of karma thus rules the cosmic order, whether its causality is conditioned or free, and the^'m*, which is imprisoned by the chain of amdyci-karma owing to its age-long identification with prakrti, can never escape from the wheel of karma as long as it is in the world of samsdra. The empirical or earth-bound self as the doer doing the deed is therefore externally determined by the gtinas of prakrti, and whether its mind is clear, calm and happy or confused, rest- less and unhappy or ignorant, indolent and inert, it is never free from the domination of the gunas, which have become its habit or second nature. Akarma or inaction is thus a psycho- logical impossibility ; but, ethically, it is possible for the self to dissociate itself from guna-ridden karma, as it is essentially the dtman and not the bodily self moulded on the pattern of prakrti. The moral philosopher, who knows the psychology of the empirical ' me ' or ahankdra as the result of the conjunc- tion of the dtman with prakrti, concludes that karma 3 is due
1 B. G. ii, 47.
9 ahaakaravimudhatma kartSham iti manyate. — fi. G., III. 27.
3 gu^S guge$u vartanta iti matva na sajjate. — B. G., III. 28.
328 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
to the action and reaction of the gunas, is not influenced by the conceit " I am the doer," and seeks to renounce the egocentric mentality or ahankdra. The formula is expressed thus : " So act that you may regard all action as determined by the gunas of prakrti and not as determined by the atman." Karma Ydga thus consists in abandoning not the deed, but the doer-consciousness. It is the process of self-realisation by self-renouncement or self-stripping ; the most essential requisite of Karma Yoga is the shedding of selfishness and the giving up of the false notion taking the form " I am the doer " and *' the world is mine ". The ethical idea of self-renunciation is thus at first negative, but as it fills up in meaning, it leads to self-realisation.
The performance of disinterested duty presupposes the Sankhyan knowledge of the spiritual self as contrasted with the empirical ' me ' or dehatma and the application of the knowledge to Karma Yoga ; it is thus a synthesis of scientific theory and moral practice. Karma Yoga combines rational insight and active endeavour, and when the ydgin is well-disciplined, he becomes sthitaprajna or steadfast in knowledge, and is definitely on the road to self-realisation or atmajnana. There are four stages in the evolution of yoga from moral outlook to spiritual insight. The outgoing tendency of the mind is first arrested and directed inward, and this stage is called yatamdna samjnd or effort made to direct the mind inward.1 In the next stage, the mind is calm, and is neither elated by success nor depressed by failure, and it is called vyatireka samjnd 2. When the mind
1 yada samharate cayam kurmdnganiva sarvas'ah I indriyaflindriyarthebhyal^. . . . I — B.G., II. 58.
2 yah sarvatranabhisnehastatratprapya s'ubhas'ubham I nabhinandati na dvesti tasya prajfia pratisthita". — B. G., II. 57.
KARMA YOGA 329
is self-centred and steady, it reaches a higher stage called ekendriya samjna l. In this stage the yogin endeavours to wipe off the indelible impress left by the effect of previous karma in the psycho-neural mechanism. The culmination of this process consists in the dtman knowing itself a and being satisfied with itself. Here the impress of karma or vdsana is completely destroyed, and the highest stage of steadfastness is reached. This stage is called vas'lkdra samjna. Self-rever- ence and self-knowledge are the highest ideals of moral consciousness and the joy of this self-knowledge is different from hedonistic enjoyments and also Stoic or Sdnkhyan detachment. When the atman falsely identifies itself with prakrti, it belongs to the world of sense, is imprisoned in the causality of karma, and subjects itself to the hazards of rdga-dvesa ; but when the self knows that he is the atman and not a mode of acit, he is morally free and enjoys svarajya or self -sovereignty. The bodily self seeks the lusts of the flesh and is indriydramd or delighting in the senses ; but the moral self subdues them and is dtmdramd or delighting in the atman. Like the driver who has perfect control over his horses, the self subjugates the senses and acquires self-mas- tery,3 and not even a deva can conquer a man who has con- quered himself. He attains this moral autonomy by insight and endeavour and not by the empty rationalism of the Sdnkhya and the Stoic or the blind activism of the Mlmdm- saka, the Vedic ritualist.
Niskdma karma is an imperative of duty of the form " Do your duty without caring for the consequences," and
1 vltaragabhayakrQdha^. — jB. G., II. 56.
* atmanyevatmana tu$tah.— B. G., II. 55.
8 tasyendriyaflivas'yafli sad as'va iva saratheh. — Kath. Up., I. iii. 6.
330 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
its sanction is based on revelation and not on reason. The ethics of karma as a rational exposition of conduct is not satisfying, as the reality of the moral distinction between right and wrong cannot be logically proved. Moral consciousness presupposes the eternity of the dtman and the existence of the Paramatman or God, who is absolutely good, and it is not a postulate of natural religion, but a moral faith in revealed religion or s'dstra. The belief in supernatural religion, which seeks to establish divine omnipotence by sacrificing the intrinsic reality of the moral law, tends to justify the existence of unmerited suffering and the unmerited grace of God. The idea of winning divine favour without deserving it destroys the primacy and the austerity of moral life. Religion is therefore founded on ethics, and in a true ethical religion, omnipotence and justice go together. The law of karma is founded on, and fulfilled in, the divine idea of justice and righteousness. The imperative of niskdma karma is a divine command, which has an absolute claim upon our obedience, and the violation of the law is the repudiation of the divine will and the refusal to listen to the voice of God in the inner moral consciousness of mankind. The kind of duty may be determined by one's temperament and station in life ; but the nature or inner motive of karma is the same in all, viz., duty for duty's sake, irrespective of inclination within and utility without. From the standpoint of ethical religion, it is more true to say that Isrvara wills the good than to say that what He wills is good. God is absolutely good, and it is the aim of the ethics of niskdma karma that man ought to choose the way of goodness so that he may grow into the goodness of God. The highest moral good consists in following the categorical imperative as a duty that 'Ought to be done and not as a coercive law that must be followed.
KARMA YOGA 331
As classic illustrations of niskdma karma, the practice of s, ddna, yajna, and warfare may be considered. In all these cases, the tamasic state of ignorance and inertia is overcome by the rajasic mentality of restless activity. When satva dominates over rajas, it ousts the will to self-glorification and enables the will to be ruled by reason and to follow the course of disinterested action. While the Vedic hedonist conforms to these commandments with a view to attaining earthly and celestial pleasures, the Veddntin as an expert in Sdnkhyan knowledge performs them without any expectation of reward. Tapas ! is a duty to the self and is the practice of self-purifica- tion in thought, word and deed, and connotes the virtues of truthfulness, ahitnsa and patience. Dana as a duty to others is the exercise of benevolence without any egoistic calculation, and it is a gift to the needy man in which the right hand does not know what the left hand does. Yajna as a duty to the gods is offering sacrifices to the devas, who help in maintaining the cosmic order, without the taint of bargaining with them for boons. The ethics of warfare condemns vindictiveness, cowardice and greed as well as misplaced pity, and it is a virtue to be practised by the Ksatriya as a guardian of society. It is righteous warfare in the interests of the weak and the victimised for the protection of dharma and the destruction of adharma. It is the duty of every man to maintain the moral order of society and its solidarity by doing the duties of his station in life without asserting his egoism or exclusive
1 ... s'aucamarjavam
brahmacaryam ahimsa ca . . .— E.G.. XVII. 14. anwdvegakaram vakyam satyam— B.C., XVII. 15. atmavinigrahah bhavasams'uddhih.--B.G., XVII. 16.
dfttavyam iti yad danam diyate anupakaripe I deate kale ca patre ca . . .— B.G., XVII. 20.
Aphalak&nk<jibhiryajfi6 vidhi dr?$d ya ijyate I ya$*avyameveti manas samadhaya . . . — J3.G., XVII* 11.
332 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
self-feeling. These examples serve to bring out the solidarity of life in all its levels by insisting on duties rather than rights, and are far more comprehensive than the classic examples adduced in Kantian ethics. The dtman is not, like the things of prakrti, a thing which excites the animal instincts of self- preservation, acquisitiveness, sex and pugnacity, but is a person or self in the highest sense of the term having his own intrinsic dignity. While the phenomenalised self is the slave of sensi- bility and self-love, the noumenal self has mastery over its mental environment and sheds its exclusiveness.
The moral advantages accruing from the practice of niskama karma as the master thought of Veddntic morals may now be summed up before the next stage of self-realisation is considered. A man who is not allured by the seductions of sensibility is a real yogin and by conquering himself, he has conquered the whole world. While the sensualist falls into the pitfalls of heteronomy, the karma yogin attains moral autonomy, which is more valuable than political conquest. Dis- interested duty fosters reverence for the moral law and arouses the feeling of dignity and sublimity. The moral idea of samatva or equanimity is not a harmonious mean between the spiri- tual and the animal aspects of life. It brings out the superiority of soul-power over brute force. The moral philosopher is not an indifferent spectator of the drama of life, but is himself the battle ground, the contending parties and the conqueror. He avoids the extremes of the voluptuary, who abandons himself to the impulsive life of visayaraga and the ascetic who resorts to inhibition. He follows the middle course between the active and the contemplative life as it is more easy, natural and con- ducive to spirituality than karnta or karma sannyasa. The true moral evil is not the existence of the self in the world of embodied
KARMA YOGA 333
life, but the falsity and falsehood of the ahankara-ridden ego that pretends to be the atman, but is not really so. Matter is not in itself evil, but the materialistic view fosters evil-minded- ness. The body is a living temple of God or Brahmapuri, and evil is in wrongful possession and enjoyment of it. The self is the eternal atman ; but it simulates prakrti and suffers from the consequent errors and evils. The true karma yogin sheds the egoistic feeling of ahankara and the commercial view of karma, and the moral self ascends to the higher stage of Jnana Yoga. The transition from Karma Yoga to Jnana Yoga is thus a transition from self-renouncement to self- realisation, and marks a higher stage in spiritual progression. Niskama karma is really not an end in itself, but is a means to mukti through self-purification and self-knowledge.
CHAPTER XIV JNANA YOGA
ARMA YOGA as rationalised karma is a direct path to self-realisation or dtmdvalokana and is preferred on account of its ease, naturalness, efficacy and freedom from the naturalistic fallacy of mistaking the dtman for the andtman or natural self.1 Karma and jndna interpenetrate each other, and by moralising jndna and rationalising karma, the metaphysic of morals passes into the philosophy of the self. This goal is reached more easily by practical reason than by reason itself, as the life of reason is often emptied of moral and emotional content, and becomes a hypostatised abstraction. There is a transition from the empirical or hedonistic ethics of kdmya karma to -the rationalistic ethics of niskdma karma and the latter view has its consummation in the philosophical ideal of self-realisation. The spiritual self is no doubt more allied to the rational than to the sensitive self, and therefore Jndna Yoga is more adequate to self-intuition than Karma Ydga ; but in practice, rationalism often leads to more pitfalls than activism, and wisdom consists in rationalising karma and not in abandoning it. When karma is illumined by jndna, the metaphysical knowledge of the dtman, Karma Yoga is as effective as Jndna Yoga.
1 karmaySgasya antargatatmajSanatvad apramadatvat sukaratvat nirapek- satvat ca jyayastvam. — Gitabhasya, V. In trod.
YOGA 335
In Jnana Yoga the knowledge of the atman is mediate, but in atmavalokana it is immediate, and the best evidence for the proof of the atman is in direct experience. Atmava- Idkana presupposes the speculative knowledge about the self as a real possibility. There is a gradual transition from the metaphysics of morals of niskdma karma to the spiritual philosophy of dtma kdma. It is a passage from the moral ideal of what a man ought to do to the spiritual enquiry of what a man ought to be. It is the development of the moral ' ought ' into a deeper ' is '. While doing good is an external duty, being good is an inner virtue. The mumuksu who desires to know the atman, is called the aruruksu, or one who strives to ascend to spirituality, and he ought to do his duty till he realises the atman and becomes the drudha or awakened spirit. In the intuition of the atman all activity is swallowed up. When the end is reached, there is no longer any need for endeavour. While moral life is a pursuit of truth, spiritual life connotes its possession.
The spiritual philosopher that seeks self-knowledge has the freedom to become better and realise the best, and is therefore not a slave of the causality of karma or avidya* Manas is, especially to the mumuksu, the free cause of either samsdra or mukti and though his prdrabdha karma is a necessary consequence of his ancient vasanas or inner dis- positions, he is not a necessary agent or instrument of karma, as he has the will to win freedom or lose it. The agency ascribed to prakrti and the prakrti- ridden atman is traceable to avidya in the moral sense of karma ', as con- trasted with the monistic idea of adhydsa and abhava*
1 It should be noted that avidya in this sense is quite different from the avidya of the Advaitin. (See S.B.E., XLVIII, p. 101.)
336 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
The jlva is a spiritual entity and not a false or ficti- tious being due to some innate nescience or self-deceiving nature of the absolute. If the idea of agency arises from adhydsa and is not, like the heat of fire, the true nature of the self, which is real in itself, then moral and spiritual free- dom would become illusory, and seeking self-realisation itself would be a mere appearance. The jlva is a real self, and its desire for self-knowledge is not a delusion but a real process of self-revelation, involving the conquest of karma and the removal of avidya. Spiritual freedom is thus different from the determinism of karma and the illusionism of avidya and is freedom from the joint influence of avidyd-karma. It is the aim of yoga as Karma Yoga or Jndna Yoga to help the dtman to free itself from the confusions of avidya and the causal determinations of karma and shine in its own splendour. The term empirical or natural self connotes dehdtmd or the embodied soul or the dtman that has falsely identified itself with prakrti ; the moral self is the karma yogin that has a theoretic knowledge of the dtman as different from prakrti and does his duty in a disinterested way. The state of dtmdvalokana is called the realisation of the spiritual self. While the meta- physic of morals analyses the nature of niskdma karma, the philosophy of the spirit expounds the rationale of dtmdva- lokana. It is only by means of self-purification that the ideal of self-perfection can be achieved.
The philosophy of the dtman has not received due atten- tion in the history of thought, and its realm is often regarded as a no-man's land. While materialistic monism abolishes the self by making it a bye-product of matter, the absolute of the idealistic monist swallows up its very being. Even
J$ANA YOGA 337
religion in its deistic aspect seeks to exalt God at the expense of the spirit, and does not adequately bring out the full nature and status of personality. The dtman is not an appearance of reality, but is an entity that has its own unique nature, its existence is self-proved, and it can realise itself in intuitive perception or atmasaksatkdra. The atman is not the body feeling, will or cognition, but has its own spiritual identity apart from its psycho-physical contents. The atman survives its mind-body and exists on its own account. It has a unity and continuity in the incarnate state of samsara as well as in the discarnate state of mukti on account of its moral and spiritual consciousness and striving for mukti. This experience is evidence of its personal immortality. Persons may have the same intelligence, but the self-feeling carries its own personal or spiritual worth. The atman, distinguished from its empirical contents, is not impoverished thereby, but shines as an eternal substance, subject or self, and even the monist that denies duality, has to posit a plurality of jlvas to satisfy the claims of practical reason. The duality of the subject-* object relation is different from the duality between two subjects. They are mutually related, and one subject cannot be resolved into another. If A falls asleep, B does not vanish, but is quite awake. A and B are therefore poly-centric. In the case of love between two persons each is the subject of love as well as the object of love, owing to the intrinsic value of the persons who enter into the relation. The relation is spiritual and not logical and is the very foundation of inter-subjective intercourse and the consciousness of kind. The world of souls is a spiritual realm transcending con- ceptual knowledge which suffers from the perils of scep- ticism on the one hand and of subjectivism on the other. It is the fatal defect of pantheism, at least in its lower
22
338 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
form, that it recognises only God and nature as a short-cut to unity, and omits the philosophy of the self. It is the self that enquires into nature and God, and, by relinquishing its materialistic associations, seeks to know itself and its inner self. It is the supreme merit of Vis'istadvaita that it lays special stress on the philosophy of the self, and insists on atmadars'ana or vision of the self as a prelude to the philo- sophy of religion.1
The realisation of the pratyagatman or inner self, the goal of Jndna Ydga, is achieved only by a rigorous moral and spiritual discipline. The first requisite in this ydgic process is the training in samatva or spiritual equanimity, the exact meaning of which is, however, difficult to define in logical terms. The instinct of acquisitiveness can never coexist with the yearning of the mumuksu, and it profits him little to gain the whole world and lose his atman. The renouncement of economic goods is therefore indispensable to spiritual progress, and the aspirant should regard dust and diamond as equally worthless. The dvandvas like success and failure, pleasure and pain, and likes and dislikes lead to the dilemma of the divided life. The moral self should therefore practise samatva, which includes the virtues of indifference, endurance and detachment in an ascending scale. Introspective life implies indifference to the utilitarian ideas of success and failure. There are £hree ways of over- coming the hedonistic hazards of pleasure and pain. Every pleasure is fraught with pain, and is therefore to be avoided ; or every pain is a blessing in disguise, and is therefore to be
1 parama prapya bhutasya parasya brahmapah . . . praptyupayabhatam tad upasanara . . . tadafigabhatam atmajffanapilrvakarmanu^ fhana sadhyam praptufc pratyagatmanaji yathatmyadars'anam.— Gita Bha$yam, VII. Introduction.
YOGA 339
endured ; or both alike should be treated with indifference. The twin-evils of raga-dvesa are attributable to abhimdna or false identification with the body, and they can be overcome by assuming the attitude of the indifferent spectator or dissociation of the self from its fleshly cravings. The psychology of the three gunas enables the mumuksu to tran- scend the inertia of tamas and the restless drive ot rajas by disinterested work and to attain the nirguna stage or detachment from the influence of prakrti. Samatva also connotes the state of tranquillity which is awakened by subduing the vdsands and practising Karma Yoga. In any case, it does not refer to the Greek idea of balancing the extremes by averaging them, or by arriving at a harmonious mean between spirituality and animality. In the positive sense, it includes tlje sanity of thought, the sobriety of self-conquest and the serenity of knowing the effulgent at man. It is a ydgic attitude which can be better experienced than explained in conceptual terms, but the sddhana can be expounded in a scientific way.
Jndna ni$tha starts with the reflective analysis of the ideas of pratyagdtman or the inner self and dehdtman or the embodied self and the progression in spiritual en- deavour. The body is not the dtman> and animal perfection is neither intelligible nor attainable, though physical well- being is essential to spirituality. Even self-culture and the formation of sdtvic habits are only means to self-knowledge. Spiritual endeavour is both a negative method of vairdgya or self-renouncement and a positive way of abhydsa l or in- troversion. The former is a process of self-stripping and self-simplification, which is known as the method of 1 B. G., VI. 35
340 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
spiritual induction. As in the case of gold in the refiner's fire, the dross of ahankara is removed. But self- discipline is not to be confused with self-mutilation or self-extinction, as the renunciation of the lower self and the realisation of the higher self go together. The more spiritual a thing is, the more real it is, and the jnanl seeks to remove the veils of ajnana and enter into the inner sanctuary of dtmajndna as the saksin or spectator of the psychic changes. Introversion consists in withdrawing the mind from the cinema shows of ancient vdsands and the distractions of surface consciousness and focussing the will on the centre. Thought is not merely suppressed but is thought away. By entering into the inner sanctuary, consciousness freed from functioning on the sensuous plane seeks to return to the centre and this is derived from mono-ideism. In this way the jnanl enters into the orison of inner quiet ; but even this state is only a half-way house to dtmajnana. The state of inner quiet should not lapse into the evils of quietism or laya like passivity and nothingness, which is like the repose of a log of wood. Quietism is a danger zone in spiritual ascent, as consciousness is likely to be attenuated and destroyed in that rarefied atmosphere. In dtmdvalckana the vrttis or mental modes of prakrti alone are destroyed and not the self. The dtman is not annulled but is enriched in the process of abhydsa or repeated practice, and it is therefore idle to say that it is a method of elimination or abstraction.
The aruruksu, or yogin desirous of ascent, who desires dtmajnana, is no longer allured by wealth or bound by social ties, as his consciousness is withdrawn from all objective or external activities and turned inward. Theydjgm retires to a sequestered and pure spot and focusses his citta or mind on
YOGA 341
the atman by subduing its fugitive and fickle-minded nature. The intuition of the atman is his only endeavour and end, and it alone gives him supreme satisfaction. Yogic sddhqna consists of the eight well-known stages of yama, niyama, asana,prdnayama, pratyahara, dhdrana, dhyana and samddhi. Varna is the moral practice of truthfulness, ahimsa, contentment, conti- nence, poverty, and the will to receive no favours or benefits. Continence is the sublimation of sex-energy or retas into spirit- ual energy or djas. Niyama is the transition from restraint to self-restraint and the discipline of the mind-body resulting in self-purification, study, reflection, austerity and the attunement of the mind to the will of God. Asana is the physical control of the body by keeping it stiff, symmetrical and straight and thus overcoming its tamasic languor and rajasic restlessness. Prdndydma is the control oiprqna or the vital breath by balanc- ing the respiratory function of prdna and apdna with a view to attain psychic control. These four stages are steps ioydgic introversion and are not yoga in the strict sense of the term. Pratyahara is the arresting of the outgoing senses and attun- ing them to the inner sense. Dhdrana is the focussing of manas on an object, by withdrawing it from the distractions of sense and the tumult of the vdsands or dispositions. When the self-centred citta passes into the state of ceaseless intro- version, dhdrana deepens into dhyana. The habit of philoso- phic reflection spiritualises the mind by removing the distrac- tion of manas, the restlessness of citta and the ego-centric conceit of ahankdra. Thought ceases when it reflects on itself, but it is not a case of suppression or extinction. Dhyana has its completion in samddhi, when the contemplation of the atman becomes a direct intuition. In samddhi, consciousness ascends from the conative and reflective levels and returns to its own pure state of aloneness and the self-effulgent joy of
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sahasrdra. The process of ydga is thus a philosophic and spiritual discipline, and is not to be falsely identified with mere psychic control, occultism, or the siddhi-seeking mental- ity. The ydgic endeavour of the druruksu to ascend is consummated in the intuition of the drudha. In the drudha, the ancient karma complex is entirely burnt out in the fire of spirituality.
The end as self-realisation is also a social good, and the social ideal here implied is ultimately that of the mumuksu and not that of the citizen of a state or of a political philosopher. The concept of social progress is a spiritual ideal, and is different from that of the process of nature. While process is a law of nature or prakrti or ceaseless change or evolution, the idea of progress is governed by the rule of karma and the freedom of the moral self. The cosmos hangs together as a unity and is conditioned by the law of causation ; but the progress of humanity has no mean- ing apart from the spiritual growth of the individuals that constitute society. This view is opposed to that of utilitarian- ism and humanism. Humanity is not an aggregate of indivi- duals in which each man counts as one and no one as more than one, as such an arithmetical idea is entirely alien to the atmanistic theory of progress. Likewise, the humanistic ideal of striving for a better world as a substitute for other- worldliness is a species of secular morality, which is not founded on the spiritual values of life, and has therefore no stability. Humanism may be a corrective to the materialistic and supernaturalistic ideas of life, but it may have its nemesis in exclusive individualism. The Veddntic ideal of society is not that of an aggregate of atomic individuals or of an organ- ism, but that of a spiritual community of jlvas providing an
YOGA 343
Opportunity for the gradual realisation of each self as an atman and not as a thing. It starts with the economic end of the acquisition of wealth or artha for the welfare of all, and ascends to the hedonistic end of life as the disciplined satisfac- tion of desires or kaftia, and then to the moral life of right- eousness or dharma as contrasted with the assertion of rights. Ultimately it ends with the ideal of self-realisation as the goal of individual and social life. In such a spiritual community, the external goods have value only in so far as they promote the goods of the soul or spiritual welfare. The physical life of each man in terms of cosmic ethics is sustained by his appropriation of the goods of the world, secured from the five elements, his parents, his teachers and the gods, and a spiri- tual scheme of society consists in doing our duty to the cosmos and not in the assertion of exclusive rights. The ideal of the chief rnas and yajnas is thus based on the conscious- ness of giving back to the universe what has been received from it. Though the nature of a man's duty may be deter- mined psychologically by his station in life and svadharma, his ethical motive is deduced from the universal ideal of right- eousness.
The social side of spiritual life is briefly illustrated in the institutions of warfare, private property and marriage. The ethics of evolution recognises and provides for differences in the development of moral and spiritual life due to the indivi- dual disposition and the environment of the evolving self. But the final spiritual ideal of ihejiva is the realisation of the inner worth of each self, the similarity of the attributive con- sciousness of all jlvas and the solidarity of life in all the levels of the three-storeyed universe. The institution of warfare is inevitable in biological life on account of the assertion of the
344 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
pugnacious instinct, but is not essential. Its evil is minimised by the idea of dharma yuddha or righteous warfare confined to the Ksatriya who is qualified to fight without ill-will or egoism, for the establishment of the kingdom of righteousness with the deathless courage of a spiritual conviction that the self neither slays another nor is slain, and is eternal* and that it is the body alone that is subject to birth and death. This is a middle course between militarism and pacifism and eventually leads to the ethics of ahimsa and universal love. The institution ot private property may be justified realistically as the organisation of the acquisitive instinct, which has its origin in the twin evils of ahankara and mamakara or the egoistic feelings of * I ' and ' mine/ But from the idealistic point of view, the theory of property is freed from the sense of possession, and wealth becomes a medium for developing the self and social unity. Riches alone may be hated but not the rich man who gets wealth for giving it to others. The institu* tion of marriage serves as the ethical foundation for the unity of the family which is the training ground for the promotion of the virtue of universal brotherhood. It starts realistically as a response to a biological need, passes through the idealistic stage as an opportunity for fostering monogamous fidelity and selfless love, and finally it promotes the ideal of spiritual at- one-ment. Fraternal love has full meaning only on the ethical and spiritual levels of life and not on the economic and the political. Thus the ultimate motive of all social institutions is the promotion of the unity of all jivas as a realm of ends by removing the hindrances to such a consummation.
The experience of the spiritual unity of all jivas is ana- lysed by the author of the Glta in his exposition of the nature of the drudha in verses 29 to 32 of Chapter VI. Looking alike
YOGA 345
on all things, the yogin who has intuited the atman sees the same self in all jlvas owing to the similarity of their spiritual intelligence or dharmabhutajnana. It is only the bodily feel- ing caused by karma that creates the separatist consciousness and generates rdga dvesa. But the seer who has dtma drsfi or soul-sight and sweet reasonableness or vinaya intuits the same atman in a dog as in a god. In a higher stage, the yogin has a glimpse of Paramatman, the Supreme Self, as the per- vading identity in all j 'was, and sees Him in all beings and all beings in Him. In the next higher stage the spiritual experi- ence of this unity consciousness is further enriched. The spiritual insight of atmajnana is completely acquired in the fourth stage by the exhibition of universal sympathy in which the jnani realises the kinship of all jlvas and regards the joys and sorrows of others as his own.1 Sympathy is not merely a feeling that impels the yogin, but is a spiritual motive that induces him to action. It overcomes the dualism between egoism and altruism, as the bodily consciousness that separates jlvas is transcended in the arudha state. It is deeper than the ideal of universal brotherhood, as it is an appeal to spiritual kinship without any taint of the individualistic con- sciousness. The monistic theory that abolishes individuality affords no scope for such social love, as it affirms absolute identity and not the unity or equality of all jlvas. If the ydgin loves his neighbour as himself on account of the identity between their two selves, there is no scope for brotherly love or benevolence. Vedantic ethics from the Visfistddvaitic stand- point demands not only self-knowledge by the removal of error but also self-denial by the destruction of egotism ; it
1 sarva bhuta hite ratah I— B.C., V. 25. s'ruyatam dharma sarvasvam s'rutvacapyavadharyatam I atmanah pratikulani pares am na sa ma caret I — Mahabharata quoted in the Tatparyacandrika, V. 25.
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therefore gives the deepest explanation of the philosophy of the spiritual and social self.
The true meaning of service as kainkarya may be summed up in this connection by contrasting it with the other theories of social ethics, secular as well as spiritual, which are advocated in the east and the west. All the theories agree in their opposition to egoism and self-centredness. The ideal of material progress like the prolongation of life and its pleasures, the democratic dissemination of secular knowledge and hedon- istic views are based on the animal faith that physical well- being is more valuable than spiritual welfare. The utilitarian theory that insists on the greatest happiness of the greatest number is only a refined form of egoism as it is founded on enlightened self-love and prudence. Positivism goes a step further when it defines the religion of humanity as love and service to mankind as a whole in the collective and universal sense. But even this view is untenable as it is no satisfaction to the individual to know that, when humanity persists and progresses, he himself withers and perishes in the process. Communism also upholds the morality of collectivism in its attempt to establish a classless society on an economic basis, but it fails to recognise the intrinsic worth of personality and the higher values of life. Humanism remedies this defect when it stresses the dignity of man and the need for promoting social order ; but when it prefers better-worldliness to other- worldliness it is a secular view and has no stability as better- worldliness is still a form of worldliness without any spiritual value. All these theories of social progress bring to light the difficulties of overcoming, from the secular standpoint, the dualism between egoism and altruism, individualism and socialism. A new orientation is given to the problem by the
YOGA 347
Indian philosopher in his theories of karma and reincarnation and the need for the recognition of the kinship of all living beings as jlvas and f or jwakarunya. Buddhism and Jainism favour, more than any other religion, the ethics of ahimsa and jlvaharunya extended even to the sub-human species. But the positive motive for universal benevolence is lacking in both as the first denies human personality and the second has no use for divine personality. There are pragmatists in the west who cherish the will to believe in a personal but finite God fighting against evil with the active co-operation of man ; but the will to believe is often a make-believe as a finite God is no God at all. The absolutists explain the need for benevolence or lokasangraha in terms of the identity philosophy revealed in the text " Thou art That " and justify neighbourly love on the ground that the neighbour and oneself are identical. Deussen who extols this philosophy, however, thinks that it is Christianity that brings out its moral side and ex- pounds the meaning of social love. The question of brotherhood has no place in the identity philosophy and the idea of the Heavenly Father is too remote to bring out spiritual intimacy. The true meaning of brotherhood can be explained only by the Vis'istadvaitic teaching of the immanence of Brahman in all jlvas and their essential unity or similarity.
The spiritual philosophy of the atman which refers to atmavalokana or self-realization is different from the religion of God-realization attained by bhakti and prapatti. The philosopher who prefers the joy of Jtaiyulya to the bliss of divine life is called a kevala. To him seeking God is only a means to his seeing the self. He seeks the spiritual freedom which arises from dissociation from
348 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
prakrti and also dependence on the cosmic ruler. The kevala is a contemplative who devotes himself toyogic introversion by withdrawing his mind from its outgoing tendencies. The atman is by nature immutable (aksard) and self-effulgent and is not to be identified with the embodied self. It is the goal of the kevala to intuit his self by abandoning the false and fleeting ideas of * I ' and ' mine ', regain his essential and eternal nature and thus attain freedom from birth and death and the ills of samsdra. The state of kaivalya thus attained may be called the flight of ' the Alone to the Alone ' in which the atman enjoys inner quiet and is self-satisfied. Soul-culture no doubt leads to sanity and peace or &anti. But the quiet of kaiyalyq, often leads to quietism and subjectivism and the godless state of Sdnkhyan kaivalya and nirvana. The kevala is stranded in solid singleness without the glow of godliness. His spiritual attainment is only the orison of quiet and not the orison of divine union and is at best a half-way house to the perfection of mukti. There is some difference of opinion among the Visrista- dvaitic philosophers regarding the value and destiny of the kevala. One school, that of the Tenkalais, maintains the view that kaivalya is not on the road to mukti but is mukti itself in which the mukta enjoys the * peace that passeth understanding ' but is only in the outskirts of Paramapada and has no hope of intuiting God and enjoying the bliss of commu- nion. But the Vadakalai school favours the theory that the kevala is on the path to perfection and will eventually reach the divine goal. The path of devotion leads to God and not away from Him and the instinct which the kevala has for the infinite soon asserts itself and urges him to shed his sinfulness arising from self-satisfaction and self-alienation. He is on the right path in so far as he has discriminated between prakrti and purusa, freed himself from the shackles of prakjti and
YOGA 349
turned his attention Godward. The kevala is transformed into the jnanl that hungers for God and attains the bliss of immortal communion with Him. Thus, of the four types of devotees to God mentioned in the Gltd, ihejnam and the kevala return no more to the world of samsdra !, while the other two who only long for* the pleasures of this world and of svarga continue their career of births and deaths in samsara, though they also attain freedom eventually. The spiritual conscious- ness of the kevala has its fruition only in religious con- sciousness.
The religious consciousness consists in shifting the centre of reference from the dtman to Paramdtman, and this effects a revolution in our life, which is of far greater importance than the Copernican revolution. While the astronomer realises the littleness of the earth and the greatness of the sun that draws it to itself, the religious man or bhakta knows the emptiness of the earth-bound self and the saving might of God who is the source and centre of all living beings. The knowledge of the finite self has its religious fulfilment in the integral experience of the infinite, which is its ground and goal. Kaivalya is no doubt on the plane of mukti or on the path to it, but the satisfaction of dtmajndna has little or no value when it is contrasted with the bliss of Brahman. The Gltd starts with the morals of niskdma karma and the philo- sophy of dtmajndna and ends with the religious exposition of Bhakti Yoga as the highest state in the philosophy of religion. Bhakti Yoga is itself a disciplinary process involving different stages ; but, in all its stages, it is dominated by the single aim of seeking Brahman as Bhagavdn and seeing Him face to face.
1 Ramanuja's Gita Bha$ya, VIII. 15.
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Certain schools of monism begin with the subject of experience or self-consciousness as the starting point of philo- sophy and end in subjectivism. Bhakti Yoga does not thrive in the atmosphere of such subjectivism and solipsism. Sub- jectivism starts with sensationalism and ends with solipsism. But in all cases it denies extra-mental reality or an external world order. The existence of a thing is only in its mental ex- perience. The first stage is the philosophy of subjective ideal- ism which holds that esse is percipi or drsti is s'rsti. Matter is only mind-dependent and its primary and secondary qualities are only a cluster of sensations. In a higher stage called objective idealism, reality is said to be mental in the logical as opposed to the psychological sense ; but even the logical idea of the object is not the object. In a still higher stage known as transcendental idealism, the world as constituted by space, time and causality is said to be ' my ' idea. They are subjective forms of the intellect, which are presupposed in experience and not deduced from it. Absolute idealism goes a step further, when the whole of reality is made to rest in the ' I '. Reality is mind- begotten, mind-made and dissolved into the mind. The absolute ' I ' falsely imagines itself to be the world. In this way, subjective idealism, in all its later or more developed forms ends in solipsism, and cannot escape the charge of the ego-centric fallacy. This conclusion is confirmed by the monistic argument that truth is a passage from the objective to the subjective and that the realism of the waking state should lead to the truer state of the mentalism of the dream state. Cosmology is thus dissolved in epistemology and epistemology is dissolved in psychology, and the psychology of eka-jlva, the single-self theory, is the only view of truth. Vi&istadvaita repudiates this subjectivistic philosophy and its super-solipsism, and upholds the philosophy of the absolute as the self of the
J$ANA YOGA 351
universe of cit and acit and their Lord who is the &aririn. It reinterprets idealism in terms of personalism which deals with persons or purusas and their ideas and ideals and personalism in terms of supra-personalism dealing with the absolute as super-personal or Purusottama. Bhakti shifts the centre from the ' I ' to the * Thou ' or from the finite con- sciousness of the purusa to the consciousness of Purusottama who is the world ground as well as the inner ruler. He is the eternal ' other ', whether He is the internal or the external Self, and bhakti is the longing of the jiva as the sfarlra to become one with its self or s'aririn and thus serve His ends.
CHAPTER XV BHAKT1 YOGA
scheme of Karma Yoga, Jnana Yoga and Bhakti -*• Yoga marks the different stages in the progressive realisation of mukti. Caught up in the causal cycle oiavidya- karma, the mumuksu at long last reflects on the waste of soul life and the perishing values of empirical life from the bare existence of the amoeba to the joys of Brahmaldka, and longs to go back to his home in the absolute. Karma Ydga is the path of disinterested duty illumined by the knowledge of the distinction between the eternal atman and the empirical ego of prakrti and the gradual renunciation of egoism or the conceit of ahankara and mamakara or the feel- ing of ' I ' and ' mine '. Jnana Yoga is the process of self- realisation in which the self retires from the circumference to the centre, and regains its own state. But it is the orison of quiet, which may lapse into the pitfalls of quietism, and is not the supreme end of life, as it is a godless state of aloneless without the glow of love. Upasana or bhakti is the unitive way in which the mumuksu sheds his egoism and ego-centric outlook, attunes himself to the will of God as Purusottama, and yearns for eternal communion with Him. It is therefore the consummation of moral and spiritual culture. Karma Ydga and Jnana Ydga are means to mukti only through
BHAKTI YOGA 353
Bhakti Yoga. Bhakti Yoga is the direct pathway to perfection, as it leads to the very heart of the religious consciousness. The path to mukti is a progressive realisation of Brahman, and each Yoga is a stepping stone to a higher stage. The yogin equipped with viveka or discrimination and vairagya or self-renuncia- tion gives up his egoism, realises his eternal nature as the dtman and gradually attains his home in the absolute or Brahman.
Though the ideal of every dars'ana is the attainment of mukti or freedom from the travails of samsara, there are sharp differences of opinion amongst them in respect of the means employed to secure it. The chief views are explained by Ramanuja with a view to proving how by mutual criticism they lend themselves to a reinterpretation in terms of bhaktl as the chief means of mukti. The Mimdmsaka insists on the primacy of the moral law of dharma and this conclusion may be shown to satisfy the tests of s'ruti, yukti and anubhava. Every Vedic proposition has a practical purpose, and action is its main import. The performance of dharma for its own sake as in the case of nitya-karmas is the highest ideal of con- duct. When the Upanisad extols knowledge, it sets forth the true nature of the active self alone, and knowledge is only auxiliary to action. Every state of consciousness is cona- tional ; and even introspective insight is only an ideo- motor action, and thus there is action even in apparent inaction. It is well known that Janaka who was a knower of Brahman, preferred the active life to the contemplative. Thus the Mimdmsaka proves his conclusion that the performance of Vedic duty is the only end of conduct.
The Advaitin goes to the other extreme when he refers to jndna as the only means to mukti. Mukti to him is the direct
23
354 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
cognition of Brahman as the eternal, changeless and ever self- realised, and it is not therefore due to the intervention of any Vedic injunction. While the Karma Kdnda sets forth the truth of difference or bheda, the Jndna Kdnda affirms the reality of non-difference or abheda, and jndna and karma are contradic- tory. In the light of scripture, the Advaitin concludes that karma is the effect of avidyd &ndjndna is the cessation of avidyd and karma. For example, the moment the rope is cognised as such, the illusion that it is a snake is dispelled. Brahman, being eternally self-realised, cannot be originated, attained or modified. As the thinker of thought Brahman cannot be the object of knowledge or objectified. The Dhydna-niyoga-vddin accepts the Advaita contention, but objects to its conclusion that knowledge is immediate and not a process of knowing. Brahma-/?7<ma is a real progression in knowledge involving the different stages of dhydna or meditation as enjoined in the s'ruti. In the example of the rope-snake illusion, disillusionment arises not from the bare cognition of the rope, but from actual ocular verification. The Veddntic imperative that Brahman should be reflected upon and realised has more value than the Vedic law of duty, as it directly leads to mukti. By following the Mimdmsaka principle of niyoga and the Veddntic rule of meditation, the Dhydna-niyoga-vadin gradually gives up the sense of plurality and intuits the self-identity of Brahman in the end. The allied theory of nisprapancikarana-niyoga defines mukti acosmically as the knowledge of Brahman by the destruction of the world order. But the theory of niyoga as an unseen external agency has already been shown to be mechanical and meaningless. The view that Advaita negates the world order was proved to be untenable as Advaita destroys only the sense of separateness and not the world itself. These two views of niyoga which try to combine the philosophy of
BHAKTI YOGA 355
Advaita with the ethics of Mlmamsa are neither philosophical nor ethical. The Bheddbhedavddin steps in at this stage and tries to reconcile the counter-claims of karma and jndna by his theory of jndna-karma-samuccaya as the only way to mukti. He accepts the equal validity and value of the method oi jndna or contemplative insight and karma or moral endeavour. The jlva suffers from the errors and evils of avidyd-karma and the only way of overcoming these barriers lies in the co-ordination of jndna and karma. Jndna is the continuous meditation on the abheda aspect of Brahman and karma is rationalised as niskama karma and then spiritualised as Brahmdrpana. Jndna gives a meaning to moral endeavour, and karma furnishes the dynamic side of spiritual insight. In this way the mumuksu avoids the pitfalls of the Vedic ritualism of the Mlmdmsaka and the illusionism of Mdydvdda and utilises the highest values of moral and spiritual life in the meditational process. But its chief defect lies, as has been frequently pointed out before, in the attribution of imperfections to Brahman.
Vis'istddvaita steers clear of the fallacies of the Mimdm- saka on the one hand and of the schools of monism on the other, as it accepts the reality of experience in all its levels and the relative values of the moral and metaphysical disci- plines detailed in the Karma Kdnda and the Jndna Kdnda. Purva Mlmamsa and Uttara Mlmamsa are integrally related as one S'drlraka S'astra, and there is continuity and unity in the two parts, which are the distinguishable elements of a syste- matic whole. The monistic view that the s'dstra affirms the self-contradiction between karma, updsana and jndna finally negates negation, and is itself sublated by the self-identity of Brahman. It tends to destroy scriptural faith and faith in reason itself, and every moral and spiritual endeavour
356 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
is shipwrecked at the very entrance to the absolutist haven. The only escape from such all-destroying scepti- cism lies in abandoning the dangers of the pan-illusion theory and following the safe path of affirmation en- shrined in the truth that Vasudeva pervades all things and thinkers as the s'aririn or inner self. The wisdom of Veddnta is the natural completion of Vedic knowledge and is not its cancellation, and from the first Sutra of the Karma Mlmdmsa beginning with the ethical enquiry into dharma to the last Sutra in the Brahma Mlmdmsa ending with the entry of the self into the eternal bliss of Brahman, 'from which there is no return, the scripture describes with meticulous accuracy the different mile-stones in the spiritual progress of the jlva. There is thus a real transition, logical as well as chronological, from the Ptirva Mlmdmsa to the Uttara Mlmdmsa and the Mlmdmsaka is transfigured into a mumuksu, when he realises that the value of karma is transitory and transient and that of jndna is eternal and infinite. Every judgment, Vedic and Veddntic, has a certain relevancy or specific end. The former stresses the end of conduct as the attainment of Svarga, while the latter refers to the, attainment of apavarga or Moksa as the supreme end of life. The moral imperative or ' ought ' has its religious foundation in the knowledge of Brahman and thus involves a deeper ' is '. The facts of sense-perception, which are out there and the acts of moral life, which aim at the 4 ought ', lead to the religious experience of Brahman which is more valuable than the things of prakrti which are affirmed, and the imperatives of dharma which are enjoined. To the mumuksu, every judgment ultimately connotes the whole of reality as Brahman, and his whole life is dedicated to the meditation on Brahman as his very Self. Meditation deepens into bhakti and it is the practice of bhakti that becomes the
BHAKTI YOGA 357
direct pathway to Brahman. The entire body of the Veddnta Sutras dealing with the nature of Brahman and the means of attaining Him is opposed to the Advaitic distinction between a lower and a higher knowledge of Brahman or apara vidyd and para vidya, the former dealing with the meditation on saguna Brahman or the absolute in an empirical dress, which is a concession to the avidya- ridden mind, and the latter affirming the self-identity of the absolute, which is directly intuited and not attained. The Veddnta Sutras, which form a systematic exposition of the Upanisads, begin with the definition of Brahman as the ground of all existent beings l and end with the description of the eternal 2 bliss of true mukti, which is the summum bonum of religious endeavour. The Advaitic conten- tion that the beginning or itpakrama and the end or upasam- hdra of the wrhole philosophy refer only to the exoteric doctrine of the lower Brahman and lower knowledge is not only a violation of the rules of Vedic interpretation, but is a serious charge against the integrity of the Stitrakara, the recognised expositor of the system of Vedanta. The modern view of the critical philosopher that the Sutras and the Glta support Ramanuja and that S'ankara faithfully represents the monism of the Upanisads does no justice either to .Ramanuja, whose dialectic criticism of Advaita in the form of saptavidha anupapatti is unsurpassed, nor to the heart of S'ankara, the immortal author of " Bhaja Govindam ", who is more a Brahmavadin than a Mdydvddin. Besides, this method of speculation may cut both ways and lead nowhere. Some say that the Upanisads are mere guesses at truth and do not constitute a systematic whole ; others hold that they teach divergent doctrines, and still others seek their support in
1 janmadyasya yatah— V. S., I. i. 2.
2 na ca punaravartate na ca punaravartate. — V. S., IV. iv. 22.
358 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
justification of their siddhdnta. It is therefore safe to follow the traditional view upheld by all dcdryas that the scriptural authority of the Upanisads (implying the oneness of all the S'dkhas), the Sutras and the Git a is an integral unity, and the validity of a system depends on its coherence with the whole s'astra and its drift and spirit. Vis'istddvaita, as a systematic and self-contained philosophy of religion, sees no difference between the absolute of philosophy and the God of religion, and reconciles the claims of logic with the needs of religious feeling. Brahman is the very heart of logic, and satsifies the logic of the heart, and there is really no paradox
in this statement.
•
Brahman is one, and is the goal of the different updsanas.1 The historical view that Bhakti Yoga is the result of the fusion of the orthodox teachings of Brahmopasana with the non-Vedic teaching of the Pdncardtra that Bhagavdn is the Supreme Self, and with the later theory of the avatars in which heroes are deified, is a strange assumption, which is not really historical at all. History deals with facts given in sense perception and religion with super-sensuous truths. History therefore oversteps its bounds, when it refers to spiritual truths, which can only be discerned and described spiritually. Besides, such conclusions arrived at by historians are merely stories coloured by presuppositions and prejudices of the historian turned religious thinker. It is a more scientific conclusion to reject the whole religious thesis than to pull it to pieces and then to piece them together. It is the supreme merit of Vis'istd- dvaita that it follows the logic of religious intuition, and con- cludes that the Brahman of the Upanisads and the Sutras, the Vdsudeva of the Gitd, the Bhagavdn of the Pdncardtra and the
1 S.B., III. iii. 1 to 4, S.B.E., XLVIII, pp. 629 to 632.
BHAKTI YOGA 359
area of the Alvars connote the same Supreme Self, and insists on Bhakti Yoga as the direct means of knowing Brahman. It is untenable to say that philosophers, who have Stoic equanim- ity and who shy at sentimentalism, accept the nirguna Brahman of S'ahkara and allow saguna Brahman, which is less than the absolute, to accommodate the mass mind or average intelligence. This dual standpoint is admittedly a learned error or true lie and it freezes the heart, misses the delights of devotion, and dries up the springs of sympathy and love. But Vis'istadvaita meets the demands of meta- physics, and satisfies the supreme call of love by its theory of bhaktirupapanna jnana or jnana turned bhakti.
The practice of bhakti presupposes certain elaborate disciplines, which include not only the sublimation of feeling but also the training of the intellect and the will. They are known as the sadhana saptaka or the seven- fold moral and spiritual discipline, contrasted with the sadhana catustaya or the fourfold discipline of Advaita. The Advaitic sadhana also consists of the triple discipline of thought, feeling and will, defined as viveka, vairagya and the disciplines of s'ama, dama and the rest. But, strictly speaking, Advaitic sadhana is self-discrepant, as its idea of mukti is the cessation of avidya or the sense of plural- ity and not a progressive attainment. Jnana is the sublation of ajnana, and there can be no degrees and stages in denying the false. The opening sentences in the two Sutra Bhasyas strike the key note of their Veddntic theory. S'ankara defines the aim of the Sarlraka Mimamsa as the knowledge of the identity of Brahman by the removal of adhydsa or the illusion arising from the super-imposition of the nature of Brahman on non-Brahman. BrahmajMna is immediate as Brahman
360 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
is ever self-realised. The opening sentence of Ramanuja's S'n Bhasya reveals the contrast : " May my buddhi or jnana blossom into bhakti or devotion to Brahman or S'rinivasa whose nature is revealed in the Upanisad as the self, that, out of the Ilia or sport of love, creates, sustains and reabsorbs the whole bhuvana or universe with a view to saving thejivas that seek His love." Brahman as the s'aririn of they iva is the prdpaka as well as the prdpya, the endeavour as well as the end, and the scheme of sddhana saptaka is helpful in the building up of bhakti.
The seven sddhanas* to'upasana or bhakti are ennumerated and explained by the Vdkyakdra as viveka, vimoka, abhyasa, kriydj kalydna, anavasdda and anuddharsa* Viveka is the purification of the body or kdya s'uddhi by means of s'atvic food. The body is Brahmapuri or a living temple of God, and as cleanliness is a help to godliness, bodily purity is prescribed as necessary for purity of mind, or satva s'uddhi which leads to spiritual concentration or dhruva smrti? Vimoka* is freedom from the circle of kama and krodha, and this mental detachment is essential to the meditation on Brahman.5 Abhydsa" follows from bodily purity and mental calmness and means the continuous prac- tice of the presence of the indwelling Self, so that the mind may be Brahmanised7 (tadbhdva bhdvita). The practice
1 S.B. I. i. i p. 11 and S.B.E. XLVIII, p. 17.
2 tallabdhir vivekavimDkabhyasa kriya kalyananavasadanuddharsebhyas sambhavan nirvacanacca I — Budhayarn&vrttt.
8 ahara s'uddhau satva s'uddhih satvas'uddhau dhruva smrtih. — Chh. Up,, VII. xxvi. 2
4 vimokah kamanabhisvangah I — Bodh. Vriti. ^'antaupasItal—CA/i. Up.— III. xiv. 1.
6 arambhapasams'Ilanam punah punar abhyasah I — Bodh. Vrtti.
7 B. G., VIII. 6.
BHAKTI YOGA 361
of such introversion does not free the updsaka from his moral obligation to others and the next sddhana known as kriya is the performance of the fivefold duties according to one's ability, as such moral obligations develop into a medita- tion on God.1 The mttmuksu seeks to know Brahman by Vedic recitation, sacrifice, benevolence and tapas? Kriya is the fivefold duty to the sub-human species, human society, the guru, the forefathers and the gods, as the right to life, well- being and education involves the corresponding obligation to the universe from which the aspirant derives his psycho- physical existence. Like the horse that requires grooming by the attendant before it is set for riding, updsana needs the performance of duties as a means of purification. While kriya is overt action or duty, kalydna :{ is the practice of virtue as the inner side of duty, and it consists of satya or truthful- ness, arjava or integrity, or purity of thought, word and deed, dayd or compassion, ddna or benevolence and ahimsd or non- violence.1 The next sddhana is anavasdda or freedom from despair due to disappointment, remembrance of past sorrows, and horrible imaginings. Anuddharsa is the absence of exaltation and is a mean between the two extremes of excessive joy or atisantosa and absence of joy or asantosa. Good and evil actions are the result of karma, and niskdma karma is duty emptied of the subjective inclinations and objective ideas of utility. The rneditation on Brahman finally frees the jlva from
1 pancamahayagnadyanu§thanam s'aktitah kriya! — BQdh. Vrtti. kriyavanesa brahmavidafn varisthah I— Mund. Up., III. i. iv.
3 Br. Up., VI. iv. 22
3 satyarjavadayadanahimsanabhidhyah kalya^ani, — Bodh. Vrtti.
4 satyena labhyah I— -Mund. Up., III. i. 5.
ye§am tap5 brahmacaryam yesu satyam pratis thitam te§amasau virajo- brahmalokah na yesu jihmam anrtam na mSya ceti.— Prayna Up., I. xv, 16.
desakalavaigupyat s'okavastvadyanu-smrtes'ca tajjam dainyam abhasvara tvam manasah anavasadah tadviparyayaja tuatih uddharsah — Bodh . Vrtti.
362 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
karma with its causal chains of punya resulting from good deeds and papa. The chief aim of the seven sadhanas is the practice of moral and spiritual discipline by the harmonious development of thought, feeling and will, which are partial expressions of the attributive consciousness of the meditating devotee.
Equipped with these disciplines, the updsaka enters on the life of meditation, and cultivates the love of God. Updsana is a divine command like the performance of dhanna, but while the Vedic ' ought ' is of the form * Do your duty without caring for the consequences,' the Veddntic ' ought ' is of the form ' Know the deity that is your self.' Of the three Upanisadic injunctions of s'ravana, or hearing, manana or reflection and nidhidhydsana or meditation, the first two naturally lead to the third, and dhydna is the only divine com- mand ; s'ravana and manana as the apperception of scriptural terms and the assimilation thereof by reflection have no value unless they deepen into dhydna. It is by absolute devotion to God and not by Vedic study, meritorious work or austerity that Brahman is realised.1 The knowledge of Brahman is not academic or speculative, but is a spiritual intuition which transcends grammatical and logical thinking.2 The term vedana in the text : * Brahmavid dpnoti param ' or one who knows Brahman attains the highest, connotes dhydna or medi- tation which deepens into updsana or devotion or worship.3 Updsana is the practice of the presence of the dtman, and admits of the three stages of firm meditation or dhruvdnusmrti, repeti- tion or asakrddvrtti and the orison of union or dar&ana
1 nayamatma pravacanena labhyo
na medhaya na bahuna s'rutena \-Kath. Up.t I. ii. 22.
2 Taitt. Up., Ananda Valli, I. i. 1.
3 S.B., I. i. 1. p. 9 and 9.B.E.. XLVIII, p. 16.
BHAKTI YOGA 363
samanakarata. The first is not mere remembrance in the psychological sense, but a spiritual quest to gather together and get a glimpse of a prenatal experience of Brahman, as the atman is a trailing cloud of glory, which has its home in the absolute. Every cognition of Brahman is a recognition of the inner self of the upasaka, and is a recollection of the a priori idea of God as an archetype. Dhyana is a continuous process of mental concentration, or ekdgracittatd,* on the nature and form of Brahman, which is practised daily till the moment of death or dissolution of the body.1 Dhyana as upasana is a ceaseless remembrance of the Lord, which is likened to the uninterrupted flow of oil (tailadhdrdvat aviccinna smrti- santdna-rtlpa).2 It is the process of focussing the mind on Brahman in a proper environment. For this the aspirant is recommended to choose the proper place and time and to adopt the sitting posture, which is most conducive to dhyana, as standing and walking involve effort, and lying down favours sleep and slothfulness. The eight stages of yoga are specially designed to draw the mind from its outgoing tendency and dispersal, to subdue its vdsands and to centre it in samddhi. Astdnga Yoga or the eightfold yoga is thus not only essential to the attainment of Sdnkhyan kaivalya or the realisation of the atman but also to Brahmopdsana. As bondage is a descent to the world of samsdra, mukti is the process of retracing the steps and returning to the spiritual home in God, and the whole scheme of updsana is governed by this central concept. Upasana deepens into bhakti, when recollection acquires by practice the clearness and distinctness of a direct perception
1 s'ucau dese pratisthapya sthiramasanamatmanah natyucchritam natinlcam celajinakus'ottaram II tatraikagram manah krtva yatacittendriyakriyah
upavis'yasane yunjyad yOgam atmavis'uddhaye II — B.G., VI. 11 and 12 andS.B., IV. i. 1 to 12 and S.B.E.. XLVIII, pp. 715 to 721.
2 S.B., I. i. 1. p. 9 and S.B.E., XLVIII, p. 14.
364 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
of the beatific form of Paramatman or the Supreme Self (dar&ana samanakara). Imagination in the aesthetic sense is not merely creative imagination, but is a vision and faculty divine, which becomes as vivid as the soul sight of Bhagavdn.
The exact meaning of Brahmopdsana as expounded by Ramanuja can now be ascertained by distinguishing it from the concepts employed by Dvaita and Advaita. The Dvaita Darsrana expounds the living faith in the infinite will of I&vara as contrasted with the infinitesimal nature of the jiva and the feeling of the absolute dependence of thejiva on His mercy. Advaita denies externality and otherness, and affirms the absolute identity of jiva and Is'vara by eliminating distinc- tion and difference. The meditation on Brahman as the Self or s'aririn of the meditating devotee is opposed to externality as well as identity, and is deduced from the idea that Is'vara is not only with us, but is in us as the Inner Ruler Immortal. The Upanisad in its classical exposition of Brahman as antaryamin defines His nature, immanence and intimacy in the following terms : " He who, dwelling within the self, is different from the self, whom the self does not know, of whom the self is the body, who rules the self from within, He is thy Self, the Inner Ruler Immortal/' ' The updsaka turns his vision inward, and thinks himself into the antaryamin in the form : " I am indeed Thou, holy divinity, and Thou art my self." * In the ordinary judgment ' I am a man ' the term connoting the s'arira connotes the s'aririn ; likewise in the Upanisadic affirmation ' I am Thou ', the term connoting the jiva connotes ultimately Brahman, of which it is the body.
1 ya atmani ti^than atmanOntarah yam atma na veda yasya atma s'arlram ya atmanam antarO yamayati— Br. Up., V. vii, 22 (Madhyandina reading)
2 tvam va aham asmi bhagavo devate aham vai tvam asi bhagavo devate tad yOham s5sau ydsau soham asmi.
BHAKTI YOGA 365
Brahman is the source and sustenance of thejlva, and 'the latter exists for His satisfaction. Brahmopasana is changed into Brahmabhava, in which the finite self is infinitised and invested with the quality of Brahman. The converse, that the infinite should be finitised and given an anthropo- morphic form, is not desirable.1 Identification with the self should not be mistaken as identity with it, £,s the self is more than ihejlva or adhika but is not anya,2 i.e., externally related to it. Vasudeva is in all beings, but is not all beings. He is the life of our life, nearer to the self than it is to itself. This upasana promotes spiritual intimacy and the unitive consciousness.
There are thirty-two varieties of Brahma Vidya de- scribed in the Upanisads for securing moksa and the Stitras, as a systematic exposition of the upasanas, bring to light their philosophic meaning and religious aim, and conclude that the only subject of enquiry in all the Vidyas is Brahman and not prakrti or jiva, and their only object is the meditation on Brahman to attain mukti, and not the hedonistic enjoyment of worldly and other-worldly pleasures.3 Among the chief Vidyas may be mentioned the Bhuma Vidya, the Sad Vidya, the Antaryami Vidya, the Antaraditya Vidya, the Anandamaya Vidya, the Madhu Vidya, the Dahara Vidya, the Maitreyl Vidya, the Nyasa Vidya and the Paryanka Vidya. The first defines the true nature of the mumuksu as a seeker after Brah- man or the bhilman, the true infinite. The next six Vidyas are mainly devoted to the metaphysical meditation on Brahman as the absolute that has satyam, jnanam, anantam, ananda
1 S.B., IV. i. 4 and S.B.JE., XLVIII, p. 719.
2 adhikamtu bhedanirdes'at.— V.S., II. i. 22. tadananyatvam arambhapas'abdadibhyah. — V.S., II. i. 15.
3 S.B., III. iii. 1 and S.B.E., XLVIII, p.- 629.
366 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
and amalatvam. In the Antardditya Vidya the Supreme Self is meditated upon as having a beauteous form of His own as bhuvana sundara. The next two Vidyds insist on bhakti and prapatti or self-surrender as the chief means of attaining Brah- man, and the last Vidya brings out the nature of mukti itself. The Sad Vidya (Chan. Up., VI. ii. 1) defines Brahman as the sat without a second "and the true of the true, and this knowledge is determinate and not indeterminate. The apprehension of the being of Brahman cannot be separated from the compre- hension of its nature or guna. The Antarydmi Vidya (Brha. Up., V. vii. 4) explicitly equates the sat with the inner self of all beings and the super-subject or light of lights. The Tait- tirlya Upanisad further defines Brahman as the infinitely blissful. The Aksara Vidya (Mundaka Up., I. i. 5-6) stresses the imperishable quality of the infinite. The Dahara Vidya (Chan. Up., VIII. i. 1) extols the infinite that seeks the interior of the heart of all beings as the infinitesimal to satisfy the devotional ends of the updsaka or devotee. The Paryanka Vidya of the Kausitaki Upanisad visualises by sense symbo- lism the transcendental realm of Brahman by attaining which everything else is attained. Each of the thirty-two Vidyds has its own specific character determined by the condition of its subject-matter or prakriya, name or ndmadheya, quality or guna, number or sankhya and repetition or abhydsa.1 Though the starting points and the procedure vary with the psycho- logical temperament and training of the adhikdrin, the ulti- mate goal is the attainment of Brahman. What is ascertained from all the Veddntic texts is the truth of the unity of the Vidyds on account of the non-difference of the result. As Brahman is the identical subject of all specific meditations, the contemplation of one essential quality comprises other
1 S.B.. III. iii. 56 and S>B.E>, XLVIII, p. 679.
BHAKTI YOGA. 367
qualities as well.1 Every essential quality of Brahman con- notes other qualities of Brahman as well, owing to their aprthaksiddha vis'esana or organic inseparability and identity of content. Brahman is saguna with the metaphysical and moral perfections of satyam, jndnam, anantam, amalatvam and dnanda as His differentia ; and with the other kalydna or auspicious gunas derived from the essential qualities. Me- ditation on one quality of Brahman implies meditation on the other essential qualities. But each is complete in itself and ha? as its aim the attainment of Brahman. Owing to the differences in the psychological dispositions of the adhikdrin and the ultimate unity of the result, the Upanisads provide option to each updsaka to choose his own vidyd?
In the building up of Brahmopdsana as an act of medita- tion as in all other actions, there are five component factors of which the chief is the will of Is'vara.. The updsaka has to renounce the false views of materialism and monadism that the deJia or body as the adhistdna or support and the dtman as karta or the doer are the real subjects of moral and religi- ous practices and to realise that the supreme actor is Para- mdtman, the inner Ruler of all beings and Paramas'esi. Is'vara resides in the hearts of all beings after moulding their bodies out of matter and moving them to act according to their gunas. As the righteous Ruler of the universe, He dispenses justice according to the karma of the individual without any caprice or cruelty. When the moral self becomes a mumuksu, he recognises the redemptive will of the s'esi, and effaces his egoism in service. The s'esa does not live unto himself but unto the s'esi. The jiva, as materialist or sensualist, seeks the
1 S.B., III. iii. 13 and S.B.E., XLVIII, p. 638.
2 S.B., III. iii. 57 and S.B.E,, XLVIII, p. 681.
368 .THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
goods of life, but when he turns into a worshipper of God, he prays to the Giver of all good or Providence for the boons of life, and the sweets of life are then bestowed on him and the bitters are removed. Thejlva then ascends to a higher stage when he prays to Is'vara for the boon of atmavalokana and then he intuits his dtman. The mumuksu does not bargain with Providence for the pleasures of this life or of Svarga, nor does he seek the philosophic delight of self-knowledge or kaivalya, but meditates on Vasudeva as his real self, and utilises his spiritual freedom for the service of the s'esi. The karma yogin who does his duty in a disinterested way becomes a jnana yogin, who prefers self-knowledge to activity, and is transformed into a devotee, to whom karma is not niskama or akdma, but is kainkarya or consecrated service. The offerings to the devas like Agni, Indra and Vayu are really dedicated Co the Devadeva or the God of gods, who is their inner ruler ; and therefore every Vedic work is really the Vedantic worship of the supreme s'esi. Is'vara, the bestower of boons according to karma, transforms Himself into the redeemer or the bestow- er of moksa. Thus the fruit of upasana is not earned by merit alone but by the redemptive mercy of the raksaka or saviour. The Lord accepts the flower of devotion more than the flower offerings of outer devotion and it is the eight-petalled flower of ahitnsa, kindness, patience, truth, self-control, tapas, in- wardness and jnana.1
When Brahmajijnasa or the philosophic enquiry into Brahman develops into Brahmopasana or the ceaseless
1 ahimsa prathamam puspam puspam indriyanigrahah I sarvabhutadaya puspara k?ama puspam vis'e§ata£ if jflanam pusspam tapah puspam dhyanam puspam tathaiva ca I satyam asthavidham puspam vi§noh prltikaram bhavet II
— Vatsya Varadacarya's Prapanna Parijatat V. 29-29.
BHAKTI YOGA 369
meditation on His nature, self-effort is transfigured into self- giving and the saving faith in the grace of God. Moksa, as ex- pounded in the philosophy of fruition, is not attained by mere moral and spiritual discipline. The real value of the practice of niskdma karma and ceaseless dhydna lies in the recognition of the shortcomings of human endeavour and the reliance on divine grace as the only means to mukti. The Advaitic view that the knowledge of Brahman is not conditioned by the empirical distinction between endeavour and end, but is ever self-realised by the metaphysical atman and that the seeking of divine grace is a concession to the theological faith of the phenomenal ego caught up in the sphere of causality, uproots the very foundations of the Brahma Vidyd, and the reality of the progression from the stage of sddhana or means to sddhya or end. If the idea of mnkti as liberation through grace be the result of exoteric personification, the fact of mumuksutva and the seeking of the grace of the guru would itself become illusory. But every school of Veddnta insists on its practical aspect, namely, the necessity of the guru-s'isya rela- tion and the absolute faith of the s'isya in attaining moksa through guru-prasdda or the favour of thegtirti. Identity philo- sophers like Deussen, who admire the equational view of the dtman and Brahman as the philosophy of all time from which no deviation is possible, are constrained to admit that there is no satisfactory solution to the question of finding in the esoteric system what corresponds to the grace of God and that it is a deviation from the logical structure of Advaita to treat of the sddhanas9 which refer to both the exoteric and the esoteric Brahman. Deussen is therefore inclined to think that Christianity completes the Veddntic view, whose fundamental want is the renewal of the will and freeing it from the realm of sin. That integration is, however, fully effected by Ramanuja.
24
370 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
While Advaitic monism, according to him, demands identity by the destruction gf avidya or error, Christianity demands self- denial and love by the destruction of egoism and sin. Monism is as far removed from the religion of love, which defines salvation as the transformation of will, as Christianity is different from the Advattic view, which defines mukti as the transformation of thought, and it is only Vis'istadvaita, that enjoins the conquest of avidya and karma by the scheme of bhaktirupapanna jnana or knowledge developed into devotion or bhakti, which defines mukti as liberation through the saving grace of God. The Upanisadic statement is clear and con- clusive. It is not by study or reflection that Brahman is realised. " Whom He chooses, unto him He reveals Himself "„
Thus the term vedana in the Upanisad text " Brahma vid dpnoti param " deepens into steady meditation or upasana, which is a recollection of our divine home, and when it becomes one-pointed and intense, it acquires the vividness of immediate presentation or pratyaksata. Representation then has the sensory vividness of a presentation or direct intuition. The archetypal idea of God is revived by means of frequent and intense association and reinstated by the dominant emotion of bhakti. Then the succession of the thoughts of God develops by interest and intensity into simultaneity, and what is mediate thought becomes immediate or felt. What is smrti-santana- rupa or of the nature of a stream of remembrances changes into dar&ana samandkara or the likeness of direct intuition. When the idea of God as s'esi is clear and distinct and the re- ligious emotion is disciplined, upasana has its fruition in bhakti.
Bhakti is meditation on Brahman touched with love or priti. It is absolute devotion to Bhagavan as the life of our
BHAKTI YOGA 371
life, and is love for love's sake. The true bhakta is the true jndni, as he knows that Bhagavan alone is the source and satisfaction of life.1 So he lives and has his being in the divine love. The Lord of love seeks ihejnani and sees him as His very life and self.2 Thus i\\e jiva who, as the prakara of Brahman, seeks the prakdrin, is now sought by Brahman and loved as His prakarin. The truejnani does not meditate on himself or do svasvarupa anusandhdna. He meditates on the Self of his self and thus transforms himself into a bhakta, who loves Bhagavan as his very life and rejects mukti itself, if it is devoid of divine life. To him the Muktipdda of the Sutras is transfigured into a Bhaktipada. The essentials of bhakti are thus constituted by the ideas of absoluteness, reciprocity and unconditionality. The supreme value of bhakti is the accessibility of the Lord to His bhakta and adaptability to his devotional needs. Brahman, the transcendental one without a second, is overpowered by His dayd or compas- sion and enters into the heart of humanity or jiva-loka and incarnates in any form to satisfy the needs of love and bhakti. In the light of this sacred truth or rahasya, it is untenable to say that the philosophic updsanas of the Upanisad have been erroneously adapted by Ramanuja to the theistic needs of the Git a and the emotional requirements of the Pdncardtra, and that Brahman in Vis'istddvaita becomes Bhagavan or the anthropomorphic highest and the avatdra or uttama purusa or pattern of human evolution. The ideas of antarydmin and avatdra are not the phenomenalised forms of Brahman, but are the manifestation of divine love. The true joy of bhakti is in the building up by thejiva of a sopdna or ladder from the earth to Paramapada or the eternal abode and the descent of
1 E.G., vil. 19»
2 E.G.. VII. 17 and 18.
372 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
Brahman from Paramapada to K$irdbdhi and from Kslrdbdhi to the realms of immanence and incarnation. Love ignores inequality of status and function. While I&vara tries to shed His Is'varatva to become one with ihejlva, the beloved, the bhakta sheds his avidyd and karma and communes with the Lord. Bhakti is not aware of the barriers of distance and the fear arising from the sinfulness of sin contrasted with the holiness of the Holy. Bhakti is for the sake of bhakti and has its fruition in absolute self-surrender to Bhagavan as the updya or means and the upeya or end. The Glta, as the crown of Upanisadic teaching, affords spiritual insight into the nature of Brahman or Bhagavan as S'ri Krsna, who is the supreme tatva or truth, the real hita or means and the purusdrtha or aim of human effort. According to the Gltdrtha Sangraha of Yamunacarya the Glta consists of three satkas or sec- tions of six chapters each, which throw light on the path from sensuality to spirituality and from spirituality to bhakti. The first satka defines the nature of Karma Yoga and Jndna Yoga as the limbs of dtmavalokana or intuition of the dtman as a means to Bhakti Yoga ; the second extols bhakti as the supreme means to mukti, and the last sums up the whole truth, and insists on absolute self-surrender to the Lord as the only way of redemption. The second chapter expounds the eternity of the dtman and the ethics of niskdma karma or dis- interested action, and thus correlates Sdnkhyan knowledge and yogic conduct. The third chapter defines niskdma karma negatively as the result of the interaction of the gunas and positively as consecrated service to Bhagavan. The fourth reveals thejndna aspect of karma and the true nature of avatdra or incarnation. The fifth stresses the ease and expeditious- ness of Karma Yoga and the meaning of samadarsfana ; the sixth chapter explains the nature of dtmavalokana as the
BHAKTI YOGA 373
fulfilment of the two Yogas. The middle satka explains and extols the nature of Bhagavdn &s the Supreme Self, and Bhakti Yoga as the most efficacious means of knowing Him and attaining mukti. The seventh chapter classifies bhaktas into four types, namely, drta, jijndsu, ais'varydrthi and jndnl or the man in affliction, the man who seeks self-knowledge, the man who seeks worldly goods and the wise man, and assigns the highest place to ihejnani who seeks God alone as his dtman and who is sought by God as His very life. The eighth chapter analyses the motives and ends of the different seekers of God. The ninth brings to light the transcendental character of the avatdras and the essentials of bhakti. The tenth expatiates on the infinity of perfections or kalydna gunas of Brahman with a view to awaken the true devotional conscious- ness of the bhakta. The eleventh describes with epic sublimity the cosmic glory or vibhilti of Bhagavdn as experienced by Arjuna who was given the * vision and faculty divine '. The twelfth chapter states the supreme value of bhakti, and indi- cates the diverse ways of practising it according to the psycho- logical requirements of the adhikari. The last satka sums up the central aim of the Glta and rounds off with the truth that absolute self-surrender is the one and only way to redemption. The thirteenth chapter distinguishes between the body as ksetra or field and the dtman as ksetrajiia or the dweller in the field, and points out the means of freeing oneself from the bondage of embodiment or samsara. The fourteenth traces the cause of bondage to the interaction of the three gunas with a view to securing the disillusionment of the dtman. The fifteenth chapter points to Purusottama as higher than the highest of ihejivas, known as the aksara or freed self. The sixteenth defines the divine type of the jiva as the supreme seeker after Bhagavdn and the seventeenth analyses the
374 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
psychological distinctions of conduct as determined by the gunas with a view to defining djity as a divine command. The last chapter insists on s'arandgati or surrender to the Lord as the supreme means of moksa.
When meditation or updsana as a divine command deep- ens into innate and intense love or premd, bhakti becomes its own end marked by fidelity and fervour and is called pdramaikdntya. The building up of bHakti by Karma Yoga and Jndna Yoga develops into paramaikdnta prlti or definitely determined love to Bhagavan as the ddhdra, niyantd and s'esi. There is no other Bhagavan than Bhagavan. The paramai- kdntin knows, feels and acts with the s'astraic conviction that Bhagavan is both the means and the end, the prdpaka and the prdpya. As the ddheya, the bhakta realises his inseparability from Paramdtman like the radiance of the sun (the prabhd of Bhdskara) and lives only in the love of God. He feels that Brahman is absolute bliss and renounces the pleasures of ai&varya or wealth . and the happiness of kaivalya and other egoistic satisfaction, and realises that he exists for the satis- faction of the s'esl. < Bhakti increases pari passu with the intensity of self-renouncement or vairdgya. As s'esa he recognises the supreme truth, namely, ' I am not He, but am eternally His ddsa,' not soham but ddsoham, and effaces himself in the service of the s'esi. Every karma by thought, word and deed is transfigured into kainkarya or worship of Bhagavdn, as He is Himself the ultimate doer and the deed. Service to the s'esi is entirely different from ddsya in the ordinary sense. To attribute it to the slave mentality of the creature awe-struck by the dictatorial fiat of the capricious Lord is the result of deep-rooted prejudice and misunderstanding of the function of the will. The will of Bhagavan as niyantd is
BHAKTI YOGA 375
the will to love and be ruled by love and the will of the s'esa consists in its response to the divine call and attunement with the redeeming purpose by developing the attitude of service to God as the only motive of conduct and as its sole end. The rewards and rebuffs of life arise from self-alienation from the s'esl, and the paramaikdntin or absolute and perfect devotee knows that the real evil is not suffering but the sin of self-estrangement from the s'anrin. Thus the philosophic knowledge of Brahman as ddhdra and thejlva as ddheya has its fruition in the religious relation of s'e?l and s'esa or svdmin and ddsa. Such ddsyatva or service is not a task implying a must or an ought but is a spiritual experience which is sui generis, and it connotes pdratantrya or dependence on the Lord and pdrdrthya or existence for the Lord. It is not even induced by the goodness of God but is the true relation of the self to God who is necessarily good, not gunairddsya but svarilpa ddsya. The self enters the service of the Lord not owing to the attraction of His qualities but owing to its own real nature. The bhakta recognises Bhagavdn as his only Lord and serves His will, as such service is the only goal of religious experience and constitutes the highest joy of life or rasa. It is the self that primarily experiences' dnand a or bliss, and not its body or s'arlra, and all the delights of life belong not to the jlva but to the jlva-srarlrin or the Supreme Self who lives within the self. While the mood of pdratantrya is aroused by our unworthiness, that of pdrdrthya is unconditioned self-surrender to the will of God, the only s'esi. The paramaikdntin thus lives and has his being in bhakti, and not only has ais'varya or kaivalya no charms for him, but even mukti has no value, if it were emptied of bhakti. Samsdra with uninterrupted bhakti has itself the value of apavarga or moksa and Vedanta Desnka's
376 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
preference of Varada-6Aa££i l here and now to the bliss of Vai- kuntha th0,t is beyond is a typical Vaisnavite experience, which has practically more value than jlvanmukti. Another feature of paramaikantya is the intense love of Bhagavan to the bhakta whom He regards as His prakarin or s'anrin? He is extolled as the mahatma who intuits Him everywhere as Vasudeva and is sustained by Him as his ddhara and s'esi. Bhakti as service to God is completed or consummated only in the ideal of service to godly persons and to all jJvas and is the supreme end of paramaikantya.
The jndni meditates on Brahman as his self and cultivates exclusive devotion to Him or ekabhakti and is the true bhakta, as his devotion is controlled by the single idea of attaining mukti. When Bhakti Yoga thus becomes a means to moksa, it is called parabhakti. This bhakti is awakened only by s'astraic knowledge purified by karma and sanctified by jnana, and when it develops into a thirst for the direct intuition of Bhagavan it is called parajnana. Then the view of God becomes a vision of God, but it is still not perfect ; love leads to a continuous and deep longing for God and unquenchable spiritual thirst ; "and then parabhakti becomes parama bhakti? The bhakta at this stage is not satisfied by mere visions, voices and auditions which are only intimations of immortality, but eagerly and restlessly seeks the stability of eternal bliss. The bhakta longs to see the beauteous form of Bhagavan with the eye of the soul and hear the music of love with the spiritual ear. While the philosopher in him cogitates on Brahman as
1 Vedanta Des'ika : Varadaraja Pancas'at, 49.
2 jSanavan mam prapadyate I
Vasudevas sarvamiti sa mahatma sudurlabhah II B. G., VII. 19, jffanttvatmaiva me matam I.— B, G., VII. 18 !
8 Vedanta Des'ika : Rahasyatraya Sara, Ch, IX.
BHAKTI YOGA 377
the ultimate unity of all existing things, the bhakta hungers for union and communion with the Self who has established His home in the interior of his heart. He does not desire the gifts of God like ais'varya and kaivalya, but seeks the Giver Himself. By renouncing his egoism, he seeks to attain Brah- man, who is all in all. When the bhakta seeks God, God also seeks him and the lover and the beloved are finally united in the realm of mukti.
In his well-known work, the " Paramapada Sopana," Vedanta Des'ika indicates the nine stages in the path to per- fection, of which the first five, viz., viveka, nirveda, virakti, bhitibhdva and updya, constitute the means. While ihejlva continuously suffers from the sorrows of samsdra arising from the cycle of karma, avidyd, vdsand, ruci and prakrti- sambandha and is bewildered by the confusion of ajnana or ignorance, sam&aya or doubt, and viparyaya or wrong notion, the Lord of Love, ever on the watch for an occa- sion to turn the jiva from his career of sin and redeem him from the error of his ways, finds a suitable opportunity and comes to him as the Brahma guru. The mumuksu is blessed with viveka and acquires a clear and distinct know- ledge of the difference between cit, acit and Is'vara in terms of vest and S'esa and of His attributes of jiidtrtva, kartrtva and bhoktrtva as depending on and derived from the Supreme Self as parama s'esi. Reflecting on the wickedness and vanity of earthly life, the mumuksu becomes sick-minded and is seized with remorse. Instead of serving the s'esi as Bhagavat kinkara he has become the slave of sensibility and sin as indriya kinkara, and this knowledge brings on the mood of repentance. Viveka and nirveda lead to virakti. The mumuksu realises his nature as an dtman different from the
378 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
deha and feels the hazards and hardships of samsara, to which he is exposed by his rdga and dvesa, and renounces the pleasures of sense and sensibility and even the happiness of Svarga. If papa is an iron chain of karma binding the jlva to samsdra, punya is but a golden chain leading to Svarga where thejiva serves the devas for a time like a beast of burden and is finally hurled again into the world of adventure. The mumuksu, there- fore, rejects and renounces the values of earthly and heavenly life, and discrimination is thus followed by remorse and dis- sociation from bodily feelings. In the fourth stage, the dread of the infinite chain of karma and of the sinfulness of ancient sin becomes a marked feature of the spiritual struggle. While viveka arrests dtmdpahdra or the stealing of the at man by the senses and the loss of the self, nirveda is the moral feeling that sin should be avoided owing to its fatal effect (nisiddha nivrtti) and virakti destroys sensuality. In the bhlti parva, the author traces the ultimate cause of ignorance and sin and their self-multiplying power which cannot be destroyed by expiation or retribution, and brings home to the mind of the mumuksu the hideousness and horrors of sin and the miseries of metempsychosis and samsara familiarly known as the tdpatraya or threefold torment. The classic portrayal by Tirumahgai Alvar of the tyranny of karma and the tragedy of human sorrows by the analogies of the storm-tossed ship, the dilemma of the ant caught between the two burning ends of *a faggot, the pack of animals on an island enveloped by rising floods and the man dwelling with cobras in the house is un- surpassed in religious literature. This mood of sick-minded- ness is only a spur to spiritual effort and therefore a passing phase in religious evolution, and the mumuksu not only seeks freedom from avidyd-karma, but, as a bhakta> seeks reunion with the Lord. The next stage of Bhakti
BHAKTA YOGA 379
Yoga explains the rationale of bhakti and defines it as the continuous and loving meditation on Bhagavdn with the vividness of a direct intuition. Bhakti is not merely the act of pleasing God by external worship but is also an inner spiritual attitude enriched by the eight virtues or atma gunas. They consist of s'auca or purity, ksanti or patience, anasuyd or absence of jealousy, anaydsa or absence of depression, asprhd or absence of covetousness, akdrpanya or strength of mind, mangala or good deeds, kind words and noble thoughts and sarva bhutesu dayd or love to all beings. When bhakti deepens into prema bhakti or ananya bhakti or absolute devotion, it ceases to be an injunction and becomes a deep yearning for God. God is also seized with soul-hunger and yearns for communion with ihejiva. When scriptural faith in God ceases to be of the bargaining type and is marked by fidelity and fervour, the soul-hunger for God becomes irrepressible and the two are united together for ever in love.
CHAPTER XVI PR AP ATT I
nr^HE building up of bhakti is an elaborate process of -*• synthesis, which unites the different mental elements of conation or karma, cognition or jndna, and feeling or bhoga and brings them into a higher synthesis of religious aspiration, bhaktirupdpanna jndna or the knowledge which has become bhakti. The devotional process pulsates with the triple rhythm of Karma Yoga, Jndna Yoga and Bhakti Yoga ; and the sym- metry of the triadic process set forth in Vis'istddvaita, by which the dtman ascends to the absolute, remains unsurpassed in the philosophy of religion. It portrays the return of thejlva to its home in Brahman, by which the sense of self-alienation is overcome. Karma Yoga presupposes the s'dstraic knowledge of the distinction between the dtman and Paramdtman, and it consists in the performance of duty as a divine command without caring for the fruits of karma and in acquiring moral autonomy. Jndna Yoga helps in the process of self-realisation or dtmdvalokana through self-renunciation. The dtman is ex- perienced as a spiritual entity different from the natural self arising from the mistaken identity of the jlva with the deha or body, and the true aham ' I ' lives by the death of the false ahankdra or egoism. The knowledge of the dtman leads to God-consciousness or bhakti. In Bhakti Yoga the theoretical
PRAPATTI 381
knowledge of Bhagavdn develops into upasana or meditation on the Lord including His svariipa, rtlpa and guna. Upasana is dhruvasmrti or steady thought of God, which gains in intensity by dvrtti or ceaseless practice till the end is attained. Smrti or thought thereby acquires the glow and vividness of dars'ana or vision. Then karma becomes kainkarya or service and worship of God. Jndna, which, in its early stages, is buddhi or viveka (discrimination), develops into dtmajndna or knowledge of the self and Brahmajndna or knowledge of God ; and bhakti ends in kainkarya ; intellectual love and remem- brance of God are changed into the realisation of God. When bhakti is no longer a prayer to, and praise of, Bhagavan for the gain of ai&varya or for the goal of kaivalya, but is love for love's sake, the bhakta becomes a paramaikdntin.
The love of God becomes, in course of time, a thirst for communion and parabhakti deepens into parafndna ; and parajndna results in paramabhakti or supreme devotion and becomes irresistible. The. progression in bhakti corresponds to the awakening of divine grace. Brahman as Is'vara becomes a redeemer and finally the Lord of Love. Bhakti has its con- summation in mukti and the attainment of the eternal bliss of Brahman. The philosophy of bhakti is thus a ladder of love from earth to heaven and the philosophy of divine grace, one from heaven to earth ; and the sublimity of the whole design is only matched by its symmetry. It is however too sublime for the ordinary man to follow. The four main requirements or ad,hikdra for Bhakti Yoga are a clear philosophic knowledge of the realms of karma, jndna and bhakti, the will rigorously to undergo the discipline in due order, the s'dstraic qualifica- tion of birth as an essential aid to bhakti and the sdtvic patience to endure the ills of prdrabdha karma till it is
382 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
exhausted or expiated. The whole design collapses even if a single condition in the long vista of its evolution is not fulfilled or a false step is taken. The path of bhakti finally leads to the world of Bhagavan, but is strewn with infinite pitfalls and setbacks. It is likened to a bridge of hair over a river of fire, and the jiva, with its load of avidya and proneness to evil, has, in this Kali age of confusion, very little chance of reach- ing the goal of liberation. But s'dstra, in its infinite tender- ness for erring and weak-kneed humanity, guarantees God to all jivas irrespective of their status and station in life. As demon- strated by Vedanta Des'ika, the chief apostle of Vis'istadvaita, after Ramanuja, it has provided for the weak and infirm an alternative path to mukti known as prapatti.
The misconception that Prapatti Yoga is an alien graft on Vedanta and not an inner growth is removed by an appeal to s'astra and s'astraic experience. The Upanisad prescribes for the mumuksu, prapatti and bhakti which lead to Brahma prasada or the grace of God, the pre-requisite for mukti. The Gita, as the essence of Upanisadic wisdom, sum- mons the whole world of jlvas that are heavily laden with sin to renounce their duties and take refuge at the feet of the universal saviour and offers mukti to all of them. In the systematic exposition of the Vidyas, the Vedanta Stitras, according to the S'rutaprakas'ika, the classic gloss on the S'ri Bhasya, insist on the unity of all Brahma Vidyas, and it is the intention of the Sutrakara to include the Nyasa Vidya or Prapatti Yoga among the important means to mdksa. The spiritual experience of the Tamil seers or Alvars is epitomised [Tiruvaimolij VI. x. 10] in the nyasa of Nammalvar who is extolled as the super-prapanna of S'n Vaisnavism. Bhakti Yoga is a steep path to mukti hedged in by the exacting
PRAPATTI 383
conditions of Karma Yoga and Jndna Yoga, and it includes the wearisome disciplines of astdnga yoga, and is a gradual progression in religious consciousness. Although bhakti is a desirable means to mukti, it is not easily practised in this Kali Yuga owing to its arduousness. But prapatti preserves the essentials of bhakti, dispenses with its predisposing causes or conditions, which are only contingent, and omits the non- essentials like the need for ceaseless practice. It is thus a direct and independent (advdraka) means to moksa. The only requisite for prapatti. is the change of heart or contrition on the part of the mumuksu and his absolute confidence in the saving grace of the raksaka. It is no«t the possession of merit that is the operative cause of grace or dayd, but the sense of one's unworthiness and the sinfulness of sin. The Lord is the only way and goal to the mumuksu and prapatti is the act of self- surrender to His grace. It is not a juristic conception of debit and credit account between thejiva as the doer of karma and Is'vara as the giver of boons, nor is it an undeserved favour of the Lord. It implies an intimate relation between the self-gift of the mumuksu and the flow of divine mercy or daya. Redemption is a justification by faith or mahavis'vasa and not by works, and it is not won by merit as the result of a continuous process. It is the essence of the religion of prapatti that the Lord of grace seeks the prapanna and draws him to Himself. The act has a summary effect, as it destroys even prdrabdha karma or karma that has begun to operate. The supreme merit of prapatti lies in the universality of its appeal to all castes and classes, the guarantee of salvation to all jivas who cannot follow the precipitous and arduous path of bhakti, its intrinsic and independent value as means or upaya and the naturalness and ease in securing immediate effect (sarvddhi- karatva, sukarafd, sakrtkartavyatd and avilamba phalatva).
384 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
The inner meaning and value of prapatti is revealed by Pillai Lokacarya and Vedanta Des'ika in their exposition of the three sacred truths or rahasya traya which contain the essentials of Vedanta in terms of tatva, hita, and purusartha. They are known as mflla mantra, dvaya and carama sloka ; the first states them in a nutshell, the second makes the meaning more explicit and the third elaborates it still further. The pranava in the mula mantra sums up wisdom in the sacred sound and is the supreme mantra of the Nydsa Vidyd.1 The letter 3T or akara connotes Paramdtman as the source of all things, ideas and words, the twenty-sixth tatva which is the truth of all things and al£o the alpha and omega of langu- age ; ukara or the letter 3" denotes S'rl in the dual sense of S'ri- yalipati ; makdra or the letter J^ refers to the jlva who is thus declared to be the ddheya or supported and the sesa or dependent of S'riyahpati. The Nydsa Vidyd condemns self- conceit and self-love and affirms the truth of pdratantryam or the soul's utter dependence on God, and it signifies the self-oblation of the jlva to Paramdtman who is its self. The mula mantra is an expansion of the pranava, and it makes the meaning more clear by equating Brahman with Narayana and explaining the means to moksa as dtmanivedana or self- gift to the s'esl. The term Narayana in the mantra is yoga- rudha, i.e., significant and singular. He is the one without a second, not in the mathematical but in the metaphysical sense. As akara and Narayana, Paramdtman is immanent in all beings as their life without losing His transcendental eminence and is the sarva raksaka that redeems all jivas from their evil career. He is the ground of all existence and the giver of all
1 prapavO dhanus'sarohyatma brahmatallaksyam ucyate I apramattena veddhavyam s'aravat tanmayO bhavet II. — Mund. Up. II. ii. 4. Om ityatmanam yuSjita \~-Taitt. Up., Narayan, 79.
PRAPATTI 385
good. Nara is the makdra of pranava and it refers to the universe of cit and acit of which Narayana is the pervading Self. Narayana is immanent in the nara and is also the goal or ayana of the nara. The middle word namah of the mantra prescribes the abandonment of all egoism (ahdnkara) or self- naughting and s'aranagati as the chief hita or upaya, and it also connotes the truth that God is the only goal of life. Thus the mula mantra as a whole and in each of its parts proclaims that Narayana alone is the source of all existence, the goal of all experience and the means lof realising that goal.1 He is the saviour of all jlvas and all actions should be dedicated to the &esl who is- the real Actor, and the highest offering is self-gift to the s'esi to whom the self belongs by divine right.
The mumuksu as a philosopher-devotee trains his intellect in all its eight aspects and offers the eight flowers of bhakti to Bhagavdn. Buddhi is disciplined in eight ways which are grahana or quick grasp of Vedantic truth, dhdrana or reten- tion in the mind, smarana or reproduction, pratipddana or lucid exposition to others, uha or inferring the unknown from the known, apdha or apperception and application in new contexts, vijndna or discrimination and tatvajndna or the knowledge of first principles. The eight flowers of devotion to be offered at the feet of the Lord are the avoidance of harm to others or ahimsa, sovereignty over the senses or indriya nigraha, benevolence to all beings or sarvabhuta dayd, for* giveness or ksama, knowledge or jndna, austerity or tapas, meditation or dhydna and truthfulness or satya?
1 svapraptes svayameva sadhanataya joghu^yamana^. — Vedanta Desfika, Rahasyatraya Sara, Ch. XXIII.
Vatsya VaradScarya's Prapanna Parijata, V. 28-29. 25
386 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
Dvaya has kingly pre-eminence over other mantras, as it brings out the full implications of the supreme tatva or truth, as S'riman Narayana or Narayana and S'ri. The first half initiates the seeker after God into the rahasya that Narayana is not only the source and centre of the universe (Jagatpati), but is also the Lord of Love or S'riyahpati and that S'n resides in the heart of Narayana to redeem the sinning sundered self from its sinfulness. The dual form of the Godhead typifies the Fatherhood and Motherhood of God designed to inspire the hope of universal salvation. Thejlva, realising his utter unworthiness, casts himself on the mercy of the Lord which is spontaneously showered on him. Prapatti as an act or attitude of self-surrender presupposes the shedding of egoism and the sense of responsibility and also implies responsiveness to the operation of grace. The second part deals with prdpti -and the prapanna realises that his self- feeling is swept away by the downpour of mercy and he leads a dedicated life, and eats, drinks and lives by religion. What is implicit in the Sveta- swatara Upanisad * and Katha S'ruti is elaborated in the Gadya of Ramanuja and the Rahasyatraya Sara of Vedanta Des'ika and is exemplified in ,the s'arandgati of Nammalvar,9 the super- prapanna of S'n Vatsnavism and of Yamunacarya 3. The Veddntic truth that Brahman exists to Brahmanise thejiva is illumined by the Pdncardtra idea of Vasudeva and Narayana as ruler and raksaka and is further confirmed by the assurance contained in the dvaya mantra and the Tamil Prabandha that •divine justice is not only tempered by day a or compassion but is dominated by it. The word S'n has six meanings in the
1 mumuk^ur vai s'arapam aham prapadye. — Sv. Up.t VI, 18.
2 Tiruvoimozhi, VI. x. 10.
* na dharma nisthOsmi na catmavedi na bbaktiman tvaccaraparavinde I akificanOnanyagati's' s'aranya tvatpadamulam s'arapam prapadye II Stdtraratnam , 21.
PRAPATTI 387
religion of redemption, of which the most relevant is the idea of her converting Is'vara as ruler into s'aranya or saviour by her timely intercession and mediation on behalf of the re- pentant sinner. In the epic conflict between the ideas of retribution and forgiveness, law rules over love in the moral realm, and the two are balanced in ethical religion ; but in the sphere of the religion of redemption, dayd or mercy dominates over dandadharatva or retributive justice and transforms the love of law into the law of love. S'ri is svdmini to the jlva and as purusakdra or mediator, she mediates on behalf of the sinner and is the eternal link of love between the Ruler and the transgressor, transforming the former into the Saviour and the latter into the penitent seeker after pardon. The words prapadye and namah in the dvaya mantra insist on the need for renouncing egoism (svarupa samarpana) and the sense of self-responsibility (bhara samarpana) on the ground that the Lord and S'ri are updya and upeya or the endeavour and the end and for performing kainkarya for the satisfaction of the s'esL The s'arandgati of Nammalvar in the Tiruvdimozhi (VI. x. 10) is the pattern of prapatti set by a super-^ra- panna, as it eminently satisfies the requirements of the Upanisad and the Gitd, It reveals the organic relation between the s'aranya or Saviour and the s'arandgata or soul that seeks refuge in Him in terms of s'arandgati. Laksmi resides for ever as and in the heart of Is'vara as anapdyinl or inseparably united and is indistinguish- able from Him like the fragrance from the flower. The two, Is'vara and S'n, are one ontologically, but different functionally owing to the redemptive needs of the jlva. In the interests of redemption, Laksmi becomes the Isrvari of Is'vara and changes His law of karma into the rule of krpa. Is'vara overpowered by dayd or compassion and vdtsalya or
388 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
affection renounces His paratva or supreme greatness and incarnates as S'rinivasa of unsurpassable beauty and love. He is the only sraranya or refuge and strength of the jlva ; Alvdr as s'arandgata seeks refuge at His feet with the inter- cession of Laksmi as purusakdra or mediator, and s'arandgati or prapatti is self-surrender at the feet of S'rinivasa with the conviction that He is the only updya and upeya.
The religion of s'arandgati is enshrined in the Carama S'loka or final teaching of the Lord in the Gltopanisad and the knowledge of this supreme secret or rahasyatama is intended to remove the sorrows of life and afford the stability of salvation. In the philosophy of religion, Brahman is the infinite beyond the world, the Holy that exacts reverence and the Immanent that brings out mystic intimacy. The concep- tion of the same Brahman as the Redeemer brings to light the qualities of saulabhya, vdtsalya and kdrunya which are indis- pensable in a redeemer. S'rl Krsna, the Lord of dayd, as the sdrathi or charioteer of Arjuna, the rathi, the typical son of man or Nara, with all the frailties of humanity, drives home the gospel of mukti as, a song of love to all who suffer from the burden of sin and are unable to overcome it by their own effort. " Renounce all dharmas and take refuge in me ; I shall release you from all sins. Grieve not." Every karma pre- supposes five factors of which the real operative cause is the redemptive will of God working through the freedom of the jiva. It is this truth that furnishes the motive and meaning to the imperative of niskdma karma : * Do your karma ' ; of upasana, ' Meditate on Brahman ' and of the Prapatti Ydga '* Renounce all dharmas and take refuge in me.' The moral law, the Upani$adic injunction and the command of the raksaka derive their authority from the supreme truth that the
PRAPATTI 389
kartd is an instrument of Is'vara. The divine imperative 4 Renounce dharma and take refuge in me ' (parityajya and vraja) implies the freedom of the jlva to follow it. The freedom of the self is Is'varddhma or dependent on l&vara and it is fulfilled only when it is attuned to the will of the raksaka. Even the will to serve the Lord by self-efface- ment is only the gift of His grace. Tydga or renuncia- tion connotes the abandonment not of karma and spiritual endeavour but only of the sense of egoism. Karma sannydsa as the literal giving up of all one's duties would destroy the moral foundations of service and updya nirds'd might result in moral and social irresponsibility. The essential condition of nydsa is not the abandonment of duty but the renunciation of the egoistic motive. The consummation of karma is kainkarya or service consecrated to the sraranya. The Lord is ultimately both the endeavour and the end, the prdpya and the prdpaka, the updya and the upeya. The sadhyopdya is the act of self- surrender (s'aranam vraja) to the will of the raksaka who is the inner ruler and the siddhopdya is the Lord Himself (mam ekam). Such s'ardnagati is the most efficacious means to moksa and the removal of suffering. The Lord reveals Himself to theprapanna, who seeks Him as his absolute refuge.
If the Mulamantra explains the theory of s'arandgati and the Dvayamantra elaborates it, and shows also how it is to be practised, the Carama S'loka explicitly prescribes sarandgati as the means to be adopted by the mumuksu incapable of Bhakti Yoga or as the response to divine grace and expressly promises him release from all the accumulated load of sins that prevent his enjoyment of the birthright of absolute service to the Lord in Paramapada. The first quarter refers to the mumuksu who is anxious to be released from the burden of samsdra but is
390 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
unable to undergo the arduous discipline of Bhakti Yoga and the second prescribes the taking of refuge in the Lord as the sole Saviour. The second half promises the fullest release from sin to those who practise self-surrender with supreme faith in the Saviour and bids them be of good cheer. It is the call of the Redeemer to the whole of humanity : " Come unto me, all ye who are heavily laden, abandoning your egoism, and I shall give you eternal life and myself." The sinner seeks God and is saved, and God seeks the sinner and is satisfied. The unique value of the Carama S'loka lies in its universal appeal to all sinners to seek refuge in Him and be saved.
The scheme of prapatti is elaborated in its six arigas or parts known as dnukulya sarikalpa, prdtikulya varjana, mahdvis'vdsa, karpanya, goptrtvavarana and atma niksepa.1 The first furnishes the satvic motive to follow the will of the vest. When the human will is emptied of egoism or ahatikdra, it is divinely enriched and attuned to the re- demptive purpose of the raksaka. It also connotes the will of the mumuksu to serve all jivas (sarvabhiit dnukulya} . Prdti- kulya varjana is thQ negative way of stating the same truth, and consists in the renunciation of what is repugnant to the Lord. Mahdvis'vdsa is absolute and firm faith in the saving grace of God as the universal raksaka. It is un- shakable confidence in prapatti as guaranteeing God. The fourth anga known as kdrpanya expresses the feeling of in- capacity to follow the prescribed path of katma, jnftna and bhakti. The sense of utter unworthiness and helplessness creates this feeling of humility. The fifth is gdptrtvavarana and is the act of seeking the dayd of the Lord as the only
1 Ahirbudhnya Samhita, XXXVII. ii. 27 and 28 as quoted in Vedanta Des'ika's Rahastraya Sara, Chap. XI. The last, atma niksepa, is sometimes called the ahgin of which the other five are angas or parts.
PRAPATTI 391
hope for moksa. The last factor is dtma niksepa which consists in self-oblation to the s'esl with the conviction that such self-donation is itself a gift of God's grace. The prapanna is tormented by the thought that the transgres- sion of the divine commands entails the wrath of the moral ruler and that the wages of sin is moral and spiritual death. The sinfulness of sin is too deep for expiation or recompense. But the religion of s'arandgati dispels the scepticism of the moral consciousness and the fears of spirit- ual fall are dispelled by the assurance that krpa reigns in the realm of religion and ousts the evils of avidyd-karma and that no sin is so sinful as to exhaust the redemptive grace of God* Mahavi&vasa is the absolutely clear and distinct knowledge of the omnipotence of daya and is therefore the central and ruling motive of Prapatti Yoga. The other conditions follow from this spiritual conviction and exalt the levels of conation, feeling and cognition. While Bhakti Yoga is the arduous building up of devotion from below a posteriori, prapatti is the a priori way of divine daya and is the descent of krpa into the realm of karma ; but whether it is from earth to heaven or from heaven to earth, the essentials of bhakti and prapatti are the same, namely, the illumined faith in the saving grace of God as both the updya and the upeya. The motive also determines the nature of the end ; and he who seeks kaivalya or ais'varya attains it, and he who seeks Bhagavdn attains Bhagavdn. On realising other ends, Bhagavdn may or may not be attained but, by realising God, all other ends are also realised. " Whom He chooses, unto him He reveals Himself." 1 The jnani seeks God as his vanrin and offers himself to Him. God in turn seeks the jnani as His s'aririn and guarantees mukti to him.
1 Kajh. Up., I. ii. 22.
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Prapatti as the religion of dtmaniksepa is also con- sidered under the three aspects of phala samarpana, bhara samarpana and svanlpa samarpana or the renounce- ment of the hedonistic, the moralistic and the egoistic views of life. Of these, phala samarpana or phalatydga is the abandonment of the hedonistic motive that self-satisfaction or happiness is the supreme end of prapatti. While the seekers after aisrvarya and kaivalya pursue the happiness of Svarga and the inner joy of atmavalokana, the true follower of prapatti knows that as an ananydrha s'esa or absolute depen- dent he subsists in the s'esi and exists for His satisfaction and so gives up every form of egoistic or selfish satisfaction. True s'esatva is realised when the s'esa knows that he is nothing, has nothing and does nothing and thus renounces the selfish feelings of ' I,' * my ' and * mine ' or kartrtva, mamatd and svartha. The verbs ' to be ' and ' to have ' agree with the subject ahankdra and have thus no place in the grammar of prapatti. Even the consciousness of religious individualism that arises from the joy of freedom or atmaraksd savours of selfism and has therefore to be abandoned and overcome. Secondly, bharasamarpana is the renunciation of the sense of responsibility involved in the saving act. Re- demption or atmaraksd comes from the raksaka who is1 Himself the sddhya and the sddhana or the end and the means and not from the will of the prapanna, owing to his impotence to follow the ordained path. Prapatti removes the heaviness of heart due to the sense of duty and effort and to the burden of sin. While Bhakti Yoga demands ceaseless moral effort and spiritual arduousness and vigil, prapatti is not such a toilsome task and requires only a change of heart and a living faith in the saving power of day a. By casting oneself on dayd, the weight of world-weariness
PRAPATTI 393
is lifted off and the prapanna becomes fearless (nirbhaya). Thirdly, svarupatyaga is not only the elimination of ahan- kdra but is also the gift of the self or atman to God who is its real owner or Self. T\\e jlva lives but is not thejlva as such but the s'arlrin or s'esl that lives in it. The term * aham * is the self that has its being and worth only in the s'arlrin and therefore svarupatyaga consists in giving back the self to its Owner. All these forms of sdtvika sacrifice or service are deduced from the first principles of religious experience consisting in the life of God in the love of man ; it marks a radical or revolutionary change from the ego- centric view or svasvdmitva to the theocentric or Krsna- centric view of pdratantrya which is summed up in the truth " sarvam Krsndrpanamastu" Everything belongs to Krsna and is offered to Krsna. The Vis'istddvaitic meaning of prapatti is summarised in a kdrika of Vedanta Desika ' as follows :
Svdmin svas'esam svavas'am svabharatvena nirbharam I svadatta svadhiyd svdrtham svasmin nyasyasi mam svayam II
The word svdrtha denotes phalasamarpana signifying that the sfesa exists for the satisfaction of the s'esi and that the only end of dtma samarpana is the realisation of His will as the only will. The words svabharatvena nirbharam signify bhara samarpana or the idea that dtmaraksd is the con- cern of the s'aranya and not of the s'arandgata. The word svas'esa connotes the fact of self-oblation as the main motive for prapatti. The couplet thus expounds the Vis'istddvaitic idea that the dtman has jndtrtva or self- consciousness, kartrtva or freedom and bhoktrtva or feeling tone but the jlva as the s'arira of Paramdtman has its triple
1 Vedanta Des'ika's Nyasa Da&aka, verse 2.
394 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
function of knowing, willing and feeling fulfilled organically in the life of the s'anrin. Prapatti is the religious conclusion of the philosophy of the varira-variri relation and it affirms that the sraririn is Himself the upaya and the upeya. The terms svartha, svadatta and svayam nyasyasi proclaim the truth that atmasamarpana is self-donation to the para vest who is the giver and the gift, the end and the endeavour. The theory of vyaja or justification by faith as developed by Vedanta Des'ika further illuminates the meaning of Prapatti Yoga and its ultimate relation to the saving grace of the s'aranya. The seeker after prapatti has spiritual freedom to serve the Lord and become an instrument in the divine scheme. His will is divinely determined (paradhina) and not self-determined (svadhina). Prapatti Yoga is a free act of absolute self-sur- render to the raksaka without any hedonistic or utilitarian con- siderations. It is not a way of recompense or a legalistic view of karma resting on antecedent merit but is justification by faith. Merit has ethical meaning, but daya is a divine quality and is therefore amoral. Forgiveness transcends the moralistic view of karma ; but if it is free without even the desire to deserve it, the doctrine might encourage favouritism, laxity and license. Daya as the amoral is the fulfilment of the moral, and is not hostile to it. The self seeks God's grace and strives to deserve it and the grace of God lifts him up.
The Sutrakara affirms the truth that if krpa or grace is not considered to be rooted in righteousness, arbitrariness and cruelty would have to be attributed to the divine nature.1 The forgiveness of the raksaka presupposes the quality of forgive- ableness in the jwa and a change of heart. The gift of daya 1 na vai?amya nairghpaye sapek^atvat, V. S., II. i. 34.
PRAPATTI 395-
may be unreserved, but should not be undeserved. The theory of vydja reconciles the claims of human endeavour and divine daya on the principle that a trivial cause may occasion a mighty effect, e.g., the turning of a switch may result in the illumination of a whole city. Similarly, a spark, nay, even a show, of contrition may result in a conflagration and consume the effect of age-long karma. A little leaven of sincerity may leaven the whole life of the jlva. An infinitesimal effort may lead to infinite mercy. Vydja results from the feeling of dkincanya or one's moral and spiritual littleness. This, however, should be genuine and not a mere show of penitence to serve as an excuse for divine intervention. The act of forgiveness presupposes a change of heart and this is a qualitative and not a quantitative change ; contrition alone opens the flood gates of krpa and it is more in the spirit than in the letter. The words s'aranam vraja in the Carama S'loka of the Glta, though they presuppose and posit the fact of redemption as the expression of causeless grace (nirhetuka krpa), at the same time emphasise the fact that grace needs a vydja or occasion to reveal itself. The seed can sprout only in a suitable soil, and krpd can never take root in the soil of hard-heartedness. dissimulation, hostility or atheistic scepticism.
S'rl Vaisnavism extols the Rdmdyana as a text-book of practical religion par excellence and regards it as a s'aranagati veda, of which the topic known as abhaya praddna relating to the acceptance by Rama of Vibhlsana's surrender to Him is the Upanisad. By the application of the six Mimdmsa rules of interpretation known as upakrama, upasamhdra, abhyasa, apurvatva, arthavdda and upapatti, it is proved that the epic as a unity with continuity of
396 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
meaning and value has as its central theme the redemption of the jivas by self-surrender to the Lord. It is the epic exposi- tion of the metaphysical, moral and religious aspects of Vedanta, i.e., tatva, hita and puntsartha in the light of the s'aranagati s'astra. Paratatva or the supreme truth is the tran- scendental Brahman of the Upanisads, that incarnated into humanity as the sarva s'aranya or saviour of all beings ; sfaranagati is the universal means of salvation and is therefore the parama hita or greatest good. The supreme end or puru- sartha is kainkarya or service to Him and to all jivas. The main theme of all the six Kandas is the divine assurance of forgiveness to all that seek refuge at the feet of God whether they are human, sub-human, or celestial jivas, including even Raksasas who are ever hostile to the cosmic redemptive pur- pose of Is'vara. The Hindu view of animal and other sub- human species seeking the raksaka has got a spiritual as opposed to the naturalistic foundation, owing to the kinship of all jivas and their common divine heritage. It is based on the idea of karma and rebirth and the spiritual development of the jiva, which, though eternal, self-conscious and free by nature, falls from its high state and enters into various bodies owing to its karma. The highly evolved, who abuse their freedom, lapse into vice and are born as birds and other animals, may get glimpses of their divine origin and seek pardon through penitence. The classic examples of the materialised Ahalya touched by the lotus feet of the Lord leaping into life once again, the afflicted Kakasura flying to the Lord for mercy after his vain and weary flight through all the worlds in fear of life, Gajendra, crying out to the creator for protection in its distress and Sugriva, seeking refuge at the feet of Rama, are freely quoted by the devout Hindu, as inspiring types of the redemptive acts of the raksaka.
PKAPATTI 397
The fullest exposition of the divine assurance of sal- vation or abhaya praddna is given in the section dealing with Vibhisana s'arandgati. Vibhisana, the virtuous, denounces Havana's wickedness, renounces all his relations and posses- sions and flies from Lanka and falls at the feet of Rama invoking his mercy. He typifies the jlva that dreads the follies and allurements of the sensuous life surrounding it owing to its isolation from the Lord and insular life and, equipped with the five arigas of prapatti, soars homeward and Godward and yearns for the security and stability of abhaya praddna or God's assurance of salvation. The Lord is sarvaloka saranya, the saviour and refuge of the whole universe ; Vibhisana, though a Raksasa by birth, seeks refuge at the feet of the s'dranya as the only hope of life, and the Lord accepts him by proclaiming His redemptive purpose to all the three worlds and summoning them to share His divine love. " Come unto me, all ye who are heavily laden, saints and sinners, devas and Raksasas, all the jlvas of the world ; even a show of friendship melts me and moves me to give you succour and safety. Even the dove in the tree gave up its life to serve as food to the hungry hunter that sought its shade. None that seeks me as Saviour will ever be given up by me. Him shall I succour and save from all his enemies. I can never give up such a person. No one who seeks protection shall ever be forsaken. This is the law of love approved of by all good men."1 The universal Saviour or sarvaloka&aranya -that is the inner self of all jlvas frees the jlva from the fears of samsdra and gives him eternal life and joy. The Edmdyana is therefore extolled as the shrine of s'arandgati or the scripture of self-surrender and it inspires every one with the hope of everlasting life and joy.
1 Ramayana, ' Yuddhaka^da, ' XVIII, 3 and 33.
398 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
The theory of Bhakti Yoga and Prapatti Yoga as sadhyo- payas is not accepted by the school founded by Filial Loka- carya (known as the Tenkalai school). According to it, Bhakti Yoga as a building up of devotion is, like Jacob's ladder, a vain and futile attempt besides being arduous and artificial, while Prapatti Ycga the alternative method, founded on the feeling of akincanya, or the sense of unworthiness, is a confession of impotence. The Tenkalai school therefore interprets pra- patti not as a yoga or human endeavour, but a mere faith in the grace of God or nirhetuka kataksa. The paradox of prapatti s'dstra arises from the Vis'istadvditic truth that the sarva s'esi is both the upaya and the prapya, the means as well as the end of Vedantic life, and it leads to the dualism between the spirit- ual effort of the jlva and the spontaneity of divine grace. The Tenkalai denial of human initiative as a requisite condition of redemption leads to the predication of arbitrariness and favouritism in the divine will. The denial by the other school of Vaisnavism, the Vadakalai school, of the absoluteness of divine grace, or the free flow of divine daya, without even a vyaja, affirms the primacy and priority of human freedom. This school upholds the upaya theory as the true position as it has s'astraic support, and employs the analogy of the young monkey clinging to the mother for protection to illustrate the mumuksu seeking refuge at the feet of the s'aranya or saviour. The Tenkalai school maintains the opposite view, as it coheres with mystic experience and illustrates it by the analogy of the cat carrying the kitten in its mouth or the marjaranyaya, as contrasted with the markata nyaya of the Vadakalais. The Vadakalai and Ten- kalai views are sometimes compared to the volitional type and the self-surrender type mentioned by William James in his Varieties of Religious Experience, and the Christian
PRAPATTI 399
distinction between justification by works and justification by faith. But the comparison is superficial as the dis- tinction between volition and self-surrender or that between works and faith is entirely different from the S'rl Vaisnava views of sahetuka kataksa or grace arising from a cause and nirhetuka kataksa or grace not arising from any cause. Before examining these theories comparatively, it is essential to define the meaning of nirhetuka kataksa as explained by the Ten- kalai school.
The Tenkalais insist on the operation of grace as un- conditioned by human endeavour and as absolute, and they support this conclusion by appeal to revelation, reasoning and sense-perception. The well-known text, " Whom the Self chooses, by him is He attained " l is confirmed by the Carama S'loka of the Git a and the mystic experience of Nammalvar. The Gltd guarantees God to man and it is in the light of this operative daya afforded by the Carama S'loka that all the chapters should be read. Moksa is not a goal to be won by yogic discipline but is a gift of God to be received with gladness. If the Saviour is both the upaya and the upeya, the theory of seeking grace is self-contradictory. Forgiveness is justification by love and not by antecedent merit. Krpa is divinely bestowed and not won by moral effort. The moralistic view insists on a life of righteousness and piety and conformity to law, but such self-culture breeds a mood of self-righteousness and often sinks into the conceit of pietism. Forgiveness is a gift of the forgiver, and is spontaneous and free, and therefore is its own value. God- liness alone makes for goodness and not vice versa, as goodness cannot lead to godliness. Redemption justifies itself and is
1 yamevai§a v^ute tena labhyah — Kath. Up., I. ii. 22.
400 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
not causally determined. It is not virtue that calls out dayd, though daya may call out virtue. Dayd comes as the leaves come to a tree. The pardoning Lord is the god of the sinner and He seeks the evil-doer more than He does the satvika. He even relishes the physical evil or dosa in the prapanna like the mother who embraces with pleasure her dirt-stained child re- turning from play. The religion of nirhetuka-dayd should not be corrupted by economic and hedonistic considerations, as the calculating nature is fatal to its free flow. The difference between mulaippdl or mother's milk freely secreted for the baby and vilaippdl or milk sold in the market for money is the difference between the operative grace of the Lord or nirhetuka katdksa and His consequent grace or sahetuka katdksa. The reign of daya is absolute and dominates the ideas of moral and spiritual endeavour and ousts them from the realm of s'arandgati.
The Gitd is the unique expression of the gospel of nirhetuka katdksa in which the Lord is at once the teacher, mediator and saviour. The rahasyas or secret doctrines of the Mulamantra, the Dvaya and the Carama Sloka contain the quintessence of prapatti sfdstra and drive home the truth that the raksaka is Himself the updya and theprdpya and that His daya is not conditioned by the causal law of karma or the moral needs of retribution. The raksaka is Himself the saviour as well as the salvation, the way as well as the goal, of the religious consciousness. The religion of nirhetuka katdksa is summaris- ed in the Sutra style in Tamil by Pillai Lokacarya in his work, " S'rl Vacana Bhusana," which expounds the nature of purusakdra and prapatti. It denies the value of Bhakti Ydga disciplined by karma and jndna, as the effort involved in the process is not commensurate with the spiritual
PRAPATTI 401
gain and even prapatti has no value if it is practised as a means to mukti. Bhakti and prapatti follow neces- sarily from the grace of the raksaka and are not essential antecedents of such grace. The endeavour of the jlva to attain the Lord is svagata svlkara (or acceptance resulting from one's endeavour) and is utterly futile, but the idea of the raksaka seeking the jlva is paragata svlkara or acceptance arising from the Lord's will and is natural and efficacious. The working of the redemptive will of the Lord is inconceivable in terms of the causal category as the law of daya knows no higher law and is self-explanatory ; grace ceases to be grace, if it is elec- tion by works. The only upaya to be followed by the mumtiksu is to renounce the tipaya mentality, receive the grace of God in a passive way and respond to the divine call of krpa when it comes. The jlva, as a self-conscious and self- active entity, should give up its ahankara and become a thinking thing so that it may be the receptacle of krpa. But the atman in such an inert state is still the atman and is incapable of the inert existence of matter ; its spiritua- lity is then consummated in service, atma ddsya or kain- karya. Work is worship of God followed by service to all jlvas. The prapanna is a bhagavata and his spiritual worth is not in any way influenced by his birth and social status. The idea of service extends to all castes and outcasts irrespective of the social distinction determined by the varna- s'rama ideal. Service to the acarya is more important than service to the Lord as the acarya is essentially interested in saving the disciple, whereas the Lord is both a severe Judge and a Saviour.
The difference between this school and the Vadakalai school is not about the exact relation between karma and
26
402 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
krpa, as both schools agree in the definition of mukti as the conquest of karma by krpa and its final cancellation. The main problem is the dualism between sahetuka kataksa and nirhetuka kataksa, and is more religious than ethical, Vedanta Des'ika's theory of vyaja is a reconciliation of the extremes, as it insists only on a gesture and change of heart on the part of the sinner and the difference between contrition and responsiveness to daya is not radical. A spark of repen- tance destroys the whole load of avidya-karma and thus the infinite series is annihilated by infinitesimal effort. The distinction that Des'ika draws between the two standpoints of the sadhyopaya and the siddlwpaya is intended to further narrow down the issue and bridge the gulf. Brahman is eternally self-realised and free and is the siddlwpdya ; but the mumuksu seeks the grace of God by bhakti and prapatti, as ' our will is somehow ours, only to make it His.' This distinction may be explained in terms of the noumenal aspect of grace which is free, and the phenomenal aspect where it is conditioned by effort. The siddhdpaya is the transcendental standpoint of daya as the free cause which is self-conditioned and spontaneous. The sadhyopaya is the phenomenal or human aspect in which tlie self is relatively free and derives such freedom from the noumenal source. The phenomenal is rooted in the noumenal and the opposition between the two is apparent and not real. Human freedom is a problem from the phenomenal point of view and a possession from the noumenal. What is known as the free causality of daya noumenally is known as yoga from the phenomenal standpoint. When the prapatti -seeker becomes a prapanna, the problem is not only solved but dissolved. The Tenkalai school refuses to accept such distinctions and standpoints, as it stakes its faith in the absoluteness of daya in which there is an identity of content
PRAPATTI 403
between the updya and the upeya. The Vadakalais point to the moral and social dangers that might follow from the idea of absoluteness lapsing into the arbitrariness of election. If daya is free and unconditioned, vaisamya or arbitrariness and nairghrnya or cruelty would be attributable to the divine nature. If the human will is in any way free, it conflicts with divine determinism. It is difficult to take the dilemma by the horns or escape between them or rebut it. Daya is neither won by effort nor forced on the jlva. If the problem is restated in terms of the S'ariraka S'dstra and not of the Hetu S'dstra or logic, the distinction becomes philosophically negligible. Katdksa or grace is neither sahetuka nor nirhetuka. It is based not on the logical view of causality but on organic union. Mystic experience is alogical and amoral in the sense that it is more and not less than the logical and the moral, and it is illegitimate to apply logical and ethical terms to what is tran- scendent. The gift of grace and self-gift are vitally related like the systole and the diastole and are not causally connected and their relation involves reciprocity and responsiveness. The sucking of the mother's milk by the child is instincively related to the spontaneous secretion of milk and the two form an organic process in the maintenance of life. It is impossible to divide the unitive process and decide how much comes from the s'esa and how much, from the sre&i. " You have got to deepen yourself in it or let it deepen itself in you, whatever phrase best expresses the fact to your mind."1 Thejndni is dearest to God, ihe&aririn, and God is dearest to thejndnl the s'anra, and this organic relation defies logical analysis. Daya pours itself fully into the self and the self flows irresistibly into daya and it is undesirable to dissect this living flow into the logical categories of cause and effect.
1 Bosanquet, What Religion Is, p. 21.
404 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
A comparison of the theories of redemption, Vaisnavite and Christian, reveals points of striking similarity as well as difference between the two and enables us to estimate their relative values for the religious consciousness. Redemption is deliverance from sin or papa and the attainment of God or Brahman ; and so the meaning of sin or papa has to be ascertained before the definition of deliverance or moksa is attempted. Sin is not physical evil or suffering, though suffering may result from it as a penalty. Moral evil is the violation of the moral law of autonomy and it is a reproach to the self. The law is self-legislative, having its own dignity. Statutory religion appeals to the miraculous and the mysterious. It ministers to fear and superstition and substitutes magic for morality and affects the inner worth of life. To please God or the gods and win their favour by extra-moral methods is, however, alien to the spirit of true religion. Supernaturalism, with its anthropomorphic tendency, creates a magnified poten- tate or despot and thrives in an atmosphere of fear and credu- lousness and has often its nemesis in scepticism and irreligion. Morality, however, carries us into the very heart of reality when it seeks a sanction for its law of righteousness and accepts the faith in a moral ruler or niyanta who works in the hearts of all through goodness. The moral law on the religious level is known as dharma or duty, a divine command, and the violation of the command is called sin or papa. A good deed is better than a good intention ; but an evil thought is worse than an act of wickedness, as it is an ancient inner perversity, which soils the soul itself and is a revolt against law. " We practise the evil which we would not and do not the good which we would, owing to the sin dwelling in us." The prone- ness to sin is regarded by Christianity as an inherent depravity or original sin which is inherited by us from the first man.
PRAPATTI 405
Christianity holds that sin is radical and natural, that man is an eternal sinner and that his first disobedience has multiplied itself and tainted humanity. S'n Vaisnavism traces papa to human accountability and avidyd-karma which is anadi or causally inexplicable. The propensity to papa or sin is some- how there, but it is not original sin, as the dtman has the freedom to fall into sin or grow into godliness. The self is essentially pure and sin is only an accident. Sin is begin- ningless but has an end. Though as a moral fact sin is, in the religious realm it ought not to be. Every jwa is ultimately salvable and can attain mdksa. If the Lord cannot prevent evil and sin, He is not Almighty ; if He can prevent it but will not, He is cruel. But it is the basic faith of redemptive religfon that He can and will prevent evil and sin.
Deliverance from sin is the fundamental aim of religion and the hope of deliverance lies in the saving grace of the Redeemer and casting oneself on His mercy. If God is the cause of sin, deliverance from it would mean turning away from Him and not turning to Him as the Saviour. God is holy and amala or spotless and the sinfulness of sin is a measure of the holiness of the Holy. Legalistic religion thus exalts God by increasing the distance between the Holy and the sinner. But it depresses man and makes him conclude that redemption can never be secured by expiation. True religion is not juristic and its definition of God as the Saviour inspires the sinner with the assurance of deliverance. The belief in original sin or nitya-samsaratva and in predestination results in the redemptive faith in grace as a gratuitous gift of God. According to Augustine, grace works pre-veniently and lifts man out of sin, works co-operantly and makes him righteous and works irresistibly owing to the omnipotence of the divine
406 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
will. Gratia operans comes from God. Gratia co-oferans is based on human will. But grace is not a supernatural force or energy emitted by the Lord and infused into the soul from without. Grace is not the infusion of the physical force that acts on the soul externally and effects a regeneration. Theologians of a different school therefore protest against the theory of supernatural force and insist on inner sanctifi- cation and justification by faith, as contrasted with justification by works and the remission of sin by confession. The two types of thought are represented in a different way by the doctrines of Thomism and Molinism. Thomism holds that the human will is predestined by God and consents to the divine influx. But Molinism is opposed to the view of predesti- nation as it holds that the divine will is alongside ot the human will and that grace has good use. The same contrast is stressed by the doctrines of pietism and mysticism. The former insists on the need for inner purification and, as a religion of the heart, it is opposed to ceremonialism and justification by faith. But it over-emphasises the subjective value of redemption and is individualistic in tone and temper. Mysticism has a leaning towards the idea of absolute grace and the downpour of divine love into the human heart. The Christian theory of the single birth of the self does not explain the moral injustices accruing in cases of unmerited suffering, and the idea of substitutionary or vicarious sacrifice and atonement does no justice to the law of retribution. The doctrine of the " One begotten Son " and the " Chosen people " is dogmatic and coercive and it does violence to the history of universal re- demption and the working of divine mercy through different channels. Incarnation is the invasion into humanity of divine mercy in times of moral crisis and it is not just and adequate to explain redemption as the regenerative act of the only
PRAPATTI 407
begotten Son of God suffering vicariously for the sins or the karma of humanity. Every jiva is a son of man who bears the cross of his karma and, as the Son of God, has his sin destroyed by His day a. Atonement for sin is really attained by the at-one-ment of bhaktL Sin is ultimately self-alienation from God and it stultifies itself by contact with krpa or grace ; it is then destroyed and the sinner is transformed and re- conciled to God. The historical sense is changed into the consciousness of eternal life. The Christian theory of wheat and chaff or election and eternal damnation conflicts with the doctrine of the universal Saviour. The Vaimamte view of sarvafoka s'aranya and the omnipotence of His daya, whether absolute or self-limited by the jlva's karma, guarantees even- tual salvation to all jlvas irrespective of their social, religious and other differences.
The lives and teachings of the founders of Christianity and of S'n Vaisnavism also bring out the points of resem- blance and difference between the two religions, and emphasise the spiritual hospitality of the latter. They ca£Lbe studied from three standpoints, viz., the supernatural, the historical and institutional, and the mystic. The supernatural Christ is the only begotten Son of God who worked many miracles as a Messiah to testify to the imminent advent of the Kingdom of God. The doctrines of the Immaculate Conception, the Resurrection, the miracles performed during the ministrations and the apocalyptic faith are beliefs or overbeliefs which cannot be tested by reasoning. The birth of Nammalvar at Tirunagari in the Tinnevelly District was also a divine occur- rence and it was foretold by earlier prophets. His enlightenment under the tamarind tree (an avatar of Adi S'esa), the mystery of Madhurakavi Alvar, a wise seer, who was drawn to him from
408 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
the distant north by a strange celestial light and who became his disciple ; the prophetic vision of the succeeding dcaryas who formed the apostolic succession and the Vaisna- vites of the white island ' S'veta Dvlpa ' who heralded the destruction of Kali, are miraculous occurrences which bore testimony to the strange workings of God and His inter- vention with the natural order. But historic criticism distrusts such supernatural occurrences which are a breach of the uniformity of nature. The dogmatic faith that esse is credi and that miracles are designed to destroy atheism runs counter to the moral argument. Historic religion there- fore dwells mainly on the narration of spiritual occurrences and the interpretation of their inner purpose. Jesus, from this standpoint, was only a historic person who was the descendant of David and Abraham, was baptised by John the Baptist and then went to the wilderness where he withstood the temptations of the devil and underwent a spiritual course. He then went from place to place preaching the advent of the Kingdom of God, gathered his twelve disciples to continue the ministration and was crucified on the cross after establishing the reign of love. The acts of the Apostles and the history of the church reveal their purpose of evangelisation and con- quest of the world for Christ. The life of Nammalvar is a chronicle of his yogic experience under the tamarind tree for sixteen years, of his initiation into bhakti by his teacher, and of the remaining twenty years of his spiritual life spent in devotional experience. The outpourings of his bhakti in the form of Tamil songs are now regarded as Upanisad. This Upanisad, Drdvida Upanisad as it is called, was lost for a while and was recovered by the great yogin Nathamuni, who established the Vaisnavite tradition and started spreading the gospel of universal dayd among all persons. It was
PRAPATTI 409
continued by his apostolic successors such as Alavandar, Rama- nuja, Pillai Lokacarya and Vedanta Des'ika. This Vaisna- vite tradition is now growing into popularity throughout the country and outside it, in suitable forms, as the religion of redemption.
Historic and institutional religion has a tendency to uni- formity and standardisation, and the form often kills the spirit. The mystic, who has faith in tlie personal experience of God, therefore, thinks of Christs and Nammalvars as spe- cialists in spirituality and patterns of godliness. The real miracle is the moulding of the soul and the realisation of the Kingdom of God in the inner sanctuary of the atman. Life, light and love are the real trinity, and self-gift to God and sharing the experience with others are the real vocation of the mystic, who intuits the truth " I live, yet not I but God in me". Nammalvar was a born mystic sustained by the love of God and, as a super -prapanna, he extended the hospitality of his divine experience to the whole world of jivas, with a view to establishing a spiritual community of bhaktas or mystics. Vaisnavism does not favour the monopolist mentality exhibited in the doctrine of " the chosen people of the God of Israel " and the " Judgment Day/' From all the three standpoints S'ri Krsna's teachings as contained in the Song on the chariot, (the Bhagavad Glta) are more comprehensive and catholic than those of Christianity expressed in the Sermon on the Mount. Prapatti S'astra, as the gospel of salvation, is designed by the Saviour to draw erring humanity to Himself, and wean them from their career of sin and sorrow. It is only this religion of daya that is the solace of life and the solace of death, and has the highest claim to universality. Its definition of the absolute, while it includes the Upanisadic idea of Brahman and I&vara
410 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
and the Pdncardtra idea of Bhagavdn, exceeds them by its con- cept of daydnidhi. The Lord is rich in mercy and has not day a as His differentia but is day a itself and is there- fore impersonal. Dayd is for daycCs sake, and is not the fruit of righteousness, and is therefore not juristic or moral- istic. Dayd is not a process of placating the holy wrath of God, and is not vindictive and retributive. It does not brook bartering at all by the arithmetical calculations of punya-pdpa and schemes of rewards and penalties. It does not connote forgiveness by instalments, as it is spontane- ous in nature and instantaneous in effect. While philo- sophy expounds the nature of Bhagavdn as the s'aririn of the jlva, Prapatti S'dstra defines dayd as the soul of Bhagavdn Himself, as it is the source, sustenance and satisfac- tion of the divine nature. Dayd dominates the creative urge of I&vara and is the underlying motive even in destruction.1 Creation therefore does not really groan and travail in pain, but is conceived in love. Forgiveness implies the forgetfulness of sin, and dayd therefore limits, so to say, the omniscience and foreknowledge of Is'vara and changes the sarvajna (All- Kriower) into avijndtd. Dayd dwells for ever as the inner ruler of the Self and enters into the heart of incarnation. It forces the cosmic ruler or Narayana to drive nara's chariot and from the chariot-seat to give utterance to the gospel of redemption. Redemption is not restricted by the distinctions of birth and status, and, in its universality of appeal, it extends to the j was even in sub-human bodies. The asura, that is steeped in cruelty and motiveless malignity, has as much chance of regenera- tion as the saint that follows the way of righteousness, if only there be a change of heart. Dayd is unaware of distinction, election and elimination, and runs counter to the doctrine of
1 Vedanta Des'ika's Daya Sataka, 16 and 17.
PRAPATTI 411
the Judgment Day when the good are saved and the wicked are smitten and sent to hell. While in Christianity judgment follows redemption, in S'n Vaisnavism justice is overpowered by redemptive love. Even in our human relations, we are commanded to render to no man evil for evil, but to bless them that persecute us ; for evil is overcome not by evil but by good. " Love works no ill to anyone. Love is kind and never fails. It bears all things and believes all things. It is never provoked and takes no account of evil." Human love is but an infinitesimal expression of the tenderness and mercy of the Lord ; and the religion of prapatti is the gospel of universal forgiveness. Kali is the age of confusion and carnal-minded- ness, and the only way of salvation lies in the discerning faith in the saving grace of the star any a or Redeemer. No gospel is more inspiring than the Git a call of day a and its assurance of deliverance to all jlvas.
CHAPTER XVII UBHAYA V ED ANT A
SECTION I. THE RELIGION OF THE " S'RI BHASYA "
AN attempt was made in the preceding chapters to expound Vis'istadvaita as a philosophy of religion by exhibit- ing the synthetic unity of the metaphysical, spiritual and religious aspects of Vedanta (of tatva, hita and purusartha) and gradually developing the philosophy of the prakara or mode into the religion of bhakti andprapatti. The first two chapters of the Vedanta Sutras form a metaphysical enquiry into the nature of sat as the supreme tatva or saguna Brahman ; the third defines the nature of hita as vedana, upasand or bhakti, and prapatti, and the last brings out the meaning of purusartha as the attainment of Brahman. The essentials of this method are worthy of restatement in the present context. The ground of the existents is the only goal of experience (karanantu dhyeya). Brahman is the root of philosophic thinking and the fruit of religious feeling and is the first cause and the final cause. The four chapters of the Brahma Sutras reveal the synoptic insight of the Sutrakara and are a systematic elucidation of the truth step by step from the first Sutra to the last. Each chapter of the S'ariraka S'astra is not merely a part or unit of the
UBHAYA VEDANTA, 413
whole and a member of an organic unity, but is itself a self- complete whole. A fresh insight into the S'dstra is afforded by Mahammahopadhyaya Kapistalam Des'ikacariar in his master-thought that every adhikarana or section is an anu- bhava or intuition of Brahman. What is metaphysically determined as the ultimate ground of all existence is also the supreme end of man's spiritual quest and yields a specific anu- bhava of the divine perfection. Each adhikarana aims not merely at logical satisfactoriness or coherence but also at spiritual satisfaction. This synthetic insight corrects the ordinary idea that the Vedanta Sutras are a mere theoretic study of Vis'istddvaita and that the Bhagavad Visaya of Nammalvar embodies its practical aspect of spiritual experi- ence and confirms the theory that Vis'istddvaita is Ubhaya Vedanta. It is the supreme merit of the Svdmin to have replaced the analytic method by the synthetic, and regarded each adhikarana as the spiritual experience of a Bhagavad guna or auspicious quality of Bhagavdn in the manner of the ecstatic outpourings of Nammalvar. This chapter furnishes a brief summary of his exposition, which throws fresh light on the meaning of the term ' philosophy of religion ' as it insists on the ultimate unity of philosophy and religion and the supreme truth that reality is realisable and that what is logically valid is also spiritually valuable. In his Vydsa Siddhdnta Mdrtdnda, the Svdmin shows that each adhikarana both proves a philo- sophic truth and is a spiritual anubhava or experience of an attribute of Narayana. In his later work, the Adhikarana Ratnamdla, Narayana is equated with S'rinivasa. The Sutras consisting of one hundred and fifty-six adhikaranas or sections are valued as one hundred and fifty-six gems of the perfections or kalydna gunas strung together by devotional art. The absolute of the Upanisad is equated with the supreme
414 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
Narayana, the God of religion, and is finally identified with the Redeemer, S'rlnivasa.
The first section called the Iksati Adhikarana refers to the Chdndogya text in Chapter VI, section ii, " Being only was this, in the beginning, one only, without a second. . . . It thought : May I be many, may I grow forth." From the metaphysical standpoint it sets aside the Sankhyan view that pradhana is the cosmic ground, on account of the fact that intelligence can evolve and emerge only from the dtman and not from matter, and establishes the truth that the sat without a second is Brahman or the Supreme Self. The one without a second is the metaphysical self and not the mathematical aggregate or whole of parts. By its self-creative urge, it wills to be the many and becomes the manifold of cit and acit and becomes their source and s'esi. The absolute is Is'vara and not Is'vara, cit and acit, as the cosmic process is the self- differentiation of Is'vara. From the religious standpoint the adhikarana is an anubhava or religious experience of the sat as the self of S'vetaketu. Brahman, the creator, preserver and destroyer of the universe is the atman of the atman of S'vetaketu. The sdf that is the ground of the macrocosm is also the self of the microcosm. It brings out the Vis'istad- vaitic truth that the Self of the external world is the Self of every finite self by setting aside the identity philosophy that makes mdyd-bound Is'vara one with avidyd-riddenjiva. While the latter expresses logical identity, the former stresses spiritual intimacy. The world order as the expression of the creative urge of Brahman is really His Kid. The creative urge becomes an aesthetic impulse and is transformed into the religious motive of redemption. Soul-making is the sport of the raksaka and He shapes matter and moulds the soul
UBHAYA VEDANTA 415
to make it His own. The next topic known as the Ananda- maya Adhikarana discusses the Taittirlya text " Different from the self of vijndna is the other inner self which consists of bliss " * and dismisses the view that the term dnandamaya or the self of bliss is the jlva which is Brahman reflected in avidyd. The Sutrakdra contends that the jlva cannot create the universe and that the infinite alone as the prakdrin can have infinite bliss and not the finite self. Brahman is blissful and imparts its nature to the jlva. The Highest and the one who attains the Highest are not identical. S'ankara follows the Sutra argument and then dismisses the conclusion of the Sutrakdra by a sudden volte face by his theory of two Brah- mans deduced from his own independent reasoning. This adhikarana expounds, from the anubhava aspect, the nature of the ecstasy of the unitive consciousness or brahmdnanda. Brahman is the transcendentally blissful Being of beauty delighting in communicating His bliss to the bhakta, and enabling him to revel in the rapport of communion.
The third adhikarana known as the Antar Adhikarana rejects the anthropomorphic view that the shining self in the sun with- a golden complexion and eyes like the lotus mentioned in theChdndogya Upanisad (I. vi.) is the jlva, as the quality of sinlessness referred to in the text pertains to the highest Brahman and not tq Aditya. This distinction is clearly drawn in another Upanisad. " He who dwells in Aditya, whom the Aditya does not know, who rules Aditya from within."2 Brahman is a boundless ocean, as it were, of com- passion and kindness and has a divine form (divyamangala
1 tasmadva etasmad vijnanamayat I
anyontara atmanandamayah I Taitt* Up., Anand,, V,
2 ya- aditye ti^than nadityad an tar o yam adity5 na veda yasyadityas' s'ariram ya Sdityam antaro yamayati. Br. Up. V. vii.9
416 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
vigraha) which He individualises to satisfy His devotees. In its anubhava aspect, the section refers to the Supreme Sinless Self with an aprdkrta or transcendental form of His own whose ravishing beauty fills the yogin with ecstasy, even more than His svarupa. The next section refutes the mechani- cal theory of the universe and concludes that the term akas'a in the Chdndogya text,1 (I. ix. 1), is not the elemental ether but refers to the Paramapurusa or Supreme Self as the world ground with an infinity of perfections, who is at once the supreme and the only way to life. The Jyotir Vidyd in the Chdndogya Upanisad, (III. xiii. 7) which explains reality as the jyotis or light which shines above the heaven, higher than everything, refers not to physical light but to the Highest Self with infinite splendour. On the religious level, the section points to the existence of an absolutely luminous region of eternal bliss, in which the ineffably luminous being jyotisdtn jyotis or light of lights resides for ever, as distinguished from the phenomenal world of Ilia vibhuti which expresses His sportive activity and redemptive joy. These opening adhikaranas or sections define the experience of Brah- man as the creator or ground of existence, His blissful nature and His transcendental form or His sv'ariipa, kalydna gunas and rupa, or paratva, bhogyatva and divyamangala- vigrahatva. As these are brought out in order in the first three s'atakas of Nammalvar's Tiruvoimozhi, the striking resem- blance between the two is noteworthy. The last topic of the first part of the chapter proves that words connoting thejlva like Brahma and Indra connote also by the principle of co- ordination or sftmdnddhikaranya the Supreme Self of which they are the s'arira. The meditation on Indra prdna is the
sarvapi ha va imani bhutanyakas'adeva samutpadyante akas'am pratya- stam yanti.^ — Ch. Up., I. ix. 1.
UBHAYA VEDANTA 417
meditation on Brahman, the s'aririn of Indra prana. The real proof of the existence of Brahman is the experience of Brah- man as in the case of Vamadeva, Prahlada and Nammalvar. The rsi Vamadeva intuits Brahman as the inner self of all jwas. The term * I ' means Brahman as its s'aririn when the rsi says : " I am Manu, I am Surya."1 Says Prahlada : " As the infinite one abides within all, He constitutes my * I ' also. All is from me. I am all, within me is all." 2 Nammalvar also realises that his true aham is Brahman as the life of his life. Brahman is the true ' I ' of every ' I ' in the universe and is its intimate meaning. Thus the first part of the chapter es- tablishes the truth that Brahman is the Supreme Self other than prakrti and the jlva, is possessed of infinite auspicious qualities like bliss, and has a divine form of His own which is not due to prakrti and karma and that loving meditation on the Self as the self of one's self leads to the attainment of eternal bliss. The true philosopher as the seeker after Brahman has no use for materialism and anthropomorphism and as the seer of Brahman, he enjoys eternal bliss. The second section of the first chapter consists of six topics and it estab- lishes the supremacy of Brahman as the s'aririn or inner self of all by ruling out the claims of the finite self. The first topic determines the meaning of the pantheistic text of the Chan- dogya Upanisad, " All this is Brahman,"3 and defines the nature of the Supreme Self as the atman of the universe but without even the shadow of its imperfections. The word ' all ' in the text does not connote the totality or society of selves, as the determining quality of tajjalan or tajja, tadala and tadana,
1 tad haitat pas'yan r§ir vamadevah pratipede aham manurabhavam suryas'ca.— Br. Up., III. iv. 10.
3 sarvagatvad anantasya sa evaham avasthitah I mattassarvam aham sarvam mayi sarvam sanatanell — V. P., I. xix. 89.
3 sarvam khalvidam brahma tajjalan iti s'anta upasita I — Ch. Up.t III. xiv. 1. 27
418 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
in the context refers only to Brahman and not to the ji Cosmic evolution and involution cannot be due to the finite self. The universe is in Brahman, but is not Brahman as it cannot exhaust its spiritual content. Brahman is imma- nent in the universe, but is not affected by its imperfections. On the religious side, the adhikarana guarantees mukti or deliverance to the devotee whose mind is purified by medi- tation and freed from the opposites of raga and dvesa and equipped with the seven virtues beginning with viveka.. Prahlada realised Narayana as the Inner Self of all and attained samadars'ana or the sense of spiritual similarity and solidarity, by which he lost the egoistic consciousness of the distinction between friend and foe. In His infinite mercy, the Lord of Love enters the heart of the devotee and imparts to him the fragrant delicioiisness of bliss. Brahman is the prdpya or the subject to be realised and the mukta is the prdptd or one who realises it.1 The second topic applies the term ' eater ' in the Kathopanisad 2 to the destructive aspect of Visnu which implies not extinction but reabsorption. Mukta-making or bringing deliverance to all is the purpose of Isfvara and even the destructive function which makes a " condiment " of death itself arises from His redemptive impulse. When thejiva sinks into sensuality and sin, the merciful Lord temporarily puts a stop to the cosmic process and deprives the jiva of his instruments of sense-experience so that there may be no further incentive to evil, like a loving father who cures the insanity of his son by imposing restrictions on his physical freedom. The two selves that live together in the cave of the heart 3 are the finite and the infinite. The Upanisad
1 Vide, the Rahasyatraya Sara, ch. IV. end.
* yasya brahma ca ksatrafica ubhe bhavata odane I mrtyur yasyopasecanam, —Ka$h. Up.. I. ii. 25.
* Kath. Upan., I. iii. 1.
UBHAYA VEDlNTA 419
(I. ii. 12) affirms that the wise man who meditates on the Self who is hidden in the cave is rid of sorrow and refers to the distinctive attributes of the dtman as the meditating subject and Paramatman as the inner Self or object of meditation. This section has a deep religious significance and shows that the infinite Lord in His boundless tenderness is unable to bear the separation of His other self and therefore stations Himself in the heart of thejlva with a view to leading him back to his highest abode. The aim of Veddnta is to reveal the divinity that lies concealed in the heart of all jivas.
The third topic expounds the meaning of the Upakosala Vidyd in the Chdndogya Upanisad (IV. xv. 1). The purusa within the eye is Brahman, the fearless and the immortaL The Sutra eliminates the other alternatives, viz., that the purusa is the reflected self or pratibimba dtman, the jlva or a god, and affirms the truth that it is Brahman, on the ground that the attributes of samyadvdma, vdmanl and bhdmanl refer to the Highest Self. All blessings go towards Him ; He leads all blessings and shines in all the worlds. Brahman is ka and kha of the Chdndogva Upanisad (IV. x. 5) and is supremely bliss- ful. In the anubhava aspect, Brahman as the Inner Self is eternally blissful and communicates bliss to the finite self and leads him gloriously to the world beyond.
The fourth topic throws light on the nature of Brahman as the antarydmin, the Inner Ruler immortal, and on the organic relation between Brahman and the universe of cit and acit as srarlrin and s'arlra. It strikes the key-note of Veddntic thought and experience. The seventh section of the fifth chapter of the Brhaddranyaka Upanisad develops the meta- physical truth that Brahman, as the immanent self of all the
420 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
•
worlds, of all living beings, all Devas, and all the Vedas, is their inner meaning. The Absolute Substance of the Sad Vidyd is the inner self of the Antarydmi Vidyd and as the life of life, the seer of all the seers and the love of all loves, He constitutes the s'arlrin of the universe in the collective and the individual aspects. This view alone reconciles the so- called monistic view of the Brhaddranyaka and the theistic teaching of the S'vetd&vatara without torturing any text or twisting its meaning. The crass anthropomorphic idea of the s'arira-sarlrin relation as that between the mind and the body is refuted by the text : " He grasps without limbs, hears with- out ears and sees without eyes " \ which contrasts the know- ledge of the All-Self with that of thejiva obscured by karma. When this Veddntic truth is intuitively realised in religious experience, the self as a tissue of the s'arlrin pulsates with its life, functions through its will and throbs with its love. The fifth topic points to Brahman as the aksara or the imperishable as defined in the Mundaka Upanisad (I. i. 5). The text refers to two kinds of knowledge, aparavidyd and paravidyd and prefers the latter as the higher kind of knowledge which con- sists in the immediate apprehension of Brahman as a supra- relational experience. The Upanisad concludes that Brahman is the imperishable Highest Self which is higher than the aggregate of individual jlvas which are themselves higher than the unevolved subtle elements. Brahman as the true of the true is higher than the jiva on account of distinction and difference or vis'esana and guna, while the jlva is itself higher than acit ; this comparison relates to valuation and not sublation. The Advaitic theory of the absolute admitting of three kinds of reality or degrees of truth is not tenable. The absolute does
1 apaflipado javanO grahita pas'yatyacaksus sa s'rpotyakarnah I
— Sv. Up., III. 19.
UBHAYA VEDANTA 421
not admit of kinds of reality, as reality is secondless. It does not admit of degrees of truth, as there can be no passage from degrees of truth to absolute truth. The real difference is not between existence and reality based on the criterion of non- contradiction but is between existence and value based on the principle of preference. There are stages in valuation from the sensuous side to the spiritual and to the religious conscious- ness. In its anubhava aspect, the Brahma Vidya directs the aspirant to the practice of bhakti and prapatti as the supreme means df attaining oneness with Brahman orsdmyam. Brahman is identical with Vasudeva who resides in all and from whom all derive their being and also Bhagavdn with the six per- fections comprising jndna, bala, ai&varya, vlrya, srakti and tejas. Sdmya consists in attaining the likeness of Bhagavan. Spiritual and divine consciousness are similar in content but not identical in existence. The next topic is the Vais'vdnara Vidya of the Chandogya Upanisad (V. xi, et seq.) denning the meditation on Brahman as the Vais'vdnara self having the three worlds for His body. Though Brahman is niravayava or formless, He is meditated upon in the form of a person ; the Heavens are meditated upon as identical with the head of the highest Self, and the earth is meditated upon as constituting the feet of the Self. The cosmic consciousness of vis'varupa was divinely granted to Arjuna and he was so dazzled by its sublimity that he longed for the human form on account of its easy accessibility for devotion. In the Vais'vdnara Vidya, the human form is infinitised and adored as the living symbol of the cosmic form and consciousness. The essential idea of bhakti is to intuit the infinite as the meaning and goal of the finite and thus enable the seeker after God to attain the world of Brahman. In this way, the Stitrakara establishes in the six adhikaranas
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of the second part of the first chapter, that Brahman is the All- Self, the inner ruler of alljivas, the infinite in the finite in the cave of the human heart, the source of its vision and the Supreme Self which is higher than the highest, and experiences these philosophic truths as spiritual excellences of Brahman.
The third part of the first chapter is devoted to the exposition of the truth that Brahman and not the finite self is the subject of enquiry in some other doubtful Upanisadic texts. The first topic establishes the conclusion that the Being described in the Mundaka Upanisad as the warp and woof of earth and heaven is the highest Self as the varirin and not the jlva. " Him in whom heaven and earth, the mind and the vital airs are woven, know Him alone as the Self. He is the bund or setu of the immortal." * It is an unfair criticism to say that Ramanuja's view of Brahman as the sfaririn of all makes the soul of God the efficient cause and His body the material cause, and is like taking half a fowl for cooking and leaving the other half to lay eggs. This view misses the inner meaning of the Upanisad which expounds the nature of Brahman as the creator of the process of nature for the progress and perfection of the finite self. The relation of the finite to the infinite is really the crux of monism, and it cannot be solved by the crude pantheism that all is Brahman or by the acosmism of the illusion theory. The view that the absolute is an arithmetical whole, an organic unity or a concrete universal may have some affinity to the theory of bhedabheda, but has no relation to Ramanuja's theory of the sraririn, as this is only an analogical way of bringing out the spiritual intimacy between the finite and the infinite as jwatman and Paramatman. Paramatman as the inner self
1 Mund. Up., II. ii. 5.
UBHAYA VEDANTA 423
of thejlva enters into the warp and woof of the world process with a view to spiritualising thejiva and finally Brahmanising it. This includes logical immanence and spiritual transcendence. Vis'istadvaita accepts the reality of all things and thinking beings but insists on a sense of proportion and distinguishes between the demands of the logical intellect for unity and the spiritual needs of union with Brahman. Brahman as the immanent ground of existence is the goal of transcendent experience. To dissect Brahman into two halves in the manner of cutting a fowl is to dissect life into dead bits. Mathematics has no place in mystic intuition. The Upa~ nisadic analogy of the two birds on the same tree, of the shining one above and the suffering one below, becoming united in the end is more sublime and more appropriate than that of the fowl and its two halves. The infinite is in the finite self with a view to infinitising its content. The Upanisad defines Brahman as the abode of the universe and the bund of the immortal. The metaphysician who thinks of Brahman in the universe becomes the mumuksu who seeks the same Brahman beyond it. Therefore, in the anubhava stage, the arithmetical idea of the whole, the biological idea of the organism and the metaphysical view of a self or of a system give place to the mystic consciousness of God or brahmadrsti and attaining the world beyond, of Brahman or Isfa. Even as the waters of the Ganges lose themselves in the sea, the finite self flows into Brahman by divesting itself of the different- iations of name and form due to karma and becoming one with Brahman by losing its separatist self-feeling, but not its self-existence.
The second topic declares that the infinite or the bhuman referred to in Chapter VII. xxiv. 1 of the Chandogya
424 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
Upanisad, beyond which there is nothing to be known is Brahman who is absolutely blissful. The Upanisad defines it thus : " Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else, that is Bhuman, the infinite. Where one sees something else, hears something else, knows something else, then that is alpa, the small." The Upanisad affirms that we can know Brahman, the absolute, and hope for its immortal bliss as the most beneficial end of life, and it leads the mumuksu step by step from " naming " up to " hoping " and concludes that the ativad- in who seeks the more in the universe ends with the meditation on Bhuman as the supremely beneficial aim of life. Brahman is infinite bliss and when the devotee intuits Brahman as immanent in all beings, he does not see anything apart from Him and therefore experiences infinite bliss. The pleasures of the senses and the happiness of the cultured mind are only partial expressions of the bliss of Brahman. The world of phenomenal experience is essentially blissful as it is pervaded by the bhuman ; but the finite self affected by avidyd in the form of karma has a fragmentary view of the world as, owing to its distorted vision, it sees apart from Brahman, and suffers from the sorrows of the divided consciousness. But the seer who has brahmadrsti or the intuition of the All-Self is immersed in the bliss of the bhuman. He revels in the Self and enjoys the universe as His ais'varya or wrealth. The finite self connotes Brahman as its true self and this meditation on the bhuman leads to the attainment of brahmananda. Thus the philosophic knowledge of the Bhilma Vidya leads to the mystic experience of the bliss of the bhuman.
The third topic treats of the Aksara Vidya in the Brha- daranyaka Upanisad (III. viii. 8-11) : " The aksara is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long ; it is without colour or
UBHAYA VEDANTA 425
shadow, without inside or outside ; it eats none and none eats
it In that imperishable or aksara the ether is woven,
warp and woof/' The author of the Sutras rejects the prima facie view that the imperishable referred to is pradhana or the jlva. While the previous meditations contemplate Brahman as the creator, destroyer and inner ruler of the universe, the Aksara Vidya concerns itself with Brahman as its sustainer or support. It is the will or pras'asana of Is'vara that controls the wheel of time, the uniform behaviour of the sun, the moon and the stars and thus sustains the physical and moral life of all jlvas. This theory therefore rejects materialism as well as monadism and establishes the Upanisadic truth that Brahman alone is the Imperishable Law- giver and Sustainer. " That imperishable is unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unthought but thinking. There is nothing else that sees, hears or thinks thus but it. In that Imperishable, the ether is woven, warp and woof." This description of the aksara as the All-Self excludes the jiva and the text therefore clearly states that Brahman is the sustainer of all beings. From the point of view of spiritual experience or anubhava, the Vidya inculcates the worship of Brahman as the cosmic ruler or the father of all jlvas. The instinct of parental love, the political idea of the king and the state as the protector of the life and welfare of the subjects and the cosmic guardian- ship of the Manus and gods are very partial expressions of the divine will to support and sustain the world of cit and acit. The Father of all is not only in heaven, but is the inner Ruler, and His redemptive will is self-revealed both on earth and in heaven.
The key to a clear understanding of all the Upanisadic texts is furnished by the fourth topic of this part which refers
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to " He " or Brahman as the object of the highest intuition.1 Brahman as the sat is not the ' that ' or reality beyond the ' what ' or idea, as such dialectic enquiry ends in ultimate doubts. Nor is it true to say that Vcddnta has an idealistic foundation in self-consciousness as every idealism drifts to- wards subjectivism. The word ' He ' remedies the defects of scepticism and solipsism and also rules out the reference to the collective self or karya Brahman which is only a glorified but karma-ridden jlva. ' He ' alone is to be meditated on and not the *I ' as the latter may lead in Vedantic practice to the pitfalls of subjectivism. From the anubhava aspect, Brahman is higher than the highest in a world beyond the terrestrial and the celestial worlds and is alone the object of apprehension and attainment. Paramapada or the supreme abode trans- cends the sphere of karma, and the mukta enjoys the ecstasy of the intuition of Brahman in the world beyond.
The subject of enquiry in the fifth topic is the Dakara Vidyd of the Chdndogya Upanisad (VIII) which enjoins the meditation on the ' ether of the heart which is the city of Brahman.' The Upanisad directs us to look within and seek for the subtle ether or dahardka&a in the lotus heart which is the city of God or Brahmapuri. The adhikarana, by a process of elimination, excludes the two alternatives of the elemental ether and the spiritual entity being the objects of the prescribed meditation and concludes that the ether in the heart refers to the highest Brahman. The Upanisad ascribes to it eight perfections which imply freedom from evil in its physical, moral and metaphysical aspects in the well-known passage : " The self is free from
1 sa papmana vinirmuktah sa samabhir unniyate brahmalokam sa etasmaj jivaghanat paratparam puris'ayam purusam iksate. — Pr. Up., V. 15. Ik?ati karmavyapades'at sal?.— Ve. Su. I. iii. 1*3.
UBHAYA VEDANTA 427
•evil, old age, grief, hunger, thirst and death and its wishes are immediately self-realised .'k } To distinguish it from the freed self which has the same qualities, the Upanisad declares that the subtle ether contains both heaven and earth within it and is the abode of the whole universe ; it is the Brahman who dwells in the self and rules it and whom the self does not know.'2 Self-knowledge is essential to the meditation on Brahman and therefore the Upanisad requires the mumuksu to realise his true dtman as different from the empirical jlva in the three states of waking, dream and dreamlessness. While the dtman is finite, Brahman is in- finite and omnipotent. The predication of will to Brahman is in no sense a bar to His infinity, as He is absolutely free from the self-contradictions of the finite-infinite and even from a shadow of the imperfections of karma and punya-pdpa. Omnipotence is expressed in the absoluteness of His mercy. Out of His boundless love, Is'vara sets aside His supreme glory .and becomes easy of access to all jlvas by entering into their hearts. Within every jlva is hidden in the Brahmapuri the rich treasure of absolute truth, goodness and beauty. Blinded by karma, the finite self is unable to discover it. When the self is morally cleansed, it intuits itself, becomes serene and radiant with bhakti and reaches the resplendent region of • everlasting bliss with the saving grace of its inner light.
The next topic is the Kathopanisad texts (II. iv. 12-13 and II. vi. 17) treating of the person of the size of the thumb standing in the middle of the self. The Sutras state that the expression refers to the Supreme Self and not to the jlva, since the lordship or Is'varatva referred to in the context would
1 esa atma apahatapapma vijaro vimrtyur vis'oko vijighatso apipasas
satyakamas satyasankalpah. — Ch. Ut>., VIII. i. 5. aCfc. Up., VIII. i. 3.
428 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
apply only to Is'vara and not to the jlva. The Upanisad (II- vi. 2-3) also declares that the whole universe is a cosmos and not chaos and its uniformity is not mechanical but is ordained by a being of infinite might and benevolence for fear of whom the sun shines, fire burns and the wind blows. The Upanisad enshrines the truth that Brahman rules the world from within and is the ultimate reason for the laws of thought and nature and is yet transcendental in His glory. Brahman transcends- the limitations of prakrti and the jlva and is therefore nirguncr and niravayava. None of the categories of space, time and causality which have a phenomenal use are adequate to describe the noumenal self. But the measureless enters into the world of space-time without losing its infinity for the purpose of meditation by the mumuksu. In His infinite mercy the Lord of love seeks the sinning self and dwells in its body in spite of its filthiness with a view to redeeming it from its sinful career.1 The last topic of the section is the Chdndogya text (VIII. xiv. 1) that speaks of ether as the evolver of names and forms. This ether is not the elemental ether or dkasra or the jlva but is Brahman. This is clear from the description given that He is the Lord of lords who rules the self even in the state of deep sleep. The thirty-two Vidyds expounded in the Upanisads are meditations on Brahman with the essential qualities of satya, jndna, dnanda, ananta and amala and they all point to the realisation of Brahman as the sttmmum bonum of life. It is thus shown that the ' logical ' Highest of what may be called ' The Pure Vis'istadvaita ' of the Sutras is also the * Intuitional Highest of the Practical1 Vi&istadvaita ' of the Bhagavad Visaya. The next section shows the identity of the Intuitional Highest with the logical
1 daharakuhare devastisthan nisadhvaradirghika nipatitanijapatyaditsavati- rjiapit^kramat I — Rahasyatraya Sara, Chap. X.
UBHAYA VEDANTA 429
Highest and thus justifies the view that Vis'istddvaita is Ubhaya Veddnta.
SECTION II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE " BHAGAVAD VISAYA "
Vis'istadvaita as a philosophy of religion not only inter- prets metaphysics in terms of religion and religion in terms of metaphysics, but equates the two by the common designa- tion dars'ana. The term dars'ana connotes a philosophical system as well as a spiritual perception of reality and may be explained as an integral intuition of Brahman. The metaphy- sician thinks God's thoughts after Him and has a soul-sight of God as his very self. The rsis and the Alvars realised the existence of Brahman by directly experiencing Him and thus proved the truth that Brahman is the intuitional as well as the philosophical Highest. Their anubhava is justified by philoso- phic thinking. In extreme monism, Brahman is jndna and is realised by jndna ; extreme theism distrusts the intellect and relies on scriptural faith. But in Vis'istadvaita Brahman can be enquired into as well as experienced. Conceptual know- ledge of God is exalted by the soul-sense of God, and the soul- sight of God is rationalised by conceptual knowledge. Jndna is inspired by bhakti and bhakti is illumined by jndna and the two together constitute bhaktirupdpanna jndna. Thought melts into feeling and is verified by it, and feeling is illumined by thought and justified by it. This truth is well established by Ramanuja as the philosopher-saint who integrated the ex- periences of the rsis and the Alvdrs and expounded them as one single coherent whole called Ubhaya Veddnta. As a philosopher-saint he established the truths of Vis'istddvaita as embodied in the Veddnta Sutras and at the same time thought,
430 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
of each adhikarana as a Brahmanubhava or experience of the Brahman. As a saint-philosopher he intuited the truths of Tiruvdimoli and gave a critical exposition of the experiences of the Alvars by showing their logical coherence. As a saint, he contacted God and as a philosopher he proved the truths of spiritual experience.
The Bhagavad Visaya is the logical exposition of the spiri- tual experiences of Nammalvar just as the S'rlBhasya sums up the varieties of Vedantic experience systematised in the Sutras. The method in both is the same, though the former stresses the inductive side and the latter the deductive side. The entire system is explained in a twofold way as tatva-hita-purusartha and arthapancaka. The first of these can be explained as the co-ordination of the metaphysical, moral and religious aspects of experience, tatva, hita and purusartha respectively. Arthapan- caka deals with the five truths of the philosophy of religion,, namely, prapya, prapta, updya, praptivirodha and prapti. The metaphysics of Vedanta treats of the Upanisadic way of know- ing Brahman and the theoretic knowledge of Brahman as the Being that is the source of all beings. Vedantic ethics deals with the hita or the means of realising the supreme tatva which consists in the moral and spiritual discipline of the mumuksu. The purusartha or the supreme end is the realisation of Brahman and the attainment of eternal bliss in Paramapada. This method is elaborated in the arthapancaka in a more concrete way. Brahman is the prapya or the end to be spirit- ually apprehended and attained. The praptd is the jlva that seeks Brahman as its s'arlri or prakdri. Bhakti and prapatti are the upaya or means of attaining Brahman, by ceaseless devotion or absolute self-surrender to the Lord. The chief obstacles to be overcome or prdptivirodha are avidya-karma,
UBHAYA VEDANTA 431
the evils of ahankdra and mamakdra or the concept of ' I ' and 4 mine ' ; the realisation of Brahman by ascending to His world is the prdpti or the highest end to be attained. The Bhagavad Visaya as well as the Brahma Sutras employ the same Veddntic method, and use the same spiritual language. The first two chapters of the Sutras determine the nature of the tatva, the third defines the hita and the fourth deals with the purusdrtha. In the same way the first section of the Bhagavad Visaya is the meditation on the chief tatva or prdpya. The second section describes the hita or updya and the last section the purusdrtha or prdpti. Thus the beginning (upakrama) as well as the end (upasamhdra) is identical in both the systems.. The end and aim of Ubhaya Veddnta is summed up in the Upanisad, " He who knows Brahman attains the Highest." Just as the whole teaching of the Sutras is summed up in the first four Sutras, the meaning of the entire Tiruvdimoli is epitomised in the four lines of the first verse itself.
The first commentary on the Tiruvdimoli composed under Ramanuja's direct guidance is the Ardyirappadi. Of the later commentaries on both, " Idu muppattdrdyiram " or " Idu " as it is popularly called is well known. It gives a psychological and logical account of the divine life of the Alvdr and traces the stages by which he realised Brahman and enjoyed the bliss of eternal kainkarya to Him. In the four works, the Tiruviruttam, the Tiruvdsririyam, the Peria tiru- vandddi and the Tiruvdimoli, the Alvdr describes the way in which he renounced worldliness, was drawn by the entrancing Beauty of the Lord and was caught up in the flaming love of Beauty. The Tiruvdimoli expounds the art of divine life and love which consists in the descent of God into the self of the Alvdr, and the ascent of the Alvdr to His divine Home..
432 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
Judged from this standpoint, the spiritual experiences of the Alvar show how the grace of God transforms the Alvar into a mukta and through him the whole of humanity. The first section of a hundred hymns insists on kainkarya to God as the chief end of life. Bhagavan is the Supreme Lord who is ever adorable, accessible, holy and blissful and the saviour of all. The second analyses kainkarya and concludes that kain- karya is only for His satisfaction, without any taint of egoism. In the third stage, kainkarya has an extended meaning as it finds its completion in Bhagavata kainkarya or service to all godly men, irrespective of their birth or status. The fourth part traces the way in which the obstacles to divine life, like the temptations of ais'varya and kaivalya, are surmounted. The fifth is justification by the faith that the Lord Himself re- moves these hindrances. The sixth section is an important stage in spiritual life as it defines prapatti as the only way to God and the whole attitude of devotion is consummated in prapatti. But mukti is not yet in sight in spite of prapatti and the Alvar portrays his feeling of dejection in the seventh section. The eighth is an account of the purificatory value of such disappointment as it leads to further self-naughting and introversion, and ir>creases the hunger for God. Dejection is soon transfigured into hope and it makes love an irrepres- sible longing. The tenth section is a glowing account of the glorious ascent of the Alvar to his divine home and the attain- ment of the bliss of Brahman having its fruition in kainkarya.
Vedanta Des'ika who was a specialist in Upanisadic knowledge was so deeply influenced by the soul-stirring out- pourings of Nammalvar that he styled them as Dramido- panisad and even preferred them in some respects to the Upanisads, owing to their direct spiritual appeal. The
UBHAYA VEDANTA 433
Tiruvdimoli as Vedantic experience has more value to the mumukstt than mere metaphysical exposition. This truth is well brought out in the definition of the nature of Brabman in the Brahma Sutras and in the Tiruvdimoli. While the former starts with the definition of Brahman as the cosmic ground, the latter begins straightway with the description of Brahman as beauti- ful and blissful, and these qualities have more value to the seeker of Brahman than the cosmological idea. Upanisadic Vedanta is the enquiry into Brahman as the first cause of all, with a view to knowing Him as the final cause and the goal of life ; but in Dramida Veddnta, the experience of Brahman is the primary aim, and the metaphysical view is deduced from it. It is in the light of this immediate intuition of Brahman that Vedanta Des'ika expounds the meaning and value of the religion of Alvdr and extols it as the Dramidopanisad. The whole teaching of the Tiruvdimoli is summarised by Vedanta Des'ika in his Dramidd- panisat Sdram and Dramidopanisat Tdtparya Ratndvall. The first section of the Tiruvdimoli consisting of the first hundred verses defines Brahman as the Supreme Self that alone is adorable and attainable. What is adorable is also blissful, and the second section or hundred therefore further characterises Him as the Blissful. The Beautiful can never be formless or niravayava and the third hundred describes Him as having an aprdkrta form of bewitching beauty. But such beauty and love may also induce the devotee of God to seek the hedonistic pleasures of ais'varya or the spiritual joys of kaivalya. As they have no charm for the Alvdr, he as ajnani seeks Him in the next two sections of the Tiruvdimoli as the supreme end of life as well as the giver of that good. By stripping himself of ahankdra and with his faith in the saving grace of the Redeem- er, the Alvdr in the sixth section practises prapatti. Finding that his prapatti bears no fruit, he at first thinks of the
28
434 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
cruelty of God in subjecting him to further hardships in the world of samsara, but very soon, in the course of the next section, the assured faith that the Lord is the saviour of all who are heavily laden and afflicted asserts itself. The eighth section describes the redemptive love of God who is drawn by love and dwells for ever in the heart of devotees with a view to saving them from sin and requires of them nothing more than a change of heart. The ninth gives the final definition of God as the eternal friend and companion of the mumuksu and the tenth and last hundred marks the completion of the spiritual progress of the Alvar and the attainment by him of the eternal bliss of Brahman in Vaikuntha. In this way, the Tiruvaimoli teaches the truth that Bhagavdn is Himself the prdpaka and the prdpya, the updya and the upeya.1
The first Tiruvaimoli consisting of ten verses sums up the teaching of the whole work and is a typical philosophic poem setting forth the essentials of Vis'istadvaita. The first verse defines the nature of Brahman as saguna with tran- scendental bliss (uyarnalam) as the essential quality and with .a beauteous form of His own. The second states that He is different from cit and acit and has a self-luminous nature of His own. The two thus refute the view that Brahman is nirguna and niravayava and conclude that Brahman isjiva- vi&ista Paramdtman. The third stresses the immanence of Brahman in all sentient and non-sentient beings and affirms the intimacy between the atman and Paramdtman. The universe without this underlying unity would become a
1 Ittham sevyam subhogyam s'ubhasubhagatanum sarva bhogya prakrstham, s'reyastaddhetubhutam prapadanasulabham svas'ritanisthajisnum I* " bhaktaccandanuraktam nirupadhisuhrdam sat padavyam sahayam devas' s'riman svasiddheh karanam iti vadan nekam artham sahasre, sevyatvadin das'arthan prthag iha s'atakair vakti tatsthapanartham I
UBHAYA VEDANTA 435
multi-verse or chaos. All beings with their infinite variations have their source in Brahman and their functions are centrally controlled by Him and yet Brahman is beyond. These verses repudiate pluralism and monadism as well as pantheism. The ninth and the tenth verses are directed against the s'iinya- vddins who deny everything. Denial has its function in real- ity and cannot be of reality and every denial presupposes an affirmation. Existence is implied even in the denial of all existence. But the most important verse is the seventh as it is the coping stone of the whole system. The truths of transcendence and immanence are explained in the light of sarlrdtmabhdva and Bhagavdn is described as the s'arlrin that sustains rand controls cit and acit.1 They have no exist- ence apart from Brahman and they are only for His satisfac- tion. Brahman is the dhdraka, niydmaka and s'esi of both cit and acit. The atman pervades the self as its sarlrl and is therefore accessible to it and attainable by it. Thus in this first Tiruvdimoli Nammalvar summarises the teaching of the thousand verses and the truths of the S'drlraka S'dstra.
The opening verse itself strikes the keynote of the whole philosophy of the Tiruvdimoli and by knowing it, the meaning of the whole can be known. It gives in a nutshell the central truth of Vis'istddvaita in the light of the traditional method of tatva, hita and pumsdrtha and the fivefold method of arthapancaka . The term uyarnalam in the first line defines the supreme tatva or prdpya as Brahman the absolutely Blissful in the manner of the Taittinya Upanisad. The hita or updya by which Bhagavdn is attained is indicated by the very suggestive term in the second line, namely, matinalam or bhaktiriipdpanna jndna or intellectual love of God. When 1 udal mis'ai uyirenak karandu engum parandujan, — verse 7.
436 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
jndna is exalted by bhakti and bhakti is lighted up byjnana, the two are glued together as a single unity and their full significance is brought out by the term toludu indicating absolute self -surrender to the raksaka. Really He is Himself the updya and the upeya. The mumuksu is blessed with mukti and is no longer subject to the ills of samsdra as pointed out by the term tuyararu. Brahman who is perfect (purna) makes the jlva perfect. The true idealistic method of Veddnta is its philosophic passion for unity and simplicity. " To idealise is to essentialise." Knowledge according to all schools is epitomised in the word of truth known as the pranava which is made up of the three initial letters of the first three lines of the first verse. In this way the expounders of Ubhaya Veddnta establish the truth of the synthetic philosophy of Ramanuja that the aim of the S'ri Bhdsya and the Bhagavad Visaya is identical^ that the foundation of the Brahma Sutras is the intuition of the seers of Brahman, and that the intuition* of the Alvdr& falls into line with the system of Veddnta.
CHAPTER XVIII THE MYSTICISM OF VISISTADVAITA
I? ACH philosophy or school of thought — eastern or "*—•' western — has its own mystics in whose lives and utterances the system finds support and verification. But it is not every system that can claim mysticism as an appropriate branch of its tenets or doctrines. Though mysticism has now been given a high rank in some philosophic treatises and in spite of there being several treatises written on mysticism itself as a separate subject, its true meaning is still shrouded in mystery. It is the purpose of this chapter to obtain a clear notion of what true mysticism is, and to demonstrate how Vis'istddvaita alone, among all the schools of philosophic thought, is an appropriate and fit system for mysticism to flourish in. What is mysticism ? One can easily start by pointing out what mysticism is not. It is not magic, mystery-mongering or siddhi-seeking. It is entirely different from occultism and spiritualism, and from psycho-analysis and the experiences of subliminal consciousness. The true mystic rejects the values of supernatural powers and yogic siddhis as he seeks God and only God. Visions and voices, photisms, auditions and automatisms may simulate spiritual experience but they do not lead to God; rather they lead away from Him. William James has proved conclusively the theory that
438 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
mystic experience is not the aberration of a diseased mind as explained by the medical materialist, but is a genuine experi- ence of God, which illumines the intellect, purifies the will and exalts the feeling. To identify mysticism with feeling is to ignore its supersensuous and supra-rational character. While sense-experience is fragmentary or is merely sentience below the level of relational experience, inference is mediate. The intuitive insight of the mystic is immediate and ineffable. God is intuited and not inferred, and He can be contacted directly though He cannot be categorised. But the intuition of God is not mere feeling or emotion. The view that it leads to emotionalism and erotism and is bereft of the sanity and serenity of the jndnl mistakes the dynamic flow of spirituality or God-intoxication for sensual revelry and narcotic excesses.
Vedantic anubhava or experience does not mean the * feelings and acts of individuals in their solitude so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.' It is the integral experience of the whole dtman and not of its sectional states. The subjective feeling has its foundation in the impersonal truths of s'dstraic revelation and is not a mere psychological experi- ence. The word intuition is often so vaguely and loosely employed that it may mean any state of consciousness, from mere feeling or sentient experience which is below the level of relational thought, to supra-sensuous and supra-rational states above relational consciousness. It is too vague for clear understanding and is therefore without definite significance. It should not be confused with the immediacy of sense-experience as it is supra-mental, nor is it intellectual love as it transcends the limitations of tarka or the logical intellect- While the knowledge given in sense- perception is fragmentary
THE MYSTICISM OF VIS'ISTADV AITA 439
and inferential knowledge is mediate, intuitional insight is an immediate experience of Brahman. Intuition reaches the heart of reality and carries deeper conviction than pratyaksa and anumdna, or sense perception and inference. Brahman is directly intuited by the divine eye granted to the freed self and is not logically proved. The view that saguna Brahman is the logical highest creates a dualism between thought and intuition, and is not consistent with the facts of mystic experience and scriptural integrity. The experience of Brah- man or brahmanubhava is unaware of the antithesis between thought and reality, or that between the what and the that, as it is the direct apprehension of the svarupa or form of Brahman and the comprehension of its character or guna. The term brahmanubhava is, on the whole, preferable to the terms mysticism and intuition, ow7ing to the definite meaning fixed by tradition and the recorded experiences of rsis and Alvars.
The mumuksu as a mystic has an organic craving1 for Brahman and he longs for love or bhakti2 and not merely for the negative state of mukti or freedom from the sorrows of samsara. Even the infinite glory of Vaikuntha has no attrac- tion or value for him3 if it be merely an escape from samsara without contacting God and enjoying the bliss of communion with Him here and in this life. The mystic has the instinct for the infinite and to him the best proof of the existence of Brahman is the immediate experience of Brahman, a soul-sight of the Self here and now and a revelling in His love. With his genius for God, the bhakta has no use for soulless ritualism and arid dialectics ; a famine-stricken
1 Tiruvaimoli, III. viii.
2 Alavandar, Stotra-Ratna , 54.
3 Vedanta Des'ika, Varadar&ja Pancasfat, 49.
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ryot who longs for rainfall is not satisfied with the weather chart. The intuition of Brahman consists in the bhakta crossing the frontiers of dialectic and divided thinking, and in losing himself in the immensity of the intregral experience. The experience of God is the finite-infinite relation of love, which on the divine side is the invasion of love into the heart of the finite self, and on the human side is an intellectual love of God known as bhaktirupapanna jnana or in Tamil mati- nalam. Bhakti is the thought of God touched by feeling and turned into devotion. Jnana deepens into bhakti and bhakti is exalted by jnana ; and the two are fused together as prema. While philosophy seeks the unity of reality, and religion refers to the union of thejlva with Brahman, mystic- ism expresses the intense yearning, or avd, hunger for the Absolute which is the fusion of jnana and bhakti. Jnana and bhakti can be distinguished but cannot be divided ; and the two together find their consummation in divine love, which in its highest stages bursts the bounds of artificial restraint and becomes a deluge of ecstasy. Intense love towards God or perava is the consummation of thought and the exalta- tion of feeling ; and the charges of intellectualism and senti- mentalism cannot apply to a spiritual state which is more than thought and feeling. Mysticism as the experience of God-intoxication cannot fully thrive in the theistic atmosphere of absolute difference between the omnipotence of the creator and the impotence of the creature, nor in the rarified region of pure consciousness devoid of content. The mystic delights in communion with God, and not in the surrender of will, or in the negation of thought.
The various stages by which the logical ego, as a vi&esana of Brahman, gradually evolves into the mystic, thirsting for
THE MYSTICISM OF VIS'ISTADVAITA 441
*God, is worthy of restatement. The metaphysically-minded Vi&istadvaitin thinks of the jlva as the adjective or element •of the absolute or Brahman, deriving its life from the whole. As a moralist or ethical ego, the jlva is not a vis'esana but a person depending on the redemptive will of Is'vara as the cosmic Ruler or s'esl. When the ethical ego is drawn by the beauteous form of Bhagavan, it changes into the aesthetic self and the s'esl becomes sundara. The self then is strip- ped of ahankara and becomes the srarira of the All-Self. As a bhakta he longs for the love of Bhagavan and as a ptapanna he surrenders his will absolutely to the Raksaka and effaces himself in kainkarya. When love generated in bhakti and prapatti becomes a longing, the bhakta or prapanna pants for God and pines away. The soul-hunger of God is equally intense and the prakarin becomes a prakara longing for com- munion with the jlva as His very self or atman. The relation between the two is changed from the logical, the ethical, the aesthetic and the religious into the mystic love between the lover and the beloved, and it is the aim of Vis'istddvaitic mysticism to reach the heart of love and to feel directly its inner pulsations.
The Vedantic theory of Brahmajnana may be reinter- preted and summarised in the light of the mystic experience of Brahman as alogical, amoral and supra-personal. The intuition of the mystic as rsi or Alvar is alogical in the sense that it is the completion of the logical realm and not its sublation. After a laborious discipline in the exercise of the (logical intellect, there comes a stage in the spiritual life of the seeker when he sees truth, as it were, in a flash. Truth possesses him, so to say, and the tools of knowledge are used <only to explain the intuitive experience. Intuition is the
442 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
immediate or direct experience of Brahman, but it presupposes strenuous intellectual discipline acquired in the lower realms of knowledge. The knowledge given in sense perception should be clear, precise and free from bias. But even so, it is piecemeal and not capable of scientific explanation in terms of cause and effect. In the next higher stage, the particulars of sense are systematically explained as elements of an inter- related unity. Philosophy is thinking things together in their wholeness with a view to discovering their underlying unity. But even philosophic knowledge is fragmentary and abstract, as its account of reality is purely conceptual. Philosophical systems are conflicting and contradictory and have no finality. It is only when philosophic thinking which works with limited categories is perfected in mystic insight that the riddles of reason can be solved. Then intellect is illumined by divine vision and melts into ecstasy. The mystic anubhava of Brahman is not sentient or infra-rational experience, but is supra-rational and is the crown and completion of the different realms of knowledge given in sense-perception, science and philosophy. Mystic experience is not mere feeling or thought, but is an integral experience which includes both these elements and transcends their limitations. The view that Vaisnavism encourages emotionalism and erotism and fosters in man the soft passivity of the feminine nature ignores the value of jnana and bhakti as stepping stones to mukti and not as stopping places. When the devout seeker subdues the emotions in the light of reason, emotion and intellect become one. Love is for love's sake and it knows no fear and seeks no favour. God is the Lord of love and every jiva has a humane nature nurtured by love and the restless adventure of love's game goes on till the two — the lover and the beloved — are united for ever. The bliss of such union is not the
THE MYSTICISM OF VIS'ISTADVAITA 443
result of emotionalism and is entirely free from the taint of sensuality and sin. It also transcends the limits of philosophic thinking as thought expires in enjoyment. Intuition or tatva dars'ana is the consummation of the logical intellect or tarka drsti. The mystic experience of Brahman is full, perfect and free from the limitations of intellectualism and is there- fore alogical.
The criticism that Vedantic mysticism does not promote the ends of individual and social morality but encourages inertia and passivity cannot apply to Vi&istadvaita. It is not a world-denying religion which favours the unhealthy ascetic view that life is rather to be shunned than lived. The mystic hungers and thirsts for God, feels the life of God in the depths of his being and is absorbed in ecstasy. He shakes off the ego-centric standpoint and self-centredness and surrenders himself to the Absolute. Mystic life is enriched by self-sur- render as it enhances personal worth by partaking in the riches of the divine life. The self dies to live and it is deified by contacting God and entering into eternity. Its other-worldly attitude evolves from life here and now and is not a revolution- ary change from illusoriness to enlightenment. The mystic realises that he is only an instrument of the divine will and the basis of all his activity is shifted to God as the All-Self and Cosmic Actor (krtsnavit and krtsnakrt}. By attuning himself to the will of God and thus becoming one with Him, the mystic transcends the individualistic standpoint and the moral distinctions of good and bad or puny a and papa. His life is supra-moral in the sense that it is the crown and completion of the moral life. God is absolutely good and is not morally indifferent, and the chief quality of God is transmitting His godliness to His other and making him perfect. Saintliness-
444 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
and unrighteousness can never co-exist. Personal worth is ^enhanced by self-effacement and self-gift. When the lower self of ahankdra is renounced, the dtman is deified and its highest values of truth, goodness and beauty are conserved. It then sheds its exclusive feeling and realises the unitive consciousness. The mystic reaches the heights of moral and spiritual consciousness, partakes of the riches of divine experience and sees all beings in God and God in all beings. On the moral level there is progress towards ideals, but in mystic or amoral experience aspiration is crowned with achievement. Morality is at best a struggle to reach the ideal of goodness. But there comes a stage in the spiritual life of the aspirant when he has no longer to seek the good but be- comes goodness itself. Thus the amoral is the fulfilment of the moral life and not its negation. V is'istddvaita does not -encourage the method of self-extinction ending in the stirless rest of nirvana, but insists on spiritual activism and the ful- ness and freedom of deified consciousness. Spirituality is perfected in service, and mystics like Namtnalvar and Prah- ladk work ceaselessly for the welfare of all beings till they .attain a direct realisation of Brahman.
The Vi&istddvaitic philosophy of love is enshrined in the Maitreyi Brdhmana of the Brhaddranyaka Upanisad which says that a husband is dear not for the love of the husband but for the love of the Self. An object is dear to one's self not for its own sake, but for the love of the Self. Maitreyi renounces wealth and other earthly posses- sions and seeks immortality, and the sage Yajnavalkya, her husband, intimates to her that the only means of obtaining immortal love is the knowledge of the Supreme Self. Brah- *tnan is perfectly blissful and imparts its bliss to different
THE MYSTICISM OF VIS'ISTADVAITA 445'
beings according to their karma. Human love is a perishing feeling, but is a fractional expression of the infinite love of God. Love of home, love of country and love of humanity are not to be inhibited, as they are but partial revelations of divine love. Kama may be of three kinds, viz., visaya kdma, dtma kdma and Bhagavat kdma. Love or kdma is by itself neither good nor bad, and its value depends upon the object desired. Visaya kdma is desire for the objects of sense, and its satisfaction is momentary and fraught with pain in all its stages.1 As the pursuit of sensual pleasure, it is an adventure which lands one finally in the wilderness of samsdra. One has then to retrace one's steps and follow the way of dtma kdma by self control and introversion. The joy of self-realisation is enduring, but it arises from the flight of the alone to the alone, and being a state of solid singleness it is tinged with egoism. Baghavat kdma or Paramdtma rdga is love directed to the Lord who is the source and centre of all human love. When kdma or rdga is spiritualised and direct- ed Godward, it loses its sting and is reckoned a virtue. If kdma as sexual feeling is not humanised, it is bestial and blind, clamant and chaotic, and becomes a deadly vice. But when it is idealised and disciplined into married love, selfishness disappears, and the fleeting voluptuousness of reckless adven- ture is replaced by the lasting happiness of perfect pleasure. If it is further spiritualised into divine love, it loses all traces of selfishness and becomes ethereally ennobled. Kdma is the urge of love. But as Bhagavat kdma, it is a craving for spiritual marriage with the Beloved. Love is a relation between the dtman and its eternal other, and is a longing for a communion which is not infected by self-contradiction. When
1 dtthkhamula, duhkhamis'ra and duhkhfidarka or originating in pain,, mixed with pain and causing pain.
446 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
it becomes an infinite longing for the Infinite, as in the case of Maitreyl, it leads to immortal bliss. While human love is fleeting and perishing, divine love is deathless and has -eternal value.
Brahmdnubhava may be mystically explained by the ex- perience of love and beauty and this experience is treasured up in the Bhagavata and the Bhagavad Visaya. Their aesthe- tic philosophy of Brahman has a soul-stirring appeal to the mumuksu, an appeal which remains unsurpassed in mystic literature. To the mystic, the tatva is Brahman the Beautiful, the hita is pretnd and the realisation of the bliss of Brah- man is the purusdrtha. Premd is thus the spiritual copula between the knowledge of Brahman and the realisation of its bliss. The Bhagavata is the homeland of divine Ilia (Prema rasa) and the Tiruvdimoli, the outpouring of Sata- kopa, the God-intoxicated Alvdr, is the spiritual biography of the eternal game of divine love. The mysticism of Nam- malvar is the heart of Vis'istddvaitic wisdom, and it furnishes the raison de etre of its metaphysics. Nammalvar is a seeker after Brahman and seer ; he is the prophet of universal salva- tion. His Tiruvdimoli begins with the definition of Brahman as bliss (I. i. 1) and ends with a glorious description of the attainment by the Alvdr of that eternal bliss.
Brahman is defined philosophically as the Lord of Bliss or the aesthetic Highest, and is finally realised in mukti as the intuitional Highest. To the Alvdr, the Absolute who is the heart of logic is also the Beautiful who satisfies the logic of the heart ; and metaphysics ends in mysticism. Brahman is dnanda and rasa. The universe has its source and sustenance only in the bliss of Brahman. It is the theatre of the llld
THE MYSTICISM OF VIS'ISTADVAITA 447
•of God which aims at turning men into muktas. Though love is a unitive experience, it presupposes the duality of the experiencing subjects. The sat without a second, as ekdki, or the one that remained alone in the pralaya state, was joy- less, and therefore it divided itself into finite centres and loving beings and entered into them as their pervasive inner Love (Brhad. Upan., III. iv. 3). Love does not thrive in loneliness or self-identity, as it takes two to love and be loved. Love involves otherness and even in the highest states of bliss, when the self-feeling is effaced, love is a dual relation and a double fruition. The absolute is love. Brahman, the ekdki experiences creative joy by self-giving and love and becomes complete only by self-division into loving pairs. The one Self that is without a second sports as two, as the lover and the beloved, without losing His wholeness. The dialectician who sees nothing but self-contradiction in the act of creation, as it involves, according to him, the non-relational entering into relations, misses the whole point of the Upani- sad. The blissful Brahman in its sportive act of love separates itself from its beloved other, seeks it, and then becomes one with it. The Absolute itself assumes a bewitching form of beauty in order to attract its other to Itself.
To the mystic, Reality is not a problem but is realisation itself ; and Nammalvar, the super-mystic of S'n Vaisnavism, is so deeply intoxicated by divine love that he has no other thought or feeling than that of God. Krsna alone satisfies his organic cravings of hunger, thirst and pleasure.1 The instinct for the Infinite alone preserves his being. The transcendental Brahman beyond the world equally seized with soul-hunger incarnates into the heart of humanity without
1 Tiruv&imolit VI* vii. 1.
448 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
abandoning His holiness and glory. This mutualness results in the game of love, a game devised by the divine Artist to transmute the karma-ridden jiva into a mukta. The recipro- city of love leads to irresistibility by the mystic process of sams'lesa alternating with vis'lesa, the systole-diastole move- ment of prema bhakti. The former is the joy of contacting the entrancing beauty of Bhuvana Sundara, and the latter the sorrow of separation from Him. The jnanl turns his vision to God and focusses his love on Him as his atman. God like- wise longs for the jnam as His atman {. Excess of Prema transforms the jnam into a spiritual bride pining for her lord. The symbolism of marriage embodies the secrets of the soul's longings and its sslf-giving joys. In vis'lesa, each moment stretches into eternity,2 but in sams'lesa eternity is crowded into a moment. In the former case the mystic pines away owing to the feeling of unrequited love and becomes pale and passive. In the latter, the soul is caught up to God and has a momentary joy of union or ecstasy. This opposition is known as the mystic paradox and its object is the trans- mutation of the earthly self into the godly by a process of spiritual alchemy. The like alone seeks the like ; love alone calls for love. Like golcl in the refiner's fire, the self is purified and deified by alternate depressions and exaltations. At one time, it is thrilled by His touches ; at another, it is torn away from Him and languishes. In mystic philosophy both are the essential elements of love and the dualism between the two is overcome by the attainment of unitive consciousness. Nam- malvar passes through this process of sams'lesa and vis'lesa till he becomes one with the Beloved and enjoys the eternal bliss of such communion.
1 cm, vii, is.
2 Tiruv&imolt, V. iv. 3.
THE MYSTICISM OF VIS'ISTADVAITA 449
In vi&lesa, the joy due to the intimate presence of the Lord and His beatific vision is swept away, and the dark night of forlornness or deprivation sets in. Sin in this state is not the violation of the divine law but the ego-centric feeling and the sense of separation from the beloved. The renouncement by the self of the 'me* and 'mine' is the sine qua non of spirituality ; and self-love and sensuality are rooted out.1 The spiritual quest for the Lord ripens into the mystic thirst for Him. The woes of vis'lesa experienced by Nammalvar and expressed through the medium of nayaki- nayaka love, or the love of the lover and his beloved, are unmatched in mystic literature for their moving power. While sams'lesa is the spring season when love blossoms, vis'lesa is the desolation of winter when the grace and the glow of love fade away, and life becomes dreary and desolate. It is a state of spiritual lassitude, or ennui and pallor, aroused by a sense of unworthiness, blankness and impotence, which is known in the language of mysticism as the dark night of the soul.2 The absence of God leads to the feeling of utter emptiness and helplessness ; and nothingness takes the place of the fulness of the orison of union. The self-feeling is wiped out and the Alvar drops into passivity by the growing feeling that he really has, does, and is nothing. Reaction soon sets in and passivity changes into an invasive and as- saulting mood. Love takes the offensive and becomes flaming and fierce, and, in the agony of disappointment and des- pair, the Alvar, consumed by the intensity of his love threatens to do what is technically known in Tamil poetic convention as madal urtal, in which the nayakl charges the
1 nir numadenrivai ver mudal maittii. — Tiru., I. ii. 3.
* urellam tuffji ulagellam nallirulai nirellanteri orniliravai ni$<jadal.-~ Tiru., V. iv. 1.
29
450 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
truant lover with desertion, rebukes and exposes publicly his cruelty and treachery. When love's labour is lost, by not being responded to, its fierceness bursts all artificial bounds and the lover is publicly chid for his faithlessness. Vaisnavite mysticism transforms the monistic view of Is'vara as the arch- illusionist into that of the elusive enchanter of souls as jara cora tfikhamani, the cunning and thievish Lord of Love who steals away the hearts of devotees and ravishes them out of all their feeling of fleshliness. The Mayin is the cunning artist who allures the self bv His beauty, transfigures its lusts of the flesh into holy love, and by a strange alchemy makes it His own. The divinely mad Alvar is consumed by Krsna prema and every sense organ pants for contacting Krsna.1 The medical materialist and the worldly man steeped in sensuality may ascribe this mystic genius for God to the morbidity of hysteria or psychopathic degeneration. But a drop of divine love is the only •cure, the rasayana (elixir) that removes the ills of samsara ; and the Alvar, caught up in supernal love, adopts the experiential standpoint and appeals to the rationalist and the sceptic to dis- cern the meaning of spiritual rapport with his spiritual outlook.2
While thus pining away, the Alvar gets a sudden glimpse of God, and feels a strange joy sweeping over him. It is but a glimpse and mental vision or trance which is physically im- perceptible and lacks sensory vividness and substantiality. Unsatisfied, the Alvar yearns for the aesthetic enjoyment of his outer senses. He longs for physical contact with the divine beauty ; and realising that his vision is only £ sensory image resulting from intense mono-ideistic love or manobhava, swings back to the mood of depression and relapses once again into
1 See mudiyane. — Tirut, III, viii. 1,
2 yenneBjinal nOkkikkapIr.— Tiru., V. v. 2.
THE MYSTICISM OF VIS'ISTADVAITA 451
passivity and emptiness. Once again he reproaches his beloved with being a Brahman that simply is, but does not feel any love, and rebukes Him for His callousness and cruelty.1 His love overflows his inner being 2 and his spiritual cry assumes cosmic dimensions and is heard even in the world beyond the sphere of samsara? The thought of oscillating between earth and heaven is deeply distressing, but earthly life with God is preferable to Vaikuntha after life. The Alvdr is caught up in the dilemma of devotion. Love yearns for physical communion here and now and longs at the same time for transcendental life. The former is eagerly desired but not desirable on account of its impermanence, and sensuous setting and content ; and the latter is desirable but is not actually desired on account of its remoteness in time and space. Mystic love is tossed between the spiritual longing for release and the divine dalliance in the Ilia of love. At one time, over- powered by the sense of forlornness, the Alvar was on the verge of suicide. But he gave up the attempt feeling that the disposal of the self belonged only to the s'aririn and that he had no freedom in the matter.4 The Lord alone is the source, sustenance and satisfaction of life (dharaka, posaka and bhogya).^ He alone satisfies spiritual hunger and thirst, and is the end of all hedonistic desires. The intensity of anuraga or love destroys the distinction and difference between the lover and the beloved, and on one occasion the Alvar imitates, like the Gopis, the ways of Is'vara and experiences cosmic consciousness.6 The anguish
1 kadiyan kodiyan. — Tiru., V. iii. 5.
2 aviyinparamalla vetkaiyando. — Tiru., X. iii. 2.
3 nirai nilanai. — Tiru., VI. ix.
4 mayum vagaiyariyen. — Tint., V. iv. 3.
5 Tiru., VI. vii. 1.
r> kadal jnalam s'eidenum yane yennum. — Tiru., V. vi. 1.
452 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
caused by vis'lesa and the pranks and freaks of the Ilia of love at last become unbearable and the life of the Alvar from this stage till the time of final union is one long period of struggle and suffering which has no precedent in the history of mystic literature in the east or in the west.
The depressions of vis'lesa vanish with the onset of the ecstasy of the unitive consciousness. While vis'lesa provides an opportunity to the Alvar to think of the perfections of the Lord or His kalyana gunas and to arouse devotional ardour, sams'lesa is the soul-sight of His bewitching beauty followed by God-intoxication. The Alvar is allured by the Enchanter and thrilled by His touches. The unknown and indistinct is now intuited as the " dark gem 'V It may not be the integral experience of Brahman in the super-sensuous sphere of Paramapada but it has all the vividness of that experience owing to the perfervid nature of prema bhakti or the devotion of love. The feeling of oneness with the absolute as the Lord of love is known in mystic lore as the orison of union and it is a state of being ravished out of the fleshly feeling. Though the joy of union is ineffable and incommunicable, the outpourings of the Alvar enable the mystic philosopher to evaluate them in the light of the Taittirlya estimate of ananda. The feeling of pleasure is aroused by the contact of the self with the objects of sense and is a trivial and transient state. Happi- ness is more enduring, as it is the result of an inner cultural discipline. The joy of spiritual communion is different in degree and kind from the pleasures of sensibility and the happiness of cultured life, as it is aroused centrally and not peripherally. The satisfaction of sams'lesa is due to the entry of
1 Karumaflikkam .
THE MYSTICISM OF VIS'ISTADVAITA 453
transcendental Beauty into one's being and the invasion of its love into every phase of one's life. To the God-intoxicated Alvar, the joy of sams'lesa overflows the inner springs and inundates the mind and the conative and cognitive sense organs. Rapture is the sudden onrush of joy, and ecstasy is the temporary suspension of the functioning of the sense organs ; but in both the cases, the self-feeling is swallowed up in joy. When Beauty rushes to the embrace of the beloved, the beloved expires in the arms of ecstasy.
While the Upanisad starts with a calculus of pleasures and concludes that Brahmananda transcends thought and word 1 and therefore defies definition and description, the God-intoxicated Alvar employs the term " aravamudu " to express the nature of Brahman as Bliss insatiable. The joy of communion with Him is never-ending ; each assault of love but whets the appetite for more and is only a prelude to the next [punarccikkaraccukavellain] , the self emerges from ananda only to merge in it again. This fits in well with the Upanisadic anubhava according to which Brahman is rasa or bliss itself 2 and the self emerges from ananda, is sustained by ananda and merges into ananda.* The rapture of commun- ion overflows from the inner springs and inundates the senses, and it is therefore more delightful than all the tastes, smells and sounds which have a sensory origin. The Lord of Love seized with soul-madness enters into the whole being 4 of the Alvar, communicates His joy to it and makes it pulsate with joy. The joy of love's embrace is inescapable and irresistible
1 Yato vaco nivartante aprapya manasa saha.
2 raso vai sah, — Taitt. Up., Anand., vii.
:1 Anandaddhyeva khalvimani bhutani jayante I anandena jatani jivanti anandam prayantyabhisam vis'antitil Taitt. Up., Bhrghu., vi.
4 Oruvidam onrinri ennui kalandanukke. Tiru. II. v. 2.
454 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
and the Alvar is immersed in divine deliciousness and the thirst of ages is satisfied. Melting with gratitude, the Alvar offers himself to the beloved and then feels that, since the jlva is the body of the Lord, self-gift to Him has no meaning as He alone is the giver and the gift.1 The Lord is the life of the Alvar and the Alvar is the life of the Lord and the joy of union is reciprocal on account of the reversibility of relationship. The relish of love increases with enjoyment and is therefore fecundative. Even nwksa has no value, if it is not for His satisfaction. Divine madness like this is infinitely preferable to the mad hankering after worldly and celestial pleasures. In his exalted mood the Alvar loses himself in the love of all living beings and feels in his infinite benevolence that every jlva should attain the state of Brahman and be free from the sorrows of karma. Even the lowliest of the low is adorable if he is touched with divine love. The Lord of the universe seeks His home in the inner self of the Alvar and thus satisfies His soul-hunger. Brahman realises His nature only by enveloping the Alvar and devouring his individuality. The joy of unitive experience is in the loss not of personality, but in personality. Sensation, form and self melt into Him, and finite thought expires in infinite bliss. When the body is at last dissolved in death, the freed self soars gloriously through the shining solar path to its eternal home in the absolute. Nature celebrates the occasion by wearing a festive garb, an the very gods hail the cosmic event and the Alvar led by the ambassadors of the absolute reaches the world of eternal bliss (X. ix) and becomes free for ever.
Mysticism delights in clothing supra-rational experience in symbolic imagery and sensuous form, and it is only the
1 Tiruvdimoli, II. iii. 4.
THE MYSTICISM OF VIS'ISTADVAITA 455
pure in heart who have subdued the lusts of the flesh and tasted bhakti rasa that can understand the language employed in the grammar of spiritual marriage or dtmavivaha and appreciate the eternal value of Bhagavat kdma. Kama S'astra is the science of erotics based on conjugal love and it has its own idealistic and mystic charm on account of its being a human expression of the divine love. The mysticism of dtma vivaha has spiritual content and value but is dressed in erotic form owing to the fidelity, fecundity and reciprocity so richly treasured in the Hindu ideal of conjugal love. The most inspiring example of such spiritual marriage in Tamil mystic literature is furnished by the life of AndaJ, the daughter of Perialvar, who, filled with Krsna prema even in her girlhood, pours out her flaming love in lyric poetry which is unmatched for its thrilling power.
In her Tiruppavai, justly noted for its poetic beauty and philosophic suggestiveness, Andal gathers together a band of mystics who, like her, were seized with Krsna prema and became God-intoxicated like the Gopis. They all hurry to the Home of Love in Brndavan to awaken the sleeping Beauty and pray for the fulfilment of their spiritual longing. In another poem known as Ndcciydr Tirumozhi consisting of 143 verses, she pours out her burning passion for union with Krsna. When there is no response to the message of love sent by her, she pines away in gloom. Then she invokes the aid of Manmatha, but even the seductions of his shafts have no power over the Ravisher of souls. Her passivity gives way to aggressive love and in the frenzy of fierce love, she assaults the Lord by attempting to pluck out the very roots of love budding from the bosom and aim them at the Torturer so that His heart may be pierced by the wounds of unrequited love.
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No true God could long resist the call of such unearthly love and in the mystic consummation that follows, the doors of the sleeping Beauty of S'rirahgam are flung open. Soul meets soul and Andal rushes into the arms of love and her separate being melts away in the ecstasy of union.
Krsna lila, as enshrined in the Bhagavata, is the concrete expression par excellence of the divine Ilia of love and is the foundation of Veddntic mysticism. The supernatural and historic Krsna depicted in the Mahd Bhdrata and the Visnu Purdna as cosmic ruler and redeemer appears in the Bhagavata as the mystic Krsna that shines in every jlva as its uncreated light and sports with it. Metaphysics is transformed into mysticism when the tatva is defined as absolute Beauty with an aprdkrta or formless or supersensuous form of its own. The supreme hita is premd or Bhagavat kdma and the attain- ment of bliss is the purusdrtha. Beauty feeds love and love has its fruition in bliss. The Sermon on the Mount has its raison de etre in the Song Celestial and the Song Celestial has its meaning and value in the Bhagavata testament of bliss. The ritualism of the Mlmdmsa, the quietism of the Sdnkhya, the realism of Nydya and monistic idealism have their fulfilment in Krsna Hid which is the crown of Veddntic thought.
The supersensuous beauty of Vaikuntha becomes the cosmic beauty or Bhuvana-sundara with a view to alluring the jlva and ravishing it out of its fleshly feeling. Krsna is beauty and bliss. The Holy of holies, Yogis'vares'vara who has no taint of evil, transforms Himself into Manmatha Manmatha, the Conqueror of Eros, by ravishing him out of his erotic at- tractiveness. Vyasa, the Veddntin, and S'uka, the born Brahma- jnanl, were so much drawn by the perfect avatdra of beauty
THE MYSTICISM OF VIS'ISTADVAITA 457
that they gave up the abstractions of metaphysics and the serenity of mauna or silence and revelled in Krsna Kid. It is the rsi who has subdued the lusts of the flesh as ftrdhva- retas or the mystic who has overcome the threefold trsnds that can enter the atmosphere of Brndavana, be entertained by the touches and thrills of Krsna premd and madden others with his divine madness. Brahman as Krsna is sarva rasa and sarva gandha, and His deliciousness is ever creative and fecundative and knows no satiety.1 The universe is no blot or blank to us, but is ensouled by Beauty which is the food and drink of the mystic. The cosmos is born in Beauty and the whole creat- ive act is the magic of divine love. Mathura is the heart of the universe and when Beauty was born on the human plane without abandoning its infinity, the shining celestials and the ascetic rsis were also born as cowherdesses in that blessed land and nature put on a festive attire to celebrate the cosmic event. The miracles of love enacted in Gokula and Brndavana and ending with the Rasa Llld are so entrancing th£t even meta- physicians and sages through the ages have renounced every- thing to dwell in the land of the cowherds and worship its dust.
The secret of the full incarnation of Brahman in Brnda- vana (avatdra rahasya) is revealed in the scene of Gopi-love leading to the Rasa Llld. The rsis of Dandaka were so much smitten with the entrancing beauty of Rama that they became love- mad and yearned for tasting Brahmarasa or the bliss of Brahman even on the physical plane. The purndvatdra brings out the mdyd of mystic love when the Enchanter descends into human love by establishing Himself in its centre and by the cunning art of spiritual alchemy transfigures
1 tad eva ramyam ruciram navam navam tad eva s'as'van manaso rnahot- savam. — Sri Bh&gavatam. XII. xii. 49.
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the bodily self and brahmanises it. Art reveals itself by concealment and it is the art of Krsna may a that pleasingly smites selfishness, removes otherness and transmutes it into its own likeness. Go/>I-love is the highest symbolic expression of the s'arlra-s'aririn relation that is expounded in the S'arlraka S'astra. Just as the body without the soul is like fish out of water, so the Gopl could not live without the love of Krsna pulsating through her soul. The soul-hunger of Krsna was as intense as the God-hunger of the Gopis and when in the game of love they were stripped of ahankara, Krsna entered on the scene to reveal Brahma-rasa in the Rdsa-krlda. All nature was clothed in radiance and was in a mute rapturous mood. It was a beautiful moon-lit night in favoured Brnda- vana in the budding spring, and the silvery Jumna gently glided with limpid waves. The air was perfumed with the fragrance of flowers. The woods were resonant with the notes of the cuckoo, the humming of the bee and the melodious songs of birds. The grassy lawns were soft like velvet and reflected the shining splendour of the sky. A sublime harmony pervaded and gladdened the whole scene and even the stars in the distant Milky Way twinkled with unutterable love. The voiceless heavens declared the glory and grace of love and gave intimation of their blessed nature. The Beauty of beauties, the Dazzling Dark, entered a lawn on the Jumna bank, flower- garlanded, with a feather on the head, and a flute on His lips and poured forth the sweetest strains of melody. Krsna wore the crown of beauty, touched the heart of love and caused entrancing bliss. Nature felt the thrill of love's song and even stones melted with joy. In the village, the artless Gopis alone heard the call of divine love and were irresistibly drawn by the Enchanter's melody. The Rasa-kn4a that was then enacted is the highest consummation of mystic
THE MYSTICISM OF VIS'ISTADVAITA 459
consciousness whose spiritual meaning and value even the genius of S'uka, the philosopher-poet, could not fully bring out. The Rasa dance was a circular rhythm of mystic dance in which the one Beauty without a second became as many Krsnas as there were Gopls and, in the ecstasy that followed, the sense of separateness between the finite and the infinite that kept them at arm's length was dissolved. The Dance of Divine Love as the perfection of rhythmic life is the most delicious rasa of Brahmananda. Nature responds to the rhythm and tunes itself to the Dance of Divine Love. The atoms dance in matter and suns and stars dance to the tune of gravitation in space. Life dances when it pulsates through the arteries. Ideas trip in the rhythm of logic. Human progress is the procession of rhythmic love, and even in the systematic thinking of the metaphysician^ concepts shed their discord owing to the harmony that vibrates through them. In the mystic dance of love, this play reaches perfection. Each jwa is a spark of light, a beam of beauty and a note in Krsna's flute. In the symphony of the Rasa Lild Krsna is in the centre of love. The centre is every- where and the circumference nowhere. In the ecstasy of the Rasa dance, the self-feeling is swept away and reflection ex- pires in rapture. Infinity is held in the arms of love and eternal bliss is experienced in a moment as the eternal present^ S'uka, the Veddntin, is so much entranced by a glimpse of this- unitive joy that he prefers the dust on the stage of the Rasa Llla to the bliss of mukti and Vaikuntha.
CHAPTER XIX MUKTI
T^HE study of the nature of the mumuksu leads to that of -•• mukti and the present chapter deals with the Vi&istad- vaitic exposition of the spiritual destiny of the mumuksu and his attainment of Paramapada or the supreme abode of the self. In the sddhana stages, including the mystic quest, the ecstasy of union is only momentary and has no security and stability. It is only by attaining Paramapada that the mumuksu has an integral experience of the absolute (paripurna Brahma- nubhava) and enjoys eternal bliss. The Paramapada sopana or the ladder to perfection as described by Vedanta Des'ika con- sists of nine stages or steps, of which the first five have already been indicated, viz., viveka, nirveda, virakti, bhiti and prasddana. Viveka is the clear philosophic thought of Brahman as s'aririn and s'esi. The second, nirveda, is the moral feeling of remorse arising from reflection on the sinfulness of sin and the sorrows of punya-papa, and it leads to vairagya or the renunciation of the hedonistic joys of heaven and of the contentment of kaivalya. Blnti is not the instinct of fear, but the spiritual dread of the hideousness of samsara which awakens the religious consciousness and induces the mumuksu to practise bhakti and prapatti in a volitional or responsive way as means to mukti. Mukti is impossible without the grace
MUKTI 461
of God and of the guru whether as gratia operans or as gratia cooperans. When bhakti and prapatti develop into a thirst for God, God Himself becomes " the Hound of Heaven ", who seeks the self, slays its ahankdra or egoism, and swallows up its isolated being. The remaining four stages consisting of utkramana, arcirddi, divya des'a prabhdva and prdpti deal with the summum bonum of spiritual endeavour or purusdrtha, and portray in a pictorical way the ascent of the mukta or redeemed soul to his home in the absolute. The paramaikdntin or mystic is practically freed from the fetters of karma including even prdrabda karma, as godliness is already guaranteed to him, and mukti may be realised even- tually or immediately. In any case, he is a krta-krtya, who has no more problem to solve or evil to subdue. The seed of samsdra stored up in santita is destroyed, and the vidvdn merely awaits release, doing the duties of his ds'rama. Till then he has only a glimpse of the Immortal Sea that shines beyond. At the time of the dissolution of the body the mukta ascends to Vaikuntha by the straight and shining path of arcirddi and attains sdyujya or intimate union with Brahman.
Mukti is the return from the becoming of samsdra to the being of Brahman, and is thus a reversal of the empirical process due to the complex of avidyd , kdma and karma and the infinite regress of causality. The self that belongs to Brahman somehow confounds itself, has an empirical dress and claims to be a mode of acit, and is thus spatialised by avidyd or ignorance. The confusion of avidyd generates kdma or the desire for sense objects and their transient pleasures. Avidyd creates kdma and kdma creates avidyd and avidyd- kdma binds the empirical self with the chains of samsdra^ and
462 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
subjects it to the claims and counter-claims of karma and retribution. The free and eternal self is thus confused by uvidydj tempted by kdma and confined by karma and is caught up in the wheel of time. The objective world of space-time vis subject to the parindma of endless becoming, and is a cyclic process of being-becoming and pralaya-srsti. But Brahman is the absolute that transcends the psycho-physical contrac- tions of the empirical self and the cosmological changes of prakrti. Brahman is ever free from the complex of avidyd- kdma-karma. He is alogical, amorafl and supra-personal, and is the transcendental Being that is never phenomenalised by space-time and is therefore supra-cosmic. The world of space-time is finite and fractional, and the jlva can attain freedom only* when it breaks the fetters of karma and the barriers of space-time. What is true of the cosmos as macrocosm is also true of the mind-body as a microcosm. What is yonder is here and what is here is yonder. The mind-body is made of prakrti and its functions are due to the entry of the cosmic devas into it. While Agni, the god of fire, 'becomes speech, and Vayu, the wind god, becomes smell, the sun becomes sight and the moon, the mind. One part of man is the earth and the other is heaven, and mukti is liberation from worldly and other-worldly limitations and entry into the infinite. Mukti thus implies self-transcendence in the subject- ive aspect of mastery over karma and in the objective aspect of going beyond the limits of space-time. The mind-body of the empirical self is composed of the twenty-four tatvas or principles of prakrti including psychic, material and cosmic stuff and freedom from embodiment connotes the withdrawal -of the jlva from the psycho-physical sphere of avidyd-kdma- karma and the cosmic sphere of space-time. While the idea of divine immanence inspires the hope of spiritual union and
MUKTI 463
immortal life, that of transcendence assures the security of salvation in Paramapada. Brahman creates the world of space-time as a suitable environment for moulding thejiva and shaping it into its own image by brahmanising it, and this consummation is attained in the sphere of eternity. Brahman is partially revealed in the transient world of lild and fully realised only in the eternal world yonder which is referred to as tripdddsya amrtam divi in the " Purusa S'ukta ".
The Advaitic idea of mukti presents difficulties arising from the dualism between Brahman and avidyd. Avidyd is either existent or non-existent or both. If it is non-existent like the square-circle as held by the Ajdtavddins, there is no meaning in seeking mukti or negating bare negation. If it exists as a bhdva paddrtha as held by the phenomenalists, it must have some reality, and what is real cannot be sublated or destroyed. If it is both, as an obscuring indefinable something as held by the illusionists, it confessedly cannot be logically defined as an object of practical enquiry. Mukti is the destruction of avidyd and the consequent release from embodiment. Hence the idea of jlvanmukti or freedom in embodiment, which involves the continuance of the body even after release, is a manifest self-contradiction. It is sought to be explained by the Advaitin by the analogies of the whirling of the potter's wheel even after the potter has stopped turning it, of the perception of the double moon even after disillusionment and of the velocity of the flying arrow after it is discharged. But the points of resemblance are not essential. The first simile is not adequate because the idea of causality has strictly no place in Advaita. As regards the second simile, there is an illicit use of the causal category. The cause of the illusion is not an illusion, and if there is disillusionment, then the
464 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
illusion as sublated by jndna should vanish, and can never continue to be an effect. To say that illusion remains and illusoriness vanishes is ingenious, but not convincing ; it ex- plains away the problem instead of explaining it. The third simile also employs the causal category, but really it explains away the whole problem. Jnana and ajnana can never co- exist. If ajnana is sublated, it is destroyed for ever, and there cannot be any degrees in such sublation. The explanation offered by the Ekajivavadins and the N anajlvavadins is equally unsatisfactory. The former deny the many-soul theory and affirm that the soul is only one and that release is entire and instantaneous, as it is the dissolution of nesci- ence. But its chief defect lies in denying the reality of social life and its solidarity and it is a case of super-solipsism. The doctrine of ndnajlva, which admits of a plurality of jlvas, also admits of plurality of mukti and there would thus be as many jivanmuktas as there are individual avidyds. To over- come this difficulty, the Advaitin states that in jivanmukti the jlvanmukta becomes Is'vara and mukti thus connotes not dis-illusionment or disillusion, but the state of I&varatva. But even the omniscience of Is'vara is only nescience on a cosmic scale, and till he attains freedom eventually in sarva- mukti he is not free from mayopddhi or the limitations of maya. To escape this charge, the Advaitin defines mukti as disillusionment like light removing darkness at once. He denies the validity of two muktis, jivanmukti and videhamukti. Enlightenment is the cessation of ajnana and has no relation to the dissolution of the body. On the onset of Brahmajnana, bhramd is sublated or dispelled, and it is immaterial whether there is body or no body. But this theory of sublation is itself riddled with discrepancies and has no conclusiveness. Sublation is a relation between the sublater and the sublated
MUKTI 465
and involves a locus or as'raya. Jndna cannot stultify ajnana and stultify itself. The latter is sublated by the former ; but the former cannot destroy itself. Jndna is itself the effect of ajnana, and dvarana s'akti or obscuring power persists even after the viksepa or appearance ceases to be. To say that jndna destroys ajnana and destroys itself like poison dispelling poison and the clearing-nut precipitating itself is not convinc- ing as, in both the analogies, the cause persists in the effect. In the case of the three kinds of reality, prdtibhdsika, vydva- hdrika and paramarthika, there are kinds and degrees of sublation, and the higher stultifies the lower and the highest, Brahma jndna, cannot stultify itself. Sublation is a state of self-transcendence and not a process of negating negation. Thus all the theories of mukti like disillusionment, sublation and the dissolution of the false outlook have no finality, and carry no conviction. In true tnukti, the eternal transcends the temporal, and it is only in the world of Brahman tran- scending the phenomenal world that the jlva is transformed or brahmanised and enjoys eternal life. The mukta belongs to the realm of Brahman, but as long as he continues in karma loka, he is subject to the ills of avidyd-kdma -karma. Emanci- pation results only when the bound self abandons the realm of karma and attains Brahman.
At the time of the dissolution of the physical body, which may happen at any time1 and in any manner, the released self withdraws from the gross state to the subtle state and ascends to the absolute by the straight and shining path of arcirddi. Dissolution is not the destruction of the psychic make-up, but a process of withdrawal and involution, and death to the vidvdn is the re-entry of the self into the realm of the infinite,
1 S. B.t IV. ii. 19 and 20 and 1 to 13. 30
466 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
which is the headquarters of reality. The indriyas enter into manas and manas into prana and prana is absorbed in the jlva, and the self, with its homing instinct, sheds the body for ever and retires from functioning in the world of sense and understanding and returns to its centre, which is the heart of Brahmapuri. Brahman's entry into matter with the self and making the body its living temple are solely with a view to transfiguring it. Death is the last scene of this divine comedy. Before entry into the Brahmarandhra, there is the parting of the ways known as arciradi or the path of the Gods and dhumayana or the path of smoke. The bound jlva that has not intuited Brahman follows the dark and dreary way and descends into the wilderness of samsara after a temporary enjoyment of the pleasures of pitr loka or the world of the manes and of Svarga ; but the vidvdn who has esoteric knowledge of Brahman ascends the shining path or arciradi gati1. The Brahmarandhra is the gateway to God and is illumined by the jydtis of the Hdrda, the indwelling self ; the enlightened mukta then finds the Brahmanddi 2 and soars gloriously to the world of eternal beauty by the radiant path of the gods. The making of a single mukta is a cosmic event and the devas' ha.il the entry of the finite self into infinity and sing hallelujahs in their own celestial way. The cos- mic gods like Agni, Vayu, Varuna, Indra and Brahma greet the vidvdn as a rare spiritual victor who has regained his spirituality by subduing worldliness. They are not sign-posts (mdrga- chinna), nor spheres of enjoyment (bhogasthdna) , but are spirit- ual powers with specific functions, of which the most important is the glorifying of the radiant self in its triumphant progress to its pre-established eternal :> home. The spiritual ascent is
1 Kath. Up.t II. vi. 16.
2 S.B., IV. ii. 16.
3 S. B., IV. iii. 4.
MUKTI 467
facilitated by the help of the trans-human person known as amdnava purusa who is really the ambassador of the absolute/ The mukta soars on the two wings of freedom and wisdom higher and higher, and goes beyond the cosmic sphere of space-time consisting of the seven spheres or circles (avarana saptaka) of and a (the mundane world), jala (the world of water), agni (the world of fire), akas'a (the world of ether), ahankdra (egoism), mahat (intellect) and pradhdna (matter), sheds the garments of nature, reaches the sphere of Brahman and enjoys its bliss for ever.
The Sutrakara here raises the eschatological question whether this arcirddi gati_ involving ascent and attainment applies to the meditators on the Supreme Brahman or those on the effected or karya Brahman called Hiranyagarbha, and takes as his text the Chdndogya Upanisad passage (V. x. 2) which promises the godward way leading to Brahma (sa endn Brahma* gamayati) to one who practises the Pan,- cdgnividyd or meditation on the five-fold fire. In dis- cussing this topic in IV. iii. 6, he considers the prim a facie view of Badari that the gati applies only to meditators on the kdrya Brahman and its refutation by Jaimini before he states his own view or siddhdnta. But the Advaitin turns the tables by accepting, on his own a priori principles of reasoning, the view of Badari as the first and final view. The distinction between saguna Brahman and nirguna Brahman serves his purpose and saguna Brahman is here equated by him with Hiranyagarbha, the first born of the absolute. The monistic philosopher regards the ideals of gati (ascent) and gantavya
] C/i. Up., V. x. 2.
3 The word " Brahma " is used here in the neuter and so signifies Parabrah- man. The same word in the masculine form Brahmanam would apply to Brahma the four-faced, the effected or karya Brahman.
468 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
(attainment) as the categories of phenomenal reality, which have no adequacy in the identity philosophy of nirguna Brah- man. Mukti is the awakening of pure consciousness which is eternally self-realised and not the accomplishment of a far off divine event. The notion of a Brahmaloka or paradise, in which the released self basks and feasts in eternal sunshine, drinks nectar without satiety and divinely obtains all worlds and all desires, is refuted and rejected by the monistic philosopher as a mere anthropomorphic and hedonistic view suited only to the empirically-minded. The distinctions of here and yonder, now and hereafter are spatial and temporal ideas and they cannot apply to mukti, which is the immediate intuition of the absolute here-now and not something to be attained or super-added. In mukti, there is no going or goal, as Brahman is the same as jiiana or mukti. The absolute, being changeless and timeless, can never move and " has no seasons." Progress is in reality, though it is not of reality, and it has a meaning only in the moral and religious realms. The Advaitic theory of two Brahmans claims to satisfy both the philosopher, that knows the self-identical absolute, and the empirically-minded theist that worships a personal God and seeks His kingdom. With this a priori idea, the Advaitin defends Badari and assigns only a secondary value to the siddhanta of Badarayana by straining the te^ts. Badari argues ^flius : Firstly, the neuter word ' Brahma * in the context signifies or suggests the karya Brahman owing to the proximity of the latter to Parabrahman as its first born.1 Secondly, the promise of final mukti to the seeker after karya Brahman is not self-discrepant, as he attains it eventually along with Brahma himself in krama mukti, though not immediately. Thirdly, the reference in the corresponding
1 Vide, Sv. Up., VI. xviii.
MUKTI 469
passage of the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad (VIII. ii. 15) to the muktas being led to the worlds of Brahman can apply only to the pluralistic universe of conditioned Brahman and not to the absolute.
Following the interpretation of the Sutrakara, Ramanuia combats the view of Badari and establishes the truth that arciradi gati is the direct way to mukti, by appeal to reason and revelation. Mukti is not only the direct apprehension of Brahman, but a spiritual pilgrimage to, or the progressive attainment of, Brahmaloka. The Advaitic exposition of the doctrine of two muktis, — kratna mukti for those who meditate on the saguna Brahman reduced to the level of Hiranya- garbha, the karya Brahman, and of jlvanmukti for those who directly apprehend the absolute or nirguna Brahman, — is untenable. Pure Advaita as identity philosophy does not admit of the dual standpoint of two vidyas, two Brahmans and two muktis. The very distinction between the mumuksu who seeks jnana and the mukta who realises it, betrays the self-contradiction between becoming and being. On the strict Advaitic view or ajatavada, Brahman is and may a is not and the problem of two paths, two view-points and even stages of sublation is illegitimate and non-existent like the square- circle. But practical Advaita, as the theory of compromises which concedes the reality of the spatialised Brahman to suit the needs of theism, is caught up in the confusions of thought and the dogmatism of theology. The theory of an unreal self seeking freedom from unreal bondage and attaining an unreal world is itself false and illusory. Mukti is a region where reason cannot penetrate and the illumined faith in the Upanisad which has specialised in it is the only logical attitude, and not agnosticism. If the Upanisad is a real text
470 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
and test of truth, it could not speak with a double Voice and could not be aware of the antagonism between the metaphysical highest or nirguna Brahman and the theological highest or karya Brahman. To seek the support of the Upanisad in favour of this distinction is a case of straining the text to suit the needs of esoteric metaphysics.
The three arguments are countered by the following reasons. Firstly, to say that Brahman refers to Brahma on account of the proximity of the latter to Brahman, and to make saguna Brahman a finite God are to do violence to philosophic thinking and religious exposition. In the second place, there is no collision between historic progress and philosophic insight, as the eternal alone gives a meaning to the temporal. It is only the moral and spiritual self fettered by karma that progresses with its subtle s'arira towards per- fection and not the absolute which is pure and perfect. If saguna Brahman is a glorified samsarin needing mukti for himself, no mumuksu will adore a finite God who is a brahman suffering from imperfection. The Advaitin first accepts saguna Brahman as satisfying the Sutrakara's defini- tion in the second Sutra that Brahman is the first cause and finally relegates the same saguna Brahman to the status of the effected Brahma or the first-born of Brahman. As regards the so-called pluralistic view contained in the expression ' worlds of Brahman ', it should be noted that the words * worlds ' and ' Brahman ' are appositional involving no opposition, and connote Brahman. In mukti, the pluralistic consciousness of the world alone is abolished and not the pluralistic world itself, and it is entirely different from ' the paradise of the popular imagination ' both in degree and in kind ; Vis'istadvaita
MUKTI 471
alone satisfies the philosophic quest for unity and the mystic hunger for union.
The crux of the whole problem lies in the interpretation of the Sfitra (IV. ii. 12) about the destiny of the released self as expounded in the Brhadaranyakopanisad (VI. iv. 6) : " Of him who is without desire (akdmayamdna) his vital breaths or prdnas do not depart." The contention of the Advaitin that it refers to the immediate destruction of the linga s'arira or subtle body resulting from avidyd is examined at some length in Chapter VIII of my " Philosophy of Bhedabheda." It is there shown that the Upanisadic meaning is that the prdnas in the linga s'arlra follow the vidvdn till he tran- scends the world of samsdra. If the theory of the fictitious self (caitanya dbhdsa), which is only an illusory appearance of consciousness attaining the world of Is'vara, the first born of the cosmic figment, is seriously maintained by speculative Advaita, mukti becomes a make-believe, and the whole theory is open to the charge of acosmic illusionism. The Vis'istdd- vaitin claims insight into Veddntic tradition and seeks the saving grace of Brahman as " moksaprasdda," a term for which, according to Deussen, there is no corresponding term in the esoteric system of monism. The Upanisad repeatedly declares the attainment of Brahman as the goal and glory of spiritual endeavour. The Chdndogya (IV. xv. 6), the Mundaka (I. ii. 11), the Brhaddranyaka (VIII. ii. 15) and the Prasma Upanisads (I. 10) guarantee eternal life (apunaravrtti) to the vidvdn who seeks the luminous path and avoids the way of darkness. The Katha Upanisad (II. vi. 16) and the Aitareya Upanisad (VI. v. 1) likewise glorify the way to immortality and the Gltd also (VIII. 26) extols the devaydna path leading to eternity. The Siitras begin with the metaphysical definition
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of Brahman as the immanent ground of existence and end with the religious idea of Brahman as the goal of spiritual experience and the home of all eternal values, and promise mukti and eternal life to the seeker after Brahman as the God of religion.
The ascent to the absolute is further described in the " Paramapada Sopana ", following the " Vaikuntha Gadya " and the Kausltaki Upanisad as the entry into the home of the absolute or divyades'a prapti. The soaring self led by the ambassador of eternity at last enters the waters of im- mortality or Virajd which mark the boundary line or the transition between the transcendental sphere of Brahman and the empirical sphere of karma. By spiritually plunging into the Ocean Pacific, as the mystic calls it, the released self is purified and perfected and goes to the other shore like the stranded islander crossing the sea, and enters his own home in the country of the Soul, where there is light without night or nescience. When Brahman is intuited, the fetters of the heart are broken,1 all doubts are solved and all karma is destroyed. As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea losing their name and form, a wise man freed from name and form goes to the Shining Self and the mortal becomes immortal.2 The Kausltaki Upanisad, while expounding the Paryanka Vidyd (Chap. I. 2 to 5) portrays in the language of sense- symbolism and artistic imagery, the ineffable ecstasy of attaining Brahmaloka or Vaikuntha which is alogical, amoral and supra-personal. The Upanisad frequently refers to the transcendental nature of experience, when it insists on the initiation into Brahmajndna of those who are specialists
1 Mund. Up., II. ii. 8. * Ibid., III. ii. 8.
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in spirituality. Brahman as ultimate reality is realisable only., by the vidvan who is pure in heart, and it is by Brahmaprayatna that he can attain Brahma j fidna and eventually Brahmdnanda in Brahmaloka. Immersed in the Ocean Pacific, the mukta is freed from the contractions of karma in its dual aspect of punya-papa and the pairs of oppo- sites and at the entrance to the infinite he is transfigured and brahmanised. The process of transfiguration is explained metaphorically as Brahmdlarikdra, Brahma gandha and Brah- marasa. In the world of karma, the senses turn outward, but the vidvan who desires immortality has Brahmadrsti or a vision of Brahman. The form, flavour and fragrance of Brahmdnubhava are not physical or psychical, but are aprdkrta or super-sensuous. In the world of Brahman or Paramapada, matter shines without mutation and time exists under the form of eternity. The eternals are not vis'esanas or adjectives housed in the absolute as its elements, but are its members revelling in the rapture of union. " The sun does not shine there, nor the moon, nor the stars ; by His light everything is lighted ". " Brahman is before and behind, above and below." The freed soul gloriously enters into S'n Vaikuntha which is the heart of Brahmaloka and its headquarters, reaches the hall of dnandamaya or bliss and has a direct soul-sight of the Paramjyotis or Supreme Light with a shining form more luminous than a million suns on the paryanka or couch, of which till then he had only fragmentary, inferential and s'dstraic knowledge. Brahman as infinite Beauty is enthroned on a paryanka which no mortal eye has seen and which is supported by dharma, jnana, vairdgya and ais'varya. That throne is prajnd or wisdom and Brahman is satyam or the true of the true. The released self realises the unitive con- sciousness. The infinite of space-time, which staggers the
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scientific imagination, pales into infinitesimal littleness in the light of the infinite and the eternal glory of Vaikuntha, which transcends the limits of thought. The Brahmavit enjoys all the perfections of Vaikiintha like salokya or identity of abode, samipya or proximity, sarupya or similarity of form and sayujya or intimate union ; and is ever immersed in the eternal bliss of Brahman. Salokya or co-existence leads to fellowship (samipya) and transformation and deification (sariipya), and is consummated in the bliss of communion or sayujya.
The nature of mnkti as the attainment of the blessedness of Paramapada cannot be described or defined, and even the Upanisad with its genius for Brahman recognises the utter inadequacy of finite categories to grasp the meaning of that transcendental state. Brahmaloka is the nameless beyond, which cannot be proved by logical thinking or apprehended by s'astraic or scriptural knowledge. The absolute of onto- logy is beyond space and time or prakrti and kdla, and is therefore niravayava or formless, nirguna or indeterminate, kalatita or eternal. As Paramatman, Brahman is the super- subject and is supra- personal and transcends the limits of materialism and spiritualism. Ethical religion is equally help- less in knowing the redemptive will of l&vara as the Creator of creators and overcoming the dilemma of free will and determinism. From the religious point of view, He reveals Himself unto him whom He chooses as He is Himself the ttpaya and the upeya ; and it is difficult to decide between voluntarism and predestination. On the whole the Vms- tadvaitic idea of mttkti transcends the theorising activity of thought, and cannot be labelled as a form of theism, non- dualism or any other known form of * ism '.
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This negative logic saves its philosophy from the charge of dogmatism, but it may lead to the perils of agnosticism. The Upanisad therefore attempts to describe the inexpressible experience by positive predicates, by insisting on the fact of intuitive perception of Brahman by the purified and perfected consciousness or jnana. The Brahmavit can apprehend Brahman with the divine eye, comprehend His nature and have an integral experience of the absolute (paripurna Brahma- nubhava). He is led from the unreal to the real, from dark- ness to light and from death to immortality1 and though this experience is alogical and amoral, the Upanisad tries to make it intelligible to the empirical consciousness in terms of cog- nition, conation and feeling. Brahman is the All-Self and by the expansive consciousness of dharmabhutajnana, the nityasiiri realises the unitive state. Rsi Vamadeva saw Brahman in all beings and all beings in Brahman and, on the onset of cosmic consciousness, he sang " I am Manu, I am the sun, I am all things." The mukta overcomes the moral distinction of punya-papa and realises all his desires in Paramapada. His self-feeling melts away at the sight of the bewitching beauty of Brahman and his Vcddntic thought expires in the ecstasy of mystic union.
Yama, the God of Death, teaches Naciketas the nature of deathless life or mukti, and in expounding his teaching, Ramanuja following the Siltrakara develops his philosophy by refuting rival theories.2 These may be arranged in an ascending order according to their Vedantic value. The Buddhist, as Ksanikavijnanavadin, regards the jiva as a series of momentary mental states appearing as a persisting
1 Brhad. Up., III. Hi. 28. - S.B., I. ii. 12.
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entity and explains mukti as the cessation of the psycho- physical process. In nirvana, the self perishes, the five skandas are abolished and pain passes away and there is stir- less repose. But a mere mental state cannot seek mukti and the fatal negative logic of nirvana leads to the abyss of s'unya or void. The Jaina posits the existence of ihejlva and explains mukti as the severance of the dtman from the soilure of karma and the entry of the self into endless perfection. But if mukti is an ascent and not an attain- ment, such an endless pursuit is without ethical meaning and spiritual value. The ethical concept of progress can have its meaning only in the religious realisation of Brah- man. In the Sdnkhyan scheme, bondage is the conjunc- tion of purusa and prakrti and mukti is their disjunction. Kaivalya is the flight of the alone to the alone. It is more a negative state of riddance from evil than the realisation of positive bliss. The freed self is a passive spectator that knows nothing and does nothing. The Vais'esika affirms the exist- ence of l&vara ; but his view of mukti is also negative, as it means only the cessation of pain and the abolition of the cognitional activity of the jlva. The Vais'esika feels that thinking leads to doubt and distress, and is therefore inclined to do away with the whole process. But the state of the abolished consciousness is like the stillness of the statue and the peace of death. Consciousness without an object is equivalent to unconsciousness. The Veddntic view of mukti has the merit of recognising the eternal value of Brahma- jnana though Vedantins differ in their exposition. Bhaskara, the Bhedabhedavadin, defines mukti as the attainment of ekl- bhdva or oneness with the absolute in which the jlva sheds its conditionateness or upadhis and becomes the unconditioned Brahman. The other Bheddbhedavddins correct the monistic
MUKTI 477
tendency of Bhaskara and explain mukti as the realisation of the identity of ihejlva with Brahman as well as its difference. To them mukti is not the abolition of the self but its fulfil- ment as an element or member of the absolute. As the S'dkt says, Brahman is both the seamless or pure con- sciousness and the sundered whole. The Dvaitavdda of Anandatirtha rejects all the monistic views of mukti, but its contention that there are differences in the qualitative experiences of the bliss of Brahman is not acceptable to the Vi&istadvaitin.
The Advaitic view of mukti in its different forms demands more attention on account of its philosophic interest and the respect it commands in modern Indian thought. Mukti is defined by the Advaitins as the negation of nescience or bhramd that is somehow in Brahman and is variously interpreted as self-transcendence, disillusionment or self-identity of the absolute. If avidya means the principle of relativity or dual- ity, mukti is the dissolution of the dualistic outlook, and it is not very different from Bhaskara's ekiblidva. If avidya is the upddhi as an illusion and not as a phenomenal appearance, mukti means disillusionment. By denying the false, the true remains identical with itself. This view, however, has to meet the charge of leading to acosmism and subjectivism. Mukti is negatively stated as the removal of a jndna through jndna. If avidya is non-existent, like the square-circle, and Brahmajiidna is jndna that is Brahman and not jndna of Brahman, Brahman is ever-existent, and the question of mukti would not arise at all. The theistic criticism of Advaita as Buddhism in disguise is met by its modern expounders by the counter-argument that Buddhism itself is Advaita in a negative aspect. The Advaitic view of nirvana as
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Brahmajnana is said to complete and justify the negative way of Buddhist dialectics, as it regards the absolute as srunya or non-existent from the empirical standpoint and as the fulness of being in the transcendental state. Buddhism is said to be valuable to the Advaitic dialecticians when it lays bare the self-contradictions of the Is'vara concept and thus marks a transition to aikyavdda. The absolutist as a mere Mdydvddin makes common cause with Nagarjuna and Bradley, and pulls down Is'vara from His Is'varatva by defining Him as the absolute phenomenalised, being-becoming and the finite-in- finite caught up in the self-contradiction of maya, subordinat- ing Him even to the jivanmukta and finally destroying Him by the devastating dialectic of drstisrsti-vada and ekajlvavada. S'aiikara's distinction of two Brahmans and two muktis tends to compromise the absolute of monism by mobilising the immobile nirguna Brahman and giving Him an empiric dress to suit the needs of the avidyd-riddeu theist, though this attempt at fusion seems to end in confusion. The Nagarjuna or Humiau mentality is obvious in the following compliment paid by an eminent Advaitin to Vis'istddvaita : " Ramanuja's beautiful stories of the other world, which he narrates with the confidence of one who had personally assisted at the origination of the world, carries no conviction." The criticism of illusionism by the same thinker is, however, in the theistic line. " The false imitators of the Upanisadic ideal with an extreme of arrogant audacity declare that Brahman is absolute- ly homogeneous impersonal intelligence." If the Advaitin gives up his intellectualism and its resulting agnosticism and follows his religious instinct, nirguna Brahman would become practically the same as the Brahman of Vis'istddvaita and muhti would then be gained by the saving grace of God. Nirguna Brahman would not be the truth of saguna Brahman
MUKTI 479
as reality behind appearance but would be saguna Brahman itself. Mukti would then mean not the abolition of plurality, but only the removal of the sense of plurality or of a false outlook.
Ramanuja understands by mukti the integral experience of Brahman that has infinite jhdna and dnanda and other per- fections. This is also the true nature of the jlva realised by the destruction of avidyd-kanna. The jlva is a prakdra or s'arlra of Brahman and its jiidna which is infinite, has, as its essential nature, the intuitive experience of the bliss of Brah- man. The Chdnddgya text (VIII. iii. 4) explains mukti as the self-realisation of the at man by self-transcendence " Param jyotir upasampadya svena riipena abhini&padyate " and the Sutras bring out its full implication.1 The serene self attains the being of its being when it has a soul-sight of the boundless light of Brahman, and thus attains its essential and eternal nature. Self-realisation is not the attainment or emergence of something neu , but is the self-manifestation due to the cessa- tion of avidya-karma and the samsdric process resulting therefrom. In mukti the dtman is free from sin, old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst, and his desires are at once realised. Karma conditions jiidna and contracts it and creates the bodily self which is subject to contingency, change and sorrow ; but in mukti the mortal becomes immortal and the self regains its eternity. Consciousness in the empirical states of waking, dream and sleep is obscured by avidyd and is cribbed and cabined ; but, in the expansive state of the unitive life, it realises its infinity. Though the dtman is avikdra or changeless and nitya or eternal, the limitations and obscurations of its attributive intelligence affect its integrity indirectly, and it is 1 S.B., IV. iv. i.
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only in the state of self-realisedness that the self shines in its own effulgence like the cloudless sun. The atman itself is a ray of the Paramjyotis or supreme light and its luminosity is the revelation of the boundless light, which is the source of the light of suns and stars and the serene self. Self-realisation is thus the intuitive knowledge of the at man and its self, and is not bare identity. If, as the Advaitin says.jndna consists in the abolition of the vrttis of the self or psychoses, nothingness alone would remain, and mukti would cease to have any meaning. The self cannot suck in its own selfhood without committing suicide.
Brahmajnana is the intuition of Brahman as the Supreme Self, and, though it is alogical, the Sutras, in the concluding section, seek to make it intelligible to us by using metaphors and analogies in the language of cognition, conation and feeling. Before denning the content of mukti, the fascinating problem of the destiny of the soul is discussed. Is mukti the experience of absolute distinction and difference between the mukta and Brahman or of their identity or inseparability ? The Upanisads express divergent views, which seem to defy the Sutra method of samanvaya and synthesis. The bheda texts like those of the Katha Upanisad (I. iii. 1) dwell on the distinction between the two and the absolute dependence of they'Zva on Is'vara. The Taittiriya Upanisad (Anand. i) and the Mundaka Upanisad (III. i. 3) dwell on fellowship and equality of attributes when the seer intuits the shining self and attains all desires along with Brahman. The Chdndogya text in VI. xiii and the Mundaka text in III. ii. 8 intimate the truth of absorption by the analogy of the dissolution of salt in water and the merging of the river in the sea. The western absolutist uses the terms absorption, mergence,
MUKTI 481
coalescence, dissolution, dissipation and identity in a loose sense without defining their exact meaning and value. The monistic texts favour identity when they affirm that the self is Brahman. The philosophical theist insists on the external but eternal relation between the finite and the infinite and defines Brahman as the personal God entering into personal relations with thejlva with a view to redeeming it from its career of sin, and states that, in Brahmaloka, the mukta has the freedom to serve Is'vara in his own unique way. He also affirms the fellowship and equality of the self with God as the son of God participating in the joy of the Father. Bhaskara defines mukti as eklbhdva or oneness with the absolute in which the self is dissolved in the infinite both in existence and in content. The idea of Dvaitddvaita or pluralistic monism as a form of bheddbheda preserves separateness as well as unity. The monist insists on identity or aikya as opposed to separateness (bheda), similarity (parama sdmya or sdmarasya), absorption (eklbhdva) and the ideas of bheddbheda.
The Sutrakara reconciles all the texts and their truths by the all-comprehensive concept of avibhdga.1 The dtman has Brahman as its inner self and prakdrin and the non- dualistic consciousness of the mukta is revealed in the ex- perience, " I am Brahman without any division or vibhdga." This does not mean svariipa aikya or absolute identity but vis'ista aikya in which the self is realised as the aprthaksid- dhavis'esana or inseparable mode and not as an adjec- tive housed in the absolute. The jlva abides for ever as an entity and is different from Brahman, but though there is difference in denotation, there is identity in connotation, as every concept connoting the prakdra also connotes the 1 S.B., iv. iv. 4.
31
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prakdrin. This avindbhdva or inseparability abolishes the sense of exclusiveness and externality that belongs to the bodily self of ahankdra or egoism, but it does not annul the aham or ego consciousness of the dtman. Rapt in love, the mukta is ever drawn by the beauty of Brahman and enjoys its bliss. Equality is attained when the bmhmanised mukta sheds his body, shakes off punya-pdpa and acquires the purity of Brahman. Such transmutation does not mean that every discord and evil is harmonised in the absolute and contributes to its wholeness. The sense of dependence is revealed by the truth that the s'arlra depends for its life on the s'arlrin and serves as an instrument of His will. Avibhdga or non-divi- sion thus connotes existential difference between Brahman and the mukta and experienced unity due to the joy of sdyujya or intimate communion, and it is not the same as the loss of personality. In the mystic sense, the self-feeling is swallowed up in the supra-personal experience of avibhdga or the unitive experience of the bliss of Brahman. This brings out the nature of Brahmarasa more than co-existence (salokya), similarity (sdrupya) and intimacy (sdmlpya). As the Visnu Purdna ! says, the mukta attains dtmabhdva like magnetised iron and is not identical with Brahman. The author of the Dramida Bhdsya also says that owing to his equality (sdyujya) with the divinity, the mukta effects all things like Him. The Gitd defines mukti as the attainment of equality of attributes with Brahman/
Identity philosophy (aikyavdda) is extolled by Deussen as the fundamental truth of philosophy and religion, which the Upanisadic thinkers discovered for the first time to their
1 Visnu Purana, VI. vii. 30. *B. G.t XIV. 2.
MUKTI 483
immortal honour. The same solution was, according to him, found later, ont wo occasions, by Parmenides and Plato in whom Greek thought reached its climax, and still later by Kant and Schopenhauer. According to this view, Brahman is the sole reality and the world is only an appearance or maya which is to be rejected. The equational view is later explained by Deussen in terms of unio-mystico or mystic union. In the meta- physical domain there is no becoming. \Vhat is two can never become one and what is one is one already. The state of mukti is further elucidated by the term indivisibility in the light of the simile of the rivers losing their names when they flow into the sea. Mukti is also denned by him as a state of the trans- formation of the natural man. He says that the Upanisad and the New Testament state the same truth though the former demands a change of the understanding and the latter, of the will. The terms equation, union and indivisibility used by Deussen are neither synonymous nor clear. Identity is not the same as equation and both are different from the term indivisibility. The meaning conveyed by the term transfor- mation as also the term inseparability fits in with Vis'istad- vaita and has no relation to the theory of pure consciousness* Deussen's exposition is rejected by other modern Advaitins who make a distinction between the illusion theory and the phenomenon view, and criticise the former as a false imitation or misunderstanding of the Upanisadic ideal. The finite ac- cording to them is rooted in the infinite and even in mukti there is the abolition not of plurality but only of the sense of plurality. The illusoriness of the world disappears and no longer deceives the mukta, though the illusion may remain. Non-difference denies difference but does not affirm identity. Advaitic experience thus interpreted has much in common with Bhaskara's idea of mukti as ekibhava or the unitive
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experience of the mystic. If the logic of mysticism is followed, the only conclusion is the Sutra idea of avibhaga as inter- preted by Ramanuja. Advaita has either to accept the ajata- vada of Gaudapada and its Buddhistic leanings or to make common cause with the view of Vis'istadvaita. The latter is an integral experience of Brahman which satisfies all the demands of spiritual life, and the canons of consistent thinking.
The next question is the enquiry into the nature of the manifestation of intelligence in mukti. While Jaimini thinks that the freed self is brahmanised and has the eight-fold perfections of Brahman, Audulomi favours the monistic view that moksa is the realisation of the pure consciousness of Brahman (vijnana-ghana) devoid of the subject-object relation. The Advaitin distinguishes between the intuition of the indeterminate and the logical thought of the concrete universal. He concludes that Brahma jnana is consciousness transcending the self-contradictions of the sub- ject-object relation and that Jaimini is at the logical level of Is'vara and that Audulomi has the intuition of the absolute. But consciousness, as ' the name itself suggests, implies an experiencing subject conscious of an object and is therefore determinate. Absolute consciousness without any content is in no way different from absolute unconsciousness like that of a stone or the sleep state. Consistent monism affirming absolute consciousness or cinmatra cannot maintain the theory of the All-Self or universal consciousness, as the sat without a second is neither a self nor All-Self, and the universe and its manifoldness vanish in the absolute. If Is'vara is moulded by thought and spatialised by the upadhis, and if omniscience is nescience on a cosmic scale, philosophy itself would be
MUKTI 485
infected by avidya and religion would become a mere appear- ance. The only way of avoiding subjectivism and nihilism is to retrace the steps and accept the integrity of the one Brahman without dissecting it into two and to consider it as sagtma as all the other Veddntic philosophers do. In mukti, the brahmanised self acquires Brahma jndna and intuits Brahman in all beings and all beings in Brahman " under the form of eternity ". Intuition is the alogical which is the fulfilment of the logical. The monism of Audulomi is acceptable to Bada- rayana if it Drings out the self-manifestation of intelligence without doing violence to the theistic exposition of Jaimini. The principle of sublation is inadmissible where there is equal Upanisadic authority for both the sides, and there is really no self-contradiction in the varieties of Upanisadic experience. Self-illumination in the state of mukti brings out the infinite intelligence and omniscience of the finite or monadic self, when it is freed from the limitations of karma. Its vis'ista aikya is then apprehended in non-difference from Brahman. The Veddntic seer intuits Brahman as his very self when he says : " I am Thou, Holy Divinity, and Thou art myself." " What He is, that am I." Prahlada, like Vama- deva, in his ecstasy, thus describes the onset of cosmic consciousness and All-Selfness : " As the infinite is all-per- vading, He is myself, all things proceed from me, I am all things, all things are in me who am eternal." ' The dtman is non-different from the Supreme Self by attaining the being of its being. Nammalvar also affirms the truth of this cosmic experience when he, in the excess of his love, imitates and mirrors forth the glory of God and claims in his Tiruvdimoli (V. vi) the two vibhutis of the cosmic and ultra-cosmic func- tions as his own. He feels he owns the infinite when he has
1 Visnu Purana, I. xix. 85.
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a soul-sight of ' that divine thread which holds the whole congeries of things '. Thus the mukta with his freed conscious- ness views himself and the cosmos with the eye of Brahman (Brahma caksus) when he experiences his aham as the pra- kdra or mode of Brahman and when his jnana mirrors forth the whole universe and he realises his oneness with Brahman.
In the world of the absolute as will, the self is freed from its imprisonment in egoistic individuality and entangle- ment in the wheel of punya-pdpa and acquires its purity and other perfections. Mukti is not the isolation of kaivalya nor the abolition of consciousness, but is the consum- mation of moral endeavour, in which the divinised self realises the eternal values of life. It is a state of self-transcendence in which the moral life is perfected in the amoral, resulting in the transvaluation and conservation of all eternal values. Owing to the infinity of the essential quality, the mukta, as Dramida says, effects all things like the divinity.1 The mukta enjoys the perfections of Brahman with Brahman 2 and enjoys everything everywhere by his mere sankalpa or will without any external aid or constraint. He wills the true and the good and every conation is immediately fulfilled without the moral gulf between endeavour and end, between the apprehension of good and its attainment. The victim of samsdra is now a victor thereof and a self-ruler and enjoys absolute freedom from the shackles of karma and the taint of error, evil, ugli- ness and other imperfections. He is no longer subject to Vedic and Veddntic imperatives and external determinations. The ' ought to be ' of Karma Yoga is now fulfilled in the
1S. B. £,,XLVIII, p. 99. 2 Tait. Up.. Anand. i.
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deeper ' is ' of the world of Brahman. Every sankalpa or act of will is at once satisfied, and this satisfaction is enriched by fecundity and the novelties created by the self. The idea of a block universe in which the sat merely is a stirless, static being and the self emptied of its content is a void, is alien to the Vis'istadvaitic view of moksa. The eternal realises itself in the temporal and is an eternal now. When space-time is transfigured, it adds to the infinite riches of spiritual experience. The mukta has the freedom to move in both the worlds. While the ascent to the world of eternity is an escape from the sorry scheme of samsara, the descent of the freed self into the finite world expresses the cosmic freedom of the mukta, whose all-pervasive consciousness destroys the barriers of distance and duration. The worlds of Ilia and nitya constitute the world of Brahman as a whole and are comprised in the all-inclusive cosmic consciousness. By realising Brahman as the self of all the worlds, everything else is realised.
Though Brahman imparts its nature to the atman, its mode, and infinitises itsjnana, the atman persists in its monadic being with a view to utilising the freedom gained in moksa in self-effacement and service to the Supreme Self, who is the ground of all existents. I&vara alone has cosmic rulership and the stability of salvation is the gift of His redemptive will, and it is this jagad vyapdra or universal lordship that marks the difference between the atman that is the self-ruler and Brahman the world-ruler.1 He alone sustains the cosmic, moral and spiritual order and guarantees immortality to the mumuksu. He plays with the atman in the world of Ilia and brahmanises it in the world of eternity. Though God's 1 jagad vyaparavarjam prakarapad asannihitatvacca I. Ve, Su.t IV. iv. 17.
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will is eternally self-realised, it is also realising itself in the making of the universe for the moulding of muktas. The finite self lives, moves and has its being in Brahman as the All-Self or sarva s'aririn. The Sutra in the S'ariraka S'dstra dealing with cosmic rulership orjagat vydpdra is a stumbling block to the monist, and he seeks to explain it away by the theory of two Brahmans and two muktas. But the logic of jlvanmukti as expounded by Mdydvdda exposes itself to the difficulties of subjectivism and pan-illusionism. Jlvanmukti to be absolute cannot admit of stages of stultification or negating negation and this would be possible only if the pure Advaita of eka-jiva be accepted with its solipsistic consequences. But practical Advaita with its faith in s'astra and in the social order prefers the philosophy of nand-jwa or many souls and I&vara and the religion of sarva mukti, and this end can be realised only by attaining the world of Brahman and His mukti prasdda or gift of deliverance. Bhaskara rejects the theory of two Brahmans. He also rejects the theistic idea of mukti as the realisation of the dependence of the jiva on Is'vara, who is absolutely different from it. But he describes two ways to mukti cajled krama mukti or gradual deliverance and sadyomukti or immediate deliverance. The former is a progressive attainment of Brahman and provides for the theistic temper, and the latter satisfies the monistic yearning for immediate intuition. This interpretation has the advantage of real sympathy for the theistic view, but it strains the text to suit a pre-conceived theory. Vis'istadvaita seeks to follow the primary and explicit meaning of s'dstra which alone has specialised in the exposition of moksa and accepts the literal sense of Brahman being the only Lord of the world or jagat. Brahman is the srarlrin of the atman, the life of its life (ddhdra), and the inner ruler of the self (vidhata), and the dtman exists
MUKTI 489>
and knows that it exists for the satisfaction of Brahman. It is therefore nothing, has nothing and does nothing by itself. As Paramdtman alone is the ground of the atman and pulsates through its being, it is nothing without Him. Finite will exists, but has no value. As the inner ruler of the self, Brahman has the will to control all beings and is the real agent of all activity and action, and the jlva can do nothing by itself. The self belongs to Brahman and is a means to His satisfaction. Therefore it has nothing for itself. Brahman is Himself the ground and the goal, the end and endeavour. While matter also subserves the divine end, the mukta knows the meaning of svamitva, and effaces his self-consciousness by service to the Lord and to the society of free and freed selves. The true value of freedom lies in attuning the finite will to the Infinite and making it His instrument. Paramapada is not a society of freed selves, which seek to cooperate with Brahman and help Him in the evolution of His cosmic purpose, nor is it a world suffering from the contradictions and confusion of two wills, finite and infinite, with no chance of harmony. The first view betrays the egoism of the naive theist, and the second, the intellectualism of the speculative monist. The idea of ddsatva in the ethical monism of Vis'is- tddvaita does not imply slave-mentality extolled as a spiritual virtue, but brings out the infinite riches of the denial of ego- ism and attunement of the self to the cosmic purpose of universal redemption. Mukti is the realisation of the meaning of the relation between the jlva and Is'vara enshrined in the Upanisadic text " Thou art that ", and there is more value in abolishing the ahankdra of the jlva by self-effacement and the surrender of the self to the true Self than in dissolving and annulling the idea of Is'vara and deifying the jlva. Kainkarya rasa brings out the joy of selfless service, but kaivalya rasa
490 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
savours of atmarati or delight in the self, and it may lapse into moral stultification and egoism. In attuning his naughted will to that of the sresl, the mukta as a modeless mode feels that he is like a lute on which the supreme singer plays. Love is fulfilled in surrender and service and its cosmic value lies in attuning itself to the infinite.
But it is the experience of the bliss of Brahman that expresses the supreme value of mukti in the Vis'istddvaitic sense of the ecstasy of the unitive consciousness.1 The mukta is immersed in the supreme and unsurpassable bliss of Brahmanubhava without losing his self-being. It is a state of sayujya in which the unitive experience of bliss is present without the loss of self-existence.2 Veddntic mukti is not the cessation of sorrow which is in vacuo, as in the Vais'esika theory, but is the positive experience of dnanda which is inef- fable and incommunicable. Even the Upanisad with its genius for explaining Brahmanubhava fails in its hedonistic .and eudaemonistic description which is unparalleled in mystic power, to measure by a calculus of pleasures the bliss of Brahman, in which speculative thought melts away and expires in enjoyment. Visaydnanda or the delight in the objects of sense due to contacting sense-object is really pleasant, but transient and trivial, and the thrills arising from excitement exhaust themselves by their very nature. Vivekdnanda is the happiness of culture and contentment arising from sweet -reasonableness and, though more enduring than pleasure, it has .not the intrinsic value of dtmdnanda or the satisfaction of •self-realisedness. But even this state results from self-centred- jness and is therefore individualistic. Brahmdnanda is the
1 Ve. Su., IV. iv. 21.
2 vide, Chap. XXII of Vedanta Des'ika's Rahasyatraya Sara.
MUKTI 491
blessedness of divine communion which passeth all understand- ing and the Brahmajndm alone can give an experience-defini- tion of that exalted state which transcends the imperfect medium of thought and language.1 The analytic intellect seeks to dissect the soul of such Brahmarasa and expresses it diagrammatically, as it were, in Veddntic language. To the theist Brahmdnanda is two-sided. It involves two centres of experience and a double fruition, and it admits of qualitative and quantitative difference. Bhaskara expounds it as eklbhdva or the abolition of the /itoa>consciousness in intent and extent and absorption in the absolute. The merging of the self in the All-Self is like the dissolution of the fragrance of the flower in the air and the melting of the iceberg in the ocean. Advaitic bliss transcends the duality of the experient and the experienced object and the delight is not in tasting the rasa but in being bliss itself. But on the Vis'istddvaitic view of sdyujya the soul-hunger of God and the God-hunger of the soul are satisfied, and the separate consciousness of both is swallowed up in the enjoyment of bliss. Speaking of this state, the Upanisad bursts into ecstasy : " I eat as food him who eats food." * " As a man embraced by his be- loved wife knows nothing that is without or within, even so the self when embraced by the All-Knowing Self knows nothing without and nothing within." 3 Thus in Brahmdnanda, the experients exist, but their feeling of separateness melts away in the irresistibility of ecstasy. " Even wisdom is swept away and sunk in rapture." In the rapt love of mystic union, the mukta is mad with God and sings about His glory and
1 yato vacQ nivartante I aprapya manasa saha I — Tait, Anand. iv,
2 aham annam annamadantam admi. — Tait. Vp.t Bhrgu., X.
8 tad yatha priyaya striya samparisvaktah na bahyam kiScana veda nantaram evam evayam puru?ah prajflenatmana samparisvaktali na bahyam kiScana veda nantaram. — Br. Up., VI. iii. 21.
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goodness by chanting the songs of the Sama Veda. The bliss of union is ever fecundative, and it enhances the value of the released state. The bliss of self-realisedness signifies the self that is realised and its value is eternally conserved.
In a true philosophy of religion, reality and value go together. The scientist-philosopher who thinks that the uni- verse is indifferent to moral and spiritual values is as one sided as the ethical religionist who accepts the supremacy of faith and fights shy of reason. But the world of facts is also the realm of ends and values. To create a gap between reason and faith is not in the interests of either and this truth is well brought out in the history of western thought as well as in Indian philosophy. Spinoza as a mystic philosopher dis- covered the futility of following the mathematical method of philosophy, retraced his steps in his Ethics and rehabilitated philosophy. Kant likewise realised the failure of theoretical reason and turned to practical reason and judgment as the way of escape from agnosticism. Indian philosophy has no doubt been relatively free from the conflict between philosophy and religion ; but certain monistic schools have rejected the reality of ethical religion and its ultimate values. S'ankara as a metaphysician says that avidya, as negation should be negat- ed or stultified ; but, as a believer in mumuksutva and mukti, he insists on moral and religious values. Certain Semitic religions, on the other hand, have faith in the supremacy of scriptural values but do not trust the method of philosophy. But a religion which is hostile to metaphysics stifles reason ; man is essentially a thinking being and unless his faith is grounded in philosophy, it cannot claim any stability. Visristadvaita as a philosophy of religion posits and proves that reality is
MUKTI 493
realisable and is therefore the home of eternal values. Brah- man is the absolute, and finite thought purified by the sadhanas can cross the barriers of finiteness and intuit the absolute. The Veddntin as a philosopher can think God's thought after Him and realise His godliness By knowing Brahman as the reason of the universe, the jnani is freed from worldliness and attains the realm of ethical values.
It is only when the soul reaches perfection in mukti that perfect satisfaction arises. The universe as the lllavibhuti exists not for pleasure but for the moulding of the soul into a mukta. Cit and acit are eternally real and do not admit of degrees of reality. But values admit of levels or degrees. Values have meaning only in relation to the self and the satisfaction of its desires. In the phenomenal world the values of the evolving self are transient and perishing. The values of spiritual life are more stable and permanent than those of the sensuous life ; but it is only in mukti that the jlva is perfected and brahman- ised. The mukta is no longer affected by the flux of prakrti or tainted by evil, error or ugliness. The values of truth, goodness and beauty then attain their highest degree of per- fection. Mukti is not merely freedom from ignorance, sin and sorrow, but is also the regaining of Paramapada which is the realm of eternal values. It is not true to say that values alone survive in the absolute and not persons. The freed self is not a vanishing illusion, nor does it merge in the whole like the dew-drop slipping into the shining sea. Its con- tent is no doubt transmuted ; but it is not true to say that it contributes to the whole. The only offering that the freed self makes to Brahman is self-gift without selfishness. Every value is trans-valued and perfected. The self gains itself by renouncing its empirical and exclusive nature,
494 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
acquires the colour, flavour and fragrance of Brahman (Brahma rtipa, Brahmarasa and Brahmagandha) and is immersed in its everlasting and ever fecundative bliss. Freed from the shackles of prakrti and the limitations of time, it lives in spaceless space and timeless time, and it is supra-personal, but not impersonal. Brahman, the absolute, has, in the nitya vibhuti, no history * ; it has " no seasons, but all at once bears its leaves, blossom and fruit." In the world of lila, there is endless progress involving endless duration due to the pitfalls and perils of metempsychosis. Infinite becoming is self -contradictory and purposeless, and becoming really pre- supposes being and a beginning and an end. In Paramapada, the jiva attains its infinite consciousness and regains the eternal values. Eternity is not the prolongation of the present life, nor is it personal survival, but is a state of self- transcendence, in which the self renounces the phenomenal shows that come and go and realises its noumenal state.
The world of Paramapada is a shining spiritual world,2 and is made of bliss itself, aprakrta, paramakd&a and ananda- loka. It is the realm of s'uddhasatva made of a peculiar kind of matter, which is immutable. It isajada and is self-luminous like jndna, and exists for the enjoyment of the atman. Space and time do not disappear in the absolute, but are transfigured and contribute to the infinite riches of divine experience. Paramapada transcends the world of prakrti or tamas, and has more resplendence than that of a million suns and stars. In its purity and perfection, it is beyond the obscuration of amdydj the taint of evil and the stain of ugliness. It is a noumenal realm, which can neither be perceived by the senses
1 kalam sa pacate tatra na kalas tatra vaiprabhuh. — Mahabharata, S'anti parva, CXC. vi. 9. jfiananandamaya lokah. — Sri Pancaratra.
MUKTI 495
nor conceived by the spatialising intellect. It cannot be ade- quately described by s'dstra and can only be intuited under the form of eternity by the nityasuri or the mukta. The supreme beauty of Paramapada cannot be adequately port- rayed by the divine faculty of the poet, the painter or the musician. The bliss of dnandaloka can be described only by the blissful mukta. The allegories employed by Plato and Plotinus to describe the * ideas r of beauty and the glories of the spiritual worlds are poor symbols of the sublimity enshrined in the mystic language of the KausUaki Upanisad and the Vaikuntha Gadya of Ramanuja. Brahman has His own transcendental nature (svarupa), infinity of perfections (guna) and supreme unsurpassed form of beauty (rupa), which are alogical, amoral and supra-mystical. Metaphysics deals with what can be known, and that is the world of Brahman ;. ethics deals with what, should be done, and that is kainkarya or service ; and religion deals with what we may hope for, and that is the attainment of the immortality of bliss. In this way metaphysical knowledge ripens into virtue, and virtue is crowned with happiness. The supreme end of life is the enjoyment of the bliss of Brahman. Logic and ethics have their consummation in aesthetics and mysticism, and the crowning glory of mystic experience is to revel in the beauty of dnandaloka. Vis'istddvaita is the only philosophy of religion that identifies existence and value and defines Brahman as satyasya satyam ! or real reality which brahman- ises the mukta and imparts its beauty and bliss to him.
Paramapada is the realm of self-luminous s'uddhasatva? which is free from the parindmic or evolutionary modifications
1 Br. Up., IV. i. 20 and IV. iii. 6.
2 svasattabhasakam satvam gunasatvad vilaksanam. — Sri P&ncaratra.
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•of prakrti and the contracting influence of its three gunas. It is beyond prakrti and its twenty-three successive ema- nations, and it is not therefore conditioned by the five elements that compose the cosmic stuff, nor is it affected by the psycho-physical changes of the mind-body of the migrating jiva. In Paramapada, matter exists, without modification, in an aprdkrta or non-material form ; but its value in mukti is more important than its eternal existence. It shines in its own light as ajada, but it exists as a medium and means for the enjoyment of the mukta. Beauty consists of form and matter and can never be nirguna or attributeless, or nir- avayava or formless. Brahman who is nirguna and niravayava wills to be and becomes the Beautiful by creating a body of His own which has divine symmetry, softness,1 fragrance, colour and eternal youthfulness, with a view to ravishing the bound self, including the asura or demoniac type, out of its fleshly feeling and sinfulness, and imparts His beauty and bliss to the mukta. The radiant form of Brahman is bodied forth with matchless lyric beauty in the Bhaga- vata, the Vaikuntha Gadya and the Paramapada Sopana. Brahman beautifies, and is beautified by, the whole uni- verse of cit and acit. The world of nature is His S'rl Vatsa or the emblem on His chest ; and the spiritual world of the dtman adorns His heart as the gem called the Kau~ stubha. While embodiment as the effect of karma is an impediment and may even be evil, embodiedness in Parama- pada is the creative spontaneity of the aesthetic joy of Brahman. The jndna of the mukta is all-pervasive ; but if he desires the enjoyment of his cosmic freedom with a body, the desire is immediately realised, and he attunes himself to the will of I&vara as in the waking consciousness of the
1 C/., sarvagandhah, sarvarasah — Ch. Up.% III. xiv. 2 and 4.
MUKTI 497
baddha state l. Without a body he enjoys the same freedom divinely created as in the dream state of the baddha. In any case the freedom of the mukta is no longer obscured by avidya or curtailed by karma. He enjoys eternal self-rule and universal sovereignty by the absolute abolition of the egoistic and individualistic standpoint and attunes himself to the redemptive will of Is'vara as the cosmic s'esi.
Time does not vanish in the abyss of the absolute as a stirless state of nothingness, but it enriches the blissful experience of Brahman, which is an eternal now. The nitya siiri is the spectator of all time in the supra-temporal state of Paramapada. The meaning and value of time in the Vis'istadvaitic system can be determined by distinguishing the three meanings of time expounded by western philosophers, namely, endless duration in the phenomenal realm, the eternal that transcends the temporal process, and the eternal that is in the temporal and beyond it. According to the first inter- pretation, time in the world of sense is finite and relative, but is not subjective, nor is it an internal sense, which is illusory. Time is the succession of events and not a series of exclusive moments. Nothing is static, and everything is in a state of ceaseless becoming. Things pass away and perish, as they come into being. Worlds are dissolved periodically at the end of each kalpa or epoch, and even Brahmas come and go in the ever-changing universe. The destruction and with- drawal of the cosmic process is itself conditioned by kala or time. The time sense varies with the process of the suns and other celestial bodies, and the infinite time taken up by the passing away of the cosmos is but a day for Brahma, and even
1 tanvabhave sandhyavad upapatte^i. — Ve. SH.t IV. iv. 13. Bhave jagradvat.— Ve. Su.t IV. iv. 14.
32
498 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
the cosmic will of Is'vara is self-conditioned by kdla. But this view is not tenable, as pure duration without a being that endures is an abstraction. To say that time is beginningless is to be entangled in the fallacy of infinite regress, and endless process is self-contradictory. The view that being changes is unthinkable. Therefore the monist goes to the other extreme, when he contends that being is real and becoming is illusory. Thus, according to the second view, the eternal is pure being and the temporal is an illusion that exists but is not real. Progress and regress are self-discrepant, and they cannot be ascribed to pure being. The absolute has no history, and reality does not progress, though there may be progress in reality. Reality sublates and transcends the three-dimensional process. Mukti thus connotes the non-existence of time and the self- identity of Brahman. Whatever is is and whatever is not is not.
Vis'istddvaita gives a different exposition of the nature of time. It steers clear of the two extremes of endlessness and eternity by affirming the eternal as immanent in the temporal and transcending it. The Hid vibhuti, the world of splendour which exists for the sport of the Lord, is the play of the eternal in the temporal and the nitya vibhuti or eternal splendour of Paramapada is time as eternity. The former is the realm of karma or causal necessity without any contin- gency, and is the sphere of soul-making and is not a realm of relativity rooted in avidyd. The finite self feels its finitude, and seeks freedom from the passing shows of empirical life by attaining immortality. As the eternal alone gives meaning to the temporal process and is its final consummation, the reality of the progressive attainment of eternal life is assured. Moral and spiritual endeavour is a sddhana for such self-transcend- ence. Truth leads to the more of itself and is the passage of
MUKTI 499
the self from the Ilia vibhuti to the nitya vibhuti which is the infinitely more glorious * yonder '. In the former, time is finite and affected by the gunas, while in the latter, it is not causally related, but is infinite and beyond the plane of space- time. Samsdra is determined by the time series, but mukti determines the time series by the self gaining mastery over it. The Lord is the link of love between the two realms, and soul-making is the goal of cosmic Ilia, and, in the attainment of eternal life, the self transcends the transient dimensions. The mukta views everything under the form of eternity, and his bliss of sdyujya is ever creative and is an eternal now. It is like a symphony in which each note sweetens the whole effect and is sweetened by it ; but no analogy drawn from human experience can adequately bring out the ecstasy of eternal life.
The nature of mukti is so rich and varied in con- tent that it cannot be exhausted by philosophic labels and formulae. Brahman is the sat without a second, but Brahmdnubhava differs with different muktas, and this truth brings out the uniqueness of each experience and its uni- versality. The Chdndogya Upanisad (III. xiv. 1) expounds it in the light of the principle of tat kratu nydya. The mukta is free to realise the infinite in infinite ways, and this freedom is determined by his own will. Every meditation on Brahman ends in the attainment of Brahman. The nature of what is attained in mukti is determined by the nature of the medita- tion of the mumuksu (Ve. S«., IV. iii. 14). In discussing the value of the thirty-two meditations on Brahman, the Sutra- kdra, in III. iii. 57, raises the important question whether they are all compulsory or optional and decides in favour of the latter alternative on account of the identity of the result. The methods and the starting points may vary with the
500 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
psychological variations of mumuksutva, but the Vedantic goal is the same, namely, the intuition of Brahman, which is of the nature of supreme unsurpassable Bliss. Brahman, as the Vdkyakdra says,1 has qualities, because the meditation on Brahman defines His qualities. The determining attributes of Brahman are satyatva, jfidtrtva, anantatva, apahata- pdpmatva and dnanda and as every essential quality connotes the subject of which it is the definition, it follows that every meditation includes these qualities and that Brahman is their subject. The other ideas of God like saulabhya and saus'ilya are derived from the definition and refer only to specific updsanas or forms of meditation (III. iii. 11 et seq). Thus every updsana has its adequacy and efficacy in securing the stability of mukti. Brahman is the goal of the spiritual endeavour of the mumuksu, and every specific experience of mukti is the im- mediate experience of Brahman itself. The mumuksu may be a jndrii or metaphysician interested in the unitive con- sciousness of avibhdga, vis'ista aikya or Brahmabhava, or a yogin who delights in intuiting Brahman as his inner light in which the flickerless flame of dtma jyutis shines in param jyotis or the boundless light of Brahman. The man of active temperament dedicates himself to selfless service to the Lord and His devotees and prefers kainkarya rasa to Brahmabhava. The mystic is drawn by premd and thrilled by the touches of the alluring beauty of Brahman, which ravishes even the ascetic and the dialectician, and changes the jndnis or rsis of Dandaka into the Gopls of Brndavana. The mumuksu meditates on some single quality of Brahman according to his inclination and even the eternal seers enjoy only one aspect of the divine jiature. The bliss of Brahman is however irresistible and every Vedantin seeks Ananda as the supreme end and aim of life. 1 S.B. £., XLVIII. p. 99.
CHAPTER XX
A BRIEF HISTORY OF VIS' 1ST A D VA IT 1C VA I SNA VISM
A BRIEF history of SVz Vaisnavism and Vaisnavism in -*- ** general is now attempted before the concluding chapter is taken up, as it throws light on the practical value of its philosophy. S'n Vaisnavism is as old as Hinduism and it has been extolled through the ages as the religion of re- demption. Vaisnavism connotes the religion in which Visnu, the eternally pure and perfect, enters into the history of humanity with a view to redeeming the bound self from sinfulness and selfishness and vaisnavise its nature. S'n Vaisnavism makes the meaning more explicit by defining the dual function of Visnu as S'riyahpati> which consists in universal redemption. While Vis'istddvaita defines Brahman as the Godhead that creates, sustains and destroys the uni- verse with a view to brahmanising the finite self, Vaisnavism, as its religious aspect, identifies the same Godhead as unity in trinity with Visnu who pervades all jlvas and vaisnavises their nature. In the history of Indian philosophy, Vis'istadvaitic Vaisnavism occupies a central position both as philosophy and as religion, as a meeting of the extremes of monism and pluralism and of non-dualism and theism. Every system of faith is, historically speaking, a response to the needs of the
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age which gave it birth or brought it to the forefront andr from this standpoint, it may be proved that S'ankara came to correct the atheistic teaching of Buddhism by re-estab- lishing the Hindu view of the eternity of the Veda and restoring the Veddntic truths of Brahmavidyd. Though S'an- kara accepted all the six faiths prevalent in his age, he tried to abolish the evil practices connected with vdmdcdra and prefer the sdtvika faith in Bhagavdn, bhakti and the bhdga- vata religion. At any rate, his practical Advaita is not incom- patible with Vis'istadvaita. But the God-destroying dia- lectics of Mdydvdda dormant in S'ankara's theory became pronounced in certain schools of post-S'ahkara Advaita and the timespirit required a philosopher that could rescue Veddnta from the evils of pan-illusionism and that was the mission of Ramanuja. Though Ramanuja formulated Vis'istadvaita, he was not its founder as his mission was only to systematise the traditional teachings of the rsis and the Alvdrs as expounded by Nathamuni and Alavandar. Like post-S'ahkara Advaita, post-Ramanuja Vis'istadvaita gave rise to different schools of Vaisnavism like the Vadakalai sect represented by Vedanta Des'ika and the Tenkalai sect represented by Pillailokacarya* In spite of the varieties of Vaisnavite teachings, their common aim is devotion to Visnu as the All-Self and Redeemer of all.
The varieties of Vaisnavite experience by the rsis, the Bhdgavatas and the Alvdrs afford the data for the formulation of Vis'istddvaita, and the twin truths handed down traditionally by the rsis and the Alvdrs are embodied in the system and are known as " Ubhaya Veddnta." It is wrong to say that it is an amalgam of two different cultures or a fusion of the divergent currents of philosophy and popular cults. It is essentially a S'ariraka S'dstra or synoptic philosophy whose aim is not only
HISTORY OF VIS'ISTADVAITIC VAISNAVISM 503
to seek the whole or soul of knowledge but to extend the hospi- tality of its divine ideas to all humanity. While Vis'istad- vaita stresses the metaphysical side, S'ri Vaisnavism em- phasises the moral and mystic sides, and the two are insepar- able and really one. It is summed up by Nammalvar in the opening verse of his Tiruvaimoli, ' He who is Bliss (uyarnalam) imparts the illumining and illuminating bhakti (matinalam) to the mumuksu,1 Bhakti is more than the intel- lectual love of God, as it is the life of man in the love of God and includes philosophic knowledge and religious feeling. The history of Vaisnavism is mainly the biography of its best men, the Alvdrs and the Acdryas or the seers and the prophets, re- corded in its Guruparamparas. Though the mystic forgets him- self in God and the Acarya works for world-welfare, the two are not different, as, in S'n Vaisnavism, love of God and service to humanity go together. Namrnalvar is the chief of the Alvdrs who directly intuited Brahman, and he is in a line with Vamadeva of the S'rutis and S'uka and Prahlada of the Bhdgavata ; Ramanuja is the foremost of the Vedantic ex- ponents of the Vis'istddvaitic system. The biography of seers and prophets is often naturally mixed up with the record of the miracles wrought by them and their mystic experiences. But to the student of Vedanta, the spiritual side alone is relevant and not the supernatural, nor even the historic. It is, however, desirable that the lives and teachings of the Alvars and the Acdryas are briefly sketched as a background to the study of Vis'istddvaita or Ramanuja dar&ana.
PRE-RAMANUJA VIS'ISTADVAITA
It is a cardinal teaching of S'n Vaisnavism that God who is transcendental Love incarnates again and again into
504 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
history without renouncing His infinity l with a view not only to redeeming the wicked man from his career of wicked- ness, but to seeking the jnarii or philosopher-mystic 2 who is His very self or dtmd. The Vedas, the Itihasas, the Puranas, the Pdncardtra and the Dramida Veda are successive revelations of the redemptive love of God. This truth is well brought out in the divine life of the Alvdrs as revealed by their inspired poetic utterances. The prophecy of the Bhdgavata that in the Kali Ytiga, the rsis devoted to Narayana would be born on the banks of the Cauvery, the Tamraparni and the Palar in Dravidadesa or in the land of Agastya :* was fulfilled in the lives and teachings of the Alvdrs. Tradition ascribes the age of the Alvdrs, twelve in number, to the beginning of the Kali Yuga (more than 5,000 years ago) ; but modern historical research assigns it to the period between the second century A.D. and the eighth century A.D. The determination of the exact dates of their birth is outside the scope of this work, which is concerned only with their divine life. The Alvdrs were God-intoxicated mystics and their one and only aim in life was to contact God in His beauteous aprdkrta form and communicate the joy of their communion with Him to humanity. They were specialists in spirituality to whom the only proof of the being of God was being in God and holding converse with Him. They had an insight into the nature of Narayana as their inner self and in their religious outlook they saw Narayana pervading all things. They insisted on the need for inner purity and
1 svam eva rupam tattatsajatiyasamsthanam sva svabhavam ajahadeva kurvan tesu tesu lokesvavatiryavatlrya. — Ramanuja's Gitffbh&sya, In- troduction.
janma karmaca me divyam. — B. G., IV. 9.
2 paritranaya sadhunam. — E.G., IV. 8.
3 Book XI, Chap. V, verses 38-40 as quoted also by Vedanta Des'ika in the introductory chapter of his Rahasyatraya Sara.
HISTORY OF VIS'ISTADVAITIC VAISNAVISM 505
personal experience and, without in any way breaking with traditional and institutional faith, disseminated spiritual knowl- edge to all without distinction of birth and status in life and thus revitalised Hinduism. Though they were born into different castes and at different times, they all had the same instinct for the infinite, lived, moved and had their being in divine love or Bhagavat-prema and poured forth their experi- ences through Tamil pds'uratns or hymns. They were all mes- sengers of God who spread the Vis'istddvaita gospel that Brahman, the srarlrin of all, ha^ the chief quality of saulabhya even on the perceptual level and that by rooting out ahankdra and by self-surrender to His love, every man can attain muktL Every man is the son of God and can attain salvation by seeking God and responding to His love. The highest end of life is not even mukti in the world yonder, but is bhakti here and now, because love is love for ever, absolute, unconditioned and eternal. Man's only responsibility in life is response to the love of God. The lofty view of Veddntic philosophy was thus turned into Vaisnavite religion ; and instead of vivisecting Hinduism into the domain of philosophy for the few and religion for the many, this process vivifies and invigorates Hinduism and makes it live for ever as the philosophy of religion.
Though all the Alvdrs had a genius for God, each gave poetic expression to his experience in his own way. The earliest of the Alvdrs were a trio called respectively Poigai, Bhutam and Pai. They were endowed with the highest yogic insight. They were born in the same month and in the same year on consecutive days in Conjeeveram, Mahabalipuram and Mylapur respectively. The most inspiring episode in their life is the story of their meeting in a narrow room in Tirukoilur,
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a place in South Arcot District. Having sought shelter in a narrow passage on a dark rainy night, the three were squeezed together in that narrow room, where one alone could lie, two could sit or three stand. Suddenly they all felt a strange Presence and to discern it they lit their lamps of spiritual wisdom and were gifted with a vision of the beatific form of God who was pressing them so closely. At once they broke into song and the realisation of each Alvar took the form of a Tiruvandddi of one hundred verses. These are the earliest of the Prabandhas addressed mostly to the Lord of the Seven Hills as the God of Gods. Tirumalis'aialvar who came next was so called because he was born in Tirumalis'ai, a village near Madras. By a process of philosophic and spiritual induc- tion, he intuited the supremacy of Narayana and he is well- known for his monotheistic faith and fervour and yogic intro- version. His two works are known as the Nanmukhan Tiru- vandadi and the Tiruccanda Virttttam. The religion of bhakti sown by the first three Alvars blossomed ' in the fourth and came to full fruition in Nammajvar. Nammalvar, also known as Maran, S'atakopa and Parahkus'a, is venerated as the super- mystic of Vaisnavism and its super -prapanna or founder of the prapatti school. As already mentioned, he was born in Kurukur, now known after him as Alvartirunagari, in Tinnevelly on the banks of the Tamraparm. Like S'uka, he was conceived and born in godliness. With his instinct for the infinite, his hunger and thirst were only for God. His divine love was a divine gift and he was immersed in it for sixteen years at the foot of a tamarind tree till he came down to the waking state and gave articulate expression to his infinite ava or prema in the soul-stirring poems known as the Tirumruttam, the
1 anbilanri azhianai yavarkaiiavallare ? (Who can see him except by love ?)
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Tiruvds'iriyam, the Periya Tiruvandddi and the Tiruvdimoli. The love of God can come only from God, the infinite, and the Alvdr says that his Tiruvdimoli was really the word of God expressed through the instrumentality of his human medium. The Tiruvdimoli is extolled by Vedanta Des'ika as the Dramidopanisad and is unsurpassed in mystic literature for its spiritual depth and fervour. The Tiruvdimoli is, in fact, equated with Veddnta, and each is interpreted in terms of the other and the two are fused into a single system which enables the philosopher-mystic to realise the alogical state of divine life transcending the limits of linguistics and logic. Nammalvar is the very heart of Vis'istddvaitic mysticism and is described symbolically as the soul, of which the first three Alvars are the mind and the other Alvdrs, the body. It was given to Madhurakavi Alvar to discover Nammalvar and though his only work, the Kanninunciruttdmbu, is a short poem of eleven verses on Nammalvar, it forms an integral part of the four thousand Divya Prabandhas and brings out the venera- tion in which the Alvdr was held by S'rl Vaisnavas.
Kulas'ekhara, who ruled over three principalities on the west coast (Kolli, Kudal and Koli ; Cera, Pandya and Cola), became an Alvdr by the intensity of his devotion to God. His 105 verses are grouped together as the Petu- mdl Tirumoli and are noted for their passionate fervour towards God and godly men. A poor Brahmin of S'rl- villiputtur, Visnucitta by name, who spent his time in offering flowers to God, was gifted with divine lore and love and is known as Periyalvar. He was able to establish in a polemic discussion at the Pandyan king's court, the supremacy of Vaisnavite monotheism. He was so much immersed in the love of child Krsna that he forgot His divinity
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tended Him with the tenderness of Yas'oda. This kind of bhakti is known in Vaisnava mysticism as vdtsalya bhdva. His songs called the Periya Tirumoli are the outpourings of his Krsna love which are as soul-stirring as the language of S'uka in the " Bhagavata." Periyalvar adopted as his daughter Andal or Goda who had a miraculous birth like Slta. Her heart was set on wedding S'rl Krsna and her pining for love and her assaults on the beloved as des- cribed in her Tiruppdvai and Tirumoli can bear com- parison only with the mystic ardour of the Gopls. The Tirup- pavai portrays, with rare lyrical beauty, the scene of her approaching the Sleeping Beauty of Brndavan at day dawn with other damsels and awakening Him from His strange sleep. The Lord of Love could not resist her maddening love and their spiritual marriage took place in the shrine of S'ri- rafigam when she rushed into the arms of Love and was lost in the bliss of communion.
Tondaradippodi Alvar, in his moving hymns, the Tirup- palli Elucci and the Tirumdlai, seeks to awaken the Lord of Rariga or the theatre of Ilia, from His yoganidrd and make Him respond to the call of bhakti. He exhorts humanity to give up their career of sin and seek the redemptive love of Rariga. True to his name, he cleansed himself with the holy dust of the feet of devotees when they entered the shrine of the Holy and effaced himself in service. Tiruppanalvar was a pancama born near S'rlrarigam and, in his ten immortal verses beginning with " Amalan" he adores God as the Holy, the Pure and the Perfect (amalan, vimalan, nirmalari) and feels blessed by the fact that divine love invaded his inner being and cleansed him of all sin. Tradition has it that the Lord of Rariga commanded the temple priest in a dream to carry the Alvar on his shoulders
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from the outskirts of the city to His inner shrine whence his name Munivdhanan. The next Alvar was Tirumangai Mannan, also called Kaliyan and Parakalan, who was born in a Velldla family in Siyali. He was a military chief who was weaned away from his worldly career by the redemptive grace of God. In his poetic works called the Periya Tirumoli, the Tiruk- kurnntandakam, the Tiruneduntandakam, the S'iriya Tiruma- dal, the Periya Tirumadal and the Elukiirrirukkai, which are extolled as the six Veddngas of the Drdvida Veda, he sings the glory of God as the permanent incarnation of mercy in all His temples from Badarinath to Tirup- pullani near Rames'varam. He begins his Periya Tim- molt in his characteristic way with a confession of his previous sinfulness followed by the feeling of security obtained by uttering the holy name of Narayana, and ends it with the joy of mukti or freedom from the fear of samskra.
The hymns of the Alvdrs, four thousand in number, were collected and collated by Nathamuni in the manner of the four Vedas arranged by Vyasa, and are called the Divya Pra- bandha or Tamil Veda, and they contain the quintessence of the Upanisads. The first part includes the hymns of Peri- yalvar, Andal, Kulas'ekhara, Tirumalis'ai, Tondaradippodi and Madhurakavi ; the second consists of three works of Tiru- mangai Alvar ; the third is the Tiruvdimoli of Nammalvar ; and the fourth is made up of the three Andddis of the first three Alvdrs, one Andddi of Tirumalis'ai, three poems of Nam- malvar and three of Tirumangai Alvar. Vedanta Des'ika in- cludes the Rdmdnuja Nurrandddi in the Four Thousand, but the Tenkalai Acdryas compute 4,000 without the Rdmdnuja Nurrandddi.
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The Alvars are esteemed for their austerity and self- renouncement and for their missionary zeal in promoting the spiritual welfare of all beings. They do not claim to be specially chosen by God with any special covenant, as they regard every man as the son of God who can eventually attain salvation. To them the only true miracle is the miracle of .mercy or ami, and it is almighty and accessible to all.
While the Alvars were divers into divinity, the Acaryas that followed them became the expositors of the Alvars9 experi- ence and the apostles of S'n Vaisnavism as the system is now known. Their task was to interpret it in terms of Vis'ist- .ddvaitic thought and Vis'istadvaitic philosophy in terms of S'n Vaisnavism and spread the gospel of prapatti among all persons. They taught that Brahman is the s'arlrin of all persons and things and though He is the One without a second metaphysically, He also exists as S'riman Narayana -in the interests of world redemption. It is untenable to say that S'n Vaisnavism has a South Indian origin, as it has its eternal foundation in the law of love and is not limited by geographical and historical barriers. This truth is borne out by the life and teachings of Nathamuni, the founder of the Ubhaya Vedanta school and first pontiff of S'n Vais- navism. He was a descendant of the Bhagavata immigrants from the Gangetic valley to the south who came to disseminate the Bhagavata religion of bhakti. He was born at Mannar- gudi in the South Arcot District in 824 A.D. and even in his youth he was given to yogic introversion and became a muni. Tradition ascribes to him the miraculous discovery of the lost Tiruvdimoli of Nammalvar and then of the entire Pra- bandha. While at Kumbakonam, he happened to hear the reci- tal of the soul-stirring hymns of Nammalvar beginning with
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" Aravamude," a word which connotes the immortal bliss of Brahman or divine deliciousness. The ascetic then realised the sweetness of those divine songs and became eager to re- cover the whole work. He went to Tirunagari where the whole Prabandha was miraculously revealed to him by the Alvar himself after the recital of the verses beginning with " Kanninunciruttambu " sung by Madhurakavi Alvar about Nammalvar. Nathamuni grouped the Prabandha on the Vedic model into four parts, each containing nearly one thousand stanzas. The recitation of the Prabandhas was made an integral part of temple worship at S'rirangam and this practice is even now followed in all S'rl Vaisnava temples. This innovation effected a silent revolution in temple worship, as it raised the status of the Prabandha to the level of the Veda and liberalized the meaning of Revelation. Nathamuni's Nydya Tatva, which is now lost, was the first modern treatise on Vis'istadvaita and it was elaborated by later dcdryas. A few quotations from it are given in the Nydya Sidddnjana of Vedanta Des'ika. It is said that Nathamuni knew of a secret yoga which had the ease and efficacy of securing mukti with minimum endeavour and that he was anxious to communicate it to his grandson Alavandar. But Alavandar could not meet his grand-father's disciple at the appointed time and so the precious yoga was lost to humanity. Nathamuni devoted all his time in his old age to the practice of samddhi and passed away in 920 A.D. He was succeeded by Uyyakkondar or Pundarikaksa and he by Manakkalnambi or Rama Mis'ra.
The next important milestone in the history of S'rl Vaisnavism is marked by the life and teachings of Alavandar or Yamunacarya, the grandson of Nathamuni. Even as a boy, he showed his prodigious learning and skill when he accepted
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the challenge of Akkialvan, the court Pandit of the Cola king", made to his guru and easily vanquished him in the learned assembly of the king by a clever puzzle, He was at once greeted by the queen as " Alavandar " for having conquered the proud poet, and was granted a portion of the kingdom according to the terms of the polemic duel. He lived a life of luxurious ease, when a sudden change came over him after an interview with the old teacher, Rama Mis'ra, who intimated to him the news of the patrimony be- queathed to him by his grandfather in the form of a valuable treasure imbedded between two rivers. He eagerly followed the guru to take possession of the treasure, and when he was shown the shining shrine at S'rlrahgam, he became converted, was overjoyed and took sannyasa. His whole life was there- after dedicated to spirituality and service, the twin ideals of a true Vaisnava, and he made S'rlrangam a veritable Vai- kuntha on earth. As a philosopher, his main task was the criticism of Advaita, and he was an eminent controversialist and author of valuable treatises on Vedanta. His famous work, the Siddhi Traya explains the main teachings of Vis'istddvaita, following the tradition of Bodhayana, Dramida, and Taiika and in accordance with logical thinking ; it consists of three sections — " Atma Siddhi/' " Is'vara Siddhi " and " Samvit Siddhi." His masterly summary in the Gltdrtha Sangraha of the truths of the Git a is a luminous exposition in about thirty slokas of the nature of prakrti, purusa and Purusottama and of the need for bha'kti and prapatti as the supreme means to moksa.1 It was later developed by Rama- nuja and further elaborated by Vedanta Des'ika.
1 It is further summarised in the verse of that work as follows : " svadharmajnanavairagyasadhyabhaktyaikagOcarali I Narayapah param brahma gitasastre samiritah II "
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In his Agamapramanya, he controverts the conclusion of the Advaitin that the Pancaratra, as expounded in the Sat- vata and the Pauskara Samhitas, has no Vedic authority and that its teaching is opposed to Vedanta. As the word of Narayana, it contains the essentials of Vedanta, is accepted by the Siitrakdra and extolled by him in the Mahdbharata. Owing to its comprehensive definition of Brahman as Vasu- deva who is the same as Bhagavdn or the God of religion, and its exalted moral or sdtvika ideal of conduct which explains every act of duty as the adoration of Brahman, it is Vedanta applied to practical life. Says Thibaut : " The Sutra- kdra closes the polemical section of the second chapter with a •defence of the doctrine which, in spite of objections, has to be viewed as the true one." But really there are no objections to the tantra, as the forms of Vasudeva are His incarnational manifestations and not emanations and as the eternity of the self is nowhere rejected. The Ekayana Sakha from which the system is deduced is traced to the S'ukla (white) Yajur Veda and the moral and spiritual austerity of life led by the Ekayana is evident in his daily conduct. The five-fold yajna consisting of abhigamana, updddna, ijyd, svddhydya and yoga is nothing but the dedication of the daily conduct to the indwelling Deity. True yajna is but the killing of egoism and the offering of the self to God. Alavandar's Stotra-ratna, a master-piece of lyrical devotion, reveals his discerning faith in Narayana and S'rl and the intense humility of the philosopher-devotee who pours forth his heart-felt bhakti in soul-stirring verses to which there is no parallel in Stotra literature. In praise of S'rl or LaksmI, Alavandar sang a separate poem of four s'lokas, which, for that reason, is known as Catus'lokl, and it is the earliest of the stotras sung about S'n and furnishes the foundation and basis of later
33
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works on S'n Tatva such as those of Alvan, Bhattar and Vedanta Des'ika. Another work, Purusa Nirnaya, is also ascribed to Alavandar. His disciples are believed to have been fifteen in number, of whom five are said to have taught Rama- nuja, the next great dcarya.
RAMANUJA
Ramanuja was born in S'rlperumbudur near Kanci in the year 1017 A.D. as the son of Asuri Kesava Somayajl and Kantimati, sister of S'risaila Purna, the grandson of Yamuna- carya. From his childhood he showed signs of Vedantic genius and he was sent to Kanci to have a course of studies in Vedanta under the great Advaita teacher Yadavaprakas'a. It is said that his teachings did not satisfy the budding Vis'istadvaitin. One day, when Yadava explained the Taittirlya text " satyam, jnanam, anantam Brahma" in terms of absolute identity, the disciple felt that identity was no ex- planation at all and reconstrued the text by saying that Brahman is and has satyam, jndnam and anantam as His essential ontological attributes. The guru's exposition at another time of the Upahisadic description " kapydsam " of the lotus to which the beauteous eyes of Bhagavdn were compared by translating that expression as the red posteriors of the monkey, brought hot tears of grief to the eyes of Ramanuja, and he im- mediately corrected the ugly analogy by giving the true meaning of that term as the well developed lotus that blossoms at day-dawn.1 These reinterpretations aroused the anger and jealousy of the teacher who, in consultation with some trusted disciples, arranged for a pilgrimage to Benares with the evil idea of drowning Ramanuja in the Ganges and attributing it to
gambhirambhassamudbhutasumrstanalaravikaravikasitapupdarika, . . .
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accident. On the way, Ramanuja was apprised of the con- spiracy and he escaped at dead of night while they were passing through a wilderness. Weary and foot-sore, Rama- nuja wandered several days till a hunter and a huntress met him and offered to take him to Kanci, which they said was their destination too. When they were very near Kanci, the couple suddenly disappeared after asking Ramanuja for a little water and on his looking around, the lofty towers of the temple of Lord Varadaraja in Kanci greeted his wondering eyes. Ramanuja at once realised that Lord Varada and His Consort had rescued him in that miraculous manner and as they had asked for water he made it a point from that day onwards to fetch a potful every day from a well near the spot where They disappeared, to be used for Their daily puja. Yadava later on became a disciple of Ramanuja. At this time, Saint Tirukkacci Nambi had daily contact and converse with the Lord, and Ramanuja came under his spiritual influence.
Ramanuja never met Alavandar face to face though the latter had seen Ramanuja and, unwilling to disturb his studies, had blessed him from a distance. Five of Alavandar's disciples, as already stated, imparted the teachings of Alavandar to young Ramanuja who was to become the chief propagator of Vis'istadvaita. Mahapurna or Periyanambi was Rama- nuja's principal dcarya who initiated him into the meaning of the Dvaya Mantra at Madhurantakam. Under Gostlpurna (Tirukkottiyur Nambi), Ramanuja revised the rahasyarthas or the meaning and significance of the rahasya mantras which play a very important part in the life and knowledge of a S'rl Vaisnava. From Tirumalaiyandan and Alavandaralvan Ramanuja learnt the Tiruvdimoli and from Tirumalai Nambi, S'rimad Ramayana. The truths of S'/i Vaisnavism
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communicated by Lord Varada to Tirukkacci Nambi were also duly imparted to him : " I am the supreme truth, the way and the goal. The world of souls is different from Me and depends on Me as its source and sustenance. Prapatti is the way to salvation." Thus equipped with the know- ledge of spiritual truths and the sadhanas to mukti gained from specialists, Ramanuja became qualified to enter on his mission of spreading the gospel of Vis'istddvaitic Vaisnavism and to become a world teacher. To dedicate himself wholly to the cause of religion and the service of humanity, he joined the sannydsa order and became Yatirdja or the prince of sannydsins on account of his austere and ascetic life. While he settled down at S'rirangam and prepared himself to carry out his mission, he had to meet an Advaitic controversialist, Yajnamurti by name, and after seventeen days' disputation the opponent was defeated.
He started on a pilgrimage round the country from Rames'varam to Badarinath by the west coast and returned via the east coast. With his ever faithful disciple Kures'a (Kurattalvan), he reached S'rlnagar and secured a manuscript copy of the Bodhdyana Vrtti, which Kures'a, with his pro- digious memory, was able to learn by heart even at the very first reading. He was thus enabled to bring out his S'n Bhdsya by literally following tradition and is said to have earned the title of " Bhasyakara " in Kasmlr from SarasvatI herself. At this time occurred the persecution of the Vaisnavas by the Cola king, Kulottuhga Cola I, who, in his bigoted zeal for the spread of S'aivism, tried to repress the dissenters by capital punishment. As Kures'a and the venerable Mahapurna refused to change their faith, their eyes were plucked out. Rama- nuja's retirement to Mysore at this critical period was an
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epoch in its religious history, as it led to the conversion of a large number of Jains and also of Bittideva, the king of the Hoysalas, followed by the construction in 1099 of the city of Melkot and the consecration of a temple for S'elva Pillai. His return to S'rirangam in 1118 after an absence of two decades was hailed with joy by the whole S'n Vaisnava com- munity and the remaining years of his life were devoted to the consolidation of his missionary work by organising temple worship and establishing seventy-four spiritual centres in different parts of the country, presided over by his disciples, to popularise Vis'istadvaita. He passed away in 1137 full of honours after a long span of 120 years.1
The works of Ramanuja are as valuable as his life, and they were the fulfilment of his promise in youth to carry out the message of Alavandar to systematise the whole teaching of Vis'istadvaita in its metaphysical, moral and mystical aspects. In his Veddrtha Sangraha, he analyses the defects of Advaita, Bheddbheda and S'aivism and harmonises the apparently conflicting texts of the Upanisads by his foun- dational principle of the s'arira-s'arirl relation. The Veddnta Sara and the Vedanta Dipa are short treatises on the Siltras and bring to light the essentials of Vedanta. But his magnum opus is the immortal S'rl Bhdsya which is an authoritative exposition of the Sutras as S'driraka S'dstra in the truest sense of the term.2 His Gltd Bhdsya is a develop- ment of the Gitdrtha Sangraha of Alavandar and explains the building up of bhakti and constructs a ladder as it were
1 For a full account of his life and teaching, the reader is referred to the contemporary work of Amudanar's Nurrandadi in Tamil, Vedanta Des'ika's Yatirajasaptati and Manavala Mahamunigal's Yatiraja Vims'ati.
- The Srutaprakfts'ika is a commentary on the Sri Bh&sya composed later by Sudars'ana Bhatta ; the Bhava Prakas'ika is a gloss on this work ; and the Tatva fika is a fuller gloss by Vedanta Des'ika.
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from the world of prakrti to the realm of Purusdttama. In his S'aranagati Gadya, Ramanuja gives a classic exposition of the nature and value of prapatti. The Sriranga Gadyam reveals the devotional fervour of Ramanuja to the Lord of S'rirangam which is praised as Vaikuntha on earth. The Vai- kuntha Gadya is a rapturous outpouring on the transcendental beauty and bliss of Vaikuntha. In another prose work called the Nityam, Ramanuja elaborates the ideal of the daily life of a true paramaikantin. The Arayirappadi, the first Vis'is- tddvaitic commentary on the Tiruvaimoli of Nammalvar, is traced to his inspiring influence. This was composed by his chief disciple Kurukes'a (Tirukkurugaippiran Pillan). A commentary on the Visnu Sahasranama was written by Paras'ara Bhatta in compliance with Ramanuja's instructions. In this way and by these works the dream of Alavandar to formulate Vis'istadvaitic Vaisnavism became an accomplished fact. These great works are ever-enduring monuments of Ramanuja's synthetic genius. To his followers Ramanuja is the Udaiyavar or owner of the two worlds and this truth ex- presses the S'ri Vaisnava loyalty to the Acarya and their living faith in him as the guru that holds the keys of earth and heaven. To the philosopher, he is the Bhdsyakara and his S'rl Bhasya is the exposition par excellence of the Vedanta Sutras.
It is difficult to appraise the worth of this great synoptic thinker, prophet and seer. As the exponent of Vedanta as a philosophy of religion, he reconciles the claims of philosophy with the demands of religion and is between S'ankara and Madhva not only chronologically but also philosophically. With his practical social idealism and essential humanism, he insists on the equality of all jlvas owing to the in-dwelling of God in their hearts without in any way undermining the Gltd
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ideal of varnas'rama and each man's svadharma.1 He was not merely the representative of his age but a philosopher for all time who combined in himself the profundity of a thinker and the humility of a saint. With his magnetic personality, encyclopaedic knowledge arid brilliant powers of exposition, he summed up in his long life all that was good in the known past, namely, the heart of Buddha, the head of S'ankara and the apostolic fervour of the Semitic religions. Even after ten centuries of his passing away, the dynamic influence of bhakti that was created in his life-time is not only not ex- hausted, but is ever on the increase.
POST-RAMANUJA VIS'ISTADVAITA
Ramanuja at the close of his career entrusted the spiritual care of the Vis'istddvaita community to seventy-four Simha- sanddhipatis or apostles. The chief among them were Kurukes'a or S'atakopa, better known as Pillan, who wrote the authorita- tive gloss called the Six Thousand (from the number of granthas " in it) on the Tintvdimoli of Nammalvar, Pranatarti- hara, who received the title of Veddntodayana (Udayana being the famous master of logic), and Paras'ara Bhatta, the son of Kurattalvan, born in 1074 A.D. S'atakopa's disciple, Visnu- citta, was the Acdrya of the famous Varadacarya whose lectures on the S'rl Bhdsya in the hall of S'ri Varadaraja's temple at Kanci formed the basis of S'udars'ana Bhatta's standard gloss on the S'rl Bhdsya called the S'rutaprakds'ika.
1 As instances of his love to humanity are cited the stories of his broad- casting the secret of the mantra imparted to him by the guru regardless of the torments of hell for transgressing the guru's injunction and of his allowing Adi Dravidas entry into the Melket temple on the day of the car festival. It is said Ramanuja preferred suffering in hell if that would bring salvation to all.
2 A grantha in Sanskrit consists of 32 letters.
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Varadacarya was popularly known as Nadadur Ammal and the hall where he delivered his lectures is still known as Ammal's lecture hall. Paras'ara Bhatta's disciple, Nanjlyar, wrote a commentary on the Tiruvaimoli called the Nine Thousand. He popularised the study of the Divya Prabandha still further, and his disciple Periavaccan Pillai elaborated his lectures in a work known as the Twenty-Four Thousand. It was at this time that the schism in S'n Vaisnavism became marked and gave rise to the schools of Tenkalal and Vadakalai. After Nampillai came Vadakku Tiruvidipillai, who wrote a more elaborate commentary called the Thirty-Six Thousand and known as the Idu or the equal of the Tiruvaimoli, in its spiritual value. Pillailokacarya, the son of , Vadakku Tiru- vidipillai, was the elder contemporary of Vedanta Des'ika, and is generally regarded as the first formulator of the Tenkalal school. He was born in 1264 A.D. He is called the younger Pillai to distinguish him from Nampillai who lived earlier ; and he passed away in 1327 A.D. His spiritual descent is traced to Ramanuja hierarchically through Periavaccan Pillai, Nampillai, Nanjlyar, Bhattar and Embar. When the Muhammadans sacked S'rlrangam and slaughtered the Vaisnavas and com- mitted sacrilege in the temple, he took a leading part in removing the vigraha to a place of safety. He composed the eighteen Rahasyas or sacred manuals of Tenkalaism mostly in Manipravala or Sanskritised Tamil, of which the chief are the Artha Pancaka and the Tatva Traya, dealing with the philosophic aspect, and the S'rl Vacana Bhusana expounding the religious side. The Artha Pancaka brings out the es- sentials of Vis'istadvaita in their fivefold aspect of (1) the nature of l&vara, (2) the jtva, (3) the purusdrtha, (4) the upaya and (5) the virodhl. Each is analysed into five forms with its own special features. Is'vara exists as para, vyuha.
HISTORY OF VIS'ISTADVAITIC VAISNAVISM 521
vibhava, antarydmin and area, of whom the last as the per- manent incarnation of the grace of God is most accessible to the mumuksu. The jiva is classified into five kinds, namely, the nitya or ever free, the mukta or freed, the baddha or samsarin, the kevala enjoying kaivalya in a state of stranded spiritual solitude, and the mumuksu. The five chief ends of conduct are dharma or the performance of Vedic duties, artha or the acquisition of the economic goods of life, kdma or the enjoyment of the pleasures of life here and in Svarga, dtmdnubhava or kaivalya and Bhagavadanubhava or the experience of Brahman. The five means of attaining Brahman are karma, jndna, bhakti or salvation by self- effort, prapatti or submission to the redemptive will of God and dcdrydbhimdna or absolute loyalty to the guru as a living mediator between the mumuksu and the Lord. The obstacles are also fivefold, and they are traced to faith in other gods, other means and ends than those pre- scribed for the mumuksu , the mistaken faith in svarupa jiidna as an end in itself, godlessness and the confusions relating to prapatti. The Tatva Tray a is written in a terse aphoristic manipravdla style on the model of the Brahma Sutras and consists of three parts, defining the nature of cit, acit and Is'vara. Part I defines dtman and its j nan a, and explains the classification of dtman. Part II describes acit in its three as- pects of kdla, s'uddha satva and mis'ra tatva or prakrti evolving into the twenty-three categories including the psycho-physical factors of buddhi, manas and the indriyas and the cosmological elements of the five bhiltas and tanmdt- ras. It is also known as avidyd or mdyd. The third part is devoted to the understanding of Is'vara including His svarupa, rupa and guna. The S'rl Vacana Bhiisana of the Acdrya is also aphoristic. It consists of four chapters, .
522 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
but is more popular on account of its main religious motive and value. The first chapter brings out the status of S'n in the salvation scheme as the divine mediatrix or purnsakdra between the cetana and the Lord, with her unique«qualities of ananyarhatva (of being His alone), paratantrya or de- pendence on Him and krpa, as exemplified in Sita's life. .She joyfully submits herself to I&vara, as she has her being in Him and belongs to Him, and always inter- cedes on behalf of the sinner by pleading for his being for- given. On the one hand, she subdues the retributive will of Is'vara by the beauty of her enticing love and on the other, she melts the heart of the sinner by her infinite tenderness. The nature of the Lord as teacher, mediator and saviour in the Unitarian way is revealed in the Bhagavad Gita by the Lord Himself being deary a , pumsakara and raksaka at the same time. It is the sinner mentality of the sinner that occasions the intervention of divine grace, and this grace is spontaneous and not conditioned by the effort of the self as in the case of the bhakta. Of the fivefold forms of divine mercy, para, that of Brahman in Vaiktmtha, is remote like the rain drops in cloud- Jand ; vyilha is* like the waters that encircle the cosmic egg ; antaryamin, the indwelling Lord, is like the spring in the earth which has to be discovered ; vibhava or that of the avatArs is like the occasional freshes in a river which come and go ; and it is only area that is the reservoir of divinity which remains after the incarnational flow passes away, and it is ever available to the cetana who thirsts for God. The Lord is Himself the upaya and the upeya, and the true meaning of prapatti is not winning the grace of God by self-effort but responding passively to its free flow. The second chapter dwells on the superiority oiparagata svlkara, in which the Lord seeks the sinner, over the svagata svlkara, in
HISTORY OF VIS'ISTADVAITIC VAISNAVISM 523
which the bhakta seeks the Lord. Grace is the free gift of God, and it flows spontaneously like mother's milk ; if it is to be gained by effort, it resembles the artificial milk for the same baby, purchased in a milk depot or a chemist's shop. The volitional type, which stresses the need for self-effort, often promotes the feelings of self-esteem and self-righteousness, which stain the soul and have no in- trinsic value. But justification by faith and self-surrender is the result of operative grace which is as stable as it is spon- taneous. When man seeks God, even prapatti is futile ; but jf the Lord elects him, even his sinfulness is ignored, if not relished. Prapatti has its fruition in service to God and to the Bhdgavatas in a spirit of utter humility without the slightest trace of egoism. A Bhdgavata is known by his spiritual worth and not by his birth, and the conceit of birth is an impediment to devotion, and becomes a heresy when a Bhdgavata of low birth is not duly respected. The third chapter assigns the -highest value to mangalds'dsanam or benediction offered by the devotee, in his intense solicitude of love, to the Lord for His •eternal reign of grace and to deep devotion due to tender affec- tion, like that of Perialvar, who was so much drawn by the beauty of Balakrsna that, in his God-intoxicated state, he forgot His .Is'varatva and with deep concern for the safety of the Divine child tended him with the affection of a fond parent. The -fourth chapter prefers dcdrydbhimdna to the grace of God for the main reason that, while the Lord is both just and merciful, the dcdrya is moved only by mercy. The worship of the dcdrya became in later days a main feature of some sects of Vaisna- vism in Northern India also. The work then concludes with the statement that service to the dcdrya and to the Bhagavatas irrespective of their station in life is the highest and only .means of attaining God. Pillailokacarya was succeeded by
524 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
Manavala Mahamunigal, who is revered by the Tenkalais as their greatest Acdrya. The chief contribution of Tenkalaism to the cause of S'rl Vaisnavism consists in its democratic dis- semination to all people, of the truths of the dars'ana confined till then to the higher castes.
Three centuries after Ramanuja, arose another great tea* cher of Vis'istadvaita, Vedanta Des'ika, who, by his unrivalled jnana and vairagya, established beyond doubt the teaching of Ubhaya Vedanta and spread the gospel of prapatti as a Vedan- tic means to the attainment of Brahman. Venkatanatha, as he was named, was born in 1268 A.D. at Tuppil in Kafici, which, in his own words,1 is the chief among the seven salvation-giving cities in this blessed land of Ind whose soil is so congenial to the sprouting of spirituality. The biography of prophets and saints is often a blending of supernatural, historical and mystical elements whose relevancy and value are determined by the reactions of the readers. Vedanta Des-ika is called Ghantavatara as he is said to be the incarnation of the bell of the shrine of S'rl S'rlnivasa at Tirupati, through whom the Lord rings the glory of His love from the hill top and summons humanity to partake of it. Venkatanatha's spiritual descent is traced to Ramanuja through a line of acdryas — Appullar, Nadadur Ammal, Visnucittar and Tirukkurukaippiranpillan. His prodigious intellect was a marvel even in his childhood ; and one day, when, at the age of five, he followed his uncle Appullar to the temple of S'rl Varada where the great Nadadur Ammal was delivering a brilliant discourse on the Pdncardtra, that great dcdrya was so much attracted by the beaming countenance of the bright boy that he missed the thread of his lecture, which was then
1 muttitarum nagar ezbil mukkiamam kacci.
HISTORY OF VIS'ISTADVAITIC VAISNAVISM 525
supplied by the precocious lad. Under the guidance of his uncle, Atreya Ramanuja familiarly known as Appullar, he easily acquired, even at the age of twenty,1 perfect know- ledge in all the then available secular and spiritual litera- ture, including the arts, the sciences, the several dars'anas, the various dgamas, Smrtis, Vedas, Vedanta, and the Prabandhas, a mastery which led later on to the title of " Sarva Tantra Svatantra " or the master of all arts and sciences, being divinely bestowed on him at S'rirangam. In addition to his encyclopaedic knowledge, he had intuitive intimations of the divine nature or Brahmdnubhava. He was married to Kanakavalli who proved to be a worthy com- panion in his Veddntic mission, and together they led an exemplary life, he living for God only and she for God in him. When Appullar's end was near, he blessed Des'ika and exhorted him to spread the ideals of Vis'istddvaita and to carry on the great tradition. Venkatanatha went to Tiru- vahlndrapuram, a holy place in the South Arcot District, and, on the pretty hill overlooking the river Garuda, he chose a pipul tree for yogic meditation, first on Garuda, the embodi- ment of the Vedas, and then on Hayagriva, the Lord of Wis- dom. He was soon blessed with a vision of Hayagriva who conferred on him the power to spread the Vis'istddvaita system in the interests of world- welfare. He composed several stotras in Sanskrit like the Hayagriva Stotra, and the well-known lyric the Mahdvlra Vaibhava and also a Prakrta poem Accutas'atakam ; and his Gopala Vims'ati, a hymn of twenty stanzas on Gopala or the cowherd Krsna, is written in the sweetest strains of Sanskrit melody. The opponents of the system representing seventeen doctrines and sects were overthrown by him in a controversy started by them, and the
1 Vims'atyabde visruta nanavidha vidyah
526 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
% • •
arguments advanced during the debate were then summarised* by him in a Sanskrit-Tamil polemic work called the Para- mata Bhangam. With his logical subtlety, metaphysical1 profundity, poetic genius, unrivalled debating skill and devo- tional earnestness, he was able to defeat his rivals and make them his disciples. Owing to his rare mastery of poetics and dialectics and the art of disputation, he won the title of " Kavi Tarkika Simha " (the lion of poets and logicians). He then returned to Kanci, composed many more stotras and Prabandhas, including the Varadardja Pancdsat, in praise of S'rl Varada, his favourite deity, who accepted his prapatti, as shown by his works, Nydsd Das'aka and the Adaik- kalappattu.1
An important event in one's life in those days was the pilgrimage that one undertook to holy places in Northern Indk including Benares and Brndavan via Tirupati. In his Daya S'ataka, composed at Tirupati, he praises the redemptive grace of S'rinivasa as the permanent incarnation of Brahman and as the Lord of creation who is ruled by His daya or grace. In this incarnation of Divinity, redemptive love dominates over omnipotence and transfigures it into almighty mercy. On his return to Kanci after seven years of pilgrimage, he wrote his famous reply to his old friend, Vidyaranya, the minister of Bukkaraya, the king of Vijayanagar, who had invited him to the court to receive royal favour. The reply consists of five stanzas called the Vairdgya Pancaka and is a classical expression of his vairagya. He said that the grains gleaned in the harvest field, a handful of water from a tank and a tattered loin cloth were enough for the body and that, rich with the possession of the heavenly treasure at 1 Attigiri Arulalarku adaikkalam nan pukundene.
HISTORY OF VIS'I§TADVAITIC VAISNAVSIM 527
Hastigiri (Kanci), he had no need for earthly treasures. The story is told of how he rejected and threw away gold pieces that were one day concealed by well-intentioned benefactors in the doles of rice given to him in his daily rounds of uncavrtti or alms-taking. When he was fifty years old, he accepted an invitation from the Vaisnavite leaders of S'rl- rangam to defend the dars'ana against the charges made by some eminent Advaitins from the north. The opponents were vanquished in a seven days' controversy and converted to the faith. The arguments used in the debate were sum- marised by his disciples in the well-known work called Sata Dusam, and the title " Ubhaya Vedantacarya " was then divinely conferred on him. It was in S'rlrangam that he wrote his chief philosophical works and rahasyas.. In 1310, Malik Kaffur, the general of Allauddin, sacked Madura and later on the Mohamedans invaded S'rlrangam and massacred thousands of SV* Vaisnavas in the latter place, including Sudars'ana Bhatta, the author of S'ruta Prakas'ika the standard gloss on the S'rl Bhasya. Vedanta Des'ika, however, saved the gloss by burying it in the ground and also took charge of Sudars'ana Bhatta's two sons who were entrusted to him during that reign of terror. He then retired to Satyarnangalam (now part of the Coimbatore District) in Mysore, as Ramanuja had done, and later returned with joy when he heard of the restoration of the shrine of S'rlrangam and the re-installation of the image of the Lord. He then composed the allegorical drama called the Sankalpa Suryodaya in ten acts, which has more divinity in it than the divine comedy of Dante, as a rejoinder to the Advaitic work of Krsna Mis'ra known as the Prabo- dha Candrodaya. His Hamsa Sandes'a is on the lines of Kalidasa's Megha Duta, but it improves on the poet's
.528 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
work, as it employs poetry in the service of religion. The Padttkd Sahasram is said to have been composed as a hymn on the sandals of S'rl Ranganatha in three hours during one night, to justify the title of Kavi Tarkika Simha which was demurred to by his opponents. He wrote more than forty works in S'rlrangam and lived for the full span of one hundred years and one more.
His life has a more inspiring influence than even his learning, and, though uncompromising as a critic and con- troversialist, he was absolutely austere and humble in his -daily life, and bore meekly many a trial and tribulation return- ing love for hatred. His chief characteristics were his pro- found appreciation of the * vision and faculty divine ' revealed in Ramanuja's teaching, his sturdy hatred of dependence on others, his utter contempt for money and position, his deep devotion to God as S'rlman Narayana and his anxiety to use his rare logical gifts purely in the service of religion. He had often to conduct disputations but these were always with those who did not accept Ramanuja's teachings, and he under- took the task in defence of the dars'ana and not for personal triumph. This is clear from his own retrospect of his life given in the closing verses of his Rahasyatraya Sara.
nirvistam yatisarvabhaumavacasamavrttibhiryauvanam nirdhutetaraparatantryaniraya nltassukham vasarah I
angikrtya satam prasattimasatam garvopi nirvapitah s'esayusyapi s'esidampatidaya dlksa mudlksamahe II
Thus he spent his time in devotional service to God and godly men and in the spread of the gospel of prapatti to all. He had twelve disciples to carry on his work. Among them, the chief were his son Varadacarya and the sannydsin
HISTORY OF VIS'ISTADVAITIC VAISNAVISM 529
Brahmatantrasvatantra. He passed away in the year 1369 iull of age and honours.
His main contribution to Vis'istadvaita was the further 'elucidation of the Vis'istddvaitic teachings of Ramanuja by esta- blishing by Veddntic methods the truths of Ubhaya Vedanta and the supreme value of prapatti. With his synthetic genius, he sought the co-ordination of the different facets of his ency- clopaedic knowledge, by the central idea of Brahman as the s'arlrin or Self of all. As an acute logician and metaphysician, he pointed out the essentials of scriptural knowledge in his Rahasyatrayasara and explained the Upanisad in terms of the Divya Prabandha and the Divya Prabandha in terms of the Upanisads. He thus co-ordinated the teach- ings of the rsis and the Alvdrs. He was a synoptic thinker with a long-range view of life as well as a vision of reality. As a conservative revolutionary, he bridged the gulf between bhakti and prapatti by reconciling the moral .and social needs of karma and the religious needs of krpd. He harmonised the paternal idea of the Fatherhood of God and rulership with the maternal instinct of tenderness, in the idea of Narayana and S'rI. Truth is true for ever and uncompro- mising, but when it is transfigured by love, it mediates between extremes, links thought and action and becomes a unifying power. Truth is based on non-contradiction and is expressed by ' either — or — ' ; but love is based on harmony, and is expressed by * both — and — '. Vedanta Desaka was a meta- physician as well as a bhakta, and though he spoke and wrote as a rigorous logician, he acted as a true bhakta in whom dayd was more dominant than dialectic dis- play. His daily life was a model of saintly purity and simplicity.
34
530 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
In the light of this critical estimate of his work and' worth, his philosophic exposition may be briefly summarised under the headings of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics and religion. The merit of his logic and epistemology consists in reconstructing the Nydya Vais'esika system in the light of Vis'istadvaita by simplifying the categories and including among the pramanas the teachings of the Alvdrs by extolling them with the name Dramidopanisad. The Nydya Pari&uddhi expounds the nature of the three main pramanas and proves the authority of the Pancaratra. His Ses'vara Mlmdmsa is a reconstruction of Jaimini's Pilrva Mirndmsa by integrating the two Mimdmsas and controverting the atheistic interpretation of the former. His metaphysics has a negative and a positive side. On the negative side, it is a refutation of rival systems. In his Tamil work, Paramata Bhanga, he gives a brief summary of the doctrines of the prevailing philosophical systems, somewhat on the lines of the Sarva Dar&ana Sarigraha of Madhvacarya, and refutes them in the light of Vis'istadvaita. But it is his S'ata Dusani that brings out his dialectical genius in repudiating Mdydvdda on the lines of Ramanuja's criticism known as the saptavi- dhdnupapatti and also in criticising the two schools of Bhedd- bheda. The Vddi Traya Khandana is a shorter work following the same lines of criticism. The constructive side of his con- tribution is brought out in the following philosophical works. Tatva Muktd Kaldpa is a Viffistadvaita exposition of the nature of jada or acit, jwa or cit, mukti, adravya, buddhi and Iswara. Sarvdrtha Siddhi is a more detailed exposition of the same truths. Nydya Siddhdnjana consists of six sections dealing with the same problems of jada,jiva, Is'vara, mukti, buddhi and adravya. His commentaries on Is'dvdsyopanisad and Bhagavad Gltd controvert the Advaitic theory of ajndncr
HISTORY OF VIS'ISTADVAITIC VAISNAVISM 531
and akarma and defend the view that Brahman is saguna and not nirguna and that karma is transfigured into kainkarya. Desaka's Vedantic ethics insists on the performance of the imperatives of duty as divine commands according to each man's station in life, which is determined by his karma and guna. In his Vairdgya Pancaka, Vedanta Desdka shows that man can- not worship God and mammon at the same time and that the divine treasure is infinitely more valuable than the pleasures that earthly wealth can provide. His poetic genius lay in his synthesis of literature and religion by furnishing a divine background to epic, lyric, and dramatic poetry. This is recognised by the great philosopher, Appayya Dlksitar, who commented on Des'ika's epic, Yddavdbhyudaya, in the course of which he pays a glowing tribute to the poetic genius of Des'ika. His aesthetic philosophy defines Brah- man as the beautiful and blissful, and prefers bhakti to the rasas extolled by mere aesthetics. In his Sankalpa Siiryodaya, the author combats the Advaitic conclusion of Krsna Mis'ra, by preferring the solar light of divine grace to the moony effulgence of atmajnana. It is an allegorical drama in ten Acts representing the conflict in thejlva between the forces of Viveka and Mahdmoha helped by Kama, Krodha, Darpa and Dambha. Viveka subdues the evils of rdga and dvesa and is reinforced by vairdgya and tatva jndna led by Visnubhakti. The hero is Viveka and Sumati is his queen and their plan is to free the Purusa from the hazards of karma and to enable him to attain mukti. Act I begins the play by showing the seductive charms of Kama and his plan of enticing Purusa, which is to be frustrated by Viveka. Act II presents the teachings of Ramanuja by the refutation of rival systems and the steadying effect of this on Viveka. Acts III and IV delineate the evil
532 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
influence of rdga and dvesa on Purusa. Act V describes the power philosophy of pride and vanity and reveals the author's accurate knowledge of human psychology. Acts VI and VII describe the aerial travel of Viveka to all the important religi- ous centres of India with a view to discovering a congenial place for meditation on the Lord and concludes that the purified heart is the best place for focussing the will on the beauteous form of the Lord and for conquering the foes of the spirit. Act VIII describes the battle between Viveka and Maha- moha and the final victory of Viveka. In the last two Acts, Purusa, freed from the evils of moha, enters on the practice of introversion or samadhi, and, aided by Visnu- bhakti, he surrenders himself to the Lord and attains s'anti, on the solar awakening of divine sankalpa or grace. With the dawn of His redemptive will, the darkness of moha is dispelled for ever.
Vedanta Des'ika expounds the essentials of Vis'istadvaita in a popular way in his masterpiece called the Rahasya- traya Sara, in which he follows the Sutra method of develop- ing the whole theme in terms of tatva, hita and purusartha. The supreme tatva is S'rlman Narayana as the s'anrin or the Self of the jiva, being its adhara or support, niyanta or controller, sresl or possessor and svaml or master. He is Himself the upaya and the upeya. The sadhya upaya or means of attainment is bhakti or its alternative prapatti The siddhopaya is the free causality of God Himself. He thus emphasises that, though the prime cause of salvation is the grace of God who is the siddha upaya, the aspirant has to deserve it at least by seeking it or asking for it. The mother's milk flows freely no doubt, but it does not do so unless the child applies its mouth to the teat. This sadhya upaya
HISTORY OF VIS'ISTADVAITIC VAISNAVISM 533
determines the nature of the recipients of the grace of the Lord, who is not an arbitrary or capricious ruler. The treatise also describes the life of the prapanna and his integral experience of Brahman in Vaihuntha in the state of sayujya. This is also beautifully brought out in his Paramapada Sopdna, in which he constructs a spiritual ladder, as it were, from worldliness to Vaikuntha. In this pathway to the headquarters of Reality, the main mile-stones are the meta- physical knowledge of Brahman arrived at by viveka, the moral progress of the pilgrim through vairagya, the religious striving by bhakti or prapatti and the mystic ascent to the home in the Absolute.
After Pillailokacarya and Vedanta Des'ika, the split between the Tenkalai and Vadakalai schools became more pronounced. While the latter tradition was carried on by Varadacarya, Brahmatantrasvatantra and their disciples, the Tenkalai position was definitely consolidated and established by Manavala Mahamunigal (1370 — 1443 A.D.) This well- known leader of the Tenkalai school was born near Alvar Tirunagari in Tinnevelly. He was the son of Totadri, a devotee of Lord Ranganatha, and is believed by his followers to have been a re-incarnation of Ramanuja. He soon acquired pro- ficiency in the tenets of Vis'istddvaita and was initiated into the essentials of the Tiruvdimoli by a famous teacher S'rl S'aila or Tiruvaimolipillai by name. He settled down at S'rlrarigam and spent his time in consecrated service to the Lord and the co-ordination of worship in the Vaisnava shrines by organising the work of his disciples in different sees or centres of sampradaya or tradition. His devotion to Ramanuja is well brought out in his work known as the Yatirdja Vims'ati, and he is therefore called
534 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
" Yatmdra Pravana." He entered the sannydsa order and spent his days in devotion to S'ri Ranganatha and the exposition of the Prabandha. To popularise the teachings of Pillai- lokacarya, he wrote commentaries in a lucid style on Tatva Traya, S'rl Vacana Bhusana and Acdrya Hrdaya and also on Tiruvdimoli. He also composed a work called Upadesra Ratnamdld which contains the main teachings of the Alvdrs. The chief disciples of the Acdrya were called the " Asta Diggajas " or the eight elephants guarding the eight quarters of the land and spreading the gospel of grace to all persons. One of them is stated to be Prativadi Bhayari- kara, who wrote the Saptati Ratnamdlika in praise of Vedanta Des'ika. The split between the Vadakalai and ^he Tenkalai schools widened in course of time and the pdtrams or lauda- tory verses recited in temple-worship to-day in praise of the leading deary as are a signal for sectarian strife though there is no intrinsic cause for dissension.
There are eighteen points of difference1 between the
schools, which are mostly doctrinal, and they may be grouped
under the principles relating to tatva, hita and purusdrtha.
Among the epistemological ways of knowing Brahman, Vedanta
Des'ika insists on the integrity of Ubhaya Vedanta and the
equal validity and value of the religious authority of the rsis and
the Alvdrs ; but the Tenkalai school stresses the value of the
Tamil Prabandha on account of its pure sdtvika and Vais-
nava character. The Veddntic view of the entry of the
1 They are summarised in the following verse : — bbedas svamikrpaphalanyagatisu srivyaptyupayatvayOh tadvatsalyadayaniruktivacasam nyase ca tatkartari I dharmatyagavirodhayOs svavihite nyasangahetutvayoh prayas'cittavidhau tadiyabhajane nuvyapti kaivalyayOh li
HISTORY OF VIS'ISTADVAITIC VAISNAVISM 535
infinite into the finite is interpreted by the former school as co-existence and by the latter as pervasion. But the main point of controversy relates to the nature of Laksmi. The Vadakalai school, recognising the equal religious value of justice and mercy, regards S'rl as infinite or vibhu and defines the divine nature as non-dual ontologically and dual function- ally. Is'vara and Is'varl are two in one and one in two like the flower and its fragrance, and no mathematical explanation is adequate or relevant in dealing with their transcendental unity. Laksmi is akdra (sj) or Is'vara and not makdra (J?) or jlva, and her redemptive mercy is omnipotent ; the mithuna or unity of the Lord and S'ri is vital to the mumuksu. The Tenkalai is more monotheistic when he denies the dual nature of the infinite and relegates Laksmi to the level of a jlva. Whatever the ontological status of Laksmi, there is no doubt that both the schools insist on Her krpd as essential to muktL As divine mediatrix, she intervenes between the sinner and the Holy and transforms the former into a mukta and the latter into the Saviour. As regards the nature of the hita, or summum bonuin, the Vadakalai recognises the superi- ority of bhakti and prapatti to karma and jndna and insists on the equal validity of bhakti and prapatti as means to mukti. But he prefers the latter on account of its ease, immediacy, naturalness and universality. Prapatti is the act of casting one- self on the mercy of God with the guidance of the guru and craving for mercy, and is not born of conceit. With a view to re- conciling the opposition between karma and krpd and to avoid- ing the charge of attributing cruelty and caprice to Is'vara, the Vadakalai insists on the need for deserving the grace of God before desiring it and formulates the theory of vyaja and dkincinya or consciousness of unworthiness as an occasion for redemption and restoration. The human will is there, we
536 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
know not how : but it is made to subserve God's will as it belongs to Him and has parddhma kartrtva and not svatantra kartrtva. But the Tenkalai rejects this view as savouring of egoism and emphasises the absoluteness and unconditioned nature of God's grace (nirhetuka katdksa]. To him responsive- ness to the grace of God has more appeal than the idea of human initiative and responsibility. " Whom He chooses, unto him He reveals Himself," and bhakti is itself only the conse- quence of antecedent grace. Karma, jndna and bhakti have independent values determined by the nature of the aspirant or adhikan. While the Vadakalai defines the effect of vdtsalya in the divine nature as the removal of dosa and cleansing the soul of its soilure, the Tenkalai thinks that vdtsalya connotes also delight in dosa. It is the nature of forgiveness to welcome the sinner and not to penalise him for his wrong-doing. To the Vadakalai, dayd is realised only in the removal of another's suffering ; but to the Tenkalai it is para duhke duhkitvam entering into the sorrows of man and even the relish of evil as physical evil. On the social side, the Vadakalai insists on the performance of svadharma or the duties relating to one's station in life even in the stage after prapatti, as kainkarya and in conformity to the divine command ; but the Tenkalai feels that the acts of the prapanna are amoral and should not be judged by the moral standards applicable to the ordinary men follow- ing the rules of varnds'rama, and the question of moral laxity, condemnation or condonation does not arise in his case.. This problem closely resembles that relating to the conduct of the jlvanmukta as amoral in the sense of fulfilling the moral law or amoral as a law unto itself. While there is a view amongst some Tenkalais that makes Nammalvar a nitya sain- sdrin with a view to extolling the absolute krpd and the need
HISTORY OF VIS'ISTADVAITIC VAISNAVISM 537
for atonement and acceptance, the Vadakalai traces the castes of the Alvdts to the incarnational requirements of the Raksaka and not to their karma. The controversy on puru- sartha hinges on the status of the kaivalyarthL While the Vadakalai contends that he is on the path to perfection or Paramapada, the Tenka/ai assigns to him a place in Paramapada itself, but segregates him from the society of the nitya suris.
From the philosophical standpoint, as contrasted with the doctrinal teachings of dogmatics, these distinctions are, on the whole, negligible. In Hinduism which is a view as also a way of life, philosophical differences enter into and affect the minutest details of life and sometimes make for sectarian disputes and accentuate social exclusiveness. This influence is felt even in the siddhanta or theology of Advaita, though its theory of the Absolute admits of degrees of truth, goodness and beauty and is all-accommodating and tolerant. Vis'istad- vaita, as a philosophy of mystic love, is deeply interested in synthesis and harmony without destroying individuality and works for universal salvation. But, as Vaisnavite theology and ritual, it is constrained, in the interests of logical truth and ethical discrimination, to follow the method of * either — or — ' and develop its own dogmas and ceremonials and build up Vaisnavite institutions somewhat on the lines of the Christian church and the group feeling of Islam. Every system has its own sampradaya or tradition which tends to divide its fol- lowers into warring sects, when the logical intellect aided by the passion for external observances takes the place of spiritual spontaneity and when law supersedes love. Institutional religion often grows by alliance with secular power, compro- mises with it, and is finally enslaved by it. These influences
538 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
can be traced also in the history of modern S'rl Vaisnavism, Its tendency to profitless logomachy and degrading litigancy are blots on the fair name of the whole dars'ana. The historian philosopher who takes a long-range view of Vaisnavism and discerns its inner meaning and value knows from history that while the increase of sects is inevitable, sectarianism is un- • desirable.
Philosophically interpreted, the differences between the schools are not fundamental, but refer to matters of opinion.1 In finding out the heart of Vaisnavism, the works of the Tenkalai school which are mostly in Tamil are complement- ary to those of the Vadakalais and Vedanta Des'ika is claimed •by both the schools in their Vedantic aspect as the defender of Vaisnavism regarded as Vis'istadvaita dars'ana. The eighteen points of difference can be reduced to the single problem of krpd vs. karma in its aspect of the practice of upaya, just as •the doctrinal differences in post-Sarikara Advaita may be traced to the critical study of the relation between jndna .and avidya. The problem resembles the Christian question, whether salvation is justification by works or by faith. It is sometimes stated, in the language of William James, as the rivalry between the volitional type of saintliness and the self- surrender type, but the points of difference in the analogy are more essential than those of agreement. The idea of original sin and vicarious atonement in a miraculous way by the only •begotten Son of God is foreign to the ethical religion of S'rl Vaisnavism. The theory of grace as a supernatural infusion without a spiritual transformation and regeneration creates an unbridgeable gulf between the natural and the supernatural, J c/. Vedanta Des'ika in his Sampradaya Paris'uddhi.
S'rl Bha^yakararudalya s'i§yasampradayangalil onrilum arthavirodham allai. vakyayojanabhedame ulladu.
HISTORY OF VIS'ISTADVAITIC VAISNAVISM 539
between the moral and the religious consciousness. If salva- tion is by antecedent merit, and justification by works, it is said to be moralistic and ritualistic and to involve more faith in the inexorability of the moral law of karma than in the es- capability arising from divine grace. If salvation is by faith and antecedent grace and guarantees the remission of sin with- out any condition like remorse, it is said to favour the faith in election and pre-determination and the idea of divine arbitrari- ness which might lead to the toleration of moral laxity and chaos. Vedanta Des'ika's view of vyaja is rooted in the assurance of ethical religion, that Bhagavdn is Himself the updya and the upeya, and the true meaning of human responsibility consists in our responsiveness to the call of krpa. It is the first principle of redemptive religion that, while the holiness of God drives us away from Him, His mercy enters into culpable humanity and draws us to Him. Even the appearance of a contrite heart and the feeling of unworthiness shown in an infinitesimal degree evokes sympathy and elicits the infinite grace of the Raksaka. This view is the meeting of the extremes of salvation by merit and salvation by mercy, and the infinity of daya works through the infinitesimal condition of con- trition. It is the recognition of the fact that endeavour consists in recognising the futility of endeavour. This view preserves the idea of divine justice and provides for the domi- nation of divine grace which is its fruition, and if there is any difference between the two schools, it is in the starting point and not in the goal. It is in the emphasis of aspects and not in the choice of opposing theories. The relation between right- eousness and redemption in the working of God in human his- tory is a holy mystery which is more worthy of reverential study than the mere philosophy of the mystery of the relation between Brahman and avidya in Advaita. If the rope-snake
540 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
riddle typifies the riddle of the universe, the karma-krpa prob- lem is the mystery of religious experience, which is more relevant to the mumuksu than the logical puzzle and cannot be lightly dismissed as a theological dogma meant for the ignorant. The vexed question cannot be solved logically or ethically. It can be dissolved only by the direct intuition of God. The point whether kataksa is sahetuka or nirhetitka arising from merit or arising even when there is no merit (gratia co-operans or gratia operans) is raised in terms of the causal category, which is not so adequate as the organic or mystic conception of the s'arira- saririn relation. When bhakti or prapatti is intense and irre- pressible, the soul hungers for God, its s'aririn, and God also hungers for the soul as its dtman and this reciprocity of love ends in the irresistibility of the bliss of communion. In this rapport, the logical intellect is merged in alogical ecstasy and is indistinguishable from it. If this is the experience of the Alvars as expounded by the deary as, the distinction between the two schools regarding the working of krpd is a distinction without much difference.
CHAPTER XXI
THE INFLUENCE OF RAMANUJA ON OTHER SYSTEMS IN INDIA
catholicity of Vis'istddvaita as a philosophy of religion -!• lies in its synthetic insight into truth and the spiritual transformation of such insight into all-pervasive or universal love. It is borne out by the following oft-quoted authoritative statements contained in the Veda and the Gltd and the utter- ances of Nammajvar and Ramanuja. Says the Eg Veda : " Sat is one though the seers describe it in different ways." [ Thus the Gltd : " Even those who worship other divinities, in love and faith, worship myself, Kaunteya, but they do so in an informal manner," 2 " Like the rain-fed rivers that flow into the ocean, the worship offered to all Devas or deities finally reaches Kes'ava." 3 Nammajvar says : " The hymns uttered in praise |of your chosen gods are really addressed to my Tirumdl or Paramdtma ".4 Ramanuja's synthetic method consists in his conclusion that all ideas and names ultimately connote Brahman or Narayana, that the worship of deities like Indra is really the worship of Narayana, the Inner Ruler of all
1 ekam sad vipra bahudha vadanti.
2 ye tvanya devata bhaktah yajante s'raddhayanvitah I
tepi mameva kaunteya yajantyavidhipurvakam I! — B. G., IX. 23.
3 akas'at patitam t5yam yatha gaccati sagaram I sarvadevanamaskarah kes'avam prati gaccati II
4 num in kavi kondu num num i|ta deivam ettinal
cemmin cudarmudi en tirumalukkuccerume. — Tiru., III. ix. 6.
542 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
beings, and that in the light of this truth the essential points in the Sankhya, the Veda and the Pd&upata doctrines are to be adopted.1 The terms sarva s'aririn, sarva s'abdavacya and sarva raksaka refer only to Brahman or Narayana. In the centuries that have followed the age of Ramanuja, Hinduism has been threatened with extinction by the attacks of prosely- tising religions like Islam and Christianity and it has on the whole successfully resisted these attacks by its innate synthetic genius. In critical times in the Afghan, the Mughal and the British periods, prophets and saints arose in different parts of the country to meet the onslaughts of these hostile religions and the history of Vaispavism, especially in Northern India, marks the different stages of its development based on the needs of the situation ; but in many cases the new movements had their ultimate origin in the teachings of Ramanuja as interpreted liberally rather than literally. Reformers like Ramananda, Caitanya, and Ramdas came to fulfil the past and not to destroy it and even revolutionary movements like those that arose in Bengal and the Punjab have felt the assimilative power of ancient Hinduism. More than all, even alien faiths that came to conquer institutionally have been conquered in a mystic wray by the silent power of love as exemplified in the lives of Indian Sufis and Christian mystics. The vitality of the Vaisnavite and the Vaisnavising movements is largely trace- able to the influence of Ramanuja who himself represents the ancient tradition of Vedantic hospitality and love. Though this chapter is not strictly a part of the whole work, its main object is to bring out the vitality of S'rl Vaisnavism as a living religion and its claim to be a world religion based on universality as opposed to uniformity. It is essentially a religion of satvic love based on s'astraic authority and spiritual
1 Sri Bhasya, II. ii. 43.
INFLUENCE OF RlMANUJA ON OTHER SYSTEMS 543
experience and, if the other religions satisfy the test of spiritual- ity, they are, pragmatically speaking, allied to it.
The bhakti movement in Northern India is traceable to the influence of Ramananda, By its stress on monotheistic faith in one God and the establishment of spiritual brother- hood, it accepted the challenge of Islam in the Muhammadan period, made Hindustan safe for Hinduism, and saved it from disintegration and destruction. The monotheism of Rama- nanda exerted a great influence also on the offshoots of Hinduism like Sikhism and Rrahmoism and even on Sufism, and marked the focussing point of the varieties of Vaisnavite experience in Northern India. Ramananda (1300 — 1411) was deeply influenced by the teaching of Ramanuja and was initiated into the truths of Vis'istadvaita ; but he was a radical reformer and did not recognise caste distinctions in religion. He vital- ised religion by freeing it from religiosity, and spread the universal gospel of bhakti. He is thus regarded as the fountain- head of the bhakti movement in Northern India. Brahman is, according to him, the One without a second, and is immanent in the hearts of all sentient beings. Rama is Brahman, and there is no other God but Rama. Rama was the incarnation of dhanna or was righteousness itself, and is adored as the pattern of perfection in politics, conjugal life and religion, in their highest aspects of monarchy, monogamy and mono- theism. Monarchy is government by a wise ruler who has the righteousness of God ; monogamy insists on absolute conjugal fidelity in thought, word and deed ; and monotheism is faith in the universal Redeemer ; and history does not afford a better example of a just ruler, loyal husband and merciful Lord than Rama. The ethical religion of Rama has therefore a uni- versal appeal.
.544 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
Religion is the spiritual realisation of God by every person, irrespective of social distinctions. The twelve dis- •ciples of Ramananda, who, like the twelve apostles of Jesus, ardently spread the faith by their life and teachings in the mother-tongue, came from all classes of society, especially from the depressed classes, and Kablr and Tulsidas were among the chief of them. Ravidas, a cobbler by birth, is said to have initiated Mira Bai into the meaning of bhakti, and insisted on the need for democratising bhakti by service to all. S'ena, a barber, made the Raja of Bandogarh a disciple of Vaisnavism. Dana (1415) was a Jat and Plpa (1425) was a Rajput prince. S'ukananda, Asananda, Paramananda, Meha- nanda and S'rl Ananda also belonged to the order of Ramanuja. Kablr, born in 1398, is regarded as the greatest of Ramananda's disciples. He is said to be the son of a Brahmin widow brought up by a Muhammadan weaver. The story is told that Kablr resorted to a device to deserve the grace of Ramananda, by laying > himself on the Ganges Ghat in the guru's path in the darkness of an early morning. When Rama- nanda touched the head of Kablr, he cried " Rama, Rama," and Kablr felt that it was the mantra given to him by the .guru for meditation. He insisted on monotheistic devotion touched with morality, cared more for inner purity than for caste rigour and idolatry, and did his best to unite Islam and Hinduism by synthesising their Veddntic and Sufi aspects. Dadu (1544 — 1603), a cotton cleaner at Ahmedabad, believed more in God-realisation than in blind faith in scripture. He had interviews with Akbar with a view to bringing together divergent faiths in a common bond of love. Suri Das, blind from his birth, dedicated his poetic talents to the service of S'rl Krsna. Tulsidas (1532) was a Brahmin who had a .genius for Rama bhakti, and composed his immortal Hindi
INFLUENCE OF RAMlNUJA ON OTHER SYSTEMS 545
Ramdyana which is so highly valued in Hindustan for its moving power. But he was more conservative than Kabir .and Dadu.
The philosophy of Nimbarka l called Dvaita-Advaita or the Sanatkumara sampraddya seems to stand midway between the school of Yadava and Vis'istddvaita and is a system of Vaisnavism. Nimbarka's commentary on the Vedanta Sutras is known as the Vedanta Pdrijdta Saurabha. Reality is, according to Nimbarka, an identity that pervades difference -and gives meaning to it. Bare identity is as unthinkable as bare difference. Negation denies only bare difference, but not otherness. Dvaita-Advaita may appear paradoxical, but is not self -contradictory, and it does equal justice to both the aspects of Dvaita and Advaita. Brahman exists in itself in its abheda aspect as the saguna or the self-determined and enters into the world in a bheddbheda relation in terms of distinction as well as dependence. The cosmic order is the self-actualisation of the creative potency or s'akti that is in Brahman. The creative urge or parindma s'akti that is at the heart of Reality is potential in pralaya and actualised in srsti. Reality is the unity in trinity consisting of the jlva or bhoktd, the sub- ject of experience, the bhogya or object of experience, and I&vara, the inner Ruler of both. Creation and dissolution resemble the closing and the disclosing of a part of the body of a serpent. Like the spider spinning its cobweb out of itself, Brahman emanates into the universe of space and time, but exceeds their content. The jlva is an amsfa or element of the absolute like the sea and its waves, or the radiant sun and its radiance, and not a fictitious phantom like the reflec-
1 A Telugu Brahmin who lived in the twelfth century A. P. after Ramanuja .and before S'rikantha.
35
546 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
tion of the sun in water. It is different from Brahman and is also identical with it. Brahman exists in and as the jlva, but is not tainted by its imperfections. The absolute exists in and as the particular. Owing to the sense of finitude, the jiva suffers from the hazards of the divided consciousness and the ills of metempsychosis. The mumuksu as an updsaka con- templates on Brahman as the All-Self and surrenders hirpself to His grace. The freed self or prapanna emerges from the body when it is dissolved by death, soars to the world of Brahman through the shining paths of the gods, and attains the bliss of Brahman. Mukti is not svarupa aikya or identity with Brahman or ekibhdva or unity-consciousness, but is the realisation of the Dvaita-Advaita relation between the jlva and Brahman. The chief value of Nimbarka Vedanta consists in its being a logical transition from the Yadava school to Vis'ist- ddvaita. It is the latter system alone that removes the fatal defects of Brahma Parindmavdda by predicating imperfections to the jlva and mutability to acit.
The philosophy of Ramanuja is a logical transition from ^ Dvaita" Advaita to Vis'istddvaita ; the teaching of Purnaprajna or Madhvacarya marks an important epoch in the history of Vaisnavism, and is a change from Vi&istddvaita to Dvaita dars'ana. Madhvacarya, the first systematic exponent of the Dvaita school of Vedanta, was born near Udipi in 1199 A.D. Even as a boy, he, like the other great dcdryas, showed his extraordinary ability in mastering the various branches of knowledge and metaphysical understanding. Initiated into the sannydsa order early in life, under the name of Ananda Tirtha, he felt it his mission in life to give a new and correct interpretation of the Vedanta Sutras, different from that of other schools, traversed the whole country converting many
INFLUENCE OF RAMANUJA ON OTHER SYSTEMS 547
thinkers to his view and popularising his philosophy, final- ly went to Badrinath and there passed away. He wrote commentaries on the Rg Veda, the Upanisads, the Glta and the Brahma Sutras in the light of the Dvaita system, expounded the essentials of the Mahd Bhdrata and the Bhdgavata, and rigorously maintained the view that the prasthdnas are a- single integral whole. With a view to bringing out fully the fundamentals of Dvaita Veddnta by a refutation of other schools, notably of Mdydvdda, he composed independent treatises called the Das'a Praka- ranas. His work was carried on by his followers, the chief among them being Jaya Tlrtha, a contemporary of Vidyaranya and Vedanta Des'ika, and later on by Vyasaraya. The philo- sophy of Dvaita has a negative as well as a positive side, and is both speculative and spiritual. On the negative side, it joins issue with Advaita and rejects its theories of nirguna Brah- man, Mdydvdda and the identity philosophy, and regards the Advaitins as Buddhists in disguise. It also rejects Ramanuja's theory of aprthaksiddha vis'esana, and denies the view that Brahman is the updddnakdrana of the universe, on the ground that, if He becomes the universe, He ceases to be free and per- fect. On the positive side, it insists on the truth that reality is rooted in difference, and establishes the Veddntic philosophy of theism. Its theory of epistemology is a development of the realistic position that knowledge is savis'esana or determinate and not nirvis'esana or indeterminate, and is an external relation be- tween the visayi and the visaya or the subject and the object. It thus avoids the defects of mentalism, materialism and relativ- ism. Truth is based on correspondence and not on non-con- tradiction, and therefore there are no degrees of truth and error. The three sources of valid knowledge are pratyaksa, anumdna and dgama and the three other pramdnas recognised
548 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
by Advaita, namely, upamana, arthdpatti and anupalabdhi are included in these and are therefore not independent. Pratyaksa is the basis of knowledge, and is not sublatable or of secondary value ; and as knowledge is always savis'esana, the distinction between what is savikalpaka and nirvlkalpaka as recognised by S'ankara and Ramanuja does not hold good. When knowledge presents the object as it is and all its instru- ments function normally, it is true or yathartha, but abnormal cases arising from psycho-physical disorders and karma, are sources of error. In all cases, the reality of the world order is presupposed and is never disputed. The Veda is impersonal, infallible and eternal, and has to be accepted by the dstika or rejected in toto as is done by the nastika ; but the theory of relative truth as expounded by Advaita leads to no truth at all and thus ends in scepticism.
Epistemology, as the enquiry into the pramdnas, is es- sential to the ontological exposition of tatva or prameya as revealed by the pramana. The theory of vi&esa is the basic truth of Dvaitavada and it refers to the uniqueness or peculiar particularity of, all beings and their attributes. There is five- fold difference or pancabheda, namely, the difference between Brahman and thejlva, Brahman and jada, jiva &ndjiva,jlva .and jada and jada and jada. Brahman exists by Himself and is independent, and is the ground of the world of cetana and acetana. Brahman is svatantra or self-dependent, and is pure and perfect, and is the One without a second, having no equal or superior entity. Cit and acit are dependent on Brahman for their form and function. Dvaita cosmology combats vivartavdda and parindmavdda, and traces the world process to efficient causality and the supreme will of Isrvara. I&vara is not an illusionist or the immanent cause of creation that
INFLUENCE OF RlMANUJA ON OTHER SYSTEMS 549
enters into all beings and becomes one with the changing world, but is transcendentally pure and perfect. By His omnipotence, He creates all beings and rules them as their Supreme Lord. The creator is neither enveloped by may a or avidya nor does he suffer from any parindmic changes. There is therefore no vivarta or vikara in the pure creational motive.
Madhva psychology posits an infinity of eternal jivas which are vis'esas and not vis'esanas, each having its own exist- ence due to its yogyata or disposition. On the basis of their yogyata, they are classified into muktiyogya, tamoyogya and misrra jlva. The first are the satvic jivas that are eternally free. The second type is tamasic or evil-minded, and they choose the way of sin and eternal damnation. The third type is intermediate, and though they do evil, they can choose the sdtvika path and attain mukti. Dvaita philosophy of nature is realistic and pluralistic, and refers to eternal entities which are both positive and negative. The first consists of prakrti, dkds'a and kola, and the second, of categories like abhava* They form the cosmic order and are eternally different from h'vara and cit. Dvaita ethics insists on the distincticn be- tween good and evil, and defines their essential character. The cosmic order is also a moral order sustained by the gunas and karmas and ordained by Is'vara who dispenses justice according to desert. The Kausltaki Upanisad and the Gitd recognise the reality of moral distinction and the difference between the daivic and dsuric types and the consequences of their conduct and character.
The means of attaining mukti includes physical, moral and spiritual disciplines based on the Upanisadic injunctions of s'ravana, manana and nididhyasana. The disciplines are
550 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
fully elaborated in the scheme of Astanga Yoga, comprising bodily purity, moral excellence and spiritual introspection. They have their consummation in bhakti which has its comple- tion in divine grace. Dvaita philosophy has its fruition in the religious realisation of God and the attainment of Visnuloka. Though mukti is freedom from the ills of samsdra, there are •differences in the enjoyment of the bliss of Brahman, deter- mined by the peculiarity of each jlva. The idea that mukti •connotes the identity of the jlva and Brahman or similarity between the two is opposed to the eternal difference between the creator and the creature, and the Upanisad teaches this truth when it says " Thou art not That ", though the absolutists misconstrue the text as " Thou art That ". Some modern exponents of Dvaita think that Dvaita is Brahma- 4vaita and claim to bring out the monistic truth that Brahman alone is perfect and independent, advitiya, and is therefore not dualistic. Monotheism in itself is a form of monism, and on the Hegelian view of progress, it may be regarded as the culmination of Indian philosophic thought. But, since the whole system is based on the principle of absolute difference amongst the tatvas, it is safer to follow the ancient tradition and recognise it as a system having its own individuality. Its influence on Northern Vaisnavism, especially on the teaching of Caitanya and of Maharastra and Kannada saints is deep and permanent. Though Dvaita insists on ultimate difference and denies immanent causality, it is not radically different from Vis'istadvaitic Vaisnavism, as it affirms the supremacy of Visnu and the necessity of bhakti.
Vallabha, the founder of S'uddhadvaita Vedanta, was born in 1479 as the son of a Telugu Brahmin in Raipur in the Cen- tral Provinces, and he felt it his mission to expound the Vedanta
INFLUENCE OF RlMANUJA ON OTHER SYSTEMS 551
Siitras by combating Advaita. It is said that even at the age of fourteen, he took part in a Veddntic controversy at the court of Krsnaraya at Vijayanagar, and established the truths of Brahmavdda or S'uddhddvaita by exposing the fallacies of Maya- vdda. He extols the Bhdgavata as the fulfilment of the three prasthdnas, namely, the Upanisads, the Gltd and the Sutras. His commentary on the Sutras known as Anubhdsya and that on the Bhdgavata bring out the essentials of his philosophy of religion, though the latter is incomplete. The Brahman of the Upanisads or the Paramdtman of the S'rutis is the Bhagavdn of the Bhdgavata or S'ri Krsna, the supra- personal Purusottama with a vigraha or body made of bliss. S'ri Krsna, the highest Brahman, has a shining aprdkrta body made of sat, cit and dnanda, and He eternally sports with the jlva in the Goloka. Next to Purusottama is Aksara Brahman having sat, cit and limited dnanda, and He appears as the antarydmin. He who has mere bhakti does not attain the highest. The higher state called pusti bhakti is the gift of God, and is svarupdnanda higher than Brahmdnanda* Creation is the expression of Krsna lild, and is not the work of an external designer or a magic show. Owing to the power of dvirbhdva or manifestation, that is in Para Brahman as sat, -cit and dnanda, the one overflows as the many. The world of matter emanates from sat, that of monadic jlvas radiates from cit and the antaryamins are the outpourings of dnanda. The jlva is a spark of the shining Self, and is eternal, self-con- scious and active, but, in the bound state of samsdra, has no dnanda or bliss. Bhakti is the only way of attaining divine bliss, and there are stages in the sddhanas. It is promoted by s'ravana, smarana and klrtana. Those who meditate on the Lord by following the way of injunctions known as marydda mdrga or sfdstrlya bhakti attain sdyujya or
552 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
intimate communion; it is open only to Dvijas, and is difficult to practise in the Kali Yuga. But there is- a higher state known as pusti bhakti or the way of pure love which is a gift of God or nirhetuka katdksa and is accessible to all. Brahman is not only sat, cit and dnanda but also rasa. Rasa is the enjoyment of the love of Krsna as experienced by the Gopls with their instinct for Krsna, who* is therefore called Gopljanavallabha. While s'dstrlya bhakti is mediate and progressive, pusti bhakti is immediate, and requires no meditative effort. Pusti is the inner sacrament or Brahma sambandha, which consists in dtma nivedana or the dedication by the devotee of the self and all its belongings to the Lord to whom they really belong. Pusti bhakti is the perfection of prema, and the mystic blessed with Krsna prema gets the four kinds of mukti, and goes finally to Goloka beyond Vaikuntha, and revels in communion with the ever sportive Gopala. It is seva rather than puja that matters, self-gift rather than worship or prayer ; and a life consecrated to Krsna has more value, especially in Kali, than the monastic life ; but it pre-supposes the spirit of renunciation, which is hostile to the hedonistic temper. The consummation of pusti bhakti is the intense love of the Gopls for Krsna in the two stages of samyoga or union and viprayoga or separation followed by the immortal bliss of communion. The S'uddhdd- vaita of Vallabha as a philosophy is allied more to Viffistd^ dvaita than to Advaita and its mysticism on the whole merits comparison with that of Nammalvar and Goda as interpreted by some of its exponents.
S'ri Krsna Caitanya, the founder of Bengal Vaisnavism,. was born in 1485 in Navadvlpa, the seat of Sanskrit learning in Bengal and the home of Nydya S'astra. At that time, the
INFLUENCE OF RAMANUJA ON OTHER SYSTEMS 553
atmosphere was charged with materialism, though a few followed the monism of S'ankara. Even in his boyhood,. Caitanya attained mastery in grammar and Nyaya, and he wrote a very subtle work on Nyaya, which was later destroyed to appease the jealousy of his Advaitic guru, Raghunath. Early in life, Caitanya became dissatisfied with Advaita. When he was initiated into Vaisnavism by Is'vara Puri, a Madhva teacher at Gaya, he became intoxicated with Krsna prema. With his magnetic personality, his logical profundity and soul-stirring devotion, Caitanya spread the gospel of Krsna prema throughout the country. The philosophy of Caitanya treats of visaya or subject matter, sambandha or relation between God and the self, abhidheya or the means of realising Brahman and prayojana or the highest end. This was elabo- rated by Bala Deva who lived in the nineteenth century, in his Bhasya on the Sutras, following the teaching of Purna Prajna. It is summed up in the formula that the absolute is Krsna, the beautiful, the beloved and the blissful. The absolute manifests itself in three ways, as Brahman, Paramdtman and Bhagavan, and has infinite s'aktis of which the chief are svarupa s'akti, jlva s'akti and may a s'akti. Bhagavan as Rrsna is the abso- lute, and the concept of Radha-Krsna incarnate in Caitanya brings out the full import of Krsna Ilia. Krsna Bhagavan has a bewitching form of unsurpassed and super-sensu- ous beauty with the three eternal svarupa s'aktis or attributes of sandhinl, samvit and hladinl, which correspond to sat, cit and ananda, of which the last is the most important. They are nirvi&esa in the potential state, and savis'esa in the actualised condition. Brahman as Bhagavan is and has sat, cit and ananda, and imparts these qualities to the^jlva, and they are fully realised as hladinl or bliss. Madhurya or sweetness of love has more value in religion than the might
554 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
of Is'vara ; and Krsna as the sweetest of sweet love is a fuller expression of the divine nature than even Narayana. S'rl Krsna is advaya-jndna-tatva or the absolute beauty without a blemish, in whom essence and existence are one, with mddhurya as the chief quality. The universe is the Ilia of the Lord of bliss, though it is only a partial expression caused by the concealing power of His may a s'akti, and the true Ilia is the eternal play of Radha-Krsna as rasa Ilia. Thejlva, as the tatastha s'akti of Bhagavdn, is eternal and self-luminous, and the relation between the jlva and Bhagavdn is acintya bhedd- bheda like that of the sun and its luminosity.
Bhakti is the only means of attaining the bliss of Krsna, and varies in intensity from s'dnti rati or the joy of peace to madhura rati or the joy of divine deliciousness. Bhakti, as the logic of the heart, arises from, and arouses, the bliss potency of S'rl Krsna, and it consists in love for love's sake, and does not seek any boon. Prlti or love gradually develops into a longing and admits of five stages. Krsna prema is divinely rooted, and is not soiled by carnality or hedonistic motives. In the second $tage, called sukha prema, bhakti melts the heart and makes it glow with the fire of the love of Krsna. In the third stage of pranaya, love becomes invasive, and it assaults the Lover. Its effect is heightened in mana,- in which bhakti compels the Lover to yield to the challenge of love's labour and loyalty. In the fifth stage of rdga, even severe pa^n is welcomed as a joy, if it has the content of Krsna prema. In anurdga, rdga becomes irrepressible and deepens into the maddening love of mahdbhdva like that of Radha. Bhakti rasa is spontaneous and intrinsic and not the effect of scriptural injunction, and it is unconditioned. Love is love for ever more and is never lost, and is ever fecundative. The
INFLUENCE OF RAMlNUJA ON OTHER SYSTEMS 555
philosophy of bhakti, according to Caitanya, is an explication of the spiritual moods or bhdvas of Krsna prema in the ascending order of intimacy culminating in madhura bhdva. The Caitanya school stresses the mddhurya aspect of Vaisnavism as the summtim bonum of religious life, and has no use for the over-awing power of Is'vara. The first mood is Brahmdnanda or yogic absorption in the absolute or Brahman who is the eternal lustre of the blissful body of Bhagavdn. S'dnti rati is the result of devotional reverence to Narayana and not the bliss of Brndavana. Ddsya prlti is loving service to S'rl Krsna as the cosmic ruler, and is based on reverence to the Lord. But it is an impediment to the free flow of love. Sakhya rati or the joy of friendship overcomes the creature consciousness of the bhakta and promotes the sense of equality and fellow- ship. In vdtsalya rati or the joy of affection like that of Yas'oda for the darling Krsna, love deepens into tenderness. Madhura rati is Krsna prema par excellence, and it bursts the barriers of conventional religion and artificial discipline. It is the consummation of disciplined devotion and not its cancel- lation. Krsna prema thrives only in the soil of pure love, and has its roots in self-renouncement and its fruition in the relish of the rasa of Radha- Krsna. The beauties of nature and the music of the spheres are but a partial expression of the infinite beauty of Krsna, and the irresistibility of His love is epito- mised in the mahdbhdva of Radha. Absolute beauty divides itself into the forms of Radha and Krsna to enjoy the double fruition of love. While meditation on Brahman gives mere s'dnti emptied of the warmth of love, and devotion to Narayana is holy love to His ais'varya as it is in Vaikuntha, Krsna prema is love for love's sake in which the lover and the beloved sport with each other for ever and forget their other- ness in the ecstasy of love. Krsna prema is as opposed to
556 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
visaya rdga, as light is opposed to darkness, and has no tinge of egoism. Madhura bhdva transcends the logical and moral disciplines detailed in the bhakti s'dstra like s'astraic faith,. updsand and sddhu sangha. Mere jndna or yoga cannot open the flood-gates of the bliss potency of Bhagavdn. It is only in the maddened love of madhura bhdva that the barriers of thought and will are broken. Then self-feeling is consumed in the fire of flaming love. Truth leads to goodness, goodness shines through beauty and beauty is consummated in Krsna Itta. Love is no doubt a two-sided affair, but the feeling of separateness is overpowered in the ecstasy of union.
The nature of Radha- Krsna love is beautifully drama- tised by Saint Jayadeva who lived in the twelfth century, in his immortal lyric poem called the Gita Govinda. It is- the allegory of a ripe soul having a genius for Krsna prema yearning for the ecstasy of union. The mystic love of Radha- Krsna can be truly discerned spiritually and not by the worldly-minded man steeped in sensuality. The plot starts with the sports of Krsna writh the other Gopis which moves the heart of Radha and excites her jealousy. The Lord of Love is in all hearts and cannot be exclusively possessed by any one mystic ; and when Radha claims possession of Krsna,. He disappears suddenly. Remorse-stricken, she pines away in gloom and waits with divinest love. In the next scene,, Krsna has a vision of Radha's anguish and filled with unspeak- able longing, He languishes in loneliness. Brahman has na joy in being ekaki, and His delight is in dallying with love.. Love mediates between beauty and its alter ego. Pierced by the shafts of Radha-love, Krsna pines in grief, and is filled with cheerless melancholy. Radha is incensed at her unrequited love, suffers from the pain of vipralambha, and
INFLUENCE OF RAMANUJA ON OTHER SYSTEMS 557
chides Him for His faithlessness. The Lord is really a jealous God, and unless the bhakta is stripped of his egoism and seeks Him as his sole refuge, he does not merit His saving grace. But Krsna regards the/warn who loves Him as His very life and closer than breath itself. Vaikuntha is itself worthless to the Lord if it is without the love of the jnanl. In the next scene, Krsna is stricken with remorse and pleads with her to place her feet on His head as a mark of forgiveness. The story is told that Jayadeva regretted the irreverent tone of the last sentence and left it blank ; but in his absence, Krsna came and inserted the line " Place your feet on my head." The idea that, in the fulness of His saulabhya, the Lord seeks to efface Himself in the service of His devotee is a common- place in Vaisnavism, and Krsna is saulabhya in a concrete form. The fire of Krsna prema fed by vairdgya exceeds that of carnal love just as solar light exceeds lamp light, and when love becomes infinite longing for the infinite, Krsna can no longer resist it, and repress His own love. The lovers at last meet and rush into each other's arms, and are lost in the immortal bliss of union. The negative way of vis'lesa thus leads to the affirmation of divine union. The Radha- Krsna cult is a northern version of the nay oka-nay akl bhava experi- enced by the Alvars. The art of divine love as portrayed in the Vaisnava teaching of ndyaka-ndyaki bhava or maha- bhdva refers to a mystic experience which transcends sensuous love. Every form of Vaisnavite mysticism is sensual in garb but has a spiritual meaning.
While the Vaisnavism of Vallabha and Caitanya stresses the mystic side of Krsna Ilia perfected in the Radha- Krsna relation, the bhakti movement of Maharastra brings out its social side and the need for the democratic diffusion of bhakti to
558 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
all humanity. It also emphasises the worship of Krsna as the lord of Rukmini and not of RadKa. It is closely related to the cult of Ramananda of Benares who is identified with the teacher of Jnanes'vara's father. Jnanes'vara is the founder of the bhakti school in Maharastra. The bhakta does not reason God but feels Him as his very life. Bhakti, however, presup- poses the renunciation of ahankara and the knowledge of the self and its relation to Bhagavdn who is worshipped as Vithoba, Inner devotion is more vital than conformity to customary morality, and is the very sine qua non of spirituality. Ascetic self- repression has no value for the bhakta as he treats the body as the very temple of God. Bhakti blossoms like the lotus at the dawn of sun-light, when the bhakta realises God. Owing to the immanence of God in all jivas, what is possible to one man is possible to every man and the true test of bhakti is in service to humanity. Bhakti is said to be ninefold, and each form has its own efficacy in securing salvation. The chief forms are srravana or listening to the glory and goodness of God as Parlksit did, kirtana or singing the songs of divine love like Narada, smarana or the loving reverence of the Lord's love like Prahlada's, devotion to God and godlv men like that of Akrura, service like that of Hanuman, faith in God's fellowship like that of Arjuna and self-surrender like that of Bali. Mere visions and auditions are psychic states which should not be confused with mystic realisation. When the mystic speaks of the touches and thrills of God, he uses only sense symbolism in his desire for a realistic description.
Among the well-known bhaktas or mystics of Maharastra are Namdev, Eknath, Tukaram and Ramdas who lay stress on " the social, synthetic, personal and activistic aspects of
INFLUENCE OF RAMANUJA ON OTHER SYSTEMS 559'
mysticism." Namdev (1270-1350), born in a tailor's family, was addicted to robbery in his youth, but was seized with remorse which led to his redemption by the grace of God. His devo- tional outpourings to Pandarinath are embodied in \\isabhangas which are well-known for their devotional fervour. He holds that a contrite heart is more acceptable to Panduranga than wealthy offerings without it. The removal of egoism is more important than the practice of vows and vigils. Not by pilgrim- age nor by austerity but only by inner purity can He be seen> face to face. Eknath (1533-1598) dedicated himself to the ser- vice of God by singing sankirtans in Marathi and his life is an example of a bhakta who did the duties of his station in life with his mind fixed always in the inner Divinity in all beings. The true bhakta realises God everywhere. He had no faith in caste distinctions and it is said that, at one time, he gave to the un- touchables the food offered to his pitrs. Tukaram (1607- 1649), the son of a farmer near Poona, was sorely tried by God and subjected to intense suffering. But, unlike Eknath, he felt that godliness could not be compromised with worldly life and at one time he refused presents from Sivaji ; he courted misery to enable him to seek His mercy in the dark night of the soul. Service to God is superior to salvation. His bhakti became so intense that at one time in a mood of despera- tion, he decided on suicide, when he had a direct vision of God and enjoyed blessedness. Ramdas (1608-1681 A.D.) was an- ardent devotee of Rama and after a severe trial was blessed with direct Divine experience. As the spiritual teacher of Sivaji he instilled into him the courage to conquer the Muham- madan invader, returned the kingdom offered to him by Sivaji and helped him in the re-establishment of righteous rule. His Dasabodha contains his spiritual autobiography. By self- surrender or atmanivedana, the highest kind of bhakti, the
560 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
•bhakta became one (vibhakta) with God by His grace and finally attained sdyujya. True spirituality, to him, lies in the performance of duty with the heart set on God, and all people .are spiritually one though socially different.
S'aiva Siddhdnta is the systematic exposition of the S'rutis, the Salva Jlgamas and the experiences of the Ndyanmdrs, and in its philosophic aspect as formulated by Srlkantha, the commen- tator on the Sutras, it compels comparison with the essentials of Ramanuja's system though there are radical differences .between the two in theology and ritualism. It accepts real- ism and satkdryavdda and posits three ultimate realities, Pati, pas'u and pds'am, which can be distinguished but not separated. Pati is the Supreme Lord S'iva who is formless, as He transcends the limitations of prakrti and yet, out of mercy, He assumes eight spiritual forms, but does not incarnate like Visnu. S'iva and S'akti are inseparable like fire and heat and .S'iva-s'akti brings out the dynamic love of the Godhead and .the redemptive principle of grace. Pas'u or the soul is caught up in pds'am and the confusions of karma and becomes a mode of matter. By moral and spiritual discipline it can realise itself and become a mode of God. Religion is the transition from dtmadars'ana to S'ivadar&ana as the jiva without S'iva is like the consonant without the vowel, and mukti or sdyujya consists in intuiting S'iva as love and becoming one with Him. Mukti is not the loss of personality, but is self-effacement in the service of S'iva. From the pragmatic standpoint, S'aiva .Siddhdnta is not much different from Visristddvaita if it accepts •the theory of the immanent causality of Brahman as expounded by the Sutrakdra and the redemptive purpose of avatdra as revealed in the Gltd. The Srikara Bhdsya on the Sutras by .S'ripati expounds Vlra&aivism from the Bheddbheda standpoint
INFLUENCE OF RAMlNUJA ON OTHER SYSTEMS 561
and is called Vis'esadvaita. It refutes Mdyavdda and rejects Pancaratra Agama and by stressing Vlras'aivism, it is con- trasted with the school of S'rlkantha which is interpreted by Appayya Diksita in terms of Advaita.
Sikhism is a virile type of ethical religion which has affini- ties with Vaisnavism in its protestant and democratic aspects. Its founder, Guru Nanak, was born in 1469, a few years before Luther, and it was his mission to stress the essentials of religion by rejecting formalism and ceremonialism and to bring out the common features of Hinduism and Islam. Sikhism affirms its faith in monotheism and metempsychosis, but rejects caste exclusiveness and social distinctions. The Sikh worships the Adi Grantha Saheb as a divine revelation, but he does not accept the infallibility of Vedic authority and the value of image worship. All men live, move and have their being in God and they belong to God as much as God belongs to them. The world is itself the temple of Hari and the true Guru is Brah- man or Hari. The jlva is immortal and though he suffers from karma and the ills of samsara, he can attain moksa by bhakti and faith in the Guru. The disciple distinguishes between the eternal and the temporal, renounces worldliness though he lives in the world as an active member of society, and seeks to become one with God by repeating Hari-mantra and attaining the Guru's grace. The ten gurus represent respectively the ten cardinal virtues of humility, obedience, equality of all jivas, service, self-sacrifice, justice, mercy, purity, calmness and courage. Evil is a moral taint like lying, lust and love of wealth and it lapses into sin when it becomes disobedience of the divine law ; the root cause of sin is ahankdra. True living is higher than .truth and it is the life of devotion to the Guru and God. 36
562 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
Freedom consists in becoming one with God and attaining eternal life. Sikhism stresses the monotheistic faith and fervour of Vaisnavism and its ethical teaching of spiritual democracy.
The 6rahma Samaj accepts the theory of natural reve- lation and draws its inspiration mainly from the Upanisads, but rejects the doctrine of supernatural and miraculous revelation and also the scepticism of mdydvdda. Each individual has the innate power of inferring the existence of God or Brahman and intuiting Him by saying " My existence is self-evident, and since I am, Brahman also exists." This in- tuitive experience (dtma pratyaya) is spontaneous and self- evident and possible to all individuals, and Brahma Vidyd is the rational exposition of spiritual experiences, and is mono- theistic and not monistic. Intuition is the fulfilment of reason and is not opposed to it. The proof of the existence of God is fourfold, the cosmological, the teleological, the ontologicai and the moral, and it shows the four stages of human development. The first is the physical proof that God is the cosmic cause. The second is the biological argument that Is'vara is the Designer of the universe. The third is the philosophical idea of Is'vara as the supreme Reality. The last is the moral proof that He is morally perfect. These proofs bring out respectively the power, wisdom, infinity and holiness of God. Every scripture is a revelation of God, and is worthy of respect, though the Upanisads form the main source of the teaching of the Samaj ists as spiritual children of the rsis. The chief attributes of Brahman are satyam, jnanam, anantam, anandam, s'ivam, advaitam and sruddham. The first three are metaphysical ideas, and they define His nature (svarupa laksana) as the true of the true, the all-knowing and the infinite. As concrete infinite, He is.
INFLUENCE OF RAMANUJA ON OTHER SYSTEMS 563
One without a second as the Soul of all selves, and there cannot be two infinites. The moral attribute is the idea of God as the holy and the pure. God is essentially love, and His love transcends human love. He is infinitely blissful, and makes others happy.
Daily life is hallowed by the loving remembrance of God and by worship which is congregational as well as private. Worship of God consists of drddhana, dhyana and prarthana, and dtma samarpana and it is purely spiritual. Arddhana is the adoration of God by dwelling on His attributes. Dhyana is the practice of the presence of God, and is a higher stage than drddhana. Prdrthana is a spiritual prayer which consists in seeking the guidance of God. The three forms of devotion based on faith, love and holiness form the essence of religion. In congregational or Samaj worship, drddhana is done by the chanting of selected Upanisadic mantras, and it is followed by dhyana or silent meditation. The updsaka prays in the Upanisadic way by uttering the hymn " Lead me from untruth to truth, from darkness to light, and from death to immortality. Oh, merciful One, protect us by Thy mercy." Love and service constitute the true worship of God. The Samajist insists on the attainment of inwrard holiness and the practice of truth and kindness in individual and social life. The knowledge that Brahman is sarvajna and the jiva is alpajna fosters humility. The Samajist has no faith in the elaborate rituals associated with popular religion, in image worship and the need for incarnations ; but he has a living faith in God as the Soul of our souls. Brahman is ananta and niravayava, and idolatry and incarnation are opposed to the infinitude of Brahman. The Brahmo is also opposed to caste distinctions, as he thinks that the caste system conflicts
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with the promotion of the virtue of human brotherhood, and he thinks it a duty to break the restrictions of caste and abolish the whole system. Brahmoism affirms the eternity of the self and its gradual progress towards perfection, in which the self becomes one with God in knowing, willing and feeling ; but it rejects the monistic view that in mukti there is loss of per- sonality. Raja Ram Mohan Rai, the founder, was born in 1770 in Murshidabad and his culture was essentially liberal. The basis of the creed is intuition and the book of nature. Devendranath Tagore was attracted by the beauty of the Upanisads and its theism. Kesub Chander Sen was predisposed towards Vaisnavism and the religion of bhakti. The two scriptures are the volume of nature and intuitions implanted in the mind. The mercy and wisdom of God are written on the universe. God never becomes man by assuming a human body. Yoga is Vedic or objective, Vedantic or subjective and Pauranic or Bhakti Yoga. The first refers to God in nature, the second to the soul of our souls and the third is the realisation of God working in history arid in individual life. Brahmoism is claimed to be the essence of all religions, and is not an eclecticism that merely collects bits of truth. Salvation is the deliverance of the soul from moral disease. The New Dispensation founded by Sen proclaims the unity of all creeds. There is one music but many instruments ; one body but many limbs. It stresses the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. God is Hari who takes away evil and sin. The theistic and mystic aspects of Brahmoism are largely and increasingly influenced by Vaisnavism.
The Arya Samaj was founded by Svami Dayananda Sarasvati (1824-1883) in the year 1872 A.D. and its main object was not the inauguration of a new religion, but the
INFLUENCE OF RlMANUJA ON OTHER SYSTEMS 565
resuscitation of Vedic authority and reformation of the varnasr- rama ideal. He proved the infallibility of Vedic revelation and the universality of its moral and spiritual truths. He held that the Vedic religion was the fountain-head of religions/but did not accept the antithesis between reason and faith and the later revelations based on supernaturalism. He affirmed the eternal existence of matter, soul and God, but distinguished them by saying that matter exists as sat, soul or dtman as cit and God or Paramdtman as sat, cit and dnanda. True upasana consists in the worship of God as saguna or pure and perfect and nirguna as free from evil and other im- perfections, and thus attaining mukti. Though the Samaj rejects the faith in image worship and the perpetuation of varndsrrama based on birth, it has some affinity with Vaisnavite theism and is likely to be deeply influenced by Vis'istadvaitic thought.
Any account of modern Hinduism will be incomplete if it does not recognise the disinterested services rendered by Mrs. Besant in the cause of its revival in general and Krsnaism in particular at a time when Indian intellectuals were steeped in naturalism and agnosticism and Hinduism was threatened with extinction.
The life and teachings of S'rl Ramakrsna are an inspiring example, in modern times, of the manifold ways in which the seeker after God sees God and realises the synthetic unity of all religions. As a supermystic, he experimented with the truths of religion, sought to experience God in all His manifestations,, and communicated the joy of such communion to humanity. In his strenuous sddhana for twelve years, S'ri Ramakrsna acquired so much mastery over the desires of sensibility that his body would automatically recoil from contact with coins-
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and other worldly things, and he would regard every woman as the living manifestation of the divine Mother. He practised the varieties of Vaisnavite sddhanas and bhdvas like vdtsalya and ddsya as elaborated by Caitanya and his spiritual quest bore immediate fruit. With a view to attaining the right attitude of a ddsa he imitated Hanuman, and it is reported that, when his practice became perfect, he had actually an enlarge- ment of the coccyx by about an inch. By ceaseless thinking on the sufferings of Sita he felt that his life was likewise a tale of woe. When bhakti deepens into the ardour of Gopl love, the lover is caught up in the flame, and this experience known as mahdbhdva is the culmination of all. Over- powered by the maddening love for Krsna, S'rl Ramakrsna lost himself for six months in the agony of separation from the Lord, and it is said that minute drops of blood oozed out from the pores of his skin. God-possession is a malady of the mystic which is beyond the province of the medical materialist and the psycho-analyst, and is cured only by the mystic becoming one with God. The saint likewise practised many other sadha- nas, and his chief message to the modern world is his insist- ence on the equal efficacy of the four yogas as steps to realisa- tion and the unity of all religions. Though the Ramakrsna Mission gives the highest place to Advaita, the mysticism of S'ri Ramakrsna recognises -the equality of jndna and bhakti and the saving power of God's grace ; and such a synthetic attitude augurs well for the promotion of inter- Veddntic under- standing. The Vaisnavite experiences of the saint resemble those of Nammalvar in many respects and reveal a more or less common incarnational descent.
The famous song of the true Vaisnava made popular by Mahatma Gandhi brings out the character of the Vaisnava :
INFLUENCE OF RAMANUJA ON OTHER SYSTEMS 567
" He is the true Vaisnava who knows and feels
Another's woes as his own.
Ever ready to serve, he never boasts.
He bows to every one and despises no one,
Keeping his thought, word, and deed pure.
Blessed is the mother of such an one. He
Reverences every woman as his mother.
He keeps an equal mind and does not
Stain his lips with falsehood ; nor
Does he touch another's wealth.
No bonds of attachment can hold him.
Ever in tune with Rama nama, his body
Possesses in itself all places of pilgrimage.
Free from greed and deceit, passion
And anger, this is the true Vaisnava."
In instituting a comparison between Vis'istddvaitic Vais- .navism and the Semitic religions and discovering their affinities, the method of approach should be based more on personal mystic experience than on supernaturalism and historicity. Institutional or official Christianity seeks to prove that the Bible is the only book of revelation, Jesus the only begotten Son of God and World Saviour and the church the only chosen community of God ; and that the Krsr;a of the Gita who resembles Christ in many ways is a mythical figure and the Krsna of the Bhagavata defies all the laws of ethics and the rules of religion. But God fulfils Himself in various ways, and to a seeker after God, the idea that He is the in- dwelling Love in every man, who is the son of God, is more inspiring than the beliefs in supernaturalism and historicity. Standardised Christianity has, however, changed with time and place, as it got its theology mainly from Greece, its
568 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
organisation from Rome and its faith in personal worth as- opposed to Papacy from the Protestant countries. In India with its spirituality and genius for Vedantic life, the Sermon on the Mount will find its philosophic justification in the Divine Song on the chariot and its Vedantic experience will afford the rational and spiritual basis for Christian mysticism.. At any rate, a sympathetic study of Nammalvar and the Nazarene is sure to establish spiritual contacts between S'ri Vaisnavism and Indian Christianity as the two historic religions of redemption, and bring out the truth that the union of retributive law and redemptive love embodied in the twin ideas of the Fatherhood and Motherhood of the God- head as Narayana and S'ri with their historic incarnations in humanity; in moments of moral and spiritual crises is the surest guarantee for mukti and the most inspiring gospel of universal' salvation or sarva mukti. But it is in mysticism that Christ- ianity meets Vaisnavism and finds a philosophic justification. The mystic with his hunger for the absolute is more interested in realising God than in reasoning about Him, and there are three stages in God-realisation known as purgation, illumina- tion and the joy of unitive consciousness, which roughly correspond to Karma Yoga, Jnana Yoga and Bhakti Yoga* When the soul realises itself by self-stripping, its homing instinct asserts itself and it longs for union with God, and at last becomes immersed in the eternal bliss of divine union. Christian mysticism becomes fully coherent when it recog- nises the eternity of the self or atman, the indwelling of God as the sraririn and the true meaning of salvation as sayujya.
Islam has shown more tenacity and group feeling than any other world religion, and in its theological rigidity
INFLUENCE OF RAMANUJA ON OTHER SYSTEMS 569*
and loyalty to the founder, it has established the fact that faith can be standardised and made uniform. The student of the history of mediaeval India interested in comparative religion will find affinities and contrasts between the monotheistic fervour of Islam and the virile Vaisnavite faiths in North India in the aspect of personal as opposed to institutional religion. He will also note the attempts to avoid deadly conflicts between Hinduism and Islam by devotees like Kablr, whose very life was universal religion in action. There is a striking similarity between Sufi and Vis'istadvaitic experience, and the Indian Sufi with his spiritual instinct is sure to discover in virile Vaisnavite mysti- cism a philosophy of religion which guarantees God to all persons, and affords a philosophic basis for spiritual democracy. Sutism is essentially mystic as it defines religion as the spiritual quest of the self for union with the in-dwelling God of love. Godhead is God and He reveals Himself in the five planes of essence, attributes, actions, similitudes and ocular vision which roughly correspond to para, vyuha, vibhava, antarydmin and area.1 The soul dies as a mineral to become a plant, dies as a plant to become animal, dies as animal to become man and will die as man to return to God. Each soul is a ray of the eternal sun or God, lives and moves in Him. Divine beatitude is realised in four stages when the soul is freed from the body and reunites with God from whom it was separated, but never divided. In the ocean of divine love ' I ' and ' thou ' get dissolved, but are not destroyed. Sufism is thus akin to Ramanuja's idea of God as Love and will become fully justified if it accepts the eternity of the atman, the immanence of Paramatman and the eventual atmanisation of all selves.
1 G5vindacSrya Svamin's Metaphysique of Mysticism, Section XII.
,570 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
Every monotheistic religion is anxious to disseminate its faith and increase its fold, but in its zeal for proselytisation, it develops a monopolistic and military mentality which stifles the satvika spirit. Its dogmas are often deduceH from blind beliefs which form the major premise of fanaticism, and the conclusions have a compelling and coercive force, starting with terrorism and ending with persecution. The deduc- tive method has often been an ally of dogmatism and exclusiveness, and it is only the inductive method of spiri- tual experimentation and verification that has furnished the corrective to the perils of fanaticism. The history of * Vira ' Vaisnavism shows that it is no exception to this rule ; but if its Vis'istadvaitic inwardness is developed, it sheds its exclusiveness and becomes expansive. The idea of God as the s'arlrin of all and as in -dwelling Love offers the most inspiring motive for philosophic enlightenment and the achieve- ment of social solidarity. Sufism and Vedantism have their meeting ground only in the forum of this philosophic faith.
The claims of vital Vaisnavism to be a universal religion can be established by a liberal reinterpretation of its teachings in the light of the modern methods of criticism without in any way sacrificing its fundamentals. The history of its growth itself proves the truth that in its critical periods of conflict with alien religions, it has responded to the changing -times by concentrating on essentials or sardsara viveka without insisting on the need for conformity to customary morality and acaras and standardisation of thought. In this method, what is required is a comparative study of the varie- ties of Vaisnavite sects and experiences with a view to finding -out their common features, and correlating them with the cen- tral truths of Vis'istadvaita. Each sect has developed its own
INFLUENCE OF RAMlNUJA ON OTHER SYSTEMS 571
doctrines and rituals in accordance with the needs of its Guru parampard and sampradaya, and it is necessary to study the history of their growth as determined by the nature of the disposition of its followers and the environment in which they were placed, if we are to eliminate the non-essentials and discern only the foundational truths. Each sect has stressed certain specific aspects. For example, the schools of South Indian Vaisnavism are known for their philosophical subtlety and thoroughness. The Maharastra variety has stressed the need for the establishment of the spiritual brotherhood of humanity by spreading the gospel of bhakti to all, and arresting the iconoclastic zeal of hostile faiths. The ethical and monotheistic fervour of Vaisnavism is brought into pro- minence in the sects of Northern India. In its revitalised and virile form, it has become popular in the Punjab, which has always withstood the onslaught of Islam. The Caitanya cult in Bengal has specialised in the mysticism associated with the worship of Radha-Krsna, and the same interest in the Bhaga- vata religion is noticeable in the Vallabha devotion to Krsna Ilia. The Brahma Samaj stemmed the tide of Christian proselytisation by reinterpreting it in terms of Hinduism or Vaisnavism and thus absorbing it. Christ is accepted as a Son of God but churchianity, which makes him the only Son of God, is rejected. The teachings of Rabindranath Tagore, Aurabindo Ghosh, Mahatma Gandhi and S'ri Ramakrsna have contributed not a little to the resuscitation of Hinduism in general and Vaisnavism in particular. If the term Hinduism means, as its letters imply, the theory of the history of the unity of nature serving as a fitting environment for the know- ledge of the individual as the eternal and immutable atman and the realisation by him of the Deity that is immanent in all beings as their s'anrin, then it is the same as Religion and
572 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
coeval with Vis'istddvaitic Vaisnavism. It takes into account the unity of physical nature, the need for self-realisation and union with Divinity that is in every individual. The history of religions in India shows that religion is one though its manifestations are varied. Religion has a future if its essentials are distinguished from the non-essentials and not identified with mere rituals, dogmas or myths. The religion of the future consists in the realisation of God or Bhagavdn and communicating Godliness to others. It is the eternal religion of Vis'istddvaita realised in different ways through the ages.
CHAPTER XXII
CONCLUSION
SECTION I
threads of the various arguments developed in the pre- ceding chapters may now be gathered together as a single synthetic whole made of parts which are vitally related. The traditional method of the Indian philosophers consists in establishing their own siddhdnta by the refutation of rival systems, and each system fortifies its position by stating all the ptirva paksas or possible objections to it and demolishing them. But this dialectic warfare was conducted in an atmo- sphere of disinterested criticism in conformity with recognised methods of textual and philosophical interpretation. The high level of intellectual honesty and moral and spiritual earnestness that marked their polemical warfare is often brought out in the conduct of the defeated opponent becoming the disciple of the victorious philosopher and cheerfully seek- ing his spiritual guidance. The conversions made by Buddha, S'ankara, Ramanuja, Purnaprajna, Caitanya and others were due to inner conviction, and not to coercion, and the saving spiritual quality of the teacher. The disappearance of many systems of thought prevalent at the time of Buddha and of Vedantic schools like Bhedabheda may be traced to the struggle
574 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
of moral and spiritual ideals for existence and the survival of the best. At any rate, the popularity of the three schools of Veddnta in modern times is due to their innate vitality and their power to satisfy the religious and philosophic needs of their followers. The system of Vis'istddvaita has stood the test of ages and its future rests on the capacity and character of its followers to live up to its lofty traditions and to spread its message to the whole world. The su- preme duty of its present day follower lies in his presen- tation of the essentials of the system by freeing it from the excrescences which are inevitable in institutional religion and its re-orientation in terms of modern thought without impairing its integrity. The attempt is made in- this con- cluding chapter to sum up the central truths of the siddhdnta without entering into controversial discussions, and estimate its value as a synthetic philosophy of religion claiming to have a universal appeal. The logical method of exposition adopted in the whole work is eminently suitable to the study of Vis'is- tddvaita and will be followed in the concluding survey also.
The Vis'istddvaitic theory of pramdnas seeks to reconcile the conflicting claims of reason and revelation through the mediating link of spiritual realisation, and steers a middle course between dogmatism and intellectualism. The Veda is the breath of Brahman, and is, in an extended sense, a body of impersonal spiritual truths, which can be tested by the faith of reason and the authority of intuitive experience. This way of knowing Brahman does full justice to the threefold authority of s'ruti, yukti and anubhava, and accepts the supreme validity and value of the Veda as the eternal foundation of Truth, on which the founders of systems and sects rely for their support. The tradition of Vamadeva, S'vetaketu, Bodhayana, Prahlada
CONCLUSION 575
and Nammalvar is continued through the ages in spite of historic irrelevances. In the same way, there is a continuity in the kingdoms of knowledge given in sense-perception and spiritual and religious experience corresponding to the three kinds of existence, acit, cit and Brahman. In all cases, knowledge is relational, and relation is the mother category of metaphysics. Every judgment expresses a subject-object relation and the ultimate subject is the supreme Self. It is thus possible to know the absolute by the absolute know- ledge of every object and subject of knowledge when jndna is purified and perfected as in mukti. Acit and cit have their meaning and value only in Brahman, the ultimate subject of all knowledge, perceptual, spiritual and religious. In the same way, there is a continuity in the three tests of truth, prag- matism, correspondence and coherence, based on the principle that truth is a progress from the partial to the perfect, and that there is nothing unreal. Psychology, logic, ethics, philosophy and religion are inter-related, and every theory of truth has its own value in the synthetic scheme of Vis'istadvaita. In practical life or vyavahara, the pragmatic test is relevant and fruitful ; it relates logic to psychology and defines truth as fidelity to relevant facts satisfying the practical needs of life. But it has no finality. The realist's test of correspondence does justice to the reality of the external world, when he defines truth as fidelity to facts on the ground that jnana reveals objects as they are. In nature things belong together and even error is privation of knowledge and contains an element of truth. Even illusions and the imagined objects of fiction subsist and are as real as facts that exist. But realism does not go far enough, as it does not stress the priority and primacy of the experiencing subject or self and the all-inclu- sive nature of the supreme Self. The idealistic view of
T576 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
-coherence recognises the value of internal relations and the work of thought, and includes the correspondence view in an extended sense. But it does not go far enough, as it may lapse into subjectivism. The coherence of jnana is based on the immanent criterion that truth is the whole, includes the more of itself and is ahead of us though it is now circum- scribed, owing to the absence of logical and moral discipline. Purified knowledge is a progression from the perceptual and the conceptual levels to the integral intuition of the whole of Reality in mukti. The Vis'istadvaitic theory re-interprets that of external relations in terms of internal relation, and the latter in terms of the organic relation of sarlra-sarlrin. The All-Self can be known by the finite self, when its conscious- ness which is now of the earth earthy, is purified, and expands into all-comprehensive knowledge. Truth is then not inferred but divined and the mukta sees all things in Brahman and Brahman in all things. Thus epistemology in its extended sense affirms the knowability of Reality in all its levels.
The theory of knowledge is the theory of the knowledge of reality, and thus leads to ontology. To apprehend that Brahman is, is to comprehend what He is, and therefore Brah- man is saguna, and is defined as real Reality, satyasya satyam, the inner subject of all thinking beings and the ever blissful Self. As the sat, Brahman exists in, and for, itself, and is self-contained. It is the One that pervades the many, but does not pass over into the many. It is the absolute that is the fact of facts, and is the true of the true, as it includes cit-acit and exceeds their content and value. The metaphysi- cal highest is also the ethical highest and Brahman as adhara becomes I&vara as niyanta, who is the righteous ruler of all and who dispenses justice according to the karma of the
CONCLUSION 577
individual. This view reconciles the conflict between omni- potence and righteousness. Is'vara, as s'esl or svami, is the way as well as the goal of life, and every karma is kainkarya or worship of the Lord, who is the ultimate actor in the moral and spiritual world. Brahman exists in five forms, the eternal in the world beyond, the infinite that creates the finite, the immanent that resides in all beings and the incarnations, historical as well as permanent, and the inner purpose of this fivefold function is to enter into humanity and redeem it from its avidya-karma. The threefold relation between Brahman and the world of cit-acit is explained by the S'arlraka S'astra in terms of the comprehensive term s'arlra-s'arlrl sambandha. It means that the finite is rooted in the infinite, sustained by its will, and serves its redemptive end as a free agent. This view reconciles the claims of monism and theism and those of transcendence and immanence. Brahman is the s'arlrin in this special sense, and is the life of our life and the inner Ruler immortal in all beings; and every term, thing or thought that connotes the s'arlra also connotes the s'arlrin as He enters into cit and acit and gives them name and form.
The cosmology of Vis'istadvaita follows from its ontologi- •cal view of Brahman as the s'arlrin of the universe of cit-acit by a suitable application of satkarya-vada. The sat without a second, which is undifferentiated in pralaya, differentiates itself into the world of nama-riipa. The pre- creational stage is a real possibility in which cit and acit are pre-existent in a subtle but indistinguishable way and not non-existent, and in srsti the potential becomes actual. In both the stages Brahman exists with its prakaras or modes. The absolute, according to Ramanuja, is not Brahman and the world of cit and acit in the mathematical sense but is
37
578 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
Brahman in the world in the metaphysical sense. The three are distinguishable but not divisible, eternal but not external. Brahman enters into the world as its immanent cause, but is unaffected by the world process and is therefore transcend- ental. This view reconciles the logical or pantheistic view and the ethical or deistic view. The process of nature is in the interests of the progress of the self and both subserve the inner purpose of Brahman to grow into the universe with a view to the moulding of muktas. Veddnta without cosmology would be mere dtmavidyd and not Brahmavidya, and the chief value of cosmology lies in its insistence on the truth that the ground of the universe is also the subject of religious meditation.
Vi&istadvaitic psychology has a metaphysical basis, and refers to a plurality of eternal and immutable jlvas having jnana as their essential attribute. The jlva is an atomic or infinitesimal entity ; but its intelligence is infinite, though limited or circumscribed by karma. Selfhood is presupposed in the mental process consisting of cognitive, affective and conative factors, and it alone gives meaning to the unity and continuity of the psychic complex in all its normal and abnor- mal states. .The jlva is substance-attribute ; it is a vi&esya and vis'esana with monadic uniqueness and modal dependence on Brahman ; this view removes the defects of naive plural- ism and monism. As the logical self, it derives its substantial- ity from Brahman, and is called its aprthaksiddha vis'esana, upddeya and ams'a. As the ethical self, the jlva has moral freedom but dedicates itself to the service of the Lord who is the &esi or svdml. As the aesthetic ego, it is made of beauty which is a joy for ever and which is imparted to it by the absolute beauty of Brahman. The dtman derives its form and function
CONCLUSION 579
from Brahman, depends on His redemptive will and exists for His aesthetic satisfaction, and is therefore His s'arlra. It is different from Brahman in the denotative aspect as it is a unique individual, and one with Him as it connotes Him as His self. This is the paradox of the theory of prakdra which alone satisfies the needs of theistic monism and reconciles monadism and pantheism. The term " atman ' brings out the meaning of the jlva and its relation to Paramdtman or Vasu- deva, and the terms ' soul/ ' spirit ' and * self ' are not adequate enough for the purpose. This view has the modesty and merit of ascribing the evils of life and the irrationalism of the universe to the avidyd-ridden jlva and purity and perfection to Brahman. As Vis'istddvaita affirms the fundamental similarity of the intelligence of all/mzs and also of Brahman, it provides full scope for the promotion of spiritual brother- hood and social solidarity.
The metaphysician who speculates on the nature of Brah- man turns mumuksu when he seeks liberation from the miseries of metempsychosis by re-union with Brahman. By reflecting on the trivial and transient pleasures of life here and in Svarga he becomes sick-minded ; but such a pessimism is only a passing mood as it leads to a positive yearning for Brahma- jndna. The mumuksu is interested more in shedding worldli- ness in bitter earnest than in escaping from the world. As a seeker after God, he prefers bhakti to mukti, if mukti is emptied of divine life and love. Vis'istadvaita prescribes a course of Veddntic culture or sddhana, moral, spiritual and religious, for the mumuksu to free himself from the confusions of avidyd and the fetters of karma and to attain Brahman. It consists in the building up of bhakti by means of Karma Yoga, Jndna Yoga and Bhakti Yoga as described in the Bhagavad
580 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
GUa. Karma Yoga consists in transfiguring kamya katma into niskama karma by avoiding the one-sided ethical views of hedonism and rationalism. Kamya karma, as action impelled by inclination and induced by the idea of utility, has no place in the Gita view of morals. But niskama karma is disinterest- ed duty done for duty's sake as determined by buddhi. It is 4< renunciation in action and not of action," and leads to self- sovereignty. But it is only a negative view of morals ; on its constructive side, every karma becomes a kainkarya to God, and this is deduced by the moral insight that the ultimate subject or agent of moral action is Is'vara Himself. Karma, on the moral level, implies the freedom of the self to shape its future though its prarabdha karma is causally determined and cannot be changed. From the religious standpoint karma including the duties of perfect obligation is consecrated service arising from attuning oneself to the will of God. Niskama karma presupposes the spiritual knowledge of the atman as it is and not merely as it does. The first step in the process is the knowledge of the distinction between purusa and the pseudo- self made in the moulds of prakrti on account of avidyd, and the elimination of the false view of the self. The next stage is the practice of yogic introversion by stilling the vasanas and seeking the inner quiet by entering into samadhi. This is the kaivalya stage of the drudha or the orison of spiritual s'dnti. But kaivalya is only on the outskirts of mukti or on the pathway to it, and it is a halfway house between the state of dehatma- nubhava and God-realisation by bhakti.
Bhakti consists in changing self-centredness into God-cen- tredness and turning the mind from sensuality to the spiritual love of God as the Self of all beings. Equipped with the seven sadhanas and disciplined by the eightfold yoga, the bhakta
CONCLUSION 581
chooses any one of the thirty-two updsanas and meditates on Brahman as his s'aririn. Meditation consists in the intellectual knowledge of Brahman as the prakdrz, the feeling of His loving presence and the ceaseless practice of bhakti till the moment of death. Reflection clarifies the nature of bhakti as the loving re- collection of a pre-natal contact with Brahman. Feeling changes recollection into a loving experience and will makes the mood a devotional habit. The recognition of God becomes vivid like a direct cognition ; but the vividness of the vision is not the vision itself, but an intimation and foretaste of the realisation of the bliss of Brahman in the world of Vaikuntha. While bhakti is thus a continuous loving medita- tion on Brahman, in strict conformity to Vedantic injunctions* and is open only to the three higher castes or dvijas, prapatti, as self -surrender to the redemptive grace of God, does not require the trying and tedious discipline of bhakti and opens the gateway of God to all jlvas including even the sub- human species. The distinction between the two has given rise to two divergent schools of thought, the Tenkalai and the Vadakalai. The former says that the grace of God flows where it listeth and the prapanna has only to respond to the free flow of antecedent grace by casting away the burden of responsibility and the conceit of self-righteousness. God seeks the sinner and would cease to be the Saviour if moksa is to be won only by merit. The Vadakalai school treats prapatti as a yoga like bhakti on the ground that one who desires grace should also deserve it. It insists on contrition and deathless faith in the Saviour, as the way of opening the flood gates of krpd. The only effort required is the knowledge of the futility of mere human effort and casting oneself on the mercy of the Redeemer. This effortless effort is only a vydja or occasion for the self-manifestation of mercy. If this view be
582 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
abandoned, the result would be to make God arbitrary, accept the theory of predestination and destroy the moral order of the world. In the former case, God seeks the sinner and wins him by His antecedent or unconditioned grace. The two schools are distinguished in various ways. The former is called by vari* ous names — justification by faith, the self-surrender theory or the mdrjdra way in which the cat carries the kitten. The latter is called justification by works, the volitional theory or the markata way in which the baby monkey clings to the mother. Both the schools accept the Vis'istddvaita view that S'riman Narayana Himself is both the updya and the upeya, and in His dual capacity fulfils Himself as law and love. The mumuksu has the instinct for God which cannot be explained by the analytic intellect ; and in explaining the alogical experi- ence of divine life and love, it is immaterial to ask how much comes from God and how much from man. The dualism between jnana and ajndna in Advaita is dissolved in Brahma- jndna ; likewise the dualism between karma and krpd is not solved, but dissolved in mystic experience.
The mystic experience of Nammalvar is the fruition of bhakti and prapatti, and is the consummation of Vis'istddvaitic experience. The Alvdr is a born mystic and his only hunger and thirst are the hunger and thirst for God. God is infinite love and the Alvdr's longing for God is infinite and bursts the bounds of human personality. The true meaning of the srarira-s'arlrl relation is fully brought out in the Alvar's organic craving for God. Just as the body cannot live for a moment without the soul, the self cannot live even for a second without the pulsation of the love of God, its s'aririn. Allured by the bewitching beauty of God, the Alvdr renounces the lusts of the flesh and is consumed by the flaming love
CONCLUSION 583
of Krsna. The sublimity of his agony of separation in the dark night of the soul is unique even in mystic literature. When the jlva sheds its ahankdra and is purified in the furnace of love, it attains its home in the absolute and is immersed in immortal bliss. The Alvdr returns from his blissful state, invites the world to share his joy and says to every one : " Come and see." Though the ardent prapanna is practically a mukta even in the state of embodiment and is free from all karma, he is absolutely purified only when he crosses the ocean of samsara and reaches the headquarters of reality. It is only when the phenomenal world of space-time and causality and the moral sphere of karma are transcended that there is real miikti or freedom from embodiment. Then the Brahmavit realises the world of Brahman and is immersed in immortal ananda. The goal of Brahmajnana is Brahmananda, and it is the most valued of the eternal values of mukti. The mukta regains his unitive-consciousness by renouncing the separatist outlook, and sees everything with the eye of Brahman under the form of eternity in the spaceless space of timeless time. Even the Upanisad fails to describe the nature of this Anandaloka and resorts to poetic metaphor and analogy to express the inexpressible state. The prapanna's uniqueness of being is lost in the universality of divine life and selfless service to the s'esl. The Alvdrs and the dcdryas who have had a soul sight of Brahman find their supreme joy for ever in serving the Lord in His Ilia of love and world redemption.
SECTION II
Before attempting a critical estimate of Vis'istddvaita, it is necessary to examine the main charges levelled against it, in the light of its central features as summarised in the
584 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
foregoing section and the more elaborate explanation in the work itself. Every philosophy has to be understood from its highest standpoint and evaluated in terms of the ideals of immanent criticism gained by such sympathetic insight. The chief points of criticism may be grouped in the order of the methods of study adopted in this work, and answered from the Visfistddvaitic standpoint. The first charge relates to the pramana, and is against its acceptance of non-Vedic authority like that of the Pancaratra and the Tamil Prabandha. It is met by reminding the critic that in philosophy the value of a truth is more important than its origin and that, even as regards origin, the Pancaratra as the word of God contains the essentials of the Upanisads and the Prabandha as the experience of the seers of God has acquired the status of the Veda l. The spiritual motive of Vis'istddvaita is at least as valuable as its epistemology, and it gives in effect a liberal interpretation of the Veda as a body of eternal spiritual truths spiritually verified by rsis and Alvdrs and verifiable by others, and such a view is worthy more of commendation than of criticism. The second objection is to the Vis'istadvaitic view of ontology that the sat without a second is saguna Brahman ; and what is called nirguna is the negation not of saguna, but of heya guna or evil in the divine nature. The opponents argue that Ramanuja is only on the logical or theological level and does not rise to the higher level of the intuition of Reality which is more than mere existence. To him the Real is not the real in itself, but the real for thought which is a concrete universal. Is'vara, the God of religion is made in the moulds of logic to suit common sense, and suffers from the self-con- tradictions of the finite-infinite. This is not a single objection
1 Even other schools base their authority on overbeliefs in minor Upani* $ads and other sources of knowledge and some of them reject the Veda itself if it does not support their main theory,
CONCLUSION 585'
but a complex question, and suffers from confusion. The philosophy of nirguna Brahman is inconceivable, as nirguna Brahman is a concept and at the same time transcends con- ceptual life. There is no affinity between the absolute of Hegel and that of Vis'istadvaita, as the former is based on dialectics- and the latter on s'astraic authority. Besides, every Vedantin transcends the logical level and relies on intuition, and it is not true to say that Ramanuja occupies the logical level and S'ankara the intuitional. Vi&istadvaita as a philosophy of religion identifies the absolute of philosophy with the God of religion and does not accept the theory of two Brahmans.
The charge against its cosmology is that Brahman; cannot be the material and efficient cause of the world of cit- acit in the s'arira-s'arirl relation. If, as the theory says, cit- acit as the body of God is the material cause and the soul of God is the efficient cause, it is like saying that we take half a fowl for cooking and leave the other half to lay eggs.. Here the metaphysical view of " pan-organismal monism " is mistaken for a mathematical one. The creative urge is spatialised and dissected into parts. The critic next asks :. " How can the changeless Brahman become the changing universe ? " This is the crux of every Vedantic philosophy, and every school has to rely on s'astra as the only authority for its explanation. Ramanuja, following the Stitrakara, says that Brahman is in the changing world, but is not the chang- ing world, as He is immanent in the logical aspect and eminent in the ethical. Brahman is ever pure and perfect,, and the imperfections of life are traceable to the moral free- dom of the jlva and the whole process is a Ilia of love for making muktas. The critic mistakes cosmology for mytho- logy when he explains the reality of the cosmic process and
:586 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
purpose in terms of anthropomorphism and the myth-making tendency of man. The remark of the critic that Ramanuja tells fairy tales and narrates beautiful stories of the other world with the confidence of one who had personally assisted in the origination of the world is not serious and does not call for criticism. The fourth objection is a frontal attack on the key-thought of Brahman as the s'aririn of the world. There is interaction between soul and body and the jiva suffers from the manifold ills of the body. Brahman as the s'aririn of all jlvas who constitute his body should suffer from the ills of the infinite number of jlvas and become a samsdrin on a cosmic scale. A true understanding of the sranra-srarln relation in terms of immanence and transcend- ence will remove this misconception. The infinite enters into the finite as its Self and infinitises its content. The relation expresses in metaphorical language the deep metaphysical aad mystic idea of the spiritual intimacy between the dtman .and Paramdtman who descends into the dtman and deifies it. The whole Sdnraka S'dstra will be stultified if logical immanence and spiritual eminence are not vitally related.
The chief difficulty in Vis'istadvaitic psychology is the apparent contradiction between the finite self and its all- pervading attributive consciousness. Ramanuja explains it by the Sutra analogy of the lamp and its luminosity. There is the same infinity in the atom as in the stellar space. From the point of view of the ultimate experience of the released self iri mukti, it is clear that the mukta like Varna- deva has the direct intuition of the infinite and also cosmic ^consciousness. The finite-infinite nature of the self is deduced irom this intuition, and this view does full justice to the
CONCLUSION 587
pluralistic view of nana-jiva and the monistic ideal of the amitive consciousness, and is more satisfactory than the solution offered by Advaita to the problem of the existence of a plurality of jlvas even after the experience of identity by the first jlvanmukta. The finite-infinite problem is really a stumbling block in every school of philosophy ; but RamSnuja's solution has the advantage of the support of s'dstra and spiritual experi- ence. He reveals spiritual modesty when he attributes the contradiction to thejlva and not to Brahman. A more serious difficulty arises from the definition of the jiva as a unique monad or visresya and at the same time as a mode of Brahman or vis'esana. The jlva has its own nature and moral and spiritual worth ; but its individuality is not self-centred and exclusive, as its centre is the self-luminous Brahman. The self exists with the inner Self as its life and light. This view does full justice to theism and pantheism and satisfies the ethical and mystical consciousness.
The ethical problem of Ramanuja is the dilemma of determinism. The purusa is either determined by prakrti and the gunas or controlled by the will of God. He is thus caught between the horns of fatalism and divine determinism. This defect is removed by escaping between the horns of the dilemma and pointing to the third alternative, namely, the freedom of the self on the moral level. The self has the will to attain self-sovereignty by overcoming the gunas, to seek mukti and to attune itself to the will of the supreme Self. The seventh objection is raised against the relation between karma and krpfi, as the two are really self-discrepant. S'rl Vaisna- vism, as an ethical religion, recognises the dualism between the two, but calls attention to the reign of the law of love in ;the domain of religious experience. Godhead is one, but
588 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
works in the dual capacity of Isrvara-Isrvan in the interests- of world redemption. Is'vara is the God of righteousness* who is free from arbitrariness and cruelty as He metes out justice to every one according to his karma or desert, and is at the same time the Redeemer, as S'rl or Love enthrones Herself in the heart of divine law. Law and love may be analysed logically but cannot really be divided, and it is the supreme merit of Sfrl Vaisnavism that it accepts the organic relation between law and love and recognises the reign of love in the supreme realm of religion. Mukti is as much a gift as a gain,, and it is impossible without the grace of the guru and God or guru and Is'vara prasdda.
The eighth charge is that Vis'istddvaita, in its mystic aspect, savours of the evils of sentimentalism and erotism.. This criticism was considered at some length in the relevant chapters and traced to misunderstanding. Humanity should not be judged by its aberrations ; and every religion has a right to be understood and appreciated in the light of its best expon- ents and exemplars. Vis'istddvaitic Vaisnavism defines God as Love and religion as the life of God in the love of man, and insists on the dual discipline of thought and feeling in its scheme of devotion as bhaktirupdpannajndna or matinalam as Nammalvar calls it. The GUd defines the true devotee disjndni because he knows that God alone sustains him as his s'aririn, and loves Him for love's sake without any fear or love of gain ;. but such love cannot be called intellectual love, as the Lord rof love seeks the jndril as his sraririn and is sustained by such love. Love is reciprocal, but it is a unitive experience ; and the rasa Hid is a sublime expression of the llld of love and it is only the pure in heart who are free from sexuality even ia thought that can have a glimpse of its beatitude.
CONCLUSION 589
The ninth is the familiar criticism that Ramanuja's Avorld of mukti or Paramapada is anthropomorphic and is a .glorious picture of an earthly paradise in which the Vaisna- vites enjoy all the pleasures of the senses and call it the bliss of Vaikuntha. Amidst the delights of sparkling rivers, trees laden with delicious fruits, gentle breezes and golden sunshine, they drink and dance, sing and feast and some- times hold philosophic converse with one another. But this criticism is more a satire than a sympathetic view, and applies not to Ramanuja's, picture but to the Kausltaki Upanisad on which it is based. Ramanuja insists on viveka .and vairdgya as essential steps to mukti, and describes it as a world beyond space and time and a state which only the purified and perfected mukta can enjoy. The Upanisad employs poetic or allegoric language to describe the infinite beyond the senses ; but the critic mistakes it for the infinite in the senses by a process of adhyasa. The Upanisad refers to Brahma- gandha, Brahma-riipa, Brahma-rasa and Brahma- dnanda in terms of Brahmdnubhava ; but the whole sense is destroyed if the stress is on gandha, rupa and rasa and not on Brahman. In the unitive experience of Brahman in the world of dnanda, the seer transcends the barriers of divided life and his thought expires in enjoyment.
The tenth and last objection is directed against the philosophy as a whole. As a system of theistic monism which tries to mediate between theism and monism, it shares the defects of both without having their advantages and falls between two stools. As a philosophy of religion it is not consistent with itself, as in theory it is non-dualistic and in practice theistic. Though it combats the schools of Bhedabheda, it does not radically differ from them in its
590 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable elements of bheda and abheda, and is often identified with them. The main point in all these objections is the criticism not of Vis'istadvaita but of synthetic philosophy itself ; and it is well-known that the philosophers who hold extreme views do not like to meet, and mistake synthesis for compromise or eclecticism. But Vis'istadvaita is as hostile to Bheddbheda as Advaita, owing to the absurdity of the Bheddbheda assertion of the co-existence of contradictories, and its great defect in the predication of evil to the divine nature. The most inspiring truth of Vis'istdd- vaita is its definition of God as love. Love mediates between thought and will by inspiring the former and illumining the latter, and, guided by love, the pluralist and the rrtonist go hand in hand without being at arm's length.
SECTION III
Vis'istddvaita as S'drlraka S'dstra is entirely different from* other systems of Indian philosophy, dstika and ndstika, and it has its own peculiar meaning and value. As a matter of fact,, every system of Indian philosophy has a distinct individuality of its own, due probably to its insistence on a clear and distinct knowledge of the pramdnas as a preliminary to philosophical enquiry and the formation of the intellectual habit of definite- ness in polemic warfare. Vis'istddvaita is different from Dvaita in spite of the affinities between the two systems caused by their opposition to Advaita. The ideas of Ubhaya Vedftnta, immanent causality, aprthaksiddha vis'esana and the similarity of all muktas in the unitive experience of the bliss of Brahman are peculiar to Vis'istadvaita, and do not meet with the approval of the Dvaitavddin. Vis'istadvaita is- opposed to the Advaita theory of Mayavada and identity
CONCLUSION 591
philosophy, as it affirms the reality of jagat and recognises only vis'ista aikya and not svarupa aikya. It is entirely opposed to every school of Bhedabheda, as the latter predicates imper- fections to Brahman. Ramanuja's exposition of the Sutras is different from that of S'rikantha and S'rlkara in spite of their many common philosophical ideas, as Ramanuja denies supremacy to S'iva and the theory of causality which makes S'iva the efficient cause of the world. But, owing to its all- comprehensive character, Vis'istadvaita accepts whatever is coherent with its unity in other systems, though it gives a new meaning to them. It has no objection to the Nyaya theory of the pramanas, the satkaryavdda and the psychology of the Sdnkhyas and the yogic discipline and the primacy given to- morals by the Mimdmsaka, as they fit into its system, though their meaning is transfigured. The system of Ramanuja has much in common with the Vaisnavite teachings of Caitanya and Vallabha who followed him, but it does not approve of the Acintya Bhedabhedavada of Caitanya and the S'uddhadvaita of Vallabha. Thus from the point of view of siddhanta, Vis'istddvaita has a continuous tradition through the ages and has its peculiar meaning and value in the history of Indian philosophy.
Philosophy is a persistent enquiry into the nature of Reality in its threefold aspects of nature, self and God or acit, cit and Is'vara, and different systems of thought were deduced by possible combinations of the three tatvas. Phenomenal- ism denies the noumenal reality of the tatvas and lapses into nihilism like that of Buddhism. The concept of Reality as either matter, self or God has given rise to the three monistic schools of materialism, the subjectivism of the Ekajlva-vada and the identity philosophy of nirguna Brahman. The
592 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
•combinations of two tatvas lead to the formulation of the Jaina and Sdnkhyan systems and the schools of personalism. The Vais'esika and the schools of Vedanta including practical Advaita recognise the existence of all the three tatvas. But it is Vis'istadvaita that brings out the integral and organic -unity of the tatvas.
The Vedantic systems, Dvaita, Advaita &nd Vis'istadvaita, .are often identified with the western systems of theism, mon- ism *and pantheism, though the points of resemblance are not essential. As the western views overlap, blur distinctiveness and have not the well-defined character of Vedanta, there is •no basis for comparison and the establishment of affinities. For example, all Vedantic schools, unlike the western varieties, have faith in the co-ordination of the pramdnas including the Veda, the theory of manas as an internal sense organ evolved •from prakrti, the existence of the eternal dtman, the moral order of karma and the spiritual realisation of mukti. Theism is often defined as faith in an extra-cosmic God who creates souls by the mere fiat of His will, saves the believer and the elect and rejects the unbeliever. In its modern form, it is deeply influenced by pantheism. But Dvaita insists on eternal relations and eternal differences between Is'vara, cit and acit, defines Is'vara as the self-dependent and supreme Ruler of the universe, and the jiva as eternally dependent on His will, and assures mukti to the sdtvika jlva. Pantheism affirms that God is all or all is God. It may connote pancosmism, acosmism, neo-Platonism or even panlogism. Vis'istadvaita is not pantheistic in any of these senses, as it defines Brahman as the Self that is in all beings and beyond them. Monism as absolute idealism affirms the unity of all beings by denying pluralism and theism, but it may mean the
CONCLUSION 593
monism of Parmenides, Spinoza or Bradley. But Advaita is different from the western theories, as it affirms the identity of jiva and Is'vara as experienced in jivanmukti. This study of contrasts does not minimise the value of compara- tive study and of the synthetic method of stressing the points of convergence. But before the method is attempted, it is essential to know that the terms matter, soul, self or spirit and God, as employed in western thought, are different from the terms prakrti, dtman and Brahman used in Veddnta.
The fundamental difference in the two ways of approach lies in the Vedantic conception that the metaphysical problem is really the right understanding by the mumuksu of the rela- tion between the dtman and Brahman by viveka and vairdgya. While western theism, monism and pantheism are mainly interested in ascertaining the nature of God in His relation to the universe, the Vedantic schools seek to discover the spiritual basis of nature and the exact status of the dtman in the realisation of Brahman. It is profitless for a man to know the universe in its immensity and conquer its secrets without knowing his own soul and its divine foundations. The Veddntin is not satisfied with the knowledge of the external world and the pleasures of life here and in Svarga, but seeks the light of Brahmajndna and eternal life. By realising Brahman as the unity of the whole universe, the universe is known ; but by knowing the universe we cannot know Brahman. While western thought is an outlook, Veddnta is an insight into the nature of the inner self. This is well brought out- in the classic instance of S'vetaketu whose pride that he knew all things was humbled by his father when he reminded the son that he had not the wisdom of Brahmajndna, in the sorrow of Narada who knew all sciences but was not
38
594 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
aware of Brahman which alone gives bliss, in the quest of Naciketas for eternal life beyond the historic successions of births and deaths, in the longing of Maitreyl for infinite life and love, and in the cosmic intuition of Prahlada which he com- municated to his father that everything in the cosmos was big with Brahman. Knowledge is an ocean and the mumuksu should seek only what is relevant to his spiritual needs. Man has to dive into divinity and be merged in its immortal bliss.
God is the centre of the universe, and the philosopher who tries to understand the universe without knowing God simply goes round the circumference and never even comes near the centre. The more the scientist-philosopher seeks to unravel the mystery of nature, the more veils are left behind. Ignor- ance increases with knowledge and the riddle of the sphynx remains unsolved. The question of the evolution of the universe is wrapped in mystery and wonder and the theories of Mayavada, Brahmaparinamavdda and the origin of evil are admissions of the failure of the logical intellect to probe into the ultimate meaning of the universe of space-time. The vision of the cosmos divinely bestowed on Arjuna filled him with awe, and in utter humility he implored the cosmic Ruler to reveal His true nature as his eternal Friend and Saviour. The metaphysician who seeks to scan the starry heavens and to know the infinite stretch of space and time is perplexed by its increasing mystery and turns sceptic. But, if he becomes a mystic who seeks Brahman, he becomes a seer of Brahman. By knowing God everything else is revealed, and it is this truth that is revealed by the terms Advaita, Dvaita and Vi&ista- dvaita. It is enshrined in the text " Thou art That ", and it sums up the wisdom of the Upanisads and brings out their immortal glory.
CONCLUSION 595
The term ' That ' refers to Brahman and the term ' thou ' to the atman, and it is the supreme problem of Veddnta to find out the exact connection between the two, known as the jlvdt- man and Paramdttnan. All the varieties of Veddntic experience are ultimately based on the knowledge of the text which is extolled by Advaita as the Mahdvdkya. S'ankara explains it as the knowledge of the absolute identity or aikya between the jiva and Is'vara by the elimination or sublation of the apparent self-contradictions contained in the relation between the two, due to nescience in its subjective and objective aspects of avidyd and mdyd. Dvaita revolts against this irreverence, as religion is rooted in the worship of Is'vara as the creator of the universe, and absolutely different from the jiva or the creature which for ever depends on Isrvara's will. By applying the rules of grammar, logic and Mimdmsd, it reads the text as " Thou art not That," and then it means " thou art His (tasya) as His ddsa ". The schools of Bheddbheda claim to do equal justice to the aspects of abheda and bheda and interpret the Upanisad in the light of bheddbheda. To Bhaskara the judgment means mystic union or eklbhdvam which the jiva merges into Brahman like a river losing itself in the ocean. Yadava, however, thinks that it includes difference as well as identity. To Caitanya it reveals the relation between the lover and the beloved in terms of acintya bheddbheda. Vallabha thinks that Tat is tasmdt or That from which the jiva emanates and that on the mystic side it is the ecstasy of love. S'rlkantha says that ' That ' is S'iva and ' thou ' is the jiva and the two become one in mukti. Ramanuja expounds it as the relation of s'arira and s'aririn and affirms that Brahman, the cosmic ground, is the inner self of the jiva as its s'aririn. His interpretation reveals the meaning of the text in the light of the illustrations employed in the Upanisad,
596 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
fits in with the context and satisfies the ends of synthetic philosophy.
In a sense every Veddntic system has a synthetic purpose, as it claims to be a criticism and a fulfilment of the previous systems. Each is a chronological and logical transition from its precursor, satisfies a specific historic need and is prag- matically justified. Every school seeks to satisfy the triple tests of sruti, yukti and anubhava and the three prasthdnas. The Advaita of S'arikara avoids the extremes of the nihilism of Nagarjuna and the theism of the Naiydyika and claims to harmonise the six religions which were popular at the time. It deduces the theory of Maya from the' experi- ence of Advaita. Bhaskara re-interprets S'ankara by his theory of upddhis as the real and not fictitious limiting adjuncts of saguna Brahman, who is perfect but is at the same time formless, and by his theory of ekibhdva in the place of aikya jndna. Yadava substitutes Brahmaparindma for upddhis and thinks of Brahman as the perfect Self with a form of His own and mukti as a bheddbheda relation between the jiva and Brahman. Nimbarka posits an immanent s'akti in Brahman and largely follows Ramanuja's idea of God. Ramanuja's theory of Brahman seeks to avoid the extremes of bheddbheda and naive theism. Purnaprajna brings out the theistic impli- cations of Veddnta by defining Brahman as omnipotent and omniscient and as the operative cause of the world, the jiva as a vi&esa and not a vis'esana and mukti as the graded enjoy- ment of the bliss of Brahman as His eternal ddsa. Caitanya gives a mystic version of theism by defining God as love in terms of the Acintya Bhedhdbheda relation with the devotee. Vallabha stresses the non-dual aspect of theism by his theory of Sfuddhddvaita in which he refers to emanation and
CONCLUSION 597
ecstasy. In this way every Vedantic school claims to synthesise extreme views and present a coherent view of nature, self and God.
On the whole it is Vis'istadvaita as S'drlraka S'dstra that presents a synthetic view, par excellence, of Veddnta, because it is its avowed aim to harmonise the seeming contradictions of the S'ruti in the light of the Ghataka S'nttis by employing the samanvaya method, and it is the supreme merit of the Bhcisyakdra to wind up the discussion with a note of harmony in the highest sense of the term " Thus everything is satisfactorily explained (iti sarvam samaiijasam)" It is the only philosophy of religion that affirms the self-identity of Brahman as the meta- physical, ethical and intuitional highest, and it interprets every adhikarana in the first two chapters of the Brahma Sutras as the establishment of Brahman as the supreme tattva for the purpose of experiencing Him as the supreme end or purusdrtha. It is a spiritual syllogism in which the spirit- ual attainment of Brahman follows from philosophic know- ledge. The theory of the jlva as the s'arlra of Brahman as defined by Ramanuja fits in with the grammatical rule of sdmdnddhikaranya, the logical principle of aprthaksiddha vi&esana, the metaphysical view of am&a, the cosmolo- gical idea of the upadeya as non-different from the updddna kdrana and the ethico-religious truths of karma and krpd. The nirguna texts in the Upanisad do not deny guna but only heya guna or the existence of imperfection in the divine nature. The abheda texts do not deny the plurality of things but deny only the pluralistic view of Reality. The bheda texts affirm the existence of eternal entities but deny their externality to Brahman. The Kdrana S'rutis deny the
598 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'JSTADVAITIA
Naiyayika and the Sdnkhyan views but affirm the immanence of Brahman and His transcendental eminence. The S'rutis that define the nature of Brahman (svarupa nirilpaka dharma) affirm self-determination and deny external determination. Bare denial is nothingness or vacuity and denial and affirma- tion imply each other, and negation is on a par with affirma- tion. Aikya S'rutis affirm vis'ista aihya and deny svarupa aikya ; they deny identity and affirm non-division. In this way, all the conflicting Upanisadic texts and the acting problems of philosophy are solved by the comprehensive idea that Brahman is the s'anrin of all. S'rikantha presents a S'aivite version of Vis'istddvaita and leans towards non- dualism. Love heals all discords and differences. Even from the point of view of valuation, the synoptic view holds good, because the values of truth, goodness and beauty which are realised by the mukta are conserved in the world of Brahman who is ever true, good, beautiful and perfect. The philosophy of love mediates between the metaphysics of Advaita and the ethics of Dvaita. It transforms Madhusudhana Sarasvati, the monistic thinker, into a mystic drawn by the alluring beauty of Krsna-prema and Caitanya, the subtle logician, into a God-intoxicated lover.
The claim of Veddnta to universality rests on the liberal interpretation of its essentials and the emphasis on the points of agreement and not on those of divergence, and Vis'istdd- vaita offers a basis for such rapprochement. On the analogy of the Kantian distinction between pure reason and practical reason and the mathematical and ethical methods of Spinoza, difference can be drawn between the pure Advaita of the Mdyd- vadin which employs the principle of adhydsa and sublation in establishing the philosophy of identity and the practical
CONCLUSION 599
Advaita of the Brahmavddin, which accepts the reality of the world and the unitive consciousness by moral and spiritual discipline. Practical Advaita should accept the identity of the absolute of philosophy and the God of religion, the coordi- nation of jnana and bhakti as means to mukti and the need for the grace of God and the guru in the attainment of mukti. S'arikara the practical Veddntin, who accepts the Bhdgavata way of devotion and worships Govinda1 and works for world welfare, is more helpful to humanity than S'arikara the dialec- tician, who destroys the world with the all-devouring weapon of sublation. The pure Vis'istddvaitin as a theistic monist and mystic has to accept the non-dualistic implications of the terms aprthaksiddha vis'esana, vis'ista aikya, non-diffe- rence in the causal relation, and avibhdga, and thus practically recognise the points of rapprochement between his system and that of Advaita in the vydvahdrika state, which alone pro- vides a basis for inter-Veddntic understanding. What is beyond Veda and thought is beyond experience and is not a subject of enquiry. Dvaita rightly stresses the eternal distinction between Brahman, the jiva and the universe and the way of bhakti to mukti; but it does not bring out the omnipotence of love and the loss not of, but in, personality which the mystic experiences in the ecstasy of communion. There is no sinner as such in the religion of love, and sin destroys itself by contacting divine love. The theory of Brahman as the All-Self or s'arlrin of all beings who is immanent in all jlvas and in all religions with a view to brahmanising the self furnishes the most inspiring motive for spirituality and service. All philosophies and religions meet in Veddnta and work hand in hand for the uplift of humanity
karujiamaya s'arapatn karava$i tavakau carapau I iti §atpadi madieye vadanasaroje sada vasatu II — S'ahkara's £}a\padi.
600 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
and the establishment of the spiritual kinship of alljlvas including the sub-human species. The Vedantin is not a conservative that adores the past nor a progressivist that looks forward, but is a religious philosopher who seeks the Eternal One in and beyond the temporal, sees Him directly and works for universal salvation. Even the lowest of the low and the worst sinner can attain God if he but trusts Him. Vis'istadvaita with its innate genius for God invites humanity to share in its spiritual hospitality and see Him in all beings and in all sects. The Glta as the quintessence of Veddntic wisdom brings out this inspiring message in the immortal words of Bhagavdn " Whoever with true devotion worships any deity, in him I deepen that devotion and he ultimately reaches me " * and " Even those who worship other divinities worship me." 2
1 yo y6 yam yam tanum bhaktah s'raddhayar-gitum iccati I
tasya tasyacalam s'raddham tarn eva vidadhamyaham II— E.G., VII. 21.
2 yepyanyadevatabhaktah yajante s'raddhayanvitah I
tapi mameva kaunteya yajantyavidhipurvakam II-— E.G., IX. 23.
SANSKRIT GLOSSARY
abhdva : non-existence
abheda : non-difference
abhigamana : morning worship
abhimdna : attachment
abhivyakta : manifested
abhydsa : repetition
dcdrya : preceptor
acetana : non-sentient
acintya : inconceivable
acit : see acetana
ddhdra : sustainer ; support
ddheya : the supported
adhisthdna : substratum ; body ; the basis for mistaking the
real for the unreal as in the shell-silver example adhydsa : super-imposition as in perceiving a rope as a snake adrsta : unseen effect of one's actions caused by karma in
the person who does it Advaita : non-dualism advitlya : without a second dgama : religious treatise aham : I ; ego ahankara : egoism ; the spurious ego of matter ; a stage of
prakrti in its evolution
602 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
aikya : identity
ais'varya : lordship
ajada: not jada, immaterial
ajdtavdda : the Advaittc view that may a is non-existent
ajndna : ignorance
dkds'a : ether
aksara : imperishable
amala : pure
amrta : immortal
amsfa : part or element of the ampin
amsrin : one with ams'as
dnanda : bliss
dnandamaya : blissful
ananta : infinite
ananydrha-s'esatva : absolute serviceability to one only
anavasthd : infinite regress
anga : limb ; what stands in a subsidiary relation to the
principal
anirvacamya : inexplicable annamaya : consisting of food anrta : false
antahkarana : inner organ, mind antahpraves'a : entering into antarydmin : the immanent one anu : atom or monad anubhava : experience anumdna : inference anupalabdhi : non-cognition of a thing when the conditions
for cognition are available anupapatti : impropriety
apaccheda nydya : a rule in the Purva Mimdmsd apahatapdpmatva : purity
SANSKRIT GLOSSARY 603
aparoksa : immediate ; direct
apavarga : release from samsara
aprdkrta : matter without its mutability
aprthaksiddha vis'esana : inseparable attribute
apiirva : an unseen and blind agency that rewards and punishes
merit and demerit apurvatva : novelty area : permanent incarnation of God arcirddimdrga : the solar path (to moksa) drjava : straight-forwardness arthdpatti : presumption
arthavdda : glorificatory passage, not to be taken literally arthapancaka : the five truths asat : the changeable, i.e., matter asatkhydti : the theory that the void is knowable asatkaryavdda : the theory that the effect, once non-existent,
comes into being afterwards d&raya : locus astdnga : eightfold dstika : believer asura : demon dsuric : demoniac
dtmabhdva : the nature of the dtman dtmaikds'rayatva : dependent entirely on the Self dtmaikaprakdratva : deriving its modal existence from the Self dtmaikaprayojanatva : entirely subserving the needs of the Self dtmajndna : knowledge of the self dtman : self ; soul
dtmdnubhava : experience of the self avatdra : incarnation avibhdga : inseparability avidvdn : one who is not a vidvdn
604 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
avidyd : ignorance ; an inner obscuring something or nescience which conceals the self-identity of Brahman, according to Advaita
avijndtd : one who does not know
avyakta : un manifest
B
baddha : the bound (soul in samsdra)
bddhita : contradicted ; sublated
bala : strength
bhdgavata : devotee of God
bhdgavata-kairikarya : service to the devotees of God
bhakti : devotion to God
bhaktirupdpannajndna : intellectual intuition or love of God ; jndna turned into bhakti
bhnva : feeling
bheda : difference
bheddbheda : identity in difference
bhogya : object of experience or enjoyment
bhrama : error
Bhuvana sundara : God as Cosmic Beauty
Brahmajndna : realisation of Brahman
Brahman : the Absolute of philosophy that is also the god of religion
Brahmaparindmavdda : the theory that the Absolute trans- forms itself as the world
Brahmdrpana : offering to God
buddhi : intellect
caitanya : intelligence carama-s'loka : last verse
SANSKRIT GLOSSARY 605
cetana : sentient cit : sentient being
dama : control of the senses
dambha : ostentation
darpa : pride
dars'ana : system of philosophy leading to the direct know- ledge of Reality
ddsa : servant ; one who freely dedicates oneself to the services of God and godly men
dd'sya : serviceability
dayd : mercy
dehdtmabhdva : imagining the body to constitute one's self
dhdraka : sustenance ; supporter
dharma : attribute ; duty
dharmabutajndna : attributive intelligence distinguished from substantive intelligence
dharmin : possessor of dharma or attribute
dhydna : meditation
dhydna-niyoga-vddin i one who holds that dhydna is a pre- scribed discipline to attain Brahmajiidna
Divya-Prabandha : The sacred Tamil hymns of the Alvdrs
dravya : substance
dvandva : pair (of opposites)
dvesa: hatred
ekajlva : a single self
ekajwavdda : the theory that there is only one jlva or soul
606 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
G
ghataka S'ruti : mediating text, e.g., Br. Up., III. vii. 7 ct seg
guru : spiritual teacher
guru parampara : line of gurus
H
hita : means (to the chief end, Self-realisation)
I
ijya : the principal worship at midday as ordained in the
Pancaratra S'astra
indriyas : senses (cognitive and conative) Is'vara : God ; the inner controller of all beings
j
jada : inert : matter
jagat : the cosmic order
jahadajahal-laksana : the principle in Advaita of affirming the
identity of jlva and Is'vara by eliminating their differences jlva : individual soul that has cognition, conation and feeling jlvanmukti : mukti realised in life ; freedom in embodiment jnana : knowledge jnana-karma-samuccaya : the co-ordination of knowledge
and action
jnanas'raya : locus of jnana
jnatrtva : the state of being the subject of knowledge or knower jyotisam jyotis : light of lights
K
kainkarya : consecrated service kaivalya : self-realisation kalyana guna : auspicious quality
SANSKRIT GLOSSARY 607
kdma: desire
kdmya-karma : action prompted by desire
karma : action ; the result on the self of its previous actions
kdrya Brahman : effected Brahman
kartrtva : responsibility for action
kinkara : servant
klrtana : singing
krama-mukti : progressive ascent to the realm of the supreme
krodha : anger
krpd : mercy
ksanika-vijnana : momentariness of cognition
ksetra : the body as the field where one reaps the result of
past karma
ksetrajna : the knower of the body, i.e., the soul kslrdbdhi : ocean of Milk
L
laksana : definition laksand : secondary import liriga-s'arlra : subtle body Ilia : sport
loka : world
M
Mahdvdkya i the supreme Upanisadic texts (dealing with
Brahmajndna according to the Advaitin) manana : reflection manas : mind
manomaya : mind-made ; mental mantra : incantation mdyd : cosmic illusion or nescience mdydvdda : the theory that everything except Brahman is
illusory or phenomenal
608 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
mdyin : creator of may a ; illusionist
Mlmamsd: Interpretation of Vedic injunctions
moksa : release from samsara or bondage due to karma
mukta : released soul
mukti : release (from the round of births and deaths)
miila-prakrti : primordial matter or cosmic stuff
mulavidya : primordial nescience
mumuksu : one desiring release ; the seeker after salvation
N
ndma : name or form
nara : man
ndstika : unbeliever, athiest
neti : not thus
nididhydsana : steady meditation
nimitta-karana : efficient cause
niravayava : incapable of physical division ; partless
nirguna : without qualities — indeterminate
nirguna Brahman : Indeterminate Brahman
nirhetuka-katdksa : unconditioned (or operative) grace
nirupddhika : unconditioned
nirveda : regret and repentence
nirvikalpaka pratyaksa : indeterminate perception or cognition
of the object for the first time nirvis'esa : attributeless nirvikdra : immutable niskama-karma : disinterested action nisprapanca-niyoga-vada : the theory that regards mukti as
cosmic dissolution nitya-suri : the eternally free niyamena prakdra : invariable mode
SANSKRIT GLOSSARY 609
niyantd : ruler ; controller
my ant a : rtuer ; cuiuruiier
niyoga : injunction : unseen result produced by carrying out a Vedic injunction
P
Pdncardtra : certain scriptures accepted by S'r! Vaisnavas, as
revealed by Narayana paflclkarana : quintuplication : the theory that holds that
every physical object contains all the five bhiitas papa : sin para : great parama : supreme
paramapada ; the supreme abode of Brahman Paramdtman : Supreme Self pdratantrya : dependence on God parindma : change ; transformation parindma-vdda : See Brahmaparindma-vdda Paroksa : mediate prdcurya : abundance
pradhdna : primal nature ; see also prakrti prakdra : mode ; the jlva as a mode of God Prakdrin : the substance which has modes; Brahman prakrti : nature ; a modification of matter : also called pradhdna pralaya : unmanifested condition of the universe ; dissolution
of the universe
pramdnas : sources of valid knowledge ; authorities prdndydma : control of the vital airs prdpaka : one who leads to the prdpya prapanna : one who has surrendered his self to God prapatti : self -surrender to God prdpti : attainment prdpya : end to be attained
39
610 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
prdrabdha-kanna : previous deeds that have begun to produce
their moral results ; karma that has begun to bear fruit prdrthand : prayer
pratyaksa : evidence of the senses or sense-perception pratyaktva : self-awareness premd : deep love
punya : an act of religious merit leading to svarga purusa : person ; self Punisottama : the supreme self purusartha : ends of human endeavour Purvapaksa : prima facie view
R
rdga : desire
Eaksaka : Redeemer
rajas : the quality of prakrti producing restless activity
rasa : aesthetic taste ; deliciousness
rathl : the master in the chariot
rsi : seer ; sage
ruci : taste
nlpa : form
S
s'abda : verbal testimony ; scriptural authority
sddhana : a course of religious discipline
sddhyopdya : the means to moksa which has to be effected
by the aspirant saguita : possessing attributes sdksin : witness sfdkti : power samddhi : deep contemplation or introversion
SANSKRIT GLOSSARY 611
sdmdnddhikaranya : syntactic equation of terms denoting the same thing, but connoting different attributes ; grammati- cal apposition
samanvaya : method of reconciliation samavdya : inherence, a category of the Vais'esikas samasti : aggregate sambandha : relation samsdra : empirical life including the cycle of births and deaths ;
bondage
sam&aya : doubt sams'lesa : union s'ama : control of mind sancita-karma : past action that has not yet commenced to
fructify
sankalpa : will
sankalpd&raya : dependent on the will of God sankoca : contraction sannydsa : renunciation saptavidhdnupapatti : seven-fold objections raised by Rama-
nuja against the Advaitin's theory of avidyd s'arira : body
s'arlrin : the owner of the body srarlra-s'ariri sambandha : the relation between body and soul ;
between the finite self and the Absolute as expounded by
Ramanuja sat : being ; a sentient being different from asat or material
object satkdrya vdda : the view that the effect is pre-existent as
cause and not non-existent satkhydti: realism satyakdma : self -fulfilled desire satyasya satyam : Real of reals ; real Reality ; the True of the true.
612 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
sattva : the quality of prakrtl leading to happiness and harmony
savikalpaka-jnana : determinate knowledge
savi&esa : determinate ; with qualities
savi&esana-jndna : determinate knowledge ; apprehension of the new object in the light of the old
sfesa : one who exists for the purpose of the s'esin, or one who is in tune with the will of God
sresin : one who utilises the s'esa for His purpose
siddhdnta : the final view
siddhopdya : the means to moksa which is self-accom- plished, i.e., God
&ivam : auspicious
skandha : aggregate
smarana : remembering
srravana : hearing
srsti : creation
s'ruti : the Veda
sfuddha : pure
sundara : beautiful
sfunya : non-existent, like the sky-flower ; bare negation
srunyavada : theory of nihilism
svabhava vada : theory of naturalism
svadharma : one's own duty (based on birth and station in life)
svadhydya : study of the Veda
svamin : master
Svarga : the world of celestial pleasures as a reward for good deeds here
svarupa : essential nature
svarupaikya : absolute identity
svarupa nirupaka dharma : determining attributes
svayam jyotis : self-effulgent
SANSKRIT GLOSSARY 613
T
tamas : the quality of prakrti resulting in indolence and inertia tanmdtra : subtle element tattva : truth ; reality
tattva-traya : the three categories or ultimate factors of real- ity : matter, spirit and God tejas : energy
U
ubhcrya-linga : with two signs (a topic in the Veddnta Sutras dealing with the two-fold nature of Brahman as perfect and free from imperfections)
updddna : collecting materials (for worship of God)
updddna-kdrana : material or immanent cause
upddhis : limiting adjuncts, real or fictitious
upakrama : the beginning of a topic
upamdna : comparison
upapattl : fitness, propriety
updsaka : aspirant
upasamhdra : termination
uptiya : means to an end
upeya : end to be attained
utkramana : ascent from the body (of the dtman)
utkrdnti : see utkramana
V
vdda : argument ; theory vaikunfha : the world of Brahman
vairagya : freedom from the desires of sensibility ; abandon- ment of worldly desires
varnas'rama-dharma : duties based on birth and station in life vedana : knowledge or loving meditation or bhakti vibhu : pervasive vicdra : enquiry
614 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
mcchinna : limited
vidheyatva : the quality of being controlled
vidvdn : the wise man who knows Brahman
vijnana : knowledge
mjnanamaya : the knowing self
vikara : modification
vikasa : expansion
viparyaya : wrong notion
vipralambha : separation from the beloved one
•virakti : see vairagya
virodhi: obstacle
vlrya : heroism
vi&esana : an attribute of an object
vi&esya : possessed of attributes
vis'lesa : separation
vis'ista : with attributes
Vis'istadvaita : the theory of the Absolute as Brahman the
sfarlrin with the universe as s'arlra ; pan-organismal
monism viyistaikyam : ur^ity in the form of an organic whole involving
several attributes vi&varupa-dars'ana : the cosmic form of God revealed to
Arjuna on the field of Kuruksetra vyaja : occasion vyavahdrika-satya : phenomenal or relative reality
Y
yajna : worship
yathartha : corresponding to fact
yathartha-khyati : the theory that all knowledge is real
ydgin : One who intuits Reality
yukti : Argumentation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
SOURCES AJavandar : (1) Gltdrthasangraha. (2) Stotraratna. (3) Siddhi-
traya
Atreya Ramanuja : Nyaya Kulis'a ed. R. Ramanujachari Bhagavad Visaya ed. S. Krishnamachariar Bhaskara : Bhasya on the Brahma Sutras Chovvkamba Series Narayanarya : Nltl Mala ed. R. Ramanujachari Nimbarka : Bhasya on the Brahma Sutras Pillailokacarya : Sri Vacana Bhiisana ; Tattvatraya Ramanuja : (1) Gadyatraya ; (2) Gltd Bhasya ; (3) Nitya ;
(4) S'rl Bhasya ; (5) Veddnta Dlpa ; (6) Vedanta Sara ;
(7) Vedartha Sangraha
Rahgaramanuja : Upanisad Bhasya ed. V. N. Krishnamacharya S'ankara : Siltra Bhasya ; Viveka Cudamayl S'rmivasacarya: Yatindramatadipikaed. V. K. Ramanujacharya Mahamahopadhyaya Kapistalam Des'ikacarya : (1) Adhi-
karana Ratna Mala ; (2) Vyasa Siddhanta Martatidam Vedanta Des'ika : (1) Adhikarana Saravall ; (2) Dramido-
panisat Tatparyaratnavall ; (3) GltdbMsya Tdtparya
Candrika ; (4) Paramapada Sopana ; (5) Paramata
Bhanga ; (6) Rahasyas ; (7) Rahasyatrayasdra ; (8)
Sankalpa Suryodaya ; (9) S'atadusanl
OTHER WORKS CONSULTED Bhandarkar : History of Vaishnavism and Saivism Bosanquet : Value and Destiny of the Individual Boyce Gibson : God ivith Us Bradley : Appearance and Reality Dasgupta : History of Indian Philosophy
616 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
De, S. K. : Early History of the Vaishnava Faith and Move- ment in Bengal
Deussen : System of Vedanta
Evans, T. : Theistic Monism
Galloway, G. : Philosophy of Religion
Govindacarya Swamin : Metaphysique of Mysticism of Rama- nuja
Hayavadana Rao : S'rlkara Bhdsya
Hiriyanna : Outlines of Indian Philosophy
Hoffding, H. : Philosophy of Religion
James : Varieties of Religious Experience ; Psychology
Laird, J. : Problem of the Self
Lindsay, J. : Theistic Idealism
Madhavacarya : Sarva Darsfana Sangraha translated by Cowell and Gough
Muirhead : Contemporary British Philosophy
Nagaraja Sarina, Dr. R. : Reign of Realism in Indian Philo- sophy
Pringle-Pattison : The Idea of God
Radhakrishnan, Sir S. : History of Indian Philosophy
Rajagopalachari, T. : Vaishnavite Reformers of India
Ramanujachari, V. K. : The Three Tattvas
Ranade : Mysticism in Maharashtra
Royce, J. : The World and the Individual
Sitanath Tatva Bhushan : Philosophy of Brahmaism
Sorley : Moral Values of the Idea of God
Suryanarayana Sastn, S. S. : S'ivadvaita of S'rikantha ; Bhdmati
Swami Vivekananda : Complete Works
Thibaut : Translation of the Brahma Siitras with the cowmen* taries of S'ankara and Rdmdnuja
Underbill, Miss Evelyn : Mysticism
ERRATA
[N.B. — The following list consists of only such correc- tions as are important. Minor corrections which the reader can correct for himself are omitted.]
READ
skandhas adhikarin padayoh s'abda
circular reasoning adhisthana mula tula
nivrttyanupapatti s'astra yathartha apaccheda sadbhava brahmanatvat s'aririn
for * and linguistics ' read * lin- guistics ' laksana tuccha tripadasya odanah
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618 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
PAGE LINE READ
164 22 saumya
186 31 omit " Spinoza "
214 36 uparistat
236 29 ya atmani
238 30 laksana
339 28 or practice of introversion
363 13 avicchinna
379 1 BHAKTI
393 3 & 8 svarupasamarpana
477 6 s'akta
484 13 etc. Audulomi
494 33 'jnana
505 27 Pei
508 4 Periyajvar Tirumoli
509 18 samsara 512 22 Dramida 514 31 'Gambhira 534 34 nyasariga
In the case of the following words, the diacritical marks should be as below wherever they occur
ahimsa ; bhokta ; dehl ; dharmi ; gum ; jijnasa ; mimamsa ; saksin ; Sathakopa; sattva ; s'esl ; sphota ; srsti ; tattva ; upasana.
INDEX
A bbreviations : A = Ad vaita ; BB = Bhedabheda ; Bh = Bhas- kara; D = Dvaita; M = Madhva; /? = Ramanuja; S=S'an- kara; V = Vis'istad vaita ; accg. to = according to
abadha 45
abhava not a pramana accg. to Bh 65
abhyasa in jnananistha 339, 340 ; in sadhanasaptaka 360
absolute, theories of the 79-80
acaryabhimana in Tenkalai Vaisnavisim 523
acosmism 77, 122, 225
activism (and asceticism) 324-325, 329
adhara, adheya 96; Brahman as adhara Ch. IV; 122, 123, 134, 138, 220
adhyasa 22, 52, 54, 113, 128, 141, 253, 292, 335
adrsja 266
Advaita : Advaitic consciousness ; rise of in PrabodhacandrOdaya 218; anandamaya: meaning of, accg. to 215-217 ; criticised by Bh 217 ; apara and para vidya : distinction of in 357-358 ; avasthatraya accg. to 291-292 ; beauty : idea of in 200, 218 ; Brahman accg. to 129 ; Brahmananda accg. to 491; Brahma- jnana accg. to : criticised 364 ; method of realising Brahman accg. to 88 ; theory of two muktis in : criticised by R 469, creation accg. to 203 ; cause accg. to 253 ; and deism 89, 130 ; dialectics of, contradictions in 112-124; ethics in 149 ; evil ; problem of in 171 ; God (Is'vara) accg, to 89, 226, 267, 593 : illusion theories and 52-53 ; jiva accg. to : criticised 301 ; jivan- mukti accg. to : contradictions in 354, 463-465, 467-471, 477-478, 480, 482, 484, 488 ; kainkarya : absence of motive for in 194 ; Karma Mimamsa and 128-129 ; avidya : theories of accg. to: criticised 55-60 by M 548 ; mukti accg. to: criticised 471-472, 484-485 ; pantheism and 77 ; pracchanna Buddhism : charge of against 477-478 ; pure and practical 22, 89-92, 598-599 ; reality : three kinds of accg. to 420, 465 ; riddle of 174; sadhanacatustaya of 359-360; tattvamasi meaning of accg. to 229, 595, criticised by R ; 143-144, 243-244; relation to other schools, 596
620 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
aesthetics : alankara s'astra and 208 et seq. ; divinity and 269, 298 mediation between metaphysics and ethics by 201, 203 religion and 209-210; sentimentalism : danger of in 223 V and 218-219
ahankara 141, 145 ; as cause of evil 169, 184, 222 ; in the process of the evolution of prakrti 262 ; in relation to vairagya 314-315 and passim
aikyavada 478, 482
ajatavadins 463, 484
ajnana : difficulties in the theory of 463-465 and passim
akhyati 53
aksara vidya 424-425
alankara s'astra 208 et seq.
Alavandar 409, 502, 511-514, 515
Alexander 270
Alvars : Soul-sight of beauty in area by 208 ; on Brahman as the storm 246 ; spiritual experience of 382, 429r 430, 502, 504-505, 584 ; Poigai, Bhutam and Pei 505-506 ; Nammalvar 506-507, see_also under Nammalvar ; Kulas'ekharalvar 507, Periyalvar, Aijdal, Tofldaradippodi 508 ; Tiruppanalvar 508- 509, Madhurakavi 511 ; Tirumalis'aialvar 506, Tirumangai Mannan 509
amalatva : of Brahman 224
anandamaya: 61, 66; adhikarana of the Brahma Sutras 415, anandamaya vidya 365, meaning of 213-214 ; accg. to A 215- 217 ; accg. to V 214-215, 218-219
Anandatlrta : see under Madhvacarya
AfldaJ 455-456, 508
animism : theory'of 6-7 ; criticised by V 7-8
anirvacaniya 53, 56, 98
antafckara^a 54, 240
antaradhikarana of Brahma Sutras 415
antaryamin 42, 73, 85 ; antaryami vidya 138 ; on the absolutist theory 141-142, criticised by BB 141; antaryamin text ac- cepted by BB 142 ; reconciliation by V. of absolutism and theism regarding 142 ; moral significance of 142-143, 156, 162, 188, 194 : Brahman, the beautiful as 205-206 ; as re- conciling the extremes of monism and pluralism 235 ; exposi- tion of 235-236; 240, 241, 242, 243, 364, 365-366, 371,419
anthropomorphism : 9
anupapattis of avidya accg. to R 55-57, 98
anyathakhyati, 53
apaccheda 97 ; (sublation), principle of : criticised by R 258
apahatapapmatva (of Is'vara) : accg. to V: 125 ; accg. to Bh 132
aprakrta s'arlra (of Is'vara) : 238, 239, 240
INDEX 621
aprthaksiddha vis'esaija : 39, 40, 42, 78, 87, 187, 191, 229, 231, 234, 237, 241, 247, 297, 481, 578, 590,597,599; criticised by M 547
arambhana adhikarana 250, 252, 264
araryirappadi : 431
area: 8; meaning of 160-162, 207-208 see also under avatar and incarnation
arciradi marga : 461
Aristotle: 249
arthapancaka (in Bhagavad Visaya) 430, 520
aruruksu (and arudha) 335, 340, 342, 580; expounded in the Gita 344-345
Arya Samaj : 564-565
asat : meaning of accg. to V 252
asatkaryavada : 82, 102, 227, 257
asatkhyati : 52
atheist : criticism of God by 267
atmakhyati : 52
atman : relation to Paramatman accg. to V 42 ; 140-141, 183, 305, jnana and 51; nature of 114; as the eternal self 122, 140-141 ; VS. ahankara 145; wrong identification of with prakrti 146, 305-306 and passim ; as s'aririn : three conditions of : as (1) svarupas'rita and atmaikaprakaratva, (2) sankalpas'rita and atmaikas'rayatva, (3) atmaikaprayojanatva 298-299 ; in A 54 ; the social self 291 ; on the Vedantic view 305, 337 and passim. SeS also under self and under jiva
atmaniksepa as ariga or arigin of prapatti : 390, 391, 392-394
atmavalokana (atmadars'ana, atmasaksatkara) : 334, 335, 336, 337, 368, 392; stages in 338-341; distinguished from bhakti and prapatti 347-351
atomic theory : 3
Audulomi : 484, 485
Augustine, St. 405-406
Aurobindo Ghose : 571
avasthatraya : 88, analysis of 291-292 ; accg. to V 292-295
avatar 10, theories of 156-159 ; accg. to the Gita 158-159 ; accg, to V 159- 160 ; rahasya of 206-207, 371 ; and S'aiva Siddhanta 560 ; and Brahma Samaj 563 ; see also under incarnation and area.
avibhaga : concept of in relation to the mukta and Brahman 481-482
avidya:28, 31, 34, 47, 48, 53-54,54-55,67, 113, 128, 129,301, 302, 463-464, 477 ; Is'vara accg. to : 254 ; place in the Advaitic interpretation of avasthatraya 292 ; and mumuksutva 57, 58 ; and mukti 107 ; removal of accg. to dhyananiyoga vada 130, 131; criticism of R 55-56; by Vedanta Detfika 57-58;
622 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
meaning of in terms of karma in V 134, 152, 203 ; and rasa 218 ; in R 303 avinabhava 482
Badarayana : 92, 150, 178
Badari : 62. 68, 467, 468
Beauty, nature of : distinguished from Truth and Goodness 195-196 ; theories of accg. to western philosophers 196-200 ; accg. to V 196, 198, 201 ; as an essential value of Reality 200-201 ; Advaitic idea of 200 ; pluralistic view of 200 ; transcendental 201 ; in the Bhagavata mysticism 456-459. See also under aesthetics
Berkeley: 178
Besant, Mrs. 565
Bhagavat-kama : 212, 213
Bhagavad Visaya : 430-431 ; arthapancaka in ; 430 ; portrayal of the mysticism of Brahmanubhava in 446
Bhagavan, Idea of : 162-163. See also under Is'vara
Bhagavata, S'rimad : exposition of Brahman as the Beautiful in : 196, 201, 206, 207 ; treatment of sublimation of emotions in 210 ; aesthetic religion of 210, 273.
bhagavat kainkarya : 432
bhakti : nature of : 351, 352, 370-380, 421, 425, 440, 460-461, 503 ; essentials of 371, 580-581 ; supreme value of 371 ; joy of 371 ; fruition of self-surrender 372 ; treatment of in the Gita 373-374 sadhanas for 359-362 ; fruit of upasana ; 370 ; development of into paramaikantya 374-376, 381 ; into parabhakti and para jnana 376, 381 : into parama bhakti 376, prema bhakti or ananyabhakti 379 ; the eight flowers of 385 ; awakening of : as Sankalpa SuryOdaya 218 ; in the religion of Madhva 550 ; dis- tinction between s'astriya bhakti and pusti bhakti of Vallabha 551-552 ; bhakti movement of Sri Caitanya 554-556 ; in Gita GQvinda 556-557 ; bhakti school of accg. to Jfianes'vara 558 ; affinity with Christian idea of joy 568
Bhakti Yoga : 305, 317, 350 ; Ch. XV ; 380-381 ; transition to from JSana Y6ga 349 ; historical view of : considered and criticised 358 ; four adhikaras for 381-382 ; distinguished from Prapatti Yoga 382-383 ; 581 ; chief value of denied by Pillailokacarya 400-401, 521 ; bhakti movement in North India 543 bhara samarpaija : 392 BhartrprapaSca on cosmology : 256
Bhaskara : criticism of the theory of two Brahmans by 64-69, 70, 79, 80; theory of jftana-karma samuccaya of 131-132 ; criti- cism of niyOga vada by 133, 161 ; meaning of anandamaya accg. to 217 ; on cosmology 255-256, 257 ; theory of Brah- man accg. to : 488 ; criticised 258 ; on krama mukti and
INDEX 623
sadyo mukti 488 ; meaning of tattvamasi accg. to 595 ; relation to other systems 596 ; passim, see also under Bhedabheda
bhava in alankara s'astra : 209, 210
Bhedabheda : theory of identity in difference 41, 69, 162, 163 ; Brahman accg. to 99-100, criticised by R 101 ; relation of Brahman and jiva accg. to 303, 481, Brahmaparirjtama vada of 104, 203 ; cosmology accg. to 255-257 ; idea of and means to mukti accg. to : considered and criticised 355, 476, 481 : refutation of Advaitic view of antaryamin in 141-142 ; and Hegel 73, 75 ; and Bradley 75, 76 ; affinities with western thinkers 77 ; trend in western absolutist theories of beauty 200 ; refutation of theory of nirguna Brahman by 98-100 ; used by V 70: dilemma of 71
bhuma vidya : 213, 214, 365, 423-424
BOdhayana: 135, 574
Bosanquet : affinity with R considered 74 ; criticised 75 ; on evil 171-172 ; idea of Beauty accg, to 199, 200 ; on religion 403
Boyce Gibson : 185
Bradley : 109, 123, 124, 301, 478, 593 ; on the reality of God of religion 75-76 ; on evil 171 ; idea of Beauty accg. to 199 ; on Reality 271
Brahma : place of in creation : 264, 266
Brahman : according to various Vedantins 79-80, 81, 84-85, 221 ; karya Brahman 61, 62 ; meaning of in terms of tattvamasi in A and in V 228-229 ; relation of to jiva accg. to pluralism : 300-301 ; meditation on in the several vidyas 365-367 in the Sutras 414 et seq.t and avidya 53-54 ; S'ankara's arguments in favour of the theory of two Brahmans 61-64, refuted 96-98 ; nature of accg. to V 129 ; in relation to universe accg. to A 253-254, 258; in relation to jiva accg. to 1/301-303.; karya Brahman and arciradi marga 467-468 accg. to BJB 99- 100, relation to universe accg. to Bh 255, criticised 258 ; accg. to Yadava 256; accg. to Nimbarka 256-257; relation to jiva 301 ; criticism of theory of two Brahmans by Bh 64, by Yadava 69, by Nimbarka 69 accg. to M 548 ; accg. to V 46, 60, 80-92, 114-115 414 et seq., 500; ground of existence and goal of religion 86-87 ; as unity of cit and acit 105-106, 108 ; as satyam 102-108 ; as satyasya satyam 106-108, 122-123, 246, 462, 463 ; as jnanam 108-117; as anantam 117-121 ; as adhara Ch. IVf 122-123, 181-182, 220, 224, 242-243, 298-299; as niyanta Ch. V, 181-182, 186; as antaryamin 138-139; as Ruler and Redeemer Ch. VI ; as s'esin Ch. VII, 220, 224, 242'243, 298- 299 ; five-fold forms of 154*, 162, 204-205 ; as upaya and upeya 182, 241, 388 ; as the Beautiful Ch. VIII, 224, 298-299 ; as possessing svarupa, rupa and guna 202, beauteous form of 202 ;
624 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
as the divine artist 203, 204 ; as anandamaya 213 et seq., accg. to A 215-217, accg. to Bh 217, accg to V 215 ; as Jyotisam Jyotis 246, 462, 463 ; relation of to the universe Ch. X ; and creation 264, 266-267 as immanent and transcendent 225-226 ; as svarupas'raya of things 220 ; and the finite self 123, 233- 234, 296-300, 305, 586; as vistesya of matter and jivas 231- 232 ; as prakarin 232-233, objection to the V theory of relation between Brahman and jiva considered 299-300 ; theory of two Brahmans criticised Ch. Ill ; same connotation of as of Bhaga- van and Paramatman accg. to R 163 ; as identical with Vasudeva 421 ; in mystic experience 446-447 ; as tattva, hita and puru- sartha 304 ; as the ground of existence and goal of life 315-317. See alsounder Brahmajnana,Brahmananda etc. Generally^ ss/m
Bramajnana: 66, 109-110, 136, 304, 305,317,319,472,484-486, 491, 583 ; accg. to V reconciliation of realism and idealism 115-118
Brahmananda: 66, 212; treatment of in the Taittiriya Upanisad 213-214; nature of in mukti 472-474, 490-491 ; in Rasakrida 457-459 ; accg. to A 491, as ekibhava accg. to Bh 491
Brahmanubhava : as Vedantic mysticism 439-441 ; portrayed in the Bhagavata and the Bhagavad Visaya 446 ; in Rasakrida 457-459 ; paripurarjia Brahmanubhava 460 ; in mukti 472-474 ; varieties of 500
Brahmaparinama vada : 255, 546
Brahmaprayatna : 317-473
Brahma Sutras : passim ; as expounded by Kapistalam Desikacariar 413 et seq. ; discussion of arciradigati in 467 et seq.
Brahma Vidyas : varieties of 365-367, unity of 382, 421
BrahmQism : 543, '571
Brahmopasana : accg. to the three Vedantic Schools 364-365 ; component factors in 367
Buddhi : eight ways of disciplining 385
Buddhism: 178, 230; Reality accg. to 8, 9 ; theory of knowledge accg. to criticised 44 ; mentalism of 140 ; dhamma in 175-176 ; ksa^abhanga vada of repudiated by Vedantins 257 ; theory of the jiva accg. to 278-279, 285 ; ethics of 323-324, 347 ; mukti accg. to 475-476 ; and A 478
Caird, John : 72
Caitanya : 542. See also under Kr§rjia Caitanya
Carama s'loka : See under rahasyatraya and under Glta
CSrvaka : theory of life accg. to : 2-3 ; 104 ; 105 ; theory of pleasure
accg. to : 212-213 ; 307-310 ; 323 cause : idea of accg. to V 82, 243, 250-252, 259-261 ; accg. to
Mayavada 253 ; accg. to Karjiada 252-253, criticised by A 253 ;
INDEX 625
accg. to Sarikhya 260 ; idea of in relation to Brahman in V 260-261
Christ : compared with Nammalvar 407-408
Christianity: idea of incarnation accg. to 157-158; on sin and forgiveness 176-179 ; 404-407 ; inadequate basis for kainkarya in 193-194; and S'rlvaisnavism 567-568; distinction be- tween justification by faith and by works in 398-399
communism : 346
cosmology : Vedantic Ch. X ; accg. to Kanada 252-253 : accg. to A 253-254 ; accg. to Bh 255-256 ; accg to Yadava 256, accg. to Bhatrprapanca 256, accg. to Nimbarka 256-257 ; accg. to M 548, accg. to V 577-578
creation : accg. to different schools of Vedanta 82-83 ; accg. to M 548-549; accg. to V 105-106; from the metaphysical point of view 203 ; from the ethical point of view 203 ; on the Ilia theory 204, 269 ; order of, accg. to S'astra 261-265 ; samasti aspect of 261-263 ; vyasti aspect of 263-265 ; of the world from the word of Veda 265-267
Dadu (Saint) : 544
dahara vidya : 143, 365, 426-427
dars'ana : meaning of : 429
dasya, of jiva : 184 ; 192-194, 374, 375, 489
daya: of Is'vara 163-168, 409-411 ; difference of Vaisnavite theory from the Semitic idea of mercy 164 ; inner necessity of Vais- ijavite, pantheism and Srivaisnavite theism 165-168 ; and redemption 180; and S'ri 191-192, 386 ; as amoral 394, 403 j the place of, in prapatti S'astra 402-403. See also under krpa
Dayananda Sarasvati : 564-565
Descartes: 279
Des'ikacaryar of Kapistalam : interpretation of Vedanta Sutras as philosophy of religion by : 413 et seq.
determinism : dilemma of 147 ; overcome by the ethical religion of V 147-149, 587-588
Deussen : 162, 347, 369, 471, 482, 483
devayana marga : 471
dharmabhuta jnana : 27 et seq. ', 43, 111, 231, 284-285, 291, 345, 475
dhumayana marga : 466
dhyana : 363, 369 *
dhyana-niyOgavadin : criticism of Advaitic theory of karma by 130 \ insistence on Vedantic culture by 130-131 ; means of mukti accg. to 130-131; criticised by Bh 131, by R 135; criticism of Advaitic conception of mukti by 354.
Dramidopanisad : 432-433, 504
dream : 49, 51, 227, 254, 293-294, interpretation of by R 51.
40
626 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
drstisrsjivada : 478
Dvaitavadin : on Advaitin's avidya 260, BrahmOpasana accg. to
examined 364 ; mukti accg. to 477 ; relation of mukta to
Brahman 481 ; relation of Is'vara, cit and acit 592, 599 ;
meaning of tattvamasi accg. to 595. dvaya : see under rahasyatraya. ekajivavada: 63, 254, 301-303, 350,464,478,488,591; criticism
of by R 59, 89
Eknath : 558, 559
epistemology : of V Ch. II ; ultimate foundation of on philosophy of religion 52
error : Vedantic theory of 47 et seq., 50 ; theory of accg. to A criticised 48
evil : the problem of 150, 168 et seq., in relation to Isvara 168 ; in Zoroastrianism 169 ; in Christian theology 169, 171, 176, accg. to western absolutists 171 ; accg. to Vedanta 312 ; accg. to A 152, 171 ; accg. to BB 171, criticised 171 ; accg. to #153, 172
evolution : theories of : 269-270
Fichte : resemblance with bhedabheda : 76, 80, 122, 249 forgiveness : 394. See also under daya, krpa and S'ri freedom : human and divine : problem of reconciled by V 146-149, 289 ; in relation to evil 170 ; true meaning of spiritual 183, 185, 489; as self-surrender 186, possibility of, implied by S'astra 288-289 ; spiritual as distinguished from the determinism of karma 336 ; of self is Is^varSdhina 389, 402 Freud : 210
Gandhi, Mahatma : 566,571 Gaudapada : 92
Gita: analysis of karma and voluntary action in 144-145; theory of niskama karma in 323-33 ; on the Srudha 344-345 ; on the jnani 349 ; on Bhagavan 372 ; as the gospel of nirhetuka kataksa 400; definition of mukti as equality of attributes with Brahman 482; offer of mukti to all jivas 382, 388 ; idea of avatara accg. to 158-159; superiority to Christianity and Buddhism 178-179 ; compared with the Sermon on the Mount 409 ; call of daya in ; 411 ; 541, 549, 600* Gita GOvinda of Jayadeva 556-557 Gitarta Sangraha : analysis of the Gita by 372-373 God: and Naturalism 3; proofs for the existence of 12-14, 562 ; in Bradley and in Pantheism 78 ; in eastern and western systems 80 ; in absolutist philosophies 124 ; in Sufism 569 ; of religion is the absolute of thought accg. to V 86-87 ; accg.
INDEX 627
to A and D 89 ; as the antaryamin 85 > and passim. See also
under Is'vara guna and gunin : relation between accg. to A and V 230 ; rule of
co-ordination re : 231
guflas : sattva, rajas and tamas : nature of 322-323, 339 Guru Nanak : 561
hallucination : 49
hedonism : psychological : 145
Hegel : affinity with R considered 73, criticised 74, 76, 77 ; panlog-
ism of 77, 78, 110, 111, 197, 198, 249 ; idea of beauty accg. to
199 ; panlogical absolutism of 270-271 humanism : social progress and service accg. to : 342, 346 Hume: 124, 178
idealism : theory of knowledge accg. to 43-44, criticism of 44 ; 575- 576 ; image worship accg. to 160 ; ethical, considered and criticised 223 ; subjective and objective 350 ; as interpreted by V 350-351
identity : concept of : different views on : 110-111
Idu: 431
iksati adhikaraija ; 414
illusion : 49, 50, 52
illusionism : criticised 27, 28
image worship : 160-161
incarnation : 406-407 ; idea of accg. to Christianity 157-158
infinite : meaning of 117-119 ; accg. to V 118-119; Brahman as the 120-121
intuition : 15-17
Islam : and North Indian Vaisijavite faiths 568-569
Is'vara: 51, 55, 61,62, 63, 67,69,74; in Mimamsaka view 127, 128 ; place of, in ethical religion and the problem of human freedom 147-149 ; according to A 90-92, 226, 258 ; contradic- tions in Advaitic conception of 113 ; criticism by other schools 143-144; according to BB 132 ; in Nimbarka's system 257 according to Mayavada 99, accg. to Madhva 548-549 according to V 137, 226, 241 ; apahatapapmatva of 125 ; aprakrta s'arira of 239 ; in Brahmopasana 367-368 ; and creation 264-265 ; dandana by and daya of 153-154, 163-164, 168-171 ; as dha- raka, posaka and bhogya 451 ; as ethical highest 150 ; as father 189-190; five-fold manifestations of 154-155, 162 ; jagad- vyapara of 487-488 ; in relation to jiva 296-300, 487-488 ; as kapatanatakasutradhara 269 ; as niyanta Ch. V, 222-223 ; and prakrti 271, 296-300 ; as Raksaka 389, 395-396 ; as Redeemer 164-165, 388 ; as Satyakama and Satya Sankalpa 151-152 ; as
628 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
S'esin Ch. VII and Svamin 577; in relation to S'ri 190-192; as supra-personal 188 ; charge of cruelty and caprice of : refuted 267-268 ; charge of imperfection in ; refuted 268-269 ; in Pillailokacarya's system 520-521 ; in other Vaisnavite schools Ch. XXI ; See also under God, Vis'istadvaita and Vaisr^avism ; and passim
jahadajahal laksar^a : 90
Jaimini : 62, 68, 484, 485
Jainism : ethics of 347 ; mukti accg. to 476, 592
James, William : 398, 538 ; on the self 279-280 ; on activistic temperament 324
Jayadeva: 556-557
jiva : 105, 180, 182, 184, 186; inadequacy of western theories of 274-275 ; accg. to dehatmavadin 275-276 ; accg. to the naturalist 276: accg. to vitalism 276 ; accg. to the indriyatmavadin 276 ; accg. to the suksmadehatmavadin 277 ; antahkaranavadin 277 ; accg. to psycho-analysis 277 ; accg. to yogic psychology 277- 278 ; accg. to Buddhism 278 : accg. to the rationalist 279 ; accg. to William James 279-280 ; accg. to the sociologist 281 ; distinc- tion of individuality and personality in 281 ; concept of self- identity of 282 ; neither modal nor adjectival of the absolute 282 ; creationist view of 282 ; accg. to A 137-138 ; accg. to Nim- barka 545-546 ; accg. to V : 137-138, 271, 283 et seq., 335-336, 578-579, 586-587 ; psychology of Ch. XI ; different from prakrti. ksetrajna, avinSs'i, satya, s'as'vata 283; nirgu^a, avyakta, acintya, aprameya, as'caryavatdrsta, svayamprakas'a, jnanas'raya 284, logically indistinguishable from jnana 285, relation to jnana 285- 288, karta 288; and freedom 288-290, 389 : bhokta 290; in relation to karma, punya, papa and the interplay of destiny and divinity 310-311, 321-322 ; in relation to kvara 187-189, 193, 296-300, 351, 488-489, as aprthak-siddha-vis'e§ana 297 ; putratva of 189-190; svarupas'raya and sarikalpas'raya of, on Is'vara 222 ; as s'arira of Brahman 226 ; as having modal dependence and monadic uniqueness 233-234 ; as s'esa and as dasa 298 ; kainkarya of 298 ; plurality of jlvas 299 ; accg. to Pillailoka- carya 521. accg. toS'aiva Siddhanta 560 ; accg. to Sikhism 561. See also under self, atman and passim
jivanmukti : 67, 463, 488, 536, 587, 593 ; self-contradiction in 59
jnana : 23, 24, 25, 27-34, 100, 227 ; and ainana considered by V 101 ; Brahman, the ultimate basis of 37 ; and error 50-51, 67 ; nature of in relation to self 111-112 ; dharma-dharmi relation between jfiana and jiva 285-288 ; savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka : no contradiction between accg. to V 37 ; transition to atma- jnana 340 ; para-jfiana 376 and passim
INDEX 629
jnana-karma samuccaya : Bh's theory of 131-132, 355
jnanamatravadin : 242
jnananistha : stages in 339-342
Jnana Yoga : 305, 317, 352, 380 ; Ch. XIV ; transition from Karma
Yoga 333-334 ; stages in the realisation of the pratyagatman by
338-341 ; affinity with the Christian idea of illumination 568 Jnanes'vara : Maharastra bhakti school of 558 ; nature of bhakti
accg. to 558 judgment : theory of accg. to V and criticism of other theories
on 34-37 jyotir vidya : 416
Kabir : 544, 569
kainkarya: 174, 183, 184, 193-194, 222,298,368,374,389,489, 577, 580 ; bhagavat, bhagavata and acarya kainkarya 193, 432, 489 ; meaning of service as 346-347 ; as paramapurusartha 396 ; kainkaryarasa 500 ; more inclusive in V than in Christi- anity 193-194 ; no motive for in A 194
kaivalya (and kevala) 347-349, 489-490 ; in atmavalokana 347- 348 ; Sankhyan 348 ; differences between Tenkalais and Vada- kalais regarding 348 ; inadequacy of 349, 580
kama ; three kinds of 445 ; sams'lesa and vis'lesa in 447-453
kama-krodha : 312
KamaS'astra: 211-212
Kaflada : theory of cause accg. to 252-253
Kant : 21, 25, 66, 76, 123, 125, 178, 240, 289, 324, 483, 492, 598
Kapila: 25
karma j; 105, 203-204, 320-321, 335, 361, 369,388,584; accg. to Purva Mimamsa school 125-128; inadequacy of 136; theory and interpretation of 151-154 ; niskama 324-333, illustrated in the practice of tapas, dana and yajna 331-332 ; and Is'vara 330 ; interpenetrating with jnana 334 ; three kinds of 312 ; and the problem of evil, and freedom 170, 171 ; and human inequality 268 ; charges of fatalism and individualism against considered 172-174; Buddhist idea of 175, 176; and A : contradiction accg. to A 128, 129 ; cannot co-exist with jnana accg. to A 129 ; cannot apply to Brahman accg. to A 129 ; and V : equated with avidya 60, 105 ; as cause of error 47, 48 ; as cause of imperfections 227 ; and jlva 295 ; as kainkarya 183, 222, 389, 577 ; transition from kamya karma to atma kama 334-335 ; and krpa 166, 174. 176 ; moral law of and Is'vara's redemptive love 222; and sin 178; prarabdha karma 461 ; karma sannyasa : meaning of 389 ; and passim
Karma Yoga: 305, 317, 352, 380 ; Ch. XIII, 579-580; distinguished from karma 320 ; ethics of 323-325 ; true meaning of 328 ;
630 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
stages in 328-329 ; superiority of 332-333 ; transition to J Sana Yoga 333-334 ; attainment of samatva by 339 ; affinity with the Christian idea of purgation 568
kataksa : nirhetuka and sahetuka : 398-400, 401-403, 536, 540. See also under krpa
Kesub Chander Sen : 564
knowledge : theory of : accg. to V 41-45 ; synthesis of pragmatism, realism and idealism in Vis'istadvaitic theory of 48-49
krama mukti : 468, 488. See also under mukti
krpa : 154 ; concrete expressions of in five forms of Brahman 154-158 ; and karma 166, 174, 538-540, 582 ; nirhetuka 395 : and S'ri 166, 522 ; in PillailGkacarya's system 522 .
Krsna Caitanya : 552-556, 566, 571, 573; philosophy of 553-556, 596 ; concept of Radhakrsna lila accg. to 554 ; concept of madhurya accg. to 554-555, 556 ; relation between Bhagavan and jiva accg, to 554 ; theory of bhakti as means to bliss of Krsna accg. to 554 ; stages in bhakti accg. to 554-555 ; several ratis in the systems of 555 ; Krsna-prema of 555-556 ; meaning of tattvamasi accg. to 595
ksanabhangavada of Buddhism : repudiated by Vedantins 257
Laksmi : place of, in V religion 190-193 ; place of in Vadakalai
and Tenkalai schools of Vaisnavism 535. See also
under S'ri
Leibnitz : 42, 249 ; resemblance with R considered 72-73 lila: 196, 203-204, 248, 414, 585; the motive of Is'vara in
creation 269 ; of mystic love 451-452 ; Krsna lila : the crown
of Vedantic thought 456 ; Rasa lila 457-459 lilavibhuti : 416, 4,63, 493, 494 ; and time series 498-499 Locke: 178 lokayata:. theory of 307-308, 313; criticised 308-310; see also
under Carvaka
Madhurakavi Alvar : 407
Madhusudana Sarasvati : 598
Madhuvidya: 213, 214, 365
Madhvacarya : philosophy and religion of 546-550 ; rejection of nirguna Brahman and Mayavada, aprthaksiddha-vis'esana and upadana-karafla theories by 547 ; epistemology of 547-548 ; theory of vis'esa accg. to 548 ; nature of Brahman accg. to 548 ; cosmology of 548 ; Is'vara accg. to 548-549 ; psychology and ethics of 549 ; mukti accg. to 550 ; affinity of with Vis'istadvaitic Vaisnavism 550
madhyamikas : 178 ; theory of cause accg. to repudiated 178
Manavala Mahamunigal 227 ; dialectics of 267, 524, 533-534
INDEX 631
materialism : criticism of 4-5 ; reaction of faith to 5 ; image wor- ship accg. to 160
matter : idealistic view of : criticised 105
maya : 45, 46, 48, 54, 59, 63, 64, 67, 69, 79, 85, 86, 89 ; controlled by Is'vara accg. to V 134, 248 ; creatures moved to action by Is'vara's 147; and passim
Mayavada : 64, 80, 594 ; dangers of accg. to BB 99 ; criticised by R 258, 502 and passim
Mimamsa : rules of interpretation 395
(Purva) : theory of karma accg. to 125-128 ; theory of dharma accg. to 126 ; Is'vara in 127, 128 ; moksaaccg. to 126 ; criticised by A 128 ; criticised by R 135 ; re-interpreted accg. to Vedanta 135; continuity with Uttara Mimamsa 135, 137; method of attaining mukti accg. to : criticised 353 (Uttara) : object of 128
Mimamsaka : theory of akhyati of 53 ; view of freedom accg. to 126
Molinism : 406
mukti: 31, 33, 59, 67, 78, 86, 91, 107, 217; discussion of in Brahma Sutras 467 et seq ; nature of accg. to A 463-465, 467- 469, 488, Jivanmukti : contradiction in 463-464, Advaitic interpretation of application to karya Brahman 467-469, destiny of released soul accg. to A 471-472 ; mukti accg. to aikyavada 482-483 ; accg. to BB 476, Bh's theory of krama mukti and sadyo mukti 488 ; accg. to Brahma Samaj 564 ; accg. to Buddhism 475-476 ; accg. to D 477, 500 ; accg. to Jainism 476 ; accg. to STaiva Siddhanta 560 ; accg. to Sankhya 476; accg. to Vais'esika 476, accg. to V : 137-138, Ch. XIX, 499 ; Karma, Jnana and Bhakti Yogas as paths to 352-353, 579- 580 ; path to described in Vedanta Des'ika's Paramapada Sopana 377-379, 460-461 ; vairagya and viveka as means to 589 ; alternative means to 499-500 ; description of in Paryarika Vidya 472-473 ; ascent to the Absolute or divyades'a prapti 472- 474 ; as return to Brahman 461 ; as freedom from limitations of prakrti 462 ; as result of Brahmanising process 463, 583 ; pro- cess of involution in 465-466 ; progress of bound soul along dhu- mayana 466 ; progress of released soul along arciradi marga 465-467, 471.-472; Brahmanubhava in 472-474; salokya, samipya, sarupya and sayujya in Paramapada 474 ; indescri- bability of 474 ; attempted description of the in Upanisads 475 ; manifestation of intelligence in 484-486 ; relation between mukta and Brahman 480-484 ; jagadvyapara as difference between mukta and Brahman 489 ; value of as experience of the bliss of Brahman 490-492 ; mukti and the sense of time 498-499, 589 ; as integral experience for R 479-480 ; freedom
632 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
of mukta from punya, papa, karma and samsara 486 ; all- pervasive consciousness of mukta 487 ; perfection of mukta 493-494 ; mukta and Paramapada 496-497 ; freedom of mukta to be embodied 496-497 ; place of Is'vara's grace in 368-369 ; place of guru prasada in attaining 369
Mulamantra : See under Rahasyatraya
mulaprakrti : 116
mulavidya : 56
mumuksu and mumuksutva : real nature of accg. to V 137, 352, 367-368, 428, Ch.* XII, 579-580; Upanisadic conception of 318-319, 593-594; and spiritual quest 335, 499-500; social ideal of mumuksu 342-347, distinguished from humanism, utilitarianism and positivism 342
mysticism : nature of 437-438 : Vedantic 438-440 ; Vedantic in Maitreyl Brahmana 444-445 ; view of Vedantic mysticism as not promoting individual and social morality criticised 443-444 ; the evolution of the mystic in Brahmanubhava 440-441 ; mystic experience alogical, amoral and supra-personal 441-443 ; view of Vaisnavite as erotic and emotional criticised 442-443, 588 ; in relation to Bhagavat kama 445-446 ; portrayal of in Bhagavata and Bhagavad Visaya 446, 456-459 ; the nature of Brahman in 446-447 ; kama, sams'lesa and vis'lesa in 447-453 ; nayaki-nayakabhava in 449-450; of the GOpIs 451 ; the bliss of mystic union 452-453j symbolic imagery of 454-455 '• of Nammalvar 446-455 ; of Arjidal 455-456 : the mystic interpreta- tion of the experience of avibhaga 482 ; love of mystic union 491-492 ; mystic way of mukti 500 ; spiritual meaning of sensual garb of Vaisnavite mysticism 557 ; of S'ri Ramakrsna 565 ; of Christianity and SVi Vaisnavism 568
Nagarjuna : 64, 75, 124, 141, 478, 596
naiskarmya siddhi : 128
Namdev : and his abhangas 558, 559
Nammalvar: 211, 399, 416, 417, 511, 541, 566, 568, 575 ; life of 506-507 ; life of compared with that of Christ 407-408 ; as the super-prapanna 382, 386 ; spiritual experiences of in Tiruvai- moli 432-436 ; mysticism of 444, 446-455, 582-583 ; on the two vibhutis 485-486
nanajivavada : 114, 488
Narada : 558
Narayarjia : meaning of in Mulamantra 384-385 ; as S'riyahpati in Dvaya 386-387 ; incarnation as S'rinivasa 388
Nathamuni : 511
naturalism : theory of reality accg. to 270 ; autonomy of ethical religion destroyed by 271 ; conflict with supernaturalism 3
INDEX 633
natura naturans (and natura naturata) 72, 83, 106, 226-227, 251
nayaki-nayaka bhava : 449-450, 557
Naiyayika : on samanya 36 ; theory of illusion (anyathakhyati) of
53, s'arira accg. to, 238-239; adrsta theory of 266; theism
of 596 Nimbarka : 71, 79-80, 255 ; Dvaita-advaita of 545-546 ; cosmology
of 256-257 ; criticism of theory of two Brahmans by 69 ;
affinity with V 70 ; relation to other systems 596 nirguna Brahman ; theory of established by A 98 ; combated by
BB and V 98-102, 230, 585 ; meaning of nirguna texts accg.
to V 243, 584, 591 nisprapanca-niyoga vada : 77, 132-133; state of mukti accg. to
354 ; criticised by Bh 133, by R 133, 135 nitya suris ; 237, 240, 475, 495
nitya-vibhuti : 205, 494 ; and sense of eternity 498-499 niyanta and niyamya •' 96 ; Brahman as niyanta Ch. V niyoga : in Karma Mimamsa 127 ; criticised by A 129, by Bh 131,
_ by R 133, 138, 266 nyasa vidya 382, 384 ; and passim
Ontology ; accg. to V : Brahman as adhara Ch. IV, 246-247, 304, 576-577 ; superiority of Vedantic to western and of Vis'ist- advaitic to other Vedantic schools 246-247
Pancaratra: 157, 162, 371, 410, 504; as a pramana for V 584 ; exaltation of vyuha form of beauty in 205 ; idea of Vasudeva and Narayana in 386 ; defended by Ajavandar against the Advaitin 513
pancikaraQa : 50-51
pan-illusionism : 77, 78, 225, 258
pantheism : 222 ; relation to Vedantic schools and criticism of 77-78, 592 ; image worship accg. to 160
paramaikantin : 461
paramaikantya : 374-376, 381
Paramapada 305, 426, 430, 450, 475, 489, 493-497, 589 ; as nitya- vibhuti 493 ; condition of mukta in 494 ; aprakrta nature of 494 ; indescribability of 495 ; as s'uddhasatva realm 495- 496; description of in /?*s Vaikuijtha Gadya and Vedanta Des'ika's Paramapada Sopana 496-497
Paramatman 8, 142, 183, 184, 187-188,227,233; relation to jiva 193-194, 229 ; and passim
pararthya of jiva : 375
paratantrya of jiva 375, 393 ; of S'ri 191 ; see also under S'ri
Pariksit : 558
Parmenides : 80, 249, 483, 593
634 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
parinama : 79, 84 ; parinamic changes and soul making 105-106 ; paripama s'akti 100, 132, 134. 545 ; parinama vada 65, 69, 72, 102-104, 203, 255-256, 462, 546
paryanka vidya : 472
pas'upata : 245
phala samarpana (in atmaniksepa) : 392, 393
Philosophy : difference from theology 1, 2
Pillailokacarya : 166, 167, 502 ; life and works of 520-524 ; exposi- tion of prapatti by 384 ; exposition of nirhetuka kataksa by 400-401 ; criticism of prapatti as sadhyOpaya by 398-400
Plato : 249, 483, 495, idea of beauty accg. to 200, theory of ideas and archetypes accg. to 266
Plotinus : 78, 80, 122, 249, 425
pluralism : creation accg. to 252-253 ; God accg. to criticised 300-301
polytheism and henotheism : 10
positivism : social progress accg. to 346
Prabandha : 386 ; as a pramana 584
Prabodha-candrodaya : 218
pradhana : explanation of the universe in terms of : criticised by S and R 140, 227
pragmatism : 347, 575
Prahlada : 417, 418, 444, 485, 503, 574, 594
prakara (and prakarin) : 39, 42, 60, 71, 72, 83,- 84, 87, 232, 241, 299-300, 579
prakrti: 65, 84, 102, 120-121, 132, 139, 140, 141, 142, 179, 183, 184, 188, 462 ; subject to the law of parinama 103-104 ; rela- tion to atman 146 ; accg. to V 227 ; evolution of 261-263
pramanas : 46 ; relation between 47
pranaism : 7, 145
prapatti : Ch. XVI : 421, 583; misconceptions about 382 ; easier than Bhakti Yoga 382-383, 392 ; distinguished from Bhakti Yoga 382, 391, 581-582, requisite, implication, essence, effect and merit of 383, inner meaning and value of 384, 386, em- phasis on paratantryam of jiva in 384, 393 ; six angas of 390-392 ; as religion of atmaniksepa 391-394 ; three aspects of atmaniksepam 392-393 ; explained by Vedanta Des'ika 393- 394, 529 ; as the religious conclusion of s'arira-s'ariri samban- dha 394 ; in relation to the theory of vyaja 394-395 ; as sadhyOpaya controverted by Tenkalai school 398-403, 521- 523 ; general appreciation of the doctrine of 409-411
progress (moral) : meaning of accg. to Hindu religion 179-180
purusa: relation to Puru§5ttama 139, 179 ; and passim
psychiatry 295
psychology : and religion 9 ; view of reality accg. to criticised 10-11
INDEX 635
purjtya (and papa): 306, 310-311, 378, 404-405 and passim. See
also under sin Purrjuaprajna : 573 ; relation to other systems 546. See also under
Anandatlrta and Madhva purusarthas : 315-317 ; the supreme 316-317 Purusa Sukta : 239, 463 Purusottama; relation to purusa and prakrti 139-140, 142 ; and
passim
Radha : 558
Rahasyatraya : 384-390; mulamantra 384-385, 389, 400; dvaya 386-388, 389, 400 ; carama s'loka 388-390, 395, 400
Rahasyatraya sara : 386, 532-533
Raja Ram Mohan Rai : 564
Ramananda : 542, 543-544, 558
Ramanuja : life and works of 514-519; mission of 502, 512; synthetic method of 245, 542-543 ; 572 ; as the exponent of Ubhaya Vedanta 429-430 ; emphasis on ethical religion by 134, creation accg. to 259, 264-265 ; on the antaryami vidya 235 ; interpretation of avidya accg. to 303 ; exposition of Brahmo- pasana accg. to, as distinguished from that of A and of D 364- 365 ; criticism of Bh's theory of upadhis by 133-134 ; criticism of Buddhist's kSanabhariga vada by 257 ; criticism of apaccheda theory by 258 ; treatment of mukti by 479-480 ; criticism of other dars'anas regarding their means for attaining mukti 353- 355 ; influence of on other systems in India Ch. XXI ; Vai- kuntha Gadya of 386, 495, 496 ; and passim ; see also under Vis'istadvaita
Ramayana : beauty of as a kavya 209 ; epic of karuna rasa 211 ; as S'aranagati Veda 395-397 ; treatment of God as the Beauti- ful in 206, 207
Ramdas : 542, 558, 559-560
rasa: theory of 209, 218
rasa krida (rasa lila) : 457-459
rationalism and theology, conflict between 12-13
realism : theory of knowledge accg. to 43, 575
reality : Vedantic theory of 45-46
reality : degrees of 63
redemption: philosophy of (Daya S'astra) 155-156; accg. to S'ri- vaisnavism 405-407, 538-539; Christian religion of 176-179, 404-407, 538-539; compared with Vedantic idea of 178-180 ; accg. to St. Augustine 405-406
relations : the theory of 39 et seq '. external expounded and criti- cised 39-40; internal 41; Vis'istadvaitic view of 41-42 ; accg. to Bradley 75, 76
636 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
religion : in A, D and V 89-90 Royce: 76, 120
Sadvidya 61, 64, 66, 225, 230, 235, 259, 263, 365, 420 and Satkhyati 60, 84-85, treatment of Vedantic cosmology in : interpreted by V 250-252, by A 253-254, by SB 254-255 Sadyomukti: 488
Saguna Brahman : theory of in Taittirlya text refuted by A 96-98, 258, explained by R 102 ; contradiction in advaitic view regarding 230, 243 ; in Nimbarka 257 S'aiva Siddhanta : 560-561 Saivism : on avatara 157 salokya : 474, 482
S'akta vada : and the theories of upadhis 71 S'akti : 79
samanadhikaranya : 38-39, 71, 85, 97, 237, 247, 416, 597 ; appli- cation of to s'arira-sariri relation 228-231 samanvaya method of R : 83, 245 samatva ; 339
samavaya : Naiyayika theory of 65 samipya : 474, 482
Sarikalpa Suryodaya : 218, 527, 531-532 S'arikara : practical Advaita of 90-92, 599 ; the devotee and the
dialectician 91 ; Brahmavadin or Mayavadin, 357 and passim .
See also under Advaita Sarikhya: 175, 227, 245, 251, 414, 591-592; parinama vada of
102 ; purusa accg. to 287 ; ethics of 323-324 ; mukti accg.
to 476_
sanmatravadin : 66 « sannyasa : 325 s'aranagati : 386, 388 ; of Nammalvar 387; religion of, in the carama
sloka of the Gita 388-390 ; as parama hita 396 s'arira : meaning of and classification of different kinds in the Veda
237-238 ; accg. to Vedanta 238 ; faulty definitions considered
238-240 ; accg. to Vais'esika 238-239 ; accg. ito V 241 ;
350-351 s'arira-s'ariri : relation of 78, 80, 85, 88, 95, 224, 225, 241-242, 364,
420, 576, 577, 585 ; expressed in the antaryamividya 235-236 ;
theory of, reconciles apparently contradictory texts 242-244 ;
reconciles schools of abheda, bhedabheda and bheda 244-245 ;
provides the one universal satisfactory philosophy 246-249 ;
difference between s'arira and s'aririn 243 S'ariraka S'astra: 95, 234, 245, 355-357, 488, 577, 586 ; meaning of,
accg. to V 224, 597 sarupya : 189, 474, 482
INDEX 637
sarvam samanjasam ; explained in terms of s'arira-s'anri bhava
246-249, 597
sarvamukti : impossible accg. to Mayavada 99, 488 s'astra : (scripture) 16, 288
satkaryavada : 82, 102, 225, 227, 236, 247, 251, 255, 560, 591 satkhyati : 43 Sautrantikas : 178
sayujya: 189, 461, 474, 482, 490, 491, 499, 560, 568 Schelling : resemblance to Yadava 76 ; mysticism of 77 ; idea of
Beauty accg. to 198-199 Schopenhauer : 483
self: nature of, accg. to V 31-32, _84, 85, 87, 88, 95-96, 100-101, 104-105 ; in the state of samsara 105, relation of, to jnana 112-113, 136 ; relation of ; to the problems of evil and freedom 170 ; see also under atman and under jiva sensationalism : 8 s'esin, s'esa and s'esatva : 96, 183-185, 187, 188, 189, 220, 241,
298
Sikhism: 543, 561-562 sin : and redemption accg. to Christianity and Vaisnavism 404-407.
See also under daya, krpa and redemption Spencer, Herbert : 123 SphOtavada : criticised 266 Spinoza: 33, 34, 42, 80, 122,_249, 492, 593 and pantheism 77 ;
affinity of, with Indian Vedantic schools considered 71-72 S'ri : 190-193, 222, 386-387, 568, 588 role of, in redemption by love 166 ; relation to the Lord in Vaisnavite theology 166-168, as anapayini 387 : as purusakara 387,' 388 ; in PillailOkacarya's system 521-522 ; in Vedanta Des'ika's system 529 : Alavandar's Stotra on 513-514 S'rikantha : 560, 591 ; meaning of tattvamasi accg. to 595 ; S'aivite
version of V by 598 S'rikara: 591 S'ri vaisnavism : 179, paradox of, as an ethical religion 174. See
also under Vaisnavism
srsti : 104, 155 ; as self -differentiation of the absolute accg. to V 226, 251, 252, 259, 267 ; as lila of Brahman 204; accg. to Bh 255 ; and pralaya (cyclic process) 258 S'rutaprakas'ika : insistence on the unity of all Brahmavidyas
in 382
s'ruti : self-validity of 19
subjectivism : stages of, towards solipsism 350 sublation : Advaitic theory of 464-465 substance: accg. to Spinoza 71 Sufism : 543, 544, 569, 570
638 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
sfanyavada : 64, 92 ; theory of illusion accg. to 52
Sun Das : 544
svabhava vada : 3
svami-dasa relation : 186-187
svarupa aikya : 230, 243
svarupa samarpana in Stmaniksepa : 392, 393
svarupas'raya : 220
Tagore, Rabindranath : 571
tat kratu nyaya : 499
tattva (hita and purusartha) : 21, 22
Tenkalai school of Vaisnavism : 502, 520 ; prapatti accg, to 398-
403 1 as developed by Pillailokacarya 520-524 ; difference
from Vadakalai school 534-540, 581-582; also see Vadakalai
school, Vaisnavism ; PillailOkacarya
tattvamasi : different interpretations of by Vedantins 594-595 theism : western : considered and criticised 78-79, 162, 592 ; and
karma 175, 189 theology : difference of, from philosophy 1,2; reconciled with
ethics in jR's system 151 et seq. Thibaut: 513 Thomism : 406 time : theories of 497-498 Tirumangai Alvar : 378 Tiruppavai : mysticism of 455-456 Tiruvaimoli : 387, 416, 430, 446, 485 ; the spiritual experiences of
Nammalvar in 431-436 ; see also under Nammalvar Tukaram : 558, 559 Tulsidas : 544-545' truth : pramanas of 46, Vis'istadvaitic theories of 45 et seq. ', twofold
test of, accg. to V 46 ; criteria of, accg. to V 48-49, 50 ;
Advaitic theory of, criticised 45
ubhayalinga: 61, 62
Ubhaya Vedanta : Ch. XVII, 429, 502, 529 ; position of Tenkalai
school of VaisTjiavism
upadana karana : 534 Brahman as : 103 ; criticised by M 547 upadhis : 63, 79, 85, 86, 99, 132-134 ; criticised by V 70 : and passim upakOsala vidya : 419 Upanisads ; significance of 234-235 ; and Brahmoism 562-563 ; and
passim upasana : 67, 358, 362-365, sadhanas to 360 ; has its fruition in
bhakti 370 utilitarianism : social progress accg. to 342 ; a refined form of
egoism 346
INDEX 639
Vatfakalai School of Vaisnavism : 502, 520 ; on Prapatti ffastra 398-400, 535 ; difference from Tenkalai school on sadhyopaya and siddhopaya 401-403, 534-540, 581-582 ; regarding Ubhaya Vedanta 534 ; on the entry of the infinite into the finite 534-535 ; on daya 536 ; on krpa vs. karma 538-540, on hita 535 ; on Laksmi 535 ; on morality and prapanna 536 ; on Nammajvar as nitya samsarin 536-537 ; on purusartha 537 ; on vyaja 535
vaibhasikas : 178
Vaikuntha : 461, 473-474, 589. See also under Pararnapada
vairagyk (virakti) : 304, 307, 313-315, 339, 353, 377, 378, 589
Vais'esika : asatkaryavada of, repudiated 227, 257 ; Self accg. to 285, 287 ; mukti accg. to 476, 592
Vaisrjiavism : History of Ch. XX ; distinguished from V 501, 503 ; acaryas of, distinguished from the mystics 503 ; avatara, the cardinal principle of 503^504 ; contribution of alvars to 504-511, of Nathamuni 511, of Alavandar 511-514, of Ramanuja 514-
519, of Visr^ucitta 519 ; of Varadacarya (Nadadur Ammal) 519-
520, of Nanjiyar, Periyavaccan Pillai, Vadakku Tiruvldhi Pillai 520, of Pillailokacarya 520-524, of Manavala Mahamunigaj 524, 533-534, of Vedanta Des'ika 524-533 ; Schools of (Tenkalai and Vadakalai) 534-540 ; as theological institution 537-538 ; historical view of 538 ; claim to be a world religion 542-543 affinities with : Dvaita 550, with Vallabhacarya 552, with Krsna Caitanya 552-556, with Jayadeva 556-557, with Jnanes'vara 558, with Namdev, Eknath, Tukaram and Ramdas 558-560 ; Vaisnavism and other schools : Arya Samaj 564-565, Brahma Saniaj 564, 571 ; Christianity 567-568, 571 ; Islam 571, Mahatma Gandhi 566-567, 571, Ramakrsna 565-566, 571 ; S'aiva Siddhanta 560-561, Sufism 569-570 ;" ' Vira ' Vaisijavism 570 ; varieties of 570-572
Vais'vanaravidya : 421
Vallabhacarya: 163, 571, 591; Suddhadvaita theory of 550-551, 596: pusti bhakti theory of 551-552 ; religion of 552 ; affinity with V 552
Vasudeva : nature of 226
Veda : infallibility of 265 ; and creation 265-266 ; 504
vedana : meaning of 304-305
Vedanta: problem of 18; a dars'ana 18-19, 78, 79, 113, meta- physics of, outlined 93-94 ; creation accg. to 261-267 ; meaning of s'arira accg. to 238, idea of social progress accg. to 342-343 ; repudiation of sphotavada by 266 : accg. to dhyananiyogavada 130; and Purva Mimamsa 135-136; explained in terms of tattva, hita and purusartha 384 ; popularity of the three schools
640 THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
of 574 ; distinction between the three schools of 592-593, 596-597 ; and western thought 249, 592-594
Vedanta Des'ika : 57, 136, 166, 273, 375, 382, 409, 460, 472-474 496, 502, 512, 514,520,533,547; life and work of 524-533 ; and Dramidopanisad 432-433 ; on the relation of karma and krpa 538-539; Paramapada Sopana of 377-379 ; explanation of Prapatti Yoga by 384 ; theory of vyaja in prapatti 394, 402
Vedanta Sutras : 11, 61, 66, 83, 138 264, 266, 382, 412 ; Advaitic interpretations of, criticised 357-358 ; interpreted as a philoso- phy of religion by Kapistalam Des'ikacaryar 413 et seq. See also under Brahma Sutras, and passim
Vedantin : 600
Vedarta Sangraha : 244
Vedavadin : 125, 136
videha mukti ; 464
vidheyatva : of Brahman 220
vijnanavadin : theory of illusion accg. to 52
virakti : see vairagya
viruddha vibhuti : of Brahman as mayin 211
visaya kama: 204, 213; turned into Bhaga vat kama in aesthetic religion 212
Vis'esadvaita of S'ripati ; 560-561
vis'esya-vis'esana : relation between Brahman, matter and self 231-232"
vis'istaikya : 78, 230
Vis'istadvaita : aim of, as a philosophy of religion 19-20, 83 ; not to be identified with western pantheism 77 ; not theistic 78 ; sadhana saptaka accg. to 359-362 ; theory of knowledge accg. to Ch. II, 574-576 ; nature of perceptive judgment accg. to 23-27, differ- ence from western theories 24 ; theory of dharmabhutajnana accg. to 27 et seq ; psychology accg. to : interpretation of avasthatraya in 292-295 ; on dreams 293-294 ; nature of jiva accg. to Ch. XI, 578-579 ; cosmology accg. to parinamavada of 102-104 ; ontology accg. to : ontological realism of : nature of Brahman, Is'vara and creation accg. to 226-227, 495, 577-578 ; Brahman accg. to 113-118, 576-578, as adhara 93-121, as niyanta 122-149, as ruler and redeemer 1,50-180, as stesi 181-194, as the Beautiful 195-219, as the s'aririn 220-249, as anantam 120-121, as antaryamin 138-139, as prakarin 232-234, as vis'esya 231-232; nature of Brahmananda 491-492 ; nature of atman and relation to Brahman accg. to 140-141 ; s'arlra- s'ariri bhava between atman and Brahman accg. to Ch. IX ; meaning of tattvamasi accg. to 595 ; ethics accg. to : problem of evil in 172; problem of freedom in 146-149; relation be- tween karma and krpa accg. to 164-168 ; and loka sangraha
INDEX 641
347 ; religion accg. to : theory of avatara in 159-160 ; symmetry of triadic devotional process accg. to 380 ; dasatva in 489 ; immanence and transcendence reconciled in 186 ; Is'vara and LaksmI, relation between, accg. to 189-190 ; Is'vara as having apahatapapmatva accg. to 125 ; relation of atman and Para- matman accg. to 296-300, 578-579 ; doctrine of universal redemption accg. to 223; and Vaisnavism. See under Vai§navism; mysticism of : Ch. XVIII ; idea of beauty in 201 ; and Alankara Sastra 208 et. seq ; affinity with mysticism by equating the Abso- lute with God of Beauty and Bliss 213 ; meaning of anandamaya accg. to 215,219; relation to other systems : and A 590-591; and BB 589-591, and D 590 and^asszVw; and nisprapafici- karananiyOgavada 133, 135 ; interpretation of Purva Mimamsa accg. to 135 ; affirmation of the continuity of the two Mimamsas accg. to 135-136 ; and S'aiva Siddhanta 560-561 ; criticisms of : answered 583-590, (1) re : pramanas of PaScaratra and Prabandha 584-585, (2) re : ontology of 585, (3) re : cosmology 585-586, (4) re : Brahman as s'aririn 586, (5) & (6) re : the theory of jivas 586-587, (7) re : ethics of 587-588, (8) re : the mysticism of 588-589, (9) re : the world of mukti (10) re : the philosophy of 589-590. General estimate of : as Ubhaya Vedanta 429 et seq. ; summary of central truths Ch. XXII ; idealism of 185-186 ; synthetic view of experience 220-221 ; synthetic view of Prasthanatraya 357-358 ; catholicity of 541 superiority of the metaphysics of 223-224, 495 ; sarvam samaSjasam expounded accg. to 248-249. Also see under relevant topics
vitalism : conflict with animism 5-6, 104 ; criticised by V 7-8
vivarta : 65, 102
viveka : in sadhana saptaka 360 ; and passim
vyaja : place of, in prapatti 394-395, 402
Ward, James : on feelings and emotions 290 warfare : ethics of 331, 343-344
Yadava : cosmology accg. to 256 ; theory of Brahman accg. to 258- 259, 514; meaning of tattvamasi accg. to 595; distinction from Nimbarka 70; criticised by V 70, criticism of two Brahman theory by 69 ; affinity of, with Bosanquet 75, with Schelling 76 ; relation to other Vedantic thinkers 596
YajSavalkya: 162, 235, 318
Yamunacarya : 386 ; see also under Alavandar
Yatlndramatadipika : 27
yath&rthakhyati : 43, 59-60
41
642
THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA
yOga : 245 ; sadhanas of 341-342 ; eight stages of 363 yOgacaras : 178 yOgavasista : 63
Zoroastrianism ; the problem of evil in 169
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED
B. G. Br. Up.
Ch. Up. Ch. Upan Kath. Up. Kausl. Up. Mund. Up. Pr. Up. S. S.
S. B. S. B. E. Sv. Up. -I Svet. Up. J Taitt. Up. Taitt. Tiru. V. P. V. S. Ve. Su. Y. M. D. Y. D,
Bhagavad Glta Brhadara$yakopanisad
Chandogya Upanisad
Kathopanisad Kausitaki Upanisad Mundakopanisad Pras'nopanisad S'arlraka Sutras
S'rl Bhasya
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S'vetas'vatara Upanisad
Taittiriyopanisad
Tiruvaimoli Visnu Purana
Vedanta Sutras YatlndramatadlpikS
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Part 4, Some Practical Applications ... 24
1939
22. RGVEDAVYAKHYA, MADHAVAKRTA— Edited by Prof. C, Kunhan
Raja, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon.) Vol. I. ... 6 0
1940
23. THE NUMBER OF RASAS. By V. Raghavan, M.A., Ph. D.,
Department of Samskft, University of Madras, with a Foreword by Prof. M. Hiriyanna, M. A., formerly Professor of Sainskft Maharajah's College, Mysore ... 3 0
1941
24. SAMANYA VEDANTA UP AN ISADS— Translated into English by
T. R. Srinivasa Aiyangar, B.A., L.T., and Pandit S. Subrah- manya Sastri, F.T.S. ... 5 0
25. BHAGAVADGITARTHAPRAKAS'IKA of Upanisad Brahmayogin (Sams-
kr.t). Edited by the Pandits of the Adyar Library with an Introduction by Prof. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D.Phil. (Oxon.)
... 4 0
26. SAMAVEDA-SA^HITA — With the Commentaries of Madhava and
Bharatasvamin. Edited by Prof. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon.) ... 6 0
27. RAJA DHARMA (Dewan Bahadur K. Krishnaswami Rao Lectures,
1938, University of Madras) by Rao Bahadur K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, M.A. ... 3 8
28. VARIVASYARAHASYAM of Bhasuranandanatha (2nd Edition) by
Pandit S. Subrahmanya Sastri, F.T.S. (with English Translation)
... 2 8
29. VYAVAHARANIRNAYA OF VARADARAJA — Edited by Rao Bahadur
K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, M.A., and A. N. Krishna .
Aiyangar, M.A., L.T., Adyar Library with a FOREWORD by
Sir P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyer, K. C.S.I., C.I.E., LL.D. ... 15 0
30. SAVGITARATNAKARA — With the Commentaries of Catura Kal-
linatha and Simhabhupala. Edited by Pandit S. Subrahmanya Sastri, F.T.S. Vol. I. (Adhyaya 1) ... 9 o
* Published under the auspices of the Adyar Library Association.
Rs. A, 1942
31. CATALOGUE OF THE ADYAR LIBRARY, Western Section part 1—
prepared under the direction of Bhikshu Arya Asanga, Jt. Direc- tor and Curator, Western Section, Adyar Library 5 0
32. ALAMBANAPARiKSA AND VRTTi by Dinnaga with English transla-
tion, Tibetan text etc by PandUt N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Tirupati 3 8
33. SOME CONCEPTS OF ALANKARA S'ASTRA by V. Raghavan, M.A.,
Ph. D., University of Madras ... 40
34. VEDANTAPARIBHASA— with English translation and Notes by
Prof. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, M.A., B.Sc. (Oxon.), Bar-at- Law, Reader, Head of the Department of Philosophy, Uni- versity of Madras. ... 2 12
35. A DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGUE of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the
Adyar Library by K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, M.O.L., under the direction of Prof. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon.) Vol. I— Vedic ... 15 0
36. S'R! PANCARATRA RAKSA of S'ri VedSnta Des'ika— Edited by
Vaidyaratna Pandit M. Duraiswami Aiyangar and VedSnta S'iromani T. Venugopalacharya ; with an Introduction in English by G. Srinivasa Murti, Hon. Director, Adyar Library. 4 8
37. CATALOGUE OF THE ADYAR LIBRARY, Western Section, part 2,
prepared under the. direction of Bhikshu Arya Asanga, Jt. Director and Curator, Western Section. ... 60
38. CATURDAS'ALAKSANI OF GADADHARA with three commentaries-
Edited by Pandit N. Santanam Aiyar. Vol. I. 4 g
39. PHILOSOPHY OF VIS'ISTADVAITA by Prof. P.N. Srinivasachari,
M.A., Retired principal, Pachaiyappa's College, Madras. ... 10 0
40. VADAVALI OF JAYATIRTHA with English translation and Notes by
P. Nagaraja Rao, M.A. Sir Sayaji Rao, Fellow, Benares Hindu University ... 4 o
PAMPHLETS 1939
A VARIANT VERSION OF THE EK£GNIKANDA. (Reprinted from the Adyar Library Bulletin, October, 1939). Edited by K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, M.O.L. ... 03
1940
THE RAJAMIJGANKA OF BHOJA. (Reprinted from the Adyar Library Bulletin, October, 1940). Edited by K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, M.O.L. ... 0 4
Rs. A. 1942
THE SAT PANCAS'IKA, a Silpas'astra manual. (Reprinted from the Adyar Library Bulletin, February 1942). Edited by K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, M.O.L. ... 0 5
THE PRAMA^AMANJAR! OF SARVADEVA. (Reprinted from the Adyar Library Bulletin, May, 1942). Edited by K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, M.O.L. ... 0 6
THE PATH OF GREATNESS. (Reprinted from the Adyar Library Bulletin, December, 1942), by Dr. G. S. Arundale, M.A., D.Lit. 0 6
1943
of Trayambaka Mis'ra. Edited H. G. Narahari, M.A. (Reprinted from the Adyar Library Bulletin, May 1943).
IN THE PRESS
1. As'VALAYANAGRHYA-SOTRA— With Devasvami Bhasya— -Edited by Swami
Ravi Tirtha.
2. AS'VALAYANAGRHYA-SOTRA (Bhasya of Devasvami). Translated into
English by A. N. Krishna Aiyangar, M.A., L.T., Adyar Library.
3. JIVANANDANAM OF ANANDARAYAMAKHi with a Commentary by Vaidya-
ratna Pandit M. Duraiswami Aiyangar. Edited by VaidyaratnaG. Srini- vasa Murti, B.A., B.L., M. B. & C.M. and Vaidyaratna Pandit M. Duraiswami Aiyangar.
4. VAISNAVA UPAN ISADS — Translated into English by T. R. Srinivasa
Aiyangar, B.A., L.T. and Dr. G. Srinivasa Murti, Hon. Director, Adyar Library.
5. USANIRUDDHO of Rama Panivada. Edited by Pandit S. Subrahmanya
Sastri, F.T.S. and Prof. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon.)
6. NYAYAKUSUMA&JALI of Udayanacarya — Translated into English by Swami
Ravi Tirtha.
7. THE APASTAMBASMRTI — Edited by A. N. Krishna Aiyangar, M.A., L.T.,
Adyar Library.
8. THE ACYUTARAYABHYUDAYAM of Rsjanatha Di$dima — Sargas 7 to 12—
63? A. N. Krishna Aiyangar, M.A., L.T., Adyar Library.
9. GAUTAMASMRTI — Edited by A. N. Krishna Aiyangar, M.A., L.T., Adyar
Library,
10. KALADARS'A OF ADITYA BHATTA— Edited by Rao Bahadur K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, M.A., and A. N. Krishna Aiyangar, M.A., L.T.f Adyar Library,
11. PAKSATA OF GADADHARA— with four commentaries by Pap<Jit N.
Santanam Aiyar.
12. HORAS'ASTRA— with the commentary Apurvarthapradars'ika by A. N.
Srinivasaraghava Aiyangar, M.A., L.T.
13. ViStfUSMirn — With the Kes'ava Vaijayanti of Nanda Pandita. Edited
by Rao Bahadur K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, M.A., and A. N, Krishna Aiyangar, M.A., L.T., Adyar Library.
14. CATURDAS'ALAKSANI OF GADADHARA with three commentaries. Vol. II
and III. by Pandit N. Santanam Aiyar,
15. SAtyGiTARATNAKARA— With the Commentaries of Catura Kallinatha and
Siiphabhupala. Edited by Pandit S Subrahmanya Sastri, RT.S. Vol II. (Adhyayas 2, 3 and 4).
16. UNMATTARAGHAVA OF VIRUPAKSA— Edited by Pandit V. Krishnama-
charya, and A. N, Krishna Aiyangar M.A., L,T. Adyar Library.
17. S'ALISTAMBHASOTRA — Restored from Tibetan and Chinese Sources — by
Pandit N. Aiyaswami Sastri.
WORKS UNDER PREPARATION
1. AVAYAVA OF GADADHARA— with commentaries by Pantjit N. San-
tanam Aiyar.
2. V^TTARATNAVALI— with commentary, English Translation and Notes by
H. G. Narahari, M.A., Adyar Library.
3. SiDDHANTALAKSAisfAM OF GADADHARA with commentaries. Edited by
Pandit N. Santanam Aiyar.
4. SAMANYANIRUKTI OF GADADHARA with commentrries. Edited by Pandit
N, Santanam Aiyar.
5. VYUTPATTIVADA OF GADADHARA with commentaries. Edited by Pantjit
N. Santanam Aiyar.
Agents for our publications :
THE THEOSOPHICAL PUBLISHING HOUSE Adyar, Madras, S. India