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
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ON THE BASIS OF ITS HISTORY

BY

DR. OTTO PFLEIDERER

PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN

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PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
ON THE BASIS OF ITS HISTORY

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
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THIS volume completes the historical part of Dr. Pfeiderer's *Philosophy of Religion*, and the two volumes now in the hands of the English reader may be regarded as a complete work, in which the impressive story of European religious thought from Spinoza downwards is comprehensively set forth by a master hand. The author has very kindly furnished for this translation a discussion of the position of Mr. Matthew Arnold; this will be found in the chapter on Neo-Kantian thought, which deals with religious views similar to those of Mr. Arnold, which have been advanced in recent times in other countries of Europe. Part of the section on Biedermann in the chapter on Post-Hegelian thought is also new, and a paragraph on Mr. Henry Drummond has been added for the present volume.

A. M.



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SECTION III.

(continued.)

THE SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

CHAPTER III.

FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH SCHELLING.¹

THAT the world is a phenomenon of mind, is the fundamental thought of modern philosophy from Kant downwards; and that philosophy is accordingly in its essence idealism. With Kant this phenomenon has its basis both in the knowing mind and in the "thing in itself"; and since these are to his view two heterogeneous causes without inner relation to each other, it is impossible to determine how much of the phenomenon belongs to the knowing subject, how much to the thing, the object of knowledge. It is not an accurate expression of the nature of either the one or the other; and so it is, and remains, an appearance which oscillates indefinitely and without possibility of definition between subjectivity and objectivity, and the truth of which never ceases to be problematical. With *Fichte* the phenomenon has its basis in the knowing mind alone; it is the product of the imagination of that mind, the self-set limit of its freedom, the material, made sensible, of its duties; in fact, it is the reflection of the subjective mind, in which its nature is correctly mirrored; in this, in this alone, lies the truth of it; the world

¹ ROSENKRANTZ, *Schelling-Vorlesungen vom Sommer*, 42. HUBERT BECKER'S *Abhandlung über die negative und positive Philosophie Schelling's, und über die Bedeutung der Schelling'schen Metaphysik* (1861). CONSTANTIN FRANTZ, *Schelling's positive Philosophie*. Cöthen, 1880. OTTO PFLEIDERER, *Gedächtnissrede zu Schelling's Jubiläum*. Stuttgart, 1875.

which appears to the mind has no separate reality at all. *Schelling*, on the contrary, will have the world regarded as the real phenomenon of mind, which possesses truth in itself separately, apart from the knowing mind and before its knowledge; but a truth which is not like Kant's "thing in itself," foreign and inaccessible to the knowing mind, but of the same nature, and hence accessible and manifest to its knowledge, so that the mind in making the world the object of its knowledge, finds itself in it, and recognises in the phenomenon of the world both its own nature and that of the world, both in the same objective truth, because in essential unity, the only difference being in the form in which that one truth is realised and set forth. Thus idealism is here both completed and supplemented; not supplemented by tacking on to it, in a lame external way, a realistic appendix, but by being shown to be when completed at once and immediately one with realism. Mind is invisible nature, Nature is mind made visible; mind is the inner side of all that is outward, the real working principle in all that is actual, as all that is outward is but its representation of itself, all that is actual the form and means of its self-realisation.

2 of text ✓: From this point of view there arose new tasks for philosophy; the attempt had to be made to recognise in nature the unconscious shaping of mind, striving after consciousness and freedom through the various stages of organisation; and on the other hand, to trace in the historical life of mind the process by which it extricates itself from its original entanglement in nature, and comes to itself; and then, further, how it again makes good its breach with nature, and restores its original unity with her in a higher form as its own free product. Thus we have the three principal parts of philosophy—the philosophy of Nature, of History, and of Art and Religion. These are treated connectedly in the *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), which is the most complete of Schelling's writings. In this work the subject of religion is only briefly touched upon at the close of the *History of Philosophy*; but the suggestions thrown out are interesting both in themselves and as the germs of thought put forward at a later period, and we shall do well to notice them.

Schelling's mind is already busy with the problem of liberty in its relation to the necessity, the law, and the purpose of the world-order; to this problem he is already seeking a solution drawn from ultimate metaphysical principles. "That the entirely lawless play of freedom, which every free being is playing for itself, as if no other being existed by its side, should yet issue in a result which is reasonable and connected—and that this is so, I am obliged to take for granted in every act I do—is a thing quite incomprehensible if it be not the case that the objective is in all acting something common, by which all the acts of men are guided to one harmonious end, so that, however they indulge their own caprices, they yet bring about, without and against their will, by a necessity which is hidden from their eyes, a development of the drama which they themselves were far from intending. This necessity can only be thought by an absolute synthesis of all the acts by which the whole of history unrolls itself, a synthesis in which all is estimated and calculated beforehand in such a way that, however contradictory and disharmonious it may appear, it yet has and finds in it its basis of unity." Such a synthesis or pre-established harmony of the subjective and the objective, the conscious and the unconscious, the free and the necessary, must have its ground in a Higher, which transcends both, which can be neither of the two, but only the absolute identity of both. The "Eternal Unconscious" is, on the one hand, the invisible root of all intelligences and the ground of the law-observance they exhibit in the midst of their freedom; but itself cannot be denoted by any predicates taken from the world of intelligence and freedom, since it is the absolutely Simple, which for that reason can never be an object of knowledge, but only of presupposition in action, *i.e.* of faith.

This absolute, which forms the necessary presupposition of the order found in history, does not become outwardly visible at any single part of history, but it manifests itself continuously throughout all history. "God never *is*, if being be that which manifests itself in the objective world; if he *were* we would not be; but he manifests himself continually. Man carries on throughout his history a continuous proof of the existence of God; but the proof can only be

completed by the whole of history. If we think of history as a play in which every one performs his part without constraint, the rational development of this intricate play presupposes the unity of the mind that is creative in them all; but the freedom of our acting obliges us to think that the poet is not independent of us, so that we should have merely to carry out what he has conceived; but that he only discovers himself step by step by the play of our freedom, so that we are collaborators of the whole, and self-inventors each of his own part. Thus the last ground of harmony between freedom and the objective (what is under law) can never become perfectly objective if the appearance of freedom is to continue." It is easy to discern in these sentences the germs of the later theogonic speculations of Schelling. The continuous becoming manifest of God in human history is even here called his "becoming objective," and confounded with a real becoming of God.

In the historical manifestation of the absolute we have to distinguish, according to Schelling, three periods. Those he characterises in a very curious way. The *first* is ruled by blind fate, to which the noblest humanity that ever blossomed, such as will never come again, tragically falls a victim. In the *second* the law of Nature rules, and manifesting itself in the Roman thirst for conquest, brings into existence a universal state, all occurrences in which, including the fall of the Roman world-state, are to be regarded purely as natural events. The *third* period will be that in which what appeared in the earlier ones as fate, and as nature, reveals itself as Providence. When this period will begin we cannot say, but when it is there, God too will *be*. Here it is hard to understand, in the first place, how Schelling could have conceived a period of the "noblest humanity" to have existed under the rule of blind fate. Still harder is it to see why he only expects the period of providence from the future, instead of regarding it as come in Christianity; he himself says that when reflection lifts itself up to the absolute as the common basis of the unity of both freedom and necessity, the system of Providence, *i.e.* religion in the only true sense of the word, came into existence; and we should imagine that

he found this in Christianity, especially as, if this were not so, his scheme of history would omit the whole Christian period altogether. At a later time he changed his position in this respect. But the over-estimate of *mythology*, which is here apparent, remained with him: he regards it as the poetical form of religion. Art also he over-valued; it appears simply to take the place of religion with him, as when he says, "Art is to the philosopher the highest, since it opens to him, as it were, the Holy of Holies, where he sees burning, as it were in one flame, in the eternal and original unity, things which in nature and history are severed from each other, and in life and action, as well as in thought, must remain eternally asunder." Hence, Schelling says in conclusion, it may be expected that philosophy and all the sciences, as they were the children and nurslings of poetry in the childhood of the race, will at the completion of the race flow back again as so many streams to the universal ocean of poetry, and that this return of science to poetry will be accomplished by the aid of mythology. This flowing together of science and poetry, philosophy and mythology, proved fatal to Schelling himself; his fancy was occupied from the first with the views and fancies of Romanticism, and these acted with increasing force, as time went on, on his philosophy. Schleiermacher, on the contrary, though starting from the same point possessed an acuter critical insight which emancipated him more and more from these influences.

Schelling found occasion to speak more at length on religion and Christianity in his work on *The Method of Academical Study* (1803), a sort of philosophical encyclopædia. Here also it is curious to notice the point at which, in the eighth lecture, religion is taken up. He takes it up, not in connection with the subjective mental life, but in connection with the philosophy of the history of the world, in which Christianity is regarded as an important stage of the development of the world-spirit. In the classic world, it is represented, mind was still at one with nature. The antithesis of the infinite and the finite was still at rest. But the modern world began with a "universal Fall," a breach of man with nature. The

mind becoming aware of its difference from nature, the golden age of innocence departed, and naturalness now appears as sin and guilt. But this painful consciousness of division is itself only the necessary means to a higher unity. As the immediate unity of the nature-life of mankind is followed by the epoch of division, unblestness and guilt, so this in its turn is followed by the third and highest epoch, that of reconciliation, in which the conflict of freedom and law, spirit and nature, passes into a unity in the belief in Providence. This period begins with Christianity, the central idea of which is, therefore, God made man, Christ as the summit and the end of the world of the old gods, and the beginning of a new time, the ruling principle of which is the Infinite in the Finite. The Christian view of the world is expressed in the doctrine of the Trinity, the meaning of which is that "the eternal Son, born of the essence of the Father of all things, is the finite itself, as it is in the eternal view of God; it appears as a suffering God, subject to the catastrophes of time, who at the culminating point of his appearance, in Christ, closes the world of the finite, and opens that of the Infinite or the period of the rule of the Spirit." The Incarnation of God, accordingly, is not to be regarded empirically as a single event in time; taken in that way it is meaningless, as God is entirely outside of time; it is an incarnation from eternity which, it is true, reaches its highest point in Christ, and at that point begins fully to realise itself, but which by no means prevents us from understanding the genesis of Christianity as a historical event and the personality of Jesus as a historical phenomenon. Just because the idea of Christianity is an eternal and necessary one, positive Christianity is not absolutely opposed to what is pre-Christian or extra-Christian, the boundary between the two is not a fixed but a fluctuating one. Thus in the Greek world Plato was a prophecy of Christianity, and thus the Indian belief in the incarnation of the deity is an analogous expression of the same universal idea.

To understand this idea of Christianity something more is wanted than an empirical historical knowledge of its sources and of its first appearance. "The earliest historical and doctrinal books of

Christianity are themselves no more than one special manifestation of it, and an incomplete manifestation too; the idea of Christianity is not to be sought in these books, the value of which is to be estimated according to the degree in which they provide an adequate expression for that idea. Even in the mind of the converter of the Gentiles, Paul, Christianity had come to be a different thing from what it was in the mind of its first founder. We must not stop short at any particular epoch, for any such epoch must be arbitrarily selected; we must have before our eyes the whole history of Christianity and the world it has created. Among the operations of the modern Illumination, which, to judge from its dealings with Christianity, should rather be called the Delumination, is the proposal to reduce Christianity to its original sense, its first simplicity, in which form it is also called Primitive Christianity. One might imagine that the Christian writers would be very much obliged to later times for drawing out of the scanty contents of the first books of the religion so large a quantity of speculative matter, and elaborating it into a system. One cannot help thinking how greatly the so-called books of the Bible must have stood in the way of Christianity; the really religious matter they contain cannot be compared with that of many books of early and of modern times, especially the religious books of India. The prohibition of the Bible by the Catholics may have a reason which does not lie on the surface, viz., that Christianity, as a living religion, continues not as a Past but as an eternal Present. Miracles also have not ceased in the Church, though Protestants, here also inconsistent, relegate them to past ages. These books are monuments necessary to history but not to faith; and it is they which have ever and again set up empirical Christianity in the place of the idea. The idea is independent of the books, and is set forth by the whole history of the modern world compared with the old, where it still lies undeveloped." These audacious paradoxes are, if not excused, yet palliated and explained by the catholicising tendencies of the Romanticist circle in which Schelling at that time moved: and they remind us of the erratic views of Novalis (vol. i. p. 268) on Catholicism

and Protestantism. It cannot be denied that the recurrence of such views is a symptom of the deep-seated defect of this whole school, viz., that in attending to the æsthetic and intellectual side of religion, it entirely, or almost entirely, overlooks the moral side.

Schelling condemns with equal decision the supernaturalism and the rationalism of the theology which prevailed in his day. The former seeks to found the belief in the divinity of Christianity on arguments drawn from historical facts, and proves the miracle of the resurrection by other miracles, in a very obvious logical circle, and thus gives up the game to the naturalists, since the divine cannot, from its very nature, be empirically cognisable or demonstrable. Equally lamentable are the efforts of rationalism to get rid of as many miracles as possible out of the Bible by means of philological and psychological tricks, instead of seeing that these narratives are Jewish fables, framed on the suggestions of the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament. He thus seeks to substitute the mythical view of miracles for the rationalistic one, as Strauss did later. Connected with this is the favourite watering-down method, which imports into the sources the commonplace notions of the indolent common understanding, the notions of modern morality and religion. Morality, Schelling is of opinion, is not specially distinctive of Christianity, which would never have lived in the world by a few moral maxims such as that of the love of one's neighbour, etc.

The great obstacle to a sound science of theology Schelling considers to be the mixing up of historical questions respecting the sources and the beginnings of Christianity with the dogmatic or speculative question as to the essence of Christianity—the idea of it, the eternal truth of it. “Whether these books be genuine or spurious—whether the narratives they contain be actual undistorted facts, whether the contents of them be suitable to the idea of Christianity or not—cannot affect the question of the reality of the idea of it, which is not dependent on such particulars, but universal and absolute. But that Christianity was viewed as a mere phenomenon in time, the discussion of it would have been made quite free long ago; we should have advanced much further than we have towards a

proper historical appreciation of the sources which are so important for its early period, and should not have invented so many round-about and labyrinthine ways in a matter itself so simple." Instead of mixing up with each other idea and history, to the confusion of both, Schelling asks for a union of the speculative and the historical construction of Christianity which would do justice to both elements—the history and the idea of it. He looks, moreover, for the future progress of religion, just as Fichte and Kant, Herder and Lessing had done, to the gradual decay of the "exoteric," *i.e.* the statutory ecclesiastical forms of Christianity, and the liberation of the "esoteric," "the eternal idea itself," from its former wrappings, so that it shall appear in its own clearness. That this ideal kernel would create new forms for itself out of the spirit of the time, might be seen even from the existing relations of poetry and philosophy to religion. "The former postulates religion as the first, indeed the one condition which makes the poetic synthesis possible; the latter has attained once more in the truly speculative standpoint the standpoint of religion, has got rid of empiricism, and of naturalism, which is allied to it, not only partially but wholly, and prepared for the new birth of esoteric Christianity and the proclamation of the absolute gospel."

This first philosophy of religion of Schelling might be said to be his only one; his later writings can scarcely be said to contain a "Philosophy of Religion" in our sense, *i.e.* a science of the nature and development of the human consciousness of God; what they contain are rather theosophical constructions of the development of God himself. We find him on this track even in his work on *Philosophy and Religion* (1804), in which the genesis of the finite world out of God is explained by a falling away of the ideas or souls (platonically) which finds in the history of mankind first its complete expression and then its negation in the return of the souls which in the first period became estranged from God, whereupon the world of sense resolves itself into the world of spirits. In the chiaroscuro of this poetico-philosophical picture-language one luminous thought appears in the fine description of higher morality or religion (the two are essentially identified with each other): "In unity with the Infinite,

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the soul raises itself above that necessity which is antagonistic to freedom to that which is itself absolute freedom, and in which the real also, which here in the course of nature appears independent of freedom, is brought into harmony with it." With the opposition of freedom and necessity that of virtue and happiness is also got rid of: "Blessedness is no longer an accident of virtue, but virtue itself." In unity with its absolute law, our will is at once free and blessed, like God, just because it is the complete unity of freedom and necessity, at once a blessed will and a holy.

But how can this opposition of the finite proceed out of the perfect unity of God, if it is not supposed to exist in God first in some way as a potency? Schelling's thinking turned from this period mainly on this question. The attempt to solve it led to a fundamental *transformation of his earlier philosophy of identity into a theosophical system*, having resemblance chiefly to those of Jacob Böhme and Baader. In one respect it undeniably shows a great advance in Schelling's speculation; instead of the abstract identity which had formerly been taken for granted in the world, there now appears the unity containing in itself the difference (concrete) and the spiritual livingness of the world-ground, in which the idealism of Spinoza was to be combined with the idealism of Fichte—the "substance" with the "Ego." This step was in the same direction as that taken by *Hegel* in leaving behind him the philosophy of identity, when in his *Phænomenology* he said it was necessary that the substance should become subject. But while Hegel found the reconciling Higher in the notion of Spirit, which posits in itself both the difference and the unity, Schelling makes the difference be given in God independently of his own free activity, and thus an unspiritual nature is attributed to God antecedently to his being spirit, the dualism is carried back from the world into God, and the divine being thus drawn down into the finite genetic process of the world, which is simply the root idea of all mythology. This turn in Schelling is not to be explained from accidental external influences; on the contrary, there were reasons for it in his mental idiosyncrasy, and in his past life: in his mental idiosyncrasy, because his thought was less in strictly

defined notions than in pictures of fancy and imagination, so that he had by nature a strong temptation to mythological construction; and in his past life, inasmuch as natural philosophy was still haunting him now that he had turned his speculation to the Deity. His speculations about nature in God, and at a later period about the potencies in God, were nothing but the reflection of his earlier natural philosophy in his later theosophy. Let us look for a little at the earlier form of the theosophical system as it was first set forth by Schelling in his work, *Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom* (1809).

The divine being as a pure unity or indifference of all opposites is not yet God's real being, but only the primal ground or "Un-ground" of it. It separates itself in the opposition of nature and intelligence, which together make up the real life of God. And in God, as in us, nature precedes intelligence as the ground of it, the basis of its being made real, which must be presupposed not only in logic but in fact. Without this no personality could be conceived in God any more than in us, for personality consists in the union of one standing of himself with a ground which is independent of him. The becoming of finite things also requires such a nature in God, since as becoming they can only have their ground in that which being in God himself is not himself. Further, this nature of God is yet without understanding and will, mere dim impulse, blindly working power. From this un-understanding will of the ground is to be explained that irreducible remainder, which cannot be resolved into understanding, the incomprehensible basis of reality, the unregulated which underlies all the order of the world, as the chaos which is never quite overcome. But out of the longing of this ground there is produced a reflex idea of itself, the word of longing; understanding in God. With the longing he becomes freely-creating almighty Will, and carries on a plastic arranging work in the element of unregulated nature, separating the powers and binding them together, and unfolding the closed light-germs. But in this creative work the will of the ground is constantly reacting, and only yields to reason step by step, and so the rise of nature to spirit can only take place by degrees in the various stages of the natural world, till in

man the light of consciousness breaks in. All beings have, so far as they proceed from the dark ground of God, self-will cleaving to them ; so far as they proceed from the understanding of God they have the universal will. In man both rise to their highest power, but at the same time their original unity is dissolved, self-will works on its own account, and contrary to the universal will, and so evil arises. The potency of it lies even in the divine ground, which raises up the self as an independent ground of good ; but it only comes to reality by man's own act by which he tears himself away from the universal will. In this timeless act of self-determination, by which man from the very beginning determines his character in time, even down to his bodily constitution, consists absolute freedom, which by no means precludes empirical necessity at every moment, but rather becomes apparent in that necessity.

To reconcile the conflict of the two principles is the contents and the aim of history. At the beginning the two lie in humanity unseparated ; that is the golden age of innocence, *i.e.* of unconscious naturalness. Then the will of the ground bears rule, in that period at which man regards nature as the highest, the divine—that is the age of heathen mythology, art, and science, and lastly, of the Roman Empire. During this time the light of revelation is also striving, and it calls forth the resistance of the dark powers originating in the ground. Then when light appears in a personal form as mediator to restore the connection of the creation with God, the struggle between the divine kingdom and the dæmonic reaches its highest point. In this struggle the sensuous magnificence of the old world falls to naught, and on the platform of the new world God reveals himself as the victorious spirit of good. The goal of history is the complete raising up of the dark ground into the light of the spirit, or the atonement of the particular will and the universal will in love, which is not merely indifference, but the higher unity of the opposites, in which, and in which alone, God will actually come to be all in all.

The position here taken up by Schelling was assailed by two philosophical religious writers, and their attacks led Schelling to attempt a more detailed demonstration. The first attack proceeded

from the orthodox theosophist *Eschenmeyer*, the second from Jacobi, who though, by his own confession, half a heathen, yet felt himself called to carry on a search in every quarter for Spinozism, Pantheism, Atheism (which, in his view, were all the same), and to denounce to the public all suspected of such views. A similar phenomenon may be observed in our day in the case of the Fries'ian rationalists; and this is probably one of the specific peculiarities of these philosophers of sentiment, and may be explained from their subjective position which hovers so helplessly between belief and unbelief, thinking and not thinking, by the same psychological law as that which explains the shouting and romping of children who are afraid of the dark. Hegel very fitly characterised these Jacobi alarms as "empty knocking and poking," in which he worked himself up into an infinity of absurdities, and his main resource was to vilify his opponent. Schelling compares the "hero of a reasonless belief" with a bush-ranger, who sallies forth from his faith-castle into the country, to see if any great and masterly philosopher is going that way, in order to fall in knightly fashion on, his train, but retreats at once after the exploit to "that place inaccessible to science," content with having once more for a time disturbed the quiet cultivation of science. In this controversy, however, general interest attaches only to Schelling's rejoinder to Jacobi's charge in his *Memorandum on the Work on Divine Things, etc.* (1812). "It is," he says, arguing against the whole philosophy of ignorance of Jacobi, "a matter of public concern, that that faith, which till now has been faith and nothing more, should be transformed into scientific knowledge. Man ought not to stand still, but should grow in perfectness of knowledge, till he becomes like his type. He who asserts that this object is unattainable, not only now or in the approaching times, but altogether and essentially, he takes away from all scientific labours their highest, their ultimate aim. Once let that object be removed by which alone the human mind is truly transported outside itself, and raised above itself, and the prophecy (of Lichtenberg) will be fulfilled, that science will know nothing but ghosts!" Jacobi having declared Theism and Naturalism to be opposite to each other, systems exclusive of each other, the one being

the system of faith and the other that of knowledge, Schelling pronounces this abstract separation of the two to be the great error of the cultivation of the age, which, in consequence, could only arrive at an unnatural God, and a Nature without God, and could not possibly explain Nature or reach any definite conception of the relation of God to Nature. And not only was the world an incomprehensible riddle to this abstract style of thinking, the very notion of God was confused by it; the intelligence, the consciousness, the personality of God came in such an exclusive and hollow theism to be perfectly unthinkable, and so this theism was itself the unfailing source of scientific atheism, which was in so far deserving of respect as it was, in fact, a defence of science. "As long as the God of modern theism is a colourless postulate, a mere essence which is really devoid of essence, such as we find in all the more recent systems, as long as there is no recognition of a real duality in God, and the affirmative, expansive impulse is not opposed by a limiting negative one, so long the denial of a personal God will be scientifically honest. All consciousness is concentration, collecting, drawing together, gathering up of self. This negative force, in which a being goes back to itself, is the true force of personality, that being the force of self, of the Ego. Until therefore our teacher (Jacobi) recognise such an impulse in God, or until he comprehends the absolute identity of the finite and the infinite, which is so great an offence to him in natural philosophy, to be present in God himself, he need not attempt to instruct others not to call God the infinite, he need not ask us to allow that he possesses even a *notion* of the personality of God, or to regard his discourses about it as any more than empty sound." These sentences undoubtedly contain a truth, which is independent of the peculiarities of Schelling's system, and permanently important: they contain a condemnation of that abstract theism which seeks to fix the infinite in a position of cold exclusiveness towards the finite, or to represent God as a simple unity outside of and apart from the world; they demand, and that in the true interests of theism itself, an advance from the abstract to the concrete idea of God, embracing the difference in the unity, as true speculation is bound to do.

The last phase of Schelling's philosophy of religion, the *Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation*, is based on the idea that only a concrete and living notion of God can enable us really to understand the historical fact of religion, and to recognise in it what it really is, namely, a revelation of God to man which actually develops itself in history.¹ This work was published posthumously (1856-58). Here he requires of a "complete philosophy of religion," that it should not confine its attention to the so-called religion of reason, *i.e.* to religion as arrived at by philosophical reflection, but should seek to comprehend religion in its historical reality, and trace the course of its development, which, beginning with the natural, blind, unfree religion of mythology, proceeds to the free and spiritual religion of revelation. A philosophy of religion which excluded or ignored that original enchainment and the subsequent emancipation, would be quite pointless and unhistorical. "Philosophical religion" could only be arrived at as the gradual product and result of these two historical stages; it is a *third* to these two—being the knowledge of the universal nature of religion, standing above the antithesis of the two in history, and thus transcending both abstract supranaturalism and unhistorical rationalism. He expressly declares, that is to say, that one aim of the work is "to make supernaturalism to a certain degree natural, since as traditionally expounded it cannot but appear unnatural, and must therefore incur the opposition of all upright and liberal minds; it is here to be exhibited in an indissoluble connection with the natural itself." Here he remarks very pertinently that such notions as supernatural and supramundane cannot be thought without their opposite. "There is no supramundane God who is not thought at the same time in relation to the world. The absolute severance of the supernatural from the natural produces simply the unnatural. Thus the philosophy formerly prevailing which could not remove the Godhead far enough from nature, and consequently thought it necessary to deny any divine element in nature, produced nothing but an

¹ Works, ii. sections 1-4. For what follows the reader is specially referred to vols. iii. and iv., the *Philosophie der Offenbarung*.

unnatural God and a godless nature." Equally remote from the truth with this abstract supernaturalism, he shows in a striking way, is that unhistorical rationalism which seeks to remove from religion, so far as this is possible, all historical contents, or at least regards the historical element of religion as simply the unessential accidental form and vesture of a doctrine which is the essential part of it. "The historical is not a mere accident of the doctrine; indeed, it is the doctrine itself. The doctrinal element, what might be left remaining after sifting out the historical, as, for example, the general doctrine of a personal God, such as we meet with in rational theology, or the morality of Christianity, would be nothing by itself—nothing characteristic of religion; the characteristic element which requires to be explained is just the historical. The principal content of Christianity is just Christ himself; not what he said, but what *he is* and did. Christianity is not, in the first place, a doctrine; it is a thing, something objective, and the doctrine can never be anything but the expression of this *thing*. In earlier times, it may have been the case that the knowledge and doctrine of Christianity were somewhat lost sight of; that the thing and its objective power were too prominent; but at a later period Christianity must be acknowledged to have suffered still more from the neglect and obscurity of the thing itself in overmuch insisting and disputing on its doctrine."

These principles, as set forth by Schelling in the opening of his *Philosophy of Revelation*, are undeniably of the greatest importance. The position from which he sets out, that religion is not merely a *thought* but an *experience*, a real relation to God brought about in human consciousness; the requirement he makes further that a complete philosophy of religion should go to work *genetically*, should trace the historical development of religion, and let the philosophical knowledge of religion arise as the result out of that development—his refusal to regard the ideal side of religion by itself, as an abstract theory, and his claim to have it regarded in its unity with history, in which it becomes a reality for consciousness, and the important part he assigns to the *will* in this process of realising the religious

relation ; and finally, his view that ideal factors are operative in the history of religion everywhere and from the first, so that the abstract naked antithesis of supernatural and natural has to be reduced to a mere relative difference, marking the stages of development of the spirit in its passage from unfreedom to freedom : all these I cannot but recognise to be principles possessing permanent truth and the widest application. In these principles Schelling, here as at the beginning of the century, the genial prophet of what the age called for, pointed out to the philosophy of religion the path which it would be necessary for it to pursue. Any question regarding them must be as to their proper application. But Schelling was far from indicating the application of them in the way they themselves required, or in a way scientifically satisfactory. Notwithstanding the loud demands he made for psychological and historical reality, he was too much entangled in an idealistic *a priori* style of thought, to be able to work out his principle as to the real genesis of religion in a thorough manner. He expressly admitted, indeed,¹ that his positive philosophy, as it certainly did not proceed from that which only exists in thought (for then it would fall back into negative or rational speculation), yet as certainly did not proceed from any existence found in experience, but from *simply transcendent being*. This romantic contempt for simple experience, where alone it might be thought that reality was to be found, makes Schelling's genetic construction turn out nothing but an ideal logical movement from one notion to another, quite after the manner of Hegel's dialectical development of notions. But as Schelling desires to give something more than a mere genesis of notions—feeling, as he does, that this will not lead him to reality—he converts the logical steps of the notion into realities of a higher power, dramatises their extra-temporal relations as temporal processes of a theogony and cosmogony, and clothes the abstractions of the dialectic of notions in the pseudo-real masks of a god-and-world dramatic process, *i.e. mythologises* them. Thus though he saw the defects of the Hegelian dialectic with great clearness, or rather because he saw that the

¹ *Works*, 2d Section, iii. 126 *seq.*

ideal genetic method must yield to a real-genetic one, he was unable to put away the pre-suppositions and modes of view of the idealistic construction of the world, and not only did not get beyond Hegel, but even fell below him into the elementary mythologico-gnostic form of religious thought. He desires to take account not only of notions but of realities, but as he will not look for reality in experience he makes up for himself out of notions a *higher reality* above the actual one, that is to say, he constructs a *world of shades at once sensuous and supersensuous*, and the plays of shadows he produces in it he gives out as the real processes of growth of the Deity and the world's history, so that he wanders still further from experience, as known to sober common sense, than Hegel, whose sober logic kept him safe, ever did. And this is why the controversies between the schools of Hegel and of Schelling, controversies waged with so much heat, had so little result in which reason could rejoice. Each side was right in the reproaches it hurled at the other. The Schellingians were right in their rejection of the empty formalism of the notional dialectic; the Hegelians were right in their ridicule of the mythological pseudo-realities of the "positive philosophy." The Schellingians were in so far the advanced party as they saw through the illusion of the notional dialectic, in which the Hegelians with a certain naïve innocence still persevered, but they even sank under the level of it, because they substituted for the categories which were devoid of reality, but no worse, a fantastic appearance of reality, still further removed from the truth.

In these preliminary critical observations I have set forth the general position taken up by Schelling in the latest phase of his religious thought; and my statement and estimate of the individual features of that position need not be long.

Considering that Schelling himself sets up the principle that the philosophical notion must be produced as a result by means of historical phenomena, we should expect him to set out from the consciousness of God in history, and then to ascend to the transcendental ground of that consciousness or the being of God. Instead of this he begins the Philosophy of Revelation, just as he had begun

the doctrine of freedom, with a construction of the divine being. The same three potencies which he there distinguished in God as indifferent primal ground, nature-ground, and understanding, here appear once more under the still more abstract designations, (a) that which can be (pure potency), (b) that which simply is (pure *actus*), as such also called that which must be, and finally, that which can either be or not be, or that which ought to be, which, as including the two former in itself, is completed spirit, spirit concluded in itself. A deduction of the absolute spirit follows, which though elaborate is far from clear, and this notion is then analysed after Hegel. It is that which in itself is (pure subject or pure centre without any externality), that which is *for* itself, and therefore also is outside itself (mere object, or mere excentric peripheral being); and finally, that which is *at* itself, spirit possessing itself, incapable of losing itself, in which subject and object are indissolubly united (the excentrically set centre, or the periphery set as centre). As such Schelling will also have it regarded as the *absolutely free* spirit, in the sense that it is free from itself, from its being as spirit, not bound to that being, but in an indifference to be thus or otherwise, in the unity of its momenta or in the separateness of them. Now originally the divine potencies pass immediately into each other in the pure stream of the divine life; they find themselves in a rotating movement, so that God in this pure immediateness is beyond his own grasp, not being able to fix and hold himself in his forms. From this "unblessedness" he escapes by raising his ability to be to actuality, so that the potencies come to be outside of each other or in antithetical tension to each other, and become cosmic, demiurgic, causes. The first becomes the substratum of the world-process or the *causa ex qua*, the second the *causa formalis* or *per quam*, and the third the *causa finalis* or *in quam*. Thus the originally intra-divine potencies of the absolute spirit become relative extra-divine potencies of the creature; but they are only relatively extra-divine, inasmuch as they are mutually exclusive of each other; they do not exclude God, who, on the contrary, remains the unity of the whole, and therefore has the freely-willed forms of his existence

in the mutually exclusive potencies. Hence also the world, the product of these potencies, is not a being, but a divinely set *phenomenon*.

Schelling further declares, with great emphasis, that we must conceive the creation as a perfectly free act of the will of God, to him fortuitous and beginning in time. It lay entirely with him, he says, either to keep to himself for ever the possibility of a being outside himself, or to let it issue freely forth, then to overcome in succession all that was undivine, and change it into the God-willed, God-conscious. But if even a man of nobler character has a natural desire to be known as he is, how much more may we suppose such a need to have existed in the supreme spirit, to set another from itself, by which he should be known. "It became the Deity, therefore, being, as Plato says, incapable of envy, not to remain for ever in that *actus purissimus*, which we might also call an eternal theogony, and which is a devourer to all outside itself, but to convert this *actus purissimus* into an intelligible, differentiated process, all the momenta of which should be deposited and indeed united in an ultimate consciousness brought back to unity." But if this *became* the Deity, if it felt the *need* to be known by another, if its former movement of rotation in itself amounted to *unblessedness*, from which it could only be relieved by the creation; then it certainly is difficult to see how Schelling can still call this a perfectly free act of will in which God willed an end which to himself was accidental! And certainly the representation that in the premundane eternity God found himself in the blessedness of a closed circular movement, and that the possibility (which seems to have dawned upon him all at once) of setting the potencies to contend with each other, and so obtaining relief from the rotating motion, and being set at liberty from the necessity of his all-devouring self—that this possibility was "exceedingly welcome" to him—what is all this but pure mythology? The interpretation of the three potencies by the three persons of the church's doctrine of the Trinity, and the more than bold exposition of dogmatic formulæ and passages of Scripture, we may pass by as mere *hors d'œuvre* without value for philosophy. Orthodoxy could

feel no great gratitude to our philosopher for his deduction of a triple divine personality which only began with the creation and was only to be fully realised at the conclusion of the world-process. The trinity arrived at is that of Montanism or Sabellianism rather than that of the church.

The creation, thus introduced by the separation of the divine potencies, came to rest for a time in man, who carried in himself the God-setting principle (the "seed of God," as Schelling, with the old gnostics, expresses himself). The unity restored in him, the equilibrium of the cosmogonic potencies, should indeed (yet in another respect it should not) have been rendered by the act of his will indissoluble, even for God indissoluble, so that God and the world might have rest. But as this firm unity was to be his own work, man was made aware (by prohibition) of the possibility that he could do the opposite, namely, step into God's place, and as a second creator again bring into a state of tension the potencies which had come to rest, and thereby conjure up again the need of a new theogonic process, this time going on in the consciousness of man. This possibility was open to man, and nothing could be more natural than that he should realise it; and, indeed, God himself presses unceasingly for this "revolution," because it enables him for the first time to get the whole of being away from himself, so that the world becomes free from him, and really exists outside him. At the same time, the emancipation of man thus brought about by his free act is a catastrophe which occasioned much evil, especially in nature. With the latter man had originally stood, according to Schelling, in a *magical* relation, inasmuch as he was destined to act on nature by his mere motionless inward will, and so to form a link between it and the creator. This is the original, the true relation between man and nature, and in the belief in magic it still survives. But when man, instead of connecting nature with God, tore it away from God to himself, the world was divested of its glory, and cut off from its true future, falling into self-ness and vanity; a universal egoism seized upon the life of nature and became its ruling principle; and so ruined nature turns first against man himself

marching without compassion over him and his works. Yet in profounder minds a sentiment is preserved of the original relation and of the capacity of nature for redemption—hence the search for the “philosopher’s stone”! But the outrage of the fall had consequences not only for the world, but in a certain sense even for the Deity. “That calamity, for which man is responsible, brought it about that the Son, anew deposed from his glory in this second revolution man had brought about, had to restore everything in a new process, or rather determined to bring back man, whom, though in truth the enemy of his glory he did not leave, in a second creation, to the eternal life for which he was originally destined.” With this, however, the second person of the Godhead comes out of the glory he had hitherto occupied as the “Son of God” within the Godhead, becomes an extra-divine personality, or the “Son of man,” to whom the Father now hands over all being, with a view to its restoration. Thus the whole history which follows, from the fall downwards, is the “period of the Son;” the history of the world is the history of his humiliation and exaltation. In the first epoch, throughout the age of heathenism, the Son is in a state of humiliation, of the deepest suffering, of passivity, having still to make himself lord of undivine being in the mind of God-estranged humanity; of this suffering of the Son in his lowliness, who is yet destined to be the ruler of the world, during the pre-Christian æon, even Isaiah spoke (chap. liii.). As soon, however, as the Son has regained freedom over being, the epoch of revelation in Christianity begins. The “positive philosophy,” accordingly, which treats first of the process, beginning with the fall, of the restoration to God of the world which had become extra-divine, falls into two sections, and is a “Philosophy of Mythology and of Revelation.”

The mythological process has for its end to restore the God-affirming principle, which is essentially innate in human consciousness but was displaced by the fall. This takes place in this way. Those same potencies which were operative in creation at an earlier time as cosmogonic powers, take possession one after another of the human consciousness, and set up in it a new theogonic process

which manifests itself in the various stages and forms of the mythological consciousness of God among the nations. The representations of mythology, accordingly, are not arbitrary or fortuitous products of human consciousness; they are neither fictions, nor inventions nor speculations; they are the involuntary products of the substance of consciousness itself, namely, of the theogonic processes which underlie it. Hence the power they have, which is perfectly independent of the thought and the freedom of man, and governs the consciousness apart from his will. Inasmuch, however, as these theogonic potencies were operative in prehistoric times as cosmogonic, formative factors of nature, we have an explanation, Schelling holds, of the connection which obviously exists between the representations of mythology and the phenomena of nature. The connection is not to be explained from the natural psychological tendencies to personification and the worship of the forces of nature, but from those real supernatural powers, by which the consciousness of the nations was bewitched—nay, as it were possessed—powers which in themselves indeed are nothing but the potencies of the one divine being, but which here operate in their separateness and isolation towards each other, and therefore appear as a number of different gods, which indeed in a certain sense they are, so that polytheism has a certain amount of reality behind it. Thus the history of the human consciousness of God is here hypostatised and mythologised into a transcendental history of the divine æons, just as in the old gnostic systems. But the shell, however strange, yet contains a kernel of abiding truth as against a shallow empiricism or euhemerism. On the one side, it upholds the position that mythology is not an arbitrary thing, nor a thing made up in the way of poetry, or in any other way invented by individuals; that on the contrary it is the product of the unconscious poetic faculty of the mind of the people. On the other side, it asserts the truth that in this production of religious fancy that unconscious reason which is innate in human nature was a contributor, presaging truths afterwards to be revealed, under the symbolical guise of sensuous representations. It must be allowed to be within the province of a

philosophical treatment of the history of religion to seek even in the earliest myths these anticipations of the higher truths of religion; but how far this search should be pressed in particular cases will always be a question of individual taste and feeling. In Schelling, we no doubt often get too much of a good thing in this direction; but that is better, at least much more stimulative of thought, than dull commonplaces. It cannot be denied that Schelling's mythology greatly stimulated the comparative study of religion. The bases, however, on which he proceeds in such inquiries have long been antiquated by the researches which have been made in history, ethnology, and the science of language; and it would not reward us to enter into the particulars of his views.

The transition from mythology to revelation Schelling finds in the Greek mysteries. The doctrines concealed in these we must suppose to have been a pure abstract monotheism, whether deposited in esoteric priestly speculations or in a tradition of the original revelation handed down from the beginning, and disclosed to none but the initiated. Schelling correctly observes that not doctrine but sacred history formed the contents of the mysteries, and specially the fortunes, the sufferings, and the death of the god Dionysus, as the way to the glorification of him. Hence the connection of these mysteries with tragedy, and the similar purifying effects of both on the affections of those present. At the same time, under the dramatic form of the death of the second Dionysus, the representative of the reigning world of deities, who was to be followed by the expected third world-ruler, or the Dionysus of the future,—under this symbolical veil was accomplished the emancipation of the mind from the result of the mythological process, the fall of the many sensuous gods, and the rise of the one spiritual God: it was just this future event, the approach of a new spiritual religion, which had to hide itself as esoteric knowledge under a nocturnal veil of deepest mystery. This last thought of the Greek mind, to be compared with the dawn of the gods of the North, explains in particular "that deeply tragic tone which marks unmistakably the whole religious life of the Greeks, that consciousness which even in the abandonment of joy

does not desert them, that all this glory will one day be extinguished, that the whole of this beautiful world of appearance will one day disappear and give place to a higher clearness which shall not deceive. This *secret* pain transfigures, ennobles, and sanctifies, as it were, the beauty of Greek works of art, and is the talisman which still attracts us so irresistibly. This tragic element is due first to the middle position the Greek occupies between a sensuous religion to which, for the present, he is subject, and a purely spiritual one held up before him, but belonging only to the future." "In the mysteries the mythological consciousness saw its own end, its complete death, but also foresaw another and a new time, though it only recognised this future, and was able to represent it to itself about as far as we are able to foresee in this life the nature of the next; not in the din, not in the wild tumultuous joy of Bacchic processions, but in the silence of those solemn nights in which the Greek both was made acquainted with the necessary transiency of the reality, *i.e.* the transitoriness of the mythological representations, and saw a new and wondrous light arise out of the deep all-embracing night—in the silence of these nights, and in their solemn thoughts, lay the atonement of mythology, so far as such a thing was possible in it. But this has also brought us to the border where a transition is possible to the true, the absolute atonement." These passages may serve as evidence for the judgment enunciated above, that Schelling, even where he undoubtedly reads too much into the mythological consciousness, at least does so with so much ability and taste that many a learned poverty might subsist on the wealth of his ideas.

The Philosophy of Mythology sees in mythology a necessary process of the human mind; the Philosophy of Revelation has for its object, in Schelling's view, to show that revelation is not a necessary event, but "the manifestation of the freest, indeed the most personal, will of the Deity." And this is no doubt implied in the position taken up by Schelling above (p. 20), as to the absolute freedom of the creation of the world; but at the same time this abstract notion of the free divine activity serves the dog-

Rev^m

matizing philosopher just as it served the Scotist nominalists of later scholasticism, as the basis of an anti-rationalist positivism (there anti-Thomist, here anti-Hegelian). Now there is no doubt an important kernel of truth in Schelling's theory of revelation. It is true that the personal life and free moral activity of certain persons of great spiritual force do form the essential moving force and principle of the higher religions, especially of Christianity, and that the chief part of the revelation consists first in these fundamental historical facts and actions. Schelling's energetic insistence on this truth must be allowed to be a great advance, not only on an unhistorical rationalism (Kant), but also on the abstract intellectualism of the philosophy of religion of Hegel, as well as of his own at an earlier period. But this insistence on historical reality, well justified as it is, yet in another respect overshoots the mark. He identifies the free action of the human instruments of revelation with a free and personal activity of the Deity itself, whose interference in human history severs, in a mystical way, its natural connection, and renders all rational knowledge of the occurrence simply impossible. The latter is not what Schelling meant to do; his design is to give a "philosophy of revelation" which will make the free acts of the Deity comprehensible; but we have already seen, and in what follows we shall see yet more plainly how this comprehension of transcendent occurrences and actions leads, and necessarily must lead, to nothing more than gnostic mythology.

Schelling begins with the proposition, which, when properly understood, is perfectly true, that the substance of Christianity is simply and alone the person of Christ, and that the chief task of a philosophy of revelation must therefore be to understand this person. Here, however, he adds very significantly: "He who knows nothing of a super-historical history, has no scene on which he can place such a personality as Christ. We, however, have come from a world in which such a person can be understood and comprehended. We know from world-ages of the past a demiurgic personality, a potency instrumental in creation, which at the end of creation assumes reality as Lord of existence, consequently as a divine personality. By man it

is deposed again from this realisation, emptied of its glory. This does not make it cease to be in essence a divine personality; inwardly it is not changed; its will, its consciousness remain the same; but as against the newly raised up principle which ought not to be, it is again in a state of negation, of suffering. In presence of this existence, which it has still to reduce to subjection, it is no longer master, but only a naturally working potency. Now however comes the point at which it again in human consciousness makes itself master of that being, and thus is again in so far, externally as well as in essence, a divine personality. It is now to be designated a divine personality because it is Lord of being as external to God, because it possesses this being, not one given it by the Father, an independent being with which it can do what it will: in this consists its freedom. This glory, however, which he had it in his power to have independently of the Father, he refused, and in this he is Christ. This is the fundamental idea of Christianity." The classical passage, which unfolds the deepest mystery of Christianity, is accordingly Phil. ii. 6-8, and Schelling interprets it quite in the spirit of his own gnosis. Not merely isolated expressions, but the whole substance of the New Testament, and especially the great fact of the atonement, is said to be unintelligible, if we do not ascribe to the Son an existence co-eval with the world, outside the Father, and independent of him. The idea of the Trinity accordingly is to be conceived, not as a fixed relationship, but as a movement of the Deity through its three momenta; from the Tautousia, where the Father alone is in strictness the dominating Ousia, and all is concluded in him, through Heterousia, which lasts during the separation, and to the final reconciliation, to the Homousia, which is only the last stage, and unintelligible without the two others. Hence these three persons may also be conceived as the successive rulers of three world-ages or aeons; the pre-mundane age of the Father, the mundane age of the Son, and the post-mundane age of the Spirit. In heathenism also the Son was the working principle of all religion and wisdom, which accordingly was not without points of truth, but in heathenism the Son was operative as a natural potency, not as Christ, or as a personal prin-

ciple. In the Old Testament Christ is already as Christ, but only coming as yet. In the New Testament he is revealed as Christ. For the extra-divine divine Son divests himself of his divine form, and thereby becomes man; the incarnation of the Logos is not a becoming-other, but only a becoming-visible of the divine, which materialises itself in order to be born of the woman. "With this appearance the ecstatic history (of the Logos pre-existing in heathenism and Judaism) passes into actual history. In presence of so objective a fact, taking place before the eyes of a disenchanted world, all that had formerly been believed disappeared, and became fable, though it had been at first not mere fiction, but based, as we cannot deny it was, in a certain subjective necessity." As that which mythology anticipated became historical reality, the mythological consciousness ceases to have any justification. This statement is essentially correct, but admits of being used against our philosopher himself, for his discussions on the miraculous conception, the twofold nature of Christ, the atoning death of Christ (his exhaustion on the cross was merely the last outward appearance of the long tension in which Christ was placed during the whole of the former period, that is, from the creation), the descent into hell, the resurrection and ascension of Christ, show a curious leaven of the mythological consciousness still at work. The devil also is deduced as a spirit which came into existence, not however as a creature, but as one who had escaped from the limits of the creature. He was the seducer at the first fall of man, by which also, indeed, he properly came into existence. The whole of heathenism arose out of his inspiration, and his insidious influence on our will can only be doubted by a false philanthropy. The demoniac possessions narrated in the Bible are also explained by our philosopher as real appearances of Satan, who thus takes a material form. The reality thus conceded to the devil must not be denied to the angels. Taken as creatures, Schelling considers they would be infinitely absurd and wearisome; but they are not creatures, but mere potencies, or will-less spirits. With this opening up of the "true world of spirits," with which previous philosophy, confining its circle of vision to the known world, could have

no acquaintance, the philosophy of revelation has discharged its proper task ; it has "explained Christianity from its higher historical connection," from the connection of external history "with that inner divine transcendent history which is properly the true history *κατ' ἐξοχήν*," without which the former would be "devoid of all divine contents, waste, empty, and dead." Thus Schelling makes the ideal contents of the biblical history, which as such is of course not history over again, but idea, and nothing more, eternal determination of the divine will, or eternal truth, itself another history behind the actual, a shadow of the true history, which, being itself destitute of reality, sucks the reality from the latter like a vampire, and makes it a shadow, a spectre-like unreality. This is that "Docetism" which we meet with as the natural consequence of gnostic mythology wherever found. Its essence consists just in this, that it makes of the ideal contents of history another history behind the actual.

After we have made our way, not without effort, through all this jungle, Schelling rewards us at last with a highly suggestive philosophy of Church history. The *Catholic* Church is built on the authority of Peter, and is the Church of strict law ; it has the thing, the connection with Christ, but not the understanding of it ; it has unity, but a unity which is external, blind, unfree. In *Paul*, the apostle called independently of Peter, a principle was prepared by which the Church could be made free again not from unity, but only from its blind unity. This principle came to the front at the Reformation, and diffused itself principally among the Germanic peoples, for "that great religious change issued from the very centre of the German spirit and temper." But Protestantism itself is only a transition, a means to something higher for which it is its mission to prepare. "This alone guarantees to it a future, such as the lifeless Church of Peter cannot look to have, and can only come to have by the assistance of Protestantism. The more foolish is the hope, where this future is already manifesting itself, that it can be put under the yoke again. The judgments of history are the judgments of God ; and to get them reversed is as impossible as to guide the mighty stream back to its source or to force the tree back into its

germ." But Protestantism has not yet borne its proper fruit; for to it as a church Christ is still a closed secret; it still thinks it necessary to fence itself round with limitations borrowed from the Petrine Church. It is destined, however, to put on the true inner universality or catholicity, which will also be found to be the true unity, consisting of freedom, chosen from conviction, and therefore enduring eternally. This ultimate unity, subsisting without any external constraint, belongs to a third period which is prefigured by *John*. He is the apostle of the Spirit, as Paul of the Son, and Peter of the Father. The apostle of the Spirit, who was not an apostle of the Jews nor an apostle of the Gentiles, is the apostle of the future, of the "last time, when Christianity will have become the object of universal knowledge, when it will be no longer the narrow, perverted, poor starving thing it has been in the dogmatic schools; and still less that miserable thing which is immured in forms which keep it in darkness, nor yet that private Christianity which individuals have carved out for themselves; but when it will be for the first time the public religion, not as the religion of the State, not as an Established Church, but as the religion of the human race, which possesses in it at the same time the highest science. In no other way than this can Christianity remain the religion of the Germans. And since the Reformation we must take it in this way, or not at all."

CHAPTER IV.

FRANZ VON BAADER.

FRANZ VON BAADER, director of mines and Professor at Munich, was long intimate with Schelling, but was not so much his pupil as his intellectual kinsman. After studying the natural sciences, he sought in the critical thought of Kant for a corrective of the materialism and empiricism which disgusted him ; but from Kant's deism and moralism in turn he had found refuge in the theosophy of St. Martin and Jacob Böhme. Baader had a great natural gift for profound speculation ; but he wanted discipline and method for the development of his thought to a degree only to be found, perhaps, in *Hamann* of other thinkers ; and he has considerable similarity with Hamann generally. Both were at feud with the false abstractions of the Illumination, with its tearing asunder and isolating of elements which in the actual world are only found with and in each other ; knowledge and faith or conscience, natural science and theology ; science and tradition, church and world, nature and mind. The strength of both lay in their keen perception of the weaknesses of one-sided and limited points of view, and in their deep insight into the unity in which opposites are combined. But the weakness of both was that a lively imagination was apt to get the upper hand of sober critical understanding ; both suffered from the want of logical self-control. Hence we find both quite incapable of treating a subject in a connected way, constantly leaping from the theme in hand to another quite remote from it ; and leaping also away from thought altogether to the spinning of fancies and mythologies. This makes it uncommonly difficult to describe Baader's philosophy. His works

are collected in fifteen volumes; his ideas on every subject have to be hunted up in every corner of these volumes; and then one has to try to introduce some tolerable sort of connection among these aphorisms and curious fragments of a world of ideas which is half modern and half mediæval and scholastic, or even ancient and gnostic. Our concern, of course, is only with his philosophy of religion; but Baader gives this notion a very wide range, and proceeds on the principle of drawing no distinction between religious and natural philosophy. Thus we can scarcely put any definite limits to his religious thought, if our picture of his religious view of the world is to be complete. So comprehensive a treatment, however, would embrace much that has had no influence on the development of our science, and would only be interesting from a biographical point of view. For us, it may suffice to enumerate briefly the fundamental ideas of Baader's religious view of the world, dwelling on such as are important.¹

Even the theory of knowledge, Baader holds, must have a religious foundation, logic must be the doctrine of the Logos, as the former of the inner speech or thought, and of the enunciating or creating of God, the Mediator of immanent or ideal and emanent or real, being. It is a great merit in Hegel, Baader frequently remarks, that he attacked at its root that process of flattening down all truth which resulted from Kant's doctrine of subjectivity, and indicated for logic that reality and importance as a science which it had long lost. Only it had not been remarked that in doing this Hegel opened up the way to an understanding of the doctrine of the Logos, and enabled us to see that speaking, enunciating, is itself the central primitive and creative act, and perception (reason) accordingly the central conception. It is the radical error of the rational philosophy and theology that it thinks it can know God without God, or know about God without him, from human reason alone.

¹ The works of Baader chiefly dealt with here are his lectures on "Religious Philosophy" in the first volume of his speculative works, on "Speculative Dogmatic" in vols. viii. and ix.; and the six numbers of *Fermenta cognitionis* in vol. ii. Sentences of various others of his writings have also to be cited. *Franz Hoffmann, Hamberger, and Lutterbeck* have written on Baader.

And yet man does not possess reason at all of himself; he only possesses it by the divine reason being represented, or, as it were, reproduced, in him. God *is* reason, man *has* reason, is reasonable in so far as he partakes of that reason, but he is not himself a part of it as the pantheists hold. Hence Eckhart says, with truth, that the eye through which God sees me is the same as that in which I see God; since it is one and the same thing to know God and to be known of God. Not less groundless than the fancied autonomy of the creaturely reason thus deifying itself is the deistical opinion that reason is given to the creature as a talent, but that in the development and employment of this power it must hold itself quite alone and apart from participation in the divine act of reason. Against this we must remember that every act of attention and reflection is nothing but a holding out of the receptivity; and in such a process we must not, as is usually done, conceive man as hearing (subject), and God merely as speaking (object); on the contrary, God is at once subject and object, speaker and hearer, inasmuch as he gives to us both hearing (listening after him), and speaking (speaking after him). Hence Jacob Böhme says, with truth, that Christ's spirit feeds itself in me with his own sacred nature.

The failure to recognise this cardinal truth that we are enabled by God himself to know God, Baader considers to be the cause of the denial of the knowableness of religious objects. It is wrong, however, he remarks with Hegel, to represent God as a mere object of our reason as mere subjective capacity of perception, since he as absolute spirit is at once object and subject, and thus manifests himself both in that which is perceived by us and in our perceiving. It is a principle of our religion that the same God gives us the law as Father, and as Son enables us to fulfil it; and according to the Scriptures it is only the Spirit of God which searches out in our spirit the deep things of God. When a Jacobi rejects the knowledge of God for the sake of his religion of feeling, when a Rousseau makes feeling end where knowledge begins, this really amounts to that sceptical prudence which warns the lover to refrain for any sake from a thorough knowledge of his beloved lest the illusion of

his love should be destroyed. But true love prompts to self-manifestation, both in thinking of, and in working for, the loved object, and Thomas Aquinas truly says that we love God the more the better we know him. "Many defenders of religion in our day do not see how such poltroonery towards speculation (with which both Kant and Jacobi supply them) amounts to giving up the game to their opponents, and that they are, as it were, providing an excuse for indolence in the pursuit of the knowledge of religious objects and making these objects themselves shallow." "The avoidance of light, *i.e.* of knowledge, seeks a refuge in the Protestantism of these days in feeling, in Catholicism, in authority. Insensible to the pain of ignorance and to its shame, those photophobists never consider that to an intellectual being complete indifference, the entire extinction of desire after knowledge, can never come save as the consequence of a crime."

The ultimate roots of this error, however, lie, as Baader very acutely shows, in a false general theory of knowledge, which abstractly tears subject and object asunder. On the one side the old delusion is cherished (from which Fichte emancipated philosophy), that the mind, that which has its being in self-consciousness, could only be known by stepping out of it, leaping over our own back, and thus it is assumed that self-consciousness is not the being, the substance of the mind, but only an *accidens* or *modus* inhering in something else, in some thing-in-itself. On the other side a being, a thing-in-itself is set up, which yet must be absolutely unknown, unknowable. This, according to Baader, is the root-error of all philosophy which denies mind and God, this setting up of a primitive being independent of all knowledge, to which knowledge could only approach from without, or from which it would proceed *per generationem equivocam*. But there is no thing existing which is not also a thing known and perceived, and no thing could become the object of our knowledge, were it not a thing known before our knowledge, the matter of an intelligence. Were not, for example, non-intelligent nature pervaded by an intelligence, and therefore thought already before I came to it with my thinking, I could never as a reasonable

being find my way in it. If, on the contrary, things which are not themselves intelligent, yet react on my thoughts, this reaction must proceed from an intelligence. If God be the All-knower, then the creature only knows by receiving part of the knowledge which God has and is. In self-consciousness knower and known are one, and this identity may be traced back to that of producer and produced; for all knowledge is a producing and making oneself knowable in the product, whether we speak of an original production or of an imitative reproduction, and whether the latter be free or unfree. Hence the thinking faculty remains by itself in what is thought, while in what is not thought it goes out or loses itself. If then all being is a being known, and if the finite mind knows its own being as one not produced by itself, then it knows its being as a being known by the absolute mind which produces it. The self-knowing of the finite mind is not therefore, as Descartes held, the ultimate ground of certainty, it is itself founded in the primitive knowing-itself-known of the absolute mind. Hence all certainty is based on conscience, *i.e.* in with-knowing (*con-scientia*) with the knowledge God has of us.

With this view Baader takes up a position of antagonism, firstly to naturalists and materialists, with whom mind is a secondary thing, a mere *modus* of unintelligent matter; then also to the deist, who denies that the finite spirit has any real relation to the infinite, or, consequently, any capacity for knowing the latter; and lastly, to the pantheist, who knows no central spirit. Baader held it to be the great error of German philosophy that it placed the divinity of spirit, the knowledge of which is certainly the distinguishing feature of that philosophy, immediately and originally in the mind of the creature itself, drawing no proper distinction between the creative and the created mind, and thus, while raising man above the beasts, arrogantly deifying him. As for the view that in the progressive knowledge of mankind, the one living world-spirit brings forward into consciousness what he essentially is, no objection could be made to it, if this consciousness were taken to be not that of God but that of man, in the labour of which the manifestation of God to the

creature is completed till God comes to be all in all. But the view just stated must be rejected, as involving a denial of God, if, by the development of consciousness in time, of which it speaks, we are to understand the development of the divine self-consciousness itself; for in that case it would both contradict the notion of God as the absolute, *i.e.* complete, no longer in need of anything, and the notion of the creative mind as self-conscious, and in its self-consciousness dependent on nothing outside itself. Only of the created being can we say that its activity consists in bringing to fully realised being what it essentially is; for the immediateness of created being is first being in essence only, or being in *potentia*, as innate possibility.

To secure the proper relation of the creative and the created mind to each other, both against the separation of them, which is deism, and against the mixing them up together in pantheism, Baader proposes to recognise a threefold connection between the knowing and the known; that of *through-dwelling*, of *by-dwelling*, and of *in-dwelling*. He declares this to be the characteristic difference of his philosophical doctrine of knowledge from that formerly prevailing, that according to him logic will only be a perfect science when it not only distinguishes such a threefold mode of knowledge, but recognises and demonstrates the basis of it in a threefold mode of existence, and of the relation between the knowing and the known. If the creature is only *through-dwelt* by the Creator, then knowledge is least complete, and takes place without any free co-operation on the part of the being which thus knows. Knowledge becomes freer when God condescends so to speak to the creature, in so far as to come over-against him (*by-dwelling* by his consciousness). Still freer and quite complete will the knowledge of God be when God indwells in man. So far as the transition from one of these three modes of being or of knowing to another takes place through the will, we have a scientific foundation for the influence of the will, or faith, on knowledge. To this threefold relation of knowledge there corresponds, accordingly, a threefold relation of the action of the Creator to that of the creature. The creature finds itself, with reference to God, either in the state of *being worked* through and by him, or of *working*

with God as his organ, or of *working alone* for God as his representative. In the first case the creature is subjected to God, but in the third God subjects himself, as it were, to the creature, since he imparts to it the power of his own working. But even the first action of the intelligent creature is always dependent on the creative action of God, and that in three ways: (1) Inasmuch as this action of God precedes the action of the creature as its true *a priori*, and forms the basis of it; (2) In so far as it accompanies it as *assistance* (co-operative leading); and (3) In so far as it manifests itself to the creature as a power freely offering itself to him, and thus *follows* the determination of will of the creature. This triad of being founded in God, being led by God, and being strengthened by God, corresponds to the triad of the three divine persons, and contains the solution of all problems about freedom and law, freedom and grace, etc. And, on the contrary, every kind of mischief, both in theory and in practice, comes from the displacing of these three regions; man desires to know and to do himself where he cannot and should not, and, on the contrary, is inclined only to believe and to do nothing where he ought to know himself and to act himself. That the doing of the creature, because its freedom is only based on the Creator's doing, is nothing but the continuation of this creative doing, this is a truth the autonomists ignore, letting the creature take up its own position (begin). And thus, just as in the philosophical doctrines of the naturalists, that which is unconscious and selfless is placed above and before the conscious self, or spirit. Kant and his successors, who brought in or further developed the doctrine of the subject-object or of the absolute, fell into the mistake of counting two where they ought to have counted three. For what comes to man as foundation or as authority from within, they called the subjective, inasmuch as they mixed it up with man's own activity; and this mixing is the starting-point of the whole new heresy of the autonomy of man, and of his providing his own foundation or his own authority.

As against this falsely arrogated autonomy, which ends in slavery, it is the task of philosophy to point out the means and conditions by which man may come to the free use of his faculty of knowledge.

Only those can shrink from this liberation of knowledge who are content to exchange freedom in the law and in service for a state in which there is no law, no authority, no service. But it is true no less in knowing than in willing and in doing, that man rules only when he serves, and serves only when he rules, that he only comprehends when he wonders, and only wonders when he comprehends, that he only loves when he worships, and only worships when he loves. The freedom of knowledge has been so little understood up to this time, because it has not been recognised that this freedom can only be obtained by means of a double foundation or authority, and that philosophy can only solve her problem by seeking to add to the outer foundation and determination of knowledge, or to outward seeing, the corresponding inner foundation or inner vision, and *vice versa*, for in the mouth of two witnesses (the inner and the outer) is the truth established which makes him that knows it free. And not he is free in knowledge who casts off or says that he casts off every authority, asserting that he is an authority to himself; but he who listens to no authority than that which directly or indirectly makes him free, by giving him a foundation for his knowledge, leading or assisting, strengthening or confirming him. But what thus provides a foundation, what supports and imparts motion as well as directs it, must in every region be that which cannot itself be moved by anything else. Hence dogma is not a thing that restrains the free movement of the faculty of knowledge, but a thing which provides a basis for that movement, and imparts it as well as leads and confirms it: it is like the rock in the sea which draws to itself the seaman who holds on to it while he thinks he is drawing it to himself, and strives to do so. Thus it is as mistaken to hold only to outward testimony and authority, as only to the inner. The criterion of the true positive is rather the agreement of the inner and the outer foundation of any piece of knowledge; and philosophy has to do for knowing what ethics proposes to do for the will, to seek for the outer determining factor the corresponding one within, for the law (authority), the spirit of the law which makes subjection to it a free act, and belief in authority an undoubting conviction. But the true motive of our will

can be nothing but a will ; and, by analogy, what supports the free movement of our reason can only be reasonable, of a nature to apprehend me, and to let itself be apprehended. Or thus : man only knows when he knows himself known ; the eye of his mind only sees itself, only finds itself in the eye of another mind, and knowledge reaches the mind, not as the rationalists think, *per generationem æquivocam* or from itself, but *per traducem* ; i.e. by becoming partaker (not part), and being taken up to a seeing and knowing which, so far as he is concerned, exists *a priori*. This seeing and knowing proves itself to man to be primitive, superior or central, by its stability (ubiquity and eternity), and that both inwardly and outwardly. This double proof man therefore is right to ask. If he is to be fully convinced he must have it ; for centre and periphery, inner and outward testimony, as the inner and the outward sides of any occurrence, should and must never be disjoined. Instead of the *cogito, ergo sum* of Descartes, which heralded the advent of atheism, we should rather say *cogitor ergo cogito*, because man thinks only as being thought, only speaks as hearing, only wills as willed, only works as worked upon. "Hence by the laws of thought, will, and action, we should understand nothing more than this or different from this : that man is placed and comprehended in a thinking, willing, and working being. We can only wonder that so many theologians have allowed this fundamental doctrine, as declared by Paul, of the immanence of all things in God, to be robbed from them by philosophy (e.g., Spinoza), and a travesty of it to be used against themselves."

The thought on which Baader's theory of knowledge hangs is unquestionably a profound and a far-reaching one. It is that all our knowledge is based on an *a priori* which cannot be a mere subjective and formal principle, else we could never understand how it comes to possess validity in the objective world, but which must be an absolute knowing and producing principle, therefore the divine reason. This is in fact the solution which Kant sought, but did not find in any satisfactory way, to the problem of knowledge. So much we saw above in our discussion of Kant (vol. i. p. 153). And when Baader goes on to say that the divine reason or active

truth attests itself to us as well in the inner witness of our reason, this with-knowing with the divine, as in the outward testimonies of history, and that neither of these two sources is to be regarded as in itself abstractly valid, he disposes, in principle at least, and with perfect justice, both of abstract unhistorical subjectivism, and of abstract reasonless objectivism or positivism. No sensible person will deny that historical testimonies to the truth are incomplete without the religious consciousness of the Christian Church, which, from a religious point of view, must even stand above them. But when Baader goes on to identify this Christian religious consciousness simply with the dogma formulated by the church, and sees in the latter the "rock in the sea" which, itself unmoved, is to be regarded as the determining, foundation-giving, and directing force of our thinking, we Protestants cannot possibly follow him; we must regard his position as a relapse from the point of view of modern philosophy to that of mediæval scholasticism, the main feature of which was just that its thought moved with freedom (as Baader too requires that it should) only *within* the sphere of dogma, but never ventured to take up a position of independence and free criticism *over-against* it. Baader was no doubt a profound speculative thinker, but he was also, indeed he was first, a believing Catholic, and so it happened naturally enough that his speculative ideas became in his hands mere substructions of the dogmas of the church, the truth of which was a postulate of faith with him, without his ever becoming clearly aware of the wide chasm that separates these two points of view from each other. Schelling also, in his later stage, and the orthodox Hegelians, made the same exchange; and how much more natural was it for the Catholic Baader to make it! And we must remember that when Baader leaped from the position of speculative philosophy to that of dogmatic mythology, he did so by means of an idea the mixture of truth and error in which fitted it (and this is a frequent occurrence) to quiet the critical conscience of the philosopher by hiding from him the mistakenness and the violence of the leap he is making. Starting from the position which, stated by itself, cannot be contested, that knowledge is not independent of the moral will, that only the pure

heart can see God, that the wicked cannot come to the knowledge of divine truth, Baader concludes that our knowledge is not since the fall a *res integra*, that our reason is, in fact, perverted, so that, in order to any pure knowledge, it must first be readjusted, must be healed, by higher assistance, namely, by revealed dogma. From this it naturally follows that we cannot use our reason aright in a position of independence of dogma, but only in subjection to it. This is just the old vicious circle by which scholastic theology has always sought to shield itself against the attacks of thought, proving the superiority of dogma to reason from the corruption of reason, and the corruption of reason from the superiority of dogma.

The system Baader erects upon this theory of knowledge has a close resemblance to those of Jacob Böhme and St. Martin. In the doctrine of God he strives to keep clear both of ordinary abstract theism, with its denial of nature, and of the confusion of God and the world which belongs to Pantheism. As against the Deists Baader insists on the "immanence of all things in God" as a fundamental doctrine of Christianity; but he declares a view of the world to be irrational which throws this "all-in-one" doctrine into a doctrine of "all-one," and makes God, not the comprehender of all who is above all, but only the collective notion, or the sum, of all creatures. In such a view he says the creator, as the centre, and the created world as the periphery, compose the two halves of a substance, which, centaur-like, must be half-God and half-creature, not to mention that the lie is given to the testimony of the consciousness of the intelligent creation. Spinoza fell into this ancient and monstrous error simply because he failed to make clear to himself the threefold relation of the creator to the creatures, namely, the extra-mundaneity of the first, and his intra-mundaneity and assistance with reference to the second, as in the formula, all in one, one in all, one with all. In thus rejecting alike abstract theism and abstract monism in favour of a truly "concrete monotheism" (an expression of Schelling which he accepts), Baader unquestionably shows great insight into the conditions to which any view of the world must conform which is to reconcile the antitheses in a higher unity: but while his intention is

excellent, he fails to work it out without overleaping the barriers of sober thinking, and losing himself, like Schelling, in mythological fancies.

To conceive God as living, and yet not mix up his life in any way with the life of the world, he begins with constructing, in a way very similar to that of Böhme, a purely inner-divine "self-begetting-process" of God. The will without ground begets his son in the intelligible will, and as this *descensus* has a corresponding *ascensus*, this self-seeking a corresponding self-finding, the duality is reunited in the Spirit. This triad, however, extends itself, just as with Böhme, into a quaternion, by the idea, or wisdom, in which God appears to himself, and is united to himself. Yet this is not to be taken as a quaternity, the idea not being a person, but only the mirror of the divine self-seeing. The other three, however, are not properly persons either, and only become persons by the eternal divine nature, the desire after being, the principle of selfness or individuation, by which in the first place the immanent process of the divine self-formation becomes an emanent one of self-expressing or revelation, the esoteric word becomes exoteric. When this takes place, each of the three moments is born an actual person, a real birth, to which in God also a male and a female principle contribute, namely, the imagination of the idea, and the desire of nature. Now, we should suppose that in this emanent process, the exoteric manifestation of the Logos, we had reached the point of transition to the world-process; but this is far from being the case. In spite of all those processes, births, and expressions, we are still on the ground of pure deity. Baader cannot insist upon it strongly enough that the world has nothing whatever to do with the inner-divine life-process, that its rise is not brought about by any inner necessity in God, that God is not driven to the creation by any want or need, so that the creation cannot be known by speculation, but only as a historical fact. Only so much is to be known speculatively, that when once God desired to create, the same two principles must come into operation for the purpose which co-operated in his own generative process; viz. nature (will) as the material principle, and wisdom (intelligence) as the formal

principle. This idea, which Baader borrowed directly from Böhme (vol. i. p. 19), and which, moreover, he has in common with Leibniz, Schelling, and E. v. Hartmann, is the precious kernel among all the gnostic husks of his theogony and cosmogony ; it contains a germ capable of developing into a real-idealism, destined to correct the abstractness of idealism. Baader himself dwelt frequently on the importance of this position. He says, for instance, "It is very important to recognise the *actio vitalis* as the begetting, creative, formative act of will and desire, not separated from Knowledge indeed, but distinct from it. For through and from will was this world made, and all finds its further propagation in will. Will is at the beginning of organic unity, as of separation, in all things. Formative impulse, creative power, reside only in will and in desire." Schopenhauer says just the same : but Baader sees, as the latter does not, that will without wisdom, power without thought, can as little bring anything about, as intelligence without will, thought without power.

The process of creation also is divided, according to Baader's description of it, into two separate acts, analogous to the moments of the self-generative process of God—an esoteric (super-material) and an exoteric (material) one ; and the fall in the spirit world takes place between the two, and brings the crisis about. Baader has much to say about the fall : it might almost be said to be the cardinal point of his system. God made the intelligent creation, angels and men, not perfectly good beings, but in innocence which was capable of falling, and was only to be confirmed by the endurance of temptation, so as to rise to the condition of free children of God. Only the possibility of evil lay in their nature, in their selfness. That this possibility, instead of merely underlying man's nature, as it should have done, broke out into a motive, into selfishness which arrogantly exalts itself above the barriers imposed on it, this realisation of evil was by no means necessary ; it was the perversion of the true God-ordained relation of the creature to the creator. But this perversion did not originate in man ; he is not the inventor but the imitator of evil : the true father of it is Lucifer. The angels who arrogantly rebelled against God are removed from their original

place in the divine will ; but they are not therefore altogether autonomous, not released from God, who rather dwells through them as a restraining bond, while he dwells in the spirits who remained good as a guiding law. That the spirit of lies is an actual power (Baader says even more precisely, a personality) is proved by the work he does in the evil inspiration of man, through whom he seeks to procure entrance into the world. Now the middle place which man occupies between intelligent and non-intelligent nature would have marked him out as destined to protect the latter from the consequences of Lucifer's fall, and keep it in its right relation to God ; but man allowed himself to be seduced by the spirit of lies, and turned his attention to the nature that lay beneath him, whence in him also nature, *i.e.* self-will, was inflamed, and became the ruling power. Then, when the ruin came to be so universal, the world would have been totally lost had not God arrested its fall, and preserved it when trembling over the abyss of hell, by the creation of matter. Thus according to Baader the creation of the material world in the Mosaic six days' labour is only the second act, the tragic catastrophe of the intelligent creation has already preceded it. It is not in contradiction to this, that we have already heard Baader speak of "Nature," for he forbids us to confound nature in any way with material existence, which is not the natural, but merely the diffused in dimensions of space and time, broken-up being, as it were, which is no longer true being (which is everywhere and at all times), but only a becoming, a being there (or there). Thus limitation by space and time, and materiality which comes of such limitation, would, apart from the fall, have remained a mere possibility ; but the fall made it a reality. Yet for all this, the material is not as such of evil, nor is it the ground of evil ; on the contrary, matter is the covering which protects the fallen spirit from the consuming fire of the divine wrath, and the material which man can exercise his spiritual power in controlling, and thus prepare the way for his own restoration.

The fall of man brought about profound changes in his nature and in his relations to nature around him. Originally created

androgynous, as Baader holds with Böhme, man was now divided into two sexes—a circumstance which gave the animal side of his nature the upper hand, broke up and destroyed the harmonious relation of spirit, soul, and body, and made him subject to death. With the command of himself he also lost command of external nature, which at first yielded an unconditional obedience to his magic will; and the mechanical control he exercises over nature is a poor compensation for the loss. But all this time the divine image, the idea, remained hid in man though fallen; it preserved itself throughout the course of history, till at last it awoke again in the virgin, and was realised in Jesus as the incarnate law of God. As Adam's guilt spread like a contagious disease over the whole race as original sin, so the pure life and atoning death of Jesus became original grace, which communicates itself to the believer, like the influence passing from the magnetiser to the somnambulist, by the vehicles of prayer and of the Eucharist. The process, however, is not free from pain; the self-seeking I has to be killed that the I which is devoted to God may obtain salvation, which once obtained is indestructible, the man having reached his true destiny. Here there is error on each side; on the one side the Lutheran appeal to the imputed merit of Christ; the physician is to help, but there is to be no bitter medicine. On the other side, the Kantian morality of the categorical imperative, which being without Saviour and without salvation, is "a morality only fit for devils," as it condemns man to an eternal and a fruitless struggle against nature, *i.e.* to eternal misery. The true ethics, on the contrary, is based on the perception that God who gives us the law also fulfils it in us: as the true logic rests on the fact that we know truth because we are partakers of the divine Logos.

Now this assertion that the basis of morality and of religious knowledge is the witness and the impulse of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of the pious is nothing more or less than the fundamental idea of Protestant doctrine. It was by finding the basis of conscience in God that Protestantism wrought out its emancipation from human statutes, and from the authority of the Church and of tradition; and we should expect Baader, holding such a philosophical

position, to recognise the right of Protestantism and to sympathise with it. This, however, was far from being the case: indeed, he declared the Reformation to have been simply a rebellion against divine authority, and the root of all the modern political revolutions. The Reformers themselves, he says, only wanted to improve the Church; and were not clearly aware that their acts were so inimical to the Church as they proved to be; but their conduct was nothing less than revolutionary, for it did not proceed from that which is the foundation (authority), but turned and exalted itself against the pillar of the Church as if it had been an obstruction. And every function of knowledge is revolutionary in its tendency which turns itself against faith: even Anselm taught that we must first believe, that we may know. Instead of finding a true solution of the antithesis of civil and ecclesiastical society, and of that of tradition and science, which formed the problem of the age of the Reformation, the attempt was made to dispose of them in a radical spirit, giving them the aspect of a radical conflict or a total breach. The consequence was that the State now oppressed the Church, as the Church formerly did the State, and that the science of Protestantism had turned godless (rationalistic and naturalistic), and its faith barren of thought and afraid of knowledge (Pietism), so that the older, the true Protestantism, was no longer *inter vivos*. Hence the bill, which was merely continued in the sixteenth century, had to be met now; tradition had to be reconciled with science, natural history with theology, the State with the Church, and the conviction to be stirred up, above all, that ever since the first protest made against tradition (Protestantism) all that had been brought, and is still brought against it under the name of philosophy, never was, and is not now philosophy but an unphilosophy; while that philosophical knowledge only is properly to be called free, which is based on the true foundation (on authority), since reason, if not grounded on that which makes it free, is entangled in delusion, or falls into bottomless scepticism.

Thus in the place of Protestant science, which was and is mere unphilosophy, a "free" philosophy founded on the authority of

catholic tradition—this, according to Baader, is the cure for the evils of the age! Of such an utterance, commented on as it is from time to time by history itself in encyclical, syllabus, and dogma of infallibility, refutation is surely by this time superfluous. It only shows how difficult it is even for the profoundest of thinkers to free himself from the catholic belief in authority, and how much science owes to the Reformation by which the chain of that belief was broken.

CHAPTER V.

KARL CHRISTIAN FRIEDRICH KRAUSE.¹

RELIGION had been treated by Schleiermacher exclusively from the subjective side, as a pious determination of the feelings. With Schelling in his earlier philosophy of identity the subject quite disappeared in the absolute object, while his later attempts to remedy this one-sidedness led his thinking into mythological mazes, out of which neither he nor Baader ever emerged. Krause starts from the philosophy of identity of Schelling, but he early recognised the necessity (as also did Hegel at the same time) of uniting the Fichtean subjectivism into a system of "absolute synthetism or harmonism, or Panentheism," in which the one-sidedness of pantheism and of the theism which derives its faith from feeling should be alike transcended, and Nature and the Ego recognised as the partial beings which subsist in, through, and under, the infinite Being. Its large proportions, and the strict and almost artistic method of its execution, certainly make Krause's philosophy one of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of philosophy; and the slight attention which it still obtains can only be explained, cannot be quite excused, from the difficulty of the curious language which a capricious purism led the thinker to employ.² If in Schleiermacher's romantic religion of feeling we find an offshoot of the mystical pietistic tendency of Protestantism, in Baader's polemical theosophy

¹ The works of Krause with which we have here to do are (not to speak of the *Religionsphilosophie*, which contains nothing but controversy with Schleiermacher and Bouterweck), his *Vorlesungen über das System der Philosophie* (1828), and *über die Grundwahrheiten der Wissenschaft* (1829), the *Sittenlehre* (1811), and the *Philosophie der Geschichte* (1843), edited by H. von Leonhardi.

² In the following statement I have partly reproduced this language *verbis ipsissimis*, only leaving out what is quite too unintelligible.

a revival of scholasticism, and in Schelling's Nature-philosophy the Pantheism almost more of Giordano Bruno than of Spinoza, Krause's system of absolute *Harmonism* is a continuation of the line marked by the names of Shaftesbury, Leibniz, and Herder. Krause has in common with these thinkers the underlying basis of optimism in his mood, a mood which appears the more amiable and the more entitled to respect when we consider that he endured the narrowest circumstances, and was always and most undeservedly neglected; he never rose to a higher position than that of an extramural teacher (*Privat docent*), or private scholar, and yet continued to be the unwearied apostle of this harmonious and cheerful view of the world. It is true that this *absolute* harmonism laid too little stress on the negative, it failed to grasp the full depth of the antitheses, and hence failed to appreciate the reality of sin and redemption in the moral and religious sphere. This was Krause's weakness, as on the other hand Hegel's strength lay here. As *Leibniz* was related to *Jacob Böhme* at the beginning of German philosophy, so is Krause related to Hegel at the culminating era of that philosophy in the first third of the present century. And the same contrast presents itself in the golden age of German poetry in the persons of *Goethe* and *Schiller*. On the one side are those who behold the idea of harmonious being in eternal accomplishment, on the other those who behold it in eternal becoming by the constant overcoming of antitheses which constantly break forth afresh. On the one side is the cheerful rest of the idyll, the smooth flow of the continuous Epos, on the other the movement of the drama which develops itself through the appearance of opposites, the excitement of mighty conflicts and tragical catastrophes. And are not these two sides really inseparable from each other? Is not the supplement they mutually afford each other implied in the fundamental Christian idea of the kingdom of God, in which the early announcement of an accomplished salvation always goes hand in hand with the earnest demand of effort after salvation and sanctification?

As Schelling set out from the intellectual contemplation of the
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absolute, so Krause holds the "Contemplation of Being" or the knowledge of God as the all-comprehending infinite being, to be the fundamental principle of all knowledge, which does not admit of further proof, but is itself quite certain and the ground of all other certainty. But while Schelling's intellectual contemplation was taken for granted, postulated, "shot out of the pistol, as it were," Krause recognises the necessity of introducing that principle to thought, of leading the thinking mind by a methodical analysis of its consciousness to carry out for itself this "contemplation of Being." He therefore postpones the deductive part of his philosophy in which particular knowledge is deduced from primitive knowledge or the contemplation of being: and places first the analytical part, which leads up to that fundamental knowledge by means of an analysis of consciousness. He thus starts first of all, quite after the spirit of the critical movement, from the self-contemplation of the Ego, as that which alone is immediately certain, in which therefore no doubt is possible as to the reality of the idea, because knower and known are here one and the same. And this self-contemplation of the Ego is not conditioned, as Fichte held, by the idea of another, a Non-ego, but is clear and evident in itself, and is rather to be regarded as forming the pre-supposition for the clear representation of all else. Now the Ego knows itself first of all as the one same and entire being, which in its one wholeness comprises in itself a multiplicity of particular determinations, and which in its independence is the permanent basis of the continuous changes of its states. But while it knows itself as a whole in relation to the determination of its parts, it does not know itself as sole whole, or as the whole essential that is, but it knows other similar Egos or reasonable beings and other similar bodies or natural beings outside itself, it knows itself therefore as limited, as a finite part; and this knowledge implies the anticipation of an absolute whole which comprehends all those partial wholes. In the same way the Ego knows itself indeed as the independent basis of its changing states, but it by no means knows itself as the basis of its being itself and contemplating itself; it knows its own being, and its being as a basis, to be founded in

turn in an Other and Higher, and this knowledge again contains the anticipation of a self which is absolutely unconditioned and which forms the basis of all conditioned selfs. And as the ground of anything is the whole-essential, in which this something is as a part-essential, determined by the whole, so the ground which conditions all must be one with the whole which embraces all; *i.e.* it must be God, or "being" simply, in which and through which all is that exists. The same result is attained from the self-contemplation of the Ego on another side. I know myself partly as mind or reasonable being, partly as body or natural being, and in each case as finite, *i.e.* as a part-being of the totality of mind and the totality of nature. Now reason and nature are on the one hand infinite, as regards the part-being embraced under them; but as regards each other they are limited; and in man also they form a union by their action on each other, each determining the other. Now where such a relation subsists between two limited beings, we are compelled to think of a Higher, in which these two which interact on each other, and their interaction itself, are based as part-essential, and determined by the whole being. We cannot therefore conceive the interaction of mind and nature, which we find given in our self-contemplation, otherwise than thus, that we think them both, as well as their interaction which goes on in us, as founded in a Higher, which includes in itself as its part-essences the whole of reason and the whole of nature, which is therefore simply "Being," or God.

But while we thus arrive through the self-contemplation of the Ego at the contemplation of essence or the thought of God, it is not as if the objective validity, the reality of the latter, were based on the former. On the contrary, it now becomes clear that what was first for thought, and formed its starting-point, is last in reality, because the Ego is seen to be based altogether in God, in its being and its consciousness, its thoughts in general, and its thinking of God in particular. "When we are conscious of this thought, being or God, we are conscious at the same time that this thought, even as our thought, cannot have been originated and caused by ourselves or by any other finite being, but that this thought can only be conceived

to be possible or actual, as originated by the contents of this thought, by being itself or God himself." The opinion held by many that the thought of God comes after other thoughts in respect of the certainty of its real truth, or even withdraws itself entirely from knowledge, Krause holds to be completely mistaken; the very opposite, he holds, is true; the thought of God is the permanent basis and the sole guarantee of the truth of all our determinate thoughts and also of the general thought of basis and cause, because the causal proposition can only be valid if it is based on an unconditioned, all-conditioning cause. The certainty of all knowledge rests on the being of God, and hence the strongest form of confirmation of any statement "as surely as God is."

It is therefore of the utmost importance for all science that the fundamental thought of essence, or God, be thought correctly. By God, we understand, in the first instance, according to Krause, the one same and whole, or unconditioned and infinite, being, outside of which nothing is, which is all finite things in and through itself. This is the truth of pantheism; and the recognition of this truth is of primary importance both to the science of religion and to religion itself, for the contrary view, that anything exists in itself outside of God, and is its own beginning, would be equally repugnant to the thought of the absolute as one, and to the feeling on which religion rests, for this feeling implies that the finite mind regards itself and all other finites, not as subsisting in and of themselves, but in, through, and of God. The contrary assumption would be far from being a Christian one: in fact, it is the great error of heathenism, the making an idol of the finite, while Christianity teaches that we live and move and have our being in God. But this true proposition that everything finite is in, through, and of God, is by no means to be confounded with the other proposition that the finite itself is God, or that God is the world. This is the error of pantheism, which the religious consciousness rightly repudiates, but which careful thinking also sees to be a wrong inference from the notion of the absolute superficially understood. According to pure absolutism, which may claim to be regarded as pure (absolute)

theism, God is first and essentially the one whole being which comprehends in itself all that is finite, but having the finite in itself as a non-divine element originated by God, distinguishes itself as the unconditioned first being from the finite and conditioned part-being, which as such is under and outside of God-as-first-being, though not outside of, but in and with God as the one self and whole being. True absolutism, which may also be called "pantheism," thus combines, according to Krause, the relative truth of pantheism, that all that is finite is in God, with the truth of theism, that God as first being exists essentially and independently, before and above all finite particular beings and qualities: that hence these finite beings are in no respect, either separately or taken together, and therefore that the whole world is not, God or the same as God; while they yet are like God, each in its kind and degree; and finally, that God, as a self and whole being, is independently, in an infinite unconditioned self-inwardness, or knowing, feeling, willing and working, in one self-conscious life, as the one unconditioned and infinite Reason, which may also in a sense be called a "person," though Krause is unwilling to employ this term in scientific language, as it has ignoble associations in the language of common life.¹ This distinction between God as whole being, which is the world in, through, and of itself, and God as first being, which is above and outside of the world, Krause declares to be in part a new view, which makes it possible to reconcile the doctrines of the opposite philosophical systems as to the relation of God to the world in the one and complete truth of the "viewing of essence," thus eliciting and recognising what is true in them, and avoiding what is one-sided and erroneous.

God as the one self and whole being is related to himself, aware of his selfness; *i.e.* he knows himself, and is therefore the self-conscious, blessed God. And these properties are not attributed to God by analogy of human things, applying them to him: his self-knowledge and self-feeling are immediately known from the fundamental essential properties of God, his selfness and wholeness. But this is only the form of his essence; what are its contents? They are the

¹ *i.e.* in German—*Religionsphilosophie*, i. 490. *System der Philosophie*, 383.

whole of determinate being, as placed before us in self-contemplation as nature and reason and the union of both, or humanity. These highest world-elements are, as they are contained in God, God's own essence in the inner difference of their oppositeness, in its inner two-foldness. Now God's essence is selfness and wholeness, and therefore these highest world-elements are opposed to each other according to these fundamental essences of God. Mind answers to the side of the selfness of God, for every mind lives independently, is free and for itself, and is itself the ground of its thoughts, feelings, and acts of will. Body, or nature, answers the side of the wholeness of God, for nature shows itself in space and time and force, as one constant uninterrupted whole, in which all the parts are held and bound together by the orderly connection of the whole. Humanity, finally, as a union of mind and nature, answers to the combination of selfness and wholeness, freedom and necessity, in God, and is thus the complete, Godlike image or reflection of the whole divine being, like it in mind, differing from it only in point of magnitude, as the finite from the infinite, therefore like to it. No one can fail to notice the similarity of these thoughts to the earlier philosophy of identity of Schelling, which conceived the absolute as the unity of the ideal and the real, reason and nature, freedom and necessity. The difference, however, is equally unmistakable. With Schelling the unity was merely the neutral *tertium quid*, the indifference of the antithesis and not a higher above it; not an independent self-conscious reason, distinct from finite beings as well as united with them. Krause developed the notion of the absolute to distinctness in this direction, and like Hegel made the substance a *subject*, the absolute being an absolute *spirit*. From this one would expect it to follow, that in the world also, nature and mind are no longer co-ordinated as members of equal value, as Krause still teaches, with the philosophy of identity, but that nature is that which mind has posited for mind, and therefore a means for the ends of mind and subordinate to mind, as Hegel taught with more consistency. In this point Krause is at a disadvantage as compared with Hegel, and stands nearer the philosophy of identity of Schelling's early period; but on the other side he has the

advantage of having distinguished with greater plainness and clearness than Hegel did, the originating first being from the originated combined being, or the creative first mind from the creaturely human mind. Here he stands nearer the later speculation of Schelling and that of Baader, which however he infinitely surpasses in his more sober and disciplined style of thought.

From the relation of God to the world, which we have described, Krause further develops the idea of life, the primal life of God as primal being, as also the God-like life of the world-beings, nature, reason, and humanity, and finally, the united life of God and the world-beings or the "Orlife" of God as being. In so far as the finite world-beings are in God they have part in his infinity; and thus they are an infinite finite, or a finite infinite. This contradiction finds its solution in the fact that nature and reason are in themselves an infinite number of completely definite or individual beings, each with its own life, which as separate beings of nature or as bodies are connected in a unity with each other and with nature, and as separate beings of reason, or as minds, are united in the unity of reason with each other and with reason herself. Now, as reason and nature are essentially united in God, it follows that the two opposite series of finite individuals which they are and contain are thoroughly united the one with the other; that every individual mind is essentially connected with an individual body as man. From the union of reason and nature in God there results therefore the idea of the one infinite humanity in the world, of which that upon the earth is but a small fraction. But every separate self-being, as surely as it is in God, is also an infinite infinity, *i.e.* it has an infinite number of complete finite states, in each of which it is determined in a peculiar way. These states, since they are each peculiarly determined, are exclusive of each other; but because they cannot co-exist, and yet belong to the same essence of the same self-being, must be as a constant series one after the other. This constant succession of states in one and the same constant being is *becoming*, the form of which is *time*. The whole essence of the individual self-being only unfolds itself in the whole series of the

changing appearances of its becoming in time ; but the beings themselves, who change in time, are before and above their becoming in time, they themselves arise and do not pass away, it is only their states that arise and pass away. In the same way as the beings which change, self-changing or becoming is itself without beginning and incessant ; time is the eternal form of the infinite becoming of all finite beings, in which they develop their notion, which is eternal. But the content of all becoming in the one infinite time is the being of God himself, in so far as it manifests itself in all finite beings. Now, since the divine being is quite one and the same, always equal to itself, it follows that the state of all beings in God at any one or at every moment of time is a distinctive and full-essential representation of the whole being of God, accordingly that each moment of the one infinite becoming is only once and is unique, of infinite value in itself, and not merely for the sake of a future state, for which it is the preparatory means. In the practical contemplation of life, this view refutes the error that the youth of individuals or of peoples or of humanity, is only of value as a preparation for their age ; or that the whole of this life on earth is only a preliminary exercise in a dark vale of tears, for something yet to come. He escapes from this narrow and mischievous prejudice, who recognises that *every* time is full, in a way quite peculiar to itself, of divine being.

In so far as the divine being is manifested in an equally full and essential manner at every moment of time, God remains always equal to himself ; and it cannot be said of him that he is of time or in time. But in so far as God is the eternal and infinite basis of all becoming in infinite time, and thus shapes his own being in time itself in an infinite exhibition of ever-changing states, we may predicate of him an *inner becoming*, or *life*. And God is life in a twofold sense. As the original being he has his original life in antithesis to the world-life, but as the one whole being he comprises the total life of the world in and under himself as the structure of the members (organism) of the self-life of all finite beings. For every finite and self-knowing being has a subordinate independence and freedom of its own, in so far as it is the proximate self-essential basis of its own con-

stant self-formation in time : but as the finite beings are contained in respect of their whole essence in God, their finite being-the-basis of their own life, or their independence itself, is contained and founded in the unconditioned basis of the one life of God, and that in such a way that all the members of this one divine life mutually further and determine each other, so that each of them is organically determined by the rest, and all of them by the original life of God-as-original-being.

The essential, in so far as it is set forth in life, is the good, to be approved (*das Gute*), and so far as it is the permanent formed in time, the good (*das Gut*). Now, as the divine essence is the contents of the divine life, which is set forth in infinite time in infinite variety, it follows that the divine essence is the one good and the one chief end ; that God in relation to all the finite is the unconditioned, infinite or *highest good*. And in so far as the property of a being to set forth good of itself in time, is called goodness, God is also unconditioned and infinite *goodness*. Similarly, the goodness of every finite being consists in its actually clothing with form in time its god-like essence, as a finite good in finite life, as God forms the infinite good in infinite life. The good as the alone essential in time, is the necessary, which comprises in itself the possible as that which is still to become, and the actual, as that which is actually existing in time in individually determined form. Thus what is common to the whole series of becoming, or the law of life, is this : that the one good which ought to be real in life, become real at every moment of time in its own peculiar way. And in so far as this good is to be worked out by the activity of rational beings, it is the end, or the object of life. God, that is, as the one good, is to himself the one end of life ; and for every finite rational being, it is the end of life to set forth its own essence in its own life in infinite time : and that simply because its essence is a subordinate finite part of the essence of God, its end of life a part of the end of life of God ; its good a part of the one good of God, because God is for every finite reasonable being the one unconditioned, infinite, supreme good.

From these statements on the life of God and of the world, Krause goes on to a series of propositions regarding the divine

essence. God, aware of himself in knowledge and feeling as a living being, sees and feels in his omniscience the whole of life in the whole of infinite time, both past and future, down to the last parts of his self-living determination, and throughout all the relations in time of every individual to the whole and to its own infinite end. But he knows and feels all the temporal and finite in an infinite divine way, not limited by pleasure and pain, ignorance and longing, but so that he takes it up into the *blessedness* of his infinite mood. The knowing and feeling of the finite rational creature, too, is only fully-essential, *i.e.* true and blessed, in so far as it knows and feels itself in unity with the life of God. Again, as God determines himself to the exhibition of his essence in infinite time, freedom is to be attributed to him, as the form of the realisation of his end of life according to his own law, thus not standing in any antithesis with necessity. The conditioned freedom of finite reasonable beings is entirely dependent on the unconditioned freedom of God, as it is not only in point of subsistence eternally and irreversibly based in the divine causality, but also led and determined at every moment of its operation by God, its end of life.

As the infinite cause of life in time, or as actively realising in time his infinite resources, God is the one infinite unconditioned force and might, which, inasmuch as it contains in itself all finite power, is omnipotence (or *Ormight*), but viewed in its relation to the latter as cause to effect may be called First power. In so far as God himself occasions the nature and direction of his activity and power, he is will: and since he determines himself to direct his activity to the realisation of the one whole good, he is will of good, or *holy* will. And as the will of God being universal (or "Orwill") embraces the self whole good, it is also directed at each instant as a will determined in time or an individual will, to the good of his own life, or to securing that the one life shall be at every instant a peculiar unique and full presentation of the divine essence. Thus his will is at every time a *wise, blessed, and holy decree*. Now, since in this infinite multiplicity of individual life there is at each moment simply a harmonious representation of the one self whole essence of

God, the whole life of infinite history appears as a divine work of art of consummate beauty. In this view, *beauty of life* also is a fundamental essence of God, in close connection with the good and goodness: beauty and goodness are the same divine, only in different modes of manifestation; and equally with the morally good and with the beautiful does *justice* belong to the fundamental essences of God, for it is the whole of the conditions depending on freedom, under which the finite reasonable beings are able to attain in time their divine end of life, in joint life with each other and with God as original being. As a condition of the restoration of the good in life, justice is itself a fundamental and essential part of the good; and the realisation of it is an end of the divine will, which just because it is the foundation of all execution of justice in the world is the originally just and all-just will. Hence also it follows that as certainly as God is always equal to himself, so certainly justice can never be in conflict with the true, the good, and the beautiful; and, finally, *religion* also, the highest among all these separate determinations of life, has its basis in the essence of God. As the one whole life of God is organically divided into the primal life of God as primal being, and the God-like life of finite reasonable beings, and these two, though distinguished, are yet most intimately connected with each other in the structure of the whole, so God in his self-consciousness is yet at the same time aware of his joint life with the God-like reasonable beings, and knows them also as beings who, in their turn are aware of this their joint-life with him in knowing and feeling; and this mutual relation of "life in union of essence" God takes up into his thoughts as an essential part of his blessedness; it is to him a part of the one good, to which his holy life-impulse is directed. Now the life-impulse which is directed to union of life is love; and so God as the basis of the joint life of all with him and with each other is the *one infinite absolute love*. To that love with which God loves himself, and in and under himself all finite beings, corresponds on the side of the God-like reasonable beings the consciousness and the impulse of God-inwardness, or pious love to God and to all that is in God and like God. But as the primal love is

not the whole divine being, but only one particular fundamental essence or quality of it, the good man who is aware of God should do good in and with love to God and man certainly, but not firstly or essentially from love or for the sake of love, but purely for the sake of the good, because it is the divine, the essential; and in this way he will become truly worthy of love, and will be admitted to partake of it.

At one or two points of this demonstration we may have our doubts; but in any case we must acknowledge that the idea of God is here developed in a clear and unbroken advance of thought, and is set forth in an uncommonly rich and fruitful statement, equally removed from the empty abstractness of the absolute of Spinoza, of Schelling in his philosophy of identity, and of Schleiermacher, and from the fantastic mythological theosophy of Schelling and Baader. One conspicuous merit of Krause lies in his taking temporal life as a moment in God. By doing this, while yet distinguishing it from God's eternal being, and thus obtaining the distinction between the eternal (unchanging) causality of God and his temporal, progressive, causality, he made it possible to bring God into a much more inward and living relation to the historical life of humanity than is generally done. At this point, it is usual for theologians and philosophers to fail, because they are under the yoke of an abstract notion of the divine "eternity," which admits of nothing temporal, and excludes all progressive change of the divine action. The advantage gained by Krause at this point appears at once in his notion of *providence*. Providence he regards as consisting neither in God's having once for all fixed all that happens with a so-called "eternal act" (a wooden iron), nor in separate interferences which break through the regular connection of the world, and do away with its order. It consists in God's so determining and guiding the whole essential organism of the world at every moment of time with his universal and individually determined will, as to make it subserve both the one eternal life-purpose of the whole and the individual life-purpose of all particular beings in the definite present, and in agreement with the course of time, both in all preceding and in all subsequent

periods. In short: "God determines his infinite decree at each moment and with regard to all finite beings, in such a way as is good in every respect."¹ Hence it follows that every being in the whole of infinite time realises its life-purpose, actually attains its destiny, or comes to that blessedness which is the salvation ordained by God for every being. God's law of life, according to which he realises his own life-purpose in such a way that all finite beings are thereby led, their own power subordinately assisting, by God to their own salvation in the one salvation of God, this law of the government of the world is the one universal *plan of salvation*, which individualises itself in temporal history for peoples and for individuals, according to their several ways of life to a plan of salvation for them in particular.

But how can so much evil and wickedness as experience compels us to recognise, find a place in a world-order which aims at the universal salvation of all? The solution of this difficulty is a peculiarly difficult task for Krause, as it was for Leibniz, and must be for every similar system of universal harmony. Krause's solution of the problem is quite on the lines of Leibniz's theodicy. Evil, including wickedness, is negation, in part a simple want of essence, in part a malformation of life. This negation comes partly from without, it is the limitation of the world which cannot but form a feature of the common life of finite beings. Partly, also, it belongs to the self-essence of every finite being, in so far as the category of negativeness belongs to its essence. Leibniz expressed this more simply by saying that it belongs to the notion of the finite being that it only partakes to a limited extent in reality or perfection, that in certain respects, that is to say, it is imperfect. But evil as negation is never an independent entity, it exists *in* a being, it is partial negation in a good being, deviation from the norm of proper formation, and thus merely an exception, an abnormality, which as it came into actual existence according to the one necessary law of life, is again, according to the very same law, to be negated and removed at its set time. Evil as non-essential has its sphere only in

¹ *Lebenlehre und Phil. d. Gesch.*, p. 88.

the finite and temporal, it is not to be connected with God in any way; neither in the whole nor yet in the particulars is it caused, occasioned, or furthered by God in time, not even as a means to good, for good being the affirmation of essence, Krause characteristically states, can never proceed from evil as evil, as negation. (The notion of negative magnitude, or the real No as contrary or recoil of the Yes, in presence of which alone the latter becomes active and sensitive, this notion which was clearly recognised even by Jacob Böhme (vol. i. p. 20), does not exist for Krause any more than for Leibniz.) Hence in respect of God we can only say that the evil and wickedness found in the life of finite beings have their cause in God in an eternal manner in so far as he is the cause of the finite generally and of finite, limited freedom, in particular. Now in this good the evil of the abnormal exercise of freedom is so unavoidably involved, that the latter (evil) could not be prevented without abolishing freedom (good), and so God's relation to the actual occurrence of wickedness and sin is merely that of permitting it, not that of occasioning it or co-operating in it or approving it. As against the evil which exists, God's will is directed solely towards the negation of it, and the affirmation of good as the alone essential. God is alive to the whole of life, and he is aware both by knowledge and by feeling of the element in it which is repugnant to the essence, but he regards it as the disturbance of the life of finite beings, which has to be removed again. The divine love, in so far as it feels the pain of the finite beings which stand in the limitation of the world and forms an impulse towards their liberation from this torture, is called *compassion*, healing and saving love; God, accordingly, is the eternal and infinite pitier and compassionate deliverer of all beings; in his mind there is sympathy with the pain of the beings in the world, but always combined with infinite blessedness because of their rescue and deliverance from all pain, which he regards and feels as the work of redemption he has been engaged in from the first and will carry on to the end. Salvation from wickedness and evil by the pure force of goodness in love and compassion is one continuous act of God, eternally the same, holy and peculiar,

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the finite and temporal, it is not to be connected with God in any way ; neither in the whole nor yet in the particulars is it caused, occasioned, or furthered by God in time, not even as a means to good, for good being the affirmation of essence, Krause characteristically states, can never proceed from evil as evil, as negation. (The notion of negative magnitude, or the real No as contrary or recoil of the Yes, in presence of which alone the latter becomes active and sensitive, this notion which was clearly recognised even by Jacob Böhme (vol. i. p. 20), does not exist for Krause any more than for Leibniz.) Hence in respect of God we can only say that the evil and wickedness found in the life of finite beings have their cause in God in an eternal manner in so far as he is the cause of the finite generally and of finite, limited freedom, in particular. Now in this good the evil of the abnormal exercise of freedom is so unavoidably involved, that the latter (evil) could not be prevented without abolishing freedom (good), and so God's relation to the actual occurrence of wickedness and sin is merely that of permitting it, not that of occasioning it or co-operating in it or approving it. As against the evil which exists, God's will is directed solely towards the negation of it, and the affirmation of good as the alone essential. God is alive to the whole of life, and he is aware both by knowledge and by feeling of the element in it which is repugnant to the essence, but he regards it as the disturbance of the life of finite beings, which has to be removed again. The divine love, in so far as it feels the pain of the finite beings which stand in the limitation of the world and forms an impulse towards their liberation from this torture, is called *compassion*, healing and saving love ; God, accordingly, is the eternal and infinite pitier and compassionate deliverer of all beings ; in his mind there is sympathy with the pain of the beings in the world, but always combined with infinite blessedness because of their rescue and deliverance from all pain, which he regards and feels as the work of redemption he has been engaged in from the first and will carry on to the end. Salvation from wickedness and evil by the pure force of goodness in love and compassion is one continuous act of God, eternally the same, holy and peculiar,

belonging to his own life at every moment of time, and attaining its purpose in all finite rational beings without exception, so that none of them is lost to God in evil. An eternal damnation, eternal rejection of any one of his rational creatures would be a contradiction of his pitying love, which remains infinitely *faithful* to itself and to all its finite reasonable beings. In knowing this we also are summoned and inspired to work together with God in his eternal work of healing, and of making holy, with God's love in our hearts to all beings and to ourselves.

Krause led us at first from immediate self-contemplation to the contemplation of essence or the idea of God. He now deduces from the idea of God, thus fully worked out, the *vocation of man*, and his place in the organisation of the world-beings. Man's whole vocation is : likeness to God in his life, or the unfolding of his godlike essence in his own distinctive way as an independent active being, according to his three faculties, true knowing, blessed feeling, and holy willing and doing. That man may know himself aright it is first of all necessary that he should distinguish aright what he is as spirit, and what he is as body, and how these two are related to each other. As spirit, man knows himself in the light of his knowledge of God to be an essential eternal, unborn and immortal rational being, destined to fulfil in infinite time his divine destiny as a finite spirit an infinite number of times in an infinite number of periods or life-courses. The souls of men upon the earth are the spirits living together on the earth with individual bodily natures ; they form a part of the infinite spirit-realm of the universe, which suffers neither increase nor diminution, but lives in and with God as an eternally perfect organism of all the infinite number of spirits. Each separate spirit enters by union with a body on one of its infinite number of life-periods, develops itself through three ages of life to the highest point of its maturity, when it gradually withdraws into itself again in the declining curve (involution) to the point of returning to its original unity in God. But this final point or death of one life-course is at the same time a beginning, a second or

anti-birth into a new life-course ; and death accordingly is an experience like any other, a moment of the life which reproduces and develops itself without end. But every new life is something more than the mere repetition of the old one ; it moves in new and higher curves with a new content of its own, and yet according to the same law of life of evolution and involution, so that the whole life of each spirit in all the periods of infinite time may be represented as a curve constructed according to a definite formula, and yet growing without end at each time (a spiral or serpentine line, or a cycloid). In each of these ages or life-courses the individual fulfils his vocation in the one way possible at this point of time, a way which has its own value and importance, and is by no means a mere preparation and means for a future mode of existence. What is true of the individual man is true also of humanity on earth regarded as a whole. It also is only an organic member of the total humanity of the world, first of all of that of the solar system : it also traverses in its history the three principal ages of life, answering to childhood, youth, and maturity, but before it also there impend higher forms of development than the present earthly mode of existence, on other heavenly bodies, where the relation of spirits to one another, and to their bodies, will be a more perfect one. Of that better state we possess some intimations, if no more, in the phenomena of magnetism, clairvoyance, spirit-intercourse, and the like. Our philosopher, however, remarks himself that we here stand before the dark chambers of life, into which our knowledge cannot now penetrate. This cautious reserve considered, we cannot press our objections to the bold anticipations of future forms of existence, of the metempsychosis of individuals and of the race ; indeed we must acknowledge that this form of forecast of the future has something to say for itself, as much perhaps as other eschatological pictures with which we westerns are more familiar. From the point of view of empiricism both are equally incapable of proof : from the standpoint of idealism both may prove equally elevating and inspiring.

Krause's further discussions on the moral ideal of the individual and of society are of importance for the philosophy of morals and of

jurisprudence, but we must omit them here, and examine somewhat more closely his *Theory of Religion*. We have spoken above of the foundation of religion in God, the life of community of essence of the finite spirits with God as original being. The question remains in what forms of the mental life of man that "God-inwardness," in which according to Krause religion essentially consists, manifests itself in the individual and in the historical "religious unions." Krause discussed the psychological side of religion polemically (in criticisms of Bouterweck, Jacobi, and Schleiermacher) and also positively; and he must be acknowledged to have kept himself free from the opposite errors of Schleiermacher and of Hegel, neither overvaluing feeling at the expense of objective truth, nor theoretical truth at the expense of feeling, but exhibiting in a happy way the harmonious interaction in religion of the various sides of the mind. He had less insight, however, than either of these thinkers into the historical development of religion generally and the dogmatic stamp it assumes in ecclesiastical Christianity in particular, and this may be the principal reason why his influence on theology and the philosophy of religion has proved incomparably slighter than theirs.

Against Schleiermacher's theory of feeling Krause remarks,¹ that feeling as such incites either to good or to evil; to good when it is pure and aroused by the knowledge of good; to evil when it is impure feeling, kindled by error or led astray. Even analytical self-contemplation shows that every supersensuous feeling only then appeals to us, only then is living and active, if and so far as the supersensuous contemplation or knowledge of that essence which is to be felt, is already present in consciousness as anticipation or as knowledge. Thus even the feeling of God in its various forms, particularly as trust in God, necessarily presupposes knowledge of God, since we could not possibly trust one we did not know. To say that religion is a matter exclusively, or at least principally, of feeling, is to identify the whole contents of the mind with feeling, which is no more than a part of them. But as little as feeling must knowledge or will be taken for the original element of religion;

¹ *Religionsphil.*, ii. 2, 69; ii. 1, 358.

religion, on the contrary, as Krause admirably says, has its contents and origin in God, and in man who is the image of God, and is called and fitted to be united to him in his life, to enter into an entire and undivided communion with him in the whole range of his consciousness, in the feeling of self, in willing and in doing, aware all the time that his consciousness of God, his feeling of God, and his willing of God are founded in God himself, and caused by God.

The latter is a root-thought of Krause's, as of every other speculative philosophy of religion. "From finite reason as finite we might possibly explain the thought of itself, but not the thought of something that is outside finite reasonable beings, far less the absolute idea, in its contents infinite, of God. To become aware of God in knowledge we require certainly to make a freer use of our finite power of thought, but the thought of God itself is primarily and essentially an eternal operation of the eternal revelation of God to the finite mind." Both knowledge of God in general and the faith in the individual working of God in a man's own life which fills up that knowledge, is originally a "working of God in the finite spirit, and is the eternal and enduring foundation of God-inwardness and of assimilation with God for man and for humanity."¹ But to the knowledge of God we must also add the feeling of God, the reception in the heart of the contemplation of God, and of faith in him. The feeling of God is related to all other feelings as the knowledge of God to all other parts of knowledge; as the latter first brings unity and harmony into all finite knowledge, so the blessed harmony of all finite emotions is first attained in man's breast by the one blessed feeling of God. This also is not to be explained from the finite reasonable being, as if it thus, in freedom and of itself, raised itself above its own level: it is an operation of God, and the second foundation of God-inwardness in man. Now he who knows God and feels God is also capable of directing his will to God, so as to will only the good as the divine, and to realise in his finite life a part of the divine essence in a godlike way with a goodness and beauty peculiar to his own case. And this direction of the will is the third

¹ *Lebenlehre und Phil. d. Gesch.*, p. 207.

divine operation in the finite reasonable being, the third note, as it were, in that fundamental harmony in which the inwardness of essence or the religiosity of the finite reasonable being is realised. And this religion, because it brings all the sides of the mind alike into harmony with each other, is the primary and essential foundation of a conduct of life which is according to reason and worthy of man. In it the mind is trained to the knowledge of universal truth, or to science, the heart to pure and noble feeling, and the will to divinely good volition or to pure morality, and thus the destiny of man is attained on every side. This certainty, based on faith in God, of accomplishing by God his destiny, engenders an absolute *faith* in God's guidance, both of universal and of individual life ; and thus at the same time the heartiest *love* to God, a love which asks no more than the completion of the union of the whole life with God.

On this showing religion rests primarily and essentially on the eternal causation of God or on his general revelation in the nature of man which is in his image. To this we have to add, according to Krause's distinction between the eternal and the temporal causality of God, the *individual revelation*, in which God manifests himself to men in the course of the history of the race and of individual men, in a special manner in proportion to the degree of the development of their mental powers. This revelation being a work of the free love of God, no finite mind can assign the limits of the divine compassion, according to which it pleases God to be present to man in mind, heart, and will : so much only can we clearly apprehend, that no individual revelation of God vouchsafed to reasonable beings in time, can conflict with the eternal revelation of God in the mind and heart, but that it must be in agreement with the laws of the development of the human reasonable being, because a contradiction of the temporal with the eternal revelation of God would imply a division in God himself. In judging of individual cases there is certainly great risk of error : individual experiences, the cause of which lies in the laws of the development of mankind, and ultimately in the eternal causality of God, may be erroneously ascribed to God's temporal ordering ; indeed, even mistaken opinions and freaks of imagi-

nation may be set down as individual communications of God. The only means to guard against this danger, and keep our mind and heart chaste and pure, is that man should strive to take up into himself purely the eternal revelations of God, and to judge all asserted temporal revelations, belonging to himself or to others, according to the eternal essence of their contents compared with what is contained in the eternal revelations of God. "Man is competent to do so: he ought to do so: he should seek to walk always in the consciousness of the presence of God, and strive after God-likeness, and after the capacity of having God always actually present with him."

63 Religion is thus the "*quite God-intimate, God-like, God-united, life itself as such,*" which is based on eternal and individual revelation of God, and consists in a mutual relation of God as original being, and of all beings aware of God. From this we derive the idea of the "religious union." Religion, indeed, as Krause more than once remarks, with entire accuracy and in the spirit of genuine Protestantism,¹ is not primarily a social relation of man to man, but is an affair for each individual, an affair concerning his own innermost and most private life, "his immediate relation to God, which is brought about by nothing finite, but is to be known and lived originally by him, in such a way that no other being comes between him and God;" for "every man is immediately present before God, and immediately directed by God *in him* to God as first being *above him.*" Were this not the case, were not religion founded immediately and eternally in each individual man as an inner thing, a thing for him alone, were not God immediately present in each man, it would be inconceivable how one man could awaken religion in another, excite it, lead it, form it, and be and remain to the other a mediator between himself and God. The social element, therefore, is merely an individual feature in religion, and is not to be taken for the whole of it or for the original essence of it; as a factor of religion it is undoubtedly important. For as God unites his life

¹ *Philos. d. Gesch.* 213, and *Religionsphilos.* ii. 2, 234 (in his criticism of Schleiermacher).

with humanity also as an organism of social unions, each of the higher persons or social unions into which humanity arranges itself is destined to represent the idea of God-intimacy or union of life with God. Properly, then, did the idea prevail in its purity, the whole moral organism of men's social unions from the narrowest circles of families and local communities to the widest union of the nations of mankind, should be accompanied by the parallel series of the rich organism of religious unions, in which every single man should be at liberty to form and to celebrate his independent religious life. But in historical development the growth of religion as of other things begins with individuals, and only proceeds gradually from the parts to the higher whole. In this development, too, the truth is always accompanied by a great deal of error: religious truths imperfectly apprehended are said to be individual divine revelations and precepts, and fixed in dogmas, rites, and social institutions. Yet even at the subordinate stages the historical forms always contain an element of genuine religion as their sound kernel; and this latter always puts forth its good and divine influence, to lead men to God from one side or another, to make them like him, to unite them with him. Such is the experience of history, and on this experience rests the hope that the humanity of this earth will one day, when science is further developed and the whole of life improved, raise itself by God's help and by means of God's further revelations to the pure full-essential religion, to the "full life of union in the essence," freed from delusion, from blind belief in tradition, from all arbitrary assumptions, from the confusion of the eternal with the temporal, from all idolatry of anything finite. But as the first requisite for a pure religion is the pure, full-essential *knowledge of God*, Krause holds "the pure prosecution and improvement of science to be one of the essential conditions for man's reaching the pure God-intimacy, and god-like essence of life;" and from this he draws the conclusion, always worthy of attention, and never more so than to-day; "to seek after truth, to carry science forward, is itself a God-intimate, God-uniting act, an essential part of religion and of worship. The development of science is an essential part of the

work imposed on man by God, a service man is bound to undertake for God in love and faith. Never let us think that the truly scientific spirit, that the pure and adequate furtherance of science, is foreign or even hostile to the growth of religion : on the contrary, the scientific spirit and the improvement of science are themselves an essential foundation of religion and religiousness."

Krause here approaches very nearly to similar views held by Hegel : but in the latter the impression is produced that religion is destined to disappear in science and the church in the state, while Krause sees the truth to lie in the harmonious co-existence of spheres of life and of unions which are distinct and comparatively independent of each other. The religious union, Krause says, stands by itself independently and outside of every union which is directed to a different end ; it must therefore subsist by the side of all these unions, but at the same time united with them all in harmonious interaction. The religious union should not and must not interfere with the development, in their own way, of the other unions which are devoted to other reasonable ends : but neither must the free development of the religious unions be interfered with by any of the others. The state, for example, exists for the administration of justice, an essential aim of life, and the religious union is not subordinate to the state, but neither is the state subordinate to it. Both are co-ordinate ; both alike are called, and are fit, to found and work out one harmonious and organic common life. Each stands in need of the other for its perfection, and each ought to help the other. If religion seeks to effect the union of mankind with the Deity, the endeavour of the state is also in its way divine, god-like, and directed to God, for God is the all-just and the eternal and temporal originator of law and justice. The relation of the religious union to the unions of art and science is also one of entire agreement, of perfect harmony in the interaction of independent powers. For without science and without art, religion, and particularly social religion, cannot attain great success, cannot become developed or complete. It is through art and science that the life of religion reveals and forms itself in society, and receives always a more pro-

found and beautiful expression. And on the other side the true perfection of science and art is not possible without social godliness. The higher religious cultivation rises, the richer will be the illumination of science and art; and the more profound and rich the development of science and art, the more wonderful, the more god-like an appearance will religion have, both the religion of the individual and the manifestation of religion in society. Thus science and art and religion are meant for each other from the first, they are united in league and friendship, and mutually supplement each other.

Thus does Krause sketch out for us an ideal of church, state, and science in absolute harmony. Its only fault is that it is merely an ideal, far removed from reality. If we ask how the ideal is to get itself realised, Krause like Hegel points to *history* as the way on which mankind approximates step by step, little by little, to its ideal destiny in the various spheres of life. We are also reminded of Hegel by the trinity of the "Principal ages of life," through which, according to Krause, the development of humanity accomplishes itself, and which answer to the categories of "positing, anti-positing and uni-positing." (Thesis, antithesis and synthesis.)

In the first age, which Krause also characterises as the "age of germ-life," mankind is still, he thinks, in undivided unity, with God as First-being, and with reason and nature and the higher reasonable beings of the universe, and is led, protected, and educated by these higher powers. We cannot, Krause admits, now attain to any scientific certainty about this primitive state, yet from certain traces and relics we may construct a conjectural picture of it. This is certainly the case; only that the picture of human beginnings to which the science of the present day points us, will be less of an ideal than the golden age of Paradise that Krause thinks of. In this particular Hegel's sober historical insight helped him to a truer view. The second age, "the age of growth," is that of the opposition of the self to the original unity, of the advance of the independent and free cultivation of humanity, which unfolds itself, it is true, according to the law of the divine order, but is no longer

aware of God with a consciousness and free inclination turned towards him, but concentrates its whole interest on the knowledge and the formation of nature and of human society. This great age of humanity falls into three parts again; according to the analogy of universal history.

In the first period, the age of the division of the peoples and the formation of languages, the pure original knowledge of God disappears and withdraws itself into secret societies, priestly castes and schools of philosophers, while polytheism appears among the peoples, and takes world-beings which merely are like God, and point to God, for the divine itself. In the second period the vanished idea of God as First-being, as cause and Lord of the world, appears again, first in the minds of individuals and then spreading out from these in the consciousness of the peoples too. Instead of an esoteric private doctrine it comes to be an exoteric popular doctrine, and now rules the whole of life in such a way that yearning after unity with the supra-mundane God forms the basis of the character of this period. Along with the uniform subordination of all that is selfish under God as First-being men also begin to recognise each other as beings of equal rank with equal rights and claims; an anticipation of the idea of humanity is developed out of the religious consciousness and begins to set limits to the selfish war of classes and peoples. Yet religion, and moral life along with it, labour under great defects during this period. The relation of the finite to God being still conceived as one of opposition, not of God-inwardness and union of life with God, there springs up contempt for the world and for what is human, renunciation of social and suppression of sensuous life: nature is regarded as that which is contrary to God, and the knowledge and imitation of it in science and art, as well as the building up of society in law and civic institutions, are thrust back and arranged without freedom under a onesided religious tendency. Religion itself, wanting in knowledge, becomes a belief in tradition and authority; religious inspiration, at first pure, is mixed with much delusion and fanaticism, which call for new divisions and hostile religious parties, and set up a despotic clero-

cracy in place of the universal love of man. What specially helps to darken the purely religious sentiments of this period is the old leaven of heathen polytheistic notions still at work in it, according to which the relation of God to mankind is represented as limited to one or several individuals, in whom God himself has appeared as man in his whole essence, or whom he has used as the exclusive organs for the declaration of his will. In such doctrines Krause sees the part-truth that divine revelation proceeds in its historical development from individual men and special circles of men; but the error of them consists in their representing God as united to men *only* through the mediation of individuals, while *every* human spirit is itself eternally present before God and in God, and hence is called, according to the divine plan of salvation, to be *immediately* united with God in its knowing and feeling. The common ground of error in these representations Krause states to be defective insight into the relation of God to the world, God being regarded *only* as the extra- and supra-mundane First-being, and the being in God of the finite disregarded. From this defective knowledge of God there also arises a pollution of the motives of conduct by the idea of the rewards of heaven and the punishment of hell, the latter capable of being averted by the penance of the man himself or of another for him—a view which not only degrades morality to a servile compulsion and seeking for rewards, but serves furthermore to enchain the peoples under the despotic tutelage of the statutory religious union. For all this, however, Krause is far from denying the pedagogic value of this imperfect stage of religion, but recognises in it an arousing and salutary means of education for the nations still in their pupilage.

The second period just described Krause finds proceeding in parallel developments in various peoples and groups of peoples. For the peoples of Western Asia and of Europe it began in *Mosaism*, but it only received its completed basis and its independent development in *Jesus*, whose doctrine, so far as we can recognise it in the materials which have reached us, is just that above described; the doctrine of one God, Creator and Ruler of the world, who is life

and love; the doctrine that man is called to make himself, by his god-like life, worthy of the union of his life with God, but with this also the idea of reward and punishment, a constant reference to heaven and hell, and the beginnings of the opposition to the world, in so far as it is not yet god-like. From these beginnings of Christian doctrine there was developed for the peoples named above, in the period which is fitly called the "Middle Ages," a statutory, despotic, hierarchical, clerocratic system, in which all the above characteristics of the second period may be traced. But the same phenomena are also to be seen in the religions of the Persians, Indians, Tibetans, and Mohammedans.

The third period of the second age of the world's life was inaugurated in Europe by the Renaissance and the Reformation, the latter of which finds its parallels in the reformed Buddhism of the Sikhs and the reformed Islam of the Wahabees. The distinguishing feature of this period (the present age) is the effort to unite the onesided elements of the two former periods, and to combine the independence of the individual members with the uniform subjection of all under God's rule and providence in the synthesis of a combining whole, and to establish a fit proportion between the parts and the whole. Hence, first of all, the battle for the rights of the free moral personality against all authority based merely on tradition and against every power which takes away men's freedom and responsibility in the sacred affairs of religion and the state. But as even now there is no adequate insight into the organic relation of the structure of the essence to God and into the law of the historical development of life, on one side the striving after freedom goes astray, wanders into a revolutionary refusal to acknowledge the right of what is historically subsisting, and on the other side the tendency to conservation errs in refusing to acknowledge the right of eternal ideas to historical realisation; and thus one-sided idealistic liberalism and onesided realistic conservatism or historicism confront each other as hostile parties in state, society, church, and science. This conflict can never be atoned at the standpoint of the second age of the world's life, where the abstract separation and opposition of the

general and the particular obtains, because each of these two, supposed to be in conflict, is both right and wrong. The antithesis can only be solved when the conflicting parties unite in the higher idea of the third age of the world's life, each maintaining the truth that is in it, and casting off the error in the higher insight both alike have attained. The struggles of the religious, political, social, and scientific parties, which fill the history of modern times from their beginning till now, are the inevitable growing pains and sicknesses of humanity in its transition from the period of youth to the maturity of manhood.

The third chief age, or the *age of maturity*, Krause considers to have come as yet only as an idea in the minds of individuals; it will not arrive for mankind in general till centuries have passed. Its character is complete inner harmony, or the moulding of all particular elements into unity with each other and with the whole, both theoretically in the system of science, and practically in the system of society. This age of the accomplishment of the vocation of man will have for its *leading perception*, as its fundamental idea, the *full knowledge of God*, or the contemplation of being as the one, self, whole, infinite and unconditioned being, which is of itself and contains the structure of the fundamental essences, which is in itself and contains the structure of all finite beings and essences, which in its one life (as Or-being) comprehends, as subordinate parts of its organism, the life of reason, of nature and of humanity, and which as First being is incorporate with reason, nature, and humanity; so that now at last all the earlier anticipations of religion are completed and united in the full contemplation of the relation of God to the world. Thus man reaches the one religion which both is truly universal, and defines itself particularly in a life of its own, he reaches the full-essential God-inwardness and God-unitedness. In the matured science of God and man, the idea of the *kingdom of God*, formerly undefined and undeveloped and chiefly anticipatory, which was a leading and pervading idea of the Middle Ages and of modern times, becomes scientifically clear and distinct, and assumes a well-articulated form. "Then it becomes plain, that God-intimate, God-

united humanity is a single member of the whole dwelling-place of heaven (the earth), a single citizen of the one infinite kingdom of God; and that in this kingdom every individual man is an eternal, imperishable inner member, destined and fit to be immediately united in his life with God-as-First-being. And as it is wont to be the case, that when the light of new divine knowledge is poured into man to warm him and shine before him on the way of life, the full-essential feeling which spreads all through the heart, the disposition, the will, the act, each in its turn, follows the perception; so in the new pure light of knowledge formed in the contemplation of being there are formed perfect love and depth of heart, a pure and deep sense for what is essentially akin, what is purely divine in life; and then also arises courage and boldness for the deed that art has meditated." Krause's system closes with this prophetic gaze towards a *union of humanity*, based on pure and complete knowledge of God, and manifesting itself in pure and universal brotherly love, a union which is even one day to form relations with the spirit worlds of other spheres. The system is a fair monument of a spirit that was distinguished alike by rare nobility of heart and disposition, and by uncommon profundity and force in speculative thinking.

As for the merits of his philosophy of religion specially, we shall be prepared to approve heartily of his notion of religion; but we shall scarcely be satisfied with his view of the history of religion and of historical Christianity. Krause failed to do justice to the original and universal significance of Christianity as the religion of redemption as contrasted with the religion of law, of Judaism and Mohammedanism: this was due to his optimist view of sin. In this respect it forms the opposite extreme to the theosophy of Baader, which hinges upon Lucifer and Christ, the fall, and the corruption of the world. Half-way between this pessimism and the optimism of Krause stands the philosophy of religion of Hegel, who sees in Christianity the reconciliation of mankind separated from God, and therefore "the absolute religion." True, we must always ask what is understood by Christianity. Hegel considered his philosophy of religion to be in substance quite identical with the Christianity of

the Church, and different from it only formally, in the mode of expression. Krause judges Christianity according to its empirical appearance. Each of these views of Christianity is open to grave objections. We see at this point, what might on careful examination of the two systems be seen at many another, that Krause is strong where Hegel is weak, and weak where he is strong, so that the two thinkers are admirably calculated to correct and to supplement each other.

CHAPTER VI.

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL.

SCHLEIERMACHER'S philosophy of religion was occupied with the *subject* of religion, so much so, that the *object* faded away, and was only known as the source of the feeling of dependence. To Schelling, on the contrary, the object of religion was everything; with him even the subjective processes of consciousness were transformed into theogonic processes. With Fichte the moral subject at first thrust aside the religious object, while in his later period it in time seemed to be about to be swallowed up in mystic God-unity. With Kant, finally, the object generally and the religious object in particular had only a problematical reality by the grace of the categorical imperative. With these thinkers we see that the relation of subject and object in religion, the very hinge of the religio-philosophical problem, had not yet come to be clearly fixed. This first took place in that philosophy which did away with that antithesis of subjective and objective idealism, which being grasped on one side only or in a wavering fashion by previous thinkers had led to those defective views of the religious relation, did away with that antithesis by setting up the higher unity of absolute idealism, in which truth resides exclusively neither in the subject nor in the object, but in the relation and movement subsisting between the two, both sides being both affirmed as equally valid moments and at the same time reduced to merely relative moments of the one absolute existence of mind. With this problem Hegel dealt more definitely than Schelling and Krause, and also with greater success. In original genius he was perhaps scarcely equal to Schelling, his Swabian fellow-

countryman, and in early life his friend, but he was far superior to him in the stability, thoroughness, acuteness, and discipline, of his thinking. He forms the close of a period of the history of the philosophy of religion, he stands at the highest point it had yet gained; though it does not terminate with him, because, as he himself says, it can never terminate.

For it is the most salient feature of this philosophy that the absolute is not in it a fixed and constant being, but an eternal life that perpetually reproduces itself, always becoming what it is, always already what it is to be, manifesting its essence only in the eternal process of the development of nature and of history. The idea of development played a most important part in the system of Leibniz, but with him it was only the individual souls that developed themselves, and the development consisted in nothing more than the inner process of thought in each of them, so that the connection of the whole of them together had to be accomplished by an outward bond of harmony. Herder extended the idea of development to nature and history as well, but without pointing out in a methodical way the law of its advance. Fichte constructed from the acts of reflection of the Ego, which advance by thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, a development of consciousness, and therefore of the world too, since the world was to him merely a product of consciousness. Hegel takes up this thought, but extends it from the subjective to the objective spirit, and seeks by the dialectic development of thought to construct the development of the world in nature and in history after the same plan, starting with Spinoza from the axiom that the order and connection of things is one with the ideas. Thus the different threads combine in the philosophy of Hegel which come from Spinoza and Leibniz, Herder, Fichte, and Schelling. But artistically as Hegel weaves them together, imposing as is his attempt to cause the whole contents of the cosmos to rise out of the dialectic of the notion as out of nothing; yet this ideal genetic or dialectic method is in truth the weakness of the system and the cause of its failure. That he apprehends the world as development, in which reason is the ground, law, and object of all becoming, this

is Hegel's strength : his weakness is that he apprehends this development only as an ideal, logical one, which accordingly is to be built up by pure notional dialectic.

In the sphere of the philosophy of religion, as well as elsewhere, this may be seen to be the case. It has contributed greatly to the understanding both of the psychological and of the historical phenomena of religion that Hegel taught us to regard the religious relation as a process within the mind, developing itself from lower to higher stages and forms according to immanent laws, laws which are essentially the same in the macrocosm of humanity as in the microcosm of the individual. He thus provided the key for the understanding of the history of religion. The different religions appear on this showing not as works of chance, of arbitrary invention or irrational error, nor yet as produced by the unexplained feeling and taste of individual virtuosi, who attract kindred souls and collect them round themselves. They are rather the various stages in the process of the development of the religious mind ; they are relatively rational inasmuch as in each of them some particular side of religious truth is specially if one-sidedly set forth, till in the absolute or the Christian religion the mind comes to itself and becomes aware of its freedom in God. In this way the whole history of religion, both pre-Christian and Christian, is taken as the process of becoming, which reason *a priori* underlies, and through which it realises itself, and the old dilemma of unhistorical rational religion, and irrational historical religion, at which the Illumination laboured so long and so much in vain, is recognised as a false abstraction, making room for a rational historical religion and a historical rational religion. Or in other words the right of the religious self-consciousness to its own thinking is reconciled with the historical religious community, recognising at least a relative truth in its doctrines and worship. To have set up this ideal problem of the science of religion, and to have shown the possibility of its solution, this is the imperishable achievement of Hegel, an achievement which deserves to be all the more highly valued at a time when religious differences show everywhere such a tendency to grow sharper and to cover a wider field.

But great as was Hegel's insight in discerning in every part of the religious process, in small and great alike, the development of reason, he yet made a great mistake in introducing into this field also a mere logical development, and theoretical processes of consciousness. He thus missed from the first the right point of view for the understanding of the specifically religious element; the fact was overlooked that religion springs from the heart, and not, like science, from the head. It inevitably followed that Hegel's theory of religion leant too much to the side of the intellect, as Schleiermacher's had leant too much to the side of feeling. The errors of both thinkers arose out of their character and mode of thought; and were further confirmed by the opposition in which they were engaged against prevailing errors. As Schleiermacher's Herrnhutist sentiment was repelled by the barren cleverness of the Illumination, so the vagueness of Romanticist subjectivism and æstheticism raised a feeling of opposition in Hegel's solid thinking, which always cared only for the thing itself, for the kernel of the thing. All the value and dignity of religion, to which he was with his whole soul devoted, seemed to him to be in danger, if its whole significance should be placed in the subjective form of feeling, and the objective reasonableness of its contents, its truth, overlooked. To this extent Hegel was undoubtedly right: his mistake was only that he paid too little heed to the distinction so strongly insisted on by Spinoza between the theoretical truth of science and the practical truth of religion, or that he regarded both as merely the lower and the higher stages of a theoretical process of consciousness, and not as co-ordinate forms of the one human personality. The evil consequences of the mistake, however, appeared less plainly in himself than in his disciples. To his harmonious all-uniting nature truth was so much a matter of the heart, that he could conceive no knowing of it that did not seize, elevate, and purify the whole man. Thus in all his contentings for what is true in religion there is a tone of conviction and devotion, a pathos of the heart, which is all the deeper that it does not mirror itself in reflection about feeling, any more than it puts on the conceit of superiority and isolation. Hegel's whole

Philosophy of Religion is the evidence of this, particularly the beautiful introduction with which he opened his lectures on religion.¹

Religion he here shows is not the region of a feeling which shyly shuts itself up against thought, but rather "the region in which all the riddles of the world are solved, all the contradictions of profounder thought illuminated, all the pains of feeling lulled to rest; the region of eternal truth, of eternal peace. In its dealings with religion the mind gets rid of all that is finite; these dealings bring it satisfaction and emancipation. Religion is a consciousness absolutely free, the consciousness of absolute truth, and so itself true consciousness. Taken as feeling, it is the enjoyment which we call blessedness; as an activity, it does nothing but manifest the honour of God and show forth his glory. The peoples have always regarded this religious consciousness as their true honour, as the Sunday of their lives: all anxiety, all care, this sandbank of the finite, floats away in this ether, whether in the present feeling of devotion or in hope. In this region of the spirit flow those waters of Lethe, of which Psyche drinks, in which she sinks all her pains, changes all the hardness and darkness of time into a dream, and transfigures them into the glory of the eternal." A hymn to religion so deep in feeling and so great in conception, it would be difficult to find in any other philosopher. This of itself shows us how far Hegel was from denying that religion embraces feeling as one of its elements, or that the inner activity of devotion belongs to it, the ascent in feeling to the eternal and the meeting with him in worship. But equally a part of religion is in his view reason as a knowing faculty, the activity of understanding, of thought; and hence reli-

¹ The following discussion is based on the *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion* (Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion) which were published from Hegel's remains, with the assistance of the notes of some of his students, by Dr. Philip Marheineke, and form the eleventh and twelfth volumes of the collected edition of his works. I am not acquainted with any monograph on Hegel's Philosophy of Religion; the usual statements of it are more caricatures than true accounts of it. On Hegel's life and philosophy Rosenkrantz and Haym have written, as is well known, from different points of view.

gion is not a mere subjective thing, but a thing possessing objective truth of universal validity—in fact, it is the region of absolute truth, and hence it comes that there can be a science of religion which works out the truth which religion contains in an undeveloped state. There could be no science of religion were the assertion true that religion consists only in an immediate knowledge, and that there cannot be such a thing as a knowledge, an understanding, of God. This immediate knowledge is only the undeveloped beginning: when it seeks to be considered as the whole, it becomes a false abstraction of the understanding, and has to be exposed by true philosophical knowledge as a mere abstraction, and one which is onesided and untrue. The result of the abstract reflection of the understanding is merely to know *that* God is, not *what* he is; such reflection, therefore, in reality denies the idea of God, and thinks his highest essence as dead and empty, not as comprehensible, not as concrete contents or as spirit. To the philosophical notion, on the contrary, God is spirit; and the essence of spirit is just to manifest itself, to be for the spirit, to be manifest, to be the object of knowledge. “God is truth. But in so far as man has still faith in the dignity of his spirit, so far as he still has the courage of truth, he is driven to seek the truth; it is not a void, it is a concrete, a fulness of contents; this fulness modern theology obliterates, but it is our aim to recover it again by the notion.” The problem is therefore to develop by thought the contents of divine truth which are given in religion immediate and undeveloped, to unfold these contents, and to do so according to the necessity of the case, of the contents themselves, and not according to fortuitous opinions and suggestions.

The right of “reasonable” or speculative thought is thus upheld against the subjectivist position of the philosophy of feeling and understanding (often thus named together by Hegel). On the other side he defends the cause of philosophic thought about religion as against the positive doctrine of the church. These two cannot simply contradict each other, he judges, because there cannot be two reasons or spirits, one divine and the other human, completely

different from each other. "Human reason, the consciousness of man's being, is reason generally, or the divine in man; and the spirit in so far as it is the spirit of God is not a spirit beyond the stars, beyond this world: God is present, omnipresent as a spirit in all spirits. God is a living God, active and operative. Religion is a product of the divine spirit, not an invention of man. What has manifested itself as religion is a product of the divine spirit, and first shows itself as faith. To say that God governs the world as reason would be meaningless did we not assume that he has to do with religion as with other things, and that the divine spirit produced it in the peoples." Hegel is therefore convinced that in the positive religions, in the reason present in church doctrine, there is contained divine spirit, truth, and that it may therefore become the object of rational thought without having to dread destruction. It is quite impossible for his solid thought, which always proceeds on the basis of the unity of the mind, to content itself with the weak devices of timid spirits, which think that the way for faith and thought to live at peace together is to ignore each other, to break off mutual relations, avoid contact, and each follow its own path. "It is vain to think that faith in the contents of religion can survive when once reason has become persuaded of the contrary: the church has been consistent and right in not letting it be thought that reason can be opposed to faith and yet subject to it. The human mind is not so divided into compartments, so that two things which contradict each other can dwell in it together." As for those theologians who despise philosophic thought on religious problems and refuse to let theology be called a science save in so far as it is turned into the study of history (and philology), Hegel wittily remarks about them that they are like the clerks in a great trading house who keep books and accounts only with regard to the property of others, who only trade for others without having any capital of their own. They receive a salary, it is true, but their office is merely to serve and to register what belongs to other people. "History has to do with truths which *were* truths, namely for others, not with such as are the property of those who deal with them. But in philo-

by and religion the great matter is that the spirit itself receive its own, something of its own, and judge itself worthy of the knowledge." Finally he deals with those who think that before proceeding to reasoned thought it is necessary first to examine reason herself and fix her limits. "If we are not to begin to philosophise," he says, "till we have taken reasonable stock of reason, we cannot begin at all, for while we are engaged in knowing, we are not comprehending reasonably. But this was just what we were not to do; we were to know reason first. This is just the position of the man from Gascony who would not go into the water till he had learned to swim. We cannot examine a reasonable faculty without being reasonable." The relation of finite spirit, finite reason, to the divine cannot therefore be dealt with in a preliminary discussion on the theory of knowledge. Indeed it forms the main subject of the philosophy of religion itself, and must be dealt with when it comes up as it must necessarily do in its own place in that philosophy. This living in the matter and drawing out of it and from no external source is what makes the difference between science and "ideas about science," which are not thoughts, but "chance bubbles of thought." The Kantian criticism of the faculty of knowledge Hegel considers to be a phenomenon of the age the importance of which (for theology) had been quite mistaken.

Hegel divides the philosophy of religion as follows. In the first part of his discussion he develops the notion of religion: in the second he sets forth definite religion or the notion in its various historical manifestations, and in the third he demonstrates the unity of notion and manifestation in the absolute religion, namely Christianity.

The *notion of religion* Hegel defines as follows. It is "the relation of the subject, the subjective consciousness, to God, who is spirit," or "the finite spirit's knowledge of its own essence as absolute spirit." In this there are two sides to be forthwith distinguished, which have reference to each other and are inseparable from each other but by no means identical (as they are generally taken to be); on the one side "the elevation of man to God, or the (subjective) consciousness which is conscious to itself of God,

of spirit," and on the other side "the spirit which realises itself in consciousness," or the absolute spirit knowing itself in the finite spirit. There are thus two factors which work together in religion, two moments, only the unity of which constitutes religion, a subjective human element and an objective divine; and only in the coming together of the two which takes place in worship does religion realise itself as an entire divine-human consciousness. The first point from which according to Hegel we must set out, is spirit generally, in its absolute being and its absolute unity, or God. Then as a second we have to consider the standpoint of consciousness or the difference of the finite spirit from the absolute where the subject finds itself in the relation of difference towards God, God appearing as an object, as an outward; in this way religion is the "representing consciousness," and in this lies the difference of it from philosophy, "in which spirit is conscious of him not in the way of representation but in the way of thought." But while that which is on the other side is still external to the representing consciousness, in the completed religious act, in *cultus*, this externality resolves itself into an inner unity. "The third point is the removal of this antithesis, this separation, this distance of the subject from God, the bringing about that man feels and knows God in himself, lifts himself as this subject to God, gives himself the certainty, the enjoyment, the happiness of having God in his heart, of being united to God. This is worship. Worship is not merely a relation, a knowing; it is a doing, an act, it is giving ourselves the assurance that man is accepted by God and taken into his grace. The simple form of *cultus*, the inner *cultus*, is meditation, a mystic thing, *unio mystica*." And hence, because in *cultus* man reassures himself of his own true being as spirit in union with God, the far-reaching influence of religion on the world's life issues from this point. "For the manner in which the subject defines its ends in mundane affairs depends on the substantial consciousness it has of its own truth. As the religion of the nations is, so must also their morals and their constitution be. The tendency of morals and constitution is impressed on them by the view the people has taken of the freedom of its spirit, whether it has

taken a limited view of that freedom, or has attained the true consciousness of freedom" (namely, in its religion).

The development of the notion of religion begins accordingly with *God* as the first moment of it. To the religious consciousness it is well known what *God* is; but this well-known idea is not known scientifically until its contents are developed. Here, as a still undeveloped beginning from which thought has to set out, *God* is no more than mere universality, in which there is no limit, nothing finite, nothing particular, which in reference to development is that which is shut into itself, in absolute unity with itself. What can here be predicated of it is absolute existence and only existence, and that everything existing has its root and its existence only in this one. Thus *God* is the absolute *substance*, the only true reality. If this thought were held abstractly, this would be Spinozism, for in substance subjectivity, the ideality of the spirit, is not yet given. Hence there can be no standing still at this first statement of universality, which as the simple always comes up first into consciousness: the substance must become subject. But even in making this step the initial contents still remain the fixed foundation to proceed upon; in the whole of the rest of the development *God* never steps out of his unity with himself, he is not a mere ground out of which the differences grow, all differences remain included in this universal. But as little is he an inert abstract universal (the "resting unity" of Schleiermacher), he is the "absolute womb, the infinite spring, from which all proceeds, to which all returns and is eternally contained in it. In this way pantheism or the representation of *God* as abstract identity (substance) is transcended on its own lines, inasmuch as *God* is here not mere substance, but also determined in himself as subject, as the spiritual activity of positing differences (judging) and removing them (concluding), in short as spirit. "Spirit is absolute manifesting; this is positing, being for other. *God's* manifesting means his creating another, the subjective spirit, for which he is." The being of *God* accordingly does not consist in seclusion, in an undefinable and unknowable universality, but just in revealing himself, as spirit and for spirit. This even Aristotle and Plato knew,

when they said that God was not jealous so that he should not communicate himself. But the Christian religion, as the revealed religion in the highest sense, has this and nothing else for its essential doctrine, that God is revealed to men, that they know what God is. What was thus given in the Christian religion from the beginning in the way of religious consciousness, is in philosophy the "result" of thinking. Only this is not to be misunderstood as if God were represented as a mere result. The result of thinking ceases to be a mere resultant because it is the absolute truth, and is "as much the first as the last;" but certainly it is not merely the beginning, but also the end, the result, inasmuch as it results from itself. This and nothing else is the notion of spirit.

From the being of God as spirit there follows accordingly of necessity his becoming manifest for man, or the fact of religion. But how—this is the next question—does man become conscious of this revelation of God? In what form of the subjective consciousness does religion, this relation of spirit to spirit, realise itself in him? Spirit as finite is related first to nature as an outward, and is herein not free; but as it is free, notwithstanding, in its essence, this unfree natural relation is in contradiction to its true and higher nature as spirit; hence it retreats from this contradiction of itself into its ground, its true being. "It is just this, to emancipate itself from the vain, and to lift itself up to itself, to itself as it truly is; and this elevation is the emergence of religion. This process which is demonstrated in its necessity has for its final result, religion as the freedom of the spirit in its true being. The true consciousness is only that of the spirit in its freedom. In this necessary process lies the proof that religion is true." Here we have, compendiously stated, the fundamental thought of the Hegelian philosophy of religion; it proves religion to be true by recognising in it the process and the form of consciousness by which the spirit lifts itself up from its natural restriction to the true freedom in God which its essence requires. We see, too, how intimately this fundamental thought of the Hegelian philosophy of religion is connected with the later position of Fichte; while it is related to the "feeling of absolute de-

pendence" of Schleiermacher, if not as a contrary which excludes it, yet as a truth undeniably much higher and richer.

This process of the elevation of the spirit above its natural self-contradiction to its true and free essence, which is the subjective side of religion, is now described by Hegel in three forms which at the same time are related to each other as rising steps in the development of the consciousness of spirit. They are feeling, idea, and thought.

In his discussion of *feeling*, Hegel attacks in a thoroughgoing way the feeling-theory of the faith-philosophers and of Schleiermacher. The aptness and truth of this attack ought not to be ignored even though (as is certainly the case) it is in some respects onesided and distorted. The statements that God is given to us in feeling, or that we possess immediate knowledge of God, are, according to Hegel, quite right and by no means to be questioned; but at the same time they are quite trivial, so much so, that a science of religion which limited itself to them would have no good claim to exist. The great mistake of this standpoint lies not in what it says, but in its having no more to say; its desiring that no more should be said than these self-evident statements, its representing immediate knowledge as the only religious knowledge. A theology based on such a limitation is "as much contrary to revealed religion as to rational knowledge." Feeling is, according to Hegel, the immediate form, in which any matter is posited in consciousness as ours, its quality as our own. But this form can, as experience teaches, have the most varied, the most contradictory, contents; it may contain what is meanest as well as what is highest, what is most true as well as what most trivial. "That anything is in our feeling, proves nothing good about the thing itself: God, if he is in feeling, has no advantage over what is worst. The most royal flower blooms there side by side with the most mischievous weed. Nor is the question whether a thing exists to be settled by the fact of its being present in feeling: imaginations are there which never yet existed and never will. Those who appeal to their feelings when their arguments are exhausted cannot be reasoned with any further, Hegel says; "for a man's appeal to his

own feeling breaks off communication between him and others. On the ground of thought, of the notion, on the contrary, we are on the ground of the universal, of what is reasonable; there we have before us the nature of the fact, as to which we may arrive at some understanding: we bow to the fact, it is the element that is common to all. When we pass away to feeling we have the fact: we withdraw into the sphere of our own fortuitous state, and just look how the thing appears there. Up to this point we can agree with Hegel; but he errs by excess when he goes on to characterise feeling as what man has in common with the brutes, as the animal, sensuous form. He obviously confounds spiritual feeling, which alone is in question here, with physical sensation, which is an entirely different matter.

But cannot the true and the good be in feeling too? This Hegel is far from seeking to deny: in fact he expressly says, "it is essential that all true contents be in feeling, in the heart:" because only so can it be truly ours, our personal property. Religion must certainly be brought into the heart, if the man is to be formed religiously; the heart, the feeling, must be purified and cultivated by the reception of the true spiritual contents; thus only does it come to be true, higher, good feeling. Here he makes the striking remark that "having God in the heart" means more than only having a feeling of God; for while feeling is but momentaneous, fortuitous, fugitive, the use of the word "heart" points to such a feeling as is a permanent, persistent, mode of our existence, to that which we are not only at the moment but always, our character, our principles, our habits, our fixed methods of action.

The heart, accordingly, or the habitual mode of feeling and willing, is the fixed form in which the truth becomes a *permanent* possession of the individual, and a fruitful motive. On the other side however it is said that the heart is the *spring*, i.e. the *first* mode in which such a content appears in the subject; as the seed is the first mode of existence of the plant, so feeling is the first mode in which the spiritual content appears still wrapped up, which is afterwards to be developed. Taking the two statements together we

should expect to find the result to be that feeling is both beginning and end, both point of departure, goal and point of rest of the religious consciousness, between which two ends the theoretical and practical activity of the ideas and of (inner) worship were the connecting bond. And this would really be the truth of the matter. But this right view is distorted by Hegel in a fatal way; in his further discussion he simply leaves out of account the permanent and necessary significance of feeling in religion, which as we have seen he had so happily described, and makes it appear as if feeling were *only* the first form of consciousness of religion, a form still imperfect, and therefore needing to be transcended, and resolved into idea and thought. He is here led astray by the error in method which permeates his metaphysic (and which it is true he derived from Fichte), the error of passing from one form into another as the higher, of setting up a negative relation of disappearance, of the resolution of one thing into another, where there is in truth a purely positive relation of co-existence and interaction of several equally essential forms of mind. This appears very distinctly even in the manner in which the transition is prepared from feeling to idea, feeling being here considered as a positively reprehensible attitude of mind. "The reason why feeling is so much in favour is that in it man has before him what is particular to himself. He who lives in a matter, in the sciences, in practical life, forgets himself in it, has no feeling about it, for feeling is a reminiscence of himself. He, with what is peculiar to him, is in this case a minimum. Vanity, on the contrary, and self-complacency, which loves nothing better than self, and lays hold of nothing more eagerly, and seeks to remain in the enjoyment of itself, appeals to its own feeling, and so never comes to objective thought and action." This is manifestly the opposite extreme to the feeling-theory, and equally mistaken. This depreciation of feeling as empty self-enjoyment reminds us of the similar transition from morality to conduct in Hegel's philosophy of Right, where the former, which is said to reside in the conscience of the subject, is depreciated by the representation of the conscience as the abstract subjectivity which is always on the point of going after

evil. But the resolution of feeling into higher forms of consciousness evidently conflicts with Hegel's own very pertinent observation that truth to be quite our own must be taken up into feeling, into the heart, as well as with his view of *cultus* as the mystic act of religion. We must therefore conclude that what here as in other cases prevents his correct fundamental thoughts from exercising their proper influence, what introduces into his philosophy of religion an error of far-reaching scope and consequences, is the mistaken principle of his method.

The form of consciousness next above this is, as we have seen, the idea, or inner view, in which consciousness has before it as an object that content with which it was immediately one in feeling. In religion truth is in the form of idea, that is what distinguishes it from philosophy, which strips off this form and changes it into that of the notion. The idea has sensuous forms which are borrowed from direct vision, but in which a spiritual content, a higher meaning, is expressed. It is truth in a sensuous dress or in a sense-image (parable). Of this nature is the whole of the sacred history; the matter of it is divine, but it appears in the sensuous form of events taking place one after another in time and beside one another in space; as when the relation of God to the world is set forth in the story of God's creating the world, or when the nature of God is set forth in a number of qualities which are external to each other and fortuitous (attributes). This is always the way in which things are set forth in religion: a spiritual content, a unity which contains a multiplicity of determinations, is either taken as a simple unity without its determinations (abstractly), or its determinations are taken isolated and made external to each other, without the unity of thought which held them together. In the first case we never arrive at a nearer acquaintance with the content, in the second the content is set forth in its characteristics, but in such a way that a thing inwardly connected and only true in its unity now falls asunder into a collection of onesided, and in their onesidedness contradictory qualities (*e.g.* Man is free: man is also dependent). And we have also to remember that the idea does not embrace the

necessity of its content, but simply accepts it as a thing given, as a positive, or accidental, fact.

In all these respects it is *thought* that makes good the defect of the idea. On the one hand, it breaks up the abstract simplicity in which the content appears in the idea, into the multiplicity of inner determinations, develops it, sets it in motion, separates what is separable. In the next place, it gives the isolated determinations of the idea reference to each other, and in this way brings home to the mind the opposition between them (thus the contradiction first appears with thought, but by no means as if thought had produced it, as the feeling-philosophers contend; thought only brings it to the light). Thought exercises reflection and judgment, where the idea is content with seeing. And finally thought lays hold on the various isolated determinations of the idea, which as such were accidental and contradictory, and embraces them in the inner unity of the conception as its various moments or sides; it comprehends the opposite in its unity, the accidental in its necessity. Thus thought lifts up the content of immediate knowledge to mediate knowledge, which is aware of its grounds, unfolded into its determinations, or developed. Nothing else than this is what is meant by the so-called proofs of the existence of God, which presuppose the immediate consciousness of God, but are by no means rendered superfluous by that presupposition, inasmuch as they are nothing but a demonstration of the process of reason in its elevation from the finite to the thought of God.

Here Hegel bestows special consideration on the relation of reflecting to truly reasonable or speculative thought. "Reflection is the activity of setting up the opposites and passing from one to the other, without, however, bringing about their connection and thorough inward unity." Hence mere reflecting is not suitable for religion. It fixes the intellectual antithesis of finite and infinite as entirely exclusive and admitting of no bridge. In this way, too, the infinite on the other side, which excludes the finite, becomes itself a limited, a finite thing; and on the other hand the Ego reflecting on its finiteness already transcends it, and in its very reflecting is aware that it is

setting the limit to itself, so that the finite appears as the infinite again, as the alone essential, by which the infinite on the other side is set up as a mere reflection of itself. Thus the antitheses of reflection pass into each other, and the humility of the finite Ego passes into the arrogance of godless self-deification. But religion requires that a station be found at which the Ego may both be denied in its particular subjectivity, and maintained in its essential freedom in the truly infinite. For religion is itself this transaction, this preserving the true self in God by giving up the finite, selfish Ego. Hence the essence of religion can only be fully comprehended in a thought which passing beyond the antithesis of reflection knows the unity of both in the true infinite. Here accordingly the finite is a moment of the divine life, the infinite is this movement in itself; to make itself finite and lift up the finite into itself again. In the Ego, which makes an end of itself as finite in religious consciousness, God returns to himself; hence religion is not only our knowledge of God, but at the same time "the divine spirit's knowledge of itself by means of the finite spirit, the self-consciousness of the absolute spirit," which makes an end of its self-differentiation as finite consciousness, and restores it to unity again by going out beyond finiteness in religion. Here God the absolute Spirit might appear to be no more than the result attained by the finite spirit; but Hegel remarks with emphasis that this is only the consequence of the fact that our contemplation starts from the finite spirit, while the result spoken of has this in it essentially, that it does away with itself as a (mere result) and is the absolutely First. For while that which was first in the process of our contemplation, the finite world, both nature and the finite spirit, is itself lowered in the result from the immediate to the posited, to a mere means for the absolute spirit, at the same time the absolute spirit which is conscious of itself is known as the truly First, the positing, and the finite world as that which is posited by it and is destined to betake itself to it again. He expresses this idea of God with great clearness, thus: "God is the unity of the natural and the spiritual, but the spirit is Lord of nature, so that the two do not possess equal rank in this unity. It is in this way. The unity is

the spirit, not any third in which the two are neutralised : the indifference of the two is itself the spirit. It is firstly one side and secondly that which goes past the other side and is thus the unity of both." This shows very clearly the difference of Hegel's idea of God from that of Schelling's system of identity, and from that of Schleiermacher's dialectic. With these thinkers God is merely the indifference, *i.e.* negation of the antithesis of spirit and nature, the excluding empty unity, hence neither a positive creative principle nor a truly spiritual one. Here, on the contrary, he is the positive unity which includes the antithesis in itself in such a way as to be the ruling power above it, and in positing it to extend beyond it. He is therefore the absolute spiritual principle, which is not related in the same way to both members of the antithesis, but posits in the one (nature) the means, and in the other (spirit) the end, in the means the other than himself, but in the end, himself.

The foregoing sketch, which is given in Hegel's own words, seems clearly to show that the common view (which came into vogue through Strauss and Feuerbach) is mistaken in understanding Hegel in such a sense as makes God spirit only in the finite spirit, while in himself he is not spirit but a merely physical principle. Hegel, it is true, often appears to suggest some such view, and it might be deduced from the perverted principle of his dialectical method, according to which the movement of our thought, to which spirit is the last that knowledge arrives at, is to be regarded as the real movement of the absolute itself. That that, however, which comes out last at the standpoint of our finite thought is not so in reality, but that, on the contrary, the absolute spirit is the first and the ground which posits all else as the mere means of its own appearing : this is as clear as possible, and is repeatedly and clearly stated in the sentences we have quoted, as Hegel's own view.

Another misunderstanding has to be noticed which is closely connected with the above. It is said that according to Hegel the mere finite spirit as natural spirit is one with God, or even the sole Deity. This interpretation (also brought into currency by Strauss and Feuerbach) is the worst possible distortion of Hegel's actual

teaching. Such a view would exalt pure naturalism to the throne ; but nothing could be further from this than Hegel's idealism, which was merely the consistent systematic carrying out of Fichte's high moral idealism. Spirit, so far as it is still determined as natural, is for that reason still a thing pertaining to nature, an existence actually unspiritual though meant and fitted for spirituality, and therefore the other against God, which has still to be made one with God. To this end there is required the whole of the heavy labour of the world's history and of every individual life, the work of moral cultivation, of religious sacrifice and elevation, of intellectual self-collection and knowledge. All this is needed for the refining away from the undivine Ego of the dross of naturalness and finitude, and the bringing to the light of the true divine self. The words of Scripture, "Whosoever will lose his life, the same shall keep it unto life eternal," is the theme of the Hegelian philosophy of religion as well as of that of Fichte. The whole section on *cultus* is a variation on that text, and this section is the kernel of Hegel's philosophy of religion. Here religious depth forms an intimate and natural alliance with speculative strength, and the conflict, elsewhere deemed insoluble, between feeling and thought, is shown to be not insuperable, if only both go deep enough.¹ Hegel truly says that there can be no material difference, that there can only be a difference of form between true complete religion and philosophy : the Christian cardinal doctrines of the grace of God, justification, the holy spirit of the Church, can only be really understood by an effort of speculative thought.

Worship is first of all *faith*, the living means by which the Ego draws near to its absolute object. It can come to man by outward authority, but this outward forms only the means, and must fall away before there can be true faith. This latter "is the witness of the spirit concerning the spirit, and this involves that no finite contents can find a place in it ; the spirit only witnesses of the spirit, while finite things are recommended by external reason. The true ground of faith is the spirit, and the witness of the spirit is by its

¹ Here compare Constantin Rössler's estimate of Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, *Das Deutsche Reich und die Kirchliche Frage*, pp. 272-82.

very nature living." Faith may start from outward testimonies and authentications such as miracles, but this is as yet a mere formal faith, and must be replaced by true faith. If this distinction is not drawn, men are required to believe things which they cannot believe when they have attained to a certain degree of cultivation, and what can only be of value as a means to true faith is demanded for its own sake as an essential article of belief. Faith so demanded is faith in a thing which is accidental, and therefore cannot be the true faith for the true faith has no contents which are accidental. That accidental faith the Illumination has partly disposed of, and orthodoxy will no longer be able to uphold it. "Whether the guests at the marriage at Cana got more wine or less is perfectly indifferent, and it is a purely accidental matter whether a certain man had his hand healed: for millions of men have crippled and withered limbs which there is no one to cure for them, etc. The unspiritual is from its very nature not the contents of faith. If God speaks, that is spiritual: spirit is revealing itself to spirit."

Now this true faith and its inner authentication by the divine Spirit, which bears witness of itself in it, and thereby awakens it, is the inner, and indeed the first, moment of worship. Worship is more precisely an (inner) act, the aim of which is God's being in man, the activity of "uniting myself with God in me, of knowing myself in God as the truth of me, and God in me, and to give myself the highest, the absolute enjoyment," in this unity. Now this act is a two-sided one; it embraces God's doing, grace, and man's doing, self-sacrifice, self-surrender. Not that the two activities are external to each other, or stand over-against or limit each other, so that the divine grace excluded man's freedom and man were a mere passive material, a stone, to God's working: the aim, the divine, is to come to pass in me and through me; my giving up myself is my action, my work, but at the same time that of God, who moves himself to man and obtains existence in man by the removal of what is merely human. "What appears as my doing is then God's doing, and conversely." The good is here no longer an empty shell, an ideal, to be produced by me, brought by my subjective human power into a God-forsaken world; on the

contrary, it is itself "divine power, eternal truth," which realises itself in me and through me, when in the sacrifice of self-renunciation I surrender myself to its working. This deeply religious thought certainly touches the centre, the heart of the Christian doctrine of salvation : and it is at the same time the legitimate outcome of the notion of religion above described, and of this whole speculative system.

The stages and forms of *cultus* having been spoken of in their outward manifestation as well as doctrine, the part of Hegel's philosophy of religion dealing with principles closes with a very acute discussion on the influence of religion on social conditions and on the constitutions of states. Hegel is of opinion that religion and the foundation of the state are, broadly speaking, the same, inasmuch as both grow out of the disposition, out of the fundamental view man takes of his nature and destiny. Hence a want of freedom in religion will be followed by the absence of freedom in the state, a wrong notion of God will lead to bad laws and government. Or where the state bases its constitution on the principle of freedom, but religion does not recognise that principle, there great conflicts arise, as those between the modern state and the Catholic Church,—conflicts in which Hegel considers that the state must use force against the adherents of the hostile religion and thrust them out of the government. "Religion as church must then submit in externals." He cannot indeed ignore that this is far from settling the great conflict, since the religious principle which is hostile to the state may maintain its hold of the minds of the citizens. He also sees quite clearly that a mere separation of church and state is far from solving the difficulty between them. For the form in which truth exists for the people and the ultimate principles of morality possess validity for the people is always just the form of a *prevailing religion* ; now if this religion is not in harmony with the principles of freedom there always remains an unsolved difference, a relation of hostility, a thing contrary to the notion of the state. In this respect the Protestant states have a great advantage to start with ; they are agreed in principle with the religion, as Protestantism expressly insists on freedom, conscience, private conviction.

The second part of Hegel's philosophy of religion treats of "particular religion," *i.e.* religion in the various stages of its historical realisation before Christianity. These various positive religions are the appearance each of a particular moment of the notion, they are one-sided representations of the essence of religion not adequate to that essence, but on that very account the necessary stages through which the notion itself requires that religion should develop and realise itself. Hegel distinguishes, first immediate or nature-religion, which answers to the childhood of humanity, then that of mental individuality answering to the age of youth, of the emergence of mental freedom; and in the latter again three forms: the religion of loftiness or Judaism, of beauty, or the Greek, of outward utility, or the Roman, religion. Then comes the "absolute religion," in which the notion itself becomes phenomenon, Christianity, the religion as it were of ripe manhood. The classification at once reminds us of Lessing's view of the history of religion as an education of the human race; but on comparing his view with Hegel's philosophy of the history of religion we see that the latter is in several respects an advance and improvement on the former. For one thing, the idea of the immanent development of mind is here carried out consistently, as was not the case with Lessing, who was hampered by a want of clearness as to the principle of revelation. Then Lessing's sphere of vision was much more contracted; he fixed his attention almost exclusively on the religion of the Bible, and only touched on heathen religion occasionally when directly in contact with that of the Bible, while Hegel's philosophical view embraces the whole circle of the religions (so far as they were accessible to his age). And finally it cannot be denied that Lessing is still to a great extent entangled in the error of the unhistorical rationalism of the 18th century, which applied to individual historical forms the abstract pattern of the religion of reason, and merely asked how far they corresponded or failed to correspond to it; while Hegel seeks to understand every religion from its own immanent principle as a factor in the development of the idea of religion, and stands, at least as far as his principle goes (how far the execution answers to

the principle is another question), on the ground of objective historical study. It is through him in fact that this mode of treatment of such questions has mainly come to prevail as it now everywhere does. In this respect Hegel stands much nearer Herder than Lessing, and I believe that the great progress we notice in Hegel's philosophy of religion beyond both Lessing and Kant could scarcely be accounted for had not Herder's *Ideas on the Philosophy of History* been written in the interval. Hegel has a more accurate eye than Herder for the proper starting-point and for the general law of the development of religion, Herder has more insight into the manifold natural conditions and factors of the religious consciousness (natural impressions, poetical ways of thinking, etc.). We may properly bestow some attention on these two points: other details of this part of Hegel's philosophy of religion we may pass over, as the accounts he gives of the different religions were based on too uncertain and defective historical data.

The section on the beginning of nature-religion, or the primitive condition of man in religious and moral respects, is, for its ingenuity and delicacy, a jewel of critical and speculative discussion. The idea of man's first state in Paradise as one in every way excellent and of a perfection never since attained, of a golden age of blessedness and goodness and unclouded fellowship with God, etc., Hegel considers to involve the confusion of what is first in the notion with what was first in reality, first to appear. The notion, the essence, the constitution of man is certainly to be spirit, to think and will in accordance with reason, to know nature and God: but this idea of man is here set forth mythically (and this, by the way, is one of the most striking examples of the "forth-setting" or idea, on the ground of religion) as a thing past, not as the inner part, the permanent nature, the ground and impulse of development from the first, but as a thing that actually existed, as man's external state at the beginning. But the notion is not a state, only the realisation of it makes states, and this realisation must be of quite a different nature from that which appears in the mythic forth-setting. The spirit, to be really spirit, reasonable thinking and free willing,

must first withdraw itself from its absorption in nature, and fall out with nature, by this falling out to reach atonement, or the true self-conscious oneness. The immediate unity of the spirit with nature, on the contrary, is not a state of superior excellence; on the contrary, it is a state unworthy of the spirit, a state of rudeness, of desire, of savagery; the "innocence" of the natural man is based on nothing but this animal insensibility, on the want of the moral consciousness. The loss of this innocence, far from being an irremediable misfortune, was rather a divine necessity. "This is the eternal history of man's freedom, that he issues forth from the insensibility which envelops him in his early years, to the light of consciousness, or more precisely that there comes to be for him good and evil." It is true that this stepping out of insensibility and unconsciousness into the light of consciousness, of the moral law, of discipline and labour, appears in the first place as an evil; but this is only one side of the matter; the other side is, that in the evil there lies from the first the spring of healing: truths which Hegel extracts in the most interesting way from the Bible legend of Paradise and the fall. If the will for good is only the result of education and labour purifying from selfishness, if the knowledge of truth and of God is only the result of thought raising itself above the perceptions of the senses and the abstractions of the understanding, then natural immediateness cannot be the true existence of religion, but must rather be "the lowest, the most untrue stage of it." These thoughts have by this time passed pretty generally into the mind of educated people, and the world has as usual forgotten the tree on which the fruit grew.

But should we further ask by what psychological processes, by the force of what inner motives and outward enticements and occasions the religious development of mankind is to be conceived to have issued out of the primitive state, we must not expect a satisfactory answer to such a question from Hegel. Such a realistic historico-psychological mode of study was not in his way, his whole dialectic method pointed in a different direction. Instead of entering into such a question, he surprises us with the "metaphysical notion,"

sufficiently attended to, we should have thought, in the first part. In this notion, in the logical dialectic of its moments, we hear that the historical process and advance of the religious consciousness of humanity finds its necessary and entirely fitting explanation. This, it is true, is only the natural outcome of the formal principle of this philosophy generally, according to which the logical formal relations and movements of our thought are at the same time the real relations and movements (processes) of the actual. But few will now deny that this principle, by which he determines the method of his philosophy, is the weak side of it. It can no longer be thought to be the problem of the history of religion to construct the positive religions out of the dialectic of the notion of the absolute. For we know that the factors which are at work in the life of the peoples and in the formation, development, and change of their religion, are too numerous, and each of them determined by too many influences without and within, to admit of an adequate explanation being found in the *a priori* schema of certain abstract categories for the multiplicity and the rich variety of the actual phenomena. Here therefore the idealism of Hegel has to be supplemented by a sober realism which builds on the foundation of historical facts. And yet we ought not on the other side to forget, that no scientific, and specially no philosophical treatment of matters found in experience can have in view any other end than this: to bring out and to draw into the light of consciousness the ideas, the reason, the order, the design, which are present in the real, and are the inner power that moves it.

Both the merits and the defects of Hegel's philosophy of religion are found concentrated in his *Speculative View of Christianity*, which is executed on a large scale, and forms the third part of his work. The transition is characteristic with which he passes to Christianity both in his philosophy of religion and in his philosophy of history. It is the unhappiness of the age, the negation of the spirits of the peoples and their beautiful and joyful ideal world by the fate embodied in Roman Cæsarism, it is this pain of mortified subjectivity out of which Christianity, the religion of atonement, came forth. Now it is undoubtedly true that the unhappiness of the age prepared the

way for Christianity, and was in one view the *conditio sine qua non* of its spread and its victory ; but for all that, the negative condition is far from affording a positive explanation of Christianity. Hegel says not a word on the fact that Christianity issued out of Judaism and cannot be understood apart from the historical hope of Judaism. The actual historical genesis is here—and this is one of the most signal instances of this false method—replaced by the dialectic of the notion ; as in the Logic becoming issues directly out of nothing, so here the religion of universal freedom issues directly out of the negation of the free self-consciousness of the peoples. “ In dealing with this religion,” Hegel says in the Introduction to this section,¹ “ we do not go to work historically according to the method of the mind which begins at the outside ; we set out from the notion.” But is it not implied in Hegel’s own particular premises that the notion is to be found just in the history in which it has its being, and should therefore be deduced from its own history ? And is not that mode of treatment an “ outside ” one which does not derive the notion of a historical phenomenon from the history itself, but imports it from subjective thought ? With such questions before us, we should be inclined to say and justified in saying that the realistic turn of the post-hegelian reaction, the demand which justifies that reaction that thought should start from the fact, is only the carrying out of the true principles of the system as against the false method of scholastic treatment to which Hegel perverted it.

Christianity is characterised by Hegel as the “ absolute ” religion, in which the notion of religion is realised—*i.e.* made one with the appearance of it ; as the “ revealed ” religion, in which the revelation of spirit for spirit, which makes the essence of religion, has come to our consciousness, so that God is known as he who bears witness to himself in our spirit as truth and love. Hence it is also the religion of “ truth and freedom,” in which the spirit becomes aware of itself according to its true being, according to its oneness with God, and in this removal of the separation, this atonement, also arrives at its true freedom. Hegel then adopts a division of his treatment of Christianity in which he first speaks of God in and for

¹ *Religionsphilosophie*, vol. ii. (Works, xii.) p. 166.

himself, in the element of eternity, then of God in his self-dividing and appearance in the element of time, of history, and finally of God in his return from appearance to himself, in the process of atonement as the spirit of the Church, which is the eternal in time. These three forms he then denominates, according to the terminology of the Church, as the kingdom of the Father, of the Son, and of the Spirit.

In the Christian doctrine of the Trinity he sees the thought which lies at the root of his speculative idea of God. God is this living activity of distinguishing himself from himself and returning to himself, this eternal process of setting up the difference and removing it. The "Trinity" as number is not what is thought of here; it would show the absence of thought or of any notion to introduce this form of number here. As little is "Person" thought of, a notion which would have the effect of fixing the differences over-against each other which are posited in the living divine unity not as fixed but as solved. In the same way the notions of father, son, and spirit are childish modes of representation, images for the true thought that God is not the abstract One, the undifferentiated identity of reflection or the other-worldly omnipotence of the Jewish religion, but "the concrete unity of the distinguished," or "eternal love," for love is a distinguishing of two who are simply not distinguished for each other; this "being by one's self in another," this contemplating, feeling and knowing of the unity in the difference—this is love, and this and nothing else is the Christian idea of God. This being of God is not a mystery in the ordinary sense of the word: least of all in the Christian religion, the very place where God has revealed himself as this love entering into humanity and lifting humanity up to itself. This oneness in difference is only a mystery for the sensuous mode of thought and for the reflection of the intellect, which everywhere regards differences as fixed, and is thus led to irreconcilable contradictions. But every living thing is this contradiction in itself, is a constant arising and removal of the contradiction; "only dead intellect is selfsame and identical, but in the idea the contradiction is solved, and only the solution is the spiritual unity." This speculative interpretation of the Church's doctrine of the Trinity is certainly one of the most interesting contri-

butions ever made to a well-worn subject, and goes to the root of the matter; so far at least as a dogma which religious, historical, and philosophical forces have all helped to form, and of which they have made a very witch's tangle, can be unravelled by speculative forms. For in fact what is the Church's Trinitarian doctrine of God, but a combination of the Hebrew God-consciousness with the Hellenic, of the transcendence of the one supra-mundane God with the immanence of the manifold divine in the world and in human life? And Hegel's idea of God, is it not a perfectly analogous combination of the Spinoza-Schellingian substance with the absolute subjectivity of Fichte? the enlivening of the stiff uncommunicative unity, which abides beyond the conflict as its hidden ground, by making it enter into the finite and by means of it enter into transaction with itself, and take up, as "unity in difference," its opposite into itself? And does not this view agree completely with the apostolical word that of God and through him and to him are all things, a word in which the Church has ever recognised the root-thought of its doctrine of the Trinity? sim. h

This philosophy of Christianity reaches its highest point in its doctrine of the division and atonement of the spirit, which is one of the profoundest contributions ever made to this central idea of the religion of redemption. The difference lies in the very nature of God, but receives a definite existence as an independent other, as world; but as the world derives its existence entirely from God it is destined to return to its origin, and to pass from the division to atonement. But the difference is not fully developed in nature, which remains true to its own essence and character, faithfully obeys its own laws, and does not step outside of the substance, the necessity of its being. Man, on the contrary, is called to be or rather to become actually what he is essentially; it belongs to the notion of him that he should place himself over-against his nature, his present state, and enter into the division between his essence and his actual state. And his consciousness is itself the act by which this division is set up, for consciousness is the distinguishing of him, this particular subject, from himself, his universal being. In this discord between the subject and his notion, which is set up with and by conscious-

ness, lies the necessary and natural basis of evil. For while man posits himself as subject, as this particular being, his will is in the first place merely this particular will, is filled with what belongs to singleness, with particular impulses and inclinations; *i.e.* the natural man is self-seeking. Evil, accordingly, is not a struggle in which man engages with a foreign power, nor a conflict of man's reason with the alien power of sense; nor is it merely a defect of power in the consciousness of God as against the sensuous consciousness; no, it is the inner self-contradiction of the spirit, the contradiction of its existence and separate state as an individual subject, and its universal nature as spirit. Hence evil accompanies human freedom from the first as the first mode of its manifestation. Freedom contains in itself the essential moment of that division; it arises in the feeling of independent existence over-against other being, even against the universality and reasonableness of the will. "In this division independence is set up, and evil has its seat; here is the source of evil, but also the point from which atonement ultimately arises. It is both the beginning of sickness and the source of health." When the Church calls this evil which adheres to man from the first the original sin he has inherited from Adam, which began with Adam's fall, "this again is the sensuous way of speaking; the first man means, when we think of it, man as man, not an individual, not this man or that, not one out of many, but the first absolutely, man according to the notion of him. Man as such is consciousness; if so, then he enters at once into this division. . . . The division lies in the very notion of man; the one-sided representation of evil as the work of an individual is supplemented by the idea of communication, inheritance."

But this natural state of evil is accompanied from the first with the need of its removal, for the division of the spirit in itself is at the same time its deepest unhappiness, its infinite pain. When it rises to an extreme the opposition comes into consciousness in a double form, and occasions in two ways a feeling of unhappiness. On the one side, the subject feels itself out of harmony with the absolute, with its true nature, with its duty which confronts it as the one pure will of God commanding what is good: feels itself accord-

ingly inwardly condemned, humbled, broken, and annihilated—the unhappiness of the *Jewish* consciousness. The other unhappiness is equally profound—the subject feels himself at discord with the world ; it is at variance with his thinking and will, and he is driven back into the inwardness of his free self-conscious Ego ; but while thus seeking satisfaction by fleeing from the world and from reality, and ceasing from action and from feeling, he flees at the same time from his own actuality, loses all his will could strive for, all that gave value to life, becomes an abstractly free, *i.e.* an empty and vain Ego. This is the unhappiness of the *Roman* consciousness, as it appears in Stoicism and scepticism. Thus the division which forms the platform of the natural man issues in a double one-sidedness : in the negation of the Ego or in the abstract affirmation of the Ego and negation of the world ; and the need of the spirit for *atonement* is felt equally on both sides.

The division is in the spirit itself, which therefore possesses the infinite energy of the unit which supports the contradiction ; and here lies the objective possibility of the removal of the contradiction. But it must be asked, Will the subject be able of itself to effect this removal ? “ It shows little insight to think that it can do so.” The subject itself stands on the side of one of the conflicting powers, and all its activity is and remains one-sided, and is always, being as it is, subjective, done in mere abstract freedom, entangled, that is to say, in the opposition which has to be surmounted. On the contrary : “ the oneness of subjectivity and objectivity, this divine unity must be the presupposition of my positing ; then only has this any contents ; otherwise it is subjective, formal merely. This presupposition once made, it loses its one-sidedness.” This necessary presupposition, without which the antithesis is not to be removed in the subject and for it, is just the recognition of the truth that the antithesis is in essence removed already, namely, in the being of the absolute spirit, in so far as it is living unity, atoning love ; only because it is removed essentially, in truth, can its removal be attained for the subject too, and atonement be accomplished, appropriated, in the subject. Man can only know himself taken up,

accepted in God in so far as God is to him not a strange being, his relation to whom is merely outward, but in so far as he knows that in God his own being as spirit, as freedom, as subjectivity, is affirmed. But this essential unity of the divine nature with human nature can only be brought home to the consciousness of man, can only become an immediate certainty to him, by God's appearing as man and man as God. That which is the essential nature of spirit, to be the unity of divine and human nature, enters into the consciousness of religious, not of philosophical, humanity in the form of a visible object. In this way the Church's idea of the divinity of Christ is explained from an inner necessity of the religious consciousness at the stage of the religion of redemption. This is not affirming the existence of a God-man in the sense of the Church, but explaining how the belief in the incarnation came about in the consciousness of the Church. How far the historical Christ was necessary to the rise of this belief Hegel does not discuss; he was much more concerned about the truth of the principle of that belief and its inner necessity than about the historical form in which it first appeared. Yet we find a hint here and there bearing on this point. Christ's preaching of the kingdom of God, we are told, expressed the conviction that the atonement of God with man was a reality, and that all that remained was that man should place himself within this truth, in the kingdom of love to God. "This was brought forward in the language of enthusiasm, in such penetrating tones as make the soul tremble and draw it forth, away from physical interests. Seek ye first the kingdom of God! Blessed are the pure in heart! Such words belong to the greatest that have ever been uttered. The kingdom of heaven and purity of heart contain a far greater depth of meaning than the inwardness of Socrates." Christ here speaks out of the real unity of his consciousness with the divine will, and yet essentially as a man, in whom the divine working does not come as something superhuman, in the guise of an outward revelation, but in such a way that "the divine presence is identical with the human."

Should a doubt yet linger as to the meaning of the Hegelian

interpretation of the Church's doctrine of Christ, it would be completely solved by the suggestive observations on the meaning of the death of Christ for the belief of the Church. Before his death Christ was a man, who by his teaching and his life made men know what was the truth which must form the basis of their religious consciousness; that God is not on the other side from them, not far away, but present in his kingdom, that he is love, and that this assurance must become a feeling of our own. But the words of the man Jesus are only rightly, spiritually, apprehended by faith, and this spiritual faith is only the result of the death of Christ. "Only with this death do we make the transition to the religious; the relation to the mere man changes into a relation which is moulded by spirit, so that the nature of God is revealed in it. The consciousness of the Church which thus passes from a mere man to a God-man, the view, the consciousness, the certainty, of the oneness and union of divine and human nature, this is what the Church begins with, and what constitutes the truth on which she is founded." And just because this higher consciousness of God's being atoned with the world dawned on the Church in its full spiritual significance only after Christ's death, the Church regarded this death itself as the central point of the atonement, and saw in it the absolute love which even in finiteness overcomes finiteness, and by which death, that great negation, is itself denied.

This, therefore, is the main part of the history of Christ as it exists in the faith of the Church: this is the meaning of it (the ideal religious truth), that it is the history of God himself, *i.e.* brings home to us his nature as spirit, as love, as the principle which atones the division of the finite. And here also lies its sole authentication, the proof that it is true; in comparison with this proof outward proofs from miracles are of no account; that is a mere mechanical way of authenticating. God is in nature, he and his power, according to eternal laws, but the true miracle is spirit itself. The Church, Hegel considers, ought not to enter on the inquiry as to the truth of the narratives of the appearances after the resurrection, if only because that inquiry seems to suppose that there is some

importance in the sensuous element of the appearances, in the historical authentication, of which the spiritual truth is entirely independent. Should this appear to make ideal truth indifferent to the historical nature of the garb in which it appears, Hegel goes even further in this direction, and makes the significant statement that "what is to possess truth for the spirit, what it is to believe, must not be a sensuous belief; the belief which is true for the spirit is one in which the phenomenon of sense is treated as of small account. The spirit begins with the sensuous and comes to it as a thing worthy of itself, but its attitude towards the sensuous is at the same time a negative attitude. This is an important point." Thus we see that those who would dispense with criticism in the interests of dogma are not entitled to appeal to Hegel for support, any more than those naturalists who consider that by their criticism of the historical form they have got rid of the ideal contents too. Hegel draws a clear distinction between the two things, though he does not everywhere attach the same importance to the distinction, and often appears to ignore it altogether.

0.257 Thus Hegel had in the first place explained why it was necessary that the idea of atonement should be clothed in a historical form. Only in this form could it appear as a thing that had actually taken place, and was to be believed and built on, and so be brought home to the consciousness and appropriated as objective truth. But he now goes on to show that this form of the matter, in which it appears as a thing that once took place, offends in some degree against the truth of the idea, and to point out how this one-sided view may be corrected. It does not represent the whole of the truth, when the process of atonement, which is the very nature of spirit, is spoken of as an occurrence which took place at a particular time, and happened to a particular individual. The truth is that this one person means all men, and this once means always, but it does at first sight appear as an empirical fact that happened to one man and no more, and belongs to a past which is no longer here. Now this one-sided representation is "integrated" first of all in the form of concrete ideas. The absolute present of atonement is divided into

its moments, past and future. Thus there comes about as a supplement of the past history the sensuous representation of its repetition and completion in the future, of the "Second Coming," and the change from the outward to the inward in the idea of the "Comforter." In these two ideas the empirical isolation and externalisation of atonement gives way to a belief which is universal, permanent, and inward (as the doctrine of the fall of Adam was widened by the idea of the transmission of his sin to all). But this integration takes place at first in a merely external way: no more being done than to add to a one-sided view another equally one-sided. The main change, the replacing of the outward by an inward, only takes place by the different "subjects themselves passing, in their own experience, through this history, this process," which they first regarded as an objective divine history (transacted outside them and for them). The right relation of the subject to the truth of the atonement is that it should itself "come to this same conscious unity, should deem it good for itself, produce it in itself, and be filled with the divine spirit. This its pure self-consciousness that knows and wills the truth, is the divine spirit in it." And here, in this carrying out of atonement as a subjective process in and on individuals, the Church realises itself. The Church is an institution existing for the end that men should come to the truth, that the Holy Spirit should be really present in them, and that they should do the works of the Spirit. The means to this end is teaching, in which the Church develops into the idea (representation), the consciousness of truth which is first felt as an immediate, felt witness of the Spirit. In baptism we have the declaration that the world the child has entered is not the hostile world but the Church, in which evil is overcome in its essence and its sway, and God essentially reconciled. All that is wanting is that the individual should then form himself for the Church by education, exercise, and cultivation, and should habituate himself to the good and true which is already present in her. In this consists his regeneration. "Man must be born twice, first naturally and then spiritually, like the Brahmin. The Spirit is not immediate; it *is* only as it gives birth to itself out

of itself; it is only as the born again. The natural heart in which man is entangled is the enemy he has to contend with." That is the business of the Church, this education of the Spirit so that the truth may grow always more truly one with his self, his will, and come to be his will, his spirit. Here there is no mere shall, never-ending advance, striving that is never fulfilled, as in the Kantian philosophy. Here, on the contrary, the difference is already solved in its essence and power, evil is known as already vanquished in the spirit in its principle and sway, and the subject has only by means of this spirit, in faith in the atonement which is already there in its essence, to make his will good, and for his consciousness evil has vanished, sin is forgiven. This action is on the one side the action of the subject, which gives up the form of its immediateness, its particular, isolated, independent being ("dies with Christ"): on the other side it is the action of the divine Spirit in him. "Faith itself is the divine Spirit, acting in the subject; but the latter, be it noted, is not a mere passive vessel. The Holy Spirit is the spirit of the subject too, in so far as he has faith." In the Lord's Supper this presence of God in man is given as an immediate feeling in the soul of the individual of his union with God.

But what thus takes place in worship as an inner certainty, as a process in the depths of the subject, must also come forth and be present outwardly. Feeling must be developed and expanded to the objectivity of the kingdom of God. The atonement only becomes perfectly real when, instead of remaining in the unseen places of the heart, it shows its presence in the outward development of the whole of the world's affairs. The subject, once made aware in its reconciliation with God of its infinite value, of its freedom, will assert these in the face of the world too. But this can be done in various forms. The first and lowest is that of monastic renunciation of the world, in which freedom asserts itself only negatively and abstractly. The second form is the union of religion with the world, in which the latter as the undivine is slavishly subjected to the former as alone divine and of value. But the Church thus ruling the world sinks into unspiritual worldliness, because the world is not really atoned

with it. At last this contradiction is solved; the principle of freedom penetrates the world too, and moulds it in accordance with eternal truth. In morality, which is the realisation of the reasonable will, the atonement of religion with the world is accomplished. brought out

But it is not only in the real sphere of practice that the atonement of religion has to work out its effects. Besides the reasonable moral order of life it brings about here, it has also to play its part in the ideal sphere of rational thought, of science. Here, as in the former case, it is the abstract form of negation in which the subject, when it grows conscious of its autonomy, first asserts itself. It turns against the world of traditional ideas, with which it is surrounded: its thought is that of the Illumination. The reflection of the intellect, fixing on the contradiction which it finds in every religious statement, comes at last to the result that God cannot be known, that nothing can be known of the supersensible, and that each man has a religion for himself in the feelings of his own heart. But as the subject thus retreats to the point of its own infinity, everything objective, the objectivity even of God, of justice, of morality, comes to be a mere subjective assertion, a thought the mind has framed for itself, and the contents of which it has borrowed from its own arbitrary caprices. (Compare the illusion-theory of Anthropologism.) This religion of the Illumination or of abstract thought stands at the platform of Judaism, or, more precisely, of Mohammedanism (Allah is Allah, as here God is $x = x$). The higher platform is that at which the subject knows and acknowledges the contents, which it is true that it develops out of itself, out of its own spiritual nature and religious consciousness, to be necessary and objective, and to have an essential and independent existence of their own. Here thought is no longer the mere abstraction and negation of what is immediately given, it is a comprehending, and therefore a justifying, of the contents, both in point of their necessary existence and in point of the forms of their development. These forms of course are known as produced under certain historical conditions, and their limits are known too. (Criticism was in the Illumination the whole, but is here reduced to a mere moment of the thought which comprehends. As such it is kept

and has its place.) Philosophy, especially the philosophy of religion, has thus two sides; on one side it agrees with culture and reflection in not standing still at the form of the idea, but comprehending it in thought, and so doing away with it as a purely positive thing; on the other side it is opposed to the Illumination, inasmuch as the latter does not care for the contents, and despairs of truth. Philosophy's one care is to show the reason of religion. "Thus in philosophy religion receives its justification at the hands of the thinking consciousness. Simple piety stands in need of it, but accepts the truth as authority, and by means of this truth receives satisfaction, reconciliation." On the other hand, philosophy thinks what the subject as such feels, and leaves it to the subject to make the best it can of these feelings. Thus feeling is not rejected by philosophy, but receives from philosophy its true contents. Philosophy only takes in charge the form of belief, the substance is unchanged.¹

If we may judge from these sentences, with which Hegel concludes his philosophy of religion, he cannot have intended to teach, as he is generally supposed to teach (not without plausible evidence from other passages, *e.g.* the transition from religion to philosophy in his Encyclopædia), that religion is destined to lose itself in philosophy. Religion in its own sphere is to him the highest, the complete practical reconciliation of man in his heart. What philosophy has to add is merely this, that what religion *is* as life and experience it teaches us to know for thought and in thought, as reasonable, true, and necessary; philosophy "justifies" it; "reconciles reason with religion." Immediate piety does not require this assistance: so Hegel himself says, fully admitting the religious life to be completely independent of philosophic thought. But it is the human mind as a whole that "insists on knowing what there is in it"—even in the case of religion. And that this harmony of the whole man, this reconciliation of religious feeling with thought, is a higher position than one of antagonism between feeling and reason, no one will deny who does not, as perhaps some do, regard the state of conflict as the normal and desirable state of the human mind.

¹ ii. 287 *sq.*

SECTION IV.

TENDENCIES OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF THE PRESENT DAY.

HEGEL'S philosophy of religion closes the history of this science. It is the last complete and uniform system of the kind, and at the same time the most perfect fruit of the speculative idealistic philosophy. That its method is false and that its *a priori* dialectic of the pure notion requires to be supplemented by an examination in thought of the real material of experience, we have more than once remarked. In this at least the modern reaction to empiricism and realism must be admitted to be right. That reaction, however successful in exposing the defects of Hegel's system, and so bringing his empire to an end, has not been able to set in its place any new system that even approached it in acuteness and profundity, in unity and systematic completeness. Thus we find ourselves in a sort of interregnum in philosophy: the power of the last great systems is broken, but no new one has yet proved its right to succeed them. This is the natural soil for *eclecticism*, the method which goes back to earlier positions, and seeking to combine them with each other, to supplement the defects of one from the stores of the rest, brings them forward in a more or less renewed form as attempts at a view of the world to satisfy the present day. It is certainly interesting to observe how in our fast-moving age almost all the positions taken up in succession by philosophic thought from its modern awakening down to Hegel, are reproduced one after another for our acceptance, each regarding itself as the last while the feet of those who are to carry it out are already at the door. Here, however, we confine our-

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CHAPTER I.

ANTHROPOLOGISM AND POSITIVISM.

HEGEL said at the close of his philosophy of religion, that with regard to positive religion philosophy has two sides. She agrees with cultivation and reflection in not standing still at the form of the idea (*Vorstellung*), but embracing it in thought, and so doing away with it as a merely positive thing; but on the other side philosophy disagrees with the Illumination in the want of interest the latter has for the contents and in its despair of truth. These two sides the master himself combined; but of his followers some took one side and some the other, each finding in the side it adopted the whole and sole truth and outcome of Hegel's thought regarding religion. In proportion as each side hardened in such a partial view, did it depart from the true spirit of Hegel's philosophy, and lose itself in blind dogmatism or shallow rationalism. There were but a few, and we shall afterwards be led to speak of them, who developed and advanced Hegel's ideas in a fruitful way.

A tendency to conservatism is always and properly native to speculative philosophy. Seeking reason, as it does, not in an abstraction but in reality, as that in which the idea is embodied, it cannot but recognise the element of rational truth contained in what history delivers to us, as the most important element of it, which it must recognise and defend against sceptical reflection. That this should lead to exaggerated efforts at restoration is no more than natural; and it will not be denied that Hegel himself was carried away by such a reactionary current, especially in matters political. And it is no wonder that this tendency first asserted itself among his pupils, and was cultivated in a one-sided way in the theological as well as in other spheres. Such men as Gabler, Goeschel, Rust,

Konradi, Marheineke, and Daub, founded a scholasticism in which the Hegelian ideas were employed with more or less aptness and taste to refurbish church dogma, and dialectic became little more than the means to put to silence sober and reasonable criticism. They considered it to be the task of reason to cast doubt upon doubt, and they simply ignored the rights of critical reason even on the purely historical field, and how much more on that of dogma. Hence, as Strauss says of Daub, "It was their fate, instead of raising again the body of dogma, slain by criticism, in the incorruptible ethereal garb of the notion, to restore again the old corruptible body, and instead of making all things new, to leave all things old." Entangled in such dogmatism and scholasticism, it is very comprehensible, that in spite of all their talented playing with ideas, they failed to make any solid advance in religious science.

To this one-sided conservatism there was a corresponding reaction in the equally one-sided radicalism of the so-called *left* side of the Hegelian school. The first and most energetic representative of this reaction was Ludwig Feuerbach,¹ who has no other claim to be regarded as a member of Hegel's school than that he started from it; as his repugnance to the abstract idealistic notional dialectic soon carried him into a realistic empiricism, which issued ultimately in a very unphilosophical materialism. He retained, however, two features of that school, a keen eye for the kernel of things, for the active principle of the phenomena of experience, and a capricious tumultuous way of forcing realities under some one-sided point of view or other, and on the strength of a few generalising observations, arriving at wide generalising statements, without taking the least trouble about accurate proof. Feuerbach himself indicates the way in which, from an adherent of Hegelian speculation, he came to be a, materialistic atheist: "God was my first thought, reason my second man my third and last: the subject of the deity is reason, but the subject of reason is man." The Hegelian philosophy Feuerbach characterised as "rational mysticism," because it clings to the absolute

¹ *Wesen des Christenthums*, 1841 (this work was translated into English by Miss Evans (George Eliot) under the title of "Origin of Christianity"). *Ursprung der Götter*, 2d edition, 1866.

subject as the *causa prima*, and does not resolve it in the dialectic process as in strictness the dialectical method would require. Thus starting from the weak point of that philosophy, which we saw was just this method, he completely dissolved it and turned it into its opposite. Hegel sought to develop the absolute idea in such a way that the whole fulness of the determinations of thought, which our thought reaches as a result, should also be regarded as the principle of our thought and its eternal presupposition, and therefore as an essential and independent subject which contains in itself as its essence those determinations. Feuerbach, on the contrary, simply resolved the absolute subject into its various momenta or the divine attributes, and so destroyed it. God himself became to him an empty essenceless abstraction, whose place was then taken by "the divine" goodness, wisdom, love. But these are mere predicates: they have no independent existence, and can only exist in a subject; and thus, the absolute subject having disappeared, there remained only man as the sole reality of the divine, or as the only real God. Thus quickly was the philosophy of absolute spirit turned into the position which regards man as absolute, the deification of man, or *anthropologism*.

Everything exalted and superhuman that religious faith or philosophic thought takes to be the ground of man's life, this system (which however afterwards passed into naturalism in Feuerbach's own hands) regards as an unessential product of fancy, in which man beholds as in a mirror outside himself, his own nature. "Man simply cannot go beyond his own true nature. He can represent to himself by his fancy individuals of a different and presumably a higher kind, but from his own race, his own nature, he can never get away: the qualities he gives these other individuals are always qualities drawn from his own nature, in which he in truth only mirrors himself, and throws out himself as an object. God is the manifest Inner, the self of man clothed in expression. Religion is the solemn unveiling of man's hidden treasures, the confession of his inmost thought, the public confession of his love-secrets." In religion man is related to his own being, but as to another being. Its object is reason thrown out over-against itself, and the heart or the being of

man thrown out over against itself, apart from the limits of the individual, *i.e.* actual bodily man; made an object, *i.e.* contemplated and revered as a being by itself other than man. All the attributes of the divine being are, therefore, attributes of the human being. Man plunders himself to enrich his God, so that God may be all, man nothing. But what he takes away from himself, and is himself deprived of, he enjoys in an incomparably higher measure in God. Now as man is himself a two-sided being, in his reason tending to what is true and good, but in his heart limited, selfish, arbitrary, at variance with the world, so, according to Feuerbach, do also the God and the religion of each man exhibit these two characters, now the idea of the good, reasonable man, and again that of the sick, selfish, and limited, suffering and passionate, heart. And Feuerbach had so keen a perception of this *pathological* side of religion, it interested him so much, that religion came ultimately to be to him little more than this pathological element. At the same time it is not to be denied that his analyses of religious and specially of Christian doctrines, are often extremely suggestive, and that he sometimes lays his finger more accurately than Hegel or even Schleiermacher, on the practical psychological motives which lie at the root of dogmas, and give them their importance in worship.

Disregarding the element of exaggeration and caricature, which one must expect to find in Feuerbach, we find many useful suggestions in what he has to say, *e.g.* on the Trinity, the Incarnation, the God-man. "God as God, as Father, is the separate God, the acosmic and anticomic being, God in relation to himself alone. God the Son is the relation of God to us, but only he is the real God. In God as God man is put aside, in the Son he comes again. The Father is the metaphysical essence, which attaches to religion, because it would be imperfect did it not embrace the metaphysical element. Only in the Son does God become the *object* of religion. God as *object* of religion, as religion's God, is God as Son. In the Son man becomes *object*; in him all human needs are concentrated. As little as the religious man can love a God who has not in himself the essence of love, so little can man, can any finite being, be the *object* of a God who has not in

himself the basis, the principle, of finiteness. Such a God is wanting in the sense of the finite, in understanding of it, in sympathy for it." This remarkable statement is at once turned round by Feuerbach into a subjective form: "The Son appeals to the heart, because the true father of the divine Son is the human heart, and the Son himself nothing but the divine heart, *i.e.* the human heart thrown out over-against itself as a divine being." . . . "The true, real God of a religion is only the so-called mediator (Christ, Mary, the saints, etc.), because only he is the immediate object of religion. The God above the mediator is nothing but the cold intellect above the heart, like Fate above the gods of Olympus." And in this consists the value of the Incarnation. "The contemplation, the consciousness, of the divine love, or, what is the same thing, of God as a being himself human, this mode of view is the secret of the Incarnation. The central point of the doctrine of the Incarnation, of the mystic 'God-man,' is the love of God to man. In so far as God loves man, he is man, he gives up his deity, empties, anthropomorphises himself. The actual Incarnation (*i.e.* of course represented as actual in the belief of men) is the *argumentum ad hominem* of this inner essential humanity of God. God made man is a manifestation of man made God." A further essential attribute of God made man, or rather of God who is man, is suffering. For love proves itself through suffering. Heathen philosophy might think of God as *actus purus*; the Christian heart thinks of him as *passio pura*. For what answers to the heart that is turned into itself and shuns the world is just suffering: to such a spirit suffering is beneficent self-negation; and hence the sight of a suffering deity is the highest self-affirmation, the luxury of the suffering heart. To say, "God suffers," is to say that suffering sensibility is divine. "God is to man the book in which he enters his highest thoughts and feelings, the album in which he inscribes the names of the beings who are dearest and most sacred to him." "First man makes God after his own image, and then this God makes man in turn after his image."

Feuerbach is in his element in dealing with providence, miracles, immortality, and any part of religion in which the subjective factor

of religious thought predominates. Faith in an almighty Providence which hears prayer is, in his view, merely the self-assurance of the human heart, the certainty that the wishes of the heart possess unrestricted validity, that the objective, the outer world, is nothing, and the heart the absolute power. God is just this pure feeling, freed from all limits, the Optative of the human heart converted into the certain and blessed Indicative, the omnipotence of feeling. Here as in general we see that Feuerbach has in his eye only the empirical, pathological form of religion; he forgets that the highest prayer is that of submission. Miracle is, according to Feuerbach, the true expression of the nature of faith. Faith releases the wishes of the subject from the restraints of natural reason; but miracle is nothing but "the realisation of a supernaturalistic wish:" thus outward miracle is no more than the outward incorporation of that which faith can herself do, of the inner miracle which faith is, of the unlimited self-assurance of the particular will, of the lawless caprice and the omnipotence of the heart that is confined to the limits of self, and counts the whole of the rest of the world as nothing—a theory which does justice to one side of the matter, but wholly overlooks the other and the better side! The creation of the world and the future destruction of the world by God are only variations of this same faith, that the objective world by itself is naught, that the freedom of the subject is the only thing that is real. But the power by which the Christian heart gets rid of the objective limits and laws of the objective world, and brings about the freedom it demands, is imagination, fancy. "It alone of all the faculties answers the requirements of the heart, because it removes all the limits, all the laws which pain the heart, and so presents to man the immediate, perfectly unlimited satisfaction of the most subjective of his wishes." "The power of fancy is also the power of the heart: fancy is nothing but the heart victorious and triumphant."

It is in this freedom of heart and fancy, as against the restrictions laid on the intellect by the law of the world, by the reality of nature, that Feuerbach sees the distinctive essence of Christianity. "Christ is the omnipotence of subjectivity, the heart released from all

bonds and laws of nature, the soul concentrated on itself with the world shut out, the reality of all the wishes of the heart, fancy's ascension into heaven, the heart's resurrection-festival;—thus does Christ distinguish Christianity from heathenism." There is a true thought in this, namely, that Christianity is the religion of freedom, of the deliverance of the spirit from all the slavery of the outer world; but the truth is distorted by making it appear as if Christian freedom were the emancipation of subjective Egoism from all the law and order of the world, or the flight of the heart which turns away from the world to a paradise of its own dreams. As a matter of religious pathology this may be a view frequently taken of Christianity, but this is by no means the whole unadulterated essence of it. Feuerbach, it is true, looks for genuine Christianity only in the Catholicism of the middle ages, with its monasticism and celibacy, its scorn of worldly cultivation and of nature, its turning away from the world to heaven. But the Christian heaven has in his eyes the same significance as the Christian God; it sets forth explicitly what lies in the latter implicitly—the subjectivity released from all earthly burdens and limits, the fulfilment of all wishes. "Immortality is the last will and testament of religion. Heaven is the key to the innermost secrets of religion. Objectively heaven is the nature of God unfolded; subjectively it is the frankest expression of the inmost thoughts and dispositions of religion." Hence the variety in the descriptions of the other world, which set forth the various ideals men cherish of the good and true. But what is implied in the ideal of the world beyond is in every case the presence of that which is the reverse of ideal, the contradiction of things as they are in this world.

Thus, according to Feuerbach, religious ideas are in every case—everything turns as we see on this—only subjective products of the fancy, without any objective truth, products of a humour at variance with reason. But are they ideals which are at least subjectively true and fair, legitimate and beneficent, by which man can raise himself—if only in poetry—above common reality, and gain possession at least for his practical consciousness of something nobler than the ordinary world of the senses offers him?

This also Feuerbach denies, thus taking the last step in radical negation, a step in which even those who accompany him thus far generally refuse to follow him, and which it is very questionable if he needed to take in order to be consistent with his thinking up to this point. Religion, Feuerbach says, is the relation of man to his own being, but as a being outside himself. Its *secret* essence is just this identity of the divine and human natures, but its form, or the manifested conscious essence of religion, is rather the difference, the alienation of man from his own being as one outside himself. And while love reveals that hidden essence of religion, it is faith that constitutes its conscious form, its illusion. Faith sets man at discord with his true nature, makes him un-free, prejudiced, selfish, limited, and thus becomes the evil spring of religious fanaticism, and of all the horrors of the history of religion; it sacrifices all moral duties to the selfish interest of the heart in its own salvation, or to the jealous God in whom man's selfish heart takes form before his eyes. Its influence is, in a word, demoralising. It is love which, as the not particular but universal consciousness of the race, heals the wounds which faith has made. But in Christianity love works not because of faith, but in spite of it; it is the exoteric, while faith is the esoteric, doctrine of Christianity. And act as it does, its action is always darkened, sullied, and impeded by faith. Thus, according to Feuerbach, the truly religious element in religion, and specially in Christianity, *i.e.* faith, is an illusion which is not merely theoretically untrue, but practically mischievous. With this bold condemnation Feuerbach's examination of religion closes, thereby pronouncing its own judgment in the eyes of every sober reader. The result is manifestly perverse, but only serves to demonstrate the perversity of Feuerbach's fundamental idea, the deification of man.

In the further course of his philosophy, however, Feuerbach himself completed the critical condemnation of his *irreligious anthropologism* by advancing from it to an *immoral naturalism*. His last word was not *man*, as he had said in the *Essence of Christianity*, but *nature*, of which man, he says, is but a small and weak part. Here the feeling of man's dependence on a higher power asserted itself,

which had been entirely forgotten in the previous self-deification of man; and this might have provided an opportunity for a better appreciation of religion: the object of religion was now no longer an unessential product of fancy, a pure illusion, but a mighty reality outside of man and above him. All that was wanted in fact was the combination of this superhuman reality with the man-like ideal of the former stage into a unity in the idea of God. But instead of turning into this path, which would have led to a true apprehension of religion as at once a feeling of dependence and of emancipation, Feuerbach cast himself upon the opposite exaggeration from his former one, and so made his error ten times worse than before. Formerly the divine consisted in his view in the ideal nature of man, which however possessed no objective reality above man: now the divine is a reality above man, but the ideality of reason, of mind, is wanting to it; it is a mindless material power, which therefore degrades man also to a mere material nature-being. Formerly the error of religion consisted, in Feuerbach's view, in man's taking up an attitude to his own nature as if it were not his own, representing it as a separate being outside and above himself; now the error is said to be that man takes up an attitude to the other being which is outside him (nature) as if it were his own, falsely personifying it in order to enter into emotional relations with it. His theory is true to itself in so far as the object of religion and religion itself is still an illusion to him; but this illusion was in the former view produced by man himself, conscious of his own divinity, of his ideal, free, spiritual nature: here it is the product merely of his unfree dependence on nature, of his weakness and need. And as man is always the same as his God, the deification of nature involves the degradation of man to a mere material being, and the refusal to recognise anything as real but what can be seen and handled. "Man is what he eats,"¹ is now Feuerbach's motto. With ideas generally the idea of man is now declared to be an empty word; nothing exists but so many separate things, and there are only so many separate men, not a human being, which as such (as idea or ideal) could be an object of adoration or of love. What began with the *cultus* of humanity is

¹ German, "Der Mensch ist, was er isst."

consummated in the *cultus* of sense, of matter; and it was a mere inconsistency in Feuerbach, that when he had done away with all objective truth and law binding on the individual, he yet refused to take the last step, and declare naked egoism to be man's sole principle.

This step, which Feuerbach should in consistency have taken but did not, is taken by the pseudonymous author of the book *Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum* (The Individual and his Property), by Max Stirner (2d ed., Leipzig, 1882). This book, written not without talent, calls for serious consideration as a work which, setting out from the premises of *sceptical nominalism*, accepts to the uttermost the consequences of that position, without fear even of the regardless frivolity to which it may lead. The view of the world which makes ideas mere empty words, is not without seductive power, and is certainly charged with danger for an age wearied of thought as this is.

'Man' according to Stirner—*i.e.* the race, the idea, the essence of humanity, is as vain and arbitrary an abstraction as the god or the god-man of the old religion, and the absolute spirit, the legislative reason, the truth, the good, etc., of speculation and of the religion of humanity. "Whether I look to 'Humanity,' the race, to strive after this ideal, or to God and Christ with a like endeavour, what is the essential difference? The former has less colour in it than the latter, perhaps: that is all. As the individual is the whole of nature, so he is the whole of the race. 'Man' is only an ideal, the race is only a conception. To be 'a man' does not mean to fulfil the ideal of man, but to set forth one's self, the individual. I need not think how I am to realise the universally human, but only how I satisfy myself. I am my race, am without norm, without law, without pattern, etc. I will be the enemy of every higher power, while religion teaches us to make such a power our friend and to be humble towards it. . . . The fear of God, properly so called, was shaken to its foundations long ago, and a more or less conscious atheism, to be seen outwardly in a widespread alienation from the Church, has crept into fashion. But what was taken from God has been added to man, and the power of humanity grew greater in the

exact proportion in which religion lost weight. 'Man' is the god of to-day, and fear of man has taken the place of the old fear of God. But man only represents another supreme being, and so nothing has happened to the supreme being but a metamorphosis; the fear of man is only an altered form of the fear of God. Our atheists are religious people." It is true that Christianity robbed the things of this world of their irresistible power, made us independent of them, and freed us from the bonds of sense; but it was only to bring us into a worse subjection to the supersensible, to the spirit and its ideas, truths, prototypes and laws; just as one who grows up from a boy to a young man is freed from the rod, but "possessed" instead by thoughts and ideals. But as the man shakes off these troublesome fetters in their turn, and only asks what is "practical," *i.e.* profitable for him, advantageous for his enjoyment of life, so, according to Stirner, man is now to enter on the sober, unenthusiastic, egoistic age of manhood, where it shakes off all the fetters of its idealistic youthful dreams, all respect for the "Holy Spirit" (whether that of the Trinity or that of humanity, it is all the same thing), as it once shook off in Christianity respect for the things and powers of this world of sense. Those who still believe in any truths, ideas and ideals, and make them a law to man, the pattern he is to imitate, the task he is to accomplish, the idol to which he is to sacrifice himself with his enjoyment of life and his unlimited glory in himself, all belong, as Stirner states in an endless series of unwearied repetitions, to the parsons, whether they be philosophers, schoolmasters, or philanthropists and liberals of the most enlightened stamp. The liberation of humanity is only accomplished when man no longer recognises any higher power above him, above the individual and his property, and no longer draws a distinction between the individual as he is, and "the true man," *i.e.* the imaginary picture of a man as he could be and should be, but when every one regards himself as his only God and Lord, and his enjoyment of self as his sole calling in life, that is, in short, when every one has come to be a radical egoist on principle. "As worldly goods once did, so now must also sacred goods be set forth as things which have

lost their value. Truths are before *Me* as common and as indifferent as things, they do not carry me with them, nor stir up in me any enthusiasm. There is not one truth, whether justice, freedom, humanity or any other, that could stand before me, and to which I should bow down. They are words, nothing but words, as to the Christian all things are nothing but 'vanity.' Truths are phrases, ways of speaking, words (*λόγος* !); brought into connection, drawn up in order, they form logic, science, philosophy. . . Truths are materials that I can use up; material like vegetables or weeds; whether they are the one or the other it is *I* who must decide. Truth is a creature the value of which resides not in it but in me: *taken by itself it is worthless.* A truth above me, *one* truth, according to which I have to direct myself, I do not know. For me there is no truth, for there is nothing above me. Not even my nature, not even the nature of man, is above me. No thought, no feeling, no belief is sacred; they are all *disposable*, my disposable property, and are destroyed as they are created, by me. . . . To give vent to his humour about the littlenesses of men is in the power of every one who has 'lofty feelings;' but to let him play with all those 'great thoughts, exalted feelings, noble enthusiasm, and sacred faith, that presupposes that I am the owner of all these. What religion calls the 'sinner,' humanity calls the 'egoist.' But if I am under no necessity to please others, is the 'egoist,' in whom humanity has brought forth a new-fashioned devil, any more than a piece of nonsense? The egoist at whom the humanitarians shudder is just a bogle like the devil, and exists only as a ghost and a picture of imagination in their brain. They are always thinking still, as did their forefathers, of the contrast of good and evil, only that they have given it the modern names of 'human' and 'egoistic;' or else they would not have revived the hoary 'sinner' in their 'egoist,' and sewed a new piece on an old garment. But they could do no otherwise, for they consider it to be their task to be men!"

Enough of the obnoxious chatter of a frivolous cynical egoism! Why have I quoted so much of such folly and impertinence, the reader may be inclined to ask. My answer is, that the ripest fruits

best show the nature of the tree. The name of this tree is sceptical nominalism, and its root is that anti-rational style of thought, which sees in ideas, definitions, and in reason itself, nothing but empty words, abstractions, and figments of our arbitrary subjective reflection, because it does not recognise an objective thought which underlies our subjective thought, a truth before us and above us, which is valid in itself, and therefore possesses regulative authority for us. "Thought," Stirner says very characteristically, rules the "possessed" world, so long as it is made the presupposition of our own thought, a thing existing by itself, and set up in a position of independence as "Spirit" (under whatever name), as is done specially by Hegel, in whose school language is held which suggests that thought, or the "thinking mind," *i.e.* thinking personified, thinking as a ghost, itself thinks and acts. To this thought man then feels himself subjected, ruled by it, to serve it is his "duty,"—he is "called" to the realisation of its thoughts, therefore not free. Only when it has been perfectly found out that thought exists nowhere but in my head and in similar heads, and that every thought accordingly is my own creature and work, only then are we free enough, feeling ourselves owners of our own thoughts and those of others, to place ourselves *above* them, to emancipate ourselves from their binding power, to be simply what we are, as this or that individual, and to do what we like. "Reason is a book full of laws, all given against egoism." Hence the sceptical denial of reason, that is of its objective *a priori* validity and its inherent truth, is the sure way to the emancipation of radical egoism, and to set on foot theoretical and practical Solipsism. Such is in all seriousness the doctrine of this mad book of Stirner, a doctrine which we shall do well to keep in mind in connection with many of the phenomena of the present day!

But the denial of objective and *a priori* reason leads not only to the destruction of the moral world-order, and the setting of universal egoism in its place: it leads also to the destruction of the natural world-order, and to universal scepticism, *i.e.* it makes it impossible to account for the existence and the knowableness of an orderly nexus of the world. At the very first steps of reflection on the fundamental

problem of science, the possibility and the necessary conditions of all our knowledge, at the very beginning, that is, of serious scientific thought, the Atheism and Positivism of a Feuerbach and his companions, which throw man entirely on himself and isolate and deify the Ego, are seen to be a huge fatuity. This pseudo-scientific position is quite incapable of giving even the rudiments of a reasonable answer to the fundamental question as to the possibility of knowledge, or as to the connection between objective thought and the existence of the world; and in this lies the readiest refutation of it. Only a dilettante philosophy still at the stage of naïve realism, a philosophy, that is, which has never possessed, or having possessed has lost, the elementary insight won by criticism, could be blind to the shallowness of this position. The naturalism, therefore, which arose out of the disintegration of the speculative Hegelian philosophy is a *relapse into pre-Kantian dogmatism*, and has still to trace the steps of the way of self-knowledge; from thoroughgoing scepticism to criticism, from criticism to objective idealism and rationalism, or to the recognition of absolute reason before and above our finite reason. But the fact that such a relapse to pre-Kantian positions took place, and that it became necessary once more to traverse all the stages of the critical process of self-knowledge, proves sufficiently that the Hegelian form of speculative philosophy was seriously defective. It was impossible to stand still at it, as it is impossible simply to return to it; and in so far the truant scholars of this philosophy have done good service, who struck out other paths, and made it necessary to develop it further.

The above remarks apply with special force to the famous theological critic, *David Friedrich Strauss*, who set out from the same point as Feuerbach, and arrived by a similar road at a similar result. By his first appearance as a critic of the Gospel history he rudely dissipated the mists created by the illusion that truth was now held in secure possession, and broke in ungently, especially in the Hegelian school, on the premature treaty between faith and knowledge. It continued to be his vocation to apply the tests of criticism to tradi-

tional belief, and to all halting and vague opinions; and by his unwearied, uncompromising, and courageous fulfilment of such a task he permanently benefited theology and religious science in general. Yet it could not have been foreseen that the bold critic of the *Life of Jesus* would end with such a position as that of *The Old Faith and the New*. At the earlier period he wrote his *Friedliche Blätter* (Letters for Peace), an earnest attempt to sift out the permanent from the temporary elements of historical Christianity as the truly valuable and indestructible kernel of religious truth; and this task he discharged with equal firmness and good feeling. About the same time he wrote his admirable essay on Schleiermacher and Daub, in which he spoke of the critical operation as certainly an indispensable side of scientific theology, but not the only side of it, the speculative reconstruction of dogma with a view to its ideal contents being an equally essential part of theology, and—he still thought at that time—an even more valuable part. At that time he even gave the Hegelian Daub, who believed in miracles, a higher place as a scientific theologian than the critical Schleiermacher! Indeed he so sincerely sympathised with the genial religiosity of Daub as to quote with visible satisfaction the “splendid” words of that scholar: “A people can disappear along with its religion from the face of the earth, but religion itself can never disappear. Its apparent setting is its rise; only in men’s thoughts are the two disjoined from each other. The sun never sets: only to our sense is its rise separated from its setting: the two are really one: the sun sets while it rises, rises while it sets.”

But it was not long before the Straussian *Glaubenslehre* (“System of Doctrine”) appeared, a work which exhibited a marked cooling of religious warmth, and also a great diminution of interest in the positive rebuilding of the dogma criticism had destroyed. The acuteness and the transparent clearness of this work must still be admired as masterly; the criticism of dogma appears as the process of its own history, a natural and necessary process, set forth with playful grace and yet with irresistible force. But the answer to the inquiry as to the “permanent” in this “temporary” was scanty and uncertain;

and one would gather from this system of doctrine the comfortless impression that the only purpose of dogma was to destroy itself by its own history (as Baur somewhere remarks with great point). Behind all these dogmatic representations with their incessant contradictions, which made them all a prey to the inexorable critical intellect, the reader might have expected to find that religion itself remained as an undestroyed and indestructible kernel; but this important point has retreated very much into the background even in this work.

Thus Strauss's final confession of faith published (1872) in his famous work *The Old Faith and the New* shortly before his death, was to those who really knew him no great surprise. If at an earlier period he had been unable to distinguish between dogmatic ideas and their religious contents, it was natural that he should now answer the question: "Are we still Christians?" with an outspoken "No;" for we who live in this age have unquestionably outgrown—all of us, though in varying degrees—the old view of the world on which the dogma of the Church is built. This is apparent from the one fact that we adhere to the Copernican system which turns the old view of the world upside down. But as the central life of the mature man is the same as that of the boy, widely as the thoughts which fill the man's mind differ from the fancies of the boy; so it may well be that the same religious spirit which in Jesus and the apostles called the Church into existence may still be the soul of Christendom to-day, even though it now clothes its religious life in quite different forms of thought. If it be the case, as is generally conceded at least *in thesi*, that Christianity is not identical with the set of dogmatic propositions belonging to any particular period of the Church, but transcends these as every living principle transcends the forms in which it appears, then it is not legitimate to measure the degree of Christianity of any age by its agreement with the dogmatic tenets of earlier periods. Strauss's answer to the second question: "Have we still Religion?" is vague and uncertain. Yes, he answers, in so far as we acknowledge, if not a personal God, yet a universe full of reason and goodness, and regard it with thankful

confidence, with piety. But "reason and goodness" are qualities of mind, and obviously can only be predicated of a subject endowed in some sense with mind. To attribute them to the universe is meaningless, unless by the "universe" we understand (as in the sense of Schleiermacher's *Discourses*) the "Spirit of the World." But where are these qualities of the Straussian "universe" to come from? It is based on no spiritual principle, nor governed by any such principle; it is nothing but the sum of the material atoms, and the result of their blind mechanism. For in the third section: "How do we understand the world?" Strauss embraces an unqualified mechanical materialism, in which by the aid of the Darwinian hypothesis the last trace of ideal potencies, the teleology which is immanent, is put aside and the world regarded as a huge piece of clockwork, composed of material forces which act blindly and without an aim. Combined with such a position, the faint remainder of an ideal view of the world contained in reverence for a "reasonable and benevolent universe," is nothing but a flagrant inconsistency.

A similar inconsistency is to be remarked in the moral principles developed in the fourth section: "How do we order our life?" It is finely said, and commands our full assent when Strauss says, that moral action is a self-determination of the individual according to the idea of the race, that the sum of all morality is never to forget at any moment that you are a man and not a mere nature-being, and that in man nature strives not only upwards but even beyond herself, so that man is called not only not to fall back into the beast but to become something ever better and better, and if he cannot as a nature-being quite escape from the struggle for existence, yet to ennoble it in accordance with his higher powers, and to soften it by remembering how the members of the race belong to, and are mutually indebted to, each other. But what is this? We were told in the preceding section that the world is built up on nothing but blind material forces, and that its aim is to be sought in the struggle for existence. How, then, can nature strive in man to get beyond herself, and so be bent on denying her own essence? And how can

man attain to an "idea of the race," and recognise in it the higher law, to which he is to subordinate the all-embracing law of nature contained in the struggle for existence? We can conceive no more crying contradiction than to base such an ideal moral principle on such a materialism. The position is neither one thing nor another, and cannot be maintained. Either the mechanism of the atomic forces is the power which creates the world, and the struggle for existence the law which shapes it; and then man's life also knows nothing but the pressure of various natural impulses, and the law of the stronger; or if we recognise in the moral law a will of the whole which presents to the individual will a binding authority and a connecting unity, then this will of the whole must stretch back into the basis of the world, and form part of the cause of our being, and be recognised as an ordering spiritual principle transcending the multiplicity of individual forces. On the way of materialism, Strauss is not able to attain to a monistic view of the world. His view of the world breaks down at the most important point, breaks into two halves which are absolutely irreconcilable with each other!

The line struck out by Feuerbach and Strauss was largely followed by the "Young-Hegelians," who, in the beginning of the forties gathered about the Halle or German *Jahrbücher*, edited by Echtermeyer and Ruge. Their strength lay from the first rather in talented and witty criticism than in original production, and with the increasing vigour of philosophical and political endeavour about that time they lost all importance for science. Arnold Ruge, the principal representative of this radical philosophy, published at a later date (1869), *Discourses on Religion, its origin and decay, addressed to the Cultivated among its Respecters*—a work announced by its title as a companion to or parody on Schleiermacher's *Discourses on Religion, to the Cultivated among its Contemners*. But Ruge's *Discourses*, pretentious as they are, contain nothing that is not insignificant and superficial. On the essence of religion, the distinguishing features of the historical religions, the influence of religion on the rest of human life, we hear nothing, nothing at least but

what is one-sided and perverted. The truth shown by recent mythological investigations that the gods were originally personified nature-powers, is announced as a tremendous discovery, and the precipitate conclusion is at once drawn, as if it were a thing admitting of no question, that religion, having begun with the mythology of nature, is nothing more than mythology of nature or fairy-tale, which must disappear as the secrets of nature become known. In the course of his work, it further occurs to him that in the deities of certain religions we are dealing not merely with nature, with meteorological and astronomical Märchen, but also with human ideals, and in an appendix he speaks with great confidence of this "necessary union of humanism and naturalism in all religions" as his original discovery, which only suggested itself, however, as he was writing out his discourses. The latter circumstance may perhaps explain how a number of sentences remain standing in the book which contradict that discovery, speak of every religion as simply a nature-religion, and make every deity, the Christian as well as the rest, a nature-being of fabulous character. It may explain further how the inner relation of these two sides, the change of which fills up the history of religion, is scarcely spoken of at all. Had it pleased the author, instead of pouring out cheap tirades about religious Märchen and modern "illumination" to realise to himself the psychological motives on which the belief in deities was based from the first, he would no doubt have found that the impulse and the instinct of reason were at work in the formation of myths even in the earliest times, and sought to recognise what is highest in man as at the same time the supreme power in the world, to trace in and above nature the presence of a spirit like man's, and by this faith and the service of this higher power to rise to a higher, to a moral existence. Had he seen this, the author would have been led further to conclude that as it was in the beginning, so it is now and ever shall be, that the moral realisation of the true, the beautiful, and the good in man's life must of necessity seek to support itself by believing in a reality of the true and the good above man, and hence that the *cultus* of science, art, and politics, cannot, as Ruge holds with Strauss, thrust out reli-

gion and take its place, but must, on the contrary, rest on religion as its foundation.

All these attempts of idealistic atheists to set the worship of culture in the place of belief in God and worship of God, are marked by a style of thought curiously wanting in thoroughness and definiteness. As against such a mode of treatment, a robuster style of thinking such as that of Max Stirner is quite right in insisting that one of the alternatives be chosen : Either the true and good is antecedent to human thought and action, and exists in itself; then it is the attribute of a superhuman spirit or God existing independently, and as such is a legitimate object of religious adoration and moral devotion to spirits like ours made in the image of God : or the true and good is only set up by this and that individual, then it is not a transcendent, eternal thing at all, it is no longer above us but under us, and there is no longer any reason for offering it adoration, service, or sacrifice. There is no sufficient reason for the practical recognition of the divine as the true and good or as moral ideal, so long as it does not rest on the theoretical recognition of the divine as an independent self-existing reality, and a power all must obey, that is, on a religious belief in God, in whatever way it may be formulated. Take away this foundation, and moral idealism is entirely in the air, and destitute, for practice, of any guarantee of its substantiality and durability. In spite of all the advances of culture the old words will continue true, that the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom !

Fr. S. S. S.

A similar development to that now described took place in France and England during the same period in the rise of the "Positive Philosophy." This philosophy is essentially and fundamentally irreligious, but it makes incursions on the province of religion which are worthy of attention. On the theoretical side it is a renewal or a continuation of the mechanical materialism of the encyclopedists of the preceding century, one of whom, Turgot, advanced in his history of the progress of the human mind the very theory of the three views of the world, the mythological, the metaphysical, and the

mechanical (mathematical), which forms the kernel of the system of Auguste Comte. The only new feature with Comte is that the theory is now applied to the consideration of social life, and a communistic philanthropic ideal of society erected on this basis. This union of a mathematical intellectualism, issuing in barren atheism, with an enthusiastic social idealism, was the peculiar work of Auguste Comte, who, professionally a mathematician and physicist, had become early in life a disciple of Saint-Simon. To the vague, dreaming, and mystical theories of this religious communist, he supplied a scientific substructure in his voluminous work, *Cours de philosophie positive* (1830-1842).

The foundation and the hinge of the system is repugnance to all metaphysical speculation ; a repugnance derived from Saint-Simon, with whom it was the natural instinct of a disposition exclusively practical and sentimental. Comte sets out from the position that the sole object of science is the positive, *i.e.* facts which we know from experience ; and these consist exclusively of *relative phenomena*, relations and occurrences which we perceive with our senses, and from the similarity and the regular recurrence of which we abstract certain "general facts," the systematic setting together of which constitutes the different sciences. Of the causes of the phenomena we can know nothing, nor certainly of a supreme and absolute cause. There is, Comte says, "only one absolute principle ; that there is nothing absolute." Let it be remarked that Comte does not, like his more cautious followers in England, Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, distinguish between the non-existence of the absolute for our knowledge (its unknowableness) and its non-existence in itself (its impossibility) ; to him the one and the other go together, it is a simple matter of course that what is unthinkable is also unreal. This shows a right and proper confidence in the power and validity of our thought : but with Comte this confidence does not flow from self-assurance gained by a critico-speculative victory over scepticism, it is the pure undisturbed naïveté of an empiricism which at once regards the phenomena of sense as realities—an empiricism which, as we learn from many examples in history, assumes a tone of the greatest assurance in its affirmations and denials just

when it is most unconscious of the fact that its own position is without any foundation. The awakening from this position in scepticism marks in every instance the beginning of the process of self-inquiry which leads to well-grounded belief.

The "positive philosophy" which inquires only into facts, *i.e.* the relations of phenomena in space and time, and not into causes, is according to Comte the third and highest position to which the human mind attains in the knowledge of the world, the theological and the metaphysical positions having first been passed through. At first man explained the phenomena of nature as the operations of causes like man, or of spirits which he called gods because he held them to be active beings of superior power, and dreaded the more, the less he was able to understand their operations. That was the first stage of philosophy, the theological. But as time went on the thoughtful came to see that the phenomena of nature which take place regularly and are repeated without change could not be the work of beings who acted arbitrarily and changeably; they therefore substituted for the personal gods of theological philosophy the impersonal "entities" of metaphysics; they explained motion by motive force, its cause, life by vital force, fire by fire-stuff, light and heat from the illuminating and the heating forces, etc. These are pure abstractions which explain nothing and are simply generic names for the phenomena to be explained. In so far as they are represented as the operative causes of phenomena, they are merely weak copies of the supernatural causes of the theological philosophy. The epoch of "metaphysical philosophy" thus forms the transition from the theological to the positive philosophy of which Comte claims to be himself the founder. It does not go back to unknown and indefinite causes, either of a personal or of an abstract nature, causes whose working cannot be accurately traced or measured, and which render impossible any idea of natural laws, and therefore of science. It limits itself to investigating the natural and discernible conditions under which the phenomena generally occur. Its aim is to make us lords of nature or at least independent of nature, teaching us to modify the processes of nature or at least to foresee them, so that we may arrange our conduct in

accordance with them. For this purpose it is quite enough to know under what circumstances each phenomenon occurs. The general facts that certain things take place under certain conditions are what are metaphorically called laws of nature. Stuart Mill (here also more cautious than Comte, the naïve Empiricist) prefers to call them the "natural uniformities," thus remaining more strictly within the range of facts and keeping free from any idea of a necessary dependence. The laws of nature for each class of objects form when taken together a special science, and the combination of these special sciences with the observation of the relations of the laws of one science to those of the others, forms the universal science or (positive) philosophy. As in Comte's view there is no other reality than sense-phenomena, and every existence represented outside of these, whether called matter or spirit, soul, force, or God, is nothing but a chimæra, there can be no philosophy with objects of its own in addition to the phenomena dealt with by the particular sciences; and philosophy can only be the systematic combination of all the separate sciences.

As for the relations of the different sciences to each other, they are only distinguished—so at least Comte taught in his earlier, purely "objective" position—by the greater simplicity or complexity of their objects. The simpler their facts are the more universally valid are they; the more complex the facts the more restricted is the validity of the science. In the first stage stands mathematics; for number, extension, form are the simplest things nature shows us; hence the precision and the universal validity of mathematics. At the highest stage stands the social science, for the relations of men are the most complex of all phenomena, hence the difficulty of discovering its laws. Yet the more complex and the most complex phenomena of the higher spheres of life are ultimately no more than readjustments of the simplest mathematical relations. Now as all propositions of geometry admit of being reduced to propositions of arithmetic, so the problem at which science must labour, though it never can hope fully to solve it, is by an exhaustive analysis to reduce all phenomena, even those of the highest departments, to the simplest facts on which mathematics rest, *e.g.* the law of gravitation.

The positive philosophy accordingly would be, if completed, nothing but a mathematical and mechanical explanation of the world and all its parts. Comte, it is true, doubts if such a science can be attained, and even condemns the precipitate reduction of the characteristic phenomena of organic life to merely physical and chemical elements. He utters a warning against extending the lower sphere beyond its own limits so that the higher is lost in it, and its new and peculiar features disregarded. But in this confession that the mathematical calculus is not adequate to the explanation of biological phenomena Comte is far from seeing a proof that there are any higher principles and laws at work in the higher sphere. Soul or spirit is never any more than a metaphysical abstraction to him, and psychological phenomena he simply traces to physiological antecedents. We cannot therefore blame those (some of them are Comte's own adherents) who hold this philosophy of positivism to be identical with materialism; though Comte declined the term as unscientific, reckoning the notion of matter to be one of the metaphysical fictions, this does not change the mechanical and materialistic character of his system. We can only say of this materialism that it is superficial and incurable because the principle of it is not distinctly set forth.

But it is impossible not to ask what right such a superficial empiricism has to call itself philosophy, nay the highest philosophy, the consummation of philosophy, an empiricism which takes the phenomena of sense for realities without any inquiry, without considering that we find these phenomena primarily only as ideas in our consciousness, or asking how we arrive at these ideas, or what part our own activity has in giving rise to them?—an empiricism moreover which speaks incessantly of "laws of nature" and takes for granted as a matter of course that these laws are constant and always valid, without thinking for a moment whether there is anywhere in the matter of experience such a thing to be found as a law, a necessity in the nexus of events? whether these very notions, causality, necessity, universal validity, are not of such a nature as entirely to transcend all empirical induction, which

never can do more than state a number of individual cases, and to point convincingly to a source that is above experience, *a priori*, or seated in ourselves? Simply to ignore questions and objections of this sort is a naïveté which since the days of Berkeley, Hume, and Kant is not permitted to philosophers. In the preface to his Catechism Comte speaks of Hume and Kant as his principal predecessors, and says that positivism is the systematic working out of Kant's fundamental ideas: but this only shows, how little he understood these philosophers, as he never clearly realised the problems on which their thinking turns, far less understood the mode of solution pointed out by Kant's energetic rationalism.

So much had to be said as to the character of the positivist mode of thought, which in an age weary of thought like ours is widely diffused. As for Comte's religious theory, it answers both in the pretension of its views and in their correctness to what the character of the philosophy, as we have described it, would lead us to expect. We gladly recognise it as an improvement that from his first mechanical physical positivism Comte passed at a later period (under the influence of various experiences of life) to a *moral positivism*, or that, as he himself expresses it, he advanced from the "objective method," which explains all things, man as well as the rest, from the object, from things, to the "subjective method" which pursues an opposite course and explains the world from man, from man's moral feelings. This might seem to indicate a turn such as was executed in the history of philosophy by Kant. But for such a change Comte was too destitute of fixed connection of the various lines of thought. The new subjective method worked out by him in his *Système de politique positive* (1851-54), and his *Catéchisme positive* (1852), stood in no proper connection with his former materialistic positivism, but was only added to it as an external mechanical supplement; the physiological treatment of the life of the soul, which formerly held the ground alone, now finding a strange contrast in the sketch of the pathos of unselfish love. In the "objective method" of the earlier period the subjective factor of our knowledge, the action of thought according to the laws of

our reason, had been quite ignored ; while in the later views the most subjective feeling of all, that of love, sympathy, living for others, is alone held to be valid, and all other powers, those of intelligence among the rest, are completely subordinate to it. We do not find here any scientific proof of the moral law that the personality is to be subjected to "sociability," egoism to "altruism," any more than any proof was brought forward at the earlier stage of the right of the understanding to think of phenomena under the form of laws. Here as there the indispensable requirement of scientific method is wanting, namely the legitimation of the procedure adopted before the forum of thinking reason which alone can sanction it. In the former case, however, this was wanting, because thought had surrendered to things, and imagined itself to receive its law from them ; in the present case it is wanting because thought has surrendered to feeling, and finds its sole law in the particular feeling of love which happens at this time to rule the mood of the positivist—a procedure the arbitrariness of which in point of form is not condoned by the superior character of the contents.

Under the influence of this mood Comte's philosophy changed more and more into a religion—a religion, it is true, which possesses neither God nor soul, but in their place a chief fetish and various other fetishes, and seeks its ideal for the worship of these mainly in the mysticism of the Middle Ages. The old religions, among which Comte assigns the highest place to Catholicism, were theological : his new religion professes to be "sociological," *i.e.* it takes *humanity* for its supreme object, the one human race embracing in itself all peoples and tribes, which he calls "the great being." Humanity has its origin in the earth, and so the earth is placed beside it as the second deity, under the name of "the great Fetish." With regard to the earth too, a question arises as to the cause of its being and its motion ; and as the higher in which the earth exists space is added to humanity and the earth as the great mean (*milieu*), the third in the Comtian trinity thus occupying something like the place of the great tortoise of the savage religions, which has to support the earth. The earth which was originally livelier

and mightier in all its parts than it is now, has reduced, humbled, sacrificed itself in order to bring forth the great being, humanity, and deserves for this sacrifice our thankful adoration as the "great Fetish." But the most perfect object that man can worship is humanity itself, and in it again woman occupies the first place, because the powers of feeling to which Comte now assigns the primacy, predominate in her. The *cultus* of this new religion consists in the thankful celebration of the memory of the heroes of humanity, who have in any sphere made any valuable contribution to its progress. Comte drew out a complete calendar with the names of the new saints of the positivist religion, which forms an appendix to the *Catechisme positiviste*. The months (there are thirteen of them) are named after the most illustrious heroes: Moses, Homer, Aristotle, Archimedes, Cæsar, St. Paul, Charlemagne, Dante, Gutenberg, Shakespeare, Descartes, Frederic the Great, Bichat: the Sundays are named after the heroes of the second rank, those for example of the first month, which is dedicated to the "old theocracy," after Numa, Buddha, Confucius, and Mahomet; those of the sixth month (Catholicism) after Augustine, Hildebrand, St. Bernard, and Bossuet; those of the tenth month (modern drama) after Calderon, Corneille, Molière, Mozart; those of the eleventh (modern philosophy) after St. Thomas, Bacon, Leibniz, and Hume. It is a remarkable circumstance that neither the name of Jesus, nor that of any of the Reformers, or Protestant theologians, is to be found in this pantheon of new saints; and that German poets, artists, philosophers, and scholars, when mentioned at all, are only placed (with the exception of Leibniz and Mozart) among the saints of the third rank, whose names are attached to the days of the week, while the most obscure names of the Latin world are raised to stars of the first magnitude. I am not led to mention this by any patriotic sensitiveness, but it appears to me to be very characteristic of the thoroughly Roman Catholic character of this atheistic religion of the future, a character which may also be noticed in the similarity of the socialistic and religious (hierocratic) mode of describing individuals in all the details of their life with the Jesuit ideal of

education and politics. It would not reward us to enter into detail with regard to the nonsense in which Comte found increasing pleasure towards the end of his life. That he credited us Germans with the least amount of receptiveness for his religion of humanity is the most flattering compliment he could have paid us; but it would be the more deplorable if the progress of a thoughtless empiricism should prepare the way amongst us for French positivism and atheism, a way of thinking so entirely un-German and un-Protestant, and which would involve a breach with the glorious past and with the exalted mission of our race!

The disciples of Auguste Comte were in part more sober, in part more prudent than the founder of Positivism. They were more sober, inasmuch as they rejected the later sentimental religious tendency of their master and his attempt to found a new positivist religion, and regarded it as a melancholy aberration, which showed his mental strength to have given way. They were more prudent, inasmuch as they qualified his dogmatic atheism with a sceptical restriction, and did not declare the idea of God, as Comte did, to be a fiction, but a problematical notion, the reality of which could as little be affirmed as denied; they asserted only the unknowableness, not, as Comte had done, the impossibility, of God. This is the position of *J. Stuart Mill* and *Herbert Spencer*. Mill also objected to the reduction of psychological phenomena to physiological processes, that is to say, against the materialism of Positivism. And finally even the stoutest upholders of the system, such as *E. Littré* and *Taine*, were driven to admit the indispensableness of final causes for the explanation of nature, thus parting with the exclusively mechanical principle of the "objective or positive method." After the adherents of the school had been driven to adopt such cardinal changes, one may well ask what remained of the whole of the positivist philosophy which proudly claimed, when it first appeared, to be the inauguration of a new era of human thought? Nothing, perhaps, remained but the undefined antipathy of empiricism against thought which goes to the root of phenomena, or rational thought.

This certainly appears to be the case with regard to the first two thinkers named above, whose philosophy enjoys a great reputation in England.

Stuart Mill's philosophy is the revival of the empiricism of a Locke and a Hobbes and of the scepticism of a Hume. All our thinking is traced by Mill, as by these precursors, to the association of sensations which we find present in our minds, and with regard to which we presume, without knowing why, that they proceed from extraneous causes, called bodies. The association of these sensations so as to form notions and judgments proceeds on the similarity of certain sensations to each other, and on the frequent perception that certain ideas are connected with each other and follow each other. What we call substance is only the sum of a series of sensations to which, without any objective reason, we attribute a certain permanence; nor is it otherwise with what we call our soul, our Ego. Similarly the notion of cause is based only on the circumstance that in our experience certain phenomena are regularly and in all conditions followed by certain others. The oftener we perceive such a connection, with the greater probability do we anticipate its recurrence, but without any idea of a necessity inherent in the thing itself. Such a necessity Mill as a consistent empiricist rejects even in mathematical propositions (which it is well known determined Kant in favour of the rationalistic *a priori* theory). According to Mill the proposition that the radii of a circle are all equal is only approximately true, and the fact that 2×2 has always turned out to be 4 in our past experience, does not do away with the possibility that on another planet or in future ages on this one it may be otherwise. The reason why we attribute so high a degree of certainty to mathematical axioms is, according to Mill, simply that they belong to our earliest and most familiar experiences. In short, logical necessity, the basis of all scientific certainty, is completely done away with and reduced to a relative probability based on habit. On this footing the reality of what is before our minds, of the world and of our own soul, remains quite problematical; causality being limited to the mere association of sensations in the con-

sciousness, and its reference to anything beyond the subject denied, there is no longer any warrant for assuming external causes.

In his unlogical logic, Mill denies to reason any autonomous and productive activity of its own in the formation of our knowledge, and degrades it to a mere association of sensations. Similarly in his unmoral morals (Utilitarianism) he denies the autonomous legislation of reason, and substitutes for it the motive of interest rightly understood. Here he argues rather with Hobbes and Bentham than with Comte, whose "altruism" is immeasurably nobler than Mill's utilitarianism, only that it had no organic connection with the premises of the positivist system. We may say, indeed, that Mill drew the practical consequences of positivism more correctly than the originator of that philosophy. The principle of his morality is one which has been well known from Epicureanism downwards, that happiness is the only aim to be desired for its own sake. The means of happiness are of various kinds; but the difference between them is only quantitative, those are to be preferred which furnish greater enjoyment. But as the sympathetic disposition of man brings it about that the happiness of others augments his own, and the unhappiness of others gives him pain, therefore, Mill holds with Bentham, the pursuit of our own happiness embraces the furtherance of that of others, and the principle stated above must be extended to this, that the pursuit of the greatest possible happiness of all is the highest task of every individual. But though the principle of happiness is thus extended, the egoistic position is still expressly adhered to: "There can be no other reason for desiring the general happiness than that each man desires his own happiness, so far as it is attainable."

On this basis there can be no question of virtue or of duty in a purely moral sense. *Virtue* is only that mode of action which best knows how to combine a man's own happiness with that of others, and being thus a means of happiness it may itself be regarded as a good, just as money, power, honour, and the like are indirect goods, namely, as means towards enjoyment. But a self-less virtue which loves the good for its own sake, and forgets itself in devotion to

duty in the service of the general welfare, and even sacrifices its own existence, such a virtue—and surely no other is entitled to the name—is from the utilitarian point of view a thing without meaning, as Mill himself indicates when he calls such a way of thinking and acting a blind generosity, the real occurrence of which is yet very useful to society! If duty be the obligation to do certain things and leave undone certain others, an obligation universal, unconditioned, which puts forward its claim, and is to be considered valid, quite independently of personal inclination and aversion, it is clear that on the ground of the morals of self-interest there is no room for such an ethical idea. We can only have, in its place, the description of what is considered proper or of the custom seen to prevail; but we can never obtain from this an obligatory moral standard for the action of individuals, but at most a rule of prudence, which does not in the least prevent egoism from allowing itself an exception whenever it desires one. How infinitely higher than this pedlar's morality of interest is Shaftesbury's principle of moral beauty, of unselfish enthusiasm and love! From such an ideal point of view a Shaftesbury could find some faults with the form Christian morality had assumed in the course of history; and that we could understand. But when a Stuart Mill carps from his utilitarian point of view at the ideality of Christian morality, we are involuntarily reminded of the parable of the mote and the beam.

Thus in his logic and his morals Mill resolves objective truth and the necessity of reason into fortuitous combinations of sensations and desires. In the same way in dealing with religion, at least in his earlier period (we shall afterwards remark on his changed attitude at a later time), he does not inquire as to its truth, but only as to its utility, its value for social and individual life. His interesting essay on the *Utility of Religion*¹ opens with the question whether, when religious convictions have generally become unstable as they

¹ The second of the *Three Essays on Religion*, collected and published after the author's death, by H. Taylor (second edition: London, 1874). The prefatory note of the editor tells us that the second essay was written in the fifties, while the third, on *Theism*, was only composed in 1870, which may account for the difference between them.

now have, it may not be time to inquire whether the great expense of intellectual labour hitherto incurred in keeping up the faith has produced any corresponding advantage to human happiness, or whether this end would not be better served by an open acknowledgment that certain things are inaccessible to our mental faculties, and by turning these faculties to the strengthening and widening of those other sources of virtue and happiness which do not need the support or sanction of supernatural doctrines? This question, indeed, he goes on, is not so easy to answer as many freethinkers are inclined to believe; for the possibility is not to be denied that religion, though not intellectually tenable, may yet be morally useful: in fact, this must be admitted not only to have been the case in the earlier ages, but still to be the case for certain peoples and individuals. But is it the case generally and for all times? This is the question to be examined; and for this end he proposes to inquire whether a belief in religion regarded as a mere conviction, apart from the question of its truth, is indispensable to the temporal welfare of mankind? Is the utility of faith essential and universal, or local, temporary, and in a certain sense accidental? and could not the advantages which accompany it be attained in some other way, without the great evils by which these advantages are neutralised even in the best form of belief?

In this inquiry he does not bring up against religion those enormities which were perpetrated in earlier ages under her name. From these pollutions, the lamentable result of her identification with bad moral doctrines, religion has purified and is purifying herself. This makes it the more possible to consider whether the useful properties of religion are exclusively inherent in it, or whether their benefits can be obtained without it? It is customary to extol the usefulness of religious belief as a means of social wellbeing. But here an important distinction is commonly overlooked. It is usual to credit religion as such with the whole of the power inherent in any system of moral duties inculcated by education and enforced by opinion. Education and public opinion—these only are the great power in human life, and religion only appears so powerful because she has

this great power at her disposal. Religious obligation when not enforced by public opinion produces scarcely any effect on conduct, as, for example, in the estimation formed of duelling or of illicit sexual intercourse on the part of men—a clear proof, Mill thinks, that the motive by which education acts is not so much the fear of God as the fear of society. He finds a further proof of this in history. Greek education was entirely independent of religion, and yet produced a strong sense of duty to the community; while the Jews were continually threatened by their spiritual guides with divine punishment, and yet their history was a mere succession of lapses into Paganism. And as for rewards and punishments in another world, such as Christianity announces, they are not calculated to have any strong effect on conduct. This comes partly from their indefiniteness, from the want of vividness in the happiness or pain spoken of, partly from their uncertainty and from the hope that a man will be able in some way to escape them. All this, however, as Mill himself admits, is far from settling the question as to the value of religion. He is well aware that the most high-minded of its votaries do not insist on it as a social instrument to supplement human laws, a more cunning sort of police, but hold that the best of mankind absolutely require religion for the perfection of their own character, since it alone teaches the higher human morality, which was unknown to the legislators and philosophers of antiquity. In particular, he concedes that some of the precepts of Christ as exhibited in the Gospels brought some kinds of moral goodness to a greater height than had ever been attempted before, a goodness which, once acknowledged by good men, can never again be lost to the world. On the other hand, such doctrines first gained acceptance on the supposition of their being supernaturally revealed, and why should their acceptance continue bound to such an assumption? Mill is so far from thinking this necessary, that this appears to him to be the weakest point of religious morality. Wherever morality is supposed to be of supernatural origin, morality is stereotyped, and thus becomes incapable of adapting itself to the changing circumstances of society.

But it is said that belief in the supernatural has an abiding root in an ideal need of human nature. This Mill by no means denies ; he himself shows in a striking way how religion and poetry both supply the same want, that of ideal conceptions, grander and more beautiful than we see realised in the prose of human life. Religion differs from poetry in ascribing to these imaginative conceptions of poetry reality in the other world ; it is the poetry of the supernatural combined with a positive belief and expectation of its reality. " Belief in a God or Gods and in a life after death becomes the canvas which every mind according to its capacity covers with such ideal pictures as it can either invent or copy. So long as human life is insufficient to satisfy human aspirations, so long there will be a craving for higher things, which finds its most obvious satisfaction in religion. So long as earthly life is full of sufferings, so long there will be need of consolations, which the hope of heaven affords to the selfish, the love of God to the tender and grateful."

This sounds so well, that we might imagine our sceptic to have changed under our hands into a warm apologist. It is only in appearance, however, that this is so. For after acknowledging the value of religion to be indisputable " as a source of personal satisfaction and of elevated feelings," he goes on to ask " whether in order to obtain this good it is necessary to travel beyond the boundaries of the world which we inhabit, or whether the idealisation of our earthly life, the cultivation of a high conception of what it may be made, is not capable of supplying a poetry, and in the best sense of the word a religion equally fitted to exalt the feelings, and (with the same aid from education) still better calculated to ennoble the conduct than any belief concerning the unseen powers?" If this be said to be impossible on account of the shortness of human life, he points out that the life of the human species is practically equivalent to endlessness : and being combined with indefinite capability of improvement offers to the imagination and sympathies a large enough object to satisfy any reasonable demand for grandeur of aspiration. If such an object appears small to a mind accustomed to dream of infinite and eternal beatitudes, it will expand into far other dimensions

when those baseless fancies shall have receded into the past. If we consider how ardent a sentiment, under favourable circumstances of education, the love of country became to the ancients, we cannot judge it impossible that the love of that larger country the world, may be nursed into similar strength, both as a source of elevated emotion and as a principle of duty. A morality grounded on large and wise views of the good of the whole, neither sacrificing the individual to the aggregate nor the aggregate to the individual, but giving to duty on the one hand, and to freedom and spontaneity on the other, their proper province, would derive its power in the superior natures from sympathy and benevolence and the passion for ideal excellence, and in the inferior also from the superadded sense of shame. This exalted morality would not depend for its ascendancy on any hope of reward, but the reward which might be looked for, and the thought of which would be a consolation in suffering and a support in moments of weakness, would be the consciousness of the approbation of all those, dead or living, whom we admire or venerate. Such feelings could not be designated merely as morality; they are a real religion, for the essence of religion is "the strong and earnest direction of the emotions and desires towards an ideal object, recognised as of the highest excellence, and as rightly paramount over all selfish objects of desire."

Measured by the standard of ethical idealism, the religion of humanity of positivism is to be preferred to all the supernatural religions. This is what Mill now seeks to prove by a criticism of the latter in respect of their moral and intellectual value. The radical inferiority even of the best of the supernatural religions, as compared with the religion of humanity, he holds to be established by the fact that their promises of rewards and threats of punishment strengthen the selfish interest, and thus become one of the most serious obstacles of moral culture, the great purpose of which is to strengthen the unselfish and weaken the selfish element in our nature: a proposition which is in the highest degree surprising in a moralist who upholds utility, and who more decidedly than any one since Epicurus makes utility the sole principle of morality. We

should concede the right to any other rather than to him to set up as a critic of Christian morality, and to decide the question of the bearing of eschatological views on the idealism of religion, a question which must always be the object of earnest consideration for the thinker, but the answer to which is by no means so simple as those think who fail to distinguish between the husk and the kernel of a religion, or between a man's practical attitude and his theory. The second defect which appears to Mill to be an immense abatement from the value of the old religions as means of elevating and improving human character, is that they can only produce their best moral effects where there is a certain torpidity, if not a positive twist, in the intellectual faculties. For it is impossible for any one who habitually thinks, and who is unable to blunt his inquiring intellect by sophistry, to go on ascribing absolute perfection to the author and ruler of so clumsily made and capriciously governed a creation as this planet and the life of its inhabitants. As long as we are called on to believe that the author of nature and the author of the Sermon on the Mount are the same being, we are involved in moral perplexities without end: since the ways of this Deity in Nature are on many occasions totally at variance with the precepts of the same Deity in the Gospel. But if we seek to escape from this embarrassment by declaring the purposes of providence to be mysterious, and its justice and goodness to be other than the justice and goodness which we know and which it befits us to practise, the worship of the Deity ceases to be the adoration of moral perfection, and becomes the bowing down to the gigantic image of something not fit for us to imitate. It is the worship of power only. To these difficulties, which belong to the nature of the theistic belief in God generally, there are to be added some which are peculiar to the Christian doctrine, *e.g.*, that God created the majority of men with the certain foreknowledge that he was creating them for eternal damnation in hell. This represents his character as most dreadful and horrible. The doctrines of original sin and vicarious atonement may belong rather to the Apostle Paul and not be originally Christian. But there is one moral contradiction, inseparable from every form of

Christianity, which no ingenuity can resolve; that the good God should have extended only to a minority and by special grace the one thing needful, the divine remedy for sin and suffering, which it would have cost the Divine giver as little to have vouchsafed to all. Add to this that the Divine message has been authenticated by credentials so insufficient, that they fail to convince a large proportion of the strongest and most cultivated minds, and the difficulty of the belief in the perfect goodness and wisdom of such a God is much increased. A simple faith in the one God of Nature and of the Gospels is only possible to one who fixes his attention exclusively on what is beautiful and beneficent in the precepts and spirit of the Gospel and in the dispensations of nature, and puts all that is the reverse entirely aside; it can only co-exist, as was said above, with a torpid and inactive state of the intellectual faculties.

After this critical review of Christian doctrine, which only deviates markedly in one point from the broad way of general rationalistic criticism, Mill surprises us at the close of his discussion by indicating a certain compromise between his positivist religion of humanity and the old theistic faith. If, he says, we resign irrevocably the idea of an omnipotent creator, and regard the world as the product of a struggle between Divine wisdom and goodness and an intractable matter, as was believed by Plato, or a principle of evil as the Manichæans taught; and if we regard the final triumph of good over evil as the end fixed by the plan of providence; against the moral tendency of such a creed no possible objection can lie. The evidence for it, indeed, is too shadowy, and the promises it holds out too uncertain, to admit of its being a permanent substitute for the religion of humanity; but the two may be held in conjunction, and he to whom ideal good and the progress of the world toward it are already a religion, even though that other creed may seem to him a belief not grounded on evidence, is at liberty to indulge the pleasing and encouraging thought that its truth is possible. For there is nothing to hinder the sceptic from planting the ample domain of the imagination with possibilities, with hypotheses which cannot be known to be false, which appear to be favoured by many

appearances of nature, which by their favourable influence on the feelings acquire a just claim to toleration, and yet are far from amounting to real convictions. It must be conceded that supernatural religion affords a firmer conviction, especially with regard to the life after death ; but it is very questionable whether the want of this conviction is so serious a loss to the sceptic as most people appear to think. In many cases, such as the loss of dear friends, the comfort of such a conviction must be incalculable. Yet it is not only possible but probable that in a higher and happier condition of human life, human nature will be content with the present, and cease to desire a future in another world.

Such is the result arrived at by the positivist thinker in his inquiry as to the "utility" of religion. Its practical value is on the whole frankly acknowledged, but as to the question of its truth his attitude is partly that of denial, partly of indifference ; its practical utility appears to him to be so independent of its truth, as to be attainable as well or even better through an atheistic religion of humanity, which, however, is not incompatible with certain vague theistic possibilities and hypotheses. This position, however, appears to have failed to prove permanently satisfactory even to so cool a thinker as Mill was. Perhaps he came to feel that the most important quality of an opinion on any momentous subject is its *truth* or *falsity*, and that it can never cease to be an imperative duty to deal with the subject-matter of religion as a strictly scientific question, and to test its evidences by the same strictly scientific methods and principles as are applied in other sciences. He proposes, therefore, to inquire into the objective truth of the doctrine of the existence and the attributes of God.¹ When the problem is stated in this way and the possibility contemplated of its scientific solution, the position of scepticism, and therefore also of positivism is, it is clear, abandoned. The decisive question is no longer that of subjective utility, but that of objective truth ; and religion is thus raised above the unsettled waves of subjectivity with its fortuitous

¹ Introduction to third Essay, *Theism*, which, as was remarked above, was written about the year 1870, at least ten years after the Essay on the *Utility of Religion*.

feelings and wishes, and reinstated in her own dignity, replaced on her own foundation. And in accordance with this more respectful attitude to the religious problem, the solution now turns out very differently from before. Formerly, belief in God was counted among those pictures and vague images, possible but quite unfounded, with which imagination fills up the empty surface of our ignorance; but we have now an admission of the necessity of the thought of a God who governs the world in accordance with unchangeable laws. Mill only requires us to adopt a different view of the relation of God to the course of the world from that of the traditional theistic belief in providence. What he indicated at the earlier stage as a possible compromise with the belief in God appears to have grown up in the interval into a positive conviction.

He holds God to be not the almighty Creator of the world, but only the Former of the matter of the world, which he did not create; his power was limited by the conditions inherent in the nature of this matter. This limitation of his power may explain the manifold imperfection of his work, which side by side with undeniable traces of the wisdom and goodness of its arranger yet also shows so many evils of every kind that it cannot be conceived to be the work of perfect omnipotence, wisdom, and goodness. Only by assuming his metaphysical limitation can we maintain God's moral purity and elevation, that being the only way in which he is not chargeable with the evil and wickedness of the world as their cause. The many moral shortcomings and contradictions in the traditional idea of God flow partly from the impure moral ideas of a ruder age; partly and more specially from the circumstance that those who regarded the good principle in the accustomed way as being also omnipotent, were obliged to impute to him contradictory attributes. If he were relieved of omnipotence, and no longer responsible for the whole course of the world, then a much purer and more consistent notion of the divine ideal is open to us. Even then, it is true, his purpose in the world is for the most part hidden to us. Experience only permits us to assume on this point, that the happiness of his creatures formed part of his wish, and was one of his intentions in

the formation of the world, but by no means the whole or the sole intention. That the work, fallen into imperfection like a defective machine, stands in need of a helping hand here and there, is not in itself impossible, but can never be proved to be the case in any instance, because however extraordinary any phenomenon may be we can never be justified in assuming it to have resulted from a supernatural cause, and against the order of nature, so long as we do not possess an accurate and exhaustive knowledge of all natural causes. Immortality, too, can as little be proved from natural grounds as it can be said to be impossible. It is an object of hope which must be left to the individual, a hope which is capable of working beneficently, when as a moral motive it spurs the mind to action and composes it with regard to the riddles of this life. Finally, this peculiar thinker regards it as a valuable thought, and one which is only possible in conjunction with his view of God as a limited being, that in the struggle between the powers of good and evil man assists God, co-operates with God, and so helps to bring about his victory, and that God thus needs man to help him and enable him to carry out his obstructed plan, while man is indebted to God only for the general constitution of his nature. It is in this transposition of the ordinary religious consciousness that Mill sees the "Religion of the Future." We cannot regard these reflections of an independent thinker as devoid of value and meaning, any more than we can adopt them as they stand. To bring the truth that is in them into harmony with the absoluteness of God will be the task of speculative thought, a thought which we thus see that the acutest intellectual argument requires as its necessary complement.

We have seen that positivism was at first, in Comte himself, a naïve empiricism, and with reference to religion that it was simply dogmatic atheism. In his school, again, there was developed as the first consequence of this position a pure scepticism which, with regard to the idea of God, took up not so much the position of denial as that of indifference, regarding the existence of a God as possible but not knowable nor practically necessary, and therefore refused to come to a decision on the question. This possibility finally passed

by degrees with Stuart Mill into a certainty, based on grounds of reason, of the existence of a supreme world-governing reason, which, however, was not an absolute power. An interesting parallel to this development may be seen in Herbert Spencer, at present the principal representative of positivism in England. He also is too earnest a thinker to be able to stand still at pure scepticism. He also opposes to Comte's dictum that the one absolute certainty is the non-existence of the absolute, the certainty of the existence of an absolute, a first cause. But he adheres more strictly than Mill does to the principles of positivism, as he holds it to be impossible to know what the absolute is; as "the unknowable," he regards it as the mutual ground on which religion and science can meet in harmony.

In the first part of his *First Principles*, H. Spencer seeks to prove two things, that we are strictly limited by the bounds of our knowledge to the relative and the conditioned, but that at the same time it is theoretically necessary for us to assume something beyond this limit, or the positive existence of an absolute and unconditioned. The first proof is made mainly by quotations from Hamilton and Mansel, who thought it possible to infer the relativity and finiteness of every object of consciousness from the mere fact of its being an object, and therefore in opposition to the knowing subject. This argument is logically impregnable on this ground, but when these thinkers went on to contend that "the absolute" is not an object of thought, of consciousness at all, that the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible, shows it to be merely an expression for the negation of comprehensibility, and that thus no positive existence can be predicated of it, Spencer refuses to take this step with them. He considers that by drawing a distinction between definite and indefinite consciousness, he can save the naked existence, if no more, of the thought of the absolute. He even considers that the reciprocal nature of the notion, appearance and essence, relative and absolute, involves that the one cannot be in our consciousness without the other, and that the one is equally valid and real with the other. This thought is very correct; but it makes

a clean sweep of all the preceding proofs of the unknowableness of the absolute. This cardinal contradiction, that the "*unknowable*" is known after all as existing, and as the cause of phenomena, and therefore is at one and the same time an object of consciousness and not an object of consciousness, is not to be spirited away for a moment by all Spencer's laborious deductions. If, as Spencer stoutly maintains, we find the necessity present in our thought of adding to conditioned appearances an unconditioned as their first cause, then it is impossible to see why we should not be allowed to conclude from the appearances, in which the cause "reveals" itself, to its essence; why, *e.g.*, we should only conceive this entity as "power," when appearances reveal not only power, but also order, that is reason, so that Mill considered the world-ground to be first of all the highest reason, not absolute power. Spencer also demonstrates the existence of the absolute in the following way: We can abstract from all the particular contents of our consciousness, but not from that which is common to all these particulars, from existence generally: therefore existence is the absolute which is above the particular. But he could with equal right have pointed to thought as that which we can never think away, which we presuppose to all being, and must thus posit as underlying all being; and then he would have got for the absolute something more than the poor category of existence, namely, the rich category of mind, which would have rendered it suitable for an object of religion.

The claims Spencer puts forward as to the religious value of his "*unknowable*" are no less untenable and contradictory than his proofs of the unknowableness of its nature and the knowableness of its existence. He considers that the substitution of the unknowable for God not only does not make an end of religion, but elevates it to its highest perfection, since all finite limits are thus removed from the object of worship, its dignity raised to a *Non plus ultra*, all occasion removed for conflicts between faith and knowledge, and, finally, all differences of the various creeds obliterated in one single universal creed—that, namely, of the inscrutable mystery—so that a universal religious peace is restored. Were it not the peace of the

churchyard! It is true enough that there is always an element of mystery in religion, and that a God who should be completely and exhaustively known by our finite intellect would be no God. But it is equally certain that a religion of nothing but mystery is an absurdity, and that the absolutely "unknowable" wants simply every quality necessary for the object of a positive religious relation. "Worship" of such a being must either be dull absence of thought, or blind fear and terror at an "eerie" power; in neither case could it rise above the rudest stage of fetichistic and fatalistic superstition. But religious worship is humble reverence, and while bowing before the infinitely exalted, it also includes the element of elevating trust, and—at the highest stage—of free and joyful love; but such an attitude implies that the object of religion is essentially akin to the subject, that it is not mere physical power, but mind, reason, and goodness, that therefore it is at least in some degree thinkable according to the analogy of man. In other respects, it is true, it transcends all such analogies, and must always comprise something that is incomprehensible and mysterious: a thing which neither piety nor the deeper philosophic thought ever has denied, or will deny.

A grain of truth is present in Spencer's strange theory: so much we cannot but acknowledge. The truth in it I find in the energetic protest it makes against a stiff, dogmatic anthropomorphism, which, not content with the position of a symbol of truth which serves a practical need (a position to which no reasonable man would object) pretends to know the naked, objective truth. God is represented as a very excellent man above the clouds, who made the world after the manner of a watchmaker, and sometimes executes repairs on his construction. What presumption to prescribe such childish ideas to scientific thought and investigation in any field, as a regulative norm! Such perverse procedure has ever been the principal source of doubt as to the very idea of God, the source of scepticism and atheism. But the flowing of this spring will not be stopped by giving up along with the sceptics the possibility of a speculative knowledge of God, to erect upon this *tabula rasa* the very same

anthropomorphic deism which called forth the atheistic reaction, under the ægis this time of a revealing authority or a moral postulate. Against this method of Mansel's, who, after the manner of the German Neo-Kantians, bases theological dogmatism on theoretical scepticism, Spencer very forcibly and very properly protests. No one who is used to logical thinking can fail to agree with him when he says: "Let those who can, believe that there is eternal war set between our intellectual faculties and our moral obligations. I for one admit no such radical vice in the constitution of things."¹

No one who is earnestly desirous to see atheism repelled will be guilty of the folly of first handing over his best weapons to the sceptic in order to replace his deficiency of argument by the strength of moral pathos—a procedure which his adversary cannot fail to regard as illogical and as the evidence of weakness. He will rather seek to stop up the source of atheism by seeking to lead the atheist to see that what he is attacking is not the idea of God, but a caricature of it in the concave mirror of human weakness; while, on the contrary, his thought about the world, if it be but thorough and do not stop half-way, directs him from every point to just such a conclusion as is contained in the idea of God purely conceived. The history of positivism shows this in a way wonderfully instructive. Setting out from dogmatic atheism and passing through a stage of pure scepticism, it reaches ultimately in its two most considerable representatives two clear positions, each of which is, taken by itself, inadequate, but which, taken together, make up the full and complete truth of the idea of God. Combining in one the highest *reason* which Stuart Mill arrives at, and the absolute power which Herbert Spencer asserts as the existing mystery, we get just that reasonable omnipotence, that almighty reason, which we call God. Thus does atheistic positivism turn in the hands of its ablest advocates into an involuntary apology for Theism!

¹ *First Principles*, i. par. 31, p. 108.

CHAPTER II.

THE HALF-KANTIAN AND NEO-KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

THE tendency which bears most affinity to the Positivism of France and England is that of the so-called "Neo-Kantians," and is at present widely diffused both in Germany and in other lands. I say so-called, because the designation is not strictly accurate. It is not the whole genuine historical Kant to whom this tendency goes back, and whose philosophy it professes to revive. The Neo-Kantians adhere only to the empiricist and sceptical side of Kant's philosophy, the empiricism predominating at one time and the scepticism at another; but in general the one passes immediately into the other, as the nature of the case would lead us to expect. One side of Kant's thought they persistently leave out of view; that element which we saw above to be its true principle, the tendency which prevails throughout the whole of it, though never thoroughly worked out, namely, the rationalistic element. And this we can readily understand. It was the energetic rationalism of Kant, his assertion of reason as sole lawgiver in the world both of nature and of morals, that made Kant's thought so decisive a turning-point in the history of philosophy, and constituted it the germ for the whole speculative philosophy, which by an inner necessity was developed out of it. And it is natural that a tendency which originates in antipathy to speculation should fail to appreciate the root of speculation in Kant's rationalism, and so either overlook this side of Kant's thought from the first, or purposely eliminate it as a defective element. But to ignore (whether intentionally or unintentionally) what was in fact the true soul of Kant's philosophy is evidently to

turn it into something different from what it actually was. Hence it is not surprising that an increasing number of the adherents of this "Neo-Kantian" tendency now declare themselves more or less plainly as "Anti-Kantianists." They only show what has long been clear to any one who could look below the surface, that this tendency as a whole does not go back *to* Kant, but to something before him, to the sceptical empirical position of Locke and Hume. The further this process of clearing up matters goes, the more will the affinity which has all along existed between this school and the Positivism of Comte pass into actual identity. With respect to the philosophical Neo-Kantians at least this diagnosis may be made with a considerable degree of certainty.

The case is different certainly with the *theological* adherents of this tendency, and yet their case is quite analogous to that of the philosophers. They have in common with the latter the negative element: the antipathy to speculation; in common, too, accordingly, the displacement of the rationalistic and the accentuation of the sceptical and empirical element in Kant's theory of knowledge. Here, however, the ways part. The experience in which the theologians feel an interest is not that of sense but supersensuous, moral-religious experience. They, therefore, lay weight on the practical side of the Kantian philosophy, the "moral path of reason" which the philosophical Neo-Kantians regard as its weakest side. But with Kant the moral faith of reason was based on *a priori* rationalism, on the autonomous legislation of reason, and this principle once set aside by scepticism the moral faith of reason can no longer stand in its genuine Kantian sense: instead of its being established transcendently from reason, and being universally valid for all reasonable creatures, it is now to be set up empirically from feeling, which it is true is an immediate fact, but a fact of only subjective validity, a matter of subjective æsthetic taste. Now if this "faith of feeling," which thus supplants Kant's "faith of reason," is to have a more objective basis, there is no resource at this empirical point of view, but to supplement the subjective feeling of the individual by the analogous feelings of the many who belong to the same Church, and

thus in place of the *inner* certainty of the religious spirit, as held by Kant and by the reformation, we get the certification of the spirit, which has no support in itself, by the *outward* witness of ecclesiastical authority. So that here also, just as in the philosophical branch of Neo-Kantianism, the development lands us finally in positivism. Here the positivism is ecclesiastical and dogmatic, in the other case it is materialistic and atheistic; but whatever the difference, the two agree at least in the irrational and un-Protestant nature of their principle: the subjection of the mind to an external and alien power, whether material reality or historical authority. These two kinds of positivism being so allied to each other in principle, it is easily possible for the one to pass over into the other, both being intimately allied in their antipathy to a rational science of morals and of religion.

Neo-Kantianism in both its branches thus rejects the very specific principle of the Kantian philosophy, at all points, both in theory and practice, and replaces it by its opposite, an anti-rationalistic positivism, whether empirico-sceptical or empirico-dogmatic; and it is obvious how slender is the claim of such a position to call itself after Kant. It might more properly be characterised as Half-Kantianism; its most exact precursor at least is unmistakably a Half-Kantist who admitted that he stood nearer Jakobi than Kant—*Jakob Friedrich Fries*, whose philosophy of religion may be noticed here,¹ because, though little regarded formerly, it appears to have borne fruit in the Neo-Kantian tendency of our own day.

Fries praises Kant for having given philosophy the subjective turn from things to our ideas of things, and for having caused criticism to occupy itself with self-knowledge, with the indispensable investigation of the conditions of our experience. But while doing this Fries holds that Kant erred in two ways: first, in holding the conditions and laws of experience to be knowledge *a priori*, while they can only be known *a posteriori* by self-observation, a task

¹ The following of his numerous works are here referred to: *Handbuch der Religionsphilosophie und philos. Aesthetik*, which appeared in 1832 as the second part of his *Practical Philosophy*.—*System der Metaphysik*, 1824. *Neue kritik der Vernunft*, second edition, 1828-31. *Wissen, Glauben und Ahndung*, 1805.

to be undertaken by an empirical treatment of psychology as a natural science; and then in thinking himself called upon to *prove* the validity of the forms and ideas of reason, and therefore referring the former to a transcendental object, instead of seeing that such an object was out of the question here, as what we have to do with is never anything more than our own ideas, so that truth is not to be sought in the relation of an idea to an object, but only in the relation of the derived, mediated idea to an immediate certainty we see and to our sense of truth. It is the great merit of Jakobi to have seen this; the radical error of the Leibniz-Wolffian rationalism was thereby overcome. "Sight is its own witness of truth, taken by itself; only in so far as I trust sight do I know anything of the existence of actual objects. With equal immediateness do the fundamental metaphysical truths convince us, which come to consciousness without any introduction, immediately, in our feeling of truth. The truth about which men contend, and with respect to which they can doubt and err, is never the transcendental truth of the agreement between idea and object, it is the empirical truth of consciousness which asks nothing but a correct comparison of mediate ideas with the immediate ones. This comparison is the whole and the sole task of the criticism of reason as the founder of philosophy."¹ This important passage at once shows the subjectivist and empirical character which distinguishes Fries's philosophy from the objective and *a priori* rationalism of Kant. But whether what the empirical psychologist finds present in his subjective world of ideas is also objective truth, of force for all, that naturally can never be determined in this way.

Fries also praises Kant for having set up so clear a distinction between phenomena and things in themselves, and limited our knowledge to the former; but he cannot accept either Kant's reason for this limitation or his ambiguous treatment of the thing-in-itself; he declares his own modification of the theory to be an essential improvement of the Kantian philosophy. Now, this modification consisted in the rejection of the monistic, rationalistic ten-

¹ Preface to the *Neue kritiki d. Vernunft*, i. p. 28.

dency which we noticed shining through in Kant in spite of his traditionally inherited dualism, and of which Fichte and his successors then laid hold ; and in the accentuation of the dualism aforesaid in the direction of Jakobi's faith-philosophy. Phenomena are the contents of that knowledge which proceeds from the sense-view which is determined by space, time, and measure, and therefore never allows us to apprehend the true, unlimited, unconditioned, and eternal being of things. But for this very reason that true being is not to be found in the objects of knowledge (views, notions, and all kinds of combinations of these), which are always limited and imperfect, this knowledge points of necessity beyond itself to *faith*, which has for its contents just the true reality, the world of ideas, and the certainty of which, though of a different kind, is not less than that of knowledge. Fries frequently extols it as the great merit of "transcendental idealism," that it defends the rights of faith, while it humbles knowledge, showing that it possesses no greater degree of reality, and so reducing its supposed superiority to a mere delusion. "Our deeming a thing true is not determined by the object in knowledge any more than in faith : it is merely the activities of the knowing reason that determine themselves by themselves to knowledge or to faith. I cannot prove that there is a God, but only that every finite reason believes in a God ; and just in the same way I cannot prove the existence of matter, but only that every finite reason knows that matter exists. In any kind of conviction, be it knowledge, faith, or presentiment, or whatever other name it bear, we can only examine the subjective connection of cognitions, never the actual relation of knowledge to its object." This mocking comfort, that we cannot tell in any case what there is behind our ideas, is not very encouraging for the believer. The ideas of faith are essentially of mere negative origin, and may thus easily appear as a mere negation of that which forms the definite contents of our actual knowledge or our knowledge of reality, as mere empty forms of abstracting reflection ; but a positive use is to be made of them in our æsthetic judgment of the world ; in *anticipation* the judgment reconciles the understanding (knowledge) and the reason (faith),

and sees reality in the transfiguring light of the idea, thus reading into nature and history beauty and nobleness, utility and harmony, things which the knowledge of the understanding can nowhere find.

According to Fries, then, we have two entirely separate worlds side by side. On one side we have the world of actual phenomena, resting on the solid basis of sense-perception and intelligent reflection, in which everything is to be explained by strict mathematics, in which the causal mechanism has exclusive sway, and there can be no such thing as ends. Neither in the organic life of nature, which only rests on a more complicated kind of interaction; nor in the history of mankind, which as a phenomenon for the knowing reason is also a mere product of the social mechanism, and shows by the side of the beautiful so much of what is unbeautiful and contrary, as to make it quite impossible to trace a plan of the deity in the government of the world; those who pretend to see such a plan only impute, Fries thinks, to the government of the world their own wisdom and acuteness. Over-against this world of sense, which taken by itself is quite without idea and end, and admits only of a mechanical materialistic interpretation, stands the *world of ideas*, based on the faith cherished by reason in the reality of the perfect, complete, unconditioned being, or in the highest good, the best world, the absolute, which develops itself in the three ideas of the eternal being or the *soul*, the absolute force or *freedom*, and the unity of the absolute whole, or the *Deity* (this is the same trinity of ideas as in Kant, and as to the deduction of the idea of God from the category of totality we may refer to the remarks in the chapter on Kant, vol. i. p. 156). These ideas have nothing in common with the world of knowledge, and are in no way to be based on it or deduced or demonstrated from it. Indeed they stand in plain opposition to the phenomena of outward and inward experience, which nowhere shows us an eternal unchangeable being, but only everywhere an incessant becoming and change of appearances and states, the inward states of the soul as well as the rest; which nowhere shows us absolute force beginning from itself, but everywhere a conditioned working; which finally nowhere shows us in time and space a completed series, a

perfect whole, but always only parts which admit of being continued to infinity. Thus the relation of the ideas to the world of phenomena is only this negative one that they possess none of the limitations and conditions of the latter. Fries cannot lay stress enough on this point, that the sole "speculative ground" of the ideas consists in a denying reflection, and that they therefore do not embrace any qualities borrowed from knowledge, that they add nothing to the knowledge of the actual.

But little as the ideas contain in the way of knowledge, without importance as they are for the theoretical knowledge of the world, they derive importance from the *practical interests* connected with them. If they have nothing to do with the world of existing things, they have to do with the world of that which should exist. If they tell us nothing of the realm of phenomena, they do tell us of the realm of ends. "The original consciousness of the reason as to the unlimited, which has no positive contents of its own, but that of the negation of all negation or the denial of limitations, is reinforced by the faculty of being interested in the practical idea of absolute value or of the end in itself, which thus with its more positive contents gives life to the otherwise dead idea of eternal being." By the removal of the limits we rise above the whole realm of existence in space and time as a mere appearance present to our limited mode of apprehension, to being in itself; and thus we arrive at the idea of a free being, not bound to the law of natural necessity, and therefore also timeless or *eternal*. Thus this idea of a free and eternal being does not need to be proved: (Kant thought it did, but that was a mistake on his part:) it rests on the immediate self-certainty reason has of its own worth and independence, on the feeling of truth with regard to the sole reality as with regard to the unique value of such a free and eternal being. This idea, then, extends to an intelligible world of eternal intelligences whose communications with each other do not stand under laws of nature, but under laws of worth and of ends, which subsists through the Deity as the ideal of the supreme good. Thus the idea of the independence of the spirit is for us the fundamental thought for the true being of things, the first idea of

faith. Only in the personal existence of rational beings, therefore in human life under moral ideas, does the true being of things become somewhat more comprehensible to us.

From this point human life as it comes into view receives its ideal meaning in the idea of the moral world-order, or to be more precise, of the *spiritual world under moral laws*, whose free action is to be judged according to the idea of moral or subjective teleology, and forms the subject of *ethics*. Here the ideas of the absolute are connected with the actual by the moral schematism which gives life to them by means of our ideas of purpose and utility. But the same idea of a legislation according to value and purpose is transferred in the last instance from man's moral life to the world generally, not by a theoretical knowing, for which there is no such thing as purpose or utility anywhere, but by the *aesthetic religious* view of the world, which "judges" the world under the idea of objective teleology, *i.e.* regards it as if the legislation according to value, which properly applies only to action, applied to it too, from which there result aesthetic feelings of beauty and grandeur which can only be expressed in the images of religious representation. This aesthetic religious view of the world or "doctrine of the object of the world" is the subject treated in the second part of Fries's practical philosophy, or his *Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Aesthetic*, which he treats, quite consistently from his own point of view, as a single discipline. It lies in the nature of the case that a world-judgment absolutely separated from theoretical world-knowledge must, except where an arbitrary break is made by theological positivism, coincide with the aesthetic view of the world, since both alike represent a relation only to be apprehended by feeling, only to be set forth in poetic form between an essentially idealess reality and a world of ideas quite separated from it. The ideas being in both cases the same abstract ideals, and the means of expressing them being the same or all but the same poetic images, the religious and the aesthetic fundamental feelings and moods also correspond to each other. The religious feelings are *enthusiasm* which is awakened by the idea of the personal dignity and the eternal destiny of man, *devotion* in reference to the

idea of God, before whom the beautiful and the good eternally exist, and *resignation* with respect to the imperfections of this earthly life, which compared with the eternally true are to be esteemed as nothing. In æsthetic the epic idea answers to enthusiasm, the dramatic to resignation, and the lyric to devotion. The close affinity of this poetic religion with the identification of religion and poetry which prevails in romanticism is perfectly plain; the nearest parallel to Fries's religious and æsthetic view of the world is to be found in the poetical religious idealism of Novalis, only that the latter was not content with mere æsthetic *world-judgment*, but imputed to his ideal enthusiasm a power of magical *world-formation*, while Fries soberly and reasonably maintained the boundary which separates the ideal from the real, though he thereby certainly made the difference between the two seem all the wider, and made the ideal world, torn away as it was from reality, the more incomprehensible, pale and shadowy. It is a matter of course that such a style of religion can never become popular, but is limited to the narrow circles of the "beautiful souls" which are alive to poetic impressions. This exclusive and aristocratic trait the religion of Fries shared with romanticism, as its author very well knew when he gave his philosophy of religion the motto: "Odi profanum vulgus et arceo," a curious contrast to the invitation of the Saviour, "Come unto me all ye that labour and are heavy laden"!

But one-sided as this religious theory manifestly is, it must be allowed to contain an element of truth. This is to be found not only in that ethical idealism which is common to Fries with Kant and Fichte, and which we all understand to be a constant and necessary element of true religion. Where he is original and deviates from Kant, Fries often shows fine insight and gives utterance to sound ideas, which, properly applied, are capable of leading us beyond his dualistic point of view. Against Kant's proof of immortality from the impossibility of perfecting virtue within the limits of time, he remarks very properly that to comfort us with an eternal time which never expires is to do away with the perfection of virtue altogether; mere endless being in time would just be an

eternal imprisonment, and therefore would destroy the idea of our own being, the true quality of which is not a temporal future; but timeless true being, eternal life which consists in the incorruptibility of the spirit, the dignity of the person, its being an end in itself, and needs no proof.¹ Equally noticeable is the criticism Fries applies to Kant's proof of the existence of God from the postulate of recompence or of the connection between virtue and happiness. This mode of argument, he says, is based on a confusion of the ethical or legal mode of view with the religious. "But this is a childish idea; the cultivated understanding ought to rise above it. In the state the strong award of justice must dispense rewards and punishments to men, but the higher judgment of the ideas will dispense with such distinctions; to it virtue is precious only for its own inner beauty, it wants no reward: vice carries its condemnation in itself and needs no punishment, for the only thing that is intrinsically precious is that the spirit appear beautiful." "We do not believe in the millennium in which all earthly wishes are gratified, but only in the kingdom of God under the rule of eternal beauty and holy love."² Happiness and unhappiness only belong to the phenomenon, and have no value in reference to essential being; the only real evils are, as the Stoics truly taught, baseness and vice; and if even human wisdom can rise, and is called to rise above pain and unhappiness, then it can be no function of the highest wisdom to judge the highest good from the point of view of the distribution of happiness according to worth. Instead, therefore, of seeking to prove the existence of God in such an unsuitable way, Fries thought Kant ought to have seen that such a proof is quite superfluous, as "belief in the reality of the supreme good at once involves belief in the Deity."

This statement occurs frequently in Fries in various connections, and leads us to inquire as to the reality of his belief in God. By the idea of the supreme good he understands, as we are aware, the idea, arising from the immediate feeling of personal dignity, of a realm of ends, or of the world of spirits standing under moral laws

¹ *Religionsphilos.* par. 27, 28; *Wissen, Glauben, etc.*, p. 157.

² *Ib.* par. 36, 39. *Ib.* p. 150 seq.

which point to a purpose. Now, taking the statement strictly that with the idea of the supreme good we also and at once express the idea of the deity, so that there is no need to show the connection between the two, we find it to amount to the position that the idea of the deity is identical with that of the supreme good in the sense just explained. But here we are simply on the ground of the Feuerbach-Comte religion of humanity, which loses the idea of God in that of the ideal of mankind, and allows no other reality to that idea but that it is thought and realised by us men. This latter inference Fries was unwilling to draw; indeed he habitually calls God the ground, the cause, the lawgiver, judge, guide, Lord of the realm of ends, of the spirit-world, of the eternal order of things; he even speaks of a creation and preservation of the world by God. But in doing so he cannot hide from himself that he is applying categories drawn from natural relations and human activities, that is from external and from inner experience, to the idea of the unlimited, to which, according to all that he has said on this point, they are entirely inapplicable. Nor can he conceal from himself that his scientific view of the world, according to which nature and man (regarded as phenomenon or as nature-being) form a mechanism by themselves and sufficient for themselves, to be explained by the simplest mathematical and physical laws, and entirely excluding all teleology, neither the substance nor the motion of which can be produced by any other agency, —that this view of the world not only does not require a divine originator and guide but has no room for him. Fries, as we said, saw this difficulty perfectly well, but he thought to escape it by simply placing the religious-æsthetic view of the world side by side with the scientific view and denying *a priori* any relation or connection between them. But can we seriously regard this as a solution of the difficulty? It is possible to tolerate two views side by side on the same subject even without any distinct explanation of their relation to each other, but only so long, it is certain, as they do not contradict each other. But where this is so strikingly the case, as in Fries's two views of the world, reason has no help for it but to regard one of the two views as true, and the other as not really true,

or as untrue. In the case before us, the scientific view of the world has in its favour the evidence of sense and of the understanding, while the religious view moves in feeling and poetic images, and it is easy to see how near we are to the step of allowing to the former side alone the importance of reality, to the other side only that of a fair ideal, *i.e.* the step to the atheistic anthropologism of a Feuerbach and a Comte.

This danger must inevitably accompany every abstract dualistic idealism, which either scorns or dreads to plant its foot upon the solid ground of the actual world, and to come to an open and honourable understanding with it. Had Fries, instead of carrying Kant's dualism further than Kant did, learned from the master's *Critique of Judgment* to seek for a principle capable of embracing in unity nature and freedom, his idealism would have received a complement of solid reality, and would have been qualified, as it now is not, for a penetrative and fruitful understanding of the world of nature and of history. When we look at the matter calmly it is not the case, as Fries asserts, that the world of reality exhibits to us no element of purpose and idea, of reason and righteousness, so that it depends on the rosy spectacles of æsthetic judgment to put these things into it. This is not the case: it is and will continue to be true, that to the spiritual eye "his eternal power and Godhead are clearly seen in his works," namely, in the creation of the world, and that the work of his spirit is discerned in the "Education of the Human Race." To follow these traces of God in nature and history, and from the traces to conclude as to the being behind them, which is not merely the transcendental "Ideal of Reason," but the omnipresent actual and active reason itself, or the One of whom and through whom and to whom are all things, who is at once the ground of the world and its goal: this appears to me to be the true Realidealism, in which Kant's spirit lives on the more purely, that it is disengaged from the wrappings and chains of Kant's letter!

The philosophy of Fries attracted a small circle of disciples, among them *Ernst Friedrich Apelt*, and *de Wette*, the well-known theologian, so admirable in Biblical research, both of whom dealt

with the philosophy of religion, adhering to the thoughts and the terminology of their master. Their influence was limited to a few. But the Semi-Kantianism of Fries was taken up and greatly extended in the Neo-Kantianism of the present day, which, however, is as closely related to Feuerbach as to Fries, and attaches itself, according as the tendency of the individual thinker is more or less religious, to the one or the other of the two.

The most important representative, and in some respects the founder of Neo-Kantianism,¹ is *Albert Lange*, whose theory of religion may be placed just about half-way between Feuerbach and Fries; theoretically he is nearer to the latter, while practically he is nearer the former, his general point of view being common to both, namely, the hard and fast separation set up between feeling and understanding, practice and theory, ideal and truth. Religion according to him belongs exclusively to the sphere of the practical ideals, and has as little to do with the world of what exists, with objective truth, as poetry itself. With him also the metaphysical background of this dualism is a mechanical atomistic view of the world, only distinguished from pure materialism, because Lange does not forget its phenomenal character. But as the unknown which may be behind that which appears (we cannot know that it exists, we can only surmise that it does) comes into no sort of relation with us, and our whole reality, our psychical experience included, is to be explained solely from the mechanism of material phenomena, this world of the existing which alone we can know, which alone is real for us, is, though phenomenal merely, yet for us entirely material, and stands in as harsh a contrast to the freedom and ideality of our self-consciousness as in the most express materialism. Everything ideal is hence with Lange, as well as with Feuerbach, a product of our creative fancy, which strives in the different ways of art, religion, and philosophy to get beyond reality, at one time supplementing it by a view of the universe as one, at another correcting it by

¹ *History of Materialism*. Second German edition. Leipzig, 1875. We have to do chiefly with the last section, on Ethical Materialism and Religion, vol. ii. p. 484 *sqq.*

the picture of a fairer and better harmony. Lange, therefore, sees the essence of religion, just as Feuerbach does, in a rising of feeling above the contracted limits and the pressing yoke of the actual to a world of unreal, imagined ideals.

In the practical value attached to this ideal function, however, Lange's way deviates from Feuerbach's, and approaches the aesthetic religious idealism of Fries. While Feuerbach regarded religion as a morbid phenomenon of our nature, the consequences of which he could not paint in dark enough colours, Lange holds an opposite view. He speaks not only with appreciation but with a warmth very unusual in philosophers of his stamp, of the lofty and irreplaceable value and of the permanent importance of religion, which only needs to be freed from the claims and disfigurements of dogmatism and hierarchism to be on the point of fulfilling her blessed mission among the struggles and crises of the present time. "In a certain sense the ideals of religion are also imperishable. Who shall condemn a mass of Palestrina, or convict of error the Madonna of Raphael? The *Gloria in Excelsis* is and remains a world-historical power, and will sound through the centuries as long as human nerves remain capable of thrilling at the touch of what is grand. And those simple fundamental thoughts of the redemption of the individual man by the surrender of his self-will to the will which guides the whole; those images of death and resurrection which express the loftiest and most inspiring sentiments that move the human breast, where prose is no longer capable of representing in calm words the fulness of the heart; those doctrines finally which command us to share our bread with the hungry and to preach good tidings to the poor,—they will not disappear for ever to make room for a society which has reached its goal when the understanding has supplied it with a better police force, and ingenuity achieved the satisfaction of ever new wants by ever new inventions!"¹

Which of us does not heartily rejoice at such words? And whom do they not inspire with genuine respect for the noble mental character of a thinker whose course, alas! was too soon closed? Yet

¹ *History of Materialism*, ii. 561.

our cheerful recognition of this noble practical idealism must not blind us to the weakness of the theoretical basis it rests on, nor to the want of consistency of the whole view to which this difference gives rise. You are glad of Lange's word as to "the redemption of man by the surrender of his own will to the will which guides the whole." But how if your understanding, schooled in Lange's philosophy, should whisper in your ear that in the world of what exists there is nothing but atoms and their mechanical, causal relations to each other, that there is neither a whole nor a will of the whole, and that these ideas are merely the products of your own synthetic impulse towards unity: will your heart then be able to put on such enthusiasm for these fictions of your imagination, as will enable it to bring the painful sacrifice of self-will and of its real possessions? It is one thing to take up the battle of life and the pain of suffering for the sake of an idea, and a very different thing to be merely æsthetically affected by it. The beauty of Raphael's Madonna and of Palestrina's mass can carry you away without your thinking of any ideas, or if you think of them, without your allowing these æsthetic ideas any influence whatever on the shaping of your convictions and your principles in real life. Thus, if religious ideas are *not more* to you, are not of a more real meaning and truth than these æsthetic ones, then you are not in earnest about religion, it is merely a fine play to you. The collocation of the "imperishable ideas of religion" with the irrefutableness and infallibility of æsthetic beauty is a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*, a misleading fallacy. Yet you assure us that you have personally experienced that the heart is not disturbed by the knowledge of the understanding, because it clings by a thousand roots of fancy and of memory of the hallowed hours of childhood to the old familiar soil of religion.¹ It is well for you if that is so, if that is so permanently; but where did your heart get this firm ground of religion which insures it from shipwreck in the waves of scepticism? From the deep impressions of the firm faith of those who brought you up, your parents and teachers, whose conviction was still solid, still all of a piece, and not divided between the Yes

¹ *History of Materialism*, ii. 555.

of the heart and the No of the understanding? But how will it be with the next generation, which is to grow up under the impression of this discord, which your philosophy recommends as the normal condition of mankind? Will it also find firm ground to which it can cling? Will it not be much more likely to hold to that side of your philosophy which is clear, to the materialism of your theory, and discard the "standpoint of the ideal" as an idle and bothersome addition, as a mystical luxury?

The signs of this turn of thought are indeed already to be noticed in various quarters. In the prevailing literature of the day Lange is the favourite philosopher, but the praise bestowed on him is given to the realistic Kantian, to the man of the understanding, the friend of materialism and contemner of ideas in theoretic thought; his practical idealism is regarded as a private opinion which has little connection with his leading thought, or it is passed over with a shamefaced silence, as a pardonable weakness in a head otherwise so sober. A disciple of Lange's, *Vaihinger*,¹ gives vent to this feeling with little reserve, lamenting that Lange has not yet attained to the complete victory of the mind (understanding) over mysticism, that he has not quite broken with the dangerous principle of introspection (speculation), and has not reached perfect clearness. This disciple of Lange's, moreover, himself gives a specimen of the consistency and clearness desiderated in his master, and we see it to consist in nothing but complete and radical scepticism, which must prove equally fatal to religion, to science, and to conduct. To have laid bare with perfect frankness, without any shrinking or reserve, the goal to which the system tends, is certainly a useful service.

The obvious step from dualistic Neo-Kantianism to empiric sceptical positivism has been taken in the most distinct manner by *Ernst Laas*, to whom we may the more fittingly give some attention, as he recently set forth his religio-philosophical views in a discussion on Kant.² Lange had found fault with Kant for proposing to find

¹ In the work: *Hartmann, Düring, and Lange*. Iserlohn, 1876.

² Kant's *Stellung in der Geschichte des Conflicts zwischen Glauben und Wissen*. Berlin, 1882. He had formerly published *Idealismus und Positivismus* in 2 vols.

and deduce *a priori* that which is *a priori* in ourselves; Laas considers Kant's fundamental error to be the assertion of an *a priori* element in us at all, a rational element not derived from experience, by which rationalism as to the theory of knowledge he became the precursor of all those half-titanic half-absurd attempts to explain the world from an absolute reason, and is thus partly to blame for the decline of the Illumination in the nineteenth century. This judgment of Kant is in many points correct, though we certainly cannot agree with the Anti-Kantianist in making that a reproach against Kant which constitutes him the beginner of a new era; but we cannot but be thankful to have the real views of Neo-Kantianism so frankly stated. Laas himself proposes, quite in the manner of Auguste Comte and Stuart Mill, to regard the fundamental forms of our knowledge, which Kant had deduced as *a priori* forms of our faculty of knowledge, as the sums arrived at by the whole historical experience of our race, which would of course prevent them from ever attaining a greater degree of validity than that of probability. He proposes, however, to maintain the negative result of Kant's criticism of knowledge, that we can know nothing of that which is above sense, and that it therefore is only a possible thought to us, and all reality of which we have experience merely phenomenal. Yet the fact that in all perception we have to do with objects as the necessary correlate of consciousness, "suggests the thought of a (supersensuous) being which stands above the correlation of subject and object, and is everything at once." We must also confess it to be impossible to explain our consciousness on the ground of materialism. But these suggestions and admissions are far from warranting us to seek with Kant the root and the object of our actions in that supersensuous sphere. Kant's morality with its autonomy of a reason so-called "pure," and its platonic turning away from pleasure, do not describe the moral law exactly as it works, and we can make nothing of his "intelligible freedom." Freedom is not to be regarded as a specific something which establishes an insuperable interval between man and beast. Here as in the theoretical sphere we can only speak of gradual, though slowly increasing, differences. And, finally, Kant's

idea of the supreme good is conceived in so subjective and arbitrary a way and treated in so harsh and scholastic a way, that the pre-suppositions of faith deduced from it either must seek some other foundation, or fall to the ground.

Laas acknowledges the principal intention of the Kantian theory of religion to be legitimate: namely, to gain by means of the ideas of faith such psychological forces and motives as may engender and maintain for moral action and endeavour a sufficiency of freshness, hope, courage, and cheerfulness. "Such pre-suppositions, ideas, and postulates human life and effort will never perhaps learn to dispense with." But while Kant's faith, agreeing here with Christian tradition, relates entirely to the individual and his relation to the supersensuous, the intelligible world, to continuance and recompence in another life and so on, Laas would place before this egoistic transcendent faith, or by its side, "an immanent and at the same time a socialistic, as it were a more sympathetic faith," which also rests on pre-suppositions which cannot be proved, but is also in the same way necessary, to maintain the freshness of our moral courage. The hints thrown out by Laas on this point indicate very plainly the religion of humanity of positivism, especially in the sober form it has with Stuart Mill and Spencer. With the latter he has the dark background of the religion of humanity in an unknowable supersensuous being "which is all at once." For the criticism of this theory I may therefore refer to what was said above, and need only add that this example may teach the Neo-Kantians that quite different consequences may be drawn from their premises than those they themselves propose to draw, and perhaps with greater logical justice.

L2. The K2
 The theological variation of this tendency differs from the philosophical line in not regarding the religious ideals as *mere* products of creative fancy without any objective reality, but holding that there is some reality or other behind them, only that we cannot know what this reality consists in, nor how it is related to the world which our intellect apprehends as real. This does nothing to remove the chasm

between our intellectual knowledge, on the one side, which knows only the causal relations of the finite, and the religious ideas on the other, and the antithesis between them often becomes as harshly apparent as on the philosophical side. Thus it is clear that to claim for these religious ideas the same objective truth and reality as is attributable to the former is only to accentuate the dualism of the two views of the world. An example of this tendency, which we may call æsthetic religious "*Neo-Kantianism*," is the work of Pierson : "Tendency and Life."¹

The writer is one of those natures in whom an acute analytical intellect exists side by side with warm religious feeling, and the way to harmonise the two together cannot be found, because the power of synthetic thinking cannot keep pace with that of analytic. Such natures are always inclined to regard what is denied to them as individuals, with a pardonable generalisation as transcending human powers altogether, and to set up absolute Not knowing as an axiom with the same assurance as formerly set up absolute knowledge. For there certainly is an assurance which does not testify to great critical modesty in such a sentence as this : "Does any one boast of a doctrine of divine things which, to use a favourite expression, satisfies at once the demands of the heart and those of thought, his sweet delusion brings to our lips a kindly smile, as if to say, *sancta simplicitas!* . . . It would be folly itself to expect that our need of reality, of pure clear demonstration, should meet with satisfaction in the sphere of religion." But while thus denying to thought—and it is only analytical and critical thought that he is acquainted with—any capacity to overcome antitheses and to lay hold on a synthetic unity, while led by hypercritical distrust to this denial, he places an innocent confidence in subjective feeling, an authority, indeed, to which the most various tendencies, even atheistic positivism among them, make their appeal. Pierson's argument is shortly this : The

¹ Translated from Dutch into German, with a preface by H. Lang. The later work of the same writer, *Levensbeschouwing* (View of Life), I only know from a review by D. Späth in the *Prot. Kirchen-Zeitung*, 1877, No. 32 sq. Here Pierson appears to have drawn the conclusions of his formerly more retiring scepticism with praiseworthy honesty.

religious feeling is a feeling of dependence. This definition is historical, not arbitrarily chosen. But experience tells us that passivity and fear, though present in the very earliest forms of the religious feeling, are no part of its essence. The feeling of dependence which is identical with the religious feeling, must therefore be moral in its nature. The religious man feels himself dependent on a being who is morally superior to him. He feels himself constrained to pay to that being a respect which passes into reverence. This would not be possible, without representing that higher being as the absolutely perfect being. But the highest conceivable perfection is love. Either, therefore, no God or a God whose being is love. But further, it is no more than natural to think of the supreme love as also infinite, almighty, as perfect wisdom, as holiness itself; also as "one with the most powerful personality, since never does one's own self come forward more markedly than when one is giving one's self away from love to others." Then the deduction closes with this assurance: "I do not believe that all this needs to be proved." This confidence of feeling, however, is disturbed by realistic intellect, which will not shut its eyes to the fact, that actual experience with its thousand ills does not always seem to speak for the presupposition of the almighty love of God, and even declares that a considerable portion of existing things is better explained by the assumption of a fate which holds us in a blind rule. Thus the testimonies of the highest authorities, of the feelings occurring in our experience, flagrantly contradict each other: and what are we to hold to? The solution of the difficulty which Pierson recommends to us is a remarkable one. It may be said of love to God as of other love, that it conceals all things, believes, hopes, and bears all things; that love which is slow to judge fellow-men must beware of speaking evil of God; "we prefer not to lay too much stress on what is enigmatical in his government of the world!" Thus to cover over the breach between intellect and feeling is only possible to æsthetic taste, a thing which is far removed from the earnestness and force of religious conviction. With this it agrees that the formation and development of religious ideas, as well as the education and training

of youth to religion, is regarded in the main from the point of view of æsthetics. "If it be once agreed that the language of religion is not to be drawn from a philosophical dictionary but from a poetical one, then it is clear that only æsthetic can here be the lawgiver: and we fearlessly arrive at the principle that every religious expression is to be approved of which satisfies the requirements of a sensitive and well-developed sense of beauty, and returns a pure religious emotion." "But in that case æsthetic development cannot be a matter of no interest to our religious life. On the contrary, it is indispensable, and we may perhaps be allowed with regard to the language of religion to turn round the well-known rule, and to say: *Rien n'est vrai que le beau*, because the truly beautiful alone can be regarded as the fitting expression for the exalted emotions of our hearts." Now if any one should argue, that since taste is the sole standard for the truth of religion, Catholicism with its Raphaels and its Palestrinas is truer than Protestantism, and another, that the Greek "religion of beauty" is the truest; what satisfactory answer could be made from Pierson's principles?

Somewhat more direct and definite than this vague æstheticism is a tendency, otherwise very closely akin to it, which has made considerable way in the Netherlands and elsewhere, under the name of "Ethical idealism." According to this system the religious ideas do not denote anything actual, but are ideals in which man represents his own moral being, but in such a way that he projects it out of himself into the world, and seeks to find it again there. Because, for example, he is or is striving to be, a harmonious whole, he regards the world also as a harmonious whole, and finds in it accordingly not a natural order only, but a moral order of which the merely intellectual view of the world tells him nothing. And because man feels love to be in himself the highest moral life and the power which conquers all, he desires to regard love as the supreme power that rules the world, and makes it the essence of God, though his understanding tells him that he only knows love as a human emotion, and can form no conception of the superhuman love of a

divine being. The religious ideas are thus ideals which the moral man forms for himself from a psychological need of a reality to correspond to the world of his experience.

Agreed so far, the adherents of ethical idealism separate into three paths on the question of the relation of the ideals of faith to reality. One party (*e.g.* Van Hamel) follow Feuerbach and Albert Lange in denying to these ideals all reality, and declaring them to be mere subjective figments of fancy, the value of which consists in the power they can exert as motives, in exciting moral activity, and helping us to forget the pains of life. Another section, as De Bussy,¹ insists that religious ideas, though in the first instance they may be subjective ideals and not adequate to reality, yet have a real background. The proof of this assumption by the postulate that the arrangement of the outer world must in some way correspond with the natural requirements found in our inner world, is wanting in firmness, and the definition of the underlying reality is vague and nebulous. It is therefore to be expected that the difference between this and the former shade of ethical idealism is a very fluid one, and can scarcely be fixed *in concreto*—a fresh confirmation of the close affinity between Fries and Feuerbach, or Neo-Kantianism and Anthropologism. The third tendency, finally, of the ethical idealists, makes out of the dualism of the views of the world an objective dualism of the nature and ground of the world itself, which is either conceived as an antithesis of the spiritual and the mental substance, as by Vitranga and Stuart Mill (see above, p. 153), or as an antithesis of the good God and the not-good demiurge.

“Ethical Idealism” is represented in England by Mr. Matthew Arnold. In his works, *Literature and Dogma* (1873) and *God and the Bible* (1875), he seeks to emancipate religion from metaphysics, which is its weakness, and to base it on the one firm ground of moral experience. Religion he considers to be “morality touched by emotion,” enthusiasm, or pathos. The language of religion is that poetical and rhetorical language to which it is natural to personify and anthropomorphise the states and experiences of the soul. Thus

¹ In his work : *Ethisch Idealisme*, Amsterdam, 1875.

God is the religious expression for the power which makes for righteousness,—a power of which we can say no more on the basis of real experience than that it is not ourselves, but eternally manifests itself in us and in the world as working towards the production of righteousness. More generally expressed, it is the power by which all things fulfil the law of their being. That this power should be personified by religious fancy as a personal God who thinks and governs the world, is perfectly right so long as we see in this no more than a poetical expression for the power or tendency which goes to produce righteousness. But as soon as we take the personal God as an actual truth in the theoretical sense, and as an object of thought as a notion, we wander in the field of metaphysical abstractions, which it is impossible to verify by experience, and where dogmatic superstition has a free hand. But the alleged scientific proofs for the existence of a thinking cause of the world are just as baseless as the popular argument from miracles, and have indeed even less value, because in miraculous legends we do at least hear the voice of religious fancy, while in these abstract arguments there is nothing but a hollow pretence of science. Of an eternal power which is not ourselves and which works for righteousness, Arnold considers that we have a clear notion, founded on experience, but of a Creator and Governor of the world, who thinks and wills, we can form no clear notion, and there is no basis in our experience for such a belief. This notion is therefore a product of metaphysics, and must be banished from religion, so that the latter may rest on a solid basis, and be nothing more than morality with emotion.

Such are the main ideas of Arnold's theory, which he constantly repeats, and which he seeks to show to be the essence of the religion of the Bible. In the review of the Biblical religion undertaken with this end, we find as is natural a number of bold exegetical *tours de force*. We leave the historical arguments to bestow a little attention on the philosophical assertions. For, protest as he may, the author's notion of an eternal power or tendency which is not ourselves, and which makes for righteousness, is a philosophical or metaphysical notion, and by no means a clear and simple one, nor one that at

once explains itself, but one which appears to me, at least, to be very vague and indefinite. This Not-ourselves is described at one time as a real operative power, at another as a law of nature of the same kind as the law of gravitation or the law of spiritual beauty which the Greeks personified in Apollo. In the same way, Arnold thinks the natural law of morality was personified by the Hebrews by investing it with the attribute of existence, and exalted into a divine Being. But a law is not itself an operating power, it is the form in which a power works which is there already, or the necessary connection of the working of several forces. Nor can a law lie outside the forces in the operation of which it manifests itself; the law of beauty is present in beautiful things or persons, and the law of righteousness must be present in moral beings or in men who act. How are we to understand the Not-ourselves, on which Arnold insists so pertinaciously? A strict positivist, I imagine, would see in it a survival, not yet transcended, of mysticism and metaphysical speculation, not derived from experience nor capable of being verified by experience; and would demand the surrender of it, to be replaced simply by humanity with its moral constitution, strivings and compensations. But if this is, as we cannot doubt, what Arnold's position of empirical moralism logically leads to, the last possibility disappears of that moral elevation or worship by which, according to Arnold, religion is still to be distinguished from morality. For what common experience teaches us to think about humanity in respect of morals is far from being so perfect and exalted as to be the object of serious and enthusiastic worship. And, in fact, a moral "law of nature," or a power or tendency conceived after the analogy of the powers of nature and making for righteousness, is a very problematical object of worship. What we are to worship we must also look up to, we must regard not merely as a power physically superior but as an authority eternally excellent and binding. But this is only to be found in a morally perfect or holy will. It is not therefore, as Arnold asserts, merely the metaphysical ingenuity of theorists; no, it is the practical interest of the religious spirit itself which demands as an object of worship a morally perfect being, and refuses to be

satisfied with a mere personified law of nature. And that the God who thinks and wills is less capable of being demonstrated from experience than the vague power of the Not-ourselves which works for righteousness, is an assertion which has no foundation. The one admits as little as the other of exact proof by mathematical experiments and measurements, but the reasonable spirit of God, the ruler of the world, can be proved from the revelations of his nature in experience at least as well as, or indeed far better than the vague power of the Not-ourselves. We cannot know the thinking and willing of our fellow-men immediately, but we can infer it from the manifestations which we perceive, and which we interpret after our own mind as signs of a mind similar to ours. Why should it not be possible to us to infer from the signs of reason and of justice exhibited to us by the world of nature and of history the presence of a being analogous to ourselves who governs the world? And is it not much simpler and more obvious to see the cause of the moral experiences of the world in a moral being, that is a being who thinks and wills, than in a mindless and will-less nature-power, of which it is hard for us to form any conception, the harder the more we try to keep it free from any analogy with our own will-force? The fact is, indeed, that the notion of God which Arnold rejects as abstruse and not verifiable by experience is incomparably clearer and closer to experience than the substitute which he recommends to us with so much eloquence and conscious pride—the power, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness.

Mr. Arnold's historical argument is so far true. It is correct to say that the stress laid throughout and as a matter of principle on the moral side of the belief in God was the peculiar distinction, the "revelation" of Israel; but it is no less distinctly a perversion to make Israel's belief in God, as Arnold does, amount to no more than the personification of the moral law. One must deliberately shut one's eyes in order not to see how essential an element in the God-consciousness of Israel is the metaphysical side of it, the omnipotence and wisdom which rule the world. The very notion of holiness, which at a later time was understood as denoting mainly the moral

perfection of God, was originally the expression for his exalted power and His terrible, unapproachable majesty, and is a favourite term in this sense even in Ezekiel and deutero-Isaiah. To suppress this side of the Biblical notion of God is to destroy the foundation, and consequently the reality of the moral notion of God, and what remains after the subtraction is a shadowy ideal of the moral man, such as could never be the object of religious belief, adoration, or trust. It is true that the historical progress of the Biblical religion moves in the direction of a purer development of the moral side of the idea of God: but it is not to be overlooked that this progress was only possible on the basis of the established certainty of the metaphysical reality of God as the thinking and willing ruler of the world. Attractive as Mr. Arnold's description of the Biblical religion of both the Old and New Testaments undeniably is in many particulars, we cannot escape the impression that in many ways he does violence to history in order to make it harmonise with his preconceived opinions. The disturbing influence of this dogmatism is felt with special force in his treatment of critical questions. The present is not a fitting opportunity for the discussion of this point, or else it would be easy to show how the arguments which he regards as a refutation of German criticism (*e.g.*, on the question of the fourth Gospel) are based on superficial study which fails to perceive the really decisive points, and on sophistical disarrangement of the real facts of the case. Arnold is no doubt a writer of great and many-sided acquirements: all that he writes is pleasant to read and full of suggestions, but he possesses no real grip either in philosophy or in history, and if he thinks he can make this want good by dint of clever and eloquent writing, he is mistaken; nor will it mend his error to exalt himself, and make his readers merry at the expense of those who have treated serious problems more seriously than he.

A similar gnostic dualism to that of the Dutch *Ethische Richting* meets us in the anonymous work, *Das Evangelium der Armen Seele* (*The Gospel of A Poor Soul*), Leipzig, 1871. It is impossible to read this remarkable book without feeling at one time strongly

attracted, and at another as strongly repelled, by it; whether attracted or repelled one is always powerfully interested. A warm, religious spirit keenly alive to the sanctifying and strengthening influence of approach to God as holy love, is at conflict with, or, more properly, in an indifferent, unfused co-ordination with the intellect, which regards the world of the actual as the mechanism of forces which have nothing whatever to do, in respect of either their origin or their law, with that holy love and its purely ideal ends. Here God is merely the (objective) moral ideal, the will of the good, and gives himself as such to be felt by the human heart, striving with all its might after goodness, and thus supplying its want; but he is not the Creator nor the Preserver, nor even the immediate governor of the world. "The final causes of the world it is for science to investigate (and at the inquiry of science the world points back not to one cause but to many); religion only knows that God is her God, not that he is the first cause of the world, and that all the attempts of science to prove God to be this cause of the world are essentially futile and vain. To religion this world with its elements, powers, and laws, is a thing independent of God, simply existing as he does; it is the part of science to know this world as it is, was, and will be. Piety and morality have no plea to urge here but this, that such science alone does not satisfy, and is a moral good only when it is subordinated to love to one's fellow-men."

By this separation of the ideal God of religion from the real causality of the world free play is to be given, on the one side, to the understanding for a realistic (materialistic) explanation of the world, in spite of the claims of the heart, while, on the other side, religion is to be assured that her pure picture of God can no longer be darkened by the shadows which appear to be cast by the realities of the world and life on the causal principle, and if this principle be identical with God, threaten to obscure God's ideal glory and to weaken his power over our heart. The religious kernel of the belief in an almighty God, the creator and ruler of the world, is said to remain unaffected by this separation of the good God from the real power which moves the world. "The world," God says to com-

fort the poor soul, "has not hitherto been dependent on me; yet the course of its events has served pious souls which love God and man, and helped them to their true good; and this will continue to be the case so long as the world lasts." Now, how is it conceivable that the mechanism of blindly working forces which constitutes the real world, forces which are supposed to have nothing whatever to do with the divine will of holy love either in their origin or in their nature, can yet serve the ideal end of this holy love, and be serviceable and furthering to the human heart, and its true good in union with God? This it is hard to see. It is equally difficult, in fact it is impossible, to think of God, to whose nature belongs infinite life, and therefore infinite activity, as a mere idle spectator of the course of the world which is entirely independent of him. The sceptical thought is forcibly suggested here that the God who does not work may be an unreal reflection of ourselves. But, apart from this, it is clear that such a dualism cannot satisfy the living religious consciousness. A God who is not the force of existing things, but passive in presence of that force, cannot exercise the binding and constraining power over the finite will, nor the redeeming power for the mind entangled in the finite, which the living, religious consciousness looks for in God. The holiness and the redeeming love of God would be robbed of their foundation for faith, if he were not also the almighty ground of the world and of man. This the early Church well knew, when she opposed to gnostic dualism her own theological metaphysics, which expressed in the language of the time that God was the Creator and the Redeemer in one.

To the æsthetic, the ethical, and the gnostic varieties of Neo-Kantianism, we have to add in the last place the specifically ecclesiastical form of this tendency. Ritschl's theology, it is well known, owes its success to the combination of modern Neo-Kantianism with an energetic church spirit. I am led to notice it here by the fact that a disciple of Ritschl, W. Hermann, in his pamphlet, *Die Metaphysik in der Theologie* (1876), denies the legitimacy of the philosophical treatment of religion, and thus denies the very right to

exist of the philosophy of religion. We hear once more the old song, with which we have grown familiar, in its different variations from Feuerbach and A. Lange down to the "Gospel of a Poor Soul," viz., that metaphysics have only to take cognisance of facts, while religion has only to do with the moral ideal (Christian religion with the positive ideal of the Christian Church), so that the two views of the world have nothing to do with each other, and the combination of them, as in the speculative science of religion, can only issue in the obscuring and spoiling of both functions, the religious and the knowing. "The refusal to recognise the irreducible difference that exists between the feeling of the value of goodness and the knowledge of facts, may come perhaps from the relinquishment of the supra-mundane character of the Christian idea of God. In plain words, the Christian idea of God is lost as soon as it is not based exclusively on the moral sense of the ideal but on a thinking contemplation of the world as well; for between these two, ideal and reality, there is an irreducible difference." "The consideration of this peculiarity (of the religious sense) forces us to acknowledge, that what we speak of as real in Christianity is quite different from what is spoken of as real in metaphysics. Here it means the producing real, by which we explain to ourselves the possibility of all being and becoming; in the former case its certainty is connected with the incommunicable experience of the value of Christian goodness. To attempt therefore to mix up the two kinds of reality is to deny that the ethical fact in which the religious view of the world has its root, is a separate thing, not to be grasped in the general forms of being and becoming, not within the view of metaphysics at all." Really! It would be a strange metaphysics which should think its task, the knowledge of that which is, discharged, while the highest fact of all, the ethical and religious mind, was excluded from her view! As long as there is such a thing as metaphysics it is her task to interpret the whole of the actual, both thing and spirit, as a unity and from a single principle: should she put out of her sight either one side or the other, wholly or in part, in that degree she has not fulfilled her task, and is not

true metaphysics at all. It is for this reason that metaphysics is so intimately related both to the mental and to the natural sciences; and it cannot be a matter of indifference to the mental sciences how metaphysics conceives the producing ground of being and becoming, whether, for example, it one-sidedly inclines to the natural sciences and adopts such a view of the origin of things as reduces spiritual life to a mere product of things. What are we to say of such sentences as this: "The problem of religion is not made more difficult, it is not made easier by the tendency of the dogmatic metaphysics the Christian follows, be that tendency idealistic or materialist. Whether philosophy be deistic, pantheistic, theistic, or whatever it is, is a matter of indifference to theologians. The simple Christian will naturally feel safer in the neighbourhood of a theistic philosopher than of a deist; the theologian ought possibly to look for direct furtherance from the one, if he has done his duty as a scientific worker, from the other possibly not. . . . He who imagines he will solve or even advance the problem of religion (to estimate the world solely and exclusively as a means of our salvation) with the assistance of that metaphysic of the much longed-for theistic philosophy, either divests himself in theology of his Christianity, or is directly asking for another religion." Yet we also read: "We must ask metaphysics to supply us with notions corresponding to those relations (of the kingdom of nature and of spirit). . . . It is a task metaphysics cannot avoid, to mark the change our notions undergo, according as they are applied to things or to spirit. The result of this labour is the armoury of systematic theology. . . . If theology would set forth Christianity with scientific accuracy, it must make use of this material supplied by metaphysics; it makes no difference to her activity, though these should be changed at some other point in the process of metaphysical inquiry." In addition to this requirement to furnish theology with the armouries of scientific notions, theology puts forth a second demand on metaphysics: "To respect the limits which divide the sphere of independent knowledge from the realm of the concrete, moral ideal."

It is extraordinary to see how innocently positions are here advanced side by side which doubly and trebly contradict each other! Does the writer not perceive that a science which furnishes me with the notions for my special field of study, exercises in so doing the deepest influence on my own work? Can philosophical notions be used like empty boxes, into which we may put any contents we please, and any variety of contents? How could any one, with even the most superficial acquaintance with modern philosophy, fall back into such a mediæval scholastic view of philosophy and its relation to theology? Even the mediæval schoolmen were more rational and more consistent; they did not with one breath require philosophy to do the maid-servant's work of preparing their formal notions, and declare the contents of philosophy and the position taken up by her to be matters of no consequence. It is perfectly obvious that if philosophy is to form notions suitable to the "armoury of systematic theology," it dare not set out from a principle which is hostile to moral and religious ideas, or even alien and indifferent to them. If philosophy is to perform, to perform correctly, even what the Neo-Kantian theologian here asks of her, her horizon must be wider than that which is here drawn for her.

Mediæval scholasticism had heard all about the "double truth," the philosophical and the religious, which were said to have nothing to do with each other. But the Sorbonne knew very well why it condemned this view, for there lay concealed behind this dualism in these days as in ours, simply the scepticism of a disintegrating Nominalism. The breach with the faith of the Church could remain concealed, consciously or unconsciously, behind this "double truth," till the time came to throw off the mask in the radicalism of the Renaissance. In our day, when a Feuerbach and an A. Lange have shown so plainly and frankly what that dualism leads to, and that it simply means the negation of all objective religious truth, it is hard to see how any one can extol this double truth, this two-soul theory as the sheet-anchor of religion and theology. "By the truly real we mean quite a different thing in Christianity from what we mean in metaphysics;" what rational idea can we see in this? Is there any-

thing outside of the truly real but the not truly real, *i.e.* the unreal, what is represented merely, the fantastic world of abstract ideas? As there is only *one* reason, so there is but *one* truth, but one world of reality, whether the reality of the senses or of the mind, which together constitute the one reality, the object of our rational thought. In this speculative philosophy is entirely at one with the honest unperverted thinking of the simple Christian: it is only the sophistry of the double, half-sceptical, half-believing "Neo-Kantian" that would torture the mind by asking it to combine with equal conviction two pictures of the world which are quite indifferent and even in part quite repugnant to each other.

It might easily be shown how what has led to the various contradictions of the above-quoted sentences is the old confusion of religion with the science of religion or theology. For religion itself, for being good and for practical faith, no metaphysics in the strictly scientific sense is wanted, no speculative notions: so much every child knows. But something analogous to metaphysics, some objective view of the world, the most simply religious require and indeed have; the world his dogmatic ideas call up to him provides him with such a view. And it is just because religion comprises not only a practical element but also a theoretical, that the science of religion cannot solve the problem of a real and pure knowledge of the religious fact, without a correct metaphysic, or more generally, philosophy, to help her. How otherwise could she know how much of the object she deals with, the religion before her, belongs to the moral ideal, and how much to the popular metaphysics? or more accurately what belongs to the objective kernel of the religious function, and what to the subjectively determined form of consciousness? How little clearness is to be gained on such questions we see very distinctly in the halting attitude of the Ritschl theology on the cardinal question of the notion of miracles and of revelation, a subject of which we shall yet come to speak.

Since the earlier edition of this book, Hermann has given a more detailed statement of his views in the work, *Die Religion im Verhältniss zum Welterkennen und zur Sittlichkeit* (The Relation of Religion

to our knowledge of the world and to morality) (1879), which is interesting as showing an advance beyond Kant in somewhat the same direction as that taken by Fichte in his famous essays : " On the Ground of our Belief in the Divine Government of the World," and " Appeal to the Public against the Charge of Atheism " (vol. i. pp. 279-281.) Instead of Fichte's frank decision in drawing his negative conclusions, however, we find Hermann involved in indefiniteness and ambiguity with respect to the cardinal question of the reality of the idea of God, or the real relation of the human Ego to the world-governing power represented under the idea of God. In this feeling of uncertainty about the whole position, we may perhaps find the occasion of the heat with which the writer falls upon all who differ from him.¹

To prove that religious belief cannot be arrived at from any other quarter than moral consciousness Hermann first attempts to show that all our knowledge of the world subserves the practical aim of ruling it, and is thus directed by practical interests and by no means sought for its own sake, but " utilised by the living person as a means to his own ends." Metaphysics, too, is not a theoretical but a practical explanation of the world, and does not busy itself with an impartial apprehension of what is given in fact, but with " an impassioned endeavour to obtain recognition for thoughts, the contents of which have no other title to be recognised than their value for us." For the metaphysical idea of a unity of the world has its origin solely in the feeling and willing person whose personal need in judging of the world as occasioning pleasure or pain is only met by the idea of a completed whole. These propositions worked out in endless repetitions are a new variation of the old theme of the sophists that man is the measure of all things, and that there is therefore no such thing as objective truth independent of the fortuitous interests of the subject, true for all minds. This is the

¹ An acute and pertinent criticism of Hermann's book from the pen of Professor Krauss appeared in the *Jahrb. f. prot. Theol.* 1883, second number. While referring to this detailed criticism, I may here be allowed to omit a number of details which might give occasion for remark, and to restrict myself to the main points bearing on an estimate of Hermann's position and of theological Neo-Kantianism generally.

fundamental thought of all scepticism, and the inner contradictions of it were laid bare by Plato. But crooked and perverted as is this assertion of the pathological interestedness of all knowledge, it is yet interesting as a *confession* by an individual: in fact it contains the pathological key to the peculiarities of that cultivation of science with which Hermann is occupied.

Metaphysic being concerned to reach such a view of the unity of the world as may enable man to rule nature by working at her, religion, on the other hand, is concerned to reach a view of the unity of the world which may uphold the self-certainty of the personality over-against things. "When I seek to represent a world-whole, because as a person conscious of my supreme good I wish not to lose myself in the multiplicity of things, I experience the impulse to religious belief. Man's desire after salvation, which every religious interpretation of the world is an attempt to satisfy, is manifestly nothing else than a manifestation of that feeling of self which makes him wish to see his own existence, felt to be valuable beyond all else, exalted above the irresistible course of events." What answers to this personal interest of man or his desire to be himself, is the idea of God as the power which subordinates the world to man's ends. That this practical motive plays an important part in religion, no one can deny; but thus to make the natural tendency to self-assertion the whole of religion, and to divorce it from the humble acknowledgment of our dependence on a supreme power which does not exist for us alone, but to the eternal laws and purposes of which we ourselves with all others are subordinate and owe obedience; to sacrifice this pious feeling of dependence to the selfish desire of unlimited assertion of man's personality, this is just to adopt the theory of religion of Feuerbach, which makes it the outcome of a sickly egoistical heart at variance with the reasonable order of the world. The position if worked out would lead to the result, that religion is the better the more it flatters an unreasonable egoism, *i.e.* the more immoral it becomes.

Hermann, of course, protests against such an inference from his position, and takes a great deal of trouble to detach the personal

feeling of self and self-persistence, which he regards as the origin of religion, from its questionable egoistic back-ground, and to raise it to the elevation of pure moral will. The object is respectable, though the way in which it is sought is open to serious question. The reasonable subject, his deduction runs, in asserting its own self is compelled to assume the reality of the unconditioned. The will of the reasonable being sets up aims in which that being in fact wills itself. From this it results that the willing subject must be thought as an end. But the will which acts as its own end, and itself produces the law of its own action, is autonomous. The person, therefore, who desires to maintain and to intensify his own life, must think the moral law, for the content of the moral law is just the supersensuous personality as an autonomous being, exalted above nature and an end to itself. Morality does not therefore rest on religion, but morality accomplishes itself only in the form of a religious explanation of the world. For inadmissible and harsh as it would be to go further back for the basis of the personality and its autonomous moral law, yet the moral person can fully appropriate the moral law only by means of a religious teleological judgment as to the world, therefore by the idea of God, whose essence it is to will just what the moral person wills, who "claims to be nothing more than the unchangeable will of the rule of the personality over nature." Religious judgments, therefore, are "only intelligible as the expression of the personal self-certainty of the human spirit which is in some way morally determined;" and accordingly, "their truth just means the reality of the ideal world to which the moral intercourse of men ultimately points. For merely knowing beings the truth of religion does not exist; it is only valid for the practice of a number of persons having intercourse with each other." From this Hermann infers that religion as well as morality is completely withdrawn from scientific knowledge of the world, and that the very attempt to embrace it in that knowledge destroys it by reducing it to the level of natural existence. If it be urged that the moral will, however peculiar it be, is yet a part of the totality of experience, and must admit of being traced back, like everything else, to an ultimate

common ground of the world, Hermann rejoins, that the moral law, in teaching us to think of the will as free, reminds us that "we must not go behind personality to ask what other agency has made it possible. In it the moral person has reached the ultimate ground of all being, the one point to which all that is actual is to be referred. It is, therefore, to surrender the position in which the moral law places us, if we take our stand over-against the moral law as a thing given objectively, and place it under a supposed higher point of view along with the multiplicity of the things which can be explained. In doing this we cast ourselves into personal relations with an ultimate, in which our thinking is to come to rest, and from which as our starting-point we seek to restore the unity of view which is indispensable to the personal life. But in doing so we are disregarding that conclusion of the matter which the moral law has pointed out to us, and by placing ourselves in conflict with it we introduce a division into our view of life, which is not only a crux for thought, but which, according to the objective moral standard, must be pronounced immoral."¹

This assertion, that by tracing our personality and its moral laws back to the ultimate ground of the world, or God, we become chargeable with an immorality, is, from the mouth of a theologian, certainly astounding. Even Kant did not go so far; the idea of our duties as divine commands, or of God as lawgiver, served to maintain the connection of His autonomous morality with religion. But the cold autonomy of the moral subject, who in this view was fenced in with his own formal reason, was hard to harmonise with that survival of a deistic belief in God, and this led Fichte to the further step of setting the moral personality entirely on its own feet. With almost the same words as those now used by Hermann, Fichte declared:² "I myself and my necessary end are the supersensuous, the absolutely positive and categorical, beyond which I cannot go, beyond which I cannot wish to go, without destroying my inner life.

¹ *Die Religion*, etc., pp. 255 *seq.*; cf. 210, 299, 251.

² *On the Ground of our Belief in a Divine Government of the World.—Fichte's Works*, v. 181, *seq.* cf. 205. (See above, in the present work, vol. i. p. 279.)

It is the end of our existence, that the reasonable being in us should be absolute and quite free and independent ; reason should be sufficient for herself," etc. The further step, too, the deduction of belief in the moral order of the world from the immediate sense of duty, was there taken by Fichte, by means of a chain of reasoning similar to that of Hermann, only much clearer and simpler. At this point, however, the paths seem to diverge. From such premises Fichte frankly concludes, a conclusion which can scarcely be avoided, that this moral being of our own, which represents itself to our consciousness in the idea of the moral order of the world, is the *only divine* we are entitled to assume, while to trace this order to a world-ground or God as its foundation would be to destroy its absoluteness, would be to "scorn that conclusion of the matter which the moral law has pointed out to us, and to place ourselves in conflict with that law," to use Hermann's words. But whether Hermann accepts the conclusion at which Fichte arrived, he nowhere distinctly says : several of his expressions¹ would seem to indicate that he does so. Continuing the passage above cited, he goes on to show that our consciousness of freedom, in which every individual knows himself as the "absolute beginning of the moral world," yet does not exclude the consciousness of dependence, "because the two attitudes only represent the different ways in which the reality of the absolute end, the intercourse of moral persons, is apprehended by an individual human spirit. The same content appears, in the one case, as the power over the world, which deprives of its terror the natural limitation of our life, in the other case as the life-element of our freedom." The only meaning it seems possible to attach to this statement is that our freedom is just the same as that which in another way of looking at it appears as the divine power above the world—an idea which accurately coincides with Fichte's faith in the sole divinity of our pure (not our individual) Ego, and its self-produced world-order. The above-cited passage amounts simply to this : the being of God "claims to be nothing more than the unchangeable will of the rule of the personality over nature." To

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 258, 204, 210.

the same effect the following :—" For man there can be no higher mode of view than that from the position of personal life : in looking about for a higher he forgets that the moral law which reveals to him his own nature as a person has led him to the limits of his thought. The word which solves for *man* the riddle of the universe can be no other than 'personality.' " The connection here shows distinctly that the personality spoken of is not that of God, but that of man. But when this world is declared to be that which solves the riddle of the universe, the personality is made God, and thus our Neo-Kantianist has rapidly developed from one position to another, has overtaken Fichte, and is now at the level of Feuerbach, of whom he reminds us in many ways. One more marked passage in conclusion. " Religious faith in God is, rightly understood, just the medium by which the universal demand of the moral law becomes individualised for the individual man in his particular place in the world's life, so as to enable him to recognise its absoluteness as the ground of his self-certainty, and the ideal drawn in it as his own personal end." Compare with this the following words of Fichte :² " That man in speaking to others of the various relations of that (moral) order to him and his actions comprises and fixes them in the notion of an existing being, whom he perhaps calls God, is the result of the finiteness of his intellect, but does him no harm if only he does not employ that notion for any other purpose than just to hold together in this way the relations of the supersensuous world to him which manifest themselves within him." We see that for Fichte as for Hermann, the religious belief in God, rightly understood, is just the medium by which the moral law is individualised, brought to bear on the individual.

So closely does Hermann approach the earlier Fichtean position, where God disappears in the moral order of the world and religion in morality. That he does not proceed boldly on Fichte's road, but remains with one foot in the deism of Kant, is no advantage, but a deplorable obstacle to the inner transcending of this irreligious moralism. If Hermann would once take up this position as

¹ " Appeal to the Public against the Charge of Atheism," v. 208.

decidedly and clearly as Fichte did, we should expect with confidence that the logic of the case would lead him as it led Fichte beyond an untenable subjective idealism to an idealism objective and absolute. That absolute freedom and autonomy which simply does not exist in us finite reasonable beings he would be led to transfer to the infinite reason above us and before us, and then he would find in it the real ground both for our moral and for all natural existence. For it is not the case, as Hermann with a curious blindness continues to reproach us, that to refer these two to a common divine origin is to make them alike in nature or of equal value. In such a solid theism not only would full justice be done to the legitimate elements of the Kant-Fichtean idealism, but the crying contradiction would be removed which the weak half-sceptical half-believing position of Neo-Kantian theology seeks to impose on us, of seeking the power which orders the world in a God, in whom the moral persons, the principal factors of our world, are not based, and who stands in no conceivable connection with the other factor, with nature!

Instead of thus endeavouring by earnest examination of such difficulties and problems to work out what is unsatisfactory and ambiguous in his position, a position which oscillates between the anthropologism of Fichte and Feuerbach and the deism of Kant, Hermann appears, at any rate up to this time (for he may not have spoken his last word) to prefer to shelter himself under the protecting wings of positive authority. The reason he gives for this *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος* is highly characteristic of the weakness of the whole position. "If we be told," he says, "that religion, which we declare to be the correlative of personal self-certainty, is the mere imagination of an energetic subjectivity, we can make no direct answer. We can only point to the fact that the world of belief is the world of the living, and that the living holds the field. When the believer looks that circumstance straight in the face, the existence of religious communion becomes invaluable to him, confirming his own certainty as nothing else can. With burning desire must he then lay hold upon the testimony by which the mighty traces of religion in

history, and most of all the religious tradition in which he himself was nourished, vouch for the fact that his proud and anxious heart is not alone answerable for the inexplicable audacity of faith, but that when he believes he is yielding to a power which sways many hearts which are thus united with him." Instead, then, of immediate personal certainty which here suffers shipwreck in the conflict between knowledge and heart, an appeal to the "many," who yield to the same power of faith! As if in matters of truth numbers were to decide. As if the one Luther in Worms with his appeal to clear grounds of Scripture and reason, were not in the right as against all the millions of Catholics of his own and of all times! No; this replacing of the missing inner certainty of truth, of the "witness of the Spirit with our spirit," as Scripture calls it, by a multitude of outward testimonies, and by the powers of tradition and authority, is surely neither Kantian nor Protestant, but only positivist and Catholic!

But the stumbling weakness of the Neo-Kantian faith once sheltered in the safe citadel of ecclesiastical positivism, that facility which can only proceed from the exaltation of this belief above all worldly knowledge, and so above all logic too, is once again employed, and the idealistic premises which were used as a ladder to rise to this height, are cast aside as useless lumber. Before, the idealistic self-certainty of the moral personality was said to be of such unconditional autonomy, that it could not endure even to be traced back to God as the creative and legislative ground. Now we are surprised by assertions, in which the most extreme belief on authority and on tradition, such a belief as even the dogmatic of the Church had never taught so nakedly, is made a religious and consequently also a moral principle of life. "The source of religious knowledge is for us neither our morality nor one kind or another of metaphysics, but *revelation*. Thus do we designate an event in which we have recognised the declaration of the divine will directed to our salvation." This revelation, we are carefully assured, is always merely an outward event, even for the bearers of the revelation, who have always to set the divine declaration over-against the

course of their own lives as something quite different from the latter. It seems almost a commonplace, and yet it is necessary to remind this massive positivism of the well-known objections; where were men, both the first bearers of a revelation and those to whom they communicated it, to get the criterion of a divine declaration, and the reason for holding it to be authentic, if it did not meet with a point of connection in something within them, if there was not an inner revelation there already, to which the new, outwardly communicated revelation corresponded, and by which it was authenticated? To this *inner revelation* all the bearers of revelations have from the first appealed: Jesus spoke of it when he spoke of the "light that is in thee," which must be sound if the whole man is to be full of light; Paul spoke of it when he spoke of the law of God written on the hearts of the Gentiles, and John spoke of it when he spoke of the drawing of the Father to the Son, by which those who are of the truth are led to Christ: the early Fathers thought of it when they spoke of the pre-Christian activity of the Logos in the whole of humanity or of the *anima naturaliter Christiana*; Protestant dogmatic referred to in the *revelatio naturalis*, on which the relative truth of the *theologia naturalis* is based. I know but one school of doctrine which has repudiated as decidedly as the Neo-Kantian theology any inner and universal revelation, in favour of one exclusively external and historical. I refer to the *Socinian* doctrine, with which the doctrine we are discussing shows in other respects also a strong similarity. We see in both the characteristic combination of a barren rationalistic moralism with a lifeless supernatural positivism.

In connection with the question how we are to conceive of the historical facts of revelation, the problem of belief in miracles must of necessity be faced. This is a sore point for a theology which on one side is so anxious to maintain its reputation for orthodoxy, and on the other has set up an absolute partition between the causal nexus of nature and a transcendent God, who is only to be thought of in the categories of ethics. Hence on this point also we only get from these theologians oracles of Pythian darkness and ambiguity. "The

excited discussion for or against the credibility of the miraculous narratives of the Gospels, on grounds of principle, is completely indifferent for the present problem of theology. It is however excellently suited to confuse men's minds and to blunt their perception of religious truth. For whether a man proves the possibility or the impossibility of miracles, what determines his judgment is a view of God which is not the Christian one. We do not share the belief which is common to the apologists and their opponents, that nature is a completed whole for our knowledge. Hence to our view every miracle of God is immeasurably prepared for in natural ways. God works through nature which he created as a means for his final purpose. But we must repudiate as superstitious any attempt to come to a final decision as to the possibility or impossibility of any reported occurrences, if that attempt proceeds on a view of the whole of nature, the materials of which view have been gathered from the results up to this time of natural science." This suspension of judgment may be right and fitting in regard to many miraculous narratives, but to extend it to all of them is certainly more prudent than reasonable. As for the Resurrection in particular, Hermann declares on the one hand that he cannot see how a believer in the presence and activity of God throughout the whole existence of Christ can surrender the conviction that he actually rose again : we are not entitled however to make any inferences from a fact which we can so little penetrate, as to the real form of the world, inferences which would bring about a fantastic dislocation of our knowledge of the world. The fact is as inexplicable to us as the creation of the world, and belongs, as far as we are concerned, to the same category. Yet, on the other hand, a belief in the fact ought not to be made a condition of belonging to the Christian community. In general we should not forget, that we here stand in a sphere in which we do not mark out the ways for ourselves, but yield to the educating influence put forth by an objective spiritual power. In such a situation it is a commandment of God to us thankfully to rejoice in the revelation which makes us free, and to enrich our knowledge at its historical source. In doing so "we are not called on to make a sacrifice of the intellect,

which would merely be the sacrifice of a metaphysical prejudice, because we do not possess the wisdom at all, which we should be called to surrender."

And this is enough for us. Scientifically we can have no further dealings with a theologian who himself confesses that it no longer remains for him to make a sacrifice of the intellect. I am also of opinion that yea and nay is not good theology, and that the words apply to theology as well as to other things: "As for the upright, He directeth his way"!

An interesting parallel to Hermann's *Religion* is Julius Kaftan's *Essence of the Christian Religion* (1881). He shares with Hermann the Neo-Kantian basis of his theory of religion, the strict separation of knowledge and faith, and the limitation of knowledge to the facts of nature and history, with the repudiation of its right to interfere in the sphere of faith, which is based exclusively on estimates of value, and subservient to man's need of salvation. Starting however from this common basis, the paths of the two thinkers at once diverge in a remarkable way, only to meet again in positive dogma. The difference may be shortly stated as follows: Hermann goes beyond Kant in the direction of Fichte, *i.e.* of subjective idealism, but Kaftan goes back before Kant, in the direction of Hume and Locke, *i.e.* of sceptical empiricism (scepticism of course is not directed against faith in this theologian, but against knowledge, in favour of faith). The relation of Kaftan to Hermann is therefore exactly the same as that of Laas to Albert Lange on the philosophical line of Neo-Kantianism; as the ethical idealism of the latter turns with Laas (p. 177) into Comtian positivism, so the Kantian moralism which still serves as a basis for Hermann, turns with Kaftan into an anti-Kantian empiricism and a purely historical religious positivism. This close parallel in the two branches, otherwise quite independent of each other, unmistakably reveals an inner law in the development of the whole tendency, a law indeed of its disintegration.

Hermann holds fast the *a priorism* of Kant both in the theoretical and in the practical reason, and allows the validity of the laws of

thought at least within the sphere of experience. Kaftan, on the other hand, rejects this *a priori*ism entirely, and regards it as an evil effect of platonic speculation, from which even Kant suffered. The so-called "laws of thought" too, which are thought to provide a bridge from science to metaphysical speculation, can never, Kaftan holds quite in the spirit of the positivist Stuart Mill, claim any greater importance than that of rules which we the human race have abstracted from our successful investigation and thought. This applies even to what is most universal, "where the idea of an *a priori* principle might suggest itself most readily." The only legitimation of a method is its success. Hence the laws of thought undergo a change according to the objects of knowledge to which they are applied. For the construction of religious truth they are the formal means, but they must never play a legislative part in this sphere; they must be subordinated to the highest principle, the ruling idea of the supreme good. This is not in contradiction with the principles which guide the search for truth in other fields, but directly connected with the state of the facts everywhere. "The truth on which this principle is based is in fact no other than this, that not facts but values form the decisive consideration in all questions of human knowledge." This is going even further than the positivist theory of science, in which, though the laws of thought are regarded as Kaftan regards them, as mere rules derived from induction, the facts still hold their place as the ultimate test of truth; while Kaftan denies to them this validity, and makes "values," *i.e.* fortuitous subjective taste, the sole deciding tribunal in all questions of human knowledge. It is hard to see how anything like science can still maintain itself along with this absolute sceptical subjectivism. We are taken back to the position of a Protagoras, for whom Plato and Aristotle, Leibniz and Kant, do not exist.

But Kaftan works out his principle in thorough earnest in the practical sphere. And this is the point at which his path diverges most decidedly from that of Hermann. The latter stretched Kant's autonomy of the practical reason to the most extreme Fichtean idealism, and constructed religion just on this absoluteness of a

moral law and a moral will, which lie quite beyond all experience. Kaftan regards the *a priori* character of the moral law with Kant as a remainder of platonic speculation which must be got rid of; it is a mischievous and antiquated prejudice, he holds, to think that there is in this sphere of personal life such a constant element of the human spirit (as legislative practical reason), an innate moral disposition on which our moral consciousness could support itself. On the contrary, it ought to be seen that with all these ideas about the *a priori* nature of the human mind and all that is in it, we are simply weaving a myth, and involving ourselves in contradictions, since what is born in us by nature is nature in its character. The moral life, Kaftan says, quite in the spirit of Locke and of the modern positivists, arises and develops itself naturally in the course of history, and the moral disposition of the individual is simply his qualification to take his place in such a historically given development. Philosophy, too, need not look for the moral ideas anywhere but in history, where they take form as the common principles of valuation in historical communities. Now, I am far from denying the legitimacy of this appeal to history; I myself seek to grasp ideas in their historical development, and hence describe my own philosophy of religion as "genetico-speculative." But I certainly consider that to speak of development is always to take for granted that there is something to develop, some entity containing in itself from the first a germ and a law of growth, and that this *a priori* cause of development is to be carefully distinguished from its historical process; and I think it cannot but be mischievous, especially in the sphere of ethics, to confound the growth under historical conditions with the unconditioned cause or *a priori* law of it. For if all morality is reduced to a mere positive product of history and the eternal norm denied, which is immanent in the constitution of reason ("the law of God written in the heart," the Scriptures call it), then it is clear that there exists no longer any objective and universally valid motive and criterion of morality; it depends, as Kaftan himself concedes, "in the last instance on the subjective factor of personal valuation," *i.e.* it is a matter of taste for each individual. From the

formidable ethical consequences of this subjective position, one mind may take refuge in revelation, but the position provides us with no universally valid reasons for forbidding another to turn to quite another side, perhaps to the immoral side.

Starting from this pure empiricism, Kaftan arrives at a theory of religion, which is partly superior to Hermann's, partly inferior to it. It is superior: for while with Hermann religion all but disappears in morality, or at least is represented as only another way of taking the same thing, a thing which is to be found in its reality in the moral intercourse of mankind, Kaftan is far from doing away with religion in such a fashion. He states from the first emphatically, and with express disapproval of the Hermann-Ritschl theology, that religion aims not at ethical ideals but at goods: that its specific difference from morality consists just in this, that the motive of what is done in religion is the desire of life and of goods, while the foundation of moral action is the feeling of the binding power of a moral ideal: the kernel of the Christian religion in particular, he says, is the life of the soul hid with Christ in God; and he even goes so far as to assert that religion is only completed in the man for whom the world with its goods no longer exists, whose soul lives entirely in God, and that a positive reference out of this life in God back to the life in the world is essentially alien to religion, the soul of which does not attach itself to the moral goods of the earthly life but to a supreme supramundane good: "the certainty of an eternal life in a kingdom of God which is above the world, which lies to us as yet in the beyond, is the very nerve of our Christian piety." This accentuation of the specific meaning and importance of religion, and the warm and hearty tone with which Kaftan speaks of it, form a pleasing contrast to the icy cold of the moralism of Ritschl and Hermann; yet, on the other hand, we cannot deny that this advantage on Kaftan's side is dearly bought at the expense of the absolute value of morality which with Hermann was so energetically set forth, and was made the basis of religious certainty. In place of the absolute value of morality, Kaftan sets up endæmonism. Not only does he find the origin of religion, as does also Hermann, exclusively

in the egoistic endæmonistic effort to hold life and its goods secure against the hardship of the earth, but he never lets religion in its further growth get beyond egoistic endæmonism (as Hermann earnestly endeavours to do). True, the goods sought after become always more refined till they consist in the supramundane blessedness of the kingdom of God in the world beyond; but however the objects change to which value is attached, the sole motive continues to be the individual desire of happiness, the impulse towards enjoyment. But if this endeavour (whether directed to the goods (*i.e.* the materials of enjoyment) of this world or of the world beyond) is made the highest and the dominating point of the view of life, and morality related to it as a mean to an end, as Kaftan expressly does, then two things inevitably follow. Morality is degraded: it obviously loses its specific truth, its unconditional validity or "holiness," because it is lowered to the category of conditions, means, of individual satisfaction, to interest properly understood, after the manner of Bentham and Stuart Mill. And, secondly, with this degradation of the morally unconditioned the last remnant of all unconditioned truth whatever, the last inner support even of religious truth, is sacrificed, and faith comes to be based exclusively on the subjective pathos of the endæmonistic Ego; or, as Hume said, on the passions of the heart. Here we reach the position, or rather the want of any definite position, the *instabilis tellus, innabilis unda*, of the scepticism of Hume. Now it is true that this standpoint appears, as Hume himself declared of it, to offer the special advantage to the theologian, that as no certainty remains either for theoretical or for practical reason, we are thrown back the more entirely on unconditional faith in an outward revelation; and Kaftan accordingly points to revelation as the sole stay of all religious certainty. Alas! there lies and will ever lie, a "broad ugly ditch" between every positive revelation and subjective conviction. Lessing pointed to it in the fatal question, How can I know whether that which is handed down as a revelation, really is so? or in what sense and to what extent the tradition is to be taken as a revelation? what is the original and essential part of it, the real heart of the matter? what

is to be regarded as the permanent truth of it, and what as the mere historical dress? These questions are not to be lightly put aside: they indicate the *heel of Achilles of every system of sceptical positivism*, as any man can with slight consideration convince himself.

A proof of this may indeed be gathered from Kaftan's own book. With extraordinary confidence he states it to be the revealed essence of the Christian religion that it not only fulfils the moral law but promises a corresponding supramundane good, namely, the supramundane kingdom of God, as the goal of our existence in the world beyond, to which the moral ideals and goods of this earthly life are related only as means and conditions. This, he says, is what makes Christianity the perfect religion, which it would cease to be wherever the centre of gravity of our existence should be transferred to this world instead of the other, even were it placed in the moral ideals of social life on the earth. Now this must be allowed to be a view of Christianity which many have shared at every period of its history; but no less certain is it that others took a different view, and it is very questionable which is the loftier conception of Christianity, that which places its centre of gravity in the eschatological hope of the future, so as to make it differ little from the Judaism of the Essenes and Pharisees, or that which holds it to be the peculiar and the original principle of Christianity that it transfers the kingdom of God from the beyond of the Jewish hope to the here of a present spiritual and historical reality, and says: The kingdom of God has come to you, is present in you, is righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost, is that eternal life which makes its entry into our hearts as the knowledge and love of God, and into the world we live in as a sanctifying power. These different views of the nature of Christianity have always, we learn from history, existed side by side, and the question as to their religious truth can scarcely be decided by historical considerations. Nor can the point be settled by an appeal to the subjective judgment of the world, since judgments of taste are no proper subject of discussion, and possess only subjective validity. If any decision is to be arrived at at all, it is hard to see in what other way we are to look for it than by appeal-

ing to such authorities as are neither historically problematical nor based on subjective taste, but of universal objective validity. And this leads to nothing but some *a priori*, some inner revelation of God as the last support of certainty, whether that revelation be thought, in terms of theology, as the witness of the Holy Ghost, or in terms of philosophy as an ideal Ego, practical reason, pure self-consciousness, or in whatever other way.

But it must be said that we cannot arrive at a clear and decided judgment of any form of Christianity which is not consistently worked out. Kaftan's view appears to me to stop short of its legitimate conclusion, as he attributes value not only to the supreme good of the beyond, but also, in a relative degree, to the moral ends of this world, which stand in no necessary connection with the former. The full energy of the purely transcendental, and therefore anti-rational view of Christianity, we do not find in Kaftan: we do find it in the Dane, Sören Kierkegaard.

Sören Kierkegaard¹ sets out like the Neo-Kantians from the position that truth is not a matter of objective thought at all, since such thought has for its contents some form or other of being, and hence is quite inadequate for the existing, which is not a being but a becoming. Christianity, in particular, is not a truth which could ever be the subject of scientific knowledge, whether called philosophical or theological or historical. It is rather a relation of existence, which can only be the subject of personal experience, of passionate, infinitely interested, appropriation. The truth of it consists entirely in the subjective inwardness and passionateness of personal appropriation of and absorption in the absolute relation of existences on which salvation or its opposite depends. The way to Christianity accordingly does not lead through objective thought, which, so far as it is philosophical, is a delusion, so far as it is his-

¹ One of his works is translated into German, viz., *Exercises in Christianity*, translated by A. Bärthold (Halle, 1878), and gives a tolerably clear representation of Kierkegaard's original style of thought. I have also had at my disposal a number of papers by the Danish scholars, H. Bröchner and S. Heegard, which Dr. Alexander Thorsoe of Copenhagen was good enough to translate for me.

torical can only attain to an approximation to the truth, not to the truth itself. But equally little does the way to Christianity lead through the Church which, in its character as Christendom existing in alliance with the world, is rather a declension from true Christianity than the way to it. The way to it is no other than subjective thought, self-collection about one's own existence, infinite concern about one's self and one's sins, and the infinite passion of faith or of absorption, arising from the deepest subjective interest in one's personal relation to the divine. But this way possesses several stages, and leads through various forms of existence.

The first stage is that of immediate or æsthetic existence, where life is directed to enjoyment, and consists in the passionate laying hold of the moment and of its fortuitous goods at each time, without any constancy of direction or any consciousness of the eternal value of the spirit. This stage leads to despair, which as finite leads to hardening, but as absolute to submission and so to healing. The Ego has to choose between its fortuitous individuality and its eternal spiritual validity; if it determines for the latter, it has gained itself in its freedom or absoluteness, and has passed therewith to the position of *ethical* existence. But the self which has attained its freedom can only maintain it by constantly realising it; the ethical man is *eo ipso* the acting man. And absolute freedom can only be realised as one with absolute dependence, *i.e.* in the fulfilment of duty, especially of the man's calling, in which the universally human comes to individual expression. But the individual faints under the absolute demand of infinity, and comes to require higher assistance; and so the ethical is shown to be a mere transitional sphere on the way to the higher, the *religious* existence. The first form of this existence, not yet specifically Christian, is that of general religious inwardness, or of absolute direction to the absolute end of eternal salvation. But this absolute end does not admit of being reconciled with the relative ends of finiteness, and so the man who directs himself to that end finds himself confronted with the task of renouncing his finite existence in its relative ends, no longer having his life in them, and in this pathos of self-renunciation accomplishing an act

which transcends merely moral action. The fundamental quality of the religious life is *suffering*. To be without suffering is to be without religion. But the meaning of suffering is self-effacement, which, however, is not a spiritless giving up of oneself, but the strenuous exertion of an uninterrupted struggle for self-mastery. The relation of man to the eternal presents itself primarily as a consciousness of sin and guilt; and out of this comes the specific Christian religious spirit through the faith which lays hold of the paradox, "God manifested in time as man," and looks for its salvation from its relation to the eternal, who came into the limits of time, to the divine which put on an individual existence. It is of the very essence of Christian faith, Kierkegaard strongly insists, that it conflicts with all the laws and forms of thought, declaring the birth of the eternal in a particular moment of time, and the union of God with an individual man in the historical God-man. But this very paradox which to thought is the inconceivable itself, is all the more the highest certainty to faith; faith lays hold of it afresh every moment with the infinite energy of a passionate desire of salvation, and carries it off, as it were, in spite of the opposition of the understanding, maintaining it on the strength of its own subjective feeling in spite of everything objective. Faith, according to Kierkegaard, conflicts not merely with particular forms of thought, but with thought altogether and entirely: it throws all the rational contents of consciousness overboard on principle, and loses itself, with its consciousness of sin, in the paradox of the grace which appeared in time in the God-man, in this absolute miracle, thus "becoming contemporary with Christ."

But this opposition contained in faith to what is naturally human is not limited to the intellectual side, it affects the practical side as well. As the miracle of faith can never be reconciled with reason, the life of faith can never have anything in common with the life of the world; as the need of salvation demands the breach with thought, so it demands that a breach should be made with the finite interests of the world. The absolute religious relation does not, according to Kierkegaard, transcend the relative ethical relations of the life of the world in the sense that it embraces them in itself and

seeks to develop its power in them, and to elevate them to absolute divine worth and importance; its relation to them is that of indifference, exclusion, negation; it claims man's whole strength for itself, requires him to refer himself absolutely to the absolute at every moment, and sum up all his desires in a convulsive assertion of his entirely subjective relation to God, to his eternal end, to salvation. Then he has no strength left for ethical relations, they must of necessity disappear, as unessential and valueless in comparison to the infinite religious relation, because they fall outside of it. Hence Kierkegaard can only find true Christianity in entire renunciation of the world, in the following of Christ in lowliness and suffering especially when met by hatred and persecution on the part of the world. Hence his passionate polemic against ecclesiastical Christianity, which he says has fallen away from Christ, by coming to a peaceful understanding with the world and conforming itself to the world's life. True Christianity, on the contrary, is a constant polemical pathos, a battle against reason, nature, and the world; its commandment is enmity with the world, its way to life is the death of the naturally human. Not only was this negative relation characteristic of it at its first appearance, this is still its abiding essence, and hence, so long as Christianity remains true to its nature, it can only call forth the most extreme opposition, hatred, and scorn, on the part of the world. Where this is not the case, as in the Christianity of the Church, it is a sign that true Christianity is adulterated and perverted, since it can never be the affair of the mass, but only of the individuals who renounce the world in order to find God and to save their souls.

This is a consistent theory. It teaches with a resolution worthy of Tertullian, not in theory only but in earnest, contempt of reason and science, of nature and of cultivation, of the morals and customs of the world (of marriage as well as others), and of a Church which conforms to the world. And there is something refreshing, something commanding in this resolute consistency, when we contrast it with the half measures and the ambiguities of our "Neo-Kantian" theologians. It has also the advantage of being incapable of refuta-

tion, since refutation can only take place by grounds of reason, the validity of which is here denied in advance. The position is therefore unassailable. Yet its trees will not grow till they reach heaven; that is certain from the constitution of human nature, the reason in which cannot be uprooted and was not abolished by Christianity either, so that abstinence from the use of reason in thought and action cannot be permanently epidemic.

CHAPTER III.

THE HERBERTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBERT, realistic pluralist antipode of the speculative successors of Kant, wrote no philosophy of religion himself, but contented himself with a few remarks on religious matters, which stand in no intimate connection with his philosophy proper, and may therefore be regarded rather as personal confessions of a philosopher who undoubtedly was religiously disposed, than as possessing any special importance for the history of the philosophy of religion. Some of his disciples, however, proceeded to work out the philosophy of religion on the basis of his philosophy, and though they did this in different ways and differed widely from each other, yet for the most part they agree in displaying an extraordinary animosity towards all who are not followers of Herbart, and especially towards every form of speculative philosophy of religion and speculative theology. It may not therefore be out of place, not to answer their attacks, which are based on too palpable misunderstandings, and the tone of which is too far removed from the language of the cultivated scientific world to make a discussion with them possible,¹ but to cast the light of criticism on their own performances.

Herbart always spoke of religion with great respect: he sees in it a most valuable, indeed an indispensable medicine for the human

¹ The most moderate, and scientifically the most important of the Herbartian religio-philosophers is *Drobisch*; in *Thilo* the discussion is more violent and more one-sided; while in *Flügel* and in *Schöl*, Herbartian zeal has grown into a blind fanaticism, the rudeness of which is only surpassed by the narrowness of vision to which all understanding of other modes of thought is absolutely sealed. Herbart's religious views are collected and exhibited in a clear manner by *Alexis Schwarze*, in the dissertation: "The position of the Philosophy of Religion in Herbart's system," Halle, 1880.

heart, which receives from it, amidst the evils of life, strength, comfort, and uplifting. As a support of morality also, and as a subsidiary means of moral education, he holds religion to be of great value, and he recognises the importance of the work of the Church for the preservation and consolidation of social order. The justification of religion rests accordingly in the first place on its practical value, but in addition to this Herbart allows it a certain theoretical validity, in virtue, that is, of the aesthetic teleological view of nature which it represents. As mankind was led to religion from the beginning not merely by the need of higher aid, but also by admiring wonder of the world, so for us also, practical necessity is not the only motive of religion, but is accompanied by that derived from the contemplation of the utility and purpose which are in nature. This purpose is not read into nature by us, as Herbart is careful to insist, as against subjective idealism, but meets us as a relation of things objectively valid, and so leads us involuntarily to the thought that this purposeful arrangement must be the work of a supreme intelligence. At the same time this purpose is connected with our æsthetic contemplation of nature only; it has nothing to do with theoretical thought proper or with the metaphysical explanation of the world. Hence the religious view of the world which rests on æsthetic teleological contemplation of nature, may be called a supplement of metaphysic, but stands in no essential connection with metaphysic. Herbart even makes the significant admission that he loses control of his metaphysic as soon as he attempts to turn it to the improper purpose of a theoretical definition of the highest object. This is comprehensible enough. For in fact Herbart's metaphysic is of such a nature as not only not to require the notion of God, but to have no room for it.

Herbart's metaphysic is a pluralistic realism. He sets out from the same point as Kant, that what is given to us in experience is in the first place merely phenomena, not being itself. But instead of proceeding with Fichte to drop the Kantian thing-in-itself, and to explain phenomena in the way of idealism, from the Ego, Herbart turns in the opposite direction, holds to that realistic background

of the Kantian criticism, and sets philosophy the task of determining by means of critical reflection what is the being which underlies phenomena. We are compelled to go beyond phenomena by the contradictions they contain, specially by the contradiction of one thing with its several qualities, and the change or the co-existence of *A* and *non A* in the same thing. These contradictions, according to Herbart, make it impossible for us to see true being in the phenomenon itself: yet it is not an appearance merely: it points to a being, and the only question is how we have to conceive this being in order to solve the contradictions of the phenomenon. Herbart's answer to this question is shortly as follows: That which exists must consist of a multiplicity of real essences, each of which is absolutely posited, hence quite simple and unchangeable in itself, but from the being together of which there result for our "fortuitous view" the manifold relations which appear to us as the different qualities and changes of things. When, that is to say, two or more reals of different quality are together, each preserves itself in its simple and unchangeable being against the disturbances threatening it from the others, and these self-preservations, varying according to the variety of the opposition, produce the appearance of different and changing qualities of things. But these disturbances and self-preservations which are the basis of the "happening" of our experience, are yet not a real happening which takes place in the reals themselves; for as they are supposed to be absolutely unchangeable they can experience no disturbances, no influences at all, from without, nor can they be thus incited to real acts of self-preservation; what appear to us to be so are only their relations to each other, present for our chance view, but unessential to the reals themselves; their "coming and going," to which Herbart reduces the appearance of the change, is, since the relation of space is assumed to be mere appearance, no proper movement of the reals themselves, but the mere changing form of their connection and relation to our subjective apprehension. This, however, is merely to shift the change from the object to the subject; the explanation of it is merely thrust back, not facilitated; on the contrary, the difficulty under the Herbartian presuppositions

here appears quite insoluble. For the representing subject or the soul is essentially, like all reals, a perfectly simple and unchangeable being, without any inner multiplicity. Only from its being together with other reals, which form its body and outward things generally, do the disturbances on the one hand, the self-preservation on the other, arise, which form the contents of the soul's life. The self-pervations of the soul are ideas, in the mutual oppositions and connections of which consists the mechanism of psychical occurrences, which admit of being described mathematically. The idea of the Ego or self-consciousness, too, as a being aware of its own manifold contents and remaining identical with itself amid their change, is according to Herbart a mere illusion, which arises from the fact that all our series of ideas intersect each other in *one* point, and we distinguish this point, which is constantly in motion, from the various series which meet together in it. Here the question unavoidably presents itself, how even the idea of the combination of the multiform and the change of the contents of the ideas can occur in the soul if it is a perfectly simple and unchangeable being? Grant that the Ego is a mere illusion, still this illusion must be present to a subject to whom it appears, but this subject for which the change of ideas appears must from that very fact itself have changing ideas, and so take part really in the change; it cannot therefore be the unchangeable simple soul-substance Herbart would have it. The Herbartian psychology and metaphysic suffers shipwreck by its manifest incapacity really to make intelligible the phenomenon it was constructed to explain. Proposing to solve contradictions arbitrarily supposed to exist, it is itself entangled in the cardinal contradiction of a consciousness for which no subject is to be found.

From such a psychology as this, according to which the soul is a simple being without contents or life, which can only receive contents or manifestations of life by fortuitous external relations, and the functions of which are said to form a strictly mathematical and calculable mechanism, from such a theory it is obvious that only a mechanical and materialistic view of the spiritual life can result. It is equally clear that a metaphysic which can tell us of nothing but

an indefinite multiplicity of absolutely independent reals, and explains the whole of phenomena from fortuitous views as to their togetherness and their coming and going, has no room for a God as creator, preserver, and ruler of the world. Even so favourable a judge of Herbart as *Alexis Schwarze* states it as his first thesis, after describing the Herbartian theory of religion, that "Herbart's metaphysic, like every atomistic system, leads when consistently worked out to the denial of the notion of God:" and one might expect the Herbartians to see that this conviction, which must force itself on every unprejudiced mind¹ in connection with Herbart's metaphysic, is not a mere arbitrary opinion and a malicious calumny, but belongs to the truth of the matter. The fact that there is a gaping contradiction between Herbart's atheistic system and his personal belief in God is one which the attempts of his disciples to bridge over the chasm cannot materially alter, so long as they adhere to the principles of the system. Let us consider those attempts.

Taking first the philosophy of religion of Drobisch, we must acknowledge that he does not seek to avoid the difficulty by basing the belief in God, as the Neo-Kantians do, entirely on estimates of value. He sees clearly the different sides of the problem. "The religion of feeling," he well says, "never gets beyond mere subjectivity, and in this way runs great risk, without being aware of it, of losing altogether the pearl it is seeking to secure. He who only believes in a God because he *wishes* one, because it is agreeable to him to assume that there is one, he has *made* him himself and for his own use only, like a fetich; he has not *known* a God. To do this objective reasons are necessary." "In the philosophy of religion we must demand a demonstration that the idea of God is objectively valid." Drobisch furnishes this demonstration by a scientific

¹ Compare Erdmann, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philos.* ii. 524: "Herbart's system is one more proof of the fact that there is no room in individualistic systems for that which the religious man, because he sees in it the ground of all that is real, calls God." Zeller, *Geschichte der Deutschen Philosophie*, p. 865: "The notion of God would have presented peculiar difficulties to Herbart's metaphysic." Ueberweg, *Gesch. d. Philos.* iii. 268: "Herbart's belief in God is in several respects contradicted by his metaphysic," a view which he demonstrates by similar considerations to those now to be stated by myself.

examination of the proofs of the existence of God. The ontological proof he meets with the arguments of Kant. The error of the cosmological proof he holds to consist in the assumption that the absolutely necessary must be a unity ; if we understand by the absolutely necessary that which simply is, then according to the principle "much appearance points to much being" (*wie viel Schein, so viel Hindeutung auf's Sein*), it must be thought not as one being but as indefinitely many, which is not to be taken as leading to polytheism, since the notion of the absolutely necessary is not identical with that of the supreme perfect being, or of God. But in addition to the being of the elements it is necessary to assume an original motion of them not limited by any particular forces, in every direction and at every rate of speed, and from this there results a beginning at some period or other of the course of the world in time. "Sooner or later, *i.e.* at a longer or shorter distance of time from the present, some sort of a world of mechanical order could not fail to arise. So that our world *could* at any rate be indebted for its existence to such a formal ground. Were this the whole result of our metaphysic, it might not unjustly be called atheistic." But to the cosmological proof, which takes no account of the quality of existence, there is to be added the teleological, which concludes not with cogent necessity, but with a high degree of probability, to a purposeful arrangement of the whole by an intelligent cause. Here Drobisch distinguishes very correctly between mere subjective utility, which exists for us only, and rests on the arrogant and egoistical assumption that the whole of nature only exists for the sake of man, and that man's doings are of absolute value, an end in themselves—a utility which we unwarrantably import into nature from our one-sided point of view, and from which no objectively valid conclusions can be drawn—and the objective utility, which actually lies in the facts of organic life, as, for example, even in the arrangement and the relations of the masses of our planetary system, where it is not imported by our thought. True, we cannot from this infer a creator, but only an architect of the world, and even the unity and the perfection of that architect might not be beyond doubt,

when we look at the real arrangements of the world as it is. Yet these considerations at least warrant the inference that the existence of the object of faith is not merely a desirable thing but a very probable thing. What the position lacks in point of subjective certainty and of definiteness of contents is supplied by the ethical and practical grounds of belief. These consist, according to Drobisch's view, in this, that it is a condition, not of the obligation of duty but of the possibility of fulfilling it, that we should believe the world to be arranged by a moral cause with a view to goodness, because only on this condition can the indispensable assumption be made that moral ends are capable of being attained. This proof differs from that of Kant; it does not postulate the consummation of a supreme good which is independent of our efforts by the power of God, but regards the realisation of the supreme good, namely the moral purpose of the world or the kingdom of God, by us, as a task, the practicability of which is guaranteed by the arrangement of the world by God. The ethical idea of God thus obtained Drobisch then defines in accordance with the five Herbartian fundamental notions of morality, holiness, perfection, goodness, the righteousness which judges, and the righteousness which recompenses (compensates).

Attractive as Drobisch's line of thought appears in many respects, yet the most important difficulties are by no means solved. How are we to harmonise the original independence of the world-elements or reals, which cannot be traced to any source but themselves, with their dependence on the regulating and governing activity of God? How are the reals, simple existences admitting of no change, and therefore incapable of being influenced from without, to be determined by God to the order of His purpose? Since they have an original motion of their own, this motion cannot be taken away and changed by God, for this would be to influence the reals and so to change them; but inasmuch as this original motion is not a motion of the reals themselves, but only the fortuitous view of their mutual disturbances and self-preservations, the purposeful grouping of them would not be a change in them but only in the view of the beholder,

and as this original beholder is according to the hypothesis God himself, we are led to a change of God's view of the reals, a change which he himself brings about, an idea, however, which is condemned by Herbart's decided rejection of all self-determination of God, or of his being *causa sui*. And here we stumble on another difficulty; how are we to reconcile an extra-mundane independent intelligence of God with the fundamental principles of the Herbartian psychology, by which intelligence is only produced in the process of the soul's self-preservation as against other reals? It is a cardinal principle of Herbart that the soul being an uncompounded being is not an idea-producing power, that it does not possess the spontaneous power of throwing out ideas, but that ideas only come to it by its external relations to other reals, particularly to such as are already grouped about it in that suitable way which we denominate as organism. Now this must be true of God as a simple, soul-like being, and he therefore can only have received his ideas by suitable relations to other reals; but if so, then this suitability (the organisation of the world) cannot have been brought about by him, since to bring it about he must have had the suitable ideas in himself beforehand, and then produced them spontaneously out of himself, which according to Herbart is a perfect contradiction in thought. But if this suitability is not designed by God then the whole physico- and ethico- teleological argument, on which the objective validity of the idea of God was to rest, falls to the ground. I have failed to find either in Herbart or in any of his disciples any solution of these difficulties, or any answer to objections, which apply to the very foundations of his philosophy of religion.

The difficulty which arises out of the absolute independence of the unoriginated reals is simply avoided by Drobisch and Flügel, when they remark that the assumption of the creation of the world by God out of nothing is not necessary for the religious consciousness which is content to know that that arrangement of the world which alone is real to us was made by God, even though God found materials to his hand in the "simple something" of the reals: the manner of the creation remains an inscrutable mystery only to be

dreamed about by fantastic speculation. To this we may answer, that it is certainly a matter of indifference to the religious consciousness whether the world is conceived as created or uncreated, as beginning in time or without any beginning, as made out of nothing, or out of something, provided only that its complete dependence on God remain unimpaired: but that a metaphysical theory, on the other hand, which conceives the world-ground in such a way as to destroy or bring into question this dependence of the world on God cannot be indifferent to the religious consciousness, as it would compromise its essential interests. This is, in fact, the objection to the Herbartian system, and it is an objection not to be removed by appealing to the difficulty of the problem, and the fact that it transcends our knowledge, nor by scornful invectives against speculative theories of creation. However erroneous these theories may be (and I have no great liking to them either), that does not make the error of the Herbartian system any better, or help us to excuse it. No one is entitled to take up the ground of the inscrutableness of the whole question who does not refrain from *all* positive assertions on the subject; he who sets up such a definite theory of the world-ground as we find in the Herbartian metaphysic on the one side and philosophy of religion on the other, cannot escape the obligation to account honestly and straightforwardly for the contradiction which exists between the two sides of his position, and to say whether he is able to solve it, and in what way. If he will not or cannot do this, he might at least be recommended to observe a modester and more temperate style of judging other theories and standpoints than Flügel has allowed himself in his attack on speculative theology (1881), a work which indulges throughout in the grossest caricature. (Of the youthful insolence of the latest Herbart-fanatic Schöl, it may be better to say nothing.)

We look in vain, moreover, for any satisfactory guidance in connection with the second cardinal difficulty of the system, the relation of the notion of God to the fundamental ideas of the Herbartian psychology. Drobisch remarks that we must think of God as the "world-soul," according to the analogy of our own soul, *i.e.* as a

simple being, unchangeable in its quality and eternal, which, however, by no means pervades the whole world, but as our soul resides at a particular spot in our brain, and so near the extremity of the body, has its seat only at the extreme limit of the world (in heaven), and is only connected with the world by something intermediate, whether something analogous to the nerves, or angels, or whatever it be. To this world-soul we should perhaps ascribe a quality unique in genus and character ; we may also conceive it "in the most intimate connection with a system of beings, the qualities of which are in such relations to that of the world-soul, that the latter, while quite independent of the world, yet maintains a conscious and deliberate connection with it." Here the idea is indicated quietly and cautiously, yet unmistakably, that the conscious and deliberate connection of God with the world is not due to his own absolute being, but to the suitable relation of his simple being to certain other reals, so that his being God depends on these reals which are independent of him. Finally, Drobisch is honest enough to confess that even God's being spirit, his personality, conflicts with the psychological premises. "Must we not conceive the acts of setting forth of the world-soul as its acts of self-preservation, as our own acts of setting forth ? How did it come to this ? Mind is the inner formation of the soul ; but whence comes the world-soul ? Such questions can never receive any answer. Here we find ourselves face to face with a mystery, which a thick impenetrable veil will for ever conceal from our eyes," etc.¹ Well, every one will allow that there is something mysterious and inscrutable in the Divine nature ; but a notion of God which is entirely incomprehensible, entirely contradictory of the views elsewhere underlying the system, what theoretical value can such a notion have ? Would it not be better to give up the attempt to form a notion of God altogether, and to allow the belief in God to be framed simply according to personal needs and tastes ? At least it might reasonably be expected that a thinker with so precarious a notion of God should not set up as a censor of other views possessing infinitely more solidity.

¹ Drobisch, *Philos. of Religion*, pp. 227, 221.

At least he should not do so in the tone adopted by Flügel.¹ In discussing the original relation of God to the reals, this writer allows us to choose between two assumptions, the first of which must, if carried out consistently, lead beyond the Herbartian philosophy, while the other makes God a conditioned and relative being, differing only in degree from other beings. According to the first assumption, all the reals were originally in each other and in God, and at the creation they came forth out of God, so that from that point onwards they are only in mediate, not in immediate, connection with God. The supposition of an existence of the reals in each other at the beginning may, he says, be improbable, regarded in itself; but is the easiest way to make the causal nexus between God and the reals conceivable, besides that it involves an original fulness of inner states in God, which at once gives us the objective basis of the divine self-consciousness. Now this is a most remarkable admission, and fully confirms, at the mouth of a Herbartian, the criticism of the Herbartian system given above. If the causal nexus between God and the reals can only be explained and a foundation for the original divine self-consciousness can only be found on the assumption that the reals were originally not outside God, but in God, *i.e.* the assumption that the divine unity is the original from which multiplicity has issued forth, then an admission is made of that which we non-Herbartians have always contended, *viz.*, that the Herbartian pluralist metaphysic makes both the causal nexus between God and the reals and the divine self-consciousness or God's nature as spirit inexplicable, so that this pluralist metaphysic must be abandoned in favour of some monistic system if belief in God is to be established beyond contradiction. If, on the contrary, the original independence of the reals be maintained, then it remains the case, as Flügel assumes in the second member of the above alternative, that God's inner states, which constitute his intelligence, his spiritual, self-conscious being, are conditioned by "the original togetherness of God with all the real beings, or with a part of them," *i.e.* that God's personality depends

¹ *The Speculative Theology of the Present Day*, pp. 349 *sqq.*

on the world, and in fine is not specifically divine, and differs from that of every man only in degree. Thus, one of two things must be given up—the Herbartian metaphysic or a true God: *tertium non datur*. This is the clear and concise result of the dilemma as stated by the Herbartian himself—a result not to be put out of sight by all the language that may be used about inscrutable mysteries and the want of data of experience. This appeal to mystery, as soon as one's Latin is at fault, is a convenient piece of tactics, but cannot possibly be allowed to one who not only sets up a very definite theory of God's nature and relation to the world, but also ventures to declare his own theory to be the only true one, and all others to be radically mistaken. First to throw down one's glove with all the insolence of a challenger, and then as soon as one is in straits to retreat with all speed behind the shelter of an "inscrutable mystery," that is scarcely a chivalrous mode of warfare!

The uncertain and untenable nature of the foundations of the Herbartian philosophy of religion being once recognised, the detail of the system cannot awaken much interest. It may be said, however, that it turns out just what we might expect from such premises, a morally respectable, but from the point of view of religion, a poor and starved Deism, holding about the same relation to the Christian religion as Jesus the son of Sirach to Jesus of Nazareth. As for the divine attributes, God is not, according to the Herbartians, strictly almighty, for he is dependent on the reals, which are given externally to him. Nor is he eternal, since he only receives the contents of his mind from his relations to the world, *i.e.* practically in time. Nor is he omnipresent, for he is extra-mundane, and has his seat at the extreme limit of the world, like the Aristotelian God, who originates motion from the outside sphere. Nay, the Herbartian God is not even everywhere active, not at least immediately, but only mediately, since "all natural being and becoming is not to be regarded as an immediate operation of God, but only as the consequence of his activity at the beginning. We cannot assume such an omnipresence of God as would make him continuously active"

(Drobisch). Only the moral attributes, especially righteousness and love, are to be predicated of God without any qualification ; but it seems so doubtful how, under the deistic presuppositions above stated, these can ever come into play, that the religious value of their admission is seriously compromised. On this point Herbart himself holds the peculiar opinion that "it promotes religion to think that he who cared for men as their father (in the arrangement of the world at the beginning) now leaves mankind to itself in the deepest silence, as if he had no longer any part in it, without a trace of any such emotion as could be compared to human sympathy, or, indeed, egoism."¹ Drobisch says in the same way : " Regarded from the practical religious point of view, the belief that God, after furnishing his world with everything that could serve its happiness and welfare, left it entirely to itself, to strive towards its moral destiny, is a better support to virtue and righteousness than that which assumes extraordinary interferences of God, at least now and then, on which it is too glad to depend. And the faith that nothing happens contrary to God's will, since nothing can happen that was not foreseen at the creation as at least a possible event in the future, taken along with the thought that God wills nothing but good, is sufficient to sustain us in all the storms of life." Yet he admits that the belief in a closer intercourse of our spirit with God in devotion is one more suited to the grasp of our thought and feeling, and therefore often found connected with a deeper form of piety. This view, however, can never be more than a permissible one ; that man should have real intercourse and communion with a God who is external to the world and separated from us by the whole of space is out of the question from this deistic point of view. Having once manifested himself in the arrangement of the world as a kind and careful father, God leaves humanity ever after to itself "in the deepest silence ;" continuous revelation of God to man in history and to the individual in the heart, there is none.

On this showing, what becomes of Christianity ? It does not

¹ *Text-Book of Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 251.

sound very hopeful at the outset, when Drobisch characterises Christianity as the religion which answers to the old age of humanity, though this is spoken in its praise. The universal religious contents of Christianity he finds in its declaration of God, against Jewish particularism, as the loving father of all men, and in its pointing to a life beyond the grave as a state of recompence where it promises eternal salvation to those who, its true confessors, strive to fulfil the laws of love and righteousness. The distinctive doctrines of Christianity, on the contrary, the doctrines of redemption and atonement, he represents as the mere historical garb of Christianity by which it was introduced into the world. This follows not only from the deistic denial of historical revelation, but also from the Pelagianism which marks the system. The doctrine that man is by nature evil and in need of redemption is according to Herbart a huge calumny, which tends to do away with all morality, and presents an insuperable obstacle to the reconciliation of philosophy with Christianity. (This is true only of the Herbartian philosophy, it does not apply to the philosophy of Kant, of Fichte, of Hegel, of Schelling, or of Schopenhauer!) Evil is simply one of those unhealthy phenomena by which both the physical and the mental life of individuals is constantly threatened. The only cure for it is repentance and amendment, and these can only proceed from man himself, who may at such a time look to the love of God, and comfort himself with the hope that God will be gracious to him, *i.e.* will in his judicial sentence have regard to circumstances and motives, and be guided by fairness. More than such an indefinite hope, however, complete rest and assurance of peace with God, Herbart and Drobisch do not consider possible. It would be difficult to go further than they do in the way of emptying Christian doctrine. A very brief review of the philosophy of Christianity from Kant to Hegel and a comparison of it with this doctrine will enable us to estimate at its right value the following sentence of the Herbartian Schöl:¹ "Herbart, working on Kant's lines and in union with Kant, has, though indirectly, done

¹ *Contribution to Criticism of the Herbartian Philosophy of Religion* (1883), p. 18.

more for theology as a positive science, or, to speak more correctly, for the positive systematic science of religion, than all the Fathers and the Schoolmen, both those of old times and the modern, and the most recent of them."

Attempts have been made, it is true, by certain Herbartians to build up an orthodox theology on the basis of this philosophy. Thus, for example, Von Taute, who in his *Philosophy of Religion from the Standpoint of the Religion of Herbart* (1840) defines religion as "the product of ideas and masses of ideas given in experience which stand to each other in the relation of a religious ego and non-ego; the religious ego strives against the religious non-ego, so that it itself may reach the condition of being perfectly set forth, and the religious non-ego be thrust down upon or under the static threshold: but the religious ego does not possess the means to reach its end, that of being perfectly set forth, by its own energy and power; on the contrary, this is only possible to it by the object of its striving being given to it, *i.e.* by a contemplation of God as a religious ego perfectly set forth," etc. On this basis he accomplishes the task of setting up an orthodox theology with a massive belief in miracles, the sole interest of which, however, consists in the confirmation it affords of the dictum that "the Herbartian system will admit of any theology, *because it has no theology.*"

CHAPTER IV.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION OF SCHOPENHAUER.

THE philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer is a peculiar combination of Fichtean idealism with Schellingian realism, which here, however, receive an original turn to pessimism and nihilism. "The world is idea," Schopenhauer says with Fichte: "the world is will," he says with Schelling; and the recognition that it is merely idea leads to the denial of will, so that the existence of the world is resolved into nothing, and the end is the mystical wisdom of the East.

That the world is idea, Schopenhauer proves with Kant from the subjective nature of the forms of perception, space, and time, and of the form of thought, of the law of causality, the only one he gives in place of Kant's table of categories. By applying the subjective law of thought to the equally subjective sensations there arises the view and idea, also only subjective, of objects. Matter also is only causality made visible, and only exists by and for the idea. But it is not permissible to conclude from our ideas to a thing-in-itself outside ourselves, as its cause, because the law of causality is purely subjective. It is therefore impossible for our consciousness to get past the subjectivity of appearance to an essential being; the whole world, as it is an object for us, is only given us as idea and in idea. "Everything objective is idea, and thus appearance, indeed mere brain-phenomenon, to seek to know it objectively is to ask a contradiction."¹

But if we cannot penetrate to the inner essence of things from without there is yet a way open to us from within, a subterranean passage as it were, a secret connection which opens to us from

¹ *The World as Will and Idea*, ii. (Works, iii.), p. 219.

within the outwardly impregnable fortress ; this is the *will* known to each man immediately in his self-consciousness as something real. "In fact, our will furnishes us with the one opportunity we have of understanding a process which presents itself to us from without, from within at the same time ; it is thus the one thing that is known to us *immediately*, and not, like everything else, as merely given in idea. Here lies the datum which alone is fit to become the key to all the rest, the one strait gate to the truth. We must therefore learn nature out of ourselves, not ourselves from nature. What is immediately known to us must expound to us what is mediately known, and not *vice versa*." It is true, as Schopenhauer at once adds, that the inner perception of our will affords no immediate and thus no adequate knowledge of the thing in itself. For in inner knowledge, too, there is a difference between the essential being of its object and the perception of that object in the knowing subject. Though one form of perception, space, disappears, and the form of thought of causality, yet the form of time still remains, and causes the individual to know his will only in single successive acts, not altogether, nor as a whole. But yet the perception of the movements and acts of our own will is far more immediate than any other ; it is the point at which the thing-in-itself comes most immediately into view, and is seen closest by the knowing subject, and hence a process known so intimately is the 'only one fitted to become the expositor of every other. Though the act of will which we immediately know is only the nearest and clearest *appearance* of the thing-in-itself, yet from this it follows, "that if all other phenomena could be known by us in as immediate and intimate a manner, we should judge them to be just what will is in us." In this sense Schopenhauer declares will to be the inner essence of everything, the thing-in-itself of the world. But what this thing-in-itself is purely as such, apart from that form of appearance in our will which alone is known to us, he declares it to be impossible to know ; it may perhaps possess "determinations, qualities, modes of existence, which are to us simply unknowable and incomprehensible, and which remain over as the essence of the thing-in-

itself just when it has freely done away with itself as will, has therefore entirely passed out of appearance, and to our knowledge, *i.e.* with respect to the world of phenomena, has passed into empty nothingness. Were the will simply and absolutely the thing-in-itself, then this nothing would be an absolute one, instead of proving to be just at that point a merely relative one."¹ But is it not an arbitrary proceeding to call this thing-in-itself by the name of will? This question must be urged the more seriously when we remember how distant the analogy is which couples the will which we know together with the forces of things in nature.

Schopenhauer then shows in his natural philosophy (which is closely similar to that of Schelling) how the various stages of the life of nature are just so many steps in the becoming objective of the one primal being, the will. Fine and pertinent as the demonstration is which is here given of the inner teleology which pervades the whole process, we cannot help asking how it is possible that a blind will, without aim or direction, which is nothing but an impulse after existence, can produce the regularity and arrangement of visible things. At this point Schelling appears more consistent in letting the dim impulse of will give birth to formless chaos only, which is only formed into a world by ordering intelligence. For will is according to Schopenhauer a blind, unconscious, and purposeless striving, till in the nervous system of animal life it makes itself an organ for its consciousness, and in the human brain ultimately an organ of self-consciousness. Now intellect as a function of the brain is added to will, as a light to shine upon its way, to supply it with the more complicated methods of its self-assertion, to suggest motives to it, but at last to reveal to it the impotence of its fruitless striving, and so to act as a quietive, and help it to self-negation and redemption from its misery.

Here, it cannot be denied, the philosopher becomes entangled in the most curious contradictions. The intellect is represented as arising out of the material brain, and as being nothing but a function of the brain; and yet we were told before that the whole material

¹ *World as Will and Idea*, ii. p. 222.

world, including our body, was nothing but idea, arising from our purely subjective forms of perception and thought. This vicious circle appears quite plainly in words Schopenhauer himself employs, *e.g.* in the following passages: "The body is degraded to a mere idea, as it is only the mode in which the will represents itself in the view of the intellect, or (!) brain." "It is true that in my view the existence of the body presupposes the world of idea, since it also as a body or real object only exists in that world; and on the other side the idea almost equally presupposes the body, being produced only by the function of one of its organs."¹ Thus, as Zeller says, "We find ourselves in a palpable circle, the idea is a product of the brain, and the brain is a product of the idea, a contradiction which the philosopher does nothing whatever to solve." The origin of the intellect being such as is described, it follows with regard to its relation to the will, that it can be nothing but the obedient servant of the self-affirming will to live, and cannot, as reason, be its lord and master, lawgiver, and governor. According to Schopenhauer, there is no practical reason or law of reason, as little as there is any reasonable will of positive good; the will is always essentially unreasonable, always the mere egoistic impulse towards individual self-satisfaction or pleasure, which the intellect subserves by showing it the ways and means to this end. But the more extraordinary is it that the intellect, this secondary appearance of the will, this effect of its becoming objective in the body, can yet, when fully developed, obtain such power over the will as to lull to rest for a time its restless striving—in moments of æsthetic contemplation even removing it completely—by that ascetic mystic negation of the will to live, which Schopenhauer describes as religious regeneration and redemption. But incomprehensible as we may think this self-negation of the will, the one reality of the world, by the force of its knowledge of its own nothingness, this setting aside of the will by the knowledge itself chose to be the instrument of its willing, yet the conclusion is full of importance for the practical bearing of Schopenhauer's philosophy.

¹ *World as Will, etc.*, ii. pp. 306, 312.

The evil of the world and redemption from it is the theme which underlies the whole of Schopenhauer's practical philosophy, which thus comes very near religion, especially the religion of redemption, though the peculiar point of view from which this philosophy regards evil and redemption is far removed from the Christian view of the world with its ethical teleology, and has more affinity to the doctrine of redemption of Buddhism. *The evil of the world*, according to Schopenhauer, is to be accounted for ultimately by the fact that the will in its individual manifestation, as the individual will of every living being, and also of man, is nothing but egoistic desire for individual self-assertion, desire of pleasure for pleasure's sake. These egoistic individual wills naturally come in perpetual conflict with each other and with the order of the world, and the result of these conflicts is a great preponderance of pain over pleasure: pain indeed forms the real positive content of life, while pleasure is a mere episode when pain is occasionally quieted, and therefore merely something negative, an accidental feature in the positive tissue of life.¹ But as the will only aims at pleasure for pleasure's sake, this world, so full of pain, is the opposite of its ideal, is bad through and through. The existence of the world is itself the greatest evil of all, and underlies all other evil, and similarly the root evil for each individual is his having come into the world. This is not only the root evil but the root sin, since the existence of each being in the world is based on a first act in which the will to live, which is also his will, received individuality and bodily form. This first act of the will, its entrance upon existence as a separate will, is the "original sin and original guilt" of our race. Schopenhauer thus adopts these Christian dogmas, adopts them in their harshest Augustinian form, with which, moreover, he shares the view that the will to live (*peccatum originans*) has its focus in sexual desire (*concupiscentia*), and its most peculiar form of manifestation in the sexual act, so that every life issues to this extent out of guilt. "Man's greatest crime is that he was born," he says with Calderon. In one point however Schopenhauer departs from the Augustinian and ecclesiastical form of the dogma. With

¹ Compare the demonstration *Welt als Wille*, etc., i. pp. 376 sqq. ; ii. pp. 657 sqq. :

some gnosticising teachers of the Church (*e.g.* Origen, Scotus Erigena, and more recently J. Müller) he traces original sin, not to a fall of the historical first man, who was free, but to the free rational act of each individual. "That man enters the world guilty can only appear absurd to one who holds him to have been first created out of nothing and to be the work of another." But this fundamental Jewish dogma was taken for granted when the profoundly Christian view of the contraction of guilt by the human race was set forth in the mythical form of the fall of Adam. "Because, truly regarded, the genesis of man is itself the act of his free will, and hence equivalent to the fall, and since original sin, from which all other sins proceed, thus made its appearance simultaneously with man's *essentia* and *existentia*, and because the Jewish fundamental dogma did not admit of such a view; therefore Augustine taught in his books *De Libero Arbitrio* that man was innocent only as Adam before the fall, and only then had a free will, while ever since he has been entangled in the necessity of sin." Schopenhauer also defends the corollary of the Augustinian doctrine of original sin, that considering his original guilt, man, even though he exercise all possible virtues, is justly given over to pains of body and soul and made unhappy, in conformity to the eternal righteousness which affixed to the first sin, the will to live, the penalty of all the evils of the world. He also agrees with Christian dogmatics in the view that man cannot redeem himself from evil or guilt by his own works or virtues, and that no law avails for his deliverance. The law only commands a change of action, while the nature remains unchanged: but *operari sequitur esse*; "because we are what we ought not to be, we necessarily do what we ought not to do. Hence we require a complete transformation of our mind and nature, *i.e.* regeneration, which is followed by redemption as its consequence. Though guilt lies in action, in *operari*, yet the root of guilt lies in our *essentia* and *existentia*, as *operari* necessarily proceeds out of this. Hence the only sin of which we are really guilty is original sin."¹

¹ *Welt als Wille*, etc., ii. pp. 693 *sqq.* Compare also *Parerga und Paralip.* ii. (Works, vi.), p. 414, on Augustinianism and Pelagianism.

In all this there is, no doubt, a grain of truth, yet we must not fail to observe that Pelagianism is here met by its opposite extreme, Manichæism. According to Schopenhauer evil is not only a radical factor in man, it is the very essence of man, his whole being, and his redemption does not consist in a new birth to a positive new and higher existence, but in the extinction of his being, the abstract negation of it. With Fichte and Hegel too we found the negation of the natural will, as one which is not what it ought to be, made the fundamental idea of redemption ; but with these ethical thinkers this negation of the vain and egoistic is only the presupposition, the negation of the negation by which the true position is arrived at ; and thus these two stand within the Christian view, from which Schopenhauer deviates in the direction of abstract empty negation, as the philosophy of the Illumination deviates from it in the direction of abstract and shallow affirmation (optimism and naturalism).

Schopenhauer's doctrine of redemption has many points of affinity with that philosophical economy of salvation with which we made acquaintance in the five views of the world in Fichte's *Way to the Blessed Life*. Schopenhauer sets out with insisting on the fact that redemption from the evil of the world is not to be conceived as coming to pass of itself in the course of nature, by the arrival of the maturity of age or the death of the body. On the contrary, "as long as our will remains the same, our world can be no other than it is. All wish, it is true, to be delivered from the state of pain and death : they wish, as they express it, to reach eternal salvation, to get to heaven, but they do not want to travel there on their own feet : they would like to be carried there by the course of nature. But that is impossible ; nature cannot carry us anywhere but just into nature again. And what a poor thing it is to exist as a part of nature, every one learns in the course of his own life and in his death." The way to redemption therefore is only through self-denial, by which the will to live, this true self of man, is denied with all its restless and unblest striving, and the spring of all evil thus stopped up. The first stage of this road consists in *moral virtue*. Justice and love of men, the negative and the positive fundamental virtue in Schopen-

hauer's ethics, arise when the will to live begins to see through the illusion of the world of appearances, the false pretence of its separate and independent existence. In making this discovery the will to live recognises itself as the one and the self, and so feels the woes of others as if they were its own, so that it not only beware of inflicting pain on others (justice), but also strives to ward off pain from others, and to alleviate their distress as far as possible (love). These virtues are a means to further our redemption, but they are not redemption itself. The moral stage lies between the affirmation and the negation of the will to live (between sin and redemption), and is a light to show the way of salvation (as Christianity declares the law to have come in between sin and redemption, and to be a schoolmaster to lead us to the latter). Full salvation lies in the *entire negation of the will to live*, such as appears in religion as mysticism, quietism, and asceticism, but cannot be described philosophically except in negative terms. "My doctrine therefore ends with a negation. It can only speak here of what is denied, surrendered; what is won, laid hold of instead, it can only describe as nothing, adding by way of comfort, that it is only a relative nothing, not an absolute one." This negation of the will to live, this redemptive regeneration of men, what does it rest on? It is brought about, firstly, by the quietive of the will, which consists in the knowledge of its inner contradiction and of its essential nothingness; but this knowledge which does away with the selfish will at its root, does not arise in the way of cause and effect, and has no natural motive in the causal nexus, so that it does not belong to the empirical will at all, which as empirical is always without freedom; it is the entry of the transcendental freedom of will as such into the appearance of actual consciousness, "the one and only immediate expression of the (real) freedom of the will," a revelation therefore of the intelligent ground of empirical life, or, in a word, a supersensuous operation, a *work of grace*. And hence this entry into freedom is not to be obtained by seeking it: it comes flying suddenly, as if from without, but in such a way that the operation of the quietive is always in the end a free act of the will; it is therefore both grace and freedom in

one. "And since, in consequence of this work of grace, man's whole nature is changed and converted from its very foundation, so that he no longer wills any of those things which he formerly willed so eagerly, and a new man, as it were, actually comes in place of the old, therefore the Church calls this result of the operation of grace *regeneration*. For what she calls the natural man, denying to him all capacity for goodness, is just the will to live, which must be suppressed if redemption is to be attained out of such an existence as ours. For behind our existence there is something else concealed, which only becomes accessible to us when we shake off the world." We already know that this something else is the "relative nothing," the ceasing-to-exist of the only world we know, of which there is no more to be said than just this denial (just as Nirvana is spoken of in Buddhist dogmatics). If we sought to make any positive statement about a thing which Schopenhauer's philosophy can only express in negatives as the negation of the will (and of the world existing for it), we should have to turn to the description of the experience of those who have been in the states called ecstasy, trance, illumination, union with God, etc. Such a state, however, cannot be the object of true knowledge, because it transcends the opposition in the consciousness of subject and object, an opposition which is the element of all our knowledge. Hence philosophy must content herself with the negative result, and think it enough to have reached the last boundary of positive knowledge. "If we have thus come to know the essential nature of the world as will, and seen in all its phenomena the objectivity of will, and followed its manifestation from the unknowing impulse of dim nature-powers to the most perfectly conscious acts of men, we are far from seeking to escape the consequences of this line of thought, namely, that with the free negation, the surrender of will, all those manifestations are also got rid of, that constant pressing and hurrying, without aim or rest, in which and by which the world exists; we are rid of the multiplicity of forms succeeding each other in long gradation, rid, with the will, of its whole manifestation, and finally of the general forms of that manifestation, time and space, and of its

ultimate fundamental form, subject and object. No will, no idea, no world."¹

Thus by means of subjective idealism the negative doctrine of redemption turns at last to a process of world-destruction, founded on the consciousness of the subject. Nihilism is the eschatology of this philosophy. This is its distinctive character, which it shares with Buddhism as against the Christian religion of redemption. Here the final goal, is not nothing or Nirvana, but the positive kingdom of God or the reign of reason, the universal freedom and unity of all in willing the good, as Fichte happily defined it in his last work. The negation of the natural will is here as well as there the strait gate of redemption, but it is not a gate that issues out into nothing, it is the entrance into life, to salvation and freedom in the unity of the individual will with the will which guides the whole. Hence the mysticism of the Christian doctrine of redemption is not mere quietistic negation of the world, but turns into a spring of energy to overcome, re-form and transfigure the world: it is the Sabbath rest in the sanctuary of the eternal which gives us strength and impulse for the six days' work in the world.

But while pointing out this difference between the two principles, we are free to concede to Schopenhauer a considerable affinity with the deeper religious view of the world. The mysticism of this system is undoubtedly nearer the central Christian doctrines of sin and redemption than is the ordinary rationalism. And again Schopenhauer distinguishes more clearly between the kernel of truth and the symbolic and mythical form and truth, than, for example, the Hegelian speculation does. His remarks on the relative justice and injustice of rationalism and supernaturalism contain some notable thoughts. "Everything about the religious is, truly speaking, mystery (*i.e.* allegory). For it is simply impossible to bring home the truth *sensu proprio* to the people; only a mythical allegorical reflection of the truth can enter and illuminate the people's mind. Hence it is quite unjust to demand of a religion that it shall be true *sensu proprio*, and the rationalists and supernaturalists of our day are

¹ *Welt, etc.*, i. p. 486.

equally absurd, both supposing that religion must be true in this sense, and the one party proving it to be not true, while the other party obstinately contend for the truth of it. Or the former party clip and arrange the allegorical element of religion in such a way that it can be true *sensu proprio*, but in that case it is a mere platitude, while the latter party assert it to be true without any such previous arrangement—a thing which, as they ought to be aware, they will never get believed without the inquisition and the fagot. But the fact is that myth and allegory are the proper element of religion, and in this way it satisfies the ineradicable metaphysical need of man very well, and takes the place of philosophical truth which is so hard, and perhaps unattainable.” “These rationalists are honest people, and yet they are shallow heads; they have no notion of the profound meaning of the New Testament myth, and cannot get past Jewish optimism, a thing they can understand, and which suits them. They are for the naked dry truth in history as well as in dogmatics. They may be compared to the Euhemerists of antiquity. True, what the supernaturalists offer us, is at the root of the matter a mythology; but that mythology is the vehicle of profound and weighty truths, which it would be impossible to bring home to the minds of the mass of the people in any other way. On the other side, it is not to be denied that the supernaturalists are sometimes less deserving: they are parsons in the worst sense of the word. So Christianity has to consider how it is to get through between Scylla and Charybdis. The common error of both these parties is that they seek in religion unveiled dry, literal truth. But this is the aim of philosophy; religion has only an indirect, symbolical, allegorical, truth. Christianity is an allegory which reflects a true idea; but allegory is not in itself the truth. That they think it is, is the common error of supernaturalist and rationalist; and each of these parties has strong and pertinent arguments to bring against the other. The rationalists say to the supernaturalists, Your doctrine is not true; the latter rejoin, Your doctrine is not Christianity. Both are right.” “Taking Christian dogmatic *sensu proprio*, Voltaire is right. Taken allegorically, however, it is a sacred myth, a vehicle

by which truths are brought home to the people, which would otherwise be unattainable to it. Even the statement made by the Church that in the dogmas of religion reason is entirely incompetent, blind, and to be rejected, amounts at the root of the matter just to this, that these dogmas are allegorical in their nature, and are not to be judged by the standard of reason which takes everything *sensu proprio*. The absurdities found in dogma are just the seal and signature of the allegorical and mythical, although they arose out of the fact that two such heterogeneous doctrines as those of the Old Testament and of the New had to be pieced together in one system.”¹

Of the numerous adherents of Schopenhauer only two call for mention as independent thinkers, who have improved the doctrine of their master in essential points, and so have come to hold a middle place between him and other speculative philosophy. These two are *Frauenstädt* and *Eduard von Hartmann*. For the most part they are in close agreement on the points on which they differ from Schopenhauer, only that Frauenstädt, under-estimating the importance of his departure from his master, claims to be and to remain essentially an adherent of his doctrine; while Hartmann claims to take up a middle position between Schopenhauer and Hegel or Schelling. The principal change which both alike desiderate in Schopenhauer's philosophy is that the will taken by itself as irrational and blind should not be considered as a sufficient principle of the world, because if it were, the purpose on which Schopenhauer's natural philosophy insists so strongly, would be unintelligible, and no objective support could be found for the “ideas” of the æsthetic, which would then have no transcendental subject. The idea, therefore, must be something more than that secondary product of the world-will which the human brain first makes possible; it must belong to the world-will *a priori* as the first fundamental ground, enabling it to carry on its wise creative work in nature, not as *conscious* idea which depends on an animal organisation and on the opposition of individual acts of will, but as an unconscious. This unconscious

¹ *Parerga und Paralipomena*, ii. pp. 358, 417, 389.

idea of the will on which the world is based, Frauenstädt takes to be the dim feeling which is only striving upwards towards consciousness, while Hartmann justly thinks this view inadequate, and states it to be necessary for the explanation of the teleological principle of the world to recognise an "intuitive, reflectionless, intelligence free from the limits of brain-consciousness (in so far unconscious) and exalted above it (therefore supra-conscious)."¹

Thus we are led to expect, what we also find to be the fact, that E. von Hartmann does not describe the world-principle with Schopenhauer and Frauenstädt as "will"; he calls it "unity of will and intelligence," and says the nearest analogy to it is to be found in the human mind, and that it may thus be called "absolute mind." In his chief work, however, *The Philosophy of the Unconscious* (1868, now the ninth edition), he usually employs the negative expression, "the unconscious." This designation is not chosen in vain to be the motto of Hartmann's philosophy, for it contains in fact the whole riddle of that philosophy *in nuce*; the mystic indefiniteness of the title is a comfortable veil to conceal the defects of the philosophy, and especially to cover up the yawning contradiction which extends through and through it between the pantheistic tendency, which is connected with its pessimism, and the theistic leaning which forms the basis of its evolutionism or teleology. Hartmann's statements about the unconscious oscillate between these two sides, from his first work to his last, his *Philosophy of Religion*. At times he brings the unconscious so near the conscious all-wise God of theism that one can scarcely distinguish between the "over-conscious clear-seeing intelligence" of the unconscious, and the intuitive absolute consciousness of God; he ascribes to the former not only immanence but also transcendence, a being in itself above the world, and even infinite will and feeling in addition to the finite of its existence in the world. Then again he puts the contrast so strongly between his pantheistic unconscious which only comes to consciousness in man, and the theistic

¹ Frauenstädt: *Neue Briefe über die Schopenhauer'sche Philosophie*, 31ster Brief. The other view, E. von Hartmann, *Neu-Kantianismus, Schopenhauerianismus und Hegelianismus*, p. 142.

notion of God, as to found upon it a demand that a breach be made with our Christian past, and a new religion of pantheism founded for the future. And in fact, in spite of all reminiscences and hints of theism, the difference between Hartmann's unconscious and the theistic God is so fundamental that there can be no understanding between the two without the surrender of essential elements which still cleave to this philosophy from its source in Schopenhauer. This is seen at once when we inquire as to the attributes and what we may call the early history of the unconscious.

According to the "philosophy of the unconscious," the will was still blind when the act of positing the world was done; and only as the will advanced from potency to actual being did the idea arise which now saw the positing of the world to be the cardinal mistake of the blind irrational will. It was not able to make good this mistake, as the idea is without energy and has no power over the "that" of existence. It had therefore to strive to emancipate itself from the will by the help of consciousness, thus by opposition to its willing to lay the will to rest. The idea thus determines the "what" of the contents of the world and the world-process in such a way that consciousness arises, and with it the possibility of the emancipation of the intelligence from the will; and in consciousness the world-process reaches its completion, the misery of all willing becoming evident, and willing being at last renounced by a joint resolution of humanity, and thus the existence of the world brought to an end. Hartmann thus shares the pessimism of Schopenhauer so far as to regard the existence of the world as the fundamental evil, its not being as the good to be striven after. He does not, however, regard this good, like Schopenhauer, as an end for the life of the individual, but as a universal end for the life of the race; and hence he sees the way to this end not in the withdrawal of the individual from the world's life to quietism and asceticism, but rather in the active co-operation of all individuals to promote the cultivation of the whole. "As according to Paul the law given to the Jews was the 'strength' of sin, so the utmost possible progress of the world is the 'strength' of the pessimistic consciousness of humanity. And just because it is

this, only because it is this, the utmost possible progress of the world is a practical postulate." It serves to enable the consciousness to see more and more clearly the unreasonableness of willing at every stage of its illusion, till at last nothing remains but the conviction "that every act of will leads to unblestness, and that only renunciation leads to the best attainable state, to the absence of pain." "To bring back this irrational willing, which is to blame for the 'that' of the world, to not-willing and the painlessness of the nothing, this task of the logic present in the unconscious, determines the 'What and How' of the world. The question for reason is to make good again what irrational will has made evil. Thus the world-process appears as a continuous struggle of the logical with the illogical, ending in the defeat of the latter." And the comfort of this philosophy is said to lie in the possibility of this end, to the attainment of which the world is most wisely arranged and governed as a great and wonderful process of development in nature and in history. This philosophy thus forms a reconciliation of pessimism with optimism.

In some respects we may regard this definition of the world's end, the *principium ad quod*, as well as that of the world-ground, as an improvement on the Schopenhauerian doctrine. Firstly and chiefly, we have no longer the assertion of the meaninglessness and worthlessness of history, which according to Schopenhauer was merely the vain dream of humanity; history is recognised as a means to an end which has absolute value. Further, the unwholesome esoteric morality of Schopenhauer is got rid of, which culminated in fleeing from the world and hating it, in asceticism and quietism; and a positive and fruitful principle is set in its place: "To make the ends of the unconscious the ends of one's consciousness, to *do* something for the world-process, by the full surrender of one's personality to life and its pains, instead of cowardly renunciation and withdrawal." These are sound practical principles in which we can share without agreeing with Hartmann in his general views as to the world-end. Yet this improvement of Schopenhauer's doctrine, it must be confessed, only goes half-way, and thus entangles itself the more fatally in inconsistencies which do not occur in the same way in

Schopenhauer. The philosophy of the latter is a simple and consistent pessimism, and, if it be assumed that the principle of the world is non-reasonable, quite a natural scheme of thought. Hartmann begins with seeking to combine will and reason, and continues and ends with an attempt to combine pessimism and optimism. Some kind of combination of the two is possible, as we would not think of denying (Christianity, for instance, is such a combination); but, in the way in which Hartmann attempts it, it is impossible. In the first place it is a manifest metaphysical impossibility that the existence of the world should be brought to an end by the resolution of the majority of men. Such an idea is meaningless except on the basis of the most pronounced objective idealism; but one who, like Hartmann, allows the world to possess objective reality apart from human consciousness cannot possibly make the duration of its existence depend on the will, or the absence of will, of men. Then it is a psychological impossibility that the individuals in the world should sacrifice their different personal ends for the end of the whole, if the latter issues in *nothing*; this perspective makes all that Hartmann says so well about the wisdom of the world-process, the value of history, the duty of practical work in the world, perfectly illusory, and we cannot but agree with Frauenstädt in declaring this combination of optimism with pessimism to be grotesque and unnatural, and the application of the term "optimism" to the suitability of a development which aims at the destruction of the world to be an abuse of language. The reason of these contradictions is, that Hartmann only half carries out the correct intentions on which he bases his system. Very properly desiring to conceive the principle of the world not as will only, but as a unity of will and intelligence, he falls back half-way into Schopenhauer's dualism of reasonless will and powerless intellect, and the combination he proposes goes to pieces in his hands; nor does it make the matter any better that the subject of the will is also that of the idea and *vice versa*, if this subject is so divided in itself that its willing is without reason, its ideas without energy. The unreconciled division of blind will and powerless reason being thus posited in the world-principle, it is very

intelligible that the world-process cannot lead to the positive reconciliation of the will with reason, because there can never be more in the effect than there was in the cause. One thing there is which appears hard to understand, how, under such a pre-supposition, there could still be so much reason in the development of the world as a whole as Hartmann himself actually sees in it. This entanglement in the Schopenhauerianism of will and intellect is thus the radical error of the "philosophy of the unconscious," and the evil consequences of this error are plainly enough to be felt in Hartmann's ethics and his philosophy of religion too. 6. 50

Pessimism forms the foundation and the corner-stone of the ethical view of the world set forth by E. von Hartmann in his *Phänomenologie (Manifestations of the Moral Consciousness*, published in 1878) in the form of a progressive ascent of the various moral positions. Ingenious and instructive as this book is, it yet from the very beginning provokes opposition in the reader, and by its conclusion produces a painful impression of an inconsolable despair of any positive value in the rich moral world through which he has been guided. We cannot, of course, withhold our approval of the rejection of the moral principle of egoistic eudæmonism in every form, with the corresponding requirement, put forward with all confidence, of self-denying devotion to the objective ends of goodness, to the rational and moral order of the world. But here we at once encounter a fatally exaggerated and unjustified turn of the argument, forbidding man to entertain any hope whatever of any self-gratification in the service of goodness, such a hope being unwarranted and incapable of fulfilment—a pessimistic rigour which is contrary to nature, for it condemns the most natural desire man has for wellbeing, and which cannot fail to have a paralysing effect on morals, and in practice to work into the hands (though this is not Hartmann's intention) of the most unfruitful ascetic quietism. How much truer and more wholesome is the opposite Christian principle, which, while bidding us unconditionally to seek God's kingdom and righteousness, yet at the same time suffers us to hope that all other things (satisfaction of the highest order) will be

added to us thus striving! It comes partly from that exaggerated pessimistic rigour, but also in part from an intellectual over-estimate of the theoretical forms and representations in which practical motives and dispositions clothe themselves, that Hartmann unjustly condemns the Christian morality as a "transcendent eudæmonistic and heteronomous pseudo-morality." Where are we to look for truly autonomous and pure morality if, as Hartmann appears to suppose, it is only to be found with those who recognise with full scientific distinctness the immanent necessity of the moral? I for my part should imagine that the simplest child which from love to God or to the Saviour, or (for the name matters but little here) to a saint, does right and shuns evil, must be pronounced from the practical point of view to act perfectly "autonomously" and purely, rather than the Kantian moralist, who, while he considers right to be a law of reason, has it not in his heart but only in his head, and who subjects himself from a mere sense of duty, and contrary to his inclination, to a law which is alien to his heart. Nor does the hope of heavenly felicity make morality any less practically autonomous or pure, provided that hope is not as such the motive of moral conduct, but only the form of consciousness in which, to the pure heart which loves God, the certainty is clothed that it is fulfilling its calling in harmony with God's will; the hope being thus the consequence and not the antecedent of the moral disposition. This is, in fact, so obvious as at once to occur to any one dispassionately considering what simple religious goodness consists in (*e.g.* that of women): but Hartmann's generally penetrating insight into the psychological working of the heart is here confused by the double prejudice of pessimism and intellectualism, which leads to an unjust estimate of Christian morality throughout the whole of his *Phänomenologie*.

The detail of this work I must here pass over, interesting as much of it is; it would carry us too far out of our way.¹ We are only directly concerned with the close of the work, in which the

¹ I may refer to my detailed examination of the work in the periodical *Im neuen Reich*, 1879. Nos. 29 and 30.

ethical principles found inductively are traced up to an ultimate metaphysical ground. Generally speaking, this attempt at a metaphysical foundation gives Hartmann's ethics a great advantage as against naturalism and abstract dualism. It is quite correct to say that neither the subjective nor the objective moral principles taken alone could afford a sufficient basis of morality, since the former want objective universal validity and the latter subjective obligation, and that therefore the ultimate and unshakable ground must be sought in an objective metaphysico-religious principle, which alone gives to the ethical structure an objective validity which the thought of all men must recognise. And when Hartmann finds this principle in the "consciousness of identity of essence with God," we may see in this (in spite of his polemic against heteronomous theism, of which more anon), just another expression for the Christian consciousness of sonship to God, the ethical significance of which is happily described in the following sentence: "To know one's self as of divine nature, this does away with all divergence between selfwill and universal will, with all alienation between man and God, with all undivine, *i.e.* merely natural, behaviour; to regard the life of one's spirit as a spark of the divine flame engenders a resolution to lead a truly divine life, *i.e.* to raise one's self above the position of mere naturalness to a life in the spirit, which is in a positive sense God-willed; we acquire the will and the power to think, feel, and act as God being in us, and to transfigure each finite task of our earthly life in the divine light." But instead of finding as Christian ethics does, in this God-fused transfiguration of the life of individuals and of society the ultimate end of human destiny, Hartmann thinks it necessary to add to the finished building yet another story, in which the whole of moral teleology is to find its consummation. The ultimate end of the world-process is said to consist in this, that the misery of existence is brought back to the peace of non-existence, and God thus delivered from the unblestness into which he was plunged by the irrational impulse of his will to existence. All morality is ultimately nothing but co-operating in the shortening of the way of suffering and

redemption into which God betook himself in originating the world-process. With this monstrous production of phantasy, only to be paralleled in the curious dreams of the old gnostics, does Hartmann's *Phenomenology of the moral consciousness* conclude—a conclusion unfortunately only too apt to deprive of all value the good features which the work contains, hurling all the splendour and the sacredness of the moral world into the dark abyss of a hopeless nihilism!

It is true that von Hartmann tries in every conceivable way to get rid of this defect, and to show the alleged practical perilousness of his absolute nihilism to be due to a superficial apprehension, a misunderstanding, of his system. But in these attempts he is not successful, and he cannot succeed. It is not true, as he maintains, that it makes no difference in the view we take of practical moral duties, and the position we assume towards them, how we conceive the ultimate purpose of them, whether as positive or negative. By basing the whole of morality on the teleology of the world-order, he necessarily makes the idea of its ultimate purpose influence and determine the whole moral attitude. And is it not an extraordinary demand to make of the honest human understanding, that it is to take the task of life seriously, and hold its duties sacred, while all the while believing that all this expenditure of labour and sacrifice is ultimately—for no end, that the whole world-process has no meaning but to prepare for the Nothing! Can an end which implies the destruction of all reason be held to supply a rational motive to labour for its accomplishment? Or is there any obligation in the thought of a God who in magnificent egoism creates innumerable beings for unhappiness only to deliver himself from his own unhappiness? And is it possible to devote ourselves to an end the realisation of which, by means of human will and endeavour, so far transcends our comprehension, that we can only expect it to come about by an absolute miracle, which might as well happen of itself without any human co-operation? an end, moreover, which even if once realised might turn to an illusion the next moment, since even were the world successfully reduced to nothing, an unhappy chance might hurry the blind primal will again, and then again, into the impulse to existence and cause it to

commit the enormity of creating the world once more! Certain as it is therefore that the moral man can only set reasonable and realisable aims before him, it is certain that he never can adopt Hartmann's final end of the world-process as his end, can never feel obliged to seek it, never let it move him to any action, far less determine the whole tendency of his life and endeavour. The ethics of Pessimism thus want an ultimate teleological directing authority.

This serious want is accompanied by a further feature which is positively evil. The advocates of pessimism claim that it disposes of eudæmonism and so clears the necessary space for morality. But how can this be the case when pessimism itself is based entirely on the principle of a eudæmonistic estimate of the world? The pessimistic thesis that the existence of the world is evil, and that its non-existence would be better, so that the destruction of it is an end to be striven after, this thesis is founded with Hartmann upon a comparative calculation of the elements of pleasure and pain in the whole of the world's existence, a calculation which results with him in a "negative balance of pleasure," the sum of pain preponderating over the sum of pleasure. The usual way of disposing of this demonstration is to point out mistakes in the details of the calculation, exaggerations on the side of pain, inadequate statements or omissions on the side of pleasure. Such inaccuracies may no doubt be shown to be present in the argument; and it deserves particular remark that a pleasurable sensation, of whatever kind, by no means ceases to afford real pleasure to the person feeling it because it rests on an illusion which is transparent to others or even afterwards to himself. The radical error, however, of this pessimistic style of argument does not consist in the doubtful nature of some of the items of the calculation of pleasure, but in the perversity of the principle on which the whole reckoning is stated. The calculation is altogether wrong: firstly, because it is *impossible*, and secondly, because it is *useless*. It is first of all impossible, because even in the individual life the feelings of pleasure and pain are infinitely different both in kind and in degree, the variety being in proportion to the complexity of the life, and the manifold kinds of pleasure and pain crossing each other in a multitude of ways. In a man whose mental nature is

developed it would be hard to find the very shortest period of time in which heterogeneous feelings of pleasure and pain are not to be found together in mixed relations, or passing over into each other, so that no general estimate of the happiness of such states can be made, far less any precise measurement. It is still harder to sum up and balance exactly the amount of pleasure that has been present in a long life. No cautious man would presume to draw up an accurate calculation of this nature even in his own case, and how much less for the life of another whose feelings he can only trace by way of analogy from his own! How then is a balance of pleasure possible for all men, say for all living beings on the earth, and even of all the worlds, for all creatures that are now, have been, and are yet to be? How can such a balance lay claim even to probability, not to speak of certainty? Even to think such a calculation possible betrays an arrogance which has little in common with scientific investigation and demonstration. I at least cannot deny that I have never been able to understand how pessimism has come to enjoy even so much credit as to be taken for a theory capable of scientific discussion, and how it has been allowed to go so far with its baseless inductions and arguments in a field where everything is in the highest possible degree individual, fortuitous, and indefinite; where there is nothing solid to lay hold of, no fixed standard to judge by, and every one's taste and caprice, every one's individual and fugitive opinion and mood, every one's fashion or prejudice can dispose itself as it will. But this calculation of the balance of pleasure is not only impossible: it is also useless. For suppose it were the case, that the balance of the sum of pleasure of the earth, and by analogy also of the universe, could be determined with some measure of probability: how would this bear on the main question at issue as to the value of the world? Is the value of the world to be measured according to the sum of the pleasurable sensations it contains? He who maintains that it is, must in consistency go further; he must estimate the value of the life of the individual according to the sum of its pleasurable sensations, he must place the highest good of every man in the greatest possible number of such sensations; in

short, he must espouse eudæmonism pure and simple. He on the contrary who rejects eudæmonism as a moral principle, as Hartmann does, and places the meaning and the value of the life of the individual in the realisation of purely rational ends alone,— what right has he to apply the opposite standard to judge of the value and the meaning of the sum of the world's existence, and to institute inquiries as to the sum of pleasure? Here obviously there is a flagrant contradiction in the bases of the pessimistic ethics. And this contradiction is fraught with mischief in its practical bearings. It is too evident that he who has once taken up the ground of eudæmonism in judging of the value of the world will be tempted to maintain that position in judging of the value of his own life, and in choosing the ends to which his life is to be directed; especially as the pessimistic ethics fails, as we saw above, to supply any moral directive authority of its own. Thus it may be expected with the greatest psychological probability, that pessimism will not result in the majority of cases, as its defenders maintain, in displacing eudæmonism, but will rather tend to encourage it, whether in the form of positive reckless pursuit of pleasure or in that of an effeminate quietism which shrinks from the discomfort of active exertion. Of this indeed India already furnishes an example known to all men.

To these grave ethical defects and to the untenable character of the inductive proof various drawbacks of the system have to be added: the weakness, spoken of above, of the metaphysical substruction of pessimism, the dualism of the irrational will and the powerless idea, the fiction of their original existence by each other's side, but without influence or bearing on each other, the will not willing and the idea not thinking. Add to these features the mythical history, how once upon a time, on a sudden, by a chance which had no cause, the will rose out of the state of potency to that of actuality and forcibly laid hold of the idea, whereupon the latter at once became thinking reason and devised the plan of the world, to the end that the blind will might be reduced to seeing the unreasonableness of its willing, and so brought back to the rest of the original

condition, in which it was no more than potency ; and consider the logical impossibilities and the mythological extravagances of this whole metaphysical substruction, which is devised exclusively in the interests of pessimism, and there will appear to be good reason for declaring pessimism to be the cancer of Hartmann's philosophy, the gnawing poison of which permeates the whole system, degrading all its tissues, and preventing even those parts of it which are valuable and sound from enjoying their due influence and their proper development. Hartmann's intention was to combine in a higher unity Schopenhauer's principle of will with Hegel's principle of reason, and in this idea he is happy ; it might be fruitful if only the strong points of both systems were combined, and their errors allowed to correct each other. But this is just what Hartmann fails to effect. Instead of overcoming Schopenhauer's pessimism, which has no meaning but in that system where the will-principle is pre-supposed as irrational, by Hegel's rational optimism, Hartmann not only keeps the former along with the rational principle, but even exaggerates it from an individual to a universal pessimism, or to a doctrine of world-destruction. Instead of overcoming Hegel's intellectualism and ideal genetic dialectic by the realism of Schopenhauer's will, and thus making room for the emotional side of life and the real genetic development of history, he exaggerates the Hegelian intellectualism in the philosophy of religion to such a degree as to imagine he can bring about a new religion of the future by philosophical speculation—an enthusiast's dream, equally remote from the sober historical spirit of Hegel and from the contemplative mystical thought of Schopenhauer ! Thus, while the attempt is very justifiable to combine Hegel and Schopenhauer in an organic unity, we cannot regard it as successful in a philosophy which, like that of Hartmann, amalgamates the errors of both in a mixture replete with contradiction.

This is specially manifest, as above remarked, in the field of religious philosophy. Hartmann first appeared in this field with two minor critical works, in which—to speak in the military imagery of which he is so fond—he put out light cavalry skirmishers to feel

the position of opponents with whom he was not yet acquainted. The work on *The Self-disintegration of Christianity and the Religion of the Future* (*Selbstersetzung des Christenthums*) (1874), was intended to show that Christianity had outlived itself, not only in its biblical ecclesiastical form, but as viewed by liberal Protestantism also, and must yield to a religion of the future which must be neither theistic nor optimistic, but pantheistic and pessimistic, as only in such a religion could justice be done to the autonomy of morality and the religious need of redemption. In his *Crisis of Christianity* (1880), he declared that he saw the opening stage of that religion in the speculative theology of the present day, though it is neither pantheistic nor pessimistic—a fact which he thinks due to inconsistency and theological prejudice—on which point we shall yet have a word to say. Soon after these critical skirmishers appeared Hartmann's own philosophy of religion in two volumes, the first of which deals with *The Religious Consciousness of Mankind in the Successive Steps of its Development* (1881), and the second with *The Religion of Spirit* (1882); a serious work and full of matter, in which even one who does not share its central principle may yet find much that is interesting and suggestive.

The first volume lays the historical foundation of the work; all we need say of this part is that while it deals with the beginnings of religion and with the characteristics of the various extra-Christian religions in an able and interesting way, the treatment of historical Christianity is such as to disappoint even the most moderate expectations; not only is there no proper insight into the historical importance of Jesus, who is treated as belonging to Judaism, but even the apostle Paul is merely regarded as the originator of the theological doctrine out of which the the christological trinitarian dogma grew; the book closes with a scholastic and dialectical discussion of this dogma. There is not even an attempt to characterise the religious nature of Christianity, or to trace its growth in history. Here the fatal error of an abstract intellectualism betrays itself; religion is only taken as a theory, its truth is judged according to the correctness of its dogmas, and finally it is absorbed in philosophy,

or a philosophically constructed religion of the future put in the place of the historical religion.

This ideal of the future is then discussed in detail in the second volume, under the name "The Religion of Spirit," or "Concrete Monism." The discussion falls into three sections which deal with the psychology of religion, metaphysics, and ethics respectively. In the first section the religious function is described on its human side as faith, on its divine side as grace. Faith is shown to consist in the unity of idea, feeling, and will, none of these three alone constituting faith, and their isolation engendering the one-sided positions of intellectualism, mysticism, and moralism. These ideas are not exactly new, but they are finely set forth, and we could only wish that in his treatment of historical religious phenomena Hartmann adhered more strictly to the canon he has so correctly set up. The demonstration which follows—that, in so far as faith is in truth a real relation between God and man, we must assume a corresponding divine function as its inner ground, without which it never could act at all, this divine function being described by Hartmann as grace,—this demonstration sets forth a thought which is common to all speculation, and which is undoubtedly correct. It appears to me more questionable if it is right to divide this divine basis of the human function of faith, according to the three sides of the latter in consciousness, into three forms, as revealing, redeeming, and sanctifying grace. Surely the divine ground is one, and assumes various forms only in its manifestation in man. The discussion of the relation of the subjective and the historical elements in revelation is interesting; yet it cannot be denied that too little importance is allowed to the historical side, to the creative events and personalities. The "Metaphysics of Religion," which follows, argues inductively from the facts of religious consciousness to the existence of God, his nature, and his relation to the world. The fundamental fact of religious consciousness—that it seeks in God to be quit of dependence on the world—presupposes the absolute dependence of the world on God or the being of God as the absolute world-ground. A further inductive series argues partly from the spirit-like (logical dynamical) nature of the

world, partly from the subjective spiritual nature of man, and partly from the constant correspondence of the forms and laws of existence with those of consciousness, the correspondence which makes knowledge possible, to a one sole ground of both in the absolute spirit, to be conceived according to the analogy of the human spirit, with the necessary elimination of all the finite limitations of the latter—*i.e.* as Hartmann considers, as all-wise and omniscient, but by no means as self-conscious, feeling unblessedness, but by no means blessedness! A third inductive series argues firstly from the objective moral world-order to the divine righteousness therein manifesting itself; then from the subjective consciousness of the moral law to the divine holiness on which its obligation is based; and lastly from the course of the development which leads mankind in a purposeful way to its goal, or from the world-historical absolute economy of salvation to the divine grace on which it is based, but which is not to be conceived like the human affection of love. Indeed he says it is neither justifiable in itself nor is it in the interests of religion to distinguish the absolute moral world-order from God as its conscious spiritual supporter; as this theistic assumption brings the necessity of the world-order into collision with the freedom of the determination of the divine will. We shall return to this point. The religious *anthropology*, which comes next, starts from the proposition, with which we made acquaintance in the ethics, that "pessimism in the widest sense is the indispensable postulate of the religious consciousness as well as of the moral," as it alone guarantees a feeling of need for redemption. The problem of the theodicy, too, we learn later in the *cosmology* is insoluble, unless on the assumption that God himself, as absolute subject, bears all the sorrows of the world. In this case the axiom applies that *volenti non fit injuria*; monotheism, on the contrary, making God create countless beings for misery, might be called mono-satanism. It is this that lends to the "absolute tragedy of the religious consciousness" its last depth, that the world-pain becomes an infinite God-pain, and man in sympathy with the unblessed God devotes himself with all his will and all his power to the task of universal redemption or the redemption of God,

a task concerning which he can frame no idea how or when it is to be completed. Not to speak of these Manichæan gnostic aberrations, which cannot, however, be treated as of no moment, the religious anthropology contains a number of good thoughts on the essence of evil, on the relation of it to freedom and to providence, on original sin and original grace as the two ever co-existent factors of moral human nature. The religious cosmology also contains, besides the most curious opinions, such as those just detailed, and among which we may also reckon the temporary and accidental character of the creation of the world, a number of quite sound speculative thoughts, *e.g.* on the notion of the divine government of the world, or on the relation of the teleological world-order to that of natural law. And as to the *Ethics of Religion*, the description of the subjective process of salvation as it unfolds itself in the awakening of grace, in its development and in its fruits, is happy in every point where the prejudices created in the author by his pessimism do not come into play to intercept his view. This, however, is undoubtedly the case in two assertions—*first*, in the statement that the salvation offered by religious redemption and atonement is not a positive gain, but only the removal of antecedent unblessedness, and that though it appears to be blessedness as long as it reflects the contrast, yet when this reflection disappears it only leaves behind a state of peace which is neither blessed nor unblessed; and *secondly*, as a corollary from this, in the statement that the blessedness of the consciousness of redemption (sonship of God) is not to be regarded as the ultimate end of the religious process of salvation, but that the whole subjective process of salvation is merely a means for the objective, *i.e.* for moral endeavour in the process of the redemption of the world,—a proposition which robs religion of all distinctive value and all independent meaning, and ascribes these to morality alone. The conclusion of the work is occupied with the “objective process of salvation,” or the religious life of the community in the forms of church worship; and here the author develops his ideas of the cultus of the future of the religion of concrete monism. All symbolical and æsthetic elements are to be discarded, and worship is to be confined to the “service of the word,” in which, however,

the heteronomous law and the heterosoteric gospel are to be replaced by the devotional retirement of the religious consciousness into itself, into its contents, the religious relation, real unity with God. Hence the religious consciousness will draw the ever renewed realisation of saving grace as realising, redeeming, and sanctifying, thus finding in itself the only true means of grace. "It is the task of the highest stage of religious consciousness (that of the religion of immanence) to separate in worship also what is essential from what is unessential, and to realise what has hitherto been aimed at in a round-about fashion, by means of externalities and illusions, in a more perfect way by applying directly to that which is the kernel of the matter."

Let us take our place in imagination in such a religious assembly. It not only despises all symbolical acts, not only all such representations as appeal to the senses, not only all song, but it also dispenses with any historical basis for preaching, with all representation of religious truths in personal ideal, all calling to mind of the great figures and marked typical events of history, surviving as eternal witnesses of God in the consciousness of the church. In short, it disdains all incorporations of the ideal in living forms, and proposes to become absorbed in the pure, *i.e.* entirely abstract, thought of "real unity with God." What effect could we expect such a meditation to have on the religious sentiment of the community? The congregation of the religion of the future, as Hartmann describes it, would not be a worshipping religious congregation at all: it would be a philosophers' school, only to be taken for a church, even in the widest meaning of the word, by a philosopher who stands quite apart from the real life of the church, and has not yet shaken off the old error of taking religion for a kind of philosophy. E. von Hartmann extols, as the new and peculiar element of his philosophy of religion, its complete disregard of all the intermediate approaches of the religious consciousness both in history and in cultus. But it is just in these that that consciousness attains to objective reality, and acquires force to perpetuate itself in the community it has founded and sustained. This abstract intellectualism, hollowed out to a ghost-like spiritualism,

and far exceeding the intellectualism of Hegel, is one cardinal error of Hartmann's philosophy of religion.

The second great error of his system is his *pantheistic pessimism*, his evil inheritance from Schopenhauer. That experience of the evil of the world and of sin awakens the need of redemption and so leads to religion, is what no one will deny ; but what we look for in religion is just that the misery of the world be overcome by the salvation sent by God, who just on this account must necessarily be exalted above the misery of the world, and must be the power for our redemption from it. But how is redemption possible if all misery and unblestness has its original seat in God himself? How can a God who is himself unblest and in need of redemption, be the origin of redemption for us? Could we stand in any moral relation at all to a God who cherished no love for us, who on the contrary had brought all his creatures into the mournful existence they possess from a purely selfish motive, that by their self-destruction they might help him to attain redemption from his own unblestness? Would the feelings of love, gratitude, reverence, trust,—in fact the fundamental feelings of all true piety,—be psychologically possible in relation to such a God? And the one religious motive which remains, that of the hope of redemption,—what value can it have if it be the case that all “redeeming and sanctifying” grace aims ultimately at the annihilation of all things as quickly as possible? One who was in earnest as to this might perhaps find a much cheaper method of attaining his end than that of devotion to the process of world-redemption—namely, suicide ; and to discharge his duty of co-operating in the redemption of others, he would only require to see that his act found imitators. Mainländer's “Philosophy of Redemption” (*Philosophie der Erlösung*, 1876) carries the religion of pessimism to its logical conclusion, not following the roundabout road of labour at historical culture, but the straight road to the heart of the matter : redemption in the Nothing is to be set about by recommending and practising virginity and suicide. Hartmann repudiates such madness. Very well ; but his philosophy provides him with no means to refute it. We must therefore add to the result of our criticism above, which

showed pessimism to be psychologically and metaphysically baseless and ethically useless, the further declaration, that it stands in fundamental and irreconcilable antagonism to religion.

But this pessimism, not to speak of the individual psychological motives which may recommend it, but which lie outside of discussion, is intimately connected in point of theory with that will-Pantheism, the legacy from Schopenhauer which Hartmann drags with him. Not that he holds it in its hard original onesidedness; he combines it with Hegel's principle of reason, and so makes an energetic attempt to overcome it. But, as we saw above, it is no more than an attempt; the two principles are not successfully combined in unity. Hence Hartmann's *notion of God oscillates in the most extraordinary way between pantheism and speculative theism*. The reproach of inconsistency which he brings against speculative theism applies in fact to himself. It is true that speculative theism, or a majority of its representatives, declines the notion of the personality of God; but that is only to remove from the all-knowing reason and the almighty will of God the limit of personal, *i.e.* individual, consciousness and individual will. How this amounts to a contradiction or an inconsistency it is hard to see; on the contrary, theism is here freed from the error which certainly adheres to it in its ordinary form, namely, that the free determinations of the will of God are in conflict with the necessity of the absolute world-order. Hartmann was entitled to charge the common naïve theism with this error, but he ought to know that the reproach no longer applies to speculative theism. But the notion of God which Hartmann opposes to speculative theism, as the true and only consistent one, is charged with contradictions which no one can help seeing. Think of an unconscious spirit which yet is said to be all-knowing and all-wise, which accordingly knows everything, only not itself, which governs everything with skill, directs all ends to one ultimate end lying in itself, and yet has no consciousness of itself nor of its ultimate end! Think of a God who in his immanence in the world, or as the indwelling subject of all the feelings of individual beings, feels himself partly happy and partly (predominantly) unhappy; but in his transcendence,

CHAPTER V.

POST-HEGELIAN SPECULATION.

POST-HEGELIAN speculation starts from Hegel, and has always been powerfully influenced by that profound thinker; it does not, however, stand still at Hegel, but has, at least in its most considerable representatives, more or less distinctly cast off the limits of the original Hegelian system, and struck out new developments of the central thought of that system, resulting, as was to be expected, in various combinations with or resemblances to other systems. The speculative religious philosophy of the last few decennia is mostly based on such combinations of Hegelian elements, with elements derived from Schleiermacher and Schelling, and also in part, as we saw above, with Schopenhauerian ideas, or even with elements traceable to Herbart or Leibniz. These mixtures occur in varying proportions with different writers; one may be denominated a Neo-Hegelian, others Neo-Schellingians, or some such name. But the differences do not involve essential principles, and they pass into each other by many gradations, so that the same men may be called Neo-Hegelians by one party and Neo-Schellingians by another. It may, therefore, be best to take them altogether under the common heading of Post-Hegelian speculation, grouping them according to the various affinities which they display.

Of the older purely Hegelian school it was remarked above (p. 117) that it fell into two sides, a right and a left, each of which, in proportion as it ran to excess in its side-tendency, came to be at issue with the philosophy. The chief occasion of the split was the rise of the christological question, occasioned by the appearance of Strauss's *Leben Jesu* in 1835. This publication was followed by a

whole literature of pamphlets, replies and duplies, the philosophic result of which, however, was quite out of proportion to the expenditure of polemical zeal and dialectical art.¹ The best and most permanently valuable fruit of the theological conflict aroused by Strauss was the historico-critical investigation into primitive Christianity by Ferdinand Christian Baur, which brought the strife down out of the airy regions of idealistic speculation, or of the postulates of the feelings, to the solid ground of real history, thus imposing on religious speculation too the necessity for critical sobriety. The permanently valuable work of the Hegelian school on this latter side may be said to consist in the labours of two men, Vatke and Biedermann, who, both averse to the extremes of right and left Hegelians, united with the depth of Hegel the critical acuteness and the religious sentiment of Schleiermacher, and who, being at the same time thorough Biblical scholars, possessed the necessary historical knowledge to support their religious speculation.

Wilhelm Vatke, in his work *Human Freedom in its relation to Sin and to Divine Grace*,² thus defines the task of speculation. It must seek to avoid equally, he says, two dangerous rocks on which a superficial and one-sided religious science may suffer shipwreck. On the one side it must avoid abstract monism of thought, which, holding to the one absolute causality, never grasps any real difference, but regards everything finite, evil included, as an integral element of one consistent absolute process, or as the result of one sole will and decree, thus weakening the deep contradictions of the religious and moral consciousness, and depriving them of their truth and energy. On the other side it must avoid no less that abstract dualism in idea which purchases the truth of these opposites at too high a price, but is found on closer inspection to be unsound, because it has set up a hard barrier between the absolute spirit

¹ Those who are interested in the subject may be directed to Strauss's pamphlets (*Streitschriften*), and to Carl Schwarz's excellent history of modern Protestant theology: *Geschichte der neueren prot. Theologie*, 4th Edition.

² *Die menschliche Freiheit in ihrem Verhältniss zur Sünde und zur göttlichen Gnade*. (1841).

and finite spirits, has done away with the idea of the absolute, and fails to recognise the possibility of an effectual grace, an activity of the infinite spirit overleaping the barrier. To keep clear of both of these extremes, and to retain the notion of sin as the freedom of man which is contrary to God, and that of grace as the freedom of God within man, God must be conceived as the concrete spirit which has the world, the realm of finite spirits, not outside itself but in itself, the perfect condition of its real freedom, and the rational contents of its knowledge and will ; it must be recognised as a part of the real notion of God, that he embraces in himself all that is truly human, and unfolds the fulness of His being in the realm of spirits made in his image. On the other hand it must be recognised as belonging to the real notion of man, that he contains in his own nature a divine element which is the divine foundation of his development to true moral freedom. Only in the unity of these two sides is God absolute spirit in the true sense : this absolute, as the unity of all opposites, embraces personality but is itself no person, because a person cannot be absolute in the strict sense of the word. The absolute in the highest sense of the word is the theoretical and practical spirit which knows and produces itself as the concrete unity of the realm of spirits, thus God in his unity with the world, or, to speak more definitely, God in unity with his kingdom, as all in all, having the form of personality as one of his moments, not sub-personal but supra-personal, a unity above the persons and embracing them. "With this view," Vatke says, "we correct a very common intellectual error which sets the divine and the human merely side by side, and, at the same time, a pantheistic error now again making its appearance, which mixes the two sides together, and is equally with the former a mere view of the intellect which has not risen to the notion of spirit." What is here arrived at, the substitution both for the deistic separation and the pantheistic mixing up of God and man (world) of a concrete monism or monotheism, is not only the most correct interpretation of the Hegelian philosophy, but is right in itself ; this, I think, is beyond doubt. It is another question, however, whether Vatke

carries out his correct view satisfactorily, or if the problem can be satisfactorily solved from the position of pure Hegelian logical idealism, which regards nature merely as an "external objectivity of the notion," as a pure determination of thought or immediate idea set forth into external reality."

Such a doubt, however, need not hinder us from recognising in the fullest way the profound and cautious speculation which seeks to fathom the most difficult problems of freedom, sin, and grace. The fundamental condition of a right apprehension of these notions is, according to Vatke, that we should think of freedom as a dialectical process in which God and man do not stand over-against each other externally, but form two necessary and mutually inseparable sides of a relation which moves through the dialectic of the various mutual bearings of one side or the other. So long as the divine will stands out against the human, it manifests itself only as an end, a "Shall," which still wants reality, as the will falls on the human side as freedom of choice or as caprice. This diremption of the will into the two sides of subjective freedom and divine law is the necessary journey of the moral process, in which evil too has its general and, in so far, its necessary origin, as every individual must pass through the inner division, the conflict of the flesh and the spirit, in order to attain to the knowledge of good and evil, which is not possible to him who has not in some degree experienced the reality of these opposites in his own person. "For as sin is essentially a determination of the subjective will, it can only be known if it actually exists in the will, and this can only be known through reality as an inward possibility, since the knowledge comprises the other, of the actuality of sin. Thus, if it be granted that the knowledge of evil and the possibility that the ego may make it the contents of its will is an indispensable pre-requisite for energetic freedom on the good side, it merely shows a want of dialectical acuteness of thought to ignore the necessary consequence of that assumption, viz., that the actual entrance of evil is the necessary condition of moral consciousness. Hence evil is the negative moment attached to the good which is necessary to the existence of moral choice, and which

must necessarily arise in order to be overcome and to give goodness an independent existence of its own." Were evil not a necessary moment in the question of freedom, it would be impossible to assert the universality of sin. The necessity, however, is to be understood merely as a moment of the moral process, a moment destined to disappear: since each step in the development of conscience does away with the necessity that sin should exist, and leaves only the necessity that it should be possible. The way from possible good to actual good must pass through evil negated and overcome, and this constitutes the true independence of the good. As a contradiction of the will in itself, however—as the contradiction between its appearance and its idea—evil falls on the side of the finite only; it is only man's affair, it is neither willed nor brought about by God. The divine will is related to evil only as the power of the world-order which negates it, and the power of grace which does away with it.

But this doing away with the contradiction of the moments of the will is not to be conceived as a miracle which breaks through the immanent course of development; for this would be to make an end of freedom, not to realise it. The contradiction which evil makes is only conceivable with reference to a unity of the moments which is also in some real way given, and thus the will in the joint movement of its moments possesses energy to do away with the contradiction in itself, and this act must be the work of the divine and of the human side of the will, that is, at once of grace and of freedom. The divine side of the will, which in its opposition to the human was a mere "Shall," now becomes an actual will, as God himself realises his will in man, and obtains in the determination of human subjectivity his own self-determination, and thus his real freedom. God's activity in making his will subjective in the free energy with which He assumes human subjectivity subjects the particular ego to His higher universality, and in doing so makes it truly free. In this the human will is not passive under an irresistible act of God; its being determined is a self-determination, because the divine will is its true self—the prototype of itself. That which, according to the ordinary way of thinking, is an irreconcilable opposition between divine grace

and human freedom is thus reconciled, grace being seen to be the act of that divine type which belongs essentially to the notion of man's nature. Accordingly, the influence of divine grace does not differ from the immanent development of the deepest divine germ of life in man, only that it here stands over-against man regarded as a finite and separate being—as something external to himself. If the divine image is the true nature of man, and if it only possesses reality in virtue of its identity with its type or with the logos, then there can be no true self-determination in man which is not at the same time a self-determination of the type in its image. Only from this higher unity of the two sides can we understand revelation, atonement and justification, love and grace. God is not real as spirit without being at the same time manifest in the spirit of man ; and in the same way the divine love is not real unless it be poured out into human hearts, and become a warming and liberating power, an answering love. This is the meaning of the doctrine of justification by faith, which, called into existence by grace, makes grace real. For justification is not merely an act of God—a thing done to man by God while man is passive ; the two sides come to meet each other here as in concrete freedom generally, but their unity is not capable of being explained from the finite relation, because in the absolute act the relation as such is overcome, and the infinite power of the holy love of God made the contents of the consciousness which thus lives in God. The doctrine of predestination also loses its harshness at this point of view. God wills the salvation of all, taken abstractly, *i.e.* in the form of an absolute end, leaving out of consideration the means to be employed ; but in reality he wills the salvation of those who freely lay hold of it. His absolute will is conditioned in its realisation by the means appointed by himself, of subjectivity and history.

In the world of history and of society, too, the divine will does not realise itself outside or without, but in and through human freedom. The joint will and joint spirit of a people is always known mediately or immediately as identical with the divine will. The truth of all the mythic legends of divine institutions, incarnations, theocracies, lies in the Christian idea of the God-man, and the identity which it

implies of the divine will and human morality. All the streams of the world's history issue in the kingdom of God, which is the will of God in its concrete development to a moral commonwealth. Providence here acts as an actual spirit through all persons and deeds, through which the idea of the good becomes more real, especially through the creative world-historical persons, among whom Christ occupies a unique position as the central point of history, as the revealer and the reality of the archetypal idea, as the love of God grown personal. But in the laws of the world's order, too, which are both the presupposition and the limit of all subjective self-determination, divine providence is at work; for "a reasonable universal, a holy order, which maintain themselves amid all that is irrational, and, though often attacked at particular points by human caprice, always assert themselves again, and rule, judging and atoning, loosing and binding, must be the self-determination of an absolute reason and a holy will."

The same position—that of a speculation which seeks to reconcile the Hegelian right and left—was taken up from the first by the profound Zürich theologian, *Alois Emanuel Biedermann*. His first book: *Free Theology, or Philosophy and Christianity: their conflict and their harmony*,¹ was dedicated to his master, Wilhelm Vatke, in token of gratitude and reverence. In this work he seeks to prove the compatibility of speculative philosophy with Christian theology by considering the notion of each. Philosophy is the relation of the universal or thinking Ego to the universal or to thought; therefore the theoretical self-consciousness of the mind as to its universal nature, in short, "absolute self-consciousness, in which the absolute form of thinking answers to the absolute contents of thought (it being presupposed, with Hegel, that the totality of the actual is nothing but the development of the absolute idea). Religion is also, it is true, the relation of the Ego to its universal being, not, however, that of the universal or thinking Ego, but of the individual practical Ego; religion is the reflection of the immediate self-consciousness into the

¹ *Die freie Theologie oder Philosophie und Christenthum in Streit und Frieden* (1844).

theoretical consciousness of the absolute, and conversely of the latter into immediate self-consciousness; in short, it is the "practical self-consciousness of the absolute." From this it results that religion contains a theoretical moment—namely, the consciousness of the absolute, but only as a moment, which, regarded by itself alone, is not religious at all, and only becomes religious by being referred to the practical self-consciousness. But this theoretical moment in religion is not in the form of thought, but in the form of idea, and the erroneous opinion might thus arise that religion is nothing more than a mode of representation, and therefore at conflict with the pure thinking of philosophy. But this is to overlook the fact that the specific character of religion consists in its referring its theoretical moment to practical self-consciousness—a practical act so different in kind from the theoretical attitude of philosophy as not to be disturbed or put aside by the latter. The forms of the ideas of religion, however, can and do come into collision with the thinkings of philosophy. These collisions, however, will be the less dangerous for the practical kernel of a religion, the more the general principle of the religion corresponds to the principle of philosophy. Now, the principle of the Christian religion is not this or that theoretical view of the world, which must always depend on the state of culture at the time, and change with its changes: it is the union which takes place in the practical self-consciousness between the eternal universality of being and the particular finite existence of the spirit—a union issuing in the concrete unity of the one actual free spirit, in which man comes to his divine truth and God to his human reality; a religious process the notion of which presupposes that God and man are not such as to stand out against each other as different substances, but are related to each other as the moments of the universal eternal notion and the temporal real individuality of man, the essential necessity of which to each other is visibly set forth in the form of the personal God-man Christ, which, as a representation, is subject to criticism, but the religious kernel of which is the practical self-consciousness of the free spirit at one with itself, and thus practically the same as the theoretical principle of absolute philo-

sophy—so that the latter is shown to be in essential agreement with Christianity.

Defining religion in this way, as man's practical self-consciousness of his absolute being or general notion, Biedermann might be thought to approximate perilously near to Feuerbach. In his later work, however, his *Christian Dogmatic* (1868), he takes up the position of speculative theism, though with him as well as Vatke that position is held with too great logical abstractness. From the formal root-error of the Hegelian philosophy, however, the method of a *a priori* dialectic, he here disentangles himself. He insists with Hegel that in religion there is to be perceived an objective truth which extends beyond mere subjectivity, the truth of a divine revelation. This is not only present and to be perceived in the way of feeling, it may be known in its purity even by thought; and may therefore, and should, be reduced to objective scientific certainty. This truth, however, he does not find, like the older Hegelians, in the formal dialectic of the empty notion; he finds it in the elevation of the actual matter of experience to the pure form of notional thought. On the other hand, he shares with Strauss the historico-genetic mode of setting forth dogma, and an acute style of rational criticism, though the critical dissection of the historical material is not, as with Strauss, the whole, but only one side of the task of science, to be followed by the other side, the positive reconstruction of the pure truth which lies in the dogma. Thus Biedermann's science of religion, while based on the Hegelian distinction of idea and notion, is far from identifying religion with the religious idea (representation), as Hegel at least appears to do, and Strauss actually does; the religious idea is to him only the empirical and natural form of the theoretical act of consciousness, which requires to be combined with an act of will and a state of feeling before we have the whole of the religious process. He now describes religion as the mutual relation between God as infinite and man as finite spirit, and distinguishes in it two correlated and mutually indispensable moments, viz., the divine act of revelation, and the human act of faith.

Revelation is God's opening himself up to man within the sphere

of man's spiritual life. God is both subject and object of it ; it is supernatural, if by nature we understand the sensuous conditions of man's life as against his calling as a spiritual being ; but it is natural, if by nature we understand what is present in the essence. An immediate act of God, it yet takes place by means of nature generally, and of the individual disposition of him who receives it. The relation between the divine and the human spirit is threefold, and consists of the unity of essence, the opposition of subsistence, and the common life of the two ; and accordingly the immediate revelation of God falls also into three moments. God reveals himself as the infinite ground of man's spiritual life in the form of his rational impulse, as its infinite norm in man's conscience, and as infinite power in the religious freedom of the man who is reconciled to his law. To the last revelation faith corresponds as its subjective side ; it experiences the divine revelation according to its threefold psychological function : in its theoretical moment, as elevation above the former finite apprehensions of the intellect to infinite truth ; in feeling, as elevation above the natural states of feeling to infinite blessedness ; and in will, as elevation above the determination of nature to infinite freedom or self-determination as spirit. These inner spiritual processes are the real revelation of God, and the only true revelation. What is sought in the way of revelation in addition to and outside of these rests on abstractions engendered on ideas, the historical human channel in the bearers of revelation being identified with the divine act of revelation itself. The same abstraction is the basis of the ordinary opposition of revealed and natural religion, or of positive religion and the religion of reason ; it is an abstract way of putting the matter on the supernatural side to characterise any objective religion as immediately a divine revelation, as it is an abstract way of putting the matter on the naturalistic side to regard any objective religion as a merely subjective human product. Every objective religion ought to be regarded empirically, and inquiry made as to its human factors, and should also be traced as to its principle to a divine revelation. What is true of the religion of an individual is true of the history of religion as well, that it is only apprehended

truly and on all its sides when regarded first as a divine education of the human race, and secondly, as a gradual self-development of human faith in its natural connection with the development of culture generally. In tracing the steps of this religious development the science of the history of religion must neither indulge in *a priori* constructions, which are very properly at a discount at present, nor lose itself in the fortuitous externalities of history; it must seek to gather from the sum of the views and of the cultus of each religion what is essential in it and forms its real principle. Of this excellent rule Biedermann himself gives us the best illustration in his definition of the principle of Christianity, which he states to be that mutual relation between God and man, which entered into history in the religious consciousness of Jesus as a new thing, and therefore became the basis of a new community, and which is expressed in the designation of Jesus as the "Son of God." But this principle never attained to an adequate and final expression in any single historical form; the whole of the history of dogma is the unfolding of it, and it is the task of theological thought to examine and sift that history, and so to find out the principle, and reduce it to a pure notional expression. It is not our part to inquire in what manner Biedermann performs this task in his *Christian Dogmatic*. All competent judges acknowledge it to be a masterly work, and a work of permanent value for theological science, and this verdict we should not think of questioning, even though we allowed the objections raised against the work to be to some extent well-founded.

In the second edition of his *Dogmatic* (1884), Biedermann explains the theory of knowledge on which his view of the world is based, and thus supplies us with definite materials to judge of it. His theory of knowledge occupies a curious middle position between Hegel's logical idealism and Spinoza's parallelism of thought and extension on the two sides of the one substance. Biedermann holds firmly to the fundamental thought of Hegel that the substance of spirit is logical being and, as such, can only be comprehended in logical categories, but in them can be comprehended entirely and without remainder, and that both in the case of the infinite spirit or

God, and in that of the finite spirit or man. But Biedermann does not hold that the logical being of spirit comprises in itself all being, and that the world is merely the development or appearance of the absolute idea. Nor does he consider that we are able to construct and logically to deduce the world by *a priori* dialectic or by the self-movement of the pure notion. On the contrary, he teaches that spiritual or ideal being is always given only with and in sensuous or material being, and this in such a way that the two stand to each other in the relation of opposite essences—the former as spaceless and timeless, the latter as being in space and time or the being of things, but the one full reality being only made up by the two in and with each other. The task of knowledge consists in abstracting, in the case of any content of consciousness, its ideal being, *i.e.* its logical or mental determinations, from its being as a thing, in which that ideal being is here bound up, and so comprehending it according to its essential opposition, but also according to the unity in which it subsists with the latter. This seizing of the ideal contents of experience in abstract logical categories Biedermann calls “pure thought.” These propositions of his theory of knowledge contain also the basis of his metaphysic, and supply him with his answers to the questions as to the relations between body and soul, God and the world. We can the less withhold our conviction that the basis thus laid in his theory of knowledge is open to grave objections. The notion of “ideal being” is capable of two very different interpretations, and inclines on occasion to one or the other of the two. It may mean thinking being (spirit, soul, consciousness), or being as thought (logical relation, law, etc.), and the ambiguity resulting is one shared by Biedermann with all systems of logical idealism, and giving rise to confusion wherever it appears. We must also ask if a timeless spiritual being is really given to us anywhere, or if it is even conceivable, since we only know spiritual being from our own consciousness, where it always occurs in time, as a thing coming up in the course of the activities of consciousness and of the states of the soul. The question may also be raised whether the (Spinozistic) parallel of extended and thinking being as two poles of one and the

same substance is really fitted to explain in a satisfactory manner the relation between soul and body. And if this opposition is to form the real world, with what logical right can only one side of the opposition—only spiritual being—be taken to be the ground of the world? And is the nature of the absolute spirit thought in a logical manner in the categories of Being-in-itself, setting-the-world-out-of-itself, and reflecting-the-world-back-into-itself, or is not this to reduce the spiritual nature of God to the emptiest categories of an occurrence in space? Biedermann fails to satisfy his own demand for “pure thought:” it cannot be satisfied; his scorn of analogy and of metaphorical expression borrowed from human self-consciousness has made his notion of God one which contains nothing, and is no purer after all. His Spinozistic view, moreover, of the relation of soul and body as two sides of *one* substance lead to the denial of the independent reality and of the immortality of the human spirit, a view to which the religious consciousness will never reconcile itself, and to which the gravest objections must be raised in the interests of personal moral feeling. In all these particulars Biedermann’s system shares the fatal errors of abstract logical idealism which does away with the reality of the world, of the soul, and of God, reducing them to empty logical categories. Schelling’s objections to this Panlogism, so devoid of reality, apply in their full force to Biedermann’s speculation, as Lipsius correctly shows in his severe criticism.¹

In this I am at one with Lipsius, but his Neo-Kantian theory of knowledge appears to me to be equally remote from the truth with that of Biedermann. I am convinced that that theory, especially in the harsh form, almost like that of Albert Lange, in which it is argued out in the *Beiträge*,² must reduce to an impossibility *all* knowledge of objective truth, and *all* science—by no means only the science of religion. All thinking knowledge comes to us by our going beyond the phenomena given in us as ideas, and inquiring after the thing-in-itself which is to be presupposed in them; indeed, even the simple assumption of the reality of the external world is only

¹ R. A. Lipsius: *Philosophie und Religion*, p. 59 sqq.

² 1. *Evangelisch protestantische Dogmatik*, 1876, 2d ed. 1879.

2. *Dogmatische Beiträge zur Vertheidigung und Erklärung meiner Lehrbücher*, 1878.

made by means of the judgment of causality, a judgment which transcends the inner world of consciousness and posits an outside, an objective reality, as the ground of all subjective ideas. Thus to deny that the forms under which we think and perceive are valid with regard to being is to take away *a priori* the possibility of knowledge; nor does it help matters at all to put in place of the knowableness of the objective world the uniformity of the phenomenal world in all humanly organised subjects, since on the presupposition the very existence of other subjects outside myself would be a hypothesis incapable of proof. I need not here enter into the various inner contradictions which belong to Lipsius's theory of knowledge as well as that of Lange, but will only remark that the error appears to be based with Lipsius on the assumption that only two alternatives are possible: that we must accept either an absolute knowledge with Hegel, or with Hume and the Neo-Kantians no knowledge whatever, of objective truth. I decline to accept either alternative; I am convinced that out of the labyrinth of attempts made in our day to explain the theory of knowledge, that view will soon make its way to general acceptance which is already upheld by thinkers of note,—namely, that the objective validity of the forms and laws of thought is founded on the absolute world-ground, and confers upon our thought a power to know the world of reality as it essentially is; but that this power, like every other, loses in intensity in proportion to the distance at which it acts, so that though the kingdom of the knowable be nowhere boarded and nailed up against us, yet our knowledge loses in distinctness, clearness, and certainty in proportion as it seeks to press beyond our immediate experience to its ultimate basis. Accordingly I agree with Lipsius in respect to his idea of God, to the extent of regarding an absolute knowledge of God, of his absolute essential being, as not possible, and therefore think it necessary to supplement the uncertainty and indefiniteness of our theoretical knowledge about God by assumptions, arising out of "practical necessities." This I think is called-for in the religious sphere, and therefore specially in dogmatic. I cannot, however, concede that we can know nothing about God but what is negative, and

that all attempts to define the idea of God positively must involve us in insoluble contradictions (these insoluble contradictions are, for the most part, no more than the consequences of questionable assumptions—assumptions certainly of very ancient origin). And finally, I regard it as impossible for faith not only to eke out the indefiniteness of knowledge, but to set up and maintain its religious postulates even in the face of known logical contradictions—a “dualism between head and heart,” which very few men could permanently tolerate: I only remark further, that Lipsius’s positive construction and development of his dogmatic system is so largely independent of the philosophical presupposition of his theory of knowledge, as to give him a right to assert a very extensive theological agreement between his dogmatic and that of Biedermann. Different as are the philosophical foundations on which these two theologians build, they occupy the same position of critico-speculative theism, and the only result of the difference of their method of treatment of dogma is that each work possesses peculiar merits of its own. It does not, however, belong to the province of a history of religious thought to show this in detail.

We thus see that even in religious thinkers who follow Hegel, even such solid thinkers as Vatke and Biedermann, the abstract idealism of the master still to some extent bears sway. It is interesting to contrast with this the energetic but no less one-sided realism of Karl Christian Planck. This writer declared himself in his first work¹ to be an opponent of the Hegelian logic, which dissolves the real into consciousness—that is, into its opposite—and an adherent of the Schellingian philosophy of nature, with which, in spite of his protest against empty notional philosophy, he shares its *a priori* construction of the actual by means of certain abstract categories (centre and periphery, differentiation and concentration, etc.). He sets out with the assertion that, in order to have a truly realistic view of the world, the knowledge of nature as she is must take the place of the purely religious, or the half-religious half-philosophical view of

¹ *The Ages of the World* (Die Weltalter). i. *System of Pure Realism*, 1850; ii. *The Realm of Idealism: A Contribution to the Philosophy of History*, 1851. Another of his numerous works which is here referred to is his last, *The Testament of a German* (Testament eines Deutschen): *A Philosophy of Nature and of Humanity*. Edited by Carl Köstlin, 1881.

nature which has hitherto prevailed. The religious view of nature was the first, because what from the first determined man's modes of thought and feeling and his whole view of the world was not objective thinking about what lay before him, but the way in which things were related to his own objects. Contemplating things only as they bore on his own will and striving, he did not dream that their order was based on an inner natural necessity, but only saw in the order of things before him the rule of a will outside him, in which he recognised a power to further or oppose his own highest end, and a corresponding law to determine his actions. Planck accordingly defines religion as the life determined by the consciousness of the practical world-law, or the consciousness of the relation in which the given order of things regarded as a ruling will stands to his own human ends. This view, which apprehends things according to their practical bearings, knows nothing of the natural and inwardly necessary conditions and laws of all being; and here, Planck holds, we come upon the root of the one-sidedness and untruth of the purely religious mode of view, which is a certain selfish idealism, inasmuch as it makes man's own object the centre of the world. It requires, therefore, to be supplemented and corrected by the opposite, the purely scientific view of the world, or by reflective knowledge of the original and inwardly necessary conditions of all being. As the mere will taken by itself is selfishly blind, and only receives by means of thought a guiding eye and the law of its action, so in the course of its historical development humanity has to be trained by means of the independent work of thought out of a one-sided practical attitude which is blind to the real—this is the attitude of the purely religious view of the world—to a free and open sense of the original law and order of all being, which are based on the very nature of reality, and at the same time to a universal and rational arrangement of its own social life. For the former object Planck gives the necessary directions in his realistic philosophy of nature, for the latter in his idealistic philosophy of history and right. These we cannot describe in detail; we can only specify and characterise the leading ideas of them.

Planck is unwilling to prefix to the development of the world

any free spiritual principle, whether it be called religious or philosophical; but as little will he presuppose matter in the ordinary external atomistic sense; the former could not account for real existence, nor the latter for spiritual. He proposes to conceive the first ground of things as an indifference of the ideal and the real: more precisely as "the selfless unfree pure unity of all the parts with the whole," as represented in the eternal ground-forms of nature, in gravitation which is centripetal, and in the radiation of light and heat to the whole periphery. But in the natural law of the selfless unfree unity there lies already the germ of the development which goes beyond the mere nature-form—a development which attains in the independent free unity of spiritual and moral existence the end it has pursued from the beginning as the anti-type of the beginning. But the beginning itself cannot be thought as spiritual; this, according to Planck, follows from the consistent working out of the thought of "reality," which as such must be the counterpart of mere thought-unity; it must therefore be the constant pure difference of contiguity and succession of space (extension) and time, the being outside each other and the being together. There follows a natural history, a construction of the development of the world, by means of the dialectic of these hollow categories; but there is nothing convincing in this construction any more than in the preparatory deduction of it from the notion of reality. Planck's philosophy of history, however, is of greater interest.

Unlike Schelling, he conceives the first state of mankind to have been a state of peaceful innocence, in undivided unity with nature, and in a placid, though unfree and undeveloped, order of culture; the religious consciousness as a feeling of dependence, troubled by no divisions, on the one will of the whole of nature. As the original peaceful order was split up into many selfish individual wills, the original religious feeling of nature passed into a belief in supernatural magical powers of will behind and above visible nature. The deepest kernel of all the historical religions consists in the elevation they bring about above the unfreedom and constraint of this natural finite consciousness of conflicting ends by the redeeming revelation

of the one essential moral end. Especially among the people of Israel did a vivid sense of the constraint and vanity of the selfish ends give rise to the spiritual emancipating truth of the one moral end, or of ethical monotheism. The historical character of this religion as a revelation consisted in this, that the higher spiritual truth broke forth out of the opposition of the immediate natural consciousness of ends, and drew the latter in spite of its struggle and reluctance to itself, in such a way that that which really sprang from the spirit's own law of being naturally appeared as a "Beyond" over against the one-sided limitation of the natural consciousness. And so again at the beginning of Christianity it was the conflict of the old national consciousness, its painful division between a divine moral and a human national end, from which arose as the last atoning consequence a pure undivided devotion to the divine end, and therewith the assurance that the kingdom of heaven had come. This higher consciousness passed of necessity into the certain belief in a new revelation or atoning act of God. But the substantial fact was the new relation of man to God which had thus come about. As from the beginning of the history of religion, so at this its highest point, the eternal law of freedom which lies in the nature of man's spirit proved to be the redeeming power which lifts the recalcitrant finite will above itself. This was the real solution of the ancient contradiction and the complete atonement with God; it was here that Jesus found power for this new relation, and this gives the revelation of redemption its inner power as a fact. "It is not the person of a sinless and perfect Redeemer from which even to the mind of Jesus the new atoning power proceeds, but the gospel itself which he preached. Here lies the superiority of this original consciousness of revelation; it still stands firm in its historical and inwardly necessary origin, and hence it is true to the genuinely human position of Jesus, and attaches the decisive weight not to his person but to the universal revelation of which it was the bearer. It has not yet suffered change, as with Paul, at the hands of a later dogmatic consciousness." But though the new moral consciousness of Jesus and his supreme act of moral sacrifice made him the creator

of a new spiritual life, yet this life was at first entangled in a one-sided idealistic innerness and otherworldliness, and estranged itself from the real world and its natural moral duties, so that the human culture which confronted this one-sided religious idealism assumed the form of a one-sided, worldly, selfish and national realism. Hence the subsequent development requires to aim at a reconciliation and interpenetration of the two sides, the religious moral centre and the periphery of secular culture. The kingdom of the second Adam, the sharp Christian antithesis to the natural aim and striving of antiquity, has to pass over into that of the third Adam, in which consciousness will for the first time recognise and carry through its union with nature and her tasks, as a purely moral reconciliation no longer idealistically removed from the control of natural conditions. Protestantism certainly made a great step in the direction of this ultimate moral atonement of man with the law of his own nature and the law of the world; but Protestantism stopped short half-way, and failed to overcome the opposition of more resolute Catholicism, as Planck seeks to show in a review of the general history of the culture of modern times.

The philosophy of history is followed by the "Gospel of Humanity," which is the outcome of it—a development of the religious and moral idea of the future. Planck portrays that ideal as the overcoming on all sides of the untrue and baneful dualism between what is religious and what is moral and natural. "Christianity works out the purely moral and spiritually universal truth which is in it, only by disengaging itself from that last untrue remainder of Judaism, and passing from that nature-less otherworldliness into an atonement which is altogether true and present. It is just this last union with nature which makes it both a purely moral (no longer selfishly idealistic) transcending of nature, and a home for humanity truly consecrated and filled with the spirit." The road to this goal he declares to be full scientific objective knowledge of nature and of her conditions, and the full subordination of the individual Ego and of the whole of society under the genuine natural conditions of all life, a demand which must, he thinks, be held to embrace

renunciation of the idealistic hope of personal continuance or immortality. This hope is to be replaced by pure moral elevation above selfish sensual existence to an inner freedom which nothing can shake, and to the unselfish activity of love in the universal culture-work of society; for only the moral activity which the spirit sets for itself, not a continuance of the spirit set for it in advance, is its worthy end. Apart from this point, in which the realistic metaphysic of Planck agrees with the idealistic metaphysic of Biedermann, the religious thought of our author is most akin to that of Krause; the social ethical ideas of the two thinkers being essentially the same. This thoughtful philosophy of history, this acute and sober judgment of historical processes, and his bold and far-seeing projection of practical ideals for the future, appear to me to constitute Planck's chief claims to regard: the value of his metaphysic and natural philosophy is perhaps a matter of question.

J. Frohschammer¹ starts, like Planck, from a Schellingian position; like him he declines the theological problem, and restricts philosophical investigation at least to pure immanence; but he differs from him, and finds his place under real-idealistic speculation, by assuming in addition to the real world-principle, which he designates as original being and original force (why not more simply?), an ideal principle of form which he terms the "world-phantasy," a plastic, teleological, law- and end-determining principle of formation, which originally interpenetrated the "formable" (material), till a separation gradually took place between them and introduced the world-process, which in the higher psychical organism obtained possession of a spiritual material, in which the power of spirit proves itself immediately in spontaneous spiritual activity. Forces operating merely mechanically would not be sufficient to explain the whole world-process, but a direct divine act of creation, such as is said to have called all things into existence *ictu* and *actu* is more than is required, and does

¹ *Phantasy as the Ground-principle of the World-process* (Die Phantasie als Grundprinzip des Weltprozesses, 1877). *The Genesis of Mankind, and its Mental Development in Religion, Morality, and Language* (Ueber die Genesis der Menschheit und deren geistige Entwicklung in Religion, Sittlichkeit und Sprache, 1883).

not agree with the fact of the world-process. According to Frohschammer that process is best explained as the gradual issuing of the individualising formations out of an original germ-like synthesis (indifference) of the ideal creative potency and its material substratum. Whether this creative potency or world-phantasy which is immanent in the genetic process of the world, and specially the earth, is itself eternal and without beginning, or rather posited from the first beginning by a higher divine power, Frohschammer regards as a purely metaphysical question which lies outside the sphere of his investigation of the philosophy of nature and history; yet in discussing the ideal God-consciousness of the future he throws out hints which may serve to fill up the omission.

After the process of nature has reached in the formation of man the aim towards which it has been striving from the first—for it is guided by a teleological tendency to manifest the reason immanent in it by realising a rational consciousness—it is the subjective phantasy, the individualised and energised manifestation of the objective world-principle which guides the primitive historical process of the formation of language, religion and morals, and prepares the way for free historical action. The origin of religion Frohschammer finds in the belief in the continued life of the souls of the departed and in the worship paid to them, so that it might be said that spiritual life sprang chiefly out of death. At the next stage the one-sided working of a subjective phantasy as yet uneducated gave rise to the belief in the supernatural, capricious operation of ghosts or magic powers, conceived as residing and acting locally in certain outward objects—this is called fetichism; while the polytheistic belief in the general great nature-powers or the celestial deities arose later at a more advanced stage of development, out of the ideal symbolising of the phenomena of nature by æsthetic fancy. (My reasons for not admitting the correctness of this view will appear in the next volume.) In an interesting review of the historical development of religion there is of course abundant opportunity for showing phantasy to be the essential factor in the formation of the religious consciousness at all its stages; the relative rationality of its products being secured by the connection

of subjective phantasy with objective, or with the rational-teleological world-principle. The task of the present day, Frohschammer, like Planck, declares to consist in a new development of the religious consciousness by its purification from the relics of earlier stages of culture which have been left behind, and a return to the simple spiritual kernel of the religion of Jesus. "The dogmas set up in the light of a stage of culture now transcended, and the acts of worship based on a belief in magical and miraculous beings, can find no acceptance in the new religion; the Christianity of Christ, on the contrary, contains the essential elements of the religion of the future; for even though the idea of God on which it is based cannot satisfy us, regarded theoretically and in the light of the great world-process, yet practically it is perfectly suitable and sufficient for religious sentiment and for moral conduct; in the religion of the future, as in the religion of Christ, the love of God and of our neighbour is the important thing on which all else depends." This admirable proposition marks an essential difference between Frohschammer's "religion of the future" and that of Hartmann; but he would do better to avoid altogether an expression so liable to be misunderstood, and simply to speak of a higher and purer stage of the development of Christianity—a "Johannine age," so to speak.—(*Schelling*, p. 30.)

On the subject of importing greater clearness into the consciousness of God, Frohschammer makes interesting observations, the sobriety of which contrasts very favourably with the trivialities usually heard on this head from left as well as right. On the one side, he does not dissemble the difficulties of the popular anthropomorphic theism—difficulties which do not lie merely in the metaphysical notion of the absolute, but even in the simplest survey of the facts of the world-process, of nature, of history, of every-day experience. (Compare Goethe's weighty words, vol. i. p. 240.) With no less correctness, however, does he point out, on the other side, how human nature is so formed that the divine must ever be felt and represented after the image and likeness of man, because it is only in a form like that of man that the divine can be brought home to men's minds and come to influence them practically.

Hence this vesture given to the absolute by anthropomorphising phantasy, as it is unavoidable, so is also not without justification, provided only that it does not claim to be the adequate expression of Deity, and that in determining what it means we be guided by the ideas, which can never lose their validity, of the true, the good, and the beautiful. In this case the subjective investiture of the divine may even claim objective truth, since it rests, in the first place, on the ideal organisation of our mind, and that organisation is based ultimately in the primal ground of all being and perfection, of all laws and ideas. "The fact that the realisation of ideas appears to be the highest end and the deepest impulse in this world may indicate that a source of ideas, a primal idea, is the basis of all things." A small step further in the synthesis of his ideal with the real principle of the world would lead Frohschammer to a speculative theism of one of those forms which still await discussion.

On the same lines as the later Schellingian speculation, and following also Jakob Böhme, Oetinger, Baader, and other theosophists, is the *Philosophy of Christianity* of Chr. H. Weisse. This work takes up the ground of religious experience, and proposes to understand religion, and especially Christianity, speculatively from that point of view. The method employed is not that of pure dialectic, of the self-development of the notion, which, it is said, is only suitable in the science of the pure possibility of existence or in metaphysic, but unsuitable in the philosophical spheres of real knowledge, for here we have to deal with movement in the object, a thing distinct from subjective thought-movement, with the genesis of the real contents of thought, to set forth which we must resort to the *genetic* method. We see here, as in the later stage of Schelling, a perfectly legitimate endeavour to correct the abstract idealism of *a priori* dialectic in a realistic direction; but legitimate as the attempt is, it is as little successful here as with Schelling, for, seeking to avoid the Scylla of abstract idealism, Weisse falls into the Charybdis of phantastical myth-spinning. Like the later Schelling, he also constructs the being of the Deity as a process of becoming, in which

from the potency of the pure idea God rose to actuality as a three-fold personality ; and not only so, but this is to be conceived as a true process of becoming in time, which preceded the beginning of the world, as God had to arrange matters with himself inwardly before he could think of any outward activity ! The creation is accordingly described as a series of successive acts, beginning in time, the first of which was the formation of matter by the lending of the divine power of will to the forms of the divine imagination, as Weisse teaches with Böhme and Baader. In this matter, as the externalised will of God, which has come to be in conflict with his personal will, there lies a certain spontaneity of creaturely existence, which is opposed to God's blessed inwardness, and thus Weisse finds in matter the necessary and natural ground of disorders and of evil which God cannot at once do away with by an exercise of will, but can only transform gradually into order and good feeling by the progressive creative activity of his loving will. The process of creation which forms the ground of the cosmogony in time is therefore followed by the process of the incarnation of God, its continuation at a higher power, and this latter process comes into real manifestation in the *history of religion*.

On this latter subject Weisse follows in the main Schelling's philosophy of mythology and revelation, and throws out many interesting thoughts. The beginning of religion he conceives, like Schelling, as a sense of Deity thoroughly spiritual and instinct with moral power, though neither theoretically nor practically determined, but fluctuating between unity and multiplicity, between spirituality and symbolical sensuous form. This was capable of developing either into monotheism or polytheism, and did so develop itself, in the former way in Israel, in the latter in the other national religions. The process of the development of mythology has always been intimately connected with real life, especially with the world-historical formation of the peoples, and so the elaboration of mythology always went hand in hand, Weisse believes, with the moral formation of the specific content of the people's religion ; its progress consists in the work done by plastic fancy on the sensuous

images it had to deal with, and which it at first simply appropriated, but afterwards recast more and more fully into the free form of personality, independent of natural phenomenon, the physical meaning of the myths giving way to their moral meaning, which, though not quite wanting even at the first, yet only gradually came to predominate over the other. Here we may see the divine power of redemption and sanctification which resides even in the heathen religions, and which, according to Weisse, is by no means the exclusive property of the faiths called in the narrowest sense revealed religions. It is true that this power belongs in a special degree to the Mosaic legislation, and even more to the prophecy of Israel, in which the mythological imagination retires behind the energy of the moral will which made the people and formed its history. But the process of the incarnation of God, prepared by the pre-Christian history of religion, is only completed in the realisation of "Son-humanity" in the person of Jesus, in which religious experience rose to the full power of an inner revelation, which raises to the height of its consummation the historical revelation of God in the human race, for the first time embracing the full truth of the notion of God in the immediateness of self-consciousness, and showing forth the likeness of Deity purely and completely in a personal existence.

Nearly allied to the speculation of Weisse is the speculative theology of *Richard Rothe*, as found in his *Theological Ethics*. What Weisse does in fact, without confessing that he does it in principle, Rothe adopts as a principle, viz.—pure *a priori* construction from the mere notion. "Thought (*i.e.* speculative) closes its eye, as long as it is speculating, to the outward world, and only gazes into itself; it simply follows the dialectical necessity with which every notion of its own inner fruitfulness produces out of itself new notions." Only afterwards, when speculation has completed its construction, is reflection on reality to be added as a proof whether or not the result of speculation agrees with the actual state of facts in the world; and if it do not, the error is to be sought for in the working

out of the notion. Thus Rothe shares the method of the Hegelian dialectic, the incapacity of which to grasp complete reality from the empty form of thought alone may be regarded as generally admitted since the criticism of the method by Schelling. Judged by the results of his speculation, Rothe belongs less to the school of Hegel than to that of Schelling, but this is due to the very peculiar distinction he draws between philosophical and theological speculation, saying that the latter must be quite differently arranged from the former both in contents and direction. Philosophical speculation, it is said, must start from the pure consciousness of the Ego, the formal act of self-thinking, in which there is abstraction from all contents; theological speculation, on the contrary, sets out from the consciousness of God, which is co-ordinate with the consciousness of the Ego in equally immediate certainty, and is thus fitted to form the starting-point of a speculation which proceeds on parallel lines with the philosophical. Dualism is thus accepted even in the formal principle of the speculation, and there is no wonder if it dominates throughout the contents of the system. But what should hinder us from tracing theological speculation a little further back, and finding the consciousness of God to have its basis and origin in consciousness? Instead of this, Rothe begins with an arbitrary *petitio principii*, and thus opens a door for the entry, whenever it chooses, during the course of his speculation, of a rather fanciful than strictly logical thought, so that what we get from him is rather a theosophy than a philosophy of religion.

He starts from the notion of the absolute as the simply by-itself-determined—the *causa sui*. In this notion Rothe finds, as do Schelling and Weisse, the distinction of possibility and actuality; God is therefore primarily pure potency, an indifferent being without determination. From this hidden ground there arises in timeless development the actuality of God in a double form, as personality and as nature. But with the divine Ego there is immediately posited his non-ego; as an ideal, merely thought, it arises unwilled, but as a real posited being it arises by free self-determination, which excludes physical necessity and only includes the moral

necessity of love. This non-ego, opposed by God to his Ego, and so realised, is said to be matter; but here Rothe does nothing to help us out of the difficulty of conceiving how a pure nothing could be changed by a mere act of will into so solid a reality as matter afterwards proves to be in this system. As a selfset limit of his absoluteness, God cannot merely permit it to exist; he must put forth his activity to remove it. But the existence of the non-ego of God is in a certain sense a necessity, and the removal of it cannot consist simply in its negation; it must consist in God's introducing into his non-ego—into matter—his divine Ego, spirit, and thus elevating the former to his second Ego, the creaturely spirit. And this dealing with undivine matter by the forming it to be the organ of the divine (or God-like) spirit, this spiritualising of unspiritual being, is the continuous process of creation; it may be regarded as a continuous "world-becoming"—or, more correctly, considering its true end, as an "incarnation of God within material existence;" but it may also be regarded, since matter is the substratum all the while of all the forms which are produced, as a "process of the development of the creature out of itself," in which each successive creature is led up to by all that preceded it, but is caused in its principle by the creative power of God working in the whole process. In so far, therefore, as the divine creative activity is bound at each age to the preceding creatures as its means, and in the last instance to matter as its substratum, it is not purely absolute. This is the reason of the incompleteness of each stage of the world, and of the perpetual imperfection of every state of the world. All that is defective in the world of creation, all that is felt as evil, and the intensification of evil spiritually in wickedness, as the contrary of the divine spirit, springs in the last instance from matter not yet disposed of and never quite disposed of—matter, the primitive creature which is nothing in itself, *without* which God cannot begin to work, *with* which he cannot get his work completed. At every stage of creation there remains, even when an epoch of the world has reached its consummation, a kind of slag, of matter not disposed of, a residuum of the preceding process of spiritualisation; and this demands a new

epoch of creation, and not only provides material for it, but also forms the means of continuity with the preceding epochs. Hence the lifeless rest of the eschatology of the Church resolves itself, with Rothe, just as with his old mental kinsman Origen, into an endless series of new world-creations, an eternal process of stages of development succeeding each other in time.

Intimately connected with this fundamental cosmological idea is Rothe's view of the moral destiny of mankind. That which is for God the object of his successive working, the getting rid of matter as opposed to spirit, the spiritualisation of material being, forms also the moral task for the activity of the created personalities, namely, the appropriation of material nature to the human personality by the determination of the former brought about by the self-determination of the latter. The formal principle of this process is the elevation of the personality out of its natural unfreedom or material determination to full freedom in itself, or the *autexusia* which is essential to the moral or personal character of all action. The material principle is the appropriation of nature to the personality as its useful organism in the way of multifarious moral work done to the world; the created spirit, once master of itself, seeks to be master of the whole world as well. In this subjection of nature by and for spirit consists the moral process in which the divine process of creation is continued at a higher power and in a form given it by infinite persons. And just because human moral action is in itself the continuation of the divine creative action, because the divine world-purpose is identical with man's moral end, therefore, according to Rothe, the moral is essentially and normally one with the religious, and *vice versa*. If morality be in point of form an acting out of the essence of the personality, and in point of matter a treatment of nature for the ends of the personality, then it is at the same time an acting from communion with God, because arising out of the determining influence of the First personality on the becoming human personality, and also an acting for the personal purpose of God, namely, for his indwelling as a personality in cosmic existence. In short, self-consciousness and self-activity come to be,

on their moral side, the consciousness of God and the activity of God. Hence it follows, according to Rothe, that the reality of religion lies only in morality, that the measure of the one is the measure of the other also, and that in normal cases the two, morality and piety, coincide. A piety that is alone, devoid of morality, is in his eyes a *contradictio in adjecto*, an unreal ghostly piety, an empty abstract form of piety without any real contents. Especially does Christian piety coincide entirely *in concreto* with pure and complete morality, and hence the Christian religious community, the Church, is, when completed, simply one with the completed moral community, the State. That destiny of the Church and of worship to be gradually absorbed in the State and in culture, is practically involved in the view that piety has no concrete contents but in morality. In this absorption into one another of the two spheres of morals and religion, which after all are essentially diverse, we may see the working of Hegel's dialectical method; as in the dualism of God and matter there is an element of ancient Gnosticism.

Nearly akin to Rothe's speculation, but without its extravagance, is the philosophy of religion of *Carl Schwarz*.¹ In his doctrine of God he follows the new Schellingian school, the speculation of which, however, he presents in a more sober and moderate style than is usual on this side. His notion of religion seeks to combine that of Schleiermacher and that of Hegel; with the former he dwells on the mystic immediateness and central inwardness of the religious function; but he follows the latter in treating that immediateness not as a lifeless and motionless abstract indifference which excludes any attempt to account for it, but as a living and fruitful unity, which embraces in itself from the first the opposites of the other functions, and hence not only necessarily produces them out of itself, but also receives them into itself again in a higher unity, or mediated immediateness, a rich inwardness filled with the manifold contents of moral life. Schwarz then describes in a most spirited and suggestive manner the movement of immediate religiosity on its two sides—

¹ "The Nature of Religion" (*Das Wesen der Religion*, 1847).

the idea and dogma on the one side, and the practice of cultus on the other. He shows how these untransparent middle forms of knowledge and action, dogmatic reflection and the religious practice built upon it, form the transition stages to the pure knowledge of science and the pure conduct of concrete morality—how, as means for setting forth what is written, they cannot be ends in themselves; so that where they claim to be such ends the organic process of religious-moral life is arrested, and religion dies away if its living spirit do not fracture the lifeless forms with a reformation. This conflict between a religion which has stiffened into dogmatic and ecclesiastical positivism, and the living spirit of religious mysticism and autonomous morality, Schwarz sets forth in the most brilliant style.

Like Rothe and Schwarz, *Moritz Carrière*¹ dwells chiefly on the unfolding of the religious element in the moral world-order and the development of history. He defines religion as trustful resignation of the mind to the divine, the supersensuous, the eternal. Mere theoretical belief in God becomes religion when the feeling of self apprehends itself in God and God in itself. This God-inwardness constitutes the essence of it; but still more important is the ethical factor that man makes his will one with the divine will, overcomes selfishness in love, and so removes the barriers between the finite and the infinite. The notion of the divine is only the third, which though not indifferent, and though growing in depth and clearness with the advance of culture, yet is not the essential matter. The source of religion is man's reasonable nature; external need, though everywhere at work, supplied no more than an impulse to develop the idea of the divine given in reason. A view of the world's history, too, shows not only the universality of religion, but also that the kernel of religion is everywhere faith in the moral order. Thus, wherever it has burst forth in power and clearness in the heart of a religious genius it has had an emancipating and soothing influence on

¹ "The Moral Order of the World" (*Die sittliche Weltordnung*, 1877). "Art in Connection with the Development of Culture and the Ideals of Humanity" (*Die Kunst im Zusammenhang der Culturentwicklung und die Ideale der Menschheit*, 3rd edition, 1780).

mankind, often as its sweet kernel has been closed in the hard shells of superstition and clericalism. Carrière's notion of God is speculative theism: God the infinite unity apprehending itself, determining itself in difference, and overcoming the difference in itself—the self-realising harmony in which “true monism” consists as opposed to the monism of pantheism and of materialism. True monism does not exclude but includes pluralism; it represents the world as a system of powers which in their orderly working on each other produce the order of the whole. Nature and its mechanism thus prove to be the basis of an ideal world furnishing to spiritual beings the means and conditions of their self-realisation. “The one thing is force; matter is its externalisation, consciousness its internalisation, both manifestations of its being, which exists in the one in its essence, in the other in its independence. But the fact of the interworking of the many forces on each other would be inexplicable, were they not held together in the infinite unity which embraces them as its own inner determinations. Thus, after starting from Hegel, Carrière ends with Lotze, who is under the influence of Herbart, in the thought of a concrete monotheism or spirit which has the world not outside, but in itself, and is conscious of all and of itself. “God is the unity in Allness, the Ego of the universe: as our consciousness only arises by its particular ideas, so the divine self-consciousness arises by God's unfolding the world out of himself, and apprehending and comprehending himself as the formative power in it and above it.”

Towards this view, in which the absolutism of Krause, Hegel, and Schelling takes up into itself the pluralism of Leibniz and Herbart, philosophical (speculative) theories are converging from all sides. This we shall learn from the three thinkers with whom we conclude, who, though setting out from different positions, yet all arrive at a view of the world essentially similar to that just set forth,—namely Fichte, jun., Fechner, and Lotze.

Johann Hermann Fichte, in his “Speculative Theology” sets out from reality, and concludes from it to its transcendent ground. First he comes to an eternal universe as the true spaceless and timeless

substantiality which underlies the phenomenal world and forms the primary reality of everything existing in space and time. This "eternal universe" consists of the "primary positions or monads," which are inner determinations of the self-conscious will of God. For they form a system of correlated means and ends, therefore of thoughts, ideas, of a reason which embraces them in unity, or, to speak more concretely, of a self-conscious subject; for only in such a subject can the ultimate and perfect unity reside to which the uniform correlation of the world-reality divided in space and time points back. But the "primary positions" cannot be mere ideas, since there lie in them also reality and the power of self-realisation to the world of existence; there must therefore be posited besides the divine reason or the contemplative thought of God, also his will as the primary reality in the primary positions. They are therefore the sunderings, firstly inward, of the one conscious will of God, and thus they form "nature in God" over against the self-consciously uniting Ego. These inner-divine primary positions form the material of the creation of the world. The creation Fichte conceives as such an act of God's personal freedom as did not touch his essence, so that on the one hand the idea of God remains quite the same if all reference to the world be omitted, and on the other we must think that the world could as well not have existed, a view which almost unavoidably runs into deistic abstraction. Further, creation consists, according to Fichte, in God's dismissing to independence the primary positions which were joined together in one in him, dismissing them from this inner-divine bond, so that they enter into differences of space and time with reference to each other, and so become the self-realising powers of the finite. After becoming independent, they work first as extra-divine or undivine blind separate wills or powers; but even at this stage the harmonising power of their origin is still at work in them: the unity of the primary positions in the eternal world works through this separateness, and so produces even in unconscious nature that immanent purpose which is the visible copy of the archetypal harmony of the divine ideal world. But the making the primary

positions independent as finite powers is only the foundation of the world: the creation accomplishes itself after this beginning as a continuous process, in which God introduces the purpose of the world—the unity of the archetypal world—increasingly into those world-beings which have got into contradiction and hostility to each other. And thus creation passes over into preservation and providence, and this again is nothing but the increase of creation or the always completer harmonising of the contradiction of the finite.

*Gustav Theodor Fechner*¹ appears before us in the character of a speculative student of nature. He starts from the position of the study of nature, and proceeds by analogy from what is immediately given to what is more distant and most distant—from the smallest circle to the greatest. His induction from the micro- to the macro-organism leads him to regard the earth and the other spheres as animated beings of a highly spiritual kind, demigods, and intermediate beings between God and creatures like ourselves; and here he sees the truth of the Biblical angelology. As the spirits of men, with all the life in the earth, are comprised as moments in one conscious earth-spirit, so the earth-spirit is included with all the other sidereal spirits in one conscious world-spirit, or in God. The relation of God to the world Fechner conceives after the analogy of that of our one mind to the totality of the higher and lower functions and states which it contains, and the relation of nature to God as like that of our body to our conscious Ego. So little is nature herself God that it is separated from God, or without God; it is “the external side, or the manifestation, the expression, of God.” God is above nature in the same way as our conscious Ego is above our body; “only this *above* must not be changed for *outside*.” The creative activity of God consists in his setting differences in himself, which may be found—at least the general foundation of them—in the elementary phenomena of motion (æther-movements), from which the rational order of the world is then developed. This is the continuous creation, which is

¹ “*Zendavesta, or On the Things of Heaven and of the other World*” (*Zendavesta oder über die Dinge des Himmels und des Jenseits*, 1885.) “The Three Motives and Grounds of Faith” (*Die drei Motive und Gründe des Glaubens*, 1863).

thus a constant self-development of God, in which he brings to appearance his inner being, himself; the world is the objective self-appearance of God. The analogy with the finite spirit serves also to explain the existence of evil in the world: as many things are brought about in us and by our lower life, which yet are not willed by our reasonable will, so the evil of the world (moral wickedness included), like all that exists, is in God and through him, but not by his (higher) will. Rather it is the ground against which the power and activity of his higher will sets itself to strive, so as to remove it and heal it, to reconcile it, and turn it to good. To this will to resolve what is disharmonious to harmony in himself there corresponds, because he is always sure of his end, the feeling of the harmony of the whole, or the blessedness of God. Yet this higher happiness of God does not exclude a lower unhappiness which he feels in and with us men and other sensitive beings. Thus the suffering which we are accustomed to regard as the privilege of the finite is a really felt element even of the divine life, that life differing in this respect from ours "only in so far as he feels beforehand the turning, the solution, the reaction into happiness." The unhappiness is in him, but only as a moment which is overcome, which never interferes with God's unity with himself as a whole, but is taken up and removed in that absolute harmony.

Among the brightest contributions ever made to the literature of Apologetics, we must undoubtedly reckon Fechner's work on "The Three Motives and Grounds of Faith" (1863). Faith in the higher world of God and of spirits rests on three motives, none of which can be reduced to either of the others, while none of them is operative for itself alone. It is from the manifold co-operation and counter-operation of the three that the whole body of his beliefs has grown up for man, and is constantly preserved and developed. The first is the historical motive of communication through others—tradition, which forms, as for every kind of mental life, so for religion also the ground and starting-point for all personal advance. But what is communicated can only have firm continuance so long as it is supported by substantial inner reasons. These are of two kinds in

religion—the practical need, and the theoretical grounds of reason. Fechner shows very finely how, in spite of all its imperfections, from which many evils flow in individual cases, yet on the whole religious belief is a blessing both for individuals and for society which nothing could replace; that it is, in fact, absolutely necessary for both, as both the individual and society find in it the most universal and most binding support, and their highest guiding end. But if faith answers to an indefeasible requirement of human nature, that amounts to a guarantee of the truth of it. “We would not *need* religious faith if its objects *were* not. For if man has made belief in those objects because he needs it, he did not create the circumstance that he needs belief in them for his continuance and welfare, and is therefore obliged by that necessity to make it. The production of this faith by man must therefore be based on the same real nature of things which produced man with his needs. It would be to impute an absurdity to the nature of things, and it would be contrary to experience, so far as we can speak of experience in such a matter, to say that nature had constituted man in such a way that he could only prosper while cherishing a belief in a thing that is not.” At the same time, the practical point of view taken alone would admit of as many different possibilities of belief as the theoretical alone, or the historical alone; full certainty can only be attained when all the three principles coincide. But the theoretical principle of faith must not be sought for in empty notions, as is done by the idealists, nor in bare experience, as by the empiricists and materialists; it must be sought in rational conclusions from the whole of experience to its necessary presuppositions—that is, by simply continuing the same procedure of thought on which all our knowledge is based, even where its sphere is limited. Were it the case that the world of our experience was completely separated from God, and that God was not comparable with anything in the world, as many conceive of the matter, then no conclusion would be possible from it to him, from the summing up of our little mental world in our Ego to the summing up of the whole world of mind in a divine Ego, from the rule of our mind over a small portion of the world of matter to the rule of a

divine mind over the whole world of matter. But for such a separation between God and his creatures there can as little be alleged any practical motive as any theoretical ground. On the contrary, if we have any right, or are guided by any true analogy in concluding from our own soul, which alone is known to us from immediate experience, to the other souls and minds of our phenomenal world, we have the same right, the same analogy, for assuming the one sole Ego possessing thought and will, which controls all particulars in the great world of mind, which is the ground of the unity, order, and regular development of the joint life of minds, which therefore must live and move and have their being in God, just as our thoughts and feelings are in our Ego. On this foundation rests also the belief in our own imperishableness, inasmuch as the minds remain preserved in God, just as thoughts are stored up in our power of memory, inseparable from the life of our Ego. Against psychological arguments on this point, Fechner reminds us of our "entire want of knowledge of the fundamental relation of body and soul," and says that when light is thrown upon them, the future will enter upon an immense treasure of religious truths, which are at present hid from us.

As for the question of the origin of the belief in God, Fechner remarks, with great delicacy, that while it is true that it rests on divine revelation, it is not on outward but on inward revelation that it rests, or, if on outward, yet only in so far as it was brought about by the divine language of signs in nature, just as the first revelation of parents to their children is made by the language of gesture earlier than by speech. Nature was so constituted from the first as to indicate to man the existence of a power above his own, and before he came to conceive of his own mind as apart from his body; as at first he drew no distinction between the two, there was nothing to suggest the separation of mind from nature, or to think the sun which walks the sky less living than himself who walked the earth—he was only led to think it mightier, more exalted, more brilliant, than himself. He could not regard the thunder, the storm-wind, the flood, as not living, but only as a mightier life than his own—the abstraction which distinguishes between nature-power and

spiritual power was as yet quite impossible to him. Did he once feel himself under the influence of higher powers, he must have been led of necessity to place himself in an attitude of appeal towards these powers, in which he was led by the analogy of his attitude towards men standing above him. Thus the theoretical and the practical motive co-operated even for the genesis of religion; and so far as nature, like man, lives in God, and God works in both, the impression received from nature and the practical need were only two sides of the original working of God upon the beings made in him—*i.e.* therefore, the origin of belief in God was the result of a divine primitive revelation coming through nature and the human soul. This theory of the origin of religion, both simple and profound as it is, may perhaps not be far from the truth.

Theodor Fechner's nearest intellectual kinsman is *Hermann Lotze*,¹ who rivals him in delicate observation of reality and in broad speculative combination, and has the advantage of him in cautious and sober critical reflection. As Fechner traces his view of the world to the Schelling-Hegel source, but confesses also to having on his hearth a coal from the ashes of Herbart, so Lotze too started from the Schellingianism of Weisse, but was led by the study of the natural sciences to see the necessity of supplementing idealistic monism with a pluralistic realism, which, however, resembles rather the monadology of Leibniz than Herbart's doctrine of reals. Lotze protests vehemently against being called a Herbartian, and declares he has an unconquerable aversion to that philosophy. And in fact his philosophy is to be distinguished from that of Herbart in cardinal points. A characteristic of the latter is a strict separation between metaphysic and ethic, but with Lotze they are intimately

¹ His "Philosophy of Religion" was published after his death, from notes of his lectures (Leipzig, Hirzel, 1882). Of his other writings we have to take count of his "Microsmus: Ideas on Natural History, and the History of Mankind; being an attempt at a Science of Anthropology." (*Mikrokosmos: Ideen zur Naturgeschichte und Geschichte der Menschheit. Versuch einer Anthropologie.* 1st Edition, 1856-64; 3rd Edition, 1876-80). Compare Pfeleiderer: *Lotze's Philosophische Weltanschauung nach ihren Grundzügen*, 1882; O. Kaspari, *Hermann Lotze in seiner Stellung zu der durch Kant begründeten neuesten Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1883.

connected, even so as to remind us of F. G. Fichte; metaphysic indeed is based on ethic, and the idea of the good is said to be the ultimate ground of the metaphysically and logically true. And while the Herbartian metaphysic is a pure pluralism, which affords no room for the idea of God, and has to resort to the practical postulate to nourish its scanty and starving deism, Lotze's metaphysic, while starting from pluralism, transforms it at the close into absolute monism, and that in so decided a fashion that the idea of God here forms the indispensable conclusion of the whole metaphysical explanation of the world. This is connected finally with a fundamental difference in the view taken of simple beings. Of these Herbart denies all change, all activity and passivity; but according to Lotze it belongs to their essence to be the supports, the points of departure, and the points of aim, of all activity and passivity, so that he designates them, with Leibniz, as the soul-like beings which develop themselves, maintaining the identity of their being throughout the changes of their states; only that this development is not with Lotze, as with Leibniz, a mere inner sequence of the states of each separate monad without any real dependence on the rest, but a real acting upon some and being acted upon by others of them. Thus the real nature of the interaction of the soul-like monads is the point of difference between the monadology of Lotze and that of Leibniz and its still greater difference from that of Herbart.

This real interaction of the monads is the basis on which Lotze builds his metaphysical proof of the existence of God. Instead of precipitately identifying the unconditioned with the perfect before establishing the unity of the former, as is done in the cosmological argument—instead of taking for granted as our starting-point a purpose in the world which may be called in doubt, as in the teleological argument, Lotze tells us that the mere fact that there is a course of the world before us in which events are chained together according to certain laws, ought to lead us to believe in the necessary unity of the substance underlying the world. An interaction according to universal laws would be inexplicable if we started from

an original multiplicity of real beings independent of each other, because we could never understand how a change in one should necessarily, according to law, bring about a corresponding change in another, unless the two were connected by some common will. But that which connects them cannot be a universal law, since law exists between, above, and outside things; it must be one whole real being embracing all particular beings in itself, which is brought by every change in one of its parts, which it feels immediately as its own inner condition, to produce a second compensating event in another part, so that that which appears to us as the *transient* working of one thing upon another, is in fact only an *immanent* working in itself of one all-embracing being. But this notion of the absolute is a limiting notion, which requires an ultimate fact to make the world intelligible, without affording any explanation how the absolute begins, being both one and unconditioned, and at the same time many and mutually conditioned. The relation of the separate beings to the absolute cannot be explained as to its origin; it can only be taken for granted as an eternally existing relation of independence and subordination. The notion, however, which we thus attain of the absolute admits quite well of being more closely determined. The absolute world-principle can neither be conceived as matter, which is a dark and contradictory notion, and never could afford an explanation of the world of mind; nor can it be conceived as unconscious spirit, since unconscious mental states only occur in the case of a finite mental being as obstructions and limitations of conscious mental life, and the notion of mind embraces that of consciousness as an essential part of it. The desire of the soul to think of the highest as a reality in God, cannot be satisfied with any other form of existence than that of personality. Lotze does not consider this moment of the notion of God to be at all contradictory of the other element of that notion, his infinity, or the absence of limitation by anything else; for it is not as if the Ego first came to be by an antithesis to a non-ego outside it. It is because it is aware of its own reality that it places itself in antithesis to the non-ego. Thus the thought of the personality of God does not require us to

assume a real outside him and limiting him, but only the rise of a world of ideas in time to which he is related as his states. Some process, certainly, and movement of representing, in which something is experienced, belongs necessarily to the notion of a personality, and must be assumed in God as a fact, without beginning and eternal. Lotze's notion of God therefore is speculative theism, and is equally different from popular (deistic) theism and from pantheism. He uses the notion of "personality" to designate God as self-conscious spirit and true Ego, but he will by no means have him conceived as "extra-mundane personality," co-ordinated to finite spirits as one being of their order: he is the all-embracing one whole, which has all particular beings, and, if so, then also the world of finite being, in himself—not outside himself, as we have our ideas and sensations as changing states in ourselves, which we distinguish from our one persistent Ego. This is quite the same view as we found above in Fechner, and earlier in Krause, who applied to it the expression Panentheism (p. 53). Whether the notion of personality is properly applicable to it is a subordinate question of terminology, on which it is perhaps time to cease to wrangle. A much more serious ground of contention with Lotze might be found in the excessive idealism with which he denies to things any reality as distinguished from the thought of God, and makes creation amount to no more than that God calls into existence a world of minds in which his world-thought is set forth as the appearance of a material world externally surrounding it, and to be perceived by it. We are reminded indeed of Fichte the elder, when we read in Lotze that the world of things is merely a system of appearances which God causes to become visible to a world of minds as the occasion of their action and the object of their perception, letting that thought, which at first was only his own, become the thought of other minds. Even Leibniz's monadology, with its gradation of inferior and superior monads, appears comparatively realistic beside this.

Connected with Lotze's spiritualistic theory of creation is his belief in a plurality of worlds, God causing to appear to different spirit-worlds different world-orders, one of which cannot be observed

from within the sphere of another, though a transition is possible from one to another. On *miracles* Lotze is not clear. He concedes the general possibility of a change of the inner nature of things by an immediate operation of God; but as for the real occurrence of miracles, great weight must be allowed to experience, and, in accordance with its testimony, any sudden interference, such as changed the nature and mode of operation of physical elements, must be regarded as incredible. All that can be admitted is that changes occur in men's spirits by immediate divine influence, partly in the form of inspiration, which widens a man's knowledge or views—partly in the form of a vision—which thinks it sees outward facts which are not really there—partly in the form of strengthening the will, and making it capable of self-sacrifice. Extremely characteristic of Lotze's teleological idealism is his definition of the purpose of the world. This is not to be sought in the establishment of some actual state of things, some order in the course of events, some form of the connection and dialectical development of things—for it may always be asked with regard to such outward facts, for what reason one set of facts and not another ought to be in the world; it can only be sought in the realisation of the highest *values*, *i.e.* of such an experience as affords the feeling of the highest pleasure or of blessedness. We therefore find in a loving will of God the reason both of the creation of the spirit-world, in which God's own glory might turn into an enjoyment infinitely multiplied, and of the order of phenomena capable of bringing about such a state of things. Under this point of view, we must see the one creative and regulative activity of God in the inexhaustible production of forms, which appear to be arranged with a view to the end of universal pleasure, each of which, however, represents one special value, which is for God the secret of a certain definite pleasure, which is approximately felt after him by the finite spirits. Thus only is the notion of the highest principle filled with living contents, for which we may use the inadequate name of "creative phantasy," in so far as it produces forms, or of the "divine mood," in so far as the value of those productions is also the object of the divine complacency. This reminds

us of Weisse's Schellingian theosophy, as we were formerly reminded of Fichte's ethical idealism, and from the first of the monadology of Leibniz.

Thus in Lotze's philosophy the threads converge from various directions to a remarkable centre. It seeks to connect in unity the greatest antitheses—pluralism and monism, idealism and realism, mechanism and teleology. It cannot be denied that the manner in which these contraries are connected and harmonised leaves much to be desired, yet the energetic and able attempt to combine them is a distinguished service to philosophy, stating the problem she has to deal with at present and in the future, and marking out the general direction in which efforts of various kinds will have to move, if they are to co-operate fruitfully in the task, never to be more than approximately solved by man, of the discovery of truth.

CHAPTER VI.

CONCLUSION.

IN conclusion, I attempt a rapid survey of the general state of Religious Science at the present day, in the compilation of which I avail myself of communications kindly sent me by learned friends in various countries.

Though the prevailing tendencies of the day are not favourable to the speculative philosophy of religion, it is yet industriously and zealously cultivated outside Germany as well as at home, especially in the south and north of our Continent, and in the Western lands beyond the Atlantic; while in England, France, and the Netherlands more interest is devoted to the history of religion, both in the examination of separate religions and in the "comparative science of religion," in which the empirical and the philosophical study of religion go hand in hand.

In Italy, A. Vera has done much to diffuse a knowledge of the Hegelian philosophy. He began in 1876 the publication of a French translation of Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion*, with introductions and a running commentary, of which works the first two volumes have now appeared. Vera belongs to the right side of the Hegelian school, and from this standpoint wrote a criticism of Strauss's book, *The Old Faith and the New*, to which he opposed his own Christian ideal view of the world. Starting with the conviction that religion occupies a central position in the life of nations, and that its influence penetrates to every sphere of life, the political as well as the rest, he published in 1874 a refutation of the theory of Cavour, "A Free Church in a Free State." In a collection of philosophical essays, just

published at Naples (1883), he deals with a number of religious problems and with the relations of Christianity to the moral life of society.

The same subject is treated in a very able manner, and from essentially the same point of view, by Raffaele Mariano, in his studies on *Christianity, Catholicism, and Culture* (German : Leipzig, 1880). His work shows great cultivation and acuteness of judgment, and is peculiarly interesting to the German reader from its careful discussion and unbiassed estimate of the situation of literature and of politics in our land.¹ Mariano had previously written a historico-philosophical study on the idea represented by Rome in the Middle Ages and its relation to the Reformation and to modern times. His last work (1882) is a popular biography of Giordano Bruno.

While Vera and Mariano incline to the conservative side of religious speculation, their countryman Terenzio Mamiani deals with the favourite theme of *The Religion of the Future* (Milan, 1880), on the basis of a rationalistic deistic unitarianism. Gaetano Negri has proved himself in a work on *The Religious Crisis* (Milan, 1878) as well as in a number of essays and critiques (see one on Holsten's *Gospel of Paul* in *La Cultura*, 1882, No. v.) to be a well-grounded and acute student of historico-critical questions connected with primitive Christianity.

In Sweden, Christoph Jakob Boström represents a line of speculation which is most closely akin to that of Lotze.² Boström considers the only real to be the absolute self-consciousness or the personal God and the realm of personal spirits, which, however, are not outside of God or made by him, but are originally contained in him as his determinations or ideas. The sensuous world, on the contrary, has no reality ; it is merely the appearance of the spiritual world or the kingdom of God. It is a phenomenal world based, it is true, in our mental constitution, and therefore not a mere groundless show, but yet of no more than transitory import, as it will gradually dis-

¹ I may refer to my notice of this work in the *Prot. Kirchenzeitung*, No. 15.

² His views are set forth in their connection in his autobiography in the second volume of the *Swedish Biographical Lexicon*, from which Dr. Alex. Thorsoe has been good enough to send me some notes.

appear in the progressive spiritual ennobling of the human race. Of man, Boström believes, with Krause, that he is destined to pass through various forms of life, which lie in him potentially from the beginning, and the development of which is set forth at each stage in a corresponding phenomenal world. Each man, however, will certainly at last attain his divine destiny, as the evil and pain which cannot but enter into imperfect forms of life must necessarily, under God's all-wise government, disappear sooner or later for every individual. This progressive transcending of the imperfect and rise to the perfect, in which consists the salvation and atonement of finite rational beings, is God's blessed work in history, his continuous revelation. All religions rest on this universal revelation, and so Boström regards the distinction between revealed and natural religion as beside the mark, each religion being merely a particular and a relatively true form of the unfolding of the one essence of religion.

The Norwegian philosopher Monrad became known to the German public by the appearance in German of his *Critical Review of Modern Tendencies of Thought* (Bonn, 1879). At the close of this work, which is written with taste and ability, he expresses the conviction that, in spite of all the positivism that now thrusts itself forward, the true idealistic philosophy has by no means disappeared from among men; on the contrary, that speculative thought is the germ deposited in the soil of the present day, the organic mother-cell sprung from the harvest of the past, which is destined to assimilate all other materials, heterogeneous as they are, and to produce a new growth which will arise some day in its fulness and beauty. In an essay on the relation of faith and knowledge, Monrad takes up his position on the Hegelian right. Faith and knowledge, he says, are engaged in mutual and perpetual interchange with each other, which has for its goal the gradual transition of faith into knowledge, a process, however, which will never be quite concluded at any point of time. Christian faith has for its contents the complete revelation of God not only *for* man but also *in* him, as his inmost being; but its form is the external one of miraculous revelation, of

mystery. The immanence, however, of divine truth in the inner being of man indicates the removal of the mystery as such, in so far as it rests on the idea of an interval and an impassable limit. The more, therefore, the wall of division disappears—*i.e.* the more the contents of the Christian revelation are brought out fully into consciousness—the more does the form of a specific mystery disappear: and the truth is known no longer as one standing without as a stranger, but as the essential and necessary contents of consciousness; and thus faith is changed into knowledge. But the limit of finality will never be so entirely removed as that mystery should vanish absolutely. To overlook this is the enthusiasm of rationalism, as it is the error of supernaturalism to seek to fix faith for ever in its present form.

In Denmark the standpoint of a speculation which mediates between faith and knowledge, Christianity and humanitarianism, finds its representatives in the poet J. W. Heiberg, the philosopher H. Bröchner, and the theologian Martensen, who enjoys a great reputation in Germany as well as in his own country. The two first-named, especially Bröchner, incline rather to the left wing of the Hegelian school; while Martensen's speculation has a decidedly ecclesiastical and conservative character, and shows more affinity with the late Schellingian and the Baader-Böhme theosophy than with the Hegelian philosophy.

As everywhere, so also in Denmark and Scandinavia, this mediating speculation finds its opponents in two opposite camps, that of stiff orthodoxy, which repudiates all compromise with science, and that of critico-historical rationalism, which withdraws from the strife of dogmas and Churches to the primitive Christianity of the Gospels, with the belief in miracles removed from it. Zealous representatives of this position are H. N. Clausen and A. C. Larsen.

In Denmark, however, the anti-rationalistic tendency has acquired more influence in other forms: as æsthetic popular pietism (*Grundtvig*), and as ascetic individualistic mysticism (*Kierkegaard*): these forms agreeing, in spite of all their other differences, in depreciation

of knowledge generally, and particularly in passionate repudiation of its interference in the matters belonging to faith. The more remarkable is it that the anti-rational tendency of Kierkegaard (p. 209, *sqq.*) has found a scientific champion in the Copenhagen philosopher, R. Nielsen, who regards faith and knowledge as two principles of knowledge which are equally absolute, but perfectly independent of each other, and the reconciliation of which is to be sought not in bringing them to an inner agreement, but in keeping them entirely separate from each other.

We have already spoken of the wide diffusion in England of the positivism of a Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer (p. 144, *sqq.*). But speculative idealism has of late brought an increasing influence to oppose that tendency, especially since the Scottish thinker, Stirling, opened up to his countrymen the understanding of the Hegelian philosophy by his able exposition in the work *The Secret of Hegel* (1865). The Glasgow philosopher, Edward Caird, has done much to bring about a proper appreciation of Kant, whom he understands incomparably better than our "Neo-Kantians," regarding as he does not sceptical empiricism, but rationalism, as the nerve of the Kantian philosophy, and the germ of the speculation to which it gave birth. His brother, the Glasgow theologian, John Caird, has written an introduction to the *Philosophy of Religion* (1880), from the standpoint of Hegelian speculation (in the nuance of it represented by Vatke and Biedermann), in which the precious kernel of the Hegelian ideas is detached with rare art from the narrow husk of their scholastic form. Proceeding on the basis of this ideal view of the world, and giving an acute criticism of the positivist and materialistic tendencies of thought, he indicates the claims not only of religion as ideal faith, but also of the philosophy of religion as ideal knowledge.¹ A similar platform of critically free and religious ideal speculation is occupied by theologians of Independent bodies in England, A. M. Fairbairn and James Martineau, who have shown themselves

¹ I may refer to a detailed account of Caird's *Philosophy of Religion* given by me in the *Jahrb. für Prot. Theol.*, 1882, first number.

in a series of essays and addresses to be able defenders of the Christian belief in God against materialist, positivist, and anthropological assaults. The same service has been done by the Edinburgh theologian, Robert Flint, from the standpoint of a moderate ecclesiastical orthodoxy, in his two volumes on *Theism and Antitheistic Theories* (1877 and 1879).

A clever attempt to provide firm scientific foundations for religious convictions is given by Henry Drummond in his work, *Natural Law in the Spiritual World* (1885). He sets out from the assumption that whatever the differences may be between spiritual and natural life, the two spheres yet belong to one and the same world-order, which is governed by universal and inviolable laws, and that it must therefore be possible to discover in the spiritual life the action of those fundamental laws which science has established in natural life, and to trace back to these laws the essential convictions of Christendom. This demonstration he seeks to carry out in detail by pointing out parallels and analogies between natural and spiritual life, between the genesis, degeneration, growth, decay, self-preservation of the natural and of the moral and religious life; and many of the old familiar Christian doctrines are thus placed under new and interesting lights.

In spite of the High Church spirit in England, there may be discerned a widespread tendency towards a freer treatment of divine things. This is seen in the profound interest awakened by the two works of the Cambridge historian, R. Seeley, *Ecce Homo* and *Natural Religion* (1882), both written in a popular though elevated style, and seeking to recommend to the heart of their readers a Christianity freed from all dogmatic wrappings, and displayed in its simple, human, and moral beauty, and to show to the sceptically-minded generation of these days how religion is essentially one with all that is true, beautiful, and good. The attempt is certainly exposed to a great danger—that of making religion so indefinite and fluid as almost quite to disappear in humane culture.

Along with Seeley's anonymously published *Natural Religion*, we may mention *Supernatural Religion*, also an anonymous work, which

sets forth, with equal learning and clearness, the results of the modern critical inquiries regarding the Bible, and seeks by the cumulative force of all these critical objections and arguments to shake the ponderous dogmatism of the churchly-minded English, and to prepare the way for a freer mode of thought.

The same purpose is served very effectively by the public lectureships on religious subjects now instituted in various places in Great Britain. The best known of these are the lectures of the "Hibbert Trust," which are devoted to the comparative study of religion. On this foundation Max Müller delivered the opening series of lectures in 1878, on the "Origin and Development of Religion, as illustrated by the Religions of India." These were followed by the lectures of Le Page Renouf on "Egyptian Religion," of Ernest Renan on "Rome and Christianity," of Rhys Davids on "Buddhism," of A. Kuenen on "National and Universal Religions."

These lectures, which are published, and most of which have been translated into several languages, are among the most valuable results of the religious science of our day, not only giving a review, level to the ordinary comprehension, of the ripest fruits of detailed investigations in various fields, but presenting the historical material under broad and general points of view, so as to make it uncommonly fruitful for the philosophy of religion. This is specially true of the first and of the last-named series of lectures.¹

It answers, generally speaking, both to the English character and to the prevailing tendency of the time, that more weight is attached in England to the historical than to the philosophical side of religious inquiry. The English, moreover, are led by their political and commercial relations with non-Christian peoples, as well as by their zeal for missions, to a scientific treatment of foreign religions. Of the stately roll of English investigators who have made valuable contributions to the knowledge of the history of religion we may name the following:—Max Müller, whose works (in addition to the lectures above mentioned we may name his *History of Ancient*

¹ Professor Pfeleiderer himself delivered the Hibbert Lectures in 1885 on *The Influence of the Apostle Paul on the Development of Christianity*.—Tr.

Indian Literature and Religion and his *Introduction to the Science of Religion*), combine in the happiest way the learning of the Indological specialist and the breadth of vision of the philosopher: H. Wilson, Monier Williams, Dr. John Muir, founder of the Sanscrit Chair and of the lectureship on the Science of Religion in Edinburgh University; Spence Hardy, Rhys Davids—all meritorious inquirers in the field of Indian religion: then J. Edkins and R. K. Douglas, as experts in the Chinese religion; R. Bosworth Smith, J. J. Lake, J. M. Arnold, W. Muir, inquirers in the field of Islam; B. Thorpe and J. Ferguson as students of northern mythology. The comparative history of mythology and religion finally, as connected with the history of culture, has been treated by E. B. Tylor, Sir John Lubbock, G. W. Cox, A. S. Murray, C. F. Keary, F. C. Moffat, and others. The history of the Illumination in Europe has been written by W. E. H. Lecky, in the spirit of Buckle's (positivist) philosophy of history.

The Dutch have rivalled the English during the last twenty years in the successful treatment of the history of religion. Studies of this nature received a great impetus in the issue by the Haarlem publisher, A. C. Krusemann, of the great work *De vornaamste Godsdiensten*, a collection of monographs on the principal religions. The series was opened by the famous Arabic scholar R. Dozy, with a description of Islam (1863, second edition 1881); Parsism was treated by C. P. Tiele, the Greek religion by J. W. G. van Dorst, and the Scandinavian by L. S. P. Meyboom. The history of Roman Catholicism was written by A. Pierson, that of Protestantism by L. W. E. Rauwenhoff (1865-1871). The history of Buddhism is written by H. Kern, a thorough adept in Indian antiquity, who treats his subject with a good deal of historical scepticism (the whole Buddha legend is reduced to a sun-myth). The jewel of the series, however, is A. Kuenen's *Religion of Israel* (2 vols. 1869-1870; in English, in the Theological Translation Fund Series, 3 vols. 1874-75). This work is the fruit of ripe and deep inquiry, and in point of clear treatment and acute criticism may well be called a masterpiece. The whole Old Testament history is critically treated in the great

and searching style of Graf's hypothesis. A gap in the series is filled by C. P. Tiele's *Comparative History of the Egyptian and Mesopotamian Religions* (1869-71), a work of learning and merit, which has been translated into French and English (the Egyptian part only, Trübner, 1882), and is to be rendered into German. The religions of the East Indian Archipelago are described by J. W. Friederich and P. J. Veth, the historian of culture, in their works on Java, Borneo, etc.

The general history of religion was first written by the admirable theologian of Leiden, Scholten, in his compendious *Geschiedenis van Godsdienst en Wijsbegeerte* ("History of Religion and Philosophy"); in the first edition the treatment was somewhat scanty, in the third (1862), it was more comprehensive and more detailed. Scholten's principal works, however, belong to the field of New Testament criticism, where his numerous books and essays give him a prominent position, and that not only in his own country. The learned biblical scholar Hoekstra also, in his work, *Bronnen en Grondslagen van het godsdienstig Geloof*, 1864 ("The Sources and Bases of Religious Belief"), makes a valuable contribution to the question as to the origin and development of religion, which he conceives to have arisen in the main from man's ideal self-consciousness. The principal representative at present of the general comparative science of religion is undoubtedly C. P. Tiele. His *Geschiedenis van den Godsdienst tot aan de herschappij der wereld godsdiensten*, 1876 ("Outlines of the History of Religion, to the spread of the Universal Religions." Translated by Dr. Carpenter. 3rd ed. 1884), is acknowledged to be, in spite of its compendious brevity, which one would often wish somewhat extended, a work of signal importance, being the first attempt to give, on the basis of detailed modern investigations, a connected view of the history of the development of the different religions (Christianity excepted), and of their mutual relation and influence on each other. In numerous papers in the *Theol. Tijdschrift* and in *De Gids*, Tiele has also published his views on the relation of the science of religion to theology, on the method of the comparative history of religion, on the essence and origin, beginning and development of religion. The views which he has also defended against the diverging theories of

others are always acute, though not always ultimately tenable. They are impugned by Hugenholtz and Rauwenhoff in able essays published in the *Theologisch Tijdschrift*.

Of the religio-philosophical tendency of æsthetic and ethical idealism, which is widely prevalent in Holland at present, we have already spoken in this volume (page 181, *sqq.*).

In France the tendency which generally prevails in the science of religion as elsewhere, is that of Comtean positivism (see p. 139, *sqq.*), and religious studies are thus led to turn away from speculative questions and to confine themselves to the comparative history of religion. In the treatment of this science, two different currents may be distinguished. In one school which proceeds on the lines of the negative illumination of the eighteenth century, the comparison of the various religions and cults subserves the irreligious tendency of a radical naturalism. Quite in the well-known manner of Dupuis, who, in the end of last century, traced the origin of all the religions to a misunderstanding of astronomy, Ozeray proposed (1846) to explain the riddles of all religious dogmas from geology, while W. Jacolliot employs his great and various reading, in a series of works which appear almost annually, to show, by a comparison of biblical and ecclesiastical ideas with extra-biblical legends (*e.g.*, of some of the gods), that the Christian faith is on a level with heathen superstition; and A. Lefèvre reaches the conclusion, in his comparative history of religions and mythologies (2d edition, 1878), that every religious belief, even that of a Renan or a Taine, in the divine and the eternal generally, is no better than a refined order of fetichism, and that we must come at last in matters religious to the declaration which is alone logical and reasonable, "*Delenda est Carthago.*" Apart from this radical school, such men as Taine and Ernest Renan represent a cold æsthetic scepticism, which declines to decide on the truth of religion or hints on occasion that all religious theories are equally untrue, but yet does not dispute its value, but allows it a value in the judgment of cultivated taste in proportion to the dignity and beauty of its appearance. Hence the sceptic Renan's avowed

preference for Roman Catholicism. This prominence of the æsthetic point of view is the secret both of the strength and of the weakness of Renan's famous historical work on primitive Christianity. The orientalist Burnouf, in his meritorious work on *The Science of Religions* (1872), maintains more strictly than these scholars the neutral ground of a purely historical collection of phenomena.

An exception to this positivist tendency, which is so generally prevalent in France, is formed by Albert Réville. In his *Prolegomena to the History of Religion* (a book which arose out of the lectures with which he entered on his professorial work in the Collège de France), he declares on the one hand his adherence to a strictly scientific method of inquiry, but at the same time professes a "very real" (not merely æsthetic) sympathy for religion, and remarks that these two positions are by no means exclusive of each other. This real love for the subject is doubtless the secret of the deeper insight into the essence of religion and the penetration into the ideal meaning of historical phenomena which make Réville's works (he has lately added to the above-mentioned works two volumes on the history of the religion of savage races) so superior to most of the works written by his fellow-countrymen on similar themes.

The Revue de l'Histoire des Religions, ably edited by M. Vernes, has for three years afforded an excellent central organ for the science of religion in France. It is a medium of discussion open to different schools (the results of biblical inquiry are also carefully noticed in it), and may thus help by degrees to reconcile conflicting tendencies and to evolve a common method of conducting discussions on religious science. In addition to Barth, the well-known Indologue, Bouché-Leclercq, Decharme, Guyard, Maspero, Réville, and other French contributors, writers of other nationalities, such as Whitney, Tiele, Kuenen, Happel, also appear in this review, which thus acquires almost the importance of an international organ.

As for the state of the science of religion in Germany, our religio-philosophical tendencies have been described above in detail, and only a few remarks now fall to be added on what is being done for the

history of religion. German science is certainly not behind that of any other country in point of industrious detailed inquiries in this field. It is only necessary to recall the names of our famous Indologists, Lassen, Benfey, Roth, Böhlingk, and Weber, out of whose school younger students have proceeded who are already famous, such as Zimmer, Oldenberg, and Deussen; then those of our Iranian scholars, Spiegel, Haug, Windischmann; of our Assyriologists, Schrader, and Delitzsch; our Arabists, Nöldecke, Weil, Sprenger, Kremer, Dieterici; our Egyptologists, Lepsius, Brugsch, Ebers; and last, but by no means least, to remember the signal achievements of German biblical criticism, both in the Old and the New Testaments, where we may name, as representing all the rest, De Wette, Baur, Ewald, and Reuss.

In the comparative history of religion, too, much has been done in Germany. The religions of the savage races have been admirably described by Waitz and Gerland; and Bastian has also collected much valuable material here. Roskoff has delineated the nature of the religion of the least cultivated peoples, and in a careful monograph has given an excellent sketch of the belief in demons in various religions. Eschatological views have been described comparatively by Henne-am-Rhyn and Spiess. Zöckler has treated the legends of creation and of the primitive state in several works. Valuable studies of the history of Semitic religion have been contributed by Baudissin, and of the history of Indo-Germanic religion by Asmus. Delf has drawn a striking parallel between Prometheus, Dionysius, Socrates, and Christ. Seydel has treated with care the parallels, long since remarked, between the Buddha legend and our Gospels, and built bold hypotheses on the comparison. A general characterisation of Buddhism in relation to Christianity was lately published by Happel.

We have fewer comprehensive works on the history of religion. The older works of Schwenk, Wuttke, Döllinger, Sepp, Peterson, are all more or less antiquated (a fate shared by my own attempt of the year 1868), and no work embracing the whole history of religion has yet appeared to replace them. Duncker's *History of Antiquity*

(6th edition), gives valuable material, but only on the period of pre-Roman antiquity. E. v. Hartmann's *Development of the Religious Consciousness* (pp. 578), contains rather philosophical views and characterisations than a complete and historically accurate view of the religions. The works of the historians of culture, Hellwald, Caspari, Scherr, Lippert, expatiate in the most various fields of the history of religion, but deal with the materials in a very arbitrary manner and in the interests of positivist and euhemeristic principles which the writers have adopted. A soberer contribution to the subject is P. v. Lilienfeld's discussion of religion according to the principle of social science. These historians, however, are generally as destitute of any philosophical ideas as the philosophers of historical reality. To work these two elements into each other, so that each may afford a basis to and cast light upon the other, such is the aim of my *Genetic-Speculative Philosophy of Religion*, which forms the contents of the two concluding volumes of this work.

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